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FROM THE SUPREME ISLAMIC SHI'I COUNCIL TO AMAL: SHI'I POLITICS IN LEBANON FROM 1969-1984.

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A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of the requirements of
the degree of Master of Arts

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Abstract

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Title: From the Supreme Islamic Shi'i Council to *AMAL*: Shi'i Politics in Lebanon from 1969-1984.

Department: Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University

Degree: Master of Arts (M.A.)

This thesis highlights a new approach to the programs and agenda of the Shi'ite representative body in Lebanon known under the acronym AMAL. The period studied is from 1969-1984. Previous studies have drawn insufficient attention to the important and quintessentially Islamic relation between religion and politics for this particular community. This relation becomes a focal point for this thesis.

Here, I study and tell the story of how a politically and socially marginalized sector of a society awakened unto itself and sought change in its political, social and economic position. This change involved a reaffirmation of specifically Shi'i doctrines, beliefs and motifs which helped this community assert themselves with a new identity during this fifteen year period.

Résumé

Auteur: Lise Jean Herbert

Titre: Du Conseil Suprême Chi'ite à *AMAL:* La Politique Chiite au Liban de 1969 à 1984.

Département: L'Institut des Etudes Islamiques, Université McGill

Niveau: Maitrise en Arts (M.A.)

Ce mémoire jette un nouveau regard sur les programmes et ordres du jour du corps représentatif des Chi'ites du Liban, connu sous l'acronym *AMAL.* La période étudiée s'étend de 1969 à 1984. La plupart des études antérieures concernant cette communauté n'attirent pas suffisamment l'attention sur le rapport intrensèquement islamique entre la religion et la politique. Ce rapport est le point central de cette étude.

Ici, je présente et j'analyse l'histoire d'une communauté, marginalisée politiquement et socialement du reste de la société, qui s'éveille et cherche à améliorer sa situation politique, économique et sociale. Cette amélioration implique une reaffirmation des doctrines, des croyances et des motifs spécifiquement Chi'ites qui aident à une meilleure image pour la communauté sous une nouvelle identité pendant la plupart de la période étudiée.

Acknowledgments

Although this journey has been a personal one, a journey of pondering both professional and spiritual matters, I've been blessed to share it with some extremely thoughtful and talented individuals.

For guidance and time which my thesis advisor, Dr. Todd Lawson, has devoted to this project I would like to express my sincere appreciation. His keen interest in the field of Shi'i Thought has been infectious throughout the writing of this project and has kept this author on her toes.

In addition to this guidance, it is essential to acknowledge the impact of Dr. Howard Federspiel upon the political aspects of this work. His understanding of political movements and theory, and how one may recognize similarities between various organizations and their respective agendas, has enriched this thesis and steered it towards new perspectives on Shi'i politics.

It is also important to recognize Dr. Issa J.Boullata as co-supervisor and his invaluable advice concerning particular sources and significant points. Dr. A.Uner Turgay, Director of the Institute, must also be thanked for his advice throughout this three year period, along with all help which he has offered.

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I must finally recognize all of my family and friends, whether near or far, for their continual encouragement throughout these three years of study. Without the unfailing support of all, this project would not have been the journey that eventually materialized.

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Introduction

Multi-confessional governance in modern-day Lebanon was established after its independence from French and British colonial rule in 1943. Upon the lifting of the European powers' mandates, the Maronite, Sunni, Shi'i and Druze religious communities were faced with a daunting situation. They were charged with erecting a political system which takes cognizance of communal conditions in the country, assures all factions of political fairness, and represents the just aspirations of all citizens. Given patterns of communal status, was the system simply to be controlled by the major communities or was there to be widespread political participation? Could the smaller, less powerful communities accept the "majority rule" of the major communities and, particularly, the control of key political and security offices and agencies that could affect the smaller communities for good or harm without much opportunity for effective recourse? And finally, if communal organization was to pervade the political system and be its principal consideration, then how was the government itself to be structured so that all communities would feel protected on one hand and as participatory on the other?

This thesis treats the Lebanese Shi'ite perspective concerning some of the aforementioned questions. Many authors, whether of the East or the West, have studied the Lebanese Civil War and attempted to examine its causes, and if possible, its results. There are those who have interested themselves in the history of the nation and its people. The economic development of the country over the span of this century, with Beirut seemingly the West's oasis in an otherwise foreign, Arab world, has also been

considered. In many of these studies, as well as numerous other approaches left unmentioned, the varying roles of the religious communities becomes part and parcel of the work. During my initial reading as preparation for this thesis, I quickly became aware of the minor, if not insignificant role the Shi'i community seemed to assume in all dimensions of Lebanese life since the creation of the state.

Frantz Fanon, the ideologue for the Algerian revolution, claims when advantaged and disadvantaged groups within a society face off, usually violence has to occur so that both psychological views of self and opponents take place.[1] He contends that this confrontation is an inevitable outcome of colonialism, where the colonized comes to realize that the settler is no better than himself.[2] The early dialogue which the colonizers form with an elite amongst the colonized, during the period of liberation, concerns values.[3] However, for the colonized people, the most essential value is signified by the land: "the land which will bring them bread and, above all, dignity."[4] Fanon continues by elaborating upon the antagonism between town and country dwellers: "The rural dwellers talk of 'loss of morals' which is merely antagonism between those who turn colonial exploitation to his account and those who are excluded from the advantages of colonialism."[5] Thus an awareness begins to manifest itself where the necessity for national unity and national growth lies first in "the unity of a group, the disappearance of old quarrels and the final liquidation of unspoken grievances."[6] This seems to be the juncture at which the Lebanese Shi'i community finds itself in the mid 1960s with Musa

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[1] Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1966).
[2] Ibid., p. 45.
[3] Ibid., p. 44.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., p. 112.
[6] Ibid., p. 132.

al-Sadr emerging as a leading figure and key spokesman for its needs and desires. It would seem that by the very nature of the Lebanese socio-political system and its set up, Shi'ism within the country must itself be political in order to ensure survival for the community.

This aforementioned role to which I am referring concerns the economic, social and political position of the bulk of the Lebanese Shi'a population which came to a head in the latter half of the 1960s. In terms of its economic standing, the Shi'i community of Lebanon seemed cemented at the bottom rung of the ladder. This was in part due to the quickly mounting prosperity which engulfed Beirut while leaving the southern sectors of the country more destitute.[7] As the banking center of the Arab world in the 1960s, possessing a successful airline and several service companies which were recognized internationally, Beirut attracted individuals from all walks of life who were both seeking fortune as well as simply trying to improve their standard of living. Much of this commercial success was enjoyed by Christian, Palestinian and Druze entrepreneurs.[8] Some of these entrepreneurs were cognizant of a lack of Sunni participation in these commercial acts, yet they failed to encourage increased involvement.[9] A strong bond existed between the Lebanese political and economic establishment that was solidified through a "laissez-faire" approach to the economy.[10] Inequalities in terms of economic development and the sharing of wealth became obvious where only 4% of the population disposed of 32% of the GNP while the less

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[7] David McDowall, "Lebanon: A Conflict of Minorities" in Minority Rights, no. 61, pp. 12-13.
[8] Ibid., p. 12.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid., p. 13.

wealthy half of the population possessed only 18%.[11] This difference in wealth was not limited to one religious group.

Lebanese society was, therefore, divided economically and this divide was geographically observable. Prosperity was solidified in the Greater Beirut area with the mountain society (Kisrawan, the Matn, the Gharb and Shuf) incorporated within it.[12] The "forgotten areas" included 'Akkar in the north, Jabal 'Amil in the south and the Bekaa in the east.[13] Along with these more obvious economic changes was the transformation of Lebanon from "an agrarian republic into an extended city state."[14] The increased numbers swelling the Beirut population from approximately 100,000 in the 1930s to over 1 million in the 1980s[15] created extensive political and social consequences. A "Belt of Misery", encircling Beirut, sprung up with slums, squatter areas and Palestinian refugee camps. This belt began as the residence for Armenians in the 1920s, soon to give way to the Palestinians taking flight as refugees in 1948. Syrians and Kurds, seeking relief from the high unemployment at home, began to migrate to this area during the 1950s.[16] All of these groups suffered discrimination in terms of employment, as well as a lack of social and political participation in the Lebanese system. The dearth of political representation, along with a growing lack of security, produced feelings of alienation from their host country.

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[11] David Gilmour, Lebanon-The Fractured Country (London, 1963), p. 9.
[12] McDowall, "Lebanon: A Conflict of Minorities", p. 13.
[13] Ibid. As early as 1960, the disparity between these two geographic regions became apparent with the per capita income in Beirut being $803 while the southern regions were only earning a per capita income of $151. The Mountain included only 29% of the population, yet boasted having 38.2% of all schools. This should be compared with the south's 19% of the population having only 14.8% of the schools.
[14] A.H. Hourani, "Lebanon-From Feudalism to Modern State", Middle East Studies, April 1966, p. 263.
[15] McDowall, "Lebanon: A Conflict of Minorities", p. 13.
[16] Ibid.

The non-Lebanese were also joined by a number of Lebanese citizens who experienced many of the same privations mentioned above: Sunni Muslims from the 'Akkar and Shi'ites from Jabal 'Amil.[17] These Shi'a settled in Burj al-Barajneh and other parts of south Beirut where their population has grown to become the largest single confession in Beirut.[18] Due not only to the economic factors but the persistent Israeli shelling of their southern villages, an estimated 40% of the Lebanese Shi'a, by 1975, had fled their villages for the capital. This group of Shi'a became conscious that their condition was equivalent to that of their fellow non-Lebanese neighbors within the "Belt of Misery". "Alienation" perhaps describes what many Shi'a of the "Belt" experienced as the goods and services offered by the booming Beirut economy were not being shared or distributed evenly. Fanon's theory concerning the origins of man's dignity, the holding of land or property for one's own preservation, seems to be well illustrated by this particular sector of the Lebanese Shi'i community. Work was hard to find for a people reared in the agricultural way of life and who were never truly the land holders themselves. Only a small number of the Shi'a, the *zu'āma*, actually held positions of power and prestige and were often set apart from the majority of the community because of their wealth, lineage and standing/political prestige within the society. Some authors find that the representation the *zu'āma* provided was poor, at best.[19]

By the end of the 1960s, the social standing of the Shi'i community, if viewed as a whole and not in terms of the small ruling elite, was unfavorable. The south, as it

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[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.

suffered from economic dislocation, was to bear the social consequences of the drain of resources and people. Schools, hospitals and basic services, which many consider both basic and essential to life and civilization, were a rarity in this region. Those Shi'a who had earlier moved to the outskirts of Beirut and its bidonvilles, had an increasing number of educated young men amongst its ranks who were unable to find work proportionate to their skills and abilities. Their social and political dissatisfaction found some solace in the rising tide of radical ideas which were being voiced throughout the Arab world.[20]

A growing self-awareness catapulted by the quest for a stronger sense of dignity was to manifest itself within this religious community by the end of the 1960s. This singular community, like the newly emerging nations discussed in Ben Anderson's Imagined Communities, is searching to find an identity and to insist on recognition from others. One of the central questions that Anderson poses to his reader in terms of nationalism, which we may here apply to the Shi'i communal spirit, is how is it possible to feel a communal spirit when so large and diverse a group is considered?[21] His response - "Finally, it is imagined as a community because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly die for such limited imaginings."[22]

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[19] Ibid. See also Majed Halawi's A Lebanon Defied and Fouad Ajami's The Vanished Imam. Musa al-Sadr and the Shi'a of Lebanon for similar responses to the role and function of the *zu'ama* for the Shi'a of Lebanon

[20] McDowall, "Lebanon:A Conflict of Minorities",p. 13.

[21] Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 1991), p. 6.

[22] Ibid.

This manifestation of Shi'i identity was becoming evident as acknowledgment of the need grew for a new social and political order to supplant the outdated and inadequate modes of thinking, governing and cohabitating associated with the coexistence of so many confessional communities. The fact that a number of the southern Shi'ites were never given Lebanese identity cards, ultimately a recognition of its holder as being a full and participating citizen of the country, provided another example of alienation from the greater Lebanese society. The question arose as to how a religious community which had been sharing the same land as the other confessions comprising this country, having a long-standing heritage within the region, growing in number over the period of several decades to become the single largest confession within Lebanon's borders,[23] could be pushed to the periphery of the society?[24]

The fact remained that Sunnis, Druzes and Christians alike commonly referred to the Shi'a of their country by the term *mutāwila*[25], colloquially *metwali*, which carried negative associations and connotations. Once used by the Shi'a to describe their relationship of loyalty and adherence to the House of the Prophet Muḥammad, its meaning was negatively transformed into one of backwardness and discrimination. In the 1970s, under the leadership and guidance of Musa al-Sadr, the term *mutāwila* was dropped by the Lebanese Shi'a and efforts were made for the term's eradication from the vocabulary of the other communities. It had become a symbolic reminder of their being

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[23] McDowall, "Lebanon: A Conflict of Minorities", p. 13.

[24] According to Kamal Salibi in his article "Lebanon and the Middle Eastern Question", (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1988), p. 6, the steadily increasing numerical importance of the Lebanese Shi'i community was not solely due to an increased birth rate. It was due also, in part, to the higher emigration rate among the Christians.

[25] W. Ende, "Mutawālī" in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol.7.(Leiden:E.J.Brill, 1993),p. 780.

set apart from their regional neighbors. This question leads to the final area of concern for the Lebanese Shi'a which touches upon their political status within Lebanon.

Politically, the Shi'a were struggling against an antiquated/outmoded system of governance which was established, originally, to adequately represent the multi-confessional composition of the country. By 1975, the image of Lebanon, adopted by many outsiders, as a functioning model of harmony between differing communities and interests, was shattered.[26] For clarification, I will describe the political state of affairs in 1920, although the developments prior to this period in time are significant in understanding this state in the early part of this century. With the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, "Syria" was divided into two different regions: through a system of Mandates, Britain was to rule the south and France was responsible for the north.[27] This northern part was further divided into Syrian and Lebanese states. By 1920, an area known as "Greater Lebanon" received recognition as a separate state with the possibility of independence and expanded borders which eventually incorporated the coastal ports, Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon and the Bekaa valley.[28] In 1926 a Constitution was drafted which stated: the parliament was to represent the different communities with an electoral system in which all members were to be elected by all voters in the district, not simply by their own community.[29] This system was created with the desire for representatives to crossover the bounds of religious belief and appeal to the greater interests and needs of the Lebanese community

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[26] Albert Hourani, Political Society in Lebanon: A Historical Introduction, (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1986), p. 1.
[27] Ibid., p. 12. Also refer to Laurens, Henry. Le Grand Jeu. Orient Arabe et Rivalités Internationales (Paris: Armand Colin, 1991).
[28] Hourani, Political Society in Lebanon, p.1.
[29] Ibid.

as a whole.[30] Some authors, such as Farid al-Khazen,[31] argue that a process of change was taking place under the mandate which reflected the need to narrow the divide between the Christians and Muslims (or more particularly the Maronites and the Sunnis) and to end mandatory rule and seek independence.[32] This may, perhaps, have been an early attempt at establishing a more united Lebanon without concern for religious affiliation, a factor of colonial rule. Yet, the eventual response, as expressed in the 1943 National Pact/Covenant, was to prove inadequate for solving the growing questions of real political representation and governance which would torment the Lebanese community in the decades which followed.

The debate arising over the National Pact rests less in its origins and development than in varying communal interpretations.[33] To begin, agreement was reached stemming from the interests and political ambitions of the elite rather than necessarily reflecting concerns and communal priorities of the people.[34] Changes within

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[30] Ibid.

[31] See Farid al-Khazen's article The Communal Pact of National Identities: The Making and Politics of the 1943 National Pact, (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1991), p. 4, 6-17.

[32] For more details on the reasons for both Christian and Muslim agitation over French mandatory rule see Farid al-Khazen The Communal Pact of National Identities. For the Christian response to French mandatory rule, particularly concerning the Maronite Patriarch Arida's concern over the French control of the Régie des Tabacs et des Tombacs see Pierre Arida, Le Liban et la France: Mémoire sur la situation générale du Liban adressé par le Patriarche des Maronites à la sous Commission Parlementaire designée pour étudier la situation des pays sous mandat français, (Beirut: Imprimerie al Ma'arad, 1963).

Greater communal harmony was the only visible means to achieving actual independence from France. Yet, an obstacle to be overcome was how to unite two differing views of where to take the country in the future and to whom to reach out as "guarantor" of communal interests. The Sunni community of Lebanon favored the vision of a Greater Lebanon, one unseparated from the newly created state of Syria, since it was, at that time, the bastion of Arab nationalism. For the Christians, or those advocating an enlargement of "smaller Lebanon" (the Mutasarrifiya), Greater Lebanon was viewed as the "guarantee" for their free and independent existence in an Arab world that was predominantly Muslim. Therefore, some Maronite politicians advocated a preservation of the 1920 Lebanese boundaries while many Sunni leaders demanded unity with Syria.

[33] Al-Khazen, The Communal Pact of National Identities, p. 5

[34] Ibid., p. 6.

the power base of each confessional community created the necessity for a re-evaluation of the country's national identity and its internal balance of power.[35]

The National Pact did serve the country well in providing a political system that assumed governing responsibility and ended French mandatory rule. Yet any confessional solidarity which previously existed was soon to be dismantled. With the actual achievement of expanded borders in Lebanon, with the inclusion of Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon and the Bekaa valley, the earlier demographic balance was changed and the Maronites, although still the largest single community, were no longer a majority. The general agreement was that although Christians as a whole may not have been in a majority, they should be considered as having a slight majority over the Muslims, and that a census should not be taken.[36] Other problems were to arise with these newly incorporated areas into Lebanon as a variety of political cultures and ideologies were now intermingling: that of Lebanon as a Christian refuge which was the belief of the mountain Christian villages, and that of Lebanon as a larger community with various communities cohabitating with a more Arab or "Syrian" tinge.[37] This was the idea emanating from the larger cities.

The National Pact was created as an unwritten agreement between some Maronite and some Sunni political leaders regarding the distribution of power and the nature of the Lebanese state. The objective was to obtain a more equal distribution of posts within the government although "most of the really sensitive positions were kept

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[35] Ibid.
[36] Albert Hourani, Political Society in Lebanon, p. 12.
[37] Ibid.

in Christian hands."[38] Lebanon was to remain an independent state without being assimilated into a larger Syrian or Arab state. However, Lebanon was part of the Arab world and was to be linked to other regions through its policies and agendas.

The key posts within the government would be distributed as follows: the Presidency would be filled by a Maronite, the Premiership by a Sunni Muslim and the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies by a Shi'i Muslim. The allocation of the posts in government and seats in the Chamber of Deputies was to reflect the sectarian composition of Lebanese society, again based upon no current census. The ratio which was unscientifically established was six (Christians) to five (Muslims).[39] By the very nature of its composition, the National Pact was not permitting the government to dissolve its attachment to sectarianism, but was fueling the interests of the Sunni and Maronite establishments along with the role of the political elites in controlling Lebanon's political life. The Shi'a suffered from political underrepresentation and even misrepresentation. Not only were their true numbers not accounted for, but those individuals acting as representatives were political notables, often landlords of large land tracts worked by members of the various religious communities. Allegiance and loyalty were owed them by their constituents due to the economic dependency on landholders for survival, not necessarily because of the religious faith they professed.[40]

Cross-confessional support was mandatory for a political elite to be elected by his constituency, yet his ideas may not necessarily reflect those of his electors or the common good. A growing political consciousness sprung up amongst the Shi'a over the

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[38] Ibid., p. 13.
[39] David McDowall, "Lebanon: A Conflict of Minorities", p. 11.
[40] Ibid.

years erupting in the 1958 conflict and later, more violently, in 1975. In fact, the Shihabist era (1958-1960, 1974) marks a period of significance to this study as the limited successes and ultimate failure of President Fuad Shihab's program to reinforce Lebanese national unity after the nation's breakdown in 1958 helped to set the stage for the emergence of *AMAL* and other reformist movements in the 1960s.

The Palestinian arrival in Lebanon, after their 1948 expulsion by Israel, would transform the Lebanese arena as Israel progressively intruded upon the country. The social and political consequences of this Palestinian presence directly influenced pan-Arabist thought, the Lebanese Civil War beginning in 1975 and the relations between confessional communities within Lebanon. This was not simply a split between Christians and Muslims but between members of more fundamentalist groups and those who followed more conventional/conservative paths.[41] Initially, the Palestinian presence was recognized and embraced by the poorer Muslims, both Sunni and Shi'i, and by some Christian intellectuals who recognized some of the revolutionary aspirations of this disaffected and dislocated group.[42]

Pan-Arabism had developed in this region as early as the 1920s as a reaction to the division of the Arab world into separate states which were to exist independently.[43] It was believed by many that once independence from imperial powers was achieved, a natural unity would re-emerge within the region with an ideal of political unity for all neighbors within it. However, from the earlier description of Lebanese society, Arabism

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[41] Kamal Salibi, Lebanon and the Middle Eastern Question, (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1988), p. 22.
[42] David McDowall, "Lebanon: A Conflict of Minorities", p. 14.
[43] Salibi, Lebanon and the Middle Eastern Question, p. 10.

represented different visions for the various communities of the country.[44] To the Christians Arabism was a purely secular national identity which formed the basis for Arab political life without being linked to Islam. For the Muslims it was a consciousness of national identity which was inseparable from Islam.

Although the historical development of the eventual Palestinian crisis in Lebanon is long and complex, I would simply wish to point out that the Palestinian revolution would find, for a time, an ideal playing ground in Lebanon. Whereas other Arab sovereign states recognized and eventually moved against the Palestinian revolution, because of its potential to destabilize existing governments and regimes, Lebanon became the regional platform for Palestinian military and political activity. A strong degree of state-nationality was manifested in other parts of the Arab world as they responded to the Palestinian challenge, which viewed itself as both an integral part of the global Arab question and yet remained distinctly Palestinian. Within Lebanon, Muslim-Christian tensions created an ideal atmosphere for the establishment of a home for the Palestinian revolution. A virtual state within a state was created with overwhelming Muslim support for the Palestinian cause.

For a time, Palestinian particularism in Lebanon, as it professed pan-Arab legitimacy and was supported by the Muslim portion of the population, conflicted with the Christians over the issue of Lebanese particularism.[45] However, the time arrived where these Muslim allies in Lebanon, although having received organization, arms and military training from this revolutionary leadership, relinquished support for the movement. They were, some authors suggest, awakening to their own "Lebanism", a

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[44] Ibid., p. 17.

particularism defined in terms of Lebanon and their objectives for the country. According to Kamal Salibi "as in all other cases, the fact that the Palestinians, as the prime carriers of a pan-Arab cause, felt no inhibition about speaking and acting as Palestinians first, gave full pan-Arab permission, so to speak, for the Muslims of Lebanon, as for the Transjordanians and others before them, to do the same."[46] Herein lies this study's concern with this phase of the Palestinian presence and involvement in Lebanon. Many Shi'a, at first sympathetic and united with the revolutionary aspirations of the Palestinian Resistance, were to transform their loyalty into discontent as their southern lands became the object of Israeli retaliation and reprisals against Palestinian military maneuvers. The resulting consequence of these actions was a stronger, more militaristic Israeli presence in the south and a growing resentment amongst the southerners towards their long-term visitors. By 1982, the outside world began to take notice of a situation which had escalated far beyond what the human imagination could conceive.

I was also struck originally by the Shi'i quietist, non-involvement with the primary questions of the day. My own pondering led me to ask myself four essential questions about the Lebanese Shi'a which I aspire to answer in this work. First, was religion, or the socio-political condition of the Shi'i community, or both, responsible for this quietist behavior? Second, where was the leadership, if any, through these early decades of the nation's history? Third, what type of leadership was needed? Finally, if goals existed, what might their nature be- religious, political, or both?

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[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.

Throughout my research, I drew upon studies of either a political or religious nature. In the first and second chapters, I have relied upon three basic works to prepare the background for the rise of Musa al-Sadr amongst the Lebanese Shi'i community and the development of the organization known by its acronym, *AMAL*. These three works include 1)Fouad Ajami's The Vanished Imam. Musa al-Sadr and the Shi'a of Lebanon, 2)Majed Halawi's A Lebanon Defied, and 3)Augustus Richard Norton's Amal and the Shi'a. Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon. These three sources appear relevant to the subject and are therefore being used since they adequately convey the character and objectives of Musa al-Sadr. This exercise is a master's thesis perceived as a study of existing materials in English and French on the subject. Knowledge of Arabic was useful in understanding the references of the authors used in this study. It appears that few authors have delved into the figure of Musa al-Sadr and I conclude that much research needs to be conducted to acquire a greater and more balanced understanding of this figure in both Lebanese and Shi'i politics. Both Ajami and Halawi appear to laud and magnify the personality of al-Sadr. His motives, according to them, appear purely selfless with only the amelioration of the Shi'i condition as a final objective. This perspective allows little questioning of Musa al-Sadr's own ambitions and agenda. As a man of both religion and politics, it hardly seems possible that his sole desire was to awaken the Shi'a to their condition without other motivational factors being involved, the period during which he operated being one significant factor. Perhaps future research will uncover certain latent issues which will better acquaint us with this charismatic figure. As for the work by Norton, who has devoted himself to studying this particular community in terms of its political activity, very little emphasis was placed

upon Shi'i thought and behavior, always closely connected to religious belief and doctrine. Although Norton's study is straightforward and allows the reader to distinguish events and actors in recent Lebanese political history, and provides a fundamental outline to better comprehend the Shi'i dilemma in Lebanon from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, he depends little upon the Shi'i conflation of religion and politics, so characteristic of this Islamic community. It seems that this is an important perspective to consider. Therefore, chapter one should be viewed in terms of the political and historical development of *AMAL* and the important escalation in Shi'i awareness of their own plight vis-a-vis the rest of society. This chapter attempts to demonstrate where the Shi'i leadership was concentrated before the latter half of the 1960s as well as the direction in which that leadership was destined to move.

Once *AMAL* was created through the efforts of Musa al-Sadr and the SISC (the Supreme Islamic Shi'i Council), the primary issues of the day came to the foreground for discussion and debate. Thus, the first half of chapter two analyzes the twenty Demands of the Shi'i community which were prepared and presented by the SISC in 1974. I depend heavily upon the article entitled, "The Shi'a Awakening in Lebanon: A Search for Radical Change in a Traditional Way", by Thom Sicking and Dr. Shereen Khairallah. This document provides not only a chronological list of events within the community from 1973-1974, but also a detailed translation of the political, economic and social demands the community was requesting from the government. In the second part of the chapter, I have also presented the Charter for the *Ḥarakat al-Maḥrumīn* movement (Movement of the Deprived), a predecessor to the Shi'i *AMAL* organization. The only available source for the Charter which I was able to locate was from the Appendix A to

Norton's Amal and the Shi'a. Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon. Here, I am dependent upon a translated source of the original document, which may or may not conform to the Arabic original. The translation mentions many of the Shi'i motifs and institutions which are fundamental to its "Shi'iness," yet there is no analysis or detail concerning traditional Twelver Shi'ism. Thus, it is my intention in this chapter to demonstrate the degree to which this document utilizes a religious rhetoric in order to create an agenda which would achieve political ends. Here I will rely on works by Mahmoud Ayoub, Henry Corbin, Heinz Halm, P.H. Lammens, Moojan Momen, Yann Richard and A.A. Sachedina for the basic understanding of the Shi'i perspective. My interest in answering the questions introduced earlier concerning the political and/or religious nature of the Shi'i goals and the actual existence of those goals is tackled in this section. It is my desire to draw forth from the political program and agenda of the organization any and all connections with religious belief, doctrine and symbols. My realization at this juncture is that the Shi'ism of this community was a necessary component to the success of its leaders during the early 1970s, although their overriding objectives may have been politically and socially oriented. The leadership of the community seemed to operate under the assumption that economic, social and political issues would be of little interest to Shi'i villagers if they remained isolated from and ignored by the greater society. Religion had to be the means of inciting this sector of the population to act. Therefore, the religious clerics of the community began to employ a more radically religious tone to their speeches and sermons. The people would eventually begin to listen.

Chapter three of this work concerns the external influence of the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 upon the Lebanese Shi'i community. This event would alter the manner in which the Shi'a "imagined" themselves and the way in which they were to relate to the world around them. Within this chapter I found very basic information concerning the events leading up to the Iranian Revolution in sources which included Jahangir Amuzegar's The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution. The Pahlavis' Triumph and Tragedy, Said Amir Arjomand's The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam and The Turban for the Crown, Shaul Bakhash's The Reign of the Ayatollahs, Michael Fischer's Iran. From Religious Dispute to Revolution, Fred Halliday's Iran: Dictatorship and Development, Dilip Hiro's Iran Under the Ayatollahs, and Nikki R. Keddie's Roots of Revolution. An Interpretive History of Modern Iran. Most of these works provided me with a broad base for understanding the principle causes of the Iranian discontent with the Pahlavi regime. Through other studies by Norton, Bailey and Cobban, to select a few, I was able to compare the social, political and economic climates of pre-revolutionary Iran and the Shi'i predicament in Lebanon during the 1960s and 1970s; periods in both nations' recent history where the Shi'a clerical leaders depended upon religiously symbolic events and themes in order to speak to the mass of the community. Yet, few authors whom I have mentioned devoted much attention to the religious roots of these issues. The concepts of the Imāmate, the Mahdi, martyrdom, the significance of Karbala and the *Ahl al-Bayt* (household of the Prophet) and justice were ignored. It has been my wish to show that these concepts in Shi'i thought and belief were paramount to the Lebanese Shi'a's self awareness. Thus, this chapter has an almost

macro, somewhat aloof approach to the influence of the Iranian revolution upon the Shi'a of Lebanon as it is centered on ideas and their impact.

Chapter four deals with the influence of the Israeli occupation on the Shi'a of Lebanon. The dialogue utilized by *AMAL*'s leaders, as the key organization representing Shi'i grievances until approximately 1984, was dealing with urgent social and political concerns of the community. Dropped was much of the religious rhetoric employed by the early leaders and adopted by the organization's newly developing rivals for authority. As the leadership within *AMAL* transferred from the hands of clerics to those of the rising middle class, we see an actual continuum in the political program of the organization with diminishing importance and emphasis placed upon actual religious dogma and symbols. The Israeli presence would militarily, economically, socially and politically shake up the south of Lebanon and force the people to take action. Because we are dealing with the concept of war, the account itself feels the burdens of the military actions and presence in the region. It deals with contemporary events on a micro level, centers on a reinforced chronology of what happened there and how all the activity affected the Shi'i community and its politicking in Lebanon. Sources for this chapter range from The Quarterly Economic Review to works by Rabinovich, Cobban and others.

A real schism appeared within the community after 1982. There were those who found themselves motivated to solve the community's dilemmas by a more radical religious approach than the mainstream moderates. Thus, the organization which earlier hoped to symbolize representation for all the Shi'a now found itself divided by those who wanted an amelioration of the political, economic and social condition and those

who were striving for a complete overhaul of the Lebanese system of governance, one based upon religious conviction, not mere promises. It is this split within the *AMAL* organization that renders the year 1984 significant for this study. At this point more extremist organizations were organizing to find very real and productive responses to Lebanon's political, economic and social dilemmas. Within this chapter, we will raise the question concerning the traditionally quietist manner of the Shi'a without wrestling with the issue in great depth.

Through the use of the works mentioned and others it is my hope to provide the reader with a new approach to the Lebanese Shi'i condition, the *AMAL* movement, and the external influences upon this growing community. Wanting to move away from their status as the "deprived" of the nation, they began to adopt measures to ensure themselves a voice in the political arena. I have here attempted to demonstrate another example of the important combination of politics and religion in Shi'i Islam. To separate the two would seem to negate much of what the Shi'a stand for in the history of Islam. Whether speaking to the ruler or the ruled, the two concepts naturally merge. With this in mind, I would like to conclude this introduction with a quotation from 'Alī Ibn Abī-Ṭālib, the first Imam of the Shi'a, son in law and cousin of the Prophet Muḥammad, referring to the favorites versus the oppressed and how a ruler should regard the two which seems an appropriate starting point for this work;

> Let the dearest of your affairs be those which are middlemost in rightfulness, most inclusive in justice and most comprehensive in (establishing) the content[ment] of the subjects. For the discontent of the common people invalidates the content[ment] of favorites, and the discontent of favorites is pardoned at (the achievement of) the content[ment] of the masses. Moreover, none of the subjects is more burdensome upon the ruler in ease and less of a help to him in trial than his favorites. (None are) more disgusted by equity, more

importunate in demands, less grateful upon bestowal, slower to pardon (the ruler upon his) withholding (favor) and more deficient in patience at the misfortunes of time than the favorites. Whereas the support of religion, the solidarity of Muslims and preparedness in the face of the enemy lie only with the common people of the community, so let your inclination and affection be toward them.[47]

[47] William C. Chittick, trans. A Shi'ite Anthology (London: Muhammadi Trust of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1980), 70. The passage is a portion of 'Alī's instructions to Malik al-Ashtar who was to become governor of Egypt during 'Alī's caliphate.

Chapter One

The Creation of the Supreme Islamic Shi'i Council and its Evolution into the Organization known as *AMAL*.

Lebanon of the 1960's and 1970's experienced a period of what has been termed a "Shi'a awakening" in terms of the community's social, economic and political awareness.[1] The majority of the Shi'a in this Levantine society, mostly concentrated in the southern regions and the "Belt of Misery" surrounding Beirut, were conscious that their position, status and reputation were inferior to members of most other religious communities sharing the same soil. This majority was also seemingly estranged from their fellow Shi'a who traditionally held positions of authority in local and national politics and those who were descendants of some of Lebanon's southern ruling families which was an integral part of the patronage system. However, the world would not become cognizant of the Shi'a as a sizable community nor of its dissociation from the greater society until this community began challenging the prominent socio-political issues through its own organizing efforts and those of its prominent leaders. The unity of the Lebanese Shi'a would be a constant threat with which Musa al-Sadr would deal as he attempted to provide his community with a visible organization that would speak to Shi'i grievances. He, more than any other individual before him, was able to provide a program and agenda for this diverse congregation. This chapter will briefly depict the Lebanese Shi'a predicament prior to

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[1] This idea of a "Shi'a awakening" is taken in part from the title of the article by Thom Sicking, S.J. and Dr Shereen Khairallah entitled "The Shi'a Awakening in Lebanon: A Search for Radical Change in a Traditional Way," in CEMAM Reports, vol. 2 (1974), 97-130. This article describes in full the metamorphosis of the community's awareness in terms of its political, social and economic condition over a period of a decade.

Musa al-Sadr's arrival at the head of this community when its condition appeared to have reached near desperation. Following this, the development of the Supreme Islamic Shi'i Council and its eventual transformation into the organization known as *AMAL* will be described. Early demands of many within the Shi'ite community, as represented by the Supreme Islamic Shi'i Council, will be briefly introduced and we will recognize much of their broad-based applicability to Lebanon's key contemporary questions, despite individual confessional adherence. A more in-depth analysis of these demands will be taken up in chapter three.

What renders this topic of Shi'i political activism more complex is that its leadership, particularly the figure of Musa al-Sadr, was not developing in a vacuum. Instead, the times themselves were continually launching new challenges which would contribute to the need, growing amongst the Shi'a, for political activism Although the few published sources concerning al-Sadr's rise to the leadership of his confessional community provide some details as to his thoughts on various issues, it is difficult to read objectivity in the authors' words. It must be remembered that al-Sadr functioned within the limitations of his humanness and that the development of his persona and leadership actually followed a well trod path of other world leaders. What makes Lebanon such a fascinating socio-political arena to study is the continual supply of new factors that individuals in power dealt with. Some of the crises which the Shi'i leadership would face were the Palestinian settlement in Lebanon, the Israeli strikes and occupation, the entry and action of the Syrians and the collapse of the Lebanese political system itself. These events would all help ignite Shi'i political activism. Yet, when al-Sadr arrived on the Lebanese scene in 1959, much of

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Much of the early programs and activities of the leadership are, here, outlined clearly.

the aforementioned crises were not yet his primary problems. His initial concerns were perhaps those of a leader taking over a bad situation and wanting to establish a hold on the group he is leading. In order to be assured that the community will follow, a leader needs outside allies, needs to split the internal enemy, i.e. the *zu'āma*, and to eventually prove his intentions and abilities as he becomes head of a populist movement. In addition to the previously mentioned goals for this chapter, it is my hope to adequately interpret the development of Musa al-Sadr's leadership as well as to piece together an appropriate representation of who this man might have been.

One interesting and important reason for considering Musa al-Sadr's development within the Lebanese Shi'i community, as he moves from an individual taking over a difficult situation to popular leader, is to more fully understand how his steps mirror those of other popular leaders elsewhere. By briefly considering the examples of Mahatma Gandhi in both South African and Indian politics as well as Nelson Mandela in more contemporary South African politics, some light is shed upon how individual leaders establish contact and trust with the people one wishes to mobilize. I am making these comparisons to initiate the possibility that certain common denominators must be present in groups fighting for change and much of the strength lies in the leader's ability to ally him/herself with his/her followers and earn their support. Nonetheless, this should not be considered the primary focus of this chapter.

Musa al-Sadr, Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela, in my estimation, focused on five common themes in order to consolidate support for their causes and to encourage support for disobedience vis-a-vis the state apparatus, thereby demonstrating their non-championing of government policy towards the disinherited peoples within each respective

nation. These five themes may be consolidated into the following: identity, responsibility, the minority vs. the majority, adherence of the youth and the unity amongst diverse groups. Perhaps the fact that comparisons with other leaders can be made helps us see al-Sadr's character in light of his adopting, whether consciously or not, a successful recipe for leadership and thus possessing the charisma and savoir-faire of a politician, not simply a religious leader responsible for his flock.

Firstly, the identity of a group, associating itself with positive imagery, or as Anderson would state "imagining" its potential, must be established in order to inspire the people to unite and act against oppression. The issue of identity was taken up early in the struggles of the three aforementioned leaders against antiquated ways of thinking and in order to support the masses, a necessary component for future political successes. Al-Sadr's themes of identity centered around a transformation of the Shi'i conscience from the *mutāwila* (disinherited) to the *rafidun* (men of vengeance). This was linked to the early Shi'ite leaders and the legacy they left successive generations.

Gandhi's message of identity was impressed upon the untouchables of India and South Africa, as many worked as indentured laborers, and the peasantry of both. In this case, he upheld the virtues of poverty as preventing the corruption of body and soul. Although untouchability was an integral part of the Hindu religion[2], Gandhi rejected the notion as a type of "segregation gone mad."[3] The interesting aspect of identity which Gandhi created for his followers was that he himself, although of the Vaisya caste which

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[2] Louis Fischer, The Life of Mahatma Gandhi (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1983), pp. 141-142. Louis Fischer points out that within the Hindu religion, it is believed that one is reborn into other lives and forms. To raise the status of an untouchable in this life would be robbing him of "a possible ticket to a high caste in the next incarnation." An untouchable, then, is serving a type of sentence for past deeds and "this prospect reconciles religious untouchables to their current misery."

[3] Ibid.

stood below the Brahmans and the Kshatriyas[4], would try to live the life of an untouchable to prove that they were actually "Harijans" (Children of God).[5] By rendering himself an untouchable, as he shared his living space and his life with them, and even accepted them into his circle of friends, untouchability lost some of its curse. As for Mandela's ability to provide his followers with a strong sense of identity, he stressed the black African heritage and the simple fact that South Africans of color need not feel inferior to their white neighbors.[6]

These aforementioned identities would thus foster the need for groups to assume responsibility for improving their own self-image as well as the image they portray to others. Musa al-Sadr espoused both through his speeches. He called for a re-interpretation of Shi'ism's past, not as a screen behind which activism may flourish, but as a stage upon which this Shi'i activism may be voiced. The religious celebration should merely inspire rather than cause the people to lose political momentum behind traditional expressions of mourning; lamentation, self-flagellation and sorrow. Momentum should be sustained for longer periods than these particular occasions for reflection. They should be an integral part of the community's activities.

Mahatma Gandhi stressed the importance for the Indians to take responsibility for their actions, thus one of his reasons for advocating passive resistance, or "swaraj." Through demonstrated violence, he asks, how could their British occupiers see them as reasonable human beings capable of ruling themselves. This he expressed well before an audience of academics in February 1916 when, after criticizing Indians' non-involvement in

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[4] Ibid., p. 12.
[5] Ibid., p. 144.
[6] Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, Mandela. An Illustrated Autobiography (USA: Little, Brown and Co., Inc., 1996), pp. 35-37.

improving the cleanliness, security and dignity of the nation, Gandhi stated " and turning the searchlight toward ourselves... It is well to take the blame sometimes."[7] Nelson Mandela, as well , stressed the importance of assuming responsibility when he began to realize, according to his own words, "it was up to Africans to reassert themselves and reclaim what was rightfully theirs."[8] This reassertion of self seems paramount to a movement's progress and it also seems to create cohesion as individuals find greater strength searching for answers from within as opposed to finding scapegoats for their disenchantment.

The third theme intertwined in the leadership building process of these three individuals was their keen understanding of the sensitivities surrounding minority rule. All three recognize the fear and trepidation with which the ruling minority live, be they the Christians in Lebanon, the white British in India or the white Dutch in South Africa. None of these popular leaders called for the minorities to disembark from their respective countries. They, in fact, spoke in favor of these minorities' necessity to feel a sense of security within any new nation which would emerge. They were all, on the contrary, looking to erect new governing structures that would take account of ethnic differences prevalent within the nation's borders.

The fourth theme upon which al- Sadr, Gandhi and Mandela depended for consolidating support for their movements was the participation of the country's youth. The three leaders appealed to the young generation, full of energy and idealism, as they focused on their concerns. Al-Sadr utilized the campus of AUB in order to rouse backing

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[7] Fischer, The Life of Mahatma Gandhi, p. 137.

for the Palestinian plight and the economic turmoil of the poor. Youth tend to be less reluctant to participate in rallies, demonstrations, strikes and other forms of protest as they can frequently find an outlet for their idealism. Gandhi and Mandela also capitalized upon this sector of the population through the acts of non-cooperation with the government, as in the case of India, where thousands of students willingly dropped their professional studies at government run universities and proceeded into the villages to teach both literacy and non-cooperation,[9] or through the African National Congress Youth League in South Africa which was to act as a stimulus to the ANC leadership which many saw as a "tired, unmilitant, privileged African elite more concerned with protecting their own rights than those of the masses."[10]

The final notion which contributed to the consolidation of leadership of these three individuals was that unity amongst groups promotes change. Within their own countries, all three propounded the necessity for national unity in order to break the clutch of oppressive governments. Al-Sadr called upon the dispossessed of Lebanon, whether Christian, Shi'i, Sunni or Druze, to voice their common concerns and he laid before the country the Shi'i agenda which advocated, amongst other things, the establishment of national unity and the creation of Lebanon for the Lebanese. Gandhi also professed the need for Indian national unity to throw off the yoke of British authority, one of the steps towards freedom. His concern for Hindu unity, divided by an ancient class structure, along with Hindu-Muslim unity within India is demonstrated by the following statement: "It is a matter of deep humiliation to confess that we are a house divided against itself, that we

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[8] Mandela, Mandela. An Illustrated Autobiography, p. 35.
[9] Fischer, The Life of Mahatma Gandhi , p. 191.
[10] Mandela, Mandela. An Illustrated Autobiography, p. 36.

Hindus and Mussulmans are flying at one another. It is a matter of still deeper humiliation that we Hindus regard several million of our own kith and kin as too degraded even for our touch."[11] Mandela and the leadership of the ANC, before 1962 when some African leaders questioned ANC relations with white and Indian Communists[12], also understood that South African unity amongst the colored population and its white supporters was required in order for South Africa to be truly free from its oppressive government. All communities had to recognize that they were first and foremost South African before they could consider their individuality. It can therefore be seen that Musa al-Sadr utilized common themes which helped him consolidate, over time, his leadership within the Shi'i community and launched him onto the path of political activism.

Prior to the mid-1960's, Lebanese society maintained a virtual divide that was to foment the frustration and anger of "the disinherited," namely the Shi'ite community of the Southern regions (Jabal 'Āmil and the Bekaa). Jabal 'Āmil is highly significant to the Lebanese Shi'i community as it was from this region that Twelver Shi'ism is believed to have spread to Iran in the 16th century.[13] Their heritage was capitalized upon by the Shi'i community as being distinctly its own. This distinction came face to face with the new Europeanization of certain sectors of the Lebanese populus. As Lebanese culture became commingled with European culture, due to extensive French influence during the period of

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[11] Fischer, The Life of Mahatma Gandhi, p. 283.

[12] Mandela, Mandela. An Illustrated Autobiography, p. 98.

[13] It should be noted that Jabal 'Āmil, along with the great Shi'i learning centers of Qum and Najaf, was a haven for Shi'i thought, religious learning and scholarship. According to Halm, several scholars of the 16th century from the Jabal 'Āmil played a significant role in bringing Shi'ism to the fore in Safavid Iran. Among these scholars was 'Alī ibn 'Abd al-'Alī al-Karakī al-'Āmilī from Karak Nuh in the Bekaa region. He was invited to Najaf and thence was asked by the Shah Tahmasp to visit Iran where he was influential in spreading Twelver Shi'ism. Through his efforts the Hilla school was recognized by the authority of the time in Safavid Iran and the Shi'i clergy in Iran were to follow this school of thought. For more details on al-Karakī al-'Āmilī's influence see: Said Amir Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam. Religion, Political

colonization, Beirut represented all that was modern, "civilized," and western. An embracing of foreign ideas and values along with secularism helped foster a socio-economic rift which was both inter and intra-communal.

The shift in importance of certain geographical regions was creating change in the concept of confessional cohabitation. Where the Mount Lebanon had been, under the power and influence of the Ottoman Empire, a refuge of sorts for many smaller confessional communities, it lost its autonomous position as Beirut itself grew in size and stature.[14] The governing traditions of the Mountain, which had long fostered a degree of cohabitation between Maronite, Druze, and Shi'i communities, was diminishing as these groups made their way to the new capital of the country. Hourani aptly states the demographic change taking place within the country: "Lebanon had changed from being a mountain republic to a city state."[15] Beirut attracted foreign interest and, in turn, money due to its non-confrontational position vis-a-vis the West in the first half of this century. There are three immediate reasons for this prosperity in the capital: 1) the Arab boycott of the port of Haifa after 1948, 2) the Egyptian revolution of 1952 as it occasioned a decline in foreign and private enterprise, as well as 3) the irrevocable expansion of oil production and the

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Order, and Societal Change in Shi'ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984); Heinz Halm, Shiism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991), 87-88, 131.

[14] Henry Laurens, Le Royaume Impossible. La France et la Genese du Monde Arabe (Paris: Armand Colin, 1990), 82.

[15] Albert Hourani, Political Society in Lebanon: A Historical Introduction,p. 15. To further explain the growing political predicament of the country where ruling traditions were swiftly being altered we should refer to Hourani's own explanation: "Cities have been ruled in a different way from mountain villages. Government is no longer a question of balancing the interests of powerful families or of districts. The city population needs an authority to maintain order in a complicated situation, and a variety of public services. It was here that the structural weaknesses of the Lebanese political system showed itself. It proved to be incapable of governing the vast and rapidly growing city of rural immigrants. They turned elsewhere for protection and services, to organizations which expressed their own identity, and that identity was a communal and regional one.

respective revenues associated with it.[16] A prosperity never before witnessed in Lebanon was experienced with the beneficiaries moving into the services sector and distancing themselves from agriculture and industry. State intervention was minimal with the rise of unrestrained capitalism.[17] Coupled with this economic prosperity, Beirut also transformed itself into a haven for ideas, culture and scholarship within the Arab world. It possessed a free press, attracted leading scholars and considered itself the most civilized city within the Arab world, the Ba'albek Festival of Music being the showpiece of this high level of culture.[18]

Yet, the truth remained that most of Lebanon, prior to this modernizing upheaval, was engaged in agricultural activity, and the southern, Shi'a dominated regions were at the heart of this livelihood. Until the late 1950s, approximately 90 percent of the workforce engaged in agricultural activity and this populus became victims of the "progress" of the following decades.[19] It was rural life which suffered the effects of massive modernization with few benefits trickling down to the masses. Production was altered with the conglomerates of agribusinesses stripping the peasants of their traditional role in the society. These were a people that inherited the technique of land cultivation, without necessarily owning the land themselves. Suddenly, they found themselves without jobs due to a consolidation of cultivated crops and the introduction of large machinery. Therefore,

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[16] Ibid., p.13.
[17] Ibid., p. 14.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Majed Halawi, A Lebanon Defied. Musa al-Sadr and the Shi'a Community (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992),p. 52.

an exploitation of those who remained on the land was inevitable, with a government too far removed physically and ideologically to intervene on their behalf.[20]

The growth in the commercial and services sectors was strong incentive for many peasants to leave the land and relocate to Beirut and the other major cities of the country.[21] Although the economic factors were the driving motivation behind the Shi'i exodus from the countryside, other factors weighed heavily in their decision making. The representatives of these people were tenaciously aligned to the concept of *zu'āma*, or ruling elites, of the country. The relationship between the *zu'āma* and the peasant, the patronage system, is most aptly expressed by Majed Halawi:

> On the one hand the za'im protected his peasants from extortion and destitution, generally improving on their "image of the limited good," i.e., on their lack of "land, wealth, health, friendship and love, manliness and honor, respect and status, power and influence, security and safety." The peasants, in turn, expressed devotion to the za'im by sending family members to serve in his home, bringing him choice offerings from the produce of the land, publicly praising him, and providing soldiers at times of war.[22]

The *zu'āma* built a clientele amongst their voting constituents. However, these *zu'āma*, either as representatives themselves or as puppeteers for those who were, often operated according to their own interests[23], or simply misunderstood their obligations. Until the era of Musa al-Sadr, this is precisely the organization typifying Shi'i representation in the capital as landlordism, part of the Lebanese economic structure by the

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[20] Ibid.,pp. 52-58. Listed are numerous statistics further demonstrating the exploitation of the peasantry. Factors such as the specialization of crops, the overriding influence of private concerns, the intolerable conditions of agricultural workers and small landowners, the weakening of agricultural credit and the state's irrigation policies all contribute to the isolation of this population vis-a -vis the remainder of the society, namely Beirut.

[21] Ibid., p. 59.

[22] Ibid., p. 85.

late 1950s, also set the political tone for the nation as well. The most problematic aspect of this system was the fact that many necessities deemed essential for daily living were never provided as the politico-economic elite will make decisions in their own interests and promote policies which reflect the economic differentiation and roles of the economy itself. Thus, the Shi'a of the rural areas were amongst those deprived of schools, hospitals, clean running water, roads, not to mention electricity while their relatives and acquaintances inhabiting the "Belt of Misery" were not faring much better. What most of us would consider basic necessities in order to sustain life were probably luxuries to many of these Lebanese. Few persons, before the advent of Musa al-Sadr, fought for the right of all people to share in the rewards of progress. The fact that socioeconomic differentials did exist between religions and regions merely became clearer over time. According to Majed Halawi, South Lebanon and the Bekaa represented the most impoverished regions in the poverty belt of the country, with the Muslim population further removed than the Christians from any financial or material benefits. And he concludes that the Shi'a remained at the extreme limit of the socioeconomic scale.[24] Thus, the marginalization of a minority community was complete and would inflame the political and religious conscience of this disinherited group.

Although the Shi'i migrants to Beirut believed they were destined for a life of greater prosperity and fewer tribulations, they were astounded by the reality of their condition. They may have been removed from the deteriorating security environment in the

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[23]Ibid., p. 83. For more detail concerning the role of the *zu'āma* in Lebanese history see Arnold Hottinger, "Zu'āma in Historical Perspective," in Politics in Lebanon, ed. Leonard Binder (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), 85-105.

[24] Halawi, A Lebanon Defied, pp. 62-83. Majed Halawi, here, considers statistics from this period in time concerning financial, educational, occupational and health service discrepancies throughout Lebanon. It

south, yet they were juxtaposed with communities that received both governmental and international financial support and attention. The Shi'i community, whether domestic or foreign, had not drawn attention to itself in the international realm before this era in political history and therefore never benefited from the guidance and protection of foreign nations. The gulf grew between the Shi'a and the other communities, not over purely religious issues, but issues which affected modern day life. By 1971, nearly half of the Lebanese Shi'a had relocated to Beirut and her environs.[25] They found themselves jammed into densely populated quarters which lacked the basics of sanitation and a minimal sense of privacy which injured their sense of human dignity.[26] Few witnessed increased prosperity in their livelihoods or living conditions that would alleviate their economic, social and political anxiety. The Shi'a rapidly found themselves resident in the city's slums which further aggravated their predicament. In 1973 they numbered close to 200,000 residents in the environs of Beirut.[27]They were the unwelcome guests in a city unable to accommodate the mass influx of newcomers. Any and all tensions between religious communities were augmented.[28] Most Shi'i immigrants were unable to find employment in the booming industrial sector, either due to a lack of education, training or pure prejudice. Many remained unemployed or linked to peripheral society through employment in sectors such as

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becomes apparent to the reader that the Shi'a were the last to reap the benefits of any progress which took place in the country, often times being forgotten altogether.

[25]Ibid., p. 68. The author, here, presents statistics based upon the geographical survey of Joseph Chamie in his work entitled "Religious Groups in Lebanon," International Journal of Middle East Studies 11, no. 2 (1980): 181. It appears that 45/100 Shi'ites were living in Greater Beirut at the time of the 1971 survey. This fact seems to prove that many Shi'a from other parts of the country were flocking to Beirut at this time to escape economic hardship and to search for a new way of life.

[26] Halawi, A Lebanon Defied, p. 68.

[27] Based upon notes from a course with Mr. André Bourgey at the Institut des Langues et des Civilisations Orientales in 1990. Géographie du Proche-Orient Arabe, p. 65.

[28] Hourani, Political Society in Lebanon, p. 15.

peddlers, cab drivers and gang recruits for local, smaller militias.[29] The Shi'a came to be rather street-wise and their allegiances served the purpose of local, urban politicians.[30] This body of the Shi'a evolved into a group awakened to the condition of the community and the absolute necessity for a radical change in representation, stature and role within the greater Lebanese society. No longer a weak minority, it is commonly believed that by the mid 1960s the Shi'i population had grown in number to the point where it was a majority, a position long-maintained by the Maronites. Political demands were at the forefront of the issues relating to the Shi'a as they were to seek a reorganization of the traditional governing structure and greater political participation in that system.

There was an increased class consciousness amongst the Shi'a of Beirut. Exposure to the media, particularly radio and newspaper, was now common, allowing for greater understanding of the world in which the Shi'a found themselves. They observed the development of other movements and parties which were forming within the country and which seemed to provide answers to many of their ills. The traditional political system was feeling the strains of a changing, evolving society with this immense pool of recruits waiting to have a cause to cling to and fight for.[31] The causes to which the Shi'a lent their support were many as they sought a degree of control over their destiny which had originally been controlled by the personal wills of the *zu'āma*. Parties rallying around the themes of equality, improved social and health services, as well as improvements in housing

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[29] According to As'ad AbuKhalil, the Shi'ites of Lebanon were living in a world far removed from the prosperity that was viewed by the external world. The author suggests that the Shi'a were the garbage collectors, beggars, toilers and the members of radical leftist organizations. They were the unwelcomed guests in a city which was a jewel in the Mediterranean. For more details see As'ad AbuKhalil, "Druze, Sunni and Shiite Political Leadership in Present-Day Lebanon," in Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 7, no. 4 (Fall 1985), 43.

[30] Halawi, A Lebanon Defied, p. 70.

conditions were salvation for a people who experienced oppression in their home regions under the sway of their Shi'ite *zu'āma* and in their newly created communities in Beirut's suburbs. As the economy of Lebanon was changing from being mostly agrarian to one oriented towards the services sector the prominent leadership of the country was also changing. In the former system the popular will was either unimportant or not taken into account. Yet, with the increased prosperity of the country, the change in the economic base of the nation and the consequential flux in demographics, different organizations were able to capitalize upon their ability to represent and serve the popular will. Such attractive groups included the Lebanese Communist Party as well as the "antiestablishment" organization of the Communist Action Organization (*Munazzamat al-'Amal al-Shiyu'i*). It was not only secular groups which managed to attract the Shi'a but also those which were directly and intimately involved in the Palestinian resistance and movements for Arab nationalism: the Arab Liberation Front, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Arab Nationalist Movement, and the pro-Iraqi and pro-Syrian branches of the Ba'ath party.[32] These parties would soon become the target of Musa al-Sadr's rhetoric denouncing atheism and corruption perhaps not solely for religious reasons but also for a regaining of Shi'i recruits.[33] Political action was now the watchword on everyone's lips and the overt discrimination and neglect by the rest of the nation was the first obstacle to overcome. This is the point at which Imam Musa al-Sadr was able to intercede in the affairs of his adopted community and begin the transformation of Shi'i political power.

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[31] Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi'a. Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), p. 37.
[32] Ibid., p. 38.
[33] Ibid., p. 41.

Sayyid Musa al-Sadr arrived in Lebanon in 1959 upon his appointment to the city of Tyre as its next Shi'i religious leader. Musa al-Sadr was born on March 15, 1928 in Qum, Iran to a family with a long history of religious leadership and devotion.[34] Although Musa al-Sadr was Iranian by birth, his lineage was of the Jabal 'Āmil heritage of yesteryear.[35]

Upon his arrival in Lebanon, Musa al-Sadr was quickly confronted with the numerous instances of Shi'i inequality, under-representation in politics, disinherited status and overall disenchantment with Lebanese society. The myths and histories which surround this man stem from his unique character as a leader of a community rooted in its own history and mythology. Much of what he was capable of achieving is profoundly connected with his character, charisma and beliefs. Yet we as outsiders may only speculate upon the thought that was behind his actions. He is a man who arrived with the purpose of providing religious guidance to his community and yet, establishes a populist movement and becomes one of its important and influential leaders. This leader's employment of the principal Shi'i doctrines and motifs within his rhetoric are illustrative of some forethought in how to more fully unite his constituency to work for socio-political change. His personality as well as his emphasis on Shi'ism's potential for social upheaval were the keys to his success in rousing the people to action. He was remarkably apt at contextualizing Shi'i history and motifs into the current conditions of Lebanese society.

Sayyid Musa's work in Lebanon began as he made initial contact with the people. His first objective for the community may have arisen as he settled himself into his new role as religious teacher and guide and began to listen and observe. The first objective was to relieve the basic and blatant problem of poverty in southern Lebanon, an issue concomitant

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[34] Halawi, A Lebanon Defied, p. 124.

with that of the poor economic and social status of the Shi'a, while working for social change. He firmly held to the notion that the ulama were those individuals within the Muslim community responsible for educating mankind through pious efforts and their own knowledge of the *Sharī'a*.[36] Thus, with the combination of these two principle elements, Musa al-Sadr began his crusade to improve the lot of the poor in his new home country without regard for confessional differences.

The nature of Lebanon being multi-confessional implied that the various religious communities, both within themselves and without, held differing opinions about and agendas for their state in terms of its structure, protection and preservation of land, people, national character and economy. No single religious community had provided answers to the key issues affecting the Shi'a and which were dividing the nation into interest groups. These issues were protection of the southern regions, financing of projects and programs to revitalize the economy of the south, political representation for all religious communities based upon factual numbers rather than a system based upon a long-standing tradition, and finally the nature of the country and its sovereignty. Norton states "[Imam Musa] was a reformer, not a revolutionary."[37] His goal, at the outset, was "the betterment of the Shi'i in a Lebanese context."[38] The differences between religion, social status and region had grown through the years in a country where each community, one can only imagine, felt the need to protect its interests from the others. Yet, the fact remains that Lebanon is a country composed of minorities trying to live together in a region which is predominantly Sunni

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[35] For an exposé of this heritage please refer to footnote no. 13, pg. 29.
[36] Halawi, A Lebanon Defied, p. 132. This is an issue which would be of equal importance to the Ayatollah Khomeini concerning the Iranian case. The absolute necessity for the *ulama* to become concerned with the everyday affairs of man, and the eventual rule by the *velāyat-e faqīh*, will be discussed in chapter 4.
[37] Augustus Richard Norton, "Musa al-Sadr" in Pioneers of Islamic Revival, edited by Ali Rahnema (New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1994), p. 199.

Muslim.[39] It would appear that Musa al-Sadr was perceptive and sagacious by launching his communal issues onto a larger stage and eventually integrating them with the issue of national unity and the unique character of Lebanon.[40] In this way he created a more wide-spread appeal, and in turn support, for his proposals. His recognition of Maronite insecurity in Lebanon[41] and Sunni aspirations as acting representative for all Muslims, made al-Sadr an effective leader for the Shi'a, since his voice was both heard and respected by members of other communities. He was beginning to establish allies outside of his own community, a move which may not have been deliberate for the consolidation of power and authority in his hands. He seemed to understand his adopted country and the profound feelings of tenuousness each community carried within. It was not his objective to offset the needs of one community by those of another but to draw upon the collective responsibility of all to achieve the goal of national unity. The state should, in his view, assume the role of representative and protector of minorities as well as majorities[42] thus fostering an image of a just and equitable partner in the creation of a new Lebanon.

Despite the fact that Musa al-Sadr's rhetoric in these early years espoused cooperation amongst all religious groups within Lebanon, he was laying the foundation for his program of action which would begin at the end of the 1960s. The multi-factioned nature of the society needed to be overcome and a degree of unity established to meet demands which cut across confessional lines. Pressing issues of the day, for the Shi'a, included: 1) security for the south, 2) funds for improvements, 3) fair and just political

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[38] Ibid.
[39] Jean Aucagne, "L'Imam Moussa Sadr et la Communauté Chiite", Travaux et Jours, no. 53 (oct.-Déc. 1974), p. 40.
[40] Ibid., p. 41.
[41] Norton, "Musa al-Sadr", p. 199.
[42] Halawi, A Lebanon Defied, p. 133.

representation for all, and 4) the concept of Lebanese national unity. Musa al-Sadr generated greater support for his goals as he conducted dialogue with the Sunnis and the Christians. Several times he visited with the Sunni Mufti of the Lebanese Republic and gained his support.[43] His appeal to the Christians also grew through his visits to both the Maronite Patriarch and various churches in the country during the early 1970s, using the pulpit to illustrate common interests.[44] However, by the early 1970s the Shi'a's collective talents and demands were now ready to be consolidated into a firm organization so that their voice of discontent could be heard. Musa al-Sadr succeeded in establishing himself as the leader of a new community. We may perhaps use the term "new" in two different ways: not only was the community "new" in terms of al-Sadr's familiarity with it but also "new" in terms of its own re-creation.

The meeting of social needs and full representation for the Shi'i community was finally articulated in 1967 with the creation of *al-Majlis al-Islami al-Shi'i al-A'la*(The Supreme Islamic Shi'i Council or SISC). The SISC's primary purpose was to oversee the affairs and interests of the community in terms of social, economic and political issues. Sayyid Musa himself strongly felt that the condition of the Shi'a in Lebanon was closely connected to the lack of support by the state authorities: "The Shi'a problem, Sayyid Musa insisted, had to do with deprivation and degrading physical conditions, the lack of spiritual

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[43] Aucagne, "L'Imam Moussa Sadr et la Communauté Chiite", p. 40.

[44] Halawi, A Lebanon Defied, p. 182. These sermons given at churches of different Christian denominations and Sunni mosques represented Musa al-Sadr's efforts at inter-communal dialogue and commitment to the national issues. Many authors believe that al-Sadr's Lenten sermon at the Cathédrale Saint-Louis des Capucins in Beirut on February 19, 1975 stands as the epitome of his oratorical skills.

and cultural guidance, and the sociopolitical reality of being a part and yet not full participants in a country."[45]

Although the creation of a council for this community would seem to reinforce the multi-confessional nature/breakdown of Lebanon, it was deemed essential for the Shi'a, the last of the seventeen officially recognized confessional groups, to organize a millet council.[46] According to Halawi "the Shi'a community needed a central mechanism to coordinate its affairs, to defend its rights, and to oversee its interests. Such was the inevitable consequence of Lebanon's political configuration with its emphasis on communal particularism."[47]

With an increased awareness about his adopted community it would seem that Musa al-Sadr desired, through the planning and creation of the SISC organization, to give a greater voice to Shi'i interests. The organization consisted of Shi'i religious leaders and members of the intelligentsia.[48] It was earlier mentioned how al-Sadr felt the ulama should become more responsible in terms of their political duties and their examples of leadership. The creation of the SISC may have been his *modus operandi* for achieving this participation. The *zu'āma* were considered as operating under a system which was contrary to the popular will, as well as the political and economic good of the community . The *zu'āma* legitimized their claim to power based upon several factors: descent from prominent ancestors in early Islamic history, the only institution/group which could directly challenge Ottoman rule and their overall socio-economic presence in the areas they represented.[49]

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[45] Halawi, A Lebanon Defied, p. 138. See also Jean Aucagne, "L'Imam Moussa Sadr et la Communauté Chiite," in Travaux et Jour, no. 53 (October-December 1974), p. 38.
[46] Halawi, A Lebanon Defied, p. 141.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid., p. 141.
[49] Ibid., pp. 83-87.

According to Halawi, "until very recently, the leadership of these zu'āma was the organizing principle of the sociopolitical order among the Shi'a, as well as throughout Lebanon for that matter."[50] A system of "mutual benefit and loyalty between protector and protected"[51] had developed that was being challenged in the second half of the 1960s by the newly organized Shi'i religious establishment. These ulama, although lacking a long-established and traditional role as political representatives in Lebanese politics, became the symbolic representatives and the re-interpreters of Shi'i history for the mass of the community.[52] With the rise in influence of the ulama amongst the community came the splitting of the enemy to communal solidarity - the *zu'āma*. It was only a matter of time before the influence and power of these traditional leaders was to decline.

It is interesting to note that the establishment of the Supreme Islamic Shi'i Council was supported and opposed by several groups. As explained above, many *zu'āma* within the Shi'i community witnessed a move to reduce their power and status amongst their voting constituents. The patronage system was quickly being replaced by an ever growing religious institution. The fact that it was being headed by both religious clerics and Shi'i intellects created competition for the well-established *za'im*. Yet important opposition also emerged from the Sunni political establishment which argued that the Shi'i Council would further split the Muslim population of Lebanon and allow the Maronite community (often viewed as a client of the West) political hegemony.[53] Although stark differences did exist between the two principle Muslim factions, the Sunnis continually saw themselves united

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[50] Ibid., p. 83.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid., p. 90.
[53] Ibid., p. 140.

with their religious counterpart in solidarity against the Christian front.[54] The fear of the newly established organization functioning as a puppet for American-Iranian interests (during a period of cooperation on the part of both these nations) forced many Lebanese Sunnis to voice their concerns about a reduction in Muslim unity. The scenario of Maronite socio-political hegemony was at best distasteful for them.[55] Many of the Council's advocates within the Shi'i community argued that Sunni opposition stemmed from its own fear of losing its position as representative for all Muslims in Lebanon.[56] Not surprisingly, if we consider the above argument, the Christian community favored the creation of a Shi'i Council which could further divide the Muslim majority. The cloak covering Shi'i political activism was being lifted by the end of the 1960s. To be sure, al-Sadr was not wholeheartedly supported by all members of his community, but he did manage to raise the previously quiescent voice of the ulama.

Just as all other confessional groups, including the Druzes, had their respective councils established well before the Shi'a,[57]the SISC came into legislation with the intent to serve as a central council for "coordinating the community's affairs, defend its rights, and to oversee its interests."[58] However, Musa al-Sadr continued to emphasize that Shi'i interests were concomitant with those of the other communities. Through his words and actions it can only be presumed that al-Sadr wanted to promote external support for this Shi'i organization so as to better achieve their future goals and perhaps further consolidate his own position as head of this community.

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[54] Jean Aucagne, "L'Imam Moussa Sadr et la Communauté Chiite,", p. 39.
[55] Halawi, A Lebanon Defied, p. 140.
[56] Ibid., p. 141.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.

The SISC would now serve the needs of the community, in terms of securing the autonomous management of its religious affairs, as well as supervise its endowments and private institutions. The SISC was created by the Act 72/67 of the Lebanese Parliament and seven months later the bill became a law with the blessings of President Charles Hélou and Prime Minister Rashid Karami.[59] Now that it was possible for the Shi'a to direct their own religious affairs as well as monitor where the funds were being distributed once they were donated to the community, previous abuses by the *zu'āma* and the state began to disappear. The Sharī'a would provide the guiding principles for the community to live by and the Ja'fari school became an accepted school of Shi'i jurisprudence.[60]

On May 23, 1969, Musa al-Sadr was elected the SISC's first chairman by a majority vote of the Council's executive and legal committees until his sixty-fifth birthday which would have been March 15, 1993.[61] This was not accomplished without disagreement and protest within the SISC's ranks.[62] It was at this early date in Musa al-Sadr's career that the title "Imam" was granted to him by what we as readers must assume were his supporters within the SISC and without.[63] Because the concept of the Imāmate is at the very center of the Shi'i spiritual beliefs and defines the role of the ruler on earth, Musa al-Sadr was

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[59] Ibid., p. 139.
[60] Ibid., p. 140.
[61] Ibid., p. 142. However, because of his disappearance on August 31, 1978 the Shi'i community was thrown into a dilemma. Perhaps due to the Shi'i belief in the occultation of the Hidden Imam, or because the myth is closely associated with the upheld concept of martyrdom, no one truly wanted to replace al-Sadr when myth surrounded his character. This may actually have bolstered the enthusiasm within the community and spurred it on to further social/political awareness. Also see Peter Theroux, The Strange Disappearance of Imam Moussa Sadr (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987).
[62] Halawi, A Lebanon Defied, p. 142..
[63] It is also argued by certain authors that Musa al-Sadr gave himself this title (Sicking and Khairallah, The Shi'a Awakening in Lebanon, p. 108). I feel it is important to note the difference in opinion concerning this issue, which would merely contribute to the slowly revealing character of this figure in Shi'i contemporary history. Halawi is unclear in his work A Lebanon Defied, p. 142 for he merely says that the title "Imam" was "bestowed" on Musa al-Sadr, without making reference to whom this group might be.

reluctant to accept the honor.[64] The character of the Imam, as set forth in Shi'i thought, is one of infallibility and spiritual superiority. Sayyid Musa never claimed to be either since he envisioned his purpose on this earth to relocate social justice for the underprivileged and demonstrate the truths of Shi'i Islam by encouraging his followers "to accept total responsibility for their struggle, and to realize that they were 'fighting not merely for freedom from hunger, but...freedom to create and to construct, to wonder and to venture.'"[65]

The agenda for the SISC was brought before public attention and proposed on May 23, 1969 with six principles for action.[66]

1) To organize the affairs of the community and to work toward improving its socioeconomic standards.
2) To carry out his (Imam Musa al-Sadr) responsibilities according to the dictates of scripture.
3) To strive for equality and harmony among the Muslims.
4) To cooperate with all Lebanese communities, and to protect the integrity and freedom of the Lebanese nation.
5) To fight ignorance, poverty, underdevelopment, social injustice, and moral deterioration.
6) To support the Palestinian resistance and to participate effectively with Arab countries for the liberation of Palestine.

These six principles seem to reflect the primary issues confronting both the Shi'i community as well as the leadership of Musa al-Sadr. By 1969 the Shi'i predicament within

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[64] The notion of the Imāmate is an essential dogma of the Shi'i faith. However, it should be observed that although the belief in the occultation of the Twelfth Imam holds much mystical as well as spiritual potential, in essence a unifying factor for the Shi'i community, the role of the Imam itself is to serve as guide for the community. Without the presence of the Prophet amongst the believers, the Imam was to serve as the interpreter of God's will and desires for mankind, applying it to the human condition of the time in which he may find himself serving. In Sunni Islam, this is considered to be the responsibility of the temporal ruler, the Caliph, to whom all owe their allegiance. Due to the Shi'i concept of the hierarchy of leadership- God, the Prophet and the Imams- the Imam himself was closely connected to God, a position that most of humankind could never attain. Thus, the title which Musa al-Sadr was granted implied a much more profound station than he perhaps considered himself worthy of. For more details see Wilferd Madelung, "Imāma", The Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol.3 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971), pp.1163-1169.

[65] Halawi, A Lebanon Defied p.143.

Lebanon must have seemed quite clear: for the most part, they were an ignored people. Musa al-Sadr was now developing in a country that was a pressure cooker and one can only imagine that the political pressure he was facing as rising leader for his community was augmenting.

The situation he walked into in 1959 was not the same a decade later. The Palestinian settlement in Lebanon alone was creating tension within the Lebanese government as it was becoming clearer which communities supported their presence and which viewed it as a menace. This presence, as discussed earlier in the introduction, was fostering feelings for a "Lebanese particularism" to match that of the Palestinians'. This presence also helped widen the growing rift between Christians and Muslims as sentiments of Arab nationalism and support were integrated into the Palestinian question. It seems highly probable that the Christian communities within Lebanon understood Arab nationalism as being closely connected to Islam and that as a community the Christians were a definite minority within the region. This may also help explain why they later tended to align themselves with Israel during and after the 1975 Civil War, another minority community trying to exist within a region with a Muslim majority. Of course, the Palestinian presence was a primary reason for the Israeli strikes and occupation of South Lebanon which, in turn, created an important demographic change within the country as the southerners fled northward, particularly flooding the environs of Beirut. This sudden imbalance in the population, as people surged into a city which could not support this massive influx, exacerbated communal tensions.

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[66] Ibid.

Another factor of extreme importance at this time was the Syrian entry and action within Lebanon, again widening rifts between those communities which supported these moves and those which did not. Whether Syrian presence was due to a desire to "colonize" the territories it lost upon the division of Greater Syria earlier in the century, to protect its own borders and the Gaza Strip region from Israeli invasion, to support confessional communities which it felt wise and in its best interests to support, or all of the above, this Syrian presence provided fuel for the steam that made Lebanon such an active political arena. The eventual collapse of the Lebanese political system in 1975 created a new system where political alignments fluctuated and where a leader who may have once been popular was easily replaced, removed or eliminated by rivals who could prove themselves stronger and more fierce/aggressive.

Thus Musa al-Sadr's new organizational body representing Shi'i grievances established an agenda which reflected contemporary concerns of Lebanon. These issues seemed to affect every community within Lebanon despite religious orientation as no one community was immune from the crises besetting the country. The principles are grounded in universal religious doctrine such as the pursuit of good and that which is in accord with God's will while at the same time preventing what is evil, along with combating social injustice and upholding morals in society. These doctrines hold humanitarian appeal in that they are shared by the Christian, Jewish and Muslim communities as God's responsibilities for humankind.

This study has tended to focus on the figure of Musa al-Sadr as the supreme leader and guide for his community in its struggle for change and evolution within the Lebanese society. However, at this juncture, it should be noted that various authors disagree with the

importance placed upon this one individual's influence on Shi'i political and social development. It does not seem possible that one individual would have the capacity and the stamina to accomplish what some authors have claimed he did. AbuKhalil, in his article entitled, "Druze, Sunni and Shiite Leadership in Present-Day Lebanon", advocates a different view of Musa al-Sadr. He sees the revolutionism of the Shi'ites in terms of the *groups'* "persistence and dynamism" and not "an anarchic popular situation where the masses determine the path of the revolutionary process."[67] AbuKhalil is unconvinced of al-Sadr's strength and influence as an individual. It is more in accordance with his thoughts to say that al-Sadr "articulated Shi'ite grievances and resentment" while observing the mass of the community being drawn to leftist ideologies.[68] He is, in this case, not the all-knowing, omnipotent leader of a revolutionary movement as he is often depicted.

It appears that grievances toward all components of Lebanese society were a sign of the times and therefore a recognition arose amongst Shi'i leaders that an improved economic, political and social ambiance for the Shi'i community was needed. This could not have been achieved through the efforts of one man. Again, AbuKhalil aptly depicts the scene in Lebanon where Musa al-Sadr would find his niche as he moved into the position of popular leader:

> ...nobody expected the Shiites to break their chains and rebel against everyone: the Maronites for their expulsion and killings of Shiites, the Sunnis for their collaboration with the Maronites and their insensitivity towards Shiite grievances, the Palestinians for their rule and hegemony, especially in South Lebanon prior to 1982, the Arabs in general for their neglect of South Lebanon and its people,

[67] AbuKhalil, "Druze, Sunni and Shiite Political Leadership in Present-Day Lebanon," p. 45.
[68] Ibid.

and the Israelis for their occupation and oppression.[69]

Norton also states emphatically in one of his articles that Musa al-Sadr should not be viewed as a man who mobilized his entire community to action. This simply was not the case and "it is important not to exaggerate his impact in terms of the political mobilization of the Shi'i."[70] From multi-confessional parties to militias, the Shi'a were recruited by organizations that attracted their attention, fed their desires and answered the demands of the community. Norton continues by claiming that al-Sadr's greatest achievement, perhaps, was in his reduction of the power and influence of the traditional Shi'i leaders , the *zu'āma.*

Previous to Musa al-Sadr's arrival in Lebanon, others within the Shi'i community made brave attempts at improving the political and social status of the community. In 1954-1955, the *Hay'at al-Nidal al-Ijtima'i* was formed by a group of professionals (the Committee for Social Struggle) for expressing Shi'i discontent with the status quo.[71] During the presidency of Fuad Shihab, the Committee was partially responsible for ensuring the first Shi'a appointments to higher administrative posts.[72] The committee was later to disband and unite forces with Musa al-Sadr. Other attempts at organization were made by individuals such as Sayyid Shafiq Murtada, the deputy of Ba'albek and by Shaykh Muhammad Taqi Sadiq, a religious leader within the Shi'i community.[73] The initiatives these men attempted were unsuccessful, yet their endeavors show an impetus for change.

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[69] Ibid., p. 44.
[70] Augustus Richard Norton, "Musa al-Sadr," Pioneers of Islamic Revival (New Jersey: Zed Books, Ltd., 1994), 203.
[71] Halawi, A Lebanon Defied, p. 139
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.

Muhammad Jawad Mughniya (1904-1979), a Lebanese Shi'i ulama who was also a contemporary of Musa al-Sadr, worked tirelessly for improvements in his community's condition, while fervently disagreeing with the methods employed by al-Sadr.[74] He was well aware of the disabilities which his community faced and believed that a return to the traditions of Islam, along with a democratic form of government, would bring peace and prosperity to his people. It is interesting to note that Musa al-Sadr was not alone in his pursuit for improving the lot of his confessional community, and although he became a very visible representative for his people, he was by no means a maverick far removed from the ideas and ideologies of others.

By the early 1970's Imam Musa al-Sadr was at the helm of Shi'i influence in the country, as he continually attracted supporters willing to ride the tides of change and pursue a policy of greater Shi'i socio-political awareness and activism. Not only were the Shi'a themselves targeted, but those otherwise not considered traditionally sympathetic to the calls of the underprivileged. According to Halawi, university students in Lebanon traditionally were ambivalent towards Shi'i demands for they saw little connection between their scholarly world with its lofty issues and the world of the underprivileged Shi'a.[75] Until this juncture, these two groups of people were distanced in the everyday world, with little understanding and exchange taking place between them.[76] The divide was gradually being bridged as students became aware of the past and present ills afflicting this community, perhaps stemming from their (the students') own ignorance or that of their

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[74] Yann Richard, L'Islam Chiite (Paris: Fayard, 1991), 158-162. An in-depth look at Mughniya's projects within the community and the impact he had upon Lebanon.

[75] Halawi, A Lebanon Defied, p. 145.

[76] Ibid. Halawi describes the differences in the socioeconomic characters of the students and the Shi'a. He states that traditionally , "the university had been the 'main cultural outpost of the West in the East.'" It had trained Lebanese and others from the Middle East in professional skills and imported liberal democratic ideals

forefathers.[77] Al-Sadr was able to tailor his appeal to idealistic, modern, educated youth through his speech and actions. He was now dealing with a sector of the society which not only understood the importance of social change but actually embraced diverse methods by which it could be achieved.

Al-Sadr made his appeal to the students at the American University of Beirut campus by calling for support for the Palestinian cause.[78] He argued that the Israelis were menacing not only the Palestinians, but also the Arabs and Lebanese, and their presence in Palestine had to be effaced.[79] He continued by supporting the *fida'iyyin* warfare and considered it to be congruous with Lebanese security. His support for Palestinian training in coordination with Lebanese military forces perhaps cemented his appeal to the leftist perspective within the university population.[80]

Spurred on by the momentum of the day, Imam Musa al-Sadr made his demands for sociopolitical change popular amongst many sectors of the society. The absolute necessity for an overhaul of the political system in which the state would assume its responsibility for its own people was an increasingly popular notion which had earlier roots in the political ideals of former Lebanese statesmen. This notion was suggested and propounded earlier by Lebanese President Fouad Shihab (1958-1964, 1970) who wished to revise, to some degree, the political system of the country. His objective was to create a modern state apparatus, centralized and free from confessional extremism or manipulation by foreign powers and

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[77] Ibid., pp.145-146. Students on the AUB campus were beginning to break with the imported liberal democratic ideals that their own parents were brought up with. They found the previous generations to have failed at solving the Palestinian dilemma as well as address domestic social, economic and political issues. Although these students had a tendency to be uncertain about the participation of religious authorities in politics, i.e. the area of politics which was formerly the domain of "left-wing avant-gardes", the were curious about Musa al-Sadr's emergence upon the political stage.

[78] Ibid.

[79] Halawi, A Lebanon Defied, p. 146.

their own intrigues.[81] The traditional ruling elite was naturally opposed to this re-orientation of the government as they held to a strict interpretation of the status quo.[82] Shihab's vision was to create "a healthy balance" between Lebanon's Christian identity and an Arab nationalist orientation.[83] There were varying degrees of support and opposition within the religious communities themselves to this concept of balance of power and confessional character of the state, if there were to be any at all. Shihab developed a new government bureaucracy and the Deuxieme Bureau (for military intelligence) to reduce the power and influence of groups and organizations contrary to his efforts.[84] Ultimately, Shihabism failed in its immediate attempt to alter and redefine the relationship between state and community, but his ideas were to influence others after him. One of the real impacts of his failed program was that it helped to set the stage for the emergence of *AMAL* and other reformist or populist political movements in the late 1960s.

Fouad Shihab's agenda for a revised political system may have stimulated the growing Shi'i agenda to some degree as the time was again ripening for a change within the political system. Political institutions and practices needed to be reevaluated and adapted

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[80] Ibid., p. 146.

[81] Georges Corm, Géopolitique de Conflit Libanais. Étude Historique et Sociologique (Paris: La Découverte, 1986), p. 85.

[82] Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1983 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 27. This author sets forth, in his study, the challenges to the status quo in Lebanon since the 1940s. He sees these challenges as originating from three sources. "First, some Muslims rejected the 1943 compromise and its political system as unrepresentative of its population. Second, a variety of ideologically inclined groups and individuals (Arab nationalists, Communists, and other advocates of social and economic change) viewed the existing system as a barrier to the implementation of their ideas. Finally, external forces (such as Syria, Egypt, and the Soviet Union) sought to establish influence in Lebanon and to weaken Western presence and influence." (pp. 26-27). Joseph Olmert ("The Shi'is and the Lebanese State," p. 196), on the other hand, outlines the political thinking behind Shihab's policy and bases it on two assumptions: "the power of traditional *zu'ama* had to be diminished, and the state had to intervene massively in economic life in order to give thrust to the development of long-neglected, peripheral areas. Most of these regions were Shi'i-populated, and the Shihab period marked the beginning of unprecedented government interest in the welfare of the Shi'is."

[83] Ibid., p. 29.

[84] Ibid., p. 30.

to the present day. Thus, the traditional role of the *zu'āma* was again called into question as well as the dilemma of the nature of the state. A few of the Shi'i *zu'āma* actually shifted their support to Musa al-Sadr recognizing they could have a role in the improvements to Shi'i life in the south and the Bekaa. Of course, those who adhered to the views of Musa al-Sadr may have been motivated by the possibility of increased profit or status. After all, they were now observing a new, empowering force which was earlier non-existent and which might satisfy their opportunistic desires. It seems unlikely that they were unaware of their declining status as time progressed and that opportunities for political survival might just lie in an alliance with the SISC and its leadership. To move ahead alongside this attractive figure who managed to rouse the interests of the common folk presented certain promises of success for the future.

However, many remained opposed to him and tended to support the leadership of Kamil al-As'ad.[85] Not alone in their dislike for Imam Musa al-Sadr, there appeared an additional cleaving of the Shi'a themselves amongst the various centers in which they found themselves, principally Jabal 'Āmil, the Bekaa and the slums of Beirut. Their concerns and lifestyles created distinct issues for each group, seeing their respective predicaments as being unique to them. Thus the Shi'i majority was "caught in the political space between Sayyid Musa, the old elites, and the secular radicals."[86] Through his presence in the political arena, Musa al-Sadr managed to split his internal enemies and provide another option for

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[85] Halawi, A Lebanon Defied, p. 148. The al-As'ad family preserved a tenacious hold over the Shi'i inhabitants of southern Lebanon. They had been the traditional representatives of the community, along with a handful of other prominent families of the region. Throughout the 1970s the bloc of Kamil al-As'ad and that of Musa al-Sadr were to antagonize one another, prevent the other group from advancing itself further in terms of legislation and government policies, while vying for the actual leadership of this southern community. It was to become a question for the people- to follow what was predictable and familiar or to take a step out into the greater issues of the day, daring to feel worthy as full-fledged citizens. The choice

Shi'i political activism. The Shi'i community could be seen as a microcosm for the rest of Lebanese society in terms of class structure.[87] This community was now divided in the following manner: a few *zu'āma* who were sympathetic to the Imam's position, a strong bourgeoisie, middle class bureaucrats, an industrial proletariat concerned with the problems associated with urban life, expatriates living in the oil-producing nations of Arabia, a peasant society, a "radicalized" intelligentsia, and a "counter-elite" making new demands.[88]

Given his overall stance in these early years, it was apparent that Musa al-Sadr needed to provide the Shi'i community in Lebanon with simple, straightforward principles which merely prevented the division of society into the oppressor and the oppressed, the "haves" and the "have-nots," the rulers and the ruled.[89] The real power which this Shi'ite leader brought his community was the ability to finally voice the common concerns. As a traditionally ignored and isolated community, it gained visibility, self-esteem, an identity and causes to fight for in these early years under the guidance of the SISC.

Two currents did develop in the early 1970s within the Shi'i community, taking issue with questions which were not essentially religious. There was a clear division of those living in the Bekaa between the townspeople (*ahl al-balad*) and the rural inhabitants (*ahl al-jurd*). Those of the first group supported governmental interference in economic affairs as well as a centralized state leadership. Rural inhabitants preferred autonomy in running the region's economic affairs, largely because they could control the illegal

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would determine for them their potential as the ultimate beneficiaries of change. Also see Arnold Hottinger's article entitled "Zu'āma in Historical Perspective," in Politics in Lebanon, pp. 85-105.

[86] Halawi, A Lebanon Defied, p. 149.

[87] Ibid., pp. 149-150.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Norton, Amal and the Shi'a, pp. 10-14. This work deals with the very political nature of the demands of the Shi'a at this period in time. Its juxtaposition within the Lebanese political system vis-a-vis the other confessional communities is established.

trafficking of hashish and other goods which were major sources of revenue for these areas.[90] Both groups were needed for a Shi'i movement to expand, thus Imam al-Sadr attempted to appease both sides, although his views were definitely aligned with the *ahl al-balad.* His response was to urge the government to lessen the importance of the hashish economy in this region by introducing development projects which were desperately needed.[91] A list of Shi'i Demands was drawn up by the SISC after consideration of the Bekaa predicament and presented to the President Suleiman Frangié on December 10, 1973. This list of Shi'i Demands was to become the foundation for the organization of the *Ḥarakat al-Maḥrumīn* in 1974 and its new role as a political force would change the face of Lebanon in the future. This list of demands will be further pursued in the following chapter.

With civil disenchantment on the rise by 1973, any progress towards unity of the Lebanese people was to be suspended. Even the prominent voice of al-Sadr could not alter the reality of this disenchantment. Inflation, strikes, peasant and student agitation and augmented political tension were a sign of the times.[92] Workers were the most prominent group expressing their dissatisfaction with the politico-economic system. Their demands ranged from wage-increases and job security to the very basic of welfare policies. One significant point with which they took issue was Article 50 of the Labor Code suggesting that an employer could arbitrarily lay off employees with the simple indemnity of two months worth of wages. Employers engaged in this practice to meet the fluctuations in market demand.[93] A further issue of prime importance concerned child labor in the factories

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[90] Halawi, A Lebanon Defied, p. 151.
[91] Ibid.
[92] See Augustus Richard Norton, "Harakat Amal (The Movement of Hope)," in Political Anthropology, vol. 3, ed. Myron J Aronoff (New Brunswick (USA): Transaction Books,1984); Helena Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon (London: Hutchinson, 1985), 115-117.
[93] Halawi, A Lebanon Defied, p. 152.

of Beirut. Clerics and social workers alike protested this practice as reports of youth aged twelve to fifteen years working eight to nine hour days circulated. Not only was the situation abominable, it was made worse by the fact that the wages these youth earned, often to contribute to the families' economic needs, were invariably in the lowest range of the salary scale.

The combination of all the aforementioned factors and their respective developments on the Lebanese socio-political scene pointed to the necessity for a change in the Imam's approach to tackling society's problems. Yes, some headway had been made in the previous years in dialogue between the state and its citizens, particularly in terms of the Shi'a awakening unto itself. Yet, discriminations against people, predicaments and religions persisted. The old, outdated, ill-conceived system of government which dated back to the 1943 National Covenant had to be revised or replaced by another form of government which was true to the realities of the modern Lebanese population. Therefore, on June 22, 1973, under the direction of the SISC, thirteen out of the nineteen Shi'i members of Parliament vowed to reject participating in a government that continued to neglect Shi'i demands. Those who abstained from voting were followers of al-As'ad's policies.[94] The government, after being allotted two different occasions for arriving at a decision concerning the Shi'a and their interests, never responded to the SISC and thus incurred their wrath. Shi'i disobedience to the state and her concerns was now on the rise. Although this problem appears to be uniquely Shi'i, members of other Lebanese religious communities lent support to the cause including certain Christians and the members of the center and left

[94] Ibid., p. 153.

intelligentsia.[95] Thus, the inter-communal support which al-Sadr had long sought was finally in evidence.

The final solidification in Shi'i political power and influence appeared at this juncture. Members of the community grew increasingly disenchanted with their inability to move ahead in society, particularly with the constrictions placed upon them by their own government. On December 2, 1974 the Shi'i Demands were placed before the country with the following preamble, which would soon serve the organization of *AMAL*:

> Because of our faith in the dignity of man, and our refusal to tolerate oppression, ignorance, negligence, and all that contradicts that dignity; because of our loyalty to our fatherland, Lebanon, the land open to all men, land of love where all can live in harmony and with respect for the dignity of all; because of our belief that justice is the foundation on which nations rise and by which they endure, especially nations like Lebanon whose greatest asset is its human resources; the Supreme Islamic Shi'a Council feels that the present situation in Lebanon in which people live, as they do, in a world of anxiety facing a threatening future, is an obstacle to the aspirations of its citizens and to their hopes for a proper life and for dignity.[96]

Imam Musa al-Sadr was at the height of his power and popularity. He appeared to be the most visible representative of the Shi'i cause in particular and the disinherited of the country in general. Through the effective use of speeches and rallies he was able to consolidate support for his plea for social, economic and political improvement in Lebanon for those who felt discriminated against. On June 25, 1974 President Frangié met with al-Sadr and thirteen Shi'i ministers to finally discuss the Shi'i demands put forth earlier.[97] As a response to this meeting, the creation of *Ḥarakat al-Maḥrumīn* (the Movement of the Disinherited) on December 19, 1974 was the watershed in Lebanese Shi'i activism. It was a

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[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid., pp. 153-154.

movement of Shi'i hopes and desires that was speaking to the needs and issues common to many of Lebanon's southern population.[98] The chief objectives of this movement were to combat any structures of discrimination which sought to weld the Shi'a to their desperate situation as well as to defend the southern region from total destruction with the ensuing hostilities between the Palestinian refugees and Israel. Armed units known as *Afivaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya* (the Lebanese Resistance Forces), from which the acronym *AMAL* is derived, were introduced by Sayyid Musa on July 6, 1975, after the outbreak of the Katā'ib-Palestinian war, to serve as protectors of the Shi'i homeland and their rights as full-fledged Lebanese citizens.[99]

AMAL and al-Sadr were not developing in a vacuum as the number of actors upon the Lebanese stage was growing. Due to the general socio-political climate of the region as well as the times, other political and social actors were at work during the early 1970's. Three groups, the Syrians, Palestinians and Iranian Mujtahidun, allied themselves in some form with Lebanon's Shi'a.[100] Support for the Shi'a and their cause was spreading amongst these three groups, as this alliance would further their individual interests and agendas in Lebanon. The Syrian's interest in Lebanon was rekindled as it found a greater sense of stability for itself.[101] Syria, it would seem, had never truly abandoned hope of regaining Lebanon or the regions added to it in September 1920. The concerns of Syria touched upon two issues, political as well as security: "Lebanon, as an open political society, was a threat to the closed political society of Syria. And Lebanon could be used militarily by Israel to

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[97] Ibid., p. 154.
[98] Ibid., p. 155.
[99] Ibid., p. 155. Also see Norton, Amal and the Shi'a. Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon.
[100] Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, pp. 36-39.
[101] Ibid., p. 36.

outflank Syria's defenses or by Syria to open a new front against Israel."[102] Syria was observing the decline in Egyptian power and influence in the Arab world during the 1970's and Lebanon could help serve as a powerbase for increasing Syrian influence and military strength.[103] Lebanon's territory was a vital factor to the Syrian regime with its pan-Arab aspirations.

Since this study is particularly concerned with the Lebanese Shi'i community, Syrian interest and support for it must be noted. Syrian domestic politics, it was thought, could be improved if Lebanon's Shi'i leaders would acknowledge the Alawis as part of the Shi'a sect, thus helping the Syrian Alawi rulers, who were a minority, legitimize their power.[104] In the summer of 1973, this is precisely what occurred after the Sunni challenge to the Syrian Ba'thi regime in the winter and spring of the same year.[105] According to Rabinovich, "Lebanon's Shi'i leader, Musa al-Sadr, not only recognized the Alawis in Lebanon as part of his community but accused Syrian Sunnis of trying to monopolize Islam."[106] This Syrian influence helped the political mobilization of the Shi'i community as the mid-1970's approached. Al-Sadr's relationship with Hafiz al-Asad was beneficial to his role as leader of the Lebanese Shi'i community giving him the necessary clout to sap the traditional Shi'i leadership and present the primary grievances and demands of his community to the entire nation[107] within five years of his election to the SISC.

The Palestinians, too, had their own desires and agenda which, for a time, allied them with the Shi'a. The Palestinian presence within the country alone made the Shi'a a

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[102] Ibid.
[103] Ibid., p. 37.
[104] Ibid.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid. See Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon for greater detail concerning Syrian influence in Lebanon under the leadership of Hafiz al-Asad.

more visible force. Firstly, there was conflicting opinion between Christians and Muslims within the country concerning the Palestinian issue. Many Muslims considered it their "sacred duty" to provide refuge for the Palestinians as well as considering the experience as a test for the state concerning its national identity and adherence to the National Pact of 1943.[108] Many Christians, however, "regarded it as a cynical abuse of Lebanon's weakness by Egypt, Syria, and other Arab states."[109] Secondly, the presence and activities of the Palestinian organizations within the country were a direct influence upon those indigenous groups with more radical agendas. This presence demonstrated needed reform to a system that was backward in its recognition of Lebanese citizenship. Finally, because the south became the battleground for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, a large portion of the Shi'i population found itself, again, moving northward toward Beirut, "further disrupting Beirut's daily and political life."[110] The Palestinian presence re-ignited issues of security, nationality, and governing structure.

The third group which influenced Shi'i activism was the Iranian Mujtahidun (or men of religion). During the early 1970's Shi'i activists from Iran found temporary refuge in southern Lebanon and one can only hypothesize that they may have had a direct hand in stimulating Shi'i awareness and the formulation of policies and agendas to be sought after later. Again, the *Ḥarakat al-Maḥrumīn* was not designed to be solely representative of the Shi'a but to stir the entire society's conscience to the point of acknowledging that abuses of the system had existed and were in dire need of correction.

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[107] Ibid., p. 38.
[108] Ibid., p. 42.
[109] Ibid.
[110] Ibid.

The demands of the social-activist organization *Ḥarakat al-Maḥrumīn* may be summarized as follows: the protection of South Lebanon from Israeli attacks, support of the Palestinian cause, an overturning of government abuses, a fairer distribution in government posts and civil service jobs and an overhaul of discriminatory socioeconomic policies.[111] The community itself no longer wished to remain on the periphery of society but to be included to the fullest extent in Lebanese social, economic and political life.

It should here be noted that the *Ḥarakat al-Maḥrumīn* organization was, at first, separate from the aforementioned *AMAL* movement, which was principally a militia group at its debut. A merging of the two was to occur in the latter half of the 1970s where the name *AMAL* (= Hope) was preserved and where the previous objectives were maintained. *AMAL* did continue with its militia activity, but we will merely be interested in its socio-political program and activities.

AMAL as a movement was an active participant in the realm of politics. At this point a populist movement began to function within the parameters of a political party. It would further the demands previously made while experiencing a fracturing of its Shi'i constituency in the decade ahead. Within the Shi'i community, *AMAL* was to face competition from rival groups who sought solutions to contemporary problems through other methods and means. *AMAL*'s own numbers would be divided amongst newer, more radical parties while the influence of the *zu'āma* was on the decline.[112] This will be detailed in the following chapters.

The success of Musa al-Sadr in the early years of Shi'i political activism was due not only to his firm political stance and his active support for the less privileged. He also

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[111] See the text by Thom Sicking , S.J. and Dr Shereen Khairallah, "The Shi'a Awakening in Lebanon."

stressed the importance of religion in the governance of daily life as well as the obligation of the religious men of learning (the ulama) to assume their responsibilities to society. The rhetoric employed in the first years of his politically active life was one of compromise and mutual dialogue. However, this later gave way to a more radical discourse infused with religious references and symbolism, becoming at the same time more communalistic. Perhaps this was a sign that he was becoming more familiar with his constituency and the methods to employ in order to raise their social conscience. The impact of emphasizing certain religious celebrations and a re-interpretation of these celebrations in a more modern context for Shi'ism , helped rally many to his side. Musa al-Sadr's ability to tie religious themes and motifs into his charismatic speeches was a real asset to uniting his followers. Only certain speeches have been made available to readers and I am thus limited to a choice few. In February 1974, al-Sadr addressed the public by denouncing the derogatory name of *Mutāwila* and employing the term *Rafidun* when referring to the Shi'a. He continues: "Nous ne voulons plus de sentiments, mais de l'action. Nous sommes fatigués des mots, des états d'âme, des discours...J'ai fait plus de discours que quiconque. Et je suis celui qui a le plus appelé au calme...J'ai assez fait d'appels au calme. A partir d'aujourd'hui je ne me tairai plus. Si vous restez inertes, moi non..."[113]

In May 1974, following a legislative election, Musa al-Sadr addressed his supporters in the following manner, which further reflects his growing recourse to religious symbolism in order to raise the Shi'i political conscience in his speech:

> Nous avons choisi aujourd'hui Fātima, fille du Prophete. O Prophete, O Dieu, nous avons dépassé le stade de la puberté et nous avons atteint l'âge mûr, nous ne voulons

[112] Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, p. 36.
[113] Richard, L'Islam Chiite, p. 162.

> plus de tuteurs, nous n'avons plus peur, nous nous sommes libérés malgré tous les moyens qu'ils ont utilisés pour empêcher les gens de s'instruire, nous nous sommes réunis pour affirmer la fin de la tutelle car nous sommes sur la trace de Fātima et nous finirons martyrs.[114]

In making reference to the *'Āshūrā'* celebrations, commemorating the martyrdom of Hussein, grandson of the Prophet, Imam Musa al-Sadr's speeches ignited emotions for an event which was at the center of Shi'i thought and belief, capable of rousing members of the Shi'i community, whether religiously active or not. Action, both political and social, is the overriding theme in the following speech. Al-Sadr utilizes the *'Āshūrā'* celebration and all that it represents in terms of martyrdom, honor, fidelity and truth, to encapsulate what the new Shi'i movement represented. Here, he clearly emphasizes that religious celebrations should not be a substitute for political action and responsibility:

> Il vous est demandé de ne pas vous contenter de ces célébrations, pour ne pas les faire devenir des rites et des cérémonies formelles et pétrifiées derriere lesquelles se cacheraient les coupables, et ou les tyrans se dégageraient des responsabilités qu'ils portent devant le peuple. (...Il ne faut pas) que les pleurs et la participation aux funérailles deviennent un substitut pour l'action, un moyen d'éviter la colere et la vengeance, une excuse pour ne pas faire oeuvre constructive... Si nous nous sommes contentés de la représentation traditionelle et si nous n'avons pas appris quelque chose sur les moyens de combattre le mensonge et de faire triompher la vérité, nous avons été insensibles a cette commémoration.[115]

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[114] Ibid., p. 166.
[115] Jean Aucagne, "L'Imam Moussa Sadr et la Communauté Chiite", p. 47.

The dialogue employed proved to unite diverse members of the community.[116] This all served as a reminder to the Shi'a of their roots and heritage throughout Islamic history, an essential component to rendering the Shi'a more politically aware and active. Traditional Shi'i ideas, motifs and institutions were to be altered in some manner so as to fit the concerns of modern life in all its dimensions.

In conclusion, it appears that the Shi'i social and political predicament in the Lebanon of the 20th century required a return to religion, adopted to the modern era, to awaken support for integral change in the community's socio-political status, national recognition and even its own internal identity. This group was estranged within the composition of the society under the Ottomans[117] and this status was merely exacerbated by the western colonial influence and the mark it left on much of the Lebanese population. The isolation and neglect which was inflicted upon the Shi'i community by the state and the government's own structuring along confessional lines infused the political, economic and social conscience of the Shi'a in the second half of the century. Significant Shi'i religious ceremonies and demonstrations (*Muharram* and '*Āshūrā'* in particular) may have become occasions or platforms for generating greater identity within the community.

The Shi'i community that has emerged upon the Lebanese stage since the late 1950's experienced an "awakening" to their true value as Lebanese citizens, no longer

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[116] Many authors have discussed this phenomenon, particularly in terms of Twelver Shi'ism, of utilizing the major celebrations surrounding the martyrdom of Ḥusayn at Karbala and the death of the Twelve Imams. For further information, please refer to: Mahmoud Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islam. A Study of the Devotional Aspects of 'Āshūrā' in Twelver Shi'ism (New York: Mouton Publishers, 1978); Norton, Amal and the Shi'a. Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon; A.A. Sachedina, Islamic Messianism. The Idea of the Mahdi in Twelver Shi'ism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981).

[117] See Hourani, Political Society in Lebanon.; Henry Laurens, Le Grand Jeu. Orient Arabe et Rivalités Internationales (Paris: Armand Colin, 1991) and Le Royaume Impossible. La France et la Genese du Monde Arabe (Paris: Armand Colin, 1990); Robert Mantran, L'Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman (Paris: Fayard, 1989); Kamal Salibi, The House of Many Mansions. The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., Ltd., 1988), 205-208.

allowing its image as an outcast religious sect to be perpetuated. Musa al-Sadr's leadership was an effective stimulus to the community through his numerous attempts for change. The language utilized originally suggested coexistence amongst all confessional communities with a mutual aligning of demands and desires which this author predicts was used for various reasons: 1) he sought to least disrupt the order of the day, 2) to attract the more conservative members who would normally flee an organization which was too overarching or appeared too threatening in terms of its demands and 3) due to the insecurity of the religious leaders themselves in acting against a long tradition of quietism and feeling their way in the changing climate. The *AMAL* leadership began to alter its tactics to achieve Shi'i political awareness both within and without the community. Unless this leadership and a strong contingency of followers, be they Shi'ite or of Lebanon's other confessions, drew attention to the severity of their demands, no progress seemed possible. Because of this fact, Imam Musa al-Sadr radicalized his discourse over time and the politicization of the Shi'a ,as reflected in the *AMAL* movement, began.

Chapter Two

The Original Programs and Activities of *AMAL*.

The previous chapter dealt with the establishment of the *Ḥarakat al Maḥrumīn* (Movement of the Disinherited) in Lebanon and the adjunct militia organization known under the acronym *AMAL*. A brief summary of the Shi'i Demands was included in order to demonstrate the escalation in the socio-political awareness of Lebanon's Shi'ite population during the mid-1970's. In the present chapter, I wish to elucidate those demands in terms of the Shi'a's social, political and economic agenda. Some authors claim that there were sixteen points drawn up by the Shi'a, yet I propose that there are actually twenty distinct demands which I have included in an appendix to this thesis. Imam Musa al-Sadr, for a period of time, was able to keep separate the *Ḥarakat al-Maḥrumīn* from *AMAL*. Eventually the two groups merged in the latter half of the 1970s as *AMAL*. The Shi'i Demands were made public in 1974 under the direction of the *Ḥarakat al-Maḥrumīn*. The "Charter" for the organization which was to become *AMAL* was formulated approximately one year later in 1975. These two documents, the Demands and the Charter, will be the predominant focus of this chapter. My primary objective is to examine the early agendas in order to determine how they reflect the principal concerns of the Shi'i community and to what degree, if any, Shi'ite Islamic doctrine and Qur'ānic injunctions were incorporated. A comparison with similar demands by the Society of the Muslim Brothers (1928-1966) in Egypt, under the early leadership of Hasan al-Banna, may aid in demonstrating how demands and manifestos were used by other political movements. It is important to illustrate that Musa al-

Sadr's concerns were not unique to his community and that Shi'i activism in Lebanon was not so very different from other forms of political activism elsewhere. I will also analyze how these Shi'i documents may have been received by others who were either vying with the Ḥarakat al-Maḥrumīn for Shi'i recruits or by groups who may have interpreted these documents as a full fledged assault on their own rights and prerogatives. By the end of 1976, Musa al-Sadr and the Shi'i community would be at the height of their public visibility and influence before a splintering within the community and movement occurred altering the Lebanese Shi'i community.

11.1 The Shi'i Demands

Before an actual presentation and analysis of the document concerning the twenty Shi'i Demands, it would be wise to consider the import of preparing such a document by the Supreme Islamic Shi'i Council. It may well be found that these demands were in essence vague and unclear. There appears to be no absolute solution for solving all of the social and economic difficulties facing the Shi'a of this country, and any other residents of Lebanon's southern region, who felt themselves gradually estranged from the rest of the society. A political, social or economic program would seem all the more effective and powerful if it were laid out step by step. A plan of action is what incites the group to act and behave in a manner that will complete the desired task. The Shi'i Demands do not appear as a plan of action. Rather, they aptly depict the very real status facing the majority of this community in the late 1960s. However, it is precisely for this reason that the demands may be considered apposite. It

is true that they did not lay out a solution for eradicating the unacceptable social, economic and political conditions imposed on the community, but they did , perhaps, succeed for one very impressive reason: they were used to unify an otherwise diversified, inactive sector of the society. The Shi'a of all ranks and inhabiting all regions were made aware of the vast majority's socio-political situation. It is As'ad Abu Khalil who concludes that the Shi'a's vague ideology could in actuality be a strength of great significance. According to him, "...This feature is far from being a weakness within the rapidly changing nature of the Lebanese context and masses; it makes *AMAL* more able to adjust to the growing radical mood of the Shiites."[1] As will be observed later, the Demands, as put forth by the SISC and Musa al-Sadr, touched every sector within the Shi'i community, be they the residents of the south, agricultural workers, recent migrants to the city, the intelligentsia, recent migrants to Africa and other countries of the Middle East as well as politicians at the local and national levels. There was an addressing of global grievances which touched more than a few lives. Through the widespread acceptance of the Demands by a large proportion of the Shi'i community, injustices which had previously been endured were now being challenged. This may also be considered one of the more successful aspects of the Demands.

Coinciding with this notion of Shi'i unity is the corresponding need for the community to establish its own identity within the greater Lebanese society. For generations the Shi'a of Lebanon were also referred to as the *Mutawālī*[2] (*Metwali* in colloquial) both within and without the community. This term appears to have

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[1] As'ad Abu Khalil, "Druze, Sunni and Shiite Political Leadership in Present-Day Lebanon", p. 48.
[2] This spelling has been adopted from the article entitled "*Mutawālī*" by W. Ende in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, pp. 780-781.

originally made reference to the sect's own relationship in terms of loyalty and fidelity to the household of the Prophet (*Ahl al-Bayt*). The term, as applied by the Sunnis, Druzes and Christians in Lebanon, carried connotations of misfortune, underprivilege and hopelessness while the term *Mutawālī* also seemed to reinforce the negative self-impression the Shi'a held of themselves.[3] On a subconscious level, this proved to be extremely destabilizing of the Shi'i psyche before the advent of Musa al-Sadr. When Imam Musa declared "Our name is not *Matawlah.* Our name is men of refusal (*rafidun*), men of vengeance, men who revolt against all tyranny...even though this may cost our blood and our lives,"[4] he was abolishing any traces of a defeatist past and opening up the channels for a more positive and enlightened self-image for every member of his community. With the understanding that the ultimate goals of the SISC and Imam Musa al-Sadr may have resulted in the greater unification of an otherwise highly stratified group, we may now consider these demands along with their impact.

The text of the Demands is based on an English translation of the newspaper article appearing in the 12/2/74 edition of *Al-Hayat.* In order to facilitate the study of these demands, they may be grouped into several issues which concerned the community at that time: an improved political voice in the government through a more fair confessional representation, the removal of building violations in Beirut and her suburbs, the creating of programs and the enforcing of long-awaited projects for the

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[3] For a more in-depth understanding of the term *mutawālī* and its application to the Shi'a of Lebanon, please refer toW. Ende, "Mutawālī", The Encyclopaedia of Islam. Also, P.H. Lammen's article entitled "Les Perses du Liban et l'Origine des Métoualis" in Mélanges de l'Université Saint-Joseph, vol. 14, no.2 (Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique Beyrouth, 1929): 23-39. Both authors enforce that the term is rejected by Arab nationalists as possessing a Persian origin.

[4] Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam. Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 155. The author, here, describes in great detail the impact of this term on the Shi'a of

amelioration of the southerner's condition, and finally the obligatory redistribution of funds for the development of the south.[5]

In order to commence this study of the early Shi'i Demands and their agenda as a community, it should be noted that there are three general points which Musa al-Sadr and the SISC declare as the basic observances of the community. Here the SISC declares the underlying intentions motivating itself and the *Ḥarakat al-Maḥrumīn* to action. The language employed demonstrates the political outlook of historical and contemporary Shi'ism: words such as faith, dignity, loyalty, and justice possess both a religious as well as a civic/humanitarian appeal.

Within these three statements lie the basic tenets of the *Ḥarakat al-Maḥrumīn.* Desiring to hold fast to the reality of their own religious beliefs and important historical development as a community, the notion of "faith" appears to be a natural starting point. Stories abound within the Shi'i interpretation of Islamic history of defeat at the hands of the majority or those in power. In fact, the very introduction of the Shi'a onto the world stage was a direct result of their forefathers' refusal to embrace the majority position and their subsequent move to flourish in an almost "underground" fashion. In these first several decades of Islam, since the murder of 'Alī in 661 A.D., it was precisely the insistence upon human dignity (*karāma*) and the refusal to succumb to oppression and negligence that brought this community into the history of Islam. To

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Lebanon. He continues by depicting the differences which exist within the Shi'i community itself, with various classes of people rejecting others because of their "disinherited" nature.

[5] Thom Sicking and Dr. Shereen Khairallah, "The Shi'a Awakening in Lebanon: A search for a Radical Change in a Traditional Way", pp. 103-106. The following demands are a translation of those mentioned in the article of 12/2/74 of *Al-Hayat.* Any direct reference to these demands will be based upon this article unless otherwise specified. Other sources which would provide the reader with facts concerning the Shi'i demands are Norton's Amal and the Shi'a. Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon and Salim Nasr's "Mobilisation Communautaire et Symbolique Religieuse: L'Imam Sadr et les Chi'ites du Liban (1970-

refuse the upholding of these ancient principles would be to deny one's existence as both a Shi'i and as a human being. In addition to its religious dimension, this tenet also impacts the Shi'i political point of view in terms of Lebanese politics over the past century. It was demonstrated early on how impoverished this community was vis-a-vis the greater Lebanese society, with its demands and needs being met late, if at all. Therefore, without possessing this quality of, "faith in the dignity of man", the Shi'i Demands would have been incongruous with the very heart of this sect's existence.

The second tenet of the movement is based on the notion of loyalty (*walāyah* from the root *wly*). Loyalty to the Prophet and his descendants, or members of the *Ahl al-Bayt*, is steeped in the being of every Shi'i Muslim. This concept may be traced back to the schism which occurred early on in the community where the predominant question was: who was to be the successor to the Prophet, one elected by the community from amongst the Companions or a family member designated by Muḥammad himself? This sense of loyalty has also been extended to the Infallible Imams and may actually be considered a Shi'i pillar of faith.[6] Loyalty is a predominant theme within Islam, whether Sunni or Shi'i. The Muslim, or believer, must be loyal to his/her relationship with God as proclaimed within the *Shahada*. Without remaining conscious of the unity

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1975),in Radicalismes Islamiques, Volume I. Iran, Liban, Turquie, eds. Olivier Carré and Paul Dumont (Paris: Éditions l'Harmattan, 1985),119-158.

[6] For more details concerning the Shi'i concept of *walāyah* please see Hermann Landolt, "Walāyah," Encyclopedia of Religion,vol.15 (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 316-323; Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam; Henry Corbin, En Islam Iranien. Aspects Spirituels et Philosophiques (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1971); Wilfred Madelung, "Authority in Twelver Shi'ism in the Absence of the Imam," in La Notion d'Autorité au Moyen Age. Islam, Byzance, Occident (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982).

of God, i.e. without remaining "loyal" to one's covenant with the one God, an individual would no longer continue as a Muslim and will be led astray.[7].

Loyalty is also prevalent in the early story surrounding the martyrdom of Ḥusayn. Ajami, in his book concerning the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr, relates that a poet close to the Imam Ḥusayn warned him of the disloyalty of the Kufan inhabitants who had invited the Imam to guide the Shi'i community of the city[8]: "A poet who loved the Imam is reported to have told him that the people of Kufa were hopeless, that their hearts were with the kindhearted Imam and their swords with his enemies." Thus the massacre at Karbala was also a question of the troops' loyalties. They were allied with either the *Ahl al-Bayt* or the forces of Yazīd, and this would therefore determine the early fate of the community.

The last example to be elaborated upon of demonstrated loyalty to an individual or a group, as emulated within the Islamic community (umma) is through the performing of a *bay'a*, or oath of allegiance or loyalty. Oaths potentially may be broken, yet they serve the purpose of creating cohesion amongst members of a social organization or movement, be they political or religious.[9] Therefore *bay'a* is an important concept in terms of religious and political activity. Sentiments of fellowship, association, and

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[7] The term *walāyah* is employed in the Qur'ān in reference to two groups of Muslims: 1) those who emigrated from Mecca to Medina and "fought on the path of God," and 2) the *Anṣār*, or helpers in Medina, who granted the Muslims refuge in their city after fleeing Mecca. They are termed *awliyā'* in the Qur'ān because they served as friends and allies to one another. There is also the concept within Islam that either one lives one's life in pursuit of good or chooses to pursue evil. For those who devote themselves to the pursuit of God's will, they are known as the *awliyā'* of God, because they work in alliance and loyalty to His divine will. For more details concerning the concept of *walāyah* in the Qur'ān, please see Hermann Landolt's article entitled "Walāyah," in the Encyclopedia of Religion.

[8] Ajami. The Vanished Imam. Musa al-Sadr and the Shi'a of Lebanon, p. 140. Other sources concerning this event and which will provide the reader with greater detail include: Heinz Halm, Shiism; Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam. The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); S.H.M. Jafri, The Origins and Early Development of Shi'a Islam (Qum: The Group of Muslims, 1978).

brotherhood are augmented through the act of an oath. Musa al-Sadr and the SISC employed the use of *bay'a*, the second principle of the Shi'i Demands illustrates well, in order to create a sense of solidarity amongst the Shi'a as well as amongst all Lebanese. Hasan al-Banna, founder and early leader of the Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, employed the *bay'at al-ukhuwa* (oath of brotherhood) to solidify the loyalty of the Brotherhood's members to this organized society.[10] The oath became increasingly necessary as the membership in the Society of the Muslim Brothers grew and it became more difficult for Banna himself to be a constant physical presence; "For the Society of the Brothers, it [the oath] became an issue when membership outgrew the bounds within which it could be realistically expected that loyalty to Banna's person would satisfactorily solve the problem of loyalty- i.e. when it became physically impossible for Banna to supervise members' education."[11] This notion of loyalty could be considered quite palatable to Lebanon's many confessions due to the fact that no one was to be excluded. Through loyalty to an individual, a group or even a particular principle, all who are united by that individual or guiding principle are working for the improvement of the society and thus an inherent sense of unity may be established.

The third and final principle of the opening statement deals with the notion of justice. It becomes the responsibility of every citizen, despite rank, social status, intelligence or lineage, to guarantee the protection of this absolute right. Social justice (*'adl* or *inṣāf* and *al-qisṭ*) is of primary importance in Islam and is an important theme in the Qur'ān. The application of the principles of social justice becomes the SISC's

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[9] Ajami, The Vanished Imam., p. 149.
[10] Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 196.

solution to the socio-economic gaps which exist in Lebanese society at the time these Demands are written. This is most aptly expressed in the following passage taken from the introduction to the Shi'i Demands where Musa al-Sadr and the SISC interpret their vision for responsible social justice:

> Among the causes there is also the continued neglect by authorities of their basic responsibilities, especially their responsibility for defending the nation's borders, those borders which we are relinquishing today in the South, and their responsibility for building up the homeland equally for the forgotten planters, the helpless workers, the alienated and vagrant youth, and the students running away from an uncertain future. In a word, it is the lack of application of the principles of social justice and the failure to manifest a responsible view of the future that have led to this gap in the Lebanese social structure.[12]

The history of the Shi'a is replete with examples of injustice suffered at the hands of others, be they the majority or those in power. A fine example of injustice may be found in the controversy between Fāṭima, the daughter of the Prophet, and Abu Bakr over the town of Fadak.[13] Musa al-Sadr utilized several historical examples of injustice towards the Shi'a in his speeches during the 1970s in order to incite his community to action. I will refer to certain speeches of his in this and the following chapter. However, the social injustice inflicted upon the Shi'i community and the deprived citizens of Lebanon was not merely historic, but as Musa al-Sadr and the SISC stressed,

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[11] Ibid.

[12] Taken from the text of the "Shi'a Demands" by Thom Sicking and Dr Shereen Khairallah.

[13] Early in Islamic history, after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D. and during the caliphate of Abu Bakr, the Prophet's daughter Fāṭima attempted to claim possession of the town of Fadak as her father's heiress. Abu Bakr disagreed with this claim and perceived it to conflict with the Prophet's own wishes. Revenues from Fadak were previously used for benevolent purposes and Abu Bakr felt this policy should be continued. This is considered an example of injustice against the *Ahl al-Bayt* (household of the Prophet) by the Shi'a and they have incorporated it as their own. More of this episode may be read in L.Veccia Vaglieri, "Fadak", The Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol.2 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1965), pp. 725-727.

continued as a very present problem in modern day Lebanon. Al-Banna also stressed the unity between social and economic justice as part of his ideological solution for a better Egyptian society. His approach to injustice was based upon the "...'moral' dimensions of economic behaviour, an approach admittedly inspired by the Muslim view of the indivisibility of man's morality."[14] Social justice was applicable to the foundations of just economic organization, in Banna's view, because "economics without reference to 'social justice and the principles of morality' violated the fundamental teachings of God."[15]

Faith, allegiance and justice thus form a type of Shi'i "trinity" from which the notion of human dignity emerges. This dignity, according to Shi'i belief, should be the guaranteed right and privilege of all mankind.

The Shi'i Demands set forth the criteria which is lacking for a smooth running of society. It states that the demise of human dignity and honour amongst various sectors of the society, in particular for members of certain religious communities, has fostered an aura of deprivation which has further intensified feelings of anxiety and uncertainty. It is the south, Ba'albak, Hermel, 'Akkar, the villages of Jbayl, some Beirut suburbs, and some quarters in Tripoli, i.e. regions of high Shi'i concentration, that are the focus for action. An interesting and relevant note to be made concerns whom the SISC and Shi'i leaders find responsible for this deprivation. They consider it to be the men in power who are relinquishing their responsibilities over the whole of the country, not simply their respective interest groups. Many authors portray the government in control in Beirut and the position of the *zu'āma* as selfish, vain and greedy. Often this is the case,

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[14] Mitchell. The Society of the Muslim Brothers, p. 250.

but it should not be considered absolute for every action taken. It may also be the case that they misunderstood their obligations, had their loyalties skewed to another tack or that they were merely incapable, for any number of reasons, to accomplish necessary goals. The apparent lack of social justice and vision for the future during the late 1960s and early 1970s could be attributed, in large part, to the inaction or inability exhibited by these politicians, of all denominations, to build a more united, egalitarian society. Through the initiation of the Demands and the principles expressed in some of Musa al-Sadr's speeches, we observe how the SISC was requesting that members of their religious community also take responsibility for their own advancement while at the same time upholding the political figures as examples of governmental irresponsibility for the citizenry.

According to these demands, the politicians are to be held accountable for the deprivation in the south and suburbs of the major cities due to their failure to conclude political, economic or social decisions and actions justly. Throughout Islamic history it has been a guiding principle that the powerful and those possessing the wealth and means should be vigilant over those of lesser privilege. The SISC does not quote the following Surahs in their Demands. I am merely referring to them, here, to demonstrate how this notion of social and economic accountability of the wealthy and powerful is an inherent principle of Islam. The SISC seems to do well at couching basic, accepted belief and principles into its Demands while expressing them in laymen's terms. The Qur'ān contains numerous passages describing this relationship between the "haves" and the "have-nots." One of these examples comes from Surah 2, verse 215:

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[15] Ibid.

> They ask thee, (O Muhammad), what they shall spend. Say: That which ye spend for good (must go) to parents and near kindred and orphans and the needy and the wayfarer. And whatsoever good ye do, lo! Allah is Aware of it.

One of the more descriptive and colorful verses dealing with this issue is from Surah 3, verse 180:

> And let not those who hoard up that which Allah hath bestowed upon them of His bounty think that it is better for them. Nay, it is worse for them. That which they hoard will be their collar on the Day of Resurrection. Allah's is the heritage of the heavens and the earth, and Allah is Informed of what ye do.

The well-being of every individual in Lebanon, the SISC argues, must be a guaranteed right. Therefore, those who possess the power to enforce legislation must protect that well-being. The individual Lebanese, on the other hand, must not lay idle and accept present conditions. Their individual requirement is to responsibly display their dissatisfaction through political activism.

At this juncture in our analysis the principles are universal in terms of their religiosity and humaneness. They could be applicable to any member of society regardless of status, wealth, lineage or confession. It is now, as we proceed with the analysis of the twenty Demands, that the reader will perceive them as Shi'i demands for the protection of the rights of an underclass and much less the demands of a multi-confessional movement. One question to bear in mind is how a movement/party which supports national unity can balance this notion alongside its emphasizing Shi'i grievances. The confusion resulting from this apparent imbalance may be one reason *AMAL* would eventually lose its popularity and witness a decline in its membership. This agenda for the improved standard of living may be viewed as a social covenant for

those people who have suffered heavy loss through unfair distribution of resources, services, governmental posts, and territorial protection. Here, the voice of neglect will attempt to close the gap between rich and poor in the Lebanese socio-political structure through the words and actions of the religious clerics. The early religious character of *AMAL*'s leadership would alter to one of a middle-class nature by the end of the 1970s. However, it is noteworthy that the young cleric from Iran made a dramatic move away from the typical conservative quietism of those who proceeded him. Musa al-Sadr utilized the example of the Imam Ḥusayn to further his own belief that the religious man must necessarily be political because it is his duty to defend the "deprived" and to work for their advancement. Al-Sadr depicted this early leader of the community as a man who rose up against greater forces in order to fight the corruption which was prevalent at the time:

> A great sacrifice was needed to...stir feelings. The event of Kerbala was that sacrifice. Imam Hussein put his family, his forces, and even his life, in the balance against tyranny and corruption. Then the Islamic world burst forth with this revolution [to overturn the evil and oppression associated with those in authority] ...[16]

Imam al-Sadr affirmed the bond between religion and politics. He truly believed that religion had strong potential to influence politics and that history had merely illustrated the opposite effect. According to him, the men in power have influenced the men of religion for too long, extracting wealth from them according to their needs and wills. For the religious-minded to meddle in political affairs was considered by those in

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[16] Ajami. The Vanished Imam, p. 143. This translation is based upon an article which appeared in *Al Hayat*, February 1, 1974. This speech by Musa al-Sadr is his own interpretation of the events of Karbala as political in nature. The remainder of the speech further elucidates this idea.

power as ludicrous, according to this speech, since their only real function was to pray over the actions of the powerful:

> The rulers say that the men of religion must only pray and not meddle in other things. They exhort us to fast for them so that the foundations of their reign will not be shaken, while they move away from religion and exploit it to hold onto their seats of power. Do not think that men in power who proclaim their opposition to communism are opposed to atheism....They are the most infidel of the infidels and the most atheist of the atheists. They want us to give ourselves up to them.[17]

To effect the Shi'i Demands is, therefore, the responsibility of the community's religious leaders, as interpreted by Imam Musa al-Sadr. He, as the representative of the "deprived", has political responsibilities that are a mere extension of his religious position. Thus, by the very nature of his role, the community's representatives should incorporate religious sensitivity and duty into all of their actions.

The remainder of the Demands, like the Charter itself, do not carry religious overtones and are not steeped in religious dogma other than the absolute need to satisfy economic, political and social justice for all citizens. Although it would be convenient to give these documents a religious significance/reading, the language utilized and ideas presented are dependent upon political and philosophical notions concerning justice, economics, security and an all around fairer distribution of goods, services and political posts. The Demands and the Charter may utilize religious themes, and it may be convenient and attractive to see them in a purely religious light, but their true *raison d'être* is for political action.

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[17] Ibid., p. 147. This translation of Musa al-Sadr's speech is based upon an article in *An-Nahar*, March 18, 1974. This argument brought forth by Musa al-Sadr may, in fact, have been his own reply to those who were questioning his personal ambitions in the political arena. And yet, this is an issue which is raised in reference to Shi'i Islam time and time again concerning the apparent quietism of Shi'i clerics of the past.

The first two demands relate to the absolute necessity for a redistribution of public posts within the Lebanese governmental structure. The system in use at this time, and continuing into modern day, was that based on the so-called National Pact or Covenant of 1943 (*al-Mithaq al-Watani*), which established the governing structure of Lebanon along confessional lines. It was a unifying factor, or rapprochement, between the Maronite and Sunni populations, particularly the ruling elites.[18] The argument maintained by the Shi'i leaders was that the demographic configuration of Lebanon had changed since the last census was recorded in 1932.[19] The fact that the Shi'a held only 19 seats out of 99 (54 for the Maronites, 20 for the Sunnis, 19 for the Shi'a and 6 for the Druze) in the Lebanese Parliament when they themselves, by the 1970s, constituted slightly more than 30% of the population left the community with the impression that it was being denied its role as a chief political player.[20] They insisted that their rightful number of representatives should be raised to 30 and that the higher government posts should be made available, or more accessible, to the politicians of all confessional communities, including the Shi'a. The army and internal security posts were also targeted as being discriminatory towards members of this community. Few diplomats were appointed from amongst the Shi'a and those only to the less desirable postings. The just treatment of all was what these two demands sought, particularly since this community now had numbers to be reckoned with.

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[18] Farid el-Khazen, The Communal Pact of National Identities, p. 5. This article elaborates upon the Shi'i demand for an appropriate redistribution of power along the basis of the current population, rather than an antiquated census.

[19] Augustus Richard Norton, "Shi'ism and Social Protest in Lebanon" in Shi'ism and Social Protest, eds. Juan R.I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986),p. 159.

[20] This percentage is generally accepted in a country where no census has been taken since the 1930s. However, in his article "Druze, Sunni and Shiite Political Leadership in Present-Day Lebanon", As'ad Abu Khalil claims that the Shi'a now constitutes 40% of the population. Thus a discrepancy exists in the

Yet, the SISC and the Shi'i leaders were not calling for a confessionalization of jobs. They were disgruntled by the confessional classification of peoples, a long standing relic of Lebanon's Ottoman past.[21] The competence of individuals was the criteria that should be used to determine who was fit for the available positions. The multi-confessional breakdown of the population was proving ineffective in solving Lebanon's dilemmas. In fact, many Shi'a decried confessionalism and favored national unity ultimately to alleviate their problem of underrepresentation. A contradiction seemingly arises out of this dilemma between confessionalism and non-sectarianism. As a sect, the Shi'a owe their recognition, over the decades, to the confessionally based system where they have continually appeared outnumbered by the other religious groups. They have long combated being dwarfed or even swallowed by the Sunni community who would appear to advocate a united Muslim front under Sunni direction. The Shi'i community recognizes that they exist as a separate identity primarily because of Lebanon's confessional system of governance. Therefore, they are Lebanese nationalists fighting for a united system where all may share an equal voice. However, their support for the authority of the Lebanese state is problematic in that it is the state itself, and those who govern it, which disregard any notion of social justice and have thus created the dilemma in which the Shi'i community has found itself during the past

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actual percentages presented, varying between 30-40% of the whole of the population, making a factual estimate difficult.

[21] For more details on the structure of the system under Ottoman rule see: Hourani, Political Society in Lebanon. A Historical Introduction; Laurens, Le Grand Jeu. Orient Arabe et Rivalités Internationales; Mantran, L'Histoire de l''Empire Ottoman; Salibi, A House of Many Mansions. The History of Lebanon Reconsidered.

several decades.[22] Thus, the rejection of confessionalism leads one to question whether this will affect their participation as full citizens with allotted equal rights.

The third Demand of the Shi'a regards the protection of the south, as it is the region which suffered most from the Palestinian presence, in terms of Israeli maneuvers and retaliation. Many of the southern regions are inhabited by mostly Shi'i communities and the general complaint is that those who govern care least about this area which seems so removed from the heart of Lebanese society. The consequences associated with the Palestinian presence are intangible for a ruling elite, even those who are Shi'i themselves, i.e. the *zu'āma*. A well-defended south Lebanon was the ultimate goal as the public opinion towards the Palestinian refugees altered from support to growing intolerance. It was mostly Shi'i civilians who were the victims in the fighting between the Palestinians and Israelis. A change of heart as to which side deserved Shi'i support would lead to an outcome of invasion and desolation by the Israelis during the 1980s. Of this, more will be said in the next chapter. Thus, the authorities were being pleaded with to place more attention on an area that was being victimized by foreign groups and their agendas.

The fourth and final demand which dealt with a strictly political question spoke directly to the lack of national identity permitted to the Shi'i community as recognized citizens and full participants in their own country. Many who inhabited regions far removed from the metropoles of the country were not granted Lebanese identity cards, which were, in essence, one's access to many services. The denial of this right solidified

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[22] Thom Sicking, S.J. and Dr Shereen Khairallah, "The Shi'a Awakening in Lebanon: A Search for Radical Change in a Traditional Way," p. 109. Also see Norton, Amal and the Shi'a. Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, p. 71.

this community to a condition of deprivation from which they could not extract themselves. Without the Lebanese identity card it was as if this community were non-existent, its members treated as a sector that was incapable of contributing to a society that intentionally kept them at a distance. Musa al-Sadr spoke against offering charity to the inhabitants of the south, that this would only erode their dignity further: "The people of the South do not want or expect charities and contributions and tents and medicine and canned food that would make them feel that they are strangers without dignity."[23] There should be no doubt, the leaders insist, that these people are as Lebanese as the remainder of the country. In fact, there has been little or no corruption from outside forces in these remote regions due to the fact that most foreigners were not attracted to these areas for financial ventures. It was the large cities with their bustling commerce and trade during the 1920s and 1930s, with the Port of Beirut attracting business from around the world, that caught the eye of Europe and the Americas. Beirut's population alone grew tenfold between 1830 and 1900 (from 10,000 to approximately 100,000).[24] The southern regions never experienced this growth. On the contrary, the only influx of inhabitants occurred with the Palestinian presence after 1948. There were quite a few Shi'a who migrated to the larger cities in order to find employment as well as some degree of security. The right of citizenship had to be granted freely to all inhabitants regardless of faith or region of habitation as society was becoming more fluid and migratory.

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[23] Translated excerpt from a speech by Musa al-Sadr in the newspaper *An Nahar* May 27, 1970. This translation may be found in Ajami's The Vanished Imam, p.124.
[24] Hourani, Political Society in Lebanon., p. 11.

The final sixteen demands are associated with development projects which would improve the quality of life for any and all of the "deprived". The majority of the desired development projects were aimed at the south, with the depressed suburbs of Beirut requiring some action against building code violations. In essence, the SISC was seeking the just and equal distribution of funds and resources to all regions of the nation rather than those that could shout the loudest, or those which attracted foreign intrigue. The only means put forth for acquiring these projects was through planned legislation and the granting of credits. Neither of these proposals provided concrete solutions to the problems. In addition, there was no clear incentive to pursue the Demands by an authority that saw them as inconsequential. Thus, the Demands may be viewed as vague and idealistic rather than as genuine and palpable.

The diverting of the waterways of Lebanon and the irrigation of dry, arid lands was the subject of demands five through nine. Naturally, the leaders of the movement were requiring a rethinking of priorities in terms of water distribution. They believed that Beirut, although continually growing demographically and technologically, was well equipped to handle its numbers in terms of water resources. It continually absorbed the legislative action that should have been directed at the south. Reservoirs, pumping stations, irrigation networks and artificial lakes were all necessary to aid the agriculturists in terms of their technology and general condition.

The tenth demand incorporates any and all issues dealing with the development of education in the south. Schools and institutes of all levels were obligatory, without question, in order for the southerner, be he/she Shi'i or not, in order to have equal opportunities in terms of higher education and future employment with members of

other communities and regions. The Demands emphasize that the establishment of educational facilities for both males and females was of importance for the leaders of the community to confirm this as a necessity. As an aside, Musa al-Sadr, in some of his public speeches extolled the woman as a vital member of the society and her advancement as of prime importance, just as Zainab was a vital member of Ḥusayn's entourage during the battle at Karbala.[25] Today, within both Sunni and Shi'i Islam, the question concerning the roles and responsibilities of women continues to be debated. For the Shi'a, the female figures of the *Ahl al-Bayt*, both Fāṭima and Zainab, are upheld as role models for the modern-day woman, in terms of their spiritual strength and devotion, modesty and loyalty. Their almost mythological importance becomes a re-invention of old or venerable symbols within Shi'ism.

Al-Banna and members of his Society were also active in pursuing the question of more adequate schooling within Egypt for both children and adults. This was one of the Muslim Brothers' primary concerns as they felt the need to respond to the "secularization and fragmentation of the school system of Egypt, the low educational standard, and the lack of educational opportunity."[26] The Muslim Brotherhood attempted to solve this educational dilemma by: "1) propaganda and agitation for

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[25] For more information on Musa al-Sadr's view on the role of women in the community see Ajami's The Vanished Imam., p. 144. Zainab is one of the primary female figures in Shi'i Islam along with Fāṭima, the daughter of the Prophet and the wife of 'Alī, the Prophet's cousin and First Imam in the line of twelve. She holds high rank as well for her position as daughter of Muḥammad, wife of the First Imam from whom the remaining eleven are descended. She is also respected as one of the members of the mantle/cloak, or those chosen by Muḥammad as his closest family and followers. She is also embraced by the Shi'a as the Mistress of the Day of Judgement. For greater detail on the role of Fāṭima, please see: Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islam. A Study of the Devotional Aspects of 'Āshūrā' in Twelver Shi'ism;. Jafri, Origins and Early Development of Shi'a Islam, p. 297.; Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam,.pp. 148-149, 183, 235-236.

[26] Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, p. 284.

reform of the existing school system, 2) the founding of supplementary or alternative educational facilities."[27]

Demands eleven and twelve project the necessity for the provision of health services in the south. The creation of hospitals, clinics, sewer systems and highway projects would better connect the southerner to the larger Lebanese community. Health services in this region were at a premium prior to the later half of the 1970s. In order to receive proper medical treatment, one had to journey to one of the large cities, which were, in turn, poorly connected to these remote villages. The cycle seemed vicious with one obstacle butting up against another.

Welfare and social services were solutions which the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt considered for the extreme poverty rampant in Egypt in the 1940s. According to Mitchell, "while much of this effort [welfare and social services]benefited the urban membership, its initial orientation was towards the rural areas and was seen as a contribution to the greater purpose of rural reform."[28] These services were primarily concerned with "help in money or in kind to poor families, especially those without breadwinners, the aged, the homeless and the orphaned."[29]

The thirteenth demand is of great significance in terms of the movement. The plight of the tobacco cultivators and sharecroppers was a persistent problem for the Shi'a. This demand called for an amelioration of the condition of the tobacco growers which had deteriorated since the 1935 reconstitution of the *Régie des Tabacs et*

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[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid., p. 291.
[29] Ibid. Certain branches of the Brotherhood established "social treasuries" to which members made monthly contributions to provide services to those needing the help as mentioned above. However, more frequently the services provided were less organized and aid (food, clothing and soap being the primary

Tombacs.[30] This group had created a monopoly over the production of tobacco grown in Lebanon, decreasing the acreage of tobacco cultivation and increasing the number of men unemployed. The situation that resulted from this act worsened over time. In 1973, Musa al-Sadr joined the tobacco growers in a confrontation with the *Régie* and the Lebanese Security Forces. The planters wanted to obtain the right to unionize and demand higher prices for their product. A clash between the two forces in the southern town of Nabatiyya resulted in the death of two cultivators and the injury of fifteen.[31] The larger significance of this incident was that it demonstrated the inequalities which ran rampant throughout Lebanese society, another dimension of the injustices over which Islam remains concerned. Due to these economic injustices, incidents of usury, corruption and exploitation are highly possible results of a system which does not take account of its citizens or is unable to make moral and ethical decisions, either consciously or unconsciously, which are in the interests of all. This economic inequity became a point of discord between those searching for an Islamic solution to the nation's problems and those who thought little about the tenets of religion. Ajami clearly illustrates this dilemma:

> It [the tobacco crisis] reflected, above all, the structural imbalance between the agricultural and service sectors of the economy. The average annual income for the twenty-five thousand small growers for 1972-1973 was around three hundred dollars: the annual income of heads of households in the service sector in the city was about nine times larger. Then there was the gap between the growers and the large landholders. The average acreage per grower in the early 1970s was less than two *dunams* (a *dunam* was a quarter of an acre). The small growers were perennially in debt, constantly the prey for

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donations) were distributed on religious holidays by the branch of the Brotherhood itself or by "leading members of the particular society who were 'influenced' by the Society."

[30] Ajami, The Vanished Imam., p. 129.

[31] Ibid.

the loan sharks.[32]

Demands fourteen, fifteen, sixteen and seventeen concern the development and exploitation of resources concentrated in the south. The argument would appear to be that Lebanon is not lacking in technology, resources or funds. It is simply that the south is not benefiting from their distribution. There is an apparent wealth of animals, variety of agricultural production, mineral deposits, and archeological ruins (Ba'albeck and Tyre) with no technology or industry to capitalize upon them. The SISC desires to attract more tourism to the area and establish factories which would foster immigration. Instead of losing their own native population to the bustling cities the southerners, the "disinherited", were hoping to guard their own "national treasure", the people, in their home territory.

The dilemma associated with the distribution of any goods, service or finance to the disaffected populations of Lebanon was an overwhelming problem. For decades, money and attention were being pumped into Beirut with no trickle down effect. The eighteenth demand emphasizes the need for municipal funds to be more equitably distributed and this ties in directly with the notion of justice. The prosperity of Lebanon needed to be shared by all sectors of the society, a point which appeared feasible to the new Shi'i movement and its leaders.

The final two demands regard the living conditions of certain Beirut suburbs which are inhabited mostly by Shi'a. There is a call for the improvement in the suburbs in terms of housing violations, water and electricity distribution, and the general security of the areas. The notion of human dignity, as mentioned earlier, is closely

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[32] Ibid..

linked to this call for an amelioration of these unsatisfactory conditions. Another aspect to this issue is the fact that the Shi'a were often perceived by other communities as the uncouth, uncultured, backward group within the greater Lebanese community. This image, perpetuated by very real living conditions, was aggravated by governmental inaction. Because of this status, they were amongst the last to receive the bounty which Lebanon either produced or attracted, therefore creating a vicious cycle where few economic and social rewards were earned.

As stated above, the Shi'i Demands were a mostly economic agenda touching on varying political and social issues, i.e. representation and social as well as economic justice. Religious themes, although perhaps not purposely stated, do exist to some degree. The *Ḥarakat al-Maḥrumīn* was created to solve issues of injustice and their agenda appears to pursue this goal in some manner. However, in my opinion this agenda produced few results for the disaffected of the country. The ideas, although highly enlightened and beneficial, did not set forth a sound program. There was no step by step plan to implement these desired changes and the authorities at the time were sidetracked by their own issues or those of coming social unrest. However, the agenda proved to be the first platform on which the "deprived", or more specifically the Shi'a, could voice their discontent. It was the demeanor, intelligence, sensitivity and stubbornness of Musa al-Sadr, as backed by the SISC, which made the voice heard. If not a single goal had been achieved, the Demands would have been worthwhile, nonetheless, as a unifying force for the Shi'i community.

11.11 The Charter of the Harakat al-Mahrumīn Movement

The text of this Charter presents the seven overriding principles by which the *Maḥrumīn* Movement conducts itself.[33] Like the Shi'i Demands, these principles are philosophical, moral, political, and/or religious, yet with less emphasis on the economic aspects. The Charter sets forth the duties and responsibilities of each member of the Movement without providing effective solutions to welfare and economic problems. To summarize the text in one brief phrase, this author interprets the principles to imply what it means to be a human being in Lebanese society, or any other society that is under God's jurisdiction, and what the rights, privileges and responsibilities are for all members of that society. The Charter sets forth guidelines for human conduct while illustrating examples of where mankind has gone astray. It is my intention to give a brief overview of these principles, desiring to demonstrate the degree to which they may be either political or religious in nature. The language which is employed may carry religious overtones, yet the strong socio-political roots are vividly apparent. As Professor Marius Deeb states, these principles are non-revolutionary in nature.[34] I understand this to suggest that they do not incite the members to direct revolt. The language of the document is not harsh, militant or defiant. However, I would say that the ideas themselves do not allow the Movement's members to sit idle and accept their condition. The authors of the Charter summon their constituency, i.e. those who suffer

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[33] The text of the Charter is taken from Norton's book Amal and the Shi'a. Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, (Appendix A). Professor Norton has chosen to entitle the Charter under the name of the Amal Movement. I deem this inappropriate, as the text itself, as translated by Barbara Parmenter, utilizes the name of the Maḥrumīn Movement consistently throughout its pages.

[34] Marius Deeb, Militant Islamic Movements in Lebanon: Origins, Social Basis and Ideology (Georgetown University: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, November 1986), p.11.

from injustice, to rise up and meet the challenge of overhauling an antiquated system of government, an economy based upon capitalist motives and ideals and the negative impact of imperialism in all its forms. The dialogue used is interspersed with religious allusions and motifs therefore gaining wider acceptance and legitimacy for the Movement. Again, themes of justice, freedom, equality, tyranny, struggle and martyrdom have an appeal that resounds both religiously and politically, an effective way to create momentum within a political movement, and they are common themes amongst the three largest faiths living together in this region. A fine example of this recognition of the "sameness" existing in themes propounded by Christianity, Judaism and Islam is from one of Musa al-Sadr's speeches:

> It is part of a human movement toward justice, freedom, and equality, and is thus a natural extension of the movement of the prophets, peace be upon them, who called for an end to the tyranny of rulers and their decrees, a tyranny that enslaved humanity with earthly laws and human systems of rule. The movement is nourished by the struggle of freedom fighters whose martyrdom has lit the way of truth.[35]

Again, this is a discourse that might appeal to all confessional sectors of the society, not alienating any group for its respective faith and teachings. Yet, its concerns reflect and are inspired by the condition of Musa al-Sadr's community. It is here that we will elaborate upon the outstanding points of each of the seven principles.

The first principle deals in depth with the existence of God. The summary of this tenet is that God is the creator and the cause of everything which exists in the universe that is both observable and unobservable. The proof is in the entire process of life and the natural laws which give order and beauty to all beings and elements. There

follows an elaborate explanation of many natural phenomena which are clear examples of God's greatness and his overwhelming justness. Many attributes of God, which the movement claims all humans should try to emulate, are mentioned. It is highly likely that this section is aimed at the authorities in question at the time, since the notions of justness and righteousness are prevalent.

The principle continues by outlining the four forms of abstract faith in God. These are based upon the following: rituals, sectarian faith, ethnicity, and a detachment from life. The movement sees the history of Lebanon and its multi-confessional character as being grounded in these four forms of abstract faith. Here is where the breakdown in freedoms occurs along with deprivation and exploitation as consequences. Blame is placed upon the people for their own ignorance in terms of their personal faith in God. External influences, or those which were imported from Europe, created a final destabilization of the foundations of faith since, it is believed, Europe learned to separate religion from the processes of life, politics and society. The obligation to return to a true faith in God is the underlining aspect of this principle. Divine law defines every relationship which exists in the universe. It is now the responsibility of mankind to rekindle its own faith and its own relationships in accordance with the Divine law while preventing the development of those which are not.

The second principle implies an in-depth appreciation of the cultural, intellectual, literary and scientific heritage of Islam. Certain tendencies towards "modernism" (a tendency in theology to accommodate traditional religious teaching to

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[35] Norton, Amal and the Shi'a. Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, p. 148.

contemporary thought) could certainly be observed here. An important feature to be emphasized is mentioned in the opening lines:

> The holy Quran offers a solid intellectual basis for the development of civilization, a model of eloquence, the confirmation and consummation of the messages of Judaism and Christianity, and the primary source for a well-ordered set of laws regarding social life.[36]

The meshing of old, well established, accepted doctrines were to continue to influence the contemporary world while being adapted to the circumstances and structures of the modern society. The legacy of values, mores and heroism which grew out of Islamic culture were respected and ought to be preserved. Mention is made of the direct influence the Islamic culture had on the scientific and artistic development of Europe, a matter for which the Muslims ought to be proud. The political/philosophical influence of an individual such as al-Afghani may, here, be observed. As a promoter of the pan-Islamist movement[37] during the 1880s, al-Afghani was concerned with fostering a sense of Muslim solidarity against a Christian and Imperial West.[38] The necessity which al-Afghani saw was for a Muslim revival both in thought (to no longer blindly follow others and envision the future in terms of fatalism) and in action.[39] However, the Charter does not neglect the fact that benefits may be derived from elsewhere. It is stressed that there must be a combination of inherent, domestic customs and traditions mixed with what may be a positive import from elsewhere. It is not desirable to

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[36] Ibid., p. 153.
[37] Pan-Islamism was a call for Arab-Muslim unity and a re-evaluation of Islamic principles and values as they could be applied to the political-social scene of the latter half of the 19th century.
[38] Nikki R. Keddie, "Afghani, Jamal al-Din al", The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World,vol.1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 26.
[39] I. Goldziher and J. Jomier, "Djamal al-Din al-Afghani", The Encyclopaedia of Islam,vol. 2 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1965), pp. 416-417.

segregate oneself from the outside world from which very important lessons may be learned.

Yet the dominant concern is with the young generation that may be discarding its own customs and heritage for more glamorous, ill-suited, foreign ones. It is incumbent upon this generation to stop seeking after that which belongs to other cultures, and merely results in their stagnant, immovable backwardness. This generation will never emerge from its present condition if it continues to covet what does not rightly belong to it, according to the Charter.

For the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, the issue of cultural identity for every Muslim state was that its structure must be based on "Islamism."[40] The establishment of the *shari'a* as the basis for the organization of the Muslim state would "help preserve the 'national pride' and its 'integrity'; and it would give 'active expression to the treasured heritage that history has transmitted.'"[41] This notion is comparable to the current thought of the times and seems somewhat compatible with the *Ḥarakat al-Maḥrumīn*'s approach to finding answers within the gifts the Shi'i community has been given rather than from foreign systems of thought and organization.

The third principle is the innate right of all human beings to the various freedoms allotted to humankind. According to the Charter, religions forbid those actions which inhibit human dignity and discriminate between individuals. The Charter continues by defining a freedom as "a person's right to undertake any activity provided

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[40] Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, p. 242.

[41] Ibid. Al-Banna's argument centered around Islam providing spiritual, emotional and legal guidance to the community, an argument which would ultimately raise the issue of the separation of church and state. The final argument by the Brotherhood on this matter which will be mentioned here is that this 'separation' - the *din* from the *dawla* - was inadmissible. For them, " 'Islam' was a word including in its total meaning religion, politics, economics, society, etc." (Mitchell, p. 243)

that it does not infringe on the rights of others or harm himself." Although Musa al-Sadr and his movement could adopt a religious language and utilize symbols close to Shi'i belief in order to illustrate this principle, we may actually find its roots in the thought of the 19th century English political thinker John Stuart Mill. Mill concluded that a right must be shared by the whole of a society. The value of a right is to be shared widely within the community.[42] Three specific categories of rights are highlighted by the Charter and these include private and personal freedom, collective freedom and conditional economic freedom. Within these groupings the political, religious and economic are mentioned. Life should be the most valued object a person possesses as it is only through a gift of God that an individual receives life. The safeguarding of life itself and all that which is necessary to sustain it are to be guaranteed and protected by the power-brokers, i.e. the political leaders of the time.

Justice is not only obligatory for the maintenance of personal freedoms but, as the Charter succeeds in demonstrating, economic ones as well. The argument against economic injustice and discrimination is prevalent in this text. The well established Lebanese system which is based upon capitalism, where a limited portion of the people own the wealth and means of production of an entire group, remains in the Lebanon of the 1970s. A fine example of this was illustrated earlier with the discussion of the *Régie des Tabacs et Tombacs*.[43] An individual with few possessions would be forced to borrow from money-lenders to whom they would be indebted for long periods of time.

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[42] David Lyons, Rights, Welfare, and Mill's Moral Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 80.

[43] See above, pp. 86-87 of this text.

Patron-client relations had become an integral part of politics in Lebanon as the *zu'āma* often manipulated politics in terms of economics and their own interests.

In terms of the nation's economics, the Charter wishes to rid the country of this system where public profits are not distributed according to need, but according to the desires of the political patrons. The Council of the South (*Majlis al-Janūb*), the creation of the SISC and Musa al-Sadr, wound up portraying this exact scenario themselves with the distribution of funds to the south. The *Majlis al-Janūb*, in actuality, became a corrupt organization in the handling of these funds. Much of the financing never found its way to those in need. Rather, the large landowners and the favorites of those in power were its recipients.[44] It was one of the staunchest complaints by Musa al-Sadr that the *zu'amā'* was taking the finances that were to launch development projects in the southern regions. There was a complete overhauling of this organization in the 1980s by *AMAL*'s authorities.

This concern over more equitable distribution of public profits and this incident involving the *Majlis al-Janūb* are significant for comprehending the class character of *AMAL* and its leadership. As stated in a previous chapter *AMAL* was by no means the only movement within Lebanon which attracted the Shi'a. Their loyalties were divided amongst organizations including the pro-Syrian Arab Baath Organization, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the Arab Liberation Front as well as several Communist organizations.[45] In fact, *AMAL*'s strongest support has been amongst the Shi'a of the southern villages and towns where long-term social, economic and political inequalities

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[44] Aucagne, "L'Imam Moussa Sadr et la Communauté Chiite," p. 42.
[45] Augustus Richard Norton, "Harakat Amal (The Movement of Hope)", in Political Anthropology, vol. 3, ed. Myron J. Aronoff (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1984), p. 112.

are obvious. Norton demonstrates well the populist appeal of *AMAL* when he writes, "For people long under the heavy thumbs of the zu'ama who controlled land, wealth and access to the party system, the appeal of party slogans pledging equality, improvement in social and health services, and better conditions of employment and housing was obvious."[46] As Musa al-Sadr mobilized more of his co-religionists he achieved one of his greatest successes; the reduction of the authority and influence of the traditional elite. These demands for a re-distribution of political power and office, an eradication of the system of political patronage, and the re-allocation of economic resources to those areas in need keenly reflect the ambitions of a new Shi'i middle class as they struggle to establish themselves in a changing world. With few exceptions, *AMAL*'s leadership is derived from families that are not included among those previously enjoying long-standing political influence. The growing number of merchants, the small agrarian middle class and those Shi'is living overseas were significant financial contributors to the *AMAL* movement.[47] Their own personal interests lie in the villages and towns of the south where they may own small acreages, family businesses or simply nostalgic sentiments for the family home. As they witness the degradation of their homeland, it seems likely that their cognizance grows concerning the mismanagement of funds and the necessity on the part of the state to redirect and redistribute the financial resources in a more equitable fashion, or at least to their benefit. In this way, only, would they be able to prosper as a new class of bourgeoisie, better controlling the funds without being stifled by either foreign economic domination or old elites.

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[46] Norton, Amal and the Shi'a, p. 38.
[47] Ibid., p. 61.

It is very interesting to compare the memberships within *AMAL* to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as they both, in the end, became strongly affiliated with the rising middle class or *effendi*[48] It cannot be said that either organization was free from its policies and agendas being influenced by the personal wills of their respective leaderships. Economics seems to be a constant factor in the prerogatives of human beings and the leadership of these two organizations were not immune to this.

The third category within the realm of political/religious freedoms concerns the removal of sectarianism. Injustices were running rampant in Lebanon because of the multi-confessional breakdown of the society. Political alliances had been established around varying sects with little inclination to be flexible towards other groups and their ideas. The movement believes that Lebanon's sectarian structure, a long-standing organizational relic needing to be overhauled, prevents any political development and change within national institutions, and results in discrimination between peoples and damages national unity. More will be stated concerning national unity with the fifth principle.

The fourth principle is the assertion of economic rights for all. It requires the discarding of the outdated, unjust patronage system and the installation of development projects which are supported by "Arab" and national loans. These loans may, in turn, be paid through the profits from the established projects. A number of these projects were mentioned in the Shi'i Demands and they are considered by both documents as the only viable solution to halt the continued disintegration of the society. They are seen as the

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[48] Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood, p. 329. Mitchell uses the term *effendi* to describe the urban, middle class nature of the membership of the Brotherhood as they came to assume the leadership of the Society by the 1950s. The religious affiliation with the leadership, as in *AMAL* itself, was to decrease as

sole manner in which individuals may maintain their dignity and freedom without being beholden to others. This point, again, may reveal something of the class character of *AMAL*'s leadership as these are the stated demands made by the organization. They coincide beautifully with the middle-class desires and it is this rising middle class that is well positioned to act as arbiters for change. These projects would certainly help improve the economic development so needed in this southern region. Irrigation projects, improved social services and increased tourism would be a boost to any business. It would also filter down to the lower classes, thus creating more jobs and better living conditions for all.

The proposal suggested by the Charter is for the elimination of monopolies, which only serve the interests of the few. It would become the state's responsibility to set weights, measures, prices of goods and commodities in order to curb illegal pricing and the consequent exploitation of the poor. The drafters of the Charter support more government control over the Lebanese economy and business practices and give it an Islamic provenance when they state: "[Ali affirmed]...Let selling be magnanimous and openhanded, by a just measure, and at prices that are fair to both seller and buyer; he who involves himself in a monopoly, even after being warned against it, shall be made an example of and severely punished."[49] Warning is also made against the practice of usury or unlawful gain (*ribā*), which is one theme within the Qur'ān.[50] Indeed, fair trade is a major topic of the *Sharī'a* and Muḥammad himself was a trader with the reputation of being trustworthy (*al-Amīn*). According to the Charter, "Because usury provides the

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this rising middle class understood that foreign economic control in Egypt would reduce the prospects for the new bourgeoisie.

[49] Norton, Amal and the Shi'a. Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, p. 160.

best means for exploiting people and for reaping enormous profits with no effort and because it is the basis for capitalist wealth, opposing usury means opposing capitalism and exploitation.[51] The suggested method for combating usury is through the participation in "silent partnerships" (*muḍāraba*). It is recommended as part of the Divine plan to rid the world of interest. The Charter states that the "silent partnership" functions with a person or party providing financial backing to another who requires capital. According to Nabil A. Saleh, the definition for *muḍāraba* is the following:

> Nearly all schools of law have understood *mudaraba* in the following sense: "A contract between at least two parties whereby one party, called the investor (*rabb al-mal*) entrusts money to the other party called the agent-manager (*mudarib*) who is to trade with it in an agreed manner and then return to the investor the principal and a pre-agreed share of the profits and keep for himself what remains of such profits". The division of profits between the two parties must necessarily be on a proportional basis and cannot be a lump sum or a guaranteed return. In a valid *mudaraba* the investor is not liable for losses beyond the amount of the capital he has paid. Conversely the agent-manager, who does not normally partake in the investment in terms of money, does not bear any share of the losses, losing only his time and effort.[52]

The interest-free bank thus comes into play. Its responsibility is to mobilize funds from the public on the basis of *muḍāraba* partnerships while providing funds to entrepreneurs on the same basis.[53] The Movement hopes this system would replace a financial system based upon interest which only serves to divide people, further corrupt the society and

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[50] Details concerning *ribā* may be found in the article by Joseph Schacht, "Ribā", The Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol.8 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), pp. 491-493.
[51] Norton, "Appendix A" to Amal and the Shi'a, p. 160.
[52] Nabil A. Saleh, Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law. Riba, Gharar and Islamic Banking (Boston: Graham and Trotman, 1992), pp. 128-129. For a brief introduction to the concept of *mudaraba*, see Jeanette A. Wakin's article "Mudaraba", The Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol.7 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993), pp. 284-285.
[53] Saleh, Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law, p. 126.

create a breakdown in social order. As we saw earlier, the Muslim Brotherhood clearly thought economics was tied to "moral justice" and clearly this was illustrated by the indepth outline the Society provided to rid Egypt of the practice of usury and all the evils associated with it.[54] Economic reforms in terms of financing, labor, commerce and industry were thought out to close gaps in the class structure of Egyptian society and thus, ultimately, foster national unity.

It is possible to see how this option would create hostility in many of those in power or who hold the means of production. The collapse of a financial venture under this system would require a strong individual with deep moral character to accept any suggested loss. This author is not sure how feasible this plan would be in a society that has long operated under a capitalist system. Herein lies the inherent problem with the programs and agenda of the movement. Although highly organized in thought, many of the proposals are unclear and ill-defined. The desire for a plan of action is apparent, however the manner for achieving the goals is not clear. The drafters of the plan also assume these actions, if taken, would benefit more Lebanese more equitably. Yet, a problematic question remains: why is this group any more suited to provide a solution rather than other segments of the same society? We will briefly examine the possible opposition to these documents after completing our analysis of the Charter.

The fifth principle elaborates upon characterizing the *Ḥarakat al-Maḥrumīn* as a patriotic movement. The sovereignty of the nation is the primary point surrounding this notion. This is particularly interesting in terms of Lebanon's multi-cultural, multi-religious composition. The preservation of the country's territory and borders is the

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[54] For this indepth outline on economic reform for the country see Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim

first step in solidifying the nation's character while creating an atmosphere of independence for political self-determination. Lebanon's self-determination depends on the non-intervention by exterior powers and forces. The concept of mutual acceptance calls for all peoples within Lebanon to embrace one another's differences, be they religious, economic or social. In this way, the political system will be strengthened and hopefully remove former cultural and religious barriers. The Movement believes that Lebanon may be viewed as a "cultural window" through which the East (faith and spirituality) and West (practical experience and technology) connect. *AMAL*'s "cultural window" metaphor reflects the original vision of the confessional republic in 1943 where Lebanon has two views of itself: one European, the other Arab. However, the difficult part is preserving the autonomy of the country, thus prohibiting the encroachment of imperialism and imperialist powers which would demolish any established unity.

Nationalism is one of the Muslim Brotherhood's solutions to the disunity from which it believed Egypt was suffering as the aftereffects of French and British imperialism. As Egypt is a Muslim land, the Society argued, patriotism was sacred because it was "in the service of the faith."[55] They united their doctrine of national patriotism with the greater notion of Arabism in this manner: "Thus patriotism demanded, as a first step, 'the struggle against imperialism', for the salvation of Egypt is 'the first link in the anticipated renaissance'; Egypt is 'a part of the general Arab nation, and...when we act for Egypt, we act for Arabism, the East, and for Islam.'"[56]

Brothers, pp. 272-282.
[55] Ibid., p. 264.
[56] Ibid.

The society, however, does not view nationalism in "the Western sense of the word," as a "new emotion" which has established modern states but has also left the unity of the Muslim world prey to "Christian and Zionist imperialism."[57] Thus, nationalism, in terms of the Society's understanding, must be directly linked to Islam and not a "narrow nationalism" as developed in the West. The terms *wataniyya* and *qawmiyya* are used interchangeably for "nationalism" which gives it an Islamic appeal, although both terms, as Banna sees it, have "a variety of qualities of which some agree and some conflict with Islam."[58]

Another dimension of this patriotic feeling to which the Charter makes reference is the desire for Arab unity and freedom of these lands in order for the citizenry to develop themselves socially, economically and politically. The fragmentation of territory in this region is due primarily to the imperialist desire of foreign nations to subjugate the people and resources to their respective whims. The unity of language, civilization, culture, history and religion in the Middle East has fallen victim to external influences because the peoples no longer relish their own nation's strengths and fortunes. For the Movement the prime example of this imperialist force is that of Zionism. Zionist desires have been the cause of the south's deprivation, the *Ḥarakat al-Maḥrumīn* argues through its Charter. The region must be able to defend itself against invading forces who only wish to annihilate the Palestinian presence at whatever cost. Development projects in the south would permit it to remain guarded and further

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[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid. The society does not support the concept of regional and provincial loyalties as these pose two possible methods for creating disunity, partisanship and factionalism. It is also very interesting to note four movements which the Brotherhood saw as destructive to nationalism in the region this century and they are the following: 1) "Paraonicism" in Egypt, 2) "Phoenicianism" in Lebanon, 3) "Syrianism" in the Fertile Crescent and even 4) "Arabism" when it becomes "secular and racist." (Mitchell, p. 266)

support of the motherland would contribute to its protection. The one element cannot survive without the other. Thus, patriotism of all citizens towards their homeland would help guard the south from destruction.

The Zionist threat in the south is the subject of the sixth principle. Drafters of the Charter wrote that only through support of the Palestinian resistance in the south will the threat be lifted. They also state that Israelis actually covet the waterways of Lebanon (the Litani River, for example) which are so necessary for the survival of civilization in both areas. The Charter claims "Israel is a society founded on sectarian bigotry and racist sentiment." The Israelis only desire more territory, the text continues, in order to gain economic markets for their own goods. Their desire for increased production naturally results in a greater appetite for territorial acquisition. The section ends with a brief analysis of how values have been lost in Israel and the presentation of these ideas portrays Israel as a godless nation with no regard for human life. This presentation of Israel foments hatred amongst those who read and depict its character as the world's newest Leviathan.

The final principle deals with the Movement as a nondiscriminatory body of individuals who are seeking answers to Lebanon's crises. Perhaps this apparent internal contradiction (the view of a "Zionist threat" and the "non-discriminatory" nature of the Movement) between the sixth and seventh principles actually weakens the effectiveness of the Charter. The work reiterates that national unity and equality amongst citizens is the foundation of the *Maḥrumīn* Movement's doctrines. It elaborates on the utility of cooperation and welcomes the individual talents and potentials that make up the

society. Unity of all peoples benefits the entire nation and disunity only destroys the larger community.

The concluding paragraph of the Charter says the Movement is non-sectarian in nature and its interests lie in the improved status of all. It wishes to eliminate the backwardness and the disinherited aspects of the Lebanese society through a progressive religious program. The program is not linked to sectarianism in any of its forms and has as its ultimate goal the political, economic and social enlightenment of all groups.

By the very nature of demands, that they are meant to provide solutions and some degree of relief to discontentment, opposition would seem the natural consequence. One could assume that the growing Shi'i political activism, by no means representative of the entire community since many groups within the country could claim Shi'i membership, produced a reaction amongst many components within Lebanon who viewed this growing voice as an assault on their own rights and prerogatives. Leftist organizations, the *zu'āma*, Christians, Sunnis, Palestinians, Israelis and the State itself were all effected in some way by the ideas, philosophy and agenda behind the Demands and the Charter. Firstly, the establishment of the SISC could be seen as a direct infringement upon the future of politics in Lebanon as the Shi'a were the last community to organize themselves. Their population, as it increased dramatically, became a symbol of their potential power in the State. In essence, the Demands, Charter and the SISC, itself, were solutions al-Sadr sought, according to Joseph Olmert, "to gain a share for the deprived."[59] Olmert continues to define how the Shi'a benefited

[59] Joseph Olmert, "The Shi'is and the Lebanese State" in Shi ism, Resistance and Revolution, edited by Martin Kramer (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), p. 199.

from organization in terms of State relations by stating "to gain that share, they had to organize and bring pressure to bear on the state, not to question its very legitimacy."

Opposition to the SISC grew within the Shi'a community as early as the first half of the 1970s. As the organization grew and developed, this opposition sprung up amongst the deputies and notables as well as certain ulama, who questioned al-Sadr's position on the Council as leader for the entire community. Many of the Demands were aimed at reducing the power and influence of political notables and the influence of patron-client relations. Posing as an alternative to the *zu'āma* naturally created tensions between al-Sadr and his supporters in the SISC and the traditional elite. The contradictions in the two positions, one imagined as being poor and deprived while the other was surrounded by privilege and affluence, led to conflict between the two groups. The *zu'āma*'s reception of this organizing activity on the part of Sadr and his supporters in the SISC is demonstrated by Olmert and he typifies it by concluding that "some *zu'āma* violently reacted to Sadr's organizing activities in their own political fiefs."[60]

The State also included Christians and Sunnis in the principal positions of power. It seems logical that the Demands of the Shi'i community were hardly embraced by others who saw an imposition on their long-established positions of influence. It should be remembered that a reconstitution of government in a more egalitarian fashion meant a rise in Shi'i influence and a reduction in both that of the Sunnis and Christians, i.e. Maronites. Both communities, it would appear, understood the consequences the Shi'i Demands and agenda would create for their own futures in the country as this third community emerged as a strong force capable of representing its own interests.

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[60] Ibid., p. 198.

Leftist parties were also targeted as opponents to Shi'i unity as certain parties and movements were the foremost rivals for Shi'i recruits. The interesting factor in this situation is that many of the Shi'i demands were equivalent to what the Left was espousing, and their tactics were similar; appealing to the masses, using a radical rhetoric and the criticism of the established socio-political order.[61] However, Olmert describes for his readers the one very different factor which gave al-Sadr's movement and agenda favor over the Left: "...He had one great advantage over the Left in Shi'i eyes: an authenticity essential in appealing to people whose political awareness was nascent and who were still tied to religion and tradition."[62] The Demands and the Charter solidified the SISC's commitment to change in favor of the "deprived", provided a plan of action, however vague its terms, and gave the people, if they chose to follow, a new vision for themselves, rather than adopting a "foreign" philosophy for change.

The final two groups which would find opposition with these demands, as one carefully analyzes the salient points, would most probably be the Israelis and the Palestinians. The Israelis, because the language used to merely describe their presence and *raison d'être* represented opposition and defense. The Charter is a prime example of the Shi'as' concern with preservation of the southern community, both in terms of its protection and its prospering. The Palestinians could be opposed to the Demands, as Olmert emphasizes, because they "were potential enemies since they sought to gain control over the Shi'i south."[63] There is no language, as of this point, in the rhetoric or

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[61] Ibid., p. 198.
[62] Ibid., pp. 198-199.
[63] Ibid., p. 200.

writings of the SISC or the *Ḥarakat al-Maḥrumīn* speaking out against the Palestinian presence in the south, yet they both strongly advocate and urge the development of the region so that the people can assume their lives and be responsible for their own destinies. The presence of groups belligerent towards others, i.e. Israel, is only putting the lives of southern Lebanese at risk and fostering the deprivation against which they are speaking out.

Therefore, these demands reflected the hopes and aspirations of a section of the Lebanese community, although al-Sadr claimed they were for the deprived, in general. Thom Sicking and Dr. Shereen Khairallah aptly explain one of al-Sadr's fortés as a political figure; "His [al-Sadr's] own political acumen explains why he has broadened his appeal beyond his community to all the disinherited, thus laying his finger on a sensitive socio-political problem, and assuring himself support from outside his community."[64] Yet, as he succeeded in uniting a sector which had long experienced disunity, and as he became a visible actor on the Lebanese political stage, he also succeeded at creating opposition to his moves for Shi'i advancement.

In conclusion, the Charter seems to delve into the social, economic and political issues which hinder the complete growth of all sectors of the society despite their religious affiliation. The Shi'a are not alone in their deprivation and the Charter calls upon this fact as a unifying force for all communities - that the present-day issues are a common concern to be dealt with.

Religious motifs are sprinkled and scattered throughout the Charter without making a strong, direct reference to the Shi'i faith. This may be due precisely to the

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[64] Sicking and Khairallah, "The Shi'a Awakening in Lebanon,", p. 97.

Ḥarakat al-Maḥrumīn Movement's desire to attract attention and support from other sectors of the society. To present itself as too religious, i.e. too Shi'i in character, would impede the development of the community and its programs and agenda. In fact, religion as such is seen as the common denominator for those who respect the traditions of the country. Throughout the majority of the two documents religion appears to be absent from the rhetoric. However, certain issues raised do sound Qur'ānic in nature, issues which have faced the Islamic community from the beginning such as justice, usury, monopolies, jihad (internal and external), as well as the nature of God and His desires for humanity. The ensemble of the principles ties in with the Divine laws and how these govern every action and reaction ever recorded in history.

It is now that we turn to two important factors influencing the further development of *AMAL* and its later rhetoric: the Iranian Revolution and the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon.

Chapter Three

Influences of the Iranian Revolution Upon the Shi'a of Lebanon

The latter half of the 1970s was turbulent for all confessional communities in Lebanon. Not only did the Civil War, which commenced in 1975, divide the nation further into armed camps based upon issues associated with religion and political identity, but the individual communities themselves were torn apart by internal differences. The Shi'a were not immune to this phenomenon. For approximately four years, from 1975-1978, Musa al-Sadr failed to maintain his previous level of popularity amongst his constituents. He was viewed by some as too moderate for the leadership of this increasingly diverse congregation. Thus, the beginnings of splintering within *AMAL* 's membership may be seen as forming at this time. This would lead to the eventual creation of other religio-political bodies such as *Islamic AMAL* and *Hezbollah.* Musa al-Sadr's brainchild desperately needed a pretext for reuniting its members from their current dissension and continuing to dissuade those who were tempted to join the Communist/Leftist parties or those more radical organizations, as mentioned above. However, *AMAL* ultimately failed to unite members of the Shi'i community and has gradually become more of a political party for a portion of the population. The reasons for the formation of these other Shi'i organizations becomes visible as we observe the evolution of Shi'i thought, practice and politics in the second half of this century. Two significant events, the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Israeli occupation of the south, would alter the Lebanese Shi'i community in terms of its self-image and the image that the external world would hold of it.

This third chapter will concern the external influences of the 1978-79 Iranian Revolution. I would like to demonstrate how the specific Shi'ite nature of the Iranian Revolution generated a greater appreciation for religious symbolism in order for the Lebanese Shi'i leadership to achieve political ends as well as imparting a particular Shi'i identity to the greater community. Additionally, I hope to demonstrate how the theoretical model of the Iranian case allowed Shi'i individuals in Lebanon to ponder the principles of a theocracy and how it may or may not be applicable to the Lebanese case. By the 1980s *AMAL* strongholds included the south, Beirut and the Bekaa.[1] However, these support bases for *AMAL* should not imply unity and cohesion amongst the membership nor a "tightly integrated organization."[2] This is aptly demonstrated by Norton; "Not unexpectedly, given the movement's inchoate quality, there were keen regional splits that roughly corresponded with relative proximity to the Israeli (and Syrian) border. In addition to disparities born of locale, the movement subsumed a broad admixture of political perspectives and ideological preferences."[3] However, many amongst the Shi'a of Lebanon revered the awesome figure of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his ability to steer the masses towards greater "faithfulness". His vision of the Islamic state and its superiority over all other forms of governance, along with his visibly extreme piety, has made him the ultimate model for many. Therefore, I will relate certain aspects of Khomeini's vision and rhetoric which were discussed within the Lebanese Shi'i community in order to determine whether this language and agenda were applicable, or how applicable, to the Lebanese case. Leaders within the movement,

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[1] Norton, Amal and the Shi'a, p. 86.
[2] Ibid., p. 87.
[3] Ibid.

including al-Sadr himself, would employ similar Shi'i motifs in their discourse and plans for action.

To initiate our study concerning the impact of the Iranian revolution on the Shi'a of Lebanon, and more particularly the religio-political organization known as *AMAL*, it is pertinent to state that the conditions which allowed for the Islamic revolution to take place in Iran were not all congruent with the Lebanese context. The historical, cultural, political and religious motivations for the revolution to occur in Iran were a particularly Iranian phenomenon which could not necessarily be reproduced elsewhere. Without stating this primary issue, the following discussion would be less valid. However, it is true that Iran, and more particularly Ayatollah Khomeini, was perceived as an exemplar to be followed by other Shi'i communities in countries throughout the Middle East, such as certain Gulf states, Iraq and Lebanon. Even with the varying degrees of support which Iran granted to the differing communities, the revolution served only as the aforementioned model, not necessarily impacting communities worldwide to the degree originally hoped. In fact it provided the Shi'a of Lebanon with the knowledge that a group could unite under the banner of Shi'ism in order to succeed in obtaining political objectives. This would seem to be its most important influence. It is also interesting to contemplate the issue of nationalism and nationality as we look at the goals of the Shi'i leadership in Iran and Lebanon. Anderson, in Imagined Communities, proposes that nationalism has to be understood by "aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but the long cultural systems that preceded it."[4] His belief is that the

[4] Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 12.

relevant cultural systems are the religious community and the dynastic realm.[5] For this author, this seems to be the point around which some of Iran's contemporary issues revolve. The Shahs validated their authority from the dynasty over which they reigned for 2000 years (the Safavid). On the other hand, the religious leaders were trying to make sense of the Shi'i religious heritage and how religion was relevant to a strong Iranian nation. According to Anderson, both approaches to Iranian identity, and therefore nationalism, are valid. For Lebanon, the case appears somewhat different. Not having dynastic history, per say, to recreate in a contemporary context, nor a singular religious community which could claim historical predominance within the region, the Shi'i leadership interpreted the form of nationalism it felt was best adapted to the entire Lebanese community - its cultural window metaphor which we saw earlier in the Charter of the Ḥarakat al-Maḥrumīn. Perhaps this nationalism, in order to integrate the Shi'i perspective with the realities of Lebanon, had to have two faces: one European and the other Arab.

In order to begin the transformation in the political identity of a group of people, it would appear that certain social, political and economic conditions must be present along with leaders who capitalize upon these conditions along with episodes in a community's history, in order to increase their followers awareness/conscience. The leaders of both Shi'i communities, Iranian and Lebanese, utilized certain concepts, motifs and symbols as part and parcel of their discourse. We will be considering how the leadership of these communities employed various concepts and motifs to complement their political agendas. To begin to understand why Shi'i leaders within

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[5] Ibid.

both communities depended upon dialogue and language to rouse support for their agendas, we can refer to Fanon's comment made by an African leader who was warning a group of young intellectuals: "Think well before you speak to the masses, for they flare up quickly."[6]

To begin, it is perhaps best to delve into the very concrete, tangible reasons for the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy which may help illustrate cognate governmental irresponsibility in Lebanon. The necessity for a ruler or governing body to be endowed with a strong, firm sense of justice is paramount to the Shi'i understanding of authority. Particularly outspoken members of the Shi'i communities in both Iran and Lebanon blamed political and economic insecurity upon a visible lack of just governing, or perhaps a blindness to the consequences of their actions, by those in power.[7] It is the traditional belief within the Ithnā 'Asharī tradition that all accounts, whether rewards or punishments, would be settled with the return (*raj'a*) of the Mahdi, or the Twelfth Imam who is believed to be currently in occultation.[8] Thus, the concerns related to the state were closely intertwined with those of faith for the Shi'a. The meshing of the religious with the political may be considered one of Shi'ism's primary tenets. Salvation, in both its spiritual and temporal forms, might be theirs through belief and struggle.

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[6] Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 68.

[7] Here I am referring to the symptoms of "westoxication" amongst Iranian authorities. For more details see Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent. The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. (New York: New York University Press, 1993).

[8] It is not within the scope of this thesis to treat the concept of the return of the Mahdi in detail. However, it should be stated that this concept is at the heart of the Ithnā 'Asharī (or Twelver Shi'a) doctrines. It provides each believer with hope that the end to the Shi'i community's struggles throughout Islamic history is near at hand. For more specifics concerning this notion, please consult the following works: Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islam. A Study of the Devotional Aspects of 'Āshūrā' in Twelver Shi'ism; Heinz Halm, Shiism; Jassim M. Hussain, The Occultation of the Twelfth Imam (Great Britain: The Muhammadi Trust, 1982); Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam; Abdulaziz Abdulhussain Sachedina, Islamic Messianism. The Idea of the Mahdi in Twelver Shi'ism; A.A. Sachedina, The Just Ruler in Shi'ite Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

Although the Shi'a of Iran were the religious majority, many suffered from the state control over most sectors of the society under Reza Shah.[9] The masses were unable to earn the wages which would guarantee them a decent standard of living. The modernizing efforts set in motion by the Shah created greater inequalities amongst the citizens. There was also the issue surrounding the Shah's use of his secret service, SAVAK, which merely threatened any movements for change. Only the select few, either those in good standing with the Shah or those from whom he could reap benefits, were entrusted with any position of power. Therefore, these individuals were not perceived to be working directly for the people but for the "perpetrator" of the social problems in question.

Lebanon, itself, was of course not under the governance of a monarch, however, the system under which it was operating benefited few. As depicted in an earlier chapter, many Shi'a rejected the current governing structure based upon the census of the early 1930s. Here, we will not discuss the political system itself but the abuse it created as perceived by many Shi'a. The majority of this Shi'i community was not seeking to radically alter the makeup of the government, rather to obtain a fare share in the spoils and opt into the confessional republic. They were disgruntled, as mentioned previously, by the lack of attention and support given to the critical economic and political dimensions of their more "deprived" condition. Those who were their

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[9] Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs. Iran and the Islamic Revolution (New York: Basic Books, Inc, 1984),p. 11. Here the author illustrates in great detail how the Shah and his secret police organization, SAVAK, were able to control the lives and infiltrate every sector of the Iranian society prior to the revolution. For more information, also see John L. Esposito, ed., The Iranian Revolution. Its Global Impact (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990), 17-39;Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development (England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1979); Dilip Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985); Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution. An Interpretive History of Modern Iran (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

traditional representatives, the *zu'āma*, are depicted by many authors as corrupt and power-hungry, ready to trade the well-being of their community for personal gain.[10] If this is accepted as true Iran and Lebanon may be equated with one another in terms of the lack of prosperity and voice for reform for a significant portion of the population until the 1960s. At the same time these two communities also shared an inability to surmount the overwhelming influence and authority of those in power, be they Shi'i themselves or not.

Economically, Iran's majority and the Shi'a of Lebanon were faced with a similar condition; national economic growth that did not "trickle down" into their hands. For Iran the years from 1963 to 1973 was a time of rapid economic growth and development due to the discovery of oil and the industry associated with its production.[11] Job and educational opportunities increased throughout the society. Many more Iranians were able to purchase commodities which would have previously been considered luxuries, such as cars, refrigerators, radios and televisions. However, only certain sectors of the society were able to enjoy this new lifestyle, and these were mostly concentrated in the urban centers. The rural areas continued to fend for themselves without the government's financial and political aid. Large industrialists and farmers were the first to receive credit with the smaller manufacturers left to simply observe the disequilibrium. Finally, in 1974, oil prices rose sharply and Iran's economic and social life was to change the course of the nation's history.[12] The increase in oil revenues from $5 billion to $20 billion in one year permitted the Shah to commence

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[10] Please refer to Chapter 1, pp. 32 & 41 of this work for a more complete description of this account.

with his agenda for the creation of the "Great Civilization." Through his irresponsible spending for the rapid modernization of his country, Reza Shah created a situation where the economy could no longer handle the amounts of money and the number of people which were dependent upon it. Inflation skyrocketed and many rural workers migrated to the cities where they believed they might enjoy a higher standard of living. However, after 1974, the economic position of those who had originally profited from the booming economy declined. An increased gap in the incomes of the various sectors of the society created tensions between the citizens and the government. There were a few individuals, i.e. dealing in scarce commodities and questionable business dealings, who continued to prosper. To deflate the economy, the government ceased its own investment in the projects it had established earlier. Any hiring in the civil service was stopped and more importantly, to lower the prices on goods and services which had escalated terrifically, the government began to imprison the very industrialists they had supported the previous year. At this point, the bazaar merchants, a powerful sector of the society, grew very disenchanted with the established regime and would play an invaluable role alongside the religious establishment in the upcoming revolution. Frustration reigned throughout the country.[13]

Beirut, as well, was in the throes of an economic prosperity from the mid 1800s to the mid 1900s. As late as 1825, as Marwan Buheiry states in his article "Beirut's

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[11] Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, p. 12. Other sources concerning this aspect of Iran's economic growth are: Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, pp. 138-172.; Nikki R. Keddie, "Oil, Economic Policy, and Social Conflict in Iran," in Race and Class, vol. 21, no. 1(1979): 13-29.

[12] Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, p. 12

[13] Because this author, here, is merely wishing to demonstrate the important economic factors which proceeded the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution, other factors of equal importance are not stressed. For a greater comprehension of these events which also provoked revolution, please refer to: Amuzegar, Jahangir, The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution. The Pahlavis' Triumph and Tragedy (Albany: State

Role in the Political Economy of the French Mandate: 1919-1939" there were few indicators which suggested that Beirut would become the most important city in Lebanon: "In terms of population size, construction activity, artisanal production and trade, the cities of Sidon and Tripoli were probably more important."[14] However, within the time lapse of one generation, Beirut grew and developed to become the leading port of the Eastern Mediterranean coast.[15] Finally, within ten years of the establishment of the French Mandate, Beirut was acknowledged as the capital of the Lebanese Republic.[16] French influence in the spheres of education, language and political patronage were to eventually demonstrate the widening rift within Lebanese society, as this influence, along with increased modernization, was more readily available to members of the Christian community than to those of other confessions. Roger Owen states this dichotomy between the attention given to Beirut and its development and what remained for the rest of the country: "by splitting off Grand Liban from its natural hinterland the French not only confirmed the financial and commercial hegemony of Beirut over the Mountain, but also strengthened a pattern of economic activity in which

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University of New York Press, 1991).; Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown. The Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

[14] Marwan Buheiry, Beirut's Role in the Political Economy of the French Mandate: 1919-1939 (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1987), p. 1.

[15] Ibid. By 1888, the status of Beirut was bolstered by its becoming the administrative capital of a new Ottoman *wilaya* which included not only the Lebanese coastal regions, but also the northern half of Palestine including the ports of 'Akka and Haifa, as well as a large stretch of Syria's coastline and much of the regions inland including the port of Latakia.

[16] Ibid.The affluence of the city may be attributed to western influences in the nineteenth century, even such neglected factors as the presence of military garrisons and expenditures which also stimulated growth. However, Leila Tarazi Fawaz also attributes this growth to the important relationship between migration and urbanization as well as local and regional factors. Leila Tarazi Fawaz, "Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth Century Beirut", (Cambridge, MA.:Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 2-4. Expansion in banking, the services sector, sericulture, imports and growing transit trade, speculation in international stocks and shares as well as ventures in real estate and agricultural land made Beirut the center for business and commerce in the region. Certain signs of Beirut's growing prosperity were a newly constructed port, a railway line (D.H.P.) serving the Syrian interior, an increased market place, and a network of economic,

agriculture and industry had become subordinate to banking and trade."[17] Suffice it to say that as the capital of Lebanon grew in prosperity over the years, the rural areas, which were home to the majority of the Shi'i community, although touched by symbols of modernization such as roads, a growing communications network and continued access to education, lagged behind the growth taking place elsewhere.[18] This unequal distribution of wealth and resources, or its non-distribution to the areas in need of projects and services, accelerated the growing animosity towards those with political authority, be they the Beirut government or the local *zu'āma*.[19] The "disinherited" status of the community deepened, clearing the path for political and social activism. Therefore, the ideas and concepts for ameliorating the social condition, which were being spread by the clerical class in Iran during the 1960s and 1970s, influenced those who were willing to take heed in Lebanon.[20]

There were, of course, in Iran other issues which provoked the majority of the people to resent the Shah and his government. The monarch had suppressed many of the rights and liberties of the citizenry while attempting to consolidate his own power and prestige. As fundamental to the outbreak of revolution as are the violation of human

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cultural and political relations with Europe and America. For more, see Buheiry, "Beirut's role in the Political economy of the French Mandate,"p. 3.

[17] Roger Owen, "The Political Economy of Grand Liban, 1920-1970" in Roger Owen, ed., Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon, p. 24.

[18] Norton, "Amal" in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, p. 81.

[19] This inaction on the part of the authorities, again, may have been due to the fact that such economic development, although beneficial to a large number of individuals, would not have reflected the interests of the political figures of the times. In other words, the general will does not necessarily reflect the will of the ruling elites.

[20] These concepts included the Shi'i clergy's call for clerical responsibility in representing the oppressed/disinherited. It was the Islamic jurists who were required to maintain the Qur'ānic injunction of "commanding the good and forbidding the reprehensible." In addition was the notion of state or governmental responsibility for the welfare of its citizens. The government which was not pursuing policies of justice and equality for all were, therefore, corrupt and should not possess authority over the people. It is obligatory that governments be aware of the needs and desires of the people without losing

rights, violation of the constitution, and censorship, these are not the issues which concern this work. Indeed, the fact that women were granted suffrage (1962), clerics were forbidden from wearing their traditional garb, Americans living in Iran were to be immune from the jurisdiction of Iranian courts (the Status of Forces Law of 1964) were all significant points of contention between the ruling elites and the clergy, who represented the majority. However, we are most interested in the two or three newly imposed policies which fostered the greatest upset amongst the clergy.

Religiously committed Iranians were outraged, firstly, by the almost devout appreciation of the Shah for all things Western and his policies towards the secularization of his country.[21] In their eyes, their leader was taking them down a road which would produce a society no longer governed by some semblance of religion, but by the beguiling materialism and shallowness of the Western societies, particularly America whom the Shah had befriended.[22] In the Local Councils Law of 1962, the ulama of the country objected to its anti-religious establishment nature. It specified that the adherence to Islam was not a prerequisite for voting or holding office in the government. It also stipulated that the elected officials of the future would take their oath of office on "the holy book" and no longer specifically the Qur'ān. Through these

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touch with Islamic injunctions. The will of God should be the sole determiner of government policy, for it alone is just and right.

[21] Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, pp. 22-23. In these pages, Shaul Bakhash depicts the overtly un-religious character of the Shah and the policies which he pursued, thus producing greater anxiety amongst his own citizens as to where he was further leading his country. The section further explains the protest movements which followed. Other sources of reference concerning this very issue may be found in the following: Amuzegar, The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution. The Pahlavis' Triumph and Tragedy.; Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown. The Islamic Revolution in Iran; Fischer, Michael, M.J. Iran. From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980). Also see Dabashi, Theology of Discontent.

[22] This friendship between the Shah and the United States was based upon the commodity of oil. Iran's foreign relations seemed to stem from its status as a major supplier of oil to the West, in particular. Fred

two provisions of the law, it seems likely that Islam was not of prime importance for the Shah's regime. While those bureaucrats who supported the monarch saw this move as perhaps more progressive, the religious establishment interpreted it as an attack on their very existence and that of the concept of the umma. Secondly, the government had earlier that year developed a program of land distribution which was viewed as " a violation of the sanctity of private property."[23] Iran's clergy took issue with this program since they received religious endowments which furnished the mosques, religious seminaries, and the clerical community with a degree of financial independence and liberty.[24] In the absence of these endowments, the religious community would lose a significant source of financing. Thirdly, and connected with the increasing impotence of the clergy, was the predicament in which the religious class found themselves with the introduction of the Literacy Corps. This was a program designed to conscript young men into the army and then send them into the rural areas to teach the youth to read and write. This was thought to be a direct challenge to the village *mullās* who were also the village teachers. The possibility and probability that secularist thought would be spread from its locale in the cities perhaps disturbed and threatened the clerics. Thus, the ruination of the religious class and its realm of influence appeared imminent if nothing were to be done while the supremacy of secularism loomed over the horizon. The seeds of revolution had been sown.

A portion of Lebanon's Shi'i ulama, although not confronted with the possibility of "disestablishment" as some feared in Iran, felt they were being forced into submission

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Halliday, in his book Iran: Dictatorship and Development provides extensive detail concerning the Iranian-United States cooperation, which would later become a raison d'être for the coming revolution.

[23] Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, p. 24.

by and to the men of politics.[25] Musa al-Sadr made the claim that the men of politics use the men of religion to merely justify their positions.[26] He felt that the politicians only wished for the religious class to pray over the decisions they made rather than to be a part of them. The alienation of the ulama became an overriding theme around which the developing discourse and call for political action was centered.[27]

I have outlined some similarities between the causes preceding the Islamic revolution in Iran and certain growing tensions which were becoming visible to the leaders of the "disinherited" in Lebanon. These similarities help set the stage for understanding how Iran, and specifically Ayatollah Khomeini, was upheld as a model by some in Lebanon and how that model helped to quicken the pace for action.

We may now more fully explore the influence of the Iranian revolution upon the Shi'ite community of Lebanon. The radicalization of the discourse of *AMAL*'s leaders with their greater use of religious symbolism to further arouse the sentiments of more individuals will be illustrated. Some of the thought emerging from Iran was being adopted or at least pondered over by the activists of Lebanon which renders it significant for this study.

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[24] Ibid.

[25] See quote from one of Musa al-Sadr's speeches in Chaper two, p. 80 of this thesis.

[26] Ajami, The Vanished Imam, p. 147. The reader interested in Musa al-Sadr's view concerning the men of politics may also find information in the following: Augustus Richard Norton, "Musa al-Sadr," in Pioneers of Islamic Revival, ed. Ali Rahnema (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1994), p. 202.

[27] Of great importance to the understanding of Shi'ism and its history as well as significant to the topic of this thesis is the reality of Shi'i quietism. It has been argued by many authors that the Shi'a possess a tradition , of sorts, of political quietism which stems from their (the Ithnā 'Asharī) own concept of the Imamate, i.e. that it is obligatory to believe in the Imams and the fact that the Twelfth Imam, the Mahdi, will one day return to establish justice and peace on the earth. This Mahdi is a descendant of Ḥusayn, the Third Imam in the line of twelve, and his return (*raj'a*) from occultation (*ghayba*) is awaited by those who believe. Until that time, political circumstances must be tolerated with patient endurance and the Shi'a must persevere. For details concerning the expected return of the Mahdi, please consult A. A. Sachedina, Islamic Messianism. The Idea of the Mahdi in Twelver Shi'ism and The Just Ruler in Shi'ite Islam. A series of articles dealing with the metamorphosis of the ulama's character and approach to their

There existed particular Islamic ideologies whose observance was deemed necessary by leaders in both nations for the proper religious and moral functioning of society. The first of these is that the religious leader is actually an instrument of resistance to the unjust ruler(s) and that he must represent the underprivileged.[28] It is mandatory for the religious leaders, according to Khomeini and Musa al-Sadr, to be active in politics through their words, deeds, and declarations. There is a functional difference, as Khomeini sees it, between the religious leaders or clerical class and the role of the *vilāyat-e faqīh*, or rule of the jurisconsult. This will be described in greater depth in the following pages.

Fanon, in The Wretched of the Earth, writes about the peoples identification with episodes and figures in their own history as a group: "In the same way the people make use of certain episodes in the life of the community in order to hold themselves ready and to keep alive their revolutionary zeal."[29] Perhaps the Shi'i religious leadership of both communities also applied this concept of identification to their own movements. Ḥusayn, the third of the Shi'ite Imams, has been lauded by many Iranian clerics as the exemplar of cleric as social activist. His more recent portrayal has moved from being the martyred victim of Karbala to the revolutionary hero for Shi'i activism. Musa al-Sadr reworked the image of Karbala and Ḥusayn's significant role in Shi'i history and

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responsibilities within the community may be found in Keddie, Nikki R., ed., Religion and Politics in Iran. Shi'ism from Quietism to Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).

[28] Amongst the obligations of the Ithnā 'Asharī Shi'a is the belief in the twelve Imams and their eventual triumph over the unjust and unbelieving with the return of the Twelfth Imam, the Mahdi. During his absence, every age is provided with certain deputies who are chosen from amongst the jurists most knowledgeable in Islamic law and who are considered just. It is their responsibility to guide and guard all believing members of the community from unjust practices and oppression. More can be read about this concept in the following works: Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islam. A Study of the Devotional Aspects of 'Āshūrā' in Twelver Shi'ism; Corbin, En Islam Iranien. Aspects Spirituels et Philosophiques;

molded it to the Lebanon of the 1970s. No longer would the heroic stories, seemingly so distant in both time and place, be preserved amongst the great mythological tales of the past. Shi'i activism in Lebanon might grow if people did not feel so disassociated from the lives of their religious forefathers. Karbala was no longer the battle for survival fought at the beginning of Islamic history. It was reworked by the Lebanese Shi'i leadership into the civil disorder which existed in Lebanon in the present. Yazid was no longer an intangible figure who represented despotism and evil in an earlier age, but was any figure who could be considered tyrannical. As Ajami states, it could be "a policeman, a landlord, [or] an oppressive father-in-law."[30] An individual who manifested a particularly cruel personality was equated with Shimr - the individual in the Shi'i literature and passion plays who beheaded Ḥusayn.[31] Therefore, Karbala was a time held up as an example of the successful overthrow of tyrants, oppression and the rise of a powerful minority. Instead of weeping for Ḥusayn's horrific loss of life, more and more the religious classes were depicting him as the victor over the unjust, corrupt rulers and as one willing to fight for God. The stories were also used to benefit the authority of the religious clerics themselves.

A marvelous example demonstrating how these stories were re-interpreted is from the study by the anthropologist, M. Hegland, who has described the "two images" of Ḥusayn during the Muharram celebrations in one Iranian village. This study is interesting in that it demonstrates how the local clerics tried to legitimate their power and authority over the local peoples. Ḥusayn must be viewed, first, as an intercessor

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Sachedina, Islamic Messianism. The Idea of the Mahdi in Twelver Shi'ism and also by the same author The Just Ruler in Shi'ite Islam.

[29] Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 69.

between the people and God. He also holds social and political authority and therefore requires the homage and obedience of the people.[32] Here may be seen the desired relationship of interdependence between the figures of authority and the subjects for whom they are responsible. The image that was held by the villagers and propagated by the clerics was that of Ḥusayn as an honorable statesman and symbol of God's justice on earth, i.e. what the political man should be. This depiction of Ḥusayn helps give strength to the image of the cleric as authority figure and statesman in contemporary Islamic societies. The second "image" of Ḥusayn has to do with his personal obligation as a leading member of the family of 'Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib to fight for the justice of his people and to overcome the prevalent injustices within his society.[33] Here he becomes the revolutionary figure which has been capitalized upon more and more in recent history. No longer the victim, he has become the embodiment of heroism. It is clear that for the Shi'a of the Muslim world, the role model for their leaders over time has been Ḥusayn along with his pious intentions and heroic behaviour. Musa al-Sadr himself espoused this concept. It was now the time in history where a more activist role must be taken by the Lebanese ulama. The clerics had to rediscover their traditional role without falling prey to the wishes of those in political authority. They were also charged with discarding their quiescent ways of old.[34] The alim must now transform

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[30] Ajami, The Vanished Imam, p. 144.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Hegland, "Two Images of Hussain: Accomodation and Revolution in an Iranian Village," in Religion and Politics in Iran, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 218-235. Also see Yann Richard, Shi'ite Islam. Polity, Ideology, and Creed. Translated by Antonia Nevill (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 31-32.
[33] Richard, Shi'ite Islam, pp. 31-32.
[34] The argument regarding the ulama's quietist or passive tradition has been taken up by many authors. It perhaps stems from the Shi'i belief that to accept an unjust, tyrannical ruler is better than living in the absence of one. Anarchy is yet a worse state. The Ithnā 'Asharī are awaiting the return of their Hidden Imam who will correct any wrongs or evils which exist in the earth. Many authors speak exhaustively of

himself into a political figure, for in that form would he best serve the needs of his community. Musa al-Sadr's own definition of the alim's responsibilities could best be summarized by the text derived from one of his lectures:

> The responsibility of an Imam of the Community (*Imam al Jama'a*), knew no limits... An Imam had to protect the interests of his flock; he had to be generous; he had to serve his community with advice and persistance; he had to be willing to undergo martyrdom on their behalf. No leader can claim Islam who ignores the daily affairs of the community.[35]

Musa al-Sadr was a visible leader of a very diverse constituency. Due to his appreciation for the varying needs of the Lebanese Shi'ite community[36] he was capable of adapting to his audiences. It was in his role as religio-political spokesman for the community that he inspired it to achieve its full potential.[37] He, along with modern Iranian clerics, reinterpreted Ḥusayn's traditional status as martyr of the community which they felt defiled and mocked the important position Ḥusayn played in Shi'ite religious history. Ḥusayn was actually a political figure who fought in order to abolish injustice in all its forms. This characterization is clearly seen in Musa al-Sadr's 'Āshūrā' speech of 1974, where he speaks of Ḥusayn removing the constraints placed upon the ulama. Ḥusayn chose to lead the community for the following reasons:

> ...This revolution did not die in the sands of Kerbala; it flowed into the life stream of the Islamic world, and passed from

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the politically inactive ulama, particularly in Iran, a country which has received much attention over the past two decades. However, an article which elaborates upon the long tradition of political participation in which at least a few ulama have been active is Hamid Algar,"Religious Forces in Twentieth Century Iran," in The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 7, eds. Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 732-764.

[35] Ajami, The Vanished Imam, p. 123. Over the following pages a very detailed study is made of Musa al-Sadr's very "revolutionary" approach to change within his confessional community. Speeches as well as his reinterpretation of Shi'ism and Shi'i history are discussed.

[36] As seen in Chapter 1, pp. 53-54 we can see the real makeup of his support and how it is spread amongst many classes, professions and regions.

[37] Ajami, The Vanished Imam, p. 133.

> generation to generation, even to our day. It is a deposit placed in our hands so that we may profit from it, that we draw out of it a new source of reform, a new position, a new movement, a new revolution, to repel the darkness, to stop tyranny and to pulverize evil.[38]

Social justice in Islam is another ideological point that has been taken up by many reform-minded individuals in recent Islamic history.[39] The notion is a fundamental tenet within the Islamic faith and is often used in opposition to corrupt government and institutions. Yet it is interesting to note that a popular belief amongst the Imāmī Shi'a, in particular, is their possession of a cultural tradition of maintaining social justice because of the community's own history of struggle against usurpers and oppressors, often aimed at Sunni political figures in history (within both the Omeyyad and Abbasid dynasties). It is only with the return (raj'a) of the Mahdi that justice on earth shall be reestablished.[40]

Imperialism set hold in the Muslim world, as elsewhere, in the nineteenth century and the notion of social justice was then transferred onto the stage of nations confronted by those with imperialistic intentions.[41] For Iran, the cry for social justice was aimed at the Russians, the British and the Americans at varying times in its recent history. The Shi'i ulama of the late 19th century were partially responsible for the demand for a "house of justice" (*adalet khaneh*) where the application of Islamic law,

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[38] Ibid., p. 143. This is an excerpt of a speech which had been printed in the journal *Al-Hayat* on February 1, 1974. This demonstrates well Musa al-Sadr's method for reinterpreting the history of his faith while pumping life back into his community. In this way did he hope to rouse the Shi'a to action.

[39] These individuals include Ali Shariati, Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb amongst many.

[40] For more details concerning the return of the Mahdi and his role in the reestablishment of justice on earth, refer to: Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islam. A study of the Devotional Aspects of 'Āshūrā in Twelver Shi'ism; Corbin, En Islam Iranien. Aspects Spirituels et Philosophiques; Halm, Shiism.);. Sachedina, Islamic Messianism. The Idea of the Mahdi in Twelver Shi'ism.

[41] Frantz Fanon describes the transfer of power from colonizer to those with authority amongst the colonized. His example appears valid for many third world nations emerging from the grip of imperialism. See Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth and Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities.

rather than imported, foreign systems, would be guaranteed. This demand in some ways precipitated the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911. The purpose of the revolution was to reduce the tyranny which was closely knit to the absolute monarchy and the Anglo-Russian political and economic domination of Iran in the previous century.[42] As foreign nation's sank their teeth deeper into the very fabric of Iranian life, not only politically and economically, but also socially, more and more individuals viewed this intrusion with trepidation and mistrust. Many of the ulama saw the influence of the Western world as undermining Muslim traditions, customs, beliefs and institutions,[43] and therefore the very essence of their power and authority. This "corruption" by all things western, which the Iranian clerics considered the Shah of readily accepting, created a sense of Islam as being passé and outdated.

Khomeini worked to spread the notion of "Islamic justice for all"[44] in order to establish some degree of Islamic awareness amongst the Muslim population the world over. He saw Iran's revolution as representing something unique in terms of other modern revolutions because it was religiously rather than materially based. Khomeini, although not the one to develop this concept of the dichotomy between the material and spiritual, was the individual to expound upon and popularize it.

As an issue for the Lebanese Shi'i community, social and economic justice ranked high amongst priorities for the leadership to achieve. The Shi'i Demands reflect the prominence of this notion for the community. The Tobacco Crisis of 1973 was the

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[42] Esposito, The Iranian Revolution, p. 47. For additional information see: Fischer, Iran. From Religious Dispute to Revolution; Halm, Shiism; Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam.

[43] It may be interesting to the reader to look at Frantz Fanon's description of how the native of a colonized land may envision and react to the "supremacy" of the values and institutions of the western colonizer. See Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, pp. 42-43.

[44] Esposito, The Iranian Revolution, p. 48.

hallmark of Shi'i grievances, an issue in which the leadership touted the present social and economic injustices. According to Ajami, Musa al-Sadr may have made parallels between the plight of the tobacco industry and the actions he took with that of the Iranian Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892.[45] Questions arose in both countries over who actually controlled the industry; the cultivators, the landowners or a foreign entity? In both instances, it was an opportunity for the clerics to speak out against socio-economic inequalities and injustices. Musa al-Sadr exploited the issue in order to gain further support for his themes of "disinheritance" and "deprivation". He adopted a new language and style of rhetoric in order to illustrate his ideas and agenda for the community. Themes of "disinheritance" and "deprivation" became the illustrations behind much of his thought. He distanced himself from the Marxist language which included terms such as "class conflict" and "exploitation."[46] The Marxist language associated with the communist doctrine was interpreted by al-Sadr as one of disbelief and of possessing an anti-religious nature. During his 'Āshūrā' sermon of 3/2/74 Musa al-Sadr mixed religious symbolism with political thought in order to impress his concerns upon his audience without resorting to the marxist vocabulary of other competing organizations:

> Imam Husayn defined the two motives behind his action: justice was not being implemented and injustice was not being forbidden. I ask you if the Imam was amongst us today and saw that justice was not being implemented, but on the contrary, one was excessive in scorning justice, what would he have done?[47]

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[45] Ajami, The Vanished Imam, pp. 130-131.
[46] Ibid., p. 136.
[47] Taken from Salim Nasr, "Mobilisation Communautaire et Symbolique Religieuse: L'Imam Sadr et les Chi'ites du Liban (1970-1975), p. 145. The translation of this passage is my own.

It is his personal and updated interpretation of Shi'i history that may easily be considered one of Musa al-Sadr's greatest achievements. His reinterpretation of Karbala and the event of Ḥusayn's martyrdom marked a turning point in the Shi'i self-perception. The need was for the community to no longer look upon itself as victimized, often lamenting its own position and role in history. He worked painstakingly for this identity to alter to one of self-acceptance and understanding. In fact, Ḥusayn, in the eyes of modern-day Shi'a the world over has received a new interpretation in religious history. Ḥusayn is now a political figure making conscious choices about his community's destiny and legacy for mankind.[48]The basis of social justice would not and could not be overlooked since it was so closely knit with the community's own history. In the process the identities of the dispossessed were validated and confirmed through a validation and vivification of their history.

The third ideological issue which became the groundwork of Ayatollah Khomeini's thought is the concept of the *velāyat-e faqīh*, or rule by the jurisconsult. Although many Muslims may agree with Khomeini about the advantages of Islamic rule and governance, many viewed rule of the jurisconsult as a particularly Shi'i notion. However, numerous were those Shi'a who disagreed with the position of a *faqīh* at the head of the community.[49] This may also be seen as true for the Shi'a of Lebanon. Let us now look at Khomeini's concept of the *velāyat-e faqīh*.

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[48] Ajami, The Vanished Imam, pp. 142-143; Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islam, pp. 93-149. This last work will provide the reader with the traditional view of Ḥusayn in terms of his piety and self-sacrificing character.

[49] Arjomand in The Turban for the Crown, pp. 177-180 raises the fact that the concept of *velāyat* (or the Shi'ite theory of authority) remained relatively constant until the 1960s with the Infallible Imams representing the just authority. Only in circumstances which have been exacted by the Qur'ān and the Prophet himself, can the jurist possess any role of authority. This may also be seen in Gregory Rose's article "Velayat-e Faqih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity in the Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini," in

In Shi'ite Islamic history, the role of the Imam has been of utmost importance both in terms of his spiritual impact and his responsibilities as guide for the community. His authority was viewed as both spiritual and temporal. For the Shi'i community it is first and foremost God who is leader for His believers. Second in line is the Prophet Muḥammad and finally are the twelve Infallible (*ma'ṣūm*) Imams (according to the Ithnā 'Asharī).[50] However, with the occultation (*ghayba*) of the twelfth, the position of guide for each successive age fell upon jurists deemed responsible in Islamic knowledge and possessing the virtue of justice. During the Lesser Occultation, the four deputies were designated (*naṣṣ*) by the Hidden Imam. However, no replacement for the 4th deputy was designated and this began the Great Occultation. Once the community entered the period of the Greater Occultation, it was left to choose from amongst those deemed the most worthy. Thus, out of this situation arose the inevitable need for a guide (the Imam) to be present for each generation of Shi'i followers.[51] This may easily be considered the central tenet of the Shi'ite faith, one which is neither well regarded nor considered as valid by Sunni Muslims. As Richard demonstrates, the descendants of the Alid's may have disappeared with the occultation of the Twelfth Imam, al-Mahdi, yet

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Religion and Politics in Iran. Shi'ism from Quietism to Revolution, pp. 168-169. Only with the advent of Khomeini onto the political stage do we see an altering of this concept. Objections to the extension of juristic authority into the realm of government arose for two reasons; 1) the authority of the Shi'ite ulama during the period of the Twelfth Imam's occultation cannot move from the religious into the political sphere and 2) this authority cannot exist in the hands of one or a council of several jurists but must be the collective authority of all.

[50] Esposito, The Iranian Revolution, p. 47.

[51] The importance of guidance for the Shi'i community is demonstrated by the obligation to recognize and obey the institution of the Imamate and, therefore, those who are their representatives in a given age. The doctrine of the Imamate may be more fully pursued through the following works: Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islam; Corbin, En Islam Iranien. Aspects Spirituels et Philosophiques; Halm, Shiism; Wilfred Madelung, "Authority in Twelver Shiism in the Absence of the Imam," in La Notion d'Autorité au Moyen Age. Islam, Byzance, Occident (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982) and his article entitled "Imāma," in The Encyclopaedia of Islam; Sachedina, Islamic Messianism and The Just Ruler in Shi'ite Islam.

their spiritual presence continues to live amongst the people and is represented through the person of the *ḥujja* or "*apodictic proof*".[52] These individuals may be amongst the ulama of the day. Since the true and absolute authority is absent according to the Shi'a, unlike the case in Sunni Islam where one is obligated to be obedient towards his ruler be he a sultan, Shah, caliph or President, these Shi'i ulama must strive to meet the needs of the community in the absence of their Imam or ruler.[53]

These ulama must meet certain criteria in order to be accepted by the community as doctors of the law. They must obtain a superior degree of knowledge pertaining to Islamic law and they must be just. Without these two criteria, the ulama are unfit to guide the community of believers. Because of their knowledge and awareness of both the exoteric (*zāḥir*) and the esoteric (*bāṭin*) meanings of the Qur'ān and its guidelines for the correct path which every Shi'i believer must explore, the ulama actually conform to the criteria of the Imams. According to Richard:

> In theory, this double knowledge conditions every rule of succession of spiritual authority. Thus the *ulema* are subject to the same type of selection as the Imam; they must possess theological and practical knowledge to allow them to implement the Law and the spiritual charisma to give them authority over the believers; at their own level they similarly claim the same kind of legislative function, the teaching of the Law and spiritual guidance, for even in the absence of the Imam justice must still be dispensed and the faith must still be taught.[54]

Traditionally these clerics, although capable of making judgements according to the *Sharī'a*, or Islamic law, were left to examine spiritual issues, with those in political

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[52] Richard, Shi'ite Islam, p. 43.
[53] Ibid., p. 44.
[54] Ibid.

power solving the very real issues of the day. This we have seen as also being true in the Lebanese case. Ayatollah Khomeini took the concept of the ulama as guide for the community and developed a hierarchical structure for the ulama. Although they might consult with one another and exercise leadership over the entire community as a collective, the leadership may rest in a single, highly qualified individual who also is considered a leading religious authority in the community.[55] According to Ayatollah Khomeini in his work Velayat-e Faqih: Hukumat-e Eslami:

> If a deserving jurist is endowed with these two qualities [justice and knowledge of Islamic law], then his regency will be the same as enjoyed by the Prophet in the governing of the Islamic community, and it is incumbent on all Moslems to obey him.[56]

One of the important Shi'ite theorists dealing with jurisprudence in the nineteenth century, Sheikh Murtadā Ansārī (d. 1864), defined the responsibilities of the *faqīh* by his three functions: 1) the power to grant "religious decrees" (*fatwā*) concerning minor problems of the believers, 2) the power to judge and arbitrate issues dealing with personal conflict (*ḥukūma*, which does not imply political power) and 3) administrative power over possessions and people.[57] It is with this third aspect of the *faqīh's* power that there lies some controversy. For Ansārī, the Prophet and the Imams who followed him were the only individuals within the umma in whom temporal and spiritual authority were vested. With the occultation of the Twelfth Imam, this power, along with the potential for pronouncing judgments and making decisions concerning new

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[55] Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's thoughts on the role of the *faqīh* may be found in Imam Khomeini's Islam and Revolution. Writings and Declarations, transl. Hamid Algar (London: KPI, 1985), 27-168.
[56] Excerpt taken from a translation provided by Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, p. 39. For a much more indepth study of Khomeini's speeches concerning the *velāyat-e faqīh* and the role of the Islamic government, see Imam Khomeini, Islam and Revolution. Writings and Declarations.
[57] Richard, Shi'ite Islam, p. 81;. Sachedina, The Just Ruler in Shi'ite Islam, pp. 22-23, 214-229.

problems and situations which arose in the community was deemed the responsibility of the *faqīh*. These were decisions for which no previous jurisprudence had been provided. However, this authority was only a "residual" *velāyat*, as Hamid Enayat expressed it.[58] This "residual" power was merely to be utilized for the benefit of certain Muslims who were otherwise incapable of resolving their own affairs. These included those who have not yet reached adulthood and those who were mentally ill.[59]

During the years preceding the Iranian revolution, a new interpretation arose around the function of the *velāyat-e faqīh*. The Ayatollah Khomeini staunchly believed that both God and His Prophet would not have left the community of believers without guidance. It was Khomeini's firm belief that others needed to continue as representatives of God on earth. He felt that mankind would not and should not be abandoned to lead itself into the future. For him the contrast between the just *faqīh* and the Imam is no different than that between the Imam and the Prophet. Because justice in leadership is mandatory for the smooth running of society, the guardians of the people must be the doctors of religious law. They are obligated to establish an Islamic government with one or several *fuqahā'* at its head.[60] Khomeini justifies this rule of the jurisconsult by a Shi'ite tradition:

> The Commander of the believers [Ali] records that the Prophet exclaimed three times: "Oh God! Have pity on those who will succeed me." He was asked: "Oh, Messenger of God! Who are they who will succeed you?" He replied: "Those who will come after me, pass on my traditions and put them into practice [i.e. the

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[58] Hamid Enayat, "Iran: Khumayni's Concept of the 'Guardianship of the Jurisconsult,'" in Islam in the Political Process, ed. J.P. Piscatori (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 160-180.
[59] Richard, Shi'ite Islam, p. 81. Also refer to Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, pp. 178-180. For a complete historical survey concerning the role of the ulama in society see Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam.
[60] Richard, Shi'ite Islam, p. 83.

Imams] and teach the people after me."[61]

There were those in Iran who disagreed with Khomeini about the dangers of this type of rulership, yet many were not to oppose this concept until the post-revolutionary years. However, opposition did exist in Lebanon and much of *AMAL*'s history would be determined by the conformity or opposition to these ideas which were being exported from Iran. The influence of Khomeini's theories in Lebanon is proven by the mere fact that they were being considered and debated rather than ignored. The Lebanese Mohammad-Jawad Mughniyya (1904-1979) was a Shi'i alim who opposed Khomeini's vision for the rule by the doctors of the law. His own vision or concept of political power was incompatible with the overriding Iranian vision which he found to be too radical and too removed from the circumstances of the Lebanese Shi'a's needs in modern times. He was a more moderate cleric with his own interpretation of what would most benefit his community. He felt that the realm of influence of *velāyat-e faqīh* only extended into the juridical and private spheres.[62] He envisioned danger for the community which permitted these clerics, whether one or many, to decide the political destiny of all without the full participation of each citizen. In my opinion, this was an individual who profoundly understood Lebanon's confessional composition and the issues which would arise by installing such a seemingly one-sided religio-political system. It is difficult to determine whether rule by the *velāyat-e faqīh* would resolve the issues associated with the Lebanese Shi'i community, since it seems unlikely that one individual could actually lead an entire nation while dealing fairly with inter-communal

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[61]Ibid. There exists controversy within the Shi'i community as to whether this passage may refer to the Imams or to the ulama.

[62]Ibid., p. 125. Also see Chibli Mallat, Shi'i Thought from the South of Lebanon (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies), 21-25.

problems. However, Mughniyya's view is by no means standard for all the Shi'a of the country because it is over this issue, along with the influence and "model-like" behavior of the Iranian Shi'i community, that we see a splintering within *AMAL* and its constituency. There were the more extreme visionaries who felt the moderate policies and attitudes so expressed by *AMAL* were not pushing the community far enough in terms of politics and religious practice. It was evident that *Hezbollah, Islamic AMAL* (*AMAL al-islamiyya*) and the *Jihad al-Islami* fostered new visions or perhaps remained in tune with the foundations from which *AMAL* appeared to stray. This would further break up the influence *AMAL* had hitherto maintained.[63]

It is here that I would like to quickly summarize the influence of the Iranian revolution on the Shi'a of Lebanon. What I consider to be the greatest impact of the revolution on the Shi'a in Lebanon was the certainty that an unjust, corrupt, and/or mis-oriented government, of whatever form, could be overthrown for one which better represented and supported all the people. The revolution gave impetus and courage to an otherwise marginal and quiescent group. The Shi'i revolutionary way was touted as the answer to the predicament of the deprived and it also encouraged other groups to take action. A new emphasis was placed upon religion in the lives of many and the status of the clergy seems to have been further recognized and consolidated. However, Khomeini's doctrine, although it had its supporters in Lebanon, may have been irrelevant, in practice, to the Lebanese Shi'i predicament, in essence, because of the varied confessional natures of each along with the fact that socio-political circumstances were different.

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[63] See Deeb, Marius. Militant Islamic Movements in Lebanon: Origins, Social Basis, and Ideology

Secondly, Iranian authors such as Mahmud Tāleqanī, Mohammad-Baqr Sadr and Abul-Hasan Bani-Sadr were determined to depict Islam as a solution to the economic conditions which were casting the country adrift.[64] Before the revolution broke out, they were influencing many within and without their country. They spoke tirelessly about Islam's direct link to a sense of social justice, the equitable distribution of wealth, and the causes and needs of the underprivileged classes.[65] These same themes were being presented in Lebanon by Musa al-Sadr and other leading clerics who found they provided hope and answers for the Shi'i condition.[66] At a time when Marxist-socialist ideas were finding an increased voice, these individuals were searching to convince the disgruntled and indecisive youth that Islam provided solutions to the society's social and economic difficulties. Again, for certain individuals within *AMAL*, be they leaders or led, this rhetoric would prove too weak to support their growing religious fervor and militancy. They would eventually split off and form other organizations such as *Hezbollah* and *Islamic AMAL*.

Thirdly, what many in the West would consider the greatest influence of Iran in Lebanon would be the aid, both military and financial, to the Shi'i community. Iran's Revolutionary Guards (*Pasdaran*) were deployed to the south of Lebanon for the training of the local militias in the summer of 1982. The number appears to be well over 1000

(Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, November 1986), 12-20.

[64] The works of these respective authors are numerous. Mahmud Tāleqanī is well respected for his commentaries on the Qur'ān and the *Nahj al-Balagha* (sayings, sermons and letters of Ali). Mohammad-Baqr Sadr's works include *Islam and Property, in Comparison to the Economic Systems of the West*, *Falsafatuna* and *Iqtisaduna*. His *Eslam va Malekiyyat* is a statement against capitalism's exploitative character. Finally, Abul Hasan Bani-Sadr was a rather prolific writer. Amongst his works, two should be mentioned; *The Economics of Unity*(Tawḥid) and *The Fundamental Principles of Islamic Government*. For a thorough introduction to these individuals, see Dabashi, Theology of Discontent.

[65] Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, p. 167.

[66] As represented by the Demands and the Charter.

troops which settled in the area by way of Syria.[67] The Guards also engaged in armed conflict with the Israeli forces which were stationed in southern Lebanon. These troops were not necessarily sent to support the *AMAL* movement but for those groups which found little in common with *AMAL*'s leniency.[68] *Islamic Amal*, *Hezbollah* and *al-Jihad* varied from the *AMAL* constituency in that their followers were originally looking for a complete overhaul of the governing structure of the country and the eventual establishment of an Islamic state. Whereas *AMAL*'s leaders preached a more moderate line of action wanting to obtain their fair share of the political pie, without necessarily disrupting the society, as seen by the tone of both the Demands and the Charter. They merely wanted a reformed political system where their true numbers became the actual representation of their present day status, without being based upon the 1932 census and where political posts would be earned by merit rather than by confession. Iran was only willing to support those organizations which tended to mirror Iranian policy and ideology at home.[69] At this juncture it is important to reiterate that *AMAL*'s stronghold was and remains in the south of Lebanon and certain sectors of Beirut. In addition to this tactical/military aid, the financial backing of Iran allowed the more militant organizations to expand their realm of influence. Iran was known to pump funds into the south and certain sectors of Beirut where they were being applied for the provision

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[67] According to certain authors the number lies around 1000 Iranian guards. Clinton Bailey, in his article entitled "Lebanon's Shi'is After the 1982 War" in Shi'ism, Resistance, and Revolution, ed. Martin Kramer (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), 220, claims that the troops numbered 1500 at the time. Whereas for others, the number rests between 300-500 (Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs,p. 235). It seems clear that the number increased dramatically over the course of several years along with the greater intrusiveness of Israel in Lebanon.

[68] Augustus Richard Norton, "The Origins and Resurgence of Amal" in Shi'ism, Resistance and Revolution, ed. Martin Kramer (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), 213.

[69] Ibid., p. 214. This support for Iranian policy would be the determining factor in who received aid from the Iranian state. The more radical organizations would not necessarily continue to believe that the

of social services for the community's benefit. These included hospitals, schools and sanitation services, many of which the previous governments were unable or unwilling to contribute to.[70] Thus, some Shi'i demands were able to be met through the outside help of Iran, either as exemplar of the Islamic state or perhaps just another foreign patron. This aid, in addition to providing necessary services to the community and possibly winning support for local Lebanese Shi'i organizations which chose to adhere to the Iranian model, may have also fostered the desire amongst some to find Islamic solutions to the community's woes.

Fourthly, and according to the research conducted by Norton, the Iranian influence was most visible in terms of its diplomatic presence over the actions of the Lebanese Shi'ite community. Ali Akbar Velayati, the Iranian Foreign Minister, worked to end the on-going turmoil between *AMAL* and *Hezbollah* militia men which only served to weaken the cohesiveness and socio-political awareness of the majority of the Shi'a within Lebanon.[71] However, ties were discovered between the Iranian Embassy in Damascus and *Hezbollah* as the Iranians in Syria appeared to be directing and guiding much of the activity which this Lebanese organization seems to stir up.[72]

Finally, this study is only considering the years from 1969-1984 as this closing date appears to be significant for marking the real split within *AMAL* with members

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Iranian model was the answer to Lebanon's problems and this would lead to an eventual dissociation with the Shi'ite state.

[70] Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: The Internal Conflict and the Iranian Connection" in The Iranian Revolution, ed. John L. Esposito (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990), 126.

[71] Norton, "Lebanon: The Internal Conflict and the Iranian Connection," p. 118. Here the author of the article expounds upon other attempts by Iran to reconcile the differences between the extremists and the moderates amongst Lebanon's Shi'a. This author would argue with Norton as to Iran's diplomatic procedures having the most visible impact upon Lebanon's Shi'a. Iran was viewed by most as a model for what "could" occur in other countries, without serving as an absolute. This model, in this author's opinion, served as Iran's greatest visible impact, for most Shi'a were disinterested in who was behind the actions taken as long as those actions were performed.

joining other, more radical associations. 1984 also appears to be the high point of *AMAL*'s military power, its intense engagement against the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and its own confrontation with the central government in Beirut.[73] I will not deal with the continuing clashes between *AMAL* and *Hezbollah*, yet I would like to illustrate the impact of the Iranian revolution on the political scene of Lebanon. As stated earlier, one of the greatest results of the revolution for the Shi'ite community was to render the Shi'a aware of their own strength in politics. Iran provided a model only in so far as the Lebanese community found itself ripe for change. The voice they had so long sought emerged with a sense of pride and confidence they may have acquired while viewing their brothers in the faith succeed elsewhere. The Shi'a also seemed to have gained prestige amongst other religious groups in Lebanon due to the fact that the Iranian revolution was equated with a Shi'i revolution. Maronites, Sunnis and Druze, one can assume, were all left to contemplate the increased presence of Shi'ism on the world stage. This awareness of a stronger Shi'i presence in Lebanon may have produced greater accommodation for the Shi'a on the part of other confessional communities, along with increased recognition amongst themselves that their numbers were significant enough to make them major players on the political stage. The Shi'a were able to move from a political attitude of "accommodation" to one of "rejection".

The Iranian revolution contributed to the changed image of the Lebanese Shi'a as the *metwalis*. *AMAL* enjoyed increased prestige and influence amongst Shi'i voters until about 1982 when *Ḥizbollāh* (or "the Party of God"), foremost amongst the more radical organizations dedicated to a more immediate and less moderate resolution of

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[72]Ibid., p. 126.

Shi'i frustration over security issues and those associated with political representation, emerged as a challenger to the authority and politico-religious stance of *AMAL*. *AMAL*'s growth in the years which directly followed the revolution demands a recognition of the efforts by Musa al-Sadr and the Shi'i leadership who reflected upon and adopted some of Khomeini's ideas and philosophies that were applicable to the Lebanese predicament, although on a less rigorous scale.

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[73] Norton, "Amal", p. 83.

Chapter Four

The Israeli Invasions of Southern Lebanon (1976 - 1982)

It is to the influence of Israel and its presence in southern Lebanon, particularly since the latter half of the 1970s, that we now turn our attention. Many political controversies and questions have arisen in regional politics since the creation of the Jewish state in 1948. Questions over territory, security, identity and allegiance have made the region a focal point in international politics and diplomacy. These political issues of the region have seemed to be played out in Lebanon, which has continued to serve as stage for regional disputes during the past three decades. Changing allegiances and alliances between nations, as well as inter and intra-communally within and without Lebanon, demonstrate the rapidity and degree to which different actors in the ongoing struggles for territory, security and identity react in response to their own agendas.

The Shi'a of Lebanon are no strangers to this phenomenon, either as its victims or its perpetrators. The Israeli occupation of south Lebanon provides the opportunity to examine the Shi'i social, political and military activity first hand as the community is forced to act and respond to ever changing circumstances in an insecure environment. The Israeli occupation of Lebanon, particularly the invasion of the south in 1976, 1978 and 1982, along with the inevitable consequences for the Shi'a, will also be analyzed. The language employed by the members of *AMAL* when addressing the question of Israel and its presence in the country intensified in its hostility towards the Jewish state as well as towards the Palestinian groups which were now sharing the same land and

resources. Israel was often depicted, even by Khomeini himself, as the evil Satan who was backed by imperialist powers. The direct impact of these invasions were to revive the very questions Musa al-Sadr and his community outlined and sought answers to at the end of the 1960s: national identity and unity, security and political restructuring/participation. However, the political evolution of *AMAL* will be shown as other organizations vie with it for members and prominence within the Shi'i community.

In my opinion, three factors largely contributed to the Israeli invasion and occupation of Lebanon, three very real reasons Israel feared for the security of its borders, for the maintenance of its territory, its identity and its existence in the Arab world. These factors included the Syrian/Pan-Arab platform, the Palestinian question, and the Lebanese scene prior to and during the Civil War of 1975-1976. Much was happening and new trends were developing in the political atmosphere of the 1960s and 1970s in Lebanon which would have an immediate effect upon Israel's policies and agenda within Lebanon. We will briefly analyze the three aforementioned factors in order to better contextualize the analysis of the invasions in terms of time and place.

Firstly, pan-Arabism is neither a newly developed concept nor one which necessarily achieved the objectives of the countries which adopted its philosophy. Pan-Arabism, although a philosophy which was exhaulted by various Muslim revivalists in the nineteenth century, gained a more sturdy framework with the creation of the Arab League in 1945. Upon the independence of the former mandated territories, new sovereign states were formed along "the boundaries which the imperialist powers had

drawn on the map of the Arab world..."[1] The problematic aspect of pan-Arabism was how individual states were to work towards fulfilling their interests while accommodating the larger, more global interests of the region, and the region serving as a unified entity in the larger realm of global politics. Salibi sums up the potential of pan-Arabism when he writes:

> At its idealistic best, pan-Arabism could easily have served as a basis for co-operation between the sovereign states in a community of Arab fellowship, where interests which these states genuinely held in common could be pursued in co-ordination among them, and divergent interests could be reconciled by national give-and-take in an atmosphere of good will.[2]

The pan-Arab leadership originally lay in the hands of Egyptian President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir who was, until the Camp David Accords of 1978, the major actor on the Arab side of the Arab-Israeli conflict. From 1978 through the period covered by this thesis, Syria considered itself to be the major power representing the Arabs within the region, the country most able to carry the torch of pan-Arabism. However, this pan-Arabism, as stated above, could fall subject to the interests and agendas of individual sovereign states. The facade of Syrian pan-Arabism was to create a united front against an invading, ever encroaching Israel. Syria's President, Hafiz al-Assad may have envisioned and publicized himself, since the outset of the Lebanese Civil War, as the protector of Lebanese territory and sovereignty. However, this "protectionist" stance was not the interpretation which Israeli authorities, politicians and military advisors held. They understood that Syrian national security goals required a safeguarding of eastern Lebanon "which forms a natural invasion route for forces seeking to attack

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[1] Salibi, Lebanon and the Middle Eastern Question, p. 10.

Damascus from the south or west."[3] Protection of the Golan Heights became an important issue for safeguarding Syrian territory and this issue was directly linked to that of Lebanese security. The pan-Arabist tendencies of Syria became visible when it felt the necessity, as Helena Cobban writes "to be seen to be confronting 'the Zionist threat' somewhere on earth."[4] Syria's alliances and allegiances with various communities and factions within Lebanon, continually altering over the span of a decade, has demonstrated that Syrian actions have not necessarily been pro pan-Arab nor in the interests of the greater Arab community. In fact, the Syrian presence in Lebanon indicates how Syria may have fallen victim to the danger of pan-Arabism in working for individual rather than group interests.

The second factor contributing to the Israeli invasions and occupation of south Lebanon is perhaps the most obvious. The Palestinian dilemma which has plagued the Israeli conscience for the past fifty years has not only played itself out on home soil but has manifested itself throughout the region, no locale more so than Lebanon. The Palestinian Diaspora is global, yet the battleground has remained concentrated and the results have victimized all communities within Lebanon, as Israel tries to rid herself of the Palestinian presence and what she considers, menace. It was earlier described how the Palestinian refugees and community as a whole developed a unique Palestinian particularism which served their needs for an identity.[5] It was suggested that this Palestinian particularism finally found a "home" in Lebanon, where the question of national identity was amongst the issues facing the nation. The Palestinian leadership

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[2] Ibid., pp. 10-11.
[3] Helena Cobban, The Superpowers and the Syrian-Israeli Conflict. Beyond Crisis Management? (New York: Praeger, 1991), p. 19.
[4] Ibid.

was able to establish a homebase in Beirut where it served to centralize its movement for liberation from and resistance to Israeli presence and authority.

Long-term conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has had dramatic effects upon the politics and peoples of Lebanon. This presence has had a destabilizing impact within the country which has fostered inter and intra-communal animosity and disunity, all of which precipitated the Civil War of 1975-1976. Because the Palestinians had their allies, at the least tolerating, and at best supporting, their presence, it seems inevitable that Israel should invade the country to protect its own sense of security and establish its own *reseau* of indigenous allies. Much of the focus of Israel's military maneuvers was to eliminate, to the utmost, this Palestinian presence and influence just north of its borders.

The third factor contributing to the Israeli presence in Lebanon and directly linked to the second, is the Lebanese Civil War and disunity since 1975. The crisis in Lebanon arose over issues which lie deeper than the traditional claim of a clear Christian-Muslim split over communal issues.[6] In fact, the issues were of a political nature whose only context for religion was one of affiliation. According to Rabinovich, "...it should be realized that these camps [Christian and Muslim] have political aims; the largely Christian camp, a status quo coalition, sought to preserve the traditional Lebanese political system, and the largely Muslim camp, a revisionist coalition, sought to transform or overthrow that system."[7] This system for establishing authority and political power and privilege within the state apparatus has already been discussed in

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[5] Introduction, p. 13.
[6] Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1983, p. 45.
[7] Ibid.

the introduction to this thesis. Yet, the fact remains that even within the political "camps" there were individuals who disagreed more or less with their co-religionists and thus during the war, we can see actual cases of Christians fighting Christians and Muslims fighting Muslims. This factor further complicates a clear understanding of the many factions and fracturing of confessional communities which developed during this period. If one were to attempt to simplify the major objectives and concerns of many Lebanese during the first half of the 1970s, it may be said that issues centered around the national character of the country, i.e. what it means to be a Lebanese citizen, how key institutions might better reflect that character and how traditional structures, ways of thinking and behaving could be altered to suit a "new" Lebanon. Although these questions may seem removed from the incidents and problems ensuing in the country, they were the necessary questions to ask. Because these issues concerning the future and national character of Lebanon created controversy, crisis escalated throughout the country as any sense of stability within the country was broken down. Growing disputes arose over the sectarian character of the army (Christians comprising the majority), secularization of the work week with both Friday and Sunday needing to be recognized by all as sacred days, protests and strikes over fishing rights off the coast of Sidon (February 26, 1975), as well as the need to find an acceptable solution for the government - one which would be stable enough to reestablish some degree of peace, security and normalcy within the country. All of the above mentioned disputes are closely connected to dissatisfaction over how Christian/Muslim populations were to be recognized.

One of the major fears within Lebanon was the emerging trend towards a *de facto* partitioning of Lebanon into mini states based upon religious affiliation. This issue alone was to create greater rifts and breakdowns which would inevitably require foreign intervention. This state of affairs, with no stable government to produce order out of the chaos, allowed both Syria and Israel to pursue policies that were in their own interests while acting as "guardians" of various communities and militia groups. Rabinovich takes this argument of Syrian involvement in Lebanese politics one step further with his theory concerning Syrian foreign policy in Lebanon.[8] It is his contention that Syria, while continuing a close relationship with its Soviet ally, was desiring to strengthen its relationships with the United States and the oil-producing Arab countries. Syrian intervention in Lebanon would not only protect Syrian territorial interests but if she managed to solve the Lebanese crisis, would "demonstrate that Syria was the most effective Arab power in that part of the Middle East."[9] Syrian and Israeli influence over the political structure of Lebanon from the mid 1970s through the early 1980s, supporting politicians who would serve their interests, only created greater confusion as the Lebanese may have wondered who held actual power. It seems probable that Israel understood her own safeguarding and continued existence depended upon maintaining a foothold in Lebanese politics and a presence on Lebanese soil.

To demonstrate how the Israeli presence in south Lebanon raised the agitation of the Shi'i community in terms of social and political questions and helped foster fracture within its ranks, it would be most appropriate to consider the attitude of the most outstanding Shi'i figure of the time, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini towards the state

[8] Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, p. 48.

of Israel. Perhaps this will shed light upon the growing attitude, ranging from mistrust laced with tolerance to absolute disdain, amongst the Shi'a of Lebanon towards their southern neighbor. It should be noted that this fracturing of the community, and more particularly the declining membership within *AMAL*, is only partially a result of Israel's actions. To make it the qualifying issue would be to oversimplify the situation at the time. I did not include Khomeini's attitude toward Israel under the previous study concerning the influence of the Iranian revolution because it appeared to find a better explanation within the question of national security. Khomeini often expounded upon the idea of the state of Israel as embodying Satan and all that is evil. Many of his speeches were steeped in this type of rhetoric. He was able to drum up greater opposition to the Shah and his regime while in exile in Iraq by stating that the Shah was a mere puppet for Israeli/Western imperialism.[10] Khomeini continued by arguing that Iran's security depended upon safe borders and the Shah was permitting anti-Islamic influence to permeate a country which believed in the supremacy of the Islamic system. In conjunction with this call for greater security he issued *fatwās* demanding support for the Palestinian cause by all Muslims and proclaimed the Jewish state a parasite upon the lands of Islam.[11] In a speech delivered during the 'Āshūrā' celebrations on June 3, 1973 he was able to clearly illustrate his attitude about the Shah's connection with the enemy and Israel's desire to destroy Islam:

> Israel does not want the Koran to survive in this country. Israel, through its black agents, crushed the Faiziyyeh seminary. It crushes

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[9] Ibid.

[10] Halliday, in his book Iran: Dictatorship and Development devotes several pages to describing the relationship which the Pahlavi state established with the state of Israel. At times, the monarchy was seen as siding with the Arab cause, while it was in its own interests to work with the Israeli state at others. This is also true for the revolution in Iran later on.

[11] Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, p. 37.

> us. It crushes you, the nation. It desires to take over the economy. It desires to destroy our commerce and agriculture. It desires to seize the country's wealth.[12]

Khomeini foresaw the disunity of the Arab world grow with the union of the imperialistic Western powers and Israel. This disunity could harm Islam and weaken all nations of the region. In response to his fears he suggested there must be a complete return to the Qur'ān, a commitment to the principles and ideals of Islam, and a total unity of all Muslims, not merely the Shi'a.[13]

A similar call was being made in Lebanon where the Shi'a of the south, in particular, saw a real threat to the nation's security with an aggressive Israel sitting on its back porch. Musa al-Sadr incorporated the image of Israel as evil into his dialogue. Often his references to Israel were based upon a reinterpretation of Shi'i history where Yazīd, the caliph who was responsible for Ḥusayn's death, was equated with the Israeli menace.[14] This developing political language, coupled with the creation of more radical groups from the mainstream *AMAL*, depicted mistrust of Israeli ambitions after the invasion of 1982. This is the point at which Shi'i loyalties were placed in the hands of strictly Shi'i organizations[15]or those groups or nations pledging support, be it the Palestinians, Iran, Syria or other Muslim groups within Lebanon.

We will now return to the period prior to the Israeli Litani Operation beginning with Israel's policies for controlling the southern region of Lebanon in 1976 in the aftermath of the 1975-76 phase of civil disruption. This will provide us with the

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[12]Ibid., p. 29.
[13]Ibid., p. 37. A union of all Muslims may be considered unlikely since the Shi'a view themselves as a fraction of the Muslim population, with a very different approach to Islam. They, in fact, consider themselves privileged to be amongst the minority that is aligned with the *Ahl al-Bayt*.
[14] Nasr, "Mobilisation Communautaire et Symbolique Religieuse: L'Imam Sadr et les Chi'ites du Liban (1970-1975)", p. 134.

necessary background for understanding the varying Shi'i stances concerning the increased Israeli presence in their country and why many would alter their view of the PLO presence, regarding it with apprehension and sometimes anger. Since the late 1960s, the southern Shi'i villagers had been tolerating an armed Palestinian presence in their midst and by 1976 were being juggled between the interests of Palestinians, Israelis and Syrians while trying to carve out their own existence. The Shi'a of this region were to suffer heavy casualties as victims of the ongoing conflict between the Israeli and Palestinian forces as time progressed.[16] War, with all of its tragic results, contributed to Shi'i activism as one is forced to react in order to insure survival. The victimization of the south, as civilians found themselves increasingly confined to their homes and villages, forced Shi'i leaders to reinforce their demand for a national policy safeguarding Lebanon's borders from outside influence and invasion. This invasion, they felt, could emanate from the imperialist powers or from Israel. This call for national security had become part and parcel of the *Ḥarakat al-Maḥrumīn*'s Charter, as noted earlier.

By 1976 the "Red Line", a southern stretch of territory running inland from the coast to a midway point between Sidon and Tyre was established by mutual agreement between Syria and Israel.[17] The result was the Red Lines Agreement which permitted direct Syrian intervention, albeit regulated, with stipulations that would ensure Israeli

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[15] Norton, "Lebanon: The Internal Conflict and the Iranian Connection", p. 122.

[16] Cobban, "The Growth of Shi'i Power in Lebanon and Its Implications for the Future" in Shi'ism and Social Protest, eds. Juan R.I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 145. Additional information concerning the events mentioned hereafter may be found in Laurens, Le Grand Jeu. Orient Arabe et Rivalités Internationales depuis 1945.

[17] Cobban, Superpowers and the Syrian-Israeli Conflict, p. 20. Helena Cobban analyses this agreement in terms of Syrian and Israeli unwillingness to be dragged into a war against the other whether 1) out of fear

safety.[18] The three features of the agreement are the following: "Syria would not deploy ground-to-air missiles in Lebanon, the Syrian Air Force would not operate against Christian objectives in Lebanon, and the Syrian ground forces would not move south from Sidon to Mashghara (in eastern Lebanon)."[19] This agreement remained in tact through 1981 and was restored in Lebanon in 1985. Perhaps Israeli willingness to permit this obvious Syrian presence in Lebanon, albeit under some restrictions, was due to the fact that it was cognizant of its own military superiority in the region. It may also have embraced to some degree Syrian intervention in Lebanon since, until this point, Syria was fighting the Palestinian and Leftist forces within Lebanon, demonstrating greater resistance to the PLO presence and activity within the country. This opposition to the Left on the part of Syria is summed up in an excerpt from the Quarterly Economic Review:

> His [Assad's] aim is an enfeebled and pliable left in the face of a dependent right...Failing this, and indications are that his game might not pay off, Assad would probably favour a rightist state attached to Syria, a leftist mini-state, the annexation of the east and north, and some form of local administration in the buffer zone separating Syria from Israel in south Lebanon.[20]

Yet the area south of the Red Line, established by Israel to delineate its territory and region of influence, was bombarded by Israeli efforts to remove basic necessities from the southern markets. Due to this "blockade" foodstuffs, fuel and medical supplies were at a premium and the southern farmers and merchants were unable to export

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that the other might be militarily superior at a given point in time or 2) their involvement in other aspects of Lebanese politics could not afford them the time or resources for carrying on a war.

[18] Ibid., p. 21.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Quarterly Economic Review, 4th quarter 1976, p. 15.

products such as citrus and tobacco crops to traditional markets.[21] The impact of these measures did not soften the hearts of the southern villagers who saw few redeeming factors in the Israeli presence.

However, on June 24, 1976 Israel developed a new stance in terms of the southern villagers of Lebanon. For some time, the IDF(Israeli Defense Forces) had established relations with the Christian militias of the south, under the direction of Major Sa'ad Haddad. These troops received training across the border in Israel and this may have facilitated the "Good Fence" policy which created greater exchange between the southerners and the Israeli occupier.[22] The Israelis gave the impression that they were wanting to establish friendlier relations with the local population which was in need of assistance. They opened two new gates in the electronic border fence which permitted southerners access to special mobile medical clinics, to acquire basic supplies, and to earn some income by working as laborers on Israeli farms.[23] According to an entry in the Quarterly Economic Review, the "Good Fence Policy" was aimed at pacifying the southern population while those who have migrated have become the urban poor of Beirut constituting the majority of left-wing organizations' membership.[24] According to the report,

> The Israeli agricultural authorities have established a number

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[21] Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon, p. 158.

[22] Beate Hamizrachi, The Emergence of the South Lebanon Security Belt. Major Saad Haddad and the Ties with Israel, 1975-1978 (New York: Praeger, 1988), 62-67. An indepth look at the connection between the IDF and the Christian militias is provided in this section. The "Good Fence" policy is seen as developing out of this relationship.

[23] Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon, p. 158. This section of the book points out the connection between the opening of the "Good Fence" and the support of the Christian militias who received training in Israel. The author of the book notes that the new policy provided added dividends to Israel who was creating stronger relations with the southern Lebanese of all religions. Maronite militias would now be under the sway of Israeli desires in Lebanon.

[24] Quarterly Economic Review of Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus, 4th quarter 1976, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd., 1976), p. 12.

> of centres just inside Israeli territory in order to buy agricultural produce, mainly tobacco, and extend help and advice in pest control, veterinary medicine, and other fields. Concomitantly, the Israeli authorities have promoted the right-wing pocket in the south and have undertaken the arming and training of some units owing allegiance to the Imam Musa Sadr, the nominal leader of the Shiite community which preponderates in the area.[25]

In January 1977, Nabatiyya was the scene of strife between the Arab Defense Forces (ADF) under the leadership of Syria, and the Israelis. The ADF attempted to move into the area when the Israelis protested through their American supporters. The Syrians were forced to pull back and the area was incorporated into a free-fire zone. This pleased the Israelis who preferred the PLO presence to that of the Syrians, over whom they perhaps felt they had less of an advantage. This move was also significant in that it could not be separated from the politics of Beirut. With a change in the balance of military action in the south, the political climate of the capital would undergo change as well.[26]

By 1978, Israel was well established in the south. This presence greatly affected life in the south and forced the local population to respond. On March 11, 1978 eleven members of the *Fatah* organization, backed by the PLO, crossed the border into Israel where they hijacked a Haifa-bound bus and in the end 34 Israeli men, women and children were killed along with 74 wounded.[27] Six of the guerrilla fighters were found

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[25] Ibid.

[26] Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon, p. 159. Rabinovich describes what he terms the *renversement des alliances* - Syria's rapprochement with the PLO and the Lebanese left and its estrangement from the dominant groups in the Lebanese Front. He continues by stating "as has already been noted, Syria tried to distance itself from the embarrassment of its alliance with the conservative and essentially Maronite militias and from November 1977 drew closer to the PLO." Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, p. 110.

[27] Hamizrachi, The Emergence of the South Lebanon Security Belt, p. 163. The author continues by explaining the exact project the *Fatah* members had for themselves. Their original goal was to seize a hotel in Tel Aviv in order to negotiate the release of terrorists who were imprisoned in Israel. Amongst

dead as well. March 14th provided the Israelis with their moment for retaliation. They were able to determine that the terrorists had arrived from Lebanese territory so that the south of Lebanon became the selected location for an attack. The objective was the abolition of the PLO organization and its influence south of the Litani river. This stretch of land ran the length of 100km along the Israeli border and the depth of 10km inside Lebanon. According to one Israeli informant:

> Our intentions were to refrain as much as possible from harming the civilian population, to operate in a way which would insure a minimum of casualties to our forces, not to clash with the Syrian Army and to create a security belt in South Lebanon in cooperation with the Christian forces.[28]

According to Cobban, the total civilian casualties for the March 1978 invasion were estimated at 2000, while from 150-400 fighters of the PLO-leftist coalition and approximately 24 Israeli soldiers also died in the fighting.[29]

As stated earlier, it was the southern Lebanese, and more particularly the Shi'a who experienced the greatest loss of all:

> Hundreds of thousands of southern villagers fled northwards to escape the fighting. Many then found they had no homes to return to. A UN commission which visited south Lebanon shortly after the fighting found that in 100 southern villages, a total of 2500 houses had been completely destroyed, while twice that number were partially damaged. Throughout south Lebanon, roads and bridges had been devastated in the fighting; many orchards had been ploughed up by tanks or burnt by phosphorous shells; wells, water-pipes and electric lines lay broken and unusable.[30]

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these were Kozo Okamoto, a Japanese Red Army terrorist who participated in the May 1972 massacre at the Ben Gurion Airport. According to Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon, p. 161: This became an absolute embarrassment to the Likud government which promised the previous June to maintain an unflinching position against terrorism.

[28] Hamizrachi, The Emergence of the South Lebanon Security Belt, p. 165.

[29] Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon, p. 161.

[30] Ibid.

Over time the tide of support for the PLO was turning in the south against this organization and its Leftist allies. The Israelis managed to shock the Lebanese polity at the same time as it militarily broke down the PLO, at least temporarily. The increasing trouble of the PLO with the southern population is evidenced by the growing number of locals to cooperate with the Lebanese Front (a largely Christian organization made up of members from the various Christian communities), considered a foe to the Shi'a. According to the Quarterly Economic Review for this period, "An increasing number of demands have been made over the past three months for the Palestinians to leave the territory, and some Shiite leaders have joined forces with the Lebanese Front in the field of military activity."[31] It was estimated that a further quarter of a million refugees fled to Beirut and Sidon merely exacerbating the political situation, one embroiled in the crisis of sectarian confusion. The UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon) forces which had been deployed in the region to establish some order and security were sometimes successful in insulating the villages from the confrontation, and sometimes they were not. Violations by both Israelis and Palestinians were reported and the forces of Major Haddad were a very real factor in the unease of the area.[32] In fact, on April 18, 1979 Major Haddad proclaimed the southern enclave as the "State of Free Lebanon"[33] Through this action, however, effective control remained in the hands of the Israelis.

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[31] Quarterly Economic Review, no. 2 (1978), p. 6. The Lebanese Front is a Christian rightist coalition comprised of the National Liberals, the Phalange, former President Franjieh's clansmen, and the Maronie Monastic Orders. They were one in their opposition to the Palestinian presence in the country and in their call for a partition of the country. However, their unity could not be guaranteed, particularly in terms of any action against the Syrians. For more details, please see the Quarterly Economic Review, no. 2 (1978), pp. 11-12.

[32] Ibid., p. 175.

[33] Quarterly Economic Review, no. 3 (1979), p. 4.

UNIFIL's role seemed tenuous at this point as it was attacked by warring parties in Lebanon, and was neither embraced by the Israelis, the Palestinians nor the Syrians.[34]

One issue which was actually addressed, a thorn in the side of the greater Muslim community, was the creation of a new national army. One reason for the outbreak of the 1975-76 Civil War was the Lebanese Army had previously been composed mostly of Christian troops. Members of the various religious communities within Lebanon began to question the reorganization of this institution, without which Lebanon might never emerge from its crises. Parliament, in 1979, passed a law which reorganized the army and restructured its command. The head of state was to hold power over the army while a Military Council, consisting of six senior ranking officers from the major confessional communities, would serve over the divisions.[35] Problems would persist, however, because the army could still not remove itself from confessional suspicions by all parties, be they external to the country or not.

AMAL now entered a new phase in its own history as a movement. The Israeli and Palestinian ambitions to establish a strong foothold in Lebanon to solidify their own presence may have been perceived by the Shi'a as a form of exploitation. The institutions which the PLO had established earlier in the south were now fostering a growing resentment for the organization amongst the Shi'a. The Lebanese state itself had been unable to provide basic services to the inhabitants of the region and the PLO intervened. The local PLO commander was an adequate contact for receiving the previously unavailable goods and services. This dependence on the PLO, a group of

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[34] Originally sent to watch over the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon and to assist the Lebanese army in taking control, UNIFIL forces were eventually desired by the Lebanese government to act as full-fledged peace-keeping forces. The Palestinians and Lebanese left disagreed and thought that this status went beyond its mandate. Quarterly Economic Review, no. 3 (1978), p.5.

people who were originally "guests" in the area, caused resentment.[36] In addition to this AbuKhalil points out that the Shi'ites were using the Palestinians as scapegoats for their own problems: "their misery, their poverty , as well as the brutal Israeli raids on their villages, were blamed on the Palestinians."[37] The first visible indication of an attitude change towards the PLO presence came on March 12, 1980 when a skirmish broke out between the *AMAL* militia and the PLO-leftist alliance. Leaders of the two sides negotiated intensely in order to squelch the growing hostility. Their success was only temporary for fighting continued to break out in Beirut and the south. The damage had been done and reconciliation between the two sides dimmed. Another factor which contributed to increased Shi'a' mistrust for the PLO was the PLO leadership's refusal to support the Iranian, i.e. "Islamic", side in the Iran-Iraq War which broke out in 1980. This widened the rift between themselves and the Lebanese Shi'a.[38]

The Shi'ite majority in the south were anticipating Israel to again invade Lebanon, a possible solution to rid the south, and perhaps the country, of the PLO. The hope in the south was certainly not to replace one occupier by another. In fact, each side, whether Israeli or Palestinian, could potentially destroy what was left of the south and the Shi'i homeland. Although the Israelis and the forces of Major Haddad may be seen as aggressors, the Shi'a probably interpreted the Palestinian presence as provoking Israeli aggressiveness, producing a reaction amongst the southerners, quite different from that of 1978.

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[35] Quarterly Economic Review, no. 3 (1979), p. 5.
[36] Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon, p. 175.
[37] Abu Khalil, "Druze, Sunni and Shiite Political Leadership in Present-day Lebanon", p. 47. The text continues by outlining much of the corruption rampant in the PLO organization. Relations between *Fatah* and *Amal* are also illustrated.
[38] Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon, p. 176.

On June 6, 1982, Israel did invade Lebanon when they passed through UNIFIL's lines in the direction of Tyre, Nabatiyya and the southern Bekaa. The desire was to break the PLO and leftist forces' lines of communication in the south in order to expel them from Lebanon. By moving in a northward direction towards Beirut they would be able to achieve their goal. The Israeli leapfrog strategy was dependent upon the welcome they would receive from the south Lebanese villages. They were hopeful that they would have a certain degree of support from the local population, as they recognized the changing attitude towards the Palestinians within the southern regions, quite different from the attitude in 1978.[39] A significant reason for the Israeli invasion was not only to rid Lebanon of the PLO, both in terms of its physical presence and its influence, but also to create a stable governing force in the country which would be headed by "the Christians."[40] This force would be led by Bashir Gemayel, the Phalangist commander of the Lebanese Forces, who wished to become President of Lebanon in a climate of reduced Muslim power. He saw this reduction as a result of an eventual expulsion of the PLO by Israel's forces. This, however, was not to be. The significance of the Israeli desire for Christian hegemony in Lebanon may have been tied to a desire for 1) a close ally in power and 2) maintaining some control over the nation's affairs.

Until this point, much of what has been described has been the southern Shi'i response to the Israeli-Palestinian presence in the area. It was earlier suggested that the Shi'a of Beirut's suburbs were increasing in number as refugees sought shelter from the

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[39] Ibid., p. 181. The 1978 invasion of the south was ill-received by the majority of Lebanon's southern inhabitants. They were doubtful as to the changes which would occur in their communities, knowing that the Israeli's intention was not necessarily to improve the southerner's predicament vis-a-vis themselves or the PLO. For further information concerning the 1982 Israeli invasion see Rashid Khalidi, Under Seige: P.L.O. Decisionmaking During the 1982 War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

[40] Bailey, "Lebanon's Shi'is After the 1982 War," p. 219.

war in the south. However, this most recent invasion appeared to contribute to the growing shaky communal balance of Beirut. These Shi'a of the suburbs were mostly first or second generation immigrants to the city. They had established new ties in the city which were quite different from the predominant southern relationship between landowner and peasant.[41] Not only had they lived through or escaped the horrors of what was occurring in the south, they, too, found themselves frustrated over such issues as living conditions, access to certain jobs and political inferiority. They were increasingly exposed to new ideologies and experiences as well as all of the challenges that accompany life in the city.

In addition to the newness of Beirut lies the deeper issue of human loss. Here is an uprooted population that has known no peace during the past seven years and most probably is unable to shake off the horrors of war and occupation. According to statistics given by the UN Higher Council for Refugees since 1978, "3,000 families have lost their breadwinners, 8,000 people have been maimed, 11,000 orphaned, 5,000 wounded and 1,000 killed. Some villages are now ghost towns and some of the larger towns, such as Bint Jbeil, have lost 50% of their population."[42] In addition to this uprooted population coping with loss of village, family and those responsible for both, the previously settled Shi'ites of the city would perhaps have said that their greatest visible human enemy at the time were the Maronite militias which were backed by Israel. Many of the established suburban Shi'a had previously possessed homes in the eastern suburbs of the city from which they found themselves expelled by the Maronite militias in 1976. The anger towards Israel's destructive tactics, along with those of its

[41] Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon, p. 184.

Christian allies, particularly the Phalange movement, combined with *AMAL*'s mistrust, as part of the predominantly Muslim population of West Beirut, towards the PLO and leftist organizations.[43]

A heightened sense of political frustration was capitalized upon by the Shi'i religious leaders. Moreover, the economic toll that the Israeli presence, both the invasion and the occupation, exacted from the Lebanese economy was devastating. By the end of August 1982, the losses had reached $4 billion.[44] In addition to this:

> All business activity in West Beirut virtually stopped for three months, the airport was closed, and closure of other major trade routes such as those with Syria resulted in serious losses for those dependent on import-export trade. Meanwhile, the Israelis dumped their goods on the Lebanese market, especially agricultural products. This dumping injured the small traders. Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan refused to import fruits and vegetables from Lebanon for fear that they were actually Israeli goods.[45]

The period from 1982-1984 was dramatic for *AMAL* and its Shi'i supporters in terms of its domestic political activity. By August 30, 1982 the PLO evacuation of approximately 7,750 PLO fighters from Beirut, marked a victory of sorts for the Israeli camp in terms of negotiations. Their evacuation was secured through an agreement that Israel would allow a three nation multinational force (MNF) to stand by in West Beirut during the evacuation. This presence by the MNF was to serve as a symbol of "protection" over the PLO fighters as they prepared for departure from the capital.

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[42] Quarterly Economic Review, no. 2 (1981), p. 4.

[43] Quarterly Economic Review, no.1 (1982), p. 6. Amal and its Shi'i supporters were being forced to respond according to the events of the times, mainly the Iran-Iraq war which pitted Muslims against Muslims.

[44] Deeb, Militant Islamic Movements in Lebanon, p. 3.

[45] Extracted from Deeb's Militant Islamic Movements in Lebanon, p. 3. The author continues by illustrating the economic respite which Beirut and the northern areas experienced, thus creating an economic rift with the south. The growth of militant Islamic movements is further analyzed.

Bachir Gemayel, the President elect who stirred Muslim fears of a return to the status quo form of government, never survived to begin implementing his own policies. On September 14, 1982 he was assassinated in a bomb blast that devastated the Phalange headquarters in East Beirut. It is uncertain who actually killed Gemayel, since many groups, be they Palestinian, Syrian, Muslim or even Israeli, had reasons to eliminate him from Lebanese politics.[46] Perhaps it is in response to this assassination that the Israeli's made their way back into Beirut within hours of the bomb blast. The reason the Israeli's gave for their actions was to prevent the breakdown of law and order in the Muslim sector of the city while rooting out any PLO fighters who had avoided the evacuation.[47] A thorough "search" of three camps took place; Bourj al-Brajeeh, Sabra and Shatila. The first was searched by the Lebanese army while the remaining two were left to Bachir Gemayel's Phalange militia. Instead of simply looking for those fighters who may have avoided evacuation, the searches turned into massacres of innocent refugees. The horror of these three massacres had reverberations around the world as the guilty parties were being sought out. The significance of this event for the Shi'a is the ever encroaching presence of the Israelis in Lebanon as they continually effect the political and social climate of the country.

The last three months of 1982 were characterized by relative calm in Beirut, factional fighting in the north and in the mountains, and slow negotiations whose objective was the withdrawal of foreign troops. Syria made it known at this time that it was prepared to withdraw its own troops from Lebanon as soon as the Israelis committed themselves to the same promise. Despite the increased awareness amongst

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[46] Quarterly Economic Review, no. 4 (1982), p. 11.

the Lebanese, from 1975 on, that social and political crises festered due to communal intransigence and non-cooperation, no solution had been found to the inter and intra-communal fighting running rampant in Lebanon. The government of Amin Gemayel, Bachir's brother and successor as President, was unable to rid his country of foreign intervention and intrusion into the nation's political and military arenas. These facts would therefore help in the erosion of *AMAL*'s influence and authority as its membership would disperse to other groups looking for new solutions to current dilemmas after the events of 1982.

The apparent lack of political effectiveness by *AMAL* in the spheres of national politics and domestic security caused the organization to lose some of its support to the more extreme factions within the community , or what Mitchell calls the "conservative radicals." Clashes between *AMAL* and *Hezbollah* and the increased terrorist activity of *Hezbollah* and *Islamic AMAL* would win converts to these more "conservative radical" movements since victory is often an attractive lure. The primary issues of the day for the *AMAL* movement were centered around three questions; its own involvement in the government, discovering a common operating ground with Syria prevalent in the picture, and the desired goal of deliverance from the Israeli occupation.[48] These concerns would be the prominent ones for *AMAL* during the period studied by this thesis as it began to experience declining influence, authority and membership after 1982 with the evolving political, social and religious attitudes within the Shi'i community.

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[47] Ibid.

[48] Bailey, "Lebanon's Shi'is After the 1982 War,"p. 221. The pages which follow include precise details of *Amal*'s concerns vis-a-vis their own participation in the government and their concerns over Syria's wishes for Lebanon. Both questions raise the issue of *Amal*'s politics and policies versus those of the more extremist parties amongst the Shi'a. However, it is not the focus of this paper to analyze these significant yet unrelated issues to this topic.

In 1983 it was demonstrated how divided the country remained over issues concerning the continuing confessional nature of some of Lebanon's major institutions - the government and army being primary examples. By 1984, Muslim, and more specifically Shi'i concerns became evident within the political and social dimensions of Lebanese life. Amin Gemayel's[49] government survived, it seems, only through Israeli control of Beirut and the support of Muslims who may have feared further persecution of the Muslim communities.[50] As long as he held this support he neglected to conciliate Lebanese Muslims despite their important political role within the country, as they benefited from Syrian support, and their demographic superiority.[51] Former Shi'i demands under the direction of Musa al-Sadr and the Supreme Islamic Shi'i Council were now amongst the requirements set by the community if the present government wished its support; reform of the governmental structure, national unity and security. The failure to reach an agreement at the Reconciliation Talks in Lausanne[52] from March 12-20, 1984, may have been due to the inability of the Muslim opposition, led by Nabih Birri (the leader of *AMAL*) and Walid Jumblatt (leader for the Druze), to present itself as a single united front.

Nabih Birri, having joined the *Harakat al-Maḥrumīn* in the early 1970s when Musa al-Sadr was its leader, became quite active within the organization by becoming a member of *AMAL*'s Politburo and on April 25, 1980 becoming president of its

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[49] Amin succeeded his brother, Bachir, as President after Bachir was assassinated.
[50] Quarterly Economic Review, no. 4 (1982), p. 12.
[51] Quarterly Economic Review, no. 2 (1984), p. 6.
[52] Ibid., p. 7. The various goals set by the participants at the Lausanne Conference included : 1) the achievement of a guaranteed ceasefire, 2) the formulation and implementation of steps towards unification, 3) an agreement on reform and 4) the formation of a government of national unity. The gulf which continued to divide Christians and Muslims and prevent them from negotiating critical issues is demonstrated here.

Command Council. It is interesting to note that in the 1960s Birri was a member of the pro-Syrian wing of the Ba'ath Party in Lebanon, one of the important early rivals to the *Ḥarakat al-Maḥrumīn* for Shi'i membership. Perhaps this had an impact upon his allegiance to Syria and the fact that *AMAL* does not hide its support for Syrian intervention in Lebanon. It was earlier stated that much of *AMAL*'s leadership, since the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr in Libya and his successor Husain al-Husaini, has been drawn from the emerging middle class. Nabih Birri is, himself, not an individual whose family traditionally enjoyed political privilege as they were not members of the *zu'āma*. He "is an easy man to underestimate"[53] and a model for others of the middle class. Any insecurities Birri may have concerning his abilities in the political ring, Norton states, "have bred an impressive instinct for survival."[54] Birri has suffered from intracommunal challenges to his leadership particularly in late 1982-1983.[55] One such individual to pose a challenge was the Mufti Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din who depicted himself as the leader of a legitimate institution, the chair of the SISC, while his competition, he claimed, was "the leader of a militia group, activists who wield guns and little else."[56] Birri's constituency at the time was in the streets while Shams al-Din's was with the Shi'i establishment.[57]

Birri's political views show a trend towards moderation in terms of foreign alliances and the political and social position he seeks for the Shi'a. He clearly establishes the goals he holds for his community in a language which demonstrates his willingness to discuss issues and negotiate terms. Gone is the religious symbolism and

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[53] Norton, Amal and the Shi'a, p. 91.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid., pp.91-93.
[56] Ibid.

references to Shi'i history which were so much employed by the previous leaders of the movement. Birri's goals may be summarized as follows:

> As leader of Amal, I was intent on increasing the power of the Shi'ite community, which is the largest sect in Lebanon but was the least powerful. However now, as Speaker of Parliament, I wish to form a more united Lebanon with the many sects sharing power proportionate to their populations. I seek to eliminate confessionalism under which senior government jobs are distributed along religious lines.
>
> In regards to Israel, I have always been a moderate who wishes for the freedom of the Palestinians but will not sacrifice too much Lebanese blood to obtain this freedom. My main objective is to remove Israel from its nine mile wide security zone in South Lebanon.
>
> Because of Syria's backing of Amal during the late 1980s, I push for closer ties between Lebanon and Syria and consider Syria as Lebanon's closest ally. Only if Israel makes peace with Syria will I push for Lebanese peace with Israel.[58]

Both opposition leaders, Jumblatt and Birri, in the March 1984 discussions called for an end to Maronite domination of the higher levels of the civil service and army, new presidential elections within six months and constitutional reforms which would give greater power to the Muslim communities.[59] The deadlock in discussions partially occurred because of the Christian refusal to concede Muslim demands for such reforms. The Phalange preferred a loose federal system while the Shi'a emphasized the need to remove religion from the system. The two Sunni Muslim leaders, Saeb Salam and Rashid Karameh, took a middle position on these issues.[60] With the Conference's end on March 20th no firm agreement had been reached. The only developments were the realization that there needed to be greater Muslim representation at all levels of

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[57] Ibid., p. 93.

[58] Excerpt taken off the internet entry Lebanese Politicians whose last changes were made August 4, 1997.

government. It was recognized that the communal balance had changed since the census of 1932 and since the National Charter had been drawn up specifying which communities would hold what offices. In return, the Muslims recognized the feelings of fear and insecurity within the Christian community. As a minority community their sentiments should be recognized and fear relieved where possible.[61] This very fact leads us to question who should determine the degree of relief granted.

Since 1982 the attitudes of the Shi'a, and more particularly *AMAL*, have altered towards the Israeli presence in Lebanon. Although the southern Shi'a and *AMAL*-south once looked upon the Israeli presence as a "savior" for south Lebanon's eventual independence, they rapidly withdrew from this opinion. Any previous semi-amiable relations which had been established with Israeli soldiers were converted by suspicion. During the occupation period of the early 1980s, many southern Shi'a welcomed the Israelis since they believed they might gain financially from the exchanges which would be set up with Israel and the overriding belief that Israel only meant to stay for a period of three or four months and then retreat back to home territory.[62] This change of attitude is well illustrated by the following passage in the May 20, 1984 issue of the Quarterly Economic Review:

> The Israelis have decided to persuade the majority of the Shi'ite population in southern Lebanon to establish militias which will undertake to keep the PLO out of the area and thus prevent guerrilla attacks against Israel across its northern border. It is doubtful that they can succeed in doing this since, although Shi'as had welcomed the Israeli's as liberators from the PLO at the outset of the Israeli invasion in June 1982, they have come to hate them since

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[59] Quarterly Economic Review, no. 2 (1984), p. 8.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Bailey, "Lebanon's Shi'is after the 1982 War,"p. 230.

> Israeli security arrangements have seriously disrupted life in the south.[63]

The leadership of *AMAL*, during the early 1980s, although unsure of the intentions behind the Israeli activity in the south, soon realized that Israel had no intentions of leaving Lebanese soil very quickly.[64] Israel appointed civilian governors, increased the number of its troops, and imported Israeli goods into Lebanon which outstripped the Lebanese market. It was thought that Israel may actually be coveting the waters of the Litani, an idea suggested for some time. It may also have desired to pass the south off to its Christian allies for governance.[65] None of these options were attractive to the *AMAL* organization which was experiencing a decline in its prestige and influence. The more "conservative radical" organizations continued to employ Shi'i themes and symbolism which contributed to their popularity and membership as well as attracting attention to themselves, their ideology, programs and agenda. At the same time, *AMAL* was more moderate in its approach to the political questions of the day, only desiring to reform policies and procedures in order to opt into the confessional republic, rather than to overhaul it.

Although much had been happening during 1984 between various militia groups and Syrian-Israeli intervention, the landmark affair of 1984 in terms of Lebanon's national political dialogue may have been the June 12th commitment on the part of Mr. Rashid Karameh's government to represent all of Lebanon's communities.[66] Three major points were stressed which appeared as steps towards national unity: 1)to effect political and administrative reforms leading to a more equitable balance of power

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[63] Quarterly Economic Review, no.2 (1984), p. 11.
[64] Ibid., p. 231.

between Christians and Muslims,2) to provide security for all citizens of Lebanon, and 3)to obtain an Israeli withdrawal from the south.[67] These points for eventual reform coincide well with the very issues that the *Maḥrumīn* movement was inaugurating into Lebanese politics a decade before. This signaled the possibility of a breakthrough for Shi'i politics in Lebanon, although the moderate attitude and approach of *AMAL's* leadership distressed those who feared that that very leadership would make too many concessions beneficial to the other communities.

What some in the community considered a further success, although many could interpret the victory as one for the Christian community, was the Bikfaya Agreement of June 18, 1984. This agreement, under the influence of Syrian direction, was a compromise over the issue of the army. The post of Commander in Chief was to continue in the hands of the Maronites while a multi-confessional military command council, comprised of six, would be responsible for appointments at brigade and divisional levels.[68] As further concession to the Muslims, the Agreement provided for the establishment of a new national intelligence agency, to be headed by a Shi'a. However, this body would be independent of the already existing Maronite commanded military intelligence agency.[69]

A new atmosphere of unity, the project of many individual Lebanese over the years, was not to arrive as there seemed to be no way around the omnipresent issue of confessionalism at the base of all major Lebanese institutions. The moderate, seemingly

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[65] Ibid.
[66] Quarterly Economic Review, no. 3 (1984), p. 7.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.

non-confrontational attitude of *AMAL*'s leadership would create dissension and rifts within the community as individuals continued to seek answers to the community's difficult political and social dilemmas.

In conclusion, both the Iranian revolution and the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon instilled within the Shi'a of Lebanon greater political awareness and action. Although both of these events were to contribute to the eventual split within *AMAL*, between the more moderate and the more radical factions, the Shi'i community benefited from the activity of its leadership during the two previous decades. Despite the apparent waning of influence which the *AMAL* organization maintained over the Shi'i population, the Shi'a as a whole grew in their self-awareness and self-esteem over these years.

Certain groups within the community continued to employ traditional Shi'i motifs, themes and rhetoric. *AMAL*, however, after the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr, developed alternative means for arousing its members to action. Its leadership was more diversified in terms of religious background and experience than it had been a decade before. Will the legacy of increased Shi'i political awareness and activism stemming from the 1960s and 1970s create the need within the community to unite while modifying and adapting itself to the socio-political conditions of the times or will the different groups within the community function as separate entities, pursuing their own separate goals and agendas?

Conclusion

The objective of this work has been to demonstrate the intimate connection between religion and politics for the Shi'a of Lebanon and how this may be reflected in the policies and programs of the *AMAL* movement. Since my own personal interest in this question runs deep concerning the degree to which politics and religion mesh, perhaps this is the reason for choosing to look at the Shi'a of Lebanon as they continue with this "struggle" between the spiritual and the temporal. This is not to diminish or neglect the fact that the other confessional communities of Lebanon certainly had their own cares and grievances. It merely seemed to me that the majority of the Shi'a within the country saw themselves as the recipients of the outfall of the old confessional system for which their tolerance was dwindling and from which certain leaders within the community benefited for creating change.

One reason which renders it difficult to speak of the Shi'i community is precisely that it is made up of individuals with varied experiences and visions for themselves. The community, both before and throughout the period studied, was not strictly unified nor did its members necessarily have parallel demands. They were and continue to be quite varied in terms of their political views, economic status, degree of religiosity and devotion to the dogmas of the faith, etc. I asked a friend to ponder questions which she might ask of me concerning the Shi'a of Lebanon and her first question struck me most: "What do the Shi'a stand for?" I thought about her question and realized that before commencing to answer it one would have to clarify everything and you would proceed

with the idea that the Shi'a are not one people but many. They stand for much of what the other members of the human race as a whole stand for and the basic rights which leaders throughout history have defended: dignity, justice, opportunities for personal and professional growth, security and a sense of brotherhood, for we all share the same world. I would then proceed to answer what *AMAL* attempted, and continues to attempt, as the first real representatives for the Shi'i community in Lebanon: political significance, territorial security, a sense of national unity, economic and social participation, a more equal distribution of goods and services, and access to civil service positions based upon merit, not religious affiliation. The demands are essentially anti-confessional in nature although the leaders of the Shi'a were asking for a revised system of government with their current, factual population to be considered rather than the numbers which date back to the 1932 census.

AMAL's growing appeal from its debut as the *Ḥarakat al-Muḥrumīn* movement to the critical year of 1984 is reflected in its growing membership. Although *AMAL* vied with other parties and organizations for this membership within the Shi'i community, organizations such as the Lebanese Communist Party, the Communist Action Organization, the Arab Liberation Front, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Arab Nationalist Movement, and the pro-Iraqi and pro-Syrian branches of the Ba'ath party amongst others,[1] it held an appeal and attraction which gave it the proper footing for its own growth and development.

One primary reason for its success amongst a portion of the Lebanese population was the fact that it began as a movement supported by a number of the religious clerics

[1] Norton, Amal and the Shi'a, p. 37.

within the community. The influence of these individuals both within the mosques and in the streets gave *AMAL* a certain aura of authority and sensitivity which set it apart from other groups contending for Shi'a membership. With the gradual demise of the *zu'āma* from a position of authority over the social and political life of the community, *AMAL* filled the void as representatives for many in terms of their political, economic and social concerns. With the rise of the middle class in Lebanon, a class separated from the traditional hierarchy (the zu'āma) and the peasants, a new group of individuals with new direction for the community assumed the leadership of the *AMAL* movement and has been continually molding itself to the times and predicaments of the country. This middle class leadership has been working itself more into the governing system, trying to create change from within. On the one hand, this moderate approach has allowed *AMAL* and its representatives a voice which is able to negotiate and compromise on issues of importance to the community while at the same time it has helped initiate a split which was earlier based on disharmony over the nature of a future Lebanese government (should it be based upon an Islamic system or not?) and now concerns more sweeping issues of national security, the provision of goods and services to those in need as well as *AMAL*'s ties to the Assad regime in Syria (which other organizations see as Syria's attempt to achieve a range of policy objectives in Lebanon).[2]

Another factor in the early appeal of the *AMAL* movement was its development of a particular vocabulary and language which seemed to speak to many amongst the Shi'i population. This language, which this author believes was consciously selected

[2] A. Nizar Hamzeh, "Lebanon's Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation",

and employed, reinforced Shi'ism's past in Islamic history while reworking it into the political context of 1960s-1970s Lebanon. The vocabulary spoke to the religio-political context of the modern world through such key issues as social justice, martyrdom, integrity on the part of the ruling officials and an improved social conscience both towards and on the part of the underprivileged. This language and the allusions to Shi'ism's past in Islamic history assisted the SISC in creating support for its goals and working towards a "reawakening" of a Shi'i consciousness and activism. Islam, and more specifically Shi'i Islam, was used in the early period of the movement as a mobilizing agent. Religion, both in terms of doctrine and language, was a factor in the "Shi'a awakening." This factor, along with the aforementioned early ties with the Shi'i clergy, was one which appealed to those within the community who may have seen religion as the only viable solution to the ills present in Lebanese society.

The fact that the *AMAL* movement demonstrated interest in the parallel plights and causes of other groups who felt isolated from policies and programs of the government contributed to the attraction of *AMAL* for politically and socially minded Shi'a. It was not a movement specifying itself as uniquely Shi'i in nature. In fact, as stated earlier in this work, it claimed that its aims were to better the predicament of all the deprived of Lebanon without regard for religious affiliation. *AMAL*'s early leaders were cognizant of the reality of religious cohabitation within the country and the importance of "keeping the peace" with their Sunni and Christian neighbors. Themes which were to become part of their rhetoric were applicable to poor and neglected people of all communities. However, it should be recognized that although *AMAL* did

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Third World Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 2, 1993, p. 2. This version utilized was extracted from the internet.

not claim to be strictly Shi'i in its views and towards the people to whom it was extending itself, it was able to pinpoint problems within the greater Lebanese community which seemed to inflict the Shi'a as its main victims.

The charismatic leadership of Musa al-Sadr and his supporters in the SISC may also have contributed to the appeal of *AMAL*. Al-Sadr seemed quite accessible to the people and that the lifestyle he chose to adopt was in line with a leader looking for support from the masses. Whether or not the moves and precautions taken for winning mass support by al-Sadr were calculated or not is difficult to determine. Where his intentions lay on the scale of the altruistic to the egotistic we also may never fully comprehend, since his disappearance offers us an incomplete picture of the man. But he did offer the people of his community new hope for the future as he spoke of improving their status and station in terms of the entire Lebanese community. It should also be stated that Musa al-Sadr built a movement which spoke for and supported his flock where no movement had existed before. Just by the simple fact that it was new and original seems to have held appeal. The option of associating with his movement was linked to associating more readily with a Shi'i supported movement with a prominent religious figure at its head.

One final aspect of *AMAL*'s original appeal for the people of all confessions was its advocacy for national unity or the prominence of a "Lebanonism" in the political rhetoric of the modern times. Understanding where discontent and animosity arose over the structuring of the government, the leadership within *AMAL* quickly adopted the notion of national unity in order to unburden the country of its dependence upon confessionalism, vestiges of an antiquated past and, it should be stressed, one where

Shi'i participation was limited. Whether or not this "national unity" could actually be achieved in a country where internal split along confessional lines and where various communities benefit from the external support of others, remains to be seen. But this aspect of *AMAL*'s early agenda helped the members of the Shi'i community begin to rally around a movement which appeared to be forward looking rather than remaining accepting of the status quo and quiescent.

I would like to terminate with a brief glimpse at *AMAL* since 1984 in terms of its leadership, goals and objectives, external competition and membership, and other confessional communities. To predict what the future may hold for the Lebanese Shi'i community would be presumptuous. Yet by observing and analyzing *AMAL*'s development over the past two and a half decades of its existence we may see how the Shi'a are modifying in terms of religion, politics and people in order to maintain their new-found presence on the political stage of Lebanon.

The modern leadership of the *AMAL* movement now lies in the hands of the middle class. Authority is no longer in the hands of the Shi'i religious leaders and the long-lasting influence of the *zu'āma* has been greatly reduced. The implications of this change in authority have been great. This new leadership, some of whom have attended universities, lived abroad, and have been exposed to new ideas, philosophies and cultures, are emphasizing the need for a restructuring of Lebanon with an improved use of indigenous resources and human potential.

Along with this new leadership is the move from Islam functioning as a mobilizing factor for the people to its serving as a point of identification for a large, diverse group. However, the fact that *AMAL*'s leadership is derived from the middle

class begs the question concerning the "moderate stance" issue: is it precisely for this reason that *AMAL* can afford to be moderate in its approach to Lebanese politics? It would seem that the issues which concern the middle class may not be congruous with those which concern the other classes within the same community. Questions surrounding financial/economic issues, territorial disputes, the distribution of goods and services would have a differing import between the varying social classes, even those within the same community and organization. This "middle class consciousness" may be one reason for the splintering within *AMAL* and the attraction of its members to other organizations and movements.

The *AMAL* movement was created in order to achieve certain goals and objectives for the "disinherited" of Lebanon. Under the leadership of Musa al-Sadr and the SISC these objectives became part of an agenda which included; the move towards national unity rather than confessionalism, the protection of borders and a sense of national security, a more equal distribution of political and civil service posts according to merit rather than religious adherence, an increase in the number of seats allotted the Shi'a in parliament which would correlate with the growth in their own population and the equal distribution of goods and services to the south (a region neglected by the former authorities and political bosses). With the change in *AMAL*'s leadership have we witnessed a change in this agenda? I would argue that Nabih Birri and his allies have not profoundly altered the original objectives of the movement and have reiterated their commitment to these goals, in part because the issues have not truly changed since the time of Musa al-Sadr. In a statement by Nabih Birri [3] he reaffirms his intent to increase

[3] Ayman Ghazi, "Lebanese Politicians", internet, 1997, p. 2.

the power of the Shi'ite community, his desire to form a more united Lebanon with the religious sects sharing power proportionate to their populations and eliminate confessionalism, and his security objective to remove Israel from its nine mile-wide security zone in south Lebanon. Nabih Birri probably would not have come into conflict with Musa al-Sadr over his alliance with Syria as they both sought Syrian support for achieving their political objectives. However, this dependence upon Syria is an issue fostering greater tension between *AMAL* and its rivals for power. Gone is *AMAL*'s religious rhetoric and dependence upon religious symbolism and motifs which helped create a political awareness and gave the early leaders and their causes some legitimacy amongst the people.

In terms of looking at *AMAL*'s stature within the Shi'ite community since 1984, one cannot separate the issues of its dwindling membership and the rise of competitors to this organization. In this study, we have seen that prior to 1984, *AMAL*'s membership was growing as it became a viable force for representing the Shi'i voice within Lebanese politics. Its presence on the political stage was gaining visibility as more than a decade passed. However, *AMAL* witnessed its membership deserting the organization with the emergence of rival parties serving as serious competition. This fluctuation in party membership is analyzed by Augustus Norton as reflecting the fluidity and loose articulation of Shi'i politics in general as the people affiliate themselves with a movement based more on emotion than necessarily solid political ideas:

> Membership is all too frequently a political state of mind- a sense of affiliation - rather than a statement of formal affiliation. The newly politicized - angry, frustrated, and discontented with their circumstances - shift from one

> movement to another, blown by the winds of rhetoric and demagoguery. Shi'i politics are fluid and loosely articulated, and the movements competing for Shi'i members constitute a cabalistic collection that is as hard to penetrate analytically as it is to describe.[4]

The competition facing *AMAL* in the latter part of the 1990s seems to be ideologically quite different from the competition of the mid 1980s, although many of the organizations and their leadership have remained. This competition in the 90s seems to be looking at the larger society in which it functions in a more practical manner. In other words, organizations such as *Ḥizbullāh* and *Islamic AMAL* are functioning and thriving under many of the same personalities as in the 1980s, yet their doctrines, agendas and approaches for bringing about change have altered. Where *AMAL* was earlier criticized by its rivals as not striving for the integration of Lebanon into a greater Islamic state where the Sharī'a and the governance of the religious jurists should be supreme, these organizations are no longer looking to establish an Islamic Republic in Lebanon, but a greater integration of the Shi'a into the political system of the nation. Sheikh Muḥammad Ḥusayn Fadlallah, claiming to be the spiritual guide of *Ḥizbullāh*, no longer looks to abolish the Lebanese political system but to cooperate with it. He has also supported a dialogue with the Christians, including the Maronites, where Muslims and Christians may discuss their shared values and where these values may support a new type of politics for the country.[5] Officials within *Ḥizbullāh* have also become advocates of a nonconfessional system of governing, although the characteristics of that system are open for debate.[6] *Ḥizbullāh* has recently been participating in the Lebanese

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[4] Norton, Amal and the Shi'a, p. 101.
[5] Hamzeh, "Lebanon's Hizbullah", p. 4.
[6] Ibid.

parliamentary elections because "it is important for the party to be represented in the Lebanese parliament in order to contribute to the elimination of political confessionalism which is the party's goal."[7]

The services which *Ḥizbullāh* is providing to the Lebanese community are a great boost to its reputation and thus continues to increase its popularity: centers for education, radio and television stations, publications, along with the provision of social services ranging from medical care to financial aid, housing and public utilities.[8] These services which are so visible within the community only serve to augment *Ḥizbullāh*'s influence and prestige as those who utilize its services view it as an organization working for them. *AMAL* is being challenged in part because these welfare services improve the daily life of the individual with direct, observable results. Its own popularity may be declining in direct proportion to the increase in the popularity of its competitors as they aim to serve at the populist levels. However, an important fact to be conscious of is that organizations in the political realm generally do not survive their founders unless they become either extremely ideological with a hard core following or they become ingrained as mass organizations with a life of their own. Therefore the question remains whether either *AMAL* or *Ḥizbullah* have transcended their origins and where their future as political representatives of the Shi'a will move them.

Finally, *AMAL*'s relationship with the other confessional communities of Lebanon does not appear to have altered much from its position in the mid 1980s. In terms of the Sunnis, Nabih Birri pushes for the political survival of his own Shi'ite

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[7] Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah's interview in al-Shira, 13 July 1992. Found in Hamzeh, "Lebanon's Hizbullah", pp. 4-5.

[8] Hamzeh, "Lebanon's Hizbullah", pp. 6-7.

community thus having a direct effect upon his relation with the former. His efforts to eliminate confessionalism from the government may not be popular to the Sunni who are conscious of the numerical superiority of the Shi'a, a recognition of which could greatly reduce their own power. As for *AMAL*'s relationship with the Christian communities, particularly the Maronites, tension continues as Nabih Birri adheres to the deconfessionalization philosophy (while recognizing the real fears of the Christians acting as a minority in a land which has a Muslim majority), allying with Syria in terms of political and military questions, and the cool reception it gives Israel as it refuses to withdraw from its security zone in south Lebanon. It is quite difficult to determine whether Musa al-Sadr's dream of national unity will be achieved anytime in the near future as inter and intra-communal tensions persist.

It will be fascinating to observe the developments in this community and whether religion will play an increased or decreased role. Shi'ism is now being noticed the world over, permitting a large number of individuals greater awareness and identity, since the events of the late 1970s. The new generation of Lebanese Shi'a live in a world where the religious and the political realms merge regularly over daily issues. The two philosophies and ways of life cannot be separated in this society where religions must cohabit in a single, small territory. It will be the task of the Shi'a youth to determine to what degree these two realms must coexist and where it is intelligent, for the sake of the community's growth, for the two to remain separate.

Appendix

The following list of the "Shi'a Demands" has been adopted from the article by Thom Sicking, S.J. and Dr Shereen Khairallah, "The Shi'a Awakening in Lebanon: A Search for Radical Change in a Traditional Way," in CEMAM Reports, vol. 2 (1974), pp. 103-106.

DOCUMENTATION: SHI'A DEMANDS

"Because of our faith in the dignity of man, and our refusal of oppression, ignorance, negligence, and all that contradicts that dignity;

Because of our loyalty to our fatherland, Lebanon, the land open to all men, land of love, where all can live in harmony with respect for the dignity of each;

Because of our belief that justice is the foundation on which nations rise and by which they endure, especially nations like Lebanon whose greatest asset is its human resources;

The Supreme Islamic Shi'a Council considers that the present situation in Lebanon clashes with the aspirations of its citizens and the hopes they have been building up for a proper life and dignity, living, as they do, in a present full of anxiety and facing a threatening future.

In searching out the reasons for this, we find that deprivation, the deprivation of certain religious communities (tawā'if) – especially the Islamic Shi'a community – and the deprivation of certain areas – especially the South, Ba'albak, Hermel, 'Akkār, the villages of Jbayl, some Beirut suburbs, and some quarters in Tripoli – are at the base of this present anxiety and future uncertainty.

Among the causes there is also the continued neglect by authorities of their basic responsibilities, especially their responsibility for defending the nation's borders, those borders which we are relinquishing today in the South, and their responsibility for building up the homeland equally for the forgotten planters, the helpless workers, the alienated and vagrant youth, and the students running away from an uncertain future. In a word, it is the lack of application of the principles of social justice and the failure to manifest a responsible view of the future that have led to this gap in the Lebanese social structure.

For this reason, and for the sake of preserving the country, protecting the citizen, and building a better future, the Supreme Islamic Shi'a Council has begun to demand that the authorities provide justice for all citizens, areas and groups.

The Supreme Islamic Shi'a Council, in presenting to public opinion a complete list of these privations, urges all, citizens and rulers alike, to take up their national responsibilities. The Council declares that it will never accept less than justice.

A. In the field of public posts: we find, for example, that the Shi'a Community at the present time has only 19 posts in the first category, whereas it has a right, on the basis of equity promised by the Lebanese Constitution, to 30 posts.

Such is the case despite the fact that the community is deprived of every position in higher administrative and judiciary posts, suffers prejudice in appointments to army and internal security posts, as well as to the presidencies of councils of national administration.

The Supreme Islamic Shi'a Council demands immediate justice for the Shi'a sect through the appointment of 11 more qualified sons of the community to posts of the first category.

B. As for the type of posts, the Council refuses the confessional classification of citizens, and strongly reiterates the demands of those who refuse the confessionalization of jobs, and who require that jobs be assigned to members of the different communities according to their competence.

C. The first responsibility of authorities concerns the defense of the borders of the homeland and the security of citizens in different regions. In this matter the Council objects to the defense of the south of Lebanon and will not accept false or insufficient excuses or justifications.

D. Thousands of citizens in the regions of Ba'albak, Hermel, the North and other areas do not possess a Lebanese identity card, and are deprived, as a consequence, of all the rights of citizenship. It is not possible to doubt that these people are Lebanese, nor can one question their national allegiance, but their situation in life and the fact that they inhabit remote areas have kept them hidden, impeded, and deprived.

<u>In the field of development</u>:

The Council ascertains the necessity of executing development projects, in deprived and backward areas, through planned legislation, and the granting of credits in the general budget, so that the various regions of Lebanon may develop at approximately the same rate. Accordingly, the Council demands the realization of the following:

A. Implementation of the projects for the irrigation of the South from the Litani waters by ending the controversy concerning the level of water and by reliance on the exact studies which were made for this; by promulgating the

necessary legislation to insure the credits for execution; by canceling the project to bring the Litani waters to the city of Beirut, substituting instead water from the Beirut River and the Ibrahim River; and by considering the Litani project as a national, social operation as well as an economic one.

B. The implementation of the already studied project of artificial lakes to irrigate the lands in the provinces of Tyre and Bint Jbayl, the Yārīn-Kafra-Yārūn triangle, which will not benefit from the Litani project.

C. The execution of the first step of the al-Qā'-Hermel project, from the credits granted in 1962, the promulgation of proper legislation to ensure the needed credits to finish the irrigation networks in the first phase and the pumping which will ensure the irrigation of 7,000 hectares and the completion of the operations of collection and distribution (al-dam wa'l farz) so that it will be completed with the end of the project. Execution of the project in such a way that a real benefit may accrue.

D. Granting the needed credits to build the reservoir in the old Yammūna lake, necessary to ensure the irrigation of 4,000 hectares, along with the credits required to finish the irrigation network in the lands falling within the sector from Dayr al-Aḥmar-Kanīsa to Shmistar.

E. Execution of the following projects: building the "Nahla-Wādī Sbat-Jinta-Yahfufa-Shmistar" dam; the irrigation project for the Ba'albak plain from the waters of Rās al-'Ayn; the irrigation of lands from Ḥawsh Tal Safiyya and Ī'āt from the waters of the Nab' 'Addūs; the project for the 'Īḥa depression and that of the irrigation of Rajiḥin-Jabāb al-Ḥumr from 'Uyūn Arghash; the project of the Labwa waters and the correction of the course of the Litani on the lands of Hawsh al-Rāfiqa-Bīdnayil-Timnīn al-Taḥta; and furnishing the city of Ba'albak with the waters of Nab'al-Baghl and Nab'al-Lujūj.

F. Granting priority to official, technical, and normal schools (for males and females) in the South, the Biqā', 'Akkār, without taking refuge in the gradual execution of school projects in more developed areas as is now the case.

G. Creation of hospitals and health centres in deprived areas, improvement of the state of the Hermel Hospital, and the use of existing funds in the Office of Construction for the creation of a network of sewers in these areas. These projects should be insured through effective laws which forbid arbitrary action with the funds of the Office of Construction.

H. Realization of the highway projects of the Beirut-Sidon-Tyre, and of Beirut-Shtawra-Ba'albak-Syrian frontier. Realization of the project for roads for deprived villages.

I. Amelioration of the condition of the tobacco growers to end their tragic situation.

J. Increase of credits for the Green Plan, and drawing up of a law to give precedence to deprived areas.

K. Development of animal wealth, diffusion of agricultural nurseries, industrialization of agriculture, creation of factories to ensure the distribution of agricultural production after its processing.

L. Granting of necessary credits to finish archeological excavations at Ba'albak and Tyre during a period of ten years, and the building of a tourist hotel in Ba'albak, along with tourist projects for all archeological areas.

M. Complete study of mineral deposits, especially oil, in different areas of Lebanon.

N. Rectification of the law of distribution of municipal funds so that justice and prosperity are ensured to different areas of Lebanon.

O. Law of general amnesty on building violations so that the inhabitants of Beirut suburbs and others may benefit from water and electricity.

P. Amelioration of conditions of Beirut suburbs, especially the Qarantina and Nahr, Ḥay al-Silm, Burj Ḥammūd, Tal al-Za'tar, and Burj al-Barājna."

Translation by Dr. Shereen Khairallah

Hayat 12/2/74 p. 2.
The text of these demands was distributed to the Shi'a ministers following a meeting between Imam Sadr, former President Hélou, and former president of the chamber Hamadi.

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