

**PROTECTING OR POLICING CIVILIANS?
UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS AND GLOBAL ORDER
ENFORCEMENT**

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Abstract

This dissertation argues that policing is one of the constitutive elements of the current global order, and that United Nations-led peace operations act as transnational points of cross-fertilization for the creation and transmission of global policing practices. Empirically, it investigates the turn to “police peacekeeping” or “policekeeping” – the increasing role of police in peace operations. It argues that the turn to policekeeping represents more than a change in missions’ composition and the specific tasks that they accomplish: it means that the logic of policing seeps into peacekeeping. Whereas peacekeeping is a response to a situation of *conflict*, which supposes the need to mediate between various sides, policing is a response to a situation of *disorder*, calling for the punishment of lawbreakers. Although the turn to policekeeping has generally been met with enthusiasm in both academic and policy circles, this dissertation questions this optimistic reading and asks: what type of logic is the logic of policing? It argues that policing is characterized by a fundamental tension between the public mission to “serve and protect” and the mandate to enforce not just public order but social order, between inclusion and exclusion. Although policing may indeed protect some, this protection is not extended to those who are deemed to represent a threat to social order.

UN-led peace operations constitute an often overlooked transnational point of cross-fertilization for the creation and transmission of global policing practices. Deployed under a Security Council mandate and staffed by troops from all over the world, peace operations are a meeting point where North-North, North-South, South-North and South-South encounters occur. Not only do intervening countries bring their policing experience to countries of intervention, but the experience generated by international intervention then travels out. Through this circulation of discourses and practices of order enforcement, peace operations co-constitute international, transnational and domestic hierarchies. This understanding of how the fabric of world politics is woven builds on the insights of post-colonialism and global historical sociology, which have developed a view of the international based on co-constitution and relationalism. In particular, the dissertation contributes to uncovering the transnational dynamics that animate the formation and the evolution of the state domestic security apparatus, historically in the metropolises and the colonies, and today in the Global North and in the Global South.

The dissertation develops this theoretical argument through the case of the UN stabilization mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH (2004-2017) in three empirical chapters. The first examines the mission’s treatment of poor marginalized urban populations, demonstrating how these groups went from being “at risk” to being “the risk”, thus justifying robust police-military raids in these communities. The second chapter addresses the mission’s response to public demonstrations, showing how threats to public order were reinterpreted as threats to stability and thus to international peace and security. The last chapter explores how the language of human rights and justice was mobilized to legitimate the reinforcement of the state’s penal chain, and in particular the prison system. Each empirical chapter locates the case of Haiti within the broader field of global policing and demonstrates that what happens in peacekeeping does not stay in peacekeeping.

Résumé

Cette thèse avance l'idée que la police et le maintien de l'ordre sont un des éléments constitutifs de l'ordre mondial contemporain, et que les opérations de paix menées par l'ONU représentent un point de brassage transnational pour la création et la transmission de pratiques policières globales. Au niveau empirique, elle examine le tournant vers le « police peacekeeping » ou « policekeeping » – le rôle croissant de la police dans les opérations de paix. Elle soutient que le tournant vers le policekeeping constitue plus qu'un changement dans la composition des missions et les tâches qu'elles accomplissent : ce tournant implique que la logique policière s'infiltré dans le maintien de la paix. Alors que le maintien de la paix répond à une situation de *conflit*, qui suppose le besoin de médiation entre plusieurs parties, la logique policière répond à une situation de *désordre*, appelant la sanction de ceux qui ont transgressé la loi. Bien que le tournant vers le policekeeping soit généralement vu comme un changement positif par les universitaires et les praticiens, cette thèse remet en cause cette vision optimiste et pose la question : quel type de logique la logique policière représente-elle ? Elle avance que la logique policière est caractérisée par une tension fondamentale entre la mission publique de « protéger et servir » et le mandat de maintenir non seulement l'ordre public mais aussi l'ordre social, entre l'inclusion et l'exclusion. Bien que la police protège certains groupes, cette protection n'est pas étendue à ceux qui sont considérés comme une menace pour l'ordre social.

Les opérations de paix onusiennes représentent un point de brassage transnational pour la création et la transmission de pratiques policières globales qui est souvent ignoré. Déployées sous un mandat du Conseil de Sécurité et formées de troupes venant du monde entier, les opérations de paix sont un espace où ont lieu des rencontres Nord-Nord, Nord-Sud, Sud-Nord et Sud-Sud. Non seulement les États qui interviennent apportent avec eux leur expérience policière, mais l'expérience générée par les interventions internationales se propagent hors de celles-ci. À travers cette circulation de discours et pratiques du maintien de l'ordre, les opérations de paix co-constituent des hiérarchies au niveau international, transnational et national. Cette conceptualisation de la manière dont la politique mondiale est tissée s'appuie sur le post-colonialisme et la sociologie historique globale, qui ont développé une vision de l'international basée sur la co-constitution et le relationalisme. En particulier, cette thèse contribue à l'analyse des dynamiques transnationales qui animent la formation et l'évolution de l'appareil sécuritaire des États, de manière historique dans les colonies et les métropoles, et aujourd'hui dans le Nord et le Sud.

La thèse développe cet argument théorique à travers le cas de la mission de stabilisation des Nations Unies en Haïti, la MINUSTAH (2004-2017), dans trois chapitres empiriques. Le premier examine comment la mission a interagi avec les populations urbaines marginalisées, et démontre que ces groupes originellement vus comme « en danger » sont devenus « le danger ». Le deuxième chapitre se penche sur la réponse que la mission a apporté aux manifestations, et montre que les menaces à l'ordre public ont été réinterprétées comme des menaces à la stabilité et donc à la paix et sécurité internationale. Le dernier chapitre explore comment le langage des droits humains et de la justice a été mobilisé pour légitimer le renforcement de la chaîne pénale en Haïti, et en particulier le système pénitentiaire. Chaque chapitre empirique place le cas d'Haïti au sein du champ plus large de la police au niveau global, et démontre que ce qui se passe dans les opérations de paix ne reste pas dans les opérations de paix.

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Introduction: Global policing and global order

This dissertation argues that policing is one of the constitutive elements of the current global order, and that United Nations-led peace operations play a key role in the creation and transmission of global policing practices. The idea that policing is central to global governance has been advanced by scholars in both International Relations and criminology. In their contribution to Barnett and Duval's seminal edited volume *Power in Global Governance*, Laffey and Weldes (2009, p. 59) argue that "examining mundane practices of policing long ignored within a discipline more attentive to the upper reaches of state power" makes visible "the myriad forms and the astonishing amounts of power that are required for the system to exist at all". In criminology, Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) have shown how policing can be understood as a "synecdoche" of global governance, in the sense that "global policing is integral to global governance in that it is an institutional component of the general world system, which, in turn, it shapes in fundamental ways. Global policing is global governance's most general characteristic; it is what constitutes the global system as a system" (Bowling & Sheptycki, 2011, pp. 185-185).

As this dissertation will show, the order that is constituted by global policing is characterized by hierarchy, rather than anarchy (Lake, 2009; Pouliot, 2016; Zarakol, 2017b), and by the political and socio-economic exclusion of large segments of the population in both the Global North and the Global South (Duffield, 2001, 2007) and the need to control and contain them. UN-led peace operations constitute an often overlooked transnational point of cross-fertilization for the creation and transmission of policing practices, and thus play a constitutive role in the generation of this global order. Deployed under a Security Council mandate and staffed with troops from all over the world, UN-led peace operations are a meeting point where North-North, North-South, South-South and South-North encounters occur. Not only do intervening countries bring their policing experience to countries of intervention, but the experience generated by international intervention then travels out. In other words, what happens in peacekeeping does not stay in peacekeeping.

The role of peace operations as transnational points of cross-fertilization for the creation and transmission of policing practices occurs in the context of a turn to "police peacekeeping" (Greener, 2011, p. 183) or "policekeeping" (Day & Freeman, 2005). The increasing role of police

in peace operations is reflected in the growing size of police contingents, the fact that peace operations are increasingly carrying out policing functions (such as crowd control), and that they routinely engage in “policebuilding” by recruiting, training and supporting local police forces. But the turn to policing represents more than a change in missions’ composition and the specific tasks that they accomplish, it means that the logic of policing seeps into peacekeeping. Whereas peacekeeping is a response to a situation of *conflict*, which supposes the need to mediate between various sides, policing is a response to a situation of *disorder*, calling for law enforcement and the punishment of lawbreakers (Cockayne & Lupel, 2009). Peacekeeping becomes policing in a context where “instigators of violence are often now seen as criminals” (Paddon Rhoads, 2016, p. 2) and where UN forces, rather than mediating between sides, are charged with “stabilizing” situations in which conflict is often ongoing, usually by supporting one side (the host government).

The turn to policekeeping has generally been met with enthusiasm in both academic and policy circles. Policing is often understood to provide a more civilian instrument of intervention, better suited to mandates that increasingly emphasize protection of civilians. Rebuilding of local police forces along democratic, liberal lines is seen as the guarantee of a successful transition towards peace and stability. This dissertation questions this optimistic reading of policekeeping. It asks: what type of logic is the logic of policing? I argue that policing at both the domestic and international levels is characterized by a fundamental tension between the public mission to “serve and protect” and the mandate to enforce not just public order but social order, between inclusion and exclusion. Although policing may indeed protect some, this protection is not extended to those who are deemed to represent a threat to social order. The turn to peacekeeping as policing should be seen as part of a broader trend of increasingly coercive police response to a wide range of social problems. This trend spans domestic societies across the globe and leads to the disproportionate targeting of socio-economically marginalized and racialized populations.

Peace operations and global order

This dissertation argues that peace operations act as transnational points of cross-fertilization for the creation and transmission of policing practices, not only allowing existing discourses and practices to circulate but also generating new experiences of intervention that can travel out. Peace operations do not simply reflect and reproduce an existing culture or order, they are generative of that culture and order. This view stands in contrast with the way peace operations

are usually theorized in IR. Scholars have pointed out that peace operations “fit into – and are reflections of – international politics writ large” and are “products and instruments of the international system” (Paris, 2014, p. 501) and see them as tools used to “convey[...] the preferences of the hegemonic power and its allies” (Pugh, 2004, p. 48). In these analyses, peace operations reflect the existing global order, but they would seem to have very little role in generating it.

I propose a more dynamic understanding of the role that peace operations play in constituting a certain global order. This view shares affinities with recent efforts to bring to the forefront how practices are generative of the agents, objects and structures that constitute world politics. Thus, an edited volume on *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics* (Sending, Pouliot, & Neumann, 2015a) argues that “diplomacy is a socially emergent phenomenon and as such it produces effects of its own on world politics” (Sending, Pouliot, & Neumann, 2015b, p. 17). Similarly, I propose that peace operations are a socially emergent phenomenon that produces effects of its own on world politics. In particular, I am interested in how coercive practices co-constitute domestic and international orders. In his analysis of the transnational origins of military power, Barkawi (2017, p. 75) argues that studying the military outside of the nation-state reveals “the multiple interconnections through which world politics are made, “demonstrating the ways in which various types of coercive practices have been generative of international order” (Go & Lawson, 2017b, p. 30). Thus, “the organization of violence is seen as socially productive, as generative of certain political orders, at home, abroad, and internationally” (Barkawi, 2017, p. 72). Today, peace operations are the second largest military-police deployment in the world, second only to the US international presence.¹ They bring together troops, police officers and civilians from dozens of contributing countries, socializing them into a certain model of intervention. And they leave behind local military and police forces that have trained with UN instructors and operated side by side with UN missions. The scale and transnational nature of this exercise beg the question of how peace operations could *not* be generative of “certain political orders, at home, abroad, and internationally”.

¹ According to the US Department of Defense’s Defense Manpower Data Center, there were over 165,000 military and civilian DoD personnel serving abroad as of March 31, 2019 (https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/rest/download?fileName=DMDC_Website_Location_Report_1903.xlsx&groupName=milRegionCountry, accessed July 18, 2019). As of May 31, 2019, there were 100,945 uniformed and civilian personnel serving in 14 UN peace operations (<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data>, accessed July 18, 2019).

What type of order are they generating? Because of their apparent aspiration to keep and build peace, one might hope that peace operations would not only serve to reorganize local security forces along democratic, liberal lines, but also that they would socialize participating troops and officers along these very same lines (Findlay, 1996). Peace operations would thus be generative of a more peaceful liberal order. Adopting a less optimistic view, this dissertation reveals not only the inherent exclusion and violence that accompanies the construction of such a liberal order, but also the feedback and boomerang effects created when force is deployed in the name of generating liberal order. It shows that peace operations can disinhibit the use of violence in the pursuit of policing goals and create and transmit more aggressive forms of policing. If this does not look like a step towards liberalism, then this should raise serious questions about the nature of the liberal world order.

How is this possible? The role of peace operations in creating and transmitting global policing practices can be understood along a number of axes. First, peace operations are a training ground, generating experience that contributing countries can re-import “back home”. While there is a general assumption that this experience will lead to more peaceful practices, recent experience raises the question of “how far [...] the content of peacekeeping training and operational experience [can] be parlayed into functions of domestic repression and/or counter-insurgency” (Cunliffe, 2017, p. 14). For instance, soldiers returning from peace operations have sometimes been deployed for domestic law enforcement in light of their UN experience. The most well-known case of such a practice, which is studied in this dissertation, is the case of Brazilian troops who had served in Haiti and were deployed for “pacification” purposes in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro (Harig, 2019; Hoelscher & Norheim-Martinsen, 2014; Müller, 2016; Sotomayor, 2014). Recent reports have also revealed that South African troops who had participated in the UN missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Sudan were sent in to support police action against gangs in Cape Town (Pijoos, 2019).

Second, peace operations act as standard setters. Again, while there are expectations that these standards would be more democratic and liberal, in fact rules of engagement in peace operations may disinhibit the use of force for law enforcement at home. It is not particularly controversial to point out that peace operations are increasingly jettisoning the traditional norms of neutrality and impartiality to use force and “take sides” (Paddon Rhoads, 2016), often in support of the host government against challengers. But what if these missions are then taken as a model

for domestic intervention? In the case of Haiti, the robust use of force under Chapter VII “fuelled the military leadership’s demands for similar rules of engagement in GLO [guaranteeing law and order] operations” back in Brazil (Harig, 2019, p. 144). When troops and officers who had participated in robust action against “gangs” in Haiti were deployed back in Brazil, they expected to be able to follow similar rules of engagement, including the possibility of using lethal force against “criminals” deemed to be acting (or intending to act) in a hostile manner (Harig, 2019, p. 149). Thus, “the mission in Haiti has [...] created expectations among troops that can hardly be harmonised with the rule of law in a liberal democracy” (Harig, 2019, p. 146).

Third, UN peace operations are a market that generates demand for certain skills and capacities from troop contributing countries. In other words, peace operations do not only draw on existing capacities and experience, they encourage participating countries to produce them. Thus, in the name of peace operations, the international community (in particular the G7 and the US) has promoted the recruitment and training of paramilitary forces in the Global South. Situated between the police and military, these forces – based on the model of the French *gendarmerie* or Italian *carabinieri* – are seen as particularly adapted to complex environments that fall between armed conflict and post-conflict (Agordzo, 2009; CoESPU, 2005; Dziedzic & Stark, 2006). But there has been little reflection on the role that they might play when they are redeployed back home, in a context where police paramilitarization is generally understood to deteriorate the relationship between police and communities and increase the likelihood of human rights abuses (Hill, Beger, & Zanetti, 2007; Wiatrowski, Pino, & Pritchard, 2008).

The global field of policing

The idea of peace operations as transnational points of cross-fertilization for the creation and transmission of policing practices fits with approaches that emphasize multidirectional circulation rather than top-down diffusion (Hönke & Müller, 2016b). It explains isomorphism not through the global diffusion of Western cultural norms in a “world society” (Finnemore, 1996; Meyer, 1999b), but through a more processual and relational ontology. Processual in the sense that it does not assume that an already fully constituted model is seamlessly exported to new contexts, but is attentive to how models are in fact always in flux and change as they circulate. Relational in the sense that it is interested in how these models are co-constituted during encounters, rather than passed on from one actor to another.

In a context where the majority of IR remains characterized by a substantialist ontology (Adler-Nissen, 2015) – the idea that “entities precede interaction, or that entities are already entities before they enter into social relations with other entities” (P. T. Jackson & Nexon, 1999, p. 293) – this understanding of how the fabric of world politics is woven shares affinities with a number of approaches that have emphasized processual relationalism (P. T. Jackson & Nexon, 1999). In particular, the idea that processes of state formation – such as the formation of the state policing apparatus – can only be understood through such a processual relationalism resonates with post-colonial approaches in IR and recent efforts to advance a “global historical sociology” program (Go & Lawson, 2017a), which develop a view of the international based on co-constitution. Postcolonial approaches in IR stress “the mutually constitutive nature of world politics, the numerous and diverse ways in which the weak and the strong are bound” (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006, p. 345) and adopt a “processual ontology through which international relations of diverse kinds constitute the entities and phenomena that populate world politics” (Barkawi & Laffey, 2002, p. 114). For Barkawi and Laffey (2002, p. 110), the concept of “empire” helps capture this reality, rendering a picture of the international as “a ‘thick’ set of social relations, consisting of social and cultural flows as well as political-military and economic interactions in a context of hierarchy”. This contrasts with the “thinness” of the international in dominant approaches, where the international “becomes a spare space of strategic interaction between ‘pre-existing’ entities” (Barkawi & Laffey, 2002, p. 112).

This “thick” conception of the international as generative of global order, rather than an arena in which already constituted entities interact, is shared by proponents of a global historical sociology program. In their edited volume introducing the approach, Go and Lawson (2017b) argue against both substantialism and methodological nationalism. By methodological nationalism, they mean the idea that “the boundaries of social relations map directly onto the boundaries of the nation-state” and that “nation-states form the natural unit of social scientific analysis” (Go & Lawson, 2017b, p. 4). Contra substantialism and methodological nationalism, they propose a “methodological relationalism” that “urges examination between and across those social spaces that have typically been analytically contained as ‘national,’ reconnecting social relations that have been kept apart” (Go & Lawson, 2017b, p. 27).

A clear point of convergence of both approaches is the process of state formation, and in particular of the state coercive apparatus. In a global historical sociology approach, the state is “an

entity-in-motion that is embedded within, and formed by, wider flows, circuits, and networks” (Go & Lawson, 2017b, p. 14). Post-colonial scholars, on the other hand, have called for “historically informed account of the relations between rule ‘at home’ and ‘abroad’” (Barkawi & Laffey, 2002, p. 122). Bridging the two, Barkawi’s contribution to Go and Lawson’s volume argues that, contra dominant interpretations of military power, armed forces are not “constituted within a sovereign and national state, and projected outwards” (Barkawi, 2017, p. 58). Rather, he demonstrates that “the coercive power of states has always had transnational dimensions” (Barkawi, 2017, p. 59). While Barkawi studies armed forces, this analysis resonates with a number of studies in history, sociology and political science that have revealed the transnational dynamics that animate the formation and the evolution of the state domestic security apparatus, both in the metropolises and the colonies, in the North and in the South (Barder, 2015; Kuzmarov, 2013; McCoy & Scarano, 2009). In particular, these analyses show how foreign intervention and domestic policing are linked. To paraphrase Barkawi on armed forces, “there are international dimensions to the organization of [police] force in world politics veiled by sovereignty” (Barkawi, 2011, p. 600).

The analysis proposed in this dissertation contributes to uncovering the social relations that constitute a “thick” international sphere. By bringing policing to the forefront, it deepens our understanding of what makes international relations, opening up the field to a range of questions that are not usually considered to be part of the IR discipline. It reveals how discourses and practices of order maintenance circulate between the domestic and the international and vice-versa, placing the two in a relation of co-constitution.

Policing as more humane?

The 2014 UN policy on police in peacekeeping states that “perhaps the greatest comparative advantage of United Nations policing is that it provides international legitimacy to police development efforts” (UN DPKO/DFS, 2014b, p. 6). This claim encapsulates the belief that police forces are a central and necessary component of peaceful and democratic societies. In addition, the turn to policekeeping is generally seen as a positive development at the UN and beyond, representing a more civilian form of intervention better adapted to complex environments and particularly well suited for the protection of civilians.

But does the world need more police? And does policing actually provide for more humane forms of intervention? This dissertation is skeptical of both claims. Rather than a more civilian

and humane response, it argues that the turn to policekeeping and the focus on policebuilding should be understood as a way of managing political and social conflict in countries of intervention. Peacekeeping as policing turns conflict into disorder and populations engaged in conflict into criminals. To put it differently, peacekeeping as policing manages conflict by delegitimizing and depoliticizing it, suggesting that there is in fact no conflict or antagonism, but just a situation of disorder (Holmqvist, 2014, p. 8). Thus, those who are responsible for “disorder”, because they contest the existing order or seem to represent a threat to it, become criminals. Just like the historical emergence of domestic police forces cannot be solely explained as a response to crime, but must be put in the context of the need to enforce order in changing social arrangements (such as industrialization, urbanization or colonialism), so the rise of peacekeeping as policing cannot be explained simply as a response to the merging of conflict and crime, the “crime-conflict nexus” (de Boer & Bosetti, 2015). Rather, I argue that peacekeeping as policing represents a strategy of order enforcement in a global order that produces exclusion.

But even if policing depoliticizes conflict and “end[s] up characterizing entire populations engaged in conflict as ‘criminals’ that must be repressed by the ‘international community’” (Cockayne & Lupel, 2009, p. 5), is it still not better than armed conflict and military force? Is it not a more humane way of enforcing order? There are a number of issues with this interpretation. First, historically the move from war to policing is not a progressive one. During colonialism, the argument that the colonies presented a situation of disorder and crime rather than one of armed conflict was used to exclude colonial populations from the regulation and protection provided by a nascent International Humanitarian Law. Thus, “the question became one of law maintenance rather than actual armed conflict, and ‘pacification’ the euphemism under which massacres could be carried out with impunity” (Mégret, 2006, pp. 270-271). Second, the discourse of policing obscures the inherent violence that is at stake when enforcing order in the face of political and social conflict. This makes policing seemingly more legitimate than war-fighting, and thus more acceptable. In his book *The Remnants of War*, which argues that contemporary conflicts are policing problems, Mueller ominously notes that “wars may end, but policing never does” (J. E. Mueller, 2004, p. 1 & 22). Third, rather than taming violence, policing may authorize violence against a larger population, in the context where there is a “shift from identifying individuals who have committed criminal acts to criminalising communities” (Holmqvist, 2014, p. 51). If the difference is no longer between “combatants” and “civilians” but between “criminals” and

“innocents”, “at stake is the replacement of the category of civilian, which, as a regulative ideal, is nondiscriminatory with respect to an individual’s political views by a scale of accountability that ranges from guilty to innocent” (Winter, 2011, p. 504).

Mobs and savages

The final issue with the lesser evil argument is that it ignores the global ramifications of peacekeeping as policing. Because peace operations act as training grounds, standard setters and a demand-generating market, the turn to peacekeeping as policing has impacts far beyond the specific locales where peace operations are deployed. This dissertation argues that the experience gained in peace operations can travel back “home” in the countries that intervened, because enforcing order “at home” and managing disorder “abroad” have always been closely linked activities. Under colonialism, not only was the formation of the state security apparatus in the metropolises influenced by the colonial experience, but some metropolitan populations were considered to be similar to colonial populations, and thus to warrant similar techniques of management (Barder, 2015; Netzloff, 2003). There was a “resonance and reverberation between European class politics and colonial racial policies” (Cooper & Stoler, 1997, p. 7). Thus, as the use of tear gas for order maintenance spread after World War I, enthusiastic US officers noted that it could be used “in dealing with mobs as well as with savages”, and could lead to a “diminution of violent social disorders and savage uprising as to amount to their disappearance” (Feigenbaum, 2017, p. 27).

These parallels are not just of historical interest. As Comaroff and Comaroff (2006) argue, the postcolony today is also present in the former metropolises. In the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005, as scenes of people raiding stores for food and other items (“looting” or just trying to survive, depending on whom you asked) were widely broadcast on US channels,

The repeatedly televised scenes, underscored by the slow reaction of the state, left embarrassed Americans gazing upon Louisiana in incredulity, confessing that what came to mind amid the scenes of destitution and violence were familiar pictures of... Africa. Complete with what were quickly called ‘refugees.’ The United States had come face to face with the reality that it, too, looks more than a little postcolonial: that it has its own ‘south’, a racialized world of the poor, excluded and criminalized (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2006, p. 37).

This dissertation argues that global policing generates political orders at home, abroad and internationally that are based on the exclusion and increasingly aggressive policing of often racialized, socio-economically marginalized populations. In other words, global policing works not only to enforce international hierarchies, it also contributes to reproducing domestic ones. Because policing is a global field that encompasses domestic and international intervention, those on the receiving end of intervention domestically and internationally form a transnational community of fate (Fraser, 2005, p. 45), “defined not by a common identity or residing in a shared territory, but by being jointly affected by an issue” (Hänska, 2018, p. 106).

Plan of the dissertation

The dissertation’s first chapter presents a theory of peace operations as generative of hierarchical international, transnational and domestic orders. It argues that peace operations are too often treated as *sui generis*, when in fact they should be understood as an instance of a broader type of social relation, which can be broadly termed the relation between those who govern and those who are governed (Duffield, 2007, p. 233). This socio-structural relation is characterized by hierarchy: international interveners stand in relation to local populations in a way that resembles how those who represent state authority stand in relation to those that are submitted to it. This explains why discourses and practices of intervention can circulate from the domestic to the international and vice and versa.

Chapter 2 addresses peacekeeping as policing. It traces the rise of “policekeeping” and the phenomena that this encompasses, and argues that the turn to policing goes beyond change in the composition of peace operations or the fact that they increasingly carry out specific policing mandates. Rather, the logic of policing reflects a fundamental tension between two concomitant evolutions in peace operations – the growing importance of “protection of civilians” and the turn towards stabilization. The pull between these two imperatives is constitutive of police power, which is characterized by a tension between the public mission “to serve and protect” and a mandate to enforce not just public order but social order, between inclusion and exclusion. The chapter challenges a number of preconceptions about police forces and policing, including the idea that police’s main function is to respond to crime and that police and military emerged as two distinct spheres. I argue that police forces’ mission to “serve and protect” is always interpreted through their mandate to enforce order, and that protection is not granted to some populations that

are deemed to threaten order. The chapter addresses the alternative explanation that peacekeeping as policing is just a logical response to the merging of crime and conflict and shows that this explanation is at best incomplete. Finally, the chapter situates UN peace operations as part of a broader field of global policing. Although this field is hierarchically structured – with a clear division of labour between decision-makers and implementers – it is not defined by a linear diffusion of discourses and practices from the centre to the periphery. Rather, peace operations allow for circulation along North-South, South-North and South-South lines.

Chapter 3 presents the case of the UN stabilization mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH (2004-2017) and justifies the selection of the mission as an entry point for the study of peacekeeping as policing and its place in the global field of policing. It offers historical and political background necessary to understand the context in which the mission was deployed, and shows that the mission's stabilization mandate amounted to taking sides in an ongoing process of contentious statebuilding opposing a small dominant class to a vast impoverished majority. I argue that MINUSTAH is a good entry point in the field of global policing because it not only reflected broader changes in UN peacekeeping, but is also understood as a blueprint for future operations. The chapter also provides a more reflexive account of the choice of Haiti for the dissertation and the difficulties encountered in studying the country, and presents background on the fieldwork experience and the interviews conducted in Port-au-Prince.

Chapter 4 explores how MINUSTAH disproportionately focused on the poorest neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince as sources of instability. It shows how, under the mission's stabilization mandate, threats to social order were reinterpreted as threats to security, and thus international security, and groups challenging social order were treated as “spoilers” of a non-existent peace process. Thus, from a population in danger to be protected, slum dwellers became a dangerous population to be policed. The chapter demonstrates the parallels between MINUSTAH's strategy and counterinsurgency tactics, revealing how concerns for civilian protection were overridden by the goal of stabilization. It puts MINUSTAH's intervention in a global context, showing how it fits within a trend of militarization of urban marginality. In particular, I explore the synergy between the mission's actions in Haiti and Brazilian military policing of favelas.

Chapter 5 addresses the growing importance of public order policing in UN peace operations and examines how they see protests and responds to them. It shows that, under a

stabilization mandate, protests become part of a spectrum of threats that include terrorism, organized crime and natural disasters, and that UN training emphasizes their potential for danger and violence. In Haiti, MINUSTAH's stabilization mandate led it to see protests as a challenge to its mission to enforce order. The mission developed a conspiracist understanding of protests that depicted them as manipulated threats. Certain practices ensued from this understanding, including an escalated forced model focused on deterring protests through shows of force and containing them by resorting to (para)military force. I argue that the protest policing style developed by MINUSTAH is not only illustrative of UN protest policing but also reverberates through time and space, as UN peace operations create a market for certain skills and tools, help develop them, and socialize troops into them.

Chapter 6 explores the rise of international penal peacebuilding, the idea that reinforcing the prison system is necessary in states that have experienced conflict. Because prison is the end of the policing chain, it makes obvious and magnifies the effects of the logic of policing. The chapter provides an overview of the UN's turn towards international penal peacebuilding, the genealogy of these practices, and how they involve a network of international and non-governmental organizations, states, and lobby groups. It explores the effects of penal peacebuilding in Haiti, in particular the fact that rule of law reform has led to a dramatic increase in prison population, overcrowding and high rates of pre-trial detention. In this context, I contrast the UN discourse on the functions that the prison is supposed to play with the role that it actually plays in Haiti. I show that the promotion of the prison is divorced from its penological functions (such as the punishment and rehabilitation of criminals) and that other justifications, such as the prison humanitarian's function, are shaky. Rather, the prison primarily fulfills a social ordering function that particularly targets marginalized urban populations.

The conclusion recaps some of the payoffs of the theory of peace operations proposed in the dissertation and what it helps uncover about the current global order. It identifies points of connection with other debates in IR that could be further explored in the future, in particular the question of the dynamics of inclusion/exclusion in protection, and discussions on how to make international peace interventions better.

Chapter 1: Beyond the here and now of peace operations

This chapter presents a theory of UN peace operations that is rooted in a processual and relational ontology of world politics. The theory builds on recent insights that remain to be explored in the peace operations literature: the fact that the social relations that characterize peace operations (between interveners and local populations) are similar to other social relations (such as the relation between colonizers and colonized); and the fact that peace operations are not self-contained fields, but allow for the circulation of discourses and practices of intervention in and out of them. It argues that peace operations generate global order by co-constituting international, transnational and domestic hierarchies. This theorization of peace operations builds on studies of imperialism and colonialism that have revealed how practices of managing populations circulated from the metropole to the colonies and vice-versa, and how colonial elites deemed certain metropolitan populations to be similar to colonial ones.

By UN peace operations, I refer to missions authorized by the UN Security Council and staffed through multilateral contributions under the UN umbrella and authority. The shift to the concept of “peace operations” (rather than “peacekeeping” or “peacebuilding”) in policy and academia is a response to the fact that these operations are increasingly deployed in places where there is no peace to keep.² It also reflects their engagement in a wide range of simultaneous activities, ranging from offensive use of force to support for rule of law reform. Indeed, these missions often encompass activities ranging from “peace enforcement” to “peacebuilding” in a context where the idea of consecutive stages of deployment (starting with peace enforcement, moving to peacekeeping, and then to peacebuilding) is increasingly obsolete. This is reflected in the conceptual confusion in both policy and academia, where, as one scholar notes:

Peacebuilding has no proper definition, as the term is shorthand for many different activities conducted in countries and societies riddled by violent conflict, including humanitarian assistance, demilitarization and demobilization, human rights education, police force training, administration, and rights. It is often indistinctively used as synonym for statebuilding, democratization, humanitarian intervention, or peacemaking—peacebuilding’s definition all too often depends on the contexts and actors (Goetze, 2017, p. 1)

² As of January 2019, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was thus renamed the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) (UN General Assembly, 2018).

The first section of the chapter situates my contribution within debates about what a theory of peace operations should do and explores how my approach builds on paths that existing literature opens but leaves under-theorized. In Section II, I propose a theory of peace operations as co-constituting international, transnational and domestic hierarchies that builds on sociological and historical analyses of imperialism and colonialism. I show how peace operations should be understood as an instance of a broader type of social relation, the relation between those who govern and those who are governed. At the same time, these social relations are dynamically co-constituted through the circulation of discourses and practices, in a context where peace operations not only draw on the domestic experience of contributing countries in governing certain populations, they also generate experience that travels out and can be re-imported back home. Thus, peace operations are both made possible by socio-structural hierarchy and (re)produce it. Section III sketches a methodology to match this theory, arguing that peace operations can only be understood by opening the field of inquiry beyond what is happening in peace operations. The research must start by “zooming in” on what goes on in peace operations before “zooming out” to see how they are part of a dynamic web spanning space and time. In Section IV, I address some of the theoretical implications of this theory of peace operations. Most notably, it challenges established concepts in the study of the “international”, and suggests that the major axis of contention in the current global order may not be between states (e.g. the Global North vs. the Global South) but between those who govern and those who are governed across and within states.

I. Theorizing peace operations

1. What should a theory of peace operations look like?

The under-theorization of peace operations has been a subject of lament at least since the early 2000s. As the literature grew exponentially in the 1990s, some argued that it was overly descriptive (Diehl, Daniel, & James, 1998, p. 34) and excessively oriented towards policy relevance (Paris, 2000). The peace operations literature does tend to be animated by the question of “how to make peacekeeping/peacebuilding better?”, even in approaches that identify as critical. For instance, even when scholars interrogate the norms and values of the “liberal peace” paradigm, it is often to try to find better ways of building peace (Mac Ginty, 2008, 2011; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Newman, Paris, & Richmond, 2009; Richmond, 2010, 2011).

In these debates, a question has often remained implicit: what should a theory of peace operations *do*? For many, the problem-solving nature of much of the peace operations literature does not necessarily represent either a problem or a dearth of theorizing. One way of understanding theorizing in the field of peace operations is as a theory of success and failure, of what works and what does not. One of the earlier works in this vein aimed to build “theoretical explanations across a variety of peacekeeping operations for why and how those operations are successful (or not)” (Diehl, 1993, p. 3). This approach to theory has focused attention on questions of definition – giving birth to (debated) typologies of “generations” or types of peace operations (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2004; Diehl et al., 1998; M. W. Doyle, 2001) – and on criteria for evaluating outcomes (Martin-Brûlé, 2016). One author argues that a (good) theory of peacekeeping must explain at least three puzzles: the onset of the mission, the specific type of operation, and the success of the mission (Bures, 2007, p. 429).

This, however, is only one way of thinking about what a theory of peace operations could look like. Some have argued that peacekeeping should not be studied only on its own merit, but to the extent that it speaks to larger phenomena of international politics (Paris, 2000, pp. 27-28). This has led to call for better linkages between studies of peacekeeping and the broader IR literature, to better relate “peace operations to theories of knowledge and the essence of phenomena that enliven debates in International Relations about the nature of world politics” (Pugh, 2003, p. 104). Paris (2000, p. 28) thus proposes to use peace operations as a “window” onto international politics, to investigate how peace operations “fit into – and are reflections of – international politics writ large” and are “products and instruments of the international system” (Paris, 2014, p. 501). Developing a critical theory of peacekeeping based on Cox’s and Duffield’s work (Robert W. Cox, 1981; Duffield, 2001), Pugh (2004, p. 41) argues that the “received view of peacekeeping in global governance is not neutral but serves the purpose of an existing order”, and that peace operations have “conveyed the preferences of the hegemonic power and its allies, and furthermore identified these values with the UN and the ‘international community’” (Pugh, 2004, p. 48).

This dissertation offers one response to calls for better integrating the study of peace operations into IR theory, but moves away from seeing them (only) as “reflections”, “products and instruments” of the international system. Rather, it proposes that peace operations also constitute and generate global order. This more processual and relational understanding means that, rather than simply mapping the study of peace operations onto IR theory, peace operations become an

entry point to rethink the way the international is conceptualized in vast swathes of IR. As we shall see, not only do they play a constitutive role in making the international, they extend beyond the field of “international relations” narrowly conceived.

Such a theory of peace operations starts from the premise that they are not self-contained but opened onto the rest of the social world. Rather than the here and now of intervention, this emphasizes how peace operations constitute one field imbricated with other fields temporally and spatially, which are linked through a circulation of discourses and practices. As one recent work notes, this “relational web” around peace operations remains “largely unexplored” (Goetze, 2017, p. 23). Before moving on to theory, the next section explores how my approach builds findings in the existing literature that point to the fact that peace operations are not *sui generis*, that they are part of a larger set of fields, and that they are not self-contained phenomena.

2. *Peace operations are not sui generis*

It is clear from reading the peacekeeping literature that peace operations are not unique, that they are *like* other things. This is one of the important findings emerging from a growing literature that “zooms in” on the people who carry out intervention, the local populations they purport to help, and the interaction between them, by incorporating analytical frames and methods from sociology, ethnography and anthropology. This is reflected in a series of “turns” in the field, including the “local turn” (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013), “hybrid turn” (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016), “cultural turn” (Bräuchler, 2018), “ethnographic turn” (Millar, 2018b, p. 658) (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016, p. 5), “‘everyday’ turn” (Mitchell, 2011, p. 1623) and the turn to the “micro-level dimensions of peacekeeping” (Autesserre, 2014a). Though these “turns” encompass diverse approaches, they do converge on the disconnect and conflict between the practices and culture of international interveners and those of local populations. But this literature has not only uncovered the differences between internationals and locals, it has also shown that the relationship between interveners and local populations is similar to others, including the relation between colonizers and colonized, and between groups that represent state authority and those who are submitted to it.

Perhaps the most obvious comparison is with imperialism. Indeed, “discussion of empire in peacekeeping studies is open and frank, even among the staunchest supporters of peacebuilding”, and “there is at least as much ‘mainstream’ literature that makes the comparison

between imperialism and peacekeeping as there is critical literature” (Cunliffe, 2012, pp. 428-429). Roland Paris, once advisor to Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, goes as far as arguing that “the contemporary practice of peacebuilding may be viewed as a modern rendering of the *mission civilisatrice*” (Paris, 2002, p. 368). Similarly, one author notes that “[t]he tasks performed by imperial soldiers in many ways match what is being asked of today’s peacekeepers” (Marten, 2004, p. 17).

Growing interest in the day-to-day practices of international interveners has revealed that there are indeed similarities in attitudes, discourse and interactions. Not only do studies find that populations that undergo intervention complain that peacebuilders are like colonialists, but sociological analyses confirm that they do behave like them. In her study of “peace operations seen from below”, Pouligny (2006, p. 156) finds that “in countries as varied as Somalia, Mozambique and Cambodia, reference to the colonial past was regularly made by local political entrepreneurs in their relations with the United Nations operation”. In her account of “Peaceland”, Autesserre (2014b, p. 100) similarly reports that “in Congo, Sudan, and Timor-Leste, a number of local interviewees stated that the interveners’ behaviour reminded them of what colonialism must have been like”. In Timor, a local peacebuilder “noted how the daily behaviours of his expatriate colleagues were often so humiliating and frustrating that they reminded him of the Portuguese and Indonesian colonizers who had only recently left his country” (Autesserre, 2014b, p. 100).

What makes interveners similar to colonizers? Based on a Bourdieusian analysis of interveners, Goetze (2017, p. 222) concludes that “peacebuilding does, indeed, stand in the tradition of colonialism [...] because it imposes its forms of managing social organizations”. Like colonizers, “foreign interveners ‘know what is best for local people,’” they are always in the leadership ranks, and they “socialize among themselves” (Autesserre, 2014b, p. 202). Autesserre draws the comparison clearly in the conclusion of *Peaceland*, where she argues that:

The issues I note throughout the book are not even limited to international relations in the twenty-first century. Today’s international interveners present a number of similarities with the colonial officials who lived overseas a century ago [...]. In many aspects – the expatriate bubble, the boundaries between foreigners and local people, the politics of knowledge, the ethics of care – my description of Peaceland is reminiscent of the description of colonial society in Edward Said’s *Orientalism* and in classic novels such as E. M. Forster’s *A Passage to India* and J. M. Coetzee’s *Waiting for the Barbarians* (Autesserre, 2014, p. 253).

Although these parallels are acknowledged, the comparison is seldom pushed further. Contemporary peacekeeping efforts are said to differ from past imperial ventures for two reasons: interveners' intentions, and the multilateral nature of peace operations (Cunliffe, 2012). First, it is argued that, although the practices may look similar, the intentions are not the same. For instance, Rubinstein (2010, p. 465) posits that peacekeeping and imperial policing are not distinguished by the activities they undertake "but by the intentions that animate those activities". Indeed, according to another author, forces deployed to maintain order or keep the peace engage in a similar set of tasks regardless of the ideologies and motivations that caused their deployment (Last, 2006). Similarly, Goetze (2017, p. 222) notes that, although peacekeeping may look like colonialism, it does so "not because it would explicitly carry imperial intentions [but] because it imposes its forms of managing social organizations". Although Autesserre's interviewees make reference to colonialism, "she herself systematically declines to take these as serious interpretations" (Sabaratnam, 2017, p. 31). In other words, it is assumed that today's interveners are well-intentioned, animated by the right liberal values and concerned about the well-being of target populations, while 19th century (and earlier) imperialists were not. Alternatively, the multilateralism of peace interventions is supposed to distinguish them from imperial ventures. Surely in an age where UN peace operations emerge from multilateral decision-making and are staffed in great majority by troops from the Global South (e.g. Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India, Nepal), they cannot be considered imperialistic?

Neither of these arguments are particularly convincing in light of the historical record. First, intentions: in his detailed study of Eurocentric thought in IR, Hobson shows that the distinction between historical imperialism and contemporary intervention based on intentions rests on a revisionist understanding of imperialism. It is only by denying that imperialism also professed good intentions that it can be distinguished from today's interventions (Hobson, 2012). The idea of progressive evolutionary change in world politics, which would clearly differentiate the post-1989 liberal interventionism from the "dark and oppressive era" of racist imperialism, "elides or obscures the many continuities that exist" between both eras (Hobson, 2017, p. 104). It does so by overemphasizing the progressiveness of current efforts and downplaying the stated progressive intentions of past ones, when in fact the underlying liberal-imperial normative discourse has not fundamentally changed. Liberal proponents of 19th century imperialism "were entirely sincere" in their beliefs that the civilizing mission would help Eastern societies to progress, and in their

insistence that intervention should not be carried out with the self-interest of intervening powers in mind (Hobson, 2017, pp. 114-115). If the similarity of practices of intervention cannot be dismissed on the basis of diverging intentions, then it must be a topic of investigation.

Second, multilateralism: in fact, during colonial times metropolises frequently made use of troops from colonized states to police their empire, thus leading to a form of “imperial multilateralism” (Cunliffe, 2013). As Sabaratnam (2017, p. 31) notes, “using the presence of African-origin international civilians in peacekeeping missions [...] to disqualify intervention as a setting in which colonial or racist relations might obtain” is to proceed “as if any institution of colonial governance was established only by whites”. What is particularly striking is that today’s UN troops are very often recruited from the same military units that were used by colonial powers (Cunliffe, 2013). Thus, on both counts (intentions and multilateralism) the comparison stands, and cannot be so easily dismissed. Rather, this opens up an important avenue of inquiry that asks how it is possible for the practices of peace operations to be *like* colonial practices.

Imperialism is not the only point of comparison. Studies have also shown how peace operations should be understood as part of the statebuilding process in countries of intervention (Chandler, 2017, Chapter 4), and how there are parallels between international interveners and local state authorities. Thus, one analysis points out that “peacebuilding becomes part of the spectrum of authority, imposing claims on the population. *It engages in the same practices of state-making*” (Iniguez de Heredia, 2017, p. 11, emphasis added). In her study of how people react to UN intervention, Pouligny (2006, p. 251, emphasis added) notes that “people resort to dodging UN personnel as the last resort of the weak against the strong, symbolised by the state *or those considered the same as the state*”. Despite being foreign, international interveners are like ruling elites in the sense that they occupy similar social positions vis-à-vis local populations. Indeed, UN staff members “live in the same districts as the oligarchy”, and “some even marry people belonging to those same groups” (Pouligny, 2006, p. 182). As one scholar argues, the peacebuilding literature should better study the “interventionist class” that “consists of those profiting from intervention, both on the intervened and intervening side” (Kühn, 2019, p. 259).

On the other hand, analyses of interveners reveal how their discourses and practices are similar to those who govern “at home”. Goetze’s sociological analysis of “peacebuilders” clearly shows that they resemble governmental elites in the West. She notes the isomorphism between the field of peacebuilding and those not only of IOs and NGOs but also governmental politics, business

corporations, and scholarly research and consultancies (Goetze, 2017, pp. 105-106). Because “peacebuilding recruits from the same pool as the business world, civil services, and many political circles” (Goetze, 2017, p. 105), and because there is a revolving door between these various fields, the people who govern “at home” in the West and “abroad” in countries that undergo intervention not only share a similar background and similar worldviews, they are sometimes the same.

Even the casual racism of interveners towards local populations is not unique to this situation. This racism is well highlighted in Autesserre’s work, as she shows how interveners “use very different criteria to evaluate ‘normal’ levels of violence depending on their geographical focus” (Autesserre, 2010, p. 255), and tend to consider violence “normal” where they are deployed. But Autesserre (2010, pp. 263-264) also notes that, in an interview, “a Western diplomat sincerely argued that, after a decade of serious fighting, regarding violence toward the Congolese population as normal was just as ‘legitimate’ as judging high levels of shooting in certain large U.S. cities as part of the background there”. Such comparisons made in passing reveal much about how international interveners relate to local populations may not be that different from how governmental elites relate to some populations (in this example, urban, poor and racialized populations) in their own countries.

These comparisons – between peacekeeping and imperialism, between interveners and state authorities – open up two important avenues of inquiry. First, they de-exoticize peace operations by revealing how the dynamics that traverse intervention and the encounter between international, interveners and local populations of intervention are not unique. Second, they bring to the forefront the social positions that structure intervention, rather than the intentions that animate it. How is it possible for international interveners to behave towards local populations the same way that colonizers did, even if we assume that their intentions are different? In the next section, I argue that these parallels point to the fact that peace operations are an instance of a broader type of social relation characterized by hierarchy.

3. Peace operations are not a self-contained field

Peace operations are not *sui generis*, and neither are they self-contained: the discourses and practices that constitute them circulate to and from other fields. In other words, peace operations are not “an isolated, detached activity” (Adler-Nissen, 2015, p. 296). While this insight appears in different forms in the literature, it has not been fully explored.

Perhaps the most intuitive way of conceptualizing peace operations as a field open to the rest of the social world is by highlighting how this outer world influences them. Some observers have underlined that, to understand what peace operations do, inquiry cannot be limited to what is going on in the field. There is a “set of broader contextual factors that have always, whether directly or indirectly, had a critical bearing on the practice of UN peacekeeping”, including “in the first instance, the state of political relations among the members of the Security Council”, as well as “the machinery and workings of the organisation that supports peacekeepers in the field” (Berdal, 2016, p. 4). In the end, these broader factors often lead to a “tendency for operations to be driven by factors extraneous to the conflict itself” (Berdal, 2016, p. 6). Because peace operations are carried out by corporate actors animated by geo- and bureaucratic politics that extend far beyond the here and now of intervention, they cannot be studied on their own terms.

Others have taken the conversation towards a more normative ground. Drawing on world polity theory, Paris (2003, p. 443) argues that the practices of peace operations are constrained by “global culture”: these missions have to “develop and implement strategies that conform with the norms of global culture”. His approach, however, remains at a high level of abstraction (e.g. identifying sovereignty as one of the main norms of global culture) and does not clearly identify how global culture emerges or is reproduced. It is a one-directional, static approach, which assumes that global culture trickles down to peace operations. Paddon Rhoads’ study of the peacekeeping norm of impartiality provides a more dynamic and processual approach. She argues that the norm of impartiality should be studied both “at the macro-level politics surrounding institutionalization” and at the level of “micro-level politics surrounding its implementation”, because “impartiality is a peripatetic norm, relevant from the hallowed halls of UN headquarters in New York to the remote villages where blue helmets deploy” (Paddon Rhoads, 2016, p. 5). Therefore, a multi-level analysis of peacekeeping is required to account for the fact that “the global politics of peacekeeping are not and cannot be separated from the local dimensions of peacekeeping” (Paddon Rhoads, 2016, p. 8).

While the concept of global culture focuses on the circulation of norms from the global level to local peace operations, another strand of the literature has highlighted that norms and practices can travel *out* of peace operations. There is burgeoning interest in the link between participation in peace operations and reverse statebuilding, in other words the fact that when states participate in peace operations it may affect them domestically. One recent work argues that

studying the “feedback effects of peacekeeping on peacekeeper-contributing states is a logical next phase for peacekeeping scholarship” (Cunliffe, 2017, p. 15).

Democratic peace approaches to peace operations have long argued that participation in these missions can “socialize” the armed forces of states from the Global South emerging from military dictatorships, leading to the acquisition of democratic values and a rebalancing of civil-military relations (Findlay, 1996). According to former Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno (writing in 2007), ‘Service with UN peacekeeping ... [exposes] militaries to key international norms and standards including human rights training, gender parity, support for elections and a doctrine of civilian control’ (cited in Cunliffe, 2017, p. 5). Though socialization thus tends to be presented as a positive impact of peace operations, more recent works have argued that troop contributing countries can also be socialized into practices that are not necessarily democracy-enhancing, for instance because they enable repression of domestic opponents. Cunliffe (2017, p. 14) raises the question: “how far can the content of peacekeeping training and operational experience be parlayed into functions of domestic repression and/or counter-insurgency?”

More recent literature thus hints at an important link that remains so far under-theorized: the feedback effects of peace operations on contributing countries, and the potential connection between the management of populations in countries of intervention and the management domestic populations. The next section shows that these issues lie at the heart of the historical processes that underpinned imperialism, and proposes to build on historical and sociological analyses of imperialism to construct a theory of peace operations as constitutive of international, transnational and domestic hierarchies.

II. Peace operations and hierarchical order

1. Learning from the past: the imperial boomerang

As we have seen, the comparison between imperialism and peacekeeping is widespread. It is grounded in empirical similarities in the way international interveners behave and interact with local populations, and this comparison cannot be easily dismissed on the basis of intentions. In this context, the study of imperialism may have something to tell us about peace operations. This section draws on historical and sociological analyses of imperialism and colonialism that have long identified the circulation of discourses and practices of management from the colonies to the

metropole and vice-versa, to show how they can help illuminate the findings highlighted in the section above – that peace operations are not *sui generis*, and that they are not a self-contained field.

The idea that strategies developed in the colonial context could be re-imported back to the metropole was clearly articulated by Foucault in his 1976 lecture “Society must be defended”, where he argued that

While colonization, with its techniques and its political and juridical weapons, obviously transported European models to other continents, it also had a considerable boomerang effect on the mechanisms of power in the West, and on the apparatuses, institutions, and techniques of power. A whole series of colonial models was brought back to the West, and the result was that the West could practice something resembling colonization, or an internal colonialism, on itself (Foucault, 2003, p. 103)

The idea of a “boomerang effect” had gained particular traction in Europe following the end of World War II, with some intellectuals turning to the colonial experience to explain the rise of fascism and genocidal policies. It is quite likely that Foucault borrowed the concept of “boomerang” from Hannah Arendt, who, in *The origins of totalitarianism*, connects the racist bureaucratic practices of colonial administrations with fascism in Europe. As Arendt (1973, p. 221) pointedly notes in her analysis of colonial administration, “lying under anybody's nose were many of the elements which gathered together could create a totalitarian government on the basis of racism”.

These parallels had particular resonance in the context of the fight for decolonization and civil rights. In his *Discourse on Colonialism*, Aimé Césaire (2000, p. 36) argued that Hitler “applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then had been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the ‘coolies’ of India, and the ‘niggers’ of Africa”. Meanwhile, in the US, W.E.B. Du Bois (1965, p. 23) noted that

There was no Nazi atrocity – concentration camps, wholesale maiming and murder, defilement of women or ghastly blasphemy of childhood – which the Christian civilization of Europe had not been practicing against colored folk in all parts of the world in the name of and for the defense of a Superior Race born to rule the world.

These insights are supported by a growing scholarship that emphasizes the co-constitution of political orders in the metropolises and the colonies. Thus, scholars of 19th and early 20th century

imperialism and colonialism have revealed how processes of state formation in the metropole and colonies were intertwined, in particular when it came to the creation of a state security apparatus (Barder, 2015; Kuzmarov, 2013; McCoy, 2009; McCoy & Scarano, 2009). Importantly, these works stress that this process should not be understood as a one way street, with metropolises exporting statebuilding to colonies. Looking at the example of US colonization of the Philippines, McCoy (2009, p. 11) argues that “both modern states were forged after 1898 in the same crucible of colonial conquest that unleashed powerful forces of mutual transformation, particularly in the sub rosa realm of internal security”. The US experience in setting up a police force in the Philippines was highly influential in the creation of its domestic policing capacity (McCoy, 2009). Lending support to the views expressed by Arendt, Césaire and Du Bois, Barder in *Empire Within* establishes a genealogy of concentration camps and barbed wire from the Indian Wars to the Boer War to Europe (Barder, 2015, Chapter 2).

Importantly, circulation between colonies and metropolises was not limited to actual techniques of intervention, but also involved discourses and representations of populations to be governed. Barder (2015, p. 79) identifies “a metaphor that linked colonial and Western peoples. In other words, certain European groups were deemed to be similar to colonial peoples”. Cooper and Stoler (1997, p. 9) similarly highlight the “resonance and reverberation between European class politics and colonial racial policies”. In the heyday of colonialism, policymakers (and authors) openly established comparisons between colonial populations and some populations at home that were deemed to exhibit similar characteristics and therefore to warrant similar strategies of management (Netzloff, 2003). For instance, “in nineteenth-century South Africa or turn-of-the-century East Africa, the British used a vocabulary to describe Africans remarkably like that used at home to describe the lowest elements of the class order, ‘the residuum’, the degraded class of criminals and casual laborers of Victorian cities” (Cooper & Stoler, 1997, p. 27). Again it is important to note that this was a two-way street, involving both the racialization of class representations and the transfer of racial discourses to class politics (Stoler, 2010).

Two related conclusions can be drawn from this literature. First, that colonized populations stood in relation to colonizers in a way that paralleled how certain populations back home stood in relation to those who governed them. Second, that these two social relations – colonizer/colonized, governing/governed – were co-constitutive, characterized by a dynamic circulation of representations and strategies of management from one to the other. This precisely

mirrors the findings highlighted in the previous section – that the relationship between international interveners and local populations is not *sui generis*, and that practices travel in and out of peace operations. These findings, I argue, should lead to a theory of peace operations that focuses on how they co-constitute international, transnational and domestic hierarchies.

2. Peace operations and the co-constitution of international, transnational and domestic hierarchies

The fact that the social relations that characterize peace operations are not unique and that missions are a field open to circulation points to a theory of peace operations that emphasizes both structure and process. On the one hand, the relationship between interveners and local populations is similar to others, including the relation between colonizers and colonized, and between groups that represent state authority and those who are submitted to it. This suggests that these relations should be seen as instances of a type of social relation, characterized by hierarchy, which positions some groups so that they can intervene in the lives of others and structures the interaction between them. On the other hand, the fact that discourses and practices can circulate from one field to another points to the process through which these social structures are (re)produced. In other words, peace operations are both made possible by socio-structural hierarchy and (re)produce it. Here I use the concept of hierarchy broadly, to refer to a “system through which actors are organised into vertical relations of super- and subordination” (Zarakol, 2017a, p. 1), without presuming that this system is legitimate and based on authority (more on this issue in the chapter’s conclusion).

Structure: The social structure in which peace operations exist is characterized by overlapping hierarchies at the international, transnational and domestic levels. As others have shown, at the international level peace operations are based on multiple hierarchies between states that possess decision-making powers, states that provide troops, and states that are intervened upon (Cunliffe, 2009). In this dissertation, I am particularly interested in drawing out how these international hierarchies between states co-exist with and are impacted by transnational and domestic hierarchies. To put it simply, the idea that some states (those which intervene) are dominant while others (those which are intervened upon) are subordinate obscures the extent to which populations within these states may experience the effects of international hierarchy quite differently depending on where they stand in transnational and domestic hierarchies.

While it occurs in a context of international hierarchy, the transnational relationship between international interveners and the population in the intervened upon state is impacted by domestic hierarchies. Thus, as we have seen in the discussion of recent findings in the peace operations literature, international interveners tend to interact mostly with local ruling elites, and are seen by the local population as forming part of the spectrum of state authority. Both international interveners and ruling elites relate to the local population on hierarchical terms. There is a homology, “a correspondence in type and structure” (Owens, 2015, p. 11), between transnational and domestic hierarchies: international interveners stand in relation to local populations in a way that resembles how those who represent state authority stand in relation to those that are submitted to it. This explains some of the findings of the peace operations literature highlighted above – such as the fact that local populations see international interveners as similar to state authorities – and the historical equivalence between certain metropolitan and colonial populations. Furthermore, the effects of international hierarchy are refracted through domestic hierarchies not only in states that are intervened upon, but also in states that intervene. As we have seen in the discussion of the imperial boomerang, colonial elites saw some segments of their own society as akin to colonial populations and deserving of the same techniques of control and management. For these populations, international colonial hierarchy coincided with domestic hierarchies that placed them in a subordinate position.

Analysis of international hierarchy must thus be complemented by an understanding of how it is refracted through transnational and domestic hierarchies. I propose to define these hierarchies schematically, as the relation between those who govern and those who are governed. Both the transnational relationship between international interveners and local populations and the domestic relationship between those who represent state authority and those that are submitted to it can be understood as an instance of this broader type of relationship. This observation was the basis for Duffield’s call for a “solidarity of the governed” in his book *Development, security and unending war: Governing the world of peoples* (2007). Duffield argues that global neoliberalism produces alienating effects across societies, and that therefore:

While difference is acknowledged, *it is the similarities that are important*. [...] Distant struggles are common points of departure that collectively problematize the overarching, anti-democratic and marginalizing effects of global neoliberalism, whether as struggles against hospital closures in mass consumer society or the ruination of pastoralist livelihoods beyond its borders (Duffield, 2007, p. 233, emphasis in original).

In other words, and to use the concepts developed by Iris Marion Young, the social positions that these groups occupy in relation to each other are similar. According to Young,

When we consider members of society in terms of social positions, we are less concerned with their individualized preferences, abilities, and attributes, and more concerned with the relations in which they stand to other persons. Sociologically, these relations position people prior to their interactions, and condition expectations and possibilities of interaction (Young, 2011, p. 57).

This may seem like a rather obvious observation, but the social positions that characterize international intervention involve one group of people coming into another group of people's country to keep and build peace, and this relationship is not about to be reversed. The situation is similar in domestic contexts of low social mobility, where the positions of “governed” and “governing” are not easily reversible.³ In other words, socio-structural processes position some groups in a way that enable some to govern and others to be governed, be it at home or abroad. They create social positions marked by hierarchy.⁴

Thus, the international hierarchy between states that intervene and states that are intervened upon is refracted through these transnational and domestic hierarchies. Those who govern in intervened upon states may be standing in a subordinate international position compared with international interveners, but both these groups dominate those who are being governed in intervened upon states, and they may find common ground in the process of governing – remember the idea of the “interventionist class” that “consists of those profiting from intervention, both on the intervened and intervening side” (Kühn, 2019, p. 259). Meanwhile, the international hierarchy between intervening and intervened upon states does not necessarily translate into a dominant position for those who are governed in intervening states. This understanding of how international, transnational and domestic hierarchies interact echoes works on colonial history that have emphasized “structural injustices that cut across the colonizer–colonized divide” (Lu, 2017, p. 135). In her analysis of the World War II Japanese “comfort” system that forced women from Japan-occupied territories (including China, Korea and the Philippines) into sexual slavery, Lu shows that these women, who tended to be poor, rural, and working-class, were often recruited

³ See e.g. the 2018 report of the OECD on “A Broken Social Elevator?”

⁴ Young would see this not just as a question of hierarchy, but as one of justice. This question is addressed below.

(deceptively and forcibly) by officials and entrepreneurs from their own country (Lu, 2017, p. 132). Indeed, some colonized groups, including state officials and local elites, benefited from the comfort system. In this context, “being a victim of colonial domination does not translate into equality of domination with all other members of the colonized society” (Lu, 2017, p. 130). Conversely, lower-class Japanese women were also recruited in the system, demonstrating that certain segments of the colonial society could be on the receiving end of colonial domination. Similarly, I argue that being a subject of international intervention does not translate into equality with all members of the intervened upon state, and that belonging to the intervening society does not necessarily translate into a superordinate position.

Process: The idea that peace operations are characterized by socio-structural hierarchies at the international, transnational and domestic levels, however, provides for a rather static picture. This is where the second insight – that discourses and practices circulate – is important. As the scholarship on imperialism and colonialism highlighted above argues, this circulation meant that the relationship between colonizer and colonized was reinterpreted through class politics at home, and that class relations at home were reinterpreted through the colonial experience. In other words, these social relations were dynamically co-constituted through the circulation of discourses and practices. The same process is at play in peace operations. Peace operations not only draw on the domestic experience of contributing countries, they also generate experience that travels out and can be re-imported back home. Thus, the relationship between international interveners and local populations and the relationship between those who govern and those who are governed at home are co-constituted through peace operations.⁵

In this analysis, hierarchy is both what makes peace operations possible and what they contribute to constituting. In other words, “there is no ‘time zero’ (t0) in hierarchy” (Pouliot, 2016, p. 266). While this may *a priori* seem contradictory, it echoes the classical insight of constructivist IR and constructionist social theory more generally, that structure is both medium and outcome (Giddens, 1979, p. 69; Wendt, 1987). Approaches that focus on the constitutive and generative nature of social processes do not oppose these to structure. Thus, Global Historical Sociology

⁵ The “process” here refers to the practices (discursive and material) that make up peace operations. Although this approach share some affinities with practice theory as it has developed in IR – notably a structurationist ontology – my analysis does not follow Bourdieu-inspired practice theory and his conceptual apparatus, including habitus, background knowledge and so on. Rather, I use “practice” in a much more layman way, simply to designate what people do, what they say they are doing and why they say they do it.

(GHS) does not reject the idea of “structure” or “system”, but argues that “these structures are not prepackaged with certain ingredients – they are not ‘ready to cook.’ Rather, social forms are historically constituted” (Go & Lawson, 2017b, p. 23). A social structure is “a pattern of interactions that has been routinized and institutionalized” (Go & Lawson, 2017b, p. 23). ‘Things’ (like states) may appear as structures, but they can (and should) be denaturalized, as “the danger lies in naturalizing in our analyses what is constructed in practice (Go & Lawson, 2017b, p. 3). Attending to how these things were co-constituted through social relations with other things (for instance, how state formation in the metropole was bound up with the colonial experience) is a way of doing just that. This dissertation’s modest contribution to the process-structure (or agent-structure) debate is to investigate one way in which patterns of interaction become “routinized and institutionalized” (Go & Lawson, 2017b, p. 23) through transnational co-constitution, an approach that shares ontological and methodological sympathies with GHS and post-colonialism in IR.

III. Studying peace operations

1. “Zooming in” and “zooming out”

How do we go about studying peace operations if we believe that they co-constitute international, transnational and domestic hierarchies? For Wendt, a structurationist ontology – attentive to the co-constitution of agent and structure – involves two types of explanations. On the one hand,

Structural explanations reveal the conditions of existence or ‘rules of the game’ of social action. In this sense structural theory is necessarily ‘critical,’ since it forces us to look beyond given appearances to the underlying social relationships that generate (in a possibilistic sense) phenomenal forms (Wendt, 1987, p. 363).

On the other hand, there is a need for “historical analysis to trace the causally significant sequence of choices and interactions which lead to particular events (and to the reproduction of social structures)” (Wendt, 1987, p. 364). Both types of explanations are necessary given that “the respective explanatory roles of agents and social structures cannot be understood apart from their interrelationship” (Wendt, 1987, p. 365). Although I may use a slightly different vocabulary, my claim that peace operations are an instance of a certain social configuration and that this social configuration is (re)produced through the circulation of discourses and practices is entirely consistent with this way of understanding and studying the world.

What Wendt did not explicitly address, however, is the need for relational explanation. Indeed, Wendt has been criticized precisely for reifying the state (Guzzini & Leander, 2001), thus missing the opportunity to deliver on one of constructivism's promises, "to restore a focus on process and practice in international politics" (Weber, 2005, p. 86). Wendt's reification of the state stands in contrast with post-colonial approaches that have emphasized the transnational social relations that constitute "the state" (Barkawi & Laffey, 2002). Contra reification, GHS proposes a "methodological relationalism" that "attends to interstitial interactions and the constitutive relations between "inside" and "outside" through which entities take on their appearances" (Go & Lawson, 2017b, p. 28). At its most basic, relationalism is "the seeing together [...] of what before had been seen in separation" (Dewey & Bentley, 1949, p. 112).

To recapitulate, then, the explanation must be at once sociological, historical and relational. It must start by "zooming in" on what goes on in peace operations before "zooming out" to see how they are part of a dynamic web spanning space and time. In other words, peace operations can only be understood by opening the field of inquiry beyond what is happening in peace operations. Looking at it from the reverse direction, this means that studying peace operations should be about developing a situated understanding of global patterns (Ferguson, 2006, pp. 25-49). Such an approach must start with the practices of peace operations as an entry point, but cannot stop at the here and now of intervention.

The idea of "zooming in" on the concrete everyday experience of peace operations as a starting point builds on the turns to the "local", the "micro" and the "everyday" and their important insight that we cannot understand these missions just by looking at how they are designed and conceptualized (Autesserre, 2014a, 2014b; Goetze & de Guevara, 2014; Higate & Henry, 2009; Mitchell, 2011; Pouligny, 2006). At the same time, treating the everyday lives of these missions as if they were *sui generis* and self-contained seems to miss important aspects. To give a concrete example, there is no doubt that the militarization of policing in UN peace operations that I explore in this dissertation can be studied on its own terms, by looking at peace operations' mandates and how they are interpreted and enacted on the ground, the type of troops contributed, and so on. But it would seem strange to stop there at a time when it is clear that the turn towards more militarized policing is a global trend occurring within many societies. While Leander (2008, p. 21) notes that we should not "assume that links between a field and other fields deprive the field studied of its own logic", I would argue that studying this logic in isolation would provide for a very truncated

understanding of what is at stake. It is not so easy to “draw the line between the field and practices that are central and those shaping them from elsewhere” (Leander, 2008, p. 21).

The moment of “zooming in” draws attention to the practices of interveners (both material and discursive) and the relation between interveners and local populations. Questions that pertain to this moment include: How do interveners understand and present the problem to be addressed? What practices do they deploy? How are these justified and legitimized? This must then be followed by a moment of “zooming out” that situates the social relations uncovered within broader patterns of global hierarchy. It asks not only what type of social relations these are, but also how they are co-constituted through the circulation of discourses and practices. Questions that pertain to this moment of “zooming out” include: What are the conditions of possibility for these practices? What is their genesis?

2. *Methodological issues*

In advocating for a theory of peace operations that sees them as open to the rest of the social world, I raise one obvious question: Where do I start? Where do I draw the boundary? How do I know which aspects of the social world to look for? Clearly a theory of peace operations cannot be a theory of everything. In Chapter 3, I explain why Haiti and the UN mission in the country, MINUSTAH (2004-2017) constitute a good entry point into the subject matter. This does not mean that Haiti is the only entry point, simply that if you start from an ontology of the social world that emphasizes recursive co-constitution and global circulation you have to start *somewhere*, in a given place at a given time and with a given set of practices. From there you can travel backward and forward in time and move around spatially, to investigate how these practices “have a specific institutional genealogy, a gestational continuity” that can be traced in “personnel, policies, and precedents” (McCoy, 2009, p. 18) and circulate across space and time. If you start from a relational, processual ontology, the idea that the thing you are interested in studying can only be understood through this spatial and temporal widening is not a problem to be solved but precisely what needs to be investigated.

This approach bears similarities to the post-structuralist idea of intertextuality. In her seminal contribution on discourse analysis and foreign policy, Hansen (2006, p. 55) argues that “the meaning of a text is [...] never fully given by the text itself but is always a product of other readings and interpretation”. Therefore, she proposes to study the identity articulated in official

foreign policy discourse by widening the field of inquiry – to opposition discourse, wider cultural representations, and marginal political discourses. My object of study is not identity but practices, but Hansen’s understanding of how the meaning of a text is constructed shares many similarities with my understanding of how practices are constituted through circulation.

Methodologically, this presents some obvious drawbacks in terms of the tension between depth and breadth. In this study, I do not pretend to conduct in-depth ethnographic work of UN practices of intervention in Haiti. Similarly, I do not pretend to have given equal weight to studying MINUSTAH’s practices and, for instance, the practices of militarized urban policing in Rio’s favelas with which they share many links. As with every methodology, choices and sacrifices were made. My ontological wager about the nature of peace operations means that, to understand the turn to “policekeeping”, I have spent less time trying to recover the subjective meanings and habitus of actors, and more time developing a contextualized sociological and historical understanding of policing. This also means that research has taken me into directions that would perhaps appear strange to someone who understands peacekeeping as a more self-contained field. Reading widely about the history of police forces, about the role of the police in (re)producing social order in contemporary societies, or about changing ways of thinking of and addressing “crime”, might seem like a very roundabout way of understanding peace operations (Fassin, 2013, 2014; Garland, 2001; Haring, 1983; Jobard, 2005, 2008; Kraska, 2007; Kuzmarov, 2013; McCoy, 2009; Neocleous, 2000, 2014; Vitale, 2017). Yet without such a sociological and historical understanding of what policing means, an analysis of policing in peace operations is bound to start with an “incredibly impoverished concept of police power” (Neocleous, 2014, p. 9), and therefore to apprehend only a small fraction of what is at play.

In terms of methods, the research relies principally on interviews and the analysis of primary and secondary textual sources. The broad purpose is to find out: “what are the rules of discourse and action that organize the diverse practices that make up this field?” (Garland, 2001, p. 2). The moment of “zooming in” involved 41 interviews conducted during fieldwork in Port-au-Prince in the period May-July 2017. The fieldwork process and the interviews are examined more thoroughly in Chapter 3. This was followed by a moment of “zooming out”, which relied on 13 interviews in New York in February-March 2018 with UN officials and diplomats, as well as archival research at the UN in November 2018. The interviews in New York were meant to situate MINUSTAH’s experience in Haiti within broader evolutions at the UN. The archived material

consisted of cables exchanged between the mission headquarters in Port-au-Prince and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York between March 2004 and March 2006. These exchanges revealed not only many aspects of MINUSTAH's day-to-day workings, but also how these related to concerns in New York. I was able to access the documents after requesting that they be declassified (UN archives are embargoed for a period of 20 years as a matter of course). Although DPKO agreed to declassify the majority of the documents, this did not include those marked "strictly confidential". In addition to interviews and archival work, the analysis in both Port-au-Prince and New York was completed through UN official documents (including resolutions of the Security Council, reports of the Secretary-General and reports by MINUSTAH), reports by external organizations such as NGOs and think tanks, media reports, YouTube videos posted by MINUSTAH, and existing academic literature.

The research "zoomed out" further by widening the inquiry in time and space to trace the genealogy of discourses and practices, which is less straightforward in terms of methods. Sometimes such tracing is easy, when links are explicitly identified in interviews, internal documents, or in the academic literature. For instance, the circulation of practices of pacification from Haiti to Brazil has been openly discussed both in the media and in scholarly analyses (Harig, 2015, 2019; Müller, 2016; Schuberth, 2019). Thus, it is easy to widen because you know which "personnel, policies, and precedents" (McCoy, 2009, p. 18) to follow. Another smoking gun scenario also helped me in my research for Chapter 5, which investigates the fact that UN peace operations increasingly engage in public order maintenance, including through crowd control. One obvious question I was confronted with was: where does the UN's philosophy of public order maintenance come from? Thankfully, internal UN training documents showed me the way by mentioning explicit references, such as Gustave Le Bon's psychology of crowds. This smoking gun option, however, is not always available. Often, the process is rather more experimental, involving a willingness to cast a wide net so that you can see together what before had been seen in separation, as Dewey and Bentley (1949, p. 112) put it. To put it bluntly, this amounts to saying that we cannot understand peace operations if we only read about peace operations. To mention one small example, it was while reading about the history of Haiti that I realized that armed peasant groups that had resisted the country's occupation by the US in 1915-1934 were labeled as "bandits". To me this presented an obvious parallel with the situation almost a 100 years later, given the UN's focus on "gangs" as a major threat to stabilization. What may seem like an

anecdotal connection allowed me precisely to see together these two things that before had been in separation.

The idea of casting a wide net is hard to systematize, and in many ways it is highly dependent on the researcher (Chapter 3 provides some reflections on the role of autobiography in research). My net may not catch the same things as yours. For this reason, I do not claim to have exhausted the relations of co-constitution that characterize the UN peace operation in Haiti. My claim is that by casting *my* net wide I have illuminated important genealogical aspects of the mission that would have remained obscured by remaining in the here and now of intervention.

IV. Theoretical implications

At the most meta-theoretical level, this work can be read as a contribution to debates on the nature of IR as a discipline. The circulation of practices and discourses of governing between international intervention and domestic intervention provides a concrete case to problematize the traditional inside/outside division (Bigo, 2001; Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004; R. B. J. Walker, 1993) and for a “thick” conception of the international. As proponents of Global Historical Sociology (GHS) argue, “social sites ‘at home’ and ‘over there,’ the ‘foreign’ and the ‘domestic,’ the ‘East’ and the ‘West,’ ‘metropole,’ and ‘colony’ are not easily analytically separable any more than they are empirically discrete” (Go & Lawson, 2017b, p. 4). Post-colonial approaches have long posited that the concept of empire helps to grasp the international as “a ‘thick’ set of social relations, consisting of social and cultural flows as well as political-military and economic interactions in a context of hierarchy” (Barkawi & Laffey, 2002). This work answers Barkawi and Laffey (2002, p. 122) call for “a more historically informed account of the relations between rule ‘at home’ and ‘abroad’”. It clearly questions the extent to which we have moved way from imperial patterns of global order and demonstrates the continued relevance of the post-colonial focus on co-constitution, in a context where the Global North “too, looks more than a little postcolonial” – with “its own ‘south,’ a racialized world of the poor, excluded and criminalized” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2006, p. 37) – and where international intervention is carried out by troops from the Global South.

Such a dynamic understanding of the circulation of practices of intervention also challenges more unidirectional accounts that emphasize how policies and norms diffuse from the North to the South and how the South is socialized into new practices in a top-down manner. As others have

shown, norms can also emerge “from below” in a context where states at the bottom of the international hierarchy use them to try and increase their standing (Towns, 2012). Furthermore, states on the receiving end of diffusion are not simply passive, but reconstruct foreign norms to fit with their priors and identities (Acharya, 2004). My approach here shares affinities with GHS, which situates itself in contrast to analyses of diffusion, such as the world society approach. For Go and Lawson (2017b, p. 29), the difference resides in the fact that the world society’s approach is substantialist – it assumes that there is a stable “thing” with essential characteristics” that diffuses – when GHS is relational. My work contributes to this research program and to a growing scholarship that shows how, in the context of (neo)imperial international relations, practices and discourses circulate through “reverberations” (Barder, 2015) and “cross-fertilization” (Sinclair & Williams, 2007). Rather than diffusion and socialization, this emphasizes the “entanglements” produced by international interventions (Müller, 2015) and how sites of intervention act as “transmission belts” for technologies of war and security (Stockmarr, 2016).

This also has ramifications for how we understand hierarchies in world politics. Highlighting the circulation of discourses and practices of governing populations from the international to the local emphasizes a sometime overlooked axis of tension and struggle. Rather than pitting (dominant) states from the Global North against (subaltern) states from the Global South, it distinguishes between those who are governed and those who govern, showing how peace operations can reinforce the power of some groups over others, not only across, but also within states. Governing groups can benefit even in states that seem to be disadvantaged players in world politics, while governed groups in the most advantaged states find themselves at the receiving end of increasingly harsh instruments of control and coercion. The idea of hierarchies that cut across intervening states and states that are intervened upon provides an original way of conceptualizing hierarchy in international relations. There is now a significant literature that argues that world politics is organized on a hierarchical basis and spans a wide range of theoretical perspectives. One prominent approach is contractual, seeing hierarchy as a mutually beneficial response to problems of governance driven by the rational interests of both the dominant and the subordinate parties (Ikenberry, 2011; Lake, 2009). This conception of hierarchy revolves around the concepts of authority and legitimacy (Hurd, 2008): “hierarchical authority means [...] that some are entitled to command and some are required to obey, and that both sides recognize as legitimate the social logic of this unequal situation” (Hobson & Sharman, 2005, p. 69 & 70). The voluntarist

understanding of hierarchy contrasts with approaches that sees hierarchies as “deep structures of organised inequality that are neither designed nor particularly open to renegotiation” (Zarakol, 2017a, p. 7) and question the extent to which they are based on the consent of the subordinate (Barnett, 2017; Pouliot, 2016, pp. 261-263). In her representational analysis of North-South relations, Doty (1996, p. 3) argues that in “asymmetrical encounters [...] one entity has been able to construct ‘realities’ that were taken seriously and acted upon and the other entity has been denied equal degrees or kinds of agency”. This understanding of hierarchy is close to Young’s definition of structural injustice, which exists

when social processes put large groups of persons under systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities, at the same time that these processes enable others to dominate or to have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising capacities available to them (Young, 2011, p. 52)

My argument that international, transnational and domestic hierarchies are co-constituted contributes to this debate in several ways. In her introduction to an edited volume on *Hierarchies in world politics*, Zarakol (2017a, p. 4) argues that “hierarchy research, if it is to open new paths for IR thinking, needs to first better specify where hierarchies come from, how different hierarchies interact and how actors navigate hierarchies given the particular origin and interactive effects of existing hierarchies”. My approach is based on the idea that multiple hierarchies at various levels are imbricated. Thus, the hierarchy between states (with some states being able to intervene in other states while others are intervened upon) overlaps with hierarchies within states. This means that actors’ positions depend on where they are situated in both international and domestic hierarchies. For instance, depending on their position in domestic hierarchies, actors in intervened upon states can see their subordinate international position as a mutually beneficial arrangement. Governing elites in the Global South may be quite happy to rely on the international community to strengthen and bolster their domestic security apparatus. Those in a subordinate position in domestic hierarchies, however, are likely to hold quite a different view. Thus, consent to international hierarchy may be directly related to where one stands in domestic hierarchies. If this is true, then the voluntarist, contractual understanding of hierarchy and the structural approach are not either/or options, but rather cover a range of different positions within segments of subordinate states. This is one of the takeaways of the idea of “structural injustices that cut across the colonizer–colonized divide” (Lu, 2017, p. 135). As the example of the “comfort women” shows, the effects

of international hierarchy are refracted through domestic hierarchies along class, gender and race lines.

My work also demonstrates that it takes a considerable amount of effort to keep a hierarchical world going, a point that de-emphasizes consent and emphasizes coercion. This is in line with more structural approaches, for which “from the bottom point of view, most hierarchies are neither rational nor legitimate; they are just there, seemingly unmovable” (Pouliot, 2016, p. 262). But while Pouliot’s practice-theoretical approach to hierarchy assumes that “subordinates are forced into reproducing the structure” and thus can “become ‘complicit’ in maintaining the domination pattern” (Pouliot, 2016, p. 262 & 269), I foreground the considerable amount of coercion that is involved in making subordinates stay in line. For Pouliot (2016, p. 264), hierarchy as a social concept is distinct from “brute coercion or domination maintained through force” because “the organizing principles that structure hierarchy in the form of strata are socially constructed and politically generated”. In contrast, I argue that this is not an either/or issue: hierarchy should rather be understood as belonging to a spectrum that includes “brute coercion or domination maintained through force”. This echoes Gramscian conceptions of power, according to which consensual hegemony is always backed by latent coercion. “To the extent that the consensual aspect of power is in the forefront, hegemony prevails,” but “coercion is always latent” even if it is “only applied in marginal deviant cases” (Robert W Cox, 1983, p. 172).

Is hierarchy the same thing as structural injustice? Since I have referred to this concept in several occasions, this warrants some clarification. As mentioned above, a structural understanding of hierarchy based on the idea that the dominant actor can exercise agency while the subordinate actor is denied it is close to Young’s understanding of structural injustice, which position actors in such a way that some can dominate while others are dominated. For Young, this configuration is not just an analytical phenomenon to be filed under the concept of hierarchy, but a normative issue representing a situation of injustice. Indeed, discussions of hierarchy are fundamentally normative, although this is not always openly acknowledged. Thus, the contractual view rests on the implicit assumption that things would be worse without hierarchy, even for the subordinate party, which is what makes hierarchy legitimate. But if we do not start from the assumption that hierarchy is the result of a rational, mutually beneficial agreement between parties, then its legitimacy is open to questioning rather than taken for granted. Examining the case of paternalism in humanitarianism, Barnett (2017) argues that non-consensual hierarchy could be considered legitimate if it operates

for the good of the subordinate party. But such an optimistic understanding relies entirely on the benevolence of the dominant actor, in a context where the subordinate actor has very little room to negotiate the terms of the relationship. It is also based on the tacit assumption that things would be worse for the subordinate without hierarchy. The considerable amount of coercion that it takes to reproduce hierarchies raises the question of how this calculus is made. The bar for legitimation that could justify such coercion is high, and the idea that things would be worse without it provide too vague an argument (Chapter 3 also addresses issues with this counterfactual approach). Rather than seeing hierarchy as *a priori* legitimate, conceptualizing hierarchy as structural injustice makes it *a priori* illegitimate and in need of justification.

The next chapter explores how the logic of policing – which rests on the criminalization of those who are deemed to threaten order, authorizing violence against them in the name of law enforcement – represents one way in which international, transnational and domestic hierarchies are co-constituted.

Chapter 2: Protecting civilians or enforcing order? The rise of peacekeeping as policing

It is not controversial to argue that policing plays an increasingly important role in UN peace operations. The rise of “police peacekeeping” or “policekeeping” is reflected both in the growing size of police contingents on the ground and in the fact that peace operations (military and police components) are increasingly carrying out policing functions, such as crowd control. Thus, a 2007 article by the Associated Press could state in passing that “in most of the U.N.’s 15 peacekeeping missions around the world, international troops are used mainly as police to maintain order in post-conflict countries” (Jacobs, 2007). Furthermore, UN peace operations routinely engage in “policebuilding” by helping to recruit and train local police forces and providing them with institutional and operational support.

The turn to policekeeping has generally been met with enthusiasm in both academic and policy circles. Policing is often understood to provide a more civilian instrument of intervention, better suited to mandates that increasingly emphasize protection of civilians as a central component of peace operations. UN policing appears to fill an important gap in unstable, post-conflict environments where local security forces cannot protect civilians – or worse, are actively targeting them. On the other hand, the rebuilding of local police forces along democratic, liberal lines is seen as a guarantee of a successful transition towards peace and stability. One analysis, for instance, notes that “the transition from civil war to civil society is inextricably linked to the development of civilian, apolitical police forces that are composed of different political contingents and ethnic groups, and who will protect citizens, uphold the rule of law and help to maintain order with a minimum of force” (Call & Barnett, 1999, p. 44).

This chapter questions this optimistic reading of police peacekeeping. It asks: what type of logic is the logic of policing? I argue that optimism regarding the turn to policing is sustained by a limited understanding of police power, which does not fully take into consideration how police forces emerged in domestic societies and the role that they play in enforcing order. Building on a vast literature in history, sociology and criminology, I show that policing is characterized by a fundamental tension between the public mission to “serve and protect” and the mandate to enforce order. Historically, police forces did not emerge to protect citizens from crime, but as a response

to new social arrangements – including industrialization, urbanization and colonialism – that traditional, informal mechanisms of order maintenance could no longer contain. The line between military and police has always been blurrier than liberal accounts of policing would have it, and the idea that the police (contrary to the military) has no “enemies” flies in the face of the historical and contemporary treatment of marginalized, racialized populations by police forces. Though police forces may indeed “serve and protect”, the question is who is included in and excluded from this protection.

If the logic of policing is characterized by a tension between order enforcement and protection, between inclusion and exclusion, what does this mean for policing in peacekeeping? More than a change in missions’ composition and the specific tasks that they accomplish, peacekeeping as policing captures a broader shift in the field of peacekeeping, which is pulled between the imperative of protection of civilians and stabilization. It is also not controversial to argue that UN peace operations are increasingly deployed in contexts where there is no peace to keep and “take sides” by supporting the host government against challengers in the name of stability. At the same time, peace operations’ *raison d’être* and legitimacy increasingly revolve around their ability to protect civilians. But are enforcing stability (or “order”) and protecting civilians the same thing? Can these two goals clash if some civilians are deemed to represent a threat to stability?

The turn to policing does not represent only a different instrument of intervention, but constitutes a different way of thinking about and managing conflict. Whereas peacekeeping is a response to a situation of *conflict*, which supposes the need to mediate between various sides that all have potentially legitimate claims, policing is a response to a situation of *disorder*, calling for the re-establishment of order and the punishment of lawbreakers. Thus, peacekeeping as policing both depoliticizes conflict and criminalizes those who engage in it. As the chapter demonstrates, the new interest in policing cannot only be justified by the “criminalization” of conflict or the existence of a “crime-conflict nexus”. Policing is not a straightforward response to crime, but also represent a strategy of order enforcement.

While policing is generally understood to provide a response to crime, it is increasingly used as a response to a much broader set of issues. Ideally, in a healthy society, police acts as an institution of last resort, responding to social problems that other social institutions have failed to resolve. In reality, in many societies “law enforcement has become the favoured tool for managing

social problems” (Fassin, 2013, p. 218), including problems that do not *a priori* call for a police response, such as poverty or mental health. This trend spans domestic societies from Latin America to Europe to Oceania, and disproportionately leads to the targeting of socio-economically marginalized and racialized populations within these societies. The turn to peacekeeping as policing should be seen as part of this broader trend of increasingly coercive police response to a wide range of social problems. Peace operations are part of a wider field of policing that extends transnationally and is characterized by encounters and exchanges along North-South, South-North and South-South lines. Not only is policing in peace operations influenced by trends in intervening societies, but the experience generated by international intervention then travels out. Peace operations can thus be seen as one of the transnational points of cross-fertilization for the creation and transmission of policing practices.

This chapter’s first section provides an empirical overview of the rise of police peacekeeping and the phenomena that it encompasses. In the second section, I argue that peacekeeping as policing should not be understood only as describing a change in the composition of peace operations or the fact that they increasingly carry out specific policing mandates. Rather, I show how the idea of policing captures the fundamental tension between two concomitant evolutions in peace operations – the growing importance of “protection of civilians” and the turn towards stabilization. The pull between these two imperatives is constitutive of police power, which is pulled between the public mission “to serve and protect” and a mandate to enforce order. Section III challenges a number of preconceptions about police forces and policing, including the idea that police’s main function is to respond to crime and that police and military emerged as two distinct spheres, by drawing on a literature that spans history, sociology and criminology. I argue that police forces’ mission to “serve and protect” is always interpreted through their mandate to enforce order, and that protection is not granted to some populations that are deemed to threaten order. In Section IV, I address the alternative explanation that peacekeeping as policing is simply a problem-solving move, a logical response to the merging of crime and conflict and show that this explanation is at best incomplete. Section V posits that, rather than the emergence of new forms of intervention in the wake of “new wars”, we are in fact seeing a return to colonial and Cold War discourses and practices. Finally, in Section VI, I situate UN peace operations as part of a broader field of global policing. Although this field is hierarchically structured – with a clear division of labour between decision-makers and implementers – it is not defined by a linear

diffusion of discourses and practices from the centre to the periphery. Rather, peace operations constitute one of the transnational points of cross-fertilization that allow for circulation along North-North, North-South, South-North and South-South lines.

I. The rise of policekeeping


1. Transformations at the UN

Policing has become a central component of UN peace operations. Writing in 2011, one scholar noted that “UNPOL is the fastest growing component of the overall UN peacekeeping enterprise” (Van der Spuy, 2011, p. 35), while another pointed out that “the phrase ‘international police peacekeeping’ is now in common usage in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations” (Greener, 2011, p. 183).⁶ An indication of this evolution can be found in the peacekeeping literature: in the first edition of Bellamy and Williams’s textbook *Understanding Peacekeeping*, published in 2004, there was no chapter specifically dealing with policing. This was added in the 2010 edition (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2010). At the UN, the growing importance of police in peacekeeping is reflected in evolutions on the ground, institutional transformations, and interest by member states.

Evolutions on the ground: Although the UN first deployed police officers to support its mission in the Congo in 1960 (Bowling & Sheptycki, 2012, p. 4), it was not until the 2000s that police became a major component of peace operations. As Figure 1 shows, police contingents have constituted at least 10% of peace operations personnel since the early 2000s, in sharp contrast with their role in the 1990s. Although Figure 2 makes clear that UN operations are still a military-first affair, there is no doubt that, as the UN has deployed more troops in the past 15 years, UN police has kept up with the pace. Not only has the size of police contingents increased in the 2000s compared to the 1990s, but the number of missions with a policing mandate has also multiplied. “In January 1988, there were only 35 UN police officers from a handful of countries serving in a single peace operation in Cyprus” (Rotmann, 2011, p. 84), while today most missions have a police component. While UNPOL officers represented only 2% of UN peacekeeping forces deployed worldwide in 1995 (J. G. Smith, Holt, & Durch, 2007b), today there is about 1 police officer for every 6 military troops deployed in peace operations. The growing importance of police is also

⁶ The concept is also used by member states, for instance Canada. See e.g. <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/entrng-crm/plcng/ntrtnl-plc-pckpng-en.aspx>

reflected in the fact that, in 2006, the UN created the “Standing Police Capacity”, “a rapidly deployable unit of police officers with extensive post-conflict experience to help start new UN operations and to support existing ones” (Rotmann, 2011, p. 90). As of 2019, the Standing Police Capacity counted 36 specialized police officers ready to be deployed.⁷




Source: Data provided by DPKO.⁸ Figures as of January 31 of each year.

The continued prominence of peace operations’ military component should not obscure the fact that UN military peacekeepers have also taken on policing functions. The idea of “international police peacekeeping” does not refer only to a change in the composition of peace operations, it also conveys a change in the role that both military and police actors play. Indeed, as we shall see in the next section, the fact that military peacekeepers have undertaken policing tasks has led some to warn against a militarization of police peacekeeping (Hill et al., 2007).


⁷ United Nations Police Website, Standing Police Capacity, <https://police.un.org/en/standing-police-capacity>, accessed June 5, 2019.

⁸ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>, accessed July 1, 2019.



Source: Data provided by DPKO.⁹ Figures as of January 31 of each year.

The majority of police contingents deployed in UN peace operations come from the Global South, a pattern that mirrors the more general one in peacekeeping. As Figure 3 shows, in 2019 a group of ten countries from Africa and Asia contributed almost 7,000 (67%) of the 10,387 police officers deployed in UN peace operations.




Source: Data provided by DPKO.¹⁰ Figures as of January 31, 2019.

⁹ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>, accessed July 1, 2019.

¹⁰ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>, accessed July 1, 2019.

The vast majority of these countries' contribution to UN policing come in the form of Formed Police Units (FPUs) rather than Individual Police Officers (IPOs), and the recent growth in UN police contingents is mostly attributable to FPUs. While IPOs are police officers deployed by member states on an individual basis, FPUs are deployed as a contingent of around 140 individuals. FPUs therefore tend to come from a more military or paramilitary background and fit the definition of paramilitary policing, “the application of (quasi-) military training, equipment, philosophy and organization to questions of policing” (Jefferson, 1990, p. 16). As of October 2018, 7,772 FPUs were deployed in UN peace operations against 2,911 IPOs (DPKO, 2018), meaning that FPUs constituted almost 73% of UN police contingents (see Figure 4). The role of these paramilitary units is explored more fully in Chapter 5.



Source: Data provided by DPKO.¹¹ This includes only missions that have more than 10 police officers deployed, as of January 31, 2019.

Institutional transformations: The growing number of police officers in the field was not immediately accompanied by reflection on the special role they were to play in peace operations. Although the 2000 Brahimi report called for a “doctrinal shift in how the Organization conceives of and utilizes civilian police in peace operations” and argued that it should be “better understood

¹¹ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>, accessed July 1, 2019.

and developed” (United Nations, 2000, p. para 40), in fact “little doctrinal guidance on policing and peacekeeping was generated until recently” (Sebastián, 2015, p. 9). It was only in 2011 that the UN Secretariat started work on a UN police doctrine (A. Carpenter, 2014), which resulted in a set of policy guidelines known as the “Strategic Guidance Framework”. The Strategic Guidance Framework includes the Policy on UN Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions (2014) as well as guidelines on Police Administration, Police Capacity-Building and Development, Police Command and Police Operations.¹²

Doctrinal development on policing within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO, now Department of Peace Operations, DPO) has been accompanied by the development of police capacities, for instance through the deployment of “Specialized Police Teams” (SPTs). While “initial SPTs focused on gender and sexual violence”, the concept has been extended to “special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams, canine units, special or international crime investigation and forensic teams” (van der Laan et al., 2016, p. 43). Furthermore, DPKO has expressed interest in emulating the “smart policing” strategies of domestic police departments. In 2014, a panel of experts on technology and innovation in UN peacekeeping recommended that the organization acquire new technologies such as non-lethal weapons and body cameras (United Nations, 2014a).

As the role of UN police underwent doctrinal clarification, the UN also institutionalized the “rule of law” component of peace operations. In 2007, the “Office for the Rule of Law and Security Institutions” (OROLSI) was created within DPKO to increase coherence by gathering police, mine, criminal law, DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) and SSR (Security Sector Reform) activities in one office. In 2012, DPKO and UNDP created a joint Global Focal Point for police, justice and corrections issues in postconflict and other crisis situations, with the same purpose of fostering coherence across the UN and “delivering as one”.¹³

Interest by member states: Member states have been slow to officially recognize the importance of police in peace operations. The Security Council passed its first stand-alone resolution on policing in peacekeeping in 2014, an initiative that was spearheaded by elected Council member Australia (UN Security Council, 2014c). Italy sponsored a follow-up resolution

¹² UN Police website, <https://police.un.org/en/sgf>, accessed June 5, 2019.

¹³ UNDP website, <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democratic-governance-and-peacebuilding/rule-of-law--justice-and-security/global-focal-point-for-police--justice--and-corrections/>, accessed June 5, 2019.

during its time on the Council in 2017 (UN Security Council, 2017d). Since 2006, the UN has organized a “UN Police week” (usually held in November), during which the heads of the police components of peace operations gather in New York for internal meetings and to brief the Security Council and the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34).¹⁴

Some member states have also developed capacity to follow and advise on police issues in New York, by appointing police advisors within their missions. The Canadian mission, for instance, has had a police advisor at least since the mid-2000s,¹⁵ while the Norwegian mission created the position in 2008.¹⁶ However, many missions, in particular from the Global South, do not have a dedicated adviser on police issues, but rather a double-hatted military advisor. As one interviewee noted, for 140 Military Advisors working around the UN, there are only about 20 Police Advisors, and 90% of them are Western.¹⁷ Even within larger Western missions, the difference between police and military is not always clear. At the time of my fieldwork in New York (February-March 2018), the police advisor for the French mission was seconded from the gendarmerie and part of the military branch of the mission. This state of affairs illustrates not only a lack of capacity on the part of some smaller missions, but also the ongoing dominance of the military side of peace operations and, more fundamentally, the lack of clarity on the specific role that police should play. As we shall see in Section VI, this also means that some (mostly Western) states often take the lead on policing issues.

Because policing falls under peacekeeping issues, the General Assembly has generally played a secondary role on the topic. As the UN Police’s website puts it, the Assembly’s C34 committee “provides overall guidance” to DPKO on peacekeeping issues, including police.¹⁸ The Assembly also passed its first resolution on the rule of law in 2006 (Barriga & Kerschischnig, 2010). Although the resolution does not explicitly mention policing, it “recogniz[es] the importance of the rule of law to virtually all areas of United Nations engagement” (UN General Assembly, 2010, p. 2).

¹⁴ UN Permanent Missions website, “Did you know it is United Nations Police week?”, November 8, 2016, <https://www.un.int/news/did-you-know-it-united-nations-police-week>, accessed June 24, 2019.

¹⁵ Interview 52, New York, March 2018.

¹⁶ Interview 45, New York, February 2018.

¹⁷ Interview 44, New York, February 2018.

¹⁸ UN Police website, “The mission of UN Police”, <https://police.un.org/en/node/8008>, accessed June 24, 2019.

2. *What phenomena does this encompass?*

The idea of international police peacekeeping encompasses a number of phenomena and activities implying more or less direct policing by the UN. At one end of the spectrum are executive mandates that entrust UN peace operations with direct policing functions, effectively having them stand in for local police forces. These mandates are rare but have occurred in Kosovo and Timor Leste. Importantly, executive policing is not carried out only by police forces. Scholars and practitioners have noted that peace operations often face a “deployment gap” (Hills, 2001, p. 80) and a “security gap” during the early phase of a mission, where local police cannot protect the population and ensure order and not enough international civilian police forces have yet been deployed. In these contexts where no one is taking responsibility for public security (Hovens, 2017), the military intervenes to “fill the gap”: “the military is an important asset in complex peace support operations, especially to prevent a security gap in the early phases of a post-conflict mission and to deter potential spoilers of fragile peace agreements” (Penksa, 2010, p. 44). The idea behind the “deployment gap” is thus that the military does law enforcement by default, because local police forces are unable to, and because international police officers are too few and not prepared to deal with things like riot control (Friesendorf & Penksa, 2008, p. 677).

More frequently, UN forces do not have an executive mandate, but provide assistance to existing police forces, by patrolling with them and supporting them during operations, as was the case with MINUSTAH in Haiti. As the Haitian case shows, even in the absence of an executive policing mandate, policing functions can be taken on by both police and military peacekeepers. In Haiti, the UN mission carried out robust joint police-military raids against “gangs” in the capital Port-au-Prince, a case that is examined in Chapter 4.

The other side of international police peacekeeping is more institutional and involves support for the recruitment and training of local police forces. Sometimes referred to as “policebuilding” (Heiduk, 2015, p. 81), this is usually a large part of Security Sector Reform (SSR) efforts in post-conflict, transitional states (Bayley, 2006; Goldsmith & Sheptycki, 2007; Marenin, 2005). Policebuilding involves “co-location”, where individual UN police officers are deployed to work side by side with host state police counterparts to provide mentoring and capacity-building, as well as support for reform efforts, including training and restructuring.

3. *Police peacekeeping: What's not to like?*

At the UN and in the academic literature, the turn to police peacekeeping is widely considered to be a positive evolution. Police peacekeeping is seen as a more civilianized, cheaper and efficient way to build durable stability in post-conflict states. In a 2013 op-ed, a researcher at the liberal North-South Institute in Canada argued that “post-conflict developing countries don’t need Canadian peacekeepers; they need Canadian peace officers”, pointing out that “policing should be considerably less expensive than military peacekeeping” and “developing professional policing [...] has a longer term impact than holding territory and imposing an often tenuous order through military might” (Salahub, 2013). As we shall see, police peacekeeping is particularly championed by a group of states that are generally considered to advance international liberalism and human rights, including Canada and Norway.

UN interviewees echoed these feelings. According to a Western diplomat in New York, “the genesis of police in peacekeeping I think really stems from the reality that if you look across the board at many of the tasks that we’re asking peacekeeping missions to undertake, police, well trained police, were very well placed to actually perform those functions”.¹⁹ Similarly, a high level civilian MINUSTAH official reflected that “maybe that’s one of the reasons why we have, I won’t say this proliferation, but proliferation of individual police officers or FPU. To try and get rid of some of that militarization of peacekeeping”.²⁰

Enthusiasm for international police peacekeeping is often underpinned by an overly optimistic understanding of what it actually entails. For instance, a 2013 report by the International Peace Institute notes in passing that “UN policing is geared toward community policing” (Kemp, Shaw, & Boutellis, 2013, p. 7), a concept that generally elicits positive feelings (though for a critique, see Chapter 4). This, however, does not square with the fact that paramilitary FPUs now form the majority of UN police contingents, and that these troops are singularly non-adapted to conduct community policing tasks. In light of the reality of police peacekeeping on the ground, some scholarly analyses have sought “to challenge the commonplace account of policebuilding as an essentially ‘civilian’ tool in the liberal interventionist’s toolbox” (Heiduk, 2015, p. 81), by showing how it “has often gone beyond the export of democratic, civilian policing techniques, featuring robust, military elements of policing such as riot control or even counter insurgency”

¹⁹ Interview 47, New York, March 2018.

²⁰ Interview 41, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

(Heiduk, 2015, p. 70). Some have pointed out the danger of a militarization of policing in peace operations, in light of the fact that military peacekeepers sometimes carry out policing tasks and that paramilitary forces form the vast majority of police contingents (Friesendorf, 2011; Friesendorf & Penksa, 2008; Greener, 2011; Hills, 2001).

This dissertation argues that the blurring of the line between military and police is not an unfortunate incident, a side-effect of the need to respond to pressing “security gaps” on the ground. Rather, it is intrinsic to the way peace operations have evolved since the early 2000s. As the next section argues, peace operations are caught between contradictory imperatives. On the one hand “protection of civilians” has become a key legitimating idea for peacekeeping but, on the other, peace operations are often mandated to “stabilize” societies in which conflict is ongoing. Policing – whether militarized or not – encapsulates the tension between these two imperatives. Policing is and has always been characterized by a tension between the public goal of protecting the population (most obviously against crime) and a mandate to enforce not just public order but also social order. Thus, some populations are excluded from protection not only because they break the law, but because of the socio-economic position they occupy. This raises the question of whether UN peace operations can combine stabilization and protection without similarly excluding some populations that seem to threaten stability.

II. Peacekeeping as policing and the evolution of peace operations

In this section, I argue that the concept of policing captures not just a change in the composition of peace operations or the fact that they are given policing mandates, but a broader shift in the field of peacekeeping, which is pulled between the imperatives of protection of civilians and stabilization.

1. Protection of civilians

Protection of civilians mandates may generate debates between member states, but there is no doubt that the concept has become one of the driving values of UN peace operations. In 2014, a report by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services stated that “protection of civilians is a strategic objective of peacekeeping” (UN General Assembly, 2014, p. 4). As one analysis notes, “protection is now widely seen as one of the primary functions of peace operations and central to their legitimacy” (Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 828).

Indeed, members of the Security Council regularly invoke protection of civilians to authorize the use of force under Chapter VII (Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 828; Breakey et al., 2012, p. V), in a context where threats to civilians are increasingly seen to constitute threats to international peace and security. In 1999 and 2000, the Security Council passed its first two thematic resolutions on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and in one them noted that “the deliberate targeting of civilian populations or other protected persons and the committing of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed conflict may constitute a threat to international peace and security” (UN Security Council, 2000, p. 2)(see also (UN Security Council, 1999, p. 3). The issue was kept on the agenda in another thematic resolution in 2006 (UN Security Council, 2006b) as well as in annual reports from the Secretary-General. Today, most peace operations are deployed with a mandate to protect civilians. The 2014 evaluation of protection of civilian mandates by the UN Office of Internal Oversight focused on nine missions which accounted “for about 97 per cent of uniformed personnel and 95 per cent of civilian personnel in United Nations peacekeeping” (UN General Assembly, 2014, p. 4). As protection mandates have proliferated, so has the number of situations that fall under the heading of “protection of civilians”, stretching the concept and multiplying the instances that authorize the use of force. As the General Assembly noted in 2014, “protection of civilians mandates now cover threats from organized and politically motivated armed groups to opportunistic and criminally motivated armed groups, tribal and intercommunal conflict and conflict over land and resources (UN General Assembly, 2014, p. para 53).

In many ways, protection of civilians can be understood as a policing activity. Protection is at the centre of the public mission of police forces in most parts of the world, as illustrated by the fact that many police departments have adopted a version of “to serve and protect” or “to protect and serve” as their official motto, from Los Angeles to Toronto to Port-au-Prince (“protéger et servir” is the official motto of the Haitian National Police). A volume on police power defines it as “regulatory power to take coercive measures to ensure the safety and welfare of the ‘community’” (Dubber and Valverde, 2006: 4). It is common to read in analyses of the role of the police in peace operations that “a core function of the police is to provide a sense of safety and security to the community” (den Heyer, 2011, p. 467). Indeed, a 2014 UNPOL document laying out a “vision and multi-year strategy” until 2020 is entitled “Serve and Protect to Build Peace and Security” (UNPOL, 2014). As we have seen in the previous section, the idea that peacekeepers

(military and police) should “fill in the security gap” when local police forces are incapable of protecting the public is widespread. Indeed, filling the gap is often done in the name of protecting civilians. Thus, protection is a form of policing, regardless of the forces (military or actual police) that undertake it.

Furthermore, the UN has stressed the special role that international police forces should play in protection of civilians. The 2014 DPKO/DFS guidelines on police in peacekeeping note that “protection is a core element of the concept of international policing” (UN DPKO/DFS, 2014b, p. 14). In its 2014 resolution on police in peace operations, the Security Council also affirmed UN police’s central role in protecting civilians (UN Security Council, 2014c). UN police is mandated to protect civilians in three ways. If the UN mission has an executive mandate, UN police “shall be directly responsible for physical protection of civilians against imminent threats”, e.g. through force projection and/or high visibility and increased patrolling. More frequently, UN police will provide “operational support to protection of civilians under imminent threats of physical violence provided by host State police, such as advice on planning and conducting operations and investigations into incidents or training host State police to perform key protection functions”. And finally, “capacity-building of the host State police can also contribute to the protection of civilians mandate” (UN DPKO/DFS, 2014b, p. 15).

Reinforcing local police forces is thus done in the name of protecting civilians. Indeed, capacity-building of the host state, including through Security Sector Reform and police-building, is increasingly seen as the endpoint of protection mandates. In 2010, DPKO outlined a three-tiered approach to protection in UN peace operations. Tier I involves “protection through dialogue and engagement”, including mediation; Tier II encompasses the “provision of physical protection”, in situations where civilians are under threat; and Tier III revolves around the “establishment of a protective environment”, e.g. through DDR, SSR and strengthening the rule of law (UN DPKO/DFS, 2015a, pp. 8-9).

The central role of police-building in protection mandates challenges some pre-existing ideas about the protection of civilians concept. Protection of civilians is generally understood to be a less politically contentious offshoot of the responsibility to protect (R2P) (Rhoads & Welsh, 2019) and, like R2P, protection of civilians’ pedigree can be traced back to the rise of “human security” in the late 1990s and that idea that old notions of state security were to be replaced by a focus on the welfare of individuals (Axworthy, 2001; Kaldor, 2007). But the supposed radical

opposition between state and human security has always been dubious. Already in 2007, Duffield argued that “human security signals the return of the state to development discourse” (Duffield, 2007, p. 126). Proponents of the Copenhagen School cautioned that “reconstructing human rights as human security reinforces the danger that security is taken to be the desired end” (Buzan, 2004, p. 370). Skeptical scholars have proposed to see human security as a “practice of government in response to the discourse of global chaos” rather than a paradigm changing innovation, emphasizing how a supposedly “demilitarized approach to security” has in fact “been remilitarized in humanitarian interventions” (Makaremi, 2010, p. 108 & 116). In recent years, the distinction between human and “traditional” security has become even more tenuous. As one recent analysis notes, both R2P and protection of civilians have converged on “a state-centric focus on building and strengthening the capacity of national authorities to protect populations” (Rhoads & Welsh, 2019, p. 598). Increasingly, protection of civilians has become explicitly associated with the building of state capacity to assume a protection goal, in a context where “state responsibility for the security and safety of the people who live within their borders is the end-goal of the protection chain” (Grande, 2016, p. 391). Thus, the reinforcement of the state security apparatus is done in the name of protecting civilians. As the next section makes clear, capacity- and police-building are also at the centre of stabilization agendas.

2. Stabilization

MINUSTAH was the first “stabilization” mission to be authorized by the Security Council, and the concept has now traveled to the UN missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO, 2010), Mali (MINUSMA, 2013) and the Central African Republic (MINUSCA, 2014). While the UN has never provided an official definition of what “stabilization” entails, stabilization missions display “a common pattern of supporting the host-state government to reclaim territory controlled by nonstate armed actors that have been deemed politically illegitimate by UN member states, the host-state government, and/or parties to a peace agreement” (Gorur, 2016, p. 21).

Beyond the specific cases in which the term figures in a mission’s acronym, the idea of stabilization encompasses a broader transformation within UN peace operations, which are increasingly deployed in situations of ongoing conflict. Indeed, in many cases, “the UN’s field presence has become decoupled from any meaningful political process aiming to reach lasting

settlements among parties to the conflict” (Berdal, 2016, p. 23). In such contexts, peace operations are more likely to engage in pacification than in peacekeeping as is traditionally understood. Stabilization is part of a broader trend of “taking sides” (Paddon Rhoads, 2016), and observers have raised concerns about how this challenges the traditional concept of impartiality (Bellamy & Hunt, 2015; Hunt, 2016). In the DRC, for instance, the UN stabilization mission, MONUSCO, has participated in joint operations with the Congolese army against opposing armed groups, despite credible allegations that the Congolese army itself was involved in numerous human rights abuses (Berdal, 2016). These actions prompted former Under Secretary General for UN peace operations Alain Le Roy to remark that MONUSCO had become a “kind of gun for hire ... President Kabila’s own private military company” (Paddon Rhoads, 2016, p. 150). His successor Jean-Marie Guéhenno similarly notes that the UN “[became] almost an auxiliary of the government [...]” (Guéhenno, 2015, p. 159).

The term “stabilization” was first used by NATO in its Stabilization Force (SFOR) for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Mac Ginty, 2012, p. 23), and it is NATO members that have promoted the concept most prolifically. Indeed, “[...] Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, among others, are all heavily invested in stabilization and have developed multi-agency bureaucratic units and funding mechanisms to plan and implement stabilization” (Muggah, 2013, p. 56). In the UK, a “Stabilisation Unit” was created in 2007 to “support the integrated coordination of UK government activities in fragile and conflict-affected states”.²¹ In Canada, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force was created in 2005 to advance a “whole-of government response to crisis situations, both natural and human inflicted” (Global Affairs Canada, 2016). In 2003, the US Army Peacekeeping Institute was renamed the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (Mac Ginty, 2012, p. 23). As we shall see, these states are also among the most prominent champions of police peacekeeping at the UN.

The shift in language and the move from “peace” to “stability” are not benign. In a pointed critique of the concept of stabilization, Mac Ginty (2012, p. 20) notes “how the concept of peace has been side-lined in recent years and has been supplanted by ‘stabilization’, ‘security’ and other concepts that are based on ideas of control”. Critics of the “liberal peace” paradigm might see this as a welcome retreat from the hubristic goals of exporting liberal democracy and free markets to

²¹ Stabilisation Unit website, <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/stabilisation-unit/about>, accessed June 5, 2019.

every post-conflict state, and some might point out that the notion of “peace” should not be romanticized given the many historical “instances in which cities have been razed and populations cleared to secure ‘peace’” (Mac Ginty, 2012, p. 21). Yet this should not obscure that stabilization and associated ideas of “good enough governance” often entail “a conservative exercise of maintaining a controlled environment rather than emancipation or liberation” and “a diet of compliance and discipline” that gives the military a central role in peacebuilding (Mac Ginty, 2012, p. 27).

Indeed, stabilization shares many characteristics with counter-insurgency, a concept that does not elicit warm fuzzy feelings in most people. As one analysis notes, “much of the actual content of stabilization finds its antecedents in counterinsurgency operations undertaken as part of both international and civil wars during the twentieth century” (Muggah, 2013, p. 60). “Stabilization” is often applied to missions that fall “somewhere between occupation duty, peace operations, state-building, counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency, but often combining elements of them all” (Brocades Zaalberg, 2012, p. 91). In fact, academic analyses and policy documents sometimes use the terms interchangeably. For instance, a 2009 policy paper published by the Brookings Institution is entitled “Assessing Counterinsurgency and Stabilization Missions”, with a focus on Afghanistan and Iraq (Campbell, O’Hanlon, & Shapiro, 2009). Although one analysis examining the difference between counterinsurgency and peacekeeping argues that they can only be equated by “overemphasiz[ing] the soft side of counterinsurgency doctrine and operations” and leaving out “reference to the key role of coercion, harsh emergency legislation, rigorous population-control measures and [...] ‘neutralizing the insurgent’ in defeating insurgencies” (Brocades Zaalberg, 2012, p. 93), in fact such tactics and language is not hard to find in contemporary peace operations with stabilization mandates.

Stabilization not only involves aligning with state forces, it also means reinforcing them. Capacity-building, and in particular the reinforcement of the state’s security apparatus, is a central component of stabilization missions. Thus, policebuilding is carried out in the name of both stabilization and protection of civilians, two objectives that may be at odds. Most obviously, and as the examples above show, alignment with one party (the state) often means turning a blind eye to abuses committed by state forces. But the contradiction between stabilization and protection is deeper, in a context where stabilization entails a commitment not only to stop and contain conflict, but to enforce order. In this context, stabilization missions are concerned not only about the

behaviour of clearly recognized armed groups, but about the behaviour of the general population more generally. This concern means that the capacity to control disorder and control crowds has become a central component of stabilization missions, as we shall see in the following sections.

What is the relationship between stabilization and protection of civilians? An analysis published by the Stimson Center recommends that “the concept of stabilization should not be conflated with the protection of civilians” (Gorur, 2016, p. 24), as has been the case in several Security Resolutions. For instance, in the 2015 and 2016 versions of the UN mission in Mali’s mandate, “stabilization” was under the same heading as “protection of civilians” (Gorur, 2016, p. 10). This conflation is based on the idea that stabilization is undertaken “to restore and reinforce the capacity of the state to provide legitimate security” (Muggah, 2010, p. 2), and thus to protect civilians. The Stimson Center report rightly highlights that, although “stabilization aims ultimately to create a secure and stable environment in which civilians are not subjected to violence”, “the strategies and tactics that support the transfer of territorial control from spoilers to legitimate authorities may increase risks to civilians in the short term” (Gorur, 2016, p. 24). But the contradictions run even deeper. There is an inherent contradiction between enforcing order and protecting civilians, revolving around the fact that, although order maintenance is often done in the name of protection, it *de facto* excludes from protection certain populations that are seen to threaten order. As the next section argues, this contradiction is at the heart of policing, but often unacknowledged in academic and policy studies of police peacekeeping.

III. The logic of policing

The previous section has argued that protection of civilians, stabilization and police peacekeeping should be understood as constituting a single phenomenon that is captured under the concept of peacekeeping as policing. Peacekeeping as policing refers not only to the changing composition of peace operations (the growing importance of police contingents), but also and more fundamentally to the fact that peace operations can be understood as a form of policing. Policing refers not only to the presence of police, but encapsulates the contradictions between protection of civilians and stabilization. This understanding of peacekeeping as policing is based on a historical and sociological conception of police power that does not take at face value the idea that the police’s mission is to “protect and serve”. Rather, it stresses the contradictions between two ways of thinking about policing, which are well encapsulated by the double moniker given to police

forces in French, where police officers can be both “peacekeepers” (“gardiens de la paix”) and enforcers of order (“forces de l’ordre”) (Fassin, 2013, p. 216). To put it differently, policing can be understood both as “protecting and serving” the public and as “protecting and serving” the state, depending on the types of missions that police forces undertake.

Importantly, then, not all good things go together. There is a contradiction between protecting the state and social order and protecting the public, because protection does not extend to certain populations that are deemed to threaten order. In other words, protection is conditional on where people stand in relation to social order.²² This understanding of policing contrasts with the common wisdom in academic and policy circles. Typically, the 2017 UN guidelines on the role of police in protection of civilians provides the following definition of policing: “a function of governance responsible for the prevention, detection and investigation of crime; the protection of persons and property; and the maintenance of public order and safety” (UN DPKO/DFS, 2017b, p. 24). This not only proceeds as if there was no contradiction between protecting civilians and maintaining order, but also assumes that the police’s primary function is in fact to respond to crime.

In this section, I argue that analyses of policing in peacekeeping often rest on a fundamental misrepresentation of the historical emergence of police power within domestic societies and the role that it plays today. I address a series of misconceptions about policing, including the idea that without police there would be no social order; that police was created to fight crime; that there is a clear distinction between police and military, and that this separation has always been clear. My argument is based on a vast literature that spans history, sociology and criminology and generally converges on the conclusion that police’s mission has always been more to enforce order than only to fight crime, that police power targets certain populations that are deemed to threaten order, and that police and military have always been part of a continuum of practices of governing rather than diametrically opposed categories.²³

Without police, there would be no social order: Criminologist Robert Reiner has coined the term “police fetishism” to refer to “the ideological assumption that the police are a functional prerequisite of social order so that without a police force chaos would ensue” (Reiner, 2010, p. 3).

²² Credit for the concept of “conditional protection” is due to Jennings (2019).

²³ In many ways, debates on the role of the police in criminology echo debates on the role of the state in political science. Thus, the idea of the police as a neutral force charged with protecting all of society fits with pluralist understandings of the state (P. Q. Hirst, 1989), while analyses that point to the police’s role in enforcing a certain order share more with Marxist theories of the state (Jessop, 1982; Poulantzas, 1978).

However, this fetishism ignores that, historically, societies have found many ways to maintain social order without police forces. One can question whether these ways were “better” or “worse” than current arrangements centred around police forces, but this makes clear that the absence of police does not necessarily entail chaos.

The police’s main function is to fight crime: Many analyses of transnational policing “begin by assuming that the meaning of ‘police’ is self-evident, a position that has an underlying functional logic: there are criminals so we need police to go after them” (Bowling & Sheptycki, 2012, p. 11). The idea that the rise of police peacekeeping is simply a response to crime (or the criminalization of conflict) is addressed more fully in the next section. For now, suffice it to say that, historically, police forces did not emerge to respond to crime. In his analysis of the emergence of modern policing, David Bayley, one of the world’s most recognized scholars of policing, argues that police forces were created as a response to the social effects of new political and economic arrangements that existing informal, community-based and private processes could no longer contain (Bayley, 1999, p. 67). Specifically, nascent police forces “were tied to three basic social arrangements of inequality in the eighteenth century: slavery, colonialism, and the control of a new industrial working class” (Vitale, 2017, p. 34). In other words, police emerged as a response to demands for justice, not as a response to crime (Silver, 2017). In the US, newly created police forces played a key role as strike-breakers in industrializing cities (Harring, 1983). In Europe, gendarmerie-type forces “served to deal with particularly severe forms of internal strife and turmoil, which [...] accompanied the nation building process” (Lutterbeck, 2004, p. 47). In the colonies, European powers created local police forces to enforce colonial order and, after independence, to repress domestic opposition (we return to this history in more depth in the next section).

Historically, it is highly dubious to see police as a response to crime. Today, this link continues to be questionable. Bayley opens his book on police for the future with the following provocative quote:

The police do not prevent crime. This is one of the best kept secrets of modern life. Experts know it, the police know it, but the public does not know it. Yet the police pretend that they are society's best defense against crime and continually argue that if they are given more resources, especially personnel, they will be able to protect communities against crime. This is a myth (Bayley, 1996, p. 3).

Studies of police effectiveness have come to widely diverging conclusions about the role that police *by itself* plays in fighting crime. Some argue that peaks and drops in crime have more to do with broad socio-economic conditions than with specific police strategies. For instance, was the decline in crime in New York City in 1990s due to Mayor Giuliani's adoption of "broken windows" policing, the harsh policing of minor misdemeanours? Or was that decline rather due to broader factors, including economic growth, a transformation of the drug economy, and the effectiveness of awareness campaigns? (Harcourt, 2001; Wacquant, 2009, chapter 8).

In light of the apparent disconnection between crime and policing, some sociologists and criminologists argue that policing should be primarily understood as the production of social order (Neocleous, 2000). In his ethnographic study of policing in a Parisian "banlieue", Fassin (2013, p. 71) demonstrates how police patrols do not only maintain order, but enforce social order by "reminding people of their place, most particularly their place in relation to the state and those tasked with implementing its repressive policies". Working on the case of a large Canadian regional police force, Ericson shows how "beyond the narrow view of police work as crime work, one can see that the presence of police officers has become an end in itself [...] They are 'the law', they represent order, they embody law and order" and "ensure the reproduction of social order" (Ericson, 1982, pp. 197-198).

There is a clear separation between police and military and this distinction has always been clear: The literature on transnational policing and police peacekeeping often expresses concerns that policing is becoming more militarized and that the line between police and military is blurring. Such concerns "ontologically suggest [...] a 'pure' starting point, implying that at one point there were distinct police and military sphere" (Heiduk, 2015, p. 73). For instance, a report on the role of police and military components in peace operations argues that the "traditional policing role" is "protect/prevent" and "mostly benign", while the traditional war-fighting role is "overwhelm/pacify" and "typically hostile" (Greener & Fish, 2011, p. 21). In a book on "the new international policing", Greener argues that:

In all commentary about the role of police in contemporary international peace support operations there is much reference to the notion that 'building rule of law institutions must begin as soon as the fighting stops' – suggesting there must be some sort of agreed social order that is represented by the ability of police and policing to exist (Greener, 2009, p. 105).

This assumes that the military operates in situations of armed conflict, while police operates in situations of “some sort of agreed social order”. This assumption rests on the idea that, historically, military and police forces took on these divergent roles as part of a series of binaries including “the dualism of state/society, the border between internal order/external anarchy, the opposition of friend/enemy, and the us/them distinction” (Bigo, 2001, p. 96). To put it simply, police are deemed to operate in situation of internal order to protect society, while the military protects the state against external enemies in an international context of anarchy.

This supposed divergent trajectory of police and military forces seems to ignore the fact that scholars as diverse as Weber, Marx, Foucault and Elias have shown that the rise of nation-states as military organizations coincided with the development of tactics of policing of domestic subjects. According to Foucault (1995, p. 168), “the classical age saw the birth of the great political and military strategy by which nations confronted each other’s economic and demographic forces; but it also saw the birth of meticulous military and political tactics by which the control of bodies and individual forces was exercised within states”. But this goes back even further. Early theorists of state formation like Bodin and Botero (both writing in the 16th century) suggested that “military discipline and training in arms are necessary for war with other nations and for disciplining one’s own subjects” (Neocleous, 2014, p. 27). In settler states such as Australia, Canada and the US, “domestic” police forces have always been “international”. Thus, “the US [...] had its own domestic version of colonial policing: the Texas Rangers”, who were charged with protecting white settlers and their property from indigenous populations (Vitale, 2017, p. 43). In Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police were and continue to be engaged in and “international” policing in a context where “Indigenous peoples defined themselves as autonomous nations both at the beginning of colonial settlement and now” (Bell & Schreiner, 2018, p. 112).

The entangled history of police and military power leads some to see them more as part of a single continuum rather than entirely separate activities. Although temporally police and military may be deployed separately, in the sense that police may arrive “once the conditions for order have been violently established by the military”, policing is then “the continuation of military actions by other means” (Ryan, 2013, p. 441). An analysis critical of the idea that policebuilding is a fundamentally civilian activity points out that

A more theoretically informed conceptualization of the police, which defines them not a priori as a civilian agency in disassociation from the military but as a tool to establish and

maintain a particular (liberal) social order through a wide range of practices – including at times illiberal (violent, exclusionary) means – points us towards an understanding that sees ‘civilian’ and ‘militarized’ policing not as competing but complementary techniques of governing disorderly populations (Heiduk, 2015, p. 75).

To distinguish police and military, much is often made of the fact that police forces – like peacekeeping forces – do not have “enemies”, in contrast to military forces. Thus, a former British Assistant Commissioner of Police can argue that “the difference between the quasi military and the civil policeman is that the civil policeman should have no enemies. People may be criminal, they may be violent, but they are not enemies to be destroyed” (quoted in McCulloch, 2016, p. 251). In her book on international policing, Greener (2009, p. 93) similarly distinguishes police from military by arguing that the military’s “focus on the ‘enemy’ presents a particular ethos that shapes broader notions of the requirements of defence, and that legitimises the maxim of maximum force”. According to another analysis, there are four key differences between military and police: 1) “Police confronts a situation of disorder rather than an enemy”, 2) “Police thus aims at defusing situations and restoring order rather than defeating the enemy and attaining victory”, 3) “The logic of police is preventive and developmental rather than one of victory and defeat”, and 4) “The use of force is more finely calibrated” (Dean, 2006, p. 196).

But just as it is highly questionable that peace operations do not have “enemies” today (as the discussion of stabilization mandates above made clear), so it is the case for police forces. Sociological studies of police forces have well documented how police officers often hold an adversarial representation of the populations that they are meant to serve, which are “seen globally as hostile” (Fassin, 2013, p. 100). In the US, “police often think of themselves as soldiers in a battle with the public rather than guardians of public safety”, and the fact they many police officers are veterans and that police departments are increasingly issued military-grade weaponry often reinforces this perception (Vitale, 2017, p. 3). The paramilitarization of police forces (an issue to which we return below) may have accentuated such perceptions. Studies of police paramilitarization have noted how “the stridently masculine culture of [paramilitary police units] is more interested in state protectionism (or so-called ‘regime policing’) than upholding the rights and civil liberties of citizens” and that these units’ “tendency to identify groups as ‘the enemy’ is evident in their adoption of saturation policing in minority neighbourhoods” (Hill et al., 2007, p. 304). However, “approaching categories of people as presumptive enemies, rather than citizens

who might have broken the law” (McCulloch, 2016, p. 256) is nothing new. In his lectures at the Collège de France on “the punitive society”, Foucault refers to the development of the penal system in the 18th and 19th centuries as the “civil war”. For Foucault, this was “social war”, “war of rich against poor”, where the criminal was defined as a “social enemy” and “someone who wages war on society” (Foucault, 2015, pp. 32-33).

Although police forces may see the population as globally hostile, often “police aggressiveness is focused on certain categories, sparing others” (Fassin, 2013, p. 100). The category of “enemies” tends to be applied to “marginalized, particularly poor and racialized groups [...] against whom extraordinarily high levels of force can be used and with confident impunity” (McCulloch, 2016, p. 261). In Brazil, for instance, “the favela, and its population, are increasingly articulated as radical ‘others’ and represented through discourses of enmity allowing for their exclusion and elimination” (Gomes, 2016, p. 13), a pattern that is repeated in many societies around the globe. In his analysis of the penalization of poverty under neoliberalism, Wacquant argues that

Unfettered penalization leads to assimilating the nether sociospatial boundaries inside the city to foreign borders. Under this approach, urban law-enforcement agencies operate in the manner of border patrols and forces of occupation in poor areas treated as domestic ‘war zones’ harboring an alien population stripped of the normal protections and privileges of the law (Wacquant, 2008, p. 70).

The way peace operations relate to marginalized urban populations is explored in Chapter 4. For now, the point is to challenge the preconception that police forces have no enemies. As we have seen in the previous section, the belief that the role of the police is to protect “the community” is widespread, but this is less seldom accompanied by reflection on whom this “community” may be excluding. Some categories of population have always perceived their relationship to the police as one akin to military occupation. In the 1960s, the civil rights activist and writer James Baldwin wrote “a report from occupied territory” from Harlem in New York, arguing that “the police are simply the hired enemies of this population” (Baldwin, 1966).

In other words, some populations are excluded from the protection that police forces are supposed to bestow upon citizens. This is not an unfortunate accident, but inherent in the fact that police forces do not simply exist to “serve and protect” but have the primary function of enforcing social order. Protecting citizens and enforcing order have never been the same thing. As argued

above, peace operations face the same contradiction when they are mandated to both protect civilians and stabilize, in other words to be both “keepers of the peace” and “enforcers of order”.

IV. Or: Just a logical response to new problems?

Not surprisingly, a historically and sociologically informed view of policing fosters great skepticism vis-à-vis the usual claims that justify the expansion of transnational policing and the turn to police peacekeeping: that international policing is a response to inter- or transnational crime and its implications, that conflict is criminalized, and that internal and external security are merging. The previous section should have provided ample fodder to question these claims. Because they are so widespread, I address them more thoroughly in this section.

1. Is peacekeeping as policing a response to the criminalization of conflict?

Although we have just seen that response to crime is a poor explanation for the existence of police forces, this argument is widespread in policy and academic analyses when it comes to justifying the emergence of international policing. It rests on the idea that the end of the Cold War has seen a criminalization of conflict and the emergence of a “crime-conflict nexus”, an evolution that would make international police peacekeeping a natural response to this new state of affairs.

The idea that conflict is becoming criminalized gained traction following the end of the Cold War. In light of the rise of intra-state conflict, some argued that the world was facing a breed of “new wars” motivated by criminal rather than political motives and characterized by indiscriminate levels of violence against civilians (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Kaldor, 1999). The economic analysis of conflict led to a conception of “rebellion as a quasi-criminal activity” (Collier, 2000), featuring greedy and bloodthirsty ‘warlords who rise in the face of state failure to engage in conflict for their own private gain. Indeed, the term ‘warlord’ gained traction precisely because it “encapsulated a shared perception of a brutal and non-political figure” (Marchal, 2007, p. 1094).²⁴ This line of analysis fitted within a broader understanding of the criminalization of “warlord politics” (Reno, 1999), particularly on the African continent. In their seminal book on “disorder as political instrument” in Africa, published in the late 1990s, Chabal and Daloz (1999, p. 83) propose to distinguish political conflicts, “which are considered legitimate by a significant

²⁴ For a critical analysis of the uses of the “warlord” concept, see Goetze (2016).

proportion of the populations” from criminal conflicts, which “are not considered politically legitimate by those who are engulfed in them”.

According to proponents of the criminalization of conflict, these “new wars” in turn called for a “cosmopolitan law enforcement” response. For J. E. Mueller (2004), these conflicts are but the “remnants of war”, “policing problems”. Kaldor (1999, p. 11) argues that “since the new wars are, in a sense, a mixture of war, crime and human rights violations, so the agents of cosmopolitan law-enforcement have to be a mixture of soldiers and policemen”. Rather than traditional war fighting, the order of the day was to be “global policing operations to neutralize emergent threats and install or restore the rule of law, democracy, and market freedom in so called failed or failing states – warfare as law enforcement” (Michael Smith, 2014, p. 150). In a critical analysis, Holmqvist (2014, p. 3) calls this form of intervention “policing wars”, based on the idea that “‘war’ nowadays takes place not for lofty power political purposes but is conceived as a corrective directed against enemies of order”.

Peace operations, led by the UN or by “coalitions of the willing”, were seen to be particularly apt to carry on the task of policing. Thus, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright could declare in 2000 that:

Peace operations today require skills that are neither strictly military nor strictly police but, rather, a combination of the two. The international community needs to identify and train units that are able to control crowds, deter vigilante actions, prevent looting and disarm civilian agitators while, at the same time, winning the trust of the communities in which they are deployed (T. L. Thomas, 2001, p. 29).

As we have seen in the previous section, justifications for the existence of the police often rely on a functionalist logic: there is crime so there must be police. Similarly, “the usual justification for policing beyond borders is the globalisation of crime and insecurity” (Bowling & Sheptycki, 2012, p. 1). This logic is also extended to the realm of peacekeeping: there is crime, crime threatens international peace and security, so peace operations must address crime. The link between crime, conflict and peacekeeping has been a topic of reflection at least since the intervention in Bosnia in the early 1990s (Friesendorf & Penksa, 2008). In the context of simultaneous wars “on terror” and “on drugs”, accounts portraying transnational organized crime and transnational gangs as threats to international peace and security have proliferated. A 2005 publication by the US Army War College, for instance, argues that street gangs amount to a new

“urban insurgency” (Manwaring, 2005) that directly threatens states through what the author refers to as “coup d’streets” (Manwaring, 2006). Crime is often depicted as both an agent of destabilization within (weak) states and as a transnational challenge. The alleged link between (or even merging of) terrorist groups and organized crime (Sanderson, 2004), in particular, has contributed to transforming criminal groups into international security threats. In the field of peace operations, researchers in both policy and academic circles have drawn attention to the “crime-conflict nexus” (de Boer & Bosetti, 2015) and have reflected on how peacekeeping missions should deal with criminal “spoilers” (Kemp et al., 2013). A 2013 report by the International Peace Institute argues that, although “the UN Charter makes no specific reference to fighting crime”,

The very first article of the UN Charter says that the purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security and, to that end, to take collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace. If organized crime is a serious threat to peace and stability, then the UN should prevent and remove it (Kemp et al., 2013, p. 8).

This understanding of the necessity of police peacekeeping relies on a simple logic: crime threatens state stability, not only thriving on state failure but also contributing to it, and thus crime is a threat to international peace and security. But is it empirically true that crime and state failure go hand in hand? In fact, the link is shaky, in a context where crime can be a result of state action, rather than state failure (de Boer & Bosetti, 2015, p. 6). A review on the conceptualization of gangs as armed groups found that there was little evidence to support the alarmist idea that gangs were representing a new “urban insurgency” (Hazen, 2010). Gangs may constitute an ‘indirect threat’ to states in the sense that they represent “an alternative to government in areas where government is weak and ineffective” (Hazen, 2010, p. 381), but this is quite different from the idea that gangs are out to take over state power. Furthermore, the “transnational” nature of criminal groups tends to be exaggerated, as they often organize on a local basis rather than through federal-like structures of command (Rodgers & Muggah, 2009). Depicting organized criminal groups as a transnational threat to states and to peace and security also provides for a misleading picture of the relationship between states and criminal activities. Pitting illicit criminal groups against threatened licit state actors ignores the “dialectical” relations between them (Rodgers & Muggah, 2009, p. 313). Crime is not what distinguished legitimate state actors from illegitimate non state ones, but a strategy that can be used by both types of actors (de Boer & Bosetti, 2015, p. 3). For instance, as Tilly (2017) famously demonstrated, the process of statebuilding can be understood as a form of racketeering.

Finally, if there is indeed a crime-conflict nexus, it is not clear that there is anything new about it (more on this below), which raises questions about the timing of the emergence of the criminalization of conflict narrative.

More generally, critics have questioned the supposed difference between “old” and “new” wars by pointing out that, empirically, the new does not seem to differ so much from the old. As Bellamy (2004, p. 28) points out, “many of the phenomena of so-called ‘new wars’ [...] were present in the protracted conflicts of the Cold War”. The newness of new wars is often based on a misunderstanding of history, which fails to acknowledge that many “old” conflicts presented characteristics that are now attributed to “new” ones. For instance, opposition between an “old” political terrorism and a “new” terrorism based on religious fundamentalism obscures that “old” forms of terrorism were also criminalized by the state. Although UK counter-terrorism agencies now depicts the IRA as a form of political terrorism, in 1970s and 1980s the state’s response was criminalization (W. Jackson, 2013, p. 151). In other words, opposing new and old forms of conflict often relies on a revisionist understanding of old conflicts.

2. The political life of the new wars and the crime-conflict nexus

Could it be that the sudden prominence of “new wars” in the late 1990s and the attention given to the crime-conflict nexus reflected not simply changes on the ground, but rather changes in Western academic and policy circles in the triumphalist dawn of the “end of history”? In his strong critique of the supposed distinction between new and old wars, Kalyvas (2001, p. 99) argues that this distinction “may be attributable more to the demise of readily available conceptual categories than to the existence of profound differences”. Similarly, Bellamy (2004, p. 28) points out that sudden interest in how peace operations could address the crime-conflict nexus “had more to do with the fact that Western peacekeepers now confronted them face-to-face than with any particularly ‘new’ trends in violent conflict”.

Although the idea that conflict is becoming more criminal should therefore be assessed with skepticism, there is no doubt that the discourse around the “new wars” has contributed to building a certain representation of conflict. In contrast to the idea that the current focus on policing is a straightforward response to the criminalization of conflict, this suggests an alternative scenario: that the turn to policing represents not a response to new problems, but a new way of responding to an old question. In light of the empirical challenges to the common sense view, this

alternative scenario deserves to be explored. The point is not to argue that there is no connection between crime and conflict, that criminals do not commit crime, but simply that the common sense view fails by itself to explain the current policing response. It is not that the response is entirely decoupled from reality, that it conjured up this reality from scratch, but that this reality alone fails to explain the response.

Conflict is indeed “criminalized” not in the sense that conflict and crime are merging in unprecedented ways, but in the sense that those who engage in conflict are treated as criminals. This criminalization and depoliticization negates the very existence of conflict, instead treating it as an instance of disorder. While conflict supposes the existence of various parties with potentially legitimate claims, “labelling a phenomenon as ‘crime’ implies the need for a punitive response, excluding criminals from legitimate social interactions”; this can “end up characterizing entire populations engaged in conflict as ‘criminals’ that must be repressed by the ‘international community’” (Cockayne & Lupel, 2009, p. 5 & 8). As Hall et al. note in their well-known analysis of the “mugging” crisis in the UK, “there is something appealingly simple about the ‘criminal label’: it resolves ambiguities in public feeling. [...] Crime issues are clear-cut; political conflicts are double-edged” (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Roberts, 1978, p. 189).

In her analysis of the shifting meanings of the norm of impartiality in peace operations, Paddon Rhoads argues that

While traditional peacekeeping mandates treated parties with moral equivalence and eschewed notions of blame and punishment, instigators of violence are often now seen as criminals—their crime a form of moral collapse to be judged and righted by peacekeepers, rather than as a symptom of a political conflict to be mediated (Paddon Rhoads, 2016, p. 2).

Thus, the distinction between conflict and disorder, between conflict and crime, primarily revolves around politics and legitimacy. While conflict is implicitly understood to be political, in the sense that that it involves (sometimes violent) disagreement about how to organize society and government, disorder is depoliticized, supposing that there is no antagonism, simply a situation where one side is breaking the law. While conflict supposes that various parties can make more or less political legitimate claims, disorder delegitimizes lawbreakers.

Some scholars have highlighted the political repercussions of the concept of “new wars” and how they echo past imperial and colonial practices. In a critique of Collier’s work on rebellion as a quasi-criminal activity, Hurrell (2011, p. 148) argues that “to be told that conflict is the result of

internal factors and that it has little or nothing to do with politics or with political grievance delegitimizes many forms of political violence and shifts the locus of responsibility away from the global”. Not only is the idea that we are facing more criminalized conflicts dubious, but we should not forget that characterizing opposition as “criminal” is a time-honoured strategy of states facing opposition at home and abroad, and that “the ‘criminalisation’ of political and economic-conflicts is a central aspect of the exercise of social control” (Hall et al., 1978, p. 190).

During the US occupation of the Philippines, for instance, “the November 1902 Bandolerismo Statute classified all forms of internal resistance as banditry and labelled any armed group brigands” (Bhatia, 2005, p. 6). In Haiti itself, the armed peasant groups resisting US occupation in 1915-1934 were labeled as “bandits” by the US (Hurbon, 1995, p. 184; Schmidt, 1995), and the occupiers’ propaganda efforts encouraged Haitians to refer to them as such (Pressley-Sanon, 2014, p. 127). Efforts to paint these groups as criminal illustrate and reproduce “the everywhere taken-for-granted assumption that it is the powerful, most prominently the West, other great powers and their clients, who have the right to bear arms” (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006, p. 350). Historically, the argument that the colonies presented a situation of disorder and crime rather than one of armed conflict was used to exclude colonial populations from the regulation and protection provided by International Humanitarian Law (IHL):

By the time the land-grabbing process was completed, colonizing powers would often successfully claim that they were merely maintaining order in territory effectively under their control (whether they exercised formal sovereignty or not). Thus the issue of the treatment of non-European peoples became confined to international law’s darker recesses [...] “The question became one of law maintenance rather than actual armed conflict, and ‘pacification’ the euphemism under which massacres could be carried out with impunity (Mégret, 2006, pp. 270-271).

To this critical historical analysis, one may reply that the criminalization of violence and conflict has been one of the most progressive developments of the late 20th century. Human rights advocates and scholars indeed see the creation of new international crimes condemning genocide, war crimes and egregious human rights violations during conflict as a progress towards justice for humanity (Sikkink, 2011; Teitel, 2011). A detailed critique of this narrative of progress in the fight against “impunity” is proposed in Chapter 6, which studies the emergence of “international penal peacebuilding”, or the idea that the reconstruction of the penal chain is essential to building peace in post-conflict societies. For the purposes of this chapter, I will stick to a more general critique

regarding the criminalization of conflict and the treatment of conflict as disorder. I primarily want to underline the effects of extending the language of crime and the tools of criminal justice to the realm of international intervention. Legal scholar Jonathan Simon has coined the concept of “governing through crime” to describe how

When we govern through crime, we make crime and the forms of knowledge historically associated with it—criminal law, popular crime narrative, and criminology—available outside their limited original subject domains as powerful tools with which to interpret and frame all forms of social action as a problem of governance (Simon, 2007, p. 17).

In this context, one can ask “what, precisely, is activated when police and security become the dominant frames through which contemporary international peacekeeping operations are understood?” (Doucet, 2017, p. 47). As noted above, one of the effects of governing through crime is to turn conflict into disorder and populations engaged in conflict into criminals. Here I want to highlight three other effects. First, when disorder and crime are deemed to constitute threats to international peace and security, this leads to an expanding understanding of what may constitute such a threat and thus call for international “policing” intervention. As argued earlier, police is not just a response to crime. Rather, “policing is also a form of power that builds on dominance over the definition of what ‘public order’ is and which behaviour violates ‘order’ and is thus deemed to be ‘criminal’ and ‘disorderly’” (Heiduk, 2015, p. 74). Governing conflict through crime means that countless behaviours can be defined as criminal and disorderly and thus as threats to international peace and security, with the underlying idea that there is a continuum leading from minor instances of disorder to full out armed conflict. Chapter 5 provides a detailed analysis of the effects generated by the idea of such a continuum, showing how in Haiti the UN peacekeeping mission re-interpreted public demonstrations (usually considered to be a right and an instance of freedom of expression) as threats to stability (or “order”) and thus as threats to international peace and security.

Second, the idea that disorder can constitute a threat to international peace and security tends to place order above all other values. As analysis of the uses of the concepts of order and disorder in international relations have shown, “order” is often treated not as an analytical category but as normative goal (Bleiker, 2005, p. 186). This obscures that it is “difficult to dispute that many if not most injustices in life, from domestic abuse to torture, are not the product of disorder, but of unjust orders” (Bleiker, 2005, p. 187).

Third, governing conflict through crime means deploying a police response to a host of issues that call for other types of responses. Ideally, in a healthy society, the police acts as an institution of last resort, operating “where other social institutions fail to diagnose, prevent, treat and respond to community and social problems” (den Heyer, 2011, p. 467). In reality, in many societies “law enforcement has become the favoured tool for managing social problems” (Fassin, 2013, p. 218) and police officers have become first responders to a range of social issues that do not a priori call for police response, including discipline in school, mental health and homelessness (Vitale, 2017, p. chapters 3 to 5). The turn to peacekeeping as policing should be understood as part of these broader evolutions.

3. If peacekeeping as policing is not a response to crime, then why is it happening?

At this point of the analysis, one might be tempted to ask why we are witnessing the rise of peacekeeping as policing, if the changes on the ground that would justify this development are indeed highly contestable. If peacekeeping as policing is not a straightforward response to the criminalization of conflict and the crime-conflict nexus, then what function does it serve? Clearly my critique so far indicates that I believe that it serves a function other than the one claimed.

There are two ways of answering this question. One is to focus on timing. As critics of the “new vs. old wars” narrative have pointed out, the sudden prominence of this discourse had less to do with changes on the ground than with the opportunities opened by the end of the Cold War. The absence of an adversarial bloc and the demise of the Third World independence movement have constituted a favourable setting not only for the development of such discourse, but also for a multiplication of UN and Western-led interventions in the Global South. As we shall see in the next section, the current moment, rather than a new development, may in fact represent a case of “back to the future”, displaying many past patterns of intervention. If this is the case, the current moment is perhaps better understood as a return to normal after a parenthesis, rather than an entirely new configuration.

This line of argument demands a clarification: is there anything new here? Contra those who argue that the nature of conflict and war changed in the 1990s, a diametrically opposed response would be to say that there is nothing new, and that the purpose of peacekeeping has always been policing. Indeed, historically the parallels between peacekeeping and policing are clear: “peacekeeping was from its inception articulated by Pearson as a policing activity based on

the maintenance of global order. Consequently, peacekeeping adopted a domestic model that was based on the core characteristics of the domestic British bobby: impartial, legitimate, lightly armed mediators and monitors” (Ryan, 2013, p. 449). This suggests that the distinction between conflict and disorder has never been as clear as some of the proponents of the new wars would have it. But is this really a case of nothing new under the sun? It is also true that there has been a qualitative change in the composition of peace operations and the tasks that they engage in, as documented earlier in this chapter. Today’s peace operations are able to engage in the day-to-day policing of local populations in a way that earlier, more traditional peace operations could not. As the next section will show, it is possible to think of the historical pattern as “both cyclical and evolutionary, returning to some familiar early themes and patterns” while also allowing for new forms of intervention to develop (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, p. 190).

The second way to think about the why of peacekeeping as policing is to reflect on the functions that it serves. McCulloch (2016, p. 258), for instance, argues that the narrative that transnational crime has become a global threat requiring the merging of military and police forces serves “as a cover for agendas linked to the rise of neo-liberal globalization and the hollowing out of the welfare functions of the state in favour of more repressive functions that benefit powerful states, elites, and multinational corporations”. This type of argument echoes critical analyses of the role of police forces in domestic society, which are explored above. Police is not a response to crime, but a strategy to enforce order in hierarchical societies organized along class, race, and gender lines. The analysis developed in chapters 4 to 6 clearly develops this position. In Chapter 4, I show how MINUSTAH’s stabilization mandate led it to disproportionately focus on the danger represented by the inhabitants of poor urban neighbourhoods, thus excluding them from the population of civilians to be protected. Chapter 5 analyzes how goals of stability and order led to repression of public dissent. And Chapter 6 argues that the rise of international penal peacebuilding cannot be understood as a straightforward response to rising crime rates.

V. Putting international police peacekeeping in historical context

As we have seen, the historical context that presided over the emergence of police forces within society is usually ignored. This is also true of the history of international efforts to develop police forces in the Global South. Little attention is given to the historicity of interventions that focus on “security sector reform, rule of law and policing of citizens” (Kühn, 2016, p. 26). As one

analysis notes, “contrary to what might initially be gathered from reading the contemporary statebuilding and peacebuilding literature, one should recall that there is a long and varied relationship between international relations and ‘police’ that predates the current popularity of police reform-oriented frameworks such as Security Sector Reform (SSR)” (Doucet, 2017, p. 44).

“While domestically it has always been a mistake to pretend that policing can be a neutral, apolitical practice, at the international level to pretend similarly is an even grosser and more dangerous conceit” (Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007, p. 1106). The origins of police building “lie partly in colonial annexation and administration and partly in inter-country technical assistance on narrowly focused security concerns” (Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007, p. 1094). In many countries of the Global South, “the security apparatus was established by colonial powers and Great Power patrons” (Call & Barnett, 1999, p. 45). Current efforts should be placed in the context of this history and its two branches – the colonial branch and the Cold War/decolonization branch – which are examined in turn.

1. Policing in the colonies

“Policing was the lynchpin of the colonial project” (Bowling & Sheptycki, 2012, p. 21): not only did colonial powers deploy their own military forces to enforce order, they also worked to set up local police forces. The historian of counterinsurgency Thomas Mockaitis, for instance, argues that “the British Army for much of its history has been more of an imperial police force tasked with maintaining order and later combating insurgency within a global empire” (Mockaitis, 2007, p. 12). Furthermore, colonial powers engaged in policebuilding, and “frequently co-opted certain local actors, and with their aid enacted specific practices of policing/law enforcement in an effort to stabilise the colony” (Gheciu, 2012, p. 299). Policing was central to the colonial project in the British empire (Anderson & Killingray, 1991, 1992), in the Philippines under US occupation (McCoy, 2009), in Indonesia (Bloembergen, 2007), and in France’s “Muslim Territories” (M. Thomas, 2005). The development of local police forces was used to enforce colonial order and, after independence, to repress domestic opposition (Kuzmarov, 2013; McCoy, 2009). In her analysis of policing in colonial Surabaya (Indonesia) in the early 20th century, Marieke Bloembergen notes that

The modern colonial police were, more than police forces elsewhere, sharply hampered by their two potentially conflicting tasks - to ensure public safety, which required the support

and cooperation of the population, and to enforce (political) order, actions that tended to incite resentment and resistance from the population (Bloembergen, 2007, p. 121).

As argued above, this tension is not unique to colonial policing: it is central to policing in domestic societies and in peace operations. In fact, the colonial period was characterized by a circulation of policing innovations between the colonies and the metropole. In the British empire, “colonial police were central to both British imperial rule worldwide and modernization of the London metropolitan force at home” (McCoy, 2009, p. 33). Policing methods developed in one colony (e.g. India) travelled to others (e.g. Ireland and Palestine) and to the metropole in a recursive process that McCoy dubs a “cross-fertilization of imperial policing” (McCoy, 2009, p. 34). Similar processes have been documented in the case of the US, where “Washington repatriated the personnel and policies of colonial rule during World War I and used them to conduct what may have been the most systematic surveillance of its citizens ever undertaken by a modern government” (McCoy, 2009, p. 13). For instance, the man who created the Haitian gendarmerie during the US occupation also served as police chief in Philadelphia in the 1920s (Vitale, 2017, p. 42). This cross-fertilization had important repercussions in the metropole and the colonies. Studying the interconnected development of the state security apparatus in the US and the Philippines, McCoy concludes that “by collaborating in the refinement of covert techniques for internal security, these two states have forged powerful instruments to fortify themselves against the processes of political change, slowing progress toward civil rights in America and social justice in the Philippines” (McCoy, 2009, p. 18).

This history of imperial cross-fertilization clashes with liberal understandings of policing, which are based on a model of policing by consent. The ideal police force in such models is the British bobby, who is unarmed, close to the population, and acts as a peacekeeper. Some might therefore argue that comparing policing in the colonies to policing in the metropole (or policing in peace operations to policing “at home” today) ignores this liberal tradition. Bowling and Sheptycki (2012, p. 21), for instance, note that “colonial policing practice was different from the model cultivated within the homeland, which was much more concerned with the appearance of legality, bureaucratic efficiency, effectiveness and policing by consent”. But as we have seen, the idea of policing by consent is based on a rather optimistic understanding of police forces that assumes that, contrary to the military, they have no “enemies”. This was always historically dubious and is put into question by today’s militarization of policing. As one analysis notes, “it seems that in all

types of society where consent is absent, the police rely on what can be called the colonial style” (Brewer, 1992, p. 519). In other words, the liberal idea of policing by consent does not take into account how some populations are excluded from the category of citizens to be served and protected.

The colonial antecedents of policebuilding are often ignored by both practitioners and scholars and, when they are acknowledged, dismissed. Commenting on the growing importance of policebuilding in the repertoire of international intervention, Call and Barnett argue that, although the practices may be the same, the intent differs:

In many respects this renewed interest by the international community in internal security represents a throwback to the colonial days, though with an important twist: during colonial times the emphasis was on internal security as defined by the regime in power, and on the creation of a security apparatus that could meet this demand. And because the regime in power was often a non-democratic one representing a small segment of elites rather than the population at large, the international system tended to reinforce the security of the regime rather than that of society (Call & Barnett, 1999, p. 45).

As we have seen in the previous chapter, this optimistic reading of contemporary efforts rests on the idea of progressive evolutionary change in world politics and “elides or obscures the many continuities that exist” between 19th century imperialism and contemporary efforts (Hobson, 2012, p. 104). Furthermore, the extent to which governments in post-conflict states today represent more than “a small segment of elites” is itself rather dubious. In any case, regardless of intentions, the question should be whether the *effects* of these policies differ under colonialism and contemporary intervention. This dissertation provides ample empirical evidence that questions the extent to which they do.

2. Policebuilding during the Cold War and decolonization

The contemporary interest in policebuilding is not only reminiscent of colonial times, it also harks back to the practices of great powers during the Cold War and decolonization. The creation of local security forces in Latin America and Asia was central to US strategy during the 1960s. The Kennedy administration launched an international civilian police training program under the Office of Public Safety that included the creation of an International Police Academy (hosted in Washington), where allied governments sent their police forces. The US Congress ended the program in 1974 after it became public that it had abetted torture and the persecution of political

opponents in Latin America and Asia. But US assistance to foreign police continued under the form of cooperation around narcotics control (Huggins, 1987), and most of the Office of Public Safety's activities were simply transferred to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In 1986, the US created the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) to “develop professional and transparent law enforcement institutions that protect human rights, combat corruption, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and terrorism” in foreign countries.²⁵ As Call and Barnett (1999, p. 63) cautiously note, “becoming more deeply involved in member-states' security institutions does expose the UN to the risk of abetting the establishment of repressive or abusive institutions. In this respect, UN police assistance programmes run a risk similar to the track record established by US bilateral programmes in the 1960s”.

The US was not an isolated case. As France withdrew from its empire, it implemented similar strategies of remotely controlling the development of police forces in its former colonies. In the 1960s, France created the Service de Coopération Internationale Technique de Police (International Technical Cooperation Service for Police, SCITP) to “assist” the decolonization process by sending French police officers in former colonies. Police forces in many of these countries were thus de facto led by French officers.²⁶ Later on, the SCITP also managed the deployment of French police forces in peace operations. In 2010, the SCITP was transformed into the Direction de la Coopération Internationale (Office of International Cooperation, DCI), which brings together the French police and the gendarmerie.

This period was also marked by a circulation or cross-fertilization of police practices. US trainers working for the Office of Public Safety spent years training police forces in Latin America, Vietnam or Iran, with a strong focus on counterinsurgency techniques. These individuals were then reintegrated into domestic law enforcement, at the DEA, the FBI or in state and local police forces, “bringing with them a more militarized vision of policing steeped in Cold War imperatives of suppressing social movements through counterintelligence, militarized riot-suppression techniques, and heavy-handed crime control” (Vitale, 2017, p. 49). This knowledge was applied, for instance, to repression of the Black Panthers movement. The growth of paramilitary police in

²⁵ US Department of Justice website, « International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)”, <https://www.justice.gov/criminal-icitap>, accessed June 24, 2019.

²⁶ Interview 12, Port-au-Prince, June 2017.

the US was encouraged by the Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Officials Act, enacted by Congress in 1981, which authorized the transfer of military training and weaponry to federal, state, and local police agencies. In turn, the US played a key role in advocating for the use of paramilitary police units in peace support operations (Hill et al., 2007). Meanwhile, France's counterinsurgency campaigns in Indochina and Algeria led to innovations in policing at home, with counter-insurgency doctrines focused on the "enemy within" colonial society migrating to conceptions of policing of immigrant populations in the metropole (Rigouste, 2014).

VI. Peacekeeping as policing and the global field of policing

As the previous section has shown, the history of policing is marked by a circulation or cross-fertilization between policing doctrines and strategies "at home" and "abroad". This suggests that policing should be understood as a globalized field encompassing policing within societies and policing in UN peace operations. In this section, I show how UN policing has become an important component of this broader field.

1. The players

As we have seen in the first section, a small number of mostly Western states are particularly active on the issue of policing at the UN. These states have the capacity to fund a Police Advisor within their missions in New York, while other missions often make do with a double-hatted Military Advisor (smaller missions may not even have such a position). In a context where the majority of police contingents deployed in UN peace operations come from the Global South, this creates a division of labour between states that are contributors and states that wield influence on decision-making, a division that runs throughout the field of UN peacekeeping (Cunliffe, 2009).

While policing on the ground is mostly carried out by forces from Africa and Asia, at UN headquarters policing initiatives are largely driven by Western states. The Special Police Advisory Group (SPAG) was created in 2008 by Police Advisors to advise on police-related issues at the UN. It is composed of 25 to 35 members who attend monthly meetings. At the time of my fieldwork in New York, it was headed by the Canadian Police Advisor, and the most recent leaders

before then were the Swedish and French Advisors.²⁷ The SPAG works closely with the UN Police Division, which describes the group as among its “key collaborators” (UNPOL, 2014, p. 17), as well as with the Group of Friends of UN Police.²⁸ The Group of Friends was created by Germany as an informal group in 2012 “to raise awareness of the role of UN Police, to advise and support the UN in the further strategic and operative development of the Police Division, to increase contributions by Member States to UN policing and to help the UN in coordinating Member States’ donor activity and involvement”.²⁹ It is an open group with no fixed list of members. The group meets regularly, and a Police Advisor from the Global North interviewed in March 2018 reported that at their latest meeting (February 2018) 30 to 35 countries were represented.³⁰ Germany still acts as chair of the group.

At the Security Council, the issue of policing in peace operations has been taken on by elected members. Australia sponsored the first stand-alone resolution on policing in peacekeeping in 2014, and a follow-up resolution was sponsored by Italy during its time on the Council in 2017. States have also individually stepped in to provide resources on policing when the UN lacked capacity. Canada and the US, for instance, have offered the UN support ranging from “logistical and financial support for conferences and workshops to the provision of funds for research projects and consulting assignments to the production of entire draft doctrines” (Rotmann, 2011, p. 88). Norway has provided funding and support to the Police Division to develop the Strategic Guidance Framework, including by providing funding for a full-time position in the UN Police Division as well as consultations.³¹

The US has not formally adopted a prominent profile on the issue of UN policing, which is most closely associated with Australia, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Norway and the UK. At the same time, there is no denying that the US has played a key role in shaping the development of UN police, in particular the growing use of paramilitary FPU. UN police forces used to be lightly armed and not deployed as whole units, and “that this policy eventually changed was to a great extent the result of American pressure” (Hill et al., 2007, p. 310). In 2000, the Clinton administration’s Presidential Decision Directive 71 advocated “that UN missions make use of a

²⁷ Interview 44, New York, February 2018.

²⁸ Interview 53, New York, March 2018.

²⁹ “International Police Cooperation”, website of the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the UN, <https://new-york-un.diplo.de/un-en/themen/international-police-cooperation/920784>, accessed June 19, 2019.

³⁰ Interview 52, New York, March 2018.

³¹ Interview 45, New York, February 2018.

suitable mix of military and paramilitary forces to accomplish the assigned tasks of any new peace operation” because “such forces bring specialized skills, such as crowd control capabilities, that are not common to traditional military or civilian police organizations.” These forces, it argued, “are most effective when deployed as units rather than individuals” (US Department of State, 2000). US think tanks and research centres have also played a key role in promoting the paramilitarization of UN police. As one analysis notes, “perhaps the most prominent advocate for the utilization of paramilitary police units in peace-support operations has been the former Deputy Director of ICITAP, Robert Perito” (Hill et al., 2007, p. 312), who has authored many publications for the US Institute of Peace (USIP) (Dziedzic & Perito, 2008; Perito, 2007, 2013). USIP has played an important role in discussions of the role of police in peace operations, an issue that is addressed more fully in Chapter 5.

The division of labour between contributor states and decision makers has generated some tension. In interviews, this was sometimes presented as a straightforward iteration of the classical divide between “like-minded” countries (read: European and North American states) and the “NAM” (Non-Aligned Movement). According to the Police Advisor of a Global North state, troop contributing countries (TCCs) are not necessarily favourable to increasing the role of the police for at least two reasons:

If we start valuing the role of the police, it’s a closed system, so this means that there is going to be a transfer from the military branch to the police branch. But these states they prefer sending soldiers rather than police. So this transformation is not seen favourably by TCCs. Beside the fact that you’re addressing the heart of the state, the rule of law... Generally, troop contributors don’t have an interest in transforming the military question into a police question.³²

Similarly, another Police Advisor from the Global North argued that, while European countries are supporting the creation of more “specialized police teams” (included those devoted to gender issues), NAM countries prefer the FPU model.³³ These statements fit into a widespread understanding of political fault lines at the UN, with on one side Western countries supporting more ambitious mandates and more references to human rights (but not providing much in the way of troops), and on the other countries from the Global South showing reticence to infringe on state

³² Interview 44, New York, February 2018 (translated from French).

³³ Interview 45, New York, February 2018.

sovereignty, skepticism towards human rights language, and a preference for more militarized approaches (and actually providing most of the troops). As evidence presented so far makes clear, this dichotomy does not always reflect reality. The Global South, for instance, does not have a monopoly on paramilitary policing. Some European countries that are very active on UN policing issues have a long history of paramilitary police forces (France and Italy), and paramilitarization of police forces is a reality in many Western societies, including Australia (McCulloch, 2001), which spearheaded the first Security Council resolution on policing in peace operations. Furthermore, as we have just seen, the US has been particularly active in promoting the use of paramilitary forces in peace operations and the training of these forces in TCCs.

In other words, it is not particularly useful to think of UN policing as a North vs. South issue. This is not to deny that there are disagreements and points of tension between certain groups of states on this issue, but these disagreements should not obscure the fact that they are all players in the field, and converge on a paramilitarized form of policing.

2. The stage

If policing is to be understood as a global field, how is it structured and what place do UN peace operations occupy in it? Analyses of transnational policing have shown how the circulation of knowledge and practices has led to the formation of “a transnational criminal law enforcement community based on expanding cross-border governmental networks with shared technical and investigative expertise” (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, p. 9). The concepts of “epistemic community” (Karstedt, 2002), “network” or “networked governance” (L. Johnston & Shearing, 2003), “nodal governance” (L. Johnston & Shearing, 2003) and “field” have been used to describe the resulting arrangement. Building on Bourdieu, Bigo has developed the idea of a “field of security professionals” to describe the interpenetration of internal and external security and the convergence of the police and the military around the alleged globalization of insecurity (Bigo, 2005). I prefer the concept of field because it does not presume the identity of the actors (state or non-state) nor the nature of their relationship (a question we return to below), and it fits better with my sociological approach.³⁴

How is the global field of policing structured? For some, transnational law enforcement is a highly hierarchized field, characterized by the transfer of knowledge from a few central states

³⁴ For a discussion of the merits of the concepts of field vs. nodal governance, see Scherrer and Dupont (2010).

(usually North American and European) to peripheral ones (usually in the Global South). This broadly fits with understandings of how “diffusion” and “socialization” work in the “world society” tradition (Meyer, 1999a). Some analyses have found that the field is strongly dominated by the US, which has actively exported its criminal justice abroad under the rubric of “rule of law” reform (McLeod, 2010). As we have seen, the US has been a key player in international police training, and thousands of police officers worldwide have been trained in US-funded or US-managed centres. In this context, Nadelmann (1993, p. 12) argues that we have witnessed “the internationalization of U.S. law enforcement”, which

has shaped the evolution of criminal justice systems in dozens of other countries. No other government has pursued its international law enforcement agenda in as aggressive and penetrative a manner or devoted so much effort to promoting its own criminal justice norms to others. [...] The result has been something of an ‘Americanization’ of criminal justice systems throughout much of the world (Nadelmann, 1993, p. 12)

Andreas and Nadelmann (2006, p. 10) go as far as arguing that “international crime control is one of the most important — and one of the most overlooked — dimensions of U.S. hegemony in world politics”. For them, US dominance explains the “homogenization of criminal justice systems (and particularly criminal laws) toward a common norm” (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, p. 8).³⁵

However, in an edited volume on the “global making of policing”, Hönke and Müller (2016a, p. 1) argue that “policing models and practices are not simply globalized, as is often assumed, through diffusion from a supposed (liberal) centre to seemingly marginal spaces, in which they get translated at best”. Rather “practices of global policing are dynamically coproduced” by/in the “West” and the “postcolony”, and although the field is hierarchically structured “agents in the ‘postcolony’ have shaped these processes” (Hönke & Müller, 2016a, p. 2). In the book, rather than using the concepts of “policy diffusion” or “policy transfer”, contributors prefer those of “capillaries” (McCoy, 2016), “laboratories” (Graham & Baker, 2016), “transmission belt” (Stockmarr, 2016) and “entanglement” (Müller, 2016). In these analyses, the circulation of knowledge and practices is not only North to South. On the one hand, “often exclusionary and violent technologies of policing are being developed and tested with the active contribution of Western actors in (post)colonies” and then “travel across the globe and back to

³⁵ See also McLeod (2010).

shape ‘homeland security’ in the metropole” (Hönke & Müller, 2016a, p. 10). On the other, the global making of policing occurs through South-South encounters, for instance in UN peace operations, which are largely staffed by troops from the Global South (Hönke & Müller, 2016a, p. 10).

I situate my analysis within this co-constituted view of global policing. This does not deny that some states (like the US) play a prominent role in promoting a certain model, nor that the field is hierarchically structured. As the analysis of the players shows, in UN policing there is a clear division of labour between contributors and decision-makers. But this need not mean that diffusion and learning proceed only in one direction. To illustrate the issue concretely, let me turn to an anecdote told to me during an interview with a high level officer of the Haitian National Police. While we were discussing the training of the Haitian police by MINUSTAH, this officer mentioned that the mission had received some funding to train the Haitian SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) team, but had no SWAT team to conduct the training. In the end, the mission called in officers of the French gendarmerie to conduct the training but, according to my interlocutor:

It’s completely unrelated, the training of the gendarmerie and the training of SWAT. So, on the ground, what happened? It’s the Haitian SWAT agents who trained the French gendarmerie officers. Because the French gendarmerie officers, at the level of high risk interventions, they were not trained for that type of intervention. In MINUSTAH documents you’ll see that training was given to the SWAT unit, but in reality it’s the SWAT unit who trained the French gendarmerie.³⁶

While it may be interpreted as a boast against the former colonizer, this anecdote clearly illustrates the potential for “Western” actors to learn from their experience in peace operations, through interaction with local actors or with fellow interveners from the Global South. Some Western states openly acknowledge that peace operations represent such a learning experience for their police officers. The website of Public Safety Canada, for instance, lists the benefits of Canadian police deployments in peace operations, which include the fact that “once police officers have returned from mission to their home police service, their experiences can help strengthen police services relationships with diaspora communities”.³⁷ In effect, this places on the same

³⁶ Interview 20, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

³⁷ Public Safety Canada, International Police Peacekeeping and Peace Operations, <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/plcng/ntrntnl-plc-pckpng-en.aspx> (accessed August 10, 2018).

footing populations in countries of intervention and populations “at home” that may originate from these countries.

Peace operations are transnational points of cross-fertilization for the creation and transmission of policing practices. Not only do they constitute a meeting point where North-South, South-South and South-North encounters occur; they also participate in structuring the larger field. As we have seen in the introduction, peace operations act as training grounds, standard setters and a demand-generating market. They generate experience that contributing countries can reimport “back home”, and can act as a model to follow. In Chapter 4, I explore how the UN mission in Haiti provided such a model for “pacification” campaigns in Rio de Janeiro, leading the military to advocate for more lenient restraints on the use of force. Furthermore, peace operations create a demand in the sense that do not only draw on existing capacities and experience, they encourage participating countries to produce them. Chapter 5 examines how peace operations’ need for troops that can engage in public order maintenance creates a demand for paramilitarized police and less than lethal weapons for crowd control.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the turn to peacekeeping as policing cannot be understood solely as a response to the criminalization of conflict and the crime-conflict nexus. Rather, building on critical analyses of police power in history, sociology and criminology, I define policing as a practice of order enforcement. Policing enforces order by criminalizing behaviours and populations that are deemed to represent a threat to that order. Policing thus refers to more than “what police forces do”, it constitutes a way of governing that involves not just police officers on the ground but policymakers, legislators, etc, who are all engaged in the “fabrication of social order” (Neocleous, 2000). Similarly, I propose that peacekeeping as policing is a way of enforcing order on a transnational scale, by turning conflict into disorder and populations engaged in conflict into criminals.

By way of a conclusion, let me highlight two of the major themes that run throughout the analysis in chapters 4 to 6. The first major theme could be broadly dubbed “the dark side of protection”. By this I mean two things. First, it refers to the extension of the state’s coercive apparatus in the name of protection. As we have seen, not only do peace operations engage in policebuilding in countries where they intervene, but paramilitarized police forces are developed

in troop contributing countries for deployment in peace operations. This is often done in the name of protecting civilians in unstable and post-conflict states. Thus, the language of protection has come to justify police power. Chapter 6 on international penal peacebuilding specifically explores how the language of human rights, justice and anti-impunity is mobilized to legitimate the reinforcement of the state's penal chain, and in particular the prison system, in countries of intervention. This is part of a broader trend through which "human rights discourse has become a key vehicle [...] for the transnationalization of carceral politics" (Bernstein, 2012, p. 235).

Second, the dark side of protection refers to the fact that some populations are excluded from protection. Protection is conditional on where people are situated in the existing social order and whether they seem to threaten that order. Violence can be meted out those who are undeserving of protection or guilty. Chapter 4 examines the treatment of poor marginalized urban populations by MINUSTAH, showing how these groups went from being "at risk" to being "the risk", thus justifying robust police-military raids in these communities. In Chapter 5, I address the mission's response to public demonstrations, showing how threats to public order were reinterpreted as threats to stability and thus to international peace and security, which pathologized expressions of public dissent by turning them into security issues.

The second major theme is the circulation of discourses and practices of policing and the role of peace operations as transnational points of cross-fertilization for the creation and transmission of these practices. This echoes the theory of peace operations developed in Chapter 1, which argues that they are not *sui generis* nor self-contained fields. Each empirical chapter shows how what happened in Haiti needs to be situated within the broader field of global policing, and how developments within the mission echoed and built on evolutions outside of it. It also demonstrates how what happens in peacekeeping does not stay in peacekeeping. Not only do discourses and practices travel out of peace operations back to countries that intervened, but peace operations act as a market, generating demand for certain types of policing strategies and instruments, such as paramilitary police forces and less than lethal weapons for crowd control purposes (Chapter 5).

Chapter 3: Haiti as entry point

The case of Haiti presents an instance in which UN operations were broadly successful – yet the patient failed to recover (Malone & von Einsiedel, 2004, p. 467).

Haiti is clearly unable to sort itself out, and the effect of leaving it alone would be continued or worsening chaos. Our globalized world cannot afford such a political vacuum, whether in the mountains of Afghanistan or on the very doorstep of the sole remaining superpower. The spectacle of human misery is harder to ignore than it used to be, but the crucial difference from the past is that chaos can no longer be contained by frontiers. It tends to spread, whether in the form of refugee flows, terrorism, or illicit trafficking in drugs, weapons and even human beings. No one wants to intervene, but ultimately there is no choice (Annan, 2004).

In the 2004 *Wall Street Journal* op-ed from which this quote is excerpted, former Secretary-General Kofi Annan's expressed the international community's lassitude about Haiti. There can be no doubt about the message, when the op-ed opens with the exclamation "Not again!" and is entitled "This time, we must get it right". In 2004, there was a sense of déjà-vu about the situation in Haiti. Like in 1991, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was President and, like in 1991, he had been ousted by a coup. But the parallels stopped there. While the 1991 military coup against Aristide was condemned by the international community, the reaction in 2004 was much more ambiguous. By early 2004, Aristide was increasingly depicted as an authoritarian leader ready to mete out violence on those who opposed him. Security Council members, including France and the US, had denounced his government's response to public demonstrations and supported the opposition's demands. Meanwhile, a group of "rebels" largely made up of former Haitian soldiers had crossed into Haiti from the Dominican Republic, taken territory in the North, and were threatening to march on Port-au-Prince. While in 1991 the international community had supported Aristide's claim to the Presidency, and eventually moved to re-institute him by force in 1994, in 2004 Aristide found no such support.

As Aristide was made to leave the country in February 2004, the Security Council authorized the deployment of a multinational force led by the US (the Multinational Interim Force, MIF), which was followed in October by the UN Stabilization Mission, MINUSTAH. Both the MIF and MINUSTAH were charged with supporting the interim government that was put in place following the coup, and the Security Council made it clear that Aristide was not expected to come back to serve the remainder of his term. Although the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)

expressed concerns that this amounted to *de facto* endorsing a coup against a democratically-elected government, a particularly problematic move given the history of the region, the Security Council overruled these concerns. Aristide's departure, rather than a blow to democracy in the region, was to be welcomed as necessary to usher Haiti into a new era of democracy and stability.

From the beginning, MINUSTAH was somewhat of a strange mission. As a high-level military officer interviewed in Port-au-Prince in 2017 noted, "MINUSTAH is not a typical peacekeeping mission, it is not. Sometimes my troops have difficulty understanding what they're doing here."³⁸ Most observers agree that the situation in Haiti never amounted to one of armed conflict. Rather than mediating between sides following a peace agreement, the mission was charged with "stabilizing" a country in the aftermath of a coup. The spokesperson for MINUSTAH put the matter rather starkly in 2007 when they declared that "we normally deal with rebel groups or armed factions who have leaders and have agreed to disarm or enter into a political agreement. Here, none of that is true. They're just a bunch of gangs who fight us" (Jacobs, 2007). In MINUSTAH's first months, the focus quickly shifted from the rebels to the risk posed by "gangs" in poor neighbourhoods of the capital Port-au-Prince. Most of the mission's resources were geared towards this priority, as the question of insecurity in Port-au-Prince became central to stabilization.

Although MINUSTAH was given a fairly standard multidimensional mandate (to establish a secure and stable environment, support the political process, and promote and protect human rights), it soon found itself engaged in rather non-standard tasks. On July 6, 2005, about 1,400 heavily armed peacekeepers (military and police) entered the low-income neighbourhood of Cité Soleil in Port-au-Prince to conduct an early-morning raid against suspected gang members. During the 12-hour raid, dubbed 'Operation Iron Fist', MINUSTAH peacekeepers fired 22,700 rounds of ammunition and 78 grenades, leaving over 20 civilians dead and injuring dozens (Cockayne, 2009; Lynch, 2005). This was but one example of the large-scale offensive raids against gangs conducted by the mission in 2004-2007 (Dorn, 2009, p. 818). MINUSTAH's repeated use of force makes the mission one of the most obvious cases of the turn to "robust" peacekeeping in the beginning of the 20th century (Hunt, 2016; Johnstone, 2006; Tardy, 2011). Although the Haitian case may appear strange by some standards, it also squarely fits within broader evolutions in UN peace operations, including the increasing permissibility of the use of force and the turn to "stabilization" mandates.

³⁸ Interview 38, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

Because of the focus on criminality, MINUSTAH was often understood as a “police-first” mission, even though its military component remained significantly larger than its police component throughout the mission’s existence. At the same time, MINUSTAH invested considerable effort into recruiting, training and assisting the Haitian National Police (HNP). This aspect of the mission was in line with the history of UN intervention in the country since the early 1990s. Indeed, there have been no fewer than six peacekeeping missions in Haiti since 1993, including the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH, 1993-1996), the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH, 1996-1997), the UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH, 1997), the UN Support Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH, 1997-2000), MINUSTAH (2004-2017), and the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH, 2017-2019). In June 2019, the Security Council decided to end MINUJUSTH, and to replace it by a political mission, the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH). Haiti was also host to two civilian missions, the joint UN-OAS International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH, 1993-2000) and the International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAHA, 2000-2001). With the exception of MICIVIH, which focused on human right monitoring, all of these missions have been concerned with the question of police reform in Haiti. The Haitian case is thus an important milestone in the rise of “policekeeping” described in the previous chapter.

This chapter provides an overview of MINUSTAH and justifies the selection of the mission as an entry point for the study of policekeeping and its place in the global field of policing. Section I offers historical and political background necessary to understand the context in which the mission was deployed. In Section II, I show that the mission’s stabilization mandate amounted to taking sides in an ongoing process of contentious statebuilding opposing a small dominant class to a vast impoverished majority. The ambiguous evaluation of MINUSTAH’s success – many participants actually consider the mission to be a failure – reflects the lack of resolution of this fundamental conflict in Haitian society. Section III justifies the choice of MINUSTAH as an entry point into the questions highlighted in the previous chapter. It shows that the mission not only reflected broader changes in the field of UN peacekeeping, but is also understood as a blueprint for future operations because of its precedent-setting nature. Section IV is a more reflexive account of the choice of Haiti for the dissertation and the difficulties encountered in studying the country. I provide background on the fieldwork experience and the interviews conducted in Port-au-Prince. In light of the inherently political nature of media coverage and scholarly analyses of Haiti and the

UN intervention in the country, I attempt to situate myself and my own biases as transparently as possible.

I. Historical and political context

1. *The lead-up to 2004*

The history of Haiti deeply bears the mark of international influence (Farmer, 1994). Following French colonialism and brutal slavery, the country gained its independence in 1804 after a long war that left it impoverished and internationally isolated. The Haitian Revolution and the creation of the first “black republic” not only stoked the “unmitigated hatred of white supremacist powers” (Fatton, 2004, p. 26), in particular the slaveholding United States, but also generated worldwide incredulity. Haitian anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot calls the Haitian Revolution an “unthinkable history”, noting that the event “entered history with the peculiar characteristic of being unthinkable even as it happened” (Trouillot, 2012, p. 75), in a context where colonial powers were incapable of imagining that blacks could collectively mobilize in a rebellion.

Although Haiti had gained formal sovereign independence, it found itself in a situation of “impoverished dependence on the global economy” (Buck-Morss, 2009, p. 137), and Haitian founding fathers *de facto* reinstated the plantation system in the name of nationalism. In 1825, France offered to grant Haiti political recognition and terminate the country’s isolation if it agreed to pay reparations to French former slaveholders for their lost “property”. This debt crippled the country’s economy and was only fully paid in 1947.

In 1915, citing instability in the country after a succession of six presidents within four years, the US invaded Haiti. In 1914, the US military had already removed the Haitian government gold’s reserve from the country and moved it to New York to prevent what the US saw as dangerous German influence over Haiti’s economy. Following the occupation, the US Senate passed the Haitian-American Convention, which granted the US oversight over Haiti’s economy and security for ten years (Schmidt, 1995). Faced with a peasant rebellion, the occupying power deployed US Marines and developed the Haitian Gendarmerie to police the Haitian peasantry and keep production going (Renda, 2001, pp. 31-32). The Gendarmerie later became the Garde d’Haïti, “an institution that received ongoing training from the U.S. Marine Corps and that was the basis for Haiti’s modern army and policing force” (James, 2010, p. 54). Thus, “the construction of the

Haitian gendarmerie left the country with a military force trained and experienced only in fighting Haitians and suppressing dissent” (Shah, 2009, p. 27).

The US occupation ended in 1934. Following a period during which the Garde d’Haïti assumed power, François Duvalier was elected president in 1957. This marked the beginning of a dictatorship that would only end in 1986. Duvalier’s term was characterized by widespread repression of any opposition, notably carried out by the paramilitary “Tontons Macoutes”, and an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 Haitians were killed in this period. Following Duvalier’s death in 1971, his son Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” assumed power at the age of 19. In 1986, in the face of growing public discontent, the army pushed Baby Doc to resign and leave Haiti (Trouillot, 1990).

A new Constitution was ratified in 1987 and, in December 1990, after several aborted efforts at a democratic transition, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected President of Haiti. Aristide, a liberation theology Catholic priest, won two-thirds of the vote in a process vetted by international observers. He was elected on a platform of radical reforms to benefit the Haitian poor, which garnered opposition from the traditional political and business elites. In September 1991, General Raoul Cédras led a military coup against Aristide, who was exiled to Venezuela before moving to the US. Under military rule from 1991 to 1994, Aristide supporters were persecuted, and 4,000 to 10,000 people were killed, according to different sources (Commission Nationale de Vérité et de Justice, 1996; Hallward, 2007, p. 40). The majority were poor Haitians in areas deemed to be sympathetic to Aristide and his party “Organisation Politique Lavalas” (OPL, often known as “Lavalas”, which can be translated to “flood”). The repression sparked a refugee crisis, with many Haitians attempting to flee and reach the US by boat.

In 1994, the UN Security Council passed resolution 940 under Chapter VII, authorizing a US-led force to reinstate Aristide’s government to Haiti. This was an unprecedented move in the history of the Council, which for the first time authorized the use of force to “restore democracy” in a country (Pouligny-Morgant, 1998). Despite references to democracy promotion, it was no secret that the US-led, Security Council-authorized intervention was primarily meant to stem the departure of refugees (Farmer, 1994).

Upon his return, one of Aristide’s first moves was to disband the army to avoid a repeat of the 1991 coup. The international community considered that Aristide’s term should expire in 1996, regardless of his time in exile, and according to the Constitution he could not run for a consecutive term. In the 1995 elections, Aristide’s close ally René Préval running as OPL candidate was elected

with 88% of the vote. In 1996, Aristide broke from OPL and formed the Fanmi Lavalas (Lavalas Family) party, leading to a deadlock with Préval's ruling party.

Fanmi Lavalas dominated the 2000 legislative elections, but there was controversy about the necessity of holding run-off elections. The opposition, led by the Convergence Démocratique (a gathering of political parties) and the Group of 184 (a civil society coalition), refused to recognize the elections' result and announced it would boycott the upcoming presidential elections. In November 2000, Aristide was once again elected President with 90% of the vote on a 50% turnout in elections boycotted by the opposition, which denounced the results. The aftermath of Aristide's return to the Presidency was marked by a coup attempt and mass demonstrations leading to clashes between Lavalas supporters and opponents. The opposition accused Aristide of using the police and armed gangs to repress opponents, and of encouraging mob violence against them. Although Aristide offered to hold new elections, the opposition refused to negotiate (Dupuy, 2006b). Despite Aristide's eroding popularity, he still commanded the support of vast swathes of the poor majority, while a 2002 poll situated support for the Convergence Démocratique at a mere 8%. In that context, for the opposition "negotiating any resolution to the crisis that kept Aristide in power and that called for new elections in which his party would participate was unacceptable [...] Thus, the only alternative was for the DC [Convergence Démocratique], with U.S. backing, to stick to its "Option Zero" strategy and force Aristide out of power" (Dupuy, 2005).

Meanwhile, from 2001 to 2003 groups of former soldiers and paramilitaries conducted hit-and-run operations in the Central Plateau region and the North of the country before retreating to the Dominican Republic. In September 2003, these groups eventually found a foothold in the town of Gonaïves, in the North of Haiti, following the unsolved murder of a prominent gang leader. Though the gang leader had long been deemed loyal to Aristide, the President was accused of having fomented his assassination, leading his brother to take up arms against Aristide, eventually taking over police stations and much of the city. The gang was joined by member of the former Haitian military and together the group of "rebels" took much of the North of the country and the Central Plateau before deciding to march on Port-au-Prince with the visible intent of violently ousting Aristide (Hallward, 2007).

While Aristide called on the international community to send in a peacekeeping force to act as a buffer, the US and France "insisted that a multinational police force can only be dispatched once the government forges some sort of an agreement with the opposition to halt the fighting" (T.

Smith, 2004). But the opposition refused to settle for anything less than Aristide's resignation and rejected a compromise plan negotiated by CARICOM. In this context, the refusal of Canada, France and the US to send in a peacekeeping force in the absence of an agreement meant that "the three powers simply let the rebel forces do their work and give them the excuse they needed to compel Aristide to leave" (Dupuy, 2006b, p. 161).

On Sunday February 29, 2004, Aristide left Haiti in disputed circumstances on a US chartered airplane and accompanied by US military personnel. According to the US government, the President left of his own accord after resigning to avoid bloodshed. According to Aristide, he was for all intents and purposes kidnapped and flown to a destination he had not chosen, Bangui in the Central African Republic. The international community reacted with remarkable alacrity to his departure. Aristide left the country early on Sunday morning; Canadian and US troops were deployed at the Port-au-Prince airport by noon; and by the end of the day the Security Council had unanimously passed a resolution authorizing the deployment of an interim international force. French forces started arriving the next day (Hallward, 2007, p. 235). To oversee the transition period, the international community set up a "Council of the Wise" that was to nominate a new Prime Minister. Gérard Latortue, who at that time resided in Florida, was selected by the Council and appointed as head of the interim government in March 2004, until elections were to be held in 2005. In April 2004, the Security Council authorized the deployment of MINUSTAH, which replaced the MIF in October.

2. The context of MINUSTAH's intervention

When Jean-Bertrand Aristide was forced to flee the country in 2004, under strong U.S. pressure and amid a wave of armed conflict, his departure was, like most recent Haitian history, full of ambiguity. He had destroyed the hopes initially put in him by increasingly abusive methods of power, appointing cronies to run the police and using thugs called the "chimères" to consolidate his power. But it was a very narrow constituency that ousted him. The relentless populist campaign by Aristide to raise Haiti's very low minimum wage had made him strong enemies in the business community. Low wages are one of the few competitive advantages of Haiti if it wants to attract foreign investment, and the business community had some reasons to be wary. But the balance between business interests and the welfare of the population should not be decided by coups" (Guéhenno, 2015, p. 259).

The quote above, by former Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno, encapsulates the tensions that characterized the political context in which MINUSTAH

was deployed. Although the circumstances around the 2004 coup are hotly debated (an issue we return to in the last section), there are a number of facts that can be established about this context.³⁹ First, the mission was very clearly “taking sides” (Paddon Rhoads, 2016). The UN Security Council’s decision to intervene in support of an unelected interim government rather than a democratically-elected President led to considerable tension within the international community. CARICOM, Venezuela and the African Union requested a UN investigation into the circumstances surrounding Aristide’s departure, which was blocked by France and the US (Dupuy, 2006b, p. 160). Some of these countries also refused to officially recognize the interim government, citing the dangerous precedent that this represented for the region. In the lead up to the crisis, CARICOM’s efforts at mediation between Aristide’s government and the opposition had been sidelined by Security Council members France and the US (Dumas, 2008), who had tacitly and sometimes less tacitly supported the opposition’s intransigence in insisting that no negotiations could take place until Aristide had left office (Dupuy, 2006b, p. 161). Thus, CARICOM’s power-sharing plan was accepted by Aristide, but rejected by the opposition. On February 25, four days before the coup, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin and US Secretary of State Colin Powell had called on Aristide to resign after blaming him for the crisis (Dupuy, 2006b, p. 162). Although the interim government came to power undemocratically, it had the full support of the international community, including Canada, France, the US and the financial institutions that had refused to provide political and economic support to Aristide’s government on account of his alleged authoritarian practices (Dupuy, 2006b, p. 162).

Meanwhile, the Latortue interim government made no secret of where its sympathies lay. As Amnesty International reported, “three days after taking office, Prime Minister Gérard Latortue – sharing a platform with [a] convicted murderer⁴⁰ – hailed the former insurgents as ‘freedom fighters’” (Amnesty International, 2004, p. 8). His government acquitted key rebel figures who had been accused of human rights abuses in the aftermath of the 1991 coup, making clear that “no one would be prosecuted in Haiti for killing or abusing Aristide supporters, past or present” (Dupuy, 2006b, p. 168). For the Latortue government, the main goal was “to rid the country of the

³⁹ This section draws heavily on Dupuy’s *The Prophet and Power* (2006). The reason for this choice is explained in the last section.

⁴⁰ Louis-Jodel Chamblain, convicted for his role in the massacre of pro-Aristide demonstrators in Raboteau in 1994.

remnants of Aristide's supporters and to weaken as much as possible his Lavalas Family party" (Dupuy, 2005, p. 189).

This international and domestic context made it impossible for MINUSTAH to be perceived as anything close to a neutral force in Haiti. As Dupuy puts it, "the UN's main mission was to work with the Haitian National Police (HNP) to pacify Haiti rather than to negotiate a peaceful resolution of a conflict between a government in power and a foreign-backed opposition" (Dupuy, 2006b, p. 161). As we shall see in Chapter 4 and 5, one of MINUSTAH's unofficial missions was clearly to prevent the return of Aristide to Haiti and the resurgence of Lavalas.

Second, despite claims that Aristide had to go to stop violence, most of the violence occurred after his departure, and was largely directed at those who were thought to support him. There was a clear double-standard in the way that not only the international community, but also Haitian civil society organizations, assessed the human rights record of the Aristide government and its successor. The human rights organizations and media outlets who had vocally denounced Aristide's repression fell silent as the police and unidentified paramilitary forces summarily executed hundreds of people in areas deemed to be loyal to Aristide (Dupuy, 2006b, p. 170). Most of the victims in the months following the coup were Aristide supporters and/or residents of the poor neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince, as documented in international human rights reports (Amnesty International, 2004; Griffin, 2004). A 2004 report by Amnesty International notes that "a large proportion of the victims of violence were Aristide supporters" and that "the identity of the victims and the nature of the threats and other abuses committed were mostly consistent with a pattern of persecution, especially of those close, or perceived to have been close, to the former Fanmi Lavalas regime." (Amnesty International, 2004, p. 17). Describing a "horror-movie gruesome" scene at the morgue in Port-au-Prince in November 2004, human rights investigators reported that "the morgue workers stated that 'it was never like this under Aristide'" (Griffin, 2004, p. 54 & 57). According to different estimates, about 1,500 to 3,000 people were killed by police forces, paramilitary groups and gangs in the two years following the coup (2004-2006), the vast majority of them civilians and alleged Lavalas supporters (Dupuy, 2005, p. 174; Hallward, 2007, p. 155). In contrast, adding up numbers from media and NGO reports, Hallward (2007, p. 155) finds that at most 30 political killings can be attributed to the Haitian police under Aristide's second term (2001-2004), and the number may be closer to 10. As Amnesty International noted in a 2005

report, the violence in 2004-2006 occurred “despite the presence of the nearly 7,000 UN contingent mandated to secure the country and protect the population”(Amnesty International, 2005, p. 1).

3. *A Latin American mission?*

One important element should also be addressed to understand MINUSTAH’s context. MINUSTAH is often presented as a “Latin American mission” (Heine & Thompson, 2011), in light of the fact that Brazil provided a large number of the military contingent for much of MINUSTAH’s existence, in cooperation with a number of Central and Latin American countries such as Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Uruguay. The fact that the mission was led by Latin American countries was sometimes touted as a guarantee of its legitimacy – a regional solution to a regional problem, as it were. In 2004, the Bush administration was keen to pass on the mantle of intervention to Latin American countries not only to avoid accusations of US imperialism, but also to focus its attention on the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq (see e.g. Valente, 2005). The idea of MINUSTAH as a Latin American mission, however, does not square well with a number of events that presided over the mission’s creation and its subsequent history.

As we have seen, the UN Security Council’s position on Haiti generated considerable tension among the international community. As MINUSTAH was established, there were debates on whether the mission should be mandated under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the Charter, with the understanding that a Chapter VII mission would benefit from much more leeway in the use of force than a Chapter VI one. Diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks show that, during diplomatic negotiations, Brazil pushed for a Chapter VI rather than Chapter VII mandate, while the US (among others) urged for a Chapter VII mandate.⁴¹ Although the mission was eventually established under Chapter VII, this was only the beginning of tensions between Brazil and the countries that had been the most active in ushering political change in Haiti: Canada, France and the US. As we shall see in Chapter 4, these countries accused the Brazilian military contingent of being overly passive and of failing to confront the gangs of Port-au-Prince with sufficient force. Brazilian Force Commanders, in turn, argued that they were leading a peace operation, not a military occupation, and that robust use of force in the city’s slums was too likely to result in

⁴¹ See for instance Centre for Economic and Policy Research, ‘Wikileaked Documents Shed More Light on U.S., Brazilian Motives Behind MINUSTAH’ (23 December 2010), available at { <http://cepr.net/blogs/haiti-relief-and-reconstruction-watch/wikileaked-documents-shed-more-light-on-us-brazilian-motives-behind-minustah> }, accessed 19 May 2017.

civilian casualties. Eventually, pressure for more robust action prevailed. As these debates make clear, the idea of MINUSTAH as a regional solution to a regional problem obscures the leading role of Canada, France and the US.

Furthermore, the fact that Brazil (in conjunction with other Latin American states) led the mission's military contingent did not necessarily translate into Brazilian prominence over political decisions. As scholars of UN peacekeeping have noted, the field is characterized by a clear division of labour between troop contributors and decision-makers, and the involvement of Global South countries on the ground has usually not led to greater political influence (Cunliffe, 2009). MINUSTAH is no exception to this reality. Although Latin Americans may have constituted the bulk of the mission's military personnel, key positions continued to be held by Western powers, in particular Canada, France and the US. When I conducted fieldwork in Port-au-Prince in 2017, one of my interviewees noted that, since 2004, Canadians have always held the Chief of Staff position, which is a key position in the mission.⁴² In his recollection of his time in Haiti, Chilean Deputy Force Commander Eduardo Aldunate notes that a Canadian held the Chief of Staff position, which "had been reserved for his country. There were only three Canadians on the mission, all of them officers at General Headquarters" (Aldunate, 2010, p. 39). Canadians may have been few within MINUSTAH, but they occupied strategic positions. In a 2008 statement to the Canadian Foreign Affairs and International Development Committee, then MINUSTAH Police Commissioner David Beer noted that "although our numbers are down to a certain degree in the total number of almost 1,900 serving police officers, in the mission Canada continues to have very key roles. Indeed, Canada holds the position of deputy commissioner of operations, senior mentor and advisor, and senior mentoring unit for the police for the city of Port-au-Prince" (Foreign Affairs and International Development Committee, 2008). Although this could be interpreted as a nationalistic boast, Canadian monopoly on some leadership positions was a reality. The Police Commissioner for much of the mission's history was Canadian, and at the time of my visit he was French.

Similarly, although the US maintained a low profile within MINUSTAH, the country occupied some key positions within the mission. For instance, US nationals usually headed the "U2 unit", the military intelligence branch. As a Latin American military member of MINUSTAH noted, "the US has reserved for itself the intelligence [...] The Force Commander is important, but

⁴² Interview 27, Port-au-Prince, June 2017.

in fact the Chief of Staff does all the work. The five eyes [Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US], they say, “you want to be Force Commander, fine, but I’ll be U2”.⁴³ When I raised the fact that, in this context, it was somewhat ironic that MINUSTAH was presented as a Latin American mission, the answer was: “Yes, the troops are from Latin America. But the decisions are made by others”.⁴⁴ This background is not just of scholarly interest for those curious about the division of labour in peace operations, it is also important to understand how MINUSTAH’s positioned itself politically after the coup and in the following years.

II. MINUSTAH’s intervention

The first Security Council resolution authorizing the deployment of MINUSTAH provided for 6,700 troops and 1,622 civilian police (UN Security Council, 2004). At the time, it made MINUSTAH the 3rd largest peace operation deployed by the UN, after the missions in Liberia and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. After a devastating earthquake hit the country in January 2010 earthquake, the Security Council authorized an increase in the mission’s personnel to 8,940 troops and 3,711 police (UN Security Council, 2010). The authorized size of the military contingent decreased after 2011, though it remained over 2,000 troops until 2017, when MINUSTAH was replaced by MINUJUSTH, which had no military component.

As mentioned above, MINUSTAH was given a fairly standard multidimensional mandate, and charged with three broad tasks: establishing a secure and stable environment (by supporting the Transitional Government, reforming the Haitian National Police, conducting disarmament, restoring the rule of law and protecting civilians); supporting the political process (by assisting in national dialogue and reconciliation, organizing elections and fostering good governance); and promoting and protecting human rights (UN Security Council, 2004). In this dissertation, I focus primarily on the first bundle of tasks. As we shall see, MINUSTAH’s stabilization and policing role greatly impacted its political and human rights work.

Although MINUSTAH did not have an executive policing mandate, it “assumed de facto responsibility for public order in mid-2004” and “actively policed the country” over the next few years (Durch, 2014, p. 4). As late as 2014, of all the patrols conducted by MINUSTAH, “80 per cent were carried out independently of the national police,” which lacked capacity and equipment

⁴³ Interview 34, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

⁴⁴ Interview 34, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

(UN Security Council, 2014b, pp. 5-6). In addition to patrols, as we have seen, the mission also carried out offensive actions against suspected gang members in Port-au-Prince, particularly in the period before the 2010 earthquake. After the earthquake, MINUSTAH continued to intervene in Port-au-Prince's poor neighbourhoods to arrest suspected criminals. For instance, a video uploaded in April 2010 on the mission's official YouTube channel entitled "Cité Soleil UNPOL and PNH action" shows a joint effort by blue helmets, UN police and Haitian police (some wearing balaclavas) to arrest "twelve criminals" who had escaped from the National Penitentiary in the aftermath of the earthquake. This video, like others posted on the mission's YouTube channel, gives a concrete sense of the MINUSTAH's day-to-day policing role entailed (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: MINUSTAH's policing interventions



Source: Screen captures from official MINUSTAH TV video "Cité Soleil UNPOL and PNH action", posted on April 8, 2010.⁴⁵ MINUSTAH has chosen not to blur the faces of arrested men.

1. MINUSTAH's selective focus on gangs

In light of the political context highlighted in the previous section, it is not surprising that international intervention in Haiti – first under the MIF and then under MINUSTAH – clearly took sides. Although the missions were deployed in the wake of coup carried out by a nebulous group of "rebels", they focused most of their efforts on disarming and neutralizing armed gangs who

⁴⁵ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MLIL51PFJxY>, accessed on July 12, 2019.

were deemed to be loyal to Aristide, arguing that these represented the greater threat to stability in the country. Chapter 4 will provide more background on the complex reality that is often obscured by using the concept of “gangs” in Haiti. For now, I address the disproportionate international focus on these groups. For instance, a 2004 report by Amnesty International noted that

To date, the little disarmament that has taken place has only been carried out in poor neighbourhoods, with meagre results. [...] The MIF did not appear to have an impartial and comprehensive approach to disarmament. In a conversation with Amnesty International, a US Embassy political officer explained that the US considered the disarmament of ‘the urban pro-Aristide gangs’ a priority, since they presented a more immediate danger. The US official apparently did not see the need to disarm the former insurgents as ‘we haven’t found a replacement [for them] yet’ (Amnesty International, 2004, p. 13).

MINUSTAH broadly followed the same pattern, deploying significantly more strength to deal with the “gangs” than with the disbanded Haitian army (Fatton, 2007, p. 212; Lemay-Hébert, 2014, p. 207). Participants have noted how the mission’s DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration) program was geared towards gangs deemed to be supportive of Aristide rather than the armed rebels who had precipitated the 2004 crisis. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General Reginald Dumas, who was present in Haiti in 2004, notes that because of the focus on gangs, “nothing is ever said about the even better-armed political and civil society opposition elements. Perhaps they are regarded as middle class and hence responsible; they would never resort to attempts at the violent overthrow of any government. That is nonsense” (Dumas, 2008, p. 63). Former Police Commissioner David Beer lays the blame for the lack of efforts to disarm the rebels on the interim government, noting that “MINUSTAH planned for and attempted a DDR program for ex-FAd’H [Forces Armées d’Haïti] soldiers involved in the unrest that precipitated Aristide’s departure, though the project got no support from the interim GoH [Government of Haiti] and failed unceremoniously” (Beer, 2016, p. 91). One analysis goes as far as arguing that, in light of its lack of support for security sector reform, the Latortue government was “a spoiler which slowed down the democratisation process and establishment of the rule of law [...] They wanted to eradicate Lavalas’ support and in many ways used their time in office to obtain that goal” (Mobekk, 2016, p. 121).

MINUSTAH’s actions were characterized by a disproportionate focus on the poorest neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince, including Bel Air, Martissant and Cité Soleil, and the threat posed by “gangs” in these areas. Former Police Commissioner David Beer notes that “security (in

Port-au-Prince particularly) became the all-consuming priority, and effort and resources were diverted from other stated objectives of the multifaceted mandate that included aid, capacity building, and human rights issues” (Beer, 2016, p. 81). As former Deputy Force Commander Eduardo Aldunate describes:

[The Special Representative of the Secretary-General], the transitional government and even the authorities in New York were focused on events in Port-au-Prince, mainly in Cité Soleil and along Route #1, where the crimes and kidnappings were taking place. Every conversation with New York and with the transitional government began and ended with events in these places. I cannot remember making a single reference to any other area in the country regarding security issues. Our headquarters was spending at least 90 percent of its time analyzing the events in Port-au-Prince” (Aldunate, 2010, p. 76).

Action against gangs only officially became part of MINUSTAH’s mandate in 2006, two years after the mission’s deployment. Security Council resolution 1702 explicitly mandates MINUSTAH “to counter crime and violence, particularly in urban areas” (UN Security Council, 2006c). And yet raids against gangs became such a central part of MINUSTAH’s activities in Haiti from the very beginning of the mission that participants could later claim that MINUSTAH was *specifically* deployed to deal with the gang problem. Writing several years after his deployment in 2004, former Deputy Force Commander Eduardo Aldunate recalls that MINUSTAH’s “mandate was to prevent chaos in Haiti. Specifically, it was instructed to protect the population against the attacks of armed gangs” (Aldunate, 2010, p. 127). Similarly, Brazilian Colonel Marcio Walker (who was to become Force Commander in 2014) argues that it was because the gangs were sowing terror among the population that the Security Council decided that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security and sent in MINUSTAH (M. S. Walker, 2016, p. 19).

Although MINUSTAH started carrying out offensive action against “gangs” soon after it was deployed in 2004,⁴⁶ the election of René Préval to the presidency in 2006 gave the mission increased legitimacy to do so. The elections, originally planned for 2005, were delayed four times, and finally took place in February 2006. Préval, running on a platform called Lespwa (“hope”), was elected in the first round, although the election was marred by allegations of fraud (with some arguing that the fraud had benefited Préval, while others claimed that it had in fact undermined his significant lead) (Dumas, 2008; Dupuy, 2006a; Seitenfus, 2015). Lavalas, which was barred from

⁴⁶ For instance, raids in Bel Air started in October 2004. See Hallward, 2007, pp. 278-286.

the 2006 elections, boycotted the process but supported the election of Préval. Once in power, Préval started negotiations with the gangs of Cité Soleil. But in the face of an increasing numbers of kidnappings⁴⁷ and pressure from the business community, in October 2006 he publicly issued an ultimatum to the gangs, “disarm or die”, giving MINUSTAH the green light to intervene. As one scholar notes, this “represented a remarkable turn of events: a local political leader, buttressed by democratic re-election but lacking domestic instruments of force, dictated the use of force by an international contingent against his own people” (Cockayne, 2014, p. 750).

MINUSTAH was only one of the international actors focusing on these poor neighbourhoods as great sources of instability. The US also targeted Cité Soleil in its intervention under the “Haiti Stabilization Initiative” (HSI), an “innovative program that integrates security and development and strengthens government presence and local institutions in Cité Soleil, Haiti’s most dangerous neighbourhood and a persistent source of instability”.⁴⁸

What justified this focus and the mission’s quasi-obsessional concern about Cité Soleil? As we shall see in Chapter 4, the idea that Cité Soleil was the epicentre of kidnappings does not square with the fact that a wide range of actors, including policemen, were involved in the kidnapping epidemics. In addition to criminality, interveners often pointed to Cité Soleil’s strategic location. The former head of HSI, for instance, justifies this focus by arguing that

Poor people live all over Haiti, of course. But Cité Soleil’s strategic location was a threat to national integrity. A U.S. military study called it ‘decisive terrain,’ bordering Haiti’s only industrial zone and international seaport, straddling the main north-south road out of the capital, and within walking distance to the international airport and the national palace (Becker, 2011, p. 139).

Similarly, a diplomatic source in Port-au-Prince argued: “You have to remember what the situation was like in 2004. Cité Soleil occupies a strategic position in Port-au-Prince between the airport. It was necessary to pacify it for stability”.⁴⁹

But the idea that Cité Soleil occupies a strategic location is only part of the story. First, it does not explain why other poor neighbourhoods that do not occupy the same position were also extensively targeted. Martissant for instance is rather far from the city centre and on the opposite

⁴⁷ For more on the kidnappings, see Chapter 4.

⁴⁸ Haiti Stabilization Initiative, US Department of State Archive, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/79748.htm>, accessed April 17, 2019.

⁴⁹ Interview 3, Port-au-Prince, May 2017.

side of the bay from the airport. Second, the focus on strategic location fails to acknowledge that these neighbourhoods were historically supportive of Aristide's Lavalas party. As we shall see in Chapter 4, it is very clear from interviews and internal UN documents that these neighbourhoods were deemed to be threats to stability not (only) because of their strategic location, but because they housed Lavalas supporters, in a context where the UN mission was explicitly mandated to support the post-coup transitional government and implicitly charged with preventing Aristide's return at all cost.

Furthermore, the idea that poor neighbourhoods, and in particular Cité Soleil, were hotbeds of insecurity that could lead to nationwide instability was contested by some participants, who argued that the threat posed by the gangs was exaggerated. Former Deputy Force Commander Aludnate notes that the international and Haitian media tended to exaggerate the level of insecurity in Port-au-Prince (Aldunate, 2010, p. 143), while former Force Commander Heleno argues that the media created panic in the face of criminal actions similar to what occurs in other parts of the world (Heleno Ribeiro Pereira, 2007, p. 11).

Not surprisingly given its background and its actions, MINUSTAH was seen by many Haitians as a highly partisan force that was in effect helping the interim government and the Haitian National Police crackdown on pro-Aristide communities (Donais & Burt, 2015, p. 7). Despite accusations by some states and the Haitian political and business elite that the mission was soft on crime and overly cautious in its tackling of the gang problem, it is clear that it spent significantly more resources intervening in poor neighbourhoods that had historically been loyal to Aristide than against the armed groups that had triggered the 2004 crisis. One analysis notes that "among many former Aristide supporters and members of Lavalas these actions led to a perception of MINUSTAH as not being neutral, since its operations had mainly been concentrated in the areas of Port-au-Prince where Aristide and Lavalas had enjoyed strong support" (Hauge, Doucet, & Gilles, 2015, p. 263). In a strongly worded statement, the organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, which operated hospitals in Cité Soleil) condemned MINUSTAH'S lack of impartiality:

Minustah cannot "reestablish peace" in Port-au-Prince. Because of its mandate from the UN Security Council allowing it to use force in order to accomplish its 'mission', it has become an armed player in the conflict, a source of violence against civilians during police operations in the slums. No longer taken aback by 'collateral damage' caused by UN soldiers, one of its representatives even sees it as the price that has to be paid in order to 'stabilize' Port-au-Prince. There seems little concern if Minustah is now seen by a significant segment of the

population as an occupation force, buttressing a transitional government with limited powers (Salignon, 2005).

2. *MINUSTAH and contentious state-building*

MINUSTAH's intervention in Haiti should be understood as participating in an ongoing process of contentious state-building in the country. As one article on the need to "bring social conflict back in" the study of statebuilding notes, "it is necessary to view international state-builders as simply one party to the highly conflict-ridden process that always generates state forms" (Jones, 2010, p. 548). Contra institutionalist accounts that emphasize rational and technocratic design, historical studies of state formation have shown how states emerge and evolve as compromises are struck between various social forces (Spruyt, 1994; Tilly, 1990). Because statebuilding is fundamentally "a process that advances some interests over others", "to believe that social conflict can be evacuated from state institutions via some sort of institutional fix is simply deluded" (Jones, 2010, p. 563 & 566). The question is which coalition of social forces will be favoured, and whether it will be able to provide stability.

What then was MINUSTAH's statebuilding plan in Haiti? As we have seen, the mission clearly took sides in favour of a coalition that broadly encompassed the country's political and economic elite. This coalition, however, represents a small minority of the Haitian population, and the political history of Haiti shows that it has always been at pains to produce a cohesive national project. As political scientist Robert Fatton (2002, p. 27) argues, "the Haitian state has historically represented the paradigmatic predatory state" in service of the possessing and ruling class.⁵⁰ One of my interviewees, a researcher who has worked for several years in Haiti, put the matter thus:

[MINUSTAH] starts from a false premise: that the state was once strong, that it had a monopoly on legitimate violence, and that it was then captured by private interests. But the state always was a public argument to favour private interests. We're still in a colonial state that was imported. They didn't understand the foundations of the state. The police is colonial to begin with. It's always served to protect private interests. The state is strong in some aspects.⁵¹

⁵⁰ For Fatton the dominant class in Haiti comprises the "possessing" class (which derives its wealth from the private sector) and the ruling class proper (which has direct political control over the state) (Fatton, 2002, pp. 9-10).

⁵¹ Interview 27, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

The end of the Duvalier dictatorship and the aborted democratization attempt in 1987-1991 represented a clash between the historically dominant class and the poor majority. The dictatorship's fall "indicated that subordinates hitherto quiet had finally mustered the means, the resources, and the courage to break their silence" (Fatton, 2002, p. 27). The 1991 coup, in turn, "reflected the persisting capacity of the Haitian dominant class to unleash the most brutal violence against those forces that threatened to turn the change of regime into a change of state" (Fatton, 2002, p. 9). As Fatton notes, dominant classes "will halt democratization once they perceive – objectively or in the imaginary – that popular forces challenge the distribution of resources, the structure of ownership, or the acquisition of privilege" (Fatton, 2002, p. 19).

The 2004 crisis and MINUSTAH's intervention should be put in the context of this history of contentious statebuilding. As one analysis notes, "the approach of the Latortue government, and its domestic and foreign supporters (including the United Nations) was to use a military solution to what is fundamentally a social problem, anchored in profound social, economic and cultural inequalities" (Lemay-Hébert, 2014, p. 204). As the previous section has shown, this problem goes back to the creation of the Haitian state.

Situating MINUSTAH's intervention within this history is particularly important to understand the mission's focus on reforming the Haitian National Police. As others have noted, policebuilding is a "strategy aimed at reconstructing one of the very core parts of statehood in order to rebuild functioning states" (Greener, 2009, p. 124). It is also "inherently political" because "it creates winners and losers" (Hunt, 2015, p. 42). Police reform is not a technical issue, but a "commitment to a specific political development at the expense of other possible developments" (Eide & Holm, 2013, p. 5). In Haiti, policebuilding has always been an integral part of contentious statebuilding. This is not a particularly controversial claim, as many participants and scholars recognize that this is the case. Academic analyses have noted how "there is no precedent for just or neutral state law enforcement in Haiti" (Peirce, 2007, p. 93), and how "public security forces in Haiti have traditionally been more threats than guarantors of human security" (Donais, 2005, p. 271). Former MINUSTAH Police Commissioner Graham Muir put the matter starkly during an interview:

Suffice to say, the police are not known to be, nor have they ever been, a helping service. They have typically been an agent of the state. While they may have a presence in the community, it is not necessarily a trusted or respected presence in their community. So it

wasn't, as I explained to some of those folks who cared to listen, it wasn't so much a question of teaching the Haitian National Police how to behave, what the police had to learn how to do, it was a question of how do you make a society unlearn what they expect of their police? (Muir, 2008, p. 11)

Similarly, former Deputy Force Commander Aldunate notes in his recollection of his time with MINUSTAH: "I realize now that the Haitian people's rejection of the PNH [Police Nationale d'Haïti] and the authorities in general was justified by their past experiences with both. It was going to take time to build a good relationship between the people and their police and other authorities" (Aldunate, 2010, p. 108).

The historical role of the police has led a vast majority of Haitians to rely an alternative means of ensuring their security. A 2017 study of "vigilante brigades" in Haiti found that brigades that were created during the dictatorship to protect communities against the coercive powers of the state persisted in the present (Edouard & Dandoy, 2017). In interviews for the study, it was not uncommon to see police forces referred to as "uniformed bandits" or "legal bandits" serving the powerful (Edouard & Dandoy, 2017, p. 23). The study concluded that these community brigades are still popular not only because of lack of trust in state institutions, but also because the Haitian National Police continues to alienate communities who live in poor neighbourhoods through brutal methods that are reminiscent of the dictatorship (Edouard & Dandoy, 2017, p. 33).

Of course, the idea of turning the police into an instrument in the service of the people rather than a repressive tool of the state is at the centre of the philosophy of security sector reform. "In the UN political imaginary, in order to become democratic, 'abnormal' states [have] to change the ways in which their institutions (in the first place, institutions of punishment) exert[...] power" (Zanotti, 2008, p. 554). Transforming local police forces along democratic, liberal lines so that they are accountable to the law rather than specific governments (Bayley, 2006, p. 145) is part and parcel of peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts. Often, this means efforts at "depoliticizing" police forces so that they do not serve the power in place but the general population.

There are a number of problems with this optimistic interpretation of police reform. First, as argued in Chapter 2, police forces in all societies are always to some extent "politicized". Scholars of police history and police sociologists have shown how "everyday" policing and "political" policing, or "low" and "high" policing, do not constitute separate spheres of order

maintenance but are deeply interconnected.⁵² As criminologist Jean-Paul Brodeur argues, the policing of political activities is not a “deviant” police activity: “political” policing is “a core feature of high policing instead of merely being a suspicious peripheral aspect of the police apparatus” (Brodeur, 1983, p. 507).

Second, in Haiti policing is an integral part of contentious statebuilding, as the history of the Haitian gendarmerie makes clear. The formation and evolution of the Haitian police is deeply intertwined with international intervention in the country and the fate of the Haitian dominant class. Since its creation, the Haitian policing apparatus has been influenced as much by the need to violently enforce social order as by the preoccupations of foreign powers. This is obvious when one considers not only the gendarmerie, but the efforts at police reform in the 1990s. When the international community undertook police reform following Aristide’s return in 1994, international concerns - fighting against drug trafficking – were promoted before local security concerns. In the US-led reform process, the focus on drug enforcement contributed to a militarized policing model (Mendelson-Forman, 2006). The US “Department of Justice arranged training of Haitian police officers at military camps in the United States, where the use of military-style techniques was emphasized” (Peirce, 2007). Furthermore, the US insisted on recruiting former members of the armed forces for the new police force “because they had public security experience”, but also because they were supposed to counterbalance Aristide supporters (Mobekk, 2016, p. 113). In other words, the international community’s calls for a “depoliticized” police force are in direct contradiction with previous international efforts at police reform. The international community has always envisioned the Haitian police as a politicized force and, as shall become clear in the following chapters, the period following the 2004 was no exception.

MINUSTAH’s police actions and its efforts at police reform cannot be understood without putting them in the context of the conflictual process of statebuilding in Haiti. As a Western researcher and human rights worker put it during an interview, “when it’s in the context of a historical analysis of what conflict is, it seems to me that MINUSTAH and PNH [Police Nationale d’Haïti] represent conflict, internal conflict, within the society”.⁵³

⁵² See e.g. Harring (1983) on US urban history and Fassin (2013) on contemporary French policing.

⁵³ Interview 2, Port-au-Prince, May 2017.

3. *Evaluating MINUSTAH*

“In a polarized society, what is a success for some is not necessarily a success for others”.⁵⁴

An understanding of MINUSTAH’s political context and its role in contentious statebuilding is helpful to understand how the mission is evaluated. As we shall see, there is considerable ambiguity among participants about whether MINUSTAH can be considered a success. These divergent discourses can only be understood by acknowledging the subtext behind MINUSTAH’s “stabilization” mission.

The organization of two presidential elections following Préval’s win in 2006 is often presented as a measure of the mission’s success. In 2011, singer Michel “Sweet Micky” Martelly was elected President in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake and in the context of the spreading cholera epidemics and public demonstrations, in elections from which Fanmi Lavalas was barred on a technical matter. In the 2015-2016 elections, Martelly’s designated successor, Jovenel Moïse, a businessman who had been unknown until then, succeeded him at the presidency in a process where the turnout barely reached 20% (Le Monde & AFP, 2017). Despite this low rate of participation (contrasting with the elections in 2000 and 2006), the 2016 elections were touted as a resounding success justifying the withdrawal of MINUSTAH and the transition to the smaller MINUJUSTH. Starting in late 2018, Haiti was rocked by large scale demonstrations against corruption spurred by the “Petrocaribe” case (an oil program sponsored by Venezuela) (Semple, 2018) that continued into 2019. In November 2018, twenty-six people were brutally murdered in the poor neighbourhood of La Saline in an attack involving warring gangs. A 2019 report by MINUJUSTH found that there was credible evidence that the Haitian police and members of the executive had been involved (MINUJUSTH, 2019). Despite this volatile situation, in June 2019 the Security Council voted to replace MINUJUSTH with an Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) in October of that year (UN News, 2019).

Does the transition to MINUJUSTH, and more recently to BINUH, signal MINUSTAH’s success? Some participants have not shied away from calling the mission a failure. In his memoirs published in 2015, former Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno bluntly states that “today, Haiti is not significantly better than it was twenty years ago” (Guéhenno,

⁵⁴ Interview 26, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

2015, p. 256), because it is still the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, it still has one of the worst inequality ratios in the world, and successive UN peace operations have not been able to make a break with the past. For Guéhenno, MINUSTAH's actions looked less like peacekeeping than "an approximation of counterinsurgency", and "the fact that, in the end, the operations did not achieve the political breakthrough that would put Haiti on a sustainable path to peace and development raises serious questions not only for 'robust peacekeeping' [...] but also for the now-fashionable counterinsurgency doctrine" (Guéhenno, 2015, p. 262).

As I conducted interviews in the Port-au-Prince in the summer of 2017, MINUSTAH was preparing to withdraw and be replaced by MINUJUSTH, a smaller mission with no military component. Many interviewees from the international community were worried about the transition, particularly in a context of economic downturn. They thought that Haiti could easily slide back into instability. As one Western diplomat put it (talking about Cité Soleil and other poor neighbourhoods), "they [MINUSTAH] put out the fire, but the embers are still there".⁵⁵ This fear of social unrest had served to justify the continuing presence of a large military contingent in the country for 13 years. Year after year, the UN Secretary-General's report on the situation in the country had underlined that security had increased and Haiti was more stable, yet highlighted that the situation could always degrade, thus justifying recommendations to continue the mission (Verlin, 2014). In interviews, the situation did not appear much better in 2017 than it had in previous years.

In fact, MINUSTAH's withdrawal in 2017 had less to do with the perceived success of the mission than with budgetary considerations. This was explained very clearly to me during interviews with members of MINUSTAH and the diplomatic community. In the context of Donald Trump's election to the presidency, the US was looking to cut the UN peacekeeping budget. As a long running expensive mission, MINUSTAH was one of the first on the chopping block. As a Western diplomat described, "the debate in New York it's, well for the P3, the red line is 8 billion for DPKO's budget. We were at 8.2 billion for the 16 ongoing missions, MINUSTAH was around 300-400 million, so you cut MINUSTAH out, you go under 8 billion".⁵⁶ Similarly, when I asked a Latin American military officer whether MINUSTAH's recruiting and training of the Haitian

⁵⁵ Interview 21, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

⁵⁶ Interview 8, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

police could be considered a success, the immediate response was: “the decision to withdraw MINUSTAH was a budgetary decision”.⁵⁷

While the international community was concerned about the aftermath of MINUSTAH’s departure, I heard another point of view in some of my interviews with upper-class Haitians (generally people from civil society and the university). Thus, when asked to evaluate the mission, the head of a prominent human rights organization argued that “MINUSTAH does not play an important role. MINUSTAH is not an efficient mission”.⁵⁸ Similarly, a Haitian political scientist noted: “when you talk to people, let’s say ordinary people, from civil society, they say ‘we don’t know what MINUSTAH is doing here, what’s its use’. It’s as if they’re indifferent to its presence, they’re not conscious that MINUSTAH is present”.⁵⁹ These assessments stand in sharp contrast with, for instance, the testimonies of inhabitants of Cité Soleil whose family members were killed and houses destroyed during MINUSTAH raids (see e.g. Wills, 2018). For these people, MINUSTAH was criminal, not inefficient. Thus, many residents interviewed in the documentary “It stays with you” complain that no one from the UN came to see them and investigate in the aftermath of those raids. As one resident put it, “a massacre takes place in an area and no one comes to find out how many victims there were, or how many people were lost, how many cases there are” (Wills, 2018, p. 683).

So, what are we to make of these contradictory assessments? I argue that they are much easier to understand if one takes into consideration the role played by MINUSTAH in the process of contentious statebuilding. MINUSTAH clearly took sides in favour of the small dominant class, but historically this class has been unable to propose a national project that could rally the vast poor majority, and has often had to rely on external intervention to ensure its grip on power. To put it differently, the dominant class refuses to give up power, but it cannot provide stability. In this context, MINUSTAH’s stabilization mission could not succeed in the long run. This explains the seemingly paradoxical assessment of international interveners: in many ways, MINUSTAH seems to have ticked all the boxes, yet the moment it leaves chaos may erupt again. On the other hand, for the dominant Haitian class, MINUSTAH had not done enough to help it secure power. As we shall see in Chapter 4, the Haitian elite accused MINUSTAH of being too soft on the gangs

⁵⁷ Interview 34, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

⁵⁸ Interview 6, Port-au-Prince, May 2017 (translated from French).

⁵⁹ Interview 5, Port-au-Prince, May 2017 (translate from French).

and pushed it to intervene much more forcefully in Cité Soleil and other poor neighbourhoods. The mission only partially fulfilled their wishes. Because MINUSTAH was submitted to other imperatives – including budgetary debates at the UN – its support for the dominant class’ project was far from unwavering. As the previously mentioned Haitian political scientist notes:

But there is a sort of, I’d say, a sort of misunderstanding. [Between] people who think that MINUSTAH is there to solve their security problems, and the international community, which decides to deploy MINUSTAH, which has other concerns. [...] Even though at one given point there was collusion, that’s quite possible. When Aristide had to leave in 2004, it’s clear that the Haitian elite, well, represented by what they call the Group of 184, it was acting in concert with the international community, or rather France and the US.

[...]

If you look at the issue throughout time, you’re going to see that at some points this country’s elites got along well with MINUSTAH, with the countries that control MINUSTAH, and at other points they didn’t.⁶⁰

For populations who had been on the receiving end of MINUSTAH’s robust raids, however, there seemed little doubt that the mission was aligned with the Haitian dominant class in repressing them, and that it had done so rather successfully. As one union leader put it, “MINUSTAH is the continuity of the status quo in Haiti”.⁶¹

4. What would have happened had MINUSTAH not been there? The problem with counterfactuals

But surely, regardless of how badly MINUSTAH performed, it cannot be worse than what Haitians would have done if left by themselves? I have encountered this rejoinder more than once when presenting my work, and I know it is not an uncommon view. Haitian political scientist Robert Fatton, for instance, is not particularly warm towards the UN mission, but speculates that without MINUSTAH Haiti “would have easily degenerated into a chaotic Hobbesian world” (Fatton, 2011, p. 41).

I have already provided some elements of response to this counterfactual argument. For defenders of human rights, the comparison between the years that preceded the 2004 coup and UN intervention and the years that followed should raise concerns. Furthermore, my claims are not particularly controversial in a context where many UN participants themselves see the mission as

⁶⁰ Interview 5, Port-au-Prince, May 2017 (translated from French).

⁶¹ Interview 33, Port-au-Prince, July 2017 (translated from French).

a failure. In addition, the outbreak of the cholera epidemic clearly tainted the mission's legacy. Not only did the epidemic lead to over 8,000 deaths and over 600,000 infections,⁶² but the inability to hold the UN accountable because of the organization's immunity clearly belied MINUSTAH's focus on restoring the "rule of law" (Pillinger, Hurd, & Barnett, 2016).

In addition to these elements, I see two broader problems with the counterfactual argument that revolves around the question "but what would have happened without the UN intervention?" and the presumption that critique is not legitimate since the alternative (however ill-defined, but we assume it is bloody) would have been worse.

First, although those who raise counterfactuals tend to see themselves as hard-nosed objective observers, the counterfactual argument comes straight out of the interveners' discourse. In fact, it is precisely Kofi Annan's argument in the quote that opens this chapter: "No one wants to intervene, but ultimately there is no choice" (Annan, 2004). In other words, this is a political discourse. Far from me the idea that we should (or can) ban politics from academic research, but at the very least we should be aware of the assumptions and worldviews that sustain this discourse. The argument of "intervention or barbarism" has a long historical pedigree, and not so long ago could be found under the avatar of "imperialism or barbarism" (Rieff, 1999). As others have pointed out, justifications for intervention along these lines often rest on a racialized view of the world "as a space where civilized peoples from the North go to the South to do battle with evil" (Razack, 2004). In the case of Haiti, this argument was used to justify the US occupation of 1915-1934 (Renda, 2001). In fact, the counterfactual "what would have happened without UN intervention?" is based on a certain representation of Haiti that can be traced back to the Haitian Revolution. This representation positions Haitians alternatively as helpless children in need of protection or as violent subjects driven by mythical Vodou beliefs. There are many discursive parallels between the justifications for the US occupation in the early 20th century and justifications for the UN interventions in the 1990s and 2000s (Pressley-Sanon, 2014). One scholar reports that interviewees from the International Organization for Migration and the UN in the 1990s argued that "it is hogwash to talk about human rights in Haiti, it should be something to aspire to for sure, but we are in a society where violence is part of their culture" and, "in Haiti basic values have gone" (quoted in Mobekk, 2001, p. 110). In 2005, a human rights delegation found that official

⁶² Cholera in Haiti, Center for Disease Control and Prevention, <https://www.cdc.gov/cholera/haiti/index.html>, accessed August 6, 2019.

MINUSTAH documents on DDR blamed the slowness of the disarmament on a cultural “affinity to the weapon” and “violence blessed by Voodoo” (Harvard Law Students for Human Rights & Centro de Justiça Global, 2005, p. 43).

I return to some of the effects of these representations in the last section. For now, I would like to stress that not only do the assumptions sustaining counterfactual scenarios have a history rooted in racism, but also that, despite their claim to hard-nosed objectivity, they are likely not factually correct. In other words, the problem is not political correctness, but factual correctness. Let us take the example of the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. At that time, there was strong assumptions among the international community that the situation would devolve into chaos, thus justifying emphasis on a military-led humanitarian response. Comparing the international response in Haiti to US actions in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, Mullings, Werner, and Peake (2010) note that both the media and governments “constructed Haitians as dangerous and violent, a people so pre-disposed to criminality that it was necessary to ‘secure’ the island before desperately needed medical supplies, food and water could be distributed to the injured and displaced”. Over 40 governments deployed military assets and the US alone deployed 22,000 troops to, among other things, ensure the security of aid distribution. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates, for instance, justified the role of the military in the relief effort by pointing out that “without any structure for distribution or to provide security when things become available, then it seems to me that’s a formula for contributing to chaos rather than – rather than preventing it” (Shaughnessy, 2010). The fear of widespread looting and violence was widely relayed in the international media, sometimes in contradiction to the facts on the ground (Katz, 2013, p. 82). In fact, the militarized distribution of aid itself sparked panic and chaos, as journalist Jonathan Katz relates in his book on the aftermath of the earthquake (Katz, 2013). The following anecdote encapsulates the contradiction:

Looking back, aid workers would say they did the best they could under the circumstances. One aid worker later told me that food distribution had improved once the panic abated. But people weren’t panicking in Haiti, I said.
 ‘Well, people were panicking outside of Haiti’, she replied (Katz, 2013, p. 80)

As some analyses have shown there was a wide gap between the “myths” relayed in the media and the reality on the ground (I. Gilmore, 2010; Golash-Boza, 2010). Despite this reality, the absence of chaos was taken as proof that the security-first, militarized response had worked.

Thus, when the US military relief mission ended after six months, “one of the most-cited proofs of its success was that no riots had taken place” (Katz, 2013, p. 106). There are many parallels here that should encourage caution about volunteering counterfactual arguments regarding how things would have happened without the intervention of the international community. At the very least, it warrants asking the question of where these counterfactual scenarios come from, and what type of imaginary sustains them.

The other problem with the counterfactual argument is that it is ahistorical. It proceeds as if international intervention in Haiti was not a historical reality, from colonialism to slavery to occupation to international meddling in the country’s affairs. Because of this history, there is no basis in reality for a scenario where in 2004 the “international community” decided to change tracks and not intervene. In fact, as we have seen earlier, the international community played a major role in tacitly (and sometimes less tacitly) supporting the coup against Aristide in 2004. So in order to seriously entertain a counterfactual about what would have happened had the UN not intervened, you would also need to assume that the international community had not worked to oust Aristide; not only that, but you would also need to go back in Haitian history and think of what the counterfactuals would have been at several moments of Haitian history had the international community not meddled in the country’s affairs. Haiti’s history has been so internationalized since before the country’s independence that it is this assuredly an impossible task.

III. MINUSTAH as entry point

1. Haiti: single case study or entry point?

In the language of qualitative analysis, Haiti can be thought of a “most-likely case” – if my analysis of peacekeeping as policing is correct, it is likely to apply to Haiti if it applies to any case at all (Bennett & Elman, 2009). As we shall see in this section, MINUSTAH is both representative of a number of trends in UN peacekeeping and understood as a blueprint for future missions. In many ways, it is emblematic of the turn to policekeeping.

However, presenting my work on Haiti as a “single case study” would clash with my theoretical framework. One of my main contributions is to argue that peace operations should be understood as part of a global field of policing, and that they are transnational points of cross-fertilization for the creation and transmission of policing practices. This makes it difficult to think of a peace operation as a “case”, since cases tend to be understood as bounded units of analysis.

For instance, a widely cited chapter by Robert Stake on qualitative case studies argues that “the object of study is a specific, unique, bounded system” (Stake, 2005, p. 445). This view stands in sharp contrast with the approach proposed in Global Historical Sociology (GHS), a current in which I broadly situate my work. The “history” part of GHS posits that “the world is not composed of static entities with timeless properties but, rather, is ‘on the move,’” so that “there is no static unit of analysis and no set of universal properties that can be attributed to these units” (Go & Lawson, 2017b, p. 3). The “global” part of GHS, on the other hand, cautions against “methodological nationalism”, the assumption that “the boundaries of social relations map directly onto the boundaries of the nation-state” and that “nation-states form the natural unit of social scientific analysis” (Go & Lawson, 2017b, p. 4).⁶³ The idea of bounded national cases fits badly with an ontology that emphasizes relationalism and co-constitution.

More than a case, Haiti and MINUSTAH can be understood as an entry point into the study of policekeeping and how it fits in the global field of policing. This section argues that it is a good entry point because it encapsulates a number of broader evolutions in UN peace operations. The empirical chapters (4 to 6) will demonstrate how it can also be situated in the wider field of global policing, and that it not only draws on existing discourses and practices in this field but contributing to constitute it.

2. *MINUSTAH as blueprint*

As we have seen, although MINUSTAH is sometimes presented as a “strange” mission, in fact it fits well within broader evolutions in the field of peacekeeping in the 2000s and 2010s. First, MINUSTAH has clear historical antecedents, including the UN missions established in the late 1990s in Kosovo and Timor Leste. In both these cases, UN Police assumed an executive mandate in a context where the missions’ “primary tasks became protecting the international civilian interim government against what were often called ‘spoilers’” (Brocades Zaalberg, 2012, p. 89). One observer notes that agreement between Haitian government and the UN to establish MINUSTAH was “remarkably similar in wording to that reached with the government of Timor-Leste” (Durch, 2014, pp. 4-5). Both missions were concerned about organized crime, and the mission in Timor Leste carried out some anti-gang functions.

⁶³ See also Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002).

MINUSTAH's actions in Haiti also share many parallels with the EU mission in Bosnia, EUFOR. One analysis of EUFOR's law enforcement strategy found that the mission's military commanders were initially hesitant to engage in law enforcement tasks, and that they ended up doing so unsystematically; that they relied extensively on Formed Police Units (called IPU's in the EU context), thus promoting a paramilitary form of policing; that they did not really define "organized crime" and a clear strategy to fight it; and that the threat of organized crime was seriously over-inflated (Friesendorf & Penksa, 2008). As we shall see, these are all issues with which the UN mission in Haiti grappled.

While the specific process of contentious statebuilding in Haiti is particular to that case, contentious statebuilding is a reality in all countries where the international community promotes policebuilding efforts. The ethnic and political conflict in Timor Leste may not resemble the situation in Haiti, but it also affected the statebuilding and policebuilding context (Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007). Furthermore, internationalized policebuilding tends to produce similar effects in various settings in a context where efforts at policebuilding (either multilateral or bilateral) are determined by regional and international agendas focused on crime and security issues, rather than local concerns (Goldsmith & Sheptycki, 2007).

In other words, MINUSTAH is not a particularly strange mission in the broader landscape of peace operations in the late 1990s and 2000s. In addition, the mission is sometimes cited as a "laboratory" and a "blueprint" for future operations, in light of its precedent-setting on a number of issues. MINUSTAH was a "laboratory" because it allowed for the development and refinement of new practices, and is seen as a "blueprint" because this experience is taken to be a model for future operations. In this sense, MINUSTAH truly was both a point of "cross-fertilization" (McCoy, 2009, p. 34) and a "transmission belt" (Stockmarr, 2016) for practices of policing in peace operations.

While conducting research, I was struck by the fact that several interviewees used the word "laboratory" to describe MINUSTAH. A high-level MINUSTAH police officer in Port-au-Prince told me: "I think Haiti could be a laboratory for a new model of cooperation, with more space for the civilian component. Because there is no war. Can police pacify? What's the use of the military component?"⁶⁴ Pointing to the fact that "MICIVIH was the first mission of its kind in the world",

⁶⁴ Interview 15, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

a Haitian human rights official argued that “Haiti is a little international laboratory”.⁶⁵ According to a Secretariat source in New York, “Haiti is a laboratory”, even though “the lessons you draw are not necessarily the best or the most accurate. There are individual interpretations”.⁶⁶ Other scholars working on Haiti have encountered similar responses. One notes that, during an interview, a former DDR officer for MINUSTAH stated that “Haiti served a bit like a laboratory to try to understand what to do” (Schuberth, 2015, p. 8). The concept of “laboratory” captures a key aspect of the role of peace operations in constituting global order: that they generate new experiences. But the concept of laboratory leaves out some other important elements. The laboratory approach “looks at how ‘we’ develop theories, go test them elsewhere (on our distant ‘others’) and come back home to apply them (on our near ‘others’)”; this ignores “the roles played by both sides [“core” and “periphery”] in the production of goods and ideas, and their mutual transformation through this interaction” (Bilgin, 2016, p. 187). This is why I prefer to refer to peace operations as transnational points of cross-fertilization for the creation and transmission of policing practices. While this may not be as elegant as “laboratory”, it better captures the ideas of co-constitution, creation and circulation.

These multiple references to MINUSTAH’s function as a “laboratory” suggest that the mission generated new experiences, and that these experiences has repercussions beyond the Haitian case. First, MINUSTAH was the first “stabilization” mission authorized by the Security Council, a concept that has now travelled to the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali (for more on stabilization, see Chapter 2). MINUSTAH thus announced somewhat of a turning point in UN peacekeeping doctrine. And it was not the first time that Haiti had set a precedent for the UN. In the 1990s, Haiti was also one of the first cases of UN intervention outside of a context of armed conflict (Pouligny-Morgant, 1998). As one analysis notes, Haiti “represents a microcosm of the doctrinal evolution of peacekeeping over the years. MINUSTAH is the latest of seven UN missions in the country – stretching over 20 years of international involvement in Haiti” (Lemay-Hébert, 2018, p. 90). The mission’s experience with “integration” and the role of Formed Police Units (explored in Chapter 4 and 5) also situate it squarely within broader evolutions in UN peacekeeping in the 2000s.

⁶⁵ Interview 16, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

⁶⁶ Interview 42, New York, February 2018 (translated from French).

MINUSTAH's "stabilization" experience is clearly valued within the UN and outside of it. In 2013, Brazilian General Santos Cruz, who was MINUSTAH Force Commander from January 2007 to April 2009, was personally invited by the UN Secretariat to lead MONUSCO and its new "Force Intervention Brigade" in light of his experience with robust peacekeeping in Haiti (Harig & Kenkel, 2017, p. 638). When MINUSTAH ended in 2017, Brazil decided to send troops to participate in the stabilization mission in the Central African Republic, MINUSCA. According to the Brazilian Armed Forces, this decision was motivated by the UN's hope that Brazilian commanders could transmit to their colleagues of other nationalities the experience obtained in Haiti, given that the mission is considered to be a success (Kawaguti, 2018). MINUSTAH's stabilization experience is also mentioned in a 2008 Canadian counterinsurgency manual and a Brazilian counterinsurgency manual released in 2015 (Müller, 2016).⁶⁷ The US stabilization efforts in Cité Soleil, the Haiti Stabilization Initiative, "was designed to pilot a model for stabilisation for other complex environments where the US is currently engaged, including Afghanistan and Iraq" (Muggah, 2010, p. 8).

Indeed, MINUSTAH is deemed to be fairly representative of the "complex and asymmetrical environments" in which UN peace operations are increasingly expected to be deployed. The idea of "complex and asymmetrical environments" refers to "situations where organized conflict coexists with other types of criminal/urban violence, or post-conflict scenarios in which major organized conflict has been settled in a peace agreement but criminal, communal, and/or revenge-based violence continues to pose significant physical threats to civilians" (Sebastián, 2015, p. 28). Thus, "a number of programmes implemented in Haiti have been described by practitioners on the ground as a role model for future peace operations in unconventional settings characterized by the proliferation of [urban armed groups]" (Schuberth, 2017, p. 5). At a time when peace operations are increasingly expected to operate in urban environments (Bosetti, Cooper, de Boer, & Munshey, 2016), MINUSTAH's experience dealing with the gangs of Port-au-Prince is highly relevant at the UN and beyond. The International Committee of the Red Cross, for instance, conceived of Haiti as a 'laboratory' for new engagement in urban areas affected by armed gangs" (Muggah, 2010, p. 15).

⁶⁷ A version of the manual is available on Wikileaks at https://wikileaks.org/wiki/Canadian_Counter-insurgency_Operations_manual_13_Dec_2008, accessed 11 May 2017.

The mission's experience with intelligence and disarmament, in particular, are sometimes cited as blueprints for future operations. According to Dorn (2009) and Dziedzic and Perito (2008), MINUSTAH was the first "intelligence-led" peacekeeping mission, leading to a change in UN doctrine on the issue. In 2005, MINUSTAH established an integrated "Joint Mission Analysis Centre" (JMAC) gathering representatives of the military, police and civilian branches of the mission at the behest of the Security Council (Dorn, 2009, p. 806). It was not until the next year that DPKO adopted an organization-wide policy on the role of JMACs in peace operations (UN DPKO/DFS, 2006). MINUSTAH was not the first mission to use intelligence, but it signaled a shift in the acceptance of this practice. As one participant notes, UNMIK in Kosovo had already deployed intelligence against "criminals", "but the success had not translated to doctrine, policy, or operational acceptance at the political level" (Beer, 2016, p. 85).

MINUSTAH's "Community Violence Reduction" (CVR) program is also seen as a blueprint for future missions. The CVR program's purpose was to work "with marginalized neighbourhoods to create economic and social opportunities in view to extract them from violence and the influence of gangs" (MINUSTAH Fact Sheet, quoted in (Schuberth, 2017, p. 12). CVR is sometimes touted as the "next generation" of DDR mechanisms (Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015) in "unconventional settings" (Schuberth, 2017). A critical take on these programs focused on temporary "cash for work" schemes is proposed in Chapter 4.

Generally, MINUSTAH is seen as a key milestone in the evolution of the role of the police in UN peace operations. According to a Police Advisor in New York, the Special Police Advisory Group (SPAG) chose to conduct its first field trip in Haiti in 2018 "because it is a mission that exemplifies current police. The results of this mission will condition the future of police at the UN."⁶⁸ Similarly, a Western diplomat in New York argued that MINUSTAH could serve as a model in two ways: "One is [...] the important, beyond important, the central role that police peacekeepers will play, particularly in transition contexts. And then secondly, there's a lot of lessons we're going to have to learn from Haiti just on the issue of transition of a major peacekeeping mission drawing down".⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Interview 44, New York, February 2018 (translated from French).

⁶⁹ Interview 47, New York, March 2018.

IV. Studying Haiti

1. *Situatedness*

Social analysis, like the operation of power, is never neutral. Whether we like it or not, our efforts to comprehend the world inevitably express a politics: a set of commitments to how the world should be. Claims to value-neutrality are just so much special pleading: better to be honest about what we think is important (Laffey & Weldes, 2009, p. 79).

In a piece on scholarly situatedness and method, Neumann and Neumann (2015, p. 800) argue that “it is helpful for the scholar to reflect on where that gaze comes from and what it does and does not catch, and it is helpful for readers who want to evaluate the findings to know something about the origins of the scholarly gaze that engendered the research.” Often, the role of the researcher and his or her biases are left out of the analysis, because authors are concerned that revealing these will decrease their legitimacy, or that it will be dismissed as egocentric navel gazing (Wilkinson, 2008, p. 60). In this section, I lay some of my cards on the table, in the hope that this will help the reader navigate the research and evaluate my claims. Although I believe this should generally be a necessary step in every research project, it is particularly important in the case of Haiti.

In an article covering the aftermath of the 2004 coup and the international intervention, *The Economist* noted that “establishing facts is a near impossibility in Haiti, where claims and counterclaims fly freely” (The Economist, 2004). This assessment may have reflected a widely held belief among internationals that Haitians are prompt to propagate rumors and quick to develop conspiracy theories (usually involving international interference in Haitian affairs). But the idea that “establishing facts is a near impossibility in Haiti” can also refer to how foreigners interpret and represent Haiti. The question of the “international gaze” on Haiti is not a recent problem. As Haitian anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot argues, in the 19th century the seeming impossibility of a slave revolt in the worldview of whites in Europe and North America meant they were incapable of seeing, let alone understanding, the Haitian revolution even as it was happening (Trouillot, 2012).

Today, not only media coverage, but also scholarly analysis of international intervention in the country tends to be highly political, as analyses of the 2004 coup make clear. While in some quarters the events leading up to February 2004 are presented as a truly grassroots democratic mobilization against an increasingly authoritarian and violent head of state, in others they are

deemed to be the product of a small opposition funded and encouraged by Canada, France and the US. Was Aristide a bloodthirsty tyrant in the making or a President under siege from an elite minority and abandoned by the international community? Did he leave of his own volition or was he kidnapped by the US, as he claims? One look at the literature makes it clear that these questions have not received a settled answer that would command universal approval. Some analyses refer to the events of 2004 as a “coup d’état” (Schuberth, 2017, p. 7), others as an “uprising” (Donais, 2009b, p. 753). A report by the Spanish organization FRIDE argues that in 2004 Haiti “was in the throes of a social rebellion against an oppressor and a struggle by former military leaders to overthrow this power” (Gauthier & Bonin, 2008, p. 2). Reports by Amnesty International and International Crisis Group published in 2004 avoid the term “coup” and prefer to refer to Aristide’s “departure” (International Crisis Group, 2004), noting that “he left Haiti in disputed circumstances” (Amnesty International, 2004, p. 4). As we shall see in Chapter 4, MINUSTAH participants themselves were not sure which label to stick on Haiti – was it a case of civil war, of generalized chaos, or simply of a society plagued by high levels of poverty and inequality? The political lines around the 2004 coup did not even fall neatly along “left” and “right” leanings. It is not simply that media and scholars more on the left supported Aristide while those more on the right supported his overthrow. On the left, there was ardent criticism of Aristide for accepting neoliberal measures imposed by the international financial institutions and betraying the hopes that he had inspired in the 1990s.

We could devote a study to studies of Haiti, and I obviously cannot do so in the space of this dissertation. However, it is important to mention this background because it matters. It would be tempting to think that we can analyze MINUSTAH objectively, regardless of whether we think Aristide was an evil dictator or a flawed President facing an impossible situation, but this would be an illusion. The counterfactual “what would had MINUSTAH not been there?”, for instance, revolves around a certain vision of the events of 2004 and of Aristide’s record and persona.

So where do I stand? I am naturally suspicious of claims by the “international community” that it is acting in the name of democracy to defeat tyrants in the Global South, even more so when these claims come from three countries with whose history and politics I am more than passingly familiar: France (my country of origin), Canada (my country of adoption) and the US (where lived and worked for 3 years). Given the historical record, I think this is a healthy bias that encourages me never to take these claims at face value. I am also sensitive to the place that Haiti occupies in

the Western imaginary, and to the “long tradition of misrepresenting the Haitian nation and its culture, especially on the part of Westerners” (James, 2010, p. 9). I am inclined to locate the current moment (and the current intervention) within a long history of interactions between Haiti and the Western world. This interaction has been characterized by colonialism, brutal slavery, occupation, and constant interference in Haitian affairs. Again, being aware of this history makes me skeptical that the “international community” is a benevolent force seeking to promote “stability” and “development” in Haiti.

The way I came to Haiti, or Haiti came to me, also matters. As demonstrated above, the “case” selection can be justified on a number of objective grounds, but that would not be telling the whole story. As Neumann and Neumann (2015, p. 818) note, “choice of field, choice of research question and choice of theories are often tied to autobiography”. I became interested in Haiti before my PhD, when I was working for a small non-profit organization in New York, from 2010 to 2013. One of the organization’s programs focused on monitoring the work of the Security Council, including peace operations. My New York experience coincided with the outbreak of cholera in Haiti, and the organization helped organize advocacy efforts at UN headquarters to push the UN to recognize its responsibility. This prompted me to read widely about the country’s history and its connections to the international. I carried this background with me to the PhD program, and knew that I wanted to do research on Haiti from the very beginning. With this background in mind, it may not surprise anyone that I developed a highly critical view of MINUSTAH’s intervention in Haiti. Importantly, I believe, this critique developed far beyond the introduction of cholera in the country. In fact, the reader will notice that cholera makes few appearances in my work. In many ways, however, the question of cholera embodies a contradiction in the UN’s “protection” role that echoes my own analysis.

That being said, I do not claim that the international community’s is responsible for all of Haiti’s woes. Some are self-inflicted. As Susan Buck-Morss notes in her book *Hegel, Haiti and Universal History*, “to narrate Haiti’s history as good versus evil stunts our capacity for moral judgment. Past suffering does not guarantee future virtue. Only a distorted history is morally pure” (Buck-Morss, 2009, p. 138). Thus, after independence, “Haiti’s founding fathers used a discourse of nationalist unity ideologically to push the freed slaves back into conditions of plantation labor and production for export” (Buck-Morss, 2009, p. 138). Political scientist Robert Fatton argues that “Haitian politics have been characterized by patterns of authoritarianism since the rise of

Toussaint Louverture and independence in 1804”, and that these patterns “are rooted in the early days of the struggle for emancipation” (Fatton, 2004, p. 22). But these patterns were reinforced by (and hard to separate from) the colonial legacy, including the aftermath of practices of slavery and of an independence war that ruined the country, and by the following history of international interventionism in Haitian affairs (Fatton, 2007). In other words, the history of Haiti has never been simply a Haitian affair. This is why asking the counterfactual question “what would have happened without international intervention in 2004?” is simply beside the point.

What about Aristide and his party Lavalas? As many critics have argued, the Aristide of 1990 was not the Aristide of 2000 (Dupuy, 2006b). But legitimate critique of his government has to be accompanied by an awareness of the conditions that he was facing in the 2000s at the domestic and international level. And, if one is concerned about human rights, it is undeniable that even the worst parts of Aristide’s presidency pale in comparison to what came after. As the double-standard around Aristide’s human rights record and the record of the interim government shows, it is not so much violence as the political project that animates this violence that prompts calls for the international community to “do something”.

With all that in mind, my research is heavily reliant on primary and secondary accounts by the Haitian and international media, by local or international NGOs, and by scholars. The question of how to use the “facts” presented in these accounts was certainly an important one. I adopted two broad methods. First, and perhaps most straightforwardly, triangulation. Did various accounts agree on the broad facts on a given event, even if they disagreed on its interpretation? Second, I often turned to what could be termed the “least favourable source”, i.e. the one that is the least suspect of confirmation bias. Thus, when writing about MINUSTAH, I rely on the actual words of MINUSTAH participants whenever possible. This includes not only the interviews I conducted, but also a surprisingly high number of articles, chapters and even books written by participants about their experience (Pingeot, 2018). In these testimonies, as in interviews, participants have every interest to present the best version of themselves and, I believe, no particular interest in exaggerating their critique of the mission. My use of diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks and of communications between MINUSTAH and DPKO consulted in the UN Archives should also be understood in this context. These are what Moravcsik (1998, p. 10) refers to as “hard” primary sources (direct evidence of decision-making) rather than “soft” or secondary sources, “public statements and journalistic and academic commentary in which authors have less incentives to

report motivations accurately”. I do not necessarily consider these documents entirely more trustworthy because they were meant to be “secret”. People transmitting back information to their headquarters are also engaging in interpretation, and they may have their own motives for over- or underplaying certain facts rather than others. But these documents were useful to put things in perspective. MINUSTAH, for instance, had no particular incentive to be unnecessarily critical of the Haitian Police, a force which it was *de facto* supporting. So cables critically evaluating the police’s “professionalization” and “depoliticization” seem particularly noteworthy.

My use of sources was also informed by background knowledge of the politics of writing on Haiti. For instance, the section above on the lead-up to 2004 and the coup draws heavily from Alex Dupuy’s work, which is a deliberate choice. Dupuy is a well-regarded scholar of Haiti, which makes him a straightforward source. But he has also clearly expressed his own position on what happened in 2004, making clear that he holds little sympathy for Aristide while at the same time being highly critical of the interim government that came after him. In fact, Dupuy agrees on many of the facts with Peter Hallward, who has written a well-documented account that is much more sympathetic to Aristide (Hallward, 2007). Where the two differ is on interpretation: when Dupuy argues that Aristide was the engineer of his own downfall, Hallward stresses that he was placed in an impossible position by the opposition and the international community. In this context, and given the politics of writing about Haiti, citing Dupuy rather than Hallward is more likely to convince those who are on the fence.

2. *Doing research in Haiti*

Scholars have written about the bubble in which internationals working in post-conflict, unstable countries find themselves. Séverine Autesserre has coined the term “Peaceland” to designate the “metaphorical world, inhabited by the transnational community of interveners for whom peace is either the primary objective (such as peacekeepers) or part of a broader set of goals (such as certain diplomats and development workers)” (Autesserre, 2014b, p. 6). “Peaceland” is a play on the term “Aidland”, coined by Apthorpe to describe the world of international development workers (Apthorpe, 2011). There is a rich ethnographic literature on the lives of aid workers (Fechter & Hindman, 2011; Lewis & Mosse, 2006; Mosse, 2005, 2011), which is complemented by growing interest in how the culture and habitus of international interveners affect peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts (Björkdahl, Höglund, Millar, Van Der Lijn, & Verkoren, 2016;

Fetherston & Nordstrom, 1995; Goetze, 2017; Goetze & Bliesemann de Guevera, 2012). These studies have found that international interveners share a similar socio-economic and educational background, live in a bubble, and do not interact with local populations except for local elites.

Short of doing long-term ethnographic work in countries of intervention, scholars can easily fall into similar patterns. In Haiti, as a white foreigner visiting for only a few months, it is easy to fall back on the network of international expats for support and company. This network may provide valuable connections for interviews, but it also means spending most of your time with internationals who tend to share a certain vision of Haiti. This includes, for instance, not only a suspicious view of Haitians, who harbour mercenary motives and an “opportunistic and transactional approach to any interactions with internationals” (Jennings, 2019, p. 35), but also the idea that Port-au-Prince is a dangerous place for internationals, who run the risk of being robbed or kidnapped. There is a well-documented paranoia about insecurity among internationals in Port-au-Prince, which is reinforced by the security procedures adopted by the UN and non-governmental organizations (Dandoy, 2013; Lemay-Hébert, 2018). Chapter 4 addresses these issues more fully, notably how perceptions of insecurity fosters fear of the urban poor. For now I mean to point this out not only to situate my research experience, but also because I believe this background, often unacknowledged, matters in terms of how scholars represent Haiti.

During my fieldwork, there is no doubt that I relied on the expat network. I shared a house in Pacot with internationals from Belgium and France, most of whom had been living in Haiti for a number of years. I had no car, and you see very few *blan*⁷⁰ walking around Port-au-Prince. I was heavily dependent on my roommates for errands, and was grateful that they included me in their social outings, either at other internationals’ houses or at the local bar-restaurant, frequented by a mix of foreigners and locals mostly from the upper(-middle) class. In the first couple of weeks, however, I also found the experience highly alienating. Having fallen prey to the insecurity paranoia, I was concerned about venturing outside of the house by myself. It was only as interviews multiplied and I was obliged to travel by moto taxi that I was able to break out of that paranoia. Being able to go to Fort National or Cité Soleil (two neighborhoods labelled as dangerous “red zones” by MINUSTAH) for interviews certainly provided a very different experience than simply reading about how risky these neighbourhoods were.

⁷⁰ “Blan” literally translates to “white” but is used to designate foreigners in general.

I quickly realized that my mode of transportation was a conversation starter with interviewees. Some were horrified that I had traveled by moto taxi, running the risk of being robbed (or worse), while others tended to be more concerned about traffic accidents. A union leader interviewed in the Sonapi industrial zone commented on how claims of insecurity were overblown and told me “In fact we’re peaceful! We’re a quiet people. You see you can take your moto taxi without trouble”.⁷¹ A Haitian human rights official, an older woman, told me she would do the same if she could, and that I would get to understand Port-au-Prince better this way.⁷² My point here is not to claim this as a badge of honour – I do not claim to have carried out anything approaching ethnographic fieldwork, nor do I want to suggest that concerns for safety are entirely out of place. When traveling by moto taxi, for instance, I always relied on a handful of drivers that had been recommended to me, and rarely hailed one on the street. But I mention all this because it demonstrates that the researcher’s experience can hardly be separated from what they write. The question of insecurity figures highly in discussions around Haiti and MINUSTAH, and my perspective was undoubtedly affected by my own experience. Most obviously, this experience made me skeptical of alarmist accounts about insecurity in Haiti.

I do not pretend that I managed to extricate myself from the international bubble, despite attempts at it. Before my departure, I took two semesters of weekly Haitian Creole class in Montreal, which helped me develop limited proficiency. This did not particularly serve me for interviews – I only did one interview in Creole – but I think it changed my day-to-day experience, if only by boosting my confidence that I was not helpless in an impenetrable environment. Again, I strongly believe that these seemingly peripheral things matter greatly in the research process. I also made a point of reading literature on Haiti that had nothing to do with international security and the question of intervention (of course, given Haiti’s history, the link to the international is often implicitly or explicitly present). This included more ethnographic, anthropological literature (James, 2010; Maternowska, 2006), as well as historical studies (Renda, 2001), political theory (Buck-Morss, 2009), and fiction by Haitian authors (Dany Laferrière, Lyonel Trouillot or Gary Victor, to name only a few of the most well-known). I found the academic literature published for an area studies audience differed remarkably from the literature oriented towards international security: Haiti is generally much less pathologized in area studies and tends to be treated like a

⁷¹ Interview 33, Port-au-Prince, July 2017 (translated from French).

⁷² Interview 16, Port-au-Prince, June 2017.

“normal” case, despite plenty of arguably traumatic “abnormal” historical episodes, from slavery to the Duvalier dictatorship. To put it differently, you get a very different “feel” for Haiti when reading the *Journal of Haitian Studies* or *Caribbean Studies* rather than *International Peacekeeping*. This process of “normalizing” Haiti by avoiding the international security gaze had an important impact on my theoretical development, allowing me to see the connections between the Haitian case and the global field of policing, including supposedly “normal” domestic societies.

Of course I did not become a Haiti expert within the five years of my doctoral work. But I believe I managed to avoid the worst aspects of “parachute” research.⁷³ This, I would argue, is one of the great benefits of focusing on one case.

3. *Conducting interviews*

In Port-au-Prince, I conducted 41 interviews with 13 representatives of MINUSTAH/the UN (5 with members of the civilian branch, 4 with the military branch and 4 with the police branch), 13 members of civil society organizations (2 international and 11 local), 4 representatives of the Haitian National Police, 4 diplomats, 3 scholars (2 Haitian and 1 international), and 1 journalist; 4 interviewees requested anonymity. These were complemented by 13 interviews in New York in February-March 2018, most of them with diplomats (9) and with UN representatives (4). The interviews lasted on average an hour and a half, and some were conducted in more than one sitting. In Port-au-Prince, the interviews were split more or less equally between English and French, with one interview in Haitian Creole. With the interviewee’s agreement, I was able to record 22 of the 54 total interviews. These were fully transcribed, while I did my best to write down notes during and after the interviews that were not recorded.

With time and financial constraints in mind, I made the decision to focus my fieldwork on Port-au-Prince. This choice can be justified by the fact that MINUSTAH spent a considerable amount of its forces and efforts in the capital. As we saw earlier, participants acknowledge that the question of security in Port-au-Prince became the overriding concern of the mission in the years following its deployment. While focusing on Port-au-Prince made sense both from a practical and research point of view, it also means that I cannot provide a complete picture of MINUSTAH’s actions in the country. There is a vast gap between Port-au-Prince and the rest of the country, well-

⁷³ To paraphrase the expression “parachute journalism”, which is particularly appropriate in Haiti (Macdonald, 2008).

illustrated by the fact that, until very recently, Haitians born outside of the capital were designated as “*moun andeyo*”, literally “the people outside”. Some of the dynamics I investigate, such as the representation of the urban poor (Chapter 4) are very specific to Port-au-Prince. Others are more widespread. For instance, the question of how to deal with and contain protests, which I explore in Chapter 5, arose not just in the capital but in many other smaller cities throughout the country, particularly after the cholera outbreak. Future work could explore how the dynamics of policing and order maintenance differ between highly urbanized areas and more rural ones.

In Port-au-Prince, interviews were usually conducted at the interviewees’ workplace, though in a few occasions I also met people in cafés and restaurants. In the case of UN interviewees, this means that I did a lot of commuting between Pacot and the MINUSTAH’s camps (notably “LogBase” and “Delta Camp”), situated close to the airport, as well as a certain amount of “hanging out” at the camps in-between interviews. Diplomatic interviews were often in the wealthy Pétionville, while civil society interviews took place in middle-class neighbourhoods (Turgeau, Bois Verna, Bourdon) and in poorer ones (Bel Air, Cité Soleil, Fort National).

I contacted the interviewees on the basis of pre-fieldwork research to identify relevant organizations and people and through “snowballing”. About three quarters of interview requests were answered positively. UN interviewees were selected with a concern for representativity between the different branches of MINUSTAH (military, police, civilian) and were usually at the officer level. Diplomatic interviewees represented the countries most active in Haiti, while interviewees from the Haitian government worked for the police.

A significant number of my interviewees were from Haitian civil society, which warrants some clarification. The blanket term “civil society” should raise concern everywhere, but it is particularly problematic in Haiti. To put it bluntly, there is not really one single Haitian civil society. Because Haitian society is highly polarized between a small wealthy minority and a vast poor majority, civil society organizations also reflect these divisions. To this must be added the division between Port-au-Prince and the rest of the country, and between the city and the countryside. The politics of these distinctions are often flattened by referring to “civil society” or “human rights organizations”. It would place a heavy burden on the reader to offer a primer on the political history of each organization before quoting them, yet it would also be absurd to claim that these organizations’ views are not situated. When possible, I have attempted to provide background when I refer to interviews with civil society organizations in the dissertation.

The task was not made easy by my choice not to refer to interviewees by name. Most of my interviewees authorized me to use their names in my work, but in the end I decided against it. First, I was concerned about the fairness of naming those who had authorized me to do so while keeping the names of others secret. Second, I also admit feeling concerned about the effects this would have on some of my interviewees. This work may be highly critical of the UN's intervention in Haiti, but I do not hold any of my UN interviewees personally responsible for that situation. I was very grateful to my interviewees for taking the time to speak with me and in many (though obviously not all) cases for their openness, and citing their names seemed a poor way of repaying that. In the end, I decided to identify people through broad descriptors, e.g. "a diplomat from the Global South".

I have no doubt that being a white researcher from McGill made it easier for me to get interviews. In addition, being a young woman often worked in my favour. The vast majority of my interviewees were men – out of 41 interviewees in Port-au-Prince, fewer than 20% were women. While this reflects the gender imbalance within MINUSTAH (especially in the military and police components), the diplomatic community, the Haitian government and Haitian civil society, it can also lead to a skewed view of the situation. In an attempt to remedy this imbalance, I particularly sought out the perspective of a Haitian organization that self-declares as feminist.⁷⁴ In the process of interviewing men (often older), I think being a young woman helped project an image of harmlessness that invited my interviewees to "explain things to me" (Solnit, 2014), particularly in the UN setting, where I interacted with military and police officers. While this can create dynamics that are not always helpful if your interviewees fail to take you seriously, in my case it often worked to my benefit, in the sense that I was interested in reconstructing practices of intervention and their legitimating discourse. The impetus to "explain things to me" provided sometimes illuminating answers to simple questions such as "how do you assess the security situation in Port-au-Prince?" (see Chapter 5).

The situation was somewhat different with Haitian interviewees. I often felt, rightly or wrongly, that they entered the interview with the idea that as a foreigner I just "did not get it", and that it was up to me to prove that I had done my homework. Perhaps being a young woman compounded the effect of being foreign. In any case, this is hardly something I could begrudge them for, given that many foreign observers do avail themselves of the right to discuss Haiti as if

⁷⁴ Interview 39, Port-au-Prince, July 20, 2017.

they “got it” when they really do not. Furthermore, for some of these interviewees it was likely not their first interview experience with an international researcher. This experience may warrant some cynicism overtime, in a context where fieldwork can amount to “‘southern data harvesting’ to be used for metropolitan or northern theory production” (Richmond, Kappler, & Björkdahl, 2015, p. 6).

Because I wanted to trace the circulation of discourses and practices of intervention, I have spent more time focusing on the interveners than those on the receiving end of intervention. Again this is part of the tension between depth and breadth that is inherent when you start from an ontology based on co-constitution and relationalism. This was a practical choice too: in the 2.5 months of my fieldwork, I did not feel equipped to carry out a large number of interviews with e.g. gang members, their family and inhabitants of the slums targeted by UN raids.

That being said, the dissertation clearly attempts to balance the point of view of interveners with the point of view of the intervened upon, and does not mean to “bypass” them (Sabaratnam, 2013). If peace operations are indeed an instance of a broader type of hierarchical relation between those who govern and those who are governed, then looking at it only “from the top” would be incomplete. Thankfully, I was able to rely on a range of sources to try and recover some of the voices “from below”. First, I did conduct a small number of interviews with people in the neighbourhoods that had been targeted by the UN. This included a community organizer whom I met at his house in Fort National. He had lived through the height of the UN’s raids in the area and was involved in weekly demonstrations demanding MINUSTAH’s departure. The interview was held in Creole.⁷⁵ In Cité Soleil, I also met a community organizer who runs a youth centre.⁷⁶ In addition, I conducted a couple of interviews with union leaders and organizers.⁷⁷ While union leaders may not themselves live in the poorest neighbourhoods, they represent a constituency that does – Cité Soleil was in fact originally built to house textile workers (see Chapter 4).

I also relied heavily on secondary sources, benefiting from the fact that there is a range of studies based on interviews and focus groups with the inhabitants of the poorest neighborhoods and with gang members. For instance, human rights investigations often feature interviews with populations affected by the raids (Griffin, 2004; Harvard Law Students for Human Rights &

⁷⁵ Interview 7, Port-au-Prince, May 2017.

⁷⁶ Interview 35, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

⁷⁷ Interview 25, Port-au-Prince, June 2017; Interview 33, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

Centro de Justiça Global, 2005). There are also reports and surveys that address the issue of safety and security in these neighborhoods through the testimonies of inhabitants (Kivland, 2009; Schuller, 2012). I particularly relied on these surveys for Chapter 4, where I evaluate the success of MINUSTAH's protection mandate, as I was cognizant that I did not have the resources to carry out a similar survey myself. In addition, I am indebted to an ethnographic literature on "gangs" and "baz" that relies on extensive fieldwork, interviews and focus groups (Kivland, 2012, 2014, 2017; Kolbe, 2013).

While in Port-au-Prince, I also attended public events that did feature a diversity of voices. In early June 2017, I attended a screening of the documentary "It stays with you", which presents testimonies of Cité Soleil residents who lost family members, who were injured and/or whose house was destroyed during MINUSTAH's raids against gangs. The screening was followed by a discussion, which included a Cité Soleil resident who was interviewed in the documentary. There were also a number of young men from Cité Soleil in the audience, who asked challenging questions about the necessity of doing a documentary rather than using the money to rebuild the houses destroyed during the raids. Earlier in May, I had attended a screening of "The prison from hell", a documentary on overcrowding and pre-trial detention at the Pénitencier National in Port-au-Prince produced for Channel 4 (UK). The screening also featured a panel discussion, and one of the participants was a woman who had been in preventive detention for 7 years and testified about her experience.

The insights gleaned from these various sources are woven in the analysis to provide a counterpoint to UN discourse. In Chapter 4, I contrast MINUSTAH's analysis of gangs with the ethnographic literature on the diversity of organizations that operate in poor neighbourhoods and the multiple functions (social, economic, political, criminal) that they can take on at various times or simultaneously. Chapter 5 addresses the UN narrative of protests in Haiti as driven primarily by mercenary motives, drawing from both interviews and secondary sources that highlight the agency and political grievances of demonstrators.

Chapter 4: Policing the urban poor

As we have seen in Chapter 3, MINUSTAH's intervention in Haiti was characterized by a disproportionate focus on the poor neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince, including Bel Air, Martissant and Cité Soleil, and the threat posed by “gangs” in these areas. These neighbourhoods were seen as the primary source of insecurity and instability in the country, thus justifying robust military-police intervention. MINUSTAH's focus on poor urban areas generated a tension between its mandate to protect civilians and representations of the civilians living in these areas. Poor neighbourhoods were seen as dangerous “red zones” inimical to the UN presence, where the great majority of the population tacitly supported the gangs and engaged in criminal activities. From a population in danger to be protected, slum dwellers became a dangerous population to be policed.

This chapter explores the tension between protecting and policing the urban poor. It argues that this tension stemmed from MINUSTAH's “stabilization” mandate, which tasked the mission with supporting the government in power. Under stabilization, threats to social order were reinterpreted as threats to security, and thus international security, and groups challenging social order were treated as “spoilers” of a non-existent peace process. Rather than keeping the peace between opposite factions, MINUSTAH found itself in charge of containing social conflict between segments of society. In doing so, the mission deployed instruments reminiscent of counterinsurgency strategy, including a fusion of military and police logics and a combination of lethal force and softer “hearts and minds” development tactics.

The first section provides an overview of the socio-economic divides that structure the geography of Port-au-Prince and the history of the poor neighbourhoods that MINUSTAH targeted, as well as the complex and evolving role that “gangs” play in these areas. Section II studies UN representations of these poor neighbourhoods, which the organization classified as “red zones” of insecurity. It explores the tension between the mission's protection of civilians mandate and the stigmatization of the civilians living in these neighbourhoods, showing how areas originally deemed to be “at risk” became “risky”. In Section III, I examine how MINUSTAH's stabilization mission entailed a blurring of the line between armed conflict and social conflict, leading to the adoption of counterinsurgency-like tactics to police social order. I show how MINUSTAH leaders explicitly expressed doubts about the role that the mission should play, and

how the place of the military in particular came under question. The section demonstrates the parallels between MINUSTAH's strategy and counterinsurgency tactics, revealing how concerns for civilian protection were overridden by the goal of stabilization. In light of this strategy, Section IV asks whom and what MINUSTAH was protecting. It investigates whether the mission improved security for the inhabitants of poor neighbourhoods, and the effects of its selective targeting of these areas. Finally, Section V puts MINUSTAH's intervention in a global context, showing how it fits within a trend of militarization of urban marginality. In particular, I explore the synergy between the mission's actions in Haiti and Brazilian military policing of favelas.

I. Urban poverty and socio-economic divides in Haiti

1. A socio-economic history of Port-au-Prince slums

Despite international focus on the poorest neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince, “there has been little sensitivity to the history of these slums—to how they have come to constitute a core area of the larger socio-economic fault lines in Haiti” (Hauge et al., 2015, p. 263). The geography of Port-au-Prince is a spatial illustration of the socio-economic divide between a small elite minority and the rest of the Haitian population. Haiti is one of the world's most unequal countries, with the 4th highest Gini coefficient after Lesotho, South Africa and Micronesia.⁷⁸ According to the 2016 report of the Independent Expert on Human Rights in Haiti, “inequality continues to be a serious concern and remains the core cause of the critical situation of human rights in the country” (UN General Assembly, 2016, p. 4). An analysis of the geography of the capital notes:

Haiti still hosts two disparate societies in an unofficial apartheid. The geography of Port-au-Prince also reflects this sharp social division. Port-au-Prince has been through a progressive process of ‘popularisation of certain neighbourhoods’, especially the ‘lower’ neighbourhoods – signifying a proximity to sea level but also socioeconomic status – while, at the same time, the elite has occupied the ‘higher’ locations, especially around Pétion-Ville (Lemay-Hébert, 2018, p. 92).

Although the term of “apartheid” may be shocking, it has also been used by UN participants. The former head of DDR for MINUSTAH, Desmond Molloy, has written that Haiti experiences a “system of apartheid” against the poor majority (Molloy, 2017, p. 10). This social

⁷⁸ See e.g. the CIA's World Factbook: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html>

apartheid is reflected in the geography of Port-au-Prince. An ethnographic study of the city (Louis, 2009) established a hierarchy of four types of neighbourhoods. At the top are the wealthy neighbourhoods, usually situated on the mountain's slopes, including Pétionville and the gated community Vivy Mitchell, which houses many UN workers. These neighbourhoods are well served by public services, though they also rely on private means, such as generators for electricity. Second come neighbourhoods that are historically middle-class, including Pacot (where I lived during my fieldwork), Bourdon and Canapé Vert. These neighbourhoods have basic infrastructure (including paved roads, sewers and some street lighting) and receive decent public services (including garbage collection), though the provision of electricity and water can be intermittent. Third come the old lower class neighbourhoods, such as Carrefour-feuilles, Nazon and Delmas. These neighbourhoods historically had good infrastructure and service provision but are increasingly derelict, and some are turning into slums. Finally come the slums. There are over 357 "cités" in Port-au-Prince. These lack basic infrastructure, public services and a land registry system (Louis, 2009, pp. 140-143). Up to three quarters of Port-au-Prince residents live in these precarious neighbourhoods (Mathon, 2005). Circulation between these four types of neighbourhood is limited. Wealthy residents have no reason to venture into poorer areas, and poor residents are considered *persona non grata* in wealthy areas, except in their role as domestic workers (Louis, 2009).

The history of the "cités" in Port-au-Prince is tied both to the predatory nature of the Haitian state (Fatton, 2002) and the country's disadvantaged position in the international economy (Fatton, 2014). Cité Soleil, for instance, was developed under the government of François Duvalier (and originally named after his wife, Cité Simone) as a low-income housing project for workers arriving from the countryside to work in textile assembly factories in Port-au-Prince – an industry that subsequently collapsed. The neighbourhood covers 25 square miles and was originally meant to house 50,000 workers, though it is now home to an estimated 300,000 to 350,000 people (some estimates even put the population at half a million). As one analysis notes, Cité Soleil is the result of "unplanned urbanization resulting from a rural exodus, induced by deteriorating productivity in the rural environs combined with the attraction of urban manufacturing jobs in textile and assembly industries" (Marcelin, 2015, p. 233). International actors continue to argue that low-wage garment production is the future of economic development in Haiti despite this historical precedent and despite the fact that these low wages provide workers "with little more than needed for survival"

(Lauterbach, 2013, p. 11). Indeed, a 2019 report found that the cost of living in Haiti is more than 4 times the minimum wage for apparel workers (Solidarity Center, 2019). Meanwhile, contemporary neglect of the Haitian agricultural sector continues to drive migration to Port-au-Prince, in particular to areas like Cité Soleil (Hauge et al., 2015, p. 277).

These poor neighbourhoods played an important role in the end of the dictatorship in Haiti. Starting in 1986, Cité Soleil emerged as one of the centres of the movement for democracy. The movement around Lavalas originated from the church where Aristide officiated, Saint Jean Bosco, near the Bel Air slum. Popular organizations (“organisations populaires”) that were later accused of being gangs played a key role on this process.

2. *Gangs, “chimères”, popular organizations and “baz”*

Although the international community often refers to the “gangs” of Cité Soleil and other slums, the concept of “gang” notoriously eludes definitions. Indeed, there is a rich literature in criminology on the vagueness of the concept, how it constructs the very phenomenon that it purports to describe, and how “gang members” may or may not self-identify as such (Ball & Curry, 1995; Bjerregaard, 2002; Decker & Kempf-Leonard, 1991; Decker, Melde, & Pyrooz, 2013; Esbensen, Winfree, He, & Taylor, 2001). The concept of “gang” comes from a specific context (anglophone, especially the US) and carries negative normative connotations (Moestue & Muggah, 2009, p. 16), complicating its use as an academic category of analysis.

In Haiti, there are a number of other concepts that are sometimes used to describe what the international community refers to as “gangs”, including “baz” (base) and popular organizations. Indeed, As one analysis of “gangs” in Port-au-Prince notes, “contrary to popular assumptions about the role and behaviour of these groups, little empirical knowledge exists about their nature, composition, and motivations” (Erickson, 2014, p. 26). There is a great disconnect between the way these groups are portrayed in academic and policy analyses produced in an international security context and more ethnographic approaches concerned about their history and socio-economic role.

For instance, a study of Bel Air argues that “negative stereotypes of ‘Haiti’s gangs’ often do not correspond to how these groups construe themselves and are viewed by the local population” (Erickson, 2014, p. 5). Indeed, “many residents of Haiti’s popular zones conceive of gangs as ‘political associations’, ‘community groups,’ and most commonly as ‘bases’” (Kolbe,

2013, p. 3). Though the international community sometime uses those terms interchangeably, they carry different connotations, which are often highly contextual. A researcher who has been working on baz in Haiti for several years argued that “baz doesn’t necessarily mean armed group. It could just be a group of friends that hangs out”.⁷⁹ Similarly, the head of an organization that works in the Martissant neighbourhood volunteered the following explanation:

The word “baz” has many connotations. If you’re my friend, a long-time friend, if we meet often, you’re my baz. If you have a group of friends that meets every Friday to watch a football game, or drink beer, that’s my baz. And there’s also the connotation of armed gang doing illegal activities like robbing or kidnapping or human trafficking, drug trafficking etc, controlling the neighbourhood through violence, ok they are an armed baz. But they are also baz that just smoke marijuana for instance, ok? That are not involved in violent activities, they’re just sitting in the shade and they’re having fun you see? So it’s not completely interchangeable.⁸⁰

This is not to deny that what we think of as “gangs” exist in poor neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince, but to highlight that all groups cannot easily be lumped into this category, which tends to obscure more than it reveals. In her ethnographic study of “baz” and “gangs” in Bel Air, Chelsey Kivland reveals a complicated history, in which the role of these groups evolved, in particular in response to international intervention. Kivland distinguishes two periods and two meaning: “The term baz was first associated with the popular organizations that mobilized around [Aristide]”, while today it “tends to indicate the notion of a gang [...] rather than grassroots activism” (Kivland, 2017, pp. 146-147). This second meaning of the term arose after the first coup against Aristide in 1991, when baz organized to ask for Aristide’s return and to protect themselves and their neighbourhood against the military regime. During Aristide’s second term, some became militant groups in support of his government, the much maligned “chimères” (“chimè” is a Creole term that can be roughly translated as “ghosts”). After the 2004 coup against Aristide, these militants organized a movement to restore Aristide. But “as the fighting continued, and especially after the movement’s leader was shot and killed, baz became increasingly involved in thievery and kidnapping”, although “many militants maintained political objectives and continued to organized demonstrations and other political activities” (Kivland, 2017, p. 147). Kivland concludes:

⁷⁹ Interview 14, Port-au-Prince, June 2017.

⁸⁰ Interview 9, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

In light of this history, baz formations can be seen as illustrating a fundamental paradox of democracy: While they reflect the democratic hopes of the Haitian underclass, they are also tied to the novel forms of violence and insecurity that have arisen in the wake of the Duvalier dictatorship (Kivland, 2017, p. 147).

The mythology around the “chimères” that developed in the media and international community after 2004 does not reflect this complex reality. Many analyses argued that all chimères emerged during Aristide’s second term in office, during which he allegedly funded and armed these groups to silence opposition. According to one account, “as challenges arose to Aristide’s rule, the *chimères*, or ‘ghosts,’ emerged from the slums to silence political opponents and prey on the general population in a futile attempt to retain power” (Dziedzic & Perito, 2008, p. 2). In this analysis, “the *chimères* were only the most recent manifestation of the traditional Haitian practice of creating paramilitary groups to serve as a counterweight to government security forces and to control the population” (Dziedzic & Perito, 2008, p. 2). The chimères were often used to denounce Aristide’s authoritarianism by situating him within a long legacy of Haitian despotism that included the Duvaliers (Hammond, 2012). Aristide always denied funding and arming chimères, and some analyses have argued that the idea that he controlled them is unsupported by evidence and dubious (Hallward, 2007). In any case, not all chimères could be said to support Aristide, even though, as we shall see, this equation was often made by the Haitian government and the international community. A report by the International Crisis Group highlighted that popular organizations had followed different trajectories, and could not all be thought of as armed Aristide supporters:

The [popular organizations] were born out of the resistance to Duvalier and subsequent military regimes through participation in the democracy movement, and some remain community-based, politically-connected organisations without armed wings. Others became the armed chimères of the Aristide era. Still others switched sides prior to Aristide’s departure and took money from those who sought his ouster (International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 5).

Furthermore, after the 2004 coup, some Haitian and international media attributed much of the violence to these groups. An article published in the *Miami Herald* three months after the 2004 coup claimed that “hundreds of women and girls—some younger than 6— were raped, often by police and pro-Aristide gunmen called chimères” (Mozingo, 2004b). A report conducted in the same period by a team from the Center for the Study of Human Rights at the University of Miami

Law School, however, found that violence (including rapes) was carried out by a mix of gangs (not all deemed to be supporters of Aristide), police forces, and members of the disbanded military, and that it disproportionately targeted Lavalas supporters in poor neighbourhoods (Griffin, 2004). According to Amnesty International:

Supporters of former President Aristide have suffered abuses ranging from threats to kidnapping and extrajudicial killings, especially in the poorer areas of Port-au-Prince where the former President garnered most support. Many of the victims were members of grassroots organizations who had been victims of human rights violations during the 1991-1994 military regime and who had been involved in actions seeking redress for these crimes, and who had also become politically involved in support of the Fanmi Lavalas regime. Yet others may have been members of the *chimères*, irregular police assistants or other pro-Aristide gangs, singled out for abuse on account of the power they wielded or for the abuses they may have committed themselves in the past. Many people in Haiti, including some human rights organizations, equate being a member of a popular organization with being a member of the *chimères*. This has presented an added difficulty when documenting cases of human rights violations against such groups, as some human rights organizations who have been active in denouncing abuses committed under the Aristide period do not seem inclined to investigate abuses committed against pro-Aristide groups, dismissing them as mostly "settlements of accounts". On the other hand, some former President Aristide supporters have consistently refused to report their cases to those human rights organizations they perceive as hostile (Amnesty International, 2004).

In other words, the question of whether Aristide did or did not arm some *chimères* should not eclipse the reality that not all *baz* were *chimères*, not all *chimères* were supportive of Aristide, and not all armed groups could be equated with gangs. This should qualify claims that in the wake of the 2004 coup there was a clear shift from politically-motivated to criminally-motivated violence (Schuberth, 2015), that armed supporters of Aristide's Lavalas party turned from "grievance" to "greed" (Di Razza, 2010, pp. 57-62), and that "Haitian gang culture has morphed from a primarily community or politically-based affiliation where violence was mostly over ideology or turf conflicts, to one increasingly based on crime" (International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 5). Although these analyses fail to reflect the complex reality depicted above, they fit well in the "new wars" narrative, in which the role of villain could be endorsed by "warlords" or "gangs". According to an analysis published by the Stimson Centre, gangs operated "akin to urban warlords, where the control of territory and populations equals access to resources that sustains the group" (Hammond, 2012, p. 36).

While some groups may have indeed been moved by criminal motives, this was certainly only one aspect of a complex reality. As the next sections show, this perception led the international community (strongly encouraged by the Haitian government and elites) to see “gangs” in Port-au-Prince slums as the main threats to stability in Haiti and to stigmatize and criminalize these poor neighbourhoods’ whole population.

II. UN representations of the urban poor

1. *Red zones and no-go zones*

The UN security procedures contributed to depicting Port-au-Prince’s poor neighbourhoods as dangerous and violent. The UN security system is based on “zoning”, which designates some areas as “green” (safe); “yellow”, where “staff members are strongly advised to exercise extreme caution and remain vigilant when traveling” (Lemay-Hébert, 2018, p. 91), and “red” zones in which UN staff must be accompanied by a military or FPU escort. Although it is difficult to trace the origin and evolution of security mapping in Haiti, it is clear that areas like Cité Soleil were deemed to be “red zones” during much of MINUSTAH’s intervention. A researcher conducting interviews in 2017 found that his interlocutors “did not recall who first adopted the security colour coding, and did not have – or did not want me to access – previous maps” (Lemay-Hébert, 2018, p. 91). A map made after the 2010 earthquake, posted online by journalists Ansel Herz, showed that the yellow zone covered much of the lower city, while Bel Air and the Boston area of Cité Soleil were classified as red zones.⁸¹ An updated map in 2017 covered a similar but smaller area in yellow, and reclassified Bel Air from red to yellow (Lemay-Hébert, 2018, p. 92). Through this mapping process, “the whole population living in ‘difficult neighbourhoods’ came to be defined as a security issue in a traditional securitization move” (Lemay-Hébert, 2018, p. 90). Labeling an area a red zone “reinforces negative stereotypes and perceptions of insecurity” (Erickson, 2014, p. 24). Zoning not only stigmatizes the people who live in red zones (Higate & Henry, 2009, p. 64), it also contributes to criminalizing them and disinhibiting violence against them.

Security mapping was accompanied by a public discourse that singled out the slums of Port-au-Prince as places of egregious danger. A 2007 UN press release, for instance, claims that

⁸¹ From Ansel Herz’s flickr page, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/mediahacker/4425181780>, accessed April 24, 2019.

Cité Soleil “has long been regarded as one of the most violent [neighbourhoods] in the entire Western Hemisphere” (UN News, 2007). MINUSTAH went as far as calling Cité Soleil, “the most dangerous place on earth”, a hyperbolic and obviously inaccurate statement. Although the origins of this quote are unclear, many media and some NGOs credit the UN with coining the phrase. A 2012 *Christian Science Monitor* article on Cité Soleil, for instance, starts with this description: “the United Nations has called the sprawling and impoverished part of Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, known as Cité Soleil the most dangerous place on earth” (Yerkey, 2012). Multiple media sources attribute this quote to the UN back in 2004, although there are other stories of its origin.⁸²

To describe these areas, the international community also borrowed from the vocabulary developed in the context of Western inner cities. Cité Soleil and other slums were sometimes referred to as “no-go zones” or “zones de non droit”. For instance, in an interview, former Police Commissioner Graham Muir argues that “we were dealing with, effectively, lawlessness, [...], or the no-go zones, where effectively the Haitian police had never been” (Muir, 2008, p. 7). It is important to remember the political mythology that surrounds this vocabulary. In Europe, the idea that inner cities in Western democracies have become “no-go zones” is often shared by the far right, which argues that the police has lost control in areas dominated by immigrants, who have imposed their own way of living (see for instance National Post, 2016). These areas are often seen as breeding grounds for terrorism, and the connection to terrorism was made in the case of Cité Soleil, as we shall see in section III. In the US, the idea of “no-go zones” is more often applied to inner cities that are deemed to be lawless and crime-ridden. One of my interviewees, a US citizen working for MINUSTAH, explicitly made the connection between Haiti and his own experience of US inner cities: “We hear ‘don’t go to Cité, it’s a red zone!’ But there are places in Kansas City too that you wouldn’t go to”.⁸³

Several interviewees pointed to the discrepancy between the perceptions generated by the security mapping and the reality on the ground. While this red/yellow classification may have made sense at the height of conflict between different armed groups in these neighbourhoods, and between these groups and the UN (in 2004-2007), it stuck for many years, as if the situation had

⁸² Kovats-Bernat (2014, p. 32) identifies the following origin : “Following a bloody and devastating series of disarmament operations by joint UN-Haitian Police strike forces in 2007–2008 that claimed the lives of score of combatants and hundreds of civilians, a Brazilian UN officer directing the operations announced an end to all UN security operations in Cité Soleil and made an offhand comment that it was ‘the most dangerous place on earth’; when asked to elaborate on that sentiment, he simply reiterated the comment in the tone of a formal proclamation”.

⁸³ Interview 36, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

not changed, or as if these neighbourhoods were intrinsically insecure because they were poor. As one interviewee who has worked in Haiti and Brazil noted, “it’s funny that they call these places red zones, zones de non droit, because you can actually bring your car in the middle of Cité Soleil and have a beer and be fine. In Rio there are some places where you can’t go with your car, at night you may get shot on sight”.⁸⁴ A community organizer in Cité Soleil argued:

Cité Soleil is a victim of stereotypes, or of an exaggeration in the idea that a number of people have about the area [...] So I’d say because of this exaggeration there was a perception in the UN mission itself, MINUSTAH, that Cité Soleil is a really dangerous neighbourhood, where nothing works, and from there it led to all sorts of bad approaches.⁸⁵

Security mapping that focuses on poor neighbourhoods as zones of danger also ignores that many security incidents involving internationals happen in zones that are deemed to be “green”, such as the wealthy Pétionville (Dandoy, 2013, pp. 44-45; Lemay-Hébert, 2018).

These security mapping practices have two important implications in terms of how they position the UN (and many international workers) vis-à-vis the rest of the population. They mean that, while MINUSTAH’s military units live on base, civilian members of the mission and international expats more generally will spend most of their time living in the same neighbourhoods and patronizing the same restaurants, bars, etc, as the Haitian elite, and that these expats develop a skewed, often paranoid view of the dangers that poor Haitians represent. Security mapping for internationals “entails in practice embracing the local bourgeoisie as well as a withdrawal from everyday engagement with populations in the yellow or red zones” (Lemay-Hébert, 2018, p. 92). Security procedures that isolate international workers reproduce the division in Haitian society between the elites who live in their own “golden ghettos” and the rest of the population. Indeed, expats and Haitian elites live in the same gated communities as the Haitian elite, such as Vivy Mitchel and Bel Vil (Dandoy, 2013, p. 35). International actors’ obsession with security thus reinforces socio-spatial segregation and the marginalization of poor populations, which are seen as a source of insecurity (Dandoy, 2013, pp. 13-14). As a study of security mapping in Port-au-Prince notes,

Security regulations enforced by the UN and other international agencies have profound effects on the architecture of the city, reinforcing the existing social segregation and

⁸⁴ Interview 14, Port-au-Prince, June 2017.

⁸⁵ Interview 35, Port-au-Prince, July 2017 (translated from French).

helping to empty the securitized areas of any public utility operations [...] securitization strategies as displayed under MINUSTAH are embedded within wider logics of social segregation in Haiti – hence becoming an integral part of statebuilding and nation-building processes (Lemay-Hébert, 2018, p. 92).

Furthermore, security procedures, including security mapping, feed paranoia and fear of the wider Haitian population. For instance, during security induction, internationals are given a certain representation of the situation in Haiti and the likelihood of being a victim of crime. When I asked a UN police officer from a Western country whether what they were told during their training about Haiti matched their experience, they responded:

Well, you have to take a step back. Because of course everything is magnified. When they meet with us for induction, when they sensitize us to what is going on in Haiti, they take the worst cases. And it's reality, these are true cases, but they want to prepare us to live in a place that is totally disordered [...] The first shock they give us in induction training is to show cases that happened, cases of lynching, you know we have colleagues that have experienced dramatic situations. So they sensitize us to the fact that it can happen. And after that progressively they explain the means that are put in place to ensure our security, and the rules of behaviour during the mission, and they defuse by saying 'if you respect the rules, if you live in a securitized environment, if you, you are not at risk of living situations like this, it's out of the ordinary'. But to draw our vigilance they show cases... that we will not necessarily experience during the mission.⁸⁶

This “worst case scenario” approach encourages internationals to avoid walking in the street, going out after dark, and generally interacting with the local population (Duffield, 2010, 2012). A study of the security procedures of humanitarian organizations working in Haiti after the earthquake found a similar approach. To describe the security situation, NGOs used sentences such as “If you hit them with your car, they will get violent”, “Be careful, these gangs are not your friends. They just want to get money from you”, and “They are like bulldogs. They might beat you the next week” (Dandoy, 2013, p. 70). One of my interviewees, a US citizen who had lived in Haiti for several years, first in the countryside to work with peasant organizations and then in Port-au-Prince, raised the issue of the impact that this type of representations can have on how MINUSTAH thinks of Haitians:

I mean I think it's interesting to think about or look at what sort of security measures are imposed on soldiers of MINUSTAH, and what that actually does to their psyche. You know

⁸⁶ Interview 40, Port-au-Prince, July 2017 (translated from French).

if you're told that you should fear the population you're supposed to be serving, what does that do? I think, if you're armed with guns, this is how MINUSTAH rolls through a lot of times, they're sitting on perch observing what's happening with guns in their hands right? And they have curfews, they have these things, they have restrictions as to where they can move and where they can go. What does that do when that's like your introduction? When you're not supposed to walk and actually understand what's happening with the population? I had this conversation with an Argentinian doctor at the MINUSTAH base in Jeremie once and he was like 'I don't know the population, you know I'm not allowed to walk, I'm not allowed to converse, first of all I don't speak Creole, so on top of that, but I'm told I'm supposed to be afraid of that population and it's not my sense of what I should be feeling based on the limited interactions that I had. So how do we serve this population that we're supposed to when we're told we're supposed to be afraid of them?' What does that do on the psyche of both sides when a neighbourhood is considered a red zone?⁸⁷

2. *From population in danger to dangerous population*

Although MINUSTAH was ostensibly deployed to Haiti to protect civilians at risk, these civilians quickly became *the risk*. From the beginning MINUSTAH was charged with the “protection of civilians” (UN Security Council, 2004), and the idea that the mission was in Haiti to save lives was widely shared among participants and in public discourse. A 2012 report by the Stimson Center, for instance, is entitled “Saving Port-au-Prince” and centres on “United Nations Efforts to Protect Civilians in Haiti in 2006–2007” (Hammond, 2012). Some participants argue that MINUSTAH prevented another Rwanda-like genocide in Haiti (Aldunate, 2010, p. 55; Sanchez Marino, 2007). Offensive raids against the gangs of Cité Soleil were also justified through reference to the protection of civilians. In his memoirs, former Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno (2015, p. 255) writes of the raids against “the gangs who terrorized the population in the slums of Bel Air, Martissant, or Cité Soleil”. According to a Western diplomat, MINUSTAH’s presence in Haiti was important “to show that the people of Haiti and in particular those who are most vulnerable to potentially crime or violent crime, that there was a police presence there, that there was an international presence that they could trust”.⁸⁸

Although MINUSTAH claimed to protect vulnerable civilians, it also adopted and circulated a vision of the poor populations that it was meant to protect as dangerous and criminal. A particularly illustrative example of this mindset can be found in an interview with the head of MINUSTAH’s Community Violence Reduction program, William Gardner, conducted for an

⁸⁷ Interview 2, Port-au-Prince, May 2017.

⁸⁸ Interview 47, New York, March 2018.

episode of PBS Frontline after the 2010 earthquake. During the interview, Gardner was asked whether a majority of the people incarcerated in Haitian prisons should be considered innocent, given that they have not been presented to a judge and found guilty of a crime (see Chapter 6). His response: “Nobody is truly, fully innocent in Haiti, because just to survive you have to cope and get by, and that means not being innocent”.⁸⁹

This mindset resulted in the stigmatization of whole neighbourhoods, whose inhabitants were automatically suspected of being criminal gang members. This stigmatization was based on equating all inhabitants of red zones with Lavalas supporters, and all Lavalas with gang members. As the former head of the US-led Haiti Stabilization Initiative notes, “by 2004, Cité Soleil had become quite isolated. Being from Cité Soleil carried a stigma: the assumption was that a resident was a gang member, or at least a supporter” (Becker, 2011, p. 142). Thus, although gang members are usually assumed to be young men, suspicion was extended to all members of the neighborhoods regardless of gender or age.

This stigmatization was felt by the inhabitants of these neighbourhoods I interviewed. According to a community organizer who grew up and works in Cité Soleil:

I heard people say ‘there are zero innocents in Cité Soleil’. I heard people say ‘everyone there works for the bandits’. That means that if someone was killed, it’s probably someone who is involved in violence, or who must be related in some way to the violence, in any case.⁹⁰

Similarly, when I attended a screening of the document the documentary “It stays with you” (which documents the aftermath of MINUSTAH’s raids in Cité Soleil) in Port-au-Prince, one of the participants, a woman who was interviewed in the film, noted that “they say everyone in the zone is the mother of bandits, the father of bandits” (“yo di tout moun ki nan zon an se maman bandi, se papa bandi”).

This stigmatization was not limited to Cité Soleil. In Fort National (a poor neighbourhood adjacent to Bel Air, also classified as a red zone by the UN), I interviewed a community organizer who has been at the forefront of many demonstrations demanding that MINUSTAH leaves Haiti. He recalled:

⁸⁹ The interview is available online: <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/battle-for-haiti/interviews/william-gardner.html>, accessed July 25, 2019.

⁹⁰ Interview 35, Port-au-Prince, July 2017 (translated from French).

A MINUSTAH spokesperson after the coup said that even the dogs have weapons in Fort National – even the dogs have weapons! – that it is a reason to crush the people in Fort National. And they did a massacre, suddenly in a few seconds they killed 13 young men in Fort National on the basis that they had weapons, that they’re Lavalas militants. And you know that to kill a dog, you say it has rabies.⁹¹

MINUSTAH shared this stigmatizing view of the urban poor with the Haitian government and political and business elites, with whom the mission’s leadership was regularly meeting. In May 2005, Bernard Gousse, the Justice Minister of the transitional government, declared that “no one in Bel Air is innocent” and that the whole neighbourhood was involved in the “terrorist” operation Baghdad (Kivland, 2017, p. 147) (we come back to this event in the next section). Former USG Guéhenno recalls that “at a dinner in an elegant restaurant of Pétionville, ‘La Souvenance,’ where I met with key figures of la bourgeoisie [...] the message I heard was loud and clear: the UN mission has to do whatever it takes to purge Haiti of its dangerous elements; it has to rein in the dangerous class, the poor” (Guéhenno, 2015, p. 260). Former Police Commissioner David Beer similarly recalls:

In 2005, the author made a presentation on security issues and plans to the Port-au-Prince Chamber of Commerce. The economic elite of the country was well represented in a large audience that was clearly dissatisfied with “rule of law” approaches to combat the gangs. At the conclusion of the presentation, the audience gathered near the podium for follow-up questions and comments. A middle-aged woman, clearly of means, said in a calm but venomous tone, loudly enough for all to hear, “Why do [you not] just kill them all?” There was no shock, no surprise, and no reaction from anyone in the room but me (Beer, 2016, p. 96, footnote 51).

This stigmatizing view of the poor has a long history in Haiti. In his analysis of the extreme poverty and de-humanization that the vast majority of the Haitian population experiences, particularly in Port-au-Prince, André Corten argues that the absence of public policies related to urbanism and health illustrates the complete indifference of the well-off segments of society towards the living conditions of the masses. For Corten, this class contempt is directly linked to the fear that the poor generate among the elite:

As soon as the masses claim to make an intervention or to participate, they are immediately seen as ‘dangerous classes’. They are seen as necessarily seeking revenge after such humiliation and exploitation. This fear of social revenge is part of collective memory

⁹¹ Interview 7, Port-au-Prince, May 2017 (translated from Haitian Creole).

through the founding act of the Haitian Republic. During the slave revolt, plantations were burnt and whites massacred. This unconscious fear, because it is overlaid with total contempt, explains the vision that the wealthy have of criminality (Corten, 2000, pp. 132-133).⁹²

Particularly in the period following the 2004 coup against Aristide, poor neighbourhoods that were known to be generally supportive of Lavalas were targeted by both the Haitian Police and MINUSTAH. All the inhabitants of the slums were deemed to be dangerous Lavalas militants because of their socio-economic situation. This echoed what happened after the first coup against Aristide in 1991, when “supporters of Aristide were deemed ‘enemies’ of the coup apparatus by virtue of their poverty and presumed support for a pro-democracy platform” (James, 2010, p. 68). During the repression that followed, “the majority of the poor who were targeted were rebuked as “Lavalasyen,” partisans of the pro-democracy party” (James, 2010, p. 68). In 2005, the International Crisis Group described an eerily similar situation:

The HNP [Haitian National Police] seems to be criminalising many of the urban poor through indiscriminate declarations by senior officers and indiscriminate repressive operations in the slums. This same pattern appears in the media, which systematically associates residents of poor neighbourhoods with ‘chimères’ or, more commonly, ‘chimères Lavalas’. Members of the business elite have fuelled this campaign, demanding a tougher stance towards ‘chimères Lavalas’, ignoring the fact that many other gangs also are engaged in criminal, violent and destabilising acts. Repeated killings during pro-Lavalas demonstrations have been a consequence. Unfortunately, most Haitian human rights NGOs have not been spoken out about these abuses (International Crisis Group, 2005, p. 11).

As ICG concludes, “many were killed for no obvious reason except that they happened to live in those neighbourhood” (International Crisis Group, 2005, p. 11).

3. *Dissension*

Although MINUSTAH often stigmatized poor neighbourhoods, it also sometimes resisted pressure by the Haitian transition government and the Haitian elite to act more forcefully in these areas. Military officers, in particular, were concerned about civilian casualties that were bound to occur when conducting offensive operations in densely populated urban areas.

⁹² Translated from French by author.

The mission, in fact, came under criticism from the Haitian government and elites for not being more pro-active in neutralizing the “gangs”. For instance, in February 2005, “the Minister of Justice angrily accused MINUSTAH of protecting ‘chimères’” (International Crisis Group, 2005, p. 11). Criticism of MINUSTAH for its “inaction” against the gangs was widespread in the Haitian media and some international media (Mozingo, 2004a). MINUSTAH’s leadership was reluctant to use force while being under intense pressure to make the gangs a priority. Former Deputy Force Commander Aldunate writes in his retelling of his time in Haiti that from October 2005 to January 2006 MINUSTAH was under heavy pressure from the transitional government and the business community in Port-au-Prince to go into Cité Soleil and deal with the gangs (Aldunate, 2010, p. 142). In January 2006, the “Group of 184”, a coalition that had been at the forefront of demonstrations against Aristide in 2003-2004, organized a sit-in in front of the MINUSTAH base to protest what it called its “passive attitude”. In a letter addressed to the SG, the group argued that gangs were holding some neighbourhoods hostage, and that “such a situation benefits the political current which had set up these armed gangs and which depends on violence to return to power through an election with strong abstention or based on fear”, a thinly-veiled reference to Lavalas. The group stressed that it possessed much evidence that gangs’ actions had political goals, and added that “we can call these groups terrorists because they give weapons to young children under 12 and pursue political goals that should not be confused with banditry nor justified through strictly economic and social considerations” (UN Archives, 2006c).⁹³

The pressure also came from the UN and some member states. Former Force Commander Heleno notes that the US, France and Canada in conjunction with the Haitian elite were pushing the mission leadership to use more violence in the repression of armed groups (Heleno Ribeiro Pereira, 2007, p. 12). In October 2004, the Haitian Chargé d’Affaires met with Assistant Secretary General Annabi in New York to express concern about a “perceived lack of resolute action by MINUSTAH” (UN Archives, 2004c). In April 2005, all fifteen members of the Security Council traveled to Haiti to assess MINUSTAH’s progress, producing a report urging the mission to adopt a more robust approach. The Council’s subsequent resolution in April 2005 “authorized an increase in the mission’s strength and addition of a ‘rapid reaction force’” (Johnstone, 2006, p. 5).

Tension around forceful action against the gangs was well illustrated by one episode. In December 2004, Force Commander Heleno traveled to Brazil to brief the Brazilian House of Representatives

⁹³ Translated from French.

on the situation in Haiti. During his presentation, he reiterated his unwillingness to use indiscriminate force, and explicitly named Canada, France and the US as the countries pushing for more forceful intervention. The day following Heleno's intervention, SRSB Valdés received a cable from USG Guéhenno noting that Heleno's comments had "generated considerable media attention" and "could be a cause for serious concern" (UN Archives, 2004d). In his response, Heleno forcefully defended his position, noting:

- The press of those countries frequently publishes harmful comments regarding the effectiveness of MINUSTAH troops, forgetting that the Haitian problems have been dragging on for more than twenty years and that their own troops were present here before without solving the problems;
- The Canadian Ambassador to Haiti, during many Core Group meetings, demanded offensive operations in slum areas, ignoring the restrictions we have relating to rules of engagement and the fact that we are a peacekeeping force and not an occupation force in a war situation;
- The Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations even presented a demarche to DPKO (according to a Cable sent to MINUSTAH), stating that MINUSTAH military forces were not "sufficiently robust and effective" and that "the lack of use of an active posture by MINUSTAH troops was holding back other process and was placing MINUSTAH civilian police at an unnecessary and unreasonable" [sic];
- The French Ambassador in Haiti, also during meetings of the Core Group, requested more energy and offensive action against the *chimeres* (lavalas), mainly in Cite Soleil;
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense of the United States, M. Rogerio Pardo-Maurer, during a visit to my office, accompanied by the American Ambassador to Haiti, in the beginning of October, besides questioning me regarding strategy and tactics, declared that he would expect the operations in Cite Soleil to be similar to those deployed in Kandahar, Afghanistan, when he was part of a Special Forces Group. In this occasion, I had to remind him that the freedom of action in a situation of war differs greatly from a peacekeeping situation (UN Archives, 2004e).

Indeed, the mission leadership was acutely aware that combat operations in the densely-populated neighbourhood of Cité Soleil, where most people lived in tin shacks, was bound to lead to "collateral damage" (Valdés, 2005, p. 11). Former Deputy Force Commander Aldunate recounts many occasions during which the mission leadership expressed concerns about how such civilian casualties would affect the legitimacy of the mission. Both Aldunate and Force Commander Heleno publicly worried that the mission leadership could face war crimes charges before the International Criminal Court (Aldunate, 2008, p. 11; Ives, 2011).

Some MINUSTAH members also adopted an alternative discourse downplaying the supposedly skyrocketing levels of criminality and insecurity in Port-au-Prince's poorest neighbourhoods. Former Deputy Force Commander Aldunate, for instance, writes that during his first trip to Cité Soleil "the people's extreme poverty caught my attention, and I was sure that not all of them were criminals" (Aldunate, 2010, p. 47). Indeed, several of my international interviewees pointed out that given the living conditions in Haiti it was surprising that there was not *more* violence in the country. According to Aldunate, "future studies might try to explain why, in a country so poor and so structurally backward, there have not been more serious outbreaks of violence" (Aldunate, 2010, p. 102).

One positive reading of MINUSTAH's role is thus that it acted as a moderating influence over more radical demands by some segments of Haitian society. But there are a number of issues with this interpretation. First, it obscures the fact that the mission intervened in ways that the Haitian National Police by itself would have been incapable of, as we shall see in section III. MINUSTAH not only provided direct support to the police to conduct operations in these neighbourhoods, it also sometimes acted on its own. Second, the idea of MINUSTAH as a moderating force does not square with the fact that, when casualties did occur, MINUSTAH's leadership showed great resistance to investigating and acknowledging them. This is well documented in the film "It Stays with you", where residents of Cité Soleil testify about the UN's failure to investigate civilian casualties in the aftermath of its interventions (see also Wills, 2018). Third, it is not clear that MINUSTAH participants were motivated only by concern for the lives of slum dwellers. Although it is clearly documented that Force Commander Heleno expressed reluctance against forceful action in the slums in 2004, he later went on to argue for similar robust operations in his native Brazil. In many interviews in Brazilian media Heleno argued that MINUSTAH's raids against gangs should serve as a model for interventions in Rio (we return to this question in the last section). So what explains this change of heart? In media interviews, Heleno often argues that the military in Rio should have the same mandate as MINUSTAH in Haiti, which he interprets as authorizing lethal force against anyone perceived to be an enemy. He repeatedly lauds the appropriateness of MINUSTAH's mandate. This suggests that in 2004 he was opposed to robust action against the gangs not primarily because of potential civilian casualties, but because he was concerned that MINUSTAH did not have the proper mandate to authorize such operations. As he noted in his letter to Valdés quoted above, "the freedom of action in a situation

of war differs greatly from a peacekeeping situation". The Security Council's authorization of more robust intervention in early 2005, however, gave MINUSTAH's the freedom to carry precisely this type of action.

Finally, there is no denying that MINUSTAH's actions compared favourably to the Haitian National Police's in the aftermath of the coup. A human rights investigation carried out in November 2004 found that the Haitian police displayed "an orientation that considers the poor neighbourhoods as "enemy territory," which justifies the execution of anyone, including unarmed witnesses, women, and children" (Griffin, 2004, p. 42). Police officers interviewed for the report acknowledged that six out of ten people killed during a police operation in a poor neighbourhood were bystanders, not targets. According to these officers, these killings are "sometimes on purpose, sometimes by accident," and people in the poorest neighbourhoods were generally likely to be arrested "because they tolerate the bad ones" (Griffin, 2004, p. 50). The police (and the media) then referred to those who had been killed as "bandits", thus implying that "all who live in these neighbourhoods are either gang members or collaborators"(International Crisis Group, 2005, p. 7). As a researcher who has worked on "baz" put it, "there was still a peacekeeping mentality within MINUSTAH: 'we don't want to kill everyone, we don't want to jail everyone'. In some ways they are a lot better than the Haitian bourgeoisie!"⁹⁴

While MINUSTAH may not have expressed the same disregard for the inhabitants of slums, in this period it was de facto mandated to lend support to the Haitian police as an institution and during operations. For instance, MINUSTAH sometimes secured the perimeter around Haitian police intervention. During an operation in Bel Air witnessed by a human rights investigation team on November 18, 2004, "the APCs [Armoured Personnel Carriers] blocked off roads surrounding the target neighbourhood, preventing entry or exit by journalists, investigators and anyone else who was not a police officers or soldier" (Griffin, 2004, p. 44). In a 2005 interview, General Heleno stated that "we offer the police the protection they didn't have" and that "we give space for the HNP to operate, yes, we do that" (Harvard Law Students for Human Rights & Centro de Justiça Global, 2005, p. 33). A 2005 report by a human right delegation found that "with the direct support of the U.N.'s superior firepower and protection, including armored vehicles, bullet-proof vests and helmets, the HNP has been more aggressive in its neighbourhood sweeps than before

⁹⁴ Interview 14, Port-au-Prince, June 2017.

MINUSTAH's arrival" (Harvard Law Students for Human Rights & Centro de Justiça Global, 2005, p. 34).

Because of its mandate, MINUSTAH tacitly endorsed actions by the Haitian police, even if it did not do so officially. As former Police Commissioner David Beer notes, "the mission appeared tolerant of illegal or, at the very least, inappropriate GoH [Government of Haiti] and HNP behaviour" (Beer, 2016, p. 87). Beer's assessment of MINUSTAH's support for the Haitian police is particularly harsh:

The result was tolerance for methods and actions generally unacceptable for security forces, including search without authority, arrest without warrant, and incarceration without showing cause. The security operations of 2007, in an environment of extraordinary insecurity, would not have been countenanced in an environment where the rule of law was in place. It was accepted that the law enforcement ends justified the means (Beer, 2016, p. 96).

Furthermore, as the previous sections have shown, the mission itself displayed a propensity to consider every inhabitant of poor neighbourhoods as a potential suspect. One analysis notes that "in one operation (Operation Nazca in Belecour), practically all the men of working age were stopped by the Brazilian battalion (BRABAT) and UNPOL. A dozen suspects were thus identified and arrested through this dragnet operation" (Dorn, 2009, p. 823). Reflecting on the fact that the mission had arrested 800 alleged gang members by early 2007, former Police Commissioner sounds a note of caution about this number:

This is impressive in terms of operational success against the gangs, but the number alone is cause for reflection. By any accounting, there were certainly not 800 gangsters attacking UN security forces and killing HNP officers in 2005. So how many of these 800 were merely unemployed, uneducated, poverty-stricken young men with no prospects, who were 'going along to get along' with the gangs on the brutal streets of Cité Soleil? (Beer, 2016, pp. 92-93)

These practices are reminiscent of the Haitian National Police's practice of "arrimage", the mass arrest of people who have not been charged with a specific crime. This practice and its effects are addressed more fully in Chapter 6.

III. Blurring the line between armed conflict and social conflict

1. *Reading the conflict in Haiti*

Almost immediately after MINUSTAH was deployed in 2004, the international focus moved from the threat of civil war to problems of criminality. As MINUSTAH's mission was focused on law enforcement and the reestablishment of the rule of law, social and political conflict was underplayed. At the same time, any action that seemed to disturb efforts at "stabilization" was deemed to be a threat to security and thus politically-threatening. This led to a curious criminalization of conflict and politicization of criminality with a focus on the poorest neighbourhoods of the capital. The resulting amalgam has been dubbed a "criminal-based insurgency" by a Canadian counter-insurgency field manual.⁹⁵

MINUSTAH's leadership struggled to find the appropriate framework to make sense of Haiti, and therefore of their mission. This is encapsulated in a debate that occurred in a briefing on August 17, 2005. On the one hand, former Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Juan Gabriel Valdés "dismissed criticisms of MINUSTAH's use of force, noted that the mission had prevented a civil war" and stressed the importance of holding legitimate elections. On the other, Force Commander Heleno "pointed out that the country was facing what was at root a police problem — specifically, criminal gangs had sunk their roots deep into a society beset by extreme poverty" (Aldunate, 2010, pp. 28-29). These analyses of the situation in Haiti are contradictory and suppose very different approaches.

Participants disagreed on which conceptual box Haiti should be placed in. Was it a case of civil war, of quasi-genocide, of anarchical chaos, or of instability resulting from poverty and under-development? Early in the mission, the civil war frame was dominant. This should not be surprising in a context where Aristide had been overthrown by an armed insurgency led by former members of the Haitian armed forces. In an interview published in 2005, Valdés argued that "this mission arrived to stabilize a country that was on the brink of civil war, where the possibility of the division of the territory and the appropriation of the territory by different armed groups was a reality" (Valdés, 2005, p. 5). Participants tell that they were concerned that this civil war could evolve into a bloody conflict akin to what happened in Rwanda in 1994. Deputy Force Commander Aldunate recounts that, according to SRSG Valdés, "Haiti was facing a situation similar to the one

⁹⁵ A version of the manual is available on Wikileaks at https://wikileaks.org/wiki/Canadian_Counter-insurgency_Operations_manual_13_Dec_2008, accessed 11 May 2017.

in Rwanda, where the hatred between the Tutsis and the Hutus ran so deep that they were ready to hack each other to death with machetes” (Aldunate, 2010, p. 21). Former MINUSTAH Operations Officer Horacio Sanchez Mariño also makes the comparison to Rwanda, noting that although the world failed Rwanda, it did not fail Haiti (Sanchez Marino, 2007, p. 455). The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) frame was mobilized in the media, particularly in Canada, a historical supporter of the concept. This painted MINUSTAH as a successful mission to protect civilians, but does not really fit in a civil war framework (who is massacring whom in this scenario?).

Some participants defined the situation in Haiti as one of anarchy in the context of a failed state, with no identifiable groups confronting each other and no peace process to enforce. Former Operations Officer Sanchez Mariño argues that Haiti was not facing a coup d'état but a “Hobbesian situation” of war of all against all (Sanchez Marino, 2007, p. 431). According to SRSB Valdés, the gangs were just out there to produce chaos (Valdés, 2005, p. 13). SRSB Mulet in 2007 “called gang leaders ‘psychopaths’ who wantonly kidnap and kill law-abiding Haitians” (Jacobs, 2007). Such framework is consistent with the discourse surrounding apparently apolitical and barbaric “new wars” that emerged in the 1990s. It depoliticizes conflict by suggesting that there are no sides, simply indiscriminate violence. Yet this depoliticization was not shared by all participants. According to Former MINUSTAH Director of Political Affairs and Planning Gerard Le Chevallier, “we have reasons to be optimistic in Haiti; after all, its problem is a political conflict, which has no ethnic, religious or territorial dimensions” (Le Chevallier, 2013, p. 118).

For some participants, the gangs were of concern not because they were producing chaos, but because they were actively opposed to the government that MINUSTAH was mandated to support. For instance, former Police Commissioner Beer argues that “the gangs viewed MINUSTAH as an occupying force: an extension of the MNF, which had managed Aristide’s departure. Moreover, they saw it as supporting the country’s economic elite, the interim government, and HNP, and fundamentally anti-Aristide and anti-Lavalas”. Beer stops short of calling the gangs organized political actors, on the ground that ‘there was no unified position, manifesto, or constitutional plan for reform’ (Beer, 2016, p. 77). During a meeting of the mission’s Security Management Team (SMT) on October 12, 2004, participants noted that “the troubles perpetrated by the *Chimères*” were likely to increase, “with the objective of: destabilizing the government and in consequence MINUSTAH; Aristide’s return as an alternative to disorder” (UN Archives, 2004a).

The contested nature of the ‘gangs’ and differing interpretations of the situation in Haiti directly fed into another set of questions: what was a peace operation to do in the face of apparently ‘criminal’ armed groups, and what was the appropriate use of force to support the mandate in this context?


Former Force Commander Heleno makes the point that, because the mission was under Chapter VII and recognized only one side as legitimate (the transition government), it should have been qualified as peace enforcement, rather than peacekeeping (Heleno Ribeiro Pereira, 2007, p. 13). This is echoed by his assistant, Colonel Carlos Chagas Braga, who argues that MINUSTAH’s mandate challenged the key principles of UN peacekeeping, since ‘a mandate that only recognized the [Haitian government] and the HNP, that ignored or considered illegitimate other involved parties, could hardly be considered completely impartial’ (Braga, 2010, p. 714). However, Heleno notes that, because most of the contingents did not want to use force, they preferred to frame the mission as peacekeeping, rather than peace enforcement (Heleno Ribeiro Pereira, 2007, p. 13). According to former Police Commissioner Beer, ‘some contingents were willing to engage the gangs; others were not. And some military leaders continued to question the military’s role in this nontraditional fight’ (Beer, 2016, p. 84).

As we have seen in the previous section, military leaders often expressed reluctance about robust use of force to target the gangs. In fact, the mission leadership often argued that development, not military action, was needed. During a meeting in late 2005 with “a top official of an important country” who was pushing for more forceful action against the gangs, Aldunate recalls that he gave the following answer: “Do you think this is how we’re going to solve the problem of crime in this country? You’re wrong — it’s not bullets they need, it’s work, education, health, respect for human rights, in short, other instruments” (Aldunate, 2010, p. 142). Force Commander Heleno was criticized for not acting more forcefully against the gangs and for putting too much focus on development. According to Former Special Advisor of the Secretary-General Reginald Dumas, Heleno’s insistence that the solution was development caused him ‘to be pigeonholed by an increasing number of the population [...] as a development economist or a philosopher rather than a soldier’ (Dumas, 2008, p. 139).

2. *The role of the military*

If the problem in Haiti was one of poverty, inequality and criminality, what was to be the role of the military? Why did MINUSTAH's military contingent stayed for so many years? Indeed, this is all the more surprising given that MINUSTAH is often presented as a police first mission. According to a Western diplomat in New York, “the peacekeeping mission in Haiti, when it was MINUSTAH, was not like any peacekeeping mission around the world, it really was about, in so many ways, it really was a police-first mission”.⁹⁶

Yet the idea that MINUSTAH was a “police-first” mission sits uneasily with the fact that its military component dwarfed its police component for its entire history (see Figure 6). The military took the lead in carrying out raids against “gangs” in conjunction with UN police contingents and the Haitian police, operating in a grey zone between armed conflict and law enforcement.



Source: Data provided by DPKO.⁹⁷ Figures as of January of each year.

The role of the military was often justified as filling the “security gap”. Scholars and practitioners have noted that peace operations often face a “deployment gap” (Hills, 2001, p. 80) and a “security gap” during the early phase of a mission, where local police cannot protect the population and ensure order and not enough international civilian police forces have yet been

⁹⁶ Interview 47, New York, March 2018.

⁹⁷ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>, accessed March 15, 2019.

deployed. In these contexts where no one is taking responsibility for public security (Hovens, 2017), the military intervenes to “fill the gap”: “the military is an important asset in complex peace support operations, especially to prevent a security gap in the early phases of a post-conflict mission and to deter potential spoilers of fragile peace agreements” (Penksa, 2010, p. 44). While the “security gap” thesis may have been plausible at the beginning of MINUSTAH, it fails to explain why this gap would need filling for 13 years, in a context where the ratio of military to police remained more or less the same throughout the mission’s existence.

Although MINUSTAH’s successor, MINUJUSTH, does not have a military component, this confusion between stopping armed conflict and policing social order persists in its mandate. The mission has no military component, but was created under Chapter VII of the Charter, authorizing it to “protect civilians under imminent threats of physical violence” and to “use all necessary means to carry out its mandate” (United Nations, 2017, paras 12 & 13). This language is closer to what would be expected in a situation of ongoing conflict than in a mission that is supposedly oriented towards the rule of law. As a Western diplomat in New York noted, this focus on the rule of law does not necessarily require a peacekeeping mission and “could just as easily be good solid development programming in UNDP”.⁹⁸

Why did MINUSTAH’s military component remain so large for so long, and why does MINUJUSTH persist under Chapter VII? When I raised these questions during interviews, answers often revolved around two concepts: deterrence, and insurance policy. When asked why MINUSTAH had kept a large military contingent for 13 years, many interviewees referred to the idea that the military presence acted as a deterrent. A high level military official argued that MINUSTAH “really is a policing operation, and the military you know we’re here for deterrence”.⁹⁹ According to them:

So here in Haiti there hasn’t been a military threat ever. And the threat of heavily armed gangs subsided many years ago. So could this have transitioned to a police operation earlier? Well it depends if the police has the same deterrence that the military does. So I think we’re an insurance policy more than anything.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Interview 47, New York, March 2018.

⁹⁹ Interview 27, Port-au-Prince, June 2017.

¹⁰⁰ Interview 27, Port-au-Prince, June 2017.

A military officer similarly noted “we [the military] were there just as a presence. The Police Commissioner would tell you that he was happy to have us”.¹⁰¹ Similarly, a high level Haitian police officer described the mission’s role in these terms: “sometimes you need to frighten so you don’t have to hit. If you can’t frighten you’ll be repressive. You’ll have to defend yourself. In this sense MINUSTAH was very useful. Through the Brazilian trucks and sometimes other FPU’s the bandits were afraid”.¹⁰²

The idea of an “insurance policy” also came up when I asked interviewees why MINUJUSTH had been established under Chapter VII, given that there was no ongoing armed conflict in Haiti and that the mission was supposed to focus on the rule of law. According to a diplomat from a Western mission in New York, placing MINUJUSTH under Chapter VII “was almost a bit like an insurance policy [...] You could ramp up more quickly under chapter VII than you could ramp up under chapter VI”.¹⁰³ Another Western diplomat made a similar point: “There was fatigue, a need to change the traditional mandate. [...] But there was also a will to be cautious. Not to give the impression that the UN was just closing the door”.¹⁰⁴ For a diplomat from a Core Group country in Port-au-Prince: “Chapter VII is preventive, it is used for deterrence. It allows FPU’s to act in a more forceful manner if necessary”, because “even though MINUJUSTH will not have a military component it will retain operational capacity through FPU’s”.¹⁰⁵

An insurance policy against what exactly? As we shall see in Chapter 5, MINUSTAH’s presence, in particular its military and FPU contingents, was often seen as a way not only of deterring gang violence but also of preventing popular demonstrations and “unrest”. There was generally a sense that a strong military presence was a guarantee of stability. I conducted interviewees in Port-au-Prince in the summer of 2017, a few months before the end of MINUSTAH and the transition to MINUJUSTH. Many interviewees from the international community expressed concern that the departure of the military component would lead to instability. One Latin American diplomat pointed out:

The economic side is not encouraging. Diminishing per capita income. This is a risk from the point of view of stability [...] Potential instability could be generated by the increase

¹⁰¹ Interview 34, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

¹⁰² Interview 22, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

¹⁰³ Interview 47, New York, March 2018.

¹⁰⁴ Interview 48, New York, March 2018.

¹⁰⁵ Interview 3, Port-au-Prince, May 2017.

in the price of fuel. The government is dealing with it pretty well, but it could be a problem down the line. There is a potential for strikes and demonstrations.¹⁰⁶

The military presence was thus seen as an insurance policy against social unrest that could be triggered by the continuing abysmal economic conditions in which the large majority of Haitians live (and indeed this was rather prescient, as in 2018 the government's decision to increase the price of gas led to massive demonstrations). As one analysis notes, MINUSTAH was characterized not only by the use of the military in a policing function, but by "the adoption of a military way of thinking to address domestic security issues" (Hoelscher & Norheim-Martinsen, 2014, p. 958), or one could say to address domestic social issues. In Haiti, threats to social order were turned into threats to international security, justifying not only the intervention of an external peace operation but the use of military instruments to keep a lid on social conflict.

It is worth noting that there is also an alternative argument used to justify the prolonged presence of the military, focusing on its role as a humanitarian actor. When asked whether it was strange that MINUSTAH had been continuously renewed under Chapter VII with a military component, a Latin American diplomat argued that Chapter VII was justified not only because MINUSTAH was a guarantor of stability and because of socio-economic challenges, but also because of the problem of natural disasters.¹⁰⁷ A high level military officer within MINUSTAH stressed that the military played an important role after the earthquake: "in 2010 because the troops were in Haiti the result was not as tragic as it could have been. A lot of people were saved by troops".¹⁰⁸ Similarly, referring to 2016 Hurricane Matthew, a military officer argued:

Before and after the hurricane, the Brazilian and Paraguayan engineer companies helped a lot in the reconstruction of the country's infrastructure (e.g. schools, roads, bridges, wells, garbage removal and water supply). A similar contribution was done by the Argentinian Hospital; in fact, it was the only medical facility available in the Grand Sud in the aftermath of the earthquake. All these specialized units need the protection of fighting units while in operation (Military Doctrine). Therefore, from this "cooperative" point of view, I could say that the military presence is justifiable.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ Interview 3, Port-au-Prince, May 2017.

¹⁰⁷ Interview 3, Port-au-Prince, May 2017.

¹⁰⁸ Interview 38, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

¹⁰⁹ Email exchange with interviewee 34, July 2017.

There's a number of problems with this argument, the first one being that the military was not that efficient in delivering aid in Haiti. Journalist Jonathan Katz has well documented how the military approach to relief after the 2010 earthquake overly emphasized security concerns and thus significantly slowed down live-saving efforts (Katz, 2013). In fact, this was acknowledged by some interviewees. According to a diplomatic source in Port-au-Prince, after hurricane Matthew (which particularly impacted the South Western part of Haiti in late 2016) it took three days to mobilize MINUSTAH, even though there were already helicopters on the ground.¹¹⁰

The argument that the military's presence was justified by its humanitarian actions also raises issues about role confusion. Though many militaries increasingly seek legitimacy by advertising their humanitarian work, this move has been met with alarm by a number of humanitarian actors, who argue that it flies in the face of humanitarianism's commitment to impartiality and neutrality. The UN itself clearly states that the military is not a humanitarian actor, and should only fulfil humanitarian functions as a last resort and for determinate periods. The UN training materials on civil-military cooperation stress that "military are not expert in delivering direct support, the primary actors must remain the humanitarian actors" (UN DPKO/DFS, 2014a, p. 106) and notes:

In the hierarchy of humanitarian tasks for the military; military forces' capability can best add value to the process by focusing on indirect assistance and infrastructure Support; direct assistance is best undertaken by humanitarian actors. However, in the event that there are no humanitarian actors on the ground during the critical life-saving period, and failure to deliver urgently needed good and services could result in unacceptable loss of lives, suffering and injuries, the military, as a last resort, may be used to fill that gap (UN DPKO/DFS, 2014a, p. 105).

Again, the idea that the military "fills a gap" does not explain why this gap would need filling for 13 years, justifying continued military during that period. If anything, this argument testifies to the inability of the Haitian government and the international community (after no fewer than six peace operations) to mitigate the country's vulnerability to natural disasters and improve local response.

¹¹⁰ Interview 21, Port-au-Prince, June 2017.

3. *Counter-insurgency strategy*

Although the military component of MINUSTAH played a leading role in addressing the “gang” problem, the mission’s strategy was based on the integration of military, police and development activities. MINUSTAH’s strategy of winning the “hearts and minds” of the population of poor neighbourhoods through “Quick Impact Projects” (QIPs) and community policing was strongly based on counterinsurgency thinking. In this framework, strategies that were presented as “community-friendly” were usually animated by the primary purpose of pacification and stabilization. Although protection of civilians was the public rationale, it was a strategic afterthought.

Participants clearly acknowledged the resemblance between MINUSTAH’s actions in Port-au-Prince and counter-insurgency. In the early years of the mission, the situation in Haiti was tied to the broader narrative of the “global war on terror” and the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq through references to terrorism. This is well illustrated by the episode of “Operation Baghdad”. On September 30, 2004 (the anniversary of the 1991 coup against Aristide), during a demonstration of Aristide supporters in Bel Air, a confrontation between protesters and the Haitian police occurred after the police opened fire on the demonstration. The Justice Minister alleged that three policemen were killed and then decapitated by protesters as part of what he described as “Operation Baghdad”, in reference to similar tactics by insurgents in Iraq at the time. Many participants picked up the term and its connotations. Police Commissioner Beer, for instance, recalls that “Haitian gangsters [...] threatened to turn Port-au-Prince into another Baghdad” (Beer, 2016, p. 81). A 2005 article on Haiti in Canada’s most widely circulated newspaper, the *Globe and Mail*, was entitled “Backyard Baghdad” (Jiménez, 2005).

The story of Operation Baghdad and whether it can be said to have existed at all is contested. While the Haitian and international media presented it as a violent concerted campaign by Lavalas supporters, in fact there is no proof that police officers were indeed beheaded during this period. It is also not clear whether the name originated from those allegedly participating in this operation, or from the government, or whether some groups eventually ended up claiming it for themselves. In any case, “Operation Baghdad” fitted in a wider paranoia about how Haiti could fall prey to terrorism. In his 2005 Independence Day speech at the Port-au-Prince embassy, US Ambassador to Haiti James Foley made a reference to the attacks on September 11, 2001 and argued that

Today in Haiti, people are burning homes; they are burning stores; they are attacking transportation and communication links; they are kidnapping people of all social classes; they are assassinating, torturing and raping. [...] All of this has a name. The use of violence against civilians for political purposes is the very definition of terrorism.¹¹¹

In a 2005 interview, chief of police Mario Andrésol was asked whether there was a risk that Haiti would become a base for international terrorism, and responded:

We have some information, not yet confirmed, that people are being converted to Islam in this neighbourhood [Cité Soleil]. So there are lots of things and activities happening in this neighbourhood that gathers more than half a million people. These people live, as you know, in abject conditions of misery that can facilitate the implantation of terrorism.¹¹²

The international community also established parallels between the situation in Haiti and ongoing counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. During a conversation between Force Commander Heleno and US Deputy Secretary of Defense Rogerio Pardo-Maurer, Pardo-Maurer “declared that he would expect the operations in Cité Soleil to be similar to those deployed in Kandahar, Afghanistan, when he was part of a Special Forces Group” (UN Archives, 2004e). As former USG Guéhenno notes, MINUSTAH’s actions looked less like peacekeeping than “an approximation of counterinsurgency” (Guéhenno, 2015, p. 262). In 2004, a team of human rights investigators interviewed a commander of the UN Civilian Police Unit, who “declared that he is ‘in shock’ with the conditions he faces in Port-au-Prince. He said his UN mandate is to ‘(i) coach, (ii) train, and (iii) provide information,’ but that all he has done in Haiti is ‘engage in daily guerrilla warfare’” (Griffin, 2004, p. 40). Some argued that what the UN was facing in Haiti was a “criminal insurgency” or “criminal-based insurgency”, according to a Canadian counter-insurgency field manual.¹¹³ For the former head of the US-led Haiti Stabilization Initiative, international intervention in Cité Soleil amounted to “community counter-insurgency”, where military action to uproot gangs were followed by projects designed to win the hearts and minds of the population and sever the link between gangs and the community (Becker, 2011).

¹¹¹ “Independence Day Reception Speech”, James Foley, available on the Haiti Democracy Project website, <https://haitipolicy.org/2005/07/no-responsible-government-in-world-will-treat-with-haiti-terrorists>, accessed April 18, 2019.

¹¹² “Haïti: Les leçons d’un scrutin”, interview of Mario Andrésol by Nancy Roc, <http://www.potomitan.info/ayiti/andresol.php>, accessed April 18, 2019, translated from French.

¹¹³ A version of the manual is available on Wikileaks at https://wikileaks.org/wiki/Canadian_Counter-insurgency_Operations_manual_13_Dec_2008, accessed 11 May 2017.

MINUSTAH's analysis of the gangs was reminiscent of counter-insurgency thinking. In a cable from MINUSTAH to DPKO requesting observation helicopters for operations in Cité Soleil, SRSG Valdés refers to the "opposition", noting that "the opposition's new coordinated tactics give them the initiative over the MINUSTAH security forces' static deployment at check-points" and "the opposition activity in Port-au-Prince and throughout Haiti remains undetected as they move without any fear among the Haitian population" (UN Archives, 2006b). A previous cable regarding this request makes it clear that "opposition" refers to gangs, as it noted that, in areas like Cité Soleil and Cité Militaire, "MINUSTAH's effectiveness is restricted due to the gangs' ability to freely move and conduct attacks using small alleys and heavily buildup areas for protection and escape routes" (UN Archives, 2005). According to the head of the US-led Haiti Stabilization Initiative, "the parallels with Sadr City or Fallujah are obvious: small, loosely organized groups able to swarm a target and hide among the population quickly have the advantage" (Becker, 2011, p. 142).

MINUSTAH's strategy against the gangs was based on counterinsurgency tactics, with robust raids to uproot the gangs followed by community outreach activities aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the population. This strategy is reminiscent of "clear-hold-build" in counterinsurgency thinking, a strategy particularly associated with the US intervention in Afghanistan (Department of the Army Headquarters). This strategy also has a parallel in domestic law enforcement with "weed and seed" policing strategies that emerged in the US, where "weeding" is meant to uproot criminals in inner cities, thus justifying violence as a necessary first step before "seeding" through development (Bridenball & Jesilow, 2005).

In the first period (the "clear" or "weed" phase), MINUSTAH's joint military-police interventions made full use of lethal power. One analysis notes that "the operations were guided by the principle of overwhelming force for psychological advantage, leading to fewer casualties as opposing forces tended to withdraw earlier" (Dorn, 2009, p. 814). MINUSTAH carried out its operations at night, sometimes starting at three in the morning (Dorn, 2009, p. 814). In the second period, the mission shifted to a less violent approach aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the community. This community violence reduction (CVR) approach (Schuberth, 2017) was characterized by a widespread use of "Quick Impact Projects" (QIPs). According to a 2010 DPKO document on civil-military coordination, QIPs are used to "build confidence" in the mission (UN DPKO/DFS, 2010). In 2005, Security Council resolution 1608 "urge[d] MINUSTAH to urgently develop and implement a proactive communications and public relations strategy, in order to

improve the Haitian population's understanding of the mandate of MINUSTAH and its role in Haiti" (UN Security Council, 2005, p. para 16). In response, the mission proposed to increase the budget for QIPs in order to fight bad publicity. A 2006 cable from SRSG Valdés to USG Guéhenno argues that "to support the newly elected government, MINUSTAH needs to have some funds that can be used in a flexible manner to implement Quick Impact Projects to win the 'heart and mind' of the Haitian community" and proposed to increase the QIPs budget from \$1.4 million to \$2 million (UN Archives, 2006a). In an ethnographic study of MINUSTAH, Greenburg notes that "soldiers describe these activities, which range from clearing rubble to providing Haitians with vocational education, as 'winning hearts and minds'" (Greenburg, 2013, p. 95). QIPs were used for infrastructure work, including clearing garbage and paving roads. They often involved cash-for-work arrangements, where members of the community were hired to work on these short term projects. The rationale was that providing jobs to the community, including young men, would decrease the attractiveness of joining and supporting gangs (Schuberth, 2017, pp. 422-423).

MINUSTAH's CVR strategy was part of a larger constellation of efforts aimed at decreasing popular support for the gangs, including the US-led Haiti-Stabilization Initiative (HSI). Focused on Cité Soleil, the HSI "was the first proposed use of funding provided by the Department of Defense (DOD) under Section 1207 of the Defense Authorization Act of 2007, permitting transfer of military funds to the Department of State for projects that would help in stabilization, with a goal of preventing (expensive) DOD interventions in the future" (Becker, 2011, p. 138). Its goal was clear: "HSI would co-opt the community by building local groups dedicated to positive ends, empowering popular informal local leaders who were not beholden to gang leaders or political patrons" (Becker, 2011, p. 145).

Although QIPs are sometimes described as humanitarian in nature, or as akin to social work, this labeling obscures that the civilian populations that theoretically benefit from them are often considered to be a means to an end. In fact, a UN document on civil-military coordination clearly states that "QIPs, 'hearts and minds' activities and community support projects should not be described as 'humanitarian' in nature so as to avoid confusion and antagonism" (UN DPKO/DFS, 2014a, p. 207). The tactical purpose of QIPs is apparent in the so-called "Cruz report", which addresses the security of UN peacekeepers. Santos Cruz, who served as Force Commander in Haiti, argues that "missions should use QIPs and UNCT [UN Country Team] funds and coordination to improve road infrastructure in high-risk areas" (dos Santos Cruz, 2017, p. 25),

so as to improve access for peacekeeping forces. In Haiti, one participant notes that “Brazilian and Chilean engineers paved part of this road [Soleil street 9], which contributed greatly to people’s living conditions besides improving our mobility” (Aldunate, 2010, p. 206).

An assessment of the Haiti Stabilization Initiative by its former head makes clear that these short-term projects do not carry the primarily goal of helping people:

We were there to change the community from within, not by creating an objective needs-based assessment of the obvious and numerous problems of poverty, but by using our various activities to weaken violence entrepreneurs and empower social entrepreneurs. We were using development tools, but for stabilization purposes (Becker, 2011, p. 145)

In other words, these projects were not motivated by the actual needs of the local population that they were supposed to serve, but by the international community’s broader strategy of stabilization. Becker makes clear that the goal was not primarily to protect the population, as “we were admittedly putting the population at risk with our offers of assistance” (Becker, 2011, p. 145). “The key was to find counterinsurgency theorist David Galula’s ‘favourable minority’ and reinforce them without accidentally killing them with our embrace” (Becker, 2011, p. 153).

Because of the short-term nature of QIPs, they cannot be said to contribute to the well-being of the community on the long term. An analysis notes that “temporary employment through cash-for-work programmes has been criticized as unsustainable and prone to corruption and exploitation” (Schuberth, 2017, p. 423). During an interviewee, a high level Haitian police officers noted:

We realized that the fundamental goal sought by MINUSTAH is visibility [...] And often the most visible projects are not durable. So on the long term, even in the medium term, there are no results. We’re not against QIPs, but you should limit those projects within the deployment’s timespan. After a year you can’t intervene with QIPs.¹¹⁴

4. Community policing or policing the community?

In addition to QIPs, community policing was another initiative that claimed to be community-friendly but was primarily animated by pacification and stabilization goals. According to the UN, “community-oriented policing” is “a strategy for encouraging the public to act as partners with the police in preventing and managing crime as well as other aspects of security and

¹¹⁴ Interview 20, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

order based on the needs of the community” (UN DPKO/DFS, 2018, p. 2). Although the term is notoriously slippery, it tends to encapsulate two key elements: the idea of partnership and cooperation between the police and the community, and the idea of a problem-solving approach based on local needs. In Canada, the US, France (where it is referred to as “*police de proximité*”) and many other Western states, community policing is seen as a way not only to mend the relationship between the inhabitants of marginalized neighbourhoods and police officers, but also to fight crime more efficiently. In fact, “the model and ideology” of community policing “has become the almost unchallenged definition of good and democratic policing” (Wisler & Onwudiwe, 2009, p. vii).

At the UN, the idea of developing a doctrine around community policing emerged in the early 2000s. David Bayley, one of the world’s foremost scholars on policing, was hired as a consultant and delivered a draft doctrine in May 2005. But as the Police Advisor changed in 2005, interest in the topic declined. The new Police Advisor “and many others in the Police Division” redirected efforts towards what they saw “as more fundamental and pressing problems with FPU and police institution-building” (Rotmann, 2011, p. 90). The concept resurfaced in the first Security Council resolution addressing the role of the police in peacekeeping in 2014. The resolution noted the importance of UN police in helping reform the police sector “in a comprehensive way that emphasizes a community-oriented approach and is integrated with other areas of security sector reform and the rule of law” (UN Security Council, 2014c, p. 3).

In Haiti, the development of community policing has long been on MINUSTAH’s agenda, though not always enacted in reality. Canada has been one of the strongest supporters of the concept, assisting in the creation of “bike brigades” within the Haitian National Police. In 2013-2014, a project coordinated by an officer from Montreal’s Police Department outfitted Haitian police officers with bikes in the Port-au-Prince neighbourhoods of Croix-Des-Bouquets, Pétionville, Delmas and Cité Soleil. According to the coordinator, “it’s so important for the police and for the population to feel like the police are there for the community, to serve and protect the people [...] The bikes make it possible” (Seiden, 2014). In 2013, the US launched its own community policing program through the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, encouraging Haitian police officers to patrol on foot and build better relations with communities, for instance by visiting and giving presentations in schools (Associated Press, 2013).

What's not to like in such approaches? The idea that community policing provides a silver bullet to improve relations between police and marginalized communities and fix issues of police violence has been met with skepticism in many countries that have promoted the concept. Critics argue that community policing is not an alternative to more brutal and intrusive policing styles, but rather goes hand in hand with those practices (Camp & Heatherton, 2016). In a 2015 interview, New York police commissioner William Bratton (one of the key figures in the turn to "broken windows" policing) in fact underlined that broken windows policing is "probably the most vivid example of community policing there is" (Bartosiewicz, 2015). Some have pointed out that community policing strategy is a translation of counterinsurgency thinking to domestic policing (Williams, 2011). There is a lineage between community policing and counterinsurgency, and the Rand Corporation itself has presented community policing as the guiding principle of counterinsurgency, arguing that "pacification is best thought of as a massively enhanced version of the 'community policing' technique that emerged in the 1970s" (Long, 2002). According to a publication by the US Joint Special Operations University, "the predominant ways of utilizing police and law enforcement within a COIN strategy [...] consist of the adoption of the community-policing approach supported by offensive-policing actions such as paramilitary operations, counter guerrilla patrolling, pseudo operations, and raids" (Celeski, 2009, p. 40).

At the UN, there is clearly a tension between a vision of community policing as primarily oriented towards the needs of the community and a more instrumental understanding of the role that policing can play in pacification. The 2014 Security Resolution that mentioned the importance of community-oriented approaches also "highlight[ed] that impartial, responsive, accountable, community-oriented police institutions with well-trained personnel can help to counter violent extremism, including through building trust and dialogue between state authorities and communities" (UN Security Council, 2014c, p. 4). At the 2018 conference of the IAPTC (International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers), UN Police Advisor Luis Carrilho argued that "to win peace, we must win over the hearts and minds of the locals. Community-oriented policing has emerged as a central tenet of UN policing."¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ September 30, 2018 tweet by United Nations Police, <https://twitter.com/UNPOL/status/1046482764114153472> (accessed October 11, 2018).

IV. Protecting who and what?

Although one of MINUSTAH's core missions was to protect civilians, this was not easily compatible with its mandate to stabilize Haiti. The mission to protect existing social order often conflicted with the mission to protect civilians (this tension is also explored in Chapter 5 on policing dissent). In the end, some civilians were excluded from protection because they were deemed to be threats to social order. This section asks whom and what MINUSTAH was protecting. It shows how promoting the "rule of law" under stabilization led to the targeting of some segments of Haitian society and not others.

1. Increasing whose security?

Given MINUSTAH's focus on the poor neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince and its mandate to protect civilians, did the mission actually help reduce the insecurity that these communities experience? A number of surveys have attempted to answer this question, with somewhat contrasting results. Although trust in the police seems to have increased, the role of MINUSTAH in providing security was less clear cut. A 2010 survey of almost 3,000 households in Port-au-Prince found that the HNP was the preferred provider of security and that respondents felt that strengthening the police would make them safer (Muggah, 2010, p. 18). A 2009 report similarly found increased sense of security in Bel Air due not only to police activity but also to MINUSTAH (Kivland, 2009). Another survey conducted for the US-led Haitian Stabilization Initiative in November 2007 (mentioned in a USIP report but unavailable online) apparently found that "that 98 percent of Cité Soleil residents felt safer than they had six months earlier" (Dziedzic & Perito, 2008, p. 5). This number, so close to 100%, would seem to warrant caution. An August 2011 survey of over 800 households in two low income neighbourhoods (Cité Soleil and Martissant) and two mixed-income ones (Delmas 33 and Canapé Vert) provided more nuanced results, particularly with regards to the role of MINUSTAH's presence in increasing feelings of security. It found that "less than one-third of respondents (31.3%) felt that they were in greater physical security when a MINUSTAH agent was physically present, only slightly greater than those who declared 'mostly not' (31.0%). An additional 22.4 percent reported that they were 'not at all' safer with MINUSTAH present". However, a majority of people also responded that they did not want MINUSTAH to leave, with women more likely to support MINUSTAH's presence (Schuller, 2012).

I raised the question of MINUSTAH's success in increasing security in poor neighbourhoods in my interviews, which also generated mixed responses. When asked whether patrols by MINUSTAH in Cité Soleil created a feeling of security, a community organizer who grew up and works in the area noted:

It depends on the time. At one point a BRABAT [Brazilian Battalion] patrol was a threat, because we knew that if there's a group of young people that's sitting there playing dominoes or chatting, at one point it was when the patrol arrived everybody left, because they wanted to disperse anything that looked like a gathering. That was at one time. At another time, it was 'ah ok if there's a patrol that means that the various armed groups are not going to act'. At one point. And that even justified that people found that MINUSTAH was too passive because they knew that if MINUSTAH did more of these patrols there would be fewer cases of reprisals between these groups.¹¹⁶

According to a researcher who has worked on baz for several years, including in Bel Air:

Most of the people I know don't want MINUSTAH to leave. These include organized groups and people on the streets, the sellers and so on. This is about security. They don't think the PNH can provide stability. [...] As a middle class person like me you don't realize that security is very important for people who don't have security.¹¹⁷

On the other hand, a high level civilian officer within MINUSTAH had a much less favourable view of the role of the mission's military component:

I mean if they saw what happened in Martissant, in Cité Soleil, all of these different red zones, people were afraid, they were afraid of MINUSTAH's military. They don't feel that way about UNPOL from what I'm told, I could be wrong. They don't feel that way about the rest of the civilian staff.¹¹⁸

Another interviewee, a US citizen who works for a Haitian human rights organizations, had a rather different assessment, arguing that "the people don't think it [MINUSTAH] is really helping them to establish order for them. It's more enabling corrupt governments to lead. It just provides them with more security to do that".¹¹⁹ I raised with them the results of the 2011 survey in Cité Soleil, Martissant, Delmas 33 and Canapé Vert and its seemingly paradoxical findings that

¹¹⁶ Interview 35, Port-au-Prince, July 2017 (translated from French).

¹¹⁷ Interview 14, Port-au-Prince, June 2017.

¹¹⁸ Interview 41, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

¹¹⁹ Interview 1, Port-au-Prince, May 2017.

although people did not report feeling safer with MINUSTAH's presence they did not want the mission to leave (Schuller, 2012). The interviewee argued that this reflected the fact that "they're so desperate for security they'll take anything", and pointed to the need to acknowledge "the desperation for security by people who feel insecure, particularly poor people, particularly women".¹²⁰

Presented with the results from the 2011 survey, one interviewee, the head of a Haitian organization that defends women's rights, suggested another option: that people may have responded favourably to MINUSTAH's presence not because of a sense of increased security, but because of the economic opportunities offered by the mission. This would explain the disconnect between the two questions (are you feeling safer? And: do you want MINUSTAH to stay?), and possibly the higher rate of positive response by women who stated that MINUSTAH made them safer:

MINUSTAH contributes to changing, how can you put it, in a perverse way, [women's] economic conditions too. Because MINUSTAH gives a bit of money with prostitution, which has increased. So women feel... Maybe because we live in a country where the economic situation is getting worse. So in their precarious situation, it helps a lot [...] And you will maybe get the same response if you interview people who own stores, who have houses for rent [...], hotels etc. The majority of them are very happy with MINUSTAH's presence.¹²¹

It is thus difficult to answer with any certainty the question of whether MINUSTAH has contributed to make the population of poor neighbourhoods feel safer. It is worth noting that these populations, who cannot afford private security services, continue to rely on vigilante brigades to ensure their security, in a context where protection by the state is perceived to be insufficient (Edouard & Dandoy, 2017). For members of vigilante brigades, the police are seen as weak institution that does not meet the population's needs, or worse, as the armed wing of the wealthy (Edouard & Dandoy, 2017, p. ix). Despite improvement in the police, a police doctrine focused on order maintenance and brutal techniques of control in poor neighbourhoods – such as the practice of "arimaj" and the proliferation of riot-control units (see Chapter 6) – have fed poor populations' distrust of the institution (Edouard & Dandoy, 2017, pp. 32-33).

¹²⁰ Interview 1, Port-au-Prince, May 2017.

¹²¹ Interview 39, Port-au-Prince, July 2017, translated from French.

Furthermore, even if we accept that MINUSTAH and the HNP increased security by uprooting the gangs, this raises the question of the cost of such operations. It is a fact that many civilians living in these neighbourhoods were killed in the aftermath of the 2004 coup. As Alex Dupuy notes:

Different reports estimated that between March 2004 and the beginning of 2006, about 1,500 people had been killed [...] Regardless of the actual number of people killed, injured, or abused after the Latortue government came to power, the vast majority of them were civilians, most residing in the poor ghettos of Port-au-Prince and other cities. And, as many human rights reports made clear, the police and their affiliates were responsible for the majority of the killings (Dupuy, 2006b, p. 174).

Civilian casualties also occurred during MINUSTAH raids, most famously during the July 2005 “Iron Fist” operation and Operation New Forest in December 2006 (Wills, 2018). When I asked a Haitian journalist whether MINUSTAH could be credited with pacifying Cité Soleil, they raised the question of these costs:

Yes. If you don’t go into the details about human rights violations [...]. The UN played a role in eliminating parts of these groups. But there were reports of systemic human rights abuses. So the UN is responsible for that, but at what cost? It’s part of systemic violence against poor people in Haiti, not just by the UN.¹²²

MINUSTAH’s actions not only had a direct negative impact on civilians who were killed, wounded, or whose house was destroyed, it may also have contributed to exacerbating violence among gangs and between gangs and the mission. Many analyses in Haiti and beyond have noted that robust action against gangs tends to have counterproductive effects. In 2007, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime itself stated that “heavy handed crackdowns on gangs alone will not resolve the underlying problems. Indeed, it may exacerbate them. Gang culture is a symptom of a deeper social malaise that cannot be solved by putting all disaffected street kids behind bars” (UNODC, 2007).

In Haiti, several observers have argued that robust action radicalized youth and alleged gang members in a pattern similar to what happened in Central America, where *mano dura* policies have escalated violence (Muggah, 2010, p. 7). One report notes that forceful action against gangs had a self-fulfilling element, in a context where “disproportional response is often linked to

¹²² Interview 23, Port-au-Prince, June 2017.

cyclical violence by armed gangs” (Kolbe, 2013, p. 23) and “memberships in gangs and other armed groups increase[e] during times of government repression” (Kolbe, 2013, p. 29). Another argues that “the MINUSTAH and PNH forces used excessive force in the neighbourhoods of Greater Bel Air in attempts to dislodge and weaken the gangs. This contributed to an escalation of violence” (Erickson, 2014, p. 13). According to the head of a Haitian organization that defends women’s rights, MINUSTAH’s actions since 2004 have increased community violence in poor neighbourhoods.¹²³

Furthermore, the presence of the mission in itself can lead to conflict. As one analysis notes, “MINUSTAH and NGOs are generally not viewed as effective agents of conflict prevention and resolution in the communities, and were cited by informants as creating or exacerbating divisions” (Erickson, 2014, p. 37). In an ethnographic study of *baz* in Bel Air, Kivland argues that international aid in the wake of the 2010 earthquake contributed to creating conflict and violence between different groups which were competing for resources. Insecurity in Bel Air skyrocketed to levels not seen since the 2004 coup, and this resurgence in violence was directly linked to the “entanglement of *baz* politics and development economies”, in particular conflict over cash-for-work programs (Kivland, 2017, p. 156).

The assumption that MINUSTAH increased security for the inhabitants of slums also ignores that “the presence of large numbers of (male) peacekeepers can give rise to spaces of insecurity” (Higate & Henry, 2009, p. 137). In light of reports of sexual exploitation in peace operations, some feminist activists and scholars have questioned whether soldiers are the best placed to build peace and protect civilians (Duncanson, 2009; Whitworth, 2004), and whether militarized protection is a contradiction in terms (Sjoberg, 2013). Not only has MINUSTAH been plagued by scandals of sexual abuse since the mission’s inception, but the mission (and the associated presence of international workers) created a market for prostitution. The head of a feminist organization pointed what she saw as the “contradictions” between MINUSTAH’s official focus on the protection of human rights and attention to gender and the fact that the mission is overwhelming staffed by men. For them, this made MINUSTAH a “double-edged sword”:

So in reality the soldiers, because they came as armed soldiers, they are intimidating for the whole society, and they commit with impunity a number of actions that prove that they

¹²³ Interview 39, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

are far from guaranteeing the maintenance of order and guaranteeing women's security even less so.¹²⁴

Finally, thinking about “insecurity” purely in terms of exposure to crime and gangs provides for a limited understanding of what the concept covers in Haiti. Anthropologist Erica Caple James argues that “‘insecurity’—*ensekirite* in Haitian Creole—is the actual term that describes the social vulnerability that accompanies the crisis of the Haitian state” and that “beyond its literal signification of political and criminal violence, the term *ensekirite* can be used as a trope for the experience of living at the nexus of multiple uncertainties and forms of violence—political, economic, domestic, gendered, spiritual” (James, 2008, pp. 135-136). Insecurity is fundamentally linked to the Haitian state's incapacity and unwillingness “to protect and promote the welfare of its citizens” (James, 2008, p. 133). If this is the case, the idea that insecurity can be fixed through external intervention focused on criminality is dubious.

2. The contradictions of promoting the rule of law under stabilization

If the goal was to neutralize the gangs of Port-au-Prince, then MINUSTAH's selective focus on poor neighbourhoods provided a very limited way of doing so. As we shall see, most observers agree that gangs are funded and armed by the Haitian business and political elite. But given MINUSTAH's stabilization mandate and its support for the Haitian government, it was highly reliant on these very elites. Therefore, the mission failed to address how these groups were involved in the insecurity that it was allegedly trying to curtail. Focus on poor neighbourhoods was not only discriminatory, it also provided for a truncated rule of law strategy, which largely guaranteed the impunity of those who arm and fund the gangs.

Though MINUSTAH's raids against gangs are sometimes touted as a resounding success and a model for future missions (Dorn, 2009; Dziedzic & Perito, 2008), there is considerable skepticism about this success story even among former members of MINUSTAH. Indeed, many note that the military targeting of gangs only addressed one part of the problem, as it failed to deal with the question of who was financing and arming them (Cockayne, 2014). Former head of DDR Desmond Molloy argues that MINUSTAH's “robust actions failed to address the underlying close relations between the controlling business elites and the armed gangs” (Molloy, 2017, p. 62).

¹²⁴ Interview 39, Port-au-Prince, July 2017 (translated from French).

According to former Police Commissioner Beer, “since criminal justice in the country was dysfunctional and the capacities of the police [...] alone were insufficient to dismantle the linkages between political elites and the gangs, there seemed no other solution to the violence but to neutralize the gangs in a military sense”. In fact, “investigating the economic elites that exploited the gangs was a low priority where those same elites’ cooperation was essential to national economic recovery” (Beer, 2016, pp. 93-94). The International Crisis Group similarly notes that “demands for investigation of the private sector’s role in supporting the gangs [...] could produce unpredictable reactions from powerful individuals fearful of exposure” (International Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 3). Already in 2004, a human rights investigation had found that

Observations and interviews of police officers reveal that there is little police science at work in the daily operations in the poorest neighbourhoods, but only purposeful, indiscriminate guerrilla attacks. HNP [Haitian National Police] officers do not conduct preliminary intelligence or detective work, and there are usually no plans laid out for the arrest of a particular subject or for entry into a suspect’s house (Griffin, 2004, p. 42).

As Beer pointedly asks, “was this capture-or-kill response the only strategy available?” (Beer, 2016, p. 93) The absence of investigative work and the focus on the use of force meant that alleged gang members were more likely to be killed than interrogated, making it impossible for the police to reconstruct the networks they were part of. It is hardly a secret in Port-au-Prince that some members of the Haitian political and business elite who decry insecurity are also responsible for funding and arming gangs. This was acknowledged by several of my international and Haitian interviewees. A Western diplomat pointed out that “today they [the gangs] are quieter because the politicians ran out of money. The 10 great families that funds politicians, who in turn want to establish their power, these families now they live on credit because with instability there’s no money coming into the country”.¹²⁵ According to the head of a Haitian human rights organization

The problem, it’s who funds the ammunition, who supplies the chimères or the bandits, in quotation marks, who finances them, who gives instructions? The issue of kidnappings, who profits? Someone gets kidnapped and the parents pay 200,000 US dollars, do these 200,000 US dollars end up in Cité Soleil or Bel Air, or somewhere else?¹²⁶

¹²⁵ Interview 8, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

¹²⁶ Interview 24, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

There is ample evidence that kidnappings involved a wide range of actors beyond gang members from poor neighbourhoods, including the Haitian police itself as well as some members of the Haitian business and political elite. In an interview in early 2005, then head of the Haitian National Police Mario Andrésol noted that 29 policemen had been arrested in connection with kidnappings.¹²⁷ As former Police Commissioner Beer notes, “MINUSTAH, investigating kidnappings in Port-au-Prince, discovered cases where the HNP ‘kidnapping unit’ had facilitated or actually committed kidnappings” (Beer, 2016, pp. 80, fnote 29). A 2006 report by the International Crisis Group notes that “the perpetrators of one interrupted kidnapping were a merchant, a student and an HNP officer” (International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 5). The same year, a Haitian human rights organization denounced the release of four alleged kidnappers, including a wealthy businessman who owned the Best Western hotel in Pétionville.¹²⁸ In 2012, in a widely reported scandal, the son of one of the richest families in Haiti was arrested for his involvement in the kidnapping of two members of another of the country’s prominent families (Daudier, 2012).

In spite of this reality, as we have seen MINUSTAH concentrated its efforts entirely on the poorest neighbourhoods. This focus was not only discriminatory, it was also counterproductive: if the goal really was to dismantle gangs, then addressing the networks behind them would seem to be a crucial element of any strategy. As the head of a Haitian human rights organization puts it, “it’s as if it’s poor people who can be bandits, people who are not poor cannot be bandits. For me this is a very bad analysis, it’s a discriminatory analysis, it’s a discrimination based on wealth”.¹²⁹ They added:

Sometimes there is what you could call the intellectual author of crimes and the material author, certainly the person who performs the crimes is not the person who thought the crimes through. So if you execute the person who performed the crimes, then you kill the hope to have the possibility to go up to all criminal networks, to all the intellectual authors of those crimes. That is what MINUSTAH’s soldiers do when they intervene in Cité Soleil [...] Criminals must be punished, and I mean not only those who carry out crimes, but those who think them. I think that MINUSTAH perpetuated a form of impunity by acting the way it did.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ “Haïti: Les leçons d’un scrutin”, interview of Mario Andrésol by Nancy Roc, <http://www.potomitan.info/ayiti/andresol.php>, accessed April 18, 2019.

¹²⁸ “Four Alleged Kidnappers Released: RNDDH denounces the offensive decision by the President of the National Association of Haitian Magistrates (ANAMAH)”, RNDDH, available on the Haiti Democracy Project website, <https://haitipolicy.org/2006/01/get-out-of-jail-free>, accessed April 18, 2019.

¹²⁹ Interview 24, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

¹³⁰ Interview 24, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

For a community organizer in Fort National,

There's something to understand, an approach developed by Pierre Bourdieu, a sociologist, on symbolic violence. When a mother cannot buy her children food when they live in a society, we as an organization call it violence [...] They say we're the violent ones, they turn victims into perpetrators [...] Where are the gangs? Cité Soleil? La Saline? Tokyo? That's where they come to massacre poor people. They say they come to fight the gangs, and it's people living in misery that they attack. If it was true, they should go into the laboratory of the gangs, the ruling class.¹³¹

Faced with a tension between the mission to stabilize (enforce order) and protect, MINUSTAH thus favoured the former over the latter.

V. Urban pacification at home and abroad

1. *Conceptualizing slums and urban insecurity*

In many ways, MINUSTAH's intervention in the slums of Port-au-Prince is far from presenting a unique case. The stigmatization of slums and the association of these neighbourhoods with criminality is as old as slums themselves, which emerged during industrialization. For Victorian middle-classes, "the slum was first and above all envisioned as a place where an incorrigible and feral social 'residuum' rots in immoral and often riotous splendor" (M. Davis, 2017 [2006], p. 22). In the US, a 1894 survey of tenements in Baltimore, Chicago, New York and Philadelphia defined slums as "an area of dirty back streets, especially when inhabited by a squalid and criminal population" (M. Davis, 2017 [2006], p. 22). Contemporary rapid urbanization, in particular in the Global South, has generated apocalyptic analyses of the sanitary and security risks posed by sprawling slums with little infrastructure and public services. As Mike Davis argues in his seminal book *Planet of Slums*, slums "are frequently seen as threats simply because they are invisible to state surveillance and, effectively, 'off-Panopticon'" (M. Davis, 2017 [2006], p. 111). An illustrative report by Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada and the Canadian Consortium on Human Security claims that vulnerable slums pose a number of threats to wider cities, including

Anarchy, governmental collapse, ethnic rivalry, cultural grievances, religious-ideological extremism, environmental degradation, natural resource depletion, competition for economic resources, drug trafficking, alliances between narco-traffickers and terrorists, the

¹³¹ Interview 7, Port-au-Prince, May 2017 (translated from Haitian Creole).

proliferation of ‘inhumane weapons’ and the spread of infectious diseases (Hawrylak, Houghton, & Lawson, 2007, pp. 12-13).

With the introduction of concepts such as “urban wars” (Beall, 2007) or “slum wars” (Rodgers, 2009), both practitioners and academics have driven attention to the nexus between cities, conflict and crime. Humanitarian actors such as the International Committee for the Red Cross have proposed to intervene in urban environments where levels of armed violence can trigger international humanitarian law (Harroff-Tavel, 2010; Reid-Henry & Sending, 2014). In failing or failed states, “fragile cities are being reconceived as the primary sites of tomorrow’s warfare and development” (Muggah, 2014, p. 345). As a 2016 policy brief by the UN University notes, peace operations are likely to increasingly intervene in cities in a context where “the pace of urbanization in fragile and conflict-affected countries has been particularly pronounced, increasing by 298% over the past 40 years” (Bosetti et al., 2016).

Although slums tend to be thought of as a Global South phenomenon,¹³² poor marginalized neighbourhoods in the Global North have generated similar feelings of anxiety. In his analysis of how techniques of population control travel from colonial laboratories to the metropole, Barder notes that “peripheral zones” have emerged within metropolitan states “in the form of inner cities in the United States or banlieues in France”, and that “these zones, populated by African-Americans or immigrants, become perceived as internal threats to the established domestic order and the authority of the state” (Barder, 2015, p. 13). In a book analyzing the figure of the “internal enemy” (*ennemi intérieur*) in France, Rigouste traces its genealogy from the colonial period to today’s merging of policymakers’ concerns about international terrorism and risky urban neighbourhoods (Rigouste, 2014). But often these parallels are not established because of a bifurcated analysis that sees cities in the Global North as fundamentally different from their Global South counterparts. This is because “the partitioning of the urban areas of the world into two hermetically sealed zones – ‘developed’ cities addressed through urban geography or sociology, and ‘developing’ ones addressed through ‘development studies’ – remains remarkably common” (Graham, 2012, p. 43).

Wacquant argues that the militarization of urban marginality has traveled from the US to Latin America, in particular Brazil, and that “stigmatized neighbourhoods of relegation in both

¹³² Which does not reflect reality. For instance, a 2017 article in the French newspaper *Le Monde* reported that there are 570 slums in France (Baumard, 2017).

countries have become the prime targets of virulent police action and pivotal sites for innovations in and exhibitions of aggressive law-enforcement” that is “indistinguishable from a military incursion into an occupied territory” (Wacquant, 2008, p. 66). Police work in “tough” neighbourhoods is indeed seen by practitioners as akin to military intervention in hostile territory. A chief of security in one of the “sensitive” urban areas of France interviewed in 2001 made the comparison with the 1999 Kosovo intervention, arguing that “it’s like Kosovo there. We’re on a pacification mission. We have to hold our ground like the military does” (Bonelli, 2001, p. 42). In fact, during the 2005 urban riots in France, two infantry battalions that had been deployed in Cote d’Ivoire and Kosovo were recalled to assist in light of their experience with crowd control and order maintenance in urban environments (Rigouste, 2014, p. 280). As Fassin notes in his ethnographic study of policing in the French banlieues,

The police who work in the banlieues are therefore mainly white men who have been given the task of pacifying neighbourhoods described as a ‘jungle’, inhabited mainly by people of African origin who have been represented to them as ‘savages’ (Fassin, 2013, p. 52).

The idea that the inhabitants of slums are to be protected but are also threats is not unique to MINUSTAH. This inversion, where populations at risk become the risk, has been noted by scholars of domestic law enforcement, in a context where the policing of marginalized populations has become more militarized and punitive. Writing in the US context, Giroux (2003, p. 49) argues that “rather than being at risk in a society marked by deep racial, economic, and social inequalities, youth and minorities of color and class have been defined as the risk”. In the French context, Fassin (2013, p. 216) notes that “the activity of law enforcement has always been focused on groups whose economic and social vulnerability was easily inverted into the threat of crime and a peril to security”. Looking at the evolution of policing in French working-class neighbourhoods, Bonelli (2001) similarly argues that neighbourhoods that used to be “in danger” are now seen as “dangerous” (see also Dikeç, 2007). In the context of a global blurring of the logics of policing and armed conflict, “those formally seen as ‘at risk’ have now come to be seen as ‘the risk’” (McCulloch, 2004, p. 315). Rather than right-bearing citizens worthy of protection, some populations become criminals needing to be repressed (Cacho, 2012).

Representations of the gangs of Port-au-Prince fit into this global trend. In their analysis of the discourse and policies addressing gangs in Latin America, Muggah and Rodgers argue that

gangs are an “immediate symptom of growing inequality and exclusion, and as such a reflection of deeply iniquitous social processes” (Rodgers & Muggah, 2009, p. 312). In oligarchic societies marked by vast disparities of wealth, gangs become “convenient scapegoats” (Rodgers & Muggah, 2009, p. 313) to be eliminated at any cost, by strengthening the state security sector. The focus on order and coercive state institutions often comes at the expense of addressing political, social and economic issues, and has a strong status quo bias (Muggah, 2011).

In other words, the way MINUSTAH perceived poor urban neighbourhoods in Port-au-Prince and acted against the gangs should be seen as part of a global trend in militarizing urban security and treating marginalized urban populations as threats.

2. *Circulation*

MINUSTAH’s raids against gangs, though a first for a UN peace operation, do not seem odd in the broader landscape of an increasing militarization of urban policing. Some have located the origin of this trend towards more militarized ways of dealing with urban marginality in the US “zero tolerance” and “broken windows” policies, which have been exported to/imported in many other parts of the world, including Latin America and Europe (Wacquant, 2001, 2008; 2009, p. chapters 8 and 9). Discourses and practices of militarized policing in marginalized neighbourhoods have certainly circulated from Brazil to Haiti and back (Hoelscher & Norheim-Martinsen, 2014). Indeed, observers disagree on which way the arrow points. Some argue that Brazil exported its experience of urban “pacification” to Haiti” (Sotomayor, 2014), while others rather see it the other way, arguing that the Brazilian military used methods first perfected in Haiti in projects in several favelas in Rio de Janeiro (M. Hirst & Nasser, 2014). One analysis notes that

At the time of the Brazilian military engagement in Haiti, no clear support existed for the deployment of the armed forces in the streets of Rio de Janeiro. Heavy memories from the long years of dictatorship still prevented imagining this possibility. Since 2008, nevertheless, soldiers with experience in Haiti have been engaged in “pacification programmes” implemented in Rio de Janeiro, well know today through the “Police Pacifying Units” (UPP) implemented in several favelas of Rio de Janeiro (Gomes, 2016, p. 14).

In the end, “both sides of the argument should be seen as complementary, not mutually excluding perspectives” (Harig, 2015, p. 142). The circulation of practices was not a unidirectional event but a continuous back and forth, creating a “synergy” effect between MINUSTAH and public

security in Brazil (Harig, 2015, p. 142). This synergy manifested itself concretely in the trajectories of members of the Brazilian military, the circulation of strategies of intervention, and references to the Haitian case to justify military intervention in Brazil.

Most of the Brazilian soldiers affected to MINUSTAH were recruited from units headquartered in Rio, and in turn many of the Brazilian troops that participated in the UPPs had served with the mission (Sotomayor, 2014, p. 139). A 2013 study found that up to 90% of soldiers deployed in Rio's Pacification had experience in Haiti (Kenkel, 2013, p. 194). Many of the Brazilian commanders heading the pacification efforts in Rio had leadership experience with MINUSTAH, and the Brazilian military's experience in MINUSTAH was explicitly used by some to legitimize increasing use of the military in the favelas. Two former MINUSTAH Force Commanders intervened in the debate in early 2018 to argue that pacification efforts in Rio should apply the same rules of engagement as MINUSTAH. One pointed that the military in Rio should confront the gangs with a "power of equal or greater lethality" and that the rules of engagement should "offer troops legal security for the actions that will have to be implemented, as was the case in Haiti" (Coutinho, 2018).¹³³ The other noted that, as in Haiti, troops in Rio should be able to kill those they consider as enemies.¹³⁴ As Harig (2019) points out, Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH thus had significant effect on disinhibiting the use of military force in Rio's favelas. When troops and officers who had participated in robust action against "gangs" in Haiti were deployed back in Brazil, they expected to be able to follow similar rules of engagement, including the possibility of using lethal force against "criminals" deemed to be acting (or intending to act) in a hostile manner (Harig, 2019, p. 149). Thus, "the mission in Haiti has [...] created expectations among troops that can hardly be harmonised with the rule of law in a liberal democracy" (Harig, 2019, p. 146).

It is clear that the Brazilian troops brought their own experience to Haiti. According to a news report by a journalist who was embedded with the Brazilian military, operation Jauru in February 2007 in Cité Soleil was based on the outline of operations planned by the army for Rio (Stochero, 2007b). The Brazilian troop commander, Col. Barroso Magno, argued that "the plan

¹³³ Translated from Portuguese.

¹³⁴ "O general Augusto Heleno fala a BandNews FM sobre a intervenção federal no Rio de Janeiro." BandNews FM, February 16, 2018.
<http://www.bandnewsfm.com.br/2018/02/16/o-general-augusto-heleno-fala-bandnews-fm-sobre-intervencao-federal-no-rio-de-janeiro/> (Accessed July 11, 2018).

applied here is consistent with what was planned for Rio” (Stochero, 2007a). But then the Brazilian experience in Haiti also inspired intervention back home. For instance, the Brazilian army confirmed that the techniques employed to occupy the Rio shantytown Morro da Providência in December 2007 were the same that were used by Brazilian soldiers in Haiti (Dantas, 2007). At the height of the operations in Cité Soleil, Rio’s Military Police (Polícia Militar) sent a delegation to Haiti to study the experience of the Brazilian Army (Gombata, 2014). The interlinked and recursive nature of this circulation is well illustrated by the fact that in May 2013, Rio State Governor Sérgio Cabral and Haitian Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe signed a cooperation agreement between the Rio Polícia Militar and the HNP to exchange information on the evolution of UPP policy in Rio. Two months later, a commission of the PNH traveled to Rio to meet new UPPs (Gombata, 2014). In other words, the Haitian government was interested in learning about techniques of favela policing that had been greatly impacted by the Brazilian experience in Haiti.

The Rio UPPs were also a legacy of the Brazilian experience in Haiti. They were created in 2008, a year after the height of MINUSTAH’s anti-gang campaigns in Port-au-Prince (Müller, 2016). As one analysis points out, “UPP units even resemble UN peacekeepers with similar army fatigues and blue caps” (Hoelscher & Norheim-Martinsen, 2014, p. 964).

The Brazilian military frequently refers to the relevance of its MINUSTAH experience for domestic policing. In 2017, commenting on a military operation in the Rocinha favela, the Brazilian Defense minister declared: “We’ve had a 13-year test drive in Haiti, we have highly trained troops in terms of jungle” (Bruno, Boeckel, Barreira, & Satriano, 2017). For the Brazilian military, the lesson of Haiti for Brazil was that military action had to be followed by a “hearts and minds” campaign, and that the armed forces needed to be integrated with public security agencies (Stochero, 2007a).

It is not only practices of intervention that travel, but also depictions of populations of intervention. As one analysis of the Brazilian experience in Haiti notes,

An interview with a Brazilian military during a night patrol in Cité Soleil has revealed how a soldier born and raised in Rio de Janeiro understands the dynamic of the largest Haitian slum. On record, he did not hesitate to argue that Cité Soleil would be just like any other favela in Rio (Napoleão & da Cunha Kalil, 2015, p. 90).

As Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH was debated,

The idea that there are “Haitis” inside Brazil was used both by supporters and opponents of Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH in order to support their claims. Supporters of Brazil’s leadership in MINUSTAH used the metaphor of the ‘Haitis’ present inside the country to reinforce the idea of a natural solidarity between Brazilians and Haitians, whereas those opposed to the intervention invoked the idea that ‘Haiti is here’ with the opposite aim of focusing the country’s attention on its own serious internal problems (Gomes, 2016, pp. 10-11).

Conclusion

In its operations in poor urban areas of Port-au-Prince, MINUSTAH resolved the tension between enforcing order and protecting civilians in favour of the former. Populations that were previously deemed to be “at risk” became “the risk”. As argued in Chapter 2, this is consistent with the way the tension between protection and order enforcement is usually resolved in the logic of policing. Because policing is concerned with the enforcement of not just public order but social order, this authorizes violence against not only those who are seen to break the law, but also against those who are deemed to be a threat to social order because of their political beliefs or their mere socio-economic position. Thus, MINUSTAH (encouraged by the Haitian elites) not only saw poor populations as politically suspect (Lavalas militants) but as inherently dangerous.

This chapter has situated MINUSTAH’s actions in the poorest neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince within the broader field of policing of urban marginality, and shown how discourses and practices of intervention circulated between the mission and “pacification” operations in Brazil. This reveals the benefits of the theory of peace operations as co-constitutive of international, transnational and domestic hierarchies developed in Chapter 1. It reveals how MINUSTAH’s international interveners stood in relation to the inhabitants of Port-au-Prince slums in the same way that the Brazilian security apparatus stood in relation to inhabitants of Rio de Janeiro slums. Thus, the international hierarchy between interveners and intervened upon was refracted through domestic hierarchies within the intervened upon society. In Haiti, governing political and business elites not only approved of robust international raids against these poor neighbourhoods, but even pushed MINUSTAH to use more lethal force. Haitian slum dwellers were “twice subordinated”, first in relation to international interveners, and second in relation to Haitian governing elites. In parallel, although Brazilian slum dwellers may have been citizens of the dominant intervening party, they were put on the same footing as Haitian slum dwellers, justifying the use of similar strategies of intervention in these communities. While MINUSTAH may have affirmed Brazil’s

international hierarchical status as an intervening power, it also worked to reproduce domestic hierarchies within Brazil and Haiti.

Chapter 5: Policing dissent

The UN has become a major actor of public order policing, “the policing of protestors, campaigners and other large gatherings of people, at events that may be either planned or spontaneous in nature” (Wakefield & Fleming, 2009, p. 253). Although executive mandates that would make UN peace operations the *principal* actor of public order policing are rare (Kosovo, East Timor), in many countries these missions are in charge of supporting local police actors in a wide range of tasks, of which policing during protests is one. Because UN missions are often tasked with recruiting and training police forces, they also play a role in developing local capacities for public order management, thus imparting not only their skills but also their doctrine to host state police forces.

And yet there is a lack of systematic work on the protest policing style developed by the UN. Scholars of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees have revealed that the organization is sometimes confronted to refugee protests, but in these situations UNHCR often calls in state security forces (Holzer, 2015; Moulin & Nyers, 2007). In contrast, in peace operations the UN is directly managing protests and crowds. How do UN peace operations see protests? How do they prepare to respond to them? What practices do they deploy? In this chapter, I show that, in a context where a peace operation is charged with a stabilization mandate, it sees protests as threats to security and stability and deploys military and paramilitary forces to respond to them. In this pattern of intervention, populations that were deemed to be “at risk” and in need of protection become “the risk” and in need of policing.

The first section examines how peace operations think about protests. It shows that protests are part of a spectrum of “threats” that include terrorism, organized crime and natural disasters, and that UN training emphasizes their potential for danger and violence. The second section looks at how the UN frames protests in Haiti. It argues that MINUSTAH’s “stabilization” mandate led it to see protests as a challenge to its mission to protect the status quo. The mission developed a conspiracist understanding of protests that depicts them as manipulated threats. The third section examines the practices that flow from this understanding of protests. It shows that MINUSTAH adopted an escalated force model focused on deterring protests through shows of force and containing them by resorting to (para)military forces. In the last section, I argue that the protest

policing style developed by MINUSTAH is not only illustrative of UN protest policing but also reverberates through time and space, as UN peace operations create a market for certain skills and tools, help develop them, and socialize troops into them.

I. Thinking about public order, crowds and protests

To understand how UN peace operations police protests, we need to understand how they think about protests. Scholars of protest policing have shown that protest policing style is largely determined by “police knowledge”, “the police's perception of external reality, which shapes the concrete policing of protest on the ground” (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998, p. 2). According to Della Porta and Reiter (1998), police knowledge is the main intervening variable between structure and action. Rather than ad hoc responses to individual events, “police attitudes and tactics are organized around a coherent policing philosophy” (Vitale, 2005, p. 286). Because the stereotypes of “protesters” held by the police determine policing style, “the strategies police adopt toward these demonstrators depend not primarily on the demonstrators’ ‘objective’ actions or attributes but on the socially constructed images of the demonstrators and predictions about their behaviour” (Schweingruber, 2000, p. 372). The way protests “are policed is based in large part on the strategic orientation of the police rather than the nature of the demonstration or short-term pressures” (Vitale, 2005, p. 302).

How do UN peace operations think about protests? What do they consider protests to be an instance of? This section argues that, because of standardized risk assessment procedures, peace operations generally see protests as a risk or a threat that belongs in the same category as armed attacks, crime and natural disasters. Protests are an instance of a range of phenomena that can affect the mission’s security and safety and the stability of the country in which it is intervening. Such classification of protests *de facto* depoliticizes and criminalizes them.

1. *Strange bedfellows: terrorism, crime and protests*

Even before a given protest materializes, the UN mission on the ground has a standardized frame to think about protests: protests are analyzed within the framework of risk and threat assessment. This is not unique to the UN, and a recent study of protest policing in Canada and the US found that “police increasingly evaluate protest activity through the lens of ‘threat assessment,’ grouping it into a larger category that includes terrorism, war, and violent crime” (Wood, 2014, p.

126). Placing protests in this framework securitizes and pathologizes them. Rather than normal events, they are indicators of insecurity leading to political destabilization.

Since the bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad in 2003, the UN has attempted to systematize its security management system. In 2011, it launched a new security management framework that lays out standardized methods to assess risk, threat and vulnerability, and establishes a security level system that ranks areas where the UN operates from 1 (minimal threat) to 6 (extreme threat) (Willmot, Sheeran, & Sharland, 2015). These evolutions have been captured in a Security Policy Manual that “constitutes a solid policy framework for enabling the conduct of UN operations while ensuring the safety and security of UN personnel”.¹³⁵

The Security Policy Manual’s language provides insight into the threat assessment frame adopted by UN peace operations. The Manual equates “obstacles” that the UN mission may face with “threats”: “Any United Nations objective, from global strategic goals to local programme plans, may fail because of various obstacles. *In the security context, obstacles are called threats*” (UNDSS, p. 3). The equation of obstacles and threats can also be seen when the manual argues that “Security Risk Management is the process of identifying future harmful events (‘threats’) that may affect the achievement of United Nations objectives” (UNDSS, p. 54). As we shall see, this broad definition of threat allows the UN to lump together phenomena that would seem to have little in common, such as terrorism, protests and natural disasters.

In standardized threat assessment, the same tools are applied to these phenomena. This type of analysis “tend[s] to direct attention away from the nature of the activity itself, its meaning, and its context” (Wood, 2014, p. 129). When discussing the security of United Nations Premises, the Security Policy Manual notes that they “can be considered as desirable, even iconic, targets for various forms of violence, including terrorism, civil unrest and crime” (UNDSS, p. 70). The concept of “civil unrest” is not defined in the document, nor in any official UN documents, but it is often used to designate protests and/or riots. Here it becomes a form of “violence” sandwiched between terrorism and crime.

The Mission Risk Analysis established by MINUSTAH at the beginning of the mission in 2004 displays the same logic. Though this risk analysis was done before the new security management framework was put in place starting in 2011, the mindset is the same. After a

¹³⁵ According to the UN Department of Safety and Security website, <https://www.un.org/undss/content/policy-planning-and-coordination>, accessed July 30, 2019.

situational analysis of Haiti, the second part of the document provides a risk analysis, asset assessment, threat assessment and vulnerability assessment for the UN. These assessments are presented as tables evaluating the level of threat that a range of events may pose to UN actors and infrastructure. For instance, the table Figure 7 is excerpted from the risk analysis for the mission headquarters in Port-au-Prince.

Figure 7. MINUSTAH's risk analysis practices

Asset	Event	Impact	Threat	Vulnerability
H/Q Building	Bombing (vehicular)	Critical	Negligible	Critical
	Bombing (package)	Critical	Negligible	Critical
	Demonstrations and Riots	Critical	Medium	Critical
	Natural Disaster (flooding)	Medium	Critical	Critical
	Intrusion and Theft	Low	Medium	Critical
	Fire	Critical	Critical	Critical
	Attack on HQ by forces	Critical	Low	Critical
	Hand grenade attack	Critical	Low	Critical

Source: UN Archives (2004b, p. 33)

As we can see, “demonstrations and riots” are sandwiched between “bombing” and “natural disasters” and included in a spectrum of events that also features “attack on HQ by forces” and “hand grenade attack”.

My fieldwork confirmed that the way MINUSTAH collects and analyzes intelligence tends to lump together protests and crime. In Port-au-Prince, I interviewed a military officer working for MINUSTAH's “U-2”, the Military Information Staff Branch, which “deals with all matters concerning Military Information (MI) and military security operations” and reports to mission command (United Nations, 2014b, p. 39). I asked what sort of intelligence U-2 was looking for in reports and databases when assessing security. The response was: “We’re looking at security incidents. Signs of civilian unrest, demonstrations. Not only murder and rape. Demonstrations that can turn violent”.¹³⁶ In the same interview, I asked what my interviewee was making of arguments

¹³⁶ Interview 34, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

that the security situation might deteriorate when MINUSTAH left.¹³⁷ In response, he showed me two graphs produced by MINUSTAH. One showed the number of homicides per month, revealing that June 2017 was not above average. The other showed the number of demonstrations per month, revealing a decrease, except for the period around the recent elections. He noted that given that demonstrations start around 10am and are done at 4pm and do not go overnight, they were not really a security concern.¹³⁸ And yet this analysis equated crime and protests as equivalent indicators of security and stability.

Gathering terrorism, crime and protests or “civil unrest” in one category is not limited to technical assessments of the security situation. Indeed, there is a clear tendency for this to seep into *political* analyses. This is illustrated by the Secretary-General’s reports on the mission in Haiti, which are submitted to the Security Council twice a year (sometimes three times). A number of things stand out in the way the Secretary-General’s reports deal with protests in Haiti. First, protests are usually addressed under the “security developments” section of the reports (sometimes called “security assessment”, “security situation” or “security update” in earlier reports), rather than under “political developments”.¹³⁹ Second, protests are used as an indicator of insecurity and instability on par with crime. And third, protests are reported in a way that emphasizes statistical information and de-emphasizes content and substance.

Starting in the late 2000s, protests, demonstrations and “civil unrest” prominently feature under the security section of the Secretary-General’s reports on the mission in Haiti. In these assessments, protests become one indicator of insecurity and instability along with crime and gang activity. For instance, the September 2009 report opens its assessment of the security situation with the following: “Potential threats to stability include the risk of resumed activity by gangs, criminals and other armed groups, corruption and violence associated with illegal trafficking, *as well as large-scale civil unrest*” (UN Security Council, 2009, p. 3). The March 2013 report: “The overall security situation throughout the reporting period remained relatively stable, although it was marked by an *increase in civil unrest and major crimes*” (UN Security Council, 2013, p. 3).

¹³⁷ I conducted interviews in the summer of 2017 and MINUSTAH was supposed to leave in October to be replaced by a smaller mission with no military component.

¹³⁸ Interview 34, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

¹³⁹ There are exceptions. For instance, the 2008 protests and riots during the food crisis are reported under political developments because they led to the replacement of the Haitian Prime Minister (UN Security Council, 2008, p. 1); the August 2018 on MINUJUSTH report looks at protests sparked by the increase in the price of gas under political developments (UN Security Council, 2018).

In August 2014: “Today’s security situation is characterized by threats to law and order, linked primarily to *crime, gang violence and mobilized or spontaneous civil unrest*, triggered by political or economic grievances” (UN Security Council, 2014b, p. 14). In August 2016: “Overall, crime levels and gang activities were lower compared to the two previous reporting periods. However, the number of *demonstrations, sit-ins and strikes* has increased since April, most of them triggered by socioeconomic grievances” (UN Security Council, 2016b, p. 3). In July 2017: “Growing tensions linked to socioeconomic grievances notwithstanding, key indicators, *including crime and civil protests*, remained within historically established statistical parameters” (UN Security Council, 2017b, p. 2).

As protests are an indicator of instability comparable to crime, the Secretary-General’s reports privilege statistical information on these protests rather than information about their substance. Starting in 2014-2015, the reports of the Secretary-General adopted a standard format to report on the security situation, including protests. All the reports on MINUSTAH and MINUJUSTH follow the same format: the first paragraph under “security developments” sums up the security situation, the second paragraph describes crime statistics, and the third paragraph gives protest statistics. In later reports, the statistical information on protests follows the same template: the number of protests, how many were violent, whether the number has increased or decreased compared to the previous reporting period, the Haitian department most affected, the number of people gathered, and finally a short sentence on the motivations.¹⁴⁰ The statistical information about protests far outweighs information about their content, confirming that protests are an indicator of instability to be counted and recorded rather than socio-political events.

How specific is this form of reporting to the Haitian case? To the best of my knowledge, reports of the Secretary-General on other missions have not adopted the same standardized reporting on protests. In reports on other missions, there is no overall statistical information on the incidence of protests, and protests are sometimes reported in the political section, sometimes in

¹⁴⁰ See for instance the paragraph from the October 2017 report, the final report of the Secretary-General on MINUSTAH: “A total of 162 public protests were reported, of which 39 (24 per cent) saw some level of violence, ranging from erected barricades and stone-throwing to assaults and shootings. This represents a decrease compared with the 264 incidents reported during the previous quarter, of which 73 (28 per cent) had been violent. The Port-au-Prince metropolitan area witnessed 53 per cent of those events, followed by the Centre Department, at 7 per cent. Protests were generally small in size, with each of those 162 events involving fewer than 1,000 participants. The vast majority of protests, including most recently after the adoption of the budget, were triggered by socioeconomic grievances, related to labour, education, infrastructure, the cost of living and border management” (UN Security Council, 2017c, p. 3).

the security section, and sometimes in the section on the safety of UN facilities and personnel. The UN does seem to focus on protests in Haiti in a way that it does not elsewhere. This can be explained by the fact that other missions are concerned by much more pressing security concerns, including ongoing conflict with armed groups. And indeed even in Haiti we can see that earlier reports were less concerned about protests than they were about gang activity. In this sense, the focus on protests can be understood as a form of “mission creep”, in a context where MINUSTAH was deployed for 13 years in a state that had not experienced armed conflict. To put it differently, in order to justify MINUSTAH’s presence (and then MINUJUSTH’s) in Haiti, *something* had to be reported under security concerns.

But this should not be seen as a Haitian anomaly either. As was mentioned earlier, the tendency to apply a threat assessment framework to protests is widespread, and the practice of situating protests in a spectrum that includes armed attacks and organized crime is found at the UN outside of the Haitian case. A striking example can be found in the so-called “Cruz report”. Published in 2017, the Cruz report was authored by General dos Santos Cruz, who had served as Force Commander in Haiti and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It provided recommendations on “improving security of UN peacekeepers” in a context where deadly attacks against peacekeepers seemed to be increasing. In the report, Cruz argues that the answer is for peacekeepers to be more willing to use force, including “overwhelming force”. In his reflection on the appropriate level of force to be deployed, he argues that “under normal, *lower risk conditions (e.g. civil demonstrations)* the use of “proportional” force is a sound concept. However, *in higher-risk environments, where opposition’s tools include ambush, terrorist attack, and open combat*, the United Nations must employ overwhelming force” (dos Santos Cruz, 2017, p. 12, emphasis added). Although this would seem to establish a commonsensical gradation in the use of the force, it also places civil demonstrations on a spectrum of threats that includes terrorist attacks and open combat.

The increasingly important role of Formed Police Units (FPUs) in UN peace operations also demonstrates that this is far from being a Haitian problem. As protests are lumped together with a range of phenomena that have little to do with one another, except for being “threatening”, then these phenomena seem to call for the same response. FPUs are a large part of this response, and they contribute to placing protests within a broad category of “threats”. Use of FPUs by the UN began in the late 1990s and has since dramatically increased, to the point that they now form

the majority of UN police contingents, thus “substantially altering the character of UN police activities” (Durch, England, Mangan, & Ker, 2012, p. 7). Based on the model of the French Gendarmerie, Italian Carabinieri or Spanish Guardia Civil, FPUUs straddle the military-police divide. They are paramilitary units deployed at the battalion level (about 130-140 individuals). Contrary to individual police officers, they live on base and have limited interaction with the local population.

Though FPUUs are usually presented as “temporary security gap fillers in the early phases of a mission” (Durch et al., 2012, p. 7), they have become the face of UN policing in the field. Indeed, they are disproportionately represented in UN police forces, MINUSTAH included. A French diplomat interviewed in New York made the following comparison: “In France, the gendarmerie’s mobile forces, like the CRS [Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité, often used to police demonstrations], it’s one police officer out of 10. At the UN, it’s one out of 2, or even 2 out of 3”. According to them, “the FPUUs are very representative of the UN’s vision of police. They’re sub-military forces that cost less”.¹⁴¹

FPUUs are not only a UN phenomenon. NATO has similarly developed Multinational Specialized Units (MSUs) and the European Unions Integrated Police Units (IPUs) (CoESPU, 2005, p. 4). FPUUs, MSUs and IPUUs are part of the development of a “stability policing” capacity by these actors in a concerted international effort. In 2004, the G-8 Action Plan for Expanding Global Capability for Peace and Support Operations called for the establishment of a “an international training center that would serve as a Center of Excellence to provide training and skills for peace support operations” particularly “to develop carabinieri/gendarme-like units of interested nations, including those in Africa, for peace support operations” (COESPU, USIP, & PKSOL, 2004, p. 2). This had led to the creation of the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) based in Vicenza, Italy. The CoESPU is sponsored by the US Department of State and works in cooperation with DPKO. It is collocated with the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence (NSPCOE) thus creating “a hub of expertise for stability policing” (Hovens, 2017, p. 494). In 2010, the CoESPU signed a new memorandum of understanding with the UN Police Division, an “official endorsement by the UN” which “conferred an increased weight to CoESPU on the international scene” (Rocca, 2014).

¹⁴¹ Interview 44, New York, February 2018 (translated from French).

FPU are seen as especially capable of dealing with “public order” issues. According to the 2017 DPKO/DFS policy on FPU in peacekeeping operations, FPU have three core functions: to “protect United Nations personnel and property”; to “contribute to the protection of civilians (POC) by providing a formed response to threats to public order”; and to “support police operations that require a formed response or specialized capacity above the capability of IPOs [Individual Police Officers]” (UN DPKO/DFS, 2017a, pp. 3-4).

In Haiti’s case, it was clear to many participants that FPU’s “main function was to handle riots”, as former Deputy Force Commander Eduardo Aldunate puts it (Aldunate, 2010, p. 68). According to a FPU source interviewed in Port-au-Prince, “we need appreciation of the role of FPU in the mission. UNPOL officers work individually. Their effectivity in controlling a crowd scenario is limited. Wherever there is a crowd control scenario FPU have been the most effective weapon”. The FPU officer complained that “people are not able to appreciate the role that FPU have played here. FPU were the ones maintaining public order”.¹⁴²

Though there is much emphasis on the public order function of FPU, this is only one of the skills that they are supposed to master. FPU trained at the CoESPU in Vicenza receive theoretical and practical training in “crowd control, combating organized crime, high-risk arrests, prison security, protection of sensitive objectives, election security, VIP escort and protection, and border control” (Rocca, 2014). According to the CoESPU, “stability police” includes anything from “dealing with public disorder and threats to the peace” to “surveillance and criminal information gathering”, “VIP protection and escort duty”, “counter terrorism and counter insurgency operations” and “election security” (CoESPU, 2005, p. 17).

There is therefore a clear assumption that crowd control is part of field of intervention that includes the fight against organized crime and counter-insurgency. But what do these things have to do with one another? Indeed, “it would be difficult to identify what they had in common—if it was not for the concrete policy response” (Hörnqvist, 2004, p. 12). Like the standardized threat assessments examined above, this turns protests into an instance of events that threaten security and stability. When the CoESPU notes that FPU “operate within the UN Police component with a deterrent effect and credible response to challenges by violent obstructionist elements opposed to the peace settlement and international mandate” (CoESPU, 2005, p. 4), who are these “violent obstructionist elements”? Organized criminals? Terrorists? Insurgents? Protesters?

¹⁴² Interview 37, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

Furthermore, it is doubtful that the units that engage in counter-terrorism or anti-organized crime work can also carry out crowd control in a way that balances the right of people to assemble with public safety and avoid escalation. According to one study, “the deployment in public order policing of special units created for antirioting, antiterrorism, and/or anti-organized crime emergencies have an escalating effect” (Della Porta & Fillieule, 2004, p. 224). This was dramatically illustrated when Italy (the host of the CoESPU) used special anti-mafia units to police political demonstration during the G-8 protests in Genoa in 2001 (Andretta, Della Porta, Mosca, & Reiter, 2002).

2. *Crowd theory and mob sociology*

The UN documents addressing FPU are rife with references to “public order” and threats to it, but never define the concept. The UN does not offer an official definition (as far as I can tell), but one can be found in material produced by the US Institute of Peace (USIP), a central actor in the international stability policing scene and a UN partner. In its 2009 guiding principles on stabilization and reconstruction, USIP provides the following definition:

Public order is a condition in which laws are enforced equitably; the lives, property, freedoms, and rights of individuals are protected; criminal and politically motivated violence has been reduced to a minimum; and criminal elements (from looters and rioters to leaders of organized crime networks) are pursued, arrested, and detained (United States Institute of Peace & United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2009, p. 39).

There are a couple of remarkable things in this definition. First, note that in the list of things to be protected, “property” comes before “freedoms” and “rights”. Second, the grouping together of “criminal and politically motivated violence”, or of “looters and rioters” and “leaders of organized crime networks”, is consistent with the threat assessment frame explored above. Here, it becomes clear that these are not grouped only because they are deemed to represent a security threat, but because they are a threat to *order*. The August 2014 report of the Secretary-General on MINUSTAH suggests the same thing when it notes that “threats to law and order” are “linked primarily to crime, gang violence and mobilized or spontaneous civil unrest, triggered by political or economic grievances” (UN Security Council, 2014b, p. 3).

Though there is no official UN definition of public order, the 2017 guidelines of FPU come close to advancing such a definition when they note that “FPUs provide a formed police response to *threats to public order or against civilians*” (UN DPKO/DFS, 2017b, p. 9). But are threats to public order the same things as threats against civilians? In democratic policing, ensuring public order while protecting citizens’ right to protest represents a central dilemma. Indeed, the guidelines seem to acknowledge as much when they note that the main focus of public order management, “including crowd and riot control”, is to “to facilitate the population’s exercise of fundamental rights without any disturbance or unjustified hindrance while preventing grave harm to public safety” (UN DPKO/DFS, 2017a, p. 6). Suggesting that FPU are responses to “threats to public order or against civilians” would therefore seem to obscure how these two things can be contradictory. Despite the UN’s attempt to have it both ways, protecting public order and protecting civilians are not the same thing.

In the training given to FPU, the balance between enforcing public order and respecting citizens’ rights explicitly tilts in favour of the former. Training material puts heavy emphasis on threats to public order and little on the right to demonstrate. The Specialized Training Material for FPU on “Public Order Management”, which is available online, deals mostly with issues of crowd, riot and “mob” control and includes some of the following courses: arrest methods in a “public Order Management scenario where the offender needs to be quickly identified, isolated and brought back to the police line before the protestors around them can attempt any form of rescue” (UN DPKO/DFS, 2015d, p. 1); attacks with firearms and explosives for situations where officers are “confronted by a crowd that can be hostile” (UN DPKO/DFS, 2015e, p. 1); barricades; breaking contact “if a unit is coming under pressure from a crowd” (UN DPKO/DFS, 2015f, p. 1); crowd behaviour and dynamics; eviction of occupied premises; firefighting techniques to address the use of petrol bombs by the protestors” (UN DPKO/DFS, 2015h, p. 1); less lethal weapons, etc. These training modules often tend to stress the potential for crowds to be violent and dangerous.

Indeed, it becomes apparent in reading the training material that FPU are taught a certain idea of the crowd. As we shall see, the conception of the crowd laid out in UN training is close to what some have referred to as “mob sociology”, an approach that sees crowds as irrational and dangerous and argues that all crowds have the potential to become law-breaking mobs (Schweingruber, 2000). Though mob sociology has long historical roots (see below), it became

particularly prominent in the 1960s as a number of Western democracies were facing large scale civil unrest. It has since been proven to be rather bad sociology (McPhail, 2017). Yet UN training documents feature mob sociology concepts. In fact, it is possible to establish a genealogy of the view of crowds in UN training documents that goes back to seminal texts in mob sociology.

In the Specialized Training Material for FPU, the training slides on “crowd dynamics” note that they are three types of crowds: casual crowds, “individuals or small groups with nothing in common to bind them together” but “occupying the same common place, such as a shopping mall where these individuals or small groups meet”; sighting crowds, which are like casual crowds except that they have gathered for an event such as “sporting events, fires and accidents, music concerts, labour strikes, demonstrations, and protests”; and agitated crowds, which are like casual and sighting crowds “with the addition of strong emotions expressed verbally” including through “yelling, screaming, crying, and profane name-calling” (UN DPKO/DFS, 2015g, p. 7).

This categorization is rather puzzling. It depoliticizes the act of gathering together, by putting protests in the same category of events as people stopping to watch an accident or people watching fireworks. Where does this taxonomy come from? The language is lifted straight from the US Army “Civil Disturbance Operations” field manual, published in 2005 (p. 6). The two sections are compared in Figure 8.

Figure 8. The genealogy of the UN’s crowd theory

US Department of the Army (2005, p. 6)	UN DPKO/DFS (2015b, pp. 7-8)
<p>CASUAL</p> <p>1-28. Casual crowds are identified as individuals or small groups with nothing in common to bind them together. If they have an agenda, it is their own. They arrive separately and leave separately. Casual crowds are made up of individuals or small groups occupying the same common place, such as a shopping mall where these individuals or small groups meet.</p> <p>SIGHTING</p> <p>1-29. Sighting crowds are similar to casual crowds with one additional element—an event. There are numerous events that cause people to come together as a crowd, such as: sporting events, fires and accidents, music concerts, labor strikes, demonstrations, and protests. Individuals or groups gather at these events for the same purpose. It is the event or one’s curiosity that compels a sighting crowd to come together.</p> <p>AGITATED</p> <p>1-30. Agitated crowds are generally casual or sighting crowds with the addition of strong emotions expressed verbally. As more people within the crowd become emotionally involved, a sense of unity can develop, causing changes in the overall demeanor of the crowd. Yelling, screaming, crying, and profane name-calling are all associated with an agitated crowd.</p> <p>MOB-LIKE OR RIOTOUS</p> <p>1-31. Mobs have all the elements found in the first three types of crowds, with the addition of aggressive, physical and, sometimes, violent actions. Under these conditions, individuals within a crowd will often say and do things they usually would not. Extreme acts of violence and property damage are often a part of mob activities. Mobs consist of (or involve) the elements of people and groups being mixed together and becoming fluid.</p>	<p>CASUAL</p> <p>Casual crowds are identified as individuals or small groups with nothing in common to bind them together. If they have an agenda, it is their own. They arrive separately and leave separately. Casual crowds are made up of individuals or small groups occupying the same common place, such as a shopping mall where these individuals or small groups meet.</p> <p>SIGHTING</p> <p>Sighting crowds are similar to casual crowds with one additional element—an event. There are numerous events that cause people to come together as a crowd, such as: sporting events, fires and accidents, music concerts, labour strikes, demonstrations, and protests. Individuals or groups gather at these events for the same purpose. It is the event or one’s curiosity that compels a sighting crowd to come together.</p> <p>AGITATED</p> <p>Agitated crowds are generally casual or sighting crowds with the addition of strong emotions expressed verbally. As more people within the crowd become emotionally involved, a sense of unity can develop, causing changes in the overall demeanor of the crowd. Yelling, screaming, crying, and profane name-calling are all associated with an agitated crowd.</p> <p>[...]</p> <p>Extreme acts of violence and property damage are often a part of mob activities. Mobs consist of (or involve) the elements of people and groups being mixed together and becoming fluid. Mobs have all the elements found in the first three types of crowds (slide 7), with the addition of aggressive, physical and, sometimes, violent actions. Under these conditions, individuals within a crowd will often say and do things they usually would not.</p>

But this taxonomy was not invented by the US military. It draws from mob sociology texts, such as Raymond Momboisse's *Riots, Revolts and Insurrections* (1967). Momboisse's four types of crowds are "casual", "conventional", "expressive" and "hostile or aggressive" (Momboisse, 1967, p. 6), a taxonomy that strongly resembles the one adopted by the UN. Momboisse's conventional crowd is the UN's sighting crowd (people "assembled for a specific purpose, such as witnessing a ball game, parade, play or fire [and] have similar common interests" (Momboisse, 1967, p. 6), and his expressive crowd the UN's agitated crowd. In addition, the UN training material on crowd dynamics distinguishes between the "escape mob" and the "acquisitive mob", a difference taken from Momboisse that does not figure in the US Army Field Manual.

Furthermore, the UN training material makes direct reference to Gustave Le Bon, the godfather of mob sociology. Le Bon's *Psychologie des Foules* ("Psychology of Crowds"), published in 1895, attempted to make sense of the social upheavals of the times (including widespread labor unrest) and argued that crowds were characterized by "impulsiveness, irritability, incapacity to reason, the absence of judgement of the critical spirit, [and] the exaggeration of sentiments". Le Bon's theory has been widely criticized on empirical grounds (McPhail, 2017) and for its policy implications, as research has shown that when police embraces Le Bon's classic model of the crowd they are more likely to act in ways that escalate violence (Hoggett & Stott, 2010; Schweingruber, 2000).

So what is Le Bon doing in UN training material? In slide 22 of the training material, on crowd dynamics, the "classic model of the crowd" is contrasted with the "modern foundation of crowd behaviour". The classic model is associated with Le Bon, but it is not clear what trainees should make his theory. The notes accompanying the slides say that Le Bon is the "founder of crowd psychology". At the same time, the notes also directly quote Le Bon saying that "by the mere fact that he forms part of an organized crowd, a man descends several rungs on the ladder of civilization" (UN DPKO/DFS, 2015g, pp. 16-17). This direct quote is not followed by a comment or a discussion, and the notes instead move on to the "modern" view, which has 3 core tenets: "crowd behaviour is generated by individuals", it is "context dependent", and it is "dynamic" (UN DPKO/DFS, 2015g, p. 17). Is this view meant to complement or replace Le Bon? This is all the more confusing given that the next slide addresses the concept of "contagion", which comes from Le Bon. The notes on the slide read that "according to this theory crowds generate a kind of influence on their members similar to hypnotic effect" (UN DPKO/DFS, 2015b, p. 17). The next

slide then moves to the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) that focuses on the interactions between the crowd and the police. The notes on the slide say that “according to the model, the responsibility for violence must be shared between the gathered crowd and the control force” (UN DPKO/DFS, 2015g, p. 18), a view which would seem to strongly contradict Le Bon. The last two slides discuss how different strategies may affect the outcome of the event.

What are we supposed to make of this discussion of Le Bon’s theories? The material neither clearly embraces nor rejects them. But what is remarkable is that although the training material cites Le Bon at the end (slide 22), it borrows concepts and sometimes entire sections from mob sociology texts without citing them. As we have seen, the crowd taxonomy is lifted directly from a US Army Field Manual, but no credit is given. This signals that, for the UN, mob sociology has become common knowledge: “no longer [is] mob sociology treated as a theory developed by a particular set of researchers. It [is] something that “everybody knew” and [can] be freely repeated” (Schweingruber, 2000, p. 376).

The training material for FPU promotes an adversarial picture of crowds. In the training slides on “crowd control orders”, protesters are designed as “the opposition”, regardless of their level of hostility (UN DPKO/DFS, 2015b). The comments on one of the slides note that “the operational commanders will need to know exactly who the opposition is, their nature and attitude, is it a hostile crowd or just hungry displaced persons?” (UN DPKO/DFS, 2015b, p. 7). Social movement scholars have noted that police forces often use the concept of “opposition” to refer to “‘professional demonstrators,’ who upset public order because they enjoy provocation and revolt”, as opposed to protesters perceived to have legitimate grievances and demands (Della Porta & Fillieule, 2004, p. 226). The CoESPU also conveys an adversarial view of protesters by stressing “the value of rioting for subversives” (CoESPU, 2005, p. 15). In contrast to these representations of protesters, the idea that one of the central tasks of FPUs is to “protect the rights of persons to lawfully assemble and express their opinions” only appears in one of the training modules, on crowd dynamics, in the discussion of slide 21 (not even on the slide) out of 28 slides (UN DPKO/DFS, 2015g, p. 15).

This adversarial picture of protesters is complemented by a focus on worst-case scenarios that encourage trainees to be fearful of crowds. For instance, the training on attack with firearms and explosives introduces the issue by noting that “in some cases, some hardliners among demonstrators may try to lure police into ambushes where firearms or explosives may be used

against them”, but then notes that “it should be pointed out that this is not a common occurrence and officers should avoid overreaction or becoming fearful of Public Order situations over concerns of a sniper ambush” (UN DPKO/DFS, 2015e, p. 1). However, as scholars have noted, “where police public order training is based on worst-case scenarios it risks not simply preparing officers for trouble but causing them to *anticipate* it” (Gorringer & Rosie, 2011). The fear of the crowd that is generated through training materials thus becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

In this context, there is a disconnect between the analysis of crowds and some of the recommendations in the training material. For instance, the training argues that to disperse crowds, coercion and the use of force should be seen “as the last resort”, and that “FPU commanders on the spot should carefully consider the negotiation option” (UN DPKO/DFS, 2015g, p. 10). But how this does square with everything else that trainees learn about crowds?

This section has shown that, even before a UN peace operations encounters a given protest, it already has a standardized framework to think about it and how to respond, and that this framework *de facto* depoliticizes and criminalizes the act of protesting. Protests are not only a threat to security and public order but to peace. The next section examines how the UN’s mission to “stabilize” Haiti built on and reinforced this framework.

II. Framing dissent: protests under stabilization

This section looks at how the UN frames protests in Haiti. In the analysis of social movements, “framing refers to interpretive, signifying work that renders events and occurrences subjectively meaningful” (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Corrigan-Brown, 2007, p. 387; see also H. Johnston & Noakes, 2005). As the previous section has shown, even before framing happens a process of standardized threat assessment has contributed to depoliticizing and criminalizing protests. Here, I argue that “stabilization” compounds these effects. Stabilization mandates task UN peace operations with the protection of the status quo, the government in place, and challenges to public order are thus seen as threats to security and stability. If protest policing is determined by the relative importance given to public order and the right to demonstrate (Della Porta & Fillieule, 2004, p. 222), then in the UN’s case stabilization trumps the right to protest.

1. *Protests in Haiti*

As the numbers provided in the Secretary-General's reports over the years show, protests are a common occurrence in Haiti (see Figure 9). Though MINUSTAH does not explain how it collects data, and these numbers are therefore to be taken with a grain of salt, they are an indication of general trends. For instance, data collected by MINUSTAH show that there were over 600 protests between mid-2014 and mid-2015, and over 1,100 between mid-2015 and mid-2016, a period marked by tensions over the postponement of planned presidential elections. Even a calmer period, such as mid-2017 to mid-2018, saw on average at least one protest a day.

Figure 9. Incidence of protests in Haiti

	July 1, 2017- Aug 2, 2018	Sept 1, 2016 – June 30, 2017	Sept 1, 2015 – Aug 10, 2016	Sept 1, 2014 – Aug 15, 2015
Total protests	447	923	1127	614
Violent protests	N/A	338	409	N/A
Under 300 participants	N/A	N/A	957	391
Over 1,000 participants	N/A	45	55	28

Source: Data compiled from UN Security Council (2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2018).

Participant numbers collected by MINUSTAH indicate that most demonstrations are small, gathering fewer than 300 individuals, though again this number should be taken with caution. Indeed, “under 300” is a wide category that can include demonstrations involving 20 people or 250. Similarly, “over 1,000” could mean 1,500 or 50,000. The reports of the Secretary-General sometimes note when larger demonstrations take place. For instance, in November 2014 “up to 20,000 anti-government protesters took to the streets of the capital and other major cities” (UN Security Council, 2014a, p. 2). Large demonstrations also occurred around the food crisis in 2008, during the 2011 presidential elections, and around mobilization to increase the minimum wage in 2009 and 2017.

According to MINUSTAH's data, a significant proportion of protests are violent, though it is worth noting that the concept of “violence” includes events “ranging from erected barricades and stone-throwing to assaults against police officers and shootings” (UN Security Council, 2017b, p. 3), which lumps together aggressive actions (assault) and more defensive ones (barricades). The

practice of burning tires on the road to shut down traffic (which could constitute of form of “barricade”) is widespread in demonstrations in Haiti, but this does not coincide with violence on the part of protesters.

The fact that protests are frequent in Haiti was noted more anecdotally by MINUSTAH participants. For instance, MINUSTAH Police Commissioner Muir observed during his time in Haiti that:

The day-to-day, week-to-week routine was regularly punctuated with spontaneous gatherings. They would not on any given day be a riot, but they would most certainly be demonstrations of public disorder. Large numbers of people in the hundreds or thousands gathering, expressing discontent or upset over anything triggered by the actions of one of the many political candidates or some other affront however characterized in the day-to-day life of Haitian society (Muir, 2008, p. 7).

2. Competing frames

Why do Haitians demonstrate? This section examines the frame used by the UN to understand and explain protests, and contrasts it with a counter-frame. The UN frame argues that protests are paid for and manipulated (by a range of actors including the Haitian elites, Lavalas and gangs), and that the purpose is to create chaos. In contrast, a counter-frame, found among observers and people who have participated in protests, sees protests as a form of political expression in a context where the majority of Haitians do not consider that the electoral system is responsive and can represent their interests. In this frame, protests are motivated by legitimate grievances and the political agency of demonstrators.

During my interviews with members of MINUSTAH and of the diplomatic community in Port-au-Prince, I was repeatedly told that demonstrations in Haiti are manipulated and that demonstrators are paid to take to the streets. As one high level civilian official within MINUSTAH put it, “behind the political motivation there is always someone pushing”.¹⁴³ Two diplomatic sources (one from the Global North and one from the Global South) explained the relative absence of demonstrations in 2017 by referring to the poor economic situation and its impact on the ability to fund protest: “last year there were no violent demonstrations because there is no money left within the Haitian elite”¹⁴⁴ and “we didn’t see any violent demonstrations because the Haitian elite

¹⁴³ Interview 10, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

¹⁴⁴ Interview 21, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

is out of money”.¹⁴⁵ This analysis is shared by some Haitian observers. In a report examining “the social bond, conflict and violence in Haiti”, a Haitian professor argues that the relationship between the Haitian elites and masses allows “the former to rely on the latter for the purposes of political mobilization in the form of violent demonstrations” (Gilles, 2012, p. vii). According to Haitian historian Jean Alix René, the marginalized masses in the slums of Port-au-Prince are not capable of collective action except when they are mobilized by politicians, in a system that is historically characterized by paternalism and clientelism (René, 2003).

A variation of this argument posits that protests are driven by gangs, particularly in poor neighbourhoods like Cité Soleil. According to former MINUSTAH Police Commissioner Beer, “gang activity included participation, or at least a presence, in political action and at public events. Wherever peaceful protests erupted in violence, or armed protesters suddenly appeared in a crowd, speculation arose that such acts were politically directed” (Beer, 2016). Similarly, David Becker, the former head of Haiti Stabilization Initiative (a US State Department project that focused on Cité Soleil in 2004-2006) argues that “the gang leaders repeatedly demonstrated that they could mobilize mobs on short notice to [...] march downtown to protest (and loot) for the political issue of the day” (Becker, 2011, p. 139).

This view emphasizes the mercenary motives of protesters and de-emphasizes potential legitimate grievances or ideological motives. It is consistent with how Haitian society more generally is understood by some interveners. A 2008 report by Spanish think tank FRIDE, for instance, claims that “in a country like Haiti, in which democratic culture has never taken hold, the concept of the common good and the meaning of elections and representation are limited to the educated elites, and in particular to those who have received citizen education within the social movements” (Gauthier & Bonin, 2008, p. 14). In a similar vein, the former head of DDR for MINUSTAH writes that “there seemed to be little ideological motivation in Haitian society other than the *politique du ventre*, or the politics of the belly, a drive for self-aggrandizement in which the end justifies the means” (Molloy, 2017, p. 66). This understanding of Haitian society can be traced back to at least two sources. First, it fits within the historical representation of the island in Western writing. For instance, a 1908 article in *National Geographic Magazine* advocating for US intervention in Haiti argued that Haitians “have no higher ambition than to possess sufficient means to supply the demands of their appetites” (cited in Pressley-Sanon, 2014, p. 124). Second,

¹⁴⁵ Interview 3, Port-au-Prince, May 2017 (translated from French).

the concept of “politique du ventre” and its associated imaginary is borrowed from the recent African politics literature (Bayart, 2009) and designates a form of politics that is focused on the satisfaction of material interests and devoid of social, economic and political projects. These analyses depict “a society with no sense of the public good, one that condones corruption and is inhabited by individuals who focus on their own bellies” (Mkandawire, 2015, p. 568). The circulation of this concept to Haiti is not surprising in a context where the country inspires a form of “Afro-pessimism”, as if it were “a chunk of that easily misunderstood continent, floating in the wrong seas” (Wilentz, 2013, p. 22).

In contrast to these views, several interviewees from international civil society stressed the important role of protests in Haitian political life. According to the employee of a US-based organization working on human rights, “in Haiti in general there are lots of protests, anti-government protests, protests to claim rights. You know in Haiti this is the weapon that is the most used by the Haitian population”.¹⁴⁶ Similarly, a researcher who has worked with peasant organizations noted that “protest is what brings down the elites. Period. That’s the only thing that brings down the elites. Not fair elections because people don’t vote, 20% voter turnout. So the way you oppose the elites and the ruling class is through going to the streets”.¹⁴⁷ A MINUSTAH interviewee made a similar point in less positive terms, noting that the Haitian population often resorts to “political violence” to express political discontent: “what Haiti has been well known for is use of violence due to political fatigue or political discontent when the population becomes discontent of the decisions taken by the political, politicians, or by the elite in Haiti”.¹⁴⁸

Indeed, the high frequency of protests stands in stark contrast with participation in elections, which has steadily declined since the beginning of MINUSTAH’s intervention. In February 2006, MINUSTAH reported that 60% of registered voters participated in the presidential election (UN Security Council, 2006a, p. 1). In 2011, only between 22% and 23% of voters participated in the presidential election that brought Martelly to power. In the most recent presidential election in 2016, participation stood at just 21%, and even that number was considered by many to be overly optimistic and probably closer to 18%. Yet the UN called the 2016 elections a success. The report of the Secretary-General noted that “Haiti made significant progress in the

¹⁴⁶ Interview 4, Port-au-Prince, May 2017 (translated from French).

¹⁴⁷ Interview 1, Port-au-Prince, May 2017.

¹⁴⁸ Interview 30, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

consolidation of its democracy and stability”, and that “national and international observers noted the fairness and transparency of the process, albeit with low turnout (estimated at 21 per cent)” (UN Security Council, 2017a, pp. 1-2).

In a frame where elections are the main avenue to democracy, protests are seen as pathological. This was expressed clearly by a diplomatic source from the Global North in Port-au-Prince. The interviewee acknowledged that there was a lack of representativeness in Haitian politics, but went on to say: “well they don’t go out when there are elections, so the participation rate if you’re generous was around 18%. If you’re generous. You get the democracy that you deserve. You have an opportunity to vote. If you don’t go out to vote that is your choice”.¹⁴⁹ For this interviewee, demonstrations were not a legitimate form of political action in a context where Haitians were able to vote for their representatives in elections.

Not surprisingly, the idea that protests are driven by mercenary motives rather than legitimate grievances was challenged by Haitian interviewees who have participated in protests and were keen to emphasize their political agency. In Fort National, a poor neighbourhood classified as a “red zone” by the UN, I interviewed a community organizer who has been at the forefront of many demonstrations demanding that MINUSTAH leave Haiti. When, at the end of the interview, I asked him if there was something we had not talked about that he wanted to discuss, one of the points he raised was the following:

They [MINUSTAH] consider us illiterate, marginalized, that we’re moved by our stomach, because we live in a poor neighbourhood [quartier populaire]. But it’s not true, look at me today with you, what they told you about me before you met me is not true, [...] well I’m 43 year old in a poor neighbourhood, I’m a product of a poor neighbourhood that is Fort National, and I’m an actor against the occupation.¹⁵⁰

The head of a feminist organization that defends Haitian women’s rights had a similar response when I raised the argument that protests were paid and manipulated: “it’s like we’re a people who must live only with, I don’t know, food, and we have no thought. As soon as we start an initiative, as soon as we organize a protest, we’re paid for it, etc, etc”.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ Interview 8, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

¹⁵⁰ Interview 7, Port-au-Prince, May 2017 (translated from Haitian Creole).

¹⁵¹ Interview 39, Port-au-Prince, July 2017 (translated from French).

One interviewee raised the point that “competent” protests are more likely to be seen as being manipulated by outside elements, because of the assumption that Haitians are incompetent. In their case, the fact that they had prepared signs in several languages for a protest against MINUSTAH shortly after the cholera epidemic broke out was taken as an indication that outside interests were behind the protest:

One day there was a lady journalist. We had translations of our messages on signs in many languages. So she said we were being paid. Because “Haitians don’t speak all these languages”. So because we have signs in several languages we must be supported by someone! I just did the translation in Portuguese myself, it wasn’t very good.¹⁵²

These interviewees did not necessarily deny that there may be money behind some protests, but argued that it was absurd to claim that all protests in Haiti, including some that gather tens of thousands of people, are motivated by mercenary gains. According to the head of an organization that advocates for alternative economic development models in Haiti:

It’s true that sometimes in demonstrations, it’s not the protestors who are paid, but the influential leaders that can get people out, who sometimes receive financial support. But when you have a demonstration with 50,000 people, I don’t know how you can pay 50,000 people, you see. So for instance the protests against Martelly, or the mobilization around the minimum wage, these are not manipulated. Well, it’s the traditional discourse to delegitimize demonstrations and say that there is no political consciousness in Haiti. That Haitians are not really actors, that they cannot decide, take initiatives.¹⁵³

A researcher working on popular organizations in Haiti similarly argued against a binary analysis that opposes mercenary motives to genuine mobilization: “To me there is no contradiction between protesting for your political ideas and being paid for it!”.¹⁵⁴

Who is right? Answering this question would require a detailed analysis of individual protest events. The UN has not undertaken such analysis (which makes it difficult to take MINUSTAH’s claims that all protests in Haiti are manipulated at face value), and I certainly do not have the resources to do so. Literature on the link between patronage politics and contentious collective action would seem to support a non-binary reading. The literature has moved away from the idea that patronage and contentious collective action are antithetical to show how they are

¹⁵² Interview 23, Port-au-Prince, June 2017.

¹⁵³ Interview 19, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

¹⁵⁴ Interview 14, Port-au-Prince, June 2017.

“distinct, but sometimes overlapping, strategies for solving pressing survival problems and addressing grievances” (Auyero, Lapegna, & Poma, 2009, pp. 1-2). A study of protests in post-Soviet Central Asia has shown that they can be “weapons of the wealthy” used by elite actors to advance their own interests (Radnitz, 2010). Using the case of Russia, Robertson (2011) develops an elite competition theory of protests that shows how elites manage protests in hybrid regimes. In his study of the wave of looting in Buenos Aires in December 2001, Auyero (2007) demonstrates how it was facilitated by Peronist party brokers through the dissemination of rumors about looting and the presence or absence of the police at certain stores. The literature thus shows that protests can be manipulated by elites.

At the same time, the idea that a poor population would choose to take to the streets rather than participate in elections to express discontent also finds support in the literature. In their study of the politics of the poor, Piven and Cloward (1979, p. 25) argue that “some of the poor are sometimes so isolated from significant institutional participation that the only ‘contribution’ they can withhold is that of quiescence in civil life: they can riot”. This analysis does not romanticize the bypassing of institutions in favour of protests and riots, but points that, for some, it is the only type of action available. Furthermore, the UN itself sees protests as a valuable component of democratic politics. In July 2018, the Human Rights Council passed a resolution on “the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests”. The resolution acknowledged that “participation in peaceful protests can be an important form of exercising the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly, of expression, of association and of participation in the conduct of public affairs” and recognized that “peaceful protests can make a positive contribution to the development, strengthening and effectiveness of democratic systems and to democratic processes, including elections and referendums” (UN Human Rights Council, 2018, p. 2). It also expressed concern “at the criminalization, in all parts of the world, of individuals and groups solely for having organized, taken part in or observed, monitored or recorded peaceful protests” and stressed that “peaceful protests should not be viewed as a threat” (UN Human Rights Council, 2018, p. 3).

In other words, whether protests in Haiti are elite-driven or expressions of legitimate grievances or both is a matter to be evaluated empirically and not assumed a priori. This means that the UN frame is not necessarily “wrong”, but we should be skeptical of blanket claims that all protests are the product of elite manipulation. Furthermore, we can also ask whether this frame is applied consistently. If this frame is selectively applied depending on who is protesting against

what, rather than an objective assessment of reality it is most likely an expression of the fact that the international community deems some protests to be “good” and others to be “bad”. For instance, it is quite striking that the question of elite manipulation was never raised when protesters took to the streets in 2003-2004 against Aristide’s government. Statements by the diplomatic community saw these protests as expressing legitimate grievances and truly democratic ideals. In the international media, Aristide’s departure was seen as the result of a “popular revolution” (The Times, 2004). Indeed, the idea that protests were manipulated by elites was to be found not among the international community, but among people who saw the events of 2003-4 as a planned coup against Aristide (Hallward, 2007).

Furthermore, elite manipulation does not come up in UN discussions of elections, which may be just as easily subject to patronage politics. Scholars who have highlighted the role of patronage politics in contentious collective action have also shown its importance in electoral practices. For instance, Auyero’s ethnographic study of slum-dwellers in Argentina examines the material and symbolic networks that arise when politicians exchange favours or food in return for votes (Auyero, 2001). If clientelism leads to manipulation of protests, why would it not lead to manipulation of elections? Yet because the UN sees elections as the right form of political expression, this question is not raised.

3. *Effects*

The more interesting question may not be whether the UN frame is right, but what it *does* (Ferguson, 1994). If this is the diagnosis, what is the response? What are the consequences of seeing protests as the result of elite manipulation? What solutions and responses does it call for? What duties towards protesters? If protesters are being manipulated, do they still have a right to protest? In this section, I show that the focus on manipulation leads to a conspiracist frame that sees protests as a threat to order and stability, thus emphasizing the necessary containment of protests and de-emphasizing the demands that they voice and the right to protest. This “paves the way for a deterrent, rather than a facilitative, philosophy of protest control” (Atak, 2017, p. 695).

This mindset is well illustrated by an assessment featuring in the 2009 report of the Secretary-General:

At a time of mounting frustration over the difficult conditions of daily life, demonstrations have shown a tendency to increase in number and intensity around the country and have

highlighted the potential for groups with disparate agendas to form opportunistic alliances in order to advance their particular interests. This was exemplified by the demonstrations that began in Port-au-Prince in June 2009, where students who had taken to the streets to express various academic grievances were subsequently joined by protestors in favour of the proposed increase in the minimum wage and also appear to have been infiltrated by external, violent elements. All of these threats may be exploited by those who are pursuing political objectives, including in the context of forthcoming electoral processes, or by spoilers who seek to undermine the stabilization process in order to protect personal interests (UN Security Council, 2009, p. 5).

The assessment starts by acknowledging the objective conditions that may lead people to express discontent (“frustration over the difficult conditions of daily life”), but ends by emphasizing the threat represented by “those who are pursuing political objectives” and “spoilers who seek to undermine the stabilization process”.

A similar analysis was apparent during the “food riots” in early 2008. Decades of neoliberal policies have turned Haiti into a major importer of food staples, which made the Haitian poor “particularly vulnerable to the spike in world food prices in 2008” (Erickson, 2014, p. 23). During the food crisis, the poorest had to resort to eating mud pies seasoned with salt and vegetable oil (Katz, 2008). Following days of protests, discontent eventually brought down the prime minister. The August 2008 report of the Secretary-General on MINUSTAH describes the protests thus:

The protests began as an expression of public frustration sparked by the rapid escalation in the global prices of basic commodities, which imposed severe hardship on the country’s poor. However, as events unfolded, it became apparent from the level and scale of the demonstrations that they were being deliberately manipulated to serve a variety of political, criminal or financial objectives (UN Security Council, 2008, p. 1).

Again, the assessment acknowledges the legitimate grievances that gave rise to protests, but goes on to argue that they have been hijacked for ulterior motives. Private meetings between MINUSTAH representatives and the US Embassy in Port-au-Prince reveal the same tension. An April 3, 2008 diplomatic cable states that “several MINUSTAH sources report that FL [Fanmi Lavalas, Aristide’s party] is behind this planned protest” (in Les Cayes), but also that “MINUSTAH officials told poloffs [political officers] that the protests came as no real surprise, given the severity of the cost of living situation and widespread complaints”.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁵ https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08PORTAUPRINCE532_a.html, accessed July 30, 2019.

Other actors were quick to point to the alleged shadowy motives behind the protests. According to one news report, “government officials say the riots are being manipulated by outside forces, specifically drug smugglers who can operate more easily amid chaos” (Katz, 2008). A typical article in the Canadian newspaper *Le Devoir* argued that the “specter of Aristide” was behind the food riots. Although the article acknowledges that Haitians have legitimate grievances to protest against skyrocketing food prices, it goes on to argue that protests were hijacked by Aristide supporters. Interviewed Haitian sociologist Laennec Hurbon argues that “behind the protests by people who are indeed hungry and ask for a decrease in the prices of essential products, there is a whole political activism from Lavalas groups linked to Aristide, who ask for his return” and that “if demonstrators only had socioeconomic demands, they would have understood that you can’t ransack all stores, commercial places”. No one is interviewed to defend the point of view of demonstrators (Côté-Paluck, 2008).

Lavalas was indeed involved in some of the protests in that period, and some did call for the return of Aristide. But so what? What level of purity of protesters’ intentions would be required for the UN to take these protests seriously? In insisting that protests were being hijacked, the UN effectively obscured the pressing concerns that led people to mobilize to begin with. Protests could not be seen as a normal response to a situation of crisis, but were seen as a threat against the order defended by the international community.

Indeed, protests were particularly threatening because some directly targeted MINUSTAH as representative of an international order considered to be responsible for the crisis. “Food riots” are rarely just about a demand for food, they also reflect demands about the broader international political economy of food provisioning (Patel & McMichael, 2009). Not surprisingly, MINUSTAH’s presence became a major point of contention during the hunger riots in Haiti. These protests often presented four demands: a decrease in the price of essential products, access to the right to food, resignation of the government, and that MINUSTAH leave (Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains, 2008, p. 1). Indeed, one interviewee noted that “what they call hunger riots, it was riots and protests where one of the main targets of recrimination was MINUSTAH”.¹⁵⁶ As one analysis puts it, “it is quite symptomatic that during the food riots in April 2008, when the streets of Port-au-Prince were full of hungry and angry protesters [...] MINUSTAH cracked down on these demonstrations. MINUSTAH was in people’s eyes the UN Mission that should have been

¹⁵⁶ Interview 19, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

there to support and protect them but that now instead acted quite brutally against them” (Hauge et al., 2015, p. 273). According to a report by the Haitian Réseau National de défense des droits de l'homme (National Network for the defence of human rights, RNDDH), “MINUSTAH’s lack of professionalism was [...] condemned. Some agents are trigger happy and fired at people with rubber bullets in Les Cayes, Port-au-Prince and Petit-Goäve” (Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains, 2008, p. 3).

Protests are particularly threatening to the UN when the organization itself becomes the target of claim-making, as was quite evident during the outbreak of cholera in 2010. It has now been proved beyond doubt that, following the January 2010 earthquake that devastated the country, cholera was introduced into Haiti through faulty disposal of sewage waters at a MINUSTAH base housing Nepalese peacekeepers who carried the disease. Following increasingly clear indications that the epidemics had originated at a UN base, many demonstrations targeting the UN took place. As protests took off in November 2010, when the death toll reached 1,000, the UN was concerned about upcoming presidential elections that it deemed crucial for its stabilization efforts in Haiti. Protests were therefore seen as a security issue threatening stabilization, fomented by “enemies of democracy”, rather than an understandable process of claim-making in a situation of crisis where thousands of people had been contaminated.

Responding to one of these demonstrations, a statement published by MINUSTAH deplored “politically motivated” violence: “The way the events unfolded suggests that these incidents were politically motivated, aimed at creating a climate of insecurity on the eve of elections” [...] “MINUSTAH calls the people to remain vigilant and not be manipulated by enemies of stability and democracy in the country” (UN News, 2010b). In mid-November 2010, a large demonstration occurred at the UN base in Cap Haïtien, in the North of Haiti. One demonstrator was killed and over a dozen were injured. As an Associated Press article reports, the UN spokesperson “blamed political actors for stoking the unrest” and stated that “it looks like the demonstration began in three or four parts in the city in a simultaneous way that means it was planned ahead or organized” (Katz, 2010).

The UN also released statements condemning protests for hindering its humanitarian efforts (Mallon Andrews, 2015, p. 73). In November 2010, the UN coordinator for humanitarian action stated: “ We call upon all involved in these clearly orchestrated demonstrations to stop immediately so national and international partners can continue to save lives with our response to

the cholera” (UN News, 2010a). Haitian President Préval made a similar appeal (Miller Llana & Doucet, 2010).

As journalist Jonathan Katz notes, “fear that Haitians would riot explained the UN’s early refusal to investigate its role in the cholera outbreak” (Katz, 2013, p. 260). But this refusal not only stoked anger that led to more demonstrations, it also meant that MINUSTAH, because it refused to acknowledge its role, failed to take the necessary steps to stop contagion and contain the epidemics.

Furthermore, “framing disease as a national security concern effectively justified, both politically and morally, the UN’s military reactions to protests across the country” (Mallon Andrews, 2015, p. 74). When I interviewed one of the organizers of one of the first protests against MINUSTAH for introducing cholera to Haiti, held in Port-au-Prince in October 2010, they recounted the following:

It was the scariest moment of my life. The UN shot at us. The most iconic pictures of the UN’s presence here were taken that day. The guys holding “MINISTA = Kolera” signs. All these pictures were taken that day. After the protests we had to take a little break because the guys were so scared [...] They took our pictures there. The PNH came and helped to break down the protest. There were 150 to 200 people. We knew it was dangerous.¹⁵⁷

Because of its stabilization mandate, the UN mission in Haiti effectively adopted the mindset of those in power. The policing of protests became a question of enforcing order, rather than one of protecting civilians and their freedom of expression.

III. The militarization of protest policing

In this section, I look at MINUSTAH’s practices of public order in the field to assess the mission’s protest policing style. I show that MINUSTAH’s protest policing is close to an escalated force model (Della Porta & Fillieule, 2004, pp. 218-219). The escalated force model was dominant in many Western democracies until the 1970s and still prevails in several countries (and may be making a comeback in some democracies). It has strong affinities with mob sociology and is premised on the use of increasing amounts of force until the crowd disperses. The model led to escalation and widespread use of force in the 1960s and early 1970s and was found to be

¹⁵⁷ Interview 23, Port-au-Prince, June 2017.

counterproductive, spurring a move towards a “negotiated management” style that is less repressive and more focused on communication with demonstrators (Schweingruber, 2000).

McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy (1998) propose to distinguish protest policing styles based on five criteria: 1) the level of concerns about protesters’ rights and obligations to respect them; 2) the level of toleration for disruption; 3) the level of contact and communication between police and demonstrators and the police’s willingness to cede control to demonstrators; 4) the extent to which arrests are used to manage protesters; and 5) the level of force used with/instead of arrests to manage demonstrators. Analyzed along these five criteria, an escalated force model tends to underplay protesters’ rights, to be intolerant to challenges to the status quo, to involve minimum contact between police and demonstrators and little instances of police ceding control to them, to involve massive arrests, and to involve force to disperse demonstrators.

In this section, I show that MINUSTAH’s protest policing style fits many of these criteria. As we have seen in the previous sections, the way the UN thinks about protests tends to de-emphasize protesters’ rights and their legitimate grievances to emphasize the threat they pose to security and stability (criteria 1 and 2). Communication is de facto difficult in a context where most FPU do not speak French or Creole (criterion 3). Here I focus particularly on criterion 5, the level of force used. I show that MINUSTAH’s intervention model is based on a “shock and awe” approach that assumes that increasingly powerful shows of force can help deter and control protests. This model privileges the use of military and paramilitary forces to deal with protests, thus promoting militarization of protest policing. Militarization is “the application of quasi-military training, equipment, philosophy and organization to the question of policing” (Jefferson, 1990, p. 16).

1. “Deterring” protests

The idea that the military component of the mission played a role of deterrence or dissuasion often came up with MINUSTAH interviewees. The mission has maintained a heavy military presence for 13 years in a country where there has not been armed conflict. Indeed, even though reports of the Secretary-General on Haiti acknowledged year after year that the security situation in Haiti was stable, they also recommended to renew the mandate of the military component (Verlin, 2014). Many members of the UN and of the diplomatic community acknowledge this paradox, and some argue that the transition to a more police-oriented force could

have been done earlier. However, many also stress that the military component of the mission plays an important dissuasion or deterrence role, even if it does not directly intervene. As I conducted interviews in the summer of 2017, with the prospect of the military component withdrawing in October, many of my interlocutors were concerned that this could lead to violence and instability.

But deterring whom from doing what? The concept of dissuasion was often mentioned in relations to the gangs. Interviewees voiced concerns that as MINUSTAH's military component was withdrawing the gangs would rear their heads again. As one Western diplomat put it (talking about Cité Soleil and other poor neighbourhoods), "they [MINUSTAH] put out the fire, but the embers are still there".¹⁵⁸ But the concept of dissuasion was not only applied to gangs, it was also mentioned in the context of protests. When a high level military officer made this connection, I pushed them to elaborate further:

LP: so dissuasion or deterrence is aimed at gangs but also demonstrations, violent demonstrations?

Interviewee 38: To prevent yes. Because when Haitians start demonstrations they are prepared for violence. Violence starts like a fire. When they face a strong power they stop the violence. Demonstrations historically end in violence. The troops control violence with non-lethal weapons.¹⁵⁹

The deterrent model assumes the potential for violence, which is part of the mob sociology framework. According to a diplomatic source in Port-au-Prince, "when you're talking about elections in Haiti, it means insecurity, unless you have a force that can calm down heated minds".¹⁶⁰ MINUSTAH's military presence (in addition to its police presence and its work in recruiting and training the Haitian police) was often credited with ensuring peaceful elections in November 2016, when President Jovenel Moïse was elected. As one diplomatic source put it, "during the last electoral process the military insured a visible presence. It had a deterrent effect".¹⁶¹ In this context, deterrence through a show of force carries "a shock and awe value to deter outbreaks of violence or other unpermitted or unlawful behaviour" (Vitale, 2005, p. 294).

¹⁵⁸ Interview 21, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

¹⁵⁹ Interview 38, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

¹⁶⁰ Interview 8, Port-au-Prince, May 2017 (translated from French).

¹⁶¹ Interview 3, Port-au-Prince, May 2017.

Prevention and deterrence may seem to be “soft” approaches to protests. Is not preventing better than confronting? In fact, in their typology of styles of protest policing, (Della Porta & Fillieule, 2004, p. 218) argue that a “tough” style tends to be more preventive and dissuasive while a “soft” style is more reactive and opportunistic. Escalated force style of protest policing is associated with deterrence and “relies upon a dramatic show of force” (Della Porta & Fillieule, 2004, p. 219).

More directly, the military also deterred protesters by preventing demonstrators from accessing certain sites. When I asked a high level military officer how the military component of MINUSTAH intervenes in cases of protests, they responded by drawing a map of a crossroad, showing where different components of the mission would be stationed to prevent demonstrators from passing.¹⁶² This practice of herding demonstrators, including barring them from approaching sites deemed too sensitive, was confirmed by the head of a Haitian organization that works on the protection of human rights defenders, who recalled that during the 2016 elections:

At this time MINUSTAH was used by the government to violently repress demonstrators, street demonstrations in Port-au-Prince, in Cap Haïtien, in Gonaïves, in Les Cayes, several regions of the country. But particularly in the capital. [...] It was military personnel. Mostly military. This meant that when the political opposition or the students or the workers announced the demonstrations, there was already early in the morning the MINUSTAH soldiers who prevented people from getting close to the national palace, to certain places. So, we were really angry against the United Nations. Of course we did not want demonstrators to get violent. But preventing a demonstration is violating a political right.¹⁶³

Already in 2013, such tactics had prompted a coalition of Haitian human rights organizations to write an open letter to the Minister in charge of human rights arguing that the “government is using agents from the Haitian National Police and the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti to prevent public demonstrations by members of the political opposition or by other members of society and to violently disperse demonstrators” (Radio Kiskeya, 2013).

According to the head of a feminist organization that organized demonstrations for increasing the minimum wage in 2009, MINUSTAH’s presence had a chilling effect on workers’

¹⁶² Interview 38, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

¹⁶³ Interview 24, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

mobilization and demonstrations. In addition to direct repression of demonstrations, she mentioned the “structural” effect of the mission’s presence:

When there is a dissuasion force like this, which is frightening all the time, on the ground, it frightens the unions. So the unions, it’s only now that we’re starting a much stronger union mobilization. But for a long time... And this fear that MINUSTAH constitutes prevented unions in those sub-contracting factories to organize, etc. So no worker could take to the street.¹⁶⁴

I raised with them the fact that MINUSTAH does use the concept of dissuasion to describe the mission, mostly in the gang context but also about protests. They interjected: “In Haiti, a dissuasion force, to dissuade what and whom? Whom? If you go to any popular neighbourhood you will see. It’s normal people”.¹⁶⁵

2. *Escalated force*

MINUSTAH’s intervention model in the event of demonstrations or riots is supposed to be gradual. Participants often refer to it as the “1-2-3” principle, where the first interveners are the Haitian police and individual UN police officers (embedded with the local police), 2 is the FPU, and 3 is MINUSTAH’s military component. Again, while this may seem like a commonsensical gradation, this mindset belongs to the escalated force model, where “police begin by confronting demonstrators with a show of force followed by increasing levels of force until demonstrators disperse” (Schweingruber, 2000, p. 378).

Furthermore, it became clear in interviews that the 1-2-3 model did not correspond to reality, because options 2 and 3 are usually already on site, even if they are ultimately not needed. In other words, the FPU and the military were usually present at any event that is deemed to present a security risk, even though they did not intervene. While this is presented as a pragmatic solution (permitting rapid response), it means that the potential of military escalation is always there. A high level MINUSTAH civilian official presented the situation thus:

In the real term what normally happens is that we get the information from both the UN and from the PNH [Police Nationale d’Haïti] because they are legally speaking advised when a demonstration is going to happen and they need to agree, right? And we get the information and we assess the threat that the situation represents. [...] If the PNH says that

¹⁶⁴ Interview 39, Port-au-Prince, July 2017 (translated from French).

¹⁶⁵ Interview 39, Port-au-Prince, July 2017 (translated from French).

they are sufficiently responsible for that, then we do not take action, likewise, directly. Nevertheless, we alert our personnel and in some cases we place them over the itinerary where the demonstration is going to happen. If again the threat is beyond that we alert the military unit, when they also do the same, they place their personnel in the main areas that may facilitate their capacity to react in that case.¹⁶⁶

A high level military officer was more critical of the concept and bristled at the idea that military troops would have to wait for the PNH and UNPOL to intervene. In fact, they argued, during the 2016 elections the military was often on the frontline: “to New York it’s a symbol, 1-2-3. But it’s never stayed in my concern. It’s a good speech when meeting with the President, “your police is first”. But sometimes I was first, especially during the elections”. They went on:

1-2-3 is a fantasy, it works in New York, in Paris, in Oslo. In Europe it works. But in Haiti it doesn’t work like this. When I went to New York I said “I don’t work like this”. For example, if I have a strike now in downtown, today, I don’t wait with my troops for the solution to become more complicated. I go with my troops to wait until when it is the moment to intervene. I don’t wait for the PNH.¹⁶⁷

In reality, the military was thus frequently involved in the policing of protests. But even if the 1-2-3 model worked, it is not clear that FPU, which are meant to be option 2 before the military, can really offer a less militarized approach. FPU are premised on a paramilitary model of policing, or what some call a model of “robust police” (Rocca, 2014). While FPU have been promoted as ‘filling the gap’ between military and police (Agordzo, 2009), they also raise concerns that police activities will become more militarized (Hill et al., 2007; Hills, 2001). Experiences in places where such forces have been deployed raise concerns that “the use of Gendarmerie police forces to resolve law and order problems leads to community confusion, mistrust of the police and national government and further destabilizes the situation” (den Heyer, 2011, p. 468).

Although FPU are under the Police component in UN missions, in NATO missions MSUs are under the command and control of the Force Commander (military), while IPU may be placed under either (CoESPU, 2005, p. 6). This illustrates their dual police/military nature. According to a Police Advisor interviewed in New York, FPU are a form of lesser evil: “they’re paramilitary, but they’re still blue”,¹⁶⁸ meaning they may look like the military, but they are still under the police

¹⁶⁶ Interview 30, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

¹⁶⁷ Interview 38, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

¹⁶⁸ Interview 45, New York, February 2018.

command (blue rather than green). Though FPU are far from being able to perform all of the functions of the military, they are a form of military on the cheap, which can be interchangeable if circumstances require. An analysis of the UN's increasing use of FPU notes that in Liberia "the Security Council itself downsized the military component of the UN's operation [...] by the same amount that it increased FPU personnel", and that this is a "potentially dangerous precedent unless those troops were engaged in essentially law enforcement tasks" (J. G. Smith, Holt, & Durch, 2007a, p. 31).

In Haiti, participants found that FPU "looked an awful lot like the military" and "could be effectively interchangeable on the field depending on any operational requirement" (Muir, 2008, p. 8). This is how former Deputy Force Commander Aldunate describes the FPU:

The UN Police (UNPol) had about 1,897 men from 34 countries. Of this force, 1,000 were in the assault units—that is, in Formed Police Units (FPU)—whose main function was to handle riots. [...] They had powerful weapons and armoured vehicles — indeed, they had even more of them than some military contingents and were organized rather much like army companies (100 soldiers) (Aldunate, 2010, p. 68).

Given FPU paramilitary nature and the training they receive (see above), their capacity to de-escalate conflict and to use force proportionally is far from being guaranteed. Because of their dual nature, FPU carry with them the inherent possibility for escalation. As a study of NATO's MSU argues, "the MSU's mission is to maintain public order and safety by providing a constant presence. If prevention fails it is to deploy using force, if necessary reversing to a light infantry role" (Hills, 2001, p. 85). Potential issues were made clear in an anecdote recounted by a diplomatic source, who participated in an event organized by MINUSTAH during which FPU demonstrated their training to a group of UN officials and foreign diplomats. During this exercise, an Indian and a Bangladeshi FPU unit were playing the role of demonstrators, while other FPU units intervened according to different scenarios. My interviewee recounted the following:

The FPU did not understand that the first scenario was a unarmed crowd that wanted food, with two people who had machetes. It was the Senegalese, and well the African police it's not a police that is like ours, they have a different approach to people who confront authority. [they slam their fist in their hand] In the crowd!
[...] In the other scenarios it was more tense, they used tear gas. They ended up gassing the diplomats and the observers [...] For the 3rd scenario they just used white smoke. Same

thing, you had the ambassadors running around to escape! So we were not very impressed.¹⁶⁹

The escalated force model and the use of (para)military forces to police protests thus raises serious questions about the UN's ability to balance the enforcement of public order and the right of people to protest. The literature on protest policing styles shows that escalated force is a self-fulfilling prophecy leading to more violence on the part of both police and demonstrators. Three US commissions examined the escalated force model following violent escalation in demonstrations in the 1960s, and they all found that it was likely to lead to more violence rather than decrease it (Schweingruber, 2000, p. 380). The potentially counter-productive effect of the shock and awe model was actually highlighted by a high level MINUSTAH civilian official, who saw the 1-2-3 model as an improvement over previous practices: "before everyone arrived at the same time, even if they did not intervene at the same time. It was a form of deterrence. But in the last 3 years UNPOL are a bit further, a bit hidden. In fact *as soon as they start backing off the tension decreases*. You kind of need someone to throw stones at".¹⁷⁰

VI. UN protest policing and its reverberations

Why should we care about the way peace operations police in Haiti and more generally? Because peace operations are a point of cross-fertilization for the creation and transmission of policing practices, UN protest policing nurtures skills and tools that go on to have a life of their own. This process of "reverberation" (Barder, 2015) is made possible by the fact that MINUSTAH is considered to be a model (see chapter 3); that the UN is part of a network of protest policing ("stability police" initiatives, the CoESPU etc); that peace operations set up local police forces and socialize both local forces and troops from contributing countries into certain doctrines and practices; that these operations create a demand for specific skills and tools; and that the UN is widely seen as a legitimate international actor, thus legitimizing the adoption of UN practices by other actors.

Here I focus on two issues: the fact that the UN is creating a demand and a market for less-lethal weapons and legitimizes their use, and the fact that it has become a hub for "robust policing",

¹⁶⁹ Interview 8, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

¹⁷⁰ Interview 10, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French), emphasis added.

both leaving behind local police forces based on this model and socializing troops from contributing countries into it. Rather than just drawing on existing capacities, the UN both creates a demand for and develops skills and tools that can be applied to domestic repression (Cunliffe, 2017).

1. The UN market for less-lethal weapons

There is growing interest at the United Nations in the use of less-lethal weapons (LLW) in peace operations. In 2014, a panel of experts on technology and innovation in UN peacekeeping argued that “peacekeeping missions must consider the use of these additional tools”, including “tasers, stun and smoke grenades, rubber bullets, bean-bag rounds, riot control agents (such as tear gas)”, though recognized that these carried legal implications and that “lowering the threshold of force comes with its own complications” (United Nations, 2014a, p. 76). There has been very little research on what the use of LLW by the UN entails in the field and legally (though see Fry (2010) for a discussion of tear gas).

There would seem to be a logical connection between peacekeeping and LLW. As an article reflecting on the issue notes, LLW “are seen to be an important factor in contributing to the concept of UN benign humanitarian intervention” (Lewer & Schofield, 1997, p. 71). LLW “are said to help find force means that meet the requirements of peacekeepers and others by enabling a continuum of force responses”, for instance in situations of crowd control (Rappert, 2004b, p. 225).

However, Amnesty International has pointed out that the use of LLW in law enforcement raise a number of issues, including accuracy, proportionality, impact on vulnerable groups, misuse and abuse, “function creep” (use for purposes not originally intended), and lack of training (Amnesty International, 2015). Although a 2018 resolution of the Human Rights Council addressing protests did mention that states should make less lethal weapons available to officers, it added that “even less-lethal weapons can result in a risk to life” (UN Human Rights Council, 2018, p. 4). Although a 2018 resolution of the Human Rights Council addressing protests did mention that states should make less lethal weapons available to officers, it added that “even less-lethal weapons can result in a risk to life” (UN Human Rights Council, 2018, p. 4).

Although LLW are usually seen as a response to “concerns about the misery inflicted by modern weaponry”, “the employment of weapons, no matter their name or stated purpose, should not be taken as unproblematic” (Rappert, 2004a, p. 35 & 36). The medical profession, for instance,

has often raised caution about LLW and their supposed “non” or “less” lethal qualities. In a 1997 editorial in the *British Medical Journal*, a surgeon working with the International Committee of the Red Cross pointed out that, regardless of the terminology around “non” or “less” lethal weapons “a ‘weapon’ is something that is designed to cause bodily harm”, and that although the purpose of “disabling” may “sound[...] better than inflicting disability”, it “does not immediately beg the difficult question of how long the person will be disabled for” (Coupland, 1997, p. 72). They concluded that while “the public may be seduced by the term ‘non-lethal’”, “there are reasons why the medical profession should not be” (Coupland, 1997, p. 72).

Skeptics have also highlighted how the supposed humanitarian and benign character of LLW may in fact make the use of force more likely, by encouraging “treating situations as resolvable through force”(Rappert, 2004b, p. 240) and legitimating “targeting a wider range of locations given their supposed benign effects” (Rappert, 2004b, p. 235). This dynamic is well illustrated in Anna Feigenbaum’s history of tear gas, where she traces the use of this LLW from War World I to contemporary policing. Like others, Feigenbaum stresses that tear gas should be understood as a weapon:

If I shoot you in the foot you are less likely to die than if I shoot you in the head. However, this does not mean that the bullet shot into the foot is a “humanitarian agent” and the head bullet is a violent weapon. Unlike other objects that are not normally weapons but can be weaponized (for example, baseball bats or frying pans), tear gas has no alternative, “normal,” or everyday use (Feigenbaum, 2017, p. 9).

She also shows that tear gas became popular for law enforcement purposes precisely because it could be used to repress non-violent civil disobedience and against unarmed protesters, in particular starting in the 1960s. While more overt violence against protesters would likely have been publicly condemned, “humanitarian” violence through tear gas was seen as an appropriate response to non-violent demonstrations. The supposedly more “humane” character of tear gas thus made repression easier, in particular in the colonies (Feigenbaum, 2017, p. 61). As one scholar notes, the deployment of LLW is always bound up “with attempts at control; controlling individuals’ behaviour but also controlling assessments of events” (Rappert, 2004b, p. 223). As Foucault argued when discussing the prison, “prison certainly punished in a more humane way than the old penalties, but, more importantly, it made it possible to punish more often” (Fassin, 2017, p. 32).

In Haiti, both the military and police (FPU) components of MINUSTAH possessed and used LLW. According to a high level military officer interviewed in Port-au-Prince, in fact “they’re most of our weapons. Rubber bullets, pepper spray, gas, water cannons...”¹⁷¹ When I asked whether this was standard practice for the military component to carry such weapons, the response was: “It’s standard. But in Haiti I think the UN in the past emphasized more the use of non-lethal weapons. Especially in Haiti troops are located in big cities, well big for Haiti, where lots of children and civilians surround the troops. In Mali it may be different”.¹⁷²

A high level police officer similarly argued that LLW were commonly used by MINUSTAH police and that they were considered to be more humane. He recalled that “after Matthew [hurricane Matthew devastated the South Western part of Haiti in 2016] there were attacks against humanitarian convoys. I gave non-lethal weapons to police officers. You’re not going to shoot people who are hungry!”¹⁷³

When I visited one of the FPU bases in Port-au-Prince, I was given a tour of the premises, including the armory. Some of the weapons for the Quick Reaction Force included a long gun that fire “bean bags”, little cloth bags that they are supposed to aim below the waist. These were made by a company called Nonlethal Technologies. Police bean bags are used by law enforcement agencies in all states in the US and in at least 10 countries (de Brito, Challoner, Sehgal, & Mallon, 2001, p. 383). This is despite the fact that a 1974 study by the US military discouraged the use of bean bags for police work, arguing that the disadvantages outweighed the benefits, as the bean bags were likely to cause organ damage. A 2001 study found patterns of injuries that “raise serious public health considerations” (de Brito et al., 2001, p. 389), and similar issues were raised in another study (Suyama, Panagos, Sztajnkrzyer, FitzGerald, & Barnes, 2003).

In fact, there seems to be considerable confusion at the UN and whether bean bags are authorized for policing purposes. Thus, the *UN Peacekeeping Missions Military Police Manual* published in 2015 explicitly states that “the carriage and use of rubber bullets and bean bag rounds by non-military UN Police personnel, including Formed Police Units, is strictly prohibited by DPKO/Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions”, and that “DPKO is considering the future use of rubber bullets and bean bag rounds by UN military units” (UN DPKO/DFS, 2015i, p. 42).

¹⁷¹ Interview 38, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

¹⁷² Interview 38, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

¹⁷³ Interview 15, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

Meanwhile, the training material on LLW for FPU notes that “rubber bullets, wax bullets, plastic bullets, beanbag rounds, ring air foil projectiles (both kinetic and tear gas projectiles) and rubber bullets [...] are not any longer authorized in UN missions” (UN DPKO/DFS, 2015c, p. 15). This raises the question of what those bean bags were doing at the FPU armory in Port-au-Prince.

The UN also used tear gas, both during joint police-military action against gangs and during demonstrations. One report notes that in Cité Soleil “UN troops used teargas in areas where civilians had no protection” (Dziedzic & Perito, 2008, p. 5). Examples of tear gas use include use during the hunger riots by the Brazilian military (L. Doyle, 2008), use to disperse crowds considered too unruly at food distribution sites following natural disasters (Lakshmanan, 2004), use at a polling station to keep order during elections, use against prisoners during a prison riot in 2006, and use against a student demonstration in 2009 (Katz, 2009). As one analysis notes, the use of tear gas by the UN in Haiti raises special concerns. First, tear gas was used in conjunction with deadly military force in the case of raids against gangs, which not only can lead to an escalation of hostilities but could potentially violate the international ban on using riot control agents as a method of warfare. Second, it was used in situations, such as food distribution sites, that involve vulnerable populations, including elderly people, pregnant women and children (Fry, 2010). In light of these issues, one author argued that the UN should ban tear gas use, thus leading the way for other states to follow the ban on the use of chemical weapons (Fry, 2010).

Use of LLW in Haiti illustrates some of the dangers associated with these weapons. But regardless of these dangers, UN peacekeeping is creating a market for LLW. When troop-contributing countries deploy troops to UN missions, these are expected to come with their own equipment, which the UN then reimburses. As part of this equipment, FPUs in particular are expected to bring LLW. Indeed, the 2015 DPKO/DFS Guidelines on the use of less lethal weapons by FPUs laments that “Despite the fact ‘Guidelines on the Use of Force by Law Enforcement Agencies’ recommends the development and the deployment of less than lethal weapons and ammunitions, FPUs usually do not possess this type of equipment” (UN DPKO/DFS, 2015c, p. 1). The UN is in effect encouraging troop contributing countries to develop LLW and legitimizing the use of these weapons. As was amply demonstrated during the Arab Spring in the early 2010s, these weapons can easily be turned against states’ own population. The global LLW market is expected to be worth \$8.37 billion by 2020 (from \$5.65 billion in 2015), with the fastest growth in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific regions (MarketsandMarkets, 2016).

2. The UN as a hub for robust protest policing

When it comes to public order maintenance and crowd control, what are UN peace operations socializing troops in, and what type of local forces do they leave behind? As we have seen in previous sections, UN training of FPU carries a certain conception of public order and crowd theory. This conception stresses the danger that protests may represent, and fails to balance this with consideration for people's right to assemble. Furthermore, FPUs are socialized into practices of protest policing that emphasize deterrence and escalated force. FPUs then re-import these approaches and skills into their country of origin. This is not necessarily a cause for celebration in a context where most FPU units come from states that do not have a strong democratic tradition. The top 10 police contributors as of late 2018 are Senegal, Rwanda, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Nepal, India, Togo, Burkina Faso and Cameroon.

In addition to directly intervening in crowd control situations, MINUSTAH also contributed to recruiting and training the Haitian national police so it could do manage these situations itself. This is not unique to Haiti, and is part of a broader "policebuilding" efforts in UN-led and NATO-led operations. According to the CoESPU, FPUs role is to "assist, support and mentor the local police, especially anti-riot units" (CoESPU, 2005, p. 4). As one author notes, "'policebuilding' in countries such as Afghanistan or the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo) has often gone beyond the export of democratic, civilian policing techniques, featuring robust, military elements of policing such as riot control or even counter insurgency" (Heiduk, 2011, p. 70). In a context where training for public order maintenance is done by paramilitary police forces, it is going to be oriented towards a paramilitary policing philosophy. As one analysis notes, "training or funding paramilitary units in countries with human rights concerns, or training members of civilian police forces so that they may return to their home countries to establish such forces, thus threatens to 'leak' paramilitarism into the civilian police forces of foreign nations" (Hill et al., 2007, p. 316).

In Haiti (like in many other states where the UN intervenes), the police have a history of violently repressing demonstrations. Police violence against demonstrators was one of the arguments used by the international community to demand President Aristide's departure from Haiti (in addition to violence by "gangs"). Following Aristide's departure and MINUSTAH's intervention, UN participants acknowledge that the Haitian police deliberately attacked peaceful

demonstrations demanding Aristide's return. For instance, two MINUSTAH military officers acknowledge that there was no doubt within MINUSTAH that the police fired upon unarmed protestors during a February 2005 demonstration by Lavalas supporters (Aldunate, 2010, p. 121; Heleno Ribeiro Pereira, 2007, p. 11). Going back further in history, the Haitian gendarmerie was set up during the US occupation (1915-1934) to repress peasant unrest (Renda, 2001; Schmidt, 1995).

Seemingly oblivious to this history, MINUSTAH had invested time and efforts in reinforcing and even creating from scratch special units of the Haitian police that are meant to robustly deal with public disorder. Already existing units include the CIMO (Corps d'Intervention et de Maintien de l'Ordre), which operates at the national level, and the UDMO (Unité Départementale de Maintien de l'Ordre), which operates at the departmental level. CIMO and UDMO are supposed to take over the tasks performed by UN FPU's, and MINUSTAH has provided training for these units.¹⁷⁴ As one high level civilian MINUSTAH official dealing the development of the PNH explained to me, MINUSTAH has focused on increasing the capacity of the UDMOs in particular:

And what we have done is that, since about 3 years ago, that we have planned jointly with the PNH to increase with every graduation of the new promotion the number of people assigned to the UDMOs. MINUSTAH has been capable to provide the capacity building to these units by the means of the FPU's and by the means of the individual police officers capable to provide such support, and from the international community we have succeeded to find out how the international community can engage resources to provide additional equipment to the crowd control unit within the PNH. And I will be honest by saying that the former government, during the Martelly administration, they were also investing an important amount of financial resources to provide equipment to the PNH, either by the mean of individual equipment, vehicles and the water cannons that the PNH was requiring. So that has changed drastically the way that the PNH officers are now tackling demonstrations. If you track the most recent year despite that we may have alleged human rights violations, the way that these units have operated is more with the means of water and tear gas rather than what they were historically blamed for in the past, by use of, huh, firearms or real ammunition.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴ See for instance MINUSTAH'S website on a 2014 training session with UDMO: <https://minustah.unmissions.org/cap-haitien-l%E2%80%99udmo-renforc%C3%A9-en-technique-et-tactiques-dinterventions> (accessed August 9, 2018).

¹⁷⁵ Interview 30, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

Though the reinforcement of the UDMOs is meant to be accompanied by professionalization leading to more “humane” tactics of intervention, there are indeed still many examples of “alleged human rights violations” by UDMO. Most recently, in November 2017, both CIMO and UDMO participated in a joint operation against gangs in the Grand Ravine neighbourhood of Port-au-Prince, in conjunction with MINUJUSTH police officers and FPU. The operation ended with the summary execution of innocent civilians on a school campus in retaliation for what police officers thought was an ambush (J. Johnston, 2018; Réseau National de Défense des Droits de l'Homme, 2017a). Two UDMO members were killed (Rateau, 2017).

Despite claims to professionalization, UDMOs also continue to display a warrior identity. On the Haitian police’s website, the description of the unit notes that “they’re used to getting their hands dirty to protect you” and features a picture of a group of men wearing camouflage with their faces covered with black masks (Figure 10) – an attire reminiscent of the Tontons Macoutes and their black outfits and dark sunglasses (Mobekk, 2001, p. 106).

Figure 10. UDMO’s policing philosophy



UDMO

Unité Départementale de Maintien d'Ordre

Jusqu'à 1997, le CIMO était la seule unité de tout le pays en matière de maintien de l'ordre, À partir de cette année, chaque département géographique s'est vu doté d'une Unité Départementale de Maintien d'Ordre, à l'exception du Département de l'Ouest qui n'aura son UDMO qu'en juin 2004.

L'Unité Départementale et de Maintien d'Ordre
 (#UDMO): Faire régner l'ordre dans tous les départements du pays. Ils sont habitués à se salir les mains pour vous protéger

Source: Screen capture from the Haitian National Police's website.¹⁷⁶

In fact, MINUSTAH itself could sometimes be ambiguous about the desirability of professionalizing UDMO along human rights protection lines. For instance, a US police officer who served as Deputy Regional Commander for MINUSTAH notes that on one occasion the mission decided that UDMO should not be present at a demonstration because it “was an aggressive police component and was very feared by the public” and “their presence might enflame the crowd”. However, the police officer goes on arguing that “this perceived assertiveness and reputation should not be considered negatively since it has been observed that a single UDMO officer could break up a demonstration of 40 people when a group of regular PNH officers could not” (Sanchez, 2014, p. 166). In conclusion, both CIMO and UDMO have a long history of violent intervention in demonstrations (Amnesty International, 1998, pp. 27-30), and CIMO was also involved in extra-judicial raids to kill Aristide supporters after the coup (International Crisis Group, 2005, p. 12).

In addition to reinforcing the CIMO and the UDMOs, MINUSTAH helped with the creation of two new units of the Haitian police that are meant to fulfill similar functions. MINUSTAH played a key role in setting up the Brigade d'Opération et d'Intervention Départementale (BOID), which was created in 2015 after its more than 250 new officers received specialized training from MINUSTAH's UNPOL. The unit was to take over functions similar to those of the SWAT and UDMO units (J. M. Cadet, 2015), with a focus on organized crime. An article in Haiti's largest newspaper mentioned that “the formation of this new unit of the PNH would not be possible without the support of MINUSTAH” (Belfort, 2015). And yet this unit is widely known for its aggressive behaviour and has been accused of extrajudicial killings and other human rights abuses, including the Grand Ravine incident mentioned above and a similar incident in Lilavois (North of Port-au-Prince) in October 2017 (Réseau National de Défense des Droits de l'Homme, 2017b). As one representative of the UN OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) put it to me in New York, “these guys are brutish”.¹⁷⁷

Another unit created in 2007 with MINUSTAH's support (and bilateral support from Canada, France, some Latin American countries and the US) was the BIM (Brigade d'Intervention

¹⁷⁶ <http://www.pnh.ht/>, accessed July 1, 2018. As of July 2019, the site appears to be offline.

¹⁷⁷ Interview 43, February 2018, New York (translated from French).

Motorisée), supposed to deal with petty criminality (“petite délinquance”) (André Joseph, 2007) but also used during demonstrations. Among other things, the unit has been used to contain popular protests against land grabs and the eviction of peasants to develop tourism on the remote island of Ile a Vache (Alphonse, 2014). MINUSTAH thus leaves behind no fewer than 4 units of the Haitian police charged with public order.

Conclusion

The last two chapters have explored the tension between order enforcement (“stabilization”) and protection, showing that MINUSTAH often resolved it in favour of the former. Thus, poor urban populations in Port-au-Prince were excluded from the ambit of protection because of the alleged threat to stability they presented, and the need to enforce order took precedence over the right to protest. The next chapter explores another facet of this tension between order enforcement and protection. It investigates the practice of international penal peacebuilding, the reinforcement of the chain’s penal chain – in particular the prisons system – in the name of peace.

This chapter has also demonstrated what can be gained by opening the field of inquiry beyond the here and now of peace operations. A genealogy of MINUSTAH’s style of protest policing has traced the mission’s conception of crowds to 19th century “mob sociology” and revealed the transnational history of peace operations’ main instrument to deal with protests, the Formed Police Units. Furthermore, the chapter has shown how peace operations’ protest policing style has important transnational reverberations. Peace operations train and socialize both police from troop contributing countries and local police in a certain style of public order maintenance, which emphasizes the risk posed by demonstrators and the necessity of a show of force. Peace operations also act as a demand-generating market for instruments of protest policing such as less-lethal weapons, which legitimates and encourages the use of these weapons worldwide. Thus, peace operations help produce and nurture skills and tools of intervention that states can use against their own population, in particular to repress expressions of public dissent. In this process, peace operations can participate in the (re)production of domestic hierarchies. The hierarchy between international interveners and local populations in countries of intervention allows for the deployment and refinement of strategies of population management and control that international

interveners then go on to apply in their own country. As argued in Chapter 1, this means that peace operations co-constitute international, transnational and domestic hierarchies.

Chapter 6: Building peace by building prisons

“Our system never treated the failure of prison as a reason not to try more prison”
(Forman, 2017, p. 123)

It is a truth (nearly) universally acknowledged that a country that has experienced armed conflict must be in want of the “rule of law”. Though the rule of law concept is vague (Carothers, 2010), it is often associated with feel-good notions such as good governance, respect for human rights, accountability and justice. This obscures the fact that the institutions most closely associated with the rule of law are the penal arm of the state: the police, the criminal justice system, and the prison. In fact, this association becomes obvious if we look at the programs implemented under the rule of law rubric: concretely, the “international community” spends considerable time and money reinforcing the penal chain in post-conflict countries. According to former Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, “prisons are an essential link in the rule of law chain” (UN DPKO, 2010, p. 1). In his departure speech, Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Haiti Edmond Mulet noted that “the rule of law [Etat de droit], on the institutional level, it’s of course the police, prisons, justice. The rule of law, it’s also the management of public affairs according to norms, laws and regulations” (MINUSTAH, 2011).¹⁷⁸

This chapter introduces the concept of *international penal peacebuilding* to designate international programs that aim to strengthen the penal chain in states that have experienced conflict. It explores the turn to penal peacebuilding at the UN, a development that has so far received scant scholarly attention (though see (Brisson-Boivin & O’Connor, 2013; Walby & Monaghan, 2011; Zanotti, 2008)), and documents how this turn is justified and what it means in practice in Haiti.

Theoretically, the chapter builds on analyses of the spread of international criminal law and associated discourses of accountability and anti-impunity and fills a gap in the literature. It situates international penal peacebuilding as part of the “criminal turn” in human rights, transitional and international criminal justice (Engle, 2016). As critics have noted, human rights advocates’ call for justice and against impunity has often led them to favour criminal accountability for those accused of serious crimes during conflict, thus embracing penal power in the name of victims

¹⁷⁸ Translated from French.

(Engle, Miller, & Davis, 2016a). In this process, “accountability is largely conflated with criminal process followed by punishment, which, under international criminal law, overwhelmingly takes the form of incarceration” (Drumbl, 2003, pp. 263-264). While the critical literature on transitional and international criminal justice tends to focus on exceptional measures established in the wake of conflict (such as ad hoc tribunals or internationalized mechanisms like the ICC), this chapter draws attention to a more mundane yet more widespread phenomenon: the reinforcement of the penal chain in post-conflict states.

In introducing the concept of international penal peacebuilding, I show how the “criminal turn” extends to rule of law reform in societies that have experienced conflict. I build on the critique developed in the transitional/international criminal justice literature and extend it by proposing a sociology of punishment approach to international penal peacebuilding. This approach proposes to see punishment neither as a problem-solving question (what works to manage and prevent crime?) nor as a moral philosophical one (what is punishment just?), but rather focuses on its genealogical and sociological aspects: where do institutions and discourses of punishment come from? What social functions do they fulfill? What are their unintended effects? (Garland, 1991).

A sociology of punishment approach to international penal peacebuilding echoes many of the critiques raised in the transitional and international criminal justice literature. It shows how penal peacebuilding individualizes and decontextualizes harms, obscures harms resulting from structural injustice (Lu, 2017), reinforces the coercive powers of the state, and generally leads to “a narrowed conception of justice, and an impoverished approach to peace” (Engle, Miller, & Davis, 2016b, p. 2). In addition, a sociology of punishment approach provides for a systematic critique of the distributive effects of penal peacebuilding. It reveals how deploying the tools of the penal chain to build peace contributes to the continued marginalization of historically socio-economically disadvantaged groups, who constitute the penal chain’s main “clients”. Rather than a technical exercise, international penal peacebuilding is part of broader patterns of contentious statebuilding, where the reinforcement of the centralized coercive powers of the state benefits some groups at the expense of others. Importantly, a sociology of punishment approach shows that this outcome is not an unfortunate consequence of the “hi-jacking” of rule of law reform by certain groups (Sesay, 2019; Subotic, 2009). Rather, marginalization is built into the penal chain because its function is to enforce social order. Though the penal chain in post-conflict states like Haiti is

often seen as deviant, in fact it fulfills the same functions as the penal chain of advanced democracies.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section introduces the concept of international penal peacebuilding, situates it within the literature on transitional and international criminal justice, and lays out the basics of a sociology of punishment approach. The second section examines the UN's turn towards international penal peacebuilding, the genealogy of these practices, and how they involve a network of international and non-governmental organizations, states, and lobby groups. Section III looks at penal peacebuilding in Haiti and its effects. It explores the "Haitian paradox", the fact that rule of law reform in Haiti has led to a dramatic increase in prison population, overcrowding and high rates of pre-trial detention. In the last section, I ask: Why punish? What is punishment? and who is punished? in the context of international penal peacebuilding. I contrast the UN discourse on the functions that the prison is supposed to play with the role that it actually plays in Haiti. I show that the promotion of the prison is divorced from its penological functions (such as the punishment and rehabilitation of criminals) and that other justifications, such as the prison's humanitarian function, are shaky. Rather, the prison primarily fulfills a social ordering function that particularly targets marginalized urban populations.

I. International penal peacebuilding and the sociology of punishment

In an often cited piece, Carothers argues that "one cannot get through a foreign policy debate these days without someone proposing the rule of law as a solution to the world's troubles" (Carothers, 1998, p. 3). Both policymakers and scholars see the rule of law as a "cure", a "panacea" and an "elixir", supposed to lead to anything from economic growth to democracy to peace to respect for human rights (Carothers, 1998). The rule of law has become "the common element that development experts, security analysts, and human rights activists agree upon" (Rajagopal, 2007, p. 1348), leading to the idea of a "justice-development-security nexus" (Porter, Isser, & Berg, 2013). (Re)establishing the rule of law in post-conflict settings is seen as particularly important to avoid the re-occurrence of conflict, promote development and ensure accountability (Tolbert & Solomon, 2006).

While the rule of law concept tends to be associated with feel-good notions such as good governance, respect for human rights, accountability and justice, this obscures that the institutions most closely associated with the rule of law are the penal arm of the state: the police, the criminal

justice system, and the prison. This has not been lost on critical approaches to international criminal justice. While some have heralded the growing ability to hold perpetrators of serious human rights abuses committed during conflict as a “justice cascade” (Sikkink, 2011) and progress towards “humanity’s law” (Teitel, 2011), others have noted how “accountability is largely conflated with criminal process followed by punishment, which, under international criminal law, overwhelmingly takes the form of incarceration” (Drumbl, 2003, pp. 263-264). International criminal justice is dominated by a retributive vision of justice, where punishment must be meted out, and truth and reconciliation processes are seen as tantamount to impunity (Engle, 2016). This has led the international human rights movement to turn to criminal justice and the state’s penal power in the name of victims. In what Engle refers to as “the criminal turn in human rights law and advocacy” (Engle, 2016, p. 43), activists embrace institutions of state power that a previous generation would have been highly suspicious of. Activists who historically resisted state terror have now turned to the state’s penal powers for criminal justice purposes in the name of human rights (Moyn, 2016).

This chapter builds and expands on this critical literature through two moves. First, it proposes to expand the object of criticism. The literature on international criminal justice tends to focus on exceptional measures established in the wake of conflict (such as ad hoc local and hybrid tribunals) and internationalized processes (such as the ICC). But “in addition to these exceptional measures, huge energies have been invested in [...] reconstruction programmes of the ‘normal’ criminal justice systems” (McEvoy, 2007, p. 422). Indeed, the practice of the international legal system of “[holding] atrocity perpetrators accountable by prosecuting and incarcerating them [...] also seeps into national and local legal systems” (Drumbl, 2007, p. 123). The “criminal turn” in international justice does not concern only high profile cases - in terms of the crimes covered (crimes against humanity, war crimes etc), the people tried (heads of state etc) and the location of international justice (exceptional or internationalized measures). Rather, this represents a widespread way of thinking about how to achieve accountability, overcome conflict and build peace that is applied to whole societies, through the “normal” criminal justice system. The criminal turn in international justice should thus be studied in tandem with the widespread practice of *international penal peacebuilding*, the reinforcement of the penal chain (police, criminal justice, prison) to build peace in countries that have experienced conflict. The chapter thus establishes a dialogue between two literatures animated by similar concerns but that rarely speak to each other:

the critical literature on international criminal and transitional justice, and the literature on international security aid (Monaghan, 2017) and the transnational making of policing (Bowling & Sheptycki, 2012).

Second, the chapter proposes to look at the criminal turn in international justice through a sociology of punishment lens. The sociology of punishment, though not a unified field, broadly refers to approaches that see punishment as a social institution and crime control as a problem of social ordering (Garland, 1991, 2001). A sociological approach to punishment differs from a penological approach, which conceptualizes criminal justice as the management and control of crime, and is concerned by the question “what works?”. It also differs from a moral philosophy approach to punishment, which conceptualizes punishment as a moral puzzle, and is concerned about the question “what is just?”. Instead of “viewing punishment as a means to an end or a stock problem for moral philosophy” (Garland, 1991, p. 119), instead of foregrounding the instrumental and moral aspects of punishment, a sociology of punishment foregrounds its social aspects. It asks:

How do specific penal measures come into existence? What social functions does punishment perform? How do penal institutions relate to other institutions? How do they contribute to social order, or to state power, or to class domination, or to the cultural reproduction of society? What are punishment’s unintended social effects, its functional failures, and its wider social costs? (Garland, 1991, p. 119)

In a series on lecture on the “will to punish”, Didier Fassin proposes to ask what punishment is, why punish and who is punished not through a philosophical gaze but genealogically and ethnographically. Genealogy “questions the foundations of punitive institutions”, while ethnography “uncovers its most concrete stakes” by investigating “what it enables or excludes, what it augments or diminishes, what it renders visible or make disappear”(Fassin, 2018, p. 29). Similarly, in his analysis of the new “penal populism”, Garland proposes to “pursue a series of questions that are both genealogical and sociological” (Garland, 2001, p. 2). I propose such a genealogical and sociological approach to international penal peacebuilding in Haiti. Section II investigates the genealogy of international penal peacebuilding and the actors involved in the practice. Section III examines the history and development of the penal chain in Haiti and the effects of UN intervention. The last section looks at the social functions that prison is supposed to serve, the functions that it actually serves, and its unintended effects.

A sociology of punishment approach to international penal peacebuilding resonates with a number of the paths for criticism explored in the international criminal justice literature. Some scholars have pointed out that transitional justice and international criminal justice should not be studied as *sui generis* phenomena, but rather to the extent that they exist along a continuum with “ordinary justice” (Posner & Vermeule, 2004, p. 764). According to Drumbl,

The structure, modalities, and methodologies of international criminal law and adjudication reflect an extension of the structure, modalities, and methodologies of municipal criminal law and adjudication. The same can be said for sentencing practices. In fact, the discipline of international criminal justice, when deconstructed, truly does not have its own theoretical foundations (Drumbl, 2003, p. 268)

This echoes this dissertation’s main contention that practices of order maintenance in peace operations should be understood as existing along a continuum with domestic order maintenance. It also suggests that the tools of the sociology of punishment (developed in domestic contexts) can provide relevant insight into the logic and mechanisms of international criminal justice and international penal peacebuilding. Indeed, some have called for more criminological approaches to international criminal justice (Drumbl, 2003; Roberts & McMillan, 2017). Some argue that the study of international criminal justice tends to be overly legalistic (McEvoy, 2007), and propose to turn to criminology to provide new insights. In a text making such a call, the authors define criminology broadly as “research on law enforcement, criminal proceedings and penal treatment, in addition to core work on the definition, meaning and causes of crime” (Roberts & McMillan, 2017, p. 319). This broad definition can easily encompass penological, moral philosophical and sociological approaches to crime and punishment. Here I argue for a particular criminological approach, concerned about the sociology of punishment (for a discussion of the limitations of penological and moral philosophical approaches, see (Garland, 1991)).

Such a sociological approach echoes observations made by critical analyses of international criminal justice. Reflecting on the rise of the anti-impunity agenda Engle (2016, p. 44) offers a genealogy of the “criminal turn” in human rights and proposes four paths for criticism: “individualization and decontextualization, conceptions of economic harm and remedy, alignment with the state, and the production of history” (Engle, 2016, p. 44). First, criminal law individualizes crime, presenting “a world infused with a few bad actors, even monsters” that obscures the role of the state, the complicity of the wider population, and the political context. Second, criminal justice

de-emphasizes the necessity of economic restructuring and makes economic reparations difficult. Third, it makes human rights advocates dependent upon “the very police, prosecutorial, and even adjudicatory apparatuses of which they have long had reason to be suspicious” (Engle, 2016, p. 47). And fourth, it biases the preservation of the historical record towards prosecution goals. It is easy to see how these critiques can be framed in a sociology of punishment approach, as they revolve on asking who (and what) is punished, how punishment contributes to reinforcing state power, and what its unintended consequences might be.

A sociology of punishment approach also resonates with analyses of international and transitional justice that have emphasized its distributive effects, its ability to empower some actors and marginalize others. A number of studies have shown that international criminal justice can easily get “hi-jacked” and instrumentalized by some groups. For instance, in the Balkans in the aftermath of the Yugoslav conflict, transitional justice was used for getting rid of political opponents (Subotic, 2009). Reflecting on Uganda’s “self-referral” to the ICC in the case of the Lord’s Resistance Army, Drumbl argues that this move can be interpreted as a way for Ugandan elites not only to target rivals, but also to pre-empt resort to traditional forms of dispute resolution, which would lead to a “decentralization of power from the centralized apparatus of the state” (Drumbl, 2007, p. 144). Thus, “the ICC may offer illiberal governments a tool to consolidate power and avoid enfranchising the policy preferences of afflicted local populations [...]” (Drumbl, 2007, p. 146). In an analysis of rule of law reform in Sierra Leone and Liberia, Sesay (2019, p. 42) argues that “rebuilding the rule of law in war-torn countries disproportionately favours actors who have been historically privileged by unequal socio-legal and economic structures”. The diffusion of Western legal norms to these post-conflict countries has been “hi-jacked” by dominant actors and has had the unintended effect of increasing structural, social, and cost-related barriers to justice for the majority of the population (Sesay, 2019).

While a sociology of punishment can reach similar conclusions, it differs in that it does not depend on a critique of the Eurocentrism of international penal peacebuilding. Critics have argued that international criminal justice is marked by the diffusion of “liberal prosecutorial and correctional models” and “Western legalism generally” (Drumbl, 2007, p. 123), and the silencing of non-Western alternatives (Mani, 2002). But while criticizing the Eurocentric assumptions underpinning the export of Western rule of law is perfectly valid, it tends to take at face value the idea that the rule of law works as advertised in the West. In other words, the main problem with

Western rule of law norms and institutions is assumed to be that there are not socio-culturally appropriate and/or that they get lost in translation by being instrumentally used by elite actors. But the penal chain in the West displays marginalizing effects at least as strong as its transplants to post-conflict societies. Indeed, “the reality from the experience of the developed world suggests that even in the unlikely event that such justice systems could eventually be ‘raised’ to the performance levels of their Western counterparts, they would still most likely fall far short of the mark” (McEvoy, 2007, p. 437). In other words, penal chains in the Global South should not be considered “deviant” compared to a Western norm. In this chapter, I show that, although the Haitian prison is constantly presented as deviant, in fact it works very much in the same way as its counterparts in the West.

II. Building peace by building prisons?

1. The rise of international penal peacebuilding

In the name of stabilization and peacebuilding, multilateral and bilateral international efforts are directed at reinforcing post-conflict and fragile states’ penal chain through support for the police, justice and prison sectors. This involves the recruiting and training of staff (police officers, judges and clerks, corrections officers) as well as the building and refurbishment of infrastructures (police stations, courts, prisons). While the previous chapters looked at the effects of “policebuilding”, this chapter focuses on UN “corrections”-related programs. While police assistance has received significant attention from the literature, penal aid (Monaghan, 2017) is a central component of what (re)building the rule of law means in practice.

As OROLSI was established, “the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was designated by the UN Secretary-General to serve as the UN system-wide lead entity in the area of corrections” (UN DPKO, 2009, p. 1). Correction officers provided by member states are an increasingly important part of UN peace operations. In 2009, only 5 of the active UN peace operations deployed corrections officers, while this number rose to 8 in 2012 and to 10 in 2017 (UN DPKO, 2012a, p. 5; 2017, p. 6). Though the number of government-provided officers fluctuates, there is a clear upward trend (see Figure 11). The great majority of these corrections officers coming from the African continent, and the top contributors in 2016 were Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sweden and Tunisia (OROLSI, 2016). The UN now uses the term “Corrections Contributing Countries” or CCCs to

designate the states providing corrections officers (UN DPKO, 2010), a mirror to the existing “TCCs” (Troop Contributing Countries) and “PCCs” (Police Contributing Countries) acronyms.



Source: Data from *Corrections Update 2009-2012*, *Justice and Corrections Update 2014-2018*

Corrections have also acquired a more prominent profile within the UN architecture. In 2016, the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service (CLJAS) branch of OROLSI was renamed the “Justice and Corrections Service”. Already in 2009, DPKO started publishing a magazine-style “Corrections Update” meant for internal and external consumption, “to raise awareness about corrections work in peacekeeping” (UN DPKO, 2009, p. 11). In 2014, the magazine morphed into the “Justice and Corrections Update”. Some member states have also taken it upon themselves to raise the profile of corrections in peace operations and to encourage states to provide more corrections officers. The “Group of Friends of Corrections” emerged in 2009 at the first “United Nations International Corrections Conference” (held in Stockholm) and met formally for the first time in 2011.¹⁷⁹ The Stockholm conference was followed by yearly conferences in Belgium, Singapore, Germany (UN DPKO, 2012b, p. 7), Burkina Faso,¹⁸⁰ Zambia¹⁸¹ and Uganda.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹ See their website “Background” page: <http://www.friendsofcorrections.com/about-us/background.aspx>

¹⁸⁰ <http://archive.icpa.ca/calendar/192>

¹⁸¹ <https://icpa.org/events/6th-united-nations-international-corrections-in-peacekeeping-conference/>

¹⁸² <https://prisons.go.ug/conference2/new/seventh-international-corrections-peacekeeping-operations-conference>

2. *The international political economy of penal peacebuilding*

Although DPKO has prominence when it comes to corrections, the rule of law is “owned” by various branches of the UN (see Figure 12). For instance, the UN Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections, supposed to ensure coherence of rule of law-related activities across the UN, is operated jointly by DPKO and the UN Development Programme. Similarly, the “Rule of Law Indicators” established in 2011 to measure state performance along a diversity of criteria (including the state of its prisons) were created jointly by DPKO and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Figure 12. The international penal peacebuilding network



Source: Justice and Corrections Update, 2010 (UN DPKO, 2010, p. 32)

Furthermore, the UN is one among many actors engaged in these practices. International penal peacebuilding involves individual states, international organizations, industry groups and non-governmental organizations. International penal peacebuilding is characterized by a circulation of knowledge and practices through international conferences, training and deployment abroad. The UN is often the hub for these penal peacebuilding activities in post-conflict and “fragile” settings.

States that have been particularly active on the issue of international penal peacebuilding at the UN include Sweden (through the Swedish Prison and Probation Service), which hosted the first UN International Corrections Conference and was the first chair of the Group of Friends of Corrections (2011-2013), as well as Belgium (host of the 2010 conference), Burkina Faso (2014 conference), Canada (chair 2015-2017), Germany (2012 conference), Rwanda (chair 2013-2015),

Uganda (2018 conference), and Zambia (2016 conference). In 2019, the Group of Friends of Corrections had 45 member states, many from Africa and Europe (see Figure 13).

Figure 13. Members of the Group of Friends of Corrections

Members:

Bahamas	Barbados	Belgium	Benin
Brazil	Bulgaria	Burkina Faso	Burundi
Cameroon	Canada	Croatia	Egypt
Federal Republic of Germany	Fiji	Finland	Ghana
Italy	Kenya	Lesotho	Madagascar
Malawi	Mauritius	Mozambique	Namibia
Netherlands	Nigeria	Norway	Pakistan
Philippines	Portugal	Romania	Rwanda
Senegal	Sierra Leone	South Africa	Sweden
Tanzania	The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan	Tunisia	Turkey
Uganda	United Kingdom	United States of America	Zambia
Zimbabwe			

Source: Screen capture from Group of Friends of Corrections website.¹⁸³

The group also includes member organizations. These include associations gathering national correctional services, such as the African Correctional Services Association (ACSA), and the European Organization of Prison and Correctional Services (EuroPris); international organizations gathering both public and private actors, such as the International Corrections and Prisons Association (ICPA); and non-governmental organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Penal Reform International.

The UN has worked closely with the ICPA in particular. The organization was created in 1998 under the leadership of the Canadian Corrections Service (CSC) and is located in Brussels.¹⁸⁴ It defines itself as “the worldwide organisation for networking correctional professionals and practitioners”, with members including “National Prison and Correctional Services, government departments, technology solutions companies, service providers, NGO’s, non-profits, charitable

¹⁸³ <http://www.friendsofcorrections.com/about-us/members.aspx>, accessed April 10, 2019.

¹⁸⁴ “A brief history”, ICPA website, <https://icpa.org/about-us/a-brief-history/>, accessed April 10, 2019.

and voluntary organisations”.¹⁸⁵ The ICPA played an important role in the creation of the Group of Friends of Corrections. It co-hosted the 2010 UN International Corrections Conference in Belgium and co-organized and co-hosted the 2011 conference in Singapore (UN DPKO, 2012b, p. 7). In the late 2000s, DPKO launched a project with ICPA to design “modular prisons”, “a prison that can be erected within 60-90 days and meets UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (SMR)”, to be deployed in post-conflict and post-disaster settings (UN DPKO, 2010, p. 33).

The ICPA’s flagship activity is an international conference held every year. The 2018 conference was held in Montreal and entitled “Beyond Prisons: The Way Forward”.¹⁸⁶ This annual conference is an occasion to facilitate networking between public and private actors from all around the world, in line with the ICPA’s mission “to promote and share ethical and effective correctional practices to enhance public safety and healthier communities world-wide”.¹⁸⁷ These international conferences play an important role in identifying “best practices” and facilitating policy circulation (McCann, 2011). UN actors often attend them. For instance, the 2017 ICPA conference held in London was attended by representatives from the UN mission in South Sudan, the UN mission in Somalia, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and DPKO’s Justice and Corrections Service.¹⁸⁸

3. A brief genealogy of international penal peacebuilding

International penal peacebuilding aims to reinforce post-conflict states’ penal chain with little regard for the history of how that chain emerged and the practice’s historical antecedents. As we have seen in Chapter 2, “policing was the lynchpin of the colonial project” (Bowling & Sheptycki, 2012, p. 21). More specifically, the development of carceral systems was closely associated with colonialism, and “penal power was an important component of imperial statecraft” (Carrington, Hogg, Scott, Sozzo, & Walters, 2019, p. 103). Not only did colonial powers transport convicts to the colonies, they also developed the local penal apparatus for pacification purposes. Prison was a central component of the colonial project in Australia (Carrington et al., 2019, p.

¹⁸⁵ “Our members”, ICPA website, <https://icpa.org/our-members/>, accessed April 10, 2019.

¹⁸⁶ Conference website, <https://icpa.org/montreal2018/>, accessed April 10, 2019.

¹⁸⁷ “Mission, Vision and Values”, ICPA website, <https://icpa.org/about-us/mission-vision-and-values/>, accessed April 10, 2019.

¹⁸⁸ The attendee list is available on the ICPA website, <https://icpa.ca/library/icpa2017-conference-attendee-list/?download>, accessed July 27, 2019.

chapter 4), India (Brown, 2014), and in the Philippines, to name only a few examples that have received scholarly attention. In the Philippines, “American colonial officials built up the [...] penal apparatus alongside the police as an important mechanism of state-building and social control” (Kuzmarov, 2013, p. 30). In Haiti, the US occupation (1915-1934) not only gave birth to the paramilitary “gendarmerie”, but also led to the construction of the Pénitencier National in Port-au-Prince (Delattre, 2004) and the establishment of the first Haitian Law on the Prison System (*Loi Haïtienne sur le Régime Pénitentiaire*) in 1919.¹⁸⁹

This side of the history of international penal peacebuilding is of course seldom acknowledged in UN circles. Current activities are rather traced back to efforts by the League of Nations and the UN to promote international penal standards. The League of Nations first focused on developing “transnational penal codes involving standardized definitions of offences and penal legislation”, but then shifted from codes to practice, “to the state’s ability to care for its (incarcerated) subjects, whatever penal law held sway, through accountability measures and procedural norms based on the Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners” (Brisson-Boivin & O’Connor, 2013, p. 520). In 1955, the UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1955 adopted the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (SMRs), which were revised as the Nelson Mandela Rules in 2015.

Penal peacebuilding is not only about upholding international standards of incarceration, it directly involves the development of the penal chain in post-conflict states, a practice much more akin to the colonial history highlighted above. In light of this history, it would seem a bit curious for the UN to wholeheartedly promote corrections as a necessary component of building peace. It does not seem so curious, however, in light of the prison revival that has occurred since the 1970s-1980s. In the post-World War II period, prison populations declined in many Western countries, and the prison came to be seen as “a problematic institution, necessary as a last resort, but counter-productive and poorly oriented to correctionalist goals” (Garland, 2001, p. 14). Until the 1960s, there was a sense that prison might become obsolete in the future, used only in a small number of extreme cases. And yet in the 1970s many societies experienced a new “punitive turn”, leading to a dramatic rise in rates of incarceration (see Figure 14). Though the US is often considered an outlier, incarceration has been on the rise in most Western societies with very few exceptions.

¹⁸⁹ “Historique de l’Administration Pénitentiaire”, official website of the Direction de l’Administration Pénitentiaire, accessed April 8, 2019, <http://www.dap.ht/assets/scripts/104.php>

Often, this new punitiveness has been accompanied by a shift from ideals of rehabilitation and reintegration into society to a focus on punishment. As Garland (2001, p. 9) notes, “punishment [...] is once again a respectable, openly embraced, penal purpose”.

Figure 14. Rising incarceration rates

TABLE 1.1 Selected prisoner rates (per 100,000) in twelve countries (1970–2010)

Country	1970	1980	1990	2000	2005	2010
USA	166	221	461	684	738	748
New Zealand	83	88	114	151	186	199
England and Wales	71	85	90	125	144	153
Australia	48	59	84	113	125	133
Canada	88	98	113	101	107	117
Spain	38	85	113	145	160	159
France	55	66	77	88	96	96
Netherlands	21	23	43	84	127	94
Germany	86	92	82	97	97	85
Sweden	65	55	58	60	78	78
Norway	44	44	56	57	68	73
Finland	113	106	69	55	74	59

(Source: Lappi-Seppala, 2012; Walmsley, 2012)

Source: Scott (2013, p. 3)

This trend is not limited to the West. As the Institute for Criminal Policy Research reports, much of the world has experienced dramatic growth in the use of imprisonment from 2000 to 2015: “the total prison population of Oceania increased by 59%, while that of the Americas increased by 41%; that of Asia by 29%; and that of Africa by 15%”(Jacobson, Heard, & Fair, 2017, p. 6). While “Europe, in contrast, saw a 21% fall in total prisoner numbers”(Jacobson et al., 2017, p. 6), this decrease still means that incarceration rates are much higher than they were before 1970s.

“Why is it that in recent decades [...] most Western societies have set themselves to filling their prisons and building new ones in order to fill them just as much?” (Fassin, 2017, p. 72). While it is tempting to see the rise of incarceration as a response to growing crime rates, the relationship is anything but linear. In many contexts, this “new punitiveness” (Pratt, Brown, & Brown, 2005) has not been associated with trends in crime. In Western societies such as France, the UK and the US, prison growth has occurred even as crime rates have declined, leading some to argue that “the power to punish has broken free from its rational justifications” (Fassin, 2017, p. 39). As Garland (2001, p. 10) notes, “fear of crime has come to be regarded as a problem in and of itself, quite

distinct from actual crime and victimization”. These insights echo analyses of policing that argue that it did not historically rise as a response to crime, as seen in Chapter 2.

The disconnect between incarceration rates and crime rates has led scholars to argue that the prison serves functions others than crime control. Some see the curious comeback of the prison as a response to conditions of “late modernity” (Garland, 2001), as a result of neoliberalism (Wacquant, 2009), or “as a policy solution to the political dilemmas of governing through crime” (Simon, 2007, p. 159). As incarceration rates have increased, “the prison [has] moved from being a discredited institution destined for abolition, to become an expanded and seemingly indispensable pillar of late modern social life” (Garland, 2001, p. 199). Prison has become associated with the protection of the public, in a context where “the call for protection *from* the state has been increasingly displaced by the demand for protection *by* the state” (Garland, 2001, p. 12). The “criminal turn” in human rights is both an international (Engle, 2016) and a domestic phenomenon, strengthening the state’s penal chain under a progressive veneer. For instance, the turn to criminal justice in the name of protecting women from domestic abuse has led scholars to coin the concept of “carceral feminism” to describe “the ways in which feminist campaigns against sexual violence have not only been coopted by, but in fact been integral ingredients to the evolution of criminal justice as an apparatus of control” (Bernstein, 2012, p. 235). Analyses have shown how groups that were historically the target of criminalization, such as LGBT activists, “have begun to invest in the state punishment of others” by “supporting hate crime legislation, calling for more police in gentrifying neighbourhoods, or participating in police recruitment campaigns” (Lamble, 2013, p. 229).

III. Penal peacebuilding in Haiti

1. A brief history of the Haitian prison

The history of the Haitian prison is tied with authoritarianism. Before 1994, the penal system was marked by arbitrariness. Haitian prisons were managed by the military, outside of any judicial process. With the exception of the Pénitencier National in Port-au-Prince, which was built specifically to serve as a prison during the US occupation, there were no official prison buildings, and people were usually incarcerated in military barracks. With Aristide’s return and his disbanding of the armed forces in 1995, the government created a penitentiary administration from scratch, designating 18 sites throughout the country that could legally serve as prisons (Delattre,

2004, pp. 228-233). The prison administration was first put under the authority of the Justice Ministry but then moved under the Haitian National Police in 1997, a move in conformity with the 1987 Haitian Constitution but a “departure from international norms that separate police and penitentiary institutions” (Fuller, Texier, Brosseau, Lemaire, & Pierre-Louis, 2002, p. 5).

Although the civilian administration of prisons curtailed the worst abuses, the situation in Haitian prisons continued to be subpar. In 1993, a group of detainees in the Pénitencier National circulated a petition to the Haitian press, denouncing the conditions in which they were incarcerated.¹⁹⁰ Overcrowding combined with high rates of pre-trial detention became an issue in the late 1990s and remains a problem that persists to this date. Incidents involving prisoner abuse and death remained common. In 2001, following a detainee’s death by cardiac arrest after an altercation with a prison officer, a riot at the Pénitencier National was severely punished, as detainees were made to undress and lie down next to each other on the floor as the Directeur de l’Administration Pénitentiaire and the press looked on (Delattre, 2004, pp. 241-242).

2. UN activities since the early 1990s

Prison has been part of UN missions in Haiti since the early 1990s. Though these missions’ mandates varied, they all to some degree involved the reinforcement of the state’s police, justice and prison sectors. In 1994-1996, the US Armed Forces took the lead in improving prison conditions, while in 1995 UNDP assisted the Haitian government in improving prison management, record-keeping, and the recruitment and training of prison guards (Fuller et al., 2002, p. 6). International efforts since then have focused on expanding and refurbishing prison space, recruiting and training correctional officers, providing administrative support, and holding Haitian prisons to international standards.

From the beginning, international efforts have involved the expansion and refurbishment of prison space in Haiti. In the mid-1990s, UNDP helped build a new wing in the Pénitencier National to house 200 inmates (International Crisis Group, 2007b, p. 7). Later on, MINUSTAH used “Quick Impact Projects” (QIPs) to refurbish prisons (International Crisis Group, 2007b, p. 7). In 2013, for instance, a Rwandan FPU helped refurbish the Prison Civile de Jeremie with construction materials provided by MINUSTAH’s regional headquarters (The New Times, 2013).

¹⁹⁰ “Historique de l’Administration Pénitentiaire”, official website of the Direction de l’Administration Pénitentiaire, accessed April 8, 2019, <http://www.dap.ht/assets/scripts/104.php>

UN activities are part of a constellation of international efforts aimed at expanding prison space in Haiti. While a 2007 International Crisis Group report lamented that “there have been no significant steps to rehabilitate prisons and none at all to build them”(International Crisis Group, 2007b, p. 1), many such efforts have sprung up in the years since. There has been somewhat of a “division of labour” between donors,¹⁹¹ with some supporting management while others helped developed infrastructure. The UK Stabilization Unit has provided training to top management of the Haitian Directorate of Prisons Management (Direction de l'administration pénitentiaire, DAP) (UN DPKO, 2010, p. 19), while Canada has also supported the build-up of DAP capabilities (International Crisis Group, 2007b, p. 9). Meanwhile, the US, generally through the Bureau of International Narcotics Affairs and Enforcement (BINL), has focused on building new prisons and strengthening prison security. In 2014, the US State Department awarded a Maryland construction company a \$5.6 million contract to build a new prison in Fort Liberté (Associated Press, 2014). In 2017, a new prison for woman was opened in Cabaret, to replace an outdated facility in Pétionville that was severely overcrowded. The prison, costing \$8 million, was funded by the BINL and built by a Haitian construction firm, Panexus (Haiti Libre, 2016).

MINUSTAH also provided support to the DAP both at the management level (through e.g. assisting in the creation of a Strategic Development Plan) and on the ground, for instance by placing government-provided corrections officers in Haitian prisons for training. At the time of my stay in Port-au-Prince in the summer of 2017, a Correctional Officer described the mission’s correctional unit thus:

MINUSTAH’s Correctional Unit had 50 government provided personnel. Its work with the DAP [Direction de l’Administration Pénitentiaire] was both strategic and operational. At the strategic level, it helped to develop the DAP’s strategic plan for 2017-2021 and an action plan. It also worked on a new law that would govern prisons in Haiti, as well as a gender policy. At the operational level, the Correctional Unit has a presence in all of Haiti’s 18 prisons. Doing “training on the spot”.¹⁹²

MINUSTAH’s presence in prisons is credited with reducing guard-on-prisoner violence, in a context where prison officers are underpaid, unmotivated and frustrated, and the guard to prisoner ratio is low. According to a representative of the Haitian Office de la Protection du

¹⁹¹ Interview 29, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

¹⁹² Interview 29, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

Citoyen (Office of the Ombudsman), “MINUSTAH took a central role when it comes to police violence in prisons”, in a context where “it is everywhere in the prisons. It’s visible in the prisons. To the point that they’re so present that people don’t really notice it anymore. They forget that they’re there. They can inadvertently observe many things done by prison officers. They’re an institution within the institution”.¹⁹³ MINUSTAH has also been called on occasion to provide prison security. For instance, in late March 2007, military troops were deployed to the Pénitencier National following rumors of potential escapes (International Crisis Group, 2007b, p. 8).

Justice and corrections are a central component of MINUSTAH’s successor, the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH, 2017-2019), which aims to consolidate gains made in recruiting and training the Haitian National Police. MINUJUSTH’s goals regarding corrections in Haiti include strengthening the profile of the DAP within the Haitian National Police and “back[ing] the fight against prison overcrowding and prolonged pre-trial detention, supporting the improvement of health and hygiene services available to inmates, as well as the establishment of social reintegration programs adapted to the reality and needs of the prison population in Haiti”. The mission also puts heavy emphasis on the gender component of its work, referring to “gender sensitive prison management” and the need to “reinforce DAP personnel gender component”.¹⁹⁴ Though corrections figure prominently in MINUJUSTH’s mandate, prison reform has been on the UN agenda in Haiti since 1994, in particular around the issue of prolonged preventive detention.

3. The Haitian paradox


The Haitian prison population has dramatically increased since the early 1990s and particularly since the start of the MINUSTAH mission in 2004, an evolution that both participants and observers attribute to the mission itself. Already in 2007, an International Crisis Group report noted that “the number of arrests and the length of sentences for serious crimes are both rising” and that “ironically the increase in arrests of gang members and serious crime convictions risks further aggravating prison overcrowding” (International Crisis Group, 2007b, p. 1 & 3). While about 5,500 people were incarcerated in 2007 (International Crisis Group, 2007b), that number

¹⁹³ Interview 16, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

¹⁹⁴ See MINUJUSTH website, “Rule of Law” section, <https://minujusth.unmissions.org/en/rule-law-0>, accessed July 1, 2019.

rose to over 11,000 ten years later. As the World Prison Brief documents (Figure 15), the rate of incarceration in Haiti has almost doubled between 2000 and 2016. According to one study, “in 2001, the country’s prisons held more than twice as many inmates as in 1995” (Fuller et al., 2002, p. 1), suggesting a dramatic increase since the early 1990s.

Figure 15. Incarceration rate in Haiti (per 100,000)



Source: World Prison Brief.¹⁹⁵

The Haitian incarceration rate is on par with that of a country like France, and does not amount to a form of “mass incarceration” (compared with over 700 people incarcerated per 100,000 inhabitants in the US). However, the rising incarceration rate has led to two issues: dramatic overcrowding, and a very high percentage of pre-trial detainees. In 2016, each detainee in Haitian prisons had 0.3 square meter to live (MINUSTAH/HCDH, 2017, pp. 13, footnote 42), while the space recommended by UNDP is 4.5 square meter. A 2016 survey of the largest prison in Port-au-Prince, the Pénitencier National, found that it was meant to house 700 detainees but housed 6 times that. That year, more than 10,500 people were incarcerated in a system that could only house 1,600 inmates (AFP, 2017). The Haitian prison situation garnered some international attention in 2017 after several inmates died from hunger and malnutrition (McFadden, 2017). A MINUSTAH Correctional Officers interviewed in the summer of 2017 noted that “in 2016 we had about 11 deaths that we counted, that’s our numbers. This year in May-June we’re already at 116”.¹⁹⁶

Furthermore, a vast majority of people incarcerated in Haiti are held in pre-trial detention, sometimes for years on end, and for longer periods that they may have been sentenced to had they

¹⁹⁵ <http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/haiti>, accessed April 1, 2019.

¹⁹⁶ Interview 29, Port-au-Prince, July 2017 (translated from French).

been presented to a judge. The 1987 Haitian Constitution specifies that people lawfully arrested may only be held for 48 hours before they see a judge, and can only be held in pre-trial detention for a maximum of 4 months (Fuller et al., 2002, p. 1), but these timelines are routinely exceeded. To the problem of pre-trial detention in prison must be added the problem of detention while in custody in police stations, which is not officially tracked (Fuller et al., 2002, p. 2). Though detention in police stations is not supposed to exceed 48 hours, a 2002 study found that “detentions of several weeks are the rule, particularly in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and less accessible rural commissariats” (Fuller et al., 2002, p. 2). This form of detention is “sometimes used as a de facto punishment for low-level offenders” (Fuller et al., 2002, p. 20).

Though the rate of pre-trial detention fluctuates, it has tended to hover around 70 to 90% since the mid-1990s. As one high level civilian MINUSTAH official noted, prison reform focused towards reducing rates of pre-trial detention has been on the UN’s agenda in Haiti for a long time, with limited success:

It has been mentioned since at least 2004, and even since 1994, when the first human rights mission came. It was specifically about this prolonged pretrial detention. By and large the rates have not changed significantly over the years. It’s gone from maybe 80% to 70% back up to 73% now. So not a big, you know, massive, “what a great success story”.¹⁹⁷

A 2016 survey of the Pénitencier National found that, out of 4,500 men incarcerated there, 82% had not been sentenced – and should thus be presumed innocent (Edouard & Dandoy, 2016). In 2017, the situation had gone worse. Independent expert on human rights in Haiti Gustavo Gallon argued that “it can be said that 91 per cent of all detainees in this prison who are awaiting trial are illegally or arbitrarily detained, which represents an increase of 23 per cent since 2014” (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2017). The situation is not limited to the Pénitencier National. In the new women’s prison in Cabaret (built in 2016 with US funding), 191 of the 231 detainees had not been judged as of mid-2017, meaning that the rate of pre-trial detention was 82% (Haiti Libre, 2017b). The rate of pre-trial detention is particularly high in the Reintegration Centre for Minors in Conflict with the Law (CERMICOL), reaching 90% in 2016 (UN General Assembly, 2016, p. 7). The Independent Expert in his 2016 report concluded that “it is therefore minors and

¹⁹⁷ Interview 41, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

women who are mostly held in pretrial detention, which is seldom warranted” (UN General Assembly, 2016, p. 7).

This situation, which MINUSTAH participants themselves refer to as the “Haitian paradox” (quoted in Walby & Monaghan, 2011, p. 275), is sometimes explained by the imbalance between progress made in police reform and lack of success of justice reform. To put it simply: the recruitment and training of the police has led to more police officers in service, which has led to more arrests; in the context of a dysfunctional justice system, most people must wait months if not years to see a judge, which results in high-rates of pre-trial detention, thus dramatically increasing the prison population.

There is widespread agreement that MINUSTAH’s rule of law reform has been at best partially successful. While the recruitment of the Haitian National Police is generally considered to be a success – in the sense that the target number of police officers trained by the mission’s withdrawal date had more or less been reached – efforts in the areas of justice and prison reform are a failure. Indeed, the mission that succeeded MINUSTAH, the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), is precisely meant to address this unfinished business. The idea that the rule of law reform is a tripod (with the legs of police, justice and prison) and that in Haiti the tripod is unbalanced was shared by a number of interviewees. As one diplomatic source put it: “The rule of law is like a stool with 3 feet, the police, the judiciary and the prison. The HNP [Haitian National Police] leg is very strong, but if the other legs don’t work the stool will collapse”.¹⁹⁸ A Western diplomat in Port-au-Prince made the same diagnostic:

For the international community, in the end, it’s a catch-22 for us. We arrived here with the ambition to professionalize the PNH [Police Nationale D’Haïti], we succeeded. We have a more professional police, it arrests more people. It arrests more people and put them in a penitentiary infrastructure that is not adequate, not big enough, with a judicial system that is not doing its work. So people who stole a liter of gas or a goat or a pig, who should have a fine, or who should have a sentence of 2-3 months, they’ve been there for 3, 4, 10 years.¹⁹⁹

For many in the international community and in the Haitian government, the problem is thus seen to lie with the weak justice leg of the stool. A representative of the Office de la Protection

¹⁹⁸ Interview 18, Port-au-Prince, June 2017.

¹⁹⁹ Interview 8, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

du Citoyen expressed this opinion very clearly by arguing that “all the ills of the prison could be erased as if with a magic wand if the justice system did its job”.²⁰⁰

The Haitian paradox thus represents a situation in which MINUSTAH’s efforts at police recruitment and training have directly led to inhumane conditions in prisons. When asked to explain this situation, and whether it may have been prevented, interviewees often referred to two explanations. Some argued that the international community had more appetite for investing in the police than for addressing justice reform. According to one MINUSTAH employee: “Why was the PNH [Police Nationale d’Haïti] a success? Because there was a martial plan. How many dollars did they pour in it? The PNH received a lot of attention and funding from the UN. Did we have the same thing with rule of law? Nope!”.²⁰¹ Similarly, a high level official of the HNP argued that “there was more appetite for police than for justice”, but that “with MINUJUSTH we should see stronger mentoring of justice”.²⁰² For a Western diplomat, “with the police donors went all the way in. The idea was that you can’t do anything without security”.²⁰³

Historically, UN missions have indeed invested more in police than justice reform, in a context where “there was less support for judicial reform by international actors because donors and the Haitian government agreed that the priority was to establish an effective police service” (Mobekk, 2016, p. 146). In an analysis of his time in Haiti, former Police Commissioner David Beer notes that “the international community’s investments in police development are known to far outweigh the efforts and contributions elsewhere in the system” (Beer, 2016, p. 97). In Security Council resolutions, support for justice tended to be examined “in much less detail than police support” (Mobekk, 2016, p. 148). It was not until the MICAH mission in 2000 that justice became a pillar along with police and human rights (Mobekk, 2016, p. 144). MICAH, in fact, was explicitly meant to tackle the problem of pre-trial detention (Fuller et al., 2002, p. 11).

But the idea that the UN was not interested in justice reform is not the whole story. Some argue that the problem was not lack of interest from the international community, but rather the fact that justice reform was more political than police reform, and therefore more controversial and difficult. According to a diplomatic source in Port-au-Prince, “the international community

²⁰⁰ Interview 16, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

²⁰¹ Interview 32, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

²⁰² Interview 22, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

²⁰³ Interview 21, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

puts little money in justice reform because they got their fingers burnt”.²⁰⁴ A Justice and Corrections officer in New York addressed the issue very explicitly:

What are the political dynamics around this? Everybody would like a strong or more effective police. The elite, the government, everyone. It’s not politically difficult [...] If you’re talking about a truly effective, well-functioning criminal justice system and civil justice system, you’re talking about judges who are independent, who could hold the elite, who could hold office holders, accountable, for whatever it is. Crime, corruption, Petrocaribe... So massive blockages there.²⁰⁵

Here, lack of progress in justice reform is explained through reference to blockages by the Haitian government. However, this explanation conveniently absolves the international community of responsibility for the problem. When asked about the issue, a Police Advisor in New York who had recently visited Haiti argued that more pressure could have been put on the Haitian government to reform justice: “Why don’t we talk about ‘if you don’t develop in justice we won’t support you with police’? Haiti is really supported by the international community”.²⁰⁶ If this is the case, then the problem was rather that justice was always an afterthought compared to police reform.

In both explanations, the failure of comprehensive rule of law reform should not be seen as an unintended consequence of MINUSTAH’s actions. Rather, it represents contradictions embedded in rule of law reform in the context of stabilization. In the first explanation, because it was concerned with “stabilizing” Haiti, MINUSTAH privileged a securitized form of the rule of law by putting emphasis on the police and neglecting the justice sector (Walby & Monaghan, 2011). In the second one, MINUSTAH did attempt to reform the justice sector, but had to give up because the subject was too political and the international community was unwilling to alienate the Haitian political and business elites, on whom they were relying for their efforts at “stabilization”. This scenario echoes the analysis in Chapter 4, which has shown that MINUSTAH’s law enforcement strategy against the gangs of Port-au-Prince was at best incomplete because it could not afford to alienate the very elites that arm and fund these gangs.

Furthermore, the narrative that police reform succeeded while the rest failed conveniently leaves out the role of the police. The Human Rights Section of MINUSTAH, for instance, noted

²⁰⁴ Interview 3, Port-au-Prince, May 2017 (translated from French).

²⁰⁵ Interview 46, New York, February 2018.

²⁰⁶ Interview 52, New York, March 2018.

in 2016 that prison overpopulation is due to both the dysfunctional justice system *and* to the important number of illegal arrests made by the HNP (MINUSTAH/HCDH, 2016, p. ii). In fact, in its 2017 report, it went even further and argued that the problem was not preventive detention, but illegal arrests (MINUSTAH/HCDH, 2017, p. 13). In late 2018, the newly appointed Government Commissioner at the Port-au-Prince court of first instance wrote to the Director of the Haitian National Police to organize a dialogue around prolonged pre-trial detention. The Government Commissioner pointed out that although dysfunctions within the judicial system were to blame, illegal arrests by the police were also part of the problem, especially the practice of “arrimage”, where people are arrested without having been charged with a specific crime (R. Cadet, 2018).

According to MINUSTAH’s own Human Rights Section, a very high number of arrests made by the PNH are illegal. In its 2014 report, it noted that 34% of the arrests made by the PNH with support from MINUSTAH were illegal. Extrapolating from that number, it surmised that if 34% of all arrests made by the PNH were illegal, then 1,735 out of the 5,105 arrested in the first half of 2014 may have been illegally detained (MINUSTAH/HCDH, 2014, p. 9). For its 2017 report, the HRS conducted a study in 4 commissariats in Port-au-Prince. It found that out of 677 arrests made between January and March 2016, only 20% could be considered legal. Knowing that 14,220 people were arrested between July 2015 and December 2016 in all of Haiti, this means that 11,468 could have been illegally arrested and thus illegally detained (MINUSTAH/HCDH, 2017, pp. 16-17).

The role played by the Haitian police – recruited and trained by MINUSTAH – is acknowledged by the mission. While discussing the problem of preventive detention and prison overcrowding, a high-level civilian official within MINUSTAH similarly noted:

I think there’s a good side to the development of the PNH [Police Nationale d’Haïti], which has led to more arrests. It’s normal, police has to arrest. Well, sometimes police arrests without proof. It’s a big problem. Here they call it “arrimage”. It unnecessarily swells prison population [...] I think it’s also training the police on how to make proper arrests, what the actual laws are. I mean we say that they’re trained on that, but then why do we keep having all of these arbitrary arrests? [...] So even as you recruit and improve the professionalism of the police, how much emphasis is placed on ‘here are the only reasons you can detain someone?’ ‘You’re only allowed to detain people for 48 hours, so you’ve

got to get your paperwork together.’ ‘People who are in detention have the right to know what they’re being charged for.’ All of the things that go with that.²⁰⁷

Similarly, according to an officer working for Justice and Corrections in New York,

Prolonged pretrial detention in Haiti is not just a matter of corrections’ experts. In fact they’re kind of the victims of dysfunctionality elsewhere in the system. They just struggle to keep up with it, deal with it. But it starts with arrests. Are we facilitating arrests that in these conditions should not be happening? What guidance can we give to the HNP [Haitian National Police] about arrests that’s consistent with the international norms that Haiti has signed on to? Not just consistent with some parts of their antiquated criminal procedure code and criminal code. But I would personally, personally I would not support any arrest of anyone for non-violent offenses, in the conditions that we find people going to. So if we know they’re going to go to prison, or sometimes even worse police holding, I would not as an organization support that. At all.²⁰⁸

In this context, the idea that the Haitian paradox could be entirely resolved by reforming the justice sector is dubious. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the problem will be solved by building more prisons, a problem that UN actors acknowledge. A Western diplomat in New York noted that their country “was very involved in building prisons in Haiti with the IOM in the early to mid 2000s. But where has that taken us? In doing so are we simply contributing to the challenges?”²⁰⁹

IV. Why punish, what is punishment and who is punished? The functions of penal peacebuilding

Why are prisons important to peacebuilding? As critics of the turn towards international criminal justice as a means of reaching peace have pointed out, the rationale for punishment that would justify these practices is often lacking (Zolo, 2004). Should punishment serve as an “exemplary penalty”, a form of revenge, a means to redress damage, a way to prevent future actions? Should the convict be stigmatized or re-integrated into society? (Zolo, 2004, p. 728). This section shows that the rationale for punishment under international penal peacebuilding is similarly fuzzy. It investigates the functions that prisons are said to and actually fulfill, by putting in dialogue the UN justificatory discourse on penal peacebuilding with the reality of this practice in Haiti. I identify five functions. The first sub-section looks at the absence of function, the fact that prison

²⁰⁷ Interview 41, Port-au-Prince, July 2017.

²⁰⁸ Interview 46, New York, February 2018.

²⁰⁹ Interview 47, March 2018, New York.

is not justified by the function it fulfills but because it is just part of what building peace and democracy means. The next sub-sections look at the alleged and actual penal, humanitarian and security functions of the prison. The last sub-section presents the social ordering functions of the prison, which are absent from UN discourse but clearly in evidence in reality.

1. There is no alternative

Penal peacebuilding would seem to be in need of justification. As one analysis notes, “it is very difficult for bilateral donor agencies to politically justify to their constituents why their tax money should be spent on incarcerating individuals in a country that has suffered war for years or decades, and where there may be famine, IDPs, and a lack of health care and education” (Mobekk, 2016, p. 154). Similarly, reflecting on the UN’s role in penal peacebuilding in Haiti, a former UNDP Advisor exclaims: “To help Haiti build democracy by helping it build a penitentiary system, that seemed, and can seem to many, more than a paradox, a genuine provocation: ‘Haiti wants democracy, we give it prisons !’” (Delattre, 2004, p. 25).

Why, then, is prison so important to peacebuilding? UN justifications often operate tautologically: prison is important not because of what it actually does, but simply because corrections are an unquestioned part of a package that leads to peace and development. Developing the penal chain is a normal thing that all states do, and so should post-conflict states. This justification skates over any of the functions that prison is supposed to fulfill, as if they were commonsensical.

Public declarations by both the UN Secretariat and UN member states establish a direct link between the penal chain and peace and security, but why prison should be essential to the latter is not always made explicit. In the preamble to its first 2014 resolution on police in peacekeeping, the Security Council states that “professional, effective, accountable, and accessible law enforcement, corrections, and judicial institutions are necessary to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and national development” (UN Security Council, 2014c, p. 2) – but why? Chief of the Justice and Corrections section of OROLSI Robert Pulver similarly argues that “functioning corrections institutions are [...] a critical element to maintain peace and promote stability” (UN DPKO, 2012b, p. 19). The Justice and Corrections section “works on the clear premise that strengthening justice and corrections institutions, alongside the strengthening of the police, is

essential for peace consolidation, and for providing safety, security and respect for human rights” (UN DPKO, 2012b, p. 7)

According to Pulver, “the objective of prison support activities of UN peacekeeping operations is to contribute to the maintenance of sustainable peace and security by providing essential assistance to national prison staff to develop and manage a prison system in keeping with national and international standards” (UN DPKO, 2009, p. 2). Here prison contributes to sustainable peace and security because it follows national and international standards, outside of any specific function. Pierre Delattre, who was a UNDP advisor working on prisons during the UN missions in the mid-1990s, notes that the UN “considered prisons not as institutions that could work towards justice, but an evil, necessary or not, that was there and that needed to be contained as best as possible, as it were, like the price to pay for social development” (Delattre, 2004, p. 238).

Furthermore, prison is seen as an essential part of peacebuilding because it is the logical consequence of UN work in recruiting and training local police forces. Again, this means that prison is justified not through its function, but because it is seen as a natural step: if you recruit police, you need prisons. Former USG for Peacekeeping Alain le Roy notes that support for national prison systems since 1999 is “part of a strategy to ensure that the international community’s investment in reforming national police services is not undermined by the absence of a functioning and humane prison system” (UN DPKO, 2010, p. 2). The DPKO’s 2009 Corrections Update explains the logic further:

When the number of police officers working in peacekeeping operations is enhanced, the numbers of criminal cases leading to arrests inevitably multiply. As a result, the number of persons arrested, detained and imprisoned also increases. Without a readily available presence of rule of law actors such as prosecutors, judges, lawyers and correctional staff to deal with these detainees, prisons often become overcrowded, with pretrial detainees forming the bulk of the number of prison inmates (UN DPKO, 2009, p. 4).

Prison is seen as natural because there is often no alternative to it. During the sixth UN International Corrections Conference in Berlin in 2012, participants openly discussed alternatives to incarceration, including “non-custodial measures and sentences, such as community services”, which can “reduce overcrowding and allow offenders to compensate society for their crimes” (UN DPKO, 2012b, p. 11). But these are usually understood to complement prison rather than replace

it. A 2007 report by the International Crisis Group on rule of law reform in Haiti notes that “once adequate prisons have been set up and strengthened, it will be possible to conceptualise how alternatives to imprisonment might be incorporated into the system. Some might be considered early in the judicial process, though they will not replace a penal system” (International Crisis Group, 2007b, p. 2).

In Haiti, the international community has expressed great suspicion regarding alternatives to prison that do not involve the state. MINUSTAH has been vocally opposed to vigilantism, which it associates with lynching. In 2017, the mission published a report tellingly entitled “*Se faire justice soi-même ou le règne de l’impunité en Haïti*”, “Taking the law into your own hands or the reign of impunity” (MINUSTAH & UNHRC, 2017). The report recommended strengthening the justice system so that Haitians would not have to resort to these practices, seen as violent and abusive of human rights. Of course, the dismissal of alternatives such as vigilantism often proceeds “as if the sole alternative to law were violence, and as if that law itself is not violent” (Moyn, 2016, p. 77).

This justificatory discourse lends itself to the critique of Eurocentrism identified above. It assumes that the prison is a natural and obvious element of a developed society, and that post-conflict states need only follow international standards established in the West to progress towards peace and security. Again this critique is absolutely valid, but we cannot stop there. What is striking with this discourse is not only its Eurocentrism, but that it obscures the penal nature of corrections and severs the link between crime and prison. The prison is seen as part of the democracy/development package, with little regards for whether it is actually necessary. When I conducted interviews in New York in early 2018, a Justice and Corrections officer told me that “as it stands Haiti’s incarceration rate is rather low compared to international averages so eventually they may need to up a little bit, but not in these conditions”.²¹⁰ This claim is remarkable because it assumes that prison rates should reach a “normal” rate – comparable to some international benchmark – regardless of rates of crime in Haiti. A similar reasoning was apparent in a 2007 International Crisis Group report, which notes that the first problem in Haitian prisons is overcrowding, while the “the second is the impunity phenomenon, illustrated by how remarkably few detainees the country of 8.5 million has” (International Crisis Group, 2007b, p. 2). The report notes that the incarceration rate in Haiti is “only” 64 detainees for 100,000 inhabitants, while “by

²¹⁰ Interview 46, New York, February 2018.

way of comparison, the rate per 100,000 is 143 in the Dominican Republic, 54 in Guatemala, 174 in Salvador and 25 in Liberia” (International Crisis Group, 2007b, pp. 2, footnote 10). But what is the subtext here? That Haiti “should” have an incarceration rate on par with the Dominican Republic because it “should” have similar crime rates? That is actually an argument that I heard. According to a Western diplomat in Port-au-Prince, “if you look at crime numbers in the Dominican Republic, they’re double. So Haiti in the best scenario will probably increase its murder rate, for instance. To be within the region’s average. It’s inevitable, even if it shouldn’t be trivialized”.²¹¹ But why would that be the case? Haiti and the Dominican Republic may share an island, but they are very different societies. Indeed, many members of the international community often unfavourably compare Haiti to its neighbor in order to highlight its pathological characteristics.

2. Penal functions

From a penal perspective, prison can fulfill a number of functions: it can punish and/or rehabilitate offenders, incapacitate them to protect the public, and dissuade both offenders and the general public from committing crimes. The penal functions of prison does come up in UN discourse. The UN often mobilizes the discourse of accountability and anti-impunity to justify the link between corrections and peace and security. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations in its 2018 Justice and Corrections Update argues that “justice and corrections interventions contribute to improving security, preventing conflict, protecting civilians, extending the authority of the State and promoting accountability for serious crimes that fuel conflict” (UN DPKO, 2018, p. 1). According to Robert Pulver, “strengthening judicial and corrections [...] facilitates a peaceful mechanism for resolving disputes, while preventing impunity for crimes committed during, as well as after, a conflict” (UN DPKO, 2009, p. 2). In the 2011 Corrections Update, Robert Pulver and UN Police Advisor Ann-Marie Orler argue that

In many settings, UNPOL officers are called upon to assist national police and law enforcement services to arrest or detain individuals accused of committing serious crimes. If these suspects were to be allowed to roam free, rather than being apprehended in accordance with the tenets of the applicable criminal procedure code and international standards, impunity and criminal gangs would reign. Lasting peace and security would not be possible (UN DPKO, 2011, p. 36).

²¹¹ Interview 21, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

This refers to an obvious penal function: punishment. But, according to former USG for Peacekeeping Hervé Ladsous, penitentiary systems must not only “enforce accountability to laws that are consistent with international human rights norms and standards”, they “should also reintegrate and rehabilitate past offenders. In this way, they also help build human safety and security” (UN DPKO, 2012b). Retribution is not the only penal goal, there is also the more ambitious goal of rehabilitation. According to former Assistant Secretary for the Rule of Law Dmitry Titov, “by rehabilitating and reintegrating past offenders and protecting communities from violent crime, effective corrections systems contribute to the stabilization of post-conflict societies” (UN DPKO, 2012a, p. 1). An analysis of the UN’s work on corrections in Haiti from the 1990s to the early 2000s argues that the organization is intent on “redesigning the penal system in disciplinary terms, along the lines of the blueprint traced by Enlightenment reformers” (Zanotti, 2008, p. 542), by transforming Haitian prisons into “rehabilitation institutions” that deliver not revenge but correction (Zanotti, 2008, p. 549). This rhetoric was apparent, for instance, during the inauguration of new prison for women funded by the US in 2016:

The civil prison for women located in Cabaret is much more than women's detention site, as it will provide a safer environment, more humane, focused on the rehabilitation and integration rather than incarceration and storage. With this objective, the jail has space for vocational training, one for exercise, and a hospital supported by the Project "Health Through Walls" of USAID. These features help ensure that inmates are ready to contribute productively to society after release (Haiti Libre, 2016).

Who then is supposed to be punished and rehabilitated? UN official documents focus on “accountability for serious crimes that fuel conflict” (UN DPKO, 2018, p. 1), “crimes that risk destabilizing the peace and political process” (UN DPKO, 2018, p. 4), in particular terrorism, organized crime and “serious crimes, including inter-communal and conflict-related sexual violence” (UN DPKO, 2017). This is in line with the calls for anti-impunity in transitional and international criminal justice.

But the focus on such “serious crimes” is at odds with the profile of the prison population in Haiti. A large proportion of people in prison are not incarcerated for serious crimes, but for offenses like robbery, in a context where the penal code still criminalizes vagrancy and begging (Fuller et al., 2002, p. 31). A 2014 study of the main prison in Port-au-Prince found that 27% of

those awaiting trial were detained on charges exclusively related to robbery (MINUSTAH & UNHRC, 2017, p. footnote 18), meaning that robbery was not accompanied by violence. An unpublished MINUSTAH report notes that 42% of inmates in the Pénitencier National in Port-au-Prince are incarcerated for minor, non-violent infractions (Dandoy, 2015, pp. 44-45). This situation is not unique to Haiti. As the 2011 Corrections Update notes, in Afghanistan (another target of penal peacebuilding), “the justice system incarcerates people found guilty of relatively minor and non-violent crimes”, with “half of sentenced prisoners [...] serving relatively short sentences (of two years or less)” (UN DPKO, 2011, p. 3).

Furthermore, the prison’s punishment function is questionable in a context where a vast majority of those incarcerated have not been convicted of any crime. Remember that the Haitian prison is characterized by very high rates of detention. If 80% to 90% of people are incarcerated pending trial, then they should be considered innocent until proven guilty, and should not be subjected to punishment. In addition, high rates of pre-trial detention make the other penal functions dubious – protection of the public cannot justify incarcerating large numbers of people who haven’t been tried, while deterrence is unlikely to work given the uncertainty of the link between crime and punishment.²¹²

In this context, what is rehabilitation? Crime in international penal peacebuilding is often understood to be the result of individual motivations rather than a structural problem, which orients the shape that rehabilitation is supposed to take. In this regard, penal peacebuilding mirrors the way crime and harms are understood in international and transitional justice processes, which tend to individualize and decontextualize crime (Engle, 2016), presenting criminal acts as intentionally perpetrated by individuals and obscuring the role of structural injustice (Lu, 2017). As a researcher working on Haitian prisons notes, penal peacebuilding is based on a form of “administrative criminology” that “is problem-solving, based on causes that can be easily manipulated”:

There’s a managerial aspect. In “high risk neighbourhoods” you put street lamps to “dissuade” criminals. It’s an individualist approach. It’s the same thing with prison: the approach is about managing people’s emotions. They remove the whole context of the violence that people have lived through in the past.²¹³

²¹² Although based on interviews with detainees Edouard and Dandoy (2016) find that deterrence might actually be the only penal function that the Haitian prison fulfills.

²¹³ Interview 28, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French).

This analysis is in line with how a MINUSTAH Corrections Officer described their activities in the summer of 2017: “We put in place a program to better file detainees. We’re going to be able to identify criminogenic factors, like violence in the family, anger management. To help alleviate the deficiencies that these people may have”.²¹⁴ For instance, at the women’s prison in Pétionville, a suburb of Port-au-Prince, inmates participate in workshops to manage their anger and emotions. This psychological approach is geared towards addressing individual pathologies and often obscures the many ways in which women are victimized within and outside the prison, as if these emotional and behavioural issues had nothing to do with structural socio-economic conditions (Dandoy, 2015). Psychosocial counselling is seen as the solution to help these women’s reinsertion into society because their “deviant” behaviour is deemed to be the result of a cognitive deficit or psychological issue that makes it impossible for them to make “rational” choices. This stresses incarcerated women’s free will and their capacity to choose their behaviour, thus emphasizing women’s agency while obscuring the contextual constraints that contributed to their behaviour (Wesely, 2006). But this context is acknowledged by the UN itself. A 2014 press release on MINUSTAH’s website states that in poor marginalized neighbourhoods women are confronted to “family abandonment, illiteracy and chronic unemployment, sexual abuse and extreme poverty” and that “some women, among the most vulnerable, have no other means than to take a path of violence to protect themselves” (Adoum Goulgué, 2014). But if this is true, then how much can psychosocial counselling help “rehabilitate” these women?

Vocational training (such as sewing classes for women or mechanics classes for men) is another rehabilitation tool promoted by the UN in Haitian prisons, although many inmates do not have access to it. Furthermore, given that the Haitian informal economy largely dwarfs its formal sector, it is not clear how easily transferable these skills are outside of the prison. Finally, inmates’ stay in prison is very likely to lead them to lose their job (about two thirds of the inmates in the Pénitencier National, for instance, held a job at the time of their arrest. See Edouard & Dandoy, 2016, p. ix), thus making it difficult for them to reintegrate into society. In light of the limited success of rehabilitation schemes, the UN now deemphasizes rehabilitation goals and emphasizes humanitarian ones.

²¹⁴ Interview 29, Port-au-Prince, July 2017 (translated from French).

3. *Humanitarian functions*

As the previous section has shown, the penal functions of the prison in post-conflict settings are dubious. In this context, UN discourse often moves from penal justifications to humanitarian ones: rather than rehabilitation, respect for human rights becomes the measure by which the legitimacy of the prison is to be assessed. Penal peacebuilding is justified not because it punishes serious crimes and rehabilitates offenders, but because it respects the rights and well-being of the incarcerated, regardless of why they find themselves in prison.

As the critical literature on international criminal justice notes, human rights and humanitarian concerns have become a justification for the extension of penal power (Engle, 2016). References to the normatively-charged concepts of accountability and anti-impunity foreground respect for human rights while obscuring the penal nature of the institutions that are deployed in the name of these rights. As one scholar found while conducting interviews at the ICC, her characterization of the Court as a “penal institution” surprised many of the lawyers and human rights activists with whom she interacted (Lohne, 2018). Indeed, “humanitarianism disguises the penal nature of international criminal justice” (Lohne, 2018, p. 10).

This dynamic is apparent in UN penal peacebuilding. At the 6th UN International Corrections Conference in 2016, acting President of Zambia Inonge Wina opened the event by pointing out that “it has taken the global community too long to universally recognise offenders, or individuals in conflict with the law as a vulnerable group in peace time, and indeed in the post-conflict period.”²¹⁵ According to former Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Alain Le Roy, “prisoners have rights and standing up for these rights is an obligation that the United Nations and its Members will continue to uphold” (UN DPKO, 2010, p. 2). For former Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, penal peacebuilding is a reaffirmation of the UN’s support for human rights:

People deprived of their liberty are often overlooked, disregarded, forgotten or denied their right [...] to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Many systems of justice entail punishment by imprisonment, but there are standards that this punishment must meet. [...] By spotlighting the needs and plight of people on the margins, we are confirming our bedrock commitment to the dignity and worth of every human being, thereby helping to establish the foundations for long-term development, stability and peace (UN DPKO, 2012b, p. 3).

²¹⁵ <https://www.un.int/news/corrections-peacekeeping-conference>, accessed April 1, 2019.

Similarly, a MINUSTAH Corrections Officer interviewed in Port-au-Prison saw their mission as lifting the profile of prisons along human rights line: “Prisons don’t have a good reputation, even in [my country]. There’s a mindset, “throw away the key” [...]... You can see the attitude. So here it’s not a big priority. It’s difficult to raise awareness. We should follow Nelson Mandela, who said that to know the state of a society you had to go see its prisons”.²¹⁶

In Haiti, the humanitarian argument has clearly become the fall-back argument: prison may not serve a rehabilitation purpose, but at least prisoners should not live in inhumane conditions. As one analysis notes, “there remains nothing on MINUSTAH’s agenda [...] that indicates that transformative, rehabilitative or reintegrative standards are a priority for penal aid efforts in Haiti” (Brisson-Boivin, 2016, p. 192). The UN in Haiti focuses on the standardization of material infrastructure, which involves anything from the size of cells to the construction material used for toilet bowls (Brisson-Boivin, 2016). Again, Haiti is not an exception. At the 2012 International Corrections Conference, “it was emphasized that peace operations should focus on those tasks that are tangible and promise quick achievements and impact, e.g. infrastructure and training of staff” (UN DPKO, 2012b, p. 6). According to former SG Ban Ki-Moon, “UN peacekeepers work to relieve overcrowding; provide sanitation, food and medical care; establish rehabilitation programmes and facilities; and help host Governments build up their capacity to uphold minimum standards of incarceration” (UN DPKO, 2010, p. 1).

But what does making prison more humane mean in a society where many people struggle to find work, housing and food? As a former UNDP official in Haiti notes,

Detention conditions must be aligned with the country’s economic and social development. If they are below that level, they disqualify the system. And if they are above, no public opinion can admit that people who are incarcerated would be given solutions to problems that remain for the rest of the population (Delattre, 2004, p. 239).²¹⁷

The paradox of the humanitarian argument is that “punishment in Haiti cannot be seen as providing opportunities for prisoners that are not readily available to all Haitian citizens” (Brisson-Boivin, 2016, p. 203). The problem is not unique to Haiti. In Liberia in 2010, funds from the UN Peacebuilding Fund were used to build a new prison and recruit and train corrections officers, but this funding was not easy to secure because of “the perception of the majority of Liberians was

²¹⁶ Interview 29, Port-au-Prince, July 2017 (translated from French).

²¹⁷ Author translation from French.

that by building new prison facilities the Government would be coddling criminals and taking away from the real needs of ordinary Liberians” (UN DPKO, 2010, pp. 20-21). If prison fulfills a humanitarian function, it is not clear why it should be prioritized rather than other public services that are accessible to the majority of the population.

In 2017, the Independent Expert on Human Rights in Haiti Gustavo Gallon reported his surprise while visiting a new prison built in the city of Hinche:

Each cell has 8 beds made of concrete, which would be enough to provide a bed for each detainee, but I found cells with 14 people where prisoners are forced to share their bed, while next to it there are cells. Of the 40 cells there were 10 that were empty. This demonstrates that some civil servants have a mindset of space reduction for detainees that goes beyond the physical capacity of the existing infrastructure, a mentality that makes no sense and that it would be appropriate to correct that as soon as possible (Haiti Libre, 2017a).

Though this anecdote is shocking and seems to “make no sense”, it needs to be put in the context of the paradox of the humanitarian argument. If prison is to fulfill a punishment function in Haiti, then it is not unconceivable that prison officials would take it upon themselves to ensure that inmates do not face living conditions that are superior to the vast majority of the population’s.

The humanitarian paradox is well illustrated by the fact that some incarcerated people can access services in prison that they did not have access to outside of it. In the women’s prison in Pétionville, inmates can return to school and are given occupational training that they could not access outside of prison (Dandoy, 2015). In the detention centre for minors, the CERMICOL, detained minors attend school at a rate higher than minors outside the prison (Edouard & Dandoy, 2018). A report on the CERMICOL notes that the institutions provides incarcerated young men with living conditions above those they encountered outside, including housing, two meals a day, access to drinking water, tuition-free school, primary health care, clean clothes, toiletries, etc (Edouard & Dandoy, 2018, p. 38). Paradoxically, these minors’ stay in the CERMICOL may represent the most stable period of their life. The report’s authors, however, caution against concluding that more prisons for minors should be created. Prison cannot fill in the gaps left by the absence of other functioning public services.

4. Security functions

As we have seen, the UN emphasizes how “safe, secure and humane corrections systems constitute an important building block for upholding the rule of law and respecting human rights”

(UN DPKO, 2012b, p. 19). But even the human rights of the incarcerated are not necessarily an absolute goal in themselves. At times, human rights become part of more instrumental considerations about security. Thus, a 2008 article by *UN News* notes that prison overcrowding threatens peacebuilding efforts (UN News, 2008). Bad prison conditions (including overcrowding and lack of sanitation) are not only a human rights problem, they also increase the likelihood of riots and mass escapes, “which can have an adverse impact on an already fragile peace” (UN DPKO, 2010, p. 2). At the 2017 meeting of the Group of Friends of Corrections, speakers “emphasised that dire prison conditions in post-conflict settings are particularly conducive to the radicalisation of individuals by extremist groups”.²¹⁸ This line of reasoning is clearly at work in Haiti. A 2007 report by the International Crisis Group on the state of Haitian prisons opened with the following statement:

Haiti’s overcrowded, understaffed and insecure prisons are powder kegs awaiting a spark. Any explosion of violence or mass prisoner escape could undermine recent steps by the government and UN peacekeepers (MINUSTAH) to combat urban gangs and organised crime. The immediate needs are to ensure that the most dangerous prisoners, including newly arrested kidnap suspects, are held in maximum security cells; there are more guards to protect and ensure minimum care for prisoners; and a fast-track government/donor-financed plan to build more secure prisons begins (International Crisis Group, 2007b, p. 1).

This analysis focuses entirely on security issues, rather than human rights ones such as preventive detention or inhumane conditions of detention, even though the next paragraph of the report notes that only 10% of inmates have been convicted of a crime and that up to 90% of prisoners suffer from diseases such as scabies (International Crisis Group, 2007b, p. 1). Indeed, the report only seems interested in the Haitian “prison crisis” to the extent that it could “not only would complicate police and justice reform but could add to national insecurity” (International Crisis Group, 2007b, p. 1). The report’s first recommendation is to build a supermax prison that would segregate the most dangerous offenders (International Crisis Group, 2007b, p. 1).

Improving prison conditions, including guard-to-prisoner ratio and overcrowding, is thus seen not only as necessary to respect human rights, but also as a preventative measure to avoid things like prison escapes. For instance, the 2007 International Crisis Group report notes that “the escape of detainees charged with serious crimes is a threat to Haiti’s overall security, as was

²¹⁸ Penal Reform International website, <https://www.penalreform.org/news/pri-attends/>

demonstrated in spring 2005 after 493 prisoners escaped in February of that year” (International Crisis Group, 2007b, p. 5). But there is some contradiction in stressing the danger of prisoners escaping while also acknowledging that most prisoners have not been convicted of a crime and should thus be presumed innocent. Indeed, this report also acknowledges that only 10% of prisoners had been convicted. So how many of these 493 escapees were convicted of violent crime? Following the 2010 earthquake, a large number of inmates escaped from Haitian prisons, which was seen by many in the international community to represent a grave security risk. Yet as former Police Commissioner David Beer acknowledges: “Many of those incarcerated were in prison for gang activities. When they walked away in the aftermath of the earthquake, escalating gang crime was anticipated, but it never really materialized. [...] Nine months after the earthquake, the United Nations still reported crime rates as essentially unchanged from the months preceding the earthquake and prison escape” (Beer, 2016, pp. 94, footnote 47).

The security function of the prison points to another way in which it is supposed to assist in ending conflict and preventing its re-occurrence. DPKO’s 2012 Corrections Update notes that “among the many challenges, missions should focus on those that have the potential to contribute to conflict and are obstacles to peace and security”, in particular in relation to DDR, “in terms of reintegrating former combatants into the corrections service and assessing the impact on the criminal justice system of former combatants becoming criminal offenders”(UN DPKO, 2012b, p. 10). At the 2017 meeting of the “Group of Friends of Corrections”, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix

explained how the safe, secure and humane detention of violent offenders – including potential spoilers to peace processes and members of extremist groups – can significantly contribute to public safety in host countries of United Nations peace operations, while helping to build the trust of the population. He emphasised that strong and coordinated support to police, justice and corrections institutions is required as ‘the linkages between terrorism, conflict and the rule of law are clear’ (Penal Reform International, 2017).

This suggests a rather controversial role for prison: that it would serve to incapacitate “spoilers” to peace processes. Such an understanding of the role of prison in peacekeeping is aligned with counterinsurgency strategy. As Laleh Khalili shows in her book *Time in the Shadows*, the detention of both combatants and civilians has become a fixture in “asymmetric conflict” where

intervening powers present confinement as a more “humane” solution. Thus, detention is deployed as a tool of war in the name of “protecting” populations (Khalili, 2013).

“Spoilers” is a vague concept that can encompass anyone from petty criminals to armed combatants opposed to the “peace process” (Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacs, 2011). But in a context where many UN missions are deployed to “stabilize” ongoing conflicts (by supporting the government in power) rather than following a peace settlement (Karlsrud, 2018), there is no actual peace process to uphold. The use of the concept of “spoilers” in such contexts denies that conflict is ongoing and blurs the line between participants in the conflict and criminals. This point has long made in critiques of international criminal justice. As we have seen above, some groups can use international criminal justice mechanisms to get rid of their opponents in a context of ongoing conflict. Penal peacebuilding may serve the same role in the context of criminalization of conflict. As the next section will show, this also tends to blur the line between armed conflict and sociopolitical conflict, equating groups that threaten the status quo with “spoilers”.

5. Social order functions

The social order function of prisons is conspicuously absent from UN discourse, yet widespread in the literature, which recognizes that “penal policy often does much more than it claims, in securing lines of power and privilege” (Kutz, 2018, p. 3). Sociological approaches to prison have revealed how the rule of law is not just about maintaining order but about enforcing order (Fassin, 2013), and how punishment is less about crime than about maintaining status hierarchies (Fassin, 2018). Many scholars have been moved to studying how prison operates in society following “Foucault’s [...] general assertion that the study of penal policy is of paramount significance to an understanding of the organization of power more generally, and must therefore move from the margins to the center of contemporary social theory” (Bernstein, 2012, p. 234).

Inquiry into the social order functions of prison is all the more justified given that the prison’s penal functions are dubious. This is not only the case in Haiti, as we have seen above: many analyses of prison in a range of societies show that prison does not “work”, in the sense that it does not prevent crimes, it creates more criminals, and it fails by penological standards (Mathiesen, 2006). This was Foucault’s perhaps best remembered insight:

The prison, apparently ‘failing’, does not miss its target [...] For the observation that prison fails to eliminate crime, one should perhaps substitute the hypothesis that prison has

succeeded extremely well in producing delinquency, a specific type, a politically or economically less dangerous – and on occasion, usable – form of illegality; [...] So successful has the prison been that, after a century and a half of ‘failures’, the prison still exists, producing the same results, and there is the greatest reluctance to dispense with it (Foucault, 1995, pp. 276-277).

This insight has been supported by recent analyses. In her study of the “New Jim Crow” in the US, Michelle Alexander argues that “saying mass incarceration is an abysmal failure makes sense, though only if one assumes that the criminal justice system is designed to prevent and control crime. But if mass incarceration is understood as a system of social control—specifically, racial control—then the system is a fantastic success” (Alexander, 2011, pp. 224-225).

Similarly, Loïc Wacquant argues that the prison’s comeback is explained by its social order function: as the social state declines under neoliberalism, the penal state rises in its stead to segregate and contain marginalized populations (Wacquant, 2009). The prison acts as a “warehouse” for the “dangerous class” (Irwin, 2004). For David Garland, “imprisonment has emerged in its revived, reinvented form because it is able to serve a newly necessary function in the workings of late modern, neo-liberal societies: the need for a ‘civilized’ and ‘constitutional’ means of segregating the problem populations created by today’s economic and social arrangements” (Garland, 2001, p. 199). For Fassin, the prison, and the penal chain more generally, has become “the social institution by which contemporary society responds to the most diverse perturbations of their moral or legal order, as if, for lack of imagination or courage, they were unable to conceive of others” (Fassin, 2018, p. 124).

Such conclusions are supported by a sociological analysis of prison populations: “prisons everywhere are bursting at the seams with the poor, marginalised and socially deprived” (Scott, 2013, p. 2). This is a constant worldwide. For instance, African Americans in the US, Maoris in New Zealand and men of “African Caribbean” origin in the UK are all 8 times more likely to be incarcerated than white men. In Canada, aboriginal adults represent 4% of the population, but aboriginal men make up 21% of incarcerated males, and aboriginal women 30% of incarcerated females. Disparities are also apparent in Spain, France, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia (Scott, 2013, pp. 4-9). Studies have shown that these disparities do not reflect differences in crime rates between different communities, but are rather the result of how certain populations are more likely to find themselves targeted at every step of the penal chain, because their neighbourhoods are more

likely to be patrolled by police and they are more likely to receive longer sentences for similar offenses (see e.g. (Fassin, 2013) for a discussion of drug use and arrests in France).

If we take seriously this social ordering function of the prison, then Haiti is not deviant. The prison in Haiti fulfills the function that it fulfills in “developed” societies, but more obviously and more obviously cruelly. In his study of how US penalty has traveled to Brazil, Wacquant notes that “unnoticed features of punitive containment emerge fully into view as it travels from the First to the Second World, for there it can unfold without the strictures usually entailed by a bureaucratic state operating according to minimal legal standards and by the institutionalization of bourgeois conceptions of physical integrity and personal rights” (Wacquant, 2008, p. 58). This seems certainly true of international penal peacebuilding. Again, this differs from a critique of the Eurocentrism of rule of law reform, by highlighting how prison in the Global South magnifies some aspects of prison in the Global North rather than distorts it.

Already in 1996, a report by the UN mission in Haiti MICIVIH “noted that the penal system affects the least privileged sector of the population—with 60% of offences associated with economic inequality such as theft—and that the right to defence did not exist in practice since many could not afford a lawyer” (Brisson-Boivin, 2016, p. 149). Over twenty years later, not much has changed. A 2016 survey of the Pénitencier National in Port-au-Prince found that the prison draws its detainees from a homogenous population of socio-economically marginalized young men (Edouard & Dandoy, 2016). Similarly, the majority of women incarcerated in the Pétionville prison were arrested in so-called “red zones” in Port-au-Prince (Dandoy, 2015, p. 39). As we have seen in Chapter 4, “red zones” in Port-au-Prince mostly include very poor neighbourhoods deprived of public services, such as the notorious Cité Soleil slum.

Furthermore, it is important to remember that most of the people incarcerated in Haiti have not yet been convicted of any crime. Many people were arrested as part of neighbourhood sweeps (through “arrimage”), or in what Haitian law refers to as “flagrant délit”. As one analysis notes:

Many arrests described as made in *flagrant delit*, or during the commission of an offense, are actually based on public outcry (*clameur publique*), which is admitted in Haitian law as a basis for arrest. Flagrant delit is interpreted expansively: the Code of Criminal Investigation allows a crime to be flagrant up to 24 hours after its commission, and many judges interpret the notion even more broadly. Public outcry can be based on nothing more than unsubstantiated rumor and still result in arrests and detentions (Fuller et al., 2002, p. 23).

Furthermore, individuals are routinely arrested on the basis of “association de malfaiteurs” (unlawful conspiracy). Indeed, “registers frequently cite unlawful conspiracy as the sole grounds for imprisoning an individual” (Fuller et al., 2002, p. 22), which means that people are incarcerated not for having committed a specific crime but because of their relationship to others, are because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time. This practice, often used by law enforcement to deal with organized crime and gangs, has been shown to lead to abuse in several societies. In the US, people are placed on “gang databases” on the basis of their social networks and other subjective criteria, which targets certain communities and raises serious due process issues (Barrows & Huff, 2009; Wright, 2005).

Social inequality affects not only who gets in prison, but who stays there. The Haitian justice system is very difficult to navigate for the vast majority of Haitians. It operates entirely in French, when the majority of people, in particular the poor, only speak Creole. It is also expensive. Not only are there a number of fees in the judicial apparatus that the poor cannot afford, including clerks’ office fees and fees for expert and official reports (Fuller et al., 2002, p. 27), but legal defence is often inaccessible to them. As an International Crisis Group report notes, “legal defence is only for those who can afford it” (International Crisis Group, 2007b, p. 4). In May 2017, I attended a screening of the Channel 4 documentary “The prison from hell” at FOKAL (Fondasyon Konesans ak Libète), a cultural centre in downtown Port-au-Prince. The documentary, exploring the abysmal conditions in Haitian prisons, was followed by a discussion. Among the speakers was a woman who had been in preventive prolonged detention for seven years. She argued that if you don’t have money, the judges will not see you. “Ou pa moun”, you’re not a person. As the International Crisis Group puts it, “to most Haitians, the phrase ‘he who pays the most, wins’ describes a day in court” (International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 10).

These inequalities are acknowledged by the UN. In a 2011 media interview, then SRSG Edmund Mulet noted that: “someone who stole a chicken four years ago, is now in the same cell as a murderer [...] And the one that stole the chicken will be in jail probably longer than the killer” (Reed, 2011). According to a Justice and Corrections officer at OROLSI in New York, “People with the means and the connections are able to escape the criminal justice system, they’re not the ones that are being held in there anyway. So it’s the people with no influence or means that end up in that situation. You know really the bottom rung of the economic and social class”.²¹⁹ A senior

²¹⁹ Interview 46, New York, February 2018.

UN Police Officer in Port-au-Prince put the matter more forcefully: “People who have money don’t go to prison. There’s *one* rich person in prison, Clifford Brandt. It’s one of the biggest families here”.²²⁰ As a researcher who works with Haitian peasant organizations noted:

The prison system is really problematic [...] it functions in a way that is exacerbated by its dysfunctionality. Does that make sense? It’s across class here to larger degree than it is in the States, because [there] it’s largely racism, which was shaped by the history of slavery, right, but here it’s criminalization of the poor, the impoverished. And so because, you know, because the system doesn’t function it further criminalizes the poor.²²¹

Not only are poor people more like to be incarcerated, prison also de-socializes inmates and furthers marginalizes them and their family. As Wacquant notes in his study of the “militarization of urban marginality”, “aggressive policing, severe judicial sanction, and routine incarceration constitute self-standing sources of added urban dislocation, such that the penal state contributes directly to entrenching the very marginality it claims to resorb” (Wacquant, 2008, p. 58). Incarceration has a ricochet effect. A 2016 survey of the Pénitencier National in Port-au-Prince found that only 43% of inmates had kept contacts with their families (Edouard & Dandoy, 2016, p. 20). Because they were not able to participate in generating their family revenue, 27% reported that their partner had to resort to prostitution, while 21% reported that she resorted to begging. Fifty-six percent declared that their children had given up school because of their incarceration (Edouard & Dandoy, 2016, p. 21).

In light of this evidence, it is hard not to conclude that “penal aid [...], rather than a neutral tool of government, promotes the significantly unequal status quo in Haiti” (Brisson-Boivin, 2016, p. 169). In many ways, this should not be surprising, given that prison serves this exact function in many societies that are seen to be more economically advanced and more democratic than Haiti. The Haitian prison is thus far from deviant. Indeed, even prolonged pre-trial detention, which is often presented as a Haitian pathology, is common in many parts of the world. For instance, “in many countries in South America, the majority (79%) of inmates are detainees (ranging from 43 percent in Colombia to 90 percent in Honduras” (Brisson-Boivin, 2016, p. 146). In Canada in 2014/2015, 57 percent of people held in Provincial and territorial correctional facilities were in

²²⁰ Interview 16, Port-au-Prince, June 2017 (translated from French). The Brandts are one of the richest families in Haiti. In 2018, Clifford Brandt admitted in criminal court that he had ordered and sponsored the kidnapping of two children from another prominent Haitian family, the Moscosos. See e.g. Daudier (2012).

²²¹ Interview 2, Port-au-Prince, May 2017.

pre-trial custody (remand). According to Statistics Canada, “in comparison to ten years earlier, the number of adults in remand has grown almost six times more than the number in sentenced custody”.²²² In the US, “of the twelve million people sent to jail each year, 62 percent are not convicted and 75 percent have been accused of nonviolent offenses” (Fassin, 2018, p. 42). In France, up to a third of people incarcerated at any given time are on remand (Fassin, 2018). More generally, the practice of incarcerating people who have not been convicted is far from deviant. In several Western societies, undocumented immigrants can be held indefinitely without having been convicted of a crime, a practice that clearly violates international human rights norms (De Zayas, 2005).

Conclusion

The rise of international penal peacebuilding reveals another facet of the tension between order enforcement and protection in peace operations. Because prison is the end of the policing chain, it makes obvious and magnifies the effects of the logic of policing. Thus, the idea that policing is deployed to protect society from violent crime is belied by the fact that a large number of the people who find themselves in prison are convicted of non-violent offenses – when they are convicted at all. Prison is geared towards the reproduction of social order, rather than just the maintenance of public order. When peace operations use prison as an instrument to “build peace” in countries of intervention, they participate in the reproduction of domestic hierarchies, reinforcing the coercive power of the state in the name of protection. In doing so, they also contribute to reinforcing the legitimacy of the worldwide penal turn, by reaffirming that there is no alternative to prison and that prison is a necessary component of any peaceful democracy, regardless of the institution’s actual social effects. As we have seen earlier, the global return of the prison disproportionately targets populations that are socio-economically marginalized and racialized. International penal peacebuilding thus provides another way of understanding how peace operations participate in the co-constitution of international, transnational and domestic hierarchies.

²²² “Trends in the use of remand in Canada, 2004/2005 to 2014/2015”, <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2017001/article/14691-eng.htm>, accessed April 1, 2019.

Conclusion

In 2018, the artist Childish Gambino released a widely popular hit, “This is America”.²²³ The music video was rife with visual references to race relations in the United States, from Jim Crow imagery to the 2015 Charleston church massacre to police brutality against African-Americans. For many, the song and the video encapsulated a certain moment in US history, as consciousness of state-led violence against racialized and marginalized populations was rising in public discourse. This manifested itself not only through the “Black Lives Matter” movement, but also in critiques of the “carceral state” (Alexander, 2011; R. W. Gilmore, 2007; Murakawa, 2014) and calls for abolishing, rather than just reforming, the penal chain (A. Y. Davis, 2003; Vitale, 2017).

But the popularity of “This is America” was not limited to “America”. A number of international adaptations quickly sprung up online, with local artists using Childish Gambino’s song and video as a template to express what they thought was wrong in their own country. These remakes span Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East, and include “This is Nigeria”, “This is Kenya”, “This is Afghanistan”, “This is Malaysia”, “This is France”, “This is England”, “This is Brazil”, “This is Haiti”, and “This is Iraq”. While adaptations pick up on particular issues in their own country, they also share recurring themes, in particular the connection between marginalization and police violence. In “This is Brazil”, two policemen intervene to stop a murder but go on to commit their own crime, wounding and robbing both the would-be killer and his victim. As much a parody as a remake, the video stops before the song even truly begins because of the police’s violent intervention.²²⁴ In “This is Nigeria”, the song references the “Special Anti-Robbery Squad”, a notorious branch of the Nigerian police that has been accused of unlawful arrests, torture and murder.²²⁵ Meanwhile, the “This is France” video features SWAT police forces pushing back against demonstrators and beating up the singer.²²⁶

²²³ “This is America”, Childish Gambino/Donald Glover, May 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VYOjWnS4cMY>, accessed July 18, 2019.

²²⁴ “This is Brazil”, Porta dos Fundos, June 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LLkMdkoALbg>, accessed July 18, 2019.

²²⁵ “This is Nigeria”, Falz, May 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UW_xEqCWrm0, accessed July 18, 2019.

²²⁶ “This is France”, ZEF, July 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JTNmU7lnVC0>, accessed July 18, 2019.

What explains the global resonance of a piece of art that would seem, from its title, to be fundamentally parochial? The fact that “This is America” could reverberate internationally may be a story about the transnational qualities of hip hop, but it is also a story about the quasi-universality of some of the issues highlighted in the original video – the disenfranchisement of socio-economically marginalized and racialized groups and the constant threat of violence against them. When it comes to police violence against certain populations seen as disposable, this is not just America, this is everywhere (G. Mueller, 2018).

The argument developed in this dissertation suggests that “This is America” became a global cultural phenomenon because “America” is part of a global field characterized by the dynamic and multidirectional circulation of policing discourses and practices. It has shown how UN-led peace operations constitute an often overlooked point of cross-fertilization for the creation and transmission of these discourses and practices, and how the turn to “policekeeping” should be understood as one example of a worldwide trend characterized by the criminalization of “problem” populations and the authorization of violence against them in the name of law and order. In this sense, “this is peace operations”, too. The conclusion recaps some of the payoffs of the theory of peace operations proposed in the dissertation and what it helps uncover about the current global order, and identifies points of connection with other debates in IR that could be further explored in the future.

Peace operations and the international

This dissertation has demonstrated the benefits of moving away from the question “why do peace operations fail (or succeed)?”, which dominates the literature, to “what type of social phenomena are peace operations?”, or “what are peace operations an instance of?” I have argued that peace operations can be understood as an instance of a particular kind of social relation, the relation between those who govern and those who are governed. This approach to peace operations helps make sense of findings in the literature that had so far remained un-theorized: the fact that peace operations are not *sui generis* (the social relations that characterize international intervention look like other types of social relations), and the fact that they are not self-contained fields (discourses and practices travel in and out of them). I have shown that these two findings can be explained if we understand peace operations as co-constitutive of international, transnational and domestic hierarchies.

Thus theorized, peace operations not only help us make sense of the current global order, they also provide a concrete entry point into what the “international” is made of. In a 2016 article enjoining to break IR free from the “prison of political science”, Rosenberg (2016) argues that IR has failed to make a contribution to the broader social sciences because it has not developed a positive conceptualization of the “international”. Rather, the “international” is defined negatively, as an absence of central authority. While other disciplines have laid claim on a specific feature of reality (e.g. temporality in the case of History, spatiality in the case of Geography), IR is unable to latch on “the fact of the international as a fundamental dimension of the social world” (Rosenberg, 2017, p. 90). Consequently, “by our own account, we have so little of our own to say” (Rosenberg, 2017, p. 91). To remedy this state of affairs, Rosenberg (2016) proposes to place societal multiplicity and uneven and combined development at the centre of the international.

Here let me focus on multiplicity which, for Rosenberg (2017, pp. 90-91), “plays a deep and continuous role in the *internal* constitution of domestic societies themselves, extending the significance of the international into the subject matter of the other social sciences and humanities”. As we have seen in Chapter 1, this insight echoes post-colonialism and global historical sociology’s emphasis on relationalism. In all these views (despite their differences), the “fundamental dimension of the social world” that the “international” encompasses is *co-constitution*. Thus, peace operations are an “international” phenomenon not (only) because of their multilateral character, but because of the co-constitutive role that they play in (re)producing international, transnational and hierarchies. Furthermore, the “international” thus defined can be found in places where we do not expect it. Brazilian pacification in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, for instance, is an “international” phenomenon, in the sense that its genesis is one of international co-constitution.

One consequence of this understanding of the “international” nature of peace operations is a call to broaden the horizon of their study. “Peacekeeping” and “peacebuilding” have become a major subfield of IR, with a growing number of dedicated journals such as *International Peacekeeping*, *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, and *Peacebuilding*. These journals are important venues for discussions about what is going in peace operations, but they also reflect a certain difficulty in breaking out of the subfield. As argued in Chapter 1, the moment of “zooming in” on what goes in peace operations needs to be accompanied by a moment of “zooming out”, otherwise we are only getting half the picture. The fact that peace operations are a truly

“international” phenomenon characterized by co-constitution has two important consequences. First, it means that, to understand peace operations, we cannot read and know only about peace operations. Second, it means that peace operations are relevant to understanding our social world beyond what goes on in peace operations. To put it differently, peace operations have a lot to tell us about some of the key questions that interest the social sciences, but we must be willing to make these connections. For instance, if peace operations are an instance of the broader social relation between those who govern and those who are governed, then they have something to say about how relations of domination are sustained and legitimated.

Recommendations for better intervention and the local/global divide

This conceptualization of peace operations also has normative implications, in a context where the field of peace operations studies is often geared towards making recommendations for better intervention. Indeed, the literature on international peacekeeping and peacebuilding spends considerable time pondering why external intervention to build peace so often seems to fail. There are many ways to go about answering this question, but one in particular has gained considerable traction. The “local turn” (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013), “hybrid turn” (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016), “cultural turn” (Bräuchler, 2018), “ethnographic turn” (Millar, 2018a), “‘everyday’ turn” (Mitchell, 2011) and the turn to the “micro-level dimensions of peacekeeping” (Autesserre, 2014a) have proposed to focus on international interveners, local populations, and their relationship. Though these “turns” encompass diverse approaches, they do converge on the disconnect and conflict between the practices and culture of international interveners and those of local populations. Because international interveners impose pre-conceived templates and fail to listen to the locals, intervention not only often encounters resistance, but also proves at best useless (by failing to respond to local needs), and at worst counter-productive (by fuelling conflict) or even exploitative. This diagnosis, in turn, is the stepping stone for policy recommendations that advocate for intervention to be more attuned to local needs and values, which would require interveners to be less insular and more sensitive.

These approaches converge on “ontologies of peacebuilding which differentiate between local actors, practices, and institutions, on the one hand, and international actors, practices, and institutions, on the other” (Hirblinger & Simons, 2015, p. 423). They focus on “the cultural divides between local and international actors” (Zanotti, 2008, p. 542), and call for more “culturally

appropriate form of politics” in international intervention (Richmond, 2011, p. 102), more “culturally sensitive peacekeeping” (Duffey, 2000, p. 163), and for working “in creative and culturally sensitive ways” (Donais, 2009a, p. 20). They argue that intervention is marked by “an ongoing dispute over which (and whose) knowledge matters most for effective peacebuilding” (Autesserre, 2014b, p. 69), and that interveners come in with “Northern epistemologies of peace” that clash with “other, probably non-Western/‘modern’ ontologies and epistemologies” (Lidén, Mac Ginty, & Richmond, 2009, p. 594). Intervenors are thus “arrogant” and “blind” (Sending, 2009a) and do not “live by and implement the two procedural principles of securing ownership and being sensitive to local context” because of “the privileging of universal over local knowledge” (Sending, 2009b, p. 4). Given this diagnostic, “the solution offered to unsettle the primacy of Western forms of knowledge rests in identifying those forms of agency, knowledge and expertise that are said to have been alienated and marginalised” (Randazzo, 2016, p. 1354). Recommendations for interventions more attuned to local dynamics and needs include changes in the recruitment and training of intervenors, giving more roles to local employees, and facilitating socialization between internationals and locals (Autesserre, 2014b; Sending, 2009a).

These analyses see the failure of peace intervention as a failure of interaction, driven by the difference between intervenors and local populations, the “friction” (Björkdahl et al., 2016) at the “interface” (Boege & Rinck, 2019) between local populations and international intervenors during “peacebuilding encounters” and “global–local interactions” (Björkdahl et al., 2016). This presents “the problematic of statebuilding or peacebuilding intervention as a problem of the relationship between the liberal West and the non-liberal Other” (Chandler, 2010, p. 146), or between the global and the local. The question then becomes: “How should liberal peacebuilding engage with ‘the non-liberal other’ at the operational level?” (Lidén et al., 2009, p. 588). This “relational sensibility” (Chadwick, Debiel, & Gadinger, 2013) and “relational understanding of the limits to peacebuilding interventions” (Chandler, 2011, p. 20) focuses on “recalibrating the relations between ‘internationals’ and ‘locals’” so that “international and local interlocutors are focused [...] on partnership, relationship and exchange” (Brigg, 2013, p. 13). Indeed, the focus on the interaction between the international and the local and the difference between them often leads to concluding that intervention could be made better if intervenors knew local populations better and respected their difference. This is what the language of empathy, respect and recognition (Richmond, 2009, p. 566) suggests. For several years now the critical literature on peacebuilding

has been dominated by the question of the local and how to relate to it (Bargués-Pedreny, 2017, p. 217; Mathieu, 2018, p. 2).

My analysis of peace operations challenges this focus on local/international interaction and difference on two grounds. First, by showing that the relations that structure peace operations are not *sui generis* but an instance of a broader type of social relation, it de-emphasizes problems of difference to emphasize problems of domination. Seeing the relationship between interveners and local populations as an instance of the relationship between those who govern and those who are governed turns approaches that emphasize difference on their head. The problem with practices of international intervention is not that they are “alien” but that they are “alienating” (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 272) in a way that is recognizable across societies. If the problem is hierarchy, then the idea that more culturally appropriate forms of intervention would be better seems dubious. This should lead to focusing on “differentials of power between actors” rather than “*differences* between them” (Mathieu, 2018, p. 5, emphasis in original). The practices of interveners are not problematic because they are culturally insensitive, but because they are premised on and reproduce structural hierarchical social relations. Practice “is not an accident or an incidental part of the process, but is co-constitutive of the process itself” (Smirl, 2012, p. 243).

Second, the focus on the co-constitution of international, transnational and domestic hierarchies challenges the idea of the “local” and the “international” as two separate spheres. As others have argued, the global/local distinction ends up creating an essentialist view of the terms of the debate (Heathershaw, 2013; Sabaratnam, 2017), despite often being heavily caveated (Mitchell, 2011, p. 1628). One scholar, for instance, argues that there is a need for local knowledges to be developed “without these being tainted by Western, liberal, and developed world orthodoxies and interests” (Richmond, 2011, p. 104), as if locales of intervention were pristine, undiscovered lands. Such a distinction between global and local is challenged by post-colonial accounts that focus on co-constitution. One way of moving out of the global/local conundrum is precisely by acknowledging that this co-constitution is not (only) historical but ongoing, by recognizing the circulation of governing practices from the “local” to the “international” and vice-versa. Again, this deemphasizes questions of cultural appropriateness to emphasize questions of power and domination.

The logic of policing

I have argued that the logic of policing is characterized by a tension between protection and order enforcement, between inclusion and exclusion. As a literature spanning history, sociology and criminology shows, historically and in our contemporary societies the mission to enforce order has tended to trump the mission to protect. What happens when the logic of policing travels to peace operations? In Chapter 2, I have argued that peace operations are pulled between stabilization and “protection of civilians mandates, and that this pull embodies the tension at the heart of the logic of policing. Using the UN mission in Haiti as an entry point, I have demonstrated how peacekeeping as policing turns conflict into disorder and populations at risk into “the risk”.

Chapter 4 explored the relationship between MINUSTAH and poor urban populations. Under the mission’s stabilization mandate, threats to social order were reinterpreted as threats to security, and thus international security, legitimating violence against certain social groups that were deemed to threaten the status quo. In Chapter 5, I showed that the UN similarly analyzed protests in Haiti through the prism of stability and order enforcement, seeing them as a pathological security issue rather than a normal process of claim-making. This analysis depoliticized protests, underplayed the legitimate economic and socio-political grievances that may sustain them, and presented them instead as driven by mercenary and/or conspiratorial motives. Chapter 6 examined the turn to penal peacebuilding, the idea that reinforcing the penal chain is necessary to build peace in states that have experienced conflict. It demonstrated that the various arguments in favour of penal peacebuilding – such as the idea that it helps punish/rehabilitate violent offenders, thus protecting society – are not supported in reality. In Haiti, the dramatic rise of the carceral population in the last 15 years has been fed by the long-term imprisonment not of violent offenders but of marginalized, poor, often urban segments of the population. The prison in Haiti thus primarily fulfills a social order function.

In peace operations, the pull between stabilization and protection is usually resolved in favour of the former. This should not be surprising in a context where domestic police forces have historically resolved the tension between order enforcement and protection in a similar manner, and continue to do so. This dissertation argues that the exclusion of some populations from protection is not an unfortunate, unintended effect of the turn to peacekeeping as policing. Rather, exclusion is built into the logic of policing, be it deployed “at home” or “abroad”. The problem with policing in peace operations is not that it deviates from an ideal of what policing should be –

for instance because it is paramilitarized. It is primarily the kind of answer it proposes to the question “how do we keep and build peace?” This answer justifies the continued exclusion of “dangerous” populations that are deemed to threaten order. It may build a type of “peace”, but this peace is only sustained by authorizing and legitimating ongoing violence against some.

Of course there is nothing new about violence being inflected in the name of peace. The notion of “peace” should not be romanticized, given the many historical “instances in which cities have been razed and populations cleared to secure ‘peace’” (Mac Ginty, 2012, p. 21). For some, violence against those excluded may be a small price to pay for domestic and international stability. But this argument is rarely made openly. As we have seen, public discourse around policing is still characterized by the idea that police forces’ mission is to “protect and serve”, and the turn to “policekeeping” at the UN is generally seen as positive. Thus, policebuilding in post-conflict states is presented as a key component of a transition towards peace and liberal democracy. Clearly the violent exclusion inherent in the logic of policing tends to remain obscured by the language of law and order. This dissertation has brought this violence to the forefront, by uncovering the everyday practices that (re)produce our current global order.

Protection: who’s in and who’s out?

In many ways, my argument that some populations are excluded from protection will not surprise feminist scholars, who have long argued that gender shapes the construction of the category of “civilian” and ideas about who is to be protected. The logic of masculinist protection (Young, 2003) is based on the assumption that the people who need and deserve protection are “innocent” and “vulnerable” civilians, categories that are often tacitly understood to preclude men, particularly young men of fighting age. In this sense, maybe protection of civilians was always meant to exclude some categories of populations. As Charli Carpenter (2003) demonstrates in her analysis of the Srebrenica massacre, although young men were more likely to be massacred by opposing forces, it was women, children and the elderly whom the international forces chose to evacuate first. Thus, “gender ideas are embedded in both the category ‘innocent civilian’ and the category ‘especially vulnerable’” (R. C. Carpenter, 2003, p. 663). This explains why wars can be justified in the name of protecting “womenandchildren” (Enloe, 2014).

In her genealogy of the concept of “civilian”, Helen Kinsella (2016) argues that the distinction between civilian and combatant is based on the discourses of innocence, gender and

civilization. In the discourse of gender, women are the quintessential civilian because they are “bounded by their sex” (Kinsella, 2016, p. 16), while children and the elderly are bounded by their age. But the discourses of gender and civilization can collide, with the discourse of civilization trumping the discourse of gender. In these situations, “the killing of women and children—otherwise antithetical to the standards of civilization—is made intelligible when those same women and children are said to be outside of civilization and, in turn, pose a potential threat to it” (Kinsella, 2016, p. 20). Thus, although there is no denying that the concept of protection is tied in with gender, being female is not always enough to guarantee protection. Gender, race and class can interact in ways that lead some women to be excluded from protection. In her analysis of how peacekeepers perceive civilians to be protected, Kathleen Jennings found that peacekeepers reproduce a language that, “at least in part, constructs locals as predatory, dirty, diseased, and unfailingly opportunistic” (Jennings, 2019, p. 38). This negative view of local civilians applies not only to men but also to women, who can be seen as a vector for sexually-transmitted disease, for instance. For these “undeserving civilians”, protection is not a right, “it must be earned” (Jennings, 2019, p. 39). The “ideal narrative of peacekeeping”, that “the ‘good men’ protect the ‘good local’ from the ‘bad men’ (‘bad local’)” (Jennings, 2019, p. 37) is directly challenged by these perceptions.

Just as the discourse of civilization leads to “negating any distinction between combatant and civilian among those said to be outside the bounds of civilization” (Kinsella, 2016, p. 17), the logic of policing also complicates the gendered dimension of protection. This dissertation has shown that the logic of policing tends to broaden the understanding of who constitutes a legitimate target. The logic of policing is certainly gendered – for instance, gang members in Haiti and elsewhere are usually assumed to be young men. But it does not follow that policing includes women in protection by default. The logic of policing also revolves around the amorphous concept of “innocence”, as illustrated by a UN employee’s statement that “nobody is truly, fully innocent in Haiti, because just to survive you have to cope and get by, and that means not being innocent”.²²⁷ But “exactly what is innocence? Or, put differently, of what is a civilian innocent?” (Kinsella, 2016, pp. 8-9). As we have seen in Chapter 4, women, children and the elderly in the poorest neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince were often deemed to be guilty by association, because they were

²²⁷ The interview is available online: <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/battle-for-haiti/interviews/william-gardner.html>, accessed July 25, 2019.

assumed to provide aid to gang members, or simply because they were related to them. The logic of policing deployed in this case shared much with the logic of counterinsurgency, which “transform[s] the ‘womenandchildren’ into either actors considered by the counterinsurgent to be complicit with the combatants, a terrain upon whom the counterinsurgency’s social engineering experiments can be performed, or, increasingly, as hostages and literal or symbolic message-bearers for the work of counterinsurgency” (Khalili, 2011, p. 1479). This does not mean that the masculinist logic of protection ceases to exist, but it complicates it.

Furthermore, in the logic of policing, protection is to a large extent based on class. As I have argued in Chapter 2, policing is concerned with the maintenance not just of public order, but of social order. This means that gender and class intersect in ways that are too manifold to examine in this conclusion. The policing of prostitution, for instance, mobilizes both gender and class logics (Bernstein, 2012; Molly Smith & Mac, 2018). Historically, working-class women who engaged in strikes have been just as severely repressed by police forces than men – the “bread and roses” strike by (mostly) immigrant women textile workers in Lawrence, Massachusetts, in 1912 is a particularly well-known example (Forrant, Siegenthaler, Levenstein, & Wooding, 2016). These historical examples have contemporary resonance in Haiti, where a vast majority (slightly less than 65%) of low-wage textile workers are women (Lauterbach, 2013). On several occasions in recent years (notably in 2009 and 2013), these workers have walked out of factories and organized strikes and demonstrations to demand better wages, prompting a robust response from the Haitian National Police and MINUSTAH. In fact, MINUSTAH even installed one its FPU bases in the industrial park SONAPI, on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince. In a context where the business community greatly relied on the mission to provide security in industrial zones, “on the ground and in New York, MINUSTAH officials accepted the possibility that it would be accused of ‘protecting sweatshops . . . [in effect] guarded prisons where people work’ (Ford, 2015, p. 293).

The way class, gender and race are entangled in determining who is worthy or not of protection is likely not an either/or problem to be solved but a question that must be empirically investigated. In examining what happens when protection is understood through the prism of policing, this dissertation advances one way of looking at this question, and leaves the door open to further investigation of how class, gender and race intersect in the logic of peacekeeping as policing.

Beyond Haiti

I have argued that Haiti provides a good entry point to study not only the turn towards policekeeping, but the global field of policing more generally. The UN stabilization mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH, is widely considered to be a blueprint for future peace operations with a policing mandate in “complex environments”. Many of the issues examined in this dissertation are present in other missions. This includes the reliance on paramilitary police forces for public order maintenance and the training and socialization of local police forces into a style of protest policing that emphasizes the risk posed by demonstrators, which are explored in Chapter 5. For instance, the training of local police forces in “the maintenance and restoration of public order” is also an important component of the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUSCO (MONUSCO, 2012, 2015), one of the largest ongoing UN peace operations.

This dissertation posits that, when peace operations engage in policing, they participate in the (re)production of international, transnational and domestic hierarchies. In the case of Haiti, I have shown how peacekeeping as policing should be understood as part of an ongoing process of contentious statebuilding. Chapter 3 has explored the socio-economic fault lines behind this process, and revealed how MINUSTAH clearly took sides in favour of the small elite minority. Understanding how peace operations interact with these domestic divides is one of the great benefits of focusing on one case, as comparison across cases tends to overlook states’ specific trajectories of contentious statebuilding. Future work could explore how the specific form that contentious statebuilding takes in various countries shapes peace operations’ policing discourses and strategies. In Haiti, the urban poor were of particular concern to both local elites and MINUSTAH, which partly reflected the specific history of urbanization and economic development in the country. The dynamics may be different in a place like the DRC or Mali, although, as we have seen in Chapter 4, concern about the security threats posed by rapid uncontrolled urbanization in slums is a worldwide phenomenon (M. Davis, 2017 [2006]). Furthermore, in Haiti the question of ethnicity was not prominent, even though race and racism are also part of the divide between the elite minority and the poor majority (Trouillot, 1994). Although the case of Haiti speaks to broader global evolutions, policing as the enforcement of social order can take on various forms and adopt different targets depending on a country’s specific process of contentious statebuilding and the political, socio-economic, racial and gendered fault lines that animate it.

Why should we care?

As ongoing international debates on security attest, Haiti's challenges at times prefigure what the world at large is facing: manifest anxieties over political, economic, social and ontological security (James, 2010, p. 295).

But what we all are seeing today in Haiti is instead, perhaps, a look forward in keeping with Haiti's exception and counterintuitive modernism [...] Especially after the earthquake, Haiti has seemed more than ever like a postapocalyptic dystopia; its deforested countryside and overpopulated crumbled urban landscape, with its smoke and stench, seem like plausible sets from one of the darkly pessimistic movies of the early years of the new millennium. Maybe, I sometimes fear, this could be the future for all of us (Wilentz, 2013, p. 304).

Far from being a laggard, Brazil may provide the North Americans and Europeans with a glimpse of their future in this somber register, by revealing how unfettered penalization leads to assimilating the nether sociospatial boundaries inside the city to foreign borders. Under this approach, urban law-enforcement agencies operate in the manner of border patrols and forces of occupation in poor areas treated as domestic 'war zones' harboring an alien population stripped of the normal protections and privileges of the law (Wacquant, 2008, p. 70).

"We" in the West do not generally think of peace operations as something that directly affects us. They are something that "we" do to others. We may be concerned about the well-being of these others, or the well-being of "our" troops deployed there, but this is quite different from thinking that peace operations are also about us. In academia, this is well reflected in research practices that "have tended to create a semiotic frame in which the inhabitants of the research and intervention space are kept at a distance from the researcher", and for which "neither Europe nor North America is considered the field" (Richmond et al., 2015, p. 3&9). Thus, for many scholars of peacekeeping, peace operations would seem not to have much to tell us about our own societies.

This dissertation has challenged this neat separation between inside and outside, between intervention "abroad" and intervention "at home". It has shown how discourses and practices of intervention circulate in and out of peace operations, how local populations in the field are sometimes seen to be similar to certain populations back home, and how similar techniques of control and management can be applied to them. If this is the case, then "we" should all care about what goes on in peace operations, because this is also about "us".

In the spirit of co-constitution, there are two ways to understand this injunction. First, we should all care about peace operations because the way we intervene and participate in these

operations tells us something about our own society. Looking at the US-led war in Vietnam in the 1960s, writer and civil rights activist James Baldwin (2010 [1967], p. 248) argued that “a racist society can’t but fight a racist war [...] The assumptions acted on at home are also acted on abroad, and every American Negro knows this, for he, after the American Indian, was the first ‘Vietcong’ victim”. In this perspective, the racism of intervention “abroad” tells us something about racism “back home”. This point was powerfully made by Sherene Razack (2004) in her study of the Canadian intervention in Somalia in the 1990s. Examining the case of the “Somalia Affair”, which involved the murder and torture of Somalis by Canadian peacekeepers, Razack questions the “heart of darkness” narrative according to which peacekeepers were confronted to such atrocities in Somalia that they somehow lost it. Rather, she argues that the Somalia Affair challenged Canadian claims to a society free of racism – it is pre-existing racism that made it possible to commit atrocities, not the duress of Canadian peacekeepers’ mission. In this perspective, peace operations should be understood as a way of returning the gaze unto our own societies. Racism is an obvious prism through which to do so, but not the only one. The way peace operations understand and respond to demonstrations, for instance, may have a lot to tell us about how public order policing is evolving in our societies too. Similarly, the rise of penal peacebuilding in peace operations reveals the normalization of “penal populism” (Garland, 2001) in our societies, the return of the prison as “the social institution by which contemporary society responds to the most diverse perturbations of their moral or legal order” (Fassin, 2018, p. 124).

The second way of understanding the injunction “we should all care” is by highlighting the boomerang effect of peace operations onto domestic societies. In his analysis of empire as “a set of transnational networks and circuits that substantially imbricate both metropole and periphery” Barder (2015, p. 2 & 9) argues that “it is important to look at imperial reverberations for normative reasons. Do transnational hierarchical relations have internal detrimental effects for practice of domestic liberal democracy and the ideal of political, social and economic liberty and justice?”. As we have seen in Chapter 2, historically under colonialism and then the Cold War the circulation of discourses and practices of control have been used to repress demands for social justice “abroad” and “at home”. In his study of the joint process of policebuilding in the US and the Philippines, McCoy (2009, p. 295) notes that, “as the metropole’s internal security apparatus starts to resemble the imperial, so its domestic politics begin to exhibit many attributes of the colonial”. In a context where what happens in peace operations does not stay in peace operations, maybe we should be

concerned about police paramilitarization, the tendency to legitimate the use of less-lethal weapons, or the representation of poor urban populations as dangerous.

Some doubt may remain at this point: maybe “we” in the West should feel safe from the reverberations highlighted in this dissertation. After all, are not most troops and police officers participating in peace operations from the Global South? Maybe all of this is a problem for them, but not for us. Such complacency would seem misplaced for several reasons. First, in the mid-2010s, there was abundant discussion of a “European return” and “Canadian return” to UN peacekeeping, particularly in the context of the UN mission in Mali (Koops & Tercovich, 2016). Although Western countries disengaged from UN-led peacekeeping in the mid-1990s, they have resumed providing troops in recent years. While it may be premature to declare a return of the West to UN peace operations, the Mali example clearly shows that Western countries have not ruled out participating in UN-led efforts. Second, this dissertation has highlighted how the evolution of UN peace operations is not unique to them. In Chapter 5, I have shown how interest in paramilitary police units and their role in public order maintenance is shared by the UN, NATO and the EU. The issues highlighted here in the case of the UN are also valid for external interventions carried out by NATO and the EU. Third, as we have seen in the case of MINUSTAH in Haiti, although Western states may have few boots on the ground, they tend to occupy leadership positions in peace operations. High level officers then bring this experience back to their country of origin (Chapter 3). As the circulation of practices of pacification between Haiti and Brazil shows, it was as much troops as officers who argued for laxer rules around the use of force in Rio following their experience in Port-au-Prince (Chapter 4). Finally, UN peace operations can act as a model even for those who did not directly participate in them. For instance, any country could point to the use of less-lethal weapons in peace operations to legitimize the use of such weapons against its own population.

This second understanding of why “we should all care” echoes the quotations that open this section. Rather than seeing Haiti as a deviant case, both anthropologist Erica Caple James and journalist and author Amy Wilentz see the country as a possible iteration of what the future may look like. Loïc Wacquant, on the other hand, proposes that the violent penalization of poverty in Brazil may signal what to expect in North American and European societies. These comparisons turn the usual narrative of development and modernization on its head, disturbing the image of the West’s exceptionalism as the teleological model towards which all societies will eventually

converge. As this dissertation has shown, the coercive practices deployed in the name of building a more peaceful liberal order can have far from progressive effects not only abroad, but also at home.

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