The Sign of the Apostle:
Galatians and the Poetics of Colonization

by

Jeffrey A. Keiser

Faculty of Religious Studies
McGill University, Montreal
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In the following, references to the Greek text of the New Testament follow *Novum Testamentum Graece,* Nestle-Aland, 27th ed. Those of the Septuagint follow the *Septuaginta* (Alfred Rahlfs, ed.; Stuttgart: Württembergische Bibelanstalt/Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1979). All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

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Abstract

This dissertation argues that the apostle Paul represents Jesus as the founding hero of the Galatian churches, through whose death the Galatians enter into the inheritance of Abraham and obtain protection from the curse of the law. It draws on the typology of Greek founder cult and the poetics of colonization in order to establish the salient features of hero stories and founder cult, then shows through exegesis and comparison how Galatians reflects those features. “Poetics” refers to certain shared and idealised practices of remembrance that are grounded in broader traditions and rituals, specifically the traditions and rituals associated with the ancient, ongoing practice of worshipping heroes, commonly known as hero cult, and the closely related practice of honouring civic founders, also called founder cult. The death of the founder plays a critical role in ancient Greek colonization stories, both by marking the independence of the colony from the mother city and by linking the citizens of the newly independent city to the past through the cyclical performance of rituals established by or for the founder. In Galatians 1–2 Paul represents himself as a tomb-that-signifies Jesus and a sign for the Galatians to read.

Résumé

Cette thèse soutient que le récit autobiographique de l'apôtre Paul dans Galates 1–2 s'appuie sur la même poétique ancienne de la colonization qui influence l'histoire de Tlepolemos, le fondateur de Rhodes, comme raconté dans la Septième ode olympique de Pindare. «Poétique» se réfère à certaines pratiques partagées et idéalisées du souvenir qui sont ancrées dans les traditions et les rituels plus larges—à savoir, les traditions et les rituels associés à la pratique ancienne et constante d'adorer les héros, aussi connue comme le culte de héro, et la pratique intimement liée d'honorer les fondateurs civiques, aussi appelée le culte fondateur. La mort du fondateur joue un rôle essentiel dans les histoires anciennes de la colonization grecque comme la Septième ode olympique, à la fois en marquant l'indépendance de la colonie de la ville mère et en liant les citoyens de la ville nouvellement indépendante au passé, à travers la performance cyclique de rituels établis par ou pour le fondateur. L'héroïsation du fondateur représente donc un tournant dans la vie d'une colonie. De même, dans Galates 1-2, Paul raconte une histoire de fondation qui se termine avec sa mort. Dans le récit, c’est son propre corps qui devient un tombeau, un tournant, et un signe à lire pour les Galates.

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1. Introduction

Give me an oracle immune to factionalism; what I require is a prophecy that will allow me to live securely if I accept it. Whither are you sending the human race, on what routes, to what destinations? Let there be just one, common to all! But as things are now, I can see many colonies of philosophy, each setting off in a different direction, like Cadmus to Boeotia, or Archias to Syracuse, or Phalanthus to Tarentum, or Neleus to Miletus, or Tlepolemus to Rhodes.

— Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 29.7[1]

The above quotation, taken from the orations of the second century C.E. Platonist, Maximus of Tyre, connects the founding of philosophical schools with the founding of civic colonies. Of the five colony founders mentioned by Maximus, two, Archias of Syracuse and Tlepolemos of Rhodes, were believed to have been murderers.[2] Both were commemorated as heroes. In telling their stories, and other similar stories, Greeks associated the founding of colonies with compensation for some injustice or strife that

1. Trans., M. B. Trapp, *Maximus of Tyre: The Philosophical Orations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 244 (slightly modified).

2. The story of Archias' murder of Actaeon can be found in a collection of love stories ascribed to Plutarch (*Amat. narr.* 772e–773b). A much simpler version, lacking the murder, is told by Thucydides (6.3.2; cf. Pausanias *Descr.* 5.7.3).

had impelled the founder to leave the mother city. The death of the founder marked the independence of the colony and the transfer of his obligations to the citizens. His tomb became a source of sacral power and civic pride, as well as a focal point for sacrifices and games instituted in his honour. By celebrating such events regularly and in perpetuity, the citizens participated in a ritualized chain-of-compensation that linked them to the glory of the epic past.

1. Thesis and Scope

Maximus's remark shows that stories of founding heroes could supply viable metaphors with which to conceptualize *other* kinds of foundations, even many centuries after the age of Greek colonization ended. This study focuses that observation on the founding and maintenance of early Christian churches. The Apostle Paul's letter to the churches in Galatia presents an ideal subject for such a study. Paul is popularly regarded both as a founder of churches and a hero of the Christian faith (even, in some cases, as the founder of the faith), but these two roles have never been studied together in relation to the paradigmatic Greek practice of venerating colony founders as heroes. What is more, Paul manifestly tells a story in Galatians 1–2. His violent past as a persecutor of the church and his commission to proclaim the son of God among the Gentiles seem to fit the pattern of Greek colonization stories (Gal 1:13–16). The author of the Acts of the Apostles, the most literary exponent of the early Pauline tradition, even represents Paul as a murderer, although the question of whether that portrayal was influenced by Galatians or simply

reflects common knowledge of Paul's past remains open (Acts 9:1). As for Paul himself, he arguably would have answered Maximus's plea for an oracle "immune to factionalism" (ἀστασίαστον) with the gospel entrusted to him through a revelation of Jesus Christ, in whom, he writes, "there is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, no male and female" (Gal 1:12; 3:28; cf. Gal 5:19–21).[3]

Despite such indications that Paul and his heirs thought of his story as a colonization story writ large, there are signs that caution against identifying *him* as the founding hero of the churches in Galatia or anywhere else. These signs include his pointed rebuke of the Corinthians for their factionalism: "Is Christ divided? Paul was not crucified for you, was he?" (1 Cor 1:13). The deeper theological question this study explores is raised in an acute way by the contrast between that rebuke and Paul's self-representation in Galatians. If he could reasonably expect the Corinthians to agree that he was *not* crucified for them, how did he expect the Galatians to respond to his unprecedented claim that he *had been* crucified with Christ, and its echo in his claim that he had been crucified to the world (Gal 2:19–20; 6:14)? Such bold claims cannot easily be explained by recourse to mysticism, nor by such popular but vague ideas as sharing or participating in the death of

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3. On this point, I am largely in agreement with the thesis advanced by Daniel Boyarin, *A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 7 and throughout); namely, that Paul was motivated by, and shared with Platonists like Maximus, a "Hellenistic desire for the One."

Christ. The historical mechanisms by which Paul and his auditors thought such sharing took place must be unveiled. To the extent that Greek colonization stories and the cult of founders supplied him with metaphors for conceptualizing what he himself calls a καινὴ κτίσις—'a new foundation'—they can help us to see those mechanisms (Gal 6:15).

My thesis is that Paul represents Christ as the founding hero of the Galatian churches. His death links the Galatians to the patrimony of Abraham and thence to the epic past of their adoptive 'mother city', the Jerusalem above (Gal 4:26). In addition, it provides a source of sacral power in the form of redemption from the curse of the law and freedom from the elements of the cosmos (Gal 3:13; 4:8–9). The Galatians received these benefits partly by 'hearing with faith' and partly by 'putting on Christ' in baptism (Gal 3:2, 27). The latter, as Paul conceptualizes it, is analogous to the institution of games in Greek founder cult.

Since the focal point for the cult of a founder was typically his tomb, the success of my argument depends disproportionately on the answer to the question of how Paul conceptualizes the 'tomb' of Christ. That answer spans three chapters, but it can be summarized in two words: σῶμα σῆμα. The title of my study, *The Sign of the Apostle,* alludes to this sibillant wordplay, which can mean either "the body is a tomb" or "the body is a sign." Socrates exploits that semantic ambiguity when he says that the body is called a σῆμα both because the soul is buried in it, and because by it the soul *signifies*, σημαίνει (Plato, *Cratylus* 400c). In comparison, Paul speaks in Galatians of Christ living

in him, though he himself has died, and of bearing the στίγματα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ on his body (Gal 2:20; 6:17). This Jesus, whom the marks on Paul's body *signify*, is a crucified criminal—cursed by God—yet he becomes the source of redemption from that very curse through his 'burial' in Paul (Gal 3:13; cf. Deut 21:23). In that sense, Paul's *body* is the tomb of Christ, and it is only by the power of this hero within him that he is able to live in the flesh and fulfill his commission to proclaim Christ among the Gentiles (Gal 1:16).

Naturally, this raises the question of how Paul construes the Galatians' bodies. He can scarcely have expected them to bear στίγματα, as he does, although he does mention their 'suffering' (Gal 3:4). He is very concerned with what they wear, however—that is, whether they have 'put on Christ' in baptism—and with how their bodies are inscribed—that is, whether they are practicing circumcision (Gal 3:27; 5:1). Circumcision is especially harmful, he argues, because it separates them off from Christ, causing them to fall from grace, thus it negatively impacts their ability to 'run well' (Gal 5:4, 7). The sign of circumcision, in this case, signifies the absence of the hero.

I leave for last the question of the relationship between Paul's story in Galatians 1–2 and the rest of the letter. In advance, however, it will be helpful to reformulate that question in terms that are commensurate with my thesis. If Jesus is the founding hero of the Galatian churches, then why does Paul tell his story? Carol Dougherty's comments concerning the function of colonization stories point toward an answer:

> Although they describe the past, colonization tales must also respond to the needs of the present; the significance of the narrative depends less on an accurate reflection of facts than on internal coherence and continued cultural value. As a result, historical, literary, mythical, and legendary material are combined as needed to represent and legitimate action.[4]

Paul manifestly describes the past in Galatians 1–2, yet it is clear that he is responding to the needs of the present. One of those needs is to represent to the Galatians what the consequences of their actions will be, whether they persist in turning aside from the gospel, or whether they recover their senses and 'get in the race'—as Paul himself once did in spectacular fashion (Gal 1:6, 22–23; 5:7).

2. Preliminary Considerations

Since Paul does not explicitly refer to Christ as a founder, his appeal to the civic concept of a καινὴ κτίσις is of prime importance to my thesis for its *implication* of a founder (Gal 6:15). The common translation of this phrase, 'new creation', loses this implication and overlooks the technical usage of κτίσις, as James Constantine Hanges rightly observes:

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4. Carol Dougherty, *The Poetics of Colonization: From City to Text in Ancient Greece* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 5.

> … the only verbal parallel from Paul's general period is from Josephus, a use that conforms completely to the normal, technical usage of the word; he uses the phrase καιναὶ κτίσεις, the precise formulation found in Paul, but in the plural, to refer to newly-founded cities (*Ant.* 18.373). If we take seriously the most obvious use of κτίσις/κτίστης in the general geographic context of Paul's addressees, one need only take an imaginary turn around the any local ἀγορά by way of the surviving epigraphic record to see that the obvious meaning of the word κτίσις, or its cognate κτίστης, is "foundation" as in a newly-founded πόλις, and by extension of the emperor, and many other social patrons or benefactors call themselves κτίστης, "founder," of the local πόλις or the order that maintains it.[5]

Hanges argues that Paul's activities conform to the paradigm of a Hellenistic founder. which, when distilled from a series of rather-too-rigid historical judgments, mostly boils down to a ritual innovator with a divine commission, a redoubtable sense of personal authority, and the will to use it.[6] This *is* an accurate description of Paul, but Hanges does

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5. James Constantine Hanges, *Paul, Founder of Churches: A Study in Light of the Evidence for the Role of "Founder-Figure" in the Hellenistic-Roman Period* (WUNT 292; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 469.

6. Hanges, *Paul*, 47–139 (on the historical development of the founder-paradigm), 381–433 (on Paul's activites as founder). As an example of such a judgement,

does not discuss the fact that Paul's deployment of a κάνων in Gal 6:16 suggests the work of an architect rather than a founder.[7] Elsewhere, indeed, Paul refers to himself as a σοφὸς ἀρχιτέκτων, 'a skilled architect' (1 Cor 3:10).[8] Hanges discusses *this* title only briefly, and

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Hanges indicates that, with the end of Greek colonization and the rise of empires, the foundational paradigm was concentrated mainly in the service of cultic foundations (61). This is true, but the first century B.C.E. through the second century C.E. also witnessed renewed interest in the cult of historical heroes, including founders. Thus the foundational paradigm was also *revived* as a form of resistance and accomodation to imperial oversight. See Dennis D. Hughes, "Hero Cult, Heroic Honors, Heroic Dead: Some Developments in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods," in *Ancient Greek Hero Cult: Proceedings of the Fifth International Seminar on Ancient Greek Cult, Organized by the Department of Classical Archaeology and Ancient History, Göteborg University, 21–23 April 1995* (ed. R. Hägg; Stockholm: Svenska Institutet i Athen, 1999), 173–174.

7. Joseph Barber Lightfoot, *St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians. A Revised Text with Introduction, Notes, and Dissertations* (4th ed.; London: MacMillan, 1874), 224; Ben III Witherington, *Grace in Galatia: A Commentary on St. Paul's Letter to the Galatians* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 451.

8. For a survey of the responsibilities, status, and salary of architects in the Hellenistic period, see John James Coulton, *Ancient Greek Architects at Work: Problems of*

only in reference to an *echo* of Paul's language by Eusebius (*Hist. eccl.* 3.4.1.).[9] There is a disconnect, here, between Hanges's insistence on interpreting κτίσις in its technical sense and his reliance on the church fathers for the meaning of ἀρχιτέκτων.

The critical difference between architects and a founders, from the standpoint of my thesis, is that architects did not normally receive heroic honours for their efforts. Paul reflects that difference time and again, not least in his refusal to boast in anything other than his own ἔργον—as a church 'builder' rather than a church 'founder'—and his κάνων (1 Cor 9:1; Gal 6:14). He usually reserves the δόξα for God (Gal 1:3–5). This means that we cannot seriously develop his use of κτίσις along the lines suggested by Hanges without

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Structure and Design (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 28–29. On Paul's use of construction metaphors in 1 Corinthians, see Jay Shanor, "Paul as Master Builder: Construction Terms in First Corinthians," *NTS* 34.3 (1988): 456–471; Margaret M. Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians* (HUZT 28; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1991), 99–111; J. Duncan M. Derrett, "Paul as Master Builder," *Evangelical Quarterly* 69.2 (1997): 129–137; and Stanley H. Skreslet, *Picturing Christian Witness: New Testament Images of Disciples in Mission* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 211–218.

9. Hanges, *Paul*, 13–14.

respecting his consciousness of his own role vis-à-vis God and Christ. In other words, it means that we cannot regard Paul as the hero of the Galatians' foundation story.

For Paul, God is the 'founder' (ὁ κτίσας, Rom 1:25), Jesus is the 'foundation' (θεμέλιος), and Paul himself is but an architect, one of several coworkers, in fact (1 Cor 3:9–10). This still raises the question of whether we can regard Jesus as a founding hero, but that question is easily dealt with by an analogy to the history of Greek colonization. Although the god Apollo is often called 'founder' for his association with Delphi and its many oracles regarding colonies, this did not prevent 'historical' founders from receiving cult as heroes.[10] Similarly, Paul's view of God as 'founder' need not have prevented him from conceptualizing Jesus as a hero who, upon his death, became the 'foundation' of the Galatians cultic life.

The more important question is how to construe the structure of which Jesus is said to be the 'foundation'. Paul's reference to this building as a 'temple' (ναός) could be seen as evidence against the thesis that he represents Jesus as a hero, but buildings dedicated to heroes could, in fact, take the form of temples (1 Cor 3:16).[11] Since Galatians offers no

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10. Timothy J. Cornell, "Gründer," *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum: Sachwörterbuch zur Auseinandersetzung des Christentums mit der antiken Welt* 12:1112; Irad Malkin, *Religion and Colonization in Ancient Greece* (SGRR 3; Leiden; New York: Brill, 1987), 18.

11. Gunnel Ekroth, "Heroes and Hero Cults," in *A Companion to Greek Religion* (ed. D.

explicit guidance on the subject, I will simply note that the case for thinking in terms of a tomb endowed with games is supported by Hellenistic and Roman dedications to 'new heroes' that follow a this pattern.[12] In conjunction with these rare, wealthy endowments, the much larger number of more humble tombs inscribed with the term ἥρως and its cognates—especially in Asia Minor—should be taken seriously as evidence for the aspirations of the common people.[13] Although these tombs represent only a fraction of the

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Ogden; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2007), 108.

12. *IG* 9.3.330 (ca. 200 B.C.E.); *IG* 12.7.515 (late-second century B.C.E.); Woflgang Blümel, ed., *Die Inschriften von Knidos* (2 vols.; IGSK 41; Bonn: Habelt, 1992), 1:no. 301 (third century B.C.E.); Christiane Dunant and Jean Pouilloux, *Recherches sur l'histoire et les cultes de Thasos* (2 vols.; Études thasiennes 5; Paris: de Boccard, 1958), 2:93–99, no. 192 (first century C.E.). For discussion of these dedications, see Hughes, "Hero Cult," 169–170. Cf. *IGRR* 4.159 (first century C.E.); F. W. Hasluck, "Inscriptions from Cyzicus (Continued)," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 23 (1903): 89–91; Christopher P. Jones, *New Heroes in Antiquity: From Achilles to Antinoos* (RevAntiq 18; Harvard University Press, 2010), 35–36.

13. A search of the PHI database (http://epigraphy.packhum.org/inscriptions/) yielded 924 such inscriptions from Asia Minor. These inscriptions have not always been taken seriously. See, e.g. Richmond Lattimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs* (ISLL 28, no. 1–2; Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1942), 97, who thought

sum total, Paul's presentation of the indwelling of Christ and the possibility of a running victorious 'race' through his power arguably resonates with their hopes.

3. Method

The term 'poetics' in the subtitle of my study refers to shared and idealised practices of remembrance that are grounded in ongoing traditions and rituals.[14] This definition strikes a complementary balance between narrative and cult, thus it gives me freedom to tailor different approaches to the specific needs of my argument. The labours of four scholars, in particular, have greatly enriched my understanding of how ancient Greeks related to their heroes through story and cult.

From Irad Malkin I learned the salient features of Greek founder cult.[15] His list furnishes insight into which of Paul's metaphors may have resonated most strongly with the Galatians' understanding of what constituted a 'new foundation'. From Gregory Riley

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that ἥρως simply means 'dead man'. For additional references and a nuanced presentation the opposing viewpoint, see Hughes, "Hero Cult," 170–171.

14. I have adapted this definition from Ellen Bradshaw Aitken, "Tradition in the Mouth of the Hero: Jesus as Interpreter of Scripture," in *Performing the Gospel: Orality, Memory, and Mark* (eds. J. A. Draper, J. M. Foley, and R. Horsley; Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress, 2011), 98.

15. Malkin, *Religion and Colonization*, 229.

I learned of the heroic cycle, the sequence of δίκη–ὕβρις–ἄτη–νέμεσις–δίκη that is common in stories of heroes.[16] Riley's typology helps to answer the question of whether Paul's story of Jesus is, in fact, an heroic story. From Carol Dougherty I learned about the poetics of colonization. Although Dougherty's definition of 'poetics' differs from my own in that she focuses mainly on narrative patterns, the specific pattern which she develops from her ancient sources is what first prompted me to consider Galatians 1–2 in terms of colonization stories. Finally, from Gregory Nagy I learned about the sociological role of games and victory celebrations in forging a shared connection to the past.[17] His work suggested to me the idea of a chain-of-compensation, by which I mean the ongoing fidelity to story and cult that links citizens and athletes to their founder, and from their founder to the epic past. By 'hearing with faith' and 'running well', I suggest, the Galatians become links in just such a chain (Gal 3:1; 5:7).

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16. Gregory J. Riley, *One Jesus, Many Christs: How Jesus Inspired not One True Christianity, but Many: The Truth About Christian Origins* (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1997), 37.

17. Gregory Nagy, *Pindar's Homer: The Lyric Possession of an Epic Past* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990). Ch.5 §7. Cited 22 June 2013. Online: http://www.press.jhu.edu/books/nagy/PHTL/toc.html.

4. Structure and Summary

The architecture of my argument may helpfully be described as a set of two frames, one nested within the other. The outer frame comprises chapters two and six. These chapters focus on elucidating the poetics of colonization through exegesis of Galatians. Chapter two develops Paul's story of Jesus as an heroic story, then shows how Paul conceptualizes the Galatians' cultic relationship to Jesus. Chapter six presents a rereading of Galatians 1–2 with a view toward explaining how Paul's story of himself intervenes in the severing of the Galatians' cultic relationship with Jesus. The inner frame comprises chapters three, four, and five. Each of these chapters deals differently with the problem of how to construe the 'tomb' of Christ in Galatians. Chapter three approaches the problem from a comparative angle, through an analysis of Pindar's Seventh Olympian. Chapter four approaches it from a philosophical angle, through a survey of the σῶμα σῆμα tradition in ancient Platonism. Chapter five approaches it from an historical and exegetical angle by showing how the notion of the body as a tomb/sign impacts the interpretation of classic 'unsolved mysteries' in Galatians. The contributions of each chapter are summarized in order and at greater length below.

Chapter two develops Paul's story of Christ through a comparison of Paul's remarks in Gal 3:1 and elsewhere with Plutarch's *Life of Camillus.* The question of how Paul construes the Galatians' cultic relationship with Jesus is explored by developing his use of

chariot racing metaphors and explaining their connection to the Galatians' baptism εἰς Χριστόν (Gal 3:27).

Chapter three begins with the observation that the tomb of the founder is often assumed as part of the common framework shared by ancient authors and their audience. A close reading of Pindar's Seventh Olympian concludes that Pindar alludes to the tomb of Tlepolomos in different ways, yet without openly mentioning it. This chapter also discusses the way in which Pindar links audience, poet, and athlete to the founder in a chain-of-compensation. This is his most distinctive contribution to the history of colonization tales, thus it is relevant to the question of the relationship between Paul's presentation of himself and the Galatians as competitors in a chariot race relate and Paul's story of Christ.

The heart of chapter four is a rereading of *Cratylus* 400c in the context of fifth-century Attic funerary culture, focusing on the symbolic functions of white-ground lekythoi and Athenian family tombs. A survey of the subsequent tradition of interpretation shows that diverse Platonists intuitively grasped the nuances of Socrates emphases on justice and the semiotic function of the body. Finally, this chapter discusses Paul's evocation of the σῶμα σῆμα tradition in 1 Cor 4:7–12.

Chapter five considers how the notion of the body as a tomb/sign impacts the interpretation of several classic 'unsolved mysteries'. This chapter is organized under three headings. The section entitled "Paul's Body," discusses the nature of Paul's στίγματα

(Gal 6:17). “Galatian Bodies” looks at the question of how the στοιχεῖα τοῦ κοσμοῦ are able to enslave the Galatians (Gal 4:3, 8–9). “Christ’s Body” considers three questions: How did Paul think the agitators in Galatia were transgressing the law (Gal 6:13)? Why does he call attention to his handwriting (Gal 6:11)? How did Christ ‘become a curse’ (Gal 3:13)? In nearly every case, these questions are fruitfully addressed from the standpoint of a practice that was common in chariot racing: the burial of curses in tombs and other subterranean locations.

Finally, chapter six draws on the results of the previous chapters in a rereading of Galatians 1–2. This rereading ultimately suggests that Paul constructs his story in such a way as to identify *both* with the Galatians and with Jesus as their founding hero. Although his ‘overturning’ in Judaism and his ‘death’ to the law through his crucifixion with Christ represent turning points in his own race, they also reflect the choices presently available to the Galatians in *their* race. Thus Paul’s story challenges them to read the signs and make the appropriate course corrections.

2. Jesus and the Galatians

In an incisive essay on the subject of narrative theology and the study of Paul's letters, John M.G. Barclay touches on the perennial question of the coherence of Galatians:

> Paul manifestly tells some stories about himself in the course of his letters, not least in Galatians and Romans. In fact, Galatians 1–2 is a quintessential narrative, containing sequential episodes of a single story, complete with time indicators. What is less immediately obvious is how this story of himself relates to Paul's theology, and in particular, what connection it might bear to 'the story of Jesus'.[1]

Barclay tackles that question by shifting the terms of the debate away from the very notion of a linear, historically contingent story of Jesus. Instead, he argues that Paul's story conforms to the pattern or shape of the crucified Christ. Understood as such, the 'revelation of Jesus Christ' in Paul is not just a past event to be recalled from time to time, but an ever-present moment that punctures other times and other stories. Paul always shapes his stories in accordance with that moment, even traditional stories like the story of Adam or the story of Abraham. Barclay expresses doubt, however, as to whether Paul's

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1. John M. G. Barclay, "Paul's Story: Theology as Testimony," in *Narrative Dynamics in Paul: A Critical Assessment* (ed. B. W. Longenecker; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002), 135.

experience of Christ can be adequately grasped by thinking with Richard Hays in terms of "an imaginative identification … with the fate of the hero in the community's foundation story."[2] Barclay later clarifies his main point in a dialogue reported by his respondent in the same volume: "The Christ event *gives* meaning to the temporal narrative in which Paul places it, as much, or more, than it gains meaning from it."[3] Thus Barclay perceives an existential quality in Paul's storytelling that renders his stories irreducible to mere variants of particular narratives.

This chapter draws inspiration from Hays's intuition that Paul identified with Jesus as the hero of the Galatians' foundation story and attempts to give shape to that intuition through an historical inquiry into the poetics of colonization. It also draws inspiration from Barclay's sense of the *malleablity* of the past and its reservoir of stories in light of Paul's ever-present experience of Christ, yet without presuming that certain stories were beyond the reach of Paul's imagination to stamp with a cruciform imprint.[4] The goal is to

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2. Barclay, "Paul's Story," 155–156, quoting Richard B. Hays, "Crucified with Christ: A Synthesis of 1 and 2 Thessalonians, Philemon, Philippians, and Galatians," in *Pauline Theology, Volume 1* (eds. J. M. Bassler and D. M. Hay; SBLSymS 21; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2002), 242.

3. David G. Horrell, "Paul's Narratives or Narrative Substructure? The Significance of 'Paul's Story'," in *Narrative Dynamics in Paul: A Critical Assessment* (ed. B. W. Longenecker; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002), 167 n. 18.

look afresh at the story of Jesus and the story of the Galatians as they play out in areas of the letter that are typically classified as theological arguments or ethical paraenesis. Rather than attempting to lay bare the 'narrative substructure' of these areas, as Hays does, the focus will be on elucidating the poetics that inform Paul's choice of particular metaphors and images. The main thesis is that Paul's representation of Jesus and the Galatians constitutes a foundation story that pivots on the tragic death and powerful vindication of Jesus. That thesis will be supported in three ways: First, a comparison of Paul's story of Jesus with Plutarch's *Life of Camillus* will show that both stories conform to a popular narrative pattern called the heroic cycle. Second, a close reading of four key passages in which Paul addresses the Galatians directly will show that he represents them as competitors in a chariot race in keeping with the longstanding tradition of honouring founders with athletic contests. Third, baptism will be presented as the moment when the Galatians appropriated the benefits of Jesus's death in the form of inclusion in the lineage of Abraham and protection from the curse of the law.

1. Tearing Down in Order to Build Up: Insight from Amphipolis

In 437 B.C.E. the Athenian oikist Hagnon expelled the inhabitants of a region in Thrace near the Strymon river, where he then founded a city (ἔκτισαν τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο, Thuc. 4.102.3). Following the prerogative of founders he named the new city Amphipolis.

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4. See the trenchant response to Barclay's essay by Horrell, "Paul's Narratives," 157–171, esp. 160–162 and 166–168.

Thucydides initially mentions no heroic honours for Hagnon, but it is clear from a later passage that Hagnon received such honours even during his lifetime (5.11.1–2). In 422 B.C.E., a mere fifteen years after Hagnon's initial foundation, the Spartan general Brasidas died in battle during a successful campaign to capture the city:[5]

> μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸν Βρασίδαν οἱ ξύμμαχοι πάντες ξὺν ὅπλοις ἐπισπόμενοι δημοσίᾳ ἔθαψαν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρὸ τῆς νῦν ἀγορᾶς οὔσης· καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οἱ Ἀμφιπολῖται, περιείρξαντες αὐτοῦ τὸ μνημεῖον, ὡς ἥρωί τε ἐντέμνουσι καὶ τιμὰς δεδώκασιν ἀγῶνας καὶ ἐτησίους θυσίας, καὶ τὴν ἀποικίαν ὡς οἰκιστῇ προσέθεσαν, καταβαλόντες τὰ Ἀγνώνεια οἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἀφανίσαντες εἴ τι μνημόσυνόν που ἔμελλεν αὐτοῦ τῆς οἰκίσεως περιέσεσθαι, νομίσαντες τὸν μὲν Βρασίδαν σωτῆρά τε σφῶν γεγενῆσθαι καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἅμα τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ξυμμαχίαν φόβῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων θεραπεύοντες, τὸν δὲ Ἄγνωνα κατὰ τὸ πολέμιον τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως σφίσι ξυμφόρως οὐδ' ἂν ἡδέως τὰς τιμὰς ἔχειν (Thuc. 5.11.1–2).

5. Malkin, *Religion and Colonization*, 228–232; Bruno Currie, *Pindar and the Cult of Heroes* (OCM; Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 164–166.

> After this, all the allies, attending Brasidas in their armour, gave him a public burial in the city, in front of what is now the marketplace. The Amphipolitans henceforth segregated off his memorial, and they perform blood sacrifices to him as a hero and have accorded him the honours of athletic contexts and yearly sacrifices. And they attached the colony to him, as their founder, tearing down the buildings of Hagnon and erasing whatever reminder of the latter's founding of the city was likely to survive, considering that Brasidas had become their saviour, and simultaneously cultivating an alliance with the Spartans, in their fear of the Athenians; and considering too that Hagnon, because of the hostility of the Athenians, would not have the honours with as much benefit to themselves nor as pleasurably.[6]

The heroization of Brasidas is distinctive for the way in which the public demarcation of his memorial serves as a counterpoint to the erasure of Hagnon's memory and the demolition of the structures dedicated to him. The Amphipolitans, like Paul, thought it necessary to tear down their old foundation before erecting a new one (cf. Gal 2:18). So strong is the contrast between Hagnon and Brasidas, in fact, that it tempts one to imagine the Amphipolitans referring to old and new foundations much as Paul does (2 Cor 5:17), or to imagine them speaking of the tomb of Brasidas as a new foundation in much the same way that Paul speaks of a new foundation in Galatians (καινή κτίσις, 6:15).

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6. Trans. Currie, *Pindar*, 164.

Importantly, however, the example of Amphipolis shows that founders were honoured not only through physical structures such as the *Hagnōneia oikodomēmata* or the *mnēmeion* of Brasidas, but also through the active participation of the colonists in the cult of the founder, which involved regular sacrifices and annual, state-sponsored festivities. These practices are unlikely to have changed much with the transfer of honours from one founder to another regardless of the extent to which the Amphipolitans themselves perceived the event as a radical break with the past. What the story of Amphipolis provides, rather, is insight into how Greek speakers like the Galatians may have conceptualized Paul's argument as a way of using familiar terms to describe a truly *new* foundation, one marked by a change in cult practices as well as a change of founders. Thucydides furnishes a template by which to measure Paul's argument against the probable expectations of his auditors, shaped both by centuries of storytelling and the ongoing practice of commemorating founders.

Irad Malkin extracts the salient features of founder cult from Thucydides's account as follows:

(1) A public or state funeral

(2) A monumental tomb and a sacred enclosure inside the city

(3) A continuing hero cult (surely at the tomb)

(4) Annual "honours," that is *agōnes* and sacrifices.[7]

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7. Malkin, *Religion and Colonization*, 229.

In comparing these aspects of a typical founder cult with Galatians, special attention will be given to metaphors that are likely to have been both familiar to the Galatians and transferrable to their new foundation, a foreign cult dedicated to a crucified Palestinian Jew whom they believed had been raised from the dead. Items two and three above present special difficulties for this approach. Paul appears to keep silent about a tomb of Jesus (even an empty tomb) and the closest analogy to a continuing hero cult in the Pauline churches is the regular meal memorializing Jesus (1 Cor 11:23–26). For now, however, items one and four will provide sufficient footing to launch the discussion. The funeral of the founder and the annual festivals honouring the founder are related by the fact that such festivals normally began as funerary rites and continued thereafter to serve as periodic reminders of the founder's death.[8] Their relevance to Galatians can be

8. Literary evidence for this pattern of an heroic funeral accompanied by sacrifices and games extends all the way back to Homer's account of the funeral games of Patroklos (*Il.* 23). Closer to Paul's *floruit,* Dio Chrysostom claims to represent popular opinion when he tells the citizens of Tarsus that "founding heroes (οἰκιστὰς ἥρωας) or gods often return to their cities, invisible to others, during sacrifices and certain public festivals (ἔν τε θυσίαις καί τισιν ἑορταῖς δημοτελέσιν)." The context confirms that he is referring to sacrifices and festivals honouring founders, since he proceeds to describe the Tarsians' construction of a funeral pyre for their own founder, Herakles (ὁ ἀρχηγὸς ὑμῶν Ἡρακλῆς, 1 *Tars.* 33.47).

sketched out briefly by looking at Paul's reminder that the Galatians had once witnessed Jesus's death.

> ̓Ω ἀνόητοι Γαλάται, τίς ὑμᾶς ἐβάσκανεν, οἷς κατ᾽ ὀφθαλμοὺς ᾽Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς προεγράφη ἐσταυρωμένος; (Gal 3:1).
>
> O Foolish Galatians, who cast an evil eye on you, before whose eyes Jesus Christ was proscribed as crucified?

Gal 3:1 not only contains the only reference in all of Paul's letters to the phenomenon of casting an evil eye, it also makes the impossible claim that the Galatians had somehow witnessed the crucifixion of Jesus at firsthand. Naturally, interpreters have struggled to explain how these images relate to one another. The view set forth here differs from previous proposals by situating Gal 3:1 within the wider context of founder cult and its associated athletic contests. First, a well-known but underappreciated parallel to Paul's use of the verb προγράφειν suggests that Gal 3:1 casts Jesus as an 'unseasonal' hero, a person whose posthumous honours balance the injustice he suffered during his lifetime.[9] Second, the verb 'to cast an evil eye' (βασκαίνειν) belongs to a large constellation of terms

9. Riley, *One Jesus, Many Christs*, 37–39.

in Galatians with connections to chariot races (ἵππικοι ἀγῶνες).[10] This convergence of heroic and agonistic motifs on the death of the founder is distinctive of hero cult.

2. Unseasonal Heroes: Plutarch's Camillus and Paul's Christ

In his *Life of Camillus,* Plutarch uses the verb ἀναγράφειν to describe the commemoration of Marcus Furius Camillus as a second founder of Rome for his defeat of the Veii (κτίστης δὲ τῆς Ῥώμης ἀναγραφεὶς δεύτερος, *Cam.* 1.1). Later, Plutarch uses προγράφειν to describe the publication of a fabricated charge against Camillus (τῆς δίκης προγεγραμμένης αὐτῷ, *Cam.* 11.3). Both usages seem to involve public displays, in writing, of one form or another, yet lexicographers interested in Gal 3:1 only ever consider the latter usage, and

10. These terms include the verbs 'to frighten' (ταράσσειν, Gal 1:7; 5:10; Pausanias, *Descr.* 6.20.15–21), 'to finish' (ἐπιτελεῖσθαι, Gal 3:3; Dion. Hal. 4.25.4; 5.57.5; 7.73.1; Strabo 5.3.2; cf. 2 Cor 8:6; Phil 1:6), and 'to hinder' (ἐγκόπτειν, Gal 5:7; Porphyry, *Quaest. Hom. Il.* 16.152; Athanasius, *Hom. in Jn.* 12:27 [*PG* 26.1244a–b]; cf. 1 Thess 2:18; Rom 5:22), as well as the noun 'curse' (κατάρα, Gal 3:10, 13; Auguste Marie Henri Audollent, ed.*, Defixionum tabellae. Quotquot innotuerunt tam in Graecis orientis quam in totius occidentis partibus praeter Atticas in corpore inscriptionum Atticarum editas* (Frankfurt: Minerva, 1967), no. 241.4). On the evil eye in chariot racing, see Florent Heintz, "Agonistic Magic in the Late Antique Circus" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1999), 34–40, 193–194.

never within the larger context of Plutarch's *vita.* That context can be summarized as follows: Camillus was falsely accused of a crime for which he chose to exile himself rather than endure a sham trial. In effect, he became an outlaw.[11] As he fled the city he prayed that he would be vindicated. His fellow citizens later interpreted his prayers as curses connected to a series of misfortunes that befell Rome in his absence. Justice favoured him and he was eventually restored. Upon his death, he was honoured as a hero.

Two features of Plutarch's narrative point to Camillus's posthumous heroization. First, in his closing remarks Plutarch mentions that Camillus died when he was 'ripe' (ὡραῖος), in a wordplay that evokes the possible etymological association between 'seasonal' (ὡραῖος) and 'hero' (ἥρως). "Heroes become 'seasonal' after they die and achieve mystical immortalization," according to Gregory Nagy, "but they are 'unseasonal' during their lifetime." In the epic tradition to which Plutarch alludes here, Achilles is "the most unseasonal hero of them all" (παν-α-ῶριος, Hom. *Il.* 24.540).[12] Second, in an overt reference to Achilles, Plutarch implies that Camillus, too, was unseasonal. Describing Camillus's exile, Plutarch indicates that he fled Rome in wrath (ὀργήν):

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11. Cf. *LSJ,* 9th rev. ed., s.v. "προγράφω;" Gottlob Shrenk, "προγράφω," *TDNT* 1:771; Horst Balz, "προγράφω," *EDNT* 3:154.

12. Gregory Nagy, "The Sign of the Hero: A Prologue," in *Flavius Philostratus: Heroikos* (eds. J. K. B. MacLean and E. B. Aitken; SBLWGRW 1; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2001), xxviii, n. 21.

… καὶ μεταστραφεὶς ὀπίσω καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἀνατείνας πρὸς τὸ Καπιτώλιον ἐπεύξατο τοῖς θεοῖς, εἰ μὴ δικαίως, ἀλλ᾽ ὕβρει δήμου καὶ φθόνῳ προπηλακιζόμενος ἐκπίπτει, ταχὺ Ῥωμαίους μετανοῆσαι καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις φανεροὺς γενέσθαι δεομένους αὐτοῦ καὶ ποθοῦντας Κάμιλλον. Ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν ὥσπερ ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἀρὰς θέμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς πολίτας … (*Cam.* 12.4–13.1; cf. Livy 5.32.4; Hom. *Il.* 1.407–412).

… and when he turned back he stretched out his hands toward the Capitol and prayed to the gods that if it was not justly but through popular hubris and envy that he had been defamed and cast out, that the Romans would quickly repent, and that it would become apparent to everyone that they needed and missed Camillus. So he was like Achilles, placing curses on the citizens …

Camillus later returned to Rome in triumph, but only after a series of misfortunes that Plutarch characterizes collectively as a great retribution (νέμεσις) convinced the Romans that Justice (Δίκη) was on his side (*Cam.* 13.2).

The story of Camillus conforms to the heroic cycle described by Riley, in which a transgression of justice through hubris and envy is followed by retribution, and finally by the restoration of justice. Thus Plutarch furnishes support for Riley's broader claim that this cycle: "governed the moral and spiritual lives of antiquity and was the framework

within which stories of heroes were told."[13] In turn, this observation promises insight into a distinctively Pauline paradox. If the cross truly were "foolishness to Gentiles" (1 Cor 1:23), then the crucifixion of a Palestinian Jew would scarcely have convinced Greek-speaking Gentiles in Corinth or anywhere else to abandon their old cults in favour of a new one devoted to a convicted criminal. Why, then, did the Galatians find just such a figure so compelling?

Viewed from the standpoint of the heroic cycle, Paul's deployment of προγράφειν closely parallels Plutarch's usage. To many observers of the scene recalled in Gal 3:1, Jesus's guilt must have been self-evident from the very fact of his crucifixion—a glaring indictment if ever there was one—and yet, like Camillus, Jesus was vindicated. The same God and father who raised him from the dead also supplied the spirit to the Galatians and worked deeds of power among them (Gal 1:1; 3:5). As a result they came to believe that justice was on Jesus's side in the person of his father, the God of Israel.

When faced with the prospect of finishing through circumcision what Paul had begun through the proclamation of his gospel the Galatians were thrown into disarray. What followed in the form of Paul's letter represents his effort to correct their course by reminding them of their origins, not in their observance of the law but in the tragic death and persuasive vindication of a man who had wrongfully but willingly borne the crushing weight of the law's penalty for "anyone who does not abide by everything written in the

13. Riley, *One Jesus, Many Christs*, 37.

book of the law" (Gal 3:10). Jesus, like Camillus, was an unseasonal hero. Unlike Camillus, he did not curse his accusers and their accomplices (cf. Luke 23:34; 1 Pet 2:22–25). Instead, having himself become a curse (γενόμενος… κατάρα), he supplied all who trusted in him—Jew or Greek, slave or free, male and female—with a powerful apotropaion against the curse of the law (κατάρας τοῦ νόμου, Gal 3:13, 28).[14] So confident

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14. Gal 3:13 presents a special challenge to interpreters. See the series of open-ended questions posed by Hans Dieter Betz, *Galatians: A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Churches in Galatia* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), 150–151. Cf. Richard B. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 109–110: "The compressed narrative logic of the scenario of redemption in Gal 3:13–14 is a little obscure;" and Witherington, *Grace in Galatia*, 239: "The logic of this portion of vs. 13 is not perfectly clear." Paul's train of thought is "notoriously difficult" and his logic "somewhat obscure," according to Todd A. Wilson, *The Curse of the Law and the Crisis in Galatia: Reassessing the Purpose of Galatians* (WUNT 2.225; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 36. The traditional reading tends to clarify Paul's logic by supplying a doctrine of vicarious atonement, as found in Lightfoot, *Galatians*, 139; Herman N. Ridderbos, *The Epistle of Paul to the Churches of Galatia* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1953), 125–127; Ronald Y. K. Fung, *The Epistle to the Galatians* (NICT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 149–151; Richard N. Longenecker, *Galatians* (WBC 41; Dallas: Word

is Paul in the power of the crucified Christ to redeem from the curse of the law, in fact,

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Books, 1990), 121–122; J. Louis Martyn, *Galatians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AB 33A; New York: Doubleday, 1997), 318; and Thomas R. Schreiner, *Galatians* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2010), 217–218. The notion of the law's 'unfulfillability' that underwrites the traditional reading has been roundly rejected by scholars associated with the 'new perspective on Paul', including Krister Stendahl, *Paul among Jews and Gentiles, and other Essays* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976), 80–81; E. P. Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977), 443; E. P. Sanders, *Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 28; James D. G. Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians* (BNTC 9; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1993), 171; and others—but a satisfactory alternative remains elusive. See the critical survey by R. Barry Matlock, "Helping Paul's Argument Work? The Curse of Galatians 3.10–14," in *The Torah in the New Testament: Papers Delivered at the Manchester-Lausanne Seminar of June 2008* (eds. P. Oakes and M. Tait; LNTS 401; London; New York: T&T Clark, 2009), 154–179. Matlock concludes: "The problems encountered among these recent commentators are not simply of their own making—nor does pointing them out resolve them. *Any* reading of these verses will have to contend with gaps in Paul's argument, however it is construed" (p. 176).

that he imagines the Galatians heeding the agitators' call to practice circumcision only under the influence of envy in the form of an evil eye manifestation.

3. Reading Galatians 3:1 at the Races

The association of envy with the evil eye and its injurious effects, especially on children, have been recognized by ancient, medieval, and modern interpreters, but the question of how the evil eye phenomenon impacts the intepretation of Galatians as a whole is new.[15] The approach taken here is closest in spirit to that of Susan Eastman, who presents a compelling case for reading Gal 3:1a as an echo of the curse in Deut 28:53–57.[16] That curse gruesomely depicts transgressors of the law of Moses as starving parents in a besieged city, so desperate that they will cannibalize even their own children and, in order

15. See esp. John Hall Elliott, "Paul, Galatians, and the Evil Eye," *CurTM* 17.4 (1990): 262-273 and John Hall Elliott, "Social-Scientific Criticism: Perspective, Process and Payoff: Evil Eye Accusation at Galatia as Illustration of the Method," *HvTSt* 67.1 (2011): Art. #858, 10 pages. Cited 18 June 2013. DOI: 10.4102/hts.v67i1.858. Cf. Mark D. Nanos, "The Social Context and Message of Galatians in View of Paul's Evil Eye Warning (Gal. 3:1)" (22 June 2003). Cited 28 June 2012. Online: http://www.marknanos.com/EvilEyeWarning-6-20-03.pdf.

16. Susan Grove Eastman, "The Evil Eye and the Curse of the Law: Galatians 3.1 Revisited," *JSNT* 83 (2001): 69–87.

to avoid sharing the flesh, curse their famished kinsfolk with the evil eye (βασκαινεῖ τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ, Deut 28:54, 56). According to Eastman, Paul echoes this context in order to introduce the theme of blessing and curse which he develops in Gal 3:8–14 and thence to underwrite his subsequent use of familial imagery. Eastman continues:

> … if we read Gal. 3.1 in the context of Deut. 28.53–57, then Christ crucified is presented here not merely as the antidote to the evil eye, but as the antidote to the curse of which the evil eye is but one manifestation. Just as amulets absorb the harmful power of the eye's hostile gaze, so Christ on the cross absorbs the harmful power of the curse. In this way, Christ opens the way for both the reception and the ongoing presence of the Spirit, who will lead the Galatians from vulnerable childhood to maturity (3.2–5). That is, the 'public portrayal of Jesus Christ crucified' is the content of the ἀκοὴ πίστεως of 3.2 and 3.5, the 'message of faith' which elicits an obedient 'listening faith' like that of Abraham in 3.6.[17]

Similarly, Eastman adds, it is "against the backdrop of a curse in which children never reach maturity," that "the charge of foolishness and the question about reaching maturity by the flesh in 3.3 also make sense."[18]

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17. Eastman, "Evil Eye," 70–72 (the quoted text appears on p. 72).

18. Eastman, "Evil Eye," 75.

Eastman's case is compelling for many reasons. The Deuteronomistic curse *is* a gruesome image of ending by means of the flesh;[19] Paul *does* seem to represent the Galatians as children (Gal 4:19); he *does* seem to suggest that the agitators are 'weaker parents' who do not even keep the law themselves (Gal 6:13); and children *were* thought to be especially vulnerable to the evil eye (Pliny, *Nat.* 7.16–18; 28.39; Virgil, *Ecl.* 3.103; Perseus, *Sat.* 2.31–34; Plutarch, *Quaest. conv.* 680d). Still, two objections pertain to Eastman's central claim that the Galatians are analogous to the children in Deut 28:53–57. Beyond the question of whether they were biblically literate enough to detect such an echo in advance of Paul's marked quotations of Deuteronomy, Gal 3:1 does not appear to justify what amounts to blaming the victims.[20] The horror of the Deuteronomistic curse stems from the tacit presumption that the children are helpless bystanders, innocent casualties of hideous parental misconduct. They are victims, not perpetrators. However certain Paul may be that the agitators have influenced the Galatians, however, he does not absolve them of responsibility for their own lack of discernment. He presumes instead that they ought to have known better and scolds them

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19. Deut 28:53, 55 refer respectively to 'meat' (κρέα) and 'flesh' (σάρκες).

20. Many of the assumptions that commonly attend studies of Paul's biblical quotations and allusions are identified and critiqued by Christopher D. Stanley, "'Pearls before Swine': Did Paul's Audiences Understand His Biblical Quotations?" *NovT* 41.2 (1999): 124–144.

for being *childlike.* Later, however, he represents them biting and tearing at one another and warns them against mutual consumption—actions that seem to evoke the conduct of the sarcophagic *parents* in the Deuteronomistic curse (Gal 5:15). This inconsistency presses Eastman to adopt a position for which there is no warrant in the logic of Deut 28:53–57, namely that the Galatians have regressed to a childlike state in which they are at once victims of the evil eye and perpetrators of transgressions like those committed by the weaker parents in the curse.

Eastman anticipates and responds to these objections by conceding, first, that "it is plausible, but not provable," that Paul's auditors would hear an echo of Deut 28:53–57 in Gal 3:1, and, second, that "images do not need to be connected logically in order to call forth an emotional response." She attributes Paul's apparent inconsistency to the ancient rhetorical method of avoiding "extremely perfected logic."[21] In turn, these responses elicit two challenges that will be taken up in what follows. First, in the equally plausible event that Paul's auditors *did not* hear an echo of Deut 28:53–57 in Gal 3:1, what *did* they hear? Could Paul have anticipated an emotional response in his favour *without* assuming that they would detect his scriptural echo? Second, regardless of the advice offered by ancient rhetorical handbooks, is it not incumbent upon interpreters to ask whether imperfect logic betrays a flawed hypothesis, or at least to ask whether an inconsistency can be resolved by a different approach? The reading of Gal 3:1 presented below retains Eastman's key

21. Eastman, "Evil Eye," 84, 86, citing Betz, *Galatians*, 129.

insight that Paul portrays the crucified Christ as an antidote to the evil eye and the curse of the law whilst situating Paul's use of *baskainein* within the wider overlapping contexts of Roman chariot racing and Paul's own constellation of agonistic metaphors.

That Paul subsequently develops the themes of childhood, maturity, and inheritance is beyond dispute, but the evil eye was ubiquitous in the ancient Mediterranean world and children were not the only individuals thought to be especially vulnerable. Ever in the public eye, victorious charioteers and their painstakingly trained horses were also subject to the dangerous gaze of envy:

> Once crowned with the laurels of victory, charioteers do not find themselves safe and sound, surrounded by a protective aura that would shield them from jealousy; on the contrary, they are now exposed to increased levels of envy and therefore even more likely to incur destruction. In the late 1st c. C.E., extraordinarily successful drivers who had died young were said to have fallen victim to the envy of the Fates. Scorpus' epitaph reads: "Once that envious Lachesis was counting my victories, she deemed me to be an old man, I who was snatched away at age 27 (lit. in my ninth three-year period)."[22]

Martial's epigram for Scorpus is significant because it envisions Lachesis duplicitously counting the charioteer's victories instead of his years. The numbers are staggering. In

22. Heintz, "Agonistic Magic," 34–35, quoting Martial, *Epigr.* 10.53.3–4.

comparison to his 2,048 victories, Scorpus's scant 27 years make him seem like a mere infant. Martial's epigram plays on this double vulnerability to envy in order to achieve its pathos.

For defense against the evil eye, chariots and racehorses were outfitted with apotropaic devices of various kinds, including moon-shaped pendants inset with *fascina* or phallic amulets.[23] The Latin name for these amulets is taken over directly from the Greek term *baskania,* for "evil eye amulets," but the neuter *fascinum* also means "penis."[24] *Fascina* were also associated with the phallic deity Fascinus, whom Pliny the Elder describes as "the physician who wards off envy" and the protector not only of infants but also of victorious generals and their triumphal chariots (*Nat.* 28.39). In that capacity, *fascina* were perceived to be effective but not foolproof, as even Julius Caesar could attest.

Pliny, Suetonius, and Dio Cassius all report an incident that occurred at the outset of Caesar's unprecedented quadruple triumph in September of 46 B.C.E. Dio tells the anecdote as follows:

23. Heintz, "Agonistic Magic," 188–189.

24. Elliott, "Paul, Galatians, and the Evil Eye," 264.

ἐν δ’ οὖν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν νικητηρίων τέρας οὐκ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ ἐγένετο· ὁ γὰρ ἄξων τοῦ ἅρματος τοῦ πομπικοῦ παρ’ αὐτῷ τῷ Τυχαίῳ τῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ Λουκούλλου οἰκοδομηθέντι συνετρίβη, ὥστε ἐφ’ ἑτέρου αὐτὸν τὰ λοιπὰ ἐπιτελέσαι (D.C. 43.21.1–2; cf. Suetonius, *Jul.* 37).

Now on the first day of the triumphs an unfavourable sign fell upon him, for the axle of the triumphal chariot split opposite the very Temple of Fortune built by Lucillus, so that he had to finish the remainder of the route on a different chariot.

Ever after, according to Pliny, whenever Caesar embarked on a journey he would repeat a certain incantation three times upon taking his seat. Pliny does not say precisely what this incantation involved, only that Caesar was merely following popular practice (Pliny, *Nat.* 28.4.21). It is likely that he was applying what Pliny calls “medicine of the tongue” in order to prevail upon Fortune, “the destroyer of glory” (*Nat.* 28.7.39). The text is corrupt here but the sense is clear enough from the context, in which Pliny compares *medicina linguae* to *fascina.*[25] Fortune is the destroyer of glory because envy follows hard on the heels of success. So entrenched and yet in some ways so rational was this view that the

25. The relevant lines of Pliny’s Latin read as follows: *fascinus, imperatorum quoque, non solum infantium, custos, qui deus inter sacra Romana a Vestalibus colitur, et currus triumphantium, sub his pendens, defendit medicus invidiae, iubetque eosdem respicere similis medicina linguae, ut sit exorata a tergo Fortuna gloriae carnifex.*

true cause of Caesar's unportentous fall opposite the Temple of Fortune required no formal explanation. Like other afflictions, though, envy could sometimes be averted by a skilled physician, proper 'medication', and special tools.

Among such tools, *baskania* or *fascina* hold special relevance for the interpretation of Gal 3:1 for three reasons. First, the name itself resonates with Paul's language, whether in his own Greek (τίς ὑμᾶς ἐβάσκανεν;) or the Vulgate's Latin (*quis vos fascinavit?*). As Elliott observes, "'to fascinate' [*fascinare*] is actually to injure with the Evil Eye."[26]

Second, their very form lends irony to Paul's argument. Such irony is admittedly difficult to appreciate from the perspective of modern cultures unaccustomed to hanging phalluses on children and chariot teams, but it is less likely to have escaped the Galatians. Third, the double *function* of *fascina* as protectors of children and chariot teams is pertinent to Paul's use of two *topoi* that interpreters normally treat separately, rarely considering how they might be related. Paul's representation of the Galatians trades on the same quality of double vulnerability that gives Martial's epigram its pathos. Like Scorpus, the Galatians are mature enough to have run well, yet their very success makes them as vulnerable as children and racehorses to the harmful gaze of envy. Like Julius Caesar, they are victorious but not yet triumphant. They, too, have fallen victim to the evil eye; and they, too, have been compelled to finish their course with a different yoke (Gal 3:1–3; 5:1–4).

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26. Elliott, "Paul, Galatians, and the Evil Eye," 264

4. Circumcision and the Circus: Galatians 5:1–6

Paul introduces the image of a *zugos douleias* or yoke of slavery in Gal 5:1, where he associates it with the practice of circumcision and the corresponding obligation to do the whole law:

> τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἡμᾶς Χριστὸς ἠλευθέρωσεν· στήκετε οὖν καὶ μὴ πάλιν ζυγῷ δουλείας ἐνέχεσθε. Ἴδε ἐγὼ Παῦλος λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐὰν περιτέμνησθε Χριστὸς ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ὠφελήσει. μαρτύρομαι δὲ πάλιν παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ περιτεμνομένῳ ὅτι ὀφειλέτης ἐστὶν ὅλον τὸν νόμον ποιῆσαι. κατηργήθητε ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ οἵτινες ἐν νόμῳ δικαιοῦσθε, τῆς χάριτος ἐξεπέσατε (Gal 5:2–4).
>
> For freedom Christ set us free; so stand up and do not be burdened again with a yoke of slavery. Look! I, Paul, am telling you that if you are practicing circumcision, Christ will benefit you nothing. Again, I testify to everyone who is practicing circumcision that he [or she] is obligated to do the whole law. You are separated from Christ, you who are seeking to be justified in the law, you have fallen from grace!

In modern church contexts, the language of falling away can be used to describe a moral lapse, a general loss of commitment to faith and praxis, or outright apostasy. The last of these usages is closest to the sense of Paul's expression, yet popular and even scholarly

treatments of the subject rarely discuss the content of Paul's metaphor.[27] The context, in this case, points to a chariot race as the appropriate setting in which to conceptualize his image of falling away. That setting is indicated, first of all, by the broader context of evil-

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27. As a case in point, see the entry for "apostasy" in Leland Ryken et al., *Dictionary of Biblical Imagery* (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 1998), 40. That entry simply associates falling away with the "universal human experience" of slipping and falling. There are many particular contexts in which persons can fall, however, and most of them are irrelevant to Gal 5:4. See, e.g., Martyn, *Galatians*, 471 and Dunn, *Galatians*, 268–269. Martyn notes that falling is common in nightmares, whereas Dunn mentions a withered flower falling off its stem (James 1:11; 1 Pet 1:24) or a ship failing to maintain its course (Acts 27:26, 29). With the qualified exception of the nautical imagery, the context of Gal 5:4 supports none of these suggestions. Cf. I. Howard Marshall, *Kept by the Power of God: A Study of Perseverance and Falling Away* (London: Epworth, 1969), 100; Judith M. Gundry-Volf, *Paul and Perseverance: Staying In and Falling Away* (WUNT 2.37; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1990), 212–214; and B. J. Oropeza, *Paul and Apostasy: Eschatology, Perseverance, and Falling Away in the Corinthian Congregation* (WUNT 2.115; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 196–197. All three scholars focus strictly on the theological significance of falling away without commenting on the conceptual content of the metaphor.

eye magic and chariot racing established by our analysis of Gal 3:1, and, second, by the more immediate correlation between *falling under* a yoke of slavery and *falling away* from Christ.

The verb *ekpiptein* recurs in Greek literature from Homer onward in settings where it describes riders falling from their horses or charioteers falling from their chariots.[28] Plato provides a good example of that usage:

> Good charioteers, at any rate, do not fall from their chariots (οὐκ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἐκ τῶν ζευγῶν) during their first races and then fall (ἐκπίπτουσιν) when they have trained their horses and they themselves have become better drivers (Plato, *Gorg.* 516E).

The noun *zeugos,* as well, refers here to a chariot drawn by a pair of horses. It belongs to the same domain as Paul's word for yoke, *zugos,* but Paul need not have read the *Gorgias* to understand that good charioteers typically improved with experience and a yoke of well-trained horses; that is just common sense. The Galatians, however, defy common sense. They are mature enough to have run well yet still they have fallen. Worse yet, they have taken up a different yoke, just as Julius Caesar was forced to finish his triumph in a

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28. Homer, *Il.* 11.179; Aristophanes, *Vesp.* 1427; Xenophon, *Cyr.* 5.4.8; Plato, *Gorg.* 516e; Strabo, *Geogr.* 9.2.11; Plutarch, *Fab.* 3.1; Dio Chrysostom, *Alex.* 32.46; Galen, *Parv.Pil.* 5.910; Lucian, *Electr.* 3; *Par.* 8.

different car after falling from his first chariot (Gal 3:3; cf. Pliny the Elder, *Nat.* 28.4.21; Suetonius, *Jul.* 37; Dio Cassius, 43.21.2).[29]

Given the liklihood that Caesar's chariot was outfitted with a *fascinum,* the various accounts of his fall are emblematic of the failure of the phallus to fufill its most iconic cultural function; namely, to ward off the evil eye. Paul shrewdly exploits such impotence in Gal 5:6, where he proclaims that "neither circumcision nor uncircumcision has any power" in Christ Jesus (ἐν γὰρ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ οὔτε περιτομή τι ἰσχύει οὔτε ἀκροβυστία, Gal 5:6). The irony of that statement is too often lost in translation. In the wake of the Galatians' spectacular fall from grace under the influence of the agitators, it implies that whatever 'power' circumcision or uncircumcision may possess apart from Christ only invites destruction and lays waste to any hope of freedom from the powers that rule the cosmos (cf. Gal 4:3, 8–9). It is only "by the spirit of faithfulness," Paul reminds the Galatians, "that we eagerly await the hope of justice" (Gal 5:5).

The logic of Gal 5:6 is visual as well as verbal. It trades on the similarity between the circumcised penis and the uncircumcised phallus in order to emphasize the irony of the

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29. See above, pp. 36–38. Both Dio Cassius and Paul use the verb ἐπιτέλειν in the sense "to finish." Cf. Witherington, *Grace in Galatia*, 214: "The Galatians are thinking of adding obedience to the Law to faith in Christ. In Paul's view this is changing horses in the middle of the stream." Witherington seems to be unaware of the extent to which the image of changing horses actually approximates Paul's own metaphor.

Galatians' fascination with the very thing that is wrecking their faith (cf. *Barn.* 3:6).[30] As

30. The ancient word for a chariot crash is *naufragium* in Latin or *nauagion* in Greek—a 'shipwreck' (ναυάγια ἱππικά, Sophocles, *El.* 730; cf. Demosthenes, *Erot.* 29; Lucian, *Par.* 8.24–29)—whence the image of the 'drowning' charioteer naturally developed. Paul uses that very image in 1 Cor 15:54–55, where he composes a prophetic cento out of quotatations from Isaiah and Hosea:

κατεπόθη ὁ θάνατος εἰς νῖκος.	Death has been swallowed up into victory.
ποῦ σου, θάνατε, τὸ νῖκος;	Where, Death, is your victory?
ποῦ σου, θάνατε, τὸ κέντρον;	Where, Death, is your goad?

Cf. Isa 25:8 Θ (Q) along with the discussions by Christopher D. Stanley, *Paul and the Language of Scripture: Citation Technique in the Pauline Epistles and Contemporary Literature* (SNTSMS 69; Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 210–211 and Florian Wilk, "Isaiah in 1 and 2 Corinthians," in *Isaiah in the New Testament* (eds. S. Moyise and M. J. J. Menken; NTSI; London; New York: T & T Clark, 2005), 145–147. Hades is addressed instead of Death in Hos 13:14 (LXX): "where is your goad, Hades?" (ποῦ τὸ κέντρον σου, ᾅδη). Hades, of course, is often represented as a charioteer in Graeco-Roman art, as is the goddess Nikē or Victory. It is possible but doubtful that Paul was unaware of these associations. Moreover, Corinth boasted a circus in which chariot races were

Troy Martin has observed, the removal of the foreskin "leaves the glans penis permanently exposed, a condition that makes a circumcised male appear to be in a perpetual state of sexual arousal."[31] Martin notes that this condition was occasionally the subject of scorn, satire, and mockery by non-Jews, but presumes too much when he suggests that the Galatians were likewise revolted by the thought of a circumcised penis.[32]

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conducted during Paul's day. See David Gilman Romano, "A Roman Circus in Corinth," *Hesperia* 74 (2005): 585-611. Thus 1 Cor 15:54–55 may be taken as additional evidence of Paul's familiarity with chariot racing imagery. Cf. Plato's account of souls with their teams of winged horses being carried around beneath the outer surface of heaven, figuratively 'underwater' (συμπεριφέρονται ὑποβρύχιαι, *Phaedr.* 248A). Cf. Philo, *Gig.* 13, describing the descent of aerial souls into bodies with similar imagery: "Those who have plunged into the body as if into a river are at one time caught and swallowed (κατεπόθησαν) by the surging force of the current, and when they are first able to withstand the motion they break the surface, where they remain until they fly back to the place whence they came."

31. Troy W. Martin, "The Covenant of Circumcision (Genesis 17:9-14) and the Situational Antitheses in Galatians 3:28," *JBL* 122.1 (2003): 87–90, esp. 87.
32. Martin's otherwise meticulously crafted reading of Galatians depends almost entirely this premise. See Troy W. Martin, "Apostasy to Paganism: The Rhetorical Stasis of the Galatian Controversy," *JBL* 114.3 (1995): pp. 437-461; Troy W. Martin,

He does not account for the near-ubiquitous presence of the erect penis with exposed glans as an apotropaic device in Graeco-Roman culture. Whether the agitators exploited that device to buttress their position must remain indeterminate, but the context of Gal 5:6 makes it virtually certain that Paul did.[33]

Although the precise social dynamics at work in the churches of Galatia are difficult to determine, Gal 5:1–6 projects a worst-case scenario in which some if not most of the Galatians have suffered a chariot wreck. That scenario makes explicit for the first time the

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"Whose Flesh? What Temptation? (Galatians 4.13-14)," *JSNT* 74 (1999): 65–91; Troy W. Martin, "The Brother Body: Addressing and Describing the Galatians and the Agitators as Ἀδελφοί," *BR* 47 (2002): 5–18; and Troy W. Martin, "Pagan and Judeo-Christian Time-Keeping Schemes in Gal 4.10 and Col 2.16," *NTS* 42.01 (February, 2009): 105-119. Cf. Mark D. Nanos, *The Irony of Galatians: Paul's letter in First-Century Context* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002), 267.

33. The theory that the agitators in Galatia represented circumcision as a bulwark against the flesh has been proposed, *inter alia,* by Witherington, *Grace in Galatia*, 395–397. On the apotropaic and/or apocalyptic character of circumcision in Early Judaism, see David Flusser and Shmuel Safrai, "Who Sanctified the Beloved in the Womb," *Immanuel* 11 (1980): 46–55; Robert G. Hall, "Circumcision," *ABD* 1:1028; Shaye J. D. Cohen, *Why Aren't Jewish Women Circumcised?: Gender and Covenant in Judaism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 16–18.

choice they face: circumcision or Christ. Importantly, Paul challenges them to weigh the benefit of belonging to Christ against the cost of circumcision, much as the ancient Amphipolitans calculated the benefit of switching oikists. He does so, moreover, in the midst of a lengthy extended metaphor in which he repeatedly compares their life in Christ to a chariot race. Here as in Gal 3:1 heroic and agonistic motifs converge on the figure of the crucified Christ.

Unlike the Amphipolitans, however, the Galatians' are not confronted with a choice between two founders. Paul pointedly refrains even from mentioning Moses except as the unnamed mediator of the law (Gal 3:19–20). He also works hard to show that it is *only* by belonging to Christ that the Galatians entered into the inheritance of Abraham (Gal 3:6–29; 4:21–31). In that sense, Christ functions like a founding hero by linking them to Israel's past, thus their separation from Christ is tantamount to a severing of that link and a return to their pagan roots—ideologically, if not actually, a return to the realm of the phallus.

5. Reading Galatians 5:7 at the Races

Gal 5:7 provides an opportunity to confirm our analysis of its parallel in Gal 3:1:[34]

34. See above, pp. 31–38.

Ὦ ἀνόητοι Γαλάται, τίς ὑμᾶς ἐβάσκανεν… ; (Gal 3:1a)

O mindless Galatians, who has cast an evil eye on you … ?

Ἐτρέχετε καλῶς· τίς ὑμᾶς ἐνέκοψεν… ; (Gal 5:7a; cf. Gal 2:2; Phil 3:14)

You were running well; who hindered you … ?

The two verses are syntactically similar, consisting of a direct address followed by a rhetorical question and a subordinate clause introduced by a dative substantive; they both concern the deleterious impact of an unnamed person's activity on the Galatians; and they bracket a series of arguments focalized on the central claim that the Galatians are children of Abraham through baptism (Gal 3:26–29).[35] It follows that they belong to the same agonistic context.[36]

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35. With few exceptions, rhetorical analyses converge on the identification of Gal 3:1–4:31 as a distinct unit, of which Gal 3:26–28 "seems to form the centre" (Betz, *Galatians*, 181). A helpful tabulation of rhetorical outlines of Galatians is provided by Philip H. Kern, *Rhetoric and Galatians: Assessing an Approach to Paul's Epistle* (SNTSMS 101; Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 91–92. Paul's recapitulation of Gal 3:1 in 5:7 ties his discussion of freedom in chapter five closely to what precedes.

36. These verses are also treated as parallels by Martyn, *Galatians*, 474 and n. 22, citing Bruce M. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament: A*

Commentators normally interpret Gal 5:7 as a reference to sprinting, primarily on the basis of Paul's comment about runners in the *stadion* or sprint in 1 Cor 9:24 (οἱ ἐν σταδίῳ τρέχοντες).[37] According to conventional wisdom, therefore, the verb *enkoptein*, meaning to

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Companion Volume to the United Bible Societies' Greek New Testament (3d ed.; London; New York: United Bible Societies, 1971), 593. They are so similar, in fact, that an early scribe introduced the last clause of 5:7 into 3:1.

37. Ernest DeWitt Burton, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920), 281–282; Ridderbos, *Galatia*, 191; Robert Paul Seesengood, *Competing Identities: The Athlete and the Gladiator in Early Christianity* (PT 12; New York; London: T & T Clark, 2006), 24. Cf. Lightfoot, *Galatians*, 205. Lightfoot alone observed that ἐγκόπτειν has a usage opposite that of προκόπτειν (Gal 1:14), and thence that both terms belong to the same semantic domain. On the latter, see below, pp. 229–231. For a concise discussion of the sprint, see Philip F. Esler, "Paul and the Agon: Understanding a Pauline Motif in Its Cultural and Visual Context," in *Picturing the New Testament: Studies in Ancient Visual Images* (eds. A. Weissenrieder, F. Wendt, and P. Gemünden; WUNT 2.193; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 370, 376–377. Esler's remarks about the Olympic Games should be qualified, however. Although Pausanias indicates that the sprint was indeed the oldest and only event from the first to the thirteenth Olympiad (776–728 B.C.E.), he links the later addition of chariot

"cut in" or "to hinder," evokes the image of a runner tripping or cutting in front of another runner.[38] Problematically, that usage is otherwise unattested in contexts involving sprinters. One recent study even suggests, somewhat counterintuitively, that the agonistic

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races and other events to the mythological origin of the games, explaining that people only gradually remembered how the games originally came to be celebrated (Pausanias 5.8.5–6; 8.26.3–4). The implicit claim is that the development of the games up to *now*—i.e., Pausanias's day—reflects the way they were celebrated by the gods and heroes of antiquity. Cf. John H. Humphrey, *Roman Circuses: Arenas for Chariot Racing* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 6–8: "Chariot racing was an event in the Greek Crown Games from relatively early days and at Olympia can probably be traced back to Mycenaean times."

38. Howard F. Vos, *Galatians: A Call to Christian Liberty* (EBC; Chicago: Moody, 1971), 94–95; C. E. de Vries, "Paul's 'Cutting Remarks' about a Race: Galatians 5:1–12," in *Current Issues in Biblical and Patristic Interpretation* (eds. M. C. Tenney and G. F. Hawthorne; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), 118–119. De Vries is cited by F. F. Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 234; Longenecker, *Galatians*, 230; Witherington, *Grace in Galatia*, 371; and Martinus C. de Boer, *Galatians: A Commentary* (NTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2011), 320. Cf. Dunn, *Galatians*, 273–274.

metaphor breaks off earlier.[39] It is equally possible that Paul has extended the metaphor of the sprint in a rhetorically novel yet logically comprehensible way, but an interpretation that can be defended with relevant comparanda is prefereable to either of these options.

Parallels to Paul's use of *enkoptein* with links to chariot racing are few and relatively late, but the potential for anachronism is mitigated somewhat by the conservative nature of the sport. The practice of chariot racing changed relatively little over nearly two millenia, so it is probable that later texts reflect a usage that was already available to Paul but has since been lost.[40] The earliest extant usages of *enkoptein* in contexts involving

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39. Martin Brändl, *Der Agon bei Paulus: Herkunft und Profil paulinischer Agonmetaphorik* (WUNT 2.222; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 280–281: "Da sich ἐγκόπτειν gut in die Metaphorik einfügt, hat man darin auch eine Anspielung auf das Laufen im Stadion gesehen. Allerdings findet sich ἐγκόπτειν sonst nicht im Kontext der Agonistik, so daß man wohl eher damit rechnen muß, daß die agonistiche Metaphorik früher abbricht."

40. Humphrey, *Roman Circuses*, 5. Discussing the chariot race at the funeral games of Patroklos (Homer, *Il.* 23), Humphrey writes, "already in Homer's race, many of the features of later Greek and Roman chariot racing are present—the use of the lot to determine the staring positions, the race down a long straightaway to a turning post around which competitors turn in an anticlockwise direction, and the white stones to either side of the turning post which serve to keep the wheels of the chariot from

chariots appear in a scholion on Homer's *Iliad* by Porphyry and a fragmentary homily by Athanasius of Alexandria.

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colliding with the post. The anticlockwise turn (from right to left) is ubiquitous in Greek and Roman as in later and modern racing, being natural for horses as for right-handed charioteers." Roman innovations included fully built circuses with a continuous barrier (*spina*) dividing the racecourse. Greek hippodromes lacked such a barrier, so head-on collisions were common. Only one of 42 teams survived to finish the chariot race at the Pythian Games of 462 B.C.E. See Pindar, *Pyth.* 5.49–54, with discussion in Mark Golden, *Greek Sport and Social Status* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008), 73. The Romans also introduced four racing stables, each fielding teams identified by their colour: Reds, Whites, Blues, and Greens. The standard work on this phenomenon is still that of Alan Cameron, *Circus Factions: Blues and Greens at Rome and Byzantium* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976). These stables typically recruited drivers from the ranks of slaves and freedpersons whereas chariot teams entered in Greek races were usually privately owned by wealthy individuals of free birth and high social standing. As noted by Humphrey, *Roman Circuses*, 439, such individuals could drive a chariot themselves, if they chose, but more often they hired charioteers to race for them. In either case, it was the owner who received credit for a victory and collected any rewards that followed.

Commenting on Homer's *Iliad* 16.152, Porphyry explains why Patroklos commanded Achilles' charioteer to yoke the mortal horse, Pedasos, to the two immortal steeds that drove Achilles's chariot, Xanthos and Balios:

> …. διὰ τί δὲ δεῖται παρηόρου; οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι δεόντως πρὸς τὸ εἰ κάμοι ἢ τρωθείη εἷς ἀντεπεισάγεσθαι τὸν παρήορον ἀντὶ αὐτοῦ· τοῖς δὲ ἀθανάτοις ποῖον δέος τρωθῆναι ἢ καμεῖν; ἔστιν οὖν εὔηθες τοὺς μὲν Ὁμηρικοὺς θεοὺς τιτρώσκεσθαι, ἵππους δὲ μή. ἄλλως τε ποικῖλαι θέλει τὴν Σαρπηδόνος μάχην καὶ οὐκ ἄπρακτον αὐτὸν ἀνελεῖν. ἄπορον δὲ πῶς Ἀχιλλεὺς τοῖς ἀθανάτοις ἵπποις θνητὸν συμπλέκειν ἀξιοῖ· τὸ γὰρ χεῖρον παρὰ πολὺ τοῖς κρείσσοσι συμπλεκόμενον αἰσχύνην φέρει. ἴσως οὖν ἁρμόσει λέγειν. ὅτι τοῦτον προσέθηκεν ἐκείνοις, ἵνα <u>ἐγκόπτοιντο</u> ἐν τῷ δρόμῳ· μέτριον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ τάχος αὐτῶν ἐβούλετο καὶ οὐχ ὑπερβάλλον σφόδρα, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο ἄχρηστον ἐνίοτε. ἢ τάχα τὸν ἡνίοχον ἐπαινεῖ δυνάμενον ἀναχαιτίζειν τὴν ὁρμὴν τῶν ἀθανάτων ἵππων, ὅπως ἂν ὁ θνητὸς αὐτοῖς ἰσοδρομῇ. ἢ βούλεται ὁ ποιητὴς τὴν φύσιν ἐνδείκνυσθαι τοῦ ἥρωος μικτὴν οὖσαν ἐκ θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου (*Quaest. Hom. Il.* 16.152).

> Why does he need a trace horse? For others, the possibility that one horse should grow weary or suffer injury makes it necessary to add the trace horse next to it, but what fear have immortals of injury or fatigue? Now it is absurd that the Homeric deities are subject to injury but not horses. Alternatively, he wishes to handicap the battle with Sarpedon and not to defeat him idly. Still, it is a mystery how Achilles considered the mortal one worthy to harnass to the immortal steeds; for when the lesser is harnassed beside the greater it brings disgrace to the greater ones. It will be equally fitting, then, to say that he added the one to the others so that they would be hindered while running; for he wanted their pace to be measured and not too quick, since even this is sometimes ineffective. Or perhaps it obliges the capable charioteer to restrain the onrush of the immortal steeds whenever the mortal one keeps pace with them. Or the poet wishes to call attention to the nature of the hero, mixed from both mortal and immmortal.

Of the four interpretations proposed by Porphyry, the first three may be called practical interpretations and the last a theological (or hero-logical interpretation). The distinction is important because it shows how the contemporary practice of chariot racing could inform exegesis and theological reflection. Although the scene in the *Iliad* concerns Patroklos's preparation for battle, Porphyry's comments are less likely to reflect an antiquarian interest in Homeric warfare than the firsthand observation of a layperson familiar with the

races conducted in his own day.[41] Like Achilles's chariot, Roman *trigae* were drawn by three horses, two of which were yoked together while the third served as a *funalis* or trace horse on the inner side, closest to the turning posts (cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.* 7.73.2).[42] The trace horse helped navigate turns, which required a special balance of speed, toughness, and restraint.[43] Thus Porphyry rightly notes that unbridled speed is

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41. Porphyry's probable acquaintance with chariot racing may be judged by the existence of a monumental circus at his birthplace, Tyre, from the end of the second century, and by the fact that he spent six years studying under Plotinus in Rome (263–269 C.E.). Like Pliny the Younger (*Ep.* 9.6), he could scarcely have avoided the furor over the races even if he refused to attend them. On the circus at Tyre, see Humphrey, *Roman Circuses*, 461–477.

42. Humphrey, *Roman Circuses*, 16–17 with 641 n. 43. In Paul's day Nero drove a *triga* (Pliny, *Nat.* 28.237), and the practice area for chariot teams in Rome was called the Trigarium. The more common *bigae* and *quadrigae* required two- and four-horse teams, respectively. A *biga* was drawn by two yoked horses with no trace horses, whereas a *quadriga* was drawn by two yoked horses in the middle with trace horses harnassed on either side. The degree of difficulty increased with the number of horses.

43. Ann Hyland, *Equus: The Horse in the Roman World* (London: Batsford, 1990), 206–207.

sometimes ineffective. In that context *enkoptein* clearly means ‘to hinder’. It refers especially to the effect of the mortal horse on the immortal steeds, but Porphyry is keen to emphasize the practical value of this combination under the guidance of a capable charioteer (ἡνίοχος). By extension, the hero is someone who skillfully conducts both the mortal and immortal aspects of his or her mixed nature.

The utility of equestrian language to resolve exegetical problems and to illustrate theological points is equally evident in a fragmentary homily by Anthanasius of Alexandria. Commenting on John 12:27, Athanasius explains Jesus’s apparent hesitation to speak:

> Τὸ γὰρ, Τί εἴπω; ὥσπερ ἐγκόπτοντός ἐστι ῥῆμα, ὡς φανῆναι μὲν ἡμῖν, ὅτι καὶ σὰρξ ἀληθὴς, ὑποταττομένη δὲ, καὶ οὐ δυναμένη περισπᾶσαι, καθάπερ ἵππος τὸν ἐπιβάτην, οὐδὲ ὅσον ὀκλάσαι τὴν χεῖρα τὴν ἡνιοχοῦσαν. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τί λογίζεται τὸ πάθος; Οὐκ ἀδοξίαν, οὐκ αἰσχύνην, ἀλλὰ δόξαν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τοῦ Πατρός. Καὶ ἐπισπεύδει μᾶλλον, ἢ ἀποτρέπει τὸ πάθος.… Σαρκικὴ μὲν γὰρ φύσις παραιτεῖται τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἦν τοῦτο ἐν Χριστῷ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ γέγονε σὰρξ ὁ Λόγος ἀληθῶς· θεϊκὴ δὲ βούλησις αἱρεῖται τὴν κόσμου σωτηρίαν, ἣν ὁ θάνατος κατειργάσατο (*Hom. in Jn.* 12:27 [*PG* 26.1244a–b]).

> For the phrase "what shall I say?" is as though it were from one who is hesitating, so it seems to us that even though his flesh is true it is subjugated and unable to act, just like a horse is unable to pull the bit or even so much as slacken the hand holding the reins. What, then, does he think about the passion? It is neither a dishonour nor a disgrace, but an honour for him and the father. And he hastens onward rather than turning away from the passion.… For the fleshly nature deplores death—and this was in Christ, since the Word had truly become flesh—but the divine will chooses the salvation of the cosmos which [his] death accomplished.

Like Porphyry, Athanasius uses equestrian language to illustrate the duality of his 'hero', Jesus. Here, *enkoptein* means 'to hesitate', and here, too, it appears in a context where something that is mortal is harnassed to something that is immortal. Also like Porphyry, however, Athanasius downplays the potential disgrace of such a union by indicating that Jesus's truly fleshly nature was subjugated to the divine will in much the same way a horse is subject to the hand holding the reins (τῇ χειρὰ τῇ ἡνιοχούσῃ). Athanasius's Jesus is thus a person fully in command of all his faculties.

Despite their late date and distinctive theological concerns, Porphyry and Athanasius furnish clear and relevant parallels to Paul's use of *enkoptein.* Both writers deploy the term in agonistic contexts where they evoke the image of a skillful charioteer or rider in order to attenuate the disgrace brought by the lesser party to a union of opposites: mortal

with immortal, or fleshly nature with divine will. In neither of these contexts does *enkoptein* have the sense 'to hinder by cutting in on' but rather 'to hinder *by joining with*'. In comparison, Gal 5:7 trades on a similar dialectic of flesh and spirit, not to attenuate it but forcefully to reassert it; for as Paul writes shortly thereafter, "these things are opposed to each other, so that whatever you want to do, you do not do" (Gal 5:17). Unlike Porphyry's hero and Athanasius's Jesus, the Galatians are *not* fully in command of their faculties. Instead, Gal 3:1 and 5:7 show them afflicted by the malignant gaze of envy, yoked to a lesser horse, and slowing their onrush in the power of the spirit.

6. Unequally Yoked: Flesh and Spirit in Galatians 5:13–18

Gal 5:13–18 elaborates on the same scenario that Paul has been unfolding since the outset of the chapter, in which the Galatians have suffered a spectacular fall from grace. Here as in Gal 5:1–6 he issues a 'ringing declaration of freedom'.[44] That declaration is followed in

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44. Longenecker, *Galatians*, 222, 224, 235, 239. Triumphant descriptions of this sort tend to mask the tenor of uncertainty with which Paul confronts the crisis, so the question of whether Paul's declaration rang true is rarely broached. Cf. G. Walter Hansen, *Galatians* (IVPNTCS 9; Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 1994), 162 ("a trumpet call of freedom"); Martyn, *Galatians*, 480 ("ringing conclusion"); Witherington, *Grace in Galatia*, 340 ("high note;" "resounding") Richard B. Hays, "The Letter to the Galatians," in *The New Interpreter's Bible* (12 vols.; Nashville:

both cases by contrasting slavery metaphors, comments on the issue of the whole law, and remarks concerning the instrumentality of the spirit. The two passages are clearly parallel, yet they are normally thought to address two separate and distinct dangers: legalism under the law versus libertinism in freedom from the law.[45]

The context established by our analysis of Gal 5:7 indicates otherwise. Based on that analysis, Gal 5:1–6 and 13–18 appear to speak to different aspects of one and the same condition; namely, the condition of being unequally yoked. That condition can be defined

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Abingdon, 2000), 11:307; Pheme Perkins, *Abraham's Divided Children: Galatians and the Politics of Faith* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity, 2001), 94 ("ringing summons"); de Boer, *Galatians*, 288–289 ("a ringing declaration"). Cf. Vos, *Galatians*, 90; Frank J. Matera, *Galatians* (SP 9; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1992), 187–••. Vos calls Gal 5:1 "a ringing exhortation," but later indicates that Paul has lost some of the Galatians to the agitators. Matera, too, describes Gal 5:1 as a "ringing statement," but disputes the view that Galatians 5–6 consists mainly of paraenesis. Instead he treats Gal 5:1–12 as Paul's first warning against circumcision, Gal 5:13–6:10 as paraenesis contrasting life under the law with life in the spirit, and Gal 6:11–17 as a final warning against circumcision. This outline remains essentially unchanged from Frank J. Matera, "The Culmination of Paul's Argument to the Galatians: Gal 5:1–6:17," *JSNT* 32 (1988): 84–88.

45. Betz, *Galatians*, 258.

in terms of the obligation to do the whole law, on one hand, and bondage to the flesh, on the other hand. Gal 5:1–6 shows how the the Galatians' reception of circumcision has separated them from Christ and obligated them to do the whole law. The emphasis there is on the law, but Paul implies that observing the law apart from Christ is ideologically equivalent to donning the phallus (cf. Gal 2:16). He insists, nonetheless, that the law is not opposed to the promises of God or to the fruits of the spirit, and in that sense it belongs on the side of the spirit (Gal 3:21; 5:21b; cf. Rom 7:14). The problem is the yoking of the law to the flesh caused by separation from Christ. Paul's exhortation not to turn freedom into an opportunity for the flesh in Gal 5:13 indicates that the emphasis there is on the flesh, although he mentions the spirit and the law as well. Whether he discusses the flesh under the heading of the law or the law under the heading of the flesh, therefore the condition of being unequally yoked is the same.

To illustrate the consequences of that condition, Paul deploys the image of animals biting and tearing at one another, even to the point of mutual consumption:

> ὁ γὰρ πᾶς νόμος ἐν ἑνὶ λόγῳ πεπλήρωται, ἐν τῷ Ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν [Lev 19:18]. εἰ δὲ ἀλλήλους δάκνετε καὶ κατεσθίετε, βλέπετε μὴ ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ἀναλωθῆτε. Λέγω δέ, πνεύματι περιπατεῖτε καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν σαρκὸς οὐ μὴ τελέσητε (Gal 5:14–16).

> For the whole law is fullfilled in one saying, namely, "You shall love your neighbor as yourself" [Lev 19:18]. But if you bite and tear at each other, watch out, lest you are devoured by one another. So I say, carry on in the spirit and you will never fulfill the desire of the flesh.

Surprisingly, few interpreters exploit the contrast between the commandment of love and the vicious behaviour that Paul describes immediately thereafter.[46] Lightfoot vaguely calls Gal 5:15, "a kind of parenthetic warning," after which, "St. Paul returns to his main

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46. Standouts include Udo Borse, *Der Brief an die Galater* (RNT; Regensburg: F. Pustet, 1984), 193; Hansen, *Galatians*, 167; and Dieter Lührmann, *Galatians: A Continental Commentary* (trans. O. C. Dean; CC; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 104. Borse speculates that the contrast between *douleuete allēlois* in Gal 5:13 and *allēlous daknete* in Gal 5:15 is a wordplay. This underscores the way in which Paul brackets his quotation of Lev 19:18 with the ideal of fulfillment and its opposite. Hansen and Lührmann both indicate that Paul is describing the Galatians' situation under the law, but neither commentator provides strong exegetical support for this claim. Cf. Eastman, "Evil Eye," 69–87, esp. 74–75. Despite the criticisms of Eastman's argument discussed above, pp. 31–34, hers is by far the most thorough and thought-provoking case for reading Gal 5:15 as an image of the Galatians' plight under the law.

subject."[47] Vos thinks it is "out of place."[48] Many others follow suit, seeming content to speculate as to whether Paul has actual circumstances in mind, merely to note the contrast with the previous verse, or simply to classify it as a commonplace allusion to the vicious conduct of wild beasts, yet with little or no attention to how such an allusion might bear on the commandment of love and its fulfillment.[49] Mussner is exceptional for his apparent surprise at the fact that Paul does not express himself more literally:

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47. Lightfoot, *Galatians*, 209.

48. Vos, *Galatians*, 99–100.

49. Burton, *Galatians*, 297; George Simpson Duncan, *The Epistle of Paul to the Galatians* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1934), 164; Marie-Joseph Lagrange, *Saint Paul Épitre aux Galates* (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1950), 146; R. A. Cole, *The Epistle of Paul to the Galatians: An Introduction and Commentary* (TNTC 9; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965), 157; Betz, *Galatians*, 276–277; Bruce, *Galatians*, 242; Longenecker, *Galatians*, 244; Sam K. Williams, *Galatians* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1997), 147–148; Martyn, *Galatians*, 491; Philip F. Esler, *Galatians* (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), 225–226; Witherington, *Grace in Galatia*, 384–385; Perkins, *Abraham's Divided Children*, 105; Schreiner, *Galatians*, 335–336; Frederick W. Weidmann, *Galatians* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2012), 115.

> Eigentlich würde man aufgrund des vorausgehenden Textes folgende Formulierung dieses Verses erwarten: „Wenn ihr aber einander beißt und freßt, erfüllt ihr das Gesetz nicht“ (das euch doch sonst so am Herzen zu liegen scheint). Aber der Apostel fällt wieder in einen bitteren und fast höhnischen Ton … [50]

Regardless of his tone, however, Paul can scarcely have supplied a more vivid and fleshy image of failure to love one's neighbors than that of the Galatians biting and tearing at one another to the point of mutual consumption. That *is* his main argument. If they place themselves under the law by practicing circumcision they will run afoul of that very law by providing an opportunity to the contrary desires of the flesh, not because the law itself is fleshly but because the 'power' of circumcision, apart from Christ, is the curse of the law.[51]

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50. Franz Mussner, *Der Galaterbrief: Auslegung* (HTKNT 9; Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1977), 373.

51. Cf. Witherington, *Grace in Galatia*, 395–397. Witherington is probably correct to speculate that the agitators were advocating circumcision as a bulwark against the Galatians' fleshly desires, but mistaken (along with others) to conclude that Paul classifies circumcision itself as a 'work of the flesh'.

Biting and tearing represent the behaviour of hot-blooded racehorses, not wild animals as often suggested. Such behaviour is common among horses both in play and more seriously as a way of asserting dominance.[52] To the average observer, however, it

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52. D. S. Mills and Sue M. McDonnell, *The Domestic Horse: The Origins, Developments, and Management of its Behaviour* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 89–91; Sue M. McDonnell, *The Equid Ethogram: A Practical Field Guide to Horse Behavior* (Lexington, Ky.: Eclipse, 2003), 134. McDonnell describes biting as "opening and rapid closing of the jaws with the teeth grasping the flesh of another stallion," adding that it is "the primary fighting tactic of horses." Among ancient authors, Xenophon recommends that horses be muzzled when groomed or led without a bridle in order to prevent biting (*Peri hippikes* 5.3). Cf. J. K. Anderson, *Ancient Greek Horsemanship* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), 43 and pl. 36. According to Anderson, scenes showing the harnassing of a chariot are common in Attic vase painting of the later sixth century B.C.E. Most of these show the trace horse wearing a muzzle, which would be removed before the race. In an epigram from the first century B.C.E., Charmos dedicates a muzzle and other equestrian implements to Poseidon after a victory at the Isthmian games (*Anth. Pal.* 6.246, with translation and commentary in David Sider, *The Epigrams of Philodemos* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 191–195; cf. *Anth. Pal.* 6.233). Also pertinent to this context is Plato's

must have seemed just as vicious as the conduct of wild animals. The image of such tactics escalating to the point of mutual consumption is hyperbolic, but no more shocking than Joseph's dream of cannibalistic cattle (Genesis 41:1–4, 17–21), the flesh-eating

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allegory of the charioteer in the *Phaedrus* (246a–256e). There, Plato compares the human soul to a charioteer driving a team of winged horses, one of whom is good while the other is wicked. When the charioteer sees the soul's beloved and pulls the horses to their haunches, the wicked horse drags the team forward whilst wildly "champing at the bit" (ἐνδακὼν τὸν χαλινόν, *Phaedr.* 254d). Plutarch interprets the two horses in this scene as representing the soul and the body, so he mentions struggling with the body when it is "biting and straining" (δάκνοντος καὶ κατατείνοντος, *Tu. san.* 125b, with 137e for context; cf. Plato, *Tim.* 88B). Elsewhere, he alludes to the same scene in the *Phaedrus* when he explains why moderation is superior to self-mastery: "For biting (τὸ δάκνον), distress, and anger have not yet left self-mastery, but the soul of the moderate person is steady on all sides, not impulsive, and healthy, by which ready obedience the irrational is harmonized and united with the rational and equipped with remarkable gentleness" (*Virt. mor.* 446c–d, with 445c for context; cf. Gal 5:22–23, 6:1). On Plutarch's reception of Plato's psychology, see Jan Opsomer, "Plutarch on the Division of the Soul," in *Plato and the Divided Self* (eds. R. Barney, T. Brennan, and C. Brittian; Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,), 311–330.

mares of Diomedes (Euripides, *Alc. 478–496; Herc.* 380–384) or Alexander the Great's anthropophagic stallion (Pseudo-Callisthenes 1.13, 17).[53] More importantly, the identification of the animals in view here as domesticated animals fits the broader context of Paul's imagery with its many allusions to a chariot race.

The interpretation of Gal 5:15 as a projection of the Galatians behaving like horses rather than wild animals takes account of the following contextual data: First, Paul portrays them suffering from the effects of an evil-eye manifestation (Gal 3:1). Second, he portrays them starting one way, yet finishing another way (Gal 3:3). Third, he portrays them labouring under a burdensome yoke (Gal 5:1). Fourth, he indicates that they have fallen (Gal 5:4). Fifth, he portrays them running a race (Gal 5:7). The only persons in antiquity who were routinely exposed to these kinds of situations whilst also having to handle incredibly powerful but high-strung animals prone to bite and tear at one another were charioteers. Not surprisingly, charioteers occasionally fell and were dragged along by their horses. A horse that was poorly trained or incompatible with its yokemate was far more likely than a docile horse to instigate such behaviours and thus more likely as well to challenge the driver. To the extent that Paul represents the flesh as just such an animal,

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53. On Bukephalas, see Andrew Runni Anderson, "Bucephalas and His Legend," *The American Journal of Philology* 51.1 (1930): 1-21; E. Baynham, "Who put the 'Romance' in the Alexander Romance?: The Alexander Romances within the Alexander Historiography," *Ancient History Bulletin* 9.1 (1995): 1–13.

complete with passions and desires that conflict with the spirit, Gal 5:15ff projects a scenario in which the Galatians are imminently at risk of being dragged by the flesh into fleshly behaviours; that is, a scenario in which they are imminently at risk of falling under the curse of the law. To be "under the law," in that sense, is to be under the curse.[54]

7. Summary: The Impotence of the Phallus and the Scandal of the Cross

If Gal 5:13–18 does convey an ethical lesson, it is that one cannot easily love one's neighbor while struggling against oneself, and that seems to be what Paul wants the Galatians to consider. That is their plight under the law, a plight that he believes to be wholly irreconcilable with their reception of the spirit apart from works of the law (Gal 3:5). Under such conditions it is no wonder that he warns them to "watch out!" (Gal 5:15), for they are dangerously close to shipwrecking their faith under the disorienting influence of the evil eye and the paralyzing effects of the curse of the law.

The agitators are behind all of this trouble, according to Paul. They are the ones who have cast the evil eye on the Galatians (Gal 3:1). They are the ones who have hindered the Galatians (Gal 5:7). They are the ones who are persuading the Galatians to yoke the lesser to the greater—flesh to spirit—and thence to bring disgrace to the spirit. "They want to put on a good show in the flesh," Paul writes in a parting salvo, "just so that they are not

54. The case for interpreting the phrase "under the law" as shorthand for "under the curse of the law" has been ably argued by Wilson, *Curse*, 31–44.

pursued by the cross of Christ" (Gal 6:12).[55] Together these representations form a

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55. The verb *diōkein* is translated here in reference to the concept of "pursuit" rather than "persecution." The former usage is common in contexts involving chariots, and fits well with Paul's deployment of racing metaphors throughout the letter (esp. Gal 2:2; 3:1–3; 5:4, 7; cf. Homer, Il. 23.344–345; Aeschylus, *Pers.* 82; Sophocles, *El.* 738; Herodotus 7.140; Xenophon, Cyr. 7.1.40; Diodorus of Sicily 4.73.4; Josephus, *Ant.* 5.66–67; Dio Chrysostom, *Alex.* 32.81; *Cel. Phryg.* 35.24; and, in the Septuagint, Exod 15:9 [with 14:27–28 for context]; 4 Kgdms 9:27; Judg 4:16; Nah 3:2). As used here and elsewhere in Galatians, however, *diōkein* is normally understood in the latter sense as referring to outright persecution (Gal 1:13, 23; 4:29; 5:11). The basic assumption behind this interpretation was stated almost three decades ago by Ernst Baasland, "Persecution: A Neglected Feature in the Letter to the Galatians," *ST* 38.2 (1984): 136: "There is hardly any doubt that διώκω functions more or less as a technical term for persecution of Christians, and these texts therefore distinguish themselves clearly." The problem is that Paul stands at or very near the beginning of this development, at a point when the technical sense has yet fully to take hold. The same assumption governs older lexica and theological dictionaries. See, e.g., Albrecht Oepke, "διώκω," *TDNT* 2:229–233. The only non-biblical evidence Oepke produced for the use of *diōkein* with the sense "to persecute" or "to expel" (two quite different usages) is Homer, *Il.* 22.199, where

'religious persecution' cannot be in view and the term simply describes Achilles's pursuit of Hektor, albeit pursuit with a "hostile purpose," as suggested by Burton, *Galatians*, 45. A stronger case can be made from the LXX, yet the translators of the recent NETS version prefer renderings indicating 'pursuit' or 'chase' in 14 of the 22 passages cited by Oepke under the definition "to persecute" (Prov 12:26; Eccl 3:15; Ps 7:2, 6; 34:3; 36:28; 43:17; 70:11; 100:5; 108:16, 31; Is 30:28; Mic 2:11; Nah 1:8). Cf. BDAG, s.v. διώκω. Of the four non-Christian references cited in BDAG for the usage "to … *persecute*," all four are better classified under the usage "to … *run after, pursue*". In *OGI* 532.25, the phrase κατὰ γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν … διώξειν contains geographical markers that make the translation "to pursue by land and sea" more natural. Cf. *CIL* 2.172.7, where *persequi* simply means "to pursue." 1 Macc 5:22 contains a similar marker, thus the phrase ἐδίωξεν αὐτοὺς ἕως τῆς πύλης Πτολεμαίδος is best rendered "he pursued them as far as the gate of Ptolemais" (NETS). For *1 En.* 99.14, see Loren T. Stückenbruck, *1 Enoch 91–108* (CEJL; Berlin; New York: de Gruyter, 2007), 420–421. Stückenbruck translates διώξεται ὑμᾶς πνεῦμα πλανή[σεως] as "a spirit of error will pursue you," with commentary on the Ethiopic transmission of the text. Finally, a geographical marker is also supplied by Josephus in *Ant.* 12.272, where the phrase ἐδίωξαν εἰς τὴν ἔρημον τοὺς Ἰουδαίους is best translated "they pursued the Judeans into the desert." Even in Gal 1:13 and 23 the verb *porthein* is the main indicator of persecution, not *diōkein*.

remarkably clever *ad hominem* argument in which Paul portrays the agitators as a rival chariot team, envious of the Galatians' success and bent on slowing them down by whatever means necessary—even curse magic.

The curse of the law, in that context, is analogous to what Heintz calls aggressive or offensive magic; that is, spells designed for a very specific purpose: "to defeat the other competitors by magically sabotaging their drivers and horses."[56] Conversely, the cross of Christ is analogous to "protective or defensive magic," devices such as bells and amulets that "were used to protect horses and charioteers from harm and accidents caused either by offensive magic or the evil eye."[57] Such devices could include phallic rings called *fascina* in Latin or *baskania* in Greek. Paul ironically equates the Galatians' desire to practice circumcision with putting on such apotropaia when he proclaims that "neither circumcision nor uncircumcision has any power in Christ, but faith working through love" (Gal 5:6). That faith, specifically, pertains to the crucified Christ, who unjustly fell under the curse of the law but was later vindicated by his father. Paul's argument derives much of its rhetorical force from that wider critique of ancient phallocentrism, a critique in which the impotence of the phallus to fulfill its most iconic cultural function contrasts sharply with the power of the crucified Christ to deflect the curse of the law.

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56. Heintz, "Agonistic Magic," 9.

57. Heintz, "Agonistic Magic," 13.

Paul's emphasis on the death of Jesus and his strategic deployment of agonistic imagery to reiterate the benefits of that death for the newly founded churches in Galatia are paralleled, in the story of Amphipolis, by the Amphipolitans' calculation of the benefits they would gain by switching oikists and commemorating Brasidas through the institution of a founder cult and its accompanying *agōnes*. Malkin even calls such festivals 'independence day' celebrations, so it is significant that Paul, too, speaks of 'freedom' (ἐλευθερία) as one of the benefits the Galatians have experienced (Gal 5:1, 13). This coincidence of funerary and agonistic motifs with a view toward the ongoing benefits experienced by the citizens of a city or the members of local assemblies is less likely to constitute evidence of literary dependence than of the same cultural poetics at work in both Thucydides and Paul. In either case, Paul appears to have adapted his message to the probable expectations of his auditors.

8. Baptism and the Galatian Agōn

Just as Paul's comments in Gal 5:6 are underwritten by a wider critique of ancient phallocentrism, so, too, is his central quotation of an early baptismal liturgy:

3:26	a: Πάντες γὰρ υἱοὶ θεοῦ ἐστε b: διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.	3:26 a: For you are all children of God b: through this faith in Christ Jesus.
3:27	a: ὅσοι γὰρ εἰς Χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε, b: Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε·	3:27 a: For as many of you as were baptized into Christ, b: have put on Christ.
3:28	a: οὐκ ἔνι Ἰουδαῖος οὐδὲ Ἕλλην, οὐκ ἔνι δοῦλος οὐδὲ ἐλεύθερος, οὐκ ἔνι ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ· b: πάντες γὰρ ὑμεῖς εἷς ἐστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.[58]	3:28 a: There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is no male and female; b: for you are all one in Christ Jesus.

58. The theory that Gal 3:27–28 draws on a baptismal liturgy of the early church originated with Heinrich Schlier, *Der Brief an die Galater* (KEK 7; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), 174–175, who made baptism the centerpiece of his interpretation. The formula runs from 3:26–28 according to Wayne A. Meeks, "The Image of the Androgyne: Some Uses of a Symbol in Earliest Christianity," *History of Religions* 13.3 (1974): 180–183; Hans Dieter Betz, "Spirit, Freedom, and Law: Paul's Message to the Galatian Churches," *SEÅ* 39 (1974): 147–152; Betz, *Galatians*, 181–185; Dennis Ronald MacDonald, *There is No Male and Female: The Fate of a Dominical Saying in Paul and Gnosticism* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 4–9; and Martyn, *Galatians*, 378–379. For criticism see Gerhard Dautzenberg, "Da ist nicht männlich und weiblich. Zur Interpretation von Gal 3, 28," *Kairos* 24 (1982): 181–206 and Martin, "Circumcision," 111–115. Dunn has also challenged the consensus. See Dunn, *Galatians*, 201 and James D. G. Dunn, *The Theology of Paul*

Paul has probably furnished several epexegetical additions to this formula in order to integrate it more closely with his arguments concerning sonship and inheritance. These additions include his characteristic emphasis on faith in 3:26b as well as the explanatory γάρ and the phrase Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε in 3:27b (cf. Rom 13:14; Col 3:9–10; 1 Cor 15:53–54). The image of putting on Christ is usually interpreted as a sartorial metaphor referring to the idea of putting on the characteristics of Christ as one dons clothes.[59] J.

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the Apostle (London: T&T Clark, 2003), §17.1, 2. Dunn is virtually alone in maintaining that Paul deploys baptismal language in a strictly figurative sense and rarely, if ever, alludes to actual water baptism.

59. The consensus splinters over the origin of the metaphor, however, with proposals drawing on the Hebrew scriptures (Lightfoot, *Galatians*, 149–150; George Raymond Beasley-Murray, *Baptism in the New Testament* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1973), 148; Bruce, *Galatians*, 186), Hellenistic mystery religions (Johannes Leipoldt, *Die Urchristliche Taufe im Lichte der Religionsgeschichte* (Leipzig: Verlag von Dörffling & Franke, 1928), 60; A. J. M. Wedderburn, *Baptism and Resurrection: Studies in Pauline Theology Against its Graeco-Roman Background* (WUNT 44; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1987), 32–342), Graeco-Roman moral philosophy (Meeks, "Androgyne," 184), or 'gnosis' (Jacob Jervell, *Imago Dei. Gen 1, 26 f. im Spätjudentum, in der Gnosis und in den paulinischen Briefen* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960), 231–256; Meeks, "Androgyne," 185–189;

Albert Harrill has gone a step beyond this consensus by reading Gal 3:27 in the context of the coming-of-age ceremony for freeborn Roman boys, the *toga virilis.*[60] The ritual consisted of two parts, a familial dedication and a procession to the Forum, where the new *togati* were formally introduced as citizens and their full names entered into the registry of family groups. Harrill summarizes the familial dedication as follows:

> … the boy lay aside his apotropaic amulet (*bulla*) and his childhood *toga praetexta* prior to donning the "toga of manhood" (*toga virilis*), also called the "gown of freedom" (*toga libera*) or the "white dress" (*toga pura*). To do this the boy stood with the family before the hearth—the center of domestic worship—where often "with trembling hands" he hung his *bulla* onto the *lares*. He had worn the necklace, made of gold (if families could afford it) or leather (Juvenal, *Satirae* 5.165), since his *dies lustricus* (infant name-giving ceremony on the ninth day after birth). The *bulla* functioned to indicate freebirth status and to avert the Evil Eye, an apotropaic property that his *toga praetexta's* purple edging shared.[61]

Betz, *Galatians*, 187–189; MacDonald, *No Male and Female*, 4–9.

60. J. Albert Harrill, "Coming of Age and Putting on Christ: The *Toga virilis* Ceremony, Its Paraenesis, and Paul's Interpretation of Baptism in Galatians," *NovT* 44.3 (2002): 252-277.

Harrill says no more about *bullae* than that they were made of gold for the sons of wealthy families or leather for the sons of poorer families, but we know from Pliny that such amulets contained *fascina* (*Nat.* 28.39). Ancient speculation about their purpose is therefore especially relevant to the interpretation of Gal 3:26–28.

According to Plutarch, the *bulla* is a distinctive component of the dress of freeborn boys (ἐλευθέρων παίδων), which they wore even when they were naked in order to distinguish them from domestic slaves (οἰκετῶν). As a phylactery (φυλακτήριον) it thus served a function similar to that of a pedagogue; its purpose was to deflect the advances of older men and to restrain the youthful impulses of its wearer.[62] Plutarch even calls it a 'bit on licentiousness' (τοῦ ἀκολάστου χαλινός), alluding to the function of the bit in

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61. Freeborn girls wore the *toga praetexta* but not the *bulla.* A girl put off her *toga praetexta* at menarche but did not assume her final adult garments until she donned the *tunica recta,* or marriage gown. See Judith Lynn Sebesta, "Symbolism in the Costume of the Roman Women," in *The World of Roman Costume* (eds. J. L. Sebesta and L. Bonfante; WSC; Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994), 46–48.

62. This function of the *bulla* may have been especially relevant to families that could not afford a pedagogue. On pedagogues, see Norman H. Young, "Paidagogos: The Social Setting of a Pauline Metaphor," *NovT* 29.2 (1987): 150–176, esp. 158–165.

restraining and guiding horses (*Quest. rom.* 288a–b).[63] David M. Friedman elaborates on this use of *bullae* in Roman society:

> Like the Greeks, members of the Roman elite saw their peers' sons as objects of desire. But Romans saw these boys as *viri* (men)—or, more accurately, boys in the process of becoming *viri.* To a Roman it was anathema that this process be ruined by forcing a boy to have "a woman's experience" [i.e., being penetrated in a sexual act]. Because of this taboo a Roman boy was given a *bulla,* a locket containing a replica of an erect penis, to wear around his neck. Known as a *fascinum,* this penis replica signified the boy's status and power as a future *vir.* The *bulla* marked him off-limits to sexual approaches.[64]

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63. Cf. Barbara Kellum, "Concealing/revealing: Gender and the Play of Meaning in the Monuments of Augustan Rome," in *The Roman Cultural Revolution* (eds. T. N. Habinek and A. Schiesaro; Cambridge UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 171: "Like the phallic amulet in the child's *bulla* or the phallic harnass ornament on the prized horse, representations of the phallus offered protection from the evil eye."

64. David M Friedman, *A Mind of Its Own: A Cultural History of the Penis* (New York: Free Press, 2001), 25.

Paul ascribes an analogous function to the law when he calls it ‘our pedagogue’ (Gal 3:24). His point seems to be that the law guarded Jews like him from damaging influences until the coming of faith (Gal 3:23, 25). In much the same way, pedagogues ideally guarded the virtue of freeborn Roman boys until they reached maturity. Just as the custodial role of the pedagogue ended when his charge removed the *bulla* and donned the *toga virilis*, so too did the custodial role of the law end when Paul and other like-minded Jews put on Christ.[65]

Reading Gal 3:28 in conversation and conflict with the Roman *toga virilis* ceremony furnishes new insight into the rationale behind Paul’s adaptation of the baptismal formula to the crisis in Galatia. Specifically, the ceremonial removal of the *bulla* with its *fascinum* suggests that the common denominator linking all three antitheses in Gal 3:28 is the penis. The circumcised penis differentiates Jewish males from Greek males; the visually

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65. As a former Pharisee (Phil 3:5), Paul may also have in mind a contrast between the donning of Christ and the donning of *tĕfillîn,* small capsules containing select commandments affixed to the arm or head by leather straps. Matt 23:5 refers to such capsules as phylacteries (φυλακτήρια), and there is evidence for their use as apotropaia. See Jeffrey H. Tigay, “On the Term Phylacteries (Matt 23:5),” *HTR* 72.1/2 (1979): 45–53, esp. 51–52. The Mishna requires that males thirteen years and older wear *tĕfillîn* (*Šebu.* 3.8.11). On early Jewish use of such phylacteries more generally, see Edwin C. Hostettner, “Phylacteries,” *ABD* 5:368–370.

similar erect penis replicated by the *fascinum* differentiates freeborn Roman boys from slave boys; and the mere possession of the organ itself differentiates males from females.

The baptismal creed resolves the problem by dissolving differences. By assimilating the creed to the *toga virilis* ceremony, Paul calls the Galatians back to the moment when they, too, put off the phallus, not to don yet another impotent symbol of virility but the figure of the crucified Christ. In the Roman ceremony the new *togatus* was recognized as a legal heir to his father's estate, and the citizenship which he possessed either as a birthright or through adoption was formally registered.[66] In baptism, by contrast, such recognition was not reserved only for those who could already claim it as a legal privilege: male Jews and, to a lesser extent, male slaves in Jewish households, whom the law required to be circumcised.[67] From the standpoint of inheritance and citizenship in

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66. Harrill, "Putting on Christ," 258, 272.

67. Martin, "Circumcision," 117–118, 121. Martin argues cogently that the covenant of circumcision (Gen 17:9–14) explains the ordering of the pairs in Gal 3:28. This hypothesis is especially helpful in the case of the slave/free pair, where circumcision distinguishes the male slave in a Jewish household from a free sojourner or resident alien. That hierarchy is reversed in the context of the *bulla* and the *toga virilis* ceremony, but the order of the pair is less important to the analogy than the role of the penis as a marker of hierarchy and difference.

‘the Jerusalem above’, Paul insists that *all* who are baptized into Christ are heirs to the promises and children of Abraham (Gal 3:26–29; 4:26).

In the Pauline churches of Galatia and elsewhere baptism was preceded by the gospel that Paul preached, the good news of the crucified and resurrected Lord. That gospel is Paul’s charter myth. It is the story that accompanied the Galatians’ reception of the spirit; and it is the story that led eventually to their baptism. Importantly, as Paul writes in Romans, it is also the very story that was *ritually reenacted* in baptism:

> ἢ ἀγνοεῖτε ὅτι ὅσοι ἐβαπτίσθημεν εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν εἰς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ ἐβαπτίσθημεν; συνετάφημεν οὖν αὐτῷ διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος εἰς τὸν θάνατον, ἵνα ὥσπερ ἠγέρθη Χριστὸς ἐκ νεκρῶν διὰ τῆς δόξης τοῦ πατρός, οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς περιπατήσωμεν (Rom 6:3–4)
>
> Or do you not know, that as many of us as have been baptized into Christ Jesus have been baptized into his death? We have been *buried* with him through baptism into death, so that just as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the father, we, too, might walk in newness of life.

Construed as a burial with Christ, Pauline baptism mimetically represents the crisis in the life of Jesus as a liminal point in the lives of his followers, the end of the old regime of sin and death and the beginning of a new life—a new foundation. As Norman R. Petersen has observed, this process conforms to Arnold van Gennep’s cross-cultural, three-stage

model of rites of passage, which involves separation from a previous state, a liminal or transitional stage, and incorporation into a new state. What van Gennep learned in his study of funeral rites, however, is that transition rites are often the most elaborate and assigned the greatest importance.[68] This accounts well for Paul's insistence on the liminality of the new cultic community—always in transition, still running the race, victorious but not yet triumphant. In such precarious circumstances each new baptism presents itself as a potential reminder, to all who have been baptized, of the originary story of Jesus and its ongoing significance.

A similar emphasis on liminality characterizes Nagy's analysis of Greek athletic festivals. To participate in the games is to undergo *separation* from the city—a symbolic death, according to Nagy. Victory in a given event brings 'life' but remains incomplete pending the *reintegration* of the victor into the city: "From the standpoint of ritual, what is needed after a victory in an athletic festival is a joyous return to the community—a reintegration or reincorporation symbolizing life after death."[69] From that standpoint, the

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68. Norman R. Petersen, "Pauline Baptism and 'Secondary Burial'," *HTR* 79.1/3 (1986): 224–225, citing Arnold van Gennep, *The Rites of Passage* (trans. M. B. Vizedom and G. L. Caffee; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 3, 146; cf. Hans Dieter Betz, "Transferring a Ritual: Paul's Interpretation of Baptism in Romans 6," in *Paul in His Hellenistic Context* (ed. T. Engberg-Pedersen; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 109.

ordeal of the athletes who competed in the games is ideologically analogous to the life-and-death ordeals of heroes in the past. Like baptism, the games told the story of the founder before the very eyes of the assembled spectators through the ritualized ordeals of the competitors and the public acclamation of the victors, even, in some cases, providing an ongoing *lutron* or 'compensation' for a crisis in the past of the founder. Celebrated regularly and in perpetuity, they sublimated that crisis into a source of benefits and sacral power for the city. It is telling, therefore, that when Paul finally speaks openly about circumcision, he reasons first that Christ will be of no benefit to the Galatians if they are circumcised, and then that they have somehow been hindered in their race (Gal 5:2, 7).

Independently of both Nagy and Petersen, Harrill argues that van Gennep's three stages are evident in the *toga virilis* rite. There is the *separation* from childhood marked by the removal of the bulla, the *transition*, when the candidates processed to the sacred precinct to offer sacrifices and stand before the public, and the *reaggregation,* when the father and son returned to the household for additional sacrifices. Importantly, Harrill nuances this analysis by observing how ancient discourse focuses on the fact that the new *togatus* assumed the outward appearance of an adult male without fully assuming the character of an adult male: "Liminality thus could have continued for some time (even many years) until the youth was no longer thought of as a *novus togatus* and was viewed as a *togatus,* a Roman man like any other."[70]

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69. Nagy, *Pindar's Homer,* Ch. 5, §10.

What baptism, Greek foundation games, and the Roman *toga virilis* ceremony share in common is an emphasis on the transition from dependence to independence—the *marge* in van Gennep's terminology. They converge on the image of newly independent citizens just beginning to make their way in a world fraught with danger, for baptizands, hardened former colonists, and fresh-faced *togati* alike. That danger is illustrated in the first case by the conflict refracted in Galatians itself, in the second case by Thucydides's story of the siege of Amphipolis and its fallout in the transfer of heroic honours from Hagnon to Brasidas, and in the last case by the common topos of the prodigal *togatus*.[71] The iconic function of the phallus as a protector of both children and chariot teams allows Paul to move almost seamlessly from one metaphor to the next, from the races to the *toga virilis* and back again, and yet at every turn he contrasts the impotence of the phallus with the scandal of the cross, the power of the crucified Christ to nullify the curse of the law. To the extent that baptism represents the moment when the Galatians first appropriated that benefit for themselves, it is analogous to the institution of games in founder cult.

9. Conclusion: The Story of Jesus and the Story of the Galatians

The results of this chapter tend to confirm Hays's intuition that Jesus was the hero of the Galatians' foundation story. In that sense, they build upon one of the most enduring aspects of Hays's original thesis: his central claim that Paul's argument presupposes a

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70. Harrill, "Putting on Christ," 258–259.

71. Harrill, "Putting on Christ," 268–271.

particular story of Jesus. On the other hand, they also expose the limits of that story to explain, independently of other factors, what Hays himself calls "a network of unexplained assumptions and allusions."[72] One such limit has to do with the extent to which Paul's story of Jesus relies on the scriptures and traditions of Judaism. That issue has gained currency in the decades since the first imprint of Hays's monograph with the advancement of sweeping claims for the significance of 'story' in Pauline theology" that, in Barclay's words, "have become conceptually more diffuse and materially more specific." Barclay singles out N.T. Wright for his emphasis on a very generalized 'Jewish story' as the very specific grid within which to read Paul, but Wright is scarcely alone.[73] Even critics of narrative theology sometimes struggle to escape the assumption that early Judaism and its scriptures are the only wellsprings from which Paul drinks.[74] Without denying the centrality of these reservoirs for Paul, this chapter asked whether some of his assumptions and allusions are potentially meaningful in light of other stories and other ways of telling stories.

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72. Richard B. Hays, *The Faith of Jesus Christ: The Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1–4:11* (2d ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 1.

73. Barclay, "Paul's Story," 134.

74. See, e.g., R. Barry Matlock, "The Arrow and the Web: Critical Reflections on a Narrative Approach to Paul," in *Narrative Dynamics in Paul: A Critical Assessment* (ed. B. W. Longenecker; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002), 53.

The key findings of this chapter were facilitated by Riley's typology of the heroic cycle and Malkin's typology of founder cult. The former helped to identify certain aspects of Paul's portrayal of Jesus that would meet Graeco-Roman expectations of an heroic story, including Jesus's experience of injustice and his subsequent vindication. We noted, however, that retribution as a distinctive component of the heroic cycle is conspicuously absent from Paul's representation of Jesus. In Paul's hands Jesus becomes a curse rather than curse his accusors. That reversal, in turn, plays a critical role in his argument with the Galatians, an argument that is shaped to a considerable degree by two of Malkin's four salient features of founder cult: the funeral of the founder (1) and its associated games (4). Paul deploys chariot racing imagery extensively in order to make his case for belonging to Christ as the sole founder able to offer protection from the curse of the law and freedom to run unhindered by the flesh. Finally, as the moment when the Galatians first appropriated the benefits of Jesus's death, baptism corresponds to the institution of games at the funeral of the founder.

One important question remains unanswered. As mentioned above, there is no obvious analogy in Galatians to a popular cult offered to the founder (3), as distinct from the state-sponsored sacrifices and games. Given the way in which even the popular cult of the founder centers on his tomb (2), however, the apparent absence of references or allusions to a tomb of Jesus in Galatians is the more critical of the two difficulties to address. If Jesus is the hero of the Galatians' foundation story, then where is his tomb?

The next two chapters are ‘bridge’ chapters that will help address the problem of locating a tomb in Galatians. First, chapter three looks at the poetics of colonization as exemplified in Pindar’s Seventh Olympian in order to show how certain features of a foundation story might serve as reminders of the founder’s tomb.

3. Tombs and Turning Points

Gregory Nagy introduces the phenomenon of hero cult with the following remarks:

> The traditional practice of worshipping heroes, commonly known as "hero cult," is a basic historical fact of ancient Greek civilization, and the evidence for it goes back all the way to the "Geometric" period of the first millennium B.C.E. Paradoxically, references to this practice are not obvious—at first sight—in the prime media of archaic and classical Greek literature that deal most directly with heroes.[1]

The closely related practice of honoring founders as heroes poses a special problem. Not only are references to the practice not always obvious, but the few that are obvious tend to be frustratingly terse. Ancient authors routinely presume that their readers share a common frame of reference that renders the recording of details superflous except in outstanding cases.[2]

The procedure in what follows is simple. Having selected one example from the prime media of archaic and classical Greek literature, Pindar's Seventh Olympian*,* I shall show that it presupposes a regular feature of founder cult that is not obvious at first sight but is, in fact, pivotal to the logic of the poem. The next step requires the working

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1. Nagy, "The Sign of the Hero," xv.

2. Malkin, *Religion and Colonization*, 190.

assumption that the same ongoing phenomenon that Nagy has called to our attention in archaic and classical literature may, in some cases, account for the apparent silence of early Christian literature concerning the subject of heroes.

1. "Sweet recompense for bitter sorrow:" Pindar and the Poetics of Colonization

Carol Dougherty summarizes several scenes that recur frequently in ancient Greek foundation narratives**.** (A) A civic crisis prompts consultation of Apollo's oracle at Delphi. (B) The oracle authorizes the foundation of a colony overseas. (C) The successful colonial foundation then provides the resolution to the original crisis. (D) The foundation is marked and memorialized through the cult of the founder.[3] Pindar's *Seventh Olympian* provides a good example of this pattern.

Pindar's Seventh Olympian opens with a famous image comparing Pindar's lyric to wine in a golden drinking vessel given to a bridegroom (*vv.* 1–10). This is followed by a dedication to the subject of the poem, the champion boxer Diagoras of Rhodes (*vv.* 10–19). Diagoras' numerous victories are listed at the beginning and end of the poem (*vv.* 17; 80–87). In between Pindar recounts no fewer than three myths concerning the origin of Rhodes, beginning, in reverse chronological order, with an account of the Rhodian founder Tlepolemos. Pindar's task in these lines is to show how the comparatively recent arrival of an exiled murderer constitutes a 'beginning' in the face of ancient alternative myths that tell of the archaic birth of the island, its indigenes, and their rituals:

3. Dougherty, *Poetics*, 15.

> Around human *phrenes* hang countless errors, and this is impossible to fathom: that now and in the end the best befalls a man. For even Tlepolemos killed Licymnius, the bastard brother of Alcmēnē, striking him with a staff of solid olive wood at Tiryns as he was leaving the inner chambers of Midea, when the founder of this land was provoked to anger. Storms of *phrenes* drive even a wise man off course.[4] Thus he left to consult the oracle of god (Pindar, *Ol.* 7.24–30).

The story of Tlepolemos and his great-uncle Licymnius was well known in antiquity. It was given 'canonical' form in the Homeric Catalogue of Ships and repeated, with the basic details more or less intact, by Diodorus and Strabo (Homer, *Il.* 2.653–670; Diodorus

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4. The term φρήν has no direct equivalent in English. Pindarists tend to translate it as "mind" for its relation to φρόνεω and its traditional role in decision-making, but φρένες seem to occupy a place somewhere between "heart" and "mind" (see LSJ s.v. φρήν), thus they appear to be capable of being pulled in either direction or influenced from outside. I have opted to transliterate the term rather than risk obcuring its semantic ambiguity. For a useful overview of early usages of φρήν, see Shirley Darcus Sullivan, *Psychological and Ethical Ideas: What Early Greeks Say* (MBCBSup 144; Leiden; New York: Brill, 1995), 36–53, esp. 40–47 on the lyric and elegaic poets. For Pindar's use of the term in the *Seventh Olympian* specifically, see Shirley Darcus Sullivan, "A Strand of Thought in Pindar, *Olympians* 7," *TAPA* 112 (1982): 215–233.

4.58.7–8; Strabo 14.2.6). The Homeric version provides no motive for the murder of the aged Licymnius, nor does it mention the Delphic oracle of Apollo (cf. Diodorus 5.59.5–6). Tlepolemos sets sail for Rhodes only under duress from the other sons and grandsons of Heracles (Homer, *Il.* 2.665–667).[5] In another version he is said to have killed Licymnius inadvertently, when Licymnius placed himself in the path of blows intended for a slave (Apollodorus 2.8.2). Pindar simply indicates that Tlepolemos struck Licymnius out of anger (χολωθείς).

Dougherty situates Pindar's version of the story within the framework of an ancient poetics of colonization involving surprisingly common stories about the expulsion of murderers from their mother cities and their rehabilitation, after consulting the Delphic oracle, as leaders of colonial expeditions. These stories serve overlapping purposes. Firstly, they justify acts of colonization as creating order from chaos. Secondly, they sublimate the innate violence of colonization into the past of the founder, whose fulfillment of the oracle ultimately transforms an act of violence into a source of benefits

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5. Pausanias (3.19.9–10) mentions that Tlepolemos' wife Polyxo fled with him to Rhodes and adds an aetiological flourish explaining the origin of a Rhodian sanctuary of Helen Dendritis ("Helen of the Tree"). The Rhodians reportedly believed that Helen made her way to Rhodes after Menelaus died, whereupon Polyxo avenged the death of Tlepolemos' in the Trojan War by ordering handmaidens dressed as furies to hang Helen from a tree.

and sacral power for the newly founded city.[6] In the case of Tlepolemos, Pindar presents the institution of seasonally recurring games and burnt sacrifices as a λύτρον, a recompense or ransom (*Ol.* 7.77–80; cf. Mark 10:45; Matt 20:28).

The question of whether the Rhodian festival was instituted *by* Tlepolemos, as a purification or expiation of his original transgression, or *for* Tlepolemos, as compensation for his struggle to found a colony, cannot be resolved by Pindar's diction. Gregory Nagy initially suggests that Tlepolemos himself founded the games as a compensation for his transgression, according to a pattern seen elsewhere in the *First Olympian:* (A) A catastrophe occurs in the mythic past entailing some form of guilt or pollution. (B) A ritual is instituted to compensate for that event, seasonally and into perpetuity. (C) The ritual ordeals of athletes are ideologically equated with the life-and-death struggles of heroes of the past.[7]

Nagy adds, however, that the ordeal of athletes who compete in the games *also* compensates for the primordial catastrophe, thus winning and losing in the games are analogous to living and dying in the myth. The winner in a given event wins back 'life', yet this victory remains incomplete until the athlete is reintegrated into the city, "a reintegration or reincorporation symbolizing life after death" that is realized by the performance of the epinikion itself.[8] From this perspective, the poetics of colonization

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6. Dougherty, *Poetics*, 13–31, 120–135.

7. Nagy, *Pindar's Homer,* Ch.5 §7.

hang on a 'chain of compensation' that begins with the founder, extends to the ritual obligations incurred upon the citizens of the newly founded colony, on through to the rewards given to athletes who are victorious in the games, and finally to poets like Pindar, whose reward, ideally, is Panhellenic fame.

2. Turning a Wagon Trail into a Racetrack

Pindar's commission requires that he represent an event of Panhellenic significance to a local audience; yet the very 'trans-locality' of the event demands a reward commensurate with the achievement. Thus what Nagy says of the polis applies equally to the *epinikion* itself: "although it *contains* what is epichoric, it also *promotes* what is Panhellenic"—the honor of fame.[9] This can be graphically illustrated by considering the *Ringkomposition* of the *Seventh Olympian.* The outermost rings contain the most Panhellenic events—the ode itself, Diagoras' boxing victories, and the story of Tlepolemos—while the inner rings relate more local myths of a more distant past—the story of Helios and his children, and the story of his marriage to the nymph Rhodes when she first emerged from the brackish depths of the sea. Pindar returns to Tlepolemos—and to matters of contemporary Panhellenic significance—with a locative adverb:

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8. Nagy, *Pindar's Homer,* Ch. 5 §8–10.

9. Nagy, *Pindar's Homer,* Ch. 2 §32.

> There was established sweet recompense for bitter sorrow for Tlepolemos, *archēgetēs* of the Tirynthians, as for a god, a smoky procession of flocks and a judgment of games. With the petals from these Diagoras was twice crowned, four times he was the victor in the renowned Isthmus, time and again at Nemea, and at rocky Athens (*Ol.* 7.77–82).

Two entries in the Aristotelian *Peplos* each mention two epitaphs for Tlepolemos: one at the place where he was slain by Sarpedon, in the Troad, and one on Rhodes, where his wife later returned his body (Aristotle, *Fr. var.* 640.18; 641.55; cf. Tzetzes, *Schol. ad lyc.* 911). Since the *Peplos* entries record details that are absent from Pindar's account, they appear to provide independent confirmation of a Rhodian tradition to which Pindar merely alludes, not because it is secondary to his purpose but because anything more overt would be superfluous.[10] The tomb of Tlepolemos belongs, in short, to the common frame of reference shared by Pindar's audience.

In order to illustrate the principle that what is left unsaid is not, therefore, insignificant, I turn once more to Nagy for his analysis of a Homeric play on words. In the narrative of the chariot race at the Funeral Games of Patroklos (*Il.* 23), Nestor gives

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10. On the date and purpose of the *Peplos,* see Kathryn Gutzwiller, "Heroic Epitaphs of the Classical Age: The Aristotelian Peplos and Beyond," in *Archaic and Classical Greek Epigram* (eds. Baumbach, Petrovic, and Petrovic; Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 219–249.

his son Antilokhos advice, in the form of a σῆμα or 'sign', on how to win the race. Here is Nagy's translation of the relevant lines:

> I will tell you a *sēma*, a very distinct one, and it will not escape your mind…
> (*Iliad* 23.326)

> It is either the tomb (*sēma*) of a man who died a long time ago,
> or it was a turning point (*nussa*; i.e, in racing) of men who came before
> Now swift-footed brilliant Achilles has set it up as the turning point
> (= *terma* plural) (*Iliad* 23.331–333)

Nestor has no need to give Antilokhos further instructions because Antilokhos will *instinctively* know what to do when he notices the 'sign'. Later, when Antilokhos looks for an opportunity to pass Menelaos in the race, he describes his action with the word νοέω (*Il.* 23.415), which, to quote Nagy, "is practically synonymous with 'read' in the sense of 'read the sign'." Whether the sign that Antilokhos must 'read' is an ancient tomb or a merely an old turning point is irrelevant to the difficult maneuver that he must make in order to gain ground on Menelaos, yet Nestor's double use of σῆμα emphasizes the former alternative, and with it the distinct possibility that "not only the tomb … but the very mention of the tomb" may be a sign—a *reminder,* as Nagy puts it—of the glory of the past.[11]

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11. Nagy, *Pindar's Homer,* Ch.7 §12–13

The common frame of reference shared by Nestor and Antilokhos in the Homeric story is analogous to the common frame of reference shared by Pindar and his audience. Like Nestor, Pindar does not need to spell out every detail in order to convey his message; he needs only to provide *signs* that will serve as *reminders* at appropriate junctures in the performance. His reference to the institution of games and sacrifices honoring Tlepolemos is one such a sign, but in order to 'read' it properly—and thus to gain insight into what Pindar expects his audience to *remember*—we need to coordinate several further observations.

Firstly, in both fact and fiction (to the extent that we are able to distinguish them in our sources), the death and burial of the founder was a *turning point* in the life of a colony. His funeral marked the official end of the "foundation phase" and the beginning of a newly independent polis with its own civic festival.[12] Secondly, in his account of the institution of chariot races at the Panhellenic games, Pausanias attests to the collapse, in actual practice, of the Homeric distinction between 'tomb' and 'turning point'. He reports that the turning point in the race course is called Tarachippos, "Terror of Horses," because horses are inexplicably seized by fear when they approach it, "and disorder (ταραχή) follows from fear." The several explanations that Pausanias offers for this phenomenon include the view that Tarachippos is the tomb of a hero, to whom the charioteers pray and offer sacrifices (*Descr.* 6.20.15–20). The identity of the hero varies from one version to

12. Malkin, *Religion and Colonization*, 195.

the next, but each version presupposes a regular feature of hero cult—the capacity of the hero to bestow blessings or, when offended, to exact vengeance. Thus the various etiologies associated with Tarachippos underscore the importance that Greeks attached to knowing the stories of their heroes—partially, it seems, in order to propitiate them.[13]

The question of which story is 'true' only operates as a corollary to the emergence of a trans-local or Panhellenic awareness, and then only in cases where the divergence of local traditions requires a judgment in order to achieve what Nagy characterizes as "a convergent version acceptable to all Hellenes."[14] That brings us to Pindar's stated intention to 'put in order' or 'correct' the story of Tlepolemos (*Ol.* 7.20–21). Although there has been considerable debate over the the question of how to interpret this remark, the former rendering accurately forecasts what Pindar then proceeds to do, namely, to put the story of Tlepolemos in order, both chronologically and ideologically, to show how the comparatively recent arrival of an exiled murderer constitutes a 'beginning' in the face of alternative myths that tell of the archaic birth of the island, its indigenes, and their rituals.[15] In other words, Pindar *reminds* his audience how Rhodes came to enjoy

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13. Turning posts also had funerary or cthonic associations in Roman circuses. See Humphrey, *Roman Circuses*, 255–256.

14. Nagy, *Pindar's Homer,* Ch.2 §24.

15. W. J. Verdenius, *Commentaries on Pindar* (2 vols.; MBCBSup 97–98; Leiden: Brill, 1987), 1:56; Malcolm M. Willcock, *Victory Odes: Olympians 2, 7, 11; Nemean 4;*

Panhellenic renown. This also involves reminding them *to whom* Rhodes owes her storied glory. By giving him their eyes and ears they become links in a chain of compensation that connects the glory of the past with the promise of everlasting fame. Without them, Pindar's golden drinking goblet will turn to dust, Rhodes' glory will wilt into the brackish depths of a long-forgotten past, and the hardships endured by Tlepolemos will be for nothing.

Lastly, in a fragmentary paean, Pindar compares himself to Homer. Homer travels a well-trodden wagon trail, he says, whereas he himself rides different horses on a winged chariot (Fr. 52h.11–14 SM).[16] If Pindar's poetry is the lyrical equivalent of a racetrack, then the turning point in the *Seventh Olympian* is surely the tomb of Tlepolemos. Paradoxically, a reference to that tomb is not obvious at first sight.

3. Setting the Story Straight

In a classic essay composed in exile during World War II, the German Jewish philologist Erich Auerbach provocatively contrasted the Homeric story of Odysseus' scar to the biblical story of the *Akedah,* the binding of Isaac.[17] The Homeric style is all foreground, Auerbach argued. "Clearly outlined, brightly and uniformly illuminated, men and things

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Isthmians 3, 4, 7 (CGLC; Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 118–119.

16. Ian Rutherford, *Pindar's Paeans: A Reading of the Fragments with a Survey of the Genre* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 247–249.

stand out in a realm where everything is visible; and not less clear—wholly expressed, orderly even in their ardor—are the feelings and thoughts of the persons involved." The Homeric style skips lightly across the surface of legend; unburdened by the weight of history, it knows only "a uniformly objective present." The biblical style, however, is heavy with history and "fraught with background." Only so much as is absolutely necessary for the sake of the narrative is externalized; all else—including the thoughts and feelings of those involved—remains unexpressed. For Auerbach, this contrast emblematized a primal incommensurability between the Greek mindset and the Jewish mindset.

The Homeric version of the Tlepolemos story presents a kind of counter-example to Auerbach's characterization of the biblical style, less freighted, perhaps, but nonetheless impossible to fathom:[18]

17. Erich Auerbach, "Odysseus' Scar," in *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature* (trans. W. Trask; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), ch. 1.

18. James I. Porter, "Erich Auerbach and the Judaizing of Philology," *Crit. Inq.* 35.1 (2008): 115–147.

> When Tlepolemos grew to maturity in the well-built palace,
> Thereupon he slew his father's beloved uncle, Licymnius,
> Who was already an elderly man, a scion of Ares.
> Quickly he built ships, and, gathering many people,
> He went forth in flight over the sea; for the others threatened him,
> The sons and grandsons of mighty Heracles.
> So he came to Rhodes after wandering and suffering many things (Homer, *Il.* 2.661–667).

Most of Pindar's alleged corrections to this story serve mainly to set the scene, to foreground what Homer uncharacteristically leaves in the shadows, or to push extraneous details to the background. He mentions the murder weapon (a staff of solid olive wood), the location, and the time (at Tiryns, when Licymnius was coming from the inner chambers of Midea). He mentions that Tlepolemos grew angry. He omits several details—the construction of ships, the gathering of followers, the threats from the other sons and grandsons of Heracles, the wandering and hardships—but were such details truly 'forgotten' in the moment of performance, or were they simply pushed to the background with which his version of the story was now fraught?

This much is clear: Pindar transforms the familial/civic crisis depicted in the *Iliad* into a *psychological* drama driven swiftly forward by the inner conflict of the founder. This transformation is facilitated by his strategic deployment of gnomic expressions,[19] which not only provide crisp transitions and the illusion of spontaneity but also contribute, in terms of content, to the ethos of the poem and its personalities. According to Ian Henderson, "gnomic sayings are usually compact, but always syntactically separable from their contexts; they are ethically urgent (normative) and analogical in structure."[20] Drawing on J.D. Crossan's analysis of the aphorisms of Jesus, Henderson develops two further distinctions:

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19. Recent scholarship on Pindar's use of *gnomai* is conveniently summarized by Jonathan Miles Halliwell, "Epinician Precepts: A Study of Chiron and the Wise Adviser in Pindar" (Ph.D. diss., University of Birmingham, 2008), 7–12. See also, André Pierre Marie Hubert Lardinois, "Wisdom in Context: The Use of Gnomic Statements in Archaic Greek Poetry" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1995), 254-271.

20. Ian H. Henderson, *Jesus, Rhetoric, and Law* (BIS 20; Leiden; New York: Brill, 1996), 1–2. Henderson arrives at this definition through a detailed survey of *gnome* as a technical term in ancient Greek and Roman rhetoric (Henderson, *Jesus, Rhetoric, and Law*, 117–137), supplemented and refined by definitions from modern paroemiology (Henderson, *Jesus, Rhetoric, and Law*, 148–155).

> The first distinction is between "aphoristic structure" or "core" and "aphoristic saying"; the second is between "performantial" and "hermeneutic variation." Both are grounded in a basic distinction between actual rhetorical performance and remembered tradition. In that context, gnomic core is the memorable gist behind a potentially rich variety of gnomic performances.[21]

The second distinction attempts to account for variations that emerge on the basis of factors other than the specific speech occasion—rhetorical habits and so forth—and is less important than the first, for my purposes, since I am mainly interested in the rich variety of gnomic performances in the *Seventh Olympian* alone, especially two gnomai concerning human *phrenes:*

> Around human *phrenes* hang countless errors (ἀμφὶ δ' ἀνθρώπων φρασὶν ἀμπλακίαι), and this is impossible to fathom: that now and in the end the best befalls a man. For even Tlepolemos killed Licymnius, the bastard brother of Alcmēnē, striking him with a staff of solid olive wood at Tiryns as he was leaving the inner chambers of Midea, when the founder of this land was provoked to anger. Storms of *phrenes* drive even a wise man off course (αἰ δὲ

21. Henderson, *Jesus, Rhetoric, and Law*, 142.

φρενῶν ταραχαὶ παρέπλαγξαν καὶ σοφόν). Thus he left to consult the oracle of god (*Ol.* 7.24–31).[22]

The two underlined expressions bracket Pindar's account of Tlepolemos' crime, framing its episodic details in overtly psychological terms that allow the poet to manipulate 'reality'—including time and space—without substantively altering the 'facts' of the story. Tlepolemos' preparations to depart and the looming threat from the other Heracleidae remain out of sight because Tlepolemos is out of his mind. Analogically, each saying compares *phrenes* to seafarers whose course is dangerous and uncertain. The gnomic core on which they are fashioned concerns the basic vulnerability of *phrenes,*

22. On χρέμανται (*v.* 25) as an allusion to lures or nets, see Basil Gildersleeve, *Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes* (New York: American Book Co., 1885), 187; cf. Verdenius, *Pindar*, 1:59: "The reference is more likely to be to dark clouds obscuring the steersman's vision." Thucydides (3.77) uses ταραχή to describe the disarray of the Athenian and Corcyraean fleets as they engaged the Peloponnesians. Although Pindar's deployment of the same term in the plural (v. 30) is obviously metaphorical, the literal usage is scarcely irrelevant to the metaphor. As a point of comparison, the verb παραπλάζω (*v.* 31) has a similar range in the *Odyssey,* where it refers, e.g., to the North Wind blowing Odysseus off course (9.81), and later (20.346) to Pallas Athena confusing the minds (τὰ νοήμα) of Penelope's suitors.

which also lends them their ethical urgency: everyone has *phrenes* and everyone, even a *sophos* like Tlepolemos, is subject to errors of judgment.

Dougherty may be right to suggest that Pindar's mention of Tlepolemos' anger points to the possibility of unpremeditated murder, a crime that may have fallen under the special purview of the Delphic oracle to adjudicate. My interest, however, is in the extent to which ancient Greeks more so than we could ascribe internal emotions to external forces. We may at times speak of someone being 'possessed' by anger, but rarely do we mean that anger entered into that person from without and moved them to act in a way that might otherwise be contrary to reason. Our pyschology is too introspective and our science too empiricist to draw such conclusions. In the case of Tlepolemos, however, the overall picture that emerges is of someone pushed about by internal forces of which he is not entirely in control and over which he only gains mastery with outside help, through the intervention of the oracle. Thus the function of the oracle is not purely adjudicative but also, in some sense, analeptic, as Pindar's elegant account suggests:

> From the fragrant inner sanctum the golden-haired one spoke to him of an ocean voyage, from the shore of Lerna straight to a bucolic land surrounded by sea, where once the great king of the gods showered the city with golden snow … (*Ol.* 7.32–34).

The simplest general explanation for Pindar's addition of Tlepolemos' flight to Delphi is that he has supplemented Homer's story with material based on the

contemporary realia of colonization, but the addition of the oracle also serves another purpose. By placing an account of the voyage to Rhodes in the mouth of the oracle, Pindar implicitly contrasts the wayward state of Tlepolemos' *phrenes* with the sure course plotted by the oracle. He has no need to say overtly what his audience already will have known, that Tlepolemos indeed corrected his course, successfully fulfilled his commission, and *now* stands as a paragon of civic virtue whose *orthai phrenes* ought to be imitated—in short, a founding hero.

4. The Body is a Sign

Some say that [the body (sōma)] is a tomb (sēma) of the soul since the soul is buried for the time being, and also because by it the soul signifies (sēmainei) whatever it signifes (sēmainē), for which reason it is rightly called sēma. It seems most likely to me, however, that the circle of Orpheus established the name sōma, because, while the soul is being judged for whatever reasons it is being judged, it has this peribolos to preserve it (sōzētai)—an image of prison. And this is what the body is for the soul, as the very name sōma indicates, until the soul repays whatever is owed. Not even a single letter needs to be changed

– Plato, *Cratylus* 400c

A popular account of the relationship between body and soul in the early twentieth century can be summarized, at the risk of oversimplification, in four steps:[1] (1) If archaic Greeks and ancient Hebrews ever associated human beings with any particular part of the human constitution it was the visible body, δέμας in Greek or בשר in Hebrew, usually

1. I do not intend to suggest that this was an historically *correct* account or that it was the only popular account. For a survey of conflicting views in period, see Nancey C. Murphy, *Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 7–11.

deployed synecdochically as representing the whole.[2] The Greek ψυχή and the Hebrew נפש are similarly equivalent at this stage, both being used for *life* in the broadest sense but especially for *this present life.* Where an afterlife comes into view it is literally a shadow of antemortem existence. Thus the Homeric ψυχή only survives the death of the body as a mere *shade* of its former self, recognizable but insubstantial. (2) These ideas were transformed, in the Greek world, by the emergence of the σῶμα-σῆμα formula and the identification of ψυχή as the superior partner in an uneasy forced merger, leading eventually to a hard dualism in which σῶμα came to be maligned and ψυχή beatified as the immortal seat of human identity. Jews, meanwhile, generally retained the holistic anthropology of their ancestors, strengthened by developing beliefs concerning the future resurrection of the dead and brought to its culmination in the earliest Christian doctrine of bodily resurrection. A few hellenized Jews like Philo of Alexandria occasionally slipped into Greek-style dualism, but Paul was in closer to the majority in his view of human beings as animated bodies rather than incarcerated souls.

The scholars most directly responsible for popularizing this view also tended to disagree over its implications.[3] With few exceptions and qualifications, however, they

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2. This view was popularized by H. Wheeler Robinson, *The Christian Doctrine of Man* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1913).

3. Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament* (trans. K. Grobel; New York: Scribner, 1951), §17.1–3, 192–203; Oscar Cullmann, “Immortality of the Soul or

endorsed (and continue to endorse) Rudolf Bultmann's oft-quoted remark that "one does not *have* a σῶμα**,** one *is* a σῶμα."[4] Bultmann surmounted the difficulty posed by Pauline

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Resurrection of the Dead," in *Immortality and Resurrection: Four Essays by Oscar Cullman, Harry A. Wolfson, Werner Jaeger, and Henry J. Cadbury* (ed. K. Stendahl; New York: Macmillan, 1965), 23–30. Bultmann's existentialist reserve toward Paul's "mythological teaching on resurrection" contrasts sharply with Oscar Cullman's insistence that *both* body and soul are subject to death in the hope that the *whole person* will finally be resurrected in a spiritual (= incorruptible ≠ fleshly) body. Cf. John A. T. Robinson, *The Body: A Study in Pauline Theology* (SBT 5; London: SCM, 1952), 31–32, n.1 and Ernst Käsemann, *Perspectives on Paul* (trans. M. Kohl; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971), 21. Like Bultmann, Robinson found the significance of σῶμα in usages where it appears to designate a particular relationship. He differed from Bultmann only insofar as he perceived that relationship not as one of man to himself but of man to God, a strategy that underwrote his agnosticism regarding the physicality of resurrection bodies: σῶμα "fulfills its essence by being subject to the Spirit, not by being material or immaterial." Käsemann affirmed Bultmann's view that Paul's anthropological termini generally apply to human existence as whole, considered under its various aspects, but insisted on the vulgar corporeality of human beings in their freighted relationships with each other and the chaotic forces of the cosmos.

usages where σῶμα seems to designate the physical body *per se* by arguing that in a number of these contexts it is interchangeable with a personal pronoun so that it can be translated merely 'I' (or whatever pronoun fits the context).[5] Although Gal 6:17 appeared in his initial summary of such usages, he did not discuss the passage further, nor did his students and followers adequately probe its implications for Paul's anthropology, seeming content for the most part to identify Paul's στίγματα as the marks left on his body by the trials and suffering of his apostleship.

The lingering difficulties posed by this and other similarly recalcitrant passages prompted a number of post-Bultmannian scholars to adopt the still-popular convention of contrasting Paul's 'neutral' or 'normal' deployment of anthropological terms to his more 'theological' or 'comprehensive' usages.[6] This strategy accounts for the variability of

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4. Bultmann, *Theology*, §17.1, 195.

5. Bultmann, *Theology*, §17.1, 193–194. For criticism of this approach, see Robert Horton Gundry, *Sōma in Biblical Theology: With Emphasis on Pauline Anthropology* (SNTSMS 29; Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 29–33.

6. See Robinson, *Body*, 27, 31, contrasting σῶμα in a "purely neutral sense" meaning "the external man, 'the body'" to σάρξ, "meaning man in rebellion against God." In its 'non-neutral' sense, Robinson wrote, **"**σῶμα *stands for man, in the solidarity of creation, as made for God"* (Robinson's italics). Hans Conzelmann, *An Outline of*

Paul's language by establishing a hierarchy of significance whereby any usage that cannot be comfortably accomodated to an holistic anthropology without sacrificing clarity or a longstanding exegetical consensus simply remains 'neutral' and can be summarized as

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the Theology of the New Testament (trans. J. Bowden; New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 173: "The cosmological (κόσμος) and anthropological (σῶμα) concepts are neutral in themselves. The σῶμα can be ψυκικόν or πνευματικόν." Günther Bornkamm, *Paul* (trans. D. Stalker; New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 130: "The most comprehensive, and theologically important [anthropological term for Paul] is 'body' (*sōma*). Admittedly this is not obvious everywhere. Quite often 'body' has its normal meaning…" More recently, see Dunn, *Theology of Paul*, §3.2–4, 55–73. Dunn states that the undisputed Pauline letters deploy σῶμα more than 50 times "in what we might call the normal usage, that is, in reference to the human body of everyday existence" (55). Subsequently, a venn diagram represents "flesh," labeled 'negative', overlapping with "body," labeled 'neutral' (72). Cf. Udo Schnelle, *Apostle Paul: His Life and Theology* (trans. M. E. Boring; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), 495–498, differentiating between "σῶμα as a *neutral* designation of the human physical constitution," "σῶμα in a *negative* sense," and "σῶμα in a *positive* sense as Paul's comprehensive expression for the human self." Schnelle also remarks that "a human being both is a body and has body," yet with no attempt to reconcile the tension between these two perspectives.

such without further ado.[7] As Ernst Käsemann already recognized, however, it does not overcome the contradiction inherent in his *Doktorvaters* own demonstration of the principle that "Paul's theology is, at the same time, anthropology" and vice versa. Bultmann's method implies, on this critique, that at least some of Paul's anthropological statements are *not,* in fact, theological statements.[8]

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7. See, e.g., Dunn, *Theology of Paul*, §3.2, 54–58. Dunn deploys two different and irreconcilable methods of classifying Paul's anthropological terms. He describes the distinction between partitive (Greek) and aspective (Hebraic) conceptions of the human being as having "some merit" but hardly adequate to grasp the diversity and complexity of the Greek debate or the influence of Hellenism on diaspora Judaism. Nevertheless, he indicates that the "more 'partitive' Greek conception" of σῶμα is reflected in the Septuagint and the non-Pauline New Testament, tacitly signalling that Paul's usage corresponds to the more aspective Hebraic conception. Thereafter, he switches to a spectrographic model in which "the focus on physicality is only one end of the spectrum." Usages at the "much richer" end of the spectrum receive preferential treatment, thus the meaning 'body plus more' occupies a controlling position in his analysis of σῶμα in Paul's letters. From this vantage point it is easy to see why he never totally abandons the aspective model; it still proves useful at the narrower end of the spectrum where one must presume that the 'whole' is presupposed though partially excluded from the frame.

Käsemann went on to state that the problem could not be confined to exegesis alone without trivializing the larger hermeneutical issue:

> It is significant for both hermeutics and systematic theology that Bultmann (under Heidegger's influence) conceives human reality primarily as possibility, whereas Paul at most sees possibility as a manifestation of reality and always assigns to the body the reality of creatureliness, the reality of the fall, of redemption, of the resurrection of the dead, with all of which the appropriate functions are associated. *It can therefore hardly be maintained that the body is treated as being 'neutral in itself'. Man can never be 'neutral in himself' and is certainly not so in his corporeality, which is always already modified.* An ontology which deprives him of this already-existing modification in order to observe him *per se* falls a victim to abstraction and no longer allows him the humanity of creatureliness.[9]

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8. Bultmann, *Theology*, §17.1, 191; Käsemann, *Perspectives*, 12. For more recent criticism of Bultmann's attempt to dispose of passages that did not fit his interpretation of Paul's anthropology, see Theo K. Heckel, "Body and Soul in Saint Paul," in *Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment* (eds. J. P. Wright and P. Potter; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 117–131, esp. 118–119.

In simpler terms, Käsemann objected to the very idea of a purportedly neutral baseline—σῶμα *qua* corporeality—from which Paul intuited the possibility of different ways of being,[10] and which could therefore be shunted to the background of the exegetical process once these possibilities had been introduced and the 'real' work of elucidating Paul's anthropology had begun. He defined corporeality instead as "the nature of man in his need to participate in creatureliness and in his *capacity for communication* in the widest sense, that is to say, in his relationship to a world with which he is confronted on each several occasion."[11]

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9. Käsemann, *Perspectives*, 19–20 (my italics).

10. See Bultmann, *Theology*, §17.2, 195–198, concerning "the possibility of having one's self in hand or of losing this control and being at the mercy of a power not one's own." One must momentarily concede Bultmann's thesis and substitute "body" for "self" in order to understand the progression of his argument, the underlying idea being that both inner control and outer subjugation involve the body as something that is always already given and not (according to Greek anthropology as Bultmann regarded it) as a secondary addition that merely clings to one's real self. Control of one's *body* would theoretically be experienced indiscriminately as control of one's *self,* from this perspective, whether it were exercised from within or imposed from without.

11. Käsemann, *Perspectives*, 21.

Whether he realized it at the time or not, Käsemann's emphasis on the communicative capacity of human corporeality harked back to one of the earliest definitions of σῶμα to have come down to us: "Some say that it is a tomb … because by it the soul signifies (σημαίνει) whatever it signifes (σημαίνῃ), for which reason it is rightly called "σῆμα" (Plato, *Cratylus* 400c). It is an unfortunate fact of scholarship on Christian origins and theology, however, that this definition is regularly ignored in favour of the sibilant short form σῶμα-σῆμα—which Plato himself never uses—often accompanied by the most perfunctory analyses.[12] Readers of introductions to the New Testament,

12. Heinz-Horst Schrey, "Leib/Leiblichkeit," *TRE* 20:641: "Die orphisch-platonische Anschauung vom Leib als Kerker oder Grab der Seele (σῶμα – σῆμα) ist dem Neuen Testament ebenso fremd wie die manichäische Identifizierung des Leibes mit dem Bösen." E. P. Sanders, "Paul," in *Early Christian Thought in Its Jewish Context* (eds. J. M. G. Barclay and J. Sweet; Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 122: "People who held this kind of [body-soul] dualism often regarded the body as bad, 'the tomb of the soul' in a famous phrase (*sōma – sēma*). Thereafter Sanders devotes a few sentences to Philo as a Jewish representative of such dualism. Similarly cursory discussions elsewhere are cited below (nn. 13, 16). An older but still insightful analysis of Philo's dualism can be found in Erwin R. Goodenough, *By Light, Light: The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism* (Amsterdam: Philo, 1969), 370–415, esp. 379–380.

comprehensive theologies, and surveys of early Christian history encounter it as a 'catchy Greek phrase', a 'tag', or a 'classical pun',[13] characterizations that are not inaccurate to the extent that Plato's etymologies in the *Cratylus* are generally thought to be tongue-in-cheek, but which have a markedly different effect in the context of scholarship on Paul

13. The view that Greek anthropological dualism could be summed up by the σῶμα-σῆμα formula and rejected over against the 'unitary' biblical view of the human being was described as a "gross oversimplification" by Denys Edward Hugh Whiteley, *The Theology of St. Paul* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1964), 31–32. Whiteley then summarized "the Greek doctrine of man" in a single paragraph, contrasted it with "the Hebrew doctrine of Man," and located "St. Paul's unitary view of man" squarely in the latter category (Whiteley, *Theology*, 34–38)—surely an equally gross oversimplification. Although he admitted that Paul occasionally deployed dualistic language, he dismissed such instances as 'peripheral', 'rare', and 'non-normal' (38–39). Cf. Bart D. Ehrman, *The New Testament: A Historical introduction to the Early Christian Writings* (5th ed.; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 346; Dunn, *Theology of Paul*, §2.4, 39 n. 5; James D. G. Dunn, *Beginning from Jerusalem* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), §32.5, 825 n. 325; N. T. Wright, *The Resurrection of the Son of God* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 145; Wolfgang Schrage, *Der erste Brief an die Korinther* (4 vols.; EKK 7.1–4; Zürich; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Benziger; Neukirchener, 1991), 2:14–15.

than on Plato. Paul's view of the body, we are *wrongly* led to believe, is more serious, nuanced, and complex than that of either Plato or the Middle Academy.[14]

In retrospect, Käsemann also anticipated the 'turn to the body' that swept through the humanities during the last quarter of the twentieth century and continues apace today.[15] In

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14. As in Hans Dieter Betz, "The Concept of the 'Inner Human Being' (ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος) in the Anthropology of Paul," *NTS* 46.3 (2000): 340: "…while rejecting the Middle-Platonic dualism of an immortal soul imprisoned or entombed in a material body, Paul saw the need to work out an anthropology that could answer the questions raised." The assumption that Plato's anthropology remained stable throughout his career and continued to hold sway thereafter through the formative years of earliest Christianity has been challenged by David E. Aune, "Human Nature and Ethics in Hellenistic Philosophical Traditions and Paul: Some Issues and Problems," in *Paul in His Hellenistic Context* (ed. T. Engberg-Pedersen; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 292–297 and Dale B. Martin, *The Corinthian body* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 7–15. Their criticisms have not altered the stereotyped way in which New Testament scholars tend to deploy the σῶμα-σῆμα formula, including even David E. Aune, "Anthropological Duality in the Eschatology of 2 Cor. 4:16–5:10," in *Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide* (ed. T. Engberg-Pedersen; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 221.

15. So much so that one eminent scholar of Early Christianity has recently issued a call

this chapter I offer little in the way of Foucauldian analysis, Bahktinian carnivalesque, or Bourdieu-esque habitus, but I do want to propose that Plato and Paul may share more in common in their attention to the *function* of the human body in the *present* than has heretofore been recognized.[16]

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for a renewed look at the soul. See François Bovon, "The Soul's Comeback: Immortality and Resurrection in Early Christianity," *HTR* 103.4 (2010): 387–406.

16. That Plato and Paul differ with respect to the question of bodily existence in the afterlife is axiomatic, as indicated by the fact that the σῶμα-σῆμα formula is routinely introduced in contexts concerning Paul's views on resurrection, especially with respect to the Corinthian correspondence. In addition to the discussions cited above (n. 13) see Craig S. Keener, *1–2 Corinthians* (NCBC; Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 177; M. Eugene Boring, Klaus Berger, and Carsten Colpe, eds*., Hellenistic Commentary to the New Testament* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1995), 452; J. C. Beker, *Paul the Apostle: The Triumph of God in Life and Thought* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 224–226. For recent studies of Paul's body language that deploy the theories of Michel Foucault and/or Pierre Bourdieu, see Troels Engberg-Pedersen, *Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 139–205 and Jennifer A Glancy, *Corporal Knowledge: Early Christian Bodies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 25–47.

1. Everything in the waters that does not have fins and scales is detestable to you

In a wide-ranging declamation on the virtues of divinely inspired madness and the madness of love in the *Phaedrus*, Socrates briefly discusses the images of justice and self-restraint.[17] These images have no light in themselves he says; only a few souls gazing at them through dim instruments and with difficulty are able to contemplate the nature of the things they represent (*Phaedrus* 250b; cf. *Phaedo* 65b–d). There was a time, however, when every soul beheld shining beauty, "being pure and unmarked by this which we presently carry around and call the body, bound to it like an oyster to its shell" (*Phaedrus* 250c). The key words here are *unmarked* (ἀσήμαντοι) and *bound* (δεδεσμευμένοι). This rendering implies that the soul is somehow connected to the body in this life, and that the body signifies the place of the soul. Fowler's Loeb translation presents a different picture: "being ourselves pure and not entombed in this which we carry about with us and call the body, in which we are imprisoned like an oyster in its shell" (*Phaedr.* 250c, Fowler). Conventional renderings such as this follow the sequence of Socrates' remarks in *Cratylus* 400c—body as tomb and body as prison—yet skip lightly over his intervening comments on the body as a *sign.* They reflect the traditional interpretation of the σῶμα-

17. The speech is delivered in the dialogue by Socrates, who in turn attributes it to Stesichoros of Himera (*Phaedr.* 244a).

σῆμα formula so precisely, in fact, that they seem to confirm the popular impression that Plato was an inveterate pessimist who utterly despised the body.[18]

The conventional translation of ἀσήμαντοι as 'not buried' can be contested on strong philological grounds, although it is possible that here, too, Plato is playing with the same double signification of σῆμα that we observed in the last chapter.[19] The participle

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18. That this impression is incorrect has been argued, *inter alia,* by Cornelia J. de Vogel, *Rethinking Plato and Platonism* (MBCBSup 92; Leiden: Brill, 1986), 171–190; John M. Dillon, "Rejecting the Body, Refining the Body: Some Remarks on the Development of Platonist Asceticism," in *Asceticism* (eds. V. L. Wimbush and R. Valantasis; New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 80–87; and Thomas M. Robinson, "The Defining Features of Mind-Body Dualism in the Writings of Plato," in *Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment* (eds. J. P. Wright and P. Potter; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 37–55. Robinson focuses primarily on body-soul dualism in Plato, of which mind-body dualism is a subset. Cf. Thomas M. Robinson, *Plato's Psychology* (PhoenixSup 8; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 15–16. It is striking that his comments on the σῶμα-σῆμα formula rest mainly on *Gorgias* 493a, with no discussion of the parallels in the *Cratylus* and the *Phaedrus*.
19. Rein Ferwerda, "The Meaning of the Word σῶμα in Plato's *Cratylus* 400C," *Hermes* 113.3 (1985): 273.

δεδεσμευμένοι presents a greater challenge since the difference between 'bound' and 'fettered' is largely a value judgment. A resolution to the problem turns on how one interprets Socrates' characterization of the body as an "image of prison" (δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα, *Cratylus* 400c), but the question of whether this metaphor represents the body as 'good' or 'bad' is far too vague a starting point. If one asks instead whether the metaphor represents the embodied state as *just or unjust,* the very ambivalence of the answer turns out to be an an indictment of the failure of certain traditions of Platonism to see beyond the "image of prison" to the nature (τὸ γένος) of what it represents. On one hand the organs of sense would seem to prevent the greater mass of humanity from answering such a question at all, while a few are able, with great difficulty, to see 'through' the image of prison to the images of justice (δικαιοσύνη), self-control (σωφροσύνη), and the rest—and presumably through contemplation of these images to the very nature of the things they represent. The body is an image of images on this reading, dull and imperfect perhaps, but scarcely 'bad'.

Approaching the problem from another angle, we could speculate that oysters have for ages past told stories of the blessed few who escape their 'prisons' to live a free and unfettered life contemplating the divine light of Poseidon. Unfortunately, the indemonstrable nature of that hypothesis forces us to fall back on the much more mundane observation that the shells to which oysters are 'fettered' also appear to perform the very valuable service of protecting their occupants. Since a second look at the

Cratylus passage shows that the body performs a similar function for the human soul—so that it may be preserved (σῴζηται)—we may well wonder why the poor oyster has suffered such calumny at the hands of exegetes and translators.

2. Shell Scripts

On a Lenten evening, *circa* 415 c.e., an angry Alexandrian mob seized the exceptionally brilliant philosopher and polymath Hypatia and dragged her to a nearby church called the Caesareum. There they tore off her clothes, murdered her with ὄστρακα, and immolated her dismembered body (Socrates Scholasticus, *Hist. eccl.* 7.15). The modern myth begins in the eighteenth century with famed historian and declensionist Edward Gibbon, who reports that the mob flayed Hypatia alive with sharp oyster-shells. Gibbon's annotator, H. H. Milman, imagined that the nearby beach was "strewed with oyster shells," providing a ready cache of crude weapons for the grisly deed,[20] and novelist Charles Kingsley later wrote that the bloodthirsty mob scowered the beach and returned "brandishing flints, shells, [and] fragments of pottery."[21] A similar version of the event persists to the present day in a variation that continues to circulate on the internet and in reruns of the popular

20. Edward Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (ed. H. H. Milman; 2d ed.; 6 vols.; London: John Murray, 1846), 4:341, n. 26.

21. Charles Kingsley, *Hypatia* (New York: R.F. Fenno, 1900), 456. Originally published in 1853.

television documentary *Cosmos,* in which the host, the late astrophysicist Carl Sagan, solemnly states that the mob "flayed the flesh from her bones with *abalone shells.*"[22]

A variety of problems attend such modern retellings of Hypatia's gruesome murder, including an increasing tendency to treat it as a sweeping allegory of Christian hostility toward science and philosophy rather than a political tragedy of the first order.[23] More prosaically, though, ancient Greeks used the same word for mollusk shells and pots alike—ὄστρακα—evidently *without* collapsing these usages as they did with σῆμα. Kingsley tried to have it both ways, but as Edgar J. Goodspeed later observed concerning potsherds:

> They were not only far more numerous and accessible to the Alexandrian mob than oyster shells, but they were more suited to the bloody deed they performed.

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22. David D. M. Oyster, Dir., "Who Speaks for the Earth," *Cosmos,* episode 13 (KCET, original air date: December 21, 1980). Cited on 22 June 2013. Online: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LuzcO4mWoco. Sagan's claim appears at the 5:40 mark.

23. Thus Alejandro Amenábar's statement that his 2010 film *Agora*—which implausibly portrays Hypatia questioning Ptolemaic geocentrism—is about astronomy. No mollusk shells are in evidence in this latest theatrical retelling of Hypatia's death. For Amenábar's statement, see the interview by Scott Holleran, "Alejandro Amenábar on *Agora," Scott Holleran. Writer*. Cited 6 June 2010..

> In fact, there is no reason to doubt that Hypatia was killed with ostraca, regardless of Charles Kingsley and the translators of Socrates, with their passion for oysters.[24]

Differences that would have been obvious even to the most illiterate Greek speakers sometimes escape our notice for reasons as simple as a passion for theatricality, but the reverse is also true. A measured appreciation of how the various usages of ὄστρακον do in fact overlap calls attention to certain distinctive features of Plato's social context and material culture that cast a different light on Socrates' remarks in *Phaedrus* 250c and elsewhere. Just as one can identify an oyster by the type and provenance of its shell, for example, so too with ancient pottery can the size, shape, and ornamentation of a given vessel provide clues to its purpose and the nature of its contents. Athenian white-ground lekythoi in particular often depict the "visit to the grave" or other stock scenes,[25] and even commercial amphorae sometimes bear names, insignia, and/or other marks stamped, incised, or inked on their surfaces. These ὄστρακα perform the same functions assigned to the human body in *Cratylus* 400c: to signify and to preserve.

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24. Edgar J. Goodspeed, "Some Greek Notes," *JBL* 73.2 (1954): 86.

25. Such scenes are discussed by John Howard Oakley, *Picturing Death in Classical Athens: The Evidence of the White Lekythoi* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), chs. 2–5.

Of special interest in the former class of objects are the so-called dummy lekythoi, vessels that were clearly designed specifically for use at graves and which typically held only a modest amount of oil in a small interior container. The adjective 'dummy' can be misleading both because some of these vessels are exceptional examples of Greek polychrome vase painting and because there is no consensus as to whether their design was *intended* to deceive or whether it was implemented simply to conserve oil, facilitate pouring, and/or prevent seepage.[26] More importantly, however, they have long been viewed as bridging a gap between Late Archaic and Classical grave markers, so we may expect them to have fulfilled similar (if not strictly identical) functions.[27]

The use of painted vases as grave monuments was common in the eighth century B.C.E. but declined radically over the following centuries as inscribed monuments and sculpted images became progressively more common. Sourvinou-Inwood attributes this shift to several factors, including an emergent concern for "memory survival" marked by the increasing use of μνῆμα to designate grave monuments, a usage that is absent from the

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26. Oakley, *Picturing Death*, xxiii, 8.

27. Oakley, *Picturing Death*, 219–223. The use of white-ground lekythoi as funerary offerings peaked between the years 470 and 400 B.C.E., overlapping the careers of both Socrates and Plato. A scholion on Plato's *Hippias Minor* (368c) reports that Athenians call λήκυθοι the vessels in which they bring μύρον to the dead. For this and other literary references see Oakley, *Picturing Death*, 4–5, 234 nn. 44–45.

Homeric poems yet consistent with the ongoing use of σῆμα. Whereas the occupants of graves lacking epitaphs survived in memory only as long as knowledge of their identity persisted in the collective consciousness of the community, inscribed monuments were literally self-preserving. In the majority of cases such monuments served both indexical and symbolic functions; that is, as σᾶματα or signs of the deceased they normally testified to the presence of the buried remains of the deceased and, in their symbolic function, to the fact that the living persona of the deceased had been succeeded by his or her "new persona" as articulated with greater or lesser specificity by the monument itself.[28]

> Consequently, it was inevitably to the grave monument that was transferred all 'reference' to the deceased which had previously been associated with the corpse/bones; and, after the separation of the deceased from the world of the living, this meant the reference to his new persona, and especially his memory, the remembrance of his living persona. It follows that, when the burial was sealed off, and the grave monument erected, this became the (metonymically derived) symbol for the deceased's new persona, and most emphatically for that

28. Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood, *"Reading" Greek Death: To the End of the Classical Period* (Oxford; New York: Clarendon; Oxford University Press, 1995), 112–115, 131-140, 278-279.

part of his new persona which existed in the world of the living, his memory, the continued existence of his persona in the memory of the living.[29]

A σῆμα could also perform this function *independently* of a strict indexical relationship between monument and corpse; that is, *whether or not a grave actually contained the remains of the deceased.* What was most important from the standpoint of the funerary ritual was the sealing off of the grave or cenotaph, which sealed off or symbolically neutralized the physical remains of the deceased and marked the exclusion of their ψυχή from the world of the living—a completed rite of passage.

The signficance of these observations is twofold. First, the primary purpose of the σῆμα in the Archaic period was not always or exclusively to protect the contents of the grave, since in some cases the grave could be empty, but to signify on the one hand that the proper rites had been conducted, and increasingly, on the other hand, to preserve the memory of the deceased in the world of the living. Second, because the σῆμα stood metonymically for the *whole person*—body, soul, and the rest—it was arguably the *whole person* whose memory it sought to preserve. With the physical remains of the deceased sealed off the σῆμα itself functioned as a 'body' with which the living interacted in a variety of ritually defined ways and through which the ongoing social persona of the deceased was articulated, whether it took the form of an idealized statue or even a non-iconographical representation such as a stele:

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29. Sourvinou-Inwood, *"Reading" Greek Death*, 120.

> A *sema* can be the metonymic sign of the deceased symbolizing his social persona as a memory after death without representing that persona iconographically; such iconographical representation is only one of the options for the grave monument; and when that option was taken further options were open as to the greater or lesser definition of that persona. The perceived (by the ancients) relationship between the *sema* and the dead person was variable within wide parameters.[30]

We have only to ask at this point whether grave markers in the fifth century continued to perform functions similar to those of their archaic predecessors or whether changes in burial practices influenced by sumptuary legislation and other sociopolitical or ideological factors also exerted pressure on the parameters within which such markers were perceived. White-ground lekythoi present an ideal test case both because they were used as visible grave markers and because they were geographically and chronologically limited mainly to fifth-century Attica and the surrounding regions. They were made in Athens for Athenians, as Oakley remarks, "so there is no question for whom their imagery was meant."[31]

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30. Sourvinou-Inwood, *"Reading" Greek Death*, 229.

31. Oakley, *Picturing Death*, 231.

3. An Embarrassment of Riches

The absence of sculptured Attic grave monuments and stelae from the archaeological record beginning sometime in the late sixth or early fifth-century and lasting roughly until the start of the Peloponnesian War in 431 b.c.e. is usually attributed to legislation restricting the time and resources that could be dedicated to erecting tombs as well as the extent of their ornamentation (Cicero, *de Leg.* 2.26). Production of polychrome white-ground lekythoi peaked during this period of enforced austerity and began to trail off at the beginning of the fourth century. Most scholars agree that they originally came into vogue as substitutes for the larger, more elaborate sculptured monuments that had been restricted, but similar consensus over the reasons for their demise remains elusive.

Evidence that white lekythoi were purchased for use as gifts to be deposited *in graves* comes, not surprisingly, from excavations of ancient graves. For their placement and display *on the surface* of grave monuments our primary evidence comes from the vessels themselves, many of which show scenes at the grave in which lekythoi and/or other earthenware vessels appear in gift baskets carried by visitors, on the steps of a tomb or, in some cases, atop the tomb monument itself. Several examples will suffice to illustrate the ongoing display of vases at classical gravesites. First, a mid-fifth century B.C.E. lekythos found in Eretria shows a female figure with an offering basket standing near a large, painted loutrophoros on which a horse and rider are depicted. The scale of the loutrophoros and the representation of the offering basket, a common feature on

lekythoi illustrating "visit to the grave" scenes, indicate that the loutrophoros itself is the grave marker.[32] The use of painted clay vases for this purpose did not end in the Archaic period but continued alongside the development of other forms, including, eventually, stone and metal vases. Second, a lekythos by the Phiale Painter (ca. 435–430 B.C.E.) depicts two figures at a grave, both females. On the left stands a woman holding a hare;[33] on the right a Thracian nurse kneels in a posture of mourning, head tilted back, left hand grasping her head, right hand raised with fingers gesturing toward a large loutrophoros atop the egg-shaped tumulus that separates the two figures. Oakley identifies the woman with the pet hare as the deceased mistress for whom the old nurse mourns.[34] If this is correct, then the significance of the scene is twofold. (1) The deceased is depicted *as she*

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32. Athens, National Museum 1975. Arthur Fairbanks, *Athenian Lekythoi: With Outline Drawing in Glaze Varnish on a White Ground* (2 vols.; UMSHS 6; New York: Macmillan, 1907), 1:52–53 (A.II.18), fig. 23; Donna C. Kurtz, *Athenian White Lekythoi: Patterns and Painters* (OMCA 6; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 204, pl. 20.3; Werner Oenbrink, "Ein 'Bild im Bild' Phänomen: Zur Darstellung figürlich dekorierter Vasen auf bemalten attischen Tongefäßen," *Hephaistos* 14 (1996): fig. 7, 97–98.

33. On the symbolic significance of hares, see Sian Lewis, *The Athenian Woman: An Iconographic Handbook* (London; New York: Routledge, 2002), 161.

34. Athens, National Musuem 19355. Oakley, *Picturing Death*, 158–164, fig. 123.

was in life, that is, as a full-fledged human figure with attributes that characterize her social persona and not as a generic, winged shade (εἴδωλον).[35] (2) Although the scene suggests that the deceased is somehow present at the tomb, the actions of the mourning nurse are directed, *and deictically they direct the viewer,* toward the monument itself—the vase—thus it is reasonable to conclude that an ancient observer would have understood the image of the deceased as the very εἰκών implicitly represented by the monumental vase, the metonymic sign of the deceased in the world of the living.[36]

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35. White-ground lekythoi from the mid- to late-fifth century regularly depict εἴδωλα, but only rarely is it possible to determine whether an individual εἴδωλον represents, or is directly associated with, the deceased (e.g., New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1989.281.72). See Oakley, *Picturing Death*, pl. VIII, 212–213.

36. The interpretation is complicated by the twin problems of whether white-ground lekythoi regularly depict the deceased in "visit to the grave" scenes and how to identify the deceased in any given scene. The figure whom Oakley singles out on the Phiale Painter's lekythos may represent a living relation, though several compositional features indicate otherwise. 'Reading' the scene from left to right, both the downward gaze of the woman with the hare and the symmetry between her gently angled right hand and the hare resting in her left hand draw implicit, converging lines. The lines formed by these gestures converge to point toward the tumulus—suggesting that she is, in fact, the occupant of the grave—and from there

The observation that a lekythos is *not* the central grave monument in the Phiale Painter's scene will help us to further define the possible semiotic functions of white-ground lekythoi. In fact, only one such vessel from the later period (ca. 420 B.C.E.) shows a large, marble lekythoi as the primary grave marker.[37] The majority of white-ground lekythoi showing grave scenes depict a simple rectangular monument, probably a sarcophagus, or a stele standing on a base of one or more steps, uninscribed and bare except for a stock assortment of ornamental tops and the ubiquitous fillets and taeniae commonly used as grave offerings. Various theories concerning the source(s) of these

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to the abdomen of the bereaved Thracian nurse, the seat of her grief. The nurse's body, in turn, angles upward and outward from the tumulus, directing attention to her expressive acts of mourning. Her gestures, too, form converging lines, which point to the loutrophoros rather than the tumulus. The scene therefore establishes a programmatic visual relationship between the deceased and the grave, on the one hand, and between the mourner and the monument, on the other hand, depicting precisely the sequence of events described by Sourvinou-Inwood, wherein the body of the deceased ceases to function as a metonymic 'sign' once the grave is sealed and all reference to the deceased is subsequently transferred to the σῆμα itself. The image on the lekythos functions, in effect, as a sign of a sign.

37. Ithaca, New York F. i. 209. Kurtz, *Athenian White Lekythoi*, 65, 225, pl. 53.1; Oakley, *Picturing Death*, 200, 201, fig. 164.

depictions have been advanced but none has secured a strong following. It is probably correct to assume that most of these scenes represent actual monuments that have been lost for one reason or another, and furthermore that such monuments were typically unadorned by reliefs or individualized sculptures.[38]

In this environment white-ground lekythoi could sometimes reflect the social persona of the deceased, the type of monument the family would like to have erected, or both, as in the case of a vase on display in the Boston Museum of Fine Arts.[39] The Boston lekythos depicts a bearded man with a staff, kneeling before a sarcophagus in what appears to be a ritual pose. On the opposite side of the sarcophagus stands a beardless youth wrapped in a cloak, whom scholars normally identify as the deceased. A two-stepped base supports the sarcophagus, which is topped by a pediment sculpture showing a wrestling match. Two sculptures of nude atheletes serve as *acroteria,* one on the left

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38. The various monuments depicted on white-ground lekythoi have been classified and discussed by Nakayama, Norio, "Untersuchung der auf weissgrundigen Lekythen dargestellten Grabmaeler" (Ph.D. diss., Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, 1982). For discussion of Nakayama's classifications as well as the possible sources of the artists' depictions, see Oakley, *Picturing Death*, 191–203.

39. Boston, Museum of Fine Arts, 01.8080, with discussion in Sourvinou-Inwood, *"Reading" Greek Death*, 324, n. 99 and Oakley, *Picturing Death*, 192, 195, figs. 156–157.

holding a strigil and another on the right holding a spear. In the background on either side of the sarcophagus hang a discus and a lyre, further indications that the deceased was an ephebe. "Although individual elements of the structure can be paralleled," according to Kurtz, "the composite structure is probably fantastical."[40] Like the Phiale Painter, then, the artist who composed this scene plays with the referential character of the vessel, portraying both the social persona of the deceased and his ideal σῆμα. The lekythos thus performs a double metonymic role as a sign of the deceased and as a *sign of the sign* of the deceased. Viewed from this perspective it functions similarly to the body in our earlier comments on Plato, where we saw that the body is simultaneously a sign of the soul and an image of images. What both the lekythos and the body preserve through their respective semiotics is the *memory* of a past life, which in the latter case is perfectly consistent with Plato's doctrines of *anamnesis* and *metempsychosis* as well as his classification of *psychic* penalties derived from *social* hierarchies.[41] For Plato, if not also

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40. Kurtz, *Athenian White Lekythoi*, 210, pl. 31.1.

41. The key texts are *Meno* 81b–84b; *Cratylus* 400c; *Phaedo* 70c–72e; *Republic* 614a–621b (The Myth of Er); *Phaedrus* 248c–249c; *Timaeus* 41d–42d, 76d, and 90e–91a. Of these, *Phaedrus* 248c–249c describes a nine-layer stratigraphy in which souls reincarnated in the bodies of philosophers and "lawful or warlike and commanding kings" occupy the top two tiers, followed by gymnasts (apropos of the lekythos showing an ephebe) and physicians in the fourth tier. *Timaeus* 41d–42d and

for the artists and schools responsible for the white-ground lekythoi, the bodies of women and slaves signified differently than those of men and kings.[42]

When placed on the surface of a grave white-ground lekythoi became part of the σῆμα itself.[43] As such they could signify how the deceased should be remembered or, equally importantly, *that the deceased had been remembered:*

90c–91a indicate that souls may be reincarnated in the bodies of women as a penalty for failure in their previous life. According to *Timaeus* 76d the bodies of women were originally fashioned from those of men.

42. This is not to say that their different significations held the same meaning for Plato as for the producers and consumers of white-ground lekythoi, an observation that has a bearing on the question of why white-ground lekythoi depict women and domestic scenes more frequently than do archaic funerary monuments.

43. Athens, National Museum, 1935; R. C. Bosanquet, "Some Early Funeral Lekythoi," *JHS* 19 (1899): 169–172, pl. II; Fairbanks, *Athenian Lekythoi*, 1:205–207 (C.V.22); Zürich, University, 2518; Kurtz, *Athenian White Lekythoi*, 224, pl. 51.3. In both cases lekythoi are draped with gifts (wreaths and ribbons) that normally adorn the monument itself. The fragile nature of such displays is indicated, however, by scenes showing inevitably broken or overturned vases on tombs. For a list of such instances, see Kurtz, *Athenian White Lekythoi*, 38, n. 4.

> Probably these lekythoi were left standing on the steps of the tomb monument, informing the world of the living that the family had performed *tà nomizómena,* the proper rites. If this was the case the dummy was not strictly speaking an *entáphion,* not put into the grave, but used at rites performed after the burial…[44]

Although evidence that white-ground lekythoi were sometimes broken or burned rather than deposited intact either in or on the grave complicates this picture,[45] in general their semiotic functions seem to have gone hand in glove with their practical functions. What they signified could vary widely within certain parameters, but they were much more than mere "earthen vessels," to borrow a phrase from Paul (2 Cor 4:7), and their symbolism

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44. Helle Saskov Roberts, "Pots for the Living, Pots for the Dead," in *Pots for the Living, Pots for the Dead* (eds. A. Rathje, M. Nielsen, and B. B. Rasmussen; ActaHyp 9; Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum; University of Copenhagen, 2002), 11. On *ta nomizomena* in general and white lekythoi in particular see Robert S. J. Garland, *The Greek Way of Death* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2001), 104–108.

45. Oakley, *Picturing Death*, 9. The difficulties associated with interpreting grave goods have been discussed by Ian Morris, *Death-Ritual and Social Structure in Classical Antiquity* (KTAH; Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 103–127, although Morris' conclusions have not been widely accepted.

had at least as much to do with the lives of the living as with the putative needs of the dead.[46]

4. Family Values

In an important article on Athenian family tombs, commonly referred to as peribolos tombs after the walls that normally enclose three or four sides of the burial plot, S.C. Humphreys commented on the "markedly domestic" character of representations on Attic grave reliefs from the late-fifth century onwards.[47] She contrasted these representations to archaic funerary monuments, most of which were erected for children, young men who

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46. Lucian of Samosata was as attuned to this fact as any modern thanatologist when he opined that the practice of depositing objects in graves benefited the living more than the dead (*De luctu* 14–15).

47. S. C. Humphreys, "Family Tombs and Tomb Cult in Ancient Athens: Tradition or Traditionalism?" *JHS* 100 (1980): 112. For a useful introduction to peribolos tombs, see Robert S. J. Garland, "A First Catalogue of Attic Peribolos Tombs," *ABSA* 77 (1982): 125–133, esp. 128 on the typical architectural outline. The term "peribolos tombs" is a modern title, as noted by Wendy E. Closterman, "Family Ideology and Family History: The Function of Funerary Markers in Classical Attic Peribolos Tombs," *AJA* 111.4 (2007): 633, n. 1. Nevertheless, it is an accurate description of a basic feature of such tombs.

died in war, or adolescent girls who died before marriage—individuals who suffered from memory deficiency, and whose monuments therefore 'spoke' to a wider community than the immediate family. Humphreys further suggested that the substitution of small, painted vases for sculptured monuments during the 50-year period prior to the start of the Peloponnesian War contributed to a narrowing radius of people whose attention could be claimed by tombs, now restricted mainly to family and kin groups. Thus the domestic scenes which by the late-fifth century had come to dominate white-ground lekythoi retained their appeal long after the lekythoi themselves fell into disuse.[48] *Pace* Humphreys, however, the identity of the deceased on white-ground lekythoi is rarely as obvious, to our eyes, as in the examples discussed above. We must therefore contend with the probability that the difficulty presented by the reliefs with respect to pinpointing the deceased in a larger kin group has less to do with the different iconographic conventions of reliefs versus vases than with our own culturally determined inability to perceive in every case how a person's social persona was understood and articulated. In fact the very question "which person is the deceased" betrays certain presuppositions concerning the identification of individuals *qua* individuals versus their identification as members of a group, and especially the priority of the former over the latter.

Corollary to Sourvinou-Inwood's theory that a σῆμα could function as a metonymic sign of the deceased *without representing that person iconographically*, iconographic

48. Humphreys, "Family Tombs," 112–113.

representations could function as metonymic signs *without representing the deceased as distinct individuals* or even at all. In such cases what was thought to be distinctive about the deceased—his or her social persona—could be articulated through iconography that emphasized social roles, group cohesion, and/or ideal traits. The memory quotient of any given individual could therefore vary in relation to the iconographic decisions of the family or kin group, just as in archaic commemorations it could vary in relation to the type of monument erected. More often than not the representations on Attic tombstones do not have a one-to-one relationship to the graves within the periboloi. Instead the interplay between images creates a complex web of relationships that sometimes defies strictly genealogical interpretation and thus presents considerable difficulties for modern analysts. Closterman cites the example of the family tomb of Hierocles at Rhamnous. An inscription on a fourth-century B.C.E. *naiskos* base asks the passer-by to "consider the [σῆμα] of five brothers,"[49] yet the base itself originally supported a relief showing the last of the five brothers to die, Hieron, and a woman named Lysippe, presumably his wife. The five sons of Hierocles are nowhere portrayed together, but each appears in various groupings on different stelae. Clostermann concludes that "the [σῆμα] of five brothers must be the tomb as a whole."[50] Elsewhere she notes that funerary markers do not always

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49. *IG*2^2 13102a. I have replaced Closterman's translation of σῆμα as "monument" with the original Greek term.

50. Closterman, "Family Ideology," 641–642.

provide an accurate record of those interred in a tomb,[51] a phenomenon that sometimes had a disproportionate impact on women.[52] Only two women are represented in the Koroibos family tomb in the Kerameikos cemetery, a female slave and a seated woman identified by an inscription as "Hegeso, daughter of Proxenos." Closterman argues, however, that "in addition to functioning as a memorial to Hegeso as an individual, her idealized image later came to represent the qualities of the unnamed wives of the male descendants whose names were added to the rosette stele."[53] The memory quotient of these unnamed women is therefore low with respect to their individual personalities, yet their graves are not entirely 'unmarked'. Instead their social persona is articulated, in the context of the tomb as a whole, through the representation of a memorable individual whose image was thought to embody the traits of an ideal Athenian wife. Closterman concludes:

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51. Closterman, "Family Ideology," 638–640.

52. Garland, "Attic Peribolos Tombs," 132.

53. Closterman, "Family Ideology," 649 (my italics), following Bernhard Schmaltz, *Griechische Grabreliefs* (EF 192; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983), 7–10.

> In the context of peribolos tombs, classical Attic funerary monuments had a stronger *ideological* than *documentary* function. Their primary role was to present a family portrait, rather than to serve as a repository for information about burial or a family's genealogical history. Instead of providing a complete record of those buried in the tomb, an easily navigable portrait of the individuals commemorated, or the intricacies of the family tree, the facade of a peribolos tomb conveyed an image of family solidarity as measured against the backdrop of an Athenian ideal.[54]

One could also say that classical Attic funerary monuments had a stronger *symbolic* than *indexical* function, and that these two functions varied over time according to changes in funerary practices and social ideology. Consequently, one of the more significant aspects of such tombs emerges less from in any single example than from the fact that they are typically designed to be viewed from *outside* their walls.[55] The 'big picture' is simply less accessible from inside. The carefully-executed masonry of the facade is not visible and only the rubble interior walls and rough-hewn backs of the sculptures can be seen. This difference between the view from inside the walls and the view from outside is akin to Socrates' distinction between the acute difficulty with which

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54. Closterman, "Family Ideology," 651 (my italics).

55. Garland, "Attic Peribolos Tombs," 128; Closterman, "Family Ideology," 633.

the soul sees through the the dim organs of sense—the περίβολος of the body, in the language of the *Cratylus*—and the state of being ἀσήμαντος (*Phaedr.* 250c).

5. Facts on the Ground

The foregoing discussion has been necessary for two reasons: first, to develop a more nuanced understanding of Plato's σῶμα-σῆμα formula over against the caricature drawn by many New Testament scholars, and, second, because scholars of Plato who have attempted to read the formula in a more optimistic light have restricted their studies rather narrowly to exegetical or doctrinal concerns. Cornelia J. De Vogel infers "what σῆμα meant to the Ancients" from a single passage in the *Gorgias*,[56] for example, whereas Rein Ferwerda concentrates on the meanings that Socrates' wordplays in *Cratylus* 400c must have had for Pythagoreans and Orphics, an approach that leads him to conclude (rightly) that σῆμα did not convey "the eerie meaning 'grave' in Pythagoras' time, but (wrongly) that 'sign' is the only genuine meaning of σῆμα here and that… Plato deliberately wished to force the other one ('tomb') upon the Pythagoreans."[57] Whatever their archaic origins,

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56. Cornelia J. de Vogel, "The *Sōma-Sēma* Formula: Its Function in Plato and Plotinus Compared to Christian Writers," in *Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought: Essays in Honour of A. H. Armstrong* (eds. H. J. Blumenthal and R. A. Markus; London: Variorum, 1981), 80, commenting on *Gorgias* 493a.

57. Ferwerda, "Meaning," 271, 273.

Socrates' wordplays are best understood in view of contemporary Attic funerary culture. Thus the examples discussed above put us in a better position to plausibly infer what σῆμα meant, if not for "the Ancients" in general, then at least for Socrates and Plato.

At the most basic level the body is an *index* of the soul; it is a σῆμα because it visibly marks the presence of a soul. As Plotinus would later state: "since we have *seen* the body and know that it is ensouled we say that it has a soul" (*Enn.* 4.3.30.43–45). Beyond that the body also serves a much richer *symbolic* function; it is a σῆμα because by it the soul *signifies* (σημαίνει), on one hand by certain 'family resemblances' that mark it as belonging, for the time being, to a particular social class—men, women, kings, slaves, and so forth—and on the other hand by certain deliberate acts of *askēsis* indicating that it has accepted its lot and is actively preparing for death, and thus also for the life to come. Socrates furthermore calls the body a περίβολος, a term that was suggested, I believe, by the architecture of family tombs in the nearby cemeteries. The remnants of these tombs will help us to conceptualize the relationship between the indexical and symbolic functions of the body as Plato must have intuited them.[58]

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58. A tradition going back to Wilamowitz and extending forward at least to Ferwerda's 1985 study presumes that Plato derived the metaphor of the body as a περίβολος from Orphic doctrine, for which he clearly expresses a *preference* over against the σῶμα-σῆμα formula. The arguments in favour of this view have been rehearsed by E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (SCL 25; Berkeley; Los Angeles:

Both the *variability* of the indexical and symbolic functions over time and the *priority* which Athenians seem to have given to the latter in the production and placement of tombstones during the late-fifth and most of the fourth century B.C.E. ought in the first instance to caution us against too quickly collapsing the concept of the body as an *index* of the soul with the image of the body as a *grave* of the soul. In fact, the περίβολος metaphor provides sufficient latitude to conceive of the *place* of the soul's confinement less literally, namely in terms of *social location.* The key question here is not whether the soul is buried in the body, as in a grave, but rather how the body, as a περίβολος, is monumentalized. For example, Plato 'reads' male bodies differently than female bodies. Thus the ontological hierarchies represented in his doctrine of metempsychosis and the creation myth of the *Timaeus* reflect traces, on the ground, of distinct social hierarchies.[59]

University of California Press, 1951), 147, n. 87 (169–170). Nevertheless, Socrates nowhere denies the basic accuracy of the σῶμα-σῆμα formula as a *functional* description of the body. Having expressed *approval* of the formula he then presents what he evidently considers to be a proper etymology of σῶμα. His concluding remark, that "not even a single letter need be changed," indicates only that the phonetic difference between σῶμα and σῆμα militates against the derivation of the former from the latter. To paraphrase, then, the σῶμα is rightly (ὀρθῶς) called a σῆμα, but this neither explains the origin of the word σῶμα nor exhausts its range of applications.

6. "Male and female he created them"

The title character of the *Timaeus describes how* the Demiurge, when creating the human being, enclosed the seed—the marrow to which various kinds of soul are bound (*Tim.* 73b–c)—in a stone-like περίβολος in order to preserve it (διασῴζων, *Tim.* 74a). The word διασῴζω arguably carries the same connotation here as when Isocrates uses it in the sense of "keep in memory" in reference to an ancient cult maintained by the Spartans at the tomb of Menelaos and Helen at Therapne (*Hel. enc.* 10.63; *LSJ* s.v.); in fact this usage commends itself if we take the idea of the soul's immortality seriously. Since the soul survives the death of the body, what the περίβολος preserves must be the *memory* of the soul's past in the world of the living, a memory that is articulated partly by the monuments that adorn it and partly by the symbolic actions of the soul within, including the deliberate *askēsis* to which I referred above. The latter means of signifying provide a measure of parity in what is otherwise a rigidly stratified system dominated by male paradigms of social interaction: philosopher, king, warrior, athlete, and so on.

Even the body is originally male, as a brief remark by Timaeus makes clear: "for those who were constructing us knew that women and the other beasts (!) would one day spring from men" (ὡς γάρ ποτε ἐξ ἀνδρῶν γυναῖκες καὶ τἆλλα θηρία γενήσοιντο, ἠπίσταντο οἱ συνιστάντες ἡμᾶς, *Timaeus* 76d). The grouping of women with "other beasts" here is consistent both with Timaeus' comments elsewhere, indicating that souls who fail in a

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59. See above, n. 41

past life may be transferred "into the form of a woman" (εἰς γυναικὸς φύσιν) or, worse yet, "into some such bestial nature" (εἴς τινα τοιαύτην … θήρειον φύσιν, *Timaeus* 42b–c; cf. 90e–91a), and with Socrates' remark that a soul shall never be implanted into the form of a beast in its first birth (μὴ φυτεῦσαι εἰς μηδεμίαν θήρειον φύσιν ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γενέσει, *Phaedrus* 248d). All of these statements presuppose the philosophical male body as the standard from which all other forms decline, in an ontological hierarchy that reflects the social stratification evident, for example, in the Koroibos family tomb.

With the sole exception of Hegeso and her servant, women are neither mentioned nor represented in the Koroibos peribolos. Although it is equally true that the men of the family are not represented either (at least not *iconographically*), the recording of only *their* names on the rosette stele was almost certainly purposeful. Vernant has argued that the immobility of stone prompted ancient Greeks to identify the grave stele with the rigid corpse of the deceased, but it is difficult in this case to avoid reading the Koroibos stele as anything other than a phallus—less an index of a specific grave containing a specific body than a potent symbol of the family's male line.[60] If this is correct, then the Hegeso stele stands neither on its own nor as an egalitarian counterpart to the rosette stele but as

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60. Jean Pierre Vernant, *Myth and Thought Among the Greeks* (trans. J. Lloyd and J. Fort; New York; Cambridge, Mass.: Zone, 2006), 321–332. For a brief but trenchant critique of Vernant's view, see Sourvinou-Inwood, *"Reading" Greek Death*, 141, n. 104.

'supporting cast', representing a small chorus of idealized but nameless women who preserve the family through their domestic roles as wives and mothers.

7. Raising 'Hell'

In *Phaedrus* 249a, Socrates describes how some souls meet with judgment after their first life, whereafter they go to "places of correction under the earth" (τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς δικαιωτήρια), while others are drawn up into "a certain heavenly place" (τοὐρανοῦ τινα τόπον). In the thousandth year both come to draw lots and choose their second life. Elsewhere, discussing the prohibition of suicide, he mentions an esoteric doctrine that "we human beings are in a kind of prison (ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ) and must neither free ourselves nor escape" (*Phaedo* 62b). Later in the same dialogue he comments on the experience that lovers of learning have when philosophy first takes hold of their soul. They perceive that their soul is "bound and glued to the body, compelled to see realities through it as though through a cage" (διὰ εἱργμοῦ, *Phaedo* 82a–b). In view of these remarks one could plausibly conclude that his mention of a δεσμωτήριον in *Cratylus* 400c refers to the body. This conclusion would be in keeping with the dominant tradition of interpretation both ancient and modern,[61] yet such a longstanding consensus has only been purchased at the price of ignoring or glossing over certain fatal difficulties, not the least of which involves the observation that, according to the Socrates of the *Phaedrus,* neither under the earth

61. The ancient sources have been collected by Pierre Courcelle, "Tradition platonicienne et tradition du corps-prison," *CRAI* 109.2 (1965): 406–443.

nor in heaven are souls enclosed in corporeal bodies. From this it follows, firstly, that a soul does not need such a body either to pay a penalty for its wrongdoing or to experience correction and, secondly, that if the body is a prison merely because it limits a soul's *spatial* mobility, thereby restricting the breadth and depth of its senses, then those souls who are drawn up to the heavenly τόπος must go *no place,* or at least as close to no place as they can go.

The first of these difficulties was recognized already in antiquity by Platonists like Plutarch of Chaeronaeia and Philo of Alexandria, whose works contain traces of the notion that Hades is really *this world* (Plutarch, *Gen. Socr.* 591a–c; *Fac.* 942c–f; 943c; Philo, *Her.* 45, 78; *Somn.* 1.151, 2.133). A similar view is represented on the Latin side as well by Scipio the Elder's remark in Cicero's Dream of Scipio: *vestra vero quae dicitur esse vita mors est* (*Resp.* 6.14). Dillon presumes that this view emerged from Stoic allegorizing of Homer but comments only on the above-cited passages from Philo and several fragments from the writings of Numenius that all attribute the idea to the Pythagoreans (frr. 32, 34, 35 des Places).[62] The key text for our purposes comes from Proclus' commentary on Plato's *Republic* (*In remp.* 2.128.16–130.14; 131.8–14 Kroll = Fr. 35 des Places), where Proclus accuses Numenius of *innovation* for "introducing many another questionable tale" (ἄλλην πολλὴν ἐπεισάγων τερατολογίαν), "jumping to his own

62. John M. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), 178.

conclusions" (αὐτὸς πηδῶν), and "stitching together the sayings of Plato with astrological lore, and these with the doctrines of the mysteries" (συρράπτων τὰ πλατωνικὰ ῥήματα τοῖς γενεθλιαλοκλοῖς καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς τελεστικοῖς, 2.129.6–13).

The Platonic sayings that Numenius stitched together must certainly have included Plato's three eschatological myths: (1) the judgment scene found in *Gorgias* 523e–524a, which envisions the judges sitting at a crossroads in a meadow; (2) Socrates' account of the τόπος δαιμόνιος, the awe-inspiring place located between heaven and earth in the Myth of Er (*Resp.* 614c); and (3) his description of the subterranean rivers in *Phaedo* 111c–114b.[63] More speculatively, we may suppose that Numenius also associated these scenes with a remark elsewhere in the *Gorgias,* in which Socrates ascribes the σῶμα-σῆμα formula to certain sages, probably Pythagoreans. Responding to Callicles' suggestion that stones and corpses would be most happy if happiness consisted of wanting nothing, Socrates remarks:

63. For a helpful discussion of Numenius' attempt to harmonize these texts, see Danuta Shanzer, *A Philosophical and Literary Commentary on Martianus Capella's De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii, Book 1* (UCPCS 32; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 189–193.

> Indeed, such is life, as you say. For I would not be surprised if Euripides were right when he says, "who knows whether to live is to die and to die is to live" [*Polydus,* Fr. 638], and we, accordingly, are really dead. In fact I myself once heard from sages that we are now dead and the body is our tomb (τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα, 492e–493a).

These comments cast considerable doubt on the notion that the underworld is distinct from this world. The key word, however, is *doubt.* Numenius' innovation evidently consisted partly in his attempt to establish a degree of certainty that is absent from Plato's sayings by connecting them with other scientific and religious doctrines, but Proclus was correct to observe that it was, nonetheless, an innovation.

Proclus was also correct to observe that Numenius' distinctive cosmology is difficult to reconcile both with the notion of astral apokatastasis in the *Timaeus* and the seemingly traditional view of the underworld represented in the *Phaedo.* He accuses Numenius, firstly, of relocating the infernal rivers and the punishments of souls therein to heaven. Although he admits that these rivers must *lead up* to the πλάνητες, he does not identify them with the planetary streams as did Numenius (*In remp.* 2.130.17–131.5; Fig. 1, p. 148). Secondly, he complains that Numenius limits the number of blessed souls to the Milky Way alone, whereas Plato indicates that they are "equal in number to the stars" (*Tim.* 42d), meaning, in Proclus' view, that they fill the entire heaven (πάντα τὸν οὐρανὸν, *In remp.* 2.131.5–9). Finally, as a corollary to his initial objection, he states that

Numenius' identification of the infernal rivers with the planetary streams requires souls descending from the sphere of fixed stars for the first time to pass through the 'underworld' before returning to the τόπος δαιμόνιος (*In remp.* 2.131.9–14). In other words, they must traverse the planetary streams/infernal rivers *during* their descent into material bodies and *before* they have completed their first life, a process that seems to contradict Socrates' claim in the *Phaedrus* that such souls only experience punishment or reward *whenever they finish that life* (ὅταν τὸν πρῶτον βίον τελευτήσωσιν, 249a-b).

Proclus harmonizes Plato's eschatological myths by defining 'earth' in a threefold sense as the heights (the sublunary sphere), the middle regions (this world), and the depths (the underworld). He locates the τόπος δαιμόνιος in the aetherial region of the planetary spheres, in between the triadic 'earth' and the outer sphere of fixed stars, the ἀπλάνης (Fig. 2, p. 149). As a τρίοδος it is thus the meeting point of three roads that refer, in turn, to the three lives of souls: (1) the life of blessed souls who look upon the earth from its heights; (2) the life of souls who dwell in the underworld and suffer punishments; and (3) the life of souls who dwell in the world of generation between the two (*In remp.* 2.132.5–9; cf. Plato, *Gorg.* 524a). *This life*—ἡ τῆς δίκης [ζωή]—belongs to the middle region (*In. remp.* 2.132.13).

Figure 1: Reconstruction of the the Numenian Cosmos[64]



64. Adapted from Shanzer, *Philosophical and Literary Commentary*, 190, Fig. 5.

Figure 2: Reconstruction of the Proclan Cosmos.



The significance of the phrase ἡ τῆς δίκης [ζωή] is difficult to determine. "Toute nouvelle vie dans le *génésis* est une épreuve," according to Festugière's supposition, but it may be more precise to say that Proclus views every new life here as a second chance (or third, or fourth, and so on).[65] This seems to be confirmed by his subsequent designation of the three kinds of lives souls exhibit at the τρίοδος, which correspond to the three lives described above: (1) the life of those who are rising up (ἀνιουσῶν); (2) the life of those who are falling down (πιπτουσῶν), (3) the life of those who *have been sentenced* (καταδεδικασμένων, *In remp.* 2.133.15–24).[66] His emphasis on δίκη as *the chief characteristic of this life* confirms, regardless, that the question of justice rightly belongs

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65. A. J. Festugière, *Proclus: Commentaire sur le République* (3 vols.; BTP; Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1970), 3:3.76, n. 2.

66. Festugière, *Proclus*, 3:3.77, n. 7: "Scil. montent au ciel, tombent dans la *génésis,* purgent leur peine dans l'Hades," following the alternative order given by Proclus at 2.132.10–11 (ἢ καὶ ἄλλως τὴν οὐρανίαν, τὴν χθονίαν, τὴν ὑποχθονίαν). The order I have adopted makes better sense as a reading of *Phaedr.* 249a–b, where the third group mentioned by Socrates are those who return to the meadow (λειμών) to draw lots and choose their second life only *after* they have spent a millenium either in the celestial realm or the subterranean realm. Technically, this group is not there for judgment since they have already served their time, which explains Proclus' use of the perfect participle καταδεδικασμένων.

at the forefront of our inquiry into Plato's view of the body. To unpack the results of this approach, however, it is necessary to work backwards from Proclus' remark, earlier in the same text, that the heights of the earth are assigned by lots to souls "who have yet to completely slough off their material bodies" (οὔπω τελέως ἀποδυσαμένων τὰ ὑλαῖα σώματα, *In remp.* 2.131.24–26).

As we have seen, Proclus preserves a literal view of the subterranean regions within the context of a triadic conception of the earth, so the heights to which he refers represent the aerial regions of the sublunary sphere. The passage of the *Phaedo* on which this statement is a commentary describes how the souls of persons who are considered to have lived devoutly in this world are freed from the regions fed by the infernal rivers (τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ) and released, *as if from prisons* (ὥσπερ δεσμωτηρίων), to mount upward to their pure home and to dwell upon the earth (ἐπὶ γῆς). Of these souls, those who are sufficiently purified through philosophy live thenceforth completely apart from bodies (ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι) and pass on to still more beautiful dwellings (εἰς οἰκήσεις ἔτι τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνοῦνται), where they are not only ἀσώματοι but also ἀσήμαντοι—unmarked (*Phaedo,* 114b–c).

To the extent that Socrates' use of δεσμωτηρίον in *Phaedo* 114c is consistent with his metaphor of the body as a δεσμωτηρίου εἰκών in *Cratylus* 400c, the phrase ἀπαλλαττόμενοι ὥσπερ δεσμωτηρίων in the *Phaedo* arguably refers to the release of devout souls from the bodies they had formerly occupied in this life, which amounts to a *de jure* pardon from

further confinement in the infernal regions. Socrates' remarks therefore correlate with our reconstructed Proclan cosmos as follows: (1) the τόποι τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ correspond to the Proclan depths, or the hypochthonic sphere; (2) devout souls who are released ὥσπερ δεσμωτηρίων are released from their cthonic or 'mediterrestrial' bodies, whereupon (3) they obtain hypercthonic or 'extraterrestrial' bodies (4) eventually, some of these souls shed their corporeal bodies entirely in exchange for astral dwellings (οἰκήσεις).

Since Proclus does not collapse this world into the underworld as did Numenius, he surmounts the problem of how a soul experiences correction in the infernal regions by interpreting the ὄχημα of *Phaedo* 113d as a σῶμα, albeit an "eternal first body" (σῶμα πρῶτον ἀΐδιον) that is "unbegotten" (ἀγένητον) and "incorruptible" (ἄφθαρτον, *Inst. theol.* 196, 209; cf. Plato, *Phaedo* 113d). This in itself ought to complicate the notion of a simplex anti-somatic position in ancient Platonism, but it ultimately relies on a variant theory of the astral body that cannot be traced back to Plato.[67] Absent the supposition of such bodies there is no one-to-one correspondence between the cthonic bodies which souls occupy in this world and the hypocthonic or subterranean τόποι to which they are sent for penance and purification. Rather, Socrates depicts infernal regions such as the Acherusian lake as holding multiple souls in much the same way that *his own prison* in

67. The *terminus a quo* and later elaboration of this theory are discussed by E. R. Dodds, *Proclus: The Elements of Theology* (2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1963), 313–321.

Athens normally held multiple inmates, even allowing them to receive visitors, share meals, and participate in religious and 'political' activities.[68] Life in such prisons was no stroll in the Elysian Fields, to be sure, but Socrates' use of the prison simile to correlate *freedom* from the infernal τόποι with *release* from middle-earthly σώματα suggests that he does not view *specific* bodies but *topical* bodies as being "like prisons," not his body *per se,* for example, but philosophers' bodies, kings' bodies, and so on down the line.

If the Proclan model accurately represents Plato's cosmos—at least insofar as the underworld remains distinct from but related to this world, with life in the one being characterized by ποινή and in the other by δίκη—then the *spatial* topography of Hades is analogous to the *social* topography of the 'mediterranean' world, *where psychic hierarchies are not defined by rivers and lakes but by other kinds of bodies.* To be bound to a body in *this* world, in which the barriers to upward mobility are prohibitive is to be tied to a particular social location, able at times to see, hear, and even interact in certain limited ways with those above and on the outside but rarely able to join them as a peer. The doctrine of metempsychosis holds forth hope for a positive change of status in the *next* life and even for a kind of eschatological egalitarianism in which souls are unmarked by bodies and thus untethered from oppressive class structures, yet Plato's view of this life remains inherently conservative: "we human beings are in a kind of prison and must

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68. Virginia Hunter, "The Prison of Athens: A Comparative Perspective," *Phoenix* 51 (1997): 296-326.

neither free ourselves nor escape" (*Phaedo* 62b). To commit suicide is in the first instance to flout the system of cosmic justice, but also to destroy the *memory* of the past that is preserved and signified by the περίβολος of the body—the very opposite of the *tendence* implied by the word διασῴζω (*Tim.* 74a), expected by Athenian society, and codified in Athenian law. In short, suicide is not only unlawful but impious (μὴ ὅσιον, *Phaedo* 62a).

We are now in a better position to appreciate why Plato consistently retreats from the extreme view adopted by Platonists like Numenius, never directly equating the body with a prison and instead deploying circumlocutions like ὥσπερ and τις or calling it merely an εἰκών. We are likewise in a better position to appreciate how the indexical and symbolic functions of the body collapse in the event of signification. As a περίβολος furnished with particular kinds of monuments and symbols *that only make sense in relation to other monuments and symbols,* the body signifies where the soul is 'buried' in a distinctive and largely unyielding social hierarchy.[69] To the extent that 'escaping' from this place by destroying the body is discouraged by the risk of incurring charges of malfeasance and impiety, it doubles as an image of a prison. This explains why, in the *Phaedrus,* Socrates criticizes the notion of an immortal living being having both a body and a soul joined for all time (*Phaedr.* 246d), not because the body is innately shameful and evil but because *it no longer serves a purpose when the soul in its cyclical revolutions finally beholds justice itself* (αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην, *Phaedr.* 247d).

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69. I note here that Socrates does not indicate *where* the soul is buried in *Cratylus* 400c.

8. Here lies one whose name was writ on water

In the alternative model represented by our reconstructed Numenian cosmos the infernal rivers flow within "une terre mythique" of which this earth constitutes the lowest point (Fig. 1, p. 148).[70] The resulting collapse of this world into Hades leaves no room for doubt as to the interpretation of the prisons from which the souls of the devout are freed. The stakes are considerably higher in this case, however, because release from the body constitutes a *de facto* release from the τόποι τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ encompassing both this earth and the planetary streams. "Matter is a winding and turbulent river," according to Numenius, in a double allusion to a famous saying of Heraclitus and Plato's account of the Demiurge inserting the circles of the soul into a body liable to influx and efflux (Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 15.17.2 = Numenius, fr. 3.11 des Places; cf. Plato *Crat.* 402a; *Tim.* 43a).[71] Human beings in this life are submerged in 'wet' bodies, trapped in the roiling currents of generation and corruption, and "if the body flows, swept along by rapid change, it runs away and is no more" (Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 11.10.13 = fr. 8.5–7 des Places). The body is mercurial and therefore epistemically unreliable. The pull of this perspective upon readers steeped in Cartesian ontology should be obvious, but Descartes can scarcely shoulder the

70. Festugière, *Proclus*, 3:72, n. 2.

71. Robert Dale Petty, "The Fragments of Numenius: Text, Translation, and Commentary" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1993), 89.

full weight of responsibilty for its persistence.[72] As readings of Plato go it is both consistent and systematic in its capacity to correlate his anthropological and soteriological statements, despite the exegetical issues broached by Proclus. Consequently it is not difficult to find antecedents in the writings of near contemporaries of Paul.

Philo deploys similar fluvial imagery in his treatise on the γιγάντες born from the union of certain angels of God with human women (Gen 6:1–4). Such a union is possible, he explains, because ἄγγελλοι, δαίμονα, and ψυχαί share "the same substrate" (*Gig.* 16). They are all aerial souls, but only some manage to withstand the strong current of corporeal life:

> When they have dived into the body as if into a river they are at once caught and swallowed by the surging force of the current, and when they are first able to withstand the motion they break the surface, where they remain until they fly back to the place whence they came. These are the souls who live in a genuinely philosophical way from start to finish, practicing for life after the death of their bodies so that they may share in the incorporeal (ἀσωμάτου) and incorruptible life in the presence of the unbegotten and incorruptible [one]. But those who are swallowed up are the souls of other human beings who disregard wisdom, giving themselves over to unstable things regulated by chance, none of which leads up to the best in us, the soul or the mind, and all of which lead down to the corpse

72. Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 3–6.

> attached to us (τὸν συμφυᾶ νεκρὸν ἡμῶν), the body, or to things more lifeless than that (τὰ ἀψυχότερα τούτου), I mean appearances and riches and offices and honours, and anything else that is imagined or depicted with deceitful vainglory by those who do not contemplate beautiful things leading to truth (*Gig.* 13–15; cf. *Leg.* 2.89).[73]

These remarks fit comfortably into no fewer than three of the ten categories of dualism or duality outlined by Wright, two of which constitute types of "dual*ism* proper" which the majority of Philo's Jewish contempories allegedly rejected: "cosmological dualism, a la Plato [and Plutarch], in which the world of space, time and matter is radically inferior to the noumenal world," and "anthropological dualism which postulates a radical twofoldness of soul and body." The third category, "moral duality between good and evil," belongs to a short list of dualities that "a first-century Jew would take for granted." Unfortunately we possess insufficient polling data from which to extrapolate the views of

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73. On the broader applications for which Philo uses fluvial imagery, see David T. Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato* (PA 44; Leiden: Brill, 1986), 260–262. Note that Runia opens the section that follows by observing that "the *duality* [not dualism] of the body and soul is one of the cornerstones of Philo's thought" (my italics). Cf. Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus*, 455 (cautioning against confusing matter with body and corporeality) and the comments cited below p. 163, n. 80.

"most ancient Jews" and thus to verify Wright's claims.[74] What we do possess are a variety of geographically and chronologically diffuse writings from the hands of Greeks, Romans, and Jews that all seem to attest to the same basic dual*ity* between the *mortal* body and the *immortal* soul. Wright himself has discussed the Jewish evidence for this distinction at considerable length, so the hermeneutical question raised by his more recent remarks is not whether a first-century Jew could subscribe to it but what criteria warrant calling such a Jew 'radical'.[75] As useful as his categories are from a strictly heuristic standpoint, in practice he tends to collapse them into a static polarity, with radically world-denying Greeks (and orientals!) on one side, radically world-affirming Jews on the other side, and scant space between.[76] Philo remains something of a Janus-figure in this reconstruction because he often gives Judaism a Platonic face, as in the remarks quoted

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74. N. T. Wright, "Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body: All for One and One for All Reflections on Paul's Anthropology in his Complex Contexts" (paper presented at the Society of Christian Philosophers Regional Meeting, Fordham University, 18 March 2011). Cited on 22 June 2013. Online: http://www.ntwrightpage.com/Wright_SCP_MindSpiritSoulBody.htm. Cf. N. T. Wright, *The New Testament and the People of God* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 254–256.

75. Wright, *Resurrection*, 140–146, 162–175.

76. Wright, "Mind," contrasting "what we find in Plato and much oriental religion" with "the radical embace of space, time, and matter" by "most ancient Jews."

above, yet sometimes offers softer versions of cosmological and anthropological dualism, as in the following remarks concerning the creator's power over all things:

> We have ourselves and whatever pertains to us as a loan. I, in fact, am a combination (συνεστώς) of soul and body, seeming indeed to have sense perception, and yet I find that these things are not my own. Where was my body before I was born? Where will it go when I am gone? What happens to the different periods of life that seem to exist? Where does the newborn go, the infant, the toddler, the child, the adolescent, the teenager, the young adult, the adult? Whence came the soul, where will it go, and how long will it live with us? Can we say what it is? When did we acquire it? Before we were born? But then we did not exist. After death? But then we who are joined to bodies and have qualities shall not exist (οὐκ ἐσόμεθα οἱ μετὰ σωμάτων σύγκριτοι ποιοί), and we who are joined to incorporeal things and without qualities (οἱ μετὰ ἀσωμάτων σύγκριτοι ἄποιοι) shall hasten to rebirth.[77] And now while we are alive we are ruled rather than ruling, we are known rather than knowing; for [the soul] knows us without being understood by us and issues orders to which we are compelled to submit like household slaves to a mistress (cf. *Leg.* 3.191). When it decides to

77. This sentence is irretrievably confused in the manuscripts, probably as a result of scribal errors arising from the close verbal and syntatical similarities between the two clauses.

> abandon us it departs to the ruler whenever it wants, leaving our house devoid of life, and if we try to compel it to stay it disappears, for its nature is so refined that the body cannot grasp it. Is my mind my home, then? … Is speech my possession, or the organs of sound? … In fact I am found to control none of my senses; I am merely a slave, following promptly wherever they lead me, to colours, shapes, sounds, scents, and other things. For all of these reasons I think that we clearly have use of the possessions of others. Neither appearance nor wealth nor honours nor offices nor anything pertaining to the body or soul belong to us, not even life itself, and since we have them as a loan, if we are thoughtful we shall care for them (ἐπιμελησόμεθα) as the possessions of God, knowing in advance that it is the master's right (τῷ δεσπότῃ νόμος) to take back what is his whenever he wishes (*Cher.* 113–118).

Philo here presses his skepticism concerning time and the sensible world into the service of Wright's second type of dual*ity,* between the creator and the creature, God and the world—a world, moreover, that is governed by law. Neither the body nor the soul nor even the mind belong to the "I" who is contemplating them, yet they must be *cared for* because they belong instead to a creator who may rightfully recall them at any moment. To live in a genuinely philosophical way must therefore involve caring for the *whole* being, body, soul, and mind. Anything less would flout the law and flirt with impiety. Elsewhere Philo states that "each of us has been joined together to be twofold, both

animal and human (ζῷόν τε καὶ ἄνθρωπον)," adding that what is human is not the double-natured animal but the best part of the soul, which is called νοῦς and λόγος and is rooted in the fixed sphere of heaven. The body, meanwhile, is planted in the depths of the earth (*Det.* 82–85; cf. *Plant.* 16–17). All of this is so thoroughly Platonic in its echoes of the *Phaedrus* (246c–d), the *Timaeus* (90a–d), and the *Alcibiades* (1.130c) that it can (and sometimes does) lead Philo to outright disdain for the 'beastly' body, yet both of these Philonic passages stand out for their emphasis on the composite nature of the "I" or "we" or "each of us," whether joined to a body in the present life or to something incorporeal in the παλιγγενεσία.[78] God, in contrast, "is not a mixture" (ὁ θεὸς οὐ σύγκριμα, *Mut.* 184).

It is noteworthy, then, that when Philo defends literal observances of the Law against radical allegorizers he appeals both to epistemological and anthropological dual*ities.* "Truth is better than appearance," he writes, "but happiness comes from *both.*" He censures those who too diligently look for symbolic meanings while neglecting the literal laws "because it is necessary to care for *both*" (ἔδει γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ἐπιμεληθῆναι). They are like "hermits in the desert" or "disembodied souls" (ἀσώματοι ψυχαὶ). Knowing neither city nor village nor household nor any human solidarity whatsoever, they turn up their noses at the opinions of the majority and seek the naked truth by itself" (*Migr.* 89–90). Instead, the laws and their symbolic meanings ought to be viewed like the body and the soul. "Just as one must attend to the body, since it is the home of the soul, one

78. Goodenough, *Light*, 374–376 (on Cher. 113–115), 379 (on Det. 83).

must also care for the literal laws (τῶν ῥητῶν νόμων ἐπιμελητέον), for when they are kept (φυλαττομένων) those things which of which they are symbols will also be easier to understand" (*Migr.* 93). A third kind of duality is also clearly at work here, which is really the rhetorical face of anthropological duality and ought therefore to have a place in Wright's taxonomy, that is, the duality between the diction of a speech or a text and its meanings.

"The λόγος is called a living being by the ancients," according to an anonymous prolegomenon to Hermogenes' περὶ στάσεων, "and just as a living being is composed of a soul and a body, so also the λόγος is composed of a soul, namely its meanings, and a body, namely its diction" (Rabe, *Rh. Gr.* 14.204.25–205.4). Philo's application of this ancient principle is remarkable for several reasons, not least because he aligns himself with *the majority* of Jews who continue to heed the literal laws (one could just as well say the literal *words of the Law*), but also for the insight it provides into his view of the body. Most importantly, he presumes that *the body is a social and political entity.* To be embodied is to participate in the conventions and institutions that govern cities, villages, households, and even (or perhaps especially) alternative communities like the Theraputae, and which provide formal ways of expressing all manner of human interactions and relationships. In the same way, the manifold symbols of the Law are given formal expression by the rituals the Law prescribes. Having subtly elided the body of the text with the bodies of the faithful majority, Philo concludes quite naturally that the text is

most accessible in its *performance,* without which its soul or meaning tends to 'escape'. The radical allegorizers have gotten it wrong, he implies. There is no "naked truth."

Since this is scarcely the hardline stance one would expect a Platonist of Philo's considerable erudition to adopt, scholars have understandably wondered whence it comes.[79] Goodenough sanguinely suggested that Philo "never lost his Judaism so completely that he ceased to think of man in the *practically wholesome* way of being a combination of body and soul," and this seems to be how Wright and others construe the 'softness' in his dualism, as a kind of vestigial cultural reflex that recalls another, more profound way of being Jewish in the world.[80] Yet Philo's own writings nowhere indicate

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79. On Philo's acquaintance with Greek literature and philosophy, see Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus*, 35–36.

80. Goodenough, *Light*, 380; Wright, *New Testament*, 255*;* Ronald Williamson, *Philo and the Epistle to the Hebrews* (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 18: "For orthodox Judaism the body is God's handiwork and is to be reverenced. In Philo's thoughts about the body, however, the mingling of Jewish and Greek attitudes which went on in his mind had left the Greek ideas uppermost and the the Jewish beliefs almost entirely submerged." Compare the more judicious conclusion of David T. Runia, "God and Man in Philo of Alexandria," *JTS* 39.1 (1988): 71; repr. in David T. Runia, *Exegesis and Philosophy: Studies on Philo of Alexandria* (CS 332; Aldershot, Hampshire, UK; Brookfield, Vt.: Variorum; Gower, 1990), XII: "Philo's philosophical

that he ever thought of himself as anything other than a Jew and a philosopher, and as long as he is read otherwise he is liable to be misread. His Janus-like complexity may therefore have as much to do with Platonism as with first-century Judaism.

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conception of man is dualist. Man is basically a συναμφότερον of body and rational soul or mind. Both of these parts are created by God, but only with respect to one of them, the mind, is man related to Him. Philo extracts this anthropology from the biblical record because he reads it with Platonist spectacles. When he reads that man is made in God's image and that God breathes His spirit into man's face, he could also have taken these statements to refer to the whole of man, that is, soul and body, and not just to one of his parts. *Nevertheless, I would not wish to suggest that we have here a total abandonment of Judaism in favour of Greek philosophical ideas.* To start with, Philo does not waver in his loyalty to the biblical text, which does provide him with his starting point *and can be so read.* Moreover, it can be argued that Philo in fact shares his intellectualistic bias with his colleagues in Palestinian Judaism, but gives it a different content, he in terms of Greek rational thought, they in terms of the study of the minutiae of the Law" (my italics). Along similar lines, see Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert, "Plato in Rabbi Shimeon bar Yohai's Cave (*B. Shabbat* 33B-34A): The Talmudic Inversion of Plato's Politics of Philosophy," *AJSRev* 31.2 (2007): 277–296, esp. 288–294.

Goodenough also speculated that Philo's notion of the human being as a composite may reflect popular Greek thought, noting that similar ideas are present in different ways in the works of Aristotle and the Stoics as well as Platonists like Antiochus of Ascalon and Plutarch (*Fac.* 943a; *Virt. mor.* 441d). One could add the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus* to this list. The *Axiochus* is a spurious dialogue in which Socrates grudgingly consents to console the terminally ill Axiochus at the request of Axiochus' son, Clinias. The *Axiochus* is noteworthy chiefly for its pastiche of Platonic, Epicurean, Cynic, and Stoic doctrines, as well as a noticeable hardening of Socrates' views concerning the body.[81] Like Philo, the Socrates of this dialogue refers to the union of body and soul as a σύγκρισις that is dissolved by death:

> Once the compound is dissolved and the soul has been settled in its proper place (εἰς τὸν οἰκεῖον ἱδρυθείσης τόπον), the body which remains, being earthly and irrational, is not the human person. For each of us is a soul, an immortal living being locked up in a mortal prison; and Nature has fashioned this tent for

81. The best general introduction to the *Axiochus* remains that of Jackson P. Hershbell, *Pseudo-Plato, Axiochus* (SBLTT 21; SBLGR 6; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981), 1–21. To avoid the clutter that would ensue by citing each instance of my reliance on Hershbell, I simply note his influence throughout the following discussion.

> suffering—its pleasures are superficial, fleeting, and mixed with many pains; but its pains are undiluted, long-lasting, and without any share of pleasure. And while the soul is forced to share with the sense organs their diseases and inflammations and the other internal ills of the body (since it is distributed among its pores), it longs for its native heavenly aether, nay, thirsts after it, striving upward in hopes of feasting and dancing there. Thus being released from life is a transition from something bad to something good (*Ax.* 365e–366a, Hershbell).

There is no question here that the body is 'bad' (κάκον) and death something to anticipate with joy rather than fear. To this 'Phaedonic' argument (including *Ax.* 370b–d) Socrates adds a 'Gorgianic' argument in which he describes the departure of souls to an unseen or indeterminate place in the subterranean dwelling (*Ax.* 371a).[82] There they are judged and those who are found to have been inspired by a good daemon during their former life sent to dwell in the region of the pious, while the wicked are herded by the

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82. I have borrowed the terms 'Phaedonic' and 'Gorgianic' from Tim O'Keefe, "Socrates' Therapeutic Use of Inconsistency in the Axiochus," *Phronesis* 51.4 (2006): 391–392. Scare quotes are merited by the fact that Socrates' remarks in *Axiochus* 365e are not wholly consistent with views represented in the authentic Platonic dialogues, but 'Phaedonic' is accurate as a general description based on the prominence of the prison metaphor.

Furies to the region of the impious to suffer odious punishments of the sort that would cause even Dante to shudder (371b–372a). Axiochus enthusiastically confesses that he is persuaded by these arguments, giving no indication that he has noticed their inconsistency concerning the fate of the soul after death.

The *Axiochus* was athetized already in antiquity by Thrasyllus and Diogenes Laertius (3.62) and has drawn largely negative or mixed reviews from modern scholars. Among its few defenders, O'Keefe argues that Socrates' barrage of contradictory and inconsistent arguments effectively dramatizes the rhetorical practice followed by authors of consolation letters, which could involve the use of arguments with inconsistent premises, appeals to emotion, and tailoring arguments to the audience.[83] Socrates indeed presents several arguments only to discard them abruptly when Axiochus cannot understand them, such as the Epicurean view that the dead do not exist (365d–e). The deeper purpose of the dialogue is evident, however, in Socrates' affront when Axiochus asks him why he doesn't just kill himself: "Axiochus, you misrepresent me! *Like most Athenians* you suppose that just because I'm an inquirer into things that I'm also an expert. I wish that I

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83. O'Keefe, "Inconsistency," 393–406. For surveys of the consolatio genre, see Stanley K. Stowers, *Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity* (LEC 5; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 142–144, with examples on 145–151 and Hubert, Jr. Martin and Jane E. Phillips, "Consolatio uxorem," in *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature* (ed. H. D. Betz; SCHNT 4; Leiden: Brill, 1978), 398–410.

knew these ordinary things, so far do I fall short of the extraordinary ones!" (366b–c). This response is a non-sequitur since Axiochus's question follows naturally upon Socrates's preceding remarks concerning the pains of this life, yet it is a pointed non-sequitur with an implicitly apologetic purpose.[84] Together with Axiochus's naive acceptance of the two Platonic arguments and his failure to grasp either their inconsistency or the various alternatives, it suggests that he, like most 'Athenians', remains critically ignorant of the speculative nature of Socrates' theories concerning the afterlife, even while embracing several key Platonic doctrines, including: (1) the mortality of the body, (2) the immortality of the soul, and (3) the coming judgment. On this reading the *Axiochus* not only polemicizes against rival schools like Epicurus's Garden but does so by expropriating a *caricature* of Socrates in order to demonstrate the essential 'truth appeal' of Platonism.

The message cannot be clearer. The Athenians represent a perceived majority of cultured despisers who, when pressed, will assent to certain basic premises of Platonism despite its contradictions, including even a convicted defiler of the Eleusinian mysteries who ought to have good reasons to be skeptical.[85] The dialogue exploits Axiochus'

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84. O'Keefe, "Inconsistency," 398, n. 15. Socrates seems to assume, on the contrary, that Axiochus' question is an *objection* to what he has just said and therefore an invalid *ad hominem* attack.

85. Axiochus and Alcibiades III were charged with this and other crimes of impiety in

reputation for ἀσέβεια by pressing the conventions of the *consolatio* genre into the service of an atheist-in-a-foxhole type argument; thus it presents a considerably more complicated perspective on the Phaedonic argument than a quotation taken out of context might suggest.[86] The Socrates of this dialogue is a caricature and so, too, are his arguments. By amplifying the inconsistency between the promise of a blissful afterlife simply by virtue of the soul's release from the body and the odious punishments that await certain souls, the dialogue calls attention to Axiochus's indiscriminate acceptance of both arguments. No attempt is made to resolve the inconsistency *because the inconsistency drives home the point.*

The *Axiochus* is satire with a purpose, so its portrayal of Socrates, Axiochus, and the Athenians, like all caricatures, depends on a grain of truth. This means that New Testament scholars have rightly observed a popular strain of contempt for the body with ties to Platonism but wrongly assumed that such a view reflects either the official position

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415 B.C.E. See Debra Nails, *The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), 17–20 (on the crimes) and 63–66 (on the life of Axiochus), cited in O'Keefe, "Inconsistency," 399, n. 17.

86. On the question of whether the orthodox "Nietzschean" reading of the *Phaedo* itself as radically anti-somatic accurately represents the views of Socrates and Plato, see Laurel A. Madison, "Have We Been Careless with Socrates' Last Words?: A Rereading of the *Phaedo," JHPh* 40.4 (2002): 421–436.

of the Academy on the eve of its closure or, for that matter, of any reasonably thoughtful Platonist. This does not mean that no Platonist in antiquity held such a position, only that occasional references to the σῶμα-σῆμα formula or the related notion of the body as a prison do not in and of themselves prove the case. Social pressures, intellectual currents, rhetorical aims, and (*pace* Martin) "Plato's own positions" all had a significant bearing on how he was being read and appropriated in and around the first century C.E., and the very extremity of the views represented in the *Axiochus* gives us reason to think that at least one exponent of the Platonic tradition roughly contemporary with Paul believed that Plato was never as radical as some contemporaries seem to have imagined.[87]

10. Well-Matched Horses

That loathing for the body was not a *sine qua non* of first-century Platonism can be illustrated by observing how a familiar exponent of that tradition handles the same theme that Philo addresses in *Gig.* 13–15: the descent of the soul into a body:

> It is most true to say that the soul exiled by divine decrees and laws flees and wanders, as if on an island battered by rough seas or "like an oyster," as Plato says [*Phaedr.* 250c], bound to the body (ἐνδεδεμένη τῷ σώματι) because it can neither recall nor remember "from what honour and what lofty happiness" it has departed, not exchanging Sardis for Athens or Corinth for Lemnos or Scyros but

87. Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 12.

> heaven and the moon for earth and life on earth. Should it slip but a small distance, to this place from another (ἐνταῦθα τόπον ἐκ τόπου), it becomes distressed and feels strange, withering like a lowly plant. And yet for a plant one region is more suitable than another in which to grow and thrive, but from a human being *no place* can take away happiness (οὐδεὶς ἀφαιρεῖται τόπος εὐδαιμονίαν), just as no place can take away virtue or wisdom. Anaxagoras was busy squaring the circle while in prison (ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ), and Socrates, while drinking the hemlock, was engaging in philosophy and exhorting his companions to live philosophically, and he was declared happy by them… (Plutarch, *Exil.* 607d–e).

Plutarch says much about the soul and surprisingly little about the body in these remarks. To be embodied is a kind of exile, which, at first, distresses the soul. The figure of the body as an island in a storm anticipates Numenius, just as that of the body as an ὄστρακον looks back to Plato, yet Plutarch scarcely exploits the full anti-somatic potential of these images. He focuses instead on the disposition of the soul under the conditions imposed on it by *divine justice* (θείοις … δόγμασι καὶ νόμοις, 607d), a theme that we have seen repeatedly in Platonists of wildly diverse stripes, cutting across chronological, geographical, ideological, and religious lines: "for the body is hard-pressed by the burden bearing down upon it, but the soul often adds weight to things on its own" (599d). That burden is twofold: the body carries both the *memory* of the soul's past, since the soul

itself "can neither recall nor remember," and the *weight* of the consequences for the soul's forgetfulness. In the grand scheme of things—that is from the perspective that the cosmos is governed by law (νόμος) and justice (δικαιοσύνη)—these are *salutary* functions.

Like Philo, Plutarch draws the same basic distinction between the rational and irrational parts of the composite human being, yet with a tripartite division of mind/soul/body (*Fac.* 943a). He further subdivides the soul into nutritive and vegetative parts that are "sprung from the flesh" (*Virt. mor.* 442b), and which then grow to be assimilated to the body and to share in its passions and their fulfillment (*Virt. mor.* 450e).[88] The body itself possesses natural appetites that may "bite and strain" but to which one should yield. Conversely, "whatever pleasures the body obtains when it is prodded and stirred up by the soul are deranging, disturbing, and foreign to nature" (*Tu. san.* 125b–c).[89] When this happens the soul could indeed be said to increase the burden borne by the body. "Plato is right, therefore, when he advises neither to move the body apart from the soul nor the

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88. Jackson P. Hershbell, "De virtute morali," in *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature* (ed. H. D. Betz; SCHNT 4; Leiden: Brill, 1978), 141 (on 450e) and 157 (on 442b).

89. These remarks express a noticeably more lenient attitude toward the body than the closest parallel in the Pauline corpus (1 Cor 9:27). See Morton Smith, "De tuenda sanitate praecepta," in *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature* (ed. H. D. Betz; SHCNT 4; Leiden: Brill, 1978), 46.

soul apart from the body, but to watch them carefully (διαφυλάττειν), like a well-matched team of horses" (*Tu. san.* 137e; cf. Plato, *Tim.* 88b). The influence of Plutarch's anthropology is clear in this last remark, in which the mind must be understood as the charioteer even though it is outside the immediate frame of reference (cf. Plato, *Phaedr.* 247c). Elsewhere Plutarch even expresses the view that the mind is a δαίμων since it exists *outside* the body, whereas the soul mixes with the body to varying degrees (*Gen. Socr.* 591d–e). In sum, he maintains a strict mind/body dualism alongside a more fluid soul/body dualism in which the potential for the near total submersion of the soul in the body carries an overtly negative valence. The ideal in all of these examples remains, however, the harmonious working of the whole.[90]

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90. Eduard Schweizer, "σῶμα," *TDNT* 7:1040. The relevant question here is how much weight should be given to Schweizer's comment that Plutarch "*essentially* follows the early Plato … against Epic[tetus] … in speaking of the evil lusts of the body and the basic freedom of the soul" (my italics). Plutarch presses even the later Plato into the service of a form of theological and cosmological dualism with relevance for his anthropology. Citing *Leg.* 896d, written "when Plato was older," Plutarch attributes the better and worse aspects of the cosmos to different gods, yet mentions "a certain third nature in between, neither inanimate nor irrational nor lacking the capacity to move itself." He adds that the better has the upper hand, yet the worse is so deeply implanted in the body *and* the soul of everything (πολλὴν μὲν ἐμπεφυκυῖαν τῷ

Another text offers further insight, if not into Plutarch's own views then at least into views that were thought to be plausibly attributable to him. The pseudo-Plutarchan *Consolatio ad Apollonium* takes the form of a letter or epistolary essay, ostensibly from Plutarch to a certain Apollonius whose son has unexpectedly died. It belongs to the same genre as the *Axiochus* and presents a similar pastiche of arguments, based primarily on a jumble of quotations "emptied from the sack rather than scattered by hand." The overall perspective is Platonist, as in the *Axiochus*, so it is noteworthy that the letter opens by praising Apollonius' young son for being "especially careful to observe the conventions of *piety* and *justice* toward the gods, his parents, and his peers" (διαφερόντως τά τε πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ τὰ πρὸς γονεῖς καὶ φίλους ὅσια καὶ δίκαια διαφυλάξαντος). Apollonius himself has been neglecting his body and soul because of the tragedy (101f–102a; cf. *Cons. ux.*

σώματι, πολλὴν δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ παντὸς) that it is constantly fighting *in vain* (δυσμαχοῦσαν) against the better (Plutarch, *Is. Os.* 370e–371b; cf. *An. proc.* 1015b–c). These remarks do not easily transfer to the anthropological realm in the form of a rigid body/soul dualism, even if they imply it, so one must take Plutarch seriously when he indicates that good and bad are *mixed* in both soul and body. Cf. John Dillon, "Plutarch and God: Theodicy and Cosmogony in the Thought of Plutarch," in *Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, Its Background and Aftermath* (eds. D. Frede and A. Laks; PA 89; Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2002), 223–237.

609f–610b). In modern terms one could say that he is out of his mind with grief. The subsequent string of consolatory arguments includes a lengthy quote from the *Phaedo* (66b–67b), in which Socrates discusses the various hindrances which the body presents to the soul: diseases, lusts, desires, fears, fantasies, follies, and so forth: "Thus when we are freed from the irrationality of the body, or so it seems, we shall be with those like us, seeing for ourselves all that is pure" (*Cons. Apoll.* 108a–d). It is clear from the conclusion of the letter, however, that Apollonius is expected to find special solace in the thought that the soul of his unusually dutiful son will be judged justly. The author promises to send Apollonius a copy of "the divine Plato's" treatise *On the Soul,* then returns to the opening theme of justice with a quote from the judgment scene in the *Gorgias* (523a–524b), ending with Socrates' comment that "death is nothing but the severing of two things from each other, the soul and the body." With this, Apollonius is urged to quit his unhealthy and disturbing mistreatment of his own body and soul and to go about his normal life (κατὰ φύσιν διαγωγὴν ἐλθεῖν*, Cons. Apoll.* 120d–121f).

The *Consolatio ad Apollonium* is instructive both for its reading of Plutarch's anthropology and its treatment of Socrates' remarks in the *Phaedo* and the *Gorgias* respectively. Although the author of the *Consolatio* is not explicit concerning a tripartite anthropology, the letter can be so read in view of Plutarch's emphasis on the mind as the superior partner in the human σύνθετον. That the soul and body appear more or less as coequals in the framing remarks consequently limits the negative implications of the

Phaedonic argument. However much the body may hinder the soul, to neglect or mistreat it in the normal course of daily life would not only be unhealthy but contrary both to nature (φύσις) and to the conventions of piety and justice. In this context the Gorgianic argument does not contradict the Phaedonic argument, as it does in the *Axiochus,* but qualifies it. Freedom from the body may *perhaps* prove to be good (μήποτε γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀναφαίνηται, *Cons. Apoll.* 108d), but only for persons who, like Apollonius' son, have carefully observed their obligations to the gods, their family, their peers, and themselves. Underwriting this viewpoint is the same essentially conservative commitment to the body *as a political and social entity* as we saw in Plato and Philo. Thus for all its potential to slide into unrestrained anthropological dualism, Plutarchan Platonism retains a deontological emphasis on piety and justice that virtually demands consideration for the discrete parts of the human constitution as aspects of a larger whole, including both the human body and the body politic.

11. The Final Frontier

Plutarch describes the experience of a soul after separation from the body in *de Genio Socratis,* where he relates a myth concerning a younger companion of Socrates named Timarchus. Wanting to learn the nature of Socrates' daemon, Timarchus consulted the oracle of Trophonius at Lebadeia. During an incubation period of two nights and a day in the cave of the oracle, an apparent blow to the head released his soul:

> And as it was rising it was joyfully mixing with the translucent and pure air. Then it seemed to breathe again, stretching out for the first time in ages, and to grow larger than before, spreading out like a sail, whereupon it heard the faint rushing of something revolving above its head with a pleasant sound. Gazing upward the earth was nowhere to be seen, but islands shimmering with a soft glow were exchanging hues with one another like dye, one after the other as the light varied with their motions (*Gen. Socr.* 590b–c).

Elsewhere Plutarch writes that souls which have been raised for too long in the body are affected like captive birds, realighting time and again to return to the body (*Cons. ux.* 611d–e). This latter account can scarcely be taken as an absolute rule since it speaks urgently and specifically to the untimely death of his two-year old daughter, yet both images evoke the same conception of the soul as an essentially aerial entity as we observed in Philo.[91] Plutarch deploys such imagery particularly effectively in the Timarchus myth in order to convey a sense of the soul's welcome release after long years spent in the cramped quarters of the body, which brings us to the second of the two problems mentioned above concerning the standard interpretation of Socrates' prison imagery, namely the problem of *space.*[92]

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91. Above, p. 156.

92. Above, pp. 143–68

As I defined the first of these two problems, the traditional assumption that the corporeal body itself is a house of correction runs into exegetical difficulties with Socrates' indication in the *Phaedrus* that souls experience correction and pay penalties for wrongdoing even when they are absent from such bodies. In the subsequent discussion I highlighted two different ways of handling the recalcitrant passage that depend on two different views of the cosmos, which I schematized as the Proclan model and the Numenian model respectively. I then argued, firstly, that Proclus' view of life in this world as characterized chiefly by δίκη, or trial, accurately reflects Plato's trademark emphasis on justice, and, secondly, drawing an analogy between the subterranean τόποι and earthly bodies, that Plato's peculiar metaphysics are based less on a theory of corporal punishment than an inherently conservative theory of *social justice* in which full equality is deferred to a future moment when souls will behold justice itself rather than its imperfect images. In the here and now, a body adorned with particular kinds of monuments simultaneously *preserves* the memory of a soul's past life and *signifies* the social location where the soul is presently 'buried' or 'imprisoned'. As a περίβολος the body must therefore be *maintained* and *guarded* according to the conventions of piety and justice. Finally, I argued that these same basic emphases together with a similar commitment to the body as a political and social entity prevent even forerunners of Numenius like Philo and Plutarch from descending into unrestrained anthropological

dualism, regardless of the various ends to which they exploit the commonplace ontological distinction between the mortal body and the immortal soul.

The problem of space can be approached by looking at a recent attempt to extricate ancient anthropological concepts from Cartesian categories. Commenting on Aristotle's survey of various philosophical accounts of the soul, "all of which identify it with some kind of stuff," Martin calls attention to the fact that Aristotle extracts a triplex definition of the soul as having "movement, perception, and incorporeality" (*De an.* 1.2.405b). Concerning the last of these qualities, Martin explains that "the soul could be incorporeal and still be composed of 'stuff'. One could believe that the soul should not be called a 'body' but still understand it as occupying space, as having a 'place'." His point is basically correct; the soul "cannot be placed in the Cartesian category of nonmatter, since for Descartes (and for the traditional modern understanding) something is 'matter' or 'physical' if it occupies space".[93] In relying on Aristotle to help make that point, however, he overlooks a longstanding debate over the very nature of 'space' and 'place'.

That debate began with Aristotle himself in his comments on Plato's theory of space (χώρα) as the Receptacle or the Nurse of All Becoming (*Tim.* 48e–52d). In the *Physics* Aristotle argues that Plato equates matter (ὕλη) with space (χώρα), "because the participant (μεταληπτικόν) and space (χώραν) are one and the same" (*Phys.* 209b). Although Plato uses neither ὕλη nor μεταληπτικόν in the *Timaeus,* Aristotle evidently

93. Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 8.

presumed that his description of the Receptacle as in some way participating (μεταλαμβάνον) in the intelligible (*Tim.* 51a–b) refers to the Demiurgic process whereby inchoate matter receives shapes and numbers and is separated into the geometrically configured four elements (*Tim.* 53b). Elsewhere he criticizes Plato for failing to clarify whether the 'omnirecipient' (the Receptacle as πανδεχές) is separate from the elements (*Gen. corr.* 329a). This lack of clarity stems in part from Plato's account of the Receptacle as both the ἐν ᾧ and the ἐξ οὗ of the phenomenal flux. In other words, Plato alternately characterizes the Receptacle as that *in which* phenomenal bodies come to be and pass away and the substrate *out of which* they are made. What is clear is that the translation of χώρα as 'space' in his account of the Receptacle must be accompanied by a question: what *kind* of space?

Aristotle intreprets Plato's χώρα in terms of the first of three historical concepts of space discussed by Keimpe Algra, namely as "a kind of prime stuff or 'reservoir of physical possibilities.'" According to Algra, this kind of space "is present in theories which tend to focus on the extension of individual things, without regarding this extension as separate or separable."[94] Aristotle himself differentiates between the magnitude (μεγέθος) which matter possesses in its inchoate or undivided state and the division of magnitude (τὸ διάστημα τοῦ μεγέθους) or the dimensionality which shape and

94. Keimpe Algra, *Concepts of Space in Greek Thought* (PA 65; Leiden; New York: Brill, 1995), 15–16.

form give to matter. His example is the sphere: "for when the limits and properties of a sphere are removed nothing but matter remains." This is a purely conceptual exercise, however. Since he considers matter and form to be inseparable, he can also say that the division of magnitude *is* matter. His main criticism of Plato both in the *Physics* and in *Generation and Corruption* is that Plato went this far and no further: "Everyone says that place is something (εἶναί τι τὸν τόπον), but only he tried to say what it is." Unfortunately he stopped short: "he said that space (χώρα) and place (τόπος) are one and the same thing" (*Phys.* 209b). Having discussed the division of the Receptacle *qua* χώρα into the primary elements, "he makes no use of it" (*Gen. corr.* 329b). In short, Aristotle relegates Plato's account to the status of a prolegomenon to his own discussion, praising Plato for trying to define place but criticizing him for equating it with space.

From Aristotle's perspective, Plato's conception of space as matter defined by division and limits is not the same thing as place, nor, as Algra explains, can it adequately account for the phenomenon of locomotion: "since space of [this] kind is not separate—rather it is a constitutive element of (and closely tied to) the particular body at issue—it will be unable to play any role of importance in an account of the location or the motion of individual physical objects."[95] Aristotle was already attuned to this problem when he broached the notion of natural place:

95. Algra, *Concepts of Space*, 16.

> That there is such a thing as place (τόπος) seems clear from the phenomenon of mutual exchange: where there is now water, it flows out from there as if from a vessel and air enters in turn, and whenever any other body takes this same place (τόπος). This, then, seems to be different from all of them with their comings and goings—for air is now in that which formerly held water—so it is clear that for both the place (τόπος) is one thing and the space (χώρα) into and out of which they alternate another. Furthermore, the motions of the elementary physical bodies like fire, air, and the like confirm not only that place is something (ἐστί τι ὁ τόπος) but also that is has some potency (δύναμιν), since, when unhindered, each is carried to its own place (εἰς τὸν αὐτοῦ τόπον)" (*Phys.* 208b.1–12).

A little further on he remarks that "the potency of place must be something exceptional and prior to all things," since nothing can exist without having place yet place itself exists independently (*Phys.* 208b.34–209a.1). Together with the corollary idea of natural motion (*Phys.* 211a4–5) and his definition of place as "the limit of the containing body" or "the innermost motionless boundary of what contains" (*Phys.* 212a.6; 20), this notion of place was supposed to provide what is lacking in Plato's cosmology, a limit that is separable from the thing delimited and which can therefore provide a physical explanation for the twin phenomena of location and locomotion, rest and motion, yet without positing the active infusion of forms by the Demiurge:

> For Aristotle, the limit is found within place, indeed as part of place itself. Limit is ingredient in place from the beginning—indeed, *as* the beginning of an ordered natural world—and is not imposed by an external ordering agent. Hence there is no need to invoke a deific regulator, a divine inseminator possessing a *Logos spermatikos*. Places have their own independent potency.[96]

Aristotle's theory of place was criticized almost from the outset, even by his successors.[97] More importantly for our period, in and around the first century C.E., Plutarch perceived that it was compatible with Stoic notions of natural place and natural motion but incompatible with Stoicism's emphasis on divine providence.[98] Behind his

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96. Edward S. Casey, *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1997), 55–56.

97. Most notably Theophrastus, although the conventional interpretation of the relevant texts has recently been challenged by Ben Morison, "Did Theophrastus Reject Aristotle's Account of Place?" *Phronesis* 55.1 (2010): 68–103.

98. Whether the Stoics derived their theories of place from Aristotle or the Peripatetic school writings is disputed. For the affirmative view, together with a useful summary of the main points of convergence and divergence, see David E. Hahm, *The Origins of Stoic Cosmology* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), 91–135, esp. 114–126 on natural place and natural motion.

dismissal of Aristotle's view as "more plausible than true," therefore, lies a thinly veiled attack on Stoicism (*Def. orac.* 424c). Plutarch's remarks elsewhere are equally pointed:

> If none of the parts of the cosmos holds anything other than a natural position, but each is placed where it belongs, needing neither transposition nor rearrangement nor having required such in the beginning, I cannot fathom what role there is for providence or of what Zeus, "the master-artisan," is maker and father-creator.… (*Fac.* 927a–b).

> Furthermore, it is necessary to let go of the habits and opinions that enslave us in order to speak confidently about the actual fact that no part of the whole seems to have independent position, composition, or movement of its own that could in any way be called 'simple' according to nature. On the contrary, whenever each part usefully and properly furnishes itself to that for the sake of which it has come to be and for the purpose of which it has been produced or fashioned, moving and being affected or acting and being disposed as is fitting for the preservation or beauty or function of that thing, *then* it seems to have place (χώραν), motion, and disposition in accordance with nature. The human being, at any rate (who is as 'natural' as any other being) has heavy and earthy parts above, especially in the head, and hot and fiery parts in the middle regions. Some teeth grow upward and some grow downward and neither is contrary to nature,

> nor is the gleaming of fire around the eyes in accordance with nature while that in the belly and the heart is contrary to nature, but each has been properly and usefully arrayed (*Fac.* 927d–f).

In effect, Plutarch takes a position akin to that of the modern movement known as Intelligent Design (I. D.). The issue for Plutarch is not whether god exists, as in popular debates pitting I. D. against the evolutionary theory, but whether the discernible order of the cosmos attests to the intervention of a deity who remains in some sense above and beyond that order.[99] Like modern advocates of I. D., Plutarch grounds his argument in observations about nature that the prevailing theory allegedly fails to explain. Why, he asks, do human beings have a counterintuitive constitution in which a supposedly lighter element like fire appears not only in the head but also in the belly, while the head itself is partially composed of 'heavy' earth? What holds such beings together? Order for Plutarch—especially human order—is not the result of immanent physical processes but

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99. An argument against the Stoic conception of god that seems to have originated in the Skeptical Academy does conclude, given Stoic premises, that god must not exist, but that is not the point of Plutarch's remarks here. See G. R. Boys-Stones, "Locating the Cosmos: An Academic Argument against Chrysippus," *Mnemosyne* 50.5 (1997): 577–585, esp. 584: "Plutarch does think that the cosmos is as such sustained by god, or a god, at any rate, namely the world soul. But *his* world soul is created and given its sustaining role by *the* ineffable god, who looks on from the outside … "

of divine intervention. Not only the body as a whole but each specific part has a place that is connected with its purpose. Consequently one cannot simply assume that his myth of Timarchus reflects Aristotelian or Stoic notions of space and place. However much he may complain that the body cramps or confines the soul, his writings also attest to an ongoing sense that the purpose of the body involves more than just containment. Only when it has fulfilled that purpose, which includes both the memory-survival and signification of the soul, does it return to its element. Then, too, the soul returns to its element, expanding upward and outward as it mingles with the air.

12. Utopia

The difficulties created by uncritically imposing an Aristotelian definition of place on Platonist authors can be further illustrated by looking at Socrates' account of the soul's 'final destination', the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος or "supercelestial place." In the *Phaedrus* Socrates mentions that certain souls stand on the outer surface of heaven and behold "the things outside of heaven" (τὰ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ). He describes this supercelestial place as a possession of the colorless, formless, and imperceptible truly existing essence (ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφὴς οὐσία ὄντως οὖσα, *Phaedrus* 247b–c). Such a dense constellation of alpha-privatives indicates, paradoxically, that one ought also to conceptualize the 'owner' of this place in non-spatial or non-locative terms, as Aristotle himself suggests when he argues that "neither place (τόπος) nor void nor time exists outside the heaven" (*Cael.* 279a.11–12). In fact, Plato's divinely ineffable landlord and

Aristotle's Unmoved Mover are both placeless in some sense, but the similarity between the two conceptions is deceptive. As Casey has observed, Aristotle's Mover is logically corollary to his conception of place:

> Since the physical world takes care of itself by appearing from the start as fully formed, the only pertinent deity is an utterly stationary Mover who is (despite the appellation) eternally at rest *outside the world* and thus in effect *nowhere at all.* All places belong to the world, but the world itself has no place of its own … now the only philosophically legitimate null place is located neither before creation (as in ex nihilo accounts) nor *between* bits of created matter (as in the infinite void of the Atomists) but in the very being of the Unmoved Mover.[100]

Plato cannot have held a similar view, if Aristotle's critique is correct, because he simply lacks a robust conception of place. Plato proceeds instead from the double perspective of anthropology and metaphysics. Thus for the bulk of this chapter I have attempted to replace the common supposition that he and his heirs universally treat the body as little more than a crude container for the soul with a more nuanced appreciation of the close and complex relationship between the semiotic function of the body—what Käsemann called its communicative capacity—and Platonic notions of piety and justice.

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100. Casey, *The Fate of Place*, 56.

On the former, Aristotelian reading we should literally expect the soul that rises to the heights of heaven to go *nowhere,* yet this is precisely opposite the expectation implied by comments like the following from Philo:

> Now place (τόπος) has a threefold definition. Firstly, it is space (χώρα) filled by body. Secondly, it is the divine logos, which God himself has wholly filled with incorporeal powers … And according to the third signification God himself is called place for encompassing everything yet being encompassed by nothing whatsoever, for providing refuge for all, and because he is a district (χώρα) unto himself, self-indwelling and self-supporting. I indeed am not *a place* (οὔκ εἰμι τόπος), but I am *in place* (ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τόπῳ), as is every being; for what is encompassed differs from that which encompasses it, but God, being encompassed by nothing, is necessarily a place unto himself (αὐτὸ τόπος ἑαυτοῦ) (Philo, *Somn.* 1.62–64).

The first of Philo's definitions resembles the very view that Aristotle rejects in his comments on Plato's Receptacle. The third shares Aristotle's notion of place as encompassing yet not encompassed, which is all the more remarkable for the fact that he and Aristotle arrive at irreconcilable conceptions of 'god'. He retains an interventionist metaphysic similar to what we observed in Plutarch, as well as a sense of divine law and human freedom that is more closely related to Plato's anthropology than to Aristotle's

physics. Thus for Philo to be "in place" has more to do with virtue and moral accountability than with the laws of nature.

The issue is complicated by Philo's deployment of an Aristotelian image in his comments on Gen 2:17, from which he extracts two kinds of death. He describes the 'common' kind of death, "that which exists by nature," as the soul's release from "an evil and dead coprisoner, the body" (κακοῦ καὶ νεκροῦ συνδέτου τοῦ σώματος). The second, more distinctive kind of death, "that of the soul entombed by all kinds of passions and evils," is added to the punishment (τιμωρίᾳ), like salt rubbed into a wound (*Leg.* 1.106-108; cf. Plutarch, *Fac.* 943a–b). The imagery of these remarks goes back to one of Aristotle's early works, now lost, in which he reportedly deployed the Tyrrhenians' notorious practice of torturing their captives by chaining them face to face with corpses (νεκροί) as an analogy to the punishment meted out to souls for their sins (Iamblichus, *Protr.* 47.21–48.9 = frag. 6 Rose). This has been seen as evidence that Aristotle went through a Platonic phase or, as A.P. Bos argues, that he maintained a non-Platonistic dualism in which the corpse in the Tyrrhenian torture corresponds to the visible body and the living body corresponds to the soul plus the incorporeal *pneuma.*[101] Bos finds evidence of Aristotle's influence in the tripartite anthropology of Plutarch's *de Facie in orbe lunae* and treatise X of the *Corpus Hermeticum,* and such influence is also probable

101. Abraham P. Bos, "Aristotle on the Etruscan Robbers: A Core Text of 'Aristotelian Dualism'," *JHPh* 41.3 (2003): 289–306.

in Philo's case, yet it is difficult to reconcile Aristotle's extant view of nature as essentially a byproduct of eternally immanent physical processes with Philo's notion of the physical body as both a possession of its creator and a product of divine jurisprudence. As poorly as Philo's comments on Gen 2:17 reflect on the body, therefore, and as sharply as they contrast with his relative valorization of the body elsewhere, the emphasis in both cases must fall on *the body as the arena where law and justice are enacted.*[102] Those who remain 'buried' in the throes of passion and wickedness signify their place in the divine order of things no less than those who remain steadfastly observant of the law (including, of course, its various provisions for repentance). There is no neutral territory in between.[103]

From this perspective, which, I have argued, is basically faithful both to Plato and to the Jewish tradition as Philo knew it, the only neutral place is paradoxically *like no other*

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102. Cf. Dieter Zeller, "The Life and Death of the Soul in Philo of Alexandria: The Use and Origin of the Metaphor," *Studia Philonica Annual* 7 (1997): 19–55, esp. 44–45 and 48–49. A revised German translation is available in Dieter Zeller, *Studien zu Philo und Paulus* (165; Göttingen: V & R Unipress; Bonn University Press, 2011), 55–99.

103. In the closest conceptual parallel in early Jewish literature, those who are guilty of worshipping the creation rather than the creator are said to have been handed over to their passion (Rom 1:24–28).

place because it stands in relation to all places as an archetype to its copies. It is Place itself, and (Philo would no doubt agree) Justice itself—"a refuge for all."[104] To be *in* place therefore involves varying degrees of conformity to the divine image or, what is essentially the same thing, the divine logos.[105] Philo even indicates that the human body is fashioned after the the cosmos itself, which is the *visible image* of its creator:

> Every human being is adapted to the divine logos on account of the mind, it being an impression or fragment or effulgence of that blessed nature, and to the whole cosmos on account of the constitution of the body, for it is mixed from the same things: earth, water, air, and fire. Each of these elements contributed its share to the filling up of the most sufficient material, which the creator had to receive in order to fashion this *visible image* (ὁρατὴν ταύτην εἰκόνα, *Opif.* 146).

The body thus presents itself to Philo as the visible image of a visible image, a microcosm of creation. As such, the body provides a *visible* indicator of one's likeness to the divine,

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104. On the notion of God as place in ancient Judaism, see Shmuel Sambursky, *The Concept of Place in Late Neoplatonism* (Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1982), 15.

105. George H. van Kooten, *Paul's Anthropology in Context: The Image of God, Assimilation to God, and Tripartite Man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early Christianity* (WUNT 232; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 48, 54–57.

whether positively or negatively. Thus Philo can describe the wicked as "carrying the body about like a tomb" (τὸ σῶμα οἷα τύμβον περιφέροντας, *QG* 1.70), yet even those who fly from the body "as if from a prison or a tomb" (ὥσπερ ἐξ εἱρκτῆς ἢ μνήματος) do not nullify its function as an image or, alternatively, as an *index* of the soul's true place (*Somn.* 1.139). Instead they show it to be an 'empty' tomb on which their *askēsis* is displayed as "an ornament and badge of beauty" (*QG* 2.69).

13. Treasure in Earthen Vessels

Citing Käsemann, J. Louis Martyn writes of Gal 6:17 that Paul considers his body "to be a major form of communication, alongside the words of his letter.… Paul's physical body is thus a place in which one finds a sign of the present activity of the redeemer in the world."[106] What Martyn does not say is that Paul radically reconfigures the popular Platonic notion that willful asceticism signifies the soul's hopeful anticipation of ascending to its true home, yet without jettisoning basic propositions like the σῶμα-σῆμα formula. Though Paul may beat his body into submission (1 Cor 9·27), more often he points to physical suffering and psychic depredation inflicted *from without,* rather than heroic feats of asceticism, as indicators of God's decisive intervention in the affairs of the cosmos. Nowhere is this more evident than in 2 Cor 4:7–12, a passage that Martyn and other commentators regularly cite as a parallel to Gal 6:17:[107]

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106. Martyn, *Galatians*, 568–569.

107. Betz, *Galatians*, 324, n. 129; Bruce, *Galatians*, 275–276; Borse, *Galater*, 255; Dunn,

> We have this treasure (θησαυρὸν) in earthen vessels (ἐν ὀστρακίνοις σκεύεσιν), so that this extraordinary power might be from God and not from us. In all things we are hard-pressed but not crushed, needy but not destitute, persecuted but not forsaken, struck down but not destroyed, always carrying about the death of Jesus in the body (πάντοτε τὴν νέκρωσιν τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι περιφέροντες) so that the life of Jesus may be visible in our body (ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡμῶν φανερωθῇ). For while we live we are constantly being handed over to death because of Jesus, so that the life of Jesus may be visible in our mortal flesh. So then, death works in us but life in you.

One of the derived meanings of the word περιφέρειν is 'to publish', which seems to be the sense in which both Philo and Paul use it. In so doing they both evoke the earliest definition of σῶμα to have come down to us: "some say that it is a tomb … because by it the soul signifies whatever it signifes, for which reason it is rightly called 'σῆμα'" (Plato, *Cratylus* 400c). Paul's body is not an *empty* tomb but a tomb in which he dwells with Christ (Gal 2:19–20). In that sense his body serves an *indexical* function by marking the place where Christ is. What is equally clear from passages like 1 Cor 2:4–7 and Gal 6:17, however, is that Paul's body also serves a *symbolic* function.

Galatians, 347.

5. Galatian Bodies

This chapter gathers together and develops the results from the previous chapters in order to address a single question: how does the metaphor of the body as a tomb-that-signifies inflect Paul's representation of bodies in Galatians? That question will be considered under three headings: Paul's body, the Galatian bodies, and the body of Christ.

1. Paul's Body

The most natural staring point for our discussion of Paul's body is his reference to the στίγματα of Jesus (Gal 6:17). In order fully to comprehend the function(s) of those signs within the context of Galatians, however, it will be necessary contextualize them within the wider metaphor of the chariot race in which the agitators are trying to shipwreck the Galatians and recruit them to their own stable. To anticipate our conclusion, Paul represents both the sign of circumcision in the Galatians' flesh and the cicatrized signs on his own body as brandmarks signifying ownership.[1] Although that representation does not

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1. The view that Paul has some kind of branding or tattooing in mind, either of slaves or persons devoted to the service of some deity, has been endorsed by Lightfoot, *Galatians*, 225; Burton, *Galatians*, 360–361; Duncan, *Galatians*, 193–194; Lagrange, *Galates*, 167; Otto Betz, "στίγμα," *TDNT* 7:657–664; Cole, *Galatians*, 186; Vos, *Galatians*, 119; Betz, *Galatians*, 323–325; Bruce, *Galatians*, 275–276; Gerhard Ebeling, *The Truth of the Gospel: An Exposition of Galatians* (trans. D.

Green; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), 264; Lührmann, *Galatians*, 122; Dunn, *Galatians*, 346–347; Martyn, *Galatians*, 568 n. 71; Williams, *Galatians*, 167–168; Witherington, *Grace in Galatia*, 454; and Weidmann, *Galatians*, 132–133. The best survey of the different terms for branding versus tatooing is Christopher P. Jones, "Stigma: Tattooing and Branding in Graeco-Roman Antiquity," *JRS* 77 (1987): 139-155. According to Jones: "'stigmata' are almost always tattoo- and not brand-marks; the branding of animals is virtually never designated by *stigma* but by a word denoting a burn or a stamp; the branding of humans was exceptional, and is designated by the word *stigma* only rarely and at a comparatively late date" (140–141). Jones agrees with many of the commentators cited above in his suggestion that Paul probably "refers to marks caused by ill-treatment, but regards them figuratively as the tatoos imposed on him as a slave of Christ" (150). Jones concedes, however, that in the Roman period *stigma* could be used by extension of branding. That usage may be attested in Diodorus of Sicily (34/35.2.1, 27, 32, 36) and Martial (6.64.24–26), but Martial's Latin is ambiguous and Jones doubts that the text of Diodorus is well preserved in the Byzantine sources (153–154). Importantly, the other texts that he rules out as evidence for the practice of branding humans tend to compare humans to animals in metaphorical or farcical contexts (Eup. 318K; Lucian, *Pisc.* 46; cf. Lucian, *Cat.* 24–28). On the whole, therefore, his survey indicates that *stigmata* did not normally designate brandmarks on animals or humans

seem, at first glance, to demonstrate the tomblike nature of the body, Franz Dölger found in a thorough study of brandmarks that a number of signs known to have been branded on racehorses appear as well on a 363 C.E. epitaph from Rome. Dölger concluded that the signs on the tombstone and the signs on racehorses alike served an apotropaic function.[2] Heintz summarizes: "To the persons who commissioned the stone, the symbols must have had the apotropaic qualities necessary to secure a safe passage into the afterlife for the deceased."[3] That Paul held a similar view of his στίγματα can be illustrated through comparison with his use of chariot racing metaphors elsewhere in his letters, evidence from Clement of Alexandria's *Excerpts from Theodotus,* and through exegesis of Galatians itself.

Notwithstanding the late date of the tombstone discussed by Dölger, there are indications in Paul's other letters that he already uses victory in the chariot race as a

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but could be understood as such in figurative contexts. That conclusion is confirmed by a text that Jones overlooked (Clement of Alexandria, *Exc.* 4.86.2). See below pp. 199 for discussion.

2. Franz Joseph Dölger, "Profane und religiöse Brandmarkung der Tiere in der heidnischen und christlichen Antike," in *Antike und Christentum: kultur- und religionsgeschichtliche Studien* (6 vols.; Münster in Westfalen: Aschendorff, 1975), 3:61.

3. Heintz, "Agonistic Magic," 191.

metaphor for the defeat of death and the safe passage of the deceased to the afterlife. The prophetic cento in 1 Cor 15:54–55 is especially relevant to this point, as are Paul's comments about attaining to the resurrection in Phil 3:12–14:[4]

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4. On 1 Cor 15:54–55, see above p. 43, n. 30. The default view concerning Phil 3:12–14 is that it describes a footrace rather than a chariot race. That view was established by Joseph Barber Lightfoot, *St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians. A Revised Text with Introduction, Notes, and Dissertations* (8th ed.; London: MacMillan, 1888), 152–153, followed by Victor C. Pfitzner, *Paul and the Agon Motif: Traditional Athletic Imagery in the Pauline Literature* (NovTSup 16; Leiden: Brill, 1967), 141 and Brändl, *Agon*, 300, n. 46. It is almost invariably expressed by means of comparison with 1 Cor 9:24 and the claim that the footrace is Paul's 'usual' metaphor. No rationale is given for taking Phil 3:12–14 out of its context in the letter. Even scholars attuned to the distinctively Roman character both of Philippi and of Paul's imagery in his correspondence with the Philippians tend to indicate that Phil 3:12–14 describes a footrace, which is a distinctively Greek event. See, e.g., Edgar Krentz, "Paul, Games, and the Military," in *Paul in the Greco-Roman world: A Handbook* (ed. J. P. Sampley; Harrisburg: Trinity, 2003), 344–381, esp. 347 (on the Roman preference for gladiatorial games and chariot races over athletic contests), 352 (on Phil 3:12–14), and 355–363 (a lengthy discussion of militaristic language in Philippians, introduced by an account of the reconstitution of Philippi as

Οὐχ ὅτι ἤδη ἔλαβον ἢ ἤδη τετελείωμαι, διώκω δὲ εἰ καὶ καταλάβω, ἐφ' ᾧ καὶ κατελήμφθην ὑπὸ Χριστοῦ [Ἰησοῦ]. ἀδελφοί, ἐγὼ ἐμαυτὸν οὐ λογίζομαι κατειληφέναι· ἓν δέ, τὰ μὲν ὀπίσω ἐπιλανθανόμενος τοῖς δὲ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπεκτεινόμενος, κατὰ σκοπὸν διώκω εἰς τὸ βραβεῖον τῆς ἄνω κλήσεως τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.

Not that I have already won or that I am already finished, but I press on in hope that I may sieze that for which I was siezed by Christ. Beloved, I do not consider myself to have seized it; and for that reason, forgetting what lies behind and straining toward what lies ahead, I press on with an eye toward the prize of the heavenly call of God in Christ Jesus.

This correlation between victory in the race and resurrection suggests that the στίγματα on Paul's body are ideologically equivalent both to brandmarks signifying ownership and to

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a veterans' colony after the battle of Actium in 30 B.C.E.). Krentz does not explain why Roman influence in Philippians extends only to Paul's use of civic and military imagery. Cf. E. M. Blaiklock, *Cities of the New Testament* (Westwood, N. J.: Revell, 1965) and David John Williams, *Paul's Metaphors: Their Context and Character* (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1999), 260–262, both of whom interpret Phil 3:12–14 as an allusion to chariot racing.

inscriptions on the body/tomb that he is always "carrying about" (1 Cor 4:10). There is good evidence, moreover, that one of his earliest interpreters understood that relationship.

Dölger noted, in particular, that the noun *sphragis* and the verb *sphragizein* are used to describe brandmarks on animals as well as seals or signets. In addition to several papyri, he drew his key example from Clement of Alexandria's *Excerpts from Theodotus*:[5]

> Ἐπὶ τοῦ προ<σ>κομισθέντος νομίσματος ὁ Κύριος εἶπεν οὐ· «Τίνος τὸ κτῆμα;» ἀλλά· «Τίνος ἡ εἰκὼν καὶ ἡ ἐπιγραφή; Καίσαρος» (Mark 12:16 par.)· ἵνα οὗ ἐστιν, ἐκείνῳ δοθῇ. Οὕτως καὶ ὁ πιστός· ἐπιγραφὴν μὲν ἔχει διὰ Χριστοῦ τὸ Ὄνομα τοῦ Θεοῦ, τὸ δὲ Πνεῦμα ὡς εἰκόνα. Καὶ τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα διὰ σφραγῖδος δείκνυσι τίνος ἐστὶν ἕκαστον· καὶ ἐκ τῆς σφραγῖδος ἐκδικεῖται. Οὕτως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ πιστή, τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας λαβοῦσα σφράγισμα, «τὰ στίγματα τοῦ Χριστοῦ» περιφέρει (*Exc.* 4.86.2; cf. Gal 6:17).
>
> In the case of the coin brought forth the Lord did not say, "Whose possession is it?" but, "Whose image and inscription is it? Caesar's," in order that it might be given to that person whose it is. So, too, the faithful person has the Name of God as an inscription through Christ, and the Spirit as an image. Even irrational animals show through a seal whose property each is; and they are claimed by the

5. Dölger, "Profane und religiöse Brandmarkung," 31–33.

seal. So, too, the faithful soul, having received the seal of truth, carries around "the *stigmata* of Christ."

The importance of this text is difficult to overestimate. First, it shows that Theodotus understood Paul's στίγματα in a figurative sense as being comparable to brandmarks stamped on animals. This does not prove that Paul himself had the same metaphor in mind, but it does confirm the perspicuity of the metaphor in an ancient setting. Second, Clement's excerpt unmistakeably connects the στίγματα of Jesus with 2 Cor 4:10a, where Paul speaks of "carrying about the death of Jesus in the body" (τὴν νέκρωσιν τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι περιφέροντες). Lastly, as we saw at the end of the previous chapter, the image of "carrying about" or "publishing" things on the body has strong ties to the Platonic metaphor of the body as a tomb-that-signifies.

2. Galatian Bodies

How the Galatians' bodies function as tombs-that-signify can best be illustrated against the backdrop of the agitators' desire to 'own' the Galatians' by any means necessary—including curse magic. By pressuring the Galatians to circumcise, Paul implies, the agitators have separated them from Christ and returned them to the realm of the weak and beggarly cosmic στοιχεῖα (Gal 4:3, 8–9). There, the Galatians will be hemmed in under the power of sin (Gal 3:22).[6] The result of this transferral is the revivification of the flesh

6. The precise nature of the *stoicheia* remains open to debate, but few interpreters

with its passions and desires and thence the re-enslavement of the Galatians to entities that are, in effect, authorized by scripture to bind their limbs and their running.[7] In that way, Paul subtly equates the agitators' activities with illicit trade in aggressive magic, for which charioteers were notorious. Heintz suggests, however, that the order to use such magic often as not came down from a team owner. Thus the discovery that a rival owner had employed a sorcerer could quickly turn the race into a "fully-fledged magical

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doubt that Paul correlates the Galatians' falling once more under their sway with the reception of circumcision. The most sustained argument against the consensus has been mounted by Martin (see above, p. 44, n. 32).

7. For a similar analysis of Rom 7:7–25, see Stanley K. Stowers, *A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 273: "Paul uses the traditional language of external power for these internal forces. But God is the one who has handed the gentile peoples over to the powers, so that even God's law only witnesses to the bondage."

contest."[8] That setting of curse and counter-curse will help us to understand Paul's representation of the stakes in the Galatians' decision to practice circumcision.

In addition to socially sanctioned forms of protective magic such as *fascina,* owners of racing teams would sometimes hire sorcerers to cast distinctive spells called binding spells on their rivals. Such spells were typically inscribed on lead tablets called *defixiones* in Latin, after the practice of transfixing them with nails, and *katadesmoi* or *katathemata* in Greek.[9] They usually call upon chthonic spirits or other powers to bind the limbs and

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8. Heintz, "Agonistic Magic," 17. Heintz's comment is also germane to Galatians for another reason. Interpreters have struggled to explain why Paul appears to call out one individual for judgment in Gal 5:10b: "The person who is unsettling you will bear the judgment, whoever that may be" (ὁ δὲ ταράσσων ὑμᾶς βαστάσει τὸ κρίμα, ὅστις ἐὰν ᾖ). The view that the subject of this remark must be interpreted as a generic singular because Paul refers to the agitators in the plural in Gal 1:7; 4:17; 5:12; and 6:12 has been endorsed by a long list of commentators, including Burton, *Galatians*, 285; Lagrange, *Galates*, LII; Mussner,, 358; Betz, *Galatians*, 267; Bruce, *Galatians*, 235–236; Longenecker, *Galatians*, 232; Hays, "Galatians," 316; Schreiner, *Galatians*, 325; and de Boer, *Galatians*, 320. The pronominal subject of Paul's queries in Gal 3:1 and 5:7 is also singular, however, which seems to indicate that Paul holds a single individual uniquely responsible for unsettling the Galatians.

9. The following summary draws on Christopher A. Faraone, "The Agonistic Context

organs of the victim(s). Once inscribed, curse tablets were rolled up, folded, or both to await burial in graves, subterranean bodies of water, or, in the case of circus spells, strategic locations in or nearby a hippodrome. Favourite spots included the starting gates and turning posts, where crashes were common. Over eighty such tablets targeting charioteers and their horses have come to light, mostly in well-excavated areas that boasted monumental circuses, such as Rome, Syria, and North Africa.[10] The production of

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of Early Greek Binding Spells," in *Magika Hiera: Ancient Greek Magic and Religion* (eds. C. A. Faraone and D. Obbink; New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 3–32, esp. 11–13; John G. Gager, ed*., Curse Tablets and Binding Spells from the Ancient World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 1–77; Heintz, "Agonistic Magic," 22–34; and Daniel Ogden, "Binding Spells: Curse Tablets and Voodoo Dolls in the Greek and Roman Worlds," in *Witchcraft and Magic in Europe: Ancient Greece and Rome* (ed. V. Flint; AHWME 2; London: Athlone, 1999), 1–90. The special corpora of *defixiones* were published around the turn of the twentieth century by Richard Wünsch, *Defixionum tabellae atticae* (CIA; Berlin: Georgium Reimerum, 1897) and Audollent, *DT*. For Greek *defixiones* not included in the these corpora, see David R. Jordan, "A Survey of Greek *Defixiones* Not Included in the Special Corpora," *GRBS* 26.2 (1985): 151-197 and David R. Jordan, "New Greek Curse Tablets," *GRBS* 41.1 (2000): 5–46.

10. In comparison, only four such curses against footracers have been unearthed as of

defixiones for use against chariot teams begins in earnest only in the second century C.E., but literary evidence for the use of binding spells in chariot racing goes all the way back to the Geometric period.[11] The practice was both ancient and well known, therefore, and

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the most recent catalogue. See Jordan, "A Survey of Greek *Defixiones,"* no. 29 (Athens, Agora), no. 157 = Gager, *Curse Tablets*, no. 8 (Oxyrhynchus) and Jordan, "New Greek Curse Tablets," no. 20 (Athens, Agora), no. 26 (Isthmia, Sanctuary of Poseidon).

11. In Homer's account of the chariot race at the funeral games of Patroklos, Menelaos makes Antilokhos swear an oath to Poseidon stating that he did not win second place duplicitously: "Touch the horses and swear by the earth-holder, earth-shaker | That you did not purposefully, through subterfuge, bind my chariot" (ἵππων ἁψάμενος γαιήοχον ἐννοσίγαιον | ὄμνυθι μὴ μὲν ἑκὼν τὸ ἐμὸν δόλῳ ἅρμα πεδῆσαι, *Il.* 23.584–585; cf. Pausanias, *Descr.* 7.21.8). The combination of subterfuge and binding implies the clandestine use of a binding spell. Cf. Pindar, *Ol.* 1.75–75 and Pausanias, *Descr.* 6.20.18, with discussion in Heintz, "Agonistic Magic," 65–67 and 72–74, respectively. See esp. Dio Chrysostom, *Alex.* 32.41–42, with discussion in Heintz, "Agonistic Magic," 69–72. Heintz argues that Chrysostom's comment about *pharmaka* buried in the hippodrome at Alexandria refers not to 'drugs' but to a "highly specific kind of magical implement, namely 'binding spells' invoking chthonic powers and activated by means of burial" (71). That interpretation is also

purveyors of spells could easily be found, but the actual deployment of spells invariably took place covertly, either at night or during the early morning hours before dawn, or just prior to a race with the help of accomplices.

One such spell with a *terminus a quo* in the first century simply identifies itself as a *katara,* a curse, using the same word that Paul deploys to designate both the curse of the law and Christ having become a curse (Audollent, *DT*, no. 241.4; cf. Gal 3:10, 13). The tablet was found along with six other *defixiones* in the grave of a Roman official in Carthage (Tunisia). It measures 11.5 cm on each edge and is inscribed on one side with 33 lines of Greek text. The top margin contains letters, while the bottom, left, and right margins contain letters and quasi-alphabetic signs called *charaktēres*, a common feature of curse tablets and formularies from the first-century C.E. onward. The *charaktēres* may represent astrological symbols, but their significance remains uncertain and possibly escaped even the makers of curse tablets. In this example the letters and *charaktēres* surround the smaller text of the spell on all four sides, mimicking the desired effect of the

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pertinent to Paul's list of "works of the flesh" in Gal 5:19–20. The inclusion of *pharmakeia* or "sorcery" in that list is unique, despite Paul's frequent deployment of similar lists elsewhere in his letters (1 Thess 4:3–6; 1 Cor 5:9–13; 6:9–11; 2 Cor 12:20–21; Rom 1:29–31; 13:13; cf. Col 3:5–8; Eph 4:17–19; 5:3–5; Rev 9:21; 18:23; *Did.* 5:1; *Barn.* 16:7).

spell. As well, their larger size relative to the text of spell gives them an ocular presence that may be have been thought to express their potency.[12]

The spell proper begins with the invocation of several *voces mysticae,* which Gager defines as "words that are not immediately recognizeable as Greek, Hebrew, or any other language in common use at the time."[13] Two of these, IAKOUB and IA, may have Jewish connections.[14] Jewish influence may also be indicated by a subsequent appeal to "the god above the heaven, who is seated upon the Cherubim, who divided the earth and separated the sea," followed by more *voces mysticae,* including IAŌ, ADŌNAI, and SABAŌ (Audollent, *DT*, no. 241.23–27). As Gager notes, however, the maker of the tablet is unlikely to have understood these allusions as anything other than words of power.[15] Following the initial *voces mysticae,* the spell invokes the authority of "the great names"

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12. Cf. Gager, *Curse Tablets*, no. 6 (Apamea, Syria, fifth–sixth centuries C.E.). Thirty-eight such figures appear above the text of the spell, the first line of which addresses them directly as "most holy lord *Charaktêres.*" In the third century, Iamblichus could refer to *charaktēres* as sacred inscriptions prepared for the presence and manifestation of the gods (*Myst.* 3.14.133–134).

13. Gager, *Curse Tablets*, 9.

14. Gager, *Curse Tablets*, 65, n. 76.

15. Gager, *Curse Tablets*, 67, n. 82.

to bind a charioteer named Victoricus and his horses, as well as his teammate Secundinus and his horses. The horses themselves are named before the spell continues:

> … also (bind) as many as may be yoked with them (καὶ ὅσοι ἐάν συνζευθχῶσιν αὐτοῖς). Bind their legs, their onrush, their bounding, and their running (αὐτῶν .. τὸν δρόμον); blind their eyes so that they cannot see and twist their soul and heart so that they cannot breathe.… bind the legs and hands and head and heart of Victoricus the charioteer of the Blue team, for tomorrow; and also (bind) the horses which he is about to race … (Audollent, *DT*, no. 241.12–15, 17–20, trans. Gager, *Curse Tablets*, no. 12, slightly modified).

In addition to his head, his heart, and his horses, the spell explicitly targets "every limb and every sinew of Victoricus" (πᾶν μέλος καὶ πᾶν νεῦρον Βιχτωριχοῦ, Audollent, *DT*, no. 241.6; cf. Rom 7:23). The intent is to impair both his judgment and his physical ability to control his horses, causing him to crash.

In comparison, Paul projects a scenario in which the Galatians are suffering from the paralyzing effects of a similarly comprehensive magical assault targeting both their minds and their bodies. In that scenario they have fallen from grace under the influence of the evil eye, separated themselves from Christ, and yoked themselves simultaneously to the law and the flesh (Gal 3:1; 5:1–7; 5:13–18). Under such circumstances, the correlation between the sign of circumcision and the *stoicheia* of the cosmos is analogous to the

correlation between the mystical *charaktēres* on the Carthaginian curse tablet and the "great names" invoked by the curse. By 'activating' the sign the Galatians will bury the curse of the law in their very bodies, thereby authorizing the *stoicheia* to act upon their flesh—literally to bind their limbs and their running. Their plight will be no better than that of poor Scorpus or the tragic persona in Romans 7.

In contrast, Paul urges the Galatians to 'fall in line' with the spirit: "If we live by the spirit, let us also fall in line with the spirit" (εἰ ζῶμεν πνεύματι, πνεύματι καὶ στοιχῶμεν, Gal 5:24). Later, he offers a blessing upon anyone who 'falls in line' with his *kanōn* or rule for the community: "as many as fall in line with this *kanōn*, peace be upon them" (καὶ ὅσοι τῷ κανόνι τούτῳ στοιχήσουσιν, εἰρήνη ἐπ' αὐτοὺς, Gal 6:16a). The verb *stoichein* meaning "to hold to," "to join ranks with," or simply "to follow" is rare in Paul's letters and rarer still in the rest of the New Testament. It appears once in connection with Paul keeping the law in Acts 21:24, but he himself never uses it that way. In Rom 4:12 he deploys it to describe those who follow the tracks of Abraham. In Phil 3:16 he uses it in an exhortation to hold onto the ground gained in the 'race' for the prize of resurrection.

In both usages in Galatians *stoichein* appears in connection with an image of the cross, either the cross by which those who belong to Christ have crucified the flesh or the cross by which Paul himself has been crucified. In both cases the cross makes following something possible, whether that be the leading of the spirit or Paul's *kanōn* for the new foundation (cf. 1 Cor 3:10). In both cases, as well, the phonological similarity between

stoichein and *stoicheia* invites a comparison between the enabling power of the cross and the enslaving power of the weak and beggarly *stoicheia* (Gal 4:3, 8–9). In sum, how the Galatians are 'marked'—whether or not Christ is 'memoralized' in their body—determines their path to victory (cf. Gal 3:4).

3. Christ's Body

Paul closes the letter, in effect, by placing the agitators themselves and their sympathizers under the curse of the law:

> Ἴδετε πηλίκοις ὑμῖν γράμμασιν ἔγραψα τῇ ἐμῇ χειρί. ὅσοι θέλουσιν εὐπροσωπῆσαι ἐν σαρκί, οὗτοι ἀναγκάζουσιν ὑμᾶς περιτέμνεσθαι, μόνον ἵνα τῷ σταυρῷ τοῦ Χριστοῦ μὴ διώκωνται· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ περιτεμνόμενοι αὐτοὶ νόμον φυλάσσουσιν, ἀλλὰ θέλουσιν ὑμᾶς περιτέμνεσθαι ἵνα ἐν τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ σαρκὶ καυχήσωνται (Gal 6:11–13).
>
> See with what large letters I write to you by my own hand. As many as want to put on a good show in the flesh, they are pressuring you to practice circumcision just so that they may not be pursued by the cross of Christ; for not even those who are practicing circumcision themselves are keeping the law, yet they want *you* to practice circumcision so that they may boast in your flesh.[16]

16. Paul's reference to the cross (τῷ σταυρῷ) in Gal 6:12 is normally interpreted as a

The major question these remarks elicit is how to interpret Paul's charge that the agitators

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dative of cause accompanying the verb *diokein* used in the sense "to persecute." That interpretation has led to elaborate efforts to explain why the agitators feared persecution because of the cross. See, e.g., Robert Jewett, "The Agitators and the Galatian Congregation," *NTS* 17.2 (1971): 198–212. Jewett argues that Zealots instigated a purification campaign in Judea in the late 40s and early 50s, prompting Jewish Christians in Judea to advocate proselyte circumcision throughout the Diaspora in order to avert suspicion that they were associating with lawless Gentiles. A more recent explanation for the agitators' alleged fear of persecution has them encouraging circumcision in order to align the Gentile Galatians with the local Jewish population and thus to secure exemption from participation in the imperial cult has been argued by several scholars. See, most notably, Bruce W. Winter, *Seek the Welfare of the City: Christians as Benefactors and Citizens* (Grand Rapids; Carlisle, UK: Eerdmans; Paternoster, 1994), 123–143; Nanos, *Irony*, 257–271; Justin K. Hardin, *Galatians and the Imperial Cult: A Critical Analysis of the First-Century Social Context of Paul's letter* (WUNT 237; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 24–115. The translation given here renders Paul's reference to the cross as an instrumental dative indicating the means by which the *Galatians* would pursue the agitators had they not been hindered, namely, the cross. For the rendering of *diokein* in the sense "to pursue," see above, n. p. 67, n. 55.

are not keeping the law. A second question is usually regarded as less important and treated in isolation; namely, how to interpret Paul's singular emphasis on his own large handwriting. A cohesive interpretation is suggested, however, by the coincidence in Galatians of unusually dense curse language and the many words and images with connections to chariot racing discussed throughout this study.

Amidst the variety of answers that have been given to the question of how the agitators were failing to keep the law the consensus has settled on a healthy agnosticism. This has much to do with the fact that past proposals have amounted to little more than guesswork. Betz summarizes: "Were they libertines, or were they interested only in circumcision as a magical ritual? Did they keep only part of the Torah, or a special Torah?"[17] Is Paul addressing the conduct of Gentiles who have taken on the rite of circumcision without fully observing other aspects of the law, or the conduct of Jewish-Christians who, like Peter at Antioch, were compelling Gentiles to judaize while they themselves hellenized? Perhaps they were not from a Pharisaic background, as Paul was, so they held a less rigid view of the law? To quote Betz again: "all of these questions indicate possibilities, but none can be proven by evidence."[18] This does not mean that speculation is useless, only that it cannot be grounded in equally baseless theories about the identity of the agitators, not least because Paul purposefully obfuscates their identity.

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17. Betz, *Galatians*, 317.

18. Betz, *Galatians*, 317.

The best hope for discerning the nature of his charges against them lies, rather, in his characterization of their activity and their motives.

Paul's vivid language not only evokes the thunder and theatricality of the circus and the hippodrome but also the pervasive influence of magic and symbols in the world of racing. He cleverly presents the agitators as a rival racing faction intent on shipwrecking the surging Galatians and recruiting them to their own team. To that end they have cast an evil eye on the Galatians, caused them to fall from their chariots, and yoked them to horses running under a different sign, all for the sake of 'putting on a good show in the flesh' so that they may not be pursued, *and overtaken,* by the cross of Christ (Gal 6:12). In that context, their boasting in the Galatians' flesh arguably reflects pride in the mark of ownership. From Paul's perspective, they have lured the formerly spiritual Galatians into joining their stable, causing them to be yoked to the flesh on one hand, and to the law, on the other hand. Given that context and Paul's quotation of Lev 19:18 in Gal 5:14, it is probable but not provable that the image in Gal 5:15 of the Galatians biting and tearing at one another echoes the same Levitical context:

> Τὸν νόμον μου φυλάξεσθε· τὰ κτήνη σου οὐ κατοχεύσεις ἑτεροζύγῳ (Lev 19:19a).
>
> You shall keep my law. You shall not cover your animals with an unequally yoked stud.

Although the prohibition in Lev 19:19a deals specifically with animal husbandry, the rare references to it in contemporary Jewish writings show that it was already being interpreted allegorically. Philo offers three interpretations, concluding with the view that it prohibits plowing a field with animals of unequal strength for the sake of the weaker animal (*Spec.* 4:203–205). He treats that as evidence of God's justice, which opens the possibility of an argument such as Paul makes with respect to the prohibition against muzzling an ox while treading grain: (Deut 25:4): "oxen are no matter to God, are they, or is he speaking mainly for our sake?" (1 Cor 9:9–10).[19] The rare verb *heterozugein* occurs in a similarly figurative context in 2 Cor 6:14, in an admontion to avoid being paired with unbelievers.[20] In short, despite the scarcity of references and allusions to Lev 19:19

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19. Whether God cares for oxen is not at issue here since the commandment clearly expresses concern for their well-being by preventing them from going hungry while working. At issue, rather, is whether such concern is limited only to oxen. In effect, Paul deploys an *a minore ad maius* argument in order to underwrite his application of the commandment to his own apostolate. If the commandment provides for oxen, which are of no consequence to God, how much more must it cover human workers in the field of the lord (1 Cor 9:11; cf. Matt 6:26–30; Luke 12:24–29).

20. Hans Dieter Betz, "2 Cor 6:14–7: 1: An Anti-Pauline Fragment?" *JBL* 92.1 (1973): 89–90. Betz argues that the entire pericope from 2 Cor 6:14–7:1 is an anti-Pauline fragment that is representative of the theology of the agitators in Galatia. He does

elsewhere, there are good reasons to conclude that Paul applies it to the activity of the agitators when he charges them with failing to keep the law.

The weight of scholarly opinion concerning Paul's large handwriting rests on the theory that his letters simply underscore the importance of his closing remarks, rather like modern italics, capitals, or bold face.[21] No satisfactory explanation has yet been given as to why he adopts that strategy only in Galatians. Betz identifies Gal 6:11–18 as the *peroratio* or final appeal of the letter and calls it "the hermeneutical key to the intentions of the Apostle," but there is no intrinsic link between letter size and rhetorical division.[22] More recently, Brigitte Kahl has advanced a provocative but strained empire-critical reading of Galatians in which she re-imagines the postscript as a decryption key that unlocks the secrets of the letter as a whole, but there is likewise no intrinsic link between letter size and '(semi-)public transcripts' or 'coded' anti-imperial rhetoric.[23] *There is an*

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not adequately explain how it found its way into the Pauline corpus.

21. Betz, *Galatians*, 314. For surveys of other hypotheses, see Jeffrey A. D. Weima, "Gal. 6:11-18: A Hermeneutical Key to the Galatian Letter," *CTJ* 28 (1993): 90 n. 1 and Chris Keith, "In My Own Hand: Grapho-Literacy and the Apostle Paul," *Bib* 89.1 (2008): 42–44.

22. Betz, *Galatians*, 313.

23. Brigitte Kahl, *Galatians Re-Imagined: Reading With the Eyes of the Vanquished* (PCC; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2009), 81.

intrinsic link between the visual appearance of letters and their rhetorical function in curses and binding spells, as the *defixio* from Carthage and many others attest.[24] To the

24. Although the rolling up and deposition of curse tablets hid them from human eyes, it did not prevent their makers from deploying various kinds of visual rhetoric. See Ogden, "Binding Spells," 29: "the distinctive rolling of the lead sheet gives a physical twist to the text in one dimension, but the texts themselves were often written in a twisted fashion," mimicking the desired effect of the spell on the target. Other distinctive visual strategies feature prominently on curse tablets and formularies of the Roman period. See, e.g., Gager, *Curse Tablets*, no. 84 (Athens, Greece, I C.E.), showing a six-armed Hecate along with several magical symbols; and no. 5 (Beirut, Syria, II–III C.E.), on which the letters of the name ευλαμω are repeated to form wings for a vulturine head attacking a figure marked with crisscrossed lines, circles, and protrusions representing nails, graphically depicting the binding process. Cf. Audollent, *DT*, nos. 234–240, with commentary by Heintz, "Agonistic Magic," C2.4, group 1, pp. 207–208: "On two examples at least, one or two drivers are represented in the middle of the tablet holding a whip; the physical text spiraling around them [in concentric squares] visually strengthens their binding." Especially interesting in this regard is a multipurpose, fourth-century C.E. formulary entitled "divine assistance from three Homeric verses" (*PGM* 4.2145–2240, trans. Hubert Martin Jr., in Hans Dieter Betz, ed*., The Greek Magical*

extent that the Galatians lived in a culture suffused with magic—in which Pliny the Elder could plausibly say that "there is no one who does not fear to be spellbound by curse tablets" (*Nat.* 28.4.19, trans. Gager, *Curse Tablets*, no. 146)—they will have understood the difference between words that are merely important and words that are *potent.*[25]

Paul's words are clearly intended to be potent because, for all intents and purposes, he is placing "as many as want to put on a good show in the flesh" under the curse of the law. In that context, his use of the indefinite pronominal adjective "as many as" (ὅσοι) is a formulaic way of accounting for developments that occur after the curse is inscribed.[26]

Papyri in Translation, Including the Demotic Spells (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 76–78; Hom. *Il.* 10.564, 521, and 572). The formulary promises, among other things, that a charioteer who carries a sheet of iron engraved with the three verses will remain undefeated. The second half of the text includes a recipe for "wrecking chariots," so the formulary incorporates both performance-enhancing magic and maleficent magic, blessing and curse. The three Homeric verses are written in exceptionally large letters at the beginning of the formulary, and magical power is acribed to them elsewhere (*PGM* IV.470–74; 821–24). For discussion, see Heintz, "Agonistic Magic," F7, pp. 158–162.

25. Pliny's Latin reads: *defigi quidem diris precationibus nemo non metuit.* As Gager notes, the term *defigi* is a technical term for curse tablets.

26. Heintz, "Agonistic Magic," 24: "If the entire list of drivers and horses for each

The same word appears in the blessing in Gal 6:16 and the *defixio* from Carthage, which targets both named horses and "as many as may be yoked with them" (καὶ ὅσοι ἐάν συνζευθχῶσιν αὐτοῖς, Audollent, *DT*, no. 241.12, trans. Gager, *Curse Tablets*, no. 12). What is remarkable about Paul's curse is the manner of its deployment. Whereas *defixiones* were normally deposited anonymously in graves or other strategic locations under the cover of darkness, the activation of Paul's curse requires nothing short of full disclosure. Having arrived at the postscript, the original reader of the letter will have had physically to turn the manuscript around for the Galatians to see Paul's handwriting. Just as Christ was indicted before their very eyes, so too were the agitators. The difference is that Paul actually considers the agitators guilty of transgressing the law. His strategy is expressly designed to expose their clandestine and *illicit* exploitation of the law in the light of the cross—by which Jesus openly became a curse (Gal 3:1, 13). The visual logic of this strategy is once again compelling, for it invites a comparison between the covert sealing of curse tablets by transfixing them with nails and the public nailing of Jesus to the cross.

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faction to be cursed was not available at the time of engraving, magicians could name only a couple of drivers and refer to the rest of the team in all inclusive formulas such as 'with the horses which they race', and 'with those (drivers) who race with them.'"

6. The Sign of the Apostle

This chapter returns to the question raised at the outset of chapter one concerning how Paul's story of himself in Galatians 1–2 relates to the rest of the letter. As such, it forms an inclusio whilst drawing on the results of the intervening chapters. The main thesis is that Paul's story of himself in Galatians 1–2 draws on the same poetics of colonization exemplified by Pindar's story of Tlepolemos in the *Seventh Olympian.* The intervening chapters will provide the 'raw materials' with which to argue that thesis whilst also placing certain limitations on the kinds of conclusions that can reasonably be drawn from correspondences between the story of Paul and the story of Tlepolemos. Most importantly, chapter one has shown that Paul represents Jesus as the hero of the Galatians' foundation story. Strictly speaking, then, Paul does not (and would not) share the title of 'founder' with Jesus. Nevertheless, Paul's understanding of his body as a tomb-that-signifies Jesus indicates that it is possible to think with Hays in terms of an imaginative identification with the founding hero, and with Barclay in terms of the cross punctuating all times and all stories.

To illustrate that point it may be helpful to recall the conclusion of the last chapter. There, we found that Paul's case for 'reading' Jesus as a curse relies on visual logic rather than discursive reasoning or exegetical demonstration. That Christ hung on a tree was prima facie evidence that he was cursed, to be sure, but from the perspective of curse tablets as they were typically deployed in chariot racing and in other contexts it was the

method by which he was hung—the piercing with nails—that sealed the curse and prepared it for 'activation' by deposition in a grave or a tomb. The comparison raises a provocative possibility for re-imagining Paul's 'Christ in me' language in Gal 1:15–16 and 2:20; namely, that Christ dwells in Paul *as a curse,* crucifying the flesh with its passions and desires, binding the limbs of the powers that rule the cosmos, and freeing him to press on toward the prize. Perhaps that is why he taunts Death with words of the prophets in 1 Corinthians: "Death is swallowed up in victory! Where, Death, is your victory? Where, Death, is your goad?" (1 Cor 15:54–54).[1]

Such confidence certainly reflects an imaginative identification with the founding hero, and it is certainly punctuated by the cross. More importantly, it presents a sharp contrast with Paul's 'running' before he was apprehended by the revelation of Christ in him. That is where the story of Tlepolemos and the poetics of colonization enter the picture. The Paul who *occupies* the story in Galatians 1–2 is like Tlepolemos in the limited sense that he is represented as a paradigm of *orthai phrenes,* a model of fidelity to be imitated. In the story, Paul's tomb-that-signifies functions both as a sign and a turning point; it presents the Galatians with a choice between victory through Jesus, their founder, or re-enslavement to the powers that rule the cosmos. On the other hand, the Paul who *tells* the story is, like Pindar, an architect of tradition, emphasizing certain features of the

1. See above, p. 43, n. 30.

story and streamlining, correcting, or even suppressing others in accordance with a distinctive *kanōn*. That *kanōn*, for Paul, is the cross (Gal 6:14–16).

1. Changing Teams: Galatians 1:6–7

In chapter one we found that Paul consistently represents the Galatians as competitors in a chariot race. That metaphor agrees with his statement of the occasion for the letter:

> Θαυμάζω ὅτι οὕτως ταχέως μετατίθεσθε ἀπὸ τοῦ καλέσαντος ὑμᾶς ἐν χάριτι [Χριστοῦ] εἰς ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον, ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο· εἰ μή τινές εἰσιν οἱ ταράσσοντες ὑμᾶς καὶ θέλοντες μεταστρέψαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ (Gal 1:6–7).
>
> I am astonished that you are so quickly turning away from the one who called you in grace to another gospel, which is not another, except there are some who are agitating you and wanting to turn aside the gospel of Christ.

Three verbs are relevant here: *metatithenai* ("to turn away"), *tarassein* ("to agitate"), and *metastrephein* ("to turn aside"). *Tarassein* appears often in contexts involving chariots.[2]

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2. Asclepiades, *Fr.* 24.19–22; Diodorus of Sicily 4.62.3; Dio Chrysostom, *Alex.* 32.77; *Borysth.* 36.50; *Regn. tyr.* 62.7; Maximus of Tyre, *Diss.* 41.5; Pausanias, *Descr.* 15–20; Plutarch, *Gen.* 591e; *Tu. san.* 125c, with 137e and Plato, *Tim.* 88b for context; *Virt. mor.* 445c; 451c. Paul uses the term once to designate the agitators as a

Thus Paul's characterization of the rival evangelists as *tarassontes* ("agitators") and his subsequent double anathema in vv. 8–9 will likely have alerted the Galatians to the agonistic metaphor.[3] The other two verbs are preserved in chariot racing contexts by later writers. Basil of Caesarea deploys *metatithenai* in the sense "to change" when he derides horse-crazed persons for "unyoking chariots and changing drivers" in their dreams (ἅρματα μεταζευγνύντες καὶ ἡνιόχους μετατιθέντες, *Hex.* 4.1). Pseudo-Macarius uses *metastrephein* to characterize God as a charioteer in control of everything, who "turns around" his chariot whenever he wants (ὅπου θέλει μεταστρέψαι αὐτό, *Hom. spir.* 50.15.478).

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group (οἱ ταράσσοντες, Gal 1:7; cf. ἀναστατοῦντες, Gal 5:12) and once to designate a single individual whom he calls out for judgment (ὁ ταράσσων, Gal 5:10). The relationship between the plural and the singular may be that of a team to a lead driver, or the singular may be generic. In Roman chariot races, teams of drivers called *agitatores* competed against other teams (Pliny, *Ep.* 9.6).

3. The use of *anathema* to mean "accursed" is sometimes understood as a distinctively Jewish usage, but the term also appears on a curse tablet from Megara dated to the first or second century C.E. See Gager, *Curse Tablets*, no. 85 and Adolf Deissmann, *Light from the Ancient East: The New Testament Illustrated by Recently Discovered Texts of the Graeco-Roman World* (trans. L. R. M. Strachan; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1910), 93–94.

The metaphor Paul has in mind most likely derives from the tendency of successful charioteers to change stables.[4] In order adequately to grasp that metaphor, however, it is important to note that drivers were typically recruited from the lowest ranks of Roman society, slaves and freedpersons. Fik Meijer observes that nearly half of all inscriptions concerning charioteers designate the driver as a *servus* (slave) or *libertus* (freedman). In addition, most charioteers had only one name, often a slave name, rather than the three names that designated a Roman citizen. Successful drivers could expect to win large purses, but they would have to negotiate manumission with their owners before they could enjoy the prize money themselves. Thereafter they could entertain contracts with other stables. That process is reflected in one inscription, in particular, which shows that two brothers, the elder Marcus Aurelius Polyneices and the younger Marcus Aurelius Mollicius Tatianus, both obtained citizenship and both drove for multiple racing stables (*CIL* 6.10050).

In comparison, Paul will later remind the Galatians that Christ freed them from slavery and bought them out from under the curse of the law (Gal 3:13; 5:1). He will also warn them against turning their freedom into an "opportunity," much as if they were top drivers entertaining potentially lucrative contracts with other stables (Gal 5:13).[5] The

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4. The following discussion draws on Fik Meijer, *Chariot Racing in the Roman Empire* (trans. L. Waters; Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2010), 82–95, esp. 82–88.

density of "turning" language in Gal 1:6–7 anticipates these points whilst exploiting the milieu of chariot racing in order to introduce what will become a remarkably rich extended metaphor, complete with buyoffs, curses, drivers violently jockeying for position, and spectacular shipwrecks. The stakes are high and so is the prize. Defeat means separation from Christ, disinheritance, and enslavement (Gal 4:3, 8–9). Victory means the fulfillment of the promise to Abraham and the hope of justice itself (Gal 5:5; cf. Plato, *Phaedr.* 247d). That is the context in which Paul tells his story of himself.

2. Paul's Shipwreck in Judaism: Galatians 1:13–14

After explaining that his gospel came to him not through human means but through an apocalypse of Jesus Christ, Paul reminds the Galatians that they already know his story:

> Ἠκούσατε γὰρ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀναστροφήν ποτε ἐν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ, ὅτι καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐδίωκον τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἐπόρθουν αὐτήν, καὶ

5. The observation that the word *aphormē* in Gal 5:13 could also designate a base of operations for a military expedition has led to somewhat inflated representations of a spirit-led, all-out apocalyptic war on the flesh in Martyn, *Galatians*, 479–484, 524–540. Cf. John M. G. Barclay, *Obeying the Truth: A Study of Paul's Ethics in Galatians* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1988), 115. Paul deploys the chariot racing metaphor on a cosmic scale, of course, but that does not warrant overloading his use of *aphormē* with such starkly apocalyptic significance.

προέκοπτον ἐν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ ὑπὲρ πολλοὺς συνηλικιώτας ἐν τῷ γένει μου, περισσοτέρως ζηλωτὴς ὑπάρχων τῶν πατρικῶν μου παραδόσεων (Gal 1:13–14).

For you heard about my past overturning in Judaism, how I was pursuing the church of God recklessly and trying to destroy it, and how I was advancing in Judaism beyond many contenders in the same age-group among my people, being excessively zealous for my ancestral traditions.[6]

There is no single word that evokes the dust and thunder of the races here, but rather a cluster of terms. The key word is *anastrophē,* which lexicographers and commentators normally interpret as designating Paul's "way of life" or his "behaviour" in Judaism.[7] Despite the currency of that usage at the time, the broader context of the letter suggests that *anastrophē* should be conceptualized along the same lines as *metastrephein* ("to turn aside," Gal 1:7) and *epistrephein* ("to turn back," Gal 4:9). From that standpoint it is more

6. For the translation of διώκειν in terms of "pursuit" rather than "persecution," see above p. 67, n. 55.

7. Georg Bertram, "ἀναστρέφω," *TDNT* 7:715–717; *MM,* s.v. "ἀναστροφή;" *BDAG,* 3d ed., s.v. "ἀναστροφή;" Betz, *Galatians*, 63; Bruce, *Galatians*, 90; James D. G. Dunn, "The Theology of Galatians," in *SBL Seminar Papers, 1988* (ed. D. J. Lull; SBLSP 27; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 55–56; Longenecker, *Galatians*, 27.

likely to designate Paul's "overturning."[8] Xenophon uses *anastrophē* in that sense when he describes Cyrus's rout of an Assyrian cavalry regiment:

> ἐνταῦθα δὴ καὶ ἅρματα ἡλίσκοντο, ἔνια μὲν καὶ ἐκπιπτόντων τῶν ἡνιόχων, τῶν μὲν ἐν τῇ ἀναστροφῇ, τῶν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως, ἔνια δὲ καὶ περιτεμνόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων [ἡλίσκετο] (Xenophon, Cyr. 5.4.8).
>
> Then the chariots were also captured, some because the drivers fell out when they overturned and for other reasons, and some because they were cut off by the cavalry and captured.

Xenophon represents the Assyrian drivers as fleeing rather than pursuing, but the main point is that they fell from their chariots because they turned too sharply and caused the

8. *LSJ,* 9th ed., s.v. ἀναστροφή.

vehicles to tip precariously or fall over completely.[9] In Paul's case, his overturning appears to be the result of recklessness caused by excessive zealotry.[10]

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9. Cf. Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* (trans. W. Miller; 2 vols.; LCL 51–52; London; New York: W. Heinemann; Macmillan, 1914), 2:71. Miller renders τῶν μὲν ἐν τῇ ἀναστροφῇ with the phrase "a part of them from wheeling around to sharply." That translation accurately describes the maneouvre but leaves open the question of whether the chariots were overturned. The distinction is subtle and largely irrelevant to Paul's usage.

10. A connection between *zelos* or "zeal" and chariot driving appears as well in the Septuagint, though not in association with recklessness. 4 Kgdms 10:15–17 describes how Jehu entered into Samaria in order to wipe out Ahab's survivors. Along the way, he invited Jehonadab to accompany him: "And he said to him, 'Come with me and look upon my zeal for the Lord Sabaoth', and he set him on his chariot." The mention of a chariot is not incidental, for at this point in the story Jehu has recently been anointed king of Israel by the successor of a much more famous zealot, Elijah, who had himself been taken up into heaven on "a chariot of fire and horses of fire" (ἅρμα πυρὸς καὶ ἵπποι πυρὸς, 4 Kgdms 2:11, with 3 Kgdms 19:1–16 and 4 Kgdms 9:1–10 for Elijah's zeal and the context of Jehu's anointing). Cf. 1 Macc 2:58, which gives Elijah's "zeal for the law" as the reason for his translation to heaven. The case that Paul saw himself as a zealot in the tradition of Elijah has

The context of Gal 1:14 supplies two other terms that support the interpretation of *anastrophē* as a reference to Paul's "overturning," *prokoptein* ("to advance") and *sunēlikiōtēs* ("contender in the same age-group"). The latter word is compounded from the prefix *sun-* and the noun *ēlikiōtēs.* The plural form deployed by Paul is generally translated as "contemporaries" (NASB) or "people of the same age" (NRSV).[11] The former rendering has the advantage of suggesting an implicit contrast between Paul's contemporaries and his ancestors, but it is something of a gloss designed to cover the oddity of the more literal translation. Among commentators, Lightfoot thought that Paul is alluding to "the youthful ardour of patriotism;"[12] Bruce mentions that *sunēlikiōtēs* is "a Hellenistic term for a member of the same age-group," with no further comment;[13] and many others pass over it in silence. It is noteworthy, however, that both *anastrophē* and *sunēlikiōtēs* are *hapax legomena* within the authentic Pauline letters, as is *baskainein* ("to cast and evil eye," Gal 3:1). The latter two words are also unique in the entire New Testament. Such rarity may increase the probability that they reflect the particular situation Paul is addressing or the particular metaphor he is developing.[14]

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been argued by N. T. Wright, "Paul, Arabia, and Elijah (Galatians 1:17)," *JBL* 115.4 (1996): 683–692.

11. *MM,* s.v. "ἡλιξ;" *BDAG,* 3d ed., s.v. "συνηλικώτης."

12. Lightfoot, *Galatians*, 81.

13. Bruce, *Galatians*, 91; cf. Betz, *Galatians*, 68.

Since we found in chapter one that top charioteers and their horses were believed to be especially vulnerable to the evil eye, it is reasonable to theorize that *sunēlikiōtēs* derives from a similar agonistic context.[15] The compound word is rare in any context, but a TLG search for the uncompounded form *ēlikiōtēs* returns one very pertinent usage in the *Geometrica* attributed to Hero of Alexandria. There, the purported measurements of the hippodrome at Olympia are given:

> καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἡρῴῳ τῷ λεγομένῳ Ταραξίππου κάμπτοντες τρέχουσιν οἱ μὲν ἡλικιῶται πάντες σταδίους ϛ, αἱ συνωρίδες αἱ μὲν πωλικαὶ κύκλους γ, αἱ δὲ τέλειαι η, ἅρματα τὰ μὲν πωλικὰ κύκλους η, τὰ δὲ τέλεια κύκλους ιβ (*Geom.* 23.47).

14. So John M. G. Barclay, "Mirror-Reading a Polemical Letter: Galatians as a Test Case," *JSNT* 31 (1987): 85: "While taking into account our limited knowledge of Paul's theology, we may be entitled to consider the presence of an unfamiliar motif in Paul's letter as a reflection of a particular feature in the situation he is responding to."

15. above, pp. 31–38.

> The age-groups who round the turning post near the heroon called *Tarachippos* run six stades. The two-horse chariots run three laps with young horses and eight laps with adult horses. The [four-horse] chariots run eight laps with young horses and twelve laps with adult horses.[16]

Two features of this survey stand out: First, it clearly indicates that Olympic races were conducted according to the age-group of the horses. Second, the reference to the heroon called *Tarachippos* agrees with Pausanias's description of the turning post at Olympia as the tomb of a hero (*Descr.* 6.20.15–20). Both *Tarachippos* and Paul's word for the agitators, *tarassontes,* derive from the same root, and the agitators appear to perform essentially the same function in Galatians as *Tarachippos* did in the races; namely, unsettling charioteers. In view of such similarities, the conclusion that Paul deploys *sunēlikiōtēs* for the purpose of representing his progress in Judaism in terms of a chariot race seems to be the best explanation for its usage in Gal 1:14.

The verb *prokoptein* is rare in Paul's letters as well, appearing in the authentic letters only in Gal 1:14 and Rom 13:12 (cf. Luke 2:52; 1 Tim 2:16; 3:9, 13). Dunn remarks that it is 'neutral', but that is scarcely so in contexts involving chariot races.[17] Meijer describes how a driver might advance beyond other contenders in a Roman-style race:

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16. A diagram of the hippodrome at Olympia based partially on these measurements is provided by Humphrey, *Roman Circuses*, 7 with p. 639 nn. 9–10.

17. Dunn, *Galatians*, 59.

> In the first 160 meters the charioteers needed great self-control. There was always the risk of mishap. The umpires watched closely to check that the horses were keeping to their marked lanes; only when they reached the first of the two *metae* [turning posts] were the drivers allowed to take the ideal course and pass as close as they could to the *spina* [central divider]. If they left their lanes any earlier, they would automatically be disqualified. After that, virtually anything went. They could cut in front of each other, fan out across the full breadth of the track, or deliberately crash into other chariots. The drivers might even use violence, not against each other—that was punishable with immediate disqualification—but against their opponents' horses, which they lashed with their whips. This made the horses skittish. Turning their heads away, they were diverted from their course.[18]

For a driver to make progress, in short, required various kinds of underhanded and cruel but generally unregulated strategies, thus the metaphor of a chariot race is a fitting image with which to describe the consequences of excessive zeal. The practice of lashing horses' heads so that they turned aside shines an especially harsh light both on the agitators for

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18. Meijer,, 76–77. Cf. Pseudo-Macarius, *Hom. spir.* 50.1.196–199: "Just as chariots run in the stadium—the one making progress hindering, blocking, and impeding the other from advancing (τοῦ μὴ προκόψαι) and attaining to victory—so, too, do the thoughts of the soul and of sins run in the human person."

wanting to "turn aside the gospel" and on Paul for trying to destroy the church in order advance in Judaism (Gal 1:7; 13–14).

In sum, Gal 1:13–14 represents Paul running a reckless and brutal race in which he used every means necessary to take the lead. It shows him advancing beyond others in his 'age-class' in Judaism but still trailing behind the church of God. As a result he was trying to surpass the church by destroying it. In the event, he failed to calculate a turn properly and overturned his own chariot. These features of the narrative programatically connect his own zeal with the zeal of the agitators whilst representing his fall as a mirror-image of the Galatians fall from grace (Gal 4:17–18; 5:4).[19] Most importantly, he exploits the well-known dangers of the turning point in order to flag the gravity of the choice facing the Galatians. Figuratively, he locates both his own shipwreck in Judaism and his call at that very turning point, implicitly contrasting his *turning to* the one who called him with the Galatians' *turning away* and the consequent *turning aside* of the gospel (cf. Gal 1:6–7).

3. Paul's Call: Galatians 1:16–17

The contrast between the brutal scene represented in Gal 1:13–14 and Paul's narration of his call by God could not be more stark, at first glance. Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that Paul's narrative demands critical reflection on the themes of 'separation' and 'call' in view of his former zeal. Susan Grove Eastman's analysis follows the translation:

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19. On Gal 5:4, see above, pp. 39–46.

ὅτε δὲ εὐδόκησεν [ὁ θεὸς]

ὁ ἀφορίσας με ἐκ κοιλίας μητρός μου

καὶ καλέσας διὰ τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ

ἀποκαλύψαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἐν ἐμοὶ … (Gal 1:15–16).

But when it pleased [God,]

who separated me from my mother's womb

and called me through his grace

to reveal his son in me …

> The beginning of the sentence announces that something new is coming, and indeed the apocalypse of Jesus Christ "in" Paul is the advent of the new creation in his own life. Yet the intervening clause also announces that this new thing is preceded by the prior "setting aside" and "call" of Paul, even from his mother's womb. The parallel construction of the two subclauses links them in time and distinguishes both from the following clause … [20]

Eastman's analysis suggests that Paul's account of his call must be read *twice,* once from the perspective of his zeal in Judaism and again in view of the revelation of Christ in him. By announcing that something new is coming, yet withholding further information until

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20. Susan Grove Eastman, *Recovering Paul's Mother Tongue: Language and Theology in Galatians* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 34–35.

after he has narrated his call, Paul allows a moment of suspense in which the call can only tentatively be read in view of his zeal. Then, he abruptly repeals that interpretation by revealing the true nature of his calling. Eastman is rare among interpreters for recognizing that the very structure of the sentence suggests such a double entrendre. That observation will guide the discussion that follows.

Citing a number of texts from the New Testament, the Septuagint and other Greek writings in which "the term ἀφορίζειν refers to the setting aside as 'holy' in contrast to the 'profane,'" Betz interprets it as a synonym for ἁγιάζειν, with which the translator of Jer 1:5 renders the Hebrew verb קדש: "… before you came out from your mother I consecrated you (ἡγίακά σε [LXX]; הקדשתיך [MT])."[21] Strictly speaking, though, ἀφορίζειν has a much broader range of usage. It can also refer to the drawing of geographical, social, or political boundaries, yet without necessarily denoting sacrality. Commenting on the fourfold division of the paradisiacal river in Gen 2:10, for example, Philo indicates that the expression "is separated" (ἀφορίζεται) is equivalent to "is marked off by boundaries" (*Leg.* 1.65). The sophist Antiphon deploys the term ethnographically, in a remark with intriguing similarities to Gal 3:28: "Not one of us is marked either as a barbarian or a Greek" (Υ̓́υτε β[άρβα]ος ἀφώρισται ἡμῶν οὐδεὶς οὔτε Ἕλλην Fr. 5.7). Strabo likewise uses it in reference to geopolitical or ethnographical divisions, as when he indicates that Syria is bounded (ἀφώρισται) in the north by Cilicia and Mt. Amanus

21. Betz, *Galatians*, 92, n. 134.

(16.2.1), or when he describes the Greek people and their 'tribes' (τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔθνη καὶ … ἀφωρισμένα, 8.1.2). In some cases the political and ethnographic uses overlap, as in a fragment quoted by Josephus in which Strabo comments on the Jewish population of Egypt: "In Egypt, then, dwelling places for the Jews are assigned separately, and a large part of the city of Alexandria is allotted to this people (ἀφώρισται … τῶι ἔθνει τούτωι)" (Josephus, *JA* 14.117 = *FGrH* 2a.91.F).

Importantly, several usages of *aphorizein* appear in contexts explicitly describing acts of colonization and their aftermath. Discussing the events that led to the Ionic migration and the founding of cities both in Greece and on the west coast of Asia Minor, Isocrates praises Athens for rallying the Greeks to defeat encroaching barbarians:[22]

> Not holding these circumstances to be ideal, [Athens] instead dispatched leaders to the cities, who, after enlisting those who were especially needy, appointing themselves as generals, and defeating the barbarians in battle, founded many cities on each continent (πολλὰς μὲν ἐφ' ἑκατέρας τῆς ἠπείρου πόλεις ἔκτισαν), colonized all the islands (ἁπάσας δὲ τὰς νήσους κατῴκισαν), and saved (ἔσωσαν) both those who followed them and those who stayed behind; for to the

22. On the Ionic migration, see Section II of Walter Eder et al., "Colonization," in *Brill's New Pauly* (eds. H. Cancik et al.; 20 vols.; Leiden: Brill, 2003). 3:McGill University. Cited 1 November 2011. Online: http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/brill-s-new-pauly/colonization-e618410.

> latter they left the homeland, which was sufficient, and to the former they provided more than they started with, because they captured the whole area that we now chance to possess. As a result, they also made it easier for those who later resolved to send out colonists (ἀποικίσαι) and to imitate our great city; for they no longer had to run the risks of procuring land, but going to those places marked out by us (εἰς τὴν ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἀφορισθεῖσαν), they had only to settle there (Isocrates, *Paneg.* 4.35–36).

Isocrates' remarks in a letter sent to Philip of Macedon in 346 B.C.E. are also relevant to this usage. Urging the Macedonian king to lead the Greeks on a controversial eastward campaign against the Persian Empire, Isocrates compares Philip to Jason of Thessaly, who had won renown merely by talking about such an expedition:

> Whereas Jason advanced himself so far using words only, what kind of opinion must everyone expect to have about you, if you accomplish such things in deed, especially if you try to conquer the whole kingdom, but even if you were to carve off a territory that is vast (χώραν ὅτι πλείστην ἀφορίσασθαι), to seize Asia, as they say, from Cilicia to Sinope, and, in addition, to found cities in this region (κτίσαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ) and to settle (κατοικίσαι) those who are now itinerant for lack of daily necessities and committing outrages against whomever they encounter? (Isocrates, *Phil.* 5.120).

Usages of ἀφορίζειν in reference to territories marked out for conquest and for the settlement of colonists is not unique to Isocrates. Nearly half of the roughly eighty seven occurrences of the term in the Septuagint occur in a single chapter of Joshua, in which it is one of two different words used to render a single Hebrew term, מגרשים ("pasture lands"). The key text is Joshua 21, where, following the defeat of the Canaanite kings and the allotment of territories to the tribes of Israel, the leaders of the Levites remind Eleazer the high priest and Joshua that God had commanded Moses to give them cities and land for their cattle. The term περισπόρια indicates "surrounding lands" four times in Jos 21:2–12 and another fourteen times in Jos 21:34–42. In the intervening verses ἀφωρισμένα appears no fewer than 37 times and περισπόρια not once. Whether this variation is merely stylistic or reflects a Hebrew *Vorlage* that differs from the MT is difficult to determine, but the translator's use of ἀφορίζειν is consistent both with Isocrates' usage and with usages elsewhere in the Septuagint (2 Kgdms 8:2; Lev 25:34).

In sum, the usages of ἀφορίζειν considered above need not undermine the sacred nature of Paul's call, but neither should the sacral use of ἀφορίζω or the parallels in Isaiah and Jeremiah be given too much weight. The story of Paul's call virtually requires that both usages be held in dialectical tension. To the extent that Paul continued to understand his separation in sacral terms, he nevertheless came to realize that God had separated him *for* the Gentiles rather than *from* the Gentiles, for the purpose of building the church of

God rather than destroying it. With that realization Paul left behind his zeal in Judaism and became, in effect, a colonist among the Gentiles.

4. Staying the Course: Galatians 1:14–2:10

Following the revelation that put an end to his pursuit of the church, Paul did not go up to Jerusalem at once but went first to Arabia (Gal 1:17). A decisive answer to the question of what drove him to Arabia remains elusive since 'Arabia' at that time could refer to a vast territory between Palestine and Syria in the west and Mesopotamia in the east. The consensus maintains that he went into the Nabatean kingdom ruled by Aretas IV.[23]

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23. See esp. Douglas A. Campbell, "An Anchor for Pauline Chronology: Paul's Flight from 'the Ethnarch of King Aretas' (2 Corinthians 11: 32–33)," *JBL* 121.2 (2002): 279–302, esp. 299–300. Campbell speculates that Paul was "protected from the consequences of his message's offensiveness [to local Jews] by his ability to flee north 'over state lines', so to speak," but had nowhere to go when Aretas briefly wrested political control of Damascus from Roman hands between 36 and 37 C.E. This reconstruction is logically appealing and even thrilling in its theatricality, but the image of Paul making strategic thrusts and feints into and out of Nabatean territory has no relevance to Gal 1:17. Other exponents of the Nabatean hypothesis include Burton, *Galatians*, 57; Betz, *Galatians*, 73–74; Bruce, *Galatians*, 95–96; Dunn, *Galatians*, 69; Martyn, *Galatians*, 170; Martin Hengel and Anna Maria

At its zenith under Aretas IV, the Nabatean kingdom extended as far south as the Red Sea port of Leukē Komē on the Sinai peninsula (Strabo 16.4.23) and the urban outpost of Hegra (Mada'in Salih), east of the Red Sea, encompassing both the traditional location of Mt. Sinai at Jebel Musa and alternative locations in the former land of Midian.[24] Allen

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Schwemer, *Paul between Damascus and Antioch: The Unknown Years* (trans. J. Bowden; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997), 110–113; and Fung,, 68. For criticism of this theory and discussion of the various alternatives, see Rainer Riesner, *Paul's Early Period: Chronology, Mission Strategy, Theology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 256–260.

24. The Sinai region was densely populated by Nabateans by the first century B.C.E., according to Arvaham Negev, "The Nabateans and the Provincia Arabia," *ANRW* 8:533. After Paul's time, Josephus indicates that the borders of the land of the Nabateans extended from the Euphrates to the Erythrean (Red) Sea (*JA* 1.221). See, in addition, G.W. Ahlström, "A Nabatean Inscription from Wadi Mukatteb," in *Ex orbe religionum: studia Geo Widengren* (2 vols.; eds. S. G. F. Brandon, C. J. Bleeker, and M. Simon; SHR 21; Leiden: Brill, 1972), 1:323. Ahlström reports an estimated three to four thousand Nabatean inscriptions in the Sinai peninsula, nearly 300 or 10% of which occur in Wadi Mukatteb in the southern, mountainous region of Sinai. The earliest of these inscriptions are dated from 120 to 270 C.E. Cf. Avraham Negev, "Nabatean Inscriptions in Southern Sinai," *BA* 45.1 (1982): 21–25.

Kerkeslager argues persuasively that both the Septuagint and other early Jewish writings presume a location for Mt. Sinai somewhere east of the Red Sea, in what is now northwestern Saudi Arabia. In his view, Paul's reference to Arabia in Gal 1:17 can be most easily explained if Paul had visited Mt. Sinai following a pattern of "vision quests" modeled after the experiences of Moses and Elijah and rooted in Jewish apocalyptic traditions.[25] If this is correct, then Paul's point in Gal 1:17 is not simply that he did *not* go to Jerusalem soon after his call, but also that he *did* go to the very place where the law had been given, Arabia.

Only after he had returned to Damascus did he finally go up to Jerusalem. He had been away for over three years but stayed for a mere fifteen days, during which time he claims to have seen none of the apostles but Kephas and James (Gal 1:18–20).[26] Thereafter he departed for the regions of Syria and Cilicia, where he remained throughout

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There is no evidence for pre-Christian, Jewish pilgrimage to southern Sinai, according to Allen Kerkeslager, "Jewish Pilgrimage and Jewish Identity in Hellenistic and Early Roman Egypt," in *Pilgrimage and Holy Space in Late Antique Egypt* (ed. D. Frankfurter; 134; Leiden; Boston: Brill, 1998), 150, nn. 213–214.

25. Kerkeslager, "Jewish Pilgrimage," 146–200, esp. 175–179; cf. Lightfoot, *Galatians*, 87–90; Wright, "Paul, Arabia, and Elijah," 683–692.

26. In treating Paul's time spans in Gal 1:18 and 2:1 as consecutive rather than cumulative I follow Robert Jewett, *Dating Paul's Life* (London: SCM, 1979), 52–54.

fourteen years (Gal 1:21–2:1). Although these last two geographic markers provide few insights into the specific location of the Galatian churches, both Isocrates (*Phil.* 5.120) and Strabo (16.2.1) indicate that Cilicia was a gateway to Asia Minor. It would also have been Paul's gateway to Galatia, north or south, had not another revelation stopped him in his tracks and sent him abruptly back to Jerusalem:

> Ἔπειτα διὰ δεκατεσσάρων ἐτῶν πάλιν ἀνέβην εἰς Ἰεροσόλυμα μετὰ Βαρναβᾶ, συμπαραλαβὼν καὶ Τίτον· ἀνέβην δὲ κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν· καὶ ἀνεθέμην αὐτοῖς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ὃ κηρύσσω ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, κατ᾽ ἰδίαν δὲ τοῖς δοκοῦσιν, μή πως εἰς κενὸν τρέχω ἢ ἔδραμον (Gal 2:1–2)
>
> Then after fourteen years I again went up to Jerusalem, taking Barnabas and Titus with me. Now I went up because of a revelation; and I communicated to them the gospel that I proclaim among the Gentiles—privately, to those who are reputable—lest somehow I was running or had run for nothing.

This segment of the narrative leaves the distinct impression that Paul was on the verge of entering Galatia when he was suddenly compelled to change course and execute what seems to be a very risky maneouvre. Dunn has compressed the problem presented by Paul's account of the Jerusalem council into a concise question: "How is it that Paul in the same breath can both assert his independence of the Jerusalem apostles and yet also acknowledge that the effectiveness of his work depended on their approval of his

gospel?"[27] By far the most common solution to this problem has been to suggest that Paul was concerned to preserve the unity of the church.[28] Dunn, though critical of this view, offers what amounts to a variation on the theme, according to which Paul sought to forestall a decision by the Jerusalem apostles that, at a single stroke, would render the churches he had founded distinct from believing Israel.[29] It is far less clear in Galatians than in Acts, however, that the communion of Jewish and Gentile followers of Jesus or the unity of the gospel were issues at stake in the Jerusalem council.[30]

What Paul evidently sought to forestall in going to Jerusalem was the emergence of a party that had gained the ears of the leadership and was advocating to make Gentile converts full proselytes through circumcision and observance of the law—a movement that was bound to become parasitic on his own apostolate and undermine everything for

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27. James D. G. Dunn, "The Relationship between Paul and Jerusalem according to Galatians 1 and 2," *NTS* 28.4 (1982): 467.

28. Burton, *Galatians*, 72–73; Bruce, *Galatians*, 111; Longenecker, *Galatians*, 49; Martyn, *Galatians*, 192–193.

29. Dunn, "Relationship," 468 and 476, n. 32 and Dunn, *Galatians*, 93–94.

30. Cf. Acts 15:1–30, esp. vv. 8–9, where Peter argues against the necessity of Gentile circumcision with the explicit rationale that, in giving the Holy Spirit, God "made no *division* between us and them (οὐθὲν διέκρινεν μεταξὺ ἡμῶν τε καὶ αὐτῶν)," that is, between Jews and Gentiles. Gal 2:1–10 lacks vocabulary referring to division.

which he had long been working.[31] Paul calls them 'the false believers (Gal 2:4). Luke calls them 'some from the sect of the Pharisees' (Acts 15:5). Whoever they were, Paul reports that he and his companions did not yield to their pressure to circumcise Titus but stood firm, "so that the truth of the gospel might continue on to you" (Gal 2:5). That remark, too, gives the distinct impression that the Jerusalem conference had delayed Paul's plans to enter Galatia. Nevertheless, what started out as a gamble paid off in the acknowledgement of his gospel by the 'pillars' of the Jerusalem church and the designation of separate mission fields for Paul and Peter.

5. The Sign of the Apostle: Galatians 2:11–21

Jubilant after what he presents as a victory for his gospel, Paul returned to Antioch. He was presumably preparing to resume the evangelistic work that had been interrupted by the Jerusalem council when conflict erupted over the issue of table fellowship between Jews and Gentiles. The key parties to the conflict were Kephas, who for unknown reasons had also come to Antioch, a group from James, who arrived after Kephas, and Paul himself.

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31. *Pace* Dunn, "Relationship," 468. Dunn rejects the view that Paul fears "the future depredations of Judaizers," but there is no reason to think that Paul did not foresee the longterm consequence of a decision against his gospel as already taking effect in the event.

As Paul recounts the event, he opposed Kephas to his face because Kephas was self-condemned (Gal 2:11). Kephas had been eating with Gentiles on a regular basis, but when the group from James arrived he began to withdraw (ὑπέστελλεν) and to separate himself (ἀφώριζεν ἑαυτόν), fearing those from the circumcision (Gal 2:12). The words with which Paul describes Kephas' actions are laced with irony over the very definition of an apostle. They recall both Paul's calling as an apostle and his own separation *for* the Gentiles. Why would someone whom God had *sent out,* an ἀπόστολος, choose to *draw back,* ὑποστέλλειν? Why would someone whom God had separated choose to separate himself? The rest of the Antiochene Jews did not see things Paul's way, for he reports that they "made a show of support" for Kephas, "so that even Barnabas was carried away by their hypocrisy" (Gal 2:13).

Given the seemingly cordial relationship that Paul had shared with Kephas up to this point it is probable that he first spoke to Kephas privately, face to face. Only later did he confront Kephas publicly. The content of that confrontation is well known and need not be discussed in depth except to say that Paul presents himself as the champion of God's justice and a staunch opponent of Judaizing. Whether Kephas, the Antiochene Jews, and Paul's Galatian auditors were persuaded by his arguments must remain indeterminate, although the absence of a clear denouement may indicate that Paul was unsuccessful in his attempt to deter Kephas from separating himself and leading the Antiochene Jews into

separation. The speech trails off instead into an allusion to the opening scene of Paul's story:

> εἰ γὰρ ἃ κατέλυσα ταῦτα πάλιν οἰκοδομῶ, παραβάτην ἐμαυτὸν συνιστάνω. ἐγὼ γὰρ διὰ νόμου νόμῳ ἀπέθανον ἵνα θεῷ ζήσω. Χριστῷ συνεσταύρωμαι· ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός· ὃ δὲ νῦν ζῶ ἐν σαρκί, ἐν πίστει ζῶ τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀγαπήσαντός με καὶ παραδόντος ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ (Gal 2:18–20).
>
> For if I rebuild what I have demolished, I prove myself to be a transgressor. Through the law I died to the law so that I might live to God. I have been crucified with Christ. I no longer live. Christ lives in me. The life I now live in the flesh I live in faith, that of the son of God who loved me and gave himself for me.

The parallel with Gal 1:13–14 is suggested by the common theme of crash/death through the law, by the recurrence of "Christ in me" language, and by the juxtaposition of these themes in the same context.[32] Commentators have struggled, nonetheless, to find a shared context for the verbs *oikodomein* ("to build") and *kataluein* ("to unyoke; to

32. Beverly Roberts Gaventa, "Galatians 1 and 2: Autobiography as Paradigm," *NovT* 28.4 (1986): 318.

dissolve; to destroy") in Gal 2:18, usually with little success.[33] The wider imagery of the chariot race in the letter may suggest that *kataluein* has the sense "to unyoke." More importantly, the parallel with Gal 1:13–14 brings Paul's story full circle, back to the turning point at which he began. That inclusio lends the narrative its own integrity without severing it from what follows. It represents Paul as running an exemplary race for his consistent focus on the advancement of the gospel and his efforts to protect the gospel from being turned aside. In the end, Paul confronts the Galatians with the tomb-that-signifies Christ in the form of his own body, and thus with possibility of their own *anastrophē.* He challenges them to read the sign and make the appropriate course corrections, lest they fall victim to the artifice of the agitators and suffer defeat in their own race. Should that happen, Paul will have run in vain (Gal 2:2), Christ will have died for nothing*,* and they will remain cut off from Christ (Gal 5:3–4). *They,* not Paul, will have nullified the grace of God. By giving Paul their eyes and ears, however, they will remain connected, through Christ, to the glory of Israel's past and the hope of justice.

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33. Bruce, *Galatians*, 142–143; Dunn, *Galatians*, 142–144; Betz, *Galatians*, 121–122. Bruce adopts a building metaphor in his comments on v. 18, but switches to a legal idiom in his comments. Dunn opts for a building metaphor in his comments on v. 18, but drops that metaphor in his comments on v. 19. Betz adopts the legal metaphor in his comments on v. 18, but drops that metaphor in his comments on v. 19. The list could be expanded.

6. Galatians 1–2 and the Poetics of Colonization

Several features of Paul's story of himself in Galatians 1–2 commend themselves to comparison with the poetics of colonization developed by Dougherty and exemplified in the *Seventh Olympian.* First, Like Tlepolemos, Paul has a violent past. The analysis of Gal 1:13–14 conducted above shows, more clearly than previous interpretions, how Paul uses the image of a chariot race in order to represent the lengths to which he was willing to go in order to destroy of the church of God. Second, both Tlepolemos and Paul are sent out from their respective 'metropoleis'—figuratively in Paul's case, but with profound practical implications. Third, both Tlepolemos and Paul receive a 'new lease on life' in the form of a divine commission. For Tlepolemos, that commission comes in the form of an oracle directing him to found a colony on the island of Rhodes. For Paul, it comes in the form of a revelation directing him to proclaim God's son among the Gentiles (Gal 1:15–16). Fourth, both Tlepolemos and Paul fulfill their commissions, as seen in Tlepolemos's case by the insitution of a festival memorializing his death and formally marking the independence of Rhodes. Paul, for his part, recalls that he displayed the death of Christ before the Galatians' eyes (Gal 3:1), attests to their "hearing with faith" (Gal 3:2), and mentions their baptism "into Christ" (Gal 3:27)—events that formally marked their freedom from slavery to the powers that rule the cosmos (ἐλευθερία Gal 5:1).

To conclude on a different level, the way in which Paul uses revelations in Galatians 1–2 in order to compress the timeline and advance the narrative resembles Pindar's use of

gnomic expressions. Like Pindar's *gnomai,* Paul's references to revelations shift his story of himself into a mode of discourse that is not purely historical but also psychological, at least to the extent that he seems to have perceived such revelations as inner events having more than a strictly didactic character. They are events that quite literally *move* him from time to time and place to place, lending them mantic and even oracular dimensions not wholly lacking the analeptic quality of Pindar's oracle. That strategy conforms to Paul's representation of himself and the Galatians as being 'owned' by God and led by the spirit.

7. Conclusion

The authoritative knowledge of the hero is not limited to the poetic, epic tradition, but extends to matters of agriculture, lifestyle, and correct worship.

– Ellen Bradshaw Aitken[1]

1. Summary

This study has demonstrated through a rereading of Galatians that Paul represents Jesus as the founding hero of the Galatian churches. In chapter two, Paul's story of Jesus was found to follow the heroic cycle of δίκη–ὕβρις–ἄτη–νέμεσις–δίκη, according to which the hero suffers from a transgression of justice through a combination of pride and rash judgment but is ultimately vindicated. In Paul's hands, however, νέμεσις is replaced by the cross. Instead of bringing retribution on his accusers, Christ becomes a curse for those who hear his story with faith, and his 'burial' as the hero within them redeems them from the curse of the law (Gal 3:1, 13; cf. Deut 21:23).

Chapter two also found that Paul consistently represents the Galatians as competitors in a chariot race, in keeping with the ancient and ongoing tradition of honouring founders with games. The Galatians were found to have entered this race in baptism. By 'putting on' Christ they signified the presence of the hero within, through whom they received the

1. Aitken, "Tradition," 97.

benefit of protection of the curse of the law and the beggarly στοιχεῖα (Gal 4:8–9). Baptism, in that sense, is analogous to the institution of games in Greek founder cult.

Chapter three turned to Pindar's Seventh Olympian with a dual focus. One objective was to address, through comparison, the problem of how to construe a tomb of Christ in Galatians. The starting point for this discussion was the observation that the tomb of the founder is often assumed as part of the common framework shared by ancient authors and their readers. A close reading of the *Seventh Olympian* indicated that Pindar signals the presence of the tomb of Tlepolomos through deixis, implicitly by references to other features of founder cult such as sacrifices and games, and even through the structure of the ode itself.

A second objective of chapter three was to develop the notion of a chain-of-compensation linking the poet and the citizens of a city to the founder, and thence to the epic past. In this chain, the vicarious travails of the founder were shown to be mimetically reenacted through periodic athletic contests held in his honour. That relationship, in turn, suggests a cultic context within which Paul's comments about the Galatians' 'suffering' and his representation of their 'race' were understandable (Gal 3:4; 5:7).

Chapter four approached the problem of how to construe the tomb of Christ in Galatians from the standpoint of the σῶμα σῆμα tradition in ancient Platonism. The heart of this chapter is a rereading of Plato's metaphor of the body-as-tomb in the context of fifth-century Athenian funerary culture. The results of this rereading were twofold. First, Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood's distinction between the indexical and symbolic functions

of archaic tombs was found to carry through to classical tombstones. Second Plato's view of the body as a tomb was found to correlate mainly with the symbolic function of tombs, suggesting that the tomb-as-signifier is primary in his definition. The remainder of the chapter demonstrated, through a survey of subsequent traditions of Platonism, that the σῶμα σῆμα metaphor does not always result in a negative view of the body, but more often in an emphasis on the semiotic function of the body. The chapter concluded by showing that Paul himself evokes the σῶμα σῆμα tradition in 2 Cor 4:7–12.

Chapter five carried the results of the prevous chapters into a consideration of the different bodies represented in Paul's letter to the Galatians. The στίγματα on Paul's body were found to portray brandmarks signifying ownership and protection from malign influences. In addition, comparison of Paul's chariot racing metaphors showed that he uses the race as a metaphor for the safe passage of the deceased into the afterlife. Thus the brandmarks on his body are ideologically equivalent to apotropaic marks on a tomb intended to speed the deceased on his or her way. In that context, the question of how the Galatians' bodies are marked—whether they 'memorialize' Jesus or not—determines their path to victory. Lastly, the notion of Jesus having become a curse was shown to rely on a visual analogy between the piercing of Jesus's body with nails and the piercing of curse tablets with nails.

The final chapter deployed the metaphor of the tomb-as-signifier and the metaphor of a chariot race as analytical tools in order to understand how Paul's story of himself in Galatians 1–2 relates to the rest of the letter. This resulted in a new reading of Paul's

'overturning' in Judaism that highlights his deployment of chariot racing imagery to express the consequences of his former zeal. Paul was found to exploit the inherent danger of the turning point in the race in order to flag critical points in his narrative, and then to places his tomb-as-signifier-of-Christ at those very points. This challenges the Galatians to read the sign and make the appropriate course corrections or risk crashing. The chapter concluded that Paul draws on the poetics of colonization in his own story in order to represent himself as an exemplar of 'running well'.

2. Scripture in the Mouth of the Hero

In a study of Flavius Philostratus's *Heroikos*, Aitken and MacLean draw attention to the distinctive role of the hero, Protesilaos, as an interpreter of tradition. They observe that the *Heroikos* adopts a certain stance toward the 'canon' of Homer, and that it displays a concern for telling the story right and doing the proper ritual actions.[2] These same concerns are present, in Galatians, in Paul's concern for the truth of the gospel and his efforts to dissuade the Galatians from practicing circumcision. The hero of Galatians, nonetheless, is not Paul.

The *Heroikos* presents itself as a dialogue between a Phonecian merchant and a vinedresser who tends the grave of the hero Protesilaos. In turn, the hero appears to the vinedresser and imparts knowledge to him. By virtue of being the first to die at Troy,

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2. Jennifer K. Berenson Maclean and Ellen Bradshaw Aitken, *Flavius Philostratus: Heroikos* (SBLWGRW 1; Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2001), lx–lxii.

Protesilaos was "cleansed" of the body" and free to observe the events that unfolded thereafter (*Her.* 7.3). It is this freedom from the body that invests him with authority to criticise and to correct Homer, and yet his encounters with the vinedresser take place within the precinct of his σῆμα. Thus, in some sense, the sign of the hero continues to mediate communication between the vinedresser and the hero even after the hero has "come back to life."

In the case of Paul, by the end of his story he has died, Christ lives in him, and yet somehow he himself lives on in the flesh (Gal 2:20). Only after Paul has narrated this 'death' does the quotation formula γέγραπται γάρ appear (Gal 3:10; 4:22; 4:27). From the perspective of the narrative, these quotations of scripture come 'from the tomb'. This naturally raises the question of *who* is speaking. Is it Paul or the Christ who lives in him? 2 Cor 13:3, although it belongs to a very different context, suggests the latter: … δοκιμὴν ζητεῖτε τοῦ ἐν ἐμοὶ λαλοῦντος Χριστοῦ· ὃς εἰς ὑμᾶς οὐκ ἀσθενεῖ ἀλλὰ δυνατεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν.
" … You seek proof of the Christ speaking in me, who is not weak in dealing with you but powerful in you." The mouth of the hero is Paul's mouth, but the voice is Christ's. This fits Socrates's definition of the body as a σῆμα: "for by it the soul signifies whatever it signifies" (Plato, *Cratylus* 400c).

Commenting on the phenomenon of the 'speaking tombstone' in archaic Greece, Jesper Svenbro elucidates the relationship between the reader who reads the inscription aloud and the text itself:

> At the moment of reading, the reading voice does not belong to the reader, even though he is the one who is using his vocal apparatus to ensure that the reading takes place. If he lends his voice to these mute signs, the text appropriates it: his voice becomes the voice of the written text. So the "I" that denoted the funerary *sēma* ("I am the *sēma* of so-and-so") does not have to be changed to "it" at the moment of reading, for while he is reading, the reader is not speaking *en idíois lógois* "with his own words or as the subject of the statement. He has lent his voice, reliquished it. His voice is not regarded as his own as he reads. It belongs to what is written: *the reading is part of the text.*[3]

One can imagine a similar scene at the original reading of Galatians. Coming to the end of the letter, the reader must *show* it to the Galatians, to *show* them that the "I" who has been speaking is the same "I" that is writ large in the final lines (Gal 6:12). In the same way that the scene depicted on the Phiale Painter's lekythos discussed in chapter four draws the viewer's gaze away from the deceased and toward her σῆμα*,* Paul's letter takes command of the reader's body and voice, requiring the reader to gesture deicticly, not toward Paul, but toward the *thing* that represents his social persona.[4] Thus the letter functions like a tomb. This raises, once again, the question of who speaks from the tomb.

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3. Jesper, Svenbro, *Phrasikleia: An Anthropology of Reading in Ancient Greece* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), 49 (my italics).

4. See above, pp. 126–127

Is it Paul or the Christ who lives in him? The answer is suggested by the final warning: " … I bear the marks of Jesus on my body." The Galatians have only to read the sign.

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