

THE RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN HUNGARY IN 1849

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### Précis

In 1833 Austria, Russia and Prussia contracted an agreement providing mutual help in case any one of the parties internal security would become precarious. Between 1833 and 1848 they made several attempts to establish continuous military co-ordination among themselves. Differences over the Balkan question and German unification prevented the realization of the clauses of the Agreement. Once revolutions broke out in both Vienna and Berlin, and liberal governments were put in command, Tsar Nicholas refused to fulfil the promises of 1833. He feared that liberal Europe might liberate Poland or even try to overthrow the Russian autocracy. The revolutions soon reached Russia's borders. The Hungarian revolutionary regime attempted to support the Poles, German liberals and Roumanians. The Russian intervention in Hungary began in earnest only when it became clear that France and England would not object and that the very existence of Austria was at stake. Even then, the war was carried out by the Russians with reluctance, not because of their sympathies for the Magyar cause but rather because of their anti-Austrian feelings. However, the Russian intervention against an inferior enemy ultimately had to lead to Hungary's capitulation.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION . . . . .	ii
<u>Chapter</u>	
I.     AUSTRO-RUSSIAN MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION. 1833-1848. . . . .	1
II.    THE FIRST RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN TRANSYLVANIA . . . . .	25
III.   PASKEVICH IN HUNGARY . . . . .	63
IV.    THE SECOND RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN TRANSYLVANIA . . . . .	100
V.     AUSTRO-RUSSIAN MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE HUNGARIANS . . . . .	124
CONCLUSION . . . . .	141
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	145
APPENDIX . . . . .	159

The Transylvanian Theatre of War:  
February 9, 1849 - March 19, 1849

Hungary: June - August 1849



## INTRODUCTION

In 1849 the armies of Tsar Nicholas I crossed the Carpathian Mountains to assist the Austrian armed forces in their endeavour to defeat Hungary. The first Russian invasion occurred on January 31, 1849. Although the incursion was consequently repulsed, it was soon repeated in June of the same year under the leadership of Prince Paskevich. This campaign has always overshadowed the first invasion in historical works, but for contemporaries the January campaign held immense dangers for a general war in the area.

The significance of the Russian intervention was often exaggerated or given unusual interpretations by historians. The first Transylvanian campaign was frequently completely omitted. Professor Curtiss, in his recently published book on the army of Tsar Nicholas I, devoted a long chapter to the second Russian intervention, but chose to ignore the imperial army's unsuccessful first Transylvanian war, perhaps because he had no Hungarian works at his disposal. Due to the same difficulty, Professor Curtiss' presentation of the attitude of the Russian army towards the Hungarian war of independence left room for further exploration of the topic with the use of Hungarian and Austrian sources.

Hungarian students of the period exploited the topic of intervention with zest. The theme gave itself easily to

Magyar patriotism, anti-Russian and anti-Roumanian chauvinism or anti-Westernism after 1948 according to the current political ideology. In the 1860's Mihály Horváth, a liberal historian and minister in Kossúth's cabinet, treated the first Transylvanian campaign as a rehearsal for the second Russian intervention, and presented the Münchengrätz Agreement as the essential framework and main-spring of the Russian invasion. The military historian Gyalókey gave a very well documented description of certain phases of the intervention, but made a point of putting responsibility on the Transylvanian Roumanians for inviting the Russians. It cannot be treated as a mere coincidence that he published his articles in the early 1920's when irredentist agitation for the return of Transylvania to Hungary was just gaining momentum. In the 1930's Jenő Horváth published several valuable studies and document collections on the topic, a few of them in English. He often restricted himself, unfortunately, to a cataloguing of events and official pronouncements and limited himself to a minimum of commentary. Erzsébet Andics, leading historian of the Rákosi regime, decided to revive the two assertions of Mihály Horváth with the aid of new archival material located in the Soviet Union.

Among Soviet historians Averbukh devoted several articles and books to events in Hungary in 1848 and 1849. He emphasized the economic motives of the Russian government in waging a war against the Kossúth regime and also presented

incidents within the tsarist army as typical of the progressive nature of its members who participated in the Hungarian campaigns.

The various interpretations of the Russian intervention in Hungary in 1849 are clearly contradictory to each other, limited in their use of source material, or are heavily biased because of the ideological considerations. In this essay, an attempt has been made to re-examine the explanations of authors who wrote on the intervention. I have concentrated my study on three basic problems of the Hungarian wars of 1849: the relationship between the Münchengrätz Agreement and Tsar Nicholas I's decision to attack Hungary; the significance of the first Russian intervention in Transylvania; and the attitude of the tsarist army towards the Hungarian revolution.

In my development of the first and second problems, I had at my disposal the new collection of diplomatic correspondence edited by Andics in addition to the Blue Book of the British Government. I also made use of the little known supplement to the Blue Book edited by Jenő Horváth which contained sections of official British documents omitted from the Blue Book. My examination of official and semi-official relevant British documents was completed by the recently published British archival findings of Éva Haraszti.

My exploration of the third problem was facilitated by the presentation of new source material issued under the

auspices of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The most significant effort of the Academy was the publication of a critical edition of Kossúth's complete works covering the years 1848-1849. Waldapfel's excellent epistolary collection helped to shed new light on all phases of the basic problems.

The main part of my work has been done at McGill University, with the generous aid of its Department of History and the staff of the Redpath Library, which has given me unfailing help in my quest for material not readily accessible to readers. I am also indebted to Dr. G. G. Kemény of the University of Budapest (E.L.T.E.) and to the librarians of Columbia University who also provided valuable assistance in my research. Professor L. László of Sir George Williams University has given me frequent encouragement. My wife, Helen, and my friend Dalton West were gracious enough to offer their services to do the tedious job of reading my manuscript.

I am grateful to Professor M. Mladenovic, my research director, whose assistance and criticism have helped to carry my project to completion.

## CHAPTER ONE

### AUSTRO-RUSSIAN MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION

1833-1848

In 1830 Poland rose to overthrow Russian tutelage and to re-establish the unity of the country under the leadership of its nobility. The Hungarian gentry regarded the Polish uprising with great sympathy since it was the struggle of a social class similar to theirs which aimed at the establishment of a national identity. But the Polish war of independence failed, and the Hungarians rightly concluded that there could be no independence without including the peasants in the building of the new nation--a lesson the Polish nobility never learned.

The 1830-1831 Polish war of independence, the peasant disturbances in northern Hungary in 1831, the reform movement of the Hungarian nobles, which thrived on the occasional external complications of the Austrian Empire, the increasing confusion of Austrian finances, and the troubles in Italy forced Metternich, arch-enemy of the Magyar separatists, to co-operate more closely with Russia.

Although more than fifteen years had passed since Tsar Alexander I had initiated the formation of a grand "mutual insurance company" of kings and emperors against revolutions, the famous enterprise, better known as the Holy Alliance, remained a feeble creation until 1833. The ideals

of Alexander were compromised by the pressures of European realities. The members of the Holy Alliance could not establish a concert over the fate of the Balkan peninsula and Germany. The Eastern Question almost drove the emperors' "insurance company" to bankruptcy. Austria could not afford to allow a major extension of Russian influence on her southern flank. With her own large population of Slavic peoples, she had no wish to see the inauguration of a great emancipation movement on the Balkans because of the influence it might have on her own subjects.<sup>1</sup> Russia ultimately supported rebellious Greece against its Turkish master, while Austria remained faithful to her counter-revolutionary principles. When the Russians sank the Turkish navy at Navarino Bay, Emperor Francis spoke of "wanton murder" and Metternich called it a "frightful catastrophe" and accused Nesselrode of speaking and acting like Danton and Carnot.<sup>2</sup>

There was little Austro-Russian entente concerning Germany. In the late 1810's, Alexander supported the South German constitutional struggle despite Austrian protest. He went to the extent of massing troops in Poland as a threat to Vienna. This enabled his brother-in-law, the king of Württemberg, to keep his newly granted Constitution of

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<sup>1</sup>Barbara Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy: 1814-1914, Philadelphia, 1964, p. 56.

<sup>2</sup>A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe 1825-1878, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1954, p. 22.

Württemberg operational.<sup>1</sup> The Tsar also opposed the anti-revolutionary Carlsbad Decrees which had the added effect of increasing Habsburg influence over Germany. The ghost of German unity appeared on the European horizon, to the great dismay of Russia.

What was it then, if anything, that kept the conservative powers together? It was the fear of revolutions spreading eastward from the west, especially from France. In spite of the centrifugal forces, the Austro-Russian alliance survived, and perhaps Metternich knew what he was doing when he exaggerated the peril from France and radical nationalism. For this was the means by which Russia's attention was distracted from the Balkans.<sup>2</sup> Congress after congress, the emperors tried to sustain their "insurance company". In 1829 Nicholas deserted the conservative cause by upsetting the much desired Balkan status quo, but then the revolutions of 1830 in France, Italy, and Poland salvaged what was left after the bankruptcy. Now the Holy Alliance, which Metternich once called a "loud-sounding nothing",<sup>3</sup> was hammered into a military partnership.

In 1833 Tsar Nicholas and Emperor Francis of Austria met first at Mnichovo Hradiste (Münchengrätz) and, later in the year, at Berlin, where the King of Prussia joined them.

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<sup>1</sup>Jelavich, op. cit., p. 49.

<sup>2</sup>A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918; 1964, p. 42.

<sup>3</sup>Jelavich, op. cit., p. 42.

They then declared that the three Powers

. . . recognize that each independent Sovereign has the right to call to his aid, in case of internal troubles, as well as in case of external threat to his country, every other independent Sovereign whom he would consider as most appropriate to render this aid, and that the latter has the right to offer or deny this help.<sup>1</sup>

It was also agreed that, in the case of Poland, a request for armed support from local commanders would suffice in case of emergency. From this year on, all Polish emigrés were to be put under police surveillance in Hungary.<sup>2</sup> A secret clause guaranteed the extradition of rebels after potential insurrections. During the discussions the Habsburg ruler expressed his desire to see Paskevich as head of the allied troops in case of combined armed action.<sup>3</sup>

The conservative alliance between Russia and Austria rested on a solid foundation: resistance to European revolutions and no tampering with Turkey. The price for this latter Russian concession was that Austria would continue to exist as a conservative power.<sup>4</sup> The Berlin and Münchengrätz agreements were also intended to contain Magyar national and reform movements.

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<sup>1</sup>Nicholas V. Riasonovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia: 1825-1855; 1961, p. 244.

<sup>2</sup>Jenő Horváth, Magyar Diplomácia. A Magyar állam külpolitikai összekötetése a bécsi végzésektől a kettős monarchia felbomlásáig: 1815-1918; 1928, p. 9.

<sup>3</sup>Erzsébet Andics, A Habsburgok és Romanovok szövetsége. Az 1849. évi magyarországi cári intervenció diplomáciai előtörténete; 1961, p. 31 and p. 34.

<sup>4</sup>Taylor, op. cit., p. 43.



From the very first years of his reign, Nicholas viewed the internal developments in Hungary with grave misgivings. In 1836 Paskevich, Prince of Warsaw and head of the Russian Active Army, feared that the general mood in Hungary might soon lead to anarchy. His anxiety was shared by the Tsar. "The news from Hungary is most unpleasant. I confess," Nicholas wrote, "that nothing disturbs me more in the present position of the Austrian government than the attitude of Hungary."<sup>1</sup>

The attitude of Hungary was, at first, the attitude of the Hungarian aristocracy as expressed by Széchenyi and of the Magyar gentry as proposed by the eloquent Kossúth. Ever since the reign of Joseph II, Hungarian society had been in a turmoil. The very existence of the nobility was at stake. Their own economic privileges suffocated them. But Istvan Széchenyi was determined that Hungary should take her place among the modern states of Europe. The road to that goal was the establishment of a railway system, of modern commerce, agriculture and industry, of a credit system and of a tariff union within the Empire. Hungary, however, had no significant middle class to carry out these reforms, while all the efforts of the aristocracy and the state bureaucracy in this direction met with the resistance of the lesser nobility who realized that their economic position was threatened. This latter group, nevertheless, clearly apprehended that something had to be done if their special

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<sup>1</sup>Andics, op. cit., p. 35.

economic and political position in Hungary was to be maintained. A double solution was chosen: continuous political domination through the monopoly of the Magyar language, and economic revival and prosperity through political independence leading to the transformation of the gentry into a bourgeoisie. Their leader, Kossúth, eventually managed to convince them that they should give certain political rights to the peasants, without whom there was not the slightest chance of achieving separation from the Austrian Empire. Neither Metternich nor Széchenyi had any doubt about the separatist nature of Kossúth's policy.

The Austrian chancellor acted without hesitation. In 1837 Kossúth was arrested and sentenced to four years in jail on charges of treason. But the international tension over the Balkan situation gave an opportunity to the Hungarian Diet to wrest economic and cultural concessions from Vienna. The deputies to the Diet passed the military budget in exchange for the liberation of the political prisoners, among them Kossúth, and for laws which would improve the lot of the peasants and encourage industrial development in Hungary.

Kossúth, now free, continued his agitation for an independent Hungary. In his journal he told the gentry that they must create a new social and political order by radical means or they would soon become a target for the peasants' scythes. In contrast Széchenyi insisted that a revolutionary struggle would not lead to reforms, but rather

to national catastrophe.<sup>1</sup>

For the Diet of 1843, the government mobilized all its resources to prevent election of the radical candidates who supported Kossúth. Metternich suggested the abolishment of the internal tariffs between Austria and Hungary to satisfy the Austrian industrialists and the Hungarian commodity producing aristocracy. Since the radicals remained fairly strong in the new diet, he made further concessions to the Magyar gentry on the language question. The effect of these concessions, namely "Magyarization", proved disastrous for any future cooperation between Magyars and non-Magyar Hungarians. The Slovaks, the Roumanians of the Partium, and the Transylvanian Saxons sent protests to Vienna. In the Principality of Serbia, a new plan was born for uniting all the Serbs and Croats under the rule of Belgrade. Prime Minister Garasinin sent his agents into Hungary to promote the project.<sup>2</sup> The alienation of the non-Magyar peoples living within the borders, and south of the border of historical Hungary, greatly weakened the cause of the Magyar gentry. The strength gained through the peasant alliance diminished when the newly developed national consciousness of Slavs and Roumanians was provoked by the policy of "Magyarization".

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<sup>1</sup>Erik Molnár, et al (ed), Magyarország Története, I 1964, p. 456.

<sup>2</sup>C. A. Macartney, Hungary, A Short History, 1962, p. 150.

Metternich did not take advantage of the situation. He made a last attempt to overcome the gentry in alliance with the Hungarian magnates. The government introduced some reform legislation with due safeguards against extremism. Administrators were appointed to eighteen counties to curb the independence of the local nobility. Public works were initiated including the regulation of the Tisza River.

Kossúth took the counter-offensive. In 1847 the opposition formed itself into a modern political party. The bloody Galician jacquerie of 1846 played into his hands by forcing the opposition to shift their programme towards socio-economic radicalism. They demanded a genuinely national ministry, responsible to a parliament, exercising effective control over the collection and expenditure of revenues, extension of representation to non-nobles in the counties and municipalities; equality before the law; complete and compulsory redemption of all peasant servitude; taxation of noble lands; an adequate credit system; freedom of the press and the abolition of the censorship on books; and union with Transylvania, if voted by the Transylvanian Diet.<sup>1</sup> In February, 1848, Kossúth suggested to the diet sitting in Pozsony (Bratislava) to request a constitution, not only for Hungary, but also for the provinces of Austria proper and Italy.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 153; Molnár, op. cit., p. 475-476.

<sup>2</sup>Molnár, op. cit., p. 475-476.

In Metternich's view, it was time to make München-grätz operational. The very existence of the Empire was in jeopardy. The Russians also saw that

En Hongrie, la parti conservateur entraîne le Gouvernement dans des réformes qui tendent à démocratiser le pays et à paralyser l'influence, desordonnée mais en somme favorable à la dynastie, qu'exerçait l'aristocratie.<sup>1</sup>

At the beginning of the new year, 1848, Metternich requested a substantial loan from St. Petersburg to save Austria from financial and political bankruptcy. In a memorandum to Nicholas, he suggested that the co-ordination of their respective foreign policies be intensified. In February, Nesselrode warned the British cabinet that Russia approved every Austrian step which aimed at the preservation of her Italian possessions; furthermore, any interference by a foreign power would be regarded as casus belli. As soon as the news of the French revolution arrived at Vienna, Metternich requested the Prussian government to send General Radovitz to Vienna.<sup>2</sup> Fonton, Russian chargé-d'affaires, informed Nesselrode of Metternich's plans:

Pour convenir de l'attitude et des mesures à prendre vis-à-vis de la France, M. le Chancelier de Cour et d'Etat pense, qu'il est nécessaire d'établir sans délai un centre d'entente, et il desirait que Vienne fut choisie à cet effet.<sup>3</sup>

Meanwhile, General Radovitz arrived at the Austrian capital, and on March 7, Metternich sent the newly adopted mobilization

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<sup>1</sup>Letter from Fonton to Nesselrode, February 15, 1848, Andics, op. cit., p. 197.

<sup>2</sup>Andics, op. cit., p. 39-42.

<sup>3</sup>Letter from Fonton Nesselrode, March 3, 1848, Ibid., p. 199.

plans to St. Petersburg. On the same day, Nesselrode offered to concentrate Russian troops along the Austrian border and suggested the possible Russian occupation of Galicia to relieve the Austrian garrison for duty in Italy where the independence movement gained momentum daily.<sup>1</sup> When the March revolutions in Vienna and Berlin removed the principal directors of the counter-revolutionary "mutual insurance company", the defunct Holy Alliance, Russia could not possibly intervene immediately without risking grave consequences. The Tsar had to concentrate on preserving his autocratic regime at the home front. Police control was tightened and the army was strengthened against the spread of the European revolutionary fervour, or against a new Napoleon, who might emerge backed by a united liberal Europe, and who would attempt to liberate Poland and destroy Russia, the bastion of conservatism.

On March 26, Tsar Nicholas I warned his people and those of Europe that Russia was menaced by a "devastating plague" of anarchy, and that she would defend herself against this infection. "God is on our side," he declared, "understand this, ye peoples, and submit . . ."<sup>2</sup> The impulsive and unadvised action of the Tsar forced Nesselrode to make a humble counter-declaration assuring Europe of Russia's peace-

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<sup>1</sup>Andics, op. cit., p. 44.

<sup>2</sup>Geoffrey Bruun, Revolution and Reaction: A Mid-Century Watershed, 1848-1852, Toronto, 1958, p. 138-139.

ful intentions.<sup>1</sup> But Europe was in no mood for peace.

The Berlin revolution triumphantly liberated hundreds of jailed Polish prisoners and extorted from the Prussian king a promise for the national re-organization of the Grand Duchy of Posen (Poznan). In response, Polish committees mushroomed immediately. The Prussian railroadmen gave free transportation to the masses of Polish emigrés who were returning from Paris. The Vorparlament in Frankfurt declared it a German duty to restore Poland, while the Prussian Landtag recognized the Grand Duchy of Posen as a political entity outside the German Federation. They feared a Russian counter-revolution and hoped to establish a Polish buffer state between the now liberal Prussia and autocratic Russia. Lamartine, to increase his popularity in Paris, also supported the idea of an independent Poland. Prussian politicians felt that if they would go along with the French political designs concerning Poland, Lamartine would not block the acquisition of Schleswig-Holstein by the Germans. Thus early in April, 1848, the Prussian government sent General Willisen to mould the Grand Duchy into a fortress against Russia. The general permitted the formation of a Polish National Army of 30,000 men.<sup>2</sup> In Austrian Cracow and Galicia, Polish committees emerged following the Posen pattern.

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<sup>1</sup>Andics, op. cit., p. 45.

<sup>2</sup>István Hajnal, A Batthyány-kormány Külpolitikája, Budapest, 1951, p. 41-44; Benjamin Goriely, "Poland", The Opening of an Era: 1848, (ed.), François Fejto, London, 1949, p. 360-372.

The Hungarian government wanted Polish garrisons to replace the Magyar regiments in Austrian Poland to gain military strength at home and to aid the Polish march towards independence. The chief of the Russian Active Army, Field Marshal Paskevich, made frantic efforts to increase the number of his troops and prepare them for war. In early May he still did not feel sufficiently secure, and contemplated the evacuation of Russian Poland.<sup>1</sup>

The hopes of the resurgent Polish nationalists were soon suffocated by British appeasement, an introvert French bourgeoisie, German nationalism, and by their own chauvinism. Palmerston warned Berlin not to provoke the Russians by supporting the Poles, and Lamartine advised the European capitals of the non-aggressive policies of the French republic. On April 14, 1848, following clashes between German and Polish committees, the Berlin government, with the approval of the Frankfurt Assembly, decided to detach the German populated areas from Posen. All earlier plans for an independent Poland were abandoned. General Willisen was removed and a new commander took charge of the territory. Cracow was bombarded at the end of April, and the Polish National Army capitulated on May 9.<sup>2</sup> The next day the Russian ambassador in Berlin informed Nesselrode that there was no further danger of a German-Polish attack, and then wrote to Paskevich that

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<sup>1</sup>Goriely, op. cit., p. 370.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 369.



neither Prussia nor the rest of Germany was able to act against Russia.<sup>1</sup> Hungary was now the country whose government was most resented and feared in St. Petersburg.

With the collapse of the Polish movement, the Hungarian cabinet, which had been set up after the March revolutions of Vienna and Budapest, decided to seek the support of the Frankfurt Assembly for an anti-Russian defensive alliance after some flirtation with the Poles. With Austrian approval, a Hungarian delegation was sent to Frankfurt to make overtures of friendship. The Budapest regime saw its chance for a German alliance when the Pan-Slavic Congress in Prague stated its opposition to the Frankfurt Assembly. On May 24, the Hungarian Minister of the Interior sent secret instructions to the Frankfurt delegation with the approval of Kossúth. The delegates were to propose an anti-Slav alliance with English and French backing. Two weeks later Kossúth suggested the contracting of a formal military convention. He offered to guarantee the integrity of the Deutscher Bund against Czech or Slovene separatism in exchange for guarantees of the indivisibility of the Hungarian Crown. Later, the proposal was further clarified by a reciprocal offer of an army of 100,000 men if either Germany or Hungary would be attacked by Slav elements or by a great power allied to such groups. On July 22 the Assembly at Frankfurt unanimously accepted in principle an alliance with

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<sup>1</sup>Horváth, op. cit., p. 54.

the government at Budapest.<sup>1</sup> They did no more and no less. The impotent assembly, influenced by the summer victories of the counter-revolution, became timid, nationalist, and expansionist. They supported the Prussian militarists in their efforts at detaching Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark. The whole scheme collapsed under Russian pressure. Nicholas was willing to back a strong conservative Prussia, balanced neatly by Austria, but he had no intention of supporting a united Germany. The Prussian royal house gradually regained its power, and the Frankfurt Assembly deteriorated into a "talking machine". Hungary failed to gain the support of her northern neighbours against the much feared "gendarme of Europe". Kossúth's agents also remained unsuccessful in London.

Palmerston believed that the independence of Hungary was quite incompatible with the one essential task which the Dual Monarchy had to perform--the turning back of the tide of Russian aggrandizement westward and southward.<sup>2</sup> He supported the Hungarians as long as Hungary remained the pillar of the Austrian House, but he refused to negotiate with their agents, which would have meant the de facto recognition of an independent Hungary.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Eszter Waldapfel, A Független Magyar Külpolitika 1848-1849, Budapest, 1962, p. 15-40.

<sup>2</sup>Charles Sproxton, Palmerston and the Hungarian Revolution, Cambridge, 1919, p. 37.

<sup>3</sup>Jenő Horváth, "Anglia és a magyar szabadságharc", Századok, LIX, 1925, p. 604.

During the spring and summer of 1848, the Batthyány government searched for allies in unresponsive quarters against a non-existent Russian pan-Slavism, and a doubtful Russian intention to intervene in Hungary. Budapest, furthermore, alienated her non-Magyar population, and failed to come to terms with the Austrian liberals.

Russia was in no position to conduct an aggressive policy simultaneously along her western frontiers. "Our borders remain open from Kamenecz-Podolsk to Memel", wrote Paskevich to Nesselrode. "We entered a new era, which demands new policies."<sup>1</sup> The loan, originally promised to Metternich, was cancelled. Nesselrode expressed his confidence in the members of the Kolovrat-Ficquelmont cabinet only when he was assured that the new Austrian government was ready to secure law and order in Galicia, by force if necessary.<sup>2</sup> St. Petersburg became unfriendly when the Pillersdorf and later the Wessenberg liberal governments came to power in Vienna. An anti-Magyar Austro-Russian alliance became inconceivable. The Fourth Russian Army Corps was placed on war footing for the occupation of Galicia in case Polish revolutionary activities would revive there.<sup>3</sup> No evidence is available to show that this stand, or the occupation of the Danubian

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<sup>1</sup>Andics, op. cit., p. 47.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from Fonton to Nesselrode, March 21, 1848; letter from Nesselrode to Medem, April 5, 1848, Ibid., p. 210-224.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 51.

Principalities was originally designed as a plot against the Budapest regime. Nicholas was willing to use both his army and navy to prevent the Prussian occupation of Schleswig-Holstein, and to fish in the troubled waters of the Principalities, but he did not contemplate a military attack on Hungary. The Russian ambassador conscientiously sent his dispatches about the reasonable attitude of Hungary.

Batthyány was not for unification of Poland, wrote Medem, the Russian Ambassador in Vienna, and the Hungarian ministry was not overly worried about the suppression of the Wallachian uprising; they were mainly concerned with the effects of Russian occupation on the Slav population of Hungary.<sup>1</sup>

The new regime in Budapest thus had a breathing period during the first part of 1848 for consolidating its position. There was no help forthcoming from the north or from the west, but the Russian menace was at low ebb. The question was how well the leaders of Hungary could, and did, use this chance for the retention of their new revolutionary constitution, which Ferdinand granted in April 1848 and which in effect was the fulfilment of the demands of Kossúth's party.

Socially, the outlook seemed assured. Only a few magnates were hostile. Most of them remained patriotic Magyars until this stand did not interfere with their pro-Habsburg loyalties. The middle class, which consisted of

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<sup>1</sup>Letter from Fonton to Nesselrode, July 14, 1848, Andics, op. cit., p. 248-249.

anti-Semite Germans and assimilating Jews, supported the new government. The industrial workers generally followed in their footsteps. The landless peasants received one-third of Hungary's arable lands and, consequently, became disinterested in national politics as long as outside forces did not encroach on their gains. The cotters and agricultural labourers had received a few civic liberties which were meaningless to them. There were, nevertheless, only a few disturbances in the chronic storm centre of the Tisza River because the majority of this class still had a pre-revolutionary mentality.<sup>1</sup> In contrast, dark clouds loomed from the direction of Vienna, and the threatening voices of the Slavic and Roumanian nationalities of Hungary could be heard.

On March 22, 1848, Colonel Josip Jelačić, an enthusiastic Illyrian and fanatical anti-Magyar, was appointed by Kolovrat as Ban of Croatia. He soon announced that he would not submit to the Hungarian government. In Vienna, Jelačić refused to take the oath of Ban, on the grounds that this would prevent him from remaining a firm supporter of the Crown and the head of the Southern Slav Movement. After many provocative gestures, he formally broke with Budapest. Kossúth, who insisted upon Magyarizing Croatia-Slavonia, alienated even the moderate Croats and indirectly contributed to the formation of an anti-Magyar united Southern

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<sup>1</sup>Macartney, op. cit., p. 157.

Slav front.<sup>1</sup>

The Slovaks of northern Hungary struggled for the recognition of their language and for cultural autonomy. Their leaders used the language question to provoke them into making a stand against the Magyars. It also served to bring them into line with the Croats. The Slovak nobility and the clergy sided with Kossúth, but the peasants rose against the government in an abortive rebellion in September, 1948.<sup>2</sup>

The Roumanians of Transylvania demanded their admittance into the new constitution. They wished to see their language and religion placed on an equal level with that of the other "nations" of Transylvania. On May 15, forty thousand Roumanians held a giant rally at Balázsfalva to protest the Transylvanian Diet's voting union with Hungary before the Roumanians had received equal representation in that Diet with Magyars and Saxons. The protesters set up their central executive body, the Roumanian National Committee. When the Roumanian peasants refused the robot, and Puchner, military commander of Transylvania, decided not to employ the army against them, the Magyar dominated county authorities used the Székelys, the Hungarian military colonists, against the rebels. The Roumanian National Committee

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Albert Fražak, "Czecks and Slovaks in the Revolution of 1848", Slavonic Review, V, March, 1927, p. 571.

fled to Hermanstadt (Nagyszeben), a Saxon town near the Wallachian border, where it continued to organize its own revolution in alliance with the Saxons, who also remained loyal to the Habsburgs.<sup>1</sup>

Similar feelings dominated the Hungarian Serbs. They were the Cossacks of the Austrian Empire with national consciousness equal to that of the Magyars. Their territory, the Voivodina, was not included in the April Laws, and although Kossúth called the Serbian Congress to discuss church and cultural matters on May 27, the gesture was too little and too late. Serbian populated southern Hungary and the Military Frontier united into "Serbian Voivodina". It separated from Hungary but remained within the Empire and allied itself to Croatia.<sup>2</sup>

The southern Slavs tried to gain the support of Russia in the spirit of pan-Slavism. The Russians, however, failed to respond. Towards the end of July, Fonton, Russian chargé d'affaires in Vienna, refused to parley with the Croatian delegation which requested succor against Hungary in the name of Jelacić. Patriarch Rajačić, who pleaded for the Serbs, found no response to his request from St. Petersburg. Nicholas did not want to over-extend himself or support movements which, in his estimation, weakened the unity of Austria, notwithstanding the possibility that

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<sup>1</sup>Molnár, op. cit., p. 502-503.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 501.

Radetsky's Croatian and Serbian regiments might desert to fight the Magyars and thus contribute to Austria's defeat in Italy.<sup>1</sup>

Kossúth insisted on the historic right, the unique civilization, and the political gifts of the Magyars, and denied the rights of other nationalities within Hungary. The government at Budapest, instead of neutralizing, or even better, allying itself to the non-Magyar peoples of Hungary, provoked them into a race war. It was nationalistic blindness, inexperience, and armed repression that dominated Hungary's policies instead of liberalism, tact, and concessions. Suicidal tendencies also characterized Kossúth's Austrian policies.

He inflicted a deep wound on the bourgeois government in Vienna by refusing to help Austria pay its national debt. The Viennese were willing to liberalize the Empire, but opposed separation under any cloak. By the end of August, 1838, the stage was set for "Austroslavism" and "Great Austrianism" to combine against the claims of the Magyars.

In early July Windischgrätz bombarded Prague and, in the second half of the month, Radetzky took control of Austria's Italian provinces. In Vienna the liberal government's national guard repeated Cavaignac's bloody Paris performance by repressing the rebellious workers. The Austrian court secretly ordered Jelačić to prepare for an invasion of Hungary, and an ultimatum was also sent to Budapest. The

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<sup>1</sup>Andics, op. cit., p. 82-83.



frightened Hungarian cabinet offered to surrender Croatia, to assume its share of Austria's national debt, and to discontinue the independence both of the ministry of war and of finance if the king, in return, would recall the attacking Serbs and Croats. Ferdinand refused to negotiate. Jelačić began his march on Budapest with the support of an imperial reserve corps. Following a short cabinet crisis, Batthyány formed a Hungarian government of moderates, but the Habsburgs, aware that the Vienna diet had rejected mediation between Hungary and the dynasty, clamoured for Hungary's complete submission. The King appointed Count Lamberg as supreme military commander of Hungary, and ordered him to adjourn parliament and take charge of the armed forces in the country. The Hungarian diet refused to comply, and invested the executive power in the radical Left. Under Kossúth's presidency, the National Defence Committee was formed. The recently organized Hungarian army defeated Jelačić at Pákozd, near Budapest, but let the Croatian Ban escape towards Vienna. Near the Austrian capital Jelačić linked up with Windischgrätz's army.<sup>1</sup>

On October 6 the workers and students of Vienna rose again in support of Hungary, and against their "softening" liberal government. The Hungarian army, in pursuit of Jelačić, eventually reached the Austrian border where it came to a dead stop. Both Kossúth and the leaders of the army hesitated to cross into Austria. The diet in Vienna also vacillated about

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<sup>1</sup>Molnár, op. cit., p. 511-516.

the question of issuing an invitation to the Hungarian troops in order to break the iron ring which the Croatian and imperial armies formed around the capital. When a Hungarian agent suggested to the leaders of the workers and students the forceful dispersion of the Austrian assembly and an immediate cooperation with the Hungarians, the idea was rejected as "undemocratic".<sup>1</sup>

Windischgrätz, meanwhile, prepared for battle. "If my efforts will not be crowned by success", said the general to Fonton, "then we shall turn without hesitation to the heart of His Majesty Emperor Nicholas."<sup>2</sup> The Tsar put the following pencil remark on the margin of the chargé's report: "And I shall respond."<sup>2</sup> An English diplomatic observer also noticed the changing mood in St. Petersburg:

He (Nicholas) is . . . becoming more conscious of his Power, and though still unwilling to employ beyond his own Frontiers the large army he has collected, and which is perhaps the most efficient one Russia ever possessed, he is less indisposed than he was some time ago to maintain by force of arms the cause of Monarchy in Europe.<sup>3</sup>

The Tsar even instructed Paskevich to prepare a suite in

<sup>1</sup> Julia Kenyeres, "A szabadságharc és a nemzetközi politika", Társadalmi Szemle, III, March, 1948, p. 203.

<sup>2</sup> R. A. Averbukh, Tsarskaia interventsia v borbe s Vengerskoi revoliutsiei 1848-1849 gg., Moscow, 1935, p. 275-278.

<sup>3</sup> Report from Ambassador Lord Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, September 22, 1848, Eva Haraszti, Az angol külpolitika a magyar szabadságharc ellen, Budapest, 1951, p. 127.

Warsaw's grand hotel, the Belveder, in case the Emperor of Austria would be forced to flee.<sup>1</sup>

There was, however, no need for pessimism as yet. On October 30, 1848, Windischgrätz defeated the Hungarian army, which had finally come to the assistance of the Austrian diet. The next day the capital was restored to the Habsburgs. Russian support became passé. The Magyars were soon encircled. From the south the Serbians, from the east and southeast the Roumanian guerillas, from the northwest the reorganized Slovak irregulars, and from the north and west two imperial armies prepared to crush Hungary.

A forceful imperial policy demanded forceful ministers and a forceful emperor.<sup>2</sup> Felix Schwarzenberg, Windischgrätz's brother-in-law and the adviser of Radetzky, became prime minister of the Austrian Empire in November. On December 2, Ferdinand abdicated in favour of his eighteen-year-old nephew, Francis Joseph. Both the new prime minister and the young emperor wanted to ensure Russian support if the need would arise. On the matter of military cooperation, Schwarzenberg consulted Russian ambassador Medem,<sup>3</sup> while Francis

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<sup>1</sup>K. I., "Paskievics Magyarországon", Budapest Szemle, XCIX, 1899, p. 219.

<sup>2</sup>Taylor, op. cit., p. 84.

<sup>3</sup>"En me donnant ces détails le p<sup>ce</sup> Felix Schwarzenberg m'a exprimé le désir du Gouvernement de s'assurer de plus de garanties de sécurité encore, en pouvant compter, en cas de besoin, sur l'assistance de nos troupes, et de pouvoir même accrediter cette opinion dans le pays, lorsqu'on y apprendrait la concentration de quelques troupes russes sur la frontière, prêtes à offrir aide et assistance à l'autorité légale, si on lui refusait obéissance d'une manière compromettante pour le repos public." (Letter from Medem to Nesselrode, November 4, 1848, Andics, op. cit., p. 272.)

Joseph wrote directly to Nicholas.<sup>1</sup>

Just before the opening of new hostilities Kossúth asked William H. Stiles, the chargé d'affaires of the United States at the court of Vienna, to initiate the negotiations of an armistice for the winter between the two armies standing on the frontiers of Austria and Hungary. Stiles was willing to mediate until he was told by Windischgrätz: "I can not consent to treat with those who are in a state of rebellion."<sup>2</sup> The general launched his campaign and within a fortnight reached the vicinity of Budapest. The Austrian armies kept advancing until Hungary was merely eight or ten unoccupied counties clustered around the provincial town of Debrecen.

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<sup>1</sup>"Elle me fait espérer que nos deux Empires,--unis par les souvenirs d'une bonne et ancienne alliance et par tant d'intérêts politiques qui leur sont communs,--marcheront constamment à l'unisson pour la défense des principes d'ordre et de justice en Europe et que le poids matériel que leurs forces réunies peuvent mettre dans la balance, contribuera essentiellement à faire, au besoin, prévaloir ces principes." (Letter from Francis Joseph to Nicholas, Olmutz, December 28, 1848. Andics, op. cit., p. 304.)

<sup>2</sup>William H. Stiles, Austria in 1848-49, II, London, 1852, p. 154-157.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE FIRST RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN TRANSYLVANIA

"Europe is calm, calm again  
Her Revolutions are bygone."

With these words, Sándor Petöfi, a Magyar poet greeted the year 1849. Little did he realize that he would soon sacrifice his life for the temporary regeneration of revolutionary fervour in the continent. The socialists of Western Europe and the liberal-nationalists of Central and Southern Europe had either been defeated or were in complete retreat. On the fifth of January, 1849, Budapest fell. The British Ambassador to Austria reported: ". . . we may now look forward to the speedy termination of this war and to the final extinction of the rebellion."<sup>1</sup>

The Hungarians, nevertheless, were not yet defeated. Their speedy and well organized orderly retreat was mistaken by the Ambassador for disintegration. Actually, the new commander of the Hungarian Western Army, General Arthur Görgei, had been constantly preparing for a general counter-offensive against the Austrians since the beginning of the year. He and Kossúth only feared an outflanking by the Russian and Austrian troops stationed in the Danubian Princi-

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<sup>1</sup>Letter from Posonby to Palmerston, January 22, 1849, Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, LVIII, (Accounts and Papers, 1851), no. 1323, August, 1850, "Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of Hungary: 1847-1849," p. 131. Cited hereafter as Correspondence.

polities.

In 1848, the Hungarian government had already recognized the possibility of a Russian intervention via the Principalities. In April, the Batthyány cabinet instructed its foreign minister to call to the attention of the Austrian government the pro-Russian movements in the Danubian Principalities, and the Russian troop concentration along the Pruth River.<sup>1</sup> In a speech to the Hungarian Parliament, Lajos Kossúth pointed out to the deputies the uncertainty of the direction the Russian army would take at the Pruth.<sup>2</sup> His anxiety was fed by statements like that of the Russian chargé d'affaires, General Duhamel, in Bucharest: "The moment is here to take possession of the East and warn the West."<sup>3</sup> On January 22, 1849, Fuad Effendi, the Porte's representative in Bucharest, warned Duhamel that an armed intervention in Transylvania through Turkish territories would encourage the French to intervene in Italy.<sup>4</sup> He also held him responsible for consequences stemming from the

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<sup>1</sup> Hajnal, op. cit., p. 31.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 117.

<sup>3</sup> Letter from Canning to Titov, December 4, 1848, Jenő Horváth, Magyar Diplomácia: A Magyar állam külpolitikai összefoglalásai a bécsi végzésektől a kettős monarchia felbomlásáig: 1815-1918; 1928, p. 98.

<sup>4</sup> Letter from Duhamel to Nesselrode, January 22, 1849, Jenő Horváth (ed.), Origins of the Crimean War: Documents Relative to the Russian Intervention in Hungary and Transylvania. 1848-1849, Budapest; reprint from South Eastern Affairs 1931-1936, 1937, p. 27-20.

infraction of the London Treaty of 1841.<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant-General Puchner, Austrian military governor of Transylvania, had the same fears when he warned his War Council, which was discussing whether an invitation should or should not be delivered to the Russian troops in Wallachia, that an invitation such as this might be used by other powers, e.g., France, to justify an invasion of Piedmont.<sup>2</sup> A week before the first intervention, Colquhoun, British consul-general in Bucharest, wrote in a private letter: ". . . as soon as France hears of the Russians having crossed the Austrian Frontier, her armies will cross the Alps, and a demand will be made to open the Dardanelles."<sup>3</sup> At the time of the campaign, Lord Palmerston pointed to another aspect of the Russian occupation of Transylvania:

. . . the proof which the recent entrance of Russian troops from Wallachia into Transylvania has afforded to the greatest importance which would attach to the Danube Principalities, if in the possession of Russia, as Strategic points from whence the Austrian Empire might be threatened and attacked. The Austrian Gov't may at the present moment think only of the advantage which it has derived from the entrance of friendly military force into Austrian territory which is in the state of revolt, but the Austrian Gov't is too sagacious not to look further into futurity, and not to see that if a strong power like Russia was to be in possession of the Principalities, instead of their being held by a weak Power like Turkey, the security

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<sup>1</sup> Letter from Colquhoun to Canning, January 22, 1849, Correspondence, op. cit., p. 135.

<sup>2</sup> Origins, op. cit., p. 23-24.

<sup>3</sup> Letter from Colquhoun to John Bidwell, January 24, 1849, Ibid., p. 35.

of the Austrian Empire from attack on its Eastern frontier would be essentially diminished; and it seems therefore to be a direct interest of Austria to maintain the rights of the Sultan over Moldavia and Wallachia.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, the first Russian Intervention posed several questions. What will the Russian army do next? How will this intervention influence Turkey's position in the Principalities? How will the French government react? Will England retaliate or not? In the early months of 1849, there was no way of giving a definite answer to these questions. Tsar Nicholas I had not yet recognized Napoleon, the Battle of Novara had not yet taken place, nobody knew the exact military situation in Transylvania. These were the months of anxiety.

The status quo of the region was upset with the Russian army gradually moving into the Principalities in response to revolutionary activities there. In Moldavia dissatisfied boyars attempted a coup d'état taking advantage of the revolutionary atmosphere of the spring of 1848, but they were easily put down by the Russian-supported Prince. Shortly afterwards, there was a better organized mass uprising in Wallachia.<sup>2</sup> When a revolutionary government took power, it received the support of the western section of the diplomatic corps in Bucharest and Constantinople. The

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<sup>1</sup>Letter from Palmerston to Posonby, March 20, 1849, Ibid., p. 91.

<sup>2</sup>Michael Roller, "The Roumanians in 1848", in François Fetjò (ed.), The Opening of an Era: 1848, London, 1949, p. 300-305.



Roumanian "forty-eighters" were essentially conservative boyars who aimed at no more than the abrogation of the Russian regime, and for these reasons they were encouraged by Colquhoun. Stratford Canning, Britain's ambassador to the Porte, also supported them as he became aware of their moderate aims.<sup>1</sup> Russia was not so benevolent towards the ousters of their puppet, the Prince, and in conjunction with Turkey began the occupation of Wallachia and later Moldavia, allegedly to restore order. Already on April 7, 1848, Timoni, Austrian consul in Bucharest, indicated the forthcoming Russian occupation of the Principalities. At the end of April, Duhamel arrived at Jassy and in May he established residence in Bucharest to co-ordinate his country's political and military activities in this sphere of Europe.<sup>2</sup> In June General Luders' corps crossed the Pruth at Jassy<sup>3</sup> soon to be followed by Turkish troops who, on the advice of Nicholas I, had come to Wallachia with an army of five thousand regulars under the command of Süliman Pasha.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>R. R. Florescu, "The Roumanian Principalities and the Origins of the Crimean War", The Slavonic and East European Review, XLIII, 1965, p. 57.

<sup>2</sup>Jenő Horváth, "Törökország Semlegessége: 1848-49", Történeti Szemle, V, 1930, p. 53.

<sup>3</sup>Letter from S. Gardner to Canning, July 5, 1848, in Jenő Horváth (ed.), "Anglo-Hungarian Documents 1841-1842: England, the Zollverein and Hungary", South Eastern Affairs, I, 1931, p. 196.

<sup>4</sup>Roller, op. cit., p. 306.

According to a conservative estimate, the army of occupation did not exceed twenty-eight thousand men.<sup>1</sup> Since the Wallachian revolution deteriorated into a comic opera conclusion, that is, a minor scuffle between the firemen of Bucharest and the newly arrived Turkish troops, the occupational forces were definitely oversized for the policing of the Principalities. In October, 1848, French consul Delahante had reported from Jassy that, in his opinion, there were more troops in the Principalities than needed for occupation and the surplus was probably present for the benefit of the rebel Magyars.<sup>2</sup> Delahante's remarks were those of an acute observer; the Russians gradually moved closer and closer to the Transylvanian-Turkish border while more troops were crossing the Pruth from Bessarabia.<sup>3</sup> Soon after New Year's Day, Luders began the preparation for an attack on the Hungarians. The Russian general ordered the concentration of six battalions of infantry, four squadrons of lancers, six hundred Cossacks, and twenty cannons to rendezvous at Rimnik, a small settlement on the Wallachian side of the Hungarian border.<sup>4</sup> On the last day of January, a small

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<sup>1</sup>Letter from Buchanan to Palmerston, February 15, 1849, Origins, op. cit., p. 55-56.

<sup>2</sup>Jenő Horváth, Magyar Diplomácia, p. 61.

<sup>3</sup>Letter from Colquhoun to Canning, January 19, 1849, in Origins, op. cit., p. 22; letter from Buchanan to Palmerston, February 15, 1849, Ibid., p. 55-56.

<sup>4</sup>Letter from Duhamel to Nesselrode, January 22, 1849, Ibid., p. 27-30.

Russian detachment marched through the Tömös Pass thus initiating the first Russian invasion of Hungary.<sup>1</sup> Within a week, their number swelled to over seven thousand.<sup>2</sup> The peoples of Transylvania; Roumanians, Székelys and Saxons, in addition to the horrors of civil war, now had to suffer the presence of foreign troops.

Transylvania's legal status was most dubious in 1848 and early 1849. Emperor Ferdinand had sanctioned the union of Hungary and Transylvania in March 1848, but by autumn it was declared void along with the rest of the constitution. The Hungarian parliament refused to recognize the dissolution of the union and ordered the National Defence Committee to organize the de facto joining of the two dominions. In response, Lieutenant-General Puchner issued a manifesto in which he claimed sole authority in the disputed area. He maintained that his action was justified since the Palatine had left Hungary, the government had resigned, and the National Defence Committee was an illegal body. The Roumanian Bishop Saguna issued a proclamation on October 19, 1848, a day after Puchner's, giving his and his nation's support and

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<sup>1</sup>Jenő Gyalókey, "Az első orosz megszállás Erdélyben", Századok, LVI, 1922, p. 643.

<sup>2</sup>In Vienna the British and the American ambassadors estimated the invasion force at about ten thousand men. Their information seems to be based on a letter sent by Luders to Puchner on January 27, 1849, indicating the approach of a Russian army of 11,200 men. The order, however, was later changed as it is shown by another letter that Luders sent to the Austrian General Schurttner. Apparently this second letter was not received at Vienna, (Correspondence, op. cit., p. 139; William H. Stiles, Austria in 1848-1849, II, New York, 1852, p. 193; Gyalókey, op. cit., p. 649.

loyalty to the Emperor and the General.<sup>1</sup> Thousands of Roumanians joined either Puchner's army corps or Iancu's guerillas in the mountains between Hungary and Transylvania. The imperial troops were also backed by the Saxon National Guard, which as soon as received Puchner's proclamation, began to disarm the Transylvanian Hungarian-speaking population, the Székelys.<sup>2</sup> Within days, 30,000 Székelys revolted and a devastating civil war commenced instantly. The opposing forces occasionally indulged in a war of extermination. Villages were incinerated by the hundreds and women and children were massacred.<sup>3</sup>

Puchner subdued the Székelys with a force of seventeen hundred men. As a result of a pincer operation, Windischgrätz attacking from the west and the north, and

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<sup>1</sup>Endre Kovács, Bem József és a Magyar Szabadságharc, Budapest, 1951, p. 16.

<sup>2</sup>György Spira, A Magyar Forradalom 1848-49-ben, Budapest, 1959, p. 350.

<sup>3</sup>A British agent, E. Grant, estimated that 180 villagers were destroyed and completely devastated. He accused the Hungarians of vandalism. (Letter from Grant to Posonby from Hermanstadt (Nagyszeben), February 9, 1849, Correspondence, op. cit., p. 142). In a later letter Grant reported 300 villages burnt. This time he put the blame on both the Székelys and the Roumanians, (Letter from Grant to Colquhoun from Hermanstadt, February 26, 1849, Origins, op. cit., p. 69-70). One of Bem's gunners spoke of a Saxon and Roumanian anti-Székely rising and the massacre of Hungarian women and children at the villages of Enyed and Zalatna. (Letter from József Szarka to n. n., from Szászmelegyes, January 23, 1849, in Eszter Waldapfel (ed.), A Forradalom És Szabadságharc Levelestára, III, Budapest, 1955, p. 85).

and Puchner pressing the Hungarians from the south and east, the Austrians seemed to be on the verge of winning the war by the end of December, 1848. Puchner, however, used only a small detachment to menace the Hungarian regulars south of Debrecen<sup>1</sup> and concentrated his main strength against the Székelys. The encirclement of the feeble, demoralized army of six thousand men defending Hungary's temporary capital remained incomplete in 1848. In consequence, the recently appointed General Bem could reorganize the regular Transylvanian Magyar Army (T.M.A.), enduring little interference from the Austrians.

Bem fused the national guard units and the regular army battalions and gave extensive but rapid training to his gunners. Discipline was restored. At his new headquarters, Bem introduced himself to his officers with the following pronouncement: "Gentlemen! The government has invested me with full power over this army. I demand of you unconditional obedience. Those who will not obey will be shot. I do not talk about the past. Dismissed."<sup>2</sup> New recruits ar-

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<sup>1</sup>From this state of affairs in the Hungarian camp Gyalókey concluded that, from the military point of view, Puchner's invitation to the Russians was unjustifiable. Gyalókey ignored the fact that the Austrian general had to face a mammoth Székely uprising which he could not subdue before December 25, 1848. While Puchner then was able to face Bem, his resources were still insufficient for the permanent pacification of the Székelys, who actually revived their insurrection as soon as the first news of Bem's victory petered through to their land (Gyalókey, op. cit., p. 646).

<sup>2</sup>Sándor Teleki, Bem's adjutant, cited by Kovács, op. cit., p. 17.

rived daily at his camp. The commander ordered the requisition of arms, ammunition, food and winter clothing and his order was promptly executed. The National Defence Committee sent him the Viennese Legion and other well trained veterans, thus increasing his strength to about 13,000 men.<sup>1</sup>

Puchner sent troops against Bem in the middle of December, but they were repulsed easily by the now powerful T.M.A.<sup>2</sup> On December 20, 1848, Bem launched his first Hungarian campaign about fifty miles southeast of Debrecen. Three days later he defeated the Austrian General Wardener, who was then replaced by Colonel Urban. After a forced march, Bem's tired, hungry and exhausted troops took Kolozsvár (Cluj) on Christmas Day. This move wedged the Hungarians between Puchner and Urban.<sup>3</sup>

After a day's rest, Bem sent a detachment further south to secure his right flank while the host of the T.M.A. sought to destroy Urban's units. During the first week of January, 1849, after Bem defeated them in the Battle of Beszterce, 6,000 Roumanian and Austrian soldiers of the imperial army crossed the Borgo Pass to Bukovina. The Magyars followed them across the border. In Bukovina a final engagement took place at Dorna-Watra. The now demoralized imperial-

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<sup>1</sup>Spira, op. cit., p. 416; William H. Stiles, Austria in 1848-1849, II, New York, 1852, p. 192; Gyalókey, op. cit., p. 628-629 and p. 633; Kovács, op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>2</sup>Spira, op. cit., p. 416.

<sup>3</sup>Kovács, op. cit., p. 18.

ists retreated towards Galicia.<sup>1</sup>

Bem's victory was of major significance. Debrecen was no longer in danger of being crushed by the pincer operation. Both the Magyar armed forces and population reacted to the psychological stimulus that culminated in what Hungarian historians later labelled the Glorious Spring Campaign. The immediate effect was the Székelys' rejuvenated insurrection, that prevented Puchner from giving support to Urban.<sup>2</sup>

From Bukovina, Bem turned southward to unite with the Székelys and to secure southern Transylvania for Hungary. His force amounted then to 9,000 since he had to leave behind a detachment to secure northern Transylvania and to prevent Urban's return. On January 15, Puchner burst upon the advancing Magyars and chased them back through several villages. The next morning Bem counter-attacked. A three-hour battle ensued at Gálfalva. The agile Hungarian artillery units finally forced Puchner to retreat towards the Saxon town, Hermanstadt, giving up Medgyes (Medias) without

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<sup>1</sup>Letter from Posonby to Palmerston, January 17, 1849, Correspondence, op. cit., p. 129; letter from Timoni to Schwarzenberg, January, 1849, Origins, op. cit., p. 22.

<sup>2</sup>Gyalókey blamed Puchner for not menacing Bem's right flank and, thus, missing a good chance of destroying the Transylvanian Magyar Army (Gyalókey, op. cit., 646). He claimed that this had been done because Puchner overestimated Bem's strength. Gyalókey, however, failed to consider the new Székely risings in the counties of Csik and Háromszék, (Molnár, op. cit., p. 528-529). Puchner could not possibly have left the area without jeopardizing the loyalty of the Roumanian and Saxon sections of his corps whose homes were around Háromszék and Csik.

resistance.<sup>1</sup> This new victory gave Bem time to organize the Székelys and to receive new supplies from Nagyvárad or Kolozsvár. By now 11,000 Székelys were in arms ready to join the Transylvanian Magyar Army.<sup>2</sup> General Schurtter, Austrian military commander of Kronstadt (Brassó), had only 800 infantry men, 130 hussars, and five cannons to resist the Székelys and even this small force had decided to seek the protection of Russian and Turkish troops south of the border. Schurtter crossed the Tömös Pass to Wallachia.<sup>3</sup> Bem, nevertheless, made the rash decision of attacking Hermanstadt without the Székelys, without sufficient food and ammunition, and without awaiting the arrival of the detachment he had sent out Christmas Day to cover his right flank. Puchner responded to the Hungarians artillery barrage, which signaled the beginning of the first battle of Hermanstadt, by concentrating cannon fire against the enemy's left flank, where his infantry also broke through with a bayonet charge after seven hours of bloody fighting. By 8:30 p.m., on January 21, the Hungarian army was routed.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Letter from József Szarka to n.n., from Szászmedgyes, January 23, 1849, Waldapfel, III, op. cit., p. 84; letter from F. Domahidi to M. Domahidi, from Nagy Szelindek, January 27, 1849, Ibid., p. 89.

<sup>2</sup>Spira, op. cit., p. 417.

<sup>3</sup>Letter from Duhamel to Nesselrode, January 22, 1849, Origins, op. cit., p. 27-30; letter from Colquhoun to Canning, January 24, 1849, ibid., p. 34.

<sup>4</sup>Letter from Posonby to Palmerston, February 3, 1849, Correspondence, op. cit., p. 132-133; letter from Duhamel to Titov, February, 1849, Origins, op. cit., p. 32-33; Waldapfel, III, p. 91-92.



On January 31, Russian commander Engelhardt entered Transylvania from Turkish Wallachia to re-occupy Kronstadt with Schurttter. At first he had no more than two rifle companies plus one hundred Cossacks, and another group of 115 Cossacks which joined him during the night.<sup>1</sup> Russian General Skariatin also crossed the border with two and a half battalions, 120 Cossacks and three-quarters of an artillery battery, a total of about 2,200 men, to support Puchner at Hermanstadt.<sup>2</sup> Seven infantry companies and one artillery battery followed this advance guard in the next two days.<sup>3</sup> While Puchner, Skariatin and Hermanstadt's civic leaders celebrated the arrival of friendly troops in the elegant Törökcsárda Inn, news reached the allies that Bem was planning a new attack in conjunction with the Székelys.<sup>4</sup> Puchner immediately led his troops against the artillery-protected entrenchments of Bem only to be repulsed and pursued in the direction of their place of departure. Skariatin succeeded in rallying the Austrian troops and subsequently defeating the T.M.A., which still fought without reinforcements.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Gyalókey, op. cit., p. 643.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from Timoni to Schwarzenberg, February 6, 1849, Origins, op. cit., p. 46; Gyalókey, op. cit., p. 649.

<sup>3</sup>Gyalókey, op. cit., p. 643 and p. 645.

<sup>4</sup>Austrian Army Bulletin, Correspondence, op. cit., p.141.

<sup>5</sup>(Letter from Colquhoun to Canning, February 9, 1849, ibid., p. 141.) Colquhoun's report was confirmed by Russian and Turkish authorities in Bucharest. The Austrian government tried to conceal from the public Russian participation in the fighting around Hermanstadt. The official army bulletin mentioned only Puchner's cunning strategy in the Battle of Vizakna (Salzburg), (Ibid., p. 140-141.)

On this day of February 4, another confrontation took place between Russian and Hungarian troops. The Székely irregulars of Colonel Sándor Gál attacked the first Roumanian Infantry Frontier Regiment near Kronstadt. General Engelhardt promptly gave the support of his detachment to the Roumanians. The help was considerable since he commanded a force of 2,400 men. After heavy fighting, the Székelys withdrew.<sup>1</sup> The two Russian interventionary forces, therefore, gave active support to the Austrian army in Transylvania, defeating Bem and the Székelys simultaneously.

The second stage of the first Russian intervention was the liberation of most Austrian forces from garrison duties for an aggressive campaign against the T.M.A. Skariatín and Engelhardt occupied Hermanstadt and Kronstadt thus securing Puchner's flank. In so doing they kept the Székelys at bay as well as ensured the line of communication via Wallachia with the Serbian front.

After his defeat, Bem continued to retreat westward in order to contact the Army of Southern Hungary and receive reinforcements from it. This was realized when at Dés 3,000 soldiers were placed at his disposal.<sup>2</sup> On February 9, Puchner had to face a reinforced enemy at Piski. The result was disastrous for the imperial troops, who suffered the loss of approximately one thousand men.<sup>3</sup> An Austrian infantry regiment

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<sup>1</sup> Gyalókey, op. cit., p. 626.

<sup>2</sup> Molnár, op. cit., p. 531.

<sup>3</sup> Letter from Grant to Posonby, February 15, 1849, Origins, op. cit., p. 51.

was almost totally cut to pieces.<sup>1</sup> Puchner had to return to Hermanstadt with only 7,452 active fighters.<sup>2</sup>

While the Battle of Piski was raging, Luders sent four companies of Uhlans to Engelhardt in Kronstadt. On February 10, Engelhardt commanded a force of four and a half infantry battalions, four companies of Uhlans, 215 Cossacks and two sapper companies, a total of 4,800 men. The allied forces were to secure Kronstadt from an expected attack by 14,000 Székely irregulars. To improve his precarious situation, which grossly deteriorated with the departure of most Austrian troops for the support of their hard-pressed comrades nearby, Engelhardt requested an extra battalion from Luders to retake and secure Hétfalu, a village between Kronstadt and the Wallachian border.<sup>3</sup>

On February 12, Urban returned to Transylvania from Bukovina. At the Borgó Pass he quickly overpowered the troops left behind by Bem for the defence of northern Transylvania. The Austrian troops tried to cut Bem's line of communication with Debrecen and endeavoured to assist Puchner and the Russians.<sup>4</sup> The host of the Transylvanian Magyar Army, which in the interim had marched from Piski to Medgyes for the purpose of absorbing Székely irregular units, sent a

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<sup>1</sup>Stiles, op. cit., p. 193; letter from Kossúth to Teleki, February 24, 1849, Correspondence, op. cit., p. 164.

<sup>2</sup>Gyalókey, op. cit., p. 649.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 651-653.

<sup>4</sup>Letter from Posonby to Palmerston, Vienna, March 1, 1849, Correspondence, op. cit., p. 164.

detachment against Urban. The imperialists were expelled to Bukovina for a second time, without any interference whatsoever from Puchner.<sup>1</sup> To make his victory permanent, Bem actually resettled a Székely colony on the border junction of Bukovina, Moldavia and Transylvania.<sup>2</sup>

On March 2, all the imperial troops were assembled at the Great Square of Hermanstadt. A delegation, just arrived from Austria, brought along medals, certificates of promotions, and the personal gratitude of the new emperor, Francis Joseph. With the delegation came one of Field-Marshal Windischgrätz's staff officers. He devised a plan of attack which later proved to be disastrous for the allies.<sup>3</sup> From the Great Square the Austrian corps left for Medgyes. Bem, who had just returned to Medgyes from northern Transylvania at the head of his victorious detachment, was immediately attacked by Puchner's newly motivated troops. The Austrians forced the Magyars to evacuate Medgyes, but instead of pursuing them, Puchner made a southeasterly detour to prevent a convergence of the Székelys and the T.M.A. Puchner's move created a no-man's-land between Medgyes and Hermanstadt and even the Székelys managed to join Bem, swelling his ranks considerably. Bem immediately took advantage of the situation and turned against the main

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<sup>1</sup> Spira, op. cit., p. 421.

<sup>2</sup> Kovács, op. cit., p. 25.

<sup>3</sup> Letter from Grant to Colquhoun, March 2, 1849, Origins, op. cit., p. 73.

Austro-Russian bulwark, Hermanstadt, leaving Puchner around Segesvár--in search of him.<sup>1</sup>

The alarm for the troops was sounded on the evening of March 10, at Hermanstadt. One and a half Russian battalions with eight Austrian guns marched out of the town in the direction of Vizakna. Skariatín, who presumed that Bem was pursued by Puchner, sallied forth from his headquarters eager to participate in the crushing of the enemy. Next morning the rest of his troops, one and a half battalions, six mortars and three hundred Cossacks, also left for Vizakna. There, an artillery duel developed between the opposing forces. The interventionary troops, outnumbered at a ratio of two to one, held their ground until late afternoon, at which time they decided to evacuate Hermanstadt. Bem established outposts at Schellenburg, a suburb of the town, and made his headquarters at the residence of the burgomaster, who three weeks earlier had set a price on his head. The allied forces and the Burger Guard retreated to Nagytalmács, a village located about ten miles off the Wallachian border.<sup>2</sup>

Puchner's troops arrived just in time to witness the evacuation of Hermanstadt. After the long march from Segesvár, the imperial troops were in no shape to give momentum to a counter-attack. Skariatín, whose troops had been

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<sup>1</sup>Letter from Luders to Nesselrode, March 6, 1849, ibid., p. 83-84; letter from Colquhoun to Canning, Bucharest, March 9, 1849, ibid., p. 80.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from Colquhoun to Palmerston, March 14 and 16, 1849, Correspondence, op. cit., p. 169-170; Stiles, II, op. cit., p. 194; Gyálókay, op. cit., p. 654.

engaged in battle with the T.M.A. for about sixteen hours, could not possibly contemplate any new offensive tactic. Then, suddenly, panic seized the Austrians, and their number dwindled from 8,000 to 2,000.<sup>1</sup> Apparently, the Roumanian and Saxon recruits decided to return to their Transylvanian villages.

Kalliani, who replaced the ailing Puchner, received Engelhardt's urgent request for reinforcements accompanied with the threat that unless more troops were sent he would be forced to abandon Kronstadt. Skariatin also demanded support for the defence of Nagytalmács. The Russians received help from a nearby Austrian detachment, but the two battalions Kalliani sent could not reach him because the bridges of the intervening Olt River were already in the hands of the Hungarians. Then, Bem attacked Nagytalmács. On March 15, Skariatin's expeditionary army was forced to withdraw from Transylvania.<sup>2</sup> Two weeks later, when the Russians tried to reoccupy the Vöröstorony Pass, the T.M.A. defeated them and pursued the enemy through Turkish territory, inflicting heavy casualties on Skariatin's troops.<sup>3</sup>

Meanwhile, Engelhardt was waiting in Kronstadt for

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<sup>1</sup>Stiles, II, op. cit., p. 194; Horváth, Történeti Szemle, V, op. cit., p. 68.

<sup>2</sup>Gyalókey, op. cit., p. 655-657.

<sup>3</sup>Letter from Colquhoun to Palmerston, April 3, 1849, Correspondence, op. cit., p. 176.

Kalliani. When he saw the tired, hungry and ragged troops arriving--Kalliani's detachment was beaten in the Battle of Feketehalom a day before--he decided against holding Kronstadt.<sup>1</sup> The Austrians bivouacked in the neighbourhood of Kronstadt expecting new battle the next day. An hour before daybreak they received intelligence of the Russian evacuation and were ordered to follow them. On March 20, both Kalliani's and Engelhardt's forces left for Turkish Wallachia.<sup>2</sup>

The defeat of the allies, apart from tactical considerations, was the direct outcome of conflicting opinions within the Austrian government and the covert manipulation of the generals in Transylvania. Their intrigues were done half-heartedly in fear of reprimand, and even more, in apprehension of provoking a general European upheaval. This timidity of the generals ultimately prevented the Russian military command from giving massive support to the Transylvanian imperial forces.

To seek the aid of the Russian army for settling the civil war in Hungary and Transylvania was then contrary to the policies of the Viennese government. Prince Schwarzenberg actually attempted to unshackle Austrian policies from Russian dictates.<sup>3</sup> Bach, Stadion, Krauss and even ex-Prime

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<sup>1</sup>Letter from Buol to Schwarzenberg, April 6, 1849, Origins, op. cit., p. 107-108.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from Colquhoun to Canning, March 28, 1849, ibid., p. 97.

<sup>3</sup>A. Schwarzenberg, Prince Felix Zu Schwarzenberg, New York, 1946, p. 203.

Minister Wessenberg, lined up behind this policy. "If help is requested from Russia by the Austrian government itself," retorted General Wendel to Windischgrätz's demand for tsarist intervention, "then it would mean the latter's complete moral defeat, its admission of its impotence before all of Europe, and it would be justified only as a last measure, that is, only if the existence of the Monarchy would be threatened. However, we are far from that."<sup>1</sup> But in January, both General Puchner and General Hammerstein, military governor of Bukovina and Galicia, urged the government to call in the Russians. Windischgrätz endorsed the generals' request.<sup>2</sup>

At the cabinet meeting of January 12, the Prime Minister informed his colleagues of the deterioration of imperial military fortunes, and of Bem's "alleged" invasion of Bukovina and threat to Galicia. Schwarzenberg pronounced himself against using this "questionable" news for justifying a Russian intervention, since, in his estimation, the rebels would not be greeted by the population of Bukovina and Galicia. He also felt sure that Hammerstein could handle such an eventuality in concert with Urban and Puchner.<sup>3</sup>

"Osterreich ist stark genug um den inneren Feind mit eigenen

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<sup>1</sup>Minutes of the March 29th cabinet meeting, cited by Andics, op. cit., p. 120.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 112.

<sup>3</sup>Minutes of the January 12th cabinet meeting, excerpts, Origins, op. cit., p.17.



Mitteln zu bekämpfen", wrote the Prime Minister to Puchner.<sup>1</sup> He also communicated the cabinet's decision to Hammerstein, and added that an invitation for intervention would be a "fatal step".<sup>2</sup> This anti-interventionist stand of the Austrian government was re-stated over and over again. On January 2, January 12, March 23 and March 29, the cabinet passed resolutions against the seeking of active assistance from Russia.<sup>3</sup>

Once the intervention in Transylvania had become a fact, Schwarzenberg tried to minimize and reverse it. On February 16, Medem, the Russian ambassador to Austria, informed Nesselrode that: "A la demande du Prince Schwarzenberg j'en préviens le lieutenant-General Luders par l'officier qui va être expédié ce soir en Transylvania".<sup>4</sup> In his letter to Puchner, the Prince explicitly instructed the general that if it were the case that the intervention was already in process, he must: firstly, brief the government; secondly, advise the Russian commander that the invitation was extended without the knowledge of the Austrian government; and thirdly, that the cabinet would immediately take diplo-

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<sup>1</sup>Letter from Schwarzenberg to Puchner, January 20, 1849, Andics, op. cit., p. 314.

<sup>2</sup>Andics, op. cit., p. 112.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 117; ibid., p. 120.

<sup>4</sup>Letter from Medem to Nesselrode, February 16, 1849, ibid., p. 317.

matic steps for the withdrawal of Russian detachments from Transylvania.<sup>1</sup>

Vienna was most determined to avoid international complications. Palmerston had threatened to use the British fleet at Sicily on behalf of the Italians. The Western Powers were soon to gather at Brussels to decide the fate of Italy.<sup>2</sup> On February 7, Count Sturmer, Austria's ambassador to the Porte, expressed his anxiety over the possibility of a French-English-Turkish combined action to counter the disregard of Turkish neutrality and the Russian invasion of Transylvania.<sup>3</sup> It was felt that Austria should not aggravate France and England any further.

There was also the public to be considered. Schwarzenberg told Medem in January that the appearance of Russian troops in the Empire would be very awkward, and would make a "painful impression" on the various nationalities that constituted the dominions of Francis Joseph. Even the Austrian press was divided on the issue. It feared the possible high price that Austria might have to pay in real estate for Russia's interference in the civil war in Hungary.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Letter from Schwarzenberg to Puchner, January 20, 1849, ibid., p. 313.

<sup>2</sup>Waldapfel, A Független Magyar Külpolitika, 1848-1849, op. cit., p. 155-156.

<sup>3</sup>Horváth, Történeti Szemle, V, p. 73.

<sup>4</sup>K. I., "Paskievics Magyarországon", Budapesti Szemle, XCIX, Budapest, 1899, p. 221.

Schwarzenberg's resoluteness was constantly tempered by the military situation in Hungary, Transylvania and Italy. In March, the Magyar Army began its spring offensive and Bem already dominated the Transylvanian theatre-of-war. The Austrian army had 780,000 men but many of these troops were poorly armed or were just undergoing training. Others were doing garrison duty in scattered parts of the Empire. Ten thousand soldiers were hospitalized in Italy. None of the Magyar troops could be used in Hungary or Transylvania.<sup>1</sup> The Austrian government, nevertheless, wanted only material aid from Russia during the early months of 1849.<sup>2</sup>

At the end of March and early April, changes in the internal and international situation forced, and also enabled, the Austrian government to reverse its anti-interventionist stand. Radetzky's victory at Novara and the postponement of the Brussels Conference assured Vienna that there would not be repercussions in case of Austro-Russian military cooperation in Hungary and Transylvania. London, Paris and Berlin flinched from a possible disintegration of the Austrian Empire. Their governments were willing to tolerate or support a speedy termination of the civil war--even at the cost of Russian involvement. On April 12, 1849, thus, the Austrian government could endorse an urgent appeal to Tsar Nicholas I for armed support against the Hungarians who once again threatened the imperial

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<sup>1</sup> Andics, op. cit., p. 117.

<sup>2</sup> Letter from Buol to Nesselrode, February 14, 1849, Origins, op. cit., p. 52.

city, Vienna.<sup>1</sup> The stakes had become too high to tolerate any further vacillation.

The generals showed little understanding of the quickly changing European scene. Puchner had plotted against his government's foreign policy in regard to a Russian intervention. He had started unauthorized negotiations with Luders as early as October 31, 1848. When a Saxon-Roumanian committee of Hermanstadt decided to petition for Russian assistance, the Austrian generals stood aside approvingly. Lieutenant-General Pfersmann advised this committee that the imperial army could not secure their safety, therefore, he could not but approve their initiative and he himself would make a similar recommendation to his superiors. In Kronstadt, another Saxon Roumanian committee was formed to plead for Russian protection.<sup>2</sup> Colonel Barron Stutterheim, commander of Kronstadt, sent a letter with a plea of his own to Engelhardt. The Baron warmly supported the committee's entreaty. The two towns then sent delegations to Bucharest, where the Russian headquarters was located.<sup>3</sup>

When the military situation began to deteriorate, Puchner called a war council to debate the question of intervention. The generals, at first, voted against involving the Russians in the civil war. Just before the meeting closed, the news of Stutterheim's evacuation of Kronstadt had arrived. The war council which feared that the Székelys now might cut the last open com-

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<sup>1</sup>Mihály Horváth, Magyarország Függetlenségi Harczának Történeti 1848 és 1849-Ben, Budapest, n.d., p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>Horváth, Történeti Szemle, V, p. 56 - 62.

<sup>3</sup>Gyalókey, op. cit., p. 635.

munication lines, reversed its decision.<sup>1</sup> Puchner commissioned a major to transmit the minutes of the war council of January 20 to Lüders. Schurtter also asked the Russian commander for support without authorization from either Puchner or the government. Major Reichetzer later sanctioned Schurtter's action in the name of Puchner. General Luders, nevertheless, wanted an official invitation from Puchner himself, who was the Emperor's civil and military governor in Transylvania. The most he could get was a document signed by Lieutenant-General Pfersmann, since Puchner was conveniently absent from Hermanstadt.<sup>2</sup> General Luders finally ordered his troops to cross the border without the proper authorization. On February 2, Puchner informed the Russian commander that he did not need any armed support, but two days later he asked Skariatin to double the interventionary forces, although Schwarzenberg's instructions were already in his hands.<sup>3</sup>

Field-Marshal Hammerstein was just as anxious as Puchner to invoke the active support of the Russian army. When the news of Bem's intrusion into Bukovina reached Galicia, he ordered the closing of clubs, the surrendering of all weapons and the rounding up of all suspicious elements. Galicia was in a state of siege.<sup>4</sup> The frightened marshal immediately dispatched a letter to Shcheodaev, commander of the Fourth Russian Corps, soliciting

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<sup>1</sup>Letter from Puchner to Schwarzenberg, March, 1849, Origins, op. cit., p. 23-24.

<sup>2</sup>Gyalókey, op. cit., p. 639-643.

<sup>3</sup>Letter from Timoni to Schwarzenberg, February 6, 1849, Origins, op. cit., p. 46.

<sup>4</sup>Andics, op. cit., p. 94.

succour.<sup>1</sup>

The Austrian generals, although aware of the possible consequences of a Russian intervention, chose to ignore Schwarzenberg's efforts at settling the civil war without the participation of a third power. Their adventurousness was not just the result of the military situation in Transylvania, but also the hope of shifting the government towards a more radical, anti-parliamentary, centralist internal policy. Without a quick termination of the civil war, concessions would have had to be made to nationalities of the Habsburg Empire. The anti-federalists feared that, once concessions were given, the army would cease to be the basic pillar of the Monarchy. They mistrusted Schwarzenberg, who in November 1848, still spoke of a constitutional monarchy as Austria's future form of government.<sup>2</sup> General Haynau, military and civil governor of Hungary, also disapproved of the government's "softness", because he had been ordered to cancel the mass execution of Hungarian prisoners.<sup>3</sup>

Tsar Nicholas I, although anxious to eliminate the Polish-supported Kossúth regime, did not want to lend assistance to an Austrian government of liberal tendencies. On November 22, 1848, Nesselrode sent a confidential message to Medem. The ambassador was instructed to collect informa-

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<sup>1</sup>K. I., Budapesti Szemle, XCIX, op. cit., p. 220.

<sup>2</sup>Andics, op. cit., p. 94.

<sup>3</sup>Letter from Haynau to Radetzky, August 25, 1849, Lajos Steier (ed.), Beniczky Lajos, Budapest, 1924, p. 191-192.

tion concerning the political orientation of the new Viennese government. He was authorized to make general promises without actually committing St. Petersburg in support of Schwarzenberg.<sup>1</sup> Leading circles in Russia were averse to any large scale intervention on behalf of Austria. When Shcheodaev's chief-of-staff assured Hammerstein of the Tsar's expected military aid, he was promptly jailed by Prince Paskevich.<sup>2</sup> The chief of Russia's political police contended that during a campaign in Hungary the army would be contaminated with revolution on contact with the rebels. Many of the ministers argued against an intervention because of the high financial burden it would impose on the coffers of Russia.<sup>3</sup> Nesselrode was also ill at ease since news had come from Constantinople indicating possible English and Turkish resistance.<sup>4</sup>

Nicholas I's reluctant attitude soon crystallized into a new strategy. The Russian government offered limited armed support to the Austrian army. As soon as Transylvania was invaded, the St. Petersburg chancellery embarked on a diplomatic campaign to reassure the interested European powers of Russia's circumscribed objectives. Nesselrode

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<sup>1</sup>Letter from Nesselrode to Medem, November 22, 1848, Andics, op. cit., p. 283-284.

<sup>2</sup>K. I., Budapesti Szemle, V, p. 220.

<sup>3</sup>Andics, op. cit., p. 110.

<sup>4</sup>Jenő Horváth, Magyar Diplomácia, op. cit., p. 62; Waldapfel, op. cit., p. 156.

sent a circular to all his foreign agents. The circular emphasized that, "... the entrance of some troops into Transylvania was only influenced by motives of humanity, and that the matter was exclusively local, without any sort of connection with armed intervention in the interior affairs of the empire of Austria."<sup>1</sup>

Russian authorities in the Principalities constantly pressured St. Petersburg to sanction military support for Puchner. General Duhamel wrote that the victorious Windischgrätz was forcing the Hungarians to retreat towards Transylvania, and a critical moment was approaching when the cornered Magyars would have no other alternative but to invade Wallachia or Moldavia. Such an invasion would, according to the general, rejuvenate the rebellion in the Danubian Principalities.<sup>2</sup> General Duhamel also tried to convince the Turks of the feasibility of a combined operation against the Magyars.<sup>3</sup> His subordinates interpreted his policies correctly. On December 11, 1848, General Engelhardt occupied the Tömös Pass on the Wallachian-Transylvanian border.<sup>4</sup> Later, General Luders launched the invasion without

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<sup>1</sup>The complete text of the Circular is published in Stiles, op. cit., II, p. 408.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from Duhamel to Nesselrode, January 11, 1849, Origins, p. 27-30.

<sup>3</sup>Letter from Colquhoun to Palmerston, January 2, 1849, Correspondence, op. cit., p. 134.

<sup>4</sup>Jenő Horváth, op. cit., p. 62.



the Austrians having fulfilled the Tsar's conditions for such aid.<sup>1</sup>

When, on January 24, 1849, it was discovered that Puchner had had no authorization to request Russian military aid, Kotzebue, the Tsar's consul in Bucharest, tried to stop Luders.<sup>2</sup> Medem, who was aware of Austria's negative position concerning the intervention, demanded the recall of the Russian troops from Transylvania.<sup>3</sup> "Duhamel appears to be shaken by Fuad's firmness", wrote Stratford Canning to Palmerston, "and half glad that the Hungarians are strong enough to make the Russians on the frontier hesitate."<sup>4</sup> This hesitation and the order for only a limited intervention greatly contributed to the humiliation and defeat of the allies by the Transylvanian Magyar Army. British and French diplomats in the area also had their part in making the Russians vacillate and delay the mass invasion of Transylvania--at least temporarily.

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<sup>1</sup>Nicholas' order to Luders was as follows: ". . .les considerations politiques . . . ont obligé S. M. de me donner l'ordre de ne prêter ce secours que dans le cas de la plus pressante nécessité et à la demande expresse et formelle du Commandant Autrichien. . . Les ordres que j'ai reçus à ce sujet de S. M. sont très positives et ne me laissent aucune alternative d'en agir autrement." The letter was received on January 21, 1849, (Gyalókey, op. cit., p. 637).

<sup>2</sup>Jenő Horváth, op. cit., p. 63.

<sup>3</sup>Letter from Timoni to Schwarzenberg, March 2, 1849, Origins, op. cit., p. 282.

<sup>4</sup>Letter from Canning to Palmerston, February 5, 1849, ibid., p. 45.

For the thirty-five years before 1849, England had always relied on Metternich's policy of keeping the Russians at check in the Principalities. The Treaty of London (1841) weakened Russia's position achieved earlier through the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. The Russian government, nevertheless, would not accept either the terms of the Baltaliman Commercial Convention of 1838, or the provisions of the Strait Convention of 1841 as applicable to Moldavia or Wallachia. When, in 1844, Nicholas visited Queen Victoria, Aberdeen promised to view Moldavia and Wallachia as de facto Russian territories and guaranteed the non-application of the Baltaliman Convention in the area. In compensation, Nesselrode committed himself: firstly, to the de jure recognition of Turkish sovereignty over the Principalities; secondly, to the freedom of Danubian commerce; thirdly, that Russia would not formally annex or unjustly occupy Wallachia or Moldavia. Stratford Canning and Colquhoun were not aware of the secret Aberdeen-Nesselrode Memorandum of 1844.<sup>1</sup> At the time of the 1848-1849 crisis, thus, a discrepancy existed between the attitudes of Palmerston and his representatives.

Colquhoun, British general-consul in Bucharest, constantly encouraged the local authorities to protest Russia's violation of Turkish neutrality. He sheltered the

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<sup>1</sup>Florescu, The Slavonic and East European Review, XLIII, p. 47-59.

leaders of the defeated Wallachian uprising and even sent money to the anti-Russian émigrés. Through his agent, Effingham Grant, the consul contacted General Bem and later sent another agent to Szeged, the temporary seat of the Hungarian government.<sup>1</sup> It was Grant's assignment to find out whether the Russian forces actively participated in the civil war, or if they were "only" protecting Hermanstadt and Kronstadt from the Székelys.<sup>2</sup> Once the interventionary nature of Transylvania's invasion was communicated to Canning, the ambassador protested at the Porte in concert with General Aupick, the French ambassador.<sup>3</sup> In a private letter to Palmerston, Canning suggested that "... the appearance of a combined squadron in these latitudes would probably set all to right."<sup>4</sup>

Viscount Palmerston, Russell's foreign secretary, might have had sympathies for the Hungarians,<sup>5</sup> but he still claimed that in the frame of the European state-system it

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<sup>1</sup>Jenő Horváth, "Bem tábornok és a bukaresti külképviseletek", Hadtörténeti Közlemények, V, Budapest, 1927, p. 383.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from Bem to the commander of Beszterce, Origins, op. cit., p. 80.

<sup>3</sup>Summarized and archive identified, ibid., p. 30.

<sup>4</sup>Letter from Canning to Palmerston, February 5, 1849, ibid., p. 45-46.

<sup>5</sup>Anthony Ashley, The Life and Correspondence of Henry J. T. Viscount Palmerston, III, London, 1879, p. 103.

would be impossible to replace Austria by small states.<sup>1</sup>

Palmerston feared Russia; the route of the Grande Armée and the entry of Alexander I into Paris remained unforgotten.<sup>2</sup> England had never vehemently protested the occupation of the Principalities since it was felt in London that Russia was in the area to save Austria from collapse. The Austrian policies of Palmerston and Nesselrode ran along similar lines but their vigorous execution was hindered by mutual fear and mistrust. As early as August 1848, an English diplomatic agent, sympathetic to the Magyar cause, sent this warning to his friends: "Bear in mind that more than one Foreign Government is striving to bolster up Austria in order to prevent unity of Germany and would be glad to see Hungary conquered by Radetzky and Windischgrätz."<sup>3</sup> Palmerston urged Schwarzenberg to exploit the Russian occupation of the Principalities and worry about withdrawal later.<sup>4</sup> Canning was instructed to discourage firm Turkish protestation concerning the violation of her neutrality,<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Charles Sproxton, Palmerston and the Hungarian Revolution, Cambridge, 1919, p. 12-13.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>3</sup>Letter from Blackwall to Szalay, August 5, 1848, "Documents: Anglo-Hungarian Documents, 1841-1850", South Eastern Affairs, I, 1931, p. 199.

<sup>4</sup>Horváth, Történeti Szemle, V, op. cit., p. 72.

<sup>5</sup>Letter from Palmerston to Canning, March 20, 1849, Origins, op. cit., p. 91.

and stop sending agents or correspondents to the forces in Hungary and Transylvania.<sup>1</sup> The reluctant ambassador was told plainly that ". . . it cannot be expected that the Russians should evacuate the Turkish Provinces until the civil war in Hungary shall have been brought to successful termination by the Russians."<sup>2</sup>

France's representative in the area conducted a moderate anti-Russian diplomacy. Ségur, the French consul in Bucharest, encouraged the Turks to protest the violation of their guaranteed neutrality, but at the same time warned them to exercise discretion.<sup>3</sup> Earlier, Ségur had remonstrated ineffectually in concert with the Prussian consul against the entrance of Russian troops into Moldavia.<sup>4</sup> The French Minister in Constantinople could only play second fiddle to Canning. What Napoleon III needed was internal consolidation and diplomatic recognition of his regime. An aggressive and independent foreign policy might have pleased French public opinion but not the European powers. The French cabinet nevertheless, inquired in London about intended steps against Russia. They were informed about England's strictly enforced non-interference policy in Tran-

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<sup>1</sup>Letter from Palmerston to Canning, April 23, 1849, Ibid., p. 122.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from Palmerston to Canning, April 6, 1849, Ibid., p. 112.

<sup>3</sup>Jenő Horvath, Magyar Diplomácia, op. cit., p. 63.

<sup>4</sup>"Documents", South Eastern Affairs, I, op. cit., p.197.

sylvania and the Danubian Principalities.<sup>1</sup> France decided to keep the peace. When the Russian chargé d'affaires delivered Nesselrode's circular on the intervention, it was received with complacency by the French foreign minister.<sup>2</sup>

The Sultan was alert enough to see the writing on the wall. Since France and England had refused to support any firm anti-Russian stand, Turkey was left with no other possibility but an alliance and reluctant cooperation with the Russians. The Baltaliman Treaty that was contracted between Russia and Turkey on May 1, 1849, was preceded by a year of Turkish manipulations to hinder Russian expansion in south-eastern Europe.

In 1848, the Turkish commissioner recognized the Wallachian revolutionary government on its formation. The move was inspired by Stratford Canning.<sup>3</sup> Once Nicholas I forcibly involved the Sultan in the oppression of the revolution, the Porte negotiated a peaceful takeover of government with the Roumanians.<sup>4</sup> From the late summer of 1848

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<sup>1</sup>Sproxton, op. cit., p. 99.

<sup>2</sup>Zoltán Horváth, Teleki László: 1810-1861, I, Budapest, 1964, p. 274.

<sup>3</sup>Florescu, The Slavonic and East European Review, XLIII, p. 58.

<sup>4</sup>Michael Roller, The Opening of an Era, Fejtő (ed.), op. cit., p. 307.

there were two administrations in the Principalities: a Turkish and a Russian. This inevitably led to friction. The new Turkish commissioner, Fuad Effendi, for example, wanted to disarm all foreign troops crossing from Transylvania to Wallachia or Moldavia, but General Luders intended to disarm only the Hungarians.<sup>1</sup>

Early in January, 1849, the delegations from Kronstadt and Hermanstadt arrived at Bucharest.<sup>2</sup> They petitioned both the Russians and the Turks for armed support. General Duhamel was happy to receive them and soon suggested a Turko-Russian combined operation against the Székelys. Fuad categorically refused the approaches of Duhamel and the delegations.<sup>3</sup> He was very indignant at the quet-a-pens into which his Russian colleague seemed desirous of inveigling him.<sup>4</sup> It became clear to Fuad that the Russians were quite eager to interfere in the savage civil war raging in Transyl-

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<sup>1</sup>Fuad informed Timoni, Austrian consul-general, that: ". . . l'hospitalité que les lois de l'humanité nous font un devoir de ne leur refuser, mais en temps de proceder immédiatement au désarmement de tous ceux qui se presenteraient armés." (Letter from Fuad to Timoni, December 23, 1848, Origins, op. cit., p. 7). General Duhamel wrote the following to Timoni on the same day: ". . . désarmer les Székeleys et toute autre bande armée, qui viendraient chercher un refuge sur le territoire des Principautés." (Letter from Duhamel to Timoni, December 23, 1848, ibid.).

<sup>2</sup>Supra, p. 24.

<sup>3</sup>Letter from Colquhoun to Canning, January 19, 1849, Origins, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>4</sup>Letter from Colquhoun to Canning, January 5, 1849, ibid., p. 13.

vania. Encouraged by Colquhoun and Ségur, the commissioner declared that the measure of one friendly power invading another friendly country through neutral Turkey is ". . . so grave in its consequences that it cannot receive the assent of the representative of the Ottoman Empire."<sup>1</sup> When Count Sturmer, Austrian ambassador in Constantinople, protested at the Porte against Fuad Effendi's pro-Hungarian attitude, he was promptly informed that this slander was nothing else but the "hateful invention of the Russians".<sup>2</sup> At this point, Russian-Turkish relations deteriorated to such a low level that there was a small skirmish in Bucharest between their troops.<sup>3</sup>

Once Bem had defeated the Austro-Russian allied forces, it was feared that the theatre of war might be re-located at Wallachia. The Porte, unable to secure firm British and French support for its Wallachian policies, decided to cooperate with the Russians. To secure a safe hinterland for the Tsar's troops, who were just preparing to invade Transylvania for the second time, Russia gave Little Wallachia to Turkey.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Letter from Fuad to Duhamel, January 24, 1849, ibid., p. 32.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from Sturmer to Schwarzenberg, February 7, 1849, ibid., p. 48-50.

<sup>3</sup>Letter from Colquhoun to Palmerston, February 26, 1849, ibid., p. 68.

<sup>4</sup>Letter from Canning to Palmerston, April 11, 1849, ibid., p. 114.



The first Russian intervention in Transylvania was the illegitimate child of the Austrian and Russian commanders on the scene. These men were a step ahead of their governments which, in the given situation, tried not to irritate France and England with the involvement of the Turkish territories in the civil war in Hungary and Transylvania. Prince Schwarzenberg made continuous efforts to keep the Russians at a safe distance and to put affairs in order at home. This he sought to accomplish with Austrian participation only.

The worries of Tsar Nicholas I began and ended in the Polish provinces. Early in 1849, the European revolutionary movements had already begun to wane. Windischgrätz appeared to be on the verge of suppressing Hungary. Under the circumstances, both Vienna and St. Petersburg were anxious to keep the peace in the Danubian Principalities whose neutrality they had earlier guaranteed in concert with England and France.

The illegitimate child, however, turned out to be a feeble creature. The representatives of France and England, first in an effort to prevent and later to terminate the intervention, managed to present the illusion that their countries were at the point of taking upon themselves the task of expelling those who sought to violate Turkey's neutrality. The bluff worked just long enough to prevent the Russians from giving massive aid to their ally. It also enabled, or rather forced, Nesselrode and Schwarzenberg to explain the

events in Transylvania as a humanitarian police action. By the time the Russian and Austrian chancelleries discovered the disconcert between Palmerston and Stratford Canning, it was too late. The energetic General Bem, by expelling the interventionary forces from Transylvania, had saved all concerned from embarrassment except the defeated Austrian and Russian generals.

From the military point of view, there were two important conclusions to be drawn. First, the Hungarians had proven themselves far too strong to be subdued with small contingents. In the event of future confrontation with Hungary, a mass intervention would have to be executed. Secondly, since Austria and Russia had proved themselves incapable of fruitful military cooperation, it could be seen that in the event of renewed allied action each country would have to retain control over their own troops. Prince Paskevich, the head of Russia's Active Army, kept in mind these two lessons as a new invasion of Hungary and Transylvania reached the planning stage.

### CHAPTER THREE

#### PASKEVICH IN HUNGARY

Kápolna, a small agricultural town, lies between Budapest and Debrecen. There is a marsh south of the town and in the north the ground begins to rise. These hills witnessed, on February 26, 1849, what Field Marshal Windischgrätz then considered the last decisive battle of the civil war. After two days of battle, in which close to 80,000 soldiers participated, the Hungarian army was<sup>1</sup> defeated.

The imperial cabinet received the news with great satisfaction and decided to initiate an offensive on the political front as well. The Austrian Constitutional Assembly, the last powerless relic of the Viennese revolution, was dissolved. Schwarzenberg and his colleagues presented the Empire with a constitution of their own design. Austria became a unitary, centralized state with certain liberal features: an imperial parliament; a responsible government; equality before the law. Hungary was divided into new provinces according to nationality. The ancient Kingdom ceased to exist as a political entity - at least on paper. The constitution was promulgated on March 4, 1849.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> J. D. Breit, Magyarország 1848/49. -évi Függetlenségi Harcának Katonai Története I, Budapest, 1929, p. 270-289.

<sup>2</sup> D. Papp, (ed.), Okmánytár Magyarország Függetlenségi Harcának Történetéhez, 1848-49, II, Budapest, 1868, p. 353-356.

The new laws, contrary to expectations, intensified the resistance of the Magyars. The peace party, which clamoured for compromise, and the radicals, who wished to sever all remaining ties with the Habsburgs, agreed that everything had been in vain unless the March constitution was destroyed through military victories. Bem's successful Transylvanian campaign gave the first impetus; Kossúth's rhetorical genius, the second. Kossúth travelled from town to town to rekindle the national consciousness of the Magyars.

Hungary's boundaries were closed so that exports and imports were impossible, and the country was without gold, medicine or arms. Yet recruits kept pouring into the army, villages smelted their church bells, and chemists extracted sulphur from copper ore, and manufactured saltpetre. Popular confidence was so great that the paper money never depreciated until the news circulated that Russian troops were coming to help the Austrians, and then it fell only five or ten per cent.<sup>1</sup>

By the end of March, the Hungarian army was ready for the counter-offensive. During the first ten days of the following month, the Austrians were defeated in four major battles. They rapidly withdrew westward.

These first victories were celebrated in Debrecen with an official declaration of Hungary's independence and the dethronement of the Habsburg dynasty. Kossúth hoped that the European Powers would now recognize his regime which secured its existence militarily and made itself independent legally.

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<sup>1</sup> Priscilla Robertson, Revolutions of 1848: A Social History, New York, 1960, p. 295-296.

With the Declaration of April 14, 1849, he eliminated the possibility of a compromise with the Habsburgs and thereby paralyzed the peace party, his internal opposition. He then began to toy with the idea of sending troops to Poland in the hope that a renewed Polish uprising would further divide the Austrian armies, and pre-occupy Russia with her western provinces. Kossúth had some cause for optimism. Small Italian republics were still defying Austria. The renewed war with the Sardinian Kingdom made the sojourn of Radetzky on the Italian peninsula an absolute necessity. The Prussian army remained pre-occupied with German affairs.

On January 29 Dembinski, a Polish general, was appointed supreme commander of the Hungarian armed forces. In April he personally took charge of the Northern Army and with Kossuth's permission began preparations for the invasion of Galicia. He was instructed to defend the northern counties of Hungary and attack Galicia if the need arose.<sup>1</sup> Food depots were established near the border. Polish volunteers and a large amount of cash were sent to Dembinski.<sup>2</sup> "Well," said Kossúth, "I am expecting the Lieutenant-General's report from Lemberg or Cracow."<sup>3</sup> The planned offensive never materialized, because Slovak insurgents

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<sup>1</sup> Letter from Kossúth to Dembinski, April 19, 1849. István Barta, (ed.), Kossúth Lajos 1848/49-ben, V. Kossúth Lajos Kormányzóelnöki Iratai 1849 Április 15 - Augusztus 15, Budapest, 1955, p.42-43, cited hereafter as Kossúth.

<sup>2</sup> Letter from Kossúth to Mészáros, Minister of Defence, April 20, 1849, ibid., p.70.

<sup>3</sup> A. F. Danzer, (ed.), Dembinski Magyarországon, Budapest, 1874, p.246.

attacked the Northern Army before it was fully prepared for the invasion. Kossúth, however, did not easily abandon his plans. He now suggested that one division be sent to Bukovina: "Nur den einzigen Scrupel habe ich," he wrote to Dembinski, "dass man diese Diversion durch eine beschleunigte russische Invasion aus der Wallachei nach Siebenburgen zu vereiteln dürfte."<sup>1</sup> In early May all northern invasionary plans were suspended. The Hungarian cabinet, on the threshold of the complete liberation of Hungary, decided against exporting revolution. Recognition by the West now appeared possible and more meaningful than a Polish adventure. For few could put their trust in Polish unity after 1846. There were no guarantees whatsoever that Austria, Prussia and Russia might not unite in opposition to the new torchbearers of international disorder.<sup>2</sup> The new moderate policy of the Hungarian cabinet contributed to the momentary postponement of the Russian intervention.

The main Hungarian army gradually advanced toward Vienna. In spite of the immediate danger, the liberal ministers of Francis Joseph dodged a massive Russian intervention until the eleventh hour. On March 29, 1849, a proposal for seeking the Tsar's active help was rejected by the Viennese cabinet.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Letter from Kossúth to Dembinski, April 25, 1849, Kossúth, op.cit., p.115.

<sup>2</sup> Letter from Kossúth to Dembinski, May 6, 1849, ibid., p. 217-219.

<sup>3</sup> Andics, op.cit., p.128.

Two weeks later Baron Welden replaced Windischgrätz and promised an early victory over the enemy without Russian assistance. However, a few days' stay at the front was enough for the new commander Welden to completely reverse his stand and urge prompt cooperation with Russia.<sup>1</sup> The next meeting of the imperial cabinet took place on April 21. The ministers decided to expel all foreigners from Vienna and made other arrangements to prevent the outbreak of new disturbances in the capital. Although the Hungarians were less than seventy miles away, the cautious cabinet decided to ask Welden to make only a "well deliberated and categorical" declaration on the matter of Russian intervention. They also instructed Schwarzenberg to request Paskevich to keep his troops in readiness for possible employment against Hungary. Welden then repeated his original message. The cabinet now reversed its first decision and immediately informed Francis Joseph that direct Russian military aid had become indispensable.<sup>2</sup>

While the cabinet waivered, Schwarzenberg refused to wait until Austria was forced to plead rather than negotiate for active allied support. The March 29 cabinet decision was disregarded by the Prime Minister as he requested a Russian army of 30,000 men for a limited operation in Transylvania.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 137-138.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 142.

<sup>3</sup> Letter from Schwarzenberg to Buol, April 6, 1849, ibid., p. 337-338.

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 137-138.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 142.

<sup>3</sup> Letter from Schwarzenberg to Buol, April 6, 1849, ibid., p. 337-338.



He ordered officers to Transylvania, Galicia, and Bukovina to assist Russian troops should they enter into these territories.<sup>1</sup> On April 10 he dispatched General Welden's plans about a Russian offensive against Transylvania to St. Petersburg.<sup>2</sup> When, three weeks later, the cabinet took a wait-and-see position, Schwarzenberg went a step further. A few hours after leaving his ministers, he informed Ambassador Medem that it had become essential that the Russian troops concentrated around Cracow, commence a forced march on Hungary, where the Austrian forces were not numerous enough to block the rapid advance of the insurgent Magyars.<sup>3</sup>

This time the Russians wanted to make sure that the Transylvanian fiasco would not be repeated. Besides military considerations, the situation in Poland and the Danubian Principalities had to be taken into account. Finally, French and British neutrality were also required for the undisturbed invasion of Hungary.

In early April, Russia was still unable to determine a course of action. Nicholas was concerned about the activities of Polish emigrés in Hungary, but the troubles in Germany<sup>4</sup> disturbed him even more. He was willing to have

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<sup>1</sup> Letter from Medem to Nesselrode, April 9, 1849, ibid., p.340.

<sup>2</sup> Letter from Medem to Nesselrode, April 10, 1849, ibid., p.340-341.

<sup>3</sup> Letter from Schwarzenberg to Medem, April 21, 1849, ibid., p. 361.

<sup>4</sup> G. Szekfű, Magyar Történet, V, Budapest, 1936, p.690.

Russian troops occupy Galicia and Bukovina, but wanted the fighting in Hungary to be done by the Austrians. The Russian chancellor, nevertheless, realized the significance of the Hungarian Spring Campaign, and acted swiftly. Nesselrode rejected Schwarzenberg's request for a new limited attack on Transylvania and suggested the employment of a huge Russian army operating independently of the Austrian command.<sup>1</sup> Vienna accepted these conditions, but the Prince of Warsaw refused to move his army without direct orders from Nicholas, and without some agreement concerning the supplies for his men.<sup>2</sup> The Nicholas-Paskevich duo temporarily blocked Nesselrode's efforts, and without tangible reason unconsciously furthered the revolutionary cause. In desperation, Francis Joseph appealed personally to the Tsar.<sup>3</sup> When still no order arrived from St. Petersburg and under daily pressure exerted by Field Marshal Berg, the Tsar's military attaché, Paskevich finally detached one Russian division for the defense of Vienna. On May 10 Nicholas informed Francis Joseph that his troops were already on their way to destroy the common enemies of the two Empires.<sup>4</sup> It took the Russians another month to move the Active Army to Hungary.

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<sup>1</sup> Letter from Nesselrode to Medem, April 6, 1849, Andics, op.cit., p. 339-340.

<sup>2</sup> Letter from Paskevich to Medem, April 24, 1849, ibid., p. 365-367.

<sup>3</sup> Letter from Francis Joseph to Nicholas, May 1, 1849, ibid., p. 388-389.

<sup>4</sup> Letter from Nicholas to Francis Joseph, May 10, 1849, ibid., p. 388-389.

By that time the international climate became favourable for a direct Russian interference in the Austrian civil war. Palmerston still insisted on his policy of sustaining the Austrian Empire with Russian help to stand in the future as a barrier against Russian expansion. His representative reassured Nesselrode that if the interference of Russia were really necessary he could consider it as a sad necessity.<sup>1</sup> When Palmerston was informed that the Russian army had begun its new offensive, he remarked, "Finnisez-en vite," to the Tsar's representative.<sup>2</sup> France, in spite of popular enthusiasm for the Magyar cause, was in no position to oppose Russian action in Hungary. Louis Napoleon was engaged in his own expedition against the Roman Republic and by April France was fully occupied with her current election of a new parliament. (The problems of Eastern Europe gradually faded into the background.) A day before issuing a manifesto to his invasionary armies Nicholas recognized Napoleon de jure to further secure French neutrality.<sup>3</sup>

Reassured by the relaxation of European tensions, Field Marshal Berg, Russia's special military envoy, left St. Petersburg for Austria. He first consulted Francis Joseph

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<sup>1</sup> Letter from Buchanan to Palmerston, May 2, 1849, Eva Haraszti, Az Angol Külpolitika A Magyar Szabadságharc Ellen, Budapest, 1951, p.177.

<sup>2</sup> Letter from Brunov to Nesselrode, May 11, 1849, Andics, op.cit., p.427.

<sup>3</sup> Letter from Buol to Schwarzenberg, April 29, 1849, Origins, op. cit., p.283.

then departed for Welden's headquarters in Pressburg to negotiate with Schwarzenberg and the Austrian supreme command.<sup>1</sup> At the War Council of May first the main points of military cooperation were agreed upon. They were finalized three weeks later. As a preliminary gesture, Berg promised to help persuade Paskevich to place the Panutine Division at the disposal of Austria. The Prince of Warsaw agreed and sent the division of about 10,000 men, but the Russians joined the Austrian main army in mid-May when Vienna was no longer in danger from Hungarian attack because of the reinforcement received by Welden's corps.<sup>2</sup>

On May 21st Francis Joseph, accompanied by Schwarzenberg, arrived at Warsaw where Tsar Nicholas had been waiting for him since the seventeenth. After two days of negotiations, the details of the campaign were settled. The attack on the Hungarians was to be launched simultaneously at all points on June 17th. The Austrian War Council was to prepare the major operational orders in consultation with Berg and with the final approval of Paskevich. The Prince of Warsaw was to be in charge of all Russian armies and the Austrian troops which might join the Russian host. The Austrian commander-in-chief was in charge of the Panutine Division. In Transylvania, General Luders was to lead the

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<sup>1</sup> "Az 1849-iki Orosz Invázio Vezérei", Kincses Kalendárium, Budapest, 1911, p.343.

<sup>2</sup> György Gracza, Az 1848-49-iki Magyar Szabadságharcz Története, V, Budapest, 1894-1898, p.457.

allied forces. Russia financed most of the campaign expenses: ammunition, arms and soldiers' pay, but the Austrians were to supply the Russian armies on Austrian territories with food, repay the cost of Russian shipments and re-buy surplus material once hostilities ceased. The Tsar's troops would leave Hungary and all Habsburg territories as soon as the rebels were overcome, but certain divisions might be asked to secure Transylvania and northern Hungary even after the end of the war.<sup>1</sup>

The simultaneous June 17th attack was to proceed in the following manner. Paskevich would personally lead parts of the Second and Fourth Corps, 68 infantry battalions, 92 squadrons and 240 artillery pieces through the Dukla Pass into Hungary. Cavalry General Count Rudiger was ordered to lead the right wing column made of of 34 battalions, 32 squadrons, 12 Don Cossack squadrons and 120 guns of the Third Corps across the Carpathians and join Paskevich's left wing column. Following the combination of these two formations, the Prince would turn towards Budapest to force the enemy into an unfavourable position between his forces and those of his allies. The occupation and pacification of northern Hungary and the guarding of the supply lines became the responsibility of Generals Grabbe and Sacken. General Luders' Fifth Corps was to proceed from the Danubian

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<sup>1</sup>Breit, *op. cit.*, III, p. 36-37; Dénes Pázmándy, "Az Orosz Beavatkozás Okai És Története", József Szász (ed.), Politikai Magyarország, Budapest, 1913, p. 152.

Principalities and Lieutenant-General Grottenhelm's troops from Bukovina were to march on Transylvania.<sup>1</sup>

To implement this plan, the participation of about 200,000 Russian soldiers was required. In addition, occupational forces had to be kept in strength in restless Poland, the Danubian Principalities and Russia proper. Thus the government at St. Petersburg deemed it necessary to call the reservists to the colours. This added 177,000 men to the army. Later a special draft was ordered which netted an extra 134,000 recruits.<sup>2</sup> During the second week of May, Paskevich began preparations. He put no faith in the Austrians, who had earlier promised to put at Russia's disposal mobile, district and auxiliary reserve warehouses. His chief commissary was sent to Galicia, where there were no mobile or auxiliary warehouses to be found and even the district ones were poorly stocked. Paskevich then ordered the establishment of reserve warehouses in Warsaw, Cracow and Tarnopol. He also decided to utilize his own supplies accumulated in 1848.<sup>3</sup> The preparatory activities concentrated in Warsaw. A British agent reported:

The stores of grain collected at Modlin; and at other points in this Kingdom have all been taken to supply that want; - the Steam-Mills here at Warsaw and at Modlin are at work, day and

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<sup>1</sup>Breit, op. cit., III, p. 37-38.

<sup>2</sup>Curtiss, op. cit., p. 111.

<sup>3</sup>Svetozar Hurban-Vajansky, "Paskievic v Uchrach", Két Emkékirat Az 1849. Évi Cári Intervencióról, Budapest, 1948, p. 65-66.

night, in grinding this Corn; hundreds of bakeries are employed in preparing biscuits; and the Railway Trains to Cracow daily envoy from 80 to 100 Tons of Flour, Biscuit and Forage intended for the use of the Troops when fairly entered upon actual hostilities. Sixteen millions of Silver Rubles, - upwards of two and a half millions Pound Sterling - have been received here.<sup>1</sup>

Consequently, when the Russians moved into Hungary, they had a twenty-day reserve supply of food.<sup>2</sup> On June 15th the Active Army finally set out for the border according to plans. The troops moved slowly. They had been greatly harassed by their marches and counter-marches from and to their respective winter cantonments. Their officers were rather unhappy about the commencement of the campaign, notwithstanding Paskevich, who feared that his employment in the coming war might lead to the loss of his position as Namestnik in Poland, from which certain parties at St. Petersburg have long wished to remove him.<sup>3</sup> To improve the spirit of the army the Tsar accompanied the troops to the border where he personally addressed them.<sup>4</sup>

The Austrian army also carried on an undisturbed preparation for the June offensive. Valuable time was gained through the long defence of Buda by a handful of the

<sup>1</sup> Letter from DuPlat to Palmerston, May 8, 1849, Haraszti, op. cit., p. 186.

<sup>2</sup> Curtiss, op. cit., p. 298.

<sup>3</sup> Letters from DuPlat to Palmerston, May 25 and May 28, 1849, Haraszti, op. cit., p. 205, p. 213.

<sup>4</sup> Hurban-Vajansky, op. cit., p. 74.

imperial troops. The Hungarian leaders wanted to secure the capital for political reasons, before ordering the continuation of the victorious campaign against the Austrian host.

After their last success at Komárom, the Hungarian generals had 63,000 soldiers facing General Welden's 59,000 retreating troops.<sup>1</sup> The last chance for victory passed by the Hungarians practically unnoticed during the three-week siege of Buda. By the middle of May, Panutine's 12,000 men joined the Austrian main army. At the end of May, General Welden resigned and was replaced by the energetic Julius Haynau, who received his training in Italy under the military genius Radetsky. The peace in Italy, guaranteed after May 24th by the Western Powers, made the immediate transfer of troops to Hungary possible. Trainloads of soldiers arrived at Pressburg from the Italian fronts. They were joined by new recruits from Austria proper, and Galicia. By the middle of June, Haynau commanded a formidable army of 83,000 regulars.<sup>2</sup> Then the Austrian headquarters cancelled all furloughs. The Hungarians attacked again on June 13th, but Haynau avoided a major confrontation without losing much ground.

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<sup>1</sup> Gracza, op. cit., p. 505; M. Horváth, III, op. cit., p. 78.

<sup>2</sup> Spira, op. cit., p. 536.



He was waiting for Paskevich's move. On June 26th Francis Joseph arrived at the western front to initiate the new campaign which was well launched with two successful battles at Zsigárd and Pered.<sup>1</sup>

The "Glorious Spring Campaign" failed to bring either compromise with Austria, as it was hoped for by the Hungarian peace party, or recognition by major European powers, what Kossúth and the radicals expected. These calculations prevented the Magyar army from revolutionizing Vienna and from the possible annihilation of the Austrian host. Even after the fall of Buda on May 21, 1849, General Arthur Görgei, head of Hungary's Western Army, preoccupied himself with political maneuvering thereby accepting General Klapka's thesis of a defensive war. Görgei began the preparation of a military coup with the backing of the peace party and his ex-imperial officers. His first step was the purging of the officer corps of republican elements. But the Hungarian Eighteenth of Brumaire came only two months later. Kossúth, suspecting the plot, swiftly dissolved parliament, called new elections, and moved the government to the liberated capital, the center of radicalism. These moves undercut the influence of the peace party. When Haynau hanged two captured ex-imperial officers, all hope for an honourable entente vanished. Görgei cancelled his plans.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Lajos Steier, Haynau és Paskievics, I, Budapest, 1928, p. 67-69.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 21-23.

Kossúth was still the hero of the country and the officer corps felt trapped within the Constitution of April 14, 1849.<sup>1</sup> The new Russian invasion, to crown his ill fortune, made all of Görgei's political designs meaningless. "I saw at last," he wrote later in his memoirs, " - too late unfortunately - that I had acted imprudently in delaying the long intended offensive..."<sup>2</sup>

Besides the split in the leadership between civil and military authorities, several other problems also plagued the Hungarian camp. There were 178,000 men in arms in Hungary in the middle of June, 1849.<sup>3</sup> The predominantly peasant army became restless as the spring works started on the fields. The country was bled to the limit for almost a year when huge armies depleted the wealth of the land. It became impossible to raise more recruits. The clothing of the soldiers suffered as a result of the April campaigns. Many a Hungarian honvéd gained a beggarly appearance. Thirty thousand of them were insufficiently armed and there was a general shortage of ammunition. Hungary's primitive industries could not cope with the army's demands, and Kossúth's agents failed in their effort at purchasing military materiel abroad. The fight was carried on in spite of the heavy odds.

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<sup>1</sup>  
Supra, p.64-65.

<sup>2</sup>  
Arthur Görgei, My Life and Acts in Hungary in the Years 1848-49, II, London, 1852, p.385.

<sup>3</sup>  
"Proposal of the cabinet to the Governor" and "A Solemn Protest of the Hungarian Nation against Russian intervention", Papp.(ed.), op. cit., p.447-451.

On May 18th the Hungarian cabinet proposed that Governor Kossúth proclaim a crusade against the "Russian intruders". A solemn protest was issued to the people of Europe. The Magyars were told to rise en masse, pray, fast, and arm themselves. The clergy was to give spiritual guidance to the "holy cause". The Minister of the Interior sent orders to the northern counties commanding the destruction of bridges, the blocking of mountain passes, and the removal of food and livestock into the interior. Later another proclamation was issued encouraging guerilla warfare and a scorch-the-earth policy.<sup>1</sup> But Görgei and the peace party protested against the turning of Hungary into a desert.<sup>2</sup> To all this there was little response from the weary populace. During its retreat, the Hungarian Northern Army met with indifference. At times the soldiers could not even buy bread from the villagers.<sup>3</sup> A government commissioner reported to Kossúth: "I noticed with pain that the claim of László Gencsy, ispán of Borsod County, concerning the lack of sympathy of the people is true. He sees the root of this evil also in the unfulfilled demands of the population."<sup>4</sup>

Paskevich crossed the Carpathians under the most favourable conditions. The Slovak population of northern

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<sup>1</sup>Gracza, op. cit., V, p. 461-468; Kossúth, op. cit., p. 341-342; and p. 602-606.

<sup>2</sup>Steier, op. cit., I, p. 83.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 77.

<sup>4</sup>Report of Luzsenszky to Kossúth, June 28, 1949, ibid., p. 135.

Hungary received his troops as "Slav brothers" and many volunteered to guide them through the mountain passes.<sup>1</sup> The Magyars were tired of the war and preferred the Russians to the hated Austrians.

A detachment under General Sass infiltrated through the unguarded border as early as June 8th and secured the seat of Árva County. A week later Paskevich gave the signal for the general offensive. Close to 120,000 troops moved into Hungary, most of them through the Dukla Pass. They were opposed by the 17,000 men of General Wysocky who had replaced Dembinsky after his resignation as head of the Northern Army. There were two factors working for the Hungarians: the extreme caution displayed by Paskevich in moving his huge army as a single unit, and the cholera epidemic that struck the Russians soon after entering Hungary. The Prince believed that at least fifty to sixty thousand soldiers would challenge his progress. He ordered the Third Corps to join the main army on the Hungarian side of the frontier thus to outnumber the Northern Army. The Russians encountered hardly any resistance. On June 19th Paskevich was able to set up his headquarters at Bártfa. Putting little trust in his subordinates, he personally embarked upon a reconn-

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<sup>1</sup> L. Steier (ed.), Béniczky Lajos, Budapest, 1924, p. 154.

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 aissance mission with a company of Cossacks. Now it became obvious that Hungary's strength had been grossly overestimated. Nevertheless, lengthy preparations were made for an attack on a small town about four miles south of Bártfa.

Meanwhile the Third Corps stumbled on the Northern Army at Héthárs. The well-disciplined Russians systematically uprooted the defenders. After artillery bombardment the Russian infantry carried out a successful bayonet charge in column formation. The Cossacks and the light cavalry then gave chase to the retreating Hungarians who were saved only by the oncoming darkness.<sup>2</sup> The Battle of Héthárs convinced Wysocky that he could not effectively arrest the enemy advance. He made no further attempt to engage the Russians in fighting.

The Active Army's Second and Fourth Corps captured Kassa (Kaschau, Kosice) on June 24th without a shot being fired. It took the invading forces eight days to advance fifteen miles. By that time food reserves were available for

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<sup>1</sup>  
 P.K. Menkov, an officer who served at his headquarters, later recollected that the Field Marshal was "... distinguished by unusual vanity, distrust, suspiciousness, and a sort of strange fear of his power and that each man close to him, if not openly, then inwardly, is laughing at him. This thought constantly tormented him." He permitted no criticism or objection, demanded blind obedience, and gave independence not even to his corps commanders. (Curtiss, op. cit., p. 295-296.)

<sup>2</sup>  
 Márton Hegyesi, "Első Mérközéseink az Oroszokkal 1849 - ben és a Héthársi Utközet," Századok, XXXIII, 1899, p. 652-657.

only a few more days. Paskevich halted his troops.<sup>1</sup> The corps commanders were ordered to purchase large quantities of oxen. The bread ration had already been reduced and meat ration, which was to be obtained locally, was increased in its stead.<sup>2</sup> It was unfortunate for the Russians that the area they initially occupied was suffering from an epidemic of cholera and that the disease spread rapidly among them.<sup>3</sup> In each company of the marching troops thirty to forty men died in a space of six or eight days. In Kassa alone about 10,000 men were hospitalized. At the height of the epidemic, 1,000 men died in a single day. In three weeks thousands of Russians fell

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<sup>1</sup>Breit, op. cit., III, p. 112-113.

<sup>2</sup>Curtiss, op. cit., p. 298.

<sup>3</sup>G. Szekfű, Hungarian historian, claimed that the Russians themselves brought the cholera to Hungary, (Szekfű, op. cit., V, p. 690). Professor Curtiss thinks that the soldiers became cholera infected because they were worn out by the heavy exertion in crossing the Carpathians, by bivouacing on wet ground, by drinking impure water, and by eating unripe grapes. (Curtiss, op. cit., p. 298). It seems that both Szekfű and Curtiss overlooked the presence of cholera in Hungary before the Russian intervention. The Aradi Hirdető, a weekly paper, reported on June 16, 1849, the outbreak of cholera at Budapest. (Ferenc Bay, ed., 1848-49 a Kossuthi Napilapok Tükrében, Budapest, 1943, p. 165). Kossuth instructed the ispán of Heves County on June 18th how to cope with the cholera epidemic. He also mentioned the existence of this problem in northern Hungary in another letter that was written in mid-June. (Kossuth, op. cit., p. 545 and p. 549).

victim to the cholera. This was far more than died fighting the enemy.<sup>1</sup>

To control the epidemic hospitals were established in Kassa and Miskolc. The troops were quartered in barracks. Lieutenant-General Shcheodaev was ordered to move towards Debrecen where he could expect to find enough food to enable the army to intensify its war efforts. The town surrendered without resistance. Shcheodaev stayed for three days and was able to collect food supplies for 30,000 men for at least three weeks. He then rejoined the Russian host.<sup>2</sup>

On the western front the Magyar army fared much better than in the north. The Hungarians were able to retain their positions until the early part of July. But they were unable to capitalize on their initial success because of their constant preoccupation with the leadership struggle between G rgei and Koss th. The latter attempted to gain dictatorial power over the civilian and military administration but he was vigorously opposed by the cabinet and the Western Army. The rest of the armed forces and the cabinet were opposed also to G rgei whom they wanted to subordinate to civilian rule. At the June

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<sup>1</sup>Gracza, op. cit., V, p. 528-529; Curtiss, op. cit., p. 249.

<sup>2</sup>Breit, op. cit., II, p. 115-116.

26th cabinet meeting Kossúth suggested the concentration of all the Hungarian armies for an attack on the Russians, while the fortress of Komárom would hold down the advancing Austrians. This plan was at first rejected and General Görgei's strategy was approved in its stead.<sup>1</sup> The General was to attack on the left bank of the Danube while the Northern Army was to impede the Russian advance.

Haynau concentrated his forces on the right bank of the Danube and planned to reach Budapest by the shortest possible route, that is, via Győr and Komárom. While Görgei wasted time holding conferences, the Austrians captured Győr from the Second Hungarian Corps. The rest of the defenders remained inactive on the left bank.<sup>2</sup>

On June 29th, after receiving the news, the cabinet reversed its earlier resolution and adopted Kossúth's plan. The government moved to Szeged and ordered Görgei to unite with all the Hungarian armed forces in opposing the Russians. General Klapka was placed in command of the fortress of Komárom.<sup>3</sup> When Görgei hesitated in the

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<sup>1</sup>Spira, op. cit., p. 543.

<sup>2</sup>Breit, op. cit., III, p. 77-86.

<sup>3</sup>L. Steier, Haynau és Paskievics, I, p. 82-84.



immediate execution of the new plans, he dismissed--to be reinstated a few days later due to strong pressure from the officers of the Western Army.<sup>1</sup> On July 2nd Haynau launched his first attack on Komárom. This time the Hungarians were better prepared and were even able to initiate a counterattack. Only the Russian Panutine Division could save the Austrians from a major defeat. Görgei made an accurate evaluation of the battle and ordered preparations for an attack on Haynau within a week. The civilian authorities were thus completely ignored and the open defiance of the government was supported by the officer corps. On July 11th, the second Battle of Komárom took place but again neither party could assert its superiority. Since Görgei's plan could no more be materialized, he returned to the fold and, somewhat belatedly, attempted to obey the government's concentration order.<sup>2</sup>

The Hungarian First, Third and Seventh Corps abandoned their positions around Komárom and under the cover of night began a long march on the left bank of the Danube. The Second and the Eighth Corps were left behind to defend the fortress. "I marched towards Vác . . . (with almost 25,000 men and 130 guns)", summarized Görgei

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 113.

<sup>2</sup>Breit, op. cit., III, p. 86-103; Spira, op. cit., p. 543-545.

for Paskevich a month later, "with the purpose that from there I will go to Cegléd and execute the union with the Southern Army."<sup>1</sup> Haynau's advance guards moved along the right bank and occupied the undefended capital the day the second Battle of Komárom ended.<sup>2</sup>

The Austrians had no intention of pursuing the Western Army. Haynau requested Paskevich to order General Grabbe, who occupied northernmost Hungary, to march against Komárom, while the Active Army would annihilate the retreating Görgei. His own troops were to turn south to unite with Jelačić for the elimination of Hungary's southern divisions and for the capture of the temporary capital, Szeged.<sup>3</sup>

When the cholera epidemic subsided, Paskevich began to move his troops, still en masse, towards Budapest. He moved slowly to enable Shcheodaev to catch up with the rest of the Active Army. Some Russian troops, nevertheless, reached Vác before the Hungarians. When the Magyar hussars drove the Active Army's Moslem cavalry out of the city, Russian General Sass took command of Paskevich's advanced guard and counter-attacked. The Hungarians retired but Sass now had to endure heavy artillery fire which severely

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<sup>1</sup>P. Pach Zs. (ed), "Kiadatlan Görgei-iratok 1849 Augusztusából", Századok, XCI, 1957, p. 219.

<sup>2</sup>Steier, op. cit., I, p. 168 and p. 191.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 206.

punished his force. Paskevich brought up two army corps to save Sass from destruction. The Prince himself drove his troops all night over the hilly swampy terrain to support his advance guard and to bar Görgei's strike southward. Just before the arrival of the reinforcement, Sass disengaged his division and thus the crisis had passed. Paskevich decided to rest his troops for a day thus allowing Shcheodaev's Fourth Corps to participate in the planned new battle.<sup>1</sup>

The Western Army now could not possibly hope to strike south. Between them and the Southern Army the entire Russian host had taken up position. Görgei's War Council decided to retreat in a northeasterly direction and then to move south and join the government. While the Russian troops were in repose, Görgei evacuated Vác and after some rear guard cavalry action disappeared from sight with his entire army.<sup>2</sup>

The phantom enemy gave reason for apprehension to both Haynau and Paskevich. The Hungarians seemingly were still strong enough to break through towards Vienna or Galicia. Then Paskevich received fresh intelligence: the Western Army was marching to Losonc (Lucenec) and newly recruited Magyar troops (Tenth Corps) and Wysocky's

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<sup>1</sup> Curtiss, op. cit., p. 299-300.

<sup>2</sup> Sándor Pethő, Oroszok es Magyarok Csatai 1849-ben," Alkotmány, CLXX, 1915, p. 10-13.

divisions (Ninth Corps, Northern Army) were assuming position on his southern flank. The Prince now planned to order General Grabbe from the northern counties against Losonc and to have a small cavalry group constantly keep track of Görgei. In the meantime, his Second and Third Corps would unite at Gyöngyös and operate against enemy forces north and south. The recently arrived reserve divisions blocked the passes leading to Galicia. Shcheodaev was to seek out the Western Army and initiate its utter destruction.<sup>1</sup>

On their way to Gyöngyös, Russian cavalry units were intercepted by the Ninth and Tenth Corps at the village of Tura. The Magyars hoped to separate this group from the main army. The trapped cavalry took a defensive position and tried to drive back the hussars with the fire of cavalry batteries and the serpentine guns, which shot far and disturbed the horses with their noisiness. The Hungarian attackers, nevertheless, made a successful charge against the right wing of their opponents. But at this moment, a Russian infantry brigade arrived at the scene, saved the right wing from collapse and gave inertia to a counter-attack against the Hungarian lines. The two Magyar corps made an orderly retreat--all the way to Szeged--and were pursued not by the Russians but by the Austrian main army.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Steier, op. cit., I, p. 22-24.

<sup>2</sup>Danzer (ed.), op. cit., p. 326-328; Spira, op. cit., p. 568; Hurban-Vajansky, op. cit., p. 91.

A day after the Battle of Tura, two Russian officers arrived at Görgei's headquarters. They claimed to be the emissaries of the Russian high command and requested a forty-eight hour cease-fire as a preliminary to peace negotiations. The officers had no credentials from their superiors, therefore Görgei asked them to put in writing the suggested peace conditions. The hastily drafted document stated that, following the complete cessation of hostilities, all Hungarian officers might enroll in the Russian army and keep their arms and present ranks, or if requested, they could be simply discharged. The rank-and-file soldiers must surrender all weapons and then would have the alternative of enrolling in the Austrian army or of leaving for home.<sup>1</sup> Görgei suspected that the Russians wanted to retard his march in order to enable two corps of the Active Army to reach the River Tisza before him. The General agreed to negotiations, but at the same time accelerated the pace of retreat.<sup>2</sup> In his July 21st reply, he rejected an immediate cease-fire but promised a complete answer relative to the peace conditions within forty-eight hours.<sup>3</sup> The officers were informed verbally

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<sup>1</sup>"Peace Offer", Papp (ed.), op. cit., II, p. 512-513.

<sup>2</sup>Görgei, op. cit., II, p. 494.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 513-514.

that Hungary, in her great stress, was much more willing to accept a Russian ruler than a Habsburg and that on this matter Paskevich should enter into negotiations with the Hungarian government. The indicated complete reply was sent to Paskevich.<sup>1</sup>

Die Armee ist auf jene Verfassung beeidet,  
welche König Ferdinand V. von Ungarn, im  
Frühlinge des Jahres 1848, selbst sanctionirte,

wrote Görgei, subtly hinting his and the army's disapproval of the April Constitution of Hungary. He continued:

Die Armee hat bisher treu ihrem Eide für die  
Aufrechterhaltung dieser Verfassung gekämpft.  
Die Armee wird auch ferner ihrem Eide treu bleiben  
und ihre Waffen erst dann ruhen lassen, wenn jene  
Verfassung neu garantirt und jede feindliche Macht  
über Ungarns Grenzen hinausgedrängt sein wird.<sup>2</sup>

Another round of negotiations began under General Rudiger, independently of the first one. The corps commander requested Görgei to inform him of his conditions for halting the uneven struggle and promised to use his influence at headquarters to obtain a "just peace".<sup>3</sup> In his reply Görgei proposed secret negotiations between Paskevich and Kossúth.<sup>4</sup> When the government at Szeged was

<sup>1</sup>Breit, op. cit., III, p. 198.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from Görgei to Paskevich, July 22, 1849, Papp, (ed.), op. cit., p. 518.

<sup>3</sup>Letter from Rudiger to Görgei, July 19, 1849, ibid., p. 510-511.

<sup>4</sup>Letter from Görgei to Rudiger, July 24, 1849, ibid., p. 511-512.

informed of the current stage of peace talks, both the prime minister and the foreign minister immediately departed for Görgei's camp to conduct all future negotiations on a higher level.

As soon as Paskevich received Görgei's letter he forwarded it to General Berg.<sup>1</sup> Berg was ordered to discuss with Haynau the conditions of capitulations. The Austrian commander was willing to free Görgei, as was suggested by the Russians, and spare his officers' lives at their trial by court martial, but opposed all negotiations with the "rebels".<sup>2</sup> Paskevich, in spite of Austrian disapproval, still retained a certain benevolent attitude towards the Hungarians. He would not parley personally with them, but neither did he discourage his commanding officers from making peace overtures. "Rudiger wrote him (Görgei) a letter," the Prince informed the Tsar, "after they made him believe that Görgei would agree to surrender. I said nothing to Rudiger about the step. If he is successful, it will be his glory, but if Görgei made a fool of him and the matter would appear in the papers, I'll tell him that his experiment was useless, premature and unauthorized."<sup>3</sup> Paskevich was still uncertain about the safety of

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<sup>1</sup>Supra, p. 69,

<sup>2</sup>Letter from Berg to Paskevich, July 1849, Steier, op. cit., II, p. 113.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 15; Urban-Vajansky, op. cit., p. 95.

his supply lines and peace negotiations could have deterred the Hungarians from reconsidering an attack on Polish populated Russian, Austrian or Prussian territories.<sup>1</sup>

The allies were unaware of the conservative views of G rgei's officer corps, therefore they could not discard the possibility of a desperate revolutionizing attempt. The Russians concentrated more and more troops on the Galician border of Hungary. The Austrian government called on Prussia to secure her borders against possible attacks from Hungary. Berlin soon informed Haynau that a Prussian corps was ordered to extend its cooperation with the Austrian army.<sup>2</sup>

The Hungarian phantom army was not nearly as frightening as the allies believed them to be. The constant heavy marching had made the troops weary. The food supply became scarce. The Third Corps sent a delegation to headquarters stating that the troops had been fighting a continuous rearguard action for three days but had not

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<sup>1</sup>Paskevich's reply was given only orally a fortnight later to a new Hungarian peace delegation: "Monsieur le Marechal Prince de Varsovie me charge de vous informer, Monsieur, que la destination de son arm e est uniquement de combattre, et que si vous d sirez traiter de votre soumission   votre Souverain legitime, il faut, que vous adressiez au commandant en chef de l'arm e autrichienne, qui seul a des pouvoirs necessaires   cet effet". (Breit, op. cit., II, p. 22).

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 229.



received any food. Neither had the Seventh Corps obtained any rest or food since the Battle of Vác. The horses had been similarly neglected. The soldiers were aware of the disunity in the leadership; the officers, of the monstrous size of the enemy forces.<sup>1</sup> When an officer deserter was led before Görgei, he simply reprimanded the man but refused to pass the customary death sentence because of the "circumstances" of the army.<sup>2</sup> The rank-and-file, nevertheless, was still willing to fight, but the well informed officers were already dreaming of an honourable peace. The war dragged on.

A Magyar detachment on a reconnaissance mission reported to headquarters that Miskolc had been evacuated by the Russians as early as July 20th. Görgei occupied the undefended city and grouped his forces around it. Following the successful outcome of the Battle of Tura, Paskevich ordered his Third Corps to pursue Görgei, but this group was outmarched by the Western Army which was already at Miskolc, Fifty miles west of the new positions of the Third Corps. The revised orders directed the Second and the Third Corps to the left bank of the Tisza in order to prevent Görgei's southernly move, while Grabbe, Shcheodaev

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 214-215.

<sup>2</sup>Görgei, op. cit., II, p. 514.

and the newly arrived divisions were to menace the Hungarians from all other directions.<sup>1</sup>

After peripheral skirmishes, Görgei moved towards the Tisza and Shcheodaev occupied Miskolc. On July 25th the Russians attacked but now on a larger scale. The Western Army held its positions all day and the next. Görgei's passive behaviour was due to his expectation of new supplies and reinforcements from the Kazinczy Division of the Northern Hungarian Army, which was securing eastern Hungary at this time.

The skirmishes around Miskolc and Görgei's inactivity enabled Paskevich to cross the Tisza with two of his corps. Shcheodaev was ordered to unite with them and the pursuit of Görgei was left to Grabbe and the new divisions. The latter ones did attack the Western Army which, however, was still strong enough to seriously hurt these Russian formations.<sup>2</sup> Görgei now gave the order for the crossing of the Tisza. He could not wait for Kazinczy any longer because it was feared that the Active Army, already on the left bank, might move further east cutting him off completely from the south. By July 30th,

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<sup>1</sup>Breit, op. cit., III, p. 203-206.

<sup>2</sup>Curtiss, op. cit., p. 303; Urban-Vajansky, op. cit., p. 100.

he was at Nyiregyháza leaving Paskevich the arduous job of locating the phantom army. Two days later the chase was on again. Görgei was racing southward with the Prince on his trail.

Paskevich had his second chance; he had missed the first one at Vác, near Debrecen, to destroy at least one third of Görgei's army. On August 2nd, one of Görgei's corps marched into Debrecen with nearly 10,000 men and 43 guns. Here, just when a column of about 3,000 partially armed irregulars joined them, Russian cavalry began assailing their outposts. The attack was gradually intensified with the employment of the cavalry's light artillery. The Hungarians decided to make a stand. As soon as Paskevich was informed of the developing battle, he ordered two complete corps to march on Debrecen. These troops could move only at a snail's pace because the two corps were commanded to advance along a single road in regular battle formation. When a thick cornfield broke the closed formation, the Prince halted the whole army to make the soldiers fall back in line. The Hungarian batteries, meanwhile, started to pound the attacking Russian cavalry division inflicting serious damage on their artillery pieces and wounding many. The Magyar hussars were just about ready to charge when Paskevich arrived outnumbering the Hungarians six to one. His Moslem and Caucasian horsemen found the

weakest point of the Hungarians by outflanking, confusing and massacring their irregular troops on the right wing. Soon the whole front collapsed. Although the Magyars suffered heavy losses, about 2,000 men dead, wounded or missing, they were still able to escape annihilation because Paskevich gave no order for their pursuit.<sup>1</sup> "It was impossible to pursue further," he wrote to the Tsar, "for we might expect the corps of G"orgei . . . We had to be especially careful, because we were obliged definitely to beat the enemy on this day and to take the town, for we had no water."<sup>2</sup>

Tsar Nicholas was neither pleased nor satisfied with Paskevich's excuses. Nesselrode cautiously pressed for the removal of the Prince who was finally "saved" by the unexpected surrender of the Western Army. Moreover, the Field Marshal was supported by an anti-Austrian group within the army led by General Rudiger, who considered any further fighting unnecessary. They thought that because Russia had already "liberated" northern and eastern Hungary, the Tsar's promise was fulfilled and the rest was up to Haynau.<sup>3</sup> Paskevich established his headquarters at

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<sup>1</sup>Steier, op. cit., II, p. 59-60; Urban-Vajansky, op. cit., p. 101-103; Spira, op. cit., p. 573; Breit, op. cit., III, p. 213-220; Curtiss, op. cit., p. 303.

<sup>2</sup>Curtiss, op. cit., p. 304.

<sup>3</sup>Steier, op. cit., II, p. 69 and p. 104; Urban-Vajansky, op. cit., p. 106-108.

Debrecen where he remained for the next ten days collecting provisions--playing for time. Five days had passed by since the Battle of Debrecen when he finally dispatched a light infantry division to follow G rgei. This formation, led by General Rudiger, was instructed not to engage the Hungarians in combat because the Active Army had no plans to abandon the immediate vicinity of Debrecen.<sup>1</sup> He even requested Haynau to return the Panutine Division which was originally "loaned" for the defence of Vienna.<sup>2</sup>

Haynau, meanwhile, moved his army southward along the Tisza River. He reached the outskirts of Szeged without difficulty and united with Jela    's troops which earlier could not achieve anything but a stalemate against the Hungarian Southern Army. The new Hungarian commander, General Dembinski, fearing defeat, even though he had 40,000 men, gave up Szeged without a fight. Koss    then ordered him to march on Arad, where a rendezvous was to be carried out with G rgei. But Dembinski now refused to obey. He thought, and not without justification, that Arad was the perfect trap, a convenient location for the Russian and Austrian armies to surround the gathering Hungarian armed forces. He was also informed of the peace

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<sup>1</sup>Breit, op. cit., III, p. 223-224.

<sup>2</sup>Steier, op. cit., II, p. 89.

negotiations between Görgei and Paskevich and had no desire to fall into Russian hands. His plan was to withdraw to Transylvania, unite with Bem and Görgei, then counter-attack making use of the mountainous<sup>1</sup> terrain. Bem was already defeated in Transylvania and Görgei had no inkling for guerilla warfare. The government dismissed Dembinski and requested Bem to lead the Southern Army to Arad. However, not even the brilliant strategist could win against the innumerable odds. His ragged, underfed and poorly-equipped soldiers, long unaccustomed to victories, were no match for Haynau's veterans or Panutine's excellent batteries and élite infantry division. On August 9th Bem's northwardly strike was successfully rebuffed and in the process the Southern Army completely disintegrated and ceased to exist.

Görgei now remained alone to face both Haynau and Paskevich. The Hungarian government made several desperate attempts to bargain with the Russians. They went as far as offering St. Stephen's crown to the Romanovs.<sup>2</sup> The Russians, however, refused to talk with the government and wished to negotiate the terms of surrender with Görgei

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<sup>1</sup> Danzer, (ed.), op. cit., p. 367-368.

<sup>2</sup> Pach, (ed.), op. cit., p. 200.

exclusively. To oblige them, Kossúth resigned and all power was deposited in the general's hands. On August 11th Görgei informed Rudiger of the new political situation and offered unconditional surrender trusting the Tsar's magnanimity in saving the ex-Austrian officers of his army.<sup>1</sup> Rudiger sent his chief-of-staff to discuss the details of the laying down of arms. It was agreed that no Austrian troops would witness the surrender and that Görgei and Rudiger would meet near the village of Világos. The Russian commander was to receive two lists: one containing the names of all government functionaries and members of parliament who had of late attached themselves to the army; and the other enumerating requests of Görgei's officers. The meeting took place on August 13, 1849. Görgei asked Rudiger not to extradite his officers but rather to permit them to join the Tsar's armed forces and keep their swords and other personal properties. He made no appeal on behalf of the civilians. Rudiger promised to intercede with his chief to gain attention to these wishes.<sup>2</sup>

"And in the twilight of the 13th of August 1849, General Count Rudiger, the commander of a Russian army

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<sup>1</sup>Letter from Görgei to Rudiger, August 11, 1849, Gracza, op. cit., V, p. 717-718.

<sup>2</sup>Pach (ed), op. cit., p. 202-206.

corps, inspected the Hungarian troops under my command," wrote Gőrgei in his memoirs. "But the cavalry was dismounted, and had their swords hung on their pommels of their saddles; the muskets of the infantry were piled in pyramids; the artillery was drawn close together and unmanned; the flags and standards lay there unprotected before the disarmed ranks."<sup>1</sup>

This very same day Paskevich proudly reported to Tsar Nicholas: "Hungary lies at Your Majesty's feet."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Gőrgei, op. cit., II, p. 607.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from Paskevich to Nicholas, August 13, 1848, Gracza, op. cit., V, p. 741.



## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE SECOND RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN TRANSYLVANIA

In conjunction with the fighting in western and northern Hungary during the summer of 1849, an isolated theatre of war existed in Transylvania. This area remained, until the end, the source of hope for the Magyars, not just for an honourable peace but also for victory. Only a few months earlier, General Bem had managed to expel superior Austro-Russian expeditionary forces from Transylvania. The Polish General had also treated the nationality question with extraordinary skill and foresight. In addition, with the support of Hungary's new diplomatic corps, he had attempted to provoke the not-so-reluctant Turks into a joint attack on the Russian army in the Danubian Principalities. When things finally came to a crisis, General Bem engaged superior enemy forces in "hit and run" tactics for almost two months and at the same time even tried to revolutionize the peasants of Moldavia.

During Bem's absence from Transylvania, when he was successfully campaigning in the Banat in the months of April and May, government commissioners tried to arrest the spread of the civil strife between the Magyars and the Roumanians, but without much success. In April many of the Hungarian landlords returned to their estates and demanded from their Roumanian peasants the payment of feudal dues

retroactively. The lords often took the commoners' animals and forced the farmers to perform illegal robot again. Due to their influence, the peace committees, which were set up to estimate the damages caused during the civil war, soon turned into instruments of revenge. Irregular Magyar troops harassed the Roumanian villages in order to frighten the populace.<sup>1</sup> But the exasperated farmers did not fail to respond. Under the leadership of Avram Iancu, approximately four thousand men renewed guerilla warfare. Iancu engaged the Hungarian irregulars daily, thus limiting their village raids.<sup>2</sup> He also coordinated his maneuvers with the Austrian defenders of Gyulafehérvár. This made the Hungarian position in Transylvania quite precarious.<sup>3</sup>

Kossúth, fully realizing the seriousness of the situation, sent an agent to negotiate with Iancu, but gave no instructions for making concessions other than freedom of religion and equality before the law. As a matter of fact, while the negotiations were in progress, he let his raiders continue their operations against Iancu, who, in retaliation, ordered the execution of Kossúth's negotiating

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<sup>1</sup>Gábor Kemény, Társadalom És Nemzetiség A Szabadságharc Nadilapjaiban, Budapest, 1957, p. 54; Molnár, op. cit., p. 534.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from Csányi to Kossúth, April 21, 1849, Imre Deák, (ed.), A Szabadságharc Története Levelekben, Ahogyan A Kortársak Látták, Budapest, 1942, p. 360.

<sup>3</sup>Letter from Iancu to the Commander of Gyulafehérvár, April 26, 1849, ibid., p. 362.

agent.<sup>1</sup> Not even after the new Russian invasion of Transylvania was Kossúth willing to recognize the Roumanians as a "political nation" within Hungary.<sup>2</sup>

Kossúth's views were shared by many Magyars in Transylvania, some of whom were willing to "fight to the end" rather than give language rights to the Roumanians.<sup>3</sup> During Kossuth's absence and only a fortnight before capitulation, the Hungarian parliament finally passed a meaningful nationality law. Iancu reacted by promising neutrality, but the earlier bitter struggle had left little room for any possible alliance against the Russians and Austrians.<sup>4</sup>

Bem's approach to the nationality question was more realistic. Three days after his return to Transylvania, he issued a proclamation to the population. The Polish general promised to punish those who sabotaged the amnesty he had granted earlier to Saxons and Roumanians. Martial law, introduced in his absence in the Saxon towns, was invalidated and the work of peace committees was suspended.

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<sup>1</sup>Waldapfel, op. cit., p. 274-276.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from Kossúth to Simonffy, July 5, 1849, Kossúth, op. cit., p. 663.

<sup>3</sup>Jenő Horváth, (ed.), "A Szabadságharc Utolsó Napjai Erdélyben; Paget János Feljegyzései, 1849, június 13-augustus 27", Pt. 1, Hadtörténeti Közlemények, XXIX, 1928, p. 353.

<sup>4</sup>Letter from Kossúth to Bem, August 8, 1849, Kossúth, op. cit., p. 835-836.

Bem tried to gain the confidence of all nationalities under his jurisdiction.<sup>1</sup> He hired a Saxon popular leader as his personal secretary and a Wallachian revolutionary as his adviser.<sup>2</sup> Bem's pacification was, however, continuously countermanded by government orders. Not until August 8 was the Transylvanian Magyar Army (T.M.A.) allowed to cease attacking Iancu's guerillas.<sup>3</sup> The most Bem was able to accomplish was the neutralization of the Transylvanian Roumanians. During the intervention, this group neither hindered nor supported Magyars against the allies.

The Roumanians' and Saxons' animosity towards the Magyars was lessened by Bem's realpolitik. The Hungarian cause benefited from the Turks' traditional Russophobia that was tempered by the lack of English support in curbing Russian encroachment on Turkish sovereignty. Although the Convention of Baltaliman, an agreement legalizing the joint Russo-Turkish occupation of the Danubian Principalities, was imposed upon the recalcitrant Sultan, the Austrian and Russian troops were not supported in their movements by Turkish authorities. The Turks were more congenial towards the Magyars than their "official friends."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Endre Kovács, Bem József, Budapest, 1954, p. 521.

<sup>2</sup>Edgar Balogh, "Bem Erdélyi Politikája", Népszava, December 25, 1941.

<sup>3</sup>Order of the Governor, August 8, 1849, Kossúth, op. cit., p. 834-835.

Turkish and Hungarian officers constantly fraternized along the borders of the two countries. General Bem sent money and other gifts to Omer Pasha, the commander of the Turkish Army in the Principalities, and also to many of his subordinate officers. Kossuth's diplomatic agents, meanwhile, essayed to soften the civil governor, Fuad Effendi.<sup>1</sup> These activities were not in vain. Turkish officers kept their Hungarian counterparts informed of allied military movements and some arm and ammunition shipments found uninterrupted passage by way of Turkish territories to Hungary. Omer Pasha himself met a Hungarian member of parliament to warn him of Russian troop concentrations on the southeastern Transylvanian frontiers.<sup>2</sup>

The following report was sent to Palmerston from Turkey:

Two . . . unrecognized agents from the Hungarian Government, a Major Browne and Count Andrassy, are allowed to remain here and to communicate secretly with persons in the employment of the Porte. If I am rightly informed, even the purchase of fire arms for exportation to Hungary is not interdicted, and the means of conveying them to that country are already provided by Merchants engaged in trading to the Danube.<sup>3</sup>

When the allied representatives protested and informed the Porte that they considered any contact with the Hungarians

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<sup>1</sup>Waldapfel, A Független Magyar Külpolitika 1848-49-ben, p. 254-255.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from M. Berde to L. Csány, May 6, 1849, Deák, (ed.), op. cit., p. 365-366.

<sup>3</sup>Letter from Canning to Palmerston, July 5, 1849, Haraszti, op. cit., p. 229.

as unfriendly protestation towards their respective governments, the Sultan apologetically advised Major Browne to leave Constantinople but not without reassuring him that the Austro-Russian allied troops would not be allowed passage through Serbia.<sup>1</sup> In fact, neither was the Austrian General Malakowsky permitted to cross Wallachia and attack Hungary from the south nor was the Russian Ambassador Titov's request to let the Tsar's Fifth Corps to attack Szeged via Serbia granted.<sup>2</sup> The Turks, nevertheless, could not go much further in their undeclared support of the Hungarians without British approval. The British and French envoys in Constantinople espoused the Porte's new moves as a legitimate exercise in sovereignty not contrary to the Baltaliman Agreement, but at the same time they told the Sultan that he must refuse the Austrians and the Russians at their own risk and that they could not promise him any assistance in case of need.<sup>3</sup> Under the circumstances, Andrassy, Hungary's representative at the Porte, could see only one way of gaining Turkey's active support. He thought that it would be necessary to provoke an incident between Russian and Turkish troops, which would ultimately lead to an impromptu military alliance between Turkey and

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<sup>1</sup>Waldapfel, op. cit., p. 255 and p. 266.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from Sturmer to Schwarzenberg, June 13, 1849, Origins, op. cit., p. 289; letter from Browne to Pulszky, June 14, 1849, ibid., p. 194.

Hungary.<sup>1</sup> Bem invaded Moldavia in July but failed to produce such an incident. In any case, an alliance with such weaker forces as Bem's against Russia and possibly Austria could not be contemplated seriously by the Porte at this late stage of the Hungarian war of independence. Consequently, the Transylvanian Magyar Army (T.M.A.) stood alone against the Austro-Russian allied forces of southeastern Europe.

One of the two Russian infantry corps normally stationed in the Kiev area had occupied Wallachia since the summer of 1848. Smaller formations were assigned in conjunction with the Austrian troops to secure Moldavia. Several Austrian divisions lined up along the Hungarian border in Bukovina and in the Southern Carpathian Mountains. General Luders, commander of the Russian Fifth Corps, was in charge of all the allied troops in the area. Theoretically, he was subordinated to Field Marshal Paskevich, but once the high command informed him of the date of the planned simultaneous attack on Hungary, he was on his own. Only a general order containing several alternatives was placed at his disposal. According to the dispatch, which Luders received shortly after the signing of the Warsaw Conventions, his main objectives were to occupy Szeged, to defeat Bem, and to pacify the Székelys.<sup>2</sup> He could either proceed across the passes to Transylvania and along the Maros River to

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<sup>1</sup>Waldapfel, op. cit., p. 268.

<sup>2</sup>Averbukh, op. cit., p. 151.

Szeged via Arad, or follow a more westerly route and enter Hungary through the Banat reaching Szeged by advancing along the banks of the Tisza, or penetrate Serbia, unite with the Austro-Serbian and Croatian armies at Titel and take possession of the enemy's capital. Lúders decided on the first alternative.<sup>1</sup> Turkish reluctance to grant permission for an operation through Serbia made a westerly attack politically undesirable. To give priority to the siege of Szeged would have, in any case, left the relatively weak forces in Bukovina and Moldavia vulnerable to a possible concentrated assault from Transylvania. Both the second and the third plans would have required the lengthening of the Kiev based supply lines and the thinning of occupational forces in post-revolutionary Wallachia. In Transylvania, however, the allies could count on the support of large segments of the population: all the Saxons, some of the Roumanians and even a few Székely officers.<sup>2</sup>

General Lúders planned to have crossed the Carpathians by June 19. With 26 battalions, 16 companies of cavalry, 18 companies of Don Cossacks, and 65 guns he was to move from Ploesti to Hermanstadt (Sibiu, Nagyszeben), liberate the besieged Gyulafehérvár with the aid of 15,000 Austrians, destroy the Transylvanian Magyar Army (T.M.A.) and take Szeged together with Paskevich's forces. The Russians

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<sup>1</sup>Kovács, op. cit., p. 531. . . .

<sup>2</sup>Letter from N. László to Kossúth, July 5, 1849, Deák, op. cit., p. 398.



Lieutenant-General Grottenhelm's Fourth Corps consisted of about 10,000 men and it enjoyed the support of 3,000 Austrian regulars. These troops were to leave Bukovina on June 18. They were ordered to advance on Beszterce. After splitting the T.M.A. into two and destroying it in sections, Luders and Grottenhelm were to unite and open the road to the Hungarian Plain and to Szeged.<sup>1</sup>

In the absence of General Bem, the capability of the T.M.A. to defend the area against Luder's powerful army had greatly diminished. Discipline was lax and there remained a shortage of trained officers in the six divisions scattered throughout Transylvania. Troops were tied down by the prolonged siege of Gyulafehérvár. Another division waged an unsuccessful campaign against Roumanian guerillas. The government commissioners were remiss in their obligation to supply the T.M.A. adequately and enrolled unreliable Roumanian peasants to fight against their Russian co-religionists.<sup>2</sup> But there were also several promising signs. The Székelys, who constituted the majority of the T.M.A., were loyal to the government. By April, 1849, Governor Kossúth had already relieved them of perpetual military frontier service and had granted his loyal frontiersmen self-

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<sup>1</sup>Kovács, op. cit., p. 531-533.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 519-524.

government.<sup>1</sup> Bem promised them land, forest, and pasture and began their re-settlement on fertile lands abandoned by fleeing Roumanians.<sup>2</sup> The General then organized a Polish legion out of defectors from the Austrian and Russian armies.<sup>3</sup> He had at his disposal about 39,000 men: the First Division at Hermanstadt with 4,000 soldiers and 14 guns; the Second Division around Déva, about 6,500 men and 14 guns; the Third Division, reserve troops of 5,000 men and 2 guns defending Kolozsvár (Cluj); the Fourth Division, 8,000 men and 12 guns, near the Bukovina border; the 6,000 men and their 26 artillery pieces of the Fifth Division defended the Székelys' own counties; and the 5,500 soldiers and 14 guns of the Sixth Division held the Saxon town of Kronstadt. The rest of the army surrounded the fortress of Gyulafehérvár. All these troops had faced the first wave of Austro-Russian attacks in Transylvania on June 18, 1849.<sup>4</sup>

General Luders concentrated 21 infantry battalions, 16 Ulan companies, six Cossack companies and 48 guns a few miles south of the Hungarian border. At first he only sent forward less than half of the units to open up the Tömös

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<sup>1</sup>Letter from Kossúth to Csányi, April 27, 1849, Kossúth, op. cit., p. 147-149.

<sup>2</sup>Balogh, op. cit.

<sup>3</sup>Endre Kovács, Bem József És A Magyar Szabadságharc, Budapest, 1951, p. 34.

<sup>4</sup>Endre Kovács, Bem József, p. 536-539.

Pass.<sup>1</sup> This narrow passage, a mere ten miles from Kronstadt, was defended by less than a thousand Székely troops reinforced by 2,000 national guardsmen. After two days of savage fighting, Luders, led by Roumanian guides, had been able to circumvent crossing the Pass and threaten the defenders from all sides. The Hungarians were forced to withdraw and the Russian columns were now inside Hungary. But between them and Kronstadt, their immediate objective, still stood the fortress of Alsótömös where most of the Sixth Hungarian Division was gathered to arrest the Russian advance. Luders' batteries systematically pounded the enemy defences but it took four consecutive infantry charges to capture the fortress with its few surviving defenders.<sup>2</sup>

On June 20, Russian General Engelhardt crossed the Törösvár Pass encountering sporadic resistance in his path. The next day he linked up with Luders' forces and marched into Kronstadt. The Sixth Division of the T.M.A. was completely disintegrated in the struggles at Tömös Pass and the fortress, and only a few of its soldiers could reach the Fifth Division north of Kronstadt. The town was not defended.

Luders bivouacked most of his troops in the midst of the friendly Saxon inhabitants of Kronstadt. In anticipation of a decisive battle with the Székelys he diverted Lieutenant-

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 536.

<sup>2</sup>G. Balázs, (ed.), Bem Apó, Budapest, 1934, p. 69.

General Gasford northward and ordered Colonel Lein to penetrate the Székely counties from Bukovina. The Fifth Hungarian Division was too weak to withstand this pincer operation. On June 26 Gasford took Kézdivásárhely (Targul-Sacues), where he destroyed the Székelys' military stores and disarmed the local population. A few days later the columns of Gasford and Lein united and rejoined the Fifth Corps at Kronstadt.

Meanwhile, Luders began preparations for a westward strike and the capture of the other major Saxon town, Hermanstadt. His advance guards were about thirty miles west of Kronstadt, when intelligence reached him that the Székely population was re-arming and the Fifth Division of the T.M.A. was racing south towards Kronstadt. Luders dispatched Russian General Adlerberg with nine battalions, eight companies of cavalry and three batteries to intercept the Hungarians. When contact was made with the enemy, General Adlerberg found himself in danger of encirclement. On July 2 he withdrew, but poised his troops for an early counter-attack. The entire Russian Fifth Corps which quickly approached the newly discovered enemy positions was to assist him. Luders hoped for a decisive battle. Orders went out to the Austrian corps of Clam Gallas, still in Wallachia, to cross the Carpathians at the Törcsvár Pass and secure the Russian army's communication lines. Now all the fury of Russian might broke loose against the Székelys. At Sepsiszentgyörgy (Sfantu-Gheorghe) the Hungarians were

totally defeated and dispersed. Luders appeared to be in complete control of southeastern Transylvania. Pacification of the population was the new objective, and on July 9 the Russian commander issued a proclamation to the Székelys offering them amnesty for peaceful behaviour in the future. The document was also endorsed by the new local representative of Francis Joseph. General Gasford and Colonel Lein's troops continued to patrol the area. When Clam Gallas finally arrived from Wallachia, Luders departed for the second time to take Hermanstadt leaving the Austrians in charge of the area around Kronstadt.<sup>1</sup>

The Russian advance was made in two columns which were led by Luders and Engelhardt who covered less than ninety miles in ten days.<sup>2</sup> Because, in the meantime, the Hungarians evacuated Hermanstadt and marched north to unite with Bem, the Russian soldiers encountered no resistance until July 19, when they met the Hungarians who attempted to defend the Vöröstorony Pass, and who after a day's battle crossed to Wallachia and surrendered to the Turks.<sup>3</sup>

One month had passed since Luders had begun his operations in Transylvania, but neither the liberation of Gyulafehérvár nor the intrusion into Hungary proper had been achieved by him. Taking into consideration the fact that

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<sup>1</sup>Kovács, op. cit. p. 536-581.

<sup>2</sup>This slow troop movement was one of the characteristic features of Russian strategy throughout the invasion of Hungary in 1849.

<sup>3</sup>Balázs (ed.), op. cit., p. 70.

Lieutenant-General Grottenhelm had engaged the main body of the T.M.A. in northern Transylvania, it is almost impossible to evaluate favorably Luder's performance during the months of June and July. Because of his slow pace he failed to seek out and destroy the numerically inferior but agile forces facing him. In addition Luders hindered in his efforts by the lack of initiative on the part of Grottenhelm commanding an allied force of about 10,000 Russians and 3,000 Austrians who entered Hungary on June 20, 1849, via the Borgo Pass.

Grottenhelm advanced his troops in two columns keeping the command of the right column and entrusting the left one to Russian General Pavlov. The Hungarian border patrols were forced back with relative ease. Lieutenant-Colonel Dobai, head of the Fourth Division of the T.M.A., concentrated his defences around the village of Borgóprund, where the Hungarians would have been strong enough to make a stand if Dobai would not have forgotten about 2,300 soldiers waiting for his orders at Beszterce (Bistrita), a mere twelve miles away. Furthermore, he let the enemy form its battle columns without firing a shot at them. There was little fighting at Borgóprund for the Magyar division quickly broke into a disorderly retreat. Their inexperienced officers themselves panicked. After a short pursuit, Grottenhelm halted his troops at Borgórus but Dobai never stopped to look back until he and his men

reached the safety of the rampart of Dés, forty kilometers west of the new allied concentration.<sup>1</sup>

On June 24 General Bem arrived at Dés and, with his usual fire-brand style, dismissed the inept Dobai, issued a proclamation in which he promised the Székelys the immediate expulsion of the invaders, and began preparations for a counter-attack. He planned to cut a wedge between the forces of Luders and Grottenhelm and then deal with them separately, greatly underestimating the size of the enemy, whose forces he thought to be between twenty and twenty-four thousand. Bem's hastily reorganized division, previously commanded by Dobai, occupied Beszterce without a fight. On June 27 the Hungarians attacked the Russians near Borgórus, and after a long artillery preparation, tried to outflank the allies who outnumbered them two to one in manpower and three to one in artillery strength. Grottenhelm counter-attacked with his Ulan cavalry and won the day. Bem pulled back his forces to Beszterce, and the Russians also returned to their original positions. Grottenhelm ordered his troops to Borgóprund to prevent a possible Hungarian intrusion into Bukovina. His fear was unfounded for Bem was weakening daily although he did receive reinforcements in the form of the tough Polish Legion, but their four companies and half a company of hussars, a total of 500 men, were no compensation for the 3,000 Székely deserters who were reluctant to fight

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<sup>1</sup>Breit, III, op. cit., p. 145-148.

outside their counties in Transylvania. With his remaining 3,800 men Bem daringly occupied Beszterce without any interference on the part of Grottenhelm and dug in.

Finally on July 9 Luders sent direct orders to Grottenhelm to go on the offensive. Acting upon these instructions, without the inconvenience of initiative and responsibility, the Lieutenant-General attacked Beszterce in full force. The allied command was so self-confident that only frontal charges were ordered. Consequently, Bem's gunners were able to preserve the infantry and secure a disciplined retreat. After having occupied Beszterce, Grottenhelm remained inactive for a full week as if he had been hypnotized by the Polish General, and even after that pause failed to destroy the remnants of the Fourth Division of the T.M.A. who were slowly retreating towards the Székely counties of Transylvania.<sup>1</sup>

Bem took advantage of the lull in fighting, and leaving the Fourth Division, he embarked on a recruiting campaign in the Székely counties, and then attempted to reorganize the troops still in the area which had survived Luders' earlier offensive. Bem's appearance in southeastern Transylvania electrified the pro-Magyar population. Over 12,000 Székelys gathered at Csikszereda to enlist, but the general shortage of weapons and ammunition prevented him from

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 149.



employing all able-bodied volunteers.<sup>1</sup> Bem, nevertheless, in full agreement with Governor Kossúth, felt strong enough to break into the Danubian Principalities. He planned to cut Luders' supply lines thus forcing him to leave Transylvania, at least temporarily. Additional strength was to come from the allegedly rebellious Moldavians and Wallachians, Hungarians living in the Principalities and Turkish troops which might join in these anti-Russian military maneuvers. Kossúth sent Wallachian revolutionary agents to organize a Roumanian division. "If you would press into Wallachia," wrote Governor Kossúth to Bem, "the division (Wallachian) could form the avant garde . . . it is desirable that there we would be regarded as friends. Yes, I see the need to declare in a proclamation, that we are coming as the friends of the Turks and the Wallachs, to liberate them from the Russian yoke."<sup>2</sup>

Accordingly, Bem set out southward to sweep aside Clam Gallas' Austrian corps and then to cross the Carpathians into the Principalities. In less than a day he cleared the Székely counties of all foreign occupational troops. On July 20 he made a surprise raid on Clam Gallas who immediately pulled back to the vicinity of Kronstadt and signalled for urgent reinforcement to Russian General Dyck, whose units were securing the communication lines of Luders. The following

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<sup>1</sup>Balázs (ed.), op. cit., p. 74; Kovács, op. cit., p. 582-583.

<sup>2</sup>Gracza, V, op. cit., p. 593.

morning the Hungarians renewed their attacks and expelled an Austrian brigade and a Russian detachment from the border area. The road was open to Moldavia.<sup>1</sup> Clam Gallas concentrated all his forces for the defence of Kronstadt in the expectation of a new onslaught by the Székelys, but his patrols did not discover any enemy activity during the next twenty-four hours.<sup>2</sup>

At the Ojtoz Pass Bem separated his division into two sections. He instructed Colonel Gál to block the Olt Valley to secure both the Székely counties and the border area from Clam Gallas in order to have his rear protected. Then, on July 22, General Bem crossed the border and invaded Moldavia with about 2,200 men and eight guns.<sup>3</sup> On the eastern exit of the Ojtoz Pass only a Lithuanian rifle regiment of the Fifth Russian Corps was stationed. Once surprised, they promptly withdrew and later united with another regiment that Russian General Ustragov rushed to their reinforcement. At Onesti the Lithuanians were again defeated losing more than 150 men.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Jenő Gyalócai, "Bem Moldvaországi Hadművelétei", Történeti Szemle, V, 1918, p. 241; Kovács, op. cit., p. 581-583.

<sup>2</sup>Breit, III, op. cit., p. 167.

<sup>3</sup>Gyalócai, op. cit., p. 223-224; Kovács, op. cit., p. 584.

<sup>4</sup>Averbukh, op. cit., p. 151; Gyalócai, op. cit., p. 248.

It was in the political field where Bem's expedition was a complete failure. A proclamation issued to the population in the spirit of Kossúth's instruction found no response among the backward peasants living on the eastern slopes of the Carpathian mountains. Bem, nevertheless, penetrated deeper into Moldavia and issued a second proclamation urging the population to liberate themselves and join his forces which would help them in their revolutionary endeavour.<sup>1</sup> Some indigenous volunteers drifted into the Magyar camp but not enough to assist in the fulfilment of the expeditionary army's original task.

The allies were too strong to be shaken, except for the Russian and Austrian consuls in Jassy who panicked and prepared to move to Bessarabia.<sup>2</sup> The army prepared a swift rebuttal. Russian General Moller began concentration of larger units to oppose Bem in Moldavia. Tsar Nicholas's Minister of War ordered Iuders to block the Hungarian forces' routes leading to Galicia, where a popular rising could have been ignited easier than in the Principalities.<sup>3</sup> Clam Gallas turned on Gál with such vehemence that the Székely leader could no longer secure Bem's rear, and the nearly total collapse of communication lines prompted the withdrawal of the expeditionary Magyar units. On July 28 an emissary of

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<sup>1</sup>Kovács, op. cit., p. 586.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from Gardner to Canning, July 31, 1849, Origins, op. cit., p. 237.

<sup>3</sup>Averbukh, op. cit., p. 148.

Omer Pasha appeared at these forces and requested them to abandon all lands under Turkish sovereignty. The Hungarians had no more reason to refuse compliance, and obliged their Turkish would-be allies.<sup>1</sup>

The Moldavian adventure proved to be a fiasco. The Roumanians were depressed because of the recent failure of their independent movement. The invading army was also weak. The allies secured Moldavia well enough that Bem could not stay too long in the country, and finally, the Turks remained realistic and had no desire to partake in an uneven fight against Russia.

The forever optimistic Bem, nevertheless, refused to declare the Magyar cause unsalvageable. On July 28 he returned to Marosvásárhely with about half of the troops which had participated in the Moldavian campaign. The others returned only after an unsuccessful bid to gain the support of Omer Pasha. With unsurpassable agility Bem now more than tripled the enrolment in his army during a new recruitment. Kossúth was soon notified that the T.M.A. would march to Wallachia once Kronstadt had been reoccupied.<sup>2</sup>

When Luders received the news of Bem's return to Transylvania, he decided to concentrate all Russian and Austrian forces in the area against the Hungarian division under Bem's immediate command. The allies began these

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<sup>1</sup>Kovács, op. cit., p. 589.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 592; Breit, III, op. cit., p. 171-172.

maneuvers focusing on Marosvásárhely, the new concentration point and headquarters of the T.M.A. Luders' 12,000 men were the first to stumble on the enemy near Segesvár (Schassburg). The Russian advance guard promptly attacked but was repulsed by the troops of Bem. The Polish general lined up his army of 5,500 infantry, 500 hussars and twelve guns. Since Bem approached Segesvár from the east and not from the north, in the direction of Marosvásárhely, Luders remained under the impression that he was dealing with a mere demonstration and the main attack should be expected on the Marosvásárhely road. As a result of these speculations he split his troops leaving less than half of them to check the attackers from the east. Bem began the hostilities. One of the first victims of the initial artillery duel was General Skariatine, Luders' chief-of-staff. In spite of concentration against the Russian right wing, the Hungarian infantry failed to gain new ground. At two o'clock in the afternoon Cossack patrols reported that there were no enemy forces in the direction of Marosvásárhely. Luders quickly united all his troops and with a cavalry charge demolished the Székely right wing. When an infantry battalion tried to save the centre and the left wing by resisting the cavalry with a bayonet-protected square formation, the Russians rolled up a few light artillery pieces, broke the formation and left the rest to the cavalry. The whole Hungarian line collapsed. Bem suffered another disastrous defeat in which he lost 1,300 men, among them Sándor Petöfi, all his guns and

the baggage train. The ally losses amounted to about 250 soldiers and officers.<sup>1</sup>

After the battle of Segesvár the remnants of the T.M.A. fled towards Marosvásárhely. Bem arrived there on August 1 and in his nonchalant way reorganized his troops with the assistance of reinforcements received from Kolozsvár and within twenty-four hours set out for Hermanstadt. Colonel Stein was commanded to stop the siege of Gyulaféhevár and join him at Hermanstadt as soon as possible. When Stein attempted to fulfil this instruction his way was blocked by Russian General Gasford. The Austrian defenders of Gyulaféhevár abandoned their fortress to assist Gasford with a rear attack on the Hungarians. Out of twenty-four Magyar infantry companies only one and a half remained intact after the allied pincer operation. General Gasford then returned to Hermanstadt which he had guarded since Luders' departure for Segesvár.<sup>2</sup>

Following his victory at Segesvár, General Luders embarked on a relentless pursuit of Bem. It was reported to him that about seven to eight thousand enemy troops with seventeen guns were in the neighbourhood of Medgyes. Luders now sent 500 Cossacks to make contact with the enemy and then began to move his main forces in the same direction.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Urban-Vajanski, op. cit., p. 109-110; Breit, III, op. cit., p. 171-175; Balázs, (ed.), op. cit., p. 75-76; Gracza, V, op. cit., p. 641-643; Kovács, op. cit., p. 599-604.

<sup>2</sup>Breit, III, op. cit., p. 175-176.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 177.

Notified of the Hungarian troop movements, General Gasford took up positions north of Hermanstadt and was duly attacked on August 5, Gasford retreated and after heavy street fighting gave up Hermanstadt. Bem now divided his forces; a contingent under Colonel Forró continued pushing Gasford towards Wallachia while the rest of the army awaited Luders' attack in Gasford's original position. Luders arrived on August 6. Bem initiated an offensive operation but the Russian cavalry counter-attack proved overwhelming as so many times before during the Hungarian campaigns. Gasford also renewed hostilities which subsided earlier on the southern front and with the assistance of the Saxon Burghers defeated the Hungarians. The Transylvanian Magyar Army ceased to exist.<sup>1</sup>

Three days later Haynau beat the Hungarian Southern Army at Temesvár. Gorgei made the Western Army lay down

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<sup>1</sup>Professor Curtiss (op. cit., p. 302-303), wrote that Bem refused to believe that Luders was near and as a result the Russian general was able to destroy the Magyar army which foolishly challenged his overpowerful forces. Professor Curtiss also stated that the remnants of Bem's army fled into Turkey. Hungarian sources contradict these statements. Bem attacked Luders before the latter could arrange his troops into regular battle formations. The Hungarians took positions north of Hermanstadt with the exclusive aim of preventing Luders from returning to the Saxon town. As to the fate of the defeated T.M.A., most of the surviving soldiers returned to their not-so-far-away villages, a few surrendered a week later and only a trickle, in particular the Polish Legion, left for Turkey. (Breit, III, op. cit., p. 178-179; Kovács, op. cit., p. 610-613; Balázs (ed.), op. cit., p. 77-78; Gracza, V, op. cit., p. 653.)

arms at Világos. The fortress of Komárom stood the Austrian siege for another two months, but the allied forces had already pre-occupied themselves with the final pacification of Hungary and the establishment of a police state on its territory.



## CHAPTER FIVE

### AUSTRO-RUSSIAN MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE HUNGARIANS

The armies of tsarist Russia fought the Hungarian campaigns in a style reminiscent of the military traditions of Napoleon's period. While turning certain principles into dogma, such as concentrated mass attack in drill formation, the Russian generals retained a more flexible approach to the political aspects of warfare and a self-confidence acquired a generation earlier when Tsar Alexander led his troops to Paris. These postures contributed little to the common effort of the allies in overcoming the Magyars who were inspired by their newly found national consciousness. Another factor that adversely affected the allied campaigns in Hungary was the conclusions drawn by the Russian high command from the unsuccessful combined Austro-Russian intervention in Transylvania during the first quarter of 1849. Blaming the Austrian leadership for the failure, the Russian headquarters remained reluctant to cooperate or even coordinate further military operations against the Hungarians. Contempt and mistrust characterized Austro-Russian relations during the campaigns. Much of the ill feelings originated also from the antagonism of the two chiefs, Haynau and Paskevich.

In a letter addressed to Tsar Nicholas, Paskevich referred to Haynau as the "half-wit".<sup>1</sup> The Prince of Warsaw was infuriated because Haynau started operations too early, that is, before the Active Army could reach the Hungarian Plain. Less than two weeks after crossing the Carpathian Mountains, Paskevich stopped all troop movements and informed Russian General Berg, who was assigned to Haynau's headquarters, that he was unable to continue the campaign without regular Austrian supplies as it had been stipulated in the Warsaw Conventions. In response Haynau tried to reassure Paskevich that there would be plenty of food available at Budapest. Once the capital would be reached the Pressburg depots would become accessible, while further south the fertile Bacska district would support the allied occupational forces.<sup>2</sup> Just before the Battle of Vác, the Warsaw Prince sent Russian Colonel Zatler and Count Zichy, an Austrian commissioner, to Budapest for provisions. They had collected a good supply when, suddenly, Haynau confiscated all the provisions and wagons in spite of Zatler's protest.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore in a July 31 letter, Haynau demanded that Russian soldiers should hand over all booty because everything in Hungary must be treated as the "Kaiser's

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<sup>1</sup>Steier, I., op. cit., p. 203.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 166.

<sup>3</sup>A. P. Shcherbatov, General-fel'dmarshal kniaz "Paskevich, ego zhizn": deiatel'nost. Po neizdannym istochnikam, VI, St. Petersburg, 1888-1904, p. 114-117.

property".<sup>1</sup> In retaliation Paskevich sent no military intelligence to Austrian headquarters. Haynau complained to Radetzky:

. . .Uberhaupt geht es mit der Cooperation mehr als schlecht ungeachtet ich ihm täglich einen Courier schicke, um ihm von meiner Stellung und Vorfällenheiten Nachrichten zu geben, so habe ich seit 2 Tagen keine offizielle Nachricht von ihm, ich muss auch in Beziehung ganz im Finstern tapen.<sup>2</sup>

Paskevich also refused to let Grabbe participate in either the siege of Komárom or in the defence of the communication lines leading to Vienna. Then Haynau advised the Russian chief to send 20-25,000 troops to Szolnok and move the rest of his army to Nagyvárad. The Prince of Warsaw in his reply presented his request for support, stating that he had only 44,000 men to cross the Tisza thus he could not spare the soldiers. In fact Paskevich had 66,000 men at hand, but he wanted to keep his army heavily concentrated. And he had no desire to contribute to Haynau's personal glory.<sup>3</sup> The feeling was mutual on this latter issue. The Austrian commander wrote to Radetzky:

His [Paskevich's] aim was to have me defeated and then step forward as a go-between.<sup>4</sup>

Suspicion increased when the Austrians became aware of separate peace negotiations between their allies and Görgei,

<sup>1</sup>Steier, I, op. cit., p. 242.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., July 28, 1849, p. 239-240.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 224 and p. 234-237.

<sup>4</sup>Steier (ed.), Beniczky Lajos, August 18, 1949, p. 191.

and also of Russian negligence in guarding Hungarian prisoners. On the other hand, Paskevich openly reproached Haynau's treatment of the population in the reoccupied territories. He especially agitated against the Austrian official proclamations which "threatened half the population with death".<sup>1</sup> Paskevich's hostility was shared by the leading circles in St. Petersburg. Buchanan, British Ambassador, reported to Palmerston:

I believe the intervention is most unpopular with all classes, the Military included, and many persons even, who are of the opinion that it is better for Russia to take measures to arrest the progress of insurrection in Hungary, than to wait till it reaches Her own frontiers, do not hesitate to express the greatest disgust with the war, upon which she is about to enter and with the mismanagement of the Austrian Military Authorities, through which, they conceive, it has been rendered necessary.<sup>2</sup>

The intervention seemed very unpopular among the Russian officers. Many of them preferred garrison duty spiced with social events in the Galician homes of the local aristocracy, to the front line service. The Austrians soon became natural targets of their dissatisfaction.<sup>3</sup>

During the occupation of Budapest, Panutine's officers never appeared together with the Austrians at public places and even openly criticized them for boastfulness.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Urban-Vajansky, op. cit., p.93.

<sup>2</sup>Haraszti, May 5, 1849, op. cit., p. 183.

<sup>3</sup>Letter from DuPlat to Palmerston, May 3, 1849, ibid., p. 179; Waldapfel, A Független Magyar Külpolitika 1848-49-ben, p. 293.

<sup>4</sup>"Mikor a muszkák Pesten voltak", Függetlenség, April 7, 1887.

There were also some incidents. In a Debrecen inn some Austrians were ejected through the windows for saying that the Russians purposely prolonged the war. At the Russian headquarters there was a duel between a Russian lieutenant and Austrian Count Makezi.<sup>1</sup> A more serious confrontation took place in connection with the surrender of Arad. The Hungarians refused to give up their fortress to the Austrian commander of the siege operation but expressed desire, on the encouragement of the already captured Görgei, to negotiate with Paskevich's emissaries. General Buturlin arranged the laying down of arms to the Panutine Division. Haynau reluctantly had to agree to the humiliating procedure. Nevertheless, he secretly ordered Austrian General Schlick to occupy Arad conjunctively with the Russians. When Buturlin, suspecting foul play, warned Schlick that he would not tolerate any interference, the Austrian commander decided to disobey Haynau's order because he feared the eruption of an armed conflict between his troops and the Russians.<sup>2</sup> "One cannot but admit," a Russian officer recollected, "that at the time of the Hungarian campaign between us and our enemies there always appeared the most cordial relations, which one cannot say about the relations with our

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<sup>1</sup>Curtiss, op. cit., p. 309-310.

<sup>2</sup>Steier, II, op. cit., p. 266-269.

allies the Austrians."<sup>1</sup>

After Világos, friction continued to occur over the treatment and future of Hungarian prisoners-of-war. The reluctance of the Magyars to surrender to Austrian commanders and their drive to capitulate before Russian units infuriated the military of Francis Joseph. Haynau saw only treason in Hungary, and wanted to apply severe repressive measures. Paskevich, however, basing his policies on the Polish experiences, suggested the punishment of only the most compromised Magyar leaders. Zichy was asked by both Paskevich and Prince Constantine to approach his government on the matter of an amnesty.<sup>2</sup> The country needed a general reprieve in order to weaken further resistance. An amnesty would also enhance the reorganization of the country, eliminating the need for an excessive employment of military occupational forces. Paskevich listed these reasons in letters he forwarded to Francis Joseph, Schwarzenberg and Haynau.<sup>3</sup> Tsar Nicholas soon sent his son, Prince Alexander, to Vienna. An agreement was reached between the representatives of Russia and Austria according to which: amnesty was given to all soldiers and officers who previously had not served in the king's army; all Hungarians up to the rank

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<sup>1</sup>P. Bogdanovskii, "Iz vospominaniia o Vengerskoi i Keymskoi, kompaniiakh", Russkaia Starina, LXXVII, 1893, p. 244.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from Zichy to Schwarzenberg, August 8, 1849, Steier, II, op. cit., p. 367-372.

<sup>3</sup>Letters from Paskevich to Francis Joseph, Schwarzenberg and Haynau, August 16, 1849, ibid., p. 385-392.

of captain were allowed to join the Austrian army; all officers above the rank of captain could be tried by military courts, but none would receive a death sentence; and Görgei should be released.<sup>1</sup> Contrary to this agreement thirteen Hungarian generals were executed in the fortress of Arad in October. The Tsar wrote to the Government in Vienna: "The government of Austria broke its word made to my son. Following the unheard of cruelties that were carried on in the fortress of Arad, I deem it necessary to obtain material guarantees concerning future action, and I am forced to order Prince Paskevich to re-enter Hungary. . ."<sup>2</sup> The brigade of General Sass was ordered to re-cross the Carpathians at the end of November and occupy the Hungarian town of Bártfa, where it stayed until a new summit conference was arranged for Emperor Francis Joseph and Tsar Nicholas. To assure the Russians, Schwarzenberg began to imply the possibility of Austrian support for Russia against Turkey.<sup>3</sup> As a result the Active Army left Hungary. Although the amnesty campaign failed, the Russian officer corps found another way to express their anti-Austrianism, namely through their peculiar relations with the enemy officer corps.

General Sass and Colonel Krulov sent two pistols as

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<sup>1</sup>Dénes Pázmándy, "Az orosz beavatkozás okai és története", József Szász (ed.), Politikai Magyarország, II, Budapest, 1913, p. 156.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 159.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 159-166.

gifts to the Alsózsoltca camp of Görgei. The Hungarian commander responded to the courtesy with a similar gesture. He forwarded two modern fire-arms to the Russian officers. Private peace negotiations were initiated by several high-ranking Russian military men who often, during the ensuing conferences, openly expressed their dislike of the Austrians and their sympathy for the Hungarians.<sup>1</sup> This attitude was eventually translated into action.

The escape ratio among Hungarian prisoners was extremely high. Haynau complained to his Emperor that the Russians had not been guarding the rebels properly and as a result out of 30,000 prisoners, 15,000 fled within a week of their original capture.<sup>2</sup> In later years Hungarian veterans of the war of 1849 always mentioned the name of Russian General Anrep with great reverence because it was his humanitarian treatment of the honvéds that made the mass escapes possible after Világos.<sup>3</sup> Prince Paskevich kept postponing the transfer of prisoners to the Austrian authorities and even permitted many of the Hungarian officers to keep their swords.<sup>4</sup> Consequently the prisoners were able to kill one of the Austrian receiving officers when he attempted

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<sup>1</sup>Averbukh, op. cit., p. 156; Steier, II, op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from Haynau to Francis Joseph, August 18, 1849, Steier, II, op. cit., p. 355-358.

<sup>3</sup>"Az 1849-iki orosz invázió vezérei", Kincses Kalendárium, 1911, p. 342.

<sup>4</sup>Steier, II, op. cit., p. 332.



to collect their swords.<sup>1</sup>

Not all the pro-Hungarian sympathy present in the tsarist army was due to the resentment the officers felt for their allies. Some officials of Kossúth made efforts to inform the Russians about the political aims of the revolutionary Magyar government. Proclamations were translated into Russian and Polish and spread among the population with the possible understanding that the propaganda material would eventually find its way to the hands of Tsar Nicholas' soldiers.<sup>2</sup> It was through conversations between Hungarian prisoners-of-war and soldiers belonging to the minority nationalities of the Russian Empire that this propaganda campaign proved effective. At the end of June it was reported to Luders that the Hungarian prisoners were threatening the security of the Russian troops because they had a "certain moral influence" over the rank-and-file and even some of the officers. The prisoners were escaping by the hundreds with the encouragement of their Polish and Curland guards. General Gasford lost all his prisoners except a few Roumanians who stayed behind to volunteer against the Magyars.<sup>3</sup> Occasionally, Russian officers themselves

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<sup>1</sup>"Reminiszczenziák a magyar szabadságharc idejéből", Egyetértés, June 18, 1899.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from Kővári to Bertalan Szemere, June 4, 1849, Waldapfel (ed.), A Forradalom es Szabadságharc Levelestára, III, p. 34-36.

<sup>3</sup>"Magyar hadifoglyok az erdélyi orosz invázióvalis hadseregben", Vasárnapi Ujság, 1887, p. 9.

spread revolutionary ideas among their own troops and a few of them even changed sides during the campaign. Captain Alexei Gusev told his men that Hungary's cause was a just one and the Russian government was sending them not to liberate their Slav brothers, as they were at first told, but to put down the revolution of a free people. A clandestine organization was set up by Gusev and fifteen other officers for the support of the Magyar cause. However, they were exposed and a military court sent seven of them to the gallows and the rest of the officers to Siberian exile.<sup>1</sup> There were several further minor instances of co-operation with the Hungarians. Cornet Rulikovskii of a hussar regiment betrayed the outpost under his command and led a company across the front line to join the Magyars.<sup>2</sup> Ensign Vasil'ev and private Absamikov fought for Hungary but were later recaptured by units of the Active Army.<sup>3</sup> Twenty Russians changed sides near Szeged and another fourteen, soldiers from the Polish provinces, went over to the T.M.A. A few deserters also joined the Western Army while it was fighting the Panutine Division.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>"Vengerskaia v vesna", Pravda, March 31, 1948, p. 3; Curtiss, op. cit., p. 288; Urban-Vajanski, op. cit., p. 14-15.

<sup>2</sup>Spira, op. cit., p. 535; Curtiss, op. cit., p. 288.

<sup>3</sup>Averbukh, op. cit., p. 142.

<sup>4</sup>Letter from J. Ludvigh to Bertalan Szemere, June 21, 1849, Waldapfel, IV, op. cit., p. 114.

All in all, revolutionary activity in Paskevich's army was not significant enough to have bearing on the final outcome of the Hungarian campaigns. Captain Gusev's group was apprehended before it could influence other units, and desertion was limited almost exclusively to Poles who were attracted by the legendary fame of General Bem and the hope that he would eventually lead them in the liberation of Poland. And even their number remained relatively low. The short duration of the intervention prevented the spread of rebellion among the Russian soldiers. The majority of the tsarist officers, although willing to annoy the Austrians to the extreme, remained loyal to Nicholas. They were not the generation of the Decembrists but their Baltic German replacement.<sup>1</sup>

Prince Paskevich and his corps commanders went out of their way to gain the cooperation or at least the neutrality of the population. The Russian chief informed the people of Hungary: "The Russian Army is coming to your country not as your enemy but at the request of your King."<sup>2</sup> On entering Transylvania General Luders issued a similar proclamation, adding that the Fifth Corps will make every

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<sup>1</sup>During the Stalinist era several Soviet and Hungarian historians and writers tried to show the apparent greatness and progressive nature of the Russian people by accentuating the significance of revolutionary agitation and desertion during Paskevich's campaign in Hungary. Cf. Averbukh, op. cit., et passim; Béla Illés, "A Guszev-ügy", Magyar-Orosz Történeti Kapcsolatok, Budapest, 1945.

<sup>2</sup>"Inhabitants of Hungary", June 4, 1849, Gracza, V, op.cit., p. 486.

possible effort to preserve the life and property of the Székelys.<sup>1</sup> When General Sass of the Active Army entered Árva County at the head of Paskevich's avant-garde of 4,000 men, his manifesto had already preceeded him. Sass declared that he was coming as a friend to restore order and his soldiers would pay for everything they might need with cash.<sup>2</sup>

By and large the Russian commanders were able to live up to their promises and sustain good discipline among their regular troops. The news that the foreign soldiers treated the people properly and paid for all requisitioned goods spread quickly. Local authorities soon began to cooperate with the occupational armies,<sup>3</sup> while the generals sometimes used severe measures to discourage foraging and retributions against the population even when there was an occasional outbreak of guerilla warfare. Rudiger, for example, ordered a major to pay compensation amounting to three times more than the original damage to a farmer whose horses were stolen by the major's subordinates.<sup>4</sup> General Roth, military commander of Miskolc, punished harshly all

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 492.

<sup>2</sup>"Még valami az orosz intervencióról," Márczius Tizenötödike, May 22, 1849, p. 109.

<sup>3</sup>"Az oroszok beregmegyei szereplése 1849-ben," Bereg, December 27, 1914, p. 1-2.

<sup>4</sup>Lajos Hőke, "Emlékezések az oroszok 1849-ki hadjáratából", Vasárnapi Ujság, March 27, 1887, p. 212.

soldiers who attempted to harass the citizens of the town and in one instance reduced an officer to the ranks for such a violation--in spite of the Hungarian guerilla activities in the nearby Bükk Forests.<sup>1</sup> Travellers arriving in Vienna stated that the conduct of the Russian troops was most exemplary and afforded a striking contrast to that of the Austrians.<sup>2</sup>

Violations of the general occupational policies of the Russian high command did, nevertheless, occur. Most of the culprits belonged to the ranks of the Cossacks. When the Active Army moved into Hungary the Cossacks were pleased with the fertile country-side. They asked an officer, who later recalled the incident: "Please, your honour, is it possible to look for things there?" When questioned, they discreetly explained that they meant to forage for oats, but the real sense of it was simply to loot.<sup>3</sup> After the Battle of Vác, Cossack units burnt the fields and pillaged the homes of the nobles around the town. They drove away the horses, cows, oxen and sheep, and did not ignore the wine cellars of the neighbourhood.<sup>4</sup> In the north the Cossacks levied heavy contributions on the villages. From one of the smaller rural settlements they

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<sup>1</sup>"Az 1849-ki muszkavilágból," Fővárosi Lapok, November 24, 1876, p. 1269-1270.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from Blackwell to Palmerston, July 31, 1849, Horváth (ed.), Origins, p. 232-236.

<sup>3</sup>Curtiss, op. cit., p. 143-144.

<sup>4</sup>D'Artagnon, "Az orosz invázió idejéből," Pesti Hírlap, August 6, 1899, p. 18.

demanded 3,400 loaves of bread, four oxen and twenty barrels of pálinka.<sup>1</sup> There is also a recorded case of rape in the village of Stisne.<sup>2</sup> Some of the anti-Semitic Russian officers used their power to torment the Hungarian Jews. General Pamutine fined the Jewish community of Budapest for their consistent support of the Kossúth government.<sup>3</sup> Near the Galician border Jewish families were arrested and the male members were forced to spy for the Active Army under pain of death to their families.<sup>4</sup> On June 16 when Tokaj civilians allegedly fired upon Shcheodaev's troops the western part of the town was ravaged.<sup>5</sup> The towns of Debrecen and Losonc shared the fate of Tokaj. Once Debrecen was shaken by the Russian Fourth Corps, beside the expropriation of the food despots, rape and murder became so extensive that special orders had to be issued for the restraining of the occupational forces.<sup>6</sup> Losonc was also subjected to a methodical destruction because Hungarian guerillas attacked

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<sup>1</sup>F. Bay (ed.), 1848-49 a korabeli napilapok tükrében, Budapest, 1943, p. 176.

<sup>2</sup>Gracza, V, op. cit., p. 487.

<sup>3</sup>Mihály Horváth, Magyarország Függetlenségi Harczának Története 1848 és 1849-ben, III, p. 340.

<sup>4</sup>Egyetértés, June 18, 1899, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>5</sup>A. O. Streng, "Voina protiv Vengertsev 1849 goda", Russkaia Starina, CXXIV, 1889, p. 473.

<sup>6</sup>Letter from General Parrot to Schwarzenberg, August 7, 1849, Steier, II, op. cit., p. 69.

its Russian garrison. General Grabbe sent Colonel Kowalsky to re-occupy the town and punish the attackers. On August 7 the town was surrounded and set afire. Pillage, rape and the whipping of the town officials followed.<sup>1</sup> Later Paskevich ordered an investigation, and Colonel Kowalsky had to stand trial. All charges against him were dropped when it was learned that he had acted against Losonc according to the instructions of Count Forgach, an Austrian commissioner. Nevertheless, two Cossack captains were demoted for their behaviour in Losonc "unbecoming to the Tsar's army".<sup>2</sup>

Whenever atrocities were reported to the Russian military authorities, strict measures were introduced to preserve the good name of the army. As a result of these efforts, the occupational forces had little trouble with the population of Hungary. The anti-Magyar nationalities, Saxons, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Roumanians and Serbians gave armed support to Paskevich. During the second invasion of Transylvania, Saxon burghers attacked the T.M.A. while it was retreating through their town.<sup>3</sup> The appearance of the Russian Army, "the big brothers", filled the Slovaks and Ukrainians with pan-Slavic enthusiasm. Young men took to the forests to

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<sup>1</sup>Averbukh, op. cit., p. 176; Gracza, V, op. cit., p. 671-672; Steier (ed.), op. cit., p. 131.

<sup>2</sup>"Kormánybiztosok az orosz táborban," Budapest Hirlap, December 8, 1889, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup>Kovács, op. cit., p. 571.

avoid the Hungarian military levy, to fight national guards and to guide the Russians across the wide ranges of the Carpathian Mountains.<sup>1</sup> The Roumanian peasants performed similar friendly acts on the Transylvanian front. Serbians of the Hungarian Plain also co-operated with the Fifth Corps of General Luders.<sup>2</sup>

Although the Magyar population did not actually support the Russians against their own revolutionary armies, they remained neutral during and after the campaign. Russian occupational policy, army propaganda and the disciplined behaviour of the rank-and-file ultimately brought their dividends. The great majority of the Hungarians were weary of the long war which imposed heavy burdens on all classes of society. Many maintained that the benefits brought by the revolution were gradually cancelled out in the process of its defence. These factors made the Magyars receptive to Russian propaganda. Neutralization became desirable to both the Russians and the Magyars. Russian Colonel Osten-Korff described in his memoirs how calmly the Hungarian population received the arriving occupational forces. The Russian army's wounded soldiers were looked after even if they were left behind by their own units.<sup>3</sup> In one of his reports, Austrian General Parrot, Haynau's representative with the Active Army, emphasized the popularity

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<sup>1</sup>Spira, op. cit., p. 559.

<sup>2</sup>"Orosz betörés," Komáromi Értesítő, July 4, 1849, p. 486.

<sup>3</sup>Gracza, V, op. cit., p. 499.



of the Russians in the country-side.<sup>1</sup> At one time there was a widespread rumour that the Grand Duke Constantine had arrived to become King of Hungary. Paskevich wrote to Tsar Nicholas: "They want you or your son."<sup>2</sup> At Eperjes and Kassa special reception committees were organized and pretty girls holding flowers greeted the first Russian officers who passed through the city gates.<sup>3</sup>

Under these circumstances Paskevich's fear that an occupational army of 150-200,000 would be needed after the pacification of Hungary, proved unfounded. The Active Army began to withdraw to Poland by the end of August. After September only the Fifteenth Russian Division remained in Transylvania but they left on November 3. General Grabbe had departed a month earlier and thus before the year of 1849 was out the Russian intervention in Hungary was speedily terminated.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Curtiss, op. cit., p. 309.

<sup>2</sup>Steier, II, op. cit., p. 245.

<sup>3</sup>Egyetértés, June 18, 1899, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>4</sup>Gracza, V, op. cit., p. 807; Balázs (ed.), op. cit., p. 110.

### CONCLUSION

The seeds of Austro-Russian military co-operation laid in 1833 in Münchengrätz could not be brought to fruition sixteen years later in Hungary, where it was most needed. The causal relationship of the Münchengrätz Agreement and the tsarist intervention in 1849 was minimal. Austro-Russian relations were clouded by the Turkish question and by Nesselrode's diplomatic efforts to balance Prussia against Austria and vice versa. The alliance of 1833 rested on shaky grounds and when a real emergency arose in early 1848, Metternich could not activate the conservative forces of the three emperors. With the collapse of the autocratic regimes in Vienna and Berlin, the Russian government did not consider the Münchengrätz Agreement binding. Not even when the Habsburgs recaptured the reins of their state machinery would Tsar Nicholas I fight for Austria. The Hungarian question had no priority for the foreign policy-makers of Russia. Only when the flames of revolutions threatened to engulf his own empire did it begin to dawn on Nicholas that in order to save autocracy and preserve the indivisibility of his vast dominion, he must send troops against the Hungarians.

The Western revolutionary movement had spread rapidly towards the East. In 1848 a Polish liberation army gathered in Poznan and the liberals of Europe clamoured for a united front against Russia. In the Danubian Principalities enemies

of the Tsar captured the government and even within Russia mild tremors of dissatisfaction were detectable.

By the summer of 1848 events took a favourable turn for the conservative forces, but the Tsar remained perturbed because the Hungarians were trying to give a helping hand to rebellious Poles, Roumanians and liberal Germans. Internal developments in Hungary further increased the hostility of the Russian government.

The Hungarian reform movement under the guidance of Lajos Kossúth acquired a radical streak. The Magyars struggled for reforms, and for the creation of a new middle class and a modern European nation. When the threat of defeat endangered their newly obtained independence and freedom from feudal institutions they attempted to arouse the peoples of Eastern Europe in order to divide their enemies. The efforts of the Hungarians in rousing their neighbouring peoples were half-hearted and balanced by legalism. Their maltreatment of the nationalities within the boundaries of historical Hungary had its own detrimental effect on the international revolutionary schemes. Nevertheless, these handicaps were insufficient to lessen the anxiety of the Russian government. What prevented an effective intervention against Hungary at the end of 1848 was the fact that the Russians and the conservative circles of Austria misread the intentions of England and France. The Romanovs and the Habsburgs misunderstood the essentially non-aggressive nature of the French government and Palmer-

ston's East European policies which favoured the status quo to liberalism. The result was the failure of the first Russian intervention in Transylvania. Once Nicholas' ministers grasped that freedom of action was theirs, an effective campaign was prepared against Hungary. The successes of the Hungarian army against the Austrians during the spring of 1849 gave the last impetus to the decision to invade the territories of the Kossúth regime. Tsar Nicholas I viewed with glee the weakening of Austria, but her complete destruction and replacement by a revolutionary state was not what he had in mind. The intervention in Hungary became the most logical step in the interest of the integrity and conservatism of the Russian Empire.

Clumsiness, nonchalance, ineffective strategy and tactics characterized Paskevich's army which was entrusted with the task of suppressing the Magyar revolution. One may even say that the Russian soldiers won in spite of their leaders. The Active Army maneuvered as one single unit and as a result it was slow in its advance and incapable of pursuing fleeing enemy forces effectively. Allied co-operation was extremely limited. Neither the leaders nor the officer corps of the Russian armies were amicable with their Austrian counterparts. Nevertheless, revolutionaries could not make significant inroads in inciting the Russian soldiers to mutiny and large scale desertion. The lack of allied coordinated maneuvers remained the chief factor that grossly hindered the quick success of the intervention. The

more flexible units of Paskevich's army, the Panutine Division, the Cossack and Moslem cavalry, and the efficient Russian artillery were the ones which secured victory and prevented the few talented and highly efficient Hungarian generals from resisting the pressure of the tsarist armies despite all Russian weaknesses that had become apparent a few years later during the Crimean War.

The Hungarian armies were poorly armed and trained, underfed, ragged and very tired of fighting after their spring campaign. Most of their leaders competed with the Russians in inefficiency, disunity and their longing for peace. The nationalities in Hungary almost without exception supported the invaders and the Magyar population distinguished themselves by their neutral attitude. The Russian intervention became a success because, on the one hand, Hungary was in a state of near-collapse by June 1849 due to internal difficulties, and, on the other, the sheer presence of the mammoth Tsarist armies left little choice to the Magyar armies but to capitulate.

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