TRIBALISM, NATIONALISM AND ISLAM:
The Crisis of Political Loyalty in Somalia

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TRIBALISM, NATIONALISM and ISLAM

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This work is dedicated to my father Mo allim Abdullahi Mohammad and to my mother Zeynab Afrah Shador.

A note on the transliteration

The system of the transliteration used in this thesis follows the system adopted by the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University. Somali words are written according to the English transliteration of the Arabic words. For example, words such as <u>Wadaad</u>(religious man), <u>Roob-doon</u>(seeking rain) with two vowels according to the Somali script will be written as <u>Wadād</u> and <u>Rōb-dōn</u>. Somali characters such as X and C which correspond to the Arabic characters of ح ع خ will be used as H and C similar to the English transliteration of the Arabic. To differentiate between Somali common names and the Arabic, Somali common names will be underlined only whereas Arabic names are italicized and underlined.

ABSTRACT

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Crisis of Political Loyalty in Somalia.

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This thesis deals with the crisis of political loyalty in Somalia. The analysis is based on an elitist perspective which permits a more satisfactory integration of all levels of Somali society than is possible with familiar "clanist" or "social theory" interpretations. The paper gives details of the three leading ideological groups in Somalia over the past three decades -- the Tribalists, Nationalists and Islamists. It demonstrates how the failure of the nationalists' imported models of government and policies to contain tribalism culminated in the re-emergence of tribalism, now in more militant political form. The author presents Islam as an important political component and analyses the Islamic Movement in Somalia as a potential alternative political force for the future. The Islamists may be successful if they overcome internal divisions, personality cults and isolation from society, and adopt a moderate realistic attitude on social issues.

RÉSUMÉ

Auteur: Abdullahi, Abdurahman

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          Crise de la loyauté Politique en Somalie.

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Cette thèse traite de la crise que traverse la loyauté politique en Somalie. Cette analyse est fondée sur une perspective élitiste que permet une intégration de tous les niveaux de la société Somalienne bien meilleure que celle offerte par les interprétations "clanistes" ou qui se réclament d'une "théorie sociale." Cette thèse fournit des détails sur les trois groupes idéologiques qui ont dominé la Somalie au cours des 3 dernières décennies, les tribalistes, les nationalistes et les islamistes. Démonstration est faite de l'échec des modèles gouvernementaux importés par les nationalistes et des politiques visant à restreindre le tribalisme, culminant en fait dans la réapparition du tribalisme, seulement sous une forme politique plus militante. L'auteur présente l'Islam comme une importante composante politique et analyse le mouvement Islamique en Somalie en tant qu'alternative politique pour l'avenir. Les Islamistes peuvent réussir s'ils surmontent leurs divisions internes, les cultes de la personnalité et un certain isolement social, et adoptent une attitude modérée et sur les questions sociales.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Somalia is located on the Horn of Africa, and its seven million people are united by a common language, culture and Islamic religion. The land inhabited by Somalis was divided by the colonial powers into five parts. In 1960, two of these territories, former Italian and British colonies, became the independent Somali Republic. More than three decades have passed since the promulgation of Somalia as a nation-state. Like many other newly-formed states, however, Somalia has so far failed to establish stable state institutions capable of coping with problems of social and economic development. The Somali nationalist elites, whose formation was weak, had adopted nationalism based on pan-Somalism as the national ideology. This ideology certainly had its local ingredients, although it was expressed within the framework of liberal democracy and socialism respectively. Neither of these latter ideologies, coupled with nationalism, could withstand the torrent of tribal competition for political power.

Apparently, the nationalist leadership was not sufficiently developed to bring about a viable alternative ideology in the period between 1960 and 1969.

In this situation, the nationalists had little choice but to follow the tradition of liberal democracy which had been introduced by the colonial powers. A multi-party system and free elections were widely experimented with in the two parliamentary elections of 1964 and 1969. Although Somalia was depicted by the international community as a model for democracy in Africa, that reputation survived for only nine years. Gradual deterioration of the public administration, disruption of the local economic base, and widespread corruption of the political process became self evident. It is uncertain what the real causes were, but we may agree with Professor I.M. Lewis who has characterized the Somali political process in that period as "commercialized anarchy."[1] It was apparent that the established political institutions had failed to deal with the growing tribalism that was fuelled by low economic growth and the displacement of great numbers of rural immigrants to the urban centres As a result, on October 21 1969, the Somali national army launched a bloodless coup d'etat.

Most of the officers corps of the army, trained in Egypt and the former Soviet Union, were influenced by the prevailing ideologies in these countries. This was evident from the military regime's adoption of an authoritarian

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[1] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia. Nation and State in the Horn of Africa (London: Longmans, 1984). 206.

method of government spiced with socialism, and its projection of rigorous nationalist programs. Included in these programs were the prohibition of tribal manifestations, establishment of Somali language orthography, nationalization of foreign companies, and so on. The regime followed a pan-Somali policy which culminated in the Ogaden War of 1977-78 with Ethiopia. The military defeat suffered by the Somali military regime in the war, and the independence of the Republic of Djibouti in 1976, however, were preludes to the decline of Somali nationalism. With the withering of nationalism traditional ideologies began to flourish. Resurgent Islam and political tribalism emerged to fill the vacuum after the failure of post-independence "imported solutions."[2]

In the early seventies, Islamic revivalism was forging ahead as a "defensive return to one's own culture" and as a "rejection of the anomic behaviour" which had accompanied the projection of socialism as the state ideology.[3] Three main factors, in particular, seem to have contributed to the emergence of the Islamic revivalist movement in Somalia: (1) A change of political orientation in Egypt in the 1970s in which the Muslim Brotherhood

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[2]Yusuf al-Qardāwi, Al-Hulūl al-Mustawradah wa kayfa Janat ᶜala Umatinā (Bayrut: Muasasatu al-Risālah, 1983). The author discusses in detail the effects of liberal democracy and Arab nationalism in the Egyptian society.

[3]Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry (Hong Kong· The Macmillan Press, 1981), 53.

Ikhwān al-Muslimūn was given relative religious freedom, and a widespread identity crisis in the Arab world following the Six Days War with Israel. Somalia, which was under the cultural influence of Egypt for a long time, had received a great variety of modern Islamic literature produced by the *Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*. (2) Higher profits gained by the Gulf States from increased oil prices during and after the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. This economic boom attracted a Somali labour force and also facilitated the admission of Somali students to Islamic universities in the Arab world. Somalis were evidently given preferential treatment by these governments in order to counteract the socialist ideology in Somalia. (3) The military government of Somalia embarked upon establishing a secular state based on socialism which contravenes Somali social values. These various factors awoke among faithful believers the need to address social and economic problems from an Islamic perspective.

Political tribalism as an urban phenomenon had surfaced in southern Somalia with the first political elections in 1956. Yet, its radical development was observed only in 1977, at the end of the Ogaden War. The military regime was, in fact, culpable of implanting tribalism secretly whilst prohibiting it openly. Tribal policy was used by the state as an instrument for suppressing opposition groups and for prolonging the rule of the regime. As a reaction,

however, tribal opposition movements were formed in Ethiopia, a country which for centuries Somalis had considered their traditional enemy. When, in January 1991, these opposition movements had succeeded in crushing the military regime, internal factions and divisiveness along tribal lines began to surface within every movement and between movements, an event that has been well noted. The watershed of Somali political segmentation came, however, with the declaration, on May 17, 1991, of an independent "Somaliland Republic" in the northern regions of Somalia.

Political tribalism is a complex process in which vertical and horizontal connections play important roles. Traditional elites, for example, and their urban offspring are connected with each other and constitute one "interest group." In its radical stage, however, political tribalism brought about the dominance of nomadic people over the sedentary population and the prevalence of the nomadic cultural heritage based on anarchy, looting, and revenge.[4] Indeed, the culture of the dominant nomad is being adopted by the urban dwellers of Somalia, and a process of nomadization of the urban elites is

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[4]Ibnu-Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, trans. Franz Rosenthal (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), 303. Note the argument of the author that "places that succumb to the Arabs [nomads] are quickly ruined" and "it is their nature to plunder what other people possess." Furthermore, "nomads are not concerned with laws, and under their rule the subjects have the status of anarchy." This description could be easily compared with the situation in Mogadishu after the fall of Sayyid Barre.

currently taking place. Tribalism, nationalism and Islam are three irreconcilable ideologies coexisting in Somalia, and it is the purpose of this research to undertake a fresh examination of the crisis of political loyalties to these contending ideologies. It is possible that the same crisis of loyalty exists in other nation-states similar to Somalia in their socio-economic structure. This research, however, focuses particularly on Somalia as a case study.

Here, we are dealing with two levels of human activity: the macro-system which falls in the domain of the political scientists and the micro-system which is studied by anthropologists. At the present time, a perspective that relates the two systems is not well developed. There are two schools of thought to explain Somali history and politics: The first is anthropological school pioneered by I.M. Lewis and followed by Said Samatar and David Laiten. The second school focusses on the emergence of the petite-bourgeoisie and its prominent members are Ahmed Samatar, Abdi Samatar, and Ledwien Kapteijns. Both of these perspectives, however, downplay the political role of Islam in Somalia.

The elitist approach applied in this paper is an attempt to overcome this methodological problem for it permits a high degree of integration of the two levels of analysis. Elite analysis has presented a major challenge to the study of political power in non-western societies. Indeed, it is our opinion that it is

applicable to political analysis in the Muslim countries where kinship relations are still paramount. Elite theory starts with two basic assumptions: (1) In every society, distribution of political power is unequal; and (2) in every system some people have more power than others.[5] People who have more power (economic, political, religious) within every class may be one person (a political leader) or a small group (the elites).

This research is divided into four chapters: The first deals with the theoretical framework of political loyalty in the three conflicting ideologies: nationalism, tribalism, and Islam. The second gives a historical background of the traditional tribal states, the advent of colonial powers, and the subsequent Somali response. The third analyzes nationalism versus tribalism. A brief survey will be provided on the interaction of the nationalists with the traditional tribal structure since 1943. The fourth advances an alternative solution propagated by resurgent Islam. It deals with the emergence of the Islamic movement in Somalia and its ideological conflict with tribalism and nationalism.

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[5]Asaf Hussain, Political perspectives on the Muslim World (New York: Praeger, 1981), 81.

CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1. Tribalism

Somali society is dominated by pastoral nomads and semi-nomads whose political organization and economic life is centred in the primary unit called tribe. In fact, tribes can be found in almost every country and so tribalism is a world wide phenomenon existing wherever kinship relations and primordial attachment are paramount.[6] In the developing countries, paradoxically, tribes and tribalism were used by some western scholars as abusive terms with connotations somewhat synonymous with "primitive", "backward", and "uncultured", while the same phenomenon in the developed countries was labelled "ethnicity", and "sub-nationalism."[7] Very recently, however, many scholars have become aware of the problem and prefer the use of "ethnicity" instead of "tribalism" in their cross-cultural analysis.

In this research, we will limit our discussion to the ideology of tribalism as perceived and practised in Somalia. Even though the definition of tribe is

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[6] P.C.Lloyd, Africa in Social Change (Penguin Books Ltd , 1969), 288-93

[7] Ibid., 289.

vague and lacking general consensus among scholars, it has been treated both as a cultural and political unit.[8] In fact, scholars do agree mostly on certain criteria by which a tribe may be described. These criteria are "common territory, a tradition of common descent, common language, culture and a common name."[9]

Nevertheless, in the case of Somalia there are two exceptions. First, only a common descent dimension, "common blood",[10] may be sufficient for tribal identification for the nomadic tribes, and in the meantime, difficulties are encountered in differentiating the definition of tribe and nation. This is probably what anthropologist I.M. Lewis had in mind when he held that "tribe and nation, although in the political rhetoric, one is used as abuse and the other as approbation, connote the same meaning, a group, and the significant distinction which might be conceded is that of scale, in which case, tribes are little nations and nations are big tribes."[11] This notion would apply to the

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[8] Emanuel Max,"The Tribe as a Unit of Subsistence: Nomadic Pastoralism in the Middle East," American Anthropologist, 79:2 (1979), 343-63.

[9] Charlotte Smith, Dictionary of Anthropology (Boston: GK Hall & Co., 1986).

[10] To be more precise, this is fairly true in the pastoral regions.

[11] I.M. Lewis, "The Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup," The Journal of Modern African Studies, 10: 3(1972), 385. Lewis is a Professor of Anthropology, London School of Oriental and African studies He is a specialist on Somalia and has produced major works on that country

northern and central regions of Somalia where the whole nation constitutes a confederacy of homogeneous tribes who share the language, culture, territory, religion and so on. It would be erroneous, however, to generalize that concept with regard to the main agricultural tribes in southern Somalia where "territorial attachment" not "common blood" is the most important tribal attachment.

Second, contrary to anthropological usage, we employ the term tribe _qabīlah_ in this work mainly for two reasons:

(1) the terminology of tribe is currently used in Somalia, and it is ethically sound to call people what they call themselves. Moreover, the use of ethnicity in the Somali context does not change the nature of the phenomenon. (2) The word tribe is used in the Qur'an to refer to a group which is not defined in terms of colour or race. Consider the following Qur'anic verse: "O mankind ! Lo! We have created you male and female, and have made you into nations and tribes that ye may know one another..."(49:13).

The Somali nation consists of six major tribes: Darood, Digil, Dir, Hawiye, Isaq and Rahanwayn. These large tribes did not play important socio-political roles in the past although they have become widely politicized during the last decade. In the rural areas, in fact, the real political unit remained a

corporate group of *diyya*-paying members (blood wealth) consisting of about 200-2000 members who share an agnatic father.[12]

Tribalism is a state of mind, an act of consciousness which generates tribal solidarity *casabiyyah* and strong loyalty to one's own tribe. Its objective factor is the existence of tribe and economic subsistence. Yet, its subjective factor is high propensity among tribal chiefs to invest in the goal of controlling grazing land, wells or government.

There are two types of tribalism: one is natural and the only viable way of survival in the nomadic and semi-nomadic societies where no central authority exists to arbitrate their disputes and to provide security.[13] This tribalism may be called "rural tribalism." It plays the same role in the tribal states as nationalism does in the nation-states. Another type is "urban tribalism" which is the product of rural migration to the urban centres where migrants preserved their tribal allegiances. This kind of tribalism developed over time into political tribalism which has played a major role in all levels of the political process since the first election in Somalia in 1956.

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[12]David Laitin and Said Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Boulder, Westview Press, 1987), 30.

[13]Ibnu-Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, 261. The author stated 'hat "only tribes held together by group feeling can live in the desert."

Tribalism serves two important functions: First, it satisfies the basic human need for love, affection, and a sense of belonging and identity. This means that every citizen of Somalia belongs to one of the above mentioned tribes either genealogically or by an alliance. Indeed, the natural answer to the question of "who are you?" would be to tell descending or ascending levels of identification groups such as lineage, the *diyya*-paying group or the main tribe or the Somali nation-state depending on who asks the question and the circumstances.[14] The Somali nation is the root from which all Somali tribal branches claim to belong genealogically to their agnatic father -- Samale.[15] Second, tribal identity generates group consciousness in the segmented society. Highly consultative tribal local states are established which provide social welfare and security in the absence of a centralized government or even afterwards. In this situation, identifying oneself with his tribe automatically entitles him to certain rights and requires from him fulfilment of a set of obligations. This is regulated by unwritten common law of the tribe known as

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[14]Laitin and Samatar, Somalia: Nation, 30.

[15]Saadiya Tauval, Somali Nationalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 10, and also I.M. Lewis, Pastoral Democracy (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 12 The etymology of the name Somali is traced to a number of sources. One version holds that it means the combination of sō (go) and māl (milk) and another version traces it to the word "Zumal" which in Arabic means "the wealthy." However, the Somalis derive this name from their agnatic father -- Samale.

IIer which consists of ancestral tribal customs and Islamic laws.

Somali tribalism is very similar to the tribalism of pre-Islamic Arabia, where the political culture was based on the following set of beliefs and practices. To begin with, "the fame of an individual is derived from the fame and glory of his ancestor."[16] This belief leads to the glorification of forefathers, making annual sacrifice for them, and building their tombs. That is because the glory and virtues of ancestors "are transmitted to his progeny."[17] This practice satisfies the need for self-esteem and respect from other people. It also leads to the feeling of self-confidence, worth, strength, and capability. As a result, every member in Somali society is valued by others not only for his personal virtues but also for who his actual or fictitious forefathers were. Indeed, "men who could not boast of ancestors worth mentioning are despised."[18] Small tribes and individual families who are admitted to the larger tribes in an alliance are, therefore, often looked down upon and considered second class citizens in the tribal confederacy.

Second, in this tribal system, compliance with all the duties which are

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[16]Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim studies, Vol.I. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1910), 22

[17]Ibid., 22.

[18]Ibid., 40.

connected with family ties is inviolable. "The quintessence of the tribal value is loyalty to, and self-sacrifice for the sake of all who are connected with one's tribe."[19] This is a manifestation of real *casabiyyah* which limits political loyalty only to the person's tribe, thereby creating chauvinistic and hostile tribal interests which ignites continuous tribal wars.[20]

Finally, there is a need for the fulfilment of the law of blood revenge.[21] This value is connected with the concept of common defence. Tribal quarrels in the rural areas often arise over the use of scarce water or grazing land. As a rule, quarrels which cause a loss of life are followed by retaliation as a general rule. Tribalism in Somalia is based on a chain of successive loyalties to the different levels of the tribe in relation to other tribes which are higher in the tribal genealogical counting. It is based on the first tribal law: "I and my clan against the world, I and my brother against the clan, and I against my brother."[22] Somali tribalism is both centripetal and centrifugal. According to S. Samatar,

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[19]Ibid., 22.

[20]Laitin and Samatar, Somalia: Nation, 31.

[21]Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 22

[22]Lee Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1500-1900 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987), 21

a person gives political loyalty first to his immediate family, then to his immediate lineage, then to the clan of his lineage, then to his tribe, and ultimately to the nation. The logic of tribalism is manifested in a way that two lineages who are genealogically equidistant from a common ancestor should oppose one another but should form an alliance against any other tribe whose genealogical line is more distant.[23]

Ultimate allegiance in accordance with Somali tribal law is to be given to the common ancestor of all Somalis - the agnatic father, Samale, which means, in other words, to the Somali nation.

In the urban areas, tribalism emerged in the process of creating national institutions, such as the national assembly, where members of parliament were elected by their fellow tribesmen as a political unit. It is a manifestation of the fear of domination of one tribe by another tribe, competition for scarce opportunities for employment, and political exploitation of masses by the modern elites.

In conclusion, we may note that rural tribalism may be justified in the absence of a legitimate central authority to whom higher loyalty ought to be given. With respect to urban tribalism, however, a number of political factors and economic imperatives create a web of tribal networks and loyalties within the national institutions. Urban tribalism supersedes national interest, and is,

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[23] Laitin and Samatar, Somalia: Nation, 31.

therefore the main obstacle to nation-building in Somalia. Although for many decades Somali nationalists were trying to find a solution for the dual loyalties within the polity, it was observed that tribalism has cloaked the mantle of nationalism.[24] Henceforth, in the name of "national interest", tribalism was exercised, and social injustice and atrocities were committed.

2. Nationalism

The nation-state as a dominant political form is a recent phenomenon, a product of social and intellectual growth since the eighteenth century.[25] The formation of national consciousness was instigated by different factors in various nations. For example, nationalism was expressed as a tendency for political and economic change in Britain and the United States in the eighteenth century; as cultural revivalism in Germany, Italy and among Slovanic peoples in the nineteenth century; and as a movement for liberation from colonial domination in "Third World" nations in the twentieth century.[26]

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[24]See Ali Galaydh, "Notes on the State of the Somali State," Horn Of Africa, 13 1&2(1990), 6; Laitin and Samatar, Somalia: Nation, 46; Lewis, Pastoral Democracy, 229.

[25]Most of the nation-states in Europe appeared after 1860. See Sādiᶜ Al-Husri, Muhadarāt fi Nushū al-Fikri al-Qawmi (Bayrut: Dār al-Qalam li al-Malāyin, 1968), 9; Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism, 3.

[26]William Tordoff, Government and Politics in Africa (Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1991), 50. Here the author uses the word "anti-colonial nationalism" coined by Seton-Watson.

However, the French Revolution was the first political manifestation of this emerging political force.[27] Here, we will discuss neither nationalism and the formation of nation-states in the global historical perspective, nor will we deal with theories that explain why nationalism emerged in Europe and the "Third World" countries in a particular period of history. Theories such as Marxism which is based on the theme of aspiration for emancipation,[28] modernization theory which concentrates on the importance of western-educated elites as bearers of social change[29], and acculturation theory which ascribes political changes in "Third World" countries to western cultural influences,[30] are beyond the scope of our study. This investigation will be focussing on a

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[27]See Tibi, Arab Nationalism, 9. "Rousseau's theory of popular sovereignty was the premise for the formation of national states; and subsequent Napoleonic wars led to destruction of feudalism and the disintegration of states of mixed national composition such as Russia, Austria and Ottoman Empire."

[28]Ibid., 14. The national question was the major concern of the Second Communist International in which disagreement on the question of "the right for separate nation-states" led to its dissolution. "The Marxist theory explains the formation of nation-states as a product of the emergence of capitalism which inevitably produces the atmosphere in which strong nations exploit weak ones."

[29]Modernization theory was developed by American political schools. It "sees nationalism in the Third World in terms of transition from traditional undeveloped to a modern industrialized society"; and for them, only intellectuals trained in the colonial schools are capable of developing national consciousness. See Ibid, 20.

[30]This theory explains Third World nationalism as a "process of imitative adaptation". It divides this process into: a) "Passive-imitative acculturation" which is unreserved adaptation of culture felt superior. This type of adaptation is superficial and fails to dislodge the deep-rooted indigenous culture. b) "Active acculturation", which is selective and conscious adaptation of suitable foreign cultural elements. See Ibid., 23.

specific nationalism, Somali nationalism.

First of all, we will attempt to define the terminology of nation and then match that definition with the Somali nation which is considered a peculiar one in Africa.[31] Obviously, the nation as a concept has no clear cut definition which has been agreed upon among scholars, although certain common features are well accepted. A nation may be defined as

> the largest society of people united by a common culture and consciousness. While a nation occupies a common territory so that its memt rs have common interest of place and land, the vital binding force of the nation is variously derived from a strong sense of its own history, its special religion, or its unique culture, including language.[32]

According to Saadiya Tauval, the above cited definition is applicable to Somalis who, therefore, constitute a nation.[33] Let us now discuss briefly the components of this definition with respect to Somali society.

The first attribute of a nation as "the largest society of people united by a common culture and consciousness" is clearly met in the Somali case. Indeed, this criterion highlights the differences between tribe and nation in the Somali

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[31]Most of the African states are states in process of nation-building or in forming "an administrative nation", whereas Somalia, according to Laitin and Samatar, is a "nation in search of a state".

[32]See Julius Gould and William Kolb, The Dictionary of Social Sciences, 451

[33]Saadiya Tauval, Somali Nationalism (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1963), 24.

context. Eventually, tribes as branches of the genealogical tree resemble the root and are smaller in size. The core difference here is the "scale" and size. Therefore, although each tribe may share with the nation the attribute of having "a common culture and consciousness". Yet it is not "the largest society of people" with respect to the Somali nation-state.

The second attribute, a common territory, is also in place since, as recent linguistic evidence has shown, Somalis have been living in the Horn of Africa throughout their history.[34] Moreover, written accounts of travellers and explorers since the ninth century prove that Somalis resided continuously in the Horn of Africa. They also provided valuable information about certain tribes and city states such as Zayla , Berbera, Mogadishu, Merca and Brava.[35] In the sixteenth century, the names of some other Somali tribes were systematically mentioned in Shihab al-Din's chronicle, *Futuh al-Habasha*, the main source of information about the Jihad of Imam Ahmed Guray against

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[34]Cassanelli, The Shaping, 4.

[35]The earliest accounts were found with the Chinese explorer who visited the land of Popali (Berbera) in the ninth century and after that many Muslim explorers visited and described Somalia. These are: Yaqut Al-Hamawi, Al-Masudiyi (d.917 AD), Al-Idrisiyi (d.1166), Ibnu-Sa'id (d.1287) and Ibnu Batuta (d.1331). Al-Idrisi mentions Hawiya tribe (one of the six Somali clan-families) living near the river (Shabelle) and Ibnu-Sa'id later on identifies the city of Merca as the capital of Hawiye. See Cassanelli, The shaping, 16; Tauval, Somali Nationalism, 9; Lewis, Pastoral Democracy, 15. Ibnu-Batuta related that the ruler of Mogadishu was a Somali speaking who according to the speculation of S. Samatar was Abgal or Ajuran of Hawiye clan-family. See Laitin and Samatar, Somalia: Nation, 15.

Abyssinia (1527-43).[36]

The third criterion, a strong sense of history, is the most unifying factor

for Somalis. The strong belief in a common forefather descending from the

Hashimite House of the Prophet Muhammad and a ceaseless adverse

relationship with neighbouring Ethiopia since the thirteenth century, play a

crucial role in their common history and experience. Another important factor

is European colonization and the imposition by foreigners of non-Muslim laws

on the Muslims of Somalia. These policies awoke a consciousness of "us" versus

"them", and raised awareness of "foreign" and "native" distinctions. As a result,

domination of the Christians over the Muslims generated a defensive native

response under the leadership of the traditional ulama, the Muslim religious

leaders.[37]

The last criterion, "unique culture and religion" is also met. All Somalis

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[36]The tribes mentioned are: Harti (Majertain, Dhulbahante and Warsengeli) of Darood, Habar Magadle (Habar Yunis, Habar Yunis, And Idagale) of Isaq, and Mareehan of Darood. See Laitin and Samatar, Somalia : Nation, 12.

[37]We mention as an example only two anti-colonial responses led by the traditional ulama. The Darwish Movement led by Muhammad Abdulle Hassan in northern Somalia (1900-1920) and the Biimal Revolt led by teachers of the Qur'an in southern Somalia (1898-1908). For more details about the Darwish Movement consult Douglas Jardine. The Mad Mullah of Somalia (London: Herpert Jinkis, 1923); Abdusalam Marzuq, Thāirun min al-Somāl (al-Qāhira: Dar al-Qawmiyah li Dabaᶜat wa Nashr, 1964). On the Biimal Revolt, see Ahmad Mah, Wathāiq ᶜan al-Somāl, al-Habasha wa Eriteriya (Shirkat al-Dubāji li-Dabaᶜat wa al-Nashri, 1981), 244-49.

adhere to the Sunni Orthodox branch of Islam and the Shafi'i school of law. They are united, therefore, in basic religious beliefs. Moreover, popular Somali Islam is characterized by the dominance of the Sufi brotherhoods which had succeeded in establishing their unique trans-tribal religious culture. The population also shares the same Somali language which, although rich in literature, was not committed to writing form until 1972. The slight difference which exists in dialects between settled populations in the south and other nomadic tribes was never been a barrier to mass communication and social interaction.

According to Tauval, in addition to the common factors underlying the rise of nationalism in the "Third World" countries,[18] three factors, contributed, in particular, to the development of nationalism in Somalia. First, resentment against colonial governments which had ruled but never subjugated the Somalis. As a result, Somalis who had never been subject to an institutionalized government had to bear the burden of heavy taxation, forced

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[18]These factors are: "social and economic change, the appearance of educated elites, grievances against colonial rule, and allied war propaganda for self determination, equality, and liberty of nations". Tauval, Somali Nationalism, 76-78. See also James Colman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa", African Politics and Society, (ed.) Irving Markovitz, (New York: The Free Press, 1970),153-178.

labour, and racial policy.[39] Colonial authority applied the policy of appropriation of agricultural land and interfered with the traditional authority. Tauval states that, "the confrontation of the nomadic, individualistic and independent Somalis with organized government inevitably led to resentments and conflicts."[40] The second factor relates to religious antagonism towards both the European powers and Ethiopia. The colonial powers represented Christianity whereas Somalis were Muslims. Since there is no separation of religion and state in Islam it was "exceedingly difficult and humiliating for the Muslim society to accept non-Muslim rule."[41] The final factor is that of "the deliberate encouragement by various governments" to achieve certain goals. For example, the policy of the Italian fascists of creating a strong East African Italian Empire and their invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 was justified by a desire to include Somalis in the Ogaden region as part of "La grande Somalia." British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin also proposed, in 1946, that the British House of Commons consider "a greater Somaliland more objectively."[42]

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[39]Ibid., 61.

[40]Ibid., 62.

[41]Ibid.

[42]Bevin was Foreign Secretary of Britain in 1946 and, in a speech delivered in the House of Commons on June 4, 1946, he proposed the unification of all Somalis under British

Moreover, after 1950, revolutionary Egypt played an important role in spreading nationalist sentiments by introducing modern education in the Arabic language and the idea of Arab nationalism.[43]

In general, the ideology of nationalism could be summarized in four main points: (1) The ideal political organization is an independent nation-state and preservation of its freedom is a constant concern once that status is attained. Nation-state has the following characteristics: (a) it is a territorial association; (b) membership of it is compulsory; (c) it has ultimate authority; (d) it has permanence; and (e) it has independence.[44] Pan-Somalism which is based on unifying all Somalis under one nation-state is the cornerstone of Somali nationalism; and the policy of establishing a strong Somali army after independence is in line with the principle of preserving the freedom of the nation-state.

(2) National progress could be accomplished only through national independence. This principle emphasises that social, economic and political progress could not be attained under foreign rule.

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administration. See Ibid, 79.

[43]Abdurahman al-Najār, Al-Islam fi al-Somāl (al-Qāhira: Madabiᶜal-Azhar, 1973), 99. It is also worth mentioning here that Cairo Radio was broadcasting Somali language service.

[44]C.A. Leeds, Politics (London: Mcdonald & Evans Ltd., 1968), 5.

(3) Some nationalists assume it their responsibility to spread their "superior" political and socio-economic systems to other nations. Clear examples are the USA's "international mission" to export democracy, just as, until recently, it was the Soviet Union's mission to export socialism. Somali nationalism, however, is devoid of any sense of mission. (4) Supreme loyalty is due only to the nation-state. According to Hans Kohn, the ultimate loyalty of man is due to "his nationality, as his own life is supposedly rooted in and made possible by its welfare".[45] At the present time, supreme loyalty is contested between tribe, nation-state, and Islam, and that is why Somali nationalism is in a real crisis. All in all, the root of Somali nationalism and its core ideology revolve around the establishment of a united Somali nation-state. As we mentioned earlier, the Somali nation was divided into five parts by the colonial powers: two represent the Somali Republic, one part is the Republic of Djibout, and the other two parts are under the rule of Kenya and Ethiopia.

Somali nationalism emerged as a negation and antithesis to tribalism. It is geared toward weakening and even suppressing tribal consciousness, replacing it by a national consciousness. Somali people are taught by the

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[45]See Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956), 16

nationalists to identify with the nation and to give their allegiance exclusively to the nation-state. With respect to Islam, Somali nationalists do not deny Islam as a religion, but look at it as being apolitical. However, during the military dictatorship of Siyyad Barre, secularization was carried out with force and Islam was depicted as being obsolete and an obstacle to national progress.[46]

In conclusion, it should be restated that long before the colonial onslaught, Somalis had constituted a cultural and territorial nation; however, political nation, which means having centralized authority encompassing all tribes, is a recent phenomenon associated with the emergence of Somali nationalism.

3. ISLAM: An Inquiry of Political Loyalty.

This final section of this chapter will discuss the theoretical framework of political loyalty to the state from the perspective of modern Islamic Movements.[47] This excludes at the beginning popular Sufi Islam and Islam of

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[46]See Ali Shaykh Abukar, Al-Daʿwa al-Islāmiyyah al-Muʿasira fi al-Qarn al-Ifrīqi (Riyadh: Ummaya Publishing House, 1985), 154-176. This secular policy of the Sayyid Barre regime led to the execution of ten Muslim scholars in 1975 because of their opposition to the introduction of un-Islamic family law.

[47]Here, we will use the political positions of the founders of the two largest Islamic Movements: Hassan Al-Banna, founder of Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, and Maulana al-Maududi, founder of Jamaʿāt Islami, and their followers, the reason being that the Islamic

the established religious institutions.[48] To achieve this task, Islam will be highlighted as a political doctrine and its irreconcilability with tribalism and nationalism will be shown. Let us first examine briefly the key concepts of "sovereignty" and "loyalty" in the Islamic political system.

<u>Sovereignty</u>: is derived from the Latin word "supernuus" which means supreme, and is one of the most disputed issues in political philosophy.[49] However, we define it here simply as a theory of politics which holds that in every system of government there must be some absolute power of final decision. This power, according to Leeds, must be "obeyed without question by the rest of the people in the state".[50] This means that "absolute lordship or complete suzerainty" belongs to the sovereign. This sovereign's will and words are the laws of the land. In Islamic doctrine, sovereignty is the most revolutionary political concept and is the core of the Islamic religion. It is based on the principle of faith,

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Movement in Somalia subscribes to the political approaches of these movements.On Hassan al-Banaa and *Ikhwān* , see Hassan al-Banna, Majmuᶜat Risāil (Bayrut: Dār al-shruq,1980). On Al-Maududdi and *Jamaᶜāt*, see Al-Maududdi, The Islamic Law and Constitution (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1979).

[48]Generally Sufi Islam is apolitical, and "religious establishment" is a government institution which usually tends to justify government actions from an Islamic point of view

[49]Leeds, Politics, 20.

[50]In political philosophy, sovereignty may be located in the "state", the "legislature", the "constitution", or the "people". See Ibid., 21.

stating that God is not only the Creator of the universe and its real Sustainer and Ruler, but also that His command should be established and obeyed on earth. [51] His law, as manifested in the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet is comprehensive and flexible so that it could be applied in the ever-changing societies.

Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian *Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* scholar, stated succinctly the purpose of Islam as a religion and system of life which is opposed by all man-made laws, [52] acknowledging only the sovereignty of God in its system of government. The ultimate goal of Islam, he writes, is:

> to bring human beings into submission to God, to free them from servitude to other human beings so that they may devote themselves to the One True God, to deliver them from the clutches of human lordship and man-made laws, value systems, and traditions, so that they will acknowledge the sovereignty and authority of One True God and follow His Law in all spheres of life.[53]

Numerous Qur'anic verses stress that de facto sovereignty belongs to God and God alone. Consider the following verses which describe the extent

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[51]See Abu al-Aʿla al-Maududi, The Islamic Law and Constitution Lahore: ;Islamic Publications Ltd., 1979), 166. The Qur'anic verses about the sovereignty of God are numerous. See for instance the following: 12:37-40, 7:54, 25:2, 28:37,38, 2:30, 16:116.

[52]Man-made laws do not mean regulations and by-laws which do not contradict provisions of the Islamic laws.

[53]Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Iowa: Unity Publishing Co., 1987), 45.

of Allah's sovereignty: "He can [do] whatever He likes." (11:107); "He has to refer to none and to render account to none." (21:23); "He is the source and foundation of all authority." (23:83); "He is the only one whose authority and power nothing can limit or restrain." (23:88); and "Verily, He is the creation and His is the law." (7:54). Other verses also stress de jure sovereignty of God: "The command is for none but God: He hath commanded that ye obey none but Him; that is the right path." (12:40); "Follow the revelation sent unto you from your Lord, and do not follow guardians other than Him." (7:3); "And those who do not make their decisions in accordance with that revealed by God, are in fact the disbelievers." (5:55)

All the above quoted verses clearly show that Islam calls not only for acceptance of the de facto sovereignty of God but also His de jure sovereignty. According to Al-Maududi, failure to acknowledge both of them or even "its [partial] denial is Kufr [disbelief]."[54]

Loyalty _wilāyāt_: This concept connotes sentiment and feeling of devotion that one holds for one's country, creed, family, friends, etc. _Wilāyāt_ "is an Arabic words which means support, assistance, protection, friendship, relationship,

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[54]Al-Maududi, the Islamic Law, 217.

patronage, guardianship and the like."[55] Here we utilize the meaning of "feeling devotion and support." In the tribal state, respect and loyalty to all who are connected with one's tribe is one of the basic beliefs of the tribal society whereas in the national state, supreme loyalty is due only to the nation-state. In Islam, however, political loyalty is considered one of the fundamentals of the creed, emanating from acknowledgement of the sovereignty of God. It is the logical conclusion that supreme loyalty should belong only to The Sovereign, and under His sanction, His Messenger. The following Qur'anic verse clearly elucidates to whom loyalty should belong in Islam. "O you who believe, obey God and obey the Messenger and those charged with authority among you. If ye differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to Allah and His messenger, if ye do believe in Allah and the last day ..." (4:59).

Al-Maududi has aptly explained this verse. He writes, "the verse sets down the basis for the entire religious, political, social, and cultural system of Islam and comprises the first principle of an Islamic constitution."[56] This verse lays down the following basic principles: (1) the real sovereign, to whom every

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[55]Ibid, 186.

[56]Ibid., 178.

Muslim should render his loyalty and absolute obedience, is Allah. The "centre of loyalty and obedience for a Muslim, in his individual as well as collective life, is God alone"[57] and, according to a saying of the Prophet, "there is no obedience to the creature if it involves disobedience to the Creator."

(2) The second fundamental basis is loyalty and obedience to the Prophet. This is a practical manifestation of loyalty and obedience to Allah since the Prophet is the bearer of His message. Thus disobedience to the Prophet is equivalent to disobedience to Allah. The Prophet himself said, "whoever followed me followed God and whoever disobeyed me disobeyed God."[58] There are many verses in the Qur'an which explicitly link loyalty to God with loyalty to the Prophet: "He who obeys the messenger obeys God." (4:80); "Nay, (O Muhammad) by the Lord, they will not be believers until they accept you as the final arbiter in all their disputes and submit to your decision wholeheartedly without any heartache." (4:65) (3) The third object of the Muslims' obedience are the men in authority in the properly constituted

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[57]Ibid., 179

[58]This Hadith was related by Abu-Huraira and is recorded by Al-Bukhari and Muslim, chronicles of the prophetic traditions. See Muhammad Asad, The Principles of the Islamic State (Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalusi, 1980), 59.

Islamic government.[59] This obedience is subject to two clear-cut conditions:
(a) As the Prophet said, they must obey Allah and His messenger because
"there is no obedience in sin, it is only in virtue;" (b) They must be from the
Muslim community who believe that supreme sovereignty and loyalty is only
due to God. This verse excludes loyalty to any non-Muslim government.

Thus, Islam is clearly in opposition to tribalism and nationalism as stated
above.[60] Paramount for the Islamisists is that sovereignty rests with God and
obedience to Him is unquestionable. They refuse to give supreme loyalty to the
nation-state or tribe, and consider tribalism and nationalism as *jāhiliyyah*.[61]

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[59]Properly constituted Islamic government is democratically elected government or, to
use Islamic terminology, it is government elected according to the principle of consultation
(shura)

[60]According to Hassan al-Banna, only two types of nationalism are prohibited in Islam:
Qawmiyat al-Jāhiliyyah, meaning nationalism based on ignorance and, *qawmiyat al-ʿudwān*
which means nationalism based on aggression. See Hassan al-Banna, Majmu at al-Risa il
(Bayrut: Dar al-Shruq, 1980), 23.

[61]The terminology of *jāhiliyyah* is derived from the Qur'an, and is located in four places.
These are suspicions of ignorance (3:154); judgement of ignorance (5:50); bedeck of
ignorance (33:33; and the cant of ignorance (48:26). However, in the modern time, this
terminology was excessively used by Sayyid Qutb and his brother Muhammad Qutb. See
Muhammad Qutb, Jāhiliyat al-Qarn al-ʿishrīn (Bayrut: Dar al-Shruq, 1980).

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: Tribal states, Advent of Colonialism and Somali Response

Modern scholarship on Somali history concentrates on the colonial occupation and subsequent Somali response.[1] It relies heavily on the accounts of the European explorers and administrators.[2] Nevertheless, some recent research on the reconstruction of Somali history which has drawn on the accounts of oral traditions has shown that Somali society was in a dynamic process of continuous development from tribal micro-states confined only to one clan, to greater multi-clan confederacy (petty sultanates), and to present nation-state.[3] This chapter traces the development of Somali society before the colonial incursion and how the traditional political culture was transformed by European domination. Our main objective, here, is to set out the role played by the traditional elites (tribal chiefs and _Shaykhs_) and development of the

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[1]Most historians since the end of the 19th century were either colonial officers or scholars employed by them, so they were mainly concerned with gathering specific information to help them implement colonial policies. See Cassanelli, The Shaping, 3.

[2]The earliest European explorers were: The French explorer, Charles Guillain, who visited southern Somalia in 1847; the German, Von der Deken, who sailed the Juba River in 1865; and the British, Sir Richard Burton, who visited Zayla , Harar, and Berbera in 1854.

[3]Examples of multi-clan confederacies are Ajuran and Geledi Sulanates in southern Somalia. For a detailed account of these sultanates consult Cassanelli, The Shaping, 84-118, 131-133.

nationalist elites.

1. <u>Traditional Tribal States before the Colonial Onslaught.</u>

As we have demonstrated in the first chapter, Somalis constituted a cultural and territorial nation before the colonial intrusion. Political nationhood, in the sense of having an over all central political authority, however, was the product of a nationalist endeavour, and was realized only after European rule. Notwithstanding the influx of Islam in the Somali coast as early as the seventh century,[4] and its gradual deep penetration, Somalia had neither been incorporated in the successive Muslim Empires, nor had it been established on its own into an Islamic state.[5] Indeed, it had remained segmented into small tribal states in the rural areas and Muslim city-states scattered throughout the coast. That is why salient themes of Somali history

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[4]Although many historians believe that Islam had reached Somalia at the time of the Muslim migration to Ethiopia, another version affirms that it was in the reign of Abul-Mālik b. Marwān (65-76 H.) by Mūsa Ibn Banī-Khāth. For more details consult Muhammad Abdu al-Munᶜim Yunus, <u>Al-Somāl: Wadanan wa Shaᶜban</u> (al-Qahira: Daru al-Nahda al- Arabiya, 1962), 132.

[5]There were seven Muslim kingdoms in the Horn of Africa as reported by Shaykh Abdallah al-Zayli in 1332-38. These, however, should not be considered as Somali states. These states such as Ifat, Dawaro, Arabini, Sharkha, Hadya, Bali, and Fatajir, were purely Muslim kingdoms and Somalis were part of the Muslim population, although they played an important role, especially in the kingdom of Ifat. See J. S. Timingham, <u>Islam in Ethiopia</u> (London: Frank Cass, 1976), 67. See also Ahmed Nur, <u>Al-Nazaᶜ al-Somali al-Ithiopi: al-Judūr al-Tārīkhiyah</u> (al-Qāhira: Madbaᶜat Atlas, 1978), 21-29. It should be noted also that the Egyptian rule of the Northern regions (1875-85) was ephemeral and the rule of Sharifs of Mukha in Zaila and Omani Sultan of Banadir were nominal.

until the late nineteenth century are Somali tribal migration from the Gulf of Aden to the southern fertile land, and the rise and fall of the Muslim city states along the coast. Here, we do not intend to explain these themes, rather we focus on the political structure of the rural tribes that influenced mostly the pre-colonial history of Somalia and still continue to shape current Somali politics.

The Somali nation consists of two major groups: the Samale group which includes the main four pastoral clan-families namely, Darood, Hawiye, Dir and Isaq; and the Sab group which also comprises the two main agricultural clan-families namely, Digil and Rahanweyn.

Samale clan-families dwell mainly in the arid land of the northern, central and, to some extent, in the far south, outside the Somali political border. According to anthropological categorization of the traditional African political systems,[6] the Samale group could be classified as a classical segmented system (CSS) where "cultural unity exists, but politically diffused and broken down into a number of smaller political units whose basis of

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[6]Christian P. Patholm, The Theory and Practice of African Politics (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1976), 14.

membership is [essentially] kinship."[7] As mentioned previously, the nature of this system, is high propensity among its members to compete with one another for political domination, fissiparousness at times of crisis, and a weak territorial attachment.[8]

Sab clan-families are dwellers of the area between the Juba and Shabelle rivers in southern Somalia and their political structure is universalistic segmented systems (USS) which is similar to CSS, but does emphasize a need for a common socialization process among age-groups.[9] Moreover, because of the abundance of water and cultivable land which motivated mixed farming, Sab clan-families developed a sense of attachment to a certain land. In fact, contrary to the Samale group, this had created "greater social stratification among Sab group"[10] which is divided into dominant original land-owners, long standing cultivators and recent clients.[11] Tribal membership is acquired mostly

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[7]Classical Segmented System is not peculiar to Somalia, but is found in other African countries. For instance, the Kru In Liberia, the Ibo in Nigeria, the Nuir in Sudan to name a few. Forte and Evans-Pritchard pioneered the study of the acephalus segmented societies in Africa. See Ibid., 14.

[8]The difficulty of uniting various segments in the face of an outside threat is well illustrated in works such as Chinua Achebe, Things Fall Apart (London: Heinmann, 1958); and Elechi Amadi, The Great Ponds (London: Heinmann, 1969).

[9]Patholm, The Theory, 16.

[10]Lewis, A Modern History, 13.

[11]Ibid.

through common territory although kinship and clientship are also present.

The main distinction between Samale and Sab clan-families is due to their different ecological settings, which produced distinct economic cultures and linguistic dialectics. Samale tribes are mainly pastoral nomads and camel herders who move constantly in search of grazing land and water and speak the mahā tiri dialect of the language.[12] Sab tribes are agriculturalists and cattle-keepers who speak the may tiri Somali dialect. It is important to note that these distinctions are not always clear-cut and, moreover, are not significant obstacles to the process of national integration.

Each clan family of the Samale group consists of numerous clans, sub-clans, lineage and sub-lineage which are agnatically related. At least 50 major Somali clans, such as Bah-geri of Ogaden (Darood) and Ali-Salayman of Majertain (Darood), Wa'esle of Abgal (Hawiye) and Salayman of Habar-gidir (Hawiye), were identified at the end of the nineteenth century. The primary political unit in the rural areas, the building block of Somali society, is the diyya-paying group. This unit is the fighting unit of males, who receive and pay blood-wealth in common. In the late 1950s there were 950 recognized diyya-

[12]This is a dominant dialect used in the mass media as the lingua franca of Somalia See Cassanelli, The Shaping, 23.

paying groups in the Italian Somaliland and 361 in the British Somaliland.[13]

a. The Primary Tribal Political Unit.

Every *diyya*-paying group as a primary political unit has:

(1) a territory, although vaguely defined, which they use as grazing area during their seasonal movements and\or farming; (2) "home-wells" to which clan members return during dry seasons; (3) customary law known as Her which regulates intra-tribal relations as well as the relations with other tribes; and (4) tribal chiefs and Shaykhs as political and religious leaders of the tribe.[14] Although the tribal political system is greatly influenced by the Islamic law, the Shari'a, its dominant political ideology remains tribalism.

In the Samale group, the politics of the *diyya*-paying group are characterized by decentralization of political power, an egalitarian political process, and individual subgroup autonomy. The decision-making process is basically consultative, and all members of the lineage have the right to participate and discuss matters of the tribe in the general assembly called Shir. However, the executives, who are the chiefs of the lineage and assistant sub-lineage chiefs, meet routinely and manage the affairs of the state. The religious

[13]Lewis, A Modern History, 166-67.

[14]Lewis, Pastoral Democracy, 196-213.

ulama of the tribe enjoy the reputation of having religious power and are counsellors of the chiefs in matters of "religion". Both chiefs and ulama constitute the traditional elites of the society.

The common character of this elite is the importance accorded to old age and the respect that male elders can receive from the society. The assumption is that old age and wisdom are correlated and therefore age translates into political power.

b. Traditional Elites: The Chiefs

In general, although chiefs of the lineages do not have any kind of formal training, they are elected for life by the lineage assembly on specific qualifications. These are bravery, generosity, skill in oratory, knowledge of the traditional law Hēr, and ability in mediation. In some regions, religiosity is one of the most important factors in selecting the chiefs[15] whereas in other regions military skills are a dominant factor.[16] The chief has neither inherent power to enforce his decisions within the lineage, nor coercive power. His main instrument to fulfil his responsibilities is limited, therefore, to persuasion and

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[15]This factor is dominant in the more peaceful regions such as coastal areas and agricultural regions.

[16]The importance of military skills in selecting chiefs is observed by the researcher of this thesis in the inland territories of Somalia where camels are mostly herd and scarcity of water commonly prevails.

mediation and, whenever necessary, he turns to the assistance of the influence of the *ulamā*(religious men) Although the office of chieftaincy is not heredita- ry, qualified progenies of great chiefs and their close relatives are potential candidates for the office.

The main functions of the chiefs are: (1) to protect the land, wealth and prestige of the lineage; (2) to mediate disputes within the lineage; (3) to collect and distribute blood-wealth; (4) to represent the lineage in its relations with other lineages.[17] The functions of the sub-chiefs are to assist the chief of the lineage in all affairs pertaining to their particular sub-lineages. Members of the lineage respect their chiefs and seek his advice and help in different matters of their livelihood; and they never consider him as an authoritative ruler, but a respected elder of the lineage and the first among equals.[18]

c. Traditional Elites: The *Ulama

The terminology of ulama wadād will be used to refer to all shades of religious men who have the title *Shaykh, Mo*allim*, Khalif. Ulama can be classified according to their affiliations into two groups: independent ulama whose names are attached to *Mo*allim* and *Shaykh*; and ulama who belong to

[17] Lewis, Pastoral Democracy, 205.

[18] Ibid., 205, 206.

one of the Sufi brotherhoods whose names are attached to *Khalīf*. The word *Shaykh* is a title for those persons who can at least perform marriage contracts and administer the laws of inheritance whilst the titles *Moʿallim* and *Khalīf* are specific professional names. For example, *Moʿallim* is a person whose work is the teaching of the Qur'an, and elementary principles of Islam. *Khalīf* is a title of a man who at least took an allegiance or oath to one of the Sufi Brotherhoods and holds the banner and the chains *silsila* of the affiliated Brotherhood. Except for a *khalīf*, who holds explicit title for the Sufis, members of the ulama may or may not belong to one of the Brotherhoods. The independent ulama are individuals within the lineage who have learned the Qur'an and Islamic law, and independently exercise their expertise in the service of the community in return for their livelihood. Since they are not affiliated to the Sufi Brotherhoods, they probably play more active roles in the affairs of the tribe.[19]

The most effective and most widespread among ulama are the *Moʿallims* who are the prime teachers of Islam. In addition to their main task, which is to make sure that children memorize the Qur'an, they also undertake related duties such as eradication of illiteracy by teaching how to read and write in the

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[19]Ibid., 213-17

Arabic language and inculcate how to perform prayers, fast during the month of Ramadan and general Islamic manners. Qur'anic schools <u>Duksi</u> or <u>Maläämat</u> are in operation everywhere even in the unsettled rural areas where mobile schools are functioning. In the urban areas, some of these schools are part of a chain such as the Qur'anic schools in Mogadishu which belongs to the famous Moallim Nur, the Qaderiya Khalif who still retains his title as Moallim and administers more than 114 Qur'anic schools.[20] The teachers of the Qur'an are not confined to their tribe, and they do not participate in tribal wars. Indeed, they are teachers of all the nation and in general they are apolitical.

<u>Shaykhs</u> are men, highly educated in Islamic jurisprudence, the Arabic language, and Sufism. The prominent among them have their teaching seats in the traditional Islamic propagation centres in the Horn of Africa, such as Harar, Mogadishu, Warshekh, Merca, Brava, Bardhere, and Zayla. These centres produce new ulama who usually return to their original homes and establish small teaching centres conforming with the Qur'anic verse; "It is not for the believers to go forth together; if a contingent from every expedition goes forth to devote themselves to studies in religion and admonish the people when they return to them"(9:122). Students at Islamic centres are graduates

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[20]From personal knowledge of the author. The father of the author is <u>Moᶜallim</u> and, therefore, he is well aware of the system of the Qur'anic schools.

of the Qur'anic schools. They devote themselves to further learning and are dedicated seekers of knowledge her- ᶜilmi. Normally, most of the seekers of knowledge return to their homes with the Sufi Brotherhood banner and loyalty to their shaykhs not to their tribes. These groups of ulama are widespread in the regions of Samale, whereas ulama who are more involved in the Sufi Brotherhood and memorize the Qur'an better but are less educated in jurisprudence, are more widespread in the Sab group in southern Somalia.

In addition to the normal functions of ulama, i.e. propagation of Islam by teaching the Qur'an and Islamic law, performing marriage contracts, and inheritance, they are protectors of the tribe from enemy raids by utilizing Asmo (reading verses from the Qur'an to ward off the enemy), mediating in inter-clan disputes, and many other social functions.[21] In the south, shaykhs are characterized not so much by their capacity to uphold Muslim law as by their possession of special religious gifts. Among these are ᶜazīmo (sacred knowledge), Taᶜdar (sacred magic), and Asrār (sacred mysteries). With the spread of the Sufi Brotherhood since early nineteenth century, cult veneration had developed and Siyāro (visiting) was made to the tombs of the deceased

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[21]Other social functions include Rōb-dōn (meditations for seeking rain), Tufta (reciting Qur'an for the sick people and livestock), and hirsi-hirka (protection from Jin and evil eyes) For more details, consult Cassanelli, The shaping, 124.

shaykhs and khalifa to receive their Baraka (blessing).[22]

In Somali political thought there is a clear distinction between the sources of secular authority which rest on warrior strength (waranle or cami) and the sources of religious authority (wadād or culumo).[23] Nevertheless, the two are complementary in the sense that shaykhs become advisers of the elders in the application of the Hēr, and on some occasions these two authorities may become fused.[24] There are only a few instances in Somali history where the religious and secular authorities were incorporated. Those occasions witnessed the emergence of powerful dynasties ruling over many different clans over extensive tracts of territory. Here, we mention only two examples which occurred before the European onslaught: the Ajuran and Geledi Sultanates.

According to oral traditions, the Ajuran Sultanate traces its origins to an Arab immigrant called Bal ad who married Fatuma Jamballe, daughter of Jamballe Hawiye. The Ajuran Sultanate was religious and ruled by the Islamic Shari'a. Their leader, called the Imam, ruled over a large territory which, around the period 1500 to 1700, extended from the town of Qallafe on the

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[22]Lewis, Pastoral Democracy, 214-16; Cassanelli, The Shaping, 124-25.

[23]Lewis, Pastoral Democracy, 218-225; and also Cassanelli, The Shaping, 112.

[24]Cassanelli, The Shaping, 131, 134.

upper Shabelle River to the shore of the Indian Ocean, and from Mareeg (old town near the district of El-der in Galguddud region) in central Somalia to the Juba River in the south. The decline of the dynasty has been attributed to nomadic incursions from the north, Portuguese disruption of the Indian Ocean commerce, internal discord, and the abandonment of the law of Islam and subsequent tyrannical behaviour.[25]

The Geledi Sultanate was a confederation of Tolweyne and Yabadhale lineages with Goobroon as a religious lineage. The dynasty dominated southern Somali politics shortly after 1800, and established Afgoye (a town about 30 km from Mogadishu) as their capital. According to oral tradition, the Geledi clan had formed an alliance with the Wacadan clan to expel the Silcis, remnants of the Ajuran Sultanate.[26] Their military victories and eminence were attributed to their superior techniques in Ta^cdār and their Baraka. The Geledi is well-remembered as the suppressor of the Bardhere Jihad in 1883 with a force of 40,000 men.[27] They are also remembered as allies of the Zanzibar government

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[25]For detailed information about the Ajuran Sultanate see Ibid., 84-118

[26]Ibid., 111, 132.

[27]Ibid., 138.

and their Sultan corresponded with the son of Bargash.[28]

2. The Advent of Colonialism

The interest of the world powers in Somalia began with the Portuguese discovery of the eastern part of Africa in 1497, and the Ottoman conquest of Egypt and Arabia in 1517. These two emerging powers, representing the long-embattled West and East, confronted each other in the Horn of Africa. They actively participated in the religious war between Muslims and Christians in Ethiopia at the beginning of the sixteenth century.[29] Somali ports such as Mogadishu, Brava and Zayla , which were important commercial metropolis, were demolished by Portuguese naval forces. However, the watershed of the foreign intrusion began with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, after which, Somalia was drawn into the theatre of European colonial competition between Britain, France, and Italy.[30] On the African continent, the Kingdom of Ethiopia became a local partner after the retreat of Egypt's short-term rule of northern Somalia.

Somalia was of strategic importance to Egypt. Commercial and cultural

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[28]Ibid., 175.

[29]Trimingham, Islam, 76-98; Abdurahan M. Abdullahi, "Muslim-Christian Conflict in the Horn of Africa in the Middle Ages," a paper presented to the Islamic institute, McGill University, 1990.

[30]Muhammad Yunus, Al-Somāl , 34-35.

relations which had long-existed between the two nations had encouraged Khedive Ismail of Egypt to incorporate, in 1865, the Somali coastal towns of Zayla, Berbera and the ancient city of Harar to the nascent Egyptian empire.[31] After a decade, Egypt withdrew from Somalia for the following three reasons: (a) the uprising and revolution of Mahdi in Sudan had finally ended the Egyptian administration in Sudan in 1881; (b) the emergence of Ethiopia as a military power pursuing a policy of expansionism at the expense of its weak neighbours; (c) the British containment of Egypt in the East African region which led to the retreat of the Egyptian navy from Kismayo and the failure of General Gordon to bring Uganda under Egyptian rule.[32] The power-vacuum created by the Egyptian withdrawal encouraged Ethiopians in 1887 to conquer the city of Harar and surrounding areas inhabited by the Somalis.

As a result, the Somali nation was divided by the colonial powers into five parts: British Somaliland, French Somaliland (Djibouti), Italian Somaliland, the Ogaden region in Ethiopia and the Northern Frontier District

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[31]Hamd Al-Sālim, Al-Somāl: Qadīman wa Hadīthan (al-Qāhira: Dār al-Qawmiyyah li Daba ati wa Nashri, 1965), 435-82; and also Jalal Yahya, Al-ʿalaqāt al-Miṣriyyah al-Somaliyah (al-Qāhira: Dār al-Qawmiyyah al-ʿArabiyyah, 1960).

[32]Roland Oliver and J & D Fage, A Short History of Africa (Harmondsworth. Penguin Books Ltd., 1968), 177.

(NI D) in Kenya.

The main instrument and the real pioneers of European colonialism were commercial companies and Christian missionaries. Britain, for example, in 1827

Fig.1. The map of the Somali people

used the British East African Company to sign the first commercial treaty with tribal chiefs of Berbera in order to ensure safe passage of its ships along the Somali coast en route to East Africa and India.[33] British interest in Northern Somalia was motivated by the need for a convenient logistical supply for her troops stationed in Aden after it was conquered by Britain in 1839-40. By 1889, Britain had succeeded in signing enough treaties with main tribal chiefs in northern Somaliland to claim finally that this part of the world was under the British Protectorate.

French interest in the Horn began as early as 1830. It was motivated mainly by three factors: (a) economic ambitions motivated by the inland riches of the Ethiopian highlands, such as gold, coffee, and ivory; (b) a cooling station for her sea communications to Madagascar and Indochina, and (c) imperial competition with other European powers for acquiring more territory in Africa.[34] French domination was spearheaded by private entrepreneurs who strove hard to sign commercial treaties and gain protection with tribal chiefs of the Gulf of Tajura. Finally, in 1862 they were able to get a concession of the town of Obock and the whole coast for which they paid only 1,000 thalers.[35]

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[33]A. Samatar, <u>Socialist Somalia</u>, 16; Lewis, <u>A Modern History</u>, 33.

[34]A. Samatar, <u>Socialist Somalia</u>, 18; Lewis, <u>A Modern History</u>, 47, 48

[35]A. Samatar, <u>Socialist Somalia</u>, 19.

In 1888, five years after the establishment of four French trading companies in the region known today as the Republic of Djibouti, the French authority signed an Anglo-French Treaty and French Somaliland was finally declared.

Italian interest in the Horn began with her purchase of the Eritrean port of Assab in 1870 and a treaty with Ethiopia which led to the humiliating defeat of the Italians at the historic Battle of Adwa in 1896.[36] Italian involvement in Somalia started with the Filionardi trading company which rented the Banadir area from the Sultan of Zanzibar and, in 1893, signed treaties with the Sultans of Hobia and Majertain. After three years, the commercial company of Banadir replaced Filionardi due to the latter's financial difficulties. The new company applied an aggressive policy of confiscation of fertile lands and the use of forced labour. That policy created widespread resistance in southern Somalia and led, in 1905, to southern Somalia being placed under direct control of the Italian Government.[37]

Ethiopia which, with the exception of Liberia, is the only country in Africa to have preserved its independence from the European powers had,

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[36]Oliver and Fage, A Short History, 178; and also Tauval, Somali Nationalism, 48.

[37]There were numerous revolts against Italians in this period. The most famous is the Biimal Revolt (1898-1908). Cassanelli characterizes the period of 1870-1910 in southern Somalia as a "time of political disaggregation, economic dislocation, and reorientation of religion." Cassanelli, The Shaping, 186-97.

according to a circular distributed to the European powers in 1891, claimed land including the whole of Somalia, Sudan, up to Khartoum, and as far as Lake Nyanza in Uganda.[38] Pursuing this policy, in 1897, Ethiopia conquered the territory known today as the Ogaden region or Western Somalia or the fifth region of Ethiopia.[39]

Finally, in 1963 the northern district of the British colony of East Africa, inhabited by Somalis, was united with Kenya against the wishes of the Somali people after they had chosen to join Somalia in the general referendum of that year.[40]

3. Somali Response to the Colonial Onslaught

The responses of the traditional and modern elites to colonial domination differ both in content and style.

a. The Response of the Traditional Elites: the Chiefs

As we mentioned in the last section, tribal chiefs of Berbera in Northern Somaliland, and Obok in French Somaliland, Obbia and Majertain in Italian Somaliland, signed commercial and protection treaties with British, French,

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[38]A Samatar, Socialist Somalia, 20.

[39]Ahmed Nūr, Al-Nazāʿ, 58.

[40]Lewis, A Modern History, 292, and A. Samatar, Socialist Somalia, 20

and Italian colonial companies in 1827, 1862, and 1893 respectively.[41] In fact, tribal chiefs became colonial collaborators receiving material rewards for their accomodationist policies. The chiefs were important in pacifying their tribes and in advising the administration on tribal policies and customs.[42]

In the British administration which was based on indirect rule, tribal chiefs were incorporated into the colonial system in the earlier stage. In the first military expedition of the British administration against the Darwish Movement in 1901, tribal chiefs participated in recruiting men for the campaign. Angus Hamilton, the British officer in Berbera, points out that "in selecting men, only those vouched by responsible chiefs and those belonging to trustworthy tribes were enlisted."[43] He also said that "chiefs had agreed to bring up horsemen for enlistment."[44] I. M. Lewis relates that "during the insurrection led by Sayyid Muhammad Abdulle Hassan, the British administration also flirted with this policy in seeking to restore order and to

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[41]A. Samatar, Socialist Somalia, 16,18,19.

[42]Robert Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1966), 108

[43]Angus Hamilton, Somaliland (Westport: Negro University Press, 1970), 57.

[44]Ibid., 58.

fight the Darwish leader through Sultans of outstanding ability".[45]

In the south, the process of containment and integration of the tribal chiefs was not easy and continued until 1917 when the Italian colonial minister boasted of the success of his indirect rule stating that "with respect to the tribal chiefs of our territory, we can now rely upon their loyalty to the government and upon their performance in the interest of colony."[46] Mutual relations between chiefs and the colonial administration began with the distribution of gifts to the notables and religious judges. According to the Sorrentino Report of 1891,[47] many chiefs from the Mogadishu area who were on good terms with Italy, proposed to Filionadi that a port be built at Adala.[48] In 1908 most of the tribal chiefs were incorporated into the administration when the Italian regional commissioners nominated 577 chiefs on the government payroll with

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[45]Lewis, Pastoral democracy, 206.

[46]Hess, Italian, 109.

[47]Sorrentino was the Italian commissioner sent to Banadir (the region around the capital city of Mogadishu) in 1896 in order to restore order. He distributed 296 thalers to the Walis, notables, and religious judges "to gather friends for Italy." For more details consult Ibid , 33

[48]The town of Adala was the first Italian port established in 1891 and local Somali leaders had signed a treaty of protection with Filonardi Company. To commemorate this occasion Adala was renamed "Itala" by Filionardi See Hees, The Italian Colonialism, 31 See also Lewis, A Modern History, 52.

salaries ranging from 6-50 rupees.[49] This policy worked well in the pacification of the interior tribes after the Biimal Revolt of 1898-1908 and the Lafoole accident in 1896 in which sixteen Italians were killed.[50]

b. The Response of the Traditional Elites: the ͨUlama

Somali Muslims who had fought for centuries against Ethiopian Christians could not easily accept the rule of the white Christians. They "fell back upon the one factor that could unite them and form a basis for an awakening national consciousness, their native religion [Islam]."[51] At this period, Islam in Somalia was dominated by the Sufi Brotherhoods which had penetrated deeply in Somalia since the 1820s. Enjoying a pan-clan following, they became the more organized religious group and had the potential to reform into a political organization. There were three main Sufi Orders: (1) Qāderiyyah, founded by Abdul-qadir Al-jaylani (d.1166) in Baghdad, Iraq; (2) Ahmadiyyah, founded by the reformer Shaykh Ahmed ibn Idris al-Fasi (1758-1836) and its Somali leader was Shaykh Ali Maye Durogba (d.1917); and (3) Sālihiyyah, the offspring of Ahmadiyyah founded by Shaykh Mohamed Salah in Mecca, and Muhammad Abdulle Hassan, the Darwish leader who was his

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[49]Hees, The Italian Colonialism, 108.

[50]Ibid, 63.

[51]A. Samatar, Socialist Somalia, 25.

deputy-in-charge in Somalia.

According to Brad Martin, three divisions existed in the religious group: (1) the "rebels" and resisters, who preached Jihad and took up armies; (2) the "moderates", who occasionally preached hatred against infidels, but did not actively engage; (3) and the "conservatives", who practised mystical Islam divorced from its social environment and became collaborators of the rulers.[52]

In Somalia, the oldest and the most widespread Sufi Order is *Qaderiyyah*, but "this order ostensibly was either apolitical or acquiesced to the presence of the colonial ruler".[53] The *Qāderiyyah* community in the North, such as Shaykh Madar of Hargaysa (1825-1917) and Aw Gas of Berbera,[54] never took up arms at the time of the Darwish Jihad against the British. It was even reported that they had cultivated an excellent rapport with Colonel J. Hays, the British commissioner in Berbera. In 1900, the most prominent representative of the

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[52]B.G.Martin, Muslim Brotherhoods in Nineteenth Century Africa (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1976), 8.

[53]In 1885 a pro-British Shaykh was appointed as the official Muslim judge in place of two anti-British judges. See Lewis, A Modern History, 49.

[54]Aw Gas was a famous Qaderiya Shaykh in Berbera. He was on good terms with the British administration and became the most ardent opponent of the Salihiya order led by Muhammad Abdulle Hassan.

Order was Shaykh Aways Al-Barawi (1847-1909).[55] He returned home in 1881 after visiting the holy sites of Mecca, Madina, and the centre of the *Qāderiyyah* Order in Baghdad. During his journey Al-Barawi had received about ten years of mystical learning from Shaykh Sayyid Mustafa ibn Al-sayyid Salman Al-jaylani. Although he was "suspected of opposition by the Italians," Shaykh Aways paid little attention to politics, devoting all of his energy to the establishment of *Qāderiyyah* farming settlements.[56] The *Qadiriyyah* followers were famous for their practice of visiting tombs and asking for saintly intercession. That practice created antagonism between them and the more puritanical *Sālihiyyah* Order. Doctrinal disagreements and political differences between the two Orders led them into controversy and the assassination of Shaykh Aways in 1909 by a follower of the *Sālihiyyah* Order.[57]

Not all the followers of the Sufi Brotherhoods in the south were conservatives. According to the analysis of Cassanelli, "religious leaders stood

[55]See B.G. Martin, "Muslim Politics and Resistance to Colonial Rule: Shaykh Aways b. Muhammad al-Barawi and the *Qaderiayyah* Brotherhood in East Africa," Journal of African History, 10 3(1969), 471-486.

[56]Cassanelli, The Shaping, 237.

[57]The tomb of Shaykh Aways is located in **Biyoley** and is one of the sites of annual pilgrimage for the followers of the *Qāderiyyah* Order.

in the forefront of anti-colonial resistance in Southern Somalia."[58] He mentions, as examples, Ahmed Haji Mahadi *Qādcriyyah*, Abikar Ali Jelle *Ahmadiyyah*, Haji Abdi Abikar "Gafle" *Sālihiyyah*, and includes Moallimin (Qur'anic teachers of Biimal) who played an active role in all Biimal-Italian conflicts."[59] Italian authorities were aware that religious men posed a threat to their colonial plans. Sorrentino, the Italian commissioner who investigated the Lafoole Massacre, accused Shaykh Abikar Yerow of instigating the accident. He noted that "the religious [men] are those who make up the worst elements, ... They preached religious hatred ... ."[60]

The most puritanical and rebellious religious brotherhood was the Salihiya Order whose teachings became widespread in northern Somalia due to the efforts of the famous Darwish leader Muhammad Abdulle Hassan. Born in 1856 and learned Islamic sciences in his childhood in traditional Islamic centres such as the city of Harar. In 1894, he travelled to Mecca to make pilgrimage *Haj* and stayed there for about two years, eventually becoming a disciple of the Sudanese Shaykh Mohamed Saleh, founder of the *Sālihiyyah*

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[58]Ibid., 233.

[59]The prolonged Biimal Revolt of 1898-1908 was attributed mainly to the unity of the *Moᶜallimin*. See Ibid., 223, 226.

[60]Ibid., 235.

Brotherhood. When he returned home in 1895, Hassan established the first _Sālihiyyah_ centre in Berbera, then the main centre of British Somaliland. His negation of the belief of mediation of saints, condemnation of the use of tobacco, alcohol and chewing _Qāt_,[61] put the Salihiya Shaykh in sharp confrontation with the more established _Qāderiyyah_ Order. Eventually, he decided to move to the interior and preach militant Islam. In fact, his call found more acceptance among the interior nomadic tribes from where the Darwish movement started.

The open Darwish rebellion against foreign powers, namely British, Italian, and Ethiopians, started in the 1899 with the occupation of Burao and the declaration of "Jihad against infidels."[62] The Darwish leader called all Somalis to join him, and denounced as infidels those who hesitated to acknowledge his authority or who challenged _Sālihiyyah_ Brotherhood leadership. The British administration, with cooperation from Ethiopia and Italy, undertook four military expeditions against Darwish movement from 1901 to 1904. It was estimated that 10,000 troops, representing "the best seasoned

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[61]_Qāt_ is a tender leaf of a mild narcotic tree grown in the Horn of Africa, Yemen and Kenya

[62]Tauval, Somali Nationalism, 52.

British, Indian, and African troops at the Empire's disposal"[63] and 15,000 Ethiopians had confronted a Darwish force of 20,000, of whom 8,000 were cavalry.[64] In 1905, a fragile agreement was reached between Italy and the Darwish leader, under which he was granted Italian protection, and temporary peace was restored until 1908. However, the Darwish Movement regrouped again and gained control of the interior area, leaving no choice to the British administration but to evacuate the whole colony or wage an all out war. The administration's decision was tardy, but decisive, and a carefully planned combined air, sea, and land attack was launched against the movement in 1920.[65] Heavy casualties were inflicted on the Darwish force, resulting in the withdrawal of Sayyid Muhammad to the Ogaden region where he died in 1921 of natural causes. Thus, the longest resistance movement in Somalia, in which its leader had combined religious and secular power, came to an end.[66]

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[63] Lewis, A Modern History, 77.

[64] Abdurahman Abdullahi, "Ideological Roots of the Darwish Movement" A Paper presented to the Faculty of the Political Science, Atlanta University, 1987

[65] A. Samatar, Socialist Somalia, 33.

[66] Ibid., 37.

c. The Response of the Modern Elites.

Traditional elites, that is the tribal chiefs and Sufi leaders, were integrated into the colonial system in the 1920s in both the British and Italian Somalilands. That meant the destruction of the legitimate leadership of the people and the creation of paid chiefs to protect colonial interests.[67] With the growth of Somali national consciousness, expansion of modern education and socio-economic change, modern elites had emerged, mainly in Italian Somaliland. Contrary to their traditional counterparts, these elites had developed in the urban centres, adopted European lifestyles and admired colonial values. They also felt superior in status with respect to the tribal chiefs because of their positions of influence in the government administration and being an open group which could boast trans-clan membership. Since they were the product of the colonial system, any resentment against foreign rule had to be expressed in adopted colonial approaches.[68]

With the defeat of the Darwish Movement in 1921, organized armed

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[67]A colonial publication of 1930 praised the Biimal clan which revolted until 1908 for their loyal devotion to Italian authority and their chief, Sultan Abdirahman Ali Ise, was hailed as a staunch supporter of Italian interests. Also, Sultan Ahmad Abubakar of Geledi was made a Commander of the Order of the Colonial Star for the part he played in organizing labour recruitment for Genale consortiums. see Lewis, A Modern History, 98.

[68]"The vanquished always want to imitate the victor in his distinctive marks, his dress, his occupation, and all his other conditions and customs" Ibnu-Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, 299

struggle against colonial powers came to an end. Neither traditional elites nor emerging modern elites were capable of challenging the established colonial order. Somali people were at a crossroads and selection of the proper direction of struggle was not an easy decision. The next twenty-five years were marked by uneasiness and complete loss of conscious leadership. During this period, Somalis participated in many armed conflicts, serving their new masters as cheap, expendable cannon-fodder. For example, in the Italo-Ethiopian war (1935-41), Somalis fought on both sides. They also reached as far as Burma as soldiers in the Second World War and were well-respected soldiers in the French army. However, along with all the misery and the sacrifices, they learned a lot about the political reality of the world and acquired the language and administrative skills of the Europeans. As a result, they started to question their rights within the colonial systems, looked for higher administrative posts, and requested consultation regarding the affairs of their people. The modern elites began their political careers as advocates for their equality with other nationals as colonial employees. To pressure colonial administrations, they began to establish local clubs such as the Somali Islamic Association, *Khayriyyah* and *Hadiyatu al-Rahman* in the North, and the Somali Youth Club in the south. No other pan-tribal organizations were monitored at this period.

In fact, the first political institution did not come into existence until 1947, when the Somali Youth Club (SYC) was transformed into the Somali Youth League (SYL). This is a clear indication that the transition from armed to peaceful struggle took about a quarter of a century.[69] The means utilized by the modern Somali elites were peaceful political expressions such as demonstrations, petitions, and negotiations, thus not experiencing extreme personal danger and sacrifice. Apparently, the leaders of the movement did not suffer either execution or long-term political imprisonments as some leaders elsewhere in Africa. The comparative ease with which independence was gained in Somalia, and the short time of the political development of the Somali nationalists resulted the weakness of modern elites in the face of the traditional forces.

The theme of the modern elites' weakness in facing the traditional forces will be elaborated further in the next chapter.

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[69]Armed resistance ceased after the death of the Darwish leader Muhammad Abdulle Hassan in 1920, and the nationalist resistance began in 1947.

CHAPTER THREE

NATIONALISM VERSUS TRIBALISM

This chapter explores the interplay between Somali nationalism and political tribalism. It is divided into two sections: the first examines the formation of the nationalist elites, their means of political expression, and their relations with the traditional elites. The second investigates the nationalists' various approaches to curb tribalism, and their failure which resulted in the upsurge of radical political tribalism.

1. **Formation of the Modern Elites**

Although Somalis' feelings of solidarity and awareness of their own identity had been present all the time, modern Somali nationalism emerged after their contact with European colonialism. The emergence of modern elites depended on the advancement of modern education and socio-economic development. To explore these factors we will look into the statistical data of the colonial education and trade index.

In Italian Somaliland education had been deliberately limited because the main objective of colonial education was to provide selective training intended only to serve colonial interests. A document discovered in 1939 after the defeat of Italy in the East African War states that "the goal of the

education was to train the pupil in the cultivation of soil or to become qualified workers in the jobs not admissible for the Italian race."[1] It was also discriminatory in that "cultural" schools were reserved only for the sons of native notables. Another document which explains the importance of the children of notables stated, "because these can later on succeed to the duties of their fathers, serve us as interpreters and hold modest positions in offices."[2] That policy was intact until the trusteeship period (1950-60), when free education was open equally for every child and enrolment rates increased sharply.

Prior to 1939, only six elementary schools, managed by the Catholic Mission, had operated in the territory. Enrolment in these schools rose from 1,390 in 1930 to 1,776 in 1939.[3] Education actually declined under the British administration which took over after the Italians were defeated in 1939.[4] From 1950 to 1958, during the Italian Trusteeship period, enrolment in

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[1] Sylvia Pankhurst, Ex-Italian Somaliland (London: Watts & Co., 1951), 212.

[2] Ibid., 214.

[3] A comparative study of the expenditure of the colony in 1931-36 and 1936-40 shows that the military expenditure rose from 39% to 55%. Economic development fell from 3% to 2% Education quota was only 1%. See Ibid., 196; and A. Samatar, Socialist Somalia, 51.

[4] In 1941-43, the number of pupils attending schools fell to 399, and quota for education accounted for 0.5% of the total expenditure. Pankhurst, Ex-Italian, 192.

elementary schools jumped from. 6,459 to 31,524, in secondary schools from 193 to 1,029, and in post-secondary schools from 14 to 58.[5]

In British Somaliland, the emergence of modern educated elites was relatively slow due to low development of the educational system in the protectorate. There were two reasons for this: (1) the unavailability of government funds for education and the unwillingness of the population to accept imposed taxation to finance education; (2) opposition of religious leaders to modern secular schools because of their fear of using them as an instrument for Christian missionary propaganda.[6] Therefore, in 1934 only one government elementary school with 120 pupils was operating in the protectorate, and the allocated budget for education was only $500.[7] However, according to the records of the public office reproduced by A. Samatar, the total number of students had increased from 623 in 1948 to 6,209 in 1959.[8]

Colonial economic policy played an important role in the emergence of the modern elite. Agricultural development was directed toward attracting more European settlers and proletarianization of Somali farmers. In the Italian

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[5]Muhammad Yunus, Al-Somāl, 112-24.

[6]Tauval, Somali Nationalism, 64, 65.

[7]Ibid., 64.

[8]A. Samatar, Socialist Somalia, 47.

sector, during the Fascist Era (1923-41), the number of concessions of arable land given to Italian nationals grew considerably, from 4 in 1920 to over 115 in 1933. By the end of 1933, a total of 87,847 hectares of choice land had been granted; of the 1,192 owners, none was a Somali native.[9] During 1919-39 the value of exports represented only 20% of the value of imports and Somalis were forbidden by decree from participating in the import\export business.[10] As a result of application of deliberate underdevelopment policies and the efforts to create of a dependence attitude among Somalis, 60% of the colony's revenues in 1931-6 consisted of grants.[11] In 1951, from a total expenditure of $18.3 million US dollars, $13.5 million comprised Italian government subsidies.[12] Although that amount decreased sharply in subsequent years, still, in 1957, from a total expenditure of $14.1 million, $7.2 million was grants.[13]

Concerning British economic policy, sorghum was introduced and cultivated in the western part of the territory in areas such as Borama and west of Hargaysa. No urban growth occurred in British Somaliland and no other

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[9] Ibid, 50

[10] Pankhurst, Ex-Italian, 198.

[11] Ibid., 197.

[12] A. Samatar, Socialist Somalia, 55.

[13] Ibid

economic development projects were carried out by the administration before 1951. The only opportunity and flourishing business in the north was shipping That is why large numbers of Somalis were employed as seamen.

In addition to education and expanding trade, military service was another factor which contributed to the emergence of modern elites in Somalia. Somalis were recruited into colonial military service in both British and Italian Somalilands. During the Italo-Ethiopian War in 1935, the number of Somali recruits was increased drastically. It is estimated that 6,000 regular soldiers and more than 40,000 Somali irregulars participated in the war, alongside the Italians, from the Italian front.[14] Large numbers of Somalis, including twenty-two notables, had also fought on the Ethiopian side.[15] As a result of social mobilisation and adaptation to the new way of life during the war, many veterans began to dwell in the urban centres and became part of the emerging Somali nationalists. Rapid urbanisation occurred, particularly in the city of Mogadishu, where the population doubled within the decade 1930 to

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[14] It is interesting to note that after the war Somalis were rewarded to remove the title "native" and were honourably called "the Somalis." See Lewis, A Modern History, 111

[15] The names of the twenty-two notables are listed in Pankhurst, Ex-Italian, 17 It seems that 2,000 notables given by A. Samatar is highly exaggerated. See A Samatar, Socialist Somalia, 52.

1940, rising to more than 60,000 people.[16]

Lastly, the legacy of the Darwish Movement and contact with the nearby Muslim countries like Yemen and Sudan had also contributed to the emergence of nationalism in the British Somaliland.

Naturally, modern educated elites expressed their political ideas differently from the traditional elites. They opted for accommodation and imitation, and hence formed political parties.

a. Political Parties

In order to understand the most important post-independence problems of Somali politics, one must be aware of the fact that in Somalia, kinship coexisted with the newly adopted political organizations. Saadia Tauval strongly suggested that "the most significant fact about Somali politics is its essentially tribal basis."[17] Modern elites who espoused the ideology of nationalism were in a real dilemma within the dual polity. It was obvious that within a dual polity, and sharing loyalties, the "modern elites are not, and they cannot be of their tribal connections."[18]

Tribal divisions had an important influence on the formation of political

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[16]Lewis, A Modern History, 113.

[17]Tauval, Somali Nationalism, 85.

[18]Ibid.

parties. Political parties and non-tribal organizations were not entrenched in the Somali political culture, and the only socially accepted trans-clan organizations were the Sufi Brotherhoods. It would be expected, therefore, that forming such organizations in the urban centres would suffer organizational weakness, fluidity of ideology and traditional alignments, at least in the beginning.

In southern Somalia, twenty political parties participating in the first national election in 1954 "were associated with a particular Somali clan"[19], except SYL whose thirteen founding members, in 1943, [20] were not related to specific tribes. Although SYL enjoyed wide support in all the territories,[21] it later became the party of the Samale group, and in particular the Darood and Hawiye clan-families.[22] Sab clan-families, represented by the Hizbiyya Dastur Mustaqil Somali (HDMS) were politically united, whereas the Darood or

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[19]Laitin and Samatar, Somalia: Nation, 65.

[20]The names of the founders of the SYL party are as follows: Haji Mohames Hussayn, Muhammad Nur, Abdulqadir Sakhau Addin, Ali Hassan Muhammad, Diriye Haji Diriye, Muhammad Mursi Nur, Dahir Haji Osman, Muhammad Abdullahi, Fadah Hayis, Khalif Hudow Moalin, Muhammad Farah Hilowle, Yasin Haji Osman, Muhammad Osman Barbe, Osman Gedi Rage. See Rajab Mah, Wathāiq, 284-289.

[21]SYL branches were opened all over Somalia including the territory of NFD, Ogaden, and British Somaliland. See Tauval, Somali Nationalism, 103.

[22]A 1956 estimate of distribution of SYL members among the main clan groups was as follows: Darood, 50%; Hawiye, 30%; Digil and Rahanwayn 10%. See Lewis, A Modern History, 146. It seems that this data is highly speculative.

Hawiye clan-families were not similarly united in SYL. Before the 1956 election, the Hawiye Youth League was formed, detaching Hawiye support from SYL, while the Majertain in the Banadir and Juba area supported the Greater Somali League (GSL). The liberal Somali Youth party (PLGS) also acquired followers among the Abgal branch of the Hawiye and the Biimaal of Southern Dir in the Banadir region. Other minority parties which were operating included the Somali National Union (SNU), the main supporters of which were Reer Hamar, and Marehan Union, the only sub-clan party frankly bearing a tribal name. In the north, tribal divisions among political parties were even more evident. The Somali National League (SNL), the major northern party, was based on the dominant Isaq tribe, while the SYL branch in the north drew support from the Darood tribes of north (Dhulbahante and Warsangeli). A third party, the Somali United Front (NUF),[23] was even narrower in its base of support, confined to the Habar Toljala branch of the Isaq. The forth party, the United Somali party, which was formed in early 1960, represented an alliance of non-Isaq tribes such as Dhulbahante, Warsengeli, Issa, and Gadabursi. Fig.2 is an attempt to shows political alignments along tribal lines before the independence in 1960.

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[23] The prominent leader of this party, Michael Mariano, was the only Christian political figure in Somalia

Fig.2. Political alignments along tribal lines in Somalia in 1960s.

Party 1960	SYL	SNL	HDMS	GSL	NUF	PLGS	SNU	USP
Tribes	Darood & Hawiye	Isaq	Digil & (Rahan-wayn)	Majertain (Darood)	Haber-Toljala (Isaq)	Abgal (Hawiye) Biimal (Dir)	Reer-Hamar	Non-Isaq Tribes in the North

At the time of independence, the programs of all political parties were unanimous regarding fundamental nationalist goals such as the establishment of the nation-state, and the struggle for pan-Somalism. The process of indoctrination of these ideas took about decade because during the 1940s SYL was the only party with a pan-Somali ideology, whereas by the 1950s, all political parties were advocating pan-Somalism. However, the form of Somali unity remained a point of disagreement. Federalism was the point of view of HDMS party as party leader Jaylani Shaykh bin Skaykh articulated its goals in 1958.[24] However, SNL and SYL "favoured a unitary centralized state."[25] With

[24]"The party leader stated that the party had become convinced that the only method of unifying the Somalis ... is through a federal constitution which accords full regional

respect to other goals, such as selection of a script for the Somali language, it was wrapped up in controversy until 1972 when the military regime adopted the Latin script.[26] The adoption of the Latin alphabet was an indication of military regime's policy to curtail the cultural connections with Islam.

From the divisions and alliances of tribal groups among the national political parties we can deduce the following: (1) There was expansion of the political unit of the traditional political system from the *diyya*-paying group to at least the lineage group or higher. Examples of this phenomena are the National United Front (NUF) of the Habar Toljala lineage of Isaq Clan-family and the Somali National Union (SNU) of Reer Hamar. (2) Trans-clan membership and a nation-wide following is evident in SYL whose leaders were more enlightened.(3) Tribal alliances based on political and economic interest not only on kinship were also noted after independence. An example is the alliance of Dhulbahante, Warsangeli, Gadabursi and Issa, who, despite their diverse tribal affiliations, became united in the USP party to challenge the dominant Isaq SNL party.[27] The modern elites were not alienated from the

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autonomy". See Tauval, Somali Nationalism, 96.

[25]Ibid., 105.

[26]A. Samatar, Socialist Somalia, 102.

[27]Tauval, Somali Nationalism, 105.

traditional elites. They were probably the product of a colonial policy based on the training of the children of the local nobility for administrative jobs. Let us see how the leaders of the Somali Republic were related to the traditional elites.

b. The Relations Between the Modern and the Traditional Elites

To understand the relationship between modern and traditional elites we should bear in mind the fact that "cultural schools" were reserved for the latters' children. In fact, the colonial policy was designed to ensure continuation of the line of the traditional leadership since they have already secured their support. In addition, some of the traditional elites dwelled in the cities as religious judges and chiefs and their children had been educated at an earlier period. A clear example is the fact that a majority of the Somali representatives in the territorial councils, established in 1950 in Southern Somalia, were tribal leaders.[28] It is known in the political history of Somalia, as well, that most of the members in the first parliament had been nominated without any contest because they were religious figures or sons of chiefs who had probably acquired skills in the colonial language.

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[28]According to Tauval, political parties received only seven out of thirty-five seats, see Tauval, Somali Nationalism, 87.

Profiles of Prominent Nationalist Leaders

Let us now analyze the profiles of the prominent nationalist figures who became leaders of independent Somalia. These are the first president of the country Mr. Aden Abdulle Osman, and two prime ministers, Mr. Abdrizak Haji Hussayn and Mr. Muhammad Ibrahim Igal.

Mr. Aden Abdulle Osman was born in Beledwayne in 1908 into a Hawiye family. At the age of eight his family emigrated to Mogadishu during the British-Darwish War (1900-20). He scarcely had any formal education. He learned the Italian language and worked as a secretary in the Italian administration from 1929 to 1941. He afterwards started his own business in Beledwayne. In 1944, he joined the Somali Youth League, becoming its leader in 1953. In the first Somali election he won a seat and became president of the First National Assembly. In 1960, he was duly elected as the first Somali president where he remained until 1967.[29]

Mr. Abdirizak Haji Hussayn was born in 1924 in Galka yo into a Darood merchant family. In his early childhood he was sent to the Qur'anic school. He joined the police force, probably in the 1940s, and became a member of the SYL party. In 1953 he went to Cairo to pursue Arabic studies. In June 1955,

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[29] See John Dikie and Allen Rake, Who's Who in Africa (London: Buyer and Trader Ltd, 1973), 414

he presented a petition to the United Nations for the SYL and in 1956, he was elected president of the party. After a short period, however, he left the party and joined the Great Somali League party. In the first government, Mr. Hussayn became the interior minister and later on, became prime minister until 1967. [30]

Mr. Muhammad Ibrahim Igal was born in 1921 in Berbera, the administrative centre of British Somaliland. He is from the Isaq clan-family and the only son of a merchant. He was educated in the Qur'anic school and at the Shaykh Intermediate School. His father was politically active and became one of the founders of the *Khayriyyah* Association in 1935. Mr. Igal went to Britain for five years of private education and returned home to manage his father's business. He joined the Somali National League (SNL) in 1954 and became its secretary-general in 1958. Mr. Igal became the first prime minister of British Somaliland and after the unification of the two former Somali colonies in 1960, he became minister of defence, then prime minister from 1967 until 1969 when the coup d'etat toppled his government. [31]

From the short biographies of the above three prominent nationalist

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[30] Ibid., 417.

[31] Ibid., 418.

leaders we can see that: (1) Abdirizak Haji Hussayn and Muhammad Ibrahim Igal have the title *Haji* (one who visited Mecca for religious purposes) attached to their names, a very rare religious title in Somalia at that time. Not many could acquire the title because of difficulties in transportation and lack of security. Having that title during that early stage showed their economic well-being as well as their religiosity. This, therefore, confirms the reports that their fathers were merchants. We can see very clearly that both of them were progenies of the growing semi-urbanized traditional elites.

(2) All the three leaders had limited education which was a general characteristic of early Somali Nationalists. Nevertheless, it is evident that they invested a lot of energy in self-education, and gained experience in the early stages of their political careers.

3) Igal and Hussayn had travelled to Britain and Egypt respectively, and at least had some formal education in these countries. It is most probable that Hussayn was influenced by Arab nationalism, while Igal was inclined toward pan-Africanism, an ideology preach mostly by British educated African elites.

(4) All three leaders belong to three pastoral Samale groups, namely Hawiye (Osman), Darood (Hussayn), and Isaq (Igal) which shows the inter-play between traditional politics and nationalism.

(5) Osman's father does not have the title of belonging to the traditional elite background, since his name does not include known religious elite titles such as _Ḥaji_, _Shaykh_, or _Moᶜallim_, nor the titles of tribal chiefs such as _Boqor_, _Ugās_, _Malāq_, or _Imām_. Yet, we can consider Osman himself as a semi-urbanized elite who became a businessman before his political career in SYL.

Apparently, the nationalist elites during the years of independence were at the cross roads between the inherited traditional outlook and emerging elite values, between a conservative religious education and a more liberal modern education, and between inter-clan dependency and the self-reliance of urban life.

2. Nationalism Versus Tribalism

Tribal politics and nationalistic programs are a marked character of post-independent Africa.[32] This section examines critically the Somali nationalists' awareness of the tribal problems and their approaches to harness them. It also examines the upsurge of militant political tribalism.

a. Political Programs.

Somali nationalists were very conscious of the problems of dual polity and the destructive role which tribalism may play in building a modern nation-

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[32]David R. Smock and Kuwamena Benti-Enchil, (eds.), _The Search for National Integration in Africa_ (New York: The Free Press, 1975), 3.

state. They had, therefore, established the eradication of tribal loyalties as a primary goal in their political programs. The first modern organizations, such as *Hadiyatu al-Rahman* and *Khayriyyah* in northern Somalia, recognized the "need for pan-clan Islamic unity."[33] SNL, the nationalist party, had proclaimed in its political agenda the "promotion of pan-clanism."[34] SNL's programs were put forward to the government and, in 1957, the legislative council proposed to the government abolition of the tribal system.[35] In the south, the situation was similar. The first article of the political program of the SYL party was the unification of all Somalis in the eradication of communal friction and clanism caused by tribalism.[36] In 1959 the SYL government set up a tribunal to study ways of dealing with the problems of tribalism and to consider adaptation of tribal ties to the needs of a modern state.[37] After independence, the age-old tribal rivalries and kinship bonds reemerged peacefully. Describing this phenomena, Lewis stated that "no other single line of communication and common interest connected so directly and incontrovertibly the pastoral nomad

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[33]A Samatar, Socialist Somalia, 44.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Lewis, A Modern History, 268

[36]A Samatar, Socialist Somalia, 52.

[37]Lewis, A Modern History, 168.

in the interior with his kinsman in the civil service, in the national assembly, or in the Cabinet."[38]

Nationalist awareness of tribalism received added stimulus by the election of 1969 in which 64 parties participated and 40 lives were lost The military regime of 1969 made its priority the "liquidation of all kinds of corruption, all forms of anarchy, the malicious system of tribalism in every form, and all other bad customs in state activities."[39]

b. Attempts to Solve Tribal Problems.

Political scientists have suggested mainly three approaches to the study of tribal societies with respect to nation-state building. These are: (1) proportional representation; (2) maximum devolution into regional government; and (3) the use of political coalition.[40]

Earlier, during the period 1943 to 1969, Somali nationalists used three methods: Firstly, proportional representation of the tribes in the government and the rank and file of the public services. It was not easy to maintain the balance, however, and in the course of time specific tribes received more government jobs. The reason may have been in getting early opportunity to the

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[38]Ibid., 167.

[39] A. Samatar, Socialist Somalia, 85.

[40]B.S. Sharma, Politics of Tribalism in Africa (Delhi: Kay Printers, 1973), 145-51

colonial schools and administration. Nevertheless, it appears that specific tribal cultures and ecological factors may have had contributed to the collapse of the proportional system.[41]

In the first Government of 1956, when all ministers were chosen from the Samale group, the Sab group was outraged and the Darood felt strong resentment against the Hawiye.[42] In the government formed after the 1959 election, the 15 ministers and under secretaries were evenly distributed amongst the Darood, Hawiye and Digil and Rahanwayn clan-families.[43] After independence, the proportional approach was also applied, and in the first unity government, of the 33 northern seats, 4 ministries were allocated [2 Isaq and 2 Darood], while of 90 southern seats, 10 ministries were distributed [4 Hawiye, 4 Darood and 2 Digil and Rahanwayn].[44] Therefore, clan balancing became a standard operating procedure in the Somali Republic, although the balance of power between tribes was shifted, giving advantage to Darood clan-

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[41]It is my view that tribes whose members were raised as nomads despised menial jobs and preferred to join government employments, while some others tribes mainly from the agricultural areas had expertise working in the private sector.

[42]The government was formed by SYL dominated by Samale, where Sab constituted the opposition party HDMS. Of six portfolios including premiership, three were allocated for Hawiye, two for Darood and one for Dir. See Lewis, A Modern History, 146.

[43]Lewis, A Modern History, 160.

[44]Ibid., 168.

family due to their presence in both the northern and southern regions. [45]

Second, there was glorification of the Somali nation just as there was mockery and denial of the prevailing tribalism. Glorification was expressed in the mass media, especially in the form of poems and songs, and Somali "nationalist heroes" such as Imam Ahmad Gurey and Sayyid Muhammad Abdulle Hassan were well honoured. Some nationalists, applying radical approaches, even denied that tribalism was a force in Somali politics. They thought that the less said about tribalism the easier it would be to eradicate it. [46]

Third, tribalism was dealt with by legislation. For instance, three important laws were passed prior to 1969 to curb the influence of tribalism. The first was intended to reduce the authority of tribal chiefs, the second to lessen tribal solidarity, and the third resulted in the banning of political parties that utilized tribal names.

The military government of 1969 continued the former regime's policy with a more radical approach. They introduced harsh legislations and conducted intensive ideological propaganda against tribalism. A number of

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[45]Ibid.

[46] Tauval, Somali Nationalism. p.86

laws were enacted to "liquidate" dabar-goynta tribalism. The _Diyya_ law was replaced by the death sentence, and the former tribal chiefs were renamed "peace seekers" nabadōn. In urban areas, tribal solidarity was undermined by state programs such as public coverage of funeral expenses in cases where the deceased had no immediate family members, and compulsory insurance for auto vehicles. Above all, after 1977, the adoption of "scientific socialism" as an official state ideology produced a well-orchestrated campaign against tribalism.[17] Although the tribal eradication policy of the military regime had some ephemeral effects, it had epitomized the utopian approach of Somali nationalists.

Furthermore, the government excessively abused proportional representation. Ironically, whilst the government had initiated campaigns against clan affiliation, nepotism, and tribalism, the president, himself, was guilty of being surrounded with kinsmen of three particular clans-families: his own Marehan clan, his mother's Ogaden clan, and his son-in-law's Dhulbahante clan, collectively code-named M.O.D (Marehan-Ogaden-Dhulbahante).[48] As a result, the Hawiye, the Isaq and the Majertain, the three dominant clans in

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[47]The campaign ololeh against tribalism was launched from Feberuary-March, 1971. A. Samatar, Socialist Somalia, 107.

[48]Laitin and Samatar, Somalia Nation, 156.

the pre-1969 civilian governments were strongly resented." It is difficult to ascertain why and when the president initiated the formation of the MOD political alliance. It may have been due to security needs after the attempted coup of General Ainanshe, General Gavereire, and Colonel Dheel in 1971, who belonged to the former dominant clans of Isaq, Hawiye, and Majertain respectively, or it may have represented an initial move on the part of the president to prepare the grounds for his absolute rule[50]

Whatever the reasons, the Barre government's alliance with MOD effectively undermined the role of proportional representation, destroyed the traditional leadership within each tribe, and threw the whole social order upside down. The military government's tribal policies led to the radicalization of the disaffected tribes and their eruption in armed opposition after the regime's defeat in the Ogaden War of 1978.

3. The Upsurge of Radical Tribalism

As we have seen in the preceding pages, three approaches were used by the nationalists to check tribalism: proportional representation, legislation

[49]Before the coup of 1969, these three clans had provided two presidents, Adan Abdulle Osman, and Abdi Rashid Ali Sharmarke, and three prime ministers, Abdirashid, Abdirizak, and Igal.

[50]we may speculate that Ainanshe, Gaveire, and Dheel were representing major clans which according to the Somali tribal customs hardly accept the rule of a minor clan to whom Siyyad Barre belongs.

against tribalism, and indoctrination of people with Somali nationalism. The authoritarian rule of Muhammad Siyyad Barre abused all of them.[51]

After the coup d'etat in 1969 and the adoption of "scientific Socialism" in 1971, tribalism was officially banned and the personality of president Muhammad S. Barre was elevated to the status of a "Maoist cult" figure, honoured with the title "the father of the nation" $\overline{A}bih\overline{\imath}$ Ummada.[52] As the father, Barre expected all others to accept their status as his children. Paradoxically, while the "the father" was attacking tribal solidarity among his children, he was favouring and covertly relying on M.O.D from whom he constructed his inner political power circle. At the same time, the elites from the Hawiye, the Isaq, and the Majertain were gradually purged from the administration.[53], Since these elites could not express their grievances or voice

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[51]First, Somalism was lumped with the loyalty to the president, and whoever, was opposing the regime was depicted as opposing the nation. The opposition were called Sama did (rejecter of the goodwill), and Qaran dumis (the destroyer of the state). Second, Tribalism was promoted by targeting specific tribe either for privilege or for the wrath of the revolution. Finally, proportional representation was discarded since the president had the power of appointing and dismissing top administrative elites.

[52]There are numerous Somali songs referring to the president as the father of the nation, the father of the knowledge, and the father of the revolution. See Lewis, " The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary Nationalism", Horn of Africa, 1&2 (1990), 55. Also Abdi Shekh-Abdi, "Ideology and Leadership in Somalia", The Journal of Modern African Studies, 19 1(1981), 169

[53]Khalif Galeydh, former minister of the regime writes: "Siyad Barre exploited the adoption of Somali as the administrative language [in 1973]. The administration of things, he [the president] insisted, was no longer beyond the abilities of many thousands of

their resentment peacefully due to the curtailment of democratic rights, they opted for armed struggle.

The effective armed opposition against the regime began after the defeat of the Somali army in the Ogaden War, 1977-78, and the failure of a resulting coup attempt on 9 April 1978. The defeat of the Somali army was, in addition to the devastating human and economic consequences, a severe humilation for "the father of the nation" and his regime. After that, a new period of Somali history began which could be characterized as "a new stage of terror, exclusionist bureaucratic behaviour, overt clanism, and emergence of antithetical organizations."[54]

The first effective opposition movement was the Somali Salvation Front (SSF) which had emerged in 1979. It was stationed in Ethiopia and its members were predominately of the Majertain clan. SSF was transformed into the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SSDF) after two small opposition parties had merged with it.[55] The second opposition movement was the Somali

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unschooled and untrained, but of course loyal individuals, who were sent to fill the ranks of the civil service." These loyal unschooled had systematically replaced the educated elites in the civil service and in the officer's corps. See Khalif Galeydh, "Notes", Horn of Africa, 1&2 (1990), 26.

[54]A. Samatar, Socialist Somalia, 139.

[55]"In October, 1981, the provisional eleven members of the Executive Committee included two Isaq, one Dhulbahante, and one Hawiye. However, in 1983, only four out of

National Movement (SNM) founded in London in April 1981 by Isaq exiles, and based in Ethiopia.[56] Despite the serious efforts of SDF and SNM to make themselves a national opposition front, however, they did remained predominantly Majertain and Isaq parties.[57]

The government reacted against the two movements with a brutal military campaign based on a "scorched earth policy." Ali Galaydh noted that "gross violation of Human rights was not new, but what was new, disturbing and monstrous was the targeting of an entire clan or sub-clan as enemies of the regime."[58] The scorched earth policy, experimented in Mudug against the Majertain clan, was applied fully in the north against the Isaq clan-family.[59]

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twenty-four of the Executive Committee were non-Majertain. See Daniel Compagnon, "The Somali Opposition Fronts· Some Comments and Questions", Horn of Africa, 1 & 2 (1990), 29.

[56]In the Fourth Congress of 1984, of the forty-one elected members of the Central Committee, twenty-one were from Isaq, eight Hawiye (predominantly Habargidir), and one of each Dhulbahante, Majertain, Gadabursi, and Rahanwayn. See Ibid., 33.

[57]There are mainly three major factors for their failure to receive popular support: (1) They were stationed in Ethiopia, the traditional enemy of Somalis; (2) systematic effort of the military regime in Somalia to discredit the movement as a national opposition by depicting them as tribal chauvinists; and (3) Internal weakness due to the effect of the segmented social structure.

[58] Ali Galaydh, "Notes", Horn of Africa, 21.

[59]After the SNM attack in Northern regions in 1988, most of cities in region were destroyed by Somali army, thousands of civilians were killed and wounded, and more than 500,000 refugees fled to Ethiopia. See unpublished article of I.M. Lewis, "Segmentary Nationalism and the Collapse of the Somali State", p.9.

The political reaction of the regime was also bent on the elimination of political support from the opposition movements. In April 1988, therefore, the regime signed a peace accord with Ethiopia withdrew its support from the Western Somali Libration Front (WSLF) in a bid to eliminate the Ethiopian support for SNM and SSDF.[60] In fact, the alliance with Ethiopia, an arch enemy of Somalia, was a vital factor in the survival of the regime and the continuation of the opposing armed movements.

Other tribal opposition movements namely the Hawiye-dominated United Somali Congress (USC), and the Ogaden-dominated Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), both based in Ethiopia, emerged in 1989. If the establishment of USC signified the re-emergence of former dominant tribes, SPM represented the breakdown of the MOD alliances. The weakened regime of Siyyad Barre was finally toppled on 27 January 1991 in Mogadishu by the USC militia. Even up to the time these pages are being written, however, Somali nationalists had failed to establish a viable Somali national government, and the situation in Somalia is as follows: there are eight armed tribal militia operating in their respective clan areas: the Somali National Movement SNM (Isaq), the SDA Somali Democratic Association (DIR [Gadabursi]), the United

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[60]Lewis, "The Ogaden and Fragility", 59.

Somali Congress USC (Hawiye), the Somali Democratic Movement SDM (Digil and Rahanwayn), Somali Patriotic Movement SPM (Ogaden), the Somali Salvation Democratic Front SSDF (Majettain), the SNF Somali National Front (Darood including [SSDF and SPM]), and the United Somali Front USF (Isse). It should be pointed out, however, that tribal political alignment is not new to Somalia, although it is an indication of the failure of the Somali nationalists to achieve national unity after thirty year in power. Figure three is an attempt to compare current tribal alignment along militia with the tribal alignment along the political parties of 1960s.

Fig.3 Tribal militia 1991 compared to political parties 1960 and tribal alignments.

Militia 1991	SNM	SDM	SSDF	USC	SPM	USF	SDA	SNF
Party 1960	SNL	HDMS	GSL SYL	PLGS SYL	SYL	USP	USP	---
Tribes	Isaq	Digil & Rahanweyn	Majertain	Hawiye	Ogaden	Isse	Dir	Darood

In addition to the resurgence of political tribalism, a number of other events were symptomatic of the waning of the nationalists' experiment in pan-Somali nationalism. The decline of Somali nationalism began in 1976 when Djibouti became an independent republic without joining the Somali nation-state. The epitome of its failure, however, was the declaration on 17 May 1991, of the "Somaliland Republic" as a separate state in the former British Somaliland. The disintegration of the Somali Republic into two parts, the

independent Republic of Djibouti, new regional autonomy arrangements in Ethiopia, and long disappointments of the NFD are the signs of withering pan-Somalism.

In conclusion, we have seen the weakness of the modern elites and the persistence of the tribalism which had existed within political parties prior to independence. We have also seen the three approaches used by the nationalists to curb tribalism, proportional representation seemingly the most effective approach. The central reason for the failure of the various approaches was the authoritarian rule in Somalia which had blocked peaceful expression of the different political tendencies and had resulted, after 1978, in the emergence of militant tribal movements. It is evident that in Somalia, the nationalists have remained weak after thirty years in power, and that tribalism also remains a political reality. As can be seen from Table two, the eight tribal militia are very similar, in effect, to the pre-independence political parties.

The failure of the nationalists and the re-emergence of traditional leadership in Somalia will invite an alternative political force. According to Daniel Compagnon, such a force, which "has remained largely underground until now, totally different in its ideology as well as in its structure, might arise from inside Somali society with clear identity -- radical Islam -- and a definite

project: the establishment of an Islamic state."[61]

The next chapter will explore the Islamic movement in Somalia as an alternative political force.

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[61]Compagnon, "The Somali Opposition," 46.

THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IN SOMALIA:
The New Political Challenge in Somalia

In the last chapter we discussed the failure of Somali nationalism and the revival of political tribalism We will now examine the Islamic movement as an alternative political force. This chapter is divided into three sections the first section deals with the Islamic movement in a socio-political context Here, we look into the complex relations between the socio-political forces and, examine in particular, the relations of the Islamic movement to other forces The second section traces the historical development of the Islamic movement in Somalia It highlights traditional religious education, the emergence of the Islamic organizations, and the formative period of the modern Islamic movement The third section illustrates groups which make up the Islamic movement as well as discussing their ideology and their political positions during and after the fall of the military regime in January, 1991

I   The Islamic Movement in a Socio-Political Context

The Islamic movement in Somalia has emerged and operates in a particular socio-political environment and obviously it interacts with the effective surrounding forces There are four basic socio-political elites in Somalia[1]: (a) tribal elites and their modern urban development,(b) nationalists; (c) elites of the Sufi Brotherhoods[2] and (d) Islamists, the latter's contemporary offspring.[3] The Islamic movement is "the organized popular Islamic work which aims to bring Islam to the leadership of the society and direct the life, all the life."[4] According to the definition, well organized Sufi brotherhoods in Somalia are excluded from the Islamic Movement Figure four is and attempt to show interactions between the four basic groups

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[1] This is a basic categorization. There are possibilities of combination groups such as Nationalist-Islamists, or Sufi-nationalists; or Sufi-Tribalists.

[2] Note that traditional elites (Sufis and tribal chiefs), and nationalists were dealt with in the last three chapters.

[3] "Islamists" *Islamiyyūn* refers to the proponents of an Islamic solution to the crisis of the Muslim World. Other expressions used to refer to this group is *asaliyyūn* (the authentic ones), *mutadayyinūn* (the devotees). However, the western media use hostile names such as fanatics, extremists, radicals, fundamentalists and so on, see Emanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theory and Modern Politics (New Havens: Yale University Press, 1990), 83-128; and also H. R. Dekmejian, "Islamic Revival: Catalysts, Category, and Consequences", Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity, ed. Sherin Hunter, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 10.

[4] Yusuf Al-Qardāwi. Awlawiyāt al-Haraka al-Islāmiyah fi al-Marhala al-Qādima (al-Qāhira: Maktabat Wahbah, 1991), p 9.

Fig.4 Interactions between Islamists, Nationalists, Sufis,and Tribalists

As shown in Fig 4, Somali elites could be divided horizontally into two traditional elites, i.e. tribal elites and Sufis, who are the bases of the traditional power structure; and modern elites, i.e. nationalists and Islamists, who constitute the superstructure of the traditional foundation.[5] The elites could also be classified

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[5]The two groups are mainly the product of the modern Western type of education However, while the nationalists are conformists, the Islamists are rebels of the Western system of government.

vertically into religious elites. i e Sufis and Islamists, and secular elites. i e

tribalists and nationalists." An analysis of the web of interactions which are a)

horizontal. b) vertical. and c) sectional interactions is necessary for a clear

understanding of the current political situation of the Islamic movement

a Horizontal Relations between tribal chiefs and Sufi ulama are complementary

because social authority is clearly divided among themselves. In fact, all secular

authority of the tribe is vested in the tribal chief while all religious authority

belongs to the Sufi ulama [7] The Sufi ulama do not have a political agenda and the

tribal chiefs do not disregard the social role of religion transgressing the realm of

the ulama Usually. the two elites cultivate friendly relations, sharing the respon-

sibilities of the tribe and working together to achieve social stability Their relations

are often strengthened through marriage, and so, in most cases, both authorities are

fused in closely related persons.

Contrary to the traditional forces, relations between nationalists and Islamists

are generally confrontational in the Muslim world because they have opposing

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"The meaning of secular here is pertaining to worldly things or to things that are not regarded as religious

[7] Sufi brotherhoods are oriented toward the internal purity of the individual, and their method in reaching a wider population, especially the uneducated masses, is to utilize local culture instead of alienating it. They do not claim any political orientation. see Sadiq Amin, Al-Daʿwa al-Islāmiya Farīdatun wa Darūra (Jordan· Oman. 1978), 75.

political agendas. Nationalists do not agree with "mixing religion with politics",[8] despite the important role played by Islam during the struggle for independence. Islamists believe that Islam is both a religion and a state, "a total system of existence, universally applicable to all times and places."[9] During the repressive military regime (1969-1991), ideological confrontation between these two groups led to the suppression of Islamists. The nature of the conflict is very clear from the Islamist perspective. They consider the ruling nationalist elite as the creation of the colonial powers and their local representatives who oppose the most basic values of the Muslim community.[10] They also blame the nationalists for the failures of the Somali state during the last thirty years and preach the establishment of a just society ruled by Islamic law.[11] On the other hand, the nationalists accuse the Islamists of trying to reintroduce past institutions and practices which are inappropriate to the modern time and consider them as a reaction against

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[8]Tariq Ismael and Jacqueline Ismael, Government and Politics in Islam, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1985), 162. Note the Speech of Sadat, the former President of Egypt, in which he said "no religion in politics and no politics in religion."

[9]R. Harair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,1985), 10.

[10]John Esposito, The Straight Path (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 201.

[11]The considerable power of the Muslim Judges under Italian colonialism was diminished by the Somali Nationalists. See Lewis, A Modern History, 156.

modernity [12]

b Vertical Relations between tribalists and nationalists are ambivalent Nationalists, although they do aim at destroying tribal loyalty by replacing it with national loyalty, they are, in fact more cautious in dealing with tribalism. They recognize that the social structure of Somalia is tribally based and that no politician can get elected or gain a seat in parliament without the support of his tribe. They have, therefore, compromised with the tribalists, a policy that has gravely weakened the nationalists and strengthened the tribalists The decline of Somali nationalism and the emergence of tribalists at the beginning of the 1970s is the result of the nationalists' consistently concessions [13]

On the other hand, the relationship between the Islamists and the Sufis has developed into confrontation for two reasons: First, is the influence of Wahabi doctrine and approach in the thought of many Islamists,[14] and the introduction of the *Takfīr* idea of *Jamaʿat al-Muʾminūn* (the Organization of Believers) in the

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[12]John L. Esposito, Islam and politics (Syracuse: Syracuse University press, 1984), 234.

[13]After the fall of the Barre regime in January, 1991, tribal armed militia diminished the central authority of the state and segmented local administrations were established.

[14]Salafi doctrine gives priority to the fight against innovations *bidaʿ* in the *ʿaqīdah* (basic belief) and *ʿibādāt* (religious practice) widely practised by Sufis. However, it does not show the same concern for the political innovations of the ruling elites.

1970s in Somalia.[15] The influence of these two schools on the Somali Islamists has created an atmosphere of animosity between the Sufis and the Islamists in general. Of course, this is contrary to the evolutionary and educational approach of the Muslim Brotherhood in dealing with Sufi Orders. Second, is the reaction of some Sufi leaders to the emerging Islamists. Sufis perceive Islamists as a challenge both to their traditional authority and, to some extent, to their economic well being.[16]

c. Sectional Relations between Sufis and nationalists are not based on conflict since Sufis had actively participated with the nationalists in the struggle for national independence. Famous national heroes such as Muhammad Abdulle Hassan, Shaykh Hassan Barsane and Shaykh Bashir were all Sufis. Moreover, many of the nationalist leaders were affiliated with the Sufi Orders, and most of them at least receive the blessings of Sufi shaykhs during personal or family crises. Since Sufi Orders are mainly apolitical, they do not pose any serious threat to the political es-tablishment. They are, therefore, more than tolerated by the nationalists, they are, in fact, supported by them as a counter-balance to the growing influence of the

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[15]*Jama$at al-Mu'minun* is known as *Al-Takfir wa al-Hijra* (Repentance and Holy Flight). Its main idea is that Muslim leaders are unbelievers because they do not rule by Islamic law, and Muslim masses are also unbelievers because they accept the rule of unbelievers. See Sivan, Radical, 83-128.

[16]Many Sufi brotherhoods make their living by practising certain activities such as writing amulets, collecting contributions for tomb visits and so on.

Islamic Movement

On the other hand, the relations between tribalists and Islamists is not yet well formulated. The Islamists, of course, reject un-Islamic tribal values such as the glorification of ancestors, adherence to tribal customary law, and unlimited loyalty to the tribe. Instead, they aim to replace tribal values with Islamic values based on the sovereignty of Allah, loyalty to Allah, His Prophet, and His faithful believers.[17] However, to eliminate tribal values will require a much longer period of training even for Islamists themselves. From the tribal perspective, their relations with Islamists is not well defined either. According to tribal law, every member of the tribe has a claim to tribal solidarity. Tribal leaders, however, face the dilemma of whom they must support if a quarrel should arise among Islamists, Sufis and nationalists belonging to the same tribe.

The attempt to show the relationship of the Islamists to the above stated socio-political groups is illustrated in figure five below.

[17]Refer to the concept of loyalty in Islam in the first chapter. p. 28

Figure 5 Relationship of Islamists to the Sufis, Nationalists, and Tribalists

NATIONALISTS

ISLAMISTS

TRIBALISTS

SUFIS

It is worthy to note that Islamists and nationalists share similar educational backgrounds, i.e. a modern western model of education, and both their ideologies are based at urban centres. However, while the nationalists' main objective is the establishment and maintenance of the Somali nation-state, Islamists aim to transform the nation-state into an Islamic state The Islamists are perceived by the nationalists, therefore, as an imminent threat to the established secular nation-state On the other hand, the Islamists preach "puritanical" Islam (free from innovations), emphasize the goal of social justice, and the rule of the Shari'a In so doing, they

also pose a threat to the survival of the Sufis Given that the Sufi and nationalist groups are not in conflict with each other and that both perceive Islamists as posing a common threat, they form a fragile alliance against the Islamists who aim to dislodge both of them from power. It can be seen clearly in Table 4, how the Islamists are attacked from both flanks by the alliance of Sufis and nationalists Tribalists are more flexible, although they have been closely connected with the Sufis for many centuries and with the nationalists for the last several decades.[18]

The Islamic movement is the most recent of the socio-political forces in Somalia and only time will tell how it will be able to gain credibility in the eyes of Somalis. Apparently, Islamists are now isolated from the other socio-political forces and are in conflict with all of them.[19] The main reason is probably that the majority of Islamists view their relations with other forces from the theological perspective only. It seems that they have not yet mastered the intricate game of politics where alliances are formed and priorities set according to the general benefit _maslaha al٬āmah_.

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[18]There are four pillars of tribal authority: tribal chiefs and Sufi ulama constitute the traditional authority whereas urban businessmen and intellectuals are two modern pillars of the tribal authority. I have suggested that they are not only a form of" an interest group", but they are very closely related to each other, i.e. father and son or uncle and nephew and so on. Therefore, they constitute a very solid group. See Abdurahman Abdullahi, "Qabiilka iyo Qabyaaladda", Iftiinka, 9 (1990), 22-33.

[19]Refer to Chapter One.

In addition to their isolation within the general Somali polity, the Islamists also suffer the impediment of internal segmentation Although, they all preach the need for Islamic unity and claim no ideological differences, they, nevertheless, remain segmented. One of the main reasons may be the fact that some traditional tribal and Sufi values are still functioning in their subconscious The most important tribal value prevalent among the Islamists is high group solidarity where members of one group behave like one tribe, although they are a trans-clan organizations. In addition, a cult of personalities and allegiance to the Shaykh, a peculiarly Sufi practice, plays a major role in relations among Islamists, and thus create perhaps subtle but rather important differences among them

2. Historical Development of the Islamic Movement

Modern historical studies on Somalia have not given enough attention to its Islamic history and particularly that of the Islamic movement which has been underground for the last two decades. A reconstruction of the history of the Islamic movement in Somalia is, therefore, a difficult task to achieve and we aim, in this chapter, to initiate a preliminary research which, hopefully, will encourage further studies on the subject. We will be using general sources dealing with the international Islamic movement in addition to the few available writings by the Somali Islamists. We will give an overview of traditional education highlighting

the influence of modern education in the Arabic language and of religious organizations in drumming up support for the religious cause. Finally, we will explain why modern Islamic movements have emerged in the 1970s.

a Traditional Education.

Before the introduction of colonial education in Somalia, the educational system was essentially religious.[20] That is because, as Trimingham states, Muslims, "wherever their religion has spread, have always concentrated on education."[21] Although teaching was limited to recitation of the Qur'an and elementary jurisprudence, the system was functioning well in Somalia for centuries. The traditional educational system consists of Qur'anic schools called Duksi or Mal ⁶āmat as well as higher education in the Islamic sciences which involves extensive tutelage by a learned shayhks.

Qur'anic schools are widespread all over Somalia. Their main objective is memorization of the Qur'an. The process begins with the teaching of the Arabic alphabet, followed by memorization of short verses from the Qur'an, and leading, after a period of about three years, to memorization of the whole Qur'an. Thus, since most of the children join Qur'anic schools at the age of six, they have usually

[20]Ali Shaykh, Al-Da⁶wa Al-Islāmiya , 175.

[21]Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, 142.

finished their memorization by the age of ten. After that, some of the children remain in the school as assistant teachers Kabīr, at the same time, perfecting their memorization skills. Students who choose the religious life eventually either become teachers of the Qur'an or pursue higher Islamic education in the urban centres. Others graduate and join the community as respected educated people capable of undertaking many social or religious services. Qur'anic schools are built and financed by the pupils' parents who pay specific fees to the Qur'anic teacher as well as providing occasional extra services for him. Nearly all school-age children living in the cities and villages attend Qur'anic schools, and thus learn the Arabic alphabet in early childhood.[22]

Higher education in the Islamic sciences is normally confined to the urban centres where Mosques are located. Famous Islamic centres are located in Mogadishu, Merca, Bardhere, Warsheykh, Harar and Barava, to name a few.[23] The teachers in these institutions are called *Shaykh*, and the student her-cilmi (seekers of knowledge). Subject matters taught there usually include Arabic grammar, Islamic jurisprudence, interpretation of the Qur'an and Prophetic traditions, and mysticism. Since most of the students have to travel far away from

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[22]Al-Najar, Al-Islām fi Somāl, 40.

[23]Ibid., 42-44.

their homes, they are sponsored by individuals living near the religious centres, and no fees are required from them In addition to having their own businesses and receiving charity, most of the teachers supplement their income charging a fee for services such as marriage contracts and divorce, inheritance, and recitation of the Qur'an for healing purposes General characteristics of the traditional educational system are as follows: (1) High decentralization and segmentation, which means whoever has the will and ability to teach is free to establish his own Qur'anic school or circle for teaching Islamic jurisprudence, and no other authority can interfere in the affairs of the school; and (2) Self-sufficiency, whereby the establishment of the Qur'anic schools is dependant on the parents of the children while higher education is free. All traditional schools do not receive government assistance.[24]

b. Modern Education in the Arabic Language.

The second educational background of the Islamic movement is the introduction, in Somalia, in the 1950s, of modern education in the Arabic language. The language factor has made it possible for a great number of educated elites to learn about the ideology of *Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* through reading various sources

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[24]During British Rule in the Northern Somalia, Qur'anic schools were funded by the state and a total number of 1424 students in the colony. 807 were in the private Qur' anic schools in 1957. See Tauval. Somali Nationalism, 82. However, all funds were cut after the independence.

in Arabic. It also has facilitated for Somali students access to universities in the Arab World.

Modern education in the Arabic language was introduced in Somalia with the opening, in 1953, of the Institute of Islamic studies where scholars from Al-Azhar University became teachers. The objective for establishing the institute was to train judges, lawyers, teachers of the Arabic language, and the Islamic religion These qualifications were needed for the colonial administration since the court system was applying a mixture of colonial and Islamic laws.

As a result of local initiative, in 1954, Egyptian-administered schools were opened in Somalia.[25] By 1958, *Al-Rābida al-Islāmiyyah* had contributed funds for building fifteen schools, opened in Mogadishu, and regional cities such as Galkayo, Beledweyne, Bossasso, Kismayo and Baidoa, as well as in small towns such as Eil, Barava, and Marka. Egyptian regime during the rule of Jamal Abdi-Nasir provided teachers and textbooks, and the curriculum was the same as that of Egyptian government schools. The total number of students enrolled in these schools in 1958 was estimated at about 1,200.[26] By 1971, an extensive increase in Egyptian-based education was reported. In Mogadishu alone there were nine elementary schools,

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[25]The first school which was opened in Mogadishu consisted of 14 classes and included elementary, intermediate and secondary classes.

[26]See Muhammad Yunus Al-Somāl Wadanan , 67.

two intermediate and two high schools. The famous Jamal Abdi-Nasir high school, alone, had a total enrolment of 950 students [27]

Shaykh Abdurahman Al-Najar, head of the Al-azhar mission in Somalia from 1958 to 1963, reported in 1973 that two high school institutes of Islamic studies were opened in Somalia [28] He wrote, "Islamic institutes had multiplied and now there are eight Al-azhar institutes and all of them are intermediate level except two high school level institutes in Mogadishu and Burao."[29] Many graduates from these schools were given scholarships from the Arab world to complete their university education.[30] Al-Azhar University and Saudi religious universities provided religious education scholarships to the Somali students. Moreover, because of the cultural, military and commercial relations with the Arab world, Somalis had opportunities to join civilian universities and military institutes of Egypt, Sudan, Syria and Iraq. Besides elites who had learned Italian and English, there were now, therefore, Arabic speaking elites, especially in the ministry of education, religious affairs and the armed forces.

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[27]Al-Najar, Al-Islam fi Somāl, 47.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Ibid., 47.

[30]See Mah, Wathāiq, 308 The author provides 86 names of the Somali students in Egypt in 1952-59.

c. Pioneers of Islamic Revival and Early Islamic Organizations

First pioneers of the Islamic movement in Somalia were graduates of Egyptian and Saudi religious universities Below is a list of Shaykhs, the first generation of Islamists who brought modern understanding of Islam to Somalia

Fig.6 Pioneers of the Islamic Revival in Somalia

Names	University Attended	Positions Held
Sharif Mohammud	Al-Azhar	President / Rabida al Islamiyah
Sh Ali Ismail	Al-Azhar	Member of Parliament
Sh Abdul Qani	Al-Azhar	Min / Justice / Religious Affairs
Sh. Muhammad Geryare	Al-Madina	Director of Religious Affairs
Sh Nur Ali Olow	Al-Azhar	President of Ansaru Al-sunna
Sh Muhammad Moallim	Al-Azhar	Director of Religious Affairs
Abdurahman H Samatar	Al-Imam	Rep of Rabita al- alam al Islami
Muhamud C. Jimcale	Al-Madina	-------
Abdulli Omar Nur	Al-Madina	------

According To Shaykh Muhammad Ahmad "Geryare", before Somalia attained independence, only _Al-Rābita al-Islāmiyyah_ (The Islamic League), founded by

Sharif Mohamud was functioning, and in the period 1960 to 1969, six other religious organizations were established. These are. (1) *Jam𝘤iyatu Ansāru al-Addin* (The Association of Helpers of Religion). It was confined to Hargaysa, and its members were traditional ulama. (2) *Jam𝘤iyatu Himātu al-Addin* (The Association of Protectors of Religion), opened in Mogadishu, and its members were traditional ulama [31] (3) *Jam𝘤iyatu Ansāru al-Sunna al-Muhamadiyyah* (The Association of Helpers of the Sunna of the Prophet), located in Mogadishu and is popularly known as the Wahabiya movement.[32] (4) *Munadamat al-Nahda al-Islāmiyyah* (the Organization of the Islamic Revival), also active in Mogadishu, and its members were ulama who graduated from the Islamic universities.[33] (5) *Ahlul-Islam* (The People of Islam), which began as a Sufi organization but in the early seventies developed into an active organization with a base in the high schools.(6) *Wahdat*

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[31]First president of this association was, according to the information provided by Shaykh Muhammad Ahmed "geryare", Hagi Ma ow, and after his death, Shaykh Muhammud Abgalaw took its presidency.

[32]Its founder and president was Shaykh Nur Ali Olow. The Wahabi Movement was founded by Muhammad B. Abdul Wahab (1703-1792), and its political realization is the Saudi Arabian Kingdom.

[33]According to the information provided by Shaykh Muhammad Ahmed "Geryare", the former vice-president of al-Nahda, to the Author in January 1992, this organization was established in 1967 in Mogadishu. The founders were as follows: Shaykh Abdul Qani, the president; Shaykh Muhammad Ahamed Nur "Geryare", the vice-president; Abdurahman Farah, the General secretary; Abdullahi Moallim, the vice-secretary; Mohammud Osman Jimale, The treasurer; Abdurahman Hassan Samatar, the vice-treasurer. This Organization have also attracted other prominent ulama like Shaykh Muhammad Moallim, Ali Hagi Yusuf and others.

al-Shabāb al-Islāmi (the Union of the Islamic Youth) which was active in Hargaysa and Bur ao.

After the coup d'etat of 1969, all religious and political parties were banned and scientific socialism was introduced. In this period Islamic revival gained momentum because of the internal pressure and external factors This period will be called the formative period of the Islamic movement in Somalia.

d. Formative Period of the Modern Islamic Movement.

The Islamic Movement emerged in Somalia in the 1970s due to internal and external factors. Western scholarship has tended to explain Islamic resurgence as related to social crisis. For instance, R.H. Dekmejian identifies the sources of the crisis as "a crisis of legitimacy of political elites and political system, a paucity of social justice, and excessive reliance on coercion, military vulnerability, and the disruptive impact of modernization".[34] A different interpretation is offered by Khurshid Ahmad who, expressing the Islamic perspective, writes Islamic resurgence "is dissatisfaction with the ideals and values, the institutions and the system of government exported from the West and imposed upon them" as well as "a critique of Muslim status quo," and it is not just a question of political and

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[34]R.H.Dekmejian, "Islamic resurgent in the Arab world", Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World, (ed.) by Ali E. Hillal Desouki, (New York: Praeger, 1982), 22.

social rearrangement but "it represents a reawakening of Faith."[35]

It is our opinion that, in addition to common factors such as social crisis, economic boom and reawakening of faith, underlying the rise of Islamic resurgence in the Muslim World, three major factors had contributed, in particular, to the emergence of the Islamic movement in Somalia in the 1970s.

First, is the change of political orientation in Egypt in the 1970s, in which the Muslim Brotherhood movement was given relative religious freedom, and the atmosphere of wide- spread identity crisis in the Muslim World in the aftermath of the Six-day War with Israel in 1967. Somalia which was under the cultural influence of Egypt for a long time, had received a wide range of modern Islamic literature produced by the Muslim brotherhood. Among the most influential authors were Sayyid Qutb, Al-Maududi, Hassan Al-Banna and Muhammad Qutb.[36] The Organization of Islamic Revival *al-Nahda*, and other Somali Islamists in Sudan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were instrumental in introducing and distributing these books in Somalia in the early seventies. In addition, since most of the Somalis do not speak Arabic, *al-Nahda* provided the Abdul-qadir Mosque in Mogadishu with

"Khurshid Ahmad, "The Nature of Islamic Resurgence", Voices of Resurgent Islam, (ed.) by Lohn Esposito, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 226.

"Abdirizaq Aqli, "Survey of the Islamic Movements in Somalia", Issues in the Islamic Movement, (ed.) by Kalim Siddiqui and M. Ghayasuddin, (London: the Open Press Limited, 1987), 157-59.

an "Islamist" interpretation of the Qur'an in the Somali language. The most prominent interpreter at that period was Shaykh Muhammd Moallim, an Azhari scholar and an active member of *al-Nahda* who has introduced a new methodology of Qur'anic interpretation in Somali language.

Second, the Gulf states gained higher revenues from increased oil price in 1973 after the Arab-Israel War. This economic boom attracted a large number of Somali workers to the Gulf states where they acquired a working knowledge of the Arabic language and probably made close contact with prominent Islamic preachers. At the same time, it became easier for Somali students, who already had experienced some level of Islamic awakening in Somalia, to join universities in Arab countries. The influx of Somali students reached a peak immediately after 1975 due to the repressive policies of the Somali military regime. Evidently, Somalis were given preferential treatment by these government in order to counteract socialist ideology in Somalia. Sponsored by Saudi religious organizations such *Dār al-Iftā*, and *Rābita al-ʿālam al-Islāmi*, many graduates from these schools were sent as preachers to Somalia.[37] The oil boom in the Gulf states, however, was not the real cause of Islamic resurgence as Daniel Pipes claims, but

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[37]*Dār al-Iftā and Rābita al-ʿālam al-Islāmi* are two religious organizations which finance the propagation of Islam in the world. They are stationed in, and supported by, Saudi Arabia.

should be considered one of the several contributing factors.[38]

Third, the military government of Somalia in 1971 embarked on a policy of establishing a secular state based on socialism. According to Siyad Barre, Somali socialism was "not Islamic socialism or African socialism, but the original scientific socialism."[39] Since all social and political organizations were banned in 1969, the only avenue for expressing protest was essentially religious. Henceforth, existing organizations such as *al-Nahda* and *al-Ahli* became more active. *Al-Ahli* attracted mostly high school students, while *al-Nahda* provided them with training and books.

A more serious development took place on 11 January 1975, when a new family law was promulgated by the president which was contrary to Islamic law. The Somali ulama denounced the law, and on 23 January, ten leading ulama were executed and more than 2,000 persons detained.[40] The military regime pre-empted the Islamic movement in its early infancy by detaining *al-Ahli* activists and prominent *al-Nahda* ulama in December 1975 during a nationwide campaign. Among the prominent detainees were Shaykh Muhammad Moallim and Shaykh

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[38]Daniel Pipes, "Oil Wealth and Islamic Resurgence",Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (ed.) by Ali H. Dessouki, (New York: Praeger, 1982), 45.

[39]Kalim Sidiqui, ed. Issues , 250.

[40]Details of the execution of the ulama and the reaction of the Muslim World are well recorded in the work of Ali Shaykh Abukar, Al-Daʿwa al Islamiya Al-Muʿasira, 154-176.

Abdulqani. As a result. many activists from the *al-Ahli* organization and the *al-Nahda* ulama fled the country. The most famous among them are Abul-qadir Sh Mohammud. the leader of *al-Ahli* movement. and Shaykh Muhammad Ahmad (Geryare), vice-president of *al-Nahda* This incident proved a fatal blow to *a'-Ahli* which. although espousing the ideas of *Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*. had not built its organization accordingly. In the north, *al-Wahda* functioned well and openly until April 1978 when more than 350 of its members were detained. including then leader Abdul-Qadir Hagi Jama [41]

Thus, although the Islamic movement in Somalia in the early 1970s considered itself belonging to *Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* and succeeded in attracting high school students, its organizational structure remained very weak and its leadership was not mature enough to provide spiritual and political guidance. By the early 1980s. neither *al-Ahli* nor *al-Nahda* any longer existed The Takfir group ("excommunication" group). introduced in Somalia in the late 1970s, was also withering. Within the vacuum created by the demise of these early Islamic groups began the growth of splinter groups and the establishment of new organizations

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[41] Abdurazaq Aqli, "Survey", 159.

3. Groups and Ideology of the Islamic Movement

In the late 1970s, several underground organizations had emerged and, during the early 1980s, after the military regime had lost its iron grip on the country, three became more politically active.

a **Al-Ittiḥād al-Islami** (The Somali Islamic Union [SIU]).

According to "The manifesto of an Islamic Party", distributed by its chapter in Canada, SIU declared itself on 22 September 1991 in the United Kingdom. The document reported that SIU had been an underground organization for decades because of "the lack of security and existence of a brutal dictatorial regime bent on repressing religion and religious activism".[42] Although its manifesto does not give many details, SIU is considered a neo-Salafi movement.[43] The first of its published eight objectives is the establishment of an Islamic state. Others include the rejection of all *Jāhili* (un-Islamic) polity, the attainment of Islamic justice, the establishment of peace in society, a well planned economy, propagation of Islam, and war against all devious beliefs *bidaʿ*. Finally, after creating an Islamic state,

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[42]See "The Manifesto of an Islamic Party" distributed in the mosques of Toronto and Ottawa in October 1990, in both English and Somali languages.

[43]Traditional Salafis (traditionalists) do not have political orientation and their main goal is to fight against innovations *bidaʿ*.However, SIU has a political tendency in addition to its Wahabi theological approaches. Therefore we may call it a neo-Salafi. See Al-Sunna no.19 11/2/1990 in which Ittihad Al-Islami is described as "a Salafi organization which is the biggest Islamic organization in Somalia" See Also Al-Amal March 1991, in which Jamal bin Dahir classified Islamic movements in Somalia and considered SIU a Salafi organization.

SIU aims to establish a strong army. In the meantime, the organization rejects the idea of forming political alliances with non-Islamic political forces

During the war against the military regime SIU called for the overthrow of the dictatorship, appealed for an Islamic solution, and warned against tribal wars.[44] It also called for the unity of Somalia, and denounced SNM for declaring northern Somalia a separate "Somaliland Republic."[45] Al-Ittihād al-Islāmi became more militant since 1991 and, thus had actively participated the civil war in the southern and north eastern regions.[46]

b. Al-Haraka al-Islāmiyyah fi al-Somāl(XIS) (The Islamic Movement in Somalia)

This organization appeared in 1978 in Saudi Arabia (its former name is Al-Islāh) and published its existence openly in the magazine, Al-Mujtama' al-Islāmi in Kuwait. XIS considers itself as belonging ideologically and organizationally to the Ikhwān al-Muslimūn founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928 in Egypt.[47] According to Hassan al-Banna, Ikhwān al-Muslimūn's message is comprehensive and could

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[44]See "Bayan min Al-Itihad al-Islami al-Somali", Al-Bayān 36, February 1991

[45]See the interview with Shaykh Ali Warsame, President of SIU in Al-Bushrā 4 (July-September)1991, where he said waxa aanu ka so horjeednaa kala qaybinia shacbiga iyo dhulka Somaaliyeed (we oppose the division of Somali land and people). See also the commentary of Omar Khatib, Chief Administrator of Al-Bushrā where he said SNM waxa ay fulisay riyadii iyo himilooyinkii cadowga Soomaaliyeed iyo guud ahaan cawowga Islaamka (SNM has fulfilled the hope of the enemy of Somalia and in general the enemy of Islam), Ibid.

[46]See Al-Sharq al-Awsad 5079(24 October) 1992.

[47]See Jamal Al-dahir, "Al-Tagyir wa Ba d", Majallat al-Amal, (March, 1991), 15-21.

be described as "a Salafiya massage, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an economic [institution like] a company, and a social idea."[48]

The main regional objective of XIS is to return the Somali people to an Islamic way of life in all its aspects under an Islamic state, and to unify the efforts of the Somali people towards achieving that goal. It also aims at unifying all Muslim nationalities in the Horn of Africa.[49] XIS has involved itself in political activities since 1989 and has published a number of declarations since then. A manifesto entitled "O Islam!" which was issued at the beginning of October, 1990, XIS strongly criticized successive Somali governments since the time of independence for not applying Islamic law. It described Somali nationalists as they who "followed the way of unbelievers."[50] It also appealed to "the Somali people, the ulama, the government, the opposition movements, the Somali elders, the intellectuals, the merchants, and armed forces" to realize that "the only solution to

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[48]John Esposito, Islam and Politics (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984), 132.

[49]See an interview with Muhammad Ali Ibrahim, chairman of Islamic Movement (al-Islah) in Somalia by Al-Muslimūn, 6,315
(15 Feb) 1991. There are three main Muslim nationalities in the Horn of Africa namely, Somalis, Afar, and Oromo.

[50] "O Islam!", a Manifesto published in October 1990 by The Islamic Movement in Somalia.

save Somalia is the Islamic solution."[51]

XIS strongly condemned the Somali National Movement (SNM) for the separation of the northern regions from the rest of Somalia,[52] and opposed tribal civil wars triggered by the downfall of Siyad Barre. Since the collapse of the national Somali government. XIS took an active political role in the national reconciliation process, and established social service institutions in the fields of health and education.

c. <u>Waḥdat al-Shabab al-Islāmi</u> (the Union of Islamic Youth [SIY]). This is a regional organization confined mainly in some parts of the northern regions and considers itself belonging ideologically to the <u>Ikhwān al-Muslimūn</u>. SIY was very active in Burao and Hargaysa, and gained popularity after 1988 when the Somali army destroyed the northern urban centres. Since that time, the organization has provided social services in the refugee camps, established schools, worked in the ambulatories, distributed food and medicare, and propagated Islam publicly However, since the declaration of the "Somaliland Republic" in the northern regions, where the organization is stationed, SIY did not issue official statement opposing the disintegration of the Somali nation. In fact, the apparent acquiescence

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[51] "The Islamic Solution", a manifesto dated 1/10/1990 and distributed in Ottawa and Toronto mosques.

[52] See <u>Al-Lewā al-Islāmi</u>, 5,46(July) 1991; and also declaration in <u>Al-Muslimūn</u> of Muhammad Ali Ibrahim, the chairman of the organization. Ibid.

of SIY with the northern separatists is a great ideological setback for the movement [53]

As we have seen, the Islamic movement in Somalia has all the ingredients of the *Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* in matters pertaining to politics, and all of the organizations are united in projecting Islam as an alternative solution to the problems of Somali society. Dekmejian has summarized their ideology of an Islamic alternative in the following basic tenets:[54]

Din wa Dawla (Religion and State). Islam is a comprehensive system of life, universally applicable for all times and places; and since rulership *hukum* is inherent in Islam, there is no separation of religion and state. The Qur'an and Sunna of the Prophet provide the bases of the law that a Muslim state must enforce.

Qur'an Wa Sunna (Qur'an and the Tradition of the Prophet): The foundations of Islam are the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet. The Muslims are enjoined to follow the guidance of these two sources. Understanding of these sources should not be based only on *taqlīd* (blind imitation), but on *ijtihād* which should be exercised to make the legal system

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[53] See distributed letter by the members of SIY at the Ottawa Mosque on 26 July, 1991.

[54] Dekmejian, "Islamic Revival", 10.

of Islam dynamic

Sovereignty of God and Rule Under the Shari'a: The ultimate aim of Muslims should be the establishment of God's sovereignty on earth It can only be accomplished by constituting an Islamic state where the Muslim community enjoys freedom from the legislations of man and from man's own desires

Puritanism and Social Justice: "The family is the cornerstone of society, where men are placed in a position of leadership and responsibility while women are the source of love and kindness "[55] The Islamic dress code aims as promoting decency. The institution of *zakāt* provides a welfare fund needed to realize social justice

Jihad: They also emphasize the fact that a good Muslim is enjoined to commit themselves to a life of action in building the ideal community under the Shari'a A Muslim attempts to live in the Islamic state or strives to establish it where one does not exist. To achieve that goal, it is necessary to destroy the existing un-Islamic systems in order to replace them with a Muslim one.

In conclusion, we have seen that only three Islamic organizations have come

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[55] Ibid.

out publicly to champion their cause These are the Somali Islamic Union, the Islamic Movement in Somalia, and the Union of Islamic Youth. The first belongs to the neo-Salafi movement, and the latter two adhere to the *Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* ideology

Although Somali nationalism has failed, and radical tribalism has emerged strongly, the Islamic movement does not appear as a viable alternative political force at the present time. It will probably take years before it is able to pose any meaningful challenge to the other forces.

CONCLUSION

The theme of this thesis has been the crisis of political loyalty in Somalia The analysis is based on an elitist perspective which permits a more satisfactory integration of all levels of Somali society than is possible with familiar "clanist" or "social theory" interpretations.

The thesis attempts to show how the Somali nationalists, after governing for over thirty years, have failed to sustain the unity of the Somali nation, let alone realize their major goal of uniting all Somalis in the Horn of Africa The imported models of "proportional representation" and "scientific socialism", adopted by the nationalists in their respective democratic and authoritarian guises, together with the various policies implemented by each in an attempt to curb tribalism, were an abysmal failure. We saw how they culminated in the crushing defeat of the nationalists in face of emergent political tribalism.

Although Tribalism remains the dominant political force in Somalia, its inherently divisive character, however, will prevent it being sustained as a viable, coherent force for any length of time.

The thesis has also analyzed the emergence of the Islamic Movement as an alternative third force, examining its socio-political context, historical background and the major groups involved. We have shown that, at the present time, the

Islamic Movement is insufficiently developed to pose any meaningful challenge to political tribalism It is our view, however, that in Somalia, only Islam possesses the essential ingredients for successfully integrating the various elements of Somali society and providing stable government capable of meeting the urgent social political and economic needs of the country.

In order to succeed as an alternative political ideology, however, the Islamists must be willing and able to consider, in all their future projects, the various local peculiarities of the Somali society. In other words, they have to depart from static interpretations given to Islam by some Islamists which do not reflect the social realities of Somalia. The future success of the Islamic movement eventually depends on the quality of its political leadership and the practical programs it pursues to solve the real problems of the people.

Finally, an Islamic alternative solution can come about only if the Islamic movement is able to mobilize its internal forces, eliminate the prevalent personality cult, capitalize on the major issues, and improve relations with its potential allies.

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