

EGYPTIAN POLICY TOWARDS THE

ARAB WORLD 1955-1958

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Chapter I - Background: 1952-1954

On July 23, 1952, a "Committee of Free Officers", a secret group formed in 1947, overthrew the Farouk regime. On January 16, 1953, the officers, headed by General Mohammed Naguib, announced the dissolution of all political parties, and in June of the same year the junta - self-styled with "Council of the Revolution" (R.C.C.) - proclaimed a republic, with General Naguib as President and Prime Minister, and Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser as Deputy Premier.

According to all available evidence, this new Egyptian regime paid relatively little attention to inter-Arab affairs from the time of its accession to power in July, 1952, until the end of 1954.¹ This neglect stemmed primarily from a preoccupation with other pressing concerns - both domestic and foreign. These problems, which were prime factors in the regime's subsequent attitude to the Baghdad Pact included: the establishment of the regime's authority on a secure basis; the resolution of conflicts within the regime's own ranks; the achievement of economic development and social reform; - and in foreign affairs, the major problem of the evacuation of British troops from the Canal Zone.²

¹Wheelock, Keith, Nasser's New Egypt (London: Stevens, 1960), p. 218.

²In addition there was the problem of the future of Egypt's relation to the Sudan. On this latter problem see Mowat, R.C., Middle East Perspective (London: Blandford Press, 1958), pp. 235-245.

(A) Domestic Affairs

(1) The Problem of Establishing the Regime's Authority on a Secure Basis.

Initially this involved preventing the return of the old order as chiefly represented by the Wafd - the party of the old-regime land-owning politicians. This party tried to gain support by claiming that the coup d'etat had been staged in its name. It opposed the order, issued by the R.C.C. on July 31, 1952, for a drastic purge of political parties, and it attempted to obstruct the program of land reform.³

The party had many adherents among students, working and merchant classes, and given a return to prior electoral conditions, its network of provincial committees would have made it the strongest electoral force in Egypt.⁴

During the Naguib-Nasser conflict it was to become increasingly a symbol of suspended freedom, and it was a faction of the Wafd, which upon the signing of the Draft Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954, cooperated with the Muslim Brotherhood, and Communists (with whom they loosely grouped into a United Front) in a violent campaign against the Treaty.⁵

The activities of the Wafd, however, did not offer the consistent challenge to the regime during this period which the Muslim Brotherhood represented. The Wafd party had been considerably weakened after the advent of the new regime, largely due to the devastating effect of the Agrarian Reform on the control of the landlords. In

³Lacouture, Jean, Egypt in Transition Translated by Francis Scarfe (London: Methuen, 1958), pp. 240-241.

⁴Lacouture, op. cit; p. 243; Vatikiotis, P.J. The Egyptian Army in Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1961) p. 77.

⁵Lacouture, op. cit; p. 252.

addition, its relative demise was due to the fact that it was headed by elderly Nahas Pasha, and that its master brain Fuad Serag el-Din had been considerably discredited shortly after the coup, partly as a result of his responsibility for the Cairo riots of January 26, 1952.⁶

The regime faced a more serious challenge to its authority in the form of the Muslim Brethren. That they presented a greater threat than the landowning old-guard politicians of the Wafd was largely due to their having had direct access to active sympathizers among the Free Officers.⁷ It was due also to the fact that this group continued undissolved long after the other parties were legislated out of existence, as they were officially considered not a political party, but rather a religious association.⁸

In its organizational strength, discipline, and highly motivated leadership, it presented a strong alternative to the Free Officers Group.⁹ It had a persuasive ideology based on a theocratic state administered according to the Quran and the Sharia (canon law) and, - of major importance for its public image, - an impressive tradition of resistance to the old regime.¹⁰

Their sources of support during this period consisted of large numbers of the half-agricultural, half-artisan proletariat which had formed round the cities during the previous decade, small business people or artisans and a strong contingent of students in Cairo University making up approximately thirty per cent of the student body,

⁶ Ibid., pp. 243-244.

⁷ Vatikiotis, op. cit; p. 77.

⁸ Ibid., p. 87.

⁹ Wheelock, op. cit; p. 27.

¹⁰ Lacouture, op. cit; pp. 245-246.

strongest in the Law Faculty. They were less solidly entrenched as an organization in the rural areas though they had the support of the deeply religious fellahin during their repression in 1954.¹¹

The struggle between the Free Officers and the Supreme Council of the Muslim Brethren was a dominant aspect of the Egyptian political scene after August, 1952, when the Brethren insisted upon a share in government.¹²

The Brethren were opposed to the establishment of a republican regime so soon after the coup, as they had hoped to use the revolution for their own ends. They attempted to gain a foothold in the armed forces, police, labour unions, and National Guard. A major part of their plan consisted in planting terrorist groups in the militias created by the new regime.¹³

According to Nasser, the regime's preoccupation with the dissolution and suppression of the Brethren was due to its having

tried to introduce itself into the police and the army, with the object of gaining control of them in order to seize power by force. They were trying to start a kind of holy war against us.¹⁴

Like that of the Wafd, Muslim Brethren opposition to the regime interrelated with the conflicts within the regime's own ranks, and the domestic effects of the Canal Heads of Agreement reached with the British in July, 1954. This opposition included support of Neguib during the Neguib-Nasser conflict, and organization of violent agitation against the draft Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954.¹⁵

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 246-247.

¹² Mowat, op. cit; p. 246.

¹³ Lacouture, op. cit; p. 252.

¹⁴ Lacouture, Ibid.

¹⁵ Wheelock, op. cit; pp.30,43,45.

The Brethren were implicated in an assassination attempt on Nasser in late October, 1954. Physical evidence of the magnitude of the threat which they represented to the security of the regime during this period was presented during the same month upon the discovery of munition dumps maintained by the Brotherhood in preparation for a full-scale revolution, had the assassination attempt on Nasser succeeded.¹⁶

The Communist groupings in Egypt represented another example of the major challenges to the regime's authority, the elimination of which was a major preoccupation of the R.C.C. during this period.

However, the Communist threat to the regime was not as acute as that represented by the Muslim Brethren, and to a lesser extent, the Wafd. Inferior to these groups in organization and numbers, the Communists were further weakened by factionalism (there being at least ten divisions in Communist ranks).¹⁷

Among the workers, Communism during this period did not have a secure base of support, trade unions being extremely divided and under the increasing control of the worker's section of the regime's Liberation Rally.¹⁸ Its main success was among the intellectuals, apparently claiming the support of at least a third of the university students.¹⁹

The preoccupation with the problem of organized opposition to the regime was reflected during this period by several policy acts including: the call as early as July 31, 1952, to all political

¹⁶Wynn, Wilton, Nasser of Egypt: The Search for Dignity (Cambridge, (Mass.): Arlington Books, 1959), p. 104.

¹⁷Lacouture, op. cit; pp. 262-263.

¹⁸Ibid; pp. 269-270.

¹⁹Ibid; p. 270.

parties and associations to purge themselves of undesirable elements;²⁰ the general purge of organized political parties in January, 1953;²¹ the inauguration of the Liberation Rally in the same month to create a vehicle through which agitation by the Wafd, Muslim Brethren, and Communists, as well as other dissident elements, could be checked and through which associations such as labour unions, trade federations, and student organizations might be purged of their supporters;²² the appointment of leading R.C.G. members to key ministries;²³ the dissolution of the Muslim Brethren in January 1954;²⁴ and - after the removal of Neguib and the victory of the Nasser faction - the deprivation of all Wafdists and other former politicians who had held cabinet posts between 1942 and 1952, of their political rights for ten years, as well as numerous political trials.²⁵

* *

However, the regime's preoccupation during this period with the problem of establishing its authority on a secure basis cannot be considered solely in terms of the challenges which the major organized rival groupings represented, and the measures undertaken by the regime to meet them.²⁶ It must also be considered in terms of the indifference which the regime encountered from major segments of the Egyptian population, and the problems of creating a viable alternative to that of its rivals.

²⁰Vatikiotis, op. cit; p. 76

²¹Wheelock, op. cit; p. 20

²²Vatikiotis, op. cit; pp. 83-84.

²³Ibid; p. 84

²⁴Ibid; p. 88.

²⁵Ibid; p. 92

²⁶For an official reference to these challenges, see Nasser, Gamal Abdul, "The Egyptian Revolution" Foreign Affairs, (January, 1955), p. 209.

Quite apart from the organized opposition to the regime, it remained true at least until 1955, even after all serious opposition from the landowning old-guard politicians, the mass organization of the Muslim Brethren, lesser leftist radical groups, and communists, had been outwardly crushed, that the Junta did not strike any deep roots in the Egyptian population outside of army circles. The major support for the ruling junta was still confined to the officer corps and its army constituency.²⁷

The landowning classes had, of course, no reason to support a regime which had drastically reduced their influence. The middle-class, - half-a-million civil servants, businessmen, small landed proprietors - did not show any firm support either.²⁸

The prime sources of discontent among the middle-class was the lowering, towards the end of June, 1953, of the State employees' cost-of-living bonus by eleven per cent, and the devastating effects of the Agrarian Reform on the extra income of the class of urban civil servants and small businessmen who were only able to live thanks to rents from some small plot of land in the country.²⁹

The fellahin's attitude was a mixture of scepticism and vague hope. Though the proletariat supported a regime which had brought about the law of December 11, 1952 concerning the arbitration of disputes between workers and management and the individual work-contract, as well as attempting to halt the rise of prices, they resented the brutal suppression in August, 1952, of a mass demonstration of union

²⁷Lacouture, op. cit; pp. 172-173.

²⁸Ibid;

²⁹Ibid.

workers, followed by the hanging of the two leaders, the stifling control over trade unions exercised by the government's National Liberation Rally, and the numerous trials of communists.³⁰

In addition there was

a fickle mass of people, neither proletarian nor engaged in business, which makes up three-quarters of the Cairo population - poor peasants coming to town, domestics, semi-tramps living on trivial odd-jobs, minding cars, carrying parcels, shining shoes, managing on whatever happens to turn up - the public and author of triumphs, demonstrations, merciless city fights, the bedizened spectators of the burning of Cairo. They had applauded Farouk's conqueror, only to realize very soon that millionaires were the source of their own meagre profits...Thus they gradually cooled towards the men in Khaki.³¹

The regime's major immediate preoccupation with regard to this widespread indifference was the consolidation of the military - the hub of its power. This is reflected in the attention given the military by Nasser in public pronouncements towards the end of 1954.

From November 10, 1954, until December 2, 1954, Nasser addressed twelve military groups in the thirteen speeches made during the period. In these speeches he recorded his gratitude for the role played by the Signal Corps officers and the Air Corps during the crisis of the previous March.³²

(2) The problem of resolving conflicts within its own Ranks.

A major preoccupation of the regime during February - March, 1954, was the resolution of the conflict between Nasser, the real leader of the movement from its very inception, and front-man Neguib - Prime Minister, President of the R.C.C., and President of the Republic, -

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid.

³²Binder, Leonard in Kaplan, Morton A., ed; Revolution in World Politics (New York: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 1962) p. 178.

who advocated a return to constitutional parliamentary institutions. This split within the regime was a problem of major significance not only for its having taxed the apparent unity of purpose presented by the R.C.C. during the previous months, but also for its having been exploited by Muslim Brethren, Wafd, and Communist supporters, and their sympathizers among the army officers, who saw in Neguib a weapon against Nasser and the focal point of their hopes for a seizure of power.³³ The division in officer ranks was especially dangerous for the stability of the regime and this period was to witness significant dissensions, especially among the cavalry corps in Neguib's favour.³⁴

Striking evidence of the problems which the Neguib-Nasser conflict implied for the regime were presented during a brief period of the conflict, when restrictions were temporarily released, and it was shown that the former groupings, including the Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood, had not been stripped of their power by their suppression and the condemnation of their leaders. The Nasser-Neguib controversy provided further evidence that the revolution had not yet penetrated very deeply into Egyptian political life.³⁵

Nasser and his supporters in the R.C.C. were able to counteract the overwhelming odds against them only after a period of skillful political manoeuvring, alternately dismissing and reinstating Neguib, and culminating in the regimentation of the trade unions, the engin-

³³ Wheelock, op.cit; p. 30.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 29-30.

³⁵ Annual Register of World Events in 1954
(Aberdeen: Longmans), p. 186.

eeing of a general strike, and the occupation of strategic positions by loyal officers.³⁶

Though after skillful manipulation Nasser and his supporters had achieved effective control over the government, the regime's authority still had not been established on a firm basis, even after the resolution of the conflict within its own ranks, as it remained true that a majority of the country did not support it.³⁷

(3) The Problem of Achieving Economic Development and Social Reform

A prime preoccupation of the revolutionary regime during this period was with the problem of achieving economic development and social reform.³⁸

The economic and social measures undertaken by the regime at this time, were however of limited practical effect. Their social reformist nature, on the other hand, rendered them psychologically important. Economic and social reforms were highly significant as a means of strengthening the regime's position domestically, given the mixture of organized opposition and indifference which it had encountered. This short range policy of seeking mass popularity through measures represented as a prelude to industrialization, economic development, and agrarian reform, was paramount in consideration over

³⁶Wheelock, op. cit; pp. 28-36.

³⁷Ibid; p. 36.

³⁸For evidence in official pronouncements of this prime preoccupation, see Nasser, op. cit; pp. 201-205; see also the statement of Ehsan Abdel Kaddous, chief editor of Rose el Youssef that "the principles of the Revolution can be summed up in one word - one abstract notion: "reform (islah)", cited in Abdel-Malek, Anouar, Egypte, Société Militaire (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1962), p. 199; see also Badeau, John S. "A Role in Search of a Hero: A Brief Study of the Egyptian Revolution," Middle East Journal, autumn, 1955, p. 381.

the long-term external effects which economic development might bring - for example, the reduction of economic dependence on foreign states.

In the short and medium range Egypt's dependence on outside assistance was to be increased by such a policy and this called for a foreign policy of moderation and compromise - a conciliation with the West as the surest means of attracting capital and technical assistance, rather than a turbulent involvement in the Arab core risking alienation. Given Western interests in the area, the preoccupations with economic and social reform as a means of widening the basis of internal support seemed to rule out an immediate "drive for Arab hegemony".

This preoccupation with internal reform was reflected during the period in Nasser's explanation, on August 9, 1954, of his relatively moderate posture towards Israel. With Israel, Nasser explained, a battle would indefinitely postpone internal reform and

the government has said that reform was the key foundation to its *raison d'être*.³⁹

In the Egyptian context, a preoccupation with economic development and social reform involved of necessity: the extension of the cultivable acreage from its meagre three to four per cent of the total land area, the redistribution of agricultural wealth, the reversion of agriculture; the opening of new markets; the industrialization of the country; and in the way of social reform, to teach, tend and modernize the Egyptian himself, and adapt law and custom to the needs of the modern world.⁴⁰

³⁹ Wheelock, op.cit; p. 209. See also Nasser, op. cit; p. 211.

⁴⁰ Lacouture, op. cit: p. 340.

This involvement was especially demanding on the administrative resources of the regime due to a staggering combination of natural limitations inherited from the old order: the large population density, the overdependence on agriculture and a few cash crops within a desperately narrow area of cultivation, the costliness of basic materials - due to lack of coal, unexploited iron ore, inadequate cement production, oil resources which met only two-thirds of local needs, the lack of an adequate water supply, the absence of a middle class which alone could supply the savings needed for local investments (the alternatives being massive foreign aid with its risks or deficit financing and forced savings), the lack of a genuine home market (which in turn depended on raising the living standards of the fellah), and the poor output and quality of the labour force.⁴¹

A brief analysis follows of the regime's achievements in economic development and social reform by the end of 1954 - evidence of its preoccupation with this area of national endeavour.

The regime's preoccupation with agrarian reform was a corollary of the urgent necessity of meeting the challenge of rival groupings and extending the bases of internal support for the regime, from its confinement to the Officer Corps and its army constituency.

Though the Agrarian Reform Law, promulgated in September, 1952, was more than a purely political move, it was designed at least in the short run to break up the feudal hierarchy of the country-side and destroy Wafdist power in the villages. As P.J. Vatikiotis has put it, the reform was a means

⁴¹Ibid; chapters 3-5; Wheelock, op. cit; pp. 75, 107-108, 137.

by which to strike a sensational political note with the Egyptian masses. Considering the premium placed on land by rich and poor Egyptians alike, agrarian reform with its redistribution of large estates to the fellahin was a potent psychological measure. It gave the Free Officers their first powerful link with the peasant masses. Regardless of the economic and agricultural problems pertaining to the profitable utilization of a five-acre farm by an Egyptian fellah, the uplift to his morale was impressive. Having tilled but not owned the land for most of his life, he now viewed the young army officer who deeded it to him as a benefactor and liberator. ⁴²

The effect of the land reform during this period was purely symbolic, both with respect to security of tenure and with regard to the attractiveness of national policies to the masses of other nations - as the first attempt to change the landownership situation of any Arab country.

Even if all of the land due for expropriation had been redistributed, only about eight per cent of those in need of land would have been affected. ⁴³

Further, even as a symbolic gesture, the measure had not obtained its full potential by the end of 1954. ⁴⁴

Land reform, even on a scale much larger than undertaken could not contribute to a solution of the basic problem of Egyptian economic development, i.e. it could not increase productivity or area of arable land.

A project for a High Dam was initiated late in 1954, which was to provide a means of producing power sufficient in a few years to

⁴²Vatikiotis, op. cit; p. 75. See also Sablier, Edouard, "l'Egypte et le Panarabism" Orient, 1957, p. 117.

⁴³Lacouture, op. cit; p. 346. The Agrarian Law generally speaking limited land ownership in Egypt to a minimum of 200 feddans and provided for the distribution of 500,000 feddans among 150,000 families. See Wheelock, op. cit; p. 17.

⁴⁴Annual Register, (1954) p. 274.

save the country ~~£~~ thirty million annually in oil and other fuels, and in addition reclaim a possible ten million feddans of land area.⁴⁵

If one would judge from the controlled Egyptian press up to the beginning of 1955, the most important matter in the minds of the Egyptian decision-makers shortly before the rift with Iraq over the Baghdad Pact, was this High Dam Project, the successful pursuit of which seemed to demand a foreign policy of moderation and conciliation with a view to attracting badly needed capital.⁴⁶

The agrarian Reform and the High Dam project are two prime examples of the regime's preoccupation with providing for the economic and social welfare of the Egyptian people.⁴⁷

This preoccupation was reflected as well in pronouncements serving as indications of the regime's domestic "ideology". An example is the statement of the main aims of the Liberation Rally - founded on January 23, 1953, to replace the multi-party system, and designed to enlist mass support for the regime:

⁴⁵Ibid; p. 270.

⁴⁶Marlowe, John, Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism (London: Cresset Press, 1961) p. 87. According to original Egyptian estimates the project, including initial power installations, would require at least eighty million pounds of which sixty million would be in foreign currency. See New York Times, September 7, 1953.

⁴⁷Other indications of the Egyptian regime's preoccupation with economic and social reform during this period include: the sharp increase in the budget allotted for special development for the year 1954-5 over the previous year; the diverse programs underway for the development of Egyptian oil potential and other raw materials, for initiation of major irrigation and land reclamation projects such as the Liberation Province scheme, and liberal departures in educational and labour legislation. See Wheelock, op. cit; pp. 95, 112, 144; Annual Register of World Events, ... 1954, p. 274; Vatikiotis, op. cit; pp. 128, 132-133; Wynn, op. cit; p. 79.

These aims were presented as follows:

- (1) Establishment of a society based on belief in God and fatherland and on self-confidence.
- (2) An economic system directed towards social justice, fair distribution of wealth, and full exploitation of natural and human resources.
- (3) Safeguarding the basic political and social rights and freedoms; freedom of thought, belief and rite within the limits of the law.
- (4) Moral, social, physical training of the people for the tasks of liberation and reform for the sake of a great Egypt.⁴⁸

(B) Foreign Affairs:

The Evacuation of British Troops from The Canal Zone - The Major Problem in Foreign Affairs.

The overriding preoccupation of the Egyptian regime in foreign affairs during this period was securing the evacuation of British troops from the Canal Zone. This problem - like those of establishing the regime's authority on a secure basis, resolving conflicts within its ranks, and achieving economic development and social reform - contributed to a relative lack of concern with inter-Arab affairs. The period of negotiations necessitated a moderate posture, and the anticipation of increased Western aid after the successful completion of the

⁴⁸ Cited in Zeltzer, Moshe, Aspects of Near East Society (New York: Bookman Associates, 1962), p. 125.

Agreement considerably lessened the advisability of immediately pursuing a vigorous Arab policy, and offered the groundwork for a preoccupation with internal reform.

Egypt's interest in the Arab world was limited to the objective of preventing defense agreements with the West at least until a Suez settlement was signed, in order not to weaken Egypt's bargaining position on the Canal.⁴⁹

Her position on a possible Iraqi entry into an alliance with Turkey and Pakistan was largely conditioned during the first half of 1954 by fears of isolation in the negotiations with Britain.

Hence in April 1954, Nasser, speaking at land distribution ceremonies at Faroukia, stated that Egypt would oppose efforts to bring Iraq into the Turkish-Pakistani Defense Pact, which he said was an attempt to break Muslim-Arab unity in support of Egypt's position on the Canal Zone.⁵⁰

If the preoccupation with problems of security of tenure may be seen as an important factor in the regime's relative lack of concern with inter-Arab affairs at this time, then the Canal Zone issue, resulting as it did in the signature of the "Heads of Agreement" in July, 1954 in terms unpopular to the majority of Egyptian public opinion, may be seen as a factor which acted indirectly as well as directly on the deemphasis on Arab affairs, through its accentuation of the regime's isolation.

⁴⁹Wheelock, op. cit; p. 218.

⁵⁰Middle East Journal, Vol. 8, Summer, 1954, p. 325.

There was an increasing preoccupation during this period with answering the growing number of critics who pointed out that the Treaty did not provide for immediate evacuation (twenty months time limit was provided for), that some British would remain (even though the Agreement stipulated that they should be civilian contractors and limited their number to 1200), and most important - that it provided for the return of the British army, and that the granting of facilities "in the event of an armed attack by a power outside the Middle East against any country, which at the date of the present agreement, is a signatory of the treaty of mutual defence between the Arab states, signed in Cairo in 1950, or against Turkey" meant the equivalent of joining a Western defence pact and indirectly linking Egyptian defence with the Atlantic coalition.⁵¹

With the signing of the draft agreement of 1954, the Brotherhood started a violent opposition campaign, cooperating with the Communists, who, loosely grouped into a United Front with a faction of the Wafd, signed numerous tracts in common with the Brotherhood against the Treaty.⁵²

Conclusion

The Position of the Egyptian Regime both Domestically and in the Arab World Generally at the End of 1954:

(A) Domestic Position

By the end of 1954 all serious opposition from the landowning old guard politicians, the mass organization of the Muslim Brethren, lesser leftist radical groups and Communists, had outwardly appeared

⁵¹Lacouture, op. cit; pp. 207-208; Wynn, op. cit; p.91

⁵²Ibid.

crushed. Nevertheless the overall domestic picture was one of increasing isolation of the Nasser regime.

The Junta did not strike any deep roots in Egyptian society outside of the officer corps and its army constituency.

The signing of the "Heads of Agreement" over the Suez Canal Zone, in July, 1954, had, as pointed out, been an unpopular gesture to the majority of Egyptian public opinion which viewed it as providing the basis of an imperialist dominated defence pact.

This growing isolation was only partly offset by the psychological effect of certain measures of economic and social reform such as the Agrarian Reform Law (which even as a symbolic gesture, had not yet attained its full potential by the end of 1954), the High Dam Project (which was still in the planning stage), the extension of educational facilities, and labour legislation.

The regime had not yet justified its existence in terms of technical and material successes, in spite of grandiose plans.

(B) Position in the Arab World Generally

In the inter-Arab core as well, Egypt's position at the end of 1954, was one of increasing isolation.

As a leading architect of Egypt's Arab policy in subsequent years - Egyptian Ambassador to Syria, Mahmud Riyad, has put it:

up to 1954-5 Egypt was still very much of an unknown quantity in the Arab world. The revolutionary government had had very few contacts with other Arab governments. In the early years of the Egyptian revolution a great many forces - including the Wafd, the Muslim Brethren, the Americans, and the British - had tried to seize the leadership of the movement and lead it by

the nose to suit their interests. Those outside were puzzled. They did not know who was the real power behind the Egyptian regime nor what Abd Al-Nasir's policy was...⁵³

Further, the assault on the Muslim Brethren had shocked the governments of Saudi Arabia and Syria, the latter giving asylum to hunted Brotherhood leaders from Syria.⁵⁴

The misgivings in Egypt over the events stemming from the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty extended to large segments of the population in other Arab states.

As Wilton Wynn has put it:

Huge anti-Nasser demonstrations surged through the streets of Damascus, Amman, Baghdad, Khartoum, Karachi. In several places Egyptian embassies were attacked and burned. Ironically some of the prime organizers of these anti-Nasser riots in Syria and Jordan were members of the Baath...⁵⁵

⁵³Seale, Patrick, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965), p. 222.

⁵⁴Bullard, Sir Reader, ed., The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey, Third Ed. (Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 198.

The Syrian branch of the Muslim Brethren influenced the Syrian public against the Egyptian revolution. Representatives of the movement from Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and the Sudan met in conference in Damascus following Naguib's dismissal by Abd al-Nasir in February of 1954 and launched a campaign against the Egyptian Free Officers.

The Syrian public failed to distinguish between the Brethren's terroristic nature in Egypt and their relatively harmless counterparts in Syria.

The extent of the estrangement was revealed when Egypt recalled her ambassador from Damascus early in November, 1954, due to continued Syrian press attacks and the tolerance of anti-Egyptian activities of refugee members of the Brethren.

See Seale, op. cit; p. 180.

⁵⁵Wynn, op. cit; p. 108. The Baath in Syria, later to provide one of the strongest supports for Nasser's policy, at that time sided with Naguib largely because they considered Nasser too conciliatory in his dealings with the U.S. and Britain. Further, they also suspected him of planning to establish an authoritarian military regime as opposed to a democratic system with political parties.

See Seale, op. cit; p. 168; See also Kirk, G.E., "The Middle Eastern Scene", The British Yearbook of International Affairs, 1960, p. 152.

Rumours of efforts to bring Iraq into an existing Turkish-Pakistani Defence Pact, added to Egyptian fears.

Thus, the overall position of the Egyptian regime during the last months of 1954 may be described as one of increasing isolation at home and abroad.

Chapter II - Egypt's Foreign Policy Resources (1952-1958)

Later in this paper it will be shown that Egypt's increased involvement in the Arab core, beginning in 1955, was at first a defensive reaction in an effort to contain the influence of Iraq's initiative in the field of formal commitments with the west, and stemmed primarily from the preoccupation of Nasser with the security of tenure of his regime of moderate revolution.

It is the main purpose of this chapter to assess the resources--both material and non-material--available to the Egyptian government for this newly assumed role in foreign affairs.

The available resources were to shape significantly the techniques employed in the pursuit of policy objectives in the period under consideration.

(A) Material Capabilities

(1) Military

Egyptian military strength during the period beginning with the Egyptian revolution and ending with the Czech arms deal of September 1955 is a matter of speculation. There were unconfirmed reports that military improvements and consolidation had been completed well before the Soviet arms shipments at the end of 1955, and had resulted in a quantitative shift in Egypt's favour, in the arms balance with Israel,

specifically in the number of tanks, jets and frigates.¹

The shipments of Soviet arms subsequent to the arms deal with Czechoslovakia, in September 1955, resulted in a clearer picture of Egyptian military capabilities. The shipments included large quantities of heavy tanks, artillery, Mig jet fighters and heavy bombers, as well as the beginnings of a modern Soviet submarine arsenal.² The extent of the increase in Egyptian armed strength in the few months subsequent to the arms deal may be gathered from a statement by Lord Home, then Lord President of the Council of the British House of Lords, quoting from reliable sources on May 1, 1957, that Egypt had received military equipment from the Soviet bloc by the end of October 1956 to an estimated value of between one hundred twenty and one hundred fifty million pounds.³

However, this increase in armaments did not lead to a parallel increase in material capability vis-a-vis the Arab core.

This was in part due to the fact that the bulk of Egypt's military forces were primarily concentrated on the Israeli frontier.

¹ Keesings Contemporary Archives, (Bristol: Keesings Publications Ltd.) Volume X, 1960, p. 14985.

² Ibid; p. 15599A.

³ Keesings, op.cit.; Volume XI, p. 15582. This was to prove an underestimate.

Further, the general unavailability of physical force to counteract reversals to Egyptian foreign policy objectives and to exploit diplomatic successes in the Arab core was accentuated by the geographical separation of Egypt from the Arabs of Asia. Military ventures east of the Red Sea presented a danger of over extension in the deployment of troops.

Additional factors to be taken into account were the risk of entanglement with the Super Powers, and great financial burdens.

It is not surprising, therefore, that no major military operation was to be undertaken by the Egyptian army in the Arab core during the period under consideration.⁴

In addition, the large numbers of weapons received by Egypt from the Eastern bloc were in quantities and types beyond Egypt's immediate capacity for effective utilization, and considerable time was required to absorb them.

Material increases in the military sphere, through Soviet aid, were to increase Egypt's capability vis-a-vis the Arab core only in the form of propaganda dividends.

In addition to making definite the quantitative shift in the Egyptian-Israeli arms balance, it assured Egypt the prestige of commanding the strongest Arab army.

⁴The dispatch of Egyptian troops to Latakiah, Syria, on October 13, 1957, during the Syrian crisis, was a minor operation in the nature of a formal gesture.

See Seale, Patrick. The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965) p. 305.

Though Iraq, for example, was to receive shipments of heavy war material under the Baghdad Pact,⁵ her army was too small to exercise a significant role in international affairs. It was no match for the Egyptian force.⁶

Jordan's army was perhaps the best Arab army man for man, but could not exercise a significant independent role in international affairs due to its small size and lack of sufficient modern armor and aircraft.⁷

The major psychological significance, however, lay in opening up an alternative source of foreign military aid to Arab states and thus breaking the "Western arms monopoly."

The increase in armaments, therefore, did not significantly increase Egypt's material capability vis-a-vis the Arab core, though it reacted favourably on the non-material elements of Egypt's foreign policy resources due to its propaganda value.

⁵ Longrigg, Stephen H. and Stoakes, F./ Iraq (London: Benn, 1958) p. 162; Facts on File, (New York: Facts on File Inc. 1954), p. 135.

⁶ Cremeans, Charles D. The Arabs and the World: Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy. (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 108.

⁷ Ibid; p. 105.

The arms increase reacted unfavourably, however, on another material component of Egypt's political resources--the economic. The vast expenditure on armaments contributed to the myriad of economic difficulties which the country experienced during this period.

The extent of this expenditure may be gauged by an examination of the following figures:

It has been estimated that for the five-year period between 1954 and 1959 the military expenditures of Egypt totaled approximately one billion dollars. This was the largest military expenditure among the Arab states and probably surpassed Israel's total expenditure by some four hundred million dollars.⁸

Egypt's imports for the year 1955 were composed thirty-eight per cent of armaments (as compared with eighteen per cent of machinery and sixteen per cent of food) and this increased in 1956 owing to a twenty-five per cent rise in the army estimates.⁹

In 1956, it became known that Egyptian ~~commitments~~ for Soviet armaments exceeded two hundred and fifty million dollars.¹⁰

⁸ Halpern, Manfred, in Johnson, John J. ed. The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 283.

⁹ Lacouture, Jean and Simonne Translated by Scarfe, Francis (London: Methuen, 1958), p. 364.

¹⁰ Wheelock, Keith. Nasser's New Egypt. (London: Stevens, 1960), p. 194. In addition, weapons had arrived in bulk during 1955 from Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Italy. See Ibid; p. 233.

Armaments, and in a wider sense what the regime referred to as "Defense, Security, and Justice," accounted for some one quarter of total government expenditure. For the period 1955-1956, for example, total government expenditure was three hundred forty-three million Egyptian pounds, 88.8 million of which was spent on "Defense, Security and Justice."¹¹

This crushing burden slowed down the country's economy.

In addition to increases in armaments, there were extensive attempts during this period to improve the calibre of Egyptian military manpower. These efforts did not result in any appreciable increase in Egyptian military capability.

The doubling of the standing army, the formation of extensive reserves under a new "Liberation Army," the extension of compulsory military training to children at the primary school level,¹² the abolition--under the new Military Draft Law of 1955--of favouritism and bribery in the military draft (making military service an experience shared by every able-bodied Egyptian male), and the resulting inclusion of better educated draftees,¹³ were impressive measures intended to

¹¹ Issawi, Charles. Egypt in Revolution. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 295.

¹² Sterling, Claire. The Malevolent Genie that Nasser Set Free. Reporter, September 20, 1956, p. 12.

¹³ Vatikiotis, Panayiotis J. The Egyptian Army in Politics. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961), p. 231.

increase military resources. It still remained true throughout this period, however, that the Egyptian army was composed largely of illiterate fellahin with absolutely no prior knowledge of modern technical devices,¹⁴ that some 80 per cent of all eligible fellahin had to be rejected as unfit for military service,¹⁵ and that the two or three hundred ablest and most experienced officers of the army were preoccupied with government work.¹⁶

In addition, the general level of morale in the Egyptian army was far from impressive, as revealed in the collapse at Sinai in late 1956, in which two-thirds of Egypt's effective fighting power was routed. It was the outcome of the Sinai campaign which gave conclusive support to the view that the other Arab countries would not be able to rely on Egypt for effective military support for many years to come.

The above analysis tends to the conclusion that Egypt's military resources during the period 1952-1958 were not a significant source of capability vis-a-vis the other Arab states.

¹⁴Wynn, Wilton. Nasser of Egypt: The Search for Dignity. (Cambridge Mass. : Arlington Books, 1959), p. 122.

¹⁵Lacouture, op.cit.; P. 318.

¹⁶Ibid; p. 489.

(2) Economic

Egypt's economic development during 1952-1958 was another component of its material capabilities which failed to serve as a significant source of power vis-a-vis the other Arab states.

The natural limitations to economic development which the regime faced have previously been outlined in the discussion of its domestic achievements in this sphere, to the end of 1954.¹⁷ Throughout the period under consideration (to 1958) these same problems plagued the regime.

Added to these natural limitations were the burdens of heavy social expenditures to buy popularity and an increasing armaments budget. Meanwhile, overpopulation overtook what modest economic advance there was.¹⁸ The population growth continued at some 2.5 per cent annually while no appreciable change occurred in the relatively static level of the country's resources.¹⁹

The chief reforms in the field of economic development which were initiated by the regime during this period went but a short way towards the solution of these major difficulties.

¹⁷ See supra, Chapter I, p.12.

¹⁸ Lacouture, op.cit.; p. 335.

¹⁹ Wheelock, op.cit.; p. 107-108; 172.

(a) Agriculture:

Even if all of the land due for expropriation under the Agrarian Law promulgated in September 1952, had been redistributed, only about eight per cent of those in need of land would have been affected, and Egypt's basic agricultural problem--the increase of productivity and area--could not be affected by such measures.²⁰

Also to prove of limited economic feasibility, were the attempts at land reclamation initiated by the regime, for example, the costly desert land reclamation project begun in 1955, known as "Liberation Province." It did not offer a solution to Egypt's critical shortage of cultivated land, and ended in economic failure. Of the two hundred and one thousand feddans which were to have been under cultivation by 1958, only approximately seventeen thousand had been reclaimed. Great industrialization plans connected with the project did not materialize.²¹

The land reclamation projects in general did not substantially reduce the critical shortage of arable land. Far less than seventy-five thousand feddans had been reclaimed by 1959, of which only twenty thousand were under economic cultivation.²²

²⁰Lacouture, op.cit.; p. 346.

²¹Wheelock, op.cit.; p. 98.

²²Ibid; p. 102.

The High Dam project, presented throughout the period as the keystone of Nasser's internal development program, did not get underway during this period and prospects for its external financing seemed remote. The future of the project was obscure after the Suez crisis.²³

(b) Industry:

The index of industrial production reflected a rise of more than twenty per cent from 1952-1956 but, as Wheelock²⁴ points out, much of this increase was to be expected regardless of the regime in power, due to the normal growth in a country with a small industrial base. The per capita income by 1952 prices rose little, if at all.²⁵

The construction of steelworks, the increase in oil refining, the development and expansion of new industries, especially electrical equipment and construction materials,²⁶ were some examples of industrial achievements during this period. However, of major importance in the consideration of Egypt's economic capability from 1955-1958 is the fact that though major industrial achievements took place during the period, they did not really get underway till late 1956. In September of that year, an experienced observer could still write:

²³Ibid; p. 198.

²⁴Ibid; p. 169.

²⁵Ibid; p. 171.

²⁶Ibid; p. 169-170; 160-162.

Only two new factories--tire recapping and Ford repairs are in operation. Four more--a slaughterhouse, a pasteurization plant, a fertilizer factory, a large iron and steel works--are in various stages of construction. There are several others in blueprint: ceramics, pharmaceuticals, machine tools, paper, cement. . . But they were to have been equipped by the Soviet countries which have not yet delivered the goods.²⁷

The impact of whatever modest achievements there were was considerably lessened by the fact that markets were not readily available to absorb a large amount of new material.

Industrialization during this period was imperative, yet the country lacked sufficient capital to sustain extensive industrialization. According to Dr. Abdel Moneim Kaissuny,

[The population increase] necessitates the diversion of nearly 80 million pounds annually into new investments just to keep the same level in our standard of living. This is in addition to another 50 million pounds or so required to meet the growing consumption and maintain the existing productive capacity. This means that the minimum annual level of new investments must not be less than 130 million pounds in addition to any desired investments in projects which would lead to an increase in our standard of living.²⁸

Yet Egypt's annual savings were approximately fifty million pounds less than this figure.²⁹

²⁷ Sterling, op.cit.; p. 13.

²⁸ Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, December 6, 1957.

²⁹ Wheelock, op.cit.; p. 157.

At this time, a large portion of the capital to finance development projects came from sources peculiar to the period and whose continuation was not assured--confiscations from the royal family, and American grants.³⁰

The increasing expenditure on armaments and the Suez crisis were contingent factors impeding industrial development during this period.

The slackening effect of the increasing burden of armaments has already been discussed. The process is further exemplified by the effects of the Suez crisis of late 1956 on economic development: Egypt's Sinai oilfields were destroyed, her assets in Britain, the United States and France frozen,³¹ the Ten Year Plan which was to compliment the High Dam and to effect the partial industrialization of Egypt was crippled,³² and internal development programs curtailed. In addition, there was the added expense of mobilization, and the increasing dependence on Eastern bloc countries for soft currency supplies.³³

The Suez crisis, and the regime's armaments program, though in the long run increasing Egypt's capability vis-a-vis the Arab core in a political and psychological sense, were illustrative indications of Egypt's increasing international aspirations which reacted unfavourably on her economic capability.

³⁰Ibid; p. 172.

³¹Ibid; p. 148. For a large part of 1957, the regime was almost cutoff economically from Britain, France, and the U.S.A. and without Soviet aid the economy probably would have collapsed.

³²Partner, Peter. A Short Political Guide to the Arab World. (London: Pall Mall Press, 1960), p. 90.

³³Wheelock, op.cit; p. 148.

The above analysis tends to the conclusion that Egypt's economic development during 1952-1958 was not a significant source of capability vis-a-vis other Arab states.

One aspect of the adverse conditions within Egypt was that her marked dependence on economic aid for her own development for a long time to come precluded her being regarded as a source of extensive economic aid for the smaller Arab states.

(3) Propaganda Facilities

If it might be said that the military and economic resources which the Egyptian regime commanded from 1955 to 1958 were not significant sources of capability vis-a-vis other Arab states, the opposite was true of the regime's propaganda facilities. While Egypt had considerable weaknesses in both the economic and military spheres, it was largely non-material factors which enabled Nasser to become strong politically through his influence over masses of people as opposed to their governments--through his ability to symbolize Arab nationalism as an idea and as a practical force in the twin areas of external relations and social reform. Though it is true that Nasser's mass propaganda was successful during this period only when it re-affirmed and stimulated attitudes already existing, the level of organization of facilities for the regime's psychological campaign was of extreme importance in assessing its capabilities.

These propaganda facilities will now be analyzed.

(a) Radio:

A prominent feature of Egypt's propaganda facilities during this period was the "Voice of the Arabs." This station, which until recently had provided a half-hour program on the Egyptian home service was now beamed to Arab countries for nearly eight hours daily. The programs were pitched not to Arab governments but to the Arab masses.³⁴

The station was given extensive financial support. It was estimated to have a budget smaller than that of the Soviet foreign broadcasts, but comparable to that of the Voice of America.³⁵

The importance of the "Voice of the Arabs" radio station in the arsenal of Egyptian propaganda facilities was attested to by Nasser on July 3, 1956. He stated:

L'Egypte a lance' la "Voix des Arabes" pour engager la bataille contre les Imperialistes et fair d'elle une epene ensanglantant dans le dos des traitres...³⁶

The importance of Egyptian radio facilities for the regime's capability was attested to by Sir John Glubb, some time after his dismissal as Jordan's Chief of Staff.

³⁴Ibid; p. 224.

³⁵Issawi, op.cit.; p. 217.

³⁶Orient, 1957, No. 4; p. 131.

He stated:

La Grande-Bretagne est en train d'être chassée du Moyen Orient par des mots. Aujourd'hui les émissions radiophoniques constituent l'arme de lutte la plus puissante de cette région. Ma propre expérience m'a convaincu que les idées sont plus puissantes que les armes. . . . Nous traitons ce sujet d'importance vitale avec une négligence presque criminelle.³⁷

It is to be noted that the extensive network of communications media developed by the Egyptian regime at this time in its drive to isolate Iraq, did not depend for its effectiveness only on its quantity. Nasser's mass propaganda, highly organized though it was, was successful only when it re-affirmed and stimulated attitudes already existing. Comparable facilities, at least in the sphere of radio broadcasting were possessed by the BBC, the British station on Cyprus (The Near East Arab Broadcasting Station) Kol Isroel, and the nine clandestine radios which Nasser claimed were attacking him at one time.

As an astute observer remarked:

Cette propagande n'est pas seulement puissante par le nombre des journaux et des émetteurs qu'elle utilise, elle l'est aussi par les thèmes mêmes qu'elle diffuse. Le neutralisme Nassérien correspond en effet aux aspirations profondes des Arabes dans le moment présent de leur histoire.³⁸

³⁷ Ibid; p. 142

³⁸ Colombe, Marcel. Indépendance et Tentatives de Regroupement des Pays Arabes du Moyen-Orient. 10 Revue Française de Science Politique, 1960, p.838.

(b) Press:

Of major importance for the Government's propaganda arsenal was the Cairo press. Cairo was the journalistic centre of the Arab world. Its ~~dailies~~ far exceeded those of other Arab states in mass circulation.³⁹

Though, at one time or another, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia banned Egyptian newspapers during this period, they were constantly smuggled into these countries.

In early 1956 Egypt established ~~the~~ Mid East News Agency, owned jointly by the daily papers of Cairo, (while sixty per cent of the agency's capital was held by newspapers owned by the government).⁴⁰

The agency had but limited success, however, in direct circulation in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, as its distributions were stopped, its bureaus closed, and its correspondents expelled.⁴¹

Its most effective work was done in the Cairo and Damascus press, and on radio in the form of "press reviews."⁴²

³⁹ Harris, George L., ed. Egypt (Newhaven: Human Relations Area Files, 1957), p. 103.

⁴⁰ Wynn, op.cit.; p. 135.

⁴¹ Ibid; p. 35-36.

⁴² Ibid; p. 136.

(c) Export of Personnel

Export of Egyptian teachers was a prime component of the regime's propaganda facilities during this period. All the less developed Arab countries were obliged to recruit most of their teaching staff from abroad and Egypt's longer experience in Arab higher education stood her in good stead.

Though not all Egyptian teachers exported during this period were propagandists, they were everywhere interspersed with members of Egypt's Cultural Mission.⁴³

During the first five years of the Revolution, the export of teachers tripled.⁴⁴

While Egypt's near-monopoly over Arab education enabled her to place thousands of teachers in Arab countries, many Arab students attended classes at the University of Cairo.⁴⁵

(4) Subversive Facilities

A major source of capability during this period was the elaborate network of subversive facilities commanded by the Egyptian regime, centering around the activities of the military attache--the dominant authority in all Egyptian embassies in the Arab core.

⁴³Cremeans, op.cit.; p. 40-41.

⁴⁴Wynn, op.cit.; p. 136.

⁴⁵Ibid; p. 137; Hamburaci, Arslan. Middle East Indictment (London: Robert Hale, 1958), p. 136.

These attachés were, if we would believe Abul-Fath,⁴⁶ paid almost as much as an ambassador, not counting their secret funds. It was rare that they busied themselves with purely military questions.

The importance of the military attachés for Egypt's capability was underscored in a speech which Nasser reportedly made to Egyptian military commanders in March 1957, published in an Iraq daily, and later proclaimed a "fake document" by the Egyptian government:

Military attachés are. . . a gamble we took. . . .
There is this irregular war which costs us little, but
which costs our enemies much.⁴⁷

The planning and participation of Egyptians in subversive activities during this period was facilitated by an abundance of genuine volunteers in the host countries.

(B) Non-Material Foreign Policy Resources

(1) Security of Tenure

It has been stated earlier that at the end of 1954, the regime had not yet struck any deep roots in Egyptian society outside of the army constituency.⁴⁸ This remained true even after all serious opposition

⁴⁶Abul-Fath, Ahmed L'Affaire Nasser (Paris: Plon, 1962), p. 222. Abul-Fath was a well-known Egyptian newspaper proprietor whose newspaper Al-Misri had been the official mouthpiece of the Wafd. He escaped to Damascus in mid-May 1954.
See Seale, op.cit.; p. 169.

⁴⁷Cited in Wheelock, op.cit.; p. 252. For the Egyptian claim that the above quote is a "fake" See Akbar el Yom, August 24, 1957.

⁴⁸See Supra, Chapter I, p. 7.

from the landowning old guard politicians, the mass organization of the Muslim Brethren, lesser leftist radical groups, and Communists, had been outwardly crushed.

The reasons for this widespread indifference have previously been analyzed.⁴⁹ Two major consequences ensued for foreign policy capability, restricting courses of action: First, lack of firm support for the regime domestically dictated at first a moderate foreign policy and an attempt at technical and material successes to justify the regime's existence. Second, it necessitated the rejection of formal commitments with the Western powers regardless of calculations of immediate economic self-interest. Pacts and other devices of Western penetration were regarded with suspicion by the very segments of the population to whom Nasser of necessity had to extend his appeal.

It will be shown in subsequent sections that Egypt's increased involvement in the Arab core beginning in 1955 was at first a defensive reaction in an effort to contain the influence of Iraq's initiative in the field of formal commitments with the West, and stemmed primarily from the preoccupation of Nasser with the security of tenure of his regime of moderate revolution.

External events which followed as a result of this more vigorous Arab policy were to act as a feedback to strengthen security of tenure

⁴⁹ See Supra, Chapter I, pp. 6-8.

and capability. The main example and point of departure in this regard is the Suez crisis.

If one takes the statement of P. J. Vatikiotis that from the earliest days of the regime, the elite admitted

that while there was much rationalism in Egypt effective against an outside enemy there was very little nationalism useful as a basis for a rational or viable state.⁵⁰

to represent the situation prior to the Anglo-French-Israeli attack, one could say that the attack, due to the immediacy of the threat from an erstwhile enemy led to a consolidation of support for the regime augmented by the subsequent diplomatic victory.

In spite of the economic hardships for the average Egyptian arising out of the Suez crisis, such as high prices, shortages, and the curtailment of internal development programs, psychological factors predominated over the material ones.

In addition, part of the economic measures undertaken by the regime shortly after Suez--a series of "Egyptianization" laws decreed on January 15, 1957, benefitted the small middle class.

This benefit was all the more significant given the fact that, as Nasser had put it in August 1956, the Western economic freeze could scarcely hit any but the small middle class of Egypt's population, because more than three fourths of Egypt's people were already on the borderline of starvation.⁵¹

⁵⁰Vatikiotis, op.cit.; p. 120-121.

⁵¹Cited in Wheelock, op.cit.; p. 62.

Within this small middle class several social elements gave increasing support to Nasser partly because the "Egyptianization" laws and expulsions of minorities and foreigners had greatly accelerated their advancement from chief clerks and employees to managers or directors or members of administrative committees.⁵²

The industrialists also had reason to thank the regime for the profits which they enjoyed from the suspension of Egyptian trade with France, Britain, and the United States.

The poor showing of the military in the Sinai campaign was largely masked from the public or explained away, and did not constitute a threat to the security of the regime.⁵³

As far as the institutional aspects of legitimate authority were concerned, mass popularity replaced the need for more formalized institutional legitimacy. Consequently, the failure of an attempt at a pseudo-parliament, the National Assembly (during July 1957 to February 1958) did not contribute to a decrease in popularity of the regime, and was of no significant consequence for the development of foreign policy.⁵⁴

⁵² Lacouture, op.cit.; p. 494. The factors contributing to the previous lack of firm support on the part of this small middle class for the Nasser regime, have been considered. See Supra, pp. 7-8.

⁵³ Ibid; p. 489.

⁵⁴ Vatikiotis, P. J. in Macridis, R. C. ed. Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1962), p. 338.

Institutional aspects of legitimate authority were subordinate to considerations of the quality of leader. This emphasis on the quality of leadership was in keeping with both Islamic and Egyptian tradition in which personal qualifications, closely connected with military ability and prominence were stressed, and checks upon the ruler seldom discussed.⁵⁵

In addition, the failure of parliamentary systems before the military came to power, led most politically sophisticated Egyptians to believe that the choice was between two alternatives--the regimented political tutelage of the military and possible future development of freer institutions on a secure basis or political instability, disintegration and chaos.⁵⁶

From the Suez crisis onwards, therefore, the regime had greatly consolidated its internal position, with all that this increased security of tenure implies for capability vis-a-vis a more vigorous role in the Arab core.

(2) Attractiveness of Policy

While Egypt possessed considerable weaknesses in both the economic and military spheres, it was largely non-material factors which enabled Nasser to become strong politically through his influence over

⁵⁵ Ibid; p. 340.

⁵⁶ Childers, Erskine B. The Road to Suez: A Study of Western-Arab Relations (London: Macgibbon & Kee, 1962), p. 102.

masses of people as opposed to their governments--through his ability to symbolize Arab nationalism as an idea and as a practical force in the twin areas of external relations and social reform.

The Egyptian regime's measures of social reform during this period have already been examined, insofar as they contributed to Egyptian capability in the system.⁵⁷

The most significant basis, however, for the attractiveness of Nasser's regime to the majority of politically conscious Arabs was the development of Egyptian neutralism from an expression of Egypt's desire for complete national independence to a weapon to be used to secure the insulation of the Arab system.

As subsequent chapters will show, it was in becoming the foremost protagonist in the Arab world of a policy of what came to be known as "positive neutrality" that the Egyptian regime subsumed the aspirations of emergent groups everywhere in the Arab world.⁵⁸

It was the development of this policy that was Egypt's major political resource.

⁵⁷ See Supra, pp. 10-15.

⁵⁸ The development of Egyptian neutralism is dealt with at great length in subsequent chapters. It is to be noted that the Egyptian regime by and large advocated changes in political alignment but not changes in the social orders of Arab states. Feudalism was attacked only in those countries where it was equated with "imperialism" for example in Iraq. It was at first not attacked in Saudi Arabia. See Marlowe, John. Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism (London: Cresset Press, 1961), p. 117.

Conclusion

The analysis of the material and non-material components of Egyptian capability during the period 1952-1958 support a number of generalizations.

Military power was not a significant source of material capability vis-a-vis the other Arab states. In fact, the arms increase reacted unfavourably on another material component of Egyptian foreign policy resources--the economic.

Advances in the military sphere were a significant source of non-material capability vis-a-vis other Arab states. This was due to the propaganda dividends to be derived from breaking what was considered by the majority of politically conscious Arabs as a Western arms monopoly.

Egypt's economic development during 1952-1958 failed to serve as a significant source of material capability in the inter-Arab system. Overpopulation overtook what modest economic advance there was, and Egypt's marked dependence on economic aid for her own development, for a long time to come precluded her being regarded as a source of extensive economic aid for the smaller Arab states.

The social reformist nature of certain economic measures however, such as the Agrarian Law, the "Liberation Province" reclamation scheme, and the proposed High Dam project--put forward as a prelude to more extensive industrialization and social reform--both directly and

indirectly served as significant sources of non-material capability in the system.

Directly this was due to the increased attractiveness of the Egyptian regime's domestic policies pertaining to economic development and social reform, to the masses of other Arab nations. For example, the Agrarian Law was seen as the first significant attempt to change the landownership situation of any Arab country.

Indirectly the psychological impact of the economic and social reforms, in spite of the relative practical ineffectiveness of the measures, increased the security of tenure of the regime and hence its non-material capability with respect to a more vigorous role in the Arab system.

The high level of organization of facilities for the regime's psychological campaign was of extreme importance in assessing its capabilities. These facilities included an elaborate radio and press machinery, in addition to the extensive export of skilled personnel.

These material propaganda resources, however, become important only when viewed in the context of the content of propaganda. The latter was successful during the period under consideration only when it re-affirmed and stimulated attitudes already existing among large segments of the Arab masses, as opposed to their governments.

In evaluating the significance of Egypt's extensive subversive facilities in other Arab countries--centering around the activities of

the military attache--the same qualification applies.

The degree of security of the regime's domestic position during the period 1952-1958, and hence the significance of security of tenure for capability vis-a-vis an increased involvement in the Arab system, varied.

As will be shown in subsequent chapters, Egypt's more vigorous role in the Arab core beginning in 1955 was in large measure due to domestic considerations stemming from the preoccupation of Nasser with the security of tenure of his regime of moderate revolution. The rejection of and dynamic opposition to formal commitments with the Western powers such as the Baghdad Pact represented the opposition to such commitments on the part of the very segments of the Egyptian population to whom Nasser had to extend his appeal.

During the period of increased involvement under consideration beginning in early 1955 and ending in July 1958, external events which followed as a result of a more vigorous Arab policy acted as a feedback to strengthen security of tenure.⁵⁹ This was especially true of the Suez crisis, as a result of which the regime greatly consolidated its position.

⁵⁹The roles of both material and non-material factors in strengthening security of tenure have been outlined. See Supra, Chapter one.

The major political resource which the Egyptian regime possessed during this period--the factor in the light of which all the other components of capability must be viewed--was its policy of "positive neutrality." This policy enabled an identification with emergent groups everywhere in the Arab world.

CHAPTER III
EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ARAB SYSTEM ON THE
EVE OF THE BAGHDAD PACT

Part I: Egyptian Foreign Policy Objectives

The major objectives of Egyptian foreign policy on the eve of the announcement of the Baghdad Pact were:

- (1) long-range reconciliation with the western superpowers;
- (2) opposition to formal western defence pacts; and
- (3) the preservation of the territorial status quo in the Arab area and an absence of any significant emphasis on an Arab policy.

Each of these facets will now be examined. First, each aspect and the evidence for it in the policy statements and action of the Egyptian elite is presented. Following this description, an analysis is set forth of the reasons for the policy pursued.

(1) Long-range Reconciliation with the Western Superpowers

Egypt in late 1954 still looked to the Western powers as a source of arms, capital, and technical assistance, and as a possible future ally after a "transitional period" had elapsed. Reconciliation with the west, while not involving express commitments for the present, could foreseeably involve formal alliances between sovereign equals in the future, that is to say, between a united Arab bloc under the

leadership of Egypt, and the West.

The following major policy statements and actions of the Egyptian elite in late 1954--just prior to the announcement of the formation of the Baghdad Pact--beat out the image of an Egypt moving slowly toward political, economic, and military cooperation with the West.

In a public speech on August 12, 1954 to two thousand leaders of the National Liberation Rally (an organization created by the Revolutionary Council to transmit its views and orders to the general public) Nasser not only said that Egypt would welcome military and economic aid from the United States and Britain provided Egyptian sovereignty was not affected, but defended the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement and attacked Communists as a corrupting force.¹

The speech in part was as follows:

. . .who would attack Turkey? Naturally the U.S.S.R. in the course of a world war. The objective of the aggressor? To reach the oil fields of Abadan, Mosul, and Dharan, and to reach Egypt on account of her strategic position which is of capital importance for Africa and the Medeterranean.

In case of a world war should I wait for my house to be set on fire, or should I think of having the enemy stopped at a distance from my country? Logically the second solution is to be preferred. As for neutrality, only the strong can ensure it for themselves.²

¹World Today, Volume 12, November 1956, pp.447-448

²Bourse, August 23, 1954. **Emphasis added.**

In the same speech one can find the recurrent warning that Egypt would not engage in mutual defence pacts with the west.

In another major pronouncement on Western-Egyptian relations only a few weeks later, on September 2, 1954, an R.C.C. spokesman declared to the foreign press that Egypt was basically inclined toward the West, that Russia and Communism represented the only conceivable danger to Egypt's security, and repeated the usual plea that the West postpone the negotiation of any regional security pacts in the Middle East. This statement read in part:

. . .only after a period of complete independence during which mutual confidence would be established between Egypt and the West could the Egyptians regard without suspicion any closer association with the Western Powers. . . There seems no doubt that Egypt today holds in all respects to the side of the West. Her culture, her commerce, and her economic life are bound to the West. Ideologically she is definitely opposed to Communism. Militarily, she considers that the only danger capable of threatening the Middle East is a Soviet invasion. . .She recognizes that the United States will never invade the Arab world and neither will Britain. The U.K. need never have abandoned the Suez Canal, had its intention been one of conquest and aggression. . .with time the masses will be convinced that the West is no longer engaged in trying to conquer the Arabs. . .Co-operation based on trust and friendship, even though it is not specified by any written agreement, is better than a treaty that is regarded suspiciously by the average Egyptian.³

The policy of long-range reconciliation with the Western superpowers seemed to be duplicated during this period on a smaller scale in Egypt's relations with the Turkish regime, which was a member of NATO and had acted as a spearhead for recent Western plans for the

³ Lenczowski, Geo, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 510.

Though an official denial of this statement was subsequently issued, an official holding a responsible position privately insisted that this denial was meant for the Egyptian public. See World Today, op.cit.; p. 450.

defence of the Middle East--"MEDO" for example.⁴

Egypt's long-range plans for an alliance with pro-Western Turkey were revealed in a statement made by the newly appointed Egyptian Ambassador to Turkey in November 1954:

Turkey and Egypt are preparing to lay the solid foundations of a close collaboration. . .official contacts on this subject will begin very soon. . .a political, military, economic, and cultural alliance between Turkey and Egypt will see the establishment of an imposing force of fifty million persons in the Middle East.⁵

These objectives were also reflected in the reception in Cairo of a Turkish mission to prepare the ground for official negotiations, and in Nasser's lavish praise of the Turkish regime in a preface he had written for an official publication ("Turkey and Arab Policy"). "We belong to each other," Nasser had stated.⁶

In addition, Nasser had reportedly said publicly that Turkey and Egypt had a common destiny towards which they would march "hand in hand."⁷

⁴Turkey's extensive Western connections were also illustrated by her being a recipient of Truman aid from 1947, and a member of the Mutual Assistance Pact with Pakistan (April 2, 1954). See Rondot, Pierre. The Changing Patterns of the Middle East (London: Chatto & Windus 1961), p. 25.

⁵World Today, op.cit.; p. 452. From Anadolu Ajansi.

⁶Reported by Ankara Radio (BBC, No. 524, 7 December 1954) and cited in Seale, Patrick, The Struggle for Syria, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965), p. 209.

⁷Hamburaci, Arslan, Middle East Indictment, (London: Robert Hale, 1958) pp. 193-194.

The policy of emphasis on internal reform, outlined above-- a product of the long-range considerations of the population to land ratio and of the urgent short-range considerations of security of tenure--had as a short and medium range result the increase of Egypt's dependence on outside assistance.⁸

The country lacked sufficient capital to sustain the required extensive industrialization, as well as a sufficient home market to absorb new products.

This increased dependence on outside assistance, called for a foreign policy of reconciliation with the West as the surest means of attracting capital and technical assistance rather than a turbulent policy risking alienation.⁹

Turning towards the Western superpowers as the readiest source of capital and technical assistance was appropriate given the existing extensive commercial relations with Britain and the United States in 1954.¹⁰

⁸ For example, the High Dam Project's estimated eighty million pound cost was to require at least sixty million pounds in foreign currency. For a statement of the importance of foreign capital for Egyptian industrial development see Supra, Chapter II, p.31.

⁹ Marlowe, John. Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism (London: Cresset Press, 1961), p. 87.

¹⁰ For example Britain was still Egypt's largest trade customer and supplier although cotton sales were steadily falling off. In addition, the volume of Egypt's post-war imports depended upon access to blocked sterling. See The Middle East - A Political and Economic Survey, second edition, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954) pp. 237-241.

The prospect of Soviet aid at this time seemed considerably less, given the continuance of the Stalinist line of considering the Middle East in terms of a simple dualism of the opposing forces of "imperialism" and "anti-imperialism" with Arab governments being considered "bourgeois lackeys of imperialism."¹¹

The modification of this hostile attitude was to be manifested only in the spring and summer of 1955.¹²

Improved relations with Turkey, while part of the general pattern of long-range conciliation, were also a precautionary move aimed at preventing the outmanoeuvring of Egypt by the growing improvement of Turkish-Iraqi relations amid rumours of a Turkish-Iraqi alliance.¹³

(2) Opposition to Formal Western Defence Pacts

As the following policy statements and diplomatic manoeuvres made throughout 1954 show, the Egyptian regime prior to the announcement of the Baghdad Pact was in sharp opposition to formal Western defence pacts and believed that the Arab world should first secure its full independence before concluding any military agreements with foreign powers.

¹¹Wheeler, Geoffrey. Russia and the Middle East Political Quarterly Vol. 28, 1957, p. 134.

¹²Seale, op.cit.; p. 232.

¹³Seale, op.cit.; p. 209.

On March 22, 1954 an official spokesman in Cairo revealed that Foreign Minister Mahmud Fawzi had informed American Ambassador Jefferson Caffery that Egypt would resist "by every means" Iraq's joining a Pakistan-Turkey alliance. "All these agreements tend to weaken Egypt and her cause," he added.¹⁴

The announcement of the Turco-Pakistani agreement on April 2, 1954 was greeted by Nasser with the following condemnation:

No Arab country should join the alliance. It is a defensive pact which ignores the interests of the Middle East and at the same time aims at frustrating the work of the Arab League.¹⁵

On April 13, 1954, Nasser stated that Egypt would oppose efforts to bring Iraq into the Turkish-Pakistani Defence Pact, which he said was an attempt to break Muslim-Arab unity in support of Egypt's position on the Canal Zone issue.¹⁶

Embryonic moves towards^a preventative counter-alliance were initiated in June 1954 and were announced on June 11, 1954, Major Salah Salim stating that Egypt and Saudi Arabia had decided to pool their military resources and set up a unified command, and that both countries had agreed to oppose Western efforts to bring Arab countries into regional defence pacts.¹⁷

¹⁴Cited in Spain, Jas. W. Middle East Defence: A New Approach. Middle East Journal, Vol. 8, summer 1954, p. 257.

¹⁵BBC No. 465, 14 April 1954, cited in Seale, op.cit.; p. 196.

¹⁶Middle East Journal, Vol. 8, 1954, p. 325.

¹⁷Ibid; p. 449.

As Iraq moved gradually towards the Turkish-Pakistani Alliance, Cairo radio reiterated on July 2, 1954:

. . .The Arabs can do without any pennies and bullets which bring enslavement and put back the clock of Arab progress. Aid of this kind is not based on respect for mutual interests and for the rights of people to freedom and independence.¹⁸

On August 21, 1954 in a key address to the National Liberation Rally (cited earlier as evidence of a policy of long-term reconciliation with the West) Nasser warned that Egypt would not engage in mutual defence pacts with the West.¹⁹

In the same month a diplomatic effort to dissuade Nuri Said from joining the Turco-Pakistani Pact took place in the form of a meeting between Major Saleh Salim, Egyptian Minister of National Guidance and in charge of inter-Arab affairs,²⁰ and Nuri at Sarsank, Iraq at which Salim presented the view of the Egyptian regime that the Turco-Pakistani Pact had "no place in Arab affairs at present until we are strong ourselves."²¹

The Arab Collective Security Pact was repeatedly put forward at this conference as an alternative to a pact with the West:

¹⁸ BBC, No. 279, 2 July 1954, cited in Seale, op.cit.; p. 197.

¹⁹ Bourse, August 23, 1954.

²⁰ Salim was accompanied by Mahmud Riyad, who in January 1955 was to become Egypt's leading representative in Syria. See Seale, op.cit.; p. 201.

²¹ Bourse, August 20, 1954.

I said [Salim later related in an account of proceedings at the conference]

Let us call all the Arab countries to a conference and together set up a real defence organization. . . Our people would not be suspicious of a purely Arab organization of this sort. . .if we combine, we shall be in a far stronger position to meet our various defence and economic needs.²²

During Nuri Said's visit to Cairo on September 15, 1954, the following statement of Egypt's policy towards formal defence pacts with the West was allegedly made by Nasser:

Our intention is to conclude the evacuation agreement and we feel that matters will not crystallize until two years after the British evacuation of Egypt. Egypt needs two years after the evacuation to think the matter over and determine the policy she will follow. For this reason I cannot possibly agree to any of these proposals [that Egypt join a formal defence pact with the West based on the Turco-Pakistani Alliance] We want to enjoy independence and exercise our minds at a time when we are independent. This needs a period of two years after the evacuation.²³

The main theme which Nasser followed during the discussions was contained in these words:

We must not only think about defence against foreign aggression. We must equally consider the question of safeguarding our independence from the designs of imperialism.²⁴

²² Cited in Seale, op.cit.; pp. 203-204.

²³ Cited ibid; p. 207 (Official Egyptian version of discussions broadcast December 20, 1954)

²⁴ Saleh Salim cited ibid; p. 207.

Evidence of Egyptian opposition during this period, to formal western defence pacts was further presented at the meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers called together by Nasser in Cairo in December 1954, at which Egypt had pressed for the passing of a resolution that

. . .no alliance should be concluded outside the fold of the Arab Collective Security Pact.²⁵

The abhorrence of formal commitments was, like the preoccupation with internal reform during this period, largely a function of the regime's lack of firm basis in Egyptian society. Pacts and other devices of Western penetration were regarded with suspicion by the very segments of the population to whom Nasser had of necessity to extend his appeal.

One of the most constant characteristics of the politically frustrated groups in the Arab societies at this time (comprising the great majority of the politically articulate and including the middle class intelligentsia, a small urban proletariat, professional managers, and entrepreneurs) was their great preoccupation with Western plots against them, particularly since the Palestine defeat in 1948.

²⁵ Survey of International Affairs, (London: Oxford University Press, 1955-6), p. 23.

In fact, the whole Arab nationalist tradition of the previous twenty-five years had been uncompromisingly opposed to the idea of formal alliances with the West, in which, it was believed, the Arabs would at best be junior partners, and at worst, expendable interests.²⁶

That the threat of isolation from prevailing public opinion was uppermost in the Egyptian regime's consideration of the question of joining Western-sponsored defence pacts, is illustrated by Nasser's discussions with American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on his tour of the Middle East in May 1953, in an effort to gain adherents to a regional defence system:

I told him my opinion frankly [Nasser relates] I . . . told him that he could . . . exert pressure over any Arab government, to join the Western camp and give them military bases on its own territory, but this would be of no avail when the decisive experience came. I also added that he would find that the government which submitted to their pressure would be divorced from its popular support, and would be unable to lead the people.²⁷

²⁶ Marlowe, op.cit.; p. 85.

The belief that enterprises with the West invariably lead to exploitation had been engendered by a consideration of the history of Western dominance in the Arab core, some objectionable features of which had included: the artificial division of what were regarded as Arab lands, and their distribution between Britain and France at the end of the first World War, the imposition of capitulation regimes exempting Westerners from local law, the granting of special protection and trading opportunities to colonizers, support for conservative regimes, and--what was regarded as a crowning betrayal--the "imposition" and subsequent support of the State of Israel. See Cremeans, Charles D. The Arabs and the World (New York: Praeger, 1963). See also Kerr, Malcolm H. Egypt Under Nasser Foreign Policy Assoc'n Headline Series No. 161 (Sept.-Oct. 1963) p. 52.

²⁷ Cited in Seale, op.cit.; p. 188.

And in a retrospective account of subsequent developments
Nasser stated:

I want to lead the people, not suppress them.
British policy, if successful, would make it impossible²⁸
to lead the people. They would rise up against us all.

Until Egypt was ready to take part in a Western sponsored
defence pact herself--and even were the regime to feel so inclined--
Egyptian opinion would never tolerate a new alliance with the Western
powers--to allow a rival Arab power such as Iraq to do so would mean
to undercut Egypt's leadership of the Arab League.

The regime believed, further, that the attempts at the
integration of Iraq was based on the sinister hope of the West that
in the course of time the isolated Arab states outside the alliance
would have to fall in line with all the inherent consequences of such
an agreement.²⁹

During the negotiations over the Canal Zone a more immediate
fear, over and above the general abhorrence of formal commitments with
the West, dictated the Egyptian attitude towards formal defence
agreements. Egypt's position on a possible Iraqi entry into an
alliance with Turkey and Pakistan was in large measure conditioned, in
the first half of 1954, by immediate fears of isolation in her negotia-
tions with Britain on the Canal Base.³⁰

²⁸ Cited in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (Bristol: Keesing's
Publication Ltd.) 1956, pp. 14795-14796. (stated March 24, 1956).
For a general discussion of the influence of Egyptian public opinion
on the regime's development of neutralism see Lacouture, Jean
Egypt in Transition (London: Methuen, 1958), p. 209.

²⁹ Karanjia, R.K. Arab Dawn (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1959), p. 57.

³⁰ Spain, op. cit.; p. 257.

(3) Preservation of the territorial status quo in the Arab area -
absence of any significant emphasis on an Arab policy

It had traditionally been Egypt's policy in the Arab sub-system, since the early 1940's, to uphold the existing divisive frontiers between Arab states against any initiative for a partial or total formation of a unitary Arab state, and to aim at Egyptian primacy over a grouping of smaller, less powerful and less advanced Arab states, within the territorial status quo.³¹

A corollary of this policy was Egyptian opposition to the traditional emphasis in Iraqi foreign policy--advocacy of the "Fertile Crescent" scheme which aimed at the union of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan under Hashemite leadership with the possibility of further union with Iraq.³²

The mainstay of this traditional Egyptian policy was the 1945 Charter of the Arab League (over which Egypt presided), and more recently, the Arab Collective Security Pact of 1950. Both in effect provided for Egyptian primacy over a collection of smaller, less powerful, and less advanced Arab states, and were to be emphasized by Egypt

³¹Seale, op.cit.; pp. 311-312

³²As will be shown in the analysis of Iraq's direction of policy, the "Fertile Crescent" scheme was very much alive in 1954.

in the developing quarrel with Iraq.³³

As a study of Nasser's speeches³⁴ points out, not until the end of 1954 are we presented with any substantial reference in Nasser's speeches to a vigorous Arab policy.

Further, the preoccupation of the Egyptian press with problems of internal development, and Nasser's statements about reconciliation with the West during the same period, seem to indicate a policy dictating moderation, and given Western interests in the area, did not lend itself to an immediate drive for Arab hegemony.

Certain Egyptian pronouncements during the latter half of 1954, might be interpreted--due to their bellicose nature--as being symbolic of an increase in Egypt's involvement in the Arab world.

On closer analysis, however, such statements might well be seen as being primarily concerned with the short range problems surrounding the Canal Zone negotiations.

These problems included: the need for ensuring support during the talks through the prevention of defence arrangements with the West

³³ Egypt had induced the League to accept the Pact, but there had been no real implementation of it largely due to Iraqi reservations. The Pact was designed "to consolidate the relations between the states of the Arab League..." Its most important aspect for Egyptian purposes was its built-in prohibition of divergence in foreign policy, and it was to be emphasized during the subsequent period to contain Iraq and assert Egyptian supremacy under the slogan of Arab unity. Especially was this to be the case after autumn, 1954. See Rondot, op.cit.; pp. 133-134.

³⁴ Binder, Leonard in Kaplan, Morton, ed. The Revolution in World Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc, 1962) p. 161. See also Salem, E.A. Arab Nationalism: a reappraisal, International Journal, volume 17 (summer, 1962) p. 292.

and any changes in the territorial status quo such as might challenge Egypt's primacy, as well as the need of warding off criticism of the agreement through appropriate explanations.

On July 22, 1954--five days before the preliminary agreement to the treaty of evacuation was signed--Nasser stated:

The aim of the Revolutionary government is to make the Arabs a united nation with all its people cooperating for the common cause. . . .³⁵

When the Heads of Agreement were signed on July 27, 1954 Cairo radio was at pains to explain to the Agreement's critics that

The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement is no alliance. The "Voice of the Arabs" can emphasize that Egypt today has one alliance for which it works and in which it believes. It is the alliance of the Arab Collective Security Pact...³⁶

On the night of the evacuation agreement, on October 19, 1954, the "Voice of the Arabs" broadcast this interpretation of the Agreement:

Think what Egypt can do for you now that evacuation has been achieved. You, brother with the bowed head in Iraq, brother on the outskirts of Palestine, and in North Africa, you must remember the past two years and imagine the next two years, in Egypt; you will then raise your head in pride and dignity. In Iraq, your Arabism and your Habbaniya will be liberated by the liberation of Egypt. The imperialists will be driven to work for your friendship instead of sniffing at your hostility. Raise your head now, my brother, for victory has been won for you by your Egyptian Arabs.³⁷

³⁵ Cited in Wheelock, Keith Nasser's New Egypt (London: Stevens, 1960), p. 21

³⁶ BBC, No. 498, 7 September 1954; cited in Seale, op.cit.; p.198.

³⁷ BBC, No. 511, 22 October 1954; cited ibid; p. 210.

It was soon plain however that these statements, meant to fulfill short range objectives flowing from the Canal Zone issue, masked the underlying policy of moderate reconciliation with the West. This was reflected in the Egyptian role at the Arab Foreign Ministers conference in Cairo, as late as December 1954, where the Egyptian representative, before signing a joining declaration upholding the collective security pact but at the same time calling for cooperation with the West, insisted on including the condition "provided a just solution is found for Arab problems." According to Major Salah Salim this was

to sweeten the pill for public consumption. . .it was agreed that the solution of Arab problems might take a long time, but that cooperation with the West could start immediately.³⁸

The relative neglect by the Egyptian regime of inter-Arab affairs from the time of its accession to power in July 1952 until the end of 1954, has previously been analyzed.³⁹

This neglect was conditioned primarily by a preoccupation with other pressing concerns--both domestic and foreign. These problems which were prime factors in the regime's subsequent attitude to the

³⁸ Cited *ibid*; p. 211.

³⁹ See *Supra*, Chapter I,

Baghdad Pact, included: the establishment of the regime's authority on a secure basis, the resolution of conflicts within the regime's own ranks, the achievement of economic development and social reform--and in foreign affairs, the major problem of the evacuation of British troops from the Canal Zone.

Given the difficulty of pursuing an active policy in the Arab system at this time, an opposition to any attempt on behalf of other Arab states to change the territorial status quo in the region readily commended itself. Egypt would then retain leadership by virtue of her population, cultural facilities, and islamic institutions.⁴⁰

This is not to say that the regime was prepared to forego a vigorous Arab policy in the future, after the consolidation of the internal situation. Meanwhile she had to make sure that a common front in foreign policy coinciding with a status quo in boundaries was developed and maintained.⁴¹

⁴⁰ These bases for Egyptian supremacy in the Arab system are emphasized in explanations of her pre-eminence in the Arab League: See Boutros, Boutros-Ghali in Black, Jos. E. ed. and Thompson, Kenneth W. Foreign Policies in a World of Change (New York: Harper's Row, 1963) p. 336. See also: Longrigg, Stephen H. Iraq (London: Benn, 1958), p. 214; Chejne Anwar G. Egyptian Attitudes toward Pan-Arabism, Middle East Journal, (1957) p. 264; Seale, Patrick, The United Arab Republic and the Iraqi Challenge, World Today, volume 16 (1960) p. 298.

⁴¹ Ibid; pp. 296-305.

Part II: The Policies of the Great Powers and the Other Members of the Arab System

The main features of Egyptian foreign policy immediately prior to the Baghdad Pact announcement met with opposition on the part of the western superpowers, lack of extensive support on the part of the Soviet Union, and varying degrees of resistance and support on the part of the other members of the inter-Arab system--Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon.

(A) The Policies of the Great Powers

An analysis of the policies of Britain, the United States, and to a lesser extent the Soviet Union, immediately prior to the Baghdad Pact, reveals trends in their Arab policy inimical to Egyptian foreign policy objectives.

The inter-Arab core was indispensable to Britain for a variety of reasons including: Commonwealth communications, oil, imperial defence, and commerce.

The British position taken prior to the Suez agreement of October 1954⁴² had been strong, her interests including: the major base at Suez (the fulcrum of British military strategy in the Middle East), the special treaty relationship with Iraq (including provision

⁴²See Supra, pp. 16-17.

for use of two important military bases), the treaty of alliance and base rights with Jordan, as well as a position of primary influence through her special role in the establishment, maintenance and command of the Arab Legion; the Crown Colonies of Cyprus and Aden; and the exercise of ultimate authority in a series of protectorates on the southern and eastern rim of the Arabian peninsula.⁴³

The agreement to evacuate the Canal Base had, however, considerably undermined the entire strategic position on which these interests were based. To give but one example, Jordan had been in British strategy, the link between Egypt and the more easterly region of the Persian Gulf, a region which was otherwise inaccessible to British power. Withdrawal from the Suez Base undermined British contact with Jordan through Aquaba which had depended on security of passage between the Mediterranean and Red Seas, in spite of the fact that this was compensated to some extent by accessibility by air.

The threat to the British position in the region was all the more acute, given the fact that British permanent military arrangements had been enacted on the basis of temporary treaty rights.

⁴³ Campbell, John C. Defence of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy re ed. (New York: Harper and Bros., 1960), p. 15. Economically Britain's influence in the core was still great in 1954. For example, she was still Egypt's largest trade customer and supplier though cotton sales were steadily falling off. In addition the volume of Egypt's post-war imports depended on access to blocked sterling. In the general foreign commerce of the area taken as a whole, Britain had a substantial lead in both exports and imports.

The precariousness of the British position in Iraq was a case in point: Two of the most important British bases were held under a treaty due to expire in 1957, and not likely to be renewed. Given the fact of an eventual Suez evacuation, the strengthening of a substitute for the existing arrangements with Iraq was essential.⁴⁴

These circumstances lead, in late 1954, to a major shift in British policy in the area, from advocacy of a region-wide defence system centered on Suez to reluctant support of a modified form of the "Northern Tier" policy initiated by the United States and which had emerged from the Kennan policy of containment of the Soviet Union, and upon which the Baghdad Pact proposals were to be based.

The concept of the "Northern Tier," as put forward by the United States, rested on the following basic assumptions:

- (a) that most of the Middle Eastern peoples and governments were unwilling to be associated with the West in a regional defence organization.
- (b) Until such time as a regional association is possible, there should be a strengthening of the interrelated defences of the countries of the "Northern Tier"--Iraq, for example--which were deemed most aware

⁴⁴Sayeed, Khalid B. The Arabs and the West, Behind the Headline Series, Vol. 17, No. 3, September 1957, p. 8; Campbell, op.cit.; pp. 15, 57. Marlowe, op.cit.; p. 88.

of the Soviet danger, and were best situated to provide protection to the entire region.⁴⁵

To Britain, a defence organization formed on the basis of the "Northern Tier" proposals, though not encompassing the entire region in its initial stages, was a means of obtaining a secure base from which to conduct brief and rapid operations in support of local stability and security.⁴⁶

The ultimate aim would thus conceivably involve merging the British air forces in Iraq and the Arab Legion in Jordan in a sort of Middle East NATO arrangement under a joint command.

American post-war policy in the Middle East aimed at the defence of vital strategic territory against the U.S.S.R., and the protection of vital resources, especially oil--essential to the economy

⁴⁵Campbell, op.cit.; (1958 edition), p. 49.

⁴⁶Campbell (Rev. Ed.) op.cit.; p. 58. See also Woodhouse, C. M. Britain and the Middle East, Foreign Affairs Reports, (New Delhi: The Indian Council of World Affairs), Vol. 8, February 1959, p. 23. It should be noted however that the American proposals in their original form were quite different from the scheme which Britain was eventually to support and dominate.

The "Northern Tier" alliance was a forward defence line up against Russia's borders composed of non-Arab states such as Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, with the possible addition of Iraq as a junior partner. It thus failed to provide for extensive Arab membership.

This is to be contrasted with the eventual British-supported design put forward by Nuri Said, of which the Baghdad Pact was to be the nucleus. This involved a plan to strengthen the Arab League Pact by including Turkey, enlisting the aid of the U.K. and the U.S., and using Iraq, not as a junior partner but as the key member. See Seale, op.cit.; p. 191.

of Western Europe, and thus indirectly of great importance to the United States.⁴⁷

The United States would not deal with any of the countries of the Arab core (including Egypt) in isolation, that is to say, apart from the global struggle for power with the Soviet Union.⁴⁸

In spite of her emphasis on the "Northern Tier" policy at this time, the long range aim of the United States was the integration of the entire area, including Egypt in a Middle East security association.⁴⁹

This main aim was reflected in the American arms policy which, like that of Britain, involved providing arms in substantial quantities to Arab states only on the basis of an explicit or implicit political alliance.⁵⁰ This demand for political alliances, combined with other major deficiencies in the United States aid policy vis-a-vis the Arab core to present formidable obstacles to extensive cooperation between Egypt and the United States.

⁴⁷In their view of Middle East defence, however, the Americans tended to think less of the preservation of British treaty rights and military facilities, than of global strategy. The U. S. was thus less inclined to pressure Egypt to participate in a Middle East defence organization as a condition for an Anglo-Egyptian settlement in 1954. Ibid; pp. 186-187.

⁴⁸Campbell, John, America and the Middle East India Quarterly, Vol. 15, April-June 1959, p. 145.

⁴⁹Campbell, op.cit.; p. 50.
See also Lacouture, op.cit.; p. 214.

⁵⁰For example, the refusal in the autumn of 1952 to accede to Egyptian requests for the purchase of planes unless Egypt joined a strategical network. See ibid; p. 214.

These deficiencies (from the Arab point of view) included: an attempt to maintain an Arab-Israeli arms balance, and hence the curtailment of major arms shipments,⁵¹ prolonged administrative procedures before aid which was promised was actually allocated and delivered, an elaborate machinery for inspection of its use, the limitation of American aid to a year by year basis making long-term projects difficult, and the sending of technicians under the control of an American aid mission for set periods of time.⁵²

The Stalinist attitude to the Arab core had not been conclusive to extensive Soviet-Egyptian relations.

This approach involved the simple dualism of the opposing forces of "imperialism" and "anti-imperialism" with Arab governments, including that of Egypt, being dubbed "bourgeois lackeys of imperialism."⁵³

Though a new and more favourable line was subsequently to be adopted with respect to the "national bourgeois leaders" (Nasser, for example) it was only to be manifested in the spring and summer of 1955.⁵⁴

⁵¹For example the agreement in principle in December 1952 to sell light arms to Egypt only on condition that she would undertake no act of aggression and that such armaments would be used only for interior defence. See *ibid*; p. 214.

⁵²These features are discussed in Cremeans, *op. cit.*; pp. 280-281. As an example of the last, one might cite the insistence of the presence of an American military mission in Cairo, which was one of the major stumbling blocs to delivery of anything more than insignificant amounts of small and medium arms to Egypt after the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Draft Agreement. Lacouture, *op.cit.*; p.214-215.

⁵³Wheeler, *op.cit.*; p. 134.

⁵⁴Seale, *op.cit.*; p. 232.

The analysis of the Middle Eastern policies of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, to January 1955 reveals that Western aims were in direct opposition to Egyptian attempts at a policy of long-range reconciliation with the Western powers based on an absence of formal defence pacts. Western aims, further, were derivatively a threat to Egyptian efforts to maintain the territorial status quo in the Arab area.

The policy of the U.S.S.R. at this stage, was not to offer extensive support for Egyptian opposition to Western aims.

(B) The Policies of the Other Members of the Arab System
Iraq

Among the other members of the Arab subsystem it was the direction of policy of the Iraqi regime immediately prior to the Baghdad Pact that was most consistently inimical to Egyptian aims:

Iraqi opposition to Egypt in her foreign policy objectives had been traditional, dating back to the pre-Arab League Period.

The traditional feature of Iraqi policy during the post-war period--advocacy of the "Fertile Crescent" scheme involving the unity of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan into a single state under Hashemite leadership with a possibility of a further union with Iraq,⁵⁵ was in direct opposition to Egypt's advocacy of a larger and looser association under Egypt's leadership.

⁵⁵ Ibid; p. 312.

The major theme of Egyptian foreign policy in the Arab core during the period 1945-1955 was the objective of a united front in foreign policy and the status quo with respect to frontiers. No combination of Arab states would then be able effectively to challenge her and leadership would be assured due to her level of development, population, and Islamic institutions.

The constant Egyptian fears of the implications of Iraqi schemes for partial unity was exemplified in the Arab League Council in late 1949, when Egypt requested a guarantee from all members to respect the status quo in the Arab countries.⁵⁶

This constant Egyptian-Iraqi opposition was reflected during the Palestine campaign where Iraq supported Jordan's proposed annexation of Palestine (Iraq considered a union with Jordan as the nucleus for the unity of the Fertile Crescent), and Egypt advocated an independent Palestine under the presidency of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, so as to preserve the territorial status quo.⁵⁷

There was further evidence during this period of Iraq's constant advocacy of the Fertile Crescent scheme.

As examples one might cite the following: In 1950 Muzahim al Pachachi, Foreign Minister in the cabinet of Ali Jawat al-Ayyubi visited Cairo and agreed that Iraq should defer any plans for union with Syria.

⁵⁶New York Times, October 22, 1949.

⁵⁷Marlowe, op. cit.; pp. 37-38.

This commitment was unacceptable even to some of the cabinet members and the cabinet was forced to resign in consequence.⁵⁸ On January 19, 1954 Premier Jamali made a statement illustrating Iraq's continued interest in union with Jordan. Speaking in the Chamber of Deputies he said that the Iraqi Government would welcome a Jordanian offer of unity should she decide upon it.⁵⁹

A further illustration of Iraq's commitment to the "Fertile Crescent Plan" as late as 1954, is provided by the presentation, on January 11, by Premier Jamali, to the Arab League's Political Committee, of a plan for Arab federation.⁶⁰

Britain supported traditional Iraqi policy.⁶¹ The 1930 Treaty of Preferential Alliance between Britain and Iraq, provided for consultations on matters of foreign policy and mutual assistance in the event of war, in addition to a constant British military presence.⁶²

⁵⁸ Longrigg, op.cit.; p. 216.

⁵⁹ Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 5, March 1954, p. 104.

⁶⁰ Iraqi interest was thinly veiled on this occasion by the proviso that the plan was to be achieved in successive stages. The Iraqis emphasized the early stages, that is to say, partial federation. See Lenczowski, op.cit.; p. 288.

⁶¹ During the early phases of the period, the early 1950's however, it is more accurate to say that Britain's attitude towards the Fertile Crescent scheme was luke-warm. Britain was inhibited as far back as the late forties from promoting Fertile Crescent unity by French hostility--France considering Syria a legitimate and exclusive sphere of influence--as well as Saudi and Egyptian opposition. Further, that Britain had no enthusiasm for a merger of Syria with either Iraq or Jordan was also due to a realization it might upset her dominant position in these Hashemite states. See Seale, op.cit.; pp. 168, 264.

It was only after the mid-fifties that her support for the scheme asserted itself for reasons which will be analyzed elsewhere.

⁶² Longrigg, op.cit.; pp. 222-223.

This support increased the danger which Iraqi schemes presented to Egyptian interests in the Arab core.

The other major focal point of opposition in Iraqi foreign policy to Egyptian interests, was an attempt, beginning in the early fifties, to transfer the British alliance from the narrow field of bilateral relations to the broader field of Western-sponsored security pacts. The Iraqi government wished, by so doing, to obtain political guarantees, military assistance, and arms supplies, while at the same time bolstering the security of the regime in the non-tangible sphere by ostensibly forcing the British to evacuate Iraq before the date of expiry of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in 1957.⁶³

Saudi Arabia

The most constant support in the Arab system for Egyptian objectives immediately prior to the Baghdad Pact's announcement came from the Saudi regime. King Saud ruled Saudi Arabia as an absolute monarch. Foreign policy fluctuated according to the wishes of the king. Policy was determined by a small group of men--the King, the Crown Prince, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and their advisers.⁶⁴

Close relations had existed between Egypt and Saudi Arabia since the early post-war years, Saudi Arabia making substantial financial

⁶³Lenczowski, op. cit.; p. 291.

⁶⁴Lipsky, George A. Saudi Arabia: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1959), p. 138.

grants to Egypt, while Egyptian experts of various sorts were welcomed to Saudi Arabia.⁶⁵

By 1955, in spite of diametrically opposed internal systems, the foreign policies of Saudi Arabia and Egypt were to converge. Two major factors, acting as common denominators, accounted for this convergence.

First, there was the traditional dynastic rivalry between Saud and the Hashemites dating back to the twenties when Ibn Saud drove the Hashemite family from Arabia. This hostility had involved the opposition of Saudi Arabia to any unification of the Fertile Crescent under Hashemite auspices. Egypt, herself an advocate of the status quo, was considered by the Saudi elite as a convenient instrument for maintaining this division.⁶⁶

Second, like Egypt, Saudi Arabia was to have strained relations with Great Britain, the Buraimi Oasis dispute being at its height at this time. Egypt and Saudi Arabia were allies in the challenge to Great Britain's dominance in the Persian Gulf Area and Oman.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Ibid; p. 141. See also Marlowe, op.cit.; pp. 37-38.

⁶⁶ Lipsky, op.cit.; p. 143.

⁶⁷ Ibid; p. 145.

There existed even at this time several factors which operated as seeds of future dissension--differences which were to come to the fore in the post-Suez rift between the two regimes. They will be considered later in the paper. The factors included (a) suspicion of Egyptian penetration (b) a difference in outlook on "neutrality" (c) the unwillingness on the part of the Saudi regime to jeopardize oil revenues by using oil supplies as a political instrument and (d) the instability of common hostility to Britain as a factor, due to the long-range decline of British power in the Middle East. See Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, July 26, 1957, p. 17; Lipsky, op.cit.; p. 142; Lenczowski, op.cit.; p. 565; Shwadrin, Benjamin, Jordan: A State of Tension (New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1959), p. 344.

Syria

The frequent changes in leadership characteristic of Syrian politics during the post-war period were not conducive to either consistent support for or opposition to Egyptian policy objectives.

As an analysis of the period 1945-1954 bears out, frequent shifts in leadership led to corresponding shifts in foreign policy.

The government in power from December 1946 to March 1949 was a Nationalist one, whose previous ideal of a large Pan-Arab state had been tempered, upon taking power, by the realization that a unified Arab state would restrict their financial and political opportunities. Further as strong proponents of the republican system they shied away from any scheme of partial unity that brought the risk of domination by a Hashemite monarchical regime. Consequently, they opposed the Fertile Crescent scheme.⁶⁸

The rapid disorganization and deterioration of the governmental processes, incident upon the outcome of the Palestine War, with a collapsing economy, and an army resentful at being made the scapegoat for the defeat lead to the assumption of power by Col. Husni al Zaim, commander in chief of the army, in March 1949.

Zaim's foreign policy was originally based upon advocacy of association with Iraq, supporting the main arguments put forward by the main proponents of such an association (such as the Populists) i.e. that

⁶⁸ Torrey, Gordon H. Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964), p. 75.

Syria needed military aid to strengthen her position vis-a-vis Israel, that Jordan and Iraq were Syria's best customers, and that the Syrian situation demanded easy access to their markets.⁶⁹

Apparently because of Iraqi procrastination about the conclusion of a defensive military agreement, and in the face of a counterproposal made by Egypt in conjunction with Saudi Arabia, of formal recognition and financial aid if Zaim would maintain the Syrian republican government, the Zaim regime switched to rejection of the Fertile Crescent scheme.⁷⁰

The Zaim regime was overthrown by internal military opponents on the night of August 13, 1949 and was succeeded by that of Col. Hinnawi, who represented the supporters for union with Iraq. Plans for union seemed for a time likely to be approved by the Syrian constituent assembly. This probably provoked the Shishakli coup of December 1949.⁷¹

The Shishakli regime was pro-Egyptian and pro-Saudi in orientation, and Syrian relations with Iraq during the next five years were to deteriorate markedly with Iraq being frequently accused by Shishakli of intervention in Syria's internal affairs.⁷²

⁶⁹Ibid; p. 134

⁷⁰Ziadeh, Nicola A. Syria and Lebanon, (London: Benn, 1957) p.104

⁷¹Seale, op.cit.; p. 84.

⁷²Ziadeh, op.cit.; p. 134.

Symptomatic of Syria's movement squarely into the Egyptian-Saudi camp under Shishakli was the declaration by his minister of national economy Ma'ruf al-Dawalibi, that an Egyptian military mission to train the Syrian army signified the beginning of political co-operation between the two countries.⁷³

The strongest civilian element in the Syrian regime immediately after Col. Shishakli's overthrow and the restoration of civilian government in late 1954 were the old conservatives who attempted to turn the clock back to the 1949 pre-reform era. They formed a precarious coalition of Nationalist and Populist parties together with independents.⁷⁴

An analysis follows of the two traditional political forces and their direction of foreign policy.

The dominant party [the People's (Shaab) Party] had been formed in 1947 as an offshoot of the national Bloc and represented largely the great estate holders and merchants from Aleppo, Homs, and the Jezira province.

⁷³Torrey, op.cit.; p. 166.

⁷⁴Typical of the mixed composition of Syrian cabinets during subsequent months to early 1955 was that named by President Hashem al-Attassi, a Populist, on March 1, 1954. The premier was the secretary-general of the Nationalist Party, Sabri el-Asali, while the Populists reserved for themselves the key ministries of defence (Maaruf Dawalibi), foreign affairs (Faidi el-Atassi), and interior (Ali Buzu, secretary-general of the Populist Party).

Lenczowski, op.cit.; p. 355.

The ten-man-cabinet which governed Syria from October 1954 to February 1955 included 5 Populists and 5 Nationalists. Seale, op.cit.; p. 215.

Largely because of extensive commercial connections, the Populists were the strongest advocates of union with Iraq, and thus the main opponents in Syria, of Egyptian policy. They also favored joining a Western Pact with Turkey to strengthen the country vis-a-vis Israel while giving the army more incentive to concentrate on its own calling instead of meddling in politics.⁷⁵

During this period however they could not offer consistent and strong opposition to Egyptian policy, being part of a heterogenous cabinet, and taking cognizance of the prevailing neutralist sentiment in Syria, as well as the recent ~~memory~~ of governments being overthrown twice within four years for desiring union with Iraq.⁷⁶

The Populists, as ^{all} pro-Western politicians in Syria at this time, suffered from the stigma which Western backing of Israel had created and this weakness was accentuated by their lack of a strong party organization.⁷⁷

Thus the non-committal attitude of the Populist ministers at the December 1954 conference of the Arab League at which Iraq's movement the Turkish Pakistani Pact was discussed. Populist Foreign Faidi el Atassi refused also at a subsequent conference of Arab

⁷⁵ Torrey, op.cit.; p. 270.

⁷⁶ Lenczowski, op.cit.; p.357.

⁷⁷ Torrey, op.cit.; p. 263.

In addition, Populist weakness was due to much of their support coming from independents who were susceptible to shifting allegiances, as well as to lack of strong leadership. Ibid; p. 162.

premiers to take a clear stand for or against Iraq.⁷⁸

The Nationalist Party, with whom the Populists precariously shared power until February 1955 was like the People's Party a restricted oligarchic group supported by upper middle and upper classes dominated by a landowning and merchant elite having little contact with the Syrian masses and lacking country-wide constituencies.⁷⁹

In foreign policy, the Nationalist Party line was at times confused. After many years of opposition to Iraqi union, it came out in favour of such a union during the Hinnawi period, and Sabri al Asali was the chief proponent of this policy at that time. The main consideration appears to have been a strengthening of the country vis-a-vis Israel, and it was envisaged as a first step towards a greater Arab unity.⁸⁰

During subsequent years, however, Asali was a leader of a pro-Egyptian minority within the party consisting mostly of the left-wing younger members. The older leadership within the party were pro-Iraqi.

⁷⁸Lenczowski, op.cit.; p. 357.

⁷⁹The National Party had lost much popularity as a result of the "bungling" of the Palestine War.
See Seale, op.cit.; pp. 28, 174-175.

⁸⁰Torrey, op.cit.; p. 148.

Though not neutralist, the party was to oppose the Iraqi-Turkish Pact largely due to jealousy and suspicion of their rival fellow-conservatives, the Populists and a desire to secure agreement with the Populists' anti-Western opponents, the Azm bloc and the Baath.⁸¹

The support which the Nationalist party gave to a pro-Egyptian alignment was thus sporadic and opportunistic.

Syria's foreign policy under the Nationalist-Populist heterogenous cabinet was to be indecisive vis-a-vis Egyptian objectives.⁸²

Jordan and Lebanon

The policies of Jordan and Lebanon shortly before the announcement of the Baghdad Pact were by and large not in opposition to Egyptian policy objectives. The roles of both regimes in the inter-Arab system at this time were mediatory and conciliatory.

Jordan occupied a central position among the Arab states in the Middle East, and hence was to play a prominent role in Egyptian

⁸¹ Ibid; p. 276.

⁸² The division and consequent indecisiveness in foreign policy issues which characterized the Syrian political scene at this time was reflected in the deliberations of the Chamber Committee on Foreign Relations in the heterogenous Syrian parliament, which met several times late in December 1954, and early January 1955, in order to formulate Syria's foreign policy, but to no avail. See Ziadeh, op.cit.; pp. 152-153.

foreign policy objectives. Her geographical circumstance, the fact of her great dependence on foreign economic assistance since her inception as a political entity, the absence of an organic unity within the country creating a precarious domestic situation, had shaped many of her foreign policy problems in the country's relations with other Arab states, and more particularly with Egypt.

The relation of Jordanian foreign policy to Egyptian objectives, during the post-war period, to early 1955, culminating in a neutral , conciliatory approach, will now be analyzed.

King Abdullah's (1922-1951), main themes in foreign policy involved the utilization of Jordan as a base for a "Greater Syria" to include contemporary Syria, Transjordan, and such parts of Palestine as might be controlled by the Arabs.⁸³

This policy brought Jordan into conflict with the Egyptian policy objectives of maintaining the territorial status quo. By and large, ^{it} led to alienation from Saudi Arabia and Syria, and alignment with Iraq.

The Egyptian-Jordanian opposition was further sharpened by the occupation and subsequent annexation of Palestinian territory after the Arab-Israeli war.⁸⁴

⁸³ Harris, George L. Jordan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (New York: Grove Press, 1958), pp. 108-109.

⁸⁴ Ibid; p. 109.

Shortly before Abdullah's death, he was working toward union between Jordan and Iraq, both as a move toward a larger Arab unity, and as a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem which was too great for Jordan's limited resources. With his death the plan was shelved.⁸⁵

Abdullah's successor Talal, or more particularly the Cabinet which under his reign tended to acquire much greater executive authority, inaugurated a policy of avoiding too close association with emergent blocs among the Arab states and of ~~staying~~ on good terms with all.⁸⁶

This policy of cautious reconciliation was continued by Talal's successor, Hussein, during 1953 and 1954, and was thus the Jordanian policy shortly before the announcement of the Baghdad Pact.⁸⁷

⁸⁵Ibid; p. 110.

The plan's failure was attributed by Jordanian Prime Minister Abu al-Huda to the purely political character of the arrangement desired by the Iraqis, and to the absence of any economic benefits to be derived by Jordan. Ibid.

⁸⁶Ibid; p. 110.

Examples are Prime Minister Abul Huda's denial, (on September 18, 1951) of any attempt on Jordan's part to effect union with Iraq, and an attempted reconciliation with the rival house of Saud, (as revealed in a visit to the Saudi capital November 10-18, 1951).

See Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. II, 1951, pp. 347, 419; Ibid; Vol. III, 1952, p. 131.

⁸⁷Ibid; p. 110.

Examples are: Jordan's rejection as offensive to her allies in the Arab League of an Iraqi proposal for unification in 1954. (Iraqi Premier Jamali had made the offer in the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies, on January 19, 1954). See Middle Eastern Affairs, March 1954, p. 104. Examples of a mediatory approach appeared in early 1955--Jordanian Premier Rifai's visit to Cairo and other Arab capitals with the avowed mission of settling antagonisms. See Middle Eastern Affairs, March 1956, p. 123.

Lebanon's foreign policy during the post-war period to February 1955 and the Baghdad Pact, was based on the National Covenant of 1943, by which both Christian and Muslim Lebanese agreed to a compromise--the Moslems agreeing to Lebanon's permanent independence but as "a nation with an Arab face"⁸⁸ whereas the Christians renounced any alliances with the Western powers.

Lebanon's role in the Middle Eastern Arab system during this period may be classified as one of neutral peace-making in the recurring quarrels of the Arab states. By and large, therefore, it did not represent an opposition to Egyptian policy objectives at this stage.⁸⁹

On the issue of a possible Iraqi-Turkish Agreement, Lebanon's formal mediatory role was expressed in the following statement by President Chamoun.

The preservation of the unity of the Arab front and the cooperation among the Arab League States is vital and should be placed above all other considerations. . . . Everyone of us gives due appreciation to the arguments made in support of the Iraqi-Turkish Agreement on the one hand and the objections to its conclusion on the other. What is important is to find a solution reconciling the opposing points of view, thus safeguarding the Arab League from the danger threatening it.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Childers, Erskine The Road to Suez (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1962), p. 320.

⁸⁹ As illustrations of this position, one might note that in 1953 alone President Chamoun undertook official visits to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, and received in return King Saud (before his accession) King Fays al of Iraq, King Hussein and President Shishakli. See Qubain, Fahim I. Crisis in Lebanon (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1961), p. 26.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

The above analysis tends to support the following generalizations regarding the attitude, at the time of the Baghdad Pact's announcement, to Egyptian foreign policy objectives, on the part of other Arab governments.

The Iraqi regimes direction of policy was most consistently inimical to Egyptian aims. This policy included: opposition to Egyptian efforts at preserving the territorial status quo in the Arab area, this opposition being embodied in Iraqi schemes of partial unity under Hashemite leadership; and attempts to transfer the British alliance with Iraq from the narrow field of bilateral relations to the broader field of Western-sponsored security pacts, efforts which were diametrically opposed to the Egyptian abhorrence of Western-sponsored defence pacts in the Arab area.

Saudi Arabia's direction of policy presented constant support for Egyptian objectives, based largely on a common opposition to Hashemite partial unity schemes, and in smaller measure on a common opposition to Britain's dominance in the Persian Gulf Area and Oman.

Syria's foreign policy under a Nationalist-Populist heterogenous cabinet was indecisive vis-a-vis Egyptian objectives offering neither consistent support nor opposition.

The policies of both Jordan and Lebanon shortly before the Baghdad Pact's announcement were officially not in opposition to Egyptian policy objectives. The role of both regimes in the inter-Arab system at this time was mediatory and conciliatory.

CHAPTER IV

EGYPT'S REACTION TO THE BAGHDAD PACT

A. The Baghdad Pact and its Effect on Egypt's Position in the Arab World.

On January 13, 1955, after a number of moves towards closer collaboration, Turkish Premier **Adnan** Menderes and Iraqi Premier Nuri al-Said, announced, at Baghdad, that a mutual assistance pact would soon be signed.

Strictly speaking, the proposed pact did not provide for an alliance. However, it stipulated cooperation to assure the contracting parties' security and defence¹, non-interference in internal affairs², the possibility of the future adhesion of other states interested in the security of the Middle East, provided they are recognized by both parties³, and the creation of a permanent ministerial council to implement the pact if and when at least four parties became signatories to it⁴.

It seemed on the surface relatively harmless to Egypt's interests. As a columnist writing in the Economist pointed out:

The proposed agreement between Turkey and Iraq

¹ Article 1 of the Terms of the Baghdad Pact - 24th February 1955, cited in Birdwood, C.B., "Nuri al-Said, a study in Arab leadership", (London: Cassell, 1959) (p. 230)

² Ibid; Article 3

³ Ibid; Article 5

⁴ Ibid; p. 291, Article 6

hardly warrants all the fuss either in Egypt or the Western world. It provides simply for military staff consultations and for tax-free unimpeded transit of military stores through either country to the other. It is difficult to say what exactly it contributes to Western strategy or "perimeter defence" or why it was so urgently necessary. The psychological importance of Iraq's commitment to the western powers was already achieved by its undertaking to accept American military aid⁵ and by the severance of diplomatic relations with Russia⁵.

The announcement that the signing of the Baghdad Pact was imminent was received with indignant surprise in Cairo. It was considered an abrupt volte face, in view of the negotiations which the Egyptian regime had conducted with Iraq in August and September of 1954⁶.

These, in addition to the declarations at the last meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers in Cairo in December 1954, had given Egypt reason to hope that, if her efforts at persuading Iraq were not immediately successful, at least she had obtained a temporary postponement of the Pact.

The motives of the Iraqi regime's impending signature of the Pact appeared suspect. Her initiative was seen as an attempt to take advantage of Egypt's difficulty in preparing her public opinion for military aid based on formal pacts with the West by jumping the gun.

⁵ Economist, February 19, 1955

⁶ Survey of international affairs. (London: Oxford University Press), 1955-6, p.25.

The agreement in the 1950 Arab Collective Security Pact "to conclude no international agreement which may be inconsistent with the present Treaty" (Ar. 10) had been violated, and the use of this pact to enhance the bargaining position of Egypt and other Arab States in their negotiations for military aid without commitments had been reduced considerably.

The shift in emphasis in Middle Eastern defence from Suez to the Persian Gulf region was seen to constitute a direct threat to Egyptian supremacy.

Egypt felt herself vulnerable to increased Western pressure and faced with isolation.

In addition to having jeopardized Egyptian attempts at a unity of foreign policy in the area, based on an absence of formal defence commitments, Iraq's initiative was also seen as a threat to Egyptian plans for a maintenance of the status quo in the region. The Pact, it was feared, would lead to greater Western support for Iraq's long-cherished plan to federate with Syria and Jordan.⁷

The Baghdad Pact's long-term potential for providing a vehicle for economic and social cooperation presented a propaganda threat. If the social inequalities of Iraq could be visibly lessened, Iraq might conceivably replace Egypt as a symbol of social "liberation" within the system.

⁷ The extent of British support for these schemes has previously been analyzed. See Supra, Ch. III pp. 65-68. Suffice it here to say that Egypt feared a more positive approach to Iraqi partial unity schemes on the part of Britain and the U.S. than had hitherto been shown.

The Egyptians did not regard Iraq's adherence to the Pact in itself as a primary threat. The danger lay, rather, in the prospects of the Pact's extension to other Arab states. The known long-range plans of the British government and Iraqi regime concerning the Baghdad Pact included the merging of the British air forces in Iraq and the Arab Legion in Jordan in a sort of Middle East NATO arrangement under a joint command.⁸

⁸ Campbell, John C. Defence of the Middle East (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 58.

Proof that a self-contained Baghdad Pact might have been tolerated was to be furnished some months later, by reports in early March 1956 that when the British foreign Secretary, returning from a meeting of the S.E.A.T.O. Council called at Cairo, Nasser sought an understanding that the Baghdad Pact should not be extended to states not already members, in return for which the Egyptian Government would cease their attacks upon it. The British reply reportedly was that while they did not intend to force any government into joining, they could not agree to veto anyone who might voluntarily do so.

The Annual Register of World Events - A Review of the Year (London: Longmans Green & Co., 1956), p. 273.

Further evidence was to be furnished at about the same time in the form of a communique, issued after the March 6th to 11th, 1956 Cairo meeting of Egyptian, Syrian, and Saudi Arabian heads of state, which carefully restricted the signatories' opposition to an extension of the Pact in the Arab world.

Keesings Contemporary Archives, (Bristol: Keesings Publications Ltd.), 1956, p. 14794-5.

The Cairo correspondent of the Economist, commenting on this communique, maintained that this meant "Iraq can have its norther tier as long as it builds no struts down into the Arab world." See Economist, March 24, 1956, p. 649.

B. Egypt's Immediate Countermeasures (January - March 1955)

(1) Diplomatic Countermeasures

(a) Meeting of Arab Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers

In the attempt to prevent Iraq's entry into the Turkish-Pakistani Pact, the Egyptian regime first put emphasis on diplomacy.

After the announcement of January 13, 1955, the first major diplomatic recourse aimed at preventing Iraq from actually signing the Baghdad Pact was the calling of an emergency conference of the Arab Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers in Cairo on January 22, 1955.⁹

The purpose of Egypt in calling the conference was to obtain the censure of Iraq for her announced intention of entering a security pact with Turkey and to obtain the clarification of the participants' stance on the question.

It was to be the first and last emphasis by Egypt on diplomacy and negotiations between governments after the announcement of the Pact--apart from the efforts at building a tripartite military alliance between Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia.

The conference was attended by, in addition to the Egyptian representatives, Syrian Premier Faris al-Khuri, the Lebanese Premier Sami al-Solh, the Jordanian Premier Tawfiq Abul-Huda, the Amir Faysal of Saudi Arabia, together with the Foreign Ministers of Syria, Lebanon,

⁹ Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 6, 1955, p. 60.

and Jordan. Nuri al-Said was unable to attend because of "illness," though on January 26th, a three-man Iraqi delegation led by former Prime Minister Fadil al-Jamali arrived in Cairo and on the following day held a private meeting with the Egyptian Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and the Minister of National Guidance.¹⁰

Two major factors shaped Egypt's primary emphasis at this time on diplomacy in her efforts to prevent Iraq's entry into the Baghdad Pact.

First, the ambiguous commitments reportedly undertaken by the Iraqi leaders at conferences prior to the announcement of the Pact, no doubt acted as a catalyst to further efforts in the diplomatic sphere.

So convincing was the appearance of fluidity created by the pronouncements of the Sarsank talks and the meeting of Foreign Ministers in August and December of 1954, respectively,¹¹ that Baghdad correspondents of the leading U.S. and British newspapers could echo an

¹⁰ Seale, Patrick The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1943-1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 215.

¹¹ For example, a joint declaration after the Sarsank talks stated that the Arab Collective Security Pact would be reinforced. See Middle East Journal, 1954, p. 190.

Salim later claimed that it had been decided that no Arab state should conclude a Pact outside the Arab League. Keesings, *op. cit.*; 1955, p. 14058.

After the December, 1954 meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers in Cairo, a declaration was issued that Iraq and Egypt had agreed that the Collective Security Pact should be strengthened and developed into an effective military organization which, following the British withdrawal from Suez, would take over exclusive responsibility for the defence of the Middle East.

Survey of International Affairs, *op.cit.*; 1955-1956, p. 25.

opinion probably shared by Nasser, that nothing in the nature of a pact was immediately likely in view of Egypt's opposition.¹²

The second major reason for the emphasis on diplomacy at this time was that the alternative influencing the Iraqi government through propaganda and subversion, showed little chance of succeeding during this period.

The extensive internal support for Egypt's opposition to the foreign policy of the Iraqi regime,¹³ could not readily be converted into opportunities for undermining this policy, due to the impotency of the civilian political groupings. The lack of effectiveness of these groupings was due both to the repressive measures undertaken by the government, especially in late 1954, as well as the deficiencies of the parties themselves. These obstacles will be analyzed below.¹⁴

Egypt's major attempt, after the announcement of January 13, 1955, to obtain a censure of Iraq, at the forum of the Arab Premiers' and Foreign Ministers' conference in Cairo ended in failure.

Referring to this last-ditch effort, in an article published on February 7, 1955, Major Salim declared that the conference had been

¹²Cited in World Today, 1954, p. 455.

¹³The extent and nature of this support will be analyzed below. See *Infra*, pp. 106-110.

¹⁴See *Infra*, p. 114.

a complete failure because of the "wavering" attitude of some of the delegations, who had agreed not to join the Turkish-Iraqi Pact but had refused to support a formal resolution to that effect. The delegation, he added, had even failed to agree whether the Cairo conference should be postponed or terminated with the result that it had been left "hanging in mid-air."¹⁵

The reasons for this indecisiveness, and consequent lack of success, of the first and last major diplomatic effort undertaken by Egypt during the period following the announcement of January 13th up to the Pact's actual inception on February 25, 1955 will now be analyzed.

It appeared that the Egyptian-Iraqi dispute was an embarrassment to all Arab states except Saudi Arabia.

Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria resisted Egyptian pressure to censure Iraq on the grounds that Turkey is a close neighbour and is worth consorting with, that the Middle East has nowhere to get the arms it needs except from the West, and that to ostracize Iraq would be of no advantage to anyone except Russia.

The premiers seem to have compromised by agreeing not to follow Iraq's example themselves and by shifting to the more harmonious topic of joint Arab defence arrangements.¹⁶

¹⁵ Keesing's Archives, op.cit.; 1955, p. 14058.

¹⁶ Economist, January 29, 1955, p. 350.

The non-committal attitude of Jordan and Lebanon was understandable. In Lebanon's case, it was a continuation of her traditional role in the Arab system of neutral peacemaker.¹⁷

Jordan's stand was a continuation of Hussein's policy, inaugurated by his predecessor King Talal, of avoiding too close association with emergent blocs among the Arab states and of staying on good terms with all.¹⁸

The refusal of Syrian Prime Minister Faris el-Khuri and Foreign Minister Faidi el-Atassi to take a clear stand for or against Iraq may be explained by the precarious nature of the Populist majority in the legislature.¹⁹

¹⁷ The development of this policy and its manifestations during this period have previously been analyzed.
See Supra, p. 84.

¹⁸ The development of this policy and its manifestations have previously been analyzed.
See Supra, p. 83.

¹⁹ The Cabinet at this time was staffed largely by Populists, with an Independent as Prime Minister. The reasons for their vacillating foreign policy stance have previously been discussed.
See Supra, p. 81.

After the announcement of Iraq's intention to formally enter into the Baghdad Pact, Prime Minister Khuri made a series of public pronouncements which avoided criticism of Iraq's intention, while advocating the strength of the Arab Collective Security Pact to avoid alliances. Khuri hoped at the same time to avoid offending either Iraq or Egypt and placate Syrian anti-Western elements.
See Torrey, G. H. Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964), p. 274.

(b) Attempts at a Counter Alliance

Parallel to the diplomatic efforts of Egypt in meetings of the Arab League, Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers, at which Egypt tried to influence Iraq and prevent her entry into a Western-sponsored alliance by League resolutions, there had been the embryonic beginnings, dating back to 1954,²⁰ of a counter alliance.

The intended combination was to take, according to Egyptian plans, the form of a tripartite alliance with Syria and Saudi Arabia, or at least a system of bilateral treaties that would, in addition to acting as a counterweight to the proposed pact, greatly strengthen and largely displace the looser arrangements of the Arab League.

Following the announcement of Iraq's entry into the Baghdad Pact, this counter technique came into increasing prominence.

On February 7, 1955 Salim told a delegation of Lebanese journalists that Egypt would secede from the Collective Security Pact the day Iraq signed the proposed pact with Turkey and would seek to conclude a new military alliance with "like-minded" Arab states opposed to foreign alliances.²¹

²⁰ As early as June 11, 1954, Major Salah Salim had announced that Egypt and Saudi Arabia had decided to pool their military resources and set up a unified command. Both countries had agreed to oppose Western efforts to bring Arab countries into regional defence pacts. See Middle East Journal, 1954, p. 190. Efforts in Syria's direction were not to become significant until the change of government in February 1955.

²¹ Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 6, 1955, p. 99.

The diplomatic efforts at achieving a counter alliance with "like-minded" states, that is to say Saudi Arabia and Syria, were precautionary measures against Iraq's conclusive entry into the Baghdad Pact.

It was natural that Saudi Arabia should be chosen as one of the potential partners. In spite of diametrically opposed internal systems, a convergence of foreign policies between Egypt and Saudi Arabia was possible due to the traditional dynastic rivalry between King Saud and the Hashemites, as well as a common opposition to Great Britain's dominance in the Persian Gulf area and Oman.²²

The great reserve of capital accruing to the Saudi regime as the second largest producer of oil in the Middle East--capital available to subsidize Egyptian propaganda activities against the Pact--made the Saudi connection especially attractive to Egypt.²³

A further attraction was the Saudi ability, due to their primary importance for and defensive arrangements with the United

²² These factors have previously been discussed. See Supra, pp. 74-76.

²³ Revenues were greatly increased after the profit sharing agreement between King Saud and the American Oil Company (Aramco) in December 1950.

States, to influence the Americans in their Arab policy.²⁴

The choice of Syria as the second partner was conditioned by a number of factors: Syria's central strategic position in any battle between Egypt and Iraq for local primacy was due to her occupying the northeastern approaches to Egypt, the overland route to Iraq from the Mediterranean, the head of the Arabian peninsula, and the northern frontier of the Arab world.²⁵

Military geographic considerations apart, Syria had ideologically been the centre of the Arab national movement during the twentieth century.

Syria was the key to the balance of power in the region.

As Salah Salim has put it:

It was clear that the battle between our policy and Iraq's would be joined over Syria. The issue was quite simply this: If Iraq and Turkey got Syria on their side, Jordan and Lebanon would soon follow and Egypt would be completely isolated. We should then be faced with little choice but to yield. . .²⁶

²⁴This ability to influence American foreign policy lay in Saudi Arabia being considered by the U.S. as a nation whose "ability to defend itself or to participate in the defence of the area is important to the security of the United States." Mutual Defence Assistance Program; cited Lenczowski, G. *The Middle East in World Affairs* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 555.

The United States maintained a military training mission in Saudi Arabia. An agreement providing for a U.S. military assistance program and for the use of the Dhahran Airfield was signed in 1951, providing the Saudi government with assistance in obtaining aircraft and other military equipment and training of Saudi officers in their use.

Saudi influence over U.S. policy was to be reflected in the decision, during the ensuing period, not to join the Baghdad Pact (thus robbing it of any really effective support). The main reason for U.S. self-exclusion was the disapproval of Saudi Arabia. Laqueur, W. *Middle East in Transition* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), pp. 117-119.

At a later phase the Saudi connection was to influence a negative American attitude toward a united anti-Nasser front at Suez.

²⁵Seale, op.cit.; p. 1 Seale, Patrick *The United Arab Republic and the Iraqi Challenge* Vol. 16, World Today (1960), p. 297.

A note of urgency was lent to Egypt's efforts to secure a unity of foreign policy with Syria by the fact that Syria in early 1955 was surrounded by governments who either favoured the Pact or were lukewarm to demands for its opposition. Britain had bases in Jordan and Iraq while Turkey and Lebanon had extensive commitments to the West.

In Syria itself, though a pro-Egyptian orientation had predominated in the frequent changes in Syrian leadership with corresponding shifts in foreign policy, it was by no means constant and secure. As the extensive analysis of the main themes in Syria's foreign policy and their proponents in late 1954 and early 1955 showed²⁷ advocates of Iraqi policy to be found on the Syrian political scene included the Peoples' (Shaah) Party, as well as the older leadership of the Nationalist Party. The extent of their strength has previously been outlined.²⁸

The seeking of a tripartite alliance with Syria and Saudi Arabia, or at least a system of bilateral treaties that would, in addition to acting as a counterweight to the proposed pact, greatly strengthen and largely displace the looser arrangements of the Arab League, proved to be the most successful of the Egyptian countermeasures in the early phase.

²⁶ Cited in Seale, op.cit.; p. 212.

²⁷ See Supra, pp. 76-81.

²⁸ See Supra, pp. 78-81.

The initial attempt at a tripartite alliance was to fail, however, and Egypt in the end had to settle for two bilateral pacts.

The adherence of Saudi Arabia--where foreign policy emanated largely according to the wishes of the King, and was determined by a small group of individuals, including the King, Crown Prince, and their advisers--was a foregone conclusion given the general convergence of interests between the Saudi and Egyptian regimes.²⁹

It was the doubt surrounding the membership of Syria, where frequent changes of leadership led to corresponding shifts in foreign policy, that made the success of Egypt's efforts towards a counter alliance appear less than certain during much of the phase prior to the Baghdad Pact's inception.

The major trends in Syria's foreign policy under the ten-man coalition cabinet which governed Syria from October 1954 to February 1955 were indecisive vis-a-vis Egyptian objectives.³⁰

²⁹ The progress towards an alliance with the Saudis had been understandably steady since June 1954. On June 11, 1954 Major Salah Salim announced an Egyptian-Saudi Arabian agreement to pool military resources and set up a unified command, based on opposition to Western efforts to bring Arab countries into regional defence pacts. Middle East Journal, 1954, p. 190. On February 8, 1955 Saudi Arabia's acting prime minister Faysal told journalists in Cairo that his government was in complete agreement with the Egyptian government on all matters of Arab and foreign policy, and four days later, King Saud, in a broadcast from Mecca, set forth his determination to oppose military alliances between the Arabs and foreign powers. Middle East Journal, Vol. 9, 1955, p. 167.

³⁰ The vacillating approach of the Khuri cabinet towards the Baghdad Pact question has previously been analyzed. See Supra, p. 81.

Shortly before the Baghdad Pact's inception, however, a change in government took place in Syria resulting in a coalition in which two out of the three main elements--the Nationalists and the Baath were pro-Egyptian and anti-Pact.³¹

This shift provided more favourable conditions for the achievement of Egypt's aim, though the decision to sign an agreement was not to be taken till after the Baghdad Pact's inception.

For an understanding of the favourable nature of this cabinet shift, and its long-range implications for Egyptian foreign policy objectives an analysis of the Baath party's position in Syrian politics is in order.

Notwithstanding the sporadic, opportunistic support which the Nationalist Party gave to a pro-Egyptian alignment, it was the Baath (Resurrection) Party, coming into prominence after the elections of September 1954, which was to provide the main opportunity for an extension of Egyptian influence.

The results of the first post-dictatorship elections had reflected the gains of this party, risen from a position of negligible representation to the third largest group in the Syrian Parliament.³²

³¹It is more accurate to say that the new Premier Asali was a leader of a pro-Egyptian minority within the Nationalist Party, consisting mostly of the left-wing younger members, the older leadership within the party being pro-Iraqi. The Nationalist Party's opposition to the Pact was to rest less on doctrinal convictions than on jealousy and suspicion of their rival fellow conservatives the Populists against whom they wished to secure agreement with the anti-Western Baath. Torrey, op. cit; pp. 276, 281.

³²Seale, op.cit.; p. 182.

Into the hands of this group political power was gradually to pass during 1955 and 1956, at the expense of conservative elements, accompanied by a gradual repoliticalization of the officer corps of the army in their favour.³³

The principles of the Baath Party were especially favourable for a potential support of Egyptian foreign policy objectives. They included:³⁴

- (1) Arab unity - a struggle for political unity first among the various Arab states, after which economic standards would be raised.³⁵
- (2) Social Revolution: Not only "foreign imperialists" were considered enemies but feudal conservative landlords as well.
- (3) Tactical alliances: To pursue these goals alliances with any supporting forces and even Communists were acceptable on a temporary basis.

³³ Vatikiotis, P. J. The Egyptian Army in Politics: Pattern for New Nations? (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961), p. 143.

³⁴ An enunciation of Baathi principles is to be found in Spencer, Wm. Political Evolution in the Middle East (Philadelphia; Lippencott, 1962) pp. 197-198.

³⁵ The central position of Egypt in Baathi plans stemmed from--in addition to support of Nasser's foreign policy vis-a-vis the Great Powers--their belief that, as Michel Aflaq, prominent party theoretician has put it: "There would be no Arab unity without Egypt. This was not because we believed she was destined to be the Prussia of the Arab world, uniting it by force; nor because we thought that no other country could serve as rallying centre. It was more because we had seen at work Egypt's powers of obstruction: she could and would successfully oppose any movement towards Arab unity which excluded her--as the dismal story of the Fertile Crescent project surely proves." Cited in Seale, op.cit.; pp. 310-311.

The rise of representation of the Baath Party took on added significance for the extension of Egyptian foreign policy objectives--in spite of the Baath's having obtained only ten per cent of the seats in the September 1954 elections--given the following political characteristics of the Syrian political scene at this time: The absence of a stable majority in the Syrian Parliament notwithstanding the Populist's numerical lead among the organized parties; the Independents constituting the largest numerical group--without a policy, programme or ticket and susceptible of changing allegiances; the chronic lack of cooperation, and mutual suspicion between Nationalists and Populists with the former on several occasions opportunistically supporting their extremest foes including the Baath;³⁶ general public disgust with the old-line parties and political desire for social reform; widespread antagonism towards Iraq (the Populists and Nationalists had both previously advocated union with Iraq) and rising anti-Westernism especially among the younger generation throughout Syria at this time.

It was to the advantage of Egyptian policy as well that the Baath party was a better organized and more cohesive force than the conservative parties.³⁷

Alone of all Syrian political parties--with the possible exception of the Communists--the Baath had a detailed programme and

³⁶ Torrey, op.cit.; pp. 271, 301, 262.

³⁷ Peretz, Don The Middle East Today (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. 356.

a party line on major issues.

They infiltrated the middle and lower classes, for example the civil service, the schools and market place, the peasants of some regions and the ranks of the younger army officers.³⁸

Unlike the conservative groups they appreciated the significance of expanding their political constituency outside the urban centres. Occupying key positions in public communications as lawyers, civil servants, journalists, writers, and teachers, they were in a position to spread their ideology in the army and in the countryside.³⁹

The significance for Egyptian foreign policy objectives of Baathist formal participation in the Syrian cabinet shortly before the Baghdad Pact's inception, was reflected in the announcement of Premier Sabri al-Assali on February 22, 1955, that Syria would not join the Turkish-Iraqi Pact.⁴⁰

(2) Extensions of Diplomacy: Propaganda and Subversion

During this period, the techniques of propaganda appeal to the masses of the Arab countries, over the heads of governments, though for a time secondary to the diplomatic attempts at suasion of the governments, were by no means ignored. This is apparent from the

³⁸Torrey, op.cit.; p. 276. See also Laqueur, op.cit.; p. 328.

³⁹Vatikiotis, op.cit.; p. 143.

⁴⁰Middle East Journal, Vol. 9, 1955, p. 169.

following sampling of the Egyptian press and radio:

On January 14, 1955, the day after the announcement of an impending pact, the Egyptian organ "al-Goumhouriya" controlled by Anwar as-Sadat, who counted as one of the most extreme members of the military junta--in an article declaring that the Iraqi government's action was in complete contradiction with the spirit of the Arab League Charter and Collective Pact, alleged that Turkey had concluded a non-aggression pact with Israel. The article thus insinuated that Iraq was indirectly involved with the enemy of all true Arabs.⁴¹

On the following day al-Goumhouriya indulged in full blooded vituperation of Nuri al-Said personally. It wrote of the "unhappy chance" that "at this delicate moment in Arab history, the Iraqi government should be headed by a man entirely under the sway of the imperialist formula" and launched into a personal attack on Nuri al-Said whose policy (it alleged) served the objectives of foreign powers seeking to divide the Arab peoples.⁴²

During the last week of January 1955, as the conference of Prime Ministers appeared a failure, the propaganda aspects of Egypt's preventative measures became increasingly marked by personal attacks

⁴¹Cited World Today, Vol. 12, No. 11, November 1956, p. 456. As will be seen, the Israel bogey was to become a recurring theme in Egypt's propaganda campaign against Iraq.

⁴²Cited in Survey of International Affairs, 1955-1956, p. 25.

on Nuri al-Said, as the following sampling from Cairo Radio indicates:

Today the peoples and states of the Arab League are witnessing a new bare-faced treason, the hero of which is Nuri al-Said. His insistence on this alliance, his challenge to the Arab peoples and his trifling with their most sacred rights is an act of treachery against Arabism far more damaging to the Arab League than anything done by Israel or Zionism. . .⁴³

The subversive aspects of Egypt's campaign to prevent Iraq's entry into the Baghdad Pact also included an intrigue carried on by the Egyptian military attaché in Baghdad to arouse popular opposition to the Iraqi government.⁴⁴

An official of the Egyptian State Radio was expelled from Iraq for soliciting and recording declarations hostile to Nuri's government and the Turkish Pact from members of the opposition and the general public.⁴⁵

Egypt's propaganda and subversive activities were pursued at this time simultaneously with her diplomatic efforts.

Thus, Cairo Radio had throughout the January Arab Premiers' Conference kept up an intense barrage of propaganda against the Pact.

⁴³ Cairo Radio, 30 January 1955 (BBC, No. 539, 1 February 1955) cited in Seale, op.cit.; p. 216.

⁴⁴ Kirk, G. E. Contemporary Arab Politics; A Concise History (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 34.

⁴⁵ World Today, Vol. 11, No. 4, April 1955, p. 148.

The purpose of these activities was two-fold. One aim was to incite dissident elements in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria to efforts against the non-committal attitudes of their governments.⁴⁶

In this way it was hoped to influence the stand of the other Arab governments towards a censure of Iraq and to reinforce diplomatic suasion of Iraq not to join the Pact.

A second and more direct aim had been to increase the isolation of the Iraqi government from its own predominantly neutralist public opinion, in the hope that increased internal pressure would dissuade Iraq from joining the Pact.

Within Iraq at this time there was extensive support for Egypt's opposition to the foreign policy of the regime.

In general, a majority of educated Iraqis, and in particular the students, teachers, medium and lower levels of the civil service and professions, and all the underemployed which the educational system

⁴⁶ These dissident elements are analyzed in greater detail in other sections.

Generally speaking, Egyptian propaganda at this stage was aimed at the west-bank population in Jordan--containing some half million Palestinian Arabs and a half million refugees--comprising two thirds of Jordan's population; those personalized confessional politicians in Lebanon who at this stage opposed the government on personal grounds, as well as the programmatic segments of the Lebanese opposition and the Muslim population generally; in Syria, the prevailing neutralist sentiment among the middle and lower classes, the civil servants, teachers and peasants of some regions, and the ranks of younger army officers.

had created, provided the major civilian opposition to the regime's foreign policy.⁴⁷

Generally, they stood for complete emancipation and severance of links with Britain, the abrogation of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, and a policy of neutralism in the East-West conflict.

The most powerful blows against the foreign policy of the regime had in the past been delivered through these urban masses. They had effected the repudiation of a new long-term Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, signed on January 1948, on the grounds that it permitted the return of British troops during emergencies.⁴⁸

A description follows of the political parties which professed to represent this opposition to Iraqi foreign policy:

The most enduring of the opposition parties were the Independence (Istiqlal) and National Democratic Parties (Wakain Dimuqrati) both of which were openly active between 1946 and their suppression in 1954, and subsequently worked under cover.

The Istiqlal was a nationalist party with a right-wing policy of moderate social reform, standing in the field of foreign relations for complete emancipation from and severance of links with Britain, the abrogation of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and a policy

⁴⁷ Longrigg, Stephen H., Iraq (London: Benn, 1958) p. 235.

⁴⁸ Lenczowski, op.cit.; p. 229.

of neutralism in the East-West conflict.⁴⁹ Like most political groups they regarded Nuri al-Said and the Hashemite rulers as British pawns, constantly subjected to the insidious manipulations of the British ambassador.⁵⁰

The left-wing, moderately socialist National Democratic Party, with which the *Istiqlal* was of late in close association, was also neutralist in its foreign policy programme. Like the *Istiqlal* its principal support was the new generation in the big cities and towns.⁵¹

Like the *Istiqlal* and National Democratic Party, the United Popular Front, formed in 1951--though never assuming the proportions of a mass organization--went on record as favouring neutrality in world politics, the rejection of Western-sponsored defence plans, and the abrogation of the 1930 Treaty with Britain.⁵²

The Baath Party, which had few formal members in Iraq, and was in reality a junior partner of its Syrian counterpart, was at one with the above in its opposition to Iraqi foreign policy.⁵³

⁴⁹Peretz, op.cit.; p. 389.

⁵⁰Ibid; p. 389.

⁵¹Harris, G. L. Iraq; Its People, Its society, Its Culture (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1958), pp. 92-93.

⁵²Lenczowski, op.cit.; p. 284.

⁵³Partner, Peter A Short Political Guide to the Arab World (London: Pall Mall Press, 1960), p. 88.

The Communists, who had always been an underground movement, but who appeared to be gaining strength during this period,⁵⁴ and whose main support came from the educated, urban and westernized groups, young intellectuals, minor civil servants, lawyers, teachers, and members of religious and ethnic minorities⁵⁵ found it convenient to cloak themselves with the slogans of Arab nationalism.

In foreign policy however, they substituted "Arab Federation" and "Soviet Friendship" for Arab unity, thus intending only the loosest form of federation with a pro-Soviet and not a neutralist bent.⁵⁶

In addition to the internal civilian opposition to Iraqi foreign policy, analyzed above, which offered extensive support to what were likewise Egyptian objectives, a Free Officers movement had been taking shape in the Iraqi Army from 1953 onwards.

The members of the group were progressive, reformist, and politically conscious members of the middle and lower middle classes in uniform, were impressed by the military revolution in Egypt (which recalled the political role played by the Iraqi Army before World War II), and generally supported Nasser in his opposition to Iraqi foreign policy.⁵⁷

⁵⁴In late 1957, their strength was to be estimated at approximately 2,000 of which approximately 600 were card-carrying members. Harris, op.cit.; p. 102.

⁵⁵Ibid; p. 102

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Caractacus, Revolution in Iraq, (London: Collancz, 1959) pp. 118-121.

In addition to the extensive internal opposition to the Iraqi regimes foreign policy, the lack of appeal of the regime in terms of domestic policies, was of prime significance in a subversive situation which might be exploited by Egypt to accentuate Iraq's isolation, both internally, and externally.

The domestic problems of the Iraqi regime could not appeal to the great majority of the politically conscious in Iraq or to their counterparts in other Arab societies.

These policies were anathema to the politically frustrated groups in the Arab world outside of Egypt, for example the middle class, intelligentsia, a small urban proletariat, professional managers, and a few entrepreneurs.⁵⁸

The reasons for the lack of appeal to these significant segments of Arab societies of the domestic policies of the Iraqi regime will become apparent through a brief summary of some of their more innocuous characteristics.

⁵⁸ Lenczowski, op. cit; pp. 285-286.

The great mass of the educated public--the lower and middle grades of the administration and services, the junior teachers, the part-time lawyers and newspaper editors, were the principal victims of rising prices. Their difficulties were emphasized by the ostentatious wealth of an upper class which most of them held to be intellectually inferior.⁵⁹

A packed parliament, pyramids of corruption and patronage, political repression--including the incarceration of political suspects, the suppression of newspapers and political parties, the expulsion of students, and the dismissal of civil servants for expressing political opinions--were prominent features of the regime by late 1954.⁶⁰

The extensive foreign interests in Iraq presented a further barrier to appeal of the regime's domestic policies to the majority of the politically conscious in the Arab world.

The latter held the West responsible for the Iraqi internal situation. The British embassy, advisors and military mission, it was suspected, formed the real government of the country. They were remembered as the founders and importers of the Hashemites and their ministers.⁶¹

The lack of constructive reform of the agrarian system--largely due to the domination of the parliament by a conservative bloc

⁵⁹Mowat, R.C., Middle East Perspective (London: Blandford Press, 1958) pp. 195-196.

⁶⁰Caractacus, op. cit; pp. 42-56.

⁶¹Ibid; p. 58.

of wealthy landowners--contrasted sharply with the new agrarian measures in Egypt.⁶²

Inadequate housing aggravated the social conditions caused by widespread migration of the peasantry to the towns.⁶³

There was a general neglect of industrialization on a scale sufficient to absorb a significant proportion of unskilled labour.⁶⁴ When the regime did apply itself to industrialization, there was a lack of immediate relevance of its development program, which had a tendency towards a comparatively small number of large projects, doing nothing to ease existing human and social needs.⁶⁵

These aspects of the regime's domestic policy understandably contributed to a lack of appeal to the majority of the politically conscious segments of Arab society.⁶⁶

⁶² Ibid; p. 37.

⁶³ Ibid; p. 99.

⁶⁴ Harris, op.cit.; p. 168.

⁶⁵ Tonedes, M. Divide and Lose: The Arab Revolt of 1955-1958 (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1960), pp. 212-213.

⁶⁶ The general lack of appeal of the regime's domestic policies to the majority of the politically conscious segments of Arab society is all the more striking when considered against the backdrop of the superiority of Iraqi economic potential over that of Egypt. The vastly more favourable population-to-land ratio, the greater possibility of increase in Iraqi land area, and the greater availability of capital for development being the main features of this superiority. See Harbison, Frederick Two Centres of Arab Power, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, 1959, pp. 672-683.

Egypt was to exploit these defects, in her propaganda battle against the sole Arab adherent to the Baghdad Pact.

Apart from the extensive basis of the lack of appeal of the regime's domestic policies, outlined above, the relatively slight emphasis laid on publicity resources by the Iraqi elite added to the regime's shoddy image.⁶⁷

While one should not place too much emphasis on the significance of the propaganda resources of Iraq, given the insufficient basis of appeal to begin with, this factor must be considered, as Egyptian-Iraqi rivalry was to be not of a military but rather of a primarily psychological nature, with Syria and Jordan in the front line.

⁶⁷ There was a general lack of communication between the approximately two thousand of the ruling clique and the mass of population and their counterparts in other Arab societies.

The Directorate of Guidance and Broadcasting during the entire period under consideration did not conduct anything resembling a modern propaganda campaign. Official broadcasts on foreign policy as well as on domestic issues, tended to be defensive.

See Harris, op.cit.; pp. 135-136; Birdwood, op.cit.; p. 245; Longrigg, op.cit.; p. 239; Spencer, op.cit.; pp. 231-245.

It was only as late as June 2, 1956 that Sayyid Khalil Ibrahim Iraqi Director of Propaganda and Guidance, was to announce that Iraq had decided to open information offices in several Arab capitals.

See Middle East Journal, Vol. 10, 1956, p. 413.

This did not, however, mark a departure in the nature of Iraqi propaganda which remained defensive rather than positive in content.

Egyptian efforts at influencing the Iraqi government through subversion at this time had as little effect as diplomatic suasion.

The extensive internal support for Egypt's opposition to the foreign policy of the Iraqi regime could not be readily converted into opportunities for undermining this policy.

The civilian opposition at this time was largely impotent, and the "Free Officer's Group" within the Army was as yet scattered and patchy.

The impotency of the civilian groupings was due to a combination of factors including the repressive measures undertaken by the government, as well as the deficiencies of the parties themselves.

The parties were to find constitutional activity increasingly difficult, if not forbidden by 1954.

Shortly before the government ban on political parties, in September 1954, there had been an increase in opposition strength in the one hundred and thirty-five seat Chamber of Deputies. The Chamber was dissolved on August 3, 1954, however, and the elections of September 12, 1954 took place under stricter government supervision, after the suppression of political newspapers, as well as all political parties, which were dissolved some two weeks after the elections.

Party press organs were suspended and recourse to other press media could not be had because of a rigid censorship. Any criticism of the Baghdad Pact was forbidden.⁶⁸

⁶⁸For a description of these internal conditions see Harris, op.cit.; p. 138; See also Singh, K. Iraq Since 1945, Foreign Affairs Reports (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs), Vol. 9, No. 7 (July 1960), p. 76.

Thus shortly before the signing of the Baghdad Pact, the opposition in Iraq could have no recourse to constitutional measures, while strikes and demonstrations were prohibited.

What unofficial opposition groupings existed after the formal dissolution of the party system were largely ineffectual.⁶⁹

However, the relative lack of effect of civilian groupings at this time was not due solely to the repressive measures undertaken by the regime against them.

The above-mentioned parties were restricted in being mostly associations of politicians and publicists without machinery for wider participation, achieving only intermittent cooperation, and suffering from excessive individualism and doctrinal differences. They often lacked sufficient funds.⁷⁰

The "Free Officers Group" in the army was the only part of the nation potentially in a position to take that action which many civilians hoped for--the overthrow of the government. It was however insufficiently organized. Though by 1957 it was to become an integrated though secret organization waiting for the right opportunity, its opposition to Iraqi foreign policy at this time was of minor practical significance.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Though political parties were to be reauthorized in August of 1957, this was to be a meaningless gesture due to the suffocating effect of the police and spy network.

See Mowat, op. cit; p. 205.

⁷⁰ Harris, op. cit; p. 91.

⁷¹ Caractacus, op. cit; pp. 118-121.

Thus, in spite of the vast fertile ground for Egyptian agitation within Iraq the internal opposition was largely impotent.⁷²

Not only were Egyptian subversive efforts within Iraq largely ineffectual as a means of causing the government to waiver in support of the impending pact, but the campaign had in certain respects quite the opposite effect from that intended.

The violence of the Egyptian campaign against the Iraqi regime actually rallied to Nuri al-Said leading conservative politicians such as Salih Jabr and the Iraqi elder statesman Tawfiq as-Suwardi, with whom his relations had recently been strained.⁷³

In the final analysis, the Arab League Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers Conference, and attempts at subversion largely through propaganda proved unsuccessful as techniques of persuading the Iraqi regime not to sign the Baghdad Pact.

With her signature on February 25, 1955, the efforts towards a partial counter-alliance with Saudi Arabia and Syria remained the sole fruitful measure of the period.

⁷²See Lenczowski op.cit.; p. 289.

⁷³World Today, Vol. 12, No. 11, November 1956, p. 456.

CHAPTER V

EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE BAGHDAD PACT TO THE SUEZ CRISISPART A. Egyptian Neutralism and its Place in Egypt's Arab Policy.1. The Development of Egyptian Neutralism.

With the inception of the Baghdad Pact on February 25, 1955, the isolation of the Iraqi initiative became an urgent necessity.

The alternative was for Egypt to allow matters to drift to the point where she would be faced with the choice of isolation or joining the pact as a junior partner, with the adverse consequences which the latter move would imply for the security of tenure of the regime.

To ensure Egypt's continued dominant role in Arab affairs, the regime chose to develop Egyptian neutralism from an expression of Egypt's desire for complete national independence to a weapon to be used to secure the insulation of the Arab System, based on the Arab League, and the Arab Collective Security Pact.

This development will now be described and analyzed.

Neutralism as an expression of Egypt's desire for complete national independence was the declared policy of the Egyptian regime quite early in its history.

It was expressed quite bluntly in an article in Rose el Youssef, January 11, 1954, by the Egyptian Secretary-General of the

Arab League as follows:

L'Egypte ne saurait se passer d'une attitude qui concorde avec ses besoins et avec sa colère contre ses agresseurs et ceux des arabes. Cette attitude consiste à refuser de coopérer avec les agresseurs et à coopérer avec ceux qui sont d'accord avec elle...une attitude positive...à savoir la loyauté envers qui bon lui semble, et l'inimitié avec qui bon lui semble.¹

At a press conference on February 10th, 1954 this declaration of Egypt's policy was echoed by Major Salah Salim:

As to Egypt's policy, call it neutrality or what you like...we will not discriminate between one state and another, except in the measure of its response to our demands, and its support of us in the economic and political fields, which respect our Egyptian nationality.²

To retain Egypt's dominant role in Arab affairs, however, it was not sufficient that she alone profess neutralism. It was necessary that she undertake the spread of a policy of neutralism--with the main emphasis on a unanimous Arab repudiation of foreign military alliances--to all the Arab states, and thus secure a unity of foreign policy which would isolate the Iraqi threat to Egyptian supremacy.

¹ Cited in Abdel - Malek, Anouar, Egypte, société militaire (Paris: Seuil, 1962), p. 237.

For earlier examples of Egyptian neutrality see Lacouture, Jean, Egypt in Transition (London: Methuen, 1958), p. 221.

² BBC No. 440, Feb. 16, 1954, cited in Seale, Patrick, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-war Arab Politics, 1945-1958, (London, Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 196. (Emphasis added.)

Neutrality in the latter sense was to become increasingly emphasized after the Baghdad Pact's inception. It had already become an inherent part of Egypt's policy since the early rumours of the Pact.

Thus, as Iraq moved gradually towards the Turco-Pakistani Alliance Cairo radio declared on July 2, 1954:

Egypt has one clear and unequivocal policy, to support actively the unity of the Arabs so they can face aggression, injustice, and subjugation as one man.

The "Voice of the Arabs" calls on the Arabs to stand in one rank in face of imperialism, to expel the British, to cleanse the land of Arabdom from this plague, to obtain with their own money and to make for themselves arms which will repulse aggression and to maintain peace and justice³.

The policy of neutrality received added doctrinal impetus after the Bandung Conference of April, 1955, and Nasser's visit to India. Nasser's discussions with Sukarno, Nehru, U. Nu, and Chou En-lai helped him to synthesize the doctrine of positive neutrality -- a doctrine tailored to his current objectives.

As Nasser himself later put it in a discussion with R.K. Karanjia, an Indian journalist:

³

B.B.C. no. 279, July 2, 1954. Cited in Seale, op. cit.; p. 197

My visit to India proved a turning point in my political understanding. I learned and realized that the only wise policy for us would be one of positive neutrality and nonalignment. Coming back home, I found out from the response it had that is is the only possible policy which could get the broadest support from the Arab people⁴.

During this period of defensive containment, diplomacy and negotiation between governments was to be deemphasized after the failure of such methods to prevent Iraq's signature to the Pact.

Henceforth the emphasis was on the vast potential of opposition within the countries, as distinct from the governments. Clandestine activities, propaganda, bribery, and sabotage, were to overshadow the early attempts at a diplomatic solution, apart from the efforts at building a tripartite military alliance between Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia.

The techniques employed by the major antagonists in the ensuing polarization were conditioned

on the one hand by the Arab military weakness which prevented any Arab state from altering the territorial status quo in the Middle East itself, and on the other hand by the rivalry of the Great Powers which inhibited them from imposing on the Middle East, either separately or collectively, any alteration in the territorial status quo. The weapons used on each side

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Karanjia, R.K., Arab Dawn, (Bombay: Blitz, 1958), p. 187

therefore, apart from the Suez aberration, were limited to extensions of diplomacy such as propaganda, bribery, sabotage, attempted assassination, the imprisonment and torture of those political opponents who were get-at-able, and the systematic vilification of those who were not⁵.

For such techniques to succeed, it was necessary for the Egypt regime to subsume the aspirations of emergent ^{groups} everywhere in the Arab world.

One of the most constant characteristics of the politically frustrated groups in Arab societies, (who, it might be added, comprised the great majority of one politically articulate) for example the middle class intelligentsia, a small urban proletariat, professional managers, entrepreneurs -- was their great preoccupation with Western plots against them, particularly since the Palestine defeat.

The whole nationalist tradition of the previous twenty-five years was uncompromisingly opposed to the idea of any renewed alliance with the West in which the Arabs would at best be junior partners, and at worst expendable interests. Yet this same nationalist tradition had no illusions about the status of a Soviet satellite. Thus the "Third Force" idea was considerable attractive, and, as Marlowe has put it, it was

5

Marlowe, John, Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism, (London; Cresset Press, 1961), p. 21.

Notunnatural that Abdul Nasr, seeking a means of re-establishing Egypt's lost primacy in Arab affairs ... should see himself as the foremost protagonist in the Arab world of what he was subsequently to describe as a policy of "positive neutrality"⁶.

(2) The Implementation of Egyptian Neutralism: The Czech Arms Deal

During the Bandung conference of April, 1955, Nasser sought arms from Communist China.

Premier Chou En-lai, while not prepared to sell arms directly to Egypt, was instrumental in presenting Nasser's request to the Soviet Government, and on May 6, 1955, Daniel Solod, the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo, informed Sami Salim that his government was prepared to supply Egypt with an unlimited quantity of arms, including tanks and planes, against deferred payment in Egyptian cotton and rice.

On July 26, 1955 the first Egyptian plane carrying Egyptian technicians left for Czechoslovakia to check the first consignment of MIG 15's.

The arms shipments began at this time although the agreement

6

Ibid; p. 85
See also Vatikiotis, P.J. in Macrides, R.C. ed., Foreign Policy in World Politics, 2nd edition, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1962), p. 336-337; Sayegh Fayez, Arab Nationalism Today, Current History (November, 1957), p. 286

was not announced by Nasser until September, 1955⁷.

The armaments policies of Britain and the United States, involving explicit or implicit political alliances as the precondition to substantial arms shipments to Arab states⁸ were an obstacle to the solution of the urgent problem which Nasser faced in early 1955 of consolidating his influence with the radical military constituency in Egypt, which at that time constituted the nucleus of the internal support for the regime⁹.

These efforts had been jeopardized by an Israeli raid into Gaza in February 1955 which pointed out glaring deficiencies in Egypt's military capability and accentuated her need for heavy arms without commitments¹⁰.

The securing of an alternative source of arms without political commitments was also an absolute necessity if Egypt was to demonstrate her freedom from Western control and the practicality of the policy of "positive neutralism; the chief exponent of which she had chosen to become. It was necessary to destroy the plausibility of the Iraqi regime's chief argument in its support for the Baghdad

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From a description of the negotiations leading up to the agreement given by Salah Salim to Patrick Seale, London, 13 April, 1960, cited in Seale, op. cit.; p. 235-236.

⁸These policies have previously been analyzed. See Supra, pp. 65-70.

⁹Nasser's preoccupation with winning the support of the military in late 1954 has previously been outlined. See Supra, p.8.

¹⁰Ionedes, M. Divide and Lose: the Arab Revolt of 1955-1958, (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1960), p. 127

Pact--the need to obtain arms from the West.¹¹

The arms deal was also necessary to ensure that in the continuing confrontation with Israel, Egypt should not have to face the alternative of falling drastically behind the latter in military might or surrender to Western pressure directed towards her membership in Western defence pacts. As Salah Salim has put it:

Our view was that the West was using Israel as a constant challenge to our leadership. The Western Powers know that if faced with the choice of defeat by Israel or yielding to the West, we should have to choose the latter. This was the blackmail to which we were subjected. We felt that the only way to restore our freedom of action and liberate ourselves from Western subjection was to build up a real army able to face Israel on equal terms.¹²

Finally the arms deal was necessary to provide the material basis for the tripartite military alliance which Egypt sought with Syria and Saudi Arabia--an alliance meant as the embodiment of a unity of foreign policy revolving around the repudiation of defence pacts with the West.

¹¹ Nuri al-Said had repeatedly protested, in his early talks with Egyptian leaders, "From whom can we obtain arms if there is no link between the British and the Collective Security Pact?"

Cited in Seale, op.cit.; p. 207.

Further, one of the chief excuses used by the representatives of Lebanon, Jordan and Syria to the Arab Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers Conference of January 13, 1955, for their failure to censure Iraq, had been that the Middle East has nowhere to get the arms it needs except from the West.

See Economist, January 29, 1955, p. 350.

¹² Cited in Seale, op.cit.; p. 235.

In none of these motivations did military strategic considerations predominate in their purely physical aspect, with the exception of the Israeli question. As was pointed out earlier,¹³ the increase in armaments did not signify a parallel increase in material capability vis-a-vis the Arab core due to the necessity of concentration of manpower on the Israeli frontier, geographical separation from the Arabs of Asia, risks of entanglement with the superpowers, danger of overextension, and great financial burdens, intendent upon any large scale military operation east of the Red Sea.¹⁴

The major consideration rather was the measure's potential yield in propaganda dividends intendent upon Egypt's opening up an alternative source of foreign military aid to Arab states and the breaking of the Western arms monopoly, as well as the prestige of commanding what the arms shipments surely would make, the strongest Arab army.¹⁵

¹³ See Supra, pp. 21-28.

¹⁴ As will later be shown the Syrian-Egyptian Defence Pact and its Egyptian-Saudi counterpart were dominated not by considerations of military cooperation but rather by the objective of coordination of foreign policies which even rudimentary defence planning demanded.

¹⁵ This major consideration was mirrored in retrospective comments by Egyptian officials on the arms deal. For example, on April 24, 1956, Col. Anwar Sadat, wrote in the official *Al Goumhouriya*: "Egypt felt that a great change had taken place. The monopoly of arms has ended--the monopoly of arms by Britain, the monopoly of arms by which Britain buys the independence of countries and the freedom of peoples, the monopoly of arms which enables Britain to dominate our lives and the lives of the people in any country who aspire for liberty." Cited in Laqueur, W. Z. Nasser's Egypt, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1956), p. 24.

The shipments of Soviet arms subsequent to the arms deal announced in September, 1955 fulfilled the Egyptian objective at obtaining heavy arms without formal commitments. The shipments included large quantities of heavy tanks, artillery, MIG jet fighters and heavy bombers, as well as the beginnings of a modern submarine arsenal¹⁶.

That the agreement had been so readily concluded was due to the previous abandonment by the Soviet regime, in late 1954, of the Stalinist approach to the "national bourgeois leaders" of the Arab area (Nasser, for example)¹⁷.

A new line had been adopted, as the Soviet Union became increasingly aware of the potential advantages to her influence in the area deriving from the increasing opposition of the Egyptian regime, supported by a majority of politically articulate Arab opinion, to Western efforts at regional defense systems. The Russians became increasingly attracted to the possibilities of upsetting the status quo in a region which they had appraised as the most vulnerable area in the entire Western protective system¹⁸.

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The extent of the increase to the Egyptian arsenal in the following few months has previously been outlined. See Supra, p. 22.

¹⁷This attitude has previously been analyzed. See Supra, p. 70.

¹⁸Campbell, John C., Defense of the Middle East; problems of American policy, rev. ed. (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 161.

The new approach was initiated in 1954 and was manifested in the spring and summer of 1955. Bourgeois nationalism was to be supported through the concept of the "national front"--a scheme

embracing every class in society--in which workers, peasants, and intellectuals will rub shoulders with members of the petty, the medium, and the big bourgeoisie, with the clergy--and even with the army¹⁹

This alliance between the bourgeoisie and proletariat was to last, in the Soviet design, until the ultimate integration of the Arab core into the Eastern bloc.²⁰

Support for Arab regimes regardless of campaigns of suppression against local communists, as in Egypt, was to be a logical consequence of this new line.

The new Soviet policy in the Arab core was shortly to be manifested in a political drive whose main instrument was military aid and diplomatic support,²¹ and which included propaganda support.²²

¹⁹ Bennigsen, A. in Laqueur, W.Z., ed. Middle East in Transition (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), p. 364.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Berger, Morroe, The Arab World Today (New York: Doubleday, 1962), p.347. The first major example of diplomatic support was to appear in March of 1955 when Turkey and Iraq responded to the Syrian-Egyptian-Saudi alliance with threats against Syria accompanied by troop concentrations on Syria's border. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov publicly assured Egypt's ally of Soviet support in all necessary forms. Seale, op.cit.; pp.233-234.

²² After the Czech arms deal the Soviet press supported the Arabs in their attacks on Western arms policies. Ibid, p. 350.

It was this policy which enabled the transformation of Egyptian neutralism from a mere attitude of impartiality towards the Great Powers to a more dynamic doctrine of seeking aid where one could, while continuing to fight "Western imperialism."²³

The "Czech" arms deal increased the intangible elements in Nasser's influence with the politically articulate segments of the Arab populations enormously, and greatly aided Egypt to regain the initiative temporarily ceded to Iraq upon the announcement of the Baghdad Pact.²⁴

²³ Seale, op.cit.,; p. 237.

This transformation was skillfully used by the Soviets to extend their influence.

See Badeau, John S. The Soviet Approach to the Arab World, Orbis, (Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania) Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring, 1959) p. 75.

²⁴ See Vatikiotis, op.cit.; p. 343.

Part B. Egyptian Efforts to Contain Iraqi and British Influence
and Further the Spread of Neutralism in the Arab System

(1) Introduction

In furthering the spread of neutralism in the Arab system the Egyptian regime, at the outset of the period, encountered varying degrees of receptivity on the part of the Arab governments to whom she applied diplomatic pressure in an effort to secure an identity of foreign policy.

It is on the basis of this varied receptivity that the states of the system may be divided into three main categories: (1) Saudi Arabia and Syria, the states most prone to a unity of foreign policy with Egypt (2) Iraq, the sole adherent to the Baghdad Pact, the most irreconcilably opposed to Egyptian efforts and finally (3) Jordan and Lebanon, states which were relatively neutral in the ensuing contest between Egypt and Iraq, but whose inactive role in this struggle, was, from the point of view of Egyptian foreign policy objectives, insecure.

The following analysis of the diplomatic and non-diplomatic techniques employed by Egypt in each of the groups of countries reveals a main emphasis on and success of diplomatic measures in Syria and Saudi Arabia.

In the Arab states other than Syria and Saudi Arabia, there was a relative lack of success of diplomatic efforts in Egypt's campaign to secure a unity of foreign policy based on repudiation of military alliances with the West.

Failure in diplomatic efforts drove the regime to emphasize and draw upon the vast sources of opposition to the foreign policy of the Iraqi, Lebanese, and Jordanian governments in particular, existing among the populations of those countries.

Generally speaking, they included: the West bank population in Jordan, containing some half million Palestine Arabs and a half million refugees, comprising two thirds of Jordan's population; those personalized confessional politicians in Lebanon who at this stage opposed the government on personal grounds, as well as the programmatic segments of the Lebanese opposition and the Muslim population generally; in Iraq, the majority of educated Iraqis, and in particular the students, teachers, medium and lower levels of the civil service and professions, and the educated underemployed.²⁵

The choice of extra-diplomatic methods was also influenced by the high level of Egypt's propaganda facilities--in the form of radio, press, export of personnel and military attaches--in comparison

²⁵The nature and strength of these groups and the extent of and reasons for their support of Egyptian foreign policy objectives is discussed elsewhere.

to the relative lack of emphasis placed on propaganda facilities by her opponents.²⁶

Also taken into account was the impracticality of military operations to secure Egyptian objectives east of the Red Sea, due to the Egyptian forces being primarily concentrated on the Israeli frontier, the problems of geographical separation, the risk of entanglement with the super powers, and great financial burdens.²⁷

There exists a particularly frank statement of the considerations which drove the Egyptian regime to emphasize non-diplomatic techniques, in the form of a transcript of a secret talk by President Nasser to officers at the Headquarters of the Egyptian Army on March 9, 1957. It is a convincing analysis of Egyptian thinking though its authenticity as a transcript is open to doubt, and it was in fact proclaimed a "fake document" by the Egyptian government.²⁸

Excerpts from the transcript are as follows:

In the past epoch we knew only one way of working outside Egypt. Egypt was represented in a number of countries. Her political representatives used to meet statesmen of those countries and explain to them the Egyptian point of view.

²⁶The relative strength of the propaganda facilities of Egypt and her opponents has previously been analyzed. See Supra, pp. 33-37, 113.

²⁷These difficulties have previously been outlined. See Supra, pp. 22-23.

²⁸In Akbar el Yom, August 24, 1957.

No doubt the diplomatic channel is useful in conjunction with other means. But, we cannot impress anyone with our talk if we do not back our words with action. . .

If we want to make full use of the possibilities we have available, we must acknowledge the fact that the means of working at our disposal are neither purely military nor purely political means.

There is a straight-forward way and another, a twisting way. We know today that Egypt can obtain much by the latter.

There exist vast fields for action in countries in which we regard it necessary to strengthen our influences. The nationalist movements there are still weak and lacking in experience. . .

The costs of a regular war are tremendous and opportunities for entering a war are very rare. But, there are other and no less useful ways.

There is this irregular war which costs us little, but which costs our enemies much. . .

The great advantage of an indirect war is that our enemies cannot reply to it.

. . . we must know how to work in all these fields continuously and at the same time. At a time when the employment of indirect means is stopped, political activity increases and strengthens the means of propaganda. The "Voice of the Arabs" radio station is, in our hands, no less a weapon than guns, planes and fighters. Radio is a weapon with which you can hit without getting hurt. . .²⁹

(2) Syria and Saudi Arabia

Egypt's major objective in these two countries was a tripartite alliance or at least a system of bilateral treaties that would, in addition to acting as a counterweight to the Baghdad Pact, greatly

²⁹ Cited in Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, July 26, 1957, pp.18-19. (also published in an Iraq daily)

strengthen and largely displace the looser arrangements of the Arab League.

Efforts at an alliance with Saudi Arabia had already succeeded by the time of the Baghdad Pact's inception, and during this period, Egyptian aims in Saudi Arabia included the retention of a unity of foreign policy, the securing of Saudi financial aid for Egyptian propaganda, as well as prevailing upon the Saudi regime to use her influence with the United States government in obtaining an attitude favourable to the Egyptian struggle with Iraq.

Tangible evidence of this influence was to be seen in the United States' refusal to join the Baghdad Pact, thus robbing it of much effective support.³⁰

In the application of diplomatic pressure, on Syria Egypt sent Major Salah Salim to Damascus on February 26, the day following the Baghdad Pact's inception, where he submitted a draft to the Syrian Government of proposals for a joint command and united policies in foreign, cultural, and economic affairs.

Salim's chief co-participants on the Syrian side in the subsequent negotiations were: Khalid al Azm--the independent leftist Minister of Foreign Affairs and acting Defence Minister--Sabri al-Asali the Nationalist pro-Egyptian Prime Minister, the chief of staff General

³⁰Campbell, op.cit.; p. 60.

Shawkat Shukayr, and his deputy Adnan al Malki.

At the same time, Egyptian ambassador to Syria Mahmud Riyad was in contact with leading Syrian politicians. He had a special relationship to the Baath who were in large agreement with the Egyptian regime on major foreign policy issues.³¹

The strategic significance of Syria in the ensuing Iraqi-Egyptian power struggle has previously been outlined.³² It was imperative that control of her foreign policy be won.

It was a unity of foreign policy which was desired by Egypt and not the assumption of any burdensome local administrative responsibilities. This was to become more apparent after the final consummation of the military alliance with Syria on October 1955 (instruments of ratification were exchanged in Cairo on November 8, 1955).

It became clear that Nasser had used the plans for defence cooperation as a pretext for achieving the coordination of foreign policies which even the most basic of defence plans required. He was

³¹ According to Salim, it was mainly through Shukayr and Malki that agreement was eventually achieved. See Seale, op.cit.; pp. 222-223.

³² See Supra pp. 97-98.

reported unwilling to group operational forces on the Israeli frontier under a single command. The reason for this hesitancy was apparently the fragmentized, politicized nature of the Syrian military where civilian factionalism predominated.³³

The same was to appear true of Egypt's attitude towards the economic aspects of the proposed alliance, as the Egyptian regime objected that it was too poor to contribute substantially to a common defence budget.³⁴

Egypt was influenced in her decision to use diplomatic pressure as the primary means of ensuring a unity of Syria's foreign policy with her own, by the strong sources of support, after the cabinet change of early February 1955, for her policy, both in the government and in the armed forces of the country.

As the extensive analysis of Syria's political setting revealed³⁵ these included: (in the cabinet of February 13, 1955) Premier Sabri al Asali, leader of the pro-Egyptian minority within the Nationalist party (which minority consisted mostly of the left-wing younger members), the Baath Party--into whose hands political power was gradually to pass during 1955 and 1956 at the expense of

³³ Seale, op.cit.; pp. 244, 254.

³⁴ From an account given by Michel Aflaq, Baathist theoretician to Patrick Seale, of the negotiations of February-March 1955. Cited *ibid*; p. 225.

³⁵ See *Supra*, pp. 79-81, 99-103.

conservative elements accompanied by a gradual repolitization of the officer corps of the army in their favour; Foreign and acting Defence Minister Khalid al Azm, (independent leftist and the dominant figure in the new government) and, in the army: Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant-Colonel Cadnan Al-Malki, Abd al-Hamid Sarraj head of military intelligence, and to a lesser extent, Chief of Staff Shawkat Shukayr.³⁶

The Syrian-Egyptian Defence Pact, signed in Damascus on October 20, 1955 (the instruments of ratification of which were exchanged in Cairo on November 8th) signified the success of Egypt's efforts to achieve the coordination of foreign policies with Syria.³⁷

Though most of the Pact's provisions for military cooperation were to remain unapplied, and though it was not to become economically significant, its importance lay in the diplomatic counter to the Iraqi challenge, as even the most rudimentary of defence planning required the coordination of foreign policies.

³⁶ Seale, op.cit.; pp. 223-224, 245.

³⁷ Adherence was open to all members of the system, with the exception of Iraq. Saudi Arabia later joined and the members of this bloc were allied by two bilateral pacts. The pacts involved (1) a supreme council consisting of foreign and defence ministers (2) a war council (3) a joint command. Egyptian contribution of sixty-five percent of Syria's defence expenditure was agreed upon, as well as Saudi Arabia's initial loan of ten million dollars to Syria. For a text of the agreement see Middle East Journal, Vol. 10, 1956, p. 77.

For a detailed discussion of the provisions of the agreement see Saigh, Faiz Arab Unity, Hope and Fulfillment (New York: Devin-Adair, 1958) pp. 171-174.

Yet, this achievement was the culmination of a lengthy process,³⁸ and did not yield Egypt the tripartite alliance she wished, in which Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia were to be bound at once to each other. Instead what was finally gained was an alignment with Syria and with Saudi Arabia through two bilateral pacts.

The reasons for the procrastination and final refusal of the Syrian regime in signing a tripartite treaty will now be analyzed.

The reasons were multifold: internally, the position of the pro-Iraqi Populists, especially in the North, with its inherent dangers of separation and Iraqi intervention;³⁹ externally, a series of notes and speeches accusing Syria of anti-Turkish policy, and a feeling of growing isolation from immediate neighbours Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon.⁴⁰

The main reason, however, may be traced to another one of the frequent shifts in government in Syria, this one in September 1955 upon which the Populists regained their former prominence. The February 13th cabinet resigned after the defeat of presidential candidate Khalid Azm by Quwatli.

However, the largely Populist government--they held four

³⁸ Though on March 2, 1955 an agreement was signed defining the principles of the proposed alliance, this was still not the alliance itself. Middle East Journal, Vol. 9, 1955, p. 313.

³⁹ Humbaraci, A. Middle East Indictment (London: Robert Hale, 1958), p. 202.

⁴⁰ Lenczowski, op.cit.; p. 359.

cabinet seats, including the Ministries of Defence and Economics--had by now learned the inflammable nature of "foreign pacts."

Their remaining in office therefore depended on their muting their true feelings on the issue. Their formula was to promote "bilateralism" and to shun exclusive multilateral arrangements such as that initially suggested by Egypt.

This formula allowed for economic negotiations with Saudi Arabia or, if need be, a military pact with Iraq. They thus satisfied popular demand for a closer military link with Egypt without completely alienating Iraq.

The intended conciliation with Iraq, however, became increasingly dangerous by December, especially after an Israeli attack.⁴¹

Egyptian diplomatic efforts in Syria after the signing of the defence pact of October 1955, continued to occupy a prime place in her techniques to hold fast the control of that country's foreign policy.

The Egyptian ambassador and Nasser's chief agent in Damascus, Brigadier Mahmud Riyad, occupied a position in Syrian politics unrivalled by any other foreign envoy in Syria.

He was in constant consultation with President Quwatli the Baath Party, and the rising junta of radical nationalist officers.

⁴¹Ibid; pp. 362-363.

Especially after another cabinet reshuffle, in June 1956, had resulted in the Baath party securing the two key posts of Foreign Affairs and Economics, was Brigadier Riyadh to play a decisive role in bringing Syria into line with Egyptian foreign policy.⁴²

Evidence of the use by Egypt of non-diplomatic techniques in Saudi Arabia and Syria during this period is scant.

In the case of Syria, one must assume that with the success of Egyptian diplomatic measures in ensuring an identity of foreign policy between that country and Egypt--embodied in the Pact of October 1955, subversive measures in Syria lost their importance and were considerably diminished.

In Saudi Arabia the sole apparent example of Egyptian subversive techniques during this period is a plot on the part of Egyptian-trained officers to overthrow the regime.

This attempt was reportedly discovered as early as May 1955 and it was believed that Egyptian military advisors were involved.⁴³

Evidence for the complicity of the Egyptian regime in these activities is, however, largely unavailable. It would indeed seem strange that subversion of the Saudi regime was attempted at a time when Egyptian diplomatic techniques to attain an identity of foreign policy with Saudi Arabia had already succeeded.

⁴²Seale, op.cit.; p. 25.

⁴³Lipsky, G. A. Saudi Arabia: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1959) p. 142.

(3) Iraq

Egypt's efforts in Iraq aimed at obtaining the realignment of the regime away from a Pact policy, or alternatively, ensuring the possible undermining of the regime or its isolation.

In pursuing these objectives, virtually no emphasis was to be placed on diplomacy during this period.

In this de-emphasis Egypt was influenced by her reversals in diplomatic discussions with Iraqi leaders prior to the Baghdad Pact's inception.

The discussions with Iraqi leaders at Sarsank in August 1954 and at Cairo in September 1954 had produced no fruitful results in spite of ambiguous declarations. In the final analysis they had failed to prevent the announcement of January 13, 1955 or Iraq's final entry into the pact on February 25, 1955.

The Iraqi leaders were too obsessed with the threat of Russian expansionism, too convinced that Western arms were indispensable to Iraq's defence, and too wary of Egyptian influence in Arab Asia through the means of the Arab League and the Arab Collective Security Pact, to submit to Egyptian pressure.

The Iraqi regime was attracted by the prospect of Western arms, money and equipment which membership in the Baghdad Pact would bring. They did not hesitate to take advantage of the Egyptian regime's

concern for her neutralist opinion, by occupying the central position in a collective defence system which, it was thought, would lead to Egypt's isolation or subordination.⁴⁴

It was this diametric opposition of the Iraqi regime to Egyptian foreign policy objectives that contributed to Nasser's subsequent refusals to meet with Iraqi leaders.

An example of these refusals is presented by Nasser's response in early 1956 to King Hussein's proposals for a possible conference of the heads of all the Arab states--including Iraq. Nasser refused to cooperate holding that such a meeting could achieve little except to provide still another occasion for the expression of differing opinions.⁴⁵

Egyptian activities in Iraq during this period were, given the de-emphasis on diplomatic efforts, limited to subversive propaganda attacks on the regime in an effort to isolate it further from the majority of politically articulate Arab public opinion, and organized assassination as a more direct means of undermining the regime.

As the following analysis of these methods bears out however, Egyptian attempts at subversion in Iraq were of limited significance prior to the Suez crisis.

⁴⁴Birdwood, Christopher B. Nuri al-Said, A Study in Arab Leadership (London: Cassell, 1959), pp. 228-230.

⁴⁵The Times of London, March 6, 1956

The extent of Egyptian propaganda in Iraq was attested to by Nuri al-Said himself when, in an interview on March 30th, 1956 to the special correspondent of the Daily Telegraph in Baghdad, Mr. Anthony Mann, he accused Egypt, as well as Saudi Arabia, of attempting to subvert the Iraqi Government in these words:

Cairo radio bombards us continuously with its "Voice of the Arabs" program which is full of threats against me, and abuse of Iraq. Fortunately it does not have much effect, because people can look out of the window and see that the streets are not running with blood in spite of what Cairo tells them. At the same time, Saudi Arabia does its best to undermine us by pouring in large sums of money to buy the support of individuals.⁴⁶

As for organized assassination and subversion--an underground system, which had as its purpose the assassination of Premier Nuri al-Said, was uncovered by Iraqi counter-espionage in October 1955. Two people arrested for their part in the plot confessed that they had been directed in their efforts by the Egyptian military attache, Lt. Col. Kemal ed Din Mohammed Al Hinawi, who was found to be the head of an extensive spy ring.⁴⁷

Hinawi's activities had also included the distribution of anti-government literature, collecting anti-Iraqi material which was later broadcast over Cairo Radio, the establishment of a "National Committee of Officers and Soldier's Union" within the Iraqi army to

⁴⁶ Keesings Contemporary Archives (Bristol: Keesings Publications, 1956), p. 14795.

⁴⁷ Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, July 26, 1957, p. 8.

subvert the regime, and directing terrorists who threw bombs at the Turkish Embassy and in the Government's Guest House.⁴⁸

On February 9, 1956 the Iraqi authorities sentenced Muhammed Ali-Issa, member of the Egyptian embassy staff arrested in late January, to four years imprisonment for leading a conspiracy against the Baghdad Pact, possessing explosives, as well as directives for a group plotting to assassinate high Iraqi officials.

His superior turned out to be the same Lt. Col. Kemal Mohammed Al Hinawi, Egyptian Military attache in Baghdad, who was finally declared persona non grata.⁴⁹

Nasser's approval is underlined by the appointment of Colonel Hinawi as his personal press secretary and general manager of the Middle East News Agency, which was the most important of the Egyptian-controlled media in the Middle East.⁵⁰

Egypt's non-diplomatic measures in Iraq during this period were largely limited to propaganda and organized attempts at assassination of government officials.

Formidable obstacles prevented the undermining of the regime by establishing extensive contacts with the political parties which professed to represent the indigenous opposition to Iraqi foreign policy.⁵¹

⁴⁸Ibid; p. 8

⁴⁹Ibid; p. 8

⁵⁰Ibid; p. 8

⁵¹The nature and strength of the opposition parties, the most enduring of which were the Independence (Istiqlal) and National Democratic Parties (Watain Dimuqrati) has previously been analyzed. See Supra, pp. 107-109, 114-115.

The impotency of the urban groupings was due to a combination of factors including the repressive measures undertaken by the government, as well as the deficiencies of the parties themselves.⁵²

The prospects of military subversion at this time were likewise remote, the "Free Officer's" movement within the army--which had been developing from 1953--being as yet scattered and patchy.⁵³

On the other hand, opportunities for a sustained propaganda campaign were presented by the fact that the regime's domestic policies were anathema to the politically frustrated--the majority of the politically conscious in Iraq, and their counterparts in other Arab countries.

In Iraq, these factors have previously been outlined. This propaganda was geared to a majority of educated Iraqis, and in particular to the students, teachers, and medium and lower levels of the civil service and professions, and to a lesser extent to the peasantry who, though only beginning to become politically conscious, showed signs of restlessness especially after receiving word of the 1952 Egyptian Agrarian Reform Law.⁵⁴

⁵² See Supra, pp. 114-115.

⁵³ See Supra, p. 115.

⁵⁴ The more prominent features of the regime's domestic policy capable of being exploited by Egyptian propaganda, have already been outlined. See Supra, pp. 110-112.

In addition, the accusations already made against the foreign policy of the regime could be taken up and amplified.

Attempts at more direct methods of undermining the regime through organized assassination and terrorist subversion were necessitated by the fact that though the mass of Iraqi opposition was receptive to the major themes of Egyptian propaganda, such methods were politically ineffective as a means of undermining the regime, for reasons which have been indicated.

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Egyptian propaganda though it was to be eventually largely responsible for the psychological conditions essential to the success of the military conspiracy of July 14, 1958, at this time was politically ineffective as a means of undermining the Iraqi regime.

As was previously shown, though the majority of politically articulate segments of the Iraqi population were estranged from the regime, both on internal grounds, and because of its collaboration with Western 'imperialism' (seen as the root of much of the domestic difficulties in Iraq), the civilian opposition was powerless to bring about a political change, due to the internal security measures taken by the regime as well as the deficiencies of the political parties themselves. The embryonic nature of the conspiracy within the military segment of the Iraqi population has previously been outlined.

55.

Supra pp. 114-116.

Other subversive activities involving organized assassination attempts and terrorist bombings were likewise unsuccessful as a means of undermining the Iraqi regime during this period.

The Egyptian military attache's whole organization was uncovered by Iraqi counter espionage in October, 1955 and further arrests culminating in the expulsion of the Egyptian military attache, took place in February, 1956.⁵⁶

Egypt did not thereafter replace its military attache in Baghdad but found it convenient to continue its subversive activities through the Syrian representative.⁵⁷

(4) Jordan and Lebanon

The policy of the Jordanian regime did not represent an immediate danger to Egyptian foreign policy objectives at the outset of the period-revolving as it did around an avoidance of too close an association with emergent poles among the Arab states, and of staying on good terms with all.⁵⁸

In spite of this apparent neutrality and inactivity, however, Egypt's use of subversive methods to contain the Baghdad Pact were during the ensuing period to be largely centered on Jordan.

56. Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, July 26, 1957, p.8

It has been estimated that the extensive network of police, spies, and informers for the Iraqi regime numbered some twenty-four thousand at this time, in all spheres of Iraqi endeavour.

57. See Caractacus. Revolution in Iraq (London: Gollancz, 1959) p 53
Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, July 26, 1957. p.8

58. Examples of a mediatory approach were apparent in early 1955: Jordanian Premier Rifai's visit to Cairo and other Arab capitals with the avowed mission of settling antagonisms.
See Middle Eastern Affairs, March 1956, p.123

Jordan's strategic significance in the ensuing power struggle with Iraq was well understood by the Egyptian regime. That country was a focal point in the system from which pressure could be brought to bear on either Syria or Egypt. Further, Jordan was an integral part of British defence strategy in which it was considered an "outpost" of Iraq.

As the following analysis bears out, it was in Jordan that subversive methods achieved their highest success during this period. Diplomatic pressure on the Jordanian regime, was by contract, of limited import.

In Egypt's efforts to prevent Jordan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact and to secure her eventual incorporation into the Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian axis, the techniques employed up to the Suez crisis were primarily non-diplomatic.

These measures involved the subversion of the British-trained, led, equipped and subsidized Arab Legion--the lynchpin of Britain's defence policy in the Middle East and the mainstay of the Jordanian regime.

These techniques were largely carried out through the Egyptian military attache in Amman, Colonel Mahmoud Salah ed Din Mustafa.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Col. Mahmoud Salah ed Din Mustafa arrived in Jordan in April 1955 as the first Egyptian military attache. He was an expert in organizing terrorist groups through his experience in creating the anti-British Egyptian National Guard in 1952. Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, July 26, 1957, p. 9.

The measures included the cultivation of a close association with Abu Nuwar, King Hussein's chief aide de camp, and using the latter (beginning in November 1955) to convince the King to admit into Jordan a number of Egyptian fedayeen who would carry on attacks against Israel.

The ultimate purpose was to invite Israeli retaliation and then persuade the King to admit Syrian contingents into Jordan under the pretext of aiding Jordan in the event of an Israeli attack. This would have the effect of neutralizing the loyal forces in the Arab Legion, and move Jordan into military collaboration with the Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian axis.⁶⁰

Colonel Mahmoud Salah ed Din Mustafa also encouraged the "Free Officers" in the Jordanian Army in their efforts to obtain the dismissal of Major General Sidki el Jundi, the Jordanian Deputy Commander of the Legion and a close associate of General John Glubb Pasha--the British Commander of the Arab Legion. Their ultimate aim was the elimination of General Glubb himself.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Chamoun, Camille, Crise au Moyen Orient (Paris: Gallimard, 1963) p. 325.

Shwadran, Benjamin, Jordan: A State of Tension (New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs, 1959), p. 326, No. 21. These facts were revealed after an investigation undertaken by the Jordanian government after severe Israeli reprisals. In the spring of 1955, as well as three months later, the Jordanian government protested to Nasser regarding these findings. The latter feigned surprise. Chamoun, op.cit.p.325-6.

⁶¹ Shwadran, op.cit.; pp.316-7. The Free Officers in the Arab Legion was a secret society, which had existed for some five years, and which comprised some thirty-five officers, resentful of the higher command being largely British. The group was directed by the Hussein's aide-de camp Ali Abu Nuwar who was secretly intriguing for Egypt. Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, July 26, 1957, p. 9.

The campaign against General Glubb involved the stimulation of pre-existing attitudes through the dissemination of propaganda that he had extra-military authority, - that he was in effect the "uncrowned King of Jordan", that he had restrained the Legion from military action against Israel during the Palestine war, and that he was responsible for the subordinate positions of a number of aspiring young officers.⁶²

In working towards the elimination of General Glubb the collaboration of the Egyptian military attache with Abu Nuwar, Hussein's aide de camp, was crucial. The latter was used as an instrument to persuade Hussein that his own position was in danger if he did not get rid of Glubb.⁶³

Egyptian techniques in the attempt to subvert the Jordanian Army also included the financial support of the thirty thousand man Jordanian National Guard, composed mostly of Palestinians (in contrast to the Legion proper). This body contained the seed of possible armed rebellion by the Palestinians against the Jordanian authorities.⁶⁴

Egyptian non-diplomatic activities in Jordan during this period, apart from the sustained attempt to subvert the military, increased considerably at the time of the mission in early December, 1955, of General Sir Gerald Templer, chief of the British Imperial Staff.

62. Shwadran, op cit. pp 316-317
Chamoun, op cit. p 327

63. Shwadran, op cit. p 332 n. 31

64. Ibid p 337 n. 2

The purpose of Templer's mission was to urge Jordan's immediate adherence to the Baghdad Pact.

Egyptian activities included press and radio denunciations of Iraq and the Pact, part of the propaganda themes on Cairo Radio at the time being an alleged plot by Sir Anthony Eden and Nuri al Said to take over Jordan and divide it between Iraq and Israel.⁶⁵ In addition, the broadcasts from Cairo openly called upon the Jordanian people to overthrow their government.⁶⁶ Propaganda activities also included the collection of the statements of opposition politicians, the Egyptian Embassy in Amman working day and night interviewing them.⁶⁷

In collaboration with their Egyptian counterparts, Saudi agents bribed newspapers, members of parliament, and any other potential source of opposition to the Pact.⁶⁸

Egyptian techniques in pressuring Jordan away from adherence to the Baghdad Pact also included the establishment of close contacts with the four West-bank ministers in the eleven-minister Jordanian cabinet.⁶⁹ After the resignation of these

65. Childers, Erskine, The Road to Suez (London, MacGibbon and Kee, 1962) p1

66. Keesings Contemporary Archives, (Bristol: Keesings Publications Ltd of London) p. 44, 1956, p. 14647.

67. Shwadrin, op. cit; pp. 325-326

68. Ibid; p 326

The use of funds to stimulate agitation was attested to by a British foreign office spokesman in London in January of 1956, who said that information had been received which led the Foreign Office to believe that "a certain amount of money has been spent in Jordan in fomenting riots - and not only from communist sources" Keesings 1956 p. 14647

69. The extent of connection, while in office, between the four Palestinian Ministers (who were to resign and thus cause the fall of the cabinet of Said el-Mufti) and the Egyptian regime may be gauged from the former's insistence, when a Jordan Cabinet Committee placed before the cabinet a draft of Jordan's minimum conditions for joining the Baghdad Pact, that it be shown to the Egyptian government, before its submission to the British. The Annual Register of World Events, (Aberdeen: Longman's) vol. 197 (1955) p. 286-7

ministers in mid-December had resulted in the fall of cabinet, these ministers were supported by Egyptian agents in rousing the population against the Pact.⁷⁰

During this period diplomatic efforts on the part of Egypt to prevent Jordan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact and to secure her eventual incorporation into the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi axis, while of secondary importance, were by no means ignored.

On March 3, 1955, Major Salah Salim visited Amman, together with Khalid al-Azm - The Syrian Foreign Affairs and Acting Defence Minister - to secure the adherence of the Jordanian government to an Egyptian - Syrian Pact based on opposition to the Turco-Iraqi Alliance, and other alliances, as well as a joint military command and economic co-operation.⁷¹ The agreement, for this pact had (it was thought) been reached a few days earlier.

There were to be subsequent examples, during the period, of Egyptian diplomatic pressure on Jordan largely through the use of financial enticements.

In December, 1955, during a caretaker government, when elections in Jordan appeared imminent, Egypt and her Saudi and Syrian allies tried to influence the outcome by announcing that they were discussing the possibility of supplying Jordan with economic aid to replace that rendered to Jordan by Britain.⁷²

70. Shwadran op. cit; p 327

71. Seale, op. cit; p 224

72. Shwadran, op. cit; pp 328-329

Later, in early January 1956, further evidence of financial pressure on the part of Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia was apparent as the the three allies attempted to convene a meeting with Jordan to discuss their offer of economic aid.^{73.}

There was a subsequent offer of the same nature, after General Glubb's ouster in March 1956.⁷⁴

The primarily non-diplomatic nature of the techniques employed in Egypt's efforts to prevent Jordan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact and to secure her eventual incorporation into the Egyptian-Saudi axis was conditioned largely by the subversive potentialities existing in the Jordanian political scene:⁷⁵

In the context of foreign affairs, the Jordanian elite had to contend with strong and opposing attitudes among its people, offering widespread opportunities for an extension of Egyptian influence, all the more so after what had previously been fluid trends became rigid polarizations of Arab States - and during the period of Jordanian abandonment of a mediatory policy in favour of a closer alignment with Iraq.

Conflict in Jordanian politics stemmed largely from the 1950 annexation of Central Palestine on the west bank of the Jordan

^{73.} Ibid; p. 330, Middle Eastern Affairs, vol 7, February 1956 p. 86

^{74.} Shwadran, op. cit; p. 335

^{75.} In addition it was due to the relative lack of success of diplomatic efforts; for example, the Jordanian response to the Salim-Azm mission of March 3, 1955, was lukewarm, the government merely asking for more time to study the proposal. Seale, op. cit; p. 224

The reasons for the relative lack of success of diplomatic pressure on Jordan during this period are discussed below.

River, from which time Jordan was actually divided into parts:

It was among the relatively urbanized west bank population that major support for Egyptian policies during the periods subsequent to the Baghdad Pact's inception was to be found.

The west Bank contained some half million Palestine arabs and a half million refugees. Educational facilities had been superior and Western influence had penetrated further in this population, which - largely uprooted and embittered - outnumbered the original East Bank inhabitants, primarily rural and nomadic, by two to one. Their major immediate demands were: appropriate representation in the Jordanian government, and the removal of the British connection. They were to become an effective weapon of all dissident elements internally, and of subsequently anti-British Arab governments abroad, notably Egypt and Saudi-Arabia.⁷⁶

In the East Bank position, while the Bedouin tribesmen were by and large loyal, there were also present large numbers who considered themselves "South Syrians" and were to be susceptible to Egyptian pan-Arab propaganda in its later development.⁷⁷

Highly significant for a later extension of Egyptian influence was the estimate, based on reliable appraisal, that by early 1957, quite apart from the organized manifestations of opposition to the Jordanian regime, two thirds of the population was actually or potentially opposed to the royal authority and to the maintenance of

⁷⁶ Marlowe, op. cit; pp. 93-94
 Harris, Geo. L. Jordan: Its People its society and its culture.
 (New York: Grove Press, 1958) pp. 72-75

⁷⁷ Cremeans, Charles D. The Arabs and the World (New York: Praeger, 1963)
 pp. 103-104

of government under the terms of the existing constitution or even to the preservation of the state self.⁷⁸

This mass of opposition provided the basis of support of several Jordanian political groups, whose activities were to serve Egyptian interests considerably during subsequent periods.

Some of these groups centered around prominent personalities, several of which were in exile. The exiled Mufti of Jerusalem Hajamin al-Husseini, widely suspected of directing the murder of King Abdullah in 1951, was the most prominent of these.⁷⁹ Another prominent exile in Cairo, was Colonel Abdullah el-Tell, former Jordanian governor of Jerusalem, who maintained contact with certain dissident elements in the Arab Legion.⁸⁰

A major source of opposition which was to come out in support of Egyptian policy objectives was to be found in the groupings around Suleiman Pasha Nabulsi, a former cabinet minister and ambassador to London who broke with the ruling group in the early nineteen fifties.

78. Harris op. cit; p 72

79. Lenczowski, op. cit; p. 308

Many pro-Mufti Westbankers were to be found among the angry mobs who rioted against the proposed enlistment of Jordan in the Baghdad Pact in December 1955. These riots caused the downfall of two cabinets within a single week.

Harris op cit; p. 83.

80. Shwadrán, op. cit; p. 316

Although he was arrested by the authorities in 1954, and his group - "The National Socialist Party" (al. Hizb al-Wataniah-Ishtiraki)- was not allowed to participate in the Jordanian elections,⁸¹ the next election in 1956, - held without police and military obstruction was to show this group - drawing most of the support from Western Jordan, to be the strongest political party in the country and the centre of opposition to the Baghdad Pact.⁸²

This party offered formidable support for Egyptian policy objectives, favouring close co-operation with Egypt and Syria, modification if not abrogation of the treaty with Britain, and neutralism in the cold war.⁸³ Its worth was clearly recognized by Nasser himself who referred to it as "the symbol of Arab awakening."⁸⁴

A party of an inter-Arab ideological nature the "Arab Renaissance Party" (Baath) was next in strength in Jordan at this time.⁸⁵

Its foreign policy by and large supported Egyptian objectives,⁸⁶ and its influence was magnified by a close collaboration with the powerful Syrian Baath, whose ideology has already been outlined.

Although not permitted by the authorities to enter the 1954

81. Lenczowski, op. cit; third ed. p. 458

82. Shwadran, op. cit; p. 341

83. Ibid;

84. Harris, op. cit; p. 77

85. Lenczowski, op. cit; third ed. p. 456

86. Harris, op. cit; p. 78

Jordanian elections its leaders Abdullah Rimawi and Abdulla Nawas commanded a particularly strong following in Ramallah and Jerusalem respectively (both west-bank centres). Students and young people in general constituted the party's main support.⁸⁸

In the relatively free elections of 1956, results were to show that significant support had been lost to the more moderate "National Socialists", and to the "National Front" (Communist), yet the party's foreign policy was adequately represented in the subsequent Nabulsi cabinet, the party's leader Abdullah ar-Rimawi having obtained the post of Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.⁸⁹

The Communists were next in strength and influence in Jordan at this time, in spite of the monarchy's persistent efforts to suppress them, - the party was outlawed - , and its small numbers.⁹⁰

At least outwardly the Communists supported Egyptian objectives in foreign policy, especially since they had in 1951 abandoned their policy of peace with Israel and aligned the party with the anti-Israel, outwardly pan-Arabist counterparts in other Arab countries.⁹¹

The outlawing by the Jordanian authorities of political parties hurt the communists far less than it did rival opposition groups as they had long been accustomed to illegal operation.

A large number of refugees, bitter over what was regarded as the pro-Israeli policy of the Western nations, constituted an

88. Lenczowski, op. cit; (third ed.) p. 456

89. Harris, op. cit; p.78

90. Lenczowski, op. cit; (third ed.) pp. 457; 465

91. Harris, op. cit; pp. 79,82

important basis of support for the Communists.⁹² It drew support also from the professionals and middle class and the quality of its leadership was high, the ten cells of the Party in Jerusalem in the early fifties, for example, being made up mostly of professional men.⁹³

As examples of at least instrumental support on the part of the Communists for Egyptian foreign policy objectives in Jordan, one might cite the virulent campaign against Glubb Pasha as early as 1953, and their contribution to the election-day riots in the policed elections of 1954.⁹⁴ Most observers at that time agreed with the official Jordanian investigating Commission that the party was the most important disruptive influence during the elections.⁹⁵

A prime factor of subversive potentiality was Jordan's paucity of material resources. Jordan's hopelessly unviable economy was to offer Egypt potential areas of exploitation through propaganda and subversion in her subsequent attempts to win the political allegiance of the inhabitants of the Fertile Crescent.

⁹²Ibid; p. 83.

⁹³Ibid; p. 80.

⁹⁴Ibid; p. 80.

⁹⁵Ibid; p. 80.

The material component of Jordan's capability was almost completely derived from foreign aid. This factor, together with the inability of Jordan's resources to be developed to the point where they would be able to provide a decent living standard for the population magnified the internal discontent with the regime, outlined above.⁹⁶

To be expertly exploited in subsequent Egyptian propaganda attacks on the Hashemite monarchy was the fact that the most important single source of foreign currency for meeting Jordan's deficit at this time were grants and loans from the United Kingdom, which also provided loans without interest for economic development projects.⁹⁷

Further, as a result of a severe economic handicap, the regime was laid open to the charge of being militarily the pawn of British policy in the area. Until the termination of the British-Jordanian Alliance in March 1957, Britain was to continue subsidizing almost all the expenditures of the Arab Legion and contributed also to other military expenditures.⁹⁸

There was an absence of significant sources of appeal to other Arab societies, in the Jordanian elite's domestic policies. Hence these

⁹⁶ See the Report of the International Bank Mission, Economic Development of Jordan (pp. 5, 55, 64-69, 458-9).

⁹⁷ Shwadran, op.cit.; p. 301.

⁹⁸ Bullard, Sir Reader ed. The Middle East: A Political And Economic Survey, 3rd Ed. (Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 346.

policies could not offset the effect of Jordan's paucity of material resources.

The repressive measures of the state, the great dependence on Western economic and military assistance for its very survival, was a barrier in itself, given the prevailing neutralist sentiment and the conviction that Israel was a creation of the West and a sign of continuing Western imperialism.

Sources of appeal were still further limited by the absence of a program of social reform. The 1952 constitution, recognizing a growing pro-Socialist sentiment, included among its provisions guarantees to the right of employment, protection of labour by fair wages, hours, and compensation, rules concerning health, women's welfare, child labor, and so forth, but no actual reform program emerged from these liberal promises, few of which were ever implemented.⁹⁹

Apart from the basis of appeal, Jordanian propaganda resources were scanty and were to prove no match for her Egyptian antagonists in the ensuing struggle which was primarily a propaganda war.¹⁰⁰

By contrast, Egyptian, and to a lesser extent, Syrian newspapers and magazines, specializing in political polemic were more widely read than Jordanian material. For example, an Egyptian weekly *Rose al-Yusif* a journal with Communist tendencies, was until banned, so widely read,

⁹⁹Harris, op.cit.; p. 181.

¹⁰⁰Ibid; p. 99.

it was called the "school of politics."¹⁰¹ About half the literate population also read clandestine Communist literature printed or mimeographed by the Arab Communist Party of Jordan.¹⁰²

Added to this was the fact that the Palestinians, a powerful force of national disintegration, could make better use of the organized mob than the government could of its largely Bedouin supporters.¹⁰³

The entry of the Soviet Union with its mighty propaganda apparatus into the war of words, in support of Egypt, was to make the Jordanian regime's propaganda apparatus still more ineffectual.

The above analysis of the subversive potentialities existing in the Jordanian political scene at the time of the Baghdad Pact's inception leads one to support the conclusion of an astute observer that:

Jordan was an obvious first choice for that propaganda and subversion which were to be Abdul Nasr's principal weapons in his attempt to win the allegiance of the inhabitants of the Fertile Crescent.¹⁰⁴

The increase of both diplomatic and non-diplomatic activities in Jordan was apparently a defensive reaction to a policy initiated by Britain.

¹⁰¹Ibid; p. 103.

¹⁰²Ibid; p. 215.

¹⁰³This was to become more apparent during the riots of late 1955 and early 1956. See Lenczowski, op.cit.; (3rd Ed.) pp. 462-463.

¹⁰⁴Marlowe, op.cit.; pp. 93-94.

Britain's intention was to merge the British air forces in Iraq and the Arab legion in Jordan in a Middle-East defence system under a joint command. Especially if Jordan joined the Baghdad Pact would the erosion of Britain's positions throughout the area be checked and the oil supplies so necessary to the British economy be assured of greater protection.¹⁰⁵

In her efforts to win Jordan's adherence, Britain was prepared to offer Jordan a revision of the Treaty of 1946 (which still had ten years to run) as well as an increased subsidy.

Hussein, for his part, in spite of his protestations of neutrality¹⁰⁶ would have liked to join the Pact for the additional help to be expected from Britain, and as an additional protection from Israel.

In late 1955, a series of British and Turkish overtures in Amman were initiated. On November 2, 1955 Celal Bayar, Turkish President, began talks with the intention of getting Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact, and early in December 1955 these attempts culminated in the visit of General Sir Gerald Templer, Chief of the British Imperial Staff, urging Jordan's immediate adherence.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Campbell, op.cit.; p. 58.

¹⁰⁶ As late as November 21, 1955 Jordan announced it would remain neutral in relation to the Baghdad Pact, the Syrian-Egyptian Defence Pact, and the Egyptian-Saudi Arabian Defence Pact.

¹⁰⁷ Shwadhan, op.cit.; p. 325.

It is in this context that Egypt's activities in Jordan may be considered as a defensive containment action, as the inactivity of Jordan in the Egyptian-Iraqi dispute was by no means assured.¹⁰⁸

An essentially defensive attitude on the part of Nasser is indicated in an interview which he gave to the Cairo correspondents of the Observer and the Sunday Times on March 24, 1946 in which he explained:

After the Baghdad Pact was signed we asked Britain not to spring any more surprises, and when informed that Pakistan was going to join, we raised no objections. Nor did we oppose Britain's adherence--we did not regard this as our affair. Britain did not tell us of the mission of General Templer, and we were forced to fight against all efforts to bring Jordan into the Pact. If Jordan had joined, Syria would have been cut off, pressure would have been put upon her to join, and eventually Egypt would have been left alone to face Israel.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ Camille Chamun, President of Lebanon from 1952 to 1958 in his book Crise au Moyen Orient (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1963), pp. 324-5; and in part citing, Glubb Pasha, A Soldier with the Arabs, maintains that Egyptian subversive activities during this period were a methodical attempt to isolate King Hussein from his sources of support as a means to his eventual overthrow. It is safer to assume, however, given British diplomatic pressure on Jordan, that the immediate aim was an attempt to undermine the British position in Jordan so as to assure her non-adherence to the Baghdad Pact. Though the overthrow of Hussein may have been an ultimate aim, it belongs more properly to a later phase.

¹⁰⁹ Keessing's Archives: 1956, pp. 14795-14796. Erskine Childers in his book, The Road to Suez (p. 143), gives especially heavy emphasis to a defensive interpretation of Egyptian activities in Jordan during this period and supports his conclusion with some amazing evidence. According to Childers, Nasser had received assurances from Premier Eden and had publicly welcomed Eden's proposals in November that Arab-Israeli negotiations be initiated on the basis of a compromise between the 1947 resolutions and the defacto boundaries, on the expressed understanding that the Baghdad Pact would not be enlarged in the Arab world. Thus, increased British pressure on Jordan to join, in late 1955 came, according to Childers, as a deceitful volte-face, to Nasser who reacted accordingly. Childers, op.cit.; p. 143.

There was a consistent though qualified success of Egyptian non-diplomatic techniques in Jordan during this period.

Thus, the efforts of Egypt to infiltrate fedayeen into Jordan, through the military attache, beginning in November 1955, in order to invite Israeli reprisals which would offer a pretext for pressure to be exerted on Jordan to cooperate militarily with the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi axis--which military cooperation it was thought would lead to a coordination of foreign policies--were decidedly successful.

Nasserist intriguer Abu Nuwar, (King Hussein's chief aide de camp) convinced the King to admit the fedayeen to carry out attacks against Israel. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Ahmad Jundi, was given orders to admit some 500 terrorists, and prevent the police from interfering. Hussein apparently believed that this gesture would make him more popular with the internal opposition.

Israeli reprisals, were to play a large role, in conjunction with unrelenting pressure internally on the part of the pro-Egyptian opposition, in bringing about moves by mid-1956, towards increased military cooperation between the Arab Legion and Syrian and Egyptian forces.

¹¹⁰The Daily Mail (December 7, 1955) cited in Shwadran, op.cit.; p.326.

The success of Egyptian efforts in this sphere was reflected in the April 9, 1956 visit of King Hussein to Damascus for talks with the Syrian authorities.

At the conclusion of these a joint communique was issued stating that the two countries had agreed to have their armies cooperate to "repulse any further aggression on the Arab frontiers."

The significance of such a move for the achievement of a coordination of foreign policies was underscored by statements that the two countries had agreed to steer clear of any foreign pacts, while coordinating their defence plans.¹¹¹

Further tension along the Jordanian Israeli frontier was followed, on April 28, 1956 by a visit to Cairo by Major General Radi Annab, the new Jordanian chief of general staff of the Arab Legion, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Nuwar. The purpose of this mission was reported to be a discussion of military cooperation with Egypt, and on May 6th a joint Egyptian-Jordanian communique announced an agreement to coordinate the respective armies.¹¹²

Full success on this sphere, however, was only to be achieved in late 1956, after the results of the relatively free elections in Jordan of October 1956. At this stage the agreements between Jordan,

¹¹¹ Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 7, 1956 p. 206, 257, Shwadran, op.cit.; pp. 335-336.

¹¹² Middle East Journal, Vol. 10, 1956, p. 283.

Egypt, and Syria did not as yet provide for a unified command or full military cooperation, and hence did not constitute the full incorporation of Jordan into the Syrian-Egyptian-Saudi axis.¹¹³

Increased military cooperation, which was a significant step towards the eventual incorporation of Jordan into the Egyptian-led bloc, was also in part a long range by-product of the success of Egyptian efforts in obtaining the dismissal, on March 2, 1956, of General Glubb, British Commander of the Arab Legion.

The dismissal was a result of the interaction of political, ideological and personal opposition to Glubb and the stimulation of these pre-existing attitudes by Egyptian propaganda. Its immediate cause however was the persuasive skills of Abu Nuwar, a Nasserist intriguer whom Hussein unsuspectingly considered a personal friend, and who had been made the King's aide de camp.¹¹⁴

Together with five other young officers Nuwar successfully convinced the King that his own position was in danger if he did not get rid of Glubb.

¹¹³Ibid; p. 283.

¹¹⁴Nuwar's Nasserist connections were attested to by Camille Chamoun Lebanese President, in describing a personal meeting with Nuwar after the latter's appointment as chief of general staff in May 1956. Chamoun states: "il n'allait pas tarder à trahir son souverain. Quelques semaines après la promotion de cet officier aux fonctions de chef d'état-Major des forces Jordaniennes, je l'avais reçu a Beyrouth; il ne faisait aucun secrèt de son admiration pour le dictateur Egyptien." Chamoun, op.cit.; p. 326.

The dismissal of the British Commander of the Arab Legion, like the gradual moves towards military cooperation described above, proved to be less a victory in the short run for Egyptian aims in Jordan than at first appeared.

On the one hand, it gained the King tremendous popularity internally making him less susceptible to Egyptian pressure in the future, and on the other the dismissal did not result in the repudiation, sought by Nasser, of the alliance with Britain.

That the Glubb expulsion was less a surrender to pro-Egyptian forces than a clever tactical manoeuvre on the part of Hussein to increase popularity, was apparent from statements of the King and his ministers shortly thereafter that they not only wanted to continue the treaty relationship with Britain but also hoped to maintain the services of a number of British officers in the Legion.¹¹⁵

The qualified nature of Egyptian successes at this stage was further emphasized by the refusal of Hussein to join a conference of the Egyptian-led bloc at which proposals would be made for replacing British aid.

This refusal was coupled with a meeting with Faisal of Iraq some two weeks after Glubb's dismissal. At this meeting, a communique was issued, on March 14, 1956, stating that the discussions conducted "in an atmosphere of complete fraternal understanding" had dealt with

¹¹⁵ Shwadran, op.cit.; p. 333.

"matters of interest to both countries in particular and Arab affairs in general."¹¹⁶

Egyptian non-diplomatic activities in the non-military sphere in Jordan during this period--including propaganda attacks on the pact in an effort to stimulate anti-government riots and demonstrations, bribery, and pressure on government officials--were decidedly successful in contributing to the failure of a major British diplomatic offensive in Jordan, which had culminated in the mission of General Sir Gerald Templer, chief of the British Imperial Staff to Amman in December 1955 to urge Jordan's immediate adherence to the Baghdad Pact.

All opposition parties, whether legal or outlawed, had joined in violent and destructive demonstrations against the pact. Though they were not of much consequence per se at this time in the political structure of Jordan, due to the repressive measures of the regime,¹¹⁷ their capacity for making trouble on the Pact issue was clearly enhanced by popular sentiment.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ Ibid; p. 335; Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 7, 1956, p. 160.

¹¹⁷ For example Suleiman Pasha Nabulsi, head of the National Socialist Party--a major source of pro-Egyptian opposition--had been arrested by the authorities in 1954, and his group had not been allowed to participate in the Jordanian elections. Similarly, the Arab Renaissance Party (Baath) whose foreign policy by and large supported Egyptian objectives was not permitted by the authorities to enter the 1954 Jordanian elections. The Communists, who at least instrumentally had supported Egyptian foreign policy in Jordan, had likewise been outlawed. See Supra, pp. 152-154, 154-157.

¹¹⁸ The strong and opposing attitudes of a majority of the Jordanian population, especially the Palestinian west-bankers, to the foreign policy of the regime have previously been outlined. See Supra. Large segments of the Jordanian population, after the annexation of the west-bank in 1950, were to traditionally demand the removal of the British connection. The Palestinians, a powerful force of national disintegration, could make better use of the organized mob than the government could of its largely Bedouin supporters. Harris, op.cit.; p. 215.

As a result of the strikes and demonstrations two cabinets fell within a single week in December 1955. On December 21st a caretaker government headed by Ibrahim Hashem was sworn in, only to resign in early January 1956. Thousands of demonstrators, including large numbers of students and school children had marched on the Government buildings shouting slogans denouncing the Baghdad Pact and calling for an alliance with Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Demonstrations also took place in the old city of Jerusalem and other centres.¹¹⁹

That the British initiative in the form of the Templer mission had been defeated by these disorders was apparent from the statement of Premier Samir Rifai upon taking office on January 9, 1956:

I have assumed responsibility after a period of unrest and in circumstances in which the Jordanian nation vitally needs security and a resumption of normal life. . . I wish to declare that adherence to any new Pacts is not the policy of my Government, and that we shall continue our endeavours to strengthen cooperation and consolidate our friendly and brotherly relations with Arab countries.¹²⁰

By mid-January 1956, it was abundantly clear that no government could take Jordan into the Baghdad Pact in the near future. Lebanon was confirmed in her middle of the road stand, and a major Egyptian containment action had succeeded.

¹¹⁹Keesings, 1956, p. 14646.

¹²⁰Ibid; p. 14647.

The relative parts played by Egyptian-Saudi non-diplomatic agitation and the indigenous opposition in contributing to the failure of the Templer mission have been variously assessed by expert observers.

Thus, the diplomatic correspondent of "The Times" commenting on the Jordan riots at the time of the Templer mission, stated that feelings in that country had

evidently been exacerbated by broadcasts from Cairo, the widespread use of Saudi Arabian funds to stimulate agitation, and the influence of local Communists.¹²¹

Other observers, however--such as the Cairo correspondent of the "Economist" writing after the comparatively free Jordanian elections of October 1956, as well as pro-Nasser apologist Erskine Childers in his book "The Road to Suez"--pointed out that Egyptian and Saudi non-diplomatic techniques only stimulated an already existing disposition.¹²²

As the Economist's correspondent put it:

Neither Egyptian propaganda nor Saudi Arabian money made Jordanian opinion what it is today. If Jordan had voted freely in the later days of King Abdullah, the views of the electorate would not have been markedly different from those which produced the

¹²¹ Keesing's, op.cit.; 1956, p. 14647.

An extreme variation on this theme is found in the Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, July 26, 1957, p. 9: "It was Mustafa Egyptian military attache who organized the demonstrations in Jordan following General Templer's visit in 1955, which frightened the Jordan Government away from joining the Baghdad Pact."

¹²² Childers, op.cit.; p. 143; Economist, January 12, 1957, p. 93.

present parliament. President Nasser and the Egyptian Revolution gave impetus and encouragement to the Baath Party of Abdullah Rimawi; for example, but the opinions of Rimawi pre-date both. To no small extent President Nasser learnt from the Arab nationalists, not they from him; his propaganda succeeded because it repeated and embroidered the thoughts which the Jordanians harboured already.¹²³

Erskine Childers echoes this view when he writes:

Jordan would have erupted in angry protest against Templer and the Pact even if Cairo Radio had been silent.¹²⁴

Though evidence is lacking for arriving at a more definite conclusion regarding the relative parts played by Egyptian subversive attempts and indigenous sentiment in preventing Jordan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact, it is most realistic to say that though the events in Jordan during this period were a true reflection of native sentiment which pre-dated both Nasser and the Egyptian Revolution, it was Egyptian propaganda and Saudi money which provided the catalyst for their manifestation at this juncture.

After Egypt's success in preventing the adherence of Jordan to the Baghdad Pact in late 1955, efforts to systematically reduce British influence in the country, and ensure Jordan's permanent

¹²³ Ibid; p. 93. Emphasis added.

¹²⁴ Childers, op.cit.; p. 143.

estrangement from the Baghdad Pact and incorporation into the Egyptian axis, were continued with increased vigour.¹²⁵

These attempts had only limited success, however, until late 1956--after the relatively free elections of late October 1956.

An almost wholly pro-Egyptian parliament was elected on October 21, 1956.¹²⁶ The strongest single party was the National Socialists, whose leader Suleiman Naboulsi became Premier in a coalition, seven of whose eleven ministers were members of his party.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ The nature and degree of success of these measures insofar as the military were concerned have previously been analyzed. See *Supra*, pp. 147-150, 163-167.

¹²⁶ Three parties made up the basis of Egyptian support in these elections: the Nationalist Socialist allied unequivocally to Egypt, the Arab Renaissance (Baath), and the Communists (who during the elections called themselves the National Front.) Though having nothing in common so far as internal affairs were concerned, they were united in opposition to Western influence in Jordan, in favour of the revocation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, and the termination of British financial aid. In addition, four of the independents elected supported the pro-Egyptian leftist groups. In a parliament of forty seats, twenty seats belonged to the pro-Egyptian orientation. Harris, *op.cit.*; pp. 75-78.

¹²⁷ One minister was a Baath member, one Communist, and two Independents. A national socialist, Abdul Halim Nimri, held the vital posts of Defence and Interior; a Baathist leader, Abdullah Rimawi was made Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. Lenczowski, *op.cit.*; (3rd ed.) p. 465.

The pro-Egyptian nature of the Jordanian government from then on was a foregone conclusion. During the election campaign, on October 17, Naboulsi had stated that his party's aims were to

liberate Jordan from foreign and imperialist influence--to strengthen Jordan's ties with Syria, and to strengthen the army by increasing its numbers and supplying it with arms from the other Arab states.¹²⁸

Most significantly, Naboulsi had added:

We respect Colonel Nasser and consider him the saviour of Arab interests and welfare. . . We have no confidence in Britain fulfilling her obligations to us while she sends arms to Israel.¹²⁹

The results of these elections were thus a decided victory for Egyptian interference in Jordan's internal affairs and the incorporation of Jordan into the Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian axis.

It has been pointed out that the election results in Jordan in October 1956 were--Egyptian influence notwithstanding--a true reflection of indigenous sentiment which pre-dated both Nasser and the Egyptian Revolution, but that Egyptian propaganda and Saudi money provided the catalyst for its manifestation at this juncture.¹³⁰

A case in point is the decisive effect of the nationalization by Nasser of the Suez Canal, announced on July 26th.

¹²⁸ Keesings, op.cit.; 1956, p. 15200.

¹²⁹ Ibid, p. 15200

¹³⁰ See Supra, p. 170.

The action had touched off further disorders in Jordan, in the form of a nation-wide general strike in support of Egypt's action. During this strike police had to break up Arab demonstrators in Amman attempting to storm the British Embassy.¹³¹

The nationalization was bound to influence the elections in Jordan, given the fact that the main issue in these elections was the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty.

As Rondot has put it:

The Egyptian dictator was not slow to exploit this sudden fillip to his popularity and he was able to bring decisive influence to bear on the elections in progress in Jordan; King Hussein did not dare to summon Iraqi troops to give support to the moderates, with the result that an almost wholly pro-Egyptian parliament was elected on October 21, 1956.¹³²

From October 1956 onwards the personal influence which pro-Nasser Chief of Staff Abu Nuwar exercised over King Hussein was supported by the influence which Premier Naboulsi enjoyed both in the government and in the press, and which he used in an effort to persuade Hussein to secure the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty.

¹³¹ Keesing's, op.cit.; 1956, p. 15236A.

¹³² Rondot, Pierre, The Changing Patterns of the Middle East (London: Chatto & Windus, 1961), p. 159.
An offer of military support from Nuri al-Said was not accepted for fear it might provoke the pro-Egyptian factions.
See Dearden, Ann, Jordan (London: Robert Hale, 1958), pp. 124-125.

The October 1956 elections and resulting change of government in Jordan were of crucial significance for the success of direct diplomatic pressure on Hussein, examples of which have been presented earlier.¹³³

Prior to the favourable change of government, efforts at diplomatic pressure had failed, Egypt having had to contend with the obstinancy of both King Hussein, and his Premiers.

In spite of their protestations of neutrality, the latter were known to favour continued adherence to a British treaty relationship, being skeptical of Arab promises of financial aid and wary of subjection to Syrian, Egyptian, and Saudi Arabian pressure.

They had hoped that by tactical concessions to the opposition, such as the dismissal of Glubb Pasha, they would carry favour with them, and yet avoid Egyptian-led domination by continuing to receive the British subsidy.¹³⁴

The incorporation of Jordan into the Egyptian axis took place shortly after the elections of October 1956, and shortly before the Suez crisis.

Two days after the Naboulsi government assumed office, the Jordanian army became incorporated into a joint military command

¹³³ See Supra, pp. 151-152.

¹³⁴ Shwadrán, op.cit.; p. 334.

consisting of the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, under an Egyptian commander in chief.¹³⁵

This coordination of defence planning naturally presupposed an identity of outlook in foreign policy, and Jordan's neutrality between Iraq and Egypt was finally given up in favour of Egypt.

Lebanon

Lebanon's role in the Arab system at the outset of the period, like that of Jordan, may be classified as one of neutral peace-making in the recurring quarrels of the Arab states. By and large, therefore, it did not represent an opposition to Egyptian policy objectives at this stage.¹³⁶

It was only later into 1955 that the Lebanese regime's protestations of neutrality in the Egyptian-Iraqi struggle were to be received with increasing skepticism in the circles of the emerging Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi bloc.

In Egypt's efforts to permanently ensure a favourable direction of foreign policy on the part of the Lebanese regime, primary emphasis was throughout this period based on diplomatic pressure.

¹³⁵ Middle Eastern Affairs, 1956, Vol. 7, p. 472.

¹³⁶ For examples of Lebanon's formal mediatory role at the outset of the period, see Supra, p. 84.

This method failed to achieve any significant result.

Thus, failure was the result of the Salim-Azm diplomatic mission to Beirut on March 6th.¹³⁷ There was as well a lack of success by January 1956 of Egyptian diplomatic efforts to achieve an agreement between Lebanon and Syria.

Lebanon was unwilling to admit Syrian troops to Lebanese territory in time of war. She insisted as well on verbal changes in a communique issued on March 2, 1956 at the conclusion of a visit of the Lebanese Premier to King Saud, because the first draft seemed to limit Lebanon's freedom of manoeuvre between the two competing Middle Eastern blocs.¹³⁸

Egyptian non-diplomatic activities in Lebanon during this period were as yet embryonic. It was only after the failure of the Lebanese government to break off diplomatic relations with Britain and France during the Suez crisis, and the reorientation of Lebanese foreign policy from one of neutral peace maker in the Egyptian-Iraqi quarrel to one of being the only Arab country to officially accept the Eisenhower Doctrine,¹³⁹ that Egyptian attempts to subvert the Lebanese

¹³⁷ Seale, op.cit.; p. 224.

¹³⁸ The Lebanese President was accordingly not invited to a meeting of the Heads of State of the Egyptian-directed bloc in Cairo on March 6, 1956.

¹³⁹ Announced in January 1957, Lebanese formal acceptance of this U. S. initiative took place on March 1957. The nature and significance of the Doctrine is discussed below.

government became apparent. These non-diplomatic measures, therefore, belong to a later period.

Conclusion

The diplomatic and non-diplomatic techniques employed by Egypt in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, in her efforts to further the spread of neutralism in the system during the period beginning with the Baghdad Pact's inception (February 1955) and ending with the Suez crisis (late 1956) have been extensively analyzed.

The conclusions flowing from this analysis may be summarized as follows:

Considering the system in general, there was a main emphasis on and success of diplomatic measures in Syria and Saudi Arabia. In the other states a relative lack of success of diplomatic efforts drove the Egyptian regime to emphasize and draw upon sources of indigenous opposition to the foreign policy of their governments.

Egypt's choice of extra-diplomatic methods was also influenced by the impracticality of military operations east of the Red Sea, and the high level of development of her propaganda facilities.

An analysis of Egypt's methods in each of the countries of the system reveals the following set of developments:

(1) Saudi Arabia and Syria

Egypt's main object in each of these two countries was a tripartite alliance or at least a system of bilateral treaties to act as a counterweight to the Baghdad Pact.

At the Baghdad Pact's inception Saudi Arabia had already joined an alliance with Egypt and consequently the emphasis was on diplomatic pressure applied to Syria in order to achieve a coordination of foreign policies which would not however involve comprehensive union.

Evidence of non-diplomatic techniques in both countries during this period is scant.

The strategic significance of Syria militarily and geographically, her history as the ideological centre of Arab nationalism during the twentieth century, the fact that she was surrounded at this time by governments who either favoured the Pact or were lukewarm to its opposition, were all factors calling Egypt to pay close attention to that country.

A positive incentive lay in the strong sources of support for Egypt in Syrian political life--the Baath party, the pro-Egyptian minority in the Nationalist Party, certain important army officers, such as the Chief of Staff General Shawkat Shukayr, as well as the independent leftist Minister of Foreign Affairs and acting Defence Minister Sabri al-Asali.

Egyptian diplomatic pressure on Syria was awarded by the signing of the Syrian-Egyptian Defence Pact on October 20, 1955. This agreement signified a coordination of foreign policies regardless of its military and economic ineffectiveness. It thus constituted a decisive step in the containment of the Iraqi challenge.

Close consultation on foreign affairs continued between the Egyptian and Syrian governments throughout this period, especially after the cabinet change in June 1956 resulting in the formal representation of the Baath party in the Syrian government.

(2) Iraq

Egyptian policy towards the Iraqi regime during this period aimed at realigning it away from the Baghdad Pact, or alternatively undermining or isolating it.

Egypt paid virtually no attention to diplomacy in the pursuit of these objectives, emphasizing rather subversive propaganda attacks on the Iraqi leaders, and sporadic assassination attempts.

Egypt's de-emphasis on diplomacy in the Iraqi context was influenced by her previous reversals in diplomatic discussions with the Iraqi leaders prior to the Baghdad Pact's inception--for example, at Sarsank in August 1954 and at Cairo in September 1954.

Subversive propaganda and sporadic assassination attempts were given greater emphasis than attempts at undermining the regime by establishing extensive contacts with the political parties who professed to represent the indigenous opposition to Iraqi foreign policy. This was due to the impotency of the latter, owing to the repressive measures of the regime and the internal deficiencies of the parties themselves.

Opportunities for subverting the military at this time were remote.

There existed extensive opportunities for a sustained propaganda campaign due to the unpopularity among the majority of the politically conscious in Iraq and their counterparts in other Arab countries of the regime's domestic and foreign policies.

Though Egyptian propaganda found a wide reception, it was politically ineffective as a means of undermining the regime, and it is in this light that the resort to sporadic attempts at assassination must be viewed. These subversive activities were likewise unsuccessful due to the efforts of Iraqi counter-espionage.

(3) Jordan and Lebanon

Jordan:

Egypt's use of subversive methods to contain the Baghdad Pact, were in spite of the apparent neutrality and inactivity of the Jordan

government on the Baghdad Pact issue, largely centred on Jordan during this period.

Diplomatic pressure on the Jordanian regime was limited by contrast.

Egypt's methods in Jordan comprised a whole gamut of non-diplomatic techniques including: subversion of the Jordanian military-- more particularly the provocation through the infiltration of fedayeen, of clashes between Israel and Jordan so as to create a pretext for a Syrian military presence in Jordan that would neutralize the loyal forces in the Arab Legion, and bring about military collaboration with the Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian axis, the support of those elements in the Jordanian military who sought the elimination of its British Commander in Chief and his deputy, financial support of the mainly Palestinian Jordanian National Guard; inflammatory propaganda on the radio and in the press; extensive contacts with and bribery of opposition politicians, newspapers, members of parliament, and even cabinet members.

The intensity of both diplomatic and non-diplomatic activities in Jordan was apparently a defensive reaction to a policy initiated by Britain aiming at Jordan's joining the Baghdad Pact, and the merger of the Arab Legion with the British Air Force in Iraq. Were this policy to succeed pressure could be brought to bear on either Syria or Egypt.

The primarily non-diplomatic nature of the techniques employed by Egypt in her efforts to prevent Jordan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact and secure her eventual incorporation into the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi axis was in part due to the relative lack of success of earlier diplomatic efforts, but was conditioned largely by the subversive potentialities existing in Jordan.

These were to be found in the mass of indigenous opposition to the Jordanian regime which provided the basis of support of several Jordanian political groups whose activities were to serve Egyptian interests considerably. Other prime factors of subversive potentiality were Jordan's paucity of material resources and extensive reliance on Western foreign aid both economically and militarily, the lack of appeal of Jordanian domestic policies, and the relative neglect by the Jordanian regime of significant propaganda resources.

Egyptian non-diplomatic techniques in Jordan met with consistent though qualified success.

These activities were decidedly successful in contributing to the failure of the British diplomatic offensive to urge Jordan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact. By mid-January 1956, it was clear that no government could take Jordan into the Pact in the near future.

Events in Jordan at this time were a true reflection of indigenous sentiment which pre-dated both Nasser and the Egyptian Revolution. Nevertheless, it was Egyptian propaganda and Saudi money

which provided the catalyst for their manifestation at this juncture.

The dismissal of General Glubb, British commander of the Arab Legion, had been obtained in March 1956, yet his ouster did not result in the repudiation by the Jordanian regime of the alliance with Britain.

By mid-1956, moves were begun towards increased military cooperation between the Arab Legion and Syrian and Egyptian forces--moves which were significant for the achievement of a coordination of foreign policies.

Full success in this regard was only achieved in late 1956 after the election of an almost wholly pro-Egyptian parliament. Egyptian subversive activities had acted as a catalyst to the manifestation of indigenous sentiment producing the election results.

From October 1956 onwards, the pro-Egyptian nature of the Jordanian government under Premier Naboulsi was a foregone conclusion. Successful diplomatic pressure resulted in the incorporation of Jordan into a joint military command with Egypt and Syria, under an Egyptian commander-in-chief.

This incorporation presupposed an identity of outlook in foreign policy, and hence signified a decisive victory for Egypt in Jordan.

During the period February 1955 to late 1956, Egyptian efforts to permanently ensure the Lebanese regime's non-participation in the

Baghdad Pact and incorporation into the Syrian-Egyptian-Saudi axis, were primarily diplomatic in emphasis.

These initiatives met with consistent failure.

Egyptian non-diplomatic activities in Lebanon prior to Suez were embryonic as the direction of policy of the Lebanese regime was not as yet considered a serious threat to Egyptian foreign policy objectives.

As to the general state of the system at the end of this period, vis-a-vis Egyptian foreign policy objectives, the developments may be summarized as follows:

Just prior to the Suez crisis it seemed as though Egyptian efforts at containing the Baghdad Pact had largely succeeded: The alliance with Saudi Arabia had been consolidated; the vacillating attitude of the Syrian regime had given way to a Syrian-Egyptian Defence Pact with an implied coordination of foreign policies; efforts initiated by Britain to extend the Baghdad Pact to Jordan had been thwarted and the Jordanian regime's precarious policy of neutral inactivity in the Baghdad Pact issue had given way by late 1956 to a full incorporation into the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi axis. The direction of policy of the Lebanese regime seemed at this stage to offer no danger to Egyptian objectives.

Of the states of the Arab system only Iraq--sole adherent to

the Baghdad Pact, remained firmly opposed to Egyptian foreign policy objectives. Attempts to realign the regime or alternatively to undermine or isolate it had consistently failed.

CHAPTER 6

THE EFFECTS OF THE SUEZ CRISIS ON EGYPT'S POSITION IN THE ARAB SYSTEM(A) Background to the Suez Crisis

The main problems of development which had originally driven the Egyptian regime to a preoccupation with internal affairs and derivatively to a reconciliation with the West in late 1954, still plagued Nasser throughout the period of increased external activity directed at the defensive containment of the Baghdad Pact.

These problems have already been discussed extensively¹ and the pressures emanating from the internal setting which led to Nasser's actions prior to the Suez crisis will be briefly recapitulated.

These problems involved a large population density and the extension of the cultivable acreage from its meagre three to four per cent of the total land area.

The land reform had not gone any significant way to an alleviation of this dilemma. Even if all of the land due for expropriation had been redistributed, only about eight per cent of those in need of land would have been affected.² Most significant, even if land reform had been undertaken on a much larger scale, it could not have contributed to a solution of the basic problem; that is to

¹ See Supra, Chapter I

² Lacqueur, Nasser's New Egypt, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1956), pp.14-15.



say, it could not increase productivity or area.³ In fact it would in the short run diminish rather than increase already inadequate agricultural yields.⁴

Similarly, the land reclamation projects did not substantially reduce the critical shortage of arable land and at this stage the total desert land reclaimed was negligible.⁵

Thus for a country whose population was increasing by some 2.5 per cent yearly⁶ while its resources remained relatively static, a country for which industrialization was imperative, the plan for a high dam at Aswan was nothing more nor less than a matter of life and death.

It was understandable that by late 1955 this project had become the main feature of the regime's internal development projects.

The project, when completed, would give Egypt the use of the whole of its share of the Nile waters by storing the seasonable flood. An additional eight hundred and fifty thousand hectares would be cultivable, and it would also provide ten million kilowatt hours of low cost electricity and thereby multiply thirty fold the industrial

³ Bullard, Sir Reader ed. The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey, 3rd Ed. (London: Oxford, 1958), p. 191.

⁴ Lacqueur, op.cit.; p. 14.

⁵ Wheelock, Keith, Nasser's New Egypt (London: Stevens, 1960), pp. 94-102.

⁶ Harbison, Frederick and Ibrahim, Abdel Kader Ibrahim, Human Resources for Egyptian Enterprise (New York: McGraw Hill, 1958), p. 16.

potentialities of the Nile Valley.⁷

Egypt's chronic shortage of capital, implied a large dependence on foreign aid from the Great Powers, if the High Dam Project was to succeed.

The work, which was to take ten years, was estimated to cost \$1,400 million, of which at least \$400 million would be needed in hard currency.⁸

The World Bank had been willing to advance \$200 million; the United States and Britain were ready to supply \$56 million and \$14 million respectively and ultimately to find the remainder of the foreign currency required (\$130 million).⁹

The course of events, however, lead to the withdrawal of the Aswan Dam aid offer by the West.

Worry over the interest of other riparian states, retaliation against Egypt's anti-British propaganda campaign, retaliation for Nasser's recognition of Peking, Zionist influence, the influence of southern Democrats representing the cotton growers of their states, powerful forces in congress wishing to diminish foreign aid, an imminent presidential election, all combined to produce the withdrawal of the Western offer.¹⁰

⁷ Rondot, Pierre, The Changing Patterns of the Middle East (London: Chatto & Windus, 1961), p. 154.

⁸ Ibid; p. 154.

⁹ Ibid; p. 155.

¹⁰ Ibid; pp. 155-156.

This withdrawal was received by Nasser as a slap in the face. It touched him on every sensitive nerve, poverty, the Nile Valley, neutralism, and lead to the announcement of the Suez Canal Company nationalization which in turn lead eventually to the cooperation of Britain, France and Israel in an attack on Egypt in late October 1956.¹¹

It is not the place in this paper to give much consideration to the motives and events surrounding the Suez crisis except insofar as it adds to a description and explanation of Nasser's foreign policy in the Arab system.

This policy developed as a result of the interplay between the factors pertaining to the internal and external settings, and the pre-disposition of the regime.

In discussing this development after late 1956, a convenient starting point is the reaction of the system to the three power invasion of Egypt.

¹¹In an interview with Look Magazine, published June 15, 1957, Nasser was asked why he had seized the Canal, when in ten years time it would have automatically reverted to Egypt. President Nasser answered: "When you said you would not help us build the Aswan Dam, we had to show that you cannot insult a small country and get away with it. Had we accepted the slap in the face, you would have slapped us again. Also, we needed to raise money and build the Dam ourselves. The Canal tolls were a logical source of income." Cited Asian Recorder (New Delhi: Samuel, 1957), p. 1507.

(B) Effects on the Position of Other Arab States

The weakening of the Iraqi regime was one of the most important consequences of the Suez action.

The regime had come under heavy pressure as a result of disorders during Suez, which the police had barely managed to keep in hand.¹²

The position of the regime of Nuri al-Said and that of all pro-Western Arabs in general had become increasingly vulnerable, and among the majority of the politically conscious in Iraq, the Baghdad Pact policy was increasingly unpopular.¹³

¹² Mowat, R. C. Middle East Perspective (London: Blandford Press, 1958), p. 204.

¹³ In late November 1956, disorders had occurred in Baghdad--in which sixty police and nine civilians were officially reported to have been injured--and also in other centres, particularly Nejeff and Mosul, and it was rumoured that an attempt to assassinate the Premier had been foiled. There had been numerous arrests and parliament had been suspended for one month on the same day it opened. Annual Register of World Events (London: Longmans Green & Co.), p. 307. This increasing pressure on Iraq was no doubt at the bottom of certain apparent concessions to Arab nationalist feeling by the Iraqi regime at this time. For example, though Iraqi leaders had refrained from open criticism of British policy, they later refused for a time to attend meetings of the Baghdad Pact at which Britain should be represented. Concessions were also evident in the changed nature of Iraqi statements regarding Israel at about this time. On October 7, 1956, the Iraqi Premier had suggested that the Palestine problem should be settled urgently on the basis of the U.N. proposals of 1947 whereas after the Suez attack the Iraqi Government declared that the Jews must be expelled from Palestine and the Arab refugees restored. Ibid; p. 306.

Parallel to the increasing isolation of Iraq was the wide support for Nasser during the crisis particularly among the peoples of the Arab countries.

The Anglo-French action seemed to confirm the major themes of Egyptian propaganda voiced during the previous years. It really did appear that the creation of Israel had been a Western plot for the purpose of securing a bridgehead in the Arab world from which attacks could be launched on the Arab world; that "imperialism" was not just a term of abuse to label something which Nasser opposed, but an active, evil force, seeking to suppress any manifestation of independence among the Arab nations. As Marlowe has put it:

The fact that the forces of darkness concentrated their attacks on Abdul Nasser was proof enough that Abdul Nasser was the principal champion of the children of light.¹⁴

¹⁴ Marlowe, John. Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism (London: Cresset Press, 1961), p. 140. Popular support for Nasser during the Suez crisis had been manifested some months earlier after the nationalization of the Canal had been announced on July 26th. The act of nationalization had produced a wave of enthusiasm throughout the Arab world comparable to and even greater than the enthusiasm which nearly a year before had greeted Abdul Nasser's arms deal with Czechoslovakia. A manifestation of this popular support for Egypt throughout the Arab world is presented by the popular reaction to the London Conference which opened on August 16, 1956. A one day general strike was proclaimed. From Libya to Syria shops were shuttered, business houses closed, and bazaars deserted--all but essential work came to a halt. Karanjia, R. K. Arab Dawn (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1959), p. 87. In late 1956 popular support for Nasser was manifested, for example, in Jordan, where a two-hour general strike took place in early December 1956 in protest against the policy of Nuri al-Said. This strike was made to coincide with one taking place in Egypt. Keesings Contemporary Archives (Bristol: Keesings Publications Ltd., 1956) p.15263.

The response of most Arab governments to the attack on Egypt was ambiguous in their indication of actual governmental support for Nasser.¹⁵

First, it is difficult to say just how much it was prompted by genuine conviction, and how much by internal pressure.

Second, no military support was given in spite of the August 13th proclamation by the Arab League that it would consider any attack on Egypt as an attack on the League and would give Egypt full military support.¹⁶ Of all the governmental acts of protest,

¹⁵ The Jordanian government had protested to the British and French ambassadors in Amman against the "aggressive attack" and announced that British aircraft would not be allowed to use the two R.A.F. bases in Jordan for operation against Egypt. Jordan had also broken off diplomatic relations with France.

Syria broke relations with Britain and France, and oil pipelines were demolished.

Saudi Arabia broke relations with Britain and France and stopped the flow of oil to Bahrein (a ban which was not removed until the Israeli evacuation).

Iraq refused for a time to attend Baghdad Pact meetings at which Britain would be present.

See: Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 8, January 1957, pp. 33,36,43; Bullard, op.cit.; p. 32.

Only Lebanon was non-committal and maintained diplomatic relations with both Britain and France.

Kirk, G. A. Contemporary Arab Politics: A Concise History (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 121.

¹⁶ Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 7, October 1956, p. 367.

only one, the cutting off of the flow of IPC oil through Syria, was of any consequence.¹⁷

The real state of governmental support of Egypt was revealed to be divided when at the Beirut Conference of Arab Heads of State held from November 13 to 15, 1956, President Kuwatly of Syria unsuccessfully tried to persuade Lebanon to break off diplomatic relations with Britain and France.

President Chamoun was understood to have been supported in his opposition to such a move by King Feisal of Iraq and King Saud of Saudi Arabia who had been gravely concerned by the threat to their countries' oil interests through Syria's action in blowing up the pipelines from Iraq, as well as the closing of the Suez Canal.¹⁸

¹⁷ This action, it might be added, was not done under the direction of the Syrian government, but by an army commander on his own responsibility. Seale, Patrick, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics 1945-1958 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965), p. 262.

¹⁸ Keesings, op.cit.; p. 15236.
The shadows of Saudi estrangement from Egypt were already apparent before the attack. On September 20, 1956, there had been a meeting of Saud with Feisal of Iraq which (though it was promptly followed on September 22-24, by one between the Heads of State of the Egyptian-directed bloc) was explained by observers in the Western press as being primarily concerned with means of ensuring that the Suez crisis did not interfere with the passage through the canal of oil produced in the Persian Gulf area, on which the economies of the two countries mainly depended. Ibid; p. 15166.

On the whole, the external setting provided by the inter-Arab system shortly after Suez provided opportunities, due to the popular support for Egyptian policy which had been manifested, for a policy aiming at retaining Egyptian leadership of the Arab world, and derivatively bringing all Arab countries under the neutral fold.

The significance of the Suez crisis for the emphasis which Nasser was to give to Arab nationalism is hinted at in a speech on August 12, 1956, shortly after the nationalization and the beginning of the crisis. There he said:

Then the voices in the Arab world began to say that it is not the Suez Canal, but the Arab Canal. Arab nationalism began to appear in its best form and dearest meaning. Various kinds of support began to come from Arab kings and presidents and Arab peoples. Arab nationalism began to show its existence and its truth. I read an article on Arab nationalism in a foreign newspaper, and it said, "Arab nationalism became a danger after 1952 and after the writing of the Philosophy of the Revolution." Then I thought we as Arabs must be a single nation. We must fight as for a single cause.¹⁹

However, though as far as popular support was concerned Nasser appeared to have been at the height of his career at the outset of 1957, the dissenting attitude of certain Arab governments--the growing independence of Saudi Arabia (all the more significant when one considers that for more than a decade it was the weight of Saudi Arabia thrown on the Egyptian side that had kept Iraq on the defensive

¹⁹ Cited Binder, Leonard, in Kaplan, Morton A. ed. Revolution in World Politics (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1962), p. 162. Emphasis added.

in Arab affairs²⁰) the intransigent though weakening attitude of Iraq, and the non-committal attitude of Lebanon--was to determine that a large defensive component remain in the regime's actions in the system, especially when related to the current foreign policy of the United States with its stress on the notion of a power vacuum in the area.²¹

(C) Effects on the Position of the Great Powers

It seemed to Nasser directly after the Suez action, that the United States had decided to oppose Egyptian policy in the area.

Indeed, there was a substratum of truth in this allegation. The United States government was looking for some dramatic way to show the Russians--whose influence in the Arab world after Suez appeared to be strengthening as British influence weakened--that America had not suddenly become pacifist and neutralist towards the Middle East.

²⁰ Economist, June 15, 1957

²¹ American policy will be analyzed in a subsequent section; see below. It is to be noted that the Eisenhower Doctrine per se was not to offer as great a threat of isolation as the Baghdad Pact had initially. The danger of the United States policy came from its introduction at a time of Saudi rapprochement with Iraq and a reorientation of Lebanese policy, on the one hand, and the threat of Communist satellization of Syria on the other. These elements will be analyzed.

This latter conclusion might have been erroneously drawn by the U.S.S.R. owing to America's meticulous reliance on the United Nations for the handling of the Suez crisis.²²

Though there was a brief period after Suez during which recognition of and gratitude for the American stand were voiced by Nasser, the policy statement made by President Eisenhower on January 5, 1957 and known as the Eisenhower Doctrine²³ threatened, in Nasser's view, to isolate Egypt.

The Egyptian leader was susceptible to evidence that the unreconstructed "imperialists" were seeking new ways of domination in the area.

Nasser may have listened to clever Soviet propaganda which had broadcast that the American role in the Suez crisis had been

²²Campbell, John C. Defence of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), p. 195.

²³The U.S. President proposed and sought the authorization of congress for three types of action: (1) to assist the Middle East to develop its economic strength (2) to undertake programs of military assistance, and (3) to include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international Communism. The proposed legislation [said the declaration in a later paragraph] is primarily designed to deal with the possibility of Communist aggression, direct and indirect. Lenczowski, Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962) pp. 676-677. The U.S. was to devote \$400 to 500 million over two years to a massive aid programme designed to stop political infiltration and subversion by strengthening anti-Communist elements in the several countries. Rondot, op.cit.; p. 164.

planned by the Western powers from the start, in order that the United States might deal with the Arabs in case the Suez action had failed.²⁴

President Eisenhower had proposed to assist the Arab states against "aggression from any nation controlled by international Communism" and as Cremeans has put it:

Nasser quickly concluded that this meant him, and that the Eisenhower Doctrine actually was another Baghdad Pact in a more insidious form. The American purpose, he believed, was to isolate him from the other Arab states and to bring into close relations with the United States the Arab leaders who opposed and feared him and the neutralist Arab nationalism which he symbolized.²⁵

The increasing association of the United States with the Baghdad Pact--including formal American participation in the Baghdad Pact military committee--the alleged stopping of CARE supplies to Egypt, the United States refusal to unfreeze Egyptian dollar holdings in the early part of 1957 at a time when the economic plight of the Egyptian regime was acute, the backing of a United States ship as the

²⁴Cremeans, Charles D. The Arabs and the World: Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 157.

²⁵Ibid; p. 157

The Egyptian newspaper Al Akhbar no doubt echoed Nasser's views when it wrote: "Anyone who believes that the Arab people would accept American influence or Soviet influence as a replacement for British and French influence does not realize that the Arabs are determined not to allow their countries to become a field of foreign influence, cold war or shooting war. We can be certain that any "vacuum" in the region will be filled by Arab Nationalism."
Cited Karanjia, op.cit.; p. 113.

first to traverse the Aquaba Gulf to Eilat,²⁶ were also factors which contributed to an increasing suspicion by Nasser, of United States intent and shaped a large defensive component in his subsequent policy.²⁷

The new American policy was all the more threatening in the Egyptian view because it was closely intertwined with the growing estrangement of a hitherto valuable ally-King Saud.

The Americans as they neither could nor would turn to Baghdad-- which had refused to break off relations with Britain during the Suez crisis, and still showed every inclination to put Britain first-- increasingly focused their attention on Saud. The Saudi monarch was in the eyes of the State Department an important factor in the area in view of the spiritual, geographical and economic importance of his country.²⁸

²⁶ Lenczowski, op.cit.; p. 676.

²⁷ In an interview with Look Magazine published June 15, 1957, Nasser revealed his evaluation of U.S. intentions. America, he reminded the interviewer, had let Egypt down when the country was down to one month's wheat reserve the previous winter and when she was also short of petrol. He also accused the U.S.A. of freezing Egyptian currency and refusing to sell her wheat and medicines. Referring no doubt to the Eisenhower Doctrine and to economic pressure, he said in part: "The difference between you and your allies is this: they tried to kill us with bombs; you tried to kill us by peaceful means, by economic pressure and starvation. Both efforts have failed."

Asian Recorder, op.cit.; p. 1507.

²⁸ Rondot, op.cit.; p. 165.

It is to be noted that Saudi neutrality had never acquired a pro-Soviet orientation. King Saud, in contrast to Nasser had a mortal fear of connections with the Eastern bloc. For example in 1954 he cancelled a major Polish industrial contract and in 1955, declined a Soviet offer of arms and refused to grant Russia diplomatic recognition. Lenczowski, op.cit.; p. 356 Saud was increasingly alarmed by Soviet penetration of Syria accompanied by a close political relationship developing between Syria and Egypt.

The above circumstances determined that Nasser was to spend much of 1957 resisting Western attempts to isolate him diplomatically, and he did this, as was his wont, with aggressive countertactics.

(D) Effects on Egypt's Internal Setting

The significance of the changes in the internal setting stemming from the Suez crisis for the subsequent development of Egyptian foreign policy is open to differing interpretations.

While on the one hand, the fact that for a large part of 1957, the Egyptian regime was almost cut off economically from Britain, France, and the U.S.A. and in economic difficulties, the fact that the Egyptian population suffered from high prices and shortages,²⁹ and the fact that the future of the Aswan Dam project was still obscure and internal development programs were curtailed,³⁰ presumably decreased

²⁹ This situation is evidenced by the following government measures during 1957: January--kerosene rationing was imposed, all government departments were instructed to cut expenditure by ten per cent, and the ministry of supply seized rice stocks to prevent hoarding. February--one hundred thirty-six firms were freed from sequestration to ease currency difficulties, and prison was decreed for profiteers. March--imports were cut, and all credits for non-essentials were cancelled. April--further control of imports.

Annual Register, op.cit.; p. 308.

³⁰ The severe economic crisis after 1956 crippled the Ten Year Plan which was to complement the High Dam, and to effect the partial industrialization of Egypt. Bullard, op.cit.; p. 210; Partner, Peter A Short Political Guide to the Arab World (London: Pall Mall Press, 1960), p. 64.

the domestic popularity of the regime, this conclusion must be qualified by two major considerations:

First, one must not fall into the general Western error of taking only material factors into account when assessing the attitude of the Eastern masses towards their governments.³¹

As Lacouture has put it

They are a bit hungrier, therefore. . .the argument runs. But we ought to pay more attention to the longing for dignity and the horror of being humiliated which have haunted Egyptians, Tunisians or Persians for so many generations.

Maybe they are a little hungrier than before. Maybe they are not altogether pleased with the present state of things, yet we must not forget that their judgment may be affected by other factors than hunger.³²

Nasser's translation of a military defeat into a diplomatic victory, which was translated through propaganda techniques to all segments of the population, had created a great fund of popular enthusiasm in spite of economic hardships.

The second qualification is that the type of material yardstick used above does not even hold on its own merits, for part of the economic measures undertaken by the regime shortly after Suez--a series of

³¹ Just as it is an inherent part of the paradox of Suez that Egypt did not have those properties which the west calls power: military strength, economic productivity and accepted international prestige. There was a decided prominence of psychological factors--notably popular enthusiasm--over material ones.

³² Lacouture, Jean Egypt in Transition (London: Methuen, 1958), p. 494.

"Egyptianization" laws decreed on January 15, 1957--benefited the small middle class and industrialists and for the first time since the regime came to power firm support began to be elicited for Nasser from these classes.³³

The poor showing of the military was largely masked from the public or explained away, and did not constitute a threat to the security of the regime.

The attack, due to the immediacy of the threat from an erst-while enemy, had led to a consolidation of support for the regime augmented by the subsequent diplomatic victory.³⁴

³³ The nature of these "Egyptianization" laws and their consequences for the security of tenure of the Egyptian regime have previously been analyzed, in the discussion of security of tenure as a non-material political resource.

See Supra, pp. 40-41.

³⁴ Even segments of the population such as the peasantry who had remained indifferent to the regime until the Agrarian Reform was well underway, who were largely unaware of the crucial foreign policy issues, became increasingly active supporters of the regime in view of the immediate relevance of the crisis. For some classes the support was augmented by economic advantages accruing from the subsequent Egyptianization measures and expulsion of foreigners and minority groups. These considerations overshadowed the significance of the economic crisis, which to three quarters of Egypt's population did not make much of a difference anyway. As Morroe Berger has pointed out, the low level of living in the Arab countries is one of the factors which enabled Arab leaders to pursue political goals with little regard for immediate economic consequences. Berger, Morroe, The Arab World Today (New York: Doubleday, 1962), p.331. The effect of the Suez crisis on the security of tenure of the Egyptian regime has been discussed as well in Chapter 2. See Supra, pp. 40-42.

One could therefore say, that unlike the earlier phase (pre-Suez) of Egyptian foreign policy when Nasser was under greater personal pressure in the domestic sphere, the regime had greatly consolidated its internal position as a result of these external events, with all that this implies for capability for a more vigorous role in the inter-Arab system.³⁵

³⁵ Though Nasser was perhaps slightly less popular at home during this period than he was among the majority of the Arab masses in other countries, primarily due to the economic crisis.

CHAPTER 7EGYPTIAN POLICY IN THE ARAB SYSTEM FROM SUEZ UNTIL MID - 1957

The introduction by the United States of the Eisenhower Doctrine, American support of King Saud of Saudi Arabia as a foremost protagonist of the doctrine, the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the reorientation of Lebanese foreign policy from that of impartial mediator to supporter of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the reversal of the pro-Egyptian trend in Jordan in April 1957, were the main elements in a process of isolation which threatened Egyptian foreign policy objectives in the Arab system from late 1956 to mid-1957.

Thus, while in November 1956, Nasser seemed to have most of the Arab world on his side, within six months the situation, as the isolation process crystallized, was to change considerably.

It is this isolation process which determines that approximately six months after Suez constitutes a distinct period in Egyptian foreign policy in the Arab system.

From the point of view of the general nature of Egyptian objectives, however, this period was of a part with the previous period.

These aims still included: the retention of Egyptian leadership by bringing all the Arab countries into a neutral fold so as to replace the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine with a regional alliance centred on Cairo after the liquidation of all foreign spheres of influence-- economic as well as political, in Arab areas.

The basic notion was that neutralism and the insulation of the system from outside interference lead ultimately to unity, and derivatively to Egyptian primacy.¹

It still remained true, that Arab unity insofar as it was a policy objective during this period meant unity in the sense of political solidarity, military coordination, and revolutionary progress, as opposed to concrete political forms and unity of government.

The qualified nature of Egyptian pan-Arabism during the period under consideration is revealed in an interview which Nasser gave to R. K. Karanjia on March 23, 1957 on the occasion of the unexpected arrival in Cairo of a Syrian mission sent to negotiate for a federal union. He expressed his view as follows:

I am not thinking in terms of any federation or confederation or such constitutional formulae for the present. They will not help our cause so much as unity of thought and faith in Arab nationalism will. In fact, such constitutional frames can only create antagonisms to the Arab ideal and become weapons in the hands of our enemies to sabotage the ideal. Any study of history will convince you

¹ As Anwar es Sadat, a close adviser of Nasser and member of the Revolutionary Command Council, put it in his book, Al-Wahda al Arabiya (Arab Unity) published in 1957 in Cairo, "the axis of our Arab struggle is positive neutralism, for East is East and West is West--Kipling was right."

how paramount Arab nationalism and the unity forged by its shining flames is to every Arab people. I feel that once foreign influences are removed, Arab unity will follow automatically. All Arab peoples from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf today stand united against the aggressor. That is more important to me than any plans of confederation or federation.²

During this same interview, when asked whether he envisaged a union similar to the United States or U.S.S.R., for a common homeland stretching from Algeria to South Asia, Nasser replied:

I'm afraid I have not thought about any such federal or confederal arrangement. I should prefer organizations like the Arab League, for instance--to become strong and formidable links between Arab states.³

The aggressive countertactics--both diplomatic and non-diplomatic techniques--which the Egyptian regime employed in resisting the isolation process, will now be considered in detail.

²Cited in Torrey, Gordon H. Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964), p. 332. Emphasis added. Karanjia, R. K. Blitz News, March 23, 1957, pp. 10-11.

³Ibid.
Hesitance to accept unity with Syria during this period is an example of Nasser's reluctance to take advantage of opportunities which he thought would advance Arab unity too fast, exposing it to its enemies or creating unsound institutions. The sharp differences between Egypt's military and authoritarian regime and the forms of Syrian "democracy" (be it somewhat imperfect) with a parliament, parties, and a free press, would have, in addition to creating new antagonisms, invited embarrassing comparisons in a union in which both elements were left intact.
Lenczowski, George, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 524.

A. Diplomatic Measures

(1) General Observations

Though of limited effect, diplomatic pressure figured prominently during late 1956 to mid-1957 among Egyptian foreign policy techniques.⁴

The meagre result of this diplomatic pressure was due to the combined effect of the economic repercussions of the sabotaging of the Suez Canal,⁵ Egyptian interference in internal affairs of other Arab states,⁶ and the introduction of the Eisenhower Doctrine by the United States at a time when a reorientation of Saudi policy was taking place.⁷

⁴More particularly early 1957.

⁵There had been no consultation with Saudi Arabia in undertaking measures which endangered Saudi financial stability. Economist, June 15, 1957. Lack of consultation with Iraq on these matters was under the circumstances understandable.

⁶This interference in internal affairs will be analyzed in a subsequent section. See below, ~~Chapters 8-9~~ The importance of Egypt's non-diplomatic measures in contributing to a reorientation of Saudi, Jordanian, and Lebanese policy was stressed in an analysis of this period in the Economist, which held in part: "The architect of the Pact's (Baghdad Pact) restoration to balance is President Nasser, who by excessive meddling in the affairs of his allies has driven them to turn away and consort with his adversaries. . . The disintegration of Nasser's policy in the Middle East is due to the methods he used; not to the purposes he pursued." Economist June 15, 1957, p. 957. Non-diplomatic measures during this period, therefore acted as a feedback to limit the success of Egyptian measures in the diplomatic sphere.

⁷This reorientation of Saudi policy has previously been considered as it had begun in late 1956. See Supra, p.193. During the early half of 1957, Saudi Arabia improved relations with Iraq. State visits were exchanged, trade and cultural agreements concluded and Iraq was even invited to send a military mission to Saudi Arabia. Other important consequences (to be analyzed) of Saudi realignment, for Egyptian foreign policy during this period were: Saudi support of the Eisenhower Doctrine, encouragement to President Chamoun of Lebanon to openly resist Egypt, and the extension of support to King Hussein against the attempted pro-Egyptian coup of April 1957. Lenczowski, op.cit.; pp.467-468.

Nasser's aggressive countertactics were in spite of early diplomatic efforts, largely subversive, in a situation in which the masses were behind Egypt irrespective of the attitude of their governments, with the sole exception of Lebanon where one faction supported the Egyptian-Syrian bloc and the other opposed it.

As Fahim I. Qubain has put it:

To the Arab masses, Nasser's victories were personal, with which they identified themselves as individuals. This, together with the real reforms Nasser carried out in Egypt, his simple personal life, his uncanny ability to fathom the feelings and thoughts of the masses and verbalize them, made him the idol of the Arab masses everywhere.

The loyalty of a large majority of the Arab masses and of a large segment of the intelligentsia enabled Nasser to take actions which directly or indirectly affected the Arab states without adequate consultation or approval of the respective heads of states. . .⁸

The nature of the diplomatic measures employed by the Egyptian regime from late 1956 to mid-1957, the reasons for the choice of these measures, the extent of their success, and the reasons therefore, will now be analyzed.

In the subsequent section the non-diplomatic techniques will likewise be analyzed.

⁸ Qubain, Fahim I. Crisis in Lebanon (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1961), p. 40.

(2) Specific Measures

As a counter to the announcement by President Eisenhower of the Eisenhower Doctrine on January 5, 1957, Nasser called a conference in Cairo during January 18-19 attended by himself, King Saud, King Hussein, and Premiers Assali of Syria and Naboulsi of Jordan.⁹

The conference took place in the shadow of Saud's approaching visit to the United States.

A second major conference was initiated by Nasser in Cairo during February 25-27, 1957 after King Saud's return from Washington. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria were represented.¹⁰

That the first major conference initiated by Nasser during this period primarily aimed at forestalling any American-sponsored isolation attempt which might arise out of King Saud's visit to the United States is revealed in the contents of a statement issued on January 19th by the Egyptian Information Department, regarding the discussions of the new Eisenhower Doctrine: The statement read in part:

Each country expressed its views and they all agreed to reject the "vacuum theory" and decided that Arab nationalism was the sole basis on which Arab policy could be formulated.

⁹Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 8, 1957, p. 124.

¹⁰Ibid; p. 166.

They also resolved never to allow their countries to become spheres of influence for any foreign power and they unanimously agreed that King Saud should express this opinion to Washington.¹¹

The conference was also part of Egyptian pressure on Jordan to secure the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty.

The second conference was called in an urgent effort to oppose attempts by Saud to convass the doctrine after his return from Washington.

During his visit, Saud had met with Iraqui Crown Prince Abdul Ilah--a meeting which was generally regarded as a symbol of Iraqui-Saudi rapprochement, and with Dr. Charles Malik, the pro-Western Lebanese Foreign Minister.¹²

Though Saud did not yet feel at this juncture that he could openly oppose and attack Nasser, it seems that he had left the United States two definite commitments--both of which were in opposition to Egyptian objectives: not to work with Nasser to bring down King Hussein of Jordan, and to develop closer relations with Iraq.¹³

One could already at this time see the bare outlines of an anti-Nasser informal bloc--a sort of "King's Alliance."

¹¹ Asian Recorder 1957 (New Delhi), p. 1259.

¹² Childers, Erskine, The Road to Suez: A Study of Western-Arab Relations (London: McGibbon & Kee, 1962), p. 313.

¹³ Shwadran, Benjamin, Jordan: A State of Tension (New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1959), p. 346.

The communique on the first conference in January cited above,¹⁴ as was the case with subsequent communiqués, masked the underlying difficulties which Nasser faced in the diplomatic sphere due to the Saudi reorientation of policy--difficulties which were to culminate in the rallying of Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia--and after April 1957, Jordan--against him.

At about the same time as this first conference, the Saudi reorientation had led to Egypt's first diplomatic setback since Suez, in connection with freedom of navigation through the Gulf of Aquaba.

The eastern shore at the entrance to the Gulf of Aquaba was Saudi territory and any effective blockade would involve joint action by Egyptian and Saudi forces. King Saud was not inclined, however, to cooperate in carrying out any blockade.¹⁵

There was one aspect of the first conference, however, the attempt at effecting an elimination of British influence from Jordan, which was highly successful.

The receptivity of the Jordanian Government to the Egyptian initiative had already been assured by the success of previous Egyptian activities in Jordan¹⁶ though this receptivity was questionable as far as the King was concerned.

¹⁴See Supra, pp. 208-209.

¹⁵Marlowe, John Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism (London: Cresset Press, 1961) pp. 147-8.

¹⁶Outlined above, see Supra Chapter 5.

On January 19, in Cairo, newsmen asked Jordanian Premier Naboulsi whether Jordan was prepared to accept a replacement of British aid, by an American subsidy. Naboulsi's response indicated the success of Egyptian efforts. He said:

It is not a question of replacing a subsidy by a subsidy. We do not want it from a foreign source. It would then be a question of exchanging one master for another. . .when we found the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty was not in our interests, we searched for an alternative, which could only come from the Arabs. When the Arab countries defend Jordan they are defending the Arab world. We cannot accept military aid from any foreign power as our policy is a policy of independence.¹⁷

A convention of Arab Solidarity was signed on January 19, 1957 to run for some ten years.

The salient features of the convention was an agreement on the part of Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to pay a sum of twelve million Egyptian pounds or their countervalue. The respective shares of the annual subsidy were decided on as being: Syria, two and one half million pounds; Egypt, five million; Saudi Arabia, five million.

The Jordanian Government undertook, on the other hand, to buy all the necessities for the armed forces in the countries of the signatories (which in effect meant Egypt) to the extent that their production would be possible, and to keep a special account for Jordan's own contributions to "Arab obligation."

¹⁷Asian Recorder, op.cit.; p. 1259.

This agreement was meant to replace the annual British subsidy.¹⁸

The second conference failed to dissuade King Saud from canvassing the Eisenhower doctrine.

The Egyptian stand was supported by the Jordanian Premier Naboulsi who threatened to resign if King Hussein went against the wishes of the largely pro-Egyptian Jordanian Parliament; Syria also supported the Egyptian opposition.¹⁹

The intransigence of King Saud, however, was reflected in an interview which he gave to the Lebanese Ambassador to Cairo on February 26, 1957, during the conference, in which he said in part:

A cours de la réunion d'aujourd'hui (entre le roi Seoud, Nasser, le roi Hussein, et Chucrif Kuwatli) certains des présents [including no doubt Nasser] ont voulu faire état dans la déclaration commune qui doit paraître demain, de notre accord unanime sur la politique étrangère. J'y ai opposé mon refus formel, leur disant: Mes frères, nos routes sont différents, vous allez vers l'Orient et je me dirige vers l'Occident; j'ai donné ma parole a l'Amerique et je ne reviendrai pas sur cette promesse 20

¹⁸ Chamoun, Camille Crise au Moyen Orient (Paris: Gallimard, 1963), p. 327-329. It is to be noted that the diplomatic pressure on the part of Nasser to secure the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty was not confined to the conference proper. In private discussions shortly after with the Jordanian ambassador to Cairo, Nasser directed him to tell Hussein that if ever Saudi Arabia and Syria were late in their payments Egypt was ready to pay alone the entire sum promised to Jordan. According to Chamoun, the knowledge of this offer worried both Hussein and Saud as they suspected the Soviet Union as being behind it. Ibid.

¹⁹ Karanjia, R. K. Arab Dawn (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1959), p. 114-115.

²⁰ Cited Chamoun, op.cit.; p. 357.

The final communique issued at the end of the second conference was indicative of the necessity of compromise to mask differences between the Eastern-oriented tendencies of Egypt and Syria, (as well as of the Jordan Prime Minister) and the pro-American tendency of Hussein and Saud.

The wording of the final communique was in part as follows:

The Arab countries represented at the conference reaffirm their determination to protect the Arab world from the harm of the "Cold War" and to abide by the policy of "positive neutrality" thus preserving its real national interests. They also affirm that the defence of the Arab world should emanate from the Arab nations. . . outside the scope of foreign pacts.²¹

However, what was meant by "positive neutrality" in the context of Egyptian diplomatic failures, was described by one astute observer as follows:

The "positive neutrality" formula gives each of the four states a carte blanche to assume a friendly attitude towards any Eastern or Western country without this becoming a cause for dissension, and without incurring the condemnations meted out so generously in the past.²²

In general during this period, primary emphasis was placed by Egypt on extensions of diplomacy, such as propaganda and subversion, as it became clear that the actual state of concord between Arab governments was far different from that suggested by the communiques of the various conferences initiated by Nasser in 1957.

²¹ Keesings Contemporary Archives (Bristol: Keesings Publications Ltd.) 1957, p. 15504.

²² Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, March 15, 1957, p. 12.

These conferences did little to mask the differences between Egypt and Syria on the one hand, and the conservative pro-Western states of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Lebanon, on the other--states which were to be joined in April, 1957, by a Jordan cleansed of its pro-Egyptian government.

B. Extensions of Diplomacy

(1) Iraq

The main instrument of Nasser's campaign against Iraq, apart from the earlier diplomatic efforts at preventing a reorientation of Saudi policy towards the Baghdad Regime, consisted of a ceaseless propaganda barrage designed to isolate the regime still further from the majority of the politically articulate segments of the Arab populations

As an example of this campaign, one might cite a statement broadcast over Cairo Radio on December 20, 1956 by the Director of the Egyptian Information Office, Colonel Abdel Kadar Hatem, accusing the Iraqi Premier of concluding the Baghdad Pact because he wanted "to turn all the Arab States into British colonies and to make them part of the British sphere of influence."²³

²³ Cited Asian Recorder, op!cit.; 1957, p. 1232.

(During the weeks of the Suez crisis, domestic difficulties had led Nasser to leave the care of this propaganda campaign to the Syrian regime.)

Egyptian propaganda played skillfully on appropriate themes in the foreign policy sphere. The Iraqi regime was depicted as having delivered Iraqi oil to Israel during the Suez crisis, as collaborating with Israel and Turkey against the Syrian regime, and as collaborating with Britain and Israel in a partition plot in Jordan.

It was stressed that Turkey, a friend of Israel, and an ally of Iraq, had contributed three hundred soldiers to British-French-Israeli "aggression" against Egypt.

It was further alleged that the regime had permitted British and French air crews to use the airport at Habbiniyah.

Iraq was depicted as an imperialist base destined to be used against the movement towards Arab independence.²⁴

Ample scope was given as well to an exploitation of themes on the domestic conditions in Iraq: Publicity was given to the closure of universities, schools, and mosques; arbitrary arrests, mass deportations; executions, and in general crimes of all sorts "equal to those committed by France and Great Britain at Port Said."

²⁴Orient No. 2 April 1957, pp. 185-207: "Rivalites et luttes d'influence dans le Moyen Orient:- Diatribes de la Presse et de la Radio Syriennes et Egyptiennes contre le premier ministre d'Irak."

Hope was constantly voiced that an end would soon be dealt to the oppression of Nuri al-Said.²⁵

Subversive activities apart from the propaganda campaign were sporadic. Active Egyptian agents organized demonstrations against the Iraqi Government in all the principal cities. Propaganda posters were distributed, and bombs were thrown at the British and Lebanese Embassies.²⁶

The reasons why a subversive campaign against the Iraqi regime commenced itself at this time, will first be analyzed, followed by a commentary on the types of techniques employed.

The nature of the effects of the Suez action on the capability of the Iraqi regime has already been outlined.²⁷ While it is true, however, that the tide of popular Nasserism in Iraq had probably by now made it impossible for Premier Nuri and even the regime to stand without Western support, this support showed no signs of abating in early 1957.

The United States gave greater support to the Baghdad Pact and became a full member of its military committee.²⁸

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, July 26, 1957, p. 8.

²⁷ See Supra

²⁸ As a result of the approval expressed by the Iraqi Government of the Eisenhower Doctrine, and of the United States mission to Baghdad early in April 1957, Iraqi capability was to be enhanced by some direct military and economic aid.

Gallman, Waldemar I. Iraq under General Nuri 1954-1958 (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 80.

That a large defensive component in Egyptian policy vis-a-vis Iraq still remained, and attempts at the subversion of the Iraqi regime still commended themselves, was largely due to continuing Western support of the Iraqi regime, the fear that Britain and the United States were behind such plans, and the rapprochement of Iraq with Saudi Arabia.

As regards the Iraqi threat to Nasser's alliance with Syria, for some time after Suez, the Iraqi Premier was working closely and secretly with President Chamoun of Lebanon, and with Prime Minister McMillan and Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd of Britain, to secure the downfall of the Syrian regime.²⁹

His purpose was to isolate Nasser through a coalition between Iraq, Jordan--rid of its nationalist cabinet; Lebanon--firmly in pro-Western hands; and Syria--cleansed of its nationalist and neutralist government.³⁰

²⁹ Childers, op.cit.; p. 325.

³⁰ Ibid. An earlier plot had been revealed by the Syrian government on December 1956. This Iraqi plot involved leading members of the Popular party which traditionally supported a policy of friendship with Iraq against the National Bloc and Baath line of orientation towards Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This discovery had greatly weakened the Popular party and led to the reconstitution of the Government on lines which confirmed and intensified the pro-Soviet and pro-Egyptian orientation of Syrian policy. Torrey, op.cit.; pp. 323-9.

Further since 1954 Iraq had given much support in funds and arms to the PPS in Lebanon with whom it shared the following aims: the overthrow of the Syrian regime, and the prevention of a union between Egypt and Syria. Qubain, op.cit.; p. 84.

In addition, there were constant attempts by Iraq to get the great land-owners of Northern Syria to carry out a coup d'etat in Iraq's favour. Partner, Peter A Short Political Guide to the Arab World (London: Pall Mall Press, 1960), p. 81.

That Iraqi intervention in Syria was a distinct possibility during the period under consideration is revealed by Ambassador Gallman in the following report:

On February 13 [1957] he [Nuri] put it bluntly to me. If the green light were given him by us and the British he could "clean up" the situation quickly and effectively.

Gallman quotes Nuri as saying:

This would not be aggression for we are all brothers. We Iraqis would simply be liberating friendly and responsible elements in Syria.³¹

Iraqi policy in Jordan during this period likewise presented a threat to Egyptian foreign policy objectives and determined that a largely defensive attitude was to prevail towards the Iraqi regime.

In Jordan, Iraq's policy was a consistent striving for union in spite of the realization that she would be assuming heavy financial burdens were a union effected.

There was continuous royal consultation and there still existed strong political elements in Jordan who wanted to cooperate with the British policy of regarding Jordan as an outpost of Iraq, and join the Baghdad Pact on condition that sufficient guarantees were given against Israel and that economic contributions be made to Jordan's own defence system.³²

³¹Gallman, op.cit.; pp. 163-164.

³²Ibid.

These elements were opposed to a commitment to Egypt because they regarded the oil revenues of Iraq as the one potential source of assistance that could reduce the country's dependence on Britain.³³

No less dangerous to Egyptian policy objectives during this period were the Iraqi regime's plans for Saudi Arabia.

Ambassador Gallman quotes Nuri as describing these intentions as follows:

I want to break up the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi joint command. That can only be done gradually. Getting Saudi Arabia into a more or less formal pro-Eisenhower Doctrine alignment would help in that direction.³⁴

As to the type of subversion, the analysis of the weaknesses of the urban civilian political opposition groupings in Iraq, presented earlier in this paper, still held true during this period.³⁵ The regime consequently could not be undermined through forming extensive relations with the urban civilian opposition.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 153. Tangible evidence was abundant by May 1957, of the closer relations between Baghdad and Riyadh. During Saud's May visit, for example, air and trade agreements were initiated, views on oil policy were exchanged, and agreement was reached on cooperation in the field of education and aid to Jordan.

Saud's suspicion of the Baghdad Pact during this period appeared to have been eliminated. From being a loyal follower of Egypt he set himself up as a pro-Western protagonist. Lenczowski, op.cit.; p. 568.

³⁵ See Supra pp. 114-115.

Though by 1957 the ban on political parties had been lifted, practically speaking the continued repressive measures of the government prevented a significant political opposition.

Military opposition had developed to the point, in 1957, where a compact group within the army was waiting for a strategic opportunity to strike, though what relation Egypt had to this group is not certain.³⁶

Under these circumstances, a policy of emphasizing propaganda attacks on the Iraqi regime to isolate it still further from the Iraqi people and create the psychological atmosphere essential to the success of a take-over attempt by the only group in Iraqi society able to effect a coup--namely the army--readily commended itself.

As an attraction to such a policy there was the record of the reaction of the Iraqi masses to the Suez attack, and the difficulties which it had created for the Iraqi regime in spite of repressive measures.³⁷

³⁶It is now known that a Free Officer's movement, deeply impressed with the example of Egypt, was developing in the Iraqi army during the years 1953-1955. By 1957, it had emerged as an integrated, secret organization. See Jargy, Simon Une page d'histoire de la revolution iraquienne, Orient, No. 12, 1959, pp. 85-86.

³⁷See Supra pp. 190-191.

The practicality of a sustained propaganda campaign in relation to an increase of Western support for the Iraqi regime was no doubt well understood by the Egyptian elite. It was through such a campaign that the potential long range weakness inherent in the Iraqi regime--that as the government drew closer to the West and as Western support for the regime increased, the gap widened between the regime and the majority of the politically articulate segments of the population, thus necessitating still greater support and resulting in a further estrangement--might be most effectively played upon.

Ionedes, Michael Divide and Lose: The Arab Revolt of 1955-1958 (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1960), p. 243.

The internal security measures taken by the regime of Nuri al-Said have already been analyzed,³⁸ and the relative impotence of the civilian opposition has been explained.³⁹

However, notwithstanding the impossibility of the civilian opposition bringing about political change, there was widespread dissatisfaction with the regime.⁴⁰

Egyptian propaganda techniques were, under these circumstances, to constitute an important factor in the stimulation of the psychological conditions essential to the eventual success of the conspiracy within the army.

During the period under consideration, however, the effect of subversive propaganda on the security of tenure of the Iraqi regime was not yet crucial, due to the repressive measures of the regime,⁴¹ the continuing Western support which it received, and the absence of strategic opportunity essential to a military coup.

Egyptian subversive activities in Iraq, apart from the propaganda campaign, were sporadic and generally inconsequential.

³⁸ See Supra Chapter III.

³⁹ See Supra, Ibid.

⁴⁰ The nature and causes of this dissatisfaction have previously been outlined. The grounds of the grievances were both internal and external. See Supra, Ibid.

⁴¹ The repressive measures included an extensive system of informers in all spheres of life. These spies were said to number about twenty-four thousand. Caractacus, Revolution in Iraq (London: Gollancz, 1959) p. 52.

These activities did not escape the watchful eye of the government. For example, on January 1957 Colonel Ahmed Azem, the Syrian military attache and agent of the combined Egyptian-Syrian General Intelligence in Iraq, was summarily expelled.⁴²

(2) Jordan

There is ample proof that the Egyptian regime employed an extensive array of subversive techniques in Jordan during the period post Suez-mid 1957, in order to bring about the elimination of the monarchy.

The nature of these attempts, which culminated in an attempted military coup, the failure of which, in April 1957, reversed the pro-Egyptian trend of the previous months, and reinforced the growing isolation of the Egyptian--will now be analyzed.

A description of the elaborate lengths to which Nasser's efforts in this regard extended is presented in a statement by Hussein in the newspaper Al Urdun and a Government Radio broadcast of May 11, 1957 after the failure of the coup.

It is convincing in its detail and will be quoted here in part:

⁴² Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, July 26, 1957, p. 8.

Egypt's policy was based on the annihilation of the two Hashemite thrones and the Saudi and Libyan thrones. . . In October 1956, a political military committee was set up [by Egypt] to implement this policy. . . the duties of this committee were: (1) to strengthen relations between the Baath and the Communist parties in Jordan and Syria and to incite them to overthrow the monarchies in Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. . . (3) to establish a Baathist-Communist regime and a Revolutionary Command Council in Jordan. . . .

A few days before the Zerqua events part of the attempted coup an Egyptian officer arrived in Amman and handed to General Nuwar [King Hussein's chief aide de camp and Chief of Staff whose Nasserist connections have previously been discussed] a large sum of money through the Egyptian military attache in return for assassinating King Hussein. . . .

During the first week of April, Soviet agents prepared plans for an armed intervention in Jordan by Syrian military units, supported by MIG aircraft bearing the Syrian emblem and piloted by Russian officers. . . .⁴³

Whether Hussein's description of Egyptian interference is accurate or not, the extent of Egyptian subversion of the Jordanian army during this period may be gathered from evidence provided by John Glubb, British former chief of staff of the Arab Legion expelled in March, 1956--that the fourteen officers arrested after Hussein's coup in April 1957 had all been in strategic commanding positions and had each been

⁴³ Cited Keesings, op.cit.; 1957, p. 15564.

secretly receiving from Egypt a monthly salary ten times as great as his army pay.

In addition, extra funds were available for use in political propaganda within the army and in persuading other officers to join in the intended revolution.⁴⁴

In the propaganda field, the Egyptian radio and press campaign to undermine the monarchy during this period was particularly intense.

Its intensity is reflected in the following criticism by Hussein shortly after his coup in April 1957.

He reproached the Egyptian press and radio for spreading "propaganda and fabricated stories against me and Jordan."

He added:

I believed that obligations of friendship would at least have prevented our brothers in Egypt from provoking the Jordanian people in broadcasts and newspapers and from attacking me, who devoted my blood to Egypt during its crisis.

⁴⁴Glubb, Sir John Bagot, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hadder and Stoughton, 1957), p. 434.

The main instruments of Egyptian subversion in the army during this period were five Baathist officers who engineered the expulsion of the Army's British officers a year before and who had now obtained key posts--the Chief of Staff, Aly Abu Nuwar being their front-man. The five chief officers and their posts were as follows: (All had the backing of the Egyptian Embassy.) Shaher Youssef, Commander of the Third Infantry Brigade; Mahmoud Maeyta, Commander of the Artillery Brigade; Turki Hindawi, Commander of the Tank Regiment; Ahmed Zarour, General Staff Officer of the Army's only division; Mazen Ajlouni, Chief Aide de Camp to King Hussein.

Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, March 22, 1957, p. 6.

After denouncing,

those Egyptian tongues and pens which attack us, try to instigate part of our nation against us, distort the real situation in our country and send into the atmosphere propaganda and rumours full of lies [a reference to the Voice of the Arabs],

the King declared that he would not allow any outside interference in Jordan's internal affairs.⁴⁵

Examples of Egyptian influence over the Naboulsi cabinet have already been alluded to. A patent example is the fact that when in April 1957 the King asked the cabinet to resign, the government received a telegram from Nasser asking them not to do so.⁴⁶

These elaborate Egyptian efforts to isolate and eliminate the monarchy, culminated in the attempted army revolt of April 1957.⁴⁷

⁴⁵Cited Keesings, op.cit.; April 25, 1957, p. 15563.

An indication of the extent and intensity of Egyptian propaganda activities in Jordan during this period is the fact that on April 27, 1957 King Hussein saw it necessary to close down all offices in Jordan of the Egyptian-controlled and owned Middle East News Agency, and to expel all Egyptian journalists from Jordan. Ibid; p. 15564.

The importance of Egyptian propaganda had also been emphasized when Premier Khalidi, on April 22nd, appealed to the Arab press and broadcasting stations in the Arab world to be cautious in their writings, comments, and broadcasts, until things take their normal course. Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 8, June-July 1957, p. 264.

⁴⁶Shwadran, op.cit.; p. 348.

⁴⁷The attempted Jordanian army revolt may conveniently be considered in three phases--two military and one political. At all three levels there was striking evidence of Egyptian participation. Stage one--on April 7, the plotters made their first attempt to depose the King by surrounding the royal palace with tanks. This attempt failed. Stage two--on April 13, a renewed attempt was made at the army camp at Zerqua, twenty miles north of Amman. Lenczowski, op.cit.; p. 468. Egyptian knowledge of and participation in this second attempt has been aptly described by Chamoun as follows:

On one interpretation of the Egyptian regime's motives for attempting the undermining of the Jordanian monarchy during this period, the subversive attempts may be seen as arising from the enticement provided by the success in October 1956 in obtaining a pro-Egyptian cabinet and a heavy pro-Egyptian majority in the Jordanian Parliament.

Yet the pro-Egyptian trend since Suez had for the moment satisfied Egyptian objectives in Jordan, of a unity of foreign policy based on positive neutrality, and the elimination of the monarchy was not a logical next objective.⁴⁸

47(cont'd) Durant cette journee decisive l'attache militaire Egyptien a Amman et l'Etat Major Syrien a Damas avaient ete en communication avec ali Abou Nuwar et attenaient le developpement de la crise. Chamoun, op.cit.; p. 331.

Stage three--After Premier Nabulsi had been dismissed, Abu Nuwar had fled, and the control of the army regained, Hussein asked middle of the road independent Hussein Fakhri Khalidi to form a cabinet, and ironically with Nabulsi as foreign minister. This cabinet, in spite of Nabulsi's presence in it was attacked by the Egyptian sponsored opposition who demanded its resignation, its replacement by a "popular front" cabinet, the repudiation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the expulsion of the American ambassador and his military attache. A wave of strikes and street riots were staged in support of these demands. See Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 8, 1957, pp. 280-282.

⁴⁸The pro-Egyptian trend in Jordan since Suez may be gauged from the following: In late 1956, the Nabulsi Government had begun an extensive purge, pro-Egyptian and anti-Iraqi in orientation, among government employees and officers in the Jordan army. Among the high-ranking officials who were summarily dismissed from office were Isham Hashem, head of the Foreign Ministry; Hassan Kateb, Governor of Jerusalem and the Holy Places; the Chiefs of the Ministry of the Interior and of the Ministry for Municipal Affairs; and the Manager of the Jordan Development Board, Ibrahim Kiebiny. The victims of this purge had been suspected of favouring closer union with Iraq. Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, December 14, 1956, p. 3. The Jordanian government had in January 1957 issued statements denouncing

It is in the potential danger which King Hussein represented to Egyptian policy aims in Jordan during this period, that a clearer answer to the question "why was the elimination of the monarchy attempted during this period?" must be sought.

It is to be noted that much of the previous pro-Egyptian trend had been due to indirect pressure on the king and the necessity of his currying favour with the bulk of Jordanian public opinion. There was always a strong possibility, however, of this popular policy being obstructed or reversed, if the king saw that it led to his eventual elimination or complete ineffectiveness.

Though Hussein had signed an agreement--the Convention of Arab Solidarity--with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria on January 19, 1957 he was never quite convinced that these states would actually advance the amounts agreed upon.

48(cont'd) the Eisenhower Doctrine and forgoing an American loan in consequence. Childers, op.cit.; p. 317, Middle East Journal, 1957, Vol. 11, p. 182.

In February 1957 the government had insisted that Iraqi troops stationed in Jordan should be withdrawn and that Jordanian troops should be under Egyptian command by virtue of the Joint Military Command established in October 1956. Syrian troops were allowed to remain.

Ibid.

Diplomatic relations had been established with the U.S.S.R. and there was toleration and support of anti-western propaganda.

Ibid.

Arrangements had been made under a joint British-Jordanian understanding of February 13th for the withdrawal of British troops within six months and for the replacement of the British subsidy by subventions from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria.

Ibid.

The king still hoped, that having made tactical concessions to extremist pressure, he would still continue to receive the British subsidy and ultimately, under more favourable conditions, rid himself of the Naboulsi government.⁴⁹

The threat which King Hussein presented to Egyptian policy objectives in Jordan during this period, especially insofar as they related to an elimination of British influence, became more apparent beginning in February 1957 when the monarch began to apply greater restrictions on Premier Naboulsi's drift towards a leftist pro-Egyptian stance.

On February 2, 1957 Hussein wrote a letter to the Prime Minister warning him against the "dangers of Communism" and calling on the government to "destroy destructive propaganda."⁵⁰

According to an astute observer, the letter was intended to achieve two alternative objectives, coming as it did on the eve of the negotiations with Britain: either the King's strong anti-Communist and anti-Naboulsi position might persuade the British to continue their subsidy or though the British might withdraw financial aid the Americans might replace it in appreciation of Hussein's stand.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 8, 1957, p. 278.

The King was reportedly shocked and alarmed when the British asked that negotiations be undertaken without delay for the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, for he realized that a withdrawal of British financial assistance might well bring about the economic collapse which he suspected the Naboulsi government desired. Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

The attempt exemplified by the above letter, to invite Western intervention and reverse the Naboulsi pro-Egyptian trend, constituted a danger to Nasser's policy aims in Jordan and made the elimination of the monarch on his reduction to a mere figurehead all the more urgent.

The failure of the Jordanian army revolt of April 1957--the culmination of Egyptian subversive attempts during this period--was due to the interplay of a number of factors.

First, the element of surprise indispensable to the success of the coup, was diminished when on April 7, some officers of the king's entourage who had succeeded in infiltrating the ranks of the conspiracy, uncovered the plot and informed the king of the imminent coup d'etat.⁵²

Second, most of the army especially the Bedouin units remained loyal.

A prime factor in the coup's failure was the refusal of Bedouin recruits at Zerqua to allow a repetition of the coup attempt of April 7th by standing aside as ordered to do by Nuwar, under the pretext of ordinary manoeuvres.⁵³

Third, the nature of outside Arab intervention. While Syrian authorities were indecisive as regards Syrian army intervention, Iraq and

⁵²Chamoun, op.cit.; p. 331.

⁵³Ibid; p. 332.

Saudi Arabia forestalled Syria by moving troops into Jordan ostensibly to prevent an Israeli invasion.⁵⁴

Fourth, and perhaps the most decisive factor, was American intervention, and close cooperation with Iraq and Saudi Arabia in suppressing the revolt.

The United States Sixth Fleet moved to Beirut and U.S. President Eisenhower, on April 24th, declared the territorial integrity and independence of Jordan to be a vital American interest.

The extent of cooperation between Iraq, the U.S.A. and Saudi Arabia may be gathered from the contents of a letter, written on April 25th, by President Eisenhower to Chamoun. This read in part:

Nous suivons de très près l'évolution de la situation en Jordanie et avons transmis au roi Hussein nos encouragements et l'assurance de notre appui. Dans nos consultations avec le roi Seoud nous lui avons exprimé notre approbation pour les mesures très efficaces qu'il a prises pour aider le roi Hussein. Nous avons aussi été en contact avec le gouvernement Irakien et sommes d'avis avec lui que le développement des forces Irakiennes d'une manière qui les mette immédiatement à la disposition du roi Hussein constitue une sage mesure de précaution. . .⁵⁵

The failure of the Jordanian army revolt, in spite of the overwhelming preponderance of domestic factors in its favour, constituted a major setback to Egyptian aims in Jordan and in the Arab system generally during this period.

⁵⁴ Marlowe, op.cit.; pp. 150-151.

The inability of Egypt to intervene militarily in Jordan has previously been discussed. See Supra, pp. 22-23.

⁵⁵ Chamoun, op.cit.; p. 378.

This setback was the counterpart of Nasser's diplomatic failures in the process of his growing isolation.

It led ultimately to the solidifying of closer relations between Jordan, and the monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and within Jordan, to the exile of former pro-Egyptian political leaders, their house arrest or imprisonment, the dissolution of political parties, the strict control of press and radio and a relentless purge of political suspects.⁵⁶

The failure of the revolt reversed the pro-Egyptian trend of the previous months.

⁵⁶ When the Egyptians and Syrians tried to incite the population, as they did in November 1955 after Templer's visit they discovered that many of their active supporters were either in jail or had fled to Syria. Among those who fled were two major collaborators of the Egyptian-Syrian intelligence, Col. Mahmoud Mussa, Head of the Jordanian Intelligence and his deputy Lt. Col. Kassem Nasser. With their departure the cooperation which had existed between the three countries since the second half of 1956 was destroyed.

Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, July 26, 1957, p. 10.

(3) Lebanon

The prime instrument of Egyptian policy in Lebanon during this period was interference in the parliamentary elections of May-June 1957, so as to remove President Chamoun by frustrating his ambition to be elected to a second term.

Egyptian-organized terrorist groups had increased their activities in Lebanon some months earlier however, in November 1956, due to Lebanon's refusal to break off relations with either Britain or France during the Suez crisis.⁵⁷ They had thrown bombs at banks and other Western buildings, and sabotaged Beirut harbour. Their activities had reached a peak when they placed bombs in President Chamoun's palace.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ These groups were organized by Hassan Khalil, Egypt's military attache, who had absolute control of all underground activities in Lebanon. Ibid; p. 8.

⁵⁸ Foreign Minister Charles Malik of Lebanon had this to say of Egyptian subversive activities in Lebanon in early 1957: "Worthy of special mention is the case of the Egyptian military attache in Beirut, Hassan Khalil. Early in 1957, he was arrested carrying in his car a considerable quantity of arms. The investigations that followed his arrest led to the discovery of a terrorist gang responsible for previous acts of terrorism. This gang was responsible for the bombing of the Iraq Petroleum Company's installations in Tripoli, the British school of Shimlar, the SS Norman Prince, the Port of Beirut, the St. Georges Club, the British Bank of the Middle East and the Banque de Syrie et du Liban." Cited in Qubain, op.cit.; p. 188 also in Keesings, op.cit.; p. 15696.

After Khalil's underground system had been liquidated by Lebanese security, Egyptian activities were continued in Lebanon from Syria, and the Syrian Deuxieme Bureau (intelligence) in conjunction with the Jordanian representative, filled the gap. Brig. Mohd. Mu'ayta, the Jordanian military attache became active in Beirut as the Egyptian

Lebanon's support of the Eisenhower Doctrine⁵⁹ brought a new series of Egyptian attempts to undermine the regime.

The Egyptians established close contact with the leaders of Lebanese opposition to the regime of President Chamoun and began distributing arms and money amongst their supporters.⁶⁰ The leaders of the opposition were closely connected with the Egyptian Ambassador in Beirut, Brigadier Abd al-Hamid Ghalib.⁶¹

58(cont'd) General Intelligence Agent. He brought a number of Jordanian soldiers to Beirut under the pretext of guarding consignments being unloaded in Beirut harbour for the Jordanian army. In fact they were responsible for sabotage inside and outside Beirut harbour, in close coordination with the Syrian Deuxieme Bureau. Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, July 26, 1957, p. 9.

⁵⁹ Lebanon formally acceded to the Eisenhower Doctrine in March 1957.

⁶⁰ The nature and strength of this opposition is discussed in detail below.

⁶¹ Qubain, op.cit.; p. 55.

Criticism of the interference of the Egyptian ambassador in Lebanese affairs at this time was voiced even by a pro-Nasser apologist such as Kasruwan Labaki, political commentator of Beirut le Soir who commented in an editorial: "We have not renounced this policy [mediatory role] and no one here has betrayed it. But when His Excellency the Egyptian Ambassador behaves like Nasser's High Commissioner in Lebanon, when he behaves as if Lebanon were under an Egyptian mandate, when he makes his embassy a refuge for the opposition and chooses his friends entirely from among the enemies of the regime, he does more harm than good to his country." Ibid; p. 51.

During the parliamentary elections, the Egyptian press and radio commenced a violent personal campaign against Chamoun, Premier Sami al-Sulh, and Charles Malik, branding them as imperialist stooges and traitors to the Arab cause.

As an example one may cite a Voice of the Arabs broadcast on April 5, 1957, during a debate on foreign policy in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies. Ahmad Said, commentator, told his Lebanese listeners in part:

The government of al-Sulh accepted the Eisenhower plan; that is, agreed to cooperate with the United States, the ally of Britain and France, who are in turn the two allies of Israel. In other words, it accepted alliance with the aggressors against Egypt and the Arabs. This cooperation and alliance is undertaken by the Lebanese Government with the West, with the U.S., Britain and France at the very moment when France and Britain declare that they would stand by the side of Israel if she decided to commit an aggression against the Arabs and at the very moment when the U.S. supports Israel's ambition against Aquaba and the Canal and when Israel threatens to occupy the Sinai desert at any time.⁶²

Also typical of Egyptian propaganda methods was the fabrication of an alleged correspondence between Foreign Minister Charles Malik and Abba Eban of Israel. As a commentator of Radio Cairo told his audience on June 15, 1957:

This secret correspondence confirms what we said before and what we say about the reactionary governments and the stooges of imperialism who are now handling affairs in Jordan and Lebanon and trying to stab the Arab people in the back in the heat of their gallant struggle against imperialism, its alliances and its

⁶²Radio Voice of the Arabs, April 5, 1957, 1825 GMT.

projects.

Charles Malik and such like are merely tools in the hands of imperialism carrying out its will and obeying its orders. They can only live and rule their people under imperialist protection.⁶³

Egyptian policy in Lebanon, aiming at the removal of President Chamoun, and the satellization of Lebanon, arose in opposition to the unfavourable direction which the Lebanese government's foreign policy stance had taken.

By late 1956 the Chamoun regime had resisted all Egyptian attempts to ensure her cooperation with the Egyptian-Syrian axis.⁶⁴

⁶³Radio Cairo-review of press-broadcast-Radio Cairo--June 15, 1957, 0500 GMT.

The content and impact of the Egyptian propaganda attacks on the Lebanese government may be gauged from the fact that the Lebanese government banned all Egyptian newspapers during the whole period of the election campaign. Qubain, op.cit.; p. 38.

The Lebanese ambassador was summoned from Cairo to Beirut to protest against these attacks. Emil Bustani, a prominent Lebanese politician flew to Cairo on May 9, 1957 to plead with Nasser to ease the tension but did not receive an audience. Jewish Observer and Middle East Review: May 24, 1957, pp. 4-5.

⁶⁴Thus she had cold-shouldered the Salim-Azm diplomatic mission to Beirut on March 6, 1955, and had during the following months refused to allow Syrian troops to be stationed on Lebanese soil. See Supra, p. 176.

Since late 1956 the regime had undertaken certain policy actions posing a threat to Egypt's aim at a unity of foreign policy based on the insulation of the system from foreign interference.

These policy actions included: the refusal to break off diplomatic relations with either Britain or France during the Suez crisis,⁶⁵ the official acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine on March 16, 1957--Lebanon being the only Arab country to officially accept it--and the granting of permission to the U.S. Sixth Fleet to stand by in Beirut while King Hussein suppressed the pro-Egyptian uprising.⁶⁶

The prime reliance by Egypt on interference in the parliamentary elections was due to the fact that it was Chamoun's ambition to be elected for a second term as President in 1958. His re-election in turn depended on the amendment of the constitution by a two-thirds vote of the parliament. It was therefore essential to Egyptian objectives that the elections of May-June 1957 produce a result unfavourable to the president.

In her efforts to achieve this result, Egypt drew upon the abundant focci of opposition to the Chamoun regime, which as a minimum supported Egypt's foreign policy objectives.

⁶⁵ According to Chamoun, it was at this time that the Egyptian campaign against Lebanon became extreme. (He puts the exact time at mid-November.) See Chamoun, op.cit.; p. 301. It is to be noted that the Iraqi and Saudi regimes had supported Lebanon's refusal to break off diplomatic relations with Britain and France at the Beirut conference of Arab heads of state held from November 13-15, 1956. Lenczowski, op.cit.; p. 336.

⁶⁶ Ibid; p. 469.

Up to at least 1956, the Lebanese opposition had been

an amorphous group of men and political groups, each working independently of the other, many times at cross purposes.⁶⁷

During the period under consideration, however, a process of consolidation took place, so that by 1958 the opposition to Chamoun's government was to include almost every important political leader in Lebanon.

Personal antagonisms were catalyzed by Chamoun's attempt to succeed himself in contravention of the Constitution and aggravated by his violation of the National Covenant through adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine.⁶⁸

Interacting with foreign policy issues were the grievances of the Muslim population of Lebanon against the predominantly Christian administration. These grievances had existed for many years but appeared all the more prominent during this period.

They extended over the whole range of political, social, and economic life, and included: resentment at alleged monopolization,

⁶⁷ Qubain, op.cit.; p. 48. See also Agwani, M. S. ed. The Lebanese Crisis, 1958 (London: Asia Publishing House, 1965), pp. 1-2.

⁶⁸ Opposition to the Eisenhower Doctrine rested on two main counts: (1) It had brought Lebanon into the cold war. (2) It involved support of the U.S. against Egypt and Syria, thus constituting a violation of Lebanon's traditional policy established in the 1943 National Covenant of a neutral position on the international level and support of the Arab states against any foreign state. Qubain, op.cit.; p. 55.

by Christians of the best positions in the government, civil service, army, and private business, allegation of discrimination in educational opportunities, and accusations of favouritism towards Christian areas in economic development and social services.⁶⁹

Domestic discontent was also based on the general gulf between a wealthy minority and the majority of the population. Politically, power was persistently concentrated in the great landed families.⁷⁰

On the Lebanese political scene, there were few parties which existed on purely programmatic grounds, the vast majority of Deputies in the Chamber elected in 1953, for example, belonging to no party whatever. Temporary alliances were however made to oppose a particular policy of the government.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Ibid; pp. 30-32.

In addition to accentuating internal opposition to the Chamoun regime, Muslim grievances detracted considerably from the government's policies' appeal to the majority of the politically conscious in other Arab societies.

⁷⁰ Ibid; p. 33. There were increasing rumours of corruption involving the President, his relatives, and friends. Whether these were true or not, they were believed by a large segment of the Lebanese public as well as the politically articulate segments of the population in other Arab countries. Ibid; The presence of Western interests in Lebanon in the form of cultural interests (especially the American University of Beirut), business interests (Lebanon was the regional centre of American business), and U.S. technical assistance programs, accentuated the lack of appeal of Lebanon's domestic policies for the vast segments of the predominantly neutralist politically articulate members of the Arab societies in spite of the economic advantages of such relationships.

⁷¹ Patai, Rafael The Republic of Lebanon (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1956), pp. 549-550. No programmatic non-denominational political party managed to win sufficient mass support to enable them to threaten the heterogeneous group of personalized confessional politicians. The preservation of the religious basis for voting particularly undermined their effectiveness. Peretz, Don, The Middle East Today (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. 335.

Apart from the basis of opposition among traditional personalistic confessional groupings there nevertheless existed some significant programmatic segments of the Lebanese opposition. These groups were as a minimum to follow the lead of Egypt in their foreign policies.

The most important of these was the P.S.P. (Progressive Socialist Party) whose foreign policy stressed neutralism with a marked anti-American slant.⁷²

Kamal Jumblatt, the party's head and creator, was one of the most important traditional leaders in Lebanon, and most of the party's support came from its Druze followers, (Jumblatt being a member of an influential Druze family). The basis of the party's backing was broadened, however, by support for the P.S.P.'s domestic ideology (which was a synthesis of European socialist doctrine) among university students and labour leaders.⁷³

The illegal Lebanese Communist Party, the second strongest

⁷²Qubain, op.cit.; p. 48; Patai, op.cit.; p. 557.

⁷³Ibid.

Jumblatt, though non-Muslim, and not an Arab nationalist, regarded the National Covenant as a temporary measure and Lebanon as a primarily Arab country. He considered a voluntary incorporation of the country in a partial or full Arab union, to be inevitable. Qubain, op.cit.; p. 42.

Communist party in the Arab East⁷⁴ presented a formidable opposition to Chamoun's policies.

The Communists "inspired and directed the most sustained and ramified program of subversive activity in the land."⁷⁵

The most radical of Lebanese Muslim groupings--the paramilitary youth movement al-Najjada (Helpers) was to provide a constant support for Egypt's foreign policy objectives.

It has been observed that shortly before the Lebanese civil war in 1958,

with the possible exception of Najjada's leader, Adnan Hakim, it is doubtful whether Lebanon's opposition leaders really desired immediate comprehensive union with Egypt.⁷⁶

⁷⁴Its strength was variously estimated at 8,000-15,000 members. Patai, op.cit.; p. 575. In spite of increasing police measures the party in the fifties had been growing in strength, particularly among university students and labour groups. Symptomatic of this strength was their obtaining 5.5% of the total ballots cast in the 1951 elections. Ibid; p. 578.

⁷⁵Ibid; p. 575.

Early in 1954, the party had engineered student demonstrations (such as the one in late March 1954) at the American University of Beirut) against the Turco-Pakistani Pact, foreshadowing a later period when the party's opposition to western pacts involved instrumental support of Egyptian policy objectives. Ibid; p. 578.

⁷⁶Lenczowski, op.cit.; p. 339.

As will be shown in a later chapter, a desire for immediate comprehensive union between Egypt and Lebanon went further than even Nasser was prepared to go at that time.

The Najjada's strength had been dissipated somewhat owing to inefficient organization and internal disputes.⁷⁷

The Najjada was later to lead its para-military combat units into the pro-Nasser camp during the 1958 revolution.

More moderate Muslim groupings, whose support for Egyptian policy objectives involved at least the upholding of the National Pact, and the advocacy of closer cooperation between Lebanon and nearby Arab states were: the National Organization of Muhd. Khalil and the National Appeal Party.

While at first believing in compromise with the Chamoun regime they were to become increasingly opposed to it. Most of the members of the National Organization were to support Arab nationalist opposition to Chamoun during the 1958 civil war.

The group drew its support from doctors, merchants, lawyers and landlords.⁷⁸

While the National Appeal Party favoured the continued sovereignty of Lebanon within its existing boundaries, it upheld the National Pact.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Patai, op.cit.; p. 555.

It was never as effectively organized as the forty thousand member para-military Phalanges Libanais --a natural ally of the regime in their advocacy of an "independent" Lebanon and suspicion of Arab nationalism.

⁷⁸ Ibid; p. 556.

⁷⁹ Ibid;

None of the three Muslim groupings described above was ever represented in the Lebanese Chamber.

In addition, the Lebanese opposition to the Chamoun regime included a number of Christian elements including the influential clan of Franjaye of Zqharta in Northern Lebanon, represented by their clansman Rene Muawad.⁸⁰

Most of the opposition to Chamoun was during 1957 grouped under the National Union Front whose principal leaders were Hamid Franjaye, Abdallah Yafi, and Saib Salam (one of the two Lebanese cabinet ministers who had resigned during Suez in protest against the Government's policy on the question of diplomatic relations with Britain and France.⁸¹

According to a statement of May 12, 1957 the opposition platform showed a marked identification with Egyptian foreign policy objectives. The basic points of the platform were: (1) No amendment to the constitution to permit President Chamoun to stand for re-election (2) Total neutrality for Lebanon (3) Rejection of military bases and military pacts like the Baghdad Pact (4) Rejection of any aid which seemed to compromise Lebanese sovereignty (5) Close, impartial and effective cooperation with other Arab states (6) Replacement of the present government by a caretaker government to supervise national

⁸⁰ Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, May 24, 1957, pp. 4-5.

⁸¹ Lenczowski, op.cit.; p. 337.

elections.⁸²

The Egyptian regime was encouraged in its widespread use of propaganda techniques to undermine the Chamoun regime by the relative lack of emphasis placed on propaganda machinery by the government.

Lebanese propaganda facilities were neither extensive nor effective and did nothing to enhance the regime's basis of appeal.⁸³

Radio Cairo broadcasts, as well as those of Radio Damascus were more powerful and influential than the State-controlled radio of Lebanon, which had a limited range.⁸⁴

A factor which further facilitated Egyptian propaganda efforts in Lebanon, was the greater tolerance of divergent views in Lebanon's mass media, than in other Arab countries.⁸⁵

⁸² Middle East Journal, Vol. 11, p. 300.

⁸³ Patai, op.cit.; p. 580.

⁸⁴ Radio Beirut broadcasts in Arabic were reported to reach some 16,000 listeners in a total population of some 6 million. Ibid.

⁸⁵ A vivid picture of the contrast between the Egyptian and Lebanese attitudes to divergent views in mass media is contained in a speech which Lebanese Foreign Minister Charles Malik gave before the Security Council on June 10, 1958, during the Lebanese crisis.

UN Doc S/Pv824, 18 June 1958, pp. 26-45; Speech of Dr. Malik.

Egyptian attempts, in mid-1957, to ensure the satellization of Lebanon through interference in the parliamentary elections, so as to eliminate Chamoun, were largely unsuccessful. This failure was due to the fraudulent manipulation of the voting process by the government.

The result was a sweeping "victory" by the government of over two thirds of the seats in the new chamber.⁸⁶

However, even a government supporter, Pierre Jamayyil, the leader of the Phalanges,⁸⁷ gave an expert opinion which was supported by the vast majority of politically conscious Lebanese, as to the true significance of these election results.

In reply to the question: "Does your party believe in the legality of the parliament of 66 and its representative character?" Jamayyil replied:

The parliament which has just been given to us, represents in my opinion, only ten percent of the population of the country--at the moment the real parliament is in the street.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 8, 1957, p. 322.

⁸⁷ The Phalanges Libanaises was a forty thousand member para-military organization, mostly Maronite, which advocated a pro-Western "independent" Lebanon and which was suspicious of Arab nationalism. Qubain, op.cit.; pp. 83-84.

⁸⁸ Cited, Ibid; p. 58.

Thus, in spite of this setback to Egyptian foreign policy objectives within the framework of the Lebanese parliamentary system, the position of Egypt in Lebanon remained strong: On the main issue of interest to the Egyptian regime--the adoption by Lebanon of the Eisenhower Doctrine--a majority of the influential Lebanese leaders, Christian and Muslim--and probably a majority of the population--served as an opposition to the Chamoun regime.

Of necessity, extra-legal means had to be increasingly to be employed by this opposition, given the packed nature of the Lebanese parliament. Terrorism and arms smuggling were as a consequence to become more and more the chief instruments of Egyptian policy in Lebanon.

(4) Saudi Arabia

The Saudi regime was least exposed to Egyptian non-diplomatic techniques during the period post-Suez to mid-1957.⁸⁹

Although the stimulation of internal dissension was generally

⁸⁹ Nevertheless the Saudi reorientation of policy vis-a-vis Iraq and the Eisenhower Doctrine was related at least in part to resentment at Egyptian influence in Saudi internal affairs. Economist, June 15, 1957, p. 957.

given but slight emphasis by the Egyptian regime during this period, there did exist Egyptian attempts to stimulate division among tribes and the royal family.⁹⁰

Among the urban intelligentsia, Egypt no doubt supported the "Free Saudi Group."

Trained at the military academy in Cairo, and reinforced by the inclusion of teachers and oil technicians recruited in Egypt, Lebanon and Syria, this group was in close relations with certain emirs of the royal family, and served as instruments of Egyptian pressure on royalty.

They served to further the Egyptian point of view among the nomads to whom they distributed tracts. They were influential in strikes on the oil fields, and served as focal points of unrest among the urban intelligentsia in general.⁹¹

A more direct attempt at undermining the regime through assassination was discovered in May of 1957 and the author was said to be the Egyptian military attache, Colonel Hashbah.⁹²

⁹⁰The Round Table, Vol. 48, (1957-1958), pp. 228-237.

⁹¹Laurent, Francois L'Arabie Séoudite a L'heure de Choix, Orient, 1958, No. 6, p. 97.

⁹²Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, July 26, 1957, p. 17. Chamoun claims that a plan to assassinate King Saud had received support in the form of arms by the Egyptian military attache. Chamoun, op.cit.; p. 334.

The Egyptian press, radio, and other forms of propaganda machinery, surprisingly at first refrained from attacks on the regime even after unmistakable evidence of an unfavourable Saudi reorientation of policy was apparent.⁹³

The reorientation of Saudi foreign policy away from support for Egypt and Syria against Iraq on the Baghdad Pact issue to a stance of support for the Eisenhower Doctrine and closer relations with Iraq, Lebanon, and pro-Western Jordan after the coup of 1957, represented an unmistakable challenge during this period to Egyptian foreign policy objectives based on a united Arab repudiation of foreign pacts.⁹⁴

⁹³ Laurent, op.cit.; p. 90

⁹⁴ A review of evidence for the Saudi reorientation from late 1956 to mid-1957 is in order here: As early as September 20, 1956, there had been close consultation between Iraq and Saudi Arabia on the question of the Suez crisis' implications for the economies of oil-producing states. Keesings, op.cit.; p. 15166. King Saud became increasingly aware of the dangers involved for Saudi oil revenues in a close involvement with Egyptian policy requiring Saudi Arabia to stop oil supplies to any power with which Egypt was in conflict. Lipsky, G. A. Saudi Arabia: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1959), p.142. Further King Saud had committed himself to support for the Eisenhower Doctrine during his visit to the U.S. in January 1957 and had shown intransigence on the question of canvassing the Eisenhower Doctrine at the diplomatic conferences initiated by Egypt in early 1957. Saudi Arabia's improved relations with Iraq were apparent in the exchange of state visits, and the conclusion of cultural agreements during the early half of 1957. Iraq was even invited to send a military mission to Saudi Arabia. Spencer, Wm. Political Evolution in the Middle East (Phila.: Lippencott, 1962), p.233.

Given the failure, in early 1957, of Egyptian diplomatic efforts aimed at persuading King Saud against changing his previously favourable direction of policy,⁹⁵ attempts to undermine, or at least isolate, the Saudi regime readily commended themselves.

The mediaeval social structure of Saudi Arabia, however, acted as a barrier towards effective utilization of classic Egyptian subversive techniques. There was initially no significant opposition to the Saudi political system of absolute monarchy, on which Egypt could draw in support of her foreign policy objectives.

Long-range potential foci of unrest existed in the regular

94(cont'd) during this period included: the visit to Hussein of King Saud in June 1957 after having given military support to the Jordanian monarch during his battle to retain his throne against an Egyptian-supported subversion attempt, the freezing in Saudi Arabia of Syrian credits amounting to \$16-1/2 million, and threatening to break off diplomatic relations with Syria in response to criticism. Annual Register of World Events (New Delhi, 1957), p. 318.

⁹⁵ For a discussion of these diplomatic manoeuvres, see Supra, pp. 208-213.

Saudi Army as opposed to the feudal levies,⁹⁶ and among new post-war social classes industrial oil workers, lower middle class workers, small industrialists, artisans, contractors, and Western-educated intelligentsia.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ The loyal white army (National Guard), a conglomeration of tribal levies, possessed the major internal political power, and more than counterbalanced the relatively well-educated officers of the regular army who were susceptible to Egyptian influences (the latter's susceptibility was due to the fact that Saudi Arabia's general lack of sufficiently trained Saudis to fill administrative posts was reflected in the use of Egyptian officers as instructors and advisors to the Saudi army). Lipsky, op.cit.; p. 102. Jeandet, Noël, En Arabie Seoudite, Orient 1957, p. 97; Bullard, op.cit.; p. 85.

The short range possibilities of Egypt using the regular army as an effective means of subversion were quite limited however.

Assuming that the tribal sheiks--and more specifically the tribal leaders of the White Army--remained loyal (and due to an elaborate system of political marriages and monetary rewards, they had many reasons to be) King Saud could probably have withstood a military revolt. Lipsky, op.cit.; p. 102.

In addition one must consider the internal consequences of American military assistance to the Saudi regime.

⁹⁷ The Western-educated intelligentsia had rapidly increased in the 1950's and it might logically be supposed that this most revolutionary of the new classes would offer strong criticism of the regime's foreign policy especially during its anti-Egyptian post-Suez phase. However, generally, their place in the traditional social structure still acted as yet as a restraining factor: Western-educated Saudis often belonged to the leading wealthy families of the kingdom, and were less likely to contribute to undermining a regime in which they had an extensive economic stake. (It is to be noted that the discontent fostered by widespread unemployment or under-employment of the intelligentsia, prevalent in most countries of the Arab core was absent in Saudi Arabia due to its financial resources and expanding economy.) Ibid; p. 100.

It is true however that increased education among Saudis at this time was not limited to the well-to-do. Elements of lower status--for example, many of the sons of newly trained cadres of skilled workers, contractors, and businessmen--were also being educated to an appreciable extent. There was the influence of numerous school teachers and

Given the general absence of vehicles for institutional expression, however, the orientation of these groups in foreign policy issues, and consequently the extent of their support of Egyptian foreign policy objectives, could not readily be determined.

Power on the local level remained vested in the tribal or clan chief, and illiteracy was well over ninety per cent.⁹⁸

In spite of the general lack of opportunity to exploit internal dissension, the Egyptian regime might well have made extensive use of her radio press and other types of propaganda machinery, in direct attacks on the Saudi regime, so as to isolate it from the majority of Arab public opinion.

In addition to foreign policy issues which the Egyptian regime might have emphasized, formidable barriers to appeal of Saudi domestic policies to other Arab societies lay in the following characteristics of Saudi socio-political life: the excessive privileges of the ruling elite; the wasteful expenditure of national revenues (with perhaps half the annual revenue being dissipated by

97(cont'd) military instructors as well as Palestinian and Levantine clerks and officials. What significance this increasing education had for criticism of and opposition to foreign policy was as yet unclear.

Lenczowski, op.cit.; p. 560.

⁹⁸Ibid. p. 557.

the royal family and relatively little filtering down to the community level) the acquisition of large sums by wealthy merchants and numerous government officials and advisors; and the failure of the government to institute a comprehensive modern welfare program.⁹⁹

The public image of the Saudi regime was not enhanced by its neglect of any systematic or large-scale information and propaganda activities (in spite of the regime's vast subsidies to Egyptian propaganda during the pre-Suez period). The regime's reaction to criticism was usually censorship instead of counter-propaganda and persuasion.¹⁰⁰

That the Saudi regime was only slightly exposed to Egyptian propaganda attacks during this period is paradoxical.

The Egyptian regime's early hesitancy may perhaps have been due to financial considerations.

Saudi Arabia was contributing some 47 million pounds to Egypt, had offered during the early diplomatic conferences to raise the question with the U.S. of defreezing Egyptian funds in America (amounting to approximately \$50 million) the resumption of cotton buying and deliveries of wheat to Egypt. In addition Saud offered 400,000 tons of oil payable in Egyptian pounds to Aramco against King Saud's

⁹⁹Lipsky, op.cit.; p.132.

¹⁰⁰Ibid; p. 131.

account.¹⁰¹

Financial implications of an anti-Saudi propaganda campaign were during this time experienced by Syria, and may have been taken as a lesson.

When a violent press campaign was launched against Saudi Arabia, in June 1957, Saud countered by demanding reimbursement of a loan of six million dollars accorded to Syria some months earlier, and by blocking Syrian estates in Saudi Arabia.¹⁰²

Egyptian hesitancy to launch a propaganda offensive against the Saudi regime may also have been due to certain indications by the latter that it did not want to go all the way in the alienation of Nasser.

As an example of such indications one may cite the following:

When Saud met King Feisal of Iraq in Baghdad on May 14, 1957 he reportedly arranged to have Hussein reject an invitation to the conference,¹⁰³ and was also reported to have ruled out the presence

¹⁰¹ Jewish Observer and Middle East Review: March 1, 1957, p. 12; May 17, 1957, pp. 14-15.

As far as press media were concerned a further financial consideration may have been the Saudi regime's instructions to its embassies in both Arab and non-Arab countries to withdraw all liberal subsidies from newspapers expressing opinions hostile to the Eisenhower Doctrine, regardless of the newspapers' usefulness in the past.

Jewish Observer and Middle East Review: March 1, 1957, p. 13.

¹⁰² Orient, 1958, No. 6, p. 91.

¹⁰³ Shwadran, op.cit.; p. 360.

of President Chamoun at the meeting. The purpose of both these gestures was reported to have been avoiding to offend Egyptian and Syrian susceptibility unduly.¹⁰⁴

Conclusion

A critical analysis of Egyptian foreign policy in the Arab system from the Suez action (end of 1956) to mid-1957 has revealed decided similarities with the previous period in an emphasis on non-diplomatic techniques over those of diplomacy after diplomatic initiatives had failed.

The period is of a part with the previous one, as well in that the major objective was a unity of foreign policy based on positive neutrality and insulation of the system--an objective which fell short of comprehensive unity.

The differences in this second period lay, however, in the fact that it was marked by a process of isolation of the Egyptian regime from its governmental counterparts in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon, and by a decided lack of success of both the diplomatic and non-diplomatic efforts to arrest the process, for reasons which have been analyzed.

¹⁰⁴Annual Register of World Events, op.cit.; 1957, p. 318.

The Saudi reorientation of policy in support of what was in effect a successor to the Baghdad Pact--the Eisenhower Doctrine was marked by an increasing movement towards support of Iraq.

As has been shown, diplomatic measures undertaken by the Egyptian regime in early 1957 were unsuccessful in arresting this tendency. The non-diplomatic techniques employed in Saudi Arabia to undermine the regime were slight in emphasis and limited in effect, for reasons which have been shown.

The Lebanese refusal to break off diplomatic relations with Britain and France during Suez and her support and formal accession to the Eisenhower Doctrine represented unmistakable challenges to Egyptian foreign policy objectives and signified the departure of the Lebanese regime from the traditional foreign policy of impartial mediator.

Primary emphasis was placed on non-diplomatic techniques: propaganda, arms and financial support to opposition followers, terrorist attacks, assassination attempts, in an effort to undermine the regime.

These methods, though successful in stimulating and reinforcing the indigenous opposition to President Chamoun failed to achieve their primary objective, his overthrow.

By June 1957 it appeared that the government had successfully handled the parliamentary elections.

Egypt's greatest reversal during this period took place in

Jordan, where since October 1956 the coalition cabinet of Premier Naboulsi had followed a consistent pro-Egyptian line both domestically and in foreign policy, in spite of the reservations of King Hussein and the ever-present danger of the monarch reversing the trend.

Attempts to eliminate the monarch, in part stimulated by his placing greater restrictions on the Naboulsi government, culminated in an army revolt, which though it had a preponderance of domestic factors in its favour failed largely due to external factors: United States and Saudi intervention.

In Iraq the propaganda campaign conducted by Egypt served only to further stimulate psychological conditions necessary to the success of a coup by the military--the only segment of Iraqi society able to effect a change.

Repressive measures of the government minimized the importance of the urban civilian opposition in Egyptian efforts to undermine the regime. Such efforts were, like those in Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia unsuccessful during this period.

CHAPTER 8

THE LATTER HALF OF 1957 - A TRANSITION PERIOD IN EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Mid-1957 marks the end of a distinct period in Egyptian foreign policy, for it seemed then that the Eisenhower Doctrine had ended the isolation which Iraq had experienced as a result of the Baghdad Pact. The monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Iraq had forgotten their old enmities, and were uniting against the "new order" in the Arab world as represented by the republican governments in Cairo and Damascus. They were acting in concert with the monarchy of Jordan, strengthened by the events of April 1957, and were supported by the Lebanese government, which had to all intents and purposes openly foresaken its mediatory role, accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine, and successfully handled the elections of June 1957.

The immediate problem before Nasser at the end of this period (the crystallization of an isolation process sponsored and supported by the United States) was no longer that of isolating Iraq or of subverting Jordan, or Lebanon, but of keeping Syria in the neutralist camp, given the complicated pressures threatening that country at this time.

The main danger to Egyptian foreign policy objectives in Syria at this time, was ironically, an excessive drift to the left and intimacy with the Soviet Union as a result of a popularity contest

within Syria between the Baath, and various Independent politicians, in the context of the increasing esteem with which the Soviet Union was regarded in Syria since Suez.¹

¹The increasingly close relations between Syria and the Soviet Union at this time were the result of a popularity contest in the Syrian Government between Khalid al-Azm, Minister of State and Acting Minister of Defence, (in November 1957 to become Finance Minister as well) and the Baath Party, who together with the left-wing of the National Party, occupied the chief positions in the Syrian cabinet at this time. The nature of this popularity contest was as follows: The rising power of the socially reformist and middle class Baath was unwelcome to the most powerful of the Independent, wealthy, and socially reactionary politicians, Khalid al-Azm.

Azm realized that an expedient way of outbidding the Baath party in popular favour and at the same time diverting popular emphasis from social reform would be to enhance the prospect of financial assistance from Russia, whose popular esteem in Syria was great after the Suez crisis. It was intelligently calculated that the Baath party in spite of inherent distrust and fear of the Soviet Union, would not be able to oppose a popular pro-Russian alignment.

Marlowe, John, Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism (London: Cresset Press, 1961), pp. 157-158.

Partner, Peter, A Short Political Guide to the Arab World, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1960), p. 82.

This tendency in turn aroused the susceptibilities of the U.S. Government and raised the possibility of an invasion by the U.S. in possible conjunction with Iraq, Turkey and Jordan.² This invasion, had it taken place would have meant the ruin of Nasser's pan-Arab policy, recently **shaken** by the reorientation of Saudi Arabia and Jordan.³

²The Iraqi attitude to a possible U.S. invasion initiative in Syria has previously been analyzed. See Supra p. 218. There were ample indications during this period that invasion was at least a distinct possibility. On July 1, 1957, a U.S. plot to subvert the Syrian Government, involving major conservative Syrian army officers and the U.S. Ambassador and military attache in Damascus, as well as the Iraqi Deputy Chief of Staff, was allegedly discovered. Kirk, G.E. Contemporary Arab Politics: A Concise History (N.Y.: Praeger, 1957), p. 19. Nasser no doubt also viewed with suspicion a meeting on August 22, 1957 in Istanbul, between King Faisal of Iraq (accompanied by his Prime Minister) King Hussein of Jordan, the Turkish leaders, and Mr. Loy Henderson of the U.S. State Department. The meeting reportedly dealt with the implications of the enhanced Russian position in Syria. Annual Register of World Events, 1957, p. 311.

³Egypt's military incapacity to safeguard her interests in Syria have previously been analyzed. See Supra, p. 23.

Successful invasion would have led surely to the return of the Nationalist and Populist Parties to power, and a subsequent reorientation towards Iraq.

Apart from the dangers of a U.S. invasion and resulting gains for Iraq, the increasingly close Syrian-Soviet relations, amounting almost to a Soviet satellization process, represented a distinct challenge to the maintenance of Egypt's policy of positive neutrality in Syria, despite Nasser's protestations to the contrary.⁴

⁴Up to the vast increases in Soviet influence in Syria, that country had been considered an an appendage of Nasser, who had controlled both the army and to a large extent the political situation. After the "Iraqi plot" in late 1956 had implicated several Populist leaders and the right-wing of the National Party, a purge had taken place. As a result of this purge, National Party left-wing leader Assali, pro-Egyptian, had formed a new cabinet representing an alliance between the pro-Egyptian Baath with the pro-Egyptian left-wing of the National Party, and the pro-Soviet millionaire politician Khalidel Azam who became minister of state and acting minister of defence. The pro-Egyptian trend lay in the anti-Western forces of the Baath, the left-wing in the old line parties and pro-Egyptian independents. The almost certain lack of cooperation between the conservative parties in spite of their numerical strength in the legislature, forecast a continuation of the trend.

The pro-Egyptian trend was heavily represented in the army in the person of Baathist-influenced Colonel Sarraj, head of the army intelligence section, and Captain Akram al-Dayn, chief of military police. In May 1957, a revolutionary command council was formed within the Syrian army modelled on Egyptian lines.

This group generally intensified the pro-Egyptian orientation in the army, and was well-entrenched by July 1957.

The group's ultimate goal was to reduce parliament and the coalition cabinet under the National Party leader, Sabri Assali to a facade,

The latter half of 1957 marks a transitional period in Egyptian foreign policy from the largely defensive countertactics which the regime employed against the Eisenhower Doctrine and the emerging "King's Alliance" of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, to the regaining of the initiative by Nasser, largely due to U.S. foreign policy blunders⁵ during the "Syrian crisis" of late 1957, and

4(cont'd) and thus control Syria's foreign affairs and national policies outside the scope of cabinet or parliament. Torrey, G. H. Syrian Politics and the Military 1945-1958 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964), pp. 323-331; pp. 317-318 No. 39; pp. 355-6.

The increase in Soviet influence in Syria at this time was to include the following main features: The entry of Russian arms in formidable though variously assessed quantities; Syrian exports of grain and cotton being largely accepted by Russia; the drawing up in agreement with the Soviet Government of a development programme in every field which by an agreement reached on August 2, 1957 was to involve the lending of money and expert guidance on favourable terms. The Agreement provided for immediate credits to Syria of \$140,000,000 and Soviet assistance in 19 development projects. A loan had been promised by Czechoslovakia Lenczowski, op.cit.; p. 367; Annual Register of World Events, op.cit.; 1957, p. 311 In addition in August 1957, Syrian Chief of Staff Nizam-ud-Din, a conservative, was replaced by Brigadier Afif al-Bizri an alleged Communist. Kirk, op. cit; p. 95. The Syrian Communist Party was increasing its influence proportionately by making extensive use of "national front" tactics (for example, it had gained control of all three Syrian trade union organizations). It was a determined minority with a clear programme.

Ibid.

⁵The nature of these blunders will be analyzed.

culminating in a merger with Syria in February 1958, which merger ushered in somewhat prematurely, as will be shown, a new phase in Egypt's Arab policy.

The nature of the measures undertaken by Egypt during the "Syrian crisis," the extent of success of these measures, the reasons for this success, and the significance of this success for the system, will first be analyzed, following which an analysis will be presented of Egypt's methods in Jordan during the latter half of 1957 as an example of the continuing paramountcy of non-diplomatic over diplomatic techniques during this period.

A. The "Syrian Crisis": The regaining of the initiative.

The major objective of Egyptian foreign policy in Syria during this period was, given the circumstances outlined earlier, an attempt to keep that country in the camp of positive neutrality by forestalling a U.S. sponsored invasion attempt, and a return to power of the Populists and Nationalists with consequent reorientation towards Iraq, on the one hand, and the outmanoeuvring of the Baath Party by a Communist-Azm combination on the other.

It was the methods used to obtain the first objective that led to the regaining of the initiative by Egypt in the system.

Due to the military inability of Egypt to forestall a possible U.S. sponsored invasion of Syria the major reliance was placed on the intangible sphere of Egyptian foreign policy capabilities--an astute exploitation of American foreign policy blunders in handling the increase in Soviet influence in Syria--in an effort to render the invasion less probable.

The opportune blunder was the public announcement on September 7, 1957 by Secretary Dulles that one of his Assistant Secretaries, Loy Henderson, had received expressions of apprehension from the governments of Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon about Communist influence in Syria. This announcement was coupled with President Eisenhower's statement, in which he expressed a fear lest international communism should drive Syria into acts of aggression against her neighbours.⁶

Given the military incapability of the Syrian army to effect the type of aggression implied in the statement, it appeared clearly as an announcement of a weak pretext for American invasion plans against Syria.⁷

⁶Kirk, op.cit.; p. 98

⁷According to John Marlowe: The Syrian Army was "too inefficient to constitute the slightest disincentive to invasion from outside. (Eisenhower's conception of Syria as a potential aggressor was entirely grotesque; the intention was certainly there, as always, but as always the means were entirely lacking.)" Marlowe, op.cit.; p. 162.

This error enabled Nasser, as at Suez, to translate military ineptitude and frustration into a diplomatic and propaganda victory.

Egyptian propaganda themes made it appear that the U.S. had attempted to impose the Eisenhower Doctrine on Syria by military force, and was pushing Syria's neighbours into aggression.

A typical enunciation of these themes was contained in a press statement on September 9, 1957--two days after Dulles' announcement--broadcast by Cairo Radio, in which President Nasser expressed Egypt's "unconditional support" for Syria and attacked American policy in the Middle East.

He accused the U.S.A. of trying to turn the Middle East into a sphere of American influence. He rejected American concern over the events in Syria as "mere propaganda." Declaring that "Syria's only sin in the eyes of American policy was that she did not dance to the American tune and obey American orders," he said that the real aim of U.S. policy in Syria was "to relieve the pressure on Israel, to draw attention away from her, and to divert it to other channels in line with American policy." After failing to persuade the Arabs to conclude a peace settlement with Israel, the U.S.A. had decided "to create artificial dangers to break up Arab unity and dissipate its strength" and had chosen the "Communist threat" for this purpose.

Colonel Nasser went on to assert that U.S. policy in the Middle East had three principal aims: to "liquidate the Israel question on the basis of the status quo...."; to "impose a defence agreement which would serve American interests alone"; and to "get the Arabs to line up behind American policy on all international questions, thus converting the Arab countries into a U.S. sphere of influence."

The latest phase of this policy, beginning with the "Eisenhower Doctrine" was aimed at "putting some Arab countries in the sphere, together with Israel, a sphere in which the U.S. would play the role of conciliator and coordinator in all military fields. Thus Israel would no longer be the enemy of those Arab states, but their partner in an alliance."

After asserting that the U.S. knew that Syria had not gone over to the "Communist camp," Colonel Nasser described the flying of U.S. army supplies to Jordan as part of "a large-scale intimidation campaign designed to put the wind up some Kings and Premiers."

The weapons supplied to Jordan were not intended for use against any outside enemy but "to control the interior and to stamp out Arab nationalism should this prove possible."

In concluding this major policy statement on the Syrian crisis, Nasser declared that Egypt would "stand at the side of Syria unconditionally and unreservedly" and that "all Egypt's political,

economic, and military potentialities are behind Syria in her battle, which is our battle and the battle of Arab nationalism."⁸

A further Egyptian measure, designed to symbolically dispell the image of Egyptian military incapacity to safeguard her interests in Syria, was undertaken about a month later.

On October 13, 1957, a small body of Egyptian troops were sent to Latakiah, Syria supposedly to assist Syria against the threat of a Turkish invasion.⁹ The dispatch of Egyptian troops was small in number and of a "token" character yet was presented as being taken "under the joint defence agreement between the two countries and in implementation of the joint plan to strengthen Syrian defences formulated on September 11th."¹⁰

In addition to dispelling the image of Egyptian military incapacity to safeguard her interests in Syria, the Egyptian regime hoped to strengthen the Baath against the Communists--to deprive the Soviet Union of the sole role of defender of the Arab nation (which

⁸ Cited Keesings Contemporary Archives, (Bristol: Keesings Publications Ltd.), 1957, p. 15745.

⁹ It is to be noted that the invasion had certainly been abandoned as a result of Soviet threats, before the Egyptian landings.

¹⁰ Keesings, op.cit.; 1957, p. 15812. Referring to the talks which had taken place in Cairo in September 11-12th between Nasser, General Amer, General Bizri, and Col. Sarraj, which had dealt with the coordination of the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces. Middle Eastern Affairs, 1957, Vol. 8, November, p. 399.

she had assumed through an "expose" of alleged U.S. arms in Syria and by her threats to Turkey) or at least to share this role with her, and finally, to show by her strong support of Syria her opposition to Saudi mediation attempts¹¹ which Nasser feared would end by strengthening the conservatives.¹²

The Egyptian exploitation of the U.S. foreign policy blunder by presenting U.S. allegations against Syria as a sham and as a flimsy pretext for a planned invasion, led to a propaganda victory, and a change in direction of policy of the prospective accomplices in the alleged invasion plans.

Support for Egypt among Arab public opinion was consolidated, this support reacted as pressure on the governments and any invasion was rendered less probable in the short run.

The "exposure" was favourably received by the majority of the politically articulate segments of the Arab populations. To them, Egyptian interpretations of the "crisis" lowered the plausibility of allegations that Communism was a major threat in the Middle East and not just a clever bogey used by the United States and other "Western

¹¹ These attempts are discussed later. As Seale has put it: "Saudi efforts at mediation were made to seem overnight, timid and irresolute in contrast with Abd al-Nasir's whole-hearted commitment to the Syrian cause." Seale, Patrick, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 305.

¹² Colombe, Marcel, Après Suez, Orient, 1957, No. 4, pp. 193-4.

imperialists" to discredit and justify attacks on Arab nationalist regimes.

Hence the interpretation nullified much of what had been achieved in the psychological arena by the Eisenhower Doctrine during the previous six months. Hence also, did they further undermine the psychological assumptions on which the Baghdad Pact was built. . . .

Apart from public opinion in the Arab countries tending to lend credence to the official Egyptian interpretation of the Syrian crisis, a striking example was to be offered of Egypt exerting pressure on anti-Nasser governments by utilizing the loyalty of a large majority of the Arab masses.

It was a major consequence of the "Syrian crisis" and Egyptian exploitation of U.S. foreign policy blunders, that the anti-Nasser regimes of Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan were forced to proclaim solidarity with an "Arab brother" (Egypt's ally, Syria), "if attacked."¹³

The statements of Dulles and Eisenhower, especially when these had been given the benefit of analysis by Cairo Radio, suggested complicity of the Iraqi, Jordanian, and Lebanese governments in a thinly veiled plot to partition Syria under the pretext of self-defence against alleged aggressive intentions. Declarations disavowing such intentions, were forthcoming, and these declarations did not represent

¹³Annual Register of World Events, op.cit.; 1957, p. 315.

deep-seated changes in orientation but rather necessary appeasements of public opinion.¹⁴

Among the disavowals of State Department policies in Syria the one most significant for Egyptian foreign policy objectives during this period was that of King Saud, the "king pin" of the "King's Alliance."

Saud qualified his hitherto unreserved pro-U.S. stand and assumed a less partial mediatory role.

On September 23, 1957, Saudi Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Amir Faisal declared that Syria posed no threat to her Arab neighbours.¹⁵

¹⁴ Among the surprising statements to be made may be found the following: The Iraqi government (though allied to Turkey in the Baghdad Pact) allegedly told Syria that an attack on Syria was an attack on Iraq. See World Today, Vol. 13, No. 12, December 1957, pp. 510-517. Characteristic of this appeasement of public opinion was the attitude of the Jordanian government. In a press conference on September 10, 1957 Jordanian Foreign Minister Samir Rifai remarked that Jordan did not feel justified in interfering in Syria's internal affairs, that Israel was "a much greater danger than Syria." Jordan's recent acquisitions of substantial American arms shipments were intended solely for her internal security and Jordan would be happy to accept further aid "from any quarter under conditions which do not involve us in military pacts or interfere with our independence and freedom." The importation of "ideological struggles" in the Middle East was deplored. Keesings, op.cit.; 1957, p. 15745. Hussein's statement on October 16, 1957 that Jordan would consider an attack on Syria as an attack on all Arab countries was in a similar vein as were declarations by the Lebanese and Saudi Arabian heads of mission in Jordan. Ibid; p. 15813.

¹⁵ Shwadrán, Benjamin Jordan: A State of Tension (New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1959), p. 366.

It was further stated that Saudi Arabia would assist Syria and all other Arab countries against aggression from whatever source.¹⁶

Saud apparently saw United States policies as pushing Syria further towards Communism, and offered his good offices as an impartial mediator between the United States and the Arabs. He tried to get others to desolidarize themselves somewhat from Washington, and there was even talk in the first days of October 1957 of a conference attended by Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia at which United States-Arab differences would be studied. Saud envisaged the possibility of a meeting in New York between the Syrian Foreign Minister and the American Secretary of State.¹⁷

Saud's further movement away from an unreserved pro-U.S. stand to one of an impartial attempt at mediation was underscored when Saud's representative at the U.N. denounced American policy and

¹⁶ Keesings, op.cit.; p. 15813.

¹⁷ Colombe, Marcel Apres Suez, Orient, 1957, No. 4, pp. 186-195. Saudi diplomatic initiatives were partially successful as there was a meeting on September 25, 1957 in Damascus with Kuwatli, Assali, and other Syrian leaders. The Premier of Iraq Ali Jawdat also arrived in Damascus on September 26th from Beirut and took part in the Saudi-Syrian talks. King Saud's visit was the first to Damascus since his accession in 1953, while Jawdat's visit was the first paid by an Iraqi Premier to Syria, for eight years. Keesings, op.cit.; 1957, p. 15813.

withdrew Saudi Arabia's adhesion to the Eisenhower Doctrine.¹⁸

It should be noted, however, that though the modification of Saudi Arabia's unreservedly pro-U.S. policy was favourable in the short run to Egyptian foreign policy objectives, Nasser refused to support Saudi mediation for fear it would be interpreted as a swing to the west, and a traitorous abandonment of Syria.¹⁹

The above successes notwithstanding, the foremost objective of Egyptian policy in Syria at this time--the correction of an excessive orientation towards the Communist bloc--was not achieved during the Syrian crisis, and the danger was ever-present at the period's end that the Baath would be outmanoeuvred by a Communist-Azm combination.

Factors in the Syrian internal setting in support of this possibility were: the weakness of the Syrian central coalition government, the increase of domestic Communist influence through the small, but relatively strong and relatively united Syrian Communist party--

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid; pp. 186-195.

Egyptian propaganda went to great lengths to insinuate that the U.S. had prompted Saud's offer of mediation. Annual Register, op.cit.; p. 318. Egypt likewise considered Saudi mediatory initiatives as a challenge to her position. It is highly significant that in weeks of Saudi mediation between Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Washington in late September and early October 1957, Egypt had not been consulted and had had no part. Seale, op.cit.; p. 305.

led by the ablest of Arab Communists, Khalid Baqdash , the increase in Russian prestige among nearly all sections of the Syrian community due to the reinforcement of the image created by the U.S.S.R. during the Suez crisis, and by the events of late 1957,²⁰ the consequent tendancy of the left-wing conservative wing under Azmto stave off social reform by giving the masses the prospect of increased financial assistance from Russia, and the inability of the Baath, or President Nasser to publicly oppose the increasing pro-Soviet alignment, the absence of the anti-Egyptian, anti-Soviet Popular Party, due to many of its members having been either imprisoned or exiled, as a result of the discovery of the "Iraqi Plot" in late 1956, and the inability of the army to exercise a stabilizing influence, as it was known to be divided and to contain many Communist sympathizers for example, Chief of Staff, Colonel Bizri.²¹

At the end of 1957, it was becoming apparent that Syria had two choices: continued instability, Soviet satellization, or a final partition on the one hand, or some sort of federation into a larger Arab entity on the other.

²⁰ As Seale has put it, "By mid-1957 the Communists came to believe that still further political advantage could be drawn from their great popularity with the public. Men were then flocking to the party less out of ideological conviction than because it was thought to represent, with Soviet support, the trend of the future." Ibid; p. 316.

²¹ Torrey, op.cit.; pp. 347-374.

This meant an impending unavoidable decision for Egyptian foreign policy makers.

Due to the great preponderance of political opinion in Syria being anti-Western and anti-collaborationist, the federation could only be with Egypt notwithstanding the disadvantages of geography²² together with differences of society, orientation, economics, law, local vested interests and political life.²³

²²There being no common frontier and a separation of everything except sea and air with neither component having a significant marine or an air fleet.

Longrigg, S. H. New Groupings Among the Arab States, International Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 3, July 1958, p. 307.

²³It is in this connection that evidence of Nasser's lack of enthusiasm for immediate union between Syria and Egypt during this period must be considered.

Though in late 1957 Joint Committees were formed to study the project of union and forty Egyptian deputies joined in the sitting of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies on November 18, 1957, in fact no practical move was made in the direction of federation during this period. Annual Register, op.cit.; 1957, p. 307.

There were, however, a number of pronouncements on the subject. For example, on November 13, 1957, Egypt and Syria signed a trade and payments agreement described as aiming at developing "trade relations between the two countries to the greatest possible degree preparatory to comprehensive economic union."

Middle Eastern Affairs, 1957, Vol. 8, December, p. 42.

B. Egyptian Policy Towards Jordan: An Example of the Continuing
Emphasis on Subversive Techniques

During the period now under consideration (mid-1957 to February 1958) extensions of diplomacy, as instruments of Egyptian foreign policy were, as in previous periods, paramount over diplomatic measures.

Characteristic of the propaganda and subversive techniques applied during this period by Egypt in the Arab countries outside of Syria, were those employed in the Jordanian context.

The major objective of Egyptian foreign policy in Jordan during this time was an attempt to isolate the king and neutralize the country through a combination of techniques, including: active support of the major Jordanian opposition groups in exile in their efforts to smuggle arms and propaganda pamphlets into Jordan and carry out assassination attempts on the King, an increase in the Egyptian radio and press propaganda campaign against the Hussein regime, and as an additional measure of harassment, the refusal to honour Egypt's previous pledge of financial aid to Jordan.

Evidence of these activities will now be reviewed.

Shortly after Hussein had suppressed the military revolt in April 1957, a military mission presided over by the Egyptian General Ibrahim arrived in Damascus. The General was in ~~close~~ contact with Nasserist former Jordanian Chief of Staff Abu Nuwar, and his successor

(who had eventually proven himself to be under Egyptian control as well), Ali Hayari. The mission attempted to organize a new plot against the Jordanian regime in concert with Jordanian Baathists and Communists.²⁴

Evidence was soon presented of the renewed activities of the Egyptian military attache in Amman (Major Fuad Hilali)²⁵ and the Egyptian Consul-General in Jerusalem (Mohammed Abdul Aziz) in early June 1957.

They were declared personae non gratae by the Government and ordered to leave Jordan. The official announcement said that Major Hilali had tried to persuade a Jordanian citizen to assassinate certain Jordanian officials, had promised him arms for this purpose, and had also been involved in other cases threatening the security of the Kingdom. The Egyptian Consul-General in Jerusalem was accused of unspecified subversive activities.

It was announced on June 13, 1957 that nineteen Jordanians

²⁴Chamoun, Camille, Crise au Moyen-Orient, Paris: Edition Gallimard, 1961) p. 379.

²⁵Major Fuad Hilali succeeded to the post of Egyptian military attache in Amman left vacant when Col. Mahmoud Salah ed Din Mustafa, his predecessor, whose activities during the period prior to the Suez crisis have earlier been outlined, was killed by a parcel bomb in July 1956.

Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, July 26, 1957, p. 9.

had been arrested in the Hebron area on charges of being implicated in Hilali's alleged plot.²⁶

In the propaganda field, the radio and newspapers of Cairo accused Hussein of being in collaboration with Western foreign missions and of plotting with the forces of imperialism against Jordanian independence.²⁷

A new wave of Egyptian and Syrian press and radio propaganda was directed against the Jordanian government in early November 1957 accusing it of secret negotiations with Israel.

For example, the Cairo newspaper "al-Shaab" accused the Jordanian government on November 3, 1957 of having entered into secret negotiations with Israel, alleging that the Jordanian Foreign Minister (Mr. Samir Rifai) had had a secret meeting at Nablus on September 14, 1957 with the Israeli Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. The allegations were repeated by Cairo Radio which bitterly attacked the Jordanian leaders and accused King Hussein of accepting a "bribe" of thirty million dollars from the United States.²⁸

²⁶ Keesings, op.cit.; 1957, p. 15612.

Further, the Jordanian government on June 16, closed its embassy in Cairo in reaction to the revelation. Egyptian officials, affecting indignation, called for the recall of the Jordanian Ambassador. Annual Register, op.cit.; 1957, p. 307.

²⁷ Chamoun, op.cit.; p. 379.

²⁸ Cited Keesings, op.cit.; 1957, p. 15882.

The Egyptian press (including the official *Al-Gomhouria* and Cairo Radio) described King Hussein as a "traitor" and accused his Government of allowing Jordan to become a "base of American imperialism."²⁹ The Jordanian masses were invited to remove and even to assassinate King Hussein and his relatives.³⁰

In the field of economic harassment, Egyptian techniques consisted of refusing to contribute to Jordan the 7.5 million Egyptian pounds promised by Egypt and Syria under the Convention of Arab Solidarity signed on January 19, 1957.³¹

Evidence was presented as well during this period of Syrian collaboration with Egypt in the subversive activities of "diplomatic representatives," and on December 10, 1957 Jordan ordered the expulsion of certain Syrian embassy officials.³²

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Cited Annual Register, op.cit.; p. 317.

³¹ For a discussion of the Convention, see Supra, p. 211.

³² Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 9, January 1958, p. 42. Egyptian activities took place at the same time as steadily deteriorating Jordanian-Syrian relations. On October 19, 1957 Jordan accused Syria of activities intended to "create disorder and an atmosphere of confusion in Jordan!" Further deterioration in these relations led Hussein to state finally on October 20, 1957; contrary to previous statements (for example, the one on October 16, 1957 see Supra p.245) that the regime in Syria endangered the whole Arab world. Shwadran, op.cit.; p. 366. In addition to Syrian collaboration and support of Egyptian activities in Jordan, strong evidence of Soviet support for the Egyptian offensive in Jordan, led to U.S. charges that the U.S.S.R. had joined Egypt and Syria in a campaign to eliminate Hussein. Ibid; p. 367.

The motivation for Egyptian efforts to undermine the Jordanian regime at this time may be found partly in the challenge which the change in direction of policy of the regime represented after the suppression of the revolt of April 1957.³³

Although the Jordanian regime, after the suppression of the army revolt of April 1957, did not commit itself to formal agreements with the West due to the ever-present inflammability of the majority of Jordanian public opinion on the issue, and thus took care to avoid formal identification with the Eisenhower Doctrine, it had in fact reversed the direction of policy of the Naboulsi government to one of virtual alliance with the West, thus constituting an unmistakable challenge to Egyptian foreign policy.

For all practical purposes, the Eisenhower Doctrine had prevailed in Jordan, for as a reward for Hussein's victory in the coup of April 1957, ten million dollars in emergency U.S. aid was received. The British government delivered the first installment of payments due to Jordan under a secret agreement; there was a subsequent twenty million dollars in U.S. aid together with a British interest-free loan of 1,130,000 pounds as part of the aid program which Jordan had not fully drawn upon when the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty had been ended.³⁴

³³ The positive incentives to Egyptian subversion of Jordan differed little from those of the previous period.

³⁴ Annual Register, op.cit.; 1957, p. 311.

Jordan's inter-Arab relations as well were in opposition to Egyptian foreign policy objectives.

Efforts were made by the new government led by Samir el Rifai, an arch conservative, to strengthen the "King's Alliance" of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan--designed to counteract the revolutionary pan-Arabism of Egypt and Syria.

As evidence of this policy one might cite the visit by King Hussein to Baghdad a fortnight after the June 8, 1957 arrival of King Saud to Amman on a state visit.³⁵ The Jordanian-Iraqi conference led to the expression of the need for mutual non-interference among Arab states (an obvious reference to Egyptian subversive activities), as well as the usual polite phrases concerning Arab unity, Israel, French colonialism, and Communism.³⁶

A further example is presented by the attendance of King Hussein on August 22nd at talks held between Iraqi King Feisal and his Prime Minister, Turkish leaders, and Loy Henderson of the United States State Department, on the implications of the enhanced Russian position in Syria.³⁷

The close interaction between Egyptian efforts to undermine the Jordanian regime during this period, and the change in policy of

³⁵ Shwadran, op.cit.; p. 361-362.

³⁶ Annual Register, op.cit.; p. 310.

³⁷ Ibid; p. 307.

this regime may be illustrated by the explanation which Nasser gave of his reasons for withdrawing the proposed financial subsidy agreed upon under the Convention of Arab Solidarity on January 19, 1957.

In an interview on April 7, 1958 to the Columbia Broadcasting System of New York, Nasser explained his policy in this regard as follows:

Sir, you always speak of strings to American aid. Yet, you still refuse to honour your solemn pledge of aid to Jordan unless she changes her foreign policy completely. Isn't this a string--a big string?

To which Nasser replied:

Our aid offer to Jordan was not a luxury. We offered assistance to Jordan to fill a pressing need arising from the discontinuance of foreign aid which Jordan used to receive and which was stopped because Jordanian rulers had adopted an Arab nationalist policy. It was, therefore, incumbent upon us to carve that aid out of our own bare needs and extend it to Jordan. But now that the King of Jordan has changed his policy and obtained foreign aid as a result of this change, our aid has become unnecessary.

Furthermore, our aid to Jordan was based on the unification of the Syrian, Egyptian and Jordanian armies in the defence of supreme Arab interests. But the King of Jordan suddenly reversed this trend and turned his policy upside-down. To have extended aid to him in the circumstances would have meant encouraging him to adopt a policy that runs counter to the supreme interests of the Arabs.³⁸

³⁸ Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews (Cairo: 1958), pp. 380-381. Emphasis added.

Under the circumstances prevailing in Jordan during this period, subversive techniques had little chance of success.

The suppression of the army revolt of April 1957 had led to the exile of former pro-Egyptian political leaders, their house arrest or imprisonment and the dissolution of political parties.³⁹

The regime returned to one of royal authoritarianism, supported by the monarch, the loyal tribes, and substantial units of the army.

The subversive technique least restricted in its use was external attacks through Egyptian radio and press media and these were emphasized during this period.

In spite of this gross incitement, however, internal order was maintained due to the repressive measures of the regime and the continuing loyalty of substantial units of the army.

³⁹ Widespread arrests of National Socialist and Baath leaders were reported began April 24-25, 1957. An A.P. dispatch said Jordan's ten political parties were abolished. *Facts on File*, (New York, 1957) p. 137.

An estimated 500 leftist and nationalist leaders were reported under arrest by April 28. Ibid. Major General Ali Abu Nuwar pro-Egyptian Chief of Staff had fled and was tried in absentia for treason. Ibid; p. 145. On May 5, 1957 National Socialist, Communist, Baath and Arab Nationalist party newspaper licenses had been revoked. Ibid. House Speaker Hikmat al Misri and 16 other members of the 40-member Jordanian Parliament were reported on May 22, 1957 to be under house arrest or close parole. Ibid; p. 169. On June 18, 1957 the Jordanian Cabinet approved the suspension of the Jordanian Parliament for three months. Ibid; p. 196.

Two examples of the long-term effects of the Egyptian campaign may be cited, however.

First, when the President of the Jordan House of Deputies appealed to King Saud and to President Chamoun of Lebanon to intervene with Egypt,⁴⁰ an attempt at mediation in response to Jordanian pleas did take place, when on November 17, 1957 King Saud, along with the other Arab Kings issued an appeal to Egypt to stop the press and radio campaign against Hussein's regime.⁴¹

Second, when the Jordanian government indirectly saw fit to distract public opinion by starting, on November 20, 1957 a vigorous campaign of accusation against Israel and demanding the replacement of an allegedly partial U.N. truce observer.⁴²

The withdrawal of the proposed subsidy had but minimal effects on the Jordanian regime's capability given the above mentioned British and American aid, and in addition the fact that Iraq, on May 15, 1957 was said to have offered Jordan 4.2 million dollars under an unsummated 1955 aid agreement,⁴³ and that Saudi Arabia had honoured the Convention of Arab Solidarity having begun payments on April 1, 1957 with a contribution of seven million dollars.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Shwadran, op.cit.; p. 369.

⁴¹ Mowat, R. C. Middle East Perspective (London: Blandford Press, 1958), p.85.

⁴² Annual Register, op.cit.; 1957, p. 317.

⁴³ Facts on File, op.cit.; 1957, p. 155.

⁴⁴ Ibid; p. 154.

Conclusion

The analysis of Egyptian foreign policy in the Arab system during the latter half of 1957 may be summarized as follows:

The main problem which the regime faced in the system during this period was that of keeping Syria in the neutralist camp, given the reorientation of Saudi and Jordanian policy towards Iraq, the abandonment by Lebanon of her mediatory role in favour of support for the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the continuing danger from Iraq.

In Syria, Nasser faced a double threat: (1) The possibility of a U.S. sponsored invasion attempt in conjunction with Iraq, Turkey and Jordan on the pretext of increasing Communist influence. The result of such an event would be the reorientation of Syria away from Egypt towards Iraq and the ruin of Nasser's pan-Arab policy.

(2) The possibility of the pro-Egyptian Baath party being outmanoeuvred by a combination of the Syrian Communists and the forces of Independent Minister of State and Acting Minister of Defence Khalid al-Azm (the latter using Soviet influence largely as an expedient weapon against the Baathi program of social reform)

Increasing Communist influence in Syria challenged Egyptian control based on the identity of a positive neutralist foreign policy.

In spite of Egypt's military incapacity to decisively intervene in Syria, the Egyptian regime succeeded in forestalling--for the time being--the first possibility. This result was achieved by an astute exploitation of a United States foreign policy blunder.

In exploiting the American miscalculation, Egypt indirectly applied pressure on the anti-Nasser governments of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Lebanon, by utilizing the loyalty of a large number of the Arab masses.

Egyptian propaganda techniques at the time of the "Syrian crisis" to a large extent undermined the psychological foundations of the Eisenhower Doctrine in the area.

In doing so, Egypt regained to some extent the initiative in foreign affairs which it had lost during the previous period in the Arab system as a result of the reorientation of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon.

Claims of Iraqi, Lebanese, Jordanian, and Saudi governmental solidarity with Syria in the face of a hypothetical invasion did not represent deep-seated orientations towards the Egyptian-Syrian axis but rather tactical manoeuvres to appease public opinion.

Saudi mediation attempts at the time of the crisis were regarded by the Egyptian regime with suspicion in spite of the short-range orientation of Saudi away from an unreservedly pro-U.S. stance.

The underlying threat which the excessive drift of Syria to the left represented for Egyptian primacy in that country still remained at the end of the period.

In spite of the urgency of the problem of Syria's increasing intimacy with the Soviet Union, the solution which most suggested itself--that of a comprehensive union between Egypt and Syria--was fraught with great administrative obstacles.

The Egyptian regime's elaborate application of non-diplomatic techniques in Jordan during this period, including support of opposition groups, inflammatory propaganda and assassination attempts were characteristic of the continuing paramountcy of Egyptian subversive methods over diplomatic measures in the system.

These methods in the Jordanian context met with consistent failure due to the repressive conditions obtaining in that country since the suppression of the revolt of April 1957.

CHAPTER IXEgyptian Policy from the Formation of the UAR to the
Iraqi Coup.

P.J. Vatikiotis has discussed the significance of this period as follows:

Between 1955 and 1957 it was not too clear whether the Egyptian decision to champion Arab nationalism had any serious dimensions other than the containment of Iraq, the control of the Arab League, and the campaign of vilification against Israel. It was not until the merger with Syria in February 1, 1958, that Egypt's Arab policy represented the dynamic notion of the Arab nation based on a relatively new connotation of the term *quamuyya*, the consciousness of being an Arab. It marked the beginning of a determined ideological push...that nationalism requires unity.

It will be seen from the following analysis, that the formation of the U.A.R. increased the capability of Egypt, and regained for her the initiative in the psychological arena of Arab public opinion. An increased involvement in the civil war in Lebanon, and the undermining of the Chamoun regime, a favourable change in orientation in Saudi policy, and a seemingly Nasserist victory in Iraq² represented an increased

¹ Vatikiotis, P.J. in Macrides, R.C. ed. Foreign Policy in World Politics, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1962,) 2nd Ed., pp. 335-359.

² As will be seen, the Iraqi Coup of July 14th, 1958, did not automatically guarantee the consolidation of Egyptian influence in the system.

consolidation of Egyptian influence during the period February 1st - July 14, 1958 and the final elimination of the Baghdad Pact.

However, increasing espousals of unity by Nasser in retrospective rationalizations stemming from the assumption of new responsibilities in Syria, must be differentiated from actual primary objectives of Egyptian foreign policy.

These objectives involved the achievement of a unity of foreign policy between Arab States, based on a united repudiation of formal alliances with the Great Powers, and derivatively, Egyptian primacy over a family of smaller, less powerful and less advanced Arab States.

Egyptian foreign policy objectives did not encompass schemes for comprehensive unity based on annexations and constitutional schemes of federation or confederation.

In the qualified nature of Egyptian unity objectives (with the exception of Syria for non-ideological reasons) the period February 1st - July 14th, 1958 was of a part with the periods in Egyptian foreign policy considered earlier.

(The period was also of a part with previous periods in the continuing emphasis by the Egyptian regime on non-diplomatic over diplomatic techniques to further positive neutralism in the Arab system.)

An authoritative statement of Egypt's Arab policy at this time is to be found in Anwar Al-Sadat's Story of Arab Unity, published in Cairo in December 1957, less than two months before the union with Syria.

In this key work on Egyptian foreign policy, the Arab

collective security pact - with its built in prohibition of divergence in foreign policy - is mentioned on the second and on most pages of the opening chapter³. The pact is represented as the "sole hope of the Arabs". One looks in vain however for a hint in this book of any aspirations for territorial and political union⁴.

Further evidence of the qualified nature of Egyptian foreign policy objectives at this time, with respect to the question of Arab unity may be found in the repeated assertions - made after the collapse of the U.A.R. experiment in 1961 - by Nasser and other Egyptian spokesmen, such as Mahmud Riyad, Egyptian Ambassador to Syria, that they did not seek union with Syria but that it was forced upon them.

As Mahmud Riyad put it:

We never asked for union with Syria. We always argued that it was premature. We told each pressure group in favour of unity that we would always refuse a union brought about by force. We believed it would never last if brought about by the army...

Our policy was in fact to avoid union...⁵

³ Al-Sadat, Anwar. Qussat al-wahda al-'arabiyya (The Story of Arab unity) published in Arabic in Cairo, cited and reviewed in Seale Patrick, The Struggle for Syria; A Study of Post-war Arab Politics, 1945-1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965) p. 312.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ cited Ibid; p. 314 Emphasis added
See also Cremeans, Charles D. The Arabs and the World: Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy (New York: Praeger, 1963) p. 228.

5 cont'd.

Admissions by Egyptian officials such as that of Mahmudh Riyadh, that the policy of Egypt was to avoid union with Syria, run counter to the contention of some observers that previous agreements between Egypt and Syria concluded from 1955 to 1957 were successive landmarks in a process of gradual, functional unification of the two countries, in preparation for their political unification. See for example, Saigh, Faiz, Arab Unity, hope and fulfillment (New York: Devin Adair 1958) p. 176.

In each of the states of the Arab sub-system at this time, there existed powerful disincentives to a policy based on comprehensive union with Egypt. Some of the more prominent administrative burdens may be briefly summarized:

In Syria, the lack of common frontiers, differences in society, economics, law local vested interests, and political life (the sharp differences between Egypt's military and authoritarian regime and the forms of Syrian "democracy" (be it somewhat imperfect) with a parliament, parties, and a free press), and the factiousness of the Syrian army.

In Lebanon, the lack of common frontiers, the multiple confessional structure, and the danger of Western intervention on behalf of one Christian population, the dependence of the continual prosperity of Lebanese commerce - entrepot, transit, and currency trading, - on the maintenance of Lebanese sovereignty.

In Iraq, the lack of common frontiers and the fact that the country had a long history as a geographical and historical entity and possessed a powerful non-Arab minority - the Kurds within its borders. In addition, the substantial Shiite Muslim population of Iraq looked with suspicion on a pan-Arabism that was associated principally with Sunni Islam.

In Jordan, the burden of a hopelessly unviable economy, and the prospect of Western and/or Israeli military intervention.

In Saudi Arabia the burden of a mediaeval social structure and the prospect of U.S. intervention.

(A) The Significance of the Syrian - Egyptian Union

An analysis is now presented of the nature of the Syrian - Egyptian union of February 1st, 1958, the reasons for Egyptian acquiescence in the union, the short-range success of the union, the reasons for this success, and the significance of the success of the union for Egyptian capability in the system.

On February 1, 1958, at a session between the Syrian and Egyptian Governments, union between Syria and Egypt was proclaimed.

Executive authority was to be vested in Nasser, aided by Executive Councils in the Syrian and Egyptian regions, while legislative authority was to be exercised by an assembly approved by the president, at least half of whose members would be selected from the Egyptian and Syrian legislatures⁶.

The provisional constitution of the U.A.R. proclaimed by Nasser on March 5, 1958, declared that the U.A.R. was part of the Arab nation, that society was to be organized on the basis of social solidarity and planned economy based on the "principles of social justice" and that in place of political parties there was to be a single organization, the National Union, the principles of which were to be defined by presidential decree⁷.

⁶ Lenczowski, Geo., The Middle East in World Affairs, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962) p. 524.

⁷ Ibid; pp. 524-525

Foreign policy was to follow "Arab liberation, positive neutralism, and nonalignment"⁸

The Union of Egypt and Syria on February 1, 1958, was motivated chiefly by forces other than a comprehensive unity ideal. Egypt's acquiescence to the union was not a logical consequence of her previous Arab policy, but was rather characterized by expediency and opportunism in a desperate attempt to keep the unity of foreign policy between her and Syria alive.

The prime motivations for the Egyptian decision for union at this time were multifold:

The Baath feared the dual threat of being outmanoeuvred either by the Communists or by right-wing forces in the wake of a U.S. sponsored invasion precipitated by the Communist threat.⁹ Consequently they

⁸ Ibid; p. 530.

⁹ The factors in support of the possibility that Baathi power in Syria would be undermined by a Communist-Azm combination, accompanied by Soviet satellization have previously been outlined.

As Seale has put it:

"it was not so much that the Ba'thists ever really believed that 'Azm and Baqdash could make a successful bid for power on their own. Their fear was that they might try. They understood that a communist-led coup, even if abortive would justify vigorous right-wing counter measures and Western intervention."

Seale op. cit; p. 317. It was this threat, more than the party's unionist doctrines which caused it to press urgently for a formal link with Egypt at this time that would enable them to subdue their rivals.

pressured Egypt for union.

In addition pressure was applied on Egypt by key officers in the Syrian Army who believed that union would rid them of politicians and offer a solution to the factiousness of the Army.¹⁰

Egyptian retrospective pronouncements after one union however, were calculated to make the U.A.R. appear to Arab nationalists to be a 'first installment' of long-awaited comprehensive unity, instead of that which it really was - a desperate expedient to keep the unity of foreign policy between Egypt and Syria alive.

The general tendency in these pronouncements is exemplified by a Speech delivered by Nasser on February 5, 1958.

The inseparability of unity and strength has always been one of the most marked characteristics of the history of our nation. For not once has unity been realized, but it was followed by strength, and not once have we possessed strength, but unity was its natural result...

The way in which the efforts towards unity were pursued differed with the ages, but the aim remained the same, and the end in view was always the realization of these moments we are living now.¹¹

¹⁰ It was in this spirit that on January 12, 1958, fourteen key Syrian officers led by the Chief of Staff Bizri (who, it might be noted, was a communist sympathizer yet went along, Seale holds, most probably on communist instructions so that they could have their man at the centre of power in, a move which they could not arrest) boarded a plane for Cairo leaving behind a note to the cabinet declaring that the country was on the verge of collapse, that communism was gaining ground, and that union with Egypt was the remedy. Ibid; p. 320.

¹¹ Cited The Year Book of World Affairs, (London: Stevens, 1958), p. 164.

These retrospective rationalizations were further exemplified in an interview which Nasser granted the Columbia Broadcasting System of New York, on April 7, 1958, in which he was asked the following question:

Q. Sir, it has been charged abroad that the sudden union between Egypt and Syria was brought on by Syrian fears that their country might become a Soviet satellite. Any comment on this?

Nasser's reply was characteristic of the tendency to turn an unexpected occasion to advantage:

A. The American press fabricated stories, then believed them and based their judgments on such belief. The American press had throughout the past year been accusing Syrian leaders of being dominated by Communist influence and was, therefore, only strange that the same press should now claim that those leaders had been driven to unity with Egypt out of fear of Communist influence. The past and present conceptions of the American press in that regard were both erroneous since Syria had always had faith in Arab unity and had constantly sought to achieve that unity. Arab unity and faith in it constituted the incentive and the objective. 12

Yet even in Nasser's pronouncements on the subject shortly after the union there were hints of the real motivation of the union. For example, in a speech delivered by Nasser at Gomhouria Square, Cairo, on March 20, 1958 he said in part:

12 Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews, (Cairo: 1958) p. 378.

I myself, as Gamal Abdel Nasser, had reckoned with five years, even a little longer, for Egypt and Syria to be united. It was not I who brought about this unity of Egypt and Syria. Nor were any colleagues to any less or greater extent instrumental in bringing about this unity.

Indeed it was the Arab people in Syria and the Arab people in Egypt who willed and imposed this unity. 13

And in a speech delivered by Nasser in Damascus on February 26, 1958, the same surprise at the turn of events is echoed.

I never thought that I would come to Damascus these days. It never crossed my mind that I would be chosen President of the United Arab Republic, nor did it occur to me that unity could be accomplished as quickly as it was. I always thought that we had years before us, but you willed over here in Damascus and over there in Cairo that unity be accomplished and it was; so this unity is the outcome of your will, the will of the Arab people in Syria and Egypt. It

13 Speeches, p. 139 Emphasis added.

is also the expression of the will of the Arab peoples elsewhere. 14

Once union had been decided upon, Nasser insisted that the new united state should be unitary and not federal, as the Syrian Baath had hoped.

The reason for this insistence was that given the necessity of union, Egypt attempted to minimize the difference between its military and authoritarian regime, and the (albeit imperfect) parliamentary democracy of Syria. This could only be done by a dissolution of the Baath, and all other political parties, which Nasser regarded as symbols of internal division.

14 Ibid; p. 51

The motivations are more clearly revealed in Nasser's actions against Syrian communists shortly after the union.

Contrary to the minimization of the Communist threat as a decisive factor in the decision for union, Nasser took immediate steps to curb the influence of certain influential Communists.

On March 22, 1958, the resignation was announced of General Afifi Bizri, Syrian Commander-in-Chief since August 1957, who generally had been regarded as a pro-Communist.

Of this resignation, the Middle East correspondent of the Times wrote:

"it was unofficially conceded in informed Egyptian quarters that the decision to drop him from the team was taken by Col. Nasser because of his Communist connections."

Commenting on the removal of Bagdash and Azm, the correspondent added that it was:

"not to be overlooked that all three of the Syrian leaders who were supposed to be aligned on the Communist side against the Baathists -- the Communist Party leader, Khalid Bagdash, the deputy Premier Khalid el Azm, and General Bizri - have been removed from their positions since the proclamation of the Syrian-Egyptian union.

See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (Bristol: Keesings Publications Ltd; 1958) p. 16086.

As Lenczowski has put it:

This regime, based on full authority vested in President Nasser, could not tolerate the existence of any autonomous powered organization which, however informally, would preserve its machinery, cultivate its own ideology, and thus compete with the absolute center of power in Cairo. 15

Nasser also took care to neutralize the other effective centre of power in Syria, the Army, by removing leading Syrian military figures from Army duties and providing them with "safe offices." 16.

The nature of the Egyptian-Syrian union of February 1st, 1958, mirrored the predominance of political and psychological considerations over administrative and economic limitations, and in comparison with the rival Arab union of Iraq and Jordan (The "Arab Federation" proclaimed on February 14, 1958, largely in response to the U.A.R., its purely governmental counterpart,) increased both tangible and intangible capability factors in Egyptian foreign policy.

15 Lenczowski, op. cit. p. 528. Nasser took care to neutralize the two effective centres of power in Syria: The Army and the political parties.

These conditions were accepted by the Baath leaders in the belief that despite the formal ban, their party, as a representative of Socialist and Pan Arab ideology would continue their influence and would share in government.
Seale, op. cit. pp. 322-323.

16 Torrey, Gordon H., Syrian Politics and the Military: 1945-1958 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964) pp. 380-381.

The relative strengths and weaknesses of the two unions, in both the material and psychological spheres will now be considered.

If one applies the traditional criteria of geographic contiguity, good lines of communication, mutual resemblance of populations, and similarity of social organization and governmental structure, to the two unions, the Iraq-Jordanism federation, would appear more natural than the union of Syria and Egypt, where no such common features prevailed¹⁷. Egypt and Syria had no common frontier, were separated by everything except sea and air, yet neither had a major marine or a major air fleet.

There were differences of society, - for example the docile Egyptian peasant was an ill-mixture with the individualistic farmer of Syria, while Syrian businessmen were less malleable to control than their Egyptian counterparts - economics, law, local vested interests, and political life.¹⁸

However, on the basis of ideological criteria, the dominant elites of Egypt and Syria were both dedicated to the policy of Arab unity, social revolution, and neutralism.

¹⁷ Lenczowski, op. cit; p. 535

¹⁸ Longrigg, S.H., New Groupings among the Arab States, International Affairs, Volume 34, No. 3, July, 1958, p. 307

An examination of Baathist ideology¹⁹ bears out that the union was symptomatic of the new division along social lines in the Middle East, whereas the original conflicts in the Arab League, up until a short time before, had been accentuated by Saudi-Hashemite enmity, with Saudi Arabia on the Egyptian side²⁰.

The Hashemite Federation did Nasser the service of underlining the progressive aspect of Nasserite unity as opposed to the "reactionary" character of Hashemite unity.

Of prime importance in the intangible realm of Egypt's capability factors in the system was the fact that the Iraqi-Jordanian decision to federate was made by the respective Kings and Cabinets of Jordan and Iraq and was not taken to the people for approval.²¹

¹⁹ For analysis of Baathist ideology see supra pp. 101-102.

²⁰ F.R.L. The Meaning of the U.A.R. - the World Today, Vol. 14 (1958) p. 97.

²¹ Sayegh op. cit; p. 208
Iraq made an appearance of consultation of public opinion through a referendum on the federation but political parties had been abolished and the Syrian and Egyptian radio called for a boycott.
Birdwood, Lord Nurial-Said, a Study in Arab Leadership
(London: Cassell, 1959) p. 256.

Further, the Hashemite Federation was received with very little enthusiasm either in Iraq or Jordan, whereas by contrast, there was spontaneous popular enthusiasm about the formation of the U.A.R. among the people of Syria and Egypt who voted for it on February 21, by nearly one hundred percent majorities.²²

Though pro-Union demonstrations were banned and suppressed in Lebanon, and there was martial law in Jordan, popular enthusiasm was nevertheless expressed for the U.A.R.

The Hashemite Federation was formed as a reaction to the more immediate threat to Jordan and the more long-range threat to Iraq which the U.A.R. represented. As a reaction, it was at a distinct disadvantage in the psychological arena when contrasted with the supposed initiative towards Arab unity which the U.A.R. represented.

In addition the Iraqi-Jordanian Arab Federation appeared as a retrogression from the unity ideal, being a purely governmental union in which the two founding states were to preserve their political structures²³.

²² Whatever the degree of dissension, even those individuals who disagreed were forced by the overwhelming consensus of public opinion to remain silent or support the scheme.
Middle Eastern Affairs Vol. 19 June-July 1958 p. 207.

²³ Lenczowski, op. cit; p. 297; Sayegh, op. cit; p. 208.

Under the above circumstances Egyptian propaganda was able to exploit the "reactionary" nature of the Arab Federation, insinuating as well that it was a foreign aspiration.

As an example one might cite a speech delivered by President Nasser at Gomhourma Square, Cairo, on March 20th, 1958, in which he assailed the rival Hashemite Federation in themes characteristic of Egyptian propaganda on the subject:

After the proclamation of the U.A.R. came the announcement of the Hashemite Federation. The Hashemites have always dreamt of a federation ever since the first World War, but this talk about a federation was apparently waiting for outside inspiration in order that it might be realized. The idea of unity advocated by the Hashemites had been the dream of all the Arab peoples, why then had it never been realized up till that moment? The answer is simple: the Hashemites were forever waiting for the inspiration to come from London, but only when Egypt and Syria had united did this long-awaited inspiration come to them...

It was...obvious that the peaceful coexistence we had sought in the Arab nation was not being reciprocated, because the reactionaries in the Arab States believe that the Arab awakening, which has given birth to this union, constituted a danger for them, for their very existence and domination.

They conceived in their imagination aggressive intentions. They saw in all the principles we called for a danger threatening their thrones and positions of influence; their feudalism and their plunder and loot...²⁴

²⁴ Speeches, pp. 144-145.

The Hashemite Federation was assailed as a "sham union" and as a corollary of the "imperialist" Baghdad Pact. Its demise was confidently predicted. The U.A.R. on the other hand was represented as stemming from the "will of the people".

In a speech delivered by Nasser on February 26, 1958, in Damascus, Nasser said in part:

When we hear the statements issued in Baghdad last night, by the Iraqi Foreign Minister, to the effect that this union was established by force, against the will of the people, then I leave him to you. I leave him to hear the way in which the people of Damascus, and those of Cairo, are rejoicing at this union, at the creation of the United Arab Republic. This union, is a true union, emanating from the heart and soul of the people. This union is the embodiment of an age-long idea of liberal Arab thought. This union does not aim at promoting any personal interests, or at anything like that, but its aim is to establish the rule of the people by the people. It is not the sham union of which they are talking, such as the slogans of the Baghdad Pact; the sham unions which they have established, and which they said had been created to counteract the Egyptian-Syrian union. For they are but the chaff tossed about by the wind. Union shall gather the whole Arab Nation, whether they like it or not, because this is the will of the Arab people, in every Arab Country. 25

In addition to the psychological advantages which the ideological orientation of the U.A.R. possessed over that of the Arab Union there were tangible advantages which increased the capability

25 Speeches, p. 50. Emphasis added.

factors in Egyptian foreign policy.

The two new alignments were a realization in political terms of the economic cleavage between oil transit and oil production States²⁶, and Nasser's union had the advantage of a complete stranglehold on the waterway and on the landway through which the oil of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq had to come to the Mediterranean²⁷.

The Arab Union failed to offer any increase in tangible capability for its two components - Iraq and Jordan.

It failed to strengthen the Iraqi regime, as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait refused to join and the union did not lead to an extension of the Baghdad Pact to Jordan, Article 3 of the Arab Union constitution specifically precluding this²⁸.

²⁶ The Round Table Vol. 48 (1957-1958) New Arab Pattern, Federal Union in the Middle East, p. 231.

²⁷ Longrigg, Stephen H. Iraq (London: Benn, 1958) p. 309. It was this strategic advantage which partly was to explain King Saud's rejection of an invitation to join the Hashemite Federation for fear of an oil cut-off. The Saudi rejection precluded an expansion of the union.

Commenting on the economic strength of the U.A.R. Le Monde (Paris) wrote at the time "in addition to the republic's important agricultural and mineral resources one of the least negligible aspects of the economic strength of the new State is the fact that about nine-tenths of the oil from the Middle East crosses its territory either by way of the Suez Canal or through the pipelines of the Iraq Petroleum Company and Aramco.

(The pipelines referred to - four in number - are those which cross Syria from the Iraqi oil fields)." (Keesings, op. cit; 1958 p. 16005).

²⁸ see Iraq-Jordan Federation Agreement in Middle Eastern Affairs Vol. 9 March 1958 p. 112.

In fact, it proved a detraction from the security of tenure of the Iraqi regime for an attempt to buttress Jordan by moving in troops there was to deprive the regime of some of its more reliable military support²⁹.

Neither did the Arab Union strengthen the Jordanian regime. The potential of the Union for relieving the Jordanian economy was not realized.

Jordan could have had Iraq as an area of economic activity, reducing the regime's financial dependence on the United States and Britain (thus helping to remove its pro-Western stigma) and the refugee problem in Jordan could have been solved by widespread emigration to Iraq. As it turned out however, Iraq expected Jordan to continue to be financially supported by the United States and Britain and imposed restrictions on the migration of Jordanian citizens to Iraq³⁰.

The assurance of absolute control over the direction of Syria's policy, the consolidation of public support for the union

²⁹ Lenczowski, op. cit; p. 298.

³⁰ Marlowe, John, Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism, (London: Cresset Press, 1961), p. 165; Shwadran, Benjamin, Jordan: A State of Tension (New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1959), p. 375.

among the masses of other Arab countries, the strategic economic significance of the Union, all served to increase Egyptian foreign policy capabilities in both the intangible and tangible spheres.

The application of this increased capability to the system during this period will now be analyzed.

(B) Egypt's Utilization of its Enhanced Capability

1) Lebanon

Lebanon, during this period, was the focal point for a concerted U.A.R. thrust at Jordan and finally Iraq.

Egyptian attempts during the previous period to ensure the satellization of Lebanon and its identification with Egyptian foreign policy, by interference in the parliamentary elections of May-June 1957 - interference aiming at the prevention of Chamoun from having another term of office, and the securing of Lebanon's repudiation of the Eisenhower Doctrine - had been largely unsuccessful, due to the fraudulent manipulation of the voting process by the government.

Chamoun and Sami es-Solh, his Prime Minister, were still in power in spite of the substantial issue of money and arms by the supporters of Syria and Egypt during the elections. They had obtained 50 out of the 66 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

Yet this seeming vote of confidence obtained by the Chamoun government did not represent political actualities, and during the subsequent period (February 1 - July 14, 1958) the immediate aims of Egypt in Lebanon were the same - the prevention of Chamoun from having another term of office and the securing of Lebanon's repudiation of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The major immediate objective was to replace the Chamoun government by one that would follow Nasser's lead in foreign policy³¹. The means employed by Egypt towards this primary end will now be analyzed:

The main techniques employed by Egypt in Lebanon during this period were characteristic of the major reliance on non-diplomatic and non-military methods of intervention, of previous periods. They consisted mainly of: the subsidizing and direction of strikes and disturbances designed to keep Parliament from meeting to consider the amendment of the constitution, and to force Chamoun's resignation, a continuous radio and press propaganda campaign, and due to the relative passivity of the Lebanese Army, brought on largely by its sectarian divisions, a new feature - the collaboration with Syria in the infiltration

³¹ Nasser repeatedly declared even after the formation of the U.A.R. that he respected the existence of Lebanon as an independent state, and thus did not seek its absorption. Qubain, Fahim, I Crisis in Lebanon (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1961), p. 42.

of men and arms across the frontier, and sometimes by sea³².

The extent to which U.A.R. intervention in Lebanon was primarily responsible for the Lebanese rebellion of 1958 taking the form that it did, is a matter of much speculation. However there is abundant evidence of such interference and no objective observer denied it³³

As the subsequent analysis of Egyptian techniques in the Lebanon at this time will show, there was much truth in President Chamoun's allegations that:

Interference by the U.A.R. is but one mile stone of its desire to dominate the Arab world. An earlier mile stone was in April, 1957, when an attempt was made to overthrow the legal authorities in Jordan. We knew then that the Lebanon would be the next victim of a similar attempt. As a matter of fact, the smuggling of military equipment on a large scale and the infiltration of 'volunteers' and terrorists - Syrians, Egyptians, Palestinians, - began at that time. Three or four months ago, the smuggling of arms and men began to accelerate to the extent that the present armed rebellion became possible...³⁴

³² Annual Register of World Events (1958) p. 322

one might also include among the measures the issue of Egyptian passports by the U.A.R. Embassy in Beirut to Lebanese citizens belonging to the opposition to help them or their families to escape from the Lebanon. Keesings op. cit; 1958, p. 16293.

³³ With the exception of the UN Observation Team which came to Lebanon later to control the Syro-Lebanese frontier, and which had no safe and secure access to opposition-held areas, was numerically inadequate, and did not carry out any patrols at night. Marlowe op. cit; p. 171.

³⁴ Keesing's, op. cit; 1958, p. 16293. News conference given by President Chamoun on June 25, 1958.

These techniques will now be analyzed.

As examples of Egyptian support and direction of strikes and disturbances one may cite the following:

On March 29, there were riots in the southern town of Tyre and sympathetic strikes in other towns of this predominantly Muslem region when five youths were sent to jail for trampling on the Lebanese flag and replacing it with that of the U.A.R. The Minister of Education stated that a local college largely staffed by Egyptian teachers had had a good deal to do with the incidents³⁵.

After the murder on May 7-8, 1958, of Nasib Matni, editor of a major opposition newspaper in Beirut, the United National Front declared a general strike throughout the country, a strike which was well subsidized by Egypt and Syria.³⁶ The Front demanded the immediate resignation of Chamoun and the formation of a "Salvation" caretaker cabinet until a new president was elected. They declared that the strike would continue until their demands were met. The purpose of the strike was to bring about the downfall of the administration.

It was this strike, which though failing to bring about the downfall of the administration, (the strike itself was only partially successful, failing for example in Beirut with its cosmopolitan

³⁵ Kirk, G.E. Contemporary Arab Politics: A Concise History (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 125.

³⁶ Ibid; p. 127

population); developed into a full-fledged rebellion, beginning in Tripoli on May 9, 1958, and spreading by May 12, 1958 to Beirut³⁷.

There is abundant evidence as well of a sustained Egyptian radio and press propaganda campaign against the Chamoun regime during this period.

The characteristic feature of Egyptian press and radio propaganda at this time was a mounting incitement of the people of Lebanon to rebel against its government.

As Lebanese Foreign Minister, Dr. Charles Malik put it in an address to the U.N. Security Council on June 6, 1958:

Thus, long before the present disturbances broke out on May 9, there were unmistakable preparations for them in the press and radio of the U.A.R., and a mood of expectancy was sedulously cultivated whereby people were made to expect that some great "event" was about to take place, that the "uprising of the people" was just around the corner, that the fall of the "tyrant" was "imminent." 38

This accusation is borne out by the following illustrative samples of Egyptian radio and press propaganda attacks on the government of Lebanon. It should be noted that though most of these quotations are taken from newspaper editorials, the U.A.R. government could not (as it subsequently tried) disclaim responsibility for them, as they were broadcast over the State-controlled radio station in reviews of the press,

³⁷ Qubain, op. cit; pp. 71-72.

³⁸ UN DOC S/P v. 823, June 6th, 1958, pp. 2-50.

and because the press was State-controlled.

Commenting on the murder of Al-Matni under the headline

"Victim in Battle of Lebanese People" Al-Sha-ub wrote on May 9, 1958:

...The free and struggling people well know how these rulers have committed crimes against them time after time. The people know how they rigged the elections in order to elect a Chamber of Deputies from among their supporters so that they would condone their crimes and overlook the blood which smears their hands. The people know how their rulers tied themselves to the bandwagons of imperialism, to its pacts and doctrines, and how they threaten to resort to fleets and guns to protect them and save the seats which shake under them.

... the free men of Lebanon are much greater in number than imagined by Camille Shamun and his criminal gang. These free men of Lebanon will not allow the blood of Nasib al-Matni to be shed unavenged. The blood of Nasib al-Matni is the fuel which will feed the torch of freedom in Lebanon and which inflames the spirit of sacrifice in the people of Lebanon until final victory is accomplished for these struggling people against their traitorous and assassin rulers...39

On May 10th Al-Ahram wrote, and Radio Cairo rebroadcast the following rhetorical question

We wonder does the Lebanese President wish to remain in office despite this great number of martyrs? Does he wish to renew his term of presidency over all these bodies and victims? 40

A personal threat to Chamoun was uttered in Al-Sha'b on May 11th

39 Cited Qubain, op. cit; p. 220 Emphasis added.

40 Cited Ibid.

O President Chamoun: beware of a bloodbath not for the sake of the people of Lebanon whom you antagonized and upon whom you declared war, but for your own sake. You will be the first to drown in the bloodbath. 41

Egypt's attitude to the Chamoun regime was summed up and an inciting call issued in flowing phrases in an article in Al-Sha'b on May 28, 1958.

Under the headline "Tomorrow Every Shamun will Fall":

We once said that Shamun is the first line of defence of imperialism, the Baghdad Pact, and the Eisenhower Plan. Today we declare that you, free Lebanese people, are the first line of defence of Arab nationalism, Arab independence, and the self-liberated Arab policy. The existence of Shamun or his kind means that Lebanon will remain a center for plots and a foreign base in the midst of our homeland, weaving conspiracies, engineering aggression, and threatening peace.

Shamun therefore must go. To us Shamun is not specifically Camille alone but represents every enemy of the Arab people and peace. So strike and strike again, beloved Lebanese people. 42

At the same time, the Egyptian propaganda machine attempted to present a simplified, one-sided picture of a purely domestic insurrection with no Egyptian interference.

Characteristic of these protestations of outraged innocence was a pronouncement made by Nasser in an interview given to the "Al-Shaab" Daily on June 29, 1958:

41 Cited Ibid; p. 221 Emphasis added.

42 Cited Ibid; p. 223 Emphasis added.

The rulers of Lebanon have since the beginning of the revolution in that country attempted by all means at their disposal to convert a purely internal crisis into an international issue, levelling all sorts of accusations at the United Arab Republic and deliberately avoiding all reference to the Lebanese opposition with no object in view other than the suppression of an internal revolution with the aid of foreign forces and the persecution of the opposition leaders. 43

The extent of Egyptian infiltration of arms into Lebanon during this period is less clear-cut than the interference which Egyptian inflammatory propaganda and press attacks on the government clearly represented.

The production of conclusive evidence to substantiate the Lebanese government's charges of Egyptian controlled armed infiltration into Lebanon during this period is extremely difficult⁴⁴.

⁴³ Speeches, 1958, pp. 344-345.

⁴⁴ Fahim I. Qubain has made an intensive study of the question of arms infiltration into Lebanon during this period, on the basis of information gathered from Lebanese sources, evidence represented to the Security Council and news reports and concludes that allegations of Egyptian government complicity in the substantial flow of arms from Syria should be qualified by the following considerations: (1) Lebanese, and especially the mountain people do carry arms most of the time. (2) Smuggling arms for purely monetary gain is a common occurrence in Beirut. Thus part of the arms brought from Syria into Lebanon were brought in by professional smugglers for purely monetary gain. The stock of arms possessed by professional smugglers was further augmented by the distribution of arms to civilians in Syria during the Suez war in 1956, and several times during 1957, especially during the Suez crisis. See Qubain op. cit; pp. 138-141.

U.A.R. intervention in Lebanon took place during this period in the context of personal antagonism between President Chamoun and almost every important political leader in the country,⁴⁵ aggravated by his attempt to succeed himself in contravention of the constitution, and exacerbated by his regime's violation of the National Covenant through formal adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine, and its close relations with Britain, the United States, Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan.

This widespread dissatisfaction with the Chamoun regime within Lebanon acted as positive incentives for Egyptian subversion attempts in a situation in which on the one hand the direction of policy of the regime posed a direct challenge to Egyptian attempts to secure the insulation of the system, and on the other, there existed significant foci of opposition to this regime that as a minimum were to support Egyptian foreign policy objectives.

The formation of the U.A.R. had increased the positive impulsions to an active policy on the part of Egypt in the Lebanon, as abundant evidence of mass support for the new union among a substantial segment of the Lebanese population was soon forthcoming.

Striking evidence of this support may be gauged from the

⁴⁵ The composition of the Lebanese opposition to the Chamoun regime has previously been outlined. See Supra pp. 237-243.

arrival in Damascus shortly after the union, of a large representative delegation of the United National Front, (under which the majority of the organized Lebanese opposition was grouped),⁴⁶ to pay its respects to Nasser.

Saeb Salem (one of the principal leaders of the United National Front, one of the two Sunni members of the Lebanese cabinet who had resigned during the Suez crisis in protest against Chamoun's refusal to break off relations with Britain and France), addressed Nasser on behalf of the delegation as follows:

The Lebanese people see in you and in this new homeland which you have founded, the best proof for the preservation of their entity and independence. ⁴⁷

The extent of enthusiasm among significant segments of the Lebanese population for the formation of the U.A.R. may be gauged as well from the fact that during Nasser's visit to Damascus shortly after the union, between three hundred and three hundred and fifty thousand

⁴⁶ For an analysis of the Front's composition see Supra, pp. 231-242.

⁴⁷ Radio Damascus February 25, 1958, 1915 GMT cited in Qubain op. cit; p. 63

Lebanese visitors came to that city to pay homage to him⁴⁸.

As to the reasons for the types of techniques employed by Egypt in Lebanon during this period, they were characteristic of the major reliance on non-diplomatic measures in a situation where Egypt commanded the loyalty of a substantial segment of the Arab population against its government.

The subsidizing and direction of strikes and disturbances, and the radio and press campaign were standard features of Egyptian methods of subversion.

The major departure from standard measures in Lebanon during this period was the smuggling of arms and the active formation of paramilitary bands under Egyptian and Syrian direction⁴⁹.

⁴⁸ Qubain, op. cit; p. 67.

Evidence of mass support in Lebanon for the U.A.R. may also be gathered from the fact that the Lebanese Government on February 1, 1958, the day of the U.A.R.'s formation, found it necessary to issue a ban on pro U.A.R. demonstrations. In spite of this ban, demonstrations still took place in Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon where Egyptian and Syrian flags were flown, Ibid; p. 60

It is also apparent from the fear which the Lebanese government exhibited for the increased potency of Egyptian radio and press propaganda after the formation of the U.A.R. On February 19, 1958 barely three weeks after the union, the Lebanese Council of Ministers sought powers from the Chamber of Deputies to suppress propaganda financed by foreign funds, if its aim was considered harmful to the country or likely to cause disturbances - an obvious reference to Egyptian propaganda. Ibid; p. 62.

⁴⁹ as was shown previously, however, evidence of Egyptian complicity in this regard, while suggestive is not conclusive. See supra p.306

Conditions in Lebanon were especially favourable for these latter techniques - more so than in Iraq or Jordan. This was due to the fact that the Lebanese army - being about equally divided along sectarian lines, could be used neither for subverting nor - what was of greater significance - for sustaining the authority of the government⁵⁰.

⁵⁰ The Lebanese army's relative ineffectiveness in the field of internal security was due to a number of reasons: it was a heterogeneous group which might easily split along ideological and consessional lines in time of crisis. At the same time its commander, General Shehab was opposed to a political role for the army due to his realization that the extensive connections of the increasing opposition to Chamoun - including important religious leaders, former presidents, Prime Ministers, and other important government officials would almost certainly bring some form of retaliation. He believed in a moderating role for the Army. Ibid; pp.81-83; Cremeans, op. cit; p. 102.

Facility in arms smuggling was also due to the fact that throughout the major part of the rebellion against the Chamoun regime, pro-government forces controlled nearly eighteen kilometers of territory of Lebanon's three hundred and twenty-four kilometer-long border with Syria. The rest was under rebel control. Lenczowski op. cit; p. 335.

It should be noted that the government did enjoy the full support of certain para-military formations - members of the Phalanges Libanaises and the Syrian National Party (Parti Populaire Syrian or P.P.S.)

The Phalanges Libanaises was a forty-thousand member para-military organization, mostly Maronite, fanatical advocates of a pro-western "independent" Lebanon and suspicious of Arab nationalism. Qubain op. cit; pp. 83-84.

The second major power of military support for the government came from the twenty-five thousand member militant Syrian National Party. In spite of their platform favouring union of "Natural Syrians", and while they were not legalized until 1958, there were rumours of contact between Chamoun and the P.P.s. leadership as early as 1955.

Agwani, M.S. ed. The Lebanese Crisis, 1958 (London: Asia Publishing House, 1965) p. 55; Qubain op. cit; pp. 84-5.

The extent to which U.A.R. interference specifically, in the Lebanon, was primarily responsible for the Lebanese rebellion of 1958, taking the form that it did, is a matter of much speculation⁵¹.

Whatever the relative significance of outside Egyptian interference and the workings of the purely internal factors in bringing about the war, it could be said at least that Egyptian intervention on the side of the insurgents was an important factor in its intensification.

It could be said by July, 1958, with a fair degree of certainty that Egypt had achieved her primary immediate objective in Lebanon, for the issue of Chamoun's re-election had been settled in her favour.

In interviews with the correspondents of Newsweek and the United Press during the first week of July, Chamoun stated that he would step down on September 23, when his term expired.

On May 27, 1958, the Prime Minister, Sami Al-Sulh, speaking on behalf of the government, had said in a broadcast to the nation that the President had not requested an amendment of the constitution and that neither the government nor the Chamber of Deputies intended to bring about an amendment⁵².

⁵¹ The beginnings of the actual rebellion may be traced to a general strike called by the United National Front on May 7, 1958, and well subsidized by Egypt and Syria. Though failing to bring about the desired downfall of the administration it was this strike which developed into a full-fledged rebellion, beginning in Tripoli on May 9, 1958, and spreading by May 12, 1958 to Beirut. Kirk op cit; p. 127; Qubain pp. 71-72.

⁵² Mid-East Mirror, June 1, 1958, p. 6 cited in Qubain op. cit; p. 154.

Thus Chamoun had been pressured into relinquishing his attempt to have another term of office. The prospect of a post civil war compromise government which would de-emphasize Lebanon's links with the West (such as the formal acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine) seemed an ever greater possibility, and Egypt's primary objectives in Lebanon seemed assured of fulfillment.

(2) Jordan

Egyptian objectives in Jordan during this period were unchanged from those of the previous period⁵³. The major aims still were: the isolation and possible elimination of King Hussein, and the neutralization of the country.

The main instruments of this policy were the same: assassination attempts, and a radio and propaganda campaign.

Internal conditions of repression, characteristic of the previous period - including the suppression of political parties and the arrest or imprisonment of former pro-Egyptian political leaders, remained the same, and contributed in like degree to a lack of success of Egyptian subversive attempts.

⁵³ See Supra, pp. 270-279.

Evidence of the similarity between the major instruments of Egyptian foreign policy in Jordan during this period and those of the previous period is revealed in the following examples:

The continuing emphasis on assassination attempts was evidenced by the July 12, 1958 arrest of sixty officers, including Hussein's body-guard, on charges of plotting to assassinate the King - under the direction of, and with the financial support of the U.A.R.⁵⁴

The continuing intensity of the Egyptian radio and press propaganda campaign characterized by personal invective, was evidenced by an attack made on the Premier of Jordan, on February 27, 1958, by Nasser in an address delivered at Damascus. Parts of this address are here quoted:

Your Republic was attacked by Fadel El-Gamaly and Bash-Ayan, the agents of imperialism in Iraq. And in Amman Samir el-Rifai, the imperialist's ace agent and oldest stooge, also attacked your Republic...

You know these people full well and so do I. They are the agents of imperialism and as such their span of influence and power is but a short lived thing. They are striving to prolong their lives and ward off their inevitable fate but the day will soon come when their people will sit in judgment upon them. God willing, we shall all witness this day.

...I must tell you that these stooges of imperialism are a lot more dangerous than imperialism itself. It is true that Samir El-Rifai has imprisoned the free men of Jordan but he will not escape their mighty grip. When he attacks your Republic he does not do so to appease his conscience or to please his people.

⁵⁴ Shwadran op. cit. p. 379. See also U.N. Sec'y Council S/PV 831 July 17, 1958.

He does it solely to please his lords and masters, the imperialists, and again to oblige the dollar. And so does Bash Ayan for when Bash Ayan, Foreign Minister of Iraq, declares that they stand against the United Republic, he does it merely to gratify imperialism of which he is a great supporter, but the day when these Arab traitors are judged will soon come.... 55

(C) The Failure of the Saudi Attempt to Subvert the Syrian - Egyptian Union.

The psychological implications of the formation of the U.A.R. have been analyzed⁵⁶.

In addition, it was pointed out that the union represented a strategic consolidation of control over the oil-production states of Iraq and Saudi Arabia and that fear of an oil cut-off was a major factor in Saud's reluctance to join the rival conservative union.⁵⁷ The media of Egyptian influence in Saudi Arabia has previously been discussed⁵⁸, as well as the abundant examples of the subversive activities of Egyptian attache's in Jordan, Lebanon, and to a lesser extent Iraq, which could at this time serve as a lesson to Saud of what could happen in his own country.

⁵⁵ Speeches, op. cit; pp. 56-57. Emphasis added.

The new feature of Egyptian press and propaganda attacks on the Hashemite Federation, characterizing it as a reactionary foreign aspiration has previously been illustrated. See Supra pp. 295-296.

⁵⁶ See Supra, pp. 302-306.

⁵⁷ A deputation sent to Riyaadh was told that Saudi Arabia would join neither union - Annual Register, 1958, p. 319.

⁵⁸ See Supra pp. 242-250.

The formation of the U.A.R, was under these circumstances, seen by Saud as an increased threat to the security of his regime, and provoked a protective reaction - an attempt by Saud to bribe Syria's executive minister of the interior - Colonel Sarraj, paying one million pounds to have a coup d'etat carried out, which would aim at the secession of Syria from the recently formed union, as well as the assassination of Nasser. Saud attempted to use his father-in-law in Damascus as a contact man with certain Syrian Army Officers⁵⁹.

The failure of the Saudi plot precipitated an internal crisis in the Saudi Arabian leadership which, coinciding with grave financial difficulties, severely detracted from Saudi Arabia's ability to challenge the Egyptian initiative in foreign affairs during this period⁶⁰, and led eventually to a renewed avowal of neutralism and a partial reorientation of policy towards Nasser⁶¹.

⁵⁹ Karanjia, R.K. Arab Dawn (Bombay: Blitz, 1958) p. 156.

⁶⁰ Lenczowski op. cit; p. 568.

This financial crisis was due to a marked depreciation in Saudi currency brought on by lack of regular budgeting, overspending, and the incurrence of substantial debts. Owing to the financial crisis politically conscious strata in the kingdom, merchants, some princes, and the budding intelligentsia had been pressing for reform and a change in government.

⁶¹ However, as will be shown this "neutralism" was not to imply that Saudi Arabia had become a willing tool of Egyptian foreign policy objectives.

Just as during the Syrian crisis, Egyptian foreign policy objectives achieved an advance largely as a result of an unexpected policy blunder on the part of an opponent.

Saudi Crown Prince Feisal, who had received a long training in foreign affairs, - (lacking in Saud's background,) ⁶² - had long been critical of his brother Saud's estrangement from Egypt and cooperation with Iraq, as well as his handling of Saudi financial affairs.

The charge against Saud after the failure of the assassination plot was the very thing Feisal was looking for as a pretext to pressure Saud to modify his foreign policy and to undertake a drastic reorganization of the government ⁶³.

Saud, for his part, allegedly feared the consequences of any opposition to Feisal, believing that if the latter left the country he would assume an exile in Egypt and conduct a damaging campaign against him ⁶⁴.

This fear and the internal pressure which was being exerted on Saud, together with the embarrassment before Arab nationalist public opinion in other Arab countries which Saud had suffered as a result of the

⁶² Mowat, R.C. Middle East Perspective, (London: Blandford Press, 1958) p. 85.

⁶³ Shwadrán, op. cit; p. 737.

⁶⁴ Karanjia op. cit; p. 157

exposure of the plot,⁶⁵ brought about the assumption of full legislative

65 The Egyptian propaganda apparatus had been able to make good capital out of the plot's exposure, aiming no doubt at the isolation of the Saudi regime from Arab nationalist public opinion, as well as the intensification of divisions within the Saudi royal family, especially between Saud and Feisal.

(A change in the nature of Egyptian propaganda attacks had been taking place since January, 1958 after the initial hesitancy described earlier (See Supra pp.248-9). In January, 1958 a personal propaganda attack on Saud accused him of having sold Dahrein to the Americans, and of having bought the price of Iraq's renunciation of the throne of the Hedjaz by offering the Iraqi Prince a future Syrian Kingdom. *Chronique de Politique E'trangere*, Brussels, Vol. 12 No. 3-4 p. 443.

The isolation of Saudi Arabia was not the only objective of Egyptian propaganda attacks following the plot's exposure. For example, Nasser's revelation of the plot in a speech on the occasion of the proclamation of the provisional constitution of the U.A.R. on March 5, 1958 was done in such a manner as to extol the virtues of the Army (whom Saud had tried to bribe) as a prelude to the extension of monolithic military rule to Syria and the abolition of political freedoms. This is evidenced by the following excerpt:

..."Today, brethren, they tried to incite the army against the people. They tried before to separate the Army from the people. But as I told you at the beginning of my speech, the army is only a servant to the people.

The army has taken upon itself and has taken an oath to give the blood and life of its men to the people and to this good earth

Today we will all unite, people and Army, with no parties. We are all one man, to protect this republic, and to protect these principles and ideals."

Speeches, pp. 85-86. Emphasis added.

After Prince Feisal assumed power and vowed "neutralism" in foreign affairs, attacks against Saudi Arabia ceased in the Cairo press. *Chronique de Politique e'trangere*, Vol. 12 No. 3-4, pp. 443-44. Attacks in the Syrian press on the Saudi regime did not cease however and the extent to which Cairo supported these attacks is a matter of conjecture *Orient*, 1958, No. 2, p. 97.

and executive powers in the fiscal, internal, and foreign fields by Crown Prince Feisal, on March 24, 1958.

The transfer of power from King Saud to Feisal, was to signify only a partial success for Egypt. It was soon to appear that the change did not bring about that unity of foreign policy which was Nasser's primary objective in Saudi Arabia at this time.

On the one hand, a growing estrangement of Saudi Arabia from Jordan and Iraq under Feisal's leadership was evidenced by his recall of Saudi troops from Jordan and his refusal in April 1958 to receive a military mission from Iraq that was supposed to replace the Egyptian mission that had been expelled the preceding month by Saud⁶⁶, but on the other hand the guarded nature of Saudi "neutralism" was revealed when Feisal did not recall the Egyptian military mission to take the place of the Iraqis⁶⁷.

It seemed that in essence Saudi foreign and Arab policies did not undergo any significant change, and there was grave doubt as to whether Egypt would tolerate a continuation of this guarded "neutralism". As one astute observer remarked in evaluating the significance of the change in government for Egyptian foreign policy:

Mais est-ce à dire que l'Egypt soit disposée pour
autant à se contenter d'un succès de prestige et à
accepter très longtemps sans réagir que se continue
sous Feysal une politique de neutralité au fond assez

⁶⁶ These units had been in Jordan since April, 1957.
See Laurent Francois "L'Arabie Se'oudite à l'heure de Choix,
Orient, No. 6; 1958, p. 96.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

voisine de celle qu'elle a refuse d'admettre lorsqu'elle etait le fait de s6'oud. Tres probablement pas. 68

(D) The Role of Egypt in the Iraqi Coup and the Significance of this Event for Egyptian Policy in the Arab System.

Primary sources relating to Egypt's role in the Iraqi coup of July 14th, 1958 are largely unavailable. According to all available evidence the Cairo Government was not responsible either for the planning or the execution of the Iraqi coup, which was of General Kassem's and his associate's own making.⁶⁹

It is now known that a Free Officer's Movement, deeply impressed with the example of Egypt, was developing in the Iraqi army and gradually emerged as an integrated, secret organization, which by 1957 was waiting for an opportunity to put its plan, which contained an important element of surprise, into action.⁷⁰

As General Kassem has put it:

Perhaps we should thank the foolishness of those who decided to send part of the army to Jordan, for they facilitated the revolution and destroyed themselves. 71

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Lenczowski, op. cit; p. 300.

⁷⁰ Jargy, Simon une page d'histoire de la révolution irakienne le procès d'Abdal Salem Aref Orient, No. 12 (1959) pp. 85-6. See also Caractacus, Revolution in Iraq (London: Collancz, 1939) pp. 118-122.

⁷¹ Keesings, op. cit; 1958, p. 16307.

The internal security measures taken by the regime of Nuri Said have already been analyzed⁷² and the relative impotence of the civilian opposition has been explained⁷³.

Notwithstanding the fact that the civilian opposition was powerless to bring about a political change, it was noted that the majority of politically articulate segments of the Iraqi population⁷⁴ were estranged from the regime.

Their opposition was based both on internal grounds, and because of the Iraqi government's collaboration with Western "imperialism", (seen as the root of much of the domestic difficulties in Iraq) and the regime's isolation from Egypt and Syria and what was considered the mainstream of Arab nationalism of Pan-Arabism and reformism.

One can therefore say that Egyptian foreign policy techniques operated indirectly: Egyptian propaganda attacks aiming at the isolation of the Iraqi regime and which have previously been analyzed⁷⁵, were largely responsible for the stimulation of the psychological condition essential to the success of the conspiracy within the army - the only body within Iraq at this time which was capable of effecting a political change.⁷⁶

⁷² See supra pp. 114-115.

⁷³ See supra Ibid.

⁷⁴ For an analysis of the internal opposition to the Iraqi regime see Chapter four.

⁷⁵ See supra Ibid.

⁷⁶ Caractus, op. cit; p. 120.

To Egypt, the Iraqi coup marked the end of the long conflict with Iraq over the Baghdad Pact, and represented a victory for the primary Egyptian foreign policy objectives:- the destruction of Western-sponsored defence schemes and the attainment of a unity of foreign policy based on positive neutralism.

This interpretation of the Iraqi revolution was mirrored in a statement which Nasser made on July 18, 1958, upon the reception of an Iraqi ministerial deputation in Damascus, that the Iraqis had "won a victory over Imperialism and exploitation", and had:

smashed their fetters and demolished the walls of their great jail. They have now joined us. We can now become a great force, capable of defeating the tyrants, capable of defeating aggression, and I should like to say to your brethren in Baghdad that we are with them heart and soul, that we carry arms with them and that we are ready to shed our blood, every drop of our blood, for them. 77

The identity of purpose of the U.A.R. and the new Iraqi republic was further echoed in Nasser's speech on the eve of July 23, 1958 on the occasion of Revolution Day, during which he said in part:

In your name, brethren, and in the name of the whole Arab nation, I welcome the delegation from Iraq, and if to-day we are celebrating as we did five times before, our revolution day, the 23rd of July, we are

77 Speeches, p. 219

Nasser called the revolution "the greatest triumph hitherto of Arab nationalism" Ibid; p. 400.

really celebrating two days, the 23rd of July in Cairo and the 14th of July in Baghdad for each compliments the other and the victory of the Arab Nation is but one victory, the causes of its struggle are one and so are its objectives. 78

The coup's significance was described in the same vein by Nasser, somewhat later, in Nasser's opening speech at the first meeting of the Council of the Union of Arab States (The Union between Yemen and the U.A.R.):

We thank God that this meeting occurs after the annihilation of the Baghdad Pact which was set up to separate and to weaken and destroy the countries of the Arab Nation. This pact was destroyed by the people and army of Iraq.

This achievement was the result of the long and bitter struggle of the sons of the Arab Nation in every Arab country, with the struggling Iraqi people taking the lead. They fought the Baghdad Pact because they knew that it was established for the purpose of placing the whole area under foreign domination, under British domination. They knew that the pact aimed at making Baghdad stand against the Arabs. Baghdad struggled, and the Iraqi people struggled to destroy the pact and now Iraq has become united with the Arab people against their enemies. 79

And further in a speech on December 23, 1958, on the occasion of "Victory Day" celebrations at Port Said:

The collapse of the Baghdad Pact meant that no voice but the voice of its sons themselves could be raised over this part of the world, and that no voice other than the voice of the Arabs themselves could be raised

78 Ibid; p. 225.

79 Ibid; pp. 253-254.

over the Arab nation, where there was no room no more for foreign domination. 80

With regard to the question of the type of unity desired with the new Iraqi regime it appeared that the propositions concerning the qualified nature of Egyptian unity objectives - signifying solidarity in foreign policy rather than comprehensive union applied here as well.

The Egyptians no doubt realized that strong administrative obstacles existed to the implementation of immediate union with Iraq, in spite of the positive incentives which Iraq's oil wealth presented as a source of badly needed capital for economic development and industrialization.

Further, they were aware of the opposition to a policy of immediate union by a strong section of Iraqi opinion and also by the large Kurdish minority in the Mosul and Kirkuk regions of Northern Iraq.

As Marlowe has put it:

In Iraq...which had a definite geographical and historical entity and which, in the Kurds, had within its borders a large and powerful non-Arab minority, Iraqi nationalism was a principle of unity between Arabs and Kurds while pan-Arabism was a principle of division between Arabs and Kurds. And to a lesser extent, since pan-Arabism was associated principally with Sunni Islam, it acted not as a principle of unity but as a principle of division between the Sunni and Shia sects...In

80 Ibid; p. 351

Iraq, therefore, pan-Arabism had undertones of subordination and disruptiveness which would have been incomprehensible in Syria or Jordan, and communism became a much more acceptable alternative to discontented nationalists that it was either in Syria or Jordan. For it was not difficult for communism to be represented, in terms of Iraqi nationalism, as a much more patriotic alternative than pan-Arabism. Thus reformist elements, both inside and outside the army, tended to become divided between pan-Arabism and communism. Since all reformist elements had been driven underground by the authoritarian nature of the regime, particularly after the suppression of political parties in September 1954, this rivalry did not become generally apparent until after the revolution in July, 1958. 81

Statements later in the year bear out that the unity which Nasser contemplated did not imply immediate comprehensive union but rather a close cooperation and common front on foreign policy. For example, in an interview which Nasser gave to Mr. R.K. Karanjia, editor of Blitz Newsmagazine of India, on September 28, 1958, the question and answer sequence was as follows:

Question: What will be the future pattern of Iraq's collaboration with the United Arab Republic - complete unity, a federation or confederation, or simply an alliance?

Answer: That is an issue for the new Republic of Iraq to decide for herself. So far as we are concerned, we welcome cooperation with any Arab country to the extent she desires.

Question: In this context, may I have your views on the present controversies in regard to the complete union or some alliance as the pattern for cooperation of Arab countries in the future:

81 Marlowe, op. cit; p. 180.

Answer: We have no plan or pattern as such. We like to depend on historical forces and the crystallization of the will of the people in the case of each liberated country. I want you to understand quite clearly that we do not wish to force the pace of the pattern of events. Everything must evolve naturally and on the basis of popular faith. My chief concern is Arab solidarity as it is the only sound basis on which Arab nationalism can stand. 82

That the Iraqi revolution did in fact represent a decisive victory for Egyptian efforts at a unity of foreign policy, is reflected in the first public statement by General Kassem on July 14th, which contained promises of a foreign policy conforming to "the principles of the Bandung Conference" i.e. a policy of neutralism and non-alignment.⁸³

Another example of the apparent unity in foreign policy between the new Iraqi regime and Egypt is contained in an agreement signed between U.A.R. and Iraq on July 19, 1958, containing the following provisions:

- 1) reaffirmed full support for the Arab League Charter and Collective Security Pact.
- 2) "Cooperating as one bloc" Iraq and the U.A.R. would take all measures to repulse an attack against either country.
- 3) Both countries would "cooperate fully in the international field to safeguard the rights of the two countries..."
- 4) "Urgent and effective steps" would be taken to promote economic and cultural cooperation between the U.A.R. and Iraq.

82 Emphasis added.

Ibid; pp. 400-401. In late 1958 commentary in the British press was to suggest that Iraqi Deputy Premier Aref's agitation in favour of immediate union with the U.A.R. had not been approved by President Nasser who was believed to have supported Brigadier Kassem during the struggles between the Iraqi leaders (Annual Register of World Events - 1958, p. 322.)

83 Cited Lenczowski, op. cit; pp. 298-299.

- 5) "Continuous contact and consultations" would be maintained between the two countries in all matters concerning them. 84

Further evidence of an apparent unity in foreign policy between the Iraqi Revolutionary Government and the Egyptian regime was presented when Iraq joined in the inflammatory propaganda war on Jordan.

On July 16, 1958 Baghdad Radio called on the Jordanian people to revolt against King Hussein and his Prime Minister (Mr. Samir Refai) who were described as "traitors and agents of imperialism." 85

The Hashemite Federation was practically a dead-letter though it was not formally destroyed until August 2nd, 1958. Though the regime issued inconsistent statements on the Baghdad Pact, and Iraq nominally remained a member until 1959, July 14th represents the cut-off date for the practical value of the Pact.

However, inspite of the apparent achievement of a unity in foreign policy between Iraq and Egypt, the victory for Egyptian objectives in the Arab system which the Iraqi revolution at first sight seemed to represent was not unqualified.

There existed in the system at the time of the coup ominous factors, the presence of which presented potential dangers to Egyptian interests.

84 Cited Keesing's op. cit; 1958, p. 16333.

85 Ibid; p. 16305.

In Lebanon, for example, it had appeared - after Chamoun's statement during the first week of July - that Nasser had achieved his primary objectives - the prevention of the President from having a second term of office, and the repudiation of the Eisenhower Doctrine (which had appeared only a matter of time with the occurrence of the first objective - given the inroads which the opposition had made).

The success of the Iraqi revolution, however, raised the spectre of a reversal for Nasser in Lebanon, due to invention by the United States under a make-shift utilization of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The causal connection between American intervention and the events in Iraq was to be alluded to by President Eisenhower in a statement on July 15th, announcing the landing of American marines:

President Chamoun made clear that he considered an immediate U.S. response imperative if Lebanon's independence, already menaced from without, were to be preserved in the face of the grave developments which occurred yesterday in Baghdad, whereby the lawful government was violently overthrown and many of its members martyred. 86

For Washington, it was an hour of trial in the Arab system. Failure to go to the assistance of the Lebanese regime (in spite of the fact that such assistance could not be rationalized under protection

86 Cited Keesings op. cit; 1958, p. 16306.

against Communism) would have led to the disintegration of the entire military and political position of the United States in the area. Her alliances would no longer appear trustworthy.

The first contingents of three thousand American marines landed⁸⁷ in Beirut on July 15th, followed by further units of the army.

The purpose of United States intervention, which proved to be of a mediatory nature between government and anti-government forces, could not have been completely clear to Nasser at this time, and it appeared as if it might have as its goal the indefinite support of the Chamoun regime.

Similarly, in Jordan, the success of the Iraqi coup in bringing about the demise of the Hashemite Federation was overshadowed by the prospects of immediate foreign intervention, by Britain.

This foreign intervention (consisting of a paratrooper force)⁸⁸ also had the Iraqi coup as its immediate cause.

The pretext for this intervention was an alleged "imminent attempt by the U.A.R. to create internal disorder and to overthrow

⁸⁷ Middle Eastern Affairs, Volume 9, August - September, 1958, p. 297.

⁸⁸ Ibid; p. 294.

the present regime on the pattern of recent events in Iraq.⁸⁹

However, naked foreign intervention by Britain and the United States of the type practiced in Lebanon and Jordan, did not constitute a stable check to Nasser's policy in the area.

Over the long run such assistance could only increase the isolation of the recipient regimes from important segments of the politically articulate Arab population. Thus, increased collaboration with the West accompanied by calls for military landings, seemed a source of future weakness, though of temporary strength.⁹⁰ (In Jordan, it was the Israeli army, and not British paratroopers which constituted the major military deterrent).

Factors of a more serious and long-range consequence for Egyptian foreign policy lay in submerged divisions in the Iraqi policy-making group, which were to come to the fore during a later period.

⁸⁹ Prime Minister McMillan in House of Commons Debate as result of the British Government's decision to despatch British forces to Jordan in response to an appeal by King Hussein - Keesings op. cit; 1958, p. 16358.

⁹⁰ As one British M.P. pointed out during the debate in the House of Commons over the sending of troops into Jordan - the Jordanian regime must have been considerably weakened by events in Iraq if it had to rely on foreign intervention against an impending coup of which it had had abundant forewarning. Aneurin Bevan. Keesings op. cit; 1958, p. 16359.

These cleavages - which were to become apparent in late 1958, and the consequences of which lie outside the scope of this paper, - consisted of a division between partisans of immediate union with the U.A.R. and all those who preferred an independent line of these good relations with the U.A.R.

Notably, among the former group were to be found Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy Commander-in-Chief Colonel Abdul Salam Mohammed Aref, a pan-Arab group of army officers, and the Iraqi branch of the Baath Party (deriving its support mainly from substantial numbers of younger officers, intellectuals, and middle class).⁹¹

In addition, the Minister of Education, Dr. Jabit Omar and the Minister of Reconstruction, Brigadier Faud al-Rikabi (Baath) were later to appear as supporters of Aref and immediate union with the U.A.R.⁹² The latter group included General Kassem himself (to whom Aref's policy was a source of embarrassment, being opposed by a strong section of Iraqi opinion, and also by the large Kurdish minority in the Mosul and Kirkuk regions of Northern Iraq), the majority of the members of the government including a handful of civilian National Democratic politicians, and a substantial portion of the army officers, who did not want to become merged in a stronger organization.⁹³

⁹¹ Ibid; p. 16520

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Lenczowski, op. cit; pp. 300-301.

The interaction of these divisions was to lead, during a later period, to increasing communist influence, which—as it had in Syria during an earlier period—jeopardized the policy of positive neutrality espoused by Kassem and raised the dangers of possible Western intervention.

For Kassem allowed the communists in Iraq to greatly increase their activities, as a counterbalance to the unionist elements, and there was a danger that he would not be able to effectively control them.⁹⁴

These divisions were also to lead to the elimination of important proponents of immediate union with Egypt — proponents whom Nasser, though he did not encourage them during this period, no doubt considered important in the development of Egyptian-Iraqi relations to a later phase of comprehensive union.

Yet insofar as Communist influence was not apparent at this time, and the struggle between Kassem and Aref had not yet come into the open, there was unqualified Egyptian support for the regime.

It was a far cry from the period some seven months thereafter when Nasser could say:

⁹⁴ Ibid; p. 302.

When we see what is happening in Baghdad seven months after the death of Nuri-as-Said we realize that terrorism has reached a pitch that it had never known under Nuri's rule. 95

Meanwhile in Syria, Nasser was meeting resistance on the part of the merchant-landowners and bourgeoisie to proposed land reforms, while the Baath party was beginning to resent the increase in Egyptian control and the accompanying abolition of political freedom.⁹⁶

In conclusion, therefore, the Iraqi Coup of July 14th, 1958, while momentous for the defeat of the Baghdad Pact and the regime of Egypt's chief rival in the system - Iraq, did not automatically guarantee the consolidation of Egyptian influence in the system.

⁹⁵ Al-Ahram, March 16th, cited in Orient (1959), p. 151.

⁹⁶ Childers, Erskine B. The Road to Suez: A Study of Western-Arab Relations (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1962), p. 353.

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