Fāhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on the Human Soul:

A Study of the Psychology Section of al-Mabāḥīṭ

al-mašriqīyya fī ʿilm al-ilāhiyyāt wa-l-ṭabīʿīyyāt

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Abstract

This thesis is a study of the psychological theory of Faṭr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d.606/1210) as advanced in the psychology section of his early philosophical work, al-Mabāḥīṭ al-mašriqiyya fi ʾilm al-ilāhiyyāt wa-l-ṭabīʿiyyāt (Mabāḥīṭ II.2.2.5). In this section of the Mabāḥīṭ, Rāzī evaluates central aspects of Avicennian psychological doctrines, especially those that are presented in the Psychology of the Šifāʾ. Though Rāzī adopts the traditional, Avicennian arrangement of this text, he uses it as a template through which he assesses the strengths and weaknesses of Ibn Sīnā’s arguments, and advances his own alternative theories. We argue that Rāzī, in critically evaluating Ibn Sīnā’s psychological doctrines, was motivated by a consistent philosophical approach, one that concerns less the content of these doctrines as the epistemology by which Ibn Sīnā advances them. In Chapter 2 of this thesis, we closely examine how Rāzī evaluates the Avicennian doctrines of the human soul’s immateriality, the univocity of its essence, its temporal generation, and the nature of its unity vis-à-vis the diverse functions it performs. At the heart of his discussion are the issues of the human soul’s quiddity and the theory of faculty differentiation. In his treatment of these two issues, Rāzī develops a critique of the epistemic claims of abstraction (ṭağrīd), which is the basis of Ibn Sīnā’s theories regarding the nature of human souls and the faculties that they possess. In Chapter 3, we attempt to reconstruct from Rāzī’s critical evaluation of these issues his own psychological theory, which consists of the soul’s immateriality, its essential differentiation among individuals, and its direct agency over the corporeal organs. We argue that these doctrines are central elements of what can be referred to as Rāzī’s simplified psychological theory. Furthermore, in asserting these doctrines, he develops a method of investigating the nature of the human soul that does not presume to have access to its ontological structure. By understanding the philosophical basis by which Rāzī critically evaluated Avicennian psychological doctrines and asserted his own alternative theories, we are be able to gain a deeper understanding of his role and influence in the Avicennian tradition and contextualize his investigation of psychological issues in later works.
Résumé

Cette thèse est une étude de la théorie psychologique de Fāhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d.606/1210), telle présentée dans la section ‘Psychologie’ de l’un de ses premiers écrits, al-Mabāḥīţ al-mašriqiyya fi īlm al-ilāhiyyāt wa-l-ṭabī‘iyyāt (Mabāḥīţ II.2.2.5). Dans cette section du Mabāḥīţ, Rāzī évalue les aspects centraux des doctrines psychologiques avicenniennes, particulièrement ceux présentés dans le traité de psychologie du Šifā‘. Si Rāzī adopte la disposition traditionnelle, avicennienne de ce texte, il s’en sert comme modèle afin d’apprécier les forces et les faiblesses des arguments d’Ibn Sīnā et d’y faire valoir ses propres théories. Nous soutenons que cette évaluation critique des doctrines psychologiques d’Ibn Sīnā est motivée par une approche cohérente qui concerne moins le contenu de ces doctrines que l’épistémologie par laquelle Ibn Sīnā les invoque. Dans la deuxième partie de notre thèse, nous examinons de près la manière dont Rāzī critique plusieurs doctrines avicenniennes; notamment, celles de l’immatérialité de l’âme humaine, de l’univocité de son essence, de sa génération temporelle, et de la nature de son unité vis-à-vis les diverses fonctions qu’elle exerce. Les questions de la quiddité de l’âme humaine et la théorie de la faculté de différenciation se trouvent au cœur de ces doctrines. Dans le traitement de ces deux dernières questions, Rāzī élabore une critique des revendications épistémologiques de l’abstraction (taǧrīd) qui constituent la fondation des théories d’Ibn Sīnā sur la nature et les facultés de l’âme humaine. Dans la troisième partie, nous cherchons à reconstruire la théorie psychologique de Rāzī à partir de sa critique des doctrines de l’immatérialité de l’âme, de la différenciation essentielle parmi les individus et de son contrôle immédiat sur les organes corporels. Nous avançons que ces doctrines constituent des éléments centraux de ce que nous appelons la ‘théorie psychologique simplifiée de Rāzī.’ En affirmant ces propres doctrines, Rāzī développe une méthode visant à étudier l’âme humaine qui ne saurait prétendre accéder à sa structure ontologique. La compréhension des fondements philosophiques sur lesquels Rāzī se base en évaluant les doctrines psychologiques avicenniennes et pour créer ses propres doctrines nous permet de mieux connaître le rôle et l’influence de ce grand philosophe dans la tradition avicennienne, et également de contextualiser ses réflexions sur la psychologie dans ses ouvrages ultérieurs.
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I would like first to thank my supervisor, Prof. Robert Wisnovsky, whose continued support and guidance throughout my research allowed for the completion of this thesis. From him I learned the importance of reading Arabic philosophical texts with patience and fidelity. Through his seminars and personal advice, I learned how to make sense of what I often thought to be the daunting complexity of medieval Islamic philosophical and theological thought. It was also a course he taught during my undergraduate studies that led to my decision to pursue further studies of Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy, especially the topics related to the human soul. To Prof. Torrance Kirby, I would like to acknowledge his role as my mentor since the beginning of my undergraduate studies. Upon his encouragement, I presented a paper in Istanbul on Fahīr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s metaethics. It was while researching this topic that I began to engage more deeply in Rāzī’s philosophical works. The development of my research also owes a great deal to the friendship of Dr. Bilal Ibrahim, who initiated me in the reading of the Ṭabāḥiṭ and whom I consider to be my senpai in Razian studies.

Thanks is also due to the staff at the Islamic Studies Library, especially Sean Swanick and Steve Millier for their friendship and expert librarianship. Among my colleagues in the Institute of Islamic Studies, I have benefited from the conversations, insights and comraderie of Heather Empey, Jonathan Dubé, Giovanni Carrera, Nasser Dumeirieh, Bruno-Olivier Bureau, Christopher Anzalone, Nasser Dumeirieh, Pascal Abidor, Eric Van Lit, Bariza Umar, and many others. I would like to also express my thanks to Adina Sirgatau for her kind and proficient assistance during my studies.

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Finally, I dedicate this work to my parents and little sister, without whom I would not have embarked on this journey. Their sacrifice has given me the opportunity to study at McGill University, and their love has sustained me in completing my studies.
In memory of my late grandfather and grandmother,

both of whom passed away while I was still far in *perantauan*. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction

One of the central figures that influenced the reception and development of the Avicennian tradition during the post-classical period of Islamic Philosophy was Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d.606/1210), a theologian and polymath who is widely recognized in the Sunni Tradition as the Renewer of faith during the sixth century of the Hijrah.¹ Though the picture of his role is not yet complete, the later development of Ibn Sinā’s doctrines was deeply influenced by Rāzī’s standardization and reworking of a number of philosophical problems in the received maššāʾī (Arabic Aristotelian-Neoplatonic) tradition and his restructuring of the philosophical compendium.² In his early philosophical writings that examined topics traditionally dealt with by the falāṣīfa, Rāzī evaluated major aspects of the Avicennian tradition, preserving much of its structure


and content while criticizing fundamental tenets of its metaphysics and epistemology that he deems problematic. In particular, two major works of this early period, al-Mabāḥīṭ al-mašriqīyya fī ʾīlm al-ilāhiyyāt wa-l-ṭabīʿyyāt and al-Mulāḥḥas fī al-hikma wa-l-maṭāqīq, are often considered as the second stage of Rāzī’s philosophical and theological thought where he began to engage critically and systematically with Avicennian philosophy. In these works, Rāzī was concerned with the study of philosophical issues that departed from the Kalam-oriented investigation of his earlier theological works.

His method consisted of using the core doctrines of the Avicennian tradition—as these are articulated in the Šīfāʾ, the Naḡāt and the Išārāt—as a template through which he would both revise these received claims and develop his own independent positions. In doing so, he reorganized the traditional division of the Aristotelian sciences, which separated systematic inquiries in, for instance, metaphysics from that of physics based upon a delineation of their respective subject matters. Though he standardized some of

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3 For a historical overview of Rāzī’s life, including the latest attempt at working out a chronology of his works, see Frank Griffel, ‘On Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Life and the Patronage He Received,’ Journal of Islamic Studies 18. 3 (2007): 313-344.


7 Eichner, ’Dissolving the Unity of Metaphysics,’ 143. In this article, she characterizes this reorganization as ‘dissolving the unity of metaphysics’ and argues that it is not motivated by a deeper theoretical concern but was Rāzī’s standardization of earlier trends in the development of the philosophical compendia. Janssens agrees with Eichner’s findings, observing that Rāzī, following Bahmanyār, ’has blurred somewhat the distinction between logic, natural sciences and metaphysics.’
the content and structure of the philosophical compendium, through which much later philosophical work was carried out, the resulting investigations moved away from the epistemological boundaries of the received falsafa tradition. It was within this framework that he critically assessed the standard philosophical issues that fall under these divisions under new epistemic light and proposed alternative theories. Furthermore, this new approach underscores the paramount importance of the Avicennian system in Rāzī’s philosophical outlook, to the extent that he takes it as a starting point for his own independent research.

This thesis is a study of Rāzī’s discussion on the nature of the human soul in the psychology section of the Mabāḥīṭ in the Second Major Part (al-ğumla al-țānī) of the

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See Janssens, ‘Ibn Sīnā’s Impact on Faḥr al-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Mabāḥīṭ al-mašriqiyya,’ 267. Ibrahim, in his recent dissertation, characterizes this in similar terms as ‘freeing philosophy from metaphysics.’ Unlike Eichner and Janssens, however, he argues that the reorganization of the tradition Avicennian sciences was the necessary result of a logical programme that Razi develops in opposition to Ibn Sīnā’s scientific method. See Ibrahim, ‘Freeing Philosophy from Metaphysics,’ 197-199.

8 As we shall see shortly, this is a point of debate among current scholars.

second Book (Mabāḥīṯ II.2.2.5). We intend to examine the method by which Rāzī responds to a central philosophical problem that he inherits from the falsafa tradition. The particular issue we are concerned with is the ontological status of the human soul and its relationship with the body as these are expounded by Ibn Sīnā in the psychology section of the Šifāʾ. A close reading of Rāzī’s treatment of a single issue is meant to continue the work of current scholars who have analyzed the structure of the Mabāḥīṯ and the Mulahḥas. We learn from these recent works how deeply Rāzī was influenced by Ibn Sīnā and his successors. In Eichner’s article, for instance, we learn how the structure of the Mulahḥas became the blueprint for the philosophical compendium written during post-classical falsafa and Sunni theological tradition. However, the picture that emerges from these studies is one where Razi’s reorganization of the

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10 To facilitate this study, we have translated extended parts of this section in the appendices of this thesis. Currently, there are two edited texts of the Mabāḥīṯ. The earlier Hyderabad edition was first published in 1924 by an anonymous editor, while another edition was later published in 1990 edited by Muʿtaṣim bi-Lāh al-Baghdādī. This edition was printed in Beirut by Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī. Having investigated the quality of these edited works, I have decided to use the Hyderabad edition as the main text on which to base our translation. Though the al-Baghdādī edition includes a critical apparatus and provides references to related topics in other sections in the Mabāḥīṯ, the Hyderabad edition seems to have made use of a better quality manuscript, and does not contain the orthographic errors that are found more frequently in al-Baghdādī’s edition. The pagination of the translations in the appendices follows the Hyderabad edition.


12 I shall refer to this work hereon as ‘the Psychology.’


14 Eichner, ‘Dissolving the Unity of Metaphysics,’ 194-197.
traditional Aristotelian sciences is regarded primarily as a culmination of the
developments initiated by Ibn Sīnā’s immediate successors, such as Bahmanyār.\textsuperscript{15} The
upshot of this view is to read Rāzī’s critical stance in the Mabāḥīṭ and the Mulahḥḥaṣ as an
attempt to revise certain propositions of the Avicennian tradition and to offer solutions
to a number of problems therein. That is to say, Rāzī’s objections are directed at
particular doctrines of his predecessor’s philosophy but were never meant to challenge
the theoretical foundation of the system.\textsuperscript{16}

Our thesis differs from these recent studies in that we intend to examine
whether, underlying his critical assessment of a number of Avicennian psychological
doctrines, Rāzī has a deeper epistemological concern motivating his revisions.\textsuperscript{17} Our
study has been particularly informed by the recent findings of Bilal Ibrahim, who
argues that in the Mabāḥīṭ and the Mulahḥḥaṣ Rāzī asserts a distinct epistemological

\textsuperscript{15} Eichner, ‘Dissolving the Unity of Metaphysics,’ 143.
\textsuperscript{16} Another consequence of this reading is that the innovations of post-classical works that were
influenced by Rāzī are taken to be incidental to Rāzī’s reorganization of the sciences, lacking ‘deep
theoretical concerns’ (Eichner, ‘Dissolving the Unity of Metaphysics,’ 143). In this picture, when Rāzī
followed earlier trends in philosophical exposition by dissolving the boundaries of the sciences, he
opened up opportunities for innovative interpretations, not only for himself but especially for the
later generation who were influenced by his works. Since the traditional divisions were informed by
an epistemic programme and differentiated ontologically the subject-matters of these sciences, the
innovations themselves inevitably reached to deeper substantive issues, and not were merely
structural.
\textsuperscript{17} On the centrality of psychology in Ibn Sīnā’s philosophical system, see Dimitri Gutas, Avicenna and
See also Robert Hall, “Intellect, Soul and Body in Ibn Sina: Systematic Synthesis and Development of
the Aristotelian, Neoplatonic and Galenic Theories” in Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in
Medieval Islam: Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Avicenna Study Group, ed. Jon McGinnis and
Autour de son Statut Épistémologique et de son Fondement Métaphysique,” Documenti e Studi Sulla
method that motivates both his rearrangement of the traditional divisions of the sciences and his criticism of particular Avicennian doctrines.\textsuperscript{18} Ibrahim argues that in these two works Rāzī operates within a phenomenalist epistemological framework, in opposition to Ibn Sinā’s essentialist epistemology.\textsuperscript{19} One central aspect of this framework is that for Rāzī the logical ordering of universals that describes the ‘whatness’ of a thing—expressed for instance in what Ibn Sinā refers to as real or complete definitions (\textit{al-hadd al-tāmm})—fails to yield certainty regarding the thing’s noumenal reality.\textsuperscript{20} Rāzī is skeptical that our intellectual conception of natural phenomena corresponds directly to their ontological structure.\textsuperscript{21} As we shall see, a number of Rāzī’s criticisms of Ibn Sinā’s psychological doctrines—\textit{i.e.} whether human souls share a common quiddity, and the theory of faculty differentiation—would not be fully intelligible unless we make explicit the phenomenalist framework under which he investigates these issues. Furthermore, Ibrahim advances an account of Rāzī’s phenomenalist epistemology as a distinctive philosophical programme, one that is

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{18} Ibrahim, ‘Freeing Philosophy from Metaphysics,’ 197.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Ibid.}, 3-9.
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid.}, 80-83.
\end{flushleft}
based upon the notion of ‘structured universals’. However, when discussing his positive doctrines on the soul in Chapter 3 of this thesis, we limit our use of Ibrahim’s reconstruction of this philosophical programme to how Rāzī develops an alternative philosophical method in the study of natural phenomena that attempts to accurately describe their phenomenal properties rather than revealing their deeper ontological structures.

In the *Mabāḥīt* Rāzī develops a critique of Avicennian epistemology through his reading of Ibn Sīnā’s psychological doctrines and asserts what has been aptly described as minimal claims regarding the nature of the soul. However, we cannot reconstruct

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22 Ibrahim develops this concept in Chapter 2 of his dissertation: ‘Freeing Philosophy from Metaphysics,’ 122-169. To summarize briefly, a structured universal expresses the phenomenal properties of a complex sensible as a unified entity. It is different from the universal in the Avicennian sense in that it is entirely mind-dependent, rather than arising from the nature of the sensible complex in the extramental world. Another differentiating feature is that whereas the universal terms Ibn Sīnā uses to describe complex sensibles are unified by the internal structure of the quiddity, viz. the dependant relationship of the external parts of the quiddity—which are accidents and concomitants—with the internal parts of the quiddity—which are the differentia and genus—, Rāzī’s structured universals describe a phenomenal unity that subordinates these attributes ‘symmetrically’ as external determinations of the subject. The procedure that yields knowledge of structured universals is the use of nominal definitions that aims to describe the effects or phenomenal attributes of a thing so that it can be properly distinguished from another. On the aims and role of nominal definitions, see ‘Freeing Philosophy from Metaphysics,’ 97-100. For a breakdown of the components of a structured universal consult pages 144-145 of the same work.

23 As we will discuss below, the central aim of this thesis is to identify the core elements of Rāzī’s psychological theory and the philosophical bases that underlie it. We will not, however, focus on discussing some of the detailed aspects of Ibrahim’s reconstruction of Rāzī’s phenomenalist method, including the latter’s theory on nominal definitions and structured universals. Despite this, however, the reader should know that Ibrahim’s insights on these issues guide much of our methodological approach in interpreting Rāzī’s criticism of Avicennian psychology. A study of his overall phenomenalist method in advancing positive psychological doctrines would have to wait for a comprehensive study of his study of the human soul in his other philosophical works.

24 Ibrahim, ‘Freeing Philosophy from Metaphysics,’ 298. Here, he specifically describes Rāzī’s position regarding the immateriality of the soul. The same however can be said with respect to his psychological theory in the *Mabāḥīt*. 
Rāzī’s positive psychological theory based solely on a reading of the Mabāḥīṭ, since the psychology section of this text focuses on criticizing Ibn Sīnā rather than asserting a positive view. When Rāzī asserts alternative doctrines on the human soul, he reserves judgement on their veracity and is content to show that arguments for these doctrines are more reliable than those used by Ibn Sīnā. However, in a later philosophical text written during the same period and devoted specifically to psychology and ethical theory, Kitāb al-nafs wa-l-rūḥ wa-šarḥ qūwāḥ mā, Rāzī follows up his discussions in the Mabāḥīṭ and asserts a systematic psychological theory that is distinct from that of Ibn Sīnā. As we shall see, whereas in the Mabāḥīṭ, Rāzī develops through his critique alternative doctrines on the nature of the human soul, in the Kitāb al-nafs he explicitly affirms these doctrines as being part of his own psychological theory. We will thus supplement our reading of the psychology section of the Mabāḥīṭ with the contents of the Kitāb al-nafs and reconstruct what we take to be Rāzī’s theory of the soul.

25 Rāzī divides this work in two major parts: the first discusses the nature of the human soul in order to establish meta-ethical principles, while the second is a work on normative ethics, viz. on how to achieve moral and theoretical perfection. Unlike the Mabāḥīṭ, the Kitāb al-nafs is not a purely falsafa work, in that it includes rational as well as textual proofs based on the Quran and Ḥadīṭ for a number of psychological claims. When read separately, this text shows a very strong Avicennian influence, especially in the terminology that Rāzī adopts. However, when read with the relevant sections of the psychology of the Mabāḥīṭ, it becomes clear to what extent and on what issues he adopts Ibn Sīnā’s doctrines and departs from them. In fact, reading his criticism of Avicennian epistemology in his earlier falsafa is key to a proper understanding of this work. Without this, we are liable to exaggerate Rāzī’s dependence on Ibn Sīnā and pass over new insights that are genuinely distinct from the Avicennian perspective. In this thesis we restrict our reading of the Kitāb al-nafs to how it affirms the alternative psychological doctrines and continues the same philosophical method developed in the Mabāḥīṭ.
Very few studies have examined Rāzī’s critique and adoption of Avicennian psychology doctrines. Jules Janssens, in a recent article, has shown how Rāzī follows closely Ibn Sīnā’s psychological writings, especially in the relevant chapters of the Šifāʾ. His study focuses on the first four out of the seven chapters Rāzī devotes to human souls in the Second Major Part of the Book II of the Mabāḥīṭ. Janssens also summarized arguments for the immateriality of the human soul that Rāzī outlines in the first half of Chapter 5. Though our study covers part of what Janssens has discussed and summarized in his article, viz. the outline of arguments for the immateriality of the soul and its separation from the body, the focus of our study is on the latter half of Chapter 5 (Mabāḥīṭ II.2.2.5. Sections II-XI). This is because in these latter sections Rāzī

26 In addition to Janssens’ article which is discussed extensively here, we also have Frank Griffel’s article that traces out Ibn Sīnā’s influence on Rāzī’s psychological arguments for the existence of prophets: Frank Griffel, ‘Al-Ǧazāʾirī’s Concept of Prophecy: the Introduction of Avivennan Psychology into Ašʿarite Theology,’ Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14: 106-113. Muammer Iskenderoglu examines Rāzī’s arguments for the immateriality of the human soul in the Maṭālib al-ʿāliyā, ‘Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on the Immateriality of the Human Soul,’ Journal of Oriental and African Studies 14 (2005): 121-136. Directly relevant to our subject of this thesis is Ibrahim’s brief treatment of the psychology section of the Mabāḥīṭ, ‘Freeing Philosophy from Metaphysics,’ 298-299.


28 The subdivisions of this chapter are as follows:

- Section I. That the soul is separable from the body
- Section II. The manner by which the soul is attached to the body
- Section III. Whether or not human souls differ from each other in quiddity
- Section IV. That it is necessary that each soul possess a body and each body possess a soul separately
- Section V. The temporal origination of human souls
- Section VI. Repudiating transmigration of souls
- Section VII. That the soul does not perish with the death of the body
- Section VIII. That it is impossible for the soul’s passing away to occur
- Section IX. The cause of rational souls
- Section X. The objection of the ancients against the unity of the soul
- Section XI. The first attachment to the soul
discusses a greater range of Avicennian psychological doctrines, assessing their strengths and weaknesses, and offers a number of alternative views.

At the heart of Rāzī’s critical stance in the psychology of the *Mabāḥiṭ* is the discussion of Section III. Here he interrogates Ibn Sīnā’s theory that human souls are univocal in quiddity, whereby individual members of this species are common in their ability to perceive intelligibles and govern the body. Rāzī argues instead that the process of abstraction by which this theory is asserted is not sufficient to yield knowledge of essences; rather, such a claim requires demonstration (*burḥān*). As we shall see, Rāzī’s criticism against Ibn Sīnā and his proposal for an alternative theory of the soul’s substantiability have ramifications on Rāzī’s analysis of other psychological topics, such as the nature of the unity of the human soul (Section X), its temporal generation (Section V), its causes (Section IX), and the nature of its connection to the body (Sections II and X). Therefore, understanding this aspect of Rāzī’s critique is essential to understanding his overall method in the *Mabāḥiṭ*. However, Rāzī largely reproduces Ibn Sīnā’s positions when these are not related directly to the question of whether human souls possess a common quiddity. These sections are those that discuss the soul’s immortality (Section VII and VIII), its inhering in separate individuated bodies (Section IV), and the first bodily organ that attaches to it (Section XI).29 We find therefore a revisionist and scholastic aspect in the psychology of the *Mabāḥiṭ*. By

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29 We will not summarize these Sections where we find Rāzī simply reproducing Ibn Sīnā’s discussions in the *Psychology*, unless they relate closely to some of the important revisions made in other sections.
focusing on these two aspects of the text, we should be able to understand how Rāzī uses the source-material of the Avicennian tradition when investigating the nature of the human soul.

In order to achieve this task, we divide our study of Rāzī’s psychology in two major parts. In Chapter 2 of this thesis, we summarize important parts of the psychology of the Mabāḥiṭ. Here, we examine 1) how Rāzī adopts the basic structure of Ibn Sīnā’s Psychology and revises it in accordance to his needs, and 2) his criticism of Ibn Sīnā’s psychological doctrines. By the end of this analysis, we should have a clearer picture of the theoretical concerns that led Rāzī to revise aspects of Avicennian psychology. In Chapter 3, we examine more closely some of the alternative doctrines he develops in Mabāḥiṭ and how these were later affirmed in the Kitāb al-nafs. Indeed, Rāzī’s non-committal formulation of these doctrines in the first text provides the philosophical grounding upon which he asserts them as his own in the second. Through this analysis we hope to reconstruct the key elements of a Razian psychological theory.
Chapter 2: Rāzī’s Critical Evaluation of Ibn Sīnā’s Psychology

In the first Section of Chapter 5, Rāzī summarizes twelve Avicennian arguments for the immateriality of the human soul and raises objections against a number of their claims. A major part of Rāzī’s assessment—one that concludes his summary of the twelve Avicennian proofs—is the presentation of two additional arguments for the soul’s immateriality that he deems to be more reliable in establishing the separability of the human soul from the body. Rāzī presents these arguments as though they do not belong to the Avicennian line of reasoning. These two additional arguments are: 1) that our awareness of our self (šu‘ūr bi-ḏātinā) persists from one moment to another, in spite of all the changes that our body undergoes during that period, and 2) that the percipient that perceives the different types of perceptions cannot be something that subsists in a body. The first argument seems very similar to the argument from apperception of individual identity in Proof II, which is based on the Avicennian principle that ‘anything whose essence obtains itself [as an object of perception]

30 We will not discuss in these proofs in this thesis, since Janssens has aptly summarized Rāzī’s presentation and objections against them. As Rāzī notes in the beginning of this presentation, many of these proofs and objections are taken from the relevant sections of the Mabāḥathāt, especially those related to self-awareness. In his article, Janssens writes that the central proofs of this Section are also culled from Chapter V.2. of the Psychology at times verbatim: Janssens, ‘Takhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on the Soul,’ 570-78. However, we have included a complete translation of Proof II in the Appendix of the thesis. Rāzī takes this proof to be the strongest Avicennian argument for the immateriality of the human soul. As we shall see, his reconstruction and objections against this proof will be repeated in other parts of the psychology of the Mabāḥith.

31 For a translation of these Razian proofs, see Appendix II.
(ḥāsilatun li-ḏātihi) subsists by itself (qāʾiman bi- ḏātihi).” However, though both arguments rely on the notion of an irreducible selfhood, Rāzī’s preferred proofs do not appeal to an Avicennian model of intellection, as was the case with not only Proof II, but also Proofs I, V, VII and XI. Though in the end of his discussion Rāzī neither affirms nor denies the Avicennian doctrine that human beings possess an immaterial essence, he is not convinced that arguing through premises derived from Ibn Sīnā’s theory of intellection can settle the question. Rather, we can establish the immateriality of the human soul more reliably by the two alternative proofs, which relies on arguments from common experiences of self-consciousness and sense-perception. In Chapter 3 of this thesis, we will discuss these proofs more closely and how they relate to his overall phenomenalist method.


33 The difficulties of this inference as this was articulated in the Mabāḥātāt have been discussed extensively by Black, ‘Avicenna on Self-Awareness and Knowing that One Knows,’ 73-76. As we have mentioned briefly above, however, Rāzī’s final position is that the soul is immaterial: see Muammer Iskenderoglu, ‘Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on the Immateriality of the Human Soul,’ Journal of Oriental and African Studies 14 (2005): 121-136, a study of the psychology section of Rāzī’s latest philosophical work Matālīb al-ʿāliyā, and Jaffer, ‘Fāhr al-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606/1210): Philosopher and Theologian as Exegete,’ 147, a dissertation that studies Rāzī’s psychology in the Mafāṭīḥ al-ḥayb.

34 Cf. Ibrahim, ‘Freeing Philosophy from Metaphysics,’ 298.
Rāzī continues in Section II with a discussion of the nature of the soul’s attachment to the body.\textsuperscript{35} The corresponding discussion in Chapter V of Ibn Sīnā’s Psychology outlines the relationship between the practical and theoretical faculties of the human soul and how each are differentiated in terms of the kind of object of knowledge it obtains. Ibn Sīnā also discusses how the proper human activity is that of the theoretical intellect and that the true perfection of the bodily functions are achieved when they serve the activities this faculty. Rāzī’s outline of the contents of this Chapter, however, does not assume knowledge of the soul’s essence, and attempts instead to address the issue by two propositions that he is willing to accept with regard to the substantiality of the soul. The first is the soul’s unity as substance (established in Chapter 1 of the psychology of the Mabāḥīṯ); the second is the soul’s (established in the end of Section I of Chapter 5). Rāzī then reproduces Ibn Sīnā’s famous analogy that the soul is the unified agency that acts as the administrator and governor of the body. He writes that

\begin{quote}
If it were established that human souls are uniform (muttafaqā) in species, it follows that at the first stage of their creation (fī mabāḏi ḥilqatiḥā), they be devoid of all virtuous and base attributes [viz. they would not have innate traits of character]. If such is the case [if human beings share a common quiddity], it will be necessary that the soul devote the instruments of its individuation to the acquisition of these perfections [viz. rational activity]. [It would also be necessary that] these instruments be different [one from the other], and that the soul possess a special act with respect to each instrument. Otherwise, the objects of perception would agglomerate in the soul, [in which case] some [of them] will be confused with others, and the soul will not come to possess anything perfect and complete on account of them. But when the instruments
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{35} See Appendix III for a translation of this Section.
differ then surely when the soul tries to see (ḥāwalat al-abṣār) and directs its attention (ilhafatat) to the eye, [the soul] will thus be capable of perfect vision. If [the soul] tries to hear, and directs it attention to the ears, [the soul] will thus be capable of perfect hearing. The same applies to the other actions with other faculties.\(^{36}\)

This model of the soul’s unity vis-à-vis the diverse functions it performs rests on the proviso that human souls possess a common quiddity, a claim that Rāzī will dispute in Section III. As we shall later see, having criticized this doctrine, he will in Section X take up again this issue of the soul’s unity and present an alternative view on the matter, one that does not rely on Ibn Sīnā’s theory of faculty differentiation.\(^{37}\) For now he confines himself to presenting the Avicennian view on the soul’s relationship with the bodily organs. Thus we will postpone discussing his critique until the relevant discussions in Sections III and X are properly examined.

In the introduction to this thesis, we have mentioned that Rāzī’s critique of Ibn Sīnā’s view on the quiddity of the human soul underlies much of what is discussed in the psychology of the Mabāḥīṭ. In Section III of Chapter 5, he produces an extensive critique of this view.\(^{38}\) This section marks a clear departure from the structure of the text so far, which not only follows the traditional order and wording of the subject-headings in the Psychology, but also refrains from asserting positive claims despite the critical posture Rāzī adopts therein. The subject-heading of Section III, ‘Whether or not human souls differ from each other in quiddity,’ indicates both an attempt to criticize

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\(^{36}\) Rāzī, Mabāḥīṭ II, 383.

\(^{37}\) Ibid, 377.

\(^{38}\) See Appendix IV for a translation of this Section.
 Ibn Sīnā’s theory of the quiddity of the human soul as articulated in Chapter V.1 of the *Psychology* and to assert a possible alternative. Rāzī’s criticism of this view is deceptively simple: he argues that Ibn Sīnā’s claims are weak because he has failed to support them by demonstrative proof (*burhān*). The following is Rāzī’s reconstruction of three of these supposedly undemonstrated arguments:

The Master claims that human souls are all one in species, but said no more regarding this claim. He did not [even] provide an aporia (*šabhatan*) to validate [his claim], let alone a proof. Abu al-Barakāt al-Bağdādi denied the unity [384] of human souls in species and devoted a long discussion to it. It was acknowledged after this extended [discussion] that no one has [yet] found a demonstrative proof to validate what is sought-after [i.e. that human souls are one in species]. We will mention the utmost of what is possible to say regarding this issue.

Whoever maintains the unity of the souls in species argues in the following ways. The first is that human souls are things that have in common (*mušaraka*) their being human souls (*fī kawnihā n fuṣūsan bašariyyatan*). For if some of them were differentiated from others by means of some essential constituent (*muqawwam*) after their having in common (*ištirākuhā*) their being human souls, then it would follow that they are composites (*murakkab*). [This is] because that through which commonality [occurs] (*mā bihi al-ištirak*) is something distinct than that through which differentiation (*al-imtiyāz*) [occurs]. Now, if [human souls] were composite, they would be corporeal—but this is absurd. The second is that when we examined (*taṣaffāḥān*) the types of human souls, we find them to be restricted (*munḥaṣira*) to two species: perceptive and motive; and of perceptive, there are some that are universal and others particular perceptions. Now we find souls to be mutually equivalent in having these attributes apply truly to them: even though human beings differ in intelligence and ignorance, they all have in common [the ability to intellect] first principles (*al-awwalīyyāt*). I mean to say that when you call their attention to this, they come to realize (*yantabihān*), for instance, that which is finite in respect of ignorance (*mutanāḥī fī al-balāda*). So if you acknowledge this, the meaning of your statement, ‘things that are equivalent (*muṣāwiya*) to a single thing are equal to each other (*mutasāwiya*),’ would be inevitably understood, even if it takes some time. [Such is also the case] when the reality of the circle (*haqīqat al-dā‘ira*) is mentioned to him—that it is by its nature in such a shape (*annahu šakl*...
For it is necessary that he conceptualizes this, even though [this conceptualization] comes after giving examples (darb al-amṭāl) and the exertion of of thought. When this [i.e. the reality of the sphere] is understood, it is possible to understand the first figure (al-šakl al-awwal) of Euclid. The discussions regarding all the intricacies of the sciences (ǧamīʿ daqāʾiq al-ʿulām) proceed in this way. Thus it is possible that all human beings have in common the possibility of knowing objects of knowledge (muṣṭarikūn fī šīḥat al-ʿilm bi-maʿlūmāt) and that they have in common the possibility of being shaped by good morals (muṣṭarikūn fī šīḥat al-taḥalluq bi-kulli al-ahuq). [For in the latter case], if the irascible person (al-ġāḍūb) is forced to adopt the habits of patience, then his irritability will decrease. The same must also be said about all good morals

[...]

The third is that we have proven in the section on knowledge that all separate quiddities must be a thinking subject of the reality of its essence (ʿāqilatan li-haqiqat ǧātihā). Now our soul is a separate quiddity and is therefore a thinking subject (ʿāqilatan) of the reality of its essence. Moreover, we intellect of out souls nothing but the quiddity that is capable of perception and movement. Therefore, the quiddity of my soul is just this [i.e. that which is capable of perception and movement] (ḥāda al-qadr), which is something that is common (muṣṭarak) between my soul and other souls, given the mentioned proofs in explaining [386] that existence is something common. Therefore, the perfection (tamām) of the quiddity of my soul is predicable of other souls. Moreover, it is impossible that [there exists] for this common thing (muṣṭarak) a differentia (faṣlan) that is constitutive (muqawwim) of something other than myself, a differentia that [essentially] distinguishes me from something other than me. There is also no need for a distinguishing differentia in that other thing, since a single nature (al-ṭabīʿyya al-wāhida) will not be simultaneously dependent and independent (muḥtāğatan wa-ğaniyyatan māʾan). Thus it is established that human souls are uniform in (muttafiqa fī) species. This [line of thought] is that which can be taken upon for asserting the unity of the human souls in species. But it is weak.39

The common thread that links these arguments together is the capacity of the human intellect to conceptualize a thing’s essential nature: the first and second argument assumes an Avicennian model of intellection, in that it involves the grasping of

39 Rāzī, Mabāhiṯ II, 383.
universals that are the essential attributes of human beings, while the third is an argument that asserts this ability, in that human beings belong to those class of separable intellects that are capable of self-intellection. In this summary of these Avicennian arguments, Rāzī seems to be responding to Ibn Sīnā’s discussion of the human faculties in Chapter V. I of the Psychology, which investigates the activities and attributes that properly distinguish human functions from those of animals. Here, Ibn Sīnā outlines the kinds of actions that characterize uniquely human qualities as distinct to that of animal qualities. He then classifies these differentiating activities into two kinds of basic capacities; namely the ability to perceive universals and to act morally. When narrowed down even further, however, the most specific attribute of the human being is the ability ‘to conceptualize the universal connotational attributes belonging to the intellect that are abstracted completely of all matter.’ Ibn Sīnā thus effectively describes the process of abstraction (taǧrīd), through which a systematic investigation of the attributes of particular members of a species yields universal knowledge of the nature of the species.

Later on, in Psychology V.6, Ibn Sīnā picks up again the issue of abstraction. He writes that the role the intellect in this process is to conceptualize (taṣawwur) the

41 Ibn Sīnā, Psychology V.I, 206.
intelligible through the method of division (tafṣīl) and combination (tarkīb). That is to say, the intellect structures its knowledge of a thing’s attributes in a logical ordering that identifies its necessary and accidental parts. The result of this process is the definition of that thing in terms of the genus and difference that are the constituent parts of its essence. For Ibn Sīnā, the notion that human beings share a common nature, viz. ‘rational animal,’ is an epistemologically basic insight, which in turn serves as the first principle for the investigation of other aspects of the human soul. Thus, Rāzī’s assessment—that the doctrine of the unity of the human soul in species is not defended by Ibn Sīnā through demonstrative proof—seems to be accurate. For the Avicennian, however, demonstration in this context is not necessary, since through abstraction the intellect is capable of gaining immediate insight into the very nature of this object of knowledge. Thus, motivating Rāzī’s criticism is a sceptical attitude

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42 Ibn Sīnā, *Psychology* V.6, 241. To be sure, conceptualization, in Ibn Sīnā’s scientific method, is part of the wider process of abstraction. In this thesis, however, I refer to them separately in order to emphasize the empirical aspects of abstraction and logical aspects of conceptualization, a distinction that is essential in understanding Rāzī’s critique. For an analysis of this section of the *Psychology* and a discussion on the role of the cogitative faculty in conceptualization see Peter Adamson, ‘Non-Discursive Thought in Avicenna’s Commentary on the Theology of Aristotle’ in *Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam: Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Avicenna Study Group*, ed. Jon McGinnis and David C. Reisman. (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2004).

43 In a broader sense, however, the results of the action of the intellect in the process of abstraction is not only definitions, but also that it ‘combine[s] [an intelligible] in all manner of ways, some in the order proper to a statement at explains the account of a thing, like definition and description, others in the order of [syllogistic] proposition’ (Ibn Sīnā, *Book of Demonstration* III.5, 159–160, translated in *Classical Arabic Philosophy: an Anthology of Sources*, trans. Jon McGinnis David Reisman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2007). On the role of abstraction and its relationship with logic in scientific investigations, consult McGinnis, ‘Logic and Science’ 170–78.


regarding the epistemic claims of abstraction (taḡrīd): that they yield knowledge of a thing’s ontological structure. Implicitly, Rāzī is arguing that knowledge of essences—in this case human souls—belongs to a class of knowledge that requires demonstration.

Having identified the method by which Ibn Sīnā asserts his theory of the human soul, Rāzī focuses again on the issue of abstraction in articulating his critique. Responding to the three Avicennian proofs mentioned above, he writes, regarding the first proof, whether it is necessary to conceive the quiddity of a thing as being composed by constitutive parts (muqawwimāt), viz. genus and differentia. For Rāzī, it is possible to conceive the ability for rational thought, which is the differentiating attribute of human beings from animals, as a necessary concomittant (al-lāzima) rather as a constitutive: ‘it is possible that all these things are concomitants (al-lāzima) of the substance of the soul (li-ḡawhar al-nafs) and are not constitutive (muqawwima) of it. To this extent, souls will differ in the perfection of their quiddity. They have in common the extrinsic necessary concomittants (al-lawāzim al-ḥāriğiyya) in a similar way that the differentiae that are constitutive of the species of a single genus have this genus in

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46 By ontological structure, we mean the manner by which the genus contains within itself things that render it a species and things that do not render it a species, viz. accidents: Ibn Sīnā, The Metaphysics of the Healing, V. 4, 1.

47 This confirms Ibrahim’s claim that, for Rāzī, Avicennian real definitions (as a means for conceptualization) do not yield immediate knowledge of a thing’s essence. Instead, definitions serve the sole function of ‘making precise what a name signifies in a general way.’ Rāzī thus develops a theory of nominal definitions that aims at delineating the various attributes—accidental or necessary—of a given subject, without necessarily probing the deeper ontological structures thereof. See Ibrahim, ‘Freeing Philosophy from Metaphysics,’ 83-97 and 115-117.
Rāzī’s goal here is to show how Ibn Sīnā’s theory that human souls are univocal in species results from the latter’s commitment to a particular logical procedure he employs during conceptualization, one where human beings are constituted by the genus ‘animal’ and difference ‘rational’.

Against the second, Rāzī interrogates whether it is in fact possible to infer knowledge of a thing’s essence through inductive reasoning. Specifically, he interrogates whether it is valid to infer from the observation that many human beings have attribute \( x \) that to be a human being is for \( x \) to be essentially predicated of human. The thought seems to be that unless we can catalog the attributes of all members of a given species, we cannot make essential claims regarding the species itself. Thus without a complete sample, whatever claims we make apply only to the individuals within that incomplete sample.

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48 Rāzī, Mabāḥīṯ II, 386.
49 For full account of Rāzī’s critique of Ibn Sīnā’s notion of quiddity as constituted by these parts, see Ibrahim, ‘Freeing Philosophy from Metaphysics,’ 122-169. The general philosophical basis of this critique is outlined in detail in this dissertation.
50 Rāzī, Mabāḥīṯ II, 386-87: ‘As for the second proof: it is a weak induction (istiqrāʾīyya ḍaʿīfa) from two angles. The first is that it is impossible [387] for us to judge that all human beings are receptive to all conceptualizations (qābilan li-ẓamīʿ al-taṣawwurāt). The second is that it is impossible for us to judge that a soul that we know to have received an attribute (allatī qubūlūḥā li-ṣifātīn) is receptive of all attributes. How is this the case, while it is impossible to have knowledge of all [possible] attributes (kayfa wa-dābt al-ṣifāt)?’
51 Suhrawardī in the Ḥikmat al-Išrāq also notably used this line of reasoning when criticizing the Peripatetic theory of definition. Criticizing the idea that a correct definition must include a genus and the most essential attribute of a given thing, viz. the differentia, he writes: ‘Even if someone enumerates the essential he knows, he cannot be sure that he has not overlooked the existence of some other essential. Thus an inquirer or an opponent may challenge the person who constructs a definition, and that person will be unable to reply, ‘were there another attribute, I would have known about it,’ for there are more attributes that are not evident [...] Thus, if the possibility exists that another essential has not been apprehended, there can be no certainty about the knowledge of the reality of the thing’ (Ḥikmat al-Išrāq 10. 28 – 11. 1-5). For a discussion of this passage in the context
that he has not taken account of all members of the human species—this is practically impossible. However, he would argue that through the process of abstraction—especially with the aid of the Active Intellect—the human mind can obtain knowledge of the species’ essence, even though the procedure begins with empirical observations that are not exhaustive in the way Rāzī envisions.

Against the third, Rāzī anticipates a syllogistic inference that Ibn Sīnā might have constructed to avoid the second objection. This inference consists of two arguments. The first is: all separable quiddities intellect their essence; the human soul is a separable quiddity; therefore it intellects its essence. The second is the argument that, since human souls intellect their essence and this intellection consists in the conception (taṣawwur) that human beings are capable of rational perception and movement, their essence belongs to the class of things that are capable of rational perception and movement. Rāzī however is sceptical that we are capable of knowing in the first place whether all separable quiddities are common in species. As Rāzī puts it, these kinds of questions belong to a class of knowledge ‘for which there is no way [to knowing] (wa-ḏālika mimmā lā sabīl ilayh).’ Though he does not elaborate further on this claim, the first and second objections could be marshalled once again with the relevant terms, since in principle the epistemic claims involved in conceptualizing the

\[52\] Rāzī, Mabāḥīṭ II, 387.

of Suhrwardi’s critique of Ibn Sīnā’s epistemology, consult Hossein Ziai, Knowledge and Illumination, 120-122.
species of separable quiddities is the same as that of human souls. It seems, therefore, that the knowledge of the essence of human souls also belongs to the same class of inaccessible knowledge.

These objections show that Rāzī’s criticism is not directed simply at doctrinal aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s psychology, but they reveal a deeper concern he has with fundamental aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s scientific method. In both his outline of Ibn Sīnā’s arguments and his criticism against them, the issues at stake are no less than the epistemic status of abstraction as the means to gaining knowledge of thing’s ontological structure. However, as we shall see in Chapter 3 of this thesis, Rāzī’s central concern has less to do with the empirical aspects involved in the process of abstraction, i.e. those that includes careful study of natural phenomena, as with essentialist claims inherent in the Avicennian logical system, through which conceptualization is structured.\(^53\)

Furthermore, Rāzī’s critique also raises questions regarding the metaphysical basis that underlie Ibn Sīnā’s epistemology. The role of abstraction in gaining knowledge of universals through careful study of particulars is guaranteed

\(^{53}\) The ontological basis of essential predication is established, for instance, in Book V of the Metaphysics of the Healing, specifically chapters 4-9. Regarding defining actually existing things, Ibn Sīnā writes that ‘insomuch as genera and differentiae are natures that arise as [one] nature, as you have known, they are predicated of the thing defined. Indeed, we say: Definition in reality yields the meaning of one nature. For example, if you say, ‘rational animal,’ from this is realized the meaning of one thing which is the very animal which [in the definition] is that very animal that is rational […] [T]he consideration that necessitates that the definition itself is the thing defined does not render ‘rational’ and ‘anima’ the two parts of the definition; but rather, [it renders them] predicates of it in that it itself is [one thing], not that they are two things of a reality that are different from each other and each different from the composite. Rather, by it, in our example, we mean the thing which is itself animal, being that animal whose animality is perfected and realized through rationality’ (Metaphysics of the Healing, V. 7, 11-12).
ontologically by the role of the Active Intellect and the metaphysical distinctions of quiddity in its mental, neutral, and external aspects. Though Rāzī did not raise these metaphysical concerns in the psychology of the Mabāḥīṭ, he discusses them elsewhere in this work. As we shall see, his resistance to aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics, such as the existence of the Active Intellect and the question of mental existence, will also guide his arguments for alternative psychological doctrines.

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56 For an extended discussion on Rāzī’s critique of the Avicennian theory of universals in relationship to his own phenomenalist approach, see Ibrahim’s discussion Rāzī’s commentary of Namat III of the Šarḥ al-Išārāt, ‘Freeing Philosophy from Metaphysics,’ 292-298. Ibrahim in his dissertation has argued that Rāzī attempts to work out a method of scientific investigation that does not presuppose Ibn Sīnā’s ontology and theory of essential definition. He further argues that Rāzī applies this method to the substantive issues of both the Mabāḥīṭ and the Mulahḥas (ibid., 242). As we have seen above, it is clear that the question of the soul’s quiddity is one such issue. This is especially clear in the first objection above, where Rāzī questions the claim that quiddities are constituted by the unique line of genera and differentiae of a given species. The precise content of this critique will be clearer once we
In addition to criticizing Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine regarding the human soul’s quiddity, Rāzī also advances his own positive views on the matter. He begins his arguments in his customary detached style, taking distance from the partisan positions he is about to outline. He writes that those ‘who maintain the difference of souls in species’ begin their arguments with the observation that

[they] find in humanity persons who are knowledgeable, ignorant, strong, weak, noble, mean, good, evil, irascible, and indolent. This difference (iḥtilāf) is either 1) on account of the difference of the souls in respect of their substances or 2) because of the difference of the bodily organs, as is the case when it is said that the person whose temperament has more heat has more anger and is more intelligent in comprehension, while the person whose temperament is colder is the opposite.\(^{57}\)

For the partisans of differentiation, one can only account for these differences if they are determined either by the essential difference that pertains to the individual soul, or by the varying determinations of the bodily organs; that is to say, the preponderant cause is either internal or external to the essence. However, the varying determinations of the bodily organs cannot account for difference in the character of human beings.

\(^{57}\) Rāzī, Mabāḥīṯ II, 387. This passage seems to be a summary of Abū al-Barakāt’s discussion Chapter 16 of Book II of the Kitāb al-mu’tabar, 423-427, ‘On the Original and Acquired States of the Human Soul.’ This Chapter begins with a similar observation: ‘According to the opinion of those who have direct vision, the human soul possesses different states in their dispositions (isti’dādihā), perfections (kamālātihā), activities (afʿālihā) and proper affinities (munāsibihā). You will find among human beings a person who is strong, weak, noble, ignoble, knowledgeable, ignorant, chaste, vile, high-minded, lowly, just, unjust, generous, stingy, patient, hot-tempered, frivolous, indolent, compassionate, severe, courageous, cowardly, keen of mind, and slow-witted. Now you will find that some of these states are the result of habits and instruction (al-ʿādat wa-l-taʿlim), others the result of the bodily temperaments, others the result of accidents (al-ḥawādatth) that occur upon the souls with respect to that which undergoes and that with which it is afflicted (fī mā talqāh wa-taʿāniyah), and others the result of primary natures and essential accidents (al-gharāʾiz al-awwalyya wa-l-aʿrād).’
This is because there seems to be no correlation between the purported cause (i.e. the varying temperaments) and the effects (i.e. the traits of character). They argue for instance that it is possible that two individuals exist who are identical in temperament and upbringing but who nonetheless differ in character. This shows that external influences—whether bodily or in terms of pedagogy—exert no preponderating cause upon a person’s behavior. Furthermore, they observe that the temperaments of human beings change over time and under different physical environments. If heat in the body causes intelligence in character, a person’s character should also vary in accordance to the change of the temperaments. But this is not the case, because a person’s character seems to persist through illness or other states that induce physiological changes. The partisans of difference therefore argue that if external determinations exercise no preponderant effect upon a person’s behaviour, then the contrary proposition must be true; namely that a certain combination of character-traits in an individual is an irreducible and predetermined state and is therefore the result of intrinsic causes. They identify these intrinsic causes as the ‘make-up of [a person’s] soul and his primary natural disposition’ (ḫilqihi al-nafsānī wa-ğerizatīhi). Hence individual human souls are the very principle of their differentiation.

In the next argument, Rāzī makes use of a line of reasoning by Ibn Sīnā in the *Psychology*, but for a different purpose from which it was originally intended:

[I]t is known that the soul’s capacity (quwwatuhā) in making use (taṣarruf) of the prime matter of this world (fi hayūla hāغا al-ʿālam)—viz. the transformation of water into fire, earth into air, and the staff into the snake (al-ʿasā ʿaḥānan—
occurs] not on account of the power of its temperament. As such this division [i.e. this second division aforementioned] is false. The Master acknowledges this when he said that the temperament that is predisposed to receiving the soul is that whose existence harmonizes [with the soul] (yat-ta'fīq) only rarely (nādiran). This division is false. Thus it is established that the difference of the souls during these moments [occurs] on account of the difference of their substance only.58

Still reproducing the position of those who argue for the soul’s difference in species, Rāzī deploys the argument that matter qua matter does not account for the transformations it undergoes. Separate active principles must account for the actuality of the material substrate. For Rāzī, however, this becomes an argument for the differentiation of species of human souls. In this appropriation of the principle, Ibn Sīnā’s claim that only predisposed bodies receive souls further substantiates Rāzī’s claim that differences in character are accounted for by the substance of the soul.

Rather than the material substrates conforming to a species-configuration that triggers the emanation of the natural form from the Active Intellect, they conform, instead, to the essential nature of each individual soul. Admittedly, this appropriation of Ibn Sīnā’s argument—attributed by Rāzī to Abū al-Barakāt in the Mu‘tabar—is not worked out in detail and thus rather ambiguous.59 However, the gist of the idea is clear. The argument has already taken as a premise the idea that character-traits are essential states. The separate principle that determines this state therefore cannot be some other external cause like the Active Intellect, which in Avicennian metaphysics is responsible for the

58 Rāzī, Mabāḥīf II, 388.
causation of universals, rather than particulars. In Rāzī’s argument, we thus see a single-minded effort to ignore the theoretical possibility of the role of the Active Intellect, because of the metaphysical commitments it entails. He opts instead for what seems to be another causal explanation for substantial change; namely the existence of a human essence that is ontologically separate from its material substrate, essentially differentiated, and is an active principle for change. We will present a more detailed exploration of this view in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

Rāzī concludes his presentation of the arguments for the difference of human essences by showing a preference for that position:

[i]f we accept the difference of the dispositions of souls, the truth emerges that either the soul of each human being differs in species from other human souls, or it is possible that souls identical in quiddity exist. However, this is among that which a proof cannot be given (lam yadillu dalīlun) based upon one of two contraries [viz. the two possibilities above remain indeterminate]. However it is impossible to infer (al-istidlāl) the equivalence (tasāwī) of two souls from their equivalence in the totality of actions (tasāwīhimā fi ǧumlat al-afʿāl). Therefore, you know that inferring the equivalence of something that possesses certain necessary concomitants, given the identity of these necessary concomitants, is false.\(^6^0\)

The central premise that Rāzī is willing to accept in order to arrive at the correct view of the soul’s quiddity is the difference of the soul’s native dispositions as observed by the moral behaviour that we express. The possible cause of this can be either the soul’s essential difference that acts as a determining principle, or, in the case that the soul is essentially uniform, accidental determinations, e.g. physiological factors or pedagogy.

\(^6^0\) Rāzī, Mabāḥīṭ II 388.
Initially, Rāzī sets up these two propositions here as contradictories. However, he then argues that it is not yet clear whether these two propositions are contradictory in the first place. That is to say, the possible explanations that can corroborate the truth of the initial premise—viz. that the soul has native dispositions—remain indeterminate. He does not in this text suggest what other variables would come into play. He does, however, think that the second proposition—namely that the soul is essentially uniform—is a weak inference. He does not think that you can infer that two souls are identical in essence simply because they appear to possess identical attributes. Instead, as we shall discuss in Chapter 3 of this thesis, Rāzī argues the essential differentiation of human souls’ original make-up is the causal principle of those attributes that each member of the species appears to share in common.

Thus we return to the earlier critique of Ibn Sīnā’s theory of the soul’s common quiddity: that the argument for the unity of the human soul in quiddity should be a species of demonstrative knowledge. The method of abstraction and the resulting conceptual ordering in terms of essential predications are, for Rāzī, thin grounds to substantiate the argument. As a result, though he stops short at making a definitive affirmation of the issue, it is clear that he finds the arguments of those who argue for

61 Another variable that Rāzī considers elsewhere is the astrological doctrine of the Talisman Specialist, whereby certain groups of individuals fall under the influence of certain celestial spheres. See, Shihadeh, *The Teleological Ethics*, 118. However, this consideration remains speculative on this part.
62 Rāzī, *Mabāḥiṭ II*, 386. Here, he refers to these effects as concomitants (*lawāẓim*). In the *Kitāb al-nafs wa-l-rūḥ*, 87, he substitutes the term ‘concomitants’ with ‘accidental and external attributes’ (*al-ṣīfāt al-‘araḍiyya al-ḥāriğiyya*).
the essential difference of individual human souls to be more convincing than Ibn Sīnā’s.63

In Section V of Chapter 5, Rāzī proceeds to examine the arguments for and against the temporal generation of human souls. His account of this issue begins with an outline of the theory of ‘a group among the ancients’ (qawm min al-qudamā’) for the pre-existence of the human soul. On the other side of the debate, he presents what he deems to be Ibn Sīnā’s most comprehensive articulation of the temporal generation of the human soul. Rāzī follows up this argument with a second argument for the soul’s temporal generation articulated by Abū al-Barakāt. In both accounts, he attempts to be faithful to the presupposition of each school of thought, in an attempt to remain neutral and lay bare the strengths and weaknesses of each argument.

Rāzī’s recension of the the Peripatetic argument is based on the one Ibn Sīnā articulates in the *The Psychology* V. 3.64 This argument shows that all possible scenarios of the soul’s pre-existence lead to absurdities or contradictions. It is necessary, therefore, that the contradiction of this proposition obtains; namely that souls come into existence temporally. Rāzī follows up this argument with six objections against Ibn

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63 Rāzī’s affirmation of this position is argued for more robustly in his other works such as the *Kitāb al-nafs* and most work of Quranic exegesis *Maṣūḥ al-ğayb*. As we shall discuss more extensively in Chapter 3, Rāzī follows up this discussion in the *Kitāb al-nafs* and argues that each individual soul are essentially different from the other but common in terms of ‘accidental and external attributes’ (*al-ṣifāt al-‘aradīyya al-ḥāriqīyya*), which for him is the capacity of the soul in administering and governing the body. As we have seen, however, the philosophical critique of Ibn Sīnā theory of essential predication that led to this view is presented in Section III of the *Mašāḥif* that we have just discussed. On Rāzī’s position in the *Maṣūḥ al-ğayb*, see Jaffer, ‘Fāṣr al-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606/1210): Philosopher and Theologian as Exegete’ (PhD Diss., Yale University, 2005), 147.

Sīnā’s argument, each of which attempts to show that at least one of the scenarios above can hold true. If one of these scenarios is possible, there is a possibility for human souls to be pre-existent, and the claim for their temporal generation must be proven by some other argument. Many of these counterarguments seem so weak as to be trivial. But this is Rāzī’s attempt at being as comprehensive as possible in presenting all the relevant issues at stake in either position. He includes therefore arguments that are weak and even sophistical (such as the fourth counterargument) alongside more serious arguments (such as the third). Rāzī then produces extended responses to these six counterarguments from a strictly Avicennian perspective. He writes at the end of this discussion that ‘this is what is possible to have as a support for the opinion of this method (fa-hāḍā mā yumkinu an yatamahḥala fi taqrīri hāḍīhi al-tariq)’. This ‘method’ he refers to is of course Avicennian, his aim being in this section to be as comprehensive and faithful as possible to the strengths of Ibn Sīnā’s position.

65 We need not discuss all six of the counterarguments. However, the two we’ve mentioned above are at the extreme of the spectrum. The fourth argument for instance engages in the futile reasoning that perhaps the differentiation occurs because a given soul was attached to another body before it is attached to the current body. Rāzī then goes on to a side-discussion of the possibility that before instantiation in a particular body, the soul was differentiated to another body that existed simply as a temporary host before the true instantiation during which the soul fulfills the purpose of its life. However pointless this objection seems to be, the short discussion is a side-note to show an oversight, Rāzī claims, in the arguments of the ancients for the temporal generation of the soul. According to Rāzī—and also Abū al-Barakāt it seems—the ancients proved their argument through a refutation of the doctrine of metempsychosis. However, they also attempted to prove the falsity of metempsychosis through the proof of the temporal generation of the soul. It seems that the relevance of this side note is simply to assert that simply refuting metempsychosis does not resolves the issue.

66 Rāzī, Mabāḥih II 396.

67 For an analysis of the metaphysical and soteriological issues at stake in Ibn Sīnā’s theory of temporal generation see Thérèse-Anne Druart, ‘The Human Soul’s Individuation and its Survival
Having discussed the temporal generation of the soul, Rāzī discusses in Section VI of Chapter 5 the theory of metempsychosis. Rāzī reproduces Ibn Sīnā’s discussion in Chapter V.4 of the *Psychology* and adds two more arguments that do not presuppose the metaphysical claims in the Avicennian arguments, viz. that the Giver of Forms emanates souls to predisposed bodies, and that the individuating principle of the soul is the material substrate. The first of these two arguments was asserted by Abū al-Barakāt, who argued that if the doctrine of metempsychosis is true, then during the transference of the soul from one body to another the soul must be inert until it enters a new body. However, this is impossible, since for Abū al-Barakāt the soul is essentially active. The second is an argument of the Mutakallimūn, who argued that if metempsychosis were true, we would have memories of our existence in past bodies, the assumption being that the substrate of knowledge, memory and recollection is the soul. Since it is the soul that survives, then these properties should also subsist. But since it does not, then the theory of metempsychosis falters.

In the following two sections (Section VII and VIII), Rāzī discusses the immortality and incorruptibility of the human soul, largely summarizing Ibn Sīnā’s arguments in Chapter V. 4 of the *Psychology of the Šifā*'. The only difference is that Rāzī opts to place the discussion on metempsychosis before establishing the human soul’s immortality and incorruptibility, whereas Ibn Sīnā ordered his discussion the other way.

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around. Furthermore, though the arguments for these claims also presume the
metaphysical premises aforementioned, Rāzī does not bring other sources into the
discussion.

Unlike these previous two Sections of the Psychology of the Mabāḥīṯ, Section IX
of Chapter 5 departs significantly from Ibn Ṣīnā’s corresponding discussion in the Šifā’.68
Here, Rāzī turns to the issue of the causes of the rational soul, which corresponds to
Chapter V.5 of the Psychology. This chapter is a central part of the Psychology in that it
contains the discussion of the Active Intellect as the cause of a person’s intellectual
perception of universals. Here, Ibn Ṣīnā outlines the psychological foundations for his
method of abstraction and conceptualization, which involves the role of the Active
Intellect in ‘illuminating’ the intelligibles present in particular objects of perception.69
However, his discussion not only establishes how intellection works, but also, in the
context of psychology proper, ascertains the final cause of human souls. In this section,
Ibn Ṣīnā continues his explanation of the stages of the theoretical intellect that he
begins in Psychology I.5, where he writes that the final stage of the human intellect is the
acquired intellect, which denotes the ‘absolute actuality’ of a person’s potentiality for
intellection.70 At this stage of the intellect, ‘the genus animal and the part of it that is
the species of human are complete, and there the human faculty [i.e. the theoretical

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68 See Appendix V for a translation of this Section.
69 On the on the role of the Active Intellect in abstraction, see Hasse, ‘Avicenna on Abstraction,’ 39-
70 Ibn Ṣīnā, Psychology I.5. 50-51.
intellect] will have made itself similar to the first principles of all existence."\(^\text{71}\) The sense of completeness here is that at the moment a person engages in rational thought, he actualizes the unique function that separates him from other animals.\(^\text{72}\) The discussion in V.5 describes the role of the Active Intellect in actualizing the acquired intellect.\(^\text{73}\) As we have seen, this involves an account of the process of abstraction, an account of which requires explaining how the external senses and the five internal senses contribute to this process. Thus, as Ibn Sīnā notes in *Psychology* I. 5. 16-17, by establishing the perfecting cause of the rational faculty, he establishes the final cause of the bodily faculties of the human soul.

This account, however, describes what Ibn Sīnā would call the second perfection of the human soul. He defines the second perfection as ‘whatever comes after the species of the thing, such as its actions and passions.’\(^\text{74}\) The analysis of the stages of the intellect and the role of the Active Intellect in the process of abstraction pertains to how a human being actualizes those actions and passions that he possesses as a member of a certain species, namely ‘rational animal’. Rāzī’s discussion in Section IX, however, pertains to what his predecessor would call the first perfection of the human soul, which he defines in the Šifāʾ as ‘that by which the species actually becomes a species,

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\(^\text{71}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{72}\) The major study on Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine that the rational soul is the separable final cause of the body is Robert Wisnovsky, *Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), especially pages 113-144.

\(^\text{73}\) Ibn Sīnā, *Psychology* V.5. 234-237.

\(^\text{74}\) Ibn Sīnā, *Psychology* I.1. 11
like the shape that belongs to the sword. In doing so, Rāzī brings into the discussion Avicennian principles of substantial change that were explained in other sections of the *Psychology*, especially in Chapter I. He repeats in this section the same discussion with which he began the *Psychology of the Mabāḥīṭ*; namely that bodies as body do not explain the diversity of functions displayed by natural bodies. Still working within an Avicennian framework, he writes:

> It is clear that it is impossible that the cause of souls is the body, for otherwise each body would be like this. It is also impossible that [the cause] is something corporeal (ǧasmāniyyan), since this corporeal thing needs the body either essentially (fī ḍātihi) or in its being a cause (muʿattiriyyatih), that is to say, the need for the body [occurs] either in existence or in causing existence (immā an yakūna fī al-waḡūd aw fī al-iḡād).

As we shall see, the division between requiring the body ‘in existence’ or ‘in causing existence’ functions similarly to the Avicennian first and second perfection. Rāzī then proceeds to outline three arguments showing how the existence of a natural body cannot be accounted for by the body—that it therefore requires a separate principle to explain its various functions. He first brings into the discussion Ibn Sīnā’s argument that matter does not exist without corporeal forms that act as the formal cause of its being whatever species of existent it may be. A causal story of natural phenomena involves explaining—inter alia—their material cause and formal cause, with the latter

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75 *Ibid.* An extended discussion first and second perfection of the human soul, especially as it relates to this passage of the *Šifāʾ* can be consulted in Wisnovsky, *Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context*, 121.


being understood in the case of living things as ‘soul’.\(^78\) On the other hand, the material substrate as matter is mere potentiality; thus it cannot be the cause of its own existence.\(^79\) As Rāzī puts it, it is impossible that this substrate, viz. the physical constitution of the human being, is simultaneously that which causes its actuality and that which is caused. In the second argument, he writes that whereas the forms of natural bodies actualize their acts through the mediation of place, the body cannot act upon something that has no dimensions, such as corporeal forms. It is impossible, therefore, that the body is the cause of the soul. As for the third argument, it is based on the Avicennian principle that the cause is stronger than the caused and that the corporeal is weaker than things that are incorporeal, in which case it is unlikely that the body is the cause of an incorporeal thing such as the soul.\(^80\)

Having presented these Avicennian arguments, Rāzī proceeds to refute the second scenario; namely that natural bodies require the body, rather than the soul, in performing their respective functions. He starts with a universal affirmation that all actions that are performed through the participation of the body and are mediated by it are things that possess a place. The contrary of the conversion of this proposition must, therefore, be true; namely that no thing that possesses a place is a thing that acts through the mediation of the body. It is impossible that something corporeal affects the actions of the formal cause (viz. the soul) of a natural body. What affects the soul—that

\(^{78}\) As established in the *Psychology* I.1. 4-6.
\(^{79}\) Ibid.
\(^{80}\) This principle is stated for instance in the *Metaphysics* of the *Naǧāt* I.12. 520.
is to say, what actualizes the second perfection of the soul—must be something that is separate from matter:

The agent of the soul (fāʿil al-nafs) is in itself and in respect to its agency (fāʿiliyyatuhu) independent from matter. The agent of the rational soul is thus a separate substance, both in itself and in respect of any attachments between its essence and matter. [This agent] is named the Active Intellect. The reason for this name is that all things that are separate from matter must necessarily intellect itself. Now it was established that a [thing’s] intellection of itself is not on account of the presence of another form that is equivalent to it, but is instead on account of its presence in itself. Therefore, its essence is [simultaneously] an intellect, an intellector an object of intellection. The reason for its being named ‘active’ is that it is the existentiating cause (mūǧid) for our souls and that which acts on them (al-muʾṭṭiru fi-hā).81

Thus Rāzī identifies the Active Intellect as the Giver of Forms, which is both the existentiating cause of the human soul and the cause that actualizes the unique functions of the human soul.82 He thus accounts for the role of the Active Intellect in the first and second perfection of the soul.

In reproducing Ibn Sīnā’s form-matter analysis on how the rational soul is caused, Rāzī is interested here in presenting Avicennian principles as accurately as possible, bringing to light the metaphysical commitments that bear upon the issue, especially with respect to the Active Intellect and the unity of the human soul’s quiddity as rational animal. The following part of this Section, however, marks a departure from the preceding discussion. Rather than treating Ibn Sīnā’s position as the sole authority, he places it as a possible theory regarding the next issue he

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81 Rāzī, Mabāḥīṯ II, 403.
82 On the Giver of Forms as Active Intellect see Jules Janssens, ‘The Notions of Wāḥib al-ṣawwar (Giver of Forms) and Wāḥib al-ʿaql (Bestower of Intelligence) in Ibn Sīnā,’ in Pacheco and Meirinhos, Intellect et Imagination dans la Philosophie Médievale, 551–562.
discusses; namely the soul as a unity. In the Psychology, this topic follows the discussion of the Active Intellect and the perfection of the human theoretical intellect (Chapters V.5-6). Rāzī follows this ordering and in large part reproduces some of the same arguments that Ibn Sīnā made against those who argue that there is a plurality of souls in a single body. However, he departs from the Avicennian framework when he discusses the manner by which the soul is a unity. Here, he offers a different view of how the soul is related to the bodily faculties, and whether these faculties are differentiated in the same manner that Ibn Sīnā takes them to be differentiated.

At the beginning of the discussion, Rāzī reproduces Ibn Sīnā’s view of the soul as the governor and administrator of the body, taking up a concern he left off in Section II, ‘On the Manner by Which the Soul is Attached to the Body’. He proceeds by first outlining the different positions on how the soul relates to the bodily faculties:

Some of them hold that the soul is one, and they consist of two groups: the [first group] say that the soul performs all of its actions by its essence, but [only] through the mediation of the different organs. This is the truth according to us based upon has passed [above]. The [second group] say that the soul is a principle of the existence of many corporeal faculties, and thereafter a proper action issues from each proper faculties. This is the position of the Master. The [third group] say that the soul is not one, but there exists in the body a number of souls, some of them are sensible (ḥassāsa), others cogitative (mufakkira), others concupiscible (šahwāniyya), and others irascible (gādabiyya). Here Rāzī explicitly affirms his own position and attempts to revise that of Ibn Sīnā.

Still consistent with this scholastic style, however, he reproduces both the Avicennian

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83 See Appendix VI for a translation of this Section.
84 Rāzī, Mabāḥīṭ II, 405.
arguments and that of a third group, who asserted—in opposition to both Rāzī and Ibn Sīnā—that there is a plurality of souls in a single natural body.

The arguments for the unity of the soul are based on the observation that despite the different functions that the natural body possesses, these functions are performed by a single agency. That is to say, there exists in each living thing a single agency that directs its diverse functions and resolves its potentially contradictory actions. In the case of human beings for instance, when we engage in more abstract thought, our senses tend to become more obscure, whereas if we were to concentrate on feeling physical sensations, it would become difficult to engage in abstract thought at the same time. The 'partisans of unity' thus infer from the fact that it is possible for the faculties cooperate and suppress each other’s natural actions under some overriding prerogative the existence of a unified agency that regulates their functions. Rāzī, following Ibn Sīnā, refers to this ‘common agency’ as a nexus (ribaṭ). He classifies this type of knowledge as a class of intuitive knowledge, since it pertains to how we attain the basic knowledge of our own individual identity (huwiyya) and agency. On the other hand, he continues, 'what is sought-after by investigation and rational reflection (al-baḥṭ wa-l-naẓar) in the Book of the Soul is the knowledge of [the soul’s] quiddity, faculties, and the manner of its states of temporal generation and eternality.'85

85 Ibid. As we shall discuss in the following Chapter of this thesis, this is in fact what Rāzī does in the Kitāb al-nafs, substantiating insights regarding the soul’s unity with a ‘second stage’ (al-maṭlam al-ţāni) of argumentation, namely rational proofs: Rāzī, Kitāb al-nafs, 28.
Though Rāzī works within an Avicennian framework during this initial discussion of the soul’s unity, when discussing the nature of this nexus and its relationship with the diverse functions of the soul, he takes a step back and attempts to revise Ibn Sīnā’s theory. He writes that if by the soul’s being a nexus we mean that

[the soul is the governor of these faculties and their mover, then this is possible in two ways. The first is that it is said that the soul sees objects of sight, hears audible things, and desires things that are desirable. The essence of the soul is a substrate for these faculties and a principle (mabdaʾan) for these actions, and thus it sees, desires or becomes angry. This is how things are (fa-haqā al-haqq). However, this requires an argument that denies [the existence of] the faculties that the Master has asserted in certain, specific organs. For if the soul sees, hears and desires, what need is there in asserting the faculty of sight in the spirit—one that [exists] in the confluence of the two nerves (multaqā al-ʿaṣabatayni)—and the faculty of hearing in the spirit—one that is in the nerves of the ear canal (al-ʿaṣab al-ṣamāḥi)? In short, human beings see and hear through the sight and hearing that subsists in them, not through the sight and hearing that subsists in another thing.

The second is that we mean by the soul being a nexus that when the faculty of sight senses a particular sensible, the soul becomes disposed, since it perceives this in a universal way. For instance, if the faculty of sight perceives the form of a particular individual, the rational soul will perceive that there exists an individual thing that is characterized by such and such colour, such and such shape (šakl), and such and such posture (hayʾa). This does not exclude it from universality (wa-kullu dālika lā yataḥārragūhu ‘an al-kulliyya). Therefore, you know that when the universal is bound (quyyida) by universal attributes, it does not become particular through it. In summary, sensing this particular thing (al-ġuz?) is a cause of the soul’s disposition to perceive this particular thing in a universal way. Moreover this perception is a cause of searching for a universal in order to obtain (taḥṣil) this thing [as a piece of knowledge]. With this search, [this thing] becomes something particular given the particularity (taḥaṣṣus) of the recipient. This particular search consists in desire (šahwa). Thus it follows that the soul’s being a nexus for the corporeal faculties and as a meeting place (maǧmaʾan) for them be conceived as the Master’s view.]

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86 Rāzī, Mabāḥīṭ II, 407.
It seems at first that Rāzī’s criticism of Ibn Sinā’s theory of faculty differentiation in the first account would preclude the second from being a viable way of understanding the role of the soul as the nexus of the bodily functions. This is because this second account argues that, since the activities of the bodily organs prepare the soul in a universal way, it is necessary to conceive the soul as a nexus of the corporeal faculties; yet it was argued in the first account that there is no need to posit the existence of these faculties. Rāzī seems to have fallen into a contradiction.

However, Rāzī’s position on the matter is subtler. His criticism of the theory of faculty differentiation, in the first account, was directed specifically against what he takes to be the ontological claims that Ibn Sinā asserts with respect to the location of the faculties.87 When, for instance, Ibn Sinā claims that the common sense is located in the front ventricle of the brain, Rāzī would have taken this to mean that the common sense subsists in that part of the body in some sort of independent mode of existence. On the other hand, the claims of the second scenario describe the way the soul brings together the sense-data relayed by the various organs of sense perceptions into an intelligible whole, which is referred to here as the ‘universal’. Thus, the term ‘corporeal faculties’ in this account simply refers to the different types of bodily functions that the human soul is capable of performing, rather than suggesting the sort of independent existence that Rāzī takes Ibn Sinā to assert. Indeed, he uses this term in his own works

87 For Ibn Sinā’s discussion on the ontological status of the faculties, see Psychology III. 7. 144 and III. 8. On the localization of the corporeal faculties and their relationship with the organs and pneuma, see Robert Hall, ‘Intellect, Soul and Body in Ibn Sīna,’ 74-81.152.
when he wants to classify certain types of bodily or intellectual functions. Thus it is
clear that the two accounts of the soul as a nexus outlined above—with the condition
that the first do not refer to the localization of faculties in parts of the body—are not
mutually exclusive. The soul is a nexus of the body in that it both directs the various
bodily various actions through a single agency and is capable of receiving and
transforming information relayed to it by the body’s percipient organs into thought.
For Rāzī, both scenarios accurately capture the different senses by which the soul is
understood as the nexus for the bodily faculties. Therefore, though these two accounts
of the soul as nexus are inspired by Avicennian principles, Rāzī carefully selects aspects
thereof that are neutral in respect of Ibn Sīnā’s ontological claims.

Rāzī’s attempt to distance himself from Ibn Sīnā’s ontology is more clearly
observed when we examine the epistemological aspects of the Avicennian theory of
faculty differentiation. Though he does not describe the problem as being one of
epistemology, we venture to speculate that his rejection of the existence of faculties is
also motivated by his larger criticism of Avicenna’s theory of essential predication,
which we have seen applied in the discussions of Section III on the quiddity of the
human soul. To understand how this can be the case, we need to review why Ibn Sīnā
made these differentiations, not only with respect to the faculties, but also with respect
to the types of souls to which they essentially pertain, i.e. the vegetative, animal, and
rational. As we shall see, Rāzī criticism of Ibn Sīnā’s classification of souls and faculties

\[88\] As we shall see later in the Kitāb al-nafs.
in this Section and in Section II is linked to his larger epistemological concern with Ibn Sīnā’s method of essential definitions in scientific investigation.

In Chapter I.5 of the Psychology, Ibn Sīnā outlines the different faculties that pertain to the vegetative, animal and human soul respectively. Underlying this division of the soul’s functions is a theory of faculty differentiation that is based in part on the physiological features of the temperaments.\(^9^9\) Furthermore, the differentiation of the soul of natural bodies into three types of ‘souls’ is in turn based upon Ibn Sīnā’s method of division in essential definition. Ibn Sīnā also writes that the relationship that holds between the types of souls and their respective faculties is one of a first perfection and second perfection of a natural body. Bringing all these differentiations together (viz. the types of souls, faculties, and how they are respectively the first and second perfections of a natural body), he writes that

\[\text{were it not for convention, it would be best to make each first [perfection] an explicit condition in describing the second [perfection], if we wanted to describe the soul and not the faculty of the soul belonging to it by reason of that actuality. For ‘perfection’ is used to define the soul, not a faculty of the soul. You will learn the difference between the animal soul and the faculties of perception and motion and the difference between the rational soul and the faculty of the things mentioned, such as discrimination, etc. If you want a thorough account, the correct thing to do would be to make the vegetative soul a genus of the animal, and the animal a genus of the human, using the more general in the definition of the more specific; but if you consider the souls in terms of the faculties peculiar to them as animal and human [souls], you may be satisfied with what we have mentioned.}\(^9^0\)

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\(^9^9\) Ibn Sīnā, Psychology of the Šifāʾ, I.5, 43–44.

\(^9^0\) Ibn Sīnā, Psychology of the Šifāʾ, I.5 39. An extended discussion of this passage in the context of the ontological status of the rational soul as final cause of the human body is by Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context, 115–127. For our purposes I’ve read this passage in the context of Avicenna’s method in concept acquisition.
As Ibn Sīnā writes above, the method of division (viz. the ‘thorough account’) requires that the scientific classification of things be based on a descending order of species that includes all possible things that are included as types of an ascending order of genera.  

This descending order is based on a successive differentiation of genera that yields their respective species. Ibn Sīnā follows Aristotle’s requirement that this differentiation must be based on a ‘natural division’ that picks out essential rather than accidental classifications; that is to say, the logical ordering must be preceded by scientific ordering that is the result of an investigation of natural causes.  

Thus, for instance, the highest genus of living things would be the vegetative soul, which he defines essentially as the ‘first perfection of of a natural body possessed of organs in terms of its reproducing, growing, and taking nourishment.’ This highest genus includes all living things in the sublunary realm, since it contains the basic potentiality common to them.

This class of existents can be further divided to include the animal soul as a species, which is differentiated as the ‘first perfection of a natural body possessed of organs in terms of it perceiving particulars and moving by volition.’ The animal soul, however, can be conceptualized as a genus in its own right with respect to a further subdivision of its species. The particular species relevant in the passage is the human being, which

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92 On the relation between scientific objects and their ordering in logical structure that is the basis of Avicennian scientific method, see McGinnis, ‘Logic and Science,’ 176-78.


94 *Ibid*.
is differentiated from other animals by virtue of being ‘the first perfection of a natural body possessed of organs in terms of attributing to it the performance of actions occurring by choice based on thinking and the ascertainment of opinion, and in the sense that it perceives universals.’ In the same chapter of the Psychology, Ibn Sīnā then differentiates the faculties that belong to each type of terrestrial souls. The vegetative soul, for instance, consists of three faculties: the nutritive, reproductive, and the faculty of growth. The principle of successive division applies to these differentiations. The animal soul is further divided into the faculty of motion and perception; while this perceptive faculty is in turn further subdivided into external and internal perceptions. These percipients are in turn subdivided, based upon the unique actions they perform, viz. sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch in the case of external perception, and the common sense, form-bearing faculty, compositive imagination, estimative faculty, and memory in the case of internal perception. Such is also the case when Ibn Sīnā subdivides the rational soul into practical and theoretical intellect, where the latter consists of the material, possible, actual, and acquired intellect. Thus we obtain a logical ordering that provides a scientific description of certain classes of terrestrial entities and the various attributes they possess.

In the context of psychology, however, Ibn Sīnā states above that it is possible to conceptualize the division of types of souls into faculties as describing the relationship that obtains between the first perfection of a given natural body with its

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95 Ibid.
second perfection. In this sense, the faculties refer to the types of actions that actualize the native capacities of a natural body as a member of a particular species. This method of describing the relationship between souls and their functions sheds light on the attributes that are both necessary and accidental to their essences. In the case of the human being, it also shows the unified hierarchy of these diverse functions under the determination of the rational soul as their final cause. This method, however, does not preclude the logical analysis; namely that each successive subdivision within the line of genera picks out different classes of existing things.

However, how does Ibn Sīnā ensure that these divisions pick out essential attributes rather than accidental ones? In both external and internal functions, the faculties are distinguished by their association with the organ that carries out the acts. In the case of sight, for instance, the faculty of sight is located in the meeting place of the optical nerves from the eyes. The pneuma that traverses this area of the nerves is the ‘vehicle’ of the faculty that relays sense data of the external senses to the internal faculties of perception. As for the internal senses, in Chapter 1.5 of the Psychology, Ibn

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97 Another way of understanding what Ibn Sīnā meant by ‘the thorough account’ with the specific, psychological account is that the first is a description of the classes of attributes that agglomerate in a particular line of genera without having to pick out a species existing in the world. Animal, for instance, does not exist in itself in the world and is not actually predicated by its genus and differentia. The second account proceeds after an actually existing species has been defined—namely, human beings—and describes the classes of attributes that predicated of it, whether essential or accidental. In the *Metaphysics of the Healing*, Ibn Sīnā describes the first account as giving an account of a genus and differentia inasmuch as they are ‘part of the definition qua definition,’ while the second is to give an account of a genus and differentia inasmuch as they ‘are natures that arise as [one] nature,’ (*The Metaphysics of the Healing*, V. 7, 11).
Sīnā delineates the location of animal’s internal senses through three principles of differentiation. As summarized by McGinnis, these differentiations are based upon 1) the different cognitive objects, 2) the difference between receptive and retentive faculties, and 3) the difference between active and passive powers. For instance, the common sense accepts forms but not intentions (maʿānīn), actively receiving without passively retaining them; whereas memory receives intentions rather than forms, passively retaining without actively perceiving them. Part of this theory is based on Aristotle’s physiology of the elements: a natural body cannot simultaneously receive and retain because this would require that it be both wet and dry at the same time, whereas both are contradictory elements. Thus Ibn Sīnā locates the different internal faculties in different locations of the brain, since presumably different parts of this organs possess different elemental mixtures. The common sense, for example, is located in the front ventricle of the brain; the form-bearing faculty in the the middle ventricle; the estimative in the far end of the middle ventricle, etc. In this way, the logical analysis is grounded in the ontology of the natural world.

The correspondence between the existence of certain faculties in the soul with certain parts of the body is what Rāzī was referring to when he wrote that it is necessary to question the need for positing ‘the faculties that the Master has asserted

99 Jon McGinnis, Avicenna. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 111. In the Psychology of the Šifāʾ I.5.43, Ibn Sīnā writes: ‘As for the faculties of internal perception, some of them are faculties that perceive the forms of sensible and some the connotational attributes (maʿānd) of sensibles. The faculties of perception include those that both perceive and act; those that perceive but do not act; those that perceive in a primary way; and those that perceive in a secondary way.’

100 Ibn Sīnā, Physics of the Šifāʾ. II.3.
[to exist] in some of the specific organs.’ His criticism seems to be that Ibn Sīnā’s theory of faculty differentiation is superfluous. In understanding how the soul relates to its organs, it suffices to rely on the phenomenalist observation that Ibn Sīnā himself has written in the Psychology: that despite the diverse functions we produce through our bodies, we have the primary intuition that they belong to a single agency, such that we ‘[c]orrectly say: ‘When we sense, we desire,’ and ‘When we saw such-and-such, we became angry.’ This observation is consistent with Rāzī’s affirmation of the separability of the soul from the body, which is asserted through the principle that ‘the percipient of all acts of perception for all objects of perception is a single thing in human beings (ṣayʿun wāḥidun).’ We will discuss more extensively this aspect of his critique in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

The epistemic dimension to Ibn Sīnā’s theory of faculty differentiation that we have just outlined allows us to further grasp in what sense Rāzī deems the existence of the faculties to be superfluous. On the one hand, we have seen how Rāzī accepts Ibn Sīnā’s basic claim that the human soul is a unified entity, despite the various bodily and non-bodily actions it is capable of doing, and further substantiates this view with insights of his own. In addition, we have discussed how in Section IX Rāzī allies himself

102 Rāzī, Mabāḥīṯ II, 378.
103 Rāzī’s arguments against the theory of faculty differentiation and its link with the unified human agent is clearly taken from Abū al-Barakāt’s discussion of the same topic in the psychology section of the Kitāb al-muʿtabar. Shlomo Pines has translated these relevant sections and examined Abū al-Barakāt’s criticism in relation to Ibn Sīnā’s theory of self-awareness in the Mabāḥīṯ, ‘La Conception de la Conscience de Soi Chez Avicenne et Chez Abu’l-Barakat al-Baghdadi,’ 57-98.
with Ibn Sīnā in arguing against the Platonic theory of a plurality of souls in the human being and accepts the notion that the various bodily functions are subordinated essentially to the determinations of the human soul. What separates the two philosophers is that Rāzī refuses to conceptualize—in the Avicennian technical sense—these bodily functions as active principles of physical organs. That is to say, he does not accept the view that the faculties are the substrates from which the various activities of the soul are carried out. Thus, given that Ibn Sīnā’s theory of faculty differentiation is the result of a logical ordering of the various types of capacities human beings are capable of performing, and since this logical ordering is also the method by which Ibn Sīnā asserts the theory of the human soul’s univocity in essence, which Rāzī criticizes from an epistemological point of view, Rāzī’s denial of the existence of the faculties can be taken as being part of his wider concern regarding the epistemic merits of Avicennian absraction.\textsuperscript{104} The charge of superfluity is meant to convey the thought that we can accept the basic empirical insight of the theory of faculty differentiation—namely, our knowledge of the unified nature of the human soul and its interactions with the bodily functions—without having to commit to Ibn Sīnā’s views on the nature of the faculties as substrates for certain types of actions and attributes. Rāzī’s critique

\textsuperscript{104} As Ibrahim writes, the Avicennian method of division involves a particular way of conceiving the ontological unity of a quiddity as being structured by the relationship between the internal, constitutive parts of the quiddity and its external parts (\textit{viz.} accidents and concomitants). It is precisely this conception of the quiddity that Rāzī criticizes as being beyond our conceptual grasp: ‘Freeing Philosophy from Metaphysics,’ 125-129.
thus arises out of the desire to preserve the phenomenal unity of the soul, which the Avicennian theory of faculty differentiation seems to have compromised.

Throughout the psychology of the Mabāḥīṯ, Rāzī consistently resists the use of Avicennian epistemology and the ontological claims it asserts. We have seen how he is skeptical of Ibn Sīnā’s theory that human souls share a common essence. In fact, he seems to prefer the view of Abū al-Barakāt that they are essentially differentiated, though he does not give assent to this doctrine, but rather is content with raising doubts against the Avicennian position and suggesting possible alternative theories. We also find that although Rāzī accepts a number of Ibn Sīnā’s insights, he does so while remaining neutral in respect of Ibn Sīnā’s ontology. Thus he revises their content and justifications in accordance with his larger phenomenalist epistemological framework. Such was the case with his alternative arguments for the immateriality of the human soul and his revision of the first account of the soul as the nexus for the bodily functions. On the other hand, Rāzī in the psychology of the Mabāḥīṯ may opt to summarize a number of Ibn Sīnā’s psychological theories, while making clear the metaphysical commitments that bear upon the issue. We have seen how this was the case regarding the issues of the soul’s temporal generation, immortality and incorruptibility. Furthermore, when Rāzī finds a theory convincing, such as the unity of
the human soul and the physiological dimensions of the soul’s attachment to the body, he makes his affirmations explicit.105

In the psychology of the *Mabāḥīṭ*, Rāzī thus operates in a very subtle way. He sees his task as one where he refines the debates surrounding a number of psychological doctrines and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the competing arguments, bringing out the metaphysical and epistemological committments that underlie them. He then selects aspects of these doctrines that are consistent with his own approach in natural philosophy and advances a number of alternative theories to Avicennian psychology. As we shall see in the following part of this thesis, the result of these careful selections is that they contribute to Rāzī’s own theory of the human soul.

105 We did not discuss Rāzī’s account of Section XI. Here, he reproduces Ibn Sīnā’s argument in *Psychology* V. 8 that the first organ that attaches to the body is the heart. This argument is not contentious as it is justified through ‘experience in medicine’ (*Mabāḥīṭ* II, 409). In *Kitāb al-nafs*, he presents an extended discussion of the issue, criticizing the Galenic position that the brain is the first organ and supporting Aristotle’s where the heart is the first organ to be developed.
Chapter 3: Rāzī’s Simplified Theory of the Human Soul

In his critical engagement with Avicennian psychology, Rāzī asserts a number of alternative doctrines regarding the nature of the human soul. In our summary of Chapter 5 of the psychology of the Mabāḥiṭ, we discussed how Rāzī focused on three aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s psychological theory; namely the immateriality of the human soul, the univocity of its essence, and the nature of its unity and agency in respect of the diverse functions it performs. The bulk of Rāzī’s critique is found, as we have seen, in Sections I, III, and IX respectively. Here Rāzī develops arguments for three positions that revise each of the Avicennian theories mentioned above. The first position is a revision only of the proofs and method by which the doctrine is asserted rather than of the actual content, while the second and third is a revision on both counts. These positions are that 1) the human soul is essentially separable from the body, 2) individual human quiddities are essentially differentiated, and 3) human souls exert direct agency over the organs of the body, rather than being mediated by the corporeal and psychic faculties. However, though these three positions were initially set up as a dialectic response to the corresponding Avicennian positions, they were affirmed in a later work of the same period devoted specifically to psychology and ethical theory, the Kitāb al-nafs. Reading the critical approach of the Mabāḥiṭ together the relevant sections of this later work, we are able to reconstruct elements of a distinctly Razian psychological theory. The reason for this is that the three positions are interrelated theoretically and
are the result of a detailed reworking of Ibn Sīnā’s psychology by means of a phenomenalist procedure that Rāzī initially sets up in the psychology of the Mabāḥīṭ. In the previous Chapter, we have briefly discussed how he asserts these positions in the larger context of evaluating and revising Ibn Sīnā’s psychological theories. In the following, however, we will discuss in more detail how Rāzī develops these three positions as a systematic psychological theory.

The central concern in Rāzī’s critique of Ibn Sīnā’s proofs for the immateriality of the human soul in the Mabāḥīṭ is the latter’s reliance on the premise—established as the first proof of Section I—that human beings are capable of intellecting universals. According to Ibn Sīnā, since universals are indivisible entities, they cannot inhere in or come into contact with divisible substrates such as the body. Furthermore, he defines intellectual perception as the acquisition of the quiddity of the object of perception in the essence of the percipient subject. Therefore, whatever exists in the human being that is capable of perceiving the universals, or, to put it differently, whatever exists in the human being that comes into direct contact with the universal cannot be something that is divisible. The faculty that intellects universals is therefore indivisible and this is the soul. These premises regarding the intellection of universals are the basis of a number of other Avicennian proofs that Rāzī lists, such as the second, fifth, eighth, and eleventh proof.106

behind Avicenna’s epistemology and his psychological doctrines, a link that Rāzī duly recognizes and exploits in his critical evaluation of these proofs.

When, in the end of Section I, Rāzī offers what he considers to be more reliable proofs of the immateriality of the human soul, he attempts to do so without assuming Ibn Sīnā’s epistemological model with which the ontology of the soul is asserted. As we have briefly discussed in the previous Chapter, the two arguments that come out of this method is 1) an argument through recognition of selfhood from one moment to another and 2) the inference that our unified experience of sense-data can be explained only through the existence of a single percipient within us that is our soul.107

These two arguments purport to use premises gained through common experience in the act of sense-perception. In the first argument, Rāzī begins with the basic observation that we are consistently aware of our selfhood from one moment to another. This self that we perceive could either be 1) a body or something that subsists in a body or 2) incorporeal and something that does not subsist in a body. Scenario (1) is false, because awareness of our individual identity still occurs when we are preoccupied by our experience of the internal or external senses. Furthermore, our corporeal organs and external characteristics of the body are always subject to change; yet despite these bodily transformations, the self that is the object of our apperception remains the same. Hence (2) is the correct view; namely that the individual identity of human beings is incorporeal. As for the second argument, Rāzī begins with the observation that the

107 Rāzī, Mabūḥīt II, 377-78.
percipient of all percipient faculties of the human being is itself a ‘single thing in the body.’ That is to say, the different types of sense-data that faculties perceive are not experienced separately in discrete moments of experience. Rather, we experience them in a unified way. This points to the existence of a single agent that beings them together in a single act of perception. Rāzī writes that this single thing is either 1) a body (1.a) or an attribute that subsists in a body (1.b), or 2) it is not a body and does not subsist in it. Scenario (1.a) is false because of the principle that bodies insofar as they are bodies cannot act. The single thing could not also be an attribute in a body (1.b) because then it would have to exist in some parts of the body or all parts of the body. The first is false because this does not satisfy the requirement that this single thing should be the percipient of all percipient capacities in the body; while the second is false because then all parts of the body (every organ and limbs) should be capable of perceiving. Therefore, Rāzī concludes, the single thing is incorporeal. Unlike Ibn Sīnā’s proofs, therefore, Rāzī attempts to develop arguments that do not require metaphysical or ontological assumptions as premises. Instead, his primary premises are obtained through our experience of sense-perception; namely the perpetual recognition of self-hood and the unity of sensory experience.

108 Rāzī, Mabāḥīṭ II, 231-235.
109 As part of his academic style, Rāzī offers two objections against his own arguments, which we need not discuss here. The second objection was a possible Avicennian response that uses the doctrine of the human soul’s common quiddity as a premise. Rāzī dismisses the first objection as being irrelevant to the issues at hand.
Rāzī carries out the same method in Chapter 4 of the *Kitāb al-nafs*, entitled ‘On Investigating the Quiddity of the Substance of the Soul.’\(^{110}\) Here, he undertakes to prove the proposition that our individual identity is ‘something other than the external sensible structure.’\(^{111}\) He thus develops six arguments, the three of which (Proofs I, II, and IV) are detailed elaborations of the two alternative proofs he presents in the *Mabāḥīṭ*. Notably, however, the Proof VI shows a very strong Avicennian coloring, since it follows very closely Ibn Sīnā’s identification of intelligibles with the rational faculty, and that in turn with soul. In the following we will examine these four arguments in particular and how they continue and expand the procedure Rāzī sets up in the psychology of the *Mabāḥīṭ*.

Proof I on the immateriality of the human soul is based on the premise that the soul is one.\(^{112}\) Rāzī argues, like Ibn Sīnā, that this claim can be supported by intuitive knowledge (*al-ʿīlm al-badiḥi*). Whenever we point out a particular person or identify ourself, we always intend a single entity rather than multiple entities. However, Rāzī is aware that this insight alone is not sufficient to establish the proposition; this phenomenal unity can in fact be composed of many entities. He thus adds to this first proof a second stage (*al-maqām al-ṭānī*) of argumentation, which are four rational proofs for the premise that the soul is a single thing. These proofs are based on a similar observation we have seen he makes in the *Mabāḥīṭ*: that there seems to be a single

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\(^{111}\) Ibid., 27.

\(^{112}\) Ibid., 27-33.
agency in the activities of a human being that is capable of resolving his potentially contradictory functions, such as desire or aversion towards some physical stimulant.

Rāzī reasons that the source of this unified agency must be a single substrate that is the organizing principle of these functions.

Having presented these arguments to establish the unity of the human soul, Rāzī goes on to argue for its immaterial nature. He does this by deploying again the second alternative proof of the Mabāḥīṯ, namely the claim that the percipient of all percipients of the body is a single thing. Thus he writes:

> It is necessary that the soul is not an expression (ʿibāra) of any part of the body. The proof for this is that we necessarily know (bi-l-Ḍarūrī) that there is no single part of the body that in itself can be attributed by sight, hearing, tasting, thinking, and memory. Rather, it has been understood by the mind from the outset that sight is peculiar to the eye, and the same statement can be said of other perceptions and actions. [...] Now if it is said that there exists in the body a single entity, then this part must specifically characterize all of these perceptions and actions. We know necessarily that such a part is non-existent. Now it has been established that the human soul is a single thing that is characterized by these perceptions and the totality of these actions. And it has [also] been established by intuition that the totality of the body is not like this, nor is this the case with any part of the body. As such, there is certainty that the soul is something other than the body or any part of the body. And this is what is sought-after.¹¹³

Rāzī’s reasoning is based on two premises, namely 1) that each organ of action or perception is tasked with a single kind of activity and 2) that our experience of agency and perception indicates that whoever experiences these activities is a single thing.

Since we intuit that there is no single physical part of the body that receives and

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performs these activities—whereas the discreet totality of organs do not form a single agency—this single agency must be something other than the body. He thus concludes that ‘the essence of the soul is a substance that is other than [the body] and is essentially separate from it, being attached to it by way of governance and administration.’ Rāzī then declares that this first proof is the most compelling demonstration (*al-burhān al-qāhir*) for the immateriality of the human soul.

Proof II is also an elaboration of the second alternative proof of the *Mabāḥiṭ*.

Rāzī writes that if a human being were just an expression of the body then their various attributes such as life, knowledge, power and volition would have to either exist in every part of his body or not. The first division is false because then every limb and organ of the body would be living, knowing, doing, and willing independently of each other. This of course violates the premise he establishes early on, namely that the human being is a single entity. The second division is also false because then each of the qualities—which was assumed to be physical—would have to exist in multiple places at the same time. The notion that a single body exists simultaneously in many places is an absurdity. Furthermore, if for instance ‘living’ is located in the heart, it cannot bring life to the limbs without leaving the heart to perish, which again is absurd.

Proof IV is an elaboration of the first alternative argument in the *Mabāḥiṭ*, namely that self-awareness subsists even when the body undergoes perpetual

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114 Ibid., 32-33.
115 Ibid., 33.
Here, Rāzī adds some more observations of physiological change in the human being, e.g. the liquid substance that comprise much of the human body evaporates when it produces bodily heat, bodily parts also undergo reduction through prespiration and increase through nutrition. However, despite these physical changes, the 'I' that we identify to be ourself, say twenty years ago, was the same then as it is now. Hence, he concludes that this object of self-awareness survives physical changes and thus cannot be essentially dependent upon them. Here, Rāzī adopts the Avicennian doctrine that self-awareness is none other than the very existence of the human soul.\[117\]

In Proof VI, Rāzī betrays a very strong Avicennian influence, since he uses an argument that seems at first to adopt Ibn Sinā’s ontology of intellection. Rāzī writes:

> When we examine the states of the soul, we see that its state is contrary to the states of the body. This indicates that the soul is not bodily. This account can be settled by more than one way: the first is that all bodies that obtain a form that comes after another form different in kind do not obtain [that second form] except after the complete disappearance of the first form from it \[i.e. the body\]. For example, when the shape of a triangle obtains in wax, it is impossible that the shape of a square and circle obtains in it except after the disappearance of the first form from it. However, we find that the state in the soul’s reception of the conceptualization of intelligibles is contrary to this. The soul that has not receive an intelligible form will find it difficult to receive it, on account of one intelligible. When \[the soul\] receives one [other] form, it receives this second form more easily \[and so on\].\[118\]

Rāzī then continues to observe that in the successive acquisition of intelligibles, the soul does not weaken; rather it gathers strength and ultimately becomes perfected. He

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116 This is in fact the fourth argument of the six Rāzī presents in support of the immateriality of the human soul. *Ibid.*, 37.


concludes that since the state of the body behaves in exactly the opposite way to this, in that it suffers deterioration, the soul cannot be a body.

This argument seems to use a premise that Rāzī does not state explicitly; namely that the substrate for intelligibles is the soul. This premise is similar to the first Avicennian proof for the immateriality of the soul as summarized in the Mabāḥīṭ, where he argues that in the perception of universals, the substrate in which these intelligibles inhere cannot be divisible, such as a body, but an indivisible entity. The organ that perceives universals must therefore be immaterial and this is soul. However, despite the similarities, Rāzī’s argument in the Kitāb al-nafs is different in that he uses a different set of terms. The intelligibles to which Rāzī refers can be imaginative forms (as the example suggests) rather than just universals. He might have intended to include universals, but he does not restrict his argument to it. Secondly, Rāzī focuses on the different behaviour of, or the observable effects displayed by, the body and the thing that perceives intelligibles when they receive forms successively, rather than on their nature as being divisible or indivisible entities. Hence, whereas Ibn Sīnā’s arguments involve a highly abstract discussion on the claim that the only indivisible bodily thing is a punctiform extremity (taraq nuqti), and that points cannot be the substrate for universal concepts, Rāzī’s arguments compare the observable effects shown by the soul when it thinks of successive forms—be them an imaginative or intellectual—with the effects displayed by

119 Rāzī, Mabāḥīṭ II, 345.
120 Ibid.
bodily things when they receive successive forms. In the first case, the thing that perceives these forms does not suffer deterioration, but in fact increases in strength even when the successive forms are radically different from the first; whereas in the second case, the bodily thing will undergo deterioration with each successive transmutations, especially if the change is drastic. Given the premise, established early on, that the percipient of all percipients in the human being is the soul, the thing that perceives intelligibles is none other than the soul and it must therefore be essentially separable from the body.\textsuperscript{121}

Thus it is clear that though Rāzī postpones judgement on the immateriality of the human soul in the \textit{Mabāḥīt}, he later affirms this doctrine in the \textit{Kitāb al-nafs} by means of the same arguments and method he had previously developed. Furthermore, he not only repeats his earlier insights, but considerably extends their discussion, working out in detail the premises initially assumed and marshalling fresh arguments to strengthen his case. Furthermore, as we have seen, Rāzī remains faithful to the phenomenalist procedure he applies in the \textit{Mabāḥīt}. All six arguments in the \textit{Kitāb al-nafs} do not presume an Avicennian model of intellection and universals. Instead, he makes more extensive use of premises gained from common experience of self-awareness, perception, empirical observation of physiological changes, and intuitive

\textsuperscript{121} Later on in this chapter we will discuss with more precision how Rāzī conceives the role of the soul as the substrate for diverse functions.
knowledge.\textsuperscript{122} In the case of the sixth argument, though he is clearly influenced by Ibn Sīnā’s proof through intellection of universals, Rāzī restricts himself to examining the observable effects of the soul and body in their reception of forms.\textsuperscript{123} Furthermore, since he includes imaginative forms in his use of the term intelligibles, he stays clear of Ibn Sīnā’s model of intellection and ontology of universals, which he criticizes in the \textit{Mabāḥīḥ}.

Let us now turn to the second element of Razian psychology, namely the internal structure of the human soul. We have seen how in the \textit{Mabāḥīḥ} Rāzī argues that Ibn Sīnā’s theory that individual human souls share the same quiddity is weak because it is not supported by demonstration. Implicit in this claim is the more fundamental disagreement that Rāzī has concerning the possibility of attaining knowledge of a thing’s essence through the Avicennian procedure of abstraction, which purports to gain knowledge of a thing’s ontological structure.\textsuperscript{124} Since Rāzī is sceptical of the reliability of this procedure, the expectation seems to be that claims like the existence of a common quiddity among individual members of a species must be secured by

\textsuperscript{122} In Proof III for instance Rāzī writes that whenever we say ‘I,’ the space-occupying body is not necessarily or immediately made known. He contends that if the ‘I’ is an expression of the self then some sort of ‘general knowledge’ (\textit{al-ʿilm ʿalā sabīl al-ʿumla}) of the body must occur whenever we state or is aware of our individual identity, even if detailed knowledge (\textit{al-ʿilm bi-l-taḥṣīl}) does not obtain on account of forgetfulness. A similar line of thought is advanced in Proof V, where he observes that whenever we verbalize our actions such as ‘I have thought’ or ‘I have heard,’ we are at that moment forgetful of our face, brain, hands and other organs related to the functions of the action.

\textsuperscript{123} Ibrahim, ‘Freeing Philosophy from Metaphysics,’ 164-166. As quoted by Ibrahim, Rāzī writes in the \textit{Mabāḥīḥ} that when examining the nature of the body, ‘since we do not grasp the essences of those constitutive parts [\textit{i.e.} genus and differentia], we will doubtless define “body” by its effects and concomitant attributes,’ (170).

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Ibid.}, 83-97.
demonstrations whose premises consist of analytic propositions. These propositions in turn are acquired by common sources of knowledge, such as our experience of agency and sense perception. In the case of the immateriality of the soul above, Rāzī uses the observations of stability in self-awareness and unity in sensory experience as premises for his proof of the soul’s immateriality. In a similar way, Rāzī works out a procedure that tries to fulfill this condition. Thus, we have seen how he adopts Abū al-Barakāt’s argument that human souls are essentially differentiated, since systematic observation shows that the character-traits of individual human beings are unchanging, despite the external circumstances of an individual’s life, be them his physiological make-up or education. The causal principle that determines a person’s level of intelligence, courage, or generosity seems to be intrinsic to his essence. For Rāzī, therefore, the soul’s essence seems to be, as it were, encoded indivisibly by these varying qualities. To this effect he writes, in his critique of Ibn Sīnā’s theory of the univocity of human souls, that they ‘differ in the perfection of their quiddity.’ This ‘perfection’ denotes nothing more than original state of an individual’s essence. The perfection of a person’s quiddity is, for instance, the predetermined level of

125 Ibid. 129; real definitions that form the premises for Avicennian demonstrative science are non-analytic in that they identify no less the indivisible essence of a thing. On the other hand Ibrahim identifies Rāzī’s method as ‘analytic,’ in that it examines the attributes belonging to a thing’s phenomenal unity without judging how the internal structure of the essence necessitates its attributes: ‘Freeing Philosophy from Metaphysics,’ 178.

126 Rāzī, Mabāḥīṯ II, 386
intelligence, generosity, courage, and other traits of character he possesses.\textsuperscript{127} Thus, unlike the Avicennian concept of perfection that is operative on the level of species, Rāzī’s use of the term in this context is operative on the level of individual substances.\textsuperscript{128}

These native attributes that are expressed in our behaviour are phenomenally basic, since we possess immediate epistemological access to them through the everyday observations of sense-perception. The upshot of this view is that the essence of the human being—in whatever form it may be constituted ontologically—possesses an internal structure that is the primary determination of these character-trait phenomena. The fact that these attributes can be generalized into classes of attributes, such as ‘rational,’ is therefore an entirely mental construct. Though human beings seem to be capable of rational thought—since this quality in their variations of intensity and expression are

\textsuperscript{127} To be sure, external circumstances can cause change in a person’s original disposition. However, the original nature or archetype will never be eradicated completely, but simply kept in latency or minimized; see Rāzī, \textit{Mabāḥīt II}, 387. This view has a direct implication on his ethical theory. For an extended discussion on Rāzī conception of perfection of the human soul in the context of his teleological ethical theory, consult Shihadeh, \textit{The Teleological Ethics}, 109–129.

\textsuperscript{128} Rāzī’s use of the term ‘perfection’ is highly contextual to the current discussion where he is specifically engaging with Avicennian psychological theory. For Ibn Śinā, the soul as first perfection of the human body means that the soul is the cause of a particular kind of natural body that is distinctly human. This particular human body becomes in turn the ‘springboard’, as it were, for distinctly human activities, and this is the second perfection (Wisnovsky, \textit{Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context}, 119–125). In this context, Rāzī’s use of the word ‘perfection’ suggests that he wants to retain Ibn Śinā’s technical vocabulary and describe his view of the essential differentiation of human souls as one where each soul is the only member of its own species. This use of Avicennian terminology no longer appears when Rāzī advances the same doctrine in the \textit{Kitāb al-nafs}, 85–88. In an article on Rāzī’s metaethical theory, we briefly sorted out the different ways he used the term ‘perfection’ (\textit{tamām} or \textit{kamāl}) in his psychological theory in the \textit{Kitāb al-nafs}: Fariduddin Attar Rifai, ‘Metaphysics of Goodness According to St. Anselm of Anterbury and Fahr al-Dīn al-Rāzī,’ in Philosophy and the Abrahamic Religions: Scriptural Hermeneutics and Epistemology, eds. Torrance Kirby, Rahim Acar and Bilal Baş (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013) 167–169.
displayed by many individuals—the primary observation to which we have unmediated access remains that each individual expresses unique variations and intensities of this attribute—e.g. the intelligence of a mathematician and a physicist. The secondary, mental construction is that these variations nonetheless fall under a certain kind of category; namely the genus of rational activities. In other words, ‘rational’ is equivocally not univocally named of one individual human being to another.

In light of this distinction between our mental construct of a certain hierarchy of attributes and the phenomenal expressions thereof in various human activities, Rāzī writes that it is possible to conceive ‘rational’ as an external necessary concomitant (al-lawāżim al-ḥāriğiyya). This is in opposition to Ibn Sīnā’s theory where ‘rational’ is a constitutive (muqawwima) of the quiddity. Rāzī offers an alternative account to the Avicennian analysis of substance as being divisible into its constituent parts; namely the genus and differentia, which together identify the species of a given individual. He thinks that the observation that to be human is to be capable of rational activity does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that rational is predicated of the very essence of humanity as a constitutive part of the substance. Rather it is possible to account for the necessity, or rather the appearance of necessity, as a concomitant of the essence. Thus he appropriates the Avicennian technical sense of ‘concomitant’ that is meant to denote

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129 It is in this sense that Rāzī speaks of practical and theoretical perfection, as in the case of the prophets. Frank Griffel, Al-Ġazālī’s Concept of Prophecy,’ 101–144.
130 Rāzī, Mabāḥīḥ II, 386
an attribute that is external to the constituted essence but is necessitated by it.\(^{132}\) This allows Rāzī to avoid passing judgement on the ontological nature of the soul, while making the necessary scientific observation that a human soul is capable of rational actions.

In the Kitāb al-nafṣ, Rāzī devotes a chapter to the question ‘whether the rational soul is one in species or many in species.”\(^ {133}\) In support of the thesis that human beings differ in nature, he repeats the same argument he develops in the Mabāḥīṭ, reproducing Abu al-Barakāt’s observations regarding the immutability of human character traits or personality despite the physiological changes and pedagogy. To buttress his position, Rāzī responds to the following objection from an Avicennian perspective: if that which differs among human beings (e.g. traits of character) are also part of the internal structure of that which is common among human beings (e.g. the activities of the rational soul), then this structure would be something composite, in which case it must be bodily—yet it has been accepted earlier that the human soul is essentially different from the body. As we have seen in Chapter 2, Rāzī presents this line of reasoning as the

\(^{132}\) As was the case above with Rāzī’s use of the word ‘perfection’ to denote individual souls’ natural disposition, the use of the word ‘concomitant’ is also contextual to his direct engagement with Ibn Sīnā. In Kitāb al-nafṣ, 87, he changes his vocabulary and describes these ‘concomitants’ as ‘accidental and external attributes’ (al-sifūt al-‘aradiyya al-ḥāriǧiyya), which he identifies as the capacity of the soul in administering and governing the body. I suspect that rationality is implicitly included in this capacity.

\(^{133}\) Rāzī, Kitāb al-nafṣ, 85-88.
first argument for the view that human beings share a common essence. Against this objection he writes that

There is no meaning in their being souls except that they are the things that administer this body. However, their being administrators for this body is a relational and accidental attribute. So why is it impossible to say that the substance of the soul (jawhar al-nafs) differs in the perfection of their essences? Their being in common is only with respect to this accidental and external attribute. On this opinion, it does not follow that there is composition in their quiddities. Simple existing things that are differentiated in the perfection of their quiddities are common in their being things that exist, things that are mentioned, and things that are known (muštarikatun fil kawnih mawǧūdatan w-a- maḏkūranat wa-maʿlūmatan). Thus composition [in their nature] does not follow from these [states].

Thus Rāzī’s responds by arguing that the common attributes, viz. the activities of the rational soul, are reducible to its various functions in administrating the body. As such, these activities are not essential attributes of the human soul but are accidental and relational. They are merely the visible effects, as it were, of a particular activity of

134 Rāzī, Mabāḥīḥ II, 383
135 Rāzī, Kitāb al-nafs, 87.
136 Implicitly, this means that the rational soul is simply a certain aspect of the soul when it administers the body. However, if this is case, Rāzī has thus reduced all activities of the rational soul to its relationship with the body. It is doubtful that he is not aware that this is a startling point to make, especially when compared to the Avicennian context in which this kind of relationship is reserved to describe the practical faculty. Does Rāzī recognize that there is something like a theoretical faculty, where the soul performs a sort of action that has no connection with the body whatsoever, i.e. intellection of universals? Unfortunately, he does not flesh out this claim in the present text. However, as we shall see later, the division between practical and theoretical faculties—and in fact, any differentiation of corporeal or psychic faculties—should not obscure the reality of the ‘substance of the soul,’ a concept which he alludes to in the passage above and which we will discuss more extensively below. The thought seems to be that the substrate for all actions and passions of the soul, whether they are categorized as rational, imaginative, perceptive, etc, is the ‘substance of the soul.’ Thus we have the claim above that the ‘rational’ is reducible to actions of the substance of the soul when it administers its body, accentuating the accidental or derivative character of these activities. Another possible explanation for the claim in the above passage is that Rāzī also believes that however abstract and detached we are in the intellectual life, this ultimately remains a kind of governance and administration of the body.
the ‘substance of the soul’ (jawhar al-nafs), a term Rāzī uses consistently in the Kitāb al-nafs to designate the essence of human beings. As a result, the Avicennian objection does not apply, since in this picture, the common and differing aspects of human souls are not combined in their essence. As Rāzī writes, the ‘things that are differentiated’ refers to the substance of the soul that are encoded indivisibly by the combination of possible attributes that renders it unique, e.g. traits of character, while the things that are ‘common’ refers specifically to those activities of the substance of the soul when they concern the governance and administration of the body. The two categories remain separate, the first being internal to the essence, the second being external to the essence.

As a result, Rāzī effectively reversed the causal relationship between these two classes of attributes as it is theorized by Ibn Sīnā, while preserving, at the same time, the empirical insight that Ibn Sīnā also recognizes, namely that human beings are common in certain respects and different in others. For Rāzī, the causal principle of individual human souls is the difference, viz. variations of human traits; while the effect of this cause in the realm of existence and conceptualization (fi kawnihi mawǧūdatan wa-maḏkūratan wa-ma‘lūmatan) is the common attribute, e.g. rational activity. Rāzī seems to have turned Ibn Sīnā’s theory on its head.

By offering this alternative account, Rāzī makes explicit the ontological implications of Ibn Sīnā’s logical procedure in conceptualizing the common attribute of members of a certain species as a constituent of their essences. What is at stake for Rāzī,
in his scientific observations regarding the human soul, is the two phenomena of 1) difference and commonality in the actions and passions of individual human beings and 2) the observation he made in Section III regarding the invariability of human traits of character, irrespective of any external causes, whether pedagogical or physiological. Though Ibn Sīnā’s view that the common attribute (viz. rational) is the cause of the human body can account for the first phenomena, this theory, Rāzī argues, does not adequately explain the second phenomena. That is to say, whereas Ibn Sīnā’s view that the human soul’s quiddity as ‘rational animal’ is adequate in explaining the uniquely human functions that individual members of the species are capable of performing, this theory, in assigning differentiation to extrinsic, material causes, is incapable of explaining the fact that human beings possess seemingly innate traits of character that are reducible neither to their upbringing or physiological make-up. On the other hand, Rāzī believes that his theory—that assigns differentiation to intrinsic, essential causes—accounts adequately for both the phenomena of commonality and differentiation among the human species.

In this scheme, the question is a matter of plausibility: which model explains best our systematic observation of natural phenomena? Thus Rāzī raises the issue as a matter of possibility, claiming that ‘it is possible that [rational activity] are concomitants (al-lāzima) for the substance of the soul.”137 By raising the issue in this manner, he makes the general claim that Ibn Sīnā’s logical procedure of conceptualizing

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137 Rāzī, Mabāḥih II, 386.
essences as being internally constituted by genus and differentia carries an ontological baggage that can compromise our capacity to adequately investigate natural phenomena. Rāzī’s specific claim in Section III of the psychology of the Mabāḥīṭ and the Kitāb al-nafs is that this ontological commitment has indeed compromised a more accurate view on matter.

However, Ibn Sīnā’s theory that essences are internally constituted by the genus and differentia is meant to preserve the natural unity of the species in the procedure of scientific investigation. The pre-scientific notion of human beings already differentiates them as a class of existing things different from other existents. The kinds of predications proper to explaining what a human being is must not only consist of a set of attributes differentiated as belonging to one class of things rather than another, but also account for the causal relationships that obtain between these class-specific attributes. For instance, the ability to reproduce seems to be part of a number of functions that are shared with other species that can be generalized as ‘animal’ functions. The classification of the internal constituents of an essence and those attributes causally dependent upon them is an attempt to preserve the natural unity of individual members of the species. Rāzī, as we have seen, does not accept this ontological model. How then does Rāzī explain the natural unity of a given species? His theory of necessary concomitants pertaining to an essence implies a hierarchy of attributes that are predicated of the human being. But it is not clear how these concomitants are parts of the unified structure of a given individual. Are these simply
discrete functions that agglomerate in an individual essence, or are there deeper structures by which these functions are ordered as parts of the essence? Furthermore, how do these concomitants relate to those attributes that seem contingent on the essential properties of human beings? These questions will be clarified once we discuss the third aspect of Rāzī’s psychology in the Mabāḥīṭ: namely his criticism of Ibn Sīnā’s theory of faculty differentiation, and his alternative view that there are no deeper ontological structures that mediate between the individual human soul and its actions.

In our discussion of Rāzī’s criticism in Section IX of Ibn Sīnā’s theory of faculty differentiation, we have shown how Rāzī deems the existence of these faculties to be superfluous in conceiving the relationship between the soul and the bodily instruments that carry out its actions. Let us revisit the passage in Section X regarding the role of the soul as the nexus of the corporeal faculties, but focusing this time on an aspect of Rāzī’s critique that we did not previously discuss, namely, the unity of the human soul:

What is the meaning of the soul being a nexus (ribaṭ) for these faculties? For if you mean by this that the soul is a ground (illa) of their existence, this much does not suffice in [allowing] some of them to cooperate with others in the actions they perform or in [allowing some of them] to be an impediment (mu‘āfaqan) to them. For if the cause brings to existence specific faculties in different substrates and bestows a proper organ to each of them, they would each be detached from (munfasila ‘an) the other faculty and be independent of it, without a connection to it in any way whatsoever. In such a case, how will the commencement (šurū‘) of some of [these faculties] in their specific action prevent others in their action? Isn’t the Active Intellect a principle of the existence of all the faculties in bodies? It would follow therefore from [the fact that] they are altogether an effect of a single principle and a single cause, that some impede others from their action or aid them in it. But if you mean by this that the soul is the governor of these faculties and their mover, then this is possible in two ways.
The first is that it is said that the soul sees objects of sight, hears audible things, and desires things that are desirable. The essence [of the soul] is a substrate for these faculties and a principle (mabdaʿan) for these actions, and thus it sees, desires or becomes angry. This is how things are (fa-haḏā al-haqqa). However, this requires an argument that denies [the existence of] the faculties that the Master has asserted in certain, specific organs. For if the soul sees, hears and desires, what need is there in asserting the faculty of sight in the spirit—one that [exists] in the confluence of the two nerves (multaqā al-ʿaṣabatayni)—and the faculty of hearing in the spirit—one that is in the nerves of the ear canal (al-ʿaṣab al-ṣamāḥ)? In short, human beings see and hear through the sight and hearing that subsists in them, not through the sight and hearing that subsists in another thing.\footnote{Rāzī, Mabāḥīṭ II, 407. The second way that the soul can be conceptualized as a nexus is the standard Avicennian account (ʿalā maḏḥab al-ṣayḥ), which he criticizes in this passage.}

Here, we see Rāzī struggling with Ibn Sinā’s analysis of the soul as the source of actions performed by the body. Rāzī seems to take Ibn Sinā’s method of division as entailing an ontological division: that each organ is ‘governed’ by a corresponding faculty that is distinct from the essence of the soul.\footnote{This rescension of Ibn Sinā’s views is consistent with those expressed in, for instance, Psychology III: Ibn Sinā, Psychology III. 7. 144 and III. 8. 152.} Thus Rāzī writes that action should not proceed in something ‘that subsists in another thing’. Earlier in this Section, he wrote that the unified agency of human beings—through cooperation and surpression (mutaʿāwana and mutadāfaʿa)—was possible because of the existence of a ‘common thing’ (šayʿ muṣṭarik).\footnote{Rāzī, Mabāḥīṭ II, 406}

To claim that the faculties are the source of specific actions would not only violate this principle of a common agency, but is also superfluous if, in the final analysis, the soul itself is the substrate of these actions. However, this is of course not the way Ibn Sinā conceived his theory of faculty of differentiation. As we have shown in Chapter 2 of this...
thesis, Ibn Sīnā’s differentiation of the faculties is meant to establish a unified hierarchy of human functions that are subject to the determinations of the rational soul as their final cause. In its descent from the Active Intellect into a natural body, the ‘life’ of the rational soul is diffused among the diverse potentialities of that body, being capable therefore not only of the act of rational thought but other functions classified as ‘vegetative’ and ‘animal’. The existence of the faculties must be posited insofar as the actualizing cause of these functions does not arise from the organs themselves, since these are simply material substrates, which are mere potencies. It does not seem to be true, therefore, that in the Avicennian framework the existence of these faculties introduces multiplicity in a ‘common thing’, such that the status of the soul as the substrate of action is compromised. Thus Rāzī, in his criticism, is being either misleadingly dialectical or simply misunderstands Ibn Sīnā’s theory.\textsuperscript{141}

Whatever the case may be, this discussion highlights Rāzī’s resistance—repeated, as we have seen, throughout the psychology of the Mabāḥīṯ—to an analysis of causation that presupposes Ibn Sīnā’s ontology. Instead, his analysis of the question of the soul’s unity with respect to its different functions seems rather simplistic. He

\textsuperscript{141} As we have seen in Chapter 1 of this thesis, it is unlikely that Razi misunderstands the theory. His critical engagement in his commentary of Namaṭ III of the Išārāt, shows that he is aware of the logical framework Avicenna’s method of division. See Ibrahim, ‘Freeing Philosophy from Metaphysics’, 298-298. It is more likely that he is being dialectical here in that he decontextualizes the theory from its logical framework, emphasizing its ontological aspects. Still the ambiguities remain. Rāzī uses the terms ‘faculties’ to describe certain functions of the human soul, both in the psychology of the Mabāḥīṯ and other works that touch on psychology. As we have discussed in Chapter 2, what he is criticizes here focuses on what he deems to be the localization of the faculty in specific organs, which he thinks introduces an otherness to the soul’s unity.
argues that ‘the soul performs its actions by its essence, but [only] through the mediation of the different organs,’ comparing this to Ibn Sīnā’s position where ‘the soul is a principle of the existence of many corporeal faculties, and thereafter a proper action issues from each proper faculty.’” Thus he emphasizes the passive qualities of the organs by stressing their mediative role in action, contrasting that with Ibn Sīnā’s theory where the faculties extert a causal influence (as form) over their respective organs (as matter). It is in this sense that Rāzī writes that the soul simply uses the organ of sight in order to see or the organs of hearing to hear. Rāzī does not seek to unravel the deeper ontological structures that underlie these acts. What he defends adamantly is the phenomenal unity displayed by the soul as the ‘common thing’ in the various functions it performs. It was this concern that brought him into disagreement with Avicenna’s theory of faculty differentiation.

In the Kitāb al-nafs, Rāzī devotes Chapters 7 and 9 to a discussion on the nature of the faculties and their relationship to the soul. In Chapter 7, he follows very closely Ibn Sīnā’s scheme for the various faculties present in the human being in the Psychology I.5 of the Šifā’. He outlines the various functions of the vegetative and animal faculties, and does not depart from the Avicennian division of the internal senses. He also presents the major division of the human soul into the theoretical and

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142 Rāzī, Mabāḥīṯ II, 405
143 Rāzī, Kitāb al-nafs, 74-84.
practical faculties, but changes the wording of their definition in accordance to his views on the relationship between the faculties and the human substance:

The theoretical [faculty] is the faculty through which the substance of the soul is prepared to receive the universal and separable forms. The practical [faculty] is the faculty through which the substance of the soul is prepared for administrating the body.144

Here, Rāzī emphasizes on the mediating role of the faculties and the active role of the ‘substance of the soul.’ He seems to have good reason to believe that this is a different theory to that of Ibn Sīnā, since in the Psychology I.5 of the Šifāʾ, the definition of the theoretical and practical faculty focuses on their agency as active principles and the very locus from which the action takes place. Regarding the theoretical faculty, Ibn Sīnā writes that it is ‘a faculty whose role is to be imprinted with the universal forms that are separate from matter,’ whereas the practical faculty is ‘a principle that moves the human body to perform particular actions determined by reflecting on what is required by customary opinions specific to [those actions].’145 Given that the previous discussion on the nature of the vegetative and animal souls does not depart from Psychology I.5 of the Šifāʾ, this departure from the the Avicennian scheme is a deliberate move and shows a clear disagreement on Rāzī’s part. This is consistent with the position he takes in the Mabāḥīṭ, where he argues that the Avicennian theory of faculty differentiation, which assigns an active role to the faculties, compromises the unity of the human substance.

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144 Ibid., 77.
In the *Kitāb al-nafs*, however, this disagreement is more clearly stated. By the end of Chapter 7, having defined the theoretical and practical faculties of the human soul, Rāzī writes:

Know that the philosophers have elaborated these arguments regarding the faculties, and they assigned each [type of] action to a single faculty. Then they claim that some of them are corporeal faculties, while others are psychic faculties. However, we have established in a number of our books that all these perceptions belong to the substance of the soul, and all these actions belong to the substance of the soul. Every organ of the body is an instrument of the soul with respect to a particular action. For instance, the instrument of the soul for seeing is the eye, for hearing is the ears, for speech is the tongue. Since we have settled the proofs that indicate the correctness of this argument in many of our books, there is no need for us to repeat them in this chapter.¹⁴⁶

Though this line of thought does not depart significantly from the discussion in the *Mabāḥīṭ*, the new insight we gain is that Rāzī clarifies what he means when he talks about the theoretical and practical faculties. This is particularly important in the context of the *Kitāb al-nafs*, because his definition of these terms relate to how he understands the related concepts of theoretical and practical perfection in ethical theory, one that departs from the Avicennian concept of perfection even though the same terms are used. Indeed, as we have seen in the discussion of Chapter 7, Rāzī seems to have adopted wholesale Ibn Sīnā’s theory of faculty differentiation because the same terms are used. However, we have shown that Rāzī only takes those aspects of this theory that suits his own phenomenalist epistemology and rejects those that do not fit into this framework. In the first case, he adopts the idea that certain organs are tasked

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¹⁴⁶ Rāzī, *Kitāb al-nafs*, 77-78
with a specific function; in the second case, he rejects the claim that these faculties are active principles that are the locus from which these functions take place. Though in this passage he does not explore the reason why this should be the case, we can safely assume that he holds the same reservations as in the *Mabāḥīṯ*, namely that the Avicennian theory of faculty differentiation compromises the phenomenal unity of the soul.

However, in the *Kitāb al-Nafs*, ṫāzī takes this argument further and ascribes an ontological significance to this phenomenal unity as the aforementioned 'substance of the soul' (*ǧawhar al-nafs*) that is the substrate where all actions and perceptions take place. In the language of the *Mabāḥīṯ*, this substrate is referred to as the 'nexus' of the faculties or the ‘perceipient of all percepts,’ which brings to mind a more relational rather than ontological reality. Now if we bring into the discussion his theory of the soul’s essential differentiatedness, then this ‘substance of the soul’ is none other than the uniquely encoded essence where all the latent capacities and characteristics of a given individual is contained. This essence is in turn an immaterial entity, completely separable from the body and is the principle of unity that organizes the various functions and characteristics of the human being.

Thus we have seen how, through a phenomenalist methodology by which he criticizes and revises a number of Avicennian psychological theory, ṫāzī develops what we have called a simplified theory of the human soul. It is simplified in comparison to Ibn Sīnā’s theory, which not only accounts for the three issues above, but also explains
the soul’s causation of the body in a theory of temporal generation (Section V and VI),
the soul’s incorruptibility (Section VII and VIII), and the soul’s origins in the
emanations of the Active intellect (Section IX). As we have seen in Chapter 2 of this
thesis, Rāzī does not in the Mabāḥīṭ develop his own views when discussing these issues.
He largely reproduces Ibn Sīnā’s insights in the Psychology—emphasizing that these are
based on premises derived from Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics—and makes gestures to
alternative accounts by Abū al-Barakāt and the Mutakalimīn. Ibn Sīnā’s theory also
accounts for the internal structure of the human soul: his theory of faculty
differentiation shows the various determinations of the human rational soul in its
interaction with the body and the kinds of activities proper to it; namely the
classification of the theoretical faculty into the material intellect, intellect in habitus,
actual intellect, and acquired intellect.147 While the first set of determinations is
accidental in that the human soul’s connection to the body is accidental, the second set
of determinations reveals its essential structure because they identify its unique
activity insofar as it is separable from the body, i.e. the intellection of universals. Rāzī’s
theory of the human soul on the other hand does not attempt to describe its internal
structure. His view that an individual soul is a unified immaterial entity encoded by a
unique set of attributes, especially as this is asserted in the Kitāb al-nafs, simplifies the
picture by reducing the essential and accidental determinations of the soul into a single
indivisible substrate, namely the ‘substance of the soul.’ As we have discussed above,

147 Ibn Sīnā, Psychology I.5, 48-50.
Rāzī believes that doing away with these internal differentiations preserves the phenomenal unity displayed by human beings.

However, the question thus emerges, does this judgement regarding the essence or ‘substance of the soul’ point out to a noumenal or phenomenal reality? In other words, does this designation describe the true nature of the human soul or does it describe the human soul as it appears to the senses? We have seen above that when asserting his own alternative psychological doctrines, Rāzī uses premises gained from empirical and common-sense or intuitive observations of the human soul’s characteristics. This is of course what Ibn Sīnā also does when he conceptualizes a philosophical problem related to natural phenomena. The difference between the two is that Ibn Sīnā arranges his conceptualization of these attributes in a logical ordering that identifies the universal terms expressing the human soul’s ontological structure. As we have discussed in Chapter 2, this structure is constituted by those animal and rational determinations that are uniquely combined in the human being. Furthermore, we have seen how this constituted essence can be further subdivided into the various faculties that exercises unique functions for the soul. The veracity of this conceptualization is in turn guaranteed by the role of the Active Intellect.

However, as we have seen, Rāzī does not believe that the process of abstraction that leads to the grasping of universals necessarily lead to the view that animal and rational parts constitute the internal structure of the human soul. Instead, he argues that nothing prevents us from conceptualizing the concomitant and accidental
characteristics of a human being—which in the Avicennian perspective are external to the essence—as being part of his original make-up. In the Kitāb al-nafṣ, he takes this insight further and asserts this original make-up as the ‘substance of the soul.’ In doing so, Rāzī avoids distributing these various external characteristics under higher classes of universals that correspond to some internal structure of the soul, e.g. sense-perception and imagination under animal, moral reasoning and intellection of universals under rational. That is to say, he deliberately avoids abstraction in the Avicennian sense. He relies instead on the phenomenal unity that each human being displays in his actions, passions, and self-awareness as the organizing principle of these discrete attributes. This is the central premise that led him to judge that the substrate of all human functions and characteristics is the uniquely encoded substance of the soul.

However, Rāzī’s claim is not only that Avicennian abstraction falls short in explaining a number of phenomenal properties of the human soul, but that it also does not yield certainty at all. In fact, in the Mabāḥīṭ he claims that Ibn Sīnā asserts his theory of the univocity of human souls as ‘by means of weak persuasion (bāb al-iqna‘iyyāt al-da‘īfa).’ To understand how this is the case, we must recall Rāzī’s objection to the second Avicennian proof for this theory in the psychology of the Mabāḥīṭ. As we have discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, this proof is asserted through a process of abstraction. Ibn Sīnā argues that a careful study of the many properties

148 Rāzī, Mabāḥīṭ II, 388.
that human beings possess will show that they share a common attribute, namely the
capacity to intellect universals that are completely separated from matter.¹⁴⁹ Rāżī
responds to this argument by arguing that this argument is

a weak induction (istiqrāʾīyya daʿīfa) from two angles. The first is that it is
impossible [387] for us to judge that all human beings are receptive to all
conceptualizations (qābilan li-γamlī al-taṣawwurāt). The second is that it is
impossible for us to judge that a soul that we know to have received an attribute
(allatī qubūluḥā li-ṣifatin) is receptive of all attributes. How is this the case, while
it is impossible to have knowledge of all [possible] attributes (kayfā wa-ḍabt al-
ṣifāt)?¹⁵⁰

Rāżī is skeptical that abstraction from phenomenal properties can reveal a thing’s
ontological structure. The fact that an individual human being displays varying
characteristics of rational activity does not mean that ‘rational’ can be essentially
predicated of human as a common attribute. The Avicennian procedure lacks certitude
because it is based on an incomplete sample; we can never catalogue all expressions of
rational activity and compare this data to a complete set of human beings past, present
and future. Whatever claims it produces, they are necessarily provisional, being
dependant upon the available data, and this is far from the sort of universal knowledge
Ibn Sīnā envisions. Rāżī’s solution, as we have seen, is to focus on the study of
phenomenal properties and draw our conclusions regarding the nature of human
beings without compromising the integrity of the phenomena. The epistemological
immediacy of phenomenal properties renders them more reliable premises for
scientific investigation.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 384.
¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 386
Thus, though it seems at first that Rāzī exercises judgement on the ontological reality of the human soul, his conclusion regarding the immateriality, unity, and uniqueness of each soul is drawn from premises that consist entirely of the soul’s phenomenal properties. Furthermore, he does this in order to preserve what he takes to be the most immediate and trustworthy knowledge we have of the reality of the human soul, namely its phenomenal unity. Thus, Rāzī’s psychological theory Kitāb al-nafs is consistent with the overall phenomenalist method he develops in the Mabāḥīt. Admittedly, terms like ‘essences,’ ‘substances,’ and ‘quiddities’ evoke a distinctly Avicennian landscape; however, Rāzī appropriates these terms to describe what he takes to be the most accurate picture of the nature of the human soul we can deduce from its phenomenal properties. For Rāzī, therefore, we do not need to render judgement on a thing’s noumenal reality to gain an accurate description of its nature.

\[151\] For a detailed discussion on Rāzī criticism of Ibn Sīnā’s conception of quiddity in the Mabāḥīt, consult chapter 5 of Ibrahim, ‘Freeing Philosophy from Metaphysics,’ 243-289.
Chapter 4: Conclusion

In this thesis, we have attempted to understand the philosophical bases that motivated Rāzī’s criticism of a number of Avicennian psychological doctrines in Chapter 5 of the Second Major Part of the Mabāḥīṭ. In doing so, we have identified a consistent philosophical method that Rāzī uses in his analysis. Furthermore, by supplementing our reading of the psychology section of the Mabāḥīṭ with the contents of the Kitāb al-nafs, we have reconstructed what we take to be Rāzī’s core psychological doctrines. The soul’s immateriality, its essential differentiation among individuals, and its direct agency over the corporeal and psychic faculties are elements of what we have referred to as Rāzī’s simplified psychological theory. In the previous chapter, we have seen how it is simplified in comparison to Ibn Sīnā’s theory, which includes a comprehensive theory of the soul’s temporal generation, its incorruptibility, the causes of its existence, and describes how the process of perceiving and thinking relates to the various determinations of the soul. In the Mabāḥīṭ and the Kitāb al-nafs, Rāzī does not discuss these issues, focusing rather on the three aspects of the human soul mentioned above.

We have also discussed how Rāzī’s psychological theory is simplified in the sense that it does not seek to uncover the deeper ontological structure of the soul. Instead, he affirms minimalist claims that we can make from a careful study of our experience of perception and agency, self-awareness, and patterns of character-traits. Through this method, Rāzī simplifies the Avicennian division of the internal structure
of the human soul, collapsing these differentiations into a single indivisible substrate, namely the ‘substance of the soul.’ Positing the existence of corporeal and psychic faculties as active principles of certain types of human actions—such as the vegetative, animal, theoretical and practical faculties—obscures the basic phenomenal insight that their activities spring from a single substrate, namely the substance of the soul.

According to Rāzī, the faculties describe the kinds of things that the soul is capable of doing rather than describing the soul itself. Indeed, his resistance to passing judgement on the ontological structure of the soul is a central aspect of what we have described as a phenomenalist approach in the psychology of the *Mabāḥīṭ* and the *Kitāb al-nafs*.

As we have discussed in Chapter 2, the basis for Rāzī’s simpler psychological doctrine was established early on in the psychology of the *Mabāḥīṭ*, where Rāzī presents arguments for the human soul’s immateriality. He argues that the unity of sensory experience points to the existence of a unified agency that is the subject of these diverse perceptions. The second element of the theory is of the soul’s essential differentiation. Adopting Abu al-Barakāt’s position in the *Muʿtabar*, Rāzī argues that the internal structure of the soul’s essence is encoded, as it were, by the variations of native attributes that determine the capacities of a given individual. Furthermore, from his critique of Ibn Sīnā’s theory of faculty differentiation, we learn that the determination of the human soul’s diverse functions results from the instrumental use of the bodily organs by the direct agency of the encoded essence. The resulting positive doctrine that come out of this procedure is the claim that this substance of the soul is an immaterial
entity, essentially differentiated and the substrate of all actions and passions of the human being.

Our findings in this regard corroborate the core aspects of Ibrahim’s reconstruction of Rāzī’s phenomenalist philosophical programme, which we have discussed in the introduction of this thesis. Ibrahim’s study has allowed us to hypothesize the critical aspect of this method; namely that Rāzī has a deeper epistemological—rather than just doctrinal—concern in his critique of Avicennian psychology. We have shown how Rāzī’s assessment of Ibn Sīnā’s theory of the human soul’s univocity in essence and faculty differentiation is motivated by a skeptical attitude regarding the epistemic claims of abstraction—that it yields knowledge of a thing’s noumenal reality from observation of its phenomenal properties—and real definitions—that it is an epistemologically basic insight. As an alternative, Rāzī develops a method that aims to accurately describe the soul’s nature based on its phenomenal properties, rather than to gain knowledge of its ontological structure. Having tested this hypothesis in the context of psychology of the Mabāḥīṭ (in Chapter 2), we were then able to identify the core elements of Rāzī’s distinctive psychological doctrine and work out the philosophical bases that underlie them (in Chapter 3). Ibrahim’s central claim is that Rāzī systematically develops this epistemological approach in the logic of the Mulahhaṣ and other falsafa-oriented works of the same period. That this approach is applied consistently in the substantial issue of psychology testifies to its programmatic scope.
Throughout the psychology of the *Mabāhīṭ*, Rāzī sets up Ibn Sīnā as the main philosophical inspiration. As we have seen in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the structure of the topics of the translated sections mirrors in large part the presentation of Chapter V of the *Psychology*. Rāzī also often quotes verbatim or summarizes Ibn Sīnā’s writings on certain issues. If Rāzī intended to present a new philosophical method, why did he depend on his predecessor’s writings and technical vocabulary as templates for his own? Why did he not abandon the Avicennian system—at least in its structure—and begin in earnest a new approach in investigating the nature of the soul, beginning with the so-called phenomenalist premises, and thereby unburden himself entirely of the baggage of Ibn Sīnā’s epistemology? With respect to the psychology section of the *Mabāhīṭ*, we have argued that Rāzī’s close reading of Ibn Sīnā’s psychological doctrines was motivated in part by an scholastic spirit: bringing in the strongest arguments on a particular issue, and testing their strength by marshalling counterarguments, either by Rāzī himself or by the members of the philosophical community. The thoroughness of this style is attested when Rāzī presents objections not only to Ibn Sīnā’s theory, but also to his own arguments, and those, for instance, of Abū al-Barakāt. This is also reflected by how Rāzī outlines objections and counterobjections that seem trivial or are culled from sources from a variety of disciplines. However, since Ibn Sīnā and his followers dominated the philosophical scene during this period, their views take up much of the discussion of the text, and Rāzī rightly saw them as the main philosophical tradition that needed to be studied. He thus presents their views thoroughly and
critically. Furthermore, this critical approach does not prevent Rāzī from accepting aspects of Avicennian psychology that he deems to be accurate. As Janssens has shown, the basic insights of the soul as the principle of life in natural bodies, and much of the topics discussed in Chapter 1 of the Second Major Part of the Mabāḥīṭ, were largely culled from the Avicennian corpus, especially the Psychology. With respect to Chapter 5, we have seen how the basic Avicennian positions on the soul’s temporal generation, incorruptibility, and the physiological dimensions of its attachment to the body, were congenial to Rāzī’s simplified theory. Rāzī does not raise major objections against these positions, nor does he advance an alternative view, which he usually does on more contentious issues. However, given how thin the discussions surrounding these issues are in the Mabāḥīṭ, we would need to study his psychological works in order to understand his definitive claims on these issues. Furthermore, when Rāzī forthrightly accepts an Avicennian insight, he operates subtly by sifting out the metaphysical and ontological commitments that bear upon the argument. Thus Rāzī accepts the view that the soul is the nexus for the bodily functions as their governor and administrator as long as this does not commit him to Ibn Sīnā’s view of faculty differentiation, which involves accepting the notion of a constituted quiddity. In light of the overall phenomenalist approach that Rāzī adopts in the psychology of the Mabāḥīṭ, certain aspects of his psychological theory that seem on the surface to be restatements of Ibn Sīnā’s, such as the the soul’s unity, its role as governor and administrator of the body,

The classification of human soul-functions into rational, animal and vegetative, are in fact motivated by Rāzī’s distinctive philosophical method.

The scope of our analysis however is restricted to the psychological issues raised in Chapter 5 of the Second Major Part of the Mabāḥīṭ, which discusses specifically the nature of the human soul. Furthermore, by supplementing our analysis of this text with a discussion of Rāzī’s positive doctrines in the Kitāb al-nafs, we have identified the basic elements of a Razian psychological theory. However, in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of Rāzī’s psychological theory, it would be necessary to examine the earlier chapters of the psychology of the Mabāḥīṭ, where Rāzī discusses the general principles of soul in natural philosophy and the characteristics of vegetative and animal souls. In addition to studying the psychology sections in Rāzī’s other falsafa-oriented works of the same period, such as the Mulahḥas and Šarḥ al-Iṣārāt, it would also be necessary to study his non-philosophical works in order to understand how his analysis of the human soul in natural philosophy relates to the moral, eschatological, and theological dimensions of his thought. Only then would we obtain a clear picture of Rāzī’s comprehensive psychological doctrine.
Appendix I: Section I, Proof 2 on the Immateriality of the Human Soul

1. [352] The second proof is one that the Master Ibn Sīnā relied upon in the Mubāḥatāt. He claimed that this proof is the strongest he has on this topic. His students raised many objections against him, and the Master answered them. However, the questions and answers were scattered. But [here] we have sorted them out and reproduced them in good order.

2. [353] We say that it is possible for us to intellect our selves (dawāt), and anyone who intellects a thing (dāt) possesses the quiddity of that thing. As such, we possess the quiddity of our self (māhiyyat dātinā). [Now] the following necessarily comes to pass: either our intellection of our self (taʿaqqulunā li-dātinā) [occurs] because another form equivalent to our self exists (taḥsalu) in our self (dātinā), or [it is on account of the fact] that our very self (nafs dātinā) is present (ḥādira) to our self. The first is false because it leads to the conflation of two equivalent things. The second is thus chosen. Anything whose essence occurs to itself (ḥāsilun li-dātihi) subsists by itself (qāʾiman bi-dātihi). Therefore, the intellectual faculty subsists by itself, while all bodies and corporeal things are not self-subsistent. The intellectual faculty therefore is not attached to a body nor is it corporeal.

3. The objections against him are [raised] from six points of view: the first is that we do not accept that we intellect (naʿqalu) our selves (dawātanā). Why is it impossible that our perception (idrāk) of our selves is another kind of perception that is
distinct from intellection, given that the intellection consists in the coming-to-be in thinking subject the quiddity of the object of knowledge? For it is not possible for us to be aware of our intellecting our selves (kawnā ʿāqilīn li- ʿawātinā), unless we are aware of our selves belonging to our selves (ḥāsilatun li- ʿawātinā). If it is possible for us to show that we possess the reality of our selves (ḥaqqat ʿawātinā) without the mediation of intellection, then what is the need of saying that we intellect our selves and that we arrive from it [i.e. self-intellection] at [the statement] that we possess the reality of our selves? But if it is impossible [to show that we do not possess the reality of our selves without the mediation of the intellect], then the argument of our being capable of intellecting our selves is possible only by explaining the acquisition of the reality of our selves. And this is not possible except by explaining our being capable of intellecting our selves. Hence circularity would follow.

4. The respondent said that the argument [of the questioner above] is not related to intellection (taʾaqqul) and awareness (ṣūʿūr), but rather to perception (idrāk). It has already been established that perception is a [technical] term for the acquisition of the quiddity of the percipient by the perceiver and this much suffices in correcting (taṣḥīḥ) this proof.

5. The questioner then said, in settling (taqrīr) his first question: why is it impossible that our perception of our self not require that the reality of our self occurs to us (ḥāsilatun la-nā) [i.e. unto our self], being rather a kind of impression (ṣār) that occurs to self from our self, an impression that is not identical to (bi-ʿaynihi) the reality...
of the self (ḥaqiqat ēd)? And in view of this, the reality coming from it [viz. the self] that occurs to our self [lit. unto us] is an impression and we have awareness (našʿaru bi) of this impression. As such this impression is not the reality [of a thing], [354] nor does our self (ēd) occur to us two times.

6. The respondent said: it has been discussed that perception is nothing other than ascertaining (taḥaqquq) what a thing really is. As for the questioner’s statement that an impression occurs to our self from it [the thing] and that we thus have awareness of this impression, [we say] awareness (šʿūr) produces either the same impression (nafs al-ātār) or something other than (muğāyir) this impression that comes after it. If the case is [that awareness produces] the same impression, then his statement that ‘we have awareness of this impression’ has no meaning; rather it is identical to saying that ‘an impression obtains occurs to our self.’ Now if awareness is something that comes after [the impression], then either this awareness consists in the coming-to-be (ḥuṣūl) of the quiddity of a thing, or it consists in the coming-to-be of something other than that thing. If the latter is the case, then awareness consists in the coming-to-be neither of the quiddity nor the mental content (maʿnā) of that thing. However, if the two are identical [viz. if awareness consists in the obtaining of the quiddity of that thing] then 1) the quiddity of the self will require this impression in order for the quiddity of the self to occur to it, such that the quiddity of the self will not exist until this impression is obtained by awareness and such that this quiddity will not be impressed (mutaʿṭṭara) [in the process of our gaining awareness of it], but instead
[will be] generated (mutakawwana), [and] this is absurd (ḫulf). If the quiddity of the self obtains a second time in another moment through abstraction (tağrid) or something that connects to it by way of accidents, then the object of intellection will consist in this abstracted thing that is renewed [a second time], and yet our discussion concerns whether or not the object of intellection is identical to the fixed substance of our soul is at the two moments.

7. The second objection is that we concede that we intellect our selves, but why do you say that every person who intellects something possesses the quiddity of this thing? Were this the case, then if we were to intellect God Most High and the Active Intellects, then it would be necessary that their realities occur to us (yuḥṣalu la-nā ḥaqāʾiq hā).

8. The respondent said that the thing that occurs in us from the Active Intellect—if it is possible for us to intellect it—is the Active Intellect in terms of species and nature (ǧihat al-naw’ wa al-ṭabī’a), not in terms of the individual (ǧihat al-šahs). This is because one of the two [viz. species or nature] exists in a different mode than the other [the individual] and [because] the object of intellection [that derives] from your reality does not distinguish your reality in terms of species and quiddity, nor does it distinguish it at all through accidents. Thus it will be identical as an individual just as it is identical as a species. As for the Active Intellect, whatever we intellect from it is what it is in terms of meaning (ma’nā) and not [355] in individual.
9. The questioner said that if a form identical to the quiddity of God Most High is impressed (irtasama) in our mind, then the quiddity of God Most High will predicable of the numerically multiple, and this is absurd.

10. The respondent said that the demonstration is based upon [the premise that] this quiddity is not predicable of multiple [beings] in the extramental world (fī-al-hāriǧ), as of multiple [beings] in the mental world (fī-al-ḏihn). As a result, the demonstration does not stand upon its falsity.

11. The third objection is that we concede that whoever intellects a self, the quiddity of the object of intellection occurs to him. But why isn’t it possible that the quiddity of my self obtains in my estimative faculty (quwwatī al-wahmiyya), such that my estimative faculty is aware of it just as the intellectual faculty has awareness of estimation? In view of this, the intellectual faculty will not be connected (muqārana) to itself, nor will it subsist by itself. Rather [the intellectual faculty will] connected to the estimative faculty. [This is the same] as in the case when you say that the estimative faculty is not connected to itself, but rather to the intellectual faculty.

12. The respondent replied that your awareness is of your individual identity (huwiyya) rather than of your faculties; otherwise the object of awareness would be identical to the one who perceives. Along with being aware of your self (ḏātika) you are aware that you are aware only of your soul (nafsika) and that you are the one who is aware of your soul. Now if the thing that is aware of your soul is another faculty, then that faculty will either subsists in your soul (nafsika), in which case your soul that is
fixed (tābita) to the faculty that is fixed to your soul is fixed to your soul—and this is what is sought-after (maṭlāb). But if [that faculty] does not subsist in your soul, but rather in the body, then your soul [that is the object of awareness] either subsists in this body or it does not. If it does not, then it is necessary that there is no awareness of your self in any way, and [it is also necessary] that there is no perception of your self in a way that is proper to what it [i.e. the self] is (bi-ḥuşūsiyyatīhā). Instead, every corporeal thing senses through something other than itself, as is the case when you sense through your hands and your legs. So if your soul subsists in this body, then your soul will exist in that body and so too would your faculty of awareness. Thus the existence of this soul and this faculty is on account of something other than them. As such it is not the case that the soul perceives its self through this faculty, since the quiddity of the faculty and the quiddity of the soul would together [exist] on account of something that is different, [356] which is the body.

13. The questioner said as an attempt to settle this position (maqām): why isn’t it possible that my perception of my self is [occurs] through my self’s existing (ḥuşūl ḍāṭī) in something whose relation to my self is like the relation between a mirror and eye-sight?

14. The respondent said: if it is accepted that a person who stands in front of a mirror conceptualizes (yataşawwaru) through [this] mirror, he would need to conceptualize a second time through the pupil. Such would be the case here: it is
necessary that the form of our self is imprinted (tantabi’u) in this thing [viz. the intellect] another time in our self.

15. The fourth objection: why isn’t it possible that my perception of my self (ḏāt) be by means of the existence (ḥuṣūl) of another form in my self (ḏāt)? When I intellect the self of Zayd, either 1) I do not intellect my self—and this is false because someone who intellects something is a thinker through a power that is close to being actual (al-‘āqila li-al-šay’ī ʿaqilun bi-al-quwwa al-qariba min al-fi’il) on account of his being a thinker, and this involves his act of intellecting his self (ḏāt), or 2) I intellect my self and that of Zayd at the same time, in which case it is necessary that what occurs (al-ḥāṣil) in my soul from my self and Zayd is either two forms, or [just] one. If one form [exists], then I will be something other than myself and that other thing will be me, since the form that exists in the soul will, at one moment, encompass (iktanafa) my accidental attributes (aʿrād) and, during another moment, [it will encompass] Zayd’s accidental attributes. Whereas if what exist are two [forms], then this is what is sought-after (maṭlūb).

16. The respondent said: whenever you intellect your soul (nafs), you have intellected a part of your self (ḏāt). When you intellect the humanity of Zayd, then you have added to this part of your self something else that you have connected with it (qarantahu bihi). Furthermore, ‘humanity’ is not reproduced (takarrara) in you twice; rather it recurs (taʿaddada) upon consideration (iṭībār).
17. And know that this is the difference between the soul in the absolute sense (al-nafṣ al-muṭlaqa) that is considered (muʿtabara) in itself and the soul insofar as it is a universal (kulliyā) in which many (kaṭīrīn) partake (muštarak fihi). The first is the part of my soul, while the common soul (al-nafṣ al-ʿāmma) is the soul with a bond of commonality (qayd al-ʿumūm); it [the soul] is not a part of my soul.

18. The fifth objection is that they said that the category that you have chosen is also false. The explanation for this is that when [357] we say ‘an existent [that exists] on account of itself’ three meanings are understood from it. The first is that its self in its existence does not depend upon something else; the second is that it is not a state in something else, as whiteness is in a body. These two divisions do not require that the thing be a perceiver (mudrikan), since being a perceiver (mudrikiyya) is a permanent state (amr ṭubūtī) and is also the term (ʿibāra) for the acquisition (ḥuṣūl) of the object of knowledge by the thinking subject. The two divisions that have been mentioned are [thus] negated. The third is that the self [of that which exists on account of itself] is something related (muḍāf) to itself; but this is impossible because a relation (iḍāfa) requires a duality (iṭnāniyya), while singularity negates [the relation].

19. Nor is it proposed that the relative (muḍāf) and that to which it is related (muḍāf ilayh) are more universal (aʾamma) than that which, when each one is something else or some other thing. It will be impossible to negate the universal by negating the specific, since we say that this is a verbal fallacy (muğālaṭa lafziyya). This is similar to the case where it is said that the thing that produces action (muʿṭṭtir) requires (yastadʿī) [in
its being conceptualized as such] [the correlate of] an effect (ṭran), for this is more
general than [the case where] the thing that acts is the effect or something other thing.

As such it follows from this the possibility that a thing is a cause in itself [viz. without
the correlate of 'effect']. However, just as this is false, so too is the case here.

20. And the respondent said: the reality of the self is one thing; its
determination [as an individual] (taʿayyunuhā) is another; and the totality [that consists
of] the self and [its] determination is yet another thing. This argument still applies in
this case regardless whether the determination comes from the concomitants (lawāzin)
of the quiddity, as is the case with God Most High and the Active Intellects, or whether
it is not like this, as is the case of the various of species with their individual members
(al-anwāʾ al-mutakattira bi al-ašḥāṣihā) in existence. This factor (qadr) of otherness
(ġayriyya) suffices in [upholding] the possibility (ṣihḥa) of the relation. Given this
verification (taḥqīq), it is possible [for you] to say 'my self' and 'your self', so that your
self is related (tuḍīfu) to your self.

21. The sixth objection, the objection is raised through [the argument] that
other animals [also] perceive them selves (anfusahā), despite the fact that their souls are
not separate [from their bodies]. But [in upholding this argument] it cannot be
considered (lā yaltafata) the theory of someone who denies the animal’s perception of
their self; that [this is] because they seek things that are agreeable and flee from things
that are disagreeable [in such a way that] their desire is not for something that is
agreeable in the absolute sense (al-malāʾim al-muṭlaq). For otherwise they would seek out
things that are agreeable to other things [i.e. other species] in the same way they would seek out things that are [actually] agreeable to them. Because of this, if they [the animals] were to seek out things that are agreeable in the absolute sense, then they would be able to perceive them insofar as they are agreeable, which is a universal (kulliya). As a result, cattle (baḥmīma) would be able to perceive universals, while animals (ḥayawanāt) would not be able to perceive a universal. Thus, cattle seek out that which is agreeable to them, and their perception of the agreeable includes their perception of their proper selves (anfusha al-maḥṣūsa). Knowledge of a relation between one thing with another (iḍāfa amr ilā amr) thus includes knowledge of both of these correlated things (muḍāfayn).

22. [358] The respondent said that the self (ḏāt) of the human soul is aware of itself (bi ḏātiha), while the selves of the souls of the other animals are not aware of their selves; rather [they have awareness] of their estimations (awhām) in the organ of these estimations, just as they are aware of other things through their sensations and estimations in the organs of these sensations and estimations. The thing that perceives the particular intention (al-maʿnā al-juzʿiyya) that is not sensible and which has a connection with the sensible is the [faculty of] estimation in animals. Through this [faculty] the souls of animals (anfusu al-ḥayawanāt) perceive themselves (ẓawāṭiha). However, this act of perception is not [performed] through their selves (bi-ẓawāṭiha), nor through an organ of their selves (ālat ẓawāṭiha), that is the heart. Rather, [the perception is performed] in the organ of estimation, as is the case when they perceive
other intentions (ma‘ānin) through estimation and an organ. In view of this, the selves (dawāt) of animals are, at one moment, in the organ of their selves, which is the heart, and at another moment, in the organ of their estimation, which perceives insofar as it is the organ of estimation.

23. The questioner asks: what is the demonstration that our awareness (shu‘ūrana) of our selves (dawātina) is not like the awareness of other animals?

24. The respondent said: [this is the case] because all the faculties that perceive universals perceive the faculties that perceive universals. As such, it is possible that the faculties that perceive universals perceive the quiddity of their self [as being] abstracted from all extraneous concomitants (lawāhiq ġarbīyya). Thus if we are aware of our particular self (dātinā al-ġuz‘iyya) that is mixed (mağlīta) with other things, we are aware of something that is composed of many things (bi wāḥid murakkab min umūr), and we are aware of each of those things insofar as they are distinguished (tumayyyazu) from [each] other. Now what I mean by these things (umūr) [which comprises the thing that we perceive] is the reality of our self (ḥaqiqa dātinā); while [other] things that are mixed has what is extraneous to it (lahā al-ġarība ‘anha). It is possible that the reality of our self (ḥaqiqa dātinā) is represented in us, even if [these] other things are absent (ġā‘iba). Yet, the animal’s perception of their self does not work in this way. As such, the distinction [between animal and human perception] is clarified.

25. The questioner says: it is not [the case that], if it is possible for us to distinguish our self (dātinā) from that which mixes with it (yuḥālīţuhā) in the mind, it
will be necessary that this is possible [that this occurs] extramentally. It may be the case that this distinction is something that we produce (nafṛluhu) and suppose (nafṛdahu) in our minds, even though whatever is found extramentally is unlike (bi-nilāf) this. Furthermore, whatever you mentioned by way of proof does not specifically apply (gāyr muḥtaṣṣi) when we perceive ourselves as separable universals (kulliyya muğarrada) or mixed particulars (ḫuzʾiyya mahlūta). [359] Because of this [we ask], when we took you to task in the first objections—with the explanation of our being capable of intellecting our selves (kawninā ʿāqilīn li-anfusinā)—[and] you responded by saying that this argument does not specifically apply to the [issue of] intellection (taʿaqul) but rather to perception (idrāk), how have you retreated from this [position] now?

26. Furthermore, the exact verification (taḥqīq) [of this issue] is that anything that perceives something possesses this thing as a universal or as a particular. So if a donkey perceives its mixed self (ḏātahu al-mahlūta), it possesses his mixed self. Therefore, the donkey possesses its existing self (ḏātahu al-mawgūda) in every state, and this is only at a single time. Thus [the donkey’s] self would also be separate [from its body]. This [conclusion] is something undeniable.

27. Furthermore, another [argument that] refutes your claim that what perceives the donkey’s self is its estimation is that we say: if it is not the donkey’s self (ḏāt) that perceives its self, but rather another faculty, then if this faculty is in the donkey, the self of the donkey is in the donkey. But if the [self of the donkey] is in something other than it [the donkey], the thing that is aware will not be the thing of
which there is awareness. As such the donkey will not perceive its self. Therefore, we have refuted [this claim] at the outset (awwalan). Furthermore, if we concede that the donkey perceives itself (ḏāt) not through itself (ḏāt), but through a part of its self (ǧuzʾi ǧātihi), then that part will also have the form of its self (ṣūra ǧātihi), and that part would be separate [from the body] (muġarrad). Also, if the soul (nafs) of the donkey exists in the organ of its estimative faculty, along with its being mixed, then it will be necessary that the organ of estimation is something alive through this soul, as it is the case that when the organ of the soul is something living through it [the soul].

28. The respondent said regarding this final [statement]: this form’s occurring in the estimation is comparable to the green that occurs from sensation. For the occurring of this colour in its specific organ is comparable to the original green in nature.

29. In the book al-Mubāḥatāt, the answers to the aforementioned questions were obscure and useless. Thus we have omitted them for those who desire them. Hence, let him study this book in order to find the discussions in it scattered (šattī) in various places.

30. But know that we have some other objections against this proof, however we know that for whoever understands what we have mention in the chapter on knowledge and objects of knowledge, it will be easy for them to reproduce [these objections], and so we do not list them here.
Appendix II: Section I, Proof 12 on the Immateriality of the Human Soul

1. [376] The twelfth proof: if the substrate of perception is a corporeal faculty, then it is possible that knowledge (‘ilm) subsists in some [parts] of this body while ignorance (ḡahl) [subsists] in other parts of it. Thus, an individual person would be knowing and ignorant at the same time.

2. Someone may say: You do not say that it is impossible that there subsists in a part of the celestial spheres (al-falak) an accident that is contrary to the accident that subsists in another part of the sphere. Thus we have intellected a body in whose two extremities two contraries cannot possibly subsist. If we intellect this generally, then why isn’t it possible that the heart is like this, in a way that, even though it is corporeal, when a knowledge subsists in one of its parts, it would be impossible at this moment that ignorance subsist in another part of it.

3. Furthermore, this argument [i.e. that the substrate of perception is an incorporeal faculty because contraries cannot subsist in it, unlike in corporeal things] is refuted (manqūḍ) through [an examination of] appetite, anger, and the estimative faculty (al-šahwa, al-ġadb, wa-l-quwwa al-wahmiyya), since it is impossible that a single human being desires and is averse towards a thing during the same time. [It is also impossible that a single human being] judges a single person to be both an enemy and friend at the same time. [This is the case] [377] even though according to you the appetitive and estimative faculty are both corporeal. This is therefore a summary of
what we have found from the proofs that assert the separation of the soul from the body. None of these satisfies us given the problems that have been mentioned.

Therefore, whoever is capable of solving them will be able to use them as arguments.

4. Whereas that which is relied upon for the assertion of what is sought (al-maṭlūb) [i.e. that the soul is separable from the body] is that any thinking subject (kulla ʿāqilin) finds (yağidu) in himself (min nafsihi) that he was [that which existed] before this moment. Now his individual identity (huwiyyatihi) is either a body, or subsists in a body, or it is not a body and does not subsist in a body.

5. The first [i.e. that the individual identity of the thinker is corporeal] is false, because first, a human being could gain knowledge of his individual identity [even] when he is distracted from the totality of his external and internal organs. Second, the corporeal parts are always decomposing and changing (dāʾimat al-taḥallul wa-l-tabaddul), because the the causes of decomposition includes external and internal heat, and mental and bodily motions among them that are not specific to one part and not another. The body is composed of composite parts that are composed of simple parts, like the bone and flesh. Therefore, every part of the flesh is like any other [part of flesh] in being disposed to decompose. If all parts are equivalent in this [way], the relation of decomposed things to each of these parts is like their relation to any other part. Thus the occurrence (ʿurūd) of decomposition of some of the parts is no more likely than its occurrence in some other parts. As a result it is established that the individual identity of a human being is not a body, nor is it something that subsists in a body, since that
which subsists in the body must necessarily change during the changing of the body, given the impossibility of the transformation (al-intiqāl) of accidents. [If the individual identity of the human being is a body] it would follow that a person will not find himself to be the one who existed before this [moment], since this knowledge is among [the class of] intuitive knowledge (al-ʿulūm al-badīhiyya). Thus we know that the individual identity of human beings is not a body, nor does it require the body. Thus it is a separate substance, and this is what is sought after.

6. Now if it is said: what would you say regarding other animals? We will respond: according to us, it is not affirmed that the intellect from their selves that they are identical to that which existed before this [moment], such that it would follow that their souls are separate. The gist is that the awareness of the individual identity while being unaware of all the organs proves that this individual identity is something different from the organs. Being aware that this individual identity is that which existed years before this [moment] indicates that this individual identity does not depend upon any bodily thing. Now what we know through an aforementioned proof is that animals know the individual identity of their selves. However we [still] do not know through a proof that they know from their selves that they are that which existed before this [moment]. It certainly does not follow that their souls are separate. But God knows best. Hence this is that which is relied upon in the assertion of the separation of the soul.
7. Furthermore, it is possible argue for what is sought after (al-maṭlūb) with another argument, which is that we have proven that the percipient of all types of perceiving all objects of perception is a single thing in human beings (šay‘un wāhidun).

8. For we say: this percipient thing is either a body or an attribute (ṣifa) that subsists in bodies, or it is not a body and does not subsist in bodies. The first [i.e. this thing that perceives is a body] is clearly false, because it is impossible for bodies insofar as they are bodies to be capable of perception. The second [i.e. it is an attribute (ṣifa) that subsists in bodies] is also false, because the attribute either subsists in all parts of the body or in some parts thereof and not others. The former [i.e. the attribute subsists in all parts of the body] is false, or else every part of the body's parts would be capable of hearing, seeing, imagining, cogitating, intellecting. Yet this is not the case, since the toes of the feet is capable neither of imagination nor sight. Indeed, most of the body's parts neither imagine, see, hear, nor intellect. Furthermore, it is false to also say that in some of the organs subsists the faculty for perceiving all these objects of perception, for it would follow that there existed in the body a single organ that hears, sees, intellects and comprehends. However, we do not find this organ.

9. [379] Furthermore, the incorrectness of the argument that ‘perhaps the faculty for perceiving all objects of perception subsists in a subtle body confined some particular organ’ is clear, since if this were the case, then we would find as being a part of our bodies a place (mawḍī) that comprises a body qualified by its hearing, seeing, thinking, and comprehending. Yet we do not find this.
10. However, no one can say: suppose that you are not aware of this place (mawḍi'). Now, the non-existence of this [place] is not evidence pointing out to its [the place's] non-existence. [This cannot be said] because we have proven (dalalnā) that it is we who hear, see, imagine, comprehend and intellect. So it could not be true that some body—whether it is a part of a body (al-badan) or is confined to a part of the body—is qualified (mawṣūfan) by the faculty that is connected to all these percipients, for it would not be real, nor would our individual identity be anything other than this body that is qualified by that faculty that is connected to all the percipients. If this were the case, and moreover [if it was also the case that] we weren no aware of this thing [i.e. the mawḍi' that comprises of a body qualified by its hearing, seeing, thinking, and comprehending], we would not be aware of the reality of our selves (haqīqa anf sanā)—and this is false. As such, it is established that whatever is characterized by this faculty that perceives all objects of perception is fundamentally incorporeal (aṣlan). Therefore this thing is a separate substance and this is what is sought-after.

11. As for those who deny the separation of the soul [from the body], they argue in three ways: The first is that we know by necessity that what perceives the pain of a blow is the skin, and what perceives taste is the tongue. Therefore, these perceptions are bodily. You have indicated that whatever perceives all objects of perception through all kinds of perceptions is a single thing. Since it is established that whatever perceives tangible and tasteable things is a corporeal thing, it is necessary that whatever perceives intelligibles is corporeal and this is what is sought-after.
12. The second is that when we see a particular individual (šahsan muʿayyinan), then we see him again after this [the next day], we will know intuitively that this human being is he whom we saw yesterday. If a thing is considered (iʿtabara) in terms of his individual identity in addition to [his] sensible structure (al-binya al-maḥṣūsa), it will be impossible for us to know that he whom we see now is he whom we saw before, since it is possible that this soul had separated from him and that another soul had come to be.

13. Suppose that this likelihood [viz. that another soul had come to be] is among that which makes possible the establishment of an argument for its incorrectness [i.e. the incorrectness of the claim that the soul is separable from the body]. However, before the argument this was [already] possible. Yet before the argument (al-iḥtiğāy) for the incorrectness of this likelihood, we know that the thing that we see now is that which we saw before. Similarly, the common people (al-ʿawāmm) know it. Nay, even cattle perceive this; for when they sense someone who feeds them and hasten in running towards him, this is on account of their knowledge that the one whom they perceive (adrakuḥu) now is the one who gave them fodder before.

14. The third is that most of the proponents of the soul [i.e. its separate existence from the body] agree that its individuals are one in species. Moreover, it is known that what is receptive (al-qābil) of one of two identical things (miṭlayn) is also receptive to the other. So if we suppose that two [identical] temperaments (miẓāġayn) come to be and become predisposed to receive the soul in a single period of time, then
it would be necessary either that a single soul unites (tattaşīlu) with them both—and this is impossible—or two souls [unite with them both]. However, the unification (al-ittişāl) of one of the two souls with one of the two bodies [i.e. the temperaments aforementioned] is not more likely than (awlā mīn) the reverse. So the soul will not unite with any of these two [bodies] despite the fact that each has become a living and perceiving human body. Therefore it follows that human beings in their humanity do not require this soul and this is what is sought-after. Perhaps they posited the discussion (al-kalām) with respect to twins (fī al-taw'āmin).

15. The answer to the first is that if you meant by your position that ‘what suffers pain is the skin and what tastes is the tongue’ is that the substrate in which continuity is divided the separation of the contiguity occurs [i.e. the substrate in which the blow was struck] (maḥall tafarruq al-ittişāl) is the skin and that the substrate of contact with food is the tongue, then [your position] is true. However, if you meant by this that whatever perceives pain and food is the skin and tongue [respectively], we have explained that the matter is not like this. How can this be said, while we [already] know by necessity that what suffers pain is the human being and not this spot [on the skin], and what suffers hunger is the human being and not the stomach, and what sees is the human being and not the eye, in view of what has been settled previously?

16. [381] The answer to the second question, namely that if a human being consisted in this soul, then we would not know that the individual whom we saw a second time is the human being whom we saw the first time. First, we hold that this is
also necessarily entailed with those who claim that the human being is a particular bodily structure: that the power of God Most High can create a human being like Zayd in shape, delineation and appearance (fi ṣaklihi, taḥṭīṭ, wa-hay’a). Given this possibility, how can we assert categorically that he whom we saw second is he whom we saw first?

Second, it is not impossible that the elements (usṭuqsāt) are mixed in the way they are mixed in that Zayd’s bodily structure, such that an individual identical to Zayd is generated from the mixture. Suppose that this is absurd. But this impossibility becomes manifest only through a proof and before this proof it is necessary that we be doubtful about whether the person we perceive is Zayd or not. Third, Zayd’s bodily parts are constantly decomposing and transforming (al-taḥallul wa-l-tabdīl). So how do we know that this thing that is seen (al-muṣāhada) is identical to that which we saw before it, given the possibility of change in his original parts?

17. Rather we say: when we indicate that Zayd is Zayd, the thing that is indicated (al-mušār ilayh) is either the soul, the body, or the combination of them both.

1) if it is the soul, then when we see [Zayd] another time, how will do we know whether or not the person who is seen the second time is identical to the person who was seen [the first time], given the possibility that this soul left and another soul entered? 2) Now if the thing that is indicated as Zayd is the body, then either he consists in the agglomeration of his parts or is a specific part thereof. The first is false, since we know that he became fat after having been thin; and became this after having been fat. In view of this, the totality (ǧumla) of his parts is not fundamental (ašliyya). Furthermore,
each day, food increases in him, while parts that were already united with him are reduced. Now suppose that this is absurd. But its impossibility is known only through a proof, and before this proof [is produced], it is necessary that we do assert decisively that the one whom we see now is the one whom [382] we saw before.

18. If it is said that the thing that is indicated as being Zayd consists in specific parts persisting in the body, we say: first that we have indicated that one of [Zayd's] parts that undergoes decomposition is not more likely (awlā) [to undergo decomposition] than some other [part]. Second, these parts are unknown: we do not know where they are, nor [do we know] their qualities (kayfiyya). How is it possible to say that indicating (al-išāra) Zayd is in fact identical to indicating the parts whose state and attribute are unknown to us? If it is possible to say that these parts are are necessarily known to persist (maʿlūmat al-baṣāʾ)—despite the fact that they are unsensed—it will be possible to say the same thing about to the soul. Now, if it is said that the thing that is indicated as Zayd is an agglomeration of soul and body, then we will say: the possibility of transformation in the soul by itself and the body by itself requires the possibility of transformation entails a change in their agglomeration. We therefore know that the aforementioned objection [problem-raising] necessarily applies to all the positions [on this issue], and that it is not possible to invalidate one individual position [with it, without invalidating all of them.

19. As for the third answer: we say that if two predisposed mixtures comes into being at the same time, this is not because the connection of one of two souls with one
[bodily mixture] is more likely than its connection with the other body. Either they are both connected with both [bodies]—and this is absurd—or they do not connect with one of the them, in which case the [other] mixture will pass away and an animal will not be generated because they are never generated without a soul. If this is possible, then the inference (al-istidlāl) fails.
Appendix III. Section II on the Manner by which the Soul is Attached to the Body

1. [382] Something may be connected to another in such a way that if [whatever is connected] were to separate from [the thing], [the attachment] would be null and void, as with the attachment of accidents and material forms to their substrates. The attachment could [also] be something weak whose attachment easily disappears (zawāluhu) for the merest reason (bi-adnā sabab), despite the persistence of that to which [the attachment] is connected, like the attachment of bodies to the spaces [they occupy] (amkinātiḥā), from which [bodies] can easily move away. However, in respect of strength, the attachment of souls to their bodies is not like the first division, nor in terms of weakness is it like the second division.

2. [383] As for [the claim that the attachment of souls to their bodies] is not like the first division: [this is because] you already know that [souls] are separate in essence and independent of that which inheres in them [by way of the body]. As for [the claim that the attachment of the souls with their bodies] is not like the second division, [this is because otherwise] it would have been necessary that human beings are capable of (yatamakkana min) separating (mufāraqa) from the body by the [mere] act of walking, without requiring some other instrument.

3. It is also apparent that the soul loves this body, abhors separating from it, and does not become weary of it inspite of the length of the association [between soul
and body] (ṭūl al-ṣuḥba). Since the two divisions are false (baṭala), it is established that the attachment of the soul to the body is like the attachment of the lover to the beloved with a great and inspired love (išqan ǧabaliyyan ilhāmiyyan), with the result that this attachment is not severed as long as the body (al-badn) remains disposed for the soul to be attached to it. [The attachment of the soul to the body is] also like the attachment of the craftsman (al-ṣāni‘) to the tools that he needs for his different activities. Now if it were established that human souls are uniform (muttafaqā) in species, it follows that at the first stage of their creation (fī mabādi ẖilqatihā), they be devoid of all virtuous and base attributes [viz. they would not have innate traits of character]. If such is the case [if human beings share a common quiddity], it will be necessary that the soul devote the instruments of its individuation to the acquisition of these perfections [viz. rational activity]. [It would also be necessary that] these instruments be different [one from the other], and that the soul possess a special act with respect to each instrument. Otherwise, the objects of perception would agglomerate in the soul, [in which case] some [of them] will be confused with others, and the soul will not come to possess anything perfect and complete on account of them. But when the instruments differ then surely when the soul tries to see (ḥāwalat al-abṣār) and directs its attention (iltafatat) to the eye, [the soul] will thus be capable of perfect vision. If [the soul] tries to hear, and directs it attention to the ears, [the soul] will thus be capable of perfect hearing. The same applies to the other actions with other faculties.
4. On account of what we have said, it is clear that the soul’s attachment to the body is the attachment of administration and governance (ta'alluq al-tadbir wa-l-taṣarruf), which is stronger than the attachment of the lover with the beloved (ta'alluq al-āšiq bi-l-ma'ṣūq).
Appendix IV: Section III on Whether or Not Human Souls Differ from Each Other in Quiddity

1. [383] The Master [i.e. Ibn Sinā] claims that human souls are all one in species, but said no more regarding this claim. He did not [even] provide an aporia (Šubhatan) to validate [his claim], let alone a proof. Abu al-Barakāt al-Baġdādi denied the unity [384] of human souls in species and devoted a long discussion to it. It was acknowledged after this extended [discussion] that no one has [yet] found a demonstrative proof does not exist to validate what is sought-after [i.e. that human souls are one in species]. We will mention the utmost of what is possible to say regarding this issue.

2. Whoever maintains the unity of the souls in species argues in the following ways. The first is that human souls are things that have in common (muštaraka) their being human souls (fi kawnihā nufūsan bašariyyatan). For if some of them were differentiated from others by means of some essential constituent (muqawwam) after their having in common (ištirākuha) their being human souls, then it would follow that they are composites (murakkab). [This is] because that through which commonality [occurs] (mā bihi al-ištirāk) is something distinct than that through which differentiation (al-imtiyāz) [occurs]. Now, if [human souls] were composite, they would be corporeal—but this is absurd. The second is that when we examined (taṣṣaffahānā) the types of human souls, we find them to be restricted (munḥaṣira) to two species:
perceptive and motive; and of perceptive, there are some that are universal and others
particular perceptions. Now we find souls to be mutually equivalent in having these
attributes apply truly to them: even though human beings differ in intelligence and
ignorance, they all have in common primary knowledge (al-awwaliyyāt). I mean to say
that when you call their attention to this, they come to realize (yantabihūn), for
instance, that which is finite in respect of ignorance (mutanāhi fī al-balāda). So if you
acknowledge this, the meaning of your statement, ‘things that are equivalent
(musāwiya) to a single thing are equal to each other (mutasāwiya),’ would be inevitably
understood, even if it takes some time. [Such is also the case] when the reality of the
circle (haqīqat al-dāʿira) is mentioned to him—that it is by its nature in such a shape
(annahu šakl min šāʾinīhi kaḏā). For it is necessary that he conceptualizes this, even
though [this conceptualization] comes after giving examples (darb al-amṭāl) and the
exertion of of thought. When this [i.e. the reality of the circle] is understood, it is
possible to understand the first figure (al-šakl al-awwal) of Euclid. The discussions
regarding all the intricacies of the sciences (ǧamīʿ daqāʾiq al-ʿulūm) proceed in this way.
Thus it is possible that all human beings have in common the possibility of knowing
objects of knowledge (muṣṭarikūn fī šihhat al-ʿilm bi-maʿlūmāt) and that they have in
common the possibility of being shaped by good morals (muṣṭarikūn fī šihhat al-taḥḥalluq
bi-kulli al-aḥlāq). [For in the latter case], if the irascible person (al-ġaḍūb) is forced to
adopt the habits of patience, then his irritability will decrease. The same must also be
said about all good morals.
3. Now if this is established, we say: the nature of the soul in being receptive of knowledge-items (kawn al-nafs qābilatan al-ʿulūm) is one of the necessary concomitants of the soul (lawāzīm al-nafs). As such, it [i.e. the soul’s receptivity to knowledge-items] always [exists] with the persistence of the soul. If we know that a [certain] soul is ignorant such that it can [only] conceptualize a quiddity at some particular moment, we will acknowledge that the possibility of obtaining this conceptualization always [exists] obtains for the soul. If this is so, we know that when it is difficult for the ignorant to perceive this quiddity, this is not because the substance of his soul (ḡawhar nafsihi) is not receptive of the perception of this quiddity, but rather this difficulty must be due to things that are external to [the substance] itself (ḏātihi).

Thus it is established that all souls are equivalent in the possibility of perceiving quiddities. Now it has been established already that the conceptualization of quiddity and the conceptualization of its necessary concomitant is grounds (ʿilla) for the judgment (li-l-ḥukm bi-) that affirms that this necessary concomitant belongs to it [i.e. the quiddity]. If all the souls are equivalent in the possibility of perceiving quiddities, and the perception of quiddities is grounds for knowing the mental judgment (bi-ḥukm al-ḥihn bi) that affirms that some [necessary concomitants] belong to some [quiddities] and denies that some [necessary concomitants] belong to some [quiddities], then the souls have in common being receptive to the grounds of these judgments. Therefore, they have in common the possibility of these judgments. Hence, it is established that souls have in common, in their substances, the possibility of these perceptions. By this
method, it will be clear that [souls also] have motion in common, since if the irascible person gets accustomed to patience (al-ḥilm), then he will have to be patient, even if it takes some time.

4. If it is established that souls are equivalent in the possibility of their being qualified by the activities of perception and motion, we say that it follows definitively that they are no doubt equivalent. [This is] because we do not intellect the attributes of [human] souls except in their being perceptive and motive by volition. We have already explained [the soul’s] equivalence (tasāwīhā) in both regards [i.e. perception and motion]. Therefore, they are equivalent in all of their intelligible attributes. If they were to differ after this, their difference in attributes would be something unintelligible (gayr ma’qūla). Now if we were to open up this possibility [of a difference that is unintelligible] (fataḥnā hāda al-bāb), it would follow that there would be difficulty in [producing] the judgment that two things are similar (tamāṯul šay’ayn), for if we were to see two similar black things, one of them could differ from the other through an attribute that is unintelligible to us. This leads to the negative judgement concerning the similarity of similar things (al-ḥukmi bi-l-qadḥī fī tamāṯul al-mutamāṭilāt).

5. The third is that we have proven in the section on knowledge that all separate quiddities must be a thinking subject of the reality of its essence (āqilatan li-ḥaqīqat dātiḥā). Now our soul is a separate quiddity and is therefore a thinking subject (‘āqilatan) of the reality of its essence. Moreover, we intellect of out souls nothing but
the quiddity that is capable of perception and movement. Therefore, the quiddity of my soul is just this [i.e. that which is capable of perception and movement] (ḥāda al-qadr), which is something that is common (muṣṭarak) between my soul and other souls, given the mentioned proofs in explaining [386] that existence is something common. Therefore, the perfection (tamām) of the quiddity of my soul is predicable of other souls.

Moreover, it is impossible that [there exists] for this common thing (muṣṭarak) a differentia (faṣlan) that is constitutive (muqawwim) of something other than myself, a differentia that [essentially] distinguishes me from something other than me. There is also no need for a distinguishing differentia in that other thing, since a single nature (al-ṭabī‘yya al-wāhida) will not be simultaneously dependent and independent (muḥtāḥatan wa-ġaniyyatan ma‘an). Thus it is established that human souls are uniform in (muttafiqa fī) species. This [line of thought] is that which can be taken upon for asserting the unity of the human souls in species. But it is weak.

6. As for the first proof, someone may say: why is it impossible to say that even though these souls are different (muḥtalifā) in species they do not have a genus in common to all, in which case their being different in species does not entail that they are composites?

7. Their argument is that [the fact that] the souls are common in their being human souls is an essential property (waṣfun ḍātiyyun).
8. The answer is that human souls have in common the possibility of perceiving universals and their being that which administers (mudabbira) human bodies. However, it is possible that all these things are concomitants (al-lāzima) of the substance of the soul (li-ŷawhar al-nafs) and are not constitutive (muqawwima) of it. To this extent, souls will differ in the perfection of their quiddity. They have in common the extrinsic necessary concommitants (al-lawāzim al-ḥāriğiyya) in a similar way that the differentiae that are constitutive of the species of a single genus have this genus in common. Therefore, the necessary implication of composition (al-tarkīb) will not follow. Moreover, even if we were to concede that these properties [i.e. perceptive and motive] are essential, why would it be impossible for the soul to be a composite in its quiddity (murakkaba fi māhiyyatihā), even though it is incorporeal? For such is the case with [the fact that] blackness and whiteness are classified under a genus, namely colour. Each is a composite without any corporeal composition (murakkaban lā tarkīban ǧasmaniyyan). Such is the case here [i.e. the case here with colours is also the case with souls and substances]. However, in the present case, what is stronger than [their argument] that substance is predicable of (maqūlun) the soul and body is the discussion of the genus (qawlu al-jins). For according to them, the soul is a composite without corporeal composition. So how is it possible that they deny this?

9. As for the second proof: it is a weak induction (istiqrāʾiyya daʾīfa) from two angles. The first is that it is impossible [387] for us to judge that all human beings are
receptive to all conceptualizations (qābilan li-ğamīr al-taṣawwurāt). The second is that it is impossible for us to judge that a soul that we know to have received an attribute (allatī qubūluhā li-ṣifatin) is receptive of all attributes. How is this the case, while it is impossible to have knowledge of all [possible] attributes (kayfa wa-dabt al-ṣifāt)?

10. As for the third proof, it requires that the species of all separable [things] is a single species. However, this is the things that there is no way [of knowing] (wa-ḏālika mimmā lā sabīl ilayh).

11. As for he who maintains the difference of souls in species, he argues that we find in humanity people who are knowledgeable, ignorant, strong, weak, noble, mean, good, evil, irascible, and indolent. This difference (iḥṭilāf) is either 1) on account of the difference of the souls in respect of their substances or 2) because of the difference of the bodily organs, as is the case when it is said that the person whose temperament has more heat has more anger and is more intelligent in comprehension, while the person whose temperament is colder is the opposite.

12. The second division [i.e. the difference is because the difference of the bodily organs] is false from two angles. The first is that we find two individuals who are equivalent in temperament and in external upbringing (al-taʿdībāt al-ḥāriğiyya) but different in character (al-aḥlāq). Similarly, we find two individuals who are equivalent in character, but different in temperament and external upbringing. This refutes this division. Now two things that are identical in temperament and external upbringing
could differ in character, since we see two individuals who are very close in temperament to the utmost degree (ḡāyat al-muqāraba), but who are different to the utmost degree (ḡāyat al-tabāyin) in mercy, severity, generosity, stinginess, chastity and debauchery. This is also not due to the teachings of a teacher or the supervision of parents. Therefore, it may be the case that the combination of all extrinsic factors hastens [to produce] (ittafaqa ijtima‘ al-asbāb al-ḥāriǧyya) chastity, yet the person through his natural disposition inclines towards debauchery. Perhaps too the opposite should come to pass. It may also be the case that the parents are vulgar and ruinous to the utmost degree, yet their child is the utmost in nobility and dignity. Such is the argument regarding other moral traits. Therefore, we know that this is due to nothing other than the substance of souls.

13. [388] Now two things that differ in temperament might be equivalent identical in these things [i.e. in these moral traits]. The fact is, we see intelligence and cleverness from the heat, coldness, humidity and dryness of the temperament, yet the temperament of a single person could become very hot and then cool down, depending on the make-up of his soul and his primary natural disposition (ʿalā ḥilqihi al-nafsānī wa-ḡarīzatihi). If this [intelligence] were on account of the temperament, then his character would have varied.

14. The second is that it is known that the soul’s capacity (quwwatuhā) in making use (taṣarruf) of the prime matter of this world (fī ḥayūlā ḥāda al-ʿālam)—viz. the
transformation of water into fire, earth into air, and the staff into the snake (al-ʿaṣaṭaʿbānan—[occurs] not on account of the power of its temperament. As such this division [i.e. this second division aforementioned] is false. The Master acknowledges this when he said that the temperament that is predisposed to receiving the soul is that whose existence harmonizes [with the soul] (yattafiq) only rarely (nādiran). This division is false. Thus it is established that the difference of the souls during these moments [occurs] on account of the difference of their substance only. This is the most excellent of [arguments] upon which the author of the Muʿtabar [i.e. Abu al-Barakāt al-Bağdādī] relied. In truth, therefore, this [argument by Ibn Sīnā] is not [done] through demonstrations (min al-burḥān), but rather by means of weak persuasion (min bāb al-iqnaʿiyyāt al-ḍaʿīfa).

Moreover, if we accept the difference of the dispositions of souls, the truth emerges that either the soul of each human being differs in species from other human souls, or it is possible that souls identical in quiddity exist. However, this is among that which a proof cannot be given (lam yadillu dalīlun) based upon one of two contraries [viz. the two possibilities above remain indeterminate]. However it is impossible to infer (al-istidlāl) the equivalence (tasāwī) of two souls from their equivalence in the totality of actions (tasāwīhimā fi ǧumlat al-aʿfāl). Therefore, you know that inferring the equivalence of something that possesses certain necessary concomitants, given the identity of these necessary concomitants, is false.
Appendix V: Section IX on the Causes of the Rational Soul

1. [402] It is clear that it is impossible that the cause of souls is the body, for otherwise each body would be like this. It is also impossible that [the cause] is something corporeal (ǧasmāniyyan), since this corporeal thing needs the body either essentially (fī ḍātihi) or in its being a cause (muʿṭṭiriyatihi), that is to say, the need for the body [occurs] either in existence or in causing existence (imnā an yakūna fī al-wuğūd aw fī al-īğād).

2. But it is impossible that the [need for the body occurs] in existence, because of three reasons. The first is that if corporeal forms (al-ṣuwar al-ǧismāniyya) were to act, their acts would be [achieved] by association (bi-mušāraka) of the recipient (al-qābil). Now it is impossible for this recipient that is the body to be a part of a cause (juʿzan min al-μuʿṭṭir), and the verification of this reason is already known in what was passed above.

3. The second is that the corporeal forms produce acts of causation (tuʿaṭṭiru) through the mediation of place (waḍʿ), and it is impossible that place exists in that which does not have a place.

4. [403] The third is that the cause (al-ʿilla) is more perfect and stronger than the effect (maʿlūl), and the corporeal is weaker than that which is separate [from matter]. As such, it is impossible that the cause of the soul’s existence needs the body
in order [for that cause] to exist. It is [also] impossible that [the cause] requires the body in its being the cause of the existence (mūjidiyyatihi) of the body. This is because whatever requires the body, in terms of its being an agent, is that which produces an act that makes it possible for this body—which is an instrument (āla)—to have a place and relation to this act in terms of proximity and distance. Therefore it is necessary either that [the body] produces acts of causation on account of some cause (immā an yakūn taʿṯīran li-ʿilla) that is dependent upon that which is close to this body, or is independent of this. If it is independent, it will follow that its acts of causation on what is near this body is no different to its acts of causation on what is far. Therefore, there is in principle no involvement (daḥlun) of this body in its acts of causation. Now if its act of causation on what is near to this body comes before its acts of causation on what is far from this body, it will follow that this act is the kind of thing of which closeness and distance are possible. As such, it is neither separate [from matter] nor spiritual. As a result, anything whose actions [are performed] through the participation and mediation of the body possesses a place. The converse of the contrary will thus convert (fa-yanʿakisu inʿikās al-naqīḍ): whatever does not possess a place cannot act through the mediation of the body. Now the soul is among that which does not possess a place. Hence it is impossible that it acts through the mediation of the body. The agent of the soul (fāʿil al-nafs) is in itself and in respect to its agency (fāʿiliyyatuhu) independent from matter. The agent of the rational soul is thus a separate substance, both in itself and in respect of any attachments between its essence and matter. [This agent] is named the
Active Intellect. The reason for this name is that all things that are separate from matter must necessarily intellect itself. Now it was established that a [thing’s] intellection of itself is not on account of the presence of another form that is equivalent to it, but is instead on account of its presence in itself. Therefore, its essence is [simultaneously] an intellect, an intellecter an object of intellection. The reason for its being named ‘active’ is that it is the existentiating cause (mūǧid) for our souls and that which acts on them (al-mu’attiru fi-hā). Now it has been explained that this [i.e. the existentiating cause and that acts on them] is not the Necessary of Existence (bi-wāǧib al-wuǧūd). For it is based upon [the principle that] a plurality (akṭar min wāḥid) does not issue from a single thing (al-ṣay’ al-wāḥid).

5. Now if it is said: Why is it not possible that the thing that acts on the soul of infants is the soul of his parents?

6. [404] We say that whatever we have reached [above] is enough to refute this. However the Master [i.e. Ibn Sīnā] has mentioned it specifically in the Mubāḥatāt through another argument, which is that he said: we have explained that the human soul is one in species. So if we were to make our soul the effect (maʿlūl) of some [other] soul, it would be necessary that the cause is a single soul or more than one. If it is a single soul, then [the cause] will either be individuated or non-individuated (muʿayyana aw ġayr muʿayyana). Now it is absurd that it be individuated, because human souls are one in species and thus a given soul will not be more likely to act than another. It is also
absurd that [the cause] be non-individuated, because an individuated thing requires an individuating cause. Now in the case of the possible, the scales are not more likely to tip (yatarağğahu) in favor of its existence than its non-existence, except through the existence of something [else]. When [the other thing’s] non-existence is postulated, it will follow, from the postulation of its non-existence, that this [possible] thing is non-existent. This thing is thus individuated in its existence. Now if the soul is caused on account of more than one soul, this will be false, since no number is more likely than [another] number (laysa ‘adadun awlá min ‘adadin). It would therefore follow that what acts on a single soul is the totality of all separate souls (ğami‘ al-nufüs al-mufāriqa). But this is absurd, because what is less than (al-aqalla) the totality of existing things (al-mağmü‘ al-ḥāsil) in our time (zamāninā) would be independent of (mustaqilla bi-) [their] acts of causation. Thus if the totality that [existed] prior to our time is less than the totality that [exists] in our time, and this lesser [totality] is that which acts, some units of the totality that [exists] in our time will be sufficient in [performing] the act. Furthermore, it will be impossible for the totality to be that which produces acts when you come to know that two independent causes do not combine [to act] upon a single effect. As a result, 1) the causation of the soul (ta’lil al-nafs) [occurs] through the totality of prior souls (bi-mağmü‘ al-nufüs al-sābiqa) and not through some individuals among them [i.e. the prior souls], and 2) it is impossible that the soul is attributable (istinādūhā) to something of this [i.e. to some prior individual souls instead of the totality], which is
what is sought-after. This proof is what would yield the counter argument (wa-hādihi-l-
ḥuḡa ma bi-hā ba’sun), if only the unity of the soul in terms of quiddity were affirmed.
Appendix VI: Section X on the Objection of the Ancients against the Unity of the Soul

1. [404] Know that we have explained that the human soul is its [very] essence and reality, and [that] all thinking subjects know, by the intuition of their intellect, that their essence and reality is a single thing not a plurality.

2. [405] In summary, human beings’ knowledge of their existence and unity is by and large an intuitive knowledge. So how is this something sought-after by demonstration? Rather, what is sought-after by investigation and rational reflection (al-bahṭ wa-l-naẓar) in the Book of the Soul is the knowledge of [the soul’s] quiddity, faculties, and the manner of its states of temporal generation and eternality. But, since the ancients assigned different types of actions for [certain] types of faculties, ascribing each one of [the actions] to some other faculty, they needed to explain that in their [i.e. faculty’s] whole there exists something like a source and principle (ka-l-āṣl wa-l-mabda’) and that the rest of the faculties are, as it were, consequences [or effects] and derivatives (ka-l-tawābi’ wa-l-furū‘). So let us discuss [here] the positions that are stated in this topic and let us discuss the proof of each camp (firqa).

3. Some of them hold that the soul is one, and they consist of two groups: the [first group] say that the soul performs all of its actions by its essence, but [only] through the mediation of the different organs. This is the truth according to us based upon has passed [above]. The [second group] say that the soul is a principle of the
existence of many corporeal faculties, and thereafter a proper action issues from each proper faculties. This is the position of the Master. The [third group] say that the soul is not one, but there exists in the body a number of souls, some of them are sensible (ḥassāsa), others cogitative (mufakkira), others concupiscible (šahwāniyya), and others irascible (gaḍabiyya).

4. As for those who claim a plurality of souls, they argue that we find that plants possess the nutritive (gaḍā'īyya) soul, and animals possess the appetitive and sensible soul but not the cogitative and intellectual soul. Therefore, if we see the vegetative soul existing with the absence of the sensible soul, and the sensible soul existing with the absence of the rational soul, we know that these are mutually distinct things. Now if [souls] are one, it would be impossible for one of [these souls] to exist except with the coming-to-be of all of them together. Since their mutual distinctiveness and the independence of each one of them from the other is affirmed, and we see them agglomerate in the human being, we will know [therefore] that they are mutually distinct souls that attach to a single body.

5. [406] As for those who claim a unity of the soul (al-muwḥḥidūn), they argue against this, because they say: we have proven that the different actions that the soul possesses are attributable to the different faculties, and that each faculty, insofar as it is what it is, produces only a specific kind of action. Thus, the irascible is not spurred into action (lā tanfaʿilu) by pleasurable things, nor is the appetitive spurred into action by
harmful things \((\text{al-mu'āddiyāt})\), while the apprehensive faculty is not affected by that by which these two [i.e. the irascible and concupiscible] are affected.

6. So if this is established, then we say: these faculties sometimes cooperate \((\text{muta'āwina})\) in action and other times they suppress \((\text{mutadāfi'a})\) each other. As for the cooperation, this is shown [by the fact that] when we sense such and such thing, we desire or avoid [it]. As for the mutual supression, [this is shown by the fact that] when we turn our attention to cogitation, the senses are mixed \((\text{iḥtalla})\), or [if we turn our attention to] the senses, the irascible or the appetitive is mixed.

7. So if this is established, then we say that were it not for the existence of a thing that is common to these faculties and [which] is not like the governor of all of them, then the existence of that which cooperates and that which interferes would be impossible, since if the action of each faculty is not connected \((\text{ittiṣāl})\) to the other faculty and the organs are not something that are common \((\text{laysat al-āla muṣṭarika})\), but instead each of them is specific to \((\text{mahṣūsa})\) an organ, it is necessary that this thing that interferes and cooperates between them will not come-to-be. Now if the existence of a common thing \((\text{šay' muṣṭarik})\) is established, then this common thing is either 1) bodily, 2) a disposition \((\text{ḥālan})\) in a body, or 3) not a body and not a disposition in a body. The first two divisions are false, given what was [discussed] before in the previous chapters. Thus, the third division remains, which is that the totality of the faculties is something that is not a body nor is it corporeal, and this is the soul.
8. Now if it is said: if your individual identity (huwiyyatuka) is the soul, then you would always have had awareness of the soul. But this is not the case, for you do not know the soul except through demonstration.

9. We say: What is unknown (maḏhūl) is the naming of your individual identity as 'self'. Whereas the quiddity that is named 'self' is always known to you, since the soul is the essence that uses the bodily organs (al-ḏāt al-mustaʿmila al-ālāt al-badaniyya) in the kinds of perceptions and movements [you perform]. This is known without requiring demonstration. Such is the result of Master's discussion.

10. [407] Now someone may say: what is the meaning of the soul being a nexus (ribāt) for these faculties? For if you mean by this that the soul is a ground (iʿlla) of their existence, this much does not suffice in [allowing] some of them to cooperate with others in the actions they perform or in [allowing some of them] to be an impediment (muʿāfaqan) to them. For if the cause brings to existence specific faculties in different substrates and bestows a proper organ to each of them, they would each be detached from (munfaṣila ʿan) the other faculty and be independent of it, without a connection to it in any way whatsoever. In such a case, how will the commencement (šurūʿ) of some of [these faculties] in their specific action prevent others in their action? Isn't the Active Intellect a principle of the existence of all the faculties in bodies? It would follow therefore from [the fact that] they are altogether an effect of a single principle and a single cause, that some impede others from their action or aid them in it. But if you
mean by this that the soul is the governor of these faculties and their mover, then this is possible in two ways.

11. The first is that it is said that the soul sees objects of sight, hears audible things, and desires things that are desirable. The essence [of the soul] is a substrate for these faculties and a principle (mabdaʾan) for these actions, and thus it sees, desires or becomes angry. This is how things are (fa-haḍā al-haq). However, this requires an argument that denies [the existence of] the faculties that the Master has asserted in certain, specific organs. For if the soul sees, hears and desires, what need is there in asserting the faculty of sight in the spirit—one that [exists] in the confluence of the two nerves (multaqā al-ʿashabatayni)—and the faculty of hearing in the spirit—one that is in the nerves of the ear canal (al-ʿaṣab al-ṣamāḥi)? In short, human beings see and hear through the sight and hearing that subsists in them, not through the sight and hearing that subsists in another thing.

12. The second is that we mean by the soul being a nexus that when the faculty of sight senses a particular sensible, the soul becomes disposed, since it perceives this in a universal way. For instance, if the faculty of sight perceives the form of a particular individual, the rational soul will perceive that there exists an individual thing that is characterized by such and such colour, such and such shape (šakl), and such and such posture (hayʾa). This [408] does not exclude it from universality (wa-kullu ġālika lā yataḥarrajahu ʾan al-kulliyya). Therefore, you know that when the universal is confined
(quyyida) by universal attributes, it does not become particular through it. In summary, sensing this particular thing (al-ǧuzʿi) is a cause of the soul’s disposition to perceive this particular thing in a universal way. Moreover this perception is a cause of searching for a universal in order to obtain (taḥṣil) this thing [as a piece of knowledge]. With this search, [this thing] becomes something particular given the particularity (taḥṣṣuṣ) of the recipient. This particular search consists in desire (ṣahwa). Thus it follows that the soul’s being a nexus for the corporeal faculties and as a meeting place (maǧmaʿan) for them be conceived as the Master’s view.

13. As for the argument of those who believe in the plurality of the soul, it is very weak, since we do not hold that the faculties responsible for acts of intellectual perception are in fact identical to the faculties [responsible for] acts of sensible perceptions. Rather, we say that they are different faculties, though their substrate is the soul. Now it does not follow from the fact that their substrate in animals are bodies and corporeal (aǧsām abdāniḥa) that this is also the case in human beings. Rather, [the faculty that is responsible for acts of intellectual perception] necessitates a substrate, whose individual determination (taʿayyun) depends upon demonstration. Furthermore, if we hold that the faculty that [is responsible for] perception and movement is one, it will not follow that this would be the case in all situations (jamīʿ al-mawāḍir). Therefore, it is not impossible for a single faculty to attach to many species and for there to exist, in each of this species, a delineated faculty (quwwatan ʿalá hiddatan), and for the faculty
that regulates all of these [species] to be different in quiddity to the faculty that regulates some of them. If this is possible, then what they argue falters.
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