


THE ROLE OF THE 'ULAMA'  
OF INDONESIA (1942-45)

by

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This is the way  
the student signs  
his name



THE ROLE OF THE 'ULAMA'  
DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF INDONESIA  
(1942 - 45)

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A thesis  
submitted to the Institute of Islamic Studies,  
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, McGill University,  
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts;

McGill University, Montreal, Canada,  
1975.

ABSTRAIT.

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Titre de la thèse : Le Rôle des 'ulamā' pendant  
l'occupation japonaise de  
l'Indonésie (1942 - 45).  
Département : Institut d'Etudes islamiques.  
Diplôme : Maîtrise ès Arts.

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Cette thèse se propose de décrire l'évolution de l'Islam indonésien et le rôle complexe qu'ont joué les 'ulamā' dans l'histoire moderne de l'Indonésie, et plus particulièrement pendant la période de l'occupation japonaise.

Par opposition à la politique hollandaise, les japonais, quant à eux, choisirent les 'ulamā' afin que ces derniers participent à leur administration gouvernementale. Les 'ulamā' saisirent cette occasion imprévue pour préparer les indonésiens à obtenir leur indépendance.

D'autre part, les japonais essayèrent de "nipponiser" l'Islam indonésien mais cet effort échoua car les 'ulamā' les résistèrent.

ABSTRACT.

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Title of thesis : The Role of the 'Ulamā'  
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This thesis is intended to describe the evolution of Indonesian Islam and the complex role played by the 'ulamā' in the modern history of Indonesia and particularly during the Japanese occupation.

In contrast to Dutch policy, the Japanese chose the 'ulamā' to participate in their administration. The 'ulamā' seized this fortuitous opportunity to prepare the Indonesians for the achievement of their freedom.

On the other hand, the Japanese also attempted to Nipponize Indonesian Islām, but this attempt failed because the 'ulamā' resisted it.

### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.

For his studies at McGill University, first of all the writer wishes to express his sincere thanks to Professor Charles J. Adams in his capacity as Director of the Institute of Islamic Studies, who gave him the opportunity to study at the Institute from 1973 to 1975. Professor Adams as the writer's guide has in so many ways encouraged him to finish his M.A. at the Institute. The writer is also very grateful for his assistance in making it possible to do research for this study in the United States, during the summer of 1975.

The writer is indebted to his supervisor Professor A. A. Kudsi-Zadeh for his guidance, advice, and understanding in preparing this study. The writer's special thanks are due to him.

The writer's thanks are also due to Professor A. M. Abu-Hakima, Professor R. N. Verdery, Professor N. Berkès, and Professor D. P. Little, who offered him sympathetic guidance during the academic years of 1973 to 1975.

The writer is also indebted to the Canadian International Development Agency for its financial assistance, both for having granted a fellowship during the

years of 1973 to 1975, and for making possible research at the libraries of Yale University at New Haven, Connecticut, and Cornell University at Ithaca, New York, during the summer of 1975. The writer's special thanks are also due to the Indonesian Government who gave him the opportunity to study at McGill University.

The list of names whose thoughts, writings, and experiences have helped the writer in so many ways is too long to be included here, but his gratitude to them is no less deep. To mention some of them, the writer's debt is particularly great to his father, Professor T.M. Hasbi ash-Shiddieqy who gave him invaluable information regarding the attitudes and responses of the 'ulamā' of Sumatra; to Mr. T. A. Rahman Muli, who gave information on the rebellion at Bayu; to Colonel M. Diyah Haji, who gave information on the Pusa and the rebellion at Pandrah, and to present leaders of the pesantren of Sukamanah Singaparna, who gave information on the Kyai Zainal Mustafa's rebellion. The writer also expresses his gratitude to his close friend, Sudipta Maitra and Mr. A. Ripplin, who gave considerable help to him.

Finally, the writer wishes to record his indebtedness to his wife, not only for her help in collecting material for this study, as she travelled to Sukamanah

Singaparna in order to get information on the rebellion of Kyai Zainal Mustafa, but also for her understanding and patience at home.

May God bless all their kindness.

N. S.

Montreal, P.Q., December 3 , 1975.

### NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION.

In this study, Indonesian names and terms including words of Arabic origin, are written according to the system of Indonesian transliteration. In dealing with the perplexing problem of variations in the spelling of Indonesian proper names, Suwandi's method<sup>1</sup> is used. For all other words, the New Indonesian spelling system<sup>2</sup> is used.

Arabic technical terms and terminology not normally part of the Indonesian language are written according to the transliteration system followed by the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University.

The New Indonesian spelling system in comparison with Suwandi's method and the English transliteration is as follows:

Indonesian.		English transliteration.
Suwandi's method.	New spelling.	
tj	c	ch
dh	dh	z

<sup>1</sup>Being used by the government of Indonesia between 1947 and 1972.

<sup>2</sup>Promulgated on August 17, 1972.

Suwandi's  
method.New  
spelling.English  
transliteration.

dl

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## INTRODUCTION.

Josef Silverstein says, "Among political scientists studying Southeast Asia during the past decade only a few have shown their passing interest in the period of the Japanese occupation."<sup>1</sup> Silverstein's statement is valid also for Indonesian history. Unlike the attention given to the period of Dutch colonial rule, only a few scholars have shown their interest in the period of the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, in general, and in Islamic developments in particular. Harry J. Benda and Benedict R.O'G. Anderson limited their discussions to Java, and A. J. Piekaar limited his discussion to Aceh. Although these two areas deserve special attention, for Java is the centre of Islamic movements and Aceh is the most staunchly Islamic area of Indonesia, one cannot deny that other areas also have played a leading role in the political evolution of Indonesia.

In this study the writer attempts to trace the evolution of Islamic movements in the whole of Indonesia and the complex role the 'ulamā' played in modern history, particularly during the period of the Japanese occupation (March 1942 to August 1945). The 'ulamā' in this study are to be distinguished from the group of Western-educat-

ed Islamic leaders who also played an important role in Islamic political developments. Because they worked together with the 'ulamā' during the Japanese occupation, they are included in this study, while the secular nationalists, who were also active but did not work with the 'ulamā', are given brief mention only.

The study is divided into three chapters. Chapter one describes the role of the 'ulamā' as well as terms used in referring to them. In this connection the writer has chosen the terms used in three areas, namely Java, Minangkabau, and Aceh for the sample. Although there are 250 ethnic groups in Indonesia with, probably, every group having its own term for the 'ulamā', in the three areas mentioned above, the 'ulamā' enjoy greater influence in the community and their position is clearer than in other areas. In order to have an idea about the Indonesian 'ulamā', who they are, what their position is in the community, what their functions are and what they represent, attention should be given to the problem and development of these 'ulamā'. Before the Japanese occupation these 'ulamā' were divided into two groups, the kaum tua (conservative) which had great influence in the villages, and the kaum muda (modernist) which had great influence

in the cities. The Japanese, for reasons which will be discussed later, attempted to reconcile these two groups.

Thanks to this Japanese attempt, the open conflict between the kaum tua and the kaum muda which was concerned mainly about furu<sup>6</sup> (religious details) gradually disappeared, and from then on they are generally treated as one group in Indonesian politics.

Chapter two deals with the problems of the Japanese policy towards Islām in Indonesia. In contrast to the Dutch colonial rule when the 'ulamā' were excluded from positions of real political or administrative power, the Japanese chose the 'ulamā' to participate in their administration. The Dutch used the aristocratic group, that is to say the priyayi in Java, the kaum adat in Minangkabau, the uleebalang in Aceh, and elsewhere the rajas as the cornerstone of their colonial system. They even saw the 'ulamā' as a troublemaking element in village society. On the other hand, the Japanese chose the 'ulamā' in order to help them obtain a firm footing in the Indonesian world in which the 'ulamā' played an important role (in the Muslim community).<sup>4</sup> In order to gain the sympathy of the 'ulamā', the Japanese began to show their interest in Islām long before they invaded Indonesia. It was not a

surprise, therefore, that as early as 1937, Sjahrir said, "As far as I can make out, the whole Islamic population of our country is now pro-Japanese."<sup>2</sup> The Japanese also proclaimed that they would esteem and respect Islām, and that "liberated" Indonesia would even be set up on the basis of Islām. Shortly before they landed in Indonesia they beamed broadcasts to Indonesia in which they claimed that they were coming to liberate the country from the oppression of the Dutch Christian rule. Aircrafts dropped miniature Indonesian flags which, along with the national anthem, Indonesia Raya, had been forbidden by the Dutch. Thus, when the Japanese landed in Indonesia they were at first welcomed as liberators. In Aceh, even before the Japanese arrival, there was already an uprising against the Dutch.

As a matter of fact, it will be shown that the Japanese were not the liberators who would bring freedom to the Indonesians, nor were they men who would respect and esteem Islām. Rather, their policy towards the Indonesians was to carry out a plan to Nipponize the Indonesians, a plan which they had previously successfully carried out in Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria. The Japanese wanted to imbue Indonesian Muslims with their own

spirit, culture, ideas, and ideals. Everything in the field of Islām had to be put under their control, and had to become tools for spreading their culture and ideas. Muslim schools and pésantrens (boarding school) had to adopt the Japanese curriculum in which the Japanese language had to be taught. The Japanese, even during the first year of their occupation, banned the teaching of Arabic. The 'ulamā' had to join the latihan kyai (training course for 'ulamā') where they were introduced to the Japanese culture in order that they would spread it out to the people. These 'ulamā', even during their stay at the latihan kyai, were forced to perform the saikeirei (a deep bow towards the direction of the Japanese Emperor's throne in Tokyo), which was contrary to Islamic teachings. In the field of Muslim movements, the Japanese wanted to have only one single organization, instead of several movements which had existed since the pre-war period. This attempt had the aims, 1) to have a huge media to reach the masses so as to introduce their ideas and ideals, and 2) to control easily both the organization and the masses. Therefore, when the Japanese saw that the Majlisul Islam Alaa Indonesia (Supreme Islamic Council of Indonesians), better known as MIAI, was not a tool with which they could reach

their goal, the MIAI was then dissolved and replaced by the Majlis Syura Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), well known as Masyumi. The only institution with which the Japanese implemented their policy towards Indonesian Muslims was the Department of Religious Affairs which was established within a few weeks of their arrival. All of these matters will be discussed in chapter two.

Chapter three deals with the responses and attitudes of the 'ulamā' towards the Japanese policy. The 'ulamā' and Muslim leaders became aware that the Japanese would interweave Islām with Shintoism. Therefore they opposed the Japanese policy. In the field of Muslim movements, the opposition took shape in the proclamation by their leaders, that they would work together with the Japanese Military Government, but only on condition that a way be used which would not offend Islām. The Masyumi, which the Japanese expected could bind the 'ulamā' to their side while working on the Japanese plan, seized the opportunity given by the Japanese to organize the masses in order to prepare them to achieve their freedom. When the Japanese asked the Masyumi to stir up the Muslims to do a jihād<sup>3</sup> (holy war), this campaign became a boomerang

for them, for the Japanese themselves were kāfirs (infidels); they were not even ahl al-kitāb<sup>4</sup> (the people who have a scripture). Some of the 'ulamā' and Muslims chose their own way to show their opposition to the Japanese by inciting rebellions against them. Before the end of 1942, stimulated by the spirit of jihād, a 'ālim named Tengku Abdul Jalil led a rebellion against the Japanese in Aceh. This rebellion was followed by sporadic rebellions all over Indonesia. In December 1943, another rebellion broke out at Pontianak in West Kalimantan (Borneo). In February 1944, yet another rebellion broke out at Sukamanah Singaparna, and this continued at Karang Ampel in May, and at Lohbener in August in the same year. All of these three places mentioned above are in West Java. In February 1945, a detachment of Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air (Voluntary Defenders of the Homeland), better known as Peta, broke out in mutiny at Blitar in East Java. In May 1945, again, a rebellion broke out at Pandraih in Aceh. And, in September 1945, when the Japanese had surrendered to the Allies, the people at Lhokseumawe in Aceh took revenge by attacking the Japanese at Cunda. All of these matters will be discussed in chapter three.

One point that should be emphasized here is that the

information and data utilized in this study are based mainly upon secondary works. All that the writer could do was to have information from eyewitnesses of some events, especially on the attitudes and responses of the 'ulamā' of Sumatra towards the Japanese policy, and on rebellions at Bayu and Pandraih, both in Aceh. The reason is that, it is very difficult to obtain original sources, as most of the Japanese records in Indonesia were lost or destroyed. Moreover, the writer did not have an opportunity to do research on the problem in Indonesia itself. Therefore, this study can only yield tentative results.

## FOOTNOTES TO INTRODUCTION.

<sup>1</sup> Josef Silverstein, "The Importance of the Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia to the Political Scientist", Josef Silverstein, ed., Southeast Asia in World War II. Monograph Series No. 7 (New Haven: Yale University, 1966), p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> See Sutan Sjahrir. Out of Exile, trans. by Charles Wolf Jr. (New York: John Day, 1949), pp. 237ff. Sjahrir was then a leader of the Socialist Party. In 1937 he was living in exile in Banda Island. In 1947 he became the first Prime Minister of Indonesia.

<sup>3</sup> For more information on the jihād, See H.A.R. Gibb. Mohammedanism. An Historical Survey (New York: Mentor Book, 1955), pp. 57-58.

<sup>4</sup> According to the understanding of most of the Indonesian Muslims, the ahl al-kitāb are only Jews and Christians.

## Chapter One.

### THE 'ULAMĀ' OF INDONESIA.

#### 1. DESCRIPTION OF THE 'ULAMĀ'

Since eighty-five per-cent of the Indonesian population are Muslims<sup>1</sup>, Islām is an important part of life, and its requirements are understood and obeyed among a large segment of the population.<sup>2</sup> It is the most significant bond of unity among the Indonesians.<sup>3</sup> In the villages, faithful adherence to its precepts has become a cultural ideal.<sup>4</sup>

The 'ulamā', who holds positions of social, religious, and in some places, political importance<sup>5</sup>, are those to whom people ask questions, consult about their problems and get solutions and advice. For the people, a fatwā (legal ruling) by a 'ālīm', is a decision which cannot be argued. Their position in Indonesia, especially among the Muslims, is highly respected, and at times some holiness is also attributed to them.<sup>8</sup>

In Java the 'ālīm' is called kyai. The words kyai in Javanese denotes a venerated old man. It is

also related to the term guru of Sanskrit origin, which means teacher. Sometimes it refers to the Javanese empu, which literally means lord, master, smith. Empu, which means smith, is usually described in Java as a humble man, or honored person.<sup>9</sup> The term kyai is also still used to refer the heirlooms spears, kerises,<sup>10</sup> etc., which are considered to possess magical powers.

Nowadays the term kyai, which originally simply meant respected man or charismatic religious teacher, has come to mean specifically a 'ālim'.<sup>11</sup> During the Dutch colonial rule only independent 'ulamā' not belonging to the official scribes connected with the mosque were called kyais.<sup>12</sup> The official scribes connected with the mosque were called penghulus. The kyais were not always on good terms with the penghulus, because the latter were appointees of the Dutch government.<sup>13</sup> At present, all 'ulamā' in Java, whether they are independent or connected with the official positions in the government, are called kyais. Everyone who has a knowledge of Islamics and spreads his knowledge to society can be called kyai.<sup>14</sup>

Although most of the well-known kyais had been to the Holy City; Mecca, to perform the hajj, this was

not a necessary ritual in order to be called a kyai. On the contrary, not all hajis (one who has performed the hajj) were kyais<sup>15</sup>, although they were very much respected because of their pilgrimage. Some of the hajis were the agents of the incessant flow of religious rejuvenation. It was these hajis who continuously brought their society up to date with the universal community.<sup>16</sup>

Many of the kyais were heads of, or teachers at the pesantrens (boarding schools), which were located at the centre of villages. The pesantrens have been very significant in Indonesian history for spreading literacy and a certain independence of thought.<sup>17</sup> Even now, they are depicted as nurseries of the Muslim leaders who resisted colonial domination.<sup>18</sup>

Usually, a kyai refers to a descendant of the kyai founder of a pesantren. As a general practice, the head of a pesantren would be the son of the previous kyai. However, in the absence of a male heir the position could be taken by a son-in-law.<sup>19</sup>

In his classical role, a kyai was a specialist in the communication of Islām to the villagers. As a religious scholar, directing his own pesantren, he has long

occupied the focal position in the traditional social structure through which the monotheistic ideas of Islām have penetrated to the countryside.<sup>20</sup> As an independent group, the kyais have brought together the general moral doctrines of Islām. They worked among the villagers who wished to become a part of the great international Islamic civilization.<sup>21</sup> As they stood firmly guarding over the crucial juncture of relationships which connected the local systems to the larger whole, they came to be one of the most important cultural brokers, as Eric Wolf has called them, in pre-war Java.<sup>22</sup> Their enormous prestige and power in the villages was due to their performance of this broker function.<sup>23</sup>

Practically all of these kyais were exclusively educated in pesantrens, in a strictly orthodox, old fashioned system of education.<sup>24</sup> During their stay at pesantrens they strove to absorb the knowledge that was embodied in the soul and books of their teachers. The content of that knowledge was revealed from antique notebooks in the hands of the dictating kyai.<sup>25</sup> When they were students at pesantrens, they were called santris. These santris owed unconditional obedience to their kyais.

who were their spiritual leaders and teachers.<sup>26</sup> Some of these santris used to go to Mecca and Medina for several years to continue their studies. After their return with the prestigious title of haji, they used to establish their own pesantrens. Some of them obtained certificates from Sufi orders giving them authority to found branches of those orders in Indonesia.<sup>27</sup>

As they had been trained in the pesantrens, rising from their mats at dawn, cooking their own food, laboring by day in the field, and contemplating sacred texts by night which led them to an ascetic and disciplined life, the daily life of the kyai was very simple. Few of them had regular incomes. Others lived upon irregular revenues, from occasional gifts received from their santris, from the zakāt (religious taxes), and sadaqah (alms-giving). Some had rice fields or other cultivable soil, either as personal property, or as waqf (religious endowment) to their pesantrens.<sup>28</sup> In such cases, they often relied upon their santris for the cultivation of those lands.<sup>29</sup>

According to Clifford Geertz's thesis, the kyais began to play a role in the political field in the early twentieth century. This change of role was not an isolat-

ed phenomenon. It was related to the changes in the society as a whole, such as the interpenetration of a modern spirit into the traditional values, the breaking up of the traditional economic system, the restructuring of the class system within society, the trend away from individualism towards collective action, and the growth of nationalism.<sup>30</sup> Thus, because of the social changes and the influence of the kaum muda (modernist group), the kyais found themselves occupying a new political and social role in addition to the religious one.

In the words of Geertz:

"Under the pressures of nationalism, Islamic modernism and the whole complex of social transformations which have taken place in Indonesia in this century, he [the kyai] is becoming, or attempting to become, a new kind of broker for a different sort of society and a different sort of culture, that of the nationally centered, metropolitan-based, intelligentsia-led "New Indonesia". And, as such, he has increasingly found himself occupying a new social role pregnant with possibilities both for securing and enhancing his social power and prestige, and for destroying the essential foundations of it: that of local party leader."<sup>31</sup>

Geertz goes on to say that Snouck Hurgronje's book, The Achehnese, dealt with the 'ulamā' as he found them in 1892. However, the role of the 'ulamā' was changing at that very time. In Geertz's own words, this was "at the end of one era and the beginning of a new one."<sup>32</sup>

Geertz's thesis does not seem to be entirely correct. The 'ulamā' had played their political and social roles long before the beginning of the twentieth century. The Paderi war, which was based upon religious fervor as well as politics, led by a 'ālim' named Tuanku Imam Bonjol, took place in Minangkabau, west coast of Sumatra, early in the nineteenth century (1821-37).<sup>33</sup> Likewise, the Diponegoro war took place in Java in 1825-30, and the Aceh war, where Tengku Cik di Tiro was stirring up the Acehnese by the spirit of jihād to raise their weapons against the Dutch, took place in Aceh in 1873-1908.<sup>34</sup> These incidents show that the 'ulamā' started to play a role in the political and social fields early in the nineteenth century. According to Leonard Binder, "The responsibilities and the opportunities for the rural ulamas in the Middle East will remain smaller than those of the kijaji [kyai]"<sup>35</sup>

In Minangkabau, on the west coast of Sumatra, the 'ulamā' were called tuanku, or guru, or syaikh, or angku sieh.<sup>36</sup> Their students, who pursued religious knowledge in a surau (Javanese: pesantren), were called urang siak<sup>37</sup> (Javanese: santri).

According to a Dutch official, Verkerk Pistorius (1860), the prestige and the moral authority of the tuanku

were far greater than that of the kaum adat (native chiefs) because they not only preached, but also constantly awakened the people from their lethargic environment and urged them to strive for a high and noble life.<sup>38</sup> Perceiving this situation, the Dutch colonial government, on the one hand attempted to isolate the tuankus from direct participation in the nagari (village) affairs, and on the other hand, supported the kaum adat as the ruling elite.<sup>39</sup> Nevertheless, the more the Dutch sought to ally themselves with the kaum adat against the tuankus, the stronger became the symbolic value of Islām as a common bond against them.<sup>40</sup> Its rapid numerical increase and the suspicions of the ruling authorities made the group of tuanku a fertile soil for radicalism. The kaum Paderi (Paderi movement) in the early nineteenth century, challenged both the Dutch and the kaum adat.<sup>41</sup>

In Aceh, the 'ulamā' are called tengku. One becomes a tengku through study in a dayah or ranggang (Javanese: pesantren) away from his birthplace. One could not become a tengku by studying in the region in which one was born. He would drift from dayah to dayah absorbing what he could from each teacher, and then he would depart for the holy city, Mecca.<sup>42</sup> The Acehnese

assert , that no man ever becomes tengku in his own gampong (village). To be esteemed as a tengku in the place of his birth, he must have acquired his learning elsewhere.<sup>43</sup> Therefore, one who studies in a dayah is called meudagang, or meranto, which originally meant to be a stranger, to travel from place to place, to leave one's home area.<sup>44</sup>

By drifting from one dayah to another in order to be engaged in study, the candidate tengku obtained the experience which led him to stress that man's nature could be the basis of unity between men, even though social distinctions separated them.<sup>45</sup> He saw his own life in the dayah as a manifestation of common nature. These tengkus, therefore, appealed to men to act not as villagers but as Muslims, regardless of their social identification<sup>46</sup>, and that is why these tengkus attracted much attention and respect from the people. For the most part villagers and tengku coexisted, because their worlds did not interpenetrate.<sup>47</sup>

Snouck Hurgronje states,

"The mass of the people believe in the absolute truth of the ulamas' teaching, yet transgress it from their youth up. The ulamas are wont to conceal their aversion to such sins so long as forbidden acts and objects are not obtruded on their

notice. [When] an ulama [sic] goes beyond these everyday limits and travels about the country to enforce reform according to the spirit of the law, the respect he inspires increases to the highest degree...."<sup>48</sup>

Furthermore, Snouck Hurgronje states that Aceh was frequently swept by these tengkus who were of much greater weight in political life than either departed saints or living mystics.<sup>49</sup> In the Aceh war, which lasted for more than thirty years, the tengkus became commanders of the Acehnesse troops, and again, the first rebellion against the Japanese that took place in Indonesia was led by a tengku. Both incidents show that the role played by the 'ulamā' in the political field cannot be belittled.

## 2. THE KAUM TUA AND THE KAUM MUDA.

Early in this century, when Muhammad 'Abduh's reformist ideas spread to Indonesia, the 'ulamā' of Indonesia were divided into two groups. The first group consisted of those who rejected these ideas, continued with their conservative opinions, and became known as the kaum tua. The second group consisted of those who accepted the reforms and they became known as the kaum muda.

Geertz sees the kaum tua as made up, in general, of men who were old, rural, uneducated, and deeply pious.<sup>50</sup> To them, Islām was mostly fiqh (jurisprudence) and based mainly upon madhhab al-Shāfi'i (Shāfi'i school). In this connection, they rejected the validity of ijtihad (reasoning by deduction) and recognized taqlid (blind obedience). In their opinion, to follow an established fatwā of one of the fuqahā' (jurists) was a compulsion.<sup>51</sup> With this point of view, the kaum tua regarded the fuqahā' and the 'ulamā' or kyais as infallible. The kyai's fatwā was final and could not be argued with. Therefore, the system of education in the pesantren, or surau, or dayah, was learning by heart rather than understanding. The students did not dare to express a different view than that of the kyai.<sup>52</sup> On the other hand, many of the kaum tua were also concerned with sufism<sup>53</sup> and to this extent were somewhat more flexible, as shown by their greater tolerance towards both abangan<sup>54</sup> rituals and priyayi mysticism.<sup>55</sup>

The kaum muda were, in Gibb's words:

"... those who do care, and sometimes deeply, about their religions but who are, in various degrees, offended by the traditional dogmatics, and by the insistence of the conservative upon the traditional institution in the Muslim World."<sup>56</sup>

According to Geertz, a kaum muda was a man who was young, urban and educated.<sup>57</sup> To them, Islām is compatible with the demands of time and circumstances. Islām also means progress; it will not hamper the search for knowledge, the development of science, and the position of women in the society.<sup>58</sup> Consequently, instead of learning only fiqh, the kaum muda strove for the rediscovery of the true ethics of Islām, which they said should be found in the Qur'ān and the hadīth (Prophetic Tradition). In order to enter the world of contemporaries, the kaum muda tended to reject the 'inglorious history' of Islām, which had produced the taglīd mentality, a blind dogmatic obedience to the codified law.<sup>59</sup>

The kaum muda, therefore, were concerned, in part, with the purification of the faith by removal of the bid'ah (accretion to the teaching of the Prophet) which has obscured the teachings of the Prophet. They also aimed at the maintenance of the revival of orthodoxy against such subtle compromises with pre-Islamic beliefs and practices which have been performed by abangan and priyayi mysticism.<sup>60</sup> The kaum muda believed that a purified doctrine based upon ijtihād and with the revival of the true ethics of Islām,

could enable the ummah (Islamic community) to meet the challenges of social changes.<sup>61</sup> To them, the slogan of 'Return to the era of the Prophet' was in fact a reflection of the necessity to rediscover the true ethic rather than, as Jan Prins suggested, a retreat to the 'old glorious days'.<sup>62</sup>

The debate between the kaum tua and the kaum muda centers around the problem of the use of ijtihād in the interpretation of the Qur'ān. The kaum muda argue that it is man's right and duty to use his individual reason to apply the principles of the Qur'ān to the problems of his time. Refusing to do so is to commit the error of jumūd (stagnation) and taqlīd. On the other hand, the kaum tua believe that a Muslim who does not thoroughly know Arabic, the Qur'ān, the sunnah (tradition) of the Prophet, the writing of the fuqahā', and the qiyās (science of analogy), is not equipped to make his own interpretations of Islamic law. If one is not a scholar, the guidance and authority of the 'ulamā' are indispensable, and it would be wrong to brand obedience to the 'ulamā' as taqlīd.<sup>63</sup>

Furthermore, the manner in which 'ibādah (worship) should be observed has also been an issue between the two.

These differences arise from various interpretations of the fiqh. Although most of the 'ibādāt in dispute did not involve the basic faith, they were, nevertheless, significant and even carried to extremes.<sup>64</sup> Tension rose to the point where the kaum tua would not go to the same mosque with the kaum muda. The kaum tua even considered opening a book by 'Abduh as a mortal sin which would lead to blindness.<sup>65</sup> The kaum muda sneered at the kaum tua beliefs as 'kuburan dan ganjaran' (grave and reward) religion, by which they meant that it was largely concerned with life in the hereafter.<sup>66</sup> In the eyes of the kaum muda, the kaum tua had fallen into bid'ah practices to such an extent that accretions to the religion were considered as if they had been derived from the practices of the Prophet. It was true that many of the kaum tua, especially the tariqat (sufi order) people, entertained ideas and carried out practices which ran counter to tawhīd (belief in the oneness of God).<sup>67</sup> On the other hand, in the eyes of the kaum tua, the kaum muda were committing harām (forbidden by religion) by adopting Western methods, as in education, and had Western habits, as in clothing.<sup>68</sup>

Geertz, in his Religion of Java, lists five ques-

tions on which kaum muda thought found itself at variance with that of the kaum tua. This analysis was based on his research in Pare, Mojokuto in East Java. First , the kaum tua tended to take a fatalistic view of man's relationship with God, whereas the kaum muda emphasized the virtue of human effort. Second , the kaum tua tended to deny a distinction between secular and religious life and insisted that religion penetrated all departments of life, whereas the kaum muda tended to operate as though there was a degree of independence between the two. Third, the kaum tua tended to be ready to accept an accommodation with non-Islamic beliefs and rituals, whereas the kaum muda insisted upon the purification of the faith. Fourth , the kaum tua tended to emphasize the reality of religious experience, whereas the kaum muda tended to stress outward behavior. Fifth , the kaum tua tended to be more scholastic in their approach to the faith, whereas the kaum muda stressed reason and used practical arguments to justify particular actions.<sup>69</sup>

In addition, there was the opposition between the kaum tua, who relied on custom and detailed scholastic learning, and the kaum muda, who tended to take general injunctions from the Qur'ān and justified them pragmati-

cally. These, then, were the dimensions along which doctrinal distinctions within the ummah tended to arrange themselves: a 'fated' life versus a 'self-determined' one; a 'totalistic' view of religion versus a 'narrowed' one; a more 'syncretic' Islām versus a 'pure' one; an interest in 'religious experience' versus an emphasis on 'the instrumental aspect of religion'; the justification of practice by 'custom' and 'scholastic learning' versus justification by the 'spirit of the Qur'ān and the hadīth' generally and pragmatically.<sup>70</sup>

The kaum tua were supported mainly by the rural 'ulamā' and by those who were directly influenced by the latter. In order to cope with the competitive influence of the kaum muda, which had arisen within the modernist Muslim movement, the Muhammadiyah<sup>71</sup> (established in 1912), the kaum tua set up an organization of their own, named Nahdlatul Ulama.<sup>72</sup> Thanks to this organization which was established in 1926, the kaum tua could take at least some measures to face the growing influence of the kaum muda in rural society.<sup>73</sup>

Today, most of the differences between the kaum tua and the kaum muda have been eroded by the passing of time.<sup>74</sup> Although the doctrinal differences between the

two groups still persists and a certain degree of antagonism continues to be manifested concerning them, in general both sides began to claim that they merely differed from each other in the furū (detail of Islamic law), but were in agreement as far as usūl (principles) were concerned.<sup>75</sup> They began to realize that their basic creed, embodied in what is called rukun Islam (the pillar of Islām), and rukun iman (the pillar of faith) were the same.<sup>76</sup>

The causes for the reconciliation between the two groups were many. Besides the fact that there was little distinction between their basic creed, the kyais and their village followers began to come into increasing contact with the modern world. At the same time some of their sons moved into towns where the influence of the kaum muda had been rooted, and some of the kaum tuas' daughters married the sons of the kaum muda, or vice versa, bringing the two groups closer together. The process of reconciliation took shape, on the kaum tua side, by their acceptance of the kaum muda innovations in organization, such as the foundation of the Nahdlatul Ulama, and on the kaum muda side, by the abandonment of an intensive attempt to force reformist interpretation of the furū upon the ummah.<sup>77</sup>

Thanks to the Japanese attempt to reconcile these two groups, they sat together in the Masyumi (this matter will be discussed in chapter two), quickening the process of reconciliation. The debate on the furū between the two faded and was replaced by common activities in order to reach the same goal. They had the same views towards the Japanese policy. The two groups joined hands, both to resist Nipponization of Islām and to prepare the Indonesian people for the achievement of their freedom. From then on the two groups were generally treated as one group in Indonesian politics.<sup>78</sup>

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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER ONE.

<sup>1</sup>Rosihan Anwar, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia", Robert O. Tilman, ed. Man, State, and Society in Contemporary Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 115.

<sup>2</sup>See Clifford Geertz, "Religious Belief and Economic Behavior in a Central Javanese Town: Some Preliminary Consideration", in Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. IV, No. 2 (January, 1956), pp. 132-159.

<sup>3</sup>Harry J. Benda, "Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-45", in Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia. Monograph Series No. 18 (New Haven: Yale University, 1972), p. 38.

<sup>4</sup>Justus M. van der Kroef. Indonesia in the Modern World, 2 vols. (Bandung: Masa Baru, 1959), I:190.

<sup>5</sup>Harry J. Benda, James K. Irikura, and Koichi Kishi. Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia, Selected Document. Translation Series No. 6 (New Haven: Yale University, 1965), p. 73.

<sup>6</sup>Muhammad Natsir. Capita Selecta (Bandung, s' Gravenhage: W. van Hoeve, 1954), p. 133.

<sup>7</sup>Clifford Geertz. The Religion of Java (Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 1960), p. 122.

<sup>8</sup>See Hasan Shadaly, "A Preliminary Study on the Impact of Islam on a Community and Its Culture in Indonesia". Unpublished M.A. thesis (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1955), p. 155.

<sup>9</sup>W. H. Rassers. Panji, the Cultural Hero. A Structural Study of Religion in Java (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1957), p. 14

<sup>10</sup>For more information on the keris see Ibid, // pp. 219-297; see also Werner Forman. Swords and Daggers of Indonesia (London: Spring Books, n.d.), pp. 8, 14, 16, and 21 to 33).

<sup>11</sup>Clifford Geertz, "The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker", in Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. II, No. 2 (January, 1960), p. 232.

<sup>12</sup>Geraldus W.J. Drewes, "Indonesia: Mysticism and Activism", Gustav E. von Grunebaum, ed. Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 309.

<sup>13</sup>F.H. Naerssen. Culture Contact and Social Conflict in Indonesia (New York: Southeast Asia Institute, 1947), p. 12.

<sup>14</sup>Samudja Asjari, "Kedudukan Kyai Dalam Pondok Pesantren" (The Position of the Kyai in a Pesantren). Unpublished Drs. thesis (Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University, 1967), p. 177.

<sup>15</sup>Geertz, "The Javanese Kijaji", pp. 232-233.

<sup>16</sup>C. Snouck Hurgronje. Mekka in the Later Part of the Nineteenth Century, trans. by J.H. Monahan (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1931), p. 238. The Dutch also excluded hajis from administrative power. When a certain haji was appointed as a tuanku laras (chief of the district) in Padang, in November 1873, in less than a month the Governor of the West Coast of Sumatra issued a statement that it was unwise to choose a haji for any governmental post; see Taufiq Abdullah, "Minangkabau 1900-1927. Preliminary Studies in Social Development". Unpublished M.A. thesis (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1963), pp. 41-42.

<sup>17</sup>James L. Peacock. Indonesia: An Anthropological Perspective (Pacific Palisades, California: Good Year Publishing Company, Inc., 1973), p. 25.

<sup>18</sup> See al-Djami'ah, th. IV, No. 5-6 (September-November, 1965, Jogjakarta, 1965), p. 96; see also B.J. Boland. The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 7.

<sup>19</sup> Asjari, "Kedudukan Kyai", p. 177.

<sup>20</sup> See R. Redfield. Peasant Society and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 67-104.

<sup>21</sup> Geertz, "The Javanese Kijaji", pp. 233-234.

<sup>22</sup> See Eric Wolf, "Aspect of Group Relations. in a Complex Society", in American Anthropologist, Vol. 88, No. 6 (December, 1956), pp. 1065-1078.

<sup>23</sup> Geertz, "The Javanese Kijaji", p. 230.

<sup>24</sup> Sudjoko Prasodjo, M. Zamroni, M. Mastuhu, Soedjono Goenari, Nur Cholis Madjid, M. Dawam Rahardjo. Profil Pesantren (Profile of Pesantren) (Jakarta: Tawang Alun, 1974), p. 47.

<sup>25</sup> See Drewes, "Indonesia", pp. 298-299.

<sup>26</sup> Naerssen. Culture Contact, p. 12.

<sup>27</sup> Peacock. Indonesia, pp. 24-25.

<sup>28</sup> Asjari, "Kedudukan Kyai", pp. 178-180.

<sup>29</sup> C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze. Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia (The Hague: W. van Hoeve; 1958), p. 46.

<sup>30</sup> See Justus M. van der Kroef. Indonesian Social Evolution (Amsterdam: N.V. Boekhandel Antiquariaat en Uitgeverij, C.P.J. van der Peet, 1958), pp. 161ff; W.F. Wertheim. Indonesian Society in Transition. A Study of Social Change (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1956), pp. 39-46

<sup>31</sup>Geertz, "The Javanese Kijaji", p. 230.

<sup>32</sup>Idem, The Religion of Java, p. 124.

<sup>33</sup>For more information on the Paderi war, see Muhammad Radjab. Perang Paderi (Paderi War). (Jakarta: P.N. Balai Pustaka, 1965).

<sup>34</sup>For a good account in English of the Achehnese war, see F.S. de Klerk. History of the Netherlands Indies (Rotterdam: W.L. & J. Brusse, 1938), Vol. II, pp. 342ff.

<sup>35</sup>Leonard Binder, "Islamic Tradition and Politics: The Kijaji and the Alim", in Comparative Study in Society and History, Vol. II, No. 2 (January, 1960), p. 255.

<sup>36</sup>Abdullah, "Minangkabau", p. 27; Natsir. Capita, p. 133.

<sup>37</sup>Abdullah, "Minangkabau", p. 27.

<sup>38</sup>Quoted in Ibid, p. 30.

<sup>39</sup>Alfian, "Islamic Modernism in Indonesian Politics. The Muhammadiyah Movement During the Dutch Colonial Period (1912-1942)". Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1969), p. 391.

<sup>40</sup>Ailsa Zainuddin. A Short History of Indonesia (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1970), p. 170.

<sup>41</sup>Alfian, "Islamic Modernism", p. 391.

<sup>42</sup>Peacock. Indonesia, p. 24.

<sup>43</sup>C. Snouck Hurgronje. The Achehnese, 2 vols., trans. by A.W.S. Sullivan (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1906), II: 25.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid, p. 26.

<sup>45</sup>James T. Siegel. The Rope of God (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 58.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid, p. 77.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid, p. 59.

<sup>48</sup>Hurgronje. The Achehnese, I:160.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid, I:165.

<sup>50</sup>Geertz. Religion of Java, p. 163.

<sup>51</sup>Deliar Noer. The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 300.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid, p. 301.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid, p. 300.

<sup>54</sup>For a discussion on abangan, see Robert Reneville Jay. "Santri and Abangan. Religious Schism in Rural Central Java". Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1957).

<sup>55</sup>Geertz. Religion of Java, p. 153.

<sup>56</sup>H.A.R. Gibb. Modern Trends in Islam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 52-53.

<sup>57</sup>Geertz. The Religion of Java, p. 163.

<sup>58</sup>Noer. The Modernist, p. 302.

<sup>59</sup>See W.C. Smith. Islam in Modern History (New York: Princeton University, 1959), pp. 11-47.

<sup>60</sup>J.D. Legge. Indonesia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 54.

<sup>61</sup>Abdullah, "Minangkabau", p. 95.

<sup>62</sup>See Jan Prins, "Some Notes about Islam and Politics in Indonesia", in Die Welt des Islam, No. 6 (1959-61), pp. 117-129. Quoted in Abdullah, "Minangkabau", p. 95.

<sup>63</sup>Anwar, "Islam and Politics", p. 119.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid.

<sup>65</sup>Geertz. The Religion of Java, p. 139.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid, p. 150.

<sup>67</sup>Noer. The Modernist, p. 303.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid.

<sup>69</sup>See Geertz. The Religion of Java, pp. 149-150.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid, p. 160.

<sup>71</sup>For a discussion on Muhammadiyah, see Mukti Ali, "The Muhammadiyah Movement. A Bibliographical Introduction". Unpublished M.A. thesis (Montreal: McGill University, 1957), and Howard M. Federspiel, "The Muhammadiyah. A Study of an Orthodox Islamic Movement in Indonesia", in Indonesia, 10 (October 1970).

<sup>72</sup>For a discussion on Nahdlatul Ulama, see Mochtar Naim, "The Nahdlatul Ulama Party (1952-1955)". Unpublished M.A. thesis (Montreal: McGill University, 1960).

<sup>73</sup>Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 46. For a discussion of a rivalry between Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, see

Herbert Feith. The Indonesian Election of 1955 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1957), pp. 33-35.

<sup>74</sup>Anwar, "Islam and Politics", p. 119.

<sup>75</sup>Noer. The Modernist, p. 317.

<sup>76</sup>See M. Rasjidi, "Unity and Diversity in Islam", Kenneth W. Morgan, ed. Islam - The Straight Path (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1958), pp. 412-415.

<sup>77</sup>See Geertz. The Religion of Java, pp. 141-142.

<sup>78</sup>Harun Nasution, "The Islamic State in Indonesia: The Rise of the Ideology, the Movement for Its Creation and the Theory of the Masyumi". Unpublished M.A. thesis (Montreal: McGill University, 1965), p. iv.

## Chapter Two.

### JAPANESE POLICY TOWARDS ISLAM IN INDONESIA.

#### 1. NIPPONIZATION OF INDONESIAN MUSLIMS.

The first great propaganda campaign undertaken by the Japanese was an attempt to bring about rapid Nipponization<sup>1</sup>, and the people were forced to accept Nipponism.<sup>2</sup> It was not concerned with emphasizing Indonesian political development nor with protecting Islām as the Japanese claimed was their intention in liberating Indonesians from the Dutch colonial rule. To Nipponize the people meant to dominate the politics, economics, and culture of the occupied areas by the Japanese own system and culture. This system had previously been applied successfully in Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria.<sup>3</sup>

To this end, the first thing that had to be purged was the penetration of Western and Arab influences. The Japanese considered these influences to be "foreign" and harmful and should, therefore, be replaced by that of their own.<sup>4</sup> Likewise, the Japanese wanted to make their language the lingua franca of Asia and regarded the language programme as the necessary first step in their plan to introduce Japanese culture.<sup>5</sup> The Japanese realized

that this plan would require no short period of time. Thus, during the preparatory period, the Japanese language was introduced throughout the country to the extent that it would be predominant.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, in every issue of the newspaper, Asia Raya, there was language instruction in Japanese.<sup>7</sup>

Furthermore, in their policy to Nipponize the Indonesians, Japanese textbooks, Japanese official terms, and Japanese holidays were introduced as well as the duty of saikerei, which the Muslims regarded as shirk (polytheism).<sup>8</sup> At the same time, beginning with the youth, the Indonesians were to be made into a second "Japanese" people imbued with the Japanese spirit, traditions, and culture.<sup>9</sup> For this purpose the Japanese set up an organization named Seinendan (Youth Corps) which had its branches throughout the country. To this organization, the youth were introduced with the purpose of making them used to Japanese traditions and culture.<sup>10</sup>

The Japanese considered that education was one of the most important instruments for the penetration of Japanese ideas and culture into Indonesian life.<sup>11</sup> This can be seen in a statement of a member of the Military Administration of Singapore:

"The most profound of all means available to propaganda is education. This can be shaped and altered at will to suit the policy to be propagandized. From early childhood the child's mind can be made to assimilate teachings which are conducive to the creation of a feeling of loyalty and to the awakening of a national consciousness."<sup>12</sup>

The first act of this attempt was to close all schools in order to cleanse them of Western and Arab influences, and to prepare a Nipponization program.<sup>13</sup> On March 7, 1942, all schools, whatever their descriptions, were officially closed. This lasted till April 29, the date of the Japanese Emperor's birthday, when government schools and private primary schools using Indonesian or vernacular as their vehicular language could be re-opened. Government schools had to notify the local authorities when resuming their activities, and private schools needed to obtain a special permit before re-opening. All other schools remained closed or were closed again until further notice.<sup>14</sup>

Regarding the Japanese policy towards Islām, which they considered to be "one of the most effective means to penetrate the spiritual recesses of Indonesian life"<sup>15</sup>, the Japanese made a significant departure. The Muslim's idea of Pan-Islam had to be replaced by the Pan-Asiatic Movement, where the Japanese were the leaders.<sup>16</sup> In this

respect, the Japanese considered that the Arab influence should be reduced or removed totally. Therefore, schools using Arabic as their vehicular language were not permitted to re-open. During the first year of their occupation, the Japanese endeavored to ban the teaching of Arabic even in religious schools or pesantren.<sup>17</sup> Even the teaching of the Arabic script which was not only used for writing Arabic but also used for writing Malay, was not permitted. An order was issued by the Education Office of the Jakarta Special Municipality which forbade the teaching of Arabic in all primary schools within its jurisdiction.<sup>18</sup> Although the Muslims made some endeavors to get permits to re-open private schools with Arabic as their vehicular language, only those schools in which Arabic had been replaced by Japanese received the permit.<sup>19</sup>

It was not surprising that this policy made the Muslims question their religious liberty. Unrest among the Muslims began to appear. Knowing the sentiments of the Muslims, by the end of 1942, the Japanese took care not to express themselves openly as being anti-Arabic. Perhaps, the Japanese had realized that it was impossible to deny Muslims the right to teach the Qur'an in Arabic. For the Muslims, prohibiting the teaching of Arabic had

the same meaning as prohibiting the teaching of the Qur'ān. As a result, on September 10, 1942, the final regulation concerning the re-opening of Arabic schools was published. In this regulation, Japanese and Indonesian were to be taught side by side with Arabic.<sup>20</sup> But Arabic textbooks needed the approval of the Department of Religious Affairs.<sup>21</sup>

After having thus far incidentally and indirectly modified the curricula of the religious schools, the Japanese attempted more general provisions. A combination of the items on the government primary school curriculum and those of the religious school curriculum were moulded into one new curriculum.<sup>22</sup> Thus, the Japanese succeeded in improving their own standard curriculum in return for the freedom of teaching Arabic.

In the words of Benda:

"Admitting its use for purposes of religious instruction, they yet succeeded in making it conditional on the acceptance of their own standard curriculum in non-religious subjects and - more important still - on the teaching of their own language in addition to Arabic."<sup>23</sup>

After a complete remoulding of the school system with increased supervision of Muslim educational activities on all levels, a new form of institution for adult education was created. This institution provided a

short course indicated by the rather militaristic term latihan (training).<sup>24</sup> These latihans were established all over the country. The length of training varied as did the general objectives. They were held periodically, each lasting about two or three weeks. All latihans were devoted to the indoctrination of Japanese ideas and propaganda.<sup>25</sup>

The participants of these latihans were chosen mostly from among the intellectual and semi-intellectual strata of Indonesian society, as they were considered the proper intermediary to reach the masses. There were latihans for military youth, latihans for government officials from larger or smaller areas, latihans for teachers from government schools and from religious schools, latihans for mosque officials, and latihans for 'ulamā'.<sup>26</sup> However, the latihans which were the most important were the latihan for 'ulamā' called latihan kyai. The latihan kyais were continued longer than any other type of latihans. The Japanese' plan was to hold these latihan kyais indefinitely, until the most important 'ulamā' would have received a rapid dose of the 'new spirit'.<sup>27</sup> Altogether from July 1943 to May 1945, seventeen latihans were held at Jakarta, each attended by sixty 'ulamā' from twenty residencies.<sup>28</sup>

The procedure for choosing the participants, and the qualifications required of the candidates was described by Nieuwenhuijze: from each residency of Java and Madura three 'ulamā' having widespread influence, vast knowledge, a good social position, and an unblemished character were required to appear. Preference was given to members of the teaching profession and to officials of the Muslim community.<sup>29</sup>

On July 1, 1943, the first latihan kyai under the auspices of the Department of Religious Affairs (Japanese: Shūmubu) was opened with an impressive ceremony by Colonel Kawasaki, representing the Gunseikan (Head of Japanese Military Administration), and Colonel Horie, head of the Shūmubu.<sup>30</sup> The saikeirei was performed at the beginning of the ceremony.<sup>31</sup>

During thirty days<sup>32</sup> of their stay at the latihan, these 'ulamā' lived in a number of houses that had been turned into one living center. Three 'ulamā' from each residency were kept together in one room. They were not permitted to be in contact with the public. Their life was kept extremely simple, and a heavy programme in a very rigid schedule was imposed upon them. They lived in a sphere of absolute Japanese ideology and behavior.<sup>33</sup>

According to Geertz, some of the young 'ulamā' were sent to Brangang where they were taught how to be 'unafraid to die' like the Kamikazee (suicide pilots) who were unafraid to die for the glories of Dai Nippon and Tenno Heika.<sup>34</sup>

The main purpose of these latihans were, first, to isolate the 'ulamā' for two or three weeks from their normal environment and its protecting stability, and second, to confront them with a way of life and thought which was completely alien to their own way of life and thought. Nevertheless, these latihans produced good results for the 'ulamā', in that, to a certain extent, they lost their character as an isolated group and gained a more dynamic attitude towards life.<sup>35</sup>

The great care which the Japanese took in rallying the 'ulamā' to the Japanese side and in introducing their ideas and culture in order that those 'ulamā' would spread it out to the people, has already been mentioned. Now, "the Japanese turned towards their next objective in the field of religion, viz. the creation of one all-embracing and centralized organization under their direct control,"<sup>36</sup> to use as a media with which to reach the masses to introduce their ideas and ideals, and to use as a pliable tool which could be moved easily in the direction of their will.

The Japanese also considered that such an organization would be as important as education.<sup>37</sup> In the first year of their occupation, all Indonesian organizations, especially of a political type, were banned.<sup>38</sup> The Japanese Military Administration in a decision dated May 20, 1942 ordered two of the larger Muslim political organizations to suspend all their activities. One was the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Union Party), better known as P.S.I.I.<sup>39</sup> and the other was Partai Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Party), well-known as P.I.I.<sup>40</sup> Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama were not political and, while they were never explicitly banned, were practically paralysed.<sup>41</sup>

In the first year of their occupation, the Japanese did not like the Indonesians talking about politics and freedom for the country as they had done in pre-war time. What the Japanese wanted was only to have the tools which could be used to spread their ideas and ideals among the masses on the one hand, and to get the support from the people in order to win the war, on the other. To this end, the Japanese spent much effort in organizing all segments of the Indonesian society. It even seemed as if they encouraged and gave priority

to the Muslims in founding an organization.<sup>42</sup>

According to Robert Renevelle Jay, this policy aimed to do two things at once; first, to encourage the formation of popular organizations to harness the strength of nationalist and religious sentiment in the society for the Japanese war effort; second, and at the same time, to increase the administrative control over such sentiment.<sup>43</sup>

As has already been mentioned above, the Japanese wanted to have only one all-embracing organization for the Muslims; however, at the beginning of their attempts, the question of possible interference in uniting the various religious movements was carefully treated. This attitude did not result from their tolerance but from their inability to fuse the two powerful Islamic organizations of a non-political type, the Modernist Muhammadiyah and the conservative Nahdlatul Ulama.

In the words of Aziz:

"This benevolent attitude was not inspired by tolerance but by their sheer inability to amalgamate the two powerful Islamic organizations the progressive Muhammadiyah and the very orthodox Nahdlatul Ulama."<sup>44</sup>

In order to pave the way for a single Indonesian Muslim organization, Col. Horie, in his capacity as head of the Department of Religious Affairs, accompanied by three Japanese hajis, Abdul Hamid Ono, Abdul Muniam Inada,

and Muhammad Saleh Suzuki, made a trip throughout Java. This trip, which was to allow him to make direct contact with Indonesian Muslims, served two purposes: first, it aimed at collecting first-hand information; second, it aimed at delivering the Japanese point of view that there was no essential difference between Shinto (Japanese religion) and Islām with regard to social force since both in Shinto and in Islām, religion and politics were social forces. The Japanese used this view for propaganda purposes, in order to have the Muslim's support in promoting the glory of Dai Nippon. According to the Japanese, therefore, the common Indonesian desire for more unity and coherence within the Muslim community could be harmonized with the Japanese aim.<sup>45</sup> These contacts which were called silatur rahmi (a meeting to reinforce the ties of family and brotherhood) were systematically promoted. The first silatur rahmi took place on June 11, 1942.<sup>46</sup>

On another channel, Col. Horie and Shimizu, who was the official head of the Sendenbu (The Propaganda section in the Japanese Military Administration) used tabligh akbar (great religious gathering), organized by the Department of Religious Affairs to propagate the idea of unity.<sup>47</sup>

As a result of these silatur rahmis and tabligh

akbars, for a first attempt to unite Indonesian Muslims under one banner, a Komite Pusat Pimpinan Persatuan Ummat Islam (Central Leading Committee for the Unity of the Islamic Community) was set up.<sup>48</sup> This Committee, then, gave birth to the Badan Persatuan Ummat Islam (Council of the Unity of the Islamic Community) which came into being on July 13, 1942, in Jakarta, and soon local branches were set up all over Java.<sup>49</sup> By the establishment of this organization, in which some Japanese took seats in the board of directors, the Muslim religious leaders lost their rein. From then on the rein was kept by the Japanese, the organization being financed by the government's budget through the Department of Religious Affairs.<sup>50</sup>

The task of this Badan Persatuan Ummat Islam was to reconcile the kaum tua and the kaum muda. As the first move, the Badan Persatuan Ummat Islam established the Persatuan Alim Ulama (Union of 'Ulamā'), which was inaugurated at Jakarta on July 24, 1942.<sup>52</sup> Nevertheless, up to this time the Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama had not attached themselves to this Persatuan Alim Ulama.

The Japanese seemed to realize that they had to wait for a while to materialize a single organization for the Muslims, in which the kaum tua and the kaum muda would be the constituents. But the need for a huge Muslim

organization was very urgent. Therefore, in order to reach this goal, the Japanese allowed themselves to give a permit for the re-establishment of the Majlis Islam A'laa Indonesia (Supreme Islamic Council of Indonesia), well-known as MIAI, the supreme organization of Islamic bodies which had been dissolved in May, 1942.

The MIAI which was founded in September 1937, was a politically motivated federation of thirteen Muslim organizations.<sup>52</sup> The Muslims opposition to the Dutch government, which proposed certain legal regulations concerning marriages of Muslims and which, to some extent, were contrary to Islamic law was a major causal factor in the formation of the MIAI.<sup>53</sup> It was said that since 1938 this MIAI developed pro-Japanese sentiments,<sup>54</sup> for its members attended the Japanese Islamic World Conference in Tokyo,<sup>55</sup> and in the second congress of the MIAI, held at Solo on May 2-7, 1939, two of three foreign relation officers who had visited Japan were appointed.<sup>56</sup>

In order to pave the way for the re-establishment of the MIAI, some thirty important Muslim leaders from different places in Java were invited to attend a meeting held in Jakarta on September 4, 1942. In this meeting, the decision to recognize the MIAI as the central directing

board for the whole Muslim community was reached. All Muslim matters were entrusted to it.<sup>57</sup> From then on, the seat of the MIAI's headquarters was moved from Surabaya to Jakarta, where the Japanese gave a beautiful edifice to house it.<sup>58</sup> The first directing president was still Wondoamiseno and the first secretary was Harsono Tjokroaminoto; both were prominent leaders of the P.S.I.I. Its finances were drawn from the government's budget and the Department of Religious Affairs was its custodian.<sup>59</sup>

The Japanese hoped that this MIAI would represent, on the one hand, the whole of the Islamic community and, on the other hand, would act as the central agency, both for all Persatuan Alim Ulama and for all local branches of the MIAI; this meant a systematic appeal to the 'ulamā' and even to officials of the Islamic community who had not joined the pre-war organization.<sup>60</sup>

On January 1, 1943 the MIAI was granted permission to publish its bi-weekly periodical, the Soeara MIAI (Voice of the MIAI).<sup>61</sup> The contents of this periodical, as it was explained by its editor in the first issue, were to spread Islamic teachings and also to give information to the people about the ideas and ideals of the Japanese in creating an East-Asiatic Co-prosperity Sphere.

and to introduce the Japanese culture.<sup>62</sup> It was not surprising that the latter two aims mentioned above were included among other aims, since the Japanese granted the permission for publishing the periodical as a means for spreading their ideas, ideals, and culture to the people. Therefore, there was a place in the periodical in which Japanese writers introduced their culture.<sup>63</sup>

In the first issue, the address of the Gunseikan, Let.-Gen. Okazaki to the 'ulamā' on December 7, 1942 was published, along with the advice of Col. Horie, Haji Muhammad Muniam Inada, and other top leaders of the Department of Religious Affairs, complete with their pictures.<sup>64</sup> It is worth noting here that the cover of this periodical, at first showed optimism to the Muslim, in the guise of a picture of a huge mosque with its high minaret. A year later the mood changed to one of pessimism with a picture of an old man standing, raising both hands and praying for good fortune.<sup>65</sup>

Up to this time the Japanese apparently had succeeded in maneuvering all Muslim activities into a position of being under their jurisdiction. Everything which could possibly be organized in the field of Islām was under Japanese control. Undoubtedly, the Japanese aim

was not to encourage the Indonesian Muslims to reach their own (Muslim) goals; rather to encourage the Muslims to reach the Japanese aim and to imbue them with the Japanese culture. Everything that the people could achieve was to be for the benefit of Japan, not for Indonesia.<sup>66</sup>

Meanwhile, the Japanese were compelling the Muslims to perform saikeirei, a deep ceremonial bow towards the Japanese Emperor's seat in Tokyo for the Japanese believed Tenno Heika to be a supernatural being. Therefore, the Japanese demanded that during every conversation in which the name Tenno Heika occurs one must stand at attention.<sup>67</sup>

The Japanese ordered that all public occasions should be opened with the saikeirei.<sup>68</sup> The 'ulamā' who joined the latihan had to perform the saikeirei every morning at sunrise. Likewise, every meeting held by the MIAI was closed by crying 'banzai Dai Nippon', and Allāhu Akbar three times.<sup>69</sup>

Furthermore, the Japanese considered that it was natural that their superiority would be acknowledged by the conquered peoples and, therefore, they were to act in accordance with the traditional Japanese concept of obedience which deeply offended the sensitive Indonesians.<sup>70</sup>

Notices were posted ordering the Indonesians to bow low to every passing Japanese, whether in or out of uniform, regardless of his rank.<sup>71</sup>

Certain questions therefore arise: did Japanese attempts to Nipponize Indonesian Muslims succeed, and did the Japanese obtain full support from the Indonesians as they had expected? The answers to these questions will be discussed in chapter three.

## 2. THE DISPERSAL OF MIAI AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MASYUMI.

As mentioned in the preceding pages, the organization which the Japanese needed was a massive one in which all Muslim groups existing during the pre-war period had to be fused, especially the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, the two powerful Muslim mass-movements. While they were waiting for a good time to materialize their original plans, the Japanese gave permission to re-establish the MIAI, thus giving the key which would lead to a single all-embracing Muslim organization.

In the words of Benda:

"... the Japanese had originally, but unsuccessful-

fully, attempted to create a similar, quasi-monolithic organization, unifying reformists and orthodox Muslim. When this attempt failed, the military government sanctioned the reestablishment of the federative body M.I.A.I."<sup>72</sup>

Therefore, while the Japanese were allowing the re-establishment of the MIAI, they continued their attempts to combine the kaum tua and the kaum muda which were represented by Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, respectively. To this end, Let.-Gen. Okazaki, in his official capacity as head of the Japanese Military Administration in Java, delivered a speech in person to religious leaders and 'ulamā' from all over Java at his residence in Jakarta, on December 7, 1942. In his address he asked the Muslim leaders an 'ulamā' to lay aside all differences of opinion with regard to the madhhab (school of law), in order to unite the Muslim community for the purpose of cooperating with the Japanese Military Administration.<sup>73</sup>

Thus, when the Japanese saw the road was clear to achieve their original plans, the MIAI was dispersed and replaced by another organization, the Majlis Syura Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), well-known as Masyumi.<sup>74</sup> The date of MIAI's demise, and the birth of the Masyumi, was October 24, 1943,

which meant the rebirth of the MIAI under Japanese aegis lasted only thirteen months (September 4, 1942 to October 24, 1943).<sup>75</sup>

The reasons which caused the dispersal of the MIAI were many. The first reason was because the Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatu Ulama were not included in the reborn MIAI under the Japanese aegis. According to Aziz, this was the more obvious reason.<sup>76</sup> The Japanese, probably, considered that an organization lacking the support of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama would not be powerful enough to reach and influence the masses. Besides, the Japanese could not directly control both organizations.

The second reason was that the MIAI was not a mass organization. It was only a federative body of several Muslim movements, where its member organizations still maintained their own character and policies. Thus the Japanese considered that MIAI was not a suitable instrument with which to work on the masses.<sup>77</sup>

The third reason was that the Japanese believed that this organization had been set up through the Muslims' own initiative, and was much concerned with politics. Indeed, from the very beginning of its birth in 1937, the MIAI had strong feelings of anti-colonialism, which the

Japanese were afraid might appear again, this time towards themselves.

The fourth reason was that the Japanese feared that the activities which the MIAI carried out might threaten the Japanese policy towards Indonesian Islām.<sup>78</sup>

In pre-war days, the MIAI's aims were as follows:

- a) Uniting all Indonesian Muslim organizations for co-operation.
- b) Attempting to reconcile, whenever difference of opinions arose among the Muslims.
- c) Strengthening relationships between Indonesian Muslims and the Muslims abroad.
- d) Attempting to secure Islām and its community.
- e) Setting up an all Indonesian Muslim Congress every year.<sup>79</sup>

Now, under Japanese rule, the MIAI was entrusted by the Muslims to carry out all Muslim matters, and on its shoulder was burdened:

- 1) Securing a proper place for Islām within Indonesian society.
- 2) Harmonizing Indonesian Islām with the requirements of the changing times.<sup>80</sup>

In order to carry out these duties, the MIAI composed a programme which mainly emphasized the attainment of Muslim socio-religious aims. The items of the programme were as follows:

- a) Safeguard and maintain the dignity and glory of Islām and its believers in this world.
- b) Set up a new society among Muslims, which would maintain peace, and look after the welfare of the people.
- c) Improve all matters of vital importance to Muslims, viz.,
  - (1) Marriage affairs;
  - (2) Succession and inheritance matters;
  - (3) Mosques;
  - (4) Waqf (religious endowments);
  - (5) Zakāt (religious taxes);
  - (6) Instruction and education;
  - (7) Publicity and propaganda;
  - (8) Social affairs (aid to the poor);
  - (9) Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca).

d) Aid the Dai Nippon government and work for Greater Asia.<sup>81</sup>

Undoubtedly, the last item had to be included as it was demanded by the Japanese.<sup>82</sup>

In carrying out the programme, the MIAI concentrated their attempts on three projects, viz.,

- (1) The building of a great mosque in Jakarta,
- (2) The establishment of a Muslim University that had been planned towards the end of Dutch colonial rule, and
- (3) Setting up a central Bait al-Māl (Islamic treasury).<sup>83</sup>

Clearly, it was impossible to materialize the first and the second projects without having money, and therefore, the third project had priority. Thus, the MIAI leadership carried out a strong campaign for the creation of the Bait al-Māl. Between February and July 1943, the discussion of the Bait al-Māl occupied the greatest amount of space on the pages of the Soeara MIAI.<sup>84</sup> In January 1943, a Preparatory Committee for establishing the Bait al-Māl was set up in Jakarta. In June, a training course for treasury-organizers was instituted at Bandung. In the same month delegates were dispatched all over Java to discuss with the 'ulamā' the establishment of a Bait al-Māl. Within a few months the Bait al-Māl was established in thirty-five regencies on Java.<sup>85</sup>

The MIAI leadership seemed to have hoped to link

the Bait al-Māl in each locality with the local Persatuan Alim Ulama. If the MIAI succeeded in carrying out this plan, it would have challenged the Department of Religious Affairs' control over the village 'ulamā'.<sup>86</sup>

Without the knowledge of the Department of Religious Affairs, the MIAI endeavored to set up a network of Islamic cells throughout the country, and thus attempted to unite the people in the name of Allah rather than in the name of the Tenno Heika, the Japanese Emperor.<sup>87</sup> This matter can be seen from the speech of Wondoamiseno on the occasion of Premier Tōjō's promise of giving freedom to Indonesia, when he said,

"The Baital Mal must reach into every village, every hamlet, up to the mountain slope, and create a spirit of unity... and a powerful fortress of Islam... We will use the Baital Mal to build a protective fence around the Muslims in the villages, against the spies of the Allies... Let all of us, administrators, penghulus, ulamas, kyais, form one big family, as was ordained by Allah..."<sup>88</sup>

Therefore, the Japanese considered that the vitality an initiative which the MIAI displayed could threaten the Japanese grip. Thus, the MIAI could not be tolerated.

In the words of Nieuwenhuijze: "It would seem that the activities which MIAI tended to foster in this fields hastened its end."<sup>89</sup>

The fifth reason which caused the dispersal of the MIAI was that the Japanese needed a single mass-organization which, instead of discussing religious problems, would influence the masses in their favor and win them to the idea of a "holy war" against the Allies.<sup>90</sup> The MIAI seemed not to fulfil this Japanese hope.

The Masyumi, which replaced the MIAI, was a mass-organization, in which all Muslim movements were to be fused. Above all, the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama were the basis of the Masyumi. The first statement of the Masyumi clarified that the initial basis of the Masyumi consisted of the former MIAI organization members, Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, and Persatuan Islam (Muslim Unity), better known as Persis.<sup>91</sup> For the time being, organizations not yet recognized could apply for an admission, which undoubtedly, would include incorporation into Masyumi.<sup>92</sup>

The men who were put in charge of the Masyumi were the leaders of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. Kyai Hasjim Asj'ari and Kyai Wahab Hasbullah, both from Nahdlatul Ulama, and Kyai Mas Mansur from Muhammadiyah became the first president and vice-presidents of the Masyumi.<sup>93</sup> The former leaders of the MIAI, who were

mainly from P.S.I.I., and who were men with a strong anti-colonial and non-cooperative spirit<sup>94</sup> were not invited to play their roles through the Masyumi. It is interesting to note that Wondoamiseno, the president of the former MIAI, was never brought to the fore again throughout the remainder of the Japanese occupation.<sup>95</sup>

Now the Masyumi began to play its role in Indonesian history. But here, again, questions appear. Did the Japanese get satisfaction with the Masyumi? Was the Masyumi only a Japanese tool, which worked merely towards Japanese ends? What was the actual rôle that the Masyumi played among the Indonesian Muslims? These questions will be discussed in the following chapter.

### 3. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS.

In order to allow for a comparison between Indonesian Islām under Dutch colonial rule and under the Japanese occupation, it seems appropriate to discuss here how the Dutch treated Indonesian Islām. In the Dutch colonial period, religious matters were managed by several

bureaus. Matters relating to pilgrimages, marriages, and education were under the authority of the Departement van Binnenlandsche Zaken (Department of Home Affairs). Matters relating to the High Islamic Court, Islamic Courts, and Advisers for Islamic Courts, were under the competency of the Departement van Justitie (Department of Justice). Matters relating to 'ibādāt (worship) were under the competency of the Departement van Onderwijs en Eeredienst (Department of Education), and matters relating to Islamic movements were under the competency of the Kantoor v/d Adviseur voor Inlandsche en Mohammedansche Zaken (Bureau of Adviser for Inland Affairs and Islam).<sup>96</sup>

In all, the duty and responsibility of these bureaus were,

- 1) Giving advice to the government in matters concerning Islām,
- 2) Investigating and supervising the activities of Islamic movements.<sup>97</sup>

All of these departments and bureaus were exclusively staffed by Dutchmen.<sup>98</sup>

In the field of religion the Dutch government, instead of carrying out their declared policy of neutrality, in fact promoted Christianity at the expense of

Islām.<sup>99</sup> As Kyai Haji Munawar Cholil, a prominent member of the Muhammadiyah, said, "The neutrality of the Dutch towards religion is but a hypocrisy."<sup>100</sup>

In its early years, the Dutch Republic regarded the promotion of Christianity as one of its duties.<sup>101</sup> As van Helsdingen said, "The customary view of the age was that subjects should embrace the faith of their ruler."<sup>102</sup>

Charles Robequain said,

"As has often happened in European colonies, the preaching of the Christian Gospel went hand in hand with the conquest and exploitation of the Malay lands."<sup>103</sup>

From the beginning of the Dutch occupation of Indonesia, missionary work was one of the activities. The priests, besides preaching for the Dutch employees and their families, also worked among the Indonesians.<sup>104</sup> According to van Helsdingen, "... the East Indian Company had attempted a compulsory mass conversion."<sup>105</sup> Moreover, in 1716 East Indian Company ships were not allowed to carry pilgrims to Mecca. Under instruction from the Governor General of 1803 to his employees, there is a clause stating that the pilgrimage to Mecca was frowned upon.<sup>106</sup>

The intensity of the missionary work may be

illustrated by the fact that from 1850 onwards the Protestant missionary effort attained significant success. In 1906 a Missions' Consulate was established at Batavia (Jakarta) to represent Protestant missions with the Dutch government.<sup>107</sup> The Catholic missionary, from 1870 to 1939, had followers numbering 478,000 among the native Indonesians.<sup>108</sup>

Since 1890 the Dutch government supported the activities of missionaries and gave subsidies to their schools.<sup>109</sup> After 1895, with the government's aid the mission schools greatly increased in number, as well as in pupils.<sup>110</sup> When the Clerical parties of the Netherlands won a workable majority in the State General election of 1909, they announced that their aim was to aid the missionaries in Christianizing Indonesians.<sup>111</sup>

For similar activities of the Muslims, the Dutch gave only small subsidies. The following table shows the difference in subsidies given by the Dutch to the religious communities:<sup>112</sup>

Staadblad (Statute book)	S u b s i d i e s t o		
	Protestant	Catholic	Muslim
1936/335, pp. 25-26.	f. 686,100.-	f. 286,500.-	f. 7,500.-
1937/410, pp. 25-26.	f. 683,200.-	f. 290,700.-	f. 7,500.-

1938/511, pp. 27-28. f. 696,100.- f. 296,400.- f. 7,500.-

1939/592, p. 32 f. 844,000.- f. 335,700.- f. 7,600.-

By considering the percentage of the Muslims in comparison with that of the Protestants and Catholics, one could see how small were the subsidies which the Dutch gave to the Muslims. Although no census based on religion had been taken in Indonesia, according to Fred R. von der Mehden there were approximately three per-cent Christians out of all Indonesians.<sup>113</sup> In 1956, Kyai Haji Asnawi Hadiwidjaja published his findings as follows:<sup>114</sup>

Muslims	66,286,097.
Protestants	3,286,265.
Catholics	921,938.
Hindus and Hindu Balis	1,387,349.
Buddhists and Sam Kauws	1,500,000.
Adats and Animisms	3,666,550
Under investigation	439,680.

The comparison of the subsidies given by the Dutch government to the Protestant and Catholic missionaries and to the Muslims could explain why the Muslims feared that the Dutch would attempt to spread their religion among the Indonesian people<sup>115</sup>, thereby seriously threatening the existence of Islām in Indonesia.<sup>116</sup>

As a reaction to the Dutch policies towards Islām, the Indonesian Muslims established a movement named Sarekat Islam.<sup>117</sup> The Preamble of its constitution dated November 9, 1911 reads, "The aim is to have its members live in brotherhood, harmony and mutual assistance, and to make serious attempts... , to improve the people's living standard."<sup>118</sup>

Through the Volksraad (People's Council) which was established in 1918, the Muslims\* questioned the Dutch government's neutrality towards religion which was not being faithfully applied. In 1919 and 1932, the Volksraad passed resolutions in which it expressed the hope that the government would end its inequitable subsidies towards religions.<sup>119</sup>

The Japanese, who wanted to appease the Muslims by showing themselves on their side, criticized Dutch policy towards religion. In a mass rally held in December 1942 in Jakarta, the Gunseikan assured his audience that,

"... the Japanese Military Administration has never hesitated to respect and esteem Islām, [because] Islām has been rooted in the hearts of the Indonesian people and has influenced their spiritual lives to a great extent. The previous government [the Dutch] had paid much attention to Christianity, whereas to Islām they did not pay any attention. The Japanese by no means agree with that policy."<sup>120</sup>

The Japanese now showed an uncompromising attitude towards churches and Christian missions. Christian priests were ill-treated, some of them being sent to intern-camps on charges that they were spies for the Allies. Christian schools, hospitals and seminaries, if they were not closed, were put under the Japanese Military Administration supervision.<sup>121</sup>

The Japanese, who wanted to gain the support of Indonesian Muslims<sup>122</sup> on the one hand, and obtain a tool with which they could carry out their policy towards Islām in Indonesia,<sup>123</sup> on the other, created a separate Department of Religious Affairs (Japanese: Shūmubu), which was in contrast to the Dutch colonial policy. This department which was the most important office of the Japanese Military Administration of Indonesia<sup>124</sup> was established in March 1942, just a few weeks after they landed in Indonesia.<sup>125</sup>

Three of the Japanese 'hajis', Haji Abdul Muniam Inada, Haji Abdul Hamid Ono, and Haji Muhammad Saleh Suzuki, who had studied Islām in the Middle East and were dispatched to Indonesia with the first wave of the invading army<sup>126</sup>, were entrusted to create this department.<sup>127</sup> However, for the period between March to September 1943,

this department was headed by a Japanese, Col. Horie, who was not a Muslim.<sup>128</sup> On April 1, 1944, its branches were set up in every residency (Japanese: Shūmuka) in Java. The heads of these offices being drawn from the outstanding 'ulamā' of the residencies.<sup>129</sup> Its offices were set up in the districts, sub-districts, and the villages.<sup>130</sup>

By establishing this department, all religious matters including matters relating to the mosques which formerly were managed by the priyayi (traditional native authorities), were now directly carried out by this department.<sup>131</sup> This department, now, had four sections:

- (1) section of general purpose,
- (2) section of government and religion,
- (3) section of research, and
- (4) section of courses and publicity.

Two sections were headed by Japanese, and the other two were headed by Indonesians with Japanese assistants.<sup>132</sup>

On October 1, 1943, Col. Horie was replaced by an Indonesian named Husein Djajadiningrat, to head this department.<sup>133</sup> Nevertheless, the Japanese still remained the heads of the sections.<sup>134</sup> Djajadiningrat was the first Indonesian whom the Japanese entrusted to assume a senior post in their administration.<sup>135</sup> He was not

one of the Indonesian 'ulamā' and belonged to the Western-educated intelligentsia rather than to ummat Islam (Islamic community).<sup>136</sup> He was one of the priyayi families, and at the time of the Dutch colonial rule, was assuming a similar office as an Assistant Adviser on Native Affairs.<sup>137</sup>

When Djajadiningrat could not settle the hot disputes in Tasikmalaya and Indramayu which resulted in the Muslim rebellions against the Japanese, he was replaced by Kyai Hasjim Asj'ari, on August 1, 1944.<sup>138</sup> Kyai Hasjim Asj'ari was the head of the famous pesantren Tebu Ireng at Jombang. He was one of the kaum tua, and had great authority as a kyai.<sup>139</sup> The Japanese appointed Kyai Hasjim Asj'ari to be the head of the Department of Religious Affairs, as they merely wanted to connect the name of this old influential person with the Japanese Military Administration.<sup>140</sup> in order to make advance to the Muslims.<sup>141</sup> His appointment was thus merely a symblic one.

He did not have to assume leadership as the head of the department, since he was allowed to stay in his own village in Jombang rather than move to Jakarta where the seat of his office was situated.<sup>142</sup> Besides, by appointing Kyai Hasjim Asj'ari as the head of the Department of Religious Affairs, the Japanese wanted to make a close

connection between the department and the Masyumi since he had already been the chairman of the Masyumi.<sup>143</sup>

The Japanese apparently wanted to bring the 'ulamā' to administrative position by giving them posts in the Department of Religious Affairs, which until the end of their occupation was headed by an old kyai, perhaps in order to decrease the position of the priyayi who had been entrusted by the Dutch to carry out religious matters.<sup>144</sup>

For what reasons the Japanese had a desire for such a change is difficult to say with certainty, but three explanations can be offered. First, it may have been a continuation of the Japanese attempt, begun in Tokyo in 1930, to win the Muslim's support. Second, it may have been an attempt to eliminate Dutch influence which rested on the priyayi.<sup>145</sup> Third, the Japanese may have wanted to shift the Muslim leaders's activities into a new channel in which they were forced to act under the Japanese guidance and control, instead of having freedom to strive for the materialization of an Indonesian Muslim civilization out of the reach of Japanese control.<sup>146</sup>

At any rate, the result of this changing situation was that the 'ulamā' and other Muslim leaders could seize the opportunity given by the Japanese to make

Indonesia a truly Islamic country.<sup>147</sup> By making use of the Japanese power, the 'ulamā' and other Muslim leaders could approach their goal of realizing the ideas of Islām, or as Benda put it, "... of realizing the santri ideal."<sup>148</sup> Besides, the 'ulamā' gained experience in administrative positions, whereas during the Dutch colonial rule they had been kept away from them as far as possible. Thus, the Department of Religious Affairs which the Japanese established in order to have a tool through which they could implement and apply their policy towards Islām in Indonesia, was used by the 'ulamā' to spread the ideas of Muslim civilization among the people.

## FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER TWO.

<sup>1</sup>See Willard H. Elsbree, Japan's Role in South-east Asian Nationalist Movements, 1940 to 1945 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 79.

<sup>2</sup>I. Chaudry, The Indonesian Struggle (Lahore: Firozsons, 1950), p. 65.

<sup>3</sup>O.D.P. Sihombing, Pemuda Indonesia Menantang Fasisme Djepang (Indonesian Youth Against Japanese Facism) (Djakarta: Sinar Djaja, 1962), p. 5.

<sup>4</sup>Elsbree, Japan's Role, p. 130.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid, p. 124.

<sup>6</sup>Benda and others, Japanese Military, pp. 244-248.

<sup>7</sup>Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, translated from the German by Mary Somers Heidhues (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. 240.

<sup>8</sup>Harry Jindrich Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun. Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945 (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958), pp. 122ff.

<sup>9</sup>See Benda and others, Japanese Military, pp. 244-248.

<sup>10</sup>Sihombing, Pemuda, p. 8.

<sup>11</sup>Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 124.

<sup>12</sup>From an article by T. Fujimori of the Propaganda Department in the Shonan Shimbun (September 5, 1942) as quoted in Elsbree, Japan's Role, p. 103.

<sup>13</sup>Elsbree, Japan's Role, p. 103.

<sup>14</sup>Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 124.

<sup>15</sup>M.A. Aziz, Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia  
(The Hâgue: M. Nijhoff, 1955), p. 200.

<sup>16</sup>Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 124. The Pan-Asiatic Movement was based upon a widespread sentiment that the Asiatic races and nations had a common destiny and had a common enemy in the white races; it was a protest against the economic exploitation by Western people. The first Pan-Asiatic Conference was held at Nagasaki in 1926, in which it was decided to set up a permanent bureau in Tokyo. See Hans Kohn's article, "Pan-Movements", in Edwin R.A. Seligman, ed. Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York: The McMillan Company, 1933), Vol. XI, pp. 544-553.

<sup>17</sup>Benda, The Crescent, p. 127.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid*, p. 243 note 26.

<sup>19</sup>Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 124.

<sup>20</sup>Zainuddin, A Short History, pp. 213ff.

<sup>21</sup>Benda, The Crescent, p. 127.

<sup>22</sup>Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 203.

<sup>23</sup>Benda, The Crescent, p. 127.

<sup>24</sup>Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 127.

<sup>25</sup>See Elsbree, Japan's Role, pp. 101-103.

<sup>26</sup>Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 128.

- 27 Benda, The Crescent, p. 134.
- 28 Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 128.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Asia Raya (July 17, 1943); see Benda, The Crescent, p. 135.
- 31 Benda, The Crescent, p. 248 note 12.
- 32 Ibid, p. 135. According to Nieuwenhuijze, the latihan lasted two weeks, see Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 130; and according to Elsbree, the latihan lasted three weeks, see Elsbree, Japan's Role, p. 103.
- 33 See Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, pp. 129-130.
- 34 Geertz, The Religion of Java, p. 143.
- 35 W.F. Wertheim, "Changes in Indonesia's Social Stratification", Pacific Affairs, 28 (1953), p. 45.
- 36 Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 203.
- 37 Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 132.
- 38 Louis Fischer, The Story of Indonesia (London: Hamish-Hamilton, 1959), p. 71; Muhammad Dimiyati, Sedjarah Perdjuangan Indonesia (History of the Indonesian Struggle) (Djakarta: Widjaja, 1951), p. 52.
- 39 For a discussion on P.S.I.I. see A. Timur Jaelani, "The Sarekat Islam. Its Contribution to Indonesian Nationalism". Unpublished M.A. thesis (Montreal: McGill University, 1959).
- 40 Benda, "Indonesian Islam", p. 42.

<sup>41</sup>Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 50.

<sup>42</sup>Deliar Noer, "Masjoemi: Its Organization, Ideology and Political Role in Indonesia". Unpublished M.A. thesis (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1960), p. 26.

<sup>43</sup>Robert R. Jay, Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java, Cultural Report Series No. 12 (New Haven: Yale University, 1963), p. 24.

<sup>44</sup>Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 204.

<sup>45</sup>See Ibid, pp. 203-204.

<sup>46</sup>Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 137.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 204.

<sup>50</sup>Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 138.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid, p. 139.

<sup>52</sup>The organizations which were included in the MIAI were: 1) Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia; 2) Partai Islam Indonesia; 3) Muhammadiyah; 4) Persatuan Ulama Indonesia; 5) Persatuan Islam; 6) Nahdlatul Ulama; 7) Al-Ittihadiyatul Islamiyah; 8) Al Islam; 9) Al Irsyad ; 10) Persatuan Agama Islam; 11) Musyawaratut Thalibin ; 12) Djam'iyatul Washliyah; and 13) Komite Kesengsaraan Indonesia Mekkah. See Abu Bakar, Sedjarah Hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim dan Karangan Tersiar (Biography of K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim and His Writings) (Djakarta: Panitya Buku Peringatan Alm. K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim, 1957), p. 316.

<sup>53</sup>Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 144.

- <sup>54</sup> Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 204.
- <sup>55</sup> Benda, "Indonesian Islam", p. 41.
- <sup>56</sup> Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 146.
- <sup>57</sup> Abu Bakar, Sedjarah Hidup, p. 321.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid, p. 322.
- <sup>59</sup> Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 147.
- <sup>60</sup> Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 204.
- <sup>61</sup> Abu Bakar, Sedjarah Hidup, p. 322.
- <sup>62</sup> Ibid, p. 323.
- <sup>63</sup> Ibid, p. 325.
- <sup>64</sup> See Ibid, pp. 323-325.
- <sup>65</sup> Ibid, p. 326.
- <sup>66</sup> Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 209.
- <sup>67</sup> See Circulation Letter, Regulation Concerning Spirit and Attitude, dated 27, 1944, in Benda and others, Japanese Military, pp. 230-234.
- <sup>68</sup> George McTuran Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. III. Bernhard Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century, translated from the German by P.S. Fella (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1971), p. 90.
- <sup>69</sup> Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 142.

<sup>70</sup> Sjahrir, Out of Exile, p. 247; Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 209.

<sup>71</sup> Fischer, The Story, p. 69.

<sup>72</sup> Benda, "Indonesian Islam", p. 42.

<sup>73</sup> Abu Bakar, Sedjarah Hidup, pp. 324-325.

<sup>74</sup> B.J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1971), p. 11. }

<sup>75</sup> Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 205.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Dahm, History of Indonesia, p. 91.

<sup>78</sup> Benda, The Crescent, p. 146.

<sup>79</sup> Abu Bakar, Sedjarah Hidup, p. 312.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> See Soeara MIAI, I,1 (January 1, 1943), p. 19 as quoted in Ibid, p. 326.

<sup>82</sup> Abu Bakar, Sedjarah Hidup, p. 326.

<sup>83</sup> See Benda, The Crescent, p. 143. For more information on the Bait al-Mal; see C.H. Becker's article "Bait al Mal", in Encyclopaedia of Islam (E.I.), ed by M. Th. Houtsma and others (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1913), I:598ff.

<sup>84</sup> See Benda, The Crescent, p. 258 note 69.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid, pp. 144-146.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid, p. 146.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid, p. 147.

<sup>88</sup>See Soeara MIAI, I, 13 (July 1, 1943), pp. 2-3; see also Benda, The Crescent, p. 147 and 260 note 86.

<sup>89</sup>Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 155.

<sup>90</sup>Dahm, History of Indonesia, p. 92.

<sup>91</sup>For a discussion of Persis see Howard M. Federspiel, Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970).

<sup>92</sup>See Kahin, Nationalism, p. 111; B.H.M. Vlekke, Indonesia in 1956. Political and Economic Aspects (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Affairs, 1957), p. 26.

<sup>93</sup>Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 154; Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 205

<sup>94</sup>Benda, The Crescent, pp. 148 and 151; Boland, The Struggle, p. 11.

<sup>95</sup>Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 149.

<sup>96</sup>See Peranan Departemen Agama Dalam Revolusi dan Pembangunan Bangsa (The Role of the Department of Religious Affairs in Revolution and National Building) (Djakarta: Departemen Agama Bg. Penerbitan, 1965), p. 103.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid, p. 57.

<sup>98</sup>Jay, Religion, p. 26.

<sup>99</sup>Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 201.

<sup>100</sup> See Kyai Haji. Munawar Cholil's article, "Pemandangan Sepintas Laloe" (Observation in passing), in Sinar Baroe, Semarang Jubilee Number (July, 1943) as quoted in A. Mukti Ali, Alam Pikiran Modern di Indonesia (Modern Islamic Thought in Indonesia) (Jogjakarta: Jajasan Nida, 1971), p. 53.

<sup>101</sup> Amry Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies (Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1933), p. 227.

<sup>102</sup> W.H. van Helsdingen, ed., Mission Interrupted. The Dutch in the East Indies and Their Work in the XXth Century (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1945), p. 93.

<sup>103</sup> Charles Robequain, Malaya, Indonesia, Borneo, and the Philippines, trans. by E.D. Laborde (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1954), 390.

<sup>104</sup> Vandenbosch, The Dutch, p. 232.

<sup>105</sup> van Helsdingen, Mission, p. 93.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid, pp. 94-95.

<sup>107</sup> Robequain, Malaya, p. 395.

<sup>108</sup> van Helsdingen, Mission, p. 114.

<sup>109</sup> Fred von der Mehden, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia. Burma, Indonesia, The Philippines (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), p. 172.

<sup>110</sup> Vandenbosch, The Dutch, p. 235.

<sup>111</sup> von der Mehden, Religion, p. 177; Vandenbosch, The Dutch, p. 237.

<sup>112</sup> Ali, Alam Pikiran, p. 53 not 42.

- 113 von der Mehden, Religion, p. 171.
- 114 See Kyai Haji Asnawi Hadiwidjaja's article, "Agama-agama dan Aliran-aliran Kepertjajaan Masjarakat di Indonesia" (Religions and belief trends in the Community of Indonesia), in Hikmah, IX, 39 (October 20, 1956), p. 9.
- 115 von der Mehden, Religion, p. 177.
- 116 van Helsdingen, Mission, p. 93.
- 117 For a discussion on Sarekat Islam see C.C. Berg's article, "Sarekat Islam", in E.I.<sup>1</sup>, IV:163ff; A. Timur Jaelani, "The Sarekat Islam: Its Contribution to Indonesian Nationalism". Unpublished M.A. thesis (Montreal: McGill University, 1959).
- 118 Quoted in 29th Anniversary Department of Religious Affairs, 1946-1975 (Jakarta: The Bureau of Public Affairs, 1975), p. 9.
- 119 Vandenbosch, The Dutch, p. 231.
- 120 Kan Po (Statute Book) (March 1943), p. 18.
- 121 Peranan Departemen Agama, p. 59.
- 122 Boland, The Struggle, p. 10.
- 123 Benda, "Indonesian Islam", p. 41.
- 124 Elsbree, Japan's Role, p. 78.
- 125 Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 200; Zainuddin, A Short History, p. 213.
- 126 John F. Cady, Southeast Asia. Its Historical Development (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 569.

- <sup>127</sup>Zainuddin, A Short History, p. 213.
- <sup>128</sup>Boland, The Struggle, p. 10.
- <sup>129</sup>See Kementerian Agama 10 Tahun (Tenth year of Department of Religious Affairs) (Jakarta: Kementerian Agama Bg. Penerbitan, 1956), p. 5.
- <sup>130</sup>Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 205.
- <sup>131</sup>Ibid; Boland, The Struggle, p. 26.
- <sup>132</sup>Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 158.
- <sup>133</sup>Benda, The Crescent, p. 136.
- <sup>134</sup>Boland, The Struggle, p. 10.
- <sup>135</sup>Benda, The Crescent, p. 126.
- <sup>136</sup>Dahm, History of Indonesia, p. 98.
- <sup>137</sup>Benda, The Crescent, p. 136.
- <sup>138</sup>Ibid, p. 273; Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 158.
- <sup>139</sup>Boland, The Struggle, p. 10.
- <sup>140</sup>Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 207.
- <sup>141</sup>Dahm, History of Indonesia, p. 98.
- <sup>142</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>143</sup>Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 207; Boland, The Struggle, p. 10.

<sup>144</sup>Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 205.

<sup>145</sup>Ibid, p. 206.

<sup>146</sup>Benda, The Crescent, p. 109.

<sup>147</sup>Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 207.

<sup>148</sup>Benda, The Crescent, p. 110.

### Chapter Three.

#### THE RESPONSES AND ATTITUDES OF THE 'ULAMĀ' TOWARDS THE JAPANESE POLICY.

##### 1. CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE.

As pointed out in the preceding chapter, the Japanese made a serious mistake in their policy towards Indonesian Islām. The abortive attempt to ban the teaching of Arabic and the Arabic script, the imposition of saikeirei, the asserted divinity of the Tenno Heika, and the introduction of Shintoism into Indonesia made the Indonesian Muslims averse to the Japanese, and they began to wrest themselves from the grip of Japanese authority.<sup>1</sup>

This situation put Japanese policy towards Indonesian Muslims in some difficulty. As Benda put it,

"More important still, the overall Japanese policy of introducing their own culture standard and politico-religious concepts, in particular that of emperor-worship, constantly militated against the all-out success of their Islamic policies."<sup>2</sup>

The Japanese should have known that a true Muslim bowed down only to worship God, not to anything else. Therefore, to force Muslims to perform saikeirei, which a Muslim could only consider as an act of shirk (polytheism),

should have been avoided.<sup>3</sup>

Furthermore, the Japanese claimed that their race, culture, and religion were superior to the Indonesian's.<sup>4</sup> During the first year of their occupation, it was impossible for an Indonesian to hold a position above that of a Japanese. As Wertheim remarked, "Indonesians might hold positions much higher than those held under Dutch rule but a son of the gods could never be an inferior to any Indonesian."<sup>5</sup>

The Instruction for the Superintendent-General of Military Administration, dated August 7, 1942, read,

"Japanese subjects shall be afforded opportunity for development everywhere, and after establishing firm foothold, they shall exalt their temperament as the leading race with the basic doctrine of planning the long-term expansion of the Yamato race."<sup>6</sup>

The Japanese called the Indonesian genjūmin which meant 'native'.<sup>7</sup> This term had roughly the same meaning as inlander which had been used by the Dutch to refer to the Indonesian. Both terms denote a different status between a master and his subjects. Moreover, the Japanese view that they were of a chosen race, superior to all others, was very difficult for Indonesians to accept.<sup>8</sup> Indonesians began to become aware that there was no difference between the Dutch and the Japanese--

both were colonial in character.

In order to make it easy to spread Shintoism among the Indonesian Muslims, and to satisfy their desire to Nipponize Indonesians, the Japanese proclaimed that there was a near identity of the Japanese Hakkōichū (World Brotherhood) ideal and Islām. One of the Japanese 'hajis', Abdul Muniam Inada, head of the Department of Religious Affairs' first section, said, "The spirit of Dai Nippon and that of Islam are very close to one another, and no small degree of identity prevails between the two."<sup>9</sup>

Although, to some extent, Shinto and Islām are similar in that neither religion makes a separation between church and state, to acknowledge Tenno Heika as a divine being is very contrary to the Islamic faith. Therefore, the Muslims were infuriated when the Japanese attempted to superimpose their beliefs and practices on the Muslims. Once they were aroused, the Muslim opposition became increasingly vocal and a source of grave concern to the Japanese.<sup>10</sup>

Karim Amrullah, a prominent 'ālim from Minangkabau who was appointed adviser to the Department of Religious Affairs, fearlessly exposed the irreconcilability of emperor-worship and Islamic monotheism. When

Col. Horie, who was the head of the Department of Religious Affairs at the time, asked his opinion on the books Wadjah Semangat (The Countenance of Spirit)<sup>11</sup>, and Djiwa Baroe (The New Soul)<sup>12</sup>, both written by S. Ōzu, Amrullah criticized both books uncompromisingly.<sup>13</sup> In Wadjah Semangat, S. Ōzu asserts that Tenno Heika, who is the descendant of the sun, Amiterazu Omikami, is the God almighty. He is the owner of the world and the atmosphere, and he who bestows the livelihood for the race of Yamato.<sup>14</sup>

The Japanese apparently realized that their policy and attitudes towards Islām in Indonesia aroused a resentment among the Muslims. It was not easy to force the Muslims to accept the Japanese culture, or to make them believe in the divinity of Tenno Heika. The rôle of the 'ulamā' in keeping the Muslims away from doing shirk was still strong. Therefore, in order to combat the Muslims' resentments towards the Japanese, Let.-Gen. Imamura, the highest Japanese dignitary in Java, requested Wondoamiseno, the MIAI chairman, to communicate a message to the Muslim community asking them to forgive any mistake which the Japanese had done, especially those touching on Islām.<sup>15</sup>

Three months later, this apology was repeated by the Gunseikan in his address to the 'ulamā' assembled

in his residence. He said,

"As you know, gentlemen, it has been one of our aims to protect and pay due respect to Islam. Yet, some problems have arisen as the result of mutual misunderstandings. The [Indonesian] people know too little about the customs of Dai Nippon, while we, on the other hand, are as yet insufficiently informed about the Islamic religion and way of life, because only a few Muslims live in Nippon. We shall now [therefore] institute a thorough study of Islam, with a view to arriving at a better relationship..."<sup>16</sup>

Again, on March 3, 1943, Col. Nakayama, on behalf of the Gunseikan addressed the 50,000 Muslims assembled at Ikada park in Jakarta, and said,

"The Nippon government promises that it will study the Islamic religion and the laws and customs of its believers with the utmost care and thoroughness, in order to enable the government to pay the best possible attention to the wishes of the Indonesian people."<sup>17</sup>

The main problem which aroused the 'ulamā' and other Muslim leaders to fury was the imposition of saikerei.<sup>18</sup> The Japanese demanded that people should bow three times in the direction of the Tenno Heika's throne as a morning salutation.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, bowing towards the East in the morning when the sun is rising make the Muslims consider that they are worshipping the sun. Therefore, none of the 'ulamā' could accept the saikerei. The problem of saikerei was fast becoming a hot conversation among the 'ulamā' of Sumatra and Malaya who attended the

meeting held in Singapore in 1943. Syaikh Tahir Djalaludin suggested that the problem of Saikeirei should be put on the agenda, among other things to discuss. Unfortunately, his suggestion was not accepted since the meeting itself was entirely organized by the Japanese and was put under their direct supervision.<sup>20</sup>

Again, the first open rejection to perform saikeirei was displayed by a brave man, Karim Amrullah, the same man who had criticized S. Ozu's books. In a meeting of fifty-nine 'ulama' from all over Java held by the Department of Religious Affairs at Bandung in 1943, Amrullah remained seated when all others rose to perform the saikeirei.<sup>21</sup> Although Amrullah's action meant an offense to the Japanese Shinto feelings, the Japanese, nevertheless, apparently did not dare to punish him. This may have been due to their attempt to eliminate the widespread Muslim resentment. What the Japanese did was only to send Amrullah back to Jakarta, instead of continuing the previous planned propaganda tour throughout Java where he was to be one of the speakers. From then on Amrullah no longer appeared in public.<sup>22</sup>

Amrullah's courage not to perform saikeirei, which meant that he had overtly challenged Dai Nippon and its

emperor in an official meeting where there were some Japanese present, including Col. Horie, made the people dare to oppose the requirement for saikeirei.<sup>23</sup>

Until July 1943, the Japanese had not yet decided to abolish the ceremony of saikeirei for the Muslims, as it was still required in the opening session of the latihan kyai. The Japanese tried to make the Muslims believe that there was no similarity at all between the saikeirei and the rukut<sup>24</sup> (kneeling in prayer). A Japanese haji Abdul Hamid Ono said,

"I think that many [Muslims] are very reluctant to observe the [ceremony of] rendering honor. They believe that it is identical with the rukut, which is part of the Islamic prayer. Such thoughts and doubts are altogether wrong. The honoring [of the emperor] is completely different from the rukut, and in fact they have hardly anything in common at all. Honoring is not praying..."<sup>25</sup>

But the increasing Muslim resistance to this imposition forced the Japanese to change their policy<sup>26</sup> and withdraw the injunction to perform the saikeirei.<sup>27</sup>

It is worth noting here that not long after the meeting mentioned above, the head of the Department of Religious Affairs was given to Husein Djajadiningrat. Shortly after he assumed the office, Djajadiningrat told a leading visitor from Yogyakarta,

"Apparently the Japanese Military Administration

has realized that the saikerei was against the Muslim faith. So that, now the saikerei is no longer required in meetings of Muslims.<sup>28</sup>

The 'ulama' and other Muslim leaders became aware of what the Japanese were doing. They realized that they were being used by the Japanese merely in order to achieve the Japanese aims, not their own goals. They saw that the Japanese neither respected Islām nor held it in esteem as they had repeatedly proclaimed. What the Japanese were doing was to deviate the Muslims' qibla (the direction which the Muslims have to face when they are praying) from Mecca to Tokyo. To this end the Muslim leaders openly expressed their adverse attitude.

At a meeting held by the Education Office in Jakarta on July 23, 1943, other Muslim leaders openly proclaimed their stand that they would accept the Japanese invitation to work together with the Japanese Military Administration in order to achieve final victory on condition that a way be used which did not offend Islām. As a reaction to this statement, Okazaki, who was the head of the Education Office, blamed the Muslims for 'apparently wishing to occupy a special and unique position in Indonesian society'.<sup>29</sup>

Kyai Haji Mas Mansur, who was the chairman of the

Muhammadiyah, and who had once promised Muslim aid to the Japanese war effort<sup>30</sup>, now expressed his conditional support by asserting that,

"Indonesian Muslims, especially those who have a clear realization of all problems, hold that we can work together [with the Dai Nippon Army], but on condition that a way be used which does not offend religion [Islam]. If religion is offended, then it should be realized that the Muslims believe in defending their religion, wherever this may lead them...."<sup>31</sup>

Still in the meeting mentioned above, one Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, a prominent Muhammadiyah youth leader, expressed his objection to the Japanese attempt to Nipponize Indonesian Muslims, or to interweave Islām with Shintoism. He said,

"... quite a few Nipponese have studied the principles of Islam... The Japanese must know that Islam is not only a religion, but a whole way of life pervading all society... The struggle against Western imperialism has for long been known to us, so that we accept Nippon's aim of fighting it... [But] the principle which should be strictly observed in order to bring about this cooperation should be: 'We have our religion, and you have yours'. The difference between our two faiths need not stand in the way of our collaboration in wiping the Allies out of Asia, which is the home of all religions."<sup>32</sup>

Thus, as was mentioned above, the Japanese' desire to Nipponize Indonesian Muslims was a principal difficulty in their dealing with the Muslims. Therefore, the Japanese organizational efforts relating to the Mus-

lims in Indonesia, reflected a difficulty which hindered the implementation of the Japanese policy towards Islam in Indonesia.<sup>33</sup> On the Muslim side, although their resistance did not achieve a decisive victory, they were successful in abolishing the compulsion to perform the saikeirei during religious meetings. The Muslim resistance had forced the Japanese to modify their policy.<sup>34</sup>

## 2. THE MASYUMI SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY.

The Japanese expected that the Masyumi could be a tool in rallying the Indonesian Muslims to their side, supporting their aims in creating the Great East Asiatic Co-prosperity Sphere with the Japanese as its leader. On the other hand, as has been discussed in the preceding chapter, the replacement of the MIAI by the Masyumi was meant to prevent the 'ulama' from getting involved in politics. This Japanese stand was declared by H. Shimizu, head of the Propaganda Section of the Japanese Military Administration, who said, regarding the establishment of the Masyumi, "The reason was that the Kyai were trying to involve themselves in politics, and the Japanese did not like it."<sup>35</sup> Besides these reasons, the Japanese hoped that through the Masyumi they could set up a

better control over the 'ulamā' in the villages," preventing them from stirring up Muslim resistance against them.<sup>36</sup>

The result, however, was not as the Japanese expected. Almost all of the 'ulamā' refused to lend themselves as instruments of Japanese aims.<sup>37</sup> Above all, the Japanese attempts to Nipponize Indonesian Muslims, viz. the requirement to believe in the divinity of Tenno Heika, and the compulsion to bow towards Tokyo rather than to Mecca, made the Indonesian Muslims become aware that Islām could only be esteemed and exalted by Muslims themselves in a liberated Indonesia. Kyai Haji Mas Mansur, who was one of the vice-chairmen of the Masyumi, in his statement about the Masyumi said, "Without abandoning the teaching of Islām, we must [now] try to adjust our way of life and views to the new era and to bring them into harmony with it."<sup>38</sup> Kyai Mas Mansur's statement expressed his concern for religion rather than Japanese aims, since it was obvious that the Japanese wanted to manipulate Islām for their own aims.<sup>39</sup>

Such an awareness brought the Muslims to emphasize Indonesian independence above all else, and this was more frequently accompanied by anti-Japanese feelings.<sup>40</sup> Kyai Hasjim Asj'ari, who was the first chairman of the

Masyumi, at the meeting held in Bandung on July 30, 1944, by quoting verses in the Qur'ān, (Sūrat al-Tauba, 8 and Sūrat al-Baqara, 120), warned the attendants not to trust the kāfirs, because the kāfirs had never seriously wanted to keep their promises. Although in his speech he apparently disclosed the wickedness and the brutality of Dutch colonial rule, he composed his speech in such a way as to allow the audience to conclude that the Japanese were worse than the Dutch.<sup>41</sup>

As has been mentioned above, now the focus of the struggle was to strengthen and increase the spirit of nationalism<sup>42</sup> and to rescue Islām from disruption by the Japanese.<sup>43</sup> On the outside the Masyumi's leaders pretended to help the Japanese, but in fact they strengthened the resistance of the people against the Japanese.<sup>44</sup> The Masyumi, rather than rallying the Muslims in order to achieve the Japanese aims, as was expected by the Japanese, seized the opportunity to strengthen the unity of Indonesian Muslims in order to prepare them to obtain freedom for Indonesia, and to spread the true Islamic teachings. In order to eliminate the influence of Shintoism which had been introduced by S. Ozu through his books Wadjah Semangat and Djiwa Baroe, and by other Japa-

nese authors through various mass medias, the Masyumi established the Badan Propaganda Islam (Board of Propaganda for Islām) with which they propagated the true Islamic creed to the people.<sup>45</sup>

In short, the more the Japanese gave tasks to the Masyumi, the more opportunities they seized to strengthen themselves and to spread the Islamic teachings. In the words of Benda,

"The very bolstering of the Masyumi's strength, and the very tasks which the Japanese were entrusting to the Islamic leadership — in particular that of rallying public support in the villages to the cause of the Rising Sun — made of the Islamic movement a political force par excellence with a closely integrated local, regional and central leadership."<sup>46</sup>

Since the Masyumi were entrusted to manage the latihan kyais, and the course of 1944 leading Masyumi members were appointed to executive positions in the Department of Religious Affairs, the Masyumi were able to fortify their position.<sup>47</sup> Furthermore, the Masyumi had a chance to gain influence among the masses as all staff of the Department of Religious Affairs branches in residencies were members of the Masyumi. Through them, the Masyumi was able to build up a huge mass backing. Besides, not only did all 'ulamā' give their

support to the Masyumi, but the Masyumi also got the support from middle class Indonesian businessmen.<sup>48</sup>

When the old leaders of the Masyumi were replaced by young men, such as Wahid Hasjim, Muhammad Natsir, and Prawoto Mangkusasmito came to the fore to keep the rein of the Masyumi, the actions of the Masyumi became increasingly focused on the needs of Indonesians. The Masyumi were reluctant to encourage the people to enter Romusha (forced labour), which was disastrous for Indonesians. The Masyumi did not enthusiastically promote the Japanese ideal of the Great East Asiatic Co-prosperity Sphere.<sup>49</sup>

In a situation where the Japanese were being upset because of the victories of the Allies in every battle of the Pacific War — Indonesia also was being attacked by the Allies — these young leaders elevated their struggle to achieve freedom for an Indonesia which would be based on Islām.<sup>50</sup> For this purpose, the Masyumi held a conference in Jakarta on October 12-14, 1944, in which was passed a statement, "to prepare the Indonesian Muslim community, so as to be ready and able to receive independence and freedom of the religion of Islam."<sup>51</sup> Thereafter, numerous local meetings followed where the same ideas were proclaimed.<sup>52</sup>

On October 21, 1944, with the support of the Masyumi, the Muslim youths held a meeting. This meeting passed a statement which had the same ideas as the Masyumi's statement. Furthermore, these youths decided "to prepare themselves sincerely and voluntarily to strive in order to materialize the liberty of the Indonesian country, people, and religion."<sup>53</sup>

While the Masyumi were preparing to set up their own military corps, the Hizbullah (Army of Allah), they encouraged the Muslim youths to enter the Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air (Voluntary Defender of the Homeland), better known as Peta. The Peta was established on October 3, 1943; and the registration to enter Peta was opened on October 7, 1943.<sup>54</sup> The request for establishing the Peta was submitted by Gatot Mangkupradja to the Gunseikan on September 7, 1943. It is said that the request was written on paper with his own blood.<sup>55</sup> Six days later, ten 'ulama' from the Masyumi's leaders namely, Kyai Haji Mas Mansur, Kyai Haji R. Adnan, Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah, Haji Mansur, Haji Chalid, Kyai Haji Abdul Madjid, Haji Ja'qub, Kyai Haji Djunaidi, Haji Muchtar, and Haji Muhammad Sodri made the same request to the Gunseikan.<sup>56</sup>

It is a fact that many Muslim youths played an

important rôle in the Peta, for many members of the Peta were santris of pesantrens, young 'ulamā', and young leaders of the Masyumi.<sup>57</sup> To note some of them, Kasman Singodimedjo, a prominent youth leader of the Masyumi was the top Peta officer in Jakarta; Kyai Haji Sjamsuddin, a conservative rural 'ālim' in Banten; Muhammad Saleh, a youth leader of the Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta; and Sudirman, an Islamic school teacher in Kroya.<sup>58</sup> This Sudirman, two years later, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Thus, as Bernhard Dahm put it, "The kernel of Peta was constituted in the main by members of Muslim organization."<sup>59</sup>

The Japanese themselves also saw the Peta as a marriage between Islām and Japan. This can be seen from the Peta's flag, which depicted a combination of Islamic and Japanese attributes: The picture on the flag was of a red sun on a green field. Within the sun was the white crescent moon and star. The red sun was a Japanese symbol, while the green as well as the crescent moon were traditionally Islamic symbol.<sup>60</sup>

The code of the Peta was as follows:

1. "We will firmly adhere to the principles for the union of the whole Indonesian race into a single nation with a single language.

2. "We will offer our all for the realization and maintenance of independence for Indonesia.
3. "We will defend with glory and honour our national flag of the red and white and our national song, Indonesia Raya."<sup>61</sup>

On December 4, 1943, the Masyumi were granted permission to establish a military corps of their own, the Hizbullah, and were, therefore, strengthened. With the addition of several prominent Muslims who occupied leading positions in the Peta, the Masyumi were able to better their rôle in their own military organization.

The purpose of the Hizbullah was two fold. First, it was a military corps, trained as a reserve for the Peta. Second, it was concerned with spreading Islamic teachings, ensuring that the Muslims fulfilled their religious obligation, and defending Islām whenever it might be threatened. Thus it was to act as a religious vanguard<sup>62</sup>, or, as Nieuwenhuijze put it, "Its aim was 'to realize the device of Indonesian Muslim community, and Indonesian independence in accordance with the commandments of Islam!'"<sup>63</sup>

The Hizbullah was formed in every community in Java.<sup>64</sup> In order to provide leadership for this corps, some five hundred Muslim youths, eighteen to twenty years

old, were selected from all over Java. Each residency was required to produce twenty-five candidates.<sup>65</sup> They were sent to join a military training course at Bogor which lasted for two months. Military training was given under the Japanese command, with the assistance of members of the Peta. Religious lessons were given by Indonesian 'ulamā'.<sup>66</sup> After they had been trained at Bogor, they were sent out to organize and train local units all over Java. The age of members of these local units were to be between fifteen and twenty-five years. To finance these activities, money was placed at the disposal of the Masyumi. However, the members of the corps were not paid.<sup>67</sup>

The top leaders of the Hizbullah were prominent members of the Masyumi. Its chairman was Zainul Arifin. Among the leaders of the Hizbullah were Muhammad Roem, Anwar Tjokroaminoto, Jusuf Wibisono, and Prawoto Mangkusasmito, all of whom later became well-known politicians after the Indonesians achieved their freedom.<sup>68</sup>

It is undeniable that the Japanese granted permission for establishing the Peta and the Hizbullah with the hope that they would get the support of both the Peta and Hizbullah to win the war. At that time the Japanese were being defeated by the Allies. Thus, the Japanese

needed a considerable number of troops. Furthermore, they hoped that the Hizbullah could be mobilized on the basis of a holy war, a war against infidels. The Japanese always campaigned that the Allies (The United State, Great Britain, Australia, and the Netherlands) were kāfirs, so that war against the Allies was a "holy war". But the Japanese forgot that in the eyes of the Indonesian Muslims they themselves were kāfirs as well.<sup>69</sup>

For the Indonesians, the opportunity given by the Japanese to have a military corps was used for their own benefit. At that time it was impossible for the Indonesians to have military skills without having the support of the Japanese.<sup>70</sup> The military corps resulted in the unification of the Indonesians. The effect of the army as a unifying agent, by providing a common experience to different social groups, was described by a Japanese training officer as follows:

"Since the army is made up of volunteers from all walks of life, it has resulted in the unification of the Indonesian social strata towards the realization of its ideals. In fact, the Indonesian race has never seen such a huge comprehensive system to promote its own racial well-being."<sup>71</sup>

One Japanese 'haji', Suzuki, was appointed by the Japanese to supervise the Hizbullah<sup>72</sup>, but, as Elsbree

put it, "In all of their activities they did not lose sight of nationalist objectives."<sup>73</sup> Therefore, when Indonesian independence was proclaimed on August 17, 1945, the Hizbullah, along with all Indonesian Muslims who joined the Masyumi, issued the following statement:

"We, the Indonesian people, are truly struggling in the path of Allah, in order to defend the Indonesian Republic which is founded upon the lordship of the Almighty. We, the Muslim people of Indonesia, and hundreds of thousands of Muslim forces, are ready to defend the liberty and the honour of our religion and of our country."<sup>74</sup>

Returning to Islamic movements during the Japanese occupation, a brief account is required to compare the Japanese treatment of Muslim movements as opposed to the secularist movements of Indonesia. Indeed, the Japanese, unlike the Dutch, paid much attention to the movement and development of the Muslims. It even seemed as if the Japanese encouraged and gave priority to the Muslims as compared with the secular nationalists. One cannot be certain<sup>75</sup> whether this attitude aimed at putting the Muslims and the secular nationalists in conflict so that the Japanese could control both factions, as Benda's thesis has it,<sup>76</sup> or "...that the Japanese paid special attention to the kyai and ulama hoping to use them against the secular nationalists elite", as Fred von der Mehden put it.<sup>77</sup> According to Bernhard

Dahm, the rivalry between the Muslims and the secular nationalists was not as strong as that between the kaum tua and the kaum muda in the pre-war time.<sup>78</sup>

As far as can be ascertained, the Japanese were probably aware of the influence of the 'ulamā' upon rural society.<sup>79</sup> The people of rural areas, who were the vast majority of Indonesians, were more inclined to follow the leadership of the 'ulamā' than that of the secular nationalists.<sup>80</sup> Therefore, if the Japanese wanted to obtain the support of the villagers, it was essential to draw the 'ulamā' to their side.<sup>81</sup> Besides, the 'ulamā' were treated with respect as the traditional opponents of colonialism.<sup>82</sup> Furthermore, the Japanese probably considered that the 'ulamā' were politically less sophisticated, and therefore were more reliable than Western-educated intellectuals.<sup>83</sup> Above all, the 'ulamā' had built in their religious conviction a moral defense which was the spirit of jihād and which the Japanese were forced to respect.<sup>84</sup> Thus, a price had to be paid for the Muslims.

The reasons mentioned above were the motives which forced the Japanese to give more concessions to the Muslims than to the secular nationalists. It is worth

noting here that the Muslim movement had been granted permission to publish a journal of its own (the Soeara MIAI) since January 1944, whereas the secular nationalists did not obtain permission for their publication until 1945.

The Masyumi, who knew that the Japanese needed the Muslim support urgently, seized this opportunity to gain in stature and power. But the rapid developments and the strength of the Masyumi made the Japanese fear: a) that the Masyumi would venture far from what the Japanese expected the Masyumi to do; and b) that the secular nationalists would become suspicious and jealous of the good luck of the Masyumi.<sup>85</sup> Therefore, it is not surprising that from March 1945 the secular nationalist leaders overtly expressed their views regarding the abolition of the Masyumi as an independent organization and urged that it should merge with the Hokokai (People's Service Association) which was established in March 1944.<sup>86</sup>

Although a series of consultations by the leaders of the Hokokai and the Masyumi were held in order to discuss the merger of the Masyumi with the Hokokai, these consultations never produced results, and so the Masyumi remained an independent organization. Therefore, until the end of Japanese authority in Indonesia, the Masyumi

remained intact.<sup>87</sup>

Three months after the Japanese surrender, the Masyumi held the Kongres Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslims Congress) which was attended by representatives of Muslims from all over Indonesia. Among the decisions of the congress was the proclamation for transforming the Masyumi into a political party. The proclamation was made on November 7, 1945.<sup>88</sup>

From then on, the Masyumi made up the entire organization. All Muslim leaders and 'ulamā', including the leaders of the P.S.I.I. and P.I.I. who were excluded by the Japanese from participation in the movement, were now given prominent positions on the new party executive. This made the Masyumi a truly all-embracing Islamic political organization.<sup>89</sup>

### 3. REBELLIONS AGAINST THE JAPANESE.

The hope of the Indonesians that the Japanese would liberate them from Dutch colonial rule, as the Japanese had frequently proclaimed, very soon faded. Instead of tranquility under the Japanese rule, they were subjected to the ruthlessness and brutality of Japanese Military Administration. On the pretext of the war

effort, the Japanese ravaged almost all the crops and cattle from the people. Everything that could support the war effort, such as gold and silver ornaments, jewels, and even iron fences, had to be delivered to them. They did not pay reasonable prices for the expropriated articles which often went unpaid for. Therefore, the people suffered from poverty and lacked food and clothing. Many wore gunny sacks to cover their bodies instead of cloth.<sup>90</sup> "For the first time in living memory", said Anderson, "people were falling dead in the streets from starvation or disease."<sup>91</sup>

Besides the ravages on people's property, the Japanese set up a program of romushas. The romusha were the forced laborers who had to work on military construction projects. They were mostly peasants from the poorer areas of East and Central Java.<sup>92</sup> Many of them were sent to Burma and Thailand to work on the construction of the infamous 'death railway' connecting southern Burma with Bangkok through Kanbury<sup>93</sup> and were treated with great brutality and ruthlessness. According to Wertheim, almost three hundred thousand were sent overseas, of whom only seventy thousand returned alive after the war.<sup>94</sup> Hall says, "This institution was perhaps the worst form of tyranny."<sup>95</sup> And Dorothy Woodman states,

"Nothing that the Japanese did in their temporary occupation of Indonesia created so much bitter opposition as the treatment of these romushas. People still talk about them, as Europeans discuss Nazi atrocities in the territories which they occupied."<sup>96</sup>

Therefore, when the condition of these romushas reached the public, the opposition to the Japanese was openly expressed.<sup>97</sup>

Furthermore, many of the women were forced to be prostitutes. These women, attracted by the Japanese promise that they would be sent to Tokyo to continue their studies, were deceived into becoming prostitutes. Instead of sending them to Tokyo, they were sent to Singapore or other places to become the preys of Japanese soldiers. Several thousand of those women died or went mad.<sup>98</sup>

The worst cause of fear was the actions of the Kempeitei (Military Police). The Kempeitei believed in striking first and investigating after, if it was necessary. No one dared to have any dealings with the Kempeitei. Therefore, the people became restless. They referred to this situation as the djaman edan (mad era) which had been predicted by Djojobojo.<sup>99</sup>

Thus, within the first year of the Japanese occupation, even those who had believed in the Japanese pro-

paganda became hostile to the new regime. Those who had feelings of gratitude and desire to cooperate with the Japanese were soon convinced that the nationalist cause would not progress by mere cooperation with the Japanese but that constant pressure on the Japanese would be necessary.<sup>100</sup> The masses, in particular the peasantry who endured the unbearable sufferings, became much more politically conscious than they had ever previously been.<sup>101</sup> Hence, they were no longer impressed by the Japanese slogans, but "became fertile soil for resistance ideas," as Woodman put it.<sup>102</sup>

The Muslims lost the hope that the Japanese would give freedom to Indonesia. The Japanese attempts to Nipponize Indonesian Muslims and force them into shirk were the main causes behind the 'ulamā' resistance to the Japanese. This resistance was shown not only by the Muslim leaders' proclamation that the Muslims would work together with the Japanese on the condition that a way be used which did not offend Islām, but also by certain rebellions. To begin with, in the first year of the Japanese occupation a rebellion against the Japanese occurred in Aceh.

Tengku Abdul Djalil, a thirty-year old 'ālim of

Acheh, and head of the dayah of Cot Pling had never believed that the Japanese would esteem and respect Islām. To him there was no distinction between the Dutch and the Japanese because both were kāfirs. In his view, the Japanese would destroy Islām and replace it with their own religion, Shintoism. From him came a famous Achehnese saying, "Ta let ase, jitamong bui" (We chase away the dog, comes the pig)<sup>103</sup>, relating to the replacement of the Dutch by the Japanese to rule Indonesia.

Since August 1942, it was a widespread rumor that Tengku Abdul Djalil recited the Hikayat Prang Sabi (the Story of the Holy War) at his dayah.

The Hikayat Prang Sabi, which could encourage the Achehnese to rise in a holy war<sup>104</sup>, was written by Tengku Cik di Tiro during the Achehnese war (1873-1908) against the Dutch. Tengku Cik di Tiro was a prominent ʿālim of Acheh and was also the Commander-in-Chief of the Achehnese army at the time. This hikayat, which is based on the verse of the Qurʾān, Sūrat al-Imrān verse 169, consists of strong exhortations to sacrifice life and property to the holy cause. These exhortations are enforced with the requisite texts of holy war, showing prang sabi

(holy war) to be a bounden duty and promising to all who take part in it incomparable rewards in the hereafter.<sup>105</sup>

For the Achehnese, the most important obligation is jihād or holy war. Its fulfillment brings great gain while neglecting it is attended by misfortune of all kinds.<sup>106</sup> The passion for religious war which is so deeply rooted in the Achehnese's hearts is more marked among the Achehnese than in the majority of Muslims in other parts of Indonesia.<sup>107</sup>

At the time of the coming of the Dutch to Aceh, there were numerous dayahs or rangkangs throughout the country and it was a fact that on more than one occasion the si meudagang (students) from these dayahs threw themselves, practically unarmed, upon the bayonets of the Dutch troops. These students did so because they were inflamed to fanaticism by the teachings they had imbibed with regard to the holy war and the boundless rewards awaiting the shuhadā' (martyrs) in the hereafter.<sup>108</sup> They sought death in the battle of a holy war in order to obtain those appointed rewards in the hereafter.

Therefore, the Dutch forbade the recital of the Hikayat Prang Sabi, threatening those who dared to keep

it with heavy punishment.<sup>109</sup> Nevertheless, there were some people who secretly kept it.

The Japanese, who knew what would happen if the Achehnese were reciting the Hikayat Prang Sabi, undoubtedly paid special attention to the movement of Tengku Abdul Djalil. Above all, Tengku Abdul Djalil was not a member of the Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh (Union of 'Ulamā' of Aceh), better known as PUSA<sup>110</sup>, which rose in uprisings preceding the Japanese arrival.<sup>111</sup> Tengku Abdul Djalil even criticized the PUSA's leaders, who accepted the coming of the Japanese.

In order to give an idea of the PUSA's movement with regard to its acceptance of the coming of the Japanese in Aceh, it seems appropriate to submit a brief account of this organization here. It was believed that fourteen days after the outburst of World War II, leaders of the PUSA decided to cooperate with the Japanese in order to chase the Dutch out of the country.<sup>112</sup>

After the Japanese occupied Penang in Malaya (December 19, 1941), the PUSA sent a delegation consisting of Husein al-Mudjahid, Tengku Abdul Wahab, and Tengku Abdul Hamid to meet the Japanese in Penang in order to make a direct contact between the PUSA and the Japanese.

In this meeting an agreement was achieved that the PUSA would rebel against the Dutch prior to the Japanese landing in Aceh. In return the Japanese promised not to bombard Aceh. Later on the PUSA set up an underground movement named Fujiwara-Kikan (Fujiwara Organization), better known as Gerakan F (F Organization); F being the first letter of Fujiwara, a Japanese officer who had the responsibility to take care of and give the orders to this organization. The main task of this Gerakan F was to instigate uprisings against the Dutch and to sabotage Dutch military installations. Thus, an uprising occurred at Seulimeum led by an ālim named Tengku Abdul Wahab, who had been one of the members of the PUSA delegation sent to Penang.<sup>113</sup> The Gerakan F also destroyed railways, roads, bridges, and telephone and telegraph wires.<sup>114</sup>

In order to gain the support of all the Achehnese, the Gerakan F used religious motivations in their propaganda. They said that the relationship between the Japanese and Muslims had been built up over a long time, and the Japanese would be the protectors of Islām.<sup>115</sup> This Gerakan F was deceived by the Japanese propaganda which had been launched since the mid-1930's.<sup>116</sup>

Nevertheless, it is hard to conclude how far mem-

bers of the PUSA believed that they could realize their desire to promote Islām or their nationalistic ideas with Japanese help, for they soon began to realize that the Japanese occupation was of the same form as Dutch colonialism.<sup>117</sup> Perhaps their cooperation with the Japanese was in order to achieve their first goal, which was to chase the Dutch out of the country.<sup>118</sup>

Eventually, when the leaders of the PUSA became aware that the Japanese were not the men who would protect Islām, the leaders joined the 'Masyumi', through which they worked to propagate self confidence to the people to achieve their freedom. Even though the Japanese authorities warned the leaders not to get involved in politics, they never neglected to use opportunities to rally the people to achieve their own goal.<sup>119</sup>

However, even though the name of the PUSA seemed to include all the 'ulamā' of Aceh, it was not so. Besides Tengku Abdul Djalil who was not a member of the PUSA, there was a prominent 'ālim' of Aceh, named Tengku Muhammad Hasbi ash-Shiddieqy, who had great influence among the Achehnese and who had never belonged to the PUSA. Without saying he was a rival of the PUSA's leaders, he had never agreed on the PUSA's outlook, especially

the PUSA's accepting the Japanese coming to Indonesia. He was appointed the first vice-chairman of the Majlis Agama Islam Untuk Bantuan Kemakmuran Asia Timur Raya (Islamic Council for the Aid to the Great East Asiatic Co-prosperity Sphere), better known as Maibkatra, which was established in January 1943 by the Japanese.<sup>120</sup> His appointment resulted from the fact that the Japanese considered him important and needed his influence among the Achehnese. According to Piekaar, the Japanese forced him to take a seat in the Maibkatra.<sup>121</sup> Tengku Muhammad Daud Beureueh, who was the chairman of the PUSA, was only appointed the second vice-chairman of the Maibkatra.<sup>122</sup> Perhaps it was because the Japanese did not benefit through this Maibkatra as much as they expected that this Maibkatra was dissolved in January 1945.<sup>123</sup>

Returning to the movements of Tengku Abdul Djalil, who was reciting the Hikayat Prang Sabi at his dayah in order to strengthen the spirit of jihād against the Japanese, the Japanese at first tried to get rid of him by an open war. At the end of October 1942, he was ordered to come to the police office at Lhoksukon to justify his movements. He refused to comply with the order on the ground that he was doing a retreat.<sup>124</sup> After he had completed

the retreat the order was repeated but he still refused to fulfil it. Orders were sent, one after the other, from the Chief Police at Lhoksukon and from the Commandant of the Kempeitei at Kutaraja, the capital of the province of Aceh. But Tengku Abdul Djalil did not respond to any of these orders. The Japanese sent two delegations<sup>125</sup> in order to persuade him to fulfil the Japanese order. Both delegations failed to change his mind. He insisted on disobeying the Japanese commands. When his own teacher, Tengku Haji Hasan Kruengkale, came to see him, Tengku Abdul Djalil told Tengku Haji Hasan Kruengkale, "I have decided never to obey the Japanese, the infidels. I will carry out the jihād. Please pray for me, may God help me."<sup>126</sup>

On the other hand, Tengku Abdul Djalil refused to obey the Japanese order to come to the office of Kempeitei, probably because of the consideration that he would get ill-treatment from the Kempeitei. There was still in the air the news of the disappearance of Hasan Shab along with fifteen of his followers from the office of the Kempeitei in the first month of the Japanese occupation. Hasan Shab was a leader of the Gerakan F who should have been merited by the Japanese, but still

received such ill-treatment from the Japanese Kempeitei.<sup>127</sup> Until now, no one knows where they are buried.

The refusal of Tengku Abdul Djalil to comply with the Japanese orders undoubtedly made the situation increasingly dangerous. Tengku Abdul Djalil's pupils, who were very young (between fifteen and twenty years old), stood steadfastly behind their teacher. They armed themselves with rencongs (the famous Achehnese daggers)<sup>128</sup>, swords and spears. During the week before the open rebellion took place, day and night these pupils recited the rateb (recitation of a prayer) in the mosque. By reciting the rateb their spirit became stronger causing no fear to remain in their hearts.<sup>129</sup> To his pupils Tengku Abdul Djalil said, "If we should die, let us not die as slaves, but let us die in a battlefield holding daggers in our hands, as shuhadā' should die."<sup>130</sup>

In order to face the situation, the Japanese held a meeting at Lhokseumawe on November 10, 1942. All Japanese commandants from Aceh were summoned to this meeting in which the Japanese came to the conclusion that they should use armed force to suppress the movements of Tengku Abdul Djalil. On the same night, the Japanese moved their troops from Bireun, Lhokseumawe, and Lhoksukon ,

five hundred strong, using machine guns and three cannons<sup>131</sup> to surround Cot Pling. Thus, a battle could not be avoided.

Tengku Abdul Djalil, with three hundred of his followers, fearlessly faced the Japanese troops. In the battle that night the mosque and the dayah of Tengku Abdul Djalil were destroyed and burnt, which forced Tengku Abdul Djalil and his followers to move to Blang Mangat. In the battle the following morning (November 11, 1942), one hundred and twenty-seven of Tengku Abdul Djalil's followers were slain, and more than a hundred were injured. On the Japanese side more than a hundred were killed and several were injured.<sup>132</sup> In this battle Tengku Abdul Djalil himself, with his nine followers, including his first assistant named Tengku Muhammad Thayeb, escaped from the massacre. They moved to Buloh Gampong Tengoh where on the next day (November 12, 1942) all of them were slain while observing the noon prayer at a mosque. After the Japanese beheaded Tengku Abdul Djalil, his corpse was brought to Lhokseumawe and showed his corpse to the public in order to dissuade them from resisting the Japanese.<sup>133</sup> This event was further proof that the Japanese did not come as liberators but as suppressors.

The followers of Tengku Abdul Djalil fought with the spirit of fanaticism according to the best of Aceh-

nese traditions.<sup>134</sup> An assistant of the Japanese Kempei-tei of Lhokseumawe told T.A. Rahman Muli, who was the head of the district of Lhokseumawe at the time, that the battle between the Japanese and Tengku Abdul Djalil was a peculiar battle the like of which the Japanese had never faced before.<sup>135</sup> The Japanese could not understand how those young people had the courage to fight while only holding rencongs, swords, or spears, against the Japanese who were armed with modern weapons. This matter can only be understood by considering that, for those people who were inflamed by the spirit of jihād, to die in a holy war was something to seek, not to avoid.

The rebellion of Tengku Abdul Djalil was merely based on religious motivations<sup>136</sup> and was a warning to the Japanese that they should not belittle the religious fanaticism of the Achehnese<sup>137</sup> and the great rôle the 'ulamā' played among the people.

With the killing of Tengku Abdul Djalil, open rebellion was extinguished, while the Achehnese hatred of the Japanese increased. The exhibition of Tengku Abdul Djalil's corpse did not make the people scared. In fact, they even set up an underground resistance which appeared all over Acheh.<sup>138</sup> Knowing this situation, the Japanese

searched every house in the districts of Lhokseumawe, Bireun, and Lhoksukon. Everything that could be used as a weapon was confiscated, including kitchen knives. These confiscated weapons needed five storehouses to keep them at Lhokseumawe.<sup>139</sup> People who were believed to be supporting Tengku Abdul Djalil's movement received heavy punishment.<sup>140</sup>

The first rebellion against the Japanese has now been discussed. The second rebellion occurred at Pontianak in the West coast of Kalimantan (Borneo). In 1943 the Pemuda Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Youth) of Pontianak prepared themselves to rise in rebellion against the Japanese. They set up a fighting corps called Sukarela (Volunteer). In order to make the rebellion on a large scale, this Sukarela made contact with a similar resistance group at Banjarmasin in south Kalimantan which was under the leadership of Susilo. Both groups planned a general rebellion on December 8, 1943 when the Japanese were celebrating the third anniversary of their attack on Pearl Harbour. The rebellion was to begin with the attack on the Headquarters of the Kempeitei at Pontianak. Unfortunately, these plans were never carried out because the Japanese discovered them beforehand. Susilo and his friends at

Banjarmasin were arrested and executed. At Pontianak, within a short time, the Japanese executed most of the leaders. Within a few months the Japanese had killed approximately twenty thousand people. They were loaded in trucks, which the people called Kereta Neraka (Wagon of Hell), and taken to the swamp outside the town where they were shot to death.<sup>141</sup> As Mason put it, "The Japanese put down any attempt of resistance with horrible efficiency."<sup>142</sup>

Although the resistance movement in Kalimantan could never succeed and the Japanese took severe actions to suppress any attempt to rebel, the Indonesian Muslims were not prevented from opposing the Japanese. Therefore, the open resistance to the Japanese, which never stopped taking place, now shifted to Java. On February 25, 1944, a rebellion broke out at Sukamanah Singaparna, in the district of Tasikmalaya in West Java. This rebellion was led by a 'ālim named Kyai Haji Zainal Mustafa supported by five hundred pupils from his 'pesantren.<sup>143</sup>

The motive of his rebellion was to liberate the country from foreign subjugation.<sup>144</sup> During the Dutch colonial rule he strove towards this end and was twice jailed on charges of inciting people into rebellion. When

the Japanese occupied Indonesia, they released him from prison and permitted him to go back to Sukamanah Singaparna to head his pesantren.<sup>145</sup>

When a Japanese Colonel asked him to work for Sendenbu (Japanese Propaganda Section), he refused the invitation under the pretext that he was still weak and tired. This invitation was frequently repeated by the Japanese, but he never allowed himself to accept it. Therefore, the Japanese suspected him.<sup>146</sup> He held the same view as Tengku Abdul Djalil regarding the Japanese and the Dutch and always asked his santris and others around him not to believe the Japanese propaganda.<sup>147</sup>

Furthermore, the brutality of the Japanese Military Administration, the disrespect towards human rights, forcing women into prostitution, widespread starvation among the people, and, last but not least, the Japanese attempts to Nipponize Indonesian Islām, all very much contrary to Kyai Zainal Mustafa's desire, brought him to the conclusion that there was no choice but to rise in rebellion against the Japanese if he wanted to rescue the people and Islām from jeopardy. He committed himself to be a martyr.<sup>148</sup>

At the beginning of 1944, a plan for a rebellion

was made. With regard to spiritual force, some mass-meetings were held. In his address to the audience he stimulated people into doing a holy war. With regard to physical force, he set up troops consisting of his santris, under the command of Kyai Nadjmuddin. with the assistance of Haji Hidayat.<sup>149</sup>

When the news of Kyai Zainal Mustafa's movement reached the Japanese Kempeitei, they became alert to a situation which could shake their authority. The Japanese took the same action as they had done towards Tengku Abdul Djalil. For the first step the Japanese Kempeitei asked Kyai Zainal Mustafa to come to the office of Kempeitei at Tasikmalaya. This order, and likewise other orders which were sent one after the other, were never obeyed by him, for he and all people knew that one who was ordered to come to the office of Kempeitei would never come back again to one's family, especially in a matter connected with politics and resistance against the Japanese. To the couriers who were delivering the Japanese orders to him, he said, "If the Japanese need me, they may come and see me here at Sukamanah Singaparna, and we will accept them in our own way."<sup>150</sup>

On February 24, 1944, the Japanese sent a troop

of Indonesian policemen to arrest Kyai Zainal Mustafa. For him and his followers the matter was clear. To give himself up to the Japanese meant an unconditional surrender. All of his followers backed him and persisted in protecting him, even though they had to pay with their own blood. The policemen were disarmed. From them, the followers of Kyai Zainal Mustafa took away three revolvers, twelve rifles, and munitions.<sup>151</sup> No casualties occurred in this incident due to Kyai Zainal Mustafa's principle which would not permit Indonesian bloodshed. He allowed the policemen to leave.<sup>152</sup>

It was not surprising that the Japanese anger was revealed on the next afternoon. On Friday of February 25, 1944, four Japanese Kempeitei came to the pesantren of Kyai Zainal Mustafa. They did not approach the mosque where Kyai Zainal Mustafa and his followers were observing the Jum'a (Friday) prayer, but waited for Kyai Zainal Mustafa on top of a hill near the pesantren. At the same time Sukamanah Singaparna was surrounded by Japanese troops. When Kyai Zainal Mustafa came to these Japanese, one of them ordered Kyai Zainal Mustafa to obey them and give back the weapons which had been confiscated from the police. To the crowd who accompanied Kyai Zainal Mustafa, this Kempeitei said, "Don't dare to oppose the

Japanese authority for, if one Japanese is killed here at Sukamanah Singaparna or wherever in Indonesia, a thousand Indonesians will be killed in return." To this haughty threat, Nadjmuddin replied, "Yes, we will give ourselves up to the Kempeitei at Tasikmalaya tomorrow morning, but the four heads of yours have to be buried here in return." Immediately the four Japanese Kempeitei were surrounded by the followers of Kyai Zainal Mustafa, three of them were killed, and one escaped with injuries. Soon after that, the Japanese moved their troop which consisted of one company of Japanese raiders, two companies of Heiho (Auxiliary Forces), and two companies of police to Sukamanah Singaparna. The Heiho and the police consisted of Indonesians.<sup>153</sup>

The followers of Kyai Zainal Mustafa who decided to choose to die on the path of Allah in a holy war, awaited the Japanese troops without fear. But then, when they saw that the troops, which were approaching them, consisted of Indonesians who were Muslims as well, they hesitated. The principles of Kyai Zainal Mustafa, which were implanted in their hearts, condemned the shedding of Indonesian or Muslim blood. According to their understanding, the holy war was the war between Muslims and non-Muslims. Unfortunately, before this problem could be solved, the police

and Heiho opened fire on the Kyai Zainal Mustafa's followers, and so the battle began and could not be avoided any more.<sup>154</sup>

Although the Japanese used modern weapons, including a bomber and three fighter planes, the followers of Kyai Zainal Mustafa fought with high spirit.<sup>155</sup> Nevertheless, modern weapons with trained soldiers behind them could put down this rebellion in a short time. Within ninety minutes, the troops of Kyai Zainal Mustafa were destroyed, and Kyai Zainal Mustafa himself was caught. In this battle one hundred and seventeen of Kyai Zainal Mustafa's followers were killed, and on the other side, twenty-four were killed, among them three officers.<sup>156</sup>

During the three days after this battle, approximately a thousand people around Sukamanah Singaparna were arrested and jailed. Of these, forty-five died in jail. On October 25, 1944, Kyai Zainal Musatafa with twenty-one of his followers, Kyai Domon, Kyai Aip Abdul Hakim, Kyai Nadjmuddin, Kyai Hidajat, Haji Hafid Saefuddin, Sarkosih, Hambali, I'i Sjahroni, Adung A. Karim, Sjamsuddin, Husein, Endin, Umar, A. Razak, Asikin, Ahmad, Namri, Amna, and Hadori were executed in jail at Jakarta.<sup>157</sup>

The rebellion of Kyai Zainal Mustafa seemed to have

been suppressed; the Japanese destroyed his troops and he himself along with prominent members of his followers were under arrest and later executed. But the spirit of jihād which he planted in the hearts of the people, especially in West Java, was rapidly growing. Three months later, in May 1944, people of Karangampel in the district of Indramayu led by a haji rose in rebellion. As the Japanese had previously done in facing rebellions, this too was suppressed by severe actions.<sup>158</sup>

Again, the spirit of jihād proved too strong to be put down by any power. Despite the fact that the Japanese suppressed any attempts at resistance with horrible efficiency, the people, who were strengthened by the spirit of jihād, were not afraid of Japanese weapons and power. In August 1944, three months after the rebellion at Karangampel had taken place, a rebellion again broke out at Lohbener in the same district of Indramayu. This rebellion was larger than that at Karangampel and was led by Haji Madrias with the assistance of Haji Kartiwa, Kyai Srengseng, Kyai Kusen, and Kyai Mukasan. It took months to suppress this rebellion which eventually ended with the arrest and execution of its leaders.<sup>159</sup>

Neither the rebellion of Karangampel nor that of

Lohbener was ever made public by the Japanese. In fact, they warned those who happened to know of them not to mention them to anyone. Therefore, there was not much information on these events.

The year of 1944, as history has recorded, was not a year in which either the Indonesians or the Japanese were satisfied. On the Indonesian side, the year was marked by widespread crop failures.<sup>160</sup> The climate was bad and the peasants, instead of cultivating their soil, were forced to be romushas. Furthermore, the little crops which obtained, while not sufficient to sustain life, had to be delivered to the Japanese. Thus, the suffering became unbearable. For the Japanese, the Pacific War reached the point where they were being defeated in every battle. On July 7, 1944, Saipan was captured by General McArthur's troops. Fourteen days later the U.S. army landed on Guam Island. The fall of Saipan and Guam to the Allies terrified the Japanese, because the distance between Saipan and Tokyo was only one thousand three hundred and fifty miles, which meant bombers of the B. 29 type could reach and bombard Tokyo. Moreover, the Allied Air Force began to bombard Surabaya in East Java.<sup>161</sup> In such a situation the Japanese were forced to promise to

the Indonesians that they would get their freedom "in the near future".<sup>162</sup>

The word 'freedom' inflamed the spirit of Peta members. They wanted to get it now, not in the near future as was promised by the Japanese, for the people were subjected to unbearable sufferings. Consequently, a detachment of Peta at Blitar, in the East of Java rose in mutiny.

In order to have an idea why this Peta at Blitar was forced to rise in mutiny, it seems appropriate to give a brief description of the situation in which Peta members were living, especially the detachment of Peta at Blitar, which rose in mutiny.

When the members of this Peta were burdened with the duty of supervising the construction of fortifications on the shores of the northern and southern parts of East Java where romushas were being employed on the constructions, these Peta members saw with their own eyes how the Japanese treated the romushas which consisted of men and women. From the workers these Peta members heard of the arbitrary actions of the Japanese upon the people. These members also heard that the Japanese forced the people to deliver eggs under the pretext that those eggs

would be provided to the Peta, whereas the Peta members ate only steamed rice.<sup>163</sup> They also heard that some of their relatives were forced into prostitution instead of being sent to Tokyo to continue their studies.<sup>164</sup> Above all, the Japanese treated the Peta members as genjūmin. They had to salute all Japanese soldiers, even those belonging to the lowest ranks in the army.<sup>165</sup> All of these situations made the Peta members conclude that they should express their objections to Japanese brutality towards the people.<sup>166</sup>

A plan was made to mutiny. Supriyadi was nominated to lead this mutiny which was to begin at Blitar; other battalions of Peta would join them. Although they realized that with little ammunition it would be hard to win a battle against the Japanese, since the Japanese could isolate them from other Peta battalions and thus break down their plans, the responsibility to protect the people from the brutality of the Japanese inflamed them.<sup>167</sup>

On February 14, 1945, at three o'clock in the morning, the detachment of Peta at Blitar started the mutiny. In that very morning, all Japanese who lived at Blitar and its surrounding areas were killed. After

that, these Peta divided themselves into three troops. The first troop under the command of Supriyadi marched to Kaliputih, the second troop under the command of Munadi marched to Panataran, and the third troop under the command of Sunanto marched to Lodoyo, where they took up positions to wait for the Japanese.<sup>168</sup>

The commanders of the Japanese army headquarters at Surabaya received the information of what was happening at Blitar with great fear.<sup>169</sup> Immediately the Japanese moved their regiment at Malang, assisted by tank troops, to surround the Peta. These troops were headed by their own regiment commander, Col. Katagiri. Meanwhile the Japanese announced to other Peta battalions that the Allies had landed on the southern part of Java, so that they had to follow orders of Japanese officers.<sup>170</sup>

The Japanese tried to settle the problem before a general mutiny of Peta all over Java could materialize. For this purpose, they mobilized all experts on the subject of Indonesian behavior, including H. Shimizu, who was the head of the propaganda section of the Japanese Military Administration, and the former instructors of the Peta who were being trained at Bogor. The Japanese Army Headquarters in Jakarta even sent Major-General

Yamamoto to Blitar to see the situation.<sup>171</sup>

While Col. Katagiri, who had much combat experience, moved his troops and tanks to encircle the Peta, H. Shimizu was meeting Kyai Bendo, who was the teacher of some Peta officers. In this meeting H. Shimizu asked Kyai Bendo to help the Japanese and make Peta members surrender to the Japanese. Kyai Bendo refused to lend himself to this Japanese purpose, saying that "Muradi and his friends do not make a mistake. They are doing what they should do."<sup>172</sup>

H. Shimizu, accompanied by two Japanese instructors, met Muradi without the help of Kyai Bendo, in order to persuade Muradi to give himself up to Col. Katagiri. Muradi replied to Shimizu that he and his troops would give themselves up to Col. Katagiri if the Colonel would accept the following conditions: 1) that they would not be drawn before a court; 2) that the Japanese should treat them as officers; 3) that their weapons would not be confiscated.<sup>173</sup>

Col. Katagiri accepted all these conditions. As a token that he would respect his promises he gave his own samurai (Japanese sword) to Muradi. Muradi, then, along with his troops surrendered to Col. Katagiri.<sup>174</sup>

The troops under the command of Supriyadi, which marched to Kaliputih, were involved in a battle with the Japanese. Their position was continuously bombarded by cannons during the whole day. Under this situation, therefore, Supriyadi's troops were in disorder and destroyed. What happened to Supriyadi himself is not known. According to Soehoed, he disappeared in the jungles of Kelud<sup>175</sup>, but most likely he was shot to death.

The troops under the command of Sunanto had another story. Although the troops killed some Japanese, the Japanese in turn killed three of them and injured another eight. The battle lasted one hour and the Japanese appeared as the winner.<sup>176</sup>

At the end of February 1945, almost all the Peta members who were involved in the mutiny came back to their barracks at Blitar. They did this because they believed that the conditions which had been accepted by Col. Katagiri would be carried out.<sup>177</sup> But it was not so.

Soon after the Japanese brought the situation under their control, an order came from the Japanese Army Headquarters in Jakarta that an investigation ought to be carried out regarding those Peta members involved in the mutiny. The investigation would be carried out by the

Kempeitei. This order undoubtedly shocked the Peta members.<sup>178</sup>

After a short investigation, seventy-eight Peta members were sent to Jakarta in order to undergo further investigations. On April 14, 1945, they were drawn before the Japanese Military Court in Jakarta. The trial lasted only two days. On April 16, 1945, the Japanese judge announced the verdict: Dr. Ismail, Muradi, Suparjono, Sunanto, Sudarmo, and Halir were sentenced to death. Three people were sentenced to life, five were sentenced to fifteen years, three were sentenced to ten years, eighteen were sentenced to seven years, and two were sentenced to two years. Four out of the forty-one who were put in jail died in prison.<sup>179</sup>

Although Professor Supomo, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Otto Iskandardinata, Kasman Singodimedjo, and Sudiro appealed to the Japanese not to punish the Peta members with heavy sentences on the ground that they mutinied because their spirits were inflamed by the thought of having freedom for the country, this appeal was not heard by the Japanese. The five people who were sentenced to death were executed soon after the verdict was announced.<sup>180</sup> The rest of the Peta members at Blitar were exiled to

Gombyoh, a place famous for its bad climate and attacks by storms.<sup>181</sup>

The breaking of the promise made between the Japanese and the Peta members at Blitar forced the people to become aware that the Japanese had never meant to keep their promises. However, the awareness of this, even when combined with the abuse inflicted on the people by the Japanese, never discouraged the people from resisting the Japanese.

Again, three months later, in May 1945, a Peta member of Aceh, vacationing in his village of Pandraih, in the district of Lhokseumawe with the support of his countrymen arose against the Japanese.<sup>182</sup> Although the Japanese quickly put this rebellion down, their assistant resident at Bireun and two police officers were killed.<sup>183</sup>

This Peta member was very difficult to identify because the Japanese kept the incident a secret. The only record which the Japanese made public, was the utterance of the Japanese resident at Aceh, Let.-Gen. S. Iino who in his address in a periodical conference of Chief Police from all over Aceh on May 28, 1945, who said, "A rebellion took place several days ago. The re-

bels attacked our barracks, but on that very place the rebels were sieged. Casualties occurred on our side, and also on their side."<sup>184</sup> As a result of this rebellion hundreds of people from the surrounding areas of Pandraih were put in jail. After the Indonesians gained their freedom, it was learned that all the prisoners were tortured by the Kempeitei and as a result died.<sup>185</sup>

The spirit of jihād which was stimulated by reciting the Hikayat Prang Sabi proved that the Achehnese were never afraid of modern weapons. Although the Japanese warned the people not to recite the Hikayat Prang Sabi, it continued to be recited. The circulation letter of the head of the Japanese police of Aceh dated July 13, 1945, reads,

"... that it is against the law to possess or to sermonise the Hikayat Prang Sabi, which now has been heard is being recited by some people. One who is known to possess a Hikayat Prang Sabi, has to be interrogated immediately, and those who sermonise the Hikayat Prang Sabi should have immediate severe action taken against them."<sup>186</sup>

In September 1945, when the Japanese had given up their control over Indonesia, the Hikayat Prang Sabi was overtly recited in all meunasahs (small mosque, not to be used for Jum'a prayer). As a result of reciting the Hikayat Prang Sabi, a group of guerillas called mujāhidīn

(one who is carrying out the jihād) intercepted a train at Cunda near Lhokseumawe. The train was carrying Japanese soldiers to Medan where they were to give themselves up to the Allies. In a short attack, these mujāhidīn killed all the Japanese who were in one of the train coaches. In this attack, there was an old man with a sword in his hand, who jumped into the train coach. It is said that he alone killed those Japanese before he was shot to death.<sup>187</sup>

It was surprising that the Japanese did not retaliate; in fact, several days after the incident took place, the Japanese at Lhokseumawe handed over all their reserve weapons, enough to arm a battalion, to these mujāhidīn.

All these rebellions, during forty months of the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, along with the wars of Imam Bonjol, Pangeran Diponegoro, and the Acehnesse war, clearly shows how the 'ulamā' played their great rôle among the Indonesian Muslims. The striving of the Indonesian 'ulamā' to oppose or to free their country from foreign authority has long been known. Therefore, the rôle of the 'ulamā' with regard to the achievement of freedom for Indonesia cannot be underestimated.

## FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER THREE.

<sup>1</sup>Cady, Southeast Asia, p. 571; Chaudry, The Indonesian, p. 65; Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 195.

<sup>2</sup>Benda, "Indonesian Islam", p. 42.

<sup>3</sup>Drewes, "Indonesia", p. 303.

<sup>4</sup>Benda, The Crescent, p. 123.

<sup>5</sup>Wertheim, "Changes", p. 42.

<sup>6</sup>Quoted in Benda and others, Japanese Military, p. 187.

<sup>7</sup>Benedict R.O'G. Anderson, "Japan, the Light of Asia", Josef Silverstein, ed., Southeast Asia, p. 15.

<sup>8</sup>Benda, The Crescent, p. 123.

<sup>9</sup>See Hadji Abdul Muniam Inada's article, "Agama Islam dan Nippon" (Islam and Nippon), Pandji Poestaka, XX, 28 (October 17, 1942) as quoted in Benda, The Crescent, p. 123.

<sup>10</sup>Benda, The Crescent, p. 123.

<sup>11</sup>S. Ozu, Wadjah Semangat (Bandung, n.p., 1943).

<sup>12</sup>Idem, Djiwa Baroe (Bandung, n.p., 1943).

<sup>13</sup>See Hamka, Ajahku. Riwayat Hidup Dr. Abdul Karim Arullah dan Perjuangannya (My Father. Biography of Dr. Abdul Karim Amrullah and His Struggle) (Djakarta: Widjaja, 1950), pp. 203-216.

<sup>14</sup>See Ibid, pp. 152 and 207.

<sup>15</sup> See Wondoamiseno's article, "Sikap MIAI terhadap Peroebahan Djaman Baroe", in Pandji Poestakan, XX, 13 (July 4, 1943), p. 975. See Benda, The Crescent, p. 122.

<sup>16</sup> Soeara MIAI, I,1 (January 1, 1943) as quoted in Benda, The Crescent, p. 122.

<sup>17</sup> See Asia Raya (March 3, 1943)

<sup>18</sup> Benda, The Crescent, p. 123.

<sup>19</sup> Fischer, The Story, p. 69.

<sup>20</sup> Hamka, Ajahku, p. 152.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, p. 151; Fischer, The Story, p. 69.

<sup>22</sup> Hamka, Ajahku, p. 151.

<sup>23</sup> Fischer, The Story, p. 69.

<sup>24</sup> For more information on the ruku', see the article on "Salat", in H.A.R. Gibb and J.H. Kraemer, ed., Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1953), p. 439.

<sup>25</sup> Quoted in Benda, The Crescent, p. 124.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, p. 121.

<sup>27</sup> Fischer, The Story, p. 69.

<sup>28</sup> Hamka, Ajahku, p. 153.

<sup>29</sup> See Pandji Poestaka, XXI, 20-21 (August 1, 1943), pp. 731-738. See also Benda, The Crescent, p. 124.

<sup>30</sup> See Kyai Mansur' reply to the Gunseikan address of December 7, 1943, in Soeara MIAI, I, 1

(January 1, 1943), pp. 5-6.

<sup>31</sup>See Pandji Poestaka, XXI, 20-21 (August 1, 1943), p. 736; see also Benda, The Crescent, p. 125.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid, p. 737 as quoted in Benda, The Crescent, p. 125.

<sup>33</sup>Benda, The Crescent, p. 121.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>See G. Pakpahan, 1261 Hari Dibawah Sinar Matahari Terbit (1261 Days Under the Ray of the Rising Sun) (n.p., 1946), pp. 34f.

<sup>36</sup>Dahm, Sukarno, p. 262.

<sup>37</sup>Kahin, Nationalism, p. 111.

<sup>38</sup>See Asia Raya (November 24, 1943), p. 2 as quoted in Dahm, Sukarno, p. 262.

<sup>39</sup>Dahm, Sukarno, p. 262.

<sup>40</sup>Kahin, Nationalism, p. 111.

<sup>41</sup>Abu Bakar, Sedjarah Hidup, p. 333.

<sup>42</sup>Kahin, Nationalism, p. 111.

<sup>43</sup>Abu Bakar, Sedjarah Hidup, p. 273.

<sup>44</sup>Sihombing, Pemuda, p. 66.

<sup>45</sup>Abu Bakar, Sedjarah Hidup, p. 341.

<sup>46</sup>Benda, "Indonesian Islam", p. 44.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, p. 43.

<sup>48</sup> George McTurnan Kahin, "Indonesian Politics and Nationalism", Willem L. Holland, ed., Asian Nationalism and the West (New York: The McMillan Company, 1953), p. 75.

<sup>49</sup> Abu Bakar, Sedjarah Hidup, p. 273.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> See Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia (October 1944) as quoted in Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 159.

<sup>52</sup> Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 159.

<sup>53</sup> Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia (October, 1944) as quoted in Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Dimiyati, Sedjarah Perdjuangan, p. 61.

<sup>55</sup> Soehoed Prawiroatmodjo, Perlawanan Bersendjata Terhadap Fasisme Djepang (Armed Resistance against the Japanese Fascists) (Djakarta: Merdeka Press, 1953), p. 30.

<sup>56</sup> Sihombing, Pemuda, p. 162.

<sup>57</sup> See Oemar Bahsan, PETA (Pembela Tanah Air) dan Peristiwa Rengasdengklok (PETA and the Events of Rengasdengklok) (Bandung: N.V. Melati, 1955), p. 9. See also Dahm, History of Indonesia, p. 94.

<sup>58</sup> See R.O'G. Anderson, Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics Under the Japanese Occupation: 1944-1945, Intern Reports Series (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1961), p. 39; see also Idem, Java in a Time of Revolution. Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 21 note 12.

<sup>59</sup> Dahm, History of Indonesia, p. 94.

- <sup>60</sup>Fischer, The Story, p. 72.
- <sup>61</sup>Quoted in Elsbree, Japan's Role, p. 128.
- <sup>62</sup>See Ibid, p. 104; Dahm, The History of Indonesia, p. 98.
- <sup>63</sup>Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 159.
- <sup>64</sup>Elsbree, Japan's Role, p. 128.
- <sup>65</sup>See Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 208 ; Anderson, Java, p. 26 note 23.
- <sup>66</sup>Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 159.
- <sup>67</sup>See Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 208; and Elsbree, Japan's Role, p. 128.
- <sup>68</sup>See Benda, The Crescent, p. 280 note 26; and Boland, The Struggle, p. 13.
- <sup>69</sup>See Kahin, Nationalism, p. 111.
- <sup>70</sup>Soehod, Perlawanan, p. 92; Dimyati, Sedjarah Perdjuangan, p. 62.
- <sup>71</sup>Shonan Shimbun (October 11, 1944) as quoted in Elsbree, Japan's Role, p. 130.
- <sup>72</sup>See Drewes, "Indonesia", p. 303.
- <sup>73</sup>Elsbree, Japan's Role, p. 128.
- <sup>74</sup>See Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia (October 1944) as quoted in Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 160.
- <sup>75</sup>Noer, "Maafoemi", p. 26.

- 76 See Benda, The Crescent, pp. 152f; 156f.
- 77 von der Mehden, Religion, p. 54.
- 78 See Dahm, Sukarno, p. 263 note 133.
- 79 Wertheim, "Changes", p. 45.
- 80 Noer, "Masjoemi", p. 26.
- 81 Benda, "Indonesian Islam", p. 41.
- 82 Dahm, History of Indonesia, p. 91.
- 83 John Bastin, The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia: 1511-1957 (Englewood Cliffs, N.Y.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1967), p. 150.
- 84 Benda, "Indonesian Islam", p. 44.
- 85 Ibid.
- 86 Ibid, p. 46. For a discussion on the secularist movements during the Japanese occupation, and the Japanese policy behind them, see: Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 103, 106, 110; Benda, The Crescent, pp. 112-113, 117-119; George Standford Kanahale, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence", Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1967), Chapters 2 and 4; Zainuddin, A Short History, pp. 212-213; and Pakpahan, 1261 Hari, pp. 48, 51ff.
- 87 Benda, "Indonesian Islam", p. 47.
- 88 Abu Bakar, Sedjarah Hidup, pp. 349-350.
- 89 Benda, "Indonesian Islam", p. 47.
- 90 Soehoed, Perlawanan, p. 112.

<sup>91</sup>Anderson, Java, p. 15.

<sup>92</sup>See Tan Malaka, Dari Pendjara ke Pendjara, (From Jail to Jail), 3 vols. (Vol. I, III, Jogjakarta: Widjaja, n.d.; vol. II, Jogjakarta: Pustaka Murba, n.d.), II:170; see also John R.W. Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution, 1945-1946. A Study in the Social History of the Indonesian Revolution, Monograph Series (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1964), p. 12.

<sup>93</sup>See D.G.E. Hall, History of Southeast Asia, 3rd ed. (London: McMillan & Co., 1968), p. 821.

<sup>94</sup>See Willem Frederik Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Social Changes, 2nd ed. (Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1956), p. 228.

<sup>95</sup>Hall, A History, p. 821.

<sup>96</sup>Dorothy Woodman, The Republic of Indonesia (London: The Cresset Press, 1955), p. 90.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid, p. 189.

<sup>99</sup>Dwidjosugondo (Tjantrik Mataram), Peranan Ramalan Djojoberojo Dalam Revolusi Kita (The Role of Djojoberojo's Prediction in Our Revolution) (Bandung : Masa Baru, n.d.), pp. 29ff. Djojoberojo was the king of Kediri (1135-1157); he is still very famous among the Javanese because of these predictions.

<sup>100</sup>Chaudry, The Indonesian, p. 61.

<sup>101</sup>See Kahin, Nationalism, p. 129.

<sup>102</sup>Woodman, The Republic, p. 190.

<sup>103</sup>A.J. Piekaar, Atjeh en de Oorlog met Japan

(Acheh and the War with Japan) ('s-Gravenhage-Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1949), p. 305; Sihombing, Pemuda, p. 68. For the Achehnese, both dog and pig are the lowliest animals.

<sup>104</sup>Piekaar, Atjeh, pp. 119, 245, and 305.

<sup>105</sup>See Hurgronje, The Achehnese, II:189-190.

<sup>106</sup>*Ibid*, p. 337.

<sup>107</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>108</sup>*Ibid*, I:166.

<sup>109</sup>Piekaar, Atjeh, p. 199.

<sup>110</sup>For more information on the PUSA, see *Ibid*, Introduction.

<sup>111</sup>Piekaar, Atjeh, p. 305.

<sup>112</sup>*Ibid*, p. 175.

<sup>113</sup>*Ibid*, p. 178.

<sup>114</sup>*Ibid*, p. 190.

<sup>115</sup>*Ibid*, p. 177.

<sup>116</sup>On how the Japanese prepared themselves in order to draw the Muslim's attention to their side, and to get the Muslim's support for their aims, see Benda, The Crescent, pp. 103f; Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 106; Vlekke, Indonesia, p. 371; Zainuddin, A Short History, p. 209f; Cady, Southeast Asia, p. 569.

<sup>117</sup>Piekaar, Atjeh, p. 177.

<sup>118</sup>*Ibid*.

119 Ibid, p. 276.

120 Ibid, p. 275.

121 Ibid, p. 196.

122 Ibid, p. 276.

123 Ibid, p. 275.

124 Ibid, 305.

125 The first delegation consisted of Tuanku Mahmud, Tuanku Abdul Aziz who was the chairman of the Maibkatra, and Teuku Abdul Latief who was the head of the regency of Lhokseumawe. The second delegation consisted of Teuku Abdul Latief, and Teuku Raden, who was the chieftain of Bayu. The writer obtained this information from Teuku Abdur Rahman Muli, who was the head of the district of Lhokseumawe, and who accompanied both delegations when they met Tengku Abdul Djalil.

126 Information from T.A.R. Muli.

127 Piekaar, Atjeh, p. 194.

128 The picture of the rencong can be seen in Forman, Swords, p. 20.

129 Piekaar, Atjeh, p. 306.

130 Information from T.A.R. Muli.

131 Ibid.

132 Ibid.

133 Ibid.

- 134 Piekaar, Atjeh, p. 306.
- 135 Information from T.A.R. Muli.
- 136 Piekaar, Atjeh, p. 304.
- 137 Ibid, p. 306.
- 138 Ibid, pp. 194-196, 304.
- 139 Information from T.A.R. Muli.
- 140 Piekaar, Atjeh, p. 307.
- 141 Woodman, The Republic, p. 188.
- 142 Colin Mason, Understanding Indonesia (Sydney: Horwitz-Martin, 1970), p. 60.
- 143 Benda, The Crescent, p. 160.
- 144 Djen Amar, Bandung Lautan Api (Bandung in an Ocean of Fire) (Bandung: Dhiwantara, n.d.), p. 17.
- 145 Sjarif Hidayat Danoemihardja, Riwayat Perdjungan Kiai Hadji Zainal Mustafa. Pemimpin dan Penggerak Pemberontakan Singaparna (Story of Kiai Hadji Zainal Mustafa's Struggle. The Leader and the Driving Force behind the Rebellion of Singaparna) (n.p., 1970).
- 146 Ibid, p. 115.
- 147 Ibid.
- 148 Ibid, p. 116.
- 149 Ibid, p. 118.
- 150 Ibid, p. 120.

- <sup>151</sup>Ibid, p. 121.
- <sup>152</sup>Ibid, p. 120.
- <sup>153</sup>Ibid, p. 122.
- <sup>154</sup>Ibid, p. 123.
- <sup>155</sup>Ibid, p. 124.
- <sup>156</sup>Ibid, p. 127.
- <sup>157</sup>Ibid, p. 126.
- <sup>158</sup>See Amar, Bandung, p. 18; Anderson, Java, p. 35.
- <sup>159</sup>See Amar, Bandung, p. 18.
- <sup>160</sup>Anderson, Java, p. 35.
- <sup>161</sup>Dimiyati, Sedjarah Perdjuangan, 69f; Soehoed, Perlawanan, p. 122.
- <sup>162</sup>Dimiyati, Sedjarah Perdjuangan, p. 70.
- <sup>163</sup>Nugroho Notosusanto, Pemberontakan Tentara Peta di Blitar Terhadap Fasis Djepang (Peta at Blitar rise in Mutiny against Japanese Fascists) (Djakarta: Mega Bookstore, n.d.), p. 4.
- <sup>164</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>165</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>166</sup>Soehoed, Perlawanan, p. 144.
- <sup>167</sup>See Ibid, pp. 144-147.
- <sup>168</sup>Ibid, p. 149.

<sup>169</sup>Ibid, p. 150.

<sup>170</sup>Ibid, p. 154.

<sup>171</sup>Ibid.

<sup>172</sup>Ibid, p. 160.

<sup>173</sup>See Ibid, p. 162.

<sup>174</sup>Ibid, pp. 163-164.

<sup>175</sup>See Ibid pp. 154-158.

<sup>176</sup>See Ibid, pp. 164-172.

<sup>177</sup>Ibid, p. 173.

<sup>178</sup>Ibid, p. 175.

<sup>179</sup>See Ibid, pp. 179-184.

<sup>180</sup>Ibid, p. 181.

<sup>181</sup>Ibid, p. 185.

<sup>182</sup>See Piekaar, Atjeh, pp. 304-307.

<sup>183</sup>Ibid, p. 308.

<sup>184</sup>Quoted in Ibid, p. 307.

<sup>185</sup>The writer obtained this information from Col. M. Diyah, who was a member of the Japanese intelligence at the time.

<sup>186</sup>Quoted in Piekar, Atjeh, p. 245.

187 The place where this event occurred was only half a mile away from the writer's home. He was eleven years old at the time. Besides witnessing the result of this incident he was also told about it by his uncle who was then one of leaders of the mujāhidīn.

## CONCLUSIONS.

Islām has been one of the main determinants of the Indonesian spiritual climate, and it also has become a matter of nationality for the Indonesians. The 'ulamā' are the traditional spiritual leaders of the Indonesian Muslims to whom people ask questions and from whom they receive advice and solutions to their problems. Although in Islām there is no such institution as an Islamic church or any system of regular clergy, there is a socially distinct group, who usually have the respect of the masses on account of their religious knowledge.

In Indonesia, the 'ulamā' are one of the most important cultural brokers who are of much greater significance in political life than are either deceased saints or living mystics. They began to play their role in the political field in the early nineteenth century.

Dissatisfaction with colonial rule often crystallized around the 'ulamā'. Both Japanese and Dutch colonial rules were punctuated by rebellions led by the 'ulamā'. Therefore, the Dutch attempted to keep the 'ulamā', as far as possible, from positions of real political or administrative power. The Dutch used the

priyayi (aristocratic ruling group) as the cornerstone of their colonial system. Therefore, a conflict was unavoidable between the anti-colonial 'ulamā' and the aristocratic ruling group who had the support and protection of the Dutch.

Furthermore, the Dutch, in spite of carrying out a policy of neutrality towards religion, promoted Christianity at the expense of Islām which aroused the resentment of the Muslims. When the Muslims were divided into reformists and conservatives, the Dutch never attempted to reconcile the two. It was even believed that the Dutch kept the two in conflict in order to prevent the Muslims from ever uniting. The principle of divide et empera was aptly carried out by the Dutch.

The Japanese were aware of the influence of the 'ulamā' upon rural society, and since the villagers were more inclined to follow the leadership of the 'ulamā', the Japanese decided to draw the 'ulamā' to their side in order to obtain a firm footing in Indonesia. They brought the 'ulamā' to the fore by giving them administrative posts. On the other hand, vis à vis Islām and the Muslims, the Japanese pursued a policy less ideal than that of the Dutch.

The Japanese, instead of esteeming and respecting Islām as they frequently proclaimed, attempted to Nipponize Indonesian Muslims. Everything in the field of Islām had to be put under their control and imbued with their own spirit, culture, ideas, and ideals. The idea of Pan-Islām had to be replaced by the idea of Pan-Asiatic Movement with the Japanese as its leaders. Arabic had to be replaced by Japanese which was to be the lingua franca of their occupied areas. Moreover, Shintoism was introduced to the people and the Japanese demanded that all occasions should be opened by performing the saikeirei.

In order to make use of the 'ulamā' for spreading the Japanese ideal, the 'ulamā' were drawn to join the latihan kyai. The fact that the Japanese considered these latihan kyais as very important was proven when the latihan kyais continued operating longer than any other latihans.

In the field of Muslim organization, the Japanese wanted to have only one single organization in which all Muslim groups, in particular the kaum tua and the kaum muda, would be its constituents. But this organization was not to become involved in politics or to talk about the freedom for the country. Because it took a long time

to yield the results of the Japanese attempts to put together the kaum tua and the kaum muda in one single organization and the need to have a huge Muslim organization was very urgent, the Japanese allowed the re-establishment of the MIAI. When the Japanese found the road was clear to accomplish their original plan, the MIAI was dissolved and replaced by the Masyumi.

The Masyumi, which the Japanese expected would work on behalf of the Japanese and was to bind the Muslims in one single organization in order to support the Japanese aims, yielded good results not for the benefit of the Japanese but for the Indonesians. Instead of becoming merely a tool of the Japanese, the Masyumi seized the opportunity given by the Japanese to strengthen itself and prepared the Indonesians for the achievement of their freedom. The more the Japanese entrusted the Masyumi in rallying public support, the more chances they had to approach the masses in order to spread their own ideas and desires. When the Masyumi were permitted to establish their own military corps, the Hizbullah, the Masyumi became an Islamic organization par excellence.

Not all of the Japanese policies towards Indonesian Muslims, however, yielded poor results. Japanese

attempts to reconcile the kaum tua and the kaum muda, and the inviting of the two to take seats in the Masyumi, produced favourable reactions among the Muslims. First, besides the conflict between the kaum tua and the kaum muda disappearing, the 'ulamā' had the chance to train themselves in the management of a huge organization. From then on the 'ulamā' (the kaum tua) broke out of their isolation and began talking with other groups about their future. Second, having been posted in the Department of Religious Affairs, the 'ulamā' gained training and experience in administration. Even though the Japanese established this department in order to set up a tool through which they could implement and apply their policy towards Indonesian Islām, nevertheless, the results mentioned above were only favourable for the 'ulamā'.

However, although the Muslims, including the 'ulamā', had good reason to work together with the Japanese, there were points, as have been mentioned above, at which they collided with the Japanese policy. The Nipponization of Indonesian Islām, the introduction of Shintoism to the people, and the rudeness and brutality which the Japanese showed in their dealings with the Indonesians, made the 'ulamā' suspicious that the Japanese not only would not

bring freedom to the Indonesians -for they had the same pattern of colonial rule as the Dutch- but also they would destroy Islām, or at least mix Islām with Shinto-ism. Therefore, they felt that Islām would be jeopardized if they did not resist the Japanese policy.

The spirit of the jihād of the Muslims which the Japanese expected could be used in war against the Allies (the Americans, British, Australians, and the Dutch) was turned against the Japanese instead. In the first year of the Japanese occupation, a rebellion led by one of the 'ulamā' broke out at Bayu in Aceh. Even though the Japanese took severe action to suppress any attempt at resisting them, their ruthlessness and brutality made the 'ulamā' and the people, who were inflamed by the spirit of jihād, to never lose their courage in the rebellion against the Japanese. During the three and a half years of the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, open insurrection were constant occurrences. After the rebellion at Bayu the Japanese had to face rebellions at Pontianak in December 1943, at Sukamanah Singaparna in February 1944, at Karang-ampel in May 1944, at Lohbener in August 1944, at Blitar in February 1945, and at Pandraih in May 1945. Again, in September 1945, even when the Japanese had surrendered to

the Allies, people at Lhokseumawe still expressed their hate of the Japanese by attacking them at Cunda.

While the insurrections against the Japanese were taking place, the Muslim leaders in Jakarta openly proclaimed that they would work together with the Japanese, or in other words they would participate in the Japanese Military Administration, if Islām would not be offended.

In short, the rôle of the 'ulamā' during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia was, 1) they saved Islām and the Muslims from losing their identity which the Japanese hoped to perpetrate underhandedly, and 2) they prepared the Indonesian people to achieve their freedom.

## GLOSSARY.

This glossary of terms is intended only to identify briefly foreign terms and abbreviations appearing in this study.

### A.

abangan

The general term applied to a Javanese Muslim who is little concerned with the precepts of Islam and whose way of life is still much influenced by the Javanese pre-Islamic tradition.

adat

local custom; corpus; customary law.

ahl al-kitāb

People who have scripture.

'ālim plural 'ulamā'

see 'ulamā'.

angku sieh

title given to the 'ulamā' of Minangkabau.

ase

dog

### B.

Badan Persatuan Ummat Islam

Council of the Unity of the Islamic Community.

Badan Propaganda Islam

Board of Propaganda for Islam.

bait al-māl

Islamic treasury.

bid'ah

false innovation; accretion to the teaching of the Prophet.

bui

pig.

## D.

dayah

religious school of Aceh;  
boarding school.Departement van Binnen-  
landsche Zaken

Department of Home Affairs.

Departement van Justitie

Department of Justice.

Departement van Onderwij-  
ze en Eeredienst

Department of Education.

Djiwa Baroe

New Soul, the book written  
by S. Ozu.

## E.

empu

literally, lord, master;  
used as smith.

## F.

fatwā

Final answer on a legal  
interpretation made by a  
religious scholar (‘ālim),  
or a legal scholar (muftī),  
or a judge (qāḍī).

fiqh

Islamic jurisprudence;  
Islamic law.

Fujiwara-Kikan

Fujiwara Organization.

fuqahā' singular faqīh

jurists.

furū'

details or branches of  
Islamic law.

## G.

gampong

village.

genjūmin

native people.

Gerakan F

F Movement. This movement arose in uprisings preceding the Japanese arrival in Aceh.

Gunseikan

Head of Japanese Military Administration.

guru

teacher.

hadīth

Prophetic Tradition.

hajj

the pilgrimage to Mecca.

haji

the title for those who have undertaken the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Hakkōichū

World Brotherhood.

harām

strictly forbidden by Islam.

Heiho

Japanese Auxiliary Force.

hikayat

story.

Hikayat Prang Sabi

Story of the Holy War.

Hizbullah

literally Army of Allah.  
Military organization of the Masyumi.

Hōkōkai

People's Service Association.

I.

‘ibādah plural ‘ibādāt

rituals, the ordinance of divine worship; religious observance.

ijtihād

reasoning by deduction.  
A term used in Muslim jurisprudence to designate the

inlaander

process of arriving at a new judgment in a rule of law in a particular case by drawing conclusions from basic sources of Islamic teaching, the Qur'an and hadith.

native people.

jihād

J.

holy war.

Jum'a

Friday.

jumūd

stagnation.

kāfir

K.

infidel, unbeliever.

Kan Po

statute book.

Kantoor v/d Adviseur  
voor Inlandsche en  
Mohammedansche Zaken

Bureau of Adviser for Inland  
Affairs and Islam

kaum adat

aristocratic ruling class of  
Minangkabau.

kaum muda

literally, young group.  
Modernist.

kaum Paderi

Paderi movement.

kaum tua

literally, old group.  
Conservative.

kempeitei

Japanese Military Police.

kereta neraka

wagon of hell.

Komite Pusat Pimpinan  
Persatuan Ummat Islam

Central Leading Committee for  
the Unity of the Islamic Com-  
munity.

Kongres Muslimin  
Indonesia

Indonesian Muslim Congress.

/kuburan dan ganjaran

grave and reward. The phrase is used to sneer at the kaum tua.

kyai

a title given to the 'ulamā' of Java.

latihan

L.

training course.

latihan kyai

a training course for 'ulamā' during the Japanese occupation.

madhhab

M.

school of Islamic law.

Maibkatra  
(Madjelis Agama Islam  
Untuk Bantuan Kemakmuran  
Asia Timur Raya)

Islamic Council for the Aid  
to the Great East Asiatic  
Co-prosperity Sphere.

Masyumi  
(Majlis Syura Muslimin  
Indonesia)

Consultative Council of  
Indonesian Muslims.

meudagang

title given to the one who  
is pursuing religious know-  
ledge in a dayah or rangkang  
(boarding school) in Aceh.

meunasah

small mosque, not to be used  
for Jum'a prayer.

meuranto

see meudagang

MAI  
(Majlis Islam A'laa  
Indonesia)

Supreme Islamic Council of  
Indonesians.

Muhammadiyah

Modernist Islamic Social and  
Educational Association, es-  
tablished in 1912.

mujāhidīn

those who carry out the  
holy war.

mushrik

heretic, polytheist.

N.

Nahdlatul Ulama

literally, The Awakening of  
'Ulamā', Conservative Islamic  
Social and Educational Asso-  
ciation, established in 1926.

P.

P.I.I.  
(Partai Islam Indonesia)

Indonesian Islamic Party.

Pemuda Muhammadiyah

Muhammadiyah Youth.

penghulu

Administrator of mosque who  
also served in other religious  
capacities during pre-war time.

Persatuan Alim Ulama

Union of 'Ulamā'

Persis  
(Persatuan Islam)

Islamic Unity.

pesantren

religious school of Java;  
boarding school.

Peta  
(Tentara Sukarela Pembela  
Tanah Air)

Voluntary Defender of the  
Homeland; Vanguard Corps.

prang sabi

holy war.

P.S.I.I.  
(Partai Sarekat Islam  
Indonesia)

Indonesian Islamic Union Party

PUSA  
(Persatuan Ulama Seluruh  
(Acheh)

Union of the 'Ulamā' of Acheh

Putera  
(Pusat Tenaga Rakjat)

Center of People's Strength.

qibla

the direction which has to be faced while praying.

qiyās

analogy.

R.

raja/rajah

king, ruler.

rangkang

see dayah.

rateb

recitation of a prayer.

rencong

Achehnese dagger.

romusha

(forced) labour.

rukū'

to drop to one's knees in prayer.

rukun iman

the pillar of faith.

rukun Islam

the pillar of Islām.

S.

sadaqah

alms.

saikeirei

ceremonial bow in the direction of the Japanese Emperor's throne.

santri

title given to the one who is pursuing religious knowledge in a pesantren (boarding school) in Java.

Sarekat Islam

Islamic Association.

Seinendan

Youth Corps.

Sendenbu

Department of Propaganda of the Japanese Military Administration.

shirk	polytheism.
shuhadā'	martyrs.
Shūmubu	Department of Religious Affairs.
Shūmuka	Department of Religious Affairs' branch at residency.
silatur rahmī	a meeting to reinforce the ties of family and brotherhood.
sufism	mysticism.
sukarela	volunteer.
sunnah	tradition of the Prophet.
Sūrat	Chapter of the Qur'ān.
surau	small mosque, usually used to study Qur'ān in Minangkabau.
syaikh	see <u>angku sieh</u> .
T.	
tabligh akbar	great religious gatherings.
taqlid	blind obedience to whatever is established by the earlier ' <u>ulamā</u> '.
tariqat	sufi order.
tawhid	the oneness of God.
tengku	title given to the ' <u>ulamā</u> ' of Aceh.
Tenno Heika	Japanese Emperor.
tuanku	see <u>angku sieh</u> .
tuanku laras	the chief of a sub-district

of Minangkabau during the Dutch colonial period.

U.

'ulamā', singular 'ālim

learned men, scholars, scientists or those Muslims who are considered knowledgeable in Islamic studies. The religious dignitaries.

uleebalang

the chief of a sub-district of Aceh during the Dutch colonial period.

ummah

Islamic community.

urang siak

title given to one who is pursuing religious knowledge in Minangkabau.

usūl

principles.

V.

Volksraad

People's Council.

W.

Wadjah Semangat

The Countenance of Spirit, written by S. Ozu.

waqf

religious endowment; pious foundation.

Z.

zakāt

religious taxes.

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