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**ENCOUNTERING THE UNCANNY IN ART AND EXPERIENCE:
POSSIBILITIES FOR A CRITICAL PEDAGOGY OF
TRANSFORMATION IN A POSTMODERN TIME**

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**A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy of
Education**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis considers the ways that critical reflection on normalizations of social meaning and structures can provide sites for learning and transformation in a pluralist, divided, and destructive world. It investigates five recent “uncanny” works of art, in order to illustrate the value of critiquing closed frames of reference and attending to theories of hermeneutics, ideology critique, and aesthetics. The thesis explores the elements of postmodern consciousness which raise questions about self, identity, and agency in an era of fragmentation, difference, and challenges to master narratives. Using a dialogue between theory and text, history and fiction, it outlines part of an interpretive project, in which art provides one site for curriculum and public debate regarding a participatory and inclusionary society, thus contributing to a postmodern pedagogy of transformation.

RÉSUMÉ

Cette thèse démontre comment les différentes manières d'appliquer une réflexion critiques sur le contrôle social et les normalisations des compréhensions et structures social ouvre la porte à des transformations et à un processus d'apprentissage dans un monde pluraliste, divisé et destructif. C'est en examinant cinq oeuvres d'art controversées que l'on illustre la valeur de la critique d'un cadre de références fermés dans le processus du développement de la signification. Pour arriver à ces fins, on touche aux théories de l'hermeneutique, idéologie critique, et esthétique. À partir des théories de la formation moderne de la conscience, cette thèse s'engage plus loin dans la considération des éléments de conscience post-moderne qui questionne le soi, l'identité et la liberté de changement dans un monde fragmenté, contenant des différences et des défis vis-à-vis les grands récits. Au moyen d'un dialogue entre la théorie et le texte, l'histoire et la fiction, elle met en valeur des projets qui s'ouvrent sur un curriculum et un débat publique concernant une société participative, et inclusive menent à une pédagogie de transformation post-moderne.

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INTRODUCTION

The Situation

For many people, it feels as though our life-worlds lie in pieces, and we are fragments floating in uncharted territory. Bumping into each other, the friction causes sparks and conflagration. We feel alienated from ourselves, our places of residence, from others. We feel uneasy, grabbing at any promise of the "security" of permanence, of unchanging rules and structures. Alienation and fragmentation - the combined consciousness of the modern and the postmodern. But there is another presence in our lives, defined by the search for values, spirit, identity, and a self in community to meet the challenges of our time in history. This search is now located within the postmodern markings of a pluralist, trans-national and global late twentieth century capital-forming world.

In order to continue holding power, present economic and political structures need insecure people competing against one another. We dance to the diversity of world-beat rhythms while, at the same time, we are made the function of trans-national capital; capital which homogenizes cultures while it utilizes difference for its own goals and profits. In the "global village," local resources and cultures are exploited and assimilated into a trans-national mono-culture which represents the new imperialism of capital. But even as one billion people watch the Oscars on satellite television, local cultures and languages, not yet destroyed, struggle to re-emerge and strengthen.¹ In the midst of all this, we will need to construct a local-global ethical identity and participatory structures for responsible action. Identity is a powerful pull toward acceptance and healing, and it can open us to the values carried in any community and its legacies. Notwithstanding,

¹bell hooks (1990), who writes of remembering the past as transformational, calls for habits of being which inform our lives in the voices of those displaced and oppressed others (p.25), and reminds us that, although identity politics can exclude, they also provide a space for empowerment for marginalized groups. Taking this dilemma seriously, she reminds us that the dialogue on identity is under threat just when the un- and mis-represented are coming to voice (p.26).

certain forms of communalism can also be hurtful to those outside. This paradox needs to be considered by those committed to social change.

We also want to prepare ourselves, and our children, to meet a post-industrial, computerized,² electronic, knowledge-based society that will no longer contain the jobs and securities we once counted on. We need to value ourselves, and our abilities, and those of others, beyond the categories and labels placed on us, as we join the search for the way beyond fragmentation and alienation.

Changes come, wanted or not; the issue is whether, and how, we can participate in shaping what they bring. But there are still arguments and debates about what should replace old values and systems, and about what still has value. There are many ways these conflicts play out. Recently, the Vatican excommunicated a Sri Lankan sociologist-theologian, Tissa Balasuriya, for what it called the destructiveness of relativism. The Vatican's Congregation of the Doctrine of Faith refused to enter into any debate with this priest, who had for years promoted a necessary dialogue between cultures and faiths in his homeland, in an effort to heal the violence which is still killing so many. At least Balasuriya wasn't condemned to death; neither were other priests excommunicated recently for giving us a bigger space in which to think and fight for liberation. But each such attack is meant to silence our minds and spirits.³ To me, this is not so much about the mis-representation of tradition, as the Vatican suggests. The issue is whether controlling gatekeepers to our "homes" will interpret meaning for us⁴, or whether people will take responsibility to think for themselves about values and traditions. As we approach the end of this century, there are many signs that we face a crisis for

²Generation X novelist, Douglas Coupland (1995), doesn't give up on human caring and spirit in the microchip world of his novel, *Microserfs*: even "machines really are our subconscious ... products of our being ... windows into our souls" (p. 228).

³We need to move from uncritical reactions to the controlling gestures of excommunications and fatwas to a critical understanding of and resistance to them.

⁴To quote from the most quoted of all books, "The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things." "The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master."

imagination and consciousness⁵, as people opt into representations and attitudes that dull their ability to vision, think, and take initiatives outside the manufactured framework. Critical pedagogy and ethics can help us find participatory ways of re-socializing ourselves by learning how to “hold...before ourselves alternate models of possible realities so that we may visualize and conceptualize other ways of being in the world” (Abley, January 4, 1997).

This thesis is about finding ways we can learn and live responsibly in a world of diversity and discord, and about possible responses we can make toward a more participatory, inclusive, and responsible society. In facing the great destructions of this century, postmodern voices are reminding us that we carry everything from the past with us, good and ill. We are at risk if the contradictions with which we are constantly presented are ignored, discounted, or repressed. Contradictions can help us recognize what is of value to retain, and what needs to be let go of, can help us make responsible choices in favour of a world that all can inhabit in peace and with justice. Stating this at the outset reveals my bias in favour of some of the Enlightenment values I have inherited, and for earlier religious and ethical foundations from which these values emerged. It is my belief that within the range of possibilities for human behaviour and action, we long to be touched and transformed by experiences of justice and peace, truth and beauty, the “good,” and community, in whatever cultural form we give these; just as much as we struggle to survive. The reality of liberated and transformed individuals and communities around the globe bear witness to the reaching out to these values.

My Background and Location

As an educator, I began to develop my own values and standpoint through the experience of teaching in Central Africa, as a secondary school teacher and adult literacy

⁵I have encountered this in my own work, noting people’s resistance to discuss their thoughts, create, or admit that they can imagine (Scott Kabwe in *PMC: The Practice of Ministry in Canada*, November 1996). I am also impressed with the common-sense critical skills of many others.

worker, living with people who had recently achieved national liberation and who were committed to their own political and economic development in one of many African contexts. Returning to Canada in 1974, I found similar processes of emancipatory education and conscientization (e.g., Freire, 1970), and the same vision of a just and participatory society, in the educational programs of many churches and solidarity groups. Identifying with this vision, I began working as an educator with The United Church Of Canada, work I continue to do in my present position with this denomination as a pastoral minister in a local congregation in a First Nations community. As I became more involved in the feminist movements developing in the 1970's, I saw an action-reflection model at work again, enriched by feminist theorizing on women and knowing, and feminist theologizing from around the world.

Paulo Freire, the Brazilian educator internationally known for his models of emancipatory education, and a person of deep spirituality, stated that "liberation is thus a childbirth, and a painful one...(emerging) is a new man (sic)...no longer oppressor or oppressed, but a man in the process of achieving freedom" (Freire, 1970, p. 33). In 1987, while on sabbatical, I was able to learn more about Freire's models in a program offered in Harare by the Zimbabwe Christian Council. This program, called Learning For Transformation⁶, was based on material developed in Kenya in 1974, and since used in countries such as Nigeria, Tanzania, India, and the United States. The authors of the original DELTA Training Program, or Development Education and Leadership Teams in Action, on which it was based, prepared its content from five sources: Freire's work on critical awareness or critical reason, and conscientization, and his praxis (action-reflection) model; human relations theory — communications skills and group building; organizational theory — planning skills and goal setting; social analysis, again from the

⁶The program, based on Freire's education for emancipation (Giroux, 1992), uses instead the term education for transformation, which is closer to the theological component it holds. It adds to Freire's concept of liberation in much the same way as critical pedagogy is now doing with concepts of democracy and possibility. This is an example, among the many found throughout this thesis, of the difficulties with pinning down or finding comprehensive terminology to satisfy everyone. Our terms, like our lives, are always in the process of becoming.

Freirian model of "reading our reality," discovering root causes of systemic injustices and social contradictions; and the works of liberation theologians, a theology of transformation.

This program became theoretically foundational for me, and also helped me to continue my reflection on past experience and some of the features of my own location and identity in the matrix of power and privilege as a Canadian middle-class woman married into an African culture and extended family. As participants in the program, we met with members of collectives and co-operatives, and other development groups, who were also using the DELTA model, as well as training from the credit-union movement developed by Moses Coady in Nova Scotia during the 1930's. Immersed back in the Canadian context, I began to look for ways to adapt the "learning for transformation" processes in my work and reflection on it, although there has been no simple translation of the processes here. If, as I have discovered, learning must take context seriously, so should the curriculum materials we use and develop. In 1991, I was able to visit the Coady Institute⁷ in Antigonish, Nova Scotia, and participate in a "design lab" on education and program design in near-by Tatamagouche. This program is based on participatory approaches to learning drawn from methods of popular and experiential education, and on adult education⁸ theory. Starting with a group assessment and choice of a learning need, learning objectives are set, and a learning experience designed, planned, carried out, and finally, evaluated, or reflected on, to identify the learnings and their consequences. I have often found this approach a challenge to implement because its participatory nature is outside the normal process of curriculum development and

⁷An international training school for community and development workers, this institute has inherited the adult education commitments (educating for self-help and co-operative development) of the Antigonish Movement begun in the 1920's and 1930's by two priests, Jimmy Tompkins and Moses Coady. It continues to provide a popular, grassroots education for development, much like Highlander Folk School in Tennessee, and other such movement-schools in communities in many countries.

⁸Adult learning, 80 per cent based on discovering for self, and using group discussion, models recovery of experiential knowledge already held. By using observation and analysis, learners identify what is learned, the context that helps learning, how we learn, and who helps us.

teacher-centered lesson design. Nonetheless, it remains an important model for me⁹.

Research Questions

I describe these two programs because I have continued to see them as ground for my educational theory, questions, and practice. As I continue to study, learn, and reflect, I am finding new resources in the work of critical pedagogy which, although committed to emancipatory or transformational education, also engages the postmodern challenges that have emerged so strongly since Freire developed his first models in the late 1960's. I am also more conscious now of those learning moments and experiences that arrive in our lives without design or choice, when we are suddenly faced with decisions about how we will respond. It is often these immediate situations that will call from us the skills our educational theory and practice should be constantly developing, skills preparing us to live together in freedom, and within just social and economic structures.

The word "education" come from "educere," to understand out of embodied experience and encounters with others. My educational questions for this thesis have to do with two main areas of concern. I first ask: How can absolutist, violent, and destructive controls over meanings and lives be identified and resisted? People in all walks of life are finding ways to resist these controls. I believe that both the ability to critique ideologies, and the ability to engage the presence of the disturbing or unfamiliar with a mind open to learn, are important. If, as David Tracy (1991) has argued, we wander colonized, homeless, and exiled, amid conflicting interpretations, emancipation will come from those cultural and spiritual resources which "unnerve..consciousness.., despised resources of our own traditions (which can) release us from the terrors of our own history" (p.360). The struggle to regain and interpret these resources must in fact

⁹Based on discussions with people about what they want to learn, I have worked on developing, at various times, materials on poetry and transformation; film study guides for social justice issues; and workshops on experiential spirituality, using what the Institute For Creation-Centred Spirituality in Oakland, California calls "extravert meditation," which uses dance, drawing, music, clay, and other media for learning through the senses.

engage the very manipulation of them by the powers of Authority. As part of this struggle, Tracy himself looks at an analogous imagination which, like metaphor, brings us to the “conversation on the far side of suspicion” (p. 362). The postmodern journey of spirit Tracy describes is the dialogue with tradition and convention, where such critical conversation is possible. It illustrates for me a critical and transformational postmodern pedagogy that unites cultural forces and experiences with critical, or reflective, reason, that which Tracy calls “practical¹⁰ reason” (p. 390). Such a pedagogy can challenge the products of politics that create differences as polar opposites — products such as homophobia, racism, misogyny, class hierarchies, colonialism, and other locations of power struggle and violence.

My second question follows this first concern. What educational practices and curricula can enable personal and social transformation, changing violence and domination to democratic structures of peace and justice?

Thesis Outline

In developing responses to the questions I have posed, I have added another component to the usual thesis format. My first chapter will begin my discussion by providing an analysis of five works of art, to set the stage, so to speak, for the literature review and theoretical framework that will follow. If, as I will contend, art and aesthetics have much to contribute to a critical pedagogy of transformation, it is important, adapting the praxis model, to provide such concrete aesthetic experiences, and theory, to reflect on.

If there is a metaphor for my approach in developing my thesis, it would be that of weaving; I have found it necessary to gather separate strands of theory for the warp and for the weft, gradually inter-twining them before the whole cloth and its construction can be glimpsed. To arrive at my educational conclusions, I have opted in my review for

¹⁰“Practical reason functions as transformative of all other uses of reason...through its emancipatory interests....”

a cross-disciplinary approach, a broad view over the collection of the many narrative threads which I have found relevant and related to each other, rather than the in-depth following of a single linear trail.

Henry Giroux (1992) has promoted this approach in an attempt to re-define “both the meaning of critical pedagogy and the notion of cultural politics (p. 2). Giroux quotes one of the originators of cultural studies, Raymond Williams, who had a “desire to make learning part of the process of social change” (p. 163). In a call for a linking of cultural studies and pedagogy, Giroux reminds us that pedagogical issues are now being addressed in the “wider movements in feminist theory, poststructuralism, postmodernism, cultural studies, literary theory, and the arts.” (p. 2).

I recognize that each thread in my review in itself raises important questions and deserves to be followed in depth; certainly, these will provide me with foci for further research and understanding. Also, while the theorists I refer to are not formally, for the most part, educators - their work represents the fields of philosophy, critical social theory, sociology, theology, architecture, cultural studies, literary theory and art criticism, feminist and post-colonial theory, as well as critical pedagogy — I will try to take their work further by identifying the links they contain to the educational questions I have raised. Perhaps the whole thesis should be taken as a literature review (rather than a review of a particular literature) which will bring me to its conclusions. Themes are repeated in the different chapters, but from different perspectives. The weaving has not yet produced the finished piece, but the threads are leading to further thought and practice.

Chapter One, then, not only engages five works of art, which are representative of most major art media, but works that have proved unsettling or disturbing to many people. It is for this reason that I have chosen them. This is not “shock-art” for the sake of shock; the artists are confronting those normalizations and rationalizations that impose fundamentalist categories that limit or destroy, often in the name of group identity and tradition, whether religious, social, or political. Their art is a public citizenship that bravely resists dominant powers and worldviews, and so opens possibilities for us to

resist them as well.

The first is a postmodern ballet entitled *The hard nut*, Mark Morris's version of The Nutcracker, in which he not only critiques the original ballet, but also our present codes for relationships, and through which he comments on the human search for love and stability. This is followed by a recent film by Neil Jordon, *The crying game*, which continues the critique of gender codes, as well as analyzing racial, national, and class oppression. The third work, or series of visual art works, part of Melvin Charney's *The German series*, allows us to face the silencing of historic memory in the name of post-Holocaust reconstruction and economic development. The fourth, a music composition by R. Burn Purdon entitled *Sacred scandal*, is a deconstruction of religious tradition and narrative in order to foster dialogue about the meaning faith might offer life. The fifth work is a novel, Salman Rushdie's controversial *The satanic verses*, which explores fully the results of migration, colonization, and loss of "home," as well as the destructive power of religious controls over human life. I intend this first chapter to illustrate how encountering not only the aesthetic experience, but also what I refer to as the uncanny in art, can be an important component for both education and transformation.

In Chapter Two, in order to more clearly understand our present situation and the crises we face, I will develop that part of the thesis which can be referred to as a formal literature review. Collected around the general themes of "home" and homelessness, this review will offer an analysis of the foundations of modernity, its consciousness, often described in terms of homelessness, and its "malaise," to use Charles Taylor's term. I begin by looking at Taylor's (1991) *The malaise Of modernity*, which describes the way people live and think out of consciousness formed by the forces of modernity. He critiques this consciousness in order to understand the consequences of notions of authenticity and self that have risen out of the limitations of Enlightenment rationality. This critique of modern consciousness is enlarged by a consideration of the work of Peter and Brigitte Berger and Hansfried Kellner (1973) in *The homeless mind*. This is a valuable analysis of modernization, progress, and the development of twentieth century political and economic structures, to which they add their proposal for "de-

modernization" as a remedy to the malaise. If "homelessness" is the consciousness we have to deal with in modernity, then the clarification of the not-at-home, the uncanny, provided by Anthony Vidler (1992) in *The architectural uncanny*, bridges psyche and culture, and helps place the concept of de-modernization in the postmodern, post-colonial, era. I end this chapter with a summary of some theories of the nature of "home" in the postmodern context, theories that I propose will be helpful to the development of the kind of ethical imagination that is called for by the theorists I move on to in Chapter Three.

To answer the question of whether art in our postmodern era, and especially art that disturbs dominant powers and worldviews, can provide a moment for that change agency which is central to emancipatory, transformational, or critical pedagogy, I will turn to theories in the fields of aesthetics, politics, philosophy, and critical social theory that are themselves informed by the insights of postmodernism. The texts treated in Chapter Three make a valuable contribution to a theoretical framework into which I hope to insert subsequent educational processes. Linda Hutcheon (1988) provides a frame for understanding an important postmodern aesthetic, and I have used her identification of the need for theory to engage fiction as my model for introducing the artworks of the first chapter. Her text, *A poetics of postmodernism*, was key in leading me to recognize the need for hermeneutical skills, as well as critical reflection, in the praxis model, and the need to develop skills to critique ideologies. I stress that the interpretive search for meaning, like the use of creativity and imagination, must be carried out in the dialogues¹¹

¹¹Resistance to dialogue may be based on a justifiable fear that it carries change in its nature. Areas of uniqueness to be protected are not up for discussion, otherwise they will be lost. In a pluralist world, this possibility is too great, even when dialogue builds links across groups. On the other hand, Uma Narayan (1989) contends that it is because of our differences that dialogue is imperative (p.26). Like has nothing to discuss with like. She raises the issue of "double vision" or dual perspective, a reality integrated into the daily lives of the children of mixed race/culture/religion. People learn to inhabit critically two or more contexts. She asks whether it is necessary to lose the relationship or part of the self to belong to one group. I add that without our interpretive and imaginative sharings, we do not learn or change.

of community, to avoid self-serving interests.¹² Hutcheon's work leads me to the responses that George Steiner (1989) offers in *Real presences*, in which he makes a persuasive case for the welcoming of a transformational presence that enters between self and others. I then review postmodernism's identification of commitment to others, looking at Stephen K. White's (1991) work on the need to create a public space where certain volatile questions can be addressed. In *The politics of postmodernism*, White counters critics who see in postmodernism an inability to act, due to the relativizing of all values. White is able to hold the two responsibilities, the one to act, and the second, to others, in usable and ethical tension by reference to a feminist ethic of care.

In Chapter Four, I will carry this into some recent feminist aesthetics theory which also reflects this notion of care, after outlining some educational theories of John Dewey and Paulo Freire, which I see as relating to the feminist work I raise. I will then move to some educational notions regarding transformation which come from critical pedagogues writing primarily in the North American context, out of which I will draw my final conclusions. I pose none of the texts and theories as ends in themselves to be accepted without question, but approach them as we should approach all representation, as a provocation in the best sense to becoming aware of how and why we come to them.

In this perhaps unconventional and complex inter-twining of theories and art, I find the longings of our era, with its unbalancing mixture of modern and postmodern understandings. We are everywhere caught in struggles to be fully human. We are filled with a sense of alienation, rootlessness, and homelessness, whether as refugees, exiles, emigrants, those without jobs or prospects, without shelter, or those who psychologically or socially have no sense of belonging, to a group or even to themselves. This sense can be conscious; we can be aware of its origins. Or it can be vague in its unnerving. Not for the first time in human history have we lived in what Sigmund Freud called the uncanniness of our not-at-home moment. If imaginative, critical, and ethical thinking,

¹²Imagination, for Tracy (1991) is self-serving, and even evil, when subject to our own distortions and traumas. He calls for an inter-active and shared social imagination that will shape life-honouring patterns.

and the ability to act responsibly with care for self and others, are indeed under threat, we need a pedagogy that redevelops these skills as resources for our living. It will be a critical, aesthetic, and spiritual pedagogy that will help us recognize that we are, as Freire has written, “beings in the process of becoming...with a likewise unfinished (historical) reality” (Freire, 1970, p. 72).

CHAPTER ONE

Five Unsettling Works of Art

Horatio: O day and night, but this is wondrous strange!
Hamlet: And therefore as a stranger give it welcome. There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

— (Hamlet, Act 1, scene 5)

Introduction

What are the qualities that can reshape our sense of community, of belonging-at-home with the varieties of people and cultures and other species co-habiting together on planet earth? I think that such qualities are to be found in imagination, critical awareness, citizenship, ethical action, and compassion — areas where both art and education play a tremendous role. Our guidelines for achieving this kind of “home” and community will be created by the manner in which our stories are told to each other, and by how we are permitted to enter the many discourses or experiences engendered by whatever ruptures these stories may bring. We enter the space of encounter and reflection to partake in what Paulo Freire hoped will be social dreaming. Roger Simon (1992), in *Teaching against the grain*, describes a decentring pedagogy that critiques the taken-for-granted and starts thought in motion. He suggests that we live in both a present of ethical possibilities and an imperial present we must grasp. For Simon, the images that lead us through such a present journey are both representational and political/pedagogical. In this, he supports Walter Benjamin’s position that images that emerge in new constellations will illuminate the present as a moment of radical possibility (p. 138) where silenced memories may come to voice, and where democracy can be shaped. Art, by encouraging both imagination and critical reflection, is an important element in this release. In providing decentring aesthetic experiences, art can actually give us a space for the social dreaming we need to do. Simon holds that our lives are given daily opportunities to be open to transformative moments, and that the now-time is the standpoint for responsibility to self and others. We are called to recognize, seriously and creatively, our present moment,

what David Tracy (1991), in *The analogical imagination*, calls the “situation.” He defines situation as the “creative interpretation of existence” (p. 340), and goes on to suggest that our present moment is underscored by the search for authentic soul. This is a spiritual way of expressing the searches for “home” made by the artists and theorists I will be reviewing. This search requires us to retrieve and interpret our dangerous memories as a responsible act to the future.

We can be well served by the ability to critically reflect on our aesthetic experiences. Art and culture, whether in popular forms, or the creations of so-called “high culture”, enter our lives every day, as we watch television, read a book, go to the movies or maybe a museum or theatre, as we read the newspapers, use computers, or even attend a place of worship. It is possible to be merely pacified by art and culture. But they are important, whether we are conscious of this or not, when used as gateways for engaging the stories they tell and the images they raise; stories and images that help shape what we do and how we think. People look for certain values to be reflected in art, and are often dismayed when they don't find them. Notions of beauty have been assailed many times in the modern history of art, from Caravaggio to Barnett Newman.”¹³ Taste” has made art accessible to large audiences, because of the way it re-enforces expectations. The art that contests and dismantles conventions and norms, alienates when it re-enforces anxiety about change and prevents comfort, security, or prestige. But art also has value for its ability to make us think and get involved, even in the response itself. Art can fill us with the delight of new insights. It can also engage us even in our rejection of it. Both are acts of participation and of struggling to make sense of its

¹³Caravaggio (1573–1610) painted the sacred in the common life, angering religious authority, which felt art was for the greater glory of the deity and church. His naturalism was meant to reveal mysteries through inward experience and allow the viewer to meet one's self, a lay movement also very threatening. Barnett Newman's (1905–1970) *Voice of fire* created a scandal when purchased by the National Gallery of Canada for \$1.76 million. Some felt it was an artistic fraud on taxpayers. Newman had created the artwork for the U.S. pavilion at Expo '67 in Montréal as a vision of our common humanity. U.S. interests had previously been served by the use of such abstract expression painting by the U.S. Information Agency during the ideological battles of the Cold War — representing the “American ideals of freedom and progress” (Baxter, *et al.*, 1996).

meaning. As a source of surprise and contestation to what we do and think, art can create new spaces, new ground for us to journey through and over. The possibility for transformation lies here. In the art reviewed in this thesis, the strange and familiar, the old and the new, exist side by side. In the collisions they create, stereotypes can be overcome. New understandings of ourselves can emerge. The five works I selected were chosen subjectively because they touched me, and express what I am trying to explore. There are many other works that could be chosen to highlight the workings of uncanny art and experience. In fact, Janet Wolff (1983) and Terry Eagleton (1976) both argue that the lens of disturbance and presence can be brought to any cultural product. Not all confrontations lead to change; often they re-enforce a choice to stay with the status quo. This too is an important effect to be aware of, and deal with, as an educator.

In Zimbabwe, I met a local group using theatre for social change which had as its slogan, "a people without culture is like a tree without roots." They understood, with Amilcar Cabral, that the restoration of a people's culture can return them to their own being; that the repression of their cultural life, and therefore their own historical process, had been part of the implantation of colonialism. Cabral, a leader of national liberation in Guinea-Bissau in the early 1970's, understood a people's popular and indigenous culture as both the fruit of their history and a determinant of history. He also described a people's cultural "personality" as the organic nature out of which their positive cultural values could be released as cultural resistance aiding liberation. Such a regained culture could support the development of productive forces in national development after national liberation (Africa Information Service, 1973). Cabral's "return to the source" is not a cultural event but part of a political process; it is a window on how to critically reflect on culture and art in order to discover its liberating moments and possibilities.

Henry Giroux (1992) calls for a democratic and critical pedagogy that will raise "questions of culture, change, and language with the equally important concerns of agency and ethic" (p. 164). Cultural production by cultural workers needs to be affirmed in all areas of social endeavor, including those of education and art. Giroux points out that Antonio Gramsci promoted an education that sees all society as a vast school (p.

105). Cultural production, such as in the five works of art I undertake to engage in this thesis, becomes an important part of education, as curriculum, and as practice. It can develop the responsibility for what Stuart Hall calls the knowledge we “organize, produce, mediate, and translate.” (p. 175). Such knowledge needs to speak to those questions and concerns of our being that Giroux has identified above; it is knowledge that leads to meaning and transformation rather than the storage of information. Culture, like historical process, can limit, but it can also open up new realities beyond our experience. It is with this hope that I turn now to five unsettling works of art.

A Childhood Ritual Reborn

I will look first at *The hard nut*, by American choreographer Mark Morris. This work charmed me as much with its playfulness as with its deconstruction of a classical ballet, *The nutcracker*, that annually draws crowds looking for a traditional Christmas experience to round off the social rituals of this season. *The hard nut* premiered in Belgium and was first performed in New York City in 1993. It takes a dance icon and turns it inside out to call us deeper into our inner world. *The nutcracker* itself was based on a version by Alexandre Dumas, Père, which Dumas, in turn, based on a nineteenth century story by E.T.A. Hoffmann, an acknowledged master of the uncanny form whose works influenced both Freud and Poe. Hoffmann’s tale, *The nutcracker and the mouse king*, is itself a look at the sinister underside of technology in a Newtonian universe of clockworks and Master clockmakers, and at the healing that can come from discerning gentleness under an ugly facade. It called for the world of imagination to be carried into maturity so that the truth of love can be discovered.

The hard nut becomes a commentary on our society, as well as a commentary on social icons as unquestionable sources of meaning. It bursts our balloon of nostalgia for childhood, and critiques our enchantment with fairy-like magical atmosphere which, in *The nutcracker*, fills us with its charm. Being thus charmed, we forget that the best fairytales don’t charm, they jolt. Morris catches Hoffmann’s uncanniness, and attaches it

to the American suburban environment of the 1960's. The set of the home is that decade's pop-art cartoons instead of the bourgeois European drawing-room of the nineteenth century.

The ballet opens with a central image of the historical uncanny, that of the hearth.¹⁴ But, on centre stage, the frame for this image is a television screen that the children of the family are watching while the adults party drunkenly around them. On the screen, as a virtual reality, is a fire burning warmly in a fireplace. We have entered a destabilized, ironized, home, the adults cavorting in bellbottoms and stomping around in designer boots. Unlike the impressive Victorian Christmas tree of *The Nutcracker*, the tree on the side table is artificial and white. Baby Boomers recognize the artifact. The children have received a Barbie doll and a Star Wars-like toy robot. The nutcracker doll has an Elvis hairdo. This is not meant to be a pop culture veneer for our entertainment, but an attempt to return us to our own cultural images so that we start to think, and begin to question what we see. The dancers' gestures are rock-and-roll movements, but the music is still familiar.

A strange sensation, however, inhabits the Tchaikovsky score. We have entered an now-unconcealed world of sexuality; Morris's images do not avoid this theme. Marie is a teenager in baby-doll pyjamas and plush slippers about to be seduced by the doll-maker, Drosselmeyer. There may even be a rape off-stage. But Morris challenges even the "norm" of heterosexuality. Drosselmeyer dances with his own mirror image for the lovers' *pas de deux*, and, in a startling switch, the Snowflakes and Flowers are danced by men as well as women. Sexual identity is not only blurred, but strangely the gender switching seems to make sense all of a sudden. The Maid, dancing on traditional female point shoes, is male. We begin to laugh at our own gender identifications and at middle-class manners. We are given cultural reminders of the Ballet Monte Carlo, and *The Muppet Show*'s Miss Piggy dancing with dancer Rudolf Nureyev. But surprisingly, the music continues to recreate the recollection of a magic environment. We are so used to

¹⁴Visser (1994) links the function of the hearth with connection to the past and the earth, and with focus, and so, I suggest, with critical thought.

being carried along by this music that, at the beginning, we have a hard time really seeing what we may be seeing now. When the dancing finally pierces the music, we start to become aware of what is in front of our eyes.

In Act Two, when the story switches to the tale of Princess Pirlipat, we are confronted, not with Christmas magic, but with the dilemma of the cursed, the ugly, and the rejected and marginalized. The first act of *The hard nut* had critiqued and resisted our grand narratives¹⁵ of class and gender. Morris's second act critiques the new coca-cola-multi-cultural imperialism of capital and gives us a vision of global justice, love, and hope. He believes that love exists in the world, despite so many experiences of its lack. And he suggests where it is to be found. After a round-the-world search, imaged by a giant international date clock and re-defined "ethnic" dances, the nut that is so hard to come to terms with is found right where the characters live- at home. We will not recognize this truth until we "wake up", that is, mature. The two united lovers dance, barefoot, an element of "modern" dance, in front of a simple black backdrop that energizes us. The ballet then ends with a return to the first set. Now it is Marie looking out at her family from the TV screen. Hers is a critical standpoint. Her mother looks into the room, and doesn't notice any change. The maid switches the TV off, and the silent set is all that's left on the stage, managing to still speak to us of what is absent in this home. The new experience of love helps Marie to view her past, but critically; and possibly, we stand with her, looking out as she does, on what was, but which has been transformed within us into a new hope.

Morris calls visual and muscular attention to that which he deconstructs and un-nerves. Dance theorist David Levin (in Silverman, 1990) has called this a modern aesthetic, but he states his difficulty with the usual labelling of modern and postmodern categories. Levin says that postmodern dance achieves its freedom from, and yet remains indebted to, the dance archive. It has playfulness, historical reference, the breakdown of

¹⁵This is a term coined by Jean-François Lyotard in *The postmodern condition* (1979): "les grands récits," or the ideologies of Total Theory, which conceal and suppress all lived little narratives.

boundaries of form and content, and provocation. This would describe *The hard nut*. Within this form, Morris gives us a search for the source, meaning, and possibility of committed love, suggesting the holding of older ideals within postmodernism.

In *The hard nut*, Morris has created a sometimes parodic look at the classic ballet, *The nutcracker*, thereby helping us to think about the role of dance itself as an art form and as a transformative agent of our worldview. His ballet has the capacity to shake us out of the complacent expectations we bring to the original, and gives us a new perspective on the nature of love and culture at the end of the twentieth century. Suzanne Langer has suggested that dance goes so far back as a communicative form that it is the origin of language (Banes, 1980, p. 180). Postmodern dance, contemporary dance, or *nouvelle danse* as it is called in Québec, returns to such populist origins by utilizing all physical gesture available, ancient ones and those of the contemporary street. Like psychoanalysis, postmodern dance explores inner territory of memory and the sub-conscious. Its choreographers know they have to break the traditional rules of dance to enter this inner homeland. Good postmodern dance is therefore uncanny.¹⁶ It sets out to challenge our assumptions and shed light on our repressions. Levin posits “a possibility, in dance, of a redeeming political significance (in Silverman, 1990, p. 226). Dancer Peggy Baker once said, “I want to remember about things I can’t speak about, but I can dance about” (Taylor, Kate, Jan. 24, 1992). One goal of this genre is honesty, or “the authentic.” Another is to sense our experience of reality in a physical, embodied way, not just through thought or emotion.

David Levin argues that, in postmodern dance, meaning is “immanent in the very presence of the moving body” (in Silverman, 1990, p. 218), not in the repetition of the expected, which dulls the process of thinking any new thoughts. Such dance is the art of recollection that Herbert Marcuse speaks about as “the dance (that) can be the body’s

¹⁶This word, defined as weird or mysterious, was first articulated by Freud as rooted in the “domestic ... thereby opening up problems of identity around the self, the other, the body and its absence.” Vidler (1992, p.x). I take up Vidler’s explanation of the uncanny in greater depth in Chapter Two.

speech" (p. 232). The possibility of a thinking encounter with meaning so revealed should occur when experiencing all art, but often doesn't. We need the skill to recognize when and how this birthing of meaning takes place, because the process of encounter with content and form is how we learn.

All of these theories have been addressed for me in this ballet, with its sites of inversion that meet memory. Sites like this are, I believe, public spaces where we can meet, and regain room to live. Spaces, public or private, can no longer be allowed to imprison us, like the first act TV room of *The hard nut*. Our private spaces must no longer be the locations of our withdrawal from the world's often harsh realities, or the place where we have been convinced, by modernity, that we will find our only remaining source of freedom. The trend for cocooning in the new media rooms in our homes prevents us from taking on public responsibilities. The world cuisines we sample, and our world-wide webs do offer us symbols and experiences of connecting globally, but they more often suck in a global pastiche of fragments, which, as David Harvey (1989) warns, misleads us to a colonizing belief that all space and all cultures are ours to own. In *The hard nut*, Morris's satire on *The nutcracker*'s ethnic dances critiques colonization, and shocks us into thinking of ways we might create social relationships where we can share our spaces with others, in solidarity, rather than through exploitation. Morris's art does not domesticate, nor does it legitimize control over others. His work affirms Levin's statement that the dancing body can challenge "the passive, docile, subjugated body" and ideologies of power (in Silverman, 1990, p. 231). The moving body is a visible subject, a source of knowledge. Morris's cultural and sexual gestures stir unconscious echoes deep inside our bodies. Can the body contribute knowledge that can redeem social life? I would answer affirmatively; this ballet provides one such example.

I will close my discussion of *The hard nut* with a final observation about dance form, as compared to other media: this piece is the only one of the five I treat that has no public outcry or controversy attached to it. Have people now categorized dance as elitist and so not dangerous as a form of protest? There was a public outcry at the Paris premiere of *The rite of spring* in 1913, because it smashed classical dance conventions

and audience expectations of beauty. As Levin argues, dance contains the potential to provoke. One might argue that the issue is that of certain art forms being less accessible to a wider public, for economic or other reasons that need further analysis. A critical pedagogy of transformation that would use art as a location for learning and change will also need to pursue this question of the credibility and accessibility of art to a wide public or, going further, explore the forms of expression that are used by different publics.

My Name Is Not Paddy

I turn now to the genre of cinema and Neil Jordan's *The crying game*. We don't always see when outsiders are treated negatively or violently, or why personal or political choices are often made to resist their humanity. As viewers, we go on the same journey as Fergus, the main character and former IRA member, whose proud Irish name echoes that of the mythical hero of Irish saga. In this film, the Body, as much as the Homeland, becomes the "disputed territory on which racial, national, class, and sexual wars are fought" (Rafferty, 1992, p. 130). From the outset, Jody, the Black British soldier stationed in Belfast, and Fergus, the Irish freedom-fighter from a poor Catholic neighbourhood in this war-torn and occupied city of Northern Ireland, take the dangerous risk of moving beyond the wars they are trapped in by their histories and bodies. They carry in their bodies the memories of how their races have been attacked throughout history. Fergus is an expert hurler, and thus respected by his people whose heritage game this is; but otherwise he is a loser on all fronts, anonymous under the generic name "Paddy" assigned to every Irish male by the conquerors. "Paddy" is a sign of his people's defeat, just as "Sarah" was the name of every Black nursemaid in apartheid South Africa, and "Hey You," "Boy," or "Squaw" were the names forced on many throughout history. Such names cripple, abuse, and control; they belong to the process of colonization, as much as does the topographical re-naming of geographic locations by the forces in control of them.

Jody's roots are in slavery and the Caribbean; he is an expert cricketer, taking this game away from its imperialist British owners. But he becomes anonymous in Ireland, captured because he is a British soldier, yet suffering racial abuse here as much as at home in England. At least here, he says, they call you "nigger" to your face. Naming others without consent, stereotyping and abusing them, creates "no-bodies," people who become invisible in space, except for their exploitability.

Jody and Fergus make the first steps to resisting this when they begin to call each other by their own first names, despite the danger of doing so. They break the war-rules, and show the first signs of humanity - kindness and commitment to another human being. Jody's plea finds a home in Fergus. "Have a heart." Don't treat me like an animal before you kill me. W.B. Yeats (1963), the Irish nationalist poet, in *A prayer For my daughter*, wrote of "The heart revealing intimacy that chooses right" (p. 212). Ethical action, like art that touches us, is born of compassion. Both hold the ability to feel for another and respond caringly to another. Fergus explores what it means to have a moral identity. As screenwriter, Jordan also gives him a spiritual quality by having him quote from the Christian scriptures on the nature of love. "And now faith, hope and love abide, these three; and the greatest of these is love" (New Revised Standard Version, 1 Corinthians 13:13). The use of this quote is a demand that supporters of this religious tradition live up to its best value. This is especially poignant in light of the religious blood-letting of Northern Ireland.

Fergus's story is the human and religious journey through suffering to redemption and transformation. It is a story of people bravely vaulting across boundaries and barbed wire to become fully human. Fergus crosses into forbidden territory to discover the nature, not only of humanity, but of love. Dil's story parallels Fergus's as a journey through forbidden territory. Dil crosses the gender-identity border to live and feel as "woman", and in this, he suffers the oppression that women often live under. In *The crying game*, Woman, Black, Irish, Homosexual, all are despised and treated with the contempt assigned to these groups. The IRA's Jude is also a woman, but she adopts a stereotypical "male" hardness and lack of emotion to gain her ends. Male-female

hairdresser goes up against female(male) terrorist, and our categories are challenged.

Jordan's film explores the issues of identity-formation and "self" as well as the hurtful reality of racism, class and gender exploitation, and homophobia — all forms of colonization. The most attention-getting theme in his film, that of gender-switching, is not new, if we look at theatrical tradition. Shakespeare used sexual ambiguity in his narratives (*Twelfth night* for example), as did Virginia Woolf in *Orlando*. Cinema had Marlene Deitrich, and Jack Lemmon and Tony Curtis, and more recently films like *Tootsie*, *Mrs. Doubtfire*, *To Wong Foo...*, and the challenging *Pricilla, queen of the desert* have appeared, to name a few in this vein. Apart from the last-mentioned, the play on gender has not always been a direct attack on the heterosexual "norm" and oppression, but all of them provide images of the possibility to create contradiction to gender givens. Perhaps it is significant that "gender-bending" has become utilized so much in the 1990's, a time when people are demanding respect for all the identities they themselves choose to shape and to live out of.

The crying game is about identity and compassion, and their role in the struggle for all forms of "home-rule." Terence Rafferty (November 16, 1992) has said that this film acts like the best fairytales, with "the unstoppable momentum of a dream...a perilous but transforming experience"(p. 127). After seeing this film, we are no longer able to feel certain about our secured assumptions, most especially about gender and its fixed codes for identification. We have been made to face what we may not want to know about identities locked onto ourselves and others. As with the novel *The satanic verses*, the meaning that can be discovered in this work is expanded by the learnings found in reading the varied public responses to their un-nerving confrontations of accepted standards of human value and norms. For me, it was a pedagogical experience to hear audience responses to the in-breaking image of Dil's penis, which shocked our assumptions about her (his) femaleness. If we hadn't already been let in on this "well-kept secret" (one of the "rules" for the film's media reviews), we had been either fooled or seduced, as we watched the film, by the standard social markers for gender. The film exposes these markers to liberate us from their boundaries. I realized how often we "see"

and respond to the markers, and not to the reality they can conceal. And what is the reality of self; how is it created? Identity questions are important as we search for places to belong and be accepted. But identity is, as postmodernism recognizes, ambiguous and often unreadable, and also is often a weapon turned against us. In his film about human nature and human responsibility, Jordan explores the idea that identity can be either liberation or weapon. His message is about undoing our prejudices in order to resist the world-wide killing and colonization of individuals and the marginalization of “enemy” groups.

Jordan takes the ideological images of male and female and deconstructs them, by layering them within individuals, and placing them beside each other in disturbing ways. He does the same for stereotypes of race and class to shock the viewer out of categories of contempt. He uses the category of “woman” to critique all the norms of dominant culture, the structures imposed on identity and institutions, and he reveals symbols that regulate us all. If, as David Harvey (1989) suggests, we can realize that our era is filled with a never-ending quest for symbolic capital (status, fashion, religion, nationalism) as well as money capital, and if we discover that this quest relies on both nostalgia and privileging in these and other areas of symbolic capital, we must then choose whether to remain “value parasites” of this capital, or not (p. 347). The shattering of such notions of valuing will allow us to rebuild our knowledge bases with other, ethical, values - of love, humanity, peace, justice, integrity, inclusiveness, solidarity, compassion, and respect. While many of these values may be viewed as modern, the journey to this home, in its questioning and risk-taking to re-formulate these values, becomes very postmodern.

Into The Suffering Cities

With the images created by Montréal artist-architect Melvin Charney, we are returned to space destroyed by the “progress” of post-World War II reconstruction, that forward movement which wiped out the memory of the existence of the people who had

been left behind. His images are the contemporary uncanny haunting of our post-war "home."

In the middle of one such economic rebuilding, in West Germany, citizens, like those everywhere, go about their daily business. Charney's first works in *The German series* are from 1980-82, and are titled "Better if they think they are going to a farm." They were initiated as a proposal for installations at an outdoor art event in Kassel, Germany, called *Documenta Urbana*,¹⁷ which, like an earlier event in Montréal in 1976,¹⁸ was intended to put art back in the middle of the city's life. The whole event was later cancelled, just as in Montréal, showing up the fears of city managers about art's power to reveal a truth too threatening to let loose among the public.

Kassel itself was an important rail centre during the war; it was heavily bombed and later rebuilt. Charney's drawings for his proposed installation take us from the railway platform up to street level; his layers connect the war years to the present. He shows the facades of modern buildings, looking benign, even progressive, like all new urban skyscrapers. On closer inspection, his facades are mixed through time- a 1930's Bauhaus front, a bombed front. The images validate postmodern mixings as a source of awareness of historical connections. Charney shows, in his series, the modern glass towers that he feels are related to Germany's collective amnesia, and ours. His drawings subtly invite us to recognize that those architectural elements showing the station entrance, which is the arrival point into the town centre, are in fact connected to another rail arrival point: the gate to Auschwitz-Birkenau. These death camps had been designed by other architects, those of the SS, so that they would appear to the eyes of the prisoners arriving in boxcars as innocent farm buildings, a delusion masking the terror. Their

¹⁷Kassel's quadrennial *Documenta* continues to be an international exhibition that sees itself as providing a socially critical venue for art.

¹⁸Corridart was a city-wide festival organized by Charney (Canadian Centre for Architecture, 1991, p. 19), where his *Les maisons de la rue Sherbrooke* was censored and dismantled. In fact, this entire street exhibition during the Montréal Olympics, was ordered destroyed by City Hall during a night-time action.

illusion also symbolized the Nazi ideology of the Volk (the folk),¹⁹ rooted in mythic Aryan racial soil, the reifying of their ethnicity as a super-race. This is the facade Charney mirrors in the new office towers. He superimposes the rail lines to the death camp over the ones now entering Kassel's main street. The gate to Auschwitz-Birkenau also suggests the medieval gateway into old Kassel and becomes the doorway into the modern German psyche. For Charney, the linking of such a past with the present was not emotionally easy. But he is able to "open us all to questions of signification — what is ingrained for better or worse in our grasp of ourselves" (Canadian Centre for Architecture, 1991, p. 128).

It is not surprising that his drawings were removed from the over-all proposal for the event in Kassel, even before it was itself cancelled. Even cultural practice, let alone political will, could not tolerate such a challenge. It was a too-painful reminder of the people who were taken from their homes in the ghettos, cities, and country-sides, for the "final solution." The dead would not be allowed to walk beside the living.

In architecture, the doorway is the entrance to the home. For Sigmund Freud, it was the entrance to our unconscious and the repressed past. In the cultural uncanny as well, it becomes the threshold we cross in a journey toward ourselves; this door leads us away from what we acquiesce to in order to get through the day. In a later development of *The German series*, called *The German series*, Number 4, Charney created "The Other City," part of which is his "Visions Of The Temple, 1986." Here he creates another super-imposed image. The layout of Auschwitz-Birkenau (city of death, that so-called farm), shown in red (for blood?) is placed together with an imaginative reconstruction of the Temple in Jerusalem, originally by the Lutheran artist Hafinriffer, dating from the seventeenth century, which Charney illustrates in blue. The Temple is the past which exiled, or diaspora, Jews annually pray into their hoped-for future with the words "next year in Jerusalem." Charney places it with the death space where, the SS said, one

¹⁹The "Volksgeist" of German thought about the unique spirit of a people is not how Cabral saw organic "cultural personality." Cabral's notion of cultural personality (Africa Information Services, 1973) does not essentialize. These are important issues in the debates about identity.

“enters by the door, and exits by the chimney.”

The Jerusalem Temple was destroyed three times, rebuilt twice. It mirrors the tragic history of a people. Now left only in the remains of the Western Wall, it is important to note that it is a site of contestations even today. For example, it does not represent redemption for the Palestinian people, as it does for Jews and Christians, but rather stands for their own exile and domination. For the Jewish people, however, the Temple has evoked the prophet Ezekiel’s vision that the whole world balances on the faith cultivated within its walls. This vision, passed on through evolving religious tradition to Hafinriffer, became a vehicle of promise to him for the redemption of his own German people through a new Protestant interpretation of the faith; one that was believed would bring peace to the world. In the Jewish faith, the Temple’s central Holy of Holies was the religious site for transformation, the cosmic axis where the infinite meets the finite. At this vertical axis point stood what was called the Altar of Holocausts, the sacrificial altar where G-d²⁰ could enter the world through our hopes and prayers, the place where we could connect to the divine, and so outward to each other.

But, like Dante descending through the Inferno, Charney has created a disjunction, to reveal that which has been hidden by our post-war “progress.” He sites the Holy of Holies exactly on the chimney of the crematorium, the brilliant feat of engineering by Prufer. We travel, not on the vertical, encountering the divine, but outward, now into infinite evil in the world. Hitler had said that it was God’s work to destroy all the sub-humans of Nazi ideology, the Jews, ‘Gypsies,’ homosexuals, Communists, the mentally disabled. The horizontal axis here speaks, not of connecting to humanity and the world, but of death stretching out past rows and rows of barracks, to encircle the globe in geometric precision. The rows also remind us of the rows of benches in the slave ships of the Atlantic that financed the rise of capitalism and the

²⁰Except for the Hitler reference, I use this spelling, after the Orthodox Jewish tradition of the “word-with-space” that indicates the name of the Divine which can never be fully known. For me, this form points to the Divine positive force, open to possibility, freedom, and multiple interpretations. For Trinh T. Minh-Ha (1992), the interval is the place where critical dialogue spins out.

European empire. And they remind us perhaps of the endless, anonymous rows of the streets of our global cities. Charney's vision draws attention to the human potential within for both good and evil.

In recent work by Roger Simon and Claudia Eppert²¹, such a vision is taken seriously as a testimony to all who have suffered and died in history's holocausts. It returns, as they say, these lost lives to significance. Charney has given us a public and political memory, an engagement in the struggle against racism and other oppressions. He gives us what Montréal writer Gail Scott (1989) refers to as "the blanks in discourse, the gaps in history" (p. 10) that need to be explored. Charney's amalgamations rupture the code of silencing, and give us hope in the face of despair or "ennui." His work captures that generative force in art which redeems. We reconnect with a place where something profound in its horror happened. In doing so, we are no longer alienated from that place, hard as it is to stand there, nor from our inner ground. Moral force is recuperated.

In an era of disorientation, destabilization, and loss of any stabilizing centre, standard cultural images attempt to make us feel secure. Historical memory is manipulated to cover over our suffering or contribute to a comforting sense of well-being. In *The anti-aesthetic* (1983), Hal Foster writes that resistance to such manipulation requires that we deconstruct tradition and official representations in order to explore repressed affiliations. The "juxtaposition of diverse and seemingly incongruous elements..can be..instructive." (Harvey, 1989, p. 338) All the art under analysis in this thesis makes this juxtaposition.

Melvin Charney develops images that become a "vehicle for deeper consciousness." (Canadian Centre for Architecture, 1991, p. 13). His work constructs "visible monuments," memorials to history. A postmodernism that is reactionary "abandons all sense of historical continuity and memory" (Harvey, 1989, p. 54). It uses objects from the past only as aspects of a disconnected present. On the other hand,

²¹From a paper presented at the Canadian Critical Pedagogy Association, June 1995, "Reading Testimony: Pedagogy and Performative Engagement Between Consciousness and History."

images of place from the past can hold collective memory of what once was, and become a source of truth for the present. Elimination of memory murders both places that once existed and events that have happened. Through his art, Charney demands that such murder be prevented. Nostalgia for that security we are convinced we desire, must not replace memory of what was. His body of work has focused on rendering visible those historical layers that have been buried or destroyed. This is done to protest the annihilation of actual peoples, communities, and homes, as well as our memories of them.

David Kolb (1990), reminds us in *Postmodern sophistications* that we are now able to hold "all historical context within a new self-consciousness" (p. 103). Others have noted that not even buried or destroyed history is ever lost, it just needs excavation. One of the marks of postmodernism is said to be nostalgia, or history without memory. Nostalgia's worth lies in its ability to give us temporary rest from anxiety, and to attach us to something in the memory's storehouse. As pacification, though, nostalgia makes us easier to control. All of the past becomes a raidable warehouse, familiar sights and smells return us to a false recollecting or imagining of earlier times, which is an amnesia, returning us to a "home" we either left behind, or never knew. There is no permission for rebirth or transformation with nostalgia so used. There is just the temporary satisfaction of the longing for rest and security. The disturbing fear of loss and change is avoided by wearing retro clothes, and installing bay windows in suburban bungalows, and by clinging to older values and ways of life without thinking them through. Social institutions such as schools and churches are besieged by demands for unchanging "past values", even as the sands of late twentieth century life are shifting underneath their structures of power. Charney's images are not from museums of nostalgia. They hold memories that allow us to discover what has violated and denied people, so that we can draw closer to our moral nature²². His images do not promote passivity, lies, or death;

²²Milan Kundera (1980) writes that the struggle against controlling and destructive power is a struggle of memory against forgetting (p. 3). Kundera posits that culture can bring us to wisdom beyond the horrors.

they return history to life, and to justice.

The uncanny is the source of discomfort, but it brings us to the recognition of oppression, so that oppression can be resisted. Charney realizes that the absence of the memories he recalls supports a domesticated history, which prevents the recollection of what has been done to people. Cynthia Ozack writes that the voice of conscience cannot speak without the memory that testifies to suffering and silencing. She quotes the Hebrew Scriptures to remember the source of her people's conscience. "You shall love the alien as yourself, for you were aliens in the land of Egypt" (New Revised Standard Version, Leviticus 19:34). We are all united by such testimony, able now to imagine what it is like to exist in those other places of oppression. Charney's ruptures allow us to imagine and feel the lives of these other "strangers"; the suffering dead of the holocausts, and the exiled and suffering living. Bernard Levy, editor of *Vie des Arts*, wrote about our international amnesia, in an issue (Levy, no. 158, printemps, 1995) dedicated to the fiftieth anniversary in 1995 of the liberation of the death camps. Linking past and present holocausts, he asks whether the words and images of art are not useless in the face of such reality. Perhaps. Yet perhaps, he contends, they are important because they inhabit memory. Each artist struggles with an international amnesia, but tries to comprehend the density of such events. Education as remembering, as such, becomes a vitally important activity, helping us choose what to do so that such a history will not be repeated. Recent events in places such as Bosnia and Central Africa have shown that this is still only a hope, but one that nonetheless must still lead us forward.

Sacred Scandals

Christian theology speaks of the scandal of the cross, referring not only to Jesus's death and to the manner of torture and suffering that he and countless others have experienced in history, but also to the fact that resistance to the causes of oppression continues to scandalize those who support these causes. Thus scandal becomes a source of hope for the transformation of suffering into *Shalom*, peace. R. Burn Purdon, a United

Church of Canada minister, has composed a cantata,²³ first performed in Knowlton, Quebec, in 1996, and then in Montréal, in January, 1997. This work treats the Nativity narrative (birth of Jesus) as a scandalizing and transformative story; it is a provocative and disturbing theological and musical experience. *Sacred scandal*, as he entitles it, opposes the church's sacral tradition around the Nativity, even as it re-defines and deepens our awareness of the meaning of the sacred in life, and indeed, in this story. Theology's centuries-old battles over the meaning of Christian doctrines, and their saving potential, are continued in this exploration of the concepts of Emmanu-el (G-d present with us) and the divine incarnation. His cantata affirms divine intention for human life, an intention which is a frank condemnation of abuse of power, violence, and the oppression of women and other marginalized groups.

Purdon has a personal connection to the issues he raises in his cantata. His partner, Margaret, was a professional midwife, and midwifery continues to struggle for acceptance as a credible medical practice in Canada. He sorrowed over the death of the young women at the École Polytechnique in Montréal in 1989, and was involved in solidarity with the Kanienkeha:ka²⁴ communities in Kanesatake (Oka) and Kahnawake in 1990, to the risk of his physical safety. These experiences have contributed to his deep respect for all those who resist oppression at risk to their lives. As an artist willing to take risks, he stands in the same position as others such as Salman Rushdie. Looking at Christian and Jewish scripture, he re-discovered hidden stories of violated women which are alluded to in the gospel birth narrative in the Book of Matthew. These stories have long been silenced or forgotten and buried in the patriarchal telling of the tradition. Consequently, he felt bound to give voice to the stories of Tamar, Rahab, Ruth, and

²³This is a classical music form, vocal chamber music with semi-dramatic poetry on sacred themes (usually from biblical passage). J.S. Bach composed over one hundred of these; cantata themes were later secularized.

²⁴I prefer their own name, which refers to the "People of the Flint" or "Keepers of the Eastern Door" instead of "Mohawk," but will use the term Mohawk subsequently for easier recognition. There is a suggestion that enemies used the name Mohawk as a slur, but it has achieved commoner usage in and out of their communities.

Bathsheba, named as foremothers of the Davidic line that, we are told, led to Jesus.

In the cantata, as Mary cries out that G-d has not protected her, she is still able to experience the scriptural promise. "I shall comfort you.", says G-d. Disgraced and pregnant, she is like all women who have trusted in the protection of men in patriarchal culture and been betrayed. It is now up to her whether to trust this divine voice, or not. In another biblical story, the widow Tamar was raped by her father-in-law, and called a prostitute, but eventually finds the strength to expose him. Rahab was an outsider who helped the Hebrew people into the promised land, even as she was despised. The foreigner Ruth needed to accept the Hebrew patriarchy in order to survive, but became the great-grandmother of David. In the cantata, she sings, "We women play a major role in the unfolding of history." David lusts after Bathsheba so much he kills her husband to possess her, yet she is the mother of Solomon, who builds the Temple at Jerusalem. Hearing these women share the reality of their stories in solidarity with her, Mary is able to sing, "From scandalous beginnings, seeming deeds of shame grow wondrous new occasions to magnify G-d's name." Purdon's task is to explore how this happens.

This work suggests that we have to excavate the complexities in the biblical narrative, especially in those stories the tradition doesn't privilege, and ask where redemption can be found in oppression and suffering. By demanding an answer to this question, we discover that all lives are sacred, requiring respect. Purdon's work offers a comfort as the women offer it, against all the abuse that men are permitted to perpetuate. Beyond the gender issue, this becomes a message for anyone abused or pushed outside the boundaries of social acceptance.

Recent Christian scholarship inspired Purdon to take on this musical and theological exploration. This scholarship has been part of a movement of historical biblical research and radical theology presently beginning to make an impact on Christians and the church's life. New openings are being made for the possibility of holding a faith that speaks meaningfully to the complexities of a modern, secularized age, now a postmodern one. At the same time, the conclusions of these scholars are sparking vitriolic anger and reaction against them. Examples of this new thinking about

tradition can be found in the work of a group of theologians in what is called The Jesus Seminar,²⁵ and in academic searches for “the historical Jesus”, both of which have received much media coverage in the last few years, if very little promotion in the majority of Christian congregations. This too points to the gap between newer thinking and older practices and beliefs. Those of us in ministry leadership are constantly wondering how to raise these theological issues in a way that fosters learning rather than anger. We wonder if we have the courage to take the risk to disturb. This is a relevant educational question. Many of us have experienced personal attacks for supporting church moves to affirm and ordain homosexual persons. The doctrinal arguments over this issue eventually evolved into deeper questions about the authority and interpretation of scripture²⁶.

Kairos (Gk), according to Christian theology, is the moment of the in-breaking of the divine. What are our *kairos* moments of timelessness in time in the modern world, moments when ethical intention is understood in the face of suffering? Such *kairos* occurred the moment Mary understood the divine intention for her son as revealed to her by the Archangel Gabriel. This much is from the tradition. Purdon adds the possibility from new historical research that she receives this announcement as one more violated woman in the long line of biblical and historical examples. The cantata bursts into our consciousness at the first moment of the opening bars when Mary screams her terror as she is raped by a Roman soldier named Pantera. This twist in the old story is from the same historical research that Denys Arcand used in his film, *Jésus de Montréal*, and

²⁵The search for the historical Jesus, and for the actual words he may have spoken, is both controversial and challenging. The Jesus Seminar is an international group of religious scholars who, using finds such as the Dead Sea Scrolls, and recent discoveries of other scripture material from the period around Jesus's lifetime, are painstakingly trying to decide which of his sayings hold historical accuracy. For more on this, and the other scholarship referred to here, see for example Marcus J. Borg (1994), John Dominic Crossan (1991), and John S. Spong (1992, 1996).

²⁶New ways of disclosing and shaping the world will always meet resistance. In the face of hateful reactions and homophobia stirred up by the ordination discussion before 1988, a brief study document, “Authority and Interpretation of Scripture,” was circulated to United Church congregations for members to consider the various ways tradition can be interpreted.

raises the same disturbance here that it did for the Church in his film. It has been pointed out that there is scriptural reference to the likely scandalous illegitimacy of Jesus²⁷, just as there is *Qur'anic*²⁸ reference to the satanic verses.

Bearing in mind the possibility of Jesus's illegitimacy, the researchers bringing it to public attention maintain that the life and death of the man Jesus can continue to impact human history and life. The question raised is whether we need to hold on to traditional interpretations for the positive impact of the stories to continue, or whether we now need to let them go in order for such narratives to continue their transformational potential. This is the debate facing all traditions. It raises the need for an interpretive educational task to review how traditions arise. In St. Paul's earliest writing, there is no mention of a miraculous birth; Jesus was born "under the law" (New Revised Standard Version, Romans 4:13); that is, humanly. The "miraculous conception" accounts of the Christian Gospels came later. They were not meant to be taken as historical facts but as an affirmation of faith through which, and through metaphorical descriptions, people can recognize the impact his life has made. The hope is for the discovery of some truth in these accounts for the way we are called to live now. Their metaphorical form, perhaps more potently than any "factuality," allows the Jesus narrative to touch us at deep levels of the human psyche, experience and spirit.

Purdon's uncanny strategy is to combine familiar Christmas hymnody with these disturbing possibilities. As we hear the well-known Christmas lines, "O come, O come, Emmanuel, and ransom captive Israel, that mourns in lowly exile here....," we suddenly grasp the power of their promise. We, like Joseph responding to Mary's demand for acceptance by him, can experience a "change of heart." The choir sings, "old ways will

²⁷New Revised Standard Version (1989): John 8:41 ("we were not born of fornication," an angry crowd taunts Jesus; Mark 6:1-6 (Jesus is referred to as the carpenter, not Joseph, of whom there is no mention). Spong (1996) notes that the gospels were written for collective memory, and that Mark's, in which Jesus is called the son of Mary (a sign that paternity was unknown), is the first recorded memory of the man and his life in the canon.

²⁸I try to use originators' spellings when I am aware of them. It helps remind me of the origins, and not the colonizations.

seem absurd", and we truly hear Mary's song of peace, the Magnificat, as the song of liberation and revolution against old hegemonies that it is. The midwives sing a song of empowerment for all of us. "We are all channels for life's birthing." As Mary sings her lullaby of peace, dedicated by Purdon to the Mohawk resisters at Oka who were surrounded by the Canadian army in 1990, yet were calmed by a baby's presence, there is a possibility for wrongs to be righted. Her lullaby melds with the strains of the very familiar "O Come, All Ye Faithful," and again this musical juxtaposition opens us to a new and powerful understanding of the promise in this Christmas carol. Likewise, "Joy To The World" is integrated into the finale. The consolations of the known speak together with the shock of the unknown.

Destabilized as we can be made by this work, we can also leave with the healing energy that faith has been known to provide, faith in the sense of a divine or spiritual presence in our lives. This is the struggle for faith in the face of the historic sense of G-d's absences, such as occurred during and after the Holocaust. It is a struggle that has always led, in Jewish theology, to the rediscovery of G-d's co-suffering spirit walking with us²⁹. People who are called down, judged, accused and abused suffer name-calling that we accept, or use against others. This blocks the potential to see our incarnation, or physical life, as holy. Liberation involves risk. Conventions are not always equivalent to morality. What are we left with when the protection of old systems of faith is taken from us? At what point after the stripping away of old consolations will new ones take on a redeeming, transforming, energy? Not everyone is able to handle such questions. When life is threatened, we can either retreat to old interpretations, or risk the new. Interpretation is not the passing on of meaning to others, but the struggle to make meaning out of that which encounters us, whether this takes the form of rape, mass murder, or a shock to our conventions and cherished beliefs.

Purdon has received threats to his safety because of this cantata. He has also been

²⁹See Michael E. Lodahl (1992). Mystical Jewish interpretations of the Shekhinah/divine presence grew stronger in historical periods of trauma, such as after the Expulsion of 1492 in Spain. Shekhenah is the feminine Divine Spirit who shares exile with her suffering people.

thanked for moving some to think about another image of G-d that is meaningful for our time. This is not the first time in the life of religious communities that violence and abuse are responses to risks taken to provoke serious meaning-making. It will surely not be the last, as the next section will remind us.

Imaginary Homelands

Ernest Gellner (1992) in *Postmodernism, reason and religion*, quotes Descartes' view that the path to truth is voluntary cultural exile from imposed cultural meanings. Such an exile implies that we are doing our own thinking and shaping of our own meanings. This Enlightenment path set the tone for nineteenth century social struggles against institutional powers and their imposed "truths." This has eventually brought us to deconstruction's "free-falling through the void" (p. 41). This free-falling is the image which opens Salman Rushdie's controversial novel, *The satanic verses*, and is a key image throughout the narrative. "To be born again," sings Gibreel Farishta, tumbling from the heavens, "first you have to die." This tuneless *gazel*, Persian poetry, is sung by the novel's namesake of the Archangel Gabriel, Gibreel Farishta, after the explosion of Air India Flight 420³⁰ sends him and another Indian national, Saladin Chamcha, swimming down through the atmosphere toward Proper London, the hub of British civilization. The plane blown up by terrorists is named *Bostan* after one of Islam's gardens of Paradise, and so we engage the heart of the novel, the struggle of human identity, and the twin propensities for choosing for good or for evil that lie within all human beings after "the fall." These two actors of cinema and television are the only survivors of the blast. Consigned to this angelic-devilish fall (who is which?), they are unaware that, tumbling intertwined from more than Himalayan height, they are mutating. Revelation does not arrive in a once-and-for-all burst. Recognition of the importance of

³⁰This alludes to Air India 182, which exploded over the Irish coast on its way to New Delhi in 1985, killing 329 passengers, mostly Canadian. This connection, and the possible Canadian citizenship of the terrorists obsessed with nationalism, is the basis for Rushdie's cold Canadian suicide bomber on the flight that begins the novel.

the mutant, the hybrid, is clear only by the end of the novel. This narrative of one thousand and one strands is as intricately woven as the Persian carpet on which the suicide lover of Gibreel floats after her death, haunting him into accepting his inability to commit to their relationship. Rushdie fills the book with word images gleaned from fifty generations of Mughal, Hindi, and Islamic culture, just as Charney's and Purdon's works re-assess other traditional stories that span centuries.

Chamcha has colonized both his name and his life to escape his cultural heritage, and his father's power over him. His paradise is London, *Ellowen Deeowen*, a child's spelling and longing for the privileges of Empire. But the novel's true centre is not the metropolis of the colonizers, it is the "margins" of India's vastness. This is a narrative about people moving in and out of the clash between margin and centre, Empire and colonized; about old and new subjectivities and subjugations. Hope for the future is in the hands of the young and hybrid³¹ generations born out of this clash, those who have to accept their cultural and identity shape-shifting to survive and flourish. The young woman, Mishal, represents those children of migration who are, in this case, both British and Muslim, who are making demands for a non-racist society in which they can claim their rightful place. She is not like Chamcha, assimilated through his British-style education, who tries to become someone else, somewhere else. These are characters for pedagogy to take note of. Rushdie confronts the anxieties created by these searches for identity; anxieties that lead to tradition either being unquestioned or feeling threatened. It was his threat to his own religious tradition, his "heresy" and felt insult to the Prophet's revelation and his family, that led to the *fatwa*, or death sentence, put on him. This real-life response by religious authorities is one of the novel's important contentions. I feel that his support for the concept of the feminine aspect of the divine, in the struggle between the goddess Al-Lat and Allah, as well as his satire of the Ayatollah Khomeini,

³¹Critical pedagogy has begun to explore this notion in connection to issues of race and identity and moves toward democracy. Cornel West (1993) writes of the hybrid as the "something new" of New World emancipatory modes, found also in jazz. See also hooks (1990).

also had much to do with the anger aroused in clerics by this novel.

Rushdie takes on the theological issue of belief and meaning; he actually honours the Islamic understanding that doubt is the beginning of faith, and not its death, as some clerics of every faith would have us believe. Nothing escapes Rushdie's doubt; not the infallibility of scripture (where does the Prophet's revelation come from? Are not Satan and Gibreel both angels?); not patriarchy (in his retelling of Hagar's story, is not Father Abraham the bastard?); not Thatcher's England (where the devil immigrant, represented by Chamcha, the metamorphosed goat, was accused of being the cause of Britain's pollution); not the Iman's abuse of power (as satirized in the Iman's (Khomeini) visit to a brothel); not even himself in the character of the scribe, Salman Farci. Doubt is the beginning of the fall out of all our paradises of security. But it is also the way through the sorrows that "fallen" life in the real world bring us. Chamcha and Gibreel fall, the father of Alleluia Cone falls down the elevator shaft to meet, like Italian writer Primo Levi, the death he was denied in the Holocaust. The widow throws herself off the highrise in Bombay because Gibreel abandons her. Other characters fall off Mount Everest, or in front of a bus, or out of their image of themselves. Some die in the fall, others are transformed. The Fall is the original mythic exile from "home"; it is the parameter of our lives. But those who survive can become truly human. Chamcha gains his core self by discovering his anger at injustice. It is finally the foul-breathed goat, not the alter-ego angel, who helps us face the religious question; what must we do to be moral creatures?

Rushdie critiques all gatekeepers to the historical records of our lives and to morality. How is resistance to living within someone else's power structure taken up in a postmodern time? These are Rushdie's dangerous questions. In an earlier essay published in *Imaginary Homelands* (1991), Rushdie writes, "the past is a country from which we have all migrated...(we carry within us only) fractured perceptions.... Meaning is a shaky edifice we build out of scraps" (p. 12). Can we even be certain anymore about the scraps? Rushdie would agree with other artists that the struggles against destructive and controlling power are the struggles of memory against forgetting. To accept that memory is ambiguous doesn't mean we have to distrust it; rather, we must explore it. In all his

political novels, Rushdie resists a controlling world by re-describing it from outside the boundaries of tradition's interpretations. In writing them, he has enraged both priests and politicians, but, having taken this risk, he has also enabled the reader to re-examine not only history, but also the values held by tradition.

In *The satanic verses*, Rushdie undertakes a panoramic exploration of our modern dislocations. He uses the metaphors of Cinema, of Falling (out of location and identity), and of Migration, and these metaphors mingle with fanciful yet historical renditions of centuries of Persian and Hindu cultural details and sensibilities, twentieth century situations and experiences, and the continual consequences of questioning Authority and acting out of one's own meanings and revelations. The migrant sensibility, which Rushdie posits as one of the major themes of our century, is alive in the novel's characters. They are displaced and replaced, their bodies and identities are re-arranged. Both the novel, and the violent reactions to it, exist within the conflicts that migration creates. Rushdie demands that we analyze these conflicts so that we can learn how to live together in our multiple, pluralist, contesting environments. This is a very funny novel for all that. Its humour is based on the tradition of Islamic satires that were parables for creating tolerance. It is a woven history of histories that challenges those fundamentalist authorities that forbid our own thinking things through. Rushdie's work calls for awareness and a pedagogy that can negotiate between the contentions and contradictions of postmodern life. He hopes that its fantasy scenes and humorous voices can defeat imprisoning ideologies, whether colonial or religious.

The fact that Rushdie's contesting of Authority and fundamentalism has been invoked in the medium of print, in a novel, is important. Historically, literacy has always threatened authority. The printing press, and the subsequent mass distribution of the Bible in vernacular strengthened the Protestant reformers. Reading opens up the potential for disturbance of authorized interpretations. Readers may think or interpret for themselves. Rushdie shows us that art and imagination, and the skill to deconstruct our given identities, bring us to potential answers we seek. His mixing of literature and politics has consequences, however. This mixing is an uncanny disturbance; it is an

embarking, as Talal Asad (1993) would have it, on the unfamiliar contributing to a necessary yet risky reconstruction of ourselves. This is a postmodern work of art, using redemptive satire which contests the absurdity found in controlling grand narratives. It maintains a respect for authentic spirituality, in spite of the accusations that it is blasphemous. It resists the forces that destroy tolerance and inclusion. It has a cinematic sensibility, using both cinema's structure and a satire of the worldview of the Hollywood and Bombay film industries, the English theatre, and the world of advertising, all of which, through images, seduce our longing to be other than what we are.

In this novel, the ability to be self-fashioning is questioned by the characters' every attempt to do so. Commenting on the novel's reception, Asad (1993) argues that the novel, as a European literary form, seduces the Western reader, a reader who is most likely to be post-religious, and therefore supportive of Rushdie's attack on religious authority. Not everyone, according to Asad, has the power to resist the imposition of someone else's meaning. The novel's politics extend in many directions even beyond its pages, involving both those privileged by imperialism and members of colonized communities. European anti-Muslim tirades have been enacted since the Crusades. This novel can thus be a weapon both for and against colonized people.

The novel is caught in its own contradictions. Yet it does encourage an encounter with a liberating power in imagination, even as it can unleash an attack on those it seeks to liberate. Such a power—to liberate or attack—which shall it become? This power existed in *The Prophet's* mind in its double potential, and yet it was ascribed to external inspiration. We are not sure here whether it was angelically or satanically inspired. Imaginative, moral, and creative inspiration is at the centre of the human ability to respond and be open to otherness, to be compassionate. Such inspiration doesn't have to destroy tradition, it can allow us to understand our humanity, and revitalize our traditions on renewed terms. Chamcha returns to Bombay and his relationships there, finally able to love, ready to affirm his birth name, Salahuddin. At last he has been angered enough by the recognition of his former colonization that he can choose to leave it behind.

What role does the past play in transformation? How can a transformative

pedagogy include the excluded? I found answers to these questions both in the novel and in the contexts in which it was received. These questions provide some of the locations needed to do any cognitive mapping of our present situations. This novel tackles the “hard nut” issue of the “authority of scripture,” the voice of the past speaking to the present. Feminist and anti-fundamentalist critiques of such authority used as a tool to control, were lost in the controversy over heresy, but they are both found in this novel. “When is a rule not a rule?”, it asks. What is any authority, religious or political, grounded in? The authority of scripture as a guideline for ethical action requires an ability to discern the ethical in sacred texts, requires an internal inspiration. To help us act ethically, this inspiration needs to migrate to spaces of open debate, questioning and critiquing our institutions, where we can share our insights with others, as balance and check to their truth for us. Such activity resists the fundamentalist demand that the authority residing in God/Allah/Christ/Creator, and in the Patriarchs, the State, or in social “norms”, remain external and given, accepted, assimilated, and obeyed unquestioningly. Internalized obedience to religion and its promises, as lived out by suicide bombers or twisted nationalisms, can lead to destruction as deep as that of any authoritarian control. Rushdie shows this with his description of the butterfly girl, Ayesha. Possessed by her ethereal beauty and the desires she raises, wanting salvation from poverty or cancer, or searching for something unknown, the crowds of followers make their way to the sea on their pilgrimage to Mecca, and drown in the water that will not part miraculously for them after all. Can we gain courage from this novel to resist this kind of authority and obedience? The problematic of the authority of tradition is part of the present global situation, and must be attended to by a critical and transformative pedagogy.

Before I end this section, I will situate my position within Asad’s critique of the reader. I encounter this work from the position of privilege that Asad critiques. He, like others such as Edward Said (1994), raises the post-colonial question of who continues to benefit after national liberations. If our responses to art emerge from the nature of the struggle in which both we and art are enmeshed, then the analysis of our own context and

position related to privilege and power is as important as the analysis of the content of a work. The reality surrounding the liberating gesture is linked to the fact that works like this novel more often appeal to those readers like myself, whom the colonized Chamchas aspire to be. Even the novel form itself feeds this privilege, coming out of the era of expanding European imperialism and capitalism. Chamcha's English wife, Pamela, is named after the title character of one of the first published novels in English, and he is betrayed by his aspiration to be English like her. Clerics may be motivated by the desire for power or control, but emigrant Muslims must struggle against cultural and political rejection of their religion and traditions, and against the violence they suffer. The Western mind condemns book-burnings as an attack on freedom of thought and speech, but it must realize that these actions are also seen as resistance to that denigration of a people and a way of life that has fed into Western racism, and anti-Muslim tirades. There is never only one point of view in a dialogue. A critical pedagogy must take account of such a complexity, as has been done in the work of Homi Bhabha (1983), Stuart Hall (in Rutherford, 1990), and Edward Said (1994). Having stated this, I do find a transformative power in the not-at-homeness of the novel's narrative. Uncanniness and destabilization are its constant companions, and serve as an invitation for us to see our situations more clearly, to come to understand how ideological structures have been put into place, and how they keep us in ours.

Conclusion

Virginia Shabatay (in Witherell and Noddings, 1991) has written that our future may rest in being able to move from "communities of affinity to communities of otherness" (p. 146). Along the way we finally hear the silenced stories of raped women, homosexual persons, victims of the holocausts, villagers and immigrants, people who are "border-dwellers between two worlds" (p. 137), on the margins, who are all struggling for liberation. Comprehending their stories, "we discover what strangers have to teach us" (p. 137). "In many fables...when the stranger is ignored, destruction or failure ensues.

The community can be redeemed by the stranger who presents him(*sic*)self in all his otherness and who asks by his presence to be met. Because the stranger is often at the heart of conflict, he can reveal to us a way through that conflict (p. 137). Shabatay cites Elie Wiesel who speaks of “the connection between the way we perceive and treat strangers and the violence we unleash on one another (p. 137). How we image and respond to each other in our plural, complex, and contesting world, is a critical field for inquiry in a pedagogy concerned with justice, liberation, transformation, and democracy. Art brings us into its presence; it stops us, and we take our bearings. The creators of these five works of art have created their art compassionately, and in good hermeneutical and critical fashion, have put the present in conversation with the past. Their art comes to us like a stranger with a story. They have disturbed frameworks of meaning and structures of oppression, but they have also retrieved those values and legacies from the past which will serve us well as we confront our present and dream of an inhabitable future. They contribute to a pedagogy such as I have mentioned through their ethical rendering of the stories they tell, and through the challenge for dialogue, reflection, and growth presented to us by their works.

CHAPTER TWO

Searching for Home

When you find out what's worth keeping, you'll never lose your way back home.

— Golden Feathers, a song by Robbie Robertson

Introduction

One of the underlying themes of this thesis has to do with the social dimension of culture.³² In Chapter Two I will be integrating this theme with a review of some of the main signposts and concerns of our present historical context. To do so I will first examine theories of modernity, and will then develop those theories of “home,” of cognitive mapping and of the uncanny, which, in addressing our transition to postmodern culture, provide me with a framework for proceeding with many of my own human, social, and pedagogical concerns. As this chapter deals with modernity and its consequences, I will briefly situate modernity within the historical movement of human culture, recognizing, with Joe Holland (1984), that space, or location, allows us to look at culture as structure, but time allows us to look at its internal dynamics (p. 2).

Modernity, modernism, the modern; these terms have proved as diffuse as those related to postmodernism have become.³³ There is no sure agreement on when the

³²Joe Holland (1984) has raised the importance of a theory of culture to any examination of the social and human crises before us. His approach to such a theory includes culture's structural dimensions: economic, religious, symbolic, and linguistic; and its historical ones, which he identifies in four stages — primal, classical, modern, and post-modern (p. 9). While his framework is only one among many, he raises an interesting discussion in linking the primal stage with immanence, the classical with transcendence, the modern with interiority, and the postmodern with a notion of “the whole” (p. 27). I believe that cultural struggle provides a valuable illumination of social and human struggles.

³³While the debates around definitions (Harvey, 1989; Levin, in Silverman, 1990) have important points to make, I will have to develop the discussion at another opportunity, even though I agree with David Levin (in Silverman, 1990) that “(c)lear definitions...are imperative here” (p. 209).

modern era began; some see it only as defining the late-nineteenth and twentieth century, some place it with the seventeenth century shift to the scientific Enlightenment (Taylor, 1991). Holland (1984) sees it as having roots in the shifts of earlier centuries; in the empiricism of the European monasteries of the fourteenth century, in Renaissance secularization, in the wars of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. Charles Taylor (1991) tracks this history, to reference it philosophically as “modernity,” which itself holds many contesting political forms, from conservative to liberal to socialist. How then are we to define modernity? Its main characteristics are those of instrumental reason, a sense of time and history as progress, and linear (horizontal) expansion of productivity; an erosion of the transcendental (vertical); modernity contains individualization, alienation and fragmentation of affiliation (expressed as homelessness), reality seen as mechanical, and, most importantly, an alienation from the public sphere (p. 10).³⁴ I turn now to a review of some of the literature that has examined modernity, and its notion of homelessness; a notion that gives me a bridge to a postmodern disturbance which, I argue, contributes to that transformation of self-in-society to which critical pedagogy is committed.

The Malaise Of Modernity

Human life continually moves and changes, physically and culturally, through one form to another. Modernity erred in seeing change as an always-inevitable progress toward a better life. Radical politics asks, “best for whom?,” the power question. As the twentieth century looks back on the totalitarianisms³⁵ described by writers such as Hanna Arendt (1958), educators must deal seriously with loss of the ability to think critically,

³⁴Taylor (1991) equates individualism with a loss of meaning, instrumental reason with the eclipse of ends, and the retreat from the public sphere with a loss of freedom (p. 10).

³⁵Arendt (1958) speaks of *Homo faber* in the modern era; humans whose technologies (*techne*) have been split from art (*poesie*), which touches compassion and nature. According to Arendt, this split is what lets in the possibility of evil.

the loss of creativity, of sociality, and loss of an empowering sense of a self that can engage the world and change it.

To avoid swimming in nostalgia or fantasy, we need to know how to analyze critically our time and place. Charles Taylor (1991), in *The malaise of modernity*, helps us in this project. His analysis problematizes two themes that were beacons of the Enlightenment, individualism and instrumental reason. These have in fact brought us to crisis through their own subversion of the original hope they contained to provide a foundation for human freedom.

Individualism rests on the hope that each individual conscience will guide a person to a freedom to be, and become, herself or himself. This notion of “self-hood” became, by the end of the seventeenth century, a right, as well as an obligation, to be protected by law. Ideals of democracy were developed to draw us towards our true and free selves. Old orders and traditional moral horizons were to be abandoned, but this left people with a sense of loss at the core of their meaning-world.

Instrumental reason was the form of thinking and rationality that was privileged by the Enlightenment. Efficiency of means, “rationally” chosen, based on the growth of science and technology, created and defined new worlds. But people lost “resonance...in our human surroundings” (p. 6). Selfhood became cut off from an awareness of and sensitivity to others. Karl Marx argued that capital’s owners controlled all means, and production was for their benefit and profit, rather than for people’s own engagement with their environment.³⁶ Modernity’s social forms and structures ironically drew us away from ourselves as well as others.

Taylor points out that we now live “inside the grain,” controlled by Tocqueville’s “soft despotism,” or internalized controls on behaviour and desire. Our only defense is to develop a “vigorous political culture of participation” (p. 9). Taylor asks us to recognize how we came to accept “authenticity” of self as a modern ideal, which, he points out, we have made into our vocation. “Be true to yourself!” But behind this ideal lies a cultural

³⁶Marx also conceived of religion as a reflection of the real and deep-seated human need for consolation and beauty (Eagleton, 1976).

shift with political consequences -a conformity and dependence on social structures by people who are unsure about their place in the scheme of things (that is, their home in the cosmos and community); who are insecure about who they are. We think "authenticity" gives us a mutual respect for each other, but we have achieved instead the moral neutrality of relativism. Everyone tries to be true to themselves however possible, and still survive in a state of alienation and determining forces. The ideal of selfhood, which Taylor says is peculiar to modern culture, does have an ethical basis. But to be ethical, it must be supported by the rejection of that extreme subjectivism which is as dangerous as the objectifying of the "other" that rationalization fostered. Behavior and rationality that point us to a responsibility for self must not be disconnected from our moral obligations to others. Taylor pushes beyond rationality to what he believes exists as a deep source within all humans, a moral voice. He counters Descartes's morality of right and wrong in a rational realm by suggesting that this moral voice emerges out of our feelings. Morality for Taylor is a reflexive, reasoned awareness of ourselves, both rational and emotional, that also contains a communal moral awareness of the world and all that resides in it. In this description lies a definition of reason that matches that which feminists such as Alison Jagger (1989), Uma Narayan (1989), and Lorraine Code (1991), among others, have been describing.

Taylor next moves to consider the powerful Enlightenment ideal of self-determining freedom, and the belief, accepted as dogma in modern politics, that social contracts emerge out of a general will. But can we become so free from external influences that an individual, and then a general, will can be created unaffected by other countervailing forces? Taylor suggests that such a belief leads to a "freedom" that brooks no opposition. The sense that each of us has a uniqueness that finds expression is now deeply embedded in modern consciousness. We are convinced that we can define ourselves, and realize our potential, deep from within, unconnected to others or to any social forces or control. We follow our bliss alone, excluding others. It is a mythology that fails to see its own power to oppress. Concerned about this, Taylor explores how we can learn to reason in dialogue. We must start, he posits, by facing our differences, now

mented by soft relativism. "We become full human agents capable of understanding ourselves" (Taylor, C., p. 33) only through a self-expression which we learn to use in exchange with others. Taylor calls this the genesis of the human mind. Our self-awareness and our identities are defined "always in dialogue, sometimes in struggle against, the identities..others want to recognize in us" (p. 33). Such solidarity is not only ethical action but also a way to a consciousness of our own self-hood. It accepts the demands made on us by ties to others, ties that exist beyond, yet include, our own desires and hopes (p. 34). This requires that we learn what is significant to others beyond what we define, as Taylor points out. If there are no longer any of those pre-existing judgements of worth, which in fact make differences insignificant or unacceptable, the ethical challenge is to determine together which actions and values are more significant, more ethical, than others.

This is certainly a difficult challenge to take up, but it is crucial to Taylor's intellectual task. According to him, "The agent seeking significance..has to exist in a horizon, not of pre-existing meanings, but of important questions" (p. 40). This is where individualism links with a social ethic. Authenticity, being true to self, includes the way we live with others. Important questions come out in the delight of self-discovery, discovery of the needs of others, and in the demands of nature. Self-freedom and universal dignity are lost when the social and corporate structures, and other individuals, project "an inferior or demeaning image on another" (p. 49). What are the grounds for acknowledging equality, Taylor asks. They are found in shared standards and agreement to them. This agreement to certain shared standards is a complex issue, but it is a problematic that our ethics and politics need to comprehend. Taylor feels that, "By sharing a participatory social life, we can nurture the commonalities of values between us" (p. 52). Thus justice is not procedural but inter-subjective, and politics, economics, and relationships are not merely instruments for the control of power and profit. Taylor firmly places the development of ethical social structures, not outside reason, but within the kind of rational argument he posits. We had been fooled into thinking that the way to achieve freedom and self-development was to break the ties to others and old orders.

Rather than leading to freedom, however, this has lead to a situation wherein old constraints have merely been replaced by newer ones.

To understand who we are, we need to understand how we have arrived at our present situation of individualism which has joined with alienation under the new capitalist hierarchies. Our modern affiliations became instrumental to capital and “market forces” which are claimed to be necessary to everyone’s potential well-being. As older ties to kin, community, and manor broke, and forced mobility brought more and more people into urban centres and industrial work, the ideal of self-fulfillment masked the impersonal non-ties of urban “contact,” where life, and not just reason, became instrumental to the emerging powers of the state, and of those who benefit from control over capital. This reality was masked by the belief in the ideals of individual human potential and development. Interestingly, in following the map of this journey toward modernity, Taylor analyzes the stage beyond, activated by the postmodern critique of all values.

In looking at these postmodern critiques, Taylor points to Jacques Derrida’s notion of a self which maintains freedom even while doubting the very existence of “self.” Then he describes Michel Foucault’s theory of an aesthetics of the self, which Taylor locates as rising out of the same source that brought the ideal of authenticity to the surface in modernity. This aesthetic, Taylor contends, sees “self” and identity as created by each individual giving expression to what is original within, rather than pre-existing as external force. Taylor argues that modernity believed that revelations of authenticity come through such expression. We are able to make an “original” of ourselves, a “never-before.” In this aesthetic, morality is rejected as being a socially structured framework for constraint which succeeds when people conform to it. Imagination is to be the source of our morality and creativity. Every human is thus an artist creating “self.”

Modernity, according to Taylor (1991), was eased in by an ideological preparation of instrumentalism, which led to the atomization of people, and modernity’s structures have been kept in place by this fragmented public and consciousness. The

business of controlling the social environment and freedom of thought has been transferred to the individual, and internalized. However, although we are not really free, we are not yet lost. If we can comprehend the moral sources for our life together, and “resist the model of the disengaged human subject (p. 101), we can also find points of resistance within ourselves, and in connection to others. A moral ideal of ordinary life, based on a desire for an ethic of caring and responsibility, calls us to act on behalf of both self and others in any given situation. Morality can come from those places where we “respect the embodied, dialogical, temporal nature” (p. 106) of human life, and live out a story that connects the past to the future in the best way. Taylor feels this is the political and cultural task waiting beyond modernity. This task will be to struggle for a balance between contesting requirements, to dialogue across differences without colonization, to counter fragmentation, hopelessness and powerlessness, normalization and rationalization, by creating opportunities for common action. Democratic participation lies in the ability to identify with the whole of society as community. Taylor upholds the value of an authenticity within the ties of social affiliation, where we find, not as self-centred creatures, a self that is responsible to all of life (p. 72).

The Homeless Mind

In *The homeless mind* (1973), Peter and Brigitte Berger, and their colleague, Hansfried Kellner, are concerned with what happens to the subjective consciousness of individuals in technological societies such as those of today. Their analysis of modernization sees a consciousness-formation that develops a sense of homelessness and alienation, the *anomie* of normalization, and a state of lost references and lost ties of affiliation. They wrote at a time when subject identities and meanings were seen as stable, before the postmodern attack on the belief in objective essences and subjective meaning in consciousness took place. What has not changed since then, however, is that people still experience a plurality of lifeworlds, and migrate consciously or unconsciously among them, while trying, often at great odds, to almost alone maintain a

meaningful centre, or at-homeness, with self, if not in the world. Postmodernism is correct in critiquing the model of the disengaged, aestheticized subject of modernity. Desires for a self or group identity, and its expression detached from public responsibility, has led to much of the violence of this century.

These authors discuss how we create a web of meaning from our everyday consciousness, a web that allows us to navigate or migrate through all our situations and encounters. The social world also contains normative meanings that we can either adhere to, or break in rebellious behaviour. In considering modern consciousness, the Bergers and Kellner also look at those cultural structures and institutions which carry and disperse meanings for us. For them, modern consciousness is linked to the sense of homelessness which Karl Marx saw as a spreading and demoralizing condition of alienation. They refer to Marx's belief that alienation was a product of capital's labour needs (Berger, Berger & Kellner, 1973), and, when joined to the rootlessness which industrialization brought, created physical migration, displacement, and exploitation in modern society. These authors suggest that the modern imagination, through mass education, and the media and state myth-making that followed, has turned such forced migration (exile from "home") into values labelled "freedom" and "mobility." People had to learn to re-fashion themselves and create new identities. In doing so, they had to bargain daily between fragments of traditional patterns and new patterns, unaware of the tension between nostalgia (homesickness) and these new forms which they often did not create themselves. They (and now we) tried to re-integrate themselves into some centre of meaning in which life could be lived. For pedagogues like Freire (1970), this struggle for meaning takes shape as an emancipation from alienation and domination, and collectively gives birth to new human communities, to a new home.

For the Bergers and Kellner (1973), this emancipation will occur through a process they call de-modernization, which is not a nostalgic return to past values and forms of living and meaning. It is, rather, an active deconstruction of modern consciousness that will re-map values and behaviours for a better world than the one created by modernity and capital. They contend that this process will allow us to define

reality from our own experiences and with our own voice. Older structures, political and religious, had been broken in an earlier deconstruction, or paradigm shift, in the Enlightenment. Faced with new unbearable situations, the modern solution has been to bear the human condition by retreating to privately invested identities and meanings in order to withstand the new public ones. But even these newer arenas of family and voluntary memberships are breaking down, and we are becoming as homeless in our private lives as in our public ones. If these authors are correct in saying we are losing our skill to construct a just and livable meaning-universe, and are becoming less able to deal with life's harshness, then a critical pedagogy must find ways to re-introduce this skill. We will need to work this out in community, facing the contradictions of our pluralist and contending environments, and create those meaning-universes that can emancipate us all. This is a postmodern educational and ethical challenge that I will come to again in the final chapter.

In fact, if we look around the globe at attempts to de-modernize, we see the resurgence of ethnicities and local nationalisms, group identifications and mini-collectives, all of which can both affirm its members, but either affirm or attack outsiders. Every home also has neighbours; if they are different from each other, new decisions on how to co-exist are crucial. Group identifications were first seen as elements of the liberation fronts that bloomed in the 1960's. Now, they often turn into protected foyers, whether economical, political, or religious, where the civil and human rights of the outsider or "infidel" are once again denied. New mythologies and ideologies are being created out of a false nostalgia for past unities and home territories. The neo-mysticism of cults promises a re-attachment to an older cosmos. Hopes for participatory democracy are proving unsustainable in their closed regimes.

Our postmodern societies are at the doorway of transition to the yet unknown, where all the differences of identity and need and desire we now carry can be part of the struggle to arrive at a new definition of home. The emancipatory project now is to unite public and private spheres as these interface with questions of a moral nature. This may be the progressive postmodernism of community, locality, and regional resistances that

philosopher David Harvey (1989) discusses, where social movements carry a respect for otherness and are not sectarian, violent, and destructive. It is a postmodernism that “at its best[,]...produces trenchant images of possible other worlds (that) begin to shape the actual world” (p. 351).

The Uncanny

In his book, *The architectural uncanny* (1992), Anthony Vidler notes that the “uncanny” has become the main aesthetic sensibility since the 1960’s. It grew from the Romantic sensibility of the nineteenth century, where “home” was identified as unstable by nature. As Vidler points out, Walter Benjamin argued that this notion arose from the insecurity experienced by the bourgeoisie of Europe in their new class position, and from the crowded urban environments of Europe’s industrial cities. Local rural communities had been broken; people, then as now, were estranged from their places of birth, immigrating to the cities to survive. The new rent system made a secure home an illusion. National geographic boundaries were being reshaped, and colonial conquest continued to displace and re-name people, even if they remained where they had always lived. Uprooting led to economic and psychic depressions at the same time as it provided a new and profitable labour base for capital. Real homelessness occurred through wars, racism, domestic violence, and poverty, continuing today. As Vidler observes, nineteenth century political discourse, in order to keep people tied to the systems in power, had to develop a placating theory of home-and-family that depended on nostalgias and utopias, but also on an aesthetic of terror labelled the Gothic.³⁷ This “uncanny” occurred whenever a startling new experience confronted those assumptions and securities that enabled people to get through their daily lives. Such sudden confrontations were created through terror, which developed such a fear of loss that people forgot that loss of social stability was already occurring. Even so, terror was attractive in its own powerful way,

³⁷The twentieth century version of the Gothic novel is the horror film.

and even became desired as an aesthetic. As people's paradigms of time and space were being re-formulated, the fear of loss engendered by this Gothic uncanny could keep any awareness of actual loss at bay, and so served both individual psychic purposes and those of the state. During this period, the Romantics dwelt on imagined threats to self and place, not for post-structural reasons, but to counter the social and political upheaval of the time.

As Vidler shows, one of Freud's key ideas revolved around this aesthetic of the uncanny. Freud explored the haunting of the psyche, a lack of orientation that returns the self to the self by lifting it out of the repressions caused by normalizations. To him, the uncanny was that which arouses the feeling of dread, that which disorients, that makes us unsure of where we are, uncomfortable or uneasy, a strangeness that raises wonder or dismay. He used the term *unheimliche* (unhomeliness) for his definition of uncanny, which he saw as a healthy response. This Freudian strangeness, rather than repressing our sense of real loss, could lead us back to a repressed past that is surprisingly familiar. The strange and the familiar side by side! There is always a home in homelessness that can be re-visited. Perhaps the womb, he wrote, was the home for our first pleasures or sensations of life, of being at one with (at home in) the universe. So home was always also its opposite, un-home, for Freud. The image of hearth and home was the ultimate image of the uncanny, paradoxically concealing its contradiction with loss. The home and garden became the location of homelessness. In the art of the time, dolls could become human, little girls trying to get out of the rabbit hole could shrink and stretch. In the Freudian world-view, every effort to find a familiar signpost to home leads to a return to the same spot we start from, and so we are now filled with anxiety because of psychic, not economic or political, alienation from self and world. We want to return; do we know how?

But, as stated, even "self" and identity have become psychically, and are under question. Vidler refers to Homi Bhabha, for whom the uncanny speaks of a return from a political displacement, a diaspora. Migrants and marginalized people, those who had been located away from their homes and identities by social forces, are quitting their

spaces of domination to return to a space where emergent identities can shape themselves by new rules. By doing so, they create an uncanny sensation in themselves, and in the very dominations they refute. Such returns are not simply to a past preserved and waiting for them. In fact everyone now lives in an in-between space. This ambiguous space is our postmodern condition, just as homelessness and migration were seen as the modern one. The space created by Bhabha's uncanny now allows us to look at ourselves and our contexts from outside, from the margins, and decide what our losses or colonizations could be replaced by. Vidler expands on Bhabha's analysis of what is a post-colonial "uncanny," raising the risks of an aesthetic which deals with estrangement and domination by refusing to transform the conditions of social and political homelessness. There is also risk in treating the uncanny or the grotesque as either nostalgic decoration or thrill-seeking spectacle (p. 10). The uncanny must be politicized, argue both Bhabha and Vidler. The important issue of exclusion, Ernst Bloch's "hollow spaces" of capitalism, makes this uncanny a vehicle for discovering our subject positions and for opening the questions that are "pertinent to our late twentieth century condition" (p. 13). Thus the uncanny has become the location of a dialogue between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; in art, in philosophy, and in social theory. As a metaphor for an unliveable modern condition (p. xi), it has moved from a political strategy to a haunting of the psyche to a haunting of the powers that control us. Vidler holds that our trans-national, capital-based culture has lost a secure belief in its own history (p. 97). As an educational issue, the uncanny's ability to suspend us in ambiguity, to confuse our comfortable norms and perceptions, may be what enables us to confront the powers that control us, deal with the conflicts of our world, and return from our personal and collective exiles to a new solidarity and community.

Journeying Home

Languages are full of expressions using the word home; English describes home base, and home as where the heart is. Home can be a peaceful place of rest, or a place of

little comfort, with haunted walls and memories. Rest is denied when people are judged, maligned, or violently uprooted. Home, from the word for village, was originally seen by peoples as the centre of the world,³⁸ and the “place from which the world could be founded” (Berger, 1984, p. 55). The human and divine intersected to give a location where individual biography also crossed the collective plane. Without Mircea Eliade’s home “at the heart of the real” (p. 56), one was lost, broken, even non-existent, and migration, for non-nomadic peoples, put them uneasily among strangers, who would undo “the meaning of the world” (p. 56). Domestic morality was also guarded at the door of the home, expanding, in centuries closer to ours, to be the door of the faith, or the state. But home is also a shelter built of habits, and in our time has become the centre for romantic love, and for history, or Marx’s collective conscious presence (p. 67). John Berger comments that philosophy, the urge to be at home everywhere, is a homesickness. Uprootedness has been called “the quintessential experience of our time” (p. 55). The nomad model serves this century well. And now, wandering through life, the whole world open to us, we need to learn to be as resourceful as nomads who use what they find and analyze where to head for next. For wanderers, where does the sense of home come from? More importantly, as Berger suggests, if we hear the cries of broken spirits in anguish, will we respond so that they may find rest too? He states that “only worldwide solidarity can transcend modern homelessness” (p. 62); for him, hope is born in the whispers of the lost.

In his own analysis of the notions of “home” and identity, Jonathan Rutherford (1990), argues that the postmodern decision is to choose what the lost will be replaced with. Difference or otherness has been cast by many as “alien,” to be feared or conquered, but the “uprooting of certainty (can be) an experience of transformation and hybridity” (p. 10). Difference is the focus for the confusions, blame, and arguments that accompany change. A sense of displacement and a yearning for order and belonging have long been exploited by conservative and reactionary powers in control. Rutherford quotes

³⁸In Chinese culture, truth is found inside the family home, which remains the focus of the dream of return for all generations who have migrated away.

June Jordan, “everybody needs a home...at least (to) have some place to leave which is where...you must be coming from” (p. 14). Freud recognized the wish that “employs some event in the present to plan a future on the pattern of the past.” (p. 21). This is half the journey home. The other half employs interpretation and analysis of those past patterns to enable us to wrestle with the politics of difference and hegemony, thereby creating a new “politics of the subject” (p. 15). This journey is inevitable, just as change is always certain. Crossing the borders of such a land means entering a place where identities are made, not given, a place of unfinished relations (p. 22). This place holds both silences and those conversations that represent us to ourselves and others, as Rutherford suggests. This place can allow us to map a journey “home” which overcomes Sartre’s existential “vertigo...(where) the Other holds terror and the threat of dissolution of self (p. 11), where hegemony and imperial identity (p. 12) policed by fundamentalism (p. 17) and experiences of subordination can be overcome by a new reflexive politics with traces of new collective identities transforming category politics (p. 17). Rutherford argues that we now live “somewhere in motion” (p. 13), in the margins, turning from “sites of oppression to spaces of resistance...asserting the relational nature of identities” (p. 12). These are new, strong identities, couched in new terms which break the “logic of the otherness of binarism” (p. 22) when they speak their own experiences. His is a reflexive politics, like that of Freire, which helps us make sense of “our cultural identities and how they are mapped onto wider symbolic and political identifications” (p. 23), experiences no longer mapped “onto an imaginary homogeneous body” (p. 13). Meanings from both the margins and the centre are transformed “when the margin resists and discovers its own worlds” (p. 22). This is a politics of collective home-making in the midst of multiple subject positions, fragmentation, psychosis, and a homelessness with no moral, personal, or collective co-ordinates for historicity (p. 24). It would be a politics to create a “culture of healing and reparation (for) pain, humiliation and shame” (p. 25).

Meeka Walsh, in “Peopled intimacies: An essay on home” (October 1988), also identifies stories that describe home as a direction we head for, and not the place we leave. To leave for home is to dismantle the centre and (bravely) move into a disoriented

world of fragments (p. 54). Feminists insist on recognizing that home has not always been a safe location for women, neither has the “comforting” past been safe for many who have been subordinated in its structures. Mapping this reality in pedagogically critical ways can bring to light the hidden contradictions behind all our texts. As Vidler suggests, it can affirm the breakdown which permits “the matrices of domination (to) crack open and a new political and social practice opens up” (Vidler, 1992, p. 148).

Ernest Gellner (1992) stated that we map our condition in one of three ways: through fundamentalism, relativism, or rationalism. The most promising seems to be the third, as long as it doesn’t become another grand narrative, but instead uses reason or cognition in a way that recognizes that knowledge is both fallible, and, like identity, multiple. To head for the home that lies ahead, we need directions. Frederic Jameson (1991) is one who refers to the concept of “cognitive mapping” where we can begin to map our situations without resorting to controlling “single origin” narratives (Lyotard, 1984). His aesthetic provides a model for the process of mapping our positions and situations in such a way that we move beyond competition to an ethic of caring. For Jameson, cognitive mapping permits us to “analyze representation at a deeper, more complex level” (p. 51). “To map means to see the positive and negative dialectic of the present historical situation.” (p. 45).

Jameson’s principal metaphor is found in postmodern architecture, those new built environments like the Bonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles, but found in most cities, that create “no-space” where “the body cannot locate itself, cannot organize its immediate environment, cannot map its position cognitively and perceptually” (p. 44). This is not only true of that regressive side of postmodern consciousness and architecture, but it is also a real experience for many in these years before the millennium. If we are becoming so alienated from our environment, spaces, and our human nature that the world and our existence can no longer be mapped, then the educational task is to help us learn new habits of critical perception.

Jameson argues that we live in a world of image and story addiction, where others interpret for us, and symbolic capital, in advertising especially, reproduces the

established order in silent ways. He suggests the development of new mapping skills used with a cultural politics, before capital colonizes the last areas where we can be critical — imagination and the unconscious. These areas, emerging in art and creativity of response, can produce a map that is not cartography, as in Foucault's imperial marking of borders for imprisonment (in Gordon, 1980), but instead becomes an itinerary, as Jameson calls it, that lets us define what is worth taking on the voyage. Jameson (1991) talks of using a compass, not a surveying rod, to "map the locations and global migrations of capital and power in the late twentieth century" (p. 4).

The Internet and world-wide web sites are de-centred communication networks, codes, and systems that overlay a fluid world. Can this global network be mapped? Are we now constituted by its multiplicities? We do not need to be conflicted by such wired pluralism, nor remain stuck in institutional consciousness. The dialectic itself is fluid. We must learn how to navigate consciously and critically between and through our complex life-worlds. To reach a livable home, we have to face the voids, stand at our borders, and begin to bear witness to buried truths as we tell the stories that make the invisible visible. Jameson contends that the political form of postmodernism can invent and project a global cognitive mapping on a social as well as a spatial scale (p. 54). We must learn to "position ourselves as individual and collective subjects, and to regain the capacity to act and struggle," a capacity now neutralized by the spatial and social confusions engineered by external authority (p. 54).

Conclusion

Mapping our ways through these intersections contributes to transformational pedagogy. In them, we can find the counter-hegemonic spaces that bell hooks (1988) indicates with her descriptions of democratic education. A dialogical and dialectical historical imagination provides a resource to interrogate the stories that connect our past to the future. These narratives contain much from modernity that continue to shape us, and so it is important to understand its dynamics and structures. The historical

development of the dynamic of the uncanny has moved, as I have shown, from its modernist use, first as a social strategy and then to a psychological state influencing our search as vocation for an authentic self, to a postmodern haunting of forces of domination. The aim of this chapter has been to point to what can be both an educational and a social task. This task is to use the newer postmodern notion of the uncanny to welcome an ambiguity about, and questioning of, those modernist normalizations and rationalizations that serve powers of control. These powers have relied on our acceptance of the images and perceptions that modernity has held out, described so clearly by the theorists reviewed in this chapter. To resist them, to escape their colonizing influence, I contend here that we need to release and invite alternative images like the ones engaged in this thesis which give us entry into questions and critiques of the taken-for-granted. Such images become part of our mappings and will take us, in our homeless wanderings, to the many locations where “de-modernization” begins, on the margins of those protected foyers that forbid and exclude. These locations are, in reality, the places where we can learn to live in dialogue with difference.

CHAPTER THREE

Postmodern Excavations and Itineraries

We are communal histories, common books.

— Michael Ondaatje, *The English Patient*

Introduction

This chapter turns from an analysis of modernity to an examination of some of the concerns held up by postmodern debate. My attention has recently been drawn to a number of attempts in the media to discredit whatever is under scrutiny by calling it postmodern. Critics say postmodernism has no core, that it makes belief itself absurd. It is accused of forgetting history as just being interchangeable points of view! The word postmodernism and its concepts are dismissed as elitist garbage by critics on both the left and the right of the political spectrum. In *The condition of postmodernity*, David Harvey (1989) holds that modernism and postmodernism, as defined, inter-penstrate, and so reveal the internal relations within now late-twentieth century transnational capitalism. Our present sensibilities come from an awareness that notions and experience of time and space have once again changed.³⁹

Within this change, postmodernism speaks to both fragmentation and the possibilities of new communities. There is a side of postmodern culture, expressed in the science of “new physics” and ecology, that moves through its own tendencies to fragmentation and relativism (Fox, 1983) to a convergence of science and spirit in inter-relationship. This expression of postmodernism is anti-authoritarian, pluralist, and

³⁹Jean Baudrillard (1986) captures this shift with the notion of the simulacra, and his description of an America captured by “speed, motion, cinematic images, and technological fixes...the triumph of effect over cause, of instantaneity over time as depth” (Harvey, 1989, p. 291). It is interesting to note that space is the First Nations metaphor for existence, visualized in the Four Directions of the Sacred Circle, in which ethics are shaped by ritual, and the rooted life of community facing each new situation in the place the Creator gave their ancestors. It is a metaphor being used again by aboriginal and non-native people alike, for healing selves and the world.

populist, participatory in its moves to inclusion-within-difference. Tracing the notion of postmodernism historically is intricate, and its definitions depend on where theorists place it in political terms. For example, in opposition to the above understanding, Jameson (1991), calls it the "the internal and superstructural expression of...American military and economic domination throughout the world" (Harvey, 1989, p. 226). There is truth in both articulations. Critics of postmodern theory, for example Jameson (1991) and Habermas (in Foster, 1983) argued that it makes it impossible to achieve any political solutions to the alienations of modern life impossible to achieve. But I have discovered in postmodernism's world, where everything is open to question, a resistance to alienation, that, like Gramsci's (1971) strategies of interference, help us work through the complexities and distortions of communication to an ethical political response.

Finding popular acceptance initially in the worlds of dance and architecture, the term postmodernism was developed by Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984)⁴⁰, who described the postmodern as simply incredulity toward meta-narratives (Harvey, 1989, p. 45). Levin (in Silverman, 1990), treating postmodernism in terms of aesthetics, posits it as a practice that follows, and comments on, the modernist aesthetic which sees art as "an object ...created to disclose the workings and...logic of its historical essence" (p. 212). He sees postmodern philosophy as "deconstructive strategies, questions, and suspicions" (p. 224). It is impossible for me to fully describe the qualities of postmodernism, since much of its own theorizing deals with extensive debates about its nature. But I will indicate how I come to the term, what I take as helpful, and, in the next section, will look at those qualities it holds that may be constructive to any critical and aesthetic pedagogy of transformation. I find these in the poetics and politics of postmodernism that Linda Hutcheon (1988) and Stephen K. White (1991) put forward. I find it as well in the examination of the dialectic and dialogue between transcendence and immanence, and between hermeneutics and ideology critique for fashioning a praxis which can contain

⁴⁰If David Tracy (1991) is correct in naming Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche as "the most radical secular masters of suspicion in our period...our clearest...postmodern classics" (p. 346), then postmodernism may well extend back into the nineteenth century.

both.

Whether our dialogues are about aesthetics, politics, or education, we have to decide if modernity is bankrupt, and therefore throw out its ideals such as emancipation; or if it is an incomplete project which needs to be re-instated in the face of the unacceptably postmodern, as Habermas claims, where such ideals still need our commitment. (Foster, 1983, p. 3). Perhaps postmodernism is the reinstatement, carrying this project within it. Theologian Hans Kung (1988) has also addressed the crises of the modern paradigm in science, technology, rationality, and in nationalisms and imperialisms. He has contributed to “the arrival of a new enlightenment on the Enlightenment” (p. 6). His understanding of the postmodern paradigm as historical rather than linear, as inter-weaving the web of past, present, and future, is, as he says, a “paradigm of humanity” (p. 179). Modernity, Kung posits, has had its repressed dimensions carried forward, and the crisis created by the earlier dismissal of those religious consolations humanity needs, has led to the realization that we can no longer afford to reduce those deeper spiritual levels of reality. Kung faces this problem as critically as do other philosophers he mentions such as Max Horkheimer, who could not return to ancient faith after the Holocaust.⁴¹ Unlike Horkheimer, Kung holds that these spiritual levels contain meaning that transcends self-preservation. When leading to a truly ecumenical linking with “others,” they can hold, he argues, our longings for justice, morality, and ethics. It is this postmodern move beyond modernity, still carrying modernity’s incompletions and attempting to find new expression and structures for them, that contributes to how I have come to comprehend postmodernism. Like Kung (1988) and Harvey (1989), I too understand our era as an elision of the modern with the postmodern, carrying elements attributed to each. This chapter will trace the postmodern movement towards an ethic and aesthetic of care, and will, I hope, flesh out aspects of a theoretical framework for a critical pedagogy of transformation.

⁴¹In spite of this, Horkheimer faced the religious problem, convinced that “without faith in the ‘totally other’ there is no meaning in life beyond survival” (Kung, 1988, p. 9).

Postmodern Poetics

To Linda Hutcheon (1988), the postmodern poetic is first of all characterized by a shock, an interference with or contesting of, certainties, which puts us wandering in a maze of echoes, a maze we attempt to exit. Yet its questions and challenges to the culture of modernity give rise to knowledge created by these very disruptions. Its parody is not irrelevance or trivialization, but a strategy of interference. She sees in its aesthetic of collages and juxtapositions a mirroring of the layers of life that leads to speculative thought. It is self-reflective, and reflective of pluralities and differences, yet the subject is activated, not dissipated, within discourse. It critiques binaries by holding in tension, yet not resolving, contradictions. Most relevantly, her postmodernism is not a-historical; it critically re-visits history's nightmares and the modern myth of progress. It re-instates a communal project by showing the relationship between producer, text, receiver, and context. The artworks that I have presented all fulfill the aesthetic and ethic that Hutcheon's postmodernism holds, including a critical revisiting of history. Each addresses what happens when uncanny shock disturbs our layers of received historical interpretation, making us strangers to our own perceptions.

Modernity's attempts to destroy history and build futures free from the past have had disastrous consequences. Hutcheon deals with issues that are important to any transformative pedagogy. In this work, she advances the analysis of modernity and its consequences laid out by Charles Taylor (1991) when she argues for a concept of postmodernism which refuses a break with history. Postmodernism offers a sense of the "now-presence" of the past when it critically revisits it. Postmodernism has been criticized for a nostalgic mis-representation of history, and in its reactionary forms, this partial re-visiting of history does become dominant. Taylor, like the Bergers and Kellner (1973), has described this form of postmodernism as the satisfying of present-day desire to quell the anxieties caused by our loss of the past. A better way of dealing with this loss is to learn to read events, past and present, as *alles-beides*, both/and; to be willing to face or confront all that life can bring at any moment. Text and theory, experience and

reflection must enter into dialogue. Hutcheon re-historicizes both art and theory in her description of the mutual need that theory and text (and I would add, experience) have for each other. As I have attempted to do, she focuses on literary texts she calls "historiographical metafiction," a literature that is aware that both history and fiction are human constructs.

This is a valuable concept, one that I take to include all constructed art and texts (including the human) that we encounter, and "read". By her definition, historiographical metafiction works "within conventions to subvert them" (Hutcheon, 1988, p. 5). Such works raise the possibility of connecting the "reader" to worlds outside her boundaries. This is both a break with, and a continuation of, modernity (p. 18).

Like Taylor (1991) and Nancy Fraser (1989), Hutcheon questions how we can reach public agreement any more, in the face of our loss of consolation through universals. Postmodern art, according to Hutcheon's analysis, may be the possible cultural ground to begin a dialogue that can arrive at those instances of public agreement and shared social values we need. In its very contradictions, postmodern art may "be able to provoke change from within" (Hutcheon, 1988, p. 7). This is a cultural space that can contribute to a new political and social ground; the path itself to this cultural space provides one form of a critical pedagogy of transformation.

As Hutcheon defines it, postmodern culture had its beginnings in the questioning and challenging created by counter-cultures and social movements of the 1960's. She holds that the knowledge gained from these disruptions may be the only possible conditions for change we now have. Hutcheon claims that postmodernism carries an historical aesthetic in its desire to "face the nightmare of history" (p. 88). This aesthetic is one which thinks both critically and contextually about history. She adds that historical contexts are "significant and determining even if historical knowledge is problematic" (p. 88). Moreover, postmodernism challenges those modernist problematics of "neutrality" and "objectivity" that Taylor (1991) raises, which "contaminates the historical with the discursive" (Hutcheon, 1988, p. 92). "History is not a phenomenological (or linear) event, but an entity producing meaning, but we have to

recognize, however, with Finaly-Pelinski, as cited by Hutcheon, that “meaning is only possible in a historical context” (p. 100).

Her notion of historiographical metafiction “re-installs a communal project-it brings together text, producer, receiver and social and historical context” (p. 115). But a tranformational education, which aims at the empowerment of the oppressed, must wrestle with the loss of the stability of “self” that is highlighted by postmodernism. Postmodernism problematizes that self which claims itself as historical subject, and which Paulo Freire (1970) promotes as part of the liberating moment. Hutcheon, like other postmodernists, does not discard the possibility of agency, but pushes at this concept of self arguing that the subject is activated within discourse. She cites Catherine Belsey, who insists that we construct answers in response to those interrogative texts which disrupt the unity of self we know (Hutcheon, 1988, p. 169). In encountering such interrogations, the reader often feels uncomfortable. Identifications are not anchored or re-affirmed by the text, but set adrift, now looking for a new base - what Hutcheon calls an always-already base that we haven't recognized. It is the task of the educational process to help us find that new base. As we face emerging and multiple sites for self, we can understand self in the specific ways that are provided by the very range of positions available at a given time.

What of responsibility? The history we are living, and are the subject of, challenges our sense of self. In so doing, it may be able to give us a foresight as well as a remembrance, a means of explaining a possible new reality — one which can also include the outcome of a choice to act responsibly. As we learn to question the assumptions we have been given and have adopted, we can then see into the structures of power and valuation. Interpretation becomes a radical political act that leads to the confronting of ideologies and their construction. Using text as a ground for interpretation makes both aesthetics and ideology critique inseparable to Hutcheon.

For her, postmodernism's value lies in its conjunction of history and fiction, of theory and art (p. 227) She contends that the very aspects John Fekete calls for in an anti-foundational interpretive project, namely one that would be pluralist, rational, pragmatic

(p. 226), are already contained in this conjunction.

I think Fekete's project is necessary to any transformative pedagogy. In their conjunction, both history and fiction become self-conscious of the ideological positions that shape their cultural practices. Moreover, the contradictions and interpretations that appear from this ideological awareness can provide the fertile ground for that social experience that emancipates us from oppression and alienation.

Hermeneutics And Praxis

In any consideration of works of art in terms of interpretation, fundamental questions emerge. Does the aesthetic work by itself to transform reality, or through us and the interpretations we make? Here, we need to be mindful of Foucault's insight that modern power lies in production (including the production of meaning) and in everyday social practices and speech, and no longer in external prohibitions (in Gordon, 1980). Resistance must also focus on new sites to see where power is produced. These new sites include the inner arenas of thought, emotion, desire, and imagination. Foucault saw that every human is an element in shifting power relations. If deconstruction has shown that most traditional discourse and reflection is simply ideological space, our task is to reflect not only on our own meanings, but to do so with a hermeneutical suspicion⁴² regarding how ideology works.

It was M.M. Bakhtin (in Holquist, 1981) who renewed the act of de-familiarization by introducing the human dialogical process to meaning, and the use of language. By understanding how a text of theory, ideology, art, conversation, or experience is used in social production, we can further analyze the way it can also produce transformation. Being able to "read" the text's contradictions challenges any status quo in meaning. There is a human act and a human partner necessary at the interface of form and meaning-making. This partnership expands to achieve its

⁴²This is a term made familiar to me by Elizabeth Schussler Fiorenza (1984). We learn to read the tradition for signs of the causes of oppression. It functions like Freire's critical reflection.

emancipatory potential in the dialogues of a community of interpretations.

Hermeneutics is part of the postmodern attempt to deal with the destruction of modernity's grand narratives. Writing in *The anti-aesthetic* (Foster, 1983), Edward Said raises the postmodern concern for the role of interpretation. Like Fekete, he calls for a politics of interpretation, in the recognition that different voices in a pluralist society turn interpretation into a social, political, and ethical activity. Social conventions close the space available for marginal interpretations and voices. This is how authority is consented to. For Said, human history is informed also by the human spirit and ingenuity as well as assent to the status quo. "Human society is a crisscrossing of all interpretations" (p. 145). "How does the struggle for power enter the hermeneutic in everyday life?," he asks. (p. 146). For Said, human creation and moral choice are freed in that dialogic engagement with power struggles which is less simplistic and more challenging than merely taking sides. Terry Eagleton (1978) dismisses moral "choice"⁴³ and aesthetics as idealist devices that repress history and silence voices. Said (in Foster, 1983) has responded to this argument by agreeing that mystification is possible in both morality and aesthetics, but he contends that if we have open communities addressing all interpretations, the processes of mystification which prevent people's access to participatory democracy and moral choice can be overcome. In *Culture and imperialism*, Said (1994), writes, "recovery from imperialism (comes) at first only through the imagination. In education, we need to develop skills for a new critical consciousness, which includes the imaginative process and experience" (p. 225). It is by using what has been termed the "hermeneutical circle"⁴⁴ that critical consciousness can emerge from the dialogues between tradition and our present contexts, the dialogues that give rise to all the interpretations Said feels we must hear, and not repress.

⁴³Franz de Waal (1996), inquiring into the biological origins of morality, suggests that morality evolved for human survival. The group shares meat and maintains this sharing to keep the physical energy needed to go back to the hunt together. "Adjusting the definitions of right and wrong (has been) one of the most powerful tools at the disposal of Homo Sapiens, a species of born adaptation artists" (p. 201).

⁴⁴See Segundo (1976).

In her doctoral thesis on hermeneutics, Janet Wolff (1975) proposes that if meaning always refers to other meaning, then interpretation is necessary for “bringing the strands together, seeing the inter-connections” (p. 55). Otherwise we are caught in what artist M.C. Escher develops as images of an extreme postmodern world, where we go round and round, in and out, going somewhere but always returning to the starting point. Wolff refers to Hans-Georg Gadamer who argued that the existential and the historical are both on a horizon, waiting to be fused with another, equally composed, horizon. In order to avoid relativism and assent to control, we must learn how to critique the perspective and language-world we each bring into the dialogue with the horizon. By not imposing our own categories, we can return to our own world with new experiences that can transform our old perspective, beliefs, values, and attitudes. Hermeneutics works by holding both tradition and present context in dialogue to create new patterning. To make sense of this dialogic experience or encounter, we need the frame of reference that is provided from a tradition. This necessarily also consists of remembering and uncovering the silenced voices within the tradition, as opposed to accepting it without question. Challenging us to move beyond the fear of ideologies and prejudices, Gadamer asserted that prejudices are both the historical realities of being human, as well as necessary as a starting point in our ability to dialogue and understand. According to Wolff, if we can approach the task of interpretation fully aware of our expectations and prejudices, and open to challenges to them, we insert ourselves into a broader context of relating and connecting. We thus resist that controlling authority which cannot exist without an unaware and unquestioned stance. We also avoid those attitudes which dismiss the “other.”

For Gadamer, as Wolff demonstrates, being thus drawn deeper into meaning is also the process for the perception of art. Gadamer felt that aesthetics was both an historical and a hermeneutical experience, certainly not a-historical or “pure” ideal. Wolff takes art as human construct, open to ideological forces, but also as example of the discovery of “other.” As such, she has contributed to the theoretical framework that motivates my analysis.

Hermeneutics and praxis, edited by Robert Hollinger (1985), furthers the debate that links the two fields of praxis and hermeneutics. I also contend that praxis,⁴⁵ so much a part of Freire's approach, must operate with the expanded human interpretive project so important to postmodernism. The use of critical reason and ideological critique or social analysis to reflect on our actions and experiences is the basis of the action-reflection model of praxis. The responsibility to act must be more than theoretically motivated or promoted by values that have not undergone reflection for their underpinnings and shaping forces. But we also need a tool for sharing and learning from the different and conflicting interpretations that are brought to community. If new perspectives are unsettling, we need an educational praxis that incorporates hermeneutics. The hermeneutical circle I have referred to is the space in which to hold such a reasoned, shared discourse. We eventually need a shared or agreed to framework to act together in what some call solidarity. The danger has always been that such a choice has often stood on who has the power to insist on pre-determined meanings and value. Encouraging learners, (or viewer-receivers, in the case of art) to interpret and share meaning and value, and then act as subject-agents of history, is a risky business. For me, however, this is at the heart of the educational project. We arrive at our analysis and action choices in a community of interpreters while questioning the background with a hermeneutic of suspicion. Thus, transformational education can move us from a background to a foreground and then to new hypotheses which leads to action.

The uncanny provides encounters that disturb or question the structures of our life-worlds; structures that create and continue, through tradition and power, the social meanings we inherit. In considering the construction of social meaning, aesthetics has been an important arena of inquiry for social theory. I find that both aesthetics theory and what is termed ideology critique, called social and political analysis and critical

⁴⁵Russell (1987) names three stages of human thought: doxa, or un-examined opinion/belief; logos, critical examination of the world; praxis, where we insert ourselves in history. I see these as paralleling Freire's stages of apprehending reality; a state of acceptance of the framework, critical reflection, and historical consciousness, where agency is widened and transformation is possible (McLaren, 1993).

reflection in popular and transformational education, are equally important to understanding this social construction. In *The dialectic of ideology and technology*, Alvin W. Gouldner (1976), explores how ideology mobilizes the self, and so adapts it to ideology's own needs. Ideology "becomes the self-consciousness of ordinary language" (p. 24). The ideology of rationality functions for vested property interests, he writes, and if moralities hold false consciousness regarding interests, then it is aesthetic experience, along with self-reflexivity, that will reveal distortions and hidden interests (p. 213). He contends that art "speaks the silences, touches the unacknowledged spaces...and moves emancipation beyond rhetoric" (p. 117). It moves us to make meaning.

Gouldner looks at false consciousness and asks whether art can change perception. Modern consciousness combines cultural pessimism and technological optimism. Power over others demands the control of consciousness and the elimination of self-reflection, critical analysis, ethics, and imagination. The role of art, as Gouldner argues, is to focus on "face-to-face interaction and inter-personal speech" (p. 150) as an effective change agent, versus speech which manipulates the other. I understand our present crises to be reflected in the loss of control over our own reasoning capacity, as well as in the difficulty to think ethically and imaginatively, and to be responsible for the consequences of our actions and attitudes.

Some would argue that art has always served the ideological interests of whatever era. Today we see the signs that even culture has become a sector of the production and selling of status and consumer goods, what A. Wernick (1991) refers to as "commodity aesthetics." However, he also holds out hope for resistance to this culture of promotion, a resistance most evident in those movements that take up ecological and spiritual crises, but also in art that faces the overlappings of interpretations. Wernick thinks that such resistance creates a space for a kind of politics that includes a cultural revolution. Feminist theory identifies this resistance in an aesthetics of experience which I will develop more fully in the final chapter, when I discuss the importance of valuing the public arena as a space for non-promotional expression and communication for transformation.

For Terry Eagleton (1978), aesthetic experiences and products belong to the superstructures that legitimate the social power of the ruling group. These superstructures are so entrenched that they are considered natural and are the source of the “social mentality of the age,” or its ideology. Eagleton is astute enough to show that ideology also carries the potential to resist this social power; “to understand ideology, we need to analyse the relations between different groups and where they stand to the mode of production” (p. 7). (I would add the modes of reproduction and representation). He inquires into the collective psychology underpinning any world-view. Eagleton recognizes that ideas can influence historical struggles as either dogma or as contradictions and resistance, and art can be an active element in historical change. He accepts that while all parts of the superstructure have their own pace of evolution or change, determined by production, they are not completely bound to it.

It is true that ideologies prevent us from gaining a clear picture of society. More than law or economy, art is less transparent with regards to the interests of the dominant group. If this is so, Eagleton asks, then isn't art always false consciousness? How does art challenge the ideological assumptions of its time? He admits that art can also transcend its ideological limitations, and render insights into realities hidden by ideology. It would be important for educators to be aware of what present social structures are dominant, privileged, or competing, in the cultures of global societies, so that interests can be made more transparent in the service of liberation from ideological manipulation.

To participate in change, to break older codes and identify our own, we need to become aware of mystifications and their purposes, but also need to explore a text's always-available historical possibility, which is held in both its form and content. Eagleton helps us understand the relationship between ourselves and the “text” we “read”. He argues that art re-enforces ideologies, but it can also be transformative. When we inhabit an ideology, he says, the alternative myths it contains are also available. Art can speak directly to these myths, and address us through appeal to our many ways of knowing. The aesthetic, he admits, is too valuable to be surrendered, without a struggle, to bourgeois aestheticians who would keep art and beauty in a private, elitist, or

individualist realm.

Janet Wolff (1983) also looks at the subject of aesthetics in ideology and in the public sphere. Sociology, like Marxist literary theory, had critiqued nineteenth century bourgeois notions about art, and raised the ideological nature of aesthetic judgement. These judgements have only served to separate art from morality, and give the illusion that artistic value is beyond ideological struggles. In fact, as the above critique insists, it is firmly embedded in them. The challenge is to clarify who defines tastes and values. Changes in social relations since the nineteenth century have affected taste judgements, as well as contemporary education. Both have been used to create a false unity which obscures real antagonisms. Yet the valuations of "taste"⁴⁶ do not completely control aesthetic experience, according to Wolff. She asks, who benefits from, and who pays the price for, established aesthetic values? The aesthetic object or experience is still a socio-historical event.

But this leaves a problem that Wolff, like Eagleton (1976) does not ignore; these valuations never completely explain the "presence" in aesthetic experience. She also argues that aesthetic "value" is a phenomenon produced in the ideological appropriation of the text, but she wonders if this is an incomplete analysis. Theory about bourgeois subjectivism cannot completely explain that illumination and experience of being touched at a deep inner level of existence.⁴⁷

When materialist dialectics recognizes that art can be both ideological and autonomous, it avoids being reductionist. We live and apprehend out of daily life, consciously or unconsciously moving between determinating forces and autonomy, always able to be touched, to render some truth, however perspectival and contextual. Art's emotive power speaks to both. Like spirit, art is expressive, not only of the given, but also of the potential in human experience, of the "more-than." While taking both

⁴⁶See Kant's argument in his *Critique of judgement*.

⁴⁷George Steiner (1989) has attempted to elucidate this, and it will be addressed in the following section.

hermeneutics and ideology critique seriously,⁴⁸ the aesthetic is one site where the in-breaking and experience of mutual meeting and connection with self and other can confront power relations.

Real Presences

Poetry arrived to search for me...there I was, without a face, and it touched me.

— Pablo Neruda

There have been two poles between which critical social theories of culture and aesthetics have moved. Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin established a debate in critical social theory that illustrated the tension and relationship between ideology critique and the redemption of meaning in existence (in Arato and Gebhardt, 1992, p. 185), a debate still being carried on between the work of theorists like Eagleton and Steiner. Benjamin warned about the aestheticization of politics, the process of substituting personal desire for any real public debate, but he also saw art as the source of liberative potential. Adorno was a student of the composer Arnold Schonberg who contended, as hermeneutics does, that knowledge resides in the material, and that the new is discovered in the given. Adorno critiqued a fetishist aestheticism of sensual distraction from the disenchantments experienced in modern life. He felt that art was process, created out of a human need for the not-yet-formed. Art can provoke both entry and resistance, finding its dynamism in reciprocal give and take between the two. Art needs two reflections, one on its “I Am,” and one on its relation to social forces. Adorno tried, in fact, to bring together a transcendent critique on external forces and an immanent critique on internal dynamics. Transcendent critique relates the production and reception of cultural works to the contradictions of the base. Immanent critique talks of

⁴⁸Susan Sontag (1983) makes a case for turning away from the proposal of meaning that is hermeneutics so that we can fully engage in the aesthetic experience. For me, this is not an either/or.

future transformation via a dynamic relation of subject and object. Dealing with the antagonism between the real and the possible, Hubert Marcuse pushed this debate further. In this antagonism lies a subversive potential in the very nature of art. To Marcuse, art was immanent transcendence, the critical wedge in the body-politic.⁴⁹ Life was aesthetic when existing in non-alienation, happiness, playfulness, harmony, and liberation of mind and sense (p. 223). As Levin (in Silverman, 1990) contends, art can both critique and redeem. "Even when art is not directly critical or subversive, it can be genuinely redeeming. We do not have to choose between art that proposes a critique of ideology...(Adorno)...and art that serves to redeem existential meaning...(Benjamin)...." (p. 228).

In the light of this, those spaces where silenced voices in history begin to be heard, and antagonisms revealed, may be the sites where people's visions of liberation and their imaginary universes can first find expression, where the invisible first becomes visible. I have tried to show how art works on what society renders invisible to move us beyond hegemonic ideologies to a renewal of cultural, ethical, and spiritual life. The "invisible" belongs with the language of transcendence that has too often been seen as a threat to historical and material existence.

In *Real presences*, George Steiner (1989), deals with resistance to the interior world of spirit and imagination by constructing his explanation of an external presence that is not marked by a need to dominate. Presence to him is not detached "essence," but an experience of the now-time holding an awareness of all time. (what in religious language is called *kairos*). We enter this *kairos*-time when body and spirit are touched, to discover other worlds beyond our borders. Steiner recognizes the importance of something like Hutcheon's "impulse to fiction" as the birthing of possibility (p. 207). For me, Steiner's model of desire, encounter, response, and learning holds educational potential. How does one analyze the possible, that which may, or may not, happen, that which arrives in an uncontrollable space and moment? Aesthetics, like knowledge and

⁴⁹These arguments summarize Arato, p. 233.

ethics, works best as a relational process.

Steiner notes that the experience of presence does not have to be a privatized mysticism, but, rather, it is linked to body/sense experience, to relationship, to social bonds, and is part of that collective realm informed by ethics. Aesthetics can promote the understanding of community towards a greater unity.⁵⁰ Nancy Fraser (1989), who is rightly insistent on the need for individuals to reclaim the public sphere, is not afraid of the word "poetry," which has been accused of being part of transcendence's ideological domination. She points to radical social movements where "politics and poetry form an unbroken continuum as struggle for social justice...into the unleashing of creativity" (p. 107). This creativity is, she argues, both self-forming and world-forming, and leads to a politics "in which immanent critique and transfigurative desire mingle with one another" (p. 107). Like Steiner, Stuart Sim (1992), contends that such presence is not "essence," which has been critiqued for raising false universals, but "a now and not-now caught up in an inexhaustible network of exchange" (p. 39). It comes to us in Hume's "blink of an instant" which can be the opening up to a deeper reality where wisdom comes like a gift.

The German idealist, Fichte, suggested that to look at the world is to alter it, that "all reality is brought..by imagination...which forms the basis for the possibility of our consciousness..." (Kearney, 1991, p. 4). Steiner (1989) holds that the "potential of insight and response (is) when one human voice addresses another in its condition of freedom" (p. 4). This he calls a wager on transcendence, a grammar of hope. To him, there are two freedoms, that of the text, and that of the receiver who can also communicate and suggest back. Both cognition and aesthetics need a process of reception, which Steiner posits as ethical action. Aesthetics, hermeneutics, and critical discourse are all important in their own ways in an attempt to clarify the paradox of the Other. Encountering the presence of another requires vulnerability, which our society

⁵⁰The Gros Ventre of the Northern American plains used their ceremonial songs to maintain moral order in nature and the community. Meaning was created by the collective listening to thoughts contained in the song, and the song became a transformative episode each time it was heard and understood anew. The song expressed a moral universe and restored it by passing it back into the community (Hatton, 1990).

fears. Such vulnerability nonetheless leads to perception of the historical moral realm, with its concomitant interests. Steiner sees art as the encounter of good and evil, an encounter he contends is the most transformational moment available to human experience. He clearly links presence to social bonds and relationships, and sees its recognition and reception as a way to bring ethics back into the public and collective realm.⁵¹

We are, of course, “free” not to meet, not to receive. As an educator, I try to identify those restraints and experiences which create fear of being open to presence. If, as I hope to indicate, emancipation needs both imagination and critical reason, we need to be aware that both are informed by the self’s own needs. These needs are, in turn, often adaptations made to ideology’s needs, for survival. These needs often push us away from engaging with each other in a mutually open fashion. Steiner’s contribution to this dilemma is to accept that the interplay between freedom and presence is historically informed in part. Our attempts to understand and communicate are always approximate, and require correctives from both self and Other. Meaning has to be struggled with in community so that its limitations are clarified. If we are willing to accept that encounters are a source of self-understanding, we can also see them as the potential source of dignity in the recognition of people as subject, not object. This is an important movement away from instrumental rationality.

A wisdom from many parts of sub-Saharan Africa teaches “I am because we are; we are because I am.” Edward Said (Foster, 1983) argues for an otherness that encounters us and makes us “other”. We are thus “translated” or changed. This moves us beyond “tolerance of diversity” to the core of human identity. I propose that these transcending presences, taken as mystical, are, in fact, material as well, because they are experienced in our embodied lives and in our existential world.

Steiner concludes with a challenge to secularized societies. He contends that we

⁵¹I am attempting to show that aesthetic experiences hold possibilities that can move us to ethical action. This returns us to Habermas, who held that what he termed communicative rationality contained both aesthetics and ethics (Ingram, 1987).

are done for when “god” and art are no longer important and possibilities for encounter and response are denied. The social consequences, he contends, will then be pollution, torture, gulags and death camps. He challenges us to commit to the affirmation of spirit and art, not in the limiting forms that contribute to such consequences, but in new ways that strengthen and inform us.

Responsibility to Care

If Linda Hutcheon has been able to develop an impressive poetics of postmodernism, then Stephen K. White does the same for politics. For White (1991), postmodernism is political, holding possibilities for both a responsibility to act, and a responsibility for otherness. Like Taylor (1991), White contends that we have arrived at postmodern modernity. He re-asserts the fact that postmodernism calls us to distrust universals, essences, and the grand narratives in humanism, democracy, progress, or Marxism. Like Hutcheon (1988), White argues that postmodernism can help in the creation of new social movements.

White (1991) also attempts to explain modernity’s origins in the idea of “an isolated subject (trying to) understand the world, control it by reason and make it available for human projects (p. 3). He observes that the key grand narratives of modern life — reason, progress and emancipation — are still influential. Postmodernists like Michel Foucault (1980) and Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984) saw these modern narratives as the cause of domination, and called for resistance by deconstructing them. The mind-state of postmodernism has been called “impertinence,” the shock to, or contesting of, certainties. As with the Bergers and Kellner’s de-modernization, this state of impertinence can engender an ethical and political turn. The challenge is to work through the anxiety and melancholy that postmodernism both perpetuates and critiques. To learn “to be at home in homelessness” (White, 1991, p. 7) is not to revel in an avant-garde emigration from the bourgeois home to an impossible always-new, but to create a “future present home” which is the relational, caring, political-social community that White and

Taylor call for.

If the mindset of postmodernism is impertinence, the mood, for White, is discord, that dissonance between the social construction of self and whatever does not fit with this. White argues in favour of accepting this discord, rather than rejecting it out of fear or anger. This key concept of his book is one I support for the development of possibilities for a transformational pedagogy.

The modernist moral code, which promoted only a responsibility to act, ignores differences, and closes off sources of insight that “don't fit,” that disturb ideologically given frameworks. According to White, this merely leads to another will to power, the “disease of subjectivity” (p. 20), even when the intention is to care about others. To critique this will to power, White turns to the work of Habermas, who has identified this same flaw in the responsibility to act. Habermas has shifted in his own thought to a concept of inter-subjectivity and communicative action. His critique of rationality does not discard the need for reason. He supports “a moment of aesthetic reflection if the substantive part of our practical lives (is to be) given the dignity of reason” (Ingram, 1987, p. 42). In his study of Habermas, David Ingram notes that Habermas saw practical reason as intimately connected to poetic thought (p. 74). According to Ingram, Habermas's theory of communicative rationality saw no straight line between aesthetic cognition and communication, but left room for a “pre-critical aesthetic intuition”. Habermas was suspicious of praxis, or action-reflection, seeing theory as autonomous from, and superior to, action, but he nonetheless called for a responsibility to act.

If defense of claims becomes an act of power, and not communication, only language innovation in fictive speech can disclose the world. If, however, in promoting our fictions, we forget other's fictions, we sustain the “normalities” that post-structuralists and deconstructionists have so strongly resisted. This excludes or violates other humans. In turn, otherness is denied, and ideologies are sustained which feed the colonizing moves on others outside the “homeland” of the norm in power. White points out another danger. The “soft” co-ordination of common meaning which comes about when there is no serious struggle with the real tensions and uncompromisable differences

that otherness can present, leads only to a neutralizing and relativizing politics. This, in fact, like its opposite of warring over meaning also gives us no direction for collective action.

Deconstruction is political, White (1991) argues, in that it exposes power that constrains. He identifies two languages that can enter the space created by the breakdown of the grand narratives and their hold on certainty. The older language holds a concern for civil liberty, economic justice, and human rights. The newer one is a language of meaning found in human differences, and in the deconstruction of the binary oppositions of body and spirit, reason and emotion. Using these languages together in their tensions, White argues for new social movements that resist the closures that rationalization and normalization bring. These movements destabilize the certainties of grand narratives, heal the destructions modernity has brought, and use technologies to promote consciousness and truly democratic identities. Both languages are needed to bring us to wisdom about who we are and what is to be done with our humanity. White calls these two languages used together a “moral aesthetic,” an aesthetic of existence (p. 20). White has identified an important dilemma. Like Hutcheon, he suggests that the use of a mix of fictive language, open to otherness, and action-co-ordinating ethical language may be the key. Having raised the arguments on both sides of the dilemma, White suggests that the use of these two languages together can be illuminated by Martin Heidegger’s concept of *Nahe*⁵² as a clue to taking on this dilemma, pointing us to ways to act while keeping a responsibility to others.

Nahe is defined as finitude. White describes *Nahe* as a slipping close to the nearness of death, which, he says, brings us to presence, the openness to Other needed for inter-connection. It is the opposite to closing off otherness by actions of “infinite mastery,” a mastery that resists all death. The concept of *Nahe* is a face-to-faceness which accepts both presence and absence, the reality in death and loss. It is an accepting of our mortality and vulnerability. It is a being at-home which is a not-being-home (p.

⁵²Hildegard of Bingen, twelfth century mystic and feminist, taught that the voice of creation calls to itself to awaken. She was born near the Nahe River in the Rhineland.

65). This is different from Derrida's security of the near (the familiar) (p. 65), nor is it the essence suspected by materialists as a destructive metaphysics unattached to real life.

This is a complex set of arguments I can only refer to in reviewing White's argument, and it requires more space than that available here. For the sake of my position, however, I highlight his bringing the two sides of the debate on claims into a creative dialectic in this concept of *Nahe*. Its finitude raises the possibility of action "within mutual dialogical responsibility" (p. 52). *Nahe* thus becomes a way of experiencing "otherness such that it can remain other" (p. 67). The Other does not become assimilated, dominated, or destroyed. The space created by this experience allows room for action, albeit action which is recognized as finite and fragile, and therefore in need of care. It is "other-thinking," as White calls it, not where the "other" is banished to the margins, but where it stands at its own centre.

White refers to otherness as a moral-aesthetic sense which helps "situate ourselves in the seam (of other-thinking) between the aesthetic and the moral (p. 73). Its ethos becomes our dwelling-place, the place where we remember both our finitude and otherness. Finitude is usually resisted because it carries anxiety, but it points us beyond this modern sensibility that holds a concurrent obsession with immortality and control. As ambiguity, it can actually play an important role in transformative education, as an addition to what Freire (1989) has called a pedagogy of questioning. I will return to this in my final chapter. The shift in consciousness that finitude produces, according to White, creates the ability to face the world without giving in to anxiety, and produces a knowledge not based on accumulation, but on a relatedness linked to a responsibility to care, open to doubt and the possibility of being wrong.

Life is unsettling by its very nature, something humans have known long before deconstructionism. The reality of our death is ever before us, consciously or not. The modernist response has been to seek control over death, or repress its pain instead of facing it. For Heidegger, as White (1991) shows, the art world and the world of fictive speech, can open up a space for a "moment of truth" to emerge in front of us. This can also happen, I think, in any human encounter, but it is the aesthetic encounter that my

present exploration deals with. White, like Hutcheon, calls for an ethical postmodern theory that does not turn its back on the responsibility to act, but restructures this responsibility to include critical reflection on fictive thought and speech. He recognizes that humans interact every day, come face to face, and at the best of times, share and hear each other's stories and inter-connect. According to White, in our daily life, we experience inter-subjectivity and an obligation to be ethical. As he puts it, the practices and structures of our daily lives require a co-ordination of action beyond rationalizations and normalizations (p. 36).

White challenges us to face our mortality, and the vulnerability it brings. I find in this challenge an outline for a praxis that counters those prevailing practices of technocratic and controlling politics and social life that act always as though all is infinite. This new praxis would involve "other-thinking." White's notion gives us the necessary "dilemma" of learning how to live responsibly for self and others while our competing claims are raised. It refuses the competition for victory of one's own claims that creates violence, a competition that exists across the political spectrum. His sense of finitude is a "letting be"³³ and a listening that can also become part of an action-reflection mode for our daily living. It is this praxis that I suggest as important for a transformational education that is willing to incorporate encounters with uncanny art and situations into its curriculum.

Conclusion

In Hutcheon's framework, postmodernism is marked by a hermeneutical reading of the past in the present. In her concept of historiographical metafiction, in the beneficial conjunctions and provocations between text and theory, history and fiction, I have located an important contribution to the re-alignment of the ethical with the

³³Matthew Fox (1983) writes about Hildegard of Bingen and Meister Eckhart, another Rhineland mystic. Eckhart called the process of renouncing that which controls us, limits us and closes us off to others a "letting go and letting be."

aesthetic, without which the transformation about which critical pedagogy speaks may be too difficult to achieve. I have indicated how Said (in Foster, 1983) has noted that the struggle for power enters the hermeneutic in daily life, and I support his call for an education that will resist domination by linking the imaginative process with critical reason. I have also indicated the importance of what Fekete refers to as an anti-fundamentalist interpretive project to such a pedagogy. With their incorporation of the hermeneutic, both Said and Fekete therefore contribute to my theoretical framework for pedagogy. I have attempted to integrate the hermeneutical in my approaches to an emancipatory educational praxis which contains critical reflection on social forces and structures. I have shown how Wolff (1975, 1983) also confirms the hermeneutical aspect of postmodernism in supporting an aesthetic which draws us deeper into meaning, rather than one which serves ideological interests. I have taken up Steiner's (1989) notion of real presence as a way of overcoming the binarism of transcendence and immanence, an overcoming through which encounters with the other can lead us to ethical action. In concluding this chapter, I have positioned White's discussion of vulnerability and willingness to doubt alongside Steiner's work, as a contribution to that aspect of learning which encourages a confrontation of our limits and a praxis involving "other-thinking." It will be a learning through listening and letting be linked with critical reflection. This has implications for a transformative postmodern pedagogy which sets out to resist the controls and dominations that I have outlined as concerns in my educational questions.

CHAPTER FOUR

Educational Directions

What shall we do, and how shall we do it?

—Leo Tolstoi

Introduction

Roger Simon (1992), has written of a “pedagogy of possibility.” Henry Giroux (1992), in the same vein, writes that the “struggle against oppression...needs to redefine itself as part of a language of transformation and hope” (p. 82). Our prejudices and perceptions are often held in place by our misinformed images of each other. We must open ourselves to the history behind images. Aesthetic experience can be an arena where space for transformational possibilities overcomes domination. Art bonds, uplifts and transforms, it also has a profound potential to critique and understand life. Its discourse must move to public spaces. White (1991) has called for an aesthetic of existence as one of these discourses. Hilda Hein (in Brand and Korsmeyer, 1995) calls for a feminist aesthetic of experience. Considering the art, experiences, and theory that have engaged me over the years, and in this thesis, and as an educator I find myself pursuing the possibilities for what I would call a critical aesthetic pedagogy of experience, a pedagogy for transformation in the context of a postmodern time.

In this chapter I will examine theories that reflect the relevance of art and the aesthetic experience to the emancipatory or transformational project. Using Dewey and Freire as a educational foundation, I will move into some of the work being done by feminists, especially in the area of aesthetics. For me, these theories, educational and otherwise, all encourage the work on critical pedagogy that I turn to under the rubric of transformation. I cannot begin to understand a pedagogy of transformation without a language of poetry and the spirit and of possibility. I have found a valuing of this language running as a current through the work of the theorists presented in this thesis. I

proceed to particular educational notions that have been broadened for me by the contributions of the theorists drawn on in Chapters Two and Three, and by the works of art I have reviewed. Dewey (1963) argued that we must identify the values that contribute to a democratic society, and then proceed to educate for these values. Freire (1970) spoke of choosing for freedom through identifying what must first be changed or transformed, in the structures of consciousness and society.⁵⁴ We then can proceed toward these changes through the practice of emancipatory education. In identifying present symptoms and structures that need to be addressed for change, I argue that postmodernism, as I have outlined above, provides clues for identifying the necessary questions and sites for present educational practice.

Toward A Critical Aesthetics

The French film-maker Jean-Luc Godard tried to show that we could only avoid nihilism and madness through two things, continuing to learn, and art. In much of his writing on aesthetics, John Dewey (1934, 1958, 1963) connected education with an imagination that encouraged interpretation and meaning-making. It is our meanings that condition our responses to the world. Dewey (1934) maintained that imagination is the only gateway for meaning to enter a present situation or life experience. Ideologies and "correct" behavior and thought determine experience. The realm of chance, on the other hand, is an enlarged space beyond control. So, for Dewey, art, through imagination, enters this realm to challenge our thinking, and this is how the imaginative process becomes transformational.

Seeing this as a venture into the unknown, Dewey takes interpretation beyond thoughts that leave nothing to chance. Dewey (1963) contends that in the aesthetic experience, as in the hermeneutical, knowledge is not created afresh. Rather, it is

⁵⁴Educators for change have learned that people do not move from one frame of reference to another on the basis of new information alone. The causes of resistance to attitudinal change have to be dealt with beyond critical reflection, pointing to the need to study the role of emotions and desire in the maintenance of attitudes.

transformed into something new out of the old. Such knowledge then turns back to enrich experience. As this happens, the knowledge lifts to our consciousness both the positive and negative qualities of human life, so that we can choose how to live. The body struggles to relate to the conditions of life. As Dewey (1958) understood, when the equilibrium of organism and environment is disturbed, practical adjustments occur. Physiologically and culturally, attitudes and habits shift, and change is therefore a re-ordering of the organism itself. For Dewey, the ethical occurs when, in constant adaptation to ever-changing life, we take responsibility for our responses.

This occurs by how we handle the contestation and meeting of old and new. Aesthetics is both ethical and a vehicle of spiritual expansion when our perceptual horizons are broadened. Within an object, and between a subject's encounter with it, a meaning comes to perception. These are meanings which will either be caught or missed. We can't predict which, but educators should be skilled and caring enough to respond to those traumas which lead us to react negatively to, or avoid, experiences of encounter or presence, experiences beyond control or predictability.

This leads us back to a paradox. Dewey (1958), held that the experience or event of making connections between meaning patterns, especially if they are contradictory, is an important way of visualizing a possibility we have buried or not yet encountered. I don't think we miss meaning because art is "bad," as Dewey says. (or because a person is "unworthy" of our attention). Imagination is shaped, as I have shown in the previous chapter, by the patterns of nature⁵⁵ and culture that condition our experiences. Although

⁵⁵Research at Laurentian University's Behavior and Neurological Laboratory has been done by Michael Persinger on the brain cells firing patterns; with more interactions, the responses to stimuli are more complex, and there are more options of thought. Moreover, there are more possibilities for complex firing patterns when there is exposure to more complex structures in the external world. In the brain, these structures are images. Imaging is a skill that influences how we act. Patterns of nerve cell activity increase especially through interaction with contradictions that must be sorted out. In studying the ways our sense of self can be changed, Persinger has argued that the brain is wired for presence of the beyond. When the cortex and imigdela fire together, electrical impulses create a mediation of the subjective sense and a heightening of a not-me sense. Our brains are wired, not only for self, but for the sense of other, a voice beyond self.... He holds that self/not-self mapping begins to emerge by the fourth year of human life (Canadian Broadcasting Corp., Ideas, January 21, 1994).

Dewey (1934, 1958, 1963) wrote at a time when reason “belonged” to science, emotion and imagination to art, and common sense to business and politics, these separations were beginning to break down even in his time. Soon, a growing understanding that reason grew from the inter-play of intellect and emotion would influence the work of feminist and other critical social theorists that were referred to earlier in relation to this concern about the nature of reason (Jagger, 1989).

For Dewey (1934, 1958, 1963) then, the horizon of collected human events produces ever-changing ethics in the form of an aesthetics of experience. He believed firmly that art had a role in education. Art allows us the space and moment to respond to the aesthetic presence, and thus form a new or reformed habit for other human experiences. Perception was to him an experience of the unknown which could lead to transformation. Learning is both an event of giving of self to something worthwhile, and a means to understanding consequence. Art is best as a teacher if we learn from it how to make new discoveries and take new actions. This was emphasized in the educational philosophy of Paulo Freire (1970), who was influenced by Dewey, if not directly with these theories about art, then with the notion of gaining the new from the old, which he adapted to his process of using codes and generative themes for critical reflection.⁵⁶ Dewey (1963) posited democratic education as that which “educates” us to recognize and assume freedoms and responsibilities. Freire held to this in his notion of education committed first of all to emancipation.

But to achieve an emancipation that can eventually lead to building democratic structures and practices, dominations have to be questioned and resisted. In *Voltaire's bastards*, John Ralston Saul (1992) speaks up for the virtue of doubt. He challenges us to “alter our civilization from one of answers to one which feels satisfaction, not anxiety, when doubt is established.... Doubt is an invitation to explore, to discuss with others, to think. It is the beginning of our journey, with the context and the questions being our itinerary” (p. 584). Saul speaks against the kind of fundamentalist civilization that “seeks

⁵⁶A code is a concrete presentation of a familiar problem. Generative themes are the issues which are important to the community.

to divide through answers when our desperate need is to unify the individual through questions" (p. 585). This questioning and disturbing is represented in the role of the uncanny, which is, I contend, how it comes to bear on critical pedagogy.

In conversation with Antonio Faundez, another political exile like himself, Freire (1989) reflected on this learning to question. They both acknowledge that exiles "face (and) resolve the acute tension between being exploited and the need to put down new roots" (p. 4). They speak of a pedagogy that takes risks. "People should dare risks as the one way...of true learning" (p. 4). Speaking about teaching, they hold that "knowledge begins from asking questions" (p. 34). "An education which consists (of) asking questions is...the only education which is creative and capable of stimulating people's capacity to experience surprise, to respond to their surprise and solve their real fundamental existential problems" (p. 40). It prevents the predeterminations that are anti-democratic, reproducing authoritarianism (p. 42). Faundez and Freire reframe my explorations. "(T)heory and practice (occur when) philosophical thought...is complemented by...this other knowledge...the not-I, the Other, which will change the whole world" (p. 47).

Freire (1970) was committed to three basic themes; humanization, dialogue, and coming to critical consciousness. For him, consciousness was an awakening and a cultural action that helps us die to old myths in order to break domination, including that of cultural oppression which stunts and prevents awareness. "For apart from inquiry... men (sic) cannot be truly human" (p. 58). Education can serve domination or it can further emancipation. "Those truly committed to liberation must...adopt instead...a consciousness intent upon the world" (p. 66), clear that our historical nature is what we begin with. Freire's is an education that poses problems in dialogue where "arguments based on authority are no longer valid" (p. 67). He argues for the contention that life and reality are available to the future, marked by the process of becoming, open to the possibility of freedom. Therefore, consciousness and action are both prophetic and hopeful (p. 72).

His work, clearly based in humanism and modernity, has been critiqued for its

subsequent essentialisms. Read in the context of postmodernism, however, using some of the adaptations to the praxis model that I have suggested, I believe that it still has much to contribute. His foundation is in epistemology, in a “knowing” that affirms context. His fundamental question about education was, “What is known?” (Wren, 1977, p. 1). The different ways there are of knowing, as elucidated so well by feminist epistemologists and post-colonial theorists, and the differences of interpretation recognized by postmodern theory, help in our adaptation of this question to a pluralist situation. Popular education and critical pedagogy now work across and within the differences of all communities seeking freedom. Freire recognized in the work of his “investigation, or cultural circles” where people discussed their understanding and analyses the advances and retreats between old and new themes necessary for new themes to be fulfilled. These have been the spaces where thoughts about culture, art, and imagination entered for me. My concerns about risking and silencing also found early support in his theory. Those who dare to speak, in the face of silence,⁵⁷ about the repressed, hidden and forbidden model the coming to voice that liberates. Their efforts show that taking responsibility for the result of our actions can lead us all to further reflections, where new themes emerge.

To be transformative, pedagogy must take on new habits of perception. These habits are the mode in which the individual, with her thematic universe, is pulled in the investigation of themes; that mapping of lives and the forces that shape them. If images, identity, and culture are to help us live in a more caring, inclusive, and democratic fashion, then transformational pedagogy must provide and recognize those sites of learning that can engage the individual, and well as the community. Art and culture can reveal such sites; the move to freedom is up to us.

Feminist and postmodernist theories push beyond Freire’s definitions of oppressor groups to provide the crucial reminder that there are many locations of oppression, some of which are multilayered within individuals and groups. White (1991) proposes the usefulness of a difference feminism that is a vision of solidarity. Difference

⁵⁷Silence can also be resistance (Sontag, 1983).

feminism, as defined here, asks that “we draw others into our own interpretive framework” (p. 98). This is not so one’s own interpretation may be accepted as the only one, but so that we too are drawn into meanings held by the other. Openness and listening allow a “willingness to hold open an intersubjective space in which difference can unfold in its particularity” (p. 99). It is a listening that is in fact a doing justice- a listening that is Lyotard’s respecting “both the desire for justice and the desire for the unknown” (p. 116).

This is extremely valuable as it invites a recognition not only of the boundaries in a plural world, but also of the places where what Henry Giroux (1992) and others call “border crossings” can be made, crossings that help us mend the brokenness of the world. It allows a coming into presence to each other where we neither submit nor dominate, where we are neither absorbed nor give ourselves away. This, to me, is the key space that provides the creative tension between the two responsibilities to act and to care- a tension I, like White, believe aids both ethics and politics. In the space created by difference, we may be able to pay needed attention to the concrete histories and identities of each other, confront our ideological limits, and move towards a newly defined freedom and authenticity that allows us to live together.

Feminist and pedagogue Nancy Fraser, as White (1991) cites, speaks about such an ethic of solidarity. To her, solidarity is built by deconstructing the narratives of dominant activities that privilege one group or identity over another, demanding assimilation. Neither is it a solidarity of like-with-like arriving at an easy communalism. It goes beyond a “soft” multiculturalism to one that enables us to dialogue in the midst of our present political deadlocks. White calls this the potential to extend care even to groups against whom one is in struggle, a care that is activated even when consensus or solidarity on justice commitments is not likely to be achieved. Things or people that are unlike one another can be at least called into the open finitude that Fraser calls the “reciprocity beyond solidarity” where the hostilities of modern life are put aside for a commitment to begin a “dialogic inter-action (p. 103). This inter-action offers a chance to hear, in the narratives of our differences, the value-terms and conflicts that our

interpretive frameworks raise. This is the listening that enables us, finally, to travel toward solidarity, through the homelessness of our era.

An education that enables us to re-think the norms, institutions, and relationships that injure needs such a space. As Fraser maintains, providing this space enables us to reconsider the social and cultural means of interpretation and communication. This pedagogy needs all the skills of hermeneutics and ideology critique it can gather, for the “continual leavening of our fixed frames of reference” (p. 111). The educational task, as White points out, is to think of creative ways to foster dialogic interaction of differences. White contends that the ability to be open to otherness is now under threat (p. 120). This threat is most evident in the rising fundamentalisms of our world, and their growing positions of power. Art that critiques fundamentalisms and ideologies, in order to unmask them, stands as a good source for a curriculum for transformational pedagogy. It provides experience for the negotiation of conflicts between plural forms of life, as much as human face-to-faceness does. Hutcheon has argued that such art moves us from a language of claims to a language of self-critical storytelling, and therein lies its ability to touch us and transform us.

Since the Enlightenment, aesthetics has been separated from political life with a vengeance. In our era, postmodernism and post-colonialism have attacked the idea of a universal frame for aesthetic pleasure. We now accept that different understandings arise from different standpoints and contexts, and that there are different local responses to the pleasures of representation. It is important to continually identify where the “reader” and the knowing subject, is situated and engaged.

For Joanne B. Waugh, writing in *Feminism and tradition in aesthetics* (Brand & Korsmayer, 1995), a feminist aesthetics points to a direction for the future, interpretation can prove a productive practice by which worlds can be constituted for future claims (p. 402f). Our plural interpretations, cultural, political, or otherwise, must be justified to others. We can then think about possible alternative schemes based on our dialogues with each other. Waugh adds that sudden social events are thicker interpretive situations; and she suggests that aesthetics and language can contribute to a vocabulary and action of

resistance. Her contention dialogues with another valid argument in this collection, by Rita Felski argues that aesthetics need to be done away with. This is because aesthetics, like other areas of theory from Plato to Wittgenstein, has made stops at all the major patriarchal stations, contributing via “taste” to social stratification, elitism, and all the illusions which mask oppression.

Hilde Hein moves beyond this dilemma to posit a role for an aesthetics based on feminist models, a role based on “the paradigmatic transformation of the immediate, the multiple, the..diverse... (where a feminist aesthetic may well be how) feminist theory may be understood more broadly” (p. 449). Hein contends that “feminist theory is at present hindered by a lack of an adequate aesthetic theory” (p. 449), which could challenge the network of Western logic, epistemology, metaphysics, and values so entrenched in our consciousness. I support this direction if it refers to both aesthetics and feminist theory in the plural, because plurality is the fact of our existence. Feminism, Hein states, will depend in future on an aesthetic of experience. If experience is to be more than “the inscription of what is given and gone, it must be aesthetically embodied (that is) given shape through imagery, symbols and form” (p. 452). She goes on to posit that all art that asks the questions that are not asked, and (then) asks, “Why not?” contributes to that aesthetic discourse which draws out the object/subject so that it may be heard. Such an “instrument for re-framing the questions ...(has) positive consequences in the non-aesthetic dimension because it illuminates and corrects imagery that has influenced our conventional understanding of the world” (p. 455).

How can both participatory democracy and the human diversity of experience be fostered together? This question, running through this thesis, is addressed by Nancy Fraser (1989). In the face of totalitarian corporate, state, and religious structures that constrain and control us in a new, hidden, manner, she calls for a public and collective opposition to instrumental reason, the logic for containment and control. Like Tracy (1991), she considers the development of an alternative reason which will be political in its inclusion of the ethical and the aesthetic, perhaps even the spiritual; these are resources, not for self-fashioning alone, as the Romantic Movement desired, but for

social fashioning. These resources have been privatized in a culture of vapid, image-manipulating, non-democratic politics, and need to be returned to a participatory public realm, where needs are debated across all publics.

Transformation In Critical Pedagogy

At this point, I turn to an area of “first-world” education theory that deals with the understanding of conscientization, limiting it to what is referred to as perspective transformation, seen as a preliminary step to social and structural transformation. C.T. Patrick Diamond (1991) has contributed a theory of transformation to teacher education; his work has application to all learning situations. To comprehend a problem, space is needed where we can approach it from our own interpretive framework, the way that every individual sees the world (p. 15). He quotes other educators who have argued that any “meaning perspective (is) a reservoir of interpretation patterns...individually generated and collectively transmitted...When familiar interpretation patterns fail...new explanations...are then searched for (p. 15). For educator Jack Mezirow, perspective or meaning transformation is “an organizing construct of perspective (described as an) extension of the existential horizon...transformative of perspective” (p. 15). This is an “epistemic change...an emancipatory process of critical awareness that reconstitutes the way we see ourselves and our relationships to permit a new integration of experience and action (p. 15). Mezirow thus links individual transformation to social change.

In following this argument, we need to remember what ideology critique has raised about external forces shaping internal perspectives. Mezirow and Diamond both refer to the work of Habermas, who identifies three forms of knowledge; the technical, the social, and the emancipatory (p. 15). Taking the last two as pivotal, the historical-hermeneutical aspect of the communicative function of language, according to Habermas, aids social knowledge, and thus, social action. Self-reflexivity, the cognitive function of language, leading to perspective transformation, aids emancipatory knowledge, that which also leads to social and structural transformation. Both forms of

knowledge, the inter-personal and the representational (p. 16), are central to transformational pedagogy.

Perspective transformation, then, according to Diamond, is the “recognition of cognitive structures in the light of experience” (p. 16), a shift in world-view which allows the extension of our webs of meaning. It allows a shift to a site where the “sphere of personal agency is widened...to confront social problems and injustices” (p. 16). A non-reflective consciousness is challenged by praxis, or as Diamond puts it, perspective transformation “increases a critical sense of agency (and) a conscious direction of action” (p. 17). If discovering learning sites which help us “to see one’s own experience as encompassed by what one understands,” is part of this shift, my impetus has been to draw on “uncanny art” to widen the horizons.

So we begin the process of image-shifting and what these educators call “perspective transformation.” Linking this process with the mapping of environment and context is the remembrance that is the illumination of what Roger Simon (1992) calls radical moments of human possibility. Simon, like Benjamin before him, looks for images that provide a source of entry into the questions and critiques of the taken-for-granted (p. 141). Images that make the present and the past visible are the grounds for a critical practice that allow us to act to alter the material ground and social terms on which lives (are) lived (p. 142).

Parker Palmer (1983) adds yet another dimension, suggesting that transformational learning comes not only from encountering the different or the new, but in being heart-touched. The goal of education, for him, is to open the eye of the heart. It is a prayerful education, in that the true attitude of prayer should be to open ourselves to self and Other, risking the chance of mis-understanding or being mis-understood, but risking, nonetheless. These are the spiritual and communal aspects of education, enlivened and quickened by what Palmer says are the “correspondences revealed by encounter..made possible by emotions and empathy as well as rationality.” (p. 52). He calls this “wholesight,” “the eye of the heart looking for realities to which the mind’s eye

is blind" (p. xi).⁵⁸ Freire also used a language of the spirit which speaks of love and compassion, those qualities which transform, not only perspectives, but our knowledge into a desire and a responsibility to care.

The revolutionary feminist pedagogue known as bell hooks has called for spaces where "the process of revision (can help push) against oppressive boundaries set by race, sex, and class domination...a space where transformation is possible (hooks, 1990, p. 145). To her, such space also can be created by culture. hooks too speaks of "home." "I had to leave that space I called home to move beyond boundaries, yet I needed also to return there (p. 148). She would understand Rushdie's character, Saladin. Home, to her, "is in those locations...which enable(s) and promote(s) varied and ever-changing perspectives" (p. 148). Home likely exists in the "margins," those spaces "where we can all meet (and form) new bondings (p. 148). She agrees that aesthetics can inform daily life, and she supports Freire's notion of education as a practice of freedom. We are attached to the world. The transformative power of education, to hooks, occurs when we are presented with oppositional viewpoints to oppression and respond compassionately.

Henry Giroux (1992) furthers this view when he calls for education to be a form of cultural politics, where different narratives are made available that will "expand the politics of democratic community and solidarity (p. 170). Giroux (1993) also calls for a "curriculum that analyzes and deconstructs popular knowledge...produced through...cultural industries (p. 26). Culture then could provide one venue for a democratic education that can offer multiple languages to "communicate across borders of cultural difference, histories, and experiences" (p. 27). These are languages that question all our social practices. Giroux (1994) not only supports these directions, but in referring to Abdul JanMohamed, also adds to the notions of home and homelessness that I have found instructive. Homelessness to JanMohamed is "an enabling concept...a

⁵⁸Comenius, the sixteenth century Moravian bishop and educator, was committed to democratic education that could prepare citizens to live ethical lives. His curriculum was based on the discovery of knowledge through the senses (Sadler, 1966). The Hebrew verb *yada*, 'to know', links experience and the word for heart. Ancient Greeks, too, located reason in the whole body.

situation wherein (possibility) can endure (p. 144).

What are we to do, then, as educators? Michael R. Welton (n.d.) provides a partial response in his collection of perspectives on adult education. He deals with a crucial dialogue between practice and theory, in much the same way as Linda Hutcheon does for text and theory. Using action/practice with reflection (praxis) avoids the pitfalls of using universals and “essences” as knowledge bases, the cause of the disasters attributed to “universal” reason. Critical social theory, as Welton reminds us, has dealt with a vision of social transformation through its ideology critique, as have movements for social justice. I posit that theory deepens the social analysis normally brought to reflection in praxis, mediating its own practice, and that praxis attaches theory to experience and existence, and helps theory itself to be mediated.

It would do well to remember the recent reactionary neo-conservative attacks against critical theory in both its modern and postmodern forms, which is being waged under the calls against “political correctness” and for the reinstatement of the European (and patriarchal) cultural heritage. This argument too would have us turn away from “theory,” not to privilege action, but rather to return to the upholding of the privileged canon, under the guise of a concern for “great art” and the “essence” of beauty. The split between ethical action and aesthetics continues to be used as a strategy in cultural wars that only serve the interests of dominant social and political powers. When theory can work in conjunction with action in a way that opens up all meanings and voices for consideration, we may recover a framework that speaks for all of life. The span of emotional life that aesthetics has been connected to, from pleasure and wonder to anger and fear, need not be set against the use of the mind in critical theorizing or analysis. Here I repeat the many calls for an alternative to instrumental reason; for what Tracy (1991) calls a self-corrective reflective reason, both critical and practical, and what feminist theorists like Alison Jagger (1989) have indicated will critically integrate other ways of knowing, such as can be available through the emotions. Such reason, which connects our present to the past so that we can consider the future, leads us to accountability.

It was Antonio Gramsci who “shifted our thinking about curriculum...to the formative curricular (and lived) places of reproduction, production, civil society and culture. (Welton, *Traveling down the rocky critical road*, no date or pagination). Welton points out why social action for change is necessary, even for the development of individual human potential; “If we as social individuals are to change ourselves, we must also change at least part of the social world which shapes our individual and collective identities.” (no page). This occurs, he adds, in “dialogic reflection.” He poses the crucial question for education: does the educator/learner also need to be an activist? He accepts that education can foster democratic social action by the critical reflection on public issues that critical social theories aid, but this in turn needs collective action to change practices which go against democracy, social justice and human rights.

To Mezerow’s theory of transformative learning, Welton adds the need to learn in context. Professional practice needs to understand the origins of social context. “To use the world as curriculum sites, we also need to question the structures of the status quo as active citizens in a community of publics” (no page). These questions, and the insights they reveal when asked in community, also become part of the curriculum. “The only disciplinary framework worthy of adult education is one that is as wide as society and as deep as history....(because) the structures of our society...unequally distribute opportunities for deep self and world understanding” (no page). Freire’s “generative themes,” drawn from discussion in investigation circles, uncover the norms and values that shape our contexts and perceptions of the world and our function in it, which then can lead to our conscientization about the external and internal forces that shape our lives. Freire’s focus on culture and subjectivity, although grounded in the secular humanism of the Enlightenment, provides a vision of the possibility of self-actualization and social transformation within postmodern society. Freire chose to be on the side of the oppressed, those whom Frantz Fanon (1963) named “the wretched of the earth,” taking what liberation theology calls “an option for the poor.” The task for both critical social theory and transformative pedagogy is to reveal the structures that serve the interests of oppression, and in so doing to enable us to take action so that a just society can be

achieved.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have drawn on those arguments of Dewey and Freire which uphold those educational practices that re-think social norms and relationships, as well as fixed frames of reference. Just as these educational philosophers have raised the need to question, they have also contributed to my contention that whatever both unmasks forms of oppression, and opens us to the world, in all its antagonistic or tolerant richness of difference, serves us as part of an emancipatory and transformative pedagogy. The language of story-telling is aided by the work of perspective transformation, which in turn helps social transformation. These three contribute to the ways we interpret ourselves, our locations, our identities, and our commitments. As Freire realized, awareness of what is known, and how it is known, extends a pedagogy of possibility. I have found in Welton's arguments a reminder for activists to trust theory, and an encouragement for my own proposal to use art and aesthetic experience as sites for learning. I would add that we learn best when we come critically informed to both art and theory. As I look at recent critical pedagogy, Giroux's (1992) call for a curriculum that deconstructs, and hook's (1988) contention that oppositional viewpoints are necessary to a transformational pedagogy return me to my argument for using the uncanny in art as a liberative moment. A poetic language used with a language of questioning can contribute most effectively to opening the possibilities for transformation.

CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusions

I began this thesis by stating my commitment to explore pathways to a critical understanding of our lives, shared in a late-twentieth century world marked by diversity and discord. My hope has been that such an understanding can lead to participatory, inclusive, non-oppressive, responsible societies on this planet we call home. I also set out to discover educational practices and curricula that can enable personal and societal transformation, providing as they do so openings for resistance to homogenic, often violent controls over meanings in our lives. I undertook an analysis of the themes of homelessness, the uncanny, and the malaise of modernity as key issues for both contemporary life and education. This analysis has provided a context for what I have called necessary postmodern excavations and itineraries. These in turn have helped me develop a critical pedagogy grounded in what Fekete (in Hutcheon, 1988) has called an anti-fundamentalist interpretive project, a pedagogy where hermeneutics is integrated into emancipatory educational practice. This practice contains what Said (1994) has described as a linking of imagination with critical and reflective reason. Culture and imagination are two important resources for an emancipatory educational praxis that brings interpretive and aesthetic ingredients to bear on daily life. Everyday life is sacred and needs nurture and care, which, strangely enough, can occur through the challenging of norms and powers.

Domination over others is served by the splitting off of the ethical from the aesthetic. In my analysis of what I have called uncanny art I have focused on voices that reunite the ethical and aesthetic so that the healing transformation I envision can occur. These voices call us to risk openness, vulnerability, and employ a willingness to question as a way of living and thinking. As I have attempted to show in my analysis, art can beckon us to trace our way through the difficult intersections of our many lifeworlds. Art leads us, via alternative images, to the questions and critiques of the normalizations and rationalizations that give power for domination to some. The art highlighted in this thesis

risks out of a dialectical and dialogical historical imagination, bringing, through such questions and critiques, a postmodern haunting of such forces of domination in the hope of terminating them.

As I have shown, such art holds a key position as a form of public citizenship that opens us to possibilities for engaging and resisting dominant powers and worldviews. Such art, in conversation with our multiple interpretations, can become a space and a moment for liberative possibilities for transformation. It disturbs frameworks of ideologies and therefore destabilizes structures of oppression. It allows us to confront how we image and respond to others. Are we open to the voices of border-dwellers, strangers, the once-silenced, the marginalized, open to what they bring to us, and what they have to teach?

Welton (n.p.) has suggested that we take the world as a curriculum site. As part of this, art — and more particular to my argument art that disturbs our givens and makes their contradictions visible — can lead us to engage difference instead of repressing and attacking it. Discovering our relationship to social structures and historic forces can lead to individual and social transformation,⁹⁹ and responsibility to act within difference. My contention has been that art, in raising to consciousness our limitations, directs us to necessary critical theory and an awareness of determining forces both historically and now in our postmodern time. Moreover, in bringing us into the non-controlling presence of the other and of the unknown, it also provides an uncanny pleasure for the opening of possibilities for transformation. For all this to occur, I have argued for a trusting of art and the aesthetic experience, enhanced by the framework of theory I have presented. I have similarly argued that hermeneutics practiced in discourse not only with the horizon of tradition, but within an open community of interpreters, is a valuable addition to the practice of critical reflection. I have woven the threads of an argument that indicates that

⁹⁹Popular education promotes the creation of reflective moments for learning through participatory art experiences, moments that foster self-awareness and social analysis. "Theatre, music, art, poetry, videos, photos and journalism have been significant of adult education in the Maritimes," writes Kathryn Anderson (June 1997). Barndt (1989) also provides examples of education for change through the use of popular culture and art-making.

the language of poetry and fiction and other forms of art touches and enlarges our spirit. This language, not dogmatic but fluid and even ambiguous, enables us to recognize plurality and difference, engage it, move to solidarity, or at least be able to listen to others across differences. In many historic cases such a language, a speaking through metaphor and image linked to aesthetic “judgement” has been used to dominate or pacify.⁶⁰ But when it enlivens empathy, compassion and connection, it becomes part of the spirit of politics, a politics of spirit. bell hooks (1988) has called us to claim all the tongues in which to speak (p. 12). Voices that have the courage to raise all the realities of life and thought are the acts that move us from accommodation and passivity to accountability.

If we are searching for redefined social bonds and negotiating for a “common good,” we need to move beyond the traditional definitions of self and identity that postmodernism has rightly called into question. To move toward democracy we will need to elaborate our contesting discourses in public in the ways this thesis has indicated. Fraser (1989) has reminded us that people are members of more than one public and are implicated in multiple layers of domination and subordination. There need be no opposition between poetry and politics, theory and practice, the individual and the collective, if we locate the spaces where we can share ethical speech. Instrumental rationality, as Taylor (1991) points out, has divided us from self, from other, from creation. It has sent us into exile, physically or psychically. He, too suggests the use of a language that allows us to see ourselves as part of a larger order. Taylor argues that this language would speak of a “home” where we could call on individual intuitions (p. 87) and artistic resonances to map a public domain of shared references in the face of the homelessness of lost references. Taylor, too, sees art as a “crucial terrain for the ideal of authenticity” (p. 82), an ideal he is committed to under the condition that it be within the

⁶⁰As have the structures of modern schooling. Worsley (1984) contends that mass education developed in the nineteenth century as normative sanctions of the working class, along with adult education, reading rooms, public houses and lodges — all are sites for co-opting the growing worker population and forestalling the circulation of Painite revolutionary ideas. Critical adult education and critical pedagogy work to redeem many such sites.

ties of social affiliation.

I have attempted to explore forces that either hinder or promote consciousness, a state defined both by Freire's term *conscientization* (coming to critical awareness leading to action for change) and that enlivening of the human spirit that arises in the experience of discovery and illumination. From this, areas for further research have opened up. In terms of methodology, the metaphor of weaving with which I introduced the thesis⁶¹ supports my desire to continue to work within an interdisciplinary framework. This has been recognized in the growing arena of cultural studies, which draws necessary ideas from wherever they reside. I would like to continue to draw on the theoretical contributions of the varied discourses available under the rubric of cultural studies, and to relate them to concerns of critical pedagogy, more specifically to critical adult education. A possible future direction for my research would be to establish a globalized cross-cultural dialogue project committed to the recovery of repressed histories, a project which would develop what theologians have called an ecumenical consciousness. Such a consciousness, woven from sharing interpretations, experiences, meanings and worldviews from the *oikos*, the whole inhabited earth, the four directions, would contribute to solidarity action. An example would be a dialogue regarding the work to "recover historical memory" through reconciliation and education — which is presently taking place in South Africa and Guatemala and promoted by First Nations leaders in terms of Canadian society. Such a project would require a humanity-based language that is understandable in today's contexts. an ability to be metaphorically multilingual and to utilize multi-model thinking. Learning would take place at these conjunctions.

To conclude, I repeat that my search is for a pedagogy that speaks to material existence and its lived experiences, physical, mental, emotional, spiritual. Such pedagogy speaks to a whole being that can begin to develop freely and safely in a community of

⁶¹I am, with others, drawn to the metaphor of weaving as it points me to ideas such as craft and creating, identity, culture and history, seeing the patterns, solidarity and interconnections. I recognize a parallel between this traditional art form and *bricolage*, which in postmodern theory is a more familiar metaphor. *Bricolage*, while not the same activity, is a contemporary form of juxtaposition and "weaving" something new from other fragments.

other beings, human lives connected in care and respect, able to live open to surprise, and able to deal with the decentering, rupture and shocks that come from critical reflection and resistance to domination. The processes I have suggested for a transformational pedagogy for a postmodern time will hopefully enable us to open both our heart's eye and our mind's eye, to recognize our world and ourselves and to grow both critically and aesthetically, both as individuals and in community.

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