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A reprise of rhetoric in the *Gorgias* -Is Plato a master rhetorician?

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abstract

This thesis offers Plato's readers a different approach to reading the *Gorgias*. Chief consideration is given to Plato's artistic plan as a rhetorician, rather than a strict moral philosopher. The display of his rhetorical genius works to support his arguments in favour of a certain kind of rhetoric. The usual argument that Plato is attacking rhetoric is rejected here. In its place the reader will see a Plato refuting his contemporaries' spurious form of rhetoric, as the rhetoric Plato represents and displays is a true craft, as genuine as the dialectic. Rhetoric is not without its shortcomings, but neither is the dialectic, and though Socrates says otherwise, it is because Plato is not Socrates. The argument for two Socrates is not advanced here, but his rhetorical tendencies are expressed in three debates whose overall message culminates in his prophetic myth of life after death. Plato introduces a new kind of visionary rhetoric that Socrates does not explicitly defend but which he nonetheless displays within the drama of the dialogue. Plato's views on rhetoric, then, are not merely the sum of Socrates' views on the *Gorgias'* theme, rather it is within the dramatic presentation of different views on rhetoric that Plato seeks to convey his defence of rhetoric.

Une nouvelle approche de la lecture de Platon est adoptée dans cette thèse. L'accent porte sur le coté artistique de Platon en tant que rhétoricien plutôt que strict moraliste. L'utilisation brillante par Platon lui-même de l'art de la rhétorique montre dans quelle mesure il est favorable à une certaine réthorique. L'argument classique selon lequel Platon défend une théorie critique de la rhétorique est rejeté ici. Platon réfute la pseudo-forme rhétorique à laquelle ses contemporains ont recours, car elle ne constituerait qu'une véritable technique, dans le même sens que la dialectique. La rhétorique n'est pas sans inconvénients, mais la dialectique non plus, et si Socrate avance le contraire, c'est parce que Platon n'est pas Socrate. L'argument selon lequel il existerait deux Socrate n'est pas avancé dans cette thèse. Toutefois, les tendances rhétoriques de ce dernier sont exprimées dans trois débats et son message général domine dans son mythe de la vie après la mort. Platon introduit une nouvelle sorte de rhétorique que Socrate ne défend pas explicitement mais qu'il expose néanmoins en revêtant le dialogue d'une teinte dramatique. Ainsi, l'approche de Platon sur la rhétorique ne se réduit pas à la somme des points de vue avancés par Socrate sur le thème du Gorgias. Platon cherche plutôt à construire sa défense de la rhétorique sur la présentation des aspects dramatiques de différents aspects de la rhétorique.

Contents

Tradition has it that Gorgias of Leontini brought the art of rhetoric to Athens in 427 BC. Although the practice of persuasive discourse is rooted as far back as Homer, rhetoric first came into Greek politics from Sicily in the early fifth century BC. Rhetoric was originally "invented" by Corax and Tisias[1] according to Cicero's rendition of Aristotle.[2] Cicero says that Corax and Tisias "wrote 'an art' and 'precepts'; for before that time no one was accustomed to speak by method or art, though they did so carefully and in an orderly way." This 'art' came about from all the litigation which resulted from the establishment of the Syracusan democracy and the overthrow of the Syracusan tyrants. From its origins as a forensic skill engaged in a newly instituted democracy, it quickly developed into a political art. So it is not surprising that rhetoric became attached to the democratic institutions of Greek politics. Athenian democracy was to cultivate the practice of rhetoric not only in the law courts, but as a political craft as well; this branch of rhetoric was given the name deliberative. Thus, when Plato wrote the *Gorgias*[3] he was questioning the historical tradition of public discourse of his native city, the purpose of this recently discovered art, and the established popular democratic institutions of his time.

The *Gorgias*, read for the first time, appears to reflect Plato bitterly condemning the practice of rhetoric and fiercely set against Athenian democracy, the institution that incorporates this form of discourse. This perception has partly been attributed to the deep anger Plato held towards the democratic representatives who sentenced Socrates to death. Also, Plato's own class associations, and, his intense search for some metaphysical unity in human action are used to explain why Plato's doctrines are so hostile to democratic values like that of persuasive speech. Such are some of the reasons why the *Gorgias* triumphs as one of the most eloquent and compelling claims ever written against rhetoric. It has initiated the whole debate over the integrity of rhetoric and the status of writing.[4] The tradition of rhetoric since then has been a series of responses to this charge,[5] as history has judged Plato's account of rhetoric in the *Gorgias* from what Socrates tells Gorgias.

Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Γοργία, εἶναι τι ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὔ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς

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[1] Kennedy (1994) 11. It is likely they are the same person.
[2] Kennedy (1994) 11. Cicero (*Brutus* 46-48) may not be accurately reporting what Aristotle said because he may have been writing from memory or second hand information.
[3] Dodds (1959) 18-30. Dodds' discussion of the difficulty on dating the *Gorgias* leaves it at somewhere between 390 and 394. 392 is perhaps the date most frequently chosen.
[4] Barilli (1989) 6-9; Kennedy (1963) 14-16; Vickers (1988) 1-123
[5] Hunt (1962) 3-7

προσμιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακείαν. (463a)

The view that rhetoric is a mastery of public deceit should remove it from political craftsmanship. Plato's premise for political discourse was expertise in political resolutions arrived at through a pure non-persuasive logical discourse, an exercise deemed beyond the inexpertness of the *demos*. Reluctant to accept the political discourse originating out of his own historical traditions, Plato is charged, as a consequence, as a supporter of anti-democratic convictions. However, he does convey something else about rhetoric, as this thesis will evince; and to accuse him of being motivated solely by class affiliations and idealistic metaphysics would be to ignore the passionate appeal he makes about the individual's political nature in the *Gorgias*.

Conventional reading of the *Gorgias* takes rhetoric to be "bad philosophy" that, at best, "makes the trivial point that the practice of rhetoric can be abused."[6] Such a perception ignores the more subtle and elusive nature of this dialogue. It unfolds as a dramatic conflict of personalities whose differences are exposed by the ensuing and more intellectual issues of justice, teaching virtue, good and pleasure, categories in which rhetoric is pronounced a disappointment. But the *Gorgias* is not essentially an epistemological, metaphysical, or ontological discussion, though it has something to say on such subjects. A closer reading, which harmonises the language of drama of the opposing participants and the so-called bad philosophy of the reasoning, would better reveal Plato's view of rhetoric.

If Plato's view of rhetoric is understood simply as flattery, public deceit, a knack and private advantage, this would completely negate his argument for persuading the public to follow the good path, as posited in the *Phaedrus* and the *Republic*. The *Phaedrus* provides a more comprehensive and philosophic account of rhetoric. In it, Plato places divine inspiration, Eros, as intrinsic to the nature of public discourse. The *Republic*, with its noble lie, establishes a practical paradigm for rhetoric in politics. The account of rhetoric in the *Gorgias* may not seem to complement what Plato envisages later in these two dialogues. Thus Plato's view of rhetoric, by way of the *Gorgias*, is often judged to be partial to the exclusion of rhetoric from his philosophy. What appears to be a passionate denigration of rhetoric in the *Gorgias*, has been thought to indicate Plato's genuine banishment of its use. One can easily arrive at such a position if one unquestioningly

[6] Kastely (1991) 1

accepts the dazzling statements of Socrates to be the same as Plato's. This would also ignore what Plato implies through the positions of the other dialecticians, as they complement much of his view of rhetoric. In fact, the dialogue, as a whole, displays Plato's inclusion of rhetoric as a beneficial practice of moral persuasion; for the *Gorgias* itself is highly rhetorical in character and should be judged as a rhetorical performance. It demonstrates how Plato values the role of rhetoric in refutation, its purpose in public discourse and how it holds a place among the noble arts.

Herein lies the proposition: upon analysis of its form, the *Gorgias* is a rhetorical composition which literally displays Plato's view of the practice of genuine rhetoric. Plato was a metaphysician, ontologist, and philosopher, but his true craft was the dialogue; and he used his craft to persuade the reader of his thought. The interlocutors in the *Gorgias* were all practitioners of speech, either dialectic or rhetoric. But Plato seems to parody these so-called rhetors while even the dialectic of Socrates, at times, appears to present itself as unconvincing semantics. Yet, Plato has not written either a parody or an inadequate dialogue. His craft shows how the satirical features, rhetorical figures, deductions, and dialectical inadequacies converge in the dialogue's drama and argumentation to convince the reader of something important about rhetoric. What Plato convinces the reader of will become evident when we examine Plato's method in composing the *Gorgias* as a rhetorical work.

If the *Gorgias* is a rhetorical piece, it ought to follow some arrangement of introduction, argument, and conclusion. Since it is not a law court speech, a particular form of speech severely criticised by Plato, the reader cannot expect a προοίμιον, πρόθεσις, πίστις, ἐπιλόγος as defined by the forensic genre of rhetoric.[7] Yet, aspects of this four part organisation can be found in the *Gorgias*. A prologue, or prelude as Dodds calls it,[8] from 447a to 449c clearly marks out a beginning which, at the rhetorical level, captures the reader's attention and makes references to the *Gorgias*' themes. An epilogue, also Dodds' name,[9] sums up Plato's argument through a myth. But there cannot be said to be any obvious statement of Plato's case or a separate body of argument that could be called his proof which could be identified with a πρόθεσις and πίστισ, the narration and the proof of a rhetorical speech. The *Gorgias* is also without a στάσις, the Greek term for the main

[7] Aristotle *Rhetorica* III, 1414a-b
[8] Dodds (1959) 188
[9] Dodds (1959) 372

point at issue in a legal argument.[10] But, as it is contended here, this dialogue displays Plato's practice of genuine rhetoric, not a forensic skill. Nor could it fit into the three branches of rhetoric: *deliberative*, which was used in legislative assemblies, *forensic*, which was for the law courts, and *epideictic* or *panegyric*, which is ceremonial speech used to publicly commemorate or blame. For Plato, one could say he writes and evinces a philosophic rhetoric meant for the leaders of the *polis*. The reader will also notice in the *Gorgias* references to various styles in rhetoric, where an unornamented style is most appreciated and the elaboration of Asianic style is parodied. Beyond Plato's arrangement, genre, and style there should also be an appeal to the passions, *pathos*, some character development, denigrating some while honouring others, *ethos*, and some form of argumentation, *logos*. Devices, such as maxims, examples, enthymemes, fables, syllogisms, various techniques of exhortation, and other methods of persuasion will also provide evidence of a rhetorical work. These rhetorical parts will be illustrated by those who later wrote the manuals of rhetorical techniques. For although Plato was an artist in the discipline of moral persuasion and truly acknowledged the form of rhetoric and its proper use in the *polis*, it is Aristotle who defines the essential pattern of Greek rhetoric. The *Rhetorica*, then, will prove one useful reference in outlining the principles of the art in the *Gorgias*. But, in order to appraise the details of rhetorical technique, subsequent texts on rhetoric, such as Richard A. Lanham's *Handlist of Rhetorical Terms*, will supplement this analysis of the *Gorgias* as rhetoric. However, such manuals can provide no basis for Plato's moral dimension of rhetoric, for Plato's ideas on the morality of rhetoric are not to be confused with Aristotle's more pragmatic concerns. Aristotle regards rhetoric more as an instrument of persuasion, a technique, manipulated according to the appropriate occasion as a civic art. Plato, however, sees rhetoric as more than just a skill useful to the *polis*. He attached a great deal of importance to rhetoric as a form of moral persuasion intended to actualise the logical verdict of dialectic, as it addresses the soul and its temperament to become a ruling art in the *polis*.

If, then, Plato has written a rhetorical dialogue which appears to attack the use of rhetoric, of what argument is he persuading the reader? To begin, rhetoric is not the only form of discourse which falls under some criticism. The *animus* Plato held against the rhetors who sway the inconsistent minds of the *demos* is matched by his disappointment with the dialectic. The dialectic was for Plato the highest form of discussion. So, one can't

[10] Lanham (1991) 170

help feeling that Plato's language perceptibly reveals him a little dissatisfied with Socrates' rational discourse which was intended to defend his life, though he was not embittered with Socrates himself for not winning the day in 399 BC. Nevertheless, despite criticisms stemming from the loss of Socrates, as the dialectic's non-persuasive rationale proves ineffective before the public, he does uphold the dialectic as the highest form for arriving at the good. What was lacking from the dialectic for Plato was the passion to stir the soul, as pure dialectical resolutions do not inspire this in public discourse.

The *Gorgias* reflects two interesting theories that must have motivated Plato profoundly: first, no rhetoric without the good was discourse fitting for the *polis*; second, a dialectic without persuasion could not practically serve the *polis*. The latter would make for another interesting topic of discussion, but suffice it to say that pure dialectic was to be insufficient in the sphere of politics in the *Republic*.[11] Furthermore, Plato ventures beyond the dialectic in the *Phaedrus*[12] to seek the divine inspiration, Eros, that would be needed eventually to advocate the good. The *Gorgias*, appears to reveal Socrates' shortcomings as a pure dialectician. Some attribute the mistakes in the reasoning of Socrates in the *Gorgias* to the spuriousness of rhetoric.[13] But Socrates has not adopted the way of an artless rhetoric to refute others. It is Plato who is making a point about rhetoric. Any conception of an art or τέχνη performed for the *polis* must, for Plato, carry some moral imperative. It must aspire to goodness. The rhetoric exhibited by the orators in the *Gorgias* is artless for Plato precisely because it has no design on moral improvement in the *polis*. Such a positive view of rhetoric will subsequently be shown to be un-Socratic, as his response and use of rhetoric in the *Gorgias* is typical of his irony. Contrarily, Plato's positive moral position on rhetoric is attested to not only in the *Phaedrus* and *Republic*, but it surfaces in the *Gorgias* as Plato's refutation of all neutral or immoral use of rhetoric. The refutation of the *Gorgias* is the negative of Plato's final print in the *Phaedrus* on the use of moral persuasion. How Plato's rhetorical skill communicates this in the *Gorgias* will be apparent when we examine the arguments of the dialogue. The purpose of this first part is not only to give credit to the genius of Plato's rhetoric in the *Gorgias*, but also to define its target. The *Gorgias*' so-called attack on rhetoric produces a moral refutation of how Plato's contemporaries defined rhetoric among their political arts. Plato could never accept the idea of a neutral or immoral

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[11] *Republic* 414b-414e; 458d
[12] *Phaedrus* 277b-c
[13] Benardete (1991) 7

τέχνη in political affairs. His magic in the *Gorgias* persuades any audience that no political τέχνη could possibly serve the *polis* unless its moral intention aspired to some goodness.

This thesis leaves the reader with one outstanding consideration: if Plato upholds rhetoric as a noble art, then, why does the *Gorgias* not enthusiastically evince rhetoric a noble art in the arguments of Socrates? Why does the dialogue not conclude as positively as the third rhetorical speech of the *Phaedrus* to prove the merits of this form of moral persuasion? My examination is intended to show that Plato upholds rhetoric as an art of moral persuasion, grounded on deductions rendered by a dialectical discourse aspiring to some notion of the good. Socrates, however, is not known to hold such a view on persuasion. In the middle and late dialogues of Plato, the reader discovers a Socrates developing the theory of the forms, expounding the idea of the immortality of the soul, and among many other concepts, the inclusion of rhetoric and the art of writing. The Socrates of early Platonic works held none of these views, but could be said to be a moralist. There are, of course, two Socrates in Plato's dialogues. The dialogues of Plato's early period: *Apology*, *Charmides*, *Crito*, *Euthyphro*, *Gorgias*, *Hippias Minor*, *Ion*, *Laches*, *Protagoras*, *Republic* I are often referred to as the elenctic dialogues and have arguably been taken as representative of the historical Socrates which reflect Socratic thought. The dialogues of Plato's middle period which include the *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, and *Republic* II-X among others enact a Socrates who is no more than a mouthpiece for Plato's doctrines. These are two different men. The latter is a theorist, philosopher, ontologist, metaphysician, serious writer, artist, and rhetor. The former is a moralist, ironist, and dialectician. These differences are not intended to be addressed in this examination, but to what extent the *Gorgias* is a Socratic dialogue will be left for another examination. The bugbear of the Socratic question will be left to those who have seen two different men of ideas. The only point I wish to stress is that in the *Gorgias* it is not Plato who comes out against rhetoric, but Socrates. The *Gorgias* will be treated from the perspective of an early work in which Socrates is seen as attacking others for not properly engaging in his dialectic. This reflects a Socrates completely attached to the dialectic as the only true noble form of discussion. Therefore, in taking the *Gorgias* as Plato's early dialogue, the reader is deliberating on a number of Socratic doctrines of speech and writing which run through Plato's purpose in the dialogue. This thesis will concentrate on how Plato has written a

rhetorical work, though the viewpoint of thinkers such as Vlastos will not go without notice in the argument.

The Socrates of the *Gorgias*, according to this perspective, is true to Socratic doctrines. By contrast, in the *Phaedrus* , the words of Socrates are put there by Plato to embody his doctrine. The rhetoric of the *Gorgias* could never be expounded by Socrates, for how could he adopt the weapons he calls a sham practice and wield them to so little effect that he convinces no one in the end.[14] Plato is the persuasive craftsman, Socrates the gadfly of Athens "who examined all things under the sky."[15] Socrates' light-hearted approach to serious issues and his unconvincing semantics are read too often at face value unwitting of Socrates' intended irony. "That Socrates should outsophist the sophists is no paradox if the sophistries with which he plies them are ironical."[16] Those who accuse Socrates of deceit miss the play of his irony and blunder into vilifying him for poor reasoning or sophistry. The irony of Socrates stings of the truth, but is often mistaken for deceitful semantics, and what Vlastos says about the inaccuracy of taking Socratic irony as deceit also illuminates how the *Gorgias*, too, falls victim to a dry, undeveloped criticism of rhetoric as pure public deceit. Vlastos postulates that Socratic irony, aimed at the truth, is an indication of his sincere moral objective. Upon appreciation of the moral mission and irony of Socrates in the *Gorgias*, Plato's mission as a rhetorician will become intelligible.

Ultimately, it is Plato's purpose in the *Gorgias* that must be reckoned with, in spite of how much this early dialogue exhibits the moralising and irony of Socratic thought; for after all it is Plato who wrote the dialogue. His craft captures Socratic doctrines, as the *Gorgias* resonates with his irony and appeal to moral action, and in uniting it with the rest of the *Gorgias* he reproduces one of the finest pieces of rhetorical refutation of rhetoric defined as an immoral or neutral art. Art, for Plato, could only be designed for the benefit of civilisation and not exist as a consequence of it. True rhetoric, then, was to be practised as a form of moral persuasion towards a good.

The authors who have tackled the issue of Plato's views on rhetoric, who were the inspiration for this thesis, include Seth Benardete in his *The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy*, Thomas Brickhouse in *Plato's Socrates*, George Kennedy in *The Art of Persuasion in Ancient Greece*, Terence Irwin in his translation and commentary on the

[14] Benardete (1991) 6
[15] Aristophanes *Clouds*
[16] Vlastos (1991) 43

Gorgias, E.R. Dodds in his commentary on the *Gorgias*, George Plochmann and Franklin Robinson in *A Friendly Companion to Plato's Gorgias*, R.B. Rutherford in *The Art of Plato*, and Brian Vickers in his book *In Defence of Rhetoric*. The rhetorical features of the *Gorgias* will be rendered with the help of Aristotle's *Rhetorica* and two modern treatments on the use of rhetoric through Richard A. Lanham's manual, *A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms*, and George Kennedy's insightful *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*. With the assistance of these authors, this thesis explores the issue of the purpose of rhetoric. It will not expound the philosophy of Plato or Socrates. In particular, it will not address the controversy about the philosophical interpretation of the *Gorgias* raised by Irwin and others, though they bear an important contribution to this study of *Gorgias* seen as Plato's genuine rhetoric and his convictions thereof. Gregorgy Vlastos in his *Socrates Ironist and moral philosopher* is important for this thesis' overall premise that there are in fact two Socrates in Plato. Also, Some recent scholarship, which proceeds in the same direction as the argument here, includes Charles Kahn in *Plato and the Socratic dialogue* and his article 'Drama and Dialectic in Plato's *Gorgias*', James Murray in his recent article 'Plato on knowledge, persuasion and the art of rhetoric', Charles Kauffman, particularly in his article 'Enactment as argument in the *Gorgias*, and James Kastely's essay *In Defence of Plato's Gorgias*, who offers the Classicist an outside perspective on the action of the rhetoric in the *Gorgias*.[17]

In order to yield the complexities of his dialogue, then, this inquiry into the *Gorgias* must elaborate upon Plato's dual purpose. First, the *Gorgias*, as rhetoric, refutes what the representatives of rhetoric held to be a civic art. Each interlocutor reflects a false image of rhetoric. Gorgias will promise to teach anyone how to fake justice. Polus will argue for the speech of the man who can acquire the most goods and control the rest. Callicles will speak for hedonism with a passion that gives speech its appeal, but is misguided in its purpose. Each of these men advance what Athenians would have called rhetoric, but to Plato it was not. What Plato advances here is a different rhetoric. It contains all the artifice, appeal, arrangement, and style of rhetoric known to his contemporaries save that it is practised by

[17] Unfortunately Robert Wardy's *The Birth of Rhetoric: Gorgias, Plato, and their Successor* (1996) was published too recently for consideration. Michael S. Kochin' review indicates that Wardy is taking a technical look at the rhetoric in the *Gorgias*, while giving particular consideration to Aristotle. However, Kochin's review also suggests that Wardy's book bears a philosophy similar to that of Strauss, which is not what this thesis intends to prove.

leaders to achieve philosophical reforms in legislation that looks to the goodness of the citizens. Plato's encomium of rhetoric is in proportion to its practice in his philosophy. Seen from such a perspective, the question of Socrates' apparent inadequacy will be settled. In other words, Socrates' claims for the efficacy of dialectic is deliberately shown to fall short in practice, unless dialectical reasoning is accompanied and reinforced by genuine rhetoric in human affairs, and in the *polis* in particular.

Aristotle compares the προοίμιον of a rhetorical speech to the prologue in poetry and the prelude in flute-music,[18] as each art often begins with some flourish that takes the author's fancy. The theme, too, can be struck up in the introduction in order to familiarise the audience with what is to come in the discussion to follow. Aristotle argues that the purpose of the προοίμιον should be to make the subject of discussion clear in the listener's mind, unless the listener is already clear on the subject or it is of no significance.[19] But the *Gorgias*' subject cannot be said to be explicit in the reader's mind.[20] Nor is it insignificant. Commentators have separated the Callicles portion from the Gorgias and Polus debates and have said the *Gorgias* is about power, art, politics, pleasure, justice as well as rhetoric. Thus, it is important for Plato to engage his reader's attention in both his case against a form of speech that Greeks used with such pride and his case for another rhetoric, which he would claim genuine. Plato must not just obtain the goodwill of his reader but make him believe his words. "For as Socrates says in his Funeral Oration that 'it is easy to praise Athenians in the presence of Athenians, but not in the presence of Lacedaemonians'"[21] The *Gorgias* opens with a prologue or προοίμιον, from 447a to 449c. Some indication is made of the themes discussed in this dialogue, but what these lines tell is perhaps less than the actual appeal it makes to the reader as it captures one's attention from the opening flourish:

> *Καλλικλης*· Πολέμου καὶ μάχης φασὶ χρῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μεταλαγχάνειν. *Σωκρατες*· Ἀλλ᾽ ἦ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν ἑορτῆς ἥκομεν καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν *Καλλικλης*· Καὶ μάλα γε ἀστείας ἑορτης πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ καλὰ Γοργίας ἡμῖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο. (447a)

However little this exchange of pleasantries appears to say of events to come, this entire preliminary section of the *Gorgias* serves as Plato's prefatory maxim to the dialogue. It follows what Aristotle requires in an analogy to the flute-player, who begins "by playing whatever they can execute skilfully and attach it to the key-note."[22] It exhibits what Plato

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[18] *Rhetorica* III. xiv, 1
[19] *Rhetorica* III, xiv, 7
[20] Michael Silverthorne (1975) 10. In his article 'Laws, Preambles and the Legislator in Plato', he also argues for a rhetorical prooimion in the *Laws*, which he aptly calls the preamble. "Thus Plato's preambles are not merely rational explanations of the purpose of the various laws, but are also rhetorical and persuasive."
[21] *Rhetorica* III, xiv, 11
[22] *Rhetorica* III, xiv, 1

executes most skilfully and attaches it to his key argument in the *Gorgias*, rhetoric. Aristotle's classification of this kind of προοίμιον is particular to epideictic speech, which will subsequently be significant to perceiving how Plato is writing a satire on *epideixis* to open the *Gorgias*. However, what is obvious at present is that the actions of the speakers reveal one man in praise of rhetoric, the other in opposition. Moreover, the synthesis of both their actions displays Plato's own use of a popular maxim. So, in spite of Socrates' antagonism, Plato's use of such a traditional rhetorical device should lead the reader to evaluate Plato's view on rhetoric, in harmony with his own use, in a more sympathetic light. The threadwork binding the *Gorgias* together is just as in any other of Plato's dialogues. But what each interlocutor utters will be unified in Plato's argument and the view of one speaker, whose words are so often taken as those of Plato, namely Socrates, can only be considered together with Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles. It is important to link all the parts, each interlocutor's perspective, and each action so as to grasp that of which Plato, not Socrates, persuades the reader. The above exchange through 449c will imperceptibly come to introduce the rest of the dialogue through a condensed version of the issues, personalities, and actions which prefigure Plato's view of rhetoric in the argument of the *Gorgias*.

The prologue to the *Gorgias* is often overlooked, in spite of the intimation it gives of this dialogue's format, style and content. It is important to remember that Plato wants his reader to bear in mind that the actions in the dialogue and what can be understood from them are just as important to the flow and shape of the dialogue as what is explicitly said. Many contend that in the *Gorgias* Plato despises rhetoric and endorses only dialectic as the supreme form of discourse. It is true that the Academics of the Hellenistic period had rejected the orator's claim to greatness on account of their study of the *Gorgias*;[23] and modern scholars often hold the same trenchant anti-rhetorical analysis of the *Gorgias*. Jaeger claims Plato hates rhetoric adjudging it to be based on sheer appearances, never on truth.[24] Crushman claims that Plato distinguishes rhetoric from dialectic, naming only dialectic as "the truly rhetorical and persuasive art"; while Spitzer argues rhetoric has been thoroughly routed by Plato because he has the three rhetors dramatically defeated.[25] Yet, if indeed the *Gorgias* were intended to prove the superiority of dialectic over rhetoric, the

[23] Kennedy (1994) 93
[24] Kauffman (1983) 115
[25] Kauffman (1983) 115

prologue, at least, must set out its philosophical paradigm in clear and convincing dialectical terms. But rhetorical figures and actions in the prologue suggest rhetoric's prominence in the *Gorgias*.

The complexities in the prologue of the *Gorgias* make Plato's method less easy to grasp precisely because it is rhetorical. While this prefatory exchange introduces and parodies the presence of rhetoric, nothing is apparent about the subject of the *Gorgias*. The riddle of the unspoken subject betokens something other than a dialectic. What is like a battle, a feast and worthy of praise and blame? Callicles rejoins with rhetorical praise: "A fine and varied display."[26] This announces the event and the dialogue's subject matter, as the feast that was a battle is now the display given by Gorgias. A *significatio* is a rhetorical device that a rhetorician uses, intentionally omitting the subject to allow the reader to make certain implications. Here, it leads the reader to interpret the "charming feast" that is "a fine and varied display" beyond battle and gastronomic feast. Plato's proverbial feast and battle are indicative of the *Gorgias*' subject matter. The notion of a verbal banquet is a favourite one with Plato.[27] "Revel in your discourse without fear [and] fill up the measure of my feast, ἑστιάσεως," declares Socrates encouraging Thrasymachus to keep up the dialogue, "and complete it for me."[28] Another such reference is at the beginning of the *Phaedrus*.[29] No doubt the *Gorgias* is no less one of his verbal feasts.

The pleasing of the audience by likening speech to an elegant feast hints at its aim of the pleasures of both the body and speech; and such allusions somewhat anticipate parallels to the possible upcoming definition of rhetoric and its counterpart as gastronomic indulgence against the image of the feast of reason. The proverbial battle can be also indicative of the competitive or eristic nature of Greek discourse which can become vicious and destructive.[30] Both the notion of battle and Socrates' repartee also depict antithesis, a style which was not only common to fifth-century Greek but particular to Gorgias. The marked love of antithesis, that is, of a balanced contrast of words or ideas[31] is the keynote of this introduction. Therefore, while no topic of discussion or method of approach is

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[26]Irwin's translation is used throughout the thesis.
[27] Dodds (1959) 189
[28] *Republic* 352b
[29] *Phaedrus* 227b
[30] Rutherford (1995) 149
[31] Kennedy (1994) 25

explicitly set, as would be the case with dialectic, these rhetorical allusions foreshadow the action and speech of the dialogue.

The opening upon such vagaries and seemingly polite introductory exchanges read as though Plato has written a drama to acquaint the reader with its *dramatis personae* rather than to endorse a specific idea about rhetoric. This is in contrast to the philosophical treatise in which the reader would expect to find an introduction that clearly states the question, then lay out the procedure set to resolve it. There are such straightforward dialectical inquiries, such as the *Sophist*, in which Plato tells his reader from the outset that he intends to examine what a sophist is, what a philosopher is, what a statesman is, and whether they are three different types of people or one or two. Plato, in the *Sophist*, raises the chief question and provides the reader with part of the method to be used in answering it.[32] However, to read the *Gorgias* as a philosophical doctrine on rhetoric, or something like his *Sophist*, would be to overlook the purpose of each participant's conduct and the action of their words. But, to take the *Gorgias* simply as a drama would also make for unresolved discussion on rhetoric. The *Gorgias*, as a rhetorical work, should presume nothing less than rhetorical flourishes and devices. A rhetorical paradigm opens the prologue which, unlike a treatise, does not wholly elaborate on all the aspects of problems discussed in the dialogue. The metaphysics of the body and soul dichotomy, which is so central to Plato's arguments, go unmentioned, while pleasure, by way of feast, are prominent questions in the prologue, a subject which dominates the debate bewteen Callicles and Socrates.

Beyond the introduction of the rhetorical genre and possible topics for rhetorical encounter, the dialogue's prologue also plays an important role in preparing the audience's state of mind. In book III of the *Rhetorica*, where Aristotle discusses the προοίμιον, he refers back to his earlier point on the importance of the hearer's goodwill or εὔνοια and all other such states of mind, referring back to book II, where he considers his audience to be like judges and the speaker must know how to put the judge in a certain frame of mind.[33] Elements of this prologue draw on the reader's εὔνοια for both the negative and positive sides of rhetoric. It is important that Plato secure the goodwill of his reader in criticising the rhetoric of flattery and defending the purpose of another rhetoric. The reader can infer from the opening that rhetoric is an intrinsic element of the dialogue as a whole. One expects the

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[32] Plochmann and Robinson (1988) 3
[33] *Rhetorica* II, i

dialogue to proceed in rhetorical terms. Thus, apparent omissions,[34] such as of the body and soul, are only indicative of how little the *Gorgias* could be read as an outright attack on rhetoric or defence of dialectic. Even such dialectical terms and method as setting the terms for examination and the yes-no form of question and answer become subjugated to their rhetorical circumstances. When Socrates demands a prohibition on long speeches, the reader will sympathise with the call for a dialectical inquiry. But likewise, with all the promises of impressive speeches, wonderment at Gorgias' art, and rhetorical quips, the reader will also sympathise with the rhetoric Plato expounds in this dialogue.

Two forms of speech interpenetrate the *Gorgias*. While dialectic is not forsaken, it is rhetoric that holds the centre of Plato's argument. When the prologue comes to address the more specious aspects of rhetoric through an elaborate parody on *epideixis*, it satirically registers rhetoric without purpose as spurious. But such satirical criticisms of rhetoric do not champion the dialectic, for Plato would then equally demonstrate that the dialectic alone is not sufficient. Socrates is not characterised as the successful dialectician "dramatically defeating" less successful characters. At times Plato makes Socrates an unsympathetic character when blocking or dismissing the other interlocutors' views. At other times Socrates must adopt rhetorical techniques to convince his counterparts.

Goodwill towards Plato's argument for rhetoric can be met in the reader's sympathy for the other speakers, as the prologue introduces some convincing counterparts to Socrates. Their displayed reaction and counter argument often serve to balance the severity of Socrates' attack on rhetorical speech and "at least two of the personages here are found to be exceedingly complicated men, surpassing all of Plato's other creations in subtlety in character depiction and relation."[35] Socrates' counterparts make some compelling arguments about rhetoric. The success of Plato's rhetoric and its defence would depend in a certain measure on the failure of the Socratic *persona*. For, beyond the matter of Plato's rhetorical actions and style, the prologue should be examined for the manner in which each man contributes to the dialogue, as well as the actual setting, and what significant terms are introduced before they are relegated to the side lines as "delightful touches" or "setting of the scene."

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[34] Plochmann and Robinson (1988) 5
[35] Plochmann and Robinson (1988) 4

There are two parts to the prologue. From 447a to 448a, the initial exchange between Socrates and Callicles and reference to a rhetorical display just finished, including the suggestion of possible repetition, serve as the first section. The second part, from 448a to 449a, starts with two of the central speakers, Gorgias and Socrates, being replaced by two lesser personalities, Chaerephon (447c) and Polus (448a). The prologue could even be subdivided further: the first subsection being the brief exchange between Socrates and Callicles; the second subsection raising the question of whether Socrates would care to hear another display, or if even Gorgias would care to present one.[36] In the other half of the prologue, subsection one, there is the exchange between Chaerephon and Socrates, in which Plato asks some of the fundamental questions pertaining to craft, speaking, and what profession Gorgias ἐπαγγέλλει. Subsection two follows with Polus and Chaerephon acting out a second-rate *elenchos*, whose failings of character and method seem to anticipate the inadequacies of both dialectic and rhetoric. These simple divisions are not calculated to prove anything about the orderliness of the dialogue. Yet, they anticipate certain features of later parts of the longer conversations, as the *Gorgias* proceeds with well balanced rhetorical forms, subdivisions and dichotomies to define rhetoric. Kennedy considers this the second sign of rhetorical consciousness in Greek literature: "awareness of the possibilities of artistic unity in speeches and the advantages of dividing them into logical parts.[37]

Callicles' opening *epiplexic*[38] remarks are fighting words. He speaks of battles missed, accuses Socrates of cowardice for deliberately arriving late so as to avoid combat and consequently heaps blame on him. Rhetoric's chief set of opposites: blame and praise, start the dialogue. Callicles vaunts himself in speech in the framework of a Homeric hero. Socrates, though, manages to discharge the blame in Callicles' brave fighting words of the missed battle by facetiously referring to them as a luxurious feast. Initially Socrates appears to add praise to the marvels of the missed event, as though scarcely doubting the awe and pleasure of the event he has just missed. But the ingenious *trope* on Callicles' words of battle for feast has turned Callicles' praise of some concrete action to mere sensation. Gorgias took part in no battle and there was no feast. Callicles extols speech in figurative

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[36] Plochmann and Robinson (1988) 7
[37] Kennedy (1994) 25
[38] Lanham (1991) 68. Asking questions in order to reproach or upbraid, rather than to elicit information.

terms, Socrates reduces it to the level of imagery. The notion of "seeming" and reality are introduced and Plato would make them fundamental to his argument about rhetoric. Callicles, though, is clearly full of admiration for some spoken event and admonishes Socrates for having missed it. Socrates, evidently, does not doubt the sensation of the episode, but Socrates' *peristrophe*[39] ironically strips the event of any worthy virtue such as bravery. This interjects another element of rhetoric: genuine rhetoric is impossible without virtue. This claim becomes evident only when Socrates, in the final debate with Callicles, would link the governance of the *polis* to the ruler's ability to stamp his virtue upon the citizen. The failures of the popular rhetors of the fifth century, Pericles, Cimon and Themosticles has, in Plato's view, little to do with their ability to ingratiate the public with speech, but everything to do with their lack of virtue such as justice and temperance.

> ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν πόλιν. (519a)

Here, too, in the prologue Socrates is spurning the teacher of the virtueless form of oration they thought to be rhetoric. This introduces what Socrates will have to say about Gorgias as teacher and his practice in their dialogue to follow. Therefore, without yet uncovering any detail or explanation, the subtlety of Plato's rhetoric anticipates some of the major themes of the *Gorgias*.

Socrates' *peristrophe* has been traditionally taken as a reference to some maxim often quoted in Plato's time. It is ambiguous as to what Plato intended his reader to understand from the allusions of this maxim. Either he is using a well known metaphor or expanding on one. Dodds suggests[40] the sense may be similar to that of Falstaff's remark that "The latter end of a fray and the beginning of a feast Fits a dull fighter and a keen guest,"[41] as Plato has often put metaphor and interpretation side by side.[42] It could also be some extension of a well known metaphor. Whether Plato is adopting some metaphor or working in a rhetorical *catachreses*,[43] the rhetorical effect of these words are that of two men in antithesis. The drama of their action also suggests the utterances of Homeric heroes

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[39] Lanham (1991) 114. Coverting an opponent's argument to one's own use.
[40] Dodds (1959) 188
[41] *King Henry* IV; IV, iii
[42] Dodds (1959) 189
[43] Lanham (1991) 31. An implied metaphor, using words wrenched from common usage.

checking each other verbally before entering into the fray. They are certainly not the words of logical dialectic but an unmistakable exchange of praise and blame.

Praise and blame are the very heart of rhetoric. In Aristotelian terms they are related to one particular form of rhetoric: the *epideictic*. Praise corresponds to the correct response to virtue, and blame to vice, as those "who praise or attack a man aim at proving him worthy of honour or the reverse."[44] Plato's Homeric example in the *Gorgias* may insinuate such heroic action. Achilles, for example, is praised because he "has neglected his own interest to do what was honourable. He championed his fallen friend Patroclus, though he knew that this meant death... [for] to die thus was the nobler thing for him to do, the expedient was to live on."[45] However, Callicles is not exactly imitating anything so noble. His speech is suited to disingenuosly appeal to such sentiments and Socrates quickly silences the Homeric affectations of Callicles. He counters these high sounding Homeric utterances with the shame of someone satisfying his gluttonous desires.

The *Gorgias* opens with a parody of rhetoric's fundamentals. But Plato's satirical allusion to the rhetoric of praise and blame should not be taken as a curt dismissal of it. It serves as an initial attempt to deepen our understanding of this genre, for elsewhere, Plato has voiced the importance of praise speeches. In the *Protagoras*,[46] Plato cites encomium as effective in inspiring the young to virtue. In the *Republic*, Plato banishes the poets from his state, but grants the poetry of praise licence in "hymns to the gods and encomia to good men."[47] The *Laws*[48] sanctions communal celebrations in which Plato includes songs of praise to the gods and to "citizens who have departed and have done good and energetic deeds" to induce morals and virtue. In each of these dialogues, Plato emphasises the influence speech exerts over moral decisions. When they are grounded strictly on the reader's opinion and belief, like Aristotle, it follows the model where the objects of praise and blame are called Virtue and Vice, the Noble and the Base, in which the highest form of virtue consists in being useful to other people.[49] Praise is assigned to a noble action that results from human moral deliberation, action that is the consequence of good qualities.[50]

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[44] *Rhetorica* 1358 b28
[45] *Rhetorica* 1359 a1
[46] *Protagoras* 325-6
[47] *Republic* X, 607
[48] *Laws* 659-61, 801
[49] *Rhetorica* 1366 a23-b5
[50] *Rhetorica* 1367 b20

In the *Gorgias*, praise and blame rhetoric reveals itself through each interlocutor's method. Gorgias would praise the power of a rhetor in a number of circumstances. Polus would speak for the tyrant, while despising Socrates for his way of life. Callicles would make an even more powerful invective against Socrates' lifestyle, while establishing himself as the great proponent of nature over convention. Thus, the dynamics of praise and blame are just as central to the *Gorgias* as in any other rhetorical work. However, Plato refutes the purposelessness of his contemporaries' rhetoric as, in its praise and blame, it is flattery. Contrarily, Plato proposes and practices the rhetoric of soul therapy.

Plato's own emulated *epideictic* rhetoric begins here with an appeal to the senses: War and battle invoke physical contact; the feast summons taste and smell; and the display puts on a sound and light show. The reader's conscience is drawn to its particular setting, which is neither a law court nor a political assembly. The audience of this dialogue, estimated at about twenty,[51] is just the setting for a display. Beginning the dialogue with discussion of display while simultaneously mimicking its qualities in prose is consistent with Plato's literary method in the *Gorgias* of writing on rhetoric while writing in rhetoric. While *epideixis* was common to public discourse for rhetors such as Gorgias,[52] it was not always considered a particularly noble form of speech. Thucydides makes a distinction between genuine rhetoric and the disingenuous display of Cleon. He makes the disparaging comment about those who perform for money, namely a bribe, claiming that they are χαλεπώτατοι, the absolute worst.[53] Thus, when Plato launches the dialogue with the "showy" speech of *epideixis* he is recognising the legitimacy of a rhetorical form of discourse while criticising its specious aspects in the form of parody. Plato's satire of *epideixis* tells how seriously he takes such rhetorical speech. He wants to prove that rhetoric is not simply a knack to flatter others, but has a therapeutic role in the soul and a practical function in the *polis*. Plato praises rhetoric not only by his own use of it, but at the end of the *Gorgias*, biting satirical criticism will lead to praise of a certain kind of rhetoric. Here, in the prologue, Plato's rhetorical method and genuine search for rhetoric hint at convictions of a true rhetoric. When one recognises that Plato has composed a parody on rhetoric written in rhetoric, it will shed some light on what many may mistake as an outright rejection of rhetoric. Plato's treatment of rhetoric is one part a refutation of the flattery form

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[51] Plochmann and Robinson (1988) 7
[52] *Hippias Major* 282bc, *Protagoras* 310b-311a, 314c-315e
[53] Thucydides 3.42.2

of rhetoric and one part his own use of a genuine rhetoric, which is namely the rhetoric of refutation.

The central criticism to be levelled against rhetoric is its pretence at seeming to be another craft, such as justice, and flattering the human psyche. Plato's feigned *epideictic* opening moves the audience to consider the transitory nature of speech, as presented by the verbal feast. This would be the δύναμίς δαιμονία τις (456a) of persuasion at which Socrates later wonders (456a),[54] when Gorgias is aggregating all powers of rhetoric in public activity. When Plato later characterises Gorgias as having no serious aptitude for the logical moral argument, Gorgias exemplifies the use of how to arouse the listener's emotions which aims at putting the audience in a certain frame of mind rather than proving one's case. The patient of Gorgianic rhetoric will be persuaded to swallow medicine without ever knowing why it is really good for his health. Just as, later on, Aristotle's opening in the first chapter of his *Rhetorica* criticises the use of "external" matters, Plato refutes the δαίμων of Gorgianic rhetoric which rests merely in the magic of his words through poetic figures of speech.

Plato in his argument for genuine rhetoric only evokes the necessary ἔντεχνοι πίστεις that orators invent, such as *pathos*, to gain his reader's goodwill. His use of *ethos* arranges the parts of his argument. Socrates acts as the principal prosecutor and defender of rhetoric. The case made for and against rhetoric relies in great measure on the character and tendencies of the Socratic figure, his *ethos*, for whom the reader can be sympathetic. But, when Socrates is making the severest case, and discounts or ignores other arguments, he is an almost invidious character and the arguments of his counterparts merit serious consideration. The straightforward, inquisitive nature of Socrates, though, earns greater respect from the reader than do the more coy and boastful characters of Callicles, Polus and Gorgias. The Socrates of the *Gorgias* is much like that of the Socrates of the early dialogues and pursues his *elenchos* as adamantly as ever here. He makes every attempt to detach the discussion from the longer speeches (449b,461d). Later, he will even refuse to continue if the others make long speeches (461e-462a). But he is hardly as dismissive of the longer speeches as he says he is. Nor does he say that he is never interested in Gorgias' speech, only that he would like to hear it later. So, when Socrates expresses some irritation at having missed the display, blaming Chaerephon for being

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[54] Ταῦτα καὶ θαυμάζων

"forced to linger in the agora," the reader can infer a certain measure of irony. In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates proclaims he is "love sick for speeches,"[55] badgering Phaedrus to read a love speech of Lysias.[56] By contrast, in the *Protagoras*, Socrates is genuinely aggravated at the prospect of having to listen to a speech.[57] It seems that both impulses may be in Socrates now.[58] This is the very mood Plato reproduces in his reader.

Speeches made by sophists, including Socrates, were intended to be taken seriously and not seriously. This ambivalence and refusal of closure were highly annoying to conservative Greeks at the time.[59] A sympathetic criticism of such orators is Plato's appeal to his reader. In the prologue, tension, word play and display elements engage the reader's desire to hear rhetorical speech. But scepticism of false appeal, Socratic irony, rhetorical contempt for elaborate discourse and the vainglorious nature of some of the characters, compel one to read the longer performances with criticism. This entitles Socrates to question Gorgias on the nature of his art and teaching without actually listening to his display speech. Display and its objects are asked to be put off for some other time. No topic for speech, such as Eros in the *Phaedrus*, is of interest to Plato's argument. However, Socrates is not avoiding a performance by Gorgias because of some professed weakness or curiosity, as in the *Phaedrus*, in which he suffers from a "disturbing tendency to be taken in by the mood of Lysias,"[60] only to be rescued by a mysterious daemon.[61] Plato has the reader sympathise with the Socratic desire to inquire into rhetoric without setting a topic because the topic is rhetoric itself and any interest in listening to some showy παίγνιον of Gorgias is dropped.

Callicles, conscious of the irony in Socrates' irritation towards the missed display, ripostes with ironic surprise that Socrates would even bother to hear a display. He follows Chaerephon's promise of compelling Gorgias to put on another display with a pledge of his own to host a display speech. But Socrates expresses no interest in displays and is focused on two objectives: an honest examination of rhetoric, whence his question as to whether Gorgias "is willing to have a dialogue;" and secondly his preoccupation with its power and

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55 *Phaedrus* 228b
56 *Phaedrus* 227d; 228c
57 *Protagoras* 335a-b
58 Plochmann and Robinson (1988) 9
59 Kennedy (1994) 20
60 Plochmann and Robinson (1988) 9
61 *Phaedrus* 242b

purpose, whence the moral problem. Plato's rhetoric acquits the dialogue of becoming a display when Socrates asks to διαλέγεσθαι about rhetoric, though this hardly strips the dialogue of rhetorical effect.

The prologue also serves to define the position and strength of each character. The beginning of the *Phaedrus* excites the reader's desire to hear the speech of a reputed orator, Lysias. In the *Gorgias*, also, Plato realises that he cannot introduce such a famous personage as Gorgias without the reader wanting to know what he would have to say. The reader wants to hear Gorgias as much as Socrates; and the desire to hear rhetoric is just as keen as it is to hear dialectic. The *ethos* of each character is built upon their respective forms of speech. The sympathy or *pathos* evoked for their words are attached as much to their character as their form of speech. But Gorgias is not given the chance to make a speech. For as much as the reader may be keen to hear Gorgias' art, Plato makes it clear he has not composed a dialogue like the *Phaedrus*, which develops out of the display speech of a famous rhetor, Lysias, and its topic, Eros, which Socrates will improve upon twice. The *Gorgias* is focused on what rhetoric is and its purpose.

Chaerephon is the least significant character, but his role, particularly in the prologue, is pivotal in the dramatic build between the bigger characters. After the exchange between the two main characters, Socrates and Callicles, both Callicles and Chaerephon suggest having another display speech. Chaerephon is the first one to offer to have a replay. "I think that I can persuade Gorgias to give another display," he says, whether now or later, at his place. This suggestion, slightly presumptuous and tactless before the present host, Callicles, serves to defuse the tension initiated between Callicles and Socrates. Chaerephon is effectually a moderator throughout the dialogue. His infrequent but timely appearances dramatically establish and remind the reader of the depth and antagonism of each character, as Chaerephon must keep the discussion going or even keep them at bay. Charephon serves to facilitate discussion between the interlocutors. It is clear that Chaerephon and Socrates are friends of some sort as they speak in the first person plural about their day's activities (447b); and it is through their friendship that Plato allows the dialogue to occur. While Callicles, Gorgias and Polus are scarcely amiable towards Socrates, Chaerephon subdues Socrates' irony and his abrupt and strange questions, and brings Gorgias around to the dialectic. Chaerephon can appear to control Gorgias and Socrates as they are extraordinarily accommodating to him. But these two men depend on him to bring off a dialogue which begins and continues with talking of violence and

accommodation.[62] However, Chaerephon's great mistake, as Plochmann indicates, "is to believe that successful rhetoric leaves the hearer's emotions in precisely the same condition as they were before the speechmaking began."[63] Chaerephon's presumption that rhetoric can suddenly be displayed at a moment's notice deliberately draws the reader's attention to the role of *pathos* in speech, as Chaerephon seems distinctly unaware of the *pathos* in such a discourse.

The prologue's second part is the substitution of the dialogue's principal speakers. Two second-rate imitators take over the dialogue who, in their inadequacy, could only entice Gorgias to speak on rhetoric. Why Plato arranges the dialogue this way is not immediately obvious. Chaerephon is asked, at Socrates' request, to succeed him as the questioner; and Polus, at no one's request, butts in to replace the honoured guest from Sicily, presumed fatigued from the display he has just given. Plochmann rejects the possibility that Socrates is tired, timid, bored, respectful or solicitous towards Chaerephon. He suggests that it is because Chaerephon has said that he is a friend of Gorgias and that this gives him the authority to ask Gorgias the questions on Socrates' behalf. Chaerophon and Socrates are most certainly friends as they affably refer to themselves in the first person plural and it is reasonable to assume that Socrates and Chaerephon have just happened upon each other in the agora and their friendship brought them to hear Gorgias. Chaerephon has also quickly understood Socrates' method of discourse so much more quickly than the others who struggle to adopt or accept his dialectic. Reasons such as these may make it easier for Chaerephon to elicit candid replies from Gorgias.[64] However, Plato seems to have a more rhetorical purpose in this role substitution than just personal dynamics. This second part to the prologue is committed not just to establishing the characters in the dialogue and developing the relations between them, but as a part of Plato's rhetorical method of foreseeing objections to what he will refute and sustain. This *prolepsis*[65] and the following debate between the lesser interlocutors enact the limitations on the use of both dialectic and rhetoric among Plato's contemporaries. So, where substitution is often used grammatically and syntactically in rhetoric, in the *Gorgias*' prologue, it becomes a device to provoke the reader's interest in the use of rhetoric and to prepare for the criticisms and

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[62] Benardete (1991) 9
[63] Plochmann and Robinson (1988) 10
[64] Plochmann and Robinson (1988) 10
[65] Lanham (1991) 120. Foreseeing and forestalling objections in various ways.

defence of rhetoric. Plato takes two weaker characters to initiate the main inquiries about rhetoric and stages them on opposite ends of the ideological field. In this way he introduces the στάσεις of the debate, what rhetoric is, and demonstrates through their feeble attempt at definition just how poorly rhetoric is understood.

Plochmann's analysis of Chaerephon designates him an inept questioner. But this is not entirely convincing. He asks Socrates for clarification, not because he "fails to understand" the question Socrates importuned him to ask Gorgias.[66] He asks again because to ask Gorgias, one of the most famous men of the time, "who he is," is a trifle forward. It must not be forgotten that Chaerephon may be introducing Socrates to the reputed speaker from abroad for the first time; and that he is responsible for his guest's conduct, something to keep always in mind in any Greek context. Chaerephon is probably "shocked at such an inquiry addressed to such a man."[67] For without any formal introduction between them, Socrates rather abruptly and aggressively demands to know who Gorgias is, as though he were a mystery. Of course, any companion of Socrates ought to know that Socrates means more by this, but Chaerephon wishes to be polite to the visitor from Sicily. Nor would this be the last time Chaerephon is so cordial, as when Socrates holds "display" in disdain and scarcely refrains from making rather disparaging or belittling comparisons in rhetorical *meiosis*.[68] Socrates draws a trenchant analogy to Gorgias' profession, likening it to that of a shoemaker (448 b4-c1). Chaerephon would tactfully substitute more polite professions, such as doctor or painter.

Beyond the courtesy and topical introductions, there is another reason why Chaerephon is not "veering into total irrelevancy and ambivalence"[69] when he doesn't immediately ask Gorgias straight out "who he is." There is no reason to think that Gorgias, Polus or Callicles should be familiar with Socrates' method of asking what something is, followed by a dialectical investigation. It is by example that both the characters and the readers of the dialogue will understand the real force of the question being asked. Chaerephon is quick to grasp Socrates' meaning because he is acquainted with the Socratic method. Preparation is made for Socrates' dialectical approach. Chaerephon may also be

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[66] Plochmann and Robinson (1988) 11
[67] Dodds (1959) 190
[68] Lanham (1988) 98. To belittle, often through the *trope* of one word; use a degrading epithet. eg. Oscar Wilde's description of an English country gentleman fox-hunting as "the unspeakable in full pursuit of the uneatable."
[69] Plochmann and Robinson (1988) 11

testing to see whether Gorgias is actually prepared to engage in the dialectical process. When he asks if Gorgias is able to answer any question, there is an interesting ambiguity posed by Chaerephon to find out if Gorgias intends to engage in truthful answers or convenient clever rhetorical witticisms. Chaerephon is quite astute in his questioning, for not only does he immediately master Socrates' question by a single example -unlike Gorgias or Polus- but he realises that Gorgias is still prepared only to give a display. Gorgias thinks this is a *jeux-d'esprit* whereby a member of the audience poses difficult questions for the rhetorician, as was the custom.[70] He boasts that he can tackle any question as he's heard nothing new under the sun. Chaerephon's response, "no doubt, you'll find it easy to answer" was no doubt a little caustic, for, as Dodds ironically puts it: "he knows full well just how easy Socrates' questions are to answer."[71]

Still, Plato cannot have the principal speaker enter just yet. Gorgias, boasting of the prosaic questions he has had to answer over the years, hardly seems prepared to have a dialogue and put off display for another time. Therefore, Plato places the burden of rhetorical failure upon the most obstreperous character of the dialogue, which would later induce Gorgias to defend rhetoric. It seems only fitting that when the discussion turns to power and craft Plato's most eager and power hungry student of rhetorical practice should leap in to substitute for Gorgias. Polus pre-empts Gorgias forcefully. His character development or *ethopoeia* is intended to match the very form of rhetorical intercourse Plato abhors. When he considers it makes little difference who is supplying the answers, so long as it satisfies Chaerephon, Chaerephon's cross-examination humours Polus. But, there is not much opportunity to properly cross-examine him as he is too keen in his rhetorical glibness to give much thought to Chaerophon's astute questions and he bypasses them.

Plato's rhetoric in the prologue is not merely limited to the bold question of who Gorgias is and what he practices. He also fixes the antitheses central to the argument in the *Gorgias*. He begins with the knowledge and opinion on giving a name to a profession. Who is Gorgias? What τέχνη does he have knowledge of? Τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη are associated with each other and Polus' opinion is off the mark in naming the τέχνη of rhetoric. His opinion marks the difference between knowledge and opinion, and appearance

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[70] Gorgias' reputation as a resource of answers on set topics is seen also in the *Meno* 70c; for other examples of proposing a topic, προβάλλετε, to the audience see *Hippias minor* 363 d; *Protagoras* 315 c

[71] Dodds (1988) 191

and reality, which introduces δοκέιν and βουλέσθαι, terms which he later assigns to the arbitrariness of the will and the rationality of the ends. Chaerephon cannot be said to be less a dialectician than Polus is a rhetorician,[72] for as master of ceremonies he raises some key topics for Plato. Chaerophon's importance is that he helps, as Socrates' lesser double, to remove non-logical Gorgianic rhetoric from persisting in the discussion. He also asks what the δύναμις of his τέχνη is. This assumes that rhetoric has some power or capacity and that it is a craft.[73] Both δύναμις and τέχνη are important words for Plato in this dialogue. Power will soon come to mean power to do some good; and τέχνη will be treated as the consequence of a teachable ἐπιστήμη, as expounded at 449a, 465a, 500e- 500a, 503de, [cf. *Laches* 186ab]. Plato ingeniously adds to his question: what it is he ἐπαγγέλλει, a standard term for a sophist or other educator who offers public instruction for a fee.[74] Because Plato has introduced power, craft, and teaching to rhetoric, it is highly improbable that rhetoric could be examined as a neutral art, such as painting or music. Plato's inquiry develops into a moral concern when he asks the δύναμις and τέχνη of something.

Plato's parody of Polus is only heightened by the Gorgianic rhetorical piece on τέχνη that ends on a note similar to Gorgias' own thoughts on rhetoric. Polus' definition in the *Gorgias* (448c9) τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν is much like Gorgias' sentiments elsewhere, as in the *Philebus*: μακρῷ ἀπίστη πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν.[75] Polus' entire speech is Gorgianic in style to the point of grotesqueness,[76] the neat balance of phrase, ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως ἡυρημέναι· ἐμπειρία μὲν... κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην with the rhetorical effect of an isocolon resonant of the popular τέχνη–τύχη opposition so current of that period.[77] The ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως recalls ὅσοι δὲ ὅσους περὶ ὅσων from Gorgias' own hand πολλὰ δὲ πολλοῖς πολλῶν.[78] The style here is so peculiarly Gorgianic that one suspects that this is not an actual quote from Polus' σύγγραμμα, as Socrates states, and as many scholars believe. It is a satire on the typical empty and heavily stylised rhetorical speeches, which parodies Gorgianic rhetoric and whatever Polus may have written. Such exaggerated Gorgianic rhetoric may no more

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[72] Benardete (1991) 9
[73] Irwin (1979) 111
[74] Irwin (1979) 111
[75] *Philibus* 58ab
[76] Dodds (1959) 192
[77] Dodds (1959) 192
[78] *Encomiun on Helen* 10

be an actual quote than, as in the *Phaedrus*, the speech of Lysias is one written by Lysias, or the myth in the *Protagoras* is an actual excerpt from Protagoras. There is no proof that these are not the words of Polus' σύγγραμμα, but Plato's stylised parody makes this seem unlikely. Plato even follows up on this when Socrates picks up from Polus' τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν with Socrates' καλῶς... φαίνεται, of which *anadiplosis*[79] on variations of καλόν acts as a syllogism to equate τέχνη with φαίνεται. Plato's intention is to compare the art of Gorgianic rhetoric with mere appearances. Plato will feature the term καλόν prominently elsewhere in the discussion (474cd).

Gorgias must have been astonished when Socrates expressed his dissatisfaction with Polus' rhetorical answer to rhetoric, as it appears he would have said something similar himself. Indeed, both Polus and Gorgias are unable to follow dialectical logic, and so Socrates gives a little lesson. Plato's concern over method of speech is marked by how often he reiterates the importance of logical discussion. First Socrates asks Gorgias to put off displays to have a discussion; then, Chaerephon asks Gorgias if he is prepared -for something other than rhetoric is implied- to have a discussion; then, Polus' failure is followed by a quick lesson in logic to finally make plain what is required to διαλέγεσθαι; even this would not be the last lesson in the dialectic. While Plato is attacking the pure style of rhetoricians, the λόγος, or good argumentation of rhetoric, is not considered. Plato's refutation of rhetoric would be that speech dependent purely upon stylistic appearances could not be a craft or exercise. This rhetoric of non-logical ἐπιδείξις was the kind of rhetoric Gorgias and Polus use and teach without purpose, but it is not the rhetoric Plato would speak of later in the *Phaedrus*. Thus, it is this kind of craft that Plato sets out to refute.

Two things are said about Polus' Gorgianic response. First, it was not logical as Chaerophon asked τί not ποιόν, a definition not a description. In the *Meno*,[80] Socrates explains similarly that he cannot know ὁποῖόν τι, "what it is like", before he knows τί ἐστιν, "what it is". The *Protagoras* concludes with similar results, that until one knows what ἀρετή really is, it cannot be known to be teachable.[81] The distinction of τί and ποῖον, and their logical order is probably due to Plato, as he initiated the idea of ποιότης

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[79] Lanham (1991) 10. Repetition of the word of one line or clause to begin the next.
[80] *Meno* 71b
[81] *Protagoras* 360 e; 361 c

"suchness" or quality.[82] This idea would eventually lead to Aristotle's doctrine of substance and attribute.[83]

Secondly, the answer was an ἐγκώμιον of Gorgias' craft, speaking in defence as though it were τινὸς ψέγοντος. Praise and blame resurface, this time on behalf of rhetoric. The prologue ends as it began, with praise and blame at the head of the discussion. Socrates is trying to turn the course of the discussion away from the Gorgianic rhetoric every interlocutor is keen to display, though he himself must use rhetorical technique to do so. Gorgias, who seems far from breaking out of rhetorical discourse throws praise on himself, presents himself as erudite, by deftly quoting Homer and identifies himself with the Homeric hero of the *Iliad* who spoke this way. So the prologue ends, as it began, with Socrates trying to persuade another interlocutor to engage in a discussion while the prologue prepares all parts of rhetoric.

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[82] *Theatetus* 182a
[83] Dodds (1959) 193

While the prologue anticipates some of the incongruities of Gorgianic rhetoric, it might appear that Plato is entirely dispensing with rhetoric from the start. Now the reader could be led to believe that the dialectic will triumphantly and truthfully sift through rhetoric's fallacies because Socrates has had greater success in convincing the others to διαλέγεσθαι than the others have had at promoting rhetoric. For while Gorgias yearns to present his audience with another display, and Polus is impulsive in his efforts to give one himself, and both Chaerephon and Callicles vie to host one, it is Socrates who has charged them to διαλέγεσθαι on the subject of rhetoric. How did Socrates have four men devoted to practising rhetoric, or eager to hear it, bow so quickly to a non-rhetorical dialectical discussion? Plato will show that no one will relinquish the practice of rhetoric, least of all Socrates, as the success of this dialogue's argument depends on it.

If the *Gorgias* were intended to demonstrate the superiority of dialectic over rhetoric, as Spitzer and Rendall contend[84] along with the superiority of philosophy over sophistry, Socrates must advance his argument for the superiority of dialectic in the same dramatic terms as his argument. How Socrates presents his case is just as significant as what Socrates says, because the *Gorgias* is as much a dramatic work as an argument about rhetoric. The actions of Socrates as a dialectician must support his discursive argument. Also, hasty agreement with Socrates' initial pronouncement on rhetoric certainly may initiate some critical thinking on the practice of rhetoric. But the attack from a single interlocutor does not substantiate outright denouncement of persuasive speech in Plato. Any critical look at rhetoric in the *Gorgias* must acknowledge how crucial it is not to accept the statements of any one interlocutor as Plato's thought. Plato's position on rhetoric is rendered through his own artful use of it in the arguments of each speaker. Steady reliance on rhetorical devices, by way of various tropes, irony, and exaggerated speech in the prologue, deflate Callicles' eloquence, subdue Polus' use of Gorgianic figures in speech, and humble Gorgias' attempt at self-aggrandization. All these are devices that articulate a resolute respect for the art of rhetoric no less than respect for the dialectic. No singular attack is made on rhetoric. Rather, what the reader will see in the exposition of the *Gorgias* is that the failings of rhetoric are chronicled through three *rhetors*, and alongside them the difficulties of the dialectic in Socrates. It will become clear that dialectic does not have any

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[84] Kauffman (1983) 116

greater success with the three contending interlocutors than rhetoric does with Socrates, where at times, it even appears that dialectic trusts in the same sort of cunning presumed of rhetoric.

The phenomenon of rhetoric is that it persuades the many, whereas its counterpart, the dialectic, persuades the one. At times, it may even appear that this is the only real distinction between the two types of speeches. Of course, this is certainly not the case. But, like their counterparts in speech, Gorgias and Socrates start out in opposition equally vying to convince the other of the superiority of his speech to the other. Gorgias boasts both of his own abilities (448a;449a) and of rhetoric's power (452e). Socrates sets out to prove that only his dialectical method speaks the truth (448d). The power and virtue of dialectic is central to Platonic doctrine in the dialogues that address its τέχνη, as the dialectic is demonstrated to posses true power because of the benefits it yields from its justice. What is ostensibly apparent from the tragic and bitter tone of the *Gorgias* is that Plato did not seem to think the dialectician, Socrates, was served justice, in spite of the justness of his practice. Tragedy in the *Gorgias* manifests itself through Socrates' own words which, like the language of Cassandra, speaks prophetically of his execution. But, more significant will be the bitter tone of Plato when he shows how ineffectual the justice of the dialectic is in achieving the judgement Socrates truly deserved. It is a failing of the dialectic which haunts the *Gorgias*.

Plato, from the beginning, seems to be carefully staging a battle between rhetoric and dialectic through their representatives. Thus, the two *personae* of two different genres of speech should enact their form of speech through their arguments. Socrates, in dialectic, should be exploring the implication of two positions until one yields an inconsistency (457-458). His dialectic, by definition, should be free of abuse, vindictiveness, hostility and without personal bias. Above all, Socrates should speak without rhetorical artifice, conversing, not to convince, but to discover the truth. The diametrically opposite speech of Gorgias, through the use of rhetorical devices, ought to make no concessions to truth unless it is to the speakers' advantage. His rhetoric, by definition, should be an example of unreasonable rhetoric. Plato, then, would have Socrates handily prove Gorgias false, if this were a complete refutation of rhetoric and intended to prove dialectic as the only possible genuine form of speech. What in fact emerges is a Socrates who eventually moves in the direction of rhetoric and a Gorgias in the direction of dialectic. Gorgias will be seen moderating his responses to Socrates' dialectical demands, while it will not be too long

before Socrates makes speeches that exhibit rhetoric. Also, Gorgias will make an important and genuine moral appeal for rhetoric's practice, although his effort in this direction eventually proves to be a mere exercise in the conventional forms of rhetoric and not genuine rhetoric. Therefore, what the reader will see in Socrates' debate with Gorgias is Plato's contest between two men who hold out only the promise of a display of genuine rhetoric.

Rhetoric, as initially presented by Polus, is made out to be utterly bombastic. So, when Socrates lays bare the shabby logic of Polus, in reaction to Polus' failure to correctly answer the question and as a result of his vain attempt to prove himself a more successful rhetorician than Gorgias, the reader comes to expect from Socrates a set of standards for discussion matching the rigour of his charge against Polus. Dialectic, however, in the Socratic exercise that follows, presents the reader with some difficulties. The reader cannot help but detect shortcomings in Socrates' dialectical procedure.[85] The art of the dialectic depends on a strict definition of terms and their consistency throughout discussion. The deductions that follow from these defined and consistent terms must be of an infallible and concise sequential logic. But Socrates never stipulates an unequivocal method for his dialectic when he begins, rather he simply adopts and establishes dialectical procedures in reaction to the other interlocutors' errors. Towards the end of the dialogue, in the discussion with Callicles, Socrates offers an account of dialectic in an exchange with Callicles where two "golden souls are contesting" (486d). But, if Socrates wanted the dialogue to advance in strict dialectical terms, he should have defined what his dialectic consisted in from the beginning. Submitting it as an explanation after so much discussion is far too late and acts as the summing up of all he has inferred, not defined, in his dialogue. The final chapter will prove that this summing up will more importantly include an argument for a moral rhetoric existing in theory. Plato, as rhetorician, keeps his reader in suspense between these two genuine forms of speech. But, here, in the beginning he provides the reader with a refutation of dialectical inadequacies.

First, Socrates stipulates that dialectical argumentation should avoid "lengthy exposition" (499, 461-462). Polus' response is false, as he proves incapable of argument predicated upon logic. The criticism is certainly warranted. But Socrates does not specify

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[85] see Kastely (1991), Kauffman (1983), and Kahn (1979) for discussion on the shortcomings of the dialectic in Socrates. Vlastos (1991) argues vehemently against this throughout his study on Socrates *Socrates, Ironist and moral philosopher.*

what exactly the problem of lengthy exposition is. Polus' failure to resolve the logical difference between quiddity, how much he says, and quality, what he has said, allows Socrates to make a number of questionable hypotheses. He leaps from the distinction between quiddity and quality to make it analogous to the distinction between brachylogy and macrology. But a long speech need not be inaccurate, nor a short speech accurate. Socrates moves by *epitrochasmus*[86] to show how a long speech equals an untruthful speech. He subtly infers "that brachylogy stands to macrology as the inquiry into what something is stands to speeches of praise and blame."[87] No long accurate description could ever exist by these standards. Therefore, from this Socrates holds that the argument should be developed through a series of questions and answers. A rhetorical device, then, is used from the very outset to make brevity central to his dialectic. Socrates, however, is prescribing brevity as the provision for finding answers in order to relegate rhetoric to the sidelines. Brachylogy is an attractive model for discussion as it much resembles a mathematical proof, which eloquently draws its conclusion in a clear and concise way. There is certainly a bias for mathematical science in Platonic thought.[88] But just because the longer speeches cannot be projected onto this sort of method, it does not render them inaccurate or useless, as Socrates' actions will prove.

Secondly, Socrates, here, is establishing *a priori* that rhetoric accommodates no logical argumentation. Since he does not define rhetoric, we have only what Socrates has implied through his inductive *epitrochasmus* on lengthy exposition, namely that rhetoric is long and inaccurate, and by such inference he defines his dialectic as accurate. This is a rhetorical method that can be seen in Aristotle's *Rhetorica*, where one restates the contention in an opposite way, so that if the opposite statement holds, so will the original one.[89] It is like saying "moderation is good" instead of "excess is bad." By this method Socrates is able to contend that rhetoric is not logical and dialectic is. Although he later offers each interlocutor a definition of rhetoric, he has not yet defined it. But hasty presumptions about rhetoric by no means constitute the method of brief question and answer to be any more accurate. Misleading questions could certainly risk arriving at

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[86] Lanham (1991) 70. A swift movement from one statement to the next; rapid touching on many points.
[87] Benardete (1991) 12
[88] Vlastos (1991) 107-131. In this chapter he makes the connection between *elenchos* and mathematics in Plato.
[89] Lanham (1991) 167

erroneous conclusions; for "while long speeches do have their aim in persuasion, it is not obvious that short speeches are neutral of persuasion and bring about instruction."[90] Such a perception may suggest that the absolute value of a yes-no question and answer makes Socrates' *elenchos* non-persuasive, but what it gains in brevity it sacrifices by compromising the degree of true conviction that could be hidden in its answer.[91] Gorgias' response to follow may be indicative of this. *Elenchos*, when it selects only those answers which prove Socrates' argument, can mislead its listener just as the persuasion Socrates employs in dismissing rhetoric.

The third development, after contending that brachylogy provides the only means of proof and alleging rhetoric to be without reason, is Socrates' allegation that Gorgias promised to proceed by short question and answer. It is a promise never before mentioned by Gorgias (449b5), which Socrates is forcing on him. Perhaps it is more likely that Socrates is using a *diatyposis*.[92] But, even if Socrates were simply advising Gorgias on how to continue, it is a rhetorical manoeuvre that is only reinforced by Socrates' self-appointment as interrogator without limit to the length of his own questions. Gorgias, in good faith, responds by genuinely preparing himself to answer the questions as well as possible, but logically does not accept Socrates' assumption about the inaccuracy of long answers. Socrates, completely ignoring all validity of this remark, never addresses Gorgias' protest that "some answers require long speeches." Gorgias is challenging Socrates' initial assertion that brachylogy is more accurate than macrology, but is forced to submit, almost *argumentum ad baculum*, to the brief question and answer. Therefore, the so-called dialectical approach of Socrates has committed three *faux-pas*: First, Socrates epitomises rhetoric as non-logical discourse because of its length. It is ostensibly a type of *enthymeme*[93] which advances as weak an argument as Polus' for which he was accurately denounced only a few lines earlier by Socrates. Secondly, as part of this *enthymeme*, Socrates presumes longer speeches to be false and short question and answer to be true. This claim, also, is not founded on logical argumentation, but again, on Polus' poor response. In Lanham's list of topics based on Aristotle's *Rhetorica*, this is number twenty

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[90] Benardete (1991) 13
[91] Benardete (1991) 13
[92] Lanham (1991) 53. Recommending useful precepts to someone else.
[93] Lanham (1991) 65. Maintaining the truth of a proposition -that rhetoric is illogical- from the assumed truth of the contrary -that dialectic is logical.

seven: "Use previous mistakes as a defence (or explanation) for present ones."[94] Finally, Socrates provides no answer to Gorgias' quite reasonable objection, but simply imposes an obligation on Gorgias to use only brief answers. So, although Polus at the outset spoke profusely what we might call the Asiatic style, Socrates, here, is taking full advantage of subtle rhetorical devices to persuade Gorgias to respond with yes or no, while keeping full control of lengthy questions.

Plato provides the reader with the guidelines to good dialectic, but one is not convinced of Socrates' own dialectical conduct. The reader is presented with a clearer idea about dialectical method, but none with respect to rhetorical method. Socrates has made good use of rhetorical methods to persuade Gorgias and others to adopt the dialectic, for Gorgias does take up Socrates' proposition to remove the discussion from lengthy speech or display. His first two replies to Socrates' questions are but a dry "yes" (449d) to which Socrates bursts out Νὴ τὴν Ἥραν! (449d) in praise of Gorgias' brevity. This oath, apparently one the historical Socrates used,[95] behaves like a rhetorical attempt meant to provoke the audience and Gorgias. Socrates is fond of such *deeis*[96] or mock *thaumasmus*.[97] But he is hardly making dialectical progress. He secures no genuine agreement from Gorgias in his dialectic, nor does he even persuade or provoke. Moreover, Gorgias' reply "may express his indifferent politeness to Socrates' questions no less than a genuine assent to the proposition."[98] Gorgias, whose rhetorical eloquence has been reduced to yes or no, is parodying the very exchange in which Socrates delights. Gorgias is not as intellectually flat as some commentators make him out to be; and, in spite of how much regard Plato has for Socrates, Gorgias is treated with surprising respect. In Benardete's view, "Gorgias comes forward as more reasonable than Socrates. He seems to be the model of rationality."[99] Later in the dialogue Gorgias would even have to intrude to make a personal appeal to Socrates to continue when Socrates threatens to abandon the dialogue: Ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, χρῆναί πω ἀπιέναι, ἀλλὰ διεξελθεῖν σε τὸν λόγον. φαίνεται δέ μοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκεῖν. Βούλομαι γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτος ἀκοῦσαί σου αὐτοῦ διιόντος τὰ

[94] Lanham (1991) 168
[95] Dodds (1959) 195
[96] Lanham (1991) 46. Vehement supplication either of gods or men.
[97] Lanham (1991) 150. Exclamation of wonder.
[98] Benardete (1991) 13
[99] Benardete (1991) 13

ἐπίλοιπα (506ab). Gorgias, then, is not entirely preoccupied with his personal image,[100] as Socrates contends his practice is. Gorgias is fully aware that his reputation is on the line, as he reminds Callicles, and urges him not to quit:' Αλλὰ τί σοὶ διαφέρει; πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ τιμή, ὦ Καλλίκλεις (497b). So, in addition to Socrates' failure to secure Gorgias' agreement with the previous argument for brevity, the difficulty of a yes-no approach is mimicked by Gorgias to demonstrate how the dialectic is not completely satisfying. The reader expects dry logical argumentation from Socrates to oppose the ornate rhetoric of Polus. Instead a rather thin logical discourse follows as Plato successfully makes the reader just as weary of Socrates' dialectic.

The *Gorgias* is not a parody of formal speech throughout, though it does just that at times. Plato simply endeavours to make his reader aware of the slipperiness of speech. So, in the section where Socrates and Gorgias are supposed to be trying to define rhetoric, the reader is aware that Plato has written a debate in both dialectic and rhetoric. For while Socrates appears to be soundly winnowing a definition of rhetoric, two immediate details of this dialectic make the reader suspicious of any outcome. The most obvious is the complete break from the requirement of brief speech. Socrates contends that the only proper way to further the argument is the method of brief question and answer (435) and compels Gorgias to answer his questions briefly. But later, when Socrates is forced to answer Gorgias' question about the relationship between rhetoric and politics, Socrates breaks into a two page oration. This oration, moreover, becomes central to advancing his elaborate theory on rhetoric without submitting it to dialectical examination. "This is an unpardonable blunder," says Kauffman "for Socrates has violated not only the letter, but the spirit of the dialectic."[101] The other rule of the dialectic Socrates violates is equivocation. Basic to dialectic is the process of definition, illustrated at 449-450, it is that throughout the dialogue words must be defined unequivocally according to their context. Without agreement on what each word means, any dialectical process will fail. Socrates' terms do not always maintain consistency and are sometimes used innovatively with insufficient prior explanation, as is the case with λόγος and πείθειν. One method of defining terminology in a rhetorical argument is to define one's terms so as to place the argument in a favourable light.[102]

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[100] Kauffman (1983) 126
[101] Kauffman (183) 121
[102] Lanham (1991) 167. This is Lanham's seventh valid topic in rhetoric based on

There is no equivalent in English to *logos*, whose meaning encompasses what is spoken, thought, words, sentences, discourses, particularly rational thought, reason, argument, account or definition.[103] Naturally, relating the semantic differences in a word according to each speaker's notion makes all the difference in its definition. When Socrates at 448d says Polus seems well prepared εἰς λόγους, the opposite of rational discourse is implied (449); and Gorgias defines rhetoric to be περὶ λόγους. There is no inconsistency. *Logos* is clearly attached to what is spoken, words and sentences. Yet, Socrates would soon come to speak of *logos* in medicine and gymnastics (450), then, arithmetic, calculating, geometry, and draughts-playing, which has nothing to do with words, but is particular to rational or scientific thought.

Initially, Plato may appear to be satisfying the full range of *logos*' use and it may seem that the term needs to be defined more precisely. Gorgias' distinction of rhetoric from the other arts is that his art does not have anything to do with manufacture or actions performed by hand. Rhetoric is unlike any other art because it operates entirely "through speeches." Διὰ λόγους is opposite to χειρουργία, through the work of hands. In fact, the literally opposite term of χειρουργία would be "through the mouth," not through words. Why Gorgias restricts rhetoric to be unique in this aspect gives pause to wonder, for gesture and posture are no small part of oratory. Gorgias has difficulty understanding his own art. Socrates accepts this distinction in order to include a list of other arts which deal strictly with speech and creates a paradox. Painting and sculpting are included among these arts. Yet, nobody remarks these are done in total silence! Nor does anybody give Socrates' claim that action is integral to geometry a second thought. These make Socrates' divisions a little suspect.[104] In fact, what Benardete refers to as the carelessness in Socrates' use of *logos*,[105] is probably something more deliberate. One suspects other intentions at work when the more comprehensive definition not before too long is edited to suit one particular sense. The shift from "in speeches" to "through speeches" in arithmetic, then "by speech" in logistic and astronomy demonstrates how Socrates has actually replaced *logos*, which comprises a much broader definition meaning simply what is spoken, by a particular expression of rational thought. Socrates has assigned to the word

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Aristotle's *Rhetorica*.
[103] Irwin (1979) 114. He has created four categories for *logos*. Also see Kennedy (1994)
[104] Benardete (1991) 15
[105] Benardete (1991) 15

logos exclusively the powers of reasoning. First, diagnosis of the body is used, then numerical reasoning itself. Socrates' speech at 451a is more than a mere dialectical question, and aims to persuade Gorgias of *logos'* rational qualities. When Socrates questions and answers himself, as in a rhetorical *hypophora*,[106] and includes such rhetorical common stock court room phrases as ὥσπερ οἱ τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι[107] about the various λόγοι of scientific practices such as arithmetic, calculation, and astronomy, it cannot help but influence Gorgias and the reader to look at *logos* in this light. The effect on Gorgias perhaps explains why he would appear to have no problem with Socrates' definition of *logos* as abstract rational thought.[108] Socrates' identification of *logos* with pure rational thought would become central to his later argument that rhetoric is ἀλλόγον, without pure rationality. Socrates' soliloquy on *logos* persuades Gorgias to accept *logos* as theoretical, perhaps because Greeks did not make the distinction between explanation and the formal qualities of a science. Gorgias only makes a traditional distinction between rhetoric and the other arts, saying that it is about speech and does not deal with manual affairs and is "about the greatest and most important things." The unique quality of rhetoric, then, is that it functions primarily through *logos*, unlike the other arts, and that it deals with "the most important things."

Πείθω, naturally enough, is the other significant term associated with rhetoric. But, unlike *logos*, its meaning is more easily rendered into English as it does not shift between so many closely related definitions. Instead, Socrates raises the idea of different kinds of teaching and relates them to persuading.[109] Socrates had already prepared the other interlocutors for this association when he wanted Chaerephon to ask what Gorgias ἐπαγγέλλεται and διδάσκει. Gorgias advertises and teaches about persuasion, but Socrates manages to turn this around without much notice: "Does he persuade about what he teaches, or not?" Gorgias. "He most certainly does persuade, Socrates" (453d). While it

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[106] Lanham (1991) 87. Asking questions and immediately answering them.
[107] Dodds (1959) 199
[108] Dodds (1959) 196. Antiquity would not have drawn the distinction between the spoken λόγος and the intellectual activity of the artist in the same way a modern reader would. Although this explains the modern reader's difficult with Socrates' broad definition of λόγος, Socrates uses the discrepancies to proceed on a διαίρεσις of τέχναι to the advantage of his argument.
[109] 453d10; James Murray (1988) presents the reader with a more elaborate and philosophical analysis on the πείθω - ἐππάγγειν debate. He goes further than what is said here, but the divisions on the two kinds of teaching and persuading are what motivates this analysis its rhetorical effect.

appears reasonable that when one is teaching a subject, one is persuading something about it, such an *enthymeme* of equating teaching to persuading would be inconsistent with what Socrates says after 454d. Plato makes this proposition all the more strange by having Socrates declare arithmetic to be the persuasion of numbers (453e). Implicit here is that persuasion ought to have knowledge of its subject, because, while one believes the results of a mathematical proof or a rhetorical harangue, regardless of its subject,[110] rhetorical conviction does not stand on the same solid footing as a mathematical proof. Socrates suggests "rhetoric is the persuasion of just and unjust things," (454e) but the kind of persuasion rhetoric manufactures is false beliefs, namely opinions. Socrates starts with the persuasion of the painter, whose role is to persuade others that the image they see is the actual image. "The rhetorician too can put images in the soul and have them pass for the real thing."[111] But, when Socrates leaps to the persuasion of the mathematician, then it is instructional persuasion to which Socrates refers. Rhetoric seems to fall between the idea that it persuades of an image, as the painter does, and the idea that it also provides instructional persuasion. But as instruction must be based on knowledge, it is the dialectic, which presents itself as a dialectical proof, of which Socrates' persuasion speaks.

The semantics of λόγος and πείθειν in the *Gorgias* take into account but a small segment of the wider rhetorical approach of the interlocutors. Neither term necessarily excludes the other, for what *logos* really amounts to is reasoned argumentation. It is essential to both forms of speech. Persuasion, too, is as much a part of Socrates' dialectic as it is of rhetoric. Plato would have each interlocutor continue to exploit various terms in the *Gorgias*, not to satirise each speaker's inadequacy, but to come to terms in a critical way, not only with rhetoric, but also with dialectic.

Detail and drama, by way of rhetorical schemes, semantics, character, appeals to the audience and opposing interlocutor, have so far been the focus of the *Gorgias*' rhetoric. But, the reader is left unclear as to the definition and purpose of rhetoric. *Logos* and persuasion are defining terms, but that is all. A moral use of speech is evoked, but that fails. Just as in the prologue, subtle inferences in the debate between Socrates and Gorgias are made to lead up to Plato's chief concern, the power of speech, particularly in the *polis*. Reaction to Socrates' caustic and forward inquiry has been polite. However, Gorgias'

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[110] Plochmann and Robinson (1988) 30
[111] Benardete (1991) 20

replies hardly ever strike a note of conviction.[112] Elusively, he accredits rhetoric to be "about speeches" and "the most important things." This last vague and pompous phrase, Τὰ μέγιστα – καὶ ἄριστα, also occurs in Gorgias' pupil Isocrates. He, likewise, claims the art of discourse to be πάντων τῶν ἐνόντων ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀνθρωπῶν φύσει πλείστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιον.[113] However, as Socrates has yet really to prove himself a reasonable questioner, one cannot be entirely unsympathetic towards Gorgias' vagueness and reticence to engage in Socratic inquiry. Reservation is further warranted when Socrates turns to a drinking song to evoke more precisely what rhetoric is, as Socrates' rhetorical use of a proverbial drinking song is a far cry from a dialectic on a par with mathematical proof.

Rhetoric is no less central to Socrates' discussion than the *elenchos*. Plato has Socrates argue as such because genuine rhetoric, the dialectic's counterpart, also focuses on tight argumentation, save that logic alone does not advance a rhetorician's position, as persuasive word selection, order, rhythm, allegory, anecdotes and other persuasive lexical techniques prove rhetoric's argument. Socrates, who began faithful to his discourse of question and answer, has now fully departed from dialectical inquiry to move to a more rhetorical style in appealing to a popular drinking song.[114] Although, as Benardete points out, a drinking song does not carry much weight, to cite an apparently well known song and subject matter, is to make a great rhetorical appeal to one's audience. Socrates wants to show that others too dispute rhetoric's claim to the highest good. He is challenging Gorgias to say just what makes rhetoric such a noble art. This is purely a rhetorical device, an *epicrisis*,[115] intended to appeal to both Gorgias' rhetorical propensities and to whet the crowd's more prosaic appetite. Gorgias has been issued a rhetorical challenge: If he thinks he can master the crowd with his rhetoric, he will have his work cut out for him trying to get heard at a drinking party. Socrates presents each craftsman's claim to the highest good then runs through a series of imaginary *hypophora*[116] questions and answers designed to

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[112] Plochmann and Robinson (1988) 31
[113] Dodds (1959) 200
[114] Dodds (1959) 200. His commentary is useful in showing just how the comparison of various ways of life was a favourite theme for Greek writers. Irwin (1979) 115. His analysis on the significance of καλόν in the drinking song hints at its prominence later in the dialogue.
[115] Lanham (1991) 68. The speaker quotes a passage and comments on it.
[116] Lanham (1991) 87. Asking questions and immediately answering them.

rank the professions: medicine, physical training, and moneymaking.[117] Health is unquestionably the highest good in the song, as physical training and moneymaking follow. Controversial in their ranking, each speaker is asking how rhetoric could be placed above his. Each art is more or less self-satisfied. The physician restores health, the physical trainer maintains it, and the money-maker provides one's basic needs, which leaves Gorgias either to declare rhetoric as a medium of persuasion subjugated to each of these arts, as though advertising them only, or to proclaim rhetoric above these arts, subjugating them all to it. While three professions are named, politics and speech-writing for the law court, *logographia*, go unmentioned, and perhaps deliberately. This omission, no doubt, is what prompts Gorgias to evince pride for the profession his craft plies. Gorgias, oblivious to the appeal of Socrates' rhetorical techniques, declares his profession as the greatest. It brings freedom to the rhetorician and slavery for the listener.[118] Socrates would later redefine this, but for the time being the rhetorician is the craftsman of willing slavery or unforced tyranny which absolves the need for the use of force within the city.[119] Plato's regular use of opposing terms follow his previous binary[120] method of defining his terms. Rhetoric, as the bringer of freedom and slavery, also reminds the reader of the earlier importance of the verb πείθειν and πειθέσθαι as persuasion and obedience. Socrates will also reassign the role of rhetoric from persuasion of the many to persuading the soul. Such an antithesis reveals that two kinds of rhetoric are being considered. It may also constitute an allusion to "his elaborate comparison in the *Republic* of the class structure of the city to the soul's structure." If this is the case, then, as Benardete states, "it is safe to say that so compressed a brachylogy can hardly be matched anywhere else."[121] Although Plato is not examining political desire here, as he would later in the *Republic*, a certain measure of anticipation for the theme of the statesman's political will begins here.

Is rhetoric the ruling art? Socrates does not think so, but he has nevertheless persuaded Gorgias to look at rhetoric in this way: "what, in truth, is the greatest good and the cause no less of freedom for men themselves than of ruling others, each in his own city" (452d5-8). But, "in truth", as Socrates distantly echoes when later confronting Callicles, only Socrates practices a "truly political art'" (521d7). Plato attunes the reader to

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[117] Benardete (1991) 16
[118] Thucydides gives a good example of this at 3.45.6
[119] Benardete (1991) 17
[120] Plochmann and Robinson (1988) 28
[121] Benardete (1991) 17

his great concern with power. The very dispute for first place among these arts shows the need for a ruling art, and such allusions to rhetoric's possible subjugation or control envisions the prospect of rhetoric as the ruling art. Socrates has finally cajoled Gorgias a little. He abandons clipped one word responses and defines rhetoric. Through the preliminary groundwork of the prologue, Socrates' supplementary rhetorical soliloquies on theoretical crafts and a disputed drinking song over the highest good, Gorgias is brought to understand his calling as not just a rhetorician, but a man of influence at the highest level of the state. Gorgias, perhaps because he is a foreigner, did not come right out with his position on rhetoric. It is more likely that he remains wary of Socrates.

His statement about rhetoric as the ruling art must have been no different from what Gorgias said to open countless lectures to pupils to make them aware of the power of the discipline they are proposing to learn and of its universal application. Inflated personal beliefs about his practice and his genuine conviction that rhetoric provides a moral good make for both a resentful foreign braggart and an admired practitioner of a moral and political art. He considers his craft most capable of bringing freedom to mankind everywhere, but status and power only to himself. This is an impossible combination. Even if there is an enlightened course for the ruler to take in order to ensure the freedom of others, it remains a contradiction. Any regulated state which provides freedom for all must do so by balancing the claims of everyone, and this is bound to hinder some parts of that freedom. This problem of freedom is a modern one and has no bearing on Plato. Nevertheless, a central proposition of Plato's *Republic* is the argument for benign philosophical rulers to bring "the good" to an unenlightened public through myth, rhetoric, and "the noble lie." Contradictions in the practice of politics and speech come about when the rhetor, in the case of the *Gorgias*, or the ruler, in the case of the *Republic*, do not ground themselves in justice prior to executing their powers.

Only superficial agreement is struck over rhetoric's power when Socrates wonders at the superhuman quality rhetoric must posses (456a). Gorgias takes Socrates' ironic reiteration of rhetoric's daemonic quality in earnest and embarks on a praise of rhetoric. So, despite Gorgias' initial efforts to be the reasonable participant in defining rhetoric, Plato now makes his reader a little wary of this rhetorical craftsman when he boasts that the rhetorician "will never lose to the craftsman." Gorgias speaks for rhetoric's eristic qualities, the very rhetoric parodied from the outset, the sort of "battle" Socrates must have missed while lingering in the agora. A second property of Gorgias' rhetoric would be that his art

requires no knowledge. This would later sharply contrast with Plato's definition of genuine rhetoric. Also a new admission is made: rhetoric has no need of knowledge. Gorgias' craft in this light will be reduced to the simulacrum of a real craft. The real value of rhetoric has been subverted by two conflicting paradigms. One considers rhetoric a craft requiring some actual know-how to produce it. The other claims to surpass knowledge because it can fake it. Gorgias is now the rhetorician, who like the painter, puts images in the soul and pretends they are the real thing but need not be so. Rhetoric now becomes a clever ability to manipulate the many for personal gain and pleasure, or exact a favourable verdict in a law court. Gorgias' words become an example of the rhetoric being satirised and refuted, for Plato would look upon two kinds of rhetoric and come to uphold one and refute the other. This same distinction is made in the *Phaedrus* where Socrates first surpasses Lysias' speech in style, but then rejects both his own and Lysias' speech as false. The final speech comes to the defence of true rhetoric. Later the Polus-Socrates debate would mark a realignment on what constitutes rhetoric, for the dialectical account which ensues reveals a speech without knowledge and the shadow of appearances.

Plato, though, is moving the argument towards the power of rhetoric. Forensic and bouletic speech soon hold the centre of the polemic. Display speech, bearing no consequence in the ruling of the *polis*, falls to the wayside. The kind of rhetoric used in the *Encomium to Helen* or Gorgias' funeral oration are abandoned for persuasion in the political arena. Rhetoric is πείθους δημιουργός (453a). But it is not the only craftsman of persuasion, as Socrates convinces Gorgias of teaching as one form of persuasion (454a). The extraordinary example of arithmetic as persuasion of numbers is Socrates' proof that there are many arts which persuade.

On the face of it, Gorgias has been dealt a strange argument, and accepts it. The reader may consider otherwise. All along Socrates is telling Gorgias he "suspects" what Gorgias' view on rhetoric is; but such rhetorical coaching only leads Gorgias to evince rhetoric as an all powerful mob oratory practised before "jury courts, other mobs, about the just and unjust." Regard is given, not only to those who preach it, but also to those who are effected by it and at what level. Rhetoric has a purely political and moral purpose, which Socrates re-enforces with the rhetoric of the political tool by introducing concrete examples of political decision. He implicitly suggests that Pericles and Themistocles, whose exploits may have required the wisdom of military commanders, managed the building of walls, ramparts, harbours, fleet and defences through political action which required the strength

of their rhetorical skills. Socrates does not just link rhetoric and politics by such suspicions of Gorgias' thought and convincing examples. Gorgias, easily persuaded by them, affirms rhetoric's position in politics.

Thus, Plato has centred his argument for the readers on the power of rhetoric in the *polis*, as Socrates appears to be successfully persuading Gorgias that perhaps rhetoric is just another name for politics. Consider the case which Socrates evokes. He mentions the public selection of doctors and deliberations over military strategy. The plague of the Peloponnesian War never seems far from Plato's consciousness. The relationship between medical knowledge and military stratagem recalls how the plague broke out as a result of the overcrowding of the city, a consequence of Pericles' military policy. Plato's readers would still be familiar with Pericles' famous speech concerning the plague. It had been aimed in part to divert the minds of the citizenry from their suffering, but had nothing to do with his competence as doctor or general. It was his mastery of political rhetoric. Contrarily, Thucydides, master of rhetorical prose, accurately diagnoses the causes of the plague, but he gave no advice, like Pericles, for the people to follow. Speculating on this example of the plague, Benardete wonders whether a physician would recommend surrender to the enemy on any terms in order to reduce the rate of contagion, suggesting the answer does not lie in the expertise of physicians and military strategists. When confronted with the different competencies of military expertise and the physician's knowledge of health, some form of political discourse and not the craftsman's professional advice appears as the only possible recourse. Thus, Socrates appears to have, as Benardete states, "rigged the argument" so "Gorgias has to state the things about which rhetoric gives advice and about which it would have to know." If the physicians know health and generals know warfare, perhaps the rhetor knows politics. Later, this will be the case with genuine rhetoric, as Plato has implied here.

Perhaps Gorgias has played unwittingly into the hands of Socrates, as Plochmann suggests,[122] for Socrates has already shown Gorgias that rhetoric, the kind he is practising, knows and teaches nothing (454-455). Pericles and Themistocles prevail over the ἐκκλησία, the Athenian assembly, with rhetorical skills. No consideration is given to them for their competence as high ranking military commanders; and Socrates agrees about their advising: "Yes, Gorgias, that's said about Themistocles. And I was listening myself

[122] Plochmann and Robinson (1988) 33

when he was advising, συνβούλευεν, us about the middle wall" (455e). In the context of exchanges on political persuasion Gorgias could have been only persuaded that these men acted as truly accomplished *rhetors*.

"When I look at it like this, it seems to be some superhumanly great power," exclaims Socrates. This praise of rhetoric's "daimonic" powers is a double irony from Socrates. The sardonic witticism of how the power of the rhetor, for Socrates, is derived more from some sort of unexplained force than rational deliberation mocks Gorgias' position not rhetoric.[123] For this last remark: "when I look at it like this," comments on Plato's thought that there is more than one way to look at rhetoric. Plato builds the dialogue through the interlocutors' sense that rhetoric is an instrument to be reckoned with in politics. The suspicions Socrates raises, his striking examples and wonder at rhetoric have not yet developed into all out criticism. They serve as part of Plato's sarcastic reflections on how rhetoric can be taken as hollow when estimated powerful for all the wrong reasons. But it also implies at this stage there may be something positive to say about rhetoric.

Yet, in spite of the possibility of proving rhetoric's worth, Gorgias misses the opportunity. Socrates' rhetorical amazement at what Gorgias has to say about rhetoric, plus the political examples raised, encourages Gorgias to hypothesise on rhetoric's δαίμων. Plato, in the *Phaedrus*, stops the discussion at the same critical juncture at the end of the second speech as in the *Gorgias* where the rhetor supposedly prevails with his opinion about these things, meaning defences and fleets. Socrates shows Phaedrus that the speeches they have been making were not true rhetoric. The *Phaedrus* develops to prove how rhetoric's δαίμων, Eros and inspiration persuades on the basis of rational deliberations for the good. But no connection between the δαίμων and Eros is made at this stage of the *Gorgias*.. Thus, Gorgias' speech on behalf of rhetoric falls short because he fails to recognise where the actual δαίμων and power lies and how this δαίμων and rhetoric are not the same. Gorgias can only speak in his imitative rhetoric. From Plato's viewpoint the power of rhetoric is determined by the moral authority it can wield. Rhetoric in the *Republic* enforces dialectical deliberations. The status of rhetoric's δαίμων is not a persuasive quality to gain political favour in the city, as is the case with the *Gorgias*. It is the δαίμων of erotic inspiration revealed through the dialectian's noble encounter with

[123] Plochmann and Robinson (1988) 34

truth.[124] Certain aspects of what Gorgias says contain the essence of Plato's defence of rhetoric, but the assumption that a persuasive power is a δαίμων in itself does not reflect Plato's position on rhetoric. The self-importance that pervades Gorgias' arguments is Plato's characterisation of this misconception of rhetoric. The reader and audience may admire Gorgias' rhetoric, but when the motives become self-serving to the point of egomania about what rhetoric can do, Plato undermines sympathy for both Gorgias and his sort of rhetoric. So, when rhetoric is shown in the Gorgianic perspective, Socrates considers it banal, a knack. Plato renders both their views on rhetoric. Neither Gorgias' encomium on rhetoric nor Socrates' refutation meet with resounding approval, but both tell the reader of Plato's rhetoric.

Plato arranges Gorgias' encomium to rhetoric into two parts: praise of rhetoric's power and a defence of it. Both parts are further divided into two subsections. In the first subsection, 456a-c, Gorgias praises and provides evidence; in the second, 456c-d, he hypothesises on its domain; in the third subsection, 456d-457b, he defends the craft; in the fourth, 457b-457c, he exonerates the rhetor and teacher, blaming only the practitioner.[125] Gorgias is once more embarking on rhetorical discourse. His opening rhetorical gesture "if you only knew" accompanied by a claim of how rhetoric, συλλαβοῦσα, captures all powers and keeps them under its control, marks the return of praise and blame speech-making and oratory. It depicts Gorgias as a passionate and moral man, but nonetheless vain and undiscerning of the Socratic method or possibility of a genuine rhetoric. While Plato would show the rhetoric of Gorgias making passionate appeals and holding an ethical position, poor logical argumentation will illustrate what is lacking. For, in spite of his initial assertion that a rhetor is dependent on the competence of the doctor, Gorgias would soon forsake this competence. This is the focus of Plato's refutation of the power of rhetoric.

Apart from a return to rhetoric, what is said here recalls the aggressive and martial exchanges of the prologue. Following the examples of Pericles and Themistocles, Gorgias employs a military term, συλλαβοῦσα, to describe how rhetoric captures all the powers and keeps them under control of the rhetor. Then, in his ensuing speech, he continues with this metaphor when he compares this form of speech to combative skills such as boxing and wrestling, even speculating on the possible deadly outcomes of rhetoric: death at the

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[124](Cf *Phaedrus*)
[125] Benardete (1991) 23

hands of an abusive rhetor or death to the abusive rhetor, a penalty Gorgias himself sets. Perhaps Plato does mean to show that "underneath the surface gentility of Gorgias and his pleasurable display runs a river of faint red."[126] While Gorgias is certainly eager to demonstrate how rhetoric is eristic to the *n*th degree, a weapon of war, Plato's characterisation of Gorgias and what can be inferred from it about rhetoric is wholly distinctive of Gorgianic rhetoric. It has much to say of what is being refuted.

Plato, initially, has Gorgias argue for rhetoric's noble end. The power of rhetoric is praised because it can persuade others to noble ends. Like the actions of Pericles and Themistocles, Gorgias claims that he alone is able to persuade a patient to take his medicine when his brother, the doctor, and his colleagues are incapable of doing so. Asserting that rhetoric depends on the competence of the doctor to know what is best for the patient, Gorgias argues Plato's point that true rhetoric convinces from competence. The rhetor applies the knowledge of the doctor in the same way the rhetor in the *Phaedrus* applies the wisdom of the dialectic. Just as Pericles may have foreseen the need for the long walls to Piraeus and Themistocles the importance of raising a powerful fleet, both men, in spite of their military prowess, had to persuade an inexpert ἐκκλησία through rhetorical competence. When looked at this way rhetoric seems truly amazing.

The evidence Gorgias presents points to Plato's dichotomy of the body and soul. The doctor's and the rhetor's actions compress into one: the idea of the doctor, who tends to the health of the body, and of the dialectician who tends to the soul, and the orator, who compliments their expertise. Although Gorgias makes no mention of the dialectician, because only Socrates could, Plato's view of rhetoric at this point in the *Gorgias* matches what is corroborated in the *Phaedrus*. Gorgias argues: who but the rhetor is able persuade the inexpert patient to take the necessary medicine for better health? Likewise, one can ask: who but the rhetor is able to persuade the inexpert public to follow the advice of the wisdom of military commanders or, as the *Phaedrus* and the *Republic* argue, the wisdom of dialecticians? "No other craft" (456b) can do this. Noble ends like these argue for rhetoric in the *polis*. As in the *Phaedrus*, Plato does simply argue for rhetoric in the *polis*. and leave it at that. In the *Phaedrus*, rhetoric of a certain kind is upheld. Rhetoric in the first two speeches of the *Phaedrus* is full of false motives before Plato argues for its proper place. True rhetoric is inspired and grounded on the wisdom of dialectical deliberations. The

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[126] Plochmann and Robinson (1988) 38

Republic offers an example of its proper place. The *Gorgias*, at the beginning of Gorgias' speech, appears to argue for rhetoric's proper place vis à vis competence. Gorgias also, at first, appeals to the moral position of rhetoric. He does not say, as Plochmann morbidly thinks implicit: "I went to my brother, the doctor, who was trying to get a patient of his to take his medicine. But, I being so able to convince the patient of anything, and paying no heed to what the doctor prescribed as good for the patient, gave him some hemlock."[127] The rhetor must act on the deliberations of experts. This is strictly how Plato saw rhetoric: the counterpart to the dialectic. Gorgias' example of the and the doctor illustrate Plato's position on rhetoric as the art which achieves persuasion, but can only act on the results of expert knowledge.

After praising rhetoric for its so-called power, the second part of his speech comes to its defence. Plato brings to mind Polus' earlier rhetorical praise on rhetoric that sounded like a phrase out of a manual on rhetoric. Gorgias' praise followed by a defence recalls Socrates' censure of Polus speaking as though preparing for some censure and Gorgias appears to be doing no less here. In his defence, he argues there is a right and a wrong way to use a craft. He maintains that rhetoric should be used justly, though he doesn't say why. Plato argues for a just use for rhetoric, one that follows the good of the dialectic. Gorgias, though, cannot articulate this. Plato made this his crucial character flaw. Gorgias could have been an ally to Socrates because, unlike Polus or Callicles, Gorgias has moral convictions equal to those of Socrates, but does not have his dialectical acumen to fathom and articulate why rhetoric is powerful as a moral instrument. The passionate argument for rhetoric attached to a morality that Gorgias holds, but for which he is not able to give an account, is part of the *pathos* and *ethos* in Plato's rhetoric.

Therefore, in spite of Gorgias' attempt to find a just cause for using rhetoric in the first half of his speech, he blunders and contradicts himself in his defence. Much like the confused rendition of Plato's dichotomy of body and soul in the individual, where his art, primarily a function of addressing the soul, is working for the improvement of the body, followed by a hypothesis in the polis, he contradicts his own moral convictions. He argues that rhetoric is neutral and that its fault lies with the practitioner. Some one else would have to teach virtue. Indeed, moral and logical argumentation would only come from the dialectician, Socrates. Plato characterises Gorgias as a man who has only partially

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[127] Plochmann and Robinson (1988) 34

understood rhetoric's power. The teacher of rhetoric is compared to the teacher of martial arts: "they transmitted these crafts to be used justly, against enemies and those who do injustice, in defence, not in aggression." (456d). If rhetoric is used otherwise, power and craft are "perverted" for the wrong function. There is little doubt of Gorgias' moral position. However, Gorgias' position on rhetoric as a possible moral instrument only finishes in contradiction: "If someone acquires the rhetorical craft and then does injustice with the power and craft, we should not detest his teacher and expel him from the city." (457b). A craft that, according to Gorgias' initial argument, is transmitted for noble ends but comes to be used unjustly would not be true rhetoric for Plato. Gorgias' inconsistencies corroborate the refutation of rhetoric as an uninspired knack that is powerless without noble ends. So, in the second half, where Gorgias prepares a defence for rhetoric, Plato presents the reader with a rhetor whose power is not to assist in the healing of a patient or polis, but who "is powerful at speaking against anyone about anything." The so-called rhetor here wields a weapon capable to kill or be killed. The aggression with which Plato imbues Gorgias does not add to the appeal of the rhetor either. Indeed, Plato makes the reader a little suspicious of Gorgias, turning the reader's sympathy away. Thus, in spite of how much Gorgias comes to articulate what Plato accepted about rhetoric, his ultimate aim is to show Gorgias a boastful man unaware of what rhetoric truly is.

Socrates' response to Gorgias' encomium has the rhetorical effect of bringing about a more balanced understanding of rhetoric. While Gorgias' defence of rhetoric seems to be in preparation for an attack, Socrates never replies by arguing *ad hominem*. Socratic discourse, though, is never without meaningful personal asides and ironic remarks, which Plato strictly intends for the reader. Socrates' refutation falls into two parts: an appeal to character and a focus on Gorgias' inconsistencies.

The response to Gorgias' argument repeats a call for logical discussion. Socrates' early *aporia* on what rhetoric might be, despite his own suspicions and examples, is revived when he says that the problem of defining terms is nowhere near resolved. Both he and Gorgias recognise that "people can't easily define for each other whatever things they undertake to have a dialogue about" because, as Socrates points out, "one says the other is speaking wrongly or obscurely, they are annoyed, and think he is speaking from jealousy towards them, competing for victory, not inquiring into what is proposed in the discussion; and some end up by parting in the most shameful way, covered with insults." (457d). Rather than respond to Gorgias' argument Socrates seems to be both preparing himself for

trouble from one or all three rhetors. Socrates does not simply say "Let's just look at the arguments," he is accusing Gorgias of acting this way. Socrates gives a polite "things don't seem to quite follow from or harmonise" explanation in order to imply that Gorgias has spoken wrongly, obscurely, with anger, jealousy -perhaps towards other craftsmen- eristic, and avoiding the proposition. The reader might expect Socrates to scrutinise the argument, but here he is characterising Gorgias to the point where he even begins to incite the audience. "Some end up by parting in the most shameful way, covered in insults, when they have said and heard such abuse of each other that the people present are annoyed for themselves that they have seen fit to give a hearing to characters like these." (457d). Not the mildest words for one appealing to rational discourse.

After characterising the sort of speaker he suspects Gorgias of being, and perhaps others besides, he offers himself as the model to follow. The model is that of the dialectic and, for Socrates, there is no other way to continue. "I'm afraid to complete my examination of you [Gorgias]," because he fears his winning dialectic will end in blows. Socrates is positioned opposite to Gorgias in every aspect, but the boundaries he sets are no more comforting than Gorgias'. First, he does not qualify his self-characterisation in any way. Socrates avows it is his pleasure to be refuted, when he says something untrue, as well as to refute, when another says something untrue. Socrates declares he is a certain kind of man and wants the others to follow (458b). This implies he must persuade. He bases this claim on the pleasure he acquires from a self-knowledge established through mutual refutation (458a). Gratification is the motivation for continued talk. Socrates is then arguing he is satisfying his own need above others, much in the same way as a rhetorician exploits a certain gratification in the auditor. "Gratification has its Socratic counterpart in self-indulgence, which makes it impossible for Socrates to know the sincerity of his desire to know."[128] After arguing from the pleasure derived from self-indulgence, Socrates then defends his dialectic in the same vehement and moral tone as Gorgias did his own art. While rhetoric and dialectic are equally pleasure oriented, one crowd pleasing and the other self-indulgent, Socrates argues for the good end in being refuted. Such refutation rids one of "false beliefs," which apparently are the greatest of evils. What false beliefs Socrates implies Gorgias is full of is not clear. But it is for the good of the one being refuted to be freed of these false beliefs. Socrates' argument for the dialectic is that he prefers to be

[128] Benardete (1991) 25

refuted than refute. For it is a greater good to be freed from the greatest evil than to free another (458a). The dialectician puts his own good before another. This is the sort of man Socrates is, not exceptionally just, because he frees Gorgias from false opinion, not for Gorgias' good. He is trying to free Gorgias of false opinion to gratify himself. Socrates is not being sophistic, he is appealing to Gorgias' motivation for gratification. Socrates asks him to consider ridding himself of false opinion for his own pleasure over his other obvious pleasure, crowd pleasing.

Plato's rhetoric countermands passionate speech without moral purpose. Gorgias' argument drifts from his initial noble effort of assisting the doctor in healing the body to practising rhetoric as a competitive mechanism. Socrates' reply is proof that there exists speech with moral purpose. His speech proposes the device needed in Gorgias' speech. There is both a refutation of Gorgias' rhetoric and an appeal to *logos* or logical argumentation that defines proper rhetoric. Socrates' speech occurs strictly at the rhetorical level. He makes an *ad hominem* argument against the rhetor who speaks out of passion and competition. His speech also appeals to Gorgias' profession as a man who refutes and takes pleasure in discourse. Moreover, he appeals to his moral convictions. Socrates may have been establishing the boundaries of elenchic discourse, but the rhetoric here convinces the reader of a speech that persuades at a moral level. Socrates is not being dishonest by giving a rhetorical speech to convince Gorgias to engage in dialectical discourse, for he remains steadfast in his use of the dialectic to pursue the truth. However, his argument as to why one should strive for *logos* and take pleasure in it, proves Plato's point about true rhetoric. Eros is an important feature of rhetoric as inspired speech. Justice, is equally important to rhetoric and Gorgias seems to have this in mind. However, he fails in his neutral description of rhetoric. Plato, though, when introducing the idea of the pleasure of being refuted for some greater good, demonstrates that justice and pleasure go together. But Socrates' call for self gratification for justice would come at the expense of Gorgias, of whose "false opinion" Socrates aims to relieve him. Plato is not attacking rhetoric as such. He intends to refute the sort that contains "false opinion" and whose pleasure is derived from pleasing the crowd, rather than from the truthful inquiry.

Refutation of Gorgias' rhetoric is swift. Gorgias realises Socrates' challenge to the rhetoric he teachers would win him little reputation among potential pupils, and though he takes pride in his sense of justice, the rhetoric he claims to speak about has none of the fine moral purpose Socrates' investigation would. Gorgias seemingly acts as though he is

concerned for the prolongation of this "dialogue," but this sudden reluctance to continue without his speech reveals how fearful Gorgias is before a "dialogue." The change in Gorgias' tone reveals to the reader just how powerless Gorgias' sort of speech is. But proud of his sense of justice, which he laid claim to, he cannot shamefully withdraw. Another character who also reflects Plato's purpose in refutation is Chaerephon who speaks for everyone when he says there would be no greater advantage to hear more. Callicles speaks of his own pleasure, which we shall later see at the centre of his philosophy. It seems these men and the rest of the audience were truly inspired by Socrates' call to improve themselves through speech and the pleasure of it, in spite of their claim not to link the pleasure of refutation with their own goodness.

Only out of shame does Gorgias now continue to his end. Plato does not simply want to render Gorgianic rhetoric logically useless, but to shame it as well. The inconsistencies of Gorgias' arguments are quickly reduced. Rhetoric is removed from the status of genuine craft. When Gorgias describes it as a method of disguising itself so convincingly as another craft that the craft it is disguising, the real craft, is less convincing than his rhetoric. It is only an image of some actual craft. The second great inconsistency in Gorgias' arguments is his identification of justice with the neutral claim of rhetoric. If Gorgias felt that rhetoric was a noble art, addressing all the important issues and serving justice, he not should have suggested that his art could be taught for unjust ends. Socrates' speech at 460e - 461b is hardly satisfactory as a condemnation of rhetoric as such, but it is hard proof against the sort of rhetoric being refuted in the *Gorgias*. Socrates expresses dissatisfaction with what has been proposed and suggests further investigation into rhetoric might get to the truth of it: "But how exactly these things stand," referring to the meaning of rhetoric as powerless, "will take quite a long meeting to investigate adequately."

How rhetoric stands, Plato started to elucidate from the moment Gorgias accepted what Socrates said about persuasion and speech. Socrates is showing Gorgias that what he practices has no art and can only be seen as deceptive. The example of mathematics was to show one art that says exactly what it means and leave no room for doubt. Thus, its persuasion of numbers is a sort of literal persuasion. Its *logos* or speech is a science, but it is silent. Rhetoric must be understood as the persuasion of spoken speech and it can only be taken as non-literal, because rhetoric's persuasion might never say what it means. Therefore, Gorgias, as teacher of rhetoric, would have had to speak literally about non-literal speech. He would, as Aristotle does, explain one kind of metaphor in terms of a

proportion: The bowl is to Dionysus as the shield is to Ares. One can call the bowl the shield of Dionysus and the shield, the bowl of Dionysus.[129] Socrates may have been trying to make Gorgias conform to dialectical exchange at first, but here he is teaching Gorgias how to teach rhetoric. If he had succeeded, Gorgias could have shown that rhetoric is a true art and could possibly be put in the service of philosophy. Plato would want to prove this. Gorgias, however, does not see rhetoric like this.

[129] *Poetics* 145716-22

The long conversation with Polus revises rhetoric. As the search for genuine rhetoric between Gorgias and Socrates left only Socrates acting out its parts, only a phantom image of justice in Gorgias has been refuted. Socrates had only refuted rhetoric as flattery and no interlocutor has defined or defended rhetoric, leaving the reader with no real satisfaction as to what rhetoric is. The reader may even feel, as Kastley does, that Socrates has not addressed Gorgias as a serious contender for rhetoric who is "a decent character, seeks public good, and whose principles are worth exploring."[130] Gorgias' understanding of rhetoric may have only been half developed. His role alongside the doctor reflects the good public interest of the rhetor, in spite of his crucial misunderstanding that what he does is a mere appearance. This single flaw, which left Gorgias' rhetoric as deceiving others on matters of justice rather than persuading in justice, is the difference between Gorgias' and Plato' rhetoric. Thus, the reader admires Socrates' fine words and may feel as Socrates argues, that rhetoric is a fraudulent practice, which, in the case of Gorgias (461a) is the exploitation of a counterfeit form of justice. This is how Gorgias appears in the end. For having once "cunningly tempted Gorgias to proclaim the omnipotence of his skill in persuasion, after he has admitted that rhetoric can produce only convictions without knowledge, Socrates makes it impossible for Gorgias to deny moral responsibility."[131] Once Gorgias was compelled to say he would teach moral precepts, the reader would understand why Polus says Gorgias has conceded out of shame. However, Gorgias probably saw his art as neutral, as seen in the *Meno*, where Gorgias flatly denies to teach virtue and laughs at those who do.[132] Yet, Plato has not eliminated rhetoric in justice. He simply indicates that the simulacrum Gorgias ἐπάγγελει is far from it. Rhetoric has not been served, and Polus' reaction appears to express just that thought.

Thus, the sudden outrage from Polus, followed by a promise from Socrates to reconsider his arguments indicates that perhaps Plato is taking a second look at rhetoric as Socrates' denunciation of the practice of rhetoric has not been conclusive in Plato's mind and would require more discussion.[133] But it soon becomes clear that the debate between Polus and Socrates quickly develops into Plato's refutation of another misconception about rhetoric. For although discussion about rhetoric will in fact move on to other topics, each of

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[130] Kastley (1991) 100
[131] Kahn (1996) 134
[132] *Meno* 95c
[133] This rather wickedly pokes fun at Gorgias' earlier lack of appetite for further discussion at 447b.

the three rhetors will come to reveal his view of rhetoric through his deeply rooted view on power, pleasure, and justice. Certainly, if Plato had these men establish what these things really are at the outset, a debate could have followed for genuine rhetoric and its place among the highest of arts. But, as each takes power, pleasure, and justice according to his own self-serving practice, no single position on rhetoric could be articulating the sort of genuine art Plato practices and argues for in the *Phaedrus*.

The first part of the conversation at 461a-470b between Polus and Socrates is a refutation of Polus' defence of rhetoric's absolute political power. The second part at 470a-481a refutes Polus' position on rhetoric when applied to his argument on power, pleasure, and justice. So, the debate moves from rhetoric as the image of justice to rhetoric as the image of politics. Debate moves from what rhetoric is to its possible power and pleasure. Plato inserts a timely outburst from Polus with a rhetorical eye to the καιρός so crucial to moving through the parts of a refutation. Polus' intrusion is also the mark of a search for genuine rhetoric. Socrates has certainly struck at some of the central difficulties with the Gorgianic position, but there is clear dissatisfaction with the conclusion of these criticisms.

Polus feels, and perhaps rightly so, that Socrates has violated some of the procedures of discourse that Socrates himself set down. True, Gorgias has not been the most prodigious speaker on rhetoric' behalf. In fact, he most reasonably submitted to Socrates' demands on speech, as his only rhetorical speech was goaded by Socrates. It is Socrates who encouraged him with rhetorical examples, unqualified assumptions and a drinking song. Moreover, it is Socrates who, without the slightest moderation, acts in an eristic rhetorical manner while simultaneously asking Gorgias to refrain from doing so and to follow logic. Who would not be a little sceptical about the pronouncements of Socrates' so-called dialectical inquiry? Yet, in spite of the way Plato has measured the reader's thought on the possibility of a renewed look at rhetoric, Polus could not be the interlocutor to lead this review. The reader can empathise with Polus' sudden interruption. However, he too would overlook the failed rationale of Gorgias' argument that this sort of rhetoric amounts to the image of justice. Polus would find himself caught in a similar exhibition of imagery. So intense is Polus' irrational rhetoric that his great claim to his skill with rhetoric is now satirised by Plato who "with malicious humour... makes the professor of rhetoric tie himself into verbal knots": "sputtering with indignation and anacolutha," as Shorey put it.

Dodds'[134] and Wilamowitz's analysis of this passage illustrate just how lost Polus becomes in his sentence. Polus could only encourage and justify Socrates' ensuing vigorous attack.

Polus believes that Gorgias has succumbed to Socrates' argumentation out of shame. This confusion derives from Gorgias' earlier plea, that he could not refuse to continue the discussion because it is αἰσχιὸν (458e). Kahn draws special attention to the use of shame,[135] as it returns later with Callicles at 482e, which indicates how Polus was refuted because he was αἰσχυνθεὶς to say what he thinks. The use of shame, as previously noted in the prologue's opening on praise and blame, is very much a part of rhetoric. Socrates concedes that he is willing to withdraw anything that has been said if Polus thinks it was wrongly agreed to. Socrates wants to demonstrate from the beginning to the other interlocutors that the validity of his arguments depends on their mutual agreement. This is the essence of dialectic. Such a concession at first glance argues again for a Socrates keen on offering arguments honestly and free of rhetorical artifice. However, the sarcasm in what Socrates says here in the face of Polus' outburst of anger suggests a Socrates encouraging Polus much in the same vein as he had been goading Gorgias. Polus, unlike Gorgias who is the more experienced speaker, is young and too unsuspecting of Socrates' technique. Socrates would go so far as to turn Polus' eagerness into a pun on his name, Πῶλος δὲ ὅδε νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ὀξύς (463e), rather than simply set him straight rationally. Also, while Socrates claims he is genuinely prepared to reconsider his arguments, he immediately regulates Polus' speech by one very important criterion: "In Athens, where there is the greatest licence, though not complete licence, to say whatever one wants, Polus cannot say all that he wants."[136] In fact, two criteria have been set: there will be a reconsideration of former arguments and the reiteration of an earlier rule on the quantity of speech. Dodds points out that the language of Socrates' possible withdrawal: ἐγώ σοι ἐθέλω ... ἀναθέσθαι is the metaphor from the game of πεττεία[137] meaning to revoke one's own move.[138] Such language makes Socrates' promise a little coy. Of the restriction on the quantity of speech, Benardete points out that Socrates' restriction on conversational correction is analogous to the medical treatment or punishment of justice.

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[134] Dodds (1959) 221
[135] Kahn (1996) 135
[136] Benardete (1991) 31
[137] draughts (or checkers)
[138] Dodds (1959) 222

The patient, ignorant of corporal or psychic remedies, knows only how much pain he can endure. He is unaware and unenlightened as to what course is best for him. Socrates, who makes it a priority to improve his own soul and that of others (458a), is now telling Polus just how much he is willing to endure from him at 461e-462a. In other examples of corrective punishment, such as the advisability of the unjust man submitting to corrective punishment, no quantitative restriction is ever mentioned. Later, in the conversation with Callicles about punishment, Socrates has very little mercy (505c). Moreover, as the dialogue draws to a close, Socrates' moral earnestness reaches a climax of severity in which the incurable are punished forever (525c). So, in spite of the way Socrates would later subject the others to his own corrective and lengthy indictments, he threatens Polus with a rhetorical *protrope*[139] that, if he should become macrologous, he has every right to leave and not listen to Polus' indictment.[140]

No re-examination occurs, despite Socrates' suggestion of possible revision of the outcome of the Gorgias-Socrates debate. All that follows in the debate with Polus had already been established in Socrates' earlier synopsis of rhetoric. While Polus misdirects his accusation against Socrates, believing Gorgias' shame to have been exploited, he overlooks questioning Socrates' definition of speech, persuasion and their relation to justice. Any incongruity Socrates had formulated about the two fundamental parts of rhetoric, λόγος and πείθω, or any persuasive technique Socrates used on Gorgias remain unquestioned. Just as in his debut, Polus appears incapable of reasoned argumentation. Therefore, if he is to engage in an inquiry aimed at reviewing Socrates' arguments about rhetoric, its terms and practice, Polus' attempt at revision or acceptance of the Socrates' arguments should be looked upon with the greatest circumspection. Plato draws the reader's attention to this when Socrates echoes Polus' accusation of ἀγροικία against Socrates when he tells Polus:

> Μὴ ἀγροικότερον ᾖ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰσεῖν· ὀκνῶ γὰρ Γοργίου ἕνεκα λέγειν, μὴ οἴηταί με διακωμῳδεῖν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα. ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορικη ἣν Γοργίας ἐπιτηδεύει, οὐκ οἶδα –καὶ γὰρ ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ἐγένετὸ τί ποτε οὗτος ἡγεῖται– ὁ δ' ἐγὼ καλῶ τὴν ῥητορικήν, πράγματός τινός ἐστι μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν (462e).

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[139] Lanham (1991) 124. Exhorting hearers to act by threats or promises.
[140] Benardete (1991) 31

Plato is not condemning rhetoric here either. Socrates personal half-humorous device of making rhetoric a subdivision of something less credible, as also seen in *Euthydemus*,[141] is more like a first draft of his fourfold theory to come.[142] While this also indicates how Gorgias' understanding of rhetoric may have been only half developed, Socrates would not, as promised, reconsider what he had determined rhetoric to be in his discussion with Gorgias. Two intrinsic parts of rhetoric, which Socrates saw as crucial to his argument, remain conspicuously absent. Persuasion and speech have essentially little to do with rhetoric in Socrates' analysis here. Persuasion, which includes both πίστις and appeal, has been replaced by an unteachable form of flattery. Socrates' definition of *logos*: δίδοναι λόγον, "to give an account," has eclipsed any Greek comprehensive notion of speech, which would naturally lend itself to mean simply words, phrases, usage and science. "Socrates' rival definition of rhetoric does more than set aside Gorgias' claim that rhetoric is an art; it strips rhetoric of even the speech that is built into its name and the notion that it is at times effective."[143] Rhetoric, without its πίστις, deduction, narration, can easily be reduced to being called a τρίβη. The rhetorician, by such an account, is endowed with the power to impress upon his listeners the ability to commit anything he chooses. He wields his practice without skill because it only passes itself off as other arts such as medicine. It is without speech because it has no rational account. It is without persuasion because it flatters but does not teach. Such a description of rhetoric's practice permits Socrates to maintain his assumptions about persuasion and λόγος.

In addition to wondering whether Socrates really has any intention of re-examining his assumptions, the reader may very well ask how much credence can be put into Socrates' claim that he gets the greatest pleasure out of being refuted. The reader would have to make a great effort to actually find Socrates being refuted and taking delight in it. Should anyone try to refute Socrates, the response is sharply contested. Nor does Socrates respond purely through a dialectical refutation. In the case of Polus' refutation, Socrates ridicules him for his impulsiveness and youthful inexperience, making a pun out of his name, and flouts Polus' very real, considering Socrates' eventual demise, terrifying scenario of the tyrant's power. Μοπμόλυττη ἀυ, exclaims Socrates reducing Polus' argument to the ridiculous. The reader, though, is acutely aware of the real outcome. Plato

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[141] *Euthydemus* 289e
[142] Dodds (1959) 224
[143] Benardete (1991) 33

wrote the *Gorgias* under the shadow of Socrates' execution and is probably bitterly satirising not simply those who were responsible for his execution, but Socrates as well for his own public failure to prevent it. Socrates' mockery of Polus is not the pleasure of self-refutation at work. The reader is presented with a recalcitrant Socrates. When recalling Gorgias' objection to Socrates' earlier rejection of macrology, there was the possibility that Gorgias might be correct in thinking that some answers do require a lengthy response. Yet, Socrates pays no heed, though he is never short of breath explaining his position. When looking ahead to Callicles' case against Socrates' way of life, an even more striking argument than that of Polus is made in Callicles' argument for hedonism. Socrates expresses no pleasure at the words of Callicles. In truth, the only delight in refutation noticed is Socrates refuting others. The pleasure Socrates takes at another's expense is a rhetorical weapon of refutation which he does not wield with reluctance. It is Socrates who is now feigning. This pleasure is a rhetorical twist that acts like the reverse of an *apophasis*.[144] Socrates will affect confirmation of his self-refuting pleasure, but denies it with the joy he refutes others.[145] Socrates is pretending to affirm what is really denied.

Rhetorically, Socrates is manoeuvring Polus into the identical unhesitating questioning and response rhythm to which Gorgias has fully conformed. In Gorgias' case Socrates taunted him with a dialectical dare of εἰ μὲν καὶ σὺ εἷ τῶν ανθρώπων ὥνπερ καὶ ἐγώ (458a). This eventually convinced him to abandon the longer form of speech. But not everyone is the sort of man Socrates is and, in some ways, the colourful and heterogeneous characters, which Plato portrayed Gorgias, Polus and particularly Callicles to be, reflect a certain rhetorical energy and rhythm which have a more genuine appeal to a reader than the stark dialectical method and radical conclusions of Socrates. The discursive element to each interlocutor may never quite measure up to that of Socrates. Yet the actions of the interlocutors, even one as weak as Polus, play a positive role developing Plato's argument. Their voices act as the rhetorical figures in his rhetoric. Polus will fail in the end, but his interruption and what it signals to the reader are of equal value to Socrates' victory. Even in contrast to the critical reactions of these interlocutors, the so-called subduing of the three rhetors has as much to do with their reasonableness of mind, in spite of the ultimate weakness of their own idea of rhetoric. Even Socrates sometimes takes

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[144] Lanham (1991) 19. Pretending to deny what is really affirmed.
[145] see Vlastos'chapter on 'Happiness and virtue in Socrates' moral theory' for his philosophical possition on pleasure and good and their ends. pp. 200-232

unreasonable measures, which reflect some of the limitations to dialectic and tell of the significance of rhetoric. Plato reminds the reader how well Socrates had Gorgias conform to dialectical speech when Gorgias intervenes to bring Socrates to continue with Polus (463a-464b). Gorgias is so successful in encouraging Socrates to go ahead that Socrates breaks into a rhetorical speech (464b-466a) on his version of rhetoric. He begs the indulgence of Polus, admitting what pleasure he evidently gets from Polus' youthful brazenness. Gorgias has fallen into a stern dialectical routine, not because he has been subdued, but because he is interested in finding out where Socrates is leading the argument about rhetoric. He encourages the debate to continue, in spite of the fact that he might loose face, because it is his reputation that is at stake (463a, 497b). Socrates, the inquisitor who heads the investigation, entreats the favours of rhetoric from the practised indulger, Polus, as Socrates slyly feigns the actions of a flatterer. One favour Socrates seeks of Polus is to ask him what cookery is. When cookery turns out to be the corresponding corporal element in Socrates' scheme to rhetoric, Socrates is able to even further ridicule Gorgias' rhetoric without ridiculing his person. This indirect comparison of Gorgias to a cook rhetorically deflates Gorgias' stature, while still preventing possible uneasiness between the two men. It reflects the subtle urbanity with which Socrates enjoys accusing the others. This reminds the reader of how in the prologue Socrates' choice of professions was marked by his playful sarcasm. References to the cobbler are integral to the Socratic *persona* and often have a rhetorical dig which frustrates his opponents (490d-491a). Socrates' rhetorical actions cast little doubt on what pleasure he takes from refutation. Clearly it is not the pleasure of his own refutation, but that of refuting the other.

Plato had raised some of the philosophical issues of the *Gorgias* in the prologue. What seemed like a battle that was really a feast is a far cry from a theory on "seeming" and "being," but it rhetorically serves to anticipate its antithesis. The reference resurfaces in the fourfold theory on the arts of the body and of soul. There is no rhetorical battle, but Socrates repeats his association of Gorgianic rhetoric with gastronomic indulgence. This dichotomy of body and soul also had been alluded to in the section with Gorgias. Socrates, though, advances an idea that is undeniably Platonic.[146] The sciences assigned to the body and soul are "body-craft" and politics. It is significant that no one name is given to the science which tends to the body. In a passage where Socrates' scheme depends so much on

[146]see Vlastos (1991) chapter on 'Socrates contra Socrates in Plato' pp. 45-81

nomenclature and taxonomy, the glaring absence of a name for a body-science along with the absence of a name for the comprehensive art of soul and body, raises a problem with Socrates' quick and neat division. What single art rules over all four? Indeed, without there being a science to look to the εὐεξία, good condition, of man collectively or individually, what art would the philosopher king use?

Socrates' scheme divides politics into justice and legislation. Its corresponding "body craft" he divides into medicine and gymnastics. These are four "real" crafts, contends Socrates, and each, in turn, have pretenders, "seeming" crafts: cooking for medicine, cosmetics for gymnastics, rhetoric for justice and, by implication, sophistry for legislation. Socrates sees justice, legislation, medicine and gymnastics as arts grounded in knowledge. The other "seeming" crafts are put down as experience derived from perception. This is intended to prove that art is to experience as knowledge is to perception (464c). But no one asks how cooking competes with medicine. Medicine may be diagnostic and therapeutic, but it is not the science which claims to know the best food for the body. "Cookery, in fact, might well induce this belief without ever opening its mouth."[147] Nor is it obvious that the cook ever claims to be healing the body. A plausible explanation is that because each flattering art is dependent on perception and is only guessing at reality, it might tend to overstep its jurisdiction. Socrates confesses this is the case with rhetoric and sophistry and draws on the Anaxagorean principle of ὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. He uses this statement to prove how if the soul did not control the body, a chaos would reign in the human condition. Therefore, "Body would intrude into the spurious versions of legislation and justice and soul into cookery and cosmetics."[148] How much the body shows up in the rhetoric can be said to be a major theme of the *Gorgias*.[149] The very idea of a diagnostic science of soul, in reality, capable of making the same precise discriminations as medicine would in itself be quite extraordinary, though not necessarily impossible. But, a diagnostic science that was therapeutic is arguably quite unlikely.[150] Therefore, the gymnastics of the soul, or justice as Socrates is calling it, is not

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147 Benardete (1991) 36
148 Benardete (1991) 36
149 Plato is no doubt continuing to allude to the Historic Gorgias' comparison between the rhetorician and the doctor in his *Encomium on Helen* where he says that oratory is to the mind what drugs are to the body (*Encomium on Helen* 14)
150 Benardete (1991) 34

an entirely convincing argument.[151] No one questions the diagnostic or therapeutic level of either the science of politics or its two parts, legislation and justice. Therefore, Socrates presents this philosophy as though "it were completely in place and universally acknowledged."[152] It never gets submitted to refutation.

Once more Plato illustrates Socrates' recalcitrant attitude towards taking pleasure in being refuted by others. There will be no assessment of the philosophical adequacy that Irwin, Vlastos, Benardete, Kahn, Rutherford, Plochmann and Robinson have conjectured about Socrates' fourfold theory. Suffice it to say that to accept all aspects of this theory as Platonic doctrine is to overlook its theoretical problems. Socrates' fourfold theory is problematic, not because he is inadequate as a philosopher, but because his elaboration on the body and soul and its craft is intended to resonate more of Plato's rhetoric, a *divisio*,[153] than an actual paradigm postulated by Socrates. Other theories, such as the one concerning the afterlife, are repeated in different dialogues. But in what other dialogue does Socrates raise this complex fourfold theory? If this theory does have philosophical inadequacies, it is safe to say that their impact on this dialogue has more to do with its rhetorical effect on the argumentation than strict doctrine. These rhetorical tendencies are what a philosopher may tend to neglect. What really ought to be considered is the rhetorical value of what has been said, for the logical pitfalls only make sense as parts of Plato's rhetorical method.

An antithesis between art and experience is argued for and equated, in the fourfold scheme, with an opposition between knowledge and perception. This, in turn, is equated with the opposition between good and pleasure. Then, as Socrates' survey of art excludes pleasure, perception and experience, which Polus says make for art (448c), the only purpose of art must reside in the good achieved entirely through the purely rational agency of λόγος. The compact unexamined arguments of Socrates seem to precede and make way for his severe morality rather than explain what rhetoric is. Socrates detaches experience, perception and pleasure from τέχνη in his argument. But they are as tenuous as his logic in the fourfold theory, where the nomenclature of the craft for the body remains an unspecified "body craft" and where the analogies between the genuine and fake arts, such as cooking and medicine, are weak and suggest that the more significant analogies about the soul and its craft should be scrutinised. The confession in the end to a belief in the

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[151] Benardete (1991) 34
[152] Benardete (1991) 35
[153] Lanham (1991) 60. Division into kinds of classes.

Anaxagorian principle of "mixture in all" becomes true of τέχνη and its link with experience, perception and pleasure. Plato makes it possible in the τέχνη of his rhetoric. He plays upon the audience's experience from the Persian invasion, through the Peloponnesian War, to Socrates' death. The perception the reader has of each character develops entirely out of Plato's writing and the reader's pleasure is guided entirely through the encounters Plato has created.

Socrates' initial criticism of rhetoric is that it is a part of flattery (466a) because it appeals to pleasure. There is no λόγος, or method, to its flattery because it cannot account for the cause in it. Each art knows the causes of each thing and has a therapeutic aim. Socrates argues that an art comprehends the means it employs and the ends it pursues. He continues by contending that knowing the cause of something is knowing what that something is, and so knowing it, is to know whether it is good. Socrates then asserts that justice is good, before giving any account of justice. Justice is an art, before anyone knows what the art comprehends, whether even the art yields justice or observes justice. Socrates connects three distinct propositions: art is knowing the cause of something and being therapeutic; justice is improving the soul and city; the good is ethical beauty. The argument which runs from a series of disjunctive propositions, a *dialysis*,[154] is more of Socrates rhetoric. "One cannot but suspect that Socrates' analogues [the above mentioned] are dictating out of themselves the very structure of the unknown arts of legislation and justice. Socrates' account, then, of justice must be infected with the corporeality of what its counterpart handles and would thus betray the presence of rhetoric in its makeup. The degree to which justice is coloured with the rhetoric that apes it determines exactly the degree to which rhetoric can be successful at pulling off its masquerade."[155] Not only does Socrates delight the audience, entice his counterparts and rhetorically reprove them, he proportions his argument rhetorically. Surely if the causes of pleasure were known and this were its aim, would not pleasure be assigned an art? Socrates, at least, seems to know the causes of pleasure without disgracing the cause of reason.[156]

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[154] Lanham (1991) 52. One argues from a series of disjunctive (compound hypothetical) propositions.
[155] Benardete (1991) 37
[156] see Atkins (1960) pp. 267-68) and Kahn (1983) pp. 75-76 on the causes of delighting the audience.

Beyond the philosophical considerations that mesh with Plato's rhetoric, the portrayal of Socrates' counterparts in their arguments stand for two types of rhetoric. Plato shows that rhetoric for Gorgias must pretend to be justice and his practice is merely the phantom image of justice, which is just what Gorgias impersonates in his conversation with Socrates. Gorgias is the illusionary double of Socrates, as Plato has made rhetoric to be unjust through Gorgias, while Socrates' rhetoric is justice.[157] Also, as Polus objects that Gorgias is incapable of teaching true justice, he himself thinks that justice has nothing to do with rhetoric's power. He would only portray another rhetorical image in Plato's scheme: the speech of tyranny.

While Gorgias was under the illusion of his rhetoric, which turned out to be flattery, Polus acts with determination not to make the identical mistake. He knows well that those who use flattery live a despicable life of hand to mouth and commits himself to prove by rational means the power of rhetoric. But in the process he abandons the prestige Gorgias strove so hard to gain in his craft. The power of rhetoric, in Polus' mind, is like that of the power of the tyrant. Τί δέ; οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτεινύασίν τε ὃν ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πολεῶν ὅν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς (466c). Plato has ostensibly cast Polus as the spokesman for tyrants. But, unaware of how lost he is in his own example, it does not occur to him that tyranny has little to do with speech or rationality.

Polus is after political power at any cost. At the beginning of the discussion Socrates asks Polus whether he is starting a speech or asking a question. As Polus' indignant tone suggests to Socrates that Polus is being rhetorical, Socrates decidedly puts him in his place, as again at 466c3. Socrates continually steers Polus away from rhetoric by these exclamations and ridicule. He turns around the claim he made before, that Polus, in all his youthful vigour, is just the man to catch a stumbling old Socrates (461d). Again, Socrates takes great pleasure in refuting someone else. Polus has blundered and is shown up as a poor rhetorician and refutes rhetoric in himself. As the argument continues, Polus easily agrees with Socrates that power is good for whomever has it, though clearly oblivious to Socrates' concept of good and the ends of arts. While sternly chiding Polus on style, Socrates re-iterates the purpose of arts. He reintroduces his initial examples of the doctor and the money-maker, but rhetorically reverses the perspective and argues from the

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[157] Benardete (1991) 36

actions of the patients rather than that of the craftsman (477e). Benardete considers how Polus accepts three cardinal goods of Socrates: wisdom, health and wealth. "Wisdom replaces beauty in the drinking song, apparently on the basis of Socrates' soul-gymnastics or the art of legislation, but certainly because Polus is insensitive to beauty and the actions men take to get it in their possession."[158] What Benardete is remarking on is Socrates' choice not to introduce beauty here as his rhetorical choice of terms. Pleasure is not among the goods; only painful and troublesome actions are considered. Socrates shows Polus just what the sake of the good is. Polus argues for the goodness of tyranny, taking it for granted that tyranny is unjust without qualification. He forgets that he is committed to the rationality of rhetoric, its powers of reason against the charge of flattery. He believes rhetoric has the power to endorse the unjust tyrant. Socrates is simply showing, once more, if an art is genuine, it acts for the sake of some moral good. Had Polus argued that the tyrant believed in the goodness of tyranny, and not that tyranny is unjust, he might have argued for a real tyrant. Instead he fabricates an imaginary tyrant whom he can envy for his happiness and denounce for his injustice.[159] Plato proves such false opinion constitutes injustice: Polus is the "seeming" image of tyranny.

What Plato refutes here is tyranny, not rhetoric. Socrates shows, by the example of having the power to kill anyone in the marketplace, that there are no advantages to absolute injustice. Polus has not considered the advantages of nontyranny. In fact, unlike the case of Thrasymachus in the *Republic*, Polus' tyrant does not determine what justice is. He simply is entirely unjust. Polus elaborately praises the total irrationality of an unjust power as the most rational choice. He cites Archelaus as an example of a ruler who came to power strictly through the force of crime not persuasive speech. Polus raises his listener's moral indignation in mounting the blackest case possible against Archelaus' character. Speaking as though he were a criminal prosecutor, Polus vilifies him in rhetorical language in the closing statement as the worst of public offenders. He raises his audience's indignation even higher by stirring up their envy for his happiness. Polus' fascination with the horror of such great wickedness and evil pleasures arouses terror and a certain exhilaration in the audience. His rhetoric is the very opposite of Gorgias', whose simulacrum of rhetoric was feigning justice through flattery. Polus delivers a speech which evokes the sternest morality

[158] Benardete (1991)40
[159] Benardete (1991)42

in the harshest tones of justice. Drawing on crowd appeal, he has the listener's empathy for their sense of justice while keenly indulging in their appetite for the pleasures of tyranny.

Polus speaks for tyranny not rhetoric, for had Plato truly wished Polus to speak for rhetoric, he would not have the tyrant usurp the rhetorician. Polus could have argued that the rhetorician's power consists in persuading the city to take his word for it that what he wills is just. Instead, Polus takes it for granted that the tyrant is unjust without qualification and maintains that to commit outright injustices is better than to suffer them (469c). Polus is deeply conventional. Rationalising between two choices, being harmed or doing harm, he goes a step further than Polemarchus's justice of "doing one's friends good and harming one's enemies"[160] Polus believes that rhetoric's power of persuasion would benefit the tyrant, this is the best way, and one is better off as the tyrant. So while believing in the power of reason in the form of persuasion, he praises the total irrationality of unjust power. Thus, Polus feigns the tyrant not the rhetor. Socrates easily refutes the incongruity of Polus' position that to suffer is unjust but that it is only right to be the one to commit it. His worship of tyranny flies in the face of what he calls just. Socrates' example of a man in the agora with an all powerful dagger tucked under his cloak (469de) exaggerates this position and ridicules Polus' tyrant-rhetor alliance.

The rhetoric that was the mere guise of justice in Gorgias, is clearly not an issue for Polus. Only the happiness of the tyrant counts for Polus. Justice would make Archelaus the slave of Alketas, because his mother was Alketas' slave. Archelaus, however, does not murder his master for the sake of past injustices done to him. Polus makes it clear that Archelaus did not return rule to his father, Perdikkas, who was a free man. According to Polus, Archelaus does not act to avenge his mother's enslavement either. He only intends to restore his uncle to the throne as a ruse. In Polus' conventional way of thinking, the question of the justice of slavery is not an issue. Just as Plato was refuting rhetoric as an image of justice in Gorgias, he intends to refute the power of tyranny in Polus.

Nevertheless, just as Gorgias was able to raise legitimate arguments about the relationship of rhetoric to the polis, so too does Polus raise compelling arguments about the nature of Socratic action in the face of injustice. The example of Archelaus is designed to argue what a just man, like Socrates, would undergo at the hands of the tyrant. Polus may be completely indifferent to justice, but he appeals to the audience's sense of outrage for the

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[160] *Republic* 332d

cruel injustices of torture. He depicts both bodily and psychic torture. The body is put on the rack, castrated and the victim's eyes are gouged out. Moreover, after having endured these bodily tortures, he must also suffer in his psyche by looking at the same outrages against his wife and children. Finally he is crucified and covered with pitch. Glaucon's version of justice in the *Republic* is another variant of this.[161] The just man is portrayed as an impotent do-gooder. Plato reminds the reader once again of the injustice Socrates suffered, who in spite of his sense of justice, was not able to save himself. If the just speech of the dialectic held any power in bringing the polis to recognise Socrates' fourfold scheme here, he would not have suffered the fate he did later. Polus makes a compelling argument for the power of the tyrant and in the *polis* over the non-tyrant and dialectician, at least Socrates should not take the force of such speech as lightly as he seems to. The impotency of the dialectic reveals some power in a just rhetoric.

However, Socrates steals Polus' thunder from the crowd and goes on to denounce the two remaining forms of rhetoric: forensic and deliberative. Display rhetoric, ostensibly Gorgias' domain, had already been reduced to flattery, but Socrates had yet to brand these remaining two spectres of truth. Much of the discussion concerning justice, tyranny, rulers of past and present indicate Plato's concern with the rhetoric of the law courts and of the assembly, but Socrates had yet to severely censure these forms for their deceit and fallacies. Forensic speech "is worth nothing towards the truth," because it produces false witness. There is no λόγος or rational procedure (472b) in the forensic according to Socrates. Deliberative speech is associated with public derision and perhaps the iniquities of democracy (474a). Yet, Socrates recommends Polus to consider another form of refutation that he produces. He does not say whether the rhetorical speeches Socrates uses to denounce forensic and deliberative speech are not another rhetoric intrinsic to his refutation. Plato is not outlining the two forms of rhetorical speech. In the debate between Polus and Socrates, the moral voice is loudest and it is cloaked in rhetorical figures. Through their debate, Plato gives purpose to the rhetorical form he practices. Rhetoric survives because Socrates fails to bring his counterparts to the truth in dialectic. His rhetorical voice is audible, as in his own previous example of the drinking song. He knows how to be heard. Socrates has scarcely been reluctant to use persuasive speech to open his dialectical rebuttals. Surely, if Plato wanted to show that the dialectic could stand alone to the claim as

[161] *Republic* 361e3-362a3

the only genuine form of speech none of these rhetorical speeches would have been necessary to bring Polus round to discussion.

In the first speech, Socrates cites the problem of false witnesses testifying and overwhelming an honest man. Even in the face of credible witnesses, such as he names, Socrates claims they could never dislodge the single truth he knows. What is striking here is the paradox of his criticism. Socrates trusts only in his undisputed method and suspects the judgement of others. A court of law depends on many witnesses to ensure that the man on trial is telling the truth. Witnesses are intended to avoid the possibility of a single man deceiving, bribing or forcing those who administer justice to turn a blind eye to the truth. Socrates swears that his statements are the only truth. He implies that those of Polus as well as the others are circumspect. No one here is about to accuse Socrates, for all his moral severity, of being the sort to testify falsely under oath. But who is to say that his solitary testimony is any more trustworthy than a multitude of witnesses? If the problem is the many, why does Socrates not mention the plurality of the jury? Perhaps, as Socrates says at the very end, he believes that his arguments are being tried by his own peers, "the three wisest men of Athens" (527b) and it would not be rhetorically prudent to denounce only the many witnesses who testify falsely under oath.

It cannot be said that Plato shares the same rather conceited position. Plato does not act alone; he relies as much on the other interlocutors to match Socrates as the many witnesses testifying to his position. Socrates argues the central moral position of Plato's rhetoric, but Gorgias, Polus, Callicles and even Chaerephon act as reliable witnesses. They represent the Athenian, as well as the foreign, varied appetite for speech, justice and power. What appears as a rather extreme position simply aims to expose just what happened to Socrates in 399 BC. He told the truth, but was sentenced to death because of the countless accusations and witnesses brought against him. Plato is drawing on the reader's sympathy for Socrates' plight.

Plato's rhetoric is built on Socrates' arguments, but arguments raised by opposing interlocutors counteract the severity of his position. While Socrates' counterparts never succeed in holding their position, their assertions produce some convincing arguments. Socrates proclaims his view as universal. Is the reader honestly convinced that the tyrant who seizes the throne unjustly is unhappy and unhappier still if he never goes punished?

Polus' reaction concurs with the analysis of such readers as Kastely and Kauffmann.[162] Polus' passionate reaction maintains Plato's rhetoric in justifying a certain measure of scepticism in the reader towards the severity of Socrates' arguments. Yet, no matter what sympathies the reader may hold for Polus' contumely towards Socrates' seemingly outrageous proposition, Plato has it rhetorically pass for some version of the listener's conscience. Polus' reaction gratifies the reader, but like his rhetoric, its effects are hollow. Socrates is immune to such comic turns. It would be absurd if Polus' scorn means to stir Socrates' conscience, for it is Socrates, not Polus, who remains an adherent of justice.[163] Socrates turns Polus' laughter into a criticism of deliberative speech. For when Socrates tells Polus how he was laughed at in the assembly, the *ethos* of the Socratic *persona* is once more morally vindicated. Through Socrates' personal example, Plato sustains the moral integrity of Socrates' *ethos* when he abstained from committing himself to an illegal vote. Who could not be persuaded in 392[164] that Socrates' personal convictions outweigh the many? Plato knows that in the end the Athenians were proved wrong for their actions. Thus, he maintains the position of the one truth versus the many false. But only dialectical inquiry is necessary to establishing the truth. Socrates brings Polus back to his previous forensic analogy and turns the witness of one man in the law court of dialectical inquiry into the political context of gaining the vote of one man. However, Socrates' ignorance in a point of procedure before the assembly only endorses his own incompetence before a crowd rather than the ignorance of the many. This supports the view that Plato saw a need for rhetoric in justice where the stern dialectic does not convince. If Socrates had been persuasive that day in the assembly, he might have maintained the law, just as in 399 BC forensic speech might have saved him from injustice.

Socrates' single appeal is to moral reasoning, with which he intends to bring the interlocutors into dialectical inquiry, and to this end, he is an overwhelming success. What follows from these rhetorical proceedings, in drawing on some of the fallacies of forensic prosecution and the insincerity of the assembly, is a dialectic to prove justice beautiful. Beauty becomes a chief virtue at this stage of the argument, as Socrates dialectically proves there are beautiful bodies, as well as shameful and neutral ones, and that justice is one of

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[162] Kastely (1991) 101; Kauffman (1983) 119
[163] Benardete (1991) 48
[164] Dodds (1959) pp. 18-30. He puts the date of the Gorgias between 390 and 394

them. Socrates separates out the pleasant from the good to demonstrate the beauty of justice. It is the argument for an ethical form of speech.

Socrates' exchanges with Polus serve as the πίστις of Plato's rhetoric. By ingeniously reintroducing Gorgias' example of the physician, he plays upon the analogy between the doctor's craft of curing the sick and his own of redeeming the soul. "Don't shrink from answering, Polus -you won't be harmed at all; but present yourself nobly to the *logos* as to a doctor; answer, and say either yes or no to what I'm asking you" (475d). Socrates now comes out speaking just as Gorgias did to his brother's patients, as Socrates poses as a soul doctor promising to cure Polus. While *logos* has once more noticeably shifted from giving a diagnostic account to a therapeutic one, Socrates is persuading Polus that the punishment the unjust receive is intended to improve the condition of the soul. What can be understood from this is that the ill suffer because of faults in the body and the unjust because of faults in the soul. This is a tenous analogy. Illnesses are corporeal mistakes, but injustices are not errors of the soul. But these examples appeal to what will be the ultimate use of rhetoric in their debate. The leap from diagnosis to therapy in the body is analogous to what is practised in speech. Dialectic can serve to diagnose, but only rhetoric can actually cure the soul.

As every concept of rhetoric appears defied, the debate with Polus neither fully yields rhetoric's place, nor makes for a successful attack. It merely outlines a playful anatomy of rhetoric.[165] The outcome of the denunciation of rhetoric in the debate between Socrates and Polus is, at best, unsettled. Socrates has yet to explain the connection between rhetoric and committing just and unjust actions; and he has yet to show how being unjust is undesirable, neither of which fully justifies his conclusions about Archelaus and the real value of rhetoric.[166] This defence of rhetoric is a bit peculiar, for it does not address all of what rhetoric encompasses, as rhetoric has been stripped of its role in addressing great issues in the public forum. But this is because Socrates, here, is particularly concerned with matching rhetoric to the beauty of justice. His conclusion with Polus is meant more as a *hyperbole* and is not meant to restrict rhetoric's practice solely to denouncing oneself and one's friends for injustice because of the benefit it brings to the denouncer. But while rhetoric used in self-denunciation is a radical proposal, rhetoric used to seek the punishment

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[165] Benardete (1991) 61
[166] Irwin (1979) 167

of the unjust is conventional. However, Socrates does not mention the possible use of rhetoric to avoid unjust condemnation.[167] Rhetoric's real practice will be revealed only after Plato has finished refuting the last of the three rhetors. Yet, Socrates had told Polus that he would put the final vote to him at the end of the dialectic and disregard all others (475e). So when Polus thinks Socrates' conclusion absurd, it is clear Plato has not concluded on what genuine rhetoric is and that, once more, dialectical inquiry has fallen flat. Plato's rhetoric does not just link Socrates' argument to the moral quotient lacking in the rhetoric of his contemporaries, but appeals to the reader too. Plato certainly has no intention of flattering his readers in the *Gorgias*, but it is sheer delight to see Polus raked over the coals for his blundering logic and brazenness. He is ostensibly stressing the necessity for moral purpose in speech. This contrasts with the rhetoric of Gorgias, Polus and Callicles who gratify others for the sake of personal advancement. What makes Socrates' refutation of Polus' argument one of the most enjoyable sections of the dialogue, is how rhetorically sound Plato's argument is, not how dialectically logical it is. Perhaps, as Benardete thinks, Plato may be a makeup artist who has the good sense or bad taste not to give us Socrates straight. But, it is through Socrates that Plato's art persuades of a genuine rhetoric.

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[167] Irwin (1979) 168

Plato's words become an inspired rhetoric through the voice of Socrates. The language of Socrates is the πίστις of Plato's just rhetoric. But, in moving from Socrates' argument against Gorgias and Polus, where it is obvious what moral precepts against rhetoric his arguments counsel and persuade, it is less obvious how this attack on rhetoric achieves the conclusion Socrates reaches with Callicles on the use of true rhetoric. The following debate between Callicles and Socrates serves as a point of departure from rhetoric. The counterweight of the Calliclean figure takes issue with the harshness of Socrates' moral position with such vigorous candour that Plato has his reader question the argument Socrates has made about rhetoric. Callicles' rejoinder in this debate offers the reader two things. Plato's introduction of Callicles relieves one of the frustration that the reader encounters as a consequence of Socrates' ridiculing rhetoric through the humiliation of its spokesmen and exaggerated severity. Callicles also offers some compelling notions on human nature, whose argument has little bearing on rhetoric though his passionate rhetorical language does. So compellingly does Callicles argue in his speech that his great passion and thought on human nature reveal Plato's purpose in his rhetoric. For what is of interest in the debate between Callicles and Socrates is not only the argument of law versus nature, but how the actions of Callicles advance Plato's thought on rhetoric beyond the limits of self-vindication, though it is not until the end of their debate that Plato establishes his position on rhetoric.

Both the *pathos* and character of Plato's rhetoric reach this climax, as the language and actions of Callicles and Socrates are all the more significant at this stage of the *Gorgias*, for this act of the dialogue qualifies as Socrates' final opportunity to champion his dialectic over rhetoric. For Plato, it becomes his opportunity to resolve what he is really persuading about rhetoric. Callicles inherits almost as much respect as Socrates simply from the prominent position he occupies in the *Gorgias*. The depth of character Plato devotes to the Calliclean *persona* gives added significance to the calibre of Callicles' argument and action, which also intensifies the urgency for Socrates to gain Callicles' consent above Gorgias and Polus. If Socrates succeeds in gaining Callicles' vote, then in the end it can be said Socrates has proved rhetoric morally bankrupt and ineffective. If he fails, then this section must examine what the parts of the Callicles-Socrates debate signify for Plato's rhetoric. So, against the Socratic *persona*, Callicles' actions as well as his philosophy reinforce what Plato's rhetoric evinces as the *Gorgias* comes to term with the genius and purpose of rhetoric.

The many parts of this chapter are intended to reveal how Plato brings the reader closer to true rhetoric through: the introduction of the erotic, Socrates' continued and intensified engagement in rhetoric, what Callicles represents, and what his moral voice means in Plato's argument. Plato's rhetoric, though, will only come to light at the end when the debate between Callicles, the ultimate Athenian representative of the abuses of rhetoric, and Socrates, the austere moralist, come to an agreement on true rhetoric, which exists only in theory in the *Gorgias*. Socrates will not have won over Callicles or the others, but he will have produced an excellent argument for a moral speech. Socrates will vindicate himself in the end, though without persuading the others or gaining dialectical consent according to the stipulations he ordained, rather he will come to concede the notion of a true rhetoric in theory.

Callicles begins by swearing that he cannot tell if Socrates is in earnest or joking. Plato's rhetoric continually registers the reader's sympathy for Socrates' counterparts in the same way Polus as his debut with Socrates had, in spite of his failure as an interlocutor, anticipated the reaction Plato expects of his readers: Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὕτω καὶ σὺ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δοξάζεις ὥσπερ νῦν λέγεις (461b); Callicles' outburst is similarly an assessment of the reader's reaction to Socrates' argument. Callicles turns to Chaerephon in disbelief. Callicles turns to ask Chaerephon, rather than Socrates, what Socrates has said. This is much like how Socrates had turned to Chaerephon at the beginning, though Callicles is not opening an inquiry into Socrates. This is the exclamation of a *provocateur*. Socrates' proposition for rhetoric sounds so outrageous that Callicles must mockingly confirm with the dialogue's mediator to ask whether Socrates is in earnest or joking: Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης ἢ παίζει (481b); Plato is illustrating just how uncompromising Socrates' analogues appear. The doctor's role in correcting the body's illnesses and the rhetor's role, as correcting and improving one's own soul's imperfections, do not acknowledge the public role of the doctor and the rhetor. Socrates had bound rhetoric to such an individual rather than public role and had attached such stringent notions of beauty to power and justice, that he provokes a perfectly natural response in Callicles to this anatomy of rhetoric and its power in individual self-refutation. Ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος "our life is upside down" reflects very much not only what Plato's audience thought of Socrates' radical conclusion, but how the Athenian populace may feel. Callicles may in fact respect Socrates' conclusions that our lives are ἀνατετράμμενος, because people spend more effort on supposed goods

which benefit them less, and less effort on what benefits them most.[168] But what is of interest here is Callicles' reaction to Socrates.

If Plato wanted his readers to believe that rhetoric had been successfully refuted or reduced to self-vindication, Socrates should not have simply dumbfounded his challengers. He should have won them over to his view, just as he proposed to Polus. Failing this, Socrates cannot claim to have met his single criterion, let alone achieved universal conviction on a theory about the body and soul, politics and legislation, including rhetoric place. The vote of one man, or the attestation of one witness, was the sole criterion of successful refutation according to Socrates. Polus played out Socrates' inquiry as though gratifying Socrates, in the same way as Gorgias so quickly conformed to dialectic. Callicles will not do so here. Plato staged the dialogue between Polus, Gorgias and Socrates as an unconvincing rehearsal of dialectic, for in each case Socrates' *elenchos* makes a convincing argument, in no way does he appear to move the others to cast their vote in favour of his view. Polus' laughter before, his continuous answers replete with phrases that are not affirmative and the final claim that Socrates' argument is absurd, while sarcastically adding, "that no doubt you find that it agrees with what was said before," is not a vote for Socrates. Even if Polus were so recalcitrant and beyond redemption, Plato could have at least written a more convincing outcome for Socrates. Instead, Callicles enters to redouble the doubt about Socrates' position, as Callicles' vote will not be cast in Socrates' favour either.

There's no knowing who Callicles really was. He seems to be some made up representative of human nature and political power contemporary to Athenian politics. Callicles' name, like Socrates' pun on Polus' name, resembles a similar play on words that is a rhetorical creation of Plato.[169] Callicles, however, is not taking Socrates up on his definition of rhetoric. Therefore, Plato does not appear to challenge Socrates' "playful anatomy of rhetoric,"[170] but appears to move onto power in the polis. But, despite the way the entrance of Callicles in the debate moves the discussion from rhetoric to power, what Callicles says is not irrelevant to Plato's argument on rhetoric. Plato, for the first time, is introducing the key motivator in his view of rhetoric: Eros.

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[168] Irwin (1979) 169. Similar sentiment is expressed in the *Apology* at 29d-30b
[169] Benardete (1991) 63
[170] Benardete (1991) 61

In the *Phaedrus*, Eros is the irrational divine inspiration essential to rhetoric's purpose. But, in the *Gorgias*, Plato's only erotic allusion, which is reintroduced at 481d, establishes the role of Eros in his rhetoric. Such an opening initiates the connection between Eros and speech, not to mention the erotic nature of the Calliclean figure. Callicles far outweighs the other interlocutors in inspired speech. Socrates acknowledges as much when he speaks of their various loves; for before Callicles even gets a chance to make his argument, Socrates is cautioning Callicles not to be taken in by his passions (481de). Socrates had counselled Polus (461d) and Gorgias (499b) similarly to curb their appetite for long speeches, but not on account of Eros. Socrates is only warning of a misguided inspiration or passion, while wholly approving of Eros, as he tries to find common ground in order to make Callicles better understand his passion for truth.[171]

The warning comes in the form of a rhetorical allusion. Socrates speaks of how there is πάθος in everyone; and that πάθος is the same to both of them: λέγω δ' ἐννοήσας ὅτι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν ταὐτόν τι πεπονθότες, ἐρῶντε δύο ὄντε δυοῖν ἑκάτερος, ἐγὼ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου τε τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ φιλοσοφίας, σὺ δὲ δυοῖν, τοῦ τε Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους. (481). Socrates' allusion resonates with the corporeal and psychic duality of their Eros, where the presence of the body's love is in Alcibiades for Socrates and in Demos for Callicles. More importantly, the soul's love is philosophy for Socrates and the *demos* for Callicles. Socrates' pun on Demos also reflects how Callicles would mix the two, just as Socrates previously said to Polus in reference to "mixture in all." Plato traces someone's progress from the love of persons to love of knowledge and forms in the Symposium.[172] The two loves mentioned are scarcely just a metaphor,[173] but mesh with the love of knowledge and inspired passion in rhetoric, for which Plato argues in the *Phaedrus*. Historically, Demos was related to Plato, as his maternal uncle[174] and was a member of high Athenian society and was renowned for his youthful beauty. Callicles' character also personified membership of the upper crust, for apart from his portrayal his name is an ingenious rhetorical composite. Plato has demonstrated a certain affinity for word play with people's names and were Callicles' name a pun on the union of καλεῖν and καλόν, as there was earlier a pun on καλεῖν and καλόν, Callicles would indeed be

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171 Dodds (1959) 261
172 *Symposium* 204d-206a, 210a-212a
173 Irwin (1979) 170
174 Dodds (1959) 261

the "beautiful" interlocutor of the dialogue and contain "the naming of the beautiful." Such a name harmonises with his devotion to the two "demos." Furthermore, if Plato is alluding to such references as the passage in Aristophanes' *Knights*, where Cleon is overthrown by "a high-class slave of Demos who enlists the services of a common man with uncommon talents" to restore Demos to power,[175] then Callicles could very well be a rhetorical synthesis of the beautiful Demos, who was his apparent source of inspiration, and Cleon, whose thought and action resound in Callicles. All this is to say that Callicles' inspired character is devoted to both "a body and a name that signify the very structure of Athenian politics during the Peloponnesian War."[176] Also, the historical details, which Dodds takes as indicative of a real character, only serve to give Callicles the necessary authority to carry out the greatest part of the *Gorgias* and reflect a sensational rhetorical creation.

Eros remains beautiful in Socrates, both for his first beloved, Alcibiades, and for his second beloved, philosophy. Although Callicles' first beloved may be beautiful, his second beloved, by implication, is shameful and uninspired. Callicles' apparent passion for the Athenian *demos* is turned into a shameful enslavement to the *demos'* appetite: "In the assembly, if you're saying something and the Athenian *demos* says it's not so, you change and say what it wants" (481e). But Socrates' rhetoric is beautiful because his "philosophy says always the same." Callicles is not upstaged by Socrates' premature rhetorical indictment of democratic appeal and the attempt to shame him. The pleasure Socrates evinces in his self-refuting rhetoric, which he claims is central to his speech, does not shine through in this pre-emptive rhetorical denunciation of Callicles. In the rhetorical finale Socrates attributes musical qualities to his art of speech, saying that it is better that his lyre εἶναι ἀναρμοστεῖν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν and that everyone speak against him than he be ἀσύμφονον with himself (482c). His disharmony with others insinuates they are ἀσύμφωνον with themseves, and Socrates does not succede in convincing Callicles. This analogy of the superiority of his self-harmony over a discord in his lyre is presumably aimed at Callicles. Callicles, who began in a polite aside to Chaerephon and must endure insulting and shameful analogies to his passion, deflects Socrates' indictment. By an *antistrephon*,[177] Callicles accuses Socrates of being the very popular mob-orator Socrates was calling him. Each man here is accusing the other of using Eros or being devoted to

[175] Benardete (1991) 63
[176] Benardete (1991) 63
[177] Lanham (1991) 16. An argument that turns one's opponent's arguments or proofs to one's own purpose.

Eros falsely. Through the exchange of these men, Plato has highlighted the significance of erotic speech without detailing its use as in the *Phaedrus*. But this does more than just introduce the idea of Eros in speech, it leaves the reader wondering why, if he wanted to prove the superiority of dialectic, he brings in Eros at what appears to be the most crucial and engaging part of the *Gorgias*. Callicles diagnoses Polus' error in the same way Polus diagnosed Gorgias', and certainly rejection of the view that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it is an equitable objection. Although, as Irwin points out, he could have gone much further than challenging the premisses of the previous argument and accusing Socrates of depending solely on what the interlocutor concedes out of prejudice and embarrassment.[178] Why not challenge tacit acceptance of Socratic assumptions in the argument or the danger of fallacious inference?[179] Plato is not denouncing Socrates. He is only making the reader aware that one is reading of someone not strictly engaged in the dialectic. Rhetoric is dropped as the point of discussion. Callicles and Socrates move on to human nature and justice, which is Plato's second concern in the *Gorgias*. Yet, the debate between Callicles and Socrates will eventually lead back to the argument about rhetoric. Rhetorical interest in this section advances out of the language and the role Callicles plays as the philosophical counterweight to Socrates. Callicles' speech will be the focus of Plato's rhetoric in this section, though Socrates' ensuing dialectic will lead to the eventual stand-off between these men, which completes Plato's position on rhetoric.

Callicles' speech falls into two parts. First, he expounds his philosophy of the right of nature; second, he denounces Socrates for his philosophy. The familiar praise and censure formula runs through the speech, at times *ad hominem*. Callicles attacks Socrates *ad hominen* for being the real mob-orator in this debate, accusing Socrates of taking pleasure (482d) in forcing Gorgias to contradict himself out of shame, and the same for Polus, except that Callicles holds Polus in equal contempt for his concessions. Thus, Callciles is accusing Socrates of the same charge Socrates makes against the others: of pandering to the crowd, even adding that Socrates leads these arguments by vulgarities and the stock themes of mob-orators: εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικὰ καὶ δημηγορικά (482e). The final personal attack is the charge that Socrates accomplishes all this under the ruse of persuading of the truth. Callicles argues that Socrates' dialectic is as much the phantom of truth as Gorgias' rhetoric is the phantom of justice. His charge is as severe as

[178] Irwin (1979) 170
[179] Irwin (1979) 170

Socrates' moral arguments, but he is not entirely off the mark when criticising Socrates' arrangement and his style of being rhetorical. Socrates has scarcely been reticent in his appeals to the audience. His use of formulaic phrases, persuasive allegories and rhetorical twists are prevalent in his attempts to persuade Gorgias or Polus. "The *Gorgias* is one of the dialogues which critique the methods and assumptions of the *elenchos*."[180] Callicles sums all this up in his abusive tirade and narrows Socrates' rhetorical technique to a single device: τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκὼς. Callicles is accusing Socrates of deception: φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν (482e), namely: ἐὰν μὲν τις τὰ κατὰ νόμον λέγῃ, τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπερωτῶν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ νόμου (483a). It is deception in Callicles' eyes because he has falsely appealed to νόμος, which can be assumed to be not only law, but the conventional moral beliefs for which Socrates argues and to which Gorgias and Polus remained attached. While Socrates had previously considered Polus and Gorgias as rhetoricians who deceive and pander to their audiences, Callicles never calls Socrates a rhetorician. Callicles links Socrates' speech to his philosophy. Rhetoric, apparently, has nothing to do with Socrates' form of speech, which Callicles interprets as pure crowd pleasing, deceit and bad philosophy. While Plato never mentions the term rhetoric in Callicles' speech, rhetoric is the language and method of Callicles. Socrates, too, spoke in rhetorical refutation without evincing pride in it. Although Socrates claims to use refutation in self-refutation, he has only refuted Gorgias and Polus so far, who, in opposition, boasted of their rhetoric and its power. Their failings indicate they neither knew the real value nor the power of it. Neither of them successfully offered any comprehensive thought on what made their rhetoric so effective, but Socrates' rhetoric has been essential in elaborating his moral philosophy. Socrates' rhetoric does not persuade the others of his extreme arguments, such as that it is better to denounce one's self than to go unpunished and that one should make one's enemies escape punishment so that they never benefit from justice. Such rhetoric was nevertheless effective in reaffirming and appealing to the moral convictions each of them held, convictions which Callicles accuses Socrates of using to his advantage.

The *ethos* of the Socratic *persona* argues for moral purpose in speech. Plato has established this as even Socrates' counterparts, Gorgias and Polus, maintain the integrity of moral action and deliberation. The former spoke for its semblance and the latter its discomfort. Neither man dares to oppose Socrates philosophically but Callicles' rhetoric

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[180] Irwin (1979) 170

succeeds in accomplishing just that. Callicles has a philosophy of his own that he, like Socrates, wishes to have universally accepted. While Plato included Gorgias and Polus as the mainstays to rhetoric and Chaerephon as mediator, Callicles is the true counterpart to Socrates. The arguments raised by Gorgias and Polus meet some of the objections to Socrates' rhetoric, but Plato presents them as weak in their *logos*, or thought. Only Callicles rises to the occasion with a thorough and contemporary philosophy, as Callicles, like Socrates, claims to expound the truth. As Gorgias and Polus simply submit to Socrates, Callicles does not go in for the "are you the sort of man I am" talk (485b). Thus, in creating this composite character, Plato was creating an opposite equal to that of Socrates, who apparently had no existing opposite in Athens. Only a made up figure, who expresses popular conception among aristocratic Athenians on the νόμος–φύσις debate and their expansionist appetite, could match Socrates.

Callicles argues that the stronger man should rule over the weaker, and that the many, with their institutional νόμοι, should restrain this stronger man. The actual philosophical difficulties with Callicles' line of argument are not of particular concern to Plato's view on rhetoric, save that Callicles' rhetorical actions and philosophical position express two issues central to it. First, Callicles' view on natural justice is Plato's rhetorical account of what persuasive speech without morality sounds like. It is not genuine rhetoric, but a combination of the Gorgianic and Tyrannic rhetoric with a passion neither Gorgias nor Polus possesed. But rhetoric is never spoken in reference to what Callicles has to say. The argument of the stronger amassing more, πλέον ἔχειν, is either a question of military prowess, when referring to examples of human nature, or brawn, when making animals as the norm for legitimate behaviour. But if Xerxes and Darius are the archetype of stronger men succeeding, then Callicles is mocking himself. Both these men failed to take Greece into their possession. Socrates' previous example of Pericles and Themistocles were more successful examples. Plato would not have selected his interlocutors' examples at random. Callicles speaks for Persian men of pure military supremacy, who have little reputation for oration, as opposed to the examples on which Socrates and Gorgias agreed. He spoke for Athenian men who were both military leaders and great orators (455e-456a). The hollowness of Callicles' argument resonates with the failure of his examples. It is easy to see how this representative of Athenian aristocracy would argue for their prowess, not only militarily, but politically, in defence of his stature in society. As for Callicles' brawn, what would Callicles have to do with Hercules?

The other rhetorical purpose of the Calliclean figure is to criticise the method and assumptions of the *elenchos*,[181] which is also found in other dialogues.[182] "Just as Polus offered a diagnosis of Gorgias' error (461bc), Callicles now offers a diagnosis of Polus' error, as showing the same kind of conventional scruples as those which betrayed Gorgias (475d). This diagnosis is both right and wrong, just as Polus' was. Rejection of the view that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering would have been sufficient to block Socrates' argument, just as Gorgias could have blocked the argument in the way suggested by Polus."[183] Plato regards the *elenchos* as fundamental to true political discourse in the *Polis*. Yet, while Callicles could never analytically dissolve Socrates' dialectic, Plato knows just what end Socrates' philosophical practice comes to before the public.

The second part of the speech addresses just this question. Socrates' power to convince others of his love for self-refutation in philosophy makes him weak and unmanly in Callicles' eyes. The unmanly lisp of philosophical speech is perhaps a gibe at the young coterie that surrounded Socrates and emulated the inward nature of his philosophy. It is also pass at impugning Socrates' love, Alcibiades, whose lisp was known through antiquity. Callicles agrees that philosophy offers the young man an education, while "prolonged exposure to philosophy deprives someone of experience".[184] Experience had been an essential part of Polus' rhetorical theory. Socrates reduces it to a knack. Callicles now argues that experience is necessary to a publicly engaged life. So, if Socrates truly thinks that he is μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν (521a), then as the sole political man of Athens he can scarcely deny himself experience. Callicles accuses Socrates, as philosopher, of being a uselessness a recluse from politics. He quotes from Euripides' *Antiope*, which includes a debate between the shepherd Zethus and the musician Amphion on the relative values of the active, practical life, the contemplative life and the life of study.[185] Callicles' criticism emphasises the failure of the social recluse to acquire the reputation and honour demanded of a real man. However, this is incongruous with his contempt for popular opinions and sanctions at 483e-484a.[186]

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[181] Irwin (1979) 170,
[182] *Clitopho* 408d-410e; *Meno* 79de
[183] Irwin (1979) 170
[184] Irwin (1979) 179
[185] Irwin 180
[186] Irwin 180

Moreover, when Callicles begins at 482c, his speech is not only syntactically awkward and unclear, reflecting his haste and indignation,[187] his views clash. He initially champions the great man against the city, which is made up of the contemptible herd, but, then accuses Socrates of not being able to defend himself against such an ignominious herd. Contrarily, he also accuses Socrates of appealing to the masses, but, then warns him that one day the many will destroy him.

> Socrates is guilty of demagoguery or vulgar morality in the first part and of unmanly philosophy in the second. Callicles is thus forced to side with the many in the second part and attack them in the first. He uses philosophy to mount an attack on the city in the first part and in the second attacks philosophy in the name of the city. Philosophy in its noble weakness needs rhetoric -not for its own defence but to further political ambition.[188]

Callicles' speech, in the end, is fraught with the sort of inconsistencies Gorgias encountered in his attempt to unite his acclaim for an all power rhetoric (456a) with a defence of the justice of rhetoric.[189]

The debate between Callicles and Socrates is essentially a search for the relation between justice, power and pleasure. These aspects are central to rhetoric. But, the debate between Callicles and Socrates no longer takes rhetoric as the main issue. The reader must wait until the end of their debate, where Plato's argument is *reditus ad propositum*, and rhetoric is reinstated in their discussion and argued for. As a rejoinder to Callicles' long speech, Socrates lavishes praise on Callicles. Socrates does not attack macrology as he did before against Polus, rather he exclaims how fortunate he is to have discovered Callicles as he is the best touchstone, τούτων τινὰ τῶν λίθων ᾗ βασανίζουσιν τὸν χρυσόν, τὴν ἀρίστην (486d). He further praises him for his amicable disposition and intelligent insight. It may appear that Socrates now delights in being criticised, being true to his claim that he takes pleasure in being refuted. But he is being ironic. The contumely Socrates endures from Callicles does not qualify as friendly since later Socrates will refer to this speech as abusive (508c). This irony is exaggerated when Socrates claims himself fortunate to be among those such as Andron to whom Callicles gives sage advice: "to be careful not to become wise beyond what is needed" (487d). This only redoubles his mockery of Callicles' wisdom.

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[187] Irwin 170
[188] Benardete (1991) 64
[189] Benardete (1991) 65

While such derisive praise sums up Callicles' aggressive and aristocratic nature, as Callicles in his determination overlooks Socrates' irony, Plato addresses a fundamental challenge to the *elenchos* through Socrates' counterfeit ironic praise of Callicles. Other interlocutors had only conceded out of shame, but were never in agreement. Such a serious contention of the strength of Socrates' dialectic makes room for the use of rhetoric. Callicles is the true test for Socrates because he has no intention of conceding out of shame. Callicles represents the ultimate vote or witness according to Socrates' criterion of having a single witness to examine or one vote cast in his favour. Not only is Callicles' *persona* the composite of Athenian political action, but the very antipathy of Socrates. The reader knows that Socrates now has the opportunity to prove the power of his speech and Plato directs the reader's attention to consider, not only his position on justice and human nature, but what speech τέλος ἤδη ἕξει τῆς ἀληθείας (487e).

Callicles' rhetoric of the strong man, or powerful cities, acquiring according to their unlimited appetite, becomes his own undoing. Callicles is passionate and chaotic in advocating his hedonistic philosophy and, when Socrates questions the temperament of the rulers as to their self-rule, Callicles burst into an outright praise of license. Callicles speaks the empty rhetoric of an insatiable freedom. His speech for the happiness of the intemperate man is rhetorically composed to be so extreme and so vague that it can only tenuously be connected to what he wants to say about injustice.[190] The appetite of human nature is infinite for Callicles. Self-rule cannot exist for Callicles as everything is given over to nature. Callicles' language resonates of the brutal language of an animal kingdom. Potential rulers are compared to lions, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες ὥσπερ λέοντας, (483e) tamed by mere human contrivances: κατεπᾴδοντές τε καὶ γοητεύοντες καταδούλουμενα. The image of the lion linked to the prisoner, shackled by spells and incantations, could be laws, as Antiphon referred to them: δεσμὰ τῆς φύσεως.[191] But Callicles' fierce language of the animal kingdom and how future leaders are moulded from youth, physically captured and mentally brainwashed, invokes an attack against the use of instructional rhetoric. This also recalls Gorgias' description of rhetoric which captured all powers and placed them under the rhetor's control. The prodigal rulers are told: ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρὴ ἔχειν καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ καλὸν καὶ το δίκαιον (484a). It is the sort of moral instructional rhetoric Plato in fact aims for in the *Republic*. Callicles'

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[190]Benardete (1991) 75
[191](frag. 44a, col. 4.5) cf. Dodds (1959) 269

anarchical argument is against this kind of persuasion, saying that the best men satisfy themselves by shaking off, smashing, escaping or trampling on these γράμματα καὶ μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐπῳδὰς καὶ νόμους τοὺς παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας (484a).[192] Therefore, Callicles' language speaks against genuine rhetoric. When Callicles speaks out against the "*nomos* and speech and blame of the masses of men" (492bc) he speaks against rhetoric. Instructional moral rhetoric hinders Callicles' happy intemperate man.

Socrates, though, continues to implore the favours of rhetoric as he did with Gorgias and Polus. First, he praises Callicles for the unrestrained nature of his speech, but then argues that those who have such licence, unrestrained in speech, thought and action are unhappy. When Socrates says only those who need nothing are happy, Callicles is prompted to retort that in this case "stones and corpses would be happiest." This permits Socrates to introduce his point of persuasion. "Euripides speaks the truth in those verses where he says, 'Who knows if being alive is really being dead, and being dead being alive?'" The rhetoric of the body-soul distinction is revived and the mixture that occurs between body and soul is played through the myth of Danaids. Socrates argues, mockingly, that the needy are not miserable because they are dead, but are indistinguishable from those whom Callicles claim to be most alive.[193] The appetites of the soul are attached to the body in Callicles' hedonism. Socrates, though, separates the soul from the body. Insatiate desires eventually drain away in leaky jars, as they cannot be filled by the image of replenishment, the sieve. Thus, absolute freedom is achieved for Socrates only when the needs of the body are renounced or only the soul remains because the body is dead. The web of puns and allusions on soul and persuasion not only reveal the dissatisfaction there is to be had in Callicles' philosophy, it also says something of the rhetoric of the insatiable man. Plato is indicting both his fellow Athenians who never seem to have their fill of ingratiating speeches and those who make these speeches.

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[192] Benardete (1991) 74 remarks on the language of this passage, in that their human enslavement is "unmanly." Also, he comments on the replacement of ajnanqrovpo" for a[ner, suggesting this might reflect how the virtues of manliness have been substituted for a "human carrier of unbound desires," while Callicles equates the self to "desires and pleasures that are out of control" and eliminats the self.

[193] Benardete (1991) 75

Wine, honey and milk are the ingredients in one kind of libation to the dead.[194] The connection between these liquids and the previous example is what Socrates uses to bring satisfaction. He attempts to lure Callicles with the example of man satisfied with his method of collection, but he fails to entice Callicles as he is neither interested in the dead nor in this unattained satisfaction as Callicles exists purely for pleasure. The ensuing dialogue ordains that it is "for the sake of goods we should do other things, including pleasant things, not good things for the sake of pleasant things" (500a). Plato has inverted the hedonist's argument to show that the purpose of pleasure is linked to the good, not the other way around. This purpose of pleasure is what assigns rhetoric its true value.

Socrates now claims, contrary to his previous position, that those practices which gratify the body, cooking, and the soul, flattery, make no pretense at benefiting the body and soul. They no longer deceive, they simply aim to please. Socrates runs through the gamut of audio-visual forms of entertainment which aim to please from lyre playing to tragedy. Music only pleases the ear, but offers no benefits. Tragedy, which Socrates describes in caustic remark as that σεμνὴ and θαυμαστή pursuit (502b), only gratifies its spectators. It struggles to speak only of what is pleasant, while avoiding mention of base topics, and avoids anything beneficial so as to sing what brings pleasure. Should it displease the audience, it goes unsung. While tragedy does speak of unpleasant things, it does so only pleasantly. Tragedy may look at the folly and fate of great men who have either forgotten their temperance or abused a higher divine convention, but dramatic performances are intended to please, not improve the souls of the audience.[195] Plato, then, comes to the true purpose of rhetoric. With Gorgias, rhetoric appeared as a pretence to justice. It was flattery because it did not have an eye on what is best or aim to make the citizens as good as possible through their speeches, but gratifies the citizens for the sake of their own private interest. In returning to the "twofold schema of artful and artless treatments of the body and soul, Socrates drops all mention of flattery as the phantom image of genuine art. Flattery now aims directly at gratification; it does not pretend any

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[194] *Odyssey* 10.519-520

[195] Plato's characters, such as Socrates' histotical outcome, predictions, themes of the way of life and the afterlife, give the *Gorgias* a tragic sense of proportion. Thus, it would seem unlikely that Plato, who was said to have once attempted composition in this field, is dismissing tragedy any more than rhetoric. When the interlocutors agree that tragedy without its melody, rhythm, metre, is just *logos* the parallel to rhetoric is clear. It addresses a large mob of people as a sort of poetic oratory (cf. *Protagoras* 325-6; *Republic* X 607; *Laws* 659-61, 801)

longer that its treatments are good. Rhetoric in its political form is now a way of life in itself; it has turned back into a science."[196] Plato puts a rhetorical question to his readers: Does rhetorical speech flatter or does it improve the soul (502e)? If Plato wanted to argue that rhetoric only flattered and had no higher aim in the city, Callicles should have agreed that rhetoric is flattery just as he quickly agreed tragedy was. Instead, he says there are those "who care about the citizens when they say what they say, and others who are as you claim, [that they only aim to gratify]"(503a) Socrates now makes a distinction between two types of public speeches: τὸ μὲν ἕτερόν που τούτου κολακεία ἂν εἴη καὶ αἰσχρὰ δημηγορία, τὸ δ' ἕτερον καλόν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί. (503a).

The above rhetorical question Plato asks his reader does not leave the existence of a genuine rhetoric as an open question, he infers its existence as well as its practice. Nor is he suggesting as Socrates might imply that its practice is theoretical. Of the two types of rhetoric proposed, the fine rhetoric is yet to be seen in practice: ἀλλ' οὐ πώποτε σὺ ταύτην εἶδες τὴν ῥητορικήν (503b). Therefore, the second rhetoric, the genuine one reforming the souls of citizens is hypothetical for Socrates, but it is far from abstract theory for Plato. Aside from his actual usage of this rhetoric in the *Gorgias* to improve the reader's soul including their whole way of life. Plato posits the most compelling argument for he genuine rhetoric. He first establishes the κόσμουσι, "structure" (504a), of the craftsman and then examines what the rhetor as craftsman would look to (503e-504e). Again Socrates brings back the initial example of the doctor and its analogy with the craft which looks to the condition of soul. Socrates establishes what healthy condition the "soul doctor" must aim for in his practice. The condition of the unhealthy soul is πονηρὰ, ἀνόητονς, ἀκόλαστος ἄδικος and ἀνόσιος (505b). Therefore, a healthy soul is incorrupt, sensible, temperate, just and pious. It is interesting that Socrates fails to bring this very condition into Callicles as he adamantly disagrees on what Socrates thinks as healthy for the soul and the healthy way of life resulting from such a soul. Callicles' initial ascetic assent to Socrates' condition of the soul should not be taken as serious agreement. He soon speaks his true mind. He disagrees with Socrates as much as he did earlier (501c) and recinds all earlier agreements because he only spoke for Gorgias' sake (505c). Therefore, either Socrates is failing as a rhetorician because he cannot make Callicles' soul temperate and just, or Callicles posses the soul of a man who is to be eternally punished

[196]Benardete (1991) 83

(525c). However, in spite of the rhetoric employed, Socrates remains a dialectician. The yes-no dialectical inquiry is the failing component of Socrates' *logos*, it would take outright rhetorical technique and appeal for Socrates to continue, as Plato creates an ironic situtation. First, the supposedly famous Gorgias, turns to convince the reputed dialectician, Socrates, to continue with a speech. This begins in the image of dialectic, a *hypophora*, and digresses into rhetoric. Secondly, the dialogue had begun with Socrates asking Gorgias to put off rhetoric for some other time, but Socrates is now the one to launch into full rhetoric to the point where he will conclude with a rhetorical epilogue. The reader may very well wonder what Gorgias' display would have been had Socrates not cut him short.

Socrates, through his rhetorical *hypophora*, reinstates his argument for the condition of the healthy and, now appealing to Callicles overriding hedonistic sensibility, happy soul (507c). Moreover, like the method of the *Gorgias* which begins in dialectic and ends with ῥητορική, Socrates drops his speech that feigns the *elenchos*, the *hypophora*, and moves into an appeal to the just, ordered and temperate way of life. Socrates speaks in Attic law court terminology of what the happy man διώκτεον and φεύκτεον.[197] He argues the man who wants to be happy must "pursue and practice temperance, and flee intemperance as fast as each one of us can run" (507d). Following on the "structure" of the rhetor as craftsman, Socrates in his speech turns to specify what the *rhetor's* τέχνη is to practice and where its power lies. It is the craft that improves the soul of the citizen and by extension the political craft to improve the *polis*.

What commentators such as Dodds[198] and Vlastos[199] have said is that Socrates is positing positive doctrines which he steadfastly maintains are bound by σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις λόγοις (509a). Whether this is a different Socrates is altogether another question. But what is clear is that Socrates' tone has changed over the course of the dialogue:

> "he speaks of himself and his isolation in Athens with a passionate bitterness which strikes us as new (471e - 472b); he asserts a positive doctrine with a certitute about its truth which also appears new (473b). In

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[197]φύγειν and διώκειν were opposing legal terms for defending and prosecuting (Lidell and Scott). Also, see Benardete (1991) 57-58. He enlarges on this use of language when Socrates is in conversation with Polus at 479b.

[198] Dodds (1959) 16

[199]see Vlastos' chapter on 'Socratic irony' where he discusses statment such as these as indicative of Socrates who is maintaining a theory and that his claims to ignorance or aporia are sheer irony. p.21-45

> the first exchanges with Callicles the old Socrates, with his familiar sly irony, peeps out again; but even here there is a new confidence -whatever Socrates and Callicles agree on will be nothing less than the final truth (487e)... And in the last pages of the dialogue the transformation is complete: he speaks in the ringing tones of the prophet and preacher summoning men to a new life -tones which recall the end of the Apology (though with a marked increase of assurance), but nothing else in the early works of Plato"[200]

At the end of Socrates' speech he concludes his adamantine argument for the power of rhetoric as the power to defend oneself against the greatest of harms, injustice (509b). Socrates then leads up to the difference between the kind of rhetotic Callicles encourages him to practice (511c) and what he will ulitimately conclude in the myth of the epilogue to be the true practice of rhetoric (527c). Meanwhile, Socrates makes the rhetorical analogy of the rhetoric of Callicles practices with swimming. Both posses no value because the life, or soul, it preserves may not be worth living. He recalls his earlier argument about the life of the water-carriers and his quote from Euripides: τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν, τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν (492e). This is no cynical reflection on whether life is worth living, but that "man should forget about living some particular length of time... he should consider the next question; how best to live" (512e). The rhetor, Socrates, does become prophetical and does preach of a way of life, but he appeals to Callicles' aristocratic sensibilities. He appeals to his conservative family values when he tells Callicles that he would despise the machine-maker and would not have his daughter marry the machine maker's son (512cd). Since there is no difference between the machinemaker or boatswain and the rhetor of the law court as their only task is to preserve their lives not improve them or make them noble, Callicles should not want to associate himself with this sort of rhetorician either. Socrates concludes his condemnation of this rhetorician with the same argument he made against Gorgianic rhetoric, for it is the same rhetoric he denounces in all three interlocutors. He maintains that this rhetoric is disingenuous as he argues how it only gratifies the audience (503c).

Callicles, in spite of his counter philosophy, feels there is some merit in the speech Socrates has just given, though he is not entirely convinced (503c). This encourages Socrates to continue and permits him to recapitulate on his position of persuading as teaching (514-515). If the rhetorician does not persuade his listeners of virtue, then he has

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[200] Dodds (1959) 16

not taught them well. The failure of orators such as Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Themosticles, then, becomes their failure as teachers. They were unable to teach the Athenian populace justice and temperance. Like a keeper of donkeys or horses or cattle who leaves these animals wilder than when he took them over is a bad keeper, so are rulers by the same token seen as bad. Pericles deserved his ostracization, Themosticles his punishment and exile, Militiades the vote against him -that he was to be thrown into the pit- because they were bad keepers of the Athenian populace (516de). These lurid analogies of renowned Athenian leaders to herdsmen of beasts of burden both reviles the character of popular Athenian orators and Callicles' much earlier analogy in the animal kingdom of the individual of unleashed passion to that of the lion. The true ruler reigns in the wild or passionate or erotic aspect, not to gratify it as Socrates says Callicles does (513d), and guide their soul, *polis*, or chariot as in Socrates' example at 516e that ostensibly looks ahead to what Plato will say on the role of inspired rhetoric in the *Phaedrus* and in which the analogy of his τέχνη is guiding the wild and passionate side with the calm and logical side of the soul represented by the two horses which pull his chariot. Socrates, following his conclusion that there are in fact two types of rhetoric in which he considers only the flattering one to have ever been practiced (517a), will ultimately blame the teachers, rhetoricians, chariot drivers, and rulers of Athens (519a-d).

Socrates, the dialectician and sworn foe of μακρολογία[201] has gone beyond begging the favour of Polus and has dominated his argument with μακρολογία to an extent which has no real parallel in any other dialogue.[202] Callicles scoffs at him for it, but Socrates only countermands that he is fully capable of speaking as such, that is rhetorically. It does not matter how Socrates speaks, apparently, because he so confidently considers himself to be "one of the few Athenians -not to say the only one- ἐπιξειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ -the only one among people now" (521e) and claims his speech "aims at the best" (521e). He admitts that he may end up in court one day and face the guillotine, but he will not practice the flattering kind of rhetoric as those who denounce him surely will. Should he ever engage in this rhetoric he will be able to say neither the truth and adds in mock legal language "'All this that I say and do is just, gentlemen of the jury' (as you rhetors say)- anything else" (522c). This raises an interesting question. If Socrates swears he is the only true politician and the

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[201] 449b, 461d, 466b, [cf. *Protagoras* 329a, *Hippias minor* 364b]
[202] Dodds (1959) 17

others were failures because they were bad teachers, or mule drivers if we follow his trenchant analogy, what are we to make of Socrates when he fails to convince "the gentlemen of the jury" or fellow Athenians?

His refutation of disingenuous rhetoric is complete and the proposed genuine rheoric is never seen. Theoretcal rhetoric will be the one Socrates will aparently engage in the *Apology*, as this entire section ominously portends of his trial and its outcome. In referring to what would happen to him if he came before the law court he ends with these words: "And so perhaps whatever it turns out to be will happen to me." There is nothing theoretical about genuine rhetoric. It has been in the rhetoric of Plato's argument throughout. It is a defence of rhetoric like no other. Reviling the flattery and immorality of contemporary rhetoric and refuting it, Plato argues for a place for genuine rhetoric in the soul and *polis*. However, it is in the epilogue that Plato mounts his final defence of rhetoric as Plato champions rhetoric that is τὸ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν ἁι ψυχαί (503a).

Plato gives rise to two kinds of rhetoric. Flattery is despised at once in each of the three debates while genuine rhetoric, voiced through Plato's art and argument, gradually emerges. Each of the debates refutes what is spurious in rhetoric, as Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles each argue for the prominence of a rhetoric according to his temperament. They are ultimately Plato's voices personifying his arguments on the abuses of rhetoric. Yet, each refutation expresses a need for a genuine rhetoric. Plato's language and action depict a practice of genuine rhetoric that is transmitted both through an exposé on the subject of rhetoric and though the written format of a dialogue.

His refutation of the three images of rhetorical speech and the question he raises concerning the effectiveness of dialectic make for a compelling argument as to where rhetoric is needed. Dialectic proves insufficient as Socrates has yet to convince the others according to his dialectical stipulation, which was to win each of them over one by one. Callicles, the most important counterpart to Socrates, is not won over. He poses the very question that concerns the condition of Plato's just man: "is he able to defend himself?" (522e) and he refuses to continue out of disagreement. Socrates is successful in using the dialectic to ascertain the truth, but he is not able to persuade the others with it. He does not secure a single vote or persuade a single witness. Rhetoric must ultimately be used to make his argument and in proceeding so rhetorically, he defends a genuine form of rhetoric. Plato has also made the success of rhetoric over dialectic all the more poignant when he reminds the reader of the inability of the just man to defend himself through dialectic. Therefore, those who have taken the *Gorgias* to argue for the superiority of the dialectic over rhetoric have overlooked these three crucial points: the inability to gain the other man's vote, the need to employ rhetoric in persuading others, the failure of the just man to defend himself, not to mention Plato's greater purpose in rhetoric: to improve the soul and the city.

Has Socrates lost an argument then? Not exactly. Socrates' failures point to the success of the rhetoric which Plato advances. But until Plato consolidates his argument in the epilogue, the promise of a true rhetoric in Athens would surface as indefinite as Socrates' abstract conception of it. Thus, a recapitulation of what has occurred between Socrates and the "three wisest men of Athens" is necessary to demonstrate whether there has been persuasion and what has been persuaded.

In the first of the three sections, Plato has Socrates succeed in manoeuvring Gorgias into examining the art of which Gorgias boasts. The champion of dialectic and sworn enemy of μακρολογία incorporates rhetoric in order to convince Gorgias to engage in discussion and begin to reflect on the value of his practice. Gorgias' talents are quickly reduced to a τρίβη, as they are only μηχανὴν δέ τινα πειθοῦς (459c) used to impersonate other real crafts and, in particular, feigning the art of administering justice. Socrates shows that if Gorgias' τέχνη were really connected to justice it must have full knowledge of what justice is and perform in accordance with it. Nevertheless, Gorgias did establish basic notions intrinsic to Plato's rhetoric. His initial example of the rhetor resembling the doctor in curing the sick predicted the therapeutic role Plato eventually assigns to rhetoric. Also, Gorgias' moral temperament envisions the necessary link between rhetoric and morality that makes rhetoric an authentic art. But because Gorgianic rhetoric could not articulate a therapeutic, moral art facilitated through speech, only Socrates proves qualified to act it out. This becomes apparent at the end of his exchange with Gorgias where in a rhetorical speech he substantiates the division of the body and soul where the soul is administered by justice and legislation. This, however, was a refutation of Gorgianic rhetoric. Socrates' account of rhetoric is left so unsatisfactory that a renewed look at rhetoric was necessary.

In the second debate, Plato moves from the failure of the teacher to that of the practitioner, Polus. In the debate with Polus, a shameless omnipotent speech was advocated to empower the tyrant. Plato parodies an exaggerated Gorgianic style of speech in Polus and has Socrates refute his irreconcilable clash between his rhetorical appeal to the audience's sense of justice and his audacious endorsement of the unjust tyrant. His rationale that one must seek unjust ascendancy, like Archelaus', to avoid suffering any of the injustices, which he so convincing vilified, collapsed in the face of Socratic inquiry. Nevertheless, his moral outrage against the evils of injustice are more convincing than any of the arguments Socrates, the prominent moralist of this debate, ever musters. Also, in spite of his endorsement of the tyrant, whom he portrays as entirely unjust, and his grossly hyperbolic rhetoric, Plato reminds the reader of the ineffectiveness of dialectic when confronted with such a tyrant. Plato's audience is fully aware that Socrates, in the face of human decision-making, failed in convincing his judges. Polus' outrage represents something of Plato's own heartfelt outrage at the execution of Socrates. He was not served

justice. Thus, a language resonant of rhetorical appeal while sustained by a *logos* would be necessary to achieve justice. However, τίς ἡ μεγάλη χρεία ἐστὶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς (480a), still eludes the reader, as Socrates presents Polus with a therapeutic rhetoric to cure the soul through the administration of justice. This seems to include rhetoric in his fourfold scheme as the craft to administer justice. But, it does not build a satisfying argument for rhetoric, as the debate with Polus finishes abruptly and unsatisfactorily. Rhetoric's dimensions are limited to self-refutation, a type of rhetoric, which in spite of its therapeutic properties for one's own soul, does not occupy the public forum that is particular to rhetoric.

Callicles then steps in to complete what Plato is saying about rhetoric. The final debate with Callicles exhibits a refutation of a rhetoric steeped in misguided passion. The Eros that is central to Plato's rhetoric of the *Phaedrus* reveals itself in the *Gorgias* through the Calliclean *persona* whose role in Plato's rhetorical scheme serves to contrast Callicles' way of life with Socrates', and it is a way of life that is wanting, judging by the seductive energy of Callicles' argument. Plato may have felt a measure of sympathy for men like Callicles.[203] But the "warmth and vitality" that Dodds ascribes in his portrait of Callicles that "is tinged with a kind of regretful affection" is not simply Plato's admiration for men of such candour or shared contempt for the masses, the professors of ἀρετή, and "all the hypocrisies of a society whose morality was built on appearance."[204] Plato has not painted himself as he might have been, as he feared to be, as commentators may take what proof there may be in the *Seventh Letter* for Plato's personal intention to embark on a political career. Callicles is not a mask for Plato, he is a rhetorical figure designed to appeal to contemporary topics sanctioned by many Athenians. But the appeal Plato invests in Callicles saliently shifts over the course of their discussion. Eloquent and seductive in his hedonistic ideal of the strongman, he is eventually reduced to shouting and scoffing, and finally to sullen silence. The refutation of the Calliclean world is carried out more in its rhetorical presentation than in what is logically substantiated, despite the fact that it is grounded on a logical argument and other πίστεις such as historical evidence. As the volume of and need for rhetoric reach its zenith by the end of their discussion, Plato affirms two kinds of rhetoric in which the reader has little doubt which kind Plato practices.

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[203] Dodds (1959) 14
[204] Dodds (1959) 14, 272-273

Therefore, Plato has brought rhetoric from its deceitful beginnings to its evolved theoretical form of administering justice.

The argument Plato makes for passion's place in speech, for genuine satisfaction of the soul, showing how only justice achieves it, what the purpose of a craft is, and that the craft that can administer justice is rhetoric, leaves rhetoric as a practice that exists only in theory for Socrates. Ultimately, Socrates is demonstrating how rhetoric ought to be used against how it is actually used and is not making a concession when he eventually agrees to the idea of a true rhetoric. Yet, until rhetoric is returned to its rightful place, it appears to be merely the rhetoric that Socrates says he doesn't see anywhere (503b, 517a). But the drinking song, his parable of the *pithoi*, his comparisons with crafts of manual labour, his examples and enthymemes, his techniques of persuasion, satirical tropes, the timing of such devices, the appeal to each man's sense of justice as well as their weaknesses have been matched by his argumentation for a rhetoric like no other. It is the rhetoric of justice.

The epilogue, though, is what realises Plato's argument for rhetoric. In the same way as rhetorical speeches end with a peroration, Plato makes a summary of his argument and an appeal to the audience. Rhetoric, now distinguished from all the other arts as the craft to persuade soul and citizen, is returned to its rightful place to serve justice and rule the *polis*. Plato did not discuss rhetoric separately in the three different encounters on justice, ruling art, and soul therapy, but includes these issues, or στάσεις as they are called in rhetoric, throughout each debate. He unites them into a comprehensive form of rhetoric, sums up his argument and makes a final appeal to his audience. From the opening satire on rhetoric (447ab, 448), followed by an investigation of the impression it makes on the reader through the three debates, Plato has successfully stated his case, as in a προθέσις,[205] and presented his proofs, πίστεις.[206]

The ἐπίλογος , epilogue or peroration, is announced with Callicles' cue at 523e for Socrates to complete their dialogue. Plato, now, turns to the final rhetorical element of his argument and has Socrates announce it with all the formality of a set rhetorical piece:

> Ἄκουε δή, φασί, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσῃ μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν. (523a)

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[205] prologue
[206] proof

The rhetorical language and rhythm of this opening inaugurates the final defence of rhetoric. Ἄκουε δή, φασί is a traditional way of calling the listeners attention to his final account.[207] Plato may not be adapting iambic trimeter as Dodds contends,[208] but what follows contains the rhetorical structure of a simple parallel construction. σὺ μὲν ἡγῆσῃ μῦθον is balanced with ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον, with ἡγέομαι understood, and is neatly divided by ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι. Rhetorically, the parallel between μύθος and λόγος is intended to lead the listener to believe the ἀλήθεια of what Socrates will say. Plato makes it absolutely clear that what Socrates is about to recount persuades from a true belief, as Socrates rejects the term μύθος for his λόγος, even though the story proceeds with "the directness and vividness of folktale, and keeps something of folktale *naïveté* in its style, such as the repeated use of "he says" that mimicks the voice of the story-teller.[209]

Socrates does in fact rationally defend the so-called myth, as it is much shorter than his actual reasoning about it: 523a1-524a7 and 524a8-5527a4.[210] His λόγος draws together all of what he said earlier. How Socrates intends to prove his arguments through mythical reference to Homer rhetorically fits like a *progymnasmata*.[211] In his myth, Socrates speaks in a peaceful quasi-judicial language (Zeus, Poseidon, and Pluto παρέλαβον, took over, from their father) rather than utter the shocking story of the revolt of Zeus against his father which Plato censured telling children in the *Republic*,[212] even if it were true. There is also the language of divine ordinance: ἦν οὖν νόμος ὅδε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ Κρόνου, καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔστιν ἔν θεοῖς (523a), which replies to Callicles attack on νόμος: the mere weakness of people conspiring against nature. Plato both appeals rhetorically to the divine nature of his argument and foreshadows what he will say with prophetic language.

Plato's epilogue also maintains his refutation of Gorgianic rhetoric when he includes a refutation of the institutions which sanction its use. The story of the unreformed court at 523c in his myth recalls the procedures of the contemporary Athenian courts,[213]

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[207] Dodds (1959) 376
[208] Dodds (1959) 376
[209] Dodds (1959) 373; c2, c3, c4, d6
[210] Benardete (1991) 98
[211] Lanham (1991) 35. An Elaboration on topics for debate that includes sayings, historical examples, and citations of authority which could formulate an essay.
[212] *Republic* 378a
[213] Irwin (1959) 243

which he had also referred to earlier (471e, 475e-476a). Again, the differences between appearances and reality are articulated, but this time through the judgement of souls. When these men had foreknowledge of their death they were able to bedazzle the judges with witnesses and testimonials. They practised with complete success Gorgianic rhetoric.[214] Then Zeus decides to strip them of what disguises their souls, their appearances, to stand naked on their judgement day. They were also judged by the naked, as the law court reform includes impartial judicial experts in place of living judges: Minos, Rhadamanthys, and Aeacus, where Minos either assists the other two if they are unable to make a decision or acts, as Minos does in Homer, in judging disputes between the dead,[215] or represents the appeals court, which follows Plato's arrangement in the *Laws*.[216]

The reformation of the law courts reflects Plato's attempt to reform rhetoric, as Socrates' tale moves to the reformation of the soul. Once naked, justice is apportioned by scourging the soul so as to either improve it (525b) for its future return to life[217] or to be an example for others (525b). Socrates now delivers a warning in the same language Polus and Callicles spoke when trying to frighten Socrates about the dangers of not using rhetoric to advantage. Souls, scarred by their crimes, are not said to δίκην διδόναι as before (475d) or to κολάζεσθαι (476a). These terms are better suited to his therapeutic view of punishment. But, in the myth these souls must undergo τιμωρία, a much harsher term often associated with taking revenge.[218] Like the rhetoric of punishment it must strike fear into the souls. Only when they are φοβούμενοι will they improve. Much more severe are the punishments instituted for the incurable who are punished forever. This last apocalyptic scene of the eternally damned who διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν Ἅιδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα (525c). Although, for Plato, divine punishment is never vindictive,[219] this inexorable language is not of rational argumentation. In the *Phaedrus* myth, all souls "regain their wings" (248a), and in the *Laws* there is no mention of eternal punishment. This is the lashing Polus' tyrant,

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[214]Benardete (1991) 98
[215]*Odyssey* 11. 568
[216]*Laws* 767a
[217]The Pythagorean belief in reincarnation is assumed by Plato
[218]Irwin (1959) 244
[219]*Republic* 380b

Archelaus, would receive and these are the compelling reasons Socrates advocates to Callicles in his choice of lifestyle. But Socrates does not just intend to lead a just life for himself, he intends to address the public to follow this just way of life (526e). This is the success of Plato's rhetoric. Since none of the interlocutors were clever enough to tell their own *logos*, Gorgianic rhetoric would never be vindicated. But, had anyone told it, rhetoric as they saw it would be as deductive an art as geometry.[220] Socrates, recalling his earlier remark that his arguments are bound in iron and adamant (509a), fixes his *logos* as stable, while Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles, "the three wisest men in Greece" are unable to prove otherwise and have been refuted (527b). Finally, Socrates evinces his λόγος about what rhetoric is:

> ὡς εὐλαβητέον ἐστὶν τὸ ἀδίκειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀνδρὶ μελετητέον οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ· ἐὰν δέ τις κατά τι κακός γίγνηται, κολαστέος ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο δεύτερον ἀγαθὸν μετὰ τὸ εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ γίγνεσθαι καὶ κολαζόμενον διδόναι δίκην· καὶ πᾶσαν κολακείαν καὶ τὴν περὶ πολλούς, φευκτέον καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὕτω χρηστέον, ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ πράξει. (527bc)

While only slightly modifying his principle that doing injustice is more shameful than simply avoiding it, Socrates has now instituted a moral code for rhetoric: First, rhetoric is good when it aids someone in paying the penalty for his acts of injustice, which brings the reader back to the beginning where Gorgias cited good and bad uses of rhetoric. Second, every sort of flattery is to be avoided. This indicates that rhetorical appeals, such as those made through Eros, must be genuine. The third and final use of rhetoric is that, like every other activity, rhetoric must be practised entirely for the sake of justice. As it would be the instrument to correct the wrongs of the soul and the city in the law courts and in politics. Rhetoric is now the indispensable τέχνη of right action: one of the arts of politics.

There is no way of knowing if the rhetorical devices used in the myth would have much effect upon Callicles. Callicles, the most passionate of speakers in the *Gorgias*, remains unaffected by what Socrates has to say and has fallen into a sullen silence, while the remainder of Socrates' discourse is carried out in an expository tone. In fact Socrates

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[220]Benardete (1991) 98

has had no success in convincing Callicles or the others in the way he himself was persuaded by this λόγος (526d). The μῦθος is Socrates' final appeal. The seriousness of Socrates' mood and the intensity of their confrontation act as Socrates' final petition to save Callicles' soul.

The myth is in contrast to earlier myths in this dialogue. In the water-carrier myth, Socrates had tried to use a more sophistic and modern approach through his allegory. This was replete with ingenious puns and plays on words reminiscent of Tiresias' lecture style exposition in Euripides' *Bacchae* (272-97). In considering the presence of two Sicilians, Gorgias and Polus, the tone of his claim is slightly *ad hominem*. For he says that he heard it second-hand from the intellectuals who were reporting the witty conception of "some story-telling clever fellow, perhaps a Sicilian or an Italian" (493a). But, the myth in the epilogue leaves less room for irony and philosophic play, as one also finds in the *Republic*, *Phaedo*, or *Phaedrus*. It is a more traditional myth, largely framed upon a Homeric background that evokes primary or earlier gods of judgement such as Zeus and Minos[221] whose gravity here is a far cry from the convivial boast in Homeric language that Gorgias used at the beginning.

It is a bleak world that Plato portrays in the end. For Plato's reader, the subject matter of the afterlife would be reminiscent of Socrates' death. Thus, the outcome is tragic. For, in spite of Socrates' solemn attempt to save Callicles' soul, he no longer seems to expect to convince Callicles. Socrates anticipates what Callicles is thinking: "perhaps this will seem old wives' tales to you and you will think little of it." (527a) Socrates also begins to hint at his own dialectical inadequacy at 526e: "I exhort all other men, as far as I can." Socrates is no more successful in convincing Callicles than Socrates had success in his defence in 399. There is a double tragedy: the unnecessary death of Socrates and the inability to reform his executioners, namely men like Callicles. Has Plato persuaded his reader? Or the larger question: is it impossible to reform the citizens of Athens? The effect upon the reader of such a myth and conclusion would be like that of a spectator who has just seen a tragedy. Appalled and disturbed by what the tragedy has said about human nature and his *mores*, the spectator is solemnly and forcefully convinced of what is right

[221] *Odyssey* xi

and what is wrong. The *Gorgias* persuades its reader of the need of a genuine rhetoric grounded in moral doctrine to run the law courts and govern the *polis*.

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