



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your file - Votre référence

Our file - Notre référence

NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.

Canada

**TEXTS, TRANSLATORS, TRANSMISSIONS:
"ḤAYY IBN YAQẒĀN" AND ITS RECEPTION IN MUSLIM, JUDAIC
AND CHRISTIAN MILIEUX**

Parveen Hasanali

Institute of Islamic Studies
McGill University
April, 1995

A dissertation submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in
Islamic Studies

(c) Parveen Hasanali, 1995



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

ISBN 0-612-08110-9

Canada

ABSTRACT

From its inception in the twelfth century to its current use as a text, Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān* has a sustained history of translation and transmission. A unique aspect is its early translation into Hebrew around the first quarter of the fourteenth century, whose extensive manuscripts have been traced and established in this study. The Hebrew translation, and its commentary by Moses Narboni, shift the Tufaylian narrative from the Maghribi milieu toward Latin Averroism. They allow us to examine the particular reception in the Judaic milieu and suggest new perceptions of Ibn Rushd and Ibn Ṭufayl as rational mystics.

The extensive printed translations in Europe that begin with the Latin *Philosophus Autodidactus* (1671) reflect different facets on Individuality, the Natural Man and Inner Revelation as accessible to and sought by the natural theologies of the 17th-18th centuries. The concurrent translations also reflect the differences in their reception by the translators. Through the process of transmission, the notion of self-sufficiency becomes epitomized in the paradigm of "Robinson Crusoe."

In its own milieu, the narrative is conceived as an answer to Ibn Sīnā's 'secret of eastern philosophy' and is expressed as a rational-mystic response from the Maghribi context. The narrative finds its anti-thesis in Ibn al-Nafīs' reiteration, that applies the structure and content of the Tufaylian narrative to reverse its philosophical precepts and establish a normative frame of revelation. Its recent reclamation in modern Arabic literature as the proto-type of Robinson Crusoe is indicative of post-Colonial validation.

The different receptions of the narrative within each of the three milieux have inspired the application of new methodologies in literary criticism. Using the literary theories of reception and cultural paradigm in Hans Jauss and Edward Said, I further discuss the process of translation, transmission and reception of the narrative. Each milieu in a particular time-frame receives the text within certain sets of expectation and accordingly responds to it. This approach raises vital questions on both structural analyses that study an aesthetic work outside its history, and historical analyses that focus on the "unchanged loyalty" of its sources. The methodology developed in this study can be applied to central issues in Islamic thought, from the predilection toward its Greek sources to its dismissal of Averroism. It also allows for the appreciation of the integral notion of rational mysticism. The notion of reception validates, resolves and values the different reiterations by recognizing their diverse contexts.

RESUMÉ

C'est depuis sa création au douzième siècle, que le *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* de Ibn Ṭufayl fut traduit et transmis jusqu'à nos temps. Ce qui est particulier de ce texte, c'est qu'il fut déjà traduit très tôt en hébreu autour du premier quart du quatorzième siècle. C'est sur ces nombreux manuscrits que cette étude s'est penchée. Les analyses de Moses Narboni, ainsi que les copies en hébreu ont transformés la narration Tufaylienne du Maghreb à l'Avérroisme Latin. Ils nous permettent d'examiner la réception du milieu judaïque et nous suggèrent ainsi de nouvelles visions de Ibn Rushd et de Ibn Ṭufayl en tant que mystiques rationnels.

La diversité des traductions imprimées du récit en Europe, commençant avec le *Philosophus Autodidactus* (1671), offrent une nouvelle perception des différentes facettes de l'individualité, de l'homme naturel et de la "révélation directe" qui ont été recherchées par les théologies naturelles du dix-septième et du dix-huitième siècles. Les différences entre ces traductions font preuve de la variété des perceptions des traducteurs. A travers le procédé de transmission, apparaît la notion de l'auto-suffisance dans l'épître du paradigme de "Robinson Crusoë".

Dans le milieu musulman, le récit répond au "secret de la philosophie orientale" d'Ibn Sina: c'est une voix mystique-rationnelle provenant du contexte du Maghreb. Dans la réitération d'Ibn al-Nafis, le récit trouve cependant son antithèse. Il reprend les mêmes éléments et la même structure de la narration Tufaylienne mais en renverse les préceptes philosophiques pour finalement établir un dogme de la révélation. Les présentes études en littérature arabe, démontrant que le prototype Crusoen tire son origine dans la narration Tufaylienne, sous le signe d'une revalorisation post-coloniale.

Les différentes perceptions de la narration Tufaylienne dans chacun de ces trois milieux ont inspiré de nouvelles méthodologies en matière d'analyse littéraire. A partir des théories de réception et de paradigme culturel dans les oeuvres de Hans Jauss et de Edward Said, je traite des procédés de traductions, de transmissions et de réceptions du récit. Chaque milieu reçoit le texte selon ses propres attentes et, conséquemment, y répond de sa propre façon. A travers cette approche, nous pouvons questionner les analyses structurales qui étudient l'esthétique de l'oeuvre, toutes abstractions faites du contexte historique, ainsi que les analyses historiques qui se concentrent uniquement sur l'intégrité des sources. La méthodologie développée dans la présente étude peut être appliquée à plusieurs questions de la pensée islamique, depuis la prédilection pour les sources grecques jusqu'à la réjection de l'Avérroisme. Elle offrent aussi une description intégrale de la notion du mystique rationnel. Enfin, la notion de réception permet d'établir, de résoudre et d'apprécier les différentes réitérations en reconnaissant la diversité des contextes.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to sincerely thank my supervisor, Dr. Hermann Landolt who has been my mentor and teacher since I began my studies in Islamic thought. His extensive knowledge is tempered with his generosity to share it without reservation.

I would also like to thank all the libraries who responded to my queries on the Hebrew manuscripts, and the archival material on the early English translators, as well as the Faculty of Graduate Studies for awarding me a research grant to pursue my research on the Hebrew manuscripts and the early translators at Columbia University and the Jewish Theological Seminary at New York. The resources and staff at these institutions provided considerable aid to my research.

I would like to particularly thank the Institute of Islamic Studies, and the members of my dissertation committee.

My personal debts are many, especially when the count-down began: my colleagues at St. Thomas University, especially Dr. Michael George and Dorothy Turner for their valuable suggestions and support; Steve Mellier for assisting me with the translations of the early catalogues; Jean-François Boily for his assistance with the French abstract, and the Faculty of Arts Computer Lab at McGill and all those who work there, Kim, Robert, Rajan.... Finally, of course, I would like to thank the person who matters the most, my partner, spouse, colleague, Dr. Aziz Talbani.

PREFACE

Frames of references:

I have used the terms *Muslim* or *Islamic*, *Jewish* or *Judaic*, and *Christian* to denote the presuppositions, the repertoires and the paradigms that derive from the overall culture of each of these milieux. This is not to assume or reject the individual reiterations, but to underline that these individual reiterations come from, respond to or react against their particular milieu. Further, their use emphasizes the religious culture, ethos or value system as the primary, but not the only exclusive framework within which these terms are used. Neither is the use of these terms meant to assign them a monolithic meaning. Even within a relatively short time-frame, assigned views are often challenged. Their general use does not denote the norm or the alternative, but reflects the ethos that a culture or religion subscribes to at a given time and period and the questions that are seen as central during that particular time.

The use of single quotation marks generally indicates an allusion to a specialized use of the term in the critical or literary theories that are applied in the analysis, for example 'meaning'; or to specify the use from a particular subject area such as falsafah, or a prevalent critique in scholarship, for example, the notion of 'originality'. Terms such as falsafah or Maghribi are integrated into the English text.

Calendars: Since the study deals with different religious traditions following different calendars, the common era dates have been used as the standard. I also include the dates of the Hijri and Jewish calendar wherever necessary. When two calendars are indicated, the common practise of indicating the Hijri date, followed

by the common era date is used. Similarly, the dates of the Jewish calendar are first given, and the common era date is followed in parenthesis, for example 12 Tebet 5122 (=December 10, 1361). Some of the cataloguers (such as Zotenberg) use the Julian calendar. In these cases, we have retained the j.c. date in lieu of the c.e.

Transliteration: Arabic transliteration follows the standard indicated by the Institute of Islamic Studies, with some exceptions. Hebrew transliteration generally follows the standard of the *Jewish Encyclopedia*. Wherever citing particular references, the system used by their authors is retained. This especially applies to the description of the early catalogues entries of the Hebrew manuscripts that used different systems. In the same manner, the lexicography of older German and English has been retained. The [sic] formula has been used only to indicate inaccurate information or obvious errors. I have thus retained the language as used in the early printed translations and other works as well as the manuscript catalogues.

Proper Names, Places:

Arabic names are transliterated but the definite article has been dropped when it occurs at the beginning of a name (ex. Fārābī). The standard English spellings have been used with Jewish names, (ex. Moses Narboni, instead of Mosheh ha-Narbon). In the case of Ibn Rushd, we have used the names (Ibn Rushd and Averroes) interchangeably, preferring the former but using the latter when the context entails such a perception, or when citing a scholar utilizing it.

The standard English spelling is followed for names of places, with some exceptions; for example, Biblioteca de Torino when referring to the library, but Turin when referring to the manuscripts.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	ii
Resumé	iii
Acknowledgement	iv
Preface	v
Table of Contents	vii
 Chapter 1: Introduction	 1
The purpose of the present study	4
The significance of the study	6
Primary Sources utilized	10
 Endnotes to Chapter 1	 14
 Chapter 2: Theoretical perspectives and literary critiques	 19
Samuel Chew to Norman Daniel	20
New methodological considerations	22
Reception and reader-response theories	24
Edward Said and orientalism	28
Translation and transmission as modes of reference	32
Translation as decoding the meaning of the narrative	39
 Critical approaches to the Tufaylian narrative	 40
Léon Gauthier	41
Mohammed Arkoun	42
Sami S. Hawi	47
Lenn E. Goodman	50
Malti-Douglas	53
 Summation	 59
 Endnotes to Chapter 2	 60

Chapter 3: The story and its sequels: Transference in the Muslim milieu	72
Section I: Ibn Ṭufayl and the Avicennan connection	72
The Hermetic version of ‘Salāmān and Absāl’	79
Ṭūsī’s summary of the Avicennan ‘Salāmān and Absāl’	82
Jāmī’s ‘Salāmān and Absāl’	86
Ibn Ṭufayl and Suhrawardī	89
Ḥikāyah Dhū al-Qarnayn	92
The Himyarite story in the literary history of transmission	98
Summation of the narrative precedents	103
Section II: Approaches within Andalusian Islam	106
The revisionist transmission by Ibn al-Nafīs	106
Ibn al-Khaṭīb and rational mysticism	122
Section III: Ibn Ṭufayl in the context of falsafah	126
The question of the prologue	126
The prologue and historical record	129
The critique of Ibn Ṭufayl’s predecessors’ in the prologue	130
The prologue in relation to Ibn Ṭufayl’s main narrative	133
Summation of the debate on the prologue	138
The role of the intellectual in the Ṭufaylian narrative	139
The Philosopher as a stranger to society	141
Rational mysticism and its development from Ibn Bājjah to Ibn Rushd	144
The I-land as a return to the self	146
Endnotes to Chapter 3	149
 Chapter 4: The Hebrew manuscripts: Translation and commentary . .	171
Introduction: The Arabo-Hebrew Tradition	171
Moses Narboni, the Hebrew commentator	174
The genesis of early scholarship on <i>Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān</i>	180
The Hebrew translation and commentary	189
The Hebrew translation, its authorship and date	190
The Hebrew commentary, its author, date	190
Dates of the extant Hebrew manuscripts	191

Logistics regarding the Hebrew Manuscripts	192
The Paris manuscripts (BN)	192
The New York manuscript	197
The Vatican manuscripts	198
The Bodleian manuscripts	200
The Leiden manuscript	201
The Turin manuscript	202
The Vienna manuscript	203
The Berlin manuscript	204
The Leipzig manuscript	205
The Munich manuscripts	206
The Mantua manuscript	208
The Parma manuscripts	208
The Guenzburg manuscript.	210
The Cambridge manuscripts	210
Summation	211
Endnotes to Chapter 4	214
 Chapter 5: The Hebrew Commentaries and their Commentator: the background, context and reception	 234
Introduction	234
The philosophical precepts	236
The background of the falsafah	237
Averroism revisited	242
The Averroen Narboni	248
Narboni and rational mysticism	252
Summation: Narboni's reception	263
Endnotes to Chapter 5	266
 Chapter 6: The transmission of <i>Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān</i> in the Western Christian Tradition	 276
Introduction	276
How Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān was destined to become an Englishman	277
<i>Philosophus Autodidactus</i>	278
George Keith and the Inner Light:	284
The development of Keith's theological career	285
Keith's <i>Advertisement</i> to the Tufaylian translation	288

Keith's theology and the Tufaylian narrative	290
The reception of the Tufaylian narrative in formative	
Quaker theology	292
George Ashwell and the Indian Prince	297
Ashwell's <i>Preface</i> and the <i>Theologus Ruris</i>	298
The <i>Preface</i> : An explication of the Divine mirror of nature	301
Simon Ockley	305
Back to the source - Ockley's translation from the Arabic .	311
Ockley's <i>Preface</i> , the <i>Booksellers' Introduction</i> and the	
<i>Appendix</i>	313
The contents of Ockley's <i>Appendix</i>	315
Prologue and Afterwords: a summation	321
 Orientalism revisited: Appropriation and the Robinsonades	326
Daniel Defoe	326
Toward the Robinsonade	330
The <i>History of Josephus</i>	330
<i>Don Trezzanio</i>	332
Imaginary voyages and discovered "islands"	335
 Summation	338
 Endnotes to Chapter 6	340
 Chapter 7: Conclusion	357
The reception of the narrative in the Muslim milieu	359
The reception of the narrative in the Judaic milieu	367
The reception of the narrative in the Christian milieu	370
Lines of transmission for independent study	373
The Arabo-Spanish reception	373
Ibn Tufayl's reception in modern Arab literature	378
Other lines of transmission	379
 Summation	380
 Endnotes to Chapter 7	384
 Bibliography	386

Chapter 1: Introduction

Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* has a unique history of criticism. Although other works have been attributed to its author,¹ this text is the only major one that is extant, beside some excerpts of poetry.² Yet, it has had a great impact in its own milieu and in the Western European tradition. The Arabic *philosophus autodidactus* was widely translated from the thirteenth century onward into several languages, including Hebrew, Latin, German, Spanish, Dutch, French, Russian, Persian and Urdu.

*Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*³ is a philosophical narrative written in Arabic in the twelfth century. It is the story of a child who is born of the earth with neither a father nor a mother through a process of spontaneous generation.⁴ In a second version of Ḥayy's birth, he is born to a princess through a union that is not known to her brother, ruler and prince. Fearing his anger, the princess casts the child into the seas in an ark which lands on an island uninhabited by humans or predatory animals. The child (*Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān - Living son of the Aware*) is rescued and nurtured initially by a gazelle. Ḥayy thus grows up without human intervention. Through seven stages of seven years, he relives what is essentially the evolution of humankind: discovers fire, develops tools and domesticates animals, contemplates the stars, forms a notion of the universe and experiences the Divine Reality through scientific experimentation, rational speculation and spiritual exercises. Ḥayy, the mystic who has attained knowledge of the Divine then encounters a traveller, Absāl who had left his society in search of solitude whereby he could ponder the inner meaning of the revealed religion. On discovering the commonality in their understanding of the Divine, Ḥayy and Absāl venture back in order to convey such knowledge to the society that Absāl

had left earlier. This society is ruled by Salāmān, a virtuous leader who followed the letter of the law. Hayy is confounded by the materialism of the populace. He explains his experience to Salāmān and a group of his associates who do not understand it. In the final analysis, fearing that they might corrupt the beliefs of Salāmān and his friends, Hayy and Absāl return to the island.

The primary subject matter of the narrative might be termed as 'rational mysticism', structured on the premises of Greek philosophy and Islamic mysticism. However, the form of this work can be seen as a tale of initiation (*récit initiatique*). Since the narrative does not utilize the didactic form associated with peripatetic treatises, it is generally not given the same status in terms of its philosophy. When situating Ibn Ṭufayl and his contribution to Islamic thought, most historians of philosophy discuss him primarily in the context of the prologue with which the story of *Hayy ibn Yaqzān* begins. The prologue is a presentation of the history of philosophy and related sciences in Andalusia (North Africa and Spain), the native land of the author. It includes an analysis of the teachings and contribution of Ibn Ṭufayl's predecessors and contemporaries such as Fārābī (d. 339/950), Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) and Ibn Bājjah (d. 533/1139).

The narrative has been praised for its literary felicity and is viewed as exemplary of Arabic prose. However, the 'fictional' form of the story that follows the prologue has often been under-estimated in terms of its intellectual contribution. The 'fictive' form of the narrative is the basis for the unconscious but biased focus on the prologue, while analyzing Ibn Ṭufayl and his contribution to philosophy.⁵ Thus, a limitation imposed by critics in their appraisal of *Hayy ibn Yaqzān* arises from its literary form. Given that the content takes a definitive philosophical stance, the aesthetic aspect is often perceived as a barely disguised allegory.⁶

In concluding the narrative, Ibn Ṭufayl informs his readers that the tale of *Hayy ibn Yaqzān*, *Salāmān and Absāl* includes hidden secrets not found in

other writings or oral traditions, but known to those who have knowledge of God. He has thrown some light on these secrets through writing the story. The secrets confided in these pages remain covered by a "fine veil" (*hijāb latīf*) that can be easily uncovered by those who are prepared, but would thicken and remain impenetrable to those who are not.⁷ The "thin veil" that the participatory reader must penetrate to discern the true meaning of the narrative is shorn of its spiritual implications, if it is considered as the genre of the tale by the critic.⁸ Ibn Ṭufayl makes a distinction between the "experience" of Ḥayy and its symbolic cloaking in images as presented in scriptures. The crux of his presentation is lost if one perceives "the thin veil" as the story rather than the inexplicable experience of the Divine. Ḥayy does not represent the experience of the reader - Ḥayy (or Salāmān or Absāl) is the experience of the reader. The creative combination of the methods of literature and philosophy by Ibn Ṭufayl is either ignored or reduced by this focus on one discipline at the expense of the other.⁹

Studies on Ibn Ṭufayl in the general history of Islamic thought have outlined the following issues, i) the role of the philosopher in society; ii) the harmony between reason and revelation; and iii) the critique of the intellectual sciences as presented in the prologue. These issues are addressed in the studies by Mohammed Arkoun and Michael Marmura.¹⁰ In some other cases, Ibn Ṭufayl's originality as a philosopher is valued on his ability to structure his presentation despite his *borrowed* sources. Thus, the measure of his genius is reflected in his ability to put 'borrowed' sources to such good use, rather than in terms of his creativity!¹¹ Likewise, it is expressed in the tendency to compare him with later Western thinkers, from Descartes to Dewey.¹² There has also been some interest and perhaps fascination in later European transmissions and recent Arab studies¹³ to relate *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* to Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*. This proclivity, its validity and historical recurrence will be examined in chapters two and six of the dissertation.¹⁴

My earlier study raised questions regarding the authorship of the prologue.

If it was not written by Ibn Ṭufayl, the debate on sources (the subject of several critiques) is put to question, since it primarily hinges on the citation of his predecessors in the prologue. The work is primarily a textual study that looks at Ibn Ṭufayl afresh as a thinker in his own right and draws attention to the original and radical aspects of his thought. It analyzes the focus text as literature and philosophy to reflect its aesthetic value in both the disciplines. It examines the major literary and philosophical themes of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* and discusses how one might 'read' the narrative in terms of genre. It also compares the narrative by Ibn Ṭufayl to other uses of the *récit d'initiation* by Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī and the *Kitāb al-ʿĀlim w'al-ghulām* generally attributed to Ibn al-Hawshab Maṣṣūr al-Yaman (d. 302/914).¹⁵

The purpose of the present study:

The present dissertation aims to study *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* not just as *explication de texte* or an assessment of the text in itself, but to trace the manner in which the narrative has been transmitted in the Islamic, Judaic and Christian traditions. This includes its endorsement within religious and mystical spheres as well as literary, popular and intellectual domains. Despite the fact that not much is known of the impact of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* in its own time, its popularity and later dissemination is tremendous.

This study is concerned with the process of transmission of a set of ideas and forms primarily through the mode of translation into universal and particular contexts. To what extent does the primary source survive in translation and in what manner does it contribute to the retrieval of new meaning from a shift in its cultural and linguistic environment? How does each of the translators receive the text in different religious contexts, and how is the text transformed in this process? What happens to a text and its author when they are appropriated in a different context? Does the translation produce 'side-effects' in the different cultures in which it is transmitted? How valid is it to 'connect' seemingly

disparate developments in philosophy and religion to the primary text? What is the means between reducing an aesthetic work to the sum of its influences or to a text-based analysis? These questions are the starting point in the analysis of the focus text and its transmission in all the three milieux.

While one might surmise that Ibn Ṭufayl influenced and affected his contemporaries and thinkers who came much after him, there has been no study that has assessed the various dimensions of these transmissions. An early study by Antonio Pastor examined some of the European translations of the narrative.¹⁶ More recent studies in the nineteen seventies and early eighties by Lenn Goodman and Sami Hawi indicate the parallels and influences of Ibn Ṭufayl in post-Enlightenment western thinkers in relation to the development of modern disciplines. These approaches are limited by a lack of contextual integrity, further underlining the need to study the process of transmission. The dissemination and appropriation of the Tufaylian narrative can be underscored within a framework of translation and transmission. However, it is problematic to draw parallels between medieval thought and post-Renaissance Cartesian western thought, without establishing the genesis of the western transmission of the text.

The present study is divided into seven chapters

1. An Introduction to the study as discussed in this chapter.
2. The theoretical framework of the study including
 - i) a methodological consideration of literary theory and how it is applied to the current study primarily using some aspects of *reception theory*;¹⁷
 - ii) a literature review on the various approaches to the study of the focus text.
3. The impact of the focus text in the Muslim context.
 - i) an examination of the archetypal reiteration of Ḥayy, Salāmān and Absāl in Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Ṭufayl, Suhrawardī (1152-1191), Jāmī (1414-1492) and earlier Greek models;
 - ii) an evaluation of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* in relation to the anti-thesis by Ibn

- al-Nafīs (1210-88);
 - iii) the critique by historian-critic Ibn al-Khaṭīb (d. 1374), who also hailed from the Maghribi-Andalusi tradition;
 - iv) the manner in which Ibn Ṭufayl has been understood by the historian, Marrākushī (b. 1185 c.e.) and its contribution to the debate on the prologue;
 - (v) an assessment of Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy in relation to his predecessors referred to in the prologue, its contradictions with the main text and the question of the authorship of the prologue;
 - (vi) fundamental motifs of the Tufaylian narrative in relation to the Muslim milieu, such as the role of the intellectual, the role of the ascetic and the island motif.
4. The early Hebrew translations of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* and its commentary by Moses Narboni, including an assessment of extant manuscripts.
 5. An analysis of the themes raised by the fourteenth-century Hebrew commentator, Moses Narboni and their repercussions on the association of Averroism with rational mysticism.
 6. The influence of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* through the printed translation in Europe from the seventeenth century and the different approaches that have been taken such as a) the self-taught philosopher; b) the focus on 'Inner Light' and 'Immediate Revelation' by the Quakers; c) Natural theology; d) literary plagiarism and e) the Robinsonade.
 7. Conclusions: an analysis of the main findings of the study and suggestions for further research.

The significance of the study

Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* had a considerable impact beyond the milieu and civilization within which it was written. Since a) not much was known about Ibn Ṭufayl, b) the subject matter had universal appeal and c) access to the text was

effected through translations, many of these developments tended to be independent of the context of the narrative, and in some cases, even verve in a direction that was distant from its original articulation.

To provide a historical interpretation of the process of transmission, one must begin with the premise of the primary reception of the narrative itself in its aesthetic and interpretive modes. Prior research by this author has analyzed the narrative in terms of form and content, literature and philosophy, thus reflecting the literary tradition and the social and the historical context of its articulation.¹⁸ In the current study, the focus is laid on the further transmission of the narrative through translations and commentaries. Chapter two of this study will establish the theoretical frame and the application of literary criticism to the process of transmission. It will underline how to avoid the reduction of the focus text either in terms of its 'sources' or 'influences,' approaches that are especially prevalent given the impact of the text. Using the notion of reception, it will reflect on the different contexts from which it arose and in which it was received by translators and those who co-opted it within their native cultures. It will also present a literature review that analyzes the various critical approaches to the narrative.

With regard to the impact of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* in the Muslim context which is the focus of chapter three, the study will examine several aspects that have not drawn the attention of scholars. In section I, the reiteration of the 'tale' will be seen in the context of its precedents including earlier Greek tales, *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* and *Salāmān and Absāl* by Ibn Sīnā, as well as later applications by Suhrawardī and Jāmī.

The examination of the theological anti-thesis by Ibn al-Nafīs, that is the focus of section II of chapter three, will contribute to understanding how the text of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* was received and responded to as an anti-thesis. Section II will also examine the literary analysis by a fellow Andalusian, Ibn al-Khaṭīb that has been generally neglected by scholars. Ibn al-Khaṭīb's critique makes a valuable contribution to recognizing *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* in its geographical context.

This analysis restores the spiritual integrity of the focus text, whose fluid transmission otherwise allows it to easily accommodate the various compartments of philosophical and literary approaches.

Section III will address the philosophical issues raised by a comparison of the prologue to the main text that might explain some of the so-called ‘confused’ historical statements by Marrākushī and other students of Ibn Ṭufayl. It will also explore the central themes of the narrative, such as the role of the intellectual, the philosopher-ascetic and the island motif.

The earliest translation of the text was rendered into Hebrew in the thirteenth or fourteenth century, to which a commentary by Moses Narboni was written in the mid-fourteenth century. Interestingly, there are over twenty manuscripts of the Hebrew translation and commentary that have generally been neglected in the earlier studies on *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*. Chapters four and five trace and establish the manuscripts of the Hebrew translation and commentary and examine some of the prevalent issues evoked by the commentator. The early studies by Solomon Munk and Léon Gauthier had only mentioned the existence of the four Parisian manuscripts. Later monographs on Ibn Ṭufayl’s *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* by Goodman and Hawi did not provide any further details on the Hebrew translation and commentary. Until the recent works by Maurice Hayoun on Moses Narboni in Jewish Studies, there have only been some brief articles or scattered citations of the Hebrew translation and commentary of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*.¹⁹ Scholars in Islamic Studies themselves have not undertaken any further research into this area and remain unaware for the most part of the extent of this channel of transmission of the Arabic narrative. Given its extensive usage by Hebrew scholars of the fifteenth century following the movement of Jews from Spain to Italy, Germany and France, and the further demarcation from the earlier Arabo-Spanish Maghribi culture with the Christianization of Spain, it is crucial to see how the translated text and its commentary shifted in terms of context and content.

The narrative was further contextualized by its later reception in seventeenth century Christian Europe. The European transmission of the focus text and its repercussions, dealt with in chapter six, take off from the first printed version. The Arabic text was first edited and translated into Latin in 1671 by Edward Pococke Jr., librarian at the Bodleian, Oxford. It became the starting point for the European transmission and the standard source for subsequent translations into various languages. George Keith, the translator of the first English edition (1674) from the Latin, was a leading member of the Quakers in Britain and an influential if controversial figure among the early settlers in North America. Keith recognized parallels between Quaker philosophies and that of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* especially in relation to "Immediate Revelation." The list of the other illustrious translators is long. A salient feature is that most of the translations were recognized by their exponents as being empathic to their own areas of reflection and interest and were not undertaken to merely provide access to a literary work written in another language.

In the process of transmission, the access to the original sources or languages was often severed. Thus, further research by non Islamicist scholars (such as Antonio Pastor, 1930) with regard to the translations into western languages was necessarily restricted. As a scholar of Spanish literature, Pastor was able to draw together the two separate lines of eastern and western transmission by assuming the Arabo-Spanish background, by perceiving the role of the narrative in relation to the spirituality of the Quakers and by alluding to a connection with the development of the English novel (Robinson Crusoe). However, he was unable to relate the narrative to either Islamic spirituality or the *falsafah* context from which it evolved. Chapter six will also examine anonymous appropriated texts during the rise of realistic novel in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the development of the Robinsonades.²⁰

Primary Sources utilized

Included in this category are unpublished manuscripts, archival material, early catalogues and other early studies that are not readily available. Beside such primary material, I also expended considerable effort in tracing and further perusing background material and period studies from all three religious traditions in which the focus text was received and transmitted. Given below is a brief introduction of the various types of primary sources utilized whose details will be further explicated in the relevant chapters.

1. Hebrew Manuscripts

Several Hebrew manuscripts of the Tufaylian narrative including its translation and commentary were examined. Other Hebrew commentaries (manuscripts) by Moses Narboni on the works of Muslim thinkers such as Ibn Rushd, Ghazālī and Ibn Bājjah were also examined. A major aspect of the research was devoted to gleaning information about the manuscripts and their current status, and then examining several of the manuscripts themselves. A comprehensive list and descriptions of the manuscripts will be undertaken in chapter three. I would like to acknowledge the generosity of the various institutions that provided me access to their manuscripts and other early material.

2. Early printed catalogues and bio-bibliographies

Most of the printed library catalogues that listed the Hebrew manuscripts belong to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and were written in several European languages, such as Latin, German and Italian. Some of them had more than one version compiled. Most of these early catalogues belonged to rare book sections, special collections or reference sections with limited access. The catalogue entries of the Hebrew manuscript were examined to ascertain their accuracy. The current research in chapter three notes and updates much of the information therein.

The bio-bibliographical works by Moritz Steinschneider (1816-1907) were

also examined in detail and provide invaluable sources for the variety of material available on the Hebrew translation, its fourteenth century commentary of *Hayy ibn Yaqzān* and their further impact and transmission in Jewish thought from the fifteenth century onwards. These resources indicate a parallel stream of development that sprang from Hebrew translations of Arabic manuscripts, similar to the phenomenon of Averroism that resulted from the Latin translations of Arabic manuscripts, but guided in each case by its particular reception in the religio-cultural context.

3. Early printed translations

Searches were undertaken to trace the early printed translations from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that were located in rare book sections and special collections of various libraries such as the Islamic Studies and Osler Libraries at McGill University, Montreal, Butler Library at Columbia University, the Jewish Theological Seminary Library and the Union Theological Seminary Library at New York, and the Harriet Irving Library at St. Thomas University and the University of New Brunswick, Fredericton. The Latin and English translators and translations by Edward Pococke Jr. (1671) George Keith (1674) and George Ashwell (1686) are the focus of chapter six. The other early translators and translations are cited wherever necessary.

4. Anonymous appropriations

Two appropriated and summarized version of the Tufaylian narrative written in English were also studied in themselves and in their relation to the shift in paradigm that may be perceived by their possible reiteration in Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*. These appropriated texts are examined in chapter six. They are *The History of Josephus* (1696)²¹ and *The Life and Surprising Adventures of Don Antonio de Trezzanio, Who was Self-educated, and Lived Forty-five Years in an Uninhabited Island in the East-Indies.*(1761)²²

5. Other works by the translators and their contemporaries

- a) The translation of the Tufaylian narrative, Christian theological and polemical tracts on Quaker works by George Keith (1639?-1716). Works on Quaker theology by Robert Barclay (1648-1690).
- b) Historical and archival material on the early Quaker movement in Britain and the Anglican missions in North America, including letters, Keith's journal and records on Keith's mission in North America with John Talbot (1645-1727).²³
- b) Biographical and background studies by contemporaries of the European translators, such as the biography on Edward Pococke Sr. by Leonard Twells, the reports by Isaac Disraeli (1766-1848) on Simon Ockley, the polemical study on Muḥammad by Humphrey Prideaux (1648-1724) and the historical works by Edward Gibbon (1737-1794).
- c) Archival material and early works of Simon Ockley (1648-1720), including the first English translation of the narrative from the Arabic.

6. Writers influenced by the Tufaylian narrative.

We examined archival material, early cross-references to the narrative or to its influence on particular writers, early editions and descriptive catalogues on the works of Daniel Defoe (*ca.* 1661-1731), Balthasar Gracian (1601-1658), and Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677).

It is impossible to list all sources that this study utilizes but is important to indicate and acknowledge at least those sources that required considerable effort in obtaining and those academic institutions that provided access to these materials. For the process of research that is based on an inter-relation between text and reader to occur, these texts have to be retained in time, received anew and reproduced anew. It is a recognition of this process on which this dissertation and its analysis rests.

This study intends to look at how the focus text was further received through the process of translation and appropriation. It will attempt to deconstruct and separate the past (through the text as written) and near past

(through translations) and the present (current approaches by critics). What were the meanings intended by its author and which ones (if any) were made concrete through reception? By attempting to address such issues, it will indicate how the leap between the past and present is bridged and thus recognize the inter-relations between the received texts that would otherwise remain unresolved by sheer reason of their incompatibility outside the historical context of their reception. The study also recognizes that the receptions of the text are grounded in their particular contexts and have to be analyzed on such terms.

Since the developments within the different disciplines have come about almost independent of each other, the very task of collecting information poses a problem. The range and influence of Ibn Ṭufayl's text underlines the need for an interdisciplinary approach that would allow the critic to examine the different aspects of the various transmissions. The value of such a study lies in its attempt to link these different developments together and examine their relation to each other as well as their independent evolution within the different social context from which they spring. It hopes to serve the needs of Islamicists by drawing their attention to developments of which they are unaware and to indicate to the non-Islamicist the context and contribution of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* towards the development of different strands of thought.

Endnotes to Chapter 1

1. The closest contemporary source on Ibn Ṭufayl's biography may be found in 'Abd al-Wāḥid ibn 'Alī al-Marrākushī (b. 581/1185), *Al-mu'jib fī talkhīs akhbār al-Maghrib*, ed. Muḥammad Sa'īd and Muḥammad al-'Arabī al-'Alamī (Cairo: Maṭba'at al-Istiḳāmah, 1949), 306-307. It has been translated into French by E. Fagnon, *Histoire des Almohades d'Abd el-Wāḥid Merrākechi* (Algiers: Adolphe Jourdan, 1893) (Marrākushī, *Histoire*). The Almohad historian, Marrākushī refers to another major work by Ibn Ṭufayl entitled *Kitāb al-nafs* which had been shown to him by Ibn Ṭufayl's son, Yahya. To our knowledge, this text is no longer extant and is sometimes considered as an alternative title of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*. For a discussion of the issues surrounding the existence of the *Kitāb al-nafs*, see Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's 'Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān': an analytical study*, M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1987, 14-17.

2. Three poems on the soul and spiritual awareness have been preserved in Marrākushī's account on Ibn Ṭufayl in the *Histoire (Mu'jib)*, 208-209, and are cited by Antonio Pastor, *The Idea of Robinson Crusoe* (Watford: Gongora Press, 1930), 81, 85-86. Other poetry attributed to Ibn Ṭufayl include a lengthy medical poem of over seven thousand verses and a political piece. For a discussion of these poems, see Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's 'Ḥayy*, 11-13, nos. 35-37.

3. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy ben Yaqdhân: roman philosophique d'Ibn Thofaïl*, ed./tr. Léon Gauthier, 2nd ed. (1936; rpt. Paris: J Vrin, 1984). Unless otherwise noted, this Arabic edition (henceforth Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*) has been used.

4. One might analyze Ḥayy's birth through the process of spontaneous generation as having at least two dimensions. The first aspect that is universally recognized focuses on the scientific description of how it is possible for a human being to be born without human parents. This idea draws from the "theory of humours" that sees the temperament of all human beings as composed of a ratio of four elements: earth, fire, water and air. The ratio of these elements account for varying human nature. In the Tufaylian narrative, the balance of these four elements occurs in a fermenting mass of clay on an island located in the centre of the world. The rare possibility of such equilibrium allowed a tiny bubble in the centre of this clay mass to develop into human form and be graced by the spirit that enlivens it.

Beside Ibn Ṭufayl's application of the theory of humours to include the notion of the spirit, the second dimension of spontaneous generation links Ḥayy's birth as being "of the earth", much like the primal myth of Adam's creation. Thus, the parallel to the prophets of the Islamic tradition link the events surrounding Ḥayy's birth to Adam and Moses.

5. See for example Muhsin Mahdi, *Philosophical Literature*, in *Religion, Learning and Science in the 'Abbasid Period*, ed. M. J. L. Young, J. D. Latham and R. B. Serjeant. (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 76-105. After a brief introduction and section on Fārābī, Mahdi discusses the theme of *The Philosopher and the City*, basing his entire discussion on the prologue and including a discussion of Ibn Ṭufayl's views of his predecessors. One can understand why the prologue is so attractive to historians of philosophy since this single write-up allows us to situate the main proponents of medieval thought and outline some of the problems that arose around the study of philosophy. Ibn Ṭufayl's main narrative also makes a significant contribution to 'philosophical literature,' but the analysis of its 'philosophy' in terms other than the prologue is generally ignored.

6. The primacy of philosophy in such analyses is deeply grounded in the negative association of the allegory. The excessive use (by Ghazālī) of descriptive images (*amthāl*), symbols (*ramz*) and allusion (*ishārah*) are derided in the prologue that critiques the ensuing 'confusion'. See Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 4-5. Any discussion of allegory has to distinguish between its pejorative uses versus its rich literary repertory in relation to symbolic works of writers such as Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī and Ibn Ṭufayl. We have addressed this question in some detail in our earlier study, Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy*, (1987). Another study draws attention to the diverse use of the allegory as a method of analysis, the necessity of recognizing the terms on which the Islamic use of allegory is grounded as well as the question of "fiction" versus the "analytic discourse". Peter Heath, *Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā)* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 7.

7. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 155-56.

8. S. Hawi, *Islamic Naturalism and Mysticism: A Philosophical Study of Ibn Ṭufayl's 'Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān'* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), 30-31, 36-40. In keeping with his general thesis on the centrality of "philosophy" as opposed to "symbolism" in *Ḥayy*, Hawi considers the 'story' to be the veil referred to by Ibn Ṭufayl. See also H. Fradkin, *Ibn Ṭufayl's 'Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān': On the Relationship of Mysticism, Prophecy and Philosophy*, Diss. University of Chicago, 1978, 13-15; Fradkin suggests the possibility of the literary "veil" (*hijāb*) used by Ibn Ṭufayl in the first instance as "something essentially external, artificial and unitary" but qualifies "however that an uncommon work like *Ḥayy* employs common terms in uncommon ways." See also G. F. Hourani, *The Principal Subject of Ibn Ṭufayl's 'Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān'*, *JNES* (1956), Vol. 15, no. 1, 40-46. The thesis of this article is to indicate the centrality of "the ascent of unaided human reason to mystical knowledge" and to refute Gauthier's view about the climax of the story being contained in the latter section of *Ḥayy*'s encounter with Absāl and society. However, its reiteration that the "thin veil refers to the fable form in which the main message is cast" (p. 42) circumscribes its analysis.

Similar assumptions have guided the interpretation of Ibn Sīnā's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, leading to two representative approaches by Henry Corbin and Amélie Marie Goichon;

whether it reflects Ibn Sīnā's secret oriental philosophy (that he alludes to in his other works) being written as a *récit d'initiation* as Corbin indicated; or whether it is in line with Ibn Sīnā's overall peripatetic philosophy despite utilizing the 'fictional' form, as Goichon argued. See Goichon, *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, *Encyclopædia of Islam*, 2nd ed., 1964, (henceforth= *EI*²), III: 331. See also G. C. Anawati, *Gnose et philosophie à propos du Récit de Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān de A.M. Goichon*, *Cahier de Civilisation Médiévale*, 1963, VI année, no. 2; rpt. in *Études de philosophie musulmane* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1974), 160-173. Anawati analyzes the two perspectives and sums up the whole debate. An alternative that Heath suggests is to focus on the relationship between the literary and philosophical modes of discourse before clarifying the parallel dichotomies of the doctrinal or rhetorical modes. Cf. Heath, *Allegory*, 8.

9. *Op. cit.* Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy*, 3, 86-88, 117-20, 141-47, 162-69. The recognition of the narrative as both literature and philosophy and its absence in critical analyses of the Tufaylian narrative was the *leitmotif* of the above study.

10. Chapter two deals with specific critiques of the narrative including the study by M. Arkoun, *Ibn Ṭufayl ou le philosophe dans la cité almohade*, *Les Africains*, VI (1977), 263-287. Chapter three cites Marmura's analysis in relation to Ibn Ṭufayl and his predecessors; see M. E. Marmura, *The Islamic Philosophers' Conception of Islam*, in *Islam's Understanding of Itself*, ed. R. Hovannisian and S. Vyonis, Jr. (California: Undena Publications, 1983), 87-102; *The Philosopher and Society: Some Medieval Arabic discussions*, *Arab Studies Quarterly*, I, no. 4 (1979), 309-323.

11. See Léon Gauthier, *Ibn Thofāil, sa vie et ses oeuvres* (Paris: Leroux, 1909), 67, 85-89. The first monograph on Ibn Ṭufayl was written by Gauthier. Its early date and the prevalence of historical positivism as the primary mode of understanding at the time makes the questions of its *originality* and *borrowed* sources in terms of the story and its philosophy central to Gauthier's analysis. The study otherwise makes valuable contributions that remain the basis of later scholarship. The attribution of sources becomes a bone of contention with other scholars such as Garcia Gomez, Gauthier's most virulent critic, as discussed further in chapter three; Garcia Gomez, *Un cuento árabe, fuente común de Abentofáil y de Gracián*, *Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas y Museos*, XXX (1926), 1-66, 241-269. Gauthier responds to Garcia Gomez's critique in the introduction to his second edition of the text; *L'originalité d'Ibn Thofāil dans son roman philosophique*, in *Ḥayy*, V-XXII.

12. Studies that render such interpretations include those by Lenn Goodman and Sami S. Hawi; *op. cit.* Hawi, *Islamic Naturalism*; Goodman, *Introduction*, in *Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān: A Philosophical Study* (1972; 2nd. ed. Los Angeles: Gee Tee Bee Publs., 1983). See chapter two for further details on these perspectives.

13. See Farouk Saad, *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* (Beirut: Dār al-afāq al-jadīdah, 1978). In the introduction to this Arabic edition, Saad discusses various modern disseminations of the narrative in the Arab world through popular drama, poetry and art that reflect what one

might perceive as Robinsonade elements. See also Nawal Hassan, *Hayy bin Yaqzan and Robinson Crusoe: A Study of an Early Arabic Impact on English Literature* (Baghdad: Al-Rashid House for Publication, 1980), 132, no. 8. Some studies that address the interrelation between *Hayy* include Hasan Mahmud Abbas, *Hayy ibn Yaqzān wa Rubinsun Kuruzu dirāsah muqāranah* (Beirut: al-Mu'assasah al-'Arabīyah, 1983); 'Umar Farrukh, *The Arab Genius in Science and Philosophy*, tr. John Hardie (Washington: Edward Bros., 1954), 103; A. Misrati, *Ibn Ṭufayl wa āthār al-fikr*, *Al-Tarīq*, nos. 1 & 2 (Jan. & Feb. 1962), 47; K. Kilani, *Hayy bin Yaqzān* (Misr: Dār al-ma'rif, n.d.), 150-56.

14. Such a predilection may be analyzed in the framework of the reclamation of native traditions and voices. See P. Hasanali, *Hayy ibn Yaqzān*, in *Companion to Arabic Literature*, ed. Julie Meisami and Paul Starkey (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, forthcoming). This general tendency in post-Colonial literature is discussed by Edward Said in his study, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993).

15. See Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's 'Hayy'*, 49-55; 168-173.

16. *Op. cit.* Pastor, *The Idea of Robinson Crusoe*. Pastor aimed to study the question of Robinson Crusoe in his intended second volume that was never published. The first volume deals with aspects of the European translation without tying them to the question of Robinson Crusoe.

17. Reception theory is a method in literary criticism that was formulated at the Konstanz school in Germany in the early seventies. It has gained wide currency and now has many proponents and new applications in North America, where it is generally formulated in terms of "reader-response" theory. Aspects of these theories that are applied to this study will be discussed further in chapter two.

18. Cf. Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's Hayy*, 135-160.

19. The studies by Hayoun are cited further. Other scholars, such as George Vajda, E. I. J. Rosenthal and Charles Touati, primarily utilize the Paris manuscripts. Cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal, *Political ideas in Moshe Narboni's Commentary on Ibn Ṭufayl's Hayy b. Yaqzān*, in *Homage à George Vajda*, ed. Gerard Nahon and Charles Touati (Louvain: Editions Peeters, 1980), 227-234; Charles Touati, *Dieu et le monde selon Moïse Narboni*, *AHDMLA*, 22 (1954), 193-205; Vajda, *Comment le philosophe juif, Moïse de Narbonne, commentateur d'Ibn Tufayl comprenait-il les paroles extatique (shatahāt) des soufis*, in *Actas del Primer Congreso de Estudios Arabes et Islamicos*, (1962a), 129-135; Vajda, *Moïse de Narbonne sur les séfirōt, les intelligences et les sphères*, annex note 10 in *Recherche sur la philosophie et la kabbale* (Paris: La Haye, 1962b), 396-402.

20. The Robinsonade refers to a post-eighteenth century literary genre particularly popular in Europe and further transmitted to North America that drew inspiration from the common features of Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* written in the later eighteenth century. Anachronistically, *Hayy ibn Yaqzān* has been viewed as a Robinsonade and

alternatively as its source. Both these views are problematic but occur through the process of transmission. See Martin Green, *The Robinson Crusoe Story* (University Park: Penn State University, 1990), 1-15. Green discusses the "retelling" of the Robinsonades, focusing on various interpretations in Europe and North America from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries.

21. R. Greene, *The Pleasant and Delightful History of Dorastus, Prince of Sicily and Fawnia, Daughter and Heir to Pandosta, King of Bohemia ... a Pleasant Winter Evening's Entertainment* (London: Printed for G. Conyers, 1696).

22. Abu Bakr ibn al-Tufail, in *The British Library Catalogue of Printed Books to 1975* (London: The British Library, 1975), I:436. *Don Trezzanio* is published in 1761 and is referred to inaccurately in the catalogue as an abridged translation of *Philosophus Autodidactus*. The "abridged" *History of Josephus* is not included in the list but many of the other European translations are mentioned.

23. E. Pennington (ed.), *Apostle of New Jersey John Talbot (1645-1727)*. Philadelphia: The Church Historical Society, n.d.

Chapter 2: Theoretical perspectives and literary critiques

The methodology utilized in addressing the major issues in this dissertation has been primarily motivated by the focus text, *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* and the implications that its transmission and translation carry. The rich literary history of the text also allows one to apply current theories in literary criticism. This chapter will first discuss the approaches in the disciplinary studies and further establish the theoretical precepts on which the present study is based. The application of the methodology in this study is of theoretical significance in itself and in relation to the focus text, since the literary theories that are formulated have not occasioned prior application. The current debates and new methodologies in literary criticism and religious studies provide a framework and further enhance their particular application to medieval literary and philosophical studies, especially in the area of Islamic Studies.

How can a text that is primarily mystical and patterned on the precepts of Greek philosophy and Muslim thought be compared to and considered as the source of the prototypical realistic novel, *Robinson Crusoe*? Further, how can this text, despite its strongly symbolic typology, be seen as the precursor of Cartesian rationalism which totally inverses its philosophical precedents? Connections of this nature perforced me to delve into the literary history of the focus text that has served as a magnet for the expression of the most diverse trends in literature and philosophy. The study looks at the process by which such opposing views are engendered, as well as the median changes elicited through the translation of the narrative. Thus, the actual transmission process whereby a gradual transformation takes place, needs to be examined. This chapter will look at some general approaches to literary and philosophical texts in Islamic Studies, establish the application by this author of the literary theories of Hans Jauss and Edward Said

in the context of the focus text, and analyze other approaches that have been applied to its study.

Samuel Chew to Norman Daniel

In the study of Islam, there are some precedents in literary history and theory that examine how the religion, its prophet Muḥammad, and its texts have been perceived in Western literature. There have been discussions by Samuel C. Chew,¹ Norman Daniel,² and R. W. Southern³ among others on the images of the east that developed in the west as well as the transmission of Islamic texts and their mis/interpretations. These studies have a general bearing in the transmission of the focus text in seventeenth to nineteenth century England, but do not deal with the philosophical and theo-mystical themes that it raises. Many studies concentrate either on the image of Muḥammad, who was one of the major objects that the theologians and proselytizers had to discredit,⁴ or the Qur'ān, since these two aspects were the intent of polemics.

Considerable emphasis was also laid on stereotypical images of the Turk, the Saracen and the Moor that entered the mainstream literature in Europe and especially England, France and Spain. Such images were generally reproduced in literary works of drama and poetry and recur in the most innocuous documents such as histories, biographies and travel books.⁵ The context of these studies are important since the primary European translators of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, philosophers, historians and theologians in their own right, were writing during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when such notions formulated perceptions of the history, cultures and religions of the east not just through scholars, but through the expansionist designs of colonialists.

Samuel Chew draws his resources from the material written in England during the Renaissance and early Elizabethan period. He gives us prime examples from travel literature, along with its lavish embellishments and "legend of lies of travel"⁶ of the Orient, focusing on the Ottomans and Persians, and ranging in characterization from the Turks and Jannisaries, to Prophet Muḥammad and the

Qur'ān, to the Persian court and representations of Muslims on the London stage. Chew clearly defines his stance; his 'vantage' point was that of a student of English Literature focusing upon London and not Istanbul, Baghdad or Isfahan. Thus, he studies the works of English writers of travelogues, poets, dramatists of "the older English drama", theologians and priests. Likewise, his analysis presents the variety, diversity and fascination that the Levant held for England. The narratives that he analyzes reflect the perceptions of a totally different world that its writers encountered, their "adventures" as diplomats in the courts of Kings and the risks that some of them faced, like being sold to slavery. "At times we may seem to wander far from Islam; but the Moslems were never, in the Near and Middle East, wholly absent from the anxious thoughts of Elizabethan travellers, even when their interests were fixed, to the exclusion of the immediate present, upon classical and biblical associations, or upon the marvels of the Orient."⁷

What is of interest to the transmission of *Ḥayy ibn Yaḡzān* is the focus on early travellers, tales and tale-bearers, whereby the Tufaylian narrative was transformed into Robinsonade⁸ tales of adventure and travel in the eighteenth century. Perhaps, one can even trace back the propensity to tales of travel and adventure recapitulated in the genre of the early English Novel to this fascination for travel tales of the Orient.⁹

While written in the medieval context, the studies by R. W. Southern focus on the works of Western writers, primarily churchmen, and the manner in which they transmitted the image of Islam, its religion, its prophet, the Crusades and additionally its philosophy, which in Southern's case meant the impact of Averroes. Southern recognizes the inability of European Christians to provide "a fully satisfying explanation of the phenomenon [Islam] they had set out to explain."¹⁰ Yet, Southern's study falls in the same milieu as Chew's with regard to its vantage point. His admiration for Renan limits his study as a response to the question of Averroism.

Norman Daniel offers a more critical analysis of the making of a deformed image of Islam, and reflects upon the conflicts between the two religions,

Christianity and Islam, even when they operated within the same cultural or geographical setting.¹¹ However, studies in Islamic philosophy and its links to the progression of western thought in the late Middle Ages, in the Renaissance and later continental philosophy, have tended to focus on the "sources" of Western thinkers (and vice-versa) or to clarify the classical Hellenistic background.¹² As I have indicated above, the total preoccupation with sources from vastly removed contexts can easily lead to reductionism and reflects the response of historical positivism applied to literary and philosophical texts. Daniel refers to the predilection involved in such studies:

I have tried wholly to exclude philosophical questions, such as those that derive from Averroism, because the interrelation of what is specifically Islamic and what is specifically Christian in the transmission of philosophical thought from one society to the other is an immense and immensely difficult subject needing special and separate attention.¹³

New methodological considerations

In the current state of research, no single discipline can be immune to the new and innovative methods on whose bases the fabric of society is constantly rewoven, especially with regard to new methods in the humanities and social sciences. Neither can the context, sociolinguistic and cultural relevance of the primary text and its posterior reception be ruled out in any analysis. This is a reason for the changes in 'structuralism' in recent analyses, reflecting the need for a combination of textual and contextual methods. The question posed by structuralists as to whether a text can speak for itself, independent of 'history' was partly a response to and rejection of nineteenth century literary historical criticism. It further provided new tools for looking at literary works and opened new venues to combine the methods of structuralism with the contextual reading of texts.

The necessity of critically responding to classical texts in their context as

well as how we read them in our own times requires the recollection of diverse methodologies that shape our understanding of texts. In both cases, the historic frame of reference assumed of past or present readings cannot be bypassed. However, structural readings attempt to pull texts 'out of time' altogether by ignoring *both* their current reception as being historically grounded *and* neglecting the historical context of their creation.

Thus, Oriental Studies can no longer be analyzed without a recognition of orientalism, even if it may be re-defined in different contexts. The current study is not focused on the impact of colonialism on literature, but responds favourably to the notions of *culture* as a construct of interpretation, used in different ways by two contemporary literary theoreticians, Edward Said and Hans Jauss, who contribute to the integration of the historical and aesthetic interpretation of narrative. It also recognizes that different methodologies and their use in the past and the present have an impact on our current reading of texts.

The new methodologies that have emerged within the last decade provide innovative trans-disciplinary approaches. In the context of Islamic Studies, some attempts have been made to apply these methodologies, for example the notion of orientalism and cultural paradigm as analyzed in the works of Edward Said in the context of literary criticism, social anthropology in Mohammed Arkoun, the utilization of feminist critical theory in Islamic literature by Fedwa Malti-Douglas, and the application of structuralism by Ian Netton in his analysis of Islamic thought.¹⁴

To these methodologies, I would like to add a recent model that has not been applied in Islamic Studies. It is usually called *reception theory* and becomes established as a specific method in the late 1970s at the University of Konstanz in Germany. Like its precedents in phenomenology and hermeneutics, reception theory emphasizes the mutual dependence and inter-relation between "the act of thinking and the object of thought,"¹⁵ further negotiating this process of communication to include how a text is received collectively by its readers and critics. The current study draws from aspects of this theory, along with some

elements of Said's critiques and the addition of my own theoretical perspectives, in exploring the literary history of the text of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* and its transmission through the process of translation. To begin with, the section below will briefly assess some developments in literary criticism and further ascertain how reception theory is able to resolve the limitations that are set by examining text (or the structural) and context (or the historical) approaches in themselves.

Reception and Reader-response theories

The theories propounded by Jauss are relevant to our consideration of the text of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* for several reasons. Jauss raises the question of the relationship between history and aesthetics in literature, both of which are redefined in a new context. Starting off from the structure and function of hermeneutics, that were re-examined by his teacher, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jauss was faced with the "inescapability of a problematic relationship between the past and the present and therefore the necessity of confronting the question of history."¹⁶ Since such a confrontation with the question of history must take place within a framework of communication, he believed it necessary to consider both the individual and social dimensions of that encounter.¹⁷ Thus, Jauss reformulates the way we conceive of our relation to literature, past and present.

The process of communication or *reading* raises a host of questions: What happens when we read? Do we bring ourselves to the work, or do we get something from it? What sort of prejudgments do we bring to our readings? Do we expect certain things in certain genres? Are we intimidated by certain works, certain authors, certain reputations? What is the nature of such intimidations? What is the image of the author that we bring to a reading? Do we exercise some influences upon the author as s/he writes for us? Do we have immediate access to literature or not, if not what *mediations* can we recall? To what extent can we be manipulated to respond in an expected manner? How can it be determined that we will respond aesthetically to something that may not have been intended that way? All these questions emerge as soon as a recipient centred approach to

literature is attempted.

As a starting point, Jauss introduces the notion of "*the horizon of expectation*" to include the "reactions, prejudgments, verbal and other behaviour that greet a work upon its appearance. A work might fulfil such a horizon by confirming the expectations vested in it, or it may disappoint the expectations by creating a distance between itself and them." Jauss labels this as "*aesthetic distance*." Aesthetic distance assists in the construction of literary history through one of two major processes, "either the public *alters* its horizon so that the work is now accepted and a stage in the aesthetics of reception is set, or it rejects the work which may remain dormant until it is accepted, i.e until a horizon for it is forged." The alteration of horizon, when applied especially to classical texts, acts as "a strong liberating force" that frees both the recipient-reader and literature "for it permits us to recover its initial impact which had been eroded by centuries of veneration and monumentalization."¹⁸

Such interaction of reader and text restores the historical dimension, "for the public of recipients, past and present is fully involved as the mediator of the texts. A history of literature undertaken according to these principles would appear to be eminently empirical and value-free, for it would not obey some foreordained logic ... it would recognize its own historical inscription... Each generation of readers must rewrite history." This aspect allows for the revitalization of critical perspectives since "no fixed view ever prevails and [that] each generation must read the texts anew and interrogate them from its own perspective and find itself concerned, in its own fashion, by the work's question."¹⁹

Jauss's theory has gained strong adherents through the translation of his works. It has led to the establishment of the "reception theory" and its subdivision of "reader-response."²⁰ The current study extends this theory beyond Jauss's framework to every phase of the literary history of the text, *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, in order to recover the *horizons of expectation* of each of the responses,

from the Avicennan text to the Tufaylian narrative. It also applies the question of reception to the process of translation. What happens to a text when it is translated within vastly different horizons of expectation, as reflected in the translators of the Tufaylian narrative? What *mediations* does the focus text undergo through the processes of translation and appropriation? In this way, one can perceive the significant aesthetic and historical dimensions of the narrative that are engendered in the various ways by which it has been received. For example, if we look at the Tufaylian narrative within the horizon of expectation that its title and connection with the Avicennan narrative produce, we are able to perceive some connections with the earlier prototype, but on the other hand, we are faced with a huge "aesthetic distance" that the totally different characters, form and message produce. Such an analysis liberates the Tufaylian text from the preconceived notions of being the 'same' text as Ibn Sīnā's that have dogged it throughout its literary history. Yet, the deliberate choices that Ibn Ṭufayl makes through the names of his protagonist, also maintain a strong social and historical connection.

Jauss's methodology is suited to the study of philosophical texts, such as *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, in their combination of hermeneutic methods, and "their attempt to revise critical procedures in such a way as to overcome the separation between literary interpretation and cultural criticism, and at the same time, suggest ways in which the aesthetic experience may be grounded in the realm of shared human experience ... the 'horizon of expectation', that necessary sociohistorical perspective that enables one to perceive, understand and represent both the social world, and as critic or reader, the world of the text."²¹

Jauss' application of his theoretical perspectives to texts that reflect religious experiences such as *Genesis*, the works of Socrates, Rousseau and Goethe may be applied to texts in Islamic thought, since the aesthetic aims are shared and of a similar philosophical nature. However, while the theory of reception might be applied to the transmission of the Tufaylian narrative, the integrity of the context or the cultural milieu in which the text is received also has to be

recognized. The process of reception recognizes the shifts that occur both within and outside a particular culture. When the text is received within a new cultural frame or in a new genre, this in itself can contribute to what I term a 'transference' of meaning. For example, such an application to Averroism in the context of reception might provide valuable insight into the phenomenon that otherwise is either rejected in the context of Islamic Studies or appropriated into Western medieval thought.

In the same manner, this methodology can be applied to the different reception of the text by translators and theologians, critics such as Ibn al-Khaṭīb and Ibn al-Nafīs, philosophers such as Moses Narboni and Ibn Rushd, as well as the modern responses by reader-critics such as Goodman, Hawi, Arkoun and Malti-Douglas. Thus, this study will also indicate the different approaches in criticism, from the Robinsonade element that appeals to some readers, to the emphasis on philosophy at the expense of aesthetics, to the mythical Avicennan, Hermetistic and Alexander stories, relevant in their own horizon and challenging it as well.

An additional question that I consider to be especially relevant to classical texts is, how is the narrative received via translations and later appropriations within different historical and cultural contexts? In his discussion of the dialogic nature of critical activity, Jauss suggests that if the process of literary texts is not to give way to a free-floating production of differences, the process of apprehension arising from the examination of a literary work and its context must be anchored in a prior understanding of the "already said, misunderstood, and previously valid" of the critic as well as the text and its author.²² He is thus concerned with previous models of works and their reiteration. Jauss shows how the reworking of Rousseau's *Heloise* served as a covert model for Goethe's *Werther*, and *Emile* for *Wilhelm Meister*.²³ This perspective is particularly valuable in the analysis of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*. Such *reworkings* are also the concern of the current study, where they are very prevalent through translation and transmission.

Edward Said and Orientalism

The literary discourse on Islam in western scholarship and interpretation has been established in the works of Edward Said, not just in his groundbreaking and provocative study on *Orientalism*²⁴ but also in his other works on literary criticism²⁵ and in his recent study, *Culture and Imperialism*.²⁶

The critical theories of Edward Said are used as a premise in the transmission and the translation of the text in question, although the final analysis as well as the methodology applied are different. Edward Said's contributions to literary criticism are important for several reasons. It was Said who essentially raised the question, within the areas of comparative literature and Islamic Studies, as to how the vantage point of the writer colours his/her approach to texts that are presented as or made to be an antithesis or 'other.' Said also highlighted our critical interest on western approaches to the study of Islam, shifting the focus from the texts that were studied to an analysis of the cultural context of the critic-interpreter or translator.

Said thus added a new critical element in the debate whose importance as a point of departure cannot be discounted. For the modern orientalist, Said's questions addressed the very validity of his or her craft, but they also made him/her guard against simplistic generalizations that remain the cornerstone in popular perceptions of Islam. Further, Said's analysis indicated a more insidious application of orientalism beyond the notion of exoticism that was explored by Chew and Southern. The orient was not simply the romantic being -- "a European invention" -- it was also the 'other.' Being the 'other' justified all acts of colonialism within a moral framework. It needed to be civilized, converted and conquered, yet all the time, the Orient was also "the source of its [European] civilizations and languages, ... In addition, *the Orient had helped to define Europe* (or the West)."²⁷

One such invention, reflected through the transmission of the focus text, is the process whereby the orient (in European scholarship) was confined to the works of western Islam as representative of the apogee of philosophical thought

rather than as a stage in the continual process of reception. With regard to the development of Islamic thought in the Maghrib, the eastern nexus from which it was separated remained the source and inspiration for such developments that were unique in themselves and in relation to the particular geographical settings in which they emerged. Said indicates that the orient means several different things, all of them interdependent.²⁸ In assessing Said, this multi-faceted approach has been somewhat ignored in favour of the potentially polemical aspects.

Said illustrates a very important trend in literary criticism. The popularity of the "textuality" within which American literary theory of the late seventies had retreated brought about the displacement of history:

Textuality is considered to take place, yes, but by the same token it does not take place anywhere or anytime in particular. It is produced, but by no one and at no time.²⁹

The arguments put forward by structuralists rejected the notion that real "history" might be somehow apprehended directly through texts. Structuralism and New Criticism invalidated the nineteenth century approaches to texts and their interpretation, but their limitations are being explored in the current criticism, indicating the need to examine works both in relation to their *explications de texte* and historical circumstances.

In *Culture and Imperialism*, Said uses the notion of "culture" as an operative mode of discourse. This culture, that often exists in relative autonomy from the economic, social and political realm, is expressed in aesthetic forms, one of whose principal aims is pleasure. The novel thus becomes *the* aesthetic object whose connection to the expanding societies of Britain and France is particularly interesting to study. Furthermore, the period of the European translations of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* occurs just prior to the establishment of the English novel as a literary genre, the prototypical example of the modern realistic novel being *Robinson Crusoe*.³⁰ One should note here that *Robinson Crusoe* and the metaphors that it utilizes (for example, the remote island, the savage who is 'civilized') have

themselves become the subject of current debates in post-colonial approaches to literature. In analyzing the Robinsonade aspect, it might be relevant to question whether the current approaches to *Robinson Crusoe* could dislodge the romanticism of parallels between the two texts that is central to some critiques of the Tufaylian narrative,³¹ whereby the reclamation of "source" (i.e. claiming *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* to be the source for *Robinson Crusoe*) might be understood as the unconscious "method colonized people use to assert their own identity and the existence of their own history."³²

Said notes further, "[a] great deal of recent criticism has concentrated on narrative fiction, yet very little attention has been paid to its position in history and world of empire." However, "the narrative is [also] crucial ... stories are at the heart of what explorers and novelists say about strange regions of the world."³³ The role of the fictive or the narrative is seen in a new perspective. Fiction is no longer the mere figment of imagination but a reflection of "history" and the manner in which it communicates the "ideals" of the time.³⁴

Citing Mathew Arnold, Said notes that culture palliates, if it does not altogether neutralize, the ravages of a modern aggressive, mercantile, and brutalizing urban existence. It can be a combative source of identity as in recent "returns" to culture and tradition. "The 'returns' accompany rigorous codes of intellectual and moral behaviour that are opposed to forms of permissiveness..."³⁵ This element is perceivable in Ibn Ṭufayl's reaction against the materialism of urban existence and his selection of solitude as the only viable option to combat it, as well as, paradoxically, in Ibn al-Nafīs's reworking of the narrative. Yet, Ibn Ṭufayl's worldview is not purely romantic or utopic. Malti-Douglas, for example, highlights some of its most brutal aspects in the dissection of the maternal figure of the gazelle.³⁶

"Culture can even be a battleground on which causes expose themselves ... and contend with one another, making it apparent that, for instance, American, French, or Indian students who are taught to read *their* national classics before they read others, are expected to appreciate and belong loyally, often uncritically

to their nations and traditions while denigrating or fighting against others."³⁷ Ibn al-Nafis responds in this manner to the Tufaylian narrative, reinforcing the urbanism and societal structure that Ibn Tufayl had reacted against, but perceiving it loyally and thus reflecting a shift in the cultural paradigm.

The application of Said's methodology to *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* brings into play the aesthetic and narrative element of the 'story' along with its crucial role in 'history.' It combines the aesthetic analysis with the historical and socio-political context in which texts are articulated. It further suggests that the reinterpretation of such texts, in relation to their history (reflecting the Imperial agenda through appropriation), as well as in response to the current time (as in their retrieval by scholars of decolonized nations), might "enhance our reading and understanding of them."³⁸

This perspective is also underlined by reception and reader-response theorists who indicate however that the reading of (classical) texts responds to the public culture of the time. Thus, our application of the literary theories by Jauss and Said forwards the connections between "literary history" and "interpretation" as modes of criticism. Secondly, these texts are being retrieved by "a new generation of scholars of decolonized nations of those worlds [who have] a standing interest in what was considered a lesser world, populated with less[er] people of color, portrayed as open to the intervention of so many Robinson Crusoes."³⁹

One of the problems in reception theory is the variety of ways in which the readers of a text might respond to it, even while assuming a "public culture." Ultimately, the majority ethos might succeed in changing the horizon of expectation of the text in later times or in its own times while other 'lesser' responses might remain dormant. In my application, the reader's place is taken over by the translator or the interpreter. Thus, the translator mediates between the (new) reader and the text, by which two processes might occur simultaneously or independently - one of appropriation and the second of the text as 'other.' For this reason, the postulates of Said's theory add a dimension to our understanding

of a text that becomes the 'other', whose prime author virtually disappears with the changing horizon of expectation. The appropriation might exist within and outside the culture, which explains how the reception might eventually lead to an anti-thesis of the text, seen in the Robinsonades as well as in Ibn al-Nafīs' response.

Translation and transmission as modes of reference

The Tufaylian narrative is concerned with new beginnings,⁴⁰ in every sense possible in contrast to the prologue which evokes a sense of *déjà vu* - a historical consciousness that attempts to place the text in history and establish its authority. The choice of the title by Ibn Ṭufayl is also a conscious beginning to link it with the archetype of recital embodied in Ibn Sīnā. The prologue achieves the opposite effect of linking it to the history of the philosophical and mystical tradition in Islam. Yet, while the effort of the prologue is commendable within the norms of validating sources, the text eventually rejects the whole notion of the past authority.

A true beginning requires the freedom from all forms. It leads back to the spirit, as reflected in the first version of Ḥayy's birth through spontaneous generation, or alternatively requires a break from tradition and established authority, as in version two of Ḥayy's birth that reflects the aberrant behaviour in the bravado of the young princess to secretly betrothe the man of her choice. Several critics have been concerned as to which version of Ḥayy's birth was primary in Ibn Ṭufayl's design. For example, Fradkin discusses the two beginnings around Ḥayy's birth and tries to ascertain which one was primary to Ibn Ṭufayl.⁴¹ In my view, the option of having two different beginnings creates a dialogical response between reader and text by its author, Ibn Ṭufayl. A similar choice is given to the readers at different stages in the narrative, for example the possibility of including both views on the question whether the world was created in time or was eternal.⁴²

The study of Islam as a "scientific and scholarly discipline" began under

the umbrella of "Oriental Studies." The translation and transmission of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān* belong to the early period of Oriental Studies. Most, if not all the translators were either pioneers in the area studies or important contributors to the other religious streams that were emerging in Europe at the time. Given the sectarian climate and expansionist ideologies of Britain, one has to raise the question of how valid were the approaches of seventeenth century Orientalists, deeply grounded in their own religious traditions and purporting to study the 'other' for reasons that were more often tied in with 'secularization' and expansion than with religious judgement.⁴³

The current research focuses on the text by Ibn Ṭufayl and its transmission. Some tangent questions on the exponential development of philosophy during the medieval Maghrib period and its implications for the phenomenon of Averroism on the Latin West and Judaism will be further addressed. However, this study is not focused on the misrepresentation of Islam that is the crux of Daniel's and Said's works, but on what the former himself alludes to as "the sound information that was available" (congruently, an allusion by Daniel to Edward Pococke Sr., the harbinger of the Bodleian manuscript that was the basis of the first printed edition) at the time.⁴⁴ For example, we will look into the European proponents (or translators) of this 'generally sound information' and examine what impelled them to make such information available. How did the translators (primarily clergy or religious scholars) draw from the narrative something that had value to the society in which they lived and the religions (Christianity and Judaism) that they practised and propagated? The frameworks provided by Daniel and Said have to be kept in the background and might even provide valuable insight as to why certain responses and approaches were undertaken by the translators who will be studied in this dissertation.

The choice of the text by Ibn Ṭufayl as the subject of translation gives us a rare glimpse into the working of the religiosity and the spirituality of the translators, who instead of being able to objectify the other (the bane of orientalism) find that it subjectifies their own religious and spiritual convictions.

Indeed, this is a major reason for the copious translations and editions of the text in its ability to articulate the various responses of translators.

The current study is broad enough not to be limited to the popular, romantic and polemic perceptions of Islam. It further examines the articulation of the intellectual bases of Maghribi Islam of the twelfth century and appropriation within western societies through the transmission of the Tufaylian narrative and the process of Averroism. A problem that has been often raised revolves on whether medieval philosophy might be defined as "Islamic" since this may exclude non-Muslim philosophers, or whether one might consider the genre as "Arab" philosophy based on linguistic grounds. This was a major methodological problem addressed in western scholarship of the early twentieth century. It elicited critical responses especially in relation to philosophy by Anawati, Corbin and Gauthier among others. The primary impetus for such discussion was drawn by the concern over historicity. It is not relevant to the current study to regurgitate this debate but it is important to recognize the fore-ground in terms of the reader-response to the narrative in the critical corpus of the early twentieth century and further perceive the directions being taken in recent scholarship.

One can contend that such a debate rests on a fallacy - that something monolithic (or almost someone) called Islam hovers over its "believers" regulating their thought and actions. This premise is especially challenged through the works of medieval Islamic philosophers who did not limit their thought processes to a particular frame and were open to intellectual dialogue. While Muslim and other intellectuals did write under taxing and sometimes inquisitorial circumstances, it is a simplification to assume that these circumstances were due to religion as an unchanging entity, rather than being grounded in particular theologies and historical circumstances. Likewise, it is misleading to consider the works of Muslim philosophy as a free-floating radical enterprise. Either response predicates one view as being not merely normative but as the only exclusive view, rather than including both the norm and responses to it.

One aspect of the debate among Muslim as well as Christian and Jewish

philosophers of the era was the motivation to reconcile revealed religion and peripatetic philosophy. If the philosophers had to respond to the question regarding the extent to which philosophy was in harmony with the revealed religion, it was due to

- a) the genuine attempt to harmonize their intellectual bent with the socioreligious elements of the societies in which they operated;
- b) the anti-philosophical responses of rulers and theologians culminating in Ghazālī's offensive on philosophy;
- c) their spiritual search that recognized elements in philosophical discourse that were conducive to spiritual enlightenment.

The second aspect of the debate in earlier criticism was focused on the "sources" of the Muslim philosophers that were an amalgamation of primarily Greek Neoplatonic works, with elements of Indian and Persian thought infused within Greek thought or as independent sources. The fallacy thus lies in the consideration that if the Islamic philosophers drew from Greek "Western" thought, then their later impact in the "West" is the reiteration of such sources, i.e. West [Greek] ---> East [Islamic] ---> West [Europe]. The basic assumption in this argument again rests on monolithic blocks of different colours, which, even if piled up together to form a structure, are perceived as distinguishable in themselves and not as the mosaic pattern that is thereby formed. Such a static interpretation ignores any form of interaction or communication.

The present study thus reflects how the approach in Islamic Studies in the nineteenth and early twentieth century was bound by the prevailing tradition of literary positivism, which treated texts as documents determined by the construct of history, or as the sum total of the influences, thus depreciating the socio-cultural or aesthetic reflection of the text. Although such interpretations may be criticized in terms of current methodologies, they reflect the horizon of expectation of the period. It is the continuance of such analyses in recent studies that is problematic, since it reflects the ignorance of any shifts in knowledge. Likewise, the general absence of scholarship on the Tufaylian narrative for almost a century

except for the phenomenal regurgitation of new editions and translations indicates that the text appeals to the public of readers and points to the need for the application of new critiques to re-consider those that are no longer communicative.⁴⁵

In underlining these fallacies, the current study does not aim to trace "sources" with the intent of proving the basis of intellectual thought. Rather, it will look at the processes whereby certain elements of the Tufaylian narrative find a constant appeal and were transferred into vastly different social, geographical and religious contexts, and to indicate what was it about this particular text that was conducive to the different 'searches'? Posing this question might also encapsulate the reasons why the Muslim philosophers had found Greek thought conducive to their intellectual pursuit, and the Christian and Jewish Philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas and Moses Narboni responded to Islamic philosophy in relation to their own inquiries.

Translation theory exists in its classical form in relation to philosophy, Greek texts, and Arabic literature. However, modern analyses have forwarded several new frameworks of reference such as socio-linguistical, structural, feminist, marxist and interpretational, within which literary analysis is undertaken. Thus, a strong debate is taking place around notions of translation. The process of translation by itself suggests some form of interpretation.

Translation has a long history in the area of Islamic Studies. While the classical question whether the 'word of God' might be translatable evoked much debate, the early acculturation of medical and philosophical works in Islamic civilization has often provoked questions on "sources" and the "originality" of Islamic thought especially as a means of justifying the inverse process evoked by the translation of Arabic texts into Hebrew and Latin under which the [Hebrew] translation of *Hayy ibn Yaqzān* falls.

In relation to translation, some questions that may be posed are: What is the impact of translation on a text? Do the original ideas remain, or do they in fact change, get transmuted and transformed? Does the question of validity arise?

What issues (such as language and culture) should the translator be aware of? How much of the persona of the translator is admissible in the process of translation?

There has not been much discussion on how the translator himself influenced the outcome, i.e. the translated text, not just in terms of literal meaning, but also in the sense of *reading*. For instance, the access to certain texts, commentaries or summarizations of Greek classics dramatically influenced the manner in which the 'Greek masters' were viewed and understood among Islamic philosophers, and consequently their impact on Islamic philosophy itself. A clear example is the presentation of a paraphrase of the *Enneads* as *The Theology of Aristotle*,⁴⁶ a process that eased the reconciliation of the rational philosophy of Aristotle with a religio-spiritual context. The examination of such questions in the context of the methodology applied may suggest new modes of analysis and communication that arise from the genre of Islamic philosophy and its reception of Greek thought, instead of the limitation to "sources."

Translation and commentaries were one reason for the partial perception of "sources." Another reason was the access to a partial body of texts of a particular author that becomes prevalent for example in the formation of Averroism. Even within the realm of Islamic philosophy, geography and other factors resulted in the demarcation of two schools, the eastern and the western. The western or Maghribi school had less access to the works of its eastern proponents and forbearers. This might have resulted in a partial analysis of some theologians and philosophers such as Ghazālī⁴⁷ and Ibn Sīnā, many of whose texts could not have reached the Maghrib by Ibn Ṭufayl's time.

Another interesting outcome of the process of transmission was the role of the commentary in the transformation of ideas. Such reception resulted in an amalgam of the philosophies of different schools, thus combining the mystical ideas of Pythagoras within the peripatetic frame, and sometimes confusing the views of one philosopher with another, such as the attribution of Neoplatonic texts to Aristotle referred to above, or the confusion between Socrates and Diogenes.⁴⁸

Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān* and its transmission is an excellent example through which one can explore various dimensions of the 'translation' process, which might also assist us in the application of a new theory of translation to the analysis of Islamic thought. The Tufaylian narrative is unique historically and through its history of transmission and translations. It allows the analyst to situate the text, the translator and the context in many variant geographical and literary-historical ways which are also conducive to a socio-literary reading.

Although the 'aesthetic' form of the Tufaylian narrative makes it apparently independent of the historical process to create a history of its own, placing it in the realm of the allegory or the utopian 'type',⁴⁹ the retrieved text (through transmission) is a product of its time and continues to be so as it is historically received through the constant process of translation. Perhaps in seeking to annihilate the urban, materialistic world from Ḥayy's realm of consciousness, the Tufaylian narrative makes its strongest criticism, whereby the utopic element of the island is counteracted by an operative dystopic society.

This study aims to reveal how the primary text and its translations are attempts to break through the norm and the silence of the particular circumstances of their time. While I consider the theoretical explorations to be of immense importance, they cannot be extrapolated from the historical contexts whereby a single text goes through a series of metamorphoses. The world of the translator, in the particular cases studied, is so eventful that the conscious choice of translating this text presents us with a microcosm of the universe which he inhabits. It is a song of protest which can not be otherwise expressed. Thus, no attempt will be made to separate the translator from the particular issues that the analysis will forward. In fact, the notion that a text can be interpreted in itself, independent of its creation in time has to be rejected. Such an interpretation would be constrained to superficial comparisons of so-called metaphorical commonalities.

Translation as decoding the meaning of the narrative

The primary text as a mode of communication is itself a translation of Greek philosophy into an Islamic context, further indicating the movement from a literal interpretation of the word of law to its inner sufic transformation. It is essentially the translation of the theoretical precepts of Greek and Islamic thought into the experiential mode through its main actors. However, the transmission channel of the story produces three different results in its chief actors in terms of received meaning.

- A) Ḥayy --> through 7 stages --> culmination - a perfect translation from theory to practice to ideal results.
- B) Absāl --> through the verbal --> to decoding or understanding of the theory --> to ideal results, theoretically.
- C) Salāmān --> verbal --> verbal --> no translation but a transmission, whereby the letter of the law is adhered to.

Thus, translation implies change in universal and particular terms. One aspect of the primary text is its translation in a particular context, reflected in the varying experience of each of its characters who represent the individual readers. The second aspect is the universal context in its ability to be received anew, which accounts for its literary history. In this sense, it fulfils the very basis of translation, access to universality. The ideas in the primary text have universal appeal which allow them to be translated into different contexts. This is a movement from the primary to the secondary. In the secondary mode, the text retains the universal aspects of the primary text but it also creates new contexts within which further texts and appropriations might be created.

With regard to the genre, when compared to other works which fulfil the 'translation' of Greek philosophy in the Islamic context, this particular text plays a dual role. It remains quite faithful to its precedents and in some senses 'reproduces' their notions. However, the basis of translation itself admits a state of 'before' and 'after'. Thus, nothing can be faithfully reproduced. To borrow from the wisdom of an erstwhile teacher, Ibn 'Arabī, even a mirror image is an

inverse one.⁵⁰ I think this notion can be particularly useful in evaluating the role of the Islamic philosophers, who were the renewed phoenix of the Greek philosophers. Thus, early and recent literary analysis of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* hinged on the debate of 'originality'. Did Ibn Ṭufayl do anything new - did he not 'reproduce' the teaching of the earlier Islamic philosophers, who themselves had put on a new garb when they transmitted ancient Greek philosophy? Acknowledgement of a "history" is not a delimiting factor in analysis even though a definitive shift in meaning can be perceived between reproduction and reception.

Critical Approaches to the Tufaylian narrative

In the various critiques of the narrative, some scholars consider that Ibn Ṭufayl's originality lay in the fictional form that he adopted, rather than ascribe any credit to his philosophical ideas. Other studies centre on Ibn Ṭufayl's greatness as the author of the prologue that gave us an assessment of the 'state' of philosophy in his own times and had immense historical value. Another approach makes him the visionary who foresaw the direction in which future philosophy would evolve. The present study suggests that the possible link to such disseminations occurred not so much through the primary text as through the further process of secondary transmissions.

In this case, the literary history of the text itself, as well as its translations are bound by a dialectic of purpose. Such a dialectic is created in the focus text by the contrasts between the prologue and the main narrative. The similarity between the titles of the narratives on *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* by Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Ṭufayl creates the confusion over the attribution of authorship that must have affected the manner in which it was received by later societies, since its reception would be bound by the expectation of the readers' overall world-view of Ibn Sīnā. This ambiguity of meaning is inherited by the translations and resurfaces in different forms, for example, whether the author was Ibn Sīnā or Ibn Ṭufayl; whether the term used to denote the "secret" philosophy is *mashriq* or *mushriq*; whether Edward Pococke Jr. or Sr. was the Latin translator and so forth. Such

external ambiguities contribute to the transference of meaning, primarily in the reception of the text.

The transmission and reception of the Tufaylian narrative might also be approached through the responses of its interpreters, whether translators or critics. This section presents the significant voices of critics, being limited to a study of those whose approaches indicate a shift in the horizon of expectation, rather than attempting to include all responses to the narrative. Other critiques that focus on Ibn Ṭufayl or *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* in a wider or comparative context will be incorporated or cross-referenced in various parts of the dissertation.⁵¹ The critiques in this section will also be approached within the methodological approach of reception, their particular perspectives thus being rendered meaningful and valuable through a recognition of their historical prescription.

Léon Gauthier

Beginning with the base laid by S. Munk,⁵² Gauthier enters into the first detailed study on Ibn Ṭufayl, in his book, *Ibn Thofail, sa vie et ses oeuvres*, which was originally presented as a doctoral thesis to the Faculté des Lettres, University of Paris. This book was published in 1909. The work is a well researched and erudite study which examines the life, works and sources of Ibn Ṭufayl. From the historical perspective, it is an excellent source book.⁵³

In our critique of Gauthier's work, one has to realize that some of the issues arise simply from the dated aspect, not merely from the point of view of content but also from the methodology. Recognizing this allows one to understand why issues such as "sources" and "originality" were central to Gauthier's thesis, since they validated (or invalidated) the particular argument that he aimed to put forward, or respond against.

Gauthier set the tone for debate among scholars on Ibn Ṭufayl. One issue that was taken up by scholars such as G. F. Hourani and S. S. Hawi is the question regarding the purpose (*le but*) of the narrative.⁵⁴ Gauthier was the first critic who focused our attention on the final episode of the encounter between

Ḥayy, Absāl and society, which he considered to be the most important segment of the narrative. However, he does not adequately justify why this is so. He simply states that quite often in a literary piece, it is the final section that contains the main thrust of the argument. The importance of the latter section of the narrative may be a valid response but Gauthier's argument is certainly weak and the work loses much due to this.

The other issue that has been subject to debate is the "originality" of Ibn Ṭufayl. In the above mentioned work, Gauthier declares that the originality of Ibn Ṭufayl lies in his use of the tale, whereas his strength in the field of philosophy lies in the assimilation of the thought of his predecessors. When this issue was later examined by Garcia Gomez who presents another tale as the source of Ibn Ṭufayl's story, Gauthier was forced to explain his earlier statements and still maintain Ibn Ṭufayl's "originality." However, Gauthier qualifies his understanding of Ibn Ṭufayl's *borrowing* versus *originality* in the first instance: "Ibn Thofāil est toujours original dans ses emprunts. Tout ce dont il s'empare, il le transforme; et ces transformations sont toujours heureuses, parce qu'elles n'apparaissent jamais que comme des conséquences imposées par le développement logique de la thèse qui sert à son oeuvre d'idée directrice et organisatrice."⁵⁵

Gauthier literally scales the field and threshes out all historical information regarding Ibn Ṭufayl, beside locating and examining a number of manuscripts of the narrative. His studies present the fundamental account of literary history that has been utilized by most other writers on the narrative. Beside his monograph, Gauthier published two editions and French translations of the narrative.⁵⁶ In the second edition, Gauthier collates additional manuscripts that had come to his attention and also adds a detailed introduction and several appendices in which he responds to some of the criticism levelled against him.

Mohammed Arkoun

Arkoun attempts to examine the role of the philosopher within society. He elucidates this issue through the explicit example of Ibn Ṭufayl⁵⁷ and to an extent

Ibn Rushd. Arkoun discusses how these two Maghribi philosophers lived in a society that was subject to the Almohad ideology and controlled by the doctrine of the *mālikite fuqahā*'.⁵⁸ He also examines the historical accounts of Marrākushī, underlining the points that indicate the intellectual and psychological conditions of philosophical reflection during this period.⁵⁹

Arkoun feels that *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* can be read as the autobiography of Ibn Ṭufayl⁶⁰ as well as a reflection of the problems that a philosopher had to face in society⁶¹ and the extent to which one could overcome them. Hence, he uses Ibn Ṭufayl as a case-study to examine the socio-political working of the Almohad Maghribi society. Arkoun feels that Ibn Ṭufayl's reflections in the main body of the tale and in the prologue aid in an understanding of the existing climate of the time. He notes that it was a period of cultural paradoxes and the works of Ibn Ṭufayl, Ibn Rushd and Maimonides contribute to the emergence of a kind of intellectual activity in Western Islamic culture which is distinct from any similar activity that might have occurred in the East.⁶²

Arkoun considers the cultural milieu in which one had to be well versed in the application of law of the *Mālikite* creed in order to gain royal favour. Hence, philosophy or intellectual activity was the domain of a very select few who had to work under taxing circumstances in order to hold royal favour.⁶³ It was a time when even *kalām* was considered irreligious. Arkoun considers that religion at the time was basically a means of legitimising the power of the *faqīh*. In this climate, an alternative was offered by Ibn Tūmart and his successors but the Almohad ideology had to found its legitimacy on the Qur'ān and ḥadīth in order to disqualify the opinions of the Mālikite 'doctors'.⁶⁴

Islamic philosophy in the Maghrib blossomed during the period of the Almohad prince Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf (d. 580/1184). Yet, according to Arkoun, the works of philosophers like Ibn Ṭufayl, Ibn Rushd and Maimonides were written under an inquisitorial climate. He feels that these thinkers could be better appreciated through a socio-critical reading of their works.⁶⁵

Through the accounts furnished by Marrākushī on Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn Rushd, Arkoun highlights the extenuating circumstances under which the personality of Ibn Ṭufayl succeeded to emerge. He points to the necessity of royal favours to "be known and appreciated" (as Ibn Rushd was after he was introduced by Ibn Ṭufayl to Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf) in order to be able to exercise "philosophical activity" with some degree of independence.⁶⁶ Ibn Ṭufayl was fortunate to have retained the amity of the Prince but the more unfortunate Ibn Rushd was later exiled and most of his works were banned by Abū Ya'qūb's successor.⁶⁷

According to Arkoun, one had to belong to a family of scholars, be connected to the power and well-grounded in the Arabo-Muslim culture of *adab*, *Qur'ān*, *ḥadīth*, *fiqh* in order to be included among the very small elite in twelfth century Andalusia who had access to a philosophical culture.⁶⁸ Even those with such a background did not necessarily condone philosophical studies and some of them vehemently opposed it. Philosophy it appeared (in the words of Marrākushī) was an "ornament of thought" limited to the very exceptional cases. Even where it existed, the distinction between the elite and masses had to be maintained. Hence, the philosopher-prince, Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf, presented a different facet of his personality when governing the state and limited his philosophical discussion to a small circle of intimate friends.⁶⁹

Arkoun views the intellectual development of Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn Rushd in contrast to the model of the Maghribi city based on the ideology of combat (*jihād*) and pressured by the Christian Reconquista.⁷⁰ Although the biographical details on Ibn Ṭufayl are scarce, Arkoun feels that one might understand Ibn Ṭufayl's character through his text. Thus, Arkoun considers the indirect formation of Ibn Ṭufayl's personality to be central. In other words, one might draw information from observations on the lack of an atmosphere conducive to philosophy, the lack of mention of Ibn Ṭufayl's teachers, whether his interest in philosophy was fuelled during his early years in the small village (Guadix) where he was brought up or in the large city (Granada) that he moved to, or his funeral being assisted by Abū Ya'qūb that was an uncommon honour. These observations

indicate Ibn Ṭufayl's elevation within the societal context. They reflect a character open to all forms of knowledge concerned with religious profundities and likened to the status of those "sages" who closely reflect the ideal of *al-insān al-kāmil*.⁷¹

The above analysis by Arkoun draws on the social climate and other aspects articulated through biographical and historical records by Marrākushī, but for the most part they are not directly reflected in the narrative itself. Arkoun explicates an important point by underlining the need for a socio-critical reading of the narrative, but fails to relate his social observations with the text of the narrative. Rather, he emphasizes a structure of learning (*ḥadīth, adab etc.*) that may not be relevant in the case of Ibn Ṭufayl. The few biographical details that we have on Ibn Ṭufayl's life indicate that he waited in line with other employees of the sultan to receive his pay, rather than set himself apart as a member of an educated elite, and that he introduced a young scholar (Ibn Rushd) to undertake the commentary on Aristotle which he was offered to commission, as Marrākushī informs us. Even if Arkoun's observations of the expected norms surrounding the role of the philosopher may be accurate, Ibn Ṭufayl broke away from these norms.

In a study of the narrative, one has to take into consideration the form and the substance of the work. Arkoun notes that the narrative is the combination of a *form* whose content is literary and a *substance* whose content is philosophical.⁷² He examines the different ways in which the narrative has been approached.⁷³ Arkoun proposes that the narrative should be read i) *critically*, or with an awareness of all the different readings of the narrative; ii) *comprehensively*, or recognizing the total meanings and functions of the work and iii) through the examination of the *ideological* function of Hayy.⁷⁴

Arkoun recognizes the distinct voices in the narrative - that of the narrator (N¹), that of the author, and that of the addressee (N²). In other words, he perceives an ideological difference between the prologue and the main narrative, whereby the narrator (of the prologue) is distinct from the author of the narrative.

However, Arkoun notes that the narrator intervenes in various parts of the main narrative, as the philosopher who underlines the value of a demonstration, or the logic of an argument. His voice is secondary to the author, though it is implicitly present.⁷⁵ Arkoun's analysis is certainly interesting. It recognizes the primary value of the recital and distinguishes it from the philosophy of the narrator and subsequently the philosophy of the prologue. However, by associating the didactic or explanatory glosses of the main narrative as its philosophy, his analysis succumbs to a narrow definition of *philosophy*. Arkoun does however emphasize a total reading of the narrative insisting that the Arabo-Islamic frame and the meaning that these symbols held within such a background have to be consciously remembered in any analysis.

Thus, Arkoun examines the *épistémè* or implicit thought in the narrative. He traces the *épistémè* in the narrative as being historically grounded, since the postulates in the narrative reflect the "mental space" of the author. With such a recognition, it is possible for our (modern) reading to recover this mental space. Accordingly, one can compare the narrative to the thought of Ghazālī or Ibn al-Nafīs since they belong to the shared (i.e cultural, psychological, historical) mental space within which Ibn Ṭufayl worked. However, it is erroneous to extract passages which are somewhat rational in order that one might compare Ibn Ṭufayl to modern Western thinkers such as Descartes, Husserl, Hume or de Chardin. I agree with Arkoun in this instance. The assumption of parallels without the context of transmission leads to undue generalization. However, we need to acknowledge that the process of translation also leads to the sharing of some aspects of this mental space and reiteration of other aspects outside this contextual realm that occur in the literary history and transmission of the Tufaylian narrative. The second error that Arkoun points to is obsession to assign at all costs the sources of the narrative. Arkoun sees the echoes of earlier writers in the narrative as part of a collective memory and not a servile repetition.

Arkoun divides the text into postulates that explore the relation between the work, the milieu and the mind by which it was created. He examines how these

postulates arise from the shared space that the author assumes of its readers and critics. For example, Ḥayy belongs from his birth to the elite who are endowed with an excellent nature (*fiṭrah*), the natural environment is good, hence no *restrictions* prevail against his inquisitive reason. The ideal spirit embodied by Ḥayy is possible because of the ideal mixture of simple elements, the ideal climate and so forth. These mixtures are only possible for certain men in certain "climates" and hence according to Arkoun's analysis, the expected distinction between elite and masses is maintained.⁷⁶

Arkoun also discusses the language of the narrative in relation to its ideological content in twelfth century Andalusia. His study suggests that the popularity of the narrative and its extensive dissemination should not allow the reader-critic to forget the meaning that a structural and contextual analysis of the narrative could derive.

Sami S. Hawi

Sami Hawi presents the narrative as the example and inspiration of modern philosophy. Hawi's thesis is to prove the philosophical basis of the narrative and its applicability to modern scientific thought:

Ibn Ṭufayl's naturalism stems from his disposition as a scientist assuming the role of a philosopher. Therefore, Ibn Ṭufayl's naturalism commits science to the service of philosophy.⁷⁷

This thesis is supported by analogical quotes that Hawi interposes in his study. The purpose of his study is also to prove the 'radical and naturalistic' approach that Ibn Ṭufayl uses. He suggests that Ibn Ṭufayl's work could well have served as a basis for many modern thinkers such as Hume, Descartes, Husserl, Darwin, Haekel, Chardin, Ryle, Spinoza, Kierkegaard, and so on. What Hawi recognizes although he does not articulate it in these terms is that the narrative represents a shift in philosophy whose significance can be perceived in retrospective within the overall development of modern thought.

Hawi does not wish merely to prove the philosophical content of the narrative as a 'treatise' but also that the form of the work -- referred to in separate occasions as a story, fiction, and allegory -- is in adherence to philosophical principles. This, Hawi feels, is made evident by the "methodical structure" of the work; by its contents which address the same issues that have also been used by philosophers like Ibn Rushd, in the 'normal' and 'nonfictional' form of the 'treatise.'⁷⁸ There is a clear tendency by Hawi to diminish the 'fictional' literary felicity in relation to the philosophical aspect.

Hawi indicates two prevalent aspects in Ibn Ṭufayl's thought - the scientific and the mystical approach. Hence, he traces the shift from an objective (=scientific /philosophical) perspective to a subjective (=mystical) end. He notes that while the initial section of the Tufaylian narrative adheres to a logical structure, the latter section has no logical basis since it is a subjective approach. This is considered to be another point to support his view that it is the naturalistic and philosophical aspects that are the main basis of Ibn Ṭufayl's thesis.

Hawi sees the movement and development of Ḥayy's thought from a rigorous naturalistic understanding of things to complete mysticism. Here again, one finds a separation between these two aspects of Ibn Ṭufayl's thought as viewed by Hawi. He aims at examining Ibn Ṭufayl's epistemological approach perceived through the workings of Ḥayy's mind. The usage of the 'fictive' is seen as a negation and an inferiorization of philosophy in Hawi's view, whereby the author (Ibn Ṭufayl) is approached solely for content without regard to the subtleness of his presentation.

Although Hawi sees Ibn Ṭufayl as a 'naturalistic mystic', he also feels that Ibn Ṭufayl's empirical approach justifies the identification of the work as belonging to the 'philosophical' realm. Intent on underlining the value of philosophy in the narrative that he perceives as being underestimated due to its 'fictional' form, Hawi is bound to an either/or approach, i.e. the text is not able to articulate itself outside pre-set models. The 'story' form of the work is presented as a process of dissemination. Hawi supports his arguments by the fact

that philosophers like Plato had used the story to convey a message that is ultimately didactic and theoretical.⁷⁹ However, the loss of aesthetic value in order to assign the rationale of structure to the narrative is not considered by Hawi.

With reference to Hayy's use of revelation as a mode of knowledge, Hawi notes that "the facts of revelation are subject to scrutiny and investigation by the philosopher" and gives the instance of Hayy's visit to Salāmān's land and "his attempts to examine and study the revealed Law according to which its inhabitants live."⁸⁰ This is an erroneous judgement. Whether Ibn Tūfayl considered revelation as *the* best method may be a debatable, but he certainly does not apply the same analytic approach utilized in the examination of the various philosophical issues that Hayy studies in his 'Aristotelian' phase. In the text of the narrative, the facts of revelation are *not* subject to the same scrutiny and investigation of the earlier phases of Hayy's life. In fact, Hayy had already applied philosophy to its fullest limit and had passed from it to the stage of contemplation, which, Hawi admits, cannot be logically deduced. Hayy accepts Absāl's account of some of the rules that condition the 'revealed' religion with reservation.⁸¹ He questions the wisdom of those rules that allow the acquisition of wealth and the excessive consumption of food. Hayy (in his naturalism) had seen the necessity to organize his own set of rules by his emulations that insured him against any sort of excessiveness. Later, the mystic realizes that all humans are not built for an ascetic life. Absāl himself observes that tradition was in harmony with Hayy's 'reason'.⁸² What Hayy sees is a lack of understanding of the message of revelation by the masses. Hayy is not able to fully comprehend the necessity of laws that delimit the individual's spiritual capacity. It is his exposure to society which makes him aware that the different strata of society have different needs. Yet, Hayy does not subject revelation itself to an analytic study: he questions the values of society and its ignorance of reality, whether clothed in symbols (as in the revealed message) or devoid of them (as in the mystical apprehension of Hayy).

Aiming towards a scientific approach, Hawi misses out on the aesthetic meaning of the narrative. He is so intent on proving Ibn Tufayl's modernity that he loses touch with the work itself. He gives it a superficial facelift by isolating it from its cultural and social context. Hawi says that one "cannot find any *legitimate* objections of a methodological or logical nature to the *retrospective* application of modern philosophical tendencies in evaluating the views of previous philosophers and in comparing them with modern ones."⁸³ The result of this methodology is an examination of Ibn Tufayl's thought in the light of modern *Western* thought. By this approach, the author wishes to avoid the perception of an Islamic philosopher from merely a cultural perspective and seeing him in the light of a universal i.e. 'western philosophical' perspective.

Lenn E. Goodman

Goodman approaches the narrative⁸⁴ from various stands such as

1. Educational Philosophy.
2. Religious Philosophy.
3. Man and Society.

Educational Philosophy: Goodman feels that the premise of the narrative poses problems of educational philosophy. Hayy develops through the learning stages of childhood imitation to practical reason, to the spiritualization of nature, and then from being wonder-struck to the stages of knowledge and wisdom of self-realization.⁸⁵ Further, Hayy represents something more than himself; he represents all [hu]mankind, which is evident by his spontaneous birth, his Adam-like position, his discovery of fire, etc.

Goodman sees points of comparison with Dewey's educational philosophy of freeing the child from the traumatic habit-forming atmosphere. However, there also exist points of difference - Hayy is given free rein and progresses towards perfection, whereas Dewey's child still remains with the "socially useful behaviour" category. It is because Hayy is endowed "with natural capacity for brilliance, boldness, curiosity, goodness, in other words his *fitra*."⁸⁶ Goodman

sees the *fiṭrah* as being a person's nature or genius. With his emphasis on this natural capacity, Goodman leaves the comparison with Dewey and aims to transfer Ḥayy back into the Muslim milieu. Goodman further emphasizes, what he terms as Ḥayy's "radical monotheism", that assumes the "god-given gift" of the *fiṭrah* as pervasive,⁸⁷ whereby the notion of "authentic" nature is opposed to the "unlearned" nature.⁸⁸ Thus, Goodman appears to reject the metaphor of the "self-taught" philosopher. While *fiṭrah* does not automatically correspond to a evolutionistic concept of "nature" and is not a directly analogous concept to the *tabula rasa* (which allows the possibility of autodidacticism), Goodman's emphasis marginalizes Ḥayy's rational discoveries.

Goodman further compares Ibn Ṭufayl with Rousseau's rejection of the "habit-forming" tendency of society. Yet, Rousseau fosters the growth of Emile and rejects the notion of him being left alone in nature that would result in a savage being.⁸⁹ In the case of Ḥayy, Goodman further notes that Ḥayy is never alone because of his *fiṭrah*.⁹⁰ This view is somewhat misleading. While the *fiṭrah* is 'present' in Ḥayy, the presence of the Divine is 'discovered'. This is what prevents Ḥayy from being a "chosen one" whose destiny is sealed and possibly a reason why he is ultimately not able to teach in the manner of a prophet.

Religious Philosophy: Goodman studies how Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy relates to the three categories: rational, mass and mystic religion. He feels that the composition of the narrative is a rationalist's affair for it gives a rational introduction to the nature of mystical experience. Mass religion, according to Goodman's interpretation, remains for Ḥayy, a veiled glimpse of truth since it would not be possible, nor beneficial for society to transcend cultural categories of thought and value by which its very nature is formed.⁹¹

Man and society: Goodman explores the use of the metaphor by Ibn Ṭufayl to render his notions of the relations of "Man and Society" which the author uses as a situative premise. Goodman also studies the role of nature in the narrative.

Goodman traces five basic metaphors to his study of the narrative. These postulates are i) the basic versus the superstructure, ii) the natural versus the artificial, iii) element versus complex, iv) primitive versus civilized and v) the attribution of a mythical time-frame.⁹²

In an attempt to see the relevance of the narrative in a universal context, Goodman uses a 'western' frame of reference. With reference to the relation of Man and Society, Goodman compares *Ḥayy ibn Yaḡzān* with William Golding's *Lord of the Flies*.⁹³ Analogies are drawn between Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy of Education and those of Rousseau, Dewey and Locke. With regard to a Philosophy of Religious Education, he places Ibn Ṭufayl in the same platform as W. D. Ross, Walter Lippman, Reinhold Niebuhr. Goodman's application could have gained considerable insight if he had traced metaphors drawn from Muslim mysticism and philosophy. The result of a comparison of the narrative versus *Lord of the Flies* in a thesis/antithesis situation forwards some interesting observations. However, the *Lord of the Flies* could have been substituted by some other story with structural and archetypal commonalities.⁹⁴

Goodman's comparison of Ibn Ṭufayl's thought with the large body of Western literature and philosophy is arbitrary. He uses the established framework of Western thought as the point of reference for the interpretation of the Tufaylian narrative. Yet, we also note a serious interest to reveal all the nuances of Ibn Ṭufayl's thought, which impels Goodman to examine Ibn Ṭufayl's educational and religious philosophy in relation to similar developments in Western thinkers. He also notes that the narrative is more than a mouthpiece for Ibn Ṭufayl's religious or educational philosophy; if this were the case "its interest would be at least historical, but at best academic."⁹⁵ Hence, Goodman does not intend to actively separate the risālah from the Muslim milieu in which it was written (as he has been criticized by Arkoun). He notes that Ibn Ṭufayl "was born a Muslim in a Muslim country and he remained a Muslim all his life."⁹⁶ One might thus see Goodman's study as a Western reader-response to Ibn Ṭufayl's thought, by relating the story of Ḥayy to the cultural and philosophical development of

humankind.

Malti-Douglas⁹⁷

A feminist critique of literature might be approached from two premises - presence and absence. The large corpus of 'past' literature (as well as other forms of the written word, or articulated image) primarily reflect the genius of men and an absence of female voice. The process of retrieving the female voice takes different directions; seeking oral literature; female and nature-centred spiritualities that are less concerned with perceived patriarchal hierarchies; showing the strong presence of the female in the early phase of religions (in Christianity and Islam) and subsequent annihilation through hierarchical power control of religious authority.⁹⁸

One mode of retrieving the female presence is through the analysis of the images of women (primarily written by men) as reflective of their roles in the particular society, which is the primary thesis of Malti-Douglas. Malti-Douglas makes a significant observation indicating that the valorization of a particular role, as that of Shahrazād in *The Thousand and One Nights* does not reflect the empowerment of the female, since she is placed in a mould that reflects her shrewdness and cunning, her ability to manipulate situations and ultimately, the use of her body, female charms and sexuality to lure the unsuspecting and helpless male, rather than her intellectual prowess. In the case of the female narrator, woman's body defines and predominates woman's word. Thus, presence itself is no indication of power, just as the positive use of the female metaphor is not tied to female empowerment. Malti-Douglas discusses the blatant sexual mores in *adab* literature to illustrate her view. The openness of sexuality in Islamic culture as opposed to the prudishness that often accompanies religious traditions is an interesting point, but it does not of itself indicate an equal relation.

Moving from *adab* literature to the area of philosophy, Malti-Douglas selects Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* to reflect what we have termed as the presence and absence motif. What Malti-Douglas observes is that beside the

absence of female protagonists, the presence of minor female characters, such as Hayy's mother (.) (both human and animal), and other references to female presence indicate the misogynist intent of the narrative.

Having a strong interest in feminist and hermeneutical critiques to literature as well as to the narrative in question, I will attempt to articulate a response to Malti-Douglas. This analysis focuses primarily on her response to philosophical and mystical works, the representative example that she uses for her analysis being the Tufaylian narrative while other narratives in the cycle (such as Jāmī's) are seen as supplements to indicate the overall misogynic intent of their authors. *Hayy ibn Yaqzān* does stand out in terms of the absence of female characters. However, this observation should be seen in the context of the narrative having only three main characters, Hayy, Salāmān and Absāl.

In terms of seeing the Tufaylian narrative as a socio-critical response, I would like to use the first version of Hayy's birth as an example. It is primarily a critique of authoritarian rule of monarchy as opposed to the freedom of individual development that Hayy's growth represents. Hayy's mother is forced to abandon her child fearing the wrath of her brother, the king. The burden of criticism levelled on this action is not placed on the mother but on the brother and on the society that he rules. Hayy is subsequently allowed to grow without the debilitating influences of society. Since no moral judgement is laid on Hayy's mother (or father who is even more absent in this instance), it implies a criticism of the society. In a less constricted society, the individual would have developed freely (even Absāl had to leave) and would not have required such an action or sacrifice. Since there is no attempt to "reconcile" Hayy with his parents or normative society,⁹⁹ it would indicate that Hayy did not "lose out" by being born under circumstances generally assumed to be socially unacceptable. Likewise, the philosopher in Ibn Ṭufayl is not the Philosopher-King. This also reflects a radical departure from the norms of philosophical culture. Solitude is not a vice - it is a virtue that is extolled.

Malti-Douglas sees the other form of female presence -- the gazelle, Hayy's

foster mother -- as being denigrated in the narrative. The nurturer becoming the brunt of the butcher through the process of dissection. The dissection of the gazelle is shocking to our modern sensibilities in two ways; first through the actual process of dissection (in the noble name of science and progress) and second through the desecration of the mother-nurturer that Malti-Douglas suggests takes on the meaning of incest. I recognize these two responses as being conditioned by the horizons of expectation of our time: the first one responding to the criticism of animals being used in experimentation and other ecological concerns; the second through the shift in sensibilities and expectations regarding the body and the soul. In other words, the action of dissecting the gazelle is sanctioned in the narrative since it aims to discover the spirit, the true entity that constitutes the "real" mother.¹⁰⁰ Our grounding in the physical body as representative of life might create a biased response to Hayy's action that should be understood in the context of his quest for the spirit. If the gazelle is considered more suitable "to fill this function [of the human female] as our thoughtful narrator so cleverly did in Ibn Ṭufayl's narrative",¹⁰¹ it is to fulfil the absence of human and societal participation in Hayy's development. One might further note that this event occurs in the immature and animal stage of Hayy's (and thus humanity's) development. Hayy later goes out of his way to consciously protect every creature or natural object through vegetarianism, healing animals and preserving and enhancing the natural habitat, that is paradoxically in tune with the current horizon of expectation mentioned above.¹⁰²

Nature (*ṭabīʿah*) then is the third female presence in the narrative. Current feminist research has delved into the use of female metaphors and whether these correlate to the perception of females in the societies that engender these metaphors.¹⁰³ There is no consensus on this matter. However, symbols are polysemic and while their gendered usage might be significant, they do not merely signify.¹⁰⁴ Studies in the phenomenology of religion by Henry Corbin give us abundant examples of what is lost when symbols are 'explained', even in the understanding of commentators that is concurrent to the genre and cultural

milieu.¹⁰⁵

The major aspect of Malti-Douglas's thesis however focuses on the imaginary island of *waq waq*. Other aspects that she discusses seem to embellish her critique rather than represent the core of the argument. The island of *waq waq* is the lore and fantasy of Arab geographers, who write about an island "where women [sic] grow on trees."¹⁰⁶ The metaphor of *waq waq* does not logically fit into a literary analysis of the narrative, since Hayy grows up in *isolation* - the central legitimization of the whole narrative on which all postulates are dependent.

Some versions of the manuscript of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān* refer to the island of *waq waq* where women grew on trees. Gauthier considers this addition an interpolation that is confirmed by no further reference to these creatures in the rest of the narrative. However, Malti-Douglas uses this as her central point of reference to indicate Ibn Ṭufayl's perversity and this is the weakness of her thesis. Many of the Arabic editions of the narrative do include this interpolation but the fact that it is inconsistent with the rest of the narrative, the late versions of the manuscripts and the absence of any cross references by Marrākushī and Ibn Khaldūn is sufficient evidence to consider it an interpolation. Its use by Malti-Douglas is also reflective of the reception of the narrative and the processes of change that it subsequently goes through.

Thus, a major problem arises from the application of methodology by the author. The methods of literature cannot be directly applied to medieval Islamic philosophy and mysticism without a recognition of particular meanings assigned to the literary forms and genres within the philosophical mode. The methodology assigned to dualities make them appear as problematic and hierarchical. If a discussion of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān* applies the model of the dialogue or a hermeneutical approach that is concerned with "meaning", it would resolve such dualities in terms of relationality.

Malti-Douglas considers Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān* as a male utopia from which the female presence is ruled out. In the context of her analysis of

Arabo-Islamic literature, she sees the Tufaylian narrative as another representation of the homosocial norm. However, the rejection of sexuality in the Tufaylian narrative is not so much the denial of female presence as it is a total rejection of male and female sexuality, that is considered a limitation toward the achievement of the highest degree of ascetic spirituality. This form of spirituality, though far from being the norm in Islamic societies, had both male and female adherents.

Malti-Douglas cites the only explicit example of Ḥayy's sexuality in the narrative - in his realization of sexual drive and his attempts to repress the 'activities' of the lower body as being inferior to the mind. I consider this acknowledgement by Ibn Ṭufayl to be important. It is not surprising in the context of asceticism and is gender neutral. It is a recognition that Ḥayy as a male with sexual drives would deal with them in whatever way solitary males in or outside society would, but as an ascetic or hermit he would ultimately aim to suppress or overcome them. Malti-Douglas's critique might be aimed at asceticism and its denial of sexuality in general, but the illustrative example in this case is not different from the various ascetic movements that have been a part of religious spirituality. It is one more example of Ḥayy's human nature, just as Ḥayy also learns through experience the necessity for balance between the demands of his body, such as nutrition, exercise etc., along with spiritual exercises. Malti-Douglas uses the example to indicate that the narrative is not entirely free from sexual references even though its author tries to free it from an active female role. The acknowledgement, especially in this narrative which is very different from the sexual overtones of the other examples of literature that Malti-Douglas analyzes, is an indication that the perception of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* as 'type' can be questioned.

The female is affirmed as the nurturing principle in the gazelle as mother, but any sexual presence is absent. Even though the role of the female as mother, or nurturer might be seen as a limitation, it is not so in the particular context and chronological frame. The author aims to reject or transcend the chronological frame, but the work like any other is rooted in its social and historical contexts.

In the other examples that Malti Douglas uses, the historical period is taken as *de facto*, even if it is not used as a basis of the argument; we know enough about the social context of the *Thousand and One Nights* as well as *adab* literature. On the other hand, to take *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* totally out of the social context of which its author, Ibn Ṭufayl, is presenting such a strong criticism, is to rule out the total validity of his argument.

Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān is a work of social criticism. It is not an affirmation of a homosocial utopia. Even the utopic elements of the narrative which make it conducive to typification need to be re-examined from a socio-cultural perspective. If anything, it is a denial of such a homosocial society. The narrative presents human beings in society as avaricious and materialistic. The human being can survive in such a society as an animal. It is only as an individual that the human can transcend physical limitations through a process of mental growth that is achieved through one's own experiences, the limitations that the human as a social being gives in to. The final responsibility is that of the individual who has to be to him/herself like an island, fully concentrated on the Principle. Companionship even of the homosocial variety [with Absāl] is perceived as a limitation, just as language is a metaphor used by revealed religion. Ḥayy's meeting with Absāl is a retardation. It creates new habits, the habits of the more affluent and sophisticated society from which Absāl hails. He develops a taste for fancy foods which entails the denial of simplicity as a principle of his ascetic life.¹⁰⁷

By considering the choice of asceticism on the part of a male as a denial of female sexuality, one is unconsciously limiting the role of the female to that of a sexual receptacle. Asceticism (and denial of sexuality) was a choice available to both the sexes. Just as the denial of sexuality through asceticism may be considered sexist, so is its celebration, for example in *adab* literature, because in the latter case, the female sex is objectified through presence, just as she is annihilated through absence. This point is validated in the light of feminist critiques of religion and philosophy. *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* might well be seen as a

glaring example of absence, but unfortunately, it is presence that receives the greater impetus of Malti-Douglas's argument - the presence of the female sexuality of *waq waq* which is as central to her argument as the cover pages of her book.

Summation

Of the various approaches, Goodman and Hawi create a form akin to Averroism by praising *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* on the basis of its resemblance to western philosophies like those of Descartes. Another form of reaction that is taken is the ideology of arabism discussed by Arkoun. Arkoun himself underlines the need for a socio-cultural approach. Both praising versions by Goodman and Hawi lead to the reactive critique by Malti-Douglas, that comes out of the context of earlier criticisms of the Averroistic kind as well as being grounded in her critique of *adab* prose. The central dimension of spirituality is lost through these processes of transmission. Such a loss is not sudden and occurs through the process of earlier criticism.

Eventually the text speaks outside its context, so even its critique is an appropriation into other contexts. This is a reason for its enduring appeal, greater when compared to the Avicennan recitals or Jāmī's poetry that can reach only a few due to their specialized symbolism. The problems of Jāmī's text in relation to a feminist critique are more obvious, and thus less attractive to being the central focus of any analysis.¹⁰⁸ With Ibn Ṭufayl as well, misogyny may appear pronounced through female absence. However, one must reconsider that there are only three characters in the narrative and the scene is focused only on one. Even Absāl's presence is incidental to the degree that the last part of the narrative is considered by many as a normative expedient to explain revelation. Further, one must also recognize the narrative as symbolic data 'explainable' within the phenomenology of religion.

Endnotes to Chapter 2

1. Samuel Chew, *The Crescent and the Rose: Islam and England during the Renaissance* (1937; rpt. New York: Octagon Books, 1965).
2. Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image* (1960; rpt. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1980).
3. R. W. Southern, *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages* (Camb. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962).
4. Cf. Phillip C. Almond, *Heretic and Hero: Muhammad and the Victorians* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1989). Almond gives us an analysis of the varied material and approaches to Muhammad during the Victorian period, including brief references to historical studies by Simon Ockley (*ibid.* 45, 90), one of the eighteenth century translators of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*.
5. An interesting case study of such a travel journey is recorded by George Sandys' *Relation of a Journey*, studied by Jonathan Hayes, *The Humanist as Traveler* (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1986), 13-22. This minor classic of the Renaissance has all the characteristics that formulate orientalism: a search for past origins of western and Judeo-Christian civilizations, an exoticization of the past history of Egypt, Phoenicia and Crete, a "confrontation with Islam, which for the Renaissance was the central instance of cultural otherness, a direct military and cultural threat" and so forth. Sandys stands "at the conjunction of two great historical events: the consolidation of the humanist culture in England and the foundation of the British Empire." The orientalism is seen for example in the illustrations whereby the Muslim presence is either ignored or personified as a tyrannical Turkish Sultan contrasted with the Virgin or some other exemplification of virtue in western consciousness.
6. Chew, *The Crescent*, 121.
7. Chew, *The Crescent*, vii.
8. The Robinsonade refers to a genre of fiction that was primarily modelled on Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*. The works that fall under this category share

a range of characteristics such as being marooned or castaway on an uninhabited island, having to survive in the wilds, encounters with the savage, discovering new and exotic lands, the myth of empire and colonization. Cf. Martin Green, *The Robinson Crusoe Story* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1990). The Robinsonade aspect and its comparison to *Hayy* will be discussed further in chapter six in relation to the European transmission.

9. Martha Pike Conant, *The Oriental Tale in England in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1966), xii, 48-49; 126-131. Conant studies the Oriental tale in the eighteenth century and recognizes Edward Pococke (through the Tufaylian narrative) as being one of its earliest disseminators in the seventeenth century. Based primarily on the Bookseller's preface to Ockley's translation, Conant considers that Defoe might have used Ockley's translation for some descriptions in *Robinson Crusoe* (p. 129). She sees "a link between the work of seventeenth century orientalist like Dr. Pococke and the oriental tales of our period; [and also] as an example of the exaltation of the "natural man" found earlier in *Oroonoko* and later in the works of Rousseau" (pp. 130-131) thus indicating the line of transmission at the most cursory level of her brief remarks.

10. Southern, 91-92; 108-109; cf. Said, *Orientalism*, 1st. ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 55, 62.

11. Daniel, 2.

12. Richard Walzer, *Islamic Philosophy*, in *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western*, Vol. II (London: Allen & Unwin, 1953), 120-48; *On the Legacy of the Classics in the Islamic World*, in *Festschrift Bruno Snell* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1956), 189-96. Both these articles were reprinted in Walzer, *Greek into Arabic: Essays on Islamic Philosophy* (1962; Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970), 1-28; 29-37. Walzer's seminal studies aim to indicate the valuable contribution of Arabic philosophy to the classical western heritage. He notes that the Arab philosophers need to be recognized within their own context but feels that classicists are unaware of the extent to which they enliven the discussions of central philosophical issues. Walzer has also edited the works of Arab philosophers (primarily Fārābī) and Arabic translations of Greek classics. Cf. *Plato Arabus* (London, 1943; Krauss rpt., 1979).

13. Daniel, 9.

14. I. A. Netton, *Allāh Transcendent: Studies in the Structure and Semiotics of Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Cosmology* (London & New York: Routledge, 1989). With the exception of this study, the other authors mentioned above have been discussed further in this chapter and will be cited accordingly.

15. Terry Eagleton, *Phenomenology, Hermeneutics and Reception Theory*, in *Literary Theory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 54-90; Eagleton cites Husserl (p. 55) and draws the connection of reception theory to phenomenology.

16. Hans Robert Jauss, *Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics*, tr. Michael Shaw and introd. by Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982a), ix. The application of reception theory is most clearly explicated in Jauss's *Question and Answer: Forms of Dialogic Understanding*, ed. and tr. by Michael Hays (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989) where he applies his analysis to particular religious and philosophical texts. See also Jauss, *Toward an Aesthetic of Reception*, tr. Timothy Bahti (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982a), 8, 22-29, 35; Z. Konstantinovic *et al.*, (ed.) *Literary Communication and Reception*, Proceedings of the IXth Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association, Innsbruck, 1979 (Innsbruck: Inst. für Sprachwiss. d. Univ., 1980).

17. Jauss, *Question and Answer*, 3.

18. Godzich, *Introduction*, in *Aesthetic Experience*, xii. There are several examples in the area of Islamic philosophy as well as in Averroism of such monumentalization that has meant until recently the exclusion of Shi'ah thought within the overview of Islamic philosophy or the marginalization of Isma'ili theologians due to the critical overview of Islamic philosophy as a hierarchy beginning with Kindī and ending with Ibn Rushd.

19. Godzich, xii-xiii.

20. The classic citations for the history of the movement from "reception theory" toward -- and through -- "reader-response criticism" are Jane Tompkins, *Reader-response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-structuralism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1980) and Susan Suleiman and Inge Crosman, *The Reader in the Text: Essays on Audience and Interpretation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), both of which are historical anthologies of reader-response works.

21. Michael Hays, *Foreword*, in Jauss, *Question and Answer*, vii.

22. Hays, ix.

23. Jauss, *Question and Answer*, 148-194.

24. Cited above.

25. Said, *The World, the Text and the Critic* (Camb., Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983); *Beginnings: Intention and Method* (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

26. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, 5th prt. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1993).

27. Said, *Orientalism*, 1.

28. *Ibid.*, 2.

29. Said, *The World, the Text and the Critic*, 4.

30. Said, *Culture*, xii.

31. Cf. Saad, *Ḥayy bin Yaḡzān*, 2nd. ed. (Beirut: Dār al-afāq al-jadīdah, 1978). The criticism on the Robinson Crusoe connection has ranged from drawing parallels (Saad) to the rejection of such connections (Salih). The methodology utilized by Said with regard to new approaches by decolonized nations reflects the value and possibility of analyzing the narrative within the framework of post-colonial literature.

The rejection of Ibn Ṭufayl's originality by interpreters in early western critiques is countermanded by the recollection of diverse literature in Arab critiques primarily focusing on tales of adventure that drew from *Ḥayy ibn Yaḡzān* as source. The more prevalent element among reader-critics, translators and transmitters of the narrative has focused on the story as an adventure tale that has universally evoked the imagination, whereas the central spiritual 'message' has not gained much attention. It is a clear indication that Ibn Ṭufayl's choice of 'fiction' over 'treatise' accounts for its wide appreciation.

Although preceding the colonial age, the society in which Ibn Ṭufayl lived might have shared some parallel elements with colonized nations; cf. Mohammed Arkoun, *Ibn Tufayl ou le philosophe dans la cité almohade, Les Africains*, IV, 263-287. Reprinted in *Pour une critique de la raison islamique* (Paris: Editions Larose, 1984), 327-348. *Ḥayy ibn Yaḡzān* might be approached within these sets of expectation with which it shares common elements.

32. Said, *Culture*, xxi. Said himself does not analyze the inter-connection between *Ḥayy ibn Yaḡzān* and *Robinson Crusoe*. Rather, this is my application of Said's analysis of post-colonial literature and *Robinson Crusoe*.

33. Said, *Culture*, xii.

34. Cf. Jauss, *Question and Answer*, 4-5. Citing Wolfgang Iser, Jauss notes that the fictive is also the communicative. He examines in detail the dialogical relation between fiction and reality. This relationship is central to the Tufaylian narrative. It also influences the reception by reader-critics such as Gauthier, Hawi and Fradkin according to which aspect of this dialectic they emphasize.

35. Said, *Culture*, xii.

36. Malti-Douglas, *Woman's Body, Woman's Word: Gender and Discourse in Arabo-Islamic Writing* (1991; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 77. Malti-Douglas notes that Hayy refers to the gazelle as "his mother" only after the dissection. She stretches the narrative by suggesting that "the narrator could not acknowledge the gazelle as mother until she was clearly eliminated. [!] And this elimination involves not only her death but her physical destruction by her metaphorical son" though Malti-Douglas earlier acknowledges that the gazelle fulfilled the maternal role, and subsequently, Hayy fulfilled the role of the 'son' by taking care of his 'mother' in her old age. For the further analysis of Malti-Douglas' critique, see the section below on approaches to the narrative.

37. Said, *Culture*, xiii.

38. Said, *Culture*, xiv.

39. *Ibid.*

40. Cf. Said, *Beginnings: Intention and Method*, 3-37. Said discusses the various ramifications of "beginnings" whether in terms of how an author begins a work, how s/he departs from other works, what constitutes its relation with other works and so forth. Said considers the questions of beginning like Jauss would consider the "shift in the horizon of expectation". These theses have inspired us to look at *Hayy* in terms of its physical beginnings which in themselves open up to alternative interpretations by the use of two versions of Hayy's birth. See also Hasanali, *Ibn Tufayl's Hayy*, 118-20, for a discussion on *muthos* and *logos*. The propensity with *origins* that is a concern of *muthos* as opposed to *logos* may suggest a useful pattern to study the Tufaylian narrative which accomplishes its structure by this circular movement from *muthos* to *logos* that 'explains' why the function of the 'story' may not be seen either as dissemination or a cover for its 'philosophy'. Heath provides an interesting analysis on *muthos* and *logos* as two different modes of discourse that subsequently aim at different results in the reader. Heath, *Allegory*, 8-9.

41. Fradkin, 13-14, no. 4; 93-120. Fradkin considers the choice of the two versions of Hayy's birth as crucial to understanding Hayy's radical solitude. He considers the second "social" account of Hayy's origins as being central to Ibn Tufayl and disagrees with Gauthier and Hawi who deem it as the "traditional" view to offset Ibn Tufayl's theories on spontaneous generation.

42. Ibn Tufayl, *Hayy*, 81.

43. Cf. Leila Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate* (Yale University Press, 1992). Leila Ahmed in her discussion of the political ideologies of colonialism in Egypt gives the example of how Lord Cromer, an anti-suffragist in England, strove to explicate the use of the 'veil' to

underline the 'backwardness' of women in Islam in order to indicate the weakness of the religion and its male adherents who promote such 'violations' in their own society.

44. Daniel, *Islam and the West*, 7, 295. Daniel considers Humphrey Prideaux's *The True Nature of Imposture Fully Displayed in the Life of Mahomet* (1697) as the last work of a dying breed that preferred "the unpleasant and untrue versions of the history of Muḥammad and tenets and practices of Islam." This issue is debatable. The period of translations of the Tufaylian narrative does mark a new attitude toward the study of Islam, but sources like Prideaux continued to be used in general scholarship.

45. Some recent approaches revise past critiques. For example, the critique by Malti-Douglas cited above reflects a reading of the narrative in terms of its [in]coherence to feminist studies and thus fosters a means of communication relevant to a new context within a new set of expectations. Whether this particular approach results in a reduction of symbols by viewing the narrative outside its own mythical horizon, or outside the phenomenology of religion might be debated, but such a concern might not be central to the critique that is grounded in a different frame of reference.

46. This process of transmission is discussed in the works of Fakhry, Endress and Anawati among others. See G. Endress and P. Schoonheim, *The Transmission of Greek Texts in Medieval Islam and the West* (Bochum: Studienverlag N. Brockmeyer, 1986); M. Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy* (1970; New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); G. Anawati and Louis Gardet, *Mystique Musulmane: Aspects et tendances, expériences et techniques*, 4th ed. (Paris: 'Vrin, 1986).

47. There are other reasons why Ghazālī may have been 'partially' received including the attribution of spurious and incomplete works. Cf. Hermann Landolt, *Ghazālī and "Religionwissenschaft"* in *Asiatische Studien/ Études Asiatiques* XLV, 1 (1991), 19-72. The questions raised by Landolt and issues surrounding Ghazālī will be discussed further in chapter three in relation to the authorship of the prologue to the Tufaylian narrative.

48. Cf. M. Marmura, *The Philosopher and Society: Some Medieval Arabic discussions*. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, I, no. 4 (1979), 310-11.

49. Heath, 149-54. Heath's discussion of the "Interpretation and Function of the Allegory" with regard to Apostleship is especially interesting - what would Ibn Tufayl's Ḥayy endowed with knowledge comparative to the prophet represent in this regard? Heath indicates that Gutas' grasp of hermeneutics in approaching the question of the 'recital' "obviates the necessity for either positing or searching esoteric elements." This [supposedly] allows the critic to engage with the material

at hand rather than bemoan its loss or marginalize it as belonging to a particular phase (Goichon). Heath further sees the Avicennan recital of Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān as a definite and independent form of self-expression that reflects the development of Ibn Sīnā's thought. Thus, the *Logos* and the *Muthos* are two different modes of expression and need to be valued in terms of their application.

50. See the chapter on Adam in Ibn 'Arabī, *The Bezels of Wisdom*, tr. R. W. J. Austin (London: SPCK, 1980), 50-58.

51. For example, the critique by Pastor who purports to look at the idea of Robinson Crusoe but actually presents some examples of the European translations of the Tufaylian narrative. Garcia Gomez traces an oriental tale of Alexander as the common for the narratives by Ibn Ṭufayl and Balthasar Gracian, or the examination of the role of the Islamic philosopher in society by Marmura (see chapter three).

52. Solomon Munk, *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe* (Paris: J Vrin, 1857), 410-18.

53. The major works on Ibn Ṭufayl undertaken by Gauthier include his monograph (1909) and two editions of the Arabic text with a detailed introduction and several appendices. Despite the numerous editions of the text, Gauthier's second edition (1936) is still the standard source that is also used in this study. L. Gauthier, *Introduction in Ḥayy ben Yaqdhān: roman philosophique d'Ibn Thofāil*, 2nd rev. ed. (1936; rpt. Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1984), 7-92; *Ibn Thofāil, sa vie ses oeuvres* (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1909).

54. G. F. Hourani, *The Principal Subject*, 40-46. Hawi's critique of Gauthier is discussed below.

55. Gauthier, *Ibn Thofāil*, 89.

56. Cited above.

57. M. Arkoun, *Ibn Ṭufayl*, 263-287.

58. A comparison of Arkoun's views with Oliver Leaman's is quite interesting. Leaman basically presents the same "historical" framework as Arkoun but assumes that the [practical] presence of the *mālikite fuqahā* was not a problem for Ibn Rushd (or was just a "temporary" problem) and Ibn Ṭufayl. However, the example he gives is not quite convincing, i.e. Ibn Rushd produced a (just one!) Mālikite law text along with his commentaries on Aristotle. Oliver Leaman, *Averroes and his Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 1-3.

59. See D. M. Dunlop, *Philosophical Predecessors and Contemporaries of Ibn Bājjah*, *Islamic Quarterly*, II (1955), 102-103. Interestingly, Dunlop in this early study uses citations from Marrākushī to indicate a different role of the philosopher than Arkoun. He notes that "the advantages in practice of a philosophical training" reflecting the official "presence status of the philosopher in these [Almoravid and Almohad] courts was evidently not an isolated phenomenon." Accordingly, this situation allowed a philosopher such as Malik b. Wuhaib to act as a protégé to Ibn Bājjah and similarly allowed Ibn Tufayl to promote Ibn Rushd to the Almohad court.

60. Arkoun, 271.

61. Arkoun, 270.

62. Arkoun, 267.

63. Arkoun, 266.

64. Arkoun, 267.

65. *Ibid.*

66. The politics of patronage recurs for example among the English translators such as Pococke and Ockley who were dependent on and sometimes circumscribed by patronage, as discussed in chapter six.

67. Arkoun, 267. Arkoun, however, de-emphasizes that Ibn Rushd's fall from grace lasted only for a year, even though the 'official ban' on philosophy remained.

68. I. A. Netton, *Al-Fārābī and His School* (London/N.Y: Routledge, 1992), 4-5, 21-24. Netton discusses the politics of patronage and the court, where Fārābī is cited by historians as going against the norms of expected behaviour by his sufic garb, and other poets such as al-Mutanabī (915-65) had no qualms over their claims to rewards.

69. Arkoun, 270.

70. Arkoun, 271.

71. Arkoun, 272.

72. Arkoun, 273.

73. The three approaches that Arkoun characterizes are
i) An empathic reading which enters directly into the semantic, intellectual and

spiritual world of Hayy, as is the methodology employed by most Arab writers and by the early translators.

ii) An intertextual reading conforming to the 'history of ideas' methodology undertaken by Goodman and Hawi that bases itself on preset Western Classical medieval models and excludes the social, psychological and ideological function of works in their native milieu.

iii) A projective reading that approaches the narrative as "le précurseur génial des plus grands philosophes modernes!" Its adherents include the ideologists of Arabism as well as some writers of Western Universities. Arkoun cites S. S. Hawi and L. E. Goodman as examples of such an interpretation. Arkoun, 274.

74. Arkoun, 274.

75. Arkoun, 274-75.

76. Arkoun, 278-79.

77. S. Hawi, *Islamic Naturalism*, 88.

78. *Ibid.*, 26, 30-32, 36. Hawi feels that the methodological approach and philosophical content justify the definition of the narrative as a 'treatise'. Yet he is constantly on the defense and often comes close to contradicting himself although he always suggests an alternative possibility.

79. Heath shows how the allegory was seen of limited value by Plato, who uses it extensively. He cautions against the assumption that a particular genre (as Hawi does in his notion of "treatise") or literary form (like the allegory) have a single unequivocal meaning. One might thus speak of an Islamic allegory being bound by different characteristics than a western, or several western modes of the allegory. Cf. Heath, 151. Arkoun argues on similar lines when he speaks of the shared mental space that provides a basis of comparison between ibn Ṭufayl and Ghazālī, but rejects a de-contextualized comparison of Ibn Ṭufayl with western philosophers.

80. Hawi, 183.

81. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Hayy*, 145-146.

82. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Hayy*, 144.

83. Hawi, *Islamic Naturalism*, 4.

84. L. Goodman, *Introduction* in *Ibn Ṭufayl's 'Hayy ibn Yaqzān'*, 7-92.

85. Goodman, *Introduction*, 7-11.

86. *Ibid.*, 12-13.
87. Goodman, *Introduction*, 15.
88. Cf. Landolt, *Ghazālī and "Religionwissenschaft"*, 19. Landolt discusses this question in relation to Ghazālī.
89. Goodman, *Introduction*, 14.
90. Cf. Qur'ān, 36:30. Ibn Ṭufayl cites this verse as well. Ḥayy is aware that he is alone, for example when he loses his mother (the gazelle), or in his classification of the natural world. Such an awareness might have highlighted the inner presence of the *fiṭrah*.
91. A distinction needs to be made to the value Ibn Ṭufayl places to such a view. It is ultimately rejected by Ḥayy's and Absāl's return to the island, or even by the abortive attempt to teach the populace. Such a distinction is also applied by Julian Obermann's study of Ghazālī. Obermann, *Der philosophische und religiöse Subjektivismus Ghazālīs: Ein Beitrag zum Problem der Religion* (Vienna & Leipzig: Wilhelm Baumüller, 1921), 108 f. However, Obermann's view is problematic since it contravenes Ghazālī's own distinction between the religious and legal sciences, as discussed by Hermann Landolt, *Ghazālī and "Religionwissenschaft"*, 20.
92. Goodman, 53-55.
93. W. Golding, *Lord of the Flies* (1962; London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1967).
94. Cf. Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy*, 123-25; J. Blenkinsopp, *The Search for the Prickly Plant*, in *Structuralism: An Interdisciplinary Study*, ed. S. Wittig (Pittsburg: The Pickwick Press, 1975), 67. The structural analysis of genre reveals certain commonalities and variations, clearly illustrated in the life-cycle of the mythic /epic-hero, whose events are placed by Blenkinsopp into four inclusive categories of antecedents and birth, infancy and youth, struggle and victory and return, that share narrative similarities with the Tufaylian text and other epics.
95. Goodman, 52.
96. *Ibid.*, 3.
97. Cited above.
98. See for example Fatima Mernissi, *Women and Islam: An Historical and Theological Enquiry*, tr. Mary Jo Lakeland (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1991); *The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1991).

99. Other stories (not cited by Malti-Douglas) connected to the Tufaylian narrative, such as the Himyarite tale of Dhu al-Qarnayn, include a reconciliation between mother and son. Significantly, Ibn al-Nafis' protagonist also returns to civilized society, but there is no parallel tale of estrangement, since he is born through spontaneous generation. In the Tufaylian, the 'return' to the island is emphasized. These examples are studied in the following chapter.

100. Such notions might be problematic to modern analyses - their problematic nature does not need to be discounted but has to be contextualized. In other words, our modern reading of the narrative especially from the perspective of social critical theory is bound to find several flaws in it. In a work of philosophy or mysticism, a socio-critical theory can supplement the analysis but the aesthetic and symbolic expression of the work have to be seen as the primary mode, otherwise, the resultant analysis will be reductionist or simplistic.

The methodological assumptions of some feminist theories critique the dualism applied in western (Greek) philosophy as promoting a hierarchy of opposition (body/soul; form/matter) that allow for certain categories (including female) as being associated with the body, base nature and the subsequent mythology of evil. In Eco-feminism (the Ecological Movement and Feminism), the domination of nature by humankind is equated with the dominance of women by men. Thus, the dissection of the gazelle would fit in seamlessly into such an equation, where the destruction of nature (gazelle) and the female principle (mother) occur simultaneously. A contextual study of the narrative as literature would result in a different analysis. Contextually, Hayy's discovery of the spirit through his analysis begins with his dissection and finally leads to an empathic relation with nature. A hermeneutical analysis of mysticism would recognize that the notion of opposition reflect the paradoxes and limitations that govern our apparently "real" perceptions, whereas Islamic mystics such as Ibn 'Arabi advocate a movement beyond opposition through the union of opposites.

101. Malti-Douglas, 99.

102. Hasanali, *Ibn Tufayl's Vision of Environmental Ethics*, paper presented at the joint conference of the *Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, Society for Neoplatonic Studies and the Society for the Promotion of Islamic Sciences and Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University, 1992), 1-35.

103. For an interesting discussion, see Caroline Walker Bynum, *Introduction in Gender and Religion: On the Complexity of Symbols* (New York: Beacon Press, 1986).

104. Bynum, *Introduction*, 2.

105. Corbin, *Avicenna*, 218. Corbin explicates this point with regard to Tūsī's commentary of the Avicennan recitals. "In this Hermetistic recital, beings, things, and modes of being are perceived by the active Imagination and transmuted into symbols. Instead of perceiving to what metamorphosis of the soul this transmutation corresponds, the commentator applies himself to bringing the symbolic data back to factual and perceptual level that preceded their transmutation. This necessitates seeking rational equivalents for the symbols, drawing up a catalogue of automatic correspondences, regarding the dramatis personae as having external and static roles instead of perceiving them as figures of the soul grappling with itself and its metamorphoses." Phenomenology allows us to recognize the partial analysis that occurs when one 'reads' as units and ignores what is conveyed as a whole.

106. This reference to *waq waq* occurs in some of the extant manuscripts of the narrative. It is considered to be an interpolation by Gauthier. The female imagery has attracted a lot of attention, especially in Malti-Douglas' analysis. One has to underline however that in the lore of *waq waq*, it was not only females that grew on trees. In fact, the particular reference to females seems to be derived primarily from the interpolation in Ibn Tufayl's narrative; Gabriel Ferrand, *Wak Wak, EI* (1913-36), Vol. 8, rpt. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987), 1105-1109.

107. Incidentally, two other reworkings of the Tufaylian narrative by Ibn al-Nafis and the Don Trezzanio version indicate the inability of the representative Hayy (Kāmil and Antonio) to tolerate the life of the single male and actively seek the re-integration into society, unlike Hayy. These two versions, discussed in chapter three and six respectively, might well reflect the homosocial bias.

108. Aspects of Arberry's and Malti-Douglas' critique on Jāmī are discussed in chapter three. Malti-Douglas responds to Jāmī's presentation of *Salāmān and Absāl* to further illustrate her analysis of *Hayy ibn Yaqzān*.

Chapter 3: The story and its sequels: Transference in the Muslim milieu

Section I: Ibn Ṭufayl and the Avicennan connection

Ibn Sīnā - the philosopher and physician is less well-known as a mystic. This aspect of the universal thinker is notably expressed in his symbolic narratives or "recitals", as opposed to the majority of his scientific works and philosophical commentaries. M. A. F. Mehren was the first European writer to undertake a study of Ibn Sīnā's recitals in his study, *Traité Mystiques d'Aboū Alī al-Hosain b. Abdallāh b. Sīnā ou d'Avicenne*.¹ Later, Henry Corbin's classic study, *Avicenne et le récit visionnaire*² presented the cycle of Avicennan recitals and discussed the symbolic connotations that link them together. Amélie Marie Goichon followed with her detailed study, *Le Récit de Ḥayy ibn Yaḡzān*³ that strove to analyze the text in relation to Ibn Sīnā's other works,⁴ whereby she concluded after presenting erudite cross-references that Ibn Sīnā aimed to present his theory of knowledge "sous une forme nouvelle et poétique."⁵ Peter Heath's study on allegory and philosophy, while disagreeing with Corbin's notion of "cycle", provides literary categories that recognize both the discursive and mythical expressions as contributing to different modes of discourse in a philosopher like Ibn Sīnā.⁶

Two of Ibn Sīnā's recitals are important to the current study. They are the *Recital of Ḥayy ibn Yaḡzān* and the *Recital of Salāmān and Absāl*.⁷ It is evident that the primary link between Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn Sīnā is the titles of their works. However, the relationship goes beyond this aspect. The stated purpose of Ibn Ṭufayl's narrative, according to the prologue, is "to unveil the secrets of oriental (or illuminative) philosophy mentioned by Ibn Sīnā."⁸ Before the

commencement of the story, the text further reads, "I am going to thus relate to you, the story of Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān, and of Salāmān and Absāl who have *received* their names from the master, Abū 'Alī [ibn Sīnā]. It can serve as an example for those who understand and 'a reminder to all men who have heart, or lend an ear and see'."⁹

The Tufaylian narrative is clearly a reception of the Avicennan tale and its transformation according to the pattern with which Ibn Ṭufayl retraces it. The fact that Ibn Ṭufayl chose to name his characters after Ibn Sīnā's recitals has also resulted in confusing the two books with each other.¹⁰ This confusion over primary text and translation was first suggested by Ibn Khallikān (d. 681/1282) who noted that "perhaps he [Ibn Sīnā] wrote it in Persian, and so we may have an Arabic translation of it, made by Ibn Ṭufayl."¹¹ Further, Ibn Khaldūn (d. 784/1382) attributes the theories of spontaneous generation -- actually referred to in Ibn Ṭufayl's narrative -- as belonging to Ibn Sīnā's recital, reinforcing the confusion.¹² Thus, it was assumed that the Arabic *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* by Ibn Ṭufayl was a translation from a so-called Persian original by Ibn Sīnā. Ḥājī Khalifah further attributes the Persian story of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* to a certain Fadhl Khenji, which Ibn Ṭufayl was supposed to have translated into Arabic.¹³

These examples suggest how the notion of 'translation' can alter or reverse the focus of a text from being 'primary' to 'secondary' and subsequently, perceived through different lenses. In the case of the Tufaylian narrative, the roles of primary and secondary texts are inter-changed in critical scholarship, whereby the Arabic primary text is analyzed as a secondary translation and a secondary Persian translation may be viewed as the primary text. Further, it suggests the fragile notion of 'context', especially social and historical context. Even if we are now able to recover Ibn Ṭufayl's text within its social context and read it in relation to the social mores of his time, we need to reflect on the fact that at different periods, i) the text may not have been attributed to Ibn Ṭufayl and thus resulted in a partial or non-existent context; ii) the names of the characters arising from the title are not just symbolically related to each other, but often supply

extraneous baggage to the narrative brought about by mis-association, allowing the particular characteristic of one usage to be applied to other usages;¹⁴ iii) much of the past reading by historians and biographers was a result of "inherited" knowledge (or hearsay) and not based on the reading of the narrative. Thus, it is extremely difficult to record any actual analysis, impact or familiarity with the text within the early Muslim context, since even the historical records are often invalidated by the 'confusion' between the narratives of Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Ṭufayl. Two analyses however become central to such impact in the Muslim context. They are the responses by Ibn al-Khaṭīb and Ibn al-Nafīs that will be examined further below.

In studying the initiatory recitals by Ibn Sīnā, Henry Corbin rejects "the neutral and impersonal perspectives of historicism" in favour of a phenomenological approach. An important statement made by him bears with our understanding of the symbolic content and context of Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān*: "Comprehending symbols is an act that takes place in 'time present'; it cannot consist in situating the past in the past as such - that is, in absence."¹⁵ Corbin appears to be referring to how the reader receives the text and how the writer comprehends the symbolic data. Paradoxically, this statement does not totally rule out historicism, or more aptly literary history, since the recurrence of these symbols in historically situated works re-enacts them by the manner in which they are received in their 'time present' to further enrich their symbolic meaning.

Due to the difference in form and content, it is difficult for critics in Islamic thought to conjure a relation of Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān* with the cycle of initiatory tales mentioned by Henry Corbin. Corbin as well, while acknowledging the mythic (or spiritual) archetypes that relate the Tufaylian narrative to "the cycle of Avicennan recitals",¹⁶ generally limits himself to Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī in order to *situate* his study within the Iranian context and within his own renditions of myth and spirituality. The works by the latter authors, along with the poem of *Salāmān and Absāl* by 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jāmī (d. 898 /1492) are included by Corbin within the genre of symbolic and mystical

works that invite 'interpretation' or *ta'wīl*, a notion on which much of his thesis revolves.

If we neglect to render to Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* the meaning that its author gave it by his choice of names and other symbolic strata in the narrative, we lose out on the ultimate purpose of the work. For, if Ibn Ṭufayl intended to convey anything at all to his readers, it was not just to provide them with a scathing critique of the state of philosophy in the prologue. The treatise also aims to assist its readers in their "unveiling the secrets" - highly symbolic terms in Islamic mysticism. Yet, a primary method suggested is of rational philosophy. The combination of the rational methods of the peripatetics with the spiritual aims of sufism creates the genre of rational mysticism which is the trademark of this narrative. This connection also allows the reader to explore the notion of 'rational mysticism,' whose creative application in the narrative is a unique contribution by Ibn Ṭufayl.¹⁷

In reiterating the symbolic value of his narration, Ibn Ṭufayl notes toward the end of his work that the story of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, *Salāmān and Absāl* makes one understand many things that had hitherto been kept hidden and which are not found in books or modes of discourse. The story, then, is about the hidden sciences that can only be understood by those who have attained knowledge of God. Nevertheless, this secret is still hidden by a *thin veil* that can easily be uncovered by people of discernment, that would thicken and be unbreachable to those who are unworthy. Ibn Ṭufayl hopes that he has inspired those to whom the work is addressed, to venture along the path that would lead them to a discovery of the mystery of mysteries.¹⁸ Ernst Cassirer almost takes the words out of Ibn Ṭufayl's mouth in his analysis of myth and symbolism when he states:

La narration mythique n'est la plupart du temps que
le reflet extérieur de ce phénomène interne, *le léger*
voile qui laisse transparaître ce drame.¹⁹

What makes Ibn Sīnā important within this typology is the illuminative qua

oriental philosophy that inspired later writers, such as Ibn Ṭufayl and Suhrawardī, to venture into the realms of mystical experience treading the path of intellectual speculation. Corbin's response to the Avicennan tales as a repository of the image that the person Ibn Sīnā carries in himself (*Imago*) and its projection into the world, intimately relates the writer to his works,²⁰ as well as to the subsequent transmitters and translators like Ibn Ṭufayl who receive the image and make it coherent to their own universe.

The character of Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān also appears as the spokesperson in Ibn Sīnā's *Treatise on Destiny (Risālah al-Qadar)*. When the philosopher and his friend reach an impasse on the theological issues surrounding free will and predestination, the figure of Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān appears before them and the narrator, Ibn Sīnā seeks his guidance to resolve their debate.²¹ The very fact that Ibn Ṭufayl used the same *dramatis personæ*, even though he departed from the story and philosophy of Ibn Sīnā, calls for an awareness on the part of the reader, i) as to how the genre had been used prior to Ibn Ṭufayl; ii) what was the thesis presented by Ibn Sīnā, and iii) a knowledge of the symbolic character-types of the *dramatis personæ* and how these symbols are transformed by Ibn Ṭufayl.

The narrative of Ibn Sīnā's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* is presented as a conversation between the narrator (accompanied by a group of companions) and the Sage, Ḥayy. There are great differences in language and style between the recitals of the two authors - Ibn Sīnā's usage is allegorical whereas Ibn Ṭufayl's narrative is held to be exemplary of the clarity of Arabic prose.²² Thus, the latter text appeals to a wider range of audience in its structure and presentation. Perhaps with a touch of hyperbole, one critic captures the differences:

Le style d'Ibn Ṭufayl est beaucoup plus beau, plus fertile en imagination; son exposé doctrinal est mille fois plus clair, plus étoffé, plus riche en aperçus, tandis que le récit d'Ibn Sīnā est très lourd, trop chargé d'allégories, alambiqué et partout, susceptible de plusieurs interprétations.²³

However, the clarity of Ibn Ṭufayl's prose has resulted in a simplistic assessment of the problems that he confronted, by neglecting the analysis of the literary modes and assuming them to be a 'method' of conveying philosophical premises. These problems were undoubtedly different from those addressed by Ibn Sīnā.

Un des thèmes majeurs du récit [sic] d'Ibn Ṭufayl est le problème de l'accord entre la philosophie et la religion, puis celui de la double vérité: vérité pour le vulgaire et vérité pour l'élite, puis celui de la société humaine ici bas - trois problèmes complètement absents des préoccupations du récit avicennien.²⁴

Any comparison of how a particular text is interpreted in different periods of time is likely to yield different results within the methodological framework of reception theory. What is of special interest here in looking at the relation between the works of the two authors is the added dimension of their use of certain common symbols given the shifts in the horizon of expectation. Mehren indicated such a shift by noting,

Ainsi la personnification de la notion philosophique *Hay b. Yaqzân* a provoqué l'ouvrage très renommé, mais d'un contenu bien différent, d'Ibn Thofeïl.²⁵

Despite these differences, Ibn Ṭufayl's use of the same *dramatis personæ* may indicate that he meant to convey something parallel to his readers, not within the frame of the story but in terms of the characters having received their names from Ibn Sīnā. The repetition of the names of Ibn Sīnā's protagonists by Ibn Ṭufayl may be likened to the 'word' given by the spiritual teacher to his/her disciple. Its remembrance (*dhikr*) is thus the continuation of the spiritual chain (*silsila*). In some of the oral sufic traditions of the Indian sub-continent, the word (*bol*; *shabd*) given by the *murshid* to the *murīd* was considered parallel to the 'true name' (*sat nām*) of the teacher or God.²⁶ Receiving the name in Islamic spirituality creates a spiritual link between teacher and disciple and establishes a continuance or transmission of secret teachings. One has to recognize the

symbolic configuration evoked between the two writers by the *repetition* of the character-names. Comparing Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* with Ibn Sīnā's, Corbin notes,

For Ibn Ṭufayl also, this name is that of the absolute hermit, mysteriously abandoned or spontaneously born on a desert island; in the absence of any human master and of all social falsification, the hermit becomes the perfect Sage. Salamān ... typifies the practical and social spirit and Absāl, contemplative and mystical.²⁷

The absence of a human master in Ibn Ṭufayl's narrative is substituted with the presence of the character-names. The figure of Ḥayy as *Shaykh-Initiator* is seen to represent the Active Intelligence in Ibn Sīnā.²⁸ In the context of the Ṭufaylian narrative, much emphasis has been laid on the name of the protagonist, Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān, a name that is blatantly symbolic especially since Ḥayy is born without parents. Being the son of Yaqzān then apparently refers to God as his father, and his whole development culminating in his mystical consummation could be understood in Plotinian terms as the individual soul and its return to its origins. Such usage also forges a symbolic connection with the Avicennan recital where the protagonist, after revealing his name as Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān declares that his face is turned toward his "father",²⁹ Yaqzān who shows him the path to follow in his journey.³⁰ However, the "father" in Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī is also associated with the archon, or Angel Gabriel. God as father is not the central motif in Islamic religiosity, but the Angel Gabriel is recognized as the Holy Spirit, the mediator of revelation. Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī radically shift this association to the Tenth Intellect, the source of the world and the "father." The Avicennan Ḥayy "speaks at the end of his 'father' ... until the line reaches the king who is the great progenitor without father and grandfather", i.e. Ḥayy's spontaneous generation. Corbin also discusses Yaqzān as distinct from the other angels in its mediatory role.³¹ The choice of the same names *combined* with the radical context of total freedom from societal influences in Ibn Ṭufayl explicate this relation of Ḥayy and

his "father" even further than the symbolic Hayy of Ibn Sīnā.³²

The Hermetistic version of 'Salāmān and Absāl'

The Hermetistic version of *Salāmān and Absāl* is available in an Arabic recension by Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq (d. 260/873).³³ It is the source of Jāmī's (d. 898/1492) poem that the latter derives from Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī's commentary.³⁴ Initially, Ṭūsī assumed this version to be related to the citation of *Salāmān and Absāl* by Ibn Sīnā in the *Ishārāt* and included a *ta'wīl* of the story to his commentary. Twenty years later, Ṭūsī discovered the Avicennan version of the tale of Salāmān and Absāl and further added a summary and *ta'wīl* of it to his commentary on the *Ishārāt*. Thus, the stories of Salāmān and Absāl occurred in two separate and different versions i) the Hermetistic version by Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq that is also summarized by Ṭūsī; ii) the Avicennan version that is extant only in the summary by Ṭūsī.

In looking at these precedents, one notes that Ibn Ṭufayl's characterization of Salāmān and Absāl is not parallel to either of these two versions. It is also uncertain whether some details in the Tufaylian narrative stem from the Hermetistic version.³⁵ As the earliest known antecedent, the Hermetistic tale provides clues to the other narratives that follow it to a greater or lesser degree. However, the names of its characters are corrupted through translation and it is difficult to relate them to actual Greek counterparts.³⁶ In this case, the question of appropriation is more clearly one of attribution, the story being attributed to an earlier Greek precedent of whose existence there is no clear evidence.

The popularity of the oriental tales of adventure surrounding the figure of Dhū al-Qarnayn, generally likened with Alexander, might also account for the Hellenistic attribution. Both the Hermetistic tale and the *Story of Dhū al-Qarnayn and the Idol* presented by Garcia Gomez (discussed below) appear to belong to the genre of oriental tales around the figure of Alexander and Dhū al-Qarnayn that were as popular at the time when they were transmitted as the

Robinsonades came to be from the eighteenth century onward.

In the Hermetic narrative,³⁷ there is a king named Hermanos son of Heraql who had profound knowledge and was well versed in the influences of the stars, knew natural properties and practised theurgic operations. Among his intimates was a sage, Aqlīqulās by whom he had been initiated into the secret sciences. This sage had devoted himself to spiritual exercises in a cave eating herbs for nourishment every forty days till his life reached the length of three cycles.³⁸

One day, the king who had no interest in women spoke to the sage about his need for progeny.³⁹ The sage, after determining a suitable "ascendant" (i.e. the right time, as in the Tufaylian *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*) procured a mandragora - a plant whose root displays a resemblance to the human body - put a little of the king's semen in it and then treated the mixture in a suitable environment until it was ready to receive a soul to govern it and become a complete human being.⁴⁰ The child that was born of this alchemical operation was named Saiāmān.

A young woman of great beauty named Absāl was found to take care of the child. In response to Hermanos's question, the sage foreseeing a revolt of the natural elements, advised the king to undertake the construction of a giant edifice of seven floors, that neither fire nor water could destroy. It would have a secret door known only to sages for whom it would be a secure refuge.⁴¹ The king accordingly built two edifices, one for the sages and the other that would shelter their treasures, sciences and bodies after death.

The king tried to separate Salāmān from Absāl when he had grown, but Salāmān was deeply attached to her. As he reached adulthood, Salāmān's affection for Absāl grew into a passionate love, and he neglected the king's service. Salāmān was admonished by the king and exhorted by the sage without any effect. The grieving king suggested a compromise by which Salāmān would spend half his time with Absāl and the other half to profit from the teaching of the sages, but the enamoured Salāmān was unable to fulfil this promise, so the king planned to get rid of Absāl. On hearing this, Salāmān and Absāl resolved to flee

beyond the ocean to a (paradisiacal) island. Hermanos who possessed two golden reeds (telescopes) pierced with seven holes corresponding to the seven climes, found out where Salāmān and Absāl were hiding. Having learnt that they were suffering all the miseries of exile,⁴² the king resolved to help them but Salāmān persisted in his voluntary exile, so the king destroyed their spiritual entities. The two lovers could no longer be united and suffered the agony of spiritual separation while being together physically.

The king tried to make his son understand that he could not assume the (celestial) throne and remain Absāl's (carnal) companion. The two unfortunate lovers finally cast themselves into the sea, but the king commanded the spiritual entity of water to spare Salāmān and allow Absāl to drown. Death rendering grief overcame Salāmān, and the king sought the advice of the sage. The sage promised Salāmān that he would be with Absāl again, if he (Salāmān) spent forty days of invocation with the sage in the cave and followed three conditions, i) wore a robe exactly as Absāl's;⁴³ ii) imitate all the actions of the sage, but whereas the sage would fast for forty days, Salāmān would be able to break his fast every seven days, and iii) promise to love no other woman but Absāl during his life. Salāmān agreed to these conditions.

Then the sage devoted himself to prayers and invocations to Venus for forty days. Likewise, Salāmān who imitated the sage's actions, would see the figure of Absāl come and talk to him lovingly everyday. He told the sage all he had seen and thanked him. At the end of forty days, by the power of the sage's prayers, there appeared the marvellous and unsurpassed form of Venus herself. Salāmān fell in love and forgot Absāl, but the sage reminded him of the condition that he would not love anyone but Absāl.

Hunayn's text is further explicated by Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī, where the pure image of ideal love (Venus) replaces the phantom (Absāl) in Salāmān's soul. Gauthier, utilizing the narrative in *Tis' Rasā'il* added that Salāmān soon became indifferent to Venus once his passion has been satisfied. His intellect thus has been totally purified from the troubles of love.⁴⁴ He succeeded his father,

cultivated wisdom and became a great king. He ordained that this story be written on seven tablets of gold and placed in the pyramids at the head of his father's tomb.

In the second part of the story, the narrative relates that after the two deluges, of fire and flood, the world was repopulated and the wise Plato appeared. Learning that the two pyramids contained sublime knowledge and precious treasures, he wished to open them up, but the king of the land refused him permission. Plato bequeathed the secret to Aristotle, who with Alexander opened the door,⁴⁵ according to the procedure indicated by Plato removing only the tablets of gold on which the story of Salāmān and Absāl were written.⁴⁶

The commentary by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī commences with an anonymous gloss citing Ibn Sīnā's allusion to Salāmān and Absāl in the *Kitāb al-Ishārāt*. It is divided into two sections that were composed with a significant time lag between them, the first one (the Hermetistic narrative) tentative in its explanation due to the lack of information available to Ṭūsī at the time, and the second part written when Ṭūsī discovered the second account of the *Salāmān and Absāl* narrative attributed to Ibn Sīnā.

Ṭūsī's summary of the Avicennan 'Salāmān and Absāl'

The Avicennan version of *Salāmān and Absāl*, is not extant. It was discovered by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī twenty years after writing his commentary on the *Ishārāt* (the work by Ibn Sīnā that contained an allusion to his recital on *Salāmān and Absāl*). It has come down to us in a brief summary by Ṭūsī that accompanies his commentary.⁴⁷ In most ways, it is quite different from the first Hermetistic version that Ṭūsī had earlier attributed to Ibn Sīnā.

A summation of the second Avicennan version preserved by Ṭūsī is as follows:

Salāmān and Absāl were half-brothers. Absāl was the younger of the two, and grew up to be handsome, chaste and brave.⁴⁸ Salāmān's wife fell in love with

Absāl, and expressed her desire to him but he did not yield to her. She then suggested to her husband, Salāmān that Absāl be married to her sister, confessing her desires to the latter. She also informed Absāl that her sister was modest and asked him not to speak to her till she became accustomed to him. On their wedding night, Salāmān's wife replaced her sister in Absāl's bed. Absāl became suspicious when she immodestly pressed her breasts against him, and a subsequent flash of lightning revealed her true identity. Absāl resolved to flee and left to conquer the world for his brother.

When Absāl returned, the (nameless) woman still desired him and was irked when he refused to submit. In the meanwhile, Salāmān had sent his brother to meet an approaching enemy army. Salāmān's wife bribed some officers to abandon Absāl on the battlefield. The enemies were victorious, and left Absāl to die. He was found by a wild beast who nursed him back to health. On his return, Absāl found Salāmān being besieged by enemies, conquered them and crowned his brother as king.

Salāmān's wife now bribed the cook and the steward to poison Absāl and he died. Salāmān then renounced his kingship and went to meditate in seclusion. The true course of events were revealed to him in secret conversation with his Lord. Salāmān made his wife, the steward and the cook drink the poison they had given Absāl and they all three die.

There are some narrative similarities between the recitals of Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Ṭufayl; for instance, the manner in which Absāl is rescued by a wild beast in Ibn Sīnā's *Salāmān and Absāl* is identical in many details to Hayy's rescue.⁴⁹ The upbringing of an abandoned child by animals is a prevalent motif in early literature that is not unique to either Ibn Sīnā or Ibn Ṭufayl.⁵⁰ The link between the two philosophers does make it probable that Ibn Ṭufayl received these details from his predecessor. In the same manner, one might find many congruent points between the two writers' narratives but the treatment of the subject matter is far from identical, judging at least on the basis of the summary received from Ṭūsī.

With regard to the characters in Ibn Sīnā, one notes the remarks made in his *Kitāb al-Ishārāt*:⁵¹ "Salāmān is a figure typifying thyself, while Absāl is a figure typifying the degree that thou hast attained in mystical gnosis."⁵² Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, in his commentary on Ibn Sīnā's *Ishārāt*, perceived that Salāmān must represent Adam and Absāl Paradise,⁵³ while Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī sees Ibn Sīnā's Salāmān as the typification of the rational soul (*nafs nāṭiqā*) and Absāl as typifying the *intellectus contemplativus*.⁵⁴ Although not parallel, such a degree of symbolism is also implied in the interpretation of Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān*. For example, Rāzī's prototypical interpretation of Salāmān as representative of the human and Absāl as paradise might be applied in symbolic terms to the Tufaylian narrative, where Salāmān represents 'the outward civilized being' and Absāl the one who seeks beyond the world, i.e. the other world or the paradisiacal stage. Similarly, Corbin's understanding of Ibn Sīnā's Salāmān as the practical intellect would also correspond to Ibn Ṭufayl's Salāmān who represents the exoteric aspect of the Divine revelation.⁵⁵ Some of these issues were studied in an earlier work on Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān* where I had also drawn an analogy between the characters, Salāmān, Absāl and Ḥayy, and the tripartite mystic model of *shar'īah*, *ṭarīqah* and *ḥaqīqah*.⁵⁶

Judging Tūsī's summary of the first Hermetic version in comparison to the narrative by Hunayn ibn Ishāq, Corbin observed it to be an eighth of the total length of the narrative. This would suggest that the Tūsīan summary of the Avicennan *Salāmān and Absāl* was also an extremely condensed version.⁵⁷ This is a problem if the reception of the Avicennan tale by Ibn Ṭufayl is based on narrative similarities. A comparison made solely on this basis would not only be fruitless but would fail to explain the title of Ibn Ṭufayl's work, the attribution of its characters having received their names from Ibn Sīnā as well its purpose of "unveiling the secrets of oriental philosophy."⁵⁸

In the absence of the primary narrative by Ibn Sīnā, one must look more closely into cross-references that he makes to Salāmān and Absāl in his other

works. The most central citation occurs at the beginning of the ninth *namat* in the third part of the *Ishārāt*. *Ishārāt* III:9 is a key passage in Ibn Sīnā's works. It is what marks this book from the *Shifā'* and the *Kitāb al-Najāt* as being representative of '*irfān*' and consequently values Ibn Sīnā as a teacher of '*irfān*'.⁵⁹ The above mentioned passage discusses the mystical stages (*maqāmāt*) of the gnostics ('*ārifīn*'). The reference to Salāmān and Absāl is thus motivated by the allusion to those gnostics who "have ... the privilege of experiencing, even in this earthly life, inner states unknown to all other men: it is as if, though remaining in the robe of the body, they had yet stripped it off and had departed toward the sacred world."⁶⁰

Looking at this passage, one is struck by its similarity of purpose with the Tufaylian narrative. The Tufaylian narrative is structured on the stages of the mystic path combined with rational and intellectual development. It is aimed at those who have or might have the privilege of experiencing the inner states in this earthly life, who are able to experience the sacred world while being bound by the body. This passage further illustrates the bases of the rational mysticism of Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Ṭufayl, whereby demonstrative certainty is the first stage in the journey. It prepares the soul for the later stages.⁶¹ The outcome of the reader's journey is enacted through Ḥayy and the reader as a potential initiate is represented by Absāl. This adds new meaning to the role of Absāl, beside the manifest explanation of reconciling the rational-mystical experience with revealed religion. Absāl is the path (*ṭarīqah*) - he embodies the journey; Ḥayy is *ḥaqīqah* - experiencing the inner states in earthly life and Salāmān is *sharī'ah* - virtuous but literalistic.⁶² Even if the larger narrative of Ibn Sīnā, if ever discovered, does not correlate to the Tufaylian narrative, the strength of this passage in the *Ishārāt* might be seen as sufficient inspiration for Ibn Ṭufayl to venture into his own narrative.

Within a framework that serves as a base for both the writers, Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn Sīnā created their works according to the particular ideas and ideals that

they wished to present. Thus, the notion of reception can be extended to not just how a work is received and interpreted according to and in reaction against the standards of its own time, but also to ideas that are archetypal in one sense, but have the ability to be received in a variety of ways under different conditions. Such is the case of reiteration of the archetypal characterization of Ḥayy, Salāmān and Absāl, in varied forms and nomenclature in Ibn Sīnā, Jāmī, Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn al-Nafīs.

The conscious choice of Ibn Ṭufayl's title carries with it a relationality between the characters of both sets of tales who share a recurrence of symbols. It is an indication to the reader that s/he needs to be familiar with the tales of Ibn Sīnā, that s/he might be able to draw some meaning regarding the intent of the story of Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān*, whose secrets are covered by a thin veil that can be uncovered by people of discernment.

Jāmī's 'Salāmān and Absāl'

Jāmī used the first Hermetistic version whose Arabic recension was written by Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq, and summarization (of the narrative first attributed to Ibn Sīnā) by Ṭūsī. Jāmī utilizes the Ṭusian version,⁶³ making a few minor changes in the narrative and adding several elucidating anecdotes. Jāmī's version does not have a direct textual connection to the Tufaylian narrative and does not in any way refer to it. Beside the common use of names clearly arising in Jāmī's case from (Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq and) the Ṭusian summary, they are unrelated. However, their use of common names link them together in the literary history of transmission.⁶⁴

Arberry noted that the 'story' was not as important to Jāmī as the overall context of the presentation, which he considered the English translator, Edward Fitzgerald to have missed in his translation. The polished artifice and noble convention in the construction of the poem might seem superfluous in translation but they reflect the sophistication of the time; such attention to detail is also prevalent in the miniature art. "So page after page reveals its equal perfection to the delighted gaze, here and there a painting to vary the mesmeric symmetry of

the sweeping script..."⁶⁵ It is thus important to consider the poem in its relationality to the miniatures and the calligraphy that explicated the work, and recognize that Persian poetry was written to be recited and evoke an aesthetic and dialogical response amongst its listeners.

The translator, Fitzgerald had access to a printed text and not the manuscripts.⁶⁶ He attempted to retain the 'oriental' flavour for an English audience while stripping the poem of its supposedly extraneous details. It is undoubtedly successful and considered to be a brilliant execution. However, its lack of recognition of the whole context of the poem causes a shift of horizon that also occurs due to other factors such as the expectations of the new reader-audience, who read the poem and no longer listened to it. Fitzgerald thus created an appropriation that is removed from the original context and intent, producing a scintillating version for the English connoisseur but failing to be faithful to the presentation of the poet himself due to a lack of understanding of the overall context of the Persian writer and the contribution of art to Persian literature.⁶⁷

Arberry suggested that the tale may not have been Hellenistic at all, but was probably the invention of a Christian monastic moralist or a Manichean due to the male-female dynamics of its metaphors and characterization.⁶⁸ Recent feminist critiques of medieval religious literature and philosophy have questioned whether the use of gendered metaphors reflect the biased and misogynist intent of writers.⁶⁹ The most obvious examples have been drawn from Aristotle's *Physics* to Aquinas' *Summa*.⁷⁰ The study by Bynum in the context of medieval Christian Orders suggests that even the positive usage of female metaphors did not necessarily reflect a congruent inter-relation in society.⁷¹ A reader-response that places Jāmi's poem and the Tufaylian narrative within similar parameters of expectation is found in the critique by Malti-Douglas, discussed in chapter two.

The use of negative female representation in Jāmi's version and its precedents in the Hermetistic and Avicennan versions of the story suggest that such elements are drawn on the one hand from the established horizons of expectations and from the gendered metaphors rooted in ancient Greek and

Manichean literature and handed down to medieval Christian (and Islamic) philosophy and mysticism. However, there is also another line of reception in Jāmī's version, whereby such images are reinstated not just through the story but through the additional episodes drawn from Persian and Arabic folklore and *adab* literature that embellish its content and occupy as much space in the narrative as the story of Salāmān and Absāl itself.⁷²

When Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* is seen in the context of the other works inspired by the same stories, one gets an ambivalent response with regard to a feminist critique. The narrative is marked by the absence of female characters, but it is also generally marked by the absence of the basic elements that suggest the misogyny in the other works, such as the characterization of the (female) Absāl in Jāmī and the Hermetistic narrative. What does the shift in gender and role of Absāl (from feminine to masculine) in Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Ṭufayl indicate? It might suggest a deliberate erasement of female role through absence but the works of Ibn Sīnā, Jāmī and the oriental Greek tales provide even more negative female images through presence. When Ibn Ṭufayl is situated within the framework of earlier as well as later works, the misogynist element is also erased through absence as much as it is deliberated in *adab* literature through presence.⁷³ Further, the absence of female participation in Ibn Ṭufayl likewise might have both positive and negative connotations especially in relation to the alternative negative presence of the symbolic content in the other narratives of the cycle. Nevertheless, the 'nameless' female voices in the Avicennan summary even when considered symbolically evoke a gendered response because of their defined and contrasted roles and expectation in relation to the 'named' male epitomes of beauty, wisdom and virtuosity, represented by the two brothers, Salāmān and Absāl and contrasted by two differentiated female representations of their wives as a) the shrewd and lewd seductress and b) her passive and compliant sister.

In contrast, there are definite shifts in the Tufaylian narrative. The spontaneous generation in the Tufaylian narrative excludes both sexes and not just female participation as in the Hermetistic narrative and the Ṭusian summary. The

human body is also recognized as being relative to the survival of the spirit and needs to be fed and clothed just as contemplation of creation reflects the divine spirit. The Tufaylian narrative primarily critiques the social system and its absence of spirituality.

In an earlier study, I had argued how the approach to the Tufaylian narrative as representative of *either* literature or philosophy meant a loss of perspective that was regained by reading it as both literature and philosophy. I would like to add here that in doing so, the difference in the critical perspectives between philosophy and literature is kept in mind. In fact, various factors such as the distinctions between Greek and Islamic philosophy; between individual philosophers; between the *mashriqi* and *maghribi* philosophers; between particular theologies and between *adab* and *falsafah* have to be recognized. Thus, looking at the Tufaylian narrative primarily from the precepts of *adab*, or *falsafah*, and ignoring its symbolic embodiment promotes the loss of other facets that need to be included in its understanding.⁷⁴

Ibn Ṭufayl and Suhrawardī

Like Ibn Ṭufayl, Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191) also alludes to Ibn Sīnā's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* and *Salāmān wa Absāl*.⁷⁵ Both the authors also use the initiatory tale to elaborate Ibn Sīnā's oriental philosophy.⁷⁶ The theme of "oriental" philosophy by Ibn Sīnā is accentuated by Suhrawardī in his philosophy of *ishrāq*. The light imagery that is present in Ibn Ṭufayl's narrative is developed into a system in Suhrawardī. The orientation of their works link them both to the emergence of the *illuminative* tradition and rational mysticism in Islamic thought.⁷⁷

The narratives by Suhrawardī and Ibn Ṭufayl that allude to Ibn Sīnā's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* do not share any similarities in terms of the 'story' that is explicated. However, it is the similarity of purpose of both Suhrawardī and Ibn Ṭufayl, as well as their methodological intent of applying the precepts of rational mysticism that is most interesting. First, on the basis of historical records, we

know that Ibn Ṭufayl and Suhrawardī were not too far apart in time although geographically, they were located in the western and in the eastern sectors of the Islamic world. This raises the interesting question of similar phenomena occurring in eastern and western Islam simultaneously.

How did the two authors mould the same mythological material to reflect their particular perspectives? In *Kitāb al-mashāriʿ*, Suhrawardī alludes to the "treasures hidden under a thin veil" that can be discovered by the discerning reader.⁷⁸ The fact that the two writers operated within a similar frame without the possibility of having had any physical contact or exposure to each others works does underline a common symbolic and spiritual link. It suggests that the horizons of expectation within which they wrote either considered the questions that they raised important or totally superfluous, engendering a reaction on the part of these individual authors to reiterate the symbolic significance of spirituality and at the same time reforge new horizons of expectation (through the transformation of the characteristics that had been articulated in the earlier tales). Undoubtedly, what they have in common is the reiteration of the symbolic figure of the Avicennan *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* but beside it, they are also linked together by the notion of illuminative philosophy as well as the image of the stranger in society.

Suhrawardī, like Ibn Ṭufayl, perceived something missing in Ibn Sīnā's "oriental philosophy" and sought to fill in this gap by departing from Avicennan symbolism. He critiqued Ibn Sīnā in the *Qiṣṣat al-ghurbat al-gharbīyah* (A Tale of Occidental Exile),

When I saw the tale of Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān, I was struck by the fact that although it contained marvels of the spiritual words and profound allusions, it was devoid of intimations to indicate *the greatest stage*, which is the 'great calamity' that is stored away in divine books, deposited in the philosophers' symbols and hidden in the tale of Salaman and Absal put together by the author of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* only at the end of the book, where it is said: 'Sometimes certain solitaries among men emigrated towards Him'.⁷⁹

The use of language and imagery is fortuitous when compared to Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*. In referring to Ibn Bājjah, the prologue relates that he reached the highest stage that was possible by theoretical speculation but did not go beyond it. By implication then, the aim of Ibn Ṭufayl's narrative was to "indicate the greatest stage." Further, the citation of Ibn Sīnā, *sometimes certain solitaries among men migrated towards him* as the marvel hidden in the tale, directly relates to Ḥayy as the solitary and to Absāl's migration. It is only this greatest stage that justifies the migration, otherwise the individual might live like a weed and yet attain intellectual perfection as with Ibn Bājjah, or he might follow the norms defined by society as with Ibn Ṭufayl's Salāmān.

Suhrawardī, like Ibn Ṭufayl aims to indicate the "secret" that had been partially revealed by Ibn Sīnā in his own narrative. Thus, Ibn Ṭufayl and Suhrawardī are linked together in their use of symbols as well as their mystical orientation - by their adherence to an illuminative philosophy that takes different structural forms in each of the writers.

A major difference between the two writers lies in their citation of previous sources. With Suhrawardī, there is the constant reference to the ancient Greek and Persian sages as his teachers.⁸⁰ Although the views of Ibn Ṭufayl's predecessors are summarized in the prologue, they are not referred to directly in the main text of the narrative. Both authors turn to earlier precedents which are different in each case. The worldview that Ḥayy derives in isolation concurs with Aristotelian and Neoplatonic precepts and hence is in response to the views of his predecessors.

The symbolic language is used by Suhrawardī to establish the presence of immutable archetypes -- a kind of "Platonic Forms" -- to communicate between exoteric forms and esoteric knowledge. In Ibn Ṭufayl also, the reconciliation between religion and philosophy is not a facile affirmation since Ḥayy's isolation is a means of establishing the existence of permanent ideals and relating these to temporary, exoteric manifestations. There is no angelic 'encounter' as with Suhrawardī although Ḥayy's ascent through the heavenly spheres might be

considered the most beautiful and ingenuous example of rational mysticism. Perhaps the heavenly locale in which Hayy lives precludes any necessity for the divine intermediary encounter and allows Hayy to perceive the *ḥaqīqah* without any mediation.

Hikāyah Dhū al-Qarnayn Abu Marāthid al-Himyarī wa qiṣṣah al-ṣanam wa al-malak wa ibnatihi

Garcia Gomez forwards a version of the Dhū al-Qarnayn legend that he discovered in the Escorial manuscript collection⁸¹ as the common source of Ibn Ṭufayl's story and *El Criticon* written by the Jesuit Spaniard, Balthasar Gracian's (1601-58) in 1651.⁸² The Himyarite story is divided into two sections: *The History of Dhū al-Qarnayn* serves as a prologue and the second part deals with the *Story of the Idol*.⁸³

The Alexander legend that relates the story of Dhū al-Qarnayn, the Himyarite is of oriental origin. One finds some striking narrative parallels in the first section of the story. However, the greatest parallels between the Tufaylian narrative and the Dhū al-Qarnayn legend belong to the second section dealing with construction of the Idol. If Ibn Ṭufayl utilized this story, he might have taken the details of his plot from both sections.

Section I relates the story of a king (*Dhū Marāthid*)⁸⁴ who governed over the length and breath of the world. God gave him strength, knowledge and sagacity. He spoke the languages of the people and understood the words of birds and beast, and one of God's angels informed him of natural and supernatural things.⁸⁵ The king undertook a tour of his Empire, sailing from island to island till he reached the island of Arin that was located on the equator and at the centre of the world, where it was neither hot nor cold neither autumn nor summer, where the days and nights are of equal length, the climate changeless and temperate. The inhabitants of this equatorial region were the healthiest and most intelligent. They were the originators of the sciences and wisdom (*al-'ulūm wa'l-ḥikmah*), and among them

were the first mathematicians and astronomers.⁸⁶

It was impossible, said the narrator, to describe the incredible monuments in the island. The king marvelled at these creations, when he confronted a lofty mount, considered the mountain of Sarandip where Adam descended from Paradise.⁸⁷ The king climbed up the mountain. When he reached the summit, he saw a gigantic idol resting on four pillars that were fashioned in the forms of a man (east), lion (west), eagle (south) and fish (north) and faced the four directions. At its peak was a praying figure that rose with the rising sun and always faced eastward. He said: "This is prodigious." He looked at the marble slab inscribed in gold in a script that neither he nor the Indian princes could read. He asked them: "Do you understand this idol?" They said: "We have no knowledge about it, nor did our fathers."⁸⁸

They told Dhū al-Qarnayn that among the inhabitants of the island, there lived a *hermit (rāhib min al-mu'minīn)* who was the wisest person on earth. They suggested that the king consult the wise sage and hermit. The honoured sage greeted the king. The king said: "Oh, noble scholar (*al- 'ālim al-karīm*) and wise philosopher (*al-faylasūf al-ḥakīm*), do you know about this idol and its construction?"⁸⁹ He responded: "Yes, I know the story of the Idol and the language in which it is written." The king said: "Read it, oh Shaykh!" After many excuses regarding his old age and short-sight, the sage finally agreed to read the inscription. The message proclaimed the eternity of God and reflected the reciprocity of knowledge and learning: "We obeyed God and were obeyed, we gave and were given, we were taught and we learnt, we wished and our wishes were fulfilled, we were strengthened and finally destroyed. Let him who comes to our kingdom and acquires some of our knowledge destroy what we have constructed, and let him put an end to what we were given! In this image we have embodied all the knowledge of the earth (*'ulūm al-ard*) and all its treasures."⁹⁰

The king (representing the invincible Alexander) was outraged and perceived the challenge to his authority and dominion. He swore to destroy the

idol. The image had been cast in eight metals and could not be destroyed, and finally, the king was forced to give up. Before leaving, an inscribed coffer made of green emerald was discovered that foretold the death of the king, and enclosed the exact amount that he had expended in his attempted destruction of the idol. So the king said: "Oh Philosopher and Sage (*hakīm*), tell me the whole truth and relate to me the reason for the building of the idol." The shaykh said: "Oh King! I will tell you what I heard from my father about this mountain, who heard it from his father, who had heard it from his grandfather." Said the king: "O wise sage (*shaykh al-hakīm*), relate it to me."⁹¹

The narrative by the sage to Dhū al-Qarnayn comprises the second section of the story on the King and his daughter.⁹²

Section II:

There was once a king who was the most powerful on earth. He had no sons but had a daughter whom he loved dearly and called '*Amrah* (Little Pearl).⁹³ The astrologer he consulted informed him that his daughter would meet with grave disgrace and have a son who would be the hero of marvellous adventures; that she would bear the fantastic child at the (fortuitous) conjunction of the seven planets under the star called Lion-heart, the eight star of the constellation of the Lion. To avoid such mishaps, the king built a protective palace for his daughter. The foundations were of lead, the walls of copper, and the merlons of silver; in it was placed a peacock of red gold with eyes of jacinth and wings of green emerald.

The princess grew up to be beautiful and was taken care by a nurse. She was overwhelmed with desire "which is already a spiritual energy" (*quwwah al-rūhānīyah*).⁹⁴ One day she spied a group of cavaliers through the high windows of the castle, and among them a young man more beautiful than the sun. She enquired about him and was told that he was the son of the Prime Minister and was called *Shams*. The princess, animated by passion "which had taken hold of her ears and eyes ... took to the way of perdition",⁹⁵ and sent her nurse as a messenger to approach the son of the Minister. Shams was hesitant about the

princess's offer but she threatened to burn him alive if he did not comply with her wishes! The young man requested her to wait for a witness to solemnize their union. The princess said that they would need no other witness but God and the young man's sword and seal would do as tokens. Later, when it became evident that she was pregnant, she retired to a hermitage and devoted herself to an ascetic life.⁹⁶

The king possessed a jacinth that he deeply treasured. The princess took this and some gold from which she made an anklet. On the fourteenth day of the equinox, she gave birth to a son and put him in an ark. She attached the jacinth to the child's neck and put the anklet on his foot. Lifting her face to heaven, prayed: "Oh Living (*ḥayy*), Oh Manifest (*mubīn*), O Creator of all things! This is my son, whom you have created with the most beautiful form (*aḥsan ṣūrah*) in the darkness of my womb, whom you did destine before the creation of the world." Setting the ark afloat on the sea, she added: "Take him to yourself, I place my trust in you, who never fails [anyone]." God said to the winds, "Take my servant and wander with him."⁹⁷

It is not known how far the ark was carried. It reached the shores of an island where there were all kinds of fruits and blessing of nature, and animals of different species, except the human. When the sun came out, the joints of the ark were loosened and the cries of the thirsty child were heard. A gazelle who had lost her child approached it, and fed it four times a day, and moved it later to a cave.

When the child grew to the age of reason (*'aql*), he contemplated the acts of the Demiurge (*ṣan' Allah*) in the stars (*kawākib*) and their elevation; the heavens (*al-samā'*) and its architecture; the celestial spheres (*falak*) and its revolutions; the earth and its expanse; the sea and the wild battering of the waves; animals and their varieties; plants and their qualities.⁹⁸ He considered what was on his right hand and on his left, behind and in front, what was above him and below. He considered all animals but did not see any one of his own kind. He

also noticed that all species (*jins*) had means of defence to keep harm away.⁹⁹

The struggle for life, the survival of the fittest, and supremacy of his species were the lessons that he learned through his observations and experiences. For example, he saw a bird dive after a fish, when it clawed open this fish, the bird found a smaller fish in its stomach; on dissecting this fish, it found an even smaller fish in its stomach and finally a worm in the stomach of the smallest fish. He learnt that "might is right" equating the injustice in creatures with the degree of their power. He saw that the same principles governed the survival of other species such as birds and animals.¹⁰⁰

He discovered his ability to use his mind (*'aql*) to be tricky (*hīl*) and cunning. He made nets and traps, fished, rode horses and subdued the animals. He became a tyrant and was resented by the other animals. The animals consulted the wise serpent about this [human] animal that was unlike any other animal, who used his arms and could look in all directions and had neither fur nor feathers. The serpent told the other animals that he was their natural lord and belonged to the race of Adam to whom God bestowed reason (*'aql*), understanding (*fahm*), knowledge (*'ilm*), intelligence (*dhakā'*), the clearness of exposition (*al-bayān*), all the arts (*al-ṣanā'i'*) and the power to prove the truth and escape from error.¹⁰¹

Meanwhile, the king was greatly enraged by the loss of his highly valued jewel. Time passed on, the Prime Minister died and was succeeded by his son, Shams. One night the king had a dream where he saw the son of Shams wearing the jacinth around his neck and sitting crowned on the throne, with the royal seal on his finger. The king was also kissing the child fervently. He woke up from the dream in terror and sought to interpret it. The sages and astrologers of the court interpreted that the person in the dream (i.e. Shams, the incumbent Prime Minister) had deceived him with the person whom he most loved (by implication his daughter), and that the son (his grandson, though unknown to him) of the deceiver would become king. The king thus rashly ordered that Shams and his followers be killed. The courtiers suggested the less drastic (and more symbolic!)

measure of exile, which the king made equal to a sentence of death by placing the young Wazir in an open boat, naked and without provisions.

God commanded the four winds: "Take my servant to my other servant" and the winds carried the boat to the same island. Shams searched the island for food, and found himself suddenly face to face with his son. Thinking that it might be some other exile, he approached the young islander who was terror-stricken and fled; the closer the Wazir approached, the faster the islander ran, till Shams finally gave up. The curious young man gradually approached Shams and heard his father utter strange sounds (speech). The Wazir then began to make signs. Shams gently attracted the islander, taught him to speak, beginning with signs written in the sand. When they could converse, Shams asked the young islander, "Who are you? Who has brought you to the island?" The islander responded, "I don't know, who are you?" Shams said, "I am the minister of the king." "And who is the king?" asked the islander. Shams added, "The Caliph of God on earth." So the curious islander said, "And what is it that you are saying about God?" Shams responded, "God is powerful (*qadīr*), eternal, the creator of forms (*khāliq al-suwar*), and creator of all things (*kull shay'*), eternal in His empire, not subject to change."¹⁰²

Then the Wazir taught the islander his religion and all he knew and the youth felt a strong desire to know the world of men. One day a ship approached the island, and the two islanders did not let its famished crew land, until they agreed to take the islanders with them. They returned to the country of the mariners, where the inhabitants spoke another language. They taught them the truths of Islam and gave them laws. Their strange adventures reached the ears of the king, who ordered them to be brought before him. He saw the lost jacinth around his grandson's neck and recognized his minister, and said to himself: "This is what I saw in my dream." The princess heard of the arrivals in her retreat, and rushed to greet her son. With the token given to her by Shams, the king pardoned his daughter and the Wazir, and was succeeded by his grandson. The prince erected the image, which Dhū al-Qarnayn discovered. Dhū al-Qarnayn was filled

with wonder, and ordered his men to leave the mountain untouched.

The Himyarite story in the literary history of transmission

In terms of co-relations, these two stories certainly have the closest equivalent "incidents" to the Tufaylian narrative, as Gomez points out by undertaking a two-column comparative analysis of the Himyarite stories with the Tufaylian narrative.¹⁰³ In his early monograph on Ibn Tufayl, Gauthier had considered the Hermetistic tales of Salāmān and Absāl to be a source for Ibn Tufayl's story.¹⁰⁴ Gauthier also indicated the distinct parallels between the Tufaylian narrative and the first part of the story, *El-Criticon*, written in the middle of the seventeenth century by the Spanish Jesuit writer, Balthasar Gracian, and considered the latter to be a clear imitation of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*.¹⁰⁵ Given that *El-Criticon* was published before 1650, and the first printed translation by Pococke appeared in 1671, Gauthier pondered on the unknown means by which Gracian had accessed the Tufaylian narrative.

This issue is addressed by Garcia Gomez who introduces the tale of Dhū al-Qarnayn, the Himyarite as the common source utilized by Ibn Tufayl and Balthasar Gracian. Garcia Gomez considers the Hermetistic and Avicennan tales to be entirely disparate in comparison to the Tufaylian narrative. He also rejects Gauthier's explanation that Ibn Tufayl utilized the two versions of *Salāmān and Absāl* summarized by Tūsī, since Tūsī had commented on them in 1246, and Ibn Tufayl died in 1185.¹⁰⁶ Possibly, Gomez understood Gauthier too literally. Even if Ibn Tufayl did precede Tūsī, the names of the protagonists are derived from Ibn Sīnā's tale or from other allusions to these names by Ibn Sīnā in the *Ishārāt* or the *Risālah al-Qadar*, or even from the 'lost' Avicennan work on oriental philosophy. Whatever be the case, all roads lead back to Ibn Sīnā, if not to Tūsī. Further, Ibn Tufayl may have had access to the Hermetistic narrative, or the story by Ibn Sīnā that Tūsī commented upon even though it is not extant now except through the commentary and summarization by Tūsī. However, as it now

stand, we do not have access to the original story of *Salāmān and Absāl* by Ibn Sīnā, except in summarization and accompanied by the commentary by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī.

While reading the Himyarite story, one is easily struck by the narrative similarities. It is clear that the two stories are inter-connected not merely through archetypal parallels. However, García Gomez's comparison by focussing on selective "content" actually misses out significant connections and differences between the stories. The Himyarite stories first of all are extremely brief (folios 25-29a) in comparison to the Tufaylian narrative. The exclusions or "additions" in the Tufaylian narrative are thus quite significant and copious.

Another significant aspect of the Himyarite story that has escaped the attention of critics is the interrelation of the various "sources" of the Tufaylian narrative to each other. This is clearly explicated in the inter-relation between the Himyarite tales and Ibn al-Nafīs's story versus the Tufaylian narrative. The parallels between the Himyarite story and Ibn al-Nafīs' narrative are close in terms of the length of the narratives and through some narrative descriptions that incidentally do not recur in the Tufaylian narrative. Such parallels might raise the question whether this story indeed was Ibn al-Nafīs's major source. Were it not for the addition of "spontaneous generation" as well as, more significantly, the intent of Ibn al-Nafīs' narrative to refute the possibility of complete knowledge outside the revelatory realm and to establish the necessity of prophecy, his anti-thesis could be viewed as being independent from the Tufaylian narrative. The latter point underlines the limitation of any analysis that focuses primarily on "narrative parallels" rather than reception and genre. Any analysis that focuses solely on descriptive and archetypal similarities might reveal that there are more narrative parallels between the Himyarite tale and Ibn al-Nafīs's narrative. Establishing these precepts do not however contribute to our understanding of the significance of each of the receptions. Further, in a quest for similarities, the subtle or deliberate transformations that provide the major clues to understanding how an author responds to the central questions in his/her time are often

overlooked.

If one were to look at textual similarities between the Himyarite tales and the first section of Ibn Nafīs's narrative, both are bound together by their concise descriptions of the discovery phase of their heroes. Both discuss how their protagonists (quickly) observe nature around them, the battering of the waves and seas, the variety of plants and animals, the heavenly spheres etc. in almost identical terms. Neither of them is constrained by the heptadic scheme in the Tufaylian narrative, even though they allude to propitious times (as in the birth of 'Amrah's son),¹⁰⁷ or mark out puberty (at twelve years) as a phase of development in the case of Ibn al-Nafīs. The symbolic use of numbers is prevalent in the Himyarite narrative. The deliberated theological defense of prophecy and the example of spontaneous generation are the major narrative connections between the Tufaylian narrative and Ibn al-Nafīs's *Sīrah Nabawīyah*. In terms of content and narrative similarities on which Garcia Gomez based his analysis, the last two stories as well as the Hermetistic story (similar to the tales of Alexander) share greater narrative commonality, an aspect of the debate that is ignored by Garcia Gomez.

The Tufaylian narrative stands apart from these stories in terms of its peripatetic structure and in terms of genre as well. The Himyarite stories closely fit into the mythic structure. They are structured dialogically and the conversational style flows within the narrative. However, Garcia Gomez does not analyze the interesting symbolic data in this story. His focus remains on refuting the connections made by Gauthier between the tales of Ibn Sīnā, Tūsī, Ibn Tufayl and primarily Balthasar Gracian. By presenting the Himyarite stories as the alternative source utilized by Gracian and Ibn Tufayl, Garcia Gomez is able to disclaim any dependence of Balthasar Gracian's *Spanish Critic* on the Maghribi Tufaylian narrative.¹⁰⁸

It would be futile to respond here to all the faults that Gomez perceived in Gauthier. The reader would be well advised to consult the detailed article by Garcia Gomez in this regard, but perhaps a quotation might indicate the tenor of

his argument,

Según Gauthier, con esta novela alegórica *Ābentofāil* se propone, no exponer el origen de la especie humana conforme a una secta determinada, como quiere El Marracoxí; ni presentar un solitario que llega, por el linre juego de su propia razón, a la inteligencia de los secretos naturales y de las más altas cuestiones metafísicas, como decían Munk o Pococke; ni ¹⁰⁹

Garcia Gomez refutes Gauthier regarding the birth of Ḥayy and its relation to the Hermetistic parallel and considers him totally in error to link the two stories. He perceives a great disparity between the Hermetistic story and the Tufaylian narrative.¹¹⁰ In all fairness, Gauthier was the first writer to produce a monograph on Ibn Ṭufayl. Many of the points that he indicates become the basis for later research. Garcia Gomez himself ignores the possible connections between the Hermetistic and the Himyarite tales, both of which share archetypal commonalities that may relate them to the genres of oriental tales surrounding the figure of Alexander and Dhū al-Qarnayn.

The conceptual differences between the Himyarite and Tufaylian stories are displaced by Garcia Gomez's focus on narrative similarities. While the "parallels" between the Himyarite stories and the Tufaylian narrative are quite clear, the content, the style and the genre are relatively different. One might apply the analysis of reception to indicate the prevalent conceptual and philosophical shifts. For example, in the Himyarite stories, the dissection of the fish represents the hierarchy of created beings based on their status power in the cycle of created beings. The human creature thus attains supremacy because of the power of his mind and his ability to control other lesser beings. The *de facto* leadership of the human race over the animal kingdom is established on the premises of the ability of the human mind to manipulate the less intelligent creature and thus control and tyrannize them. In the Tufaylian narrative, all created being receive the light to varying degree; likewise, all creation needs to be accorded respect or protection

as part of the whole macrocosm. Control over the other kingdoms is initially a part of Tufaylian narrative but this control shifts to an empathic response to all creation down to the stone that blocks the flow of the stream, or the thorn that hurts the wild animal.

Gomez does not raise such issues. His reception stems from the positivist frame of reference that focused on assigning "sources", whereby similarities are highlighted and differences ignored. Once it is clearly established that this narrative is a source for the Tufaylian narrative, other literary and aesthetic considerations that might enrich the critique are set aside.

Further, the Himyarite tales are structured as animal and mythic fables. The sage narrates the conversation between the animals, etc. They are more reminiscent of the stories by the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā' who also merge philosophical concepts in this manner. Structurally, the Tufaylian narrative as an example of rational mysticism is very different. In seeking to recognize the connections between the two, it is also important to appreciate each of the examples as works of literature and philosophy, belonging to different genres.

Garcia Gomez's inclusion of the Himyarite tales contributes significantly to our understanding of the reception of the narrative. What our analysis underlines is that the process of reception results in two approaches to the literary history of transmission of the Tufaylian narrative that focus on either narrative similarities or symbolic interaction. It places the Tufaylian narrative as a pivot that draws its meaning from both the symbolic universe of Ibn Sīnā and the narrative similarities of the Himyarite tales. One might add further that the Himyarite tales are a rich and interesting source of mythical and symbolic data. Though the emphasis on narrative similarities might be seen as a particular reception that responds to the set of expectation in its time, one loses out on the rich symbolic data by focussing merely on descriptive similarities in the interaction of the two narratives.

Summation of the narrative precedents

One of the primary connections in the stories is the names of the characters. By implication, Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy carries the memory of Ibn Sīnā's Ḥayy as a hermit, as do the other characters. The transference of gender in Absāl (or Asāl), who is presented as a woman in the Hermetistic tale and in Jāmī's version and the totally different representations of Salāmān, are also a continuation of the process of transmission. Thus translation is not the only method of transmission; transference is also a method of transmission. The initial transference of Ibn Sīnā occurs through Ibn Ṭufayl, Ibn al-Khaṭīb, Jāmī and Ibn al-Nafīs, thus creating a repository of meaning. Within Ḥayy the philosopher (of Ibn Ṭufayl) reposes Ḥayy, the Hermit of Ibn Sīnā. These two stories might also be seen as "récits d'initiation" in the Corbinian context.

Whether it is the 'lost' Avicennan version, or the other allusions by Ibn Sīnā in the *Ishārāt* that were sources for the names of Ibn Ṭufayl's protagonists; whether it was the Hermetistic tale that is connected to Ṭūsī, or the legend of Alexander the Himyarite that Garcia Gomez presents, it is important to look at the stories and their interrelation not merely in terms of sources, but to also recognize that some might have textual precedents in earlier stories while other parallels might be archetypal in nature. In either case, it is vital to see how they are understood by each of the authors, reflecting their diverse reception of common symbols.

Ḥayy, the purported noble savage is also the primal being. Thus our analysis of the transmission of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān* from Ibn Sīnā to Ibn Ṭufayl, Suhrawardī and Jāmī also hopes to restore - perhaps a *ta'wīl* of sorts - the archetypal symbolism that tie all these works together and contribute to the presentation of a salient understanding of the intellectual universe of Islamic mysticism.

Comprehending an author, especially a philosopher who succeeds in forming his own symbols, comprehending him in the full sense of the word, implies understanding *eo ipso* how and why his thought has actually been experienced in the spiritual milieus where he was recognized. For all this makes up an organic whole, of which the philosopher's thought is the seed and his experience the substance; all this makes up an organic whole, of which that thought and experience are the explanation.¹¹¹

Although the stories are quite different, the manner in which Salāmān and Absāl have been interpreted in Ibn Sīnā enhances our understanding of these characters in Ibn Ṭufayl. As discussed above, Ibn Ṭufayl felt free to transform the characters, just as Ibn Sīnā himself in his *Recital of Salāmān and Absāl* departed from the Hermetistic version that had been translated into Arabic by Hunayn ibn Ishāq, a version that was known to Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and later amplified by Jāmī.¹¹²

The above sections indicate details by which one finds some resemblance between the above tales and the Tufaylian narrative, whether in terms of the names of the protagonist, parallels between the stories, or the symbolic intention. However, such correlations are not focussed on the questions of "originality" or "sources" but on the individual reiterations. A limitation in ascribing "sources" arises from the fact that the mythic precedents might go far back into mythic time as possible, evident in some of the symbols such as the paradisiacal island of *Salāmān and Absāl* or the Adamic location of Ḥayy's island. The 'structural' approach to the literary analysis of the story could break it down to a series of semiotic signs, and thus negate any historicist approach bound by a predilection toward tracing "sources." However, a structural approach, while indicating some literary forms and archetypes, would undermine the symbolic and contextual meaning that Ibn Ṭufayl consciously places by his choice of names, his division of the work and so forth.

The literary history of textual transmission has a definite contribution to

understanding the text if it is not circumscribed by attributing sources to the author's creative work. Nevertheless, if one looks at these works totally outside of their rich literary histories, the symbols are reduced, their representation remains in names, whether of the protagonists or the philosophers of the prologue; there is nothing left to relate them to each other. This issue is made evident in the previous scholarly analysis, whether by Gauthier or Garcia Gomez, that selectively draw out the parallels, but still provide a disjointed puzzle and reflect the contradictions of earlier comparisons.

The major reason is a methodological one: can comparisons provide a valid reference of the meaning of the works? Earlier research has dealt with varied questions of origins, sources, originality, and symbolic verity. This chapter will further deal with the response by Ibn Ṭufayl to the philosophical issues that were being debated by his predecessors. Can these issues provide reasonable solutions to a work of literature, or are they conditioned by the time, place and the reader? Posing these questions allows one to re-examine the foundational claims of the narratives.

One such foundational claim is the issue of the philosopher or gnostic as a stranger to society. It is the major symbolic archetype that is articulated in the figure of Hayy in the works of Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī and Ibn Ṭufayl. It is taken even further in philosophical terms by Ibn Ṭufayl who combines the mystical elements of the Sage-Ascetic with the notion of Philosopher-King. Total isolation was not considered a necessary requirement for the philosopher. However, the shift in societal patterns, especially in a corrupt or non-virtuous society rendered the role of the philosopher as extraneous, like the weeds referred to by Fārābī and Ibn Bājjah. By superimposing the lofty ideals of isolation in relation to asceticism and mysticism on to the marginalized isolation of the intellectual in a corrupt and urban society, Ibn Ṭufayl recovers the dignity of the philosopher-mystic in his model of rational mysticism.

Section II: Approaches within Andalusian Islam

The Revisionist transmission by Ibn al-Nafīs

The task of mediation is to understand, and define the situation in respect to all the spiritual universes that the human being has borne within him, has expressed and developed in the form of myths, symbols or dogmas.¹¹³

Ibn al-Nafīs's (d. 1288/89) *al-Risālah al-Kāmilīyah fī al-Sīrah al-Nabawīyah*¹¹⁴ is a conscious revisionist response to the Tufaylian narrative of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*. It has thus earned the title of *Theologus Autodidactus* in western criticism as opposed to the notion of *Philosophus Autodidactus* that is central to the European transmission of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*. While this title sounds appropriate, in that Ibn al-Nafīs's response is a theological reaction to the Tufaylian narrative, it goes against the grain of Ibn al-Nafīs's critical intentions of denying the possibility of autodidactism.¹¹⁵ Both titles thus reflect the ideological response that belong to the European transmission rather than the Muslim milieu.

It is our intention here to contextualize Ibn al-Nafīs's work within the Muslim milieu that engendered it. The object of translation is a conscious choice of interpretation in a different language, culture or time. However, such an objective of varied interpretation might also be obtained through the transference and re-interpretation of the "myths, symbols or *dogmas*" referred to in the above quotation. Thus, transference is also a method of transmission, and the initial Tufaylian transference of Ibn Sīnā's view provokes an inverse reaction in the work by Ibn al-Nafīs, which is a response to both the meanings associated with his predecessors, the hermit Ḥayy of Ibn Sīnā and the philosopher-mystic of Ibn Tufayl. Ibn al-Nafīs' transference is a significant attempt to alter the horizon of expectation of the Tufaylian narrative. Ibn al-Nafīs's theological reception reiterates the normative notion of perfection, that can be legitimized neither in the

philosopher nor the mystic but only in the prophet, and is made meaningful not through isolation but within society.

Ibn al-Nafīs takes the bare bones of the Tufaylian narrative, shorn of its symbolic and philosophical content and transfers it to a theological, dogmatic and scientific tract. It is a reflection of the changing socio-cultural base and is endemic of the shift of knowledge base, from a time when metaphysics was central to the scientific discourse to its relegation as a minor philosophy. In asserting a dogmatic stance, Ibn al-Nafīs is nevertheless also imparting the changing knowledge bases of religion and science. Indeed, the complaint expressed in the prologue of the Tufaylian narrative regarding the numerous mathematicians in contrast to philosophers and the shift in the perception of science qua philosophy is a glaring reality that is reflected in this transference.¹¹⁶ There is no longer a continuance in Ibn al-Nafīs's narrative. It does not pick up the strings and play the tune where Ibn Tufayl stopped. Neither is there an acknowledgement of past masters. The question about the origins of the story are not addressed, and in fact are not important because the story that is so easily recognizable in form has lost its original meaning. What Ibn al-Nafīs does to the Tufaylian story is a radical shift not so much in the narrative as in its intent.

Ibn al-Nafīs' narrative is divided into four parts that are further subdivided into sections:

The First Part: On how this man called Kāmil came to be formed and how he came to know the (natural) sciences and the mission of the prophets.¹¹⁷

The Second Part: On how Kāmil came to know the story of the Prophet.¹¹⁸

The Third Part: on how Kāmil came to know the religious practices of the Prophet.¹¹⁹

The Fourth Part: on how Kāmil came to know the events which were going to happen after the death of the Prophet.¹²⁰

Only the first part deals with the transference of the Tufaylian narrative. It is divided into three sections:

1) On how the man called Kāmil came to be formed.¹²¹

2) On how the so-called Kāmil came to acquire sciences and wisdom.¹²²

3) On how the so-called Kāmil came to know the existence of prophets.¹²³

The other parts, further subdivided into sections, include a biographical narrative on Prophet Muḥammad within a theological pattern that justifies the political Sultanate of the time.¹²⁴

The intention of the author is clearly explicated. It is to relate the story of the prophet and the ordinances of religious law as transmitted by the narrator, Fāḍil ibn Nāṭiq from a man called Kāmil. There is thus a clear break in symbolic meaning from the Avicennan and Tufaylian narrative. This transference is confirmed in the choice of the names of the protagonists by Ibn al-Nafīs, Kāmil and Nāṭiq indicating that the original Ḥayy is no longer a repository or part of the analysis of initiatory recitals. Further, a new symbolism is created to replace the old. The Perfect Human (*al-insān al-kāmil*) can only be articulated in the form of the Prophet, as opposed to the philosopher or the mystic. There is no room left for doubt regarding this theological stance by the choice of the names, Kāmil, representative of the prophet and its reception through the narrator, Nāṭiq.

Beside the intent of Ibn al-Nafīs to "describe the same discovery with regard to the main tenets of Islamic religion, the life-story of the last Prophet, and the subsequent faith of his community,"¹²⁵ the fourth part of the narrative reflects the political ramifications of the rulership of the time and deals "with the condition of the sultanate of Egypt and Syria under the powerful Mamlūk ruler Baybars al-Bunduqdārī, called Malik al-Zāhir (658/1260-676/1277)."¹²⁶ Thus, this narrative is of great import as a historical documentary of the socio-political climate of the time rather than as an aesthetic work of literature. While the Tufaylian narrative also presents a critique of its time, it is implicit through the analysis of the sub text rather than a matter of statement.

Meyerhoff and Schacht note in their introduction to the Arabic edition of Ibn al-Nafīs's narrative: "The main idea of both treatises is the same; a human being originated by spontaneous generation on an uninhabited island comes to know by his own reasoning the natural, philosophical, and theological truths."¹²⁷

This banal summarization can equally be applied to both the narratives by Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn al-Nafīs, if our concern is with the bare bones of the narrative. However, one has to clarify further that a) this idea applies only to part one of Ibn al-Nafīs's narrative and is thus the starting point rather than the conclusion of his thesis, whereas with Ibn Ṭufayl it is almost the total narrative; b) within this "main idea", there are conscious shifts in Ibn al-Nafīs's version.

One of the earliest biographers of Ibn al-Nafīs, al-Ṣafadī (d.764/1363) in his work, *al-Wāfi b'il-Wafā'āt* cites a report by the Professor Bahā' al-Dīn ibn al-Nahhās:

I have seen a small book of his [in] which he opposed (to) the *Treatise of Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* of Ibn Sīnā (i.e. Ibn Ṭufayl) and which he called the *Book of Fāḍil ibn Nāṭiq*. In it he defends the system of Islam and the Muslims' doctrines on the missions of Prophets, the religious laws, the resurrection of the body, and the transitoriness of the world.¹²⁸

The above book is a unique 'fictional' tract in the repertory of Ibn al-Nafīs' output that otherwise consists of scientific works of varying nature and considerable importance and some theological studies.¹²⁹

What is common in the precedents to Ibn al-Nafīs' story is the figure of a narrator named Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān, who appears under the name of Fāḍil ibn Nāṭiq in *al-Risālah al-Kāmilīyah*. Whereas Ḥayy has the central role in the narratives by Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Ṭufayl, in Ibn al-Nafīs, the narrator plays "the part of a quite superfluous transmitter of the tale of the hero, who is called Kāmil."¹³⁰ An examination of *al-Risālah al-Kāmilīyah* reveals that its comparison with the Avicennan narrative by historians is erroneous, stemming from the confusion between the narratives of Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Ṭufayl.

In terms of narrative similarities, one can see that the works by Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn al-Nafīs have more in common with each other than the Avicennan recitals. However, there can be no doubt that Ibn al-Nafīs deliberately departed from Ibn Ṭufayl's narrative, in order to establish his primary thesis of the

necessity of the prophet as the messenger between God and humanity. Following the Tufaylian narrative, Ibn al-Nafīs's Kāmil also discovers the principles of science and knowledge by himself, but soon realizes that this knowledge is only relevant within society and in response to the message of the prophets and the law that lay down the basics of civic society.

There are many parallels albeit with varying details between the two works such as i) spontaneous generation; ii) descriptions of the sense organs; iii) the physical limitations of man as opposed to the rest of the animal world; iv) the dissection of animals; v) the use of primitive tools; vi) use of rational induction regarding the natural world leading to knowledge of celestial bodies and finally God and His attributes; vii) the linking of certain ages of the hero with the achievement of certain stages of reasoning; viii) the arrival of a stranger (or strangers) to the island from whom the hero accepts food and learns language; ix) the visit to an inhabited country; x) the reasons why the Divine Law makes use of allegories in addressing the masses.

These analogies provide street directions around the plot and might suggest that the two works are almost identical. However, Ibn al-Nafīs uses the same narrative elements as Ibn Tufayl's risālah to prove an entirely different perspective. All of the narrative analogies are used by Ibn al-Nafīs to forge a new horizon of expectation. The section below will analyze the main ideas of Part 1 of Ibn al-Nafīs's narrative in relation to the Tufaylian narrative. In terms of length itself, Part 1 takes up about eight pages of Arabic text in the total treatise of fifty pages. Thus, less than a fifth of Ibn al-Nafīs's treatise is comparable to the Tufaylian narrative.

Ibn al-Nafīs's description of Kāmil's birth through spontaneous generation is indisputably taken from the Tufaylian story, but the shifts that are brought about in the narrative should be carefully noted. In both cases, a flood causes some clay to be trapped and ferment. In Ibn al-Nafīs's version, a mixture of various clays were blocked in a cave with clay and herbs. In the Tufaylian narrative, the balanced climate of the island, with the four elements in equilibrium, its central

situation are among the factors that allow this mass of clay to become a receptacle for the spirit and body of the human.

There is no emphasis on the central location of the island in Ibn al-Nafis's version. Ibn al-Nafis mentions that the various clays achieved a mixture very near to equilibrium, "their single parts were differentiated because the kinds of clays with which they had been mixed were different. Thus, some of were hot and dry, similar to the temperament of the human heart, ... or cold and dry similar to the temperament of bones."¹³¹ The theory of humours is utilized by Ibn al-Nafis to explain the difference in consistency between the parts of the human body, rather than emphasize the holistic harmony achieved through the balance of elements, as Ibn Ṭufayl does.

In the Tufaylian narrative, it is the central part of the mass of fermented clay that was the most perfectly proportioned to form a human composition (*al-mizāj al-insānī*) aided by, as Ibn Ṭufayl mentions yet again, additional factors such as the central location of the island. Further, it is not the varying viscosity of the clay that formed different organs but rather a little bubble right in the centre of the mass. This bubble was filled with a fine and subtle substance and divided into two chambers by a thin membrane, to which was joined "the spirit which is God's and which continuously emanates from Him, like the light of the sun. When this spirit joined with that chamber, all the powers of the latter submitted totally to it, bowing to its sway and to God's command."¹³² The first chamber formed the heart, and the other sub-divided into two chambers, being the liver and the brain. Thus, all subsequent organs, blood vessels and veins parts of the body are formed of coarser and denser material. The primary importance of the heart as the receptacle of the spirit, the subsequent importance of the liver and brain second only to the heart, and the lesser importance of the other organs are clearly enunciated in the Tufaylian narrative.

Could the different approaches by Ibn al-Nafis and Ibn Ṭufayl have arisen due to a difference in scientific orientation, or due to the shifts in scientific theory that might have taken place in the time lag between the two works? The two

writers are generally in agreement in terms of scientific theories. Both of them utilize the theory of four humours. The germane notions of the lesser circulation of blood, Ibn al-Nafīs' major discovery in the field of science, might also be detected in Ibn Ṭufayl. The difference then lies in symbolic intent. Ibn al-Nafīs uses the narrative to refute notions of the independent self. He is also unable to resist using the narrative as a vehicle for scientific descriptions. Even Ibn Ṭufayl digresses on occasion to express scientific theories on the regions of the world and spontaneous generation. In the case of Ibn al-Nafīs, the predominant scientist intrudes into the narrative and with Ibn Ṭufayl, the secondary scientist attempts to interconnect such theories with spirituality. In either case, the primary intent of these narratives is not science. Even in the process of spontaneous generation, Ṭufayl's emphasizes the soul or spirit as the prime mover of the body. The soul is the inception of life and not the body. All faculties that developed were subordinate to it. In keeping with his theological frame, Ibn al-Nafīs acknowledges the power of God in human creation. The mixture with its different parts capable of forming all human organs is followed by the act of God who "does not withhold his right from anyone who deserves it, and grants to everyone who is prepared for something that for which he is prepared. Therefore He created out of those parts the organs of a man and out of their whole the body of a man."¹³³ The spirit was created by the vapours in the cave that evaporated due to the heat, and thus, the formation of a man was completed. Thus, God's role is not brought to question, but the centrality of the spirit is displaced.

It takes years in the Ṭufaylian narrative for the clay to attain perfect balance, maturity and capacity to become the receptacle of the human soul. In Ibn al-Nafīs's version, it takes a season; the flood and the blocking of the cave takes place in spring, and the process of fermentation of the clay happens in summer. The discrepancy in meaning that arises from the "reading" of the two narratives due to seemingly minute differences is tremendous. It should be noted further that Ibn al-Nafīs specifically indicates that this man (*rajul*, as opposed to *insān* in Ibn Ṭufayl) was different from the one formed in the womb thus implying the

unlikelihood of such a (repeated) occurrence, whereas Ibn Ṭufayl explains that the whole development was identical to the development of the foetus in a womb.¹³⁴

Jāmī in his explanation of the symbolic meaning of the story of *Salāmān wa Absāl* notes that the generation of Salāmān (the main protagonist) without father and mother represents the pure rational soul that is free of bodily connections.¹³⁵ It is particularly interesting to note how Ibn Ṭufayl relates the development of Ḥayy (even through spontaneous generation) to the formation of a human child. Ibn al-Nafīs explicitly denies such an occurrence and thus typifies the role of Kāmil. In terms of a feminist critique, the misogynist element is reduced in Ibn Ṭufayl in comparison to the works of Jāmī, most significantly in the alteration of the horizon of expectation that relegated such a form of birth to mean the freedom from human bodily connections. Thus, the case for balance between the body and soul is made by Ibn Ṭufayl rather than the denial of either.

Ibn al-Nafīs also adds new elements to the development of this man (*rajul*), who was formed very big, because the clay from which each organ was moulded was bulky in contrast to the particles of sperm from which the organs of the foetus are created in the womb. He was able to remain in the cave till his organs became strong, having access to matter from which he fed and air which supplied 'spirit' to his heart. Thus, the emergence of this man from the cave resembled the hatching of a chicken. When he left the cave, he was like a youth of ten-twelve years in his movement and perception, unlike the being formed in a womb.¹³⁶ The emphasis on the exaggerated difference between Kamil and the normal human being is to refute such an occurrence as possible or normative. It effectively renders Kāmil as a freak or miracle of nature. The child Ḥayy in contrast is like any other child, naked, helpless and in need of a parent figure. Ḥayy's difference from humankind lies in Ibn Ṭufayl's emphasis on the absence of human participation in his physical, mental and intellectual growth rather than physical appearance.

The alternative choices that Ibn Ṭufayl keeps offering his readers, such as the two versions of Ḥayy's birth, or the arguments whether creation is ex nihilo

or eternal and the suggestion that both possibilities may be considered valid, do not recur in Ibn al-Nafīs. Ibn Ṭufayl's presentation of options contrasts with Ibn al-Nafīs's clear and fundamental view. Theology is preferred over spiritual self-discovery. While the description of spontaneous generation is seen to reflect the scientific frame in Ibn Ṭufayl, the centrality of the spirit in Ḥayy's creation is often disregarded. The description of spontaneous generation by Ibn al-Nafīs reflects the cost of such a shift of perspective. Both the writers begin with the common scientific assumptions of the theory of humours that taught that a person's character is formed according to the proportion of the four elements in his being. While the notion of balance (of the humours) is implicit in both examples, this balance takes on entirely different meanings in the two writers. In Ibn Ṭufayl, it denotes the centrality of the soul and in Ibn al-Nafīs, the proportion of the different elements account for the difference in density and viscosity of the parts of the body.

Ibn al-Nafīs's version is not structured on the heptadic philosophy of the Tufaylian narrative even though certain ages are arbitrarily mentioned marking rites of passage.¹³⁷ In comparison to Ibn Ṭufayl, there is no loss of innocence, no exposure to sorrow at death, no maternal presence of the gazelle. Ibn al-Nafīs skips the first stage, the age of childhood and animal innocence. The twelve year old youth who emerges from the cave in section two of the first part of Ibn al-Nafīs's story quickly observes natural phenomena and is immediately able to distinguish smells, sounds, taste and perception. Thus, Kāmil begins as a fully operative creature. He soon discovered the functions of his hands and feet, and began to dissect animals in order to identify the functions of the organs in the interior of the abdomen.¹³⁸ What is the logic in skipping the first stage by Ibn al-Nafīs? One wonders why Ibn al-Nafīs takes such a drastic turn. However, as a result of this stance, the role of the gazelle is dispensed with. The gazelle in Ibn Ṭufayl represents 'Nature' who sustains life. Perhaps Ibn al-Nafīs wishes to assert that the human cannot be nurtured by nature alone. It may be tied to the notion that a child cannot survive on its own in the wilds. This observation has several

ramifications. It not only dispenses with *ṭabīʿah* and *qānūn* (natural law) but necessitates the regulatory norm of *sharīʿah* (revealed law). Thus, Ibn al-Nafīs' approach is a precedent in the ongoing debate on the role of revealed law or Scriptures, that made the Tufaylian narrative especially attractive to the early English translators, and provoked the later controversies in Europe from the eighteenth century onward that were centred on issues such as nature versus nurture, explicated in the educational theories of John Dewey and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

There is no sequential development as in the Tufaylian narrative, where Ḥayy responded to the death of the gazelle by striving to remove the impediment that caused her heart to stop beating. Ḥayy primarily involved himself in the process of dissection to seek an answer as to what had caused the death of the gazelle. Ḥayy reasoned that since the whole body stood in need of the heart, it must be the organ that was *centrally situated*; that an obstruction to the heart alone could cause the cessation of all bodily organs.¹³⁹ When Ḥayy discovered the empty chamber of the heart, he discerned that it was the entity (*al-shayʿ*) that occupied the empty chamber that was responsible for the gazelle's life. When that entity left the body, life also departed. Hence, Ḥayy discovered that the body was a vehicle for the entity that resided in it. He realized that what had characterised his mother, the gazelle, was this entity that had departed forever.¹⁴⁰ Even the dissection of the gazelle in *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* has a spiritual implication: the discovery that the essence of life is the soul, and when the soul departs there is no more meaning to the body.¹⁴¹

Ibn al-Nafīs's narrative adds information on respiration, the functions of the various organs and the digestive tract but neglects to link spiritual notions with scientific ones.¹⁴² The heart as the central organ and the receptacle of the spirit, or soul is not marked out as significant as in the Tufaylian narrative. Instead, aspects that are glossed over in the Tufaylian narrative are brought to the fore by Ibn al-Nafīs. Ibn al-Nafīs describes the observations of Kāmil on the animal

world which included aggressive predators and timid victims.¹⁴³ These observations are not incidental. The lessons that Kāmil learns is that the human animal is helpless and needs to live within the norms of society.¹⁴⁴

Kāmil observed animals, their behaviour and food habits. Later, he considered plants, how seeds grow when they come into contact with the soil, how their leaves and veins provide nourishment to the whole plant. He observed fruit, and their different types of seeds, and understood that the function of double seeds was to ensure the continuation of reproduction in case one failed. He noted the function of the skin and the vessels in grapes. Ibn al-Nafīs' interest in circulation might be detected in these descriptions. Kāmil understood from his observations that all parts of the animals and plants exist for certain purposes and uses and that nothing of them is superfluous and useless.¹⁴⁵ Like Hayy, Kāmil is able to classify the vegetable and animal kingdom.

Kāmil passed from plants to observe the conditions of phenomena such as rain, cold, snow, thunder and lightning, and then to celestial bodies, their various movements and revolutions. From his observations, he is able to perceive the necessity of a cause for existence.¹⁴⁶ However, there is no spiritual or religious explanation for the functions perceived, whereas for example, in Ibn Tufayl, Hayy feels the perfect and circular movement of heavenly bodies was attained because they were meditating on a higher presence.

By the time Kāmil reaches puberty, his mind has been refined by his observations; he rationalizes whether beings subsist in themselves or through something else that brings them into existence. He discovers the notion of contingent beings, that must have a cause for existence which is necessarily existent, and this is God.¹⁴⁷

What must be noted in Ibn al-Nafīs's narrative is that there is no process or logical frame of discovery or pattern, the observations are just made. Ibn al-Nafīs is the scientist that takes these functions as *a priori*. It is also an indication that Ibn al-Nafīs's thesis is not to reiterate the Tufaylian narrative by providing a coherent literary structure, but merely to use it as a point of departure for his

larger discussion of prophecy, revealed law and the functions of prophets and rulers.

In section 3 of Part I, Ibn al-Nafīs relates on how Kāmil came to know of the existence of prophets. This is the essentially revisionist response to the Tufaylian narrative that was built up in the earlier sections and is meant to logically follow it through. When Kāmil had discovered the notion of the Creator, "his mind had become refined as he approached full manly vigour" and he began reflecting on how He should be worshipped and obeyed.¹⁴⁸ It happened that the winds blew upon that island a ship with merchants and other people. They stayed there for some time to repair the ship and walked about the island to get firewood and collect fruit. At first Kāmil avoided them, and then cautiously approached them. The size of his body caused them fear and they called him but he ran away. In the Tufaylian narrative, the reverse occurs. Absāl came to the island by design and not accident, seeking the inner aspect of religion that was not available in society. Hayy was excited when he first saw Absāl and tried to approach him. Absāl considered Hayy as another ascetic and wanted to avoid disturbing him, and so he took flight and was followed by Hayy.¹⁴⁹

In Ibn al-Nafīs's version, the merchants "*threw* Kāmil some bread and food", he ate it *and found it very good because he had never eaten prepared food before*. The humanistic notion of preservation accompanies Hayy's self-imposed rigorous vegetarian code in the process of emulating the three aspects of his nature - body, soul and essence.¹⁵⁰ Kāmil became friendly with the merchants who covered him with clothes (no discoveries by himself), endeavoured to teach him their language, and informed him of the condition of their cities. He was astonished and *desired to travel with them*. Further, "he ate of the food of the inhabitants and put on their clothes and *it gave him enormous pleasure*. He remembered how miserable his life had been because he was always naked in cold and heat and had to confine himself to natural foodstuff, and the animals always attacked and bit him."¹⁵¹ If one detects the romantic and pastoral element in the

Tufaylian narrative (as George Ashwell does), it is certainly absent in Ibn al-Nafis.

This is totally inverse to Hayy's reaction to Absāl. In the Tufaylian narrative, Absāl offered Hayy some food which he had brought from the island. Hayy reluctantly tasted the food and liked it. He regretted the action immediately as it went against his dietary principles. After his initial excitement, Hayy realized that the encounter with Absāl was a distraction, and tried to return to the vision through contemplation but he found that he had lost the facility to do so. Absāl realized that Hayy did not know how to talk and decided to teach him the symbols of language in order to gain Divine Favour.¹⁵²

When Absāl discovers Hayy's spiritual knowledge, he urges the latter to return to the mainland and convey it to the people. Hayy does not wish to go because he feared it would affect his meditation and total concentration on God. Absal persuades him, saying the people could be saved if they were to understand the spiritual implications of worship. Only when Absāl convinces him that Hayy would provide new meaning to the inhabitants of the mainland who had been immersed in a literal and materialistic approach does Hayy decide to accompany him. The final result of their excursion is futile, and they return back to Hayy's island.¹⁵³ Ibn Tufayl is weary of the materialism in society and hopes to reinstate the spiritual aspect of divinity, not through the conversion of society but through individual effort. Ibn al-Nafis is pragmatic and materialistic, seeking to provide a viable social structure that is guided by religion.

Another point of differentiation is that Ibn al-Nafis' hero is not really self-taught. Born outside the 'theological' circle, he nevertheless asserts the necessity of theology. The hero in Ibn al-Nafis hardly makes any self-discoveries. Much of his knowledge is derived from the other beings who visit the island, such is the case with the discovery of fire, the use of clothes and other practical inventions. Then, why is the case of isolation presented? Simply to prove that "life becomes civilized only in human society."¹⁵⁴ Physically, the human is an inferior animal. However, his nature is endowed with a cunning that helps him overpower other creatures. This point is emphasized by Ibn al-Nafis. Hence, Ibn

al-Nafīs' narrative is an anti-thesis to Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*. Even the parallel incidents in the two narratives are used to refute all the notions suggested by Ibn Ṭufayl. For example, in Ibn al-Nafīs, it is the visitor, who is the base and source of information, whereas with Ibn Ṭufayl, it is the reverse. There is reciprocity between Ḥayy and Absāl, and Absāl recognizes Ḥayy as his walī. While Absāl informs Ḥayy of the exoterics of religion, in Ibn al-Nafīs, the hero discovers these through the result of speculation on what might be the doctrines likely to be taught by the prophets. Thus,

...the arrival of visitors from the outside world has a different function in each story; it serves in Ibn Ṭufayl to confirm and complete the results of the hero's independent reasoning, but in Ibn al-Nafīs only to acquaint him with the existence of a human society outside his island, from which he goes on to draw conclusions *by solitary thinking*, their confirmation by comparison with the existing religion being left to the reader.¹⁵⁵

In Ibn al-Nafīs's treatise, the social aspect is extolled just as individual solitude is preferred in the Ṭufaylian narrative. The merchants take Kāmil to a city near the island. Kāmil knew that man¹⁵⁶ because he lacked natural armour and needed artificial food and artificial clothes could not live well if he was alone. Thus, human beings needed to live in a society and community that functioned on the basis of the different duties and needs of its members. Kāmil's rational speculations are not of a metaphysical nature. He rationalizes that in order to live well, he needed to follow laws that would settle disputes. These laws could only be obeyed and accepted if it is believed that they come forth from God. The person to transmit the laws must be truthful and trustworthy and distinguished by a quality which one knows he would not have if he were not in relation with God, and this is what is called a miracle. Therefore, Kāmil knew that the good life of people becomes complete only through the existence of this prophet, that the creation of this prophet was necessary. This is the central thesis of the *Sīrah al-nabawīyah*. How could the role of the prophet be better explicated than by a

valorization of the virtuous society ruled or guided by the prophet-legislator? Ibn al-Nafis further provides information on the cycle of prophecy and the centrality of the seal of prophecy.¹⁵⁷

The hero of Ibn al-Nafis discovers the human duties of worship and social relations, the periodical development of prophecy, the life-history of the last Prophet, the subsequent fate of the community of this Prophet, and the end of this world with signs preceding it. These points are entirely Ibn al-Nafis' additions and are a presentation of his own worldview against the views presented by Ibn Ṭufayl. However, it is here that the narrative loses its pretence of being anything other than the confirmation of the normative society. Instead of logically allowing the protagonist to learn the religion and the necessity of prophecy from society once he enters it, Ibn al-Nafis narrator continues to discover these 'historical and biographical' principles by himself.

The Ṭufaylian narrative must have been seen as a threat to normative religion, to which the Nafisian alternative was offered. Nothing is allowed to intervene or change the assumed norm, even through the guise of fiction. The case for society then is primarily made on a historical basis to reiterate the expectations of the time. Ibn al-Nafis' *al-Risālah al-Kāmiliyah* is thus a polemical reaction to Ibn Ṭufayl's narrative. Its author wished to protect the rank of the prophet, which may supposedly have been endangered by Ibn Ṭufayl's narrative.

Ibn al-Nafis' narrative also presents a strong theological and scientific reaction, as opposed to naturalistic and holistic views of Ibn Ṭufayl. The greater part of the work is a defence of prophecy as well as a reflection on the politics of the state and the life of the prophet [Muḥammad]. The philosophical and mystical aspects that are the backbone of the Ṭufaylian narrative are neglected in Ibn al-Nafis's version.

Ibn al-Nafis' interest in the medical sciences filters through his presentation,¹⁵⁸ whose primary aim is to indicate the necessity of prophecy and communal life, and thus rectify any misunderstanding of these themes as presented

in the Tufaylian narrative. Despite the reductionist approach, Ibn al-Nafīs adds and updates the Tufaylian narrative in terms of scientific contribution, but since this is not the primary intent of either the philosophical romance or the theological tract, it does not contribute to the literary aspect of treatise. In terms of literary genre, Ibn al-Nafīs's narrative is a morality tale, dogmatic in content and structure. Nevertheless, it is a sincere attempt to "correct" any misapprehensions regarding prophecy and religious life that the Tufaylian narrative could have evoked. It clearly reflects the problems that the Tufaylian narrative posed which necessitated the creation of a new horizon that reflected the worldview and concerns of the time period.

In order to understand the trend of Ibn al-Nafīs's thought, we have to recognize it in relation to the original narrative by Ibn Ṭufayl, and to analyze where and how as well as why the shifts of meaning takes place. Our familiarity with the original narrative should not dull us into accepting Ibn al-Nafīs's response as a simplistic and convenient utilization of the framework that aptly provided a structure for the development of his notion of prophecy and the perfection attainable by prophets. Ibn al-Nafīs' narrative reflects the total transformation of the same story, indicating clearly that it is not the story alone that defines our understanding but its reception and re-interpretation that is governed by the horizons of expectation of its time. As shown above, the conscious choice of the narrator indicates a response and further development to the narrative, whether it is in positive or negative terms, mainstream or alternative. Whether it is a communicative or interactive role depends on the vantage point of the reader and is conditioned overall by the expectations of the time, the interpreter or translator and the reception of the work by the collective reader.

Ibn al-Nafīs is best as the scientist and not as a story-teller. The Tufaylian narrative shows the inclination to connect science with spirituality. Ibn Ṭufayl's emphasis on vegetarianism, his concern for nature and its protection might have been considered as indications of pantheistic tendencies that needed to be responded to.

Ibn al-Khaṭīb and rational mysticism

Ibn al-Khaṭīb (d.776/1374) may be considered among the first Muslim literary critics of Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*. He presents an analysis of the Tufaylian narrative in the *Rawḍat al-ta'rif bi al-ḥubb al-sharīf* which has not been recognized by the critics who have studied the narrative.¹⁵⁹ Lisān al-Dīn ibn al-Khaṭīb is a brilliant example of versatility. The *Rawḍat* reveals the mystical and ṣūfī facets of this writer who was also a historian, literary critic, statesman and jurist. His monumental work, the *Iḥāṭah*, also an important historical source on Ibn Ṭufayl, is a long monograph that is divided into two parts, containing the description of Granada and biographies of famous persons. Much of the information on Ibn al-Khaṭīb and the *Iḥāṭah* has been compiled by Maqqarī in his *Nafḥ al-ṭīb min ghuṣn al-Andalus al-ratīb*.¹⁶⁰

Ibn al-Khaṭīb does not refer to the Tufaylian narrative by name but uses it as an example to reflect the notion of *fiṭrah* and intimates that the discussion being undertaken is a study of the theories discussed by Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn Rushd. When referring to specific theories, Ibn al-Khaṭīb speaks in the third person plural, attributing these theories to Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn Rushd.¹⁶¹ The inclusion of Ibn Rushd in this geographical context is of special significance, since it reveals that his works, along with Ibn Ṭufayl's were considered as belonging to the genre of rational mysticism in the Maghrib. Ibn al-Khaṭīb's reception indicates that both Ibn Rushd and Ibn Ṭufayl were perceived as proponents of "rational mysticism" within the Maghribi milieu. In other words, the rational mysticism in Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn Rushd is not merely the remnant "traces" of Neoplatonic commentaries that arise from an Averroistic reading.

This connection was also made by another commentator on Ibn Ṭufayl, Moses Narboni, who lived contemporaneously with Ibn al-Khaṭīb within the same geographical sphere of Spain but in a different socio-religious context. The question of Ibn Ṭufayl's (and Ibn Rushd's) "rational mysticism" and how it is highlighted by his Jewish commentator as well as this Muslim literary critic needs

to be further explicated.¹⁶² This issue and its correlation to Ibn Ṭufayl is also raised in the current study, forging connections between the Andalusian writer, Averroism and Judeo-Arabic studies.¹⁶³

The question of "independent learning" that Ibn al-Khaṭīb addresses was also central to the later European transmission. However, Ibn al-Khaṭīb focuses on the *fiṭrah* as the basis for such learning. The title of the chapter on the Tufaylian narrative reads, *"Concerning the soundness of the fiṭrah and the possibility of independent learning of the arts and the sciences and to know God with that."*¹⁶⁴ Ibn al-Khaṭīb's analysis examines i) how reason, aided by natural disposition, can gain knowledge of God outside human inference; ii) how a person, in whom the elements are balanced, can be guided to the knowledge of God, due to this primordial disposition (*fiṭrah*) which exists in the soul in which knowledge of all things are hidden; and iii) how the possibility of the soul being opened by guidance to the knowledge of the Truth is due to its innate nature.¹⁶⁵ The predisposition to spiritual experiences also requires intellectual preparedness through rational speculation.

In his analysis of the narrative,¹⁶⁶ Ibn al-Khaṭīb exemplifies those examples from the Tufaylian narrative that reflect the inter-relation of mysticism and philosophy, such as the island in a harmonious clime, the manner in which the divine spirit was attached to the human being whereby matter was enclosed in the human form; the heart as the seat of the spirit and the search for the owner of the spirit i.e. its Agent (*al-mu'aththir*); and the confrontation of reason and revelation. He includes other details from the narrative such as the notion of spontaneous generation, described in almost the same words as Ibn Ṭufayl although Ibn al-Khaṭīb declares it to be implausible; the gazelle as foster mother; Ḥayy's imitation of animals; and the vivisection of the gazelle with analogous details.

Ibn al-Khaṭīb interprets the Tufaylian narrative as an esoteric explication of the story of Adam that reflects the soul as the mirror of all forms. The study

provides an interesting clue to the manner in which Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn Rushd were perceived in the Spanish tradition of Islam and subsequent Islamic thought as proponents of rational mysticism. Early European scholarship tended to receive Ibn Rushd as primarily representative of Aristotelian rationalism. Ibn al-Khaṭīb's approach to Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn Rushd indicates a sustained channel of transmission in Muslim philosophy, otherwise seen to have ended with the rejection of Averroism in the European perspective. Thus, Ibn al-Khaṭīb's interpretation of Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* as "the esoteric meaning of the story of Adam" lends greater clarity to the spiritual intent of the narrative. It is an interpretation that has been neglected by critics and still retains a fresh approach, especially since it sheds light on the whole process of rational mysticism. In this sense, the narrative may be seen as a myth that deals with 'origins' or 'beginnings.' The story of Ḥayy is like the cyclical occurrence of the Adamic myth. Ḥayy represents both the human prototype and archetype. The study also directly addresses the issue suggested by the Tufaylian narrative: whether prophecy is a necessity in order to know the Truth.¹⁶⁷ Hence, it confronts the age old issue of the dual modes of knowledge through reason and revelation.

This work presents the first clear and concise analysis of the Tufaylian narrative. Through Ibn al-Khaṭīb's account, we may assume that he had no doubt regarding the authorship of the narrative since he does not mention Ibn Sīnā at all in this context. Thus, the early transmission of the Tufaylian narrative in the Andalusian milieu does not reflect the confusion over authorship. Ibn al-Nafīs as well does not attribute the story to Ibn Sīnā (or anyone else) although his later biographer does. The earliest confusion over the two narratives occurs in Ibn Khaldūn. It is surprising that Ibn Khaldūn, who utilizes Ibn al-Khaṭīb as a historical source, was to confuse the narratives of the two writers as being the same.¹⁶⁸ Moreover, this study by Ibn al-Khaṭīb, along with the presence of the manuscript and earlier historical accounts by Marrākushī could have avoided the mixup regarding the authorship of the narrative. The other possibility is that Ibn

Ṭufayl's text was not freely circulated during its own time and may have been available only to a small group. The prologue to the narrative is addressed to a friend who is interested in knowing more about the mystical experience, perhaps it was written specifically for the philosophically inclined Almohad monarch, Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf.

Section III: Ibn Ṭufayl in the context of falsafah

The question of the prologue

In terms of structure and content, the prologue is a concise analysis of the state of medieval Islamic philosophy current in its time. It is in contrast to the form if not totally to the content of the main story. Historians of philosophy have been attracted to the prologue for several reasons seeing it as the primary source on Ibn Ṭufayl's life given the limited information available on his biography. Further, the prologue might also be seen as a legitimate self-analysis of Ibn Ṭufayl's thought.

Critics have mostly concentrated on the prologue in their survey of Ibn Ṭufayl in the context of medieval Islamic philosophy, neglecting the main narrative which is the major creative work by which he might be understood. One reason for such marginalization of the main narrative is due to the fictional form of the work, recognized for its aesthetic contribution but seen to be lacking in terms of historical validity. This perception rests primarily on earlier notions of 'fictive'¹⁶⁹ as well as being bound by positivist approaches to scholarship.

Thus, the prologue to the narrative of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* may be perceived as a part of and apart from the main story. It is connected to the narrative, since it introduces us to the predecessors of Ibn Ṭufayl and sets the field of discussion; the story that follows is meant to cover those aspects that are critiqued in Ibn Ṭufayl's predecessors. It may also be perceived apart from the story and independent of it, as an exposition of the state of philosophy in medieval Islam. Another factor that draws it apart from the corpus of the story is certain points on which it is critical of Ibn Ṭufayl's predecessors are also repeated by Ibn Ṭufayl himself in the course of the main narrative. The dual approach to the prologue poses the question of its authenticity; whether Ibn Ṭufayl wrote this introduction to his philosophical romance. On the basis of such discrepancies, an earlier study by the author called for a re-examination of the role of the

prologue that is being undertaken in this section.¹⁷⁰

Most early critics and historical reports on the Tufaylian narrative do not mention the prologue. Several of the early translations also exclude the prologue in their transmission. Given the contradictions between the prologue and the main text, I first examined the extant manuscripts of the Arabic text to affirm whether the prologue might have been a later appendage to the main story. This question remains unresolved due to the late dates of the copies of extant manuscripts of the narrative.¹⁷¹ However, these manuscripts do include the prologue as a part of the text. The choice of excluding the prologue then was made by some of the translators themselves. The earliest known (Hebrew) translation, and its commentary by Moses Narboni include the prologue, which further suggests that if the work *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* was completed in the latter part of the twelfth century, the prologue, whether of the pen of Ibn Ṭufayl or not, could have been written either contemporaneously or at the latest sometime during the early fourteenth century.¹⁷²

There is other evidence to support the response as to whether a scribe or even Ibn Ṭufayl himself added the prologue in order to tone down the radical ideas presented in the narrative. The balancing act between peripatetic philosophy and scriptural religion is also exhibited in the works of other Muslim philosophers especially after the attack on the philosophy by Ghazālī. The distinction and dialectic of separate ways of knowledge that is articulated in the works of Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn Rushd came to be referred to in Latin scholastics as the doctrine of double verity.¹⁷³

What is of parallel interest in the history of the translation of this particular text is the recurrence of the "prologue" motif - i.e. the need on the part of the translators to append the (translated) text with their own prologue or epilogue explaining the reasons why they undertook to translate the primary text, and in many cases, distancing themselves and their theology from the author's "enthusiastic" notions, as discussed further in chapter six. This tendency is reiterated from the early Hebrew commentary to the pro/epilogues included in

several of the early European translations, either by the translator or the publisher, that explain why the translator undertook his work and in what ways his own views differed from the "Arabian philosopher's."¹⁷⁴ The tension provided by the juxtaposition of the views promoted by Ibn Ṭufayl and the prevailing views in the sectarian climate of seventeenth century England *necessitated* the establishment of some ground rules, and the same case might have applied to the original narrative by Ibn Ṭufayl.

In fact, the question of the prologue as a "historical" document, on which basis it is highly extolled, is problematic. It contradicts all the historical details that we have from other sources on Ibn Ṭufayl's life. Since Ibn Ṭufayl is believed to have composed the Tufaylian narrative toward the end of his life, it is possible that the prologue was written much earlier. Possibly, this could be a reason why there is no mention of either Ibn Rushd, or of al-Bitrūjī. Ibn Ṭufayl as well has been credited with astronomical theories and medical works that are not mentioned in the prologue. Abū Ishāq al-Bitrūjī, an astronomer of the thirteen century and a student of Ibn Ṭufayl dedicates a work to his teacher and credits him with having promulgated original astronomical theories that refute Ptolemy's theory of cycles and epicycles.¹⁷⁵ Neither does the prologue mention Ibn Ṭufayl's debate with Ibn Rushd on the *Kulliyāt*.¹⁷⁶ In fact, it gives no real biographical information on Ibn Ṭufayl and does not confirm any biographical information that we have on Ibn Ṭufayl from diverse sources. It also indicates that the author of the prologue was not personally acquainted with Ibn Bājjah. With regard to Ibn Ṭufayl, this statement contravenes at the least the conceptual inter-relation between the two intellectuals as well as the claim that Ibn Ṭufayl studied under Ibn Bājjah.

Even if the author of the prologue was Ibn Ṭufayl, the necessity of the prologue, the contradictions that it fosters in relation to the main narrative and the historical data on his life indicate such a dialectic. The prologue might also be considered as a rebuttal to the "self-styled" philosophers mentioned therein, and in the epilogue. In this way, Ibn Ṭufayl may have intended to establish a clear

distinction between what might be considered as philosophy and who were its earlier proponents versus the non-philosophic intellectuals such as mathematicians and the "false philosophers" of the epilogue.¹⁷⁷

The prologue and historical record

The strongest argument on the question of the prologue can be derived from the early biographical information that is made available to us in the works of Marrākushī.¹⁷⁸ In terms of historical records, Marrākushī presents the earliest biographical records on Ibn Ṭufayl. Marrākushī does not even mention the prologue and emphasizes the early part of the main story. Marrākushī also refers to having seen the works of Ibn Ṭufayl providing his testimony from the most reliable witness, Ibn Ṭufayl's son. Later historians such as Ibn al-Khaṭīb, Ibn Abī Zar' and Maqqarī also do not mention the prologue in their comments on the Tufaylian narrative and directly discuss the issues of the main text.¹⁷⁹

If the prologue had been a later addition, this would also explain certain other contradictions. In his account, Marrākushī refers to the narrative as a treatise on the "origin of human species."¹⁸⁰ This statement has caused critics such as Gauthier to declare that Marrākushī may not have read beyond the first few pages of the narrative. Had Marrākushī even read the first few pages, he would have mentioned the prologue that appears at the beginning and at the least declared it to be an account of the state of philosophy. The absence of any mention of this history of philosophy by the literary historian, Marrākushī is quite glaring. Further, Marrākushī refers to the autographed copy of the narrative that was shown to him by Ibn Ṭufayl's son. If this copy did not include the prologue, it is likely that Ibn Ṭufayl had not included it himself in the first place.

One of the so-called weak points of Marrākushī's testimony is his statement that Ibn Ṭufayl was Ibn Bājjah's pupil: a statement that is repudiated in the prologue.¹⁸¹ However, if Ibn Ṭufayl himself was not the author of the prologue, then it is also possible that he studied under and knew Ibn Bājjah. There is enough evidence in the main body of the narrative regarding the

influence of Ibn Bājjah's thought on Ibn Ṭufayl and the Tufaylian argument in the final analysis veers closer towards Ibn Bājjah than Ibn Rushd, who picks up the issue regarding the reconciliation of revealed and rational religion where Ibn Ṭufayl leaves it, and provides a theoretical solution to the views expressed by Ibn Bājjah and Ibn Ṭufayl regarding the role of the philosopher in society.

The critique of Ibn Ṭufayl's predecessors' in the prologue

The prologue is an exposition of the relationship between metaphysics and mystical experience. This theme is exemplified by a critical review and evaluation of the works of major Muslim philosophers. The author also alludes to the relationship between mysticism and *sharī'ah* and the general validity of this relationship. The section below will reflect on the critique of the philosophers in the prologue.

a) Fārābī

The prologue is highly critical of Fārābī's theory of souls. He is also criticized for changing his views in different works and for the "doubts" expressed in his works. Examples are cited from his *Virtuous City* where Fārābī had noted that the souls who do not achieve perfection are doomed to infinite torture, whereas the prologue indicates that in the *Political Regime*, Fārābī noted that the souls of the wicked are annihilated. The Farabian notion of prophecy is also criticized. The prologue is also critical of Fārābī's limitation of happiness to this life and not the Hereafter, as purportedly alluded to in his commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.¹⁸²

b) Ibn Sīnā

Ibn Sīnā is perceived in the prologue as one who has expressed most clearly the stages of mystical perception reached by tasting (*dhawq*). Quoting from Ibn Sīnā's *Kitāb al-Ishārāt*, the prologue notes that this master had described the

gradual progress of the devotee through preparation (*al-riyāḍah*) to the stage of tranquil contemplation (*al-sakīnah*) culminating with the stage where his inmost being is like a polished mirror facing the Truth. He soon loses consciousness of his self and is only aware of the August Divinity (*janāb al-quds*). His soul exists only as the one who contemplates the Divine. This is the stage of communion (*wuṣūl*) and this situation (*rutbah*) can only be reached by experience (*dhawq*) and not through the way of speculative perception (*al-idrāk al-naẓarī*). It is further noted that one may perceive the kernel of Ibn Sīnā's teachings in his works on "oriental philosophy" while Aristotelian philosophy, as exposed by Ibn Sīnā in the *Kitāb al-Shifā'* "is insufficient to achieve your purpose."¹⁸³

c) Ghazālī

Ghazālī is singled out in the prologue as one who had experienced the mystical state and expressed it as well as he could. However, the prologue is highly critical of Ghazālī since his works abound in contradictory strands of thought and he frequently denied in one book what he has affirmed in another. The prologue compares the *Tahāfut al-falāsifah* to the *Mizān al-'amal* to validate this criticism. Ghazālī is also criticized for having advocated a multiplicity of methods of teaching and expression that resulted in a confusion regarding his actual views, as well as for the frequent use of symbols (*ramz*) and hints (*ishārah*) that result in a lack of clarity in his works. The prologue further notes that none of the esoteric books of Ghazālī had reached Andalusia. It thus excludes the *Mishkāṭ al-Anwār* as an esoteric work of Ghazālī.¹⁸⁴ Despite its misgivings on Ghazālī, the prologue counts him among those who may have found the Truth.¹⁸⁵

d) Ibn Bājja

The prologue indicates that Ibn Bājja had reached the highest level attainable by reason but did not surpass it. Although the level attributed to Ibn Bājja and the levels of intellectual investigation (*al-baḥṭh al-fikrī*) and theoretical knowledge (*al-ʿilm al-naẓarī*) do not contradict each other, there remains the difference of the clarity (*al-wuḍūḥ*) of the experience. Hence, the prologue considers that Ibn Bājja was in no position to censure the mystics for the pursuit of the bliss (*al-saʿādah*) to which he had no recourse. It is also critical of Ibn Bājja's style of living, his interest in worldly affairs and his negligence in scholarship that resulted in fragmentary and incomplete works.¹⁸⁶

e) The Mystics

The prologue also discusses examples of *shataḥāt*. The author exemplifies how the experience of the truth in the visionary state (*ḥāl mushāhadah*) gives rise to such ecstasy that those who experience it are prone to reduce it to some generality since "tongue cannot describe it." Such were the descriptions by al-Ḥallāj (d. 309/922) and al-Baṣṭāmī (d. 234/848 or later) and Abū Saʿīd ibn Abī al-Khayr (d. 440/1048), whose celebrated *paradoxa* (*shataḥāt*) are quoted anonymously in the prologue.¹⁸⁷

The value of the prologue as an early social critique revealing the actual understanding of the philosophers in their own time has fascinated historians of philosophy. However, its view of philosophy is critical, straightforward but conventional in comparison to the main text. It seems that the author provides himself with a protective armour against those views of his predecessors in which some elements do not adhere to the 'acceptable' norms in the non-philosophical milieu of the time.

The Prologue in relation to Ibn Ṭufayl's main narrative

The views of Ibn Ṭufayl's predecessors are briefly summed up in the prologue to the narrative. It succinctly points to issues where their thought deviated from his presentation. This section illustrates some of these points of divergence and hopes to show how Ibn Ṭufayl ranked these philosophers in his narrative, despite the statements made in the prologue. One of the hurdles in such a comparison is the contradictory views of the particular philosopher, which might indicate a point of divergence on the one hand and a point of convergence on the other.¹⁸⁸ Such a reading also calls for an awareness of the political and social climate of the time.

The contradictions between the prologue, the main narrative as well as the lack of any historical mention of the prologue may indicate that it was an interpolation by a scribe or contemporary who had access to the narrative. The prologue is written in the form of a treatise or letter. It presents an evaluation of the state of philosophy during the time and confirms a familiarity with the thought systems of various Islamic and Greek philosophers. In contrast, the main body of the narrative is written as a 'story' whereby Ibn Ṭufayl moulds the philosophy of his predecessors within the elements of the narrative, and hence transforms it into a living tradition - a *philosophia perennis* that is brought to life by his protagonist, Ḥayy. While Ibn Ṭufayl assimilates the teachings of his predecessors, he also tests the validity of their theories in the life of Ḥayy that may be seen to reflect his own learning and its maturity in the account of Ḥayy's spiritual growth. While the prologue is a historical presentation of the state of philosophy, the story traces its growth and development in the protagonist, Ḥayy who moves from being Aristotelian, Farabian, Neoplatonic, and Ghazalian. One is astounded by the range and flexibility of Ibn Ṭufayl's mind that results in a critique of the views of his predecessors through the main story itself. Such an understanding of the text reveals the subtle nuances of Ibn Ṭufayl's thought.

Ibn Ṭufayl's views with regard to the philosopher versus society begin where Ibn Bājjah and Fārābī had left them. Both Ibn Ṭufayl and Fārābī do not

make direct reference to the religion being discussed as Islam and to the prophet Muhammad. In Fārābī, this is in keeping with his presentation of a universal ideal. With Ibn Ṭufayl, the encounter between the philosopher and a society governed by the revealed religion is quite realistic. It is the philosopher Ḥayy, who is the ideal. The religious adherence of the masses reflects not only the message of the religion but its acceptance and mis/understanding by the people.

The following section will discuss major issues such as the immortality of the soul, conjunction with the Active Intellect, the theory of knowledge and the role of the intellect in relation to the views of Fārābī, Ibn Bājjah, Ibn Sīnā and Ghazālī as presented in the Tufaylian narrative.

Fārābī and Ibn Ṭufayl

"The theory of prophethood and revelation is best understood within the framework of Fārābī's emanative cosmology."¹⁸⁹ The prologue is critical of Fārābī's theory of Prophecy yet Ibn Ṭufayl adheres to Fārābī's emanative cosmology in the main body of the narrative. The prologue is critical of Fārābī's theory of souls. While the prologue criticizes Fārābī for declaring that the souls of those who have not known God dissolve into nothing, Ibn Ṭufayl himself says in the main narrative that those who have not known the One will not feel the "pain" and their "power will go to ruin with the body"¹⁹⁰

The questions surrounding Fārābī's theory of the soul have been subject to much debate. Ibn Ṭufayl himself considered the issue of rewards and punishments as being symbolic in relation to individual immortality. These theories on the immortality of the soul and its individual survival were to have strong repercussions in Christianity and Judaism especially in relation to Averroism, as discussed further in chapter five. Other parts of the Tufaylian narrative such as Ḥayy's mystical 'ascension' through the spheres also suggest that Ibn Ṭufayl himself did not believe in individual immortality. The statement in the prologue is significant in that it shows the early concern in the Muslim context of the immortality of the soul after death (and parallel questions of

resurrection and afterlife) which some critics have assumed to be central to Judeo-Christian philosophy rather than Islamic.¹⁹¹ A liberating factor of the main narrative is its concession to the reader to choose between different perspectives as in the two versions of Hayy's birth and the question of whether the world is eternal or created-in time. Thus, the critique in the prologue on the Farabian tendencies is also invalidated.

Ibn Bājjah and Ibn Ṭufayl

The prologue is ambivalent with regard to Ibn Bājjah whose views are the closest to Ibn Ṭufayl's presentation in the main narrative. It cites the views of Ibn Bājjah regarding the conjunction of the intellect with the divine, and quotes him in this regard, "Once this concept is grasped the mind can see itself as cut off from all that went before, with new convictions that cannot have arisen from the world of matter, too splendid to have sprung from the material since they are cleansed of all the compositeness characteristic of the physical world. Surely it would be more appropriate to call them divine ecstasies granted by God to those He will."¹⁹² It also alludes to a further stage beyond the use of reason, which Ibn Bājjah had criticized as being a figment of the imagination, for which he is rebuked (in the prologue) since he was being critical of something that he had not personally experienced.¹⁹³ Phillip Merlan cites the pseudo Alexandrian text, which emphasizes the mystical aspect of the unification: "only he who has experienced it knows what it means."¹⁹⁴

The difference between Ibn Bājjah and Ibn Ṭufayl in metaphysical terms is quite superficial in the narrative. Both of them discuss the union of the human intelligence with the immaterial intelligibles, granting certain differences. The critique of Ibn Bājjah in the prologue hinges on his lifestyle, his carelessness in scholarship and research, and his assumed lack of dedication to his study that allowed himself to commit a number of mistakes. Certainly, the philosophical inclinations of the two writers are similar but their personalities and work styles seem very different. Ibn Ṭufayl's description of Hayy's mystical ascent closely

adheres to Ibn Bājja's description, even though the latter excludes the 'imaginative' element. Further, the two writers share common ground with reference to the relation of the philosopher and society. Both the philosophers concentrate upon the intellectual qua spiritual progress of the individual rather than the society or the community itself.¹⁹⁵ Both of them critique the limitations on individual perfection set down by the state.

Ibn Bājja's problem is how the philosopher in the imperfect state should relate to society but Ibn Ṭufayl exposes his philosopher to a society converted to the "revealed" religion.¹⁹⁶ Ibn Bājja bases the perception of the Reality by the philosopher solely on his rational faculty. Ibn Ṭufayl, on the other hand, apparently perceived that logical reasoning -- without revelation or individual experience -- could result in antinomies that would remain unsolvable. This view is suggested in his examination of the createdness and/or eternity of the heavens.¹⁹⁷ However, there is no value judgement being made by him. One lesson that the narrative conveys is that the "mystery of mysteries" remains so in the perceivable, linguistic world because of antinomies that can only be resolved in a non-linguistic experiential realm.

One other difference between Ibn Bājja and Ibn Ṭufayl is that although both perceive the role of the philosopher in society to be isolating, Ibn Bājja is quite unconcerned with any sort of reform of the populace whereas Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy at least attempts to teach the populace the higher truths. Such a discussion of the role of the philosopher in society which was initiated by Ibn Bājja, established by Ibn Ṭufayl and whose solution was attempted by Ibn Rushd, could not merely be a theoretical construct and thus reflects the serious problems that a philosopher had to face in society.

Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Ṭufayl

We have discussed in the dissertation the common ground that exists between Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn Sīnā with reference to 'mystical' thought and the use of the genre. Ibn Ṭufayl also utilizes the psychology of Ibn Sīnā and possibly, its Aristotelian

source. Like Ibn Sīnā,¹⁹⁸ Ibn Ṭufayl also believed that the rational/individual soul is not pre-eternal but is generated at the same time as the individual body which can receive it, is formed. This view is reflected in his account of the spontaneous generation of Ḥayy.

The critique in the prologue on the insufficiency of the *Shifā'* to achieve knowledge is problematic since Ibn Sīnā himself declared in the beginning of the *Shifā'* that this work does not represent his personal thought but is intended as an introduction to Aristotle and other Greek thinkers for students of philosophy,¹⁹⁹ and that his own views are clarified in his works on Oriental philosophy.

Ghazālī and Ibn Ṭufayl

Despite the critique of Ghazālī's use of allegorical images in the prologue, Ibn Ṭufayl acknowledges through the experiences of Ḥayy that religion presents philosophical/mystical truth in the language of symbols. But with Ibn Ṭufayl, this is not an *a priori* precept. In fact, it is the particular situation of the masses that entails such an approach. Ḥayy is able to reveal to Absāl these realities with the minimal use of symbols (i.e. language itself being a symbolic mode of communication) and Absāl is after all an individual brought up within the norms of society and revealed religion. Hence, there are also subtle differences even within the concordance of Ibn Ṭufayl and his predecessors.

Unlike Ghazālī, Ibn Ṭufayl does not subject the mind to an established religious authority. Neither is Ibn Ṭufayl intent on justifying the relation between religion and philosophy to the extent that Ibn Rushd attempted. Both Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd -- who were otherwise in direct contrast with each other -- permit the theologian/ philosopher to present their teachings at different levels to suit the understanding of the audience, but Ibn Ṭufayl, although he ultimately accepts such an approach, does suggest that it eludes the existing problem. Such a method may be advocated under the extreme circumstances where there is an

unwillingness and fear to understand the 'truth'. The inclusion of the prologue might well be understood in terms of Ibn Ṭufayl's approach of providing both the manifest and those secret views covered by a 'thin veil' - the *ẓāhir* and the *bāṭin*.

Summation of the debate on the prologue

If the author of the prologue is other than Ibn Ṭufayl, then this also removes the base for the polemics that have been raised by some critics regarding the "lack of originality" in Ibn Ṭufayl's thought, who have supported their argument on the statements by the author in the prologue rather than in the main body of the text. Both the prologue and the brief epilogue that occurs at the conclusion of the narrative refer to certain "secrets" to be disclosed and both are critical of the "false" philosophers of the time. The statement that the story intends to unveil the secrets of the Oriental Philosophy weakens the polemical debate in scholarship, if it was not made by Ibn Ṭufayl himself. These "self-styled" philosophers remain unnamed but they might be the reason why Ibn Ṭufayl would have written the prologue, in order to distance himself from the prevalent views, and to uphold the integrity of his own views. The descriptive analysis of the classical philosophers in the prologue might be seen to set the field for a discussion on philosophy and mysticism.

It may also be assumed that the prologue is a method of dissemblance of the author's views expressed under the guise of a tale that is amenable to interpretation. This view is plausible if it is not taken to the extreme and if it does not lead to a reduction of the aesthetic as well as the communicative value of the narrative. If fiction can contribute to the generation of meaning and value what greater contribution can there be, whether to philosophy or literature! It is difficult to deny the literary felicity of the narrative. If indeed Ibn Ṭufayl had intended to use the "story" as a guise to present his philosophical arguments, a treatise in the style of the prologue would have sufficed. Other treatises by Muslim philosophers are sufficient evidence to this effect. The creative application of the story thus undermines the necessity of the prologue and makes

one question its function as a dissimulating device, or as an addition either by the author himself or the public disseminator of his work.

Beside differences, there are points of similarity between the prologue and the main text or between Ibn Ṭufayl and his predecessors. However, the most radical aspects of Ibn Ṭufayl's thesis are ignored in the prologue. The only possibility that is hinted at is the unveiling of the secrets of oriental philosophy and the allusion to the characters having received their names from Ibn Sīnā. The radical notion of the solitary, or self-discovery, the limitations of society in attaining perfection or final goals are all subjects of the main narrative. If the prologue is relevant in understanding Ibn Ṭufayl's thought, it has to be seen as a spring board, or a point of departure. Thus, responding to Ibn Ṭufayl and presenting a critique of his thought, of his originality or his sources based primarily on the prologue is reductionist criticism.

The issues that are responded to in the main text and the prologue are important in recognizing the areas in which Ibn Ṭufayl consciously meant to depart from the prevalent views in Islamic thought. In relation to his predecessors, they are also an indication of his significant and original contributions to the area of Islamic thought. Their continued impact within his own culture as well as on other cultures reflect his ability to delve into the very root of the universal intellectual, religious and social problems that plague society at large. The story is thus the articulation and the individual resolution of these issues. The reception of the story in the reader as well as the translator or commentator creates what literary critics see as the ultimate test of the genius of literature, the ability to appeal to readers of all times.

The role of the intellectual in the Tufaylian narrative

One might perhaps see the characters in the Tufaylian narrative in the light of the mystic triad of the progressive path of *sharī'ah*, *ṭarīqah* and *ḥaqīqah*, representative of the three levels that Ibn Ṭufayl articulated in the three main characters, Ḥayy, Salāmān and Absāl, each on one of three paths. It is thus

possible for different individuals to follow different paths, whereby each of them can attain the truth according to their path. One example that Ibn Ṭufayl uses is that different plants and other creatures receive light according to their transparency. Humans as well are endowed with the *fiṭrah* that allows them to receive the light according to their preparedness. In the final analysis, Ibn Ṭufayl indicates that spiritual progression is not possible or even desirable in every case, but the possibility of progress hinges on preparation. This is an affirmation of rational mysticism, that intellectual perfection is the preparation for mystical apprehension. From this basic mystical premise is derived the doctrine of the two-fold path that is taken up by Ibn Rushd.

The Tufaylian doctrine thus goes beyond the established philosophical notions of *awāmm* and *khawāṣṣ*. It puts many of the previous *a priori* notions of Muslim and Greek philosophy such as the issues of the philosopher-king, the Prophet-legislator and even revealed religion to the test. It rests on the efficacy of Muslim political philosophy to concede to the realities of societies and its rulers, while reserving a special if idealistic status to the philosopher.

Ironically, within his idealistic creation, perhaps despite it, Ibn Ṭufayl faces straight on the realism of society and is unwilling to concede even an idealistic status to the philosopher. The philosopher, if he seeks fame and fortune or even intellectual superiority, as Ibn Bājjah stands accused of, is conceding to the materialistic norms of society and is thus involved in its power-play. The flip-side of this cynicism is that it remains the duty of the philosopher to inform, but in the face of intellectual barrenness, the individual must go on her/his own (inner) journey that society cannot interfere in. The soul to be such a wonderful thing has to be free of all bodily and physical limitations, and it is in this positive sense that the story ends as it began in its quest for inner secrets - the wordless language of the soul.

The Philosopher as a stranger to society

The notion of the philosopher as a stranger to society and a weed as expressed by Ibn Bājjah and Fārābī, is taken to a different direction by Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy. On the basis of Ḥayy's savage appearance, Absāl assumes that he would gain reward by teaching Ḥayy language, scriptures and the ways of God, only to discover the sublimity of the stranger's knowledge. The strangeness is also expressed through the alienation of the philosopher among the masses.

Thus, the notion of the 'stranger' carries a dual meaning in Islamic thought. In the first sense, it is mystical, tied in with asceticism, simplicity, and the attempt toward material non-attachment, or detachment from all worldly connections or belonging. It is central to mystical thought and is connected to the idea of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* by Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī. In the second sense, it is intellectual, referring to the level of attainment by the soul and the intellect. Both these meanings are developed by Ibn Ṭufayl in the case of Ḥayy. The first meaning is articulated in his asceticism. However, it is in the second sense that Ibn Ṭufayl goes a step beyond his predecessors, such as Ibn Bājjah and Fārābī whose works also reflect on the theme of the philosopher as a stranger to society.

Marmura discusses the root of the two contrasting but nonexclusive views of the Philosopher in society in Fārābī as arising from the a) the pseudo-Socratic image of the philosopher as alien to the social fabric and b) The Platonic view of the Philosopher-king transmitted by Fārābī.²⁰⁰ In the case of Fārābī, the allusion to the philosopher as "stranger in the world, [who] lives poorly in it, and death for him is better than life" is an allusion to non-virtuous society,²⁰¹ and not the legitimate rulership that follows the Divine Law.

The convolutions of the Platonic notion of the philosopher-king to include the reality of legal rulership reflect the attempts by the Muslim philosophers to respond to the realities of the societies in which they operated. Plato is thus received in the Islamic mould in the genuine attempt by the

Muslim philosophers to create a viable alternative, rather than resort to a theological frame in which medieval religious philosophy is so often cast. Thereby, the theoretical ideals of the philosopher-king would remain supreme, leaving enough space for 'normal' operation of societies. Thus, in Fārābī, as well as in the general tenor of Islamic political philosophy, the later substitution of the philosopher by legal rulership is anticipated and accepted as a reality.²⁰² The future role of the philosopher in a society ruled by normative precepts is not anticipated by Fārābī and it is left to Ibn Ṭufayl to raise this issue. In this context, Marmura notes

Ibn Tufayl seems at first sight to go beyond both Alfarabi and Ibn Bajja to proclaim, in effect, that the philosopher even in a virtuous, religious, but conservative traditional society has neither a place nor a function. The philosopher must retire to his "island" in perfect seclusion.²⁰³

Marmura questions whether "in the final analysis the story is really a repudiation of Alfarabi's theory of the State," since Ḥayy's isolated existence "is a negation of the principle that man is a social animal, the principle that underlies the entire structure of Alfarabi's political philosophy."²⁰⁴ He argues however that the cause for isolation in the Tufaylian narrative are not discordant with Farabian principles, since it establishes the harmony between religion and philosophy²⁰⁵ as a means of conveying what is involved in pursuing the mystical path.²⁰⁶ Further, isolation as a criterium does not detract from viewing Ibn Ṭufayl's philosopher in Farabian terms "for philosophers, whether or not engaged in political activity, require isolation. Moreover ... not all philosophers for Alfarabi are endowed with political ability. There will be those who will confine themselves to the contemplative life."²⁰⁷ This scenario forwards another issue that is central to Ibn Ṭufayl's thought, even though it has not been addressed in any other study, the notion of rational mysticism.

In terms of conceptual differences, Ibn Ṭufayl's philosopher-mystic is

not political unlike Fārābī's philosopher-king. Thus, Hayy's final rejection of society is not the rejection of its inhabitants, for he does after all go to the mainland to convey the unveiled truth to the people, but a rejection of its politics. Hayy had many chances at being the master - he was able to master the elements of nature and the other animals around him. He could have become master over humankind if he sought to manipulate them, in the manner that he initially manipulates the natural order. However, he finally sought not to lead, or to overpower but to live in harmony and maintain a balanced existence with the natural order.²⁰⁸ Ibn Ṭufayl's philosopher is certainly of the cadre of the philosopher-king, then why does he reject both rulership, as well as the power of intellectual superiority over others that was still the lot of the Philosopher? Given the symbolic situation of Hayy, that places him above other humans, there is this tendency to idealize him as representative of the perfect philosopher, further underlined albeit paradoxically, by his superiority over other law-abiding citizens. However, as I have emphasized elsewhere, Hayy learns all the lessons in life, nothing comes to him easy or without example, or actual experience.²⁰⁹ If not perfection or idealization, what is the cause for isolation? It is to justify the role of asceticism allowed for within the law but not acceptable in the society, which thus required Absāl to withdraw from it.

There are many points on which Ibn Ṭufayl does not agree with the general political philosophy of Fārābī. Absāl chooses withdrawal not just because this concession was allowed within the revealed law²¹⁰ but also because he was not allowed to choose an ascetic way of life within society. He had to leave the community because its legal ruler, Salāmān, had forbidden withdrawal from society.²¹¹ Neither Hayy nor Absāl invalidate the *shari'ah* in principle. The complete failure of not just the ignorant masses but also the learned elite that surrounded Absāl point to a spiritually sterile State.²¹² Marmura also notes that Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn Bājjah "were on the defensive, vulnerable to the displeasure of the more religious conservative. This much

we can infer from the cautious way they wrote."²¹³ This may be the reason why Salāmān's defunct society may be fallaciously labelled as "virtuous."

Rational Mysticism and its development from Ibn Bājjah to Ibn Rushd

The conceptual structure that Ibn Ṭufayl articulates in his work is what might be termed as rational mysticism. The form of intellectual union and perfection that is rendered by Ibn Bājjah is taken one step further in the mystical apprehension of Ḥayy, that culminates the rational and intellectual development of the individual. However, there is a demarcation between the rational and mystical apprehension and the hypotheses that accompany them are different. While Ibn Ṭufayl logically draws up the progressive development of Ḥayy, the gnostic experience even though it is the apogee of the total experience, does not happen *ipso facto*. Then, how does one explain the *crossing over* between rational perfection and mystical experience? This is attained by the *mythic narration* - the 'experiential' mode and the symbolic interventions are the archetypal bases by which the reader might participate in the process of discovery.

One of the metaphors used in the narrative to connote the bridge between the rational and mystical perception is that of the blind boy, who is familiar with the city in which he lives and is able to conceive objects through his rational faculties but is unable to experience colours till his sight is restored. When he regains sight, the objects around him would be just as he had imagined them to be; what would distinguish his present experience from his former awareness would be the feeling of joy. In the same manner, the knowledge reached by theory (*naẓarīyah*) and by experience (*dhawq*) are the same except that the latter is more distinct and more experiential and consequently the joy felt through this method is like the experience of sight to the blind.²¹⁴

The analogy could be understood at different levels. In one sense, it is the intellectual blindness of the "self-styled philosophers" that Ibn Ṭufayl

disparages against in his own time.²¹⁵ However, the symbolic strata aims to convey the very purpose of the narration - the inner experience and joy that is beyond intellectual perception. Intellectual perception, as seen in Ḥayy's development and his ability to fix objects in his mind, is essential to the mental and perhaps even spiritual growth of the individual but is not its apex. Further, rational mysticism might thus be distinguished from the paradoxa (*shataḥāt*) and inspirational forms of mysticism that are criticized in the prologue for their reductionist element.²¹⁶

The symbolic meaning of the work is conveyed through several analogies. The application of terms such as union, conjunction, the immortality of the soul, the notion of *shay'* for that which is essentially undefinable but encompasses all, the notion of the three hearts, are used in philosophical as well as mystical contexts. Their symbolic content is sometimes passed over within the rational and intellectual frame of the work, or seen with the much narrower lense of philosophy, within the development of intellectual perfection. Perhaps the critic loses sight of the ultimate purpose of the author and is unwittingly trapped by "the thin veil" that becomes like a thick cloud which is impenetrable by those who lack discernment and cannot cross over.²¹⁷ The seeker however is taken along the same journey whereby the structured stages in the protagonist's quest is meant to evoke a similar development in its readers and thus uncover the "thin veil."

Literary theory discusses the notion of reader-response as a corollary to reception theory, whereby the critical response to a given work is governed by the collective reader-response at a given time. In terms of the reader-response theory, the mythic narrative is intended to evoke a participation on the part of the reader. In the Tufaylian narrative, the integrity of the primary author (Ibn Tufayl) is maintained through the participation of the reader in the *mythic narrative*. The weaving of such a reader-response into the structure of the story itself might account for the sustained popularity and transmission of the Tufaylian narrative. This degree of sophistication ensures the universal

validation of rational mysticism while recognizing the historicity of the reader-response.

The presence of the philosopher in the system that s/he develops is concealed behind the tissue of didactic demonstrations and impersonal developments. Yet its disclosure is necessary to determine the material genuineness of the *motifs* incorporated in the philosopher's work; what s/he adopts or rejects; understands or fails to understand; what s/he carries to the maximum of meaning or degrades to trivialities. "But it is not very often that the philosopher attains such a consciousness of his effort that the rational constructions in which his thought was projected finally show him their connection with his inmost self..." Ibn Tufayl manages to attain this connection because of the novelty of his method that combines the rational with the mythical and symbolic.²¹⁸

The I-land as a return to the self

Above the earth, heaven curves like a dome,
enclosing it, giving it the safety of a habitation
but at the same time ... it differs from the antique
intuition of the world as the sum of forms or of
corporeal objects.²¹⁹

A major locus of symbolic expression in the Tufaylian narrative is Hayy's island, at once a heaven and a haven, located physically at the centre of the earth, where days and nights are of equal length and endowed with a balanced temperate climate that allows for the spontaneous generation of the human. The enclosed space of the island also allows Ibn Tufayl to reinforce his understanding of the universe "as the sum of forms or of corporeal objects." Considering the whole orb of the heaven, it appeared to Hayy that the earth, water, air, plant and animals were all contained in it. In his natural discoveries, Hayy perceived the universe as a totality, like an animal whose senses were the stars, whose spheres were the limbs and the world of generation and its objects were like the fluids of the stomach. The whole was

like a macrocosm (*al-'ālam al-akbar*). Hence, all that existed was like a single individual.²²⁰

What does Ḥayy's island involve? In one sense, it is the site from which he experiences the total sense of the universe. The island allows for the total natural and holistic experience that the splintered inhabitants of the mainland cannot achieve.

We are asleep in the cavern of Adam, our father,
while the vicissitudes of the age keep us resolving
... Now is the time to return to our cavern, to
take refuge in the observation of arcana and in
concealment. That is the state of things described
by the Prophet when he declared: *Islam grew up
in exile and will return to exile. Blessed are those
who go into exile.* (Ikhwān al-Ṣafā, IV: 300)

The quest is toward the fulfilment and return to that awareness, represented by the protagonist's family name - his badge of belonging - the son of awareness (*yaqzān*). Thus, the island is also the place like no other place, whose motif is also expressed as the Mountain in the Himyarite Story of the Idol, or Mount Qāf where it represents the "Other World" as well as *Nā kojā Ābād* (*Nowhereville*) that appears to be equivalent to Utopia. The Utopic theme is applicable to the degree that perfect conditions can make possible the perfect knowledge of Ḥayy. In his discussion of *Nā kojā Ābād*, Corbin reflects the symbolic internalization by emphasizing that *ābād* represents a populace. He also discusses the motif of the voyage to the island in a recital on the *Green Island (Al-Jazīrat al-Iḥdrā')* by al-Kūfī that transforms the locale to the country of the hidden Imam of Twelver Shi'ism.²²¹

Ḥayy's island combines Utopia and Arcadia. Society and civilization become a prison that the philosopher-Mystic must either leave or return to in the form of self-exile, the preferred and perhaps the only choice.²²² The move to the island for Absāl represents an awakening in his consciousness of the inner experiences of religion and spirituality. In the case of Absāl,

revealed religion and society represents his outer knowledge and his move to the island represents his return to the cavern, what mystics in Islam refer to as the union of opposites, of *ẓāhir* and *bāṭin*, *shar'īah* and *ṭarīqah*. Thus, the island is also the inner self, and society is the outer. Ḥayy's exit from society and return to the island is an expression of this interiorization. Further, the island as inner being is totally reversed in the Robinsonades where it becomes the object of discovery - the extension of the new world.

Endnotes to Chapter 3

1. M. A. F. Mehren, *L'Allégorie mystique Hay ben Yaqzān*, 1st fascicule in *Traité Mystiques d'Aboū Alī al-Hosain b. Abdallāh b. Sīnā ou d'Avicenne*, 4 fascicules (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1889-1899). The first fascicule contains *the mystical allegory of Hayy ibn Yaqzān*, published using the manuscripts from the British Museum, Leiden and Bodleian. It includes the Arabic text and a partial French translation. Fascicule 2 contains the Arabic texts and translations of *Risālah al-ṭayr* and the last three sections of *al-Ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt*. Fascicule 3 contains *Risālah fī al-'ishq*, *Risālah fī māhiyyah al-ṣalūt*, *Kitāb fī ma'nī al-zīyārah wa kayfiyah ta'thīriha*, *Risālah fī dafa'a al-ghammamīn al-mawt* with French translations. Fascicule 4 contains *Risālat al-qadar*. Like Ibn Ṭufayl's *Hayy ibn Yaqzān*, Ibn Sīnā's recital was also transmitted into Rabbinic literature by a poetic imitation bearing the title *Hay ben Maqīz*, generally attributed to Ibn Ezra (d. 1174), and another anonymous Hebrew translation accompanied with a commentary by Ibn Zayla, a disciple of Ibn Sīnā; cf. Mehren, *L'Allégorie*, 8 and no. 5; 9 and nos. 1 and 2.
2. Henry Corbin, *Avicenne et le récit visionnaire* (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1954), tr. from French by Willard R. Trask as *Avicenna and the Visionary Recital*, Bollingen Series LXVI (1960); rpt. Princeton/Bollingen Pbk. Mythos Series (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). Part I includes discussions on the cycle of Avicenna recitals as well as translations of the *Recital of Hayy ibn Yaqzān*, *Recital of the Bird*, and *Recital of Salāmān and Absāl*. Part II includes the translation of the Persian commentary of Ibn Sīnā's *Hayy ibn Yaqzān*.
3. Amélie Marie Goichon, *Le Récit de Hayy ibn Yaqzān commenté par des textes d'Avicenne* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1959).
4. Besides editions and translations, there are several important studies by Fazlur Rahman, Michael Marmura, Ibrahim Madhkour, Daniel Gimaret, Jean Michot and Lenn Goodman that deal with the overall context of Ibn Sīnā's works. As noted in the previous chapter, scholarship and its particular methodologies also reflect particular receptions. We have limited ourselves to those receptions in critical scholarship that respond to the issues addressed in the dissertation. With regard to Ibn Sīnā, we refer to those critics who primarily deal with the symbolic narratives of *Hayy ibn Yaqzān*, *Salāmān and Absāl* such as Mehren, Corbin and

Goichon and secondarily, those studies that challenge or respond to the issues surrounding Ibn Sīnā's "eastern" philosophy. Two recent studies attempt to address the relation of the "recital" to an overview of Ibn Sīnā's works. These studies are by Peter Heath, *op. cit. Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā)* and Dimitri Gutas. Dimitri Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian tradition: an Introduction to reading Avicenna's philosophical works* (Leiden & New York: E. J. Brill, 1988).

5. Cf. G. C. Anawati, *Gnose et philosophie: A propos du Récit de Hayy ibn Yaqzān* de A.-M. Goichon, in *Études de philosophie musulmane* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1974), 303. The difference between Goichon's and Corbin's presentations is parallel to the dialectic between the prologue and the "story" in Ibn Ṭufayl. In the latter case, the presence of the prologue appears to nullify the necessity by some reader-critics to look at the "story" and assess the existence of the "philosophical" ideas of the *falāsifah* in the actual story itself, thus leading to the *de facto* legitimacy of the prologue. Some aspects of past scholarship in both the cases of Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Ṭufayl have focused on the reduction of the mystical and literary aspects, and thus suggest the need for new modes of analysis and the recognition of rational mysticism as being inclusive of the genres of literature, philosophy and mysticism. Cf. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian tradition*, 3-5; s. v. *Avicenna*, *Elr* (1982), III: 68-69. Gutas attempts "to set the record straight" and clear the fog that has settled over Ibn Sīnā's missing "eastern" texts. He feels that the key to resolving and avoiding distortions is to critically analyze Ibn Sīnā's auto/biography in relation to his works. Gutas considers that when "reduced to its bare essentials, it appears as a transcript of Aristotelian studies." He focuses on the systematic nature of information on Ibn Sīnā's studies in his biographies and cautions the value of any other (personal) information. Thus, it appears to Gutas that the autobiography and the records of his students accurately reflect Ibn Sīnā's Aristotelian stance as known to him within the Islamic context. Gutas does not see any problem with his own selective perspective being constrained in theory by the same factors that govern his critique of studies that bemoan lost works, or emphasize the "esoteric" tradition of particular works of Ibn Sīnā. Some problems around Gutas' translations and interpretation are reviewed by Marmura, *Plotting the course of Avicenna's Thought*, in *JAOS* 111.2 (1991), 333-343.

6. Heath, *Allegory*, 1-9. Heath's study makes a valuable contribution to this issue of two modes, by his analysis and recognition that philosophers as well as historians of philosophy tend to ascribe to the mode of logos, often assigning it a greater "truth-value" than muthos. This is most prevalent in the study of Ibn Ṭufayl's *Hayy*, with the demarcation of the prologue and the main narrative. However, in this case, we have a combination of logos and muthos in the main narrative, but its reader-critics continue to underscore one view as opposed to the other. See also Hasanali, *Further considerations of genre*, in *Ibn Ṭufayl's Hayy*, (1987), 117-119, where I discuss the movement from logos to muthos in the

Tufaylian narrative.

7. *Op. cit.* Mehren, *L'Allégorie*; Corbin, *Avicenna*.

8. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 4.

9. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 20; Qur'ān: 50:37.

10. Gutas reverses the formula by suggesting that the use of "Eastern" philosophy in the sub-title of Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy* was the basis of the mystique surrounding Ibn Sīnā's "Eastern" philosophy. This is pure "orientalism"! First, it blurs the distinction between "medieval Andalusia and contemporary Europe". Then, it places Ibn Ṭufayl and modern European scholars on the same platform as having "misinterpreted" and used "creative imagination" to represent Ibn Sīnā. Further, Gutas suggests that Ibn Ṭufayl (the prologue) misread the stylistic difference between the *Shifā'* and the *Kitāb al-mashriqīyīn*, while he ignores the prologue's citation of the *Ishārāt*.

The central question addressed by Gutas is no longer a distinction of "oriental" and "illuminative" *ḥikmah*, but the dissociation of Ibn Sīnā from "mysticism". He further argues that the use of the term ("eastern") as technically referring to the "school of Khurasan" was eventually rejected (or not systematically mentioned) in the last six years of Ibn Sīnā's life. While Gutas's view of avoiding speculation is commendable and the claim of Ibn Ṭufayl as source is a refreshing change to a student of Ibn Ṭufayl, he himself resorts to a one-sided perception by his rejection of rational mysticism. Gutas' rejection of mysticism may be seen as a claim to reassert the true contributions of Muslim philosophers, as representing the western Greek peripatetic tradition. In a response akin to Averroism, it dismisses a whole other Iranian tradition as based on a mistake. *Avicenna, EI*, II: 82.

11. This false attribution by Ibn Khallikān was repeated in the earliest Arabic editions printed in 1299/1882 at Cairo and Istanbul. Cf. Mehren, *L'Allégorie*, 7-8; Gauthier, *Ḥayy*, xxvii, no. 1; xxix, no. 1; Corbin, *Ibn Ṭufayl, Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 4 (1967), 109-110; Goichon, *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān, EI*², vol. 3 (1964), 331.

12. Ibn Khaldūn, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, tr. Franz Rosenthal, (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1958), II, 371-372. Ibn Sīnā does discuss the theory of spontaneous generation but not in his recitals. Cf. Gauthier, *Ḥayy*, xix-xxii.

13. Hājji Khalifah, *Kashf al-zunūn 'an asāmī al-kutub w'al-funūn*, ed. and tr. into Latin by Flügel under the title *Lexicon bibliographicum et encyclopedicum* (Leipzig: Oriental Translation Fund, 1835-1872; New York: Johnson Reprint, 1964), No. 1753. He attributes a Persian translation of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* to a

Fadhlallah ben Ruzbehan Khanji Isfahani (?) (Flüegel) whose Persian title is given as *Badī' al-zamān*. Gauthier suggests some possibilities about the identity of the Persian translator. Gauthier, *Ibn Thofail*, 50, no. 3, 51, no. 1. The only Persian translation of Ibn Ṭufayl's narrative is a recent one by B. Z. Furuzanfar entitled *Zindah-i Bīdār* (Teheran: BTNK, 1956).

14. We discussed in the preceding chapter the differences and connections in the use of the names by Jāmī and Ibn Ṭufayl, and how they are applied by Malti-Douglas.

15. Corbin, *Preface to the Edition in English*, in *Avicenna*, (Dallas: Spring Publications, 1980) vi.

16. Corbin, *Avicenna*, 135-136 and no. 21.

17. The methods of rational mysticism may also be applied to the intellectual contributions of other medieval Muslim thinkers such as Suhrawardī al-Maqtūl, Ibn 'Arabī, Ḥamīd al-Dīn Kirmānī, Abū Ya'qūb al-Sijistānī, etc. The inter-relation between the two modes is most clearly articulated in Ibn Ṭufayl. This usage provides a model for the application of the methods of rational mysticism in the analyses of the above writers.

18. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 151-152.

19. Ernst Cassirer, *La philosophie des formes symboliques; 2. la pensée mythique*, tr. from German [to French] by Jean Lacoste (Paris: Les éditions de minuit, 1972), 223.

20. Corbin, *Avicenna*, 8.

21. Mehren, (ed.) *Risālat al-qadar (Traité sur le destin)* in *Traité Mystiques*, fas. 4. Arabic text and French translation (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1899), 1-3. According to Mehren, Ḥayy supports the orthodox position of viewing free will as an abstract concept (preface, not paginated). Corbin's treatment of the perspective of Ḥayy (represented as Ibn Sīnā's inner consciousness) is markedly different from Mehren's and from the content of the above treatise in which Ḥayy does appear to support pre-destination. Corbin sees the transformation of the science of physiognomy ('ilm-e firāsāt) by Ḥayy as a point of departure to manifest the authentic inner human soul, or the *bāṭin*; see Corbin, *Avicenna*, 154-55.

22. A detailed comparison of the visionary recitals of Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī as well as the narrative of *Kitāb al-'ālim wa'l-ghulām* was the subject of my M.A. thesis; see Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy*, 88-117.

23. 'Abdurrahman Badawi, *Avicenne en Espagne musulmane: pénétration et polémique*, in *Milenario de Avicenna* (Madrid: Instituto Hispano Arabe de Cultura, 1981), 13-14.

24. *Ibid.*, 14.

25. Mehren, *L'Allégorie*, 8.

26. This association of the efficacy of the "true" name, or meditation on the word given by the Guide as revealing the nature of Divine knowledge is shared by Muslim, Hindu and Sikh mystic traditions. The *ginānic* (*hymns*) literature of the Khoja Isma'īlī tradition provides a rich literary repertory on this subject. See the anthology by Christopher Shackle and Zawahir Moir, *Ismaili Hymns from South Asia: An Introduction to the Ginans* (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1992). See also Ali Asani, *The Harvard Collection of Ismaili Literature in Indic Languages: A Descriptive Catalogue and Finding Aid* (Boston, Mass.: G. K. Hall, 1992); Azim Nanji, *The Nizari Ismaili Tradition in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent* (Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan, 1978).

27. Corbin, *Ibn Ṭufayl*, *EP* (1967), IV, 109.

28. Corbin, *Avicenna*, 154.

29. Perhaps, one can also draw a symbolic connection between the structurally different *Robinson Crusoe* and *Ḥayy*. "Crusoe's reason for leaving his father's house has to do with his youthful assumption that he can achieve on his own more life than is possible within the limitations imposed by his father ... Crusoe does not of course -- or not, at least in a literal sense -- ever return to his father's house ... The father to whom Crusoe does finally "go home" is of course, God the father -- who is also the God of his fathers. But he does so only after he has experienced being *ex patria* in both senses of the phrase -- only after he has known first the radical isolation and exposure of the shipwreck and eventually his own helplessness to protect himself, to deliver himself from evil". Birdsall, 25. This quotation reflects the connections and the anti-thetical aspects between the two narratives.

30. A possible allusion by Ibn Sīnā to Plotinus and the Qur'an. Ibn Sīnā, *Recital of Ḥayy*, in *Avicenna*, 137-38; cf. Plotinus, *The Enneads*, tr. Stephen MacKenna (New York: Paul Burton Philosophic Foundation, 1992), IV:8; V:1, 410, 423-24.

31. Thackston, W. (tr.) *The Mystical and Visionary Treatises of Shihabuddin Yahya Suhrawardi*, (London: Octagon Press, 1982), 107, cited by H. Landolt, *Suhrawardi's 'Tales of Initiation'*, *JAOS* 107 (1987), 475-86. Landolt further discusses the various 'meanings' of the Active Intellect, Angel Gabriel and the "fathers". In section II of the article, he cites examples from the different tales by

Suhrawardī, strongly indicating how the "father" or "fathers" may be identified with the celestial Intellects, and the Holy Spirit, or the "archon". This association is also prevalent in tales such as *Ghurbat al-gharbīyah* where Suhrawardī discusses Ḥayy ibn Yaḡzān, and *'Aql -i surkh*, as well as in his systematic treatises. Corbin also discusses the "father" as Supreme Angel in *Avicenna*, 75 ff., and 177 ff. and in his translations and commentaries on Suhrawardī in *L'Archange Empourpré* (Paris: Fayard, 1976).

32. Cf. Munk, *Mélanges*, 413.

33. The "Hermetistic source" of Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq's Arabic text has not been traced. Corbin notes that in the absence of a critical edition, the philological status of Ḥunayn's text remains doubtful. Ḥunayn's text has been used concurrently with Ibn Sīnā's texts and is included in the margins of the lithographed edition of the *Ishārāt* (Tehran 1305/1886), III, 106; cf. Corbin, *Avicenna*, 209-223, no. 8. Ḥunayn's text is also included in *Tis' Rasā'il fi al-ḥikmah wa al-ṭabī'yāt wa qisṣat Salāmān wa Absāl l'il-Shaykh al-Ra'īs*, ed. Hasan 'Āsī (1881; Beirut & Damascus: Dar Qabis, 1986). The Hermetistic summary of the story was originally published in the *Tis' Rasā'il* (Istanbul, 1298/1881) and cited by Gauthier. Corbin considered it to be inaccurate. For further details regarding the Greek tale that had been translated into Arabic by Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq, see Gauthier, *Ibn Thofāil*, 74-85.

34. A. J. Arberry, *Fitzgerald's Salaman and Absal: A Study* (Cambridge: University Press, 1956), 41. Arberry compares Fitzgerald's translation in various drafts with a literal translation of poem. He doubts the Hermetistic attribution. This point will be further elaborated while discussing Jāmī's *Salāmān and Absāl* that is translated and commented upon by Arberry.

35. Corbin, *Avicenna*, 223-242. Gauthier, *Ibn Thofāil*, 73-85. Cf. Gomez, *Un cuento*, 12-24. Gomez refutes Gauthier's notion that the Hermetistic tale was a source of Ibn Ṭufayl's tale. In his second edition of *Ḥayy*, Gauthier re-assesses the "originality" of the story and indicates some of the fallacies addressed by Garcia Gomez; cf. Gauthier, *Introduction, Ḥayy*, VI-XXII.

36. Corbin explains the problematic issues surrounding the names of the protagonists in the Arabic narration by Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq, that are attributed to an earlier Hermetistic tale. See *Avicenna*, 10, # 10.

37. See Corbin, *Avicenna*, 211 ff. that has been used as a basis for this synopsis, along with the Arabic edition in *Tis' rasā'il*.

38. As discussed further below, the cyclical heptadic pattern is crucial to the Tufaylian narrative, and exists to a lesser degree in Ibn al-Nafīs's narrative, where the protagonist is nourished by herbs in a cave till he quickly grows to the size of

a ten-twelve year old youth, at which time he emerges to the outside world. In a later stage, Ḥayy moves to vegetarianism when he realizes that killing animals might shorten their predefined life span and purpose.

39. The various attempts in world myths to shift the power of procreation solely to the male (such as the birth of Athena from Zeus) are sometimes seen in recent critiques as a reflection of the shift from matriarchy to patriarchy. The shift in mythology seems to be prevalent in cross-cultural world myths.

40. This analogy might be seen to reflect its Hermetistic roots through the use of alchemical symbolism as a means of spiritual transformation; cf. Corbin, *Avicenna*, 209. Outside its symbolic application, it can be seen as a reaffirmation of Aristotelian physics of reproduction, where the semen provided the form and the womb the matter. Within this frame, it is easy to dispense with female participation. This issue evokes a dialectic response between current feminist critical approaches and research in symbolism. One has to keep in mind both the notion of symbolism and the science of the time. In the Tufaylian narrative, the version of Ḥayy's birth through spontaneous generation excludes human participation rather than the absence of female participation. This distinction is important when comparing the 'intent' and shift by Ibn Ṭufayl in relation to the other tales that belong to the same cycle through commonality of names, symbols or sources.

41. Two aspects that have a corollary in *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* are the "secret door" and the "refuge." The "secret door" also recalls the famous ḥadīth: *I am the city of knowledge and 'Alī is its gate*. In the Tufaylian narrative, the "secret door" and the "refuge" might be represented by the island, which is the inner self of the human (in the case of both Ḥayy and Absāl), where s/he can experience knowledge of God. See further below for a discussion on the representation of "islands".

42. The notion of *ghurbah*, or exile, as well as *gharīb* (beggar, mendicant, ascetic) from the same root have strong correlations in the Avicennan recital and the tales of Suhrawardī. Interestingly, this notion is most clearly explicated by Suhrawardī in the *Risālah al-ghurbat al-gharbīyah (The Tale of Occidental Exile)* whereby the symbolic geography maps the mystical journey and its contrasting interplay between "west" and "east", "dark" and "light" and "exile" and "return." The declared intent in both Ibn Ṭufayl and Suhrawardī is to reveal the true meaning of the "oriental" Avicennan mystery. Cf. Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy*, 107.

43. Cf. Malti-Douglas, *Woman's Body*, 98. Malti-Douglas's comments on cross-dressing are worthy of further consideration. One might recall the co-relation of "robe" with the body, and the statement attributed to Ibn Abī al-Khayr in the prologue: "There is nothing under these robes but God." Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 4.

What would changing "robes" imply? It may indicate the movement from one stage to the other, as initiates often dressed differently according to the 'stage' of initiation. However, such a meaning apparently has no connection with the sexual behaviour that "cross-dressing" suggests.

44. Cited above. Corbin indicates that the narrative in *Tis' Rasā'il* is inaccurate.

45. Interestingly, this event could occur only through the combined efforts of the Philosopher (Aristotle) and King (Alexander).

46. Cf. Corbin, *Avicenna*, 217.

47. Corbin, *Avicenna*, 224-226.

48. One finds certain parallels between the story of Joseph and Zulayka, and Absāl and the unnamed woman, especially in the personification of beauty and virtuousness in the two representative male figures and the persistent pursuit by the female character; cf. Malti-Douglas, 96.

49. Ibn Ṭufayl, 26; Corbin, *Avicenna*, 225.

50. I have discussed in detail how the commonality of structural elements in various works of a similar genre sometimes leads to simplistic comparison, assigning Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* a precursor status to various adventure tales and epics that share archetypal elements. A structural analysis of the Tufaylian narrative would tie it to a vast body of literature. Cf. Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's 'Ḥayy'*, 123-24.

51. A. M. Goichon, *Livres des directives et remarques* (1938; Paris: J. Vrin, 1958).

52. Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Ishārāt*, III, 105, cited by Corbin, *Avicenna*, 206; cf. Goichon, *Livres des directives*, 484-85.

53. Corbin, *Avicenna*, 207.

54. *Ibid.* 227.

55. *Ibid.*, 227-228.

56. Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's 'Ḥayy'*, 134-35.

57. Corbin, *Avicenna*, 205.

58. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 4.

59. Corbin, *Avicenna*, 205.

60. Cited by Corbin, *Avicenna*, 205-06.

61. Marmura, *Plotting the Course of Avicenna's thought*, *JAOS* 111.2 (1992), 339-340. Marmura critiques Gutas' 'selectivity' and gives the example of his exclusion of this central passage and how it can affect a particularized ascription of Aristotelianism to Ibn Sīnā. He cites the reception of this passage in the commentaries on the *Ishārāt* by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Ṭūsī. The passage discusses the cognitive journey that begins on a rational platform and continues after *wuṣūl* through stages that cannot be expressed in words. Thus, Marmura notes that we have to pose the question of what it means in relation to Avicenna's 'Aristotelianism.' Whatever interpretation one might assign it, it cannot be ignored.

62. Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy*, 134-35.

63. Ṭūsī's summary is available in a compiled version in the *Tis' Rasā'il*. There is no complete critical edition of Ḥunayn's Arabic text.

64. Cf. A. H. Habibi, *Nigāh-i bih Salāmān ō Absāl-i Jāmī wa Sawābiq-i ān* with a commentary by M. Ismail Muballigh (Kabul: Anjuman-i-Jāmī, 1964), 16-19. The commentary presents an empathic reading of the inter-relatedness of the different narratives by Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Ṭufayl, Suhrawardī and Jāmī. Ibn Sīnā's *Ḥayy* is presented as the Intellect of the philosopher, he is upgraded in Ibn Ṭufayl as the rational mystic and in Suhrawardī he reaches the epitome of perfection as witness to the highest sūfic knowledge. Another significant point made by Muballigh is his observation on the inclusion of *Salāmān and Absāl* in the story of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* by Ibn Ṭufayl, in contrast to the stories of *Ḥayy* by Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī. This forges the lines of transmission with both the precedents to Ibn Ṭufayl in the Hermetistic and Ṭusian (Avicennan) stories as well as the *Hikayah Dhu'l Qarnayn* reported by Garcia Gomez as *the* source utilized by Ibn Ṭufayl.

65. Arberry, 44.

66. Arberry, 45.

67. Cf. Arberry, 43-44.

68. Arberry, 41.

69. Arberry considers the abolition of female participation as reflective of the misogynist elements of the narrative explicated by Jāmī; Arberry, 40.

70. For example, the demarcation of body and soul being equivalent to male and female arises from Aristotle's *Physics*. Cf. Aristotle, *The Generation of Animals*, 1:1144-46; 1:1186-87 and Thomas Aquinas, *The Production of Woman in Summa Theologica*, Question XCII in S. Young (ed.) *An Anthology of Sacred Texts* (New York: Crossroads, 1993), 157-59; 68-69. Current feminist research also looks at the shifts in creation stories. According to some theories, the female was earlier considered as the only procreator, independent of male participation, which rendered her a central role in society. This changes with the shift of the mythic powers of creation to the male, as in the birth of Athena from Zeus' forehead, as well as the shift in scientific orientation. In Aristotelian *Physics*, where male semen is considered the creative form of the human and the female womb, its matter. Thus, the provision of a receptacle bound by ideal conditions would allow for the birth of a child without female participation.

71. Caroline Bynum, *Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages* (Berkeley: University of California, 1982).

72. *Op. cit.* Arberry (tr.), *Fitzgerald's Salāmān and Absāl*. Of the seventy-seven sections into which the poem is divided, thirty-four focus on the story of Salāmān and Absāl, forty-three recount other stories and examples. In terms of length, approximately half of the poem deals with the story of *Salāmān and Absāl* and the other half with edifying examples and descriptions. Toward the end of the work, the last ten sections deal primarily with the main story.

73. See Malti-Douglas, 5-6. Malti-Douglas explicates how female body is interposed into female narrative through the presence of the female narrator as with Sherazade in *The Thousand and One Nights*.

74. Bynum, whose works are also cited by Malti-Douglas, recognizes that the use of masculine-feminine symbols might render gendered meanings, or alternatively, signify values other than gender. She further notes that symbols are polysemic, and never merely 'signify' or represent meaning, and whether masculine or feminine, they are 'experienced' (or received) differently by different cultures, sexes, classes etc. So the question she adds is not how symbols mean but for who? Applying this question to the symbolic use of the names by Jāmī and Ibn Tufayl reveals the different symbolic meaning of the common names for the different writers. Cf. Bynum, *Introduction: The Complexity of Symbols*, in *Gender and Religion*, 2-4.

75. For an elaboration of the initiatory recital in Suhrawardī, see H. Landolt, *Suhrawardī's 'Tales of Initiation,' JAOS* 107 (1987), 475-486. This article on Suhrawardī includes a detailed review of the scholarship on Suhrawardī's tales, its main proponents and the themes that the tales address. See also Yahya ibn Habash al-Suhrawardī, *The Mystical and Visionary Treatises of Shihabuddin Yahya Suhrawardī*, tr. William Thackston Jr. (London: Octagon Press, 1982), for

an English translation of the *Qiṣṣat al-ghurbat al-gharbīyah*.

76. See also the Arabic edition by Ahmad Amīn, (ed.) *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān lī Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Ṭufayl wa al-Suhrawardī* (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'arif l'il-Tibā'ah wa al-Nashr, 1959), which includes all three stories of *Ḥayy* by the above authors. For the debate on oriental/illuminative philosophy, see Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy*, 53, no. 129; cf. Corbin, *Avicenna*, 271-278.

77. See S. Munk, *Ibn Tofāil* in *Mélanges*, 413; G. Quadri, *La philosophie arabe dans l'Europe médiévale: des origines à Averroès*, translated from Italian by R. Huret (Paris: Payot, 1947), 166; H. Z. Ulken, *La Pensée de l'Islam*, tr. G. Dubois et al (Istanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1953), 529-530.

78. Suhrawardī, *Kitāb al-mashārī' wa al-muṭārahāt* in *Opera Metaphysica et Mystica*, ed. H. Corbin (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1945), I, 483-84.

79. Suhrawardī, *The Mystical and Visionary Recitals*, 100.

80. See also Nasr, *Three Muslim Sages Avicenna, Suhrawardī and Ibn 'Arabī* (Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1976), 64-66, 74-76.

81. Casiri, *Bibliotheca arabico-hispana escurialensis*, Madrid: 1760-70. Tomus posterior, 69. The codex is very vaguely described and gives no indication of the title, or author. Gomez provides an Arabic edition of the section of the codex (folios 24-29a of codex 1668; MDCLXIII in Casiri) that contains the Himyarite story. The script is Maghribi and the copy was completed in 928 /1521 Rāmādān. Cf. Garcia Gomez, *Un cuento árabe*, 7.

82. Balthasar Gracian, *The Critick*, written originally in Spanish by Lorenzo Gracian one of the best wits of Spain and translated into English by Paul Rycaut Esq. (London: Printed by T.N. for Henry Brome at the Gun in St. Paul's Church-Yard, 1681). See especially pages 8-9 (not numbered) of "The translator to the reader" wherein Rycaut compares the *Critick* to *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*.

83. Garcia Gomez, *Un Cuento*, 241-260 (Spanish translation); 265-268 (Arabic edition); cf. Pastor, 132-144. We have primarily translated the Arabic text by Gomez and have made cross-references to his Spanish translation and to the English summary by Pastor. Pastor changes the meaning of several words since his summarization is based on an interpretation of the Spanish translation by Garcia Gomez. Unless otherwise noted, all citations are from the Arabic text (henceforth referred to as *Hikāyah*).

84. Alternatively referred to as Dhū al-Qarnayn (the two horned one), he is popularly seen to represent Alexander of Macedonia, but also other persons such as 'Alī ibn Tālib. For a further discussion, see E. Mittwoch, *Dhu'l Karnain*, *EI*

(1913-1936), (rpt. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987), II: 961-962.

85. Garcia Gomez, 241-42. This description is remarkably parallel to the narrative of Hermanos and Aqliquilas of the Hermetistic tale. These two tales may have common antecedents, but Gomez does not raise or address these questions in his study of the Himyarite tale. Likewise, the commonalities might arise from belonging to the genre of the Oriental tales surrounding the figure of Dhū al-Qarnayn.

86. *Hikāyah*, 261, fol 25b. Such a description is close to the representation of Ibn Ṭufayl's island, its perfect climate and central locale that made it the primordial locus of Ḥayy's scientific, intellectual and spiritual knowledge. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 20.

87. *Hikāyah*, 261, fol. 25b. Sarandīp was the earlier name for Shri Lanka. The description is very similar to the Tufaylian narrative, where the island is referred to as being among the islands off the coast of India; Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 20.

88. *Hikāyah*, 262, fol. 25b.

89. *Hikāyah*, 262, folio 25b.

90. *Hikāyah*, 262, l. 18-21, fol. 26a. Cf. Pastor, 134.

91. *Hikāyah*, 263, folio 26b.

92. *Hikāyah*, 263-268; folio 26b, line 24 to folio 29 a.

93. The word 'Amrah might also be translation as diadem, an ornament worn on the head. Ibn Manṣūr (711 a.h.) translates it as "Little Pearl" and informs us that this was a name given to females. Jamāl al-Dīn Ibn Manṣūr, *Lisān al-'Arab*, Reprint of Būlāq edition (Cairo: Dār al-Miṣrīyah li-tā'līf wa al-tarjumah, [n.d]), VI: 284.

94. *Hikāyah*, 264, l. 10; Garcia Gomez, 251.

95. *Hikāyah*, 264; Pastor, 137.

96. *Hikāyah*, 264.

97. *Hikāyah*, 265, fol. 27 a; cf. Pastor, 138; Gomez, 252.

98. *Hikāyah*, 265, l. 13-15 (folios 27 a-b).

99. *Hikāyah*, 265, fol 27b.

100. *Hikāyah*, 265, fol. 27b.
101. *Hikāyah*, 266, fol. 28a.
102. *Hikāyah*, 267, fol. 28b.
103. Cf. Garcia Gomez, 31-35.
104. Gauthier, *Ibn Thofail*, 73-74.
105. See Gauthier, *Ibn Thofail*, 51-54. The question of the parallels between Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* and Balthasar Gracian's *El-Criticon* are also discussed by M. Menéndez y Pelayo in his introduction to the Spanish translation of the Tufaylian narrative, *El filósofo autodidacto de Abentofail, novela psicológica*, tr. Francisco Pons Boigues, with a prologue by Menendez y Pelayo (Zaragoza: Tip. de Comas Hermanos, 1900), 52. Cf. Rycaut, *The Translator to the Reader*, in *The Critick* (London, 1681) [not paginated]. Rycaut, the early English translator of the *Critick* alludes to a connection between the Latin translation of the Tufaylian narrative by Pococke and the *Critick*.
106. Garcia Gomez, 18-19; Gauthier, *Ibn Thofail*, 85.
107. The number 1000 is constantly used in the Himyarite narrative.
108. This approach by Garcia Gomez is conditioned by the reclamation of "native" origins, thus disclaiming a dependence of the Spanish tradition on Arab origins in light of the discussions by Edward Said in chapter two. Cf. Maria Rosa Menocal, *The Arabic Role in Medieval Literary History: A Forgotten Heritage* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987). Menocal presents an interesting discussion on the inter-action of Arabic and Spanish literature. This area of research merits further consideration as suggested in chapter seven.
109. Garcia Gomez, i2.
110. Garcia Gomez, 17.
111. Corbin, *Preface*, in *Avicenna*, vii.
112. Cf. Corbin, *Avicenna*, 205-206.
113. Corbin, *Avicenna*, 3.
114. Max Meyerhoff and Joseph Schacht, eds., *The Theologus Autodidactus of Ibn al-Nafīs*, edited with an Introduction, [partial] Translation and Notes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968); the Arabic title also reads *Kitāb Fādil ibn Nāfiq*. For bibliographical details on Ibn al-Nafīs' works see Ḥājji Khalīfah, *Lexicon*

bibliographicum, under *Fāḍil ibn Nāṭiq*, III:432, no. 6296.

115. Even though Ibn al-Nafīs's hero discovers knowledge and rationalizes the existence of God, his discoveries underline the limitations of reason and the physical and religious lacunae in human existence outside society and its laws, whereby the human being is vulnerable and unprotected against nature and beasts and has no ethical or moral frame to draw from.

116. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 5.

117. Ibn al-Nafīs, 4-13.

118. Ibn al-Nafīs, 14-26.

119. Ibn al-Nafīs, 26-36.

120. Ibn al-Nafīs, 36-53.

121. Ibn al-Nafīs, 4-5.

122. Ibn al-Nafīs, 6-9.

123. Ibn al-Nafīs, 9-13.

124. Ibn al-Nafīs lived in a time of social upheaval in Muslim empires, including the period of the Ayyubids and the Mamlūks and the sack of Baghdād. For a discussion of the political background, see Meyerhoff & Schacht, *Introduction*, 2-10. Thus, the legitimation of legal rulership challenged by the Tufaylian narrative needed to be reiterated.

125. Meyerhoff, *Introduction*, 2.

126. Meyerhoff, 2.

127. Meyerhoff, 29.

128. Cited by Meyerhoff and Schacht in the *Introduction*, *Theologus Autodidactus*, 14.

129. Details of Ibn al-Nafīs' life and works can be obtained from over eighteen biographies or obituary notices, the bibliographical compendium of Ḥājjī Khalīfah and existing manuscripts. There are about twenty two extant works by the author. See Meyerhoff & Schacht, *Introduction - the literary output of Ibn al-Nafīs*, 22-28.details. Other bibliographical information is available in Brockelmann, *GAL* i, 648 no. 37, and *GAL Suppl.* i, 899 f., no. 37. ii, 781 f., as well as individual studies such as N. Heer, *Thalāthat Mujalladāt Kitāb al-Shāmil li'bn al-Nafīs*,

Revue de l'Institut des manuscrits Arabes, vi (1960), 203-10, that focuses on a major work on medicine by Ibn al-Nafīs that was planned to consist of three hundred volumes, of which eighty were completed.

130. Meyerhoff, *Introduction*, 27.

131. Ibn al-Nafīs, 39.

132. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 138.

133. Ibn al-Nafīs, 39.

134. Ibn Ṭufayl, 32-33.

135. Arberry (tr.), *Salaman and Absal*, 202-203.

136. Ibn al-Nafīs, 5.

137. For the importance of the heptadic structure in philosophy, see Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy*, 130-31 and no. 325, where the Aristotelian significance of the heptadic structure of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* is discussed. Cf. Fritz Zimmerman, *Seven times Seven is Fifty: The Philosophical Age of Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, Unpublished paper presented at *The World of Ibn Ṭufayl: An Interdisciplinary Colloquium on 'Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān'* (London: The Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine, 1987).

138. Ibn al-Nafīs, 5.

139. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 40.

140. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 41-45.

141. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 51-52.

142. Ibn al-Nafīs, 6.

143. Ibn al-Nafīs, 7.

144. The Himyarite story discussed above also describes the cycle of life where different creatures are masters over others based primarily on "might". However, the protagonist is able to become the master over all creatures through the use of his intellect.

145. Ibn al-Nafīs, 6-8.

146. Ibn al-Nafīs, 8.

147. Ibn al-Nafīs, 8-9.
148. Ibn al-Nafīs, 9.
149. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 139-41.
150. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 106-113.
151. Ibn al-Nafīs, 9.
152. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 142-43.
153. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 145-154.
154. Meyerhoff & Schacht, *Introduction, Theologus*, 31.
155. *Ibid.*
156. One might assume the generic use of the term "man" but Ibn al-Nafīs uses the word *rajul* instead of the generic *insān* (used by Ibn Ṭufayl). Thus, I have not substituted the word man with the preferred human, leaving either possibility open to the reader.
157. Ibn al-Nafīs, 47-48.
158. One other commonality between Ibn al-Nafīs and Ibn Ṭufayl is their use of the theory of the [lesser] circulation of blood, that is briefly referred to in Ibn Ṭufayl's descriptions of dissection, and whose later discovery is attributed to Ibn al-Nafīs. However, it does not seem fully developed in this particular treatise by Ibn al-Nafīs. The detailed descriptions that he makes regarding the fruit and seed and the manner in which the nutrients are transmitted through the veins might provide his readers with an inkling of this major discovery, that is still applicable to modern science.
159. Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *Rawḍat al-ta'rif bi al-ḥubb al-sharīf*, ed. Muḥammad Kattāni, (Beirut: Dār al-thaqāfah, 1970), I, 281-83. Cf. Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy*, 21-24.
160. The first part of this book by Maqqarī is an account on the history, politics and literature of the Spanish Arabs which has been edited by R. Dozy *et al*, *Analectes sur l'Histoire et la Littérature des Arabes d'Espagnes par al-Makkari*, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: Oriental Press, 1967). It has also been partially translated into English by Pascual de Gayangos, *The History of Mohammedan Dynasties in Spain*, 2 vols. (London: Oriental Translation Fund, 1840-43; rpt. New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1964); see also translation of the *Iḥāṭah* by Dozy (ed.), *Scriptorum Arabum loci de Abbadides*, 2 vols. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1846-63).

161. Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *Rawḍat*, I, 281.
162. We allude to Moses Narboni's perspective on Averroes in chapter five.
163. With regard to Ibn Rushd's rational mysticism, see also P. Merlan, *Monopsychism Mysticism and Metaconsciousness* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), 17-25. Cf. Mahmoud Kassem, *Théorie de la connaissance d'après Averroës*, 206-209.
164. Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *Rawḍat*, I, 280.
165. *Ibid.*, 281.
166. Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *Rawḍat*, I, 281-283.
167. *Ibid.*, 280.
168. Ibn Khaldūn, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, tr. F. Rosenthal (London: Routledge, Kegan & Paul, 1958), II, 371-372. Ibn Khaldūn notes that Ibn Sīnā's theory of spontaneous generation was cited in his *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*.
169. Cf. Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy*, 87-89; 123-127 for discussions on the different ways of reading the Tufaylian narrative.
170. *Op. cit.* Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy* (1987).
171. See Gauthier, *Ḥayy*, xxii-xxix for details on the extant manuscripts.
172. Chapter four discusses the issues around the date of the anonymous Hebrew translation and its commentary by Moses Narboni.
173. Cf. George F. Hourani, *Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy; A translation with introduction and notes of Ibn Rushd's Kitāb faṣl al-maqāl, with its appendix (Dāmīma) and an extract from Kitāb al-kashf 'an manāḥij al-adilla*, ed. and tr. Hourani (London: Luzac & Co., 1961). These two treatises by Ibn Rushd focus on the inter-relation between philosophy and Law and the application of philosophical interpretations to Scripture. The introduction by Hourani discusses the historical background of the objections against philosophical studies, that led to its defense and the advocacy of separate methods of instruction for those grounded in philosophy and the sciences versus the masses.
174. These "afterwords" will be analyzed in chapters five and six on the Hebrew commentary and European translations.

175. Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy*, 11. Cf. P. Duhem, *Le Système du Monde* (Paris: A. Hermann et fils, 1913-1959), II: 146.

176. Recorded by Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, '*Uyūn al-anbā' fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā'*', ed. A. Müller (Cairo: Maṭba'ah al-Wahabīyah, 1882), II: 78 in the section on Ibn Rushd. There are other discussions on Ibn Ṭufayl by Ibn Rushd, see Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy*, 8-14.

177. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 151-152.

178. Marrākushī, *Al-Mu'jib*, (Cairo, 1949) 306-307; *Histoire*, tr. Fagnan, 207-209.

179. Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy*, 7-18. I discuss the biographical information on Ibn Ṭufayl in this section and citations by historians and other philosophers.

180. Marrākushī, 207.

181. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 13.

182. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 13-14. Fārābī's commentary on the *Ethics* is not extant.

183. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 6-7, 12, 14. George N. Atiyeh (tr.), *Hayy the Son of Yaqzan*, in *Medieval Political Philosophy*, ed. R. Lerner and M. Mahdi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), 139.

184. See Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 17. The prologue makes some interesting observations that highlight and contribute to the debate on the authenticity of "veils-section" of the *Mishkāt*, whose prescribed authorship to Ghazālī was questioned by Watt due to its "esoteric" nature as opposed to Ghazālī's normative "orthodoxy". Cf. H. Landolt, *Ghazālī and "Religionwissenschaft"*, 21 ff. Landolt discusses this controversy and indicates the fallacies that surround the attribution of the "veil-section" to Ghazālī based on the assumptions of the early date of the complete Şehit Ali Paşa manuscript of the *Mishkāt*. He also indicates parallel citations from the "veils section" in other parts and other texts by Ghazālī which displaces Watt's thesis on its incompatibility. He concludes that two recensions of Ghazālī's *Mishkāt* may have existed, one arising from the early manuscript dated 509 a.h and cited by Ibn Ṭufayl, and the other used by Rāzī, where the "veils tradition" occupied the second and not the last section of the manuscript.

What the prologue to Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy* observes about Ghazālī is that his works reflect diverse and quite contradictory approaches (which also nullifies Watt's thesis on the "orthodox" Ghazālī), and that *none of his esoteric works that [may have] reflected the "pure truth" (ṣarīḥ al-ḥaqq)* were believed to have reached Andalusia. However, of the works that were available in Andalusia, the clearest evidence of Ghazālī's teaching of the true verity are considered to have

occurred in the last ("veils") section of the *Mishkāt*, highlighted in the prologue. Even though the authorship of the prologue is debatable and may have been written either contemporaneously or after Ibn Ṭufayl's demise, or conceived as a separate explanatory introduction written before or after *Ḥayy* (ca. 1185), the Tufaylian narrative was completed ca. 1185 and thus is even earlier than Rāzī's interpretation of the *Mishkāt*. In case the prologue was written later, it may have been available in a Hebrew recension around 1260 (as cited by Ishaq Laṭif). It was widely circulated with its accompanying Hebrew commentary written in 1349 by Moses Narboni. However, there is no mention of the prologue by Marrākushī who says he viewed the autographed copy of *Ḥayy*. There is also a significant gap before the Tufaylian narrative surfaces with a clear identity of its own (as opposed to its confusion with Ibn Sīna's narrative of the same title). The early date of the citation of "veil tradition" in the prologue is important, but the problems of authorship make it ultimately inconclusive as a "proof" of Ghazālī's authorship of the "veils tradition."

185. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 4-5, 15-16.

186. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 5-6, 9-10, 12.

187. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 4.

188. Michael Marmura, *The Philosopher and Society: Some Medieval Arabic Discussions*, in *ASQ*, Vol I, no.4 (1979), 309-323; *idem.*, *The Islamic Philosophers' Conception of Islam*, in *Islam's Understanding of Itself*, ed. R. G. Hovannisian and S. Vryonis Jr. (California: Undena Publications, 1983), 87-102. Marmura examines some of the apparently contradictory views in Fārābī's thought and compares them with Ibn Ṭufayl's views.

189. Marmura, *The Islamic Philosophers' Conception of Islam*, 95.

190. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 95.

191. Ovey Mohammed whose work is analyzed in the following chapters discusses these perspectives in relation to Averroism, where it becomes a major bone of contention.

192. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 5.

193. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 10.

194. Merlan, 36.

195. Cf. Oliver Leaman, *Ibn Bājjā on Society and Philosophy*, *Der Islam*, LVII (1980), 109.

196. A possible allusion by Ibn Ṭufayl to the conversion of the Berbers. It might also refer to the Mālikite fuqahā' who literally adhered to the Qur'ān and Sunnāh and who also tended to accept its anthropomorphic descriptions, for which Ibn Ṭufayl criticizes the populace.

197. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 81.

198. M. S. Mahdi, *Islamic Philosophy, Encyclopedia Britannica*, (1985), XXII:26.

199. Cf. T. Izutsu, *Ishrāqīyah*, *ER*, 1986, vol. VII, 297. The allusions to the "Orient" by Ibn Ṭufayl are probably with reference to the "Orient" as mentioned in Ibn Sīnā's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* or possibly a reference to some lost works by Ibn Sīnā rather than *The Logic of the Orientals* as it is available to us. C. A. Nallino, *Filosofia orientale od illuminativa*, 433 ff. Nallino examines the issue of 'oriental/illuminative' with reference to the manner in which the issue was interpreted by various critics and translators of Ibn Ṭufayl's narrative. He further discusses it with special reference to Ibn Sīnā and its continuation in Ibn Ṭufayl. *Op. cit.* Corbin, *Avicenna; Histoire de la philosophie Islamique* 2 vols. in 1 (1964; Paris: Gallimard, 1986) 238-247. Pines provides an erudite discussion on the use of the term, 'Oriental' and its usages; Shlomo Pines, *La 'Philosophie Orientale' d'Avicenne et sa polémique contre les Baghdadiens*, *AHDLMA* 19 (1952), 5-37. He clarifies that the "orient" refers to Khurasan and not Baghdad. Gauthier, *Ibn Thofāil*, 59-61. Gutas apodictically dismisses Ibn Ṭufayl's critique of the *Shifā'*. He notes that the difference between the *Shifā'* and his other works is based on style. This assumption rests on the absence of mystical thought in Ibn Sīnā. Cf. Dimitri Gutas, *Avicenna, Elr* (1982), III, 82. See also *Manṭiq Aristu*, tr. A. Badawi in *The Classical Heritage in Islam*, ed. F. Rosenthal (London: Routledge, 1975), 76. This passage from Aristotle discusses how the apodictic and dialectic modes are both based on certain premises.

200. Marmura, *The Philosopher and Society*, 309-323. I further discuss how the Muslim philosophers dealt with issues that are central to Ibn Ṭufayl's thought in relation to the narrative, ranging from the philosopher as a stranger in society, to the relation between the revealed religion and philosophy.

201. Cited by Marmura from Fārābī's *Fusūl Muntaza'a*, ed. F. M. Najjar (Beirut, 1971), 95. Cf. Marmura, *The Philosopher and Society*, 315 and no. 20.

202. Marmura, *The Philosopher and Society*, 313 and no. 10.

203. Marmura, *The Philosopher and Society*, 309.

204. *Ibid.*, 320.

205. *Ibid.*, 313, 321.
206. *Ibid.*, 323.
207. *Ibid.*, 323.
208. Cf. P. Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's Vision of Environmental Ethics*.
209. *Ibid.*
210. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 137.
211. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 150.
212. See T. S. Eliot, *Collected Poems* (London: Faber & Faber, 1963). The metaphor used by Ibn Ṭufayl reminds one of T. S. Eliot's poem, *The Wasteland* in which the myth of the Fisher-king's sterility affects the fertility of his people. One might likewise question whether Salāmān's logocentric approach makes it impossible for his subjects to read between the lines. The possibility for ta'wīl did exist when Salāmān and Absāl were young friends but with Salāmān's rulership, Absāl needed to leave the mainland. Even an elevated person like Ḥayy could not influence a single member in Salāmān's island. In the case of Ibn Ṭufayl, the distinction is not just being made between 'awāmm and khawāṣṣ but a recognition of the distinctions between the ruler, the Mālikite fuqahā and the populace. This view may be substantiated by historical analyses on the political climate in the Maghrib. Cf. Leaman, *Averroes and his Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 1-4.
213. Marmura, *The Philosopher and Society*, 316.
214. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 7. The analogy of the blind boy recalls Plato's 'Parable of the Cave' in *The Republic*. This analogy is also used by Ibn Bājjah. See M. Mahdi, *Islamic Philosophy*, *EB*, 1985, XXII, 21.
215. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 154-55, 164-66.
216. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 4.
217. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 156.
218. Cf. Corbin, *Avicenna*, 4.
219. Corbin, *Avicenna*, 17-18.
220. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 78-81.

221. Henry Corbin, *Au Pays de l'Imām caché*, in *Vom Sinn der Utopie*. Eranos Yearbook 1963, Vol. 32 (Zurich: Rhein-Verlag, 1964), 31-87.

222. Simon Ockley, a translator discussed in chapter six, considers prison as a haven where he can concentrate on his re-search, without the distractions of society and its pressures.

Chapter 4: The Hebrew manuscripts: Translation and commentary

Introduction: The Arabo-Hebrew Tradition.

Students of medieval philosophy, whether in the areas of the Islamic, Christian or Jewish studies are aware, to a certain degree, of the intertwined relation between these traditions. These philosophical traditions also share a conceptual framework with ancient Greek and neo-Platonic philosophy. Beyond this inter-relation, each area is further defined by different religious, social and political parameters.

Islamic philosophy initially gained credence in the European tradition as the handmaid of the Greeks. Like the Magi of lore, it brought forth the gifts of the Greek masters, along with commentaries and independent treatises by Muslim philosophers, garbed in Arabic raiment. These works were translated into Latin and formed the impetus for subsequent developments in western civilization, from the curriculum of emergent Universities to the consolidation of the Church.

One can draw a parallel to a similar trend that developed in Jewish thought. The revitalization of Jewish thought in the medieval period occurred alongside the flowering of Islamic philosophy in the Maghrib (the Muslim west).¹ Like their Muslim counterparts, many of the Jewish philosophers and mystics not only wrote in Arabic, but operated within the same social and literary paradigms. The issues that were being raised were peculiar to the society in which they lived. Thus, the works of both the traditions had more commonalities than differences. Religious variants existed in the citation of particular sacred texts, but similar philosophical and ethical questions were raised by both traditions during this period.

The development of Jewish thought in the Arabic realm ranged from documents of social and cultural import like the Cairo Geniza documents, to works

of philosophy and mysticism by Maimonides (1135-1204), Sa'adya al-Fayyumi (892-942), Ibn Gabirol (*ca.* 1021-1058) and others. Most of these works were written in Arabic or in Judeo-Arabic and have been subject to several studies that establish their place in the history of philosophy. However, the further ramifications of these Hebrew translations on Jewish thought during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries have not generated sufficient interest. It is this aspect that is the subject of the current study, which will examine the Hebrew translation and commentary of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*.

Charles Touati, an early twentieth-century scholar of the Jewish philosophy, suggests that the protracted lack of interest in Moses Narboni in Jewish circles was because his works were labelled as heretical by the Rabbis since the fifteenth century. Only two of his works that were specific to Jewish law and ethics were printed in the nineteenth century.² His other commentaries to the works by Muslim philosophers were ignored, and remained unedited even after the invention of printing. Looking at the issue from a wider perspective, Munk speaks of the crises in Jewish philosophy during the medieval period due to increasing anthropomorphism, despite its early patronage under Maimonides.³

The Hebrew translation and commentary of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* belong to the latter period of Arabo-Hebrew thought that has generally faced neglect. Following the translation of Arabic texts into Hebrew (and subsequently Latin in many cases),⁴ the late medieval philosophy that grew out of these works has an independent history of development. The reasons for the shift are as follows:

1. The process of translation from Arabic into Hebrew brought about a truncation between the textual developments in the two traditions that were no longer bound by a common language or script.
2. The translation into Hebrew allowed for a renewed interpretation of the texts, independent of the Islamic socio-cultural context and traditions in which they were originally propounded.
3. The changing demography of Spain and its Christianization, the loss of Muslim dominion, and the migration of Jews from Muslim Spain to France and other parts

of Europe, brought about new interpretations in new social contexts, as seen for example in the protection of Hebrew translators of Arabic works during the reign of Frederick II.⁵

The early Jewish philosophers of Spain were proficient in Arabic and wrote in it. The works of Greek and Arab (both Jewish and Muslim) philosophers in twelfth century Provence, France were initially translated into Hebrew and Latin by Arabo-Spanish translators who knew the primary languages. On the other hand, the audience that received this philosophy in Provence was culturally and linguistically distinct from the Spanish thinkers and translators. In linguistic terms, its adherents did not know Arabic. In socio-cultural terms, due to urbanization, the material ease of a prosperous middle-class and friendly relations between the Jewish and Christian communities, Provence was particularly suited for the popularization of philosophy and "for the encounter of ideas in the process of the elaboration of philosophical thought." Since the Spanish Jewish translators had generally belonged to aristocratic families with access to the acquisition of the sciences, these thinkers also wrote and translated for a "cultivated" audience, creating a shift in the reception of philosophy in the Christian and Jewish milieu. A "much heated debate and even quarrelling concerning philosophical studies" was becoming part of the religious discourse:

Philosophy was no longer a knowledge transmitted from master to pupil; it even became the subject of public sermons. In the face of the opposition voiced by certain of the faithful, Jacob Anatoli had to interrupt the series of philosophical homilies that he was giving in the synagogue on the Sabbath, but the mere fact that he had begun to pronounce them, with the consent of some members of the community, is a good indication of the public character of philosophical manifestations.⁶

The above discussion indicates a definitive shift in the 'horizon of expectation' that might also be perceived in the context of interpretation. The changing context of philosophy set the stage for its popularization and revival in

Provence prior to Narboni's time. Overall, the shift in cultural context facilitated the continued transmission of the works of Arab philosophy and eased the process of appropriation. One also has to keep in mind that the Hebrew translation of Ghazālī's summation of philosophy, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifah*⁷ was widely disseminated in Hebrew theological circles, reflecting both the popularization and theologization of philosophy.⁸

Such popular dissemination was also to create a reaction during the same time period in the Maghribi social context, shifting the emphasis of philosophy to an individual manifestation and further separation from the public arena, reflected in Ibn Ṭufayl and legitimized by Ibn Rushd. The dialectic is made evident in the career of Moses Narboni, who comments on the works of Ghazālī, Ibn Bājjah, Ibn Ṭufayl, Ibn Rushd, Maimonides as well as on the Torah and Jewish law. Moses Narboni thus belongs to the new breed of philosophers, hailing from the Provence. He moved to Spain and subsequently lived in various cities.

A major issue that is addressed in this dissertation is the process by which *Ḥayy ibn Yaḡzān* came to be so widely translated and disseminated in Europe. Where and how did this process begin? Who were the earliest proponents? The history of its printed translations begins in the late seventeenth century. What is less well-known and of greater consequence from the viewpoint of literary and social history is the existence of several manuscripts of the Hebrew translation and commentary from the early or mid fourteenth century.

Moses Narboni, the Hebrew Commentator

The Hebrew translation and commentary to *Ḥayy ibn Yaḡzān* are available in a recension by Mosheh ben Yashua ben Mar David ha-Narboni (ca. 1300-1362), also known as Maestro Vidal, Vidal Balsoum, or later as Moses Narboni.⁹ Narboni was born around the beginning of the fourteenth century at Perpignan to a family that originally hailed from Narbonne, France. His education in philosophy began at the age of thirteen and was initially directed by his father. It also included a study of Jewish scriptures, Rabbinical literature and medicine.

Narboni was later tutored under Moses and Abraham Caslari.¹⁰ Narboni practised medicine and also wrote a voluminous medical work, *Orah Hayyim* (*The Road of Life*; BN 1200) in which he prescribed his inventions and recorded cures for various ailments.¹¹

Narboni began his career at Perpignan, where he wrote his early works including his medical work, *Orah Hayyim*, his commentary on *Lamentations*, his commentary on the *Iggeret Shi'ur Qomah* (*The Epistle on the [Divine] Body*), his commentary on the *Maqāṣid* (*Kawanot*) and his commentary on *The Possibility of Conjunction*.¹² He left Perpignan in 1344 and lived in several Spanish towns - Cervera (from where he was forced to flee in 1349, abandoning his possessions and books), Barcelona, Valencia, Toledo, Burgos and Soria.

Narboni's fame as a commentator makes it especially difficult to distinguish his original philosophies in the majority of his works. The majority of his works are commentaries on Ibn Rushd. Narboni incorporated the views of Muslim philosophers with his own distinct grounding in Judaism. Even in his commentary on the *Guide*, he clearly critiques Maimonides, advancing arguments that are based on Ibn Rushd.¹³ Narboni was strongly influenced by Ibn Ezra whom he cites extensively and whose exegetical style is evident in several of his works.¹⁴ He may have known Arabic and some Latin¹⁵ but shows no familiarity with the works of Christian thinkers.

About twenty works are attributed to Moses Narboni, a considerable output in a period of tumult, the Bubonic Plague (1348-50) and war. Most of the commentaries by Narboni include the text of the Hebrew translations, whose author is either known or anonymous, in recensions that generally include a passage of the text followed by the commentary. We do not know which texts he used for his commentary on Ibn Rushd's *The Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect*, or for his summarization of Ibn Bājja's *Tadbīr*. These translations were sometimes attributed to Narboni in early Western scholarship.¹⁶ Modern scholarship, starting from Steinschneider to Hayoun, generally rejects the

attribution to Narboni as the author of the translations that accompanied his commentaries, though the grounds for such observations are not explicit.¹⁷

The major body of Moses Narboni's works are his commentaries on Muslim philosophers, primarily Ibn Rushd, but also Ibn Bājjah, Ghazālī and Ibn Ṭufayl. The translations of several of Ibn Rushd's treatises in the thirteenth century caused a great impetus in Jewish philosophy.¹⁸ Considerable effort has been expended in recent scholarship to retrieve these commentaries, many of which have now been edited.¹⁹

In 1355, Narboni began his commentary on *Moreh Nebukim (The Guide of the Perplexed)* at Burgos and discussed a difficult point of this work with Joseph ibn Waqār at Toledo.²⁰ It is not clear whether Ibn Waqār's monumental work, *al-Maḳālāh al-jāmi'ah bayna al-falsafah wa al-sharī'ah* (n.d.) was completed when Narboni wrote his *Epistle on the [Divine] Body* (1343). Altmann considers that Narboni's attempt to create a harmony between kabbalah and philosophy in this early work shows the possible impact of Ibn Waqār's approach to philosophy.²¹ In a postscript to his commentary on the *Moreh (Guide)*, Narboni relates that his son Joshua had urged him to complete this commentary, so that "they may not after his death reproach him, for having neglected the greatest philosopher of his own nation while, on the other hand, [he had] written commentaries on the works of foreign philosophers."²² He finished his commentary on the *Guide* at Soria in April 26, 1362 and died shortly thereafter.²³

We have some intimation about the date of his death in a short *Treatise on the Free Will*²⁴ which is said to have been completed on 12 Tebet 5122 (=December 10, 1361) at Soria. This manuscript has on its heading a statement that it was composed by Narboni about three months before his death. The commentary was written as a refutation of a contemporary [probably Abner of Burgos] stance on Determinism.²⁵ The date ascribed to Narboni's demise is considered doubtful, since he further cites his treatise on Determinism in his commentary on the *Guide* that was completed on April 26, 1362.²⁶ The existing

information on the treatise on the *Free Will* also poses a problem.²⁷ We do not know of any other works being ascribed to the author after 1362, so one might assume that year to be the date of his demise.²⁸

A descriptive list of Narboni's extant commentaries and treatises²⁹ that I was able to establish is given below:³⁰

A. Commentaries on the treatises and commentaries by Ibn Rushd

- (i) *Ma'amar efsharut ha-debequt 'im ha-nifrad (The Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect)* (1344).³¹ BN 918/9, 947/5; 957/1.³² Leipzig 43a, fol. 1b-21a.³³
- (ii) *Ma'amar Alsikandar be-sekel bi'ur ben Rushd wa perush (Commentary on Ibn Rushd's Commentary on the Treatise on the Intellect by Alexander of Aphrodisias)*.³⁴ Leiden Or. 4744/4 (Warner 6/4).³⁵ Leipzig Ms. 43b - This super commentary is copied on the margins of the Leipzig Ms. 43a, which contains the commentary by Narboni on Ibn Rushd's *The possibility of conjunction (Ma'amar efsharut)*.³⁶
- (iii) *Shlemut ha-nefesh (The Perfection of the Soul)* (1349). BN 988/1.³⁷
- (iv) An analysis of Ibn Rushd's *Middle Commentary on the Physics*. BN 915/2.³⁸
- (v) *Ha-derushim ha-tib'iyim - Ibn Rushd's Dissertation on the Physics*. Vatican Ms. urb. 41; BN 988 (earlier 118).³⁹
- (vi) *Ma'amar be-'esem ha-galgal (1349) (Treatise on the Substance of the sphere/ De Substantia Orbis)*. BN 918; BN 988/2.⁴⁰
- (vii) *Kelale kol melekhet ha-higgayon*. A paraphrase of the beginning of Ibn Rushd's commentary on the *Organon*. Bodleian Neubauer Nos. 1350, 1360.⁴¹

B. Commentaries on other Muslim philosophers

- (viii) *Kawanot ha-filosofim*. The commentary on Ghazālī's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifah* (*The Intentions of the Philosophers*) by Narboni (ca. 1345-50). Translations of the treatise from Arabic to Hebrew attributed to Isaac Albalag, Judah Nathan and an anonymous translator. BN 956 (ancien fonds 358). Leiden Or. 4744/1 (Warner 6/1)⁴²
- (ix) *Iggeret Haywan ben Yaqtan haniqra Yeḥiel ben 'Uriel*. Ibn Tufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* (1348/49).⁴³
- (x) Excerpts on Ibn Bājjah's *Risālah al-wadā'* (*Iggeret ha-petirah - Farewell treatise*) cited in the commentary on *Ḥayy*.⁴⁴
- (xi) Excerpts on Ibn Bājjah's *The Solitary Regime* (*hanhaga' ha-mitboded*).⁴⁵

C. Commentaries on Maimonides and the Bible

- (xii) *Bi'ur ha-moreh nebukim* (Commentary on Maimonides' *Guide of the Perplexed*) (1362). BN 696/1, 697, 698, 699, 700/1, 701, 702, 703.⁴⁶
- (xiii) *Perush mi millot ha-higgayon*, a commentary on Maimonides' *Vocabulary of Logic*. This commentary written in the primary area of Jewish thought, is one of Narboni's early works. Munich Ms. 289.⁴⁷
- (xiv) Commentary on *Lamentations*. BN 806/15.⁴⁸ Bodleian 359/4.⁴⁹

D. Independent treatises:

- (xv) *Orah Hayyim* (*The Road of Life*). BN 1200. A medical treatise written in the early part of Narboni's career.⁵⁰
- (xvi) *Pirke Mosheh* (The Chapters on Moses) or Philosophical aphorisms.⁵¹

- (xvii) *Ma'amar ha-behirah (The treatise on Free Will)*. This epistle was written in response to the deterministic stance of a contemporary. BN 403/2.⁵²
- (xviii) *Iggeret Shi'ur Qomah (Epistle on the Measure of Divine Stature)* (1342-3). Bodleian Neubauer ms. 2250/6 [formerly Reggio 51]. A commentary on the controversial [kabbala] text, *Shi'ur Qomah*.⁵³

Beside the commentary on the *Guide*, Moses Narboni was known in Jewish theology primarily on the basis of the three shorter treatises that focussed on classical Hebrew texts: *Iggeret Shi'ur Qomah (Epistle on the 'Measure of Divine Stature [Body])*, *Pirke Mosheh (The chapters on Moses)* which aimed to harmonize philosophy and kabbalah⁵⁴ and the biblical commentary on *Lamentations*.⁵⁵ Narboni also critiqued contemporary views on fatalism in his *Ma'amar ha-Behirah (Treatise on Free Will)*.⁵⁶ A lost commentary called the *Special Treatise (Iggeret Meyuhedet)* focussed on Ibn Ezra's commentary on *Genesis XI:2*.⁵⁷ Narboni also copiously cites two works by Ibn Bājjah, *The Farewell Treatise* that is available in a Hebrew translation (Leipzig 43d; BN 959),⁵⁸ and *The Solitary Regime*, whose summary is included with the commentary on *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*.

In some cases, we only have the Hebrew commentaries extant, as with Ibn Rushd's *De Substantia Orbis (Treatise on the Spheres)*. Likewise, we have works attributed to Narboni on Ibn Rushd's commentaries on *De Caelo* and the *Metaphysics* that are not currently available.⁵⁹ The earliest date attributed to Narboni's commentaries is 1342-3, relatively late in his career; his last commentary on the *Guide* was completed in 1362. It remains difficult to resolve the problematic dates of Narboni's works, especially regarding the attribution of the majority of his works between 1343-49.

The commentaries on the works of Muslim philosophers are considered

difficult to analyze by various scholars such as Munk and Sirat, since the style is generally eclectic and includes copious citations. Although they do reflect Narboni's own interpretation, clear distinctions cannot be made between the commentator's views and the texts he cites, due to interpolations and citations that are often made from memory.⁶⁰ The text of the translations is generally divided from the commentaries. However, the commentaries themselves include large extracts from other works, such as Ibn Bājjah's *Tadbīr* and *Risālah al-wadā'*. Thus, understanding these commentaries by Narboni is also rooted in the texts on which he commented, requiring a lot of co-ordination and comparison.⁶¹ Much of the criticism levelled against Narboni in the fifteenth century focussed on his style, but may have risen due to the conceptual shift and a critique against his "radical" Averroen frame. Like his mentor, Ibn Rushd, Narboni also critiqued aspects of Avicennan Aristotelianism, as propounded by Maimonides. Reading the Tufaylian narrative in terms of a shift in the horizon is evident in its dissemination in the fifteenth century. Ibn Tufayl's text was often cited but the acknowledgement of the commentator was avoided, despite the use of the Narbonian recension.⁶²

The genesis of early scholarship on Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān

Until recently, research on the Hebrew translation and commentary on *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* has been practically non-existent. One of the problems that I indicated in my early research was the sketchy information that was available.⁶³ Modern scholarly research on *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* began with Solomon Munk's remarks on Ibn Tufayl in *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe* published in 1857, where he briefly lists the various themes of the Arabic text, such as the problem of unity and multiplicity, the conjunction of the human intellect with the Active Intellect, and the issue of the eternity or the createdness-in-time of the universe.⁶⁴

Munk first drew our attention to the existence of four manuscripts of the Hebrew translation and commentary at the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris (formerly Bibliothèque Impériale). He further indicated the existence of a summary of Ibn

Bājjah's *Tadbīr al-mutawahhīd*. This discovery of Ibn Bājjah's work was of special importance at the time, since the original text was considered to be no longer extant and not much was known of the other works of this author. Thus, the Hebrew summarization by Narboni was thought to be the only extant text till the nineteen-forties, when Asín Palacios and D. M. Dunlop began to publish material on Ibn Bājjah.⁶⁵

Munk's references are cited by other scholars such as Léon Gauthier and George Vajda. Half a century after Munk's study, Gauthier wrote the first monograph on Ibn Ṭufayl in 1909, where he also cited Munk's reference to the Hebrew translation and commentary of the Paris manuscripts. Following Munk, Gauthier assumes that Moses Narboni was the translator and commentator of the Hebrew version of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*. Gauthier admits that he was unable to examine the commentary in any detail due to his limited knowledge of Hebrew, although he had studied it with the aid of one of his students.

Referring to Munk's remark that the commentary provided very "precious information" on the doctrines of various Arab philosophers, Gauthier noted that this early commentator of the work was less informed than "us" (i.e. the current state of research at the time) on Ibn Ṭufayl and his works.⁶⁶ Gauthier then gives the example of the quotation (that he attributes to al-Ḥallāj) cited in the prologue: *laysa fī al-thawb ulla Allāh*, where the Hebrew translator confounded the word, *thawb* (garment) for *thawāb* (reward), and consequently mis-translated it as "*There is nothing in the reward except God.*" Narboni, the commentator, explained this famous saying in the context of the biblical saying, "*Virtue in itself is reward.*"⁶⁷ Gauthier is disconcerted by this misinterpretation and felt it reflected the lack of understanding of an important development in Islamic thought.⁶⁸ Possibly due to this reason, Gauthier did not pursue the Hebrew manuscript any further, stalling its transmission in Islamic scholarship. A salient point in this example is the unknown "error" arising from the translator, which becomes the source for the further transmission of the narrative, initially through the commentary by Moses

Narboni. It is the process of translation rather than the commentary by itself that results in a renewed or changed reception.

Another half a century later (!) in 1962, two articles appeared by George Vajda. The first one being a brief examination of a page of the commentary in relation to the Hebrew translation and the Arabic text (prologue), that focussed on Narboni's mis/interpretation of sufi *shataḥāt*.⁶⁹ Vajda discusses the same example given by Gauthier in the prologue, pointing out the discrepancies in its understanding. He concludes that Narboni understood and responded to the translation in terms of the ideological preoccupations prevalent among the Jewish scholars of the time.

On the whole, the attention drawn by the prologue in scholarship has tended to limit the analysis of the Arabic narrative as well as the Hebrew translation and commentary. The terms generally used in the various versions and attributions of the famous saying discussed by Gauthier and Vajda are either "*jubbah*" or "*khirqah*", with the exception of the prologue that uses "*thawb*". This appears to suggest a limited knowledge of *taṣawwuf* by the author of the prologue, that would also explain his implicit criticism of the *shataḥāt*. One must not forget that the role of the prologue is reductionist. It strips the soul of the narrative in terms of an aesthetic response and assigns it a particular meaning. It represents the most pernicious aspects of the literary history of the narrative, since those who value *Ḥayy ibn Yaḳẓān* primarily on the terms of the prologue, miss the genius and the thought processes of the author. The 'historical' facts themselves are dismantled by the very notion and necessity of the prologue.

One might look at Narboni's response in the commentary as reflecting two concurrent processes; appropriation that occurs through decontextualizing the text and reception that occurs through recontextualizing the narrative. The second article by Vajda was a translation of an interesting section of about three pages of the commentary by Moses Narboni in response to Ḥayy's mystical ascension, included as an appendix to Vajda's study on philosophy and the kabbalah.⁷⁰ The

harmonization by Narboni of mystical and philosophical themes will be discussed further in chapter five.

The Hebrew translation and commentary to *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* had a chequered history in early scholarship that focussed primarily on the Paris manuscripts. My research on the Hebrew translation and commentary confirmed the documentation by Munk and Gauthier, regarding the existence of four manuscripts in the Bibliothèque Nationale in the fonds hébreu as listed by Zotenberg (1866).⁷¹ Beside the existence of these manuscripts, the research raised some questions that merited further study:

- a) The date of the Hebrew commentary, written in 1349 is earlier than most of the extant Arabic manuscripts used to establish Arabic editions of the Tufaylian narrative. My initial research was focussed on the possibility that the early Arabic manuscripts may not have contained the prologue, based on the contradictions between the prologue and main text of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* and the fact that many of the early printed translations had also excluded it. However, the extant Arabic and the Hebrew manuscripts of the Tufaylian narrative include the prologue.
- b) Concurrently, the author of the early Hebrew translation was generally cited as anonymous and the date of this translation was not known. I considered the following points of interest with regard to the Hebrew translation: i) the geographical proximity of the Arabo-Spanish translators to Ibn Ṭufayl; ii) a difference of about a century and a half between the narrative's composition by Ibn Ṭufayl and its commentary by Moses Narboni; and iii) the mid-thirteenth century as a period of extensive translations from Arabic to Hebrew. Based on these premises, the Hebrew translation could have been undertaken any time between the early thirteenth to early fourteenth centuries.
- c) The initial importance ascribed to the Hebrew manuscript of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* was related to its inclusion of the summarized version of Ibn Bājjah's *Tadbīr* written in Hebrew. Scholars who examined the

manuscript had very little to say on the text of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, or about Narboni.

- d) Vajda (1962) observes how the Hebrew translation and commentary changed the context and meaning of the Arabic original and reflected the mystical leanings of the commentator. It made me consider whether such an analysis would be applicable to other parts of the Hebrew translation and commentary.

These issues led me to address the transformation that takes place in the process of transmission, sometimes due to a mistaken meaning or omission, sometimes as a reflection of the different social and historical context. Thus, the study purports to explore the various motifs that contribute to the transmission and transformation of a text from one mode to the other.

In the preface to the second edition (1936) of the Arabic text and translation of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, Gauthier made two observations that provided a starting point for further research into issues that had been largely ignored for over a century. Gauthier noted that, beside the Hebrew manuscripts at the Bibliothèque Nationale, there also existed a Hebrew manuscript at the Rabbinical Seminary at New York. This fact had been brought to his attention by a scholar, Josef Rehak, who had written an article (in Czech) on the various manuscripts of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* and had sent a French summary of this article to Gauthier.⁷² It raised the initial questions: did other copies of the Hebrew translation and commentary exist? If so, why had the early researchers on Ibn Ṭufayl only mentioned the Paris manuscripts?

I thus began my research into the transmission of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* through its Hebrew translation and commentary on the following premises:

- a) Four manuscripts (BN) of the Hebrew translation and commentary were known to Munk and Gauthier. They were also referred to by Vajda over a century after Munk's initial study in 1857.
- b) Gauthier, in his revised edition of the Arabic text and French translation (1936), had mentioned that another copy of the manuscript existed in the

Rabbinical Seminary of New York.

My initial interest was thus evoked by the allusions to the Hebrew translation and commentary by Munk a century and a half ago, an observation that was not followed up till the nineteen-sixties, when it was subject to brief studies by Vajda that focussed on the Paris manuscripts. Gauthier's citation of an additional manuscript opened up exciting possibilities. I also noticed that aspects that were accessible to scholars like Munk and Vajda, possibly due to their parallel interest and knowledge in Islamic and Jewish thought, had not been discussed in later studies on *Ḥayy ibn Yaḡẓān* by Goodman, Hawi, Arkoun and others. This raised some interesting questions around the Hebrew translation and commentary: why had earlier scholars such as Gauthier and Vajda limited themselves to the Paris manuscripts, and concurrently, why had these manuscripts not been mentioned in more recent studies on *Ḥayy ibn Yaḡẓān*?⁷³ None of the early studies by Gauthier, Munk and Vajda had utilized the copious number of Hebrew manuscripts that I discovered with the progress of my research, indicating the extensive application of Ibn Ṭufayl's work in the Jewish context.⁷⁴

In order to confirm the status of the research on the Hebrew translation and commentary, I then began to examine whether any independent research of the Hebrew manuscript and commentary had been undertaken in Jewish Studies and found a parallel, independent strain of information. The most important point of departure for further information on the Hebrew manuscripts was discovered in the bibliographical works of Moritz Steinschneider (1816-1907).⁷⁵ Although Steinschneider was variously cited in early scholarship, his listings on the Hebrew translation and commentary to *Ḥayy ibn Yaḡẓān* had not been cited, except in the obscure article written in Czech by Josef Rehak in 1911.⁷⁶

Since these manuscripts had not been utilized in prior research, I first had to confirm whether they were extant. This facet was a focal point in the research. While the Hebrew translation and commentary uncover several social and historical issues worthy of further research, the intent of the current research is to document the existence of several manuscripts of the Hebrew translation and

commentary.

To begin the process of tracing the existence of the Hebrew manuscripts and commentaries, I first examined the various bibliographical studies by Moritz Steinschneider. The tangent study by Steinschneider opened up a veritable treasure house, which had been covered for over a century by the cobwebs of neglect. Steinschneider's seminal works catalogued the existence of various manuscripts, that was not followed up by later researchers.

Writing in the mid-nineteenth century, the works of Steinschneider have been obscured for several reasons:

- a) They had been written in the area of bibliographical studies. Very little research had been undertaken during this time on those Arabic works that were available in Hebrew translation.⁷⁷ Since many Arabic philosophical texts had not been edited, the Hebrew translations of the Arabic texts were considered with less urgency.
- b) As mentioned earlier, Hebrew translations and commentaries of Arabic works have elicited interest in cases where it is/was believed that the Arabic text was no longer extant.⁷⁸
- c) Considerable research was required to corroborate and update much of the information provided by Steinschneider. Some of the manuscripts belonged to private collections. Other manuscripts have been scattered, moved, lost or destroyed in the process of the two world wars.
- d) The language used by Steinschneider is older German.

In *Die Hebraeischen Übersetzungen* (Hüb),⁷⁹ Steinschneider listed the manuscripts of the Hebrew translation and commentary, including excerpts and instances where they were not known to exist, where they had been cited elsewhere and whether it was unclear if they existed.⁸⁰

The next stage in the research was to locate these manuscripts and confirm their current existence. The location of the catalogues and the manuscripts required extensive field research. The task was a difficult and time-consuming one, given the early date of Steinschneider's works and the said locations of

manuscripts in various cities across Europe, most of which had witnessed the two world wars, changing governments and even different borders.

Using Steinschneider's reference to Ibn Ṭufayl in *Hüb* as the point of departure, I set forth onto new territory, somewhat like a camel rider who followed the mud road in the desert, encountering some sand storms on the path that almost obliterated the road ahead. After locating the places where the manuscripts were said to exist, I began to search for the library catalogues. Unfortunately, this task posed greater problems than I had envisaged. The pre-world wars catalogues were difficult to trace and were not accessible in most research libraries. These references were often documented on card catalogues and were not available in current databases. For the most part, these catalogues were available in the rare book sections of research libraries, and were reference works that were not loaned out. This meant that I had to physically visit various libraries and check their collections, a luxury known to scholars of lore. Further, in many cases, the card catalogues were not a reliable indication whether the works still existed on the shelves. They often included works that were no longer available, having been lost or destroyed through natural and unnatural calamities, hostage to various causes known and unknown.⁸¹

Thus, accessing catalogue information was not a facile task. It was clear why research over the last century had only referred to the Paris manuscripts, whose catalogue was more easily available to French scholars, and whose details such as codex numbers had been documented by Munk and Gauthier. Thus, the Zotenberg catalogue (BN), along with the earlier Bodleian catalogue by Steinschneider,⁸² were the only two that were available at the primary locus of my research at McGill University.

Since the impetus for further research had begun with Gauthier's citation of the existence of another Hebrew manuscript at the Rabbinical Seminary of New York, research at the New York Public Library led me to this institution, now known as the Jewish Theological Seminary (JTS) that collaborates with Columbia University in its programs. The resources available at JTS allowed me to continue

on this line of my research. After locating and listing the libraries that contained the various manuscripts, I spent the academic year, 1991-92 at JTS and Columbia University tracing the existence of the Hebrew manuscripts. I had to further confirm whether the manuscripts still existed in the libraries indicated in these early catalogues. Access to the actual libraries where the various manuscripts were located was also a difficult task, since almost all of the original libraries were in Europe. Many of the names of the libraries and the collections had also changed.⁸³

The research includes the documentation on twenty-two partial or complete manuscript of the Hebrew translation and commentary of Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*. I have also included citations on Hebrew manuscripts, primarily on the works of other Muslim philosophers that are contained in the codexes studied, as well as those manuscripts, whose primary authors were mis-catalogued or wrongly attributed.

The present study aims to fill in the century wide lacuna and to update the information regarding the different copies of the Hebrew manuscripts. It is hoped that this information will form the basis for further research, possibly into the question of authorship of the Hebrew translation and other issues of interest. I was also able to examine several of the manuscripts and especially tried to access those manuscripts that were of an early date, on which the details were somewhat unclear, or which were of special interest. I did not examine the Paris manuscripts, since they are the only ones that were studied in past and still remain the focus of current research.⁸⁴

At this stage, one might assume that the Hebrew translation and commentary are important for several reasons. In themselves, the number of extant Hebrew manuscripts in circulation reflect their wide dissemination among the Jews in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, whereas it remains difficult to measure the circulation of the Arabic original in the early period, due to its confusion with Ibn Sīnā's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*. Curiously, the lesser known Hebrew version of Ibn Sīnā's *Ḥayy* also affects the ascription and date of the Hebrew translation of the

Tufaylian narrative.

The Hebrew translation and commentary

The Hebrew translation of Ibn Ṭufayl's narrative is generally considered the work of an anonymous writer. All the pre-sixteenth century manuscripts of the Hebrew translation exist in recensions that include the commentary by Moses Narboni. Most of the other commentaries by Narboni are also accompanied with the Hebrew translations of the treatises, whose translators are either known or anonymous. Some of the early cataloguers assume the translator to be Moses Narboni.⁸⁵

The commonly occurring title of the Hebrew translation *Iggeret Ḥaywan ben Yaqṭan* (*The Epistle of Ḥayy ibn Yaqṣān*) was apparently rhymed for the purpose of alliteration, but it is also referred to by variant titles in several of the manuscripts and catalogues, as discussed below. Since most of the Hebrew cataloguers (with the exception of Steinschneider) did not have a proficient background in Islamic Studies, much of their entries focus on debating and correcting the proper title of the work and corrupting the name of its Arab author. A standard vocabulary for the discipline of Islamic Studies had not yet been established. These entries are confusing due to their use of old Latin, Italian, or German, thereby requiring some inventiveness on the part of the cataloguers and bibliographers to find equivalents to Arabic or Hebrew terms and names.⁸⁶

Narboni's recension of the manuscript is organized into eight parts. Narboni also includes a preface indicating the contents of each part. The summarization of Ibn Bājjah's *Tadbīr* generally occurs in the eighth section. Each section is further sub-divided into paragraphs of the translation that are followed by the commentary. The paragraphs of the Hebrew translation generally begin with bold letters stating "Abu Bakr said", followed by the commentary by Narboni, generally beginning with the word, "Commentary" (*perush*).⁸⁷

At the end of his introduction, Narboni says that the second name (*yaqṣān*)

of the protagonist means *yaqtza* (awake; aware) and that he has translated the names in Hebrew as *Yehial ben 'Uriel* (Living son of the Aware). These two names are placed after the others at the beginning of the text and at the head of some of the manuscripts.⁸⁸

The Hebrew translation, its authorship and date

Ibn Ṭufayl (d. 1185) is said to have completed the narrative toward the end of his life. The authorship and date of the Hebrew translation remain to be established. The Hebrew translation had been cited prior to Narboni's commentary, but these citations are not direct.⁸⁹ One such citation was made of a Hebrew text of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* by Ishaq Latīf (ca. 1260).⁹⁰ The existence of a Hebrew poem based on Ibn Sīnā's *Ḥayy* makes it difficult to ensure the accuracy of any citations of the narrative.⁹¹ Due to this historical confusion between the narratives of Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Ṭufayl, it is not clear whether the citations refer to the Hebrew translation of Ibn Ṭufayl's or Ibn Sīnā's narratives. Since the Hebrew translation exists in a recension made by Moses Narboni that was completed in 1349, the latest date for the Hebrew translation of Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* would be around the early part of the fourteenth century.⁹²

The Hebrew commentary, its author and date

There is clear evidence that the Hebrew commentary was completed in 1349, as cited at the end of most of the manuscripts. In his preface, Moses Narboni notes that he had planned to write a commentary on the narrative by Ibn Ṭufayl, on the completion of his work on *The Possibility of Conjunction of the Soul with the Active Intellect* by Ibn Rushd (1344). He begins the commentary on *Ḥayy*, apologizing for the delay in fulfilling the promise to his friends in Perpignan, due to the troubles of the war and the misfortunes faced by the Jews in most villages in Spain.⁹³

Most of the manuscripts have the date of the completion of the Hebrew

commentary as the fifth of Sivan 5109 (Jewish calendar) at Cervera. The commentator ended his work with a note indicating its completion on the Pentecost at Cervera, 5109, corresponding to 23 May, 1349. This date is also found in the preface of Paris Ms. 913 (No. 508 of the ancien fonds), where it is written out in numbers instead of being spelled out in words, and at the end of Turin Ms. A.VI.24, where it is also written in numbers.⁹⁴ Munk notes that the commentary must have been completed on the fourth of Sivan, the evening before the Pentecost, since the fifth was a Saturday, traditionally a day when no work was completed.⁹⁵ The Leiden manuscript, Or. 4744 (Warner 6/5) is dated the fourth of Sivan, or 22 May, 1349.⁹⁶

The Leipzig Manuscript 43c is the only exception that has the date of completion as 1366. Leopold Zunz has indicated that this date is erroneous in his additions to the Leipzig catalogue.⁹⁷ In fact, there is no evidence of any other works by Moses Narboni after 1362, when he wrote his commentary to Maimonides' *Moreh Nebukim* completed on April 26, 1362.⁹⁸

Dates of the extant Hebrew manuscripts

The earliest extant manuscript of the Hebrew translation and commentary is the Parma manuscript that, according to Rossi, belonged to the beginning of the fifteenth century.⁹⁹ The Turin manuscript also belonged to the early part of the fifteenth century.¹⁰⁰ Most of the other manuscripts were copied in the latter part of the fifteenth century, for example Berlin Ms. Or. Qu. 648 (Stein. 119) was copied in 1460 in Viadana by the mathematician, Mordechai Finzi;¹⁰¹ Vatican 209 was completed in 5232 (1472 a.d.);¹⁰² BN 915 was copied by Samuel Madrutiel in Saragosa in 5235 (1474 j.c.), and BN 916 was copied by Isaac Levi in 5257 (1496 j.c.) at Constantinople (Istanbul).¹⁰³

Logistics regarding the Hebrew Manuscripts

This section will deal with the numerous manuscripts of the Hebrew translation and commentary that are located in various libraries in Europe and North America. The descriptions below include catalogue information, cross references and some observations made on examining the manuscripts.¹⁰⁴ All the early catalogues were examined and their information is included where necessary. I was also able to examine most of the actual manuscripts, microfilms or prints, and indicate the instances where I was unable to do so. I have not made them the subject of the detailed study, recognizing that future research can only follow, once the existence and basic information on these manuscripts is rendered accessible. Nevertheless, the process was quite challenging. This area, even with a primary focus on Ibn Tufayl, is very extensive, given the number of manuscripts that are available. The study recognizes the limitations imposed by the above factors and aims to contribute to a 'new beginning' in the research of the Tufaylian narrative.

The Paris manuscripts (BN)

The Paris manuscripts are the starting point of the research on the Hebrew translation and its commentary by Moses Narboni, since they are extensively documented by scholarship. Four manuscripts in Oriental Manuscripts collection under the fonds hébreu of the Bibliothèque Nationale belong to codexes 913 to 916.¹⁰⁵ The descriptions by Zotenberg are very brief. Additional information from other research and cross reference have been added to Zotenberg's information.

BN 913:

The codex contains two manuscripts.

1° contains *Sefer Haywan ben Yaqṭan hanīḡara Yehīal ben 'Urīal* (*The Book titled Ḥaywān Ben Yoqṭān known in Hebrew as Yehī'el Ben-'Uriel*). In his catalogue entry, Zotenberg notes: "it is the philosophical romance entitled *Ḥayy ibn Yaqṣān*, by Abou Bekr Moḥammad, translated into Hebrew and accompanied by the

commentary by R. Moses, of Narbonne." He cites the Arabic edition and Latin translation (by Pococke) and Munk's *Mélanges*¹⁰⁶ for further details on this work and the commentary. According to Zotenberg, the codex is from the fifteenth century, and belonged earlier to the *ancien fonds* 508.¹⁰⁷

The codex contains 219 folios of which the Hebrew translation and commentary extend from folio 1 to 135 v°. The head of the paragraphs begins with square characters. Corrections by the copyist are added in the margins. The paper is from the fifteenth century. The page size is 205 x 145 mm, and each page has 30 lines.¹⁰⁸

The early cross-references to the history of this manuscript are not very clear. Citing Wolf, Rehak notes that the manuscript formerly belonged to the *ancien fonds* no. 508 at the Sorbonne Library.¹⁰⁹ While Wolf mentioned a manuscript belonging to the Sorbonne Library, he makes no reference to the *ancien fonds* no. 508.¹¹⁰ Can one then assume that the *ancien fonds* no. 508 belonged to the Sorbonne library? What Wolf noted was that the manuscript (from the Sorbonne) had not belonged to the Oratory in Paris (as did some of the other Paris manuscripts such as no. 915), but to the Oppenheim collection.¹¹¹ If this were the case, then No. 913 would be the same as the Oppenheim manuscript also referred to by Steinschneider (1858) in the Leiden catalogue *before* the catalogue on the *fonds hébreu* was printed by Zotenberg (1866). This might explain why Rehak was not able to locate a Hebrew manuscript of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* at Oppenheim.

Given that the manuscript is now located at the Bibliothèque Nationale, these cross references are confusing! However, they confirm whether a particular manuscript has been cited more than once as belonging to different collections. It is also a method of clarifying surmised observations. BN 913 is also available in microfilm at the Jewish National University Library (JNUL), where its reference no. is 26868.¹¹²

2° (fol. 136 f) contains the Hebrew translation of Ghazālī's *Tahāfut al-falāsifah*.

Its Hebrew title is *Sefer hapalet ha filosofim* and it was translated from the Arabic by R. Zerahya Ha-Levi, son of Isaac, Saladin.¹¹³

BN 914:

This codex consists of a single manuscript that contains the Hebrew translation accompanied by the commentary by Moses Narboni. Zotenberg notes that this codex contains the philosophical romance, *Ḥayy-Ibn-Yoqtân* by Abou Bekr Moḥammad Ibn-Tofāil, translated from Arabic into Hebrew under the title, *Yeḥi'el-Ben-Uriel*, and accompanied with a commentary by R. Moses, of Narbonne. The beginning and the end in this manuscript are missing and it is considered defective. The manuscript was copied in the fifteenth century and was formerly in the ancien fonds 509.¹¹⁴ According to Rehak, it is the same as the Colbertina manuscript no. 4576 cited by Wolf; this is apparently inaccurate since the Colbertina manuscript is only an excerpt.¹¹⁵ Wolf mentions the existence of a fragment of the manuscript with the commentary by Moses Narboni at the Colbertina library, no. 4576.¹¹⁶

BN 914 is available in microfilm at the Jewish National University Library, where its reference number is 26869. According to the JNUL microfiche catalogue, BN 914 contains 175 folios and was copied in 1601.

BN 915:

The codex contains three manuscripts and 160 folios.

915/1° *Kitav Ḥaywan ben Yaqtan haniqara Yeḥiel b. 'Uriel; The Book of Ḥaiwân Ibn Yoqtân* [by Abu Bekr Moḥammad Ibn Tofāil] called (in Hebrew) *Yeḥie'el-Ben-Uriel* accompanied by a commentary of R. Moses of Narbonne. There is a lacuna in this copy (fol. 76), which seems to be the result of the omission of a page by the copyist.¹¹⁷ The codex executed by Samuel Madrutiel and completed at Saragossa, 13 Tishri 5235 (1474 j.c.). The codex was formerly numbered as Oratory 120.¹¹⁸

The Hebrew translation and commentary of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* begins from folio 1 upto folio 80. The whole codex appears to be written by the same copyist, though the script is tightened after the first page of the second work. Folios 1-80 contain the same text as No. 913/1. However, there are some passages lacking and differences in punctuation. The page size is 290 x 210 mm, and there are initially 31 lines and later 37 lines per page. Corrections are made by the copyist in the margins and between the lines.¹¹⁹

Munk also includes a notice on BN 915 that was formerly Oratory No. 120 in the *Manuscripts hébreux de l'Oratoire*.¹²⁰ JNUL No. 26870.

BN 915/2° contains the *Middle Commentary* by Averroes on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, translated from the Arabic by Qalonimos ben Qalonimos. The commentary extends from folio 81 to 159. Some exclusions such as Book XIII and the last book are due to their absence in the commentary by Ibn Rushd. Zotenberg cites the date of completion of the Arabic text by Ibn Rushd as 25 Rabbi al-Awwal, 570 a.h. and includes the corresponding date as 1124 j.c. [sic] (instead of 1174?).

Zotenberg further observes that this work by Ibn Rushd is not mentioned in the Latin editions of the Works of Aristotle.¹²¹ The Hebrew translation was completed on the thirteenth of Sivan 5071 (June 1311 j.c.). He adds citations by Ibn Rushd that his commentary expresses the true meaning of Aristotle more clearly than Themistius. In an epigraph to the 13 (14) book, Ibn Rushd expressed his regrets in not having the whole text.

We discuss this manuscript in greater detail, since it poses some interesting questions. Book 11 (12) ends with an epigraph, noting that this section was completed on Monday 9 Safar, 570 a.h. Ibn Rushd was born in 520 a.h. (= 1126 c.e.). This means that the [Arabic] commentary would have been completed in 1175 c.e. when Ibn Rushd was about forty-nine years old.

No other references were found to a *Middle Commentary* on the *Metaphysics* in either Brockelmann, Bouyges or other studies on Ibn Rushd's

Metaphysics.¹²² Bouyges further discusses the problem surrounding the commentaries on the *Metaphysics* by Ibn Rushd, since early works do not mention it either as *sharḥ* or *tafsīr* and only use *talkhīṣ*. He explains the justification for rejecting the use of *talkhīṣ* and selecting the term *tafsīr* for his edition of Ibn Rushd's commentary on the "Grand" book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.¹²³ The point to be noted is the difficulty in ascertaining the correlation between the Greek and Arabic terms, since the usage is not standard, at least in the case of commentaries by Ibn Rushd on the *Metaphysics*. The *talkhīṣ* (*Epitome*) thus refers to another work distinct from the Grand Commentary and attributed to Ibn Rushd.¹²⁴ Given the absence of the citation of the Arabic text of this Hebrew manuscript, it appears that the manuscript of a *Middle Commentary* is not extant, except in the Hebrew translation.

A second option is to compare the Hebrew translation with the *Talkhīṣ Kitāb Mā Ba'd al-ṭabī'ah*¹²⁵ to check whether this is a translation of *Talkhīṣ*. Genequand suggests that a "serious doctrinal" contradiction between the *talkhīṣ* versus the *tafsīr* and the *Tahāfut* is its ascription to a theory of emanation similar to Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, which he sees as a possible reason for a "false" attribution. Otherwise, the *talkhīṣ* closely follows the *tafsīr* in language. Its explanations as well often require reference to the *tafsīr*.¹²⁶

The third most tentative suggestion at the stage of the current research, which is also a strong possibility, is that this Hebrew translation is in fact the *sharḥ*, where the *sharḥ* refers to the *Middle* commentary of the *Metaphysics*. The *talkhīṣ* makes an explicit reference to "our *sharḥ* of the *Metaphysics*" about which very little is known.¹²⁷ Genequand suggests that the *sharḥ* probably refers to the *tafsīr* (*Grand*);¹²⁸ it could equally refer to the *Middle Commentary*.

BN 915/3 begins from folio 160. The Hebrew title of this work is given as *Ma'amar li Abu Naṣr al-Farabi be kawanot Aristu* (*Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī's treatise on Aristotle's purpose*). It contains the Hebrew translation of Fārābī's treatise on

the purpose of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. This manuscript is incomplete. It was copied by Samuel at Saragosa on 13 Tishri, 5235 (1474 j.c.). A more complete (but still incomplete) version can be found under BN 989/4.¹²⁹ BN 989/4 begins at folio 212 v and lacks an ending.¹³⁰ This work appears to be the Hebrew translation of Fārābī's *Risālah fī Aghrād mā bā'd al-ṭabī'ah*.¹³¹

BN 916:

Sefer Hayy ben Yaqtan, translated into Hebrew under the title *Yeḥiel ben 'Uriel*, and accompanied with a commentary (*perush*) by R. Moses of Narbonne. This copy was executed by Isaac Levi at Constantinople and completed on the 2 Tishri 5257 (1496 j.c.). This manuscript was formerly numbered Oratory 90.¹³² It consists of 87 folios. The page size is 310 x 215 mm. There are 15 lines per page. There are several marginal and interlinear notes by different hands, including recent translations into French in the first three pages and glosses. In folios 72 and 73, a recent hand has filled in the gaps left by the copyist.¹³³ This manuscript is also available in microfilm at the Jewish National University Library, where its reference no. is 26871.

Rehak's comments on this manuscript are misleading. He noted that this manuscript was formerly Oratory 90, and previously (before that?) Oratory 120.¹³⁴ Since the codex Oratory 120 was later BN 915,¹³⁵ it is clear that two separate extant manuscripts cannot be considered to be the same.

The New York manuscript 2310

I was able to briefly examine the manuscript at the Jewish Theological Seminary that was the starting of further research into the Hebrew manuscripts.¹³⁶ It is a leather bound volume written in a fine small but clear Maghribi script. It contains 134 folios.¹³⁷

*The Vatican manuscripts*¹³⁸

The Vatican Codexes 209 and 297 were examined.¹³⁹

Codex 209:¹⁴⁰

It contains 294 folios and actually includes seven works, two of which are numbered 5. This typographical mistake in the Vatican Catalogue has caused further confusion regarding the last three works in the codex. In his reference to the Hebrew manuscript on *Ḥayy* in Codex 209, Steinschneider writes Vatican 209/5 [6].¹⁴¹ Consequently, some cataloguers refer to it as 209/6, since it is the sixth in order. However, since there is another manuscript number 6, this adds to the confusion. We have numbered it 209/5b to avoid this contingency.

209: 5 [a]: It begins from folio 69 and contains the Hebrew translation and commentary of the *Sefer ha-mikhad* (*Kitāb al-tawḥīd*) by *Abu Aḥmad* [*Ḥāmid*] *al-Ghazālī* with a commentary attributed to Narboni. This manuscript appears to be the *Kitāb al-tawḥīd wa tawwakul* from Ghazālī's *Ihya 'ulūm al-dīn*. Beside the cataloguer, this work is listed by Fürst as Ghazālī's *Tawḥīd*, who includes it in the list of Narboni's works. Otherwise, its authorship is not confirmed and it is generally not listed as a work of Narboni's.¹⁴² The known commentary on Ghazālī's works by Moses Narboni is the *Kawanot ha-filosofim* (*Maqāṣid*). Ghazālī's *Tahāfut* is also available through Hebrew translations and commentaries but these are not by Narboni. Did the cataloguer make a mistake by attributing this commentary to Moses Narboni? This issue can be examined further in a [future] study that focuses on Ghazālī's reception in the Hebrew milieu.

209: 5 [b] starts from folio 88-205 contains *Perush Sefer Ḥaywan ben Yaqṭan*, i.e. the Hebrew translation and commentary by Ibn Tufayl. I was able to examine this manuscript. The text of *Sefer Ḥayy ben Yaqṭan* begins on fol. 89a.¹⁴³ It is clear and legible. The whole codex appears to be written by one person though the print changes slightly. Parts of the manuscript are underscored and include

marginal notes. I cite this Hebrew manuscript of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* as 209/5b, folios 88-205 to avoid any confusion with the subsequent manuscripts in the codex. JNUL No. 268 refers Ibn Ṭufayl's work as 209/6.¹⁴⁴ The manuscript was copied by Jacob Albo in 5232 (1472 c.e.).

209: 6, folios 206-294, contains *Ma'amar ha-filosofia* (*Treatise on Philosophy*), attributed to Ibn Ṭufayl in this codex, but actually a work by Ibn Rushd, possibly Ibn Rushd's *Middle commentary on Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'*. The Hebrew text on folio 294 as cited in the catalogue gives the completion of the commentary as April 570 a.h. (=1175 c.e), the same date that is ascribed to Ibn Rushd's completion of his *Middle Commentary on Aristotle*.¹⁴⁵ This reference is to the completion of the Arabic commentary by Ibn Rushd to the work of Aristotle, and not the Hebrew commentary. Further, the date is too early for it to be a reference to a Hebrew translation. Recent catalogues still refer to this manuscript as 209/6 (the 7th in the codex), since there are two manuscripts numbered five. This clarification is necessary since Ibn Ṭufayl's narrative (cited above as 209 5b is also cited as 209/6). This is compounded by the false attribution of 209/6 to Ibn Ṭufayl, thus reinforcing this association.

The codex was completed in 5232 (1472 c.e.) by Jacob Albo.

Vatican 297/12-14¹⁴⁶

Steinschneider refers to another fragment of the Hebrew translation and commentary of the Tufaylian narrative in Vatican 297/19, which he notes does not exist.¹⁴⁷ However, codex 297 only contains 14 entries.¹⁴⁸ Steinschneider also referred to an excerpt in 297¹² that contains Ibn Bājjah's *Iggeret ha-petirah* (*The farewell letter*) in the Bodleian catalogue.¹⁴⁹ The Assemanus Codex 297 contains two related items, nos. 12 (folios 104-108) and 14 (folios 115-147), i.e. the Hebrew translation of *Iggeret ha-petirah* (*Farewell Letter*) translated by Ḥayim (Chaim) ben Judah, and a commentary on it attributed to R. Moses [Narboni].

Thus, neither of the entries contain the commentary on *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* but the excerpts might have been part of the commentary on *Ḥayy* since Narboni cites this text. The ascription of authorship to Ibn Ṭufayl might be due to the corrupted name of the author, as Abu Bakr b. Yehi'el (=Ḥayy) al-Ṣaigh. JNUL No. 352.

The Bodleian manuscripts¹⁵⁰

The Bodleian manuscripts were also examined.¹⁵¹

Bodleian 1337 contains six manuscripts. They are written in nice Spanish Rabbinical letters in two columns per page.¹⁵² The codex no. was formerly Bod. 116 by Steinschneider.¹⁵³

1337/1:¹⁵⁴

The Hebrew translation of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* and its commentary in the Bodleian library is entitled *Sefer Ḥai ben Yaktan asher hibber ha-ḥakam Abu Bakr ben Tofail 'im perush Mosheh Narboni* (*The Book of Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān that is ascribed to Abu Bakr ibn Ṭufayl with a commentary by Moses, of Narbonne*). It is written in 130 folios. Its former codex no. is Uri 392. Pococke Sr. mentions this manuscript in his introduction to the Latin translation of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, saying that he does not know the translator, but that Moses from Narboni finished his commentary to this manuscript in 5109 (1349). It also includes the summarization of Ibn Bājjah's *Tadbīr*.¹⁵⁵ JNUL No. 22151:

1337/2 fol. 131 ff. contains the Hebrew translation of Ibn Rushd's *The possibility of conjunction with the Active Intellect (Efsharut)* with the commentary by Narboni.

Bodleian 1351/2:

The title of this manuscript is given as *Sefer Hai ben Yaqṭan 'im perush*. It extends from folios 23a to 133b. It formerly belonged to Mich. 386, and after that Mich. 505. The summary of Ibn Bājjah's *Hanhaghat ha-mitboded* extends from folio 125b to 133b. JNUL No. 22377.

The Leiden manuscript

Ms. Leiden Or. 4744 (Warner 6)

The Codex (Warner 6) is described by Steinschneider¹⁵⁶ It contains 326 folios, comprised of works on philosophy translated into Hebrew, including several commentaries by Narboni. I was able to examine this manuscript.¹⁵⁷ It is very clear and is written in a medium sized script. The first manuscript in this codex (Warner 6/1) contains Narboni's commentary, *Perush Kawanot ha-filosofim* on Ghazālī's *Maqāsid al-falāsifah*. Warner 6/4 contains excerpts of the super-commentary on Ibn Rushd's commentary on the treatise by Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Intellect (*Ma'amar al-Iskandar 'im perush ben Rushd be-sekel* by Narboni based on an anonymous translation).¹⁵⁸

Narboni's commentary on *Hayy ibn Yaqzān* is the fifth in order. It begins at folio 124a. Its title is catalogued as *Iggeret Yahwan ben Yaqṭan*.¹⁵⁹ At the end of the work (folio 195b), the commentator notes that the work was completed at Cervera in the year 5109, one day before Whitsuntide holidays on the 5th of Sivan, which is equivalent to 22nd May 1349.¹⁶⁰

This codex also contains the Hebrew versions of Ghazālī's *Tahāfut al-falāsifah* (*Hapalet ha-filosofim*) (folios 197 v-245) and Ibn Rushd's *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* (*Hapalet hapalah*) (folios 247 v ff.).¹⁶¹ It now belongs to the Bibliothek der Rijksuniversiteit, Leiden. JNUL No. 28059.

The Turin manuscript

Codex 187. A. VI. 24

This codex is written on paper from the fifteenth century in the Spanish style of writing. It had consisted of 149 folios numbered in the recto (on the same side). The title of the work is given as *Sefer Haywan ben Yaqtan haniqra Yeḥiel ben 'Uriel* (*The Book of Hayy ibn Yaqzān called Yeḥiel ben 'Uriel*) with inter-text commentary by Moses Narboni.¹⁶² This manuscript is housed in the Bibliotheca Nazionale Universitaria, Torino. It was destroyed during a fire in 1904 and only twenty fragments from folio 3 to folio 23 have survived. It has been restored but is barely legible.¹⁶³

The description on the division of this manuscript has incidental value as a method of comparison, or a way of cross-checking whether it was the source of later copies. The original manuscript was divided into eight parts and preceded by a preface by Narboni. It also included the summary of Ibn Bājjah's *Tadbīr*.

The Catalogue description was updated by Peyron in 1880, with earlier versions cross-referenced. The different cataloguers discussed possible variants to the Arabic and the Hebrew titles of the work, and were also responsible for some of these variants. Peyron notes that the Hebrew title in the manuscript is given as *Yeḥiel ben 'Aṣriel* instead of 'Uriel. He notes that the title of this manuscript on folio 3 is written as '*Haywān*' and '*Azriel*'. This is the only manuscript in which '*Azriel*' is used as the Hebrew title instead of '*Uriel*'. Peyron also explains the different uses of the Arabic titles in various catalogues and variants to the author's name, such as Avi Jaafar (Wolf), Altaphil (Rossi), Ibn Tofeil (Steinschneider).¹⁶⁴ These variant names and titles are discussed at great lengths by Peyron, Rossi and other Hebrew scholars.

Part 1 starts from folio 4 and includes the author's name as *Abū Bakr ben al-Tufayl ha-Andalusi*. The titles of the first two sections are written in red. Part 2 began at Fol 22. Only the first two pages of this section are now available, since the rest of the manuscript was destroyed.¹⁶⁵

The Vienna manuscripts

I was able to examine these manuscripts.¹⁶⁶

Signatur Heb. 70

The Codex/ reference number of this manuscript has changed with new catalogues and editions. The early catalogue by Krafft (1847) gives detail on the Arabic text and some of its other translations, as well as cross-references to the manuscripts at Bodleian, Vatican, Rossi, and Munich. The title by the Schwarz (1914; 1925) is given as *Ḥai ben Joq̄tan*. This manuscript contains 171 leaves on octavo paper with 27 lines per page written in a fine hand, without a date or signature. The first 14 leaves are written in a Spanish cursive script. Folio 15 r onward is written in Spanish Rabbinical script. The earlier codex 132 by Krafft and Deutsch does not mention the date of copying, nor the name of the copyist, and also attributes the translation to Narboni.¹⁶⁷ The later catalogues by Schwarz, (Katalog 167) indicate that the Hebrew translation is anonymous, with the accompanying commentary by Moses Narboni. The date of completion is given in the manuscript as 5109 (1349) at Cervera. It is written in numbers (as in the Bodleian Ms.) whereas the date is spelled in the Leiden manuscript.¹⁶⁸

This manuscript belonged to the library of Sebastian Tegnagel, as indicated in folio 1a. This manuscript now belongs to the collection of the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek. The last folio (172 b) is not numbered, but has the Bibliothèque Impériale stamp on it. It is not clear whether it is part of this manuscript.

The paper belongs to the fifteenth century. It has become brittle due to dampness. The manuscript has marginal notes in Latin. These notes generally divide the manuscript and indicate the names of the philosopher being discussed (for example in the prologue), as well as references to the Bible, kabbalah, Ibn Rushd (f. 170b), Ghazālī (Ebu Hamid) (f. 70 a). There are notes on the *Tadbīr* on folio 159a. JNUL No. 1347.

Cod. hebr. 201 (ff. 113v - 114 r).

I was able to examine the excerpts from the Hebrew manuscript of *Ḥayy*.

This codex contains excerpts of several manuscripts. In the early catalogues, the codex nos. were Vienna 32/16a and 16e, and even earlier as 13/16a and 16e. Folio 113 verso contains a quotation from section two of Moses Narboni's commentary on *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, equivalent to Vienna Signatur Heb. 70, folio 37r lines 10-16. Folio 114 recto also contains an excerpt from Narboni's commentary on *Ḥayy* from part 4 equivalent to Vienna Signatur Heb. 70, folio 54v, line five below to line above 55r.¹⁶⁹ JNUL No. 1463.

The Berlin manuscript

Ms. Or. Quart. 648 (Stein. 119)¹⁷⁰

I was able to examine this manuscript in part. The title of this manuscript is *Iggeret Hai ben Yaqtan*. The Berlin manuscript is described by Steinschneider¹⁷¹ It contains 150 folios, out of which 1st and 8th create a cover for a set of 6 folios. In a similar way, the 9th and the 16th folio form a cover for folios 10-15, the 17th and 24th form a cover for folios 18-23 and so forth. These cover pages are made of parchment. They also divide the various sections of the manuscript.

Steinschneider introduces the division of the work by Narboni into eight parts. Cross references to Pococke's Latin edition and Eichhorn's German translation are also made in folio 1 of the manuscript. Section 1 begins at folio 2, Section 2 at folio 24b, section 3 at folio 42b, section 4 at folio 53, section 5 at 72b, section 6 at 90b, section 7 at 99b, section 8 at 128. The manuscript is written in beautiful legible Spanish Rabbinical handwriting until folio 120b. It is completed on folio 148 in small but legible Italian handwriting of the well-known mathematician, Mordechai Finzi 1460 in Viadana, who corrected the whole volume. Folio 43b is left blank for a picture which however is missing. JNUL No. 1773.

This manuscript belonged to the Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin that was later named as Preussische Staatsbibliothek. In January 1, 1992, the two Berlin

Libraries, Deutsche Staatsbibliothek (DSB) and Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preussischer Kulturbesitz were amalgamated under the name Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preussischer Kulturbesitz (SBB) where this manuscript is now located.¹⁷²

The Leipzig manuscript 43

I was not able to examine this manuscript, but received confirmation from the library that it is extant and that codex number is the same.¹⁷³ The catalogue description is provided by Delitzsch (1838). An additional section, *Additamenta* by Leopold Zunz discusses and clarifies the issues surrounding the variant dates of 43c.¹⁷⁴ H. O. Fleischer and Franz Delitzsch describe the oriental codices. Narboni's commentary is contained in codex no. 43 (old signature B. H. fol. 19). It contains 200 folios, that are written by two copyists, (folio 1-21a is by Abram Eliezer). The codex is divided into eight sections, of which Narboni's commentary on *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* is the third. Some of the other manuscripts of interest in this codex will be briefly mentioned.

43 a fol. 1- 21a contains the Hebrew translation Ibn Rushd's *The Possibility of Conjunction* and its commentary by Moses Narboni, copied by Abram Eliezer. 43b contains the Supercommentary by Narboni on Ibn Rushd's commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias' *Treatise on the Intellect*, which is written on the margins of 43a (folios 1-21a).

Leipzig 43c contains the *Sefer Haiwan ben Yaqtan*, or the Hebrew translation and commentary of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*. It begins at folio 21b and ends at 102a. Delitzsch recounts the story of *Ḥayy* and includes information on its translations by Pococke and Eichhorn.

43 d folios 101b - 109a contains the Hebrew translation of Ibn Bājjah's *Risālah al-wadā' - Iggeret ha-petirah*. The cataloguer makes cross references to other copies of the manuscript at Vatican and Turin. The translator is Ḥayyim ben Judah ben Vives.

43 e folios 109a - 110b is an excerpt from *Iggeret ha-petirah*.

43 f folios 111a - 173b contains an interpretation of Ghazālī's *Mizān al-'amal* attributed to Abraham bar Hasdai Crescas (1340-1410).

43 g (f. 173-177b) contains the translation of a Greco-Arabic work translated by Judah Harizi and 43h (f. 178-200a) is a compendium of philosophical and theological works, marked as *esotericum*.

This brief and tentative description is meant to indicate the contents of this codex. All the manuscripts in this codex are interesting because they contain Hebrew translations and commentaries on Ibn Ṭufayl, Ibn Bājjah, Ghazālī as well as prominent Jewish thinkers such as Crescas, Narboni, Harizi etc.

Further, Leipzig 43c is central to the discussion i) because it indicates a later date of completion than the others, i.e. 1366, which is discussed by Munk and Zunz; ii) although partly corrupted, it contains good variant readings; iii) it contains copious excerpts of other commentaries by Moses Narboni as well as later commentators.

As with the other manuscripts, 43c begins with a short preface by Narboni, but ends however with an indication that the commentary was completed in 1366. Zunz notes in his *Additamenta* to the above catalogue that this date is undoubtedly wrong.¹⁷⁵ This manuscript appears to have been excluded from the JNUL list. This manuscript currently belongs to the Stadtbibliothek Library in Leipzig. The date of the codex is not given.

The Munich manuscripts

There are two manuscripts of Narboni's commentary to Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* among the Munich manuscripts.

Codd. hebr. 59/1¹⁷⁶ *Iggeret Ḥay ben Yaqṭān* is found in the codex 59/1, and is the first of eight works contained in this codex.

The whole codex contains 384 folios, of which the Hebrew translation and commentary of *Ḥayy* occupies the first 181 folios. An analysis of Ibn Bājjah's *Tadbīr* is contained in the eight part, which begins from folio no. 152. Quotations are marked by colour and size. This manuscript has many notes on the margins, which Steinschneider attributes to Johanan (Yohanan) Alemanno.¹⁷⁷ These notes are mostly parallels or short quotations from Narboni, Isaac Albalag, Levi ben Gerson and Josef ben Shemtov. Excerpts from Jehuda ben Moses Romano's (lived in middle of fourteenth century) essay, *Perush maase bereshit* are added to Narboni's text. This manuscript is difficult to use, but contains interesting additions on other well-known commentators. The codex refers to the name of the commentator and his aliases, i.e. Moses ben Josua of Narbonne and Moshe bari Yahusha ha-Narbonah (Maestro Vidal Belsom) in Hebrew.

Steinschneider in *Sitzungsberichte der k. b. Academia* (1875, 178) introduces the names of about twelve copyists, among whom are Ishaq ben Elia Manus from Litomerice (Czechoslovakia) and Meir ben Ishaq ha Levi from Prague (Czechoslovakia), who were translating or copying the Hebrew manuscripts for these Codices. It was probably copied in 1522, based on Steinschneider's notes on the Codices Bavarici.¹⁷⁸

This codex belonged to the Codices Bavarici that contained approximately seventy codexes, which were copied under the command of Albert V (reigned from 1550-79) between 1548-52 mainly in Venice. The date of the codex in the catalogue is given as Nisan 312 in small counting. JNUL No. 1149.

Munich 272¹⁷⁹

The second Munich manuscript is titled *Iggeret Hai ben Yaqtān*. It is written in clear Spanish Rabbinical script, belonging to the fifteenth century. This manuscript is in good condition and is well maintained. It contains 191 folios that are written in the clearly legible handwriting of Spanish Jews of the fifteenth century.¹⁸⁰ JNUL No. 1629.

Currently, these two manuscripts are part of the Bayerische

Staatsbibliothek, Munich.

The Mantua manuscript

Mantua 12a

Steinschneider introduces the Mantova manuscript no. 12, described by Mark Mortara. It is a part of the collection of the library, Comunita Israelitica di Mantova Biblioteca.¹⁸¹

This codex is written on paper in small Spanish Rabbinical handwriting and contains 142 folios, 36-45 lines each. It contains six works out of which the first one is *Chivan ben Joktan di Abubekr ibn Tofail col. comm. di Mose*.¹⁸² The catalogue entry includes a brief description of the story excerpted from Delitzsch's description in the Leipzig catalogue. This copy was completed on 9 March, 1528 by Salomone de Mose of Narcia for the use of Josef Tzarfadi. The manuscript is referenced in the JNUL Catalogue is No. 792. We were not able to obtain a copy of this manuscript.

The Parma manuscripts

2442 (Rossi 415)¹⁸³

The current codex No. 2442 contains two manuscripts. It was formerly described by Rossi as codex no. 415.

2442/1 (Rossi 415/1): It contains the Hebrew translation of Ibn Rushd's commentary on the *Material Intellect* with the commentary by R. Moses, son of Joshua of Narbonne.¹⁸⁴ It is also called the *Treatise on the Possibility of Conjunction*.¹⁸⁵ Wolf refers to it as the *Epistle of Conjunction with God*.¹⁸⁶ This Hebrew translation is not extant in Arabic.¹⁸⁷

2442/2 (415/2)

The Hebrew title of the manuscript is given as *Haywan ben Yaqtan haniqra Yehiel ben 'Uriel*. Rossi describes the author as Abubecher ben AlTaphil Andalusuiani

and the title as *Epistola de conjunctione*, also known as *Liber Chivan ben Joktan*, with a commentary by Narboni. The manuscript is copied on Rabbinical paper in quarto (4 minor) of the fifteenth century. Rossi makes cross-references to the other titles by which the work was referred to: *Epistle on Conjunction* (*Iggeret ha-debequt*), *Liber Chivan ben Joktān qui vocatur Jechiel ben Ariel* [sic]. He adds other titles taken from Narboni's preface, such as *De vita ermitae, regimen solitarii* (both referring to the summary of Ibn Bājjah's *Tadbīr* and their citation by Narboni in his preface). He also makes cross references to the manuscripts at Bodleian. He discusses the alternative names ascribed to its author and further obfuscates them. However, this catalogue is quite early.¹⁸⁸

Rossi points out the mistaken attribution by Wolf of Ibn Tufayl's work to Ibn Rushd, due to their similar titles (Ibn Rushd's *Possibility of Conjunction* and the alternate Hebrew title of Ibn Tufayl narrative as *Treatise on Conjunction*) He then goes on to discuss the completion of Ibn Rushd's work in his description of 415/2, thus creating an ambiguity on the completion date of the Hebrew translation of Ibn Tufayl's narrative!

The manuscript is currently at the Bibliotheca Palatina, Parma under reference no. 2442. The Hebrew translation and commentary on *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* begins at folio 50 and extends upto folio 189. I was able to examine this manuscript, but found it quite difficult to use. It is not paginated except toward the end. Most of the manuscript is in a small printed script that is relatively clear though faded. It begins with the preface by Narboni, dividing the text into eight parts (folios 1-3). On folio three, the title is given as *Sefer Ḥaywan ben Yaqṭan haniqra 'Yehiel ben 'Ūriel*. There are some marginal notes throughout that appear to be from a single hand. The last part of the manuscript (167 ff.) is written in a different cursive hand and is numbered. Rossi estimates the date of the codex as belonging to the early fifteenth century. JNUL No. 13446.

Parma 146/3

A Hebrew manuscript of Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy* has been catalogued under the title, *Hanhagat ha-mitboded*, which is the title generally given to Ibn Bājjah's *Tadbīr*. It is not mentioned by Steinschneider, at least as belonging to the Parma library. It might be one of the manuscripts that belonged to a private collection. I was not able to examine or locate this manuscript. It is included in the JNUL microfiche card catalogue (JNUL No. 13806), with Ibn Ṭufayl as the author, but without any further information. It may only contain an excerpt from the Hebrew translation and commentary of *Ḥayy*, i.e. the summary of Ibn Bājjah's *Tadbīr*.

Rossi 835/7

This is an excerpt from the Hebrew translation commentary on *Ḥayy ibn Yaqṣān* catalogued as *Escriptum ex Commentario R. Vidal libri Che ben Jechtan*, attributed to Maestro Vidal (as Moses Narboni was also known). Wolf does not mention this excerpt, since he may not have been aware that Maestro Vidal and Narboni referred to the same person.¹⁸⁹ I did not examine this excerpt.

Guenzburg Collection, Moscow

There may also be a manuscript of the Hebrew translation and commentary of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqṣān* in codex 231/1a (1288/1) of Guenzburg collection, Moscow located in the Lenin State Library, according to the JNUL Catalogue. I was not able to get further details on this manuscript. It is recorded in the JNUL catalogue, without a reference number. Neither is this manuscript referred to in the catalogues on the Hebrew manuscripts of the Guenzburg Collection.¹⁹⁰

The Cambridge manuscripts

The Cambridge manuscripts were not described by Steinschneider in his bibliographical studies and catalogues. They are early manuscripts and probably belonged to other collections. I was able to examine microfilms of these

manuscripts, but there is no description available on them.¹⁹¹

DD 4.1

This codex contains the Hebrew translation of *Hai ben Yaqṭān*, with the commentary by Moses Narboni.¹⁹² It begins with folio 1 and goes upto folio 121. The ink darkens from folio 70 onward.¹⁹³ It is available in microfilm and the JNUL reference No. is 15916.

Add. 1527/5

The fifth manuscript in this codex at the Cambridge University Library contains the Hebrew translation and commentary of *Hai ben Yaqṭān* by Abū Bakr ibn al-Ṭufayl [sic].¹⁹⁴ It begins at folio 195 and is completed at folio 248. The script is eastern. Some parts are not clear due to water damage. The commentator's (Moses Narboni) name is given in the first folio, followed by a preface. The title of the work is given on the third folio.¹⁹⁵ JNUL No. 17464.

Add. 1522

This excerpt of *Hai ben Yaqṭān* at the Cambridge University Library only contains the last 35 pages of the Hebrew translation along with the commentary by Narboni.¹⁹⁶ JNUL No. 17459.

Summation

The copious number of manuscripts of the Hebrew translation and commentary of Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, mostly belonging to the fifteenth century, reflect a sustained history of transmission of the works of Muslim philosophy in the Judaic milieu from the thirteenth century onward. This chapter started with the question of beginnings, how did this extensive dissemination begin? The history of the transmission of the Tufaylian narrative starts with the Hebrew translation and commentary. How was scholarship on the Hebrew manuscript related to the Tufaylian narrative and how was it separate? This issue was approached by

looking at the genesis of early scholarship on the Hebrew translation and commentary, in relation to formative studies on Ibn Tufayl in Islamic studies, and the bibliographical studies by Steinschneider, their inter-connections and differences.

This chapter has discussed the fore-ground to Arabo-Jewish scholarship, the life and works of Moses Narboni and the current status of the Hebrew manuscripts that include the Hebrew translation of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, and the commentary by Moses Narboni. The distinctions between the Muslim context of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* and its reception may also be perceived in the varied information in the early catalogues. All these catalogues in various languages were studied and their observations recorded.

The research into the Hebrew manuscripts was very extensive. The logistics on the Hebrew manuscripts that are described also include cross-references and the current codex numbers of extant manuscripts. In the course of my research, I realized how important all cross-references to various manuscripts are, when I found that in some cases, the manuscripts were shelved or catalogued according to their old codex numbers rather than their current numbers in catalogues. In other cases, the researcher has only access to earlier codex number from early catalogues that have generally not been updated, even though new codex numbers have been assigned to these manuscripts. For this reason, I have also included cross-references and earlier codex numbers, especially where some ambiguity remains, and in cases where existing catalogues have not been updated and include old codex numbers.

The research also gives the current names of the libraries, or collections to which the manuscripts belong. It makes observations on the physical state of the various manuscripts, the date of the copies wherever possible, observations on the clarity of the script as well as any marginal notes. There are several early and clearly legible manuscripts, as well as those with significant marginal notes. All these factors need to be considered in establishing a definitive Hebrew edition and translation. Given the extensive amount of research that still needs to be done on

the Hebrew manuscripts discussed, this study sees itself as a starting point in relation to its observations on the Hebrew manuscripts. It is hoped that the current research will provide impetus to other scholars as well as this author to further examine the rich and varied Hebrew manuscripts of the Tufaylian narrative.

Endnotes to Chapter 4

1. The Maghrib generally denotes the larger area comprising Andalusia and North Africa. Unless otherwise indicated, our usage specifically refers to the geographical areas of Morocco and Andalusia where Ibn Tufayl was born, grew up and spent different phases of his professional life.
2. Charles Touati, *Dieu et le monde selon Moïse Narboni*, *AHDMLA*, 22 (1954), 193. See also Isaac Husik, *A History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy* (1916; New York: Meridian Books, 1960), 430. Husik cites Isaac Don Abravanel (1437-1508) among those who denounced Moses Narboni as a heretic and teacher of dangerous doctrines.
3. Munk, *Mélanges*, 488. Cf. Arkoun, *Ibn Tufayl*, 263-287. Arkoun discusses the dialectical conditions that prevailed during the Maghribi period, as discussed in chapter two, whereby the status of philosophy was restricted to a given circle and officially negated in state policy.
4. The process of translation created distinct and new genres in the secondary language. See also Colette Sirat, *A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge/Paris: Cambridge University Press/La maison des sciences de l'homme, 1985), 333. Sirat suggests that Narboni probably knew Latin and cites from his *Commentary on Ibn Rushd's 'Dissertation on the Physics'*, where Narboni had noted that "most of the ancient of the Romans called these treatises, taken together, by the name of *Substantia Orbis* [transcribed in Hebrew characters] on the matter of the spheres." (Vatican, MS Urb. 41, fol. 123r). While this is insufficient evidence of Narboni's knowledge of Latin, it indicates the inter-related aspect of the transmission of Hebrew and Latin translations of Arabic texts.
5. Munk, *Mélanges*, 488. The minority and ethnic status of Jews allowed for a process of acculturation into the Christian mainstream due to persecution.
6. Sirat, 213.
7. Sulaymān Dunyā (ed.) *Maqāṣid al-falāsifah*, 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1379/1960). Moses Narboni also commented on the *Maqāṣid*, see section b vii below for details on the Hebrew manuscript.

8. Ghazālī's ability in appealing to the widest audience, through his amalgamation of philosophy and theology as well as the growth of orthodox sufism, indicates a definite shift in the horizon toward normative popularization. The struggle of other theologies and philosophies, including Maimonides' critique of anthropomorphism, reflect the changing societal context, and the growing popularity of anthropomorphic ideas and theology. Moses Narboni himself notes that a reason why he appreciated Ghazālī and Ibn Sīnā was because they were "religious" people. Cf. Hayoun, *La philosophie*, 41; Munk, *Mélanges*, 379-380; Touati, 194.

9. The bio-bibliographical details on Moses Narboni are drawn from a variety of sources. The early documentation includes the works of Solomon Munk, *Mélanges*, 502-506; Moritz Steinschneider, *Die hebraeischen Übersetzungen und die Juden als Dolmetscher*, (hereafter = *Hüb*) (1893, rpt. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1956), 311f., 363-69; *idem. Catalogus librorum Hebraeorum in Bibliotheca Bodleiana*, Jussu curatorum digessit et notis instruxit M. Steinschneider, 3 vols (Berlin: Typis Ad. Friedlaender, 1852-1860. Rpt. (facsimile) Berlin: Welt-Verlag, 1931), Vol. 1, 1967-1977, and Renan-Neubauer, *Les écrivains juif français au xiv siècle* (1893, rpt. Farnborough, 1962), 320-335; s.v. *Moses ben Joshua*, *Encyclopaedia Judaica* (henceforth, *EJ*) (Jerusalem: Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1972), XII: 422-23; *Moses ben Joshua of Narbonne, Jewish Encyclopedia* (henceforth *JE*) (New York and London: Funk and Wagnalis, 1909), IX: 71-72. Information drawn from other sources will be indicated when utilized.

10. *Moses ben Joshua of Narbonne, JE* (1909), IX: 71b-72b; see also Sirat, 332. Sirat gives a good summary on Moses Narboni but is inconsistent in details and does not cite her sources on the biographical information presented. According to Sirat, Narboni considered his teacher, Abraham Caslari to be a plagiarist. I did not find any reference to this point and do not the source of her information.

11. Sirat, 332.

12. See Altmann, *Moses Narboni's 'Epistle on Shi'ur Qomā': An Introduction*, in *Studies in Religious Philosophy and Mysticism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969), 194-95. Details on these works are described further below.

13. Narboni critiques aspects of Maimonides' Avicennism. s.v. *Moses ben Joshua, EJ* XII:424.

14. Touati, 193. Narboni is considered to have followed Abraham Ibn Ezra in his mystical exegesis and Ibn Waqār in his methods of combining philosophy and kabbalah. Cf. Hayoun, *Moshe*, 25.

15. This view is not widely supported but is cited in the article, *Moses ben Joshua*, *EJ*, XII:422.

16. For example, the Hebrew translation of Ibn Rushd's treatise, *The Possibility of Conjunction ...with the Active Intellect* (1343) is attributed to Narboni by Renan-Neubauer, *Écrivains*, 329. Hayoun rejects the attribution as an error. Hayoun, *Le Commentaire*, 26, no. 1. On the summarization of the *Tadbīr*, Steinschneider notes, "one does not know from which source Narboni drew but by no means was it directly from the Arabic" (*Hüb*, 361). I think the major justification for not considering Narboni as the translator is that the period of extensive translation of Ibn Rushd's work primarily occurred in the early thirteenth century, and most of the translations were available by Narboni's time. However, in cases where the authors or dates of these translations are not definitively established, it is difficult to hold this assumption, especially since it remains relatively undocumented from early sources other than modern scholarship.

17. Steinschneider, *Hüb*, 365, section 209, no. 794; *Catalogus ... Bodleiana*, 1973; *Leiden*, 21. Hayoun, *Le Commentaire*, 26, no.1

18. s.v. *Philosophy, Jewish - Hebrew translators of the thirteenth century*, *EJ* XIII: 445.

19. Details about the printed editions of Narboni's works will be cited below.

20. See Vajda's detailed study on Ibn Waqār, *La conciliation de la philosophie et de la loi religieuse de Joseph b. Abraham ibn Waqār*, *Sefarad* (1949-50), IX, 311-350, X, 25-71 and 281-323.

21. See Touati, 194. On Joseph ibn Waqār, *op. cit.* Vajda, *La conciliation*. Cf. Sirat, 332; 341. The remarks by Sirat on this meeting seems contradictory. Initially, she indicates that the meeting between Narboni and Ibn Waqār took place around 1355. She later says that it took place in 1362 when Waqār was an old man. Altmann indicates that the meeting took place between 1355-58. He considers Ibn Waqār to be the major source for the profound influence of philosophical kabbalah in Narboni's work, that is reflected in the early *Epistle on the Body*. See A. Altmann, *Moses Narboni*, 198; *Von der mittelalterlichen zur modernen Aufklärung* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1987), 145 ff.

22. Munk, *Philosophy and Philosophical Authors of the Jews. A Historical Sketch*, tr. I. Kalisch (Cincinnati: Block & Co., 1881), 53. This statement is somewhat cryptic in the light of this commentary on the *Guide*, where Narboni disagrees in many instances with Maimonides and equally cites the "foreign" philosophers.

23. Sirat, 332.

24. M. Hayoun, *L'épître du libre arbitre de Moïse de Narbonne (ca. 1300-1362)*, *Revue des Études Juives*, CXLI (1-2) 1982, 139-167.
25. J. Guttman, *Philosophies of Judaism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), 207. Guttman considers Narboni's critique of Abner of Burgos's views on the freedom of will as an important example of his original works.
26. Munk notes that the intimation of Narboni's death in his treatise *On the free will* is doubtful, since this treatise is further cited in Narboni's commentary to Maimonides' *Guide*; see Munk, *Philosophy*, 52-53, no. 26.
27. See also M. Hayoun, *L'épître*, 139. Hayoun further alludes to the "diffusion restreinte" surrounding this treatise including the question of authorship since only one copy is extant (BN Ms. 403/2) and this work is not cited by other writers of the fifteenth century.
28. The Leipzig manuscript (43c) is dated 1366 but this date has been considered wrong and clarified by Zunz in his *Additamenta ad. catalogue cod. Lips.*, 325-326. For the general problem about the dates of Narboni's works, see Hayoun, *Le Commentaire*, 31, no. 29.
29. Several manuscripts of these treatises are available. I have examined the cumulative list of extant microfilmed manuscripts at JNUL which is quite extensive. I am not listing all extant copies of these manuscripts here due to the focus of the current study but will include further below a list of the manuscripts of Narboni's commentary on *Hayy ibn Yaqzān*.
30. See Steinschneider, *Catalogus ... Boldleiana*, 1968-1977. Steinschneider lists twenty works or excerpts attributed to Narboni. Following the list, I also incorporate references to those works that are not known to exist in the above sections on Narboni's biography.
31. See K. P. Bland (ed./tr.), *The Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect by Ibn Rushd with the Commentary of Moses Narboni*, Hebrew edition and English translation of *Igeret efsharut ha-devekut le-Ibn Roshd 'im be'ur Mosheh Narboni*, Moreshet series of the Jewish Theological Seminary, vol. VIII (New York: Ktav Publishing House (JTSA), 1982). This treatise by Ibn Rushd is not extant in Arabic and is only available in an anonymous Hebrew translation, accompanied by a commentary by Narboni.
32. Zotenberg, *Catalogues des manuscrits hébreux et samaritains de la Bibliothèque Impériale* (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1866), 161, 166, 168.
33. F. Delitzsch and H. O. Fleischer, *Codices Orientalium Linguarum: Die hebr. mss. beschrieben von Fr. Delitzsch, Additamenta von Leopold Zunz*, in *Catalogus*

Librorum Manuscriptorum qui in Bibliotheca Senatoria Civitatis Lipsiensis Asservantur, ed. A. G. R. Naumann (Grimma: Sumptus Fecit Julius Mauritius Gebhardt, 1838), 308-311, 325-27.

34. Ibn Rushd's supercommentary on Alexander's Commentary on the *Treatise of the Intellect* was edited by L. Bruns in *Supplementum Aristotelicum* (Berlin, 1887), Vol. II, pt. 1, cited by Bland, 14, no. 10.

35. Steinschneider, *Catalogus codicum Hebraeorum Bibliothecae Academiae Lugduno-Batavae* (Leiden, 1858; rpt. Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1977), 20-21.

36. Delitzsch, *Catalogus ...Lipsiensis*, 308b.

37. A. L. Ivry, (ed.) *The Treatise on the Perfection of the Soul* (Jerusalem: Ha-Akade'myah ha-le'umit ha-Yisre'elit le mada'im, 1977).

38. An incomplete manuscript of this commentary is also found in BN 967/1. After explaining each chapter according to Ibn Rushd, the commentator then poses several questions that he tries to resolve. This copy is without a title or introduction and has several exclusions. The copyist, Isaac Kohen, does not appear to have had a complete version at his disposal. Zotenberg, 171. Cf. Steinschneider, *Hüb*, 119; Hayoun, *Le commentaire*, 31, no. 29.

39. A. Hyman of Yeshiva University, New York had announced a forthcoming Hebrew edition.

40. The above text has been edited and translated by Arthur Hyman, *Averroes' De Substantia Orbis* (Cambridge, Mass./Jerusalem: The Medieval Academy of America/ Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1986).

41. Hayoun, *La philosophie*, 43.

42. Steinschneider, *Catalogus ...Lugduno*, 17-18. Munk, *Philosophy*, 57, no. 36. The Hebrew translation of the *Maqāsid* is accompanied with a commentary by Narboni that was copied by Isaac ben Habib and completed on the 7th of Tebet, 5232 (December 17, 1471) at Saragossa, considered at the time the seat Jewish learning represented by the philosopher, Abraham ben Bibag. See also Hayoun, *La philosophie*, 78.

43. Details on the various manuscripts of the Hebrew translation and commentary of *Hayy ibn Yaqzān* are given further below. Since past and recent scholarship has focussed on the manuscripts at the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, I have attempted to examine the other manuscripts of the Hebrew translation and commentary.

44. Delitzsch, *Codices Orientalium*, in *Catalogus ...Lipsiensis*, 309b-310a. See also Hayoun, *Le Commentaire*, 26, no. 2. The Hebrew translation of *The Farewell Treatise* is translated by Hayim ben Judah ben Vives, as indicated in Leipzig ms. 43d. Other copies of the Hebrew translation include BN ms. 959 and Turin ms. 188. I was not able to locate an Hebrew edition that Hayoun announced was to appear in *HUCA* (vol. LVIII). The excerpts on Ibn Bājjah's *Farewell Treatise* are cited in the manuscript on *Ḥayy*, for example in BN Ms. 916 fol. 3a-b, Ms 915 fol. 52b); cf. Hayoun, *La philosophie*, 47, no. 28.

45. This summary of Ibn Bājjah's *Tadbīr* by Narboni is included in all the commentaries on *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*. However, it also has an independent publication history and was first edited by David Herzog, *Bi'ur Kavanot Abu Bakr ben as-Saigh (Kitāb Tadbīr al-Mutawahhīd) Qovets al-Yad* 6 (1896) 26-42.

46. Zotenberg, 110-111. The Hebrew commentary by Narboni was partially published at Berlin in 1791. The whole work was published by Jacob Goldenthal (ed.), *Der Commentar des Rabbi Moses Narbonensis philosophen aus dem XIV.* (Vienna, 1852) and cited by Touati, 193. The commentary on the *Guide* was the last or possibly the second last work by Narboni. A Hebrew printed edition of the commentaries on Maimonides by Shem Tov ben Yosef ibn Felaqera (ca. 1225- ca. 1295), Joseph Caspi (ca. 1280-1340) and Moses Narboni reproduces the texts of three commentaries on Maimonides' *Guide* from earlier imprints (Pressburg, 1837; Frankfurt-am-Main, 1848 and Vienna, 1832); *Sheloshah kadmon'e mefarshe ha-Moreh: Moreh ha-moreh leha Rav Shem Tov (b.r. Yosef) ben Falakera, 'Amude kesef u-maskiyt kesef leha Rav Yosef (b.r. Aba Me'eri) Kaspi, beur ha-Narvoni* (Jerusalem, s.n., 1960).

47. *Moses ben Joshua, JE*, 71b. Sirat, 333.

48. Zotenberg, 137 (fol. 282-306).

49. *Moses ben Joshua, JE*, 71.

50. Cf. Hayoun, *Le commentaire*, 24.

51. Sirat, *Pirke Moshe le-Moshe Narboni, Tarbiz* 39 (1970), 287-306; French translation by the editor in *Actes du Vème congrès des études juives*. Vol. III, Jerusalem, 1972, 61-72.

52. Zotenberg, 55. The title of the work that Narboni was responding to is given as *Ma'amar ha-gezerah* (Epistle on Determinism) and in other places as *Iggeret ha-gezerah*, which is the title of the work to which Narboni was responding. This work does not appear to be extant; cf. Munk, *Philosophy*, 52-53, no. 25. Narboni's treatise was first published as *Ha-Ma'amar be-Behirah*, ed. Eliezer Ashkenazi, *Dibre Hakhamim* (Metz, 1849), 37-41. Hayoun considers the well-

known contemporary whom Narboni says he met and debated with on the subject as Abner of Burgos, who took the name of Alfonsus Burgensis of Valladolid, Spain after his conversion to Christianity. Hayoun, *L'épître*, 150, no. 2. *Moses ben Joshua*, *JE*, 72. On Abner, Alfonso de Valladolid of Burgos, see Isaac Baer, *Die Juden im christlichen Spanien*, vol. I and II (rpt. 1970) cited by Hayoun, *L'épître*, 140, no. 3.

53. A. Altmann, *Moses Narboni's 'Epistle on Shi'ur Qomā': A Critical edition of the Hebrew Text with an Introduction and an Annotated English Translation*, in *Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), 225-88. The Introduction was reprinted as *Moses Narboni's 'Epistle on Shi'ur Qomā': An Introduction*, in *Studies in Religious Philosophy and Mysticism*, as cited above.

54. Hayoun, *Moshe*, 32-33, no. 8.

55. Hayoun considers the commentary on *Lamentations* as a basic work written by Narboni in his youth that reflects his concerns with the soul and its immortality in the afterlife. This commentary must have been written at least before 1344. See Hayoun, *Le commentaire*, 24.

56. See Sirat, 332-333. Sirat includes citations from the last three short works. She considers the short treatises to be indicative of Narboni's own philosophy since he tends to utilize the first person in them.

57. Hayoun, *Moshe*, 32-33, no. 8; *Moses ben Joshua*, *JE*, 72a. As a physician during the plague, and due to problems that Jews faced in Spain, Narboni moved around a lot, having to abandon his books and other belongings.

58. See Hayoun, *Le Commentaire*, 26, no. 2. Narboni also cites passages from this treatise in his commentary on *Hayy* (Ms 916 fol 3a-b, Ms 915 fol. 52b). This work was cited by L. V. Berman in his Doctoral thesis of the 3rd cycle, Jerusalem, 1959. I was not able to locate a forthcoming Hebrew edition of the *Risālah al-wadā'* that Hayoun indicates was to appear in *Hebrew Union College Annual* (*HUCA*, vol. LVIII).

59. Cf. Sirat, 332.

60. Sirat, 333.

61. Touati, 193.

62. Steinschneider notes that except for Johannan Alemanno, later well-known theologians like Abraham Bibago, Isaac Abravanel, Joseph B. Shemtob cite the Tufaylian narrative but avoid mentioning the commentator. Steinschneider, *Hüb*,

section 210, 367-68.

63. *Op. cit.* Hasanali, *Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy*, 6, no. 9.

64. S. Munk, *Mélanges*, 410-418.

65. Three Spanish translations of Ibn Bājjah were undertaken by M. Asín Palacios: *Tratado de Avempace sobre la unión del intelecto con el hombre* (K. *ittiṣāl al-'aql bi'l-insān*) *Al-Andalus* 7 (1942), 1-47; *La 'carta de Adiós' de Avempace* (R. *al-wadā'*), *ibid.*, 8 (1943), 1-87; *El regimen del solitario* (K. *tadbīr al-mutawahhid*) (Madrid, 1946). See also D. M. Dunlop, *Ibn Bājjah's Tadbīru'l-Mutawahhid* (Rule of the Solitary), *JRAS* (1945), 61-81, which includes the Arabic text.

66. Gauthier, *Ibn Thofail*, 49, no. 3; 50; cf. Munk, *Mélanges*, 504, no. 1; Munk is obviously referring to the prologue and its report on the different philosophers. Early historians of philosophy have also tended to limit their assessment of Ibn Ṭufayl on the summarization of the state of intellectual studies as presented in the prologue.

67. In this instance, Narboni's response is based on a mis-translation, but it also reflects his general approach to his works, where he constantly found parallels between the texts being commented upon, and his larger religious context. Narboni especially cites biblical texts and commentaries from the Jewish tradition to make the commented texts meaningful to him and his audience. This approach is further explicated in his harmonization of philosophy, kabbalah, and Jewish ritual law and its practices, as discussed in chapter five.

68. Gauthier's disappointment with the limited knowledge available to the Hebrew translator might be one reason why he did not examine the Hebrew commentary any further. Gauthier assumes Moses Narboni was the translator as well as the commentator, and expresses his chagrin at Narboni's lack of information on Islamic mysticism, especially in relation to al-Ḥallāj. Nevertheless, whether it is through the translator or commentator, this lack of information occurs due to the reception of the text through translation in a new context.

The well known statement *laysa fī al-jubbah siwā Allāh* is generally attributed to Abū Sa'id b. Abī al-Khayr as cited earlier. The author of the statement is not identified in the prologue. Gauthier footnotes various cross-references on Ḥallāj (p. 49, no. 3) but does not indicate the source of attribution of this statement to Ḥallāj. Gauthier, *Ibn Thofail*, 48, no. 6; 49, no. 3; 50. In his second edition to the Arabic text, Gauthier footnotes both al-Ḥallāj and Abī al-Khayr and cites Massignon, *La Passion d'Ḥallāj*, (1922) 399, no. 2; 451, no. 7. In the notes, Massignon affirms that the idea of *khirqah* in this statement was associated with Ḥallāj. See also Massignon, *La Passion d'Ḥallāj* (1922; Paris: Gallimard, 1975), II: 236, 365; tr. into English by H. Mason as *The Passion*

of *Hallāj: Mystic and Martyr of Islam* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), II: 347, No. 64; Further research into this famous statement indicates that it has been variously attributed to Hallāj, to Bastāmī (by Rūmī), and to Junayd (among others). It does not appear to be important as to who speaks the words. It is the statement itself that exemplifies the audacity of the mystic!

69. George Vajda, *Comment le philosophe juif, Moïse de Narbonne, commentateur d'Ibn Ṭufayl comprenait-il les paroles extatiques (shataḥāt) des soufis*. In *Actas del Primer Congreso de Estudios Arabes et Islamicos*, 129-135. Vajda refers to the French translation by Gauthier and cites this edition, but makes no cross-references to Gauthier's earlier discussion. The "mis-translation" will be discussed further in the following chapter.

70. Vajda, *Moïse de Narbonne sur les séfirōt, les intelligences et les sphères*, annex note 10 in *Recherche sur la philosophie et la kabbale* (Paris: La Haye, 1962), 396-402. Vajda's translation will be analyzed in the next chapter on the Hebrew commentary.

71. Zotenberg, 159a-160b.

72. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Hayy ben Yaḡdhān: roman philosophique d'Ibn Thofail*, 2nd rev. ed. Arabic text and French translation by L. Gauthier (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1936), xxv. Rehak also drew Gauthier's attention to an Arabic manuscript of *Hayy ibn Yaḡzān* in Leiden, which was a copy of the manuscript at the Khediviale. Rehak communicated with Gauthier on this subject and sent him a summary of his article in French. I was not able to locate the French summary by Rehak which Gauthier cites but does not document. However, I was able to study the Czech article by Josef Rehak (1911), *Ibn Tufail a jeho dílo: bibliografická studie, Cestník Compes Rendus de l'Academie tchéque des lettres, sciences et arts*, XX, 19-39. I would like to thank Monika Svoboda for her assistance in translating the article. Much of the information catalogued by Rehak is misleading and inaccurate but it provided a point of departure and helped further research.

73. Extensive research on Moses Narboni has been recently undertaken by Maurice Hayoun, whose works are cited in this chapter and the next.

74. Cf. Touati, 193. Despite the copious number of extant manuscripts dating back to the fifteenth century, Moses Narboni's works were ignored in the body of Hebrew printed texts that were undertaken since the fifteenth century, because he was considered a heretic in Rabbinic circles. It is ironic however that the access to printing also led to a number of European printed translations from the seventeenth century onward, whereas just two of Narboni's works were printed upto the nineteenth century. This might explain why the Hebrew translation and commentary of *Hayy ibn Yaḡzān* were ignored in later scholarship, since they

remained in manuscript and were not a part of the European transmission of the printed text. The studies by Hayoun have redressed this neglect, and indicate that Moses Narboni's works were a major channel to the works of the Muslim philosophers in the fifteenth century, but there are barely any references to him in works of history, such as Husik's *History*, *op. cit.*

75. Moritz Steinschneider has compiled several catalogues of Hebrew manuscript collections in various libraries in Europe. *Op. cit. Hüb* where he provides concise outlines on several Jewish and Islamic writers and their works. Full bibliographical details will be cited in reference to the various manuscripts.

76. *Op. cit.* Rehak, who summarizes Steinschneider and provides details on some of the Hebrew manuscripts in this Czech article. Cf. Gauthier, *Hayy*, xxxiii. Gauthier does not cite Steinschneider's references to Ibn Tufayl or Moses Narboni with regard to his bibliographical works and refers only to one of his works on Fārābī. Although Vajda includes Steinschneider's works in his bibliographies, he does not make any citation to the list on Ibn Tufayl or Narboni.

77. Recent publications on these subjects have been undertaken by scholars such as Maurice Hayoun, Kalman Bland, Barry Kogan and Michael Blaustein in the primary area of Jewish studies by institutions such as the Jewish Theological Seminary and the Hebrew University. These works will be cited as utilized.

78. The priority in Jewish Studies has focussed on those 'exceptions' such as the commentaries by Ibn Rushd said to be no longer extant in the Arabic. Studies by Ivry, Hyman and Bland have focussed on providing such editions, cited in this study.

79. Steinschneider, *Hüb*, Section 209, pp. 311, 363-69.

80. Steinschneider, *Hüb*, Section 209, p. 365.

81. Some examples include a fire at Turin that had destroyed the Turin manuscript, which is now practically illegible. This information was conveyed to me in a letter received from L. Selvaggi, Director of the Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria, Torino (4016 Posiz. VIIa dated 14/9/92). A fire at the Jewish Theological Seminary was the verbal reason given in 1992 as to why many of the early printed translations of *Hayy ibn Yaqzān* were no longer available there although listed on the card catalogues. The card catalogues have since been updated and computerized.

82. Steinschneider, *Catalogus ... Bodleiana*, I: 1967-1977. Vols. 2-3 have special half-titles only. Steinschneider's catalogue of Bodleian manuscripts was updated by Neubauer, *Catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1886), I, 476, #1337.

83. For example, many of the manuscripts that were formerly in the Paris *Oratory* were transferred with new codex numbers to the *fonds hébreu*, or their codex numbers changed from the numbers assigned to them in the *ancien fonds* of the Bibliothèque Impériale. The BN codexes generally include the earlier codex numbers. Even so, there are some confusing cross-references such as inter-connections with the Oppenheim collection and the manuscripts at Sorbonne (=BN) being identical. Likewise, the Berlin manuscript 119 is referred to as "previously Reggio and then Steinschneider" (*Hüb*, 365). One has to assume that this refers to different catalogues. Changes in the names of the libraries are easier to resolve than changes in collections, or the move of certain manuscripts to different collections, either within the same library and sometimes outside it.

84. The features of the various manuscripts that are of special interest will be highlighted in the discussion below on each of the manuscripts.

85. Steinschneider notes in several catalogues that the Tufaylian narrative was anonymously translated into Hebrew. However, the attribution of the Hebrew translation to Narboni was continuously repeated, for example by Lucien Le Clerc, *Histoire de la médecine arabe* (Paris, 1876), II:114; It remains ambiguous in Munk, *Mélanges*, (1859) and in later works by Gauthier, *Ibn Thofaïl*, (1909). Steinschneider observes that most of these writers may have made such an assumption due to the ambiguity in the catalogue of Hebrew manuscripts in the Bibliothèque Imperiale [Nationale] catalogue by Zotenberg (1866), 159, that states "traduit en hébreu et accompagné d'un commentaire par R. Moïse"; cf. Steinschneider, *Hüb*, 365; *Catalogus ...Bodleiana*, 1973; *Catalogus ...Lugduno-Batavae*, 21. Munk and Gauthier do not directly attribute the Hebrew translation to Narboni. They just do not mention an anonymous author, and further discuss Narboni as the commentator.

86. The description by the cataloguers with regard to the title and the author have been generally retained as they present it, except in case of serious errors that are indicated. We have excluded other erroneous "debates" on names, etc. recognizing their early date and limited ascription in current Jewish and Islamic Studies. The only English catalogue is the revised Bodleian catalogue by Neubauer, referred to above.

87. Munk, *Manuscrits hébreux de l'Oratoire à la Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris* (Frankfurt: J. Kaufmann, 1911), 30-32; originally published in *Zeitschrift für Hebräische Bibliographie* (1907-9), nos. 11-14, 30.

88. Steinschneider, *Hüb*, Section 209, 365.

89. Steinschneider, *Hüb*, section 209, 366.

90. *Op. cit.* Steinschneider, *Hüb*, 365, no. 794. Rehak suggests Ishāq Latīf (ca. 1260) as a possibility, in which case one might surmise that *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* was translated into Hebrew around the second half of the thirteenth century. Cf. Rehak, 30. However, the basis for this assumption by Rehak is faulty. Rehak cites Delitzsch's write-up in the Leipzig catalogue; *Lipsiensis*, 309b. Delitzsch does not mention Ishāq Latīf. All he mentions is that the Hebrew translation was available to Narboni ("qui multo ante Narbonensis aetatem hebraicus factus videtur") as a source.

91. Delitzsch, *Catalogus ... Lipsiensis*, Codex 43c, 309b. Delitzsch mentions a parallel title of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* as *Ḥai ben Meqitz* and how the latter title relates to eternal life. He also notes that the latter title was the name of a work by Ibn Ezra. This work is actually a poetical imitation of Ibn Sīnā's *Ḥayy* generally attributed to Ibn Ezra but also to Solomon ibn Gabirol. Cf. Mehren, *L'Allégorie mystique*, 8-9. Mehren also cites another anonymous literal Hebrew translation of Ibn Sīnā's *Ḥayy*, accompanied by a commentary by Ibn Sīnā's disciple, Ibn Zayla.

92. J. B. de Rossi, *Mss Codices hebraici Bibliotheca J. B. de Rossi* (Parma: ex Publico typographeo, 1803-04), II: 34-35. Rossi's codex 415 discusses the confusion by Wolf between Ibn Rushd's *The Possibility of Conjunction (Efsharut ha-debequt)* and the alternative title of the Hebrew translation of the Tufaylian narrative, *Iggeret ha-debequt (Treatise on Union)*. Rossi further gives the date of completion of the former treatise in the codex that describes the latter (!), thus creating an ambiguity over the date of completion of the Hebrew translation of *Ḥayy*.

93. Hayoun, *Le Commentaire*, 32-33. Munk, *Manuscripts hébreux*, 31. The Jewish community, including Narboni, had to flee from Cervera in 1349.

94. Cf. Munk, *Manuscripts hébreux*, 31.

95. Munk, *Manuscripts hébreux*, 31.

96. Steinschneider, *Catalogus ...Lugduno*, 21-22.

97. See Delitzsch, *Catalogus ...Lipsiensis*, 309 and Zunz, *Additamenta*, 325 and 326; cf. Munk, *Philosophy*, 55, no. 30.

98. Munk, *Philosophy*, 53 and no. 26. Narboni's commentary on the *Guide* is probably his *opus major*, his final work which took him six years to complete. However, Narboni still remains a student of Averroes and critiques Maimonides' Avicennan views.

99. Rossi, *Mss. Codices hebraici*, 34.

100. B. Peyron, *Codices hebraici manu exarati Regiae Bibliothecae quae in Taurinensi Athenaeo Asservatur*, (Turin: Fratres Bocca, 1880), 199.

101. Steinschneider, *Die handschriften ...zu Berlin*, (Berlin, 1878), 112.

102. S. E. & J. S. Assemanus, *Codices Ebraicos et Samaritanos*, in *Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae Codicum Manuscriptorum Catalogus* (Rome: Typographia Linguarum Orientalium Angeli Rotilii in aedibus Maximorum, 1756), I: 176-177, 281-283. I: 177.

103. Zotenberg, 160.

104. There are many different systems of transliteration used by the early cataloguers for both Hebrew and Arabic titles. We have retained the spelling used by the cataloguers and have clarified inaccuracies.

105. Zotenberg, 158-159. Hayoun, *Le Commentaire*, 28. Munk, *Manuscrits hébreux*, 30-31. Zotenberg's catalogue was to have been updated by Vajda. However, we found no additional information on these manuscripts. The Paris manuscripts (primarily 915 and 916) have been the focus of study by Hayoun, who draws from the notes that Vajda made on the Paris manuscripts and incorporates them in his research. Munk as well describes BN 915. We have incorporated this information into the description of the Paris manuscripts.

106. Munk, *Mélanges*, 417 (on Ibn Tufayl) and 504 (on Moses Narboni).

107. Zotenberg, 158-159.

108. Cf. Hayoun, *Le commentaire*, 28, no. 13. Hayoun gives a description of the Paris manuscripts nos. 913, 915, and 916 that he utilized in his translation of narrative.

109. This is just one example of the misleading and confused research by Rehak. Rehak's write-up was countermanded by several errors that complicated the research in the attempts to verify their accuracy. The early catalogues and the article by Rehak often provide misleading information that was checked and counter-checked and often led to an impasse.

110. J. C. Wolf, *Bibliothecae Hebraea (=BH)*, (Hamburg: Apud B. Theod. Christoph Felgineri Viduam, 1815-33), III: 9, No. XXX1.

111. Wolf, *BH*, III: 9, no. 31.

112. Jewish National University Library. *The Collective Catalogue of Hebrew Manuscripts; from the Institute of Microfilmed Hebrew Manuscripts and the Department of Manuscripts of the Jewish National and University Library*

(Jerusalem/Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Healey Inc., 1989). This extensive microform catalogue *in Hebrew* includes 812 microfiches that put together 355,000 catalogue entries from 700 different collections. This is an updated record of the Hebrew manuscripts extant in various collections. We spent considerable time, studying these records at the Jewish Theological Seminary and the New York Public Library. The records are extensive and not easy to use. The huge collection is accompanied by a minuscule user guide. Nevertheless, the access to information available on Hebrew manuscripts is extensive. The entries on Ibn Tufayl are contained in file 1, fiche 73 and file 9, fiche 164. The entries on Moses Narboni are contained in file 9, fiche 109. We have included the JNUL reference numbers with the descriptive entries as JNUL No. #.

113. Since we have no information on the Hebrew translator of Ibn Tufayl's narrative, looking into the known Hebrew translators of the works of Arab philosopher might be a starting point for further information. Incidentally, BN 916 is copied by Isaac Levi of Constantinople. It might be worth finding out whether the translator of Ghazālī's *Tahāfut*, Rabbi Zerahya Ha-Levi, son of Isaac is possibly the son of the copyist of BN 916.

114. Zotenberg, 159.

115. Rehak, 24, no. 5.

116. Wolf, *BH*, III: 9.

117. Zotenberg, 159. Hayoun uses these two manuscripts in his article and notes that folio 76 of 915 = folio 127, l.10 - folio 128 line 2 of BN 913/1. Cf. Hayoun, *Le Commentaire*, 28, no. 13.

118. Zotenberg, 160.

119. Hayoun, *Le Commentaire*, 28, no. 13.

120. Munk, *Manuscrits hébreux*, 30-32.

121. Zotenberg, 159.

122. Ibn Rushd, *Averroes' Tafsīr Mā Ba'd al-Ṭabī'at*, ed. M. Bouyges, 4 vols. (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1938-52), I:xx-xxiv.

123. Bouyges, *Notice*, I:xx-xi.

124. Charles Genequand (tr.), *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics: A Translation with Introduction of Ibn Rushd's Commentary on Aristotle's 'Metaphysics', Book Lām* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), 10. Genequand questions the authenticity of the *Talkhīs*, discussed within the Latin corpus by Nardi, and more recently by

Bouyges and defended by Horten.

125. Ibn Rushd, *Talkhīṣ Kitāb Mā Ba'ad al-ṭabī'ah*, ed. Uthmān Amīn (Cairo: Wizārat al-tarbīyah wa al-ta'līm, 1938).

126. Genequand, 11. For a discussion on the theory of emanation by Ibn Rushd in the *Talkhīṣ (Epitome)*, see Barry Kogan, *Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation* (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1985), 248-255.

127. Ibn Rushd, *Talkhīṣ*, ed. Uthmān Amīn, 53. Cf. Bouyges, *Notice*, I: lxxxi-lxxxii; xcvi-xcviii.

128. Genequand, 11, no. 23.

129. Zotenberg, 160.

130. Zotenberg, 177.

131. Brockelmann, *GAL* I², 235. F. Dieterici (ed.), *Fī Aghrād al-ḥakīm fī kull maqālah min kitāb al-mawsūm bi al-ḥurūf* in *Alfarabi's Philosophische Abhandlungen* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1890), cited as *About the Scope of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'* by R. Walzer, *al-Fārābī, EF*², III: 778-781.

132. Zotenberg, 160.

133. Cf. Hayoun, *Le commentaire*, 28-29; Hayoun primarily used BN 916 as the basis of his translation of the commentary, supplementing it with BN 913.

134. Rehak, 24.

135. Cf. Munk, *Manuscrits hébreux*, 30; Zotenberg, 160.

136. Jewish Theological Seminary, *A Reel Guide to Philosophy Manuscripts*, No. 2310 of reel five, reels 1-22, p. 6.

137. Jewish National University Library, No. 28563.

138. Assemanus, *Bibliothecae ... Vaticanae*, I: 176-177, 281-283.

139. See Jewish Theological Seminary, *A Guide to the Hebrew Manuscript Collection of the Library of the Jewish Theological Seminary*. 5 vols. New York: JTS, 1991. Vatican 209/6 is contained in JTS Reel No. 64. Vatican 297 is contained in JTS Reel No. 81.

140. Assemanus, *Bibliothecae ... Vaticanae*, I: 176-177.

141. Cf. Steinschneider, *Die Handschriften zu Berlin*, 102. Assemanus, Codex 209, no. 5 [a & b]-6, 176-77. Vat 209/6 in JTS Reel 64.
142. Fürst mentions this work among the commentaries by Narboni. Cf. J. Fürst, *Jüdischen Literature* (Leipzig: Verlag Von Wilhelm Engelmann, 1863), vol. 4, 17, no. 9.
143. Cf. Wüstenfeld, *Geschichte der arab. Aerzte und Naturforscher* (History of Arab doctors and researchers) (1840; Göttingen, 1881), 108.
144. A microfilm of the manuscript was examined at JTS. Reel No. 64.
145. Cf. Zotenberg, no. 915/2.
146. Assemanus, *Bibliothecae ...Vaticanae*, I: 281-283.
147. Steinschneider, *Hüb*, 365 and no. 727. "A fragment (VII. T) in Vatican 297¹⁹ (is not known)." Cf. Assemanus, 282-83.
148. The fact that the codex has only 14 entries (as catalogued by Assemanus) was also confirmed in a communique from the Vatican library in response to my query to the library.
149. Steinschneider, *Catalogus ...Bodleiana*, Section 1974; Assemanus, *Vatican*, Codex 297, no. 12, pp. 281-283; JTS Reel No. 81.
150. I would like to thank Marion Stein of JTS for making arrangements and obtaining permission from the Bodleian library for me to examine and copy parts of the Bodleian manuscript at the premises of the Jewish Theological Library, New York.
151. JTS Reel No. 274.
152. Neubauer, I:476, no. 1337.
153. The earlier catalogue by Steinschneider, *Catalogus ...Bodleiana*, 1973, no. 10 gives cross references to other copies of the manuscript.
154. Wüstenfeld, *Geschichte*, 108. Bod. 1337/1 is discussed here. Cf. Steinschneider, *Catalogus ... Bodleiana*, under 'Moses Narboni', 1967-1977; *Ibn Tofeil (Abu Bakr) Hayy b. Yaqdhan seu Yehiel b. Uriel alias Iggeret ha devequt seu hanhagat ha-matikhad*, 1973-10. *Hüb*, Section 209; Wolf, *BH*, I:14; Rehak, 23, # 1.

155. Neubauer, *Bodleian*, 1337/1. This codex also contains the appendix, *Bi'ur Kawonot*; *Abu Bakr ben al-Saigh be-hanahagat ha-mitboded*, starting at folio 120b. For the dates of this manuscript, see Munk, *Mélanges*, 504; Wolf, *BH*, I: 14.

156. Steinschneider, *Catalogus ...Lugduno-Batavae*, 15. Steinschneider describes the Codex Warner 6/5 (now Ms. Or. 4744); cf. Wolf, *BH*, I:14. Rehak mistakenly refers to the Hebrew translation and commentary on *Hayy* in Warner 6/6; cf. Rehak, 23.

157. We would like to thank Dr. Jan J. Witkam, Curator of the Oriental collections at Leiden University for sending us prints of the Codex Warner 6 (Leiden Ms. Or. 4744).

158. Steinschneider, *Catalogus ...Lugduno-Batavae*, 20.

159. Steinschneider, *Catalogus ...Lugduno-Batavae*, 21. In the old Leiden catalogue (p. 283), the title is translated as *Historia animalium filii Joctan vocati Jechiel F. Uriel cum comm. Abi Bkr F. Tophail Hispani*; cf. Rehak, 23.

160. Steinschneider, *Catalogus ... Lugduno-Batavae*, 21. Most of the manuscripts indicate the completion date as 23 May, 1349, whereas this manuscript gives the date as 22 May, 1349, one day prior to the Whitsuntide (Shav'uot/Pentecost) holiday. Munk notes (cited above) that the manuscript could not have been completed on 23 May which was the Sabbath (Saturday) and prefers the date of completion as indicated in the Leiden manuscript.

161. Steinschneider, *Catalogus ... Lugduno-Batavae*, 23.

162. J. Pasinus, *Codices Manuscripti Biblioth. R. Taurinensis* Recensuerant Jps. Pasinus (Turin, 1749), I: 51. B. Peyron, *Codices Hebraici*, 198-99. Peyron updated the earlier catalogue and gives cross-references to it. I was able to consult both these early catalogues at JTS.

163. Cf. Selvaggi, *Letter 4016 Posiz. VIIa*, 14 September, 1992, Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria, Torino.

164. Peyron, 199.

165. See Pasinus, I: 51; Peyron, 199. A brief description of the following (destroyed) sections is given below for the purpose of comparison. The other six parts were separated through blank space. Part 3 began at folio 39; part 4 at folio 49b; part 5 at folio 69; part 6 at folio 87b and part 7 at folio 96, where the title of the summary of Ibn Bājjah's *Hanahagat ha-mitboded* was given, even though the actual text started in folio 99. In part 8, the date of completion of the

commentary on folio 99b line 17 was given as Pentecost 5 Sivan, the 109th day of the sixth millennium (5109/1349). Folio 149 contained a fragment of the Hebrew translation by Ibn Bājjah called *Iggeret ha-petirah* (*Farewell Treatise*).

166. JTS Reel No. 40. The microfilm was also examined at JTS. I would also like to thank Dr. Eva Irblich, Stellvertreterin des Direktors der Handschriften- und Inkunabelsammlung of the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek for responding to my queries on these manuscripts.

167. Albrecht Krafft and Simon Deutsch, *Die handschriftlichen hebräischen Werke der k.k. Hofbibliothek zu Wien* (Vienna: Aus der kaiserlich-königlichen Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1847), 145, No. 132; cf. Wolf *BH*, I:14.

168. Arthur Zacharias Schwarz, *Die hebräischen Handschriften der k. k. Hofbibliothek zu Wien* (Vienna: On Kommission bei Alfred Hölder, 1914), 22, Section 13, Nos. 16 a & e. Excerpts from Moses Narboni's commentary on *Hayy ibn Yaqzān*. In his later catalogue, Schwarz, *Die hebräischen Handschriften der Nationalbibliothek zu Wien* (Leipzig: Verlag Karl W. Hiersemann, 1925) refers to a manuscript of the Hebrew translation with commentary, # 167, 177-178. He also refers to excerpts of the commentary under Section 32, item 16a, and 16e, 35-37.

169. Schwarz, *Die hebräischen* Section 32, no. 16.

170. For catalogue information on Berlin 119, currently SBB Ms. Or. Qu. 648, see Steinschneider, *Verzeichniss der Hebräischen Handschriften von Moritz Steinschneider in Die Handschriften-Verzeichnisse der Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin* (Berlin: Buchdruckerei der Königl. Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1878), Vol. II, 102-103. This manuscript is still a part of the Berlin library and now belongs to the Orientabteilung collection of the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preussischer Kulturbesitz (SBB).

171. Steinschneider, *Die Handschriften ...zu Berlin*, 102, no. 119 (Ms. Or. Qu. 648).

172. Hars Kurio, 1958/kk: *Letter to Parveen Hasanali*, 21 January, 1993, Orientabteilung SBB, Berlin.

173. The Stadtbibliothek Leipzig library were very helpful with information requested. I did not purchase a personal copy of the microfilm since it was to be ordered by the McGill libraries. Due to some reason, the microfilm was never received. In any case, this codex is very interesting and I hope to examine it further at a later date.

174. Delitzsch, *Codices Orientalum, Catalogus ...Lipsiensis*, No. 43, 308-311.
Zunz, *Additamenta*, 325-327.

175. Zunz, *Additamenta*, 326.

176. Steinschneider, *Die hebraeischen Handschriften der K. Hof Und Staatsbibliothek in Muenchen; Catalogus codicum manu scriptorum Bibliothecae Regiae Monacensis*. Tomi Primi Pars Prima Codices Hebraicos Complectens. Monachii A.M.D. CCC. LXXV. Prostat in Libraria Regia Palmiana. Rpt. (1970) Otto Harrasowitz. The McGill University Libraries have the reprints of all the other volumes in the series except for Vol. I on the catalogue of Hebrew manuscripts. I utilized the 1875 edition at JTS; Cod. 59/1, p. 26.

177. Johanan Alemanno was from a German family that migrated from Istanbul to Italy around 1490. He was a teacher of Count Pico della Mirandola. Cf. Zunz, *Gesammelte Schriften*, (1876; Heildesheim: G Olms, 1976), III:139. Steinschneider says that Ibn Tufayl and his commentator Moses Narboni were Alemanno's favourite writers (*Hebraische Bibliographie* XXI: 132; = *HB*). As per the practice, Alemanno used the initials of Ibn Tufayl's name as the acronym (A-B-B-T) for Abu Bekr ben Tofail (*HB* V:28). Steinschneider also notes that some of the Munich manuscripts used to belong to Pico della Mirandola. The [erudite] marginal notes in this manuscript might have arisen in learning or translating sessions between Alemanno and Pico.

178. Steinschneider, *Sitzungsberichte* (1875), 178, cited by Rehak, 26, no. 13. Rehak explains that codex 59 was in fact copied by three different people. He further notes that since it contains five different works, it is quite possible that the first part was written by an unknown copyist and the following pages of the same codex were written by another copyist. He ascribes the copyist of the Tufaylian narrative to be Jacob Ben Hayim.

179. Steinschneider, *Die hebraeischen ...in Muenchen*, Codd. Hebr. 272, p. 133.

180. Steinschneider, *Die hebraeischen ...in Muenchen*, 104.

181. We wrote to the library requesting further information on the manuscript but received no response. The current existence of the manuscript has been recorded in the JNUL catalogue.

182. Mortara, *Catalogo del Manoscritti Ebraic della Biblioteca della communita Israeilitica di Mantova*, compilato dal Rabbino Maggiore Mario Mortara. Livorno: Tipografia I. Cost e.c. 1878, 15.

183. J. B. de Rossi, *Mss. Codices hebraici*, II: Cod. 415/2, 34-35.

184. Rossi notes that another copy of the manuscript on *The Possibility* is also available in Leiden; cf. Steinschneider, *Catalogus ...Lugduno*, 283.

185. Rossi notes that a Hebrew manuscript of *The Possibility of Conjunction* also belonged to the library of Moses Raphaelis of Aguilar.

186. Wolf, *BH*, III: 15.

187. The Hebrew translation and commentary is now available in an English translation by Kalman Bland cited above.

188. J. B. de Rossi, *Mss. Codices hebraici*, II: Cod. 415/2, 34-35.

189. Rossi, Cod. 835, no. 7, p. 187.

190. See Gosudarstvennaia Biblioteka SSRi, *Catalogue of the Guenzburg Collection* (Moscow: Imprint, 1892); Abraham, Katsh, *Yigal hazon: hamishim shirim hadashim mi-tekufat Sefarad* (Jerusalem: M. Nyuman, 1964).

191. University of Cambridge, *A Catalogue of the Manuscripts Preserved in the Library of the University of Cambridge* (1856-67; Hildesheim/ New York: George Olms Verlag, 1979). This reprint does not contain the later Cambridge Add. series of manuscripts. With reference to DD. 4/1, it gives cross references to the Catalogue of Oriental Mss. We examined the catalogues by D. S. Margoliuth, *Catalogue of the Oriental Manuscripts in the Library of Eaton College* (Oxford, 1904) which is a description the Pote collection now on deposit at the Cambridge University Library, and *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Oriental MSS belonging to the late E. G. Browne*, completed and edited by R. A. Nicholson (Cambridge, 1932). Neither of these catalogue include descriptions of the codexes that are cross-referred.

However, I was able to examine the microfilm of the manuscripts and would like to especially thank Marion Stein of Microfilm Department in the Jewish Theological Seminary Library for making the necessary arrangements and obtaining permission from the British libraries to examine these and other manuscripts.

192. JNUL No. 15916. JTS Reel No. 127.

193. JTS Reel No. 127.

194. JNUL No. 17464.

195. JTS Reel No. 222.

196. JNUL No. 17459. JTS No. 221.

Chapter 5: The Hebrew Commentaries and their Commentator: the background, context and reception

Introduction

The Hebrew translation and commentary on Ibn Ṭufayl's narrative has reached us through a number of complete and partial manuscripts of a recension by Moses Narboni (d. 1362). The commentator includes a summary of Ibn Bājjah's *Tadbīr al-mutawāḥḥid* and cites important passages from the *Risālah al-wadā'*.¹

There are several versions of the Hebrew title, the most common being *Iggeret Haywān ben Yaqtān* (The Treatise of Hayy ibn Yaqzān). According to Narboni, the author (Ibn Ṭufayl) wanted to convey two things: the lifestyle of the hermit (*hanhagat ha-mityahed*) and the true meaning of union with the Active Intellect, which explains alternate titles of the Hebrew translation, such as *Iggeret ha debequt* (The Treatise on Union). It is these two central themes that reflect Narboni's integration of the rational and mystical facets in his commentary.

Moses Narboni's commentary is a response to the story of Hayy from the Judaic milieu. Narboni was among the first of a string of translators and commentators who found Ibn Ṭufayl's ideas conducive to their own religio-spiritual approaches. This chapter will analyze whether Moses Narboni's response can be placed at a junction between the Muslim falsafic context and the subsequent Christian Averroistic reception, sharing in both perspectives but differing from them as well.

The central themes evoked in the commentaries by Narboni include the notion of the solitary, the attainment of human perfection through union with the Active Intellect, and the inclusion of the spiritual element of kabbalistic thought within the philosophical system. Except for the application of kabbalah that is

particular to Jewish mysticism, these issues also play an important role in the Tufaylian narrative. Narboni's combination of kabbalistic thought with Greek philosophy is parallel to Ibn Ṭufayl's integration of the mystic path of sufism with the various systems of Greek thought. These central questions are likewise tied together by Narboni to his commentaries on the three major Muslim philosophers of the Maghrib - Ibn Bājjah, Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn Rushd.

The Maghribi philosophers were the inheritors and proponents of the falsafah tradition of their predecessors, including Kindī, Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. However, philosophy, as it developed among the Maghribi triad, has to be seen as an interconnected world-view, each thesis augmented by the other. The exclusion of any one of these contributors leads to a lacuna in the overall perspective. Thus, a major reason why European Averroism developed in a different tangent may be due to the removal of Ibn Rushd and his thought from the context within which it was written.² It might also be the reason why modern scholarship can link some of the ideas that became associated with Ibn Rushd, as being rooted in Ibn Ṭufayl.³

Moses Narboni recognized this inter-relativity and sought to redress the absence of the hermit in Ibn Rushd through his commentaries on Ibn Bājjah and Ibn Ṭufayl. Narboni tells us in his introduction that a major reason for writing the commentary on the Tufaylian narrative was to explore and complete the philosophies of Ibn Bājjah and Ibn Rushd, who do not fully develop the role of the mystic-ascetic in their works.⁴ Thus, the inclusion of the summary of the *Tadbīr* with the commentary on *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* was meant to accentuate the notion of the hermit in the Tufaylian narrative. The extraction of this summary from the whole context in which it was presented by Narboni has diluted the inter-related aspect.⁵ In reading Moses Narboni, the focus shifts to his perception and response to the works of Ibn Rushd and subsequently to the nature of his Aristotelianism.⁶ For this reason, one must recall his emphasis on the inter-relatedness of the Maghribi philosophers as well as the central theme of the hermit.

Such an analysis ultimately rests on Narboni's reception of the Muslim philosophers.⁷ It provides clues to Narboni's perception of Ibn Rushd, relative to the ideas of rational mysticism within the Maghribi milieu. A review of the discussions around Ibn Rushd and Averroism will indicate the 'inherited' background that formulate one's views of Narboni as the commentator of Ibn Rushd, and in what ways his works challenge such expectations.

The Hebrew commentaries put forward complementary yet contradictory aspects of their author, Moses Narboni. On the one hand, we have the notion of Narboni as the pure Aristotelian, and on the other, the Neoplatonic Mystic and student of the kabbalah. How does one reconcile these seemingly diverse views? are they groundless or is the assumed contradiction a reader-response?

The philosophical precepts

The reception of Ibn Ṭufayl and other Muslim philosophers within and outside their particular milieu also needs to be established. The particular reception of Aristotle in the Muslim milieu is pivotal to our understanding the themes discussed by the *falāsifah*. If Ibn Rushd was the *Commentator*, Fārābī was still the *Second Teacher*. Both of them formulated their responses within their own philosophical framework. For this reason, an understanding of their philosophies is framed in the cultural and religious context. In the case of Ibn Ṭufayl, the literary history of the Tufaylian narrative reflects the various ways in which a text can be received. A similar phenomenon occurs in the case of Ibn Rushd due to i) the power balance and specific social-political circumstances in the Maghrib;⁸ ii) the altercation with Ghazālī;⁹ and iii) the process of Averroism.¹⁰

At least three separate receptions may be recognized. The first draws from the Muslim milieu: what were the central issues addressed by its classical philosophers, and how were these received by the Maghribi triad? It is important to recognize the particular positions of the *falāsifah* within the Islamic context, especially regarding the immortality of the soul and the conjunction with the intellect. The absence of this understanding led to a second reception, in which

it was either assumed that the philosophical preoccupations were similar to the Christian milieu; or otherwise, the Muslim philosophers were viewed within the Greek mould that they had transformed, either by error or intention. The third reception in the Hebrew milieu shares characteristics both with the precedent philosophies that it transmitted and the subsequent Averroean reception. However, it remains more closely linked to the process of Averroism and shares its geographical base.

Debates on the immortality of the soul and the conjunction with the Active Intellect recur in all three milieus. Even when the philosophical issues appear the same, each reception is circumscribed by conceptual differences as well as external features, such as access to texts, translations and mis-attributions.

The background of the *falāsifah*

The inter-relatedness of the Maghribi philosophers also helps us recognize these philosophers as proponents of individualism, to whom the idea of mixing philosophy and politics was abhorrent, and appreciate the nuances in their particular systems. Such individualism can be identified with Ibn Bājjah¹¹ and Ibn Tufayl.¹² It is not self-evident in the scholarship on Ibn Rushd due to his association with monumental questions, such as his defense of philosophy, the exhaustive approach in his commentaries, his style of presentation, and his attempts to correct the adumbrations that had clouded the Aristotelian framework. These large and important issues that dominate the horizon when studying Ibn Rushd, marginalize the conceptual basis of the thinker as an individual.

The issue of "conjunction" was of immense practical importance in the religious debate. Farābī's views on conjunction and the immortality of the soul have been critiqued and possibly misrepresented. In the prologue to the Tufaylian narrative, Fārābī is reprimanded for his denial of the afterlife.¹³ The question being raised was whether the individual soul survives through conjunction, or is cognisant of its conjunction. This 'philosophical' question had major repercussions on religious beliefs. In the philosophies of Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, it

suggests the integration of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic philosophies. A distinction between Aristotelian and Neoplatonic philosophies rests on the difference in emphasis on "intellect" and "soul".

Mahmoud Kassem suggests that an ascription of the views of Ibn Ṭufayl to Ibn Rushd was responsible for the whole debate between Aquinas and the Averroists. Accordingly, Aquinas assigned the so-called Tufaylian theory, whereby the human can know God, the separated intelligences and attain conjunction with God, as Averroen. Kassem recognizes that this view is not peripatetic, but associated with Alexander of Aphrodisia, for whom the Active Intellect equalled God. While further linking the Muslim counterpart of such a view (Ibn Ṭufayl) with the "Ishrāqī" school of mysticism,¹⁴ Kassem fails to recognize that within the latter perspective, the Active Intellect was likened to the "Supreme Angel" and not God (discussed in chapter three).¹⁵ Ibn Ṭufayl as well uses the terms *shay'*, and in the section dealing with conjunction, he uses *dhāt* (essence) and *essences* (*dhawāt*) in relation to the spheres to emphasize their extrinsic nature.¹⁶

Despite Ghazālī's critique, the question of the individual immortality was not resolved. Both Ibn Rushd and Averroism shifted the role of the individual philosopher, through the notion of graded knowledge for the philosopher and the populace. This, however was not a new approach in the falsafic milieu. What made it such a contentious issue? The contentious aspect must be sought in the Averroistic debate discussed further below.

The notion of the double verity was the premise of the interpreters of Ibn Rushd rather than an outcome of *falsafic* discussions.¹⁷ The theoretical frame of Fārābī combined a hierarchy of intellects with a process of emanation. This intellectual frame can help us understand why the separation of the two different truths was not integral to the Muslim milieu. In the *falsafic* discussions, especially with Fārābī, the application of a hierarchy and a difference of knowledge is resolvable within the process of emanation, which encouraged the attainment of conjunction while maintaining the demarcation between the human and the divine.

In other words, the ultimate oneness of the Truth was assured, despite the difference in function between the language of the philosopher and the language of the populace. The prophet conveyed this truth through images used by revelation. This same truth was also the ultimate goal of the philosopher. In this way, the rational 'quest' of the philosopher was rendered with a spiritual dimension, beyond theoretical precepts.¹⁸ Even outside the notion of emanation as in Ibn Rushd, the basic precept was the same truth, and not two different truths. The discussion of this issue by Ibn Rushd has to be seen within the prior history and the 'resolution of difference' within the Muslim milieu.

Another issue that plagued the Maghribi triad even more than their philosophical predecessors was the role of the philosopher-mystic. Given the different modes of knowledge, what happens to the individual philosopher? Does s/he play a role within society or is his presence obliterated within a given society, whose norms do not recognize other modes of knowledge? Each of the three philosophers answer them partially. In general terms, Ibn Bājjah saw the philosopher as a "weed" within society, Ibn Tufayl sought withdrawal from society for his philosopher, and Ibn Rushd recognized separate but compatible categories or "ways" within society. All three responses are governed by the notion of "conjunction" (*ittiṣāl*) of the individual with the Active Intellect and the ensuing attainment of happiness. This perspective formulates their discussion within a demonstrative frame.

A central concept in Islamic philosophy was the notion of the Agent Intellect. Starting from Aristotle's *Nous poietikos*, Ibn Sīnā and Fārābī see it as a separated intellect, extrinsic to the human intellect (contrary to Aquinas), without identifying it with God (as did Alexander of Aphrodisias and subsequent Averroists). Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā made this Intellect a being from emanation, thus including the gnostic aspect in Islamic philosophy.¹⁹ Thus, the Aristotelian rationalism was transferred to a scheme whose central pivot was the attainment of happiness. Fārābī interposed the "imaginative faculty" between sensation and the rational soul. This allowed for the notion of revelation as an "imitation" of the

rational and the practical modes.²⁰ Guttman aptly refers to this combination as "emanationist Aristotelians."²¹ The Islamic philosophers also transformed the peripatetic idea of the soul as a form of the organic body, assigning this as just one aspect of its function and not its principle.²² Thus, they recast the Aristotelian concept of the intellect and the Neoplatonic notions of the soul. Here lies the foundations of Ibn Ṭufayl's rational mysticism, as well as the harmony between reason and revelation.

The attack by Ghazālī led to a reformulation by Ibn Rushd. It is in Christian Europe that this reformulation became "the double truth" ascribed to Averroes.²³ Leaman indicates that Averroes emphasized a difference between religious and philosophical language, but insisted that both described the same reality - "With Averroes we have one truth and a number of versions designed for a number of audiences."²⁴ In recognizing how the dominance of Averroism and the post-thirteenth reception of Aristotle continues to define current scholarship, the background to the individual resolutions by the *falāsifah* becomes especially consequential. This view is being further tested within the cultural context and the textual corpus of Ibn Rushd's works.²⁵

Further, the larger common issues have often precluded the smaller individual approaches and resolutions. The question as to how one reconciles individual attainment with universal philosophical concepts evinced varied responses. Abū al-Barakāt (d. ca. 560/1164) assigned an agent intellect for each individual (like Aquinas), but this was a "separated intellect" and not just a faculty immanent to the individual. This resolution freed the individual from the norms and authorities of the world. In pragmatic terms, it also promotes a notion of radical freedom.²⁶ It further responds to both the religious and the philosophical concerns, making the individual immortal, but freeing this immortality from association with the contingent. The most challenging and original philosophies were rendered by Abu Bakr al-Razī (d. 925 or 932) in his concept of world-soul and individual responsibility. Rāzī's philosophies are universal and enduring in practical philosophy, but their radical nature and rejection of prophets (and

concurrent affirmation of individual autodidacticism!) challenge the normative frame.²⁷

The overall concern with sources undermines the 'originality' of the individual writers and their particular reception of these sources. Writers receive their sources and their background assumptions within the expectation of their times. In Ibn Ṭufayl's reception by Moses Narboni, Ibn al-Khaṭīb and Ibn Rushd, one is able to recover the aspect of rational mysticism, that is obliterated in later analysis by the lack of recognition of the inter-relatedness of the Maghribi philosophers. The views of Muslim intellectuals in relation to systems of philosophy were mediated within the religious culture of its adherents. The philosophical bases were the framework for their own metaphysical systems. This background explains Ibn Rushd's 'rationalism' and the reasons why he strove for the recognition of philosophy within the normative frame. Certainly, the consideration of Ibn Rushd as a Muslim theologian, a legalist and a peripatetic philosopher reflect his immense attempt to reconcile philosophy with the religious world-view that was dear to him. Within this overall perspective of including theological texts like the *Manāḥij*, we see discussions on afterlife, puzzling to scholars like Merlan who are able to discern the problems within Ibn Rushd's 'Aristotelianism' but are unfamiliar with the concerns of Muslim theology and the falsafah in the Muslim context.²⁸

In search of the "pure" Aristotle, some questions of individual attainment were risqué, or so it appeared to Aquinas. The debates in medieval Christianity (and Averroism) over the immortality of the soul and the distinctions between reason and revelation had been earlier discussed by the falāsifah, theologians and legal scholars. Their comparative relevance and the unique solutions rendered in the Muslim milieu were incorporated into the works of the philosophers. These texts were transformed into another social and religious framework, where the same issues were addressed but the particular context of their reiteration was lost. Further, the reception of Ibn Rushd in the Christian west, whether in the form of approving or disparaging Averroism, rested on partial interpretations of Ibn

Rushd.²⁹ In other words, the resolutions by the Muslim philosophers were measured against a standardized Aristotle, ignoring the responses to him by the Muslim falāsifah.

Averroism revisited

The debate on recovering the true Averroes has had significant voices in the twentieth century. The question of Averroism and the conceptual shift from Islamic philosophy begin with the Hebrew translations. Thus, the process and premises of such a shift may be seen within the background of the Hebrew commentaries on Ibn Rushd and Ibn Tufayl. The consideration of the Hebrew transmissions add a new dimension to the issues that have been widely discussed outside this context. It is interesting to see how Ibn Rushd and Ibn Tufayl were received in the Jewish milieu, specifically by Moses Narboni, and to examine further the reception of these commentaries by modern reader-critics.

The Averroistic debate is an example of the total transformation that occurs through reception in a new context. One might be able to reveal the development of the distinct phenomenon of rational mysticism by focusing on the common issues relevant to the Averroistic and Narbonian reception of Aristotelianism. The partial or misguided interpretations of Averroes have been questioned in the revisionist analyses by Philip Merlan, Mohammed Kassem, and Ovey Mohammed. By tracing where and how the shifts occurred through the Narbonian reception, one may also be able to recover the channels of transmission between Ibn Tufayl and Ibn Rushd, or from Ibn Tufayl --> Ibn Rushd --> Moses Narboni --> Averroism.

There are almost as many receptions of Ibn Rushd in the history of philosophy as there are critiques. Some of these critiques are ultimately irreconcilable due to the specific features of their reception that define their basic premises. Just as the dispute on the immortality of the soul between the Averroists and Anti-Averroists dissipated in the Christian debates, so can Averroism now be reviewed as a specific historical phenomenon. Renan and Asín

Palacios opened the Averroistic reception of Ibn Rushd to discussion. The early study by Asín Palacios suggested that the views presented by Averroes were coincident with Aquinas, even though the latter may have reacted against him based on his partial access.³⁰ Yet, the question of the Aristotelianism in Muslim philosophy still provokes polemical debate. This tension remains because of the inability to view Ibn Rushd in any context other than Aristotelian, or rather as reflecting a preconceived view of Aristotle.

In addition to his commentaries on Aristotle, Ibn Rushd wrote several works showing how Fārābī and especially Ibn Sīnā had departed from Aristotle's genuine teachings.³¹ Ibn Rushd's revival of Aristotelianism and its particular impact delimit all views on the thinker. Such receptions further obfuscate the difference between the Christian and Muslim religious and philosophical frameworks. Even with the reclamation of Ibn Rushd, the lingering and predominant Aristotelianism remains the prevalent basis of analyses. All his attempts at 'reconciling' *sharī'ah* and *falsafah* are often explained as a difference between theology and philosophy, or the use of rhetoric.³²

The hypothesis one draws from Ibn Rushd's style also needs to be further examined. Some interesting issues raised are the 'objectivity' and 'fidelity' of the commentator. Current critical analyses reject the possibility of objectivity. The process of reception is prevalent at some level, individually and collectively. The objective hypothesis, presented by Ibn Rushd himself and further reinforced by the style of his writings, often makes it difficult to perceive him outside the prevalent Aristotelian frame, or value his theological presuppositions, other than as a reaction or a reconciliation.

Current scholarship on the phenomenon of Latin Averroism itself indicates that it was a varied movement with at least two distinct phases occurring respectively in the twelfth and the sixteenth centuries.³³ After a contentious debate extending from the twelfth to the sixteenth century, there were two major interpretations of Aristotle on the soul: the *Latin Averroists*, who maintained that the intellect was not individual but one for all humans and was immortal, and the

Alexandrists (since their views coincided with Alexander of Aphrodisias) who, like Aquinas, made the possible intellect the power of each soul but like the Averroists, denied the personal immortality of the soul.³⁴

In his study on *Averroes' Doctrine of Immortality*, Mohammed discusses the issues surrounding the immortality of the individual soul and its assumed denial by Ibn Rushd. Mohammed's study is representative of the re-examination of Ibn Rushd in a context that includes its Greek precedents, its articulation in Muslim civilization, and its reception in Latin scholastics. Mohammed suggests several possibilities that led to the inimical association of extreme Aristotelian rationalism with Averroes.

The Christian theological background received Ibn Rushd's concepts of intellect and soul within its own set of expectations. Within his context, Aquinas considered the soul and intellect as one, multiple and individual, even though they are the form and perfection of the human body. To the theologians, the individual intellect was tied in to the integrity of human personality. Averroes' position suggested the disclamation of personal immortality, and thus, no reward and punishment in the after-life.³⁵ Thus, the Christian theologians' defense of the individual intellect was based on the assumption that the Averroen stance on the intellect was identical to theirs. Likewise, the Averroists surmised that if all humans shared in one intellect, they also share in one soul, because the soul was a power of the intellect. Both the orthodox Christian theologians and the Latin Averroists received the texts of Averroes within similar religio-cultural paradigms, by associating his doctrine of the intellect with the doctrine of the soul.

However, Muslim philosophers did not fully subscribe to the soul as the power of the intellect. One aspect of the soul was its association with human corporeality. In another way, it was associated with the "separated" intellect, thus eternal, perfect and not circumscribed by corporeality.

Transferred, as Averroes was, from the Arabic world with its Islamic background to the Latin world of medieval Christianity, it is no wonder that he evoked in the minds of his readers associations and meanings foreign to his thought.³⁶

Another central question is whether the difference between the Jewish and Christian reception of Ibn Rushd might have arisen from the access to texts.³⁷ Two points may be highlighted here: i) the complete Hebrew translations of Ibn Rushd's major works had been available to Narboni and other Jewish scholars, but had not been accessible either to Aquinas or the early Averroists;³⁸ ii) the Hebrew translations hold an intermediary position between the Arabic text and the later dissipation of the Scholastic-Averroistic debate.³⁹ It is thus problematic to assess the Hebrew translators in the same manner as the Latin. Yet, it is important to recognize the Hebrew reception as a contributing link to the transmission of Averroism.

Ibn Rushd and his doctrine of the soul may also be re-examined i) within the overall context of his works, some of which were not accessible to scholastics, ii) whether the Averroen texts of the Latin corpus imply a particular doctrine of the soul that opened the debate among the theologians and the Averroists, and iii) in relation to his use of commentators such as Themistius, and its correlation to rational mysticism. A re-examination of the Latin texts, without the ideological preponderance of either the Averroist or anti-Averroist camps, may suggest that there is no explicit denial of personal immortality. It is probable that the reception of Ibn Rushd's commentary on the *De Anima* is based on its particular "reading" in the Christian west.⁴⁰

Keeping in mind the difference in concepts between the Muslim philosophers, the Christian theologians and the Averroists, can Ibn Rushd be viewed as a 'rational' mystic? Can the human move from mortality to immortality? Given that the human is connected to the sensible world, how can s/he transcend such a limit? What happens to the human intellect in conjunction, does it retain cognisance? The notion of rational mysticism arises from the last

question. Conjunction itself was not denied, but its retention by the human intellect was the debate on which both prophethood and intellectual bliss rested.

Merlan's study, *Monopsychism mysticism and metaconsciousness* addresses the question of rational mysticism and its association with Ibn Rushd, drawing primarily from the Latinized Averroes. It questions the assumed rationale of the whole debate in Christian Europe between the Averroists and their opposers. Merlan applies a 'recovering' of Averroes' use of rational-mystical notions, derived from the Greek corpus and transmitted through the Latin Averroistic texts.⁴¹

To begin with the premise "rational mysticism" and the concurrent terms that it constitutes, Merlan notes

Monopsychism, mysticism and metaconsciousness - these three terms indicate why man can and should divinize himself thus reaching full statute as man, and the road leading to the goal of becoming divine.⁴²

Can the human experience union with the divine, and thus be divinized? The conventional answer given by translators like Simon Ockley (discussed in the following chapter) was that the Beatific vision was limited to the afterlife.

Merlan further discusses Ibn Rushd's notion of the speculative intelligences. The human intelligence, likened to the speculative intelligence, is transformed when 'activated' by the potential intellect. It thus becomes "iminortal" and is at the same time "mortal" by being dependent on the body. It is the aim and "destiny" of the potential intellect to transform human thinking to attain wisdom. Thus, the Active intelligence needs the human intelligences when actualized. However, since no one human mind is capable of containing "all the imaginative forms", because humankind is varied and not all are endowed with wisdom, Merlan associates this notion with collective immortality of the human race.⁴³ Merlan suggests that individual immortality based on individual "progress" could be enjoyed by only a few, whereas the notion of collective immortality means "that the human race as a whole thinks uninterruptedly

everything that is thinkable, therefore the human race as a whole possesses wisdom."⁴⁴ Merlan's analyses of the Averroen texts on the concept of conjunction is most interesting. He observes the seeming paradox in Ibn Rushd who allowed the divinization of the human in this life and yet denied the immortality of the human soul in afterlife.⁴⁵

The so-called denial arises from the extrinsic, non-corporeal, non-individuated (at least in the final analysis) notion of the soul. The basic premise is that the human soul in its conjunction with the active (abstract) intelligibles is thus transformed into the active intelligibles. This process of union described in Themistius is cited by Ibn Rushd as "divination". The purpose of the abstract intelligences is to attain union, thus at no given time is the human race deprived of this conjunction, even though it takes place some times in some individuals.⁴⁶ Further, Merlan indicates that Ibn Rushd derives his concept of union from Alexander. However, he does not discuss the distinct differences between Alexander and Themistius.

To a degree, the above notion is parallel to *al-insān al-kāmil*, *walī*, or *imām*, and the perfection attained by Ḥayy. The notion of conjunction of the extrinsic, separated intelligences is not irreconcilable with Islamic mysticism. The notion of *fanā'* indicates this loss of individualism in conjunction. The integrity of union is maintained by the paired notion of *baqā'*. Similarly, the concept of *fiṭrah* that is central to the Tufaylian narrative, is also extrinsic and of the higher order of things. It inheres in the human soul, but is *god-endowed* and not a human faculty.

Despite being established on universals, Ibn Rushd's concept of union has striking parallels to mystical thought in Merlan's discussion. The human mind becomes the productive intelligence in the act of union. That which is perishable becomes imperishable, because "in the moment of union human intelligence simply disappears (or is annihilated), and thus the union takes place not between the human intelligence as such, but rather between the possible and productive

intelligence".⁴⁷

The Averroen Narboni

Narboni and other Jewish translators and commentators (such as the famed Qalonymous triad)⁴⁸ may be placed in the critical juncture between the Maghribi philosophers and Latin Averroism. Moses Narboni approaches the issues from the perspective of Jewish philosophy, arising from the falsafah tradition. They are further tinged with the concurrent kabbalistic mysticism, and the background of the early teachers and sages of the Jewish tradition, as discussed for example in his commentary on the *Shi'ur Qomah*.⁴⁹

In our concern for the process of transmission, some points become clear. The text, whether partial or complete, suggested certain responses to the interpreters. The assumption that the discussions of the different camps are uniform or in concurrence is problematic. We have various "receptions" that address the same issues but from different stances. These particular stances are not always deliberative, but sometimes received within the particular set of expectations.

The works of Jewish philosophers like Moses Narboni may allow us to re-evaluate the European phenomenon of Averroism. Studying one of its early beginnings in Narboni can "demonumentalize" the manner in which Ibn Rushd was perceived in the Latin west, and provide clues as to whether it would be valid to re-assess Ibn Rushd as a 'rational mystic'.⁵⁰ These traces of rational mysticism might be seen as early as the beginning of Ibn Rushd's transmission by Moses Narboni, and not just through the later reception by the Alexandrists. It is thus possible to recover the integral notion of rational mysticism through this channel. It is also in this respect that the notion of Narboni as an Aristotelian, stemming from Averroes being considered the representative Aristotelian, is brought to question.

The other question that one might raise regarding Narboni is his response to the central issues, specific to the Jewish context of reception. The issues

surrounding the possibility of conjunction of the human intellect with the Active Intellect and the immortality of the human soul are also addressed by Moses Narboni in his commentaries. The notion of Narboni as the confirmed Aristotelian springs from his role as a disciple and commentator of Ibn Rushd, *the Commentator of Aristotle*.⁵¹ This *ipso facto* assumption has to be tested within the terms of the Jewish reception.

Two primary notions still dominate the background which hold potential for new interpretations: i) that Aristotelian thought is devoid of any form of mysticism, a view that is countermanded by the variety of ways in which the *De Anima* and *Ethics* have been received within the religious traditions of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic world;⁵² ii) that the extreme burden of rationalism should be on the shoulders of the commentator.⁵³

Blaustein, in his analysis of Moses Narboni's commentary on Ibn Rushd's *Possibility of Conjunction*, indicates the similarities and differences between the views of Ibn Rushd and Moses Narboni. He sees both as indicating some doubt on fully realizing "conjunction" in this life, due to very different reasons.⁵⁴ One major difference that he focuses on is the question of style.⁵⁵

These two issues of "conjunction" and "immortality" get skewed together because of the assumed association of the intellect and the soul. It is reflected in Blaustein's ascription of the denial of conjunction to Fārābī, probably confusing it with the so-called Farabian denial of after-life: "L'origine de la discussion se trouve en partie dans l'affirmation bien connue selon laquelle le philosophe du 10e siècle al-Fārābī avait dénié la possibilité de la conjonction et en conséquence, la possibilité de l'immortalité ou de toute autre perfection spirituelle."⁵⁶ Pines discusses Fārābī's affirmation of intellectual illumination whereby the potential intellect in humans can be transformed to the intellect in act and the acquired intellect, that is close to the Active Intellect. However, the human can aspire even further and attain union with the Active Intellect. This state is perfected in the Philosopher-Prophet.⁵⁷ Fārābī's transformation of Aristotelianism with his emanative cosmology is his major resolution of individual human and universal

inter-relation, on which his central system of the Intellect is based. Beside the human error, Blaustein draws from the background assumptions of Averroism.

While discussing the Narbonian commentary, Blaustein considers the difference in stance might arise from the method of application. He sees Narboni as dealing with the practical aspects in his commentary, whereas Ibn Rushd approaches it rhetorically, that is to say, "not simply to define the nature of perfection or to establish the possibility of immortality, but also to assure the right of philosophy to exist in the Islamic community. His discussion on conjunction thus also constitutes an indirect defense of philosophy."⁵⁸

Blaustein indicates that Ibn Rushd, within the mode of rhetoric, lists on one side the arguments which favour the possibility and necessity of conjunction. At the metaphysical level, the Averroean analysis appears to establish that there is no place for the possibility of conjunction, since it presupposes the perfection of the intellect *in habitu*. As Moses Narboni explains it, conjunction would require the realization of complete and all possible knowledge in the soul.⁵⁹

Ibn Rushd may use the mode of rhetoric as a primary basis, thus obviating the discussion as a personal philosophy. However, the recognition of style as contributing to 'meaning' has also been discussed in the above chapter in terms of genre. It is an important 'sign' that demarcates the Averroean frame of discussion. Ibn Rushd's thought needs to be studied further, especially with regard to his choice of style and the reader-response to it.

Does the Judaic reception suggest that conjunction is impossible in the Averroean context? Paradoxically, this does not seem to be the case. Here again, Ibn Rushd is presented in a light that challenges the notions of scholastics. Like Merlan, Blaustein also stands in the same camp, i.e. addressing the question primarily as a student of Aristotle, and looking at Ibn Rushd as the commentator, but with one difference - Moses Narboni.

In comparison with Ibn Rushd, Blaustein considers that Narboni is not preoccupied with harmonizing the views of religion and philosophy, or with the application of "rhetoric". The statement requires clarification. Perhaps, one might

say that Narboni does not perceive a dialectic between religion and philosophy, nor does he see the need to demonstrate their compatibility in apodeictic terms. If such a dialectic is not prevalent in his time, his reception of the two subject areas is not bound by a defensive stance. However, Narboni identifies his own philosophy (as opposed to his empathic response to Ibn Rushd) precisely in terms of a harmony between religion and philosophy.⁶⁰ The application of peripatetic principles that view the harmonization as a philosophical or a political issue ignores the spiritual facet that inspires such an enterprise.

How can one assume a difference between the views of Averroes and Narboni, due to the latter's grounding in Jewish religion, and yet ignore the context of Ibn Rushd's works, viewing him as an Aristotelian imitation! The prevalence of Greek, especially Aristotelian philosophy, as the basis of western civilization makes critics reject or marginalize other modes of its reception and inter-action in Islamic and Indian civilizations.

Blaustein feels that Narboni lays restrictions on conjunction in practice. While being faithful to the text and adhering to the objectives set by Averroes, Narboni reveals his divergent views on the question of individual conjunction. If conjunction is a state of total union as Ibn Rushd purportedly indicates, then there is no individual consciousness. Narboni alludes to the possibility that certain aspects of individuality can be conserved during conjunction and rejects the view that all suspension of senses is necessary.⁶¹ He cites Maimonides' passage from *The Guide* (3: 51) that the human can realize a continuous state of intellectual union with God, without impeding his devotion to his daily occupations.

This perspective is also arrived at by Hayy. Ibn Tufayl however indicates that it requires a form of temperance and a humanistic response to one's surrounding. Hayy discovers that total abstention is harmful to body and soul, and thus advocates the middle way of moderation.⁶² Narboni maintains a distinction between the individual and God. The individual can attain conjunction in this life, but not total unity.⁶³ This concords with the Tufaylian perspective, where Hayy is able to increase the periods of 'perception', but bodily needs break the cycle.

Thus, a major aspect of the problem is not only the question of conjunction, but whether conjunction is possible in this life and whether 'individual' immortality is preserved in the afterlife.

The Jewish translators and commentators of Arabic texts into Hebrew and Latin and their response to the question of the immortality of the soul provide a link to the changing reception of Averroistic ideas. Thus, the linking transmission of the Tufaylian narrative and its reception by Jewish thought, as well as through other Hebrew commentaries on Ghazālī, Ibn Bājjah and Ibn Rushd provide an inkling of the process of change that occurs through different channels of reception. Within the Jewish context, "Narboni était devenu une sorte de passage obligé pour tous les savants juifs médiévaux désireux de se familiariser avec les trésors de la pensée philosophique musulmane".⁶⁴

Narboni and Rational Mysticism

Mysticism becomes the vehicle that allows for a possibility that the rational notion of conjunction with the active intellect might be applicable to at least a partial religious understanding of individual immortality and the afterlife of the soul. I use the term 'rational mysticism' to indicate a mode of applying the rational frame of philosophy, its precepts and ideals, to notions of individual spirituality and mysticism. It may or may not be applied to particular religious systems, but is connected to religious systems in medieval philosophy, especially in the case of the *falsafah*. A general characteristic of rational mysticism is its combination of the systems of Neo-Platonic and Aristotelian thought, strongly influenced by commentaries on Plato and Aristotle. A particular characteristic, which would differ according to the primary religious base of a society, is the integration of the ideas of sufism. The prevalence of the 'rational' or the 'mystical' might also differ, as for example in Ibn Bājjah and Ibn Tufayl. In Ibn Tufayl, the precedence of the mystical aspect is clear. At one level, it appears that the 'mystical' is the crown of the rational development, but at another level, it is the starting point, the *shay' al-ʿarīf* in Ibn Tufayl's words, or the *fiṭrah*.⁶⁵ Thus, one final

characteristic of 'rational mysticism' is its subjectivity, by which I simply mean that the individual is an active player and the 'object' of knowledge is personal and experiential. This subjectivity does not exclude the extrinsic, non-corporeal and non-individuated aim of the rational mystic.

In examining the commentaries by Moses Narboni, one cannot help being aware of the mystical strain that runs through his perspective. The harmonization of the rational and the mystical is most clearly expressed in the section on Hayy's ascension.⁶⁶ Speaking of *ittiṣāl*, Fakhry indicates that Ibn Rushd also associates it with eternal bliss.⁶⁷ One problem in the debate on Ibn Rushd is that the *Treatise on the Conjunction of the Active Intellect* is only available in Hebrew. Vajda has indicated to us the cultural and conceptual transformations that sometimes accompany even the most literal translation of Arabic texts into Hebrew. Vajda sees these misinterpretation as arising from a loss of "cultural milieu", and also expressing the mode in which the Jewish scholar operated.⁶⁸ This further underlines the caution required in applying either Aristotelianism to Ibn Rushd based on his commentaries, or validating Averroes based primarily on Hebrew and Latin translations. Recognizing the commentator as a recipient and respondent to a particular system of thought, and assuming the *value* of these *reworkings* on what has been already said and established, allows one to appreciate the commentators and the 'reading' of the original texts that are reiterated.

Hayoun remarks (in a footnote) that the interest placed on the conjunction with the agent intellect permits one to think that mysticism and Averroism are not totally incompatible, and speaks of a "mystique de l'intelligible".⁶⁹ Hayoun considers Narboni as a "confirmed Averroist" who subsequently viewed all the thinkers he studied within this frame.⁷⁰ Despite his creative and mystical interpretation of Jewish biblical scriptures and his application of kabbalistic thought, Narboni is viewed within the frame-work of Averroism. Narboni's mystical interpretation of scriptures are hard to avoid, but it is probable that he had problems with the kabbalah toward the end of his career, as expressed in his last work on the *Guide*.⁷¹ Hayoun also suggests that Narboni's early works,

especially tinged with kabbalistic influences, were due to its popularity during the period. Scholars like Scholem sometimes speak of the kabbalah and Jewish mysticism as inter-changeable.⁷² Yet, Narboni's mysticism is not just of the kabbalistic strain. His response against the extremes of kabbalah, or more precisely, some of its adherents, does not entail a rejection of mysticism. In fact, the influence of Ibn Ezra and Ibn Waqār, both of whom were absorbed with the connection between Neoplatonic mysticism and Aristotelianism is another testimony to Narboni's rational mysticism. One might also compare the degree to which Narboni's works are related to Joseph Albo (1380-1444), a staunch Averroist versus Ibn Ezra and Ibn Waqār in order to discern the nuances in Narboni's reception of Ibn Rushd. Narboni's commentaries on Ibn Rushd indicate his effort at this "harmonization" of philosophy and mysticism.

Blaustein, as well, does not apply the notion of rational mysticism to Narboni, but he considers that the commentary on Ibn Rushd supports the "possibility" of conjunction. What he sees Ibn Rushd as successfully doing is making the question of conjunction one that philosophy needs to pose and one that its students need to reflect on.⁷³ In my view, this also means the exercising of the methods of rational mysticism.

In his commentary on *Hayy*, Narboni draws a parallel with the inaugural mysticism of Ezekiel and the cosmological scheme of the kabbalistic *sefirot*.⁷⁴ Narboni's works present a unique combination between the two types of early mysticism in Judaism. The first type is derived from *merkavah* (chariot) and *heikhalot* (palaces) literature inspired by the imagery of Ezekiel in the Bible. It is traced back to the teachings of the *tannaim* or the early Jewish teachers in second century Palestine, although the texts that have come down are of much later date.⁷⁵ The second type of mysticism derives from the early *kabbalah* (tradition) movement that is generally considered to have emerged in the last two decades of the twelfth century in Southern France, in proximity to the Provençal Rabbinic centre, the locus of the Hebrew philosophical translations.⁷⁶

The question of gnostic origins in the emergence of the early *kabbalah* such as the question of gnostic origins has been greatly debated.⁷⁷ Even though the nature of early *kabbalah* may be classified as gnostic phenomena, no parallels have been found between the *Sefer ha-Bahir* (*The Book of Brilliance*) that marks its beginnings, and ancient gnostic works. "The content of these [gnostic] sources and their precise path of transmission is still a mystery."⁷⁸ Gnostic elements such as dualistic imagery and the mythology of divine evil become prevalent only in the later Lurianic *kabbalah* of sixteenth century Palestine.⁷⁹

Analyzing Narboni's references to his sources (whom he refers to as *hakmeh ha-kabbalah* - *Sages of the Kabbalah*) might also clarify or add new dimensions to the scholarship around unresolved questions over the [gnostic] sources of early *kabbalah*.⁸⁰ What is interesting to this author is the application by Narboni of aspects that are central to early *kabbalah*, in terms of its *content*, the citation of *sources* and channels of *transmission*. As observed in the last chapter, Narboni hailed from a Provençal family that migrated to Spain at the time when the early *kabbalah* was an emergent movement in France. Narboni's move to Spain also transfers these early kabbalistic notions, in terms of sources and channels of transmission that remain representative of the early *kabbalah*. His mysticism, explicated in the commentary on *Hayy*, reflects an interesting combination of the early "oriental" mysticism of the *merkavah* and the early *kabbalah*. Further, what is most interesting in Narboni's commentary is his application of the cosmology of the philosophers to the mysticism of the *kabbalah*, specifically the notion of the *sefirot*.

One of Narboni's early works was a commentary (1343) on the *Shi'ur Qomah* (Measure of Divine Stature), a much debated midrashic (exegetical) Hebrew text with prevalent anthropomorphic descriptions of God. The *Shi'ur Qomah* is a text based on the physical description of the divine lover in the *Songs of Songs* of the Bible. Early *kabbalah* drew from the rich symbolism of the text. The symbolism of the *kabbalah* emphasized that the description of the Creator's

limbs should not be taken literally but understood in an esoteric, interior and mystical sense.⁸¹ However, the blatant anthropomorphic description of the *Shi'ur Qomah* meant that it had to be "explained" away. Maimonides strongly critiqued its anthropomorphism and Sa'adya attempted to explain it rationally.⁸² Descriptive literalism can be elaborated by mystical symbolism. However, symbols cannot be 'explained' in discursive terms.⁸³ Narboni's commentary gives us a combination of the two approaches and thus, a rational-mystical interpretation.

The central symbolic characteristic of the kabbalah is that of the ten *sefirot* (sing. *sefirah*). It is a difficult term to translate. It has the root meaning of "enumeration" and "boundary". As a concept, it first appears in the *Sefer Yeşirah* (Book of Creation), a cosmological work that is also described as a book of numbers and letters, probably written during the fourth century c.e. Some of the terms used in this work have parallels to *heikhalot* and *merkevah* literature based on the Biblical vision of Ezekiel, but its cosmology has no precedent. The early notion of the *sefirot* probably denotes "numeral", as in the *Book of Creation* where they represent ten extremities in a three dimensional world of space, time and morality.⁸⁴

The notion of *sefirah* becomes integral during the period of early kabbalah, just prior to Narboni's time. In the early kabbalah, the notion of *sefirot* is transformed into a series of *emanations* comprising the divine realm and separating the created worlds of angels, celestial bodies and earth from the hidden God ('Ayn Sof = No End). However, the *sefirot* are the inner workings of the Divine itself and not separate from Him.⁸⁵ Many of its elements are derived from Neoplatonic theologies and the metaphor of emanating light is often utilized. The kabbalistic symbols communicate mystical truth through language and numbers. The ten *sefirot* thus have numerical as well as symbolic connotation. The symbolic meaning is derived from the mystical interpretation of biblical and other sacred texts. The system of the *sefirot* thus differs from other philosophical and

Narboni brings together the philosophical pattern of the ten spheres, current to his own Aristotelian [and Averroen] philosophy with the *merkavah* mysticism and the kabbalistic symbolism that he knew so well. He succeeds in combining these philosophies rather than merely drawing parallels. Narboni is considered among the first Jewish thinker who makes a correspondence between the ten spheres of emanative cosmology with the ten sefirot, and further relates the spheres in terms of the mystical interpretation of Scriptural texts and commentaries. Ibn Waqār had formulated a harmonistic view that may have been a source of inspiration for Narboni. However, Narboni goes further in coordinating the *sefirot*, the separate intellect of the philosophers, and the spheres or celestial souls of the astronomers. In his commentary on the *Maqāṣid*, Narboni also relates the attribute of the *sefirah* with the corresponding sphere.⁸⁷

Vajda discusses the section of the Hebrew commentary that deals with Narboni's interconnection of the kabbalistic themes of the *sefirot* (spheres) and Hayy's ascent. In this instance, he deals with the ingenuous way in which the commentator relates Hayy's mystical ascent to kabbalistic thought. This section of the commentary is in relation to Hayy's ascent in the Tufaylian narrative, where the spheres are described by Ibn Ṭufayl as the "mirrors".⁸⁸

The first three *sefirot* cannot be apprehended by themselves. Narboni alludes that the other seven were apprehended only by Moses. Narboni correlates the seven separated intellects to the mystical interpretation of the sprinkling that the Priest performs on the Day of Atonement in Jewish religiosity. Thus, Narboni explains the festive rituals and commandments (*mitzvot*) of Jewish faith in terms of a mystical interpretation. He also explains the Jewish custom of counting eight when the requirement is seven, as "one is always separated from the seven for it symbolizes the first three who constitute a stage unique in being."




Figure 2: A modern artistic rendition of the sefirot by James R. Russell

The seven are also likened to the seven *heikhalot* (palaces), "seven altars" and other biblical and midrashic (commentaries) passages. They are divided into three worlds - of the intellect, the soul and the body - the first upto *bīnah*, the second upto *tiferet* and the third from *nezah* to *malkut*. This, says Narboni, is an explanation of the hierarchy of being ⁸⁹

In this manner, Narboni also relates the *sefirot* to the separated intellects and the spheres. In the Tufaylian narrative, the supreme sphere is described as that beyond which there is no more body, which possesses an immaterial essence exempt from matter, which is like the image of the sun reflected on a polished

mirror, and which is neither sun, nor mirror, nor anything different from one or the other. Hayy's conjunction is thus the identification of his essence with the Essence, while knowing at the same time that it is not quantifiable. Accordingly, each of the lower spheres are described as a reflection of the higher order, but connected to it as the image in a mirror.⁹⁰

Narboni gives the example of Psalm 13: 1 as an explanation of the octacord (8) being the sign of the messianic age. He also relates the verse to the eight sefirah (*hod*) in descending order which is described in the *Zohar* as the "translucid stone", thus connecting it to a stage in the "mirrors" or spheres in the Tufaylian text.⁹¹

Narboni further notes that the views of Ibn Ṭufayl are in agreement with Ibn Rushd who teaches that the celestial corpus is a simple substance because its form is the separated intellect that is called the mirror. Thus, the intellect is to the sphere in the manner of a separated form. In this way, Narboni connects each of the celestial spheres (or the mirror) to the equivalent *sefirah* and likewise to the equivalent separated intelligence. Further, the attribute of the *sefirah* is likened to the nature of the sphere, and explicated through scriptural passages. Thus, for example, the third sefirah is *binah* (discernment) which corresponds to the sphere of Saturn, associated with discernment and perfection; the fifth is *nezah* (eternity) and is also called the truth (*'emet*) and has the attribute of implacable rigour since Mars resides in it and so forth.⁹²

Narboni now moves further to reveal the "mystery between the symbols." He indicates that the ancient [Jewish] sages had known the concept of the Mover; the names of the separated entities were according to the objects received through the intermediary of the mirror that corresponds to their nature. Thus, the symbolism of the *sefirah* is the same as the notion of the spheres, and the separated intellects were known to the teachers of the sefirot! Narboni changes the traditional order of the sefirah that is illustrated in figure 1.

The correspondences drawn by Narboni are given below:

No.	<i>Sefirot</i>	Celestial Soul/ Sphere	Nature
1	<i>keter</i> (Crown) <i>'ayin</i> (Inconceivable) <i>re'shit</i> (Principle) <i>rom</i> (Elevated)	Starless sphere World of Intellect	First Cause/Prime Mover. No heavenly bodies in this sphere; Like a vault (Ezekiel I, 22). Crown (<i>keter</i>) that surrounds the whole. Divine body englobing all bodies (Aristotle)
2	<i>hokmah</i> (Wisdom)	Sphere of stars World of Intellect	From 'wisdom' proceed the science of heavenly bodies; It takes its being from nothingness (<i>'ayin</i>). Called the "soul" since it proceeds from spirit.
3	<i>binah</i> (Discernment)	Saturn World of Intellect	Instructs 'discernment' and perfection (Deut. IV, 6)
4	<i>tif'eret</i> (beauty); <i>hesed</i> (grace)	Jupiter World of Soul	Receives its movement by the grace of the intermediary.
5	<i>nezah</i> (Eternity) <i>'emet</i> (Truth)	Mars World of Soul	Ruled by Mars that makes truth implacable.

6	<i>hod</i> (Majesty) <i>raḥamim</i> (Mercy)	Sun World of Soul	The sphere corresponds to the majestic light that effuses life and confers the generative and conservative faculties. A sign of mercy.
7	<i>malkut</i> (Royalty)	Venus World of Soul	Venus comes after the Sun with regard to light.
8	<i>me'on Zedeq</i> Residence of Justice	Mercury World of Body	Sphere of the star of wisdom.
9	<i>yesod</i> (Fundament)	Moon World of Body	The sphere wherein reside the beings of the lower world.
10	<i>neqebah</i> (female) <i>kalah</i> (Fiancee) <i>knesset Yisrā'el</i> (Community of Israel)	Active Intellect World of Body	Female - receives the influx of all separated forms and transmits them to the lower world.

The application of rational mysticism by Narboni is also seen in his discussion of *sefirot* in the *Shi'ur Qomah*. Narboni interprets *shi'ur* (*measure*) as identified with God and *qomah* with all existents, reflecting the Aristotelian use of measure (*metron*) or principle (*archē*) as akin to what is being measured (*Metaphysics*, X, i 1052b, 32). Thus, the notion of measure as God in relation to the world reflects Ibn Rushd's view of God as the existents in their most glorious mode of being.⁹³ Finally, Narboni connects this idea of measure to God in the commentary on *Hayy*, he notes that "God is the measure of everything in a manner comparable to the one and indivisible unit which is the principle and measure of the beings entering into that particular category."⁹⁴ Narboni thus integrates the notion of

God as the form of the world with Ibn Rushd's views, and with Ibn Ṭufayl's discussion of the universe as an orb that contains all existents.⁹⁵

Narboni is able to reflect on the three different but inter-linked meanings that the *sefirot* evoked in Jewish thought, the *sefirot* as the body of God in the *Shi'ur Qomah*, including the notion that "emanation is a process within the Divine, and the ten *sefirot* are stages in this process," the *sefirot* as primordial man (*Adam Kadmon*),⁹⁶ and the *sefirot* as the emanation of the intellects and the celestial spheres, and the macrocosmic unity of the One as the Whole.⁹⁷

Narboni's stated purposes in writing a commentary to Ibn Ṭufayl's work were to express a) his interest in the notion of the solitary mystic b) his preoccupation with the issue on the immortality of the soul, and union with the Active Intellect. Narboni adds two quotations from the Tanakh (Old Testament) in support of segregation from the community as a means to attain the conjunction with the Active Intellect. The quotations are taken from *Jeremiah* (9:1)

O that I were in the wilderness, in a lodging place
of wayfaring men; that I might leave my people,
and go from them; for they be all adulterers, an
assembly of treacherous men.

and from Psalm 55:7

And I said, Oh that I had wings like a dove! for
then would I fly away and be at rest.

Summation: Narboni's reception

Since this dissertation revolves on the question of reception, Narboni's commentary becomes particularly interesting in its inclusion of the mystical element, whether reflected in his commentaries on Ibn Ṭufayl or Ibn Rushd. As representative of the juncture between the falsafah and the Latin Averroistic debate, Narboni draws his basis from the first and conveys it to the second. This particular interpretation by Narboni is coalescent with the perspective of the

Maghribi triad, as being inclusive of the mystical and the rational approach to philosophy. Further, it questions the emphasis on Moses Narboni as the rationalist commentator of the rationalist philosopher, a theory that is debunked by Narboni's varied interests in mysticism, from the kabbalah, to mystical commentaries on the Torah, to the rational mysticism of philosophy. In some ways, Narboni may be likened to Ghazālī, especially in the pervading element of Jewish sacred texts in the former's frame of reference.

The other factor to be underlined is the manner in which Narboni thus receives the Maghribi triad in relation to his own interests and does not hesitate to constantly cite passages from the Torah, the Midrash and other Jewish thinkers like Maimonides. Narboni re-interprets the works of the Muslim philosophers and consolidates their views with his background sources.

With regard to the 'confusions' with *thawb* and *thawāb*, discussed in chapter four, Vajda feels that the literal translation into Hebrew of the text (not commentary) of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, combined with the cultural difference allows for an interpretation in the commentary, whereby Narboni draws from his own Euro-Jewish understanding.⁷⁸ In the light of the scholarship on the prologue, there is an inherent problem in putting too much meaning to this particular mis/interpretation. If the prologue only reflects the partial intent of the main narrative, whereby the issues in the main text are contrasted, then any mis/interpretation does not in a sense affect the final perception of Narboni as an Aristotelian or a Neoplatonist. Further, Narboni finds ample scope to render his mystical and Neoplatonic tendencies through his commentary on the main text.

The point made by Vajda however is integral to the reception of the narrative. Such "mis-interpretations" or "accidents" play a significant role in changing the context of the text. One might even suggest that it is a cumulation of such "mistakes" that result in vastly disparate meanings assigned to a particular thinker. One example that was examined in some detail is the mis/appropriation of Ibn Rushd into Latin Averroism and the subsequent debate in Christian thought. The process of transmission raises the question of the different ways in which one

can distinguish the views of the Hebrew commentator from the manner in which his works and consequently the works of Muslim philosophy were received in the Christian west. Narboni's response is a link between the falsafic milieu and the transmission of the Latin translations of mostly Averroes' works.

Even if the Hebrew translation provided a view that was conducive to Hispano-Arabic philosophy without the "mis-translation", Narboni, operating in a different cultural context, would have interpreted it from this vantage, as he does in other parts of the commentary. The interpretation that develops, due to the substitution of *thawāb* for *thawb* in the prologue, indicates a shift in meaning that occurs at some level in any reception. In general terms, the purpose of the Tufaylian commentary by Narboni, as with his other commentaries on Ibn Rushd, Ghazālī and Maimonides, is to understand them within the context of *his* reception and spirituality. This is also the case with the later translations of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*. Does the notion of reception centre on the translator or does the variant purpose differ in degree and time from spiritual understanding to appropriation, from symbiotic or empathic to confrontational as in later writings on *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*?

Certainly, in the case of the *falsafah*, with Ibn Tufayl, or with Narboni despite the cultural shift, there is also a degree of empathy that allows for a reinterpretation and recreation of ideas in different social, religious and historical contexts, which has been sometimes reduced in analysis to a non-mythical quest for origins!⁹⁹ The final test of the genius of a text, as a reception-theorist would say, is its ability to be received anew by the reader, and in our case not just the reader but by the translator and commentator as well.

Endnotes to Chapter 5

1. BN No. 916, fol. 3a-b; BN No. 915, fol. 52b, as cited by Hayoun, *La philosophie*, 79.
2. Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 305-306. Fakhry refers to the "denationalization" of Ibn Rushd due to the emphasis on his prominent role as the commentator of Aristotle - "Ibn Rushd's place in the history of Islamic philosophical ideas is radically different." The application of reception theory recognizes this differentiation.
3. Mahmoud Kassem (Kacem), *Théorie de la connaissance d'après Averroës et son interprétation chez Thomas D'Aquin* (Alger: Études et documents, 1978), 206-209. Kassem discussed the notion of "double verity" and its understanding in Ibn Tufayl.
4. Hayoun, *Le commentaire*, 32-33.
5. David Herzog, *Bi'ūr Kavanōt Abū Bakr ben as-Ṣaigh (Kitāb Tadbīr al-Mutawahhīd) Qovets al-Yad 6* (1896), 26-42. For the early printed editions on the summary of Ibn Bājjah's *Tadbīr*, see Bernard Blumenkranz, *Auteurs juifs en France médiévale: leur oeuvre imprimée* (Paris: Collection Franco-Judaica, 1975); see section on *Moise ben Josue de Narbonne*.
6. See Ovey N. Mohammed, *Averroes' Doctrine of Immortality A Matter of Controversy* (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfred Laurier Press, 1984); Phillip Merlan, *Monopsychism Mysticism and Metaconsciousness* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963). The whole controversy over Averroes' mysticism is presented in Ovey and Merlan who supplement each other, even though they present two variant perspectives. Ovey re-examines the texts of Ibn Rushd, compares them with the Latin corpus and the central issues in the Latin reception and discusses these in relation to falsafic texts and their use of the Qur'ān. He suggests that the misunderstanding of Averroes lies outside the Muslim context of his works. Merlan, on the other hand, indicates the neo-Platonic influences that colour Averroes' thought. A third perspective might result from the re-examination of the thought of Aristotle himself in order to understand his "mysticism", for example in the *Ethics*, whose lost commentary by Fārābī is cited in the prologue

of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*.

7. Narboni also wrote commentaries on Ghazālī's *Maqāṣid* and *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd* of the *Ihyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*, whose manuscripts are listed in the previous chapter.

8. Arkoun, *Ibn Ṭufayl*, 263-287; Leaman, *Averroes and his Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 1-11.

9. For a discussion around this question see Leaman, *Ghazali's attack on philosophy*, in *An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy* (Camb. Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 23-108.

10. See Leaman, *Averroes*, 163-178; Butterworth, *Preface* in *Averroes Middle Commentaries*, ix-xii. Leaman points out the complexities of the phenomenon of Averroism and suggests that many of its views were compatible with Ibn Rushd's. Butterworth's discussion is a brief but useful summary that traces the larger context of the spread of Aristotle's works through translations.

11. Corbin, *Histoire de la Philosophie Islamique*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), 250.

12. Ibn Ṭufayl's individualism has been equally challenged, or likewise delimited to his use of genre, as discussed in the previous chapter.

13. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 13-14. Marmura, *The Philosopher and Society*, 312-315. Marmura discusses the misreading of Fārābī's concepts by the confusion of his premises. According to his analysis, Fārābī saw no conflict between religion and society, but considered that the non-philosopher should not be addressed in philosophic language.

14. Kassem, 206-209.

15. Cf. Corbin, *Histoire*, 243-47.

16. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 123-126.

17. See also G. F. Hourani's discussion on the *Allegorical Interpretation of Scripture*, in *Averroes on the Harmony between Religion and Philosophy*, 22-23.

18. See also Marmura, *The Islamic Philosopher's Concept*, 94-97. See especially Marmura's discussion of the notion of revelation and how it is resolved within Fārābī's emanative scheme.

19. Corbin, *Histoire*, 244.

20. Marmura, *The Islamic Philosophers*, 94-95. Marmura briefly discusses Fārābī's emanative cosmology and its inter-relation to the notion of prophecy and revelation.

21. J. Guttman, *Philosophies of Judaism: The History of Jewish Philosophy from Biblical Times to Franz Rosenzweig*, tr. from German by David W. Silverman (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), 136.

22. Corbin, *Histoire*, 244.

23. We use the names, Ibn Rushd and Averroes inter-changeably, preferring the use of Ibn Rushd, but using the corruption from the Hebrew (Avi-Rushd = Father of Rushd) when discussing the Averroistic debate, or when it is used in this manner in the critiques discussed. Averroen is used in the sense of pertaining to Averroes, whereas Averroistic specifically pertains to the debate in the Latin and Hebrew milieux.

24. Leaman, *Averroes*, 167-171.

25. See George Hourani, (tr.) *Introduction in Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy; A translation with introduction and notes of Ibn Rushd's Kitāb faṣl al-maqāl, with its appendix (Ḍamīma) and an extract from Kitāb al-kashf 'an manāḥij al-adilla* (London: Luzac & Co., 1961), 1-42. Leaman, *Introduction*, 167-75.

26. Corbin, *Histoire*, 250-253. Corbin considers this response as "revolutionary".

27. Much of our information on Rāzī, this genius in medicine and among the most individual thinkers of all times, is second-hand. One of the major source of his ideas are encapsulated and presented by Abū Hātim al-Rāzī in their famous debate on prophecy. See Abdulaziz Shamsuddin Talbani, *The Debate about Prophecy in 'Kitāb A'lām al-Nubūwah: An Analytic study*, M. A. thesis submitted to the Institute of Islamic Studies (Montreal: McGill University, 1987).

28. See the discussions by Ovey Mohammed, 107-115; 128-131. *Op. cit.* Hourani (ed.), *Faṣl al-Maqāl*.

29. Thomas Parkhill, a scholar of Native American Religions, categorizes generalizations into two types, approving and disparaging and suggests that both categories are equally harmful since they create an image of an existing reality. T. Parkhill, *Teaching Conversation on Native American Religions* (Fredericton: St. Thomas University, 1994).

The development of Averroism might be considered as an approving generalization. The distinctions between Ibn Rushd's thought and its reception through Averroism in the European transmission of the texts appear clear to the

student of Islamic thought. However, the precepts of Averroism still have an impact on the current scholarship and approach to Ibn Rushd. For example, the notion that after Ibn Rushd, Islamic philosophy had come to an end with the resolution by Aquinas of the problems created in religious philosophy. As well, the emphasis on the perception of Ibn Rushd as the rationalist par excellence à la Aristotle defined his contributions to religious thought.

30. M. Asin Palacios, *El Averroismo Teologico de Santo Tomas de Aquino in Homenaje a D. Francisco Cordera* (Zaragoza: Escar, 1904), 271-331.

31. Fakhry, *History*, 305. See Fakhry's list of the works by Ibn Rushd on Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā.

32. Fakhry, *History*, 307-325. Fakhry discusses the necessity of re-viewing Ibn Rushd's thought, drawing especially from the *Tahāfut*.

33. H. A. Wolfson, *The Twice Revealed Averroes*, *Speculum* 36, 3 (July, 1961), 373-392.

34. There were also other interpretations, like the *De Immortalitate Animae* by Pietro Pomponazzi (1464-1525) who used Alexander of Aphrodisias to deny the immortality of the soul. Pomponazzi maintained that natural reason alone cannot prove the immortality of the soul, though he accepted immortality as an article of faith. Agostino Nifo tried to reconcile the doctrine of Averroes with the immortality of the soul in his own *De Immortalitate Animae*. Cf. Mohammed, 9-10.

35. Mohammed, 6-13.

36. Mohammed, 14.

37. Mohammed, 10-15. Mohammed questions whether it was the partial exposure to Ibn Rushd's [and Aristotle's] by Latin scholastics that led to the misunderstanding of Ibn Rushd. In the final analysis, he implies that it was not really the access to texts that was the problematic, but the context of Christian theology itself, which provoked the Averroistic and anti-Averroistic interpretations.

38. The Christian scholars focused the formative discussion on the *De Anima* commentary, since the Latin translation of the *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* was available only in part in 1328. This partial version of the *Tahāfut* excluded the last four disputations on *Physics* that dealt with the intellect and soul in detail. In contrast, the whole *Tahāfut* was available in Hebrew between 1318-28.

39. See Mohammed, 11. The Hebrew and Latin translations were undertaken by three Jewish scholars, all bearing the name Calonymos. The first translation from

Arabic into Latin [a partial form that was assumed to be complete] was made by Calonymos ben Meir of Arles on the request of Robert of Anjou. The second Calonymos ben David ben Todros the Elder, a Judeo-Provençal contemporary translator like Narboni, had translated the *Tahāfu* from Arabic into Hebrew sometime between 1318 and 1328, under the title *Happalat ha-happala*. This Hebrew version was translated into Latin by Calo Calonymos, also known as Kalonymos ben David the Younger or Maestro Calo and published in 1527. The latter translator was not related to the first two. Calo Calonymos explained that prior to his Latin translation, there had existed a shortened version "lacking the last four natural principal disputations of great importance but found among the Hebrews complete in all respects."

40. Mohammed, 12.

41. Phillip Merlan, *Monopsychism, Mysticism and Metaconsciousness* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963).

42. Merlan, *Monopsychism*, 84.

43. Merlan, 85-92.

44. Merlan, 88.

45. Merlan, 102.

46. Merlan, 94-96.

47. Merlan, 100-101.

48. Cf. Fakhry, 306.

49. This legendary text is traced back in hagiography to early oral literature and becomes a focus text in the emergent kabbalah movement. For a discussion of the reiterations of this text, including the commentary on Narboni, see Martin Cohen, *The Shiur Qomah: Liturgy and Theurgy in pre-Kabbalistic Jewish mysticism* (Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, 1983), 142-143.

50. As discussed in Chapter two, one of the aims of reception theory is to read classical texts outside the centuries of "monumentalization". The re-evaluation of Averroism without presumptions might provide some surprising results.

51. See G. F. Hourani, *Introduction*, 25. Hourani notes that Ibn Rushd's attitude toward Aristotle as one of veneration as a teacher who made great progress in knowledge. He suggests that the prevalence of Aristotelianism as the only force in Ibn Rushd's thought has been greatly exaggerated. For the view of Narboni as a confirmed Aristotelian, see M. Blaustein, *Averroès et Moïse de Narbonne*,

Archives Juives 21 (1985), 5.

52. The application of reception theory to the works of Aristotle might liberate these classical texts from the centuries of monumentalization that Jauss refers to. In this regard, the application of the mode of rational mysticism might reveal new facets to any interpretation.

53. Leaman, *Averroes*, 144-160. Leaman suggests how the doctrine of double verity served the needs of both the "rationalist" and the religious philosophers of the three Semitic traditions. Ultimately, philosophy became a tool that utilized the framework of logic to make theological arguments, once a common religious base had been established. Leaman derates the loss of the pure Averroes.

A possible solution is to accept each stream of transmission on its own grounds. In the case of Ibn Rushd, even while recognizing the limitations of Averroism, his Aristotelian base still dominates most analysis. Ibn Rushd's desire to correct the misinterpretations of Aristotle in turn have undermined his views by assuming them to be exactly parallel to his teacher, Aristotle.

54. Blaustein, 5-6.

55. Leaman, *Averroes*, 8-10. Leaman critiques how the questions of philosophy are reduced to style, especially over questions of dissimulation. However, the philosophers themselves debate on the right method of analysis. Can one summarily dismiss the social context of the philosopher's work? Leaman makes a point on dubious interpretations that assume the philosophers disagreed and went against the views of religion/Islam.

56. Blaustein, 7. Blaustein cites Gauthier's edition of *Hayy*, 11 ff.

57. S. Pines, *Philosophy*, in *The Cambridge History of Islam: Islamic Society and Civilization*, ed. P.M. Holt, A. K. S. Lambton and B. Lewis, vol. 2b (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 780-823, on Fārābī, see especially 794-801.

58. Blaustein, 6.

59. Cf. *De Anima*, 429b 5-9, where the intellect *in habitu* is implied by Aristotle, cited by Blaustein, # 11.

60. See Altmann, *Moses Narboni*, 198, cited from the *Shi'ur Qomah*. Discussed further below in the section on Moses Narboni as a 'rational mystic'.

61. Blaustein, 8.

62. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Hayy*, 109-113.

63. Blaustein, 8-9.

64. Hayoun, *La philosophie*, 290.
65. Ibn Tufayl, *Ḥayy*, 105, 1.4.
66. Ibn Tufayl, *Ḥayy*, 121-125.
67. Fakhry, *History*, 324.
68. Vajda, *Comment le philosophe juif*, 121-125.
69. Hayoun, *Le Commentaire*, 27, no. 11.
70. Hayoun, *Le Commentaire*, 27-28.
71. Narboni critiques the kabbalists, directly or indirectly in his commentary on the *Guide*.
72. Scholem, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism* (New York: Schocken Books, 1961).
73. Blaustein, 7.
74. G. Vajda, *Moïse de Narbonne sur les séfirōt, les intelligences et les sphères*. Annex note 10 in *Recherche sur la philosophie et la kabbale* (Paris: La Haye, 1962), 396-402.
75. J. Dan and R. Kiener, *The Early Kabbalah* (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1986), 2.
76. Dan and Kiener, 1-2.
77. See Moshe Idel, *Kabbalah: New Perspectives* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988) for an excellent discussion on the problems of gnosticism and Jewish thought.
78. Dan and Kiener, 7.
79. Dan and Kiener, 6.
80. "Sixty years of scholarship have failed to establish even one close textual, terminological or ideological parallel between these Christian heresies and the teachings of the *Sefer ha-Bahir* and the early Kabbalists of Provence." Dan and Kiener, 6; cf. Scholem, *Ursprung und Anfänge der Kabbala* (Berlin, 1962), 11-13; 168-171, 206-10; Vajda, *Moïse de Narbonne*, 396. Vajda also alludes to his tentative translation, adding that Narboni had possible access to these "precise sources" on whom we have little information. See also Hayoun, *Moshe Narboni*,

78. Hayoun notes that Narboni refers to *hakhmé ha-qabbalah* (Sages of the kabbala) in his commentary on Ghazālī's *Maqāsid* (BN Ms. 956, f. 178a).

81. Dan and Kiener, 3.

82. See A. Altmann, *Moses Narboni*, 181-87. The *Shi'ur Qomah* was attributed to Rabbi Yishmael, an early Jewish scholar, and accredited by tradition. Sa'adya admitted to its possible spuriousness but noted that it could be conceptually explained. Maimonides was influenced by the work in his youth but later rejected it quite vehemently in his *responsa*. Cf. Sirat, 334.

83. *Op. cit.* Heath, 1-17, 80-106. Heath explains the modes of *muthos* and *logos* and suggests that one cannot analyze the "allegory" without also considering its particular use in the applied genre, whether recital, treatise etc. Heath further suggests that the two modes have to be considered independently. I agree that the theoretical analysis of the particular mode of *muthos* or *logos* likewise assigns the 'meaning' of the text. However, in the process of reception, the interpreter often does not recognize this distinction and strives to explain one mode on the terms of the other, either creating a radical shift or reduction of meaning. Thus, Sa'adya and Maimonides, in responding to the preponderant anthropomorphism of their milieu, strove to overcome it by discursive reasoning, shifting the *muthos* mode of the *Shi'ur Qomah* to the *logos* mode of their commentaries.

84. For further details on this work, see Scholem, *Kabbala* (New York: New York Times Books, 1974), 21-30. L. Glotzer, *The Fundamentals of Jewish Mysticism: The Book of Creation and its Commentaries*. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson Inc., 1992; Dan and Kiener, 7.

85. s.v. *Kabbalah: Emanation and the concept of the Sefirot; Details on the doctrine of the sefirot and their symbolism*, *EJ* X: 490 ff. 563-573.

86. Dan and Kiener, 8.

87. Altmann, *Moses Narboni*, 199.

88. Vajda, *Moïse de Narbonne*, 396-402.

89. See Vajda, *Moïse de Narbonne*, 399-402.

90. Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, 92.

91. George Vajda, *Moïse de Narbonne sur les séfirōt, les intelligences et les sphères*. Annex note 10 in *Recherche sur la philosophie et la kabbale* (Paris: La Haye, 1962, 396-97.

92. Vajda, *Moïse de Narbonne*, 396.

93. Altmann, *Moses Narboni*, 203.
94. Cited by Touati, *Dieu*, 195-196; cf. Altmann, *Moses Narboni*, 203.
95. Ibn Tufayl, *Ḥayy*, 78-81.
96. Scholem, *Emanation: In Kabbalah*, *EJ* VI:696.
97. Cf. *Kabbalah*, *EJ* X: 563-572.
98. *Op. cit.* Vajda, *Comment le philosophe*, 129-135.
99. In other words, an empathic perspective does not indicate views that are uniform with the original proponent of the works in question. The notion of reception also recognizes that both confrontational and empathic works make their original 'other', but with different purposes; either to appropriate, propagate a particular ideology, or redress an unequal power balance, as seen in some post-Colonial and feminist literature.

Chapter 6: The transmission of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* in the Western Christian Tradition

Introduction

The European transmission of Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* is most clearly explicated through its history of translation and appropriation. Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* has a unique and protracted history of printed translations, both in eastern and western languages. Starting from the first Hebrew translation around the early fourteenth century, another Latin translation is sometimes attributed to Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494), the Philosopher-Prince of the Italian Renaissance. This translation might have been based on the Hebrew translation and commentary, known to his teacher in Jewish philosophy, Johannan Alemanno. Alemanno was also a great admirer of Moses Narboni's works. It is difficult to confirm this supposition, since no extant manuscript of an early Latin translation is known.¹ The Arabic text was first edited and translated into Latin by Edward Pococke Jr. in 1671,² whereby it became famous in Europe. This edition was the source of many subsequent translations.³

The major focus here is to examine the manner in which Ibn Ṭufayl's work was transmitted from North Africa to Europe and how it was thoroughly transformed through this process. Great literature, even if engendered as a political response to particular social conditions, must ultimately transcend such a limited space. On the other hand, the forms by which it is transmitted reflect the responses to different social situations or even political climates. This hypothesis allows one to examine the transmission of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* and to ultimately understand how it might be considered a source for a disparate genre like the realistic novel by Daniel Defoe.

This chapter will focus on five transmitters of the Tufaylian narrative in Great Britain, including Edward Pococke Sr. and Jr. and three English translators,

George Keith, George Ashwell and Simon Ockley. All of them belong to the same time frame of the late seventeenth to the early eighteenth centuries but espoused vastly different religious ideologies.

These translations were the beginning of an expanding channel of transmission into various European languages, modelled on both religious and secular ideologies. One is able to see how a common text was received differently by each of the translators. Further, the varied theological stances of the translators encapsulate the religious, political and spiritual turmoil of the time. The translations of Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy* play the dual (and possibly dubious) role of ushering in the shifting position of religion. They also mark a further stage of the marginalization, or the rejection of religion. They further transmit the emergent naturalistic and humanistic philosophies that become quite pronounced in the other European transmissions of the Tufaylian narrative outside Britain, for example in the German translation (1783) by Johann Gottfried Eichhorn (1752-1827). The later translations also reflect the degree to which Christian religiosity continued to impact western secular ideologies.⁴ Eichhorn, who reflects the naturalistic reception,⁵ was also one of the early proponents of Old Testament literary criticism.

This study will also analyze how the translator applies the device of the "prologue" and "epilogue" to demarcate his reception from the other translators, or the focus text and its author. Accordingly, the study will examine these "afterwords" in relation to their authors and the religious predicaments of the time. The analysis hopes to shed light on the reasons why this work by Ibn Ṭufayl elicited such strong interest within a relatively short span, from persons with varying religious ideologies.

The polemical debates rampant in Britain at the time were a source of political conflict. This is a period of transition with the occurrence of the Cromwellian revolution, coupled with the preceding philosophies of the Renaissance, newly emergent movements like the Quakers, the naturalistic philosophies of Romanticism that soon follow, and finally the expansionist and

colonial designs encapsulated in the new genre of the English novel. In fact, the ideologies of the various European translators are chronologically parallel to these prevalent movements. The second section of this chapter will look at the popularization and appropriation of the Tufaylian narrative that eased its incorporation into the imperial culture, colonial ideologies and the realistic novel, thus indicating a shift from the theological circles of Britain to popular demarcations and ultimately, its recension in the Robinsonades.

How Hayy ibn Yaqzān was destined to become an Englishman ⁶

Why was this translation undertaken by each of the translators and how did it serve or reflect their particular ideologies? The act of translating is not a passive rendition. In this case, it is an active response as well as a declamation of the moral tendencies of the time, a *proof* of both the independence of the individual as well as a *reproach* of the collective tendencies of society.

If one is to apply the reception theory to this process of translation, then what were the factors that made the Tufaylian narrative so conducive to the various theological strains represented by the different translators? Did the horizon of expectation change through these translations? If so, could they be considered a transition between the Tufaylian narrative and the emergence of the Robinsonades? Likewise, what were the commonalities between the expectations of the Tufaylian creative act and its mimetic equivalent in later seventeenth century England? Can one perceive a parallel between the translators' response to the religio-spiritual issues that were racking seventeenth century England vis à vis the issues in the Maghrib to which Ibn Tufayl had responded? Was it this universal appeal of the text to provide a constantly sought alternative spirituality that made it conducive to variant trends from the *philosophus autodidactus*, to Rousseau's natural child⁷ to the adventurous Crusoe?

In order to answer these questions, we will briefly study the biographical information on the translators that has been drawn primarily from archival material. The section below will include details on the lives of the translators,

their background, professional careers, and theological inclinations, in order to consider why they undertook to translate the Tufaylian narrative; in what sense it responded to their spiritual purposes, and how the work (through their act of translation) appeared to reflect or counteract the tendencies of their time. The act of translation then is not free of political nuances. However, what is curious is how a single text can be applied to vastly different ideologies even within a relatively connected time-frame. Such application even puts reception theory to the test, since it would assume a transformation of the text, or a new reader-response on the part of each translator. At the least, the different reader-responses reflect the rapidly shifting horizon of expectation in concurrence with the dramatically changing roles of religion and state in seventeenth century Europe.

We will examine how the issues that the translators respond to create new horizons of expectation related to their own geopolitical space. We will further analyze the rationale of the "prologue" or "epilogue" appended by the translators and the sub-text reflected through their use; whether one might perceive them in hermeneutical terms as communicative modes that explain the meaning of Tufaylian narrative grounded in the particular reception, or whether they serve as a mode of demarcation between the different translators themselves.

Philosophus Autodidactus

It is to two English scholars, father and son, Edward Pococke, senior and junior that the [western] world is indebted for the knowledge of one of the most charming productions Arabian philosophy can boast of.⁸

The early western interest in the Tufaylian narrative commences with the edition and Latin translation of the text by Edward Pococke Jr., often confused with his father, Edward Pococke Sr.⁹ The latter was one of the earliest proponents of western oriental scholarship, the first person to hold a Chair in Arabic at Oxford and the author of several works.¹⁰

The biographical circumstances of Pococke Sr. have a bearing to the transmission of text. These are gleaned from the early biography written by Leonard Twells.¹¹ Rev. Dr. Edward Pococke Sr. (1604-1691) was "a person to whom the praise of being the first who considerably promoted the study of the Arabic language in Europe might belong."¹² Pococke Sr. may also have collaborated with his son in preparing the Arabic edition and Latin translation of the Tufaylian narrative, although the preface by Edward Pococke Sr. to the printed edition was often the primary basis for this assumption.¹³ Perceiving social history through the vicissitudes in the life of this individual presents us with a vignette of seventeenth century England and the impact of the Cromwellian Revolution.

Pococke Sr.'s area of scholarship was 'Oriental Studies,' which included the study of works in Arabic, Hebrew and Persian. As was the norm, Pococke Sr. was trained as a Reverend whose primary duty was conversion and the maintenance of a parish. However, he was as much a scholar as a priest. He spent several years in Syria as chaplain to the Levant Company at Aleppo from 1629 to 1636. He also spent several years (between 1637 and 1640) at the British Embassy in Istanbul.¹⁴ A protégé of Archbishop Laud, Pococke Sr. collected a number of Arabic manuscripts for the Bodleian library in Oxford from Morocco and Syria.¹⁵ This was probably the route whereby the Bodleian manuscript (no. 133) was obtained, that was also the source of the Arabic edition and Latin translation of the Tufaylian narrative. Pococke Sr. was an eminent figure, praised by John Locke for his calmness of manner, his humour and knowledge, as one who "often had the silence of a learner, where he had the knowledge of a Master",¹⁶ with eulogies being written on his talents as a linguist.¹⁷

Some issues that were fermenting in Britain, although clearly articulated decades later, were the conflict and separation between religion and state, and the parallel issues of reason and revelation. It was a period that included two major revolutions. The revolution of 1642 when Charles I was deposed of his throne, which was followed by Pococke's Sr.'s loss of his Chair in Arabic. The middle

period between the deposition of the monarchy and its restoration, generally called *inter-regnum* was not just reflective of the tension between Church and State, but rather one of inter-sectarian conflicts. It was also a period when there was a growing interest in natural religion, reflected, for example, in the Deist movement in Britain. Robert Boyle was a patron of many of the projects by the Pocockes, including the printing of the Tufaylian narrative and the mission visits to the Middle East. Boyle also sponsored and compiled a series of sermons on natural theology titled *A Defense of Natural and Revealed Religion*.¹⁸

The conflict between Church and State is reflected through the loss of Pococke's chairs in Arabic and Hebrew during the *inter-regnum* Cromwellian period. The establishment of the first Arabic Chair in Oxford, its loss and reestablishment reflect the religio-political scene at the time. Even though Pococke Sr. was relatively quiescent with regard to the politics of patronage, his life was constantly bogged by the academic dependence of religious scholars on the church hierarchy, or the benevolence of a wealthy patron of the church. Consequently, the Archbishop Laud's fall from grace was to adversely affect Pococke, Sr. Likewise, the conquest of Oxford University that was the last stronghold used by Charles I and its final capitulation to the parliamentary forces led by Oliver Cromwell had a negative effect on the field of Oriental Studies during Pococke Sr.'s time.

Several of these issues come to the fore in the archival and biographical material on Pococke Sr. They include the role of the university, its authority, its power structure, academic freedom, the limitations of scholarship, the dependence on patronage, the shifting power of the Church with the political tide, and finally, the expectations of patriotism, or what now might be termed as nationalism.

Edward Pococke Jr. (1648-1727) was born in the year of the peace of Westphalia,¹⁹ at a time when his father had lost both his Chairs of Arabic and Hebrew at Oxford and had been appointed as the Rector of Childrey.²⁰ Edward Jr. was the eldest of six brothers. He was deeply impressed by the stories of his father's struggle to establish Arabic Studies, his voyages to the east, his

employment as chaplain to the Levant Company in Aleppo, his residence at the British embassy in Constantinople and his tales of Muslims and Jews of the Middle East.

Due to his father's "temporary" retirement to the Rectory of Childrey, Edward Pococke Jr. grew up in a small English town, with dreams of the east and an interest in Oriental studies being fuelled by the tales of travel that his father told him. At the age of thirteen, Edward Jr. matriculated (ca. 1661) at his father's college. Pococke Sr. had just been reinstated in his Chairs and Canonry of Christ College, Oxford. "Young Pococke became a Student and was appointed chaplain to the Earl of Pembroke", then Canon of Salisbury and later Rector of Mildenhall in Wiltshire.²¹

Pococke Jr. collaborated with his father on a text of the Latin translation of *Abdollariphi Historiae Aegypti Compendium* from a manuscript the latter had brought from Syria. However, the work was stalled during the printing, when Bishop Fell required the Latin type for some other purpose and was finally published much later around 1681.²² Such vexations were mild when compared to the earlier political upheavals when the future of the University (of Oxford) was put in jeopardy. They do, however, indicate the second class status of the emergent discipline of Oriental studies and the struggles to maintain scholarship in the area. Perhaps, they also demonstrate why Edward Pococke Jr. was ultimately unsuccessful and retired in obscurity.

Ironically, the marginalized status of Oriental Studies escalates in the later period and is reflected in the scholarly career of Edward Pococke Jr.: "the love of Arabick learning was now waxed cold."²³ Pococke Jr. grew up and followed the expected course of a scholar's career but was not as prominent as his father. There was a definite shift of expectation in the role of the scholar during this period of political turmoil, whose impact on academia is also reflected in Pococke Sr.'s career.

Edward Pococke Jr. was recognized as an excellent Arabic scholar and was expected to succeed his father in the Arabic professorship, which he never did.

The Latin translator and the librarian at Bodleian was admired in Holland as "stupor mundi".²⁴ However, he lacked the political will, or as Hearne, a contemporary literary historian noted, he "wants friends to get him ye Professorships."²⁵ Edward Pococke Jr. died in 1727, apparently having withdrawn from Oriental studies.

Edward Pococke Jr.'s fame lies in providing the "fountain of versions"²⁶ in his early career - the receptacle through which *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* was to be transmitted not only to Britain, but to the rest of Europe. *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* officially took root in English soil with the first Arabic edition and Latin translation by Edward Pococke, Jr. that Twells records and summarizes in his early biographical study.²⁷ Vernon, writing to Pococke from Paris, cites Ferrand's review that "gives a handsome compliment to the piece, declaring himself at a loss, which to admire most, the author's elegance, or his interpreter's exactness." He also includes the praises of other contemporary Orientalists in Europe such as Huygens, d'Herbelot, de la Croix and Thévenot.²⁸

Many literary historians and critics have mistakenly attributed the Arabic edition and Latin translation to Edward Pococke, Sr.²⁹ In order to clarify the reasons for this confusion, it is necessary to recognize the roles of both father and son. The reasons for this attributions include: i) the names shared by father and son, just as the common titles of Ibn Ṭufayl's and Ibn Sīnā's narratives were confused together; ii) the relative obscurity of Pococke Jr. who probably faced some of the frustrations to which Ibn Ṭufayl himself had been exposed, both of whose reputations rests primarily on the basis of a single work; iii) the possible collaboration between father and son; iv) the inclusion of a Latin preface by Pococke Sr. to the edition. Pastor sees such an attribution as an indication of the work's maturity. It was after all undertaken by a young man of twenty-two years, who had just completed his Masters degree.³⁰

The long journey of Ibn Ṭufayl's text from North Africa to Britain cannot be described in exact physical details. One might surmise that Edward Pococke Sr. obtained the Bodleian Manuscript, which was the basis of the first Arabic

printed edition and Latin translation, during his time in the Levant Company.³¹ This primary line of transmission served a dual purpose. It opened up the possibility of the text's dissemination along two parallel channels with two target audiences: Orientalists who would have access to the Arabic edition; other Classicists or Church figures who would have access to the Latin translation. Thus, the intended audience was primarily academic. However, "in a comparatively short time, it caught on the fancy of the public - in fact it took the world by storm and ... remained greatly in vogue".³² This was a very propitious beginning that can only be comprehended in terms of the phenomenal results that it would produce.³³

In terms of his response to Oriental studies, Edward Pococke Sr.'s scholarship sets him apart from his contemporaries. The current analysis indicates how the process of "orientalism" by the pioneer "orientalists" such as the Pocockes and Ockley was stalled to a degree³⁴ by the text (*Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*) they chose to study. These transmitters need to be studied in relation to the context of their times and the expectations vested in them. They also were preachers of the Christian mission. This aspect has to be considered *de facto* rather than the purpose of any analysis. Given this premise, the Tufaylian narrative and personal experience in the Levant (in the case of Pococke Sr.) created changes in the vested expectations of the transmitters as well as in the ideological understanding of the text that was transmitted to Pococke Jr.

This shift might be perceived in the dialogical response by Pococke Sr. in comparison to some of his contemporaries who were also involved in religious propagation, or the historical validation of colonialism. He questioned some of the prevalent myths by leading preachers, whose works he was translating for the purpose of propagation and conversion.³⁵ The context of the critique is quite significant. It is not an academic attempt to indicate a weakness in analysis, but rather an indication that even when assuming one faith to be genuine, one cannot falsely undermine others. Pococke, Ockley and their colleagues such as Prideaux and Gibbon shared common vested expectations according to the measure of the

time. What Pococke's response indicates is a shift (although not very major) in this horizon to open a new channel of communication. These expectations necessitated the inclusion of a prologue. In the case of Ockley, the expectations included the guise of objectivity and the constant avowal of separating his views from the works he studied.

Ibn Tufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* was made widely available to a European audience through the subsequent translations from the Latin translation by Edward Pococke, Jr. The early translations by George Ashwell and Georg Pritius (1726),³⁶ did not have access to the Arabic text. This resulted in an amputation between the primary text and the translation. The intended audience of these translators was not primarily academic, which allowed them to respond to the text in their own creative ways, hastening the process of appropriation. This process of appropriation resulted in a loss of original context and an acculturation of the text within the society in which it was translated.

The late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were periods of intense sectarian controversies in Christianity, in which all three of the early English translators were involved to a great degree, whether of their own choice or not. They were also members of different movements, or churches. The translation of the narrative reflects the struggle in each of the translators with the issue of universal spirituality versus the formal church and denominations of which they were members.

George Keith and the Inner Light:

The first English translation was titled: *An Account of the Oriental Philosophy, shewing the wisdom of some Men of the East and particularly the profound wisdom of Hai Ebn Yokdhan*. It was translated from the Latin by George Keith (1638-1716).³⁷ Keith was one of the vocal proponents, and later declared an apostate, of the movement that was originally called the "Children of Light" and termed popularly as the Society of Friends or Quakers.

George Keith was a prolific writer and the list of his works occupy about

twenty-two pages in a catalogue of Quaker works.³⁸ They include pamphlets, sermons, polemic debates and theological tracts. Many of his works belong to the latter period of his life, following the split between the traditional and Keithian, or Christian Quakers and consequently, after his conversion to the Anglican church.

Ibn Tufayl's work certainly concurred with the Quaker theology, whose early proponent was George Keith and whose vocal spokesperson, Robert Barclay (1648-1690), used Keith's works as a point of departure. An earlier study on Ibn Tufayl's impact on Quakerism through Keith's translation has pointed out the correlation between the notion of Light in Ibn Tufayl and among the Quakers.³⁹ However, what has not been recognized is that this 'Quaker' translation, as well as other notions common to Ibn Tufayl's works and the Quaker theology developed by Keith and Barclay, belong to the early phase in Keith's religious career. The later developments in Keith's career include the splinter movement of the Christian Quakers, his apostasy within the Quaker movement, and his subsequent ordination as an Anglican minister. These events occur due to the varied interpretations and debates among different Christian groups on central theological questions. Thus, in analyzing Keith's works, it is integral to delineate which period they belong to and whether the translation of the Tufaylian narrative influenced the shift of horizon in his later works, if indeed one can discern a distinct change of paradigm.

The development of Keith's theological career

In order to understand George Keith's eclectic and colourful theological history, it is important to underline the three stages in his life: his adherence to early Quakerism, his development of Keithian (Christian) Quakerism and his conversion to Anglicanism.⁴⁰ There has been a tendency to correlate the Tufaylian narrative and Quaker theology, without recognizing these specific phases. The early phase of George Keith career includes his initial stance in favour of Quakerism. His

attempt to modify it within a normative frame coincide with a period when the Quakers were no longer an oppressed group but had gained a modicum of respectability and power in New England, thus reflecting the shifting sociopolitical processes at the time. Some of the questions that were central to Keith's development phases stem from the application of the issues that the Tufaylian text raises within the context of Christian theology, as discussed further below.

George Keith was born around 1638 at Peterhead, Aberdeenshire, Scotland. He was educated at Marischal College in Aberdeen, where his academic interests were focussed on mathematics and Oriental studies. He received his Master of Arts degree at Aberdeen University in 1658. As a young man, Keith was attracted to the preaching of William Dewsbury and converted to the Quaker doctrine in 1663/4. He soon became one of the foremost interpreters of the Quaker faith. He faced severe persecution and was imprisoned for his preaching in the Tollbooth, Aberdeen for a long period.⁴¹ Keith wrote most of his early impassioned works on Quakerism, including the translation of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* (1674) while in prison. He refused to take the oath and was imprisoned further on two occasions. Keith's early seminal works include *Immediate Revelation not ceased* (1668) and the *Universal Free Grace of the Gospel asserted* (1671).⁴²

A significant phase in the development of Keith's Quaker theology was his introduction to Robert Barclay, nine years his junior, who had publicly professed his loyalty to the Quaker cause three years after Keith's imprisonment. Barclay's Christology, or his radical and pronounced views (at the time) of the distinction between the heavenly and earthly Christ are a reflection of Keith's influence.⁴³ Keith and Barclay were closely identified and even published together.⁴⁴ They also appeared together in the public defense by Keith of Barclay's views against the onslaught of Scottish Divinity students, which Barclay later published.⁴⁵

In 1677, Keith and his wife, Elizabeth Johnston travelled extensively with George Fox, William Penn and Robert Barclay on a momentous missionary expedition through Holland and Germany. William Sewel (1653-1720), a contemporary historian, suggests that Keith attempted to integrate ideas of

metempsychosis that he encountered during his travels.⁴⁶ The rejection of such ideas by the Quakers, as the original cause of Keith's attacks against them.⁴⁷

In 1680, Keith opened a boarding school in Hertfordshire, Middlesex. In 1684/5, he emigrated to Boston and was appointed surveyor-general of New Jersey (*Archives of the State of New Jersey, 1 ser. 1880 I:480, 571*). In 1689, he became Headmaster of the first Friends Public School at Philadelphia,⁴⁸ a position that he gave up a year later. After contact with the American Quakers, Keith further emphasized his plan of semi-dogmatic formulation.

The possibility that Keith always believed in the "balance between dogmatic religion and individual experience" has been attested by his denial of the sufficiency of inner light and his criticism of preachers who emphasized it, thereby trivializing the Christ of history. Thus, Keith's apostasy from the Quakers developed gradually. His attempts to provide a Quaker dogma were opposed by its founder, George Fox (1624-1690). The problems Keith perceived included the lack of a creed, and questions around the function of Christ and salvation that he attempted to reform. He had drafted a first confession of faith at the height of his involvement in Quaker leadership. Such attempts were disapproved by Fox as hampering the free activity of the "inner lights."

Another cause for the rift between the Quakers may have revolved on the question of leadership over the whole movement in 1691 after the death of Barclay (d. 1690) and Fox (d. 1691), which Keith came close to winning against his opponent, William Stockdale. However, Keith's rejection of armed conflict, his questioning of the power of the magistrates, such as Thomas Lloyd, Deputy Governor of Pennsylvania province, and his opposition to slavery might have worked against him.

Keith was condemned by the older Quakers in the yearly meeting in Philadelphia in 1692 and was prohibited from preaching, whereby he led a breakaway group called the "Christian Quakers". This rift was serious and affected sixteen out of thirty-two chapters in Philadelphia alone. In 1693, Keith publicly denounced slavery in the first printed document against slavery in North

America.⁴⁹ Keith returned to London in 1694, where he was tried and "disowned" by William Penn as "this apostate and false accuser and common opposer who makes it his business to go from meeting to meeting to carp, catch and raise disturbances and trouble."⁵⁰ Thereupon, he rented a hall and preached against prominent Friends such as William Penn.⁵¹

The last phase of Keith's theological career occurred mostly in North America. Keith joined the Church of England in 1700. In 1702, he led the Missionary movement across North America as an agent for the "Society for the propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts." He travelled widely and expanded the Episcopal Church in New Jersey. Even after he left for America, Keith's followers in Britain retained their character as a separate group. Most of his works in this last period were attacks on Quakers that were polemical in nature.⁵² However, this phase is quite prolific. Keith returned to London in 1704. He was rewarded with the Rectory of Edburton, where he was opposed by Quakers in his own parish. He had to sell his books for less than ten pounds, suffered from rheumatism and died at the age of seventy-seven in 1716.⁵³

Keith's "Advertisement" to the Tufaylian translation

The *Advertisement to the Reader* is presented as a prologue explaining the *reasons* why the translator undertook the work: he "found some good things which were both savory and refreshing." The exaltation of personal experience is underlined in the *Advertisement* - "preach not thou the sweet savour of a thing thou hast not tasted" - a quotation that Keith picks up from its citation in the Tufaylian prologue, where Ghazālī's citation of it is given. The citation of this quotation is another indication of the shift in context by Keith, who attributes it to Ibn Ṭufayl himself.⁵⁴ The translator talks of how the author "showeth excellently how far the knowledge of man, whose eyes are spiritually opened, differeth from that knowledge that men acquire simply by hear-say or reading."⁵⁵

It is important to underline that Keith maintains some form of religious authority, even when attracted to the ideas of Tufaylian narrative. In his

Advertisement to the reader, Keith notes

The design of the Author is far (I believe) from perswading men to flight or refuse the help of outward means of knowledge, such as the testimonies of good and wise men; and indeed it is far from my own design, who have undertaken this Translation: It is the too much relying and resting upon them and neglecting *those native and inward testimonies in the soul and mind of man* it self, that both the scope of the Book and my design in the Translation doth fence against.⁵⁶

Keith does not reject "outward means" "such as the testimony of good and wise men" but actually uses them to confirm the value of individual experience. He further cautions the reader that s/he must not be surprised to find that "the author, or the person of whom he writeth hath been a good man, and far beyond many who have the name of Christians."⁵⁷

In justifying his translation of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, Keith quotes instances of (non-Christian) good men: did not Justin Martyr call Socrates a Christian?⁵⁸ In expounding an inclusive philosophy further, Keith quotes Augustine "nor do I think that the Jews dare contend that none belonged unto God but the Israelites" (*De Civitate Dei*, XVIII, 47) as well as the commentary of a compatriot of Ibn Tufayl, Luis Vives: "so great a matter it is to be willing to be good ... and in this sort of men what is wanting but water?" ... "Peter witnessing that some were filled with a divine inspiration, whom the mystical water had not touched ... cometh from the Son who enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world." The last two quotations highlight a point that was later to become a contentious issue amongst the Quakers themselves, i.e the action of baptism by water and how it is tied to redemption.⁵⁹ Even though Keith's response is ambivalent in this instance, it nevertheless underlines the acceptance of normative creeds. Was it then a question of Christology that drove Keith back to the dogma of the church, or would it be fair to assume that he never totally dissociates with the 'person' of Jesus?

While Keith was initially attracted to *Ḥayy ibn Yaḡzān* and even included several elements of the narrative into Quaker theology, his conversion to the Anglican church also indicates the rejection of some of the central motifs of the Tufaylian narrative. A question that might be raised in terms of Keith's *Advertisement* to the Tufaylian narrative is whether he maintained his original position on the role of revelation and the heavenly/earthly Christ with little change throughout his theological career.

The debates in Christology are somewhat parallel in nature to the discussion on the role of the Prophet and the Philosopher that was central to the *falāsifah*. Were the later positions that Keith took really very different from his original stance as expressed in the *Advertisement*, or was his original theology itself the balanced means between the early theologies of the Quakers and the later views of the Anglicans? One might be able to answer these questions by reiterating some of the basic differences between the early Quaker and the Keithian Quakers. Thus, the final return to baptism by the Keithian Quakers is not rejected in Keith's early views reflected in the *Advertisement*. The importance of the "purification through water" is underlined. It is represented as a ritual whose meaning is derived from the experience of the individual. The ritual in itself might define what a Christian is, but its absence in non-Christians does not exclude them from having a similar spiritual aptitude.

Keith's theology and the Tufaylian narrative

The early works of the first phase reflect the development of Keith's theology and its correlation with the Tufaylian narrative, that had a strong impact on the nascent Quaker movement. I have also looked at his works on Quaker theology written after his translation of *Ḥayy ibn Yaḡzān* to perceive what sort of impact the Tufaylian narrative had on the Quaker movement, what aspects were sustained in Keith's later theology, and finally, what elements of Quakerism were rejected by him and whether these were a dormant response to the Tufaylian narrative. This

study does not intend to examine the large body of Keith's works on the polemics against the Quakers, belonging to the last phase of his career, or be representative of the views of Keithian Quakers, except where they might underline a dialogical or dialectical response to the Tufaylian narrative.

Keith's major thesis, written in his early Quaker days at the Tollbooth of Aberdeen, was that *immediate Revelation* has not ceased but is a "remaining and perpetual Ordinance."⁶⁰ Keith spent much of the latter part of his career, refuting the earlier notions of the Quakers, as expounded in his own works and the works of his former colleagues. Two questions need to be posed: what were the theological notions expounded in his early works? where and why does a shift in his theological bent take place? Our analysis draws on the parallels between his earlier works and notions in the Tufaylian narrative, so that we might perceive the context within which Keith might have undertaken the translation. The analysis further suggests that the process of translation (by George Keith) raised an awareness on his part regarding the limitation of Quaker notions on the role of scripture. His attempts to reform such notions, including the sufficiency of Inner Light, may indicate a rejection of the seminal notions of Tufaylian narrative. The Tufaylian narrative had a strong impact on Keith with regard to its notion of inner light (=firah), in its critique of scriptural religion, and its ultimate observation of the insufficiency of inner light within society, that are encapsulated in developmental phases in Keith's career.

In his *Immediate Revelation* (1665),⁶¹ written prior to his translation of *Hayy ibn Yaqzān*, Keith relates his process of conversion to the Quaker movement:

It lay upon me from the Lord to depart from those teachers who could not point out the *living knowledge* of God where I could find it: and I came and heard men and women who were taught of God, who pointed me to the true principle; and though some of them could not read a letter, yet I found them wiser than all the teachers I ever formerly had been under.⁶²

One can see why the story of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān* would have appealed to the young Keith in relation to the notion of experience ("living knowledge") and unlettered wisdom. Here, we see the seed of Quakerism that Keith was first exposed to. In addition to this was the notion of "light within", like the innate nature or *fiṭrah* in the Tufaylian narrative. A salient point common to Keith's translation of the Tufaylian narrative and Quaker theology is his attraction to both as a fulfilment of the *living experience*.

Keith translated the Tufaylian narrative from the Latin in 1674. Both Pastor and Ockley in their critique of the Quakers' translation of the narrative assume that the central message is the "sufficiency of the Inner light", the exclusion of revelation and the role of the earthly Christ. "Not only has this [Keith's] translation played the most important historical role of all, but, as a work of art, ... it occupies an interesting position."⁶³

The process of appropriation and decentralization thus begins with the first English translation by Keith. The prologue, or *Advertisement to the Reader* in terms of the literary history of the text and biographical information on its primary author, basically repeats the details of the Latin preface by Pococke Sr. Even though Keith praises the author (Ibn Ṭufayl), the focus already shifts to the target audience to whom the translation is presented, and to whom it needs to be justified or explained.

The reception of the Tufaylian narrative in formative Quaker theology

Barclay included a summary of the Tufaylian narrative in his Latin *Apologia* (1677)

Yea, there is a book translated out of the Arabick, which gives an account of one *Hai Ebn Yockdan*, who, without converse of man, living in an island alone, attained to such profound knowledge of God as to have immediate converse with him, and to affirm that the best and the most certain knowledge of God is not that which is attained by premises premised, and conclusions deduced, but that which

is enjoyed by conjunction of the mind of man with the Supreme Intellect, after the mind is purified from its corruptions, and is separated from all bodily images, and is gathered into a profound stillness!⁶⁴

Barclay's quotation encapsulates his formulation of Quaker theology. Barclay's summary is in agreement with the general reception of the narrative during the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries (with the exception of Ockley). The final episode of Hayy's meeting with Absāl is also de-emphasized in the other translations and generally omitted by reviewers such as Twells. Barclay's summary appears misleading, if it is seen to ignore the rational and intellectual developments in Hayy as "knowledge of God ... is not attained by premises premised and conclusions deduced." However, it is not clear whether Barclay meant to reject the rational means described by Ibn Tufayl, or whether he wished to emphasize that immediate knowledge cannot be deduced in the final analysis, which concurs with the views presented in the Tufaylian narrative.⁶⁵

Barclay's *Apology* is considered among the most authoritative statements of Quaker principles and a significant theological work of the second half of the seventeenth century England. According to Pastor, "Barclay broke through the Presbyterian system of Quakerism and added the explicitly formulated experience of "Inner Light." One must remember that Barclay was inspired to join the Quaker movement through Keith's example and most of their early works were formulated (if not written) together. While the changes in the direction of Quaker theology after the translation of *Hayy ibn Yaqzān* may not be totally traced to it, there are definite shifts with Barclay and Keith that are quite different from George Fox's earlier formulations.

For Barclay and the early Keith, religion was to be an intimate experience, growing out of the innate capacity of human nature. The human being must *wait* for Grace, the seed (*cf. fiṭrah*) that is in the hearts of all men.⁶⁶ Thus, Barclay further laid emphasis on individual experience: "Draw water out of you ... let it be your own and not another's!"⁶⁷ Barclay rejected baptism by water as an

external act. Here, baptism is represented by inner transformation. "All men, whether Christian or heathen, are born to the light and can be saved by the light only."⁶⁸ This humanistic principle was an attempt to evolve some kind of super-Christianity - "that parallel between a kind of natural Platonism and an enlightened intellectual Muhammadanism [sic] which we find in the concluding paragraphs of the story of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*."⁶⁹

The tension between universalist and particularist approaches is evident in Quaker theology, as it also is in the attempt by Ibn Ṭufayl to reconcile individual spirituality with revelation. There is an inherent logical paradox, but the spiritual goal, though it may utilize the structure of the rational, is considered a step beyond the rational and is dependent on divine "grace." In his later critique of the Quakers, Keith presents their views as "all who lived conform unto that divine reason and word in them, and which is in all men (as said the above-mentioned Author, in one of his Apologies) were and are Christians." In this last phase, Keith critiqued the contradictions between universal salvation that was countermanded by the notion of the "elect" among the Quakers.⁷⁰ This dialectic is prevalent in various forms of spirituality and philosophy that tend to denote relations in terms of opposition.⁷¹

In this case, Keith suggests that the universality of the light without the revealed message would allow for universal salvation even for "heathens." This is a tacit acknowledgement of other ways beside the way of Christ. This universal approach to particularist religion is often reflected, though marginalized, in the works of sufis and Muslim mystics such as Ibn 'Arabī, Rūmī and Kabīr, whose poetry speaks of the presence of Divine that is neither in the Ka'bah, nor in the church but in the heart of the believer, or who speak of a God who is both Hindu and Muslim, Rām and Raḥīm.⁷² Given the sectarian climate that rejected the approaches of different groups within Christianity, the seriousness of Keith's suggestion should be measured in the context of the time and its expected norms. Further, the governing relations between conquered and conqueror, savage and civilized, were also pronounced in Western Christian approaches to Islam during

this period.

A bone of contention that was to eventually divide the Friends was the question of sacramentalism.⁷³ Keith's actions were publicly denounced by the Quaker leaders such as William Penn in 1694. Keith gathered a congregation of Christian (or Keithian) Quakers who retained the speech and dress of the old faith but were inclined to compromise with orthodoxy.⁷⁴ The sacraments of baptism and communion were re-established among the Christian Quakers. The early Quakers were attacked in pamphlets like *The Deism of William Penn and His Brethren ... exposed* (1699). A year later, Keith made his farewell sermon. In 1702, Keith was formally ordained as an Anglican clergyman and carried his polemical attacks into the enemy camp.

Unwittingly, through the process of dividing the Society of Friends, Keith contributed to legitimizing the Quakers. Efforts at maintaining unity amongst its members led the Quaker leaders to adhere to the basic dogmas of Christianity. Thus, "the Society of Friends became respectable... *enthusiasm* of any kind went out of fashion, ... and the bones of prosperous merchants quaked but moderately. The fiery spirit was extinguished in the worthy pursuit of organized charity. 'Truth is the same, God is the same, his people are the same, their principles the same, although George Keith is not the same'."⁷⁵

In a later defense against his own early works, Keith is critical of "the Quaker's common notion (though in plain contradiction to their practice) that God by his Spirit inwardly enlightening them, gives them all they need to know of God for eternal salvation, *without the means of the Holy Scriptures*."⁷⁶ The role of revealed religion and its creed is also a central problem in the Tufaylian narrative. It is introduced into Quaker theology by Keith who emphasized the importance of the experience, but later recognized the necessity of creed. The notion of creed is explicated through the function of baptism in Christianity and the debates that encircle it within the inter-sectarian polemics. Although the connections between the Tufaylian text and Quaker theology are important, those aspects that attracted George Keith to the Quaker movement and the Tufaylian narrative are ultimately

rejected by him *after* his translation. This suggests the possibility that the translation of the Tufaylian narrative may also have resulted in a translation of his own theology.

The deliberate shift in Keith's understanding makes a placid undertaking of correlations between the Tufaylian narrative and the Quaker theology redundant, without the acknowledgement of the future change of events. This shift in perspective rests on the very same questions raised in the Tufaylian narrative and refuted in Keith's later works.

Once Keith realized the full implications that his early theology had on the rejection of Christian creed, he recanted such views and sought to establish a dogma within the Quaker movement. In other words, the translation of the Tufaylian narrative brought George Keith face to face with some of the problems of reason and revelation, especially in relation to the adherence of dogma. Thus, the Tufaylian narrative might have played the role of allowing Keith to confront the question of Revelation; specifically, the role of the Scripture, prophetology (Christology), the reception of divine revelation and the distinction between individual experience and divine prophetic revelation. Keith first sought to reform Quaker theology from within. His critique of Barclay who "subverts the very fundamental of Christian faith, and introduces Deism and Natural Religion though ... he intended no subversion of Christ," is tempered with the recognition of his sincerity.⁷⁷

Beside espousing the causes of the Quakers and the Anglicans at different phases, Keith always emphasized certain elements that remained part of his theology from the beginning to the end. He believed in the "inner light" but never wholehearted rejected "external means." In fact, his constant battle with other leaders among the Quakers and his ultimate apostasy stems from his attempt to reconcile individual experience and revelation. In pragmatic terms, Keith finally returns not to the Tufaylian island of his inner being, but to the conversion of the settlements in North America as member of the Anglican mission of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel.⁷⁸

Keith's career always reflected his individual stance on touchy issues such as slavery and the emancipation of women, as well his vocal and later polemical debates within the Quaker movement. Beside his theology, Keith believed in the "Liberty and Privilege of Women."⁷⁹ His pamphlet against slavery is also considered the first printed work on the subject in North America.⁸⁰ He raised these issues that later became the dominant philosophies amongst Quaker women suffragists. Thus, despite the split among the Quakers, Keith's influence remained through the continuation of his reformist ideology.

Despite Keith's refutation of his earlier theology in several works, including *The Standard of the Quakers examined, or an answer to the apology of Robert Barclay*, his translation continued to be the focus for disclaiming the views of the Quakers.⁸¹ This factor emphasizes the impact of Keith's ideas on the formation of the Quaker theology of his time, of which we have great evidence through the extensive use of his early works, including the translation of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*.

George Ashwell and the Indian Prince

The second English translation from Pococke's Latin version was accomplished by George Ashwell (1612-1695) in 1686. Ashwell's purpose was markedly different from Keith's. Unlike Ockley, Ashwell does not present his translation as a polemical defense. In fact, Ashwell's preface underlines quite explicitly the moral value of providing a translation that is accessible to the general public. He thus transforms the lingering Latinism of the earlier translation into a simple, charming and accessible narrative.

Ashwell was an Anglo-Catholic born in the Parish of St. Martin's Ludgate in November 1612. He studied at Wadham College, Oxford and was strongly influenced by Peter Heylyn (1600-1662), a controversial geographer and vocal supporter of the rights of the Church. Ashwell supported religious freedom and induced Heylyn to publish his *Parliament's Power in Laws for Religion*, at a time when the latter had been officially declared delinquent and wandered in disguise

from village to village.⁸² Ashwell thus responded to a tension between church and state and their respective roles. The naturalism of Deist movement may have inspired Ashwell to translate the Tufaylian narrative. Further, it is reflective of the struggle over sectarian ideologies, politicized by James II attempt to legislate toleration, which was perceived as a support for the Papists.⁸³

Ashwell was fortunate to gain financial independence when he was about thirty-five years old. His chaplaincy to Sir Anthony Cope of Hanwell in Oxfordshire provided him with leisure to pursue his literary and philosophical studies. His studious works further gained him the Rectorship of Hanwell in 1658. His writings were thus conducted in the calm and peace of his life as rector of Hanwell, where he followed the spread of Socinian literature in England.⁸⁴ Due to this strong interest and the common antecedents of Socinion literature and Quakerism, Ashwell himself was sometimes mistaken to be a Quaker.⁸⁵

Ashwell's "Preface and the "Theologus Ruris"

Ashwell's last work is his translation of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* (1686), written when he was seventy-three years old,⁸⁶ whereas the other two English translations were the works of young men, Keith being thirty-five and Ockley, thirty years old.

As in the case of Keith's *Advertisement*, Ashwell's *Epistle Dedicatory*⁸⁷ and *Preface*⁸⁸ reflect limited knowledge about Ibn Ṭufayl, primarily gained through the Latin preface by Pococke, Sr. However, Ashwell's bases for undertaking the translation indicate a shift in the transmission and reception of the Tufaylian narrative. The two major reasons that are prevalent in his *Preface* and *Epistle Dedicatory* are i) the moral value of providing a text of this nature to a licentious generation; ii) to provide a translation that is accessible and that explains the method of understanding the Divine through creation without metaphysical obscurantism.⁸⁹ The translation thus marks another milestone in its journey into the popularized text that would be later reiterated in the anonymous translation on *Don Trezzanio* (discussed further below).

Ashwell's translation of the Tufaylian narrative is based on the Latin translation by Pococke. The translation by George Ashwell marks the Anglo-Scottish revival of individual justification and a romantic attitude toward nature. Some elements of romanticism might be evinced from the title of the translation: *The History of Hai Ebn Yockdan, an Indian Prince: or, the Self-Taught Philosopher. Written originally in the Arabick tongue, by Abi Jaafar Ebn Tophail, a philosopher by profession and a Mahometan by religion. Wherein is demonstrated, by what steps and degrees, human reason, improved by diligent observation and experience, may arrive to the knowledge of natural things, and from thence to the discovery of Supernatural; more especially of God, and the concernments of the other world.*⁹⁰

Ashwell mentions the author and his background and sets the context of his translation. His explanatory preface is neither apologetic nor moralistic, even though it is critical of the tendencies of the current "licentious generation." He does not try to defend Christianity as Ockley does. Ashwell retains Pococke's notion of *Philosophus Autodidactus*, possibly assuming it to be part of Ibn Tufayl's design, to which he had no direct access due to his lack of Arabic. However, his additions of the notion of the *Indian Prince*, which is an accurate description of Ḥayy in relation to the first version of his birth to a princess, indicates a shift in emphasis from autodidacticism to romanticism.

Ashwell evokes the romantic imagery that incidentally ties his response to the antecedent Alexander and Hermetistic narratives. Thus, the 'story' occupies the central stage and theoretical discussions are excluded from his translation. Further, Ashwell includes *observation* and *experience*, along with *human reason* as means of discovering *God* and the *other world*, that are not primary in the translation by Pococke.

Ashwell is selective in his translation. He emphasizes the story, excluding the prologue, scientific descriptions and the spontaneous generation of Ḥayy. Along with the translation, Ashwell also added a work of his own entitled

Theologus Ruris, or the Book of Nature, Leading us, by certain degrees, to the knowledge and Worship of the God of Nature. The similarity of the title is one indication of the impact of Ibn Ṭufayl's narrative. Ashwell thus sees nature as a sure path leading to God, whereby the human creature can "contemplate the image of God with steady eyes in these inferior Looking-glasses of his Works ... and value His divine Wisdom without having respect to thine own interest and advantage."⁹¹

In his *Epistle Dedicatory* to Viscount Tuam that precedes the *Preface*, Ashwell hopes to "not only please [the reader] for the *rarity* of the subject but profit [him] also in some measure and degree, in regard of its commodiousness and seasonableness; among the men of this licentious generation, whereof some are too loose in their practices, the one living by no rule, and the other by no certain one, but giddily following their own phanices, or other mens opinions, whom they have unadvisedly chosen for the Guides of their faith and manners."⁹²

Ashwell sees Hayy as a perfect example to be emulated

Whereas the Philosopher, whose life is here described, will instruct them in such principles of Morality and Religion, and such alone, as the *light of Nature discovers*, and which must needs be acknowledged for True by all those, who will judge and act as Men, according to the dictates of reason, and the Conclusions resulting from experience.

It also provides a guiding principle for others. It would allow for harmony between various groups, if they followed its lead on nature, the supernatural and the divine.

And I heartily wish indeed, that all of us were arrived even thus far, by the guidance of this light, and agreed in such principles as humane reason teacheth out of the Book of Nature, which sets forth to our view God's works of creation and providence. For this foundation being laid, there would be more hopes of agreement about that, which the

Supernatural light of revelation discovers to our faith, and superstructs thereupon."

The question of reason and revelation is not an issue for Ashwell. His analysis is refreshing because it makes one ponder whether this question has been over-emphasized, and whether it really not perceived as a problem by mystics of all faiths.

The Preface: An explication of the Divine mirror of nature

Ashwell's version is by far the most readable of the early translations, and perhaps the most focussed on the idea of the Tufaylian narrative, without the emphasis on the self-taught philosopher to the exclusion of the mystic end. It explicates the relation between nature, creation and the supernatural.

The design of the author in this book is to shew, how far a person of an excellent wit, and towardly disposition, being destitute of Humane society, and consequently without the direction and assistance of any other man may advance himself in knowledge, by improving his own reason to the utmost pitch, in the search of things both natural and above nature, with the sole help and exercise of his own meditation and observations upon it.⁹³

Ashwell inherits the notion of *philosophus autodidactus* from the Latin source of his translation. Yet, he adds the emphasis on the role of nature and the supernatural.

Ashwell sees the work as a *guide* that is more effective, and clearer than the confused opinions of his own time. "Wherein he [Ibn Ṭufayl] discovers and prescribes a method unto those, who will apply themselves to such contemplations, and delight to make considerable progress in them; such a safe and easie method as may be very serviceable and useful to this present age; an age so much inclined to *fanaticism*, sadducism and atheism."⁹⁴ This response by Ashwell indicates the possibility of the ideal of universalism (at least within Christianity) as opposed to the extensive sectarian groupings during this period.

Ashwell further expounds the principles of rational mysticism: *He treads indeed a new unbeaten path, wherein by set and orderly degrees, he brings his readers at length to the knowledge of God, and the upper world; beyond which steps, thus by him discovered and forepassed, no man can proceed any farther, but by the Light and Guidance of Divine revelation.*⁹⁵ The translation by Ashwell is much less didactic and is presented in a flowing style, quite unlike the other translations of his contemporaries. Perhaps, this is due to the age and maturity of the translator, whereas, the Latin translation by the young Pococke was considered awkward and literalistic.

Ashwell's translation confidently presents the narrative in terms of his philosophy of nature. The translation reflects a shift in expectations from grandiose philosophies to the pastoral naturalism of the Anglo-Scottish revival. The narrative is presented on its own terms, despite the exclusion of theoretical aspects such as spontaneous generation that Ashwell considered redundant. Likewise, Ashwell sees no need to justify his translation in relation to Christian teachings. He recognizes its universal elements and its edifying value in being able to convey knowledge in an experiential mode, rather than a theoretical discourse.

Ashwell also considers the eschatological content of the narrative. He reflects that notions of afterlife are not the subject matter of natural philosophy and supposes that they "are taken out of the Alcoran, the author of this History being a Mahometan by Religion. Yet, he brings in his Self Taught Philosopher making some Exceptions against that Book, as it was described to him by his friend Asal, and taxing it of Imperfection in several particulars, whereto He makes no particular reply."⁹⁶ Ibn Ṭufayl's rejection of society and his implicit critique of the levity within the Qur'ānic worldview is the type of material that Christian polemics could thrive on. However, Ashwell does not take such a theological stance. While noting that the author drew from his religious context, he includes Ibn Ṭufayl's critique of it, but does not use it to emphasize the virtues of Christianity.

Ashwell is cognisant and appreciative of the current streams of his time, such as the Deist movement.

It must be granted indeed, that some very ingenuous and learned men of this latter age, have endeavoured to demonstrate the main fundamental truths of religion by the light of human reason and the principles of natural theology. ... *when I consider the discourse of these learned men ... consists for the general, of such notions and proofs, as are too subtle, sublime and metaphysical for common understandings: so that they leave still in the dark*
...⁹⁷

Simplicity is the key-word in Ashwell's approach to the Tufaylian narrative, "*Whereas this author proceeds by such gentle steps, in an easy and familiar way of reasoning, which is obvious to everyone's apprehension, that he leads his reader insensibly onward, without any toilsom[e] labour, or perplexing of his Brains, in the search of the Truth, till he have brought him, before he is aware, unto the end of his journey.*"⁹⁸

Ashwell thus indicates the limitations of natural philosophy, if pursued in a theoretical or metaphysical mode. Clearly, his attraction of the Tufaylian narrative is based on the ability and ease by which it leads the reader to an understanding and attainment of spiritual goals, rather than as a vehicle of secular naturalistic philosophies.

Ashwell uses analogies such as Jacob's ladder to indicate the ascent to Divine truth: "like the easy ascent of winding stairs, which conduct to the top of a high tower, or Pyramid, such as that in Egypt: or rather, like the leisurely mounting of Jacob's Ladder, whereon he saw the Angels ascending, as well as descending; for like the Rounds of that, are the degrees whereby he conducts to his reader, till he have brought him up to the very top of the ladder, where God presents Himself unto his view."⁹⁹

The translators present the narrative as an answer to the moral and spiritual conscience of the different periods when it was written as well as translated, from

Ibn Ṭufayl's own time onwards. "The History then, being thus Englished, and so communicated to the view of all, whereas before it was locked up to most in an unknown [Latin or Arabic] language, may, I hope, prove not altogether unuseful unto many in this idol world and voluptuous age, wherein men generally seek after little else besides the concerns of this present life, studying and busying themselves about their profit or their pleasure."¹⁰⁰

Ashwell's emphasizes the observation of nature and the self-taught philosopher. The emphasis on the self-taught may have been less prevalent if Ashwell had access to the original Arabic text. Ashwell further emphasizes the empathic response to nature as a reflection of the Divine. He indicates the importance of action as opposed to theory. Thus, the rational aspect is a means toward the attainment of the spiritual experience. Likewise, the absence of a human master is not merely a method of emphasizing Ḥayy's rational mode of autodidacticism. Such an absence rejuvenates Ḥayy's quest for the Demiurge who is present in all creation to the degree that they prepare themselves to receive the Light. Thus, Ḥayy's autodidacticism is not bound by the limits of the human intellect, but is extended by its capacity to imitate and reflect on the natural and spiritual universe, which is the major pivot in the translation by Ashwell.

Ashwell advocates the need for simplicity and a degree of asceticism within his society, a suggestion that is very similar to Ḥayy's critique of Salāmān's society. The translation is a response to the contemporary society. Ashwell critiques the tendencies of his time "in heaping up riches with much care and toil, or spending their days in ease and carnal delights ... and making it their study how they may pass away their time without any care or trouble at all," responding in parallel terms to Ibn Ṭufayl's critique of materialism in the narrative. As a resolution to such a state, Ashwell indicates how "this history shows the true and genuine concerns of humane life, with the means of obtaining that felicity, which man was born for ... [by the] useful exercise of those faculties which God hath bestowed upon us, and improving them to the best advantage, by an industrious and continued experiment of all things that come in our way, ... and making

proper observations upon them, as this self-taught philosopher is said to have done; and as any other man is capable of doing in like manner, who is endued with the same sagacity of mind, and ingenuity of disposition."¹⁰¹

He further presents the translation as a practical manual for those who need to develop the wisdom and disposition that leads to divine knowledge: "And such as are not, may be his scholars, and learn with more ease such lessons as these, by what they find him to have experimented and observed."¹⁰²

Ashwell applies the spirituality and naturalism of the narrative to his own spiritual vision and concludes his accompanying treatise on *Theologus Ruris or The Book of Nature*:

If we mind Heaven while we live here upon Earth,
this Earth will serve to conduct us unto Heaven, ...
by that Ladder seen of Jacob in his nightly Vision at
Bethel, which was set indeed on the Earth, but the
Top of it reached unto Heaven (Gen. 28.12)¹⁰³

Simon Ockley

Simon Ockley (1678-1720) was the first English translator of the Tufaylian narrative directly from the Arabic. Ockley's transmission is a continuance of the academic process that was initiated by the Pocockes.¹⁰⁴ Among the three translators discussed, the life and career of Ockley most clearly highlights the process of translation in relation to the social conditions of the time.¹⁰⁵ He might be counted among the earliest Orientalists, following on the footsteps of his teacher, Edward Pococke Sr. Ockley remains best known as the author of the *History of the Saracens*, which he based on Bodleian manuscripts ascribed to al-Wākidī, Abū al-Fidā and others.¹⁰⁶ He is considered among the first scholars in Europe, who shifted the scope of Oriental and Arabic Studies from their focus on mathematics and astrology to works of literature and history. Ockley appreciated the aesthetic value of Muslim civilization. He noted that "there is some satisfaction in answering the end of my profession, in making new

discoveries, the hopes of obliging my country with the history of the greatest Empire the world ever yet saw."¹⁰⁷

Ockley's major opus, *The History of the Saracens*¹⁰⁸ is among the earliest attempts to set down a historical record of Islam, that was utilized by his contemporaries and later writers such as Prideaux and Gibbon whose works were more widely disseminated to a general audience.¹⁰⁹ When we look at the works of the latter authors who had little or no knowledge of the "Saracens" and their languages, Arabic, Persian or Turkish, we see a perpetuation of stereotypes of the Turk, the Moor and the Arab -- Mahomet and Saladin -- that persisted in European literature and history. Oriental Studies was emerging as an extensive "area study" that could be conceptualized, theorized and commented upon within the new frames of reference that drew directly or indirectly from the prevalent ideologies of expansion.¹¹⁰ Ockley extolled the important contribution of Arabic literature and philosophy in the Inaugural lecture on his appointment as Lingard Professor of Arabic at Cambridge in 1711.¹¹¹

Gibbon thought Ockley was "an original in every sense," and made ample use of his works. He declared that the *History of the Saracens* was written "in a clear and natural style. ... [H]e draws his material from the Arabic Mss. of Oxford, which he would have more deeply searched, had he been confined to the Bodleian library instead of the [Cambridge] city jail: a fate how unworthy of the man and of his country."¹¹² Ockley had been imprisoned in the gaol at Cambridge for debts amounting to less than two hundred pounds. He died in 1720, when he was only forty-two years old, "disheartened of misery, exhausted and battered by academic and ecclesiastical dunces."¹¹³

The account given by Isaac Disraeli in his *Calamities of Authors*¹¹⁴ confirms the difficult circumstances that dogged Ockley's life and scholarship. Disraeli noted that "At a time when oriental studies were in their infancy in this country, Simon Ockley devoted his life and fortune to these *novel* researches." The orient was the "other" and to be able to study it with the semblance of objectivity at that time was a struggle in itself. Ockley was faced with criticism

and prejudice with regard to his choice of studies, just as Narboni and his works were considered reflective of shifting loyalties. In both cases, these authors used their studies as a point of departure.

Ockley was constantly pressured by the politics of patronage. He complained of "that hypocritical curiosity which pretends to take an interest in things it cares little about; perpetually inquiring, as soon as a work is announced, when it is to come out." He was further frustrated "by those pretended patrons who appointing 'a professor of oriental languages' counteract the purpose of the professorship by their utter neglect of the professor, whose stipend cannot keep him on the spot where only he ought to dwell."¹¹⁵ His limited stipend and his debt often placed him in a position where he was forced to serve "heretical" causes. One example is the study by William Whiston (1667-1752), *Primitive Christianity Revived* which included Ockley's translation of the apocryphal *Book of Esdras* from the Arabic version that he had accepted as a paid assignment, rather than having undertaken it as independent scholarly research.¹¹⁶

Oriental studies responded to the image of the Orient that validated its study. Ockley was always put on the defensive regarding his research. He came from a poor economic background and had to struggle to achieve the patronage on which academic positions were established. Even when he was appointed Professor of Arabic at Cambridge, he was unable to support himself on the meagre stipend, nor was he able to obtain support to purchase books for the library and for his research. "Such was the plaudit the oriental student received."¹¹⁷ Scholarly research in Oriental Studies, as opposed to the popular "vulgar" polemic studies such as the biography on Muhammad by Prideaux, was not generally patronized. Ockley related, "A reverend dignitary asked me if, when I wrote that book"¹¹⁸ [volume 1 of the *History of the Saracens* in 1708] I had not lately been reading the history of Oliver Cromwell?"¹¹⁹ This citation reflects the pressure to conform to the governing political ideologies.

The changing political climate of the time laid additional stress on intellectual scholarship that was tied either to the crown or the parliament.

Consider the description of Ockley by Thomas Hearne at Oxford in 1701 as the "best skilled of any man in England ... [who] ought to be encouraged ... if he lives to see learning once more encouraged in England, which at present it is not."¹²⁰ The statement expounds some of the problems that Ockley encountered by his choice of area, his lack of patrons, his poor etiquette on social occasions and the perceived decline of intellectual research in his time.

In this period of colonial expansion, and nationalist tendencies, it was wondered why scholars and students would devote themselves to non-patriotic studies. Ockley's *History of the Saracens* is not free of the prejudices of early Oriental scholarship, but given the time frame, and in comparison to the polemical works of the period, it is at the least an attempt to study other cultures and religious traditions.

Ockley challenged prevailing attitudes: "He perhaps was the first who exhibited to us in the East other heroes than those of Rome and Greece, sages as contemplative, and a people more magnificent than those iron masters of the world."¹²¹ Indeed, the utilization of primary sources may be considered a significant means of providing a true picture. Even in this area, Ockley was aware of the limitations which his access to material and languages placed him. His lament on the lack of sufficient access to primary sources is a covert acknowledgement of the type of generalizations that were possible in Oriental Studies. He was devoted to his research in Islam, evident in his attempts and frustration to gain fluency in Persian: "How often have I endeavoured to perfect myself in that language, but my malignant and envious stars still frustrated any attempts; but they shall sooner alter their courses than extinguish my resolution of quenching that thirst which little I have had of it hath already excited."¹²²

How a writer's life and works reflect and contrast with the horizon of expectations of her/his time is worth observing in the case of Simon Ockley. Ockley's dedication and adherence to his chosen profession is contrasted by his inability to remain true to it due to societal pressures. While in contrast to his less informed colleagues, Ockley's approach to "Oriental" history and culture fulfils

the expectations of his time, by the inclusion of the orthodox defense of Christianity and the implicit refutation of the Tufaylian narrative in the long appendix. Ockley is finally a product of his time who receives and reflects its prejudices toward Islam and Muhammad. Ockley's life experiences help us understand some of the reasons for the two ideologically contrasted acts, his translation of the apocryphal *Book of Esdras* that was commissioned by William Whiston (1667-1652) in his revival of Aryan Christianity;¹²³ and the inclusion of the appendix by which he fulfils the expectations of his time, rather than set down the context of Islamic philosophy.

Much of Ockley's sorrow and his triumph over disappointment is expressed in the preface to the last volume of his *History*, written at a time when he was confined to prison at Cambridge Castle for debt. Talking about his history, he notes:

Had I not been forced to snatch everything that I have as it were, out of the fire, our Saracen history should have been ushered into the world after a different manner.¹²⁴

Ockley was a perfectionist to a degree of paranoia, who feared that any lack in his work would be ascribed to his indolence or negligence when it "ought more justly be attributed to the influence of inexorable necessity, could I have been master of my own time and circumstances."¹²⁵

Ockley's eccentricities placed him in a position of having to apologize to retain the favour of patrons and Nobles.¹²⁶ Examples of non-conformity are characteristic among intellectuals. One might recall the reports on Fārābī who would appear in the Baghdadian court, dressed in his traditional Central Asian garb, and thus irk the cosmopolitan clique, who tried to poison the Caliph's mind against him.¹²⁷

Ockley was certainly very cynical and bitter about his suffering and experiences: "Fortune seems only to have given me a taste of it out of spite, on purpose that I might regret the loss of it." However, his dedication allowed him

to persevere, despite his personal and financial problems: "I was forced to take advantage of the slumber of my cares, that never slept when I was awake; and if they did not incessantly interrupt my studies, were sure to succeed them with no less constancy than night doth the day." Disraeli notes that "the close of Ockley's preface shows a love-like tenderness for his studies; although he must quit life without bringing them to perfection, he opens his soul to posterity."¹²⁸

Reflecting on the limitations and circumstances of his times, Ockley notes that [future] students "will hardly come in upon the prospect of finding leisure, in a prison, to transcribe those papers for the press which they have collected, with indefatigable labour, and oftentimes at the expense of their rest, and all the other conveniences of life, for the service of the public." In a sense, Ockley lives out the role of the intellectual in society, who is like the weed in Ibn Bājjah, and the solitary in Ibn Ṭufayl. Ockley's letters to the Earl Oxford, written from the prison, reflect his solitary nature that could make a prison an ideal island.¹²⁹

Ockley's imprisonment, like Ḥayy's island, allowed him to pursue his academic desires unrestrained by the limitation of society and its theologies. "The exulting martyr of literature" makes the best of a bad situation.

I can assure them from my own experience, that I have enjoyed more true liberty, more happy leisure, and more solid repose ... here, Evil is the condition of that historian who undertakes to write the lives of others before he knows how to live himself. Yet, I have no just reason to be angry with the world. I never stood in need of its assistance in my life but I found it always very liberal of its advice; for which I am so much the more beholden to it, by how much the more I did always in my judgement give the possession of wisdom the preference to that of riches.¹³⁰

Some aspects of the above quotation reflect the application of the philosophy of the Tufaylian narrative, though they barely disguise the cynicism of the speaker. In the case of Pococke and Ockley, we see a vignette of the scholar's life, tied to the university and dependent of patronage, especially in a discipline like Oriental,

or Arabic Studies.

One can see why the Tufaylian narrative and its demarcation of perfection and balance would have appealed to Ockley. The Tufaylian narrative is certainly different in nature from most of the other works that Ockley undertook, including his *History* and the Appendix. It reflects the evocative circumstances of his own life; its achievement of perfection and calm was something that he yearned for in his own career but was not able to find.

The political climate of nationalism provoked criticism on Ockley's choice of subject. He relates the rebuke rendered for not focussing on a History of Oliver Cromwell. It was a period of growing patriotism in England that evoked a strong pride in the presentation of history. Ockley received veiled praise and criticism as "only one Englishman (Simon Ockley) of that time wrote a history in a style that, in itself, makes his book valuable, and he did not write English History."¹³¹ A 'reading' (of the sub-text) of Ockley's works of history reflect its constraints and prejudices that mirror his response to the political currents that abounded at the time.

Back to the source - Ockley's translation from the Arabic

The translation of *Hayy ibn Yaqzān* by Simon Ockley was acclaimed as the first English translation from the original Arabic. The following text appears on the title page: *The Improvement of Human Reason Exhibited in the Life of Hai Ebn Yokdhan: Written in Arabick above 500 Years ago, by Abu Jaafar Ebn Tophail. In which is demonstrated By what Methods one may, by the meer Light of Nature, attain the Knowledg[e] of things Natural and Supernatural; more particularly the Knowledg of God and the Affairs of another Life. Illustrated with proper Figures. Newly translated from the Original Arabick by Simon Ockley, A.M. Vicar of Swaveseu in Cambridgeshire. With an Appendix, In which the Possibility of Man's attaining the True Knowledg of God, and Things necessary to Salvation, without Instruction, is briefly consider'd* (1708).

Ockley dedicates the translation to Edward Pococke Jr., whose efforts "put into a capacity to travel through Europe."¹³² In his *Preface*, Ockley indicates

The design of the author is to show how human capacity, unassisted by any external help, may, by due application, attain to the knowledge of natural things, and so by degrees find out its dependence upon a Superior being, the immortality of the soul, and all things necessary to salvation."¹³³

Pastor observes that the translator neglects to mention the latter part of the work and "the final agreement between the truths discovered by Hayy and the teaching of Muhammadan [*sic*] theology."¹³⁴ Pastor wonders why the translators who defend their position against the "enthusiastic notions" of the book barely comment on its harmonization of individual experience with revealed religion and scriptures. The reason may be simple but possibly insidious. The latter part of the book might be seen to validate the Muslim scriptures and revealed religion. Although it can be applied to other scriptural religions, such an acknowledgement would imply the legitimacy of another standard of behaviour. "The romance was a suspect book, and it was important to make one's disagreement with its dangerous influence known."¹³⁵ Without a validation of its primary author, the reader and translator is free to select whatever s/he wishes from the narrative, whether applicable to inner light, autodidacticism, or natural theology.

This "other" is especially evident through Ockley's defense of normative Christianity in the Appendix. By presenting the author's (Ibn Tufayl's) views as interesting but problematic, the translators were able to avoid the necessity of answering any questions about the validity of Islam in non-polemic terms. In the final analysis, the views presented by this Muslim philosopher were 'suspect'. They allowed one to play the fantasy of individual spiritual freedom from revealed religion, without compromising the legitimacy of [normative or alternative] Christianity. The latter part of the Tufaylian narrative has often been seen as a justification of orthodox Islam, and it might be the reason why the translators generally tended to de-emphasize this section.

Ockley's 'Preface,' the 'Booksellers' Introduction and the 'Appendix'

In the *Preface*, Ockley acknowledges the existence of two previous English translations by Ashwell and the Quakers, but since neither of these were translated directly from the Arabic, he assumes that "they had mistaken the sense of the author in many places."¹³⁶ He himself does not cite such textual errors in their translations. He further includes occasional footnotes to the text of his translation, primarily on the philosophers cited in the Introduction (Prologue).

In the *Preface*, Ockley also alludes to the "enthusiastic notions" of the author (Ibn Tufayl) that were picked up by the early translators, more specifically "the Quakers who imagined that there was something in it that favoured their Enthusiastic notions."¹³⁷ This statement lays the foundation for the necessity of an *Appendix* to refute such views.¹³⁸ The critique presented is aimed at contemporary Christian groups, rather than at Ibn Tufayl or the narrative *per se*.

There is a distinction between the *preface* and the *appendix*. With regard to the narrative and its author, Ockley renders an equivocal verdict of praise in the *preface*.

'Tis certain, that he was a Man of Parts and very good Learning, considering the age he lived in, and the way of studying in those Times. There are a great many lively Stroaks in it; and I doubt not but a judicious Reader will find his Account in the Perusal of it.¹³⁹

The rationale for the appendix is first presented to the readers by the bookseller. The introduction by *The Bookseller to the Reader*, presents a summary on the author, some information on the background and the contribution of the study. This introduction repeats almost verbatim some parts of Ockley's preface that precedes it, but adds a brief summary of the story and some of the sources of its peripatetic philosophy. It is useful to [early] readers unfamiliar with the inter-relation of Greek philosophy and Islamic thought.

A question that might be posed is why the Bookseller adds this introduction, since Ockley had already included a preface. The only reason is that

"it must be confess'd indeed, that when he [Ibn Tufayl] comes to talk of the Union of God, &c [etc.] (as in the Introduction), there are some Enthusiastic Notions, which are particularly considered and refuted by the Editor in his Appendix."¹⁴⁰ Some questions still remain regarding the function of the appendix and the introduction by the bookseller. They suggest that Ockley was requested to add the appendix when the book went to the press, either by the bookseller or some other patron.

The primary thesis that Ockley presents in the *Appendix* is that "Prophecy cannot be attained by any application of industry," and "what was not enjoyed in the early times of Christianity, when the gifts of the spirit were more plentifully pour'd out cannot be expected now." The necessity of the *Appendix* is "lest any Person should, through mistake, make ill use of it, ... the Design of which the Reader may see in its proper place."¹⁴¹ The Appendix also fulfils the perennial function of the prologue or epilogue as a form of dissemination, apologetics or explanatory gloss. Ockley's defence of prophecy in the Appendix is two-fold, one to refute the views of the work itself, and two to nullify the interest that it drew among the Quakers.

The Appendix by Ockley does not present a critique of the Tufaylian narrative, as much as a defence of Christian apologetics. It basically represents an analysis of the theological questions that were central to the inter-Christian sectarian debates. These issues include the notion of Divine Light, of Immediate Revelation, whether the *Beatifik* vision can be attained without the assistance of Prophets, whether it can be attained by the individual without the aid of Scriptures, whether it is graced only on Prophets, and their spokespersons (priests), and whether it is universal (includes *heathens*) or is particular to Christianity, and questions in relation to Christology, such as the 'person' of Christ, his humanity - issues that provoked heated debate and polemics in the seventeenth century.

The *Appendix* is a justification of the reasons why he undertook to translate this work, as well as an explanation of the Christian dogma on notions such as

prophecy and redemption. In the final analysis, it is a refutation of the view that the "Vision of God" is superior to the function of prophesying, and rejects its attainment by the individual.

The table below presents the "contents" of the Appendix. In this section, we will further highlight citations from Ockley's appendix that relate to the Tufaylian narrative, or reflect a critique of Quaker theology. The appendix is divided into twenty-three sections whose table of contents is given below.

The contents of Ockley's Appendix

- 1-2: The Occasion and Design of this Discourse.
- 3-5: God's way of teaching his People was by Prophets
- 6-7: Prophecy not attain'd by any Application or Industry, but depended upon the positive Will of God.
- 8: And consequently the Vision of God, or beholding the Divine Being, which is superior to prophesying, cannot be so attained.
- 9: That it was never mentioned as attainable, nor the Search of it recommended by the Prophet Moses.
- 10: Nor any other Prophets that succeeded him.
- 11: What was not enjoy'd in the early Times of Christianity, when the Gifts of the Spirit were more plentifully pour'd out, cannot be expected now.
- 12: But such a Power, whereby a Man might (without external Helps) attain to the true Knowledge of God, and Things necessary to Salvation, was no where promis'd by our Saviour.
- 13: Nor enjoy'd by devout Persons in the first times of the Gospel; which is prov'd from the example of Eunuch.
- 14: And Cornelius.
- 15: The whole Tenour of the Apostles Doctrines forbid us to expect the Vision of God in this Life.

16: From all which is inferr'd, that those Scriptures which speak of the plentiful Effusion of the Spirit in the Gospel Times, are misunderstood by the Enthusiasts.

17: Why we are not to expect Prophet's now.

18: If these things be denied to Christians, they are not to be found amongst Heathens or Mahometans.

19-21: The Enthusiasm of our Author and others censured.

23: Conclusion

Some of the basic reasons given by Ockley on the necessity of "appending" the translation include, "The preceding History, upon the account of the lively image, which it gives of unspotted virtue, unfeigned Love of God, and Contempt of the Things of this Life, does well deserved to be read" but "it contains several things co-incident with the Errors of some Enthusiasts of these Present Times."¹⁴²

Ockley notes further that the "book, which was by me [Ockley] "designed for the Innocent and not altogether unprofitable Diversion of the Reader ... might accidentally prove a means of leading some into Error, who are not capable of judging aright; and of confirming others in their Mistakes, who, through their own Weakness, or the prejudices of a bad Education, have the Misfortune to be led out of the way."

The third and perhaps the major reason for the necessity of the Appendix is "because there has been a bad Use made of this Book before." Thus, Ockley responds to such use by adopting a theological stance in the Christian context. The fact that this is a theological response to a text that is not primarily theological, but philosophical and mystical in tone reduces the strength of the argument on the one hand, but on the other, it defines the scope of the argument and focuses on a particular audience.

Ockley indicates that "there are a great many Errors both in his [Aristotelian] *Philosophy* and [Mahometan] *Divinity*. This "Fundamental Error of

my Author" is "that God has given such a Power or Faculty to Man, whereby he may, without any *external Means*, attain to the Knowledge of all things necessary to Salvation, and even to the Beatifick Vision it self, whilst in this State: In doing which I shall still have regard to the Errors receiv'd concerning these things in the present Age."

In sections 3-5, Ockley examines the premise "that God's way of teaching his People in all times was by Prophets. Mankind was so far degenerated and deprav'd, that they had lost the true Knowledge of God ... for which reason, God was pleas'd out of his infinite Love and Mercy, to send at sundry times *Prophets; that is, men who were inspir'd by the Holy Spirit, and had the Will of God immediately reveal'd to them*; to the end that they might instruct others how to serve him." The critique against Quaker theology hinges on their notion of "Immediate Revelation" as accessible to all, rather than limited to prophets. This appears to be an attack on Keith's early work on Quaker theology titled *Immediate Revelation*.

In section 4, Ockley makes the distinction between human knowledge and prophetic knowledge: "This was the Means which the Generality of the People of God had to know his Will. They receiv'd it from the Prophets, who had it immediately from God. So that *the Difference of their Knowledge consisted in the Manner of their receiving of it, not in the Things receiv'd, which were the same both to the Prophets and the People*. Only the Prophets receiv'd it immediately, but not the People: for then consequently they would all have been prophets, which it is plain they were not." This is clearly an attack by Ockley on the Deist views prevalent during his time.

Such attacks reflect that religion was on the defensive and in fact had been so since 1641. Paradoxically, both the Deist and other naturalistic movements, as well as the offensive against such movements by the Anglican mission, reflect the changing role of religion in Britain. In the first case, it indicates the accommodation of religion to humanistic principles and in the second, the attempt

to rescue religion from such inevitable changes, due to the 'intervention' of the state into the religious sphere through bills such as the "Act of Toleration" legislated by James II.¹⁴³ Thus, the access to divine knowledge by those who develop it within themselves was considered dangerous in a period when religion was on the defensive, since it opened the door to individual and naturalistic philosophies.

From Section 5 onward, Ockley focuses on examples of prophets and prophecy from the Old and New Testaments and a defense of religious authority as the "vessel" of guidance to humanity in order to reject the form of worship advocated in the Tufaylian narrative, and by proxy the Quakers.

Section 7 explains the hierarchical religious authority from priests to Prophets: "The Priests Lips should preserve Knowledge ... for he is the Messenger of the Lord of Hosts." The priest alone can present knowledge. The source and authority of such knowledge is derived from the scriptures: "So that they were not to seek after any other more perfect manner of Worship, than what was deliver'd in that Book."

The following sections critique the central problem of "Immediate Revelation," associated with the narrative and with those who made use of it. Ockley critiques the Mystics, the Quietists and the Enthusiasts of the time. He rejects any possibility that "those Truths or Precepts (of the scriptures) should be reveal'd to them anew, either by any Prophet living in their time, or by *immediate Revelation*." It further establishes the "sufficiency" of the law, the method of worship based on it and the teaching received through "the mouth of the priests." The notion of Immediate Revelation is deliberately propounded in the context of the prophets in order to deny its possible manifestation outside such a context, and thus a rejection of its popularization in Quaker theology during that time.

In Section 10, Ockley disclaims the validity of Deism within the teachings of prophets. He notes, "Nor did any of the Prophets ... ever advance any such refined way of Worship ... not one syllable concerning any such abstracted worship, nor any mention made of Mens attaining the *Beatifik Vision*." He further

critiques the delusions of those who "pretend to such a familiarity and intimate conversation with God." The promise by God of immortality "to give his Holy Spirit to those that ask it of him ... ought to content any reasonable Man, without aspiring to *Immediate Revelation, Prophecy, obtaining the Vision of God, and such like Things, which God has deny'd to us, whilst in this State.*"¹⁴⁴ To a degree, these issues were not just limited to Christian theology but were also philosophical questions that had been raised. The union of the individual soul with the Active Intellect occupies a central stage in the Christian Averroistic debates and its interpretation by Moses Narboni has been subject to varied interpretation even in current scholarship, as well as its interpretation by the falāsifah such as Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. It is also the subject of both the main Tufaylian narrative and the prologue.

In the following sections, Ockley dismisses the views of "certain" groups within Christianity, as being opposed to its fundamental principles. In section 11, Ockley distinguishes between the knowledge attained by reason and taught by religion. In section 12, he rejects the ways of the mystics as incompatible with Christianity. In section 13, he notes that the knowledge of God is given to few. This is a rejection of Quaker and other Christian groups that practised collective reception of the spirit. In Section 16, Ockley suggests that the Gospels have been misinterpreted by some Christians.

Only Sections 18-20 deal with Muslims, and even then in very general and expected terms, rather than as a critique of the Tufaylian narrative. In section 18, the distinction is made between Christians privileged by baptism versus Muslims and heathens. Ockley concedes that due to this distinction, there is no value in debating the different perspectives. However, he does launch into a critique of Ibn Tufayl:

Our Author, who was himself a Mahometan, seems as little to have consulted the Honour of his Prophet Mahomet, and the necessity of believing his Doctrine, in feigning a Person brought up by himself, to have by his Application and Industry at-

tain'd to the Knowledge of all things reveal'd to that
suppos'd Prophet, as our Enthusiasts do value.¹⁴⁵

He further misinterprets Ibn Ṭufayl's (and the representative Muslim) views that such a means of salvation was available to all.

In section 19, Ockley notes, "I have now shown that what is here held by our Author and too many others in our times, has no manner of foundation. That it was never promis'd nor expected..."¹⁴⁶ Ockley further admits, "If I have not spoken all the while particularly to my Author, the reason is, because I write to Christians, and chiefly have regard to those Errors, held by some of that Denomination, which are common with those of our Author." He suggests however that the same argument might apply to a Muslim context, which is guided by the notions of the Qur'an as Inspiration and Muḥammad as the seal of Prophets. Ockley avoids the notion of the Qur'ān as 'revealed Law' or scripture. Thus, "to suppose the Possibility of a Man's attaining to the true Knowledge of God, and Things necessary to Salvation, and all other Things, both Spiritual and Natural, belonging either to this World, or that to come, without the Help of any outward Instruction" is problematic, whether applied to Christianity or Islam.

Ockley concludes with the view that "as true Piety is the same in all Ages and Climates and good solid Sense too, so also is Enthusiasm. And I have sometimes wonder'd when I have read the Whimsies and Conceits of the Arab Enthusiasts ... to find such a Harmony between them and ours at present. Such a perfect Agreement in their wild notions ... may easily convince any one, that the Instruments of both were strung and tun'd by the same Hand" (the Devil!).¹⁴⁷ With that final evangelical statement that explains all the ills of society (while reflecting the context of orientalism), there is no real need to explain the "errors" in the Muslim perspective.

Ockley's last proof is a "scientific" one, based on the faulty science of the past, reflected in Ḥayy's notion of spheres: "when he talk'd of those Discoveries in the latter, made by him when in that glorious State, he never dream'd in the least of those more certain Discoveries which should be made afterwards, by the

Sagacity of our Astronomers and Philosophers, and that the contrary of what he believ'd, as to those things, should be prov'd by undeniable demonstration."¹⁴⁸ Obviously, Ockley ignores the symbolic description of spiritual ascension and undermines the analogies. He assumes that its author was rendering a science lesson rather than an expression of spiritual experience. In section 21, Ockley critiques the "Pretenders in our age" and in section 22, he concludes with a request for God's grace.¹⁴⁹

The basic content of the Appendix is thus a response to the sectarian debates in England. The argument made in relation to Ibn Ṭufayl is that the author was Muslim and was expected to hold false views in contradiction with Christianity. Thus, the real threat was felt from the internal groups to whom the appendix responds.

The Appendix creates a dialectical relation between the main narrative translated by Ockley and the offensive against it. Further, it helps us understand the nature of other works of oriental scholarship in Ockley's repertory. It raises complex and puzzling questions of Ockley's approach to his "area studies," by the lack of consistency in his works, which suggest that he modulated his views to suit his audience. This does not indicate the popular analysis of the persecution and dissemination faced by intellectuals, but the contrary. It was the period of Reformation and new religious movements were on the rise. It appears that the orthodox Ockley felt constrained to respond strongly against some of these movements in his Appendix. Further, Ockley's interest in the Orient depended on Orientalism, whereby one could dispassionately discuss lost empires and their downfall. Closer to home, the sectarian difference in Britain made it difficult to lead such a dispassionate existence.

Prologue and Afterwords: a summation

All three translators responded to their study with a prologue or epilogue. This chapter also addresses the necessity or predilection on the part of the translators to explain the reasons why they chose to translate the Tufaylian narrative,

generally presented in the form of Christian apologetics or inter-sectarian polemics. The question might then be asked: does Jauss's notion of "the horizon of expectations" by which a text is received and by which it steers toward a new direction apply in this case? In this section, we will present a summation of the function of the prologue/ epilogue /appendix as a device of communication used by each of the translators, drawing from the above discussions of these prologues and epilogues.

The presence of textual apparati, also reflected in the other works or journals of these translators, needs to be underscored because of their particular function in each case. The prologue that is attached to the original work by Ibn Ṭufayl raises questions on textual integrity. What was Ibn Ṭufayl trying to convey in his narrative and how did the introductory prologue tie in with this? This question of difference between the prologue and the narrative might also be applied to the translators, reflecting a parallel (literary) tension between the text and the translator.

The translated texts under study suggest two functions of the prologue-epilogue, either to forward and clarify the intent of the translator, or to disguise and distance the views of the translator from those of the text. The four British translators of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* were aware of the political tensions or social circumstances that informed their representative views. All of them had to either justify, censor or change their ideologies to fit the horizon of expectation. The prologues and epilogues also grapple with the legitimacy of the "other", within and outside their particular contexts.

The late seventeenth to early eighteenth century was the nascent period of the discipline of Oriental Studies. However, it is problematic to assume a non-partisan approach to the study of Islam. Indeed, Pococke and Ockley were still the exceptions, and they themselves were unwittingly bound to the older school. Pococke Sr. "the glory and ornament of our age and nation"¹⁵⁰ was informed in Semitic languages and had exposure to Middle Eastern people and culture.¹⁵¹ Thus, he was able to distinguish the misconceptions and myths that were not just

rampant, but were deliberately misconstrued in order to present the Muslim religion, and particularly Muḥammad, as barbaric and false.

For example, Pococke Sr. who was translating Hugo Grotius' *De Veritate Religionis Christianae* into Arabic for the purpose of proselytizing enquired on the source of the "report" that Muḥammad had trained a dove to do his bidding and referred to it as "the holy Ghost," as presented by Grotius. "This anecdote served as a weapon in the hands of anti-Mohammadan controversialists such as Henry Smith and we find Thomas Coryat, in his Italian address to a Mohammedan speak scornfully of the tame pigeon by means of which Mahomet cozened 'the sottish people of Arabia'." Grotius admitted that it was unknown to Muslims. Gibbon further records, "Lest it should provoke their indignation and laughter *the pious lie* is suppressed in the Arabic version; but it has maintained an edifying place in the numerous editions of the Latin text."¹⁵² Thus, Pococke Sr. the author of this Arabic translation "edited" the *pious lie* in his Arabic translation. It is difficult to say whether he did so, knowing that it would be recognized as a fabrication by Muslims, and thus invalidate its proselytizing purpose, or whether he excluded it on account of its falsity.

The Latin preface by Edward Pococke Sr. provides the basic and only historical framework for the early translators, who were not generally familiar with Arabic and depended on the Latin translation. Thus, any assumptions or misconceptions in this preface are taken over by them. Although primarily academic, the translation raises one central issue by its choice of title as *Philosophus autodidactus*, which becomes the basis on which the text is received. Ashwell, who recognizes the naturalistic appeal in the text along with the *de facto* autodidacticism, includes the "Indian Prince" and the notion of "experience" to his title.

This naturalism is taken further in Eichhorn's independent German translation in the eighteenth century. The history of translation of the narrative thus represents a microcosm of social history as well. We are able to recognize

a shift in the notions from the *philosophus autodidactus* (Renaissance) to the naturalist (the Anglo-Scottish revival followed by the Romantic Age), and the noble savage (natural theology linked with colonial expansion) that was the appeal to Daniel Defoe and Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the eighteenth century.

The indirect impact on Rousseau through the new lines of transmission of the European translations might be seen at many levels. Incidentally, the first book (and the only one for a long time) that Rousseau would have Emile read that would enable an education according to nature, was to be *Robinson Crusoe*.¹⁵³ The growth in naturalism led to a return to either the *homme naturel*, or to the *homme civil* as the ideal. Both views were encapsulated earlier within the Muslim milieu as well, in the critiques by Ibn al-Khatīb and Ibn al-Nafīs. Ibn al-Nafīs' claim that the human being is only 'civilized' within society is an interesting repercussion in the Muslim milieu, when compared to both the *homme naturel et civil* in the Christian milieu.

George Keith's views in the *Advertisement* indicate his ambivalent response to whether the experiences and views of a "heathen", not touched by baptism, can be considered valid in his society. Through his *Advertisement* and translation of the Tufaylian narrative, one of his earliest undertakings, Keith asserts that wisdom is not limited to Christians in name alone. However, the necessity of addressing such questions and validating his views through citations reflect Keith's recognition of the problematic nature of his assertions. Further, this dialectic remains throughout the body of Keith's writing.

In order to understand the changing horizons of expectation, I have discussed the following points:

- a) The contribution of Tufaylian notion to Quaker theology primarily through Keith and his influence on Barclay.
- b) The Keithian controversy over the question of "authority" of the apostle/ God versus the individual.
- c) The rejection of scripture as the sole authority of revealed religion.

The question of 'scriptures' and their reception as the *sole* authority are a major locus in the critical study of the Tufaylian narrative. Its influence on Quakerism may have led to a parting of ways in the case of George Keith, thus reflecting a possible shift in the horizon. The impact of the Tufaylian narrative in the initial ideological stance of early Quakerism is often acknowledged by both its adherents and critics, but the later rejection of that stance and its possible inter-relation to Keith's 'cathartic' act of translation has not been noted. The translation of the narrative by Keith might be the pivot on which his later views were transformed.

Ockley's life as perceived through the available biographical material, reflects his dedication toward his studies and his frustration over the material limitations imposed upon him. Perceiving Ockley on the basis of the Appendix presents a totally different aspect of the scholar. It projects a highly orthodox stance, not just to another religion but also a rejection of "other" mystical or spiritual approaches within Christianity.

Disraeli, while indicating the difficult circumstances within which Ockley operated, can at the same time compare his work to "the laborious diligence of Prideaux,"¹⁵⁴ one of the most polemical writers against Islam. Thus, while the climate for research was a changing one, its prejudices are reflected in the works of the translators.

The reception of the text through translation has both aesthetic value and social articulation. The aesthetic aspect is reflected through the changing style and questions of what is included, what is excluded and why. The social impact is seen in its representation of the social movements of the time that preclude, or even intrude into the aesthetic reception, changing its direction in some cases.

Orientalism revisited: Appropriation and the Robinsonades

This section of the chapter will examine whether a series of textual transformations, or different reader responses on the part of the translator, eventually lead to new texts like the Robinsonades. Some questions we pose are: Where does the appropriation begin? Is appropriation itself a reader response? Can it finally result in an anti-thesis, or at least inspire one?

Daniel Defoe

The tenuous relation between the work of Ibn Ṭufayl and Daniel Defoe has led to the development of different trends and responses to what might be termed as "the question of Robinson Crusoe": how far is it valid to forge a relation between these two works, which in most ways are vastly different from each other?

The Robinsonades refer to the development of a genre of fiction that sought its inspiration from and became popular following the publication of Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* (1719). Despite preceding Defoe's fiction, Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān* has often been viewed as a Robinsonade. Likewise, the Latin and early English translations of the Tufaylian narrative also precede Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*. Defoe was also influenced by the Quakers and cites Keith's collaborator, Robert Barclay as well as Simon Ockley. Prior to the publication of Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*, Ibn Ṭufayl's narrative in its Latin and English translations was considered representative of the natural solitary man.¹⁵⁵ It has thus been suggested that Defoe may have been inspired by the translations of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān* to which he had access, for certain aspects of his narrative.

Parallels with the life of Crusoe are remarkable. Yokdhan is completely isolated for more than twenty [sic.] years, dresses in animal skins and indulges in religious speculations. He even has a 'Vision of the Angelic World' in the manner of Defoe's hero; so that one is led to speculate as to whether or not Defoe knew al-Tufail's work.¹⁵⁶

Even while indicating close parallels, the primacy of Robinson Crusoe remains in

the critical analyses, along the same lines as the latter phenomenon of Averroism circumscribes the views on Ibn Rushd. Crusoe lived in isolation for over twenty years, but Hayy lived in isolation for fifty. The choice of the number 50 is not random in the case of Ibn Tufayl. It is structured on seven stages of seven years leading to his penultimate development, whereby the final year ($7 \times 7 + 1 = 50$) is a signifying factor of the 'completion' of his knowledge and learning. Further, Hayy is described as having a 'vision of the angelic world' like Defoe and not vice-versa, setting aside for the moment the fact that the two "visions" are not described in parallel terms.

The most apparent aspect of *Robinson Crusoe* in comparison with *Hayy ibn Yaqzān* has been assumed to be the close narrative similarities between the function of survival in isolation¹⁵⁷ -"Man in the state of nature" as one critic notes¹⁵⁸. They are also compared in relation to the shared characteristics of the Robinsonades, aspects such as being marooned in an island, coping with the vicissitudes of nature and so forth.

The question of Robinson Crusoe has thus focussed on delineating the recurrence of narrative similarities in the two works. In other words, while the problematic chronological time-frame has barely drawn critical attention, the debate over relating Crusoe to Hayy assumes the perceived ideological primacy of the Crusoe narrative over the Tufaylian narrative. Thus, the burden of proof has rested on the Tufaylian narrative rather than vice-versa. Further, the focus has drawn solely on the "Robinsonade" aspects of the Tufaylian narrative in such analyses, neglecting an overview of the content and context of the work by Ibn Tufayl. The expectations that arise through such a comparison manipulate our response to the text. In the case of the Tufaylian narrative, such a reception leads to a shift in horizon in several modern critiques, whereby the symbolic articulation of the Tufaylian narrative is rendered irrelevant.

Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* is often seen as the primary representative of the 'realistic novel'. It certainly highlights the notion of *homo economus*. Defoe's works however are not devoid of the religious currents of the time. They

highlight the movement of religiosity away from the institutionalized church to the sceptic individual, who is born again to the realization of God's existence when faced with hardship and difficulty. The journey in Crusoe's case can hardly be seen as a symbolic internalization, but it is a journey of self-discovery and a recognition of the values of society, civilization, and likewise God and a belief-system as part of the whole package.

According to one well-known argument, the books [by Defoe] are odysseys of *homo economus*: the pursuit of money and status is at their centre. And according to another widely held view, they are, on the contrary, spiritual biographies. Such viewpoints need not be regarded as irreconcilable. But reconciliation is only possible if, in effect, we step back a little and take a broader view - if, that is to say, we become aware of the elemental nature of not only Crusoe's experience but that of the other protagonists as well."¹⁵⁹

This quotation highlights how it is possible to view *Robinson Crusoe* and likewise the Robinsonades that are patterned on it as "spiritual biographies." Although the spiritual goals of Crusoe and Hayy may be quite different, it would be simplistic to dismiss *Robinson Crusoe* as a mirror of the practical: "There can be no question that both themes are present ... they point to quite a different pattern in the fictions from what emerges when either is stressed to the exclusion or at the expense of the other."¹⁶⁰ Thus, when examining the Robinsonade connection, one has to realize that it might be applicable to both the notion of "realistic" and to the possibility of "spiritual" quest.

The second appeal of "Robinson Crusoe" in terms of its transmission through the Tufaylian narrative rests primarily on the growth of naturalism that is so prevalent in the early translations from Ashwell to Eichhorn.

Crusoe was a paradigm of the natural man not only because he lacked the luxuries of civilization but also because all contemporary discussion of the primeval state of man commenced with the concept of an isolated being, abstracted from society and

religion.¹⁶¹

In the final analysis however, Robinson Crusoe remains an anti-thesis to Ḥayy. Nature teaches Crusoe her lessons well. He learns "invincible patience ... under the worst of misery and indefatigable application". Like Kāmil, he learns to value society. "Man is a creature so formed for society that it may not only be said that it is not good for him to be alone, but 'tis really impossible that he should be alone."¹⁶²

The valorization of Crusoe by Rousseau responds to the primary appeal of the Tufaylian narrative that was received and transformed by Defoe. Rousseau's response is parallel to Ashwell's translation that indicates the lessons that society can learn from its reflection on nature.

Another impact of the Robinsonade genre that may be relevant to comparison is its reflection and justification of colonialism, a facet that has been highlighted in recent studies on Daniel Defoe.¹⁶³ The absence of a human master (and presence of the divine master in nature, creation and the intellect) in Ḥayy's quest for knowledge is replaced by the human master of the enslaved Friday in *Robinson Crusoe* as the servant of *homo economus*, the colonial overlord. One might also include the popularization of the Robinsonade analysis applied to the Tufaylian narrative in the post-Colonial reclamation of origins in some recent studies.¹⁶⁴

The irony of such reversion cannot be ignored. *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* gains recognition on the basis of an ideology of expansion that seeks to undermine it as the uncouth savage who must be converted, rather than the primitive noble savage, who is also reduced to an exotic ideal. The Tufaylian narrative itself critiques both the approving and disparaging roles of Ḥayy. Thus, the modern Arab reclamation is strikingly appropriate and inappropriate; appropriate in its rejection of the colonial ideology of the savage by indicating the primacy of the Tufaylian narrative over *Robinson Crusoe*, and inappropriate in its ignorance of the symbolism and spirituality of the author, which in itself is also a reversion.

Whether or not one finds similarities between *Robinson Crusoe* and *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān*, they have been placed together in the genre that is referred to as "Robinsonades." If one were to assume a vast difference between the Tufaylian narrative and the Robinsonades, one should also consider the internal ideological leap, whereby Ibn Tufayl maintains the literary tension in his narrative. This tension is encapsulated in the inter-relation of the utopian spiritual state represented in Ḥayy and the political ramifications of a Salāmān type rulership that depends upon the literalist application of law, both of which exist concurrently. However, the radical notion of Ḥayy's isolation, his rational and intellectual growth, and his rejection of a human master reflect a type of spirituality that is not shared by the other Robinsonades even when the latter are viewed as spiritual biographies.

Toward the Robinsonade

Beside the European translations that emerged from various perspectives and ideologies, the Tufaylian narrative also inspired two anonymous plagiarized versions. In looking at these two works, one is able to perceive the cutting of the umbilical cord and recognize the possibility of the Tufaylian narrative as the spring whereby 'the idea of Robinson Crusoe' was to become emblematic of its age.

The History of Josephus

The first appropriated abridged version of the Tufaylian narrative that is not directly derived from either the Latin translation or Arabic edition is called *The History of Josephus the Indian Prince*. It is printed along with a version of Robert Greene's (ca. 1558-1592) *Dorastus and Fawnia* that was published ca. 1696 and is not clearly distinguished from the main story¹⁶⁵ There is no mention of an author and the pagination continues after the completion of *Dorastus*. Hence, the connection with the Tufaylian narrative was not recognized due to the absence of a separate reference to an author or translator.

What is curious is that the author of *Dorastus* wrote his works prior to the Arabic edition and Latin translation by Pococke (1671). Could Robert Greene have been the author of this appropriation? This is the second indication, beside a Latin translation attributed to Pico della Mirandola, that other translations beside the Hebrew may have been undertaken during the sixteenth century before the first printed Latin translation by Pococke Jr.

If Robert Greene had produced this summary of the Tufaylian narrative, he may have had access to the elusive Latin translation that is sometimes attributed to Pico della Mirandola, or its source. There is no direct other evidence to suggest any relation. The current state of scholarship has to assume that the author (or perhaps editor) of *The History of Josephus* remains anonymous. It is more likely to have been compiled from the early translations in the late seventeenth century, and thus printed with the seventeenth century edition (1691?) of *Dorastus and Fawnia*.

With the exception of the changed name of the protagonist from Hayy to Josephus, the summary remains faithful to the story and has no extrapolations, even though it excludes spontaneous birth and other scientific descriptions from the Tufaylian narrative. This suggests a possible "source" for the version might have been Ashwell's translation, whose language is closely mirrored.

A significant observation is that the latter part of the story is given as much weight as the first section that deals with Hayy's rational development and self-discovery. This "sequel" narrates Josephus' encounter with 'Asal' and 'Salaman,' whose names remain unchanged. This version is equally divided between the two parts of the story.¹⁶⁶ The substitution of Josephus for Hayy also renders to the protagonist the idealized status of the prophet, Joseph, who represents the virtuous hero, endowed with the spiritual capacity to interpret dreams.

Don Trezzanio

The correlation between Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* and the appropriated replay of Tufaylian narrative as *Don Trezzanio* is obvious first of all from their similar titles: *The life and surprising adventures of Don Antonio de Trezzanio, who was self-educated, and lived forty-five years in an uninhabited island in the East-Indies.*(1761)¹⁶⁷ The relation between the Tufaylian narrative and *Don Trezzanio* has been documented in catalogues and cited in earlier studies.¹⁶⁸ There is the inherent bias brought about the selective and indiscriminate comparison between *Don Trezzanio* and the Tufaylian narrative. While recognizing that the plagiarized version is not representative of the greatest works of literature, one can analyze the particular reception of the narrative by discerning what is included and excluded, rather than the emphasis of correlation. Appropriation is often a veiled form of praise, as in the case of Averroism, though more often a reflection of the lack of genius and creativity. In either case, it highlights the role of the audience, essential in any form of literary communication that responds to the meaning of the text to its audience.

So what does the Trezzanio story tell us in relation to the Tufaylian narrative, *Robinson Crusoe* and the other European translations? The *Don Trezzanio* story is a reworking of both the Tufaylian narrative and *Robinson Crusoe*, using the former for a narrative basis and the latter for specific descriptions.

Don Trezzanio is an impoverished nobleman who emigrated to Goa, along with his daughter Portia and his two sons, after the Portuguese captured it in 1510. Portia is induced to join the Order of Virgin Mary by a Monk, Gratiano, who falls in love with her and then seduces her. She is raped and impregnated by him. When the child is born, Gratiano, fearing the inquisition, urges Portia to put the child in a box and throw it into the sea. The box lands in an uninhabited island; the child, Antonio is suckled and brought up by a gazelle. The Tufaylian version of Hayy's conception hinges on forbidden love, which is shifted in *Don Trezzanio*

to violent and manipulative lust. As in the Tufaylian narrative, the protagonist begins life being abandoned to the seas by his parents.

In concordance with the Tufaylian narrative, the Don Trezzanio version retains the Island in the Indian ocean, but transfers it from Sarandip to an island off Goa (West coast of India). The shift is a very distinct one and changes the whole scenario, while seeming to remain faithful to the narrative. The total significance of Hayy's island is lost. Hayy's island was central to the creation of the perfect and balanced situation. It was the only place on earth whose central locale allowed for a supernatural course of events to occur. In fact, it is the site of the legendary earthly paradise that was home to Adam and Eve, as well as many Indian mythologies. Does Trezzanio shift to just another island? The impoverished nobleman migrates presumably to make a fortune in the new colonies. The focus on Goa brings in the other aspect that is central to the Robinsonade. Goa is [was] indeed an earthly paradise, subject to the colonial expansion. It is also the final goal of Antonio to leave his island and move to Goa, a significant post of the Portuguese discovery - the feather in the cap of Vasco da Gama.

The heptadic scheme or the stages of development in Hayy are not utilized. The events in Antonio's life do not suggest a specific number scheme; even the parallel incidents from the Tufaylian narrative do not follow the same chronology. The gazelle dies when Antonio is seventeen years old, after which he discovers fire, gold and domesticates animals. At thirty years, "it occurs to him that the universe is basically one and must be ruled by a Superior Being."¹⁶⁹

The metaphors of conquest are embedded throughout the Trezzanio version, ranging from the island of Goa, to the discovery [and exploitation] of gold, to the capture and caging of nightingales for pleasure, to training and feeding lesser creatures like horses to drink blood and eat meat. Piracy and islands become defining themes. The narrative thus reflects the prevalent preoccupations of colonial expansion of the time.

Practical concerns are central to the Trezzanio version, a characteristic that it shares and borrows from the realistic novel, *Robinson Crusoe*. The questions of life and death that are addressed in the Tufaylian narrative also crop up albeit at different instances. Further, the "penny-dreadful" type of adventure story is reflected, for example, through the piracy that occurs in the high seas.¹⁷⁰ Antonio witnesses a battle between two merchant ships, in which one sinks and several objects including a dead body float ashore. This makes him ponder about death and the afterlife. Moving his habitation to a better part of the island close to the sea, Antonio meets Salandio. Salandio had left the island of Goa, after a debate between mendicant friars on the feasibility of the life of a hermit inspired him to follow his inclination to lead a solitary existence.

While the superstitious and dogmatic aspects are derided in both works, in the Tufaylian narrative, there is the underlying critique and suggestion of the ideal to move toward; with the Trezzanio version, religion is merely seen as superfluous, meaningless, perverse and corrupted. Undoubtedly, it does not occupy the central stage. Some spiritual discoveries are made by the protagonist, but it is the social and adventurous elements that hold the fort. The ascetic Salandio (=Absāl) becomes the expedient who allows Antonio to finally escape the life of the island and integrate into society. Society is where the action is and Antonio longs for the social setting.

The *Don Trezzanio* version mediates between *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* and *Robinson Crusoe*. While blatantly borrowing details from the two narratives, it does not reflect the genius of either. With the popularity of the *Oriental tale* and the novel of adventure in eighteenth century England,¹⁷¹ *Don Trezzanio* is not a surprise in itself. It is yet another narrative that cashes in on the new and popular genre of the novel. There are other works during this period that pattern themselves on *Robinson Crusoe* and utilize its title (or a similar one) as the *Don Trezzanio* version does. The *Don Trezzanio* version however reflects the extensive use of the Tufaylian narrative, drawing from it the explicit features of the Robinsonade genre.

With regard to the Oriental tale, many such imaginative, plagiarized and stereotypical versions were being produced, whose authorship ranged from the anonymous variety to almost all of the prominent writers of the eighteenth century, from Alexander Pope to Daniel Defoe who utilized pseudo-oriental retellings. However, *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* is seen as an exception to these tendencies and a particular example where the Orient was not misrepresented, since it was translated on the basis of the primary text by Pococke Jr. What is less recognized is that the Tufaylian narrative becomes subject to both roles, transmitted in the European translations as well as the plagiarized versions, of which two explicit examples have been discussed above, and several lesser extracts are known to exist.¹⁷²

Imaginary voyages and discovered "islands"

One aspect of the Robinsonade and the new genre of the realistic novel in Europe was the element of imaginary voyage and discovery. Dunlop, in his *History of Prose Fiction*, notes, "These productions bear the same relation to real voyages and travels as the common novel or romance to history and biography."¹⁷³ Yet, one has to recall that what was formerly considered the making of history or geography was now the making of fiction. In other words, the accounts of fabulous and mythic islands that had been recorded by historians and geographers of former times were now the focus of the new fiction, which claimed equal authority as 'true histories'. The ramifications of such a new movement have not been fully explored.¹⁷⁴ For such reasons, one still searches biographical details in works such as *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* and *Robinson Crusoe*. Indeed, these works are validated by their authors as being true accounts, which the readers are invited to follow. It is also in this sense that they were considered as 'realistic' novels.

The Tufaylian narrative and its repertory narratives share in the paradigmatic modes of the "voyage imaginaire". In *Robinson Crusoe*, humankind is given an example of what one of its species is capable of achieving in solitude. "Sometimes the imaginary traveller is received among nations of perfect and ideal wisdom, as in the Himyarite tale, but in this case the traveller is also the

conqueror, which brings about an interesting dynamic. Ship-wrecks and pirates and being cast away are the typical features that *Don Trezzanio* draws from. "The planets too and the centre of the earth were made the theatres of these chimerical expeditions," as in the Tufaylian narrative and the Hermetistic tale.

The fascination of a textualized approach is its ability to draw parallel between the most diverse examples. In order to avoid a 'free-floating' comparison that theorists decry, such an analysis must recognize its paradigmatic frame of reference and then can reveal interesting nuances in genre.

After establishing the types of "adventure tales," which I further illustrated through examples in this study, Dunlop moves to what he calls "the more philosophical class of the Voyage Imaginaire in the Arabian story of Hai Ebn Yokdhan." Dunlop sees the parallels between *Hayy* and *Robinson Crusoe* in the first part of the story. He further summarizes the tale and adds in his philosophy (or Ockley's!) "he enjoyed in his extacies that beatific vision to which Quietists, German Theosophes, and other enthusiasts, in modern times have aspired." Like many others before him, Dunlop is fascinated by the story and includes a detailed summary and then adds his critique (or Ockley's almost verbatim quotations from the Appendix) that "there are many errors in theology and philosophy, as the former is Mahometan and the latter Aristotelian."¹⁷⁵ How easy it is to dismiss the "other", while being drawn to it! The Tufaylian narrative does not typically fall into the "voyage imaginaire" at least on the terms that the genre is defined by Dunlop, yet the appeal of the story makes him describe it in some detail under this section. The reading that is rendered arises from the expected reader-response that appears unconscious but is consciously rendered.

Moving from text to sub-text, Said sees "culture" as an operative literary device that appropriates, either through the romanticization of the "other" or anti-thetical stereotyping. One might add that such an appropriation also occurs through the application and integration of the original into a new vision, totally divested from its source through the process of transmission. Finally, this appropriation recurs within the culture itself, as in popularization of the

Robinsonade element in modern Arabic literature. Thus, one might question the source of such reception - is it the text, or the "westernized" context?

The elements of the "imaginary voyage" take new dimensions in Defoe's time. Of this period, the "island" motif and its current analysis in post-colonial literature is particularly interesting. The Robinsonades reflect how literature becomes a mode of imperialism:

That imperialism has been more than a matter of overseas colonies and conquests. Adventure has been the main form within literature that inspired ... nationalism and imperialism and cultural chauvinism. Adventure has also ... been the liturgy of masculinism.¹⁷⁶

Thus, it is no accident that the primary novel of the time was *Robinson Crusoe* and his "conquest" of an uninhabited island. Despite this central aspect in Said, he misses the contextual link between the Tufaylian narrative, its modern articulations and the post-Colonial critiques of *Robinson Crusoe*.¹⁷⁷

In *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, the island is an escape, an earthly paradise in an otherwise material world. As a European counterpart, the paradisiacal island recurs in Renaissance notions of Arcadia. From the Seventeenth century, this pristine image that was formerly exoticized is now "conquered" as the new world, paradoxically sought by Imperialism. Thus, the romantic naturalism in literature has shifted to the ethos of adventure and discovery [i.e. expansion]. Between the periods of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* and *Robinson Crusoe*, there are developments and transference of power relations and societal shifts that make some significant stopovers in Spain, Germany and other parts of Europe. In England, the sectarian split causes the further transference of the narrative by George Keith to North America, the final choice of the new Quakerism that is no longer persecuted, but is successful and has likewise colonized the new American nation. The line between the "mythic, imaginary" island and the "real" discoveries is a fine one, when the transmission of the narrative is received within the ideologies of expansion.

Ḥayy's island, if interpreted as a narrative of decolonization, is a resistance to the forces of authorities [within and outside], which literature as "culture" tries to conquer in the translations, where the Robinsonades finally succeed, by subverting its symbolic elements. If one compares Ḥayy and Absāl with Crusoe and Friday, one immediately notes the opposing factor in power relations to the degree that the noble savage is de-romanticized and enslaved. The earlier summarizations, despite a tension in the received content, as in the anti-thesis by Ibn al-Nafīs, provide a mediatory stage in the relation between the civilized turned rustic and the to-be-civilized rustic.

The Tufaylian narrative in its own geopolitical context can also be analyzed on similar principles of stratification. In this case, the "fine veil" is the cover for the political realities. The reiteration of stories is not only "a reclamation of fictive territory" but also the means whereby the hitherto silent native "acts on territory reclaimed as part of a general movement of resistance from the colonist."¹⁷⁸ The analysis of the post-Colonial reclamation of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* in modern Arab writers might provide illuminating perspectives to these questions of cultural redefinition.

Summation

One reason why Pococke and Ockley had to defend their choice of translation would relate to the long held suspicion and polemic against Islam, reflected in Ockley's time in the works of Prideaux and Gibbon, and even his own works, which follow the norm rather than the exception.

This study has constantly sought to address relation between the meaning of 'text' in transmission, and its symbolic articulation as its basic aesthetic content. Of what value are these two approaches to text and context? What is the importance of chronology? In his analysis of the visionary recital, Corbin reiterates the importance of the "Iranian context," but further notes that texts and persons chronologically subsequent to Avicenna are of no less importance than those that precede him in time. While this indicates their symbolic connection, it

creates a problem with those works that draw from a common textual corpus, yet are enacted in totally different cultural contexts, as is the case of the European translations of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*.

This form of contact provides the grounds for a confrontational stance between cultures. Yet, this is not the most likely scenario in the present instance, despite the availability of all the ingredients, i.e. the imperial colonial context, translation and appropriation of an 'eastern' and 'Muslim' text, and so forth. Instead we have a whole-hearted appropriation, seen in the neglect to acknowledge the "source", or the apologetic response as to why the particular text was chosen for translation, its values and its "problems." The very attempt at apologetics shows that the confrontation per se is not between "they and us" but us and our sectarian neighbours. The significance that the translation and transmission draw is not solely from its "real" historical and social context, but from its "present" albeit "far-removed from the past" context. Thus, the analysis reflects the worlds of the translators and exposes the various factors that assign it meaning, whereby the text *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* is transmitted, but succeeds in retaining its original intent of spiritual transformation.

In conclusion, the particular and specific uses that were made of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* in European translations should not deflect us from its symbolical and mythic meaning. The analogous responses as well as antithetical approaches are the conscious choices of the translators in relation to the worlds in which they operated. These worlds are comprised of confrontational elements within themselves (as with Ibn Ṭufayl, or George Keith), as well as the confrontation with the other. This would explain the transference of the trope of the uninhabited island from the earthly paradise or utopic no-place to the last place that the colonist had to discover and take-over as in *Robinson Crusoe* and *Don Trezzanio*.

Endnotes to Chapter 6

1. Giovanni Pico, Count of Mirandola (1463-1494) was a leading figure of the Italian Renaissance. Beside a Latin translation to the Tufaylian narrative ascribed to Pico, there are conceptual similarities between their works. Pico was deeply interested in Hebrew and Arabic philosophy. He is best known for his '*Oration*' that was published posthumously. Cf. Pico, Giovanni. *Oration on the Dignity of Man*, tr. by A. Robert Caponigri (South Bend, Ind.: Regnery Gateway, 1956). One can see that Ibn Tufayl's narrative would have attracted his interest, since it dealt with the notion of human dignity independent of external power, that was central to Pico's philosophy. Cf. C. A. Nallino, "*Filosofia 'orientale' od 'illuminativa' d'Avicenna?*" *RSO* X (1923-25), 434. If indeed a Latin translation of the Tufaylian narrative was undertaken or commissioned by Pico, one may assume it to have come from the Hebrew translation that was widely circulated during the time. Marginal notes in the Hebrew manuscripts of *Hayy* belonging to Bayerische and Leipzig Libraries, have been attributed to Pico and Alemanno. Some of the manuscripts in the Bayerische collection had also belonged to Pico. Thus, Pico and Johanan may have studied these manuscript together.

2. *Philosophus autodidactus sive Epistola Abi Jaafar ebn Tophail de Hai ebn Yokdhan, in qua ostenditur quomodo ex inferiorum contemplatione ad superiorum notitiam ratio humana ascendere possit* (Oxford: Excudebat H. Hall Acadimae typographus, 1671). The editor and translator, Edward Pococke Jr. (1648-1727) was the son of the well-known British Orientalist Edward Pococke, Sr. (1604-1691).

3. Cf. Hasanali, *Ibn Tufayl's Hayy*, Appendix B, 180-82 for a cumulative list of translations. Beside the four (Pococke's Latin, Keith, Ashwell and Ockley's English) translations that are the focus of this section, other important early translations include the Dutch translation, *Het leeven van Hai ebn Yokdhan, in het arabisch beschreeven door Abu Jaaphar ebn Tophail, en uit de latyns che overzettinge van Eduard Pocock ... In het nederduitsch vertaald*, (Amsterdam: J. Rieuwertsz, 1672); 2nd. edition (1701), sometimes attributed to Baruch Spinoza. A copy of this translation that is part of the Spinozana Collection in the Rare Books Section at Columbia University was examined. It includes a note on the frontispiece by the cataloguer that rejects the attribution to Spinoza.

The eighteenth century includes two German translations; *Der von sich selbst gelehrte Weltweise*, tr. into German from Pococke's Latin edition by George Pritius (Frankfurt, 1726) and *Der naturmensch; oder, Geschichte des Hai ebn Joktan; ein morganlandischer Roman des Aby Dschafar ebn Tofail*, tr. from the Arabic by Johann Gottfried Eichhorn (Berlin: F. Nicolai, 1783).

There have also been several new translations starting from the early twentieth century into English, French, Spanish, Russian, Dutch, Persian and Urdu. The first Spanish translation by Francisco Pons Boigues is a study of the narrative as a psychological novel; Pons Boigues, tr. *El Filosofo Autodidacto* (Zaragoza: Tip. de Comas Hermanos, 1900). It includes a detailed Introduction by Menendez y Pelayo (ix-lv), the Spanish literary historian of the nineteenth century and a translation of Ibn Sīnā's *Ḥayy*, based on Mehren's edition in *Traité Mystique* (*op. cit.*). A later Spanish translation, *El Filosofo Autodidacto* based on Pococke's Latin version was undertaken by Angel G. Palencia (2nd ed.; Madrid: Imprenta de Ediciones Jura San Lorenzo, 1948).

4. These perspectives become indirectly prevalent in the writers of the (post) French Revolution, such as Rousseau as discussed by L. E. Goodman, *Introduction*, 7-92. Jauss explores Rousseau's 'gospel of nature': In *Emile*, "the lost wholeness and self-sufficiency of the *homme naturel* is to be restored in opposition to the divided existence of the *homme civil*." Jauss, *Question and Answer*, 165.

5. J. Eichhorn (tr.), *Hajj ibn Jaqzan der Naturmensch: Ein philosophischer Robinson-Roman aus dem arabischen Mittelalter*. Rpt. with an introduction by Stefan Schreiner (1783; Leipzig and Weimar: Gustav Kiepenhuer Verlag, 1983).

6. The choice phrase is used by Pastor in *The Idea of Robinson Crusoe*, 176-77.

7. See L. E. Goodman, *Introduction*, 13-14. See also H. Jauss, *Question and Answer*, 164-66. Interestingly, Jauss' focus on the natural child and its recurrence in Rousseau and others suggests how a study of Ibn Tufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* may be related to a discussion of reception theory. Our study further augments the theory through its example of the internal reception of the same text by the process of translation, rather than the process of reception through reiteration in new texts.

8. Paul Brönnle, *Introduction*, in *The Awakening of the Soul*, rendered from the Arabic with an introduction by Dr. Paul Brönnle, 4th ed. (1906; London: The Orient Press, 1910), 9.

9. Twells, *The Lives of Dr. Edward Pococke, the Celebrated Orientalist; of Dr. Zachary Pearce, Bishop of Rochester and of Dr. Thomas Newton, by themselves; and of the Rev. Phillip Skelton, by Mr. Burdy* 2 vols. (London: Printed for F.C. and J. Rivington by R and R. Gilbert, St. John's Square, Clerkenwell, 1816) I: 2-4. Edward Pococke, Sr. was born in Oxford and joined Corpus Christi College on December 11, 1620. In 1622, he was admitted to the degree of Bachelor of Arts at which time he began his study of eastern languages under Matthias Pasor. He received his Master of Arts in 1626, and studied further under Mr. William Bedwell, Vicar of Tottenham High Cross.

10. P. M. Holt, *An Oxford Arabist, Edward Pococke (1604-1691)*, in *Studies in the History of the Near East* (London: Frank Cass, 1973), 3-26.

11. Leonard Twells, *The Theological Works of the learned Dr. Pococke ... To which is prefaced an Account of his Life and Writings* (London, 1740).

12. Holt, 14.

13. Michael Nahas, *A translation of Hayy ibn Yaqzan by the Elder Edward Pococke (1604-1691)*, *Journal of Arabic Literature* XVI, 88-90. Nahas attributes a "planned" English translation by the Elder Pococke, based on some translated excerpts (Ms. Pococke 429, fol. 1-2, 16-17) found among the documents of Edward Pococke Sr. in the archives of the Bodleian. Nahas further cites some of the correspondence between John Worthington, Master of Jesus College, Robert Boyle, Chemist and patron and Samuel Hartlib, friend of Boyle and Worthington. In three such excerpts, these correspondents enquire further about a "Philosophic fiction", "philosophic figment" and "Arabick fiction" by Pococke Sr.

The excerpts of an "English" translation are hardly more than a few pages. Further, father and son collaborated in their work together. Pococke, Sr. a respected Orientalist and Church figure had access to otherwise scant resources, such as the use of the Arabic typescript, and had powerful patrons (Archbishop Laud). It is reasonable to assume that Pococke Sr. was the "contact" for his son's publication. Due to his public profile, Pococke Sr. was often assumed to be translator. It is likely that the correspondence might refer to the later Arabic edition and Latin translation of the Tufaylian narrative, rather than an English translation that Pococke Sr. never announced. I also examined all other correspondence on this subject and found no other evidence indicating an English translation. For records of all the correspondence about the Pocockes, see J. Crossley, ed. *The Diary and Correspondence of John Worthington*, 2 vols. in 1 (Manchester: Cheltham Society Publication, 1847-86), I, 127, 131, 176, 160-61, 259, 307, 309; II, 21, 24, 26-27, 103-05, 113.

14. Chew, *The Crescent*, 407, no. 4.

15. B. Lewis, *British Contributions to Arabic Studies* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1941), 13.

16. *The Remains of John Locke* (London, 1714) Letter 1, 2-3, 6, cited Pastor, 181.

17. Cf. Pastor, 182-3, no. 1.

18. R. Boyle, *A defense of natural and revealed religion*, 3 vols. (a series of lectures and sermons "The Boyle Lectures" from 1691 to 1732) (London: Printed for D. Midwinter [and 20 others], 1739).

19. Pastor, 182.

20. Edward Pococke Jr. grew up in the small parish of Childrey. This was understandably a very frustrating period when his father had lost not only his access to the chairs, its purse and his place of residence in Oxford but it also meant a total shift from academia to the involvement in the day to day running of a small parish, some of whose members apparently disliked their priest and complained to Cromwell's committee.

21. Clarke, *Life and Times of Wood*, III, p. 373; cited by Pastor, p. 185.

22. Thomas Hearne, *Remarks and Collections*, I: 224.

23. The words of Edward Pococke Sr. cited by Daniel, *Islam and the West*, 387, no. 21.

24. Pastor, 186.

25. Thomas Hearne, *Remarks and Collections*, ed. Doble, 3 Vols, (Oxford: Oxford Historical Society), 1907, II, 63.

26. Pastor, 178.

27. Cf. Twells, *The Theological Works*, 67.

28. Letter cited by Pastor, 189.

29. More recent scholars such as Samuel Chew confuse the two writers, suggesting for example that the text was edited by Pococke, Sr. and the Latin translation was undertaken by Pococke, Jr. Cf. Chew, *The Crescent*, 407, no. 4.

30. Pastor, 187.

31. Gauthier, *Hagg*, xxvi. Gauthier notes that the edition by Pococke exactly reproduces the Oxford manuscript, including any faults.

32. Brönnle, *Introduction*, 11.

33. Literary analysts place a lot of emphasis on beginnings in the creative process within the text rather than its transmission. Edward Said has devoted a book on literary criticism to this subject, *op. cit.*, *Beginnings: Methods and Intentions*. Clark Blaise gives us some examples of good and bad beginnings; Cf. Blaise, "To begin, to begin," in *A 20th Century Anthology: Essays, stories and poems*, ed. W. E. Messenger (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice Hall, 1984), 415-18.

34. In comparison to the prevalent views by writers such as Prideaux and Gibbon who utilized these "pioneers" for their sources on the orient.

35. Stories that were meant to indicate the trickery of Muḥammad as an imposture and his 'pretended' claim to miracles abounded both religious and literary works. One such example that was often used was a story of how Muḥammad trained a dove to do his bidding and referred to it as the holy ghost. Among others, Hugo Grotius made use of this incident to undermine Muhammad's sincerity. Pocock Sr. who was translating Grotius' *De Veritate Religionis Christianae* enquired as to the origin of the story, and when it was admitted to be a "pious lie", the story was excluded from the Arabic translation. However, it was still utilized by Pocock himself in some of his own writings. Thus, he transmitted a particular and popular image of Islam, while avoiding blatant exaggerations. Cf. Chew, *the Crescent*, 406-407.

36. Georg Pritius (tr.), *Der von sich selbst gelchrte Weltweise* (Frankfurt, 1726). Pritius produced the first German translation, based on the Latin translation by Pococke Jr.

37. *An Account of the Oriental Philosophy, shewing the wisdom of some Men of the East and particularly the profound wisdom of Hai Ebn Yokdhan*. The translation was printed in 1674. The translator is not identified in the title, possibly anticipating the polemical debate that was to ensue in this early period of Quaker persecution.

38. See R. M. Jones, *Keith, George*, in *Dictionary of American Biography*, ed. D. Malone (New York: Charles Scribner's sons, 1953), X: 289-90. See also J. Smith, *A Descriptive Catalogue of Friends Books* (1867), II:18-50 and a partial catalogue by a contemporary of Keith, John Whiting, *A Catalogue of Friends books, written by many of the people called Quakers, from the beginning of the first appearance of the said people* (London: Printed and sold by J Sowle, 1708).

39. Cf. B. H. Siddiqi, *From Hayy bin Yaqzan to the children of light*, *PPJ*, VII (July 1963), 66. Siddiqi suggests that George Fox (1624-1690), the founder of the Society of Friends might have derived his notion of "inward light" from Ibn Tufayl.

40. For contemporary records on Keith's early career, see G. Croese, *Historia Quakeriana* (Amsterdam, 1695), 191-92; *Diary of Alexander Jaffray*, provost of Aberdeen, ed. John Barclay (London, 1833), 241, 257.

41. For a summary of Keith's career, see R. M. Jones, *Keith, George*, in *Dictionary of American biography*, ed. D. Malone (New York: Charles Scribner's sons, 1953), X: 289-90.

42. R. M. Jones, *George Keith*, II: 289-90.

43. Christology refers to the theological discussions on the human and divine nature of Jesus Christ.

44. See for example G. Keith and R. Barclay, *Quakerism Confirmed, or, A Vindication of the Chief Doctrines and Principles of the People called Quakers from the Arguments and Objections of the Students of Divinity (so called) of Aberdeen* (London?: s.n., 1676).

45. R. Barclay, *Truth Triumphant ... A True and Faithful Account of the most material passages of a dispute betwixt some Students of Divinity (so-called) of the University of Aberdeen in Scotland, in Alexander Harper his Close (or Yard) before some hundreds of witnesses, upon the fourteenth day of the second month called April 1675*, (London, 1692), 570.

46. During his travels, Keith encountered the Viscount Conway and Franz Mercurius van Helmont with whom he discussed mystical doctrines of the kabbalah and Neoplatonism. Pastor suggests that ideas of metempsychosis allowed Keith to bridge the chasm over the notion of redemption that separated Quakers and Anglicans, based on the observation on Keith's travel encounters by Sewel. Pastor, 194-198.

This connection however is not self-evident in the examination of Keith's later works. Further, the last phase of Keith's career is extremely polemical. In the first phase, Keith was the object of several physical attacks, imprisonments. During the rift between the Quaker movement, he stood on trial and was finally declared an apostate. In the third stage, Keith became the attacker.

47. William Sewel, *The History of the Rise, Increase and Progress of the Christian people called Quakers ...* Written originally in Dutch (London, 1825), 616.

48. Cf. Jones, 290. It was later known as the William Penn Charter School.

49. George Keith, *An Exhortation and Caution to Friends concerning buying or keeping of Negroes, given forth in Philadelphia, the 13th day of the 8th Moneth, 1693. Copied from the original in library at Devonshire Meeting House, London, by Mr. Joseph Smith, in The First Printed Protest Against Slavery in America*, reprinted from "The Pennsylvania magazine of History and Biography" (Philadelphia, 1889).

50. George Keith, *The Tryals of Peter Boss, George Keith, Thomas Budd, and William Bradford, Quakers: for several great misdemeanours (as was pretended by their adversaries) before a court of Quakers held at Philadelphia in Pennsylvania, the ninth, tenth, and twelfth days of December, 1692: giving also*

the most arbitrary procedure of that court. London: Reprinted for Richard Baldwin, 1693.

51. Keith, *The Deism of William Penn and his brethren destructive to the Christian Religion*, exposed and plainly laid open: in the examination and refutation of his late reprinted book called *A discourse of the general rule of faith and practise and judge of controversie, wherein he contendeth that the Holy Scriptures are not the rule of faith and life, but that the light in the conscience of every man is that rule* (London: Printed for Brab. Aylmer, 1699).

52. Pastor, 204-05.

53. R. M. Jones, 289-90.

54. Ibn Tufayl, *Hayy*, 10. This quotation is cited by Ghazālī. Gauthier attributes it to Ḥarīrī; Gauthier, *Hayy*, 8 and no. 2. Mahdi notes that it is taken from Ibn al-Mu‘tazz. Mahdi, *Philosophical Literature*, 90.

55. Keith, *Advertisement*, 2 (not paginated).

56. Keith, *Advertisement*, 3. The italics are mine and appear to be a good definition of rational mysticism.

57. Keith, *Advertisement*, 2 (not paginated).

58. Barclay literally cites these passages by Keith in his *Apology* indicating either the close working relation between the two, or the fact that they wrote together. See Barclay, *Apology*, 133.

59. Incidentally, the Averroistic debate hinged on central questions of redemption - reward and punishment in the afterlife that were threatened by theories that denied the immortality of the individual soul.

60. Keith, *Immediate Revelation*, 203-204, 210.

61. This treatise was written during imprisonment. Its title is, *Immediate Revelation, or Jesus Christ the Eternall Son of God, revealed in man and revealing the knowledge of God, and the things of his Kingdom, immediately of the Holy Ghost, the Holy Spirit of Promise, the spirit of Prophecy, poured forth and inspiring man and induing him with power from on high, and baptising him, there unto, giving him wisdom, understanding, and knowledge from above (and giving to some utterance and moving them by own immediate assistance to speak forth, and declare the wonderful things of God). Not ceased but remain a standing and perpetual ordinance in the Church of Christ and being of indispensable necessity as to the whole body in general, so to every member thereof; every true believer in particular, asserted and demonstrated. And the*

objections that have any seeming weight, against it answered ... Writ by George Keith. Prisoner for the truth, in the Tollbooth of Aberdein, the 29th of the third Moneth, 1665.

62. Cf. Pastor, 192.

63. Pastor, 207.

64. Cf. *An Apology for the True Christian Divinity, as the same is held forth and preached by the people, called in scorn, Quakers. Being a full explanation and vindication of their Principles ... written and published in Latin (1676), for the information of strangers, by Robert Barclay. And now put into our own language for the benefit of his countrymen* (Aberdeen, 1678), Propositions V and VI, no. xxvii. In the eighteenth century edition, "called in scorn" is omitted perhaps because the pejorative sense of Quaker no longer applied.

65. Pastor, 209. Pastor critiques Barclay's summary, where "mystical illumination is made the only point in the romance, omitting altogether the final coincidence between revelation and individual experience," thereby dismissing the rational stages since 'the final knowledge of God' is not attained by 'premises premised'. Such a reception by Pastor (and Gauthier) reflects the concerns of early twentieth century concerns with the issue of harmonization rather than the revival of natural mysticism of the seventeenth century.

66. Barclay, *Apology*, "By the seed ... we understand a spiritual heavenly and invisible Principle ..." the *Vehiculum Dei*, Prop. V and VI, 134-135.

67. Pastor, 210.

68. Pastor, 211.

69. Pastor, 211.

70. "And thus, they christianise the Heathens and heathenise the Christians, calling them all the World's people, but themselves they call the Children of Light, the Elect People of God; and say of themselves they are in the Truth, and none but they and their Deist and Heathen Brethren; and perhaps the Quietists and followers of Molinus (whose Book held so much esteem) among the Papists." Keith, *Preface, The Deism of William Penn ...destructive to the Christian religion*, 1699; Pastor, 215-16.

71. We discuss these issues in an article, *The Synthesis of Polarity in Ibn 'Arabi*, Unpubl. paper (London: The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 1985) 1-23. Other examples such as the use of double negatives by Isma'īlī philosophers might yield significant results when analyzed through literary theories of communication and

hermeneutics that attempt to derive 'meaning' through such interaction. See Hasanali, *The Theology of Double Negation in Classical Ismailism*, Unpubl. paper, London: The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 1985, 1-25. In his analysis of the *Book of Genesis*, Jauss suggests an approach that is dialogical and centred on a theory of communication. Therefore, the question by God, "Wherefore art thou, Adam?" is approached as interaction between God and Adam in novel ways that promote communication, rather than assuming either a dialectical debate as to whether God knew or did not know where Adam was, or being seen as rhetorical devices. Jauss, *A questioning Adam*, in *Question and Answer*, 51-94.

72. For examples from these writers, see J. Kritzeck, *An Anthology of Islamic Literature from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times* (1964; New York: New America Library, 1976).

73 Cf. Pastor, 202, no. 1.

74. At Turner's Hall. Cf. Pastor, 202, no. 2.

75. Cited by Pastor, 203 from George Pennington, *The People called Quakers cleared by George Keith from the False doctrines charged upon them by George Keith*, (1696), 7.

76. Cf. Keith, *The Standards of the Quakers Examined, or an Answer to the Apology of Robert Barclay*, printed for B. Aylmer at the Three Pigeons, 1702, 5; (written after the author had become an Anglican).

77. Keith, *The Standards of Quakers*, 171.

78. E. L. Pennington, *Apostle of New Jersey John Talbot (1645-1727)*. Philadelphia: The Church Historical Society, n.d. This book deals with the records, correspondence and excerpts of the journal by George Keith during his missionary expedition across North America, accompanied by John Talbot. Keith succeeded in converting many Quaker congregations to the Episcopal Church in North America.

79. As cited by Barclay, *op. cit.*, 621.

80. George Keith, *An Exhortation and Caution to Friends concerning buying or keeping of Negroes* (Philadelphia, 1693); Reprinted as *The First Printed Protest against Slavery in North America from "The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, ed. George H. Moor (Philadelphia, 1889).

81. For example, Simon Ockley's translation in 1708 seeks to respond to some of the "enthusiastic Notions" of the time. It has always been presumed to represent a reaction against Keith and Quaker theology. Ockley's intentions are

questionable since Keith had already refuted his own early theology.

82. Heylyn's major works with regard to the religious freedom include *The Undeceiving of the People in the Point of Tithes* (London: Printed for R. B. for H. Twyford, 1647) and *Ecclesia Restaurata: The History of Reformation in the Church of England* (London: Printed by M. F. for J. Clark, 1647-48).

83. The whole controversy and varied perspectives on the "Act of Toleration" are discussed in E. Cruickshanks, *By Force or by Default? The Revolution of 1688-1689*. Edinburgh: J. Donald, 1989.

84. Cf. Pastor, 223-225. Socinism literature refers to the works surround the two Protestant-Evangelical Italians writers, Leilo and Fausto Sozzini. Leilo had some knowledge of Hebrew and Arabic and is said to have carried a copy of the Qur'an with him. The movement had mystical and occult tendencies. It also addressed the great problem of the Trinity in Christian theology. Pastor considers Leilo a precursor of Quakerism by a century.

85. Cf. Pastor, 222, 224-25. Pastor analyzes some basic precepts of the influence of Socinism literature in England. The other works by Ashwell include *Fides Apostolica, or a Discourse asserting the received authors and authority of the Apostles' creed* (1653) and *De Socino et Socinianismo Dissertatio* (1680)

86. Leslie Stephen (ed.), *Dictionary of National Biography* (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1885-1901) cited by Pastor, 226, no. 1.

87. Ashwell, *To the right honourable Philip Ld Wenman, Baron of Kilmaynham and Viscount Tuam*, 5 pp. (not numbered).

88. Ashwell, *The Preface*, 19 pp. (not numbered)

89. Ashwell, *Epistle*, 2; *Preface*, 5.

90. Ashwell, *The History of Hai ... world; set forth not long ago in the original Arabick with the Latin version Edward Pocock, M.A. and student at Christ-Church, Oxon. 1671. And now translated into English*. (London: Printed for Richard Chiswell in St. Paul's Church Yard and William Thorp, Bookseller in Banbury MDCLXXXVI (1686).

91. Ashwell, *Theologia Ruris*, in *The History of Hai*, 195-217.

92. Ashwell, *Epistle*, 2-3.

93. Ashwell, *Epistle*, 3.

94. Ashwell, *Preface*, 3.
95. Ashwell, *Preface*, 3-4.
96. Ashwell, *Preface*, B 3.
97. Ashwell, *Preface*, 4-5.
98. Ashwell, *Preface*, 5-6.
99. Ashwell, *Preface*, 6.
100. Ashwell, *Preface*, 6-7.
101. Ashwell, *Preface*, 7-8.
102. Ashwell, *Preface*, 8.
103. Ashwell, *Theologus Ruris*, 216-217.
104. The following sources and archival material have been utilized in our study of the translator, Simon Ockley:
 - a) The translation of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* by Simon Ockley (1708), including the Dedication to Edward Pococke Jr. (3 pp.), preface (3 pp.), the Bookseller to the Reader (3 pp.), the English translation (1-162) and the appendix (163-195).
 - b) Dr. Ralph Heathcote, (Ockley's grandson) *Ockley* in *Chalmer's General Biographical Dictionary*, (1761).
 - c) Isaac Disraeli (1766-1848), *The Calamities and Quarrels of Authors* (1812, II: 219-237; 1867: 186-193. We examined both (and later) editions, but have primarily used the 1867 edition.
 - d) Thomas Hearne (1638-1735), a contemporary literary historian who personally interviewed Edward Pococke, Jr. Simon Ockley and many others. He presents his observations on them.
 - e) Citations by Gibbon and other contemporaries.
 - f) Ockley's Correspondence.
 - g) Ockley's Preface to the *History of Saracens*.
105. Dr. Ralph Heathcote, *Ockley, Simon, The General Biographical Dictionary: containing a historical and critical account of the lives and writings of the most eminent persons in every nation*, ed. Alexander Chalmers, new revised ed. (1761; London: Printed for J. Nichols, 1812-1817). This is a basic source of information for the incidents in Ockley's life.
106. Simon Ockley, *The History of the Saracens. comprising the lives of Mohammed and his successors, to the death of Abdalmelik, the eleventh caliph*. 4th. rev. ed. London: H. G. Bohn, 1847.

107. For his eulogy of the Arabs, see Ockley's preface to *Sentences of Ali* (London, 1717).

108. Written in prison, the first volume appeared in 1708 and the second ten years later.

109. Humphrey Prideaux (1648-1724), author of a polemical work on Muhammad, *The True Nature of Imposture Fully Displayed in the Life of Mahomet...* (1697). Prideaux was the type of scholarly source that was used as a basic source of information of Islam, although he had no knowledge of the languages, cultures or religion of the Muslim world and used the works of other scholars such as Ockley.

110. *Op. cit.* Said, *Orientalism*. Said remarks how the notion of Oriental Studies as "area studies" included a wide range of disparate disciplines (anthropology, history, literature) and vastly different geographical areas (Africa, the Far East, the Middle East, India, China) that allowed the same methodology and premises to be applied and assumed of these disparate entities.

111. *Simonis Ockleii Oratio Inauguralis* (Cantabrigiae, 1712), 3-4.

112. *Decline and Fall*, ed. Bury, Vol. VI, p. 4, no. 8.

113. Pastor, 230.

114. Disraeli, *Calamities of Authors*, 186.

115. Disraeli, 187.

116. Simon Ockley, *Book of Esdras*, tr. from Arabic, in William Whiston, *Primitive Christianity Revived* (London: Printed for the author, 1711-12).

117. Disraeli, 187.

118. In a letter to Earl Oxford from Cambridge Castle [prison] (Sept. 7, 1717), Ockley notes: *I have at last found leisure in my confinement to finish my Saracen history, which I might have hoped for in vain in my perplexed circumstances.* Cf. Disraeli, 192.

119. Disraeli, 187.

120. Cf. *Remarks and Collections*, ed. Doble (Oxford Historical Society, 1907), I, 246, 227, 245; III 57, 286, 485. The other sources of information on Ockley's life are cited by Pastor from an article published by Ralph Heathcote (Ockley's grandson), *Chalmer's General Biographical Dictionary*, 1st. ed. 1761; cf. Pastor, 230.

121. Disraeli, 186-87.

122. Cited by Disraeli, 187. The sufic metaphor on knowledge and experience as "taste" or "thirst" occurs in the Tufaylian narrative that Ockley translated.

123. William Whiston, *Primitive Christianity Revived* (London: Printed for the Author, 1711-12).

124. Disraeli, 187.

125. Disraeli, 187.

126. Disraeli, 191. Ockley who attended a dinner party at the Lord Treasurer Harley, Earl of Oxford was later criticized by some people on his lack of social graces. Ockley was shown a letter about him which noted: "That Professor Ockley had given such extreme offence by some uncourtly answers to some gentlemen at my Lord Treasurer's table that it would be vain to make any further application to him." Unable to recall having offended anyone, Ockley apologized in a letter to the Earl and denied the accusation of being a sot (drunk). He noted further, "Here in the University, I converse with none but persons of the most distinguished reputations, both from learning and virtue, and receive from them daily as great marks of respect and esteem which I should not have if that imputation were true."

127. R. Walzer (ed.), *Al-Fārābī on the Perfect State*, New rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 4. Scholars have debated whether these "habits" reflect the practice of sufism in Fārābī. Despite the rejection of such views by Walzer and by implication, the dissociation of Farabian views from mysticism, the simplicity (and possibly eccentricity) that this report indicates about the thinker challenges prevailing views on the elitism of the philosophy.

128. Disraeli, 188.

129. Letter to the Earl of Oxford: Cambridge Castle, May 2, 1717.
I am here in the prison for debt, which must needs be an unavoidable consequence of the distractions in my family. I enjoy more repose, indeed here than I have tasted these many years, but the circumstance of a family obliges me to go out as soon as I can.

130. Disraeli, 188-89.

131. Cf. *Cambridge History of English Literature* X: 280, cited by Pastor, 233, no. 2, without an indication of the year of publication. We were not able to find this citation.
132. Ockley, *Dedication*, 1 (not paginated).
133. Ockley (tr.), *The Improvement of Human Reason*, London: Printed and sold by Edm. Powell in Black-friars and J. Morphew near Stationers-Hall, 1708. Republished in 1711, and in an abridged edition in 1731.
134. Pastor, 238.
135. Pastor, 239.
136. Ockley, *Preface*, 2 (not paginated).
137. Ockley, *Preface*, 2 (not paginated.).
138. Ockley, *Appendix* in *The Improvement of Human Reason*, 165-195.
139. Ockley, *Preface*, 2 (not paginated).
140. *The Bookseller to the Reader*, in *The Improvement of Human Reason*, tr. Simon Ockley, 2 (not numbered).
141. Ockley, *Preface*, 3 (not paginated).
142. Cf. Ockley, *Appendix*, Sections 1-2.
143. See Eveline Cruickshanks (ed.), *By Force or by Default? The Revolution of 1688-1689* (Edinburgh: J. Donald, 1989) for further discussion on the reign of James II (1633-1701) and the Cromwellian Revolution.
144. Ockley, *Appendix*, 179.
145. Ockley, *Appendix*, 190.
146. Ockley, *Appendix*, 191.
147. Ockley, *Appendix*, 193.
148. Ockley, *Appendix*, 193.
149. Ockley, *Appendix*, 195.
150. Ockley, *Dedication*, 2 (not paginated).

151. *Op. cit. Orientalism*. Said discusses how one of the major ploys of orientalism was such "first-hand" knowledge gained by scholars such as Edward Lane who lived among the people of Egypt, studying them all the time, while integrating into the society of the native, or Flaubert whose particular affair with a courtesan was to circumscribe his view of the oriental female and concurrently the view of the oriental female presented to the west.

152. Chew, *The Crescent*, 406-407; 422.

153. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile* (London: Dent, 1948), 147-48. The reiterations of Hayy in *Emile* and *Robinson Crusoe* will be discussed further below.

154. Humphrey Prideaux (1648-1724), the author of a polemical biography of Muhammad titled *The True Nature of Imposture Fully Displayed in the Life of Mahomet* (1697).

155. Cf. Alexander Pope, *Correspondence*, ed. George Sherburn (London: Clarendon Press, 1956), II: 13.

156. Maxmillian E. Novak, *Robinson Crusoe's Fear and the Search for the Natural Man*, *Modern Philology* 58 (May, 1961), 239.

157. Cf. Conant, *The Oriental Tale*, 129.

158. Virginia Birdsall, *Defoe's Perpetual Seekers: A Study of the Major Fiction* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1985), 13.

159. Birdsall, 13.

160. Birdsall, 13.

161. Novak, 238.

162. George Aitken (ed.) *Romances and Narratives by Daniel Defoe* (London, 1895), III, 12.

163. See Diana Loxley, *Problematic Shores: The Literature of Islands*, Diss. University of Essex, 1987; Rosemary Haskell, *The Antagonist Structure of the Colonial Experience in Five Novels of Daniel Defoe*, Diss. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1985.

164. Hasanali, *Ibn Tufayl*, in *Companion to Arabic Literature*, ed. J. S. Meisami and Paul Starkey (London: Routledge, 1995) [forthcoming].

165. This work is not mentioned in most catalogues. I first found a reference to *The History of Josephus* while doing an RLIN computer search. I later discovered a reprint of the text by Nawal Muhammad, *Hayy bin Yaqzan* and finally was able to look at the original printed text in Robert Greene's *The Pleasant and Delightful History of Dorastus, Prince of Sicily and Fawnia, Daughter and Heir to Pandosta, King of Bohemia a Pleasant Winter Evening's Entertainment* (London: Printed for G. Conyers, 1696?), 65-78.

166. Cf. Gauthier, *Ibn Thofail*, 91; G. Hourani, *The Principal Subject*, 40-46. Gauthier and Hourani debate on the purpose of the narrative. Hourani observes that the latter part of the story in the Tufaylian narrative was the purpose of the author, using the length of the sections as a method of measuring the purpose of the narrative.

167. *The Catalogue of Printed Books of the British Library*, vol. 1, 436 (s.v. *Abu Bakr ibn al-Tufail*) refers to this work published in 1761 as an abridged translation of the *Philosophus Autodidactus*, which is an inaccurate statement.

168. A. Pastor, *The Idea of Robinson Crusoe*, 179. M. Ṣāliḥ, *Ibn Tufayl, qadāya wa-mawāqif* (1976; Baghdad: Dar al-Shu'un al-thaqafiyah al-'ammah, 1986).

169. Remke Kruk, *An 18th Century Descendant of Hayy ibn Yaqzān and Robinson Crusoe: Don Antonio de Trezzanio*, *Arabica* 36 (Nov. 1987), 357-365.

170. George Orwell's phrase, cited by Green, 2.

171. Martha Conant, *The Oriental Tale in England in the Eighteenth Century*, (New York: Octagon Books, 1966). Conant actually does not discuss or cite the Don Trezzanio version, possibly since its plagiarization devolves it of any of the characterization of the Turk or Mahmud, the prototypical Muslim. However, this study explores the stereotypes and themes that were popularized in the eighteenth century, which the current study has not focussed on, though it has been alluded to in chapter two.

172. *A Dialogue between Mahmut and the Androgio Ben-Jockdon in Memoirs for the Curious, or An Account of what occurs that's rare, secret, extraordinary through the world*, vol. 1, no. 2 (1701), 47-50.

173. John C. Dunlop, *History of Prose Fiction*, vol. 2 (New York: AMS Press, n.d.), 518-519.

174. The inter-relation of the literature of islands in myth and history and thus the parallel between discovery themes and colonial conquests has been explored in some studies such as Stephen Greenblatt's *Marvellous Possessions: The*

Wonder of the New World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). This inter-relation also creeps into some of the late manuscripts of *Ḥayy* through the interpolation of the island of Waq of Arab mytho-geography.

175. Dunlop, 518-525.

176. Green, 2.

177. *Op. cit.* Said, *Culture*, 163 ff.

178. Said, *Culture*, 212.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* has a unique literary history that transcends language, culture, history, geography and even narrative itself. Written originally in Arabic in twelfth century Andalusia, the text brings into play the dichotomy of poles within the culture in which it was articulated. Writing in "western Islam", Ibn Ṭufayl is acutely aware of his spiritual and intellectual disconnection from the east, which is perceived as the centre and source of intellectual creativity. This sense of disconnection is expressed through the lack of access to important texts of the major teachers such as Ibn Sīnā. It is likewise perceived in the absence of intellectual thought amongst fellow Andalusians, who indicate a proclivity toward mathematics at the expense of the philosophical and speculative sciences.

The writer is re-connected to this east on the basis of illuminative philosophy that ties him symbolically with Ibn Sīnā and the *ishrāqī* tradition of Suhrawardī. The mental geography in the east, coupled by the physical disconnection, recreates a dual relationship between the story as articulated by Ibn Ṭufayl and its image in the east via Ibn Sīnā. The story thus becomes a mode binding the two cultures within the culture.

This binding point is reinforced by the narrative's intent "to reveal the secrets of Eastern philosophy," that were expressed by Ibn Sīnā and presented in the stories of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, *Salāmān and Absāl*. The different stories are primarily connected by title. Their difference also lies in reception. The stories of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, *Salāmān and Absāl* are *received* by each of the authors, who articulate them in their own social contexts and spiritual worlds, whether one is speaking of the Hermetic version of *Salāmān and Absāl*, the Tufaylian narrative or the anti-thesis by Ibn al-Nafīs. Each reception is further guided by its own set of expectations, including the time, place, culture, religion and the intention of the

writer. Thus, the literary history of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* transcends narrative, but still remains linked to the conditions of reception in its individual articulations.

Likewise, the common, narrative parallels that provide a basis for comparative studies between the tales such as *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* and *Robinson Crusoe* do not preclude this transcendence of narrative. The major motifs arise from the factors that govern their reception at the time they were written. They are further articulated in current criticism as a reader-response. Thus, the texts cannot be reduced to the conglomeration of commonalities, although these similarities provide a point of departure for their reiteration. This is clearly demonstrated, for example, in the comparison between Ibn al-Nafīs and Ibn Tufayl. The commonalities demonstrate their connection, but the individual 'reworkings' reflect expectations that are grounded in particular social, religious and spiritual frameworks.

This dissertation has centred on the reception and transmission of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* in the Muslim, Judaic and Christian milieux. The resultant developments through these transmissions have occurred independently from each other. This study has separately examined each of these channels of transmission, their inter-relation, their similarities and differences. It has also looked at the particular factors that have governed each mode of transmission. The sections of each chapter also include a summation that summarizes and draws conclusions. Given that the different transmissions have their own history, and are patterned on different paradigms, these summations allow the reader to discern the inter-relation between these sections, while approaching them as independent units. In this chapter, I will look at the process as a whole, summarize some of the observations on how these transmissions relate to each other and their salient factors. I will further indicate other lines of transmission that merit further research.

One might conclude that the *prima facie* connection between the lines of transmission arises from their use of the Tufaylian narrative. This is not self-evident, since the transmissions include appropriations and minor citations that cannot always be connected back to the central text. Past scholarship has not been

able to resolve these connections, without succumbing to overt generalization, or to a comparison based on external parallels.

The critical methodology applied in this dissertation allows one to bring together the different channels of transmission through a process of webbing. Our application not only recognizes that these transmissions are similar because of their common source, but that they are different because of the context of their reception. The further application of "culture" as a mode of analysis reinforces the different receptions, through the intent vested in the particular expectations. Thus, the differences in the various receptions reflect considerable insight into the *particular* channel of transmission, avoiding the earlier tendency to indicate the primacy of the focus text, based solely on archetypal or narrative similarities.

The reception of the narrative in the Muslim milieu

One might assume that the starting point of such a study would begin from its reception in the Muslim milieu. The literary history of the narrative challenges this assumption for two contrasting reasons; the first being its own inception within a conceptual framework that ties it to earlier precedents by its choice of names, the application of genre and common motifs. We had argued earlier that these epic commonalities might be archetypal, or arise from inherited mythic elements.¹ However, they place the narrative in the context of a 'past' history and some consideration has been given to the re-examination of these elements in this study.

The past history of the narrative also adds a new voice to a previous debate in Islamic philosophy regarding the role of Ibn Sīnā's narratives versus his peripatetic treatises. Ibn Tufayl's narrative allows for a re-examination of the views expressed by Corbin and Goichon and suggests a median solution. The Tufaylian narrative does not belong to the Persian cultural context by which Corbin circumscribes the recitals of Ibn Sīnā. Although the Tufaylian narrative shows an empathy toward the "spiritual universe" of the "east", it is clearly a product of "western" Islam. It receives, reiterates and resolves in its own context

the conflict between the rational and the intellectual traits, first posed by Ibn Bājjah. Yet, it is not alienated from the "eastern" spiritual universe. The Tufaylian narrative has also been subject to the same mode of demarcation in its history of criticism, that Goichon applied to her study of the inter-relation between the various works of Ibn Sīnā. Two new voices reiterate this discussion in relation to Ibn Sīnā, as seen in the works of Dimitri Gutas and Peter Heath.

We have shown how this tendency has been expressed by the reader-critic's view of the Tufaylian narrative as *either* literature or philosophy.² Two factors condition the weakness of such a reading with regard to Ibn Tufayl; i) the central position of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* as the primary work of its author in philosophy and narrative prose, thus providing no other work to compare it with, except for the prologue;³ ii) the literary form of the narrative does not preclude the centrality of the issues that it shares with peripatetic treatises. Assigning the Tufaylian narrative as a mode of rational mysticism, and not exclusively as either 'recital' or 'treatise' suggests a median view. This mode of "rational mysticism" could be equally applicable to the 'recital' or the 'treatise', when viewed in relation to the central issues being raised by the philosophers, rather than being limited to the genre. This approach circumvents the problem that occurs when a work of philosophy is primarily valued on the basis of its form, as has been the case with the emphasis on the prologue.

Such an approach would also recognize that the philosophers responded to the larger questions of philosophy within their own context. Thus, their reception and reiteration of these issues cannot be reduced to a regurgitation of Greek philosophy, but need to be recognized as a response within the Muslim milieu. This perspective will allow one to set aside the assumptions that often derive from monolithic views of the past, whether positive or negative, or of philosophy as an elitist, albeit intellectual sport that was outside the realm of normative behaviour. While not always possible, viewing the works of an Ibn Sīnā or a Fārābī within their larger social and biographical context enriches the literary history of their writings and their relevance, response, or reaction to the norms of their own time.

Even problematic biographies, or polemical works contribute to our understanding of the larger context. Later receptions, whether assigned as apodictic or dialectic are still circumscribed by certain premises.⁴ Literary theories of communication reject the notion of 'objectivity' as problematic, and consider that textuality occurs through the reader and through the meaning assigned to metaphors in our times. The "modern" reading of classical works may adhere faithfully to certain basic premises, but the reader public approaches a work within its own set of expectations.

The absence of authorship or its acknowledgement in the transmission of the Tufaylian narrative sometimes arises from the paucity of information. In other cases, it is due to the horizon of expectation, for example, the reiteration of Ibn Sīnā as the author of the Tufaylian narrative. Chapter three focussed the discussion on how the 'story' was received in different forms within the Muslim milieu, starting from the Hermeticist version translated into Arabic by Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq to Ibn Sīnā's reception, and likewise its post-Tufaylian presentation and its continuation with Ibn al-Khaṭīb, Jāmī and Ibn al-Nafīs.

It might be argued that while the cultural milieu succeeds in retaining a process of continuation between the tales, radical changes also occur through this process of transmission, in the form of the story, the content, its genre and characterization and finally, its intent and audience. The intent that initiates Ibn al-Nafīs's perfected narrative divests it of its mystical accretions. Further, the Tufaylian narrative plays a mediating role between the earlier representations by Ibn Sīnā, Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq, the Hermeticist precursor and the Nasirian summaries, versus Jāmī's reiteration, the anti-thetical reflections by Ibn al-Nafīs and modern Arab reclamations.

Thus, the process of reception gradually leads to anti-thetical responses in both the Christian and Muslim milieux. These anti-thetical responses also occur through the de-contextualized narrative and its author through the process of translation and transmission. For example, the attribution of the narrative's primary authorship to Ibn Sīnā, rather than Ibn Ṭufayl in itself could have

radically changed the horizon of expectation in its further transmission within the Maghribi milieu. Given that the prologue expresses the sense of dissociation and lack of access between *mashriqi* and *maghribi* Islam, can one then assume that a text originating from the *mashriq* would be considered in a different light than one originating from the *maghrib*?

With the geographical demarcation of eastern and western Islam at that time, the eastern regions were viewed as the nexus of religious and intellectual vitality. It is therefore ironical that the western regions are later associated with the creation of seminal works and thinkers in Islamic thought, despite the lack of such an expectation. Thus, each of these receptions in the Muslim milieu also shift with the changing horizon of expectation, starting from the earliest renditions of the tale.

The anti-thesis by Ibn al-Nafīs may have assumed the author of the narrative to be Ibn Sīnā, based on the records of Ibn al-Nafīs' biographer. However, the shift in the horizon of expectation by Ibn al-Nafīs occurs on theological grounds. The 'Ibn Sīnā' received by Ibn al-Nafīs might come from a different theological frame of reference, but he is not the 'Ibn Sīnā' of the recitals. In terms of scientific orientation, Ibn al-Nafīs's views are closely attuned both to Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Ṭufayl, elaborating the former's discussion of the theory of humours in relation to spontaneous generation, and developing the latter's seminal notions of blood circulation, that Ibn al-Nafīs was to later elaborate into a full-scale theory of lesser circulation. Thus, even though Ibn al-Nafīs belonged to the Maghrib, he does not appear to draw a specific meaning from this context, at least in the first part of his narrative. His perspective then arises from difference in theological and political ideologies.

In the case of Ibn al-Khaṭīb's reception, the narrative's origin in the Maghrib are a signifying factor. It allows him to associate Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn Rushd - both proponents of Maghribi Islam - together as representatives of 'rational mysticism,' that becomes strongly identified with the Maghribi philosophers. Further, Ibn al-Khaṭīb's reception achieves what the prologue

critiques. It connects the east with the west (both in the Muslim and Averroistic context), by reflecting the possibility of rationalism and mysticism. It thus rejects the general tendency to see the proponents of Maghribi Islam as representative of the *falsafah* and later Mashriqi Islam as representative of *'irfān*. Ibn al-Khaṭīb's reception underlines the limitation of such demarcation, since the Western Ibn Ṭufayl and the Eastern Suhrawardī might both be drawn together as representative transmitters of rational mysticism.

The choice of genre also grounds particular receptions. The Tufaylian narrative has generally been discerned in terms of literature or philosophy in modern reader-responses by critics. Therefore, emphasis is either laid on its literary and allegorical features, or its philosophy, viewed primarily in terms of the prologue. The mythic character of its precedents ranges from elements of fable in the Hermetistic version and the stories of Dhu'l-Qarnayn to the symbolism of the Avicennan recitals. These receptions differ both in terms of content and style. The focus on style apprises us of the process of reception as much as the changing context.

The different genres also have an impact on the content. The prevalent style of the particular narratives in their expected horizon might affect both their creation and their later reception. For example, the characterization in Jāmī's poem has been approached in two different ways. One may look at the commentaries by Naṣīruddin Ṭūsī to recognize the symbolic representation of the characters and their inter-relation with the Avicennan recitals, or one might focus on the didactic and moralistic aspects, reflected in the concrete expository examples with which Jāmī illustrates the symbolic frame of the poem, *Salāmān and Absāl*. The reduction of the characters in the reader-response by Malti-Douglas reflects the extremities of the didactic content. Yet, it is the form of the work that renders such a meaning. The modern reader-response by Malti-Douglas sees it in terms of the meaning derived through the reduction of symbols, whereas the earlier reader-response by Ṭūsī sees it (or rather its source) as reflective of the archetypal symbolism of the soul and its quest. Where does the true meaning of

the poem lie? Obviously, it is the different receptions that transform its meaning. Is there not intrinsic meaning to the poem? I would thus argue that the form or genre plays a significant role in its interpretive meaning.

Arberry has indicated some important features regarding Jāmī's works and its particularized use of stylistic formalism that was prevalent in Persian poetry at the time. I discussed the necessity of seeing the Persian works of Jāmī as a whole, the poetry along with the miniatures and the script. Further, I noted that its enunciation or recitation denotes its received meaning. Even today, the poetic forms of the *qawwālī* and the *ghazal* in the Indian sub-continent derive their emphasis primarily as evoked by the reciter (*qawwāl*) who speaks (or sings) it.

One might also look at the Persian miniatures of Salāmān and Absāl on the paradisiacal island, whose aesthetic form illustrates the limitations of reducing a poem to its 'meaning', without consideration of genre and the context of its composition. If the reduction of the poem appears distasteful to our modern sensibilities, how does one 'explain' the beauty of its illustration? What meaning is communicated by such artistic representation? Likewise, what does the 'selective' option of seeing 'beauty' in one case and the 'beast' in the other mean in aesthetic terms? The reduction of the symbols to their basic meanings is not a futile task. It does reflect to us how society may have perceived gender roles, but it must be recognized as a current response, bound by a different set of expectations. Literature is the mirror of life and past works do give us a glimpse into the workings of society. However, to assume that our reception of one poem and its reduced meaning is equally applicable to other such usages of the same symbols (in Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Ṭufayl, etc.) is fallacious. Further, it is possible, especially in this instance, to infer that the form is as representative of the poem in the context of its composition as is the meaning rendered by a reader-response.

As noted in chapter three, the connections through characterization contribute to the transmission of meaning and its reception in different contexts. Corbin primarily postulates the link between the Hermeticistic, Avicennan, Tusian, and Jamian tales as initiatory recitals, in terms of the story and spiritual-cultural

context. Despite falling outside this cultural realm, Ibn Tufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, as the repository of the "names" shares in this context. Such meanings are transferred in Ibn al-Nafīs' *Kāmil* in order to reactivate the original notion of perfection, legitimized not in the philosopher or the mystic but in the prophet. This transference is exhibited in the choice of the name -- *Kāmil* -- by Ibn al-Nafīs, indicating that the transformed protagonist can no longer be perceived in relation to the initiatory recitals.

Conversely, one can perceive common motifs between the Himyarite tale of Dhū al-Qarnayn and the Tufaylian narrative, but the intent of each work is vastly different, as are their particular receptions, explicated through the style of their narratives. The story related by a sage to Dhū al-Qarnayn shares narrative commonalities with the Tufaylian narrative. In this case, one can acknowledge the possibility of a common source. However, the Himyarite tale falls within the boundary of the fable or epic and reflects its stylistic characteristics, whereas the Tufaylian narrative utilizes these characteristics (of the epic) but transforms the style of re-presentation. The difference in style likewise changes the intent of the author and the audience addressed. The commonalities indicate a connection in the process of transmission, but if one fails to neglect the difference in reception (in this case, brought about greatly by the style of each narrative and the content), then this significant connection in transmission might likewise be reduced to narrative commonalities, rather than different receptions.

Likewise, the form of Ibn al-Nafīs's work gives us an inkling as to how we might "read" this treatise. Ibn al-Nafīs's didactic purpose is barely disguised and easily discernible, from its title to its narrative style. He excludes the mythic element and uses the story primarily as a skeletal structure. The guise of fiction is almost abandoned after the first part of the narrative by Ibn al-Nafīs. Since its inter-relation to the Tufaylian narrative is primarily limited to the first part, we have not focussed the analysis on the political ideology of the Sultanate and other issues that are not directly related to the reception of the Tufaylian narrative. Even within the first part, the form of the work sets the groundwork for the

reading intended by its author. The story fades into the background as its author renders well-constructed science modules, such as the description of the alimentary canal. With the absence of the mythical structure, one almost forgets that this is a story. Yet, the narrative by Ibn al-Nafis operates at two levels; it fulfils the popularity of the adventure novel and is similar in this sense to the realistic novel by Defoe. At the second level, it underlines the perceived proper and ethical behaviour. Thus, the variations of the Tufaylian narrative, such as the response by Ibn al-Nafis, represent a phenomenon of appropriation within the Muslim milieu, parallel to the Robinsonade.

In the case of Ibn al-Nafis, the anti-thesis is consciously formulated. It is in response to and a reversal of the Tufaylian narrative. However, in the case of *Robinson Crusoe*, this reversion occurs even though a response to the Tufaylian narrative is not central; it develops through a protracted process of transmission. Prior comparisons of the two works have focussed on narrative similarities without taking into account the reversions that occur in both the Christian and Muslim milieux.

Applying the notion of reception to the analysis of rational mysticism in Muslim philosophy would suggest new directions and perspectives in research, that are not solely limited to the inherited peripatetic structure. The works of Islamic philosophy and their reception of Greek thought (especially of Plato and Aristotle) have been clearly affected through the process of Neo-platonic and Christian commentators. An awareness of this context has allowed for added insight on the resultant philosophies derived in the Muslim context.

The modern Arab reclamation of the narrative as the prototypical Robinsonade permits its analysis as a voice of the new culture of independence, separated from the primary narrative context (except as the idealized source). To the degree that the European appropriation separates the narrative from its context, the Arab Robinsonade reclaims it. The process of transmission and reception that occurs between the primary text, its transmission and reclamation, does not result in a return to origins, whether of narrative or myth, but leads to a state of two

parallel "translations", belonging to the larger modern ideology. The continued emphasis on the Robinsonade elements of the narrative in the reader-response of critics likewise limits its reception to that particular context.

The nature of the question posed about Ibn Ṭufayl's "purpose" is whether one might assume a socio-critical function, through a reading of the sub-text in relation to the historical circumstances; or whether the Tufaylian narrative aims to reconcile the ways of reason and revelation, the common reading and certainly an important aspect of the debate in medieval Islamic philosophy of the time. One might thus see that the horizon of expectation in the area of Islamic philosophy was also shifting, addressed by Ibn Bājjah's recognition of the marginalization of the philosopher in the social expectations of his horizon, alluded to earlier by Fārābī and certainly evoked by Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn Rushd. With Ibn Ṭufayl, it is the changing role of the intellectual and the mystic that is now being explored. Whether the Intellectual Mystic should lead society as Philosopher King, or whether he should focus on his individual growth and development? Thus, the application of reception theory and the overall theoretical critique on translation in this study may be applied to an understanding of Islamic philosophy, not as a static development from Greek thought but a more nuanced expression, bound by process and context.

The reception of the narrative in the Judaic milieu

An examination of Arabo-Jewish lines of transmission from the perspective of Islamic philosophy suggests further insight on its reception in Christian Europe. The Arabo-Jewish works and commentaries, such as those by Narboni, have been primarily viewed as parallel to the subsequent Latinization and the process of Averroism, ignoring the differences due to the particular contexts of the Jewish translators, such as access to Arabic, or even early access to some Hebrew translations (of the works of Ibn Rushd).

The transmission and impact of the narrative thus move between a focus on the text and its reception by the translator and commentator. In the case of the

Hebrew transmission examined in chapters four and five, its widespread use is reflected in the first instance by the copious number of extant manuscripts from the fifteenth century. Nevertheless, in terms of its further reception, the views of the commentator are relegated second place to the anonymous Hebrew translator. Given that all versions of the Hebrew translation exist only in recension by Moses Narboni, the citation of the Hebrew translation and the lack of mention of his commentator opens up new questions.

Narboni's views on Averroes and rational mysticism were not particularly popular in certain Rabbinic circles where he was considered a heretic. One also has to recall the theological debates between the Averroists and anti-Averroists that followed the transmission of Arabic philosophical texts into Latin. These might be reasons why Narboni's commentary was not cited in some instances, even though the Hebrew translation was used.

The other postulate might be that the Hebrew translation did exist in an independent manuscript, which later critics could have accessed. Since the discussions of the Hebrew translation of the Tufaylian narrative primarily occur in the fifteenth century, it is not likely that a version other than the Narbonian recension was used during this period. Further, the fifteenth century writers who cite the translation were also highly critical of Narboni. Hence, their reluctance to acknowledge the use of his commentary is most probable. The issues surrounding the Hebrew translation, its authorship and date remain unresolved. It would be very interesting if future research could uncover independent versions of the Hebrew translation, which we know had to have been written prior to the mid-fourteenth century and was possibly cited as early as the third quarter of the thirteenth century.

Detailed information on the extant manuscripts of the Hebrew translation and commentary of the Tufaylian narrative as well some other Hebrew translations and commentaries was compiled in chapter four. This aspect of the research required extensive work into various early catalogues and their archaic use of various European languages, including Latin, German and Italian. Further

research was undertaken to locate and examine the many manuscripts of the Hebrew translation and commentary. It is difficult to use the manuscripts as the basis of an analysis, given their number and other variants. It is hoped that future research will examine other manuscripts beside the Paris ones, and a definitive edition may be established. The present research on these manuscripts should provide considerable information for this future enterprise.

In the case of the Hebrew commentary by Narboni, we have explored the manner in which he received the Tufaylian narrative, and in what ways his reception contributes further to our understanding of rational mysticism. We have also looked at how recent critics have analyzed Narboni as well as the Judaic context of his works and his reiteration of Averroes.

Narboni's reception of the works of Muslim philosophers arises from a physical and cultural context that is quite disparate from either the Maghribi culture that he reinterprets within his own religious frame, and the expanding Christian Europe, where these same texts would be included in its new institutions. Thus, both the knowledge-base and its dissemination by Narboni present a transitional stage between the so-called apex of Muslim philosophy, the consequential dissemination of Greco-Arabic works and the development of Averroism. Narboni's works were written in a time when both Jewish and Islamic thought were increasingly appropriated or received in new and culturally variant contexts. This study lays the groundwork for an empathic study on Moses Narboni's reception of Muslim philosophy, utilizing the mode of rational mysticism. Such scholarship would also contribute to a process of recognizing the ideological shift that occurred through the Europeanization of Jewry.

The works of Ibn Rushd and the phenomenon of Averroism are both indicative of a resultant reception that changes the Aristotelian reading, particularly through its reception by Ibn Tufayl and its interpretation by Narboni. It is the question of rational mysticism that allows one to be sensitive to the shift, whereby Aristotelian philosophy is transformed.

The reception of the narrative in the Christian milieu

The Tufaylian narrative itself has an uncanny capacity to break-through its reception by translators and change the horizons of expectations, thus highlighting its central appeal, whether of universal spirituality, human capacity or individual responsibility. Literary theorists extol the liberating aspect of reception theory in its recognition that the analysis of classical texts reflect the current horizon of expectation by the reader-critic. In the case of the European reception, the text becomes simultaneously representative of differing horizons of expectation and reflects this process of transition in variant translations.

Several translations were produced in the European milieu, following the Arabic edition and Latin translation by Pococke Jr. in 1671. At the basic level, the Latin translation provided access to the possibility of translation into other European languages. The dissertation focuses on four different translators within the short time-span of 1671-1708. The translators respond to the text in terms of their own theologies, or as a refutation of other Christian theologies. *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* begins as and remains the *philosophus autodidactus* of Edward Pococke Jr., as rendered in the European transmission. George Keith found the narrative responsive to the Quaker notion of "light within" and "immediate revelation," even though he critiques some of these seminal notions in the later phase of his career. Simon Ockley is bound between rejecting the "enthusiastic" notions of the Quakers, and re-asserting its "original" form as an Arabist. George Ashwell responds to the narrative within the Deist and Naturalistic theologies that sought the "mirror of the Divine" in nature. These receptions also reflect the tremendous and volatile shifts in religious, social and political spheres in Britain during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Thus, in the Christian milieu, the translations contemporaneously represent different ideological stances.

Further, the transmitter sometimes (in the case of the Pocockes) is able to temporarily stall the changing horizon, despite the strong expectations (of Orientalism) vested in them. In his approach to Oriental Studies, Pococke Sr.'s reception contradicts the expected response in the horizon of colonial expansion

that allowed for subversion of the other religion/culture. At the same time, as a Clergyman involved in the propagation of Christianity, he remains representative of his time. The process of transmission shifts the expected role of Pococke who rejects the deliberative representation of the orient and retains -- to a degree -- the expectation vested in his primary knowledge of Islam and its cultural milieu. By providing access to the primary source, the Latin translation becomes the basis of the subsequent transmissions. Even though the Latin translation makes no attempt to transform the source, its limited provision of information on the background and writing of the Tufaylian narrative become the basis for further dilution and mis-information on the author and his religio-cultural context, seen in the later European transmissions.

The connections between the different transmissions depend on varying inter-relations. The Tufaylian narrative also recurs in "abridged" versions that are removed from the original context and whose actual author disappears. It is relevant to briefly highlight how these plagiarized versions relate to each other and to the Tufaylian narrative. The *History of Josephus* and *The Life and Surprising Adventures of Don Antonio de Trezzanio* are very different in nature from each other. The *History of Josephus* is an abridged version of the Tufaylian narrative, that remains faithful to the English translation. There are no radical changes in content, except in the name of the protagonist as Josephus and the summarization of the story. The "editor's" selectivity itself provides clues to the nature of its reception. It is interesting to note that Josephus' encounter with Asāl that is often de-emphasized by the English translators is given in full detail. The appropriated *Don Trezzanio* is a lengthy fictional work that transforms the Tufaylian narrative, with the addition of gory and melodramatic details. It adds the current focus on "piracy" in the high seas and transforms the narrative into an adventure tale.

The Tufaylian narrative is received within inter-connected themes of nature, human consciousness, isolation, adventure and learning the lessons of life, especially in the post-seventeenth century Christian milieu:

i) The *philosophus autodidactus*, who is able to achieve the highest moral and

intellectual state through the use of reason, that is parallel to the sciences in society.

ii) Man as a social animal who needs the system of society and its moral framework. In the state of nature, he is ultimately insecure, fearful and dependent, despite the power of his mind.

iii) Man in the state of nature who lives in harmony with it and is able to reach the highest state through his naturalistic ethics.

Through the process of the European transmission, to quote Yeats, "things fall apart, the centre cannot hold."⁵ Thereby, the matrix constantly changes, from the Latin translation which becomes the parent of textual transformation into subsequent European translations, to contextual translations, leading to a radical loss of validity and relevance in the plagiarized adventure of Don Trezzanio.

The Don Trezzanio version 'selects' excerpts from the Tufaylian narrative and *Robinson Crusoe*. The literary debate whether the story of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* was a mere cover, an allegory of sorts, whose sole and didactic purpose was to make philosophy palatable, finds its anti-thesis in Don Trezzanio. In this version, the dramatic and fictional elements are retained and the philosophy is unceremoniously discarded. Yet, the Trezzanio version is reflective of a new direction, toward the "tales of Adventure," renewed further in some responses in modern Arabic thought as well as in the Robinsonade syndrome.

The sustained history of translation is indicative of the continued interest in the text, the issues it raises, and its universal appeal. This aspect of transmission is consistent within and outside the Muslim milieux. Further, the multiple production of translations in the same language, or the printing of several Arabic editions in Cairo (2) and Istanbul (1) during the same year (1299/1881) mirror the notion that a particular horizon of expectation allows parallel or different responses to occur almost concurrently.⁶ Such parallel occurrences are repeated in different periods in the history of the text. For example, the empathic notions of illuminative philosophy concurrent in Ibn Tufayl and Suhrawardī, without the influence of one on the other, and the separate receptions by different

translators in the same language, despite their inter-action with each other in the Christian milieu.

One might explain the Robinsonade resultant in the Christian milieu as having occurred through a gradual process of appropriation and disconnection with the context of the primary author, as well as its varying reception in relation to the prevalent ideologies of autodidacticism, Renaissance humanism and the natural man of Romanticism. Thus, the subsequent channels of transmission follow different directions, due to the absence of such primary knowledge and information on Ibn Tufayl and his "culture," drawing instead from the "culture" of the translators.

Lines of transmission for independent study

This study has drawn up theoretical and methodological frameworks that can be applied to the analysis of Islamic thought as well as to the comparative textual analysis of the various lines of transmission. It has set aside some lines of transmission due to the paucity of space. It is hoped that future opportunity would allow the author to elaborate research, adding further nuances to the reception of the Tufaylian narrative in the different cultural and religious milieux. We will briefly indicate some major areas and how they might contribute to future research.

The theoretical model for some aspects of these transmissions may also be sought in the studies by Maria Menocal and Edward Said. Neither of their works deal with the problems inherent in the Tufaylian narrative, but their respective theses allow us to recognize some of the processes that occur through the reception and transmission of the Tufaylian narrative.

The Arabo-Spanish reception

One aspect of the transmission of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* that has exciting possibilities and inherent problems is the transmission in the Spanish milieu. This philosophical work belongs to one of the richest periods in Spanish history in terms of philosophical, architectural and cultural contributions, the Muslim Arab

period. The Spanish transmission attains an unexpected bonus through the early Hebrew translation (within the Judeo-Spanish context), the movement of this text to Spain, consequently to Europe and its extensive use by Jewish thinkers. This example indicates one of the many facets of the Arabo-Spanish reception.

This fecund area of research extends over and above the Spanish translators and might be analyzed in relation to the overall Arabo-Spanish background, which essentially is Ibn Tufayl's own background. In explaining Ibn Tufayl's full name, Gauthier notes that the use of the surname al-Qaysi is the name of his ancestral Arab tribe.⁷ The inclusion of a "proper" Arab name in the Maghrib was often seen as a legitimizing means of tracing one's ancestor back to the Arabs of the east. While this is not self-evident, it could mean that Ibn Tufayl's origins were grounded in Andalusia.

Future research might also counterpose the archetypal similarities in the specific context of the Spanish reception (studied in the comparison between the Himyarite and Tufaylian narratives) in relation to the particular ideological factors that demarcate the Arabo-Spanish history of literature. Thus, an issue of particular interest to the Arabo-Spanish context is to examine the ideological leap that occurs between two "readings", from the focus on either Spanish literary history or Arab thought. Even the late Spanish translations in the early twentieth century reflect the distinctive "nationalist" claim of the translators and "prologue" writers.⁸

It is difficult to deny the impact or interaction of Arabic literature on Spanish works and its prevalent influence on language and genre. Rather than a denial of such influences, what occurs in this larger area is a covert and sometimes overt polemical debate on the primacy of one as opposed to other, through literature as a cultural arena. Quite often, those who re-present Arab culture or literature and its reception in the Spanish context acknowledge such interaction. However, their reception is conditioned by a similar set of factors that govern the process of orientalism, or the reclamation of sources, with some interesting differences. The Arabization is so integrated that it cannot be perceived as the "other". In such a case, its influence is often ignored. In some cases, it might be

exoticized or romanticized. However, such romanticization is no longer in opposition but becomes the genre itself (as in the notion of troubadour analyzed by Menocal). Indeed, the easier task for the "Spanish Critic" would be to show its impact, rather than acknowledge its integration and/or its primacy. This process is also different from the re-contextualization that occurs through Averroism. Here, the context remains a shared one, even though the balance of power has shifted to a degree that the burden of changes in reception is ultimately placed on the shoulders of Averroes. Subsequent reception then seems to be affected by this shift of political and ideological power.

Thus, an area of potential research of the Tufaylian narrative would be in relation to the overall acculturation of Arabic texts in the Spanish milieu, an issue that has been swept under the carpet⁹ and counteracted in one case, by the indication of a common basis for the Tufaylian narrative and the Spanish, *El Criticon* in order to reject the ascription of *Ḥayy ibn Yaḡẓān* as source. Garcia Gomez's research on the connections between Balthasar Gracian's *Spanish Critic*, the Tufaylian narrative and the Himyarite tale has been examined in chapter three, primarily in relation to the Tufaylian narrative and the Himyarite tale.

One needs to further examine the context of Garcia Gomez's refutation of the Tufaylian narrative was the source of Gracian's *Spanish Critic*. This refutation may be valid, but on what grounds is it validated? It might be a channel of transmission, reflective of the tendencies in current literary critiques of Arabo Spanish literature that ascribe a non-Arab source to aspects of Spanish literature in order to declaim its integration as source. This debate on sources should be approached with caution, but the application of reception might recover both horizons and discuss their inter-relation or opposition. While the current study has been limited to this specific example, the ramifications for further discussion on methodological issues are immense.

Thus, one line of literary history that is fraught with prejudices and polemics is the transmission of the Tufaylian narrative in the Spanish tradition. Menocal gives us some inkling of the problems that one might encounter in her

study of the morphological influences of Arabic on Romance languages during the "Andalusian" contact. She indicates that the established approach (or the construct) to literary history has been strongly rooted over centuries to exclude Arab "intellectual and artistic heredity."¹⁰

One of the major problems in such an analysis is the broad expanse that it covers. This breadth of canvas is necessary if one wants to gain sight of the whole picture, and this breadth might quite easily be lost if we enter the scene with a tunnel vision. In this case, the approach also rests on a broad range of linguistic expertise on the interaction and changes between Spanish and Arabic.

However, the problem is not simply a question of approach. Our research has indicated that once the work is translated, it often severs itself from the original text and context and subsists in the new and different context in which it has been reborn. It is thus received in new contexts with a different set of meanings and accordingly, engenders different responses from its readers. One reason for such a severance of ties is linguistic and the other is cultural appropriation or disconnection. This form of cultural appropriation allows a text and critical responses to it to exist, as it were, in a vacuum, or in a new context. Our study thus examines the connections and disconnections through translation and transmission. How *appropriate* are such responses? Certainly, one result of such disconnections is the prejudices and preconceptions that the translator or transmitter carries forward from his own cultural context into the transmission of the text. Secondly, what s/he leaves out in the transmission is also an indication of the *vantage point* of approach. When cultures are set one against the other, a combative element enters the process of transmission.

Said indicates the necessity to examine the narrative in terms of the vantage point and within the historically relevant frame of response. In other words, to understand Carlyle or J.S. Mill in terms of their "real" contribution and to neglect their views on colonialism, imperialism, inferior races, and "niggers" would entail a loss in analysis. Subject to the methods of analysis is for example, Carlyle's empathic reception of Muḥammad that would indicate a shift in the

horizon of expectation, but his world view would still be rooted in the current expectations of his time and indeed his other works. Similarly, the architect of democracy, John Stuart Mill did not intend his views to be applicable to the "oriental" Indian.

This notion, that I termed *vantage point* has resulted in a strong polemical approach in criticism, due to the inherent combative element. It is especially evident in the transmission of the Tufaylian narrative, when it is decontextualized in the European translations. It also results in the staking of cultural territory. Thus, colonial claims are not restricted to land, but also draw upon the aesthetic repertoire of the milieu, evident in the critical and polemical debate in Arabo-Spanish literature indicated by Menocal.

Garcia Gomez's response in some senses is indicative of such a venture. While primarily interested in exploring the rejection of an "Arabist theory", Menocal explores the influences of intercultural contacts, and the notions that it creates. However, while dealing briefly with several "Andalusians", Menocal neglects to mention Ibn Ṭufayl, who would have provided ample material to explore her theses, given its transmission in the Spanish milieu and its translation and analysis by literary critics in the forefront of Hispano-Arab studies, such as Menendez y Pelayo, Garcia Gomez, Francisco Codero and Cruz Hernandez.

One other problem in analyses is brought up by the notion of what I term archetypal reiteration, i.e. the presence of certain archetypal symbols in different works of literature are taken to indicate a historical link or connection in history. Such a theory must also be utilized with caution. It is this notion that leads the Spanish critic, Garcia Gomez to connect the work of Ibn Ṭufayl and Baltasar Gracian with an earlier model in a different genre. Garcia Gomez' primary thesis is to indicate that *El-Criticon* was not so much influenced by Ibn Ṭufayl as by an earlier model. This is the sort of approach that Menocal critiques in her study. In examining the general bases of this argument, I have indicated that these archetypal similarities might be the result of structural analyses, characterized for example in the epic genre.

Antonio Pastor reflects yet another dimension of the Spanish reception. Pastor, a scholar of Spanish literature does not focus his thesis solely on this line of transmission. His interest in fact is focussed on the European transmissions. However, as introductory material, Pastor strives to indicate the overall background of Ibn Ṭufayl's thought and thus alludes to other genres of the Arabo-Spanish realm.

A study of the Tufaylian narrative as Arabo-Spanish literature in relation to the overall and shifting contexts in North Africa and Spain has great potential in addressing several questions and issues that are lost, when one ignores this context and views the Tufaylian narrative as primarily a peripatetic text and a continuation of the falsafic and initiatic lines of transmission that trace it to the geographical and symbolic east.

Ibn Ṭufayl's reception in modern Arab literature

A prolific area of literary criticism exists in Modern Arabic literature and its debates over the analysis of the Tufaylian narrative. We ourselves have indicated that an analysis of the Tufaylian narrative as post-Colonial literature might yield interesting possibilities. The renewed vitality of the Tufaylian narrative as a classic of Arabic literature, that is constantly replayed and manifested in new and modern interpretations is a subject of great interest. These issues have not been addressed in detail, since any inter-relations with other lines of transmissions discussed in this dissertation might circumscribe the range of our analysis. For example, we have elucidated the parallel occurrence of the "Robinsonade" elements in some modern receptions by Arab critics, who paradoxically strive to reclaim the narrative. Our analysis in this case is bound by the European transmission and its creation of a frame of reference within its own worldview of the "other", i.e. orientalism. This frame is pervasive and unconscious since one uses it as a point of departure in western scholarship. The European transmission and its manifestation within the culture of empire and the neo-imperialistic context of current scholarship defines the parameters of any discussion and thus, only an

independent study of the modern reception of the narrative in the (primarily) Arab and Muslim world (through its translations into Persian, Urdu, Turkish and Russian) might allow one to step aside from this main stage to discern what is "really" happening at the creative back-stage. Even such an independent study might not be free from the prevalence of the European transmission, since it will draw from a current context that maintains an artificial geography of the poles of orient and occident and utilizes it when suitable, but is unable to retain an untainted "myth" of the "other" due to globalization - we no longer have two separate worlds of Franks and Saracens.

Thus, one aspect of the reception of modern Arab critics is likely to be sullied by the predominant neo-imperial frame of knowledge, responded to through a process of decolonization that is inherently problematic in its precepts. The point of departure of modern critiques in the Muslim world need to be defined within their own horizons, though some of the results of such critique might interconnect them to the other lines of transmission. In what ways is the narrative received by 'Umar Farrukh, Ahmad Amin, Salih Madani, Mohammad Arkoun, Nawal Hassan, Farouq Sa'ad, Albert Nadèr and others? How do they differ and what expectations do each of them respond to? How is the narrative disseminated in the school curriculum and in popular media? What repertoires does it create in art? What do these repertoires reflect of current societal expectations? Examining the whole genre of reader-response in modern Arab literature might totally shift the perspective and importance of particular themes.

Other lines of transmission

The prevalence of the Tufaylian narrative intrudes elusively in the most unexpected contexts, from the poetry of Alexander Pope, to its German translations by George Pritius (1726) and Johann Eichhorn (1783),¹¹ to the attribution of translations to Pico and Spinoza. The latter lines of transmission have remained unresolved due to the lack of substantive information and evidence. They might well be based on hearsay that has likewise survived the entrails of

time.

What one may deduce on circumstantial information and philosophical affinities is that both Pico and Spinoza had read or studied the Tufaylian narrative. As discussed earlier, Pico's teacher, Johannan Alemanno is said to have made marginal comments on a manuscript of the Hebrew translation that might have originated from Pico's collection of Hebrew and Jewish manuscripts.

An anonymous Dutch translation was printed in 1672, the first translation following Pococke's bilingual edition. In the second edition (1701), the translator's initials S.D.B. are given, whereby it has been speculated that these initials are a reversal of Spinoza's full name. Spinoza refers to the Tufaylian narrative. His motto "dare to know" as well as his general philosophy can be conceptually viewed in relation to the notions that the Tufaylian narrative evoked in the European period of its transmission. Curiously, most of the early European translations of the Tufaylian narrative belonged to the "Spinozona Collection" in the Rare Books Library at Columbia University, where I studied them further. The copy of the Dutch translation includes a note written on the frontispiece by the cataloguer, dismissing the attribution. I enquired whether this collection had once comprised the library of Spinoza, but was unable to get a definitive answer. These lines of transmission might yield further interesting information in subsequent research.

Summation

In the final analysis, the notions of transference and reception suggest that whatever be the source, it can never be truly replicated. Thus, the manner it is received in a different time and space will differ in some details, just as the manner in which it is interpreted comes out of a reader-response to the text. Yet, it can never be totally different, because it is the reiteration of diverse influences, known and unknown. It is possible to draw parallels between different works of literature, based on mythic, archetypal, or genre-related connections. However, such connections are not necessarily related to "actual" narrative concurrences.

Thus, it is necessary to trace the lines of transmission, or recognize the possible historical connections between various writers or texts. In this sense, reader-response is important because it recognizes that the basis of difference occurs through reception, while ensuring that connections are not merely incidental. The process of reception thus maintains the vitality of the work in the current consciousness of the reader public.

Two features affect each particular reception, the process whereby it is transmitted and the context of its reception. Since the historical and ideological contexts do not remain the same, so does the reception change in each case. The mythic mode that is essential to understanding Ibn Ṭufayl in relation to Ibn Sīnā loses its relevance in relation to the European translations.

In some cases, the reception is ideologically parallel in the different contexts; in other cases, such ideology is reversed. The issue of rational mysticism with regard to its reception in critical studies on Ibn Rushd is an example of the first instance. The Aristotelian notion of conjunction is transformed in the context of its reception in the religious philosophy of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. While its interpretation is the subject of debate in the different contexts of each of these milieux, the phenomenon of rational mysticism becomes a parallel mode that can be applied to any one of these systems. There might be debates and different responses between the different milieux or within the particular milieu on questions whether the individual soul remains distinct in the process of conjunction. These particular receptions respond to the theology of after-life, reward and punishment and immortality of the soul in each tradition.

The analyses of the translators also reflect their response to the sociocultural issues in their own milieux, and in this sense their reception reflects the historical conditions of their times. The study thus shows how it is not just the reader or critic who responds to a text from certain aesthetic and historical vantages, but also the translator, who often becomes the virtual author.

Just as Ibn Ṭufayl's text reflects his deviation from the sociopolitical norms of his own time, so do the approaches of the different translators reflect their

response and reaction to issues current in their lives and times: the notion of the self-taught philosopher, the Quaker response to inner light, the natural man in Eichhorn and the kabbalistic vision by Narboni. The elements of textuality that allow for the analysis of the focus text as 'type' also make it conducive to mimesis, in the form of translation as well as reproduction. On the other hand, each particular rendition is a product of a historical time and situation. To place literary theory within the bounds of textuality and outside a historical context is to limit its value.

The image produced by one interpretation (Ibn al-Nafīs) is directly inverse; the image produced by another is partial (Ibn al-Khaṭīb), though reflecting the prototype. More recent transmissions in Arabic literature tend to gloss the popular elements such as the Robinsonade factor and the 'noble savage' which have had universal appeal. Such interpretations, whether in modern Arabic literature, some modern analyses, or through the Robinsonade image of English literature reflect a curious socio-linguistic fact: the commonality of the Post-eighteenth century, modern, practical, non-mystical ethos in different cultural and linguistic contexts. It reflects a common popular culture - the realm of *homo oeconomicus* as Crusoe is proudly labelled.

The lines of transmission of the Tufaylian narrative and their diffused dissemination through the process of appropriation might be likened to a modern rendition of Pandora's box. Once opened, these transmissions spread all over, making it difficult to draw them back to the source, and certainly impossible to assume an "unchanged" loyalty. Once transferred to different worlds, neither Pandora, nor her modern counterparts can refuse to acknowledge these strange new worlds.

Jauss, in his application of the reworkings of philosophies of the "natural being" in Rousseau and Goethe, remains unaware of the Tufaylian narrative and its European transmission. These contributions are not recognized, due to the "cultural" shift from the author to the translator. This study adds new theoretical dimensions to Jauss's approach, such as the possibility of various horizons of

expectation within a given period as explicated in the reception of the narrative through its translations in Great Britain. It also suggests that new dimensions occur through translation and not just through reception. It discusses how the process of translation creates a separation from the primary text and subsequent lines of transmission, thus engendering new modes of reception.

This study has laid the foundation to the further application of its theoretical precepts, by tracing the process of transmission and the particular contexts of the transmitters. An emphasis in this study has been on establishing a theoretical frame, whereby the Tufaylian narrative and its transformations are viewed through the various lines of transmission. This frame recognizes the contexts of transmissions, explores the receptions of the Tufaylian narrative and its counterparts, and the particular choices made by various authors, such as the emphasis on the socialized being in Ibn al-Nafis, the pragmatic being in Crusoe, the spiritual being in Ibn Tufayl and the natural being in Ashwell. Using this theoretical frame, one might render new insight into comparative studies through detailed textual analyses. We have further suggested focussed lines of transmission that might indicate whether some responses were conditioned by the prevalence of imperialism, or whether other factors guided each particular reception. Thus, we have extended the notion of reception theory through its application to the Tufaylian narrative. This study suggests new ways of reading and responding to classical texts in Islamic philosophy and literature and its interaction with other systems of thought. What remains is the hope that some of these suggested possibilities will be the subject of further research.

Endnotes to Chapter 7

1. Hasanali, *Ibn Tufayl's Hayy*, 123-25.
2. Cf. Hasanali, *Ibn Tufayl's Hayy*, 87-88.
3. We have mentioned earlier that the poetry ascribed to Ibn Tufayl includes three short mystical pieces, a long medical poem and a political poem. The authorship of these other works is not definitively established. See Hasanali, *Ibn Tufayl's Hayy*, 12-13. Those critics who see the narrative as primarily a work of philosophy that uses an allegorical form, tend to rely on the prologue and ignore the story as form while indicating its representation of philosophical themes. It is problematic to rely heavily on the prologue, since it is presented as a foil to the main narrative rather than a reflection of the same philosophy, and its contradictions in relation to the main narrative raise questions regarding its authorship.
4. F. Rosenthal (tr.) *Mantiq Aristū*, in *The Classical Heritage in Islam*, tr. from German by Emile and Jenny Marmorstein (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), 76-77. Rosenthal discusses the apodictic and dialectic methods based on Aristotle's *Logic*. Even though the intent of each of the two methods is different, both are based on premises that can be proved to be true or false.
5. W. B. Yeats, *The Second Coming* (Los Angeles: Plantin Press, 1970). The poem reflects the modern apocalyptic vision of the poet, but its title, *The Second Coming* is appropriate to the European transmissions of the Tufaylian narrative.
6. Cf. Hasanali, *List of Major Editions of the Risālah, Appendix A*, in *Ibn Tufayl's 'Hayy'*, 178-79.
7. Gauthier, *Ibn Thofail*, 1, No. 4, 2.
8. *El filósofo autodidacto, de Abentofail, novela psicológica*, translated from the Arabic by Francisco Pons Boigues, with a prologue by Menéndez y Pelayo. (Zaragoza: Tip. de Comas hermanos, 1900. 2nd. ed. Buenos Aires: Espasa Calpe, 1954); *El filósofo autodidacto (Risāla Hayy ibn Yaqzān)*, translated into Spanish with an Introduction by Angel González Palencia (1934; Madrid: Impr. de E.

Maestre, 1948).

9. See M. R. Menocal, *The Arabic Role in Medieval Literary History* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1987). Menocal provides an interesting reworking of the "Arabist" theory, but does not utilize the Tufaylian narrative. Her focus remains on the more distinct genres of Arabo-Spanish literature. An examination of the works of Maghribi philosophy that are generally decontextualized from the Arabo-Spanish milieu might add new perspectives to the overall area of Arabo-Spanish literature.

10. Menocal, 1.

11. We have cited the various German translations. *Op. cit.* Pritius (tr.) *Der von sich selbst gelehrte Weltweise*, from Pococke's Latin edition (Frankfurt, 1726); J. G. Eichhorn, *Der naturmensch*, translated from the Arabic edition (Berlin: F. Nicolai, 1783). An early twentieth translation into German from P. Brönnle's English was also undertaken by A. M. Heinck, *Das Erwachen der Seele*, Die Weisheit des Ostens, II. Bd., (Rostock, s.n., 1907). This line of transmission is connected to the naturalistic philosophies that find a voice in German translation by Eichhorn in relation to the general horizon of expectation in the German and French philosophies of Goethe and Rousseau. *Op. cit.* Jauss, *Question and Answer*, where he discusses the works of Rousseau and Goethe.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbas, Hasan Mahmud. *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān wa Rubinsun Kuruzu dirāsah muqāranah*. Beirut: al-Mu'assasah al-'Arabīyah, 1983.

Ahmed, Leila. *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate*. Yale University Press, 1992.

Aitken, George (ed.). *Romances and Narratives by Daniel Defoe*. 16 vols. London, J. M. Dent, 1895.

Altmann, Alexander. *Moses Narboni's 'Epistle on Shi'ur Qomā': An Introduction*. In *Studies in Religious Philosophy and Mysticism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969. 180-209.

_____. *Von der mittelalterlichen zur modernen Aufklärung*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1987.

_____. *Essays in Jewish Intellectual History*. London: University Press of New England, 1981.

Anawati, George C. *Gnose et philosophie: A propos du Récit de Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* de A.-M. Goichon. In *Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale* (1963), VI année, No. 2. Rpt. *Études de philosophie musulmane*. Paris: J. Vrin, 1974, 160-173.

Anawati George and Louis Gardet, *Mystique Musulmane: Aspects et tendances, expériences et techniques*. 4th ed. Paris: J. Vrin, 1986.

Anonymous. *A Dialogue between Mahmut and the Androgio Ben-Jockdon*. In *Memoirs for the Curious, or An account of what occurs that's rare, secret, extraordinary through the world*, vol. 1, no. 2 (1701), 47-50.

Arberry, A. J. (tr.) *Fitzgerald's Salaman and Absal: A study*. Cambridge: University Press, 1956.

Arkoun, Mohammed. *Pour une critique de la raison islamique*. Paris: Editions Larose, 1984.

_____. *Ibn Tufayl ou le philosophe dans la cité almohade. Les Africains*, VI (1977), 263-287.

Asani, Ali. *The Harvard Collection of Ismaili Literature in Indic Languages: a descriptive catalogue and finding aid*. Boston, Mass.: G. K. Hall, 1992.

Asín Palacios, M. *El Averroismo Teológico de Santo Tomas de Aquino*. In *Homenaje a D. Francisco Cordera*. Zaragoza: Escar, 1904, 271-331.

Ashwell, George (tr.). *The History of Hai Ebn Yockdan, an Indian Prince: or, the Self-Taught Philosopher*. Written originally in the Arabick tongue, by Abi Jaqfar Ebn Tophail, a Philosopher by Profession and a Mahometan by Religion. Wherein is demonstrated, by what steps and degrees, human reason, improved by diligent observation and experience, may arrive to the knowledge of natural things, and from thence to the discovery of Supernaturals; more especially of God, and the concernments of the other world. London: Printed for Richard Chiswell, 1686.

_____. *Theologus Ruris or Book of Nature, Leading us by Certain Degrees, to the Knowledge and Worship of the God of nature*. In *The History of Hai*. London: Printed for Richard Chiswell, 1686, 195-217.

Assemanus, J.S and S. E. Assemanus. *Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae Codicum Manuscriptorum Catalogus*. 3 Vols. Rome: Typographia Linguarum Orientalium Angelī Rotilii in aedibus Maximorum, 1756. Rprt. Paris: Librairie Orientale et Américaine, Maisonneuve et frères, 1926.

Austin, R. W. J. (tr.) *Bezels of Wisdom*. Tr. of Ibn 'Arabī's *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* from Arabic. Preface by Titus Burckhardt. Classics of Western Spirituality. New York/ London: Paulist Press /SPCK, 1980.

Badawi, 'Abdurrahman. *Avicenne en Espagne musulmane: pénétration et polémique*. In *Milenario de Avicena*. Madrid: Instituto Hispano Arabe de Cultura, 1981, 9-25.

_____. *Histoire de la Philosophie Islamique*. 2 Vols. Paris: J. Vrin, 1972.

Baer, Isaac (Fritz). *Die Juden im christlichen Spanien*. 2 Vols. Erster Teil: Urkunden und Regesten. 1st ed. (n.d.). Rpt. Farnborough Gregg, 1970.

Barclay, John. *Diary of Alexander Jaffray*. London: s.n., 1833.

Barclay, Robert. *Apology for the True Christian Divinity. As the same is held forth and preached by the people called in scorn, Quaker*. Written and published in Latine ... and now put forth in our own language [English]. Aberdeen: John Forbes, 1678.

Beckingham, C. F. *Between Islam and Christendom: Travellers, Facts and Legends in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*. London: Variorum Reprints, 1983.

Birdsall, Virginia. *Defoe's Perpetual Seekers: A Study of the Major Fiction*. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1985.

Blaise, Clark. *To begin, to begin*. In *A 20th Century Anthology: Essays, Stories and Poems*. Ed. W. E. Messenger. Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice Hall, 1984, 415-18.

Bland, Kalman. (ed./tr.) *The Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect by Ibn Rushd with the Commentary of Moses Narboni*. Hebrew edition and English translation of *Igeret efsharut ha-devekut le-Ibn Roshd 'im be'ur Mosheh Narboni*. Moreshet series, vol. VIII of the Jewish Theological Seminary. New York: Ktav Publishing House, Inc., 1982.

Blenkinsopp, J. *The Search for the Prickly Plant*. In *Structuralism: An Interdisciplinary Study*. Ed. S. Wittig. Pittsburg: The Pickwick Press, 1975.

Blumenkranz, Bernhard et al. *Auteurs juifs en France médiévale: leur oeuvre imprimée*. Toulouse: Edouard Privat, 1975.

Boullata, Issa. *Trends and Issues in Contemporary Arab thought*. Albany: SUNY, 1990.

Boyle, Robert. *A Defense of Natural and Revealed Religion*. Boyle Lectures 1697-1732. 3 vols. London: Printed for D. Midwinter, 1739.

British Library. *The British Library Catalogue of Printed Books to 1975*. Vol. 1. London: The British Library, 1975.

Brockdorff, Baron Cay V. *Spinozas Verhältnis zur Philosophie des Ibn Tophail*. Kiel: Buchdrucker der Hobbes-Gesellschaft, 1932.

Brockelmann, Carl. *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*. 1898-1920; 2 vols. 2nd. ed. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1943-49. *Supplemenbände*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1937-42.

Brönnle, Paul (tr.) *The Awakening of the Soul: A Philosophical Romance*. Rendered from Arabic with an introduction by P. Brönnle. 1904; London: Orient Press, 1910.

Butterworth, Charles (tr.) *Averroës' Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle's "Topics" "Rhetoric" and "Poetics"*. Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1977.

_____. (tr.) *Averroes Middle Commentaries on Aristotle's 'Categories' and 'De Interpretatione'*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983.

Bynum, Caroline (ed.) *Gender and Religion: The Complexity of Symbols*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1986.

_____. *Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages*. Berkeley: University of California, 1982.

Casiri, M. *Bibliotheca arabico-hispana escurialensis*. 2 vols. 1760-70; rpt. Madrid: Osnabrück Biblio, 1969.

Cassirer, Ernst. *La philosophie des formes symboliques; 2. la pensée mythique*. Tr. from German to French by Jean Lacoste. Paris: Les éditions de minuit, 1972.

Cassuto, U. *Gli Ebrei a Firenze nell'età del Rinascimento*. 1918; Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1918.

Chalmers, Alexander. *The General Biographical Dictionary: Containing a Historical and Critical Account of the Lives and Writings of the Most Eminent Persons in Every Nation*. 1761; London: Printed for J. Nichols, 1812-1817.

Chew, Samuel C. *The Crescent and the Rose: Islam and England during the Renaissance*. 1937; rpt. New York: Octagon Books, 1965.

Cohen, Martin. *The Shiur Qomah: Liturgy and Theurgy in Pre-kabbalistic Jewish mysticism*. Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, 1983.

Connant, Martha Pike. *The Oriental Tale in England in the Eighteenth Century*. New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1966.

Corbin, Henry. *L'Archange Empourpré*. Paris: Fayard, 1976.

_____. *Au Pays de l'Imâm caché*. In *Vom Sinn der Utopie*. Eranos Jahrbuch 1963. Zürich: Rhein-Verlag, 1964, 31-87.

_____. *Avicenne et le récit visionnaire*. Paris: Adrien-Maissonneuve, 1954.

_____. *Avicenna and the Visionary Recital*. Tr. from French by Willard R. Trask. Bollingen Series 66. 1960; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990. Partial rpt. Irving, Texas: Spring Publications, 1980.

_____. *Histoire de la Philosophie Islamique*. New edition. Paris: Gallimard, 1986.

_____. *Ibn Tufayl. Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. IV (1967), 109-110.

Croese, G. *Historia Quakeriana*. Amsterdam: s.n., 1695.

Cruickshanks, Eveline. (ed.). *By Force or by Default? The Revolution of 1688-1689*. Edinburgh: J. Donald, 1989.

Dan, Joseph and Ronald Kiener. *The Early Kabbalah*. Classics of Western Spirituality. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1986.

Daniel, Norman. *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image*. 1960; rpt. Edinburgh: University Press, 1980.

Defoe, Daniel. *Serious Reflections during the Life and Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe, with his Vision of the Angelick World*. In *Romances and Narratives by Daniel Defoe*. Ed. G. Aitken. Vol. 3. London: J. M. Dent, 1895.

Delitzsch, Franciscus & H.O. Fleischer. *Codices Orientalium Linguarum; Die hebr. mss beschrieben von Fr. Delitzsch, Additamenta von Leopold Zunz*. In *Catalogus Librorum Manuscriptorum qui in Bibliotheca Senatoria Civitatis Lipsiensis Asservantur*. Edited by A. G. R. Naumann. Grimma: Sumptus Fecit Julius Mauritius Gebhardt, 1838.

Disraeli, Isaac. *The Calamities and Quarrels of Authors: with some enquiries respecting their moral and literary characters, And Memoirs for our Literary History*. A new edition, edited by his son, The Right Hon. B. Disraeli, M.P. 1812; London: Frederick Warne and Co; New York: Scribner and Co., 1867.

_____. *Curiosities of Literature*. London: s.n., 1840.

Dunlop, D. M. *Philosophical Predecessors and Contemporaries of Ibn Bājjah. Islamic Quarterly* II (1955), 100-116.

_____. *Ibn Bājjah's Tadbīrū'l-Mutawahhid (Rule of the Solitary)*. *JRAS* (1945), 61-81.

Eagleton, Terry. *Literary Theory*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983.

Eichhorn, Johann Gottfried (tr.). *Der Naturmensch; oder, Geschichte des Hai ebn Joktan; ein morganländischer Roman des Aby Dschafar ebn Tofail*. Berlin: F Nicolai, 1783. Rpt. *Ibn Tufail; Hajj ibn Jaqzan der Naturmensch: ein philosophischer Robinson-Roman aus dem arabischen Mittelalter*; aus dem Arabischen übersetzt von Johann Gottfried Eichhorn; herausgegeben und kommentiert von Stefan Schreiner. Leipzig: Kiepenheuer, 1983.

Eliot, T. S. *Collected Poems*. London: Faber & Faber, 1963.

Endress, Gerhard and D. Gutas. *A Greek and Arabic Lexicon: Materials for a Dictionary of the Medieval Translations from Greek to Arabic*. Leiden & New York: E. J. Brill, 1992-

Endress, Gerhard and Pieter Schoonheim. *The Transmission of Greek Texts in Medieval Islam and the West. Proceedings of the conference held at the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Study, Wassenaar, 19-21 February, 1985*. Bochum: Studienverlag N. Brockmeyer, 1986.

Fārābī, Abū Naṣr. *Al-Fārābī on the Perfect State*. Ed. R. Walzer. New rev. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985.

_____. *Fī aghrād al-ḥakīm fī kull maqālah min al-kitāb al-mawsūm bi al-ḥurūf* in *Alfarabi's Philosophische Abhandlungen*. Ed. F. Dieterici. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1890.

_____. *Kitāb al-ḥurūf*. Ed. and introduced by Muhsin Mahdi. 2nd. ed. Beirut: Dar al-mashriq, 1990.

Fakhry, Majid. *A History of Islamic Philosophy*. 1970; New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.

Farrukh, 'Umar. *The Arab Genius in Science and Philosophy*. Tr. John Hardie. Washington: Edward Bros., 1954.

Ferrand, Gabriel. *Wak Wak. Encyclopaedia of Islam (1913-36)*. Rpt. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987, VIII: 1105-1109.

Fradkin, Hillel. *Ibn Tufayl's 'Hayy ibn Yaqzan': On the Relationship of Mysticism, Prophecy and Philosophy*. Diss. University of Chicago, 1978.

Fürst, Julius. *Bibliographisches Handbuch umfassend die Druckwerke der Jüdischen Literatur, einschliesslich der über Juden und Judenthum veröffentlichten Schriften nach alphabetischer Ordnung der Verfasser bearbeitet mit einer Geschichte der Jüdischen Bibliographie sowie mit Indices versehen und herausgegeben von Dr. Julius Fürst*. 4 Vols. Leipzig: Verlag Von Wilhelm Engelmann, 1863.

_____. (ed.) *Literaturblatt (Literary gazette/review) des Orient*. I-XI; Orient XII. Leipzig, 1840-51.

Furuzanfar, B. Z. (tr.) *Zindah-i bīdār*. Teheran: BTNK, 1956.

Garcia Gomez, E. 1926. *Un cuento árabe, fuente común de Abentofáil y de Gracián*. *Revista de Archivos, Bibliothecas y Museos*, XXX (1926), 1-66, 241-269.

Gauthier, Léon. *Ibn Thofāil: sa vie et ses oeuvres*. Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1909.

_____. (ed./tr.) *Hayy ben Yaqdhân: roman philosophique d'Ibn Thofāil*. Texte arabe et traduction française. 2 ed. Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1936.

Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad. *Maqāṣid al-falāsifah*. Ed. Sulaymān Dunyā. 2nd ed. Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1379/1960.

Genequand, Charles (tr.). *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics: A Translation with Introduction of Ibn Rushd's Commentary on Aristotle's 'Metaphysics', Book Lām*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984.

Gibbon, Edward. *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. 1st. ed. 1776. Ed. J. B. Bury. 7 vols. London: Macmillan, 1902-25.

_____. and S. Ockley. *The Saracens: Their History and the Rise and Fall of their Empire*. 1869; London: s.n., 1900.

Glotzer, Leonard R. *The Fundamentals of Jewish Mysticism: the Book of Creation and its Commentaries*. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson Inc., 1992.

Goichon, Amélie Marie. *Hayy ibn Yaqzān*. *Encyclopaedia of Islam*². (1964), III: 331.

_____. (tr.). *Le livre des directives et remarques*. Translated and Annotated by A. M. Goichon. 1938; Paris: J. Vrin, 1951.

_____. *Le Récit de Hayy ibn Yaqzān commenté par des textes d'Avicenne*. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1959.

Goldenthal, Jacob (ed.). *Der Commentar des Rabbi Moses Narbonensis Philosophen aus dem XIV. Jahrhundert zu dem Werke More Nebuchim des Maimonides (Moses Narboni's Commentary to Moses Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed)*. Vienna: [s.n.], 1852.

Golding, William. *Lord of the Flies*. 1962; London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1967.

Goodman, L. E. (tr.) *Ibn Tufayl's Hayy ibn Yaqzān: A philosophical tale*. 1972; L.A. Gee Tee Bee Publs., 1983.

_____. *Avicenna*. New York: Routledge, 1992.

Gosudarstvennaia Biblioteka SSRi. *Catalogue of the Guenzburg Collection*. Moscow: Imprint, 1892.

Gracian, Lorenzo Balthasar. *The Critick; written originally in Spanish by Lorenzo Gracian (1651) one of the best wits of Spain and translated into English by Paul Rycaut Esq.* London: Printed by T.N. for Henry Brome at the Gun in St. Paul's Church-Yard, 1681.

Green, Martin. *The Robinson Crusoe Story*. University Park: Penn State University Press, 1990.

Greene, Robert. *The Pleasant and Delightful History of Dorastus, Prince of Sicily and Fawnia, Daughter and Heir to Pandosta, King of Bohemia a Pleasant Winter Evening's Entertainment*. London: Printed for G. Conyers, 1696?

Greenblatt, Stephen. *Marvellous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Gutas, Dimitri. *Avicenna: ii Biography; v. Mysticism*. *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. III (1982), 67-70, 79-83.

_____. *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: An Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works*. Leiden & New York: E. J. Brill, 1988.

Guttmann, Julius. *Philosophies of Judaism: The History of Jewish Philosophy from Biblical Times to Franz Rosenweig*. 1933; translated from German by David W. Silverman. 1964; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1988.

Habibi, A. H. *Nigāhī bih Salāmān ō Absāl-i Jāmī wa sawābiq-i ān*. Commentary by M. Ismail Muballigh. Kabul: Anjumani Jāmī, 1964.

Hājji Khalīfah. *Kashf al-zunūn ‘an asāmī al-kutub wa al-funūn*. Ed. and tr. into Latin by Flügel under the title *Lexicon bibliographicum et encyclopedicum*. 7 vols. Leipzig: Oriental Translation Fund, 1835-1872; New York: Johnson Reprint, 1964.

Hasanali, Parveen. *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*. In *Companion to Arabic Literature*. Edited by Julie Meisami and Paul Starkey. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, forthcoming.

_____. *Ibn Ṭufayl*. In *Companion to Arabic Literature*. Edited by Julie Meisami and Paul Starkey. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, forthcoming.

_____. *Ibn Ṭufayl's ‘Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān’: An Analytic Study*. M. A. thesis. Montreal: McGill University, 1987.

_____. *Ibn Ṭufayl's Vision of Environmental Ethics*. Paper presented at the joint conference of the *Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, Society for Neoplatonic Studies and the Society for the Promotion of Islamic Sciences and Philosophy*. October 23, 1992 at Columbia University, New York, 1-35.

_____. *The Synthesis of Polarity in Ibn ‘Arabī*. Unpubl. paper. London: The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 1985, 1-23.

_____. *The Theology of Double Negation in Classical Ismailism*. Unpubl. paper. London: The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 1985, 1-25.

Haskell, Rosemary. *The Antagonist Structure of the Colonial Experience in Five Novels of Daniel Defoe*. Diss. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1985.

Hassan, Nawal. *Ḥayy bin Yaqzān and Robinson Crusoe: A Study of an Early Arabic impact on English Literature*. Baghdad: Al-Rashid House for Publication, 1980.

Hawi, Sami S. *Islamic Naturalism and Mysticism: A Philosophical Study of Ibn Ṭufayl's ‘Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān’*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974.

Haynes, Jonathan. *The Humanist as Traveler: George Sandys's Relation of a Journey begun An. Dom. 1610*. Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1986.

Hayoun, Maurice. *Le commentaire de Moïse de Narbonne (1300-1362) sur le Hayy ibn Yaqzān d'Ibn Ṭufayl (mort en 1185). Archives d'Histoire Doctrinaire et Littéraire du Moyen Âge*, LV (1988), 23-98.

_____. *L'épître du libre arbitre de Moïse de Narbonne (ca. 1300-1362). Revue des Études Juives*, CXLI (1-2) 1982, 139-167.

_____. *Moïse de Narbonne: Sur les Sefirot, les Sphères, et les Intellects Separés. Edition critique d'un passage de son commentaires sur le Hayy ibn Yaqzān, avec introduction, traduction et notes. The Jewish Quarterly Review*, LXXVI, No. 2 (October, 1985) 97-147.

_____. *Moshe Narboni*. Includes the translation of Narboni's commentary on Maimonides' *Guide*. *Pirush ha-Narboni al ha-Moreh shel ha-Rambam* (125-182). Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1986.

_____. *La philosophie et la théologie de Moïse de Narbonne*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1989.

Heath, Peter. *Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā); With a Translation of the Book of the Prophet Muhammad's Ascent to Heaven*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992.

Hearne, Thomas. *Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne*. Oxford Historical Society Series 1-3. Vols 1-3 edited by Charles Doble. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885-1907.

Heer, Nicholas. *Thalāthat Mujalladāt Kitāb al-Shāmil li'bn al-Nafīs. Revue de l'Institut des manuscrits arabes*. VI (1960), 203-10.

Heinck, A. M. (tr.) *Das Erwachen der Seele nach dem Arabischen des Ibn Tufail*. Tr. A. M. Heinck. Rostock: C. J. E. Volckmann, 1907.

Herzog, David. *Bi'ūr Kavanōt Abū Bakr ben as-Ṣaigh (Kitāb Tadbīr al-Mutawahhid) Qovets al-Yad* 6 (1896) 26-42.

Heylyn, Peter. *Ecclesia Restaurata: The History of Reformation in the Church of England*. London: Printed by M. F. for J. Clark, 1647-48.

_____. *The Undeceiving of the People in the Point of Tithes*. London: Printed for R. B. for H. Twyford, 1647.

Holt, P. M. *An Oxford Arabist, Edward Pocock (1604-1691)*. In *Studies in the History of the Near East*. London: Frank Cass, 1973.

Holtz, Barry. (ed.) *Back to the Sources: Reading the Classic Jewish texts*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984.

Hourani, George F. (tr.) *Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy. A translation with introduction and notes of Ibn Rushd's Kitāb faṣl al-maqāl, with its appendix (Damīma) and an extract from Kitāb al-kashf 'an manāhij al-adilla*. London: Luzac & Co., 1961.

_____. *The Principal Subject of Ibn Tufayl's 'Hayy ibn Yaqzān'*, *JNES* (1956), Vol. 15, no. 1, 40-46.

Husik, Isaac. *A History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy*. 1916; New York: Meridian Books, 1960.

Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, 'Uyūn al-anbā' fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭṭibbā'. Ed. A. Müller. Cairo: Maṭba'ah al-Wahābīyah, 1882.

Ibn 'Arabī, Muḥyi al-Dīn. *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*. Edited with a commentary by A. A. Afifi. 2 vols. in 1. Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-'arabī, 1946.

Ibn Bājjah, Abū Bakr. *Tratado de Avempace sobre la unión del intelecto con el hombre (K. ittiṣāl al-'aql bi'l-insān)*. Ed. M. Asín Palacios. *Al-Andalus* VII (1942), 1-47.

_____. *La 'carta de Adiós' de Avempace (R. al-wadā')*. Ed. M. Asín Palacios. *Al-Andalus* 8 (1943), 1-87.

_____. *El regimen del solitario (K. tadbīr al-mutawahhīd)*. Ed. M. Asín Palacios. Madrid, 1946.

Ibn Khaldūn, 'Abd al-Raḥmān. *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*. Translated by Franz Rosenthal. 3 vols. London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1958.

Ibn al-Khaṭīb, Lisān al-Dīn. *Rawḍat al-ta'rīf bi al-ḥubb al-sharīf*. Ed. Muhammad al-Kattāni. Beirut: Dar al-thaqafah, 1970.

_____. *Scriptorum Arabum loci de Abbadides*. Ed./tr. of the *Iḥāṭah* by Dozy. 2 vols. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1846-63.

Ibn Mansūr, Jamāl al-Dīn. *Lisān al-'Arab*. Imprint of Bulaq edition. Cairo: Dār al-Misrīyah li-ta'līf wa-tarjumah (n.d), Vol. 6.

Ibn al-Nafīs 'Alā al-Dīn. *The 'Theologus Autodidactus' of Ibn al-Nafīs (K. Fādīl ibn Nātiq or al-Risālah al-Kāmilīyah fī al-Sīrah al-Nabawīyah)*. Edited and translated [partial] by M. Meyerhoff and J. Schacht. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968.

Ibn Rushd, Abū al-Walīd. *Averroës' Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle's "Topics," "Rhetoric," and "Poetics."* Edited and translated by Charles E. Butterworth. Albany: State University of New York, 1977.

_____. *Averroes' Tafsīr Mā Ba'd al-Tabī'ah*. Ed. M. Bouyges. 4 vols. Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1938-52.

_____. *Talkhīs kitāb mā ba'd al-tabī'ah*. Ed. Uthmān Amīn. Cairo: Wizārat al-tarbīyah wa al-ta'līm, 1938.

Ibn Sīnā, Abū 'Alī. *Tis' rasā'il fī al-ḥikmah wa al-ṭabī'iyāt wa qisṣat Salāmān wa Absāl l'il-Shaykh al-Ra'īs*. Ed. Ḥasan 'Āṣī. (Istanbul 1298/1881). Beirut & Damascus: Dar Qabis, 1986.

Ibn Tufayl, Abū Bakr. *Ḥayy ben Yaqdhān: roman philosophique d'Ibn Thofāil*. Texte arabe et traduction française par Léon Gauthier. 2nd. ed. Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1936.

_____. *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*. Ed. Farouk Saad. Beirut: Dār al-afāq al-jadīdah, 1978.

_____. *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān li Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Tufayl wa al-Suhrawardī*. Ed. Aḥmad Amīn. Cairo: Dār al-Ma'arif l'il-Tibā'ah wa al-Nashr, 1959.

_____. *History of Josephus, the Indian Prince*. Anonymous abridged English translation of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* appended with Robert Greene's *Dorastus and Fawnia* (1696), 65-78.

Idel, Moshe. *Kabbalah: New Perspectives*. New Haven: Yale University press, 1988.

Ivry, Alfred. See Narboni.

Izutsu, T. *Ishrāqīyah*. *Encyclopedia of Religion*. VII (1986), 296-7.

Jauss, Hans Robert. *Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics*. Tr. Michael Shaw and introd. by Wlad Godzich. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1982a.

_____. *Question and Answer: Forms of Dialogic Understanding*.
Ed. and tr. by Michael Hays. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.

_____. *Toward an Aesthetic of Reception*. Tr. Timothy Bahti.
Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1982a.

Jewish National and University Library. *The Collective Catalogue of Hebrew Manuscripts. From the Institute of Microfilmed Hebrew Manuscripts and The Department of Manuscripts of the Jewish National and University Library, Jerusalem*. France: Chadwyck-Healey, 1989.

Jewish Theological Seminary of America. *A Guide to the Hebrew Manuscript Collection of the Library of the Jewish Theological Seminary*. 5 vols. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1991.

Jewish Theological Seminary of America. *A Reel Guide to Philosophy Manuscripts*. Michigan: Xerox University Microfilms, 1974.

Jones, R. M. Keith, George, in *Dictionary of American Biography*. Ed. D. Malone. New York: Charles Scribner's sons, 1953. X: 289-90.

Jumah, Muhammad Lutfi. *Tārīkh falsafat al-Islām fī al-mashriq wa al maghrib*. Beirut: Maktabat al-'Ilmiyah, 1927.

Kabbalah: Emanation and the concept of the Sefirot; Details on the doctrine of the sefirot and their symbolism. Encyclopaedia Judaica X: 490 ff. 563-573.

Kassem, Mahmoud (Kacem). *Théorie de la connaissance d'après Averroës et son interprétation chez Thomas D'Aquin*. Alger: Études et documents, 1978.

Katsh, Abraham. *Yigal hazon: hamishim shirim hadashim mi-tekufat Sefarad*. Jerusalem: M. Nyuman, 1964.

Keith, George. *An Exhortation and Caution to Friends concerning buying or keeping of Negroes, given forth in Philadelphia, the 13th day of the 8th Moneth, 1693. Copied from the original in library at Devonshire Meeting House, London, by Mr. Joseph Smith, in The First Printed Protest against Slavery in America, reprinted from "The Pennsylvania magazine of History and Biography"* Philadelphia: [s.n.], 1889.

_____. *The Standards of the Quakers examined, or an answer to the Apology of Robert Barclay*. London: B. Ayelmer at Three Pigeons, 1702.

_____. *The Tryals of Peter Boss, George Keith, Thomas Budd, and William Bradford, Quakers: for several great misdemeanours (as was pretended by their adversaries) before a court of Quakers held at Philadelphia in Pennsylvania, the ninth, tenth, and twelfth days of December, 1692: giving also the most arbitrary procedure of that court.* London: Reprinted for Richard Baldwin, 1693.

_____. *The Deism of William Penn and his Brethren destructive to the Christian Religion, exposed and plainly laid open: in the examination and refutation of his late reprinted book called A discourse of the general rule of faith and practise and judge of controversie, wherein he contendeth that the Holy Scriptures are not the rule of faith and life, but that the light in the conscience of every man is that rule.* London: Printed for Brab. Aylmer, 1699.

_____. *Immediate Revelation; or Jesus Christ the eternall son of God revealed in Man: and revealing the knowledge of God and things of his kingdom immediately, or the Holy Ghost, the Holy Spirit of promise, the spirit of prophecy poured forth and inspiring man and induing him with power from on high ... not ceased but remaining a standing and perpetual ordinance in the Church of Christ, and being of indispensable necessity, as to the whole body in general .../writ by George Keith, prisoner of the truth in the Tollbooth of Aberdein, the 29th of the third moneth, 1665. Aberdeen?: s.n. 1668.*

_____. *A Journal of Travels from New Hampshire to Caratuck, on the Continent of North America.* 1706; Protestant Episcopal Historical Collections, 1851.

Keith George, and Barclay, Robert. *Quakerism Confirmed, or, A Vindication of the Chief Doctrines and Principles of the People called Quakers from the Arguments and Objections of the Students of Divinity (so called) of Aberdeen.* London?: s.n., 1676.

Kilani, Kamil. *Ḥayy bin Yaqzān.* Misr: Dār al-maʿrīf, n.d.

Kocache, Riad (tr.) *The Journey of the Soul. The Story of Hai ibn Yaqzan as told by Abu Bakr bin Tufayl.* London: Octagon, 1982.

Kirchheim, R. *Mss. Catalog der Samml. des Dr. G. B. Carmolly* (Auction Oct. 1875). *HB* XV, 105.

Kogan, Barry. *Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation.* Albany, N.Y: State University of New York, 1988.

Konstantinovic, Z. *et al.*, (ed.) *Literary Communication and Reception*. Proceedings of the IXth Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association, Innsbruck, 1979. Innsbruck: Inst. für Sprachwiss. d. Univ., 1980.

The Koran Interpreted. Tr. A. J. Arberry. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1955.

Krafft, Albrecht & Simon Deutsch. *Die handschriftlichen hebräischen Werke der k.k. Hofbibliothek zu Wien*. Vienna: Aus der kaiserlich-königlichen Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1847.

Kritzeck, James (ed.). *Anthology of Islamic Literature: From the Rise of Islam to Modern Times*. 1964; New York: New America Library, 1976.

Kurio, Hars. 1958/kk: *Letter to Parveen Hasanali*. 21 January, 1993. Orientabteilung SBB, Berlin.

Kruk, Remke. *An 18th century Descendant of Hayy ibn Yaqzān and Robinson Crusoe: Don Antonio de Trezzanio*. *Arabica* 36 (Nov. 1987), 357-365.

Landolt, Hermann. *Avicenna*. In *Companion to Arabic Literature*. Ed. Julie Meisami and Paul Starkey. London: Routledge, forthcoming.

_____. *Suhrawardī's 'Tales of Initiation'*, *JAOS* 107 (1987), 475-86.

_____. *Ghazālī and "Religionwissenschaft."* *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques* XLV, 1 (1991), 19-72.

Leaman, Oliver. *An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy*. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

_____. *Ibn Bājjā on Society and Philosophy*. *Der Islam*. LVII (1980), 109.

_____. *Averroes and his Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.

LeClerc, Lucien. *Histoire de la médecine arabe*. 2 vols. Paris, 1876.

Lerner Ralph, and M. Mahdi (eds). *Medieval Political Philosophy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963.

Lewis, Bernard. *British Contributions to Arabic Studies*. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1941.

Loxley, Diana. *Problematic Shores: The Literature of Islands*. Diss. University of Essex, 1987.

Mahdi, Muhsin. *Islamic Philosophy*. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1985, XXII, 26.

_____. *Philosophical Literature*. In *Religion, Learning and Science in the 'Abbasid Period*. Ed. M. J. L. Young, J. D. Latham and R. B. Serjeant. Cambridge University Press, 1990. 76-105.

Mahdi, Muhsin *et al.* *Avicenna (i-ix)*. *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. III (1982), Routledge & Kegan Paul, 66-111.

Mahmoud, 'Abd al-Halim. *Falsafat Ibn Tufayl*. 2nd. ed. Cairo: Maktabah al-Anglo al-Misriyah, 1964.

Malti-Douglas, Fedwa. *Woman's Body, Woman's Word: Gender and Discourse in Arabo-Islamic writing*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.

Maqqarī, Ahmad ibn Muhammad. *Analectes sur l'Histoire et la Littérature des Arabes d'Espagne par al-Makkari*. (*Nafḥ al-tīb min ghuṣṣ al-Andalūs al-raṭīb*) Ed. R. Dozy *et al.* 2 vols. Amsterdam: Oriental Press, 1967.

_____. *The History of Mohammedan Dynasties in Spain (Nafḥ al-tīb)*. Tr. into English by Pascual de Gayangos. 2 vols. London: Oriental Translation Fund, 1840-43; rpt. New York: Jolison Reprint Corp., 1964.

Margoliuth, D. S. *Catalogue of the Oriental Manuscripts in the Library of Eaton College*. Oxford, 1904.

Marmura, Michael E. *The Islamic Philosophers' Conception of Islam*. In *Islam's Understanding of Itself*. Ed. R. Hovannisian and S. Vyonis, Jr. California: Undena Publications, 1983, 87-102.

_____. *The Philosopher and Society: Some Medieval Arabic Discussions*. *Arab Studies Quarterly*. I, No. 4 (1979), 309-323.

_____. *Plotting the Course of Avicenna's Thought*. *JAOS* 111.2 (1991), 333-343.

Marrākushī, 'Abd al-Wāḥid. *Histoire des Almohades d'Abd el-Wāḥid Merrākechi*. Translated into French by E. Fagnon. Algiers: Adolphe Jourdan, 1893.

_____. *Al-mu'jib fī talkhūs akhbār al-Maghrib*. Ed. R. P. A. Dozy. 2nd. ed. Amsterdam: Oriental Press, 1968.

_____. *Al-mu'jib fī talkhīs akhbār al-Maghrib*. Ed. Muhammad Sa'īd and Muhammad al-'Arabī al-'Alamī. Cairo: Maṭba'at al-Istiḳāmah, 1949.

Massignon, Louis. *La Passion d'al-Hallāj, martyr mystique de l'Islām*. 4 vols. 1922; Paris: Gallimard, 1975.

_____. *The Passion of al-Hallāj: Mystic and Martyr of Islam*. Translated into English by H. Mason. 4 vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982.

Mehren, M. A. F. (ed.) *Traité Mystiques d'Aboū Alī al-Hosain b. Abdallāh b. Sīnā ou d'Avicenne*. 4 fascicules. Arabic editions accompanied by French translations and commentaries. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1889-1899.

Menocal, Maria Rosa. *The Arabic Role in Medieval Literary History: A Forgotten Heritage*. Middle Ages Series. Edited by Edward Peters. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987.

Merlan, Phillip. *Monopsychism Mysticism and Metacosciousness: Problems of the Soul in Neoaristotelian and Neoplatonic tradition*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963.

Mernissi, Fatima. *The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1991.

_____. *Women and Islam: An Historical and Theological Enquiry*. Tr. Mary Jo Lakeland. Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1991.

Meyerhoff, M and J. Schacht. See Ibn al-Nafīs.

Mittwoch, E. *Dhu'l Ḳarnain, EI (1913-1936)*. Rpt. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987, II: 961-962.

Misrati, A. *Ibn Ṭufayl wa āthār al-fīkr. Al-Ṭarīq*, nos. 1 & 2 (1962), 43-63.

Mohammed, Ovey N. *Averroes' Doctrine of Immortality A Matter of Controversy*. Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfred Laurier Press, 1984.

Mortara, M. *Catalogo del Manoscritti Ebraic della Biblioteca della comunità Israellitica di Mantova*. Compilato dal Rabbino Maggiore Mario Mortara. Livorno: Tipografia I. Cost e.c. 1878.

Moses ben Joshua. *Encyclopaedia Judaica*. XII: 422-23. Jerusalem: Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1972.

Moses ben Joshua of Narbonne. *Jewish Encyclopedia*. IX: 71-72. New York & London: Funk and Wagnalis, 1909.

Muhammad, Maḥmūd. *Qirā'ah fī urjūzah Ibn Ṭufayl fī al-ṭibb*, in *Ma'had al-makhṭūṭāt al-'arabīyah* XXX (1986), 48-61.

Munk, Solomon. *Manuscripts hébreux de l'Oratoire à la Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris*. Ed. J. Kaufmann. Extrait de la *Zeitschrift für Hebraische Bibliographie*, 11-14 (1907-10). Francfort sur le Mein: s.n., 1911.

_____. *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe*. Paris, J. Vrin, 1857.

_____. *Philosophy and Philosophical Authors of the Jews: A Historical Sketch*. Tr. I. Kalisch. Cincinnati: Blosch & Co, 1881.

Nahas, Michael. *A Translation of Hayy ibn Yaqzan by the Elder Edward Pococke (1604-1691)*, *Journal of Arabic Literature* XVI, 88-90.

Nallino, C.A. *Filosofia 'orientale' od 'illuminativa' d'Avicenna*. *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*. X (1923-5), 433-467.

Nanji, Azim. *The Nizari Ismaili Tradition in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent*. Delmar, NY: Caravan, 1978.

Narboni, Moses. *Ha-Ma'amar be-Behirah (Essay on the Freedom of Choice)*. Ed. Eliezer Ashkenazi. *Dibre Ḥakhamim (Words of the Wise)*. Metz, 1849, 37-41.

_____. *Ma'amar bi-shelemut ha-nefesh (The Treatise on the Perfection of the Soul)*. Ed. Alfred L. Ivry. Jerusalem: Ha-Akademyah ha-le'umit ha-Yisre'elit le mada'im, 1977.

_____. *Moses Narboni's 'Epistle on Shi'ur Qomā': A Critical edition of the Hebrew Text with an Introduction and an Annotated English Translation*, in *Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967, 225-88.

_____. *Pirqué Moshé le-Moshé Narboni*. *Tarbiz* 39 (1970), 287-306. Ed. Colette Sirat. French translation by the editor in *Actes du Vème congrès des études juives*. Vol. III, Jerusalem, 1972, 61-72.

_____. *Sheloshah kadmon'e mefarshe ha-Moreh: Moreh ha-moreh leha Rav Shem Tov (b.r. Yosef) ben Falakera, 'Amude kesef u-maskiyt kesef leha Rav Yosef (b.r. Aba Me'eri) Kaspi, beur ha-Narvoni* A Hebrew printed edition of the commentaries on Maimonides *Guide* by Shem Tov ben Yosef ibn Felaqera, Joseph Caspi, and Moses Narboni from Maimonides' *Guide* from earlier imprints. Pressburg, 1837; Frankfurt-am-Main, 1848 and Vienna, 1832. Rpt. Jerusalem: [s.n.], 1960-61.

Nasr, Seyyed Hossain. *Three Muslim Sages: Avicenna, Suhrawardi and Ibn 'Arabi*. 1964; Delmar, NY: Caravan Books, 1976.

Netton, Ian A. *Allāh Transcendent: Studies in the Structure and Semiotics of Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Cosmology*. London: Routledge, 1989.

_____. *Al-Fārābī and his School*. London/N.Y.: Routledge, 1992.

Neubauer, Alfred. *Catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1886.

Nicholson, R. A. *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Oriental MSS belonging to the late E. G. Browne*. Completed and edited by R. A. Nicholson. Cambridge: University Press, 1932.

Novak, Maxmillian E. *Robinson Crusoe's Fear and the Search for the Natural Man*. *Modern Philology* 58 (May, 1961), 238-245.

Obermann, Julian. *Der philosophische und religiöse Subjektivismus Ghazālīs: Ein Beitrag zum Problem der Religion*. Vienna & Leipzig: Wilhelm Baumüller, 1921.

Ockley, Simon (tr.). *Book of Esdras*. In William Whiston, *Primitive Christianity Revived*. London: Printed for the author, 1711-12.

_____. *The History of the Saracens. comprising the lives of Mohammed and his successors, to the death of Abdalmelik, the eleventh caliph*. 4th. rev. ed. London: H. G. Bohn, 1847.

_____. (tr.) *The Improvement of Human Reason: Exhibited in the Life of Hai Ebn Yokdhan*. Written in Arabick above 500 years ago, by Abu Jaafar Ebn Tophail; Newly translated from the original Arabick by Simon Ockley; with statement from the publisher Edward Powell; 1708; Rprt. Hildensheim; New York: G. Olms, 1983.

_____. *Sentences of Ali*. London: s.n., 1717.

_____. *Simonis Ockleii Oratio Inauguralis*. Cambridge: s.n., 1712.

Palencia, Angel. (tr.) *El Filosofo Autodidacto*. 2nd. ed. Madrid: Imprenta de Ediciones Jura, 1948.

Parkhill, Thomas. *Teaching Conversation on Native American Religions*. Fredericton: St. Thomas University, 1994.

Pastor, Antonio. *The Idea of Robinson Crusoe*. Vol. 1. Watford: Gangora Press, 1932.

Pasinus, J. *Codices Manuscripti Biblioth. R. Taurinensis*. Recensuerant Jps. Pasinus. Vol. 1. Turin, 1749.

Pennington, E. L. *Apostle of New Jersey John Talbot (1645-1727)*. Philadelphia: The Church Historical Society, n.d.

Petrof, D. K. *Un problème hispano-arabe*. Zapiski: Memoires du comite des orientalistes, vol. 2, Leningrad 1926.

Peyron, Bernardinus. *Codices Hebraici manu exarati Regiae Bibliothecae quae in Taurinensi Athenaeo Asservantur*. Roma-Taurini Florential: Fratres Bocca, Regis Italiae Bibliopolae, 1880.

Philosophy, Jewish - Hebrew translators of the thirteenth century, *Encyclopaedia Judaica* XIII (1971-72), 445.

Pico, Giovanni. *Oration on the Dignity of Man*. Tr. A. Robert Caponigri. South Bend, Ind.: Regnery Gateway, 1956.

Pines, Shlomo. *La 'Philosophie Orientale' d'Avicenne et sa polémique contre les Baghdadiens*. *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 19 (1952), 5-37.

_____. *Philosophy*. In *The Cambridge History of Islam: Islamic Society and Civilization*. Ed. P. M. Holt, A. K. S. Lambton and B. Lewis. Vol. 2b. London: Cambridge University Press, 1970, 780-823.

_____. *The Societies Providing for the Bare Necessities of Life According to Ibn Khaldūn and to the Philosophers*. *Studia Islamica* (1971), 125-138.

Plotinus. *The Enneads*. Translated by Stephen MacKenna. New York: Paul Burton Philosophic Foundation, 1992.

Pons Boigues, Francisco. (tr.) *El filósofo autodidacto de Abentofail, novela psicológica*. Prologue by Menendez y Pelayo. Spanish translation of Ibn Sīnā's *Ḥayy* based on Mehren's edition. Zaragoza: Tip. de Comas Hermanos, 1900.

Pococke, Edward Jr. (ed./tr.) *Philosophus Autodidactus sive Epistola Abi Jaafar ebn Tophail de Hai ebn Yokdhan, in qua ostenditur, quomodo ex inferiorum contemplatione ad superiorum notitiam ratio humana ascendere possit*. Arabic edition and Latin translation of Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān. Oxford: Excudebat H. Hall Acadimae typographus, 1671.

Pope, Alexander. *Correspondence*. Ed. George Sherburn. 5 vols. London: Clarendon Press, 1956.

Pritius, Georg (tr.). *Der von sich selbst gelehrte Weltweise*. Frankfurt, s.n., 1726.

Quadri, G. *La philosophe arabe dans l'Europe médiévale: des origines à Averroès*. Translated from Italian by R. Huret. Paris: Payot, 1947.

Qur'ān. See *The Koran Interpreted*.

Rehak, Josef. *Ibn Tufail a jeho dílo: bibliografická studie, Cestník Comptes Rendus de l'Académie tchèque des lettres, sciences et arts*. XX (1911), 19-39.

Renan, Ernst. *Averroès et l'Averroïsme*. 3rd. ed. Paris: Calman-Lévy, 1886.

Renan E. & A. Neubauer. *Les écrivains juif français au xiv siècle*. 1893; Paris: Farnborough, 1969.

Rosenthal, Franz. *The Classical Heritage in Islam*. Tr. from German by Emile and Jenny Marmorstein. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975.

_____. *Greek Philosophy in the Arab world*. Brookfield, Vt.: Varorium, 1990.

_____. *Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in medieval Islam*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970.

Rosenthal, E. I. J. *Political Ideas in Moshe Narboni's Commentary on Ibn Tufail's 'Ḥayy b. Yaqzān'*. In *Hommage à George Vajda*. Edited by Gerard Nahon and Charles Touati. Louvain: Editions Peeters, 1980, 227-234.

Rossi, Johannes B. *Mss Codices hebraici Bibliotheca J. B. de Rossi. Accurate ab eodem descripti et illustrati, accedit appendix qua continentur mss. codices religui ai linguarum.* 3 vols. Parma: ex Publico typographeo, 1803-04.

_____. *Historisches Wörterbuch der jüdischen Schriftsteller.* Tr. by C. H. Hamberger. Bautzen: s.n. 1839.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *Emile.* London: Dent, 1948.

Said, Edward. *Beginnings: Intention and Method.* New York: Basic Books, 1975.

_____. *Culture and Imperialism.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993.

_____. *Orientalism.* New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.

_____. *The World, the Text and the Critic.* Camb. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993.

Salih, Madanī. *Ibn Ṭufayl: qadāyā wa mawāqif.* 1976; Baghdad: Dār al-Shu'ūn al-thaqafīyah al-'ammah, 1986.

Sarnelli, T. *Primaute de Cordoue dans la médecine arabe d'Occident.* In *Actas del Primer Congreso de Estudios Arabes y Islamicos* (Madrid, 1964), 441-451.

Sarton, G. *From Rabbi ben Ezra to Ibn Rushd.* In *Introduction to the History of Science.* Vol. 2. Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1931.

Scholem, Gershom. *Emanation: In Kabbalah.* *Encyclopaedia Judaica.* VI:696.

_____. *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism.* 1954; New York: Schocken Books, 1961.

_____. *Kabbala.* New York: New York Times Books, 1974.

_____. *Ursprung und Anfänge der Kabbala.* Berlin: De Gruyter, 1962.

Schmölders, Auguste. *Essai sur les écoles philosophiques chez les Arabes.* Paris, 1842.

Schnurrer, C. F. *Bibliotheca Arabica.* Halle, 1811; Rpt. Amsterdam: Oriental Press, 1968.

Schwarz, A. J. *Die hebräischen Handschriften der k.k. Hofbibliothek zu Wien*. Vienna: On Kommission bei Alfred Hölder, 1914.

_____. *Die hebräischen Handschriften der Nationalbibliothek zu Wien*. Leipzig: Verlag Karl W. Hiersemann, 1925.

Selvaggi, L. 4016 Posiz. VIIa: Letter to Parveen Hasanali. 14 September 1992. Bibliotheca Nazionale Universitaria, Torino.

Sewel, William. *The History of the Rise, Increase and Progress of the Christian people called Quakers: intermixed with several remarkable occurrences*. Written originally in Dutch. 6th ed. London: [s.n.], 1834.

Shackle Christopher and Zawahir Moir, *Ismaili Hymns from South Asia: An Introduction to the Ginans*. London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1992.

Shams al-Dīn, 'Abd al-Amīr (ed.) *Al-fikr al-tarbawī 'inda Ibn Ṭufayl*. Beirut: Dar al-iqra, 1984.

Shamsuddin Talbani, A. *see* Talbani, Abdulaziz S.

Siddiqi, B. H. *From Hayy bin Yaqzan to the Children of Light*. *Pakistan Philosophical Journal*, VII (July 1963), 57-70.

Sirat, Colette. *A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages*. Paris: Edition de la maison des science de l'homme; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Steeves, Edna L. *Négritude and the Noble Savage*. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, II, 1 (1973), 91-104

Steinschneider, Moritz. *Catalogus codicum Hebraeorum Bibliothecae Academiae Lugduno-Batavae*. Leiden, 1858; reprint Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1977.

_____. *Catalogus librorum Hebraeorum in Bibliotheca Bodleiana*. Jussu curatorum digessit et notis instruxit M. Steinschneider. 3 vols. Berlin: Typis Ad. Friedlaender, 1852-1860. Rpt. (facsimile) Berlin: Welt-Verlag, 1931.

_____. *Verzeichniss der hebraeischen Handschriften von Moritz Steinschneider*. In *Die Handschriften-Verzeichnisse der Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin*. Vol.II. Berlin: Buchdruckerei der Königl. Akademie der Wissenschaften (G Vogt), 1878.

_____. *Die hebraeischen Übersetzungen und die Juden als Dolmetscher*. 1893; Rpt. Graz: Akademische Druck-u Verlagsanstalt, 1956.

_____. *Die hebräischen Handschriften der K. Hof- und Staatsbibliothek in Muenchen*. Vol 1, par 1. In *Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Regiae Monacensis*. Muenchen: Palm'sche Hofbuchhandlung, 1875. (Rpt. 1970 by Otto Harrasowitz).

Suhrawardī, Yahyā ibn Habash. *Kitāb al-mashāri' wa al-muṭārahāt*. In *Opera Metaphysica et Mystica*. Ed. H. Corbin. Vol. I. Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 1945.

_____. *The Mystical and Visionary Treatises of Shihabuddin Yahya Suhrawardi*. Tr. William Thackston Jr. London: Octagon Press, 1982.

Suleiman, Susan and Inge Crosman, *The Reader in the Text: Essays on Audience and Interpretation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980.

Suter, Heinrich. *Die Mathematiker und Astronomen der Araber*. 1900; Amsterdam: APA-Oriental Press, 1981.

Talbani, Abdulaziz Shamsuddin. *The Debate about Prophecy in 'Kitāb A'lām al-Nubūwah: An Analytic Study*. M. A. thesis submitted to the Institute of Islamic Studies. Montreal: McGill University, 1987.

Tompkins, Jane. *Reader-response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism*. Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1980.

Touati, Charles. *Dieu et le Monde selon Moise Narboni*, *AHDMLA*, 29 (1954), 193-205.

Tuqan, Q. H. *Maqām al-'aql 'ind al-'arab*. Beirut: Dār al-quḍs, n.d.

Twells, Leonard. *The Theological Works of the Learned Dr. Pococke*. London, s.n. 1740.

_____. *The Lives of Dr. Edward Pococke, the Celebrated Orientalist; of Dr. Zachary Pearce, Bishop of Rochester and of Dr. Thomas Newton, by themselves; and of the Rev. Phillip Skelton, by Mr. Burdy*. 2 Vols. London: Printed for F.C. and J. Rivington by R. R. Gilbert, St. John's Square, Clerkenwell, 1816.

Urvoy, Dominique. *Pensers d'al-Andalus La vie intellectuelle à Cordue et Séville au temps des empires Berbères*. Presses Universitaires du Mirail, 1990.

Ülken, H. Z. *La pensée de l'Islam*. Tr. G. Dubois et al. Istanbul: Fakülteler Matbaasi, 1953.

University of Cambridge. *A Catalogue of the Manuscripts preserved in the Library of the University of Cambridge*. 1856-67. Rpt. Hildesheim/New York: Olms Verlag, 1979.

Vajda, George. *La pensée juive du moyen-âge*. Paris: J. Vrin, 1947.

_____. 1962a. *Comment le philosophe juif, Moïse de Narbonne, commentateur d'Ibn Tufayl comprenait-il les paroles extatiques (shatahât) des soufis*. In *Actas del primer congreso de estudios Arabes et Islamicos*, 129-135.

_____. *La conciliation de la philosophie et de la loi religieuse de Joseph b. Abraham ibn Waqâr, Sefarad* (1949-50), IX, 311-350, X, 25-71 and 281-323.

_____. 1962b. *Moïse de Narbonne sur les séfirôt, les intelligences et les sphères*. Annex note 10 in *Recherche sur la philosophie et la kabbale*. Paris: La Haye, 1962, 396-402.

Wagner, Ewald. *Arabische Handschriften*. Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1976-

Walzer, Richard. *Greek into Arabic: Essays on Islamic Philosophy*. 1962; Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970.

Whiting, John. *A Catalogue of Friends Books, written by many of the people called Quakers, from the beginning of the first appearance of the said people*. London: Printed and sold by J Sowle, 1708.

Wirszubski, Chaim. *Pico della Mirandola's Encounter with Jewish mysticism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.

Wolf, Johann C. *Bibliothecæ Hebræa*. 4 vols. Hamburg/Lipsiæ: Apud B. Theod. Christoph. Felgineri Viduam, 1815-33.

Wolfson, Harry Austryn. *The Twice Revealed Averroes*. *Speculum* 36, 3 (July, 1961), 373-392.

Wüstenfeld, Ferdinand. *Die Übersetzungen arabischer Werke in das Lateinische seit dem XI. Jahrhundert*. Göttingen, 1877.

_____. *Geschichte der arabischen Aerzte und Naturforscher* (History of Arab doctors and researchers). Göttingen, 1840. Rpt. 1881.

Yaziji, K and A. Karam. *A'lām al-falsafah al-'arabīyah*. Beirut: Lajnat al-ta'līf al-madrasī, 1962.

Young, Serenity. (ed.) *An Anthology of Sacred Texts*. New York: Crossroads, 1993.

Yeats, W. B. *The Second Coming: & Other Poems*. Los Angeles: Plantin Press, 1970.

Zenker, Julius, T. *Bibliotheca Orientalis: Manuel de bibliographie orientale*. Leipzig, 1846-1887. Reimpression, 1966.

Zimmerman, Fritz. *Seven times Seven is Fifty: The Philosophical Age of Hayy ibn Yaqzān*. Unpublished paper presented at *The World of Ibn Ṭufayl: An Interdisciplinary Colloquium on 'Hayy ibn Yaqzān'*. London: The Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine, 1987.

Zotenberg, Hermann. *Catalogues des manuscrits hébreux et samaritains de la Bibliothèque Impériale*. Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1866.

Zunz, Leopold. *Additamenta* (See Delitzsch).

_____. *Gesammelte Schriften*. 3 vols. in 1. 1876; Heildesheim: G Olms, 1976.