THE INDIVIDUAL, PROPERTY AND DISCURSIVE PRACTICE IN BURTON AND LOCKE

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ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts a critical analysis of modern individualism through an examination of its origins in the seventeenth century. In this thesis I discuss the notion of autonomous and self-responsible individuality as a culturally constructed and culturally specific idea. Furthermore, I describe autonomy as only one of a complex of related features of the modern individual, including a withdrawn and objectifying stance toward the natural world, values and other human beings.

In this thesis, I examine two seventeenth-century authors -- Robert Burton and John Locke -- each of whom represents a different conception of individuality. Burton emulates communal conceptions of identity characteristic of the Middle Ages and Renaissance, while Locke describes an essentially modern, analytical individuality based on the control and possession of an objectified "other".

The theoretical framework for this analysis is derived from Michel Foucault and Timothy Reiss' description of the transition from the Renaissance to the seventeenth century as a transition between different epistemes or discourses. Throughout this thesis, I supplement this essentially structuralist approach with perspectives from Medieval, Renaissance and seventeenth-century cosmology, literary theory, political theory and epistemology.

RÉSUMÉ

Cette thèse est un essai d'analyse critique de l'individualisme moderne à travers l'examen de ses origines, au dix-septième siècle. Dans cette thèse, j'essaie de montrer que la notion d'individualité autonome et responsable d'elle-même est une idée construite par une culture et spécifique à une culture. De plus, j'essaie de montrer que l'autonomie n'est qu'un des traits de la complexité qui entoure l'individu moderne, traits qui incluent une position désengagée et objectifiante par rapport au monde naturel, à ses valeurs et aux autres êtres humains.

Dans cette thèse, j'étudie deux auteurs du dix-septième siècle, Robert Burton et John Locke, qui représentent chacun une conception différente de l'individualité. Burton se rapproche des conceptions communautaires de l'identité, caractéristiques du Moyen Age et de la Renaissance, tandis que Locke décrit une individualité essentiellement moderne et analytique qui se fonde sur le contrôle et la possession d'un "autre", considéré comme un objet.

Le cadre théorique de cette analyse s'inscrit dans la ligne de Michel Foucault et Timothy Reiss, qui décrivent la transition de la Renaissance au dix septième siècle comme une transition entre différents épistèmes ou discours. Tout au long de cette étude, je complète cette approche essentiellement structuraliste par des perspectives tirées de

la cosmologie du Moyen Age, de la Renaissance et du dix-septième siècle, de la théorie littéraire, de la théorie politique et de l'épistémologie.

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HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

A stock figure in literary, political, and epistemological theory of the last three centuries has been the autonomous individual. The notion that human beings are autonomous individuals or "independent centres of consciousness" (Lukes 77) each with their own particular interests, which or may not be at odds with those of society as a whole, seems to many theorists to be an incontrovertible fact of human existence and informs much of contemporary social practice. Institutionalized emphasis on the individual appears in the form of "individualism", an ideology which has set the parameters for scholarly debate over the last 300 years. Political studies in the West have been dominated by social contract models which focus on questions of individual rights (more often than not at the expense of duties). Literary studies have relied on their own forms of the individual, the author and reader, both of which have alternately taken precedence and faded into the background as cults of creative genius and various types of formalisms have swapped places. In his historical study of individualism, Steven Lukes identifies twelve distinct types of individualism -- political, economic, religious, ethical, epistemological, methodological and an overarching "abstract individualism" among others -- and in doing so gives one some idea of how far reaching the importance of this ideology has

been to intellectual pursuits of all kinds.

However, alongside positivist philosophies which view this sort of emphasis on the individual as unproblematic, the contemporary scene includes structuralist and post-structuralist studies of the individual which go beyond the parameters seen above, questioning the degree to which individuals are autonomous and self-determined and the extent to which the concept of the individual may be understood as "natural". By putting an emphasis on super-personal and self-replicating social, economic, psychological and linguistic structures and processes, they show the category of "person" to be contingent and changeable, more of an effect than a cause. Psychoanalysis (though not always intentionally) has challenged traditional notions of the independent, self-possessed individual: as Nancy Chodorow argues, it

> radically undermines notions about autonomy, individual choice, will, responsibility and rationality, showing that we do not control our own lives in the most fundamental sense. It makes it impossible to think about the self in any simple way, to talk blithely about the individual. (Chodorow 197)

Structuralist and post-structuralist linguistics have achieved similar problematizations of the individual, transferring the locus of meaning in language from its anchoring in a creative individual consciousness to a network of structural difference, and subsequently to the free-play of the "floating" signifier in a circular and infinite process of dissemination. Literary criticism, partly under the influence

of this linguistic theory, has also displaced its own versions of the individual -- the author, reader and character. Foucault, for example, argues that

> the author does not precede the work, he is a certain functional principle by which, in our collective culture, one limits, excludes and chooses, in short, by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition and recomposition of fiction. (Foucault 1979, 159)

Similarly, Barthes proclaims the "death of the author" in an essay bearing this title.

In the following, I plan to carry on this questioning of contemporary Western ideas of the individual. Specifically, I will examine the concept of the autonomous individual as a culturally constructed and culturally specific idea through a comparison of modern views of the individual with those of the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Naturally, historical studies of the individual vary in their chronologies, but many coincide in arguing that, as one goes back into the history of the West, one eventually comes to a time when the conceptual value of the individual was either negligible or entirely absent[1]. As the question of the nature and existence of the category of the individual is taken into a historical dimension, one sees that definitions of the individual are not invariable. One may then ask what the material and intellectual conditions surrounding these definitions were and whose interests worked to shape them.

As part of my study of these questions, I will start

with an admittedly selective and cursory look at notions of the individual at various points in the history of the West, to get some idea of what the precursors to modern individualistic cultural arrangements have looked like. I will take the seventeenth century as a dividing point between ancient communitarian conceptions of the individual and modern individualistic ones. The seventeenth century appears to have been a watershed period in terms of the theoretical importance of the individual in English culture. During this century one sees the development of epistemological theories which, like Descartes', focus on occurrences within the consciousness of the individual and of political theories like those of Locke and Hobbes which take autonomous, self-interested individuals as first principles in the construction of possible social orders. Furthermore, although individualistic models of artistic creation do not become strictly formalized in copyright law until the eighteenth century (Rose 52), one sees in the early seventeenth century the beginnings of a modern view of authorship (that is, one that posits an exclusive relation of responsibility or ownership between author and creation) in events such as Ben Jonson's publication of his Workes in 1616 (Loewenstein).

Michel Foucault, in The Order of Things, and Timothy Reiss, in The Discourse of Modernism, give an account of the rise of the modern individual, based on the historical succession of different sign systems ("discourses" in Reiss'

terminology, and "epistemes" in Foucault's). I will draw on their theories, and put them in the context of others dealing with historical developments in authorship, political theory and epistemology to examine how, in the seventeenth century, it became possible to conceive of the individual in isolation from his social and symbolic environment. I will use other theories to test the limits of a strictly discursive explanation, and to connect problems of representation with the wider range of contemporary cultural phenomena that involve the emerging individual.

I will also examine different ways in which the newly isolated individual is defined, especially ones that involve property and ownership as key terms. In The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, C.B. Macpherson suggests that the pervasive concern with ownership that can be found in seventeenth-century political theory was "read back into the nature of the individual," resulting in "an individuality that [could] only fully be realized in accumulating property" (Macpherson 256). It is my intention to show how the discursive changes described by Foucault and Reiss may have made possible this new and reductive definition of the individual in terms of property, not only in political matters, but also in questions of authorship and epistemology. I will also explore some of the implications that an individuality based on ownership models has for individuals working within such a system. In my second and third chapters,

I will be looking at three seventeenth-century non-fiction texts -- Robert Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy, and John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding and Second Treatise of Government -- in an effort to show that Burton and Locke represent different stages in the cultural development of an autonomous and possessive individuality.

One may begin considering the problem of individualism in the history of the West by looking at the vocabulary used throughout the ages to describe individuals; if the ancients and Medievals had some notion of autonomous individuality, one would expect to find a corresponding lexicon. Judging from the history of the vocabulary of individualism, it appears that the concept of a self-sufficient individual is a relatively recent arrival to Western thought. The first use of the term "individualism" in England was in an 1840 translation of Tocqueville's De la Democratie en Amerique, and Tocqueville himself comments on the absence of this term in what, for him, were recent times: "our fathers did not have the word 'individualism', which we have coined for our own use, because in their time there was indeed no individual who did not belong to a group and who could be considered as absolutely alone" (qtd. in Lukes 32). The term "individual," in its modern sense, has a similarly short history. It does not appear once in the complete works of Shakespeare (Spevack) and it was not used in the modern sense of "a single human being, as opposed to society, the family etc."[2] until the

seventeenth century. In the Middle Ages, "individual" was used in a sense that is opposite to its modern meaning: it described something that is "one in substance or essence; forming one indivisible entity" (OED, vol II, p.880). As Colin Morris writes, "the word 'individual' did not have the same meaning in the twelfth century as it does today -- the nearest equivalents were individuum, individualis, and singularis, but these terms belonged to logic rather than to human relations" (Morris 64).

Broadly speaking, pre-seventeenth century views of the individual[3] appear to be relational ones. In social, epistemological, literary and other types of theory, the individual seems to take on meaning only in so far as he[4] may be related to some form of collective organization: a corporate society, a transcendent world of Forms or Divine Ideas, or a body of literary tradition. More radically, it has been suggested that the conceptual oppositions of self and other, subject and object, individual and society and so on, which form the basis of our modern view of the individual, were unstable if present at all (Bordo 60). Since the relation of possession depends on a difference between that which owns and that which is owned, this lack of polarization would have complicated the designation of anything -- speech, property, ideas, artistic creations -- as one's "own".

In the writings of the ancient Greeks one finds many examples of a theoretical subordination of the individual to

the collective. James Tully points out that Aristotle's term for "own" means "belonging to the household or family" (Tully 134). This would suggest that the individual, as a factor in social arrangements, was negligible or, at any rate, subordinate to the household unit. In the Politics the individual is portrayed not only as subordinate to the family, but also as entirely secondary to a larger form of collective organization -- the state: "we must not suppose that any citizen belongs to himself, for they all belong to the state, and are part of the state, and the care of each part is inseparable from the care of the whole" (1337ª 27-33). In fact, the individual appears as a sort of afterthought, a hypothetical entity that may be conceptually abstracted from the collective, but remains secondary to it: "...the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part...." (1253ª1 19-20).

The Greeks seem to have lacked the vocabulary to express other ideas central to the notion of the autonomous individual -- that of "person," for example (Morris 2), and ideas related to human agency and individual responsibility. Such an absence results in what are, for us, bizarre interpretations of the relationship between individuals and acts that they perform. Jeanne-Pierre Vernant describes the relationship as follows: "the agent is caught in the action. He is not its author. He remains included in it" (qtd. in

Reiss 64), and Reiss, on the basis of the vocabulary of the ancients, concludes that their notion of human action "evidently ignores, indeed precludes, any treatment of the agent as source and origin of its acts" (Reiss 1982, 64-5).

A similar devaluation or absence of the category of the individual appears in the Middle Ages. Walter Ullman, for example, argues that in the Middle Ages "what mattered was the public weal, the public welfare, the public well-being, in brief the good of society itself, even at the expense of the individual well-being if necessary" (Ullman 36). The practice of collective punishment, as it is found in the interdict of locality or the amercements of towns, villages and hundreds is one of the more startling examples that Ullman gives to suggest the degree of the absorption of the individual by the collective. Besides this lack of individuation, another key characteristic of Medieval theory was the passive and subordinate role of the individual in a rigidly defined hierarchy. Both of these characteristics of the Medieval individual found their theoretical justification in the dominant Pauline organic model, which described society as an organism, each member of which had a special function but remained inseparable from the whole (Hale 28-9, Ullman 46). A transcendent Law vivified this corporate society, as a soul does a body, and this Law was ultimately grounded in the divine. The individual existed primarily as a means of carrying out God's will, and his dependence on a religious and

monarchial hierarchy for the expression of this will placed him in a totally passive role, the chief virtues of which were subjection and obedience.

It is not only in the socio-political sphere that one sees this devaluation of the individual. Throughout the Middle Ages there does not appear to be anything like what we would consider to be a modern view of authorship -- that is, one that defines a text in terms of an exclusive, one-to-one relationship with an individual creative consciousness. As Leo Spitzer has shown, Medieval authors routinely represent the thoughts. actions and emotions of others as their own. Greenblatt sums up Spitzer's argument as follows:

> ... `medieval writers seem to have had little or no concept of intellectual property' and consequently no respect for the integrity or propriety of the first-person pronoun. A Medieval writer would incorporate without any apparent concern the experiences of another into his own first-person account; indeed he would assume the 'I' of another. (Greenblatt 1986, 216)

The empirical "I", that which represents a numerical human individual is secondary to the "I" "which speaks the name of man in general," the universal type of which any individual is just a momentarily discrete manifestation (Spitzer 419). Such a possibility suggests that the relationship between author and text is not yet clearly drawn; the characteristic anonymity of literary texts, and the works of scholars, pamphleteers and architects during this period supports this view (Ullman 32; Foucault 1979, 149).

Stephen Greenblatt sees this radical of lack of

individuation continuing into the Renaissance. In his essay "Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture," Greenblatt tries to explain why many Renaissance texts which seem to invite a psychoanalytic approach are at the same time unusually resistant to it. Greenblatt argues that this period lacks the sort of unified and self-possessed individual in relation to which psychoanalysis defines its project (since, as he points out, "alienation implies at least a theoretically prior stage of nonalienation" (Greenblatt 1986, 213)). In the Renaissance, the individual appears only as the "placeholder in a complex system of possession, kinship bonds, contractual relationships, customary rights and ethical obligations": he appears as object, rather than subject, "the product of these relations, material objects, and judgements ... rather than the producer of [them]" (Greenblatt 1986, 216).

The Renaissance individual assumes an equally low profile in the world of authorship. In Renaissance poetics, intertextual relations were ideally governed by the process of imitatio, which was based on the possibility of a non-transgressive incorporation of the work of one author into that of another (Cave 35-77). As in the Middle Ages, there appears to have been no exclusive relationship between texts and authors. Joseph Loewenstein, for example, has argued that

> ... a Renaissance author never quite owned a literary work, or at least not a literary work as we now somewhat abstractly conceive it .... Strictly speaking, a playwright owned a copy of a play, a manuscript distinguishable from a scribal copy only by the fact that it was a unique copy.... the marketplace was such that

> authorial assertions of preeminent domain were all but unthinkable. (Loewenstein 102)

Evidence in conventional literary terms is found in introductions and epilogues to contemporary dramatic works:

> ... the Elizabethan play is regularly represented by the speaking actor as 'ours,' the possession and, indeed, the product of the actors. Where the playwright is mentioned, he is almost never "the Author" or "the Playwright"; he is 'our poet,' an adjunct to the proprietary group of performers. (Loewenstein 102)

So, throughout the Middle Ages and Renaissance one finds examples of an emphasis on the collective and a corresponding devaluation of the individual. This certainly appears to be the case in questions of authorship and literary property. However, when one examines questions of individuality in the context of more concrete or literal forms of property this emphasis on the collective appears less absolute. Aristotle's description of different forms of government in the Politics gives no hint of an individual whose well-being is at odds with, or, indeed, at all separate, from that of the state. However, this sort of attitude breaks down when he comes to consider how property should be distributed. For Plato and his contemporaries private property was sacred (Kilgour 27); for Aristotle it was, if not quite sacred, a force to be reckoned with. If Aristotle's description of the different forms of government in the Politics may seem somewhat ambivalent, he shows no doubt about private property. He writes that "there is always a difficulty in men living together and having all human relations in common, but especially in their having

common property" (1263^{a} 15-17). In such an arrangement, order is bound to fall into chaos since "everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest" and "that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed on it" (1261^{b} 33-34). A social arrangement that does away with the distinction between mine and thine is dismissed as an impossibility (1261^{b} 1). As sentiments of this kind are multiplied in the Politics it becomes apparent that Aristotle views the desire for a property of one's own as a basic fact of human nature: "how immeasurably greater is the pleasure," he writes, "when a man feels a thing to be his own" (1263^{a} 41-1263^{b} 1). In the context of communitarian theories of identity and social order, private property appears as an anomaly, since it sets the individual apart from the collective.

In the Middle Ages especially, ownership as it was put into practice seems to have been at odds with theory of the day. Alan Macfarlane, for example, has found evidence to suggest that in the thirteenth century many parts of England already had a developed market, mobility of labour, full private ownership, the view of land as a commodity and a widespread profit motive. On the basis of this evidence, he concludes that "the majority of people in England from at least the thirteenth century were rampant individualists, highly mobile, both geographically and socially, economically rational, and market-oriented" (Macfarlane 163). Such a

situation would appear to be in conflict with dominant Medieval theories governing property, in which, as Ullman says, "... property was considered an issue of divine grace, which precluded the emergence of a thesis according to which the individual as owner had an autonomous right to his property" (Ullman 38). Ullman in fact argues that the lower classes and a decentralized bureaucracy, largely isolated from the "somewhat rarified speculative doctrines" of Scholastic philosophy, were able, by virtue of this isolation, to develop an applied system of individual rights centring on questions of property and ownership.

This discrepancy between theories that seem to preclude the possibility of an autonomous individuality and individualistic practices having to do with ownership has been described in various ways. As we just saw, Ullman suggests that a certain segment of the Medieval population, by the simple fact of its intellectual isolation, was able to develop a system of applied rights, providing "a subterranean, invisible platform which was to prove of not inconsiderable assistance in emancipating the individual" ("subterranean" and "invisible" apparently referring to the unrecognized or untheorized nature of these applied rights) (Ullman 62). Max Weber makes the distinction between practice and theory explicit, arguing that "the impulse to acquisition, pursuit of gain, of money, of the greatest possible amount of money ... has been common to all sorts and conditions of men at all

times and in all countries of the earth ...." but that this should not be taken as an indication of the presence of a system that would justify this impulse as rational or provide a theoretical basis for it (Weber 17). Timothy Reiss has argued, along similar lines, that "individualistic" practices like those that appear in Medieval and early Renaissance economic life appear to have existed only as "occulted practices" -- that is, as ones that lacked even the most basic sort of theoretical formulation that would represent them as "meaningful" to the human understanding. Money markets, alienation of land, primitive forms of wage labour and so on seem to have existed without any formal justification. It would seem, then, that the presence of individualistic practices does not necessarily entail the existence of a theoretically viable concept of autonomous individuality.

The exclusion of the individual and individualistic practices from social, literary and other types of theory in the Middle Ages and Renaissance may be understood in the context of a general conceptual system which by the very nature of its organization and guiding assumptions precluded the appearance of this sort of theoretical individual. Reiss argues that a single such discursive system, which he terms the "discourse of patterning," determined the form of all possible types of knowledge throughout the Middle Ages and Renaissance, until the seventeenth century.

One of the key characteristics of this system, as it is

described by Reiss, is a theocentric teleology. The end of the intellectual creature in the Middle Ages and Renaissance is to understand God, and this orientation forms the basis for epistemological, social, linguistic and "literary" theory -- apparently all types of theory -- of this period. As Louis Dumont writes, "the orientation to the transcendent end, as towards a magnet, introduces a hierarchical field, in which we should expect every other worldly thing to be situated" (Dumont 103). While God is the proper telos of the human intellect, he also serves as the ultimate ground for linguistic and social order. According to Reiss,

> the corporate social relation between the Divinity and societal participant, mediated by the law (anima), and that participant and society as a whole, mediated by baptism, is the same as the relation that holds between the Divinity and the sign, guaranteed by the soul (anima) and the sign and society, guaranteed by concrete discursive practice. (Reiss 86)

Anima (which carries the multiple significations of immortal law, society itself, King, God, soul and society's laws) functions as an analogical operator, transforming one set of relations into another, animating a corporate society and language, and connecting the world of human experience to the divine.

A corollary of this orientation toward the transcendent is a devaluation of secular or "everyday" life. Scholastic philosophy tended to stress the contingent and sub-rational nature of human affairs in a world that it viewed as corrupt or fallen (Pocock 5) and, more generally, placed the material

world at the opposite end of an ontological continuum from the divine. As Charles Taylor writes, "the influential ideas of ethical hierarchy exalted the lives of contemplation" and promoted the view that "philosophers should not busy themselves with the mere manipulation of things and hence with crafts" (Taylor 212). This sort of outlook appears to continue and reinforce Aristotle's conviction that "to be always looking after the useful does not become free and exalted souls" (Politics 1338^{b} 3-4).

The sign system proper to this sort of divine teleology is, according to Reiss, one based on the workings of analogy and similitude. Various theorists have argued that in the Middle Ages and Renaissance the function considered proper to human knowledge was interpretation. Ernst Cassirer, for instance, suggests that "allegory is no mere appendage, no casual cloak; instead it becomes the vehicle of thought itself" (Cassirer 74). Dumont argues along similar lines, suggesting that the analogical techniques of biblical exegesis were similarly applied "to the interpretation of the rough data of experience" (Dumont 104).

One of the key features of this analogical type of understanding is its all-inclusive and peculiarly "democratic" character. While this discourse had its own forms of privileged authority (God and Aristotle, primarily) and did distinguish between true and false, the criteria that it used were less rigid than those of the analytical discourse; it did

so on different grounds, and worked with a broader definition of truth. Foucault writes, "the division between what we see, what others observed and handed down, and what others imagine or naively believe did not exist (Foucault 1970, 129). This also appears to have been the case in contemporary views of the natural world: "the empiricism of the Renaissance lacked objective standards of value and any principle of selection among the teeming phenomena" and seemed not to have made the separation of "the necessary from the accidental, [the] distinction between that which obeys laws and that which is fantastic and arbitrary" (Cassirer 152, 151). This sign system was also able to sustain a high degree of equivocation. Individual words, passages in scripture, or natural phenomena could carry multiple and even contradictory significations, and equivocation was understood to be a legitimate means of generating meaning[5].

Underlying these various features of the patterning discourse is similitude. In this discourse individual beings, language, observable phenomena and ideas are connected by the workings of analogy and similitude into a web-like pattern, and experience is significant (in the various senses of this word) to the degree that it is viewed in the context of such connections; meaning is, in fact, coextensive with this pattern of relations. The prevalence of this patterning type of understanding helps to explain the merely incidental status of the individual in Medieval and Renaissance theory. As Reiss

points out,

> the dominant model is a collective one in which the sign as a 'unit' of meaning or the human as an 'individual' in society has no significance at all save as it can be referred to the corporate community or social discourse on the one hand and guaranteed by the Divine on the other. (Reiss 94)

This emphasis on similitude appears to have undermined various distinctions central to modern thought, such as that between self and other, as the individual defined his identity in relationships of identification with his social others and the rest of the world rather than by his difference from them. In the Middle Ages and Renaissance, the world did not appear as an irreducible epistemological "other". The individual was thought to exist, along with the rest of creation, in what Cassirer describes as a "community of being". Such a view negates the distance between subject and object, suggesting that to understand an object is to become one with it (Cassirer 148-9). More radically, it has been suggested that the subject/object opposition was foreign to the Medieval understanding, and, consequently, that "the Medievals had no problem of knowledge," or at least none that was expressed in terms of "certifying a correspondence between ideas and an external world" (Bordo 60). This weak polarization between self and other appears to have had a limiting effect on the degree to which individuals and ownership could appear as meaningful. It would, in theory, undermine what seems for us to be the entirely necessary designation of anything --

speech, property, ideas, artistic creations or one's person -- as one's "own".

However, by the seventeenth century concepts of both the individual and property begin to be codified in several types of philosophies; in fact, they become first principles on which various types of theories, most obviously socio-political ones, are built. This new theoretical prominence of the individual and property in the seventeenth century may be understood as part of a general shift from the patterning discourse to one based on the workings of difference, which Reiss terms "analytico-referential discourse".

In the transition between discourses, the divine teleology of the patterning discourse is undermined by a utilitarian materialism. The goal proper to human intellectual activity is no longer to gain an understanding of God for its own sake, but to improve the material circumstances of one's existence. This sort of pragmatism was, for many seventeenth-century thinkers, elevated to the status of a general principle defining the purpose of all sorts of human endeavour. Bacon, for example, asserts that "fruits and works are, as it were, sponsors and sureties for the truth of philosophies" and goes so far as to argue that "truth and utility are ... the very same things" (Bacon 350, 354).

The "fruits and works" of which Bacon speaks are the results of a human ability to control and manipulate the

physical environment. The analogical system which dominated the Middle Ages and Renaissance is clearly unsuitable for the utilitarian project, since the prodigious multiplication of significations which underlies its operation would place words and concepts beyond certainty and definition. Reiss argues that the sign system proper to this project, and to knowledge generally in the seventeenth century, is one based on analysis and difference. In this analytical system the sign is viewed ideally as unequivocal, and as having some kind of empirically definable content. The correct action of the mind changes from drawing together to discriminating, and from grounding meaning in the divine to grounding it in a selective interpretation of sense impressions. It is through a rigorous empirical analysis, which describes the object of one's attention in terms of discrete and reductively defined units, that the analytical discourse imposes order on the world.

This action of the mind on sense perception represents a radical departure from the Medieval and Renaissance conception of the relationship between self and other. As Foucault puts it, it is "no longer a question of making previous content manifest, but of providing content to serve as a grounds for knowledge" (Foucault 1970, 68), of imposing an artificially constructed "grid" of classification on the world[6]. A process of deliberate exclusion characterizes the analytical discourse; as Foucault tells us, seventeenth-century natural philosophy "used its ingenuity to restrict deliberately the

area of its experience" (Foucault 1970, 132). One product of this outlook is the notion of "character," "a consciously selected set of characteristics on the basis of which things are compared" (Foucault 1970, 140). Through this kind of selection, it becomes possible to define the object of one's attention in terms of a limited number of "relevant" characteristics, with the exclusion of the numerous other contexts in which it might be considered.

The application of this process of reductive ordering to human individuals is a key step in the rise to dominance of theories of autonomous individuality. This is true in two different but connected senses; the modern individual appears, on the one hand, as the product of an analysis of human conceptions of the natural world and civil society and, on the other, as a detached epistemological subject that imposes this reductive order on an objectified world.

As a sign system based on analysis and difference comes to the fore, so does the conceptual apparatus that enables one to define a human individual in terms of his own features and only incidentally in terms of his social others and the world in which he lives. The application of this sort of analysis to individuals results in a human "character," in Foucault's sense. The human individual, described in terms of a limited and consciously selected set of attributes, becomes the object of a newly accessible process of reductive definition. The individual is perceived as significant not by virtue of his

participation in the divinity or a hierarchical social structure, but by the features of his own mind and person.

These features are typically empirically definable or material ones, in keeping with the priorities of the analytical discourse. This discourse works with an emphasis on unequivocal concepts grounded in empirical observation, and with a corresponding mistrust of abstract or equivocal language. Property and related terms lend an air of objectivity and empiricalness to discussions of issues such as meaning in language, the identity of the individual and the role of the individual in society, providing an appealing alternative to what many seventeenth-century authors viewed as overly reified scholastic discussions of similar problems. Such a conviction apparently underlies Hobbes' definition of the "worth" of a man: "the Value, or Worth of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power" (Hobbes 151). Property, in its literal or material sense, is capable of unequivocal definition in terms of objective measures -- acreage, currency, or, in the example from Hobbes, labour, as its value is determined by the market -- and as such it provides an appealing starting point for an unequivocal and concrete definition of individuals.

The ability to impose this sort of order on the world depends on another key feature of modern individuality: namely, the firm distinction between subject and object. Susan

Bordo points out that in the seventeenth century experience comes to be understood as located entirely in the individual's consciousness; she describes, for instance, Galileo's realization that "secondary qualities 'belong entirely to us' -- that touch resides 'in the palms of the hands and in the fingertips,' 'heat belongs ... ultimately to us,' and 'sensations ... have no real existence save in us'" (qtd. in Bordo 36). Bordo goes on to explain how in Descartes' writings even this interiorized realm of experience is objectified and becomes a target of control, as Descartes asserts that one must not remain in a passive relation to sense experience but submit it to one's judgement in order to separate "clear and distinct" ideas from obscure or misleading ones. Control of one's environment depends on the ability to sort through sense perception and, specifically, to separate "necessary" from accidental connections between phenomena. The ability to define the object of one's attention and the relationships between this object and others in terms of a few "relevant" characteristics is the basis on which powerful analytical innovations, such as the mathematical expression of laws that govern nature, are developed. This ability, in turn, is based on a distancing of oneself from the immediacy of what one experiences.

This critical distancing of oneself from the world signals the emergence of the modern epistemological subject. Modern individuality is dependent on an objectification of the

natural world, as the individual defines himself in relation to what exists outside of his own consciousness as a properly unknowable "other". The progression from the Renaissance to the seventeenth century involves a transition from a discourse in which the individual identifies himself with the world to one in which the individual's identity can only be defined by his difference from it.

This division between self and other, while conferring immense power on the individual, is an ambivalent phenomenon. On the one hand, it provides the dimension of difference between subject and object on which control of one's environment depends. On the other hand, the division between self and other introduces the possibility of alienation. In the transition to the analytical discourse there appears a dimension of irreducible difference between self and other; when one no longer identifies oneself with the material world, divinely guaranteed meaning in language, a corporate society and, as Descartes suggests, one's own perceptions, the question of how to secure these relations appears. As I hope to show, the seventeenth century seems to have drawn on a basic human desire, that of ownership, and a long standing tradition of individualistic economic practices to provide a means of bridging this gap between self and other.

A pattern of distancing, control and possession appears in a variety of seventeenth-century contexts. Charles Taylor notes that objectification and desire for control of the other

was directed not only toward the material world, but was also extended self-reflexively to individuals in the form of self-control, as "the disengagement both from the activities of thought and from our unreflecting desires and tastes allows us to see ourselves as objects of far-reaching reformation" (Taylor 171). This model of control over an objectified internal realm was supplemented by the interpretation of the relationship between an individual and his speech, actions, ideas, perceptions and person as one of ownership. Hobbes, for example, revives the Roman notion of persona and produces the following definition: "a person, is he whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of an other man" (Hobbes 217) and "he that owneth his words and actions, is the AUTHOR: In which case the Actor acteth by Authority. For that which in speaking of goods and possessions, is called an Owner ... speaking of actions is called Author" (Hobbes 218). By positing and maintaining a distance between oneself and one's own person or actions, one may interpret the relationship as one of exclusive ownership.

This ownership model also provides a key paradigm for rights theories in modern law. The modern individual does not live "under" a divinely sanctioned natural law that transcends him; law comes to be expressed in terms of individual rights, and the relationship between rights and the individual is described as one of ownership. As Charles Taylor notes, "the notion of a right, also called a 'subjective right', as this

developed in the Western legal tradition, is that of a legal privilege which is seen as a quasi-possession of the agent to whom it is attributed" (Taylor 11). This proprietorial conception of rights is evidently at work in Hobbes' conception of justice:

> Justice is the constant Will of giving to every man his own. And therefore where there is no Own, that is, no propriety, there is no Injustice; and where there is no coercive power erected ... there is no Propriety; all men having Right to all things.... (Hobbes 72)

In fact, as various writers have shown, in the seventeenth century words describing individual rights and property appear to have been interchangeable: "property" was used to describe a right in any thing, and the concept of a "right" was expressed in terms of a "property" in one's life, liberty and estate (Tully 115, Laslett 101).

Distancing, control and possession also play a key part in the emergence of a literary version of the autonomous individual, the author. In the literary arena, the author is defined by a relationship of exclusive responsibility for, or possession of, an objectified text. One specific source of this understanding of the relationship between individuals and texts is censorship. As Foucault has argued, the author as a category of our understanding of texts arose partly as a function of repressive authority; the author came into being in so far as he was the sort of locus of responsibility that a repressive authority felt the need to silence or punish

(Foucault 1979, 148). One sees, for example, in Parliament's printing ordinance of 1643 and Milton's response to it in Aeropagitica, the contemporary concern over the relationship between individuals and controversial or seditious pieces of literature. Milton's response is ambivalent, as he maintains the importance of freedom of expression on the one hand, and recommends "fire and executioner" for "mischievous" texts on the other (Blum 77). However, either response presupposes some recognition of individual responsibility in expression[7].

Print technology appears to have stimulated the appearance of the author in a similar way; that is, by supplying the sort of objectified text in relation to which the author could establish his identity. As print culture displaced the previously dominant manuscript culture, it "stimulated a competitive relation between book and person, a competition for preeminence as the locus of intellectual summation" (Loewenstein 101). As Joseph Loewenstein and Mark Rose have shown, another powerful motor in the development of modern views of the author was an emerging market value of literary texts. Rose suggests that the concept of the individual creative "genius" who is defined by an exclusive relation of ownership with his text is developed in early eighteenth-century legal debates over the granting of copyrights. In these debates Locke's model of material appropriation and assertion of exclusive right in the fruits of one's labour comes to be applied to literary texts. Joseph

Loewenstein sees similar developments a century earlier, particularly in the context of the theatre. Theatre companies of the early seventeenth century were plagued by the increasingly common practice of pirating texts, by "imperfectly rationalized economic relations" and a "marketplace made harrowingly unstable by plague and censor" (Loewenstein 106). As scripts came to be seen as an added source of income in this unstable economic environment, a value independent of the playwright's scribal labour or the performance of plays began to inhere in them. As scripts took on this inherent value, it became easier to conceive of the playwright himself as producing a complete "work," rather than simply performing one step in the process of putting on a play.

The concept of an autonomous individuality defined in terms of exclusive ownership, while solving a number of theoretical problems, evidently introduces its own unique set of questions. In the following chapters, through an analysis of Robert Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy and John Locke's Second Treatise of Government and Essay Concerning Human Understanding, I will examine in more detail the transition from the patterning discourse and its communal models of identity to the autonomous individuality of the analytical discourse.

The works that I will be discussing, as well as the authors themselves, are incongruous enough to require an

explanation for their mutual inclusion in this thesis. It is not immediately apparent, after all, on what basis one may compare a treatise of melancholy with an analysis of the human understanding and civil society. Even more peculiar (at first glance) is the discrepancy between the approaches of these two authors. Burton's Anatomy is a compendium of textual sources ranging from the ancients to his contemporaries, while Locke's approach is essentially that of empirical analytic philosophy. However, considering the transitional nature of the time at which these two authors are working, this discrepancy itself provides a basis for comparison. Keeping in mind Reiss' description of discursive developments in the seventeenth century, one may understand Burton and Locke as representatives of competing discursive orders. Furthermore, one may identify a corresponding contrast in their views of the individual. As I hope to show, Burton's view of the individual is congruous with that of the patterning discourse, while Locke's is that of the analytical discourse, which has persisted to this day. Burton and Locke, both working within the same transitional period between two discursive orders, but chronologically distant enough from each other for their comparison to offer a developmental perspective, provide examples of different reactions to the emergence of an autonomous individuality and different strategies proposed to deal with the problems posed by it.

ROBERT BURTON'S ANATOMY OF MELANCHOLY

Robert Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy first appeared in 1621, a year after the first edition of Bacon's New Organon, a key text in the scientific canon, was published. Devon Hodges, drawing on Reiss' theories, describes the anatomy as "a transitional form, a form uncertain about its relation to an older discourse of patterning or to the new analytical discourse of science" (Hodges 18). I will argue that Burton's Anatomy is in fact such a liminal text and that, while it may seem oversimplistic to describe the Anatomy in terms of a struggle between different discursive orders, many of its peculiarities may be explained by the presence in it of both textual, analogical features and elements of the developing discourse of analysis.

The Anatomy displays many features of the discourse of patterning described by Reiss, especially an analogical mode of understanding and a textualization of the world. For example, when Burton quotes a source which says that "if a great-bellied woman see a hare, her child will often have an hare lip" (1.215) it would appear that he is describing a world ordered by similitude. In other examples, one finds similitude in the complex and extended form of analogy. In a manner typical of the discourse of patterning, hierarchies of analogy link the different orders of animate and inanimate, and microcosm and macrocosm, with man serving as the

transformational point through which these comparisons are made. Burton at one point suggests that "melancholy extends itself not to men only, but even to vegetals and sensibles" (1.79) and, elsewhere, extends melancholy, by way of analogy, from the human body to the body politic: "as in human bodies ... there be diverse alterations proceeding from humours, so there be many diseases in a common-wealth, which do as diversely happen from several distempers" (1.79). The Anatomy also shows the textual mode of inquiry characteristic of the patterning discourse. As the ubiquitous presence of sources in the Anatomy suggests, Burton gains knowledge of his subject by studying the ways in which it has been written about in the centuries preceding him, an approach characteristic of a time when "truth was sought through the word and experimentation was rare" (Reiss 1982, 91). The Anatomy draws on a type of understanding which looks to tradition for knowledge, and understands an object by gathering together all the signs that may be linked to it by resemblance. In the Anatomy there is no sense of opposition between textual and empirical realms.

However, the particular form that these patterning elements take in the Anatomy appears to be determined, at least in part, by the context of change in which Burton worked. Burton was writing at a time of theoretical upheaval, during which the same aspects of the patterning discourse that one sees at work in the Anatomy were being rendered obsolete by new epistemologies, models of authorship and political

theories.

As Maggie Kilgour points out, there is a tendency on the part of modern critics to interpret the seventeenth century as a time of crisis -- or, more specifically, as a "fall" (Kilgour 140). Burton himself sets the Anatomy in the context of this most universal form of human crisis: man is "fallen from that he was ... become miserabilis homuncio, a castaway, a caitiff ... so much obscured by his fall that ... he is inferior to a beast" (1.130). The fallen condition of mankind finds metaphorical expression in the subject of Burton's treatise -- melancholy -- which is portrayed by him as a universal human affliction, affecting body, soul and intellect. Throughout the Anatomy, Burton's treatment of questions of epistemology, authorship and social life is coloured by this context of fallenness.

One area of crisis that Burton describes in the Anatomy is that of the human intellect. The interpretation of signs and textual tradition, the primary means by which the human understanding made sense of the world in the patterning discourse, appears to falter in the Anatomy, with resulting chaos. A breakdown of signification is evident, for example, in Burton's description of the task of defining melancholy. This project is fraught with confusion, as he is faced with a superabundance of chaotic information. Burton chooses Babel, a traditional symbol of signification gone wrong, to describe the situation:

> Babel never yielded such confusion of tongues, as this Chaos of Melancholy doth variety of symptoms .... which, howeverso they be diverse, intricate and hard to be confined, I will adventure yet, in such a vast confusion and generality, to bring them into some order.... (1.397)

In another example, he uses the alphabet[8] to describe this state of confusion:

> the four and twenty letters make no more variety of words in divers languages, than melancholy conceits produce diversity of symptoms in several persons. They are irregular, obscure, various, so infinite, Proteus himself is not so diverse; you may as well make the Moon a new coat, as a true character of a melancholy man. (1.408)

This disorder of signs is mirrored on a larger level by a chaos of textual authority. This textual chaos appears partly as a result of the sheer volume of information that Burton has to deal with: "in this scribbling age ... the number of books is without number" and "the presses be oppressed" (1.22) -- "what a glut of books ... who can read them? As already, we shall have a vast Chaos and confusion of Books, we are oppressed with them, our eyes ache with reading, our fingers with turning" (1.24). In addition to overwhelming readers, this overabundance of information appears to have had the more troubling effect of subverting traditional textual authority. O'Connell argues that Burton worked in the context of an increased availability of books which caused a "proliferation and relativizing of authority," subverting "any hope of arriving at a stable conclusion, a definitive truth" (O'Connell 44). As the availability of books increased, and it became possible for the collation of sources to become an

increasingly comprehensive undertaking, the degree of variety and contradiction inherent in them became more apparent (Eisenstein 74). Burton reflects this chaos of textual authority throughout the Anatomy, playing his sources against one another by placing contradictory statements by different authorities in stark opposition (Gibson 108). He routinely presents a variety of viewpoints when addressing any particular problem, but rather than trying to reconcile them or choosing between them Burton includes them all and, in fact, structures his text in such a way that contradictions become intractable and ambiguities more profound (Fish 330).

The increased availability of books that O'Connell mentions appears to have indirectly stimulated another form of crisis -- namely, the appearance of individualistic models of authorship and the corresponding demise of communal ones. As Elizabeth Eisenstein has argued, the increased accessibility and standardization of a large number of texts in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries appears to have been a key step in the formation of a literary canon. In turn, this increasingly present and formidable textual tradition appears to have fostered a sense of idiosyncrasy and self-consciousness in individual authors. The formation of a literary canon created a standard against which individual authors could gauge their uniqueness, providing a norm from they could deviate (Eisenstein 84). Maggie Kilgour has situated the Anatomy in the context of the Humanist ideal of

"collation" and makes the specific comparison between Burton's project and that of Erasmus in the Adages. One crucial difference is that "whereas Erasmus felt the need to create a sense of continuity with the past, for Burton that past is constantly present and so a potential rival" (Kilgour 163). As difference from one's intellectual predecessors comes to be understood as a constitutive element of authorship, rivalry between oneself and one's scholarly others becomes more of an issue. More generally, the author's relationship to these others and the bounds of one's authorial self become pressing concerns. Burton is highly self-conscious about his relationship to his sources. When he describes this relationship the possibility of a sterile repetition or theft of his predecessors' works appears: "no news here, that which I have stolen is from others .... If that severe doom of Synesius be true, it is a greater offence to steal a dead man's labours than their clothes, what shall become of most writers?" (1.22). Elsewhere, Burton writes:

> as Apothecaries we make new mixtures every day, pour out of one vessel into another; and as those old Romans robbed all the cities of the world, to set out their bad-sited Rome, we skim off the cream of other men's wits, pick the choice flowers of their tilled gardens to set out our own sterile plots. (1.23)

As the difference between one's literary self and one's literary others becomes more pronounced, the possibility of transgressive appropriation becomes more immediate.

In the Anatomy one sees a polarization between self and other and a corresponding sense of crisis not only in the

intellectual community, but also in society at large. Burton describes a society driven by aggressive self-interest in which "willing or unwilling, one must fight and either conquer or succumb, in which kill or be killed; wherein every man is for himself, his private ends & stands upon his own guard" (1.64). Burton associates this kind of divisive self-interest with a market-based system of values in which it is "every man for his own ends. Our summum bonum is commodity, and the goddess we adore Dea Moneta, Queen Money, to whom we daily offer sacrifice, which steers our hearts, hands, affections all...." (1.65). God is replaced by money and community is replaced by the market,

> a place ... wherein they cozen one another, a trap, nay, what's the world itself? A vast chaos, ... a mart of walking spirits, ... a shop of knavery .... No charity, love, friendship, fear of God, alliance, affinity, consanguinity, Christianity can contain them, but if they be any ways offended, or that string of commodity be touched, they fall foul. (1.64)

In this passage Burton is using an old satirical topos, the denunciation of lucre, but he is doing so in a century when, as Macpherson shows, the ground was being prepared for an autonomous individuality defined in terms of exclusive ownership and self-interest.

The various forms of crisis that Burton describes in the Anatomy may be understood as consequences of the passing of an analogical, communitarian outlook and the rise to dominance of a discourse of analysis. More specifically, what appear to be manifestations of crisis from Burton's essentially analogical

perspective may be understood as effects of the emphasis on difference inherent in the emerging analytical discourse. In this discourse, identity is established on the basis of difference rather than similitude. Thus, for example, analysis defines its own methodology partly by contrasting it with analogical and textual approaches, which it describes as erroneous or nonsensical. Similarly, the analytical discourse establishes appropriate modes of individuality partly by launching attacks on the communal and hierarchical models of the patterning discourse.

In the face of these sorts of critiques, the traditional workings of the patterning discourse appear to falter. Similitude and textual authority appear dysfunctional in the Anatomy since the analytical discourse, by virtue of its guiding assumptions, invalidates the sort of understanding of the world that is produced by an analogical, textual approach. Similarly, since the analytical discourse defines an individual by establishing his difference from other individuals and the rest of the world, one sees in the Anatomy representations of the breakdown of communal models of authorship and society.

In the Anatomy Burton attempts an active and, to varying degrees, self-conscious response to crisis. Rather than building on difference-based views of identity, Burton, in a regressive move, asserts various methods and priorities of the patterning discourse. In so doing, he attempts to collapse

various analytical distinctions -- that between legitimate and spurious forms of intellectual authority, for example, and that between self and other -- that underlie the various forms of crisis that he describes. Burton's approach is, then, distinct both from a naive patterning approach -- since his use of patterning elements is instrumental, or directed at something besides its ostensible subject -- and from that of the analytical discourse.

One feature of the patterning discourse which Burton puts to work in the Anatomy is an all-inclusiveness which does not privilege one form of intellectual authority over any other. Despite his occasional dismissal of stories that he describes as ridiculous, Burton has an undeniable penchant for the fantastic; indeed, as Webber points out, his description of the clinical aspects of melancholy appears somewhat dry and hurried in comparison with his lavish treatment of the strange and prodigious (Webber 89). Burton draws on all conceivable types of discourse, including anecdotes, gossip, theological tracts, old wives' tales, alchemical texts, astrological lore, hearsay, classical myths and so on, and he does not seem to draw distinctions between more and less authoritative sources of information. Madness and its cures are explained by way of descriptions surgical techniques (2.242), anecdotes about the curative powers of precious stones (2.250), tales of possession by devils (1.143), and accounts of love among vegetables, fish and angels (3.15, 44, 17). All of these may

be included because, as in the patterning discourse, they all contribute equally to an understanding of the world. When Burton does occasionally show some degree of scepticism he does not suggest a standard of selection to separate the true or necessary from the false or contingent. He advises the reader that fabulous passages in his text are to be taken "in a poetical faith" (3.73), and, in doing so, appeals to an analogical type of understanding.

Through this emulation of the all-inclusiveness of the patterning discourse, Burton undermines the privileging of one form of discourse over others. However, he also achieves similar ends through different means. One such alternative strategy is a satirical levelling of intellectual authorities. Burton supplements his positive assertion of the equal value of all forms of discourse with attempts to show that all sources of intellectual authority are equal by virtue of their inherent unreliability. In this sense, Burton aspires to an egalitarian view of intellectual authority that surpasses any similar tendencies to "democratization" in either the patterning or analytical discourses. In the Anatomy, there is no such thing as a transcendent authority since all forms of intellectual authority -- the ancients, contemporary scholars, experts, and Burton himself -- are equally flawed.

Certain features of the Anatomy -- most notably Burton's choice of Democritus Junior as a narrative persona -- suggest a satirical purpose. Different ages have attached different

significances to the figure of Democritus, but the Renaissance Democritus is primarily the laughing philosopher, a figure associated with satire (Babb 32). Burton himself portrays Democritus as a satirist and links him with the sort of social criticism and subversion of authority associated with feast days and the carnivalesque tradition as it has been described by Mikhail Bakhtin (Bakhtin 1968, Bristol). Toward the beginning of his work, Burton tells the reader that the Anatomy was written

> by an idle fellow, at idle times, about our Saturnalian or Dionysian feasts, when ... 'there is no danger in freedom:' servants in old Rome had liberty to say and do what they list .... If you deny me this liberty, upon these presumptions I will take it. (1.122)

Thus, Burton portrays himself as a satirist with critical and possibly subversive intent.

Prime targets of Burton's satire are Scholastic intellectual authorities and experts. At times Burton shows a radical anti-intellectualism, criticizing scholarly efforts which appear as ridiculous, useless or harmful; in one passage he describes "superfluous industry about unprofitable things and their qualities" and intellectual pursuits in which

> we commonly molest and tire ourselves about things unfit & unnecessary .... Be it in Religion, Humanity, Magick, Philosophy, Policy, any action or study, 'tis a needless trouble, a mere torment.... What is Astrology, but vain elections, predictions? all Magick, but a troublesome error, a pernicious foppery? Physick, but intricate subtilties, & fruitless abstractions? Alchemy but a bundle of errors? (1.366)

Burton supplements this kind of direct criticism with a more

subtle kind of subversion. Joseph Gibson shows how Burton puts to use the rhetorical technique of in utramque partum, or the arguing of both or many sides of an argument, to play authorities against one another and discredit them (Gibson 108-9). In a telling example (cited by Gibson), Burton describes "all those great philosophers the world hath ever had in admiration" (1.42) and, in particular, Socrates: he is "the wisest man of his time by the Oracle of Apollo, whom his two scholars, Plato and Xenophon, so much extol and magnify with those honourable titles, 'best and wisest of all mortal men, the happiest, and most just'" (1.42). Further on, he continues:

> re vera [in reality], he was an illiterate idiot, as Aristophanes calls him, irrisor et ambitiousus [a scoffer and fond of praise], and as ... Aristotle terms him, scurra Atticus [an Attic buffoon], as Zeno, an enemy to all arts and sciences ... an opinative ass, a caviller, a kind of pedant. (1.44)

Aristotle and other great philosophers are

> wisdom itself in the abstract, a miracle of nature, breathing libraries .. Oceanus, Phoenix, Atlas, monstrum, portentum hominis, orbis universi musaeum, ultimus humanae naturae conatus, naturae maritus [Oceanus, Phoenix, Atlas, a prodigy, a marvel of a man, a museum of the whole world, the supreme product of humanity, the spouse of Nature]," (1.43)

but in actuality "they could no more be called wise than boys men, they were children in respect, infants, not eagles, but kites; novices, illiterate, eunuchi sapientiae" (1.43). As Gibson suggests, these passages present the idea that human pretensions to final and absolute forms of knowledge are -- no matter who happens to vouch for them -- misguided, and that

"the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God" (1.43-4).

Burton does not retain this strategy exclusively for experts; he extends this critical levelling to any and all viewpoints, including his own. Examples of contradiction occur throughout the Anatomy, at times compressed into a single sentence, as Burton does a wild flip-flopping between different attitudes or accounts of his subject of the moment. In one such example, Burton addresses the reader as follows:

> [If any one thinks he has been insulted, let him think so.] If any man take exceptions, let him turn the buckle of his girdle, I care not. I owe thee nothing (reader), I look for no favour at thy hands, I am independent, I fear not

and immediately following this, "no, I recant, I will not, I care, I fear, I confess my fault, acknowledge a great offence" (1.122). After reading passage after passage of this kind, the reader no longer knows what to expect from this text -- what is sincere and what is not, what is true and what is false. Right before the beginning of the treatise proper and after a bit of abusive clowning with the reader, Burton writes "Solvite me, pardon O boni [good friends] that which is past, and I will make amends in that which is to come; I promise you a more sober discourse in my following treatise" (1.122). What follows this promise is, of course, anything but a sober discourse, and Burton's text continues to unravel itself, rendering any statement of fact questionable and giving the reader no opportunity whatsoever to get a stable fix on melancholy.

Through this kind of strategy, Burton puts any and all kinds of textual authority into the same category of unreliability. This sort of scepticism distinguishes his approach both from a naive participation in the patterning system and from the reductive empiricism of his analytically-minded contemporaries. While Burton recognizes the contingency of the knowledge culled from his sources, he does not suggest that there is some form of privileged intellectual authority that escapes contingency. His relativization of textual authority involves a recognition that each source represents one point of view among many equally legitimate (or equally flawed) ones. Despite his sceptical attitude toward his sources, there is nothing in the Anatomy to suggest that the individual may transcend this social and textual medium in his search for knowledge; while the individual is free to create his own view of the world, he invariably does so in the context of a community of scholarship, as Burton's copious quotation in the Anatomy suggests.

Burton asserts a similar sort of communal paradigm in addressing questions of originality in authorship and distinctions between a textual mine and thine. As I have tried to show, Burton indicates an awareness of the problem of intellectual property; however, rather than trying to create the illusion of an autonomous and exclusive textual individuality, Burton stresses his indebtedness to his predecessors and, looking back to earlier forms of textual

relations, invokes a communitarian model of authorship.

While a textual mine and thine do appear in the Anatomy, the line between the two is blurred to the point where they are often indistinguishable. Burton takes from other writers, but he does so in such a way that he can claim that what he takes is both his and theirs:

> ...sumpsi, non surripui [I have taken, not filched]; and what Varro ... speaks of bees ... they do little harm, and damage no one in extracting honey, I can say of myself, Whom have I injured? The matter is theirs most part, and yet mine... it is plain whence it is taken ... yet it becomes something different in its new setting. (1.25)

Burton argues that by placing the words of another in a novel context he alters their meaning: what he takes "becomes something different in its new setting". Thus, he complicates the attribution of the words that he quotes to any single creative point of origin. Burton further subverts the notion of private intellectual property through his casual style of inserting quotations into his text; as Webber points out, it is often difficult to tell where Burton's "I" ends and where that of another begins (Webber 81). The narrator's voice is, in a most radical way, permeated by the voices of others. Such an intermingling of authorial voices is, for Burton, the natural and inescapable condition of all authors. Borrowing from other authors may, as Burton's use of the term "pilfering" suggests, be understood as stealing; but such a view depends on the possibility of an establishing an exclusive, one-to-one relationship of ownership and

responsibility between a text and an author. It is this kind of setting of boundaries that Burton works against in the Anatomy. His style of quotation -- both in its copiousness, and in its intimate mixing of his voice with the voices of others -- supports the notion of an inescapable and natural dependence of authors on the works of their intellectual others.

Burton further complicates questions of intellectual property by making it impossible to identify the author of the Anatomy. The relationship between Burton, Democritus and Democritus Junior is kept deliberately ambiguous. Burton achieves this effect partly by removing the first edition's "Conclusion of the Author to the Reader," in which he revealed his identity, from subsequent editions. This editorial move has the effect of reducing his extra-textual dimension, making it difficult to identify an authorial point of origin outside of the text. In answer to the question of who is the author of the Anatomy he simply states "seek not after that which is hid; if the contents please thee, ... suppose the Man in the Moon, or whom thou wilt to be the Author; I would not willingly be known" (1.15). Even Burton's picture, which was added to subsequent editions, appears as an unreliable source of information regarding his identity since, as he writes, "we can judge a man's character much better from his conversation than his physiognomy" (1.27). When one tries to get past the surface of the text to the author behind it, one is

continually led back to this surface: as Burton writes, "I have laid myself open ... in this treatise, turned mine inside outward" (1.27). Inevitably, what appears to be a disclosure of the author's true identity is just one among several personae through which Burton dissipates any stable point of reference that might enable the reader to link the text to an individual creative point of origin. Since one may not identify a single author for the text, it is impossible to construe any relationship of exclusive possession between author and creation. By making it impossible to locate a centre of exclusive authorial responsibility outside of the text, Burton heads off questions of ownership, theft and originality.

Rather than trying to create an autonomous, self-contained individuality, Burton describes an all-encompassing (and encompassed) identity that rests on the continual give and take between himself and his sources, seemingly unconcerned with the dispersion of his own character that occurs in the process. Burton is Democritus Junior at one moment, "Roberto" at another (1.22), and Democritus at yet another (1.121); a fearful and apologetic author at one moment and an abusive scoffer at another (1.122-3). Webber describes "a feeling discernible in the seventeenth century that man is not the same person from moment to moment" (Webber 112), a problem that will be addressed in Locke's definition of personal identity as self-identity. For Burton this evidently

is not a problem; his "'I' can be equal to nobody, that is everybody, because the distinction between persons is merely a distinction between momentarily and artificially discrete manifestations of a single essence" (Fish 331). As Burton writes -- quoting Scaliger -- "we are not whole men but parts of man; from all of us together something might be made, and that not much; from each of us individually nothing" (1.60).

Burton achieves a more general collapsing of differences in the Anatomy through the use of rhetorical techniques based on the workings of similitude. The most prevalent of these are copia[9] and the related technique of equivocation. These two techniques work in opposite but related ways; in Burton's use of copia, many words are used to describe a single phenomenon, while in equivocation the same word is used in a variety of discrete but connected senses. Both of these strategies have the similar effect of multiplying and diversifying the connections between words and meanings. In a typical passage, Burton describes

> such as are improperly melancholy, or metaphorically mad, lightly mad, or in disposition, as stupid, angry, drunken, silly, sottish, sullen, proud, vain-glorious, ridiculous, beastly, peevish, obstinate, impudent, extravagant, dry, doting, dull, desperate, harebrain, &c., mad, frantic, foolish, heteroclites, which no new Hospital can hold. (1.120)

This and other examples of copia in the Anatomy are an encapsulated version of the proliferation of relations of similitude which characterizes the patterning system. The "etceteras" that Burton so frequently uses suggest that this

process may in fact go on infinitely, making the fixing of limits impossible.

This passage I have just cited is an example not only of Burton's use of copia, but also of his use of equivocation. Burton names these "improperly" melancholic types with the promise to exclude them, in order to focus on the disease proper and attain a perspicuous definition of melancholy: in his words, to "point at these particular species of dotage" and "omit all impertinent digressions" (1.120). As one reads on, however, one realizes that Burton does in fact include the various types of metaphorically melancholic characters that he promises to omit, putting them all in the single category of melancholy. As Fox suggests, "[Burton's] method can best be called by the term he uses so often: 'equivocation': say one word, 'melancholy', and mean numberless disorders by it" (Fox 129). As Burton pushes this process of equivocation to its limits, he extends the term "melancholy" to include the whole of mankind. This process of metaphorical connection through equivocation resembles the "sympathy" described by Foucault, a subspecies of similitude which, unchecked and unbalanced by its twin, antipathy (as it was in Renaissance theory), would "reduce the world to a point, a homogeneous mass, to a featureless form of the Same" (Foucault 1970, 24). Burton's use of an analogical approach tends toward this apocalyptic end, and in so doing, undermines the emphasis on difference which the analytical discourse will take up as a means of

identifying individuals and sorting them into categories.

Foucault has suggested that in the seventeenth century institutional manifestations of the analytical system appear, particularly in the context of efforts to deal with madness. As insanity comes to be more rigidly defined in opposition to normal modes of being and classified as a disease, institutions -- asylums, most obviously -- are created which physically separate the insane from the rest of society in order to bring them under control. Burton's text throws into question oppositions such as sane/insane on the basis of which the exercise of various forms of power -- medical interventions, for example -- is justified. In the above quotation, Burton writes that extension of "melancholy" beyond its clinical sense (i.e. to include "improperly" or metaphorically melancholic types of people) creates more madmen than any "new hospital" can hold. The metaphorical connections that place all of humanity in the single category of melancholy subvert the process of classification and localization that both a clinical definition of melancholy and the hospital, a physical manifestation of this classification, represent. Burton's use of similitude breaks down the difference between individuals, ultimately including them all in the same category of melancholy: "take melancholy in what sense you will, properly or improperly, in disposition or habit, for pleasure or for pain, dotage, discontent, fear, sorrow, madness, for part or all, truly or metaphorically,

'tis all one" (1.40).

Throughout the Anatomy, Burton's response to problems created by emerging difference-based models of identity is a self-conscious reassertion of the methods and priorities of the patterning discourse. In Burton's hands, the analogical techniques and corporate models of the patterning discourse become means of collapsing the dimension of difference on which analytical definitions of identity are based. Burton's text is thus a curious hybrid, showing an awareness of problems that are properly those of the analytical discourse, while responding to them in the language of patterning. A much different approach to the rising atomism and dislocation of authority in the seventeenth century -- one which has set the terms for discussions of individuality until the present day -- is found in the works of John Locke. As I hope to show in the next chapter, Locke deals with many of the same issues surrounding individuality that Burton does -- the individual's relationship to his social others and intellectual authority, in particular. However, working more firmly within the parameters defined by the analytical discourse, Locke rejects a communitarian model of individual identity in favour of an individuality based on exclusive self-possession, autonomy and control.

JOHN LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

From his doctrine of "simple ideas" to his social-contract model of the formation of civil societies, Locke makes the individual the primary reality in his epistemological and political theory, putting him in the place previously occupied by an ontic logos, nature or a divine order of things. Locke's reasons for giving the individual this privileged place in his theories may, of course, be explained in a number of different ways. Most obviously, by developing the view of an autonomous and inherently valuable individual, Locke frees him from various traditional tyrannies. In his political theory, Locke emancipates the individual from subjection to the sort of arbitrary and absolute power of monarchs that is described in political theories such as Hobbes' and Filmer's. Similarly, in his epistemological theory, Locke seeks to free the individual from the interested dogmatism of scholastic philosophy[10], as well as more common ills such as prejudice, superstition, and slavish adherence to tradition[11].

Locke uses the conceptual tools of the analytical discourse -- particularly, an emphasis on difference and empirical content in thought and speech -- to develop his theories of autonomous individuality. In his political and epistemological theory, Locke carries out a reductive analysis

of personal identity, human understanding and social order, stripping away concepts normally associated with these areas of concern in a search for their essential and empirically definable basis. The net effect of this process is an inversion of the ontological hierarchy between individuals and external reality. After the exclusion of concepts that either lack an empirical grounding or have no "necessary" connection with questions of political or conceptual order, one is left with characteristics of human individuals as the only certain reality.

This process of empirical reduction appears, for example, in II.xxvii of the Essay, where Locke tries to determine the essence of personal identity. In this section, Locke puts several concepts traditionally associated with human individuals to his empirical test of clearness and distinctness and comes to the conclusion that the meaning of these concepts is simply unknowable. He supposes the existence of something underlying the operations of the mind, but "with [an] ...ignorance of what it is": we "have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of a spirit" (Essay II.xxiii.5) and the nature of all substances, thinking or otherwise, is "secret and abstract" (Essay II.xxiii.6) -- he speaks of "this ignorance we are in of the Nature of that thinking thing, that is in us, and which we look on as our selves" (Essay II.xxvii.27). Locke continues his discussion with a process of analysis and reduction, dismissing notions that are associated

with, but not necessarily connected to personhood. The first such notion is that of "man". For Locke, man is not the "little world" that he was in the Renaissance, defined in analogical relations with the whole of creation. In the Essay this figure is fragmented into several distinct and reductively defined terms. First of all, the word itself is reduced to a description of physical appearance: "the idea in our minds of which the sound 'man' in our mouths is the sign, is nothing else but an animal of... a certain form" (Essay II.xxvii.8). Locke continues this process of exclusion, dismissing other ideas normally associated with human individuals; he asserts that the "soul alone ... would scarce be enough ... to make the same man" (Essay II.xxvii.15) and dismisses substance as an irrelevancy, not necessary or sufficient for sameness of person. Locke finally narrows down his discussion of the essence of human individuals to a single characteristic: "personal identity can by us be placed in nothing but consciousness" (Essay II.xxvii.21). The individual is defined by consciousness, both of present experience and past thoughts and actions as they are linked to the present through memory (II.xxvii.26).

Locke carries out a similar reduction in his discussion of the origins and limits of human knowledge. A recurring theme in Locke's epistemology is a denial of the possibility of certain knowledge of an objectively existing real world:

> having but some few superficial ideas of things, discovered to us only by the senses from without or by

> the mind reflecting on what it experiences ... [we] have no knowledge beyond that, much less of the internal constitution and true nature of things, being destitute of faculties to attain it (Essay II.xxiii.32)

and so

> the simple ideas we receive from sensation and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts; beyond which the mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot nor can it make any discoveries, when it would pry into the nature and hidden causes of those ideas. (Essay II.xxiii.29)

In Locke's system the real world is hidden behind an opaque veil of phenomena and, as such, is radically distanced from the individual's understanding.

Locke's response to this distancing is to dismiss the world of real essences as properly unknowable and to substitute consciousness for it as an object of knowledge; he develops a theory in which the whole of the individual's experience of the world may be defined in terms of "simple ideas," which, as he says, "are truly the materials of all our knowledge" (Essay II.xxiii.1). These simple ideas are conceptual analogs of sense perception and reflexive contemplation of one's own thought processes, both of which are contained within and exclusive to the individual. Simple ideas, in turn, serve as the building blocks for complex ideas. Taken together, simple and complex ideas account for all possible forms of thought. In substituting a world of phenomena for the world of real essences, Locke creates an epistemological subject whose entire mental life can be defined avoiding reference to anything outside of himself.

In his political theory, Locke does not actually dismiss the real nature of social order as unknowable. He does, however, suggest that there is no such thing as a natural collective social order that precedes or transcends human individuals. He does so partly through his "state of nature" theory. In this pseudo-historical narrative Locke describes "the state all men are naturally in" -- namely, "a state of perfect freedom to order their actions ... without asking leave, or depending on the will of any other man" (Second Treatise sect. 4)[12]. Locke extends this assumption of natural autonomy to modern societies by way of a number of empirical reductions which describe the basis of social order in terms of characteristics of individuals. One such characteristic is the individual will. In his social contract theory of civil society, Locke argues that individuals enter society voluntarily, "every man being ... naturally free, and nothing being able to put him into subjection to any earthly power, but only his own consent" (Treatise sect. 119). Locke makes a further reduction in which the consent that individuals give is described in terms of property. In his discussion of the social contract, Locke recognizes the infeasibility of a model that bases citizenship on "express" consent, since everybody in the commonwealth does not obviously express consent of this kind; the answer must be found in an expression of "tacit consent". Property provides a means of describing this consent, and hence the basis of the individual's participation

in government: "... every man that hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government" (Treatise sect. 119). Conversely, anyone "who will by donation, sale or otherwise quit said possession" negates his status as a citizen (Treatise sect. 121). The power to amass property is, in turn, described as a feature inherent in individuals -- a "property in one's own person" which justifies the appropriation by individuals of what is originally common to all mankind (Treatise sect. 27). By describing the origin of social institutions in terms of the consent of individuals as it is expressed in ownership, and making the original power of ownership an inherent feature of individuals, Locke reduces the origin of social order to characteristics of individuals.

In each of the above cases, Locke reduces some feature of reality to characteristics of individuals; personal identity is reduced to consciousness, knowledge of the world is reduced to combinations of simple ideas, and social order is described as a function of the individual will as it is expressed in ownership. However, another key feature of Locke's approach is his use of the notion of self-reflexivity. In each of the above cases Locke's individual is split, composed of a possessive, controlling self, and an objectified aspect of the individual -- consciousness, in the case of personal identity, and an internal analog of some feature of the external world

in his political and epistemological theory. It is the relationship of control and possession between these two aspects of the self that both defines Locke's individual and enables Locke to generate theories of social and epistemological order that do not violate the ideal of autonomous and self-contained individuality.

In Locke's epistemology, self-reflexivity appears in the idea that consciousness is always directed toward something. Locke's individual is highly self-conscious, a spectator of his own mental life. One source of simple ideas, for example, is "the notice the mind takes of its own operations" (Essay II.i.4); the mind continually "turns itself inward upon itself and observes its own actions" (Essay II.vi.1) in a mode of perception that is similar to the action of the mind as it perceives objects in sense perception[13]. Locke's individual stands in an attitude of detached observation toward his own objectified consciousness.

The degree to which the individual is dissociated from his own mental life is especially apparent in Locke's discussion of personal identity. In Locke's theory of personal identity, consciousness is objectified to the point where it becomes theoretically possible to question the relationship between a person and his own thoughts or actions. At one point in the discussion, Locke considers whether or not it is possible for the same consciousness to be transferred between different individuals or for two individuals to share a single

consciousness. He writes:

> I grant, were the same consciousness the same individual action, [consciousness of past actions] could not [be transferred from one thinking substance to another]; but, it being but a present representation of a past action, why it may not be possible that that may be represented to the mind to have been which really never was, will remain to be shown. (Essay II.xxvii.13)

One important question that comes out of these considerations is that of how to secure the relationship between an individual and his own thoughts or actions -- a relationship which comes to appear tenuous as Locke opens a rift between the individual and his objectified consciousness.

Locke's response to this troubling mobility of consciousness is to interpret the relationship between an individual and his own consciousness as one of exclusive ownership. Since consciousness of an action is not the actual action but a mental representation of it, the only means of securing the relationship between an action and the individual who performs it is a "reflex act of perception" accompanying the action, a self-reflexive, appropriative consciousness of it (Essay II.xxvii.13). Locke links an individual to his actions through an ownership model; "person," for Locke, "is a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit" (Essay II.xxvii.26). This is a model similar to that found in Locke's explanation of material appropriation in the Treatise. In his discussion of the origins of private ownership, Locke posits an undifferentiated material world that remains so until it is "mixed" with labour; material mixed with labour becomes a

possession of the individual. Locke's system of personal identity and accountability mirrors this model. One finds a world of perceived actions in an indifferent relation to the individual; it is when an action is "mixed" with consciousness, in the form of a self-reflexive act of perception, that it is appropriated by him. Starting with the notion of a split individual, Locke develops a theory which establishes a firm link between individuals and their acts, showing "how far the consciousness of past actions is annexed to any individual agent, so that another cannot possibly have it" (Essay II.xxvii.13). Personal identity of the individual is defined by the relationship of exclusive possession between an individual and his own objectified consciousness.

Locke's epistemology depends on the concept of an internally divided individual, much in the same way that his theory of personal identity does. After dismissing the real world as properly unknowable, Locke interprets reality as the product of the action of a possessive and controlling self on simple ideas. He contrasts an unthinking passivity with an active ordering of simple ideas, the latter depending on a critical distance between an ordering self and perceptions. The correct action of the mind involves an active analysis of sense perception into discrete units and a carefully controlled recombination of these units into generic ideas. After "separating carefully, one from another, ideas wherein can be found the least difference" (Essay II.xi.2) the mind

"puts together several of those simple [ideas] it has received from sensation and reflection and combines them into complex ones" (Essay II.xi.6). The individual, starting with his own simple ideas, joins them in voluntary combinations to form complex ideas which, in their totality, constitute his knowledge of the world. This model implies that, for better or worse, the individual lives in the mental world that he creates for himself.

As Amos Funkenstein has shown, seventeenth-century epistemology works with a constructive or "ergetic" theory of knowledge which is based on the idea that "we know only the things that we have constructed ourselves" (Funkenstein 297). An epistemological model of this kind holds certain advantages; Locke evidently sees in this constructive process the potential for totally precise and self-evident knowledge, especially in the case of mixed modes. These,

> being combinations of several ideas that the mind of man has arbitrarily put together, without reference to any archetypes, men may, if they please, exactly know the ideas that go to each composition, and so both use these words in a certain and undoubted signification, and perfectly declare...what they stand for. (Essay III.xi.15)

This is a type of understanding which is, for Locke, clearly superior to one which patterns its knowledge on a preexisting and external natural order; nominalists "need but know the combination of ideas that are put together within their own minds" while realists "must inquire into the whole nature and abstruse hidden constitution and various qualities existing

without them" (Essay II.xi.17). In the system that Locke describes there is no need for mysterious or ambiguous language; one may know exactly what any given concept, moral or natural, means by looking at the combination of simple ideas that one has put together to make that concept up. Locke's individual is autonomous and capable of perfect self-referential knowledge; as Tully remarks, "by designating knowledge of the world he makes as archetypal, Locke signals that this is the area in which man is, epistemologically, in a position similar to God" (Tully 22).

This theory of knowledge frees the individual from dependence on his intellectual others, and textual tradition generally, by making the individual the sole source of his understanding of the world. As Locke argues that an individual may not understand anything except in terms of the simple ideas that he himself has put together in his own mind, he also argues that the individual is independent from his scholarly others in creating knowledge. Locke in fact views intellectual dependence on others as a form of beggary, and applauds the man who, "not content to live lazily on scraps of begged opinions, sets his own thoughts on work, to find and follow truth" (Essay xxxix).

The split individual that we see in Locke's epistemology also appears in his theory of civil society. In describing how the individual comes to acquire the property on which his political identity is based, Locke makes the individual the

exclusive proprietor of his own person: "though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has a right to but himself" (Treatise sect. 27). Locke's individual is thus made up of a possessing self, and the objectified "property in one's own person".

This original relation of ownership between the individual and his objectified person provides a key paradigm for Locke's theories of the individual. Most obviously, it provides him with his chief rationale for the appropriation by individuals of that which is originally common to all of mankind. It is, as Locke writes, "the great foundation of all property" (Treatise sect. 44). Locke's individual, just as he owns his own person, owns whatever portion of the physical world is "mixed" with this person through labour: "whatsoever ... [one] removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property" (Treatise sect.27). Locke also extends this basic relation of ownership metaphorically to explain the relationship between individuals and rights. As he says at various points in the Treatise, he considers the term "property" to include "lives, liberties and estates," the full complement of individual rights that civil society was designed to protect[14]. These are joined exclusively to individuals in the same sort of relationship that links the

individual to physical property. The individual is defined in exclusive possessive relationships with himself, the material world and certain states of being -- liberty, for example -- which are described as property.

Thus Locke creates a political theory in which the individual may be defined solely in terms of his own resources and characteristics; the political identity of the individual is expressed in terms of property, and each individual contains within himself, independently of others, the power of appropriation. However, Locke also manages to describe the social interaction individuals in a way that does not compromise their autonomy and self-containment. Specifically, he makes self-interested appropriation into a legitimate form of social responsibility by way of the concept of the common good:

> he who appropriates land to himself by his labour does not lessen, but increase the common stock of mankind: for the provisions serving to the support of human life, produced by one acre of inclosed and cultivated land, are ... ten times more than those which are yielded by an acre of land of an equal richness lying waste in common. (Treatise sect. 37)

Locke grounds this apparently disingenuous assertion of the common good as a justification of self-interested appropriation in a supposed correspondence between the individual's impulse to rational appropriation and an objectively existing providential order. As Charles Taylor suggests, for Locke the impulse to self-preservation and rational (that is, efficient and fruitful) appropriation is a

providential one, corresponding to the laws that govern nature. This model of social agency allows Locke's individual to remain completely autonomous and capable of self-definition while linking him with his social others through the concept of the common good. Furthermore, Locke's model of responsible self-interest, like the various forms of ascetic protestantism that Max Weber describes, ultimately has "the psychological effect of freeing the acquisition of goods from the inhibition of traditionalistic ethics" (Weber 171).

Locke's epistemology and political theory both depend on the concept of a split individual; in each case the identity of individuals is grounded in a relationship of control and possession with an objectified aspect of the self, which is some internal analogue of the outside world. However, while apparently solving the problem of the individual's dependence on an arbitrary and capricious external order, these theories raise certain problems. One such problem is the possibility of alienation, and the corresponding possibility of a degeneration of social order. If the second term in relation to which Locke's individual defines his identity is rendered unstable, the identity of the individual and social order suffer accordingly.

In Locke's epistemology, the individual is so much the creator of his own world that solipsism becomes a problem; as John Richetti points out, "in denying the availability of an external order, Locke temporarily suggests that a zany

solipsism is an option, since an individual as such is cut off from other beings and substances" (Richetti 107). This problem is especially apparent in Locke's discussions of language. Locke makes a distinction between private and public language. On the one hand, a word is used by an individual as a marker for a collection of simple ideas that the individual himself has put together: "words, in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them, how imperfectly soever or carelessly those ideas are collected from the things which they are supposed to represent" (Essay III, ii, 2). While one finds "the right use and perfection of language" in the private realm, "civil" and "philosophical" language, which are used in communicating our thoughts to others (Essay III.ix.1), appear as a degenerate form: "the chief end of language in communication being to be understood, words serve not well for that end" (Essay III.ix.4).

Difficulties occur when one combines Locke's individualistic epistemological model with the undeniably social character of language. The "voluntary combinations of simple ideas" in different individuals, perfectly adequate in private uses of language, appear as a source of protracted confusion when individuals communicate. Discrepancy appears repeatedly as a problem: "...that [signs] signify only men's peculiar ideas ... is evident in that they often fail to excite in others the same ideas we take them to be the signs

of" and "every man has so inviolable a liberty to make words stand for what he pleases that no one hath the power to make others have the same ideas in their minds that he has, when they use the same words that he does." (Essay III.ii.8). As John Richetti points out, Locke's individual is "a prisoner of his own essentially incommunicable 'ideas' and the possessor of an irrepressible linguistic individuality, much like that claimed by Carroll's Humpty Dumpty" (Richetti 93). Furthermore, the natural intellectual idiosyncrasy in which this linguistic individuality is based causes other far-reaching problems. If the individual really is the source of the world that he experiences, countless individuals represent the threat of a total relativization of reality. In terms of the identity of the individual, this relativization undermines the stable "other" in terms of which he defines his identity.

One encounters a similar set of problems in Locke's political theory. The view of the individual as self-proprietor is based on a division between the "I" that owns and the "I" that is owned. While this split provides the initial justification for the ownership models that Locke introduces, it also opens up the possibility of alienation. If one's own person and the potential for property that it represents can be owned, it can also be sold or taken away. Macpherson points out that in the Second Treatise "the more emphatically labour is understood to be a property, the more it is understood to be alienable" (Macpherson 214). Similarly,

the more emphatically one's political identity is linked with property, the more it is understood to be alienable. Since the identity of Locke's individual is secured in this relation of ownership, alienation of property constitutes a subversion of this identity.

In the Second Treatise, this sort of danger appears most obviously in the possibility of theft. One may kill a thief who threatens to take one's money because, as Locke writes, in "using force ... to get me in his power ... I have no reason to suppose, that he, who would take away my liberty, would not, when he had me in his power, take away everything else" (Treatise sect.18). Locke's marauding thief, by transgressing the fundamental right of exclusive ownership, threatens not only the individual's material goods but "everything else" that this right of ownership secures. This threat is all the more serious for being ubiquitous. The possibility of losing one's property comes not only from thieves or tyrants but, seemingly, from every quarter. A powerful desire for possession and control is a feature of human beings that is evident from the time they are infants:

> another thing wherein [infants] show their love of Dominion, is their desire to have things to be theirs; They would have Propriety and possession, pleasing themselves with the Power which that seems to give, and the Right they thereby have, to dispose of them, as they please. (Some Thoughts Concerning Education, sect. 105)

Furthermore, Locke's hedonistic model of social agency[15] does not ensure that pain and pleasure will always direct the individual toward the good; Locke writes that desires, "if

they were left to their full swing ... would carry men to the overturning of all morality. Moral laws are set as a curb and restraint to these exorbitant desires" [6]. The "greater part" of men being "no strict observers of equity and justice," one is "constantly exposed to he invasion of others" (Treatise sect. 119).

The threat to social order that each of the above scenarios describes is also a threat to individual identity. In both Locke's epistemology and his political theory, the identity of the individual depends on a stable relationship with a second term. In Locke's epistemology, the individual is defined by his relationship to reality as it emerges in an ordering of sense perception based on the perception of difference. In his political theory, the individual is defined by his relationship with property, which, as we have seen, includes the broader concerns of "life, liberty and estate". Any threat to these connections constitutes a threat to the individual's identity.

The integrity of these relationships ultimately depends on their exclusive nature. In Locke's theories, and in the analytical discourse generally, identity is a function of difference. In contrast to the patterning discourse, a thing is defined by its difference from other things. Locke writes:

> it is the first act of the mind, when it has any sentiments or ideas at all, to perceive its ideas, and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their difference and that one is not another. This is so absolutely necessary that without it there could be no knowledge, no reasoning, no

imagination, no distinct thoughts at all. (Essay IV.i.4)

This emphasis on difference appears in Locke's methodology as well as in his theories of individuality. For example, in his theory of personal identity, Locke feels that he must show "how far the consciousness of past actions is annexed to any individual agent, so that another cannot possibly have it" (Essay II.xxvii.13) and argues that consciousness, rather than some other feature of the individual, forms the basis of personal identity since it alone "...distinguishes [any given individual] from all other thinking things..." (Essay II.xxvii.9). In Locke's theories, determining the essence of an individual, or anything else, means finding a basis on which one may distinguish it from other individuals or things.

Difference also plays a key role in Locke's theories of civil society; his political individual maintains his identity to the degree that he preserves some distinction between himself and his social others. The very basis of his autonomous identity, the relation of ownership with himself, is defined in terms of the exclusion of others: "every man has a property in his own person: this no body has a right to but himself" (Treatise sect. 27). It is precisely the breakdown of this crucial dimension of difference that Locke envisions as the breakdown of social order generally -- the state of war is one in which "every ... least difference is apt to end" (Treatise sect. 21). A nightmare scenario for Locke is one in which "some common and great distress, uniting [labourers] in

one universal ferment, makes them forget respect, and emboldens them to carve to their wants with armed force."[1] Part of the horror of the mob scenario stems from the fact that those that make it up lose their individuality; Locke speaks of "some common and great distress, uniting [labourers] in one universal ferment". Locke's description of the duties of the citizen in civil society also appears to be framed in terms of difference and exclusion. Any obligations that he does mention are negative ones; for example, one "may not ... take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another" (Treatise sect. 6). Throughout the Treatise, responsible social behaviour amounts to refraining from "invading others rights, and from doing hurt to one another" (Treatise sect.7), preserving oneself and leaving "enough and as good" land for others (Treatise sect. 33).

Institutionalized emphasis on difference appears in the form a government designed for the express purpose of protecting private property. Locke argues that people "enter into society with others for the securing and regulating of property" and, consequently, that all law making is for the preservation of property (Treatise sect. 120). That this property is private property is one of the founding assumptions of Locke's theory of civil society. Throughout the Treatise, Locke describes "property" not only as a possession but as a right. These two senses of "property" reinforce one

another, the material sense providing a metaphor to explain the relationship between individuals and rights, and the "rights" aspect reinforcing the notion of the exclusive nature of ownership. Since rights are, by definition, exclusive, Locke's "property" and the right of ownership that it represents are also exclusive. The raison d'etre of the government that he describes is the protection of private property.

A similar need for boundaries and distinctions emerges in Locke's epistemology. A main problem that appears there is the relativization of reality that autonomously thinking and speaking individuals represent. Locke attempts to solve this problem through a theory of referentiality which depends on various forms of difference.

Locke supposes a correspondence between the human ordering of sense perception and an objectively existing order of things:

> ... the mind of man, in making its complex ideas of substances, never puts any together that do not really, or are not supposed to, co-exist, and so it truly borrows that union from nature. (Essay III.vi.29)

Thus, Locke asserts a standard of referentiality in the use of language: "names must be conformable to things as they exist" (Essay III.xi.10). It is through this sort of harnessing of thought and language to an external order that Locke tries to save social and conceptual order from falling into complete chaos:

for though men may make what complex ideas they please

> and give what names to them they will, yet if they will be understood when they speak of things really existing, they must in some degree conform their ideas to the things they would speak of; or else men's language will be like that of Babel, and every man's words, being intelligible only to himself, would no longer serve to conversation and the ordinary affairs of life. (Essay III.vi.28)

However, the sort of referentiality that Locke describes admits degrees of precision; one may join simple ideas in ways that correspond more or less perfectly to the actual arrangement of the real world. In the full version of the quotation given above, Locke writes:

> though the mind of man, in making its complex ideas of substances, never puts any together that do not really, or are not supposed to, co-exist, and so it truly borrows that union from nature: yet the number it combines depends upon the various care, industry, or fancy of him that makes it. (Essay III.vi.29)

One's view of the world is more or less "correct" depending on the closeness of fit between one's selection of simple ideas and a corresponding reality. It is on the basis of this ostensible closeness of fit between ideas and the real world that Locke establishes certain types of discourse as objective[18].

However, beyond offering such vague criteria as clarity and distinctness, Locke never explains how one is to know whether or not one's collection of simple ideas does or does not have this closeness of fit. This is where procedural difference becomes important in Locke's epistemology; his designation of acceptable forms of knowledge depends more on the marginalization of other ways of understanding the world

than on the elaboration of a particular methodology. Throughout the Essay, Locke describes imperfect forms of thought and language, which serve as a foil against which he constructs legitimate forms of discourse; he defines objective forms of language largely by describing what they are not.

Figurative language is one of Locke's key targets; in Locke's opinion "all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgement, and so indeed are the perfect cheat" (Essay III.x.34). More generally, similitude, the same discursive process that rendered the world meaningful in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, becomes, in Locke's view, the chief occasion of error in thought and language. One must distinguish clearly between individual ideas so as to "avoid being misled by similitude": the

> wrong connexion in our minds of ideas, in themselves loose and independent one of another, has such an influence and is of so great force to set us awry in our actions as well moral as natural, passions, reasonings, and notions themselves, that perhaps there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after. (Essay II.xxxiii.9)

It is a type of "madness," rendering one "fitter for Bedlam than for civil conversation" (Essay II.xxxiii.4). Locke writes, "... there are degrees of madness, as of folly: the disorderly jumbling ideas together is in some more and some less" and that "madmen put wrong ideas together, and so make wrong propositions..." (Essay II.xi.13). Knowledge comes to be

seen as more or less "correct," depending on how carefully one combines simple ideas, and how thoroughly one is able to "distinguish one thing from another, where there is but the least difference" (Essay II.xi.2).

Language, rather than simply being a de facto connection between individuals, is, for Locke, a kind of social contract. In his Essay, Locke joins together potentially isolated individuals by construing the process of reductive analysis and controlled recombination of sense perception as an avenue to objective truth. However, in doing so he also relegates any concept that may not be grounded in a collection of simple ideas to the realm of error. The freedom that Locke proposes for his thinking individual is a limited form of freedom, since the ideal intellectual commonwealth that he envisions will be ruled by what the modern reader will recognize as the discourse of science and analytical philosophy As Reiss points out, the analytical discourse, based as it is on the law of the excluded middle, is not hospitable to alternative types of discourse. "What analysis cannot understand, it must exclude" (Reiss 379) -- or, as Locke advises those thinkers who will not follow the analytical criteria of clarity and perspicuity, "si non vis intelligi, debes negligi" (Essay III.ix.10). Locke's individual may no longer be dependent on professional philosophers or textual tradition for knowledge, but his power to create his own interpretations of the world is severely limited by the standard of single, absolute and

empirically verifiable objective truth that Locke proposes.

By creating definitions of political and conceptual order based on the problems and resources of individuals, Locke liberates the individual from various forms of oppression. By placing a right to property in individuals, independent of any legitimating hierarchical authority, Locke appears to secure for them the exclusive right to their liberty and the fruits of their labour. Furthermore, by locating the origin of concepts in the action of a withdrawn and controlling self on sense perception, Locke appears to give individuals the theoretical means of finding truth independently of intellectual authorities or textual tradition. However, the degree to which Locke abstracts the individual in describing his autonomous character appears to create a number of problems: primarily, that of describing a stable political order based on the interaction of intellectually idiosyncratic and politically self-interested individuals. Locke's theories of personal identity finally depend on an uncompromising emphasis on difference. Locke's individual maintains his political identity by excluding others from that property to which he has an exclusive right. Furthermore, the standards in thought and language which enable individuals to communicate are defined at the expense of other, marginalized forms of discourse. In my concluding chapter I will consider some of the broader implications of the mode of individuality described by Locke, examine contrasting implications of

developments in recent theory and consider Burton's significance in the context of modern and post-modern theories of individuality.

CONCLUSION

Analytico-referential discourse and its particular view of individuality were born in a spirit of optimism and unlimited potential for betterment of the human condition. They were also, in the case of Locke, advanced in the name of tolerance and as a safeguard against oppression, both by external authority, and by personal ills such as prejudice and superstition. Consolidated under the banner of "common sense," the view of the world advanced by Locke and his contemporaries has set the parameters within which we conceive of the individual to this day.

However, in addition to autonomy, the analytical view of the individual, especially as it appears in Locke's theories, includes a number corollaries that may be described as side effects. Locke appears to do more than he has to in creating his theory of autonomous individuality; rather than simply campaigning for the right to intellectual and political self-determination, Locke creates the view of a distanced individual who establishes his identity to the degree that he maintains control and possession over some objectified "other". Autonomy is part of a complex of related features that characterize Locke's individual. This individual may be autonomous and self-determining, but he is also reduced to what Charles Taylor has described as a "punctual self" -- a withdrawn and controlling consciousness with no necessary

connection to its social context or to the values appropriate to participation in civil society[19].

This view of the relationship between self and other has had a number of specific implications for modern individuals. One such implication is that individuals, while asserting control over an objectified "other," also become the objects of such control. This situation appears as an ambivalence at the centre of Locke's theories; while his theories constitute a justification of the right to self-determination, they also introduce the need for conformity. An emphasis on the individual does not necessarily entail more freedom for the individual; indeed, as John Meyer has argued, "only in individualist societies is it so important to control what individuals are and how they behave and think" (Meyer 212). Once self-directed human beings come to be understood as the origin of social and conceptual order or disorder, their appropriate socialization and the setting of standards in thought and behaviour become important issues. While these sorts of standards provide a means for idiosyncratic individuals to come together in society, they also sanction the imposition of order on anyone or anything that is perceived as different. The objectified self, while imposing its own order on the world, also comes to be understood as a target for the organizing and restraining action of an appropriately schooled will.

A more overtly political consequence of the dominance of

analytical theories of autonomous individuality has been the justification of self-interest as a form of responsible social agency. Locke's theories have yielded the view of an individual with no essential connection with its social, material or symbolic environments. By making it possible to ignore issues such as race, class and gender, analytical views of the individual have enabled political institutions to maintain the myth of a natural and original equality, and a self-created identity based on the unimpeded free choice of autonomous individuals -- a myth which appears increasingly ludicrous in the face of persistent economic, racial and gender inequality.

In recent scholarship many of the claims of analytico-referential discourse and its particular view of individuality have come under question, both as this discourse reveals the limits of its own functioning, and as other voices come to challenge its dominance. Demonstrating a characteristic inability of philosophy to limit the plurality of meaning inherent in the language that it uses, deconstruction has rendered problematic philosophical claims to a truth status different than that of fiction (Richetti 2). A variety of post-structuralisms have demonstrated that there is nothing to distinguish analysis and reduction, no matter how cautious or precise, as more objective than any other sort of sign manipulation. In even the most basic forms of analytical designation, "the word is a metonymic fiction, since," being

a selection of particular features and exclusion of others, "it represents a part of what is in fact an endless particularity" (Richetti 99).

These critiques have stimulated the questioning of another aspect of our Lockean inheritance -- namely, the firm distinctions between academic disciplines. This point is of special significance for this thesis, since it deals with non-fiction texts and addresses problems normally considered to be the province of philosophy. The subversion of analytical notions of objectivity and disinterestedness has paved the way for insights such as Richetti's that "the boundary between literature (or rhetoric) and writing is properly ... a historical issue, for 'literature' is meaningless except as a historical category, a variable notion" (Richetti 2). Such realizations extend the legitimate compass of literary inquiry to all types of writing. Furthermore, recent scholarship has broken down the barriers between political and literary discourse by showing the inherently ideological nature of all theorizing and interpretation. The critic makes sense of a text by temporarily suspending the infinite variety of perspectives -- gender, class, historical, anthropological and so on -- that might be taken in interpreting it, and concentrating on one reductively defined area of concern. This sort of approach makes the critic's job possible by delimiting a manageable portion of the object under study and supplying an appropriate methodology; however, in doing so it denies the

wholeness of the text. While it is impossible to imagine an approach that would not involve this sort of selective attention, one may be more or less inclusive in one's consideration of any phenomenon. In this thesis I have tried to take a more holistic view of the problem of individuality by taking into account a broader range of viewpoints.

In addition to introducing these sorts of methodological concerns, recent theoretical approaches have altered our notions of individuality, showing self-containment and "natural" autonomy to be ideologically loaded and culturally specific ideas. By attenuating the empirical rigor of traditional analytical approaches and taking into account a broader range of concerns, marxist, feminist, psychoanalytic and other initiatives have shown that the identity of individuals depends on a wide range of external and pre-determined factors. In doing so, they have rendered porous the firm boundaries between self and other that Locke sets up in his theories.

There are evidently several points of contact between recent theoretical responses to analytico-referential discourse and Burton's project in the Anatomy. Both appear to react to the difference-based strategies of the analytical discourse. Furthermore, both include critical responses aimed at the notion of privileged intellectual authority -- Burton's in the form of a satirical levelling of textual authority, and post-structuralism's, most radically, in the form of

deconstruction of the most basic assumptions underlying Western metaphysics. Both also include a relational theory of knowledge -- post-structuralism in the form of theories of intertextuality and Burton in the emulation of the textual and communitarian models of authorship of the patterning discourse.

A more specific point of contact between twentieth-century theory and Burton's project in the Anatomy is found in the works of M.M. Bakhtin. Bakhtin's "dialogism" describes meaning in language as the interplay between the intention of any individual speaker and the layers of meaning already inherent in the words that the speaker uses. For Bakhtin, language is the intersection between public and private; "language, for the individual consciousness, lies on the borderline between oneself and the other." (Bakhtin 1981, 293). Bakhtin recognizes that inherited linguistic forms do, in part, determine the meaning of what one says, but he also asserts the importance of the unique point of view -- or, unique "language" -- that each speaker represents. As I have tried to show, Locke views the linguistic and intellectual idiosyncrasy of individuals as a troubling state of affairs, the makings of a Babel or Bedlam, which must be checked by strict adherence to objective standards. Bakhtin, by contrast, views this diversity as the basis for dialogue:

> ... all languages ... whatever the principle underlying them and making each unique, are specific points of view on the world, forms for conceptualizing the world in words, specific world views, and each characterized by

> its own objects, meanings and values. As such they all may be juxtaposed to one another, mutually supplement one another, contradict one another and be interrelated dialogically. As such, they encounter one another and coexist in the consciousness of real people .... (Bakhtin 1981, 292)

For Bakhtin, standardized and universalized forms of language such as those that Locke proposes are not necessary or, indeed, possible. Rather than positing a single, universal standard in thought and speech, dialogism makes language a collective enterprise. Words bear the mark of all who use them, and any word or statement is understood as part of a conversation between different viewpoints. Reality emerges in the interaction of these various perspectives in language.

Bakhtin's theories provide an additional modern context in which to consider the significance of the Anatomy of Melancholy. Meaning in the Anatomy exists somewhere on the border between Burton's authorial voice and the sources that permeate his text. The quotations that Burton takes from these sources retain some of their integrity, or otherness, but also take on new meaning as Burton puts them in novel contexts, pits them against one another, joins them together or qualifies them with his own comments. Furthermore, he combines his sources in such a way that no one voice appears to be privileged. Rather than building on the fiction of a self-creating, autonomous individual, Burton describes an individuality that is based on an overtly inescapable interaction with the other; without his tens of hundreds of sources there would be no text, which is to say, no authorial

Burton. Simultaneously, he tries to resist the subordination of one term to the other -- neither self nor other appears as a privileged term. Through an emulation of the communal models of the patterning discourse, Burton tries to negate the same distance between self and other that makes withdrawal from the world and objectification of the other seemingly inevitable corollaries to modern individuality.

Analytico-referential discourse and the theories of autonomous individuality to which it gave rise have affected modern conceptions of the world in ways that it would not be possible, or desirable, to cast off entirely. One important task of contemporary theory is to distinguish between the different values inherent in this sort of individuality. Burton and Locke, by virtue of their liminal position in the history of modern individuality, provide perspectives that can help modern theorists to make these sorts of distinctions. The Anatomy is of value because it offers a critical response to the theoretical foundations of modern individuality that is framed in terms of a discourse other than our own. Burton helps to show the contingency of modern views of individuality by simple virtue of his "otherness". In Locke's theories we see the arguments that laid the foundations for what have since become common sense notions of individuality. By looking at a time when these notions still required some justification, and alternative political and epistemological orders were fresh in the memories of theorists, one is able to

see more clearly the motivating forces behind theories of autonomous individuality, and the complex of features that make it up. It may, as Charles Taylor has suggested, be possible to affirm the value of a self-responsible individuality while casting off the withdrawn and objectifying subjectivity on the basis of which Locke and others established the notion of the autonomous individual (Taylor 514). Informed efforts in this direction stand to gain from an examination of the seventeenth-century roots of modern individualism.

NOTES

1. Reiss, Dumont, Cassirer, Morris, Ullman, and Bordo, while examining different aspects of individuality and working with different chronologies, each posit the existence of a pre-modern world view which lacked the notion of the autonomous, inherently valuable and self-directed individual.

2. From the Oxford English Dictionary entry for "individual," volume III, pp.879-80. The Oxford English Dictionary is hereafter referred to as "OED".

3. It is important at this point to explain in what sense one can use the term "individual" when speaking of times when the concept of the individual apparently did not exist. The answer lies in distinguishing two different meanings of this term. Louis Dumont addresses the question as follows:

> ... when we speak of man as an individual we designate two concepts at once: an object out there, and a value. Comparison obliges us to distinguish analytically these two aspects; one, the empirical subject of speech, thought and will, the individual sample of mankind as found in all societies; and two, the independent, autonomous, and thus essentially non-social moral being, who carries our paramount values and is found primarily in our modern ideology of man and society. (Dumont 94)

Numerical individuals, Dumont's "individual samples of mankind" obviously did exist prior to the seventeenth century; it is the autonomous individual of modern theory that appears to be a relatively recent innovation. While the self-possessed, autonomous individual of modern ideology will be the main subject of this thesis, I will also have occasion to speak of the plain, numerical individual.

4. Throughout this thesis I will be using the pronouns "he," "his" and "him," rather than gender-neutral alternatives, to stand for the individual or person. This choice is prompted by the themes and historical period with which I am dealing. As Susan Bordo has argued, our dominant philosophical and scientific traditions, and the detached and objectifying individuality that is associated with them, emerged in a "masculinization" of thought during the seventeenth century. The approach to the natural world described by Descartes, Bacon and their contemporaries depends on a characteristically masculine cognitive style, based on autonomy, separation and distance (Bordo 104). The autonomous individual of modern theory is, essentially, a "he".

5. This is especially apparent in Augustine's discussion of exegesis in III.v.9 of On Christian Doctrine. See also Confessions XII and Robertson's discussion of Augustine's exegetical theory in his Preface to Chaucer, pp. 97-8.

6. A key feature of this discourse is, of course, that it eventually obscures the "constructed" nature of this type of classification and construes this sort of understanding as objective truth.

7. Milton appears to have been ahead of the institutions governing printing and copyright in terms of his view of authorship. As Blum notes, until as late as the Licensing Act's repeal in 1694, the owner of a book was frequently not its author (Blum 76).

8. The alphabet was a favourite metaphor of Bacon's for the process of analysis, reduction and recombination that characterizes the analytical approach to the natural world. For Bacon's use of the alphabet metaphor see Reiss' Discourse of Modernism, p.210. See also Bacon, pp.278 and 348.

9. Erasmus gives the following definition of copia: "Plentitude of thoughts and words, the opposite of brevity. The copious style speaks most fully, and enriches its matter with as varied an ornamentation as possible, expanding the subject until nothing can be added to it" (from Erasmus' De duplici copia verborum ac rerum commentari duop, quoted in Sonnino, p.216).

10. See especially III.x.9 of the Essay.

11. Neal Wood compares Locke's undertaking in the Essay to Bacon's Great Instauration, calling it a "project for a modest instauration". Locke envisions a science that would free people from the "perverting influence of customs, the frivolity of opinions, the allurements of pleasures, the violence of passions and the enthusiasms of parties" (from Two Tracts on Government, quoted in Wood, pp.95-96).

12. Hereafter referred to as Treatise.

13. In the Essay Locke writes that reflection on the actions of one's own mind, "though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly be called internal sense" (II.i.4).

14. See, for example, section 123 of the Treatise.

15. Locke describes individuals' moral and social action in terms of a hedonistic model in which individuals are motivated by pleasure and pain. The foundation for this model appears in

the Essay Concerning Human Understanding: "things then are good or evil only in reference to pleasure or pain. That we call good which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us, or else to procure or preserve us the possession of any other good or absence of any evil" (Essay II.xx.1).

16. This passage appears in I.ii.13 of the 1894 Fraser edition of the Essay, but not in Yolton's 1974 edition, which I used in preparation of this thesis. This excerpt is quoted by Macpherson, p. 239.

17. Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and Raising the Value of Money, in Works, 6th edition, 1759, ii.36. Quoted in Macpherson, p.223.

18. Elsewhere, Locke writes, "by real ideas, I mean such as have a foundation in nature, such as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things ... Fantastical or chimerical, I call such as have no foundation in nature, nor have any conformity with that reality of being to which they are tacitly referred..." (Essay II.xxx.1).

19. Locke does provide an extensive and detailed program for moral education in Some Thoughts Concerning Education but, as John and Jean Yolton point out in their introduction to this work, it is more of an adjunct to his political and epistemological theory than an outgrowth of it (Some Thoughts Concerning Education 3). The need for this kind of moral supplement to his theories might be taken as an added indication that they do not, in themselves, provide a theoretical grounding for virtuous behaviour on the part of individuals.

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