

**Religious Cinema as Virtual Religious Experience
A Theory of Religious Cinema**

Applied to Werner Herzog's

Herz aus Glas

by

Matthias Wilhelm Benfey, B.A., M.A.,

Department of Religious Studies,

McGill University, Montréal

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ABSTRACT

The dissertation is an exercise in the application of the philosophical hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur and the biblical hermeneutics of John Dominic Crossan to the aesthetics of religious cinema.

The thesis defines religious cinema as virtual religious experience, therefrom a theory of religious cinema is derived. This derivation depends on a discussion of the essential elements of the cinematic experience and permits the expansion of the category of religious cinema beyond its traditional frontier. Throughout the dissertation, a dialogue is maintained with general cinema theory on the one hand and religious cinema criticism on the other. The purpose of this dialogue is to increase credibility (in the former case) and to demonstrate originality (in the latter case).

Finally, extrapolating from a specific dialogue between Crossan and Ricoeur, a critical method is developed, then applied to Werner Herzog's *Herz aus Glas*, a transcription of which is included as an appendix.

RÉSUMÉ

La dissertation est un exercice dans l'application de l'herméneutique philosophique de Paul Ricoeur et l'herméneutique biblique de John Dominic Crossan à l'esthétique du cinéma religieux.

La thèse définit le cinéma religieux comme l'expérience religieuse virtuelle; de là une théorie du cinéma religieux est dérivée. Cette dérivation dépend d'une discussion des éléments essentiels de l'expérience cinématographique et permet l'expansion de la catégorie du cinéma religieux au delà de sa frontière traditionnelle. Dans toute la dissertation, un dialogue est maintenu avec la théorie cinématographique générale d'un côté et la critique cinématographique religieuse de l'autre côté. Le but de ce dialogue est d'augmenter la crédibilité (au premier cas) est de démontrer l'originalité (au dernier cas).

Finalement, en extrapolant d'un dialogue spécifique entre Crossan et Ricoeur, une méthode critique est développée, et ensuite appliquée à *Herz aus Glas* de Werner Herzog, dont une transcription est compris comme appendice.

To Christoph

SOURCES

The system used to indicate sources for material found in this dissertation is similar to that used in the social sciences and biblical studies. Its purpose is to simplify academic papers by eliminating the need for traditional footnotes. Since the reader may not be familiar with this system, its particular manifestation is explained here

Sources are identified in the paragraph in which they occur, thus: (author, date: page). For an author listed but once in the Bibliography, the format is reduced to: (author: page). For a work already cited in a given paragraph, provided it is the only work cited in that paragraph, the format is further reduced to: (page).

Works in the Bibliography are ordered by author (A to Z) and date of publication (older to newer). In order to determine the origin of a particular passage, one need simply match the author and date given in the source identification with the corresponding entry in the Bibliography.

PREFACE

In his preface to *Religion in Film*, John R. May laments "the emptiness of confused reaction and subjective appraisal that threatens" film criticism (May and Bird: vii). As an example of those who contribute to the "Babel of opinion and judgement" (vii), May cites

those who consider film such a total æsthetic experience that it cannot be discussed objectively and certainly not reduced to conceptual language of any sort. The critic describes, often emotes about, his experience of the film. We can share our subjective impressions and we may even agree, they would claim, but there is little hope that an objective basis can be found for dialogue. The film cultist's approach, however limited its appeal and esoteric its language of total experience, nevertheless reminds us that the element of the subjective is hard to suppress and doubtlessly never completely quieted. Only open discussion, it would seem, can disclose its influence. Where the cultist approach is least helpful—because it is admittedly gnostic—its devotees try to make their subjective impressions the objective content of the film. (vii)

Although May does not identify any "film cultist" by name, a cursory glance through this dissertation may leave the impression that it takes a "cultist approach" to religious cinema. This impression should be quashed at the outset of our enterprise.

An Objective Approach

The intent of this dissertation is to provide an approach to religious cinema that is derived from an examination of the nature and

structure of the film medium itself. It is argued that the medium is such that the term 'film' can only be associated with the actual viewing, by an audience, of a *projected* film. This is not necessarily a subjective statement. It becomes subjective only when it is further argued that the 'film' is not one film, but as many films as there are members of the audience. That is not our approach.

Our approach is to examine the structure of the 'film' with tools derived from the fields of biblical studies, religious hermeneutics, and philosophy of religion, as well as ideas and techniques borrowed from general cinema theory. It is argued that, rather than citing specific films (or elements thereof) as examples of religious cinema, all films can be seen as potentially religious. The key is perspective. While in practice this perspective has been largely subjective, its objective components can be isolated and identified, then re-applied to widely divergent films with consistently similar results.

The structure of a film is not a contour map of its content, or an exposition of its symbols, or even an interpretation of its dialogue, but the structure of the experience itself, as an experience. The experience as immediate experience is necessarily subjective, but even in its most subjective moments, it is argued in this dissertation, the experience can be examined objectively. It is this argument that separates our approach from the subjective approaches that May criticises. It also makes this dissertation a firmly academic ('scientific') enterprise, since one of the central criteria of any such enterprise is that original results be reproducible.

Statement of Originality

Given our central argument, this dissertation is original within the realm of religious cinema theory and criticism, where similar tools, ideas or techniques have been applied, they have been applied to specific films as religious texts (literally: 'texts'), rather than to the general cinematic experience. It is the application of these tools, ideas and techniques to the audience's experience of any film (under suitable conditions) that, to the best of the author's knowledge, makes this dissertation unique in its chosen field.

In the field of general cinema theory, some authors have relied on an inadequate understanding of the visual-phenomena that underlie cinema. Thus, until very recently, 'persistence of vision' was cited as the fundamental physiological mechanism that gives rise to cinema. Similarly, in the field of religious cinema theory, most authors remain unwilling to draw on the developments in general cinema theory. This would be understandable if those authors were to argue that, since the latter is still in such a state of flux, it is premature to rely too heavily on it. But general cinema theory will always remain in a state of flux. Moreover, this instability has provided—and will continue to provide—a variety of interesting approaches to the phenomenon of cinema.

This dissertation attempts to rectify this situation, if only in a provisional manner. Thus, the approach taken here parallels several

recent developments in general cinema theory; these are acknowledged when they occur (in the second chapter). This dissertation also relies on the correct understanding of the physiological mechanisms that give rise to cinema; these are discussed in the second chapter, in which the theoretical foundation of the dissertation is laid. Fortunately, here, too, a precedent exists; Bill Nichols sets the matter straight in an appendix to *Ideology and the Image* (1981: 293-301). It is interesting to note that his action could have been taken by any other author before him: the requisite information has been available in texts on visual physiology and perceptual psychology since the first half of this century.

Scope and Relevance

Unfortunately, this dissertation is quite limited in scope. There remains a great deal to do. There must still occur, within the field of religious cinema theory and criticism, a fundamental shift toward the work being done in general cinema theory. Until this shift occurs (and there are no indications that it is even being considered), there will remain a large credibility gap between the work being done in religious cinema theory and general cinema theory. This gap is advantageous to neither side; closing it would be advantageous to both.

The gap reflects a similar gap between general cinema theory and film reviews appearing in the popular media. This gap does not appear as wide between religious cinema theory and film reviews ap-

pearing in religious periodicals, because religious cinema theory is, unlike general cinema theory, little more than an extension of the techniques used by the authors of those religious film reviews. Unfortunately, this gap is justified in both cases; it will not be closed until theorists provide public access to their debates (this is a supreme challenge, since it requires a demonstration of relevance).

The fourth and final chapter of this dissertation provides further observations on the nature of these gaps and offers suggestions as to how they might be bridged. These observations and suggestions emerge naturally from the perspective developed in the body of this dissertation. It might be argued that this is sufficient to justify the work that this dissertation represents. But the final chapter also tackles the problem of relevance. It is only the resolution of the latter problem that can truly justify that work. If religious cinema theory is to be of any value, it must penetrate the phenomenon that forms its focus to the degree that it can offer it refreshed and renewed to the public at large, but in such a manner that the full paradoxical force of the original artistic creations can be unleashed. Then, and only then, will religious cinema theory have moved beyond its own limited academic bounds into that truly unlimited sphere that is commonly identified as the 'real' world.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A book could be written acknowledging the assistance that I have received, but, tradition encourages me to be brief

The German Academic Exchange Service (*Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst* or *DAAD*) of the Federal Republic of Germany financed a very rewarding year in Tübingen. The Goethe Institute of Toronto provided generous access to the Werner Herzog film, *Herz aus Glas*.

Professor Paul Ricoeur gave me a new appreciation for scholarship at play. Professor John Dominic Crossan showed me the way to play at scholarship. Professor Eberhard Jüngel shared enough of himself to push me on my own way.

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My friend, George Harper, understood the silence. My parents shared the silence in encouragement. But it was my wife, Maureen, who bore its weight upon her shoulders and our son, Christoph, who finally broke the silence with his laughter.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Origin and Intent

Religious cinema exists because it is defined to exist. It is defined to exist because certain examples of cinematic art are interpreted to be religious. This interpretation may be purely subjective, or it may be grounded through artistic, linguistic or philosophic argument. Whether subjective or objectified, the interpretation emerges from either of two sources: the filmmaker and the audience

Why is a given film religious? Both sources raise this question, the filmmaker to assist in the process of creation, the audience to assist in the process of understanding: In both cases, one may assume a prior frame of reference from whose perspective the question is raised. Yet raising the question may lead to the expansion or destruction of that frame of reference.

Primary Questions

Why is a given film religious? What does it mean to say that the film is religious? Is the film religious *per se*, or is it merely susceptible to religious interpretation? These questions lead naturally to another, in response to which this dissertation is written: What is religious cinema? To begin, we present two simple observations.

The first observation is that most audiences define religious cinema very narrowly. If asked to give an example of a religious film, most people will point to such established epics as Cecil B. DeMille's *The Ten Commandments*. This should not be taken as a sign of ignorance. The aforementioned film does deal with matters that are also dealt with in sacred texts. Although it may be argued that the treatment is more shallow in the film than in the texts, the person who defines *The Ten Commandments* as religious is technically correct. The problem is one of association. If religious films are to be defined as such because of their resemblance to religious texts, then even critical audiences will be justified in placing DeMille's epic firmly in that category.

The second observation is that most audiences enjoy a film far more for the experience it puts them through than for any meaning the film may embody. The audience is not uncritical; there is time for reflection after the film is over. During the film, the audience expects to be entertained, whether through comedy or tragedy. What the audience seeks through entertainment is participation, whether this participation be synonymous with travel to faraway times and places or insertion into the depth of another person's psyche. The problem is one of perspective. It is impossible to understand fully the reaction of people to a particular film unless one plays the rôle of audience oneself. Audience participation is immediate. 'Critical distance' destroys this fundamental perspective!

Although it is tempting to dismiss these observations as too sim-

plistic, we must not lose sight of the fact that film exists because it has an audience. This is an economic statement, not a philosophic one. The ultimate success or failure of every film is determined by its audience. The medium is subject to evolution through this process. The religious film of tomorrow is in large measure a product of audience reaction to the religious film of today and yesterday. In order to reformulate the two observations in more academic fashion, we note two critiques, each of which examines the religious dimension of a popular film in a different light.

Example Critiques

The first critique is of *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest* (Milos Forman, 1975; from the novel of the same name by Ken Kesey). The authors observe that, like "a vision, or a bad dream," the film "impinges on consciousness in an adhesive way." Indeed, they note that audiences "confess that it casts a continuing and provocative spell." (Myers and Kerr: 285)

More important for our discussion is the authors' suggestion that the film contains obvious biblical parallels. Nurse Ratched is "the paradigm of the 'law' that needs to be fulfilled through the gospel of redeeming grace. The 'law' says that in order to be good, accepted, and approved, here is what is required." McMurphy, on the other hand, "is a literary and filmic paradigm of Jesus, [bearing] the good news... that the 'law' is no longer needed for love, life, acceptance,

and integrity." (Myers and Kerr: 289)

The authors cite further biblical parallels, all of which combine to suggest that *Cuckoo's Nest* is an allegory of the original gospel story:

To mention only the obvious: a rough dozen disciples, a big rock of a man, a miraculous catch of fish, an intoxicating last supper, the dumb speak, the deaf hear, the lame and the halt walk and dance, the dead come to life, and the one who brings these blessings is betrayed by a friend and cruelly immolated as a trouble-maker and disturber of the peace. (Myers and Kerr: 290)

Thus, Myers and Kerr extrapolate from the original sacred text (which they take to be normative) to the film. Their extrapolation allows them to conclude that *Cuckoo's Nest* manifests the qualities of a religious film. The path to this conclusion is essentially the same as that taken by a more naïve audience when citing *The Ten Commandments* as an example of a religious film.

The second critique is of *2001: A Space Odyssey* (Stanley Kubrick, 1968; from the novel of the same name by Arthur C. Clarke). The author notes that, superficially, the film bears a strong resemblance to the science fiction of H. G. Wells, since it "extrapolates from technical achievements of the present into an immediate future where the wonders of a technological civilization are fully realized." Yet he finds the film surprising because it manifests "a quality that can be characterized as mystical or mythic in its tonality and import." (Comstock: 598)

Drawing on the work of Mircea Eliade, Richard Comstock argues

that *2001*, "so curiously in disharmony with the mood of technological realism, is a clear recapitulation" of the pattern of initiatory rites: "the hero in the belly of the spaceship slays a technological monster, after which he enters into his apotheosis." Bowman "ages, dies, and is reborn as a divine child, a sacred foetus that watches the earth of which he, as the 'star-child,' is now the master." (Comstock. 599)

The crucial episodes to which Comstock draws our attention occur during the fourth quarter of the film. They incorporate aural and visual effects which must be experienced to be appreciated. If one asks how the same experience might be recreated through another art form, one misses the point. The effects themselves are the experience; in another art form, they would be a different experience. Thus, the original novel presents its reader with a very different explanation of the final events of the story. The film replaces this explanation with an experience that serves to draw the audience directly into the alienism that confronts Bowman. There is no recourse to the comfort of known phrases that populate the original text.

The first critique demonstrates how one may define a film as religious without explicitly defining the term 'religious' (the definition remains implicit). It is sufficient to extract patterns reminiscent of an established religious tradition, thereby conveniently shifting the burden of definition elsewhere (and reducing the value of the critique as an academic enterprise). The second critique illustrates an approach to film that emphasizes audience participation. It is the audi-

ence that defines the film as religious because of the degree of apparent correlation between its experience of the film and its prejudice concerning the structure of religious experience (although this apparent correlation must be properly grounded to be considered a 'scientific' datum).

Thesis Statement

These two conclusions carry the seed of our thesis, albeit in a naïve form. The audience participates in the events portrayed in the film. This participation is immediate. If it bears some resemblance to past experience, then the audience relives it as virtual experience. If that past experience is identified by the audience as religious, then, irrespective of any objective correlation, the audience relives it as virtual religious experience. Hence, our thesis states: *religious cinema is virtual religious experience*.

Within the context of this dissertation, this thesis statement is deemed to be the answer to the question posed above: What is religious cinema? (It is taken for granted that the foregoing 'naïve' path to this thesis statement must be substituted by a proper academic one; the remainder of this dissertation constitutes the latter path.)

The answer is not meant to be exclusive: religious cinema is neither the only nor the foremost phenomenon that may be equated with virtual religious experience; rather, it is the sole focus of this dissertation. The answer is meant to be inclusive: *religious cinema should*

be uniquely understood as virtual religious experience; that is its core and the foundation upon which all other approaches must build.

The equation of religious cinema with virtual religious experience holds true only when we realise that the effects that embody cinema are no more than physiological and technological mechanisms that enable and promote association between the immediate effects they produce and the memory of a separate form of experience, which we define as religious. The equation of religious cinema with virtual religious experience denies the equation of religious cinema with religious experience *per se*. Since 'virtual' is the only term that separates these two equations, we address its definition first. The incongruity of the two equations is discussed in the second chapter.

Working Definition: 'Virtual'

Within æsthetics, the most extensive use of the term 'virtual' must be attributed to Susanne Langer. In *Feeling and Form*, she appears to derive her use of the term from that made by physicists in optics:

Pictorial space is not only organized by means of color (including black and white and the gamut of grays between them), it is created; without the organizing shapes it is simply not there. Like the space "behind" the surface of a mirror, it is what the physicists call "virtual space"—an intangible image. (Langer: 72)

(In fact, the correct term is "virtual image" and exists in opposition

to its counterpart, "real image" (Baez: 253-254).)

The virtual image is a construct, defined entirely by the manner of its construction, in the mirror, it is a physical construct; in the painting, it is an æsthetic construct. The virtual image exists as a *virtual* image only in relation to its counterpart, in the mirror, the image requires the presence of the object whose reflection it is; in the painting, the image requires the recognition of the "organizing shapes" that it comprises. One may imagine the image in the absence of its referent; however, it ceases to be virtual, for it has acquired identity through singular existence.

The 'virtual' is both similar and dissimilar to its counterpart. The correlation of similarity and dissimilarity provides the characteristic tension that maintains the status of the 'virtual' as virtual. This tension, however, makes impossible the delineation of precise boundaries between the 'virtual' and its counterpart. The ratio of similarity to dissimilarity, and hence the perceived tension, varies with audience and circumstance. But the degree of both similarity and dissimilarity can also be increased simultaneously, thereby magnifying the absolute tension greatly.

In this view, 'virtual' is not quite real. The mirror image appears real, but does not possess all the characteristics of its counterpart (*e.g.*, it cannot be handled, *etc.*). The cinematic event appears real, but does not duplicate every characteristic of the original event (*e.g.*, the audience does not have freedom of movement within the frame, *etc.*). The 'virtual' is an illusion that appears 'as if' it were

real. Yet, it remains an illusion. This introduces an infinity of possibilities, which allows the artist unlimited scope in the creation of the work of art. But it also allows the audience unlimited scope in the interpretation of the work of art. To add another dimension to this scope: the same work of art may be re-interpreted with time. But this is the work of art itself, not, as is the case with ordinary events, the memory thereof.

The consequences of the foregoing are further examined in the next chapter. The terms 'religious' and 'experience' remain. While they deserve independent definition, the ensuing discussion would cause too extreme a diversion within this dissertation. They are therefore treated as a single term, with 'religious language' as its complement. These two terms form halves of a phenomenon that remains forever beyond the complete jurisdiction of either. Hence, it is difficult to plot their mutual boundary and confirm permanent jurisdictions. Rather, mere outlines are attempted. These outlines provide the working definitions required for the remainder of this dissertation.

Working Definition: 'Religious Language'

Religious experience is the humus of religious language. Religious language sets the context for religious experience. Much is excluded from these statements and neither defines its subject. However, that is one of the characteristics of the terms under discussion: they themselves form a unity that constitutes the core of the major reli-

gious traditions. That core is only accessible via participation in such a tradition. Hence, discussion of the terms religious experience and religious language is necessarily at one remove from their subject.

From the perspective of our thesis, the line separating these terms is hidden by the virtual nature of the former within the cinematic context (While this statement both foreshadows and presupposes the arguments of the next chapter, and is therefore somewhat premature, it is necessary to provide an indication of the direction we take.) The immediate experience generated by the screening of a film is a physiological construct; the next level of interpretation generates an æsthetic construct; interpretation of the latter, in turn, generates a semantic construct, whose characteristics determine religious associations.

This hierarchy is superficial, yet it fosters a constructive line of questioning: At what point does the physiological construct cease to determine the nature of the æsthetic construct?: At what point does the æsthetic construct, in turn, cease to determine the nature of the semantic construct? Unless these constructs can be differentiated from one another, there remains little more than the assertion that religious associations are determined by the very physiological and technological mechanisms that give rise to the phenomenon of cinema itself.

The problem arises when religious cinema is defined as a cinema of religious symbols, whether these be simple aural or visual 'objects', a series of actions, or any other set of discrete cinematic elements. If

religious language is defined as referential, then symbols, *etc.*, are a vehicle for that reference and religious cinema criticism consists almost uniquely of locating these various symbols, *etc.*, and mapping them to their references.

While we do not wish to negate this definition, we wish to affirm another, in which religious language is defined as non-referential. In such a definition, symbols are not isolated as primary objects of study, because the very function of symbol is denied. Applying this approach to the cinema leads naturally to a radically different form of religious cinema criticism.

In the non-referential definition, religious language severs the link between itself and religious experience, not to deny the latter, but to shift one's focus from the former. The referential and non-referential definitions are complementary: whereas the former promotes the equation of symbol and referent, the latter negates or collapses this equation. In the referential definition, the function of symbol is to refer:

Religious symbols do exactly the same thing as all symbols do—namely, they open up a level of reality, which otherwise is not opened at all, which is hidden. We can call this the depth dimension of reality itself, the dimension of reality which is the ground of every other dimension and every other depth, and which therefore, is not one level beside the others but is the fundamental level, the level below all other levels, the level of being itself, or the ultimate power of being. (Tillich, 1959: 58-59)

If a religious symbol no longer fulfils this function, it dies, eventually to be replaced by another:

The dimension of ultimate reality is the dimension of the Holy. And so we can also say, religious symbols are symbols of the Holy. As such they participate in the holiness of the Holy according to our basic definition of a symbol. But participation is not identity; they are not themselves *the* Holy. The wholly transcendent transcends every symbol of the Holy. (59)

The referential definition itself leads to the non-referential one, since it denies ultimate reference, except in a capacity that remains both temporary and incomplete.

The two definitions differ in their points of origin. The referential definition begins with the affirmation of reference, whereas the non-referential definition begins with the negation of reference. But each must invade the territory of the other to remain viable. Hence the non-referential definition acknowledges the appearance of reference, but redefines it as essentially self-reference:

To speak of a limit-experience is to speak of our experience. This expression in no way says that there is nothing in our common human experience and in our common language which corresponds to speech about the extreme. If this were not so, the claim of the Scriptures that Christian self-understanding in fact is the understanding of authentic human existence would fail entirely. It is precisely as extreme that religious language is appropriated. And it is this appropriateness of limit-expressions to limit-experiences which is signified by our affirmation that religious language, like all poetic language, in the strongest sense of the word, *redescribes* human experience. (Ricoeur, 1975a: 127)

As equivalents of "limit-experience" Ricoeur suggests Tillich's "ultimate concern" and Lonergan's "formally unconditioned" (128). Continuing:

In this expression—"redescribes human experience"—we must

emphasize both halves: what religious language does is *to re-describe*; what it re-describes is *human experience*. In this sense we must say that the ultimate referent of the parables, proverbs, and eschatological sayings is not the Kingdom of God, but human reality in its wholeness, as this is indicated by the numerous expressions in the works of Norman Perrin. This is where the unshakeable truth of the existential interpretation of the New Testament lies. Religious language discloses the religious dimension of *common human experience*. (127-128)

Ricoeur's conclusion appears essentially the same as Tillich's. Yet there is one significant difference.

Since they have chosen different points of origin, Tillich and Ricoeur provide different critical methods. Tillich's method leads to an examination of symbols to determine their viability in the light of their intended referent:

Religious symbols point symbolically to that which transcends all of them. But since, as symbols, they participate in that to which they point, they always have the tendency (in the human mind, of course) to replace that to which they are supposed to point, and to become ultimate in themselves. And in the moment in which they do this, they become idols. All idolatry is nothing else than the absolutizing of symbols of the Holy, and making them identical with the Holy itself. (Tillich, 1959: 60)

Ricoeur's method concerns the rôle of symbol, but only after the fact. The immediate datum is the expression itself, the symbol not as symbol but as mere utterance. The utterance may function as symbol, but returns always to its origin as mere utterance. This movement is the focus of attention. It is the movement of paradox, which "disorients only to reorient" (Ricoeur, 1975a: 126); in this manner, identity is forever collapsing and permanent identity is denied:

Paradox then does not strike *praxis* any less than it does *theoria*, political *praxis* any less than the *praxis* of private morality. It just prevents us from converting religious discourse entirely into political discourse—for the same reasons that it forbids its conversion into moral discourse, even if this morality is elevated to the dignity of proverbial wisdom. (Ricoeur, 1975a: 127)

The distinction between Tillich and Ricoeur is minimal, but it exists and it forms the basis for our thesis: not as a distinction, but as an option.

The distinction remains between the view that religious language is characterized by paradox, resisting permanent identification because it negates it (Ricoeur), and the view that the symbol itself, as a *symbol for the Holy*, is collapsed by identification (Tillich). The options available are (1) an approach which emphasizes the inexpressibility of religious experience in non-paradoxical language (Tillich) *versus* (2) an approach which emphasizes the irreducibility of religious language as an expression of religious experience (Ricoeur). The foci of the two options differ; within this dissertation, the latter is chosen.

Allegorical Reformulation

The following is presented as a figurative reformulation of the preceding definitions (it was originally published in 1670):

Un homme est jeté par la tempête dans une île inconnue, dont les habitants étaient en peine de trouver leur roi, qui s'était perdu; et, ayant beaucoup de ressemblance de corps et de visage avec ce roi, il est pris pour lui, et reconnu en cette qualité par tout ce

peuple. D'abord il ne savait quel parti prendre; mais il se résolut enfin de se prêter à sa bonne fortune. Il reçut tous les respects qu'on lui voulut rendre, et il se laissa traiter de roi.

Mais, comme il ne pouvait oublier sa condition naturelle, il songeait, en même temps qu'il recevait ces respects, qu'il n'était pas ce roi que ce peuple cherchait, et que ce royaume ne lui appartenait pas. Ainsi il avait une double pensée: l'une par laquelle il agissait en roi, l'autre par laquelle il reconnaissait son état véritable, et que ce n'était que le hasard qui l'avait mis en place où il était. Il cachait cette dernière pensée, et il découvrait l'autre. C'était par la première qu'il traitait avec le peuple, et par la dernière qu'il traitait avec soi-même. (Pascal: 366)

We do not suggest that Pascal was anticipating cinema! His audience was the contemporary aristocracy. We shall treat Pascal's narrative as an allegory. In this capacity, it mirrors the perspective required to understand our thesis.

The pseudo-king represents the cinematic audience. The island and its people represent the cinematic presentation. The pseudo-king has the option of understanding himself as the real king or his look-alike: within his own mind, the choice is entirely his own. The former choice results in the equation, I am the king of these people, which, from the reader's perspective, is false. The latter choice results in the equation, I am the virtual king of these people, which, from the reader's perspective, is true. The virtual king functions as if he were the real king.

Similarly, throughout the cinematic presentation, the audience has the choice of participating in its events as though they are what they appear to be, or as though they merely appear to be what they are. Irrespective of the persuasive power of the cinematic presentation itself, every member of the audience retains at least this *privi-*

lege of decision. The former choice results in the equation, *religious cinema is religious experience*, which we challenge (the challenge is taken up in the second chapter). The latter choice results in the equation, *religious cinema is virtual religious experience*, which we affirm.

Moreover, although the events of the cinematic presentation may be accepted as representations of another set of events external to the presentation, they do not refer outside the sphere of the everyday world of the audience, just as the pseudo-king appears unaware of his own origin but derives his self-image from the knowledge that he is not what he appears to be. We do not know that the pseudo-king is such. He believes himself to be other than what he is, but he is unable to describe that other, except in the negative: it is not what he is taken as, of that he is certain. But his certainty remains negative.

This last point is both the most difficult and the most important. From the vantage point of our thesis, the events of the cinematic presentation *cannot* refer outside the sphere of the everyday world of the audience. Rather, those events which appear to refer outside that sphere, simply *are* outside that sphere, not through reference, but *per se*. They form an *other* within the context of—and throughout—the entire cinematic presentation; where this other is totally without referential assists, it is a *wholly other*; yet, its otherness is never more or less than virtual, since it remains an æsthetic construct, rather than an experience of other, or wholly

other, *per se*.

The pseudo-king retains the power of choice over his own nature. But the negative choice, whereby he is not the real king, remains utterly non-referential: there is no other to which it can refer. Thus, the negative choice is an other *per se*. Making the choice, the pseudo-king experiences essentially nothing, except the falseness of his rôle as king of the people among whom he finds himself. Thus, he is not only virtual king, he is also virtually other, since this other has no ground, no foundation, no contour whence to derive meaning. It is an other which he finds himself to be, without form or substance (except as himself), devoid of the very possibility of meaning.

Within the bounds of Pascal's allegory, this remains true. Were the tale to be embellished, such that the pseudo-king had a specific past, known to him and other than his new-found rôle, the other would collapse as other, becoming simply *another*. But the original story remains unembellished. So, too, the cinematic presentation; where the experience of other is manifest, it remains such in its original form. Yet embellishment may come from without. Films age; what appears once as other may be subsumed into future; when the future arrives, the other becomes another, within the sphere of the everyday world of the audience.

Working Definition: 'Religious Experience'

We have outlined an approach to religious language, but have

as yet avoided providing an explicit definition for that which we asserted as its complement: religious experience. Given the foregoing allegory and the surrounding discussion, we are now in a position to derive this definition. Since our approach to religious language is negative, our approach to its complement should, for the sake of consistency, be similar. If religious language is deliberately non-referential, except in relation to human experience, it follows that religious experience is all that which religious language deliberately does *not* describe.

While ordinary language may attempt descriptions of religious experience, religious language will inevitably negate such descriptions, in order that religious experience always remains an other, *except as the experience itself*: the experience itself is always immediate, not as an other, but as itself; yet it remains other than either the language whereby it is described, *or the memories whereby it is recalled*. Conversely, experience that can be subsumed into ordinary experience and can be subjected to the descriptive processes of ordinary language is, by this definition, not religious.

Religious experience is all that which calls ordinary experience into question; all that which is so wholly other that the primacy and veracity of ordinary experience become doubtful. Religious experience inevitably breaks down the cohesiveness that the sum of all ordinary experiences manifests. Thus, religious experience cannot be consumed by ordinary experience, since the latter has no hold over the former, except by virtue of the absence of the former. The very presence of

religious experience ruthlessly negates the power of ordinary experience, unless the former is ignored; certain circumstances make this impossible.

The pseudo-king can pretend to be the real king, but he cannot, within the context of the story, deny his own doubts. These doubts remain, inevitably colouring his experience of his new-found rôle. Similarly, religious experience remains, even if as no more than a memory of ultimate otherness. All subsequent experience is necessarily conditioned by this experience and its memory. While denial of the experience or its memory may be the only result, even the denial alters what passes henceforth as ordinary experience.

Religious cinema, on the other hand, remains an æsthetic construct. Its very capacity for repetition, in the form of subsequent screenings, denies its authenticity as anything other than an æsthetic construct. Thus, religious experience manifested in religious cinema is, by definition, not religious experience, but ordinary experience. The other of religious cinema is a fabrication, reproducible at will. Hence, religious cinema must be defined as never more than virtual religious experience, for this preserves the separation between a spontaneous experience of the wholly other and a carefully crafted representation.

However, religious cinema as virtual religious experience implies the *appearance* of permanent otherness, the *apparent* absence of the very possibility of reference. Thus, the virtual religious experience that characterizes religious cinema must itself be characterized by apparent irreducibility. Here the rôle of paradox becomes manifest.

The elements that constitute the virtual religious experience characteristic of religious cinema are apparently paradoxical; that is, they appear to give rise to paradox. However paradox can be eroded if its elements are subject to reduction. Thus, the virtual religious experience of religious cinema must rely on elements that themselves resist reduction. While these elements may be found throughout several layers of interpretation, they must be grounded at the most fundamental, least interpretative layer of the cinematic phenomenon.

If the paradoxical elements are not grounded within the most fundamental layer, then they remain vulnerable to the possibility of re-interpretation whenever a shift occurs within that layer, since all other layers are dependent on it and are themselves interpretations of that layer or layers above it. For this reason, our thesis must rely on a particular understanding of the very technology and physiology of cinema, the set of physical processes that gives rise to the essential cinematic phenomenon. Both this set of physical processes and our understanding of it arise out of specific intellectual frameworks (as discussed in the next chapter).

Alternate Definitions

Other definitions of religious experience exist. We have chosen to define religious experience from the sanctuary of a particular definition of religious language. To speak of religious experience, even negatively, requires religious language. Language itself may be defined as

(at least) referential, non-referential or self-referential. Each definition results in a different approach to that which language is taken to describe. We have chosen one approach to language and therefore one approach to that which it is taken to describe. Our definition of religious language leaves no alternative but a negative definition of religious experience.

This negative definition colours the remainder of this dissertation and conditions our analysis of Werner Herzog's *Herz aus Glas*. It could be argued that this weakens the case for our thesis as a global definition of religious cinema: if other definitions of religious language and/or religious experience are chosen, our thesis will not have been tested. There can be no ultimate defense against this critique. But such a critique can be leveled against any and every academic enterprise, since all such enterprises must begin with certain assumptions. This chapter serves to state our assumptions and provide some rationale for their presence.

Moreover, the assumptions that underlie our thesis and this dissertation are sufficiently different, as a collection, from those that have served other forays into the field of religious cinema theory and criticism that, at the very least, some interesting results are achieved. Finally, the assertion that our thesis serves as a global definition of religious cinema does not preclude the possibility that other theses may serve a similar function. Religious cinema is a complex phenomenon. Our definition provides one approach, which (it is claimed) nonetheless penetrates all layers of that phenomenon. Other

theses necessarily provide other approaches, but these, too, may penetrate all layers of the phenomenon.

A dialogue with a variety of other approaches to religious cinema is maintained throughout this dissertation. However, in the interest of proceeding with the exposition of our thesis, we now suspend further discussion of other definitions of the terms crucial to its comprehension until the fourth chapter, in which the issue of terminology is reopened to develop further conclusions on the dominion of our thesis and its contribution to the realm of religious cinema theory and criticism. This task is considerably simplified in that context, since it follows, rather than precedes, the application of our thesis, in the third chapter, to a specific film.

Marginal Approaches

To conclude this chapter, it is instructive to examine three marginal approaches to religious cinema. These approaches are labeled 'marginal' to emphasize the tentative nature of their conclusions. They are described as 'approaches' because they represent important steps toward a religious cinema theory. The first of these 'marginal' approaches to be discussed is that of Susanne Langer. Although Langer does not tackle the subject or problems of religious cinema *per se*, her reflections on cinema in general deserve mention, brief though they are.

In her appendix to *Feeling and Form*, Langer defines film as

"*the dream mode*" (412). This is not an equation: cinema is "like" dream, but it neither copies dream nor "puts one into a daydream" (412). Rather, like dream, it puts the audience in the centre of the events being portrayed. The camera "creates a virtual present" by taking the place of the dreamer in the dream, although the camera is not identical to the dreamer (412-413):

We are usually agents in a dream. The camera (and its complement, the sound track) is not itself in the picture. It is the mind's eye and nothing more. Neither is the picture (if it is art) likely to be dreamlike in its structure. It is a poetic composition, coherent, organic, governed by a definitely conceived feeling, not dictated by actual emotional pressures. (413)

The participation remains, in one sense, passive. The audience cannot *change* the events portrayed, they will run their course, which is now determined solely by the strip of Celluloid™ from which they are being reconstructed.

Langer broaches the subject of theatre and its relation to cinema, observing that novels are more readily adaptable to film than plays. The theatre is too confined to the fixed space of the stage. The novel, on the other hand, requires less decomposition, because it handles space more abstractly. In this, the novel is like both dream and film, both of which are "often intensely concerned with space" (*e.g.*, in dream, "endless roads, bottomless canyons, things too high, too near, too far") without being "oriented in any total space." (Langer: 415)

As an example of this use of space, one may cite Ingmar Berg-

man's *Persona* (1966). The overall setting is usually irrelevant to the emotional timbre of a particular shot. The shots are connected, not by locale, but by our experience of them. This effect is reinforced through Bergman's use of the close-up: the frame is not a limiting feature; rather, it serves to focus our attention on the subject, to the exclusion of the surroundings.

While Langer's approach represents an interesting departure from traditional cinema theory, it has had little impact in that field and must therefore be considered 'marginal' in a double sense. More in keeping with our task is the approach of Richard Bollman. Bollman is not anxious to reject the thematic statements that theologians employ to explain a film. However, he stresses the need to view such statements as distinct from their subject. In their stead, he proposes the development of a "theological aesthetic." (Bollman: 104)

Thematic statements reduce the significance of the medium with respect to its message. They extract from the art work a position which they identify as its theological contribution, but ignore the technique the artist uses to convey it. Bollman, on the other hand, asks the question, "What does all cinema, as a medium, have to do with man and his understanding of God?" (Bollman: 104)

Bollman outlines a contemporary Christian spirituality that allows for a different view of the rôle of art in society:

Christian spirituality today, especially among the young, almost ignores God as a looming governing figure exerting demands on His subjects asking [sic] to be worshiped and consulted, and serves Him rather in the neighbor, in liturgical gatherings rich with individual

participation and adapted to the spirit and culture of the group. Christ lives among and in the community; the gathering place of Christians is sanctified because Christians are there, not because it is a building of a certain shape, or one blessed and consecrated, or peopled with statues, or even housing the sacred bread. (Bollman: 111)

Given such a view of contemporary Christian spirituality, Bollman argues that cinema is the medium most suited to its expression.

✓ Cinema rejects "primitive religious experience" and brings its audience "into contact and unforgettable involvement with the concrete individual in time and space, using as its materials individual persons, faces, and gestures, real sounds and artifacts, actual time organized as a progress of significant events." That is, audience participation in cinema is more immediate than in the traditional arts. (Bollman: 112)

The key to this immediacy is time. In cinema, past and future are always experienced as present. Coherence is achieved, not by standard mechanical chronology; but "by the order of mutual influence and consequences" of events, "enriching each other, working together into a meaningful history." Thus, film time "is the antithesis of a series of ticked instants, of all drummed rhythms and musical beats which for the primitive stifled the chaos of time." (Bollman: 118)

Wild Strawberries (Ingmar Bergman, 1957) may be cited to clarify this point. Through its heavy use of flashbacks and dream sequences, the film softens the line between past and present, dream and 'reality'. Although we are able to recognize the flashbacks and

dream sequences as such, we experience them as immediate events, intimately connected with the present of the principal character whose memories and dreams they represent. We are on a voyage through the psyche of another individual, we participate in that individual's search for himself.

Bollman's ultimate intent is to promote a deeper investigation of the cinema by theologians. He develops, not a final definition of religious cinema, but an initial approach to such a definition. He discourages the establishment of solid boundaries between religious film and cinema in general, thereby leaving much room for the development of an æsthetic of religious cinema.

The last, and most thorough, of the 'marginal' approaches to be discussed is that of Harvey Cox. Like Bollman, Cox's chief concern is to move away from what he terms "thematic criticism." In its stead, he poses "two questions of a more structural character." The two questions are: (1) "what is the responsibility of the theologian *as theologian* in view of the sociological role played by the cinema in shaping the modern consciousness?" and (2) why is film "structurally more capable of dealing with the unique theological problem of our generation than are the other artistic media"? (Cox: 28)

Cox's answer to his first question is illuminating, in part because it defines a very positive rôle for the theologian:

The responsibility of the theologian vis-à-vis the cinema is not to spy out sensual footage or irreverent treatments of clergymen. His responsibility is to understand the cinema as an authentic art form, to expose the frauds for what they are, and to assist the ar-

tist to perform his indispensable function by criticizing him appreciatively and by helping him to get a hearing. (Cox: 35)

Although the issue of "sensual footage" is more complex than Cox's statement suggests, his perspective allows for a much broader scope of investigation on the part of the critic and artist together form a community whose reach extends beyond that of either.

While our stance is essentially in harmony with that of Cox, we wish to address issues that extend beyond it. Cox's second question is more relevant in this respect, for it directs our attention toward the fundamental issues that are at stake. According to Cox, the "unique, theological problem" that faces our generation is that of coming to grips with "the shattered pieces of our everyday world." Cinema holds these pieces before us "until they take a shape that allows us to see ourselves as we are, and therefore, perhaps, to see beyond " (Cox 40)

There is "a *structural* reason" for this: the "starkly *visual* character of the film allows it to include much more of the superficial trivia without dwelling on them." The "much more" is in comparison to contemporary theatre (pre-cinematic playwrights are exempt):

We have become so accustomed to a certain optical fullness in the cinema that plays on the stage tend always to appear spare and abstract. A playwright cannot seem to be realistic and profound at the same time, while a film-maker can. Perhaps that is the heart of the matter. A film-producer can assume a certain *given ambience*, a visual reality that is simply *there*, especially in films made on location. He can, if he knows what he is doing, simply get on with the job, making certain to utilize the natural provision in whatever way is most helpful with the camera. (Cox: 36)

It should be added that cinema can appear "spare and abstract" as well, while maintaining those qualities that, in Cox's view, allow one to distinguish it from theatre. Ingmar Bergman's trilogy, *Through a Glass Darkly* (1961), *Winter Light* (1962), and *The Silence* (1963), serves as an example. Nevertheless, the essential ingredient of Cox's argument holds true: film functions differently than the other media. The implication of this thesis depends on the rigour with which it is applied.

Our thesis may be seen as an extension of the above. The "visual reality" of which Cox speaks is fundamental to the cinematic experience. It engenders the sense of participation that the audience feels. But it can be blocked. A director may choose to deny his or her audience any familiar landscapes, any secure position from which to relate to the impressions created, although this technique may involve interference with the technology as it stands. Historically, film was developed to facilitate, indeed foster audience participation, rather than inhibit it.

We have examined three 'marginal' approaches to religious cinema, each of which provides a different perspective on the subject. In each case, we were able to cite one or more films from the *œuvre* of a single director (Ingmar Bergman) to illustrate a point. We could have cited other directors, but it is significant that a single director sufficed. It appears that the art of film is sufficient unto itself; cinematographers frequently achieve a synthesis far beyond that of the

critic. Therein lies the artist's challenge. It is a challenge that neither critic nor theoretician can reject.

While we cannot maintain that our thesis represents more than a possible approach (no matter how comprehensive) to religious cinema, we must say this in the hope that it is at least partially untrue. Religious cinema criticism must eventually develop a reputation for synthesis of the highest order. The three 'marginal' approaches just presented are no more than initial steps in this direction. In part, the task of this dissertation is to move sufficiently beyond these initial steps that one can recognize at least the possibility of such a synthesis.

Concluding Remarks

In the next, or second chapter, we ground our thesis and explore its immediate implications, thereby providing some insight into its potential for application within the field of religious cinema criticism. The thesis is then expanded to provide a specific critical method. In addition, the key contemporary approaches to religious cinema are discussed in some detail and related to our thesis. This discussion is particularly relevant to the issue of global definitions of religious cinema, if our thesis is not global with respect to all possible definitions, it may at least be shown that it incorporates those which have been presented to date. Where appropriate, a dialogue with the major film theories is developed.

The third chapter contains a detailed analysis, using the specific critical method derived from our thesis in the second chapter, of Werner Herzog's *Herz aus Glas* (1976). Readers who have not seen this film may derive some benefit from the screenplay presented at the end of the dissertation. However, readers should be cautioned that our thesis denies the equation of film and screenplay. Thus, the third chapter is based, not on the screenplay, but on multiple viewings of the original film. It is strongly recommended that readers avail themselves of any opportunity to view Herzog's film. Failing that, it may be of some benefit to have seen at least one other of Herzog's films.

The fourth and final chapter recapitulates our thesis and the results of our analysis of *Herz aus Glas*. The merits of the thesis as both critical tool and theoretical synthesis are discussed. The merits are extrapolated both into the field of religious cinema theory and criticism in particular and into the field of film theory and criticism in general. The latter extrapolation is intended solely as a possible contribution. It is anticipated that the applicability of the former extrapolation will be used to judge the immediate success or failure of this dissertation.

CHAPTER 2

Religious Cinema as Virtual Religious Experience

The last chapter introduced the question Why is a given film religious? This question is specific to a particular film. The last chapter then proceeded to the question What is religious cinema? This question is general to all 'religious' films. It is possible to move either from the general question to the specific, or *vice versa*. It is also possible to ask either question in isolation, without proceeding to its complement. This chapter employs the first option: the general question forms its focus, not in isolation, but as a foundation for the specific question. What are the consequences of the other three options?

Order and Context

If the specific question is asked in isolation, a discussion of the basic elements of the film medium is discouraged. The question serves as no more than an analytic device, rather than a synthetic one. The critic who employs this option faces no more than a simple binary decision: if the film being analysed has already been labeled religious, then the critic may argue for or against this label; if the film has yet to be labeled religious, then the critic may choose to encourage or discourage such a label.

What are the tools available to the critic in this task? There are none that is specific to the film medium until the general question has been addressed. The critic who succumbs solely to the specific question lives at the mercy of the audience of both film and analysis, and possesses no defence against the onslaught of the film theoretician, whether religious or secular. The specific question consists entirely of *a priori* components: the particular film is a given; the mode of religious interpretation is a given (an audience *must* be presupposed, although it may consist solely of the critic).

This should not be taken to imply that the analysis restricted to the specific question can offer no insight. It may contain information, or promote a perspective, that is entirely new to its audience. It may even encourage the audience to re-evaluate the film. But that is not the issue here; rather, the issue is the relation of this form of analysis to our understanding of religious cinema in general. Since this form of analysis is not initiated in an atmosphere of fundamental inquiry, it is unlikely to contribute more than a superficial appreciation for those elements unique to the film medium.

If the specific question precedes the general question, it sets the initial direction that an answer to the general question will take. It is true that the general question might never have been raised had not a surfeit of answers to the specific question led to the realization that a more general investigation was in order. The two questions also possess a structural similarity: each proceeds from a given and merges it with an adjective drawn from another given. The combination

of structural similarity and historical connection serves to encourage the movement from the specific question to the general.

However, the question What is religious cinema? presupposes its components: cinema must exist and the adjective 'religious' must have been successfully applied elsewhere, even if only to its original subject. Bringing the two components together generates the question's environment and conditions its initial interpretation. The question is asked because religious cinema is assumed to exist. But the question is also asked because it is realised that religious cinema can only be assumed to exist in general; until the question is answered, even tentatively, no examples of religious cinema can be brought to the fore, unless they are treated solely as temporary research material.

To begin with the specific question and move to the general is to place undue importance on the individual film. The latter is no longer treated as temporary research material, but becomes instead the very bedrock upon which the answer to the general question is grounded. This presents a twofold danger: (1) that the answer to the general question cannot be dissociated from the particular films that it purports to encompass and (2) that the answer to the general question does not incorporate the results of a thorough investigation of the fundamental elements of the film medium (in the absence of such an investigation, the answer to the general question will always be subject to intense criticism from those syntheses that included it).

Finally, if the general question is asked in isolation, it remains

essentially irrelevant, no more than an interesting possibility. The test of any answer to the general question will always be whether it can be successfully applied to one or more films. If the answer fails to include, or at least substantially initiate, such a test, it remains incomplete and ultimately denies its own field of study. Hence, although the remainder of this chapter will be concerned with the development of an answer to the general question, this chapter remains incomplete without the next, which represents the movement from the general to the specific, as the question Is *this* film religious? is applied to *Herz aus Glas*.

The Elements of Cinema

We have placed much emphasis on the basic elements of the film medium. What are these elements? Are they unique to the medium? Do they contribute to the isolation of the medium as a distinct art form? Finally, do they foster the identification of religious cinema as a separate category within the medium? These questions must be treated carefully. While it is tempting to provide complete answers, it must be recognized that the issues they raise extend far beyond the bounds of our thesis and this dissertation. The latter cannot provide more than working definitions.

The elements that constitute the film medium may be divided into two broad categories: (1) those that precede the projection of a film and (2) those that are concurrent with the projection of a film.

The former category will not be discussed any further, except where mention of its components proves essential to an understanding of those of the latter category. The latter category is the focus of the remainder of this dissertation. It is also recognized that there are elements that maintain residence in both categories; these will be examined only as elements of the latter category.

Are the two categories so distinct from one another that they can be examined in such complete isolation? We must answer this question in the affirmative. The audience need never know the origin of a film. It need never know whether the film represents fact or fiction. It need never know what meaning the director intended the film to provide. It need never know the relation of the film's story to any other. It need never even know what the nature of film is, how film is created and distributed. The only requirement the audience must fulfill is that of any audience: it must watch the film (there is a semantic irony here).

As stated in the first chapter, film exists by economic necessity. Without an audience, film literally becomes economically infeasible. This constraint has played a large rôle in the development of film aesthetics and film technology. Both are geared to audience satisfaction. Thus, films are generally 'screened' in large, darkened rooms to focus audience attention. They employ the latest in audio technology (*viz.* 'Dolby® stereo') to enhance audience participation. They present moving images in full, rich colour to foster an aura of reality (or faded black and white stills to promote identification with a particular

aspect or perception of reality, etc.).

These are the elements as the audience sees and hears them.

But an examination of the underlying technology reveals a substantially different set of elements. At the risk of patronizing the reader, a brief description of these elements is now presented. As mentioned earlier, this description is confined to the elements that constitute the *projection* of a film. The purpose of this description is to provide a solid *cinematic* foundation for the development of our approach to religious cinema. As is seen, this approach is predicated on certain features endemic in the projection of a film.

The film that is projected consists of a strip of Celluloid™. This strip of Celluloid™ contains an aural 'track', which serves as the base for the creation of aural effects, and a visual 'track', which serves as the base for the production of visual effects. The aural track is analogue, whereas the visual track is digital; therefore, the aural effects are a direct result of the 'reading' of the aural track, whereas the full visual effects are the result of a more complex phenomenon. (Although our selection of the terms 'aural track' and 'visual track' represents a simplification, it is sufficient for our purposes to examine the underlying technology at this level of detail.)

The aural track is 'analogue' because it is an analogue of the aural effects that it produces: there is a one-for-one correspondence between the pattern recorded on the aural track and the sound vibrations produced by the equipment that reads the aural track. The resulting aural effects are subject to further interpretation by the

immediate environment and the human ear. A soundproof room deadens the aural effects, whereas a room with reflective walls creates echoes; both alter the sound heard by the human ear. Then human physiology, psychology, *etc.*, intervene to determine the final interpretation that the sound undergoes.

The visual track is 'digital' because it is composed of discrete, static images ('frames'). These frames are usually recordings made of a coherent visual event at minute intervals in the life of that event. Thus, the visual track is identical to a series of slides taken in rapid succession and the projection of the visual track is equivalent to the rapid projection of successive slides in that series. The rate of projection of the frames on the visual track is 24 per second. Thus, an individual frame represents at most $1/24$ of a second in the life of the visual event it records. Movement is a function of the difference between successive frames.

The last statement is not exclusive: movement is more than just a function of the difference between successive frames. However, it is prudent to begin a discussion of the nature of movement within the film medium with an examination of its origin. The strip of Celluloid™ that moves through the projector is not a moving picture; it is a series of moving pictures, each slightly different than its predecessor and successor. The frames that constitute the strip of Celluloid™ are a static record of varying positions of certain objects in space, no more. Movement as experienced by the audience requires multiple levels of interpretation.

The Levels of Movement

At the first level of interpretation, movement is *implied* by the change in position of certain objects in space. If the difference between two successive frames involves the shift of an object from one position to another in the image, then the projection of the two frames in succession *implies* the movement of the object from the first position to the second in space. Since the strongest statement that can be applied to the change in position of the object at this level of interpretation is that *the position has changed*, 'movement' is merely a logical deduction (cf., Davson: 538).

At the second level of interpretation, movement is an illusion created by the rapid projection of successive frames. If the position of an object changes through a series of frames and the degree of change lies within certain limits, then the audience will perceive movement. This perception is a physiological/psychological response to the rapid succession of different frames. In the past, this response has been attributed to a hypothetical ocular phenomenon identified simply as "persistence of vision" (cf., Eisenstein, 1947: 80). Contemporary research into the physiology and psychology of vision suggests that the response is a function of the entire visual system, not just the eye; the entire visual system participates actively in the creation of the illusion (e.g., Brown, 1965a: 293; Caelli: 169; Ramachandran and Anstis: 109; for a discussion of the unfortunate absence of any

impact of this research on contemporary film theory, see Nichols, 1981: 293-301).

At the third level of interpretation, movement is simply a term used to identify a process. To identify the process, however, the audience must interpret the images presented. It is not enough to recognize change and define this change as movement. The nature of the change must be recognized, such that movement becomes more than movement *per se*. If an object moves, then it moves from one location to another; both locations and the object must be identified for the movement to acquire significance. If an event occurs, then a series of actions have acquired a degree of logical correlation; these actions must be understood before the event can be recognized. Thus, at the third level of interpretation, movement is synonymous with the entire process of signification, of transforming events and objects into semantic structures.

In the preceding exposition, it should be remembered that the perspective taken is that of a member of the audience of a film, not that of a student of physiology or psychology. The initial locus of study is not the retina, but rather the strip of Celluloid™ passing through the projector. If the former instance, the result might be:

The perception of motion has two elements in it; there is the direct appreciation of movement in consequence of the gliding of the image over the retina when the eye is still (or as a result of the movement of the eye when the image of the object fixated remains stationary on the retina), and there is the more 'intellectual' recognition of the fact of movement deduced from the observation that an object is projected to a certain point in space at one moment and at another point after a certain interval of time. Thus we recognize

that the large hand of a watch is in motion because at one minute it points at 'ten' and at the next minute at 'eleven'; there is, however, no real perception of motion, the threshold rate of movement being too low. (Davson: 538)

While this perspective—and the disciplines that underlie it—are used here to justify our own perspective, the order of interpretation of the phenomena is essentially reversed.

The Essence of Cinema

It is possible to imagine a film that incorporates no movement. Such a film would be the cinematic equivalent of a still life; yet it would remain a film, since it would consist of a series of frames projected in succession. Whereas a still life is a single image, a film without movement is composed of many 'images'. The many 'images' become one by the same process that determines the audience's experience of movement. It is therefore possible to speak of both movement and non-movement in cinema as products of the same phenomenon.

The structure of this phenomenon is the same as that described above for the experience of movement. Only one qualification must be introduced to permit universal application. At the first level of interpretation, the cinematic image is a composite of two successive frames, irrespective of the presence or absence of difference; this is a logical requirement. At the second level of interpretation, this qualification becomes more acute, since it is also a physiological require-

ment: audience perception of a coherent, identifiable image presupposes a perceptible period of similarity between images; at 24 frames per second, a series of unrelated images is indecipherable. At the third level of interpretation, the qualification is synonymous with the entire semantic process: if the image incorporates no element that allows the audience to identify it and attach significance to it, then it cannot exist as part of any meaningful structure.

It follows that the essential cinematic experience is entirely independent of movement. It is a product of human technology and physiology. While movement is a phenomenon associated with this experience, it is neither the only such phenomenon nor the most significant; rather, it is simply an effect. The filmmaker may use the techniques that give rise to this effect to create a variety of cinematic phenomena other than movement. Thus, the cinematic still life is structurally unique. In theory, it must be treated as an event quite distinct from a still life in oil, for example; the latter is an object whose existence, once painted, is set, whereas the former must be recreated during each and every presentation.

Let us recapitulate the essential ingredients of our argument thus far. The elements that constitute the underlying technology of the film medium at the moment of projection are: the film stock, the projector, and the audience. The film stock contains both an aural track and a visual track; each is 'projected' by means of a different form of technology. The audio technology is not the exclusive property of the film medium; the visual technology and its physiolog-

ical counterpart, on the other hand, provide the film medium with one of its unique characteristics. Thus, it is the visual component as it gives rise to the essential cinematic experience that will henceforth form our focus.

While the film stock provides the raw material and the projector conditions its initial interpretation, it is the audience that generates the essential cinematic experience *per se*. Although this follows from our discussion of the underlying interpretative process, it presents a further hermeneutic challenge: if the film event is synonymous with the audience's experience thereof, whence is film analysis to proceed? The only path to an objective analysis of the film is through the subjective experience of it; yet this very subjectivity then calls any subsequent objectivity into question; conversely, the very process of objective analysis destroys the fundamental subjectivity of the experience that it purports to analyse.

The observation that the only path to an objective analysis of a film is through the subjective experience of it, in conjunction with the discussion that precedes this observation, provides the impetus for our approach to religious cinema. It is important to stress that 'subjective experience' is here to be equated neither with idle opinion nor with reasoned interpretation, but solely with the immediate experience of the film: the essential cinematic experience *per se*. But this raises further questions. If any film truly *exists* solely as immediate experience, how then is it to be analysed? And how is this analysis to be reconciled with the original experience, since the analysis must,

by definition, exist apart from that experience?

The context for our answers to these questions is restricted to religious cinema. To emphasize this contextual restriction and set its bounds, let us recall the last of our earlier questions: Does the essential cinematic experience foster the identification of religious cinema as a separate category within the medium? If the essential cinematic experience is undifferentiated, then the question must be answered in the negative; there remains only the possibility that religious cinema is synonymous with all cinema; while appealing, such a conclusion must be rejected outright as inherently biased. If an affirmative answer is to be defended, it must be shown that the essential cinematic experience is at least sufficiently differentiated as to admit the possibility of multiple categories.

The path to an answer to the question recalled in the previous paragraph is a long one. But it must be traveled before we can proceed to answer the two questions first posed at the end of the second to last paragraph above. To travel this path from its origin, we begin by examining the problem of cinema as art, then proceed to discuss the rôle of ideology in our understanding of this problem, and all problems associated with the study of film. With these qualifications to serve as a background, we enter the realm of parable as a particular—in the case of this dissertation, paradigmatic—manifestation of religious language and compare the understanding of parable described there with our derivation of the essence of cinema. Thus, we arrive at the essence of our theory of religious cinema, from whose perspec-

tive we are then able to provide precise guidelines for the analysis of religious cinema, thereby answering the two aforementioned methodological questions.

The Medium as Art,

We have identified the elements that constitute the film medium and isolated those that are unique. We may now repeat our earlier question: Do they contribute to the isolation of the medium as a distinct art form? This question must now be answered. If film is *not* an art form, then our approach falls into the category of philosophy of science, since it is then an analysis of a manifestation of technology. If film is not a *distinct* art form, then our approach must be shown to apply beyond the medium.

Our answer must remain incomplete, since it is not the subject of this dissertation. Moreover, any answer must remain incomplete to the extent that it relies on a particular definition of art. Thus, our answer is of little ultimate consequence. Nevertheless, the exercise serves to outline the issue. It is an older issue, of little importance in more recent cinema theory. As an issue, it bridges the period between contemporary approaches to cinema and the earliest forays into the realm of cinema theory. It also represents a period in which the nature of the cinematic phenomenon *appeared* more clearly defined, in some respects.

The issue may be restated as follows: Is cinema simply a trick,

a technique for audience manipulation, or does cinema represent a mature medium of artistic expression, equivalent to the established art media? With the possible exception of television, film is the most pervasive form of public entertainment yet developed. At this level, however, film is no more art than the comic book; depending on one's definition, either both or neither fit the category. A trick may serve as entertainment; an audience may willingly choose to be manipulated. Yet, one may imagine a level of entertainment that shatters its own boundaries, such that the audience emerges with a fresh perspective. At this level, the original 'trick' is both irrecoverable in its initial expression and irreconcilable with its ultimate impact. In transforming its audience, it transforms itself. Thus, the silence that permeates Ingmar Bergman's film of the same name (1963) is deafening; it speaks most eloquently of the vast distances that separate human beings from one another, as well as the paradoxical degree of insight into the psyche of our neighbour that we all manifest so frequently. It is the latter that allows us to wound so effectively.

It is clear that the foregoing is neither a rigorous definition of art nor an exhaustive examination of the question at hand. Yet it is sufficient for the purposes of this dissertation, for it is also clear that film is more than a simple manifestation of technology (which is not meant to imply that *any* examples of the latter exist). At what level, then, is film a *distinct* art form? To return to *The Silence*, much is expressed by the actresses themselves. It is impossible to extract this contribution from the film and expect the original to remain in-

tact. Thus, the actresses provide much of that which allows us to consider the film as art, but nothing that allows us to place the film in a distinct category of art.

We must return to our description of the essential cinematic experience to resolve this issue. It cannot be denied that a play with the same theme and cast as *The Silence* may achieve a similar artistic effect. The difference lies in the manner of audience participation. Our argument is that the latter evidences a fundamental dissimilarity from one medium to the other, although this difference may be of no great consequence in the consideration of plot, theme, and meaning. Rather, the difference affects the nature of our approach to religious cinema.

Given our foregoing discussion, the essential cinematic experience is structurally unique; thus, a film such as *The Silence* represents an event distinct from any potential theatrical counterpart. (This will appear irrelevant to most audiences, but may be the arbiter of audience interest: the film medium is far more popular than theatre. Perhaps this heightened popular interest is a reflection of the relevance of our structural distinction.) It is at this level that we choose to assert the film medium as a distinct art form. The actresses in *The Silence* provide one element of the essential cinematic experience; we may designate this element as identity: the human form is an identifiable subject for the audience; the motions and emotions of the human form are intelligible to the audience.

The context for the element of identity is the structure of the

essential cinematic experience, which determines the function of identity: had the director chosen to use only extreme close-ups, all identity would have been lost, yet the essential cinematic experience would have remained intact, if only in principle. The essential cinematic experience represents the more fundamental perspective, since it is also the more immediate, although the audience may be aware of it only hypothetically, if at all. Thus, it is at the level of the essential cinematic experience *per se* that cinema may be defined as a *distinct* art form, since it is only then that the elements that cinema shares with the other art media recede into the background.

A Question of Paradigm

The preceding argument incorporates a particular ideology that permits the derivation of the very conclusions reached. By 'ideology' is meant, not so much a conscious choice of perspective, as an underlying, more unconscious series of assumptions about, for example, perception and technology. Indeed, one might argue further that the modes of perception and forms of technology that give rise to such conclusions are themselves ideological in origin; and this to such an extent that they cannot truly be divorced from those conclusions nor *vice versa*. There exists then the danger that the essence of cinema, as derived in this dissertation, is informed by an ideology that necessarily conditions that derivation. Of what value then our insistence on an examination of the basic elements of the film medium?

Although the term 'ideology' is appropriate within the context of the present discussion, its use can lead to the (false) assumption that it is possible to attain a perspective that is not 'ideological' in origin. In other words, 'ideology' carries a negative connotation, since it is natural to desire always the broader perspective in matters academic. To prevent this negative connotation from interfering with the following argument, we adopt the equally current 'paradigm' as a substitute. As such, the term is borrowed:

I will use the term paradigm to refer to a *tradition transmitted through historical exemplars* ["key historical examples"]. The concept of paradigm is thus defined sociologically and historically, and its implications for epistemology (the structure and character of knowledge) must be explored. (Barbour: 9)

Barbour, in turn, borrows from Thomas Kuhn:

Kuhn maintained that the thought and activity of a given scientific community are dominated by its paradigms, which he described as 'standard examples of scientific work that embody a set of conceptual, methodological and metaphysical assumptions'. Newton's work in mechanics, for instance, was the central paradigm of the community of physicists for two centuries. (Barbour: 8)

(One might also apply Foucault's *episteme* (Foucault, 1970: xxii), but that raises the spectre of an altogether separate thesis, well outside the bounds of the effort represented by this dissertation. And there remains the probability that Foucault's *episteme* encompasses a far greater domain at any particular time than does Barbour's (Kuhn's) 'paradigm'.)

In essence, then, the issue to be faced concerns the topology of the effects that give rise to the essential cinematic experience. For it must be understood that this topology is distinct from the effects that underlie it. The effects are themselves and therefore available to all for personal experience. The topology of these effects, the manner in which they are seen to be constructed, the various components that are held to be integral to their existence, on the other hand, can shift. This has more far-reaching implications than is immediately obvious for, whereas the effects themselves are a singular phenomenon, what is seen is a function of their topology, rather than the effects themselves.

As an example, we may recall that 'persistence of vision' was long held to be the fundamental component of the cinematic phenomenon. Now 'persistence of vision' no longer exists in any form other than that of a footnote in texts on film theory. Cinema has survived the demise of its essential cause intact, but the theories built around the latter have not (Nichols, 1981: 293-294). Herein lies the danger that may equally suffocate the core of our description of the essence of cinema: the essential cinematic experience. This dissertation would not survive such an attack. It is therefore expedient to build a proper paradigmatic statement with which to escape the attack before it can take place.

If we insist on an examination of the basic elements of the film medium to inform this, and every other, theory of religious cinema, then this insistence serves two functions. First, it is a provocation: if

other theories of religious cinema have not included such an examination, then an explanation is in order, for it can be shown that the absence of such an examination drastically weakens the credibility, and narrows the domain, of those theories. Second, it is a clarification: if our theory of religious cinema is to be applied properly, then it should only be applied if its assumptions—which include the described topology of the film medium—still hold true. Therein lies the value of our insistence on an examination of the basic elements of the film medium.

It is impossible to determine the horizon of the paradigm that determines our understanding of the essential cinematic experience. It is possible to compare this paradigm to the one that preceded it, wherein 'persistence of vision' lay at the core of the essential cinematic experience. But there is nothing gained by extending this comparison to all areas of the paradigm, since the result of the movement from one paradigm to the next is the death and decay of the older paradigm. Thus, a comparison of paradigms is a task for an historian, whereas the task of this dissertation is theoretical and methodological.

Were it possible to determine the horizon of the paradigm that determines our understanding of the essential cinematic experience, it is likely that a transition phase would have been entered, in which that paradigm was itself being superseded by a third, of as yet indeterminate nature, but sufficiently distinct as to permit delineation of an approximate boundary between the two. It may be that this dis-

sertation is possible precisely because such a transition phase is even now occurring:

The sense of a discipline with a body of knowledge, a set of diverse methodological principles, a tradition (albeit a short one), and an institutional base arises precisely at the time when the phenomenon of "the movies" is becoming anachronistic, marginal to a visual culture increasingly centered on television, video, and new forms of electronic communication and exchange. Some lag between culture and its scholarly study may be inevitable. (Nichols, 1985: 2)

In other words, this dissertation as an exercise in provocation and clarification may be possible precisely because its object of study has become stable. It is easy to provoke and clarify when circumstances make one's vision clearer than that of those whom one wishes to provoke, those who operated within a *milieu* as indistinct as the term 'persistence of vision' is now held to be inaccurate.

A similar argument may be used to highlight the assumptions that permeate the definition of parable that follows. A survey of literary criticism during the last fifty years provides all the ingredients required to place the contemporary understanding of parable among North American New Testament scholars in perspective. As there has been a shift from traditional definitions of originality in secular literary criticism toward a definition of creativity that does not acknowledge originality except as accident and difference, such that texts do not reflect an origin so much as a set of fortuitous circumstances, so has New Testament scholarship sought to parallel this shift by defining the parables of Jesus, not as texts 'centred' on their 'apparent' refer-

ences, but as texts whose very structure exhibits their purpose as agents of 'decentring', that is, agents of non-reference.

Our approach is therefore further compromised by its reliance on this particular definition of parable. But, as with our understanding of the essence of cinema, this also carries a degree of security, for arguing from a known paradigm lends weight to the more speculative elements of our approach. It must be remembered that this dissertation is not an exercise in pure cinema theory, nor is it intended to be either original or critical with respect to New Testament studies. Rather, it borrows heavily from these disciplines to map the considerably more restricted field of religious cinema theory and criticism.

The Essence of Parable

The definition of parable now explored is especially convenient because it represents a structural analogue to our description of the essential cinematic experience. We employ this structural analogue both to lend credence to our approach to religious cinema and to determine the potential for, and the degree of, differentiation within the essential cinematic experience. The origins of this structural analogue lie in the definition of religious language and religious experience provided in the previous chapter. The following summarizes the essence of the dominant contemporary definition of parable:

Poetic experience terminates only with its metaphorical expression so that the two are inseparably linked. So also religious experience involves both "the moment of disclosure or perception itself" and "the embodiment of the experience in symbolic form," to quote from Thomas Fawcett. This means that the experience and the expression have a profound intrinsic unity in the depths of the event itself. The fact that Jesus' experience is articulated in metaphorical parables, and not in some other linguistic types, means that these expressions are part of that experience itself. (Crossan, 1973a: 22)

While this position requires further investigation, we may extract some immediate parallels.

The key is the unity of experience and expression. This unity is twofold: the experience is recreated through the expression, yet the expression has no real meaning apart from the experience. This seems paradoxical. The paradox cannot be muted through analysis; rather, analysis must return to the original intent of the parable:

Jesus was not proclaiming that God was about to end *this* world, but, seeing this as one view of world, he was announcing God as the One who shatters world, this one and any other before or after it. If Jesus forbade calculations of the signs of the end, it was not calculations, nor signs, but end he was attacking. (Crossan, 1973a: 27)

At issue is not the validity of this assertion within the field of New Testament criticism. The assertion may stand on its own, its life determined by its applicability to general analysis.

If we reduce the assertion to its most rudimentary form, we have a linguistic phenomenon that resists reduction. The capacity to resist reduction lies in its paradoxical nature: dissonant elements that cannot be reconciled. This linguistic phenomenon may be exhibited in

a spectrum of examples. At one end of the spectrum, the resistance to reduction is minimal; it is the chance combination of temporarily dissonant elements. At the other end of the spectrum, the life of the paradoxical expression is unlimited, for it represents the fortuitous conjunction of fundamentally discordant elements. The parables of Jesus manifest the latter at several levels.

The first is internal to the experience: something has happened that does not happen; an event has occurred that is irreconcilable with our past experience. The parable gives expression to this experience in a suitable manner, for it does not reduce the paradoxical force of the experience. If the context of the parable of The Good Samaritan is understood *and accepted*, then the story it relates cannot be reconciled with the listener's world view. The function of the parable at this level is to shatter the accepted world view; this function can be resisted, even indefinitely; if it is resisted, the experience that the parable relates cannot be recreated. If the experience cannot be recreated, then the parable loses its impact.

The second level at which the parables of Jesus manifest the latter end of the spectrum is external to the experience. The expression comes from without: the listener listens to the parable. Hence, the initial focus of the listener is also external. The words must be heard and interpreted; their meaning must be assimilated. The less complex the expression, the more quickly the listener will succumb to the goal of the parable: the recreation of the experience. When expression and experience are one, the listener is faced with a before

and after; the two are irreconcilable, the before cannot be recovered. The parable will henceforth serve indefinitely as a marker between potentially opposing perspectives.

The third level at which the parables of Jesus manifest the latter end of the spectrum is external to both experience and expression. It is the very incongruity of difference. This, too, is paradoxical. There is a 'this' and a 'that'. At some time, the two may be reversed, the 'this' becoming 'that' and the 'that' becoming 'this': a shift in perspective has occurred. When this difference is reconciled through deeper insight, there remains the incongruity of difference in levels of insight. Thus, the parables remain as permanent reminders of difference and separation, while serving always to collapse that very difference and separation.

How are the parables religious? This question uncovers the root of the problem of religious language. If the parables are expressions that lie within the scope of religious language, is religious language therefore inherently parabolic? Parables may also be found outside the bounds of traditional religious language. If they are nonetheless valid examples of religious language in some form, then religious language must be defined quite broadly, perhaps such that it includes all language. The problem has now become one of reference: if religious language parallels religion and religion is a metaphor and vehicle for religious experience, then only language that refers to religious experience is religious and only parables that manifest such a reference are examples of religious language.

Yet such a definition does not remove the inherent problem of reference; it merely hides it. The paradox of religious language is that it is human: it remains an expression of human experience. But this expression is unique in that it calls all experience into question. If the world consists of the sum of all human experience, such that 'world' is all that we remain as unaware of as the air we breathe, then parable raises that world to our consciousness and forces the realization that it is no more than one possibility among many. Thus, parable refers, but by this very act of reference destroys the primacy of all that which is referred to: it is a destructive reference, though without any negative intent. Thus, parable gives rise to another experience that remains essentially unreferenced; it cannot be referenced, because it is other than all that which permits reference.

Myth and Parable

Parable is but one of many forms of narrative found in religious texts, the Bible or any other. Yet we have chosen not only one definition of parable, but also parable itself over all other forms of narrative, to serve as the prime example of our understanding of religious experience and religious expression. That this choice is deliberate has already been stated, as has the recognition that it is a limiting factor in the domain of our thesis. It is nevertheless instructive at this stage to examine the other forms of narrative and to compare, briefly, the results that might be achieved by their choice as norma-

tive to our choice of parable as normative.

Crossan (borrowing) distinguishes five formal categories in the full spectrum of narrative as "story": myth, apologue, action, satire, and parable (Crossan, 1975: 59). As story, each category bears a particular relation to "world": "Myth establishes world. Apologue defends world. Action investigates world. Satire attacks world. Parable subverts world." (59) In this description, there is a clear movement that begins at myth and reaches its end at parable (thence, perhaps, to begin again at myth, albeit another). Further, in this description, myth and parable represent extremes of story.

As one extreme, however, parable cannot survive as story, unlike myth, which becomes, in effect, the paradigm within which the middle three categories of narrative eke out their existence:

It is clear, I hope, that parable can only subvert the world created in and by myth. There is no other world it can touch. It is possible to live in myth and without parable. But it is not possible to live in parable alone. To live in parable means to dwell in the tension of myth *and* parable. It is obvious, of course, that one can change from one myth (for example, capitalism) to another (for example, communism), and that every myth can have an antimyth. But a parable is not an antimyth, and it must be carefully distinguished from such. It is a story deliberately calculated to show the limitations of myth, to shatter world so that its relativity becomes apparent. It does not, *as parable*, replace one myth with another. (Crossan, 1975: 59-60)

Since myth and parable form the most extreme opposites in the spectrum of story, it is most instructive to explore the options represented by myth, and least distracting to cease further discussion of the other three categories of story in Crossan's spectrum.

Given our foregoing exploration of the rôle of paradigm in shaping both an argument and its environment, there remains some confusion between paradigm (or *episteme*), on the one hand, and myth (or world), on the other hand. This confusion is not diminished by a return to the source of most contemporary definitions of myth:

Prevalent attempts to explain alleged differences between the so-called "primitive" mind and scientific thought have resorted to qualitative differences between the working processes of the mind in both cases while assuming that the objects to which they were applying themselves remained very much the same. If our interpretation is correct, we are led toward a completely different view, namely, that the kind of logic which is used by mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and that the difference lies not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of the things to which it is applied. This is well in agreement with the situation known to prevail in the field of technology: what makes a steel ax superior to a stone one is not that the first one is better made than the second. They are equally well made, but steel is a different thing than stone. In the same way we may be able to show that the same logical processes are put to use in myth as in science, and that man has always been thinking equally well; the improvement lies, not in an alleged progress of man's conscience, but in the discovery of new things to which it may apply its unchangeable abilities. (Lévi-Strauss, 1965: 105-106)

Extrapolating from this view, there is some justification for defining science as yet another myth, a way of exploring the possibilities of, and then ordering ('explaining'), the elements of our environment. The key is therefore, neither myth, nor world, nor science, but order. Order allows, indeed fosters, certain combinations. Order also makes extremely unlikely, if not impossible, other combinations: they are simply invisible.

Parable subverts world by disordering its ordered combinations,

by inducing conjunction of elements which cannot be conjoined if the order of things is to be maintained. But a myth is but *one* order of things; hence Foucault's laughter upon encountering a passage in Borges:

This passage quotes a 'certain Chinese encyclopædia' in which it is written that 'animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) *et cetera*, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies'. (Foucault, 1970: xv)

The order remains in the act of categorization, even the possibility of categorization. But the categories flow into one another and at the same time deny each other, not because they represent impossible categories (we can imagine each one separately), but because the order of things that gives rise to such categories *as a taxonomy* is thoroughly alien. In this alien taxonomy, we nevertheless recognize an attempt at inducing order. It is not other but *an* other.

There are, then, two conceptions of myth: one restricted, the other more general. In the restricted conception, myth is story, but encountered largely as individual stories, whose "purpose... is to provide a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction" (Lévi-Strauss, 1965: 105). But, since many apparent contradictions are, in fact, real, one story follows another as each attempts to overcome the contradictions left by its predecessor. Thus, in the more general conception, myth is the sum of all these stories; such that "myth

grows spiral-wise until the intellectual impulse which has originated it is exhausted" (105).

Returning now to the first quotation from Lévi-Strauss, in which mythic thought is compared to science, it may be equally valid to say of science that it does not appear mythic precisely because it is the myth in which, or whereby, we live, the series of 'stories' that have arisen over the last several centuries to explain all the apparent contradictions we find in our environment. Yet the contradictions remain, or new contradictions are continually being uncovered; hence, science continues, constituting innumerable attempts to explain these remaining contradictions. Now these explanations appear to us as anything but 'mythic': they are '*scientific*', which is to say 'valid', as opposed to pre-scientific thought, which has thereby been shown to be 'invalid'.

It is therefore a characteristic of all myth that the term seems least appropriate when applied to a way of perceiving reality that is still in fashion. The Ptolemaic universe was neither primitive nor mythic, but pervaded its era; similarly the Newtonian universe. It is only from our 'scientific' perspective that those universes are no longer deemed valid (though they may still be deemed appropriate). Yet contradictions remain in the environment that cannot be resolved by our science; when these contradictions are shown to be fundamental, our science may collapse as readily as its forebears. To borrow from the discussion, there is therefore no real 'contradiction' between paradigm and myth. The latter may be seen as narrowly as a particular

story that manifests the (structural) characteristics of myth, or as broadly as the collection of all narratives that inform, support, and contain a particular civilization for a given period.

Myth and Cinema

In the first chapter we examined, briefly, the consequences of applying a particular definition of myth to the criticism of a particular film deemed to present 'mythic qualities'. That critique was a single experiment in the application of myth as defined by Mircea Eliade (Comstock: 598). Given the preceding definition of myth derived from Lévi-Strauss, we may now expand this experiment slightly to answer a more general question: Whether "certain popular movies have a great deal in common with myths"? (Drummond: 1). Following Lévi-Strauss, Drummond defines myths as "stories that propose solutions to fundamental questions about human existence" (Drummond: 1): "Myth does not validate experience; it makes it possible" (Drummond: 2).

Drummond questions the traditional view of such popular movies as *Star Wars*. In considering the members of their audience,

The question is whether they are escaping *from* something or escaping *to* an underlying reality—a Dreamtime—that is only intuitively sensed in ordinary time. I think that they are doing the latter and, moreover, that what really packs them in is a movie's resonance with irreducible problems, dilemmas, tensions in human life. Movies as myth do not avoid contradiction: they revel in it. (Drummond: 6)

In analysing the manner in which popular movies seek to overcome the contradictions inherent in human existence,

Movies have to be examined in a direct, empirical, anthropological fashion that pays close attention to their concrete detail—their *content*—and identifies relationships among the movies as part of a cultural structure. (5)

Here is an important point, which also marks an obvious point of departure between Drummond's approach and our own.

Drummond identifies his approach "simply as a piece of cultural analysis, or *semiotics*" (Drummond: 8). We may suggest that such an approach is no longer possible, especially if it is to proceed so naively as to ignore *all* of the work on film semiotics by Christian Metz and those he has influenced. Beyond this, as an approach which raises *content* to the primary focus, Drummond's ignores every characteristic of the film medium that makes it a unique form of cultural expression. Hence, to complete a comparative analysis of the results of the interpretation of religious cinema as myth *versus* the results of the interpretation of religious cinema as parable requires a more thorough examination than that of Drummond. We now proceed through Drummond's exposition, then move beyond it to provide further levels of comparison.

The broad, all-pervasive definition derived above from Lévi-Strauss through Foucault finds support in Drummond's own more encompassing definition of myth as a powerful cultural force:

The culture-making processes of myth not only order items of experience (to produce a simple catalogue of the natural world) but also, and more fundamentally, struggle with and resolve the very concept of generativity itself. Culture does not consist simply in creating categories of objects and beings in the world—a static classificatory system—but also formulates for the first time the proposition that things are created and destroyed, that individuals are born and die. Creation, transformation, and destruction are names we give to processes that have no material embodiment and hence no ostensive definition—we know about them only because of the conceptual organization of culture. (Drummond: 10)

Drummond thereupon derives “three semiotic dimensions” in an “outline of a semiotic model of culture”: “animals↔machines”; “We↔Other”; and “Life Force↔Death Force” (19). Each dimension defines a tension between irreducible elements exhibiting difference; all constitute “identifiable units that possess the characteristics of generativity” (18).

“Generativity” is understood as a “*process*”: it is the process whereby “human identity is perpetually redefined because it is a creative act or series of acts, a synthesis and not an accomplished fact” (Drummond: 16). In turn,

In this model, *humanity* is situated at the switchover point or center of tension between opposing ideational constructions. Human identity is not distinct from animal, machine, and suprahuman forces, but is essentially composed of those interacting concepts. Humanity as defined by the semiotic model is an unending dialectical confrontation of polarized identities that individuals believe themselves and objects in their environment to possess. (24)

It is this multi-dimensional “dialectical confrontation” that myths in general, and certain popular movies in particular, seek to resolve:

In *Star Wars*, for example, Obi-Wan-Kenobi and The Jedi Knights embody, with comic book clarity, the otherwise ineffable presence that many twentieth century Americans feel to be a part of their lives. And the Force can be used for good or evil—for Life or Death—as Obi-Wan-Kenobi and his former pupil, Darth Vader, demonstrate. The two opponents represent opposing poles of the Force. The Life Force and Death Force, Obi-Wan-Kenobi and Darth Vader, then interact with elements of the other two semiotic dimensions to produce full significations of characters and actions. The Death Star is more than a technological artifact of the enemy; it is a metaphorical extension of Darth Vader's own pathological hatred and thus signifies the Death Force. At the other extreme, R2D2 is not just Luke Skywalker's robot assistant; his/her/its spontaneity and independence in the face of its droid limitations attest to a source of generativity that is larger than life, more resilient than technology, and expressive of the Life Force. (25)

A strikingly similar analysis could be conducted with respect to Stanley Kubrick's *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968) by substituting HAL and the Discovery for Darth Vader and the Death Star, respectively, and Bowman and his space pod for Obi-Wan-Kenobi and R2D2, respectively. But the very similarity of the analyses lends credence to the doubts raised about the *cinematic* relevance of their results. And it is likely that Drummond would not hesitate to state that his conclusions were never meant to apply *cinematically*; rather, his is a general cultural analysis intended to overcome certain deficiencies in "symbolic or semiotic analysis" that permit the latter to treat "cultural productions" as no more than "a fixed quantity, a set of discrete elements and relationships", and thereby obscure "the generative nature of culture" (29).

To proceed to the more fundamentally *cinematic*: myth implies the conception that the essential cinematic experience represents a

true resolution of the contradictions at all levels of interpretation. At the first level, the cinematic image is never truly acknowledged to be a composite of two successive frames (nor is such an acknowledgment necessary for the appreciation of a film as entertainment). At the second level, the general consensus ensures that, at 24 frames per second, a series of unrelated images rarely, if ever, occurs, except as a special effect. At the third level, both consensus and tradition ensure that few, if any, images incorporate unfamiliar elements, such that the film seen forms part of the world known.

Thus, it is possible to conceive of cinema in (at least) two ways: the first, depicted in the earlier portion of this chapter, involves recognition—but no necessary reduction—of the contradictions inherent in the technology and physiology of the cinematic process; the second, derived from the foregoing discussion of myth, involves reduction—but no necessary recognition—of the contradictions inherent in the technology and physiology of the cinematic process. The first conception leads to a theory of religious cinema as virtual religious experience, whereas the second conception leads to a theory of religious cinema as religious experience *per se*: since myth as story represents the paradigm within which it is told, it both constitutes the sum of all experience (and its interpretation and expression) acceptable to that paradigm and ignores the sum of all experience (and its interpretation and expression) unacceptable to that paradigm; if the paradigm defines and accepts certain dimensions of experience as religious, then those dimensions of experience will be incorporated as

an integral part of that paradigm; thus, myth as story represents those dimensions of experience, since the function of myth as defined above remains to resolve apparent contradictions (including secular/religious, natural/supernatural, *etc.*) and reinforce the dominant mode of interpretation.

The hypothesis that religious cinema is religious experience ignores certain tensions and contradictions inherent in the cinematic process. To the extent that this *ignorance* is maintained in spite of those tensions and contradictions, the hypothesis is itself representative of a particular paradigm, in which the film medium serves as both entertainment and propaganda. To the extent that the *hypothesis* is maintained, the rôle of the film medium as both entertainment and propaganda cannot be overcome. Thus, every act of watching a film becomes an act of submission to the paradigm that gives rise to the hypothesis. It is for precisely this reason that fundamentalist sects forbid any attendance in movie theatres: permission to attend would inevitably result in submission to a forbidden paradigm because the possibility that the film medium might subvert that paradigm is not recognized. In fact, there is no structural difference between the fundamentalist paradigm and the paradigm that gives rise to the equation of religious cinema with religious experience. What the fundamentalist denies is not the equation, but that *that* is religious experience, because *that* religious experience calls *this* religious experience into question. Similarly, the hypothesis that religious cinema is religious experience denies world as world and asserts world as reali-

ty.

Whether from the fundamentalist perspective or from the perspective of the hypothesis that religious cinema is religious experience, the concept of religious cinema as virtual religious experience is 'dangerous': it introduces the possibility of illusion, and therefore of relativity, at all levels of perception, for religious *cinema* as virtual religious experience in turn introduces the possibility of religious *experience* as virtual religious experience; in other words, experience defined as paradigmatic is inevitably questioned precisely because it is defined as paradigmatic. But to question the dominant paradigm is to recognize it as such, thence to recognize its tensions and contradictions and lose the comfort that their resolution within the paradigm provides. In the interpretation of *2001: A Space Odyssey* as myth, there lies the assumption that the opposing forces represent physical and technical absolutes: space, being a vacuum, is inimical to life as we know it. Poole dies because his suit is depressurized; Bowman must survive the transfer from his space pod to the Discovery without the benefit of his helmet. To call the danger of a vacuum into question is not to suggest that *our astronauts* try to survive space walks without space suits (that would be suicidal), but to suggest that *life* may be possible in space.

The ending of *2001* presents such a possibility, for we see a foetus (presumably Bowman reborn) within its protective membrane, but we recognize no protective clothing as our conception of life would require it. And seeing the foetus, we are left with the question: If

that is possible for a human being, what are the limits? Thus, *2001* represents myth only to the extent that its own internal contradictions remain either hidden or apparently resolved. To bring these contradictions to light and recognize their lack of resolution is to move toward an analysis of *2001* as parable. Thus, *2001* provides a multitude of elements that allow analysis of the film as either myth or parable. The questions that this raises are: Which is the dominant analysis? Does the analysis of *2001* as parable supersede, and therefore make obsolete, the analysis of the film as myth? If *2001* embodies mythic elements, do these disappear when the analysis of the film as parable is initiated or completed? These questions are diversions. Religious cinema as virtual religious experience never questions the analysis of film as myth; in fact, there is much value in such an analysis. Rather, religious cinema as virtual religious experience (as stated previously) simply denies the equation of religious cinema with religious experience.

The analysis of film as myth allows the possibility of myth as *myth*. The analysis of film as religious experience, on the other hand, denies this possibility, for there remains no barrier to the full extension of such an analysis to religious cinema as religious experience. Such an extension inevitably leads to a reduction of religious experience as experience of the Wholly Other. Nevertheless, within the domain and context of our thesis there remains a strong statement on the analysis of film as myth, namely: myth as an expression and representation of religious experience must be denied; in its

stead, we must emphasize myth as a desire for, conjecture about, and reduction of religious experience. Myth as paradigm is both inevitably necessary and inevitably temporary. Within the bounds of this cautionary statement, whose verity we do not deny, the analysis of film as myth is not subordinate to the analysis of film as parable, nor does the latter supersede, or make obsolete, the former; the mythic elements remain both when the analysis of film as parable is initiated and when it is completed. In fact, the mythic elements are *required* for the parabolic elements to be determined and highlighted; without the former, the latter would not exist, for there can be no paradox if there is no meaning to give rise to the very conflict of meaning (or interpretation) that gives rise to paradox.

The true distinction, then, is between (a) the analysis of film as myth and (b) the analysis of film from the perspective of a particular myth (paradigm) that denies the existence of paradoxical elements in either the film medium generally or specific films individually. The former analysis we affirm and support, though it does not form the most important component of this dissertation, since it has been the dominant form of analysis of films as examples of religious cinema; the latter analysis we question, indeed categorically deny. This categorical denial is grounded in our own preceding analysis of the essential cinematic experience. Thus, 'religious cinema as virtual religious experience' survives application both to the analysis of film as myth and to the conception of the film medium as mythic, provided myth is always understood as a paradigm, one possibility

among many. Far from being a diversion, then, the foregoing discussion of myth and cinema, and the conception of myth that underlies it, is integral to the thesis of this dissertation, since our understanding of parable is derived from, and can only exist as a contrast to, myth.

Cinema and Parable

Given this perspective, we are now in a position to extract the parallels between Crossan's position *vis-à-vis* the parables of Jesus and our position with respect to the essential cinematic experience. As mentioned above, the key to these parallels is the unity of experience and expression. We have defined the essential cinematic experience such that it is not possible to conceive a film apart from the experience of it. This is not meant to imply that it is impossible to imagine a film; that is part of the process of creation. However, it is enlightening to discover that most filmmakers rely on a set of devices that enhance their ability to imagine the scenes they wish to capture on film; these devices include everything from hand-drawn sketches to rehearsals using video-cameras.

The focus of all filmmaking activity is the perfection of the final audience experience. The focus of the parables of Jesus was the original experience that underlay them, the experience that listeners were invited to participate in. In both cases, the final expression cannot be conceived apart from the experience it encompasses and encourages.

However, the parables of Jesus are linguistic devices; therefore, what is true of them may also be true of all religious language. We have defined the essential cinematic experience as a necessary participation, structurally unique. Is there still room for a structural parallel?

Both parables and essential cinematic experience resist reduction. Let us examine the essential cinematic experience in the light of the paradoxical force of the parables. At the first level, internal to the experience, it is possible to imagine an event that is completely outside our ordinary experience, yet so carefully crafted, that it becomes part of our experience, though the reality would be impossible to achieve. This is surely part of the success of *2001: A Space Odyssey*. It did much to define the standards of our lay concepts of space travel in the foreseeable future. It also condemned to the realm of purely fictional entertainment all previous attempts to portray similar events.

Of course, at this level, *2001* functions not as parable, but as myth: Why do so many return to the film so often? The film provides an opportunity for virtual participation in an event that lies at the core of so many of our hopes and dreams. The film does not shatter our world view, it extends it. Few are the members of the audience who wish to resist this extension; rather, to return repeatedly is a sign of the desire for fulfillment of this extension. But this is not relevant to our discussion. To examine a particular film at this stage is premature. We must continue to map the inherent structural parallels between film and parable. Our initial goal is the determina-

tion of the degree of, and the potential for, differentiation within the essential cinematic experience.

At the second level, which is external to the essential cinematic experience, the audience is merely a passive participant in the events portrayed. The noises of the accompanying members of the audience, the distractions of drink and popcorn, the realization that this is, after all, only a movie, all combine to reduce the full impact of the essential cinematic experience. The skill of the craftsman is at stake: the more skillful the filmmaker, the less distracted the audience. The movement of attention from the moment of the dimming of the lights to the very depths of the story can be followed, if only subjectively. It is primarily the suspension of disbelief; but this suspension is almost mechanical.

It is this movement of audience attention, this willing suspension of disbelief, that leads to the tension inherent in the second level at which the essential cinematic experience manifests irreducible paradox. It is noteworthy that the most simple forms of visual imagery can be the most effective in capturing the full attention of the audience: a face, immobile; a field of wheat, waving gently in the wind; a single individual, moving slowly from one side of the image to the other at great distance from the camera. The effect of such techniques is to force attention: nothing else is happening. The skill lies in the absence of boredom. The soundtrack is often used to assist this technique.

The images do not last forever; when the scene changes, the

image comes to an end, although the memory remains. This gives rise to tension: on the one hand, there is the memory of the past image, on the other, there is the presence of the new image. The two are in relation. This relation is founded on difference. But the difference can only exist as a result of the experience, it cannot exist within it. The immediate experience remains undifferentiated; the image of the moment is a structural unity precisely because it is an immediate experience, although it may contain a multitude of separate signs, symbols and signifiers. However, this is true only at the level of least significance: the more diverse and meaningful the individual elements of the composite, the less monolithic the appearance of the whole under 'objective' (read: *post-mortem*) analysis.

At the third level, external to both experience and expression, there is tension between the film event as a whole, irrespective of content, and the everyday reality that exists apart from it. Thus, whereas the second level requires a limited degree of interpretation of the discrete images that constitute the film event, the third level does not; the pure experience suffices to distinguish the event from its absence. The audience has little control over its visual field, nor does the possibility of movement outside the bounds of that visual field exist, except as a random distraction. The immediate future will unfold according to a predetermined script.

Before and after the film, the visual field of the audience is much less precisely determined. Immediately before and after the film, the members of the audience take and leave their seats, with

very little evidence of overall coordination of effort. The greater the temporal distance from the film event, the less predictable the actions of the individual members of the audience. Thus, the film event is a device whereby the filmmaker can exercise control over a group of people, if only for a limited time. Although prior submission to this control is voluntary, the degree of submission can be manipulated once the film begins.

Before the film begins, the essential cinematic experience does not exist, although it may be anticipated. During the film event, the immediate experience is that of the film. When the film comes to an end, the essential cinematic experience as a whole becomes a memory. Thus, the movement from anticipation through experience to memory is, more simply, the movement from 'that' to 'this' to 'that' ($a \rightarrow b \rightarrow a$ or, more accurately, $a \rightarrow b \rightarrow a'$). The movement represents a necessary shift in perspective, irrespective of the actual content of the essential cinematic experience. Since this shift in perspective is, by definition, irreducible, it results in permanent tension. the memory of the event is never identical to the event itself, nor is the context of the memory ever identical to the memory itself.

The Essential Religious Cinema

These, then, are the rough structural parallels to the parables of Jesus that the essential cinematic experience exhibits. Yet, they do not immediately advance the cause of differentiation within the es-

essential cinematic experience. At the first level, as described above, the essential cinematic experience exhibits a degree of differentiation, but this differentiation is a function of the *content* of the image. At the second level, this differentiation is a function of the *form* of the image. At the third level, it is a function of experience and memory, but remains subject to the identity and specific characteristics of the immediate experience and the particular memory.

If we were now to press the issue of differentiation, such that the film event is manifestly religious or secular based on certain fundamental characteristics of the essential cinematic experience, our conclusion would be weak, for it would be indistinguishable from the assertion that language manifests a similar degree of differentiation. In fact, if the latter were true, then the parables of Jesus would be examples of religious language irrespective of context and audience. But, as we have seen, the parables are one with the experience they document and cannot be conceived apart from it. Thus, the context within which the parables are examples of religious language is that of the religious experience they document. And the audience that is required to bring this context to life is an audience that participates in the religious experience they document.

If these restrictions were removed, then the assertion that the parables of Jesus are examples of religious language would also be weak. Here we have yet another paradox, but it is symptomatic of the problem of language and ultimate reference. Language cannot refer to God unless God is already present in the experience that the

language describes. And that experience is by definition participatory, by which we may conclude that language is merely the first vehicle; thereafter, the experience is its own vehicle. If we now return to the essential cinematic experience, we are in a position to identify the minimum subsidiary characteristics to allow differentiation.

The essential cinematic experience is experience in its own right. However, to the extent that it reflects or represents another experience external to itself, it is a *simulacrum*. And as a *simulacrum*, it is to some degree unreal, an abstraction, the product of the filmmaker's imagination, since it cannot completely encompass the original experience. Thus, the essential cinematic experience is *virtual* experience. By virtual experience, no more than a simple 'as if' is implied: we experience the film event 'as if' it were truly the original experience it reflects or represents. If we define the original experience as religious, then we may experience its cinematic reproduction as virtual religious experience precisely to the extent that it appears to recreate the original.

It is crucial to understand that we have established no restrictions as to the *content* of the essential cinematic experience. Our only requirement is that the latter manifest itself in such a way that it appear 'as if' it were religious experience. Thus, our thesis is a simple equation whose validity is purely a function of interpretation. It follows that what will be interpreted as religious cinema by one audience may be interpreted quite differently by another. Herein lie the minimum subsidiary characteristics of the essential cinematic experi-

ence that allow differentiation: they are subjective. The audience remains the sole proprietor of the topography of differentiation. Both the critic and the theoretician must acknowledge the primacy of the cinematic experience *per se*.

Nevertheless, the critic and the theoretician would be justified in separating the audience from the essential cinematic experience if the audience failed to do so itself. In the case of the parables of Jesus, if the listener remains locked within the experience they encompass, the ultimate intent of the parables is aborted. The experience must not become an end in itself, for its very subjectivity mitigates its status as an absolute. So, too, the essential cinematic experience: if it becomes an end in itself, then it no longer operates at the level of virtual religious experience. Thus, our thesis actually comprises two components: both the aforementioned subjective interpretation and an objective interpretation, which functions as its corollary.

The objective corollary demands that virtual religious experience never be confused with the original experience it represents. Religious cinema is an artifice, albeit a subjective one. While religious cinema can be defined as virtual religious experience, virtual religious experience cannot be defined as religious experience *per se*. Thus, there is a fourth level at which the paradoxical force of both the parables of Jesus and the essential cinematic experience as virtual religious experience are manifested: here, the tension lies between participation in the reality of the experience that underlies the expression and the realization that the very reality of that experience is a construct, a

phantasm that has no objective existence and no ultimate referent.

The theatrical parallel to this cinematic conception exists in Bertolt Brecht's "*Verfremdungseffekt (V-Effekt)*": "Eine verfremdende Abbildung ist eine solche, die den Gegenstand zwar erkennen, ihn aber doch zugleich fremd erscheinen läßt" (Brecht: 32). In other words, the 'familiar' is presented in such a way that it is *recognized*, but is no longer *familiar*:

Die neuen Verfremdungen [as opposed to those found in classical and mediæval theatre] sollten nur den gesellschaftlich beeinflus-
baren Vorgängen den Stempel des Vertrauten wegnehmen, der sie
heute vor dem Eingriff bewahrt. (33)

The "*V-Effekt*" results "not simply [in] the breaking of illusion" (Willett: 177); nor does it imply "alienating' the spectator in the sense of making him hostile to the play" (177). Rather:

It is a matter of detachment, of reorientation: exactly what Shelley meant when he wrote that poetry 'makes familiar objects to be as if they were not familiar', or Schopenhauer when he claimed that art must show 'common objects of experience in a light that is at once clear and unfamiliar'. (177)

Yet our points of view differ: Brecht writes from the perspective of the *creator* of *theatrical* pieces, whereas this dissertation is written from the perspective of the *critic* of *cinematic* pieces. Thus, Brecht elaborates techniques (and a theoretical stance) that foster the achievement of the "*V-Effekt*," whereas we describe approaches (and a theoretical stance) that highlight the phantasmal nature of the es-

essential cinematic experience *per se*.

Here, then, are the objective equivalents to the aforementioned subjective characteristics of the essential cinematic experience that allow differentiation. It is not possible to define religious cinema as such unless this definition remains irreducible: *religious cinema exists as the tension between the film event in its objective and subjective manifestations*. If the two manifestations are reconciled, the tension dissipates, denying the possibility of religious cinema. The audience that identifies a film as religious has already denied the very possibility. On the other hand, the critic who sows seeds of doubt in the mind of an audience opens the way to a full and virulent awareness of the paradoxical force of a particular film. If religious cinema is virtual religious experience, then its fundamental characteristic is that it remain permanently distinct from the original experience it seeks to represent.

The gap between the virtual religious experience of religious cinema and the paradigmatic religious experience that religious cinema seeks to represent is pervaded by silence. This silence is the absence of correlation between the experiences on either side of the gap. The silence issues a challenge to filmmaker and audience alike. It is tempting to both to fill the silence with a multitude of pseudonymous signifiers. Traditional 'religious cinema history' abounds with examples. The filmmaker need only borrow from the vast library of symbols associated with each of the major religious traditions. Both audience and critic will find such symbols even where the filmmaker ne-

ver thought to place them. The erosion of the silence is then inevitable.

As this erosion proceeds, there is an *appearance* of meaning: the erosion of silence places elements on either side of the gap in fortuitous conjunction; this fortuitous conjunction, in turn, fosters the formal conjunction that gives the appearance of meaning. This appearance is reinforced by the appeal of immediate experience that is the hallmark of all cinema. The audience literally *desires* this immediate experience. Its temptation cannot be denied; temptation and desire are a function of distance from the original. Thus, films that present some portion of the life of Jesus appeal to any audience that seeks to understand the circumstances of the origin of Christianity at the *experiential* level. Yet, any understanding that can be derived from such experiences is limited. If the audience believes the immediate experience, it is but further removed from the original, for the immediate is replete with hidden contemporary references.

These hidden contemporary references are the cinematic humus of the immediate experience. They foster the appearance of meaning simply because they allow it. They act as anchors whereby the audience may orient itself. The more disorienting the immediate experience, the greater the desire on the part of the audience to follow the anchor lines to their source. Since their source is no more or less than their own significance, which is, in turn, merely determined by the contemporary paradigm, there is no ultimate profit in proceeding along this route. It must be resisted. Although it is indescribably

more difficult to orient on the silence *as silence*, this is the route the audience must take if the possibility of religious cinema is to exist.

We have prescribed a very restrictive approach to the phenomenon of religious cinema, in which there appears little room for the æsthetic dimension of the religious film. That is dictated by logic of our debate. As we have defined it, religious cinema does not permit the addition of æsthetic information unless that information is subordinated to the virtual religious experience that defines its existence. This should not be taken to discourage the filmmaker from incorporating an appreciation for the æsthetic structure of the essential cinematic experience in the religious film. Rather, it requires that the filmmaker be considered no more than one of many people who contribute to the essential cinematic experience we define as virtual religious experience. Thus, the filmmaker cannot define the æsthetics of religious cinema because religious cinema remains the preserve of the audience.

By the same token, the critic cannot define the horizon of religious cinema, because this horizon has no fixed location, but depends rather on the vagaries of the audience and the context of presentation. If it were possible to conceive the projection of a film portraying the life of Jesus to His original disciples, it is likely that the effect of that film would be drastically different from its effect upon the modern audience for which it was created. Rather, the critic must become one with the audience, so that the resultant analysis is a part of the experience it seeks to analyse. Although this merging of analy-

sis and experience is more difficult to achieve than traditional critique, it remains the only valid option open to the critic, who must nonetheless acknowledge the primacy of the original essential cinematic experience

Parable and Religious Cinema

There remains the problem of the formal separation of cinema, which comprises all films, from religious cinema, which does not necessarily comprise all films. In the case of the parables of Jesus, the formal separation between all language and religious language is maintained by two devices. The first device is context. The original parables are attributed by the New Testament authors to Jesus. The parables themselves appear within the New Testament. Thus, context leads to the association of the parables of Jesus with Christianity in its various manifestations. If one divorces the parables of Jesus from their context, their similarity to other parables in both secular and religious, Christian and non-Christian, literature becomes manifest (see, for example, Crossan, 1976: 99-114). Thus, the divorce of the parables of Jesus from their context is a 'dangerous' act: it may lead to a less vehement distinction between Christianity and the other religions.

There is (therefore) a second device that maintains the formal separation between all language and religious language in the case of the parables of Jesus. Many, though by no means all, of the parables

begin with an expression that focuses their interpretation:

He said, "The kingdom of God is like this. A man scatters seed on the land, he goes to bed at night and gets up in the morning, and the seed sprouts and grows—how, he does not know. The ground produces a crop by itself, first the blade, then the ear, then full-grown corn in the ear; but as soon as the crop is ripe, he plies the sickle, because harvest-time has come."

He said also, "How shall we picture the kingdom of God, or by what parable shall we describe it? It is like the mustard-seed, which is smaller than any seed in the ground at its sowing. But once sown, it springs up and grows taller than any other plant, and forms branches so large that the birds can settle in its shade." (*Mark 4: 26-32 (NEB)*)

"The kingdom of Heaven is like treasure lying buried in a field. The man who found it, buried it again; and for sheer joy went and sold everything he had, and bought that field.

"Here is another picture of the kingdom of Heaven. A merchant looking out for fine pearls found one of very special value, so he went and sold everything he had, and bought it.

"Again the kingdom of Heaven is like a net let down into the sea, where fish of every kind were caught in it. When it was full, it was dragged ashore. Then the men sat down and collected the good fish into pails and threw the worthless away." (*Matthew 13: 44-48 (NEB)*)

The conjunction of story, or "*story event*" (Crossan, 1975: 87), and expressions such as "The kingdom of God is like..." or "The kingdom of Heaven is like..." ensure that the purpose of the parable in its context is understood. Even outside this context, however, the general purpose remains more or less intact. Following Ricoeur, we use "qualifier" (Ricoeur, 1975a: 33) to designate the expression that helps to keep this purpose intact (in this sense, the function of the qualifier may have changed since the time of Jesus).

To summarize, the combination of context and qualifier serves to identify the parables of Jesus as religious texts generally and Chris-

tian parables specifically. Using this model as a guideline, though not necessarily extrapolating from it, we return to the problem of the formal separation between cinema and religious cinema; we suggest that the problem may be handled in a similar fashion. First, context: Cecil B. DeMille's *The Ten Commandments* would certainly receive a variety of interpretations if shown to different audiences. For example, if screened within a graduate seminar in anthropology, it might be examined as a primitive attempt to understand the (pre-)history of part of western civilization and/or Jewish/Christian/Muslim origins. Again, if screened before the participants in a sociological conference, it might be understood as a (fairly successful) attempt to impose a particular cultural and religious perspective on a widely divergent North American audience. Or, if screened to the members of a mainstream protestant congregation, it might be recognized as an overly literal, but perhaps morally justifiable, interpretation of the Old Testament. Finally, if screened within a fundamentalist gathering, it might even be welcomed as an accurate representation of actual historical events. (Of course, were it to be shown to an audience of students in film theory, it would be instantly recognized as one man's way to make money!)

Far from being a diversion, this discussion of context is quite relevant to our—and any other—definition of religious cinema, although it is clear that the issue is immense in scope. Since our theoretical and critical perspectives focus exclusively on the audience and ignore the pre-screening history of the film (unless the latter becomes

relevant to audience prejudice, as might be the case with some controversial or highly-publicized film), context becomes, in fact, one of the fundamental determinants of audience reaction and interpretation. Prediction of audience reaction and interpretation based on context, however, is foolhardy at best and should not be considered relevant. Thus, context is relevant to our definition of religious cinema only to the extent that it is recognized as a determinant. It is not necessary to list and describe all possible contexts; nor would this be possible, since the list would be endless, subject to further expansion and redefinition with every new film and every new variation of religious community. Rather, context becomes relevant to the exploration of the reaction of a particular audience to a particular film. This must occur *after* a particular screening or series of screenings. The only film that fulfills this requirement in the present context is Werner Herzog's *Herz aus Glas* (the present context being a function of this dissertation and the perspective it advances).

Since context permits a wide range of interpretations to be imposed on any film, it is necessary to resort to another device to narrow the range of interpretations. Context is already a narrowing agent, but the dimension of narrowing shifts from context to context. To narrow the range of interpretations to the specifically religious dimension requires a qualifier. While context is, by definition, an external to the film, the qualifier is, also by definition, an internal to the film. It is only through the fortuitous conjunction of these internal and external 'drivers' that religious cinema is possible; in fact, it

is that same fortuitous conjunction *that gives rise to* religious cinema. Thus, while our thesis *per se* describes *what religious cinema is*, it is our description of context and qualifier that identifies, at least in part, *how religious cinema arises*. Further, the discussion of the qualifier returns us to the traditional forms of religious cinema criticism, albeit with a different motive; for it is here that the relevance of traditional religious cinema criticism is revived. Since the qualifier is internal to the film, it is necessarily a derivative of the content, even if this content be understood as the *structure* of the (*particular*) film. Since traditional religious cinema criticism focuses almost exclusively on content, it is well adapted to the identification and interpretation of the qualifier.

To begin with an example, we may note that a film dealing with the life of Jesus has that as its content. If this content closely parallels the apparent content of one of the New Testament gospels, then it may also exhibit structural similarities to that gospel. Both narrative and structural parallels serve as the qualifier that says, for example, 'The kingdom of God is like...'. Here traditional religious cinema criticism shines, for it is able then to turn to Milos Forman's *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest* (1975) and isolate the elements of that film that give rise to the qualifier 'The life of Jesus is like a man who entered a modern [in 1965, perhaps] insane asylum and...' (cf., Myers and Kerr). Thus, whether a film exhibits overt religious content, as in a film dealing specifically with the life of Jesus, or possible religious content, as in a film dealing with certain aspects of

the life of Joan of Arc, or covert religious content, such that analysis is necessary to highlight that content, as in *Cuckoo's Nest*, the content *can be analysed* to highlight the religious qualifier. Of course, just as an audience is justified in classifying *The Ten Commandments* as a religious film, so also is an audience justified in denying such a classification to *Cuckoo's Nest*. Therein lies the inherent weakness of the traditional, content-oriented approach to religious cinema criticism.

This weakness is much clearer here than where it was first identified in the previous chapter. The origin of the weakness lies in a confusion of reference. This confusion of reference allows the substitution of the apparent reference of the 'religious' film, which is identified through the film's content, for the true reference, which cannot be identified except through participation in that reference: the essential cinematic experience which, in the case of religious cinema, is further encountered as virtual religious experience. The substitution of apparent reference for true reference is found in the earliest works on religious cinema; thus,

il existe une corrélation extrêmement étroite entre la qualité religieuse obtenue, et le « milieu-moyen » employé pour l'obtenir. Autrement dit (et cela n'est paradoxal qu'en apparence, et ici aussi toute l'histoire de l'art est là pour nous le confirmer) la qualité religieuse d'une œuvre dépend beaucoup moins de son contenu au sens strict, de son fond, de sa matière, que de sa forme, ou plutôt de ses « formes ». (Ayfre, 1953: 30)

This approach leads Ayfre (who must nevertheless be lauded for one

of the most thorough analyses of religious cinema to-date) to a conclusion that defines the 'religious' of religious cinema as an evocative force; this permits much wider application than simply to the overtly religious film, but it does not overcome the substitution of apparent reference for true reference, for it relies on an understanding of religious experience as a formal, external, objectifiable complement to 'secular' experience, both of which are cultural phenomena. The referent of religious cinema is religion, but the latter largely as a form of cultural expression.

The substitution of apparent reference for true reference remains in more contemporary approaches to religious cinema; for example:

Notre hypothèse de travail, qui ferait converger toutes les lignes de forces ésotériques, y comprises celles qui figurent dans *L'Art magique* composé par André Breton et dont les références à Baudelaire (la « forêt de symboles ») ne sont pas ici la moindre caution, c'est que le cinématographe permet de laisser entrevoir—à l'insu même de l'auteur du film—tout un réseau de significations latentes dans le déroulement de l'aventure humaine en elle-même ou en ses relations avec le tissu cosmique. Ne pourrait-on appliquer au septième art le texte de Claudel que nous lisons dans *La Perle noire* et qui contient le mot utilisé par Bazin: « Nous allons des choses visibles aux choses invisibles, non pas toujours comme de l'effet à la cause, mais comme du signe au signifié, et non pas tant par les chemins de la logique que par ceux de l'analogie. » (Agel, 1976: 33)

While Agel's approach is clearly more in keeping with contemporary hermeneutics (and therefore includes a discussion on the merits of the work of Christian Metz in the light of the work of Paul Ricoeur, among others), the critical method it provides is essentially no differ-

ent than that of Ayfre, resulting in similar critical analyses.

If we return once more to the parables of Jesus, we note that the combination of story event and qualifier serves to refer, not to the qualifier, but beyond it to the experience that underlies it (*cf.*, Ricoeur, 1975a: 32-34). Thus, the parables of Jesus refer, not to the kingdom of God, but to Jesus' experience thereof or, more precisely, his experience of the *kingship* of God; and the latter not as some future event or circumstance, but as an experience both current and immediate (*cf.*, Crossan, 1973a: 23-36). Thus, the reference is not truly such, for there is no direct line between the qualifier 'The kingdom of God is like...' and the experience of the kingship of God; it is an abrogated reference, an impossible reference, for how does one move from hearing the parable to experiencing the kingship of God? The path is, in fact, not such, nor even a detour, but rather a 'twist', a sudden shift toward an unexpected dimension. There is, on the one hand, the parable in its objective manifestation as a spoken or written text and, on the other hand, the experience that both underlies and supersedes it.

The literary technique employed to initiate this twist is reversal. The reversal is a function of the discrepancy between "the *structure of expectation* on the part of the hearer and... the *structure of expression* on the part of the speaker" (Crossan, 1975: 66). In the case of the parable of the mustard seed quoted earlier, this reversal may be illustrated as in figure 1.




Figure 1

(The structure of figure 1, like similar illustrations elsewhere in this dissertation, is borrowed from Crossan, 1975: 66-67.) The hearer expects a story about small seeds growing into small trees and large seeds growing into large trees. This expectation is reversed by the speaker, such that small seeds grow into large trees (and, extrapolating, large seeds grow into small trees)

Traditional New Testament exegesis identifies the parables of Jesus as analogies (*cf.*, Jülicher). Thus, the parable of the mustard seed leads to the statement that the kingdom of God represents a reversal of existing structures, be these patterns of growth or relations of power. Modern New Testament exegesis denies the analogical function of the parables of Jesus, focusing instead on the consistency of the reversal of expectation and concluding that this consistency points to the reversal of expectation as a permanent condition of human experience of the Wholly Other (*cf.*, Crossan). Thus, if the hearer's conclusion upon hearing the parable of the mustard seed is that small seeds grow into large trees, the impact of the parable has been stunted. Rather, given the contemporary paradigm, the proper con-

clusion is the realization that we should not pre-judge the outcome of the growth of any seed. Since this act of growth is aligned with the qualifier 'kingdom of God', the ultimate conclusion is the realization that we should not pre-judge the nature of that kingdom. Simply, the parables of Jesus reverse our expectations to 'twist' our attention away from particular expectation of any kind; in this context, the result is openness to the kingship of God as immediate experience.

It is clear that this 'twist' is fundamental to our argument. And it is this 'twist' that separates the perspective taken within this dissertation from what we refer to as 'traditional' religious cinema criticism. It is worth exploring the latter yet a little further, for there are instances therein that appear remarkably similar to our approach. Thus, John R. May adopts Crossan's five-fold spectrum of story, comments extensively on Crossan's definition of parable, but focuses largely on his definition of myth as the prime mode of the religious story in film (pages 32-43 in May and Bird). Similarly, Michael Bird follows Mircea Eliade's use of the term "hierophany" and aligns this use with an understanding of the "paradoxical nature of reality" to show how the *religious* film is at one and the same time both simply a film (*i.e.*, an example of artistic expression) and a "hierophanous manifestation" (pages 3-4 in May and Bird). Given their expositions, we consider it fair to state that neither Bird nor May would argue strongly for the illusory nature of the religious film; rather, their positions affirm the authenticity of the religious dimension in the 'religious' film, whether this dimension is manifested as

hierophany or myth.

If we argue for the illusory nature of the religious film, then we do not understand this to mean that all religious films are illusions, or that it is an illusion that religious films exist as such, rather, we suggest that at the core of every religious film there lies a twist that, if encountered, highlights the illusory nature of the experience that the religious film creates; similarly, we suggest that at the origin of the religious dimension of any film there lies a twist that, if encountered, brings to light the illusory nature of the experience that the religious dimension gives rise to (or exists as). This suggestion is grounded in our analysis of the essential cinematic experience. *It is precisely because the latter has been ignored in all religious cinema theory and criticism that our approach differs.* It is necessary to focus on the essential cinematic experience to arrive at, and maintain, our approach; the moment this focus is lost, our approach collapses, its position retaken by traditional religious cinema criticism.

The function of the twist that lies at the core of every religious film, or at the core of the religious dimension of any film, is twofold: it both aids the movement toward a religious interpretation and denies the completion of this interpretation. The parables of Jesus are not magic incantations that, if uttered, recreate the experience of the kingship of God. The latter is arrived at through a set of circumstances impossible to define with any degree of precision. Similarly, the religious film is not by its very nature religious, but only poten-

tially so; and the religious dimension of a film is not an automatic given, but only possibly present. The 'religious' of film is a variable set of circumstances that may or may not be recognized, even recognized, it is merely an interpretation. Thus, the consequence of our reliance on a particular understanding of the essential cinematic experience is that we are forced to acknowledge the need for a "discipline of seeing" (Dillenger: 307) to arrive at, and thereafter maintain, our perspective.

To state that the twist lies at the core of the religious film—or the religious dimension of a film—is not to say that it is a one dimensional phenomenon; for it is encountered at several levels of interpretation and is, in each case, itself an interpretation of the tension generated within that level. At the most immediate level, it arises from the tension created by the reversal of expectation in the story event (assuming that there is such a reversal, for this remains largely a function of content). At the next level, slightly more remote, it arises from the tension created by the dissonance of qualifier and story event; for if the story event is characterized by a reversal of expectation, then this reversal relies also on the assumption that the qualifier is not ordinarily associated with such a story event. At the most remote level, grounded in the essential cinematic experience, it arises from the tension between the entire film event in its objective and subjective manifestations (as stated earlier); here the objective manifestation is synonymous with the objectively identifiable components of the film that we classify as qualifier and story event

and the subjective manifestation is synonymous with the particular and individual experience of qualifier and story event as a dissonant conjunction

Thus, to the degree that the twist depends on a particular prejudice (different for every film and audience) to force tension, it is both an interpretative and subjective phenomenon. A particular perspective is required for the possibility of religious cinema to exist. But this is hardly a serious limitation. Religion, and the experience that underlies it in any of its varied forms, requires a particular perspective itself; were this not so, religion would be either universally absent or universally present and, in the latter case, identical in every instance. The parables of Jesus function as parables in the contemporary sense because every audience comprises many layers of prejudice which condition expectation; each of these layers arises from—and in turn gives to—a particular perspective

To the degree that it is possible to ignore the existence of one's prejudices in the face of glaring evidence thereof, to that precise degree religious cinema can cease to exist as such. Conversely, to the degree that it is possible to recognize and overcome one's prejudices when they are brought to light, to that precise degree religious cinema can become synonymous with almost any film event. The only qualification the latter statement requires is that there exist some objective qualifier that permits the attachment of the descriptor 'religious' to the particular film event. Our approach is therefore a hermeneutic one; that is, it requires, not a particular content, but a

particular mode of interpretation, derived from a particular theory of interpretation. Here we may pursue our 'twist' in the opposite direction from that which leads to traditional religious cinema criticism, to a point of intersection with certain more recent developments in film theory, in which contemporary hermeneutics (in particular, the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur) play a rôle.

It should be cautioned that, whereas our earlier pursuit of the 'twist' in the direction of traditional religious cinema was both devoid of peril (because this dissertation arose out of the inadequacies thereof) and necessary (because this dissertation serves as a critique thereof), the pursuit in the direction of film theory is both fraught with peril (because from that broader perspective inadequacies of this dissertation will be more visible) and extravagant (because this dissertation is not intended as a critique of the entire film theory complex, but of a particular subset thereof). The pursuit is nonetheless relevant, for it lends support to certain aspects of our argument. There is, moreover, some satisfaction to be derived from the realization that this dissertation, and the thesis it defends, neither arose out of, nor exists in, a vacuum.

Dudley Andrew identifies two different origins of the current interest in hermeneutics; these origins are represented by Paul Ricoeur and Roland Barthes. The key to Barthes' hermeneutics is interest "in pursuing not the text so much as that which the text insists upon" (Andrew, 1984: 184):

For Barthes, this referential aspect is essentially emotional. Texts in their most hieratic moments point to the inner states recognized by the reader as anxiety, waiting, jealousy, and so on. The text embodies these states carnally, and Barthes's [sic] direct, lengthy, unsystematic attention to them is meant to leave them open to an ongoing (re)reading. (184)

It will be recognized that this hermeneutic is somewhat foreign (which is not to say invalid) to our own, though not inimical to it.

More appropriate, especially in the light of our extensive reliance thereon, is the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur, the key to which is "the priority of discourse over meaning, of interpretation over structure" (Andrew, 1984: 182):

Analysis would try to fix the position of a text, whereas interpretation presumes that the work of meaning is ongoing. As he has often pointed out, every speech involves both an event in which it occurs and a meaning that persists beyond the event. Hermeneutics tries to be adequate to the whole complex of discourse by keeping both poles of speech (meaning and event) in constant interplay. (182)

To reformulate the foregoing in the language adopted within this dissertation, we would say that the traditional religious cinema criticism tries to identify the meaning(s) of a film through rigorous analysis of its signs and symbols, tracking each of these to their references; religious cinema is therefore a fixed subset of all cinema. On the other hand, our thesis, and the mode of interpretation we derive from it, highlights the paradoxical elements of films in particular and cinema in general, then tries to maintain the paradoxical quality of those elements as a permanent condition of the essential cinematic experi-

ence.

Andrew defines Ricoeur's as a "dialectical hermeneutics" (Andrew, 1984: 187) that gives rise to a "dialectical principle of interpretation". (189) As the "most telling example of the power" of the latter, Andrew cites

Jean-Pierre Schefer's *L'Homme ordinaire du cinéma*. Unschooled in film history or criticism, Schefer poses anew the most purely theoretical questions associated with film study. What is it like to go to a movie? Why do we do it and what happens to us as a consequence of our participation? Setting himself up in explicit opposition to the overly systematic reflections Metz deduced in *The Imaginary Signifier*, Schefer lodges the dialectic at the very heart of this primary fact of film viewing: at the cinema we are both ourselves and the representation built for us. Our memories are fed by the images, yet what we see is absolutely present to us now. The very words "we" and "us" must be qualified, not according to some strict Lacanian model of subjectivity but according to a dialectic in which we are alternately ruled by the representation and rule it. To use his words, film viewing is both a doxical and paradoxical experience, both ruled and anarchic. (189-190)

Here the parallel to our own approach becomes more obvious. In our terminology, we would say that it is the 'twist' that may be recognized at the core of the essential cinema experience that maintains the dual quality of film viewing as "both doxical and paradoxical experience." Our only qualifier is that in this dissertation we are dealing exclusively with religious cinema, which implies that the relevant "doxical" experience exhibits objective religious characteristics.

Bill Nichols also appears to rely on Ricoeur's hermeneutics when he employs psychoanalytic terminology to define an approach to narrative cinema. Balancing the seen and the unseen, the experienced

and the unexperienced, and recognizing that the two form halves of a necessary whole for such an approach to be valid, Nichols argues for

a logic for duplicitous meaning that acknowledges the argument that two different logics cannot operate on the same level without creating an untenable position. This is precisely the untenable position of paradox, which we have already met. We part company with the rules of formal logic that decry this untenability in order to adopt the temporal, historically-open rules of a dialectical logic. We couple the present to the absent; we attend to gaps, lacunae, to the guile of the unconscious psychism that speaks to us through outward manifestations. We prepare ourselves to listen for revelation; we steel ourselves to listen with suspicion. The ridge is narrow along which we walk, but there is no straighter way for us to go. (Nichols, 1981: 107)

The ridge is narrow because it divides the virtual from its counterpart; the former is immediate and appears to possess all the characteristics of reality, the latter is but a memory and possesses all the characteristics of a phantasm. But that is precisely the origin of our conception of the virtual as a *simulacrum*: in the appearance of objective similarity to what is but a memory, but is, in fact, a common and present memory across a wide range of individuals, originating, not in an æsthetic experience, but in an experience whose origin remains forever hidden. The virtual attempts to hide its own nature; yet, its elements manifesting a paradox that will not depart, the virtual eventually collapses into its true nature. Thus, following Nichols, we recognize two possibilities, opposites, derived from the same event; though narrative "generally exhibits congruence with the resolution of paradox" which "heightens the sense of unity and coherence," something "exceeds it, is left over; paradox remains, finally,

irresolvable" (103):

"And, as always, coherence in contradiction expresses the force of a desire." [Derrida] We return once more to desire and the pleasure of recognition-discovery. The aesthetic gratification narrative affords helps attenuate the force of real contradictions; it also helps identify them. The power of this invocation of desire can be readily yoked to a reinforcement of the *status quo*, but it can also be harnessed to the possibilities of change, radical change. Narrative cinema may work to reconstitute us in the position of self-as-subject, but it may also move us. We are not simply put in our place, we are also moved; and one possible direction that movement may follow is through and beyond the position of self-as-subject to the realm of symbolic exchange where grace or order (in an open-ended, non-imaginary sense) may be realized (103)

The "possible direction" is necessarily no more than that and, from our perspective, never more than virtual (as an objective manifestation of the film event); however, the film event is not bounded, except by choice: within it, just as outside it, but not necessarily because of it or through it, there are limitless possibilities.

From this brief discussion, it appears that some recent choices in film theory are more conducive to our thesis than the entire amalgam of previous religious cinema theory and criticism. This impression is misleading for, just as there are parallels between our approach and contemporary film theory, so previous approaches to religious cinema theory and criticism have drawn from contemporaneous film theorists (figures such as André Bazin and Siegfried Kracauer are encountered with great regularity and number among the favourites from whom to draw inspiration). What further separates our approach from previous approaches to religious cinema theory and criti-

cism, however, is our point of origin for, unlike these previous approaches, we do not begin with, or pass through, film theory on our way to a theory of religious cinema.

Our point of origin is in many respects identical to that of film theory, past and present: the analysis of film itself, using ideas and techniques borrowed from more established disciplines. In this sense, our approach is more 'authentic' or 'original' than similar approaches of the past. 'Authentic' and 'original' are not meant pejoratively, or as terms of endearment, but literally, to emphasize the importance of a thorough investigation of the very heart of the film medium in any theoretical approach, whether general or specifically religious. It is simply not possible to ask What is religious cinema? unless one asks this question in the light of its predecessor: What is cinema? With this final re-emphasis of the origin of our approach, we now turn away from both of these questions and proceed to the practical level, wherein we derive a specific method in preparation for the next chapter.

A Critical Method Derived

We now deal with those two earlier questions that still remain unanswered: If any film truly *exists* solely as immediate experience, how then is it to be analysed? And how is this analysis to be reconciled with the original experience, since the analysis must, by definition, exist apart from the experience? From the perspective developed

in this chapter, the answer to the second question is that the analysis cannot be fully reconciled with the original experience, unless its intent is the same. That is why the critic must seek to merge analysis and experience. Our answer to the first question must therefore be: it must be analysed *as immediate experience*. Since religious cinema exists as a variable subset of all films, the moment of analysis is crucial.

The analysis of religious cinema must proceed from the critic's own experience thereof. Yet, if the critic maintains a perspective that is too personal or immediate, the analysis may be incomprehensible to the reader. Therefore, the analysis of religious cinema must balance the audience's experience thereof. In practical terms, this requires the critic to mimic the film under analysis. The analysis must become an extension of the film. If the intent of the text is to analyse the film as an example of religious cinema, then the text must incorporate the perspective of the film, such that it exhibits a similar tension. The result is parable. Thus, the analysis that is true to religious cinema becomes a religious text in its own right.

While this conclusion is inescapable, it should be cautioned that it requires qualification. The conclusion does not imply equality with sacred texts. The latter are by convention or tradition isolated from the broader category of religious texts. We define as 'religious', texts that exhibit the characteristics of religious language, whereas we understand sacred texts as the paradigm whence religious language is derived. Thus, the critic of religious cinema does not compete with

the parables of Jesus. Rather, the critic adapts the characteristics of the parables of Jesus, thereby legitimating them.

The moment of analysis exists in the paradoxical tension that this form of analysis creates. In effect, the virtual religious experience of the film continues within and through the analysis. The moment of analysis is extended beyond the immediate experience of the film, although its visual component is necessarily impaired. Only in this manner is the analysis of religious cinema as virtual religious experience conceivable. A necessary precondition to the success of this form of analysis is that the reader have seen the film in question. The analysis exists only by virtue of its relation to its subject; remove the latter and the paradoxical tension of the analysis dissipates, since it is no longer an extension of the immediate experience: the moment of analysis has been severed from the moment of experience.

Given that we shortly embark on a practical example of the foregoing, it is expedient as well to describe specific critical tools that enable the critic to adhere to the general guidelines above. It should be cautioned, however, that these tools constitute neither the set of all possible tools that can be derived from our thesis, nor the set of all tools that are employed in the next chapter. The former set will expand if and when the posture defended here finds a wider audience; the latter are borrowed not only from this chapter but also from the universe of our thesis and the overall perspective it affords. Moreover, the next chapter is more than a simple analysis; its presence within this dissertation constitutes an exercise in clarification

and validation; it is an experiment, but as the first to test our particular hypothesis, it carries a considerable additional burden; to ignore this extra burden in the present context would be tantamount to academic suicide. In simple language: in this chapter the marquess of Queensberry rules apply, whereas in the next, *Herz aus Glas* as an objectively verifiable strip of Celluloid™ remains the only constant.

In keeping with our approach thus far, we return a last time to Ricoeur and Crossan, this time in direct dialogue. The reader is warned that no new information is provided here; rather, there is a convergence of perspective between Crossan and Ricoeur which is extrapolated into the field of religious cinema criticism; both the convergence and the extrapolation rely on the discussion thus far. There can therefore be no application of the critical tools developed here to any film without reference to their origin and the theoretical perspective that underlies it. Our critical tools are designed to provide new insight into religious cinema; but this insight is less a function of the actual tools than of the thesis whence they are derived. The same is true of both Ricoeur and Crossan; thus, analysis of the parables of Jesus using the method of either scholar requires—implies—the acceptance of their paradigm, their understanding of the very nature of those parables, or any others that 'fit' that paradigm.

The dialogue, while spread across a fairly large body of work, will, in the present context, be restricted to two articles (see Crossan, 1979–80, and Ricoeur, 1979–80). The former, in turn, is a reaction to an earlier article by Ricoeur (Ricoeur, 1975a); therein Ri-

coeur summarizes "the three traits which seem... essential to the definition of the 'literary genre' of the parable" (Ricoeur, 1975a: 33):

the narrative parable relies on the conjunction between a *narrative form*, a *metaphorical process*, and an appropriate "qualifier" which ensures its convergence with other forms of discourse which all point toward the meaning "Kingdom of God " (33)

Before we begin participation in their dialogue, we highlight two issues, both terminological. First, Ricoeur's interest is in defining the "literary genre" of the parable; second, Ricoeur identifies "narrative parable" as the particular form of parable he wishes to examine. We may turn these terminological qualifications to our advantage.

First, "literary genre" suggests that parable is synonymous with a particular subset of all literature; in other words, though all literature may or may not exhibit the characteristics of parable, only specific examples of literature are identified as parables *per se*. This is reminiscent of our discussion on cinema and religious cinema, in which we examined the extent of their congruence; we concluded that certain examples of religious cinema exhibited the characteristics of myth, other examples those of parable, yet others those of both. There is no question that, at least on the surface, certain films lend themselves more readily to our form of analysis than others. Thus, we may claim, at one and the same time, that our method ultimately applies, not only to all religious films, but also to the cinema generally; yet, since this claim cannot be proven except in practice (as is the case with any intellectual hypothesis), we are safe until an

application fails. We may therefore proceed (after this dissertation) by identifying films that may be successfully submitted to our form of analysis, as this body of films grows, the 'genre' of 'parabolic cinema' will take shape; if the body of films becomes very large, that 'genre' may be recognized, not as a set of characteristics of some films, but as a quality of cinema *per se* (provided a particular perspective is maintained). This process naturally extends far beyond this dissertation; thus, we do not define a genre but establish the initial credibility of our method.

Second, "narrative parable" provides a convenient focus, since it appears terminologically similar to 'narrative cinema'; thus, if it is possible that there are different manifestations of cinema (and the great majority of film theorists write as though it is, choosing particular manifestations as their foci), then we are, if not justified, at least reassured in restricting our focus to 'narrative cinema'. And we may employ a simplistic understanding thereof: films that tell stories. Documentaries therefore reside either at, or slightly beyond, the horizon of our vision, since they are at least 'intended' as 'true' representations and are usually recognized as such. Most experimental films (which may or may not exhibit the characteristics of narrative) reside well beyond our horizon, if for no other reason than that the average audience of *all* films is probably not yet 'equipped' to recognize the narrative dimension of the experimental film. (hence the qualifier 'experimental').

With these further qualifications in mind, we return to the

current dialogue. Crossan summarizes the three traits that Ricoeur identifies as "narrativity, metaphoricity, paradoxicality [where possible, we substitute 'narrative', 'metaphor', and 'paradox', respectively]" (Crossan, 1979-80: 20). To these, he prefaces a fourth: "brevity" (21). Thus: "*Parable is a very short metaphorical narrative* [Crossan's italics]" (21). Moreover, though texts may be found that exhibit the other traits but neglect brevity, these are not parables that are long, but parables that are *too* long. their effect is reduced by their length and might be restored to full strength if they were shortened. In their length, the other traits of parable become lost; if they are shortened, the other traits of parable are found again and are, therefore, much easier to fix. Ricoeur accepts the addition of brevity, a trait which he feels he overlooked (Ricoeur, 1979-80: 72).

Deviating from Ricoeur's original order, Crossan next examines metaphor, finding much common ground in Ricoeur's more recent conception of metaphor, in which "every metaphor, save the momentarily jaded or temporarily dormant, is but a localized indication and instance of the ultimate ubiquity and radical universality of metaphor itself" (Crossan, 1979-80: 25). Thereafter Crossan moves toward Derrida, surmising that this is inevitably the direction Ricoeur's conception of metaphor moves in. However, Ricoeur denies this direction, noting that "Derrida's thesis is a thesis about dead metaphors and its validity finds its limit in the analysis of live metaphors" (Ricoeur, 1979-80: 73). The difference between a live meta-

phor and a dead metaphor lies in a "stereoscopic phenomenon" (73):

In most good metaphors the conflict between the yielding literal sense and the emerging metaphorical sense may still be perceived. The semantic incongruence or impertinence of the sentence for a literal interpretation is preserved within the new congruence or pertinence which emerges from the collapse of the literal interpretation. (73)

Ricoeur does not suggest that this conception is inimical to Crossan's interpretation, but he cautions against an indefinite expansion of metaphor, such that "metaphor disappears as a distinctive 'turn' of language, every linguistic use becoming metaphorical" (73).

Crossan now explores narrative, asking first whether "narrativity might be just as humanly ubiquitous and ineluctable as metaphor-icity itself?" (Crossan, 1979-80: 27) This question is reformulated such that a solution to the problem of reference might be suggested; thus, "language refers only to linguisticity, metaphor to metaphoricity, [and] narrative to narrativity"; this implies that we must face "the ultimate implications of a radically linguistic existence, a radically metaphorical world, and a radically narrative existence" (27). Against this, Ricoeur argues: "if 'narrative existence' obtains only in language, how could the parables of Jesus challenge the actual way of life of his opponents?" (Ricoeur, 1979-80: 74). Ricoeur posits the paradox inherent in the narrative parables of Jesus at the "intersection between narrative existence and ordinary existence"; without this intersection, "there would be no paradox, i.e., no departure (*para*) from usual opinion (*doxa*)" (74). Thus, "narratives, pictures

as well as descriptions, keep re-shaping our previous versions of the world" (74)

Finally, Crossan addresses the paradox of Jesus' parables. Since "paradoxicality" is his own, rather than Ricoeur's, term, Crossan provides a definition.

I shall use the general expression "paradox" or "paradoxicality" as my own general term to include the full spectrum of phenomena subsumed under nouns such as hyperbole, paradox, limit-expression, etc., and adjectives such as strange, radical, extravagant, etc. (Crossan, 1979-80: 28)

Crossan then proceeds to analyse the paradox of Jesus' parables under three headings borrowed from American semiotic theory: pragmatics, semantics, and syntactics. Under the first heading, he notes that:

The official teachers of Jesus' day taught: (1) within a group authority; (2) within an official synagogue; (3) within a "canonical" text. Jesus, on the other hand, taught: (1) outside this group authority; (2) outside the synagogue by the lake-side; (3) outside the "canonical" texts. Indeed, it is almost as if his parables displaced the scriptures as text. Authority, situation or setting, and "text" for teaching are all paradoxically different with Jesus (30)

Under the second heading, Crossan questions the validity of comparison of Jesus' parables to contemporaneous rabbinic ones, since it may be questioned whether the latter were, in fact, contemporaneous (recent scholarship places them *after* Jesus' time); thus, Jesus' parables exhibit the paradox of a new semantic structure (31). Similarly, under the third heading, comparison of Jesus' parables to rabbinical ones is chronologically invalid; even were it valid, the syntax of Je-

Jesus' parables differs radically from those to which they are compared, further heightening their paradox (31-32).

Ricoeur sees in this analysis confirmation for his "contention that paradoxicality requires a confrontation between deviance and establishment, not only within language, but in the 'real' world" (Ricoeur, 1979-80: 75), thereby recalling his earlier disagreement with Crossan (see above). But Ricoeur welcomes the overall approach:

The confrontation between Jesus and his audience appears, accordingly, as a particular case of the inclusion of the parable-stories with the Gospel-story. The story-teller of the parables becomes a part of the meaning of the story-told, as seems to be the case with the Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen. Finally the mortal fate of the story-teller belongs to the horizon of all the stories told. And this *death* contributes to paradoxicality of the parables by leading it onto the threshold of "aniconicity." (75)

Thence, Ricoeur finds further agreement in Crossan's ultimate conclusion "that Jesus' paradoxicality is the result of turning the aniconicity of Israel's God onto language itself" (Crossan, 1979-80: 32), but adds two qualifications. "First, the *function* of paradox, exerted through the enigma-expressions (Kingdom of God, etc.), is not merely to abolish pictures, but also to elicit an inexhaustible set of inadequate pictures" (Ricoeur, 1979-80: 76). Second, the parables of Jesus "are not as such negative expressions and they have not only a negative function"; rather, they constitute "a reorientation after a disorientation"; the latter without the former would cause the parables to "remain without ethical and political implications" and "exegesis would make theology impossible; even as negative theology" (76).

The theoretical issues raised by this dialogue are immense; they cannot be addressed here. To the extent that they must be addressed to allow application of the dialogue to the derivation of a method of religious cinema criticism, to that precise extent have they already been addressed within previous sections of this dissertation. We now extrapolate from the results of the dialogue and identify a set of critical tools. We have, to begin with, four characteristics (the last of which comes in three flavours): brevity, narrative, metaphor, and paradox (in terms of pragmatics, semantics, and syntactics). As general characteristics, they do not suggest themselves to be alien to cinema: brevity suggests 'a short film'; narrative suggests 'narrative cinema', metaphor suggests 'non-literal representation'; and paradox suggests 'a clash of elements or interpretations'. Thus, each of the four characteristics may be applied in at least a vague sense without extensive redefinition or reformulation. But, in the interest of providing instruments of greater precision, we now examine each of the four characteristics in greater depth.

First brevity. There is much to be said for taking no more time than necessary to make a point or state a case; but how to measure this time? There is, first of all, the actual time required to literally 'state the case'; logically, this will vary from case to case. But there is also the effective time required to 'state the case'; a statement requires interpretation and reflection and, if it proposes (consciously or unconsciously) a shift in perspective, adjustment. Thus, we may argue, on the one hand, for brevity, but on the other hand, also for

consideration of æsthetic constraints and audience inertia. One may expect both more (in terms of their ability to follow a narrative through rapid, radical changes in scene, *etc.*) and less (in terms of their awareness of subtle literary, historical, political, *etc.*, references) of contemporary audiences. Brevity, we would argue, assists the analytic process, because it allows for (though it does not insist upon) less complexity and sharper focus; but this may be simply due to limitations in the human attention span. Thus, brevity is a convenient but not a necessary characteristic for religious cinema.

Second, narrative. We already accept this as a restriction of our focus to narrative cinema. But, in the context of the dialogue between Crossan and Ricoeur, we may refine this to a requirement for either a particular kind of narrative or a particular view of narrative. The 'particular kind of narrative' implies the requirement for a narrative that can be shown to exhibit both reflective and reflexive characteristics. Reflective implies a degree of distance from 'reality'; the narrative is not synonymous with its content, but is a reformulation thereof. Reflexive implies a degree of reflection on itself; the narrative raises questions about its own existence and its relation to 'reality'. The 'particular view of narrative' implies the requirement for a certain degree of audience competence, an ability on the part of the audience to see beyond itself, beyond the experience of the film, beyond the everyday world outside the film; this is neither a trite statement nor a snide remark: from our perspective, religious cinema is equally a function of audience perception as cinematic performance.

Third, metaphor. We may vacillate between Crossan's and Ricoeur's conceptions. Our thesis, in the form developed within this chapter, admits both possibilities. In the present, practical context, it is a function of the film at hand. Thus, with certain films, it would take substantial intellectual effort to deduce the essential metaphor of all cinema, whereas other films might bring this possibility to the surface with little or no apparent effort. Similarly, certain films appear, at first viewing, to be no more than simple stories, embodying no dissonance or discordant elements—they are, at this stage, the cinematic equivalents of dead metaphors. Multiple viewings may bring hidden dissonance or discordant elements to light, such that the films become the cinematic equivalents of live metaphors. Other films, both sufficiently familiar and sufficiently new, evidence a degree of dissonance from the outset; therein one may witness the birth of the cinematic equivalents of new metaphors.

Fourth, paradox. We must apply Crossan's three flavours thereof with circumspection, for they raise the spectre of the efficacy of the semiotic analysis of cinema generally. Thus, we accept these flavours with the proviso that they be employed in a fairly naïve manner. It is valid to focus on three different loci of paradox; but is arguable whether this validity can be easily maintained when the loci become excessively rigid and formalized. Thus, the essential focus must always be on paradox *per se*, rather than its locus. As to the divergent horizons of paradox between Crossan and Ricoeur, we may vacillate to precisely the same degree and in precisely the same man-

ner as with metaphor, for here, too, our thesis admits both possibilities; as well, films may be cited to support either conception, as they may also be analysed from either perspective. However, to deny the presence of paradox in either cinema generally or a subset thereof is to deny the very possibility of religious cinema; this is fundamental to both our theoretical and methodological perspectives. The presence of paradox is essential to our concept of religious cinema and forms the core of any analysis to demonstrate its existence.

All of the foregoing is deemed to exist in the context of the existence and analysis of the necessary qualifier that, in its turn, contextualizes the other characteristics. Of course, the qualifier also participates in, gives rise to, and derives its own existence from, the aforementioned characteristics. This invalidates any artificial approach that seeks to isolate the various characteristics of the film that admit the adjective 'religious'; against any such we prescribe a more organic analysis. Just as the original film is not only an æsthetic construct (implying the possibility of deconstruction) but also an artistic creation (implying the necessity of a more holistic approach), so must its analysis not only dissect but also recompose and revitalize its subject. And even the act of dissection must affirm the presence of an organic whole, such that dissection is not such, of a dead object, but surgery on a live subject. Pursuing this metaphor, we must also insist on a recognition of the subject as comprising a number of organic systems, all in a state of constant interaction with one another, all dependent upon one another for their continued existence and functionality.

Thus, if we employ tools and techniques such as the isolation of structures of reversal to determine the precise nature of the 'twist' that lies at the core of a particular level of cinematic expression or interpretation, we must employ these from a perspective that does not hide the greater subject whose elements exhibit the reversal.

While we do not deny the power and validity of such tools, we choose to apply them only after a preliminary inspection; the latter proceeds from a naïve perspective, wherein as few theoretical and methodological assumptions as possible are made. We must always, from the very outset, remain open to the attitude of surprise that any film might generate. And this openness must extend far beyond the first viewing of that film, such that surprise remains a possibility no matter how deeply, or from the perspective of what theoretical or methodological insight, we penetrate the film with our various tools and techniques. If we close ourselves to the possibility of surprise in order to pursue a particular theoretical or methodological insight, we face the danger of being nonetheless surprised as our insight is denied in favour of some more fundamental, disturbing insight.

Other Critical Methods Compared

To place the foregoing in perspective, it is instructive to consider the work of previous investigators in this field. Our intent is not so much to pass judgement as to highlight difference. To begin with parable:

To say that films are stories is not of course to deny that they are primarily visual-aural experiences (aesthetic experiences manifesting technical excellence and philosophical statement, as Ketcham has explained); it *is* to deny that they are to be treated as if one minor aspect of that experience—dialogue, for example—were the major factor to be considered in assessing their meaning. The peculiar context and overall structure of the visual story must be analyzed as a guide to the total meaning of the film. Thus in analyzing Wertmüller's films, it is important, we feel, to know the specific kind of visual story she employs as well as the cultural context it is seen against. Wertmüller's films, we feel, are visual parables; their context will be defined by the dominant assumptions of the popular Italian culture they so clearly satirize. (Ferlita and May, 1977: 3)

While it cannot be denied that this approach will provide insight into its chosen subject, it is clear that it does not require the prior viewing of the films to be examined. Its intent is the understanding of the context of the films; from this understanding, the reader may develop a new appreciation for the meaning of the films.

Ferlita and May choose the idiom of man's search for meaning as the basis of their analysis of the film medium. Thus, their primary concern is "analysis that leads to meaning" (Ferlita and May, 1976: 4); this conditions their definition of the medium:

Cinema is one of the most potent sources of contemporary insight into life's meaning (all too often a portrayal of its absence) precisely because of the vastness of its audience and the controlled effect of its images. (Ferlita and May, 1976: 4)

Their focus is opposed to our own. Whereas Ferlita and May move from the derivation of a film's meaning toward possibility of the essential cinematic experience, we begin with the latter and deny the

importance of the former. Whereas Ferlita and May define context as critical to the derivation of meaning, we define context as secondary, since it can be overcome by the force of the essential cinematic experience *per se*.

If the goal of the critic is the derivation and isolation of context and meaning, then the approach of Ferlita and May appears to be the more appropriate. However, if the goal of the critic is the perpetuation and intensification of the paradoxical force of the immediate experience *as virtual religious experience*, then a different approach is required. It is in part to meet the requirements of the second option that our approach was developed. Beyond this intent, there exists the more fundamental question of the structure of the essential cinematic experience; this question is left untouched by Ferlita and May, but is the point of origin of this chapter. Indeed, it is our contention that this question *must* form the point of origin of *any* approach to religious cinema.

From this perspective, the approach of Ronald Holloway represents a more compatible example:

If the very nature of technology and history is movement, cinema of course plays a key role: the motion picture is no longer the bastard of the arts, but a royal consort. Motion becomes an esthetic principle, the handmaid to philosophy and theology. When the moving object on the screen is man, and this experience is assimilated into the consciousness, a theology of secularity has one of its prime targets. (Holloway, 1977: 15)

Although extension of this quotation would result in greater diver-

gence, the expression of interest in the phenomenon of motion as a principle in its own right may be compared to our initial discussion concerning the production of the effect of movement, in which we defined the principle that underlies this effect as a primary element of the film medium.

Holloway's approach does not require the separation of the moment of analysis and the moment of experience, whereas that of Ferlita and May necessitates it. If meaning is to be isolated from the essential cinematic experience that generates it, then the essential cinematic experience will be irrecoverable in its pristine form. The meaning that is derived by this method of analysis is ultimately distinct from its origin. It ceases to exist in relation to its origin. Hence, the paradoxical force of the original relation is destroyed, though not by reduction, but by separation. If the primary function of religious cinema is the creation of irreducible paradox in the form virtual religious experience, then the isolation of meaning threatens religious cinema as a whole, for it denies the essential rôle of the medium in the maintenance of the tension that arises from that irreducible paradox.

Given our concluding remarks on method above, the approach of James Wall seems quite similar to our own, at least in its insistence on an initial *naïveté*.

Intelligent appreciation of cinema is not something that is necessarily limited to a minority who have special and exceptional qualifications. To be sure, some orientation is required, some familiarity with the medium. But gaining and developing that appreciation is

part of film education. There is no body of information that one needs for this ahead of time; the only prerequisite is an open mind. (Wall, 1971: 27)

Wall then proceeds to provide a methodology to allow the attainment of such an orientation.

He distinguishes two aspects of film viewing. One concerns "what the film is *about*—such things as its plot line, character development, message" (Wall, 1971: 33). The other concerns "what the film *is*—what it projects in and of itself" (33). These aspects may be thought of as "objective" and "subjective," or "intellectual" and "intuitive"; Wall chooses the terms "discursive" and "presentational," respectively, to identify them (33). Using this dichotomy, Wall argues that, while at one time "biblical spectacles" were box office successes, they are so no longer because their "discursive content holds little interest for a secular public" (35). More fundamentally, if

a film requires perception only at the discursive end of the continuum, it will quickly jade the viewer unless its discursive content is new material. This holds true even for explicit sex films, a fact confirmed by the findings of the President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography. In its report the Commission noted that, in a controlled test, college students soon became tired of looking at hard-core visual pornography. (35)

Therefore, Wall argues, it is more aesthetically profitable to concentrate on the tension created by the interaction of the "discursive" mode of film viewing with the "presentational" mode.

Wall's approach is both appealing and difficult to typify. By maintaining a high degree of tension between the two aspects of film

viewing, Wall succeeds in allowing much more of the film to be brought to light than many of his contemporaries. And, though he neither uses such terms as 'tension' and 'paradox' as prime elements of his critical vocabulary, nor endeavours to isolate specifically religious films or the specifically religious in film, his approach is by no means inimical to our own. Thus, if we are to offer criticism of his approach from our perspective, we must do so in terms of his methodological depth. Yet, in the light of his own qualifications, quoted above, even this seems unjust. Wall's approach sets no barriers to, posits no horizon of, a theory of religious cinema; however, given the abundance of critical and methodological literature and the paucity of comparable theoretical literature, it is simply necessary to move beyond Wall's approach to examine the medium itself in depth. So, too, this dissertation represents merely a milestone, albeit a necessary one.

Concluding Remarks

This concludes our investigation of the general question: What is religious cinema? The investigation of this question sets the horizon of concern within this chapter. We have described in rudimentary form the elements that constitute the film medium, concluding that they foster the identification of cinema as a distinct art form. By identifying structural parallels between the parables of Jesus and the essential cinematic experience, we were able to define certain instances of

the essential cinematic experience as virtual religious experience, which we equated with religious cinema. To this equation, we attached the proviso that it remain the result of dynamic interpretation on the part of the audience. The task of the critic is therefore subordinate to the immediate force of religious cinema.

In the next chapter, we shall move from the general question to the specific. Since our pronouncements on the subject of critical method are somewhat theoretical, this movement will provide a practical example of the type of analysis described above. Nevertheless, the posture defended in this chapter should stand on its own. Our very insistence on the primacy of the general question forces the answer to the specific question to take a position of less importance in the defence of our thesis. Thus, while the next chapter may clarify our thesis, it would weaken the thesis if it were shown to be a *necessary* clarification. Rather, the next chapter provides an opportunity to test the viability of the position elucidated in this chapter.

CHAPTER 3

Herz aus Glas as Virtual Religious Experience

It could be argued that the film analysed in this chapter was chosen deliberately for its obvious parallels to the theoretical and methodological position developed in the previous chapter. Such an argument would be utterly true. But is it not reasonable to expect that such would be our choice? Moreover, if the analysis is satisfactory (we believe it to be so), there can be no argument against the *application* of our perspective, only against the perspective in and of itself. Finally, the analysis is intended, not only as an experiment, but also as an example; in the latter rôle, a suitable film provides much better material than an unsuitable one and is therefore justified for that very reason.

Herz aus Glas is a 'difficult' film (this is true of every Herzog film). However, this difficulty is a measure of the film's resistance to traditional analysis, rather than a function of the film's subject matter. The temptation is to extract features that provide convenient material for traditional analysis. This appears to work at first glance, for the film abounds with elements that traditional analysis revels in, but the result remains inevitably incomplete and unsatisfactory. There is simply more (or less) to the film than traditional analysis can even hope to encompass. It is this 'more' (or 'less') that forms

the core of the practical justification for this dissertation.

The *Œuvre* of Werner Herzog

Although we have emphasized (repeatedly) the need for a naïve approach to a film, equating this naïve approach at least initially with a dogged refusal to engage in biographical and referential speculation, our first step is to ignore this insistence and pursue a discussion of Werner Herzog's *œuvre*. This is only permitted in this context; and then only because critics of Herzog's films invariably make continual references to interviews with Herzog and his other films. We examine Herzog's *œuvre*, not from our own perspective, but from an emerging consensus on the director and his place within the group identified as the architects of the 'New German Cinema'. (Nevertheless, in keeping with the methodological stance developed in the previous chapter, we provide neither a biography nor a filmography of Werner Herzog.)

The methodological danger inherent in such a perspective will become clear as the discussion proceeds. At its core may lie an unwillingness to grapple with the individual film in its own naked manifestation, for all that the general perspective affords is the recognition of common elements, not only within the *œuvre* of a single director, but also among the various films of a group of directors, such that certain large structures become visible. Yet, these large structures are no more than the elements that constitute and enforce a particu-

lar paradigm. From this perspective, Herzog is unquestionably but one of, if not many, at least several directors exhibiting a shared creativity

As an example of the above, we may cite Vernon Young's early (1977) retrospective

At this stage it is safe to venture that, as Herzog construes him, Man, led by indeterminate causes, is a maniac or the victim of maniacs, for whom all constructed reality is less adequate than his dreams. *Casper Hauser* (1974) and *The Glass Heart* [1976; cited within this dissertation as either *Heart of Glass* or *Herz aus Glas*] confirm such a definition with appreciably less conviction than *Aguirre*. (Young: 412)

Already, the specific melts into the general and elements that resist this process are cast aside. If one film serves as the norm that two other films fail to adhere to, then one may conclude that much of the original creation has been returned to the shadows whence it came.

Young proceeds to find in Herzog and his contemporaries a degree of parallel to the German cinema of the Weimar Republic that *requires* the reader to acknowledge that little, if any, æsthetic distance has been traveled in fifty years. But to hold similarity to the most intense light is to lose all possibility of recognizing difference lurking at the edge of one's vision. And difference not only historically and artistically, one artist from another, but also within each and every image. Thus, Young is forced to conclude that, "at the *simple-story* level, the film [*Herz aus Glas*] doesn't function; it's a looseleaf

assembly of wondrous images, unclear hints and highlighted boors"

(Young: 414)

John Sandford is more willing to recognize and acknowledge difference, noting about the directors that constitute the New German Cinema (he counts seven: Fassbinder, Herzog, Wenders, Kluge, Schlöndorff, Syberberg, and Straub) that

It would be difficult to imagine a more varied group of artists, each producing films with most distinctive and individual flavours. One thing is certain about the new [sic] German Cinema: it is not a cohesive 'movement' or 'school'. (Sandford: 210)

But Sandford, too, expands his focus far beyond the individual film, so that his conclusions are conclusions concerning the entire *œuvre* of the director.

This leads him to be unable to cast more than a side glance on *Herz aus Glas*. This side glance is further weakened by its reference to a well-publicized technique associated with that film: "in order to achieve the appropriate effect of collective hysteria, Herzog hypnotized the actors each day before the shooting began" (Sandford: 214).

There is no question that this is *an interesting datum*, but what is its impact on the actual audience experience of the film? If one begins with a reverse focus, wherein the manner of construction of the film informs the essential experience of it, a barrier to the appreciation of the film at the most immediate level has been erected. If Herzog hypnotized the actors, then his intent was to create a particular effect within the final presentation, rather than a fact that could be

re-imposed on the latter.

As we argue from the outset of our own analysis of *Herz aus Glas* below, that film embodies paradoxical elements that are highly contextual; but that context collapses if we move the moment of analysis beyond the essential cinematic experience. Yet these elements are objective components of the film; thus, what is actually lost if the moment of analysis is moved beyond the essential cinematic experience is precisely the *paradoxical* nature of the elements. Thus, we argue here, not for the irrelevance of the more general perspective (it sheds much light on a veritable universe of interesting subjects), but for its *inappropriateness* in the analysis of the individual film.

It is not, in fact, an *inadequate* perspective, but rather an *extravagant* one: it fosters an abundance that overwhelms the purpose of the analysis, drowning it in a sea of reference and relevance. As an example, we may cite Ruth Perlmutter's brief analysis of the cinema using the grotesque as her theme:

There are, in fact, two generic areas in which the grotesque is crucial to the cinema's aesthetic: the horror-fantasy film (including science fiction, and horror films such as Merian C. Cooper and Ernest Schoedsack's 1933 *King Kong*) and the contemporary European cinema of directors such as Luis Buñuel, Federico Fellini, Dusan Makavejev, and Werner Herzog. In the films of these directors, in particular, a new grotesque has developed—the result of the reciprocal impact of the cinematic imagination and modernism. (Perlmutter: 168)

Perlmutter understands the grotesque as a particular flavour of ab-

normality, achieved through "distortion and dehumanization" (168).

As such,

The grotesque thrives in the context of cinema's mechanically present and seemingly moving images, in the phenomenologically reduced reality of a world divorced from human resonance and intention. It is a world where anything can happen, where the otherness of things can reign supreme, disengaged, isolated. Into this fissure of a framed partial view, into the cinematic play of seen and not-seen, of absence and presence (our absence from the screen, the screen from us), creep the psychic forces of dreams and comedy, nightmares and disaster. (168-169)

To Perlmutter, Herzog "carries the grotesque to its logical conclusions": neither culture nor nature offer a place of refuge, for both "destroy humans"; to survive, humans must (and, in the case of Herzog's films, frequently do, though not in the manner expected) "go beyond human limits" (180).

Perlmutter's analysis is 'extravagant' with respect to Herzog's films because it posits a whole that is more than the sum of its parts. Herzog's *œuvre*, simplistically, is merely the collection of his films. To this collection, Perlmutter adds a dimension not apparent in the *individual* films that constitute the collection; this dimension is not apparent because it is a function of the act of collecting. Individually, Herzog's films contain characters and situations which may certainly be labeled both abnormal and grotesque. But the individual film does not constitute a 'cinema of the grotesque'; rather, it contains grotesque elements. Moreover, those grotesque elements may only be objectively so, by comparison to the world at large, which

is, by definition, 'normal'. Subjectively, that is to say from the perspective of the film as the subject that constitutes one's focus, one's complete and undivided attention, those grotesque elements may never surface as such. Within the Herzog film, it is difficult to label the grotesque as such because it is the norm; what appears equally grotesque is the extra-filmic world, mirrored within the film as characters and situations that wear the mantle of normalcy but are invariably twisted. Almost invariably, establishment figures introduce corruption and disaster, in *Herz aus Glas*, it is the factory owner himself who destroys the factory, thereby depriving not only himself but also the entire town of their primary livelihood.

It cannot be over-stressed that the foregoing argument is not against Perlmutter's conclusions, but against the relevance of those conclusions in the *restricted* context of the individual analysis, particularly if the latter is conducted in the manner prescribed in this dissertation. There is no distinction between the following perspective and our own theoretical posture:

Cinema is the most appropriate form for exposing the nakedness of the emperor, because it solicits the pleasure of looking (voyeurism) and being looked at (exhibitionism) within a form that, tied to resemblance, copies the world and only simulates the truth. (Perlmutter: 193)

Rather, our argument is simply that the conclusions reached through a more general analysis (of, for example, Young, Sandford, and Perlmutter) have little relevance within the restricted perspective of

the specific analysis. Their very extravagance carries a degree of imprecision that mitigates their usefulness; one might equally employ a metre-stick to measure the minute-by-minute progress of a snail.

The counter-argument would be that the restricted perspective of the specific analysis fails to recognize the larger patterns visible only through comparison of films to one another. But we do not deny the validity of this counter-argument. Our theoretical and methodological position concerns the nature of the individual film experienced, not the cinema intellectually explored. Thus, genre criticism might be labeled a macroscopic approach, whereas ours is a microscopic one; each provides material to inform and enrich the other; ultimately, neither can exist in isolation, for each requires information generated only within its counterpart. If our approach takes root, then further analyses of individual films from its perspective will result; as these, too, form a collection, larger patterns and deeper similarities will come to light; it is upon these that we place our hope in the suggestion that religious cinema is a function, not of the isolated film, but of the cinema generally.

If this occurs, a greater question will arise: If religious cinema is essentially anti-paradigmatic, existing exclusively and permanently at the very horizon of any and every paradigm, is this not now a paradigmatic definition? If this question is answered in the affirmative, then it must be simultaneously acknowledged that religious cinema has been both fully identified and thoroughly incorporated: in the very moment of discovery, religious cinema will have vanished.

Here an extreme extrapolation of our thesis may serve to rescue religious cinema from complete obscurity: it may then be determined that religious cinema is merely virtually anti-paradigmatic, that is to say, religious cinema is no more anti-paradigmatic than cinema as a whole can be conceived as paradigmatic. If the question is answered in the negative, then the defence of our thesis will require expansion to include a discussion of the function of non-paradigmatic 'objects' at the edge of the paradigmatic universe: Do those 'objects' assist in the definition and maintenance of a paradigm? If so, in what sense are they 'non-paradigmatic'? We return to this line of questioning in the next chapter. In the interim, it is possible to proceed to the specific analysis of *Herz aus Glas*.

Herz aus Glas: Other Approaches

Since our approach is both a departure from traditional religious cinema criticism and a provocation thereof, it is instructive to begin our analysis with a brief examination of previous approaches to *Herz aus Glas*. This examination is placed at the beginning of our analysis, rather than at its end, both because that is chronologically more appropriate and because, as a *new* provocation, our approach has yet to find its audience. Thus, the 'previous approaches' represent our point of departure in a double sense, as (1) a place to begin and (2) a perspective to leave behind. We present three critiques. In terms of their proximity to our own approach, the first is farthest, the last

nearest. Thus, this brief examination will bring us gradually toward our own analysis.

We return to Vernon Young for the first critique. As mentioned above, his is merely a few paragraphs in a larger retrospective on the New German Cinema. Thus, we have already encountered his overall conclusion that *Herz aus Glas* "doesn't function; it's a looseleaf assembly of wondrous images, unclear hints and highlighted boors" (Young: 414). This conclusion differs from our own, if for no other reason than that it emphasizes the negative component of disjunction. But also more fundamentally because it implies a negative view of disorientation. There is no question that watching *Herz aus Glas* is a disorienting experience; but Young sees this as something to steel oneself for, rather than open oneself to. The entire film therefore functions in a radically different manner.

Young of course treats *Herz aus Glas* as a completely traditional narrative; since the film 'exceeds' this category, Young is forced to treat it negatively. To be sure, Young recognizes the æsthetic and technical originality that *Herz aus Glas* manifests:

Never have I seen moss that looked mossier, or grey stone that showed such pastel hues, or definable space of water and sky that appeared at once so illimitable. Forms are not simply *bathed* in light, they have light and air *around* them. His interiors are breath-taking, especially those imitations of Georges de La Tour in which figures inhabit a profound darkness, their faces or hands alone illuminated, artificially, by candle flames. (Young: 413)

But Young then proceeds to isolate narrative fragments which are in

themselves insufficiently developed to be treated in isolation.

The narrative fragments total at least three in number. First, there is the story of Hias, "a herdsman with occult powers [who] moons around on mountains and in [the] tavern—a seer derided" (Young: 414). Second, there is the story of the townspeople at large, who deride Hias "and spend their free hours in drunken sloth, interrupted by lethal brawls" (414). Third, there is the story of the factory owner who "runs beserk, setting fire to the workshops" (414). Young chooses the third as the core narrative, whence the purpose or intent of the film may be derived, or at least deduced. Thus, one "probable interpretation" of *Herz aus Glas* is as "a fable of man's fate under monopoly enterprise" (414); but, as such, the film is inevitably "tissue-thin" (414):

A demented factory-owner, obsessed by finding a formula for ruby glass, who murders his fifteen-year-old scullery girl (she has ruby-red blood) and sets fire to his own fortune is a patently silly symbol of Capitalism Today. (414)

This forces Young to the conclusion cited above: the 'prime' narrative is clearly inadequate to any great interpretation, the remaining narratives are both too diverse and too divergent to foster any coherence, therefore the film simply does not function. The first clue to the inevitability of this conclusion is Young's designation of the film as an "allegory" (413), which implies a particular expectation; this expectation, as Young acknowledges, is not supported by the film, but Young fails to revise his expectation and explore the film from a fresh

perspective:

At first glance, Jill Forbes' critique appears headed in a similarly fruitless direction in its suggestion that the essential narrative concerns the "moment when the beginnings of capitalism and millenarian visions combine naturally" (Forbes: 256). But Forbes acknowledges that "*Heart of Glass* is not really a narrative film. The tale of the factory is simply a narrative counterpoint, though it is realised in splendid detail" (256). Even her brief synopsis of some of the major narrative elements evidences the recognition of the incongruity that pervades the film. Thus, Forbes concludes that

Heart of Glass is a film in which point of view is systematically blurred—is it what Hias sees? is it what really happens?—but which has the irrational logic of dreams. (256)

If the border between what Hias sees and what really happens is blurred, then this is because the film is not about visions, but is rather "a film of visions which are realised by Hias and articulate all the sequences" (256). Thus, Forbes concludes that "it's the vision that counts in the end" (256).

She extrapolates no further, although her concluding sentence itself is pregnant with suggestion. Rather, any movement beyond the immediate filmic text is in the direction of its director. Thus, some of her subsidiary conclusions include: (1) the suggestion that "Herzog's private obsessions" ("grotesques and overreachers especially") mark the film; (2) the suggestion that, as "the sworn enemy of intellectu-

alism," Herzog is more concerned with "popular entertainment than with scholarship"; and (3) the suggestion that the film is "stunning" because it contains intervals "when Herzog stops filming and starts to paint" (256):

Sometimes Hias is the shepherd reclining in the corner of a Romantic landscape with, behind him, torrents and ravines straight from John Martin; sometimes he is the hireling shepherd looking into a distance composed of streaks of Pre-Raphaelite gaudiness; and most often he is St. Jerome musing on the emblems of mortality. (256)

We are unable to fathom the "universal significance" of these intervals because "Herzog is far too much of a maverick" to permit it (256).

From our own perspective, then, while Forbes provides valuable insights, she still turns those too often backward, in the direction of their surmised creative origin, rather than inward, toward the essential cinematic experience, or outward, toward its relation to the world at large, or forward, toward the impact of the film on its audience (which includes Forbes herself), or downward, toward the 'proto-cinematic' elements that surface throughout the film, or upward, toward the spatio-temporal imaginary constructions that the film so *self-consciously* exhibits. These are all options unexplored, yet they provide a far more fruitful direction for analysis if the purpose of the latter includes the desire to *move* its audience. It is one thing to begin naïvely, quite another to end so.

Thus we arrive, lastly, at the critique of Michel Mesnil, who

leads us to our own beginning. It should be cautioned that Mesnil, too, interprets backward, concluding that Herzog "a placé au cœur de son film son propre cœur de verre en abyme, comme l'indique suffisamment le titre allemand: *Herz (og) aus glas*" (Mesnil. 268). Yet Mesnil comes closest to our own approach, at least in appearance, for he begins auspiciously, with parable (265). Thus, Mesnil interprets the opening scenes of *Herz aus Glas* as a series of images of hidden, even contradictory significance.

Ce sont des images écrasantes, blocs d'évidence et de mystère qu'à grande force, devant nous, l'écran extrait d'une épaisse carrière de durée. Et simultanément, cette durée s'impose; débordant de tous côtés les marges du cadre qui l'occultent, elle nous pénètre par la grâce des mélodies en-allées du groupe vocal Popol Vuh, comme une réminiscence des sublimes immensités andines d'*Aguirre, ou la colère de Dieu*. (265)

The images are dream-like, possessing only some of the characteristics of their 'real' equivalents. Yet they absorb; thus, in the case of the shots of the waterfall (009-012),

Le rideau de molécules pressées, d'où s'échappe une vapeur livide, perd sa fluidité pour acquérir la rigide souplesse de frissonnantes draperies. Le spectateur, déconnecté de toute pesanteur terrestre, s'abîme lui aussi dans le néant. (265)

In describing these and other images, Mesnil echoes Forbes' and Young's recognition of the visual beauty and intensity of Herzog's film. This alone is sufficient to draw the audience fully into the experience of the film, such that the story is not so much told as lived,

albeit briefly.

This immediacy is the key to the interpretation of *Herz aus Glas* as paradoxical experience. As the audience, "nous sommes fascinés" (Mesnil: 266). This fascination remains the primary ingredient of our experience of the film. If, through the "mouvement de l'intelligence," we begin to 'decipher' the film, we find ourselves unable to complete this process because the balanced "multiplicité des signes et leur polyvalence" rob us of the opportunity to manufacture any certitudes (266):

C'est dans cette incessante dialectique entre vérité (ou fragments de vérité) ressentie et vérité déduite que réside la jubilation d'une lecture toujours amorcée, jamais finie. (266)

Herz aus Glas resists mythification. Even the myth of the prophet, so carefully crafted throughout the majority of the presentation, eventually collapses:

Paradoxalement, c'est lui le seul être lucide parmi une troupe d'hommes apeurés, mais ses visions sont à la fois vraies et fausses. La verrerie flambe effectivement. L'ours des montagnes n'existe pas. (267)

Herz aus Glas is parable (265), serving to reverse audience expectation, initially only through isolated incongruities, eventually through a range of inconsistencies, ultimately through the paradoxical force of the film as a whole.

Interlude: *Herz aus Glas* as Religious Cinema

Herz aus Glas, unlike the parables of Jesus, is neither explicitly nor implicitly Christian. Therefore, no argument to the contrary is advanced in this chapter. Nor do the critiques just discussed examine *Herz aus Glas* explicitly as religious cinema. Nor, again, has *Herz aus Glas* found an audience among critics in religious periodicals (Mesnil is a marginal exception). Therefore one might question the wisdom in choosing a film so clearly *outside* the traditional focus of religious cinema criticism. Before we proceed in the direction implied by the previous paragraph, it is quite appropriate to respond to this question by displaying some of the 'bait' that led us to choose *Herz aus Glas* over, for example, almost any film by Ingmar Bergman, *etc.*

Considering first Herzog's *œuvre* as a whole (as countless others have done with respect to Bergman's *œuvre*), we read:

At the same time [1976], Herzog was becoming a cult director among U.S. college students, who were captivated by his lush symbolism and his stories of heroic, mystical quests. (Clarke: 51-52)

Watching a Herzog film is the nearest thing to transcendence one is likely to encounter in a movie theatre. (Cambaccini: 22)

Like the caravan trekking over the barren sands towards an unseen goal, life becomes an act of faith in Herzog's films. (Horak: 232)

Herzog uses music—in particular the ethereal electronic sounds of Popol Vuh—to add an other-worldly, mystical dimension to the beauty of his images. (Sandford: 213)

And of *Herz aus Glas* in particular, we read:

...or mystical as in *Heart of Glass*, in which a shepherd prophet preannounces the end that will engulf his village . (Bachmann. 6)

Commencé dans le panthéisme visionnaire, le film traverserait les ombres d'un mysticisme fuligineux pour déboucher sur le refus de toute Gnose, la lumière et l'espérance des oiseaux. (Mesnil. 267)

...or a visionary intensity— the clouds pouring over the forest in *Herz aus Glas*... (Sandford: 213)

...the hysterical villagers in the apocalyptic *Herz aus Glas*... (Sandford: 213)

Thus, there appears to be some consensus that Herzog's films, in this instance particularly *Herz aus Glas*, exhibit at least some general characteristics that encourage the inclusion within the horizon of religious cinema.

Our own argument, as represented by this chapter, is more vehement, since we present *Herz aus Glas* as virtual religious experience. For in spite of the equation of religious cinema with virtual religious experience defended in the last chapter, there remains a subtle distinction between these two terms. Although this dissertation serves to remove this distinction, the latter maintains a shadowy existence until the former reaches its conclusion. The distinction manifests itself within this chapter as the opposition of general and specific, for we can demonstrate no more than that the specific film, *Herz aus Glas*, exhibits the characteristics of virtual religious experience that we ascribe to the general category of religious cinema.

But this distinction also allows us the freedom to choose *Herz aus Glas* for its affinity to religious cinema traditionally defined;

then, through our analysis of *Herz aus Glas*, to redefine religious cinema, such that that film represents, not a peripheral coincidence, but a paradigmatic example. Of course, this returns us to the question posed earlier in this chapter, concerning paradigmatic definitions. In this instance, the question may be reformulated as: If *Herz aus Glas* is essentially anti-paradigmatic, existing exclusively and permanently at the very horizon of any and every paradigm, can it simultaneously serve as a paradigmatic example? As is the case with its more general partner, this question extends beyond the present argument and will be revisited in the next chapter. It is now possible to proceed to our analysis of *Herz aus Glas*.

The Absent Bear

In concluding our discussion of Mesnil's critique, we cited the absence of the bear (*note: it is not possible for the reader to proceed further without at least reading the interpreted text of *Herz aus Glas* provided as an addendum to this dissertation*). This absence represents our point of departure. The argument is now reconstructed from our own perspective, in order that the full force of the bear's absence can be applied to our own interpretation of the film. The relevant shots are 227-228; they represent an anomaly in the context of all that precedes them.

From the outset of the film, Hias warns, predicts, and explains. In all cases, the *specific* warnings, predictions, and explanations

(i.e., those that refer to some event that is to take place within the context of the film) are invariably accurate. Thus: no giant is found (explained in shot 024); the glass factory burns down (predicted in shot 026); two men cross the bridge (predicted in shot 027; we do not know whether they are, in fact, a thief and a liar, respectively); Ascherl is crushed by Wudy (prediction recounted in shot 030); the townspeople drift toward paranoia (explained in shot 080); the oven builders refuse to come (explained in shot 080); more glass is broken (predicted in shot 100); Ludmilla must leave, lest something happen to her (warned in shot 100); Goldfinger is chained to the dungeon wall, such that he can no longer see the sun (predicted in shot 108); Mühlbeck is dead, taking his secret with him (prediction recounted in shot 119); Hias is jailed until the next snowfall (predicted in shot 129); a hurdy-gurdy man appears (predicted in shot 151); Toni the harp-player awaits instructions in the inn (predicted in shot 151); the glassworkers pretend that nothing will happen to their factory and that their livelihood will not be threatened (explained in shot 158); Ludmilla lies dead in the Mansion, serenaded by Toni the harp-player (explained in shot 218); Hias did not cause the glassworks fire, merely predicted it (explained in shot 221).

The general warnings, predictions, and explanations are usually couched in sufficiently vague terms that there can be little doubt that they will eventually come true, given enough time. Thus, the specific warnings, predictions, and explanations lend weight to the general ones and both together foster the impression of a man with a

great deal of credibility, at the very least. Furthermore, Hias achieves both a singleness and a simplicity of purpose throughout the film. At the beginning, we see him with his cows in the mountains. Thence he descends into the village; eventually we discover the reason: a bear is threatening the herd and Hias requests that a hunter be dispatched to kill the bear. We never know whether his request is honoured. In any case, events overtake the request and the latter is forgotten until Hias returns to the forest. Until that moment, Hias' credibility is constantly being enhanced to the point where it seems only natural that he should be released—a very different interpretation from that given by Vernon Young: "Faith opens locks, I deduce" (Young: 414).

Thus, in the last tenth of the film, after all this build-up, after every scene in the village and its most immediate surroundings is past, Hias *appears* to encounter some wild animal, *appears* to kill it, then proclaims, "So! Und jetzt ein Bärnbraten." (shot 228), as if to indicate that he has just killed a bear (we have no idea whether it is *the* bear), *BUT THERE IS NO BEAR!* And, as if to give his own proclamation the lie, Hias does not eat anything, but proceeds to recount yet another vision, a long and involved one, that comprises the remainder of the film. Thus, at the moment we realise that Hias is fighting something that is not there, an entire level of interpretation, carefully nurtured from the very outset of the film, collapses.

As this level of interpretation collapses, a now familiar reversal of expectation occurs, as illustrated in figure 2.




Figure 2

As the audience, we have been conditioned to expect Hias to follow the logic of our own rationality; instead, he reverses this expectation and performs an act which alienates him from that rationality, thereby alienating us from our own experience of the film.

The level of interpretation that collapses is the most naïve level. Henceforth, naïveté, in the sense of a willingness to accept the film as what it appears to be, is impossible. In its stead, another naïveté is required; here the term is understood as a desire to locate the essential cinematic experience in all its manifestations, such that the film simply functions as a script that, in turn, literally inscribes an experience on its audience. If we were now to imagine the incident of the bear as we had initially expected, we would still remain unable to recapture our initial naïveté: there would still be no bear. Now, the bear's very presence would underscore its essential absence as anything other than a phantasm, an imaginary construct, a fabrication of light and sound; its presence would no longer be a function of events external to the audience, but of its imagination. Note that this

remains true even if the film is reconstructed to include the bear; our initial naïveté is permanently irrecoverable.

The purpose, then, of both the initial naïveté and its more informed descendant, is to foster an awareness of the essential cinematic experience in its naked emptiness; yet the latter, not as a negative characteristic, but rather as a pregnant potential; and this potential, in turn, not as a foundation upon which to build, through interpretation, but rather as a creative force in its own right, whence a multitude of new and unexpected possibilities *might* emerge.

Traditional religious cinema criticism would be unable to let the absent bear go, but would interpret the incident rather as a symbolic event: perhaps Hias is wrestling with some internal demon, represented by the bear; or perhaps he is attempting to atone for Ludmila's murder by sacrificing some component of his own world; or perhaps the 'death' of the bear represents the end of a more brutish mentality pervading the village and epitomized in Goldfinger's actions. In the light of all that has gone before, both in this chapter and in the previous one, these three interpretations appear considerably more extravagant than in the context wherein they are postulated to arise. This extravagance is a function of the excessive interpretation that traditional religious cinema criticism is forced to engage in, simply because it is oriented wholly toward reference, rather than its absence. Yet no amount of interpretation can change the essential absence of the bear into a presence, unless that interpretation also

alters our perception of the event that marks that absence. Thus, traditional religious cinema criticism is not so much of the essential cinematic experience as of a prior interpretation thereof (this prior interpretation conditions the essential cinematic experience and superimposes a 'foundation' that traditional religious cinema criticism is then free to explore) and our approach is less an argument against traditional religious cinema criticism as against the (hermeneutic) paradigm whence it is derived.

The thrust of that paradigm is a search for presence and an aversion to absence and silence. Thus, a New Testament exegesis, if spawned by that paradigm, might interpret *Mark* 16: 9-20 as *the* narrative about the risen Christ, but 'risen' therefore understood as present, both here and now and to the original disciples, a Son who walks and talks and eats and must be removed from the scene yet again (via the Ascension) to be present with His Father.

Given this perspective, it is only natural that, in the very absence of the bear, a hidden presence be postulated; this hidden presence informs and conditions the *apparent* absence and provides a fruitful source of referential speculation. Similarly, in his critique of *2001: A Space Odyssey*, Comstock interprets the concluding images 'positively', as the presence of a being reborn into unimaginable power. But there is nothing in these images to favour this interpretation. Might one not equally see in a gigantic orbiting foetus (*i.e.*, undeveloped intelligence and unsophisticated awareness), wrapped in a transparent membrane, a being of extraordinary vulnerability? In fact,

Comstock's interpretation evidences his reliance on the novel by Arthur C. Clarke, for it is only in the latter that the term "star-child" (Comstock: 599) and the concept of that being as one possessed of great manipulative influence over its immediate environment are encountered.

Similarly again, the exegesis that focuses on *Mark* 16: 9-20 evidences an over-reliance on the text, to the exclusion of the relation of the text to the events that the text describes, for it is widely acknowledged that the last twelve verses of Mark's gospel are not part of the original; rather, they are simultaneously a later addition and an interpretation of the original conclusion to the gospel (*Mark* 16: 1-8). Thus, without recourse to New Testament scholarship, but simply from a naïve reading of the text, we may conclude that the latter itself evidences an extravagant interpretation of the events described in the earlier portion of the chapter: whereas *Mark* 16: 1-8 is a narrative about absence, *Mark* 16 9-20 is a narrative about presence.

If the latter portion of *Mark* 16 informs the former, then the focus of interpretation necessarily remains the present Christ and the empty tomb is merely a *sign* pointing to that presence: Christ is present in human terms, in terms of flesh and blood, even if slightly odd. If, on the other hand, the former portion of *Mark* 16 informs the latter, then the focus of interpretation turns to the absent Christ and the empty tomb becomes a paradox that requires a complete shift in perspective to understand: Christ is not present in human

terms, but in His own terms, which are not immediately transparent to human intelligence.

The foregoing should not be seen as an exercise in New Testament scholarship or even, strictly speaking, New Testament exegesis; rather, it should be treated as a debate, within the field of hermeneutics, on the effect of paradigms on interpretation. But this debate may be taken to a deeper level. Returning to the absent bear, we note that we continue to refer to the bear and describe it in terms of its absence. But this description assumes a bear: it begins, essentially, with the bear's presence, even if only for the sake of argument. Therefore the discussion thus far has not taken us much beyond the paradigm informed by an essential presence.

Bracketing the incident of the bear, there are Hias' request for a hunter and Hias' statement about roast bear; these lead us to the conclusion that he has fought an imaginary bear. Thus, we arrive at the bear's absence through its 'lack' of presence. But that absence is considerably more virulent, for it extends to all levels of interpretation and arises from the 'twist' that lies at the very core of the film. At the most immediate level, at which we simply watch Hias entering and emerging from the cave and thrashing about on the ground, the twist arises from the tension created by the reversal of our expectation concerning the bear's presence: we did not expect *this* of Hias. At the next level, slightly more remote, the twist arises from the tension created by the dissonance of qualifier (which in this case might be stated as 'A prophet is like a man who...') and the entire

bear event: not only did we not expect *this* of Hias, but we also do not anticipate similar behaviour on the part of any such person ('prophet'). At the most remote level, grounded in the essential cinematic experience, the twist arises from the tension between the entire film event in its objective (what we interpret as the objective content of the film) and subjective (our interpretation of the objective content of the film) manifestations: not only did we neither expect *this* of Hias, nor anticipate similar behaviour on the part of any such person, but we also did not anticipate *any* reversal of expectation at *any* level, particularly the most fundamental. For what we, as the audience, are left with thereafter is the realization that *this* film is not merely a story that entertains, but a challenge to our very understanding of perception and our reliance on a particular mode thereof. And, though this is not a necessary extrapolation, we are led to the awareness that this is possible with any film, that the very act of a 'willing suspension of disbelief' is dangerous, for it may become anathema to our concept of belief itself.

At this point we arrive at a position that appears closer to a paradigm that is informed by an essential absence, understood, not in terms of presence, but *per se*. It is such a paradigm, in turn, that informs both *our interpretation* of *Herz aus Glas* and, we argue, that film *per se*. Thus, our discussion of the absent bear truly represents no more than our point of departure. It is a convenient point of departure, both because it manifests a simplicity that highlights its paradoxical nature and because it acts as a nexus (in the form of

Mesnil's critique) between earlier critiques informed by a philosophy of presence and our analysis of *Herz aus Glas*. Yet it can represent no more than a point of departure because, left to stand on its own, it would be no more than an anomaly, an interesting but minority opinion, a perspective as tenuous as the actual incident of the bear is brief. We now proceed to analyse the bulk of the film. In so doing, we remove ourselves ever more from the position taken by earlier critiques of *Herz aus Glas* and, indeed, the bulk of traditional religious cinema criticism as a whole, such that our discussion is ever less an argument against another perspective as an exploration of the full impact of our own.

The Absent Centre

Beyond that of the bear, there is another absence that drives much of the plot: that of Mühlbeck, the master glassworker and the sole keeper of the formula for the manufacture of the ruby glass that Goldfinger's factory specializes in and is renowned for. Mühlbeck's absence is final, but he maintains a virtual presence in terms of the impact of his absence on events throughout the film. In fact, Goldfinger and the glassworkers seek, if not Mühlbeck's renewed presence, then at least the return of the knowledge he possessed. In practical terms, Mühlbeck's is not only the death of an individual, but also the departure of an entire way of life for all those who remain in the village. The one death will result in many deaths, the singular ab-

sence is contagious, fostering a growing absence, as a black hole absorbs all matter and energy in its vicinity and returns absolutely nothing.

Mühlbeck's secret is the figurative centre of the village, for without it the village would not be. The secret of the ruby glass is the focus of all creative activity within the village, its sole source of income, its *raison d'être*. Therein lies one interpretation of the film's title, for the village truly has a *Herz aus Glas* in the form of the secret of the ruby glass. Built around the secret, like the skin of an onion, we find first Mühlbeck, who totally enveloped the secret, then the remaining glassworkers, who applied the secret, then the factory as a whole, wherein the secret was realised on a daily basis, then the remaining villagers, for they derived their sustenance both from the sale of the ruby glass and the purchases of the glassworkers themselves (as in the inn, for example), then the entire village and the valley it is nestled in, for the village as a whole was renowned for its factory and the ruby glass manufactured therein.

The individual with the greatest vested interest in the recovery of Mühlbeck's secret is Goldfinger, for he is capable of nothing. But for the income that his factory provides, he would be starving, for he knows no trade beyond that of reading and writing. Thus, he manifests the highest level of activity related to either the attempted recovery of Mühlbeck's secret or its re-discovery. But he has no practical concept of how to proceed; instead, he pursues various fruitless paths that lead, ultimately, to Ludmilla's death, the de-

struction of the factory, and his own imprisonment. It is as if his activity acts to magnify the absence that lies at its core, thereby greatly enhancing its destructive potential. If the secret is a 'singularity' and Mühlbeck's death the 'black hole' that marks its location, permanently beyond any human horizon, then Goldfinger's activity is the sum of all the high-energy radiation that is given off by falling matter as it crosses the boundary between existence and non-existence.

The individual with the smallest vested interest in the recovery of Mühlbeck's secret is Hias, for he is quite capable of surviving on his own, since that is, in fact, his primary mode of existence. Thus, Mühlbeck's death and the loss of the secret he possessed have no apparent impact on Hias, except when he ventures too close to Goldfinger in the latter's most destructive moments: Hias is in the wrong place when Goldfinger burns down the factory and finds himself temporarily incarcerated with the perpetrator as a consequence. Hias and Goldfinger therefore represent the greatest contrast within the body of characters who inhabit the film. This contrast epitomizes not only their opposing fortunes, but also the two opposing modes of interpretation of the film: Goldfinger's is a desperate search for presence, which includes the necessary belief that that search can bear fruit; Hias' is an awareness of absence and an acceptance of its inevitability in the given context, for if *he* cannot divine Mühlbeck's secret and no other knows it, then it is truly beyond recovery.

The contrast between Hias and Goldfinger is manifested on many

occasions. Thus: Hias shows the greatest concern for Ludmilla's well-being, whereas Goldfinger shows none and finally murders her, Hias is most at home outside any building and feels claustrophobic indoors (see, for example, shot 223, in which Hias insists, "Ich muß in den Wald. Ich muß in den Wald."), whereas Goldfinger spends most of his time indoors and complains, "Mir tut die Sonne weh" (shot 107), Hias sees within, and communicates all that he sees freely to all around, irrespective of their willingness to listen or believe what he says, whereas Goldfinger searches without and, when he appears to find something (as in shot 141, in which Goldfinger seems to have made his decision to murder Ludmilla and hints of this to her), hides what he has found; Hias appears to have no need to imagine, for he simply sees many things, both relevant and irrelevant to the characters who inhabit the film, whereas Goldfinger is effectively inwardly blind, such that he requests Agide's presence at his table to recount his vision of "Das Land des Rubins" (shots 137-140).

The contrast between Hias and Goldfinger serves to heighten the tension generated by the absence of the secret of the ruby glass. That absence, like that of the bear, extends to all levels of interpretation and ultimately arises from the 'twist' that lies at the very core of the film. At the most immediate level, at which we are simply made aware of the death of Mühlbeck and the consequent loss of the formula, the twist arises from the tension created by the reversal of our expectation concerning the recovery or re-discovery of the formula, for we judge that recovery or re-discovery to be well within

Hias' prophetic capability; yet his only response when asked to deliver the formula is, "Ich weiß sie nicht, die Beigab" (shot 104). This reversal of expectation is illustrated in figure 3




Figure 3

Once again, Hias acts to alienate himself from our rationality, thereby further alienating us from our own experience of the film. At the next level, slightly more remote, the twist arises from the tension created by the dissonance of qualifier (which in this case 'literally' appears as numerous ruby-coloured glasses, goblets, *etc.*) and the entire sub-plot that revolves around the loss and attempted recovery of the formula needed to manufacture ruby glass. At the most remote level, grounded in the essential cinematic experience, the twist arises from the tension between the entire film event in its objective and subjective manifestations: whereas we perceive the ruby colour of the crystal produced by the glassworkers, we are simultaneously and continuously led to the perception of its essential tenuousness as anything other than a temporary and artificial fabrication of colour;

thus, as the absence of the bear highlights the virtual nature of the *shapes* that constitute the essential cinematic experience, so the absence of the formula highlights the virtual nature of the *colours* that constitute the essential cinematic experience

From one perspective, then, *Herz aus Glas* is composed of—or even exists as—a series of 'decentrings', that is, it comprises various objects, actions, and events that exhibit the absence of any centring function, any present focus, and resist the superimposition of any such. Thus Mühlbeck is dead and remains so, keeping his secret intact as such, in spite of Goldfinger's threat to disinter him and have Hias read his decomposing brain for signs therein of his formula (shot 096); the glassworkers labour in vain to reproduce the same consistency and colour of molten glass as went into the original ruby-coloured crystal produced while Mühlbeck lived (shots 072–076); Hias' predictions and advice concerning the imminent destruction of the glass factory is universally ridiculed and ignored until it is too late and the factory is no more, at which precise point the villagers turn to Hias as the instigator of the destruction (shot 221), the villagers exhibit a form of mass (dis)illusion, wandering aimlessly and expressionlessly about their village for no apparent reason (shots 077–079).

Every one of these 'decentrings' is 'centred' on the primary absence: that of the formula, which acquires the dimensions of something magical, a supernatural essence that gives life to everything that partakes of it, or is infused by it. Thus: Goldfinger equates crystal manufactured from Mühlbeck's secret with an ideal state of exist-

ence:

Das Glas hat eine leicht zerbrechliche Seele. Es ist rein von Flecken. Der Sprung ist die Stünde. Nach dem Stündenfall gibt es keinen Ton mehr. (shots 055-056)

Similarly, to Ludmilla the contents of Goldfinger's crystal cabinet embody an ideal, though inhuman city:

Seltsam, eine gläserne Stadt. Und hier leben Menschen darin. Wie können Menschen in Glashäuser leben? Hier die Kirche. In der Kirche leben Tiere, Tiere aller Art: Hasen, Hühner, Rehe, Vögel, Kühe. Aber kein Mensch ist in der Kirche zu sehen. Die Straßen sind menschenleer. Alles ist bedeckt mit Schnee. (shots 097-098)

And Ägide envisions an entire continent permeated by the formula:

Das Land des Rubins. Mein Land. Und alle Menschen... tanzen in dem rotem Schein, und leben in ihm. Ihr Blut, ihr Leben, alles ist in dem Glas, in dem Rot, in der Farbe. Dieses Land... ist das Einzige. Alles ist in diesem Land, und alles ist Rubin. (shots 138-140)

Indeed, Goldfinger's need seems to be the greatest, since it is for his sake that Ägide recounts his vision. But for Goldfinger that vision is not enough:

Ich will den Rubin wieder. Ich will das rote Glas, versteht er? Ich brauch ein Glas mein Blut zu fassen, sonst rinnt es mir davon. (shot 107)

Thus, Goldfinger finally discovers the secret within himself (see the first part of shot 147).

Of course, of something that is permanently absent and therefore unattainable, it is easy to postulate magical, mystical, supernatural powers, since it cannot deny any such expectation (nor can its absence fulfill it). We can discern in the absence of the formula a similarity to the pattern found in Pascal's allegory, as cited in the first chapter. Thus, just as in the true king's absence a look-alike can enjoy his status, so in the loss of the formula any conceivable substitute can be endowed with all its qualities, both real and imagined. Indeed, the formula for the ruby glass becomes a metaphor for life itself, just as the virtual king becomes the very centre and focus of all power and privilege. Both Pascal's allegory and *Herz aus Glas* are therefore 'decentred texts', narratives that emerge from a prior absence and remain unwilling to restore the original presence that that absence now marks. In the case of Pascal's allegory, we deduce much more than the apparent original meaning, the virtual nature of privilege through temporal status, for we extrapolate to the virtual nature of the absent king whence his substitute derives his status. Similarly, in the case of *Herz aus Glas*, we extend the decentring to the experience of the film *per se*, such that our perspective highlights the virtual nature of all that the film *re-presents*, both specifically, in its actual content, and generally, as the essential cinematic experience.

In this respect, Hias becomes the primary agent, not only of reversal, as already mentioned, but also of decentring. Every action he performs appears as a deliberate decentring, a complete shift in

perspective, away from the absent centre that pervades the village, toward an unseen presence that is represented, at least in part, by the truth of many of his predictions and, beyond these, the images that accompany his narration of his visions. Thus, Hias begins the film in the mountains, far from a centre of any sort. Thence, he descends into the village, an apparent act of centring; yet his purpose has naught to do with any of the activity of the villagers, for he simply requests a hunter, after which his mission is essentially complete. Nevertheless, while still in the village, he uses his time to warn certain people about coming events; these warnings are yet another form of decentring, since their content is essentially a suggestion that their audience remove itself from the centre, represented both by the mansion (in the case of Ludmilla) and the glassworks (in the case of the glassworkers) in particular and the village in general. Beyond these warnings, Hias wishes nothing to do with the absent centre, the formula for the ruby glass; even when offered a very substantial bribe and despite a final humanitarian appeal (shots 104-105), he ignores that centre completely, refusing to focus on it for even a second. And when he is (briefly) jailed, his sole thought is of departure from the village and a return to the forest, a thought soon realised.

A number of settings highlight Hias' deliberate decentring, adding to the contrast between himself and Goldfinger and raising the tension engendered by their periodic encounters; for example: Hias lies on a hill overlooking a clouded valley (shot 007); he sits on a rock

within a cliff far above the village, his back turned to the latter (shot 081); he stands outside the window of the mansion while talking to Ludmilla (shots 149-152); and he wanders back through the forest after he is set free (shots 225-232). These settings are complemented by Hias' visions, which are populated with edges, borders, horizons, and boundaries; for example:

Ich schau in die Ferne, bis ans Ende der Welt. Und eh der Tag um
ist kommt schon das Ende. Erst kommt die Zeit ins Stürzen und
dann die Erde. (shot 007)

Da liegt eine Felseninsel weit draußen im Meer und eine kleinere
zweite. Sie liegen am letzten Rand der bewohnten Welt. (shot 233)

Even his sojourns within the various buildings of the village are brief and purposeful, as though nothing should even attempt to hold him back; thus: he enters the mansion to warn Ludmilla (shot 100) and request the hunter (shots 103-109), then leaves; he goes to the supply store, but once there recognizes the futility of any purchase and leaves (shots 124-131); he enters Anamirl's house to spend some time with her, but leaves after a short while, having said very little (shots 132-136); he makes a brief stop within the glassworks but is received with little respect, so leaves (shot 148); finally, he settles down to a table at the inn, there to spend what is probably his longest time in one place, after which he is arrested (shot 221). The overall impression we have of Hias, then, is of a restless individual, not content to stay in one place for any appreciable length of time.

The contrast between Hias and Goldfinger revolves primarily

around the loss of the formula; yet, in drawing our focus away from that loss and enticing it toward the abundant visions that his mind fosters, Hias embodies the force that permits a 'positive' interpretation of the film's central absence. And in the action of this force, in turn, we discern the virtual nature of the film in all its manifestations and at all levels of interpretation, for these visions, as distinct from the more mundane predictions interspersed among them, incorporate both an extravagance that lures us into participation and an emptiness and incompleteness that prevents that participation from coming to fruition in the particular vision. Even the sum of all the visions registers a degree of inadequacy: they are invariably narrated, as though they possessed insufficient life unto themselves to emerge from their primal silence into the universe of ordinary signification. Thus, they ultimately fail to signify anything; they are simply recounted, aurally and visually, such that we, as their secondary audience, might experience them as a shadow of what Hias sees. For we do not see what Hias sees—that is clear the moment we 'encounter' the absent bear. Rather, ours is a virtual experience of what Hias sees; the latter vision, in turn, remains as absent from both the film event and the essential cinematic experience as either Mühlbeck or his secret formula. In this logic lies the core of our argument for *Herz aus Glas* as virtual religious experience. However, to provide a thorough background to this argument, we turn now to a closer analysis of the film, followed by an application of the tools developed in the last chapter and a discussion of their relevance and efficacy.

A Closer Analysis

When we first see Hias, he is alone, in the mountains (shot 001); when we last see him, he is alone again, in the forest (shot 232). The first setting is pastoral, the second more rugged; thus, the second appears also to express some of the struggle that Hias has gone through since the first. In both cases, we are provided a closer view of Hias' face (shots 003 and 232, respectively); yet in the second, that closer view reveals a more disheveled individual, his eyes both more intense and more remote, as though his vision now thoroughly consumed him. And so it does in a sense, for although he remains as the absent narrator, he is *seen* no more in the film; eventually, even his narration is replaced by silence and the final, printed words on the screen.

Almost four minutes pass before a single word is uttered. In the interim, we are treated to an introduction, not only to Hias' initial setting, but also to his visions, though we are not immediately aware that they are such; thus, although shots 005-006 are in fast motion, it is not clear until Hias begins to speak that they may represent, not what Hias sees, but what he 'sees', within (we adopt this convention to designate the difference between Hias inner ('sees') and outer (sees) sight), yet their effect is immediate, as the clouds flow across the screen almost like water flowing through a set of rapids. Thus, shots 005-006 are a graphic representation of the latter part

of Hias' first statement: "Und die Wolken kommen ins Rasen" (shot 007). In shot 007, however, all is calm; we see Hias where he actually is, presumably still among, or in the vicinity of, the herd. Thus, we are also introduced to the indistinction between what Hias 'sees' and what he sees: our point of view appears to coincide with his and it is not always clear whether we see through his inner or outer 'eyes'.

The next few shots continue the inner perspective, wherein we see what Hias 'sees'. Indeed, in shot 009 the music intervenes to add further weight to Hias' vision; thus, we, too, are drawn downward by the 'ominous' music (the conventions used to describe the music throughout the Screenplay are strictly subjective; thus, 'ominous' in this context refers to music that appears to connote or conjure up 'negative' images, just as 'uplifting' in shot 012 refers to music that appears to connote or conjure up 'positive' images; no apology is given for this subjective designation), we, too, are unable to find a point within the image on which to focus our attention. Then, as Hias does find "einen Punkt auf dem meine Augen einen Halt finden" (shot 012), we, too, are lifted up by the music and find ourselves, with Hias, in a renewed setting, a younger, more rugged landscape that represents at least the possibility of a rebirth (perhaps this is a foretaste of what Hias is about to undergo through his descent into the village, his subsequent return to the forest, and his final vision of the islands far out to sea.) Then all this fades into an older landscape (shot 017), at which point the music fades out, signaling an end to

the vision.

We find ourselves in the bottom of a chasm (shot 018), a sharp contrast to even the preceding shot. The sounds are now associated with the actual setting, giving an enclosed sensation, yet not claustrophobic, for the sound of the rushing water conveys a strong sense of movement and vitality. This underscores the tension between Hias, sitting comfortably among the rocks near the water, and the four farmers, who stay far from the water, wrapping the larger, drier boulders of the far side of the chasm around themselves as they humbly seek Hias' advice on the subject of the giant. The first farmer speaks slowly, his expression one of abject terror. The second farmer sounds a more controlled note. The fourth farmer continues the exaggerated monologue of the first, postulating horrible consequences if the giant is not dealt with, which the first farmer follows up on: "Er leckt uns das Hirn aus" (shot 023).

The camera focuses on Hias, who demolishes both the giant and the farmers' fear in three sentences. Now the least fearful of the farmers is able to smile. Within seconds, Hias dashes their hope by predicting the end of the glass factory. Then, as if to lend credibility to this prediction, he anticipates the crossing of the "liar" and the "thief" (shot 027). This credibility is alluded to in the next scene, in which Wudy says to Ascherl: "Der Hias hats gsagt, daß ich auf deiner Leich schlaf. Der Hias schaut die Zukunft" (shot 030). Thus, Hias' reputation is now clearly established, such that Ascherl's detailed description of the necessary manner of his own death seems less fanci-

ful: he accepts the inevitability of his death, although he reasons that it will only come about if both he and Wudy sleep in the hay and fall in a certain order—that is, Wudy last.

From the inn, we move to the mansion, where we are apprised by Goldfinger's father of Mühlbeck's death and the consequent loss of the formula for ruby glass (shot 032). Goldfinger's father appears to derive some satisfaction from this knowledge, as though he anticipates further consequences. This apparent satisfaction is brought to light near the end of the film, when he is suddenly able to walk and, indeed, wanders about in eager anticipation of viewing the burning of the glassworks (shot 214).

From the mansion, we move to the glassworks itself, where the loss of the formula is confirmed by one of the glassworkers (shot 033; we catch a glimpse of some of the humour that lies underneath the heaviness of the film, as Wenzel counters Ägide's suggestion that Mühlbeck could have committed his secret formula to writing with: "Hast du schomal ei Wort gschrieben."). Yet here there is no satisfaction, for the only thing that the glassworkers have to anticipate is the reduction or loss of their income. As yet, no one appears to be aware of Hias' prediction of the imminent destruction of the glassworks.

And from the glassworks, we move to the graveyard, to find Anamirl at Mühlbeck's grave (shot 034). Thus, in three shots (032-034), comprising just under ninety seconds, the entire scene changes three times and we are introduced to the major camps af-

fectured by Mühlbeck's death. We are also made aware of the importance of this death, such that the events that now begin to unfold do not appear overly exaggerated. The shot containing Anamirl at the grave serves to identify her from the outset as the person most closely associated with Mühlbeck. Thence we return to the glassworks to further underscore the mood that is the result of his death (shots 035-036; the 'limbo' music connotes the state of limbo that the glassworkers now find themselves in)

Now we return to the mansion to gaze with Goldfinger upon one of the first products of the glassworks and catch a glimpse of the origins of his efforts to recover the secret of the ruby glass. It is his protector; in its loss, Goldfinger sees also the end of his special social status: "Was schützt mich jetzt vor den Unbilden des freien Weltalls?" (shot 037). This, too, Goldfinger's father finds amusing (shot 039). The next three shots are difficult to interpret, but appear at one level to presage Goldfinger's future actions. Thus, while staring at the ruby glass before him, Goldfinger slowly rubs the skin over his heart, as if in anticipation of his pending discovery in the glassworks (shot 147). And the juxtaposition of shots 041 and 042 may be seen to portend his destruction of the glassworks by fire, though this juxtaposition may also connote no more than the fever that seems to be incubating within Goldfinger's mind.

Meanwhile, at the inn, Wudy and Ascherl are declining into a drunken stupor, so much so that Ascherl hardly seems to take notice of the mug Wudy smashes on his head. Given this apparent lack of

any ill effect, this scene is actually somewhat amusing, if for no other reason than that it is also quite ridiculous. We do not know whether Wudy and Ascherl are glassworkers, or whether they are in any way affected by Mühlbeck's death and/or the loss of his secret formula. Nor do we know why they are in the inn getting drunk. This scene and its precursor (shots 028-031) serve perhaps to highlight the torpor that afflicts the majority of the villagers throughout the film.

In shots 049-052 Adalbert is introduced to us, though not without further mocking laughter from Goldfinger's father. Then we encounter Paulin and the innkeeper's wife. That Paulin is more than simply torporific is clear; what remains unclear throughout the film is her relation to the other characters; thus, we never know whether she is the daughter of the innkeeper and his wife, or is simply the village idiot who has a room at the inn. Certainly no one shows her any love or respect; rather, she is a nuisance to the innkeeper's wife and an object of ridicule and a source of merriment to the other villagers. She is also the only non-adult to appear in the entire film. Shots 053-054 contrast with the next scene in their untidiness.

The scene before the crucifix (shots 055-057) provides more evidence of Goldfinger's apparent mental instability and budding obsession, for his prayer is focused on the ruby glass, which now embodies both The Garden of Eden and The Fall, the former while the glass is in its pristine state, the latter at the appearance of the first crack or blemish. His words ring true both literally and metaphorically, the

latter as already described, the former in the statement, "Nach dem Sündenfall gibt es keinen Ton mehr" (shot 056), for a cracked glass does not have the same clear tone as a whole glass when tapped.

The next scene is perhaps the one chosen by Vernon Young to serve as the ground of his suggestion that *Herz aus Glas* is, at least in part, "a fable of man's fate under monopoly enterprise" (Young: 414), for both Goldfinger and Adalbert extrapolate from the particular loss of the secret formula to the collapse of an entire socio-economic structure (shots 058 and 060, respectively). But that is the extent of their extrapolation and, apart from the many narrations of Hias, the only reference to abstract structures that exceed the bounds of the village. Thus, it is difficult to maintain Young's argument. Even the next part of the same scene returns the focus to the particular loss, its particular effects, and particular solutions:

Der Rubin muß uns retten. Laß er des Mühlbeck Haus niederreißen und in allen Ritzen nach dem Geheimnis suchen. Das Erdreich, auf dem sein Haus gestanden, grabe man drei Fuß tief aus. Denn der Mühlbeck könne sein Geheimnis vergraben haben. Das grüne Kana-pee aus Paris, das er seiner Mutter Anamirl geschenkt, bringe man mir. (shot 061)

And if this is not enough to convince us that Goldfinger's obsession for the recovery of the formula is related to his mental instability, his next statement must surely do so: "Die Unordnung der Gestirne schmerzt mich im Kopf" (shot 061). Thus, there is reason to believe that Goldfinger and Adalbert, in their statements in shots 058 and 060, respectively, generalized from Hias' actual predictions, that Hias

described no more than the future state of the particular glassworks of the village. For this glassworks presumably maintained its competitive edge through Mühlbeck's secret formula. In the loss of that competitive edge there is no reason to see the collapse of an entire industry.

Rather, Goldfinger (with Adalbert's willing assistance, since the servant has as much to lose as his master in this instance) is engaged in a fight for survival. For this reason, he will leave no stone unturned if he suspects that Mühlbeck might have hidden his secret underneath it. To Goldfinger, the ruby glass is his saviour; hence the logic that permits him to pray, not only for its recovery, but even as if to its very essence, hoping that this prayer will be answered by the translation of that essence back into some usable form(ula).

From this perspective (which is, at least, different from that of anyone else in the village and, beyond that, somewhat self-evidently 'mad'), it is also logical that Goldfinger perceive a disorder in the universe and that this disorder affect him personally and physically: it is not only the practical formula that is missing but also its essence, which still courses through Goldfinger's veins (see shot 147).

What Goldfinger suffers from, semantically, is a confusion of reference, for in the nourishing red liquid that flows through his body he re-discovers the essence that goes into the manufacture of ruby glass. His approach is that of the mediæval alchemist, who anticipates in the chance conjunction of elements *and* an appropriate metaphysical understanding the transmutation of one substance into an-

other. Thus, Goldfinger's is an extravagant hermeneutic, opposed to the practical hermeneutic of Hias; the former consistently over-reads the immediate signs around him, whereas the latter (with noted and notable exceptions) manifests an awareness of the precise condition of this surroundings.

Following a brief interlude between Adalbert, Goldfinger, and Ludmilla (Goldfinger's father laughs at the 'favour' being done her, as if in anticipation of her fate), we are confronted with the first hard evidence of Hias' abilities as a seer: the inert bodies of Wudy and Ascherl (shots 066-070). It is a while before we discover the complete truth, however; in the interim, it appears that both might have been killed by their fall. Certainly the order is correct: Ascherl is below, Wudy on top, as Ascherl suggested in the inn. Before we discover the complete truth, Goldfinger's search for the secret formula continues.

Goldfinger suggests to his father that the time has come for him to get up (shot 071), so that he can witness the re-discovery of the ruby glass (the glassworker Gigl has laid claim to this re-discovery). Here we get an inkling of the extent of Goldfinger's father's deterioration, for he has not left his chair for twelve years (except, one presumes, for the 'necessities of nature'). Yet his rotten spine becomes instantly whole again when the circumstances are such that he truly wants to get up (shot 214). Therein we recognize that both father and son are obsessed: the latter with ruby glass, the former with conflagrations, for it has been exactly twelve years since the last

great fire, twelve years since he needed shoes to walk in.

In the glassworks there arises a heated debate between Adalbert, Goldfinger, and Gigl as to whether the latter has, in fact, re-discovered the formula for ruby glass. But, whereas Adalbert, given his social standing, is permitted no more than a sharp question (shots 074), Goldfinger rejects the molten glass outright (shot 076). This causes Goldfinger's father no end of amusement, while Gigl is at a loss for words. Even were his glass the same colour as Mühlbeck's, it appears unlikely that Goldfinger would accept it as such, given the additional characteristics he now perceives that original to be imbued with.

There follows one of the strangest scenes in the whole film, as a large group of villagers walks through the misty streets (shots 077-079). There appears no purpose to this walk, and none is ever offered, unless we consider Hias' explanation, given from on high: "Drunten im Dorf geht der Wahnsinn herum" (shot 080). It is as if the whole group is now infected by the same perceptual malady that already afflicts Goldfinger. The music that accompanies this scene suggests that all now accept the inevitability of their fate; they are like lost sheep, wandering about without their shepherd, represented by Mühlbeck and his secret formula. The movement of the camera imposes a gradual distancing from the scene, from medium long shot (shot 077), through long shot (shot 078), to extreme long shot (shot 079); from this last perspective, we encounter Hias, far above the procession, whom we approach, first in a medium long shot (shot

080), then in a medium close-up (shot 081), then, finally, as though right through his mind, into another of his visions (shots 083-092).

This vision like the first, begins on an apocalyptic note; however, its relation to the story unfolding within the village is more tenuous, for the details have little to do with either what has already transpired since the beginning of the film or what has yet to transpire before the film comes to an end. Nevertheless, the overall tenor of the vision is positive, as though, in the face of the madness that he perceives to be running amok in the village, Hias is forced to retreat to the safety of his own inner life. Perhaps, too, the contrast between the aural and visual images contained in the vision and the previous scene on the misty streets of the village serves to indicate the eventual future that will unfold for Hias, in spite of anything he may encounter in the interim. Thus, the vision also serves as the decision point; whereas it began with Hias' uncertainty about whether to proceed into the village or depart altogether (shot 080), it ends with Hias walking down through the forest (shots 093-094) on his way to his first appointment, with Ludmilla (shot 100). And, indeed, when Hias finally returns to the forest (shots 225-226), his upward path appears to be almost exactly the reverse of the current downward one; thus, shots 095-224 are bracketed in a sense, by shots 093-094 on one side and shots 225-226 on the other.

In Goldfinger's order to have Hias sent for, we detect the first stage of Hias' unwilling involvement with the madness that pervades

the village. As if to emphasize this initiation, the ominous music of shots 009-012 is repeated: here is the beginning of the unfolding of what Hias 'saw' in his first vision. And, as if to emphasize the extent of his apparent dementia, Goldfinger indicates the purpose of his order:

Und wenn wir den toten Mühlbeck wieder aus dem Grab ziehen
müssen, daß der Hias in dem Mühlbeck seinem Hirn lese. (shot 096)

Therein he persists in his confusion of reference, equating Mühlbeck's dead brain mass with the location of the formula; to read this 'text' requires only the correct interpreter: Hias. But the confusion of reference is that in a double sense, for Goldfinger's request also ignores the general nature of Hias' 'sight', which is such that, were Hias able to divine the formula, he would nevertheless not require Mühlbeck's brain.

The 'ominous' music continues for almost another minute, into the shots of Ludmilla exploring the contents of Goldfinger's crystal cabinet (shots 097-099), fading out only at the approach of Hias, as though he were perhaps some antidote to Ludmilla's fate. And, indeed, he immediately warns Ludmilla that she must leave Goldfinger's house, lest some ill befall her (shot 100). This appears to cause her some grief, for in the next shot she is crying as she prepares to announce Hias' arrival; she prefaces this announcement with the statement, "Es wird sehr viel geschehen" (shot 102), echoing Hias' own predictions. In responding to her prior grief, Goldfinger, speaks of "das

Gesetz vom Rubin" (shot 101), thus further elevating the formula to the sphere of the absolute or even the supernatural, as if it were not only the primary component of a manufacturing process but also a fundamental law of nature or even a divinely ordained pattern for living.

Naturally, Goldfinger is somewhat surprised that Hias is already there, as if the latter had known in advance that Goldfinger would issue such an order and had therefore taken it upon himself to obey that order even before it was issued. But Hias did not know or, if he did, he does not say so; the purpose of his presence is to request a hunter (shot 103). Here we encounter a fragment that appears to bear no relation to the rest of the film: Sam is mentioned for the first and last time.

(A reading of the original screenplay (see Greenberg) reveals an extensive treatment of Hias' partner. However, taken only in the context of the film, the reference to Sam seems quite irrelevant. It occurs only once, in this shot, and appears to have no effect on any of the remainder of the film. The scenes between Hias and Sam described in the original screenplay never occur in the film. The cause of Sam's absence lies ultimately in an æsthetic decision on the part of the artist-director and therefore remains outside the bounds of *our* analysis.)

Thus, we arrive at the confrontation between Hias and Goldfinger (shots 104-109), a confrontation expressed not least in their respective appearances: Goldfinger is well-dressed, yet pale and thin,

while Hias is dressed for comfort in the semi-wilderness and seems fit and strong. Hias' very presence causes Goldfinger to cringe; thus, Goldfinger unburdens himself to Hias, whereas Hias simply maintains his tack: the request for a hunter to kill the bear. Interspersed among his rebuttals, Hias provides small tidbits of Goldfinger's future, hinting at his imprisonment (shot 108) and exposure to the rats of the jail (shot 109). In shot 110, our own perspective, as witnesses to this encounter, is mirrored in Ludmilla's gaze and expression. It is a humiliating experience; Ludmilla lowers her eyes.

In the barn, the innkeeper and his wife are engaged in separating Wudy and Ascherl, in part to determine whether one or both might still be alive (shot 111). The innkeeper's wife recalls Hias' prediction and correctly identifies the living and the dead. But Wudy remains as if dead (shot 112), until a dog is brought in to rouse him (shots 113-115). And when he rises, the innkeeper's wife emphasizes the force of that result: "Was der Hias sicht, des kimmt" (shot 116).

Next, we are treated to Paulin's closer inspection of Ascherl's corpse, lying in the church (shot 117). This might be treated as a form of service or rite of passage, but Paulin's actions and facial expressions belie such an interpretation. She appears entranced by Ascherl's immobility, then expresses shock at the implication. The door moves mysteriously, as though behind it there is another person in the room. And, as if this is some signal, Paulin leaves the room. At the very least, this shot serves as a background to the later scene in the inn, when Wudy enters bearing Ascherl's corpse.

Toni arrives at the inn (shots 118-121), to the evident delight of the innkeeper. Now we find out how long Mühlbeck has been dead: he was buried the week before last; it would be quite a task for Hias to read anything at all in his brain! And it appears from Toni's statement that Hias anticipated even Mühlbeck's death. Toni, in turn, recognizes the truth of the secret formula: "des is e Krankheit vom Herrn" (shot 121), implying that, though Mühlbeck's mixture might have resulted in very beautiful crystal, it was not so exceptional as to cause so great a disaster by its loss. The glassworkers could sell their remaining stock for a much higher price, since it is now unique, while at the same time working toward another unique product.

But Goldfinger is no longer amenable to such simple arguments, for he is quite beyond any ordinary perception. Deeply engrossed in finding the formula in the clutter of books on and around the desk before him (he has evidently been through most of them), he nevertheless expresses great joy at the arrival of Anamirl's couch. We catch our first glimpse of the purpose of its transport: "Ich bin entzückt von diesem Briefe" (shot 122). To underscore his conception, Goldfinger requests his letter-opener, then proceeds to tear open the couch. Removing some of the stuffing, he prepares to 'read' it (shot 126), as though by its very proximity to Mühlbeck while the latter was still alive should endow it with Mühlbeck's knowledge of the formula. But this does not work, leaving Goldfinger as perplexed as before:

Wenn einem ein Brief erreicht ohne Papier, so daß die Buchstaben herumliegen, dann ist das eher zum nachdenken. (shot 128)

It is indeed! Here we catch a glimpse of an alien hermeneutic; and in this glimpse we become aware of another interpretation of interpretation: the act of interpretation as an act of ordering, as of the letters that are placed on a piece of paper to compose a letter. In the absence of any order there is also no possibility of any interpretation, since interpretation is essentially of a prior interpretation, a prior ordering. Thus, Goldfinger's hermeneutic can bear no fruit, since there are underlying patterns which it ignores or is unable to fathom; this ignorance is perhaps what drives Goldfinger to destroy the factory, since there is then no point in trying to recover a formula which will inevitably fail to satisfy the precise intent of its recovery.

In the inn's supply store, the innkeeper's wife is preparing some supplies for Hias, but as he looks out the doorway toward the forest, he appears to realise that her act is premature (shot 129), so she returns the supplies (shot 130) as Hias departs for Anamirl's house (shot 131). There he interprets Anamirl's signs (she is unwilling or unable to speak), then proceeds into another of his visions, albeit a short one (shots 135-136). This scene exists in stark contrast to the next, in which Ägide provides his vision of "Das Land des Rubins" to Goldfinger (shot 138): Anamirl's house is dark, Goldfinger's bright; Anamirl provides only the most basic fare for Hias—a loaf of bread—whereas Goldfinger's dinner table is supplied with an abun-

dance of food and drink. And Hiäs' manners are simple and unconscious (shot 136), whereas Agide is very concerned to act in precisely the correct fashion (shot 141)

It is at this stage that Goldfinger announces his discovery, which he follows immediately with: "An alle Glashütten kann ich mein Geheimnis verkaufen" (shot 142). This shocks Ludmilla, although we remain unable to fathom the reason. Goldfinger also announces his decision to dispose of a large quantity of the old stock of ruby crystal; but his announcement further enhances his confusion of reference, for he intends to have the crystal thrown into the water, "daß sich der See rot färbt" (shot 143), as if either the crystal itself or its colour were soluble in water. His conception of the essence of the ruby crystal is clearly different from what we can imagine; indeed, it is almost as if he expected the crystal to bleed as it fell into the water. This coincides with his actions later in the glassworks, where he identifies his own body as a repository of the formula (shot 147). In the meantime, since he now feels that he possesses the secret, he no longer wishes Mühlbeck any ill, believing that his wishes for Mühlbeck have some effect on the latter's state (shot 145).

In the glassworks, Agide, who is among the glassworkers watching Goldfinger's behaviour, recognizes its strangeness: "Da wird die Herrin schaun, wenns von der Reis zurückkommt" (shot 148). But Hias is already one step ahead of him: "Die wird nichts mehr stehen sehen, wenns zurückkommt" (shot 148). Ludmilla, too, recognizes Goldfinger's state: "Der Herr stimmt nicht mehr" (shot 149).

But she is already trapped, as it were, behind the iron bars of the window through which she talks to Hias, who makes one last attempt to get her to leave (shot 150). Adalbert appears and requests Ludmilla's presence; she catches a glimmer of her fate but is either unwilling or unable to leave (shot 151). Henceforth, events move inexorably toward her eventual death and the destruction of the glassworks:

Die Nacht laßt sich Zeit. Heut kommt sie ganz langsam. Sie kriecht in die Winkel vom Dorf, und die Leut dringen sich leise im Stall mit den Tiern zusammen. Bei der Glashütten, da arbeiten sie wieder gegen die Angst an, weil sie wissen ihre Arbeit ist umsonst. Ich hab's ihnen gesagt: in der Nacht brennt die Hütten. Aber wie im Schlaf, so sicher gehn die Leut in ihr Unglück mit offenen Augen. (shot 158)

Hias either cannot, or does not wish to, play the part of the hero, rescuing Ludmilla from her fate and saving the factory from destruction. Rather, he sees the inevitability of these events, given both his own status within the local social structure and the inertia driving the villagers. Thus, he retreats, first to the cliff far above the village (shot 158), then to the inn to watch events unfold (shot 186).

Meanwhile, we see the glassworkers working 'against their fear' (shots 159-174). Then we turn to the mansion to witness Ludmilla's last moments. Apart from Goldfinger, who, we presume, actually commits the murder, there are three witnesses: Goldfinger's father, who appears to take great pleasure in the proceedings, Adalbert, who appears almost comatose, and Toni, who simply plays his harp in the

next room. Ludmilla actually tries to escape at this point (shot 181), but Adalbert is not as comatose as he appears, for he snaps the door shut and pockets the key before Ludmilla can stop him. Now she is trapped. Various signs appear: the painting of a saint falls off the wall, as if some transgression were about to take place (shot 183); a carved figurehead trembles, as though in mock imitation of Ludmilla's fear (shot 185); we see a close-up of the saint, looking up to heaven, his stigmata the evidence of his martyrdom, which Ludmilla is about to repeat (shot 185), finally, the camera focuses on the skull lying by the saint's feet, as if to confirm Ludmilla's ultimate fate (shot 185).

While these events transpire, many of the remaining villagers have compressed themselves into the inn, as if to ward off any evil by their proximity to one another and the very intensity of their forced merriment (shots 186-198). In their midst sits Hias, oblivious to all that goes on around him, his gaze ever more intense, his visions ever more apocalyptic. He is ignored by everyone but the hurdy-gurdy man; even he is quick to use the return of Wudy with Ascherl's stiffened corpse as an excuse to participate in the general merriment. In shots 192-193 and 195-197 we find a literal dance with death, as Wudy holds Ascherl's inert body while he dances to the music of the hurdy-gurdy and the clapping of the other patrons in the inn. Only Gigl seems to find this dance offensive, but he is quickly overruled (shot 195). When Wudy finally becomes too tired to continue, the patrons turn to Paulin for further entertainment

(shots 203-208), before events finally overwhelm them.

In shot 199 we receive confirmation of Goldfinger's conception of the secret formula. to him, Ludmilla is simply another ruby goblet, fresh out of the oven, cooling quickly, but without further danger of cracking. In her blood he recognizes the essence of the formula; naturally the factories are no longer of any use, for which can produce actual human beings with blood coursing through their veins? Goldfinger takes Ludmilla's body out of the room and places it beside Toni's harp (shot 200), as though she were a sacrifice being deposited at the altar, then prepares himself for his last task by getting a burning stick from the furnace (shot 201). All this while, Toni has been playing his harp; only when Goldfinger thrusts the burning stick at him does he react to an external stimulus (shot 202).

In shots 203-208, there is a continuous counterpoint between Hias and Paulin with her goose, as though they play the parts of the fool and the idiot, respectively, in some mediæval comedy, yet they ignore one another. Thus, as if to underscore Hias' "Jeder Mensch wird einen andern Kopf haben" (shot 205), the goose moves its head farther into the frame, partially obscuring Hias' face, then draws it back again to Hias' "darf sich nicht bücken" (shot 205). And to Hias' "weils nicht lange dauert" (shot 206), Paulin lifts her dress up over her head. Hias keeps "einen eisernen Kopf" as Paulin drops her dress to the ground (shot 206). Then, as though they themselves were "Bruder' und 'Schwester'" and she were preparing for bed (shot 207), Paulin drops yet another garment to the floor. When she is

finally naked, we cut to Goldfinger preparing to torch the glassworks (shot 209). It is as if we have been transported from the figurative to the literal 'naked' truth of Goldfinger's madness, which is also reflected in the passion of the villagers for a spectacle. Nothing remains hidden, those who are to die in the film are dead; that which is to be destroyed in the film is even now being destroyed.

In the mansion, Goldfinger's father is suddenly able to overcome his alleged ailment (one may speculate as to the connection between this recovery and Ludmilla's sacrifice, but such a connection is ultimately too tenuous to maintain), he goes in search of his shoes, quickly, lest he miss the spectacle of the burning factory (shot 214). Hias continues his narration (shots 215-216), but, contrary to our expectation, he is still aware of what transpires around him, both in his immediate vicinity, as he responds to Adalbert's search for Ludmilla, and in the village as a whole, for he knows of Ludmilla's fate and her current whereabouts (shot 218). Yet the timing of his departure could not be less favourable, for he runs squarely into the mass of returning villagers, who lust for a scapegoat on whom to place the blame for the disaster that has befallen their glass factory (shot 221). Suddenly their prophet, the one to whom they turned for advice on so many past occasions, has been transformed into one possessed by the devil ("Der hat Teufelsaugen! Der hat'n bösen Blick!"), and appropriate punishment should be meted out immediately: "Reißts ihm d'Augen aus!" (shot 221).

Not his physical sight, but his inner vision is removed from

him, for Hias is placed in the prison with Goldfinger, though, unlike the latter, he is not chained to the wall, but remains free to move about (shots 222-224) Hias' weakness appears to be that he requires the solitude of the forest to maintain his inner vision, and this inner vision is his life (shot 223) Therefore, since the solitude of the prison is inappropriate, he must return to the forest Goldfinger finds this significant "Und Menschen willst du keine sehn Du gefallst mir Du hast ein Herz aus Glas" (shot 224)

This is the only occasion (apart from the credits at the beginning of the film) in which the term '*Herz aus Glas*' is used Thus, whereas the meaning of the title might traditionally be interpreted as 'delicate' and 'fragile' (e.g., Ludmilla) and therefore sought in the meanderings of Goldfinger and his murder ('sacrifice') of Ludmilla ('the sacrificial lamb', 'the innocent', etc), Goldfinger's statement in shot 224 suggests another interpretation. 'transparent', for what could be more transparent than Hias' encounter with the bear? Moreover, Hias' motives are always clear; he is direct, his intentions are visible, his entire exterior manifestation fails to hide the narration, even the experience (at one remove), of what he 'sees', within. If he does not wish to see any people, then this, too, can be interpreted as a transparency, for the villagers appear, at the very least, muddled, their thoughts opaque; beyond this, they are so thoroughly absorbed by the conventions of their existence (as servants, villagers, glass-workers, etc.) that they are unable to prevent or even perceive what to Hias has become completely obvious. Thus, if Hias does not

wish to see any people, then the latter more as the set of conventions that he does not fit, because he sees through them, beyond them, to the less conventional—even unconventional—foundation whence that set is derived

The foregoing interpretation brings to light a number of reversals of expectation




Figure 4

In figure 4, we expect Goldfinger's search eventually to bear fruit, even if through the services of Hias, but it does not.




Figure 5

In figure 5, we are not aware of any search on Hias' part, but he is the one to whom a heart of glass is attributed




Figure 6

In figure 6, we expect Ludmilla to receive a reward for obeying the conventions of her social status, yet she is sacrificed.




Figure 7

In figure 7, we expect some ill to befall Hias eventually, since he continually flouts the local conventions, but he is the one who sur--

vives, seemingly intact.

There is also a reversal of *rôles* between Hias and Goldfinger. Goldfinger, the 'official' authority figure (by convention), is imprisoned, stripped of his authority, whereas Hias, the 'unofficial' authority figure (by his absence of convention) is set free to pursue his visions. Of course, the immediate cause of Goldfinger's imprisonment is his destruction of the glassworks and—we presume that this, too, has been discovered—his prior murder of Ludmilla: no reversal of authority *per se* has taken place at this level; rather, Goldfinger has *transgressed* the authority entrusted to him, therefore, it has been taken from him, presumably to be entrusted to another (not Hias!). Hias, on the other hand, has always been outside convention, his end being no more than a continuation of his beginning. Thus, at this level of interpretation, all remains essentially as it was.

Until Hias encounters the absent bear (shots 227-228) (In this event that level of interpretation collapses, becomes infeasible: ~~this~~ film is no longer about events in the village (which is now forgotten), but about Hias' visions (whereof the events in the village serve as but one expression), and the latter, not as straightforward prophecies, but as a way of seeing, a perspective that conditions our experience of this film and, thereafter, any other. Thus, the remainder of the film begins a new narrative (shots 232/233-248/249), but differently, without all the normal attributes of a story. In its most naïve form, the new narrative becomes a metaphor *for* search; thus, the metaphor *of* search continues, from the search for the secret formu-

la, to the search for the truth of the end/edge of the world.

The tenor of these last scenes is more disturbing than that of the village story, whereas the latter wore the cloak of normalcy, albeit shifted slightly askew, the 'story' that *now* unfolds is more overtly on the edge of normalcy, where ordinary living meets the undifferentiated primordial existence whence it is derived. All signs now point toward that edge: the islands are far out to sea (shot 233); they lie at the very edge of the inhabited world (shot 233); they are inhabited by a few forgotten people (shot 233), most of the inhabitants still cling to an old model of the world (shot 234); but some are at the threshold of another model, wherein the world does not end at the horizon, but continues around, back upon itself (shots 237-239); to determine the veracity of their model, these four inhabitants set out in a small boat, aiming for the seaward horizon (shots 240-242), but their boat is much too small for the journey (shot 243); slowly, pitifully, their tiny boat becomes one with the sea (shot 248), the sea becomes one with the sky (shot 248), the sky becomes one with the end of the film (shots 249-250).

Brevity and Narrative

We apply brevity in conjunction with narrative because the two are related: brevity is of the narrative dimension of a film. In the case of *Herz aus Glas*, we may identify a variety of 'narratives': not only those of Young (see earlier discussion), but also our own distinc-

tion between the twin stories of the villagers and the islanders. Inasmuch as these stories are only loosely related, such that their storytelling functions more as an adjunct than as their primary characteristic, we refer to them as narrative 'fragments'. This term carries the notion of brevity within itself and, indeed, we find that the narrative fragments that constitute *Herz aus Glas* possess that characteristic, for they are quite short.

From our perspective, their brevity is a further indication of their function within the film as a whole: the focus of the film extends deeper than its narrative surface. Brevity increases the awareness of this depth because it increases the difficulty of pursuing the narrative dimension for its own sake; there is simply too little present within the narrative fragments to permit an exclusive focus: left to itself, that focus wanders, not only from narrative fragment to narrative fragment, but also between these fragments, in the moments when we return exclusively to Hias. Thus, the fragmentation of the narrative dimension of the film causes a degree of slipperiness which, in turn, forces our focus to slide between the cracks in that narrative dimension.

But brevity is, in the case of *Herz aus Glas*, also a measure of the absence of narrative closure: the narrative fragments are inconclusive, both literally, because 'loose ends' lie about like weeds in an untended field, and intellectually, because no formal 'conclusion' is ever reached. Given our perspective of the film, this is quite appropriate, since the narrative fragments exhibit an extravagance that

precludes a solely literal interpretation; given the inadmissibility of a literal interpretation, their 'endings' or 'outcome' are irrelevant and that focus, too, is inadmissible. In turn, the brevity of the narrative fragments assists in the development and maintenance of this perspective.

That the film comprises a multitude of narrative fragments is neither a guarantee of placement within the category of narrative cinema nor an expression of narrative *per se*. In the former case, we may treat *Herz aus Glas* as narrative cinema only on one level; but, as we have seen, this level quickly collapses and, with it, the concept of the film as an example of narrative cinema. Thus, we enter into the film from the perspective of narrative cinema, but we emerge shifted toward narrative incohesion, even incoherence, for the narrative fragments sustain neither themselves nor the film as a whole. However, this argument does not imply that *Herz aus Glas* cannot be treated within the category of narrative cinema.

Herz aus Glas employs the conventions of narrative cinema rather than those of more experimental films. And if it succeeds in collapsing our perception of itself as an example of narrative cinema, then this less as a specific example, than as the category of narrative cinema as a whole. For what is ultimately at stake is our concept of narrative itself. If we enter into the film from the perspective of narrative cinema, then we also carry with us a *desire for narrative*, even if this desire remains hidden. The desire for narrative finds its expression in our willingness to participate in the story, to treat it as

a story and, as such, to expect certain characteristics of that story.

But this desire emerges naturally, from our more general conception of narrative—the entire social structure of civilization that is built on an expected progression of events within individual, corporate, national, even global lives, it is found in such mundane but pervasive phenomena as the fetish for the obituary columns of newspapers, the television soap operas, the gossip networks that exist through all levels of any society, indeed, every interest that manifests a concern for repetitions of, and deviations from, certain established patterns. It exceeds the category of myth because it gives rise to that category, as a specific example of narrative. Rather, it is in a category unto itself. This category is characterized by myth, but now in the sense of paradigm; yet it is a paradigm of paradigms, for it is the foundation of our paradigm and any other: it is, in essence, the very concept of paradigm, of *differentiated* reality, of the necessity of an underlying order.

Taken to its most extreme interpretation, Goldfinger's search for the secret formula is an expression of the desire that characterizes this category, for his search is for the very concept of essence, as both order and origin. Recognizing that his search is this fundamental leads Goldfinger to pursue it with such intensity for, should his search prove *fundamentally* successful, he will find himself at the origin of all interpretations, including the one that gives rise to the concept of his ruby glass as a thing of value. Naturally much greater power and wealth accrue from this depth, since one is then in a position to ma-

nipulate any and every interpretation that arises from it. But Goldfinger's search is not successful. Not because he fails to penetrate to the core of the phenomenon of the ruby glass, but because there is no such core: the ruby glass is simply glass of a certain colour; it happens that this colour is pleasing to the eye of many beholders. Value and wealth accrue through this fortuitous circumstance, a coincidence, no more. Hence Toni's remark: "Des mit dem Rubinglas, des is e Krankheit vom Herrn" (shot 121) The illness is fatal, though not to Goldfinger, but to Ludmilla. And beyond Ludmilla, to the concept that underlies it, for it, too, fails to survive Ludmilla's death. If the essence of, in this instance, life is only to be found in death, then soon nothing will be left alive!

The narrative fragments that constitute *Herz aus Glas* fail completely in maintaining the existence of the concept of paradigm, of *differentiated* reality, of the necessity of an underlying order; rather, they play at a pretense of its existence. In this play, we detect both the recognition of the pervasiveness of narrative *per se* and the recognition of the nature of the latter as an *imposition*, continuously maintained, but characterized by its own essential absence as anything other than an artificial phenomenon. It is the universe we live in, but it is also *our* universe, a universe we ourselves have manufactured. It is also a necessary universe, for in the absence of difference, there is no possibility of creation and movement, and hence of existence. Thus, the film does not collapse our universe, it merely relativizes it. The narrative fragments never cease to follow one an-

other, though each is at least slightly different than its predecessor; they cannot cease, for in their absence there would be total incoherence: the actual individual frames that constitute the film would, at least metaphorically, cease to cohere to one another and the essential cinematic experience would itself collapse.

Thus, it is entirely unnecessary to associate the film's expression of narrative with the fact that it comprises a multitude of narrative fragments, for the two exist independently of one another, the latter in themselves and the former as the underlying desire that we bring to the film, apply to our acceptance of each and every narrative fragment (as a 'willing suspension of disbelief'), and attach to our primary experience of the film (as a 'narrative' experience). But this very independence permits the narrative fragments to maintain their existence as such while our concept of narrative undergoes numerous transformations on its way to its final, relative existence; for, from the perspective of the film as a whole, the narrative fragments themselves never pretend to exist at any level beyond the most immediate, whereas our concept of narrative enters the film as a component of our desire and therefore also suffers its fate.

We may now discern parallels between Hias' own expression of concern (i.e., none) for the narrative dimension of his vision, the biblical concept of narrative as expressed in the parables of Jesus and discussed in the previous chapter, and the understanding of narrative expressed through, and extrapolated from, *Herz aus Glas*, immediately above. In these parallels, Hias' unwillingness to undertake any

personal *action* to prevent the fate that he has predicted for Ludmilla from befalling her becomes clear: no relevance would pertain to any such action, for the latter would be an acceptance of narrative supremacy (we maintain this perspective solely within the context of our analysis of *Herz aus Glas*, and then only from the perspective of that film as an æsthetic construct; the perspective is postulated neither as an ethical principle nor as a moral imperative, but simply as a critical stance). In effect, by vocalizing his prediction to Ludmilla, Hias has created another narrative fragment, which now has a life of its own; if he took it seriously, then it would also rule him.

At the most immediate level of interpretation, then, Hias' prediction is a warning; but the instant we move beyond the most immediate level of interpretation, that prediction is reduced to the status of story. Thus, Ludmilla dies several times first in our imagination, when Hias warns her, then more certainly, when she is actually trapped in the room moments before her death, and finally in an absolute sense (within the context of the essential cinematic experience), when we see her dead body lying on the floor. That is precisely Hias' concern throughout the film: to tell stories, to be open to his visions. He has only one *practical* concern: to remove the threat of the bear. Beyond this practical concern, all is story. Hias' concern to tell stories, to be open to his visions, is not practical, it is essential to his existence. He could as easily have told Ludmilla the precise manner of her escape from Goldfinger's clutches, but that would have been another story, one which he has not seen and therefore cannot

recount.

In 'emitting' so many narrative fragments, Hias' imitates the very multiplicity of parables found in the New Testament, the narrative component of each of which is never concerned with a particular person, one who might be an actual member of the audience, but only potentially so, such that each and every member of the audience might feel a sense of personal address. Within the context of the specific film, *Herz aus Glas*, Hias' narrative fragments relate to particular individuals, but these are themselves merely components of those narrative fragments, outside of which they simply cease to exist. Thus, he could no more relate to them as we can claim to know, personally, the individuals who populate Jesus' parables. And from this perspective, there is no possibility that Hias could rescue Ludmilla, for that would negate the very experience that the narrative fragment that contains her death creates. In this negation, the relativity of that experience would also vanish, to be replaced by the *relevance* of that experience, and so of narrative in general.

The focus on the prevention of Ludmilla's death is derived, not from the essential cinematic experience created by *Herz aus Glas*, but from the desire that we bring to it. Thus, our conception of narrative informs our initial experience of the film, but does not survive that experience intact; it is killed with Ludmilla, when we realise the complete inevitability of her death, given that the events that constitute the essential cinematic experience are bounded by the pre-existent strip of Celluloid™ whereof that experience is created. Simi-

larly, the concept of Hias' rescue of Ludmilla is derived, not from an objective analysis of the film, but from our narrative prejudice, whereby characters with certain identifiable characteristics engage in a pre-defined set of actions relative to the other characters who populate stories. We may therefore interpret the film as whole as an æsthetic construct that consistently counters *our desire* by consistently reversing our expectation given that desire. In the film's final shots, our desire is stripped naked, then forced to recede into the very absence of focus created in and by the white sky.

Metaphor and Paradox

The white sky, in turn, serves as a metaphor for the absence of relevance that *Herz aus Glas* ultimately displays. This is not absence of relevance in the sense of *irrelevance*, but of abrogated reference, such that, in the collapse of the narrative dimension of the film and the attendant relativization of narrative *per se*, we discern an emerging metaphor of the form that Crossan postulates (see relevant discussion in the second chapter). Our desire has led us to its own absence, such that, like the pseudo-king in Pascal's allegory, it remains no more than a virtual desire, a metaphor for its own existence, deriving both its now virtual existence *and its former authoritative existence* from the tension between these two states, such that the whole evidences the essential narrative that gave rise to our desire in the first place.

By living on as a metaphor, our desire turns on its own original existence, which therefore recedes into the unknown and the undifferentiated, for it is no longer possible to isolate its precise source. In a similar fashion, Goldfinger can no longer point to the exact location of the secret formula, when he claims to find the formula, it is diffused throughout his whole body, then also throughout that of Ludmilla, and so, by extension, throughout all that lives. The formula becomes a metaphor for the essence of life itself and therefore, *within the context of the film*, of the essential metaphor of the entire experience that we identify as the essential cinematic experience, *for that is life as we are aware of it while we participate in that experience*. Goldfinger's *desire* then suffers the same fate as our own and that of the formula, for he is unable to recover that desire in its pristine form; namely, its origin in the presence of the formula while Mühlbeck once lived.

In this sense, metaphor, as evidenced within and through our experience of *Herz aus Glas*, implies a metaphorical perspective, a point of view that is both characterized by metaphor and perceives metaphor at the heart of the essential cinematic experience. For the heart of the essential cinematic experience is no more than a virtual centre, marked therefore, not by its essential presence as an objective phenomenon, but by its essential absence, since it merely *manifests* itself as an objective phenomenon but is nonetheless derived from a set of 'subjective' (*i.e.*, subject-centred and subject-derived) phenomena. Emerging from the heart of the essential cinematic experience

rience and surrounding the latter in layers, in the same manner as the aforementioned narrative elements are built around Mühlbeck's secret like the skin of an onion, we encounter the narrative fragments that constitute *Herz aus Glas* and now act as metaphors for our very experience of them

Each of the narrative fragments exhibits the characteristics of metaphor only in the light of a conjunction with the other narrative fragments that live to either side and the disjunctions that lie between. Even the neighbouring narrative fragments are no more than repetitions or re-affirmations of the narrative surface of the local fragment for, in the disjunctions that mark its boundaries, the local fragment also encounters the agent of its own demise. It is in this demise, which is the end of no more than the status of the narrative surface as an absolute, that the nature of the local fragment as a metaphor is brought to light. It acquires and maintains the status of live metaphor through its relation to previous narrative fragments, which now exist as no more than memories, but inform our experience of the current fragment nonetheless for being such. Thus, each successive fragment represents another layer wrapped around the essential cinematic experience until, with the end of the last shot, that experience is complete.

But metaphor may also be detected as the characteristic that *manufactures* our experience of *Herz aus Glas*. In this capacity, metaphor pervades the essential cinematic experience *per se*, although we can demonstrate no more than that this is true within

the limited context of our analysis of this particular film, and therefore of the particular cinematic experience derived therefrom. In this limited context, *Herz aus Glas* arises from, is manufactured by, (1) the individual frames (which can be analysed in their own right, as was done for the Screenplay included as an appendix to this dissertation) that constitute the strip of Celluloid™, (2) the collection of those frames into a series of sufficient length and consistency, one frame to the next, as to permit the superimposition of the term 'shot' as a reflection of their unity, (3) the expansion of a series of related shots into a 'scene' (a more tenuous term, since 'scene' is derived from a more distant perspective), (4) the further expansion of a group of scenes (possibly, but not necessarily, since narrative fragments need not coincide with scenes) into what we have termed a 'narrative fragment', and finally (5) the collection of all the narrative fragments, ~~and their intervening disjunctions~~ (which are, in *Herz aus Glas*, no less than shots) into our experience of the film as a whole.

We detect metaphor throughout this process because each stage requires the presence of difference and, in the case of *Herz aus Glas*, includes the repeated juxtaposition of the known and the unknown, the familiar and the unfamiliar, the expected and the unexpected, such that a continuous and pervasive tension is fostered and maintained until the very end (and, perhaps, even beyond). Thus, metaphor refers to the entire process as one that is essentially duplicitous, existing both as an experience in its own right and as an æsthetic construct, an artificial though voluntary interruption in the routine

of daily existence. In its former manifestation, the process remains literally *an experience*, whereas in the latter manifestation it is shifted toward a *metaphor for experience*. In this interpretation, we approach Ricoeur's conception (see earlier citation), for it is quite possible to perceive the continued co-existence of both manifestations, such that the former is always present in the latter, at least inasmuch as the latter was originally derived from the former.

These dual conceptions (Crossan and Ricoeur) of the metaphor that we perceive to be embodied in our experience of *Herz aus Glas* converge naturally on the paradox that we also perceive to pervade that experience. In the most immediate sense of the term, paradox exists in the tension that metaphor creates and maintains throughout the film. And this we can understand in the most simple terms, as Ricoeur has defined it: "departure (*para*) from usual opinion (*doxa*)" (Ricoeur, 1979-80: 74). However, in this sense, the paradox of the essential cinematic experience informs and conditions its metaphor, rather than *vice versa*, for paradox is evidenced the moment there occurs a separation between the immediate experience as no more than an experience and the conception of that experience as an aesthetic construct. In other words, paradox is necessarily a function of interpretation; but it is present even in the most naïve, simplistic, and immediate interpretation.

For example, in the case of the absent bear, paradox is evidenced the moment we connect Hias' statement about "ein Bärnbraten" (shot 228) with the struggle that precedes it (shots

227-228) and realise that that struggle pertains to a bear that we do not perceive (Therein lies the advantage of this scene as a point of departure for the analysis of the film as a whole.) The scene need be interpreted no further, indeed, elaborate interpretation would serve only to diminish the force of the paradox, unless that process of interpretation deliberately attempted to maintain the paradox in some manifestation of its initial form (as we have attempted in our own extensive discussion on the absent bear above)

Goldfinger's conception of the essence of the ruby glass serves as a more esoteric example. On the one hand, we are confronted, throughout the film, with numerous ruby glasses, goblets, decanters, and other assorted items produced with Mühlbeck's formula. These we see first as what they appear to be; but this initial appearance quickly gives way to a dual perception, wherein we still perceive the ruby crystal for what it is, but also invest this perception with the emerging conception of Goldfinger, such that every item of ruby glass becomes a metaphor for some essence that sets that glass apart ('*para*') from ordinary crystal ('*doxa*'), much as an altar is both identical to and distinct from a large slab of stone.

From these simple examples, we move to a wider perception of paradox. Thus, if we focus now on the narrative fragments as expressions of narrative *per se*, we discern paradox in the simultaneous awareness of those fragments as (a) experiences that completely dominate our momentary focus and serve as magnets for the desire for narrative experience that we bring to the film and (b) expressions

of the divergent narratives that constitute the film. *Herz aus Glas* fails to satisfy our desire because it constantly diverts our attention away from the literal acceptance of the narrative surface of the film and shifts it toward the gaps that ultimately exist, not only between the narrative fragments, but even within them.

The paradox exhibited by the narrative fragments leads, in turn, to a yet wider perception of the paradox that exists within the essential cinematic experience that *Herz aus Glas* creates. For the film challenges our perception of itself and the worlds it creates at every turn, such that the ultimate challenge is placed directly before *our mode of perception itself*. What is this experience that *Herz aus Glas* represents? Is it an experience of life in another century? Is it an experience of the puzzlement that an absence of knowledge gives rise to? Is it an experience of the inner vision of a simple herdsman *cum* prophet? Is it an experience of a representation of that vision? Or is it simply experience reflected back upon itself?

We do not attempt to answer these questions because they are merely members of a much larger set of questions that emerge from even a first viewing of the film. Rather, we address their thrust, the challenge placed before our mode of perception itself. From Crossan's perspective, the paradox exhibited by *Herz aus Glas* serves to undermine the possibility of any literal interpretation, and thence to undermine the concept of a literal interpretation: the film is never more than a phantasm, the narrative fragments merely illusions of perception that contain the seed of their own destruction. From Ri-

coeur's perspective, on the other hand, the paradox exhibited by *Herz aus Glas* is evidenced rather in the abundance of narrative fragments that the film contains, each of which is merely *inadequate* in its purely literal (narrative) manifestation; the ending of the film serves as an ellipsis, suggesting the indefinite continuation of the production of narrative fragments.

But Crossan's threefold conception of paradox also serves its purpose here, though from a different perspective. Whereas Crossan posits the paradox of Jesus' parables in their departure from the norm, which implies a comparison between Jesus' parables and that norm, we focus on the paradox of *Herz aus Glas* with reference to audience competence, whereby we avoid the need for a comparison between *Herz aus Glas* and other films, replacing that comparison with a consideration of the requirements that must be imposed on the audience if the latter is to perceive the paradox that we associate with *Herz aus Glas*.

Under the heading of pragmatics, then, we require that the audience be willing, first of all, to conceive of the *possibility* that certain categories of cinema might extend beyond their apparent or established bounds and, more specifically (if we are to accept *Herz aus Glas* as religious cinema), that religious cinema might extend beyond the traditional bounds set by such films as Cecil B. DeMille's *The Ten Commandments* (this film is truly the most oft-cited in any simple discussion on the subject of religious cinema). This requirement is no more trivial than the observation with which we began

our first chapter, whereby we claimed that the conception of that film as an example of religious cinema must be accepted as valid. Of course, this requirement does not necessarily prepare *any* audience for the consequences of the eventual collapse of traditional categories that a film such as *Herz aus Glas* inevitably leads to.

Under the heading of semantics, we require that the audience be willing to accept a film such as *Herz aus Glas*, with its less glamorous appearance, as nonetheless partaking of mainstream cinema. The more primitive 'feel' of *Herz aus Glas* emerges, not from its age, datedness, lack of artistic merit, *etc.*, but from the very experience that the film attempts to create: it is all part of the product and is deliberately different from the majority of comparable products on the market, certainly those produced in Hollywood by the major motion picture companies. Moreover, the more primitive 'feel' of *Herz aus Glas* is 'folded' back into our experience of the film, such that a certain simplicity and transparency accompanies the essential cinematic experience and heightens our awareness of its paradoxical nature, or at least increases the likelihood that we might come to such an awareness.

Finally, under the heading of syntactics, we find that the audience must have a reasonable familiarity with contemporary cinematic techniques, for the modern film expects more of its audience (*e.g.*, in its ability to perceive continuity in widely divergent shots). But *Herz aus Glas* does not require anything out of the ordinary; rather, our experience of it becomes necessarily 'out of the ordinary' through

the juxtaposition of shots and scenes that would not ordinarily be so juxtaposed. The film is quite literally different from what we expect, even at the most immediate level, for it employs none of the established conventions that we have come to associate with different modes of perception on the part of the characters within a film. The shots of distant landscapes that populate *Herz aus Glas* are indistinguishable from the shots that constitute the narrative fragments dealing directly with events in the village. It is their context and our interpretation thereof that separates the former from the latter.

With this three-fold conception of paradox from the perspective of audience competence we reach the limits of the tools we proposed near the end of the previous chapter. It is clear that *Herz aus Glas* is an ideal film to apply these tools to, because it manifests so many of the characteristics for which the tools are designed. But we are left with no more than a perception of the film as one that evidences a reflexive narrative, a pervasive metaphor, and an essential paradox, each of which informs and conditions the other. These are simply building blocks in our conception of the film as a premier example of religious cinema as we have defined it. The task that remains before us is to show exactly how this conception is manifested.

***Herz aus Glas* as Virtual Religious Experience**

We may return now to the argument that we began shortly before we engaged in a closer analysis of *Herz aus Glas*. This argu-

ment stated that ours is but a virtual experience of what Hias sees and that the latter remains as absent from both the film event and the essential cinematic experience as either Mühlbeck or his secret formula (from its narrative surface). The logic of this argument is now quite obvious. But how do we move from this conception to one of *Herz aus Glas* as virtual religious experience?

The missing component of our argument is the qualifier that narrows the range of interpretations to the specifically religious dimension. We have already encountered several elements that we have identified as the qualifiers of local narrative fragments (*e.g.*, in the incident of the absent bear, the qualifier was given as 'A prophet is like a man who...' and, in the case of the absent formula, as the actual ruby-coloured glasses, goblets, *etc.*, that we perceive). In these we detect the origins of the qualifier that we identify as central.

That central qualifier typifies our very conception of *Herz aus Glas*, for it is itself characterized by an absence that confirms the status of the film as the very embodiment of a *simulacrum*. *There is no qualifier in the film*. Rather, the central qualifier *arises from the essential cinematic experience* and disappears the moment the latter comes to an end. Thus, it is very much a product of interpretation, of a particular hermeneutic, and therefore remains highly susceptible to being ignored or, worse, declared irrelevant.

But it can only be declared irrelevant from the perspective of relevance, which we ignore. And it can only be ignored by a herme-

neutic of presence, which we avoid. This implies that we can only argue for our experience of the film as virtual religious experience from the perspective of our own hermeneutic (as developed in this dissertation) and given our conception of the qualifier 'religious' (as defined in the first chapter). With these qualifications, *we posit the existence of the qualifier in the tension between the seen and the unseen, the known and the unknown, the present and the absent in Herz aus Glas*

As our foregoing analysis has shown, *Herz aus Glas* is replete with signs of absence, such that our very experience of the film becomes one of pervasive absence. But the absence is qualified throughout, for it is variously identified as the absent bear, the absent formula, the absent Mühlbeck, *etc.*, and beyond these particular elements, on a more interpretive plane, the absence of narrative closure, the absence of narrative relevance, the absence of narrative significance (as conclusive signification), *etc.*

Thus, what we see is invariably characterized by absence, *but what we do not see by a hidden presence*. In the case of the absent bear, interpretation (Hias claims to have killed a bear) leads to the present bear; in the case of the absent formula, common sense (in view of the abundance of ruby crystal) leads to the present formula; in the case of the absent Mühlbeck, narrative desire (we do see his grave and numerous other signs of his potential existence, so we assume that he once lived) leads to the present Mühlbeck. Not that that presence needs to be seen; it remains permanently unseen.

Similarly, the absence of narrative closure leads to the presence of narrative closure, through the force of our imagination, and the absence of narrative relevance leads to the presence of narrative relevance, in the form of participation in the story unfolding, and, finally, the absence of narrative significance leads to the presence of narrative significance, inasmuch as that very absence becomes significant. We have shown that this presence is, in every case, inherently unstable, but here its momentary stability is important.

The momentary stability of the interpretation in favour of presence permits the juxtaposition of presence and absence at every juncture between narrative fragments. For the presence survives, briefly, as we move through that juncture. As it decays, it interacts with the absence which the juncture has brought to light, such that the two create a momentary tension which, in turn, provides the hermeneutic energy needed to interpret the preceding narrative fragment in terms of its essential absence.

Thus, in the case of the absent bear, the narrative fragments are: (a) the apparent struggle with the bear (to shot 228) and (b) the narration of the islanders' adventure (from shot 232). The narrative juncture occurs between shot 228, wherein Hias summarizes the first narrative fragment with "So! Und jetzt ein Bärnbraten", and shot 232, wherein Hias re-discovers the island, then is removed from our *sight*, though not yet out of our hearing. While Hias is still fighting the unseen animal, we are unaware of its nature, but we posit *something*, even imaginary. This presence carries through into

the narrative juncture, until Hias identifies the animal, this identification immediately points to an absent bear, but as such it is still momentarily present to us. Thus, presence and absence co-exist, briefly; in this brief co-existence, our interpretation of the previous narrative fragment is twisted from presence to absence and the energy that drives this twist is taken from the tension that the co-existence generates.

(It is important to understand that the preceding description is informed, not by a psychological perspective, but by a hermeneutic one. We have not described what transpires in the mind of a member of the audience, for that is utterly beyond the bounds of this dissertation. Rather, we have described both a model and an example for the interpretation of the hermeneutic process that drives the essential cinematic experience. In defence of this model we may cite our own analysis of *Herz aus Glas*, since that analysis demonstrates, at the very least, that the film embodies elements which, though they might equally be fodder for a more traditional analysis (as in the three examples provided), yet consistently exceed the capacity of that form of analysis.)

Wherein, then, is the qualifier? In the particular instance just presented, it exists within the juncture. Its existence is derived from the twist of presence to absence. Its essence is one with the absence that survives, but that essence can be described, for it is first and foremost an experience that coincides with the movement from presence to absence. Thus, the particular qualifier is the very experience

of absence that results. If we interpret this experience, we may describe its particular manifestation as 'A prophet is like a man who [the combination of the previous narrative fragment and the current narrative juncture]' (see previous reference). And, in the light of our definition of the term in the first chapter, we may further interpret this interpretation as 'religious', for it exists in the context of prophecy generally and conceives the latter in very traditional terms, at least until its collapse within the juncture.

That juncture (and thereafter every other juncture) extends far beyond the narrative dimension, not only because it transgresses it, but also because it extends *our experience* beyond that dimension; and this not only in the literal sense, as an end to the particular narrative fragment, but also in the metaphorical sense, as a view through the narrative dimension to the inherent emptiness that lies underneath it. Thus, as an inevitable component of our experience of the film as whole, an experience characterized by fragments and junctures, that juncture may also serve as a metaphor for the whole. In this capacity, it permits the extension of its own qualifier to encompass our experience of the entire film. But there is an attenuation associated with this extension, such that we can no longer be as specific as 'A prophet is like a man who ...'; instead, we move to a more intellectual conception.

In this more intellectual conception, we begin first with the essential cinematic experience as one that is immediate: it is characterized by an overwhelming presence, since it is also the sole focus of

our sensory apparatus. The events and characters that constitute that experience are almost an afterthought, we are much too close to them to be aware of them as anything other than immediate. But *Herz aus Glas* does not sustain this immediacy, the individual junctures serving to augment its decay. The origin of the process of decay lies in the silence that pervades the film, not as an absence of dialogue or musical background, but as an absence of signification generally: nothing sustains reference, there is an inevitable collapse of any relation between the film and the experience that we bring to it. Thus, the entire film functions as one sustained juncture between the presence that we associate with our experience prior to the film and the absence of any relevance to that experience that we face by the time we encounter the absent bear (if not soon after the film begins).

Yet the presence that we associate with our experience prior to the film maintains a shadowy status as memory; thus, it is carried into the essential cinematic experience, into the juncture, there to encounter the absence that informs the latter. Presence and absence enjoy a brief co-existence; then the memory that we maintain of our experience prior to the film is twisted from presence to absence; here, again, the energy that drives this twist is taken from the tension that the co-existence generates. The qualifier central to *Herz aus Glas* exists within the greater juncture that the film as a whole creates; its existence, too, is derived from the twist of presence to absence and its essence is one with the absence that survives; therein

lies the reason both for the disappearance of the qualifier the moment the film comes to an end (for that end is also logically the end of the particular absence that characterizes *Herz aus Glas*) and the existence of that qualifier as no more than a virtual entity (for it is created and maintained artificially and is quite repeatable). Our experience of this central qualifier coincides with the movement from presence to absence (from the very beginning of the film, but climaxing in the incident of the absent bear).

If we now interpret *this* experience, we may only describe it metaphorically, for *it remains a function of the essential cinematic experience* and does not survive any literal re-interpretation. Metaphorically, then, it is represented by the symbolic tenor of the film (we did insist, in the previous chapter, that the content of a film can and may be analysed to highlight the religious qualifier), not only do we encounter an abundance of religious signs and icons, both aural and visual, but we participate in numerous, though inconclusive, (pseudo-)religious events; even the narrative surface of the film as a whole parodies a religious quest, such as the quest for the Holy Grail: "Ich brauch ein Glas mein Blut zu fassen, sonst rinnt es mir davon" (shot 107). In all of these a traditional religious cinema criticism would find a great quantity of material from which to construct, carefully, reference by reference, a religious superstructure to impose on our experience of the film. But it is precisely this that they do *not* sustain (*e.g.*, the metaphor of the Holy Grail fails to develop and maintain a separate existence; the pieces of that metaphor

remain isolated, supporting no more than a tenuous interconnection). Their existence sustains no more than a weak association with the surface features of one or more of the major religions. But this association is sufficient to support the qualifier whose existence we posit within the greater juncture that the film as a whole creates

Beyond this surface derivation of the metaphorical interpretation of the central qualifier, we may point to the effect of the juncture that the film as a whole creates. This effect we must also describe metaphorically: it is the encounter of the audience with the edges that populate Hias' visions, thence with the edges of the narrative fragments that constitute the film, thence with the edges of the narrative dimension of the film as a whole, thence with the edges of narrative *per se*, and thence with the edges of the essential cinematic experience; and so with edge generally. The overall effect is simply one of life permanently at the edge of its own relevance, even existence; as such, this effect may also be described thus:

[original italics removed] There was once a man who owned some property on a high cliff which overlooked the sea. He spent many years of careful construction on a road from his house to the very edge of the cliff. When the road was finished, he spent hours each day standing on the extreme edge where he could feel the thrill of the sea. The people who lived round about were practical and sensible folk, and they said that he was a very good road-builder and that he certainly liked to walk a lot. (Crossan, 1975: 21)

In the most simplistic terms, then, the central qualifier '*qualifies*' our experience of *Herz aus Glas* as one of the encounter with that which can *only* be encountered, never precisely described: it is the

other that exists always and only in opposition to the familiar, in the case of *Herz aus Glas* it is at least sufficiently qualified as to receive the identification 'religious', which is to say, Wholly Other. But it is never more than virtually so, for, *as our experience of that film*, it remains an entirely artificial phenomenon. In this manner, we perceive *Herz aus Glas* as virtual religious experience.

Concluding Remarks

We may now summarize our argument for *Herz aus Glas* as virtual religious experience as follows: in the encounter between the audience and the essential cinematic experience we derive *experience*, in the further encounter of that experience as one that is characterized by absence and qualified by the religious tenor of the film, we derive *religious experience*; and in the final encounter of that experience as artificial, as an æsthetic construct, as no more than an appearance of absence, we derive *virtual religious experience* and so the premise of this chapter and an example of the application of the thesis of this dissertation.

Thus, we have achieved the goal set at the outset of this chapter, even the end of the previous chapter. This concludes our investigation of the specific question: Is *Herz aus Glas* a religious film? We have now investigated religious cinema from both sides, the general and the specific, in such a manner that the former not only took precedence over the latter, but was also clarified by the latter (al-

though we still maintain that this is not a *necessary* clarification). In this chapter, we presented past approaches to Werner Herzog's *œuvre* generally and *Herz aus Glas* specifically. This provided some background to the rationale for our choice of that film. It also provided a collective opponent against whom to initiate and refine our argument for the film as an example of religious cinema; for we have demonstrated, at the very least, that it is *possible* (if not necessary) to view the film as such. Beyond this, we have demonstrated that such a view can be informed by an entirely different hermeneutic, one that not only recognizes the same components of a film as its antecedent hermeneutic, but also uncovers and identifies dimensions, perspectives, and interpretations that are inimical to that antecedent.

Yet it is also clear from this chapter that *Herz aus Glas* lends itself superbly to the application of our thesis, whereas this is much less clear of a film such as Cecil B. DeMille's *The Ten Commandments*. Are we then in 'danger' of asserting that the latter is no longer to be included in the category of religious cinema? Or have we simply expanded that category such that it may include both, requiring our analysis to include the former and a traditional analysis to include the latter? This line of questioning leads us to the next and last chapter, in which the horizon of our thesis and the method we have derived for its application are re-examined in the light of the present chapter.

CHAPTER 4

Conclusion: Summary and Critique

We began with two questions. These we presented primarily in a naïve context. But this naïve context quickly gave way before the ever more complex environment that the questions, intertwined throughout the remainder of the dissertation, were shown to generate. Thus, the question What is religious cinema? appears far more extensive than was first suggested. It probes the phenomenon whence it arises, holding it up to a new, even alien light, such that cinema in general emerges altered. That is precisely the thrust of this dissertation: it is the audience that manufactures religious cinema, but in so doing, if motivated by the perspective developed in these pages, also alters the very experience it thought to find there.

Dissertation Summary

In the first chapter, we posed the question Why is a given film religious? This led to the question What is religious cinema? Religious cinema was defined as virtual religious experience; it was stated that this precludes the definition of religious cinema as religious experience *per se*. 'Virtual' was taken to mean 'as if': an experience that, in the context of cinema, *appears* like another, but does not possess all

the characteristics of that other. 'Religious experience' was defined from the vantage of a non-referential definition of religious language, such that the latter never refers directly to the former and religious experience is never fully encapsulated in religious language; rather, religious experience remains precisely that, an 'other' that calls all 'ordinary' experience into question. Religious cinema is *virtual* religious experience because it remains an æsthetic construct, a repeatable phenomenon, a carefully crafted representation of another experience, whence it derives its qualifier 'religious'.

In the second chapter, we narrowed our cinematic focus to the elements that are concurrent with the *projection* of a film. We then further narrowed our focus to the *visual* component of the projected film, examining the origin of movement therein. The latter we deemed to arise through difference: (1) between successive frames, where movement is merely *implied*, (2) through the coordinated but limited shift of objects along a whole series of frames, wherein movement becomes a function of the entire human visual system, and (3) through the recognition and identification of both locations and objects, such that movement becomes synonymous with the entire process of signification. We then extrapolated from this argument to cinema as a whole, such that the levels of interpretation just described apply to any film, regardless of whether movement is a part thereof. This latter interpretative process we identified as the essential cinematic experience and chose as our point of departure for the application of our thesis proper. The cinematic context of the analytic

process must therefore always remain the essential cinematic experience; this presents a hermeneutic difficulty, since that process is inevitably subjective, in the sense of subject-centred and subject-derived.

The shift toward the *religious* of religious cinema was initiated by an examination of a contemporary definition of parable, as found in the New Testament hermeneutics of John Dominic Crossan and, to a lesser extent (at this stage), Paul Ricoeur. The advantage of this definition over previous ones is its emphasis on the primacy of the experience that underlies the parable. Indeed, parable cannot be fully interpreted; rather, parable *fosters* the experience that underlies it, such that the *experience itself* becomes the interpretation. Parable achieves this through paradox: dissonant elements that cannot be reconciled. Here, too, several levels of interpretation exhibit this characteristic: (1) an unexpected event is related, but the degree of counter-expectation is absolute, such that interpretation fails to absorb the shock, (2) the expression of that event in the form of a parable is initially external to the listener but, through the process of internalization, creates a temporal dissonance of perspectives, whereupon (3) that dissonance gradually encompasses the very fact of difference and the inevitable separation that follows, such that the parable expands to become a marker between all perspectives and a reminder of the relativity thereof.

This definition of parable was chosen for its convenient focus on the experience, since that coincides with the cinematic focus of our

thesis. But there remained the problem of *determining* the 'religious' of religious cinema. This was overcome, first by emphasizing the *otherness* of the experience that parable fosters. The non-referential function of parable is precisely coordinated with the impossibility of reducing religious experience to language. Yet language is necessary to provide the foundation for dissonance. Thus, parable is a linguistic form. As such, it exists in opposition to a linguistic form that attempts to reduce or eliminate (hide) dissonance: myth. Both myth and parable employ narrative structures to create a context for their function. These narrative structures, then, exhibit the characteristics that enable the critic to identify them as either parable or myth; they also provide the necessary material to permit comprehension of their intent. The critic may choose to examine narrative structures to elucidate either their mythic or their parabolic nature. To emphasize parable is therefore not to deny myth, but to move from myth to parable. So, too, in the case of the cinema: a film, in the category of narrative cinema, may be analysed from the perspective of either parable or myth, but if from the perspective of parable, then this first through its 'mythic' text, since it is the latter that permits comprehension of the essential cinematic experience in the first place.

We then extracted the parallels between the essential cinematic experience and the foregoing definition of parable. The former was now re-examined through the mirror of the latter. The focus shifted from the atomic (the frame) to the molecular (the shot), though never from the essential cinematic experience *per se*. The parallels

determined were: (1) internal to the essential cinematic experience, whereby that experience is of an event that is completely outside our ordinary experience, yet so carefully crafted, that it becomes part of that experience, (2) external to the essential cinematic experience, whereby images move from immediate experience to personal (and collective) memory, leaving only the difference between states, which difference necessarily exists only in the disjunction between the essential cinematic experience and its end, and (3) whereby the essential cinematic experience *per se* is juxtaposed to its own absence, leaving again only the difference between states, but this beyond the individual images that constituted the events of the film, such that even the individual film becomes merely an example of this more general phenomenon.

The difference between parable and the essential cinematic experience was then brought to light, for whereas the parables of Jesus, for example, are deemed to be paradigmatic, the essential cinematic experience *as a reflection or representation of another experience external to itself*, is a *simulacrum* (i.e., a pretense that is not immediately apparent as such). It is for precisely this reason that we insisted on the definition of religious cinema as *virtual religious experience*. Thus, religious cinema was deemed to comprise two components, one subjective, the other objective; the subjective exists as the essential cinematic experience, the objective as the recognition of its counterpart as a phantasm that has no objective existence and no ultimate referent. Thereupon we defined the existence of religious cin-

ema as the tension between the film event in its objective and subjective manifestations, insisting that the very possibility of religious cinema is denied if these two manifestations are reconciled.

Next, we turned to a discussion of the context and the qualifier that are associated with the specifically religious identification of the parables of Jesus. Extrapolating once again to the cinema, we associated the specifically religious dimension of *that* medium with the presence of an appropriate context (external to the individual film) and a corresponding qualifier (internal to the individual film). We further typified our thesis as a description of *what religious cinema is* and our description of context and qualifier as a (partial) identification of *how religious cinema arises*. Beneath both of these components, however, in both parable and religious cinema, there lies a twist, initiated by a reversal of expectation, that shifts one's focus from the literal interpretation of the expression toward a metaphorical re-interpretation that brings to light the paradox at the core of the experience itself. This paradox, in turn, reveals the illusory nature of the experience, denying its status as an absolute or even an end in itself. Yet this perspective is not inevitable; rather, it remains a function of the audience. Thus, our dissertation is, at least in part, an exercise in identifying the competence required *of the audience* if the possibility of religious cinema is to exist.

Finally, working from a dialogue between Crossan and Ricoeur, we derived a specific critical method with which to perform an analysis of a film, such that the results predicted by our theory could be

consistently obtained. The critical tools associated with this method were identified as 'brevity', 'narrative', 'metaphor', and 'paradox'. The method was stated to consist of the identification of these components within the film under analysis. This would lead to a perspective that would permit the determination of the manner in which the film revealed its religious dimension. Brevity was understood quite literally; narrative was understood as one that exhibits both reflective and reflexive characteristics; metaphor was understood as the presence of dissonant or discordant elements within the film; paradox was understood as the presence, beneath metaphor, of a fundamental incongruity, one that cannot be resolved (paradox was further postulated to exist in three flavours, derived from semiotics, but—or therefore—applied with circumspection). All four components were held to be subordinate to the qualifier that, in its turn, contextualizes them, for it is ultimately the qualifier alone that permits the inclusion of a film in the category of religious cinema.

In the third chapter, we turned our attention to an analysis of Werner Herzog's *Herz aus Glas*. This analysis had two functions: (1) it served as an example of the application of our thesis, theory, and method, whereby the reader might derive a better practical understanding thereof, and (2) it served as a test of that application, whereby the efficacy and relevance of our thesis, theory, and method were highlighted. We deliberately avoided a protracted discussion of Werner Herzog's *œuvre* from our own perspective (choosing, as well, not to include either a biography or a filmography of the director),

criticizing instead several extant examples of such discussions. Thence, we moved to brief examination of past approaches to *Herz aus Glas*, in such a manner that our own approach would seem, to some extent, an extension of the path that this examination took. Before proceeding with our analysis, however, we provided a glimpse of the origin of our choice of this film, whereupon we turned our focus to the core of our own approach: the encounter between Hias and the absent bear.

In this encounter, we postulated a reversal of audience expectation and an attendant collapse of one level of interpretation of the film. We cited in this collapse the arrival of a perspective that hints at a paradigm informed by absence, existing in opposition to a paradigm informed by presence; the latter we identified as the paradigm that underlies traditional religious cinema criticism, with its focus on reference, the former we identified as the paradigm that underlies this dissertation and all that is derived therein. From the absent bear we moved to the absent centre, which we identified indistinctly as either Mühlbeck (who is dead from the outset of the film) or the secret formula for the manufacture of ruby-coloured glass that he possessed (and took with him to the grave). We then showed that, on the one hand, much of the film is 'centred' on this absent 'centre' and that, on the other hand, the film comprises a series of 'decentrings', fostered and represented primarily by Hias, who therefore exists in contrast to Goldfinger, since the latter is obsessed with the formula's recovery.

We then proceeded to analyse the film in greater depth. This closer analysis uncovered a variety of interesting data, none of which need be repeated here, for they served more as fodder for the latter portion of the chapter than as an end in themselves. Thus, we turned to the application of the critical method developed in the second chapter. Under the rubric of brevity, we determined that *Herz aus Glas* is less a monolithic narrative than a series of narrative fragments which, in turn, exhibit an absence of narrative closure. Moving then to the rubric of narrative, we concluded that *Herz aus Glas* nevertheless fits the category of narrative cinema; but, in this capacity, narrative is a function of the desire that we, as the audience, bring to the film. This desire remains unfulfilled; indeed, it is consistently countered, first in the absence of narrative closure, then in the encounter with the metaphorical dimension of the film, wherein it is unmasked and turned back on itself.

The metaphorical dimension arises from the conjunction of dissonant narrative fragments and the disjunctions that lie between. Beneath this, however, metaphor may also be found in the essential cinematic experience *per se*. Here, finally, we posited the paradox that we held to pervade that experience. Indeed, this paradox *pene- trates* the essential cinematic experience to such an extent that the film challenges not only our perception of *itself*, but our mode of *perception* itself. Then, under the guise of the three flavours of paradox postulated by Crossan, we outlined the precise requirements that the audience must fulfil to attain the perspective elucidated in our

analysis There remained only the isolation of the qualifier that would permit the formal inclusion of *Herz aus Glas* in the category of religious' cinema We asserted that there is no qualifier *in* the film; rather, the qualifier exists in the tension between the seen and the unseen, the known and the unknown, the present and the absent in the film Thus, the qualifier is a function of our experience of the film, though this only from a very specific vantage, such that the qualifier exists less as some identifiable *thing* than precisely as its absence Yet, the experience remains artificial, such that it is never more than virtual religious experience.

Dissertation Critique

We deal now with several matters identified within earlier portions of the dissertation but postponed for consideration until its final chapter. The first of these is the matter of terminology, broached in the opening chapter. The issue concerns the dominion of our thesis and its contribution to the realm of religious cinema theory and criticism, given that we have chosen particular definitions of religious language and religious experience.

This matter has largely been dealt with in the second and third chapters. We admitted that the dominion of our thesis is compromised by its reliance on the aforementioned definitions; but we also insisted that this reliance is precisely what makes this dissertation original with respect to religious cinema theory and criticism. We

further hinted that our perspective does not so much *counter* traditional religious cinema criticism as treat the latter as a specific instance of a more general approach, for traditional religious cinema criticism is a method that interacts with the surface of religious cinema, but fails to dig beneath that surface to reveal the cinematic substratum whence religious cinema is ultimately derived. Thus, we deem our thesis to represent both a deeper and a more thorough (therefore more rewarding) point of origin. Traditional religious cinema criticism maintains its relevance as a method of *mapping* the surface features that point to the immediate focus of our thesis: the essential cinematic experience.

It is necessary to choose a referential definition of religious language if one wishes to map those surface features. Nor does our thesis deny the validity of the referential definition, it merely relativizes it: reference is no longer understood in an ultimate sense, but simply as connection: between events, between objects, between images, even between levels of interpretation. Connections may be established throughout every level of the essential cinematic experience, but these connections fail to achieve any absolute status; they exist within the essential cinematic experience, or within the larger world of signification that surrounds it, or within the universe of signification that gives rise to all forms of human communication. But never beyond. Thus, if our thesis is to find its match, it is not in traditional religious cinema criticism, for it has moved beyond that; rather, it will find its match in a perspective that is yet more fundamental,

closer to the origin of the essential cinematic experience, therefore able to encompass both our thesis and traditional religious cinema criticism and demonstrate both to be but specific instances of a yet more general approach.

To provide an example of the foregoing, we may take up the questions posed at the end of the last chapter: Are we in 'danger' of asserting that Cecil B. DeMille's *The Ten Commandments* is no longer to be included in the category of religious cinema? Or have we simply expanded that category such that it may include both that film and *Herz aus Glas*, requiring our analysis to include the latter and a traditional analysis to include the former? A thorough answer to these questions requires that we attempt to analyse DeMille's film in a manner similar to our analysis of Herzog's film. But a thorough answer is unnecessary here. A contemporary audience of DeMille's film, familiar with the superb special effects available to the modern filmmaker, is unlikely to derive satisfaction from that film's more primitive effects: *the audience's desire for biblical spectacle will not be fulfilled*, at least not in the same manner or degree as might have been the case for the original audience. Indeed, it is likely that the spectacle will, to some extent, 'self-destruct' in the minds of all but the most naïve members of the audience. In this 'self-destruction', we would catch the first glimpse of the material to which to apply our approach; furthermore, traditional religious cinema criticism would also have to admit the relativity of the spectacle—and therefore of the referential dimension of the film as a whole.

This relativization, however, also points to the relativization of our thesis. It seems inevitable that some of the phenomena associated with the essential cinematic experience decay with time. Ultimately, this will lead to a need to revise our understanding of the topology of the essential cinematic experience itself: what once was thought to be fundamental to that experience is now shown to be peripheral; conversely, what is now thought to be no more than peripheral may, in time, be shown to be fundamental. Cinema, as well as our understanding thereof, is in a constant state of flux; our thesis is an island in a sea of possibilities; in time, this island will grow or sink; inevitably, other islands will appear. Thus, our thesis exists, not only in relation to traditional religious cinema criticism, but also in relation to all religious cinema theory and criticism and, beyond these, to film theory *per se*. At the very least, it leads to the expansion and further crystallization of religious cinema theory (particularly since the latter hardly exists as a discipline) and the critical methods associated with it. But wherein lies its contribution to film theory *per se*, since it is, at least in part, a derivative thereof, though perhaps somewhat inadvertently so?

The minimum contribution we posit in the *rapprochement* between film theory and religious cinema theory that this dissertation engenders: the two are in closer proximity again, as they once were when, for example, Siegfried Kracauer was more popular, though both have been permitted to change (thus, the original proximity, or its ground, is lost). Beyond this, we cite the eclectic nature of our

approach, for this encourages a less dogmatic, more loosely controlled understanding of film theory (it may seem ironic that a *religious* cinema theory should be less dogmatic than a secular or general one, yet that is very much in keeping with our perspective). But beyond even this, we note that, following the work that this dissertation represents, it should no longer be possible to develop a theory of religious cinema—or a method of religious cinema criticism—in isolation; film theory has simply revealed too much about the phenomenon that forms its focus to permit the critic or theorist of religious cinema to pay it no heed. Finally, we deem the most fundamental contribution to be the simple provision of a theory and a method—neither of which is inimical to film theory generally—with which to tackle the phenomenon of religious cinema; in other words: film theory has expanded its horizon to include religious cinema.

This expansion, however, hints also at the possibility of a *re-definition* of film theory. We would argue that many of the contemporary film theories would be inadequate to the task of analysing *Herz aus Glas*. Or, if adequate, then certainly not to the extent that they could account for our experience of that film in its entirety (note that nowhere do we claim that *our* analysis exhausts the interpretative potential of *Herz aus Glas*). In other words: now that film theory generally has expanded its horizon to include religious cinema, it can no longer ignore that phenomenon; we could require of other film theories that have initiated an analytic process that they attempt to come to terms with our own approach *before* they

complete their conclusions. Nor would this be unprofitable, for in the very attempt, a bridging of the gap between film theory and film criticism would be initiated: every analysis must credit the audience of the film in question with *some* degree of insight into its interpretative potential and it is precisely as members of the audience that we initiate our approach. Similarly, the gap between religious cinema theory and film reviews appearing in religious periodicals would be considerably narrowed through the expansion of the religious cinema critic's perspective to include many of the data outside the focus of a traditional religious cinema criticism, although this may also make such reviews unpalatable to their established audience.

In this last point we detect the core of the relevance of this dissertation (thence the justification for the work that it represents). For we have established the credibility of an approach to religious cinema that begins with an examination of the elements of the cinematic medium itself. Religious cinema theory need no longer tread as carefully around the issues that occupy film theory generally; rather, it may tackle them with equal vigour. The advantage of this freedom for the wider audience is that religious cinema theory is better able to stand on its own and defend its stance against the onslaught of other, perhaps more secular film theories (*i.e.*, whose focus is more secular). It is more feasible to justify the inclusion of particular films in the category of religious cinema; it is also easier to identify the religious dimensions often intuited in films far outside the traditional boundaries of religious cinema.

To rephrase: religious cinema theory is more relevant to the experience of the members of the audience, be they dilettantes, sophisticated viewers, or formal students of film. Nor is it any longer necessary to posit the existence of the religious dimension only in the positive (*cf.*, Weiss); the religious cinema critic is free to move beyond certain stylistic conventions (*cf.*, Schrader); the theorist is able to delve into the essential cinematic experience in all its manifestations; for in all cases the religious dimension is utterly a function of interpretation and fully recognized as such. Here we find ourselves once more on the threshold of film theory generally, but as an equal instead of as a dependant, for we are now able to offer a criticism of earlier religious cinema theory, without recourse to other film theories, but simply from the perspective of the greater confidence and precision that our deeper foundation provides.

Nevertheless, the latter is subject, finally, to the very paradox that it generates: if we return to the problem of paradigm identified early in the previous chapter, we must acknowledge that religious cinema as we have defined it is unstable; this instability resides not only in the interpretative capacity of the audience, but also in the theoretical circularity of our argument. We were unable to resolve the issue of the status of religious cinema as paradigmatic or anti-paradigmatic; in the former case, we stated that religious cinema would disappear, in the latter case, we recognized that our thesis would require expansion. The instability stems from the locus of paradigm for, as we have defined that locus, it resides, not in the body

of films that we would identify as religious cinema, but in the act of interpretation and categorization that leads to that identification. In other words, the locus of stability maintains its existence entirely within the sphere of a non-stationary, even undefined object.

As the object moves, so does the locus of our paradigm; and as the latter moves, our thesis is shifted from its own foundation. We may state, innocently, that therein lies its strength, for it is grounded in a perspective that avoids, even inhibits stability in any absolute sense. But that simply begs the question: Wherein, then, lies the value of this dissertation, if it is no more than a temporary application of its own thesis? The two cannot so easily and innocently be separated from one another, for the thesis is *defended* in this dissertation, the dissertation defends *that thesis*. Yet it is inevitable that one or the other should decay; we can prevent neither, for the origin and nature of any future critique are unknown. Thus, the value of this dissertation cannot extend much beyond its effort to move religious cinema theory and criticism in a new direction; once this move has been properly initiated and acquires some internal momentum, our work will pass into obscurity, but it will have achieved both its most immediate and its secondary academic purpose.

We are left, then, to resolve the issue of paradigm with respect to our definition of religious cinema. We deem both options mentioned in the previous chapter to apply, although they appear to contradict one another: on the one hand, if our definition of religious cinema as essentially anti-paradigmatic forces the conclusion that we define a

cinematic paradigm, with religious cinema as its paradigmatic model (and *Herz aus Glas* as the first (*i.e.*, paradigmatic) instance thereof), then religious cinema vanishes as precisely what it was defined as; on the other hand, if our definition of religious cinema as essentially anti-paradigmatic does not force the aforementioned conclusion, then the defence of our thesis requires expansion to include a discussion of the function of non-paradigmatic 'objects' (*e.g.*, *Herz aus Glas*) at the edge of the paradigmatic universe.

In the former instance, the thrust of this dissertation is, in part, toward the amalgamation of cinema and religious cinema; for, if the latter is a function of interpretation, then there are no necessary restrictions to be imposed on its horizon. Religious cinema is neither paradigmatic nor anti-paradigmatic with respect to cinema *per se*; rather, either conception is a function of the rigidity with which cinema as a whole is defined: a rigid definition requires that religious cinema be understood anti-paradigmatically, for the purpose of its existence is then to collapse that rigidity; a loose definition requires that religious cinema be understood paradigmatically, but only with respect to that loose definition, since the purpose of religious cinema is then synonymous with cinema *per se* and the existence of the latter serves always to question both its own nature and status as well as the nature and status of the 'real' world.

In the other instance above, we must also recognize that the thrust of the 'real' world is always mythic (for so it is defined) and that *every* religious endeavour must therefore retain a non-

paradigmatic, even anti-paradigmatic status in its encounter with that world. Here religious cinema exists less in relation to cinema as a whole than in relation to religion as a whole. It is therefore a non-paradigmatic object in relation, not only to cinema, but also to the 'real' world. As such, it can scarcely be defended in this dissertation, for it is synonymous with religion *per se*. All that can be defended is the particular definition of religion that underlies it. This, too, is impossible as an absolute defence; it can be defended only as a choice and as such it already has been defended, in the form of our definitions of religious language (as non-referential) and religious experience (as Wholly Other) in the first chapter.

Concluding Remarks

From this perspective, then, the two instances appear considerably less contradictory; indeed, they now seem complementary, existing together to inform and direct the expansion of our approach in to film theory, on the one hand, and religion and culture, on the other hand. In the conjunction of this complementary pair, we discern the final location of our dissertation: the latter exists in and as their nexus. And, in this discernment, we reach the end of the defence of our thesis and hence of the dissertation. Henceforth, the locus of the debate must reside elsewhere. It is our hope that such a debate will, in fact, arise, for there has been little thereof in religious cinema theory and criticism; rather, each approach has existed as

though in isolation from all others. This cannot continue. It is thus our further hope that this dissertation may serve at least as a provocation to other critics, students, and scholars of religious cinema, for this can only be of benefit to religious cinema theory and criticism.

SCREENPLAY

Herz aus Glas

Herz aus Glas was directed by Werner Herzog and released in 1976. This Screenplay contains a shot-by-shot description of the film. The description is the result of a careful, frame-by-frame analysis of the film over a one-week period. Access to the film was provided by the Goethe Institute of Toronto. The print number was 1294/28; the print was 16mm with full colour and sound; the dialogue was in German, with French subtitles. The film was screened privately on January 30, 1981, and March 3-4, 1984.

The 'shot' is the smallest structural unit identified in the description. There are 250 shots in the film as screened. Each shot is identified by number and listed in sequence. Following each shot number, a brief technical description is enclosed in square brackets. The elements of this brief technical description are:

- Number of frames.
- Number of seconds.
- Location (Exterior or Interior).
- Time of day (Day or Night).
- Type of shot (XCU, CU, MCU, MS, MLS, LS, XLS).

For example, shot number 001 contains 2008 frames, lasts approximately 84 seconds (at 24 frames per second), is an exterior shot, is

a day shot, and is a medium shot.

Following Goldstein and Kaufman, seven shot types are identified in the description:

XCu (eXtreme Close-Up): "A shot that includes just a small detail of the subject; i.e., a shot of an eye, a finger, a shoe, etc." (Goldstein and Kaufman: 595)

CU (Close-Up): "A shot which includes only a small part of the subject; i.e., a shot of just a person's head or hands." (592)

MCU (Medium Close-Up): "A shot in which a detail of the subject doesn't quite fill the frame; i.e., a person's head and shoulders." (598-599)

MS (Medium Shot): "A shot that includes about half the subject; i.e., a person from the waist up." (599)

MLS (Medium Long Shot): "A shot that includes the entire subject; i.e., a shot in which a person's figure fills the frame." (599)

LS (Long Shot): "A shot that includes the entire subject and much of its surroundings; i.e., a shot in which a person's figure occupies less than half the height of the frame." (598)

XLS (eXtreme Long Shot): "A shot in which the subject is quite small in the frame; i.e., a shot in which a human figure is dwarfed by its surroundings." (595)

After the technical description of each shot, the action, sounds, and dialogue are chronicled. Action and sounds are given in English, since language is irrelevant. All dialogue, on the other hand, is given exactly as it was recorded; thus, it is a mixture of High German and German dialect. No attempt has been made to re-introduce correct grammar, since this would destroy the effect of the spoken words. The disadvantage of this technique, to the reader with no more than a casual knowledge of the German language, is that the dialogue

becomes occasionally unreadable.

The character Hias mixes High German and German dialect. In general, his prophetic monologues are High German, and his casual conversation follows the norm for the majority of the remaining characters. Adalbert, Goldfinger, and Goldfinger's father all speak exclusively High German. All of the remaining characters who speak, speak to a greater or lesser extent in German dialect; where the dialogue is difficult to follow, its meaning may usually be inferred from the context. Occasionally, a speaking character will not be mentioned in the portion of the text describing the action; the character is outside the frame, either in an immediate sense, or more remotely, as narrator.

Shot 001 [2008f.84s.E.D.MS]

Misty field with a few trees. Foreground: Hias, back to camera, sitting on a rock, his head resting on his right hand. Background: cows feeding on the grass. Slow echoing yodeling. Title and credits:

HERZ
AUS
GLAS

Ein Film
von
Werner Herzog

Nach
einem Drehbuch
von
Herbert
Achternbusch

Mit
Josef
Bierbichler

Kamera
Jörg
Schmidt-Reitwein

Musik
Popol Vuh,
Studio der Frühen Musik

Schnitt
Beate
Mainka-Jellinghaus

Shot 002 [538f.22s.E.D.LS]

Cows feeding on the grass. Slow echoing yodeling continues.

Shot 003 [836f.35s.E.D.MS]

Continuation of 001. Hias, face to camera, as in 001. He is gazing beyond the camera. Slow echoing yodeling continues.

Shot 004 [197f.8s.E.D.LS]

Cows feeding on the grass, moving slowly. Slow echoing yodeling continues.

Shot 005 [1013f.42s.E.D.XLS]

Fast motion. Clouds washing over tree-covered hills. Slow echoing yodeling continues.

Shot 006 [731f.30s.E.D.XLS]

Fast motion. Clouds flowing from left to right over a ridge. Slow echoing yodeling continues.

Shot 007 [621f.26s.E.D.LS]

Hias, back to camera, lying on his back on a hill overlooking a clouded valley, his right arm raised in the direction of the valley. Slow echoing yodeling ends.

Hias: Ich schau in die Ferne, bis ans Ende der Welt. Und eh der Tag um ist kommt schon das Ende. Erst kommt die Zeit ins Stürzen und dann die Erde. Und die Wolken kommen ins Rasen.

Shot 008 [257f.11s.E.D.MS]

A bubbling sea of heavy blue-white liquid.

Hias: Dann kocht die Erde; das ist das Zeichen. Das ist der Anfang vom Ende.

Shot 009 [1008f.42s.E.D.LS]

Waterfall, right side to camera, lower half.

Hias: Der Rand der Welt fängt an zu stürzen. Alles fängt an zu stürzen.

Ominous music begins.

Hias: Stürzt nieder und fällt und stürzt und stürzt. Und ich schau in das Stürzen hinein. Ich spüre einen Sog. Es zieht mich. Es saugt mich hinunter. Ich beginne zu stürzen. Ich stürze. Ich stürze und schwindel vom Stürzen.

Shot 010 [435f.18s.E.D.LS]

Waterfall, right side to camera, upper half. Ominous music continues.

Shot 011 [220f. 9s. E.D. LS]

Waterfall, left side to camera, upper half. Ominous music continues.

Shot 012 [639f. 27s. E.D. LS]

Same as 009. Ominous music continues, then fades into the background.

Hias: Ja und jetzt seh ich genau auf einen Punkt des stürzenden Wassers. Ich suche einen Punkt auf dem meine Augen einen Halt finden.

Ominous music ends; uplifting music begins.

Hias: Und ich werde leicht, immer leichter. Alles wird leicht; ich fliege nach oben.

Shot 013 [632f. 26s. E.D. XLS]

Mountains wrapped in cloud. Uplifting music continues.

Hias: Dann, aus dem Stürzen und Fliegen, hebt sich ein neues Land. Wie das versunkene Atlantis taucht die Erde aus dem Wasser empor. Ich seh eine neue Erde.

Shot 014 [509f. 21s. E.D. XLS]

Sun shining through clouds onto hills and mountains. Uplifting music continues.

Shot 015 [244f. 10s. E.D. XLS]

Similar to 013. Uplifting music continues.

Shot 016 [555f. 23s. E.D. XLS]

Foreground: river, forest. Background: hills, mountains. Uplifting music continues.

Shot 017 [740f. 31s. E.D. XLS]

Arid zone with flat-topped mountains in the distance. Uplifting music continues, then fades out.

Shot 018 [617f. 26s. E.D. MS]

Bottom of a chasm with boulders and patches of snow. Sound of rushing water and falling rocks. Camera tilts

slowly upward to reveal the sky and two bridges crossing the chasm.

Shot 019 [606f. 25s. E.D. MS]

Bottom of the chasm, left side. Hias, face to camera, sitting on a rock, looking to his right. Background: top of chasm with sky and two bridges. Sound of rushing water continues.

Hias: Gehts her, trauts euch!

Hias turns his head to his left.

Hias: Gehts her, hab ich gsagt!

Camera pans to the right to follow his gaze. On the right side of the chasm, in a large crack, stand four farmers, face to camera.

Shot 020 [850f. 35s. E.D. MCU]

Head and shoulders of first farmer, face to camera, staring beyond the camera. Sound of rushing water continues.

First Farmer: Der Riese hat... Augen wie Mühlenräder, ... Finger... aus Ästen, ... und ein Felsblock... als Nase.

Shot 021 [313f. 13s. E.D. MCU]

Two of the other farmers, looking at each other. Sound of rushing water continues. One of the farmers steps forward, face to camera, looks down.

Second Farmer: Das Dorf ist in Angst. Der Rüpp sagt, er habe einen Riesen gesehen. Die Zeit der Riesen kommt wieder.

Shot 022 [208f. 9s. E.D. MCU]

The fourth farmer, face to camera, gazing beyond the camera. Sound of rushing water continues.

Fourth Farmer: Der Riese bricht die Bam. Er schlägt unser Viech und reißt uns die Darne raus, wann er uns siegt.

Shot 023 [112f. 5s. E.D. MCU]

Same as 020.

First Farmer: Er leckt uns das Hirn aus.

Shot 024 [502f. 21s. E.D. MCU]

Hias, face to camera, looking to his right. Sound of rushing water continues.

Hias: Den Rüpp sagts, den Riesen gibts nicht. Er soll das nächste mal mehr auf den Stand der Sonne achten. Die Sonne war nieder und der Riese war nur der Schatten von einem Zwerg.

Shot 025 [174f. 7s. E.D. MS]

The four farmers, face to camera, looking beyond the camera. Sound of rushing water continues. The second farmer smiles.

Shot 026 [534f. 22s. E.D. MS]

Similar to 024. Sound of rushing water continues.

Hias: Wenn sich garnichts ändert, dann glaubt ihr schon es ist wie ein Glück. Aber ich seh ein Feuer. Und ich seh die Glashütte.

Shot 027 [853f. 36s. E.D. MCU]

Same as 024. Sound of rushing water continues.

Hias: Und ich sag euch nochwas.

With his right hand, Hias points toward the two bridges over his left shoulder.

Hias: Schauts zu den beiden Brücken hinauf. Gleich läuft über die eine ein Lügner und über die andere ein Dieb.

Camera pans to the right, then tilts upward to the two bridges. The "liar" crosses the first bridge from left to right. The "thief" crosses the second bridge from left to right.

Shot 028 [328f. 14s. I.D. MLS]

The Inn. Foreground: the innkeeper clearing mugs from a table. Background: Ascherl and Wudy sitting across from one another, staring at each other. Sound of mugs being gathered together, followed by footsteps.

Shot 029 [1500f. 63s. I.D. MCU]

Ascherl and Wudy, as in 028. Ascherl's mug is half full of beer, Wudy's is almost empty.

Wudy: Bistm morgen eh hin, Ascherl.

Wudy drinks the rest of his beer.

Wudy: Und ich schlaf auf deiner Leich meinen Rausch aus.

Ascherl: Wirt, bringm Wudy no ei Bier!

The innkeeper takes away Wudy's empty mug. Sound of footsteps.

Wudy: Ich schlaf auf deiner Leich.

Shot 030 [323f.13s.1.D.MCU]

Wudy, face to camera, looking beyond the camera.

Wudy: Der Hias hats gsagt, daß ich auf deiner Leich schlaf. Der Hias schaut die Zukunft.

Shot 031 [735f.31s.1.D.MCU]

Ascherl, face to camera, looking beyond the camera.

Ascherl: Vorausgesetzt, daß wir im Heu schlafen. Und dann müßet i... als Erster auf die Ten hrunterfalln. Und dann müßttest du... auf mi drauffalln. Ab wenns nicht weich fällt, dann bist dau hi.

Shot 032 [793f.33s.1.D.MS]

The Mansion, dining room. Goldfinger's father, face to camera, sitting, as always, in his chair in the corner by the window. He wrings his hands repeatedly as the camera moves slowly closer. He laughs softly.

Father: Der Mühlbeck ist gestorben, und kein Mensch weiß das Gemenge vom Rubin.

Shot 033 [918f.38s.1.D.MS]

The Glassworks. Foreground: Wenzel, right side to camera, and Agide, face to camera, both seated, eyes downcast. Background: another seated glassworker, left side to camera, framed against the daylight. No one is working.

Ägide: Schreiben hat er doch können. Das hätt er leicht aufschreiben können, ... wie das Rubinglas gemacht wird.

Wenzel: Hast du schomal ei Wort gschrieben?

Ägide: Aber reden hätt er doch können, der Mühlbeck.

Shot 034 [532f.22s.E.D.MLS]

The Graveyard. Anamirl, face to camera, all dressed in black, kneeling before Mühlbeck's fresh grave. She has her hands on the earth covering the grave. Sound of church-bells ringing and birds singing. Anamirl clasps her hands together and raises them upward in an attitude of supplication as she raises her face up to the sky.

Shot 035 [1113f.46s.I.D.MLS]

The Glassworks. Camera moves slowly past the glassworkers as they sit, stand and move about aimlessly. 'Limbo' music fades in.

Shot 036 [620f.26s.I.D.MLS]

The oven. Sound of the fire burning fiercely. The fire has been stoked, but remains unused. 'Limbo' music fades out.

Shot 037 [855f.36s.I.D.MS]

The Mansion, dining room. Goldfinger, left side to camera, standing before the crystal cabinet. In his hands he is holding one of the ruby-coloured goblets. He fingers it carefully.

Goldfinger: Mein Gott, das war das zweite Glas! Und diese Pracht wird jetzt von der Welt hinweggetilgt. Was schützt mich jetzt vor den Unbilden des freien Weltalls?

Shot 038 [134f.6s.F.D.CU]

The goblet in Goldfinger's hands.

Shot 039 [217f.9s.I.D.MS]

Same as 032. The camera remains stationary. Goldfinger's father laughs softly, stops.

Shot 040 [138f.6s.I.D.MS]

Goldfinger, face to camera, sitting at the table. On the table before him stand a ruby glass and a ruby decanter. Through his open shirt, he slowly rubs the skin over his heart with his right hand.

Shot 041 [402f.17s.1.D.MCU]

Continuation of 040. Goldfinger's head and shoulders.

Shot 042 [444f.19s.1.D.MCU]

The Glassworks. One of the ports of the oven, belching fire. Sound of the fire burning fiercely.

Shot 043 [908f.38s.1.D.MCU]

The Inn. Ascherl and Wudy, as in 029. Ascherl grabs Wudy by the hair and shakes his head back and forth, then lets go. Wudy picks up his empty mug.

Ascherl: Dies traust du dir nit.

Wudy: Ab'Ascherl, wirkli.

Wudy raises his mug over his head.

Shot 044 [251f.10s.1.D.MCU]

Ascherl, as in 031. Wudy's hand comes down, smashing his mug on the top of Ascherl's head. Sound of mug being suddenly smashed.

Shot 045 [85f.4s.1.D.MCU]

Wudy, as in 030.

Shot 046 [239f.10s.1.D.MCU]

Continuation of 044. Ascherl shakes the broken glass out of his hair.

Shot 047 [49f.2s.1.D.MCU]

Continuation of 045.

Shot 048 [599f.25s.1.D.MS]

Ascherl and Wudy. Ascherl picks up his mug, empties its contents onto Wudy's head. Sound of beer being poured. Ascherl puts his mug back down. Wudy drops the handle

of his broken mug onto the table.

Shot 049 [507f. 21s. I.D. MLS]

The Mansion, dining room. On the table stand the ruby glass and ruby decanter. The door creaks open. Goldfinger enters.

Goldfinger: Vater, hast du Adalbert gesehen?

Shot 050 [189f. 8s. I.D. MLS]

Similar to 039. Goldfinger's father laughs softly.

Shot 051 [220f. 9s. I.D. MS]

Goldfinger opens another door, leaves the room without closing the door. Sound of footsteps.

Shot 052 [335f. 14s. I.D. MS]

Adalbert, sitting in the office, reading.

Shot 053 [1270f. 53s. I.D. MLS]

The Inn, Paulin's bedroom. Paulin, back to camera, lying on her stomach on her bed; she is covered by a large comforter. Her right arm is dangling over the edge of the bed. Sound of footsteps approaching, followed by knocking.

Wife: Paulin!

More knocking.

Wife: Paulin!

Sound of door being opened followed by footsteps as the innkeeper's wife enters the room and pulls the comforter off Paulin.

Wife: Liegst du wieder nackt im Bett!

The innkeeper's wife smacks Paulin's bottom.

Wife: Komm, zieh di au!

Sound of retreating footsteps as the innkeeper's wife leaves the room. Paulin gets up slowly, sits on the edge of the bed, looks toward the window sill.

Shot 054 [276f.12s.1.D.CU]

The window sill. A container with writing implements. Beside it is a mass of flies, some motionless, others still crawling around. Sound of flies buzzing.

Shot 055 [272f.11s.1.D.LS]

The Mansion, bedroom. Goldfinger and Adalbert are kneeling before a crucifix. A clock chimes twice.

Goldfinger: Das Glas hat eine leicht zerbrechliche Seele.

Shot 056 [344f.14s.1.D.MCU]

Goldfinger, back to camera, praying before a small statue of the Madonna.

Goldfinger: Es ist rein von Flecken. Der Sprung ist die Sünde.

He raises his hands very slowly to cover his head.

Goldfinger: Nach dem Sündenfall gibt es keinen Ton mehr.

Shot 057 [158f.7s.1.D.MCU]

Adalbert, face to camera, kneeling, hands clasped, eyes raised. He closes his eyes.

Adalbert: Amen.

Shot 058 [849f.35s.1.D.MS]

Goldfinger, left side to camera, kneeling. He gets up, as does Adalbert, who was kneeling below the frame. Adalbert adjusts Goldfinger's clothes.

Goldfinger: Wird die Zukunft im Untergang der Fabriken ebenso eine Notwendigkeit erkennen, wie uns die Burgen ein Zeichen notwendiger Wandlung sind?

Shot 059 [225f.9s.1.D.MLS]

Adalbert continues to adjust Goldfinger's clothes.

Shot 060 [450f.19s.1.D.MCU]

Adalbert, face to camera.

Adalbert: Die Leute sagen, der Hias hätte geschaut, daß die

Brennesseln aus den Glasfabriken herausschauen werden. Die Holunderstauden werden sich nach der Gesellschaft der Menschen verzehren, heißt es.

Shot 061 [1209f.50s.I.D.MCU]

Goldfinger, face to camera.

Goldfinger: Der Rubin muß uns retten. Laß er des Mühlbeck Haus niederreißen und in allen Ritzen nach dem Geheimnis suchen. Das Erdreich, auf dem sein Haus gestanden, grabe man drei Fuß tief aus. Denn der Mühlbeck könne sein Geheimnis vergraben haben. Das grüne Kanapee aus Paris, das er seiner Mutter Anamirl geschenkt, bringe man mir.

Goldfinger closes his eyes, raises the back of his right hand to his forehead.

Goldfinger: Die Unordnung der Gestirne schmerzt mich im Kopf.

Shot 062 [417f.17s.I.D.MS]

Adalbert helps Goldfinger on with his coat.

Adalbert: Der Hut.

Adalbert gives Goldfinger his hat.

Adalbert: Der Stock.

Adalbert gives Goldfinger his walking stick.

Shot 063 [256f.11s.I.D.MS]

Ludmilla, back to camera, standing before the door to the dining room, holding a tray with food and dishes. The door creaks as Adalbert opens it from within. Behind Adalbert: Goldfinger, standing, and Goldfinger's father, seated.

Adalbert: Der gnädige Herr wünscht jetzt nicht zu frühstücken.

Goldfinger: Ludmilla möge heute das Haar offen tragen.

Adalbert: Ja, sie möge das Haar offen tragen.

Shot 064 [69f.3s.I.D.MS]

Ludmilla, face to camera, seen through the doorway.

Adalbert: Eine Gunst für das Dienstmensch.

Shot 065 [251f. 10s. I.D. MS]

Continuation of 063. Goldfinger's father laughs. The door creaks as Adalbert closes it from within. Ludmilla turns around and carries the tray away.

Shot 066 [342f. 14s. I.D. LS]

The Barn. On the ground lie Ascherl (below) and Wudy (above), both on their stomachs, motionless. Paulin, face to camera, stands facing them, a cat beside her. She shakes her head slowly as the cat runs toward the open barn door in the background.

Shot 067 [165f. 7s. I.D. MCU]

Ascherl and Wudy, from above.

Shot 068 [386f. 16s. I.D. MCU]

Paulin, face to camera, her hands raised, palms open and forward, her face in anguish. She is gazing at the ground below the camera. She raises her hands above her head, then brings them down beside her head. She screams. She screams again.

Shot 069 [340f. 14s. I.D. LS]

Same as 066, without the cat. Paulin has her hands to her mouth. The innkeeper's wife enters.

Wife: Was schreist denn so?!

The innkeeper's wife stands before the bodies, crosses herself.

Wife (softly): Mariandjosef!

Shot 070 [183f. 8s. I.D. MCU]

Same as 067. The innkeeper's wife crosses from right to left.

Shot 071 [1707f. 71s. I.D. MS]

The Mansion, dining room. Goldfinger, back to camera,

stands before his seated father, face to camera.

Goldfinger: Vater, der Glasmacher Gigl meint, er habe das Geheimnis vom Rubin. Das wäre der Tag zum Aufstehen.

Father: Nein, nein. Ich bleibe in meinem Lehnstuhl. Mir ist das, mir ist das Rückgrat als ob [es] runterfallen würde, wie ein Haufen Steine.

Goldfinger: Dein Rückgrat ist nicht morsch. Dein Rückgrat ist nicht morsch. Du wirst nicht auseinanderfallen, wie ein Haufen Steine. Zwölf Jahre lang sitzt du schon auf diesem Stuhl. Zwölf Jahre.

Father (softly): Ja.

Adalbert enters carrying Goldfinger's father's shoes. He hands them to Goldfinger and leaves. Goldfinger offers the shoes to his father.

Goldfinger: Zwölf Jahre lang schon zeige ich dir deine Schuhe. Zwölf Jahre schon.

Father (softly): Ja, Zwölf.

Goldfinger (softly): Zwölf Jahre.

Goldfinger's father shakes his head and laughs.

Goldfinger: Gut. Gut. Ich lasse dich tragen wie immer.

Shot 072 [336f. 14s. I.D. MLS]

The Glassworks. Gigl takes a long pipe out of the oven; at its end: a mass of molten glass, glowing orange. He turns the pipe while blowing into it as another glassworker shapes the glass with a concave mold.

Shot 073 [149f. 6s. I.D. MLS]

A score of glassworkers look on as Gigl works the glass into shape.

Shot 074 [470f. 20s. I.D. MLS]

As Goldfinger, his father, and the glassworkers look on, Adalbert briefly inspects the glass.

Adalbert: Irrt er sich nicht? Hat er wirklich Rubinglas?

Gigl: Ja.

Gigl returns the glass to the oven, brings it back; it is glowing white hot.

Adalbert: Ist das wirklich Rubinglas?

Goldfinger's father begins to laugh loudly.

Shot 075 [276f. 12s. I.D. CU]

Goldfinger's father, face to camera, seated, looking on. He continues to laugh loudly.

Shot 076 [1746f. 73s. I.D. MLS]

Continuation of 074. Goldfinger's father continues to laugh loudly. Goldfinger dips his sword into the glass at the end of the pipe; some of the glass sticks to the end of his sword. He holds his sword up, letting it drip glass.

Goldfinger: Und das soll Rubinglas sein?!

Gigl: Ja, no eins?

Gigl drops the pipe, goes back to the oven, withdraws another pipe with molten glass on its end, brings it back. Again, Goldfinger dips his sword into the glass at the end of the pipe. Goldfinger's father stops laughing.

Goldfinger: Nein! Nein!

Goldfinger's father begins to laugh loudly, his laughter echoing throughout the Glassworks. Goldfinger throws his sword to the ground and leaves, followed by Adalbert and Goldfinger's father, the latter still seated in his chair, which is carried by three workmen, one in front, two in back. Gigl continues to turn the pipe for a little while.

Shot 077 [815f. 34s. E.D. MLS]

The Village. 'Limbo' music, as in 035-036. It is misty. A number of villagers, including Goldfinger, his father, still being carried in his chair, and Adalbert, are walking across the frame, from right to left.

Shot 078 [127f. 5s. E.D. LS]

A woman, face to camera, standing on her front porch, watching the procession. 'Limbo' music continues.

Shot 079 [361f.15s.E.D.XLS]

Continuation of 077, but from a much greater distance. 'Limbo' music continues.

Shot 080 [524f.22s.E.D.MLS]

The Forest. The camera looks up at Hias, face to camera, seated on a rock, his elbows on his knees, his back framed against the sky. 'Limbo' music continues in the background. Occasionally, mist floats across the frame.

Hias: 'Ich weiß nicht, ob ich weg soli von hier. Drunten im Dorf geht der Wahnsinn herum. Der Hüttenherr will einen neuen Ofen bauen lassen, aber die Ofensetzer bleiben aus

Shot 081 [1865f.78s.E.D.MCU]

Hias, face to camera, seated between two boulders, his back to the valley far below. 'Limbo' music continues in the background.

Hias: Ich seh wie auf einmal im Bach ein Feuer fließt,
'Limbo' music fades out.

Hias: und der Wind brennts Feuer daher. Ich seh wie die Bäume brennen wie die Zündhölzle.

Music fades in in the background.

Hias: Ich seh wie viele Menschen einen Hügel hinauf rennen. Sie machen oben atemlos halt, und erstarren zu Stein, einer neben dem andern. Ein ganzer versteineter Wald. Dann wird es finster und still, und ich seh wie unten alles verkommen ist. Kein Mensch ist mehr da und kein Haus, nurne Mauertrümmer.

Music fades out.

Hias: Ja, und dann seh ich, wie drunten auf der Waldhausstraße einer rennt, mit einem brennenden Ast in der Hand und schreit, "Bin ich wirklich noch der Letzte? Bin ich wirklich noch der Einzige?"

Shot 082 [295f.12s.E.D.XLS]

A grassy, rolling landscape covered in cloud and mist, but quite light. Plucked instrumental music. Vocalist begins to

sing soothingly.

Shot 083 [459f.19s.E.D.LS]

A small watering-hole amid a still-smoldering, burnt-out forest. Vocalist and instrumental music continue.

Shot 084 [217f.9s.E.D.LS]

Foreground: a rocky slope, rising away from the camera. Background: ruin-like shadows against a white sky. Vocalist and instrumental music continue.

Shot 085 [509f.12s.E.D.XLS]

Foreground: steaming white rock. Background: hills and mountains surrounded by cloud. Vocalist and instrumental music continue.

Shot 086 [463f.19s.E.D.LS]

Similar to 085. Vocalist and instrumental music continue.

Shot 087 [568f.24s.E.D.LS]

Similar to 085, but seen from the other side of a body of water. Vocalist and instrumental music continue.

Shot 088 [356f.15s.E.D.LS]

A lake with denuded trees. Vocalist and instrumental music continue, then fade out.

Shot 089 [536f.22s.E.D.LS]

A sea with a fog bank in the distance. Uplifting music (similar to 012-017) fades in.

Shot 090 [343f.14s.E.D.LS]

A sea with sunlight glinting off the waves. Uplifting music continues.

Shot 091 [206f.9s.E.D.XLS]

Aerial view of a sea dotted with low, elongated islands. Uplifting music continues.

Shot 092 [361f.15s.E.D.XLS]

Similar to 091. Uplifting music continues.

Shot 093 [405f.17s.E.D.LS]

The Forest. Hias, face to camera, walking downhill, away from the camera. Uplifting music continues. In the background: sound of footsteps.

Shot 094 [641f.27s.E.D.LS]

The camera follows Hias from the side. Footsteps continue in the background. Uplifting music continues, then fades out. Footsteps fade into the foreground.

Shot 095 [359f.15s.1.D.MLS]

The Mansion, office. Goldfinger, back to camera, standing at the window. Adalbert, back to camera, seated at his desk, reading.

Goldfinger: Adalbert?

Sound of footsteps as Adalbert gets up and moves to stand to the right of Goldfinger, then bows.

Shot 096 [782f.33s.1.D.MS]

Continuation of 095. Goldfinger turns toward Adalbert.

Goldfinger: Schick er nach dem Hüter Hias, daß er sofort erscheine und dieses Geheimnis des Rubins sehe.

Sound of footsteps as Adalbert nods and leaves. Ominous music (similar to 009-012) fades in in the background. The footsteps cease. The sound of a door being opened.

Goldfinger: Und wenn wir den toten Mühlbeck wieder aus dem Grab ziehen müssen, daß der Hias in dem Mühlbeck seinem Hirn lese.

Shot 097 [336f.14s.1.D.MCU]

Ludmilla, left side to camera, standing before the crystal cabinet in the dining room. She is admiring the ruby glasses, which glow with colour. She touches them gently with her right hand. Ominous music continues in the background.

Ludmilla: Seltsam, eine gläserne Stadt. Und hier leben Menschen darin. Wie können Menschen in Glashäuser leben?

Shot 098 [606f.25s.I.D.CU]

Ludmilla's right hand among the glasses. Ominous music continues in the background.

Ludmilla: Hier die Kirche. In der Kirche leben Tiere, Tiere aller Art: Hasen, Hühner, Rehe, Vögel, Kühe. Aber kein Mensch ist in der Kirche zu sehen. Die Straßen sind menschenleer. Alles ist bedeckt mit Schnee.

Shot 099 [352f.15s.I.D.MCU]

Continuation of 097. Ludmilla begins to dust the glasses with a white cloth. Ominous music continues in the background, then fades out.

Shot 100 [644f.27s.I.D.MCU]

Ludmilla, face to camera, seen through the clear glass wall of the cabinet. She holds a ruby glass up to her face and studies it carefully. Suddenly Hias appears behind Ludmilla.

Hias: Ludmilla.

Ludmilla drops the glass she is holding. Sound of glass being smashed.

Hias: Laß liegen, heut

Ludmilla (softly): Hias!

Hias: geht noch mehr drauf.

Hias puts his right arm around Ludmilla's shoulder, his mouth close to her left ear.

Hias: Geh aus dem Herrenhaus hinaus! Es könnte der Herr ausrutschen und in deinem Gesicht zu sitzen kommen.

Ludmilla does not move or turn her head.

Shot 101 [776f.32s.I.D.MS]

Goldfinger, face to camera, seated at the desk in the office, flipping somewhat aimlessly through various books. Sound of papers being rustled. Ludmilla sobs softly. Goldfinger looks up.

Goldfinger: Was flennt sie?

Goldfinger pulls his handkerchief out of his pocket and offers it.

Goldfinger: Es ist besser, das Dienstmensch betet, daß wir das Gesetz vom Rubin wieder finder, als daß es flennt.

Shot 102 [224f.9s.I.D.MS]

Ludmilla, face to camera, standing before the desk, holding her hands to the side of her face. She continues to sob softly.

Ludmilla: Es wird sehr viel geschehen. Nämlich der Hias, der ist draußen.

Shot 103 [1107f.46s.I.D.MLS]

From behind Ludmilla, the camera follows Goldfinger.

Goldfinger: Er ist schon da?

Goldfinger gets up and walks to the staircase. He looks down to see Hias standing at the bottom of the stairs, looking out the window. Sound of footsteps.

Goldfinger: Er hats gewußt?! Er hat keinen Boten gebraucht?!

Hias turns around to face Goldfinger.

Hias: Der Herr möge gnädigst einen Jager schicken, damit er den Bärn brennt.

Sound of footsteps as Hias begins to climb the stairs.

Hias: Die Stiere ängstigen sich,

Sound of footsteps ceases as Hias reaches the top of the stairs and stands, left side to camera, facing Goldfinger.

Hias: und Sam und ich können nicht garantiern, daß er nicht einen Stier schlägt, oder daß uns die andern durchbrennen. Am Tag des Bärn läuft ein Stier bis nach Mainz.

Goldfinger raises his right hand and drops the handkerchief.

Shot 104 [1029f.43s.I.D.MS]

Goldfinger: Der Mühlbeck ist gestorben.

From behind Goldfinger, whose arm is still raised, the camera follows Hias, then Goldfinger.

Goldfinger: Er hat sein Geheimnis mit sich genommen.

Both men move into the office. Goldfinger lowers his arm to pick up a transparent glass jar containing a faded red powder. He holds up the jar before Hias, who stares down at it.

Goldfinger: Aber du sollst die Beigab für den Rubin sehn. Der Mühlbeck hat uns sitzen lassen.

Hias: Ich weiß sie nicht, die Beigab.

Goldfinger: Für zehn Gulden weiß er es.

Shot 105 [698f.29s.I.D.MCU]

Goldfinger, face to camera, staring at the jar.

Goldfinger: Dann weiß er es für tausend. Will er, daß unsre Leute wieder Haferbrot fressen, von dem sie Kopfschmerzen bekommen? Dann sag ers mir, das Geheimnis, daß wir das Rubinglas wieder machen, und er kann Hüttenmeister werden. Ich trage einen Mühlstein bis Trier.

Goldfinger raises his eyes to look beyond the camera.

Shot 106 [87f.4s.I.D.MCU]

Hias, face to camera, staring beyond the camera.

Hias: Ich bin nur wegen dem Jager da.

Shot 107 [620f.26s.I.D.MCU]

Continuation of 105.

Goldfinger: Ich will den Rubin wieder. Ich will das rote Glas, versteht er?

Goldfinger moves toward Hias.

Goldfinger: Ich brauch ein Glas mein Blut zu fassen, sonst rinnt es mir davon.

Goldfinger grabs Hias by the collar.

Goldfinger: Mir tut die Sonne weh.

Hias pulls away. Goldfinger cringes, closes his eyes.

Shot 108 [72f.3s.1.D.MCU]

Continuation of 106.

Hias: Er wird die Sonne nimmer sehn.

Shot 109 [220f.9s.1.D.MCU]

Continuation of 107.

Hias: Die Ratzen werden ihn ins Ohrwaschel beißen.

Goldfinger looks up.

Shot 110 [289f.12s.1.D.MCU]

Ludmilla, face to camera, her back to the wall, holding her hands to the side of her face as she watches the two men. She is sobbing softly. She lowers her eyes.

Shot 111 [981f.41s.E.D.MLS]

The Barn. The camera looks in from outside the open door. The innkeeper and his wife are inspecting the bodies. The innkeeper shakes Wudy, pulls his head up by the hair, lets it drop back down.

Innkeeper: Der Wudy ist hin. Ders der Tote.

The innkeeper and his wife stand, looking down at the bodies.

Wife: Nei. Erwischt hatsn Ascherl. Der Hias hat geweißgt, der Erste, der Untere, der fällt zuerst.

The innkeeper's wife looks upward and points to the hayloft.

Wife: Und schaut, der Andere fällt auf ihn auf, der fällt weich, der hats überlebt, der Wudy.

The innkeeper follows his wife's gaze. Then both look down at the bodies.

Wife: Komm!

Innkeeper: Komm! Klaffens auseinander.

The innkeeper and his wife bend down and lift Wudy off of Ascherl.

Shot 112 [678f. 28s. I.D. MCU]

Wudy is being lifted off Ascherl. He is lain on his back. Ascherl is turned over on his back to lie beside Wudy.

Innkeeper: Von wem jetzt der Arm als erster runterfät, ders der Tote.

The innkeeper moves to squat between the heads of the two bodies, lifts Wudy's right arm and Ascherl's left arm, lets both arms drop at the same time; they reach the ground simultaneously.

Innkeeper: Ja kruzifix!

The innkeeper gets up.

Wife: Ein Toten flucht man nit ins Gesicht.

Shot 113 [249f. 10s. I.D. MLS]

The innkeeper has left. The innkeeper's wife, a pitchfork in her right hand, a snarling dog on a leash in her left hand.

Wife: Die dahinten, die faß! Faß an! Los, ob der da hin ist. Da! Faß!

With the pitchfork, the innkeeper's wife manœuvres the dog toward the bodies. Sound of growling and snarling.

Shot 114 [95f. 4s. I.D. MCU]

The dog, right side to camera, snapping at the pitchfork. Sound of growling and snarling continues.

Shot 115 [753f. 31s. I.D. MLS]

Continuation of 113. The sound of growling and snarling continues as the dog jumps around on the bodies in his efforts to avoid the pitchfork.

Wife: Faß! Faß!

Suddenly Wudy raises his hands and rises to a sitting position as the innkeeper's wife releases the dog. The sound of growling and snarling ends. Wudy watches the dog disappear through another doorway, then raises his right hand to his head, lowers his hand, shakes his head vigorously, looks at Ascherl lying dead beside him.

Wife: Ah! Jetzt wissen wirs.

Wudy gets up, still looking down at Ascherl, then looks toward the doorway through which the dog fled. He looks back down at Ascherl, scratches his head, looks up toward the hayloft, brushes his pants off with his right hand, looks up at the innkeeper's wife, who has been watching him throughout, then moves toward the main door.

Shot 116 [151f.6s.I.D.MS]

Continuation of 115.

Wife: Was der Hias sicht, des kimmt.

The innkeeper's wife follows Wudy with her eyes and head as he moves out the main door.

Shot 117 [1269f.53s.I.D.MLS]

The Church. Through the doorway of a room, we see Ascherl, face to camera, stretched out on a table with a white tablecloth. Above his head is a window. The interior of the room is white. Ascherl's hands are clasped over his stomach. At each elbow stands a lit candle. Paulin stands at Ascherl's right, looking at the nearer candle, which she is touching with her right hand. She hums softly. She moves around to stand at the top of the table, looking down at Ascherl's head. She raises her hands slowly and holds them outstretched to either side. Suddenly she jerks her head up and pulls her hands toward her face. She bends down and takes a closer look at either side of Ascherl's head, first the right, then the left. She raises herself up slightly as the door slowly moves to close. The door stops moving; we can still see the right half of Ascherl and Paulin. Paulin lowers her hands and leaves the room.

Shot 118 [546f.23s.I.D.MLS]

The Inn. A variety of patrons sit in pairs, facing one another. Each patron stares vacantly at the face of the other across the table. The door at the back creaks as it is

opened from the outside, admitting daylight. Toni enters, carrying his harp. Sound of footsteps.

Toni: Da bin ich.

Innkeeper: Jeß der Toni!

Toni closes the door and sets his harp down as the innkeeper walks toward him.

Shot 119 [403f.17s.I.D.MS]

Toni, face to camera, a mug of beer in front of him, sitting across the table from the innkeeper, back to camera.

Innkeeper: Den Mühlbeck haben sie vorletzte Woche eingegraben, unsern Hüttenmeister. Jetzt wissen sie nicht mehr ein noch aus.

Toni: Der Hias hats vorausgsagt.

Shot 120 [102f.4s.I.D.MS]

Foreground: two patrons, seated across a table from one another, staring at each other. Background: the innkeeper's wife cleaning mugs.

Innkeeper: Dann weißt du auch das vom Rubin?

Shot 121 [226f.9s.I.D.MS]

Continuation of 119.

Toni: Des mit dem Rubinglas, des is e Krankheit vom Herrn.

Shot 122 [1000f.42s.I.D.MS]

The Mansion, office. Goldfinger, face to camera, seated at the desk, which is covered with books. Many more books are scattered all over the floor and against the walls. Sound of rustling of papers as Goldfinger flips through one of the books on the desk. He closes the book.

Goldfinger: Rubinglas.

Goldfinger writes something on one of the pieces of paper sticking out the top of the book. Sound of footsteps as Adalbert enters, walks toward Goldfinger, stops in front of him.

Adalbert (softly): Das Kanapee ist da.

Goldfinger looks up at Adalbert and puts his pen down.

Goldfinger: Hereingetragen!

Adalbert (softly): Hereingetragen! Hereingetragen! Hereingetragen!

Adalbert and Goldfinger leave the table, Adalbert in the lead. Sound of footsteps. The camera follows them as they walk to the stairway and look down: three workmen are on their way up, carrying a couch.

Goldfinger: Hereingetragen!

Sound of footsteps ceases as the couch is placed at the top of the stairs.

Goldfinger: Ich bin entzückt von diesem Briefe.

Goldfinger bends over to touch the couch, then turns his head to look at Adalbert.

Goldfinger: Adalbert, reiche mir den Brieföffner!

Sound of footsteps as Adalbert moves off.

Shot 123 [98f.4s.1.D.MCU]

Sound of footsteps as Adalbert returns and hands the letter-opener to Goldfinger, who takes it in his right hand.

Shot 124 [170f.7s.1.D.MCU]

Holding the letter-opener first in his right hand, then with both hands, Goldfinger, right side to camera, slashes at the seat of the couch. Tearing sound.

Shot 125 [56f.2s.1.D.MCU]

The three workmen look on. Tearing sound continues.

Shot 126 [242f.10s.1.D.MCU]

The tearing sound ends. Goldfinger removes some of the stuffing from the couch. He and Adalbert examine it with their hands.

Goldfinger: Wir werden diese Nachricht lesen. Kann er das

entziffern?

Shot 127 [56f. 2s. I.D. MS]

The first workman, face to camera, looking down at the couch.

Shot 128 [619f. 26s. I.D. MCU]

Continuation of 126, from above. Goldfinger, face to camera, straightens up until his head is at camera level, his eyes downcast.

Goldfinger: Wenn einem ein Brief erreicht ohne Papier, so daß die Buchstaben herumliegen, dann ist das eher zum nachdenken.

Shot 129 [938f. 39s. I.D. MLS]

The Inn, supply store. Hias, left side to camera, stands just inside the open door, framed against the daylight. He is watching the innkeeper's wife weigh a small sack of flour.

Wife: Gehst wieder inn Wald auf, heh?

Hias turns his head slowly to the right to look out the doorway. After a short interval, he turns his head back quickly.

Hias: Wart, ich brauchs nit. Ich sig, daß ich erst wieder weg komm wenn der Schnee liegt.

Shot 130 [128f. 5s. I.D. MCU]

The innkeeper's wife, face to camera, looking beyond the camera.

Wife: Enn eech hat, schütt ichs wieder in die Truhn.

Shot 131 [437f. 18s. I.D. MCU]

Hias, as in 129. He turns, walks out the door and down a path through the trees. Sound of footsteps.

Shot 132 [567f. 24s. E.D. MLS]

Anamirl's House. Anamirl, face to camera, sits on a bench outside her front door. Sound of footsteps as Hias approaches from behind the camera and comes to a halt

beside her. She has been watching him approach.

Hias: Hier ist der Mann gestorben.

Anamirl gets up, moves her hands to her mouth, motions with her hands and nods her head. Hias stands back as she opens the door and enters the house. He follows her, closing the door behind himself. Sound of footsteps and door being opened and closed.

Shot 133 [585f.24s.1.D.MS]

Sound of footsteps continues as the camera follows Anamirl and Hias through another doorway into the kitchen. Hias, back to camera, watches Anamirl as she makes further gestures with her hands and mouth.

Hias: Sie haben dir dein Kanapee weggetragen.

Anamirl walks off to the left and the camera follows Hias as he sits down at the table, putting his left elbow on the table and resting his head on his left hand. He is looking to his right.

Shot 134 [260f.11s.1.D.MS]

Anamirl, face to camera, her light-coloured face contrasting sharply with her black garment and dark surroundings, slowly finds a seat, her eyes downcast. Sound of ticking clock.

Hias: Ja, und da ist er immer gesessen.

Shot 135 [383f.16s.1.D.MCU]

Hias, face to camera, his arms down on the table, his eyes downcast. He turns his head to the right. Sound of ticking clock continues.

Hias: Wenn die Nacht sinkt, dann sterben die Leut.

Hias turns his head back to look beyond the camera.

Shot 136 [935f.39s.1.D.MS]

At the right, Hias, left side to camera, looking toward Anamirl. In the centre, Anamirl, face to camera, looking toward Hias. Sound of ticking clock continues. Hias turns his head to look at the bowl of bread before him on the table. He rests his head on his left hand.

Hias: Unter Tags regnets jetzt viel,

Hias looks up

Hias: und trotzdem vertrocknet das Land.

Hias looks down at the bread, takes a loaf in his left hand, a knife in his right, cuts himself a slice, then, his elbows resting on the table, breaks off a piece of the slice and chews it, fingering the remaining piece in his right hand.

Shot 137 [410f.17s. I.D.MCU]

The Mansion, dining room Goldfinger, face to camera, seated at the table, a napkin raised to his lips. He wipes his mouth and lowers the napkin.

Goldfinger: Er ist zu Tisch geladen, weil er den Rubin so schön beschreibt. Sprich er!

Goldfinger lets his head rest on the back of his chair.

Goldfinger: Ich kann nicht genug davon hören.

Goldfinger closes his eyes.

Shot 138 [900f.38s. I.D.MS]

Agide, face to camera, seated at the other end of the table.

Agide: Das Land des Rubins. Mein Land. Und alle Menschen... tanzen in dem roten Schein, und leben in ihm. Ihr Blut, ihr Leben, alles ist in dem Glas, in dem Rot, in der Farbe.

Shot 139 [192f.8s. I.D.MCU]

Continuation of 137. Goldfinger's eyes are open.

Agide: Dieses Land... ist das Einzige.

Shot 140 [187f.8s. I.D.MS]

Continuation of 138.

Agide: Alles ist in diesem Land, und alles ist Rubin.

Shot 141 [1027f.43s.I.D.MLS]

Agide, right side to camera, and Goldfinger, face to camera, seated at the table, eating. Behind Goldfinger, by the window, stands Adalbert, face to camera. Goldfinger raises his glass, drinks; Agide raises his glass, drinks; both lower their glasses. Agide wipes his mouth with the back of his left hand. Goldfinger wipes his mouth with his napkin. Sound of footsteps. Ludmilla enters carrying an empty tray and begins to clear the table.

Goldfinger: Ihr Gebet hat ein Wunder bewirkt. Ich weiß seit einer Stunde etwas, was ich noch nie gewußt habe.

Shot 142 [242f.10s.I.D.MS]

Ludmilla, face to camera, from the waist up.

Goldfinger: An alle Glashütten kann ich mein Geheimnis verkaufen.

Sound of glass being suddenly smashed. Ludmilla raises her hands to her face.

Goldfinger: Zerbrich so viel du kannst.

Shot 143 [378f.16s.I.D.MLS]

Goldfinger, face to camera, lounging in his chair.

Goldfinger: Ich werde zehn Kraxen mit Rubinglas auf den Arber tragen und die Seewand herunterwerfen lassen,

Still standing by the window behind Goldfinger, Adalbert opens his book and begins to take notes.

Goldfinger: daß sich der See rot färbt.

Goldfinger rolls his head to the right, in Adalbert's direction.

Goldfinger: Adalbert! Hat er das mitbekommen?

Shot 144 [155f.6s.I.D.MCU]

Ludmilla, face to camera, her eyes half closed, her mouth half open.

Adalbert: ...der See rot färbt. Jawohl!

Ludmilla blinks several times, then opens her eyes wider.

Shot 145 [1203f.50s.I.D.MCU]

Goldfinger, left side to camera, his head rolled to the right, in the direction of Adalbert, whose hands can be seen writing.

Goldfinger: Noch heute soll das Glas für den See weggehen.
Man nehme von allen Gläsern im Magazin.

Goldfinger rolls his head to the left as Adalbert scribbles furiously.

Goldfinger: Und noch etwas: noch heute stopfe man das Gras ins Kanapee und nähe das Polster.... Und bringe der Anamirl das Kanapee und zehn Gulden zur Entschädigung. Und man überbringe ihr, daß ich ihren toten Mühlbeck nicht länger zum Teufel wünsche. Er möge von einem Schwarm Engel umgeben sein.

Adalbert stops writing and closes the book.

Shot 146 [701f.29s.I.D.LS]

The Glassworks. The oven, from above. Ominous music (similar to 096-099) in the background. Goldfinger wanders slowly around the oven. In his left hand he still clutches his napkin. He raises his right hand to the back of his head and turns half around, as if searching for something. Then he raises both hands to cover his head.

Shot 147 [1917f.80s.I.D.MLS]

Continuation of 146, from ground level. Ominous music continues in the background.

Goldfinger: Ich hab's.

Still holding his head in his hands, Goldfinger bends over, then lets go of his head. He straightens up, strokes the sleeves of his red velvet coat.

Goldfinger: Hier ist's. Und da.

Goldfinger raises his right hand to his forehead.

Goldfinger: Und auch hier drinnen ist's.

Goldfinger lowers his right hand and raises his left hand

such that both meet at the centre of his chest.

Goldfinger: Und hier!

Goldfinger looks down at the floor. He gets down on one knee.

Goldfinger: Wir alle!

Goldfinger gets down on both knees while looking around him. He sits down completely, still looking around.

Goldfinger: Ich habe schon nach den Ofensetzern von Ploßberg gesandt.

Ominous music fades out. One, then a score of glass-workers enter the frame and stand around him in a circle.

Shot 148 [632f.26s.I.D.MS]

Gigl, face to camera, and Ägide, face to camera.

Ägide: Da wird die Herrin schaun, wenns von der Reis zurückkommt.

Hias enters, stands, face to camera, between Gigl and Ägide.

Hias: Die wird nichts mehr stehen sehen, wenns zurückkommt.

Gigl: Spinniter Uhu!

Hias: Wenn die Herrin aus der Kutsche steigt, dann fliegt sie inn Dreck hinei, weils niemand auffängt, und du bist auf ein Schiff und speibst.

Gigl: No was?

Ägide: Sag lieber, obs heut ein Freibier gibt.

Hias: Ja.

Shot 149 [652f.27s.E.D.MS]

The Mansion. One of the windows, from the outside. The window is at chest level and has four vertical iron bars before the glass. The left side of the window is open. Ludmilla, face to camera, is seated on the windowsill behind the iron bars; she is looking down at a potted flower on

the ledge outside. With her left hand Ludmilla opens the right side of the window as Hias approaches and comes to a halt outside the window. The sound of footsteps accompanies Hias' approach.

Ludmilla: Der Herr stimmt nicht mehr.

Ludmilla watches Hias.

Hias: In der Hütten ist ein Sparifankerl gewesen.

Ludmilla crosses herself.

Hias: Zehn Männer hat er mit Gläsern in den Kraxen in den Wald geschickt.

Ludmilla keeps her eyes downcast.

Hias: Aber die sind nicht so dumm und schmeißen das wertvolle Glas in den See; die schmuggeln über die Grenz und verkaufens.

Shot 150 [118f.5s.I.D.MS]

Continuation of 149, but from the inside looking out. Hias is looking up at Ludmilla.

Hias: Ludmilla, geh weg von hier, bevor er von dir was will!

Shot 151 [736f.31s.E.D.MS]

Continuation of 150, but from the outside looking in, as in 149. Ludmilla is looking at Hias.

Adalbert: Ludmilla, mach dich schön bis um fünf!

Ludmilla turns her head to look inward. Hias also looks inward.

Adalbert: Der Herr wünscht deine Gesellschaft.

Ludmilla looks back at Hias. Adalbert appears.

Ludmilla: Hias!

Adalbert: Ich muß für Musik sorgen.

Hias looks out beyond the camera. Ludmilla looks at the opposite side of the window.

Hias: Auf der Pferdeweide wird gleich einer sitzen,
Ludmilla looks at Hias.

Hias: der kann Drehleier spielen.
Ludmilla looks down at her knees.

Adalbert: Zur Drehleier aber müßt ich singen.
Ludmilla looks back at Hias.

Hias: In der Schenke sitzt der Harfen Toni.

Adalbert: Sag ihm, daß er kommen soll. Es wird nicht sein Schaden sein.

Ludmilla looks down at the ground outside. Hias turns his head to look at Ludmilla.

Shot 152 [292f.12s.I.D.MS]

Continuation of 151, but from the inside looking out, as in 150. Sound of footsteps as Hias turns around and walks away. Ludmilla's gaze follows him.

Shot 153 [514f.21s.I.D.MLS]

Anamirl's House, kitchen. The camera faces the closed door. Sound of door being opened followed by footsteps as the door is pushed open from the outside by three workmen carrying the couch. They manoeuvre the couch to its place by the wall as Anamirl, seated, watches. The couch has been poorly repaired.

First Workman: So Anamirl,

Shot 154 [342f.14s.I.D.MCU]

The first workman, face to camera, looking down.

First Workman: jetzt kannst dwieder weich sitzen.

The first workman moves toward the table as the camera moves down to focus on his right hand. Sound of coins being placed on table as he places ten large silver coins on the table, one by one.

Shot 155 [321f.13s.I.D.MLS]

Continuation of 153. Sound of footsteps as the three workmen leave the room. Anamirl remains seated with her hands clasped on her knees. She looks toward the coins.

Shot 156 [496f. 21s. I. D. MLS]

Daylight streams into the hall through the open front door. Outside a forest is visible behind the closely-cropped field in the foreground. Sound of many clinking glasses. Anamirl emerges from a doorway at the left and moves to the front door. She remains standing, back to camera, in the doorway, leaning against the right side. She watches as men carrying racks covered with ruby glasses on their backs pass through the field, from left to right.

Shot 157 [500f. 21s. E. D. MLS]

Closer view of the men walking through the field. Sound of many clinking glasses continues.

Shot 158 [1091f. 45s. E. D. MCU]

Hias, right side to camera, seated on the edge of a cliff, looking down at the village far below.

Hias: Die Nacht laßt sich Zeit. Heut kommt sie ganz langsam. Sie kriecht in die Winkel vom Dorf, und die Leut dringen sich leise im Stall mit den Tiern zusammen. Bei der Glas-hütten, da arbeiten sie wieder gegen die Angst an, weil sie wissen ihre Arbeit ist umsonst. Ich hab's ihnen gesagt: in der Nacht brennt die Hütten. Aber wie im Schlaf, so sicher gehn die Leut in ihr Unglück mit offenen Augen.

Shot 159 [219f. 9s. I. D. MLS]

The Glassworks. A score of glassworkers are busy blowing glass. Sound of glassworkers at work.

Shot 160 [178f. 7s. I. D. MCU]

One glassworker molds the glass of another. Sound of glassworkers at work continues.

Shot 161 [117f. 5s. I. D. MS]

Glassworkers at work. Sound of glassworkers at work continues.

Shot 162 [182f. 8s. I. D. MCU]

Glassworker blowing glass. He holds the glass right before the camera. Sound of glassworkers at work continues.

Shot 163 [131f.5s.I.D.MS]

Molten glass being dripped from one pipe to another. Sound of glassworkers at work continues.

Shot 164 [332f.14s.I.D.MS]

Continuation of 161. Sound of glassworkers at work continues.

Shot 165 [125f.5s.I.D.CU]

Completed vase being cooled over a barrel of water by a hand sprinkling water on it. Sound of glassworkers at work continues.

Shot 166 [186f.8s.I.D.MS]

Glassworker blowing glass. Sound of glassworkers at work continues.

Shot 167 [211f.9s.I.D.MS]

Glassworker, face to camera, picks up a pitcher of beer and drinks from it. Sound of glassworkers at work continues.

Shot 168 [354f.15s.I.D.MS]

Continuation of 166. Sound of glassworkers at work continues.

Shot 169 [145f.6s.I.D.MS]

Glassworkers at work. Sound of glassworkers at work continues.

Shot 170 [364f.15s.I.D.MS]

Glassworker fashioning a vase out of white translucent glass. Sound of glassworkers at work continues.

Shot 171 [139f.6s.I.D.CU]

Glassworker cutting excess glass off a completed decanter made of clear glass. Sound of glassworkers at work continues.

ues.

Shot 172 [239f.10s.I.D.MS]

Two ports of the oven. Glassworkers are putting glass in, taking it out. Sound of glassworkers at work continues.

Shot 173 [1263f.53s.I.D.CU]

A glassworker draws a horse out of a small mass of red hot glass. Sound of glassworkers at work continues.

Shot 174 [1292f.54s.I.D.MLS]

The camera moves past a number of glassworkers, then rises slightly to watch the glassworkers from above. Sound of glassworkers at work continues.

Shot 175 [764f.32s.I.N.MS]

The Mansion, dining room. Foreground, left: Adalbert, face to camera, standing at the doorway, holding a lit candle in his left hand, staring straight ahead. Background, right: Toni, in the next room, sitting, left side to camera, by his harp. Harp music begins as Toni plucks his harp. Adalbert's eyes are almost shut.

Shot 176 [565f.24s.I.N.MLS]

From behind Adalbert's left shoulder, the camera looks into the dining room. In front of Adalbert sits Ludmilla, left side to camera, looking down. Goldfinger, who is sitting, face to camera, at the table in the centre of the room, has his head down on the table, his hands clasped together over his head. On the table stands a single lit candle. In the back, at the right, sits Goldfinger's father, face to camera, in his usual place. Seven candles stand against the back wall. Harp music continues. Ludmilla turns her head to the left, toward Adalbert, then turns it back. Goldfinger unclasps his hands and starts to raise his head. Goldfinger's father laughs. Ludmilla screams.

Shot 177 [541f.23s.I.N.MCU]

Similar to 175. Harp music continues. Adalbert's eyelids are red, his pupils almost hidden behind his upper eyelids. Goldfinger's father laughs. Adalbert's eyes move very slowly toward a closed position, but do not close completely.

Shot 178 [340f.14s. I.N.MCU]

Ludmilla, face to camera, her mouth slightly open. She is looking to her left. In the background, Goldfinger's father. Harp music continues. Ludmilla rocks back and forth slightly. She screams, then turns her head to face straight ahead.

Shot 179 [290f.12s. I.N.MS]

Toni, left side to camera, plucking his harp. Harp music continues.

Shot 180 [1248f.52s. I.N.MS]

Goldfinger, face to camera, leaning back in his chair, the back of his right hand raised to his forehead. On the table before him lies an open book. Harp music continues. Sound of footsteps as Goldfinger drops his hand, leans forward, gets up, moves to a small table set against the back wall. On the table: a lit candle and Goldfinger's sword. Goldfinger picks up the sword, walks to the back of the chair, slowly withdraws the sword from its scabbard. He holds it up and gazes at it.

Shot 181 [424f.18s. I.N.MLS]

Similar to 175. Harp music continues. Ludmilla appears and walks toward the open door, which Adalbert closes and locks before she can escape. Sound of door being closed and locked. Harp music continues in the background. Ludmilla tries the bolt in vain as Adalbert resumes his position. Then she turns to face the camera.

Shot 182 [291f.12s. I.N.MS]

Goldfinger's father, face to camera, repeatedly clenching and unclenching his fists. Harp music continues in the background.

Shot 183 [395f.16s. I.N.MS]

Adalbert, face to camera, as in 181. To his right hangs a painting of a saint. Harp music continues in the background. Sound of painting hitting the table as the painting suddenly falls off the wall and comes to rest, upright, on a small table beside Adalbert. Adalbert turns to adjust the painting slightly, then turns back, raises his eyes to the ceiling briefly, and resumes his pose.

Shot 184 [221f. 9s. I. N. CU]

A carved and painted figurehead, attached to a pair of antlers, hanging from a rafter, the shadow of the figure dark against the white wall beside it. The figure is trembling. Harp music continues in the background.

Shot 185 [306f. 13s. I. N. CU]

Detail of the painting: the saint is looking up to heaven, whence he receives the stigmata. Harp music continues in the background. The camera moves down to focus on a skull lying by the saint's feet.

Shot 186 [1445f. 60s. I. N. MLS]

The Inn. Foreground: Hias, seated at a table, staring straight ahead; to his right, seated at the next side of the table, a musician with a hurdy-gurdy. The Inn is full of patrons, sitting at many tables, talking. Sound of noisy patrons. Hurdy-gurdy music and singing begin as the musician starts to play his instrument. He stops playing.

Shot 187 [1040f. 43s. I. N. MS]

The musician, right side to camera, seated at the left, looking at Hias, face to camera, still staring straight ahead. Sound of noisy patrons continues.

Musician: Ja und dann?

Hias: Dann fangt der Kleine einen Krieg an, und der Große überm Wasser macht ihn aus. Dann kriegst dum zwei-hundert Gulden keinen Laib Brot mehr. Dann kommt ein gestrenger Herr, der zieht den Leuten das Hemd über'n Kopf, und die Haut dazu. Nach dem Krieg meinst, es ist eine Ruhe, es ist aber keine.

Shot 188 [572f. 24s. I. N. MS]

Wudy, right side to camera, seated at the left, looking down. Sound of noisy patrons continues. The first workman offers Wudy a mug of beer.

First Workman: Stoß mit an, moi!

Sound of laughter. Wudy pushes the mug away. The innkeeper serves patrons, returns.

Wudy: Der Ascherl geht mir ab.

Paulin enters from the right, carrying a large white goose.

First Workman: Ja, häst din nit erdrückt.

Sound of laughter.

Shot 189 [150f.6s.1.N.MCU]

Continuation of 188: Wudy. Sound of noisy patrons continues.

Wudy: Mir geht der Ascherl ab. Der Ascherl müßt heut dabei sein.

Shot 190 [714f.30s.1.N.MS]

Same as 188, continuation of 189. Sound of noisy patrons continues. Someone is holding a finger to the top of Paulin's head, who rotates slowly underneath it, her mouth half open.

First Workman: Da mußst schon selber nausgehn zuhm. Rein-gehn kann er selber nimmer.

Sound of laughter. Paulin leaves the frame.

Wudy: Bringst mir an Ascherl! Bringst mir an Ascherl!

Wudy gets up, walks off to the right.

Shot 191 [1257f.52s.1.N.MS]

Continuation of 187. Sound of noisy patrons continues.

Musician: Wenn i di alles glaub, aber das glaub i dir nit.

Hias: Glaubst oder glaubst nit, das is dei Sach. Ich sag nur, was ich seh. Obs eintrifft, weiß ich nit.

Musician: Ja und dann?

Hias: Die Bauern werden sich gewanden wie die Stadtleut. Und die Stadtleut werden wie die Affen. Die Weiber ziehen sich Hosen und Stiefel an. Die Bauern werden mit gewichsten Stiefeln in der Miststadt stehn. Die Bauern werden Kuchen essen und politisiern.

Shot 192 [423f.18s.1.N.MS]

Sound of noisy patrons continues. Wudy, face to camera, enters the Inn through a doorway; on his shoulders he bears the rigid body of Ascherl. As several patrons look on, Wudy stands Ascherl on his feet, wraps his arms around him, and begins to dance. Sound of noisy patrons subsides into silence.

Gigl: Spinn di aus!

Shot 193 [192f.8s.1.N.MLS]

Continuation of 192. Wudy and Ascherl are at the centre. Paulin, left side to camera, standing on the right with her goose in her arms, is one of several patrons who are looking on.

Wudy: Wer spielt uns zum Tanz auf?

Shot 194 [318f.13s.1.N.MS]

Continuation of 191. The musician looks over his right shoulder.

Musician: Ja dem Paarl, dem sprüh i auf!

Sound of footsteps as the musician leaves the table. Hias remains seated, still staring straight ahead.

Shot 195 [1281f.53s.1.N.MLS]

Continuation of 193. The musician has moved to lean, right side to camera, against the wall on the left. Hurdy-gurdy music starts as the musician plays for Wudy. The first workman cackles with mirth. Sound of stamping as Wudy turns with Ascherl and stamps his feet to the music.

First Workman: Fuß! Fuß! Tanz! Tanz! Dreh! Dreh!

First workman cackles with mirth.

First Workman: Tanz! Tanz! Fuß! Fuß!

First workman cackles with mirth.

First Workman: Tanz!

First workman cackles with mirth.

First Workman: Tanz! Tanz!

First workman cackles with mirth.

First Workman: Dreh!

First workman cackles with mirth.

Gigl: Aufhörn! Aufhörn!

Gigl walks over to the musician and brings him to a halt. Sound of laughter, stamping and hurdy-gurdy music cease. Wudy continues to turn with Ascherl.

Gigl: Laßt doch em Toten sei Ruhe!

First Workman: Gell? Es muß weiter!

First workman cackles with mirth.

Patron: Ja!

Hurdy-gurdy music and stamping begin as the musician starts up again.

Shot 196 [360f.15s.1.N.MCU]

The first workman, face to camera, encouraging Wudy. Hurdy-gurdy music and stamping continue. The camera moves to the right to focus on the musician, face to camera, playing. The camera moves further to the right to focus on Wudy and Ascherl. Laughter and shouts of encouragement.

Shot 197 [183f.8s.1.N.MLS]

Same as 195, continuation of 196. Hurdy-gurdy music, stamping and laughter continue. Hurdy-gurdy music and laughter cease as the musician stops playing. Stamping ceases as Wudy stops dancing. Wudy pants heavily from exhaustion.

Shot 198 [1282f.53s.1.N.MCU]

Continuation of 194.

Hias: Raufen tuns alle. In jedem Haus ist ein Krieg. Kein Mensch wird mehr den andern mögen. Die reichen und die feinen Leut werden umgebracht. Wer feine Hände hat wird totgeschlagen. Die Bauern werden ihre Häuser mit

einem hohen Zaun einzäunen und aus dem Fenster auf die Stadtleute schießen. Die Stadtleute werden betteln, "Laß mich ackern," aber sie werden umgebracht. Kein Mensch wird mehr den andern mögen. Wenn zwei auf einer Bank hocken und der eine sagt, "Rück ein wenig," und der andere tuts nicht, so ist das sein Tod. Das ist die Zeit vom Bankeabräumen.

Shot 199 [1547f. 64s. I. N. MCU]

The Mansion, dining room. On the right, on the floor, the head and shoulders of Ludmilla, motionless, a pool of blood beside her mouth. On the left, near the floor, Goldfinger's hands; he is kneeling beside Ludmilla; in his right hand he is holding his handkerchief.

Goldfinger: Sie ist gleich ausgekühlt, dann zerspringt sie nicht mehr.

Goldfinger dips the handkerchief in the pool of blood, raises it to eye-level as the camera follows. He inspects the blood-soaked handkerchief carefully.

Goldfinger (slowly): Das ist das reine Gemengel! Wozu sind die Fabriken noch gut?

Shot 200 [925f. 39s. I. N. MS]

The dining room door, from the inside; it is closed. Sound of footsteps and door being unlocked and opened as Adalbert, followed by Goldfinger carrying Ludmilla's body, moves toward the door, unlocks it, opens it, lets Goldfinger pass through, looks back into the room, out toward Goldfinger, back into the room, and resumes his former position, as in 183, while Goldfinger places Ludmilla's body on the floor beside the harp. Harp music begins as Toni wakes up, resumes playing. Goldfinger moves off to the right.

Shot 201 [224f. 9s. I. N. MS]

Harp music continues. Sound of door being unlatched as Goldfinger stands before the furnace door, opens it, reaches inside to withdraw a burning stick with his left hand.

Shot 202 [554f. 23s. I. N. MS]

Toni, still plucking his harp. Harp music continues, then stops suddenly when, from below the frame, the burning stick is thrust toward Toni. Sound of footsteps as Toni

jumps up and runs away, followed slowly by Goldfinger holding the burning stick at shoulder level. Sound of a glass being smashed.

Shot 203 [225f 9s 1 N.MS]

The Inn Foreground the cardplayer, face to camera, seated at a table, staring straight ahead vacantly, in his left hand he holds five cards in a fan. Background patrons in animated discussion. Sound of noisy patrons

Patron Paulin will tanzen! Paulin sie will tanzen! Paulin aufn Tisch da!

Patron Da bei Hias hinte, da is ei Platz hinten, bei Hias!

Shot 204 [278f 12s 1 N MCU]

Paulin, left side to camera, still holding her goose in her arms, smiling

Patron Paulin, sie soll nackert tanzen!

Patrons. Ja!

Sound of laughter

Patron Paulin, jetzt steig auf darn Tisch.

Patron: Ja!

Sound of laughter. Behind Paulin, two patrons raise their mugs in a toast.

Shot 205 [1021f.43s 1 N.MS]

Continuation of 198. The goose now occupies the musician's place on the table. Hias, still staring straight ahead, ignores the goose. Sound of laughter

Hias: Sommer und Winter wirst nicht mehr auseinanderkennen.

Hurdy-gurdy music begins. From the left, Paulin climbs onto the table, crosses to the right; she is visible from the knees down. Hias blinks, but continues to stare straight ahead. Paulin turns slowly to the music.

Hias: Jeder Mensch wird einen andern Kopf haben. Und der Wald wird licht wie dem Bettelmann sein Rock. Die Klein-

en werden wieder groß

The goose moves its head forward, partially obscuring Hias' face. Paulin drops her sweater to the floor, moves off to the right.

Hias: Wenn die Rotjankel kommen, mit ihren roten Jankeln, dann mußt davonlaufen, so schnellst kannst und schaun daß deinen Laib Brot mitnehmen kannst. Wer beim Laufen drei Laib Brot dabei hat und einen verliert, darf sich nicht bücken.

The goose draws its head back

Shot 206 [512f. 21s. 1. N. MS]

Paulin, dancing slowly, the camera looks up from table-level. Hurdy-gurdy music continues

Hias: Auch wenn du den zweiten Laib verlierst, so sollst i hinterlassen, weil es so pressiert, und du kannst auch mit einem Laib Brot durchhalten,

Hurdy-gurdy music ceases

Hias: weils nicht lange dauert.

Paulin lifts her dress up over her head

Hias: Die Wenigen, dies überleben, müssen einen eisernen Kopf haben.

Paulin drops her dress to the ground.

Hias: Die Leut werden krank,

Shot 207 [283f. 12s. 1. N. MS]

Continuation of 205. Paulin is back in the frame, on the right. Hias continues to ignore her.

Hias: aber kein Mensch kann ihnen helfen. Die dies überleben, werden sich zusammentun und mit "Bruder" und "Schwester" grüßen.

Paulin drops another garment to the floor.

Shot 208 [398f. 17s. 1. N. MLS]

Continuation of 207, but from a greater distance. All

heads but that of Hias are turned toward Paulin, still turning slowly on the table. Sound of laughter.

Patron: Laß, laß mal was sehn!

Sound of laughter Paulin drops her full slip to the table, she is naked from the waist up. She covers her breasts with her arms as she continues to turn.

Shot 209 [390f. 16s. E.N. MCU]

The Village First the burning stick, then Goldfinger, both moving into the frame from the left. Goldfinger comes to a halt, face to camera, moving the stick back and forth slowly. Then he turns, back to camera, and wanders off down the road

Shot 210 [1205f. 50s. I N MS]

The cardplayer, left side to camera, as in 203. To his right, the door.

Patron: Hütten brennt! Feuer!

Shouting and scuffling as suddenly

Patron: Glashütten brennt!

a mass of patrons runs toward the door and out into the night. One patron even climbs right over the cardplayer's table, but the cardplayer continues to stare straight ahead. The patrons are followed by the innkeeper and musician. Through the open doorway the outer door is visible; light from the fire plays on its surface. The musician stands, right side to camera, outside the inner doorway, framed by the latter. Hurdy-gurdy music begins as the musician watches the fire and plays his hurdy-gurdy.

Musician (singing): Die Hütten brennt! Die Hütten brennt! Die Glashütten brennt!

The cardplayer gets up and walks out through both doors, all the while staring straight ahead and holding the five cards in his left hand.

Shot 211 [101f. 4s. E.N. LS]

The Glassworks in flames. Shouting and crackle of flames.

Shot 212 [121f. 5s. E.N. MLS]

Three windows of the Glassworks, spewing flames. Shouting and crackle of flames continues.

Shot 213 [345f. 14s. E.N. LS]

Another view of the fire. The roof of the Glassworks has collapsed; the flames shoot out where the roof once was. Shouting and crackle of flames continues.

Shot 214 [1065f. 44s. I.N. MS]

The Mansion, same as 202. There is no one in the room. Goldfinger's father appears, back to camera, and shuffles past the abandoned harp.

Father: Wenns brennt möcht ich dabei sein. Wo sind meine Schuhe? Wo sind meine Schuhe? Wo sind meine Schuhe? Meine Schuhe?

Goldfinger's father wanders around the room.

Father: Zwölf Jahre has es nicht gebrannt. Zwölf Jahre. Und meine Schuh sind fort. Meine Schuh sind weg.

Goldfinger's father laughs.

Shot 215 [565f. 24s. I.N. MLS]

Same as 208. Only Hias, Paulin, and the goose remain. Hias and the goose remain where they were before, Hias still staring straight ahead. Paulin is standing on the ground, putting her clothes back on.

Hias: Die Leut richten sich ein, als obs nicht mehr weg wollten von derer Welt. Aber über Nacht geht das große Weltabräumen los.

Shot 216 [2008f. 84s. I.N. MCU]

Hias, face to camera, staring straight ahead.

Hias: Da kommt vorn Morgen her ein großer Vogel und schießt ins Meer. Das Meer wird haushoch und kocht. Die Erde wackelt und eine große Insel geht halbert unter. Die große Stadt mit dem eisernen Turm steht im Feuer. Aber das Feuer haben die eignen Leut gelegt. Und die Stadt wird dem Erdboden gleichgemacht. In Italien werden die geistlichen Herrn umgebracht und die Kirchen stürzen ein. Der Pabst sitzt in einer Zelle. Auf der Flucht weiht er eine

Ziege zum Bischof. Die Leute hungern. Die drei Tage Finsternis kommen immer näher. Dort wo der schwarze Kastl hinfällt, entsteht ein grüner und ein gelber Staub. Das Wetter wird sich ändern. Wein wird bei uns angebaut und ein Obst gibts, das ich nicht kenn.

Shot 217 [249f.10s. I.N.MS]

Same as 210. The musician, too, has left. Sound of footsteps as Adalbert enters and looks around.

Adalbert: Ludmilla!

Shot 218 [261f.11s I.N.MCU]

Continuation of 216.

Hias. Die Ludmilla liegt tot im Kontor des Herrn Und der Harfen Toni spielt ihr auf der Harfen ein Lied nach dem andern vor.

Shot 219 [324f.14s. I.N.MS]

Continuation of 217. Sound of footsteps as Adalbert turns around and leaves.

Adalbert: Ludmilla!

Shot 220 [525f.22s. I.N.MCU]

The goose, face to camera, standing amid scattered playing cards. It waddles to the right, its movement followed by the camera.

Shot 221 [1310f.55s. I.N.MS]

Similar to 219. The cardplayer reenters, still staring straight ahead and holding the five cards in his left hand. As he resumes his seat, Hias moves toward the door, putting on his coat. Before he reaches the door, some of the patrons return and block his path. Sound of voices.

Patron: Dableiben! Da ist der Hias, der uns das Unglück angewunschen hat!

Hias: Ja ich habs bloß vorausgesehn.

The patrons grab Hias as he tries to push his way out.

First Workman: Der hat Teufelsaugen! Der hatn bösen Blick!

Reißt ihm d'Augen aus!

Shouting and pummeling him with their fists, the patrons drag Hias to the ground, then lift him up and carry him out. The cardplayer remains seated, staring straight ahead and holding the five cards in his left hand.

Shot 222 [364f. 15s. I.D. MCU]

The Prison. Hias, back to camera, is looking out a small barred window. Sound of footsteps as he turns around and walks off to the right.

Shot 223 [1089f. 45s. I.D. LS]

On the left: a window at eye-level, below which sits Goldfinger, his wrists chained to the wall. On the right: a window at eye-level; Hias, back to camera, stands before the window, looking out.

Hias: Ich seh nichts mehr.

Hias turns around.

Hias: Es isso dunkel. Ich muß wieder was sehn.

Hias walks over to the window on the left and looks out.

Hias: Ich muß in den Wald. Ich muß in den Wald.

Sound of footsteps as Hias turns to face Goldfinger, turns back to the window briefly, then wanders over to the window on the right. He looks out briefly, then wanders back over to Goldfinger.

Hias: Ich will den Wald wieder sehn.

Shot 224 [354f. 15s. I.D. MS]

Goldfinger, face to camera, from above. He is looking upward.

Goldfinger: Und Menschen willst du keine sehn. Du gefällst mir.

Goldfinger closes his eyes.

Goldfinger: Du hast ein Herz aus Glas.

Goldfinger opens his eyes.

Shot 225 [742f. 31s. E.D. LS]

The Forest. The ground is covered with a shallow layer of snow. In the distance: Hias, walking uphill, approaching the camera. Sound of approaching footsteps. As Hias passes to the left of the camera, the camera turns to follow him. Music (similar to 081) fades in.

Shot 226 [1325f. 55s. E.D. LS]

Hias, climbing a snow-covered slope, approaching the camera. Music continues. Sound of approaching footsteps. As Hias passes to the right of the camera, the camera turns to follow him up the hill. Music fades out. Sound of running water.

Shot 227 [750f. 31s. E.D. LS]

Sound of running water continues in the background. Sound of footsteps as Hias, back to camera, approaches a small cave set into the slope. He crawls into the cave on his hands and knees. Suddenly, he backs out and gets up. He wraps the bottom of his coat around his left arm, holding the latter up as if to ward off a wild animal. Sounds of a struggle as he staggers backward until he bumps against a tree. With his right hand he jabs at something, then falls back toward the snow.

Shot 228 [841f. 35s. E.D. MLS]

Sounds of a struggle continue as Hias, falling face down onto the snow, rolls down the slope onto his back, struggling with something. He rolls onto his stomach, onto his back; the knife in his right hand is clearly visible. He jabs at something with the knife, then rolls onto all fours and jabs the ground repeatedly with the knife. Sounds of a struggle cease as Hias finally sits back, relaxing.

Hias: Sol Und jetzt ein Bärnbraten.

Hias gasps for breath. The camera has moved ever closer and followed the action carefully. Hias wipes his brow with his right sleeve, then puts the knife back into its pocket on the right thigh of his leather pants.

Shot 229 [277f. 12s. E.D. CU]

A small, crackling fire amid the snow.

Shot 230 [631f.26s.E.D.MLS]

Hias, face to camera, sitting on a small rock in the snow, staring beyorid the small fire in front of him.

Hias: Auf d'Nacht schaut einer übern Wald und sieht kein einziges Licht. Wenn er im Zwielight eine Wacholderstauden stehn sieht, dann rennt er drauf zu, um zu sehn, obs nicht ein Mensch ist, so wenig gibts nur noch. Im Wald krähen die Gockel, aber die Leut sind hin.

Shot 231 [299f.12s.E.D.CU]

Some glowing embers.

Hias: Mir fällt wieder was ein. Ich seh es wieder.

Shot 232 [799f.33s.E.D.MS]

Same as 230, but much closer, such that the fire is no longer visible.

Hias: Ein Fuhrmann hält an und steigt von der Kutsche. Er klopft mit dem Peitschestiel auf den Boden und sagt, "Hier hat einmal die Straubinger Stadt gestanden." Und jetzt seh ich die Felseninsel wieder. Ich seh jetzt ganz deutlich.

Shot 233 [715f.30s.E.D.XLS]

Aerial view of two rocky islands. The camera circles the larger of the two islands in a wide arc. Seagull cries in the background.

Hias: Da liegt eine Felseninsel weit draußen im Meer und eine kleinere zweite. Sie liegen am letzten Rand der bewohnten Welt. Auf der einen Insel leben seit Jahrhunderten schon ein paar wenige vergessene Menschen. Und weil sie so am letzten Rand der bewohnten Welt wohnen, ist bis zu ihnen

Shot 234 [344f.14s.E.D.XLS]

Similar to 233, but closer. Only the larger of the two islands is visible; it is green in places. Seagull cries continue in the background.

Hias: noch nicht die Kunde vorgedrungen, daß die Erde rund ist. Bei ihnen hat sich noch immer der Glaube gehalten, daß die Erde flach ist, und daß der Ozean weit draußen in einem gähnenden Abgrund endet.

Shot 235 [139f. 6s. E. D. MCU]

Foreground: the first islander, face to camera, a bearded man, dressed in a flowing black cape, standing on some high point on the large island; he is staring far beyond the camera, his hair buffeted by the wind. Background: over the first islander's right shoulder, the small island is visible. Seagull cries continue.

Shot 236 [127f. 5s. E. D. MS]

The first islander, back to camera, seen from above. Far below him, the sea. Seagull cries continue in the background.

Hias: Ich seh einen Mann auf einer Klippe des Felsens.

Shot 237 [936f. 39s. E. D. XLS]

Aerial view of the first islander as the camera circles the large island. Seagull cries continue in the background.

Hias: Jahre lang steht er einsam und starrt übers Meer, Tag für Tag, immer am gleichen Platz. Er ist der erste, der zweifelt.

Seagull cries fade into the foreground.

Shot 238 [334f. 14s. E. D. XLS]

Same as 237, but slightly closer. Seagull cries continue.

Shot 239 [373f. 16s. E. D. LS]

Same as 236. Three other islanders have joined the first. All are staring out to sea. Seagull cries continue, then fade into the background.

Hias: Dann, nach Jahren, gesellen sich drei weitere Männer hinzu. Viele Jahre lang starren sie von der Klippe aus gemeinsam aufs Meer.

Shot 240 [276f. 12s. E. D. MS]

The four islanders, face to camera, staring far beyond the camera. (The second islander can be recognized as the cardplayer.) Seagull cries continue in the background, then fade out.

Hias: Ja und dann eines Tages entschließen sie sich, das Letzte

zu wagen. Sie wolln zur Grenze der Welt, um zu sehn, ob da wirklich ein Abgrund ist.

Shot 241 [1390f.58s. E.D.LS]

The four islanders, face to camera, from above, as in 240. Behind them several others have gathered. In the distance: the small island. Instrumental plucked music begins.

Hias: Zu ihrem Abschied spielen Musikanten.

Vocalist begins to sing plaintively.

Shot 242 [188f.8s. E.D.MS]

Two women, face to camera, all dressed in black. The one on the left is standing on higher ground, her hands by her side. The one on the right is standing on lower ground, hands raised, palms inward. Both are gazing far beyond the camera. Between them, in the distance: the small island. (The woman on the right can be recognized as Anamirl.) Instrumental plucked music and vocalist continue.

Shot 243 [637f.27s. E.D.MS]

From the stern of a medium-sized rowboat, the camera watches the four islanders, face to camera, rowing, each holding a single oar. Instrumental string music.

Hias: Ja und dann brechen sie auf, pathetisch und sinnlos, in einem viel zu kleinen Boot.

Shot 244 [329f.14s. E.D.XLS]

Aerial view of the large island. The camera is stationary. Instrumental string music continues and vocalist sings plaintively.

Shot 245 [353f.15s. E.D.LS]

Cliff covered with seagulls. Instrumental string music continues.

Shot 246 [136f.6s. E.D.LS]

Similar to 245, but looking upward toward the peak of the cliff. Instrumental string music continues.

Shot 247 [320f.13s. E.D.LS]

The white sky from below. Sea gulls circling. Instrumental string music continues.

Shot 248 [2453f. 102s. E. D. XLS]

The boat with the four islanders, face to camera, from a great distance. The boat bobs up and down with the swells, almost disappearing. Instrumental string music continues. Instrumental plucked music begins. Vocalist begins to sing plaintively. After a while, the camera slowly tilts upward to a shot similar to 247. The following words appear:

Es mochte Ihnen wie ein Zeichen
von Hoffnung erscheinen, daß Ihnen
die Vögel aufs offene Meer hinaus folgten

The words disappear. The white sky fades to blue.

Shot 249:

Instrumental plucked and string music and vocalist continue, then cease. Credits against a blue background:

Darsteller
Stefan Güttler
Clemens Scheitz
Volker Prectel
Sonja Skiba
Brunhilde Klöckner

Wolf Albrecht
Thomas Binkley
Janos Fischer
Wilhelm Friedrich
Edith Gratz
Alois Hruschka
Egmont Hugel
Sterling Jones
Karl Kaufman
Helmut Kossick
Helmut Krüger
Wolfram Kunkel
Werner Lerderle
Richard Levitt
Sepp Müller
Amad Ibn Ghassem Nadij
Agnes Nuissl
Andrea von Ramm

Bernhard Schabel
Walter Schwarzmeier
Friedrich Steinhauer
Arno Vahrenwald
Detlev Weiler
Siegfried Wolf
Karl Yblagger

Produktionsleitung
Walter Saxer

Prod. Sekretärin
Anja Schmidt-Zähringer

Aufnahmeleitung
Joschi Arpa

Ton
Haymo Henry Heyder
Peter van Anft

Kameraassistent
Michael Gast

Beleuchtung
Alfred Huch

Standphotos
Gunther Freyse

Script
Regine Krejci

Kostüme
Gisela Storch
Ann Poppel

Ausstattung
Henning von Gierke
Cornelius Siegel

Schnittassistentin
Angelika Dreis

Mitarbeiter
Dr. Claude Chiarini
Ina Fritsche
Alan Greenberg
Patrick Leray
Schötze-Chörli Stein AR

Glashütte Eisch, Frauenau

Werner Herzog
Filmproduktion

Shot 250

Credits against a blue background:

Weltvertrieb
CINÉ-INTERNATIONAL
MÜNCHEN

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