SANTRI AND ABANGAN IN JAVA

by Zaini Muchtarom

A thesis

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ABSTRAIT

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Cette thèse a pour objet la description de la Société Musulmane à Java. Elle attire particulièrement l'attention sur deux groupes typologiquement distincts le santri et le abangan. Même si la recherche étudie l'origine de ces deux groupes, elle va essayer d'analyser le santri et le abangan dans leurs deux aspects essentiels, premièrement comme groupes socio-religieux, et deuxièmement comme pouvoirs socio-politiques. Elle insiste aussi sur le processus par lequel la querelle entre le santri et le abangan, par rapport à la concurence des différentes idéologies politiques, devient un des déterminants essentiels dans la politique indonesienne.

Même si la distinction socio-religieuse de ces deux groupes est ignorée pour une raison quelconque, la différence entre les deux entraîne des conséquences politiques très différentes. Par conséquent, l'étude du santri et du abangan à Java, rend possible une meilleure compréhension de l'Islam tel que pratiqué dans cette île.

ABSTRACT

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Title of thesis	:	Santri and Abangan in Java				
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This thesis is concerned with the description of Muslim society in contemporary Java, and pays particular attention to the two typologically distinctive groups, the so-called <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>. While investigation is made into the origin of these two groups, this study is attempting to elucidate <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> in their two essential aspects; firstly as socio-religious groups and secondly as socio-political powers. It also stresses the process by which the struggle of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> vis-à-vis the strife between different political ideologies becomes one of the basic determinants in Indonesian politics.

Though the socio-religious distinction of these two groups is muted for one reason and another, the difference between the two produces very different political consequences. The study of the existence of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> in Java, therefore, makes it possible to achieve better understanding of Islam as it is professed in this island.

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Z. M.

TRANSLITERATION

Since 1901 the Indonesian language has been formally written in Latin character based on Ch.A. van Ophuysen's concept. The Indonesian government endeavours to improve the Indonesian spelling system. The first proposal was put forward in <u>Kongres Bahasa Indonesia Pertama</u> (The First Indonesian Language Congress) in 1938, and the decision was made in 1947 to change to the spelling system based on Soewandi's concept which in 1957 was also revised.

There was an agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia in 1967, by which both governments decided to equalize both their languages and spelling systems, and this became effective in 1972. The new spelling system of the Indonesian language in comparison with the old one is as follows:

Old spelling	New	spelling
dj = djasa	j	= jasa
j = jakin	У	= yakin
nj = njata	ny	= nyata
sj = sjarat	sy	= syarat
tj = tjepat	с	= cepat
ch = chabar	kh	= khabar

As far as the writer is concerned with Indonesian words, the new spelling system will be employed in this thesis. Unfortunately, up to the present there is no uniformity in the Indonesian transliteration of Arabic words. In this respect, the system of the Institute of Islamic Studies McGill University has been followed in this thesis. However, there are certain Arabic letters which do not have any equivalent in the Javanese alphabet and vice versa. This lack of equivalency causes some difficulties to the Javanese, particularly to the <u>abangan</u>, in pronouncing a number of Arabic words, for example:

Arabic	Javanese
c _{amal}	ngamal
c _{ilm}	ngilmu
^c ulamā'	ngulama
faqih	pekih
hadīth	kadis
zahir	lahir

In this case, when Arabic words occur in a Javanese context, the Javanese pronunciation has been kept. Arabic, Indonesian, Javanese and other local dialects are underlined. The plural form of some common words is made by adding s, thus, <u>santri - santris</u>, <u>abangan - abangans</u> and so on. It must be noted here that the plural form of Indonesian and Javanese words is formed simply by repeating the word, thus, <u>buku</u> (book) - <u>buku2</u> (books), <u>rumah</u> (house) - <u>rumah2</u> (houses), <u>kota</u> (city) - <u>kota2</u> (cities) and so on.

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Indonesian and Javanese names are spelt as far as possible in accordance with the Indonesian and Javanese use, for example, using the Dutch oe for u like Surabaya, Sumatra and so on, while the names of men and organizations are spelt as commonly used in Indonesia; like Nahdatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Sjahrir and so on.

INTRODUCTION

Scholars interested in Javanese studies are always wellacquainted with the peculiar terms of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>. The terms and concepts of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> have become familiar and frequently employed in scholarly works on Javanese history, politics and society. Besides native writers, Clifford Geertz, the prominent American anthropologist, makes these terms widespread through his work, <u>The Religion of Java</u> (1960). Systematic examination of the concepts of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>, in accordance with native opinion, should be made.

The study of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> is important, particularly for one who wants to carefully examine the development of Islam in Java. Paying attention to these two typologically distinctive religious groups, i.e. <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>, one could obtain a better understanding of Islam as it was and is professed in Java.

While the great majority of Javanese adhere to the Islamic faith, there exist variations in the practice of Islamic precepts. They pronounce themselves to be Muslims, but at the same time within this general category they themselves make a clear distinction between <u>santris</u>, the pious Muslims who practice the <u>shari^ca</u> seriously, and <u>abangans</u> who are little concerned with the precepts of Islam and whose way of life is still much influenced by the Javanese pre-Islamic tradition. This tradition stresses the integration of

Islamic, Hindu-Buddhist and indigenous elements as a basic Javanese syncretism which is often called agama Jawa (the Javanese religion).

The subject of this study is becoming more important because these two groups to the present time exert their influences on the Indonesian people, particularly in Java. Their influences penetrate deeply into the Javanese Muslim community and are reflected in many aspects of community life. Due to this, <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> appear to have become important elements in the process of social, political and religious change in Indonesia. As such, <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> have significant impacts on social, political and religious life in Indonesia.

In this thesis <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> will be discussed in their two essential aspects; firstly, <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> as socio-religious groups, secondly, <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> as socio-political powers. For both aspects, the writer will limit himself to the development of these two groups during the early years of independent Indonesia, 1945-1950. This span of time proved to be very important not only because they shared in the common struggle for Indonesian independence, but also because their political cleavage and different ideological orientation prevailed at the end of the first decade of the independent period. Each group was strengthening its influence in the social and political realms of Javanese society.

The general election of 1955 was not the only means to measure the social and political cleavage of these groups; the situation

prior to and after the elections, of course, should be taken into consideration. Though this study deals with the present Javanese Muslims, it cannot be denied that the present situation is much influenced by the past. For this reason, an attempt will be made in this study to deal with the matter historically, although the writer realizes that it is not an historical treatise.

Santri and abangan can best be observed within the scope of Javanese culture, and the Javanese occupy the central and eastern parts of the island of Java. So this study will be limited to a description of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> in these regions, particularly in south central Java, Surakarta and Jogyakarta, wherein the writer had spent most of his life as a participant in its religion and culture. In doing a study of his own culture and group the writer has several advantages compared with outside investigators, for example in the elimination of being a "participant observer", particular status as an investigator on the eye of his informant, and so on. But the writer is deeply aware of the necessity of a "disciplined mind" to avoid bias.

After clarifying the meaning of the terms and concepts of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> in chapter I, and potraying the Javanese social stratification, the writer intends to eliminate the still existing confusion concerning division in Javanese society. An attempt will also be made to show the various reactions of Indonesian Muslims to the employment of the terms.

While tracing back to the historical origin of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>, ascribed to the structure and character of Islamization of Java, the writer would try to specify the distinction between <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> in terms of their beliefs, world view and religious practices.

As a matter of fact, the two groups are a result of the gradual development of the influence of cultural and social background and the continuous process of differentiation within Javanese civilization. However, it lies outside the aim of this study to examine in its entirety the chronological history of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>; the main purpose is an attempt to study these two religious groups as nuances of Islam as professed by the Javanese.

The rise of political parties in Indonesia, of which Java is the centre, was inseparable from the development of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>. A description is presented in chapter II of the growth and development of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> after their acquiring political significance in Java. It was the first stage of political formation in which <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> became increasingly meaningful in the political arena since the awakening of the Indonesian nationalism. An account will be given in that chapter on the process of political and ideological orientation based on the different political interest and ideals of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>.

The political contrast between <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>, which was originated in the pre-independent period, actually was and is in-

fluenced by a multifaceted process which is today still far from complete. The outmost of political contrast between <u>santri</u> under Muslim leaders influenced by the reformist movement in Egypt of Muhammad ^CAbduh and Rashid Ridā, and <u>abangan</u> under the nationalist and communist leaders influenced by modern Western ideology is mentioned in this chapter.

The struggle of <u>santri</u> versus <u>abangan</u> vis-à-vis the strife between different political ideologies which was crystalized at the most crucial point of the question on the basic principle of Indonesian state philosophy is covered in chapter III. In the establishment of the Indonesian constitution, the <u>santris</u> strove to make Islam the basic principle of the republic, whereas the <u>abangans</u> insistently emphasized Pancasila (the Five Principles).

That the division of the Muslim community into several grouping of diverse ideologies, originating in the separation of modern reformists and conservative traditionalist, should be also mentioned in the concluding chapter. The inter-group and party conflicts were sharpened as the result of the political campaign prior to the general election of 1955. That chapter, of course, can only cover the major facets involved in the separation of the <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> groups in terms of the relation between religion and politics.

The conclusion made in the last part of this study can be summerized as follows:

- 1. The better understanding of Islam as professed by the Javanese should be properly observed through the division between <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>, while the both are also subject to the division between modern and conservative. The peaceful spread of Islam in Java and undrastic change of the religion of the Javanese paves the way for Javanese syncretism which includes the indigenous, Hindu-Buddhist and Islamic elements which are tightly combined to form the basic value of <u>abangan</u>. In the late 19th century, Islamic orthodoxy in Java was rapidly expanding and strengthening uniform Islam. The history of Indonesian Islam is, then, the history of expanding santri civilization.
- 2. The rivalry between the Islamic force of the <u>santri</u> community and non-religious force of the secular-minded <u>abangan</u> communities not only marked the concluding stage of Japanese occupation, but also survived into the years of independence. The division between those identifying with orthodox-Islamic <u>santri</u> orientation, on the one hand, and adherents of the <u>abangan</u> world view, the traditional-syncretic religion of the Javanese, on the other hand, becomes one of the basic determinants of Indonesian social and political history since independence.

in contemporary Java involves more or less the position of Islam in contemporary Indonesia.

As far as the sociological, cultural, religious and political aspects are concerned, many publications have already appeared, both by outside investigators and native intellectuals, such as those of George McT. Kahin, Herbert Feith, Clifford Geertz, Robert R. Yay, Bernhard Dahm, Harry J. Benda, Ruth McVey, Hoesin Djajadiningrat, H.M. Rasjidi, R.M. Koentjaraningrat, H. Agus Salim, Moh. Natsir and so on. Each of them contributes a part toward a complete picture by the time of early independent Indonesia.

CHAPTER I

SANTRI AND ABANGAN: SOCIO-RELIGIOUS GROUPS

Before discussing <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> as socio-religious groups, one should be first concerned with the very basic relation between religion and society. It has been commonly accepted that each society is made up of small and more comprehensive units. Some of these units are composed of members that are related to one another by blood or by marriage. Actually, many factors determine the relationship of the members of a family, clan or tribe. Many kinds of activities among the members may add strength and cohesion to social units. Certain kinds of joint activities and interests can integrate the members of a group more closely. Among the ties which will increase the social cohesion of a group is religion.¹

The existance of socio-religious unit or group, such as <u>santri</u> or <u>abangan</u>, is due to and founded upon the religious attitude of its members. The cohesion of this group is increased and strengthened by religious experience which impels the association. In this respect, a group's attitude expressed in a social unit is determined by two factors; first, the role of tradition which changes and develops in accordance with the times, second, the personal experience of the holy as basic to the religious attitude, either individual or collective.²

It is not impossible that an ethnic group, like the Javanese, is divided into several groups with different religious rites. Wherever the division shows a different principle and a different religious allegiance to a certain kind of leadership, it proves the existance of a certain type of socio-religious group.³ In brief, three ways may be suggested by which to examine the relation between religion and society. First, the participation in the group's rituals and beliefs is an inseparable aspect of group membership. Second, the system of beliefs and rituals will characterize a specific community. Third, the beliefs and rituals should refer to the historical background of a particular community.⁴ Within this frame of sociological thinking, santri and abangan will be dealt with in this chapter.

1. Santri and Abangan within the Javanese Social Stratification.

As far as we are concerned with community life, it is understandable that the stratification of a society may be sharp, definite and stable. On the contrary, it may be somewhat loosely determined. When the criterion of division is based on descent or on birth or blood relationships, the class distinction tends to become fixed; but when the criterion is derived from occupational differentiation or individual ability, it tends to be less clear-cut.⁵ However, the criterion itself changes and develops in the course of time.

It would be useful at the beginning of this section to depict the conceptual scheme of the division of Javanese society made by

Clifford Geertz. Based on his field work in Mojokuto,⁶ he divides the Javanese into three main cultural types; <u>abangan</u>, <u>santri</u> and <u>priyayi</u>. He describes the three religious variants among Javanese as follows:

> <u>Abangan</u>, representing a stress on the animistic aspects of the over-all Javanese syncretism, and broadly related to the peasant elements in the population; <u>santri</u>, representing a stress on the Islamic aspects of the syncretism and generally related to the trading element (and to certain elements in the peasantry as well); and <u>prijaji</u> stressing 7 in Hindu aspects and related to the bureaucratic elements 7

He makes a clear-cut distinction among religious doctrines prevailing among people of these three divisions, and also associates the <u>abangan</u> with the peasantry in the village, the <u>santri</u> with the traders in the more urban areas, and the <u>priyayi</u> with the bureaucratic administrators. The term <u>abangan</u> is applied by Clifford Geertz to the culture of the village people, the agriculturalists, who have been affected by outsiders less than other groups in the population. The term <u>santri</u> is applied to the culture of the strict Muslims who usually live together in the towns in a quarter near a mosque. The term <u>priyayi</u> is applied to the culture of the upper classes who are generally the nobility of high or low rank. In the past they had monopolized education, both Javanese and European style, and hence were able to hold clerical jobs. Their culture is derived from the court representing a legacy of the Hindu-Javanese kingdom. Though in his work, <u>The Religion of Java</u> (1960), Geertz provides an extensive description and analysis of various aspects of the Javanese religious system and world view, his description results in several complications which are sometimes confusing. His book is organized into three main parts based upon the concepts of <u>abangan</u>, <u>santri</u>, and <u>priyayi</u>. According to the author, these are three particular world views, styles of life, religious variants and traditions. He specifies that each group emphasizes one of the three specific aspects of Javanese religious syncretism, respectively animistic, Hindu-Buddhist, and Islamic aspects.

While clarifying the actual Javanese social stratification, an attempt is made in this section to resolve the confusion regarding the division of Javanese society.

In fact, the old Javanese society could only be divided into three divisions; the princes, the nobles and the peasants.⁸ The high point of Javanese feudalism coincided with Dutch influence, which penetrated not only in a geographical sense, but also penetrated in the structure of Javanese society. During this time four levels could be distinguished; firstly the monarchs, secondly the provincial heads, about the equivalent of the modern regents, thirdly the village heads, and fourthly the mass of the villagers.⁹

In the royal principalities of Surakarta and Jogyakarta, both in south central Java, three social classes existed. First, there were the santana dalem or family of the ruler, categorized as the

group of noblemen and princes. Second, there were the <u>abdi dalem</u>, the officials or bureaucrats of the king. Third, there were the <u>kawula dalem</u>, the masses or the ruled. The first two classes were considered as the ruling class, while the third was the ruled. By taking these three classes into account, one could understand the totality of the social structure of feudal society in the royal principalities in central Java.¹⁰

Since the decline of Javanese feudalism, beginning with the years of Japanese occupation (1942-1945), the Javanese social stratification has been considerably changed. An attempt has been recently made by R.M. Koentjaraningrat to sketch the present Javanese social stratification. He tries to analyze and make clear a distinction between horizontal and vertical divisions of Javanese society. To some extent, he goes into the cultural background of each of the substrata and compares them. According to him, the Javanese themselves distinguish four horizontal social levels as status stratification; i.e. the <u>ndara</u> (nobility), the <u>priyayi</u> (bureaucrat), the <u>wong dagang</u> or <u>sudagar</u> (trader), and the <u>wong cilik</u> (little people).¹¹

The <u>ndara</u> (nobility) mainly concentrate in the four courts of south central Java; Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran, in Surakarta, and the other two Kasultanan and Paku Alaman, in Jogyakarta. Its members are persons who can trace their descent, in either the male or the female line, from rulers of these four principalities. They are divided

into different ranks and titles according to the degree of their relation to one or another of the four princely families.

The <u>priyayi</u> (bureaucrats) include members of the administrative service, the government bureaucracy, and academically trained intellectuals. They hold government positions and are stratified according to the bureaucratic hierarchy, ranging from lower <u>priyayi</u> (such as clerks, school teachers. local post office officials, railway officials) to higher <u>priyayi</u> of superior rank in the larger towns and cities. The traditional administrative personnel in Java, formerly the so-called <u>pangreh praja</u> (state ruler) and later <u>pamong praja</u> (state servant), constitute the core of the <u>priyayi</u> group.

The majority of <u>priyayi</u> are probably descended from the bureaucratic administrators of the Dutch colonial period. The Dutch government preserved the rigid exclusiveness of this group by restricting admission to the training schools for administrative officials. Only applicants who could prove kinship with a member of the administrative service would enjoy that privilage.

The <u>priyayi</u>, according to Robert Van Niel, consists of the administrators, civil servants and better educated and better situated Indonesian people, including those who are Javanese, both in town and countryside. In some degree they lead, influence, administer or guide the great mass of common people. He calls this group "the elite".¹² In the course of time the interrelation between the

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priyayi and <u>ndara</u> has become closer through intermarriage and the imitation of court culture by <u>priyayi</u> even outside the principalities.

The wong dagang or sudagar (traders), small traders and merchants, are mainly concentrated in rural towns or in the more urban centers, wherein <u>pasar</u> (the market) as an economic institution plays an important role.

The <u>wong cilik</u> (little people) are the great mass of the peasants in the <u>ndesa</u> (village) and the lower strata of the urban population. Most of the little people are <u>tani</u> (farmers) who live in villages, which are social, moral and economic units. Most <u>tani</u> work a small plot. However, there are also <u>wong cilik</u> who live in the town, in which they form the lower level of the population, working as automobile and truck drivers, barbers, pedicab drivers, artisans and servants.

Since World War II numerous changes have occured in the horizontal stratification of Javanese society. When the Dutch were interned by the Japanese, the academically trained <u>priyayi</u> moved upward in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Since independence in Indonesia, the academically trained intellectuals have filled the highest positions in the government. Today they surpass the nobility in status except in the environment of the four court centers in Surakarta and Jogyakarta.¹³

It comes to our attention in discussing Javanese social stratification that income, though playing an important role, is not

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the crucial differentiating criterion. Private enterprise and petty trade of <u>wong cilik</u> in urban centers can provide incomes greater than those of the average lower <u>priyayi</u> working as government officials. <u>Santri sudagar</u> usually have larger incomes than most <u>priyayi</u>. However, because of the strong in-group feeling and preference for endogamy among <u>priyayi</u> and <u>ndara</u>, their social class cannot be easily crossed merely by dominance or superior wealth. Admission to membership is only possible by birth or sometimes by intermarriage. Strickly speaking, the four stratified groups - <u>ndara</u>, <u>priyayi</u>, <u>sudagar</u> and <u>wong cilik</u> - are differentiated more sharply by cultural differences than by wealth distinctions.¹⁴

Distinct from the horizontal social stratification, there is a vertical classification of Javanese society based on the degree of one's devotion to Islam or the degree of one's obedience in practicing the <u>sarengat</u> (<u>shari^ca</u>). First, there is <u>santri</u>, the pious Muslim who embraces Islam seriously, and elaborately practices the Islamic precepts as he knows them, while trying to keep his beliefs free from local idolatry. Furthermore, he is also apparently characterized by his participation in the religious rituals of the <u>ummah</u> (Islamic community) or at least he shows his sense of belonging to the Islamic community as a whole. Second, there is <u>abangan</u>, literally meaning "the red one" derived from the root <u>abang</u> (red), the Javanese Muslim who is little concerned with the precepts of Islam and less strict in meeting the religious obligations.

He is nominally a Muslim whose way of life is still much dominated by the Javanese pre-Islamic tradition. This tradition represents a stress on integration of Islamic, Hindu-Buddhist and indiginous elements as a basic Javanese syncretism and is often called <u>agama</u> <u>Jawa</u> (the Javanese religion). This syncretism is also considered by the Javanese as the folk tradition.¹⁵

Thus, the distinction between <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> is made when people are classified with reference to religious behaviour. A <u>santri</u> person is more religious than an <u>abangan</u> person. However, the measure of religiousity is, of course, dependent on the personal values of those who make use of these terms. <u>Santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>, in this sense, can be regarded as two subcultures with different world views, values, and orientation within Javanese culture.¹⁶

<u>Santri</u>, originally and commonly used to refer to the student of Islamic education, is a deformation of the Indian word <u>shāstri</u>, meaning the man who knows the (Hindu) holy books,¹⁷ a scripture scholar. The word <u>shāstri</u> is drawn from <u>shāstra</u> meaning scriptures, or a religious or scientific treatise.¹⁸ In this connection, the Javanese word <u>pesantren</u>, derived from <u>santri</u> with the prefix <u>pe</u> and suffix <u>an</u>, means a traditional Muslim center of learning or monastery of Islamic students serving as a model of a Muslim religious school in Java. The teacher at a <u>pesantren</u> is called <u>kiyai</u>, the old respected man or charismatic, independent religious teacher.

An other term for <u>santri</u> as commonly used by the Javanese is <u>putihan</u>, derived from <u>putih</u> (white) with the suffix <u>an</u>, meaning "the white ones". This term is used probably because of the white garments they prefer to wear while praying. The <u>putihan</u> are usually wear <u>kopyah</u> or a black velvet cap like a fez, a white skirt, and <u>sarong</u>, especially when they attend prayer in the mosque. After they have made the pilgrimage to Mecca, becoming a <u>kaji</u> (<u>hājj</u>), they change the kopyah for the white cotton cap or <u>kopyah kaji</u>.

Still relating to the notion of white, some villages in the environs of the court principality of Surakarta are called <u>desa</u> <u>keputihan</u> or <u>desa mutihan</u> meaning "white village". The inhabitants of which are predominantly religious men,¹⁹ while inside the court principality the <u>santri priyayi</u> are called <u>abdi dalem pametakan</u> or "the white officials" of the king.²⁰ It must be noted here that the employment of the term <u>abangan</u> as opposed to <u>putihan</u> does not indicate any association with communism or radicalism in Indonesia.

In pre-Islamic times there had been religious villages whose inhabitants kept to certain strict rules. After the conversion to Islam, they became Islamic holy villages, whose inhabitants adhered strictly to Islamic precepts and to their ^Culamā' and <u>kiyai</u>. Some <u>pesantrens</u> were established in such villages and up to the present these villages are called <u>desa mutihan</u>. Since the Muslim princes granted these villages privileges of tax exemption, in order to maintain <u>pesantrens</u> or other religious duties, they were called

<u>desa perdikan</u> (free villages), granted freedom from taxes and services.²¹ This institution of <u>desa perdikan</u> is really an ancient one already in practice during the Hindu Javanese period.²²

It is clear from the above-mentioned paragraph that the term <u>santri</u>, indeed more frequently used that <u>putihan</u>, in its original and narrow sense, is used to refer to the students of the religious school called <u>pesantren</u>, like <u>penyantren</u> in Madura, <u>pondok</u> in Pasundan, <u>rangkang meunasah</u> in Aceh and <u>surau</u> in Minangkabau.²³ In <u>pesantren</u> the <u>santris</u> pursue religious studies, and there they obtain various types of spiritual, mental, and to some extent, also physical education. In the broad and more common sense the term <u>santri</u> refers to a group of Javanese Muslims who profess the most serious devotion to Islam, observing rituals of prayers, fasting, pilgrimage and so on. It is in this broad sense that the term is frequently used in this thesis.

The other group of Javanese people who accept Islam as a faith only, who seldom if ever practice the religious rituals of Islam, and who still hold Hindu-Buddhist and indigenous beliefs, are called <u>abangan</u>. <u>Abangan</u> is the counterpart - not the antithesis - of <u>santri</u>. The attachment of <u>abangan</u> to Hindu-Buddhist creeds and to indigenous beliefs as well was the outcome of long centuries of pre-Islamic influences in Java; but attachment are gradually being eliminated, with the passage of time, both by orthodox Muslim and Western influences. However, some <u>abangans</u> who live a more traditional life

still remain as they were. 24

In fact, the great majority of the Javanese pronounce themselves to be Muslims.²⁵ This pronouncement does not refer to or come from any particular stratum of Javanese society, but simultaneously reflects the religious self-consciousness of the Javanese as a whole. Within this general category, however, they make a clear distinction between <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> without taking into account the <u>dimension</u> of horizontal social stratification. It is true that <u>santri</u> as well as <u>abangan</u> exist in each strata of Javanese society, ranging from wong cilik to ndara.

There are <u>santri wong cilik</u> and <u>abangan wong cilik</u> as well among the peasants in villages. In the countryside the doctrinal aspect of <u>santri</u> is less marked, and their ethic remains somewhat closer to the <u>abangan</u>,²⁶ because the farmers who live in the village are more or less identical in political, social and economic status.

In the more urban areas there are many <u>santri sudagars</u> and <u>abangan sudagars</u>, some of whom in recent years have expanded their economic activities from local to international spheres. This <u>sudagar</u> group, either <u>santri</u> or <u>abangan</u>, is considered as the middle class, originating not from the aristocracy, but from the villagers.²⁷

Beside the <u>abangan priyayi</u> who live in the court principalities of Surakarta and Jogyakarta, there are also numerous <u>santri priyayis</u>

who are called <u>abdi dalem pametakan</u> (white officials of the king), among whom are the government officials and intellctuals. Prior to World War II the intellectuals of both <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> played important roles in the nationalist movement, and since independence they have become leaders of the Muslim political parties and nationalist political parties.²⁸

There are also many <u>santri ndaras</u> among the Javanese aristocrats. The aristocratic families in the north coastal court principalities were the first aristocratic group to convert Islam. They were later followed by the aristocratic families in the inland regions.²⁹

It is understandable that the division of the Javanese into <u>abangan</u>, <u>santri</u> and <u>priyayi</u>, as it has been drawn by Clifford Geertz, is confusing and misleading, because such a division is not based on consistent criteria. He is confusing two divisions of a different order, mixing up of horizontal and vertical divisions, and has probably overlooked the distinction between horizontal and vertical stratifications of Javanese society.

According to the Javanese opinion, as it is also stated by Koentjaraningrat, <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> denote two religious variants within Javanese culture, whereas <u>priyayi</u> does not indicate any religious tradition.³⁰ <u>Priyayi</u> can be either <u>santri</u> or <u>abangan</u>, as they may be Christians, Buddhists or Hindus. In this respect J.D. Legge points out that there are devout as well as merely

nominal Muslims in the ranks of the <u>priyayi</u>. The classification into <u>abangan</u>, <u>santri</u> and <u>priyayi</u> gives rise to the danger of confusing distinct categories.³¹ In fact, <u>priyayi</u> is a social class or cultural group of people of aristocratic origin. Only by distinguishing the horizontal from the vertical dimensions of Javanese society could one begin to properly appreciate divisions in Javanese society.

It would be more obvious, in this case, if one considers Ruth R. McVey's statement:

> In reality, the <u>priyayi-santri-abangan</u> triad is based on two divisions of a different order. In cultural terms, the main schism has been Islam and the <u>priyayi-abangan</u> "Javanese religion" (Agama Jawa) which incorporated pre-Islamic thought and represented the rural and court culture of interior Java in defense against the historically advancing power of Islam. From this point of view, Javanese society divides into two - not three - cultural parts; and indeed, a bifurcation into <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>.³²

It must be noted in this respect that the horizontal classification and vertical categorization of the Javanese society should be regarded as open class and open category, since the borderline between classes and the margine between categories are easily crossed by the members of society, especially since education has facilitated rising from the <u>wong cilik</u> to <u>priyayi</u>, and from <u>sudagar</u> to <u>priyayi</u> and <u>ndara</u> through intermarriage,³³ and shifting from <u>abangan</u> to <u>santri</u> as a result of the increasing numbers of Islamic schools, publications, and by regular activities of the Ministry of Religious affairs. It is quite certain that as the margin between categories is relative, so is the margin between <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>. H.M. Rasjidi, one of the leaders of the <u>Muhammadiyah</u> and a prominent Javanese Muslim scholar, says he simultaneously belongs to <u>abangan</u>-Islam and orthodox Islam (<u>santri</u>), while, moreover, he wants to be a modern Muslim. In speaking of <u>abangan</u>-Islam he means that he likes the <u>gamelan</u> (Javanese orchestra), <u>serimpi</u> (Javanese classical dance), and <u>wayang</u> (Javanese puppet shadow play), which according to Clifford Geertz's differentiation belong to <u>priyayi</u> and <u>abangan</u> cultural tradition.³⁴

The meaning of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>, in the course of time, has been changing. In central Java up to the 1920's the term <u>santri</u> still simply meant the student or pupil of <u>pesantren</u>, and in the cities this term referred to the Javanese Muslims who lived in a quarters around the mosque called <u>Kauman</u>. The term <u>abangan</u> in east and central Java referred to the group whose world view, belief and life style were different from the pious Muslim. In central Java, moreover, it tended to be a cynical expression of humiliation.³⁵

It is particularly important in this respect to call our attention to how the Indonesian intellectual Muslims react to the employment of the terms <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> by outside observers, especially Clifford Geertz, as a clear-cut religious differentiation. Generally, the Indonesian Muslims use other terms, in a special context, for the distinction between these two groups. They prefer

to speak of Islam, either conservative or modern, and its consciously faithful adherents rather than <u>santri</u>. From the Indonesian Muslim's point of view, the <u>abangan</u> are those who know little about Islam and are little concerned with the precepts of Islam, though they honestly consider themselves to be Muslims. Today they call themselves "Muslim, but not so fanatical and not so strict", sometimes they are the so-called <u>Islam statistik</u> (statistical Muslim).³⁶

Essentially, Indonesian Muslims consider this distinction in relation to the question of whether or not one is a consciously devout Muslim. For this reason the Indonesian Muslims, particularly their intellectuals, tend to emphasize the fact that these two groups - <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> cannot be clearly divided and certainly do not indicate two separte groups. They stress that the so-called (by Clifford Geertz) "<u>abangan</u> variant" of religion in Java ought to be regarded as a variant or nuance within Islam and the Muslim community.³⁷ One somewhat negative aspect of Clifford Geertz's analysis, in this case, is that the constrast he posits is so sharp as to be unrealistic.³⁸ In fact, there is considerable interchange and overlapping between them.

The same objection can be raised with regard to the distinction of the <u>priyayi</u> variant of religion in Java. As it has already been mentioned <u>priyayi</u> are a social status or cultural group within the Javanese community, and do not indicate any particular religious tradition. They can be either pious Muslims or statistical Muslims,

as they may also be Hindu-Buddhists or Christians. In studies of phenomena such as religion in the Javanese communities, it is necessary to be aware of the distinction between <u>adat</u> (traditional customary practices) and religion. The distinction between <u>adat</u> and religion, if not properly recognized, will bring about erroneous interpretations of a given empirical phenomenon.³⁹

For Indonesian Muslims, the Islamic world of ideas and its history constitute the basic point of departure for examining the total Muslim community in their country. They believe that there is still room to view their community from the Muslim historical approach alongside the sociological approach. Since Indonesian Muslims have been aware of the fact that Islam has not brought uniformity to Indonesia, including Java, they have been concerned with the recent developments toward the expansion and strengthening of a uniform Islam through religious education, publications and activities of the Ministry of Religious Affairs.⁴⁰

It comes to our attention, however, that the cleavage within the Muslim community itself must be added to the contrast between <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>. The reformist Muslim current of thought, which originated in Egypt during the nineteenth century, had involved to a degree a struggle against the mystical characteristics which marked the early growth of Islam in Java.⁴¹ This struggle came to be a contest between modern and more conservative currents of thought, respectively imbodied in the <u>Muhammadiyah</u>, which had been

considered as <u>santri moderen</u> (modern <u>santri</u>), and <u>Nahdatul Ulama</u>, a group of <u>santri kolot</u> (conservative <u>santri</u>). The former aimed at purification of the Islamic faith by removing the syncretic elements which had obscured the Islamic teaching. It also aimed at buttressing orthodoxy against certain compromises with pre-Islamic beliefs and practices which had been part and parcel of the spread of Islam in Java.⁴² The reformers believed that a purified Islamic doctrine, in which reason played an important role, could be reconciled with the needs of science and modern thought and enable Islam to meet the challenges of social change.⁴³

According to Clifford Geertz, five points can be put foreward which characterize, to some degree, the differences between the modernist and the conservative. First, in the matter of man's relations with God, the conservative tends to take a somewhat fatalistic view that the individual career is entirely fated by God's Will, whereas the modernist emphasizes the virtue of human effort. Second, the conservative tends to deny the distinction between secular and religious and insists that religion penetrates all departments of human life, whereas the modernist tends to hold that there is a degree of independence between secular and religious life, though he also recognizes that, in a broad sense, religion underlies all human activities. Third, toward the existing pre-Islamic beliefs and ritual, the conservative tends to be more ready to accept a certain kind of accomodation, while the modernist insists upon the purification of

the Islamic faith. Fourth, the conservative tends to emphasize religious experience, while the modernist stresses outward religious behaviour. Fifth, the conservative tends to be more traditional and scholastic in justifying religious practices and commentaries, while the modernist stresses reason and practical arguments to justify particular action.⁴⁴

In this concluding section, it should be mentioned that the social stratification of the Javanese society is also apparently recognized by an understanding of the Javanese language, which is also stratified.

Though traditionally there were at least seven styles that related to seven social status relations,⁴⁵ after a drift led to simplification, only three may be considered as the most basic sublanguages, not dialects. Each of the sublanguages has a different vocabulary but the same rules of grammar and syntax. In the choice of a certain sublanguage the Javanese shows his status in relation to whom he is addressing.

In order to speak correct Javanese, a person must master all the distinctions in connection with his specific situation in communication with others. He has also to understand the system of the three sublanguages to express the subtle differences in the degree of honour and respect.

The three sublanguages are as follows: First, there is the ngoko (low sublanguage) used by the speaker to address people of a lower social status than his own. The lower status of the other person may be based on kinship relation, age, or status in the bureaucratic hierarchy. In most cases, ngoko is used only if there is a considerable social distance between the speaker and the addressee, for example between masters and their servants. On the other hand, ngoko is also used in speaking to a person of the same status who is a close friend. An example is communication at school among students.⁴⁶ Second, there is a higher sublanguage called the krama madya (middle sublanguage) used by individuals of equal social status, or in speaking to an other person who is reputed to have a higher status than the speaker, or to a person who is older than the speaker, or to a person not well acquainted or unacquainted with the speaker.⁴⁷ Third, in talking to somebody of higher status, one has to use the krama inggil (honorific sublanguage). Here again, the higher status of the other person must be based on kinship relation, age, social status and bureaucratic hierarchy. 48

The social levels in the Javanese language are still an important factor in community life, especially in the kinship behaviour, in the majority of the nobility and <u>priyayi</u> families. A man who speaks flawless honorific sublanguage is called <u>alus</u> (polite, refined, civilized) as opposed to <u>kasar</u> (impolite, rough, uncivilized).⁴⁹ Apart from the social levels mentioned above, the Javanese

language has also local dialects.

During the Dutch colonial period, the Dutch officers preferred to use their own language wherever possible. But if the other party did not understand that language they then preferred to use the Malay language which is not stratified. Though the Dutch understood <u>krama inggil</u>, they never used it since employing this sublanguage implied rendering respect to the other persons, who were the Javanese officials. Consequently the Dutch civil officers used either Dutch or Malay. On the other hand, the Javanese civil service officials were allowed to use Dutch or Malay as the formal written language. In case of oral communication with the Dutch, the Javanese were not allowed to use Malay, because this language did not explicitly express respect for the other party.⁵⁰

During the Japanese occupation the Dutch language was officially prohibited in schools and in the administration. The only language that could be used between the Japanese and the Javanese was the Malay language. This meant that the Javanese did not need to show deference to the Japanese by employing honorific language.

Since Indonesian independence Malay has been adopted as the Indonesian national language or <u>bahasa Indonesia</u>. It is the sole official language in both oral and written communications. This decision put an end to the use of the Javanese stratified language. Only in informal relations among people of Javanese origin does the Javanese language remain in use.

2. The Origin and Social Background of Santri and Abangan.

Though this study is more concerned with <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> in contemporary Java, it is important to be acquainted with the historical origin of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> in this island. In order to understand the emerging of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>, an effort should be made to examine the structure of conversion to Islam in Java in relation to the existing Javanese culture as the environmental background of these groups. The historical evidence in this discussion will lead to an understanding of the growing number of <u>santri</u> and abangan as socio-religious groups in Java.

We have to first ascertain the meaning of a culture as an environmental background of any society. We conceive a culture, in this case, as the relationships between human beings, between human beings and their environment (both social and physical), and between institutions human beings create to implement such relationships.

To some extent, we also perceive a culture as a series of institutions, patterns of individual or interpersonal behaviour, and a system of beliefs which all are interlinked. In other works, a culture, as an environmental background of a certain society, is not simply a group of independent traits, but it is rather a series of social phenomena which are intertwined.⁵¹ In this connection, the social background of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> should be examined through a systematic study of Javanese society in order to understand

the Javanese, to recognize their civilization, and to analyze significant aspects of their society.

It has been well-known to historians that Gujaratis and Bengalis spread Islam throughout the Indonesian archipelago, but no doubt the Arabs had their share in this process of Islamization. The Arabs had earlier contacts with the populations of South Asia which paved the way for the work of proselytism carried out later by the Indians.⁵²

The Arabs had established colonies in various coastal areas of India which in due course became centres of diffusion of Islam. A mixed population within the Islamic community grew up in various ports as the result of intermarriage with local women. From these centres, then, the merchants travelled to Indonesia. They exercised a double role as traders and preachers.⁵³

Gradually many small Muslim principalities arose along the north coast of Java; Jepara, Demak, Tuban and Gresik. In connection with the rise of these principalities, Tomé Pires' record between 1512-1515, cited by R.R. Di Meglio, says:

> At the time in which pagans were living on the coasts of Java many Persian, Arab and Gujarati traders used to come to these places. They began to grow rich and to increase in number, their sons by that time had become Javanese and were wealthy, having lived in those ports for more than seventy years. In some places the pagan Javanese rulers became Muslims, and there the merchants and their mohalla (mullahs) took over the authority from them, and reigned in their stead. They thus succeeded in monopolizing Javanese trade.

The penetration of Islam into Indonesia began before the foundation of the most glorious Hindu-Javanese imperium of Majapahit in 1292. The Islamic faith was peacefully introduced into the archipelago along the spice trade route.

Marco Polo, who was accompanied by his father and uncle as Venetian ambassador to Kublai Khan in China, while awaiting favourable winds for the return to Venice, visited the northeastern coast of Sumatra for five months in 1292. He noted that the inhabitants of the kingdom of Ferlac (Perlak) on the northern tip of Sumatra had been converted to Islam by the Saracen merchants, but that the hillpeople were idolaters and cannibals.⁵⁵

It must be added to Marco Polo's account that the oldest Islamic inscription, on the tombstone of Sultan Malikul Salih, the first Muslim ruler of Samudra Pasé, dates from the year 1297.⁵⁶ The famous Moroccan traveler Ibn **Bat**tūtah, who visited Samudra on his way to China in 1345 during the reign of Sultan Malikul Zahir, reported that Islam had been established there for almost a century, and that the <u>Shāfi^ci</u> school of jurisprudence was followed. ⁵⁷ Based on this evidence, therefore, the thirteenth century is usually regarded as the earliest date of Islamic penetration into Indonesia.

Nevertheless, this assumption is challenged by the later discovery of the gravestone of a Muslim lady, Fatimah binti Maimun, in Leran near Surabaya, which bears the date 475 <u>Hijrah</u> or 1082 A.D.⁵⁸

This tombstone bears an inscription in Arabic letters, but unfortunately it cannot be determined whether she was Arabian by birth or even by descent, for the Arabic language and script are the ritual ones for all Muslims.

Aside from the gravestone at Leran, the first Arabic gravestone in Java dates from 1419. It is the grave of Malik Ibrahim known as the <u>wali</u> (Islamic saint) of Java.⁵⁹ Ma Huan, the Chinese Muslim traveler, who visited Tuban, Gresik, and Surabaya in 1416 reported:

> In this country there were three kinds of peoples; first, the Mahomedans, who had come from the west and had established themselves there; their dress and food was clean and proper. Second, the Chinese who had run away and settled there; what they ate and used was also very fine, and many of them had adopted the Mahomedan religion and observed its precepts. The third kind were the natives who were ugly and uncouth; they went about with uncombed heads and naked feet, and believed in devils.⁶⁰

One of the oldest commercial towns in Java was Tuban, whose record of overseas trade goes back to the eleventh century. A Chinese expedition landed at the end of thirteenth century in an unsuccessful attempt to conquer the island. It was the port of departure for sea voyages to Maluku. The conversion of the native ruler of this town to Islam took place some time before the middle of the fifteenth century and was probably due to Arab influence. The Muslim ruler of Tuban was not strictly orthodox in character, nor were his subjects any more orthodox.⁶¹ The other important port on the northeast coast of Java at the beginning of the sixteenth century was the port of Gresik, which was favourably situated on the channel running between the island of Madura and the mainland of Java. Meilink Roelofsz maintains:

> A great number of foreigners - Gujarati, Bengali and native of Calicut - seem to have settled in this city. Some of them rapidly succeeded in attaining a dominant position and became assimilated with the native Javanese population. Islam, which was propagated by the Muslim merchants, lent considerable force to the activity of Gresik. It was at that time a centre of Islamic propagation.⁶²

Thus, Islam in Indonesia appears to have been more acceptable in the commercial centers along the sea lanes of the Indonesian archipelago. The spread of Islam was closely associated with the pattern of international trade, and it established strong footholds in the coastal ports ranging from North Sumatra, Demak, Jepara, Tuban, Makasar to Maluku.

It is evident that "the spread of Islam throughout Indonesia had a commercial aspect"; C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze continue, "it can be argued that Islam reached Indonesia and began spreading into Indonesia on the wings of commerce".⁶³ There is a clear connection between the spread of Islam and the spice trade in the Indonesian archipelago.

The oldest evidence of Muslim presence is found along the trade routes beginning at Malaka in the west and ending on Maluku in the east.⁶⁴ In the light of this feature, the connection between Islam and commerce seems to be natural. It is probably the reason why Clifford Geertz associated <u>santri</u> with the trading element of Javanese society.⁶⁵

This historical phenomenon draws our attention to the acceptance of the principle of equality of the believers who made up the Islamic community. This principle was well suited to the world of trade. In the view of traders, Islam made no distinctions of race and class, but helped to establish a new social unity in the coastal ports where people from many different parts of the world clustered together in their separate quarters.⁶⁶ They were tied together by a common adherence of Islamic precepts.

J.C. van Leur in his book <u>Indonesian Trade and Society</u> (1955) provides documentation for the basic set of relationships between the state and trade, and details the economic relations between the nations of Southeast Asia from technical and economic points of view. He emphasizes that political factors had predominated in the process of Islamization. In other words, he sees politics as the guiding force behind the acceptance of Islam. He states that political motives and tactical considerations of the aristocratic families in the coastal ports of northeastern Java brought about Islamization.⁶⁷

Furthermore, van Leur points out that at the end of fifteenth

century the Javanese aristocratic families in the coastal ports of northeastern Java had grown to power, owning ships, monopolizing the trade from Maluku to Malaka, and maintaining their own troops. The rivalry between the central authority of Majapahit and the aristocratic families in the trading coastal principalities of north Java, both trying to exercise their own authority over the state, turned Islamization into a political instrument. In this way Islam and politics became entangled with each other.⁶⁸

Van Leur bases his explanation of conversion on the inseparable blend of trade and politics. However, aside from political motives, the course of conversion in Javanese society was also strongly effected by the social structure of Islam.

Though the adoption of Islam among the aristocratic families was perhaps initially related to political convenience, it was ultimately more complicated than this. To the rulers in the north coastal principalities of Java, the new religion presented a life pattern that allowed them greater scope for individual development than did the rigid hierarchy of a Hindu society.⁶⁹ To a trader living under a Hindu princely ruler, Islam gave a sense of individual worth in the Islamic community. According to Hindu ideology he was merely a creature of lower order than the members of the higher castes.⁷⁰ When the rulers became Muslim, subsequently, the ruled also became Muslim or at least nominally Muslim. In other words, the rulers facilitated the spread of Islam among their

subjects.⁷¹

Aside from this sociological point of view, the mysticism characteristic of Islam during the period of religious transition should be taken into consideration; it made conversion to Islam among the Javanese less objectionable. It was the Islam that had passed through Persia and India, a mystical Islam rather than a traditional Islam. This mystical Islam found a fertile soil in Java. The heretical mysticism, which was so popular at that time, was closely linked to the pantheistic views of the previous period.⁷² The ultimate goal of the quest for learning among the Javanese people was an initiation into esoteric doctrines, without which all religious knowledge was without taste or flavour.⁷³ The Javanese at that time were, indeed, more interested in Islamic mysticism than Islamic theology or jurisprudence.

Another factor that might have promoted the conversion to Islam was that the influence of Hinduism and Buddhism upon the Javanese way of thought was not very deep, especially in the hearts of lay people. The Javanese thought had been unable to completely adapt itself to Hindu thought which implied the possibility of discovering order in the universe. Islam offered a way of thought without forcing the Javanese mind to investigate the forces of the universe. Therefore, the Javanese mind easily adopted Islam and felt at home in it.⁷⁴ Though Hinduism and Buddhism produced monumental architecture and numerous <u>candis</u> (temples) in Java, e.g. Borobudur, Mendut, Prambanan, Panataran, they failed to penetrate the hearts of the Javanese. They appealed only to the upper class.⁷⁵ Therefore, it is very probable that both the sociological condition as well as the philosophical outlook of the Javanese at that time facilitated conversion to Islam.

One other thing still should be mentioned that the process of conversion and the expansion of Islamic power was also the result of anti-Christian propaganda. The spread of Islam in Java began at approximately the same time as the arrival of the Portuguese. Their appearance has been viewed as a sequel to the Crusades,⁷⁶ and as a stimulus to increased competition in trade. From the conquest of Malaka in 1511 onward, the Portuguese had been involved in the struggle against Islam and Islamic trade in the archipelago.⁷⁷ They attempted to expand their power by converting the population to Christianity.⁷⁸ No doubt, it played a significant part in speeding Islamization in Java. That is why W.F. Wertheim, who bases his idea on B.J.O. Schrieke's work, <u>Indonesian Sociological Studies</u>, part II (1957), says:

> One can, indeed, sustain the paradox that the expansion of Islam in Indonesian Archipelago was due to the Westerners. It was mainly the arrival of the Portuguese which induced a large number of Indonesian princes to embrace the Islamic faith as a political move to counter Christian penetration.79

The most important link between the native ruler and the foreign traders was the <u>shahbandar</u> (harbour master). This occupation was in the hand of a Muslim foreigner, presumably because this function demanded a knowledge of a foreign language. The <u>shahbandar</u> was responsible for the collection of anchorage fees, import and export duties, and was dealt with the foreign traders. He could, then, make himself the channel through which Islam could extend its influence into the royal courts.

At the same time, the <u>shahbandar</u> was also becoming more important in his political role by advising the ruler on overseas trade relations, by reminding him of the danger of Portuguese expansion (which first appeared in Java in 1511), and by pointing out to him the importance of the acceptance of Islam as a means of extending the ruler's power.

Not less important was that the <u>shahbandar</u> could also introduce Muslim scholars, who were then employed at the courts of the native rulers.⁸⁰ Eventually, the Muslim scholars and preachers, who were the <u>walis</u>, gave the spiritual impetus to the efforts of the Muslim rulers to extend their power. The rulers accepted them as their mentors. Sultan Agung and Sultan Pajang, for example, had their authority legitimized by Sunan Giri, one of the <u>Wali Songo</u> (Nine Saints). The ^culamā' began to occupy a highly influential position both at court and among the people.⁸¹

According to the Javanese historical tradition,⁸² the spread of Islam in Java was carried out by <u>Wali Songo</u>. The Javanese chroniclers maintain that Islam had been preached in this island by those nine preachers who are regarded as saints called <u>wali</u>, derived from Arabic <u>waliyu Allah</u> (the friend of God).

The Javanese use to write and narrate the walis' stories in the most respectful and beautiful language, describing their extraordinary miracles. The names of the walis are venerated by the Javanese, and named according to their places of burial or activity, those are; (1) Sunan Gresik, who died in Gresik in 1419, known as Maulana Malik Ibrahim or Maulana Maghribi. He was believed to be the first Muslim preacher in Java, and was probably a Persian or Arab or Gujarati.⁸³ who came to Java for trade and rose to be a shahbandar, and founded a pesantren for his disciples.84 (2) Sunan Ampel or Raden Rachmat (d. 1467) founded a pesantren in Ampel near Surabaya. His mother was a daughter of Sultan Campa. He legitimized Raden Patah as a caliph in Demak with the title Sultan Syah Sri Alam Akbar al-Fattah. He was buried near the mosque of Ampel. (3) Sunan Bonang or Makhdum Ibrahim (d. 1525) was the son of Sunan Ampel. He was in charge of the conversion to Islam in northeastern coastal Java. His tomb is in Bonang (Tuban). (4) Sunan Drajad or Syarifuddin (d. 1572) was another son of Sunan Ampel. (5) Sunan Giri or Raden Paku (d. 1530) was considered by the Javanese to be the composer of the Javanese songs of Pucung and Asmarandana.

He propagated Islam in the east part of Java. (6) Sunan Kudus or Ja^cfar Sadiq (d. 1560) was very influential in the conversion along the northern coast of central Java. He was the originator of the songs of <u>Maskumambang</u> and <u>Mijil</u>. He was buried in Kudus. (7) Sunan Murya or Raden Prawoto was believed to be the one who employed the <u>gamelan</u> (Javanese musical instrument) to appeal for conversion. The Javanese songs of <u>Sinom</u> and <u>Kinanti</u> were composed by him. He was buried in the hill of Murya near Kudus. (8) Sunan Gunung Jati or Syarif Hidayatullah, known as Fatahillah or Falatehan, came from Pasé (North Sumatra) to Japara and converted west Java to Islam. He died in 1570. (9) Sunan Kalijaga or Raden Mas Syahid (d. 1585) converted south central Java to Islam. He was influential among the nobles, and is considered to be the author of the stories of <u>Wayang</u> (puppet shadow play). He settled in Kadilangu, south of Japara, and married the daughter of Sunan Gunung Jati.⁸⁵

These <u>walis</u> had their own <u>pesantrens</u> where the <u>santris</u> studied the Islamic doctrines and mysticism.⁸⁶ <u>Wali Songo</u> were, indeed, not only the initiators of the new era of Islam in Java, which put an end the Hindu-Javanese age, but also dominated the subsequent period that was well-known by the Javanese as <u>jaman</u> kuwalen (the age of the saints).⁸⁷

The Hindu-Javanese kingdom of Majapahit lost much of its power in the last quarter of the fifteenth century.⁸⁸ This period coincided with the rise to political power of a large number of

Muslim leaders in the north Javanese coastal towns of Ampel (Surabaya), Gresik, Tuban, Demak, Bonang, Jepara and Cirebon. All of them, according to traditional sources, were <u>walis</u>. They were the first generation of Islamic Javanese religio-political leaders. These <u>walis</u> were all related by marriage or blood to the local aristocracy, who held local control at that time by favour of the Majapahit king.⁸⁹

The aristocratic families of the north coastal principalities, holding high political office, turned their political power against central authority of Majapahit for the sake of independent action. The period of Islamic conversion was marked by such shifts in loyalty. It coincided with the shift of political and economic hegemony, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, from the central authority situated in the interior of eastern Java to the north coastal principalities of Java.⁹⁰

The north coastal harbour states in Java were then able to defend their claim to independence and finally, by the early of the sixteenth century (about 1520) a coalition of harbour states led by Sultan Demak overthrew the last Majapahit ruler and carried off the royal regalia to Demak.

For seventy-five years the confederacy of Muslim harbour states controlled an increasing large area of Java.⁹¹ The Islamic kingdom of Demak reached the peak of its power around 1540.⁹² Afterwards, the center of political power was moved to central Java

where Hinduism had merged with the indigenous culture during preceding centuries.

The pattern of conversion to Islam in Java began with the foreign merchants, who had won respect and power, and who were granted the right to build mosques. As a result, religious teachers entered the country and attracted many Muslims from abroad. Those who had been in Java a long time became assimilated, and adopted the manners and customs of the old Javanese nobility.⁹³ To a large extent the Muslim rulers of the Javanese ports were descended from Muslim foreign merchants. Only in Tuban was the ruler of a native Javanese family which had converted to Islam.⁹⁴

The institutional nucleus of the <u>santri</u> groups was around the mosques and in the <u>pesantrens</u>. The latter were more successful in establishing a Muslim community because their character was based on a modified monastic pattern of the past. In <u>pesantren</u> the <u>santris</u> of different areas lived together in dormitories, cooked their own food, and usually worked in the fields belonging to the <u>pesantren</u> or to some supporters of the <u>pesantren</u>. Around the <u>pesantren</u>, then, the rural <u>santri</u> community developed.⁹⁵

More influential in sustaining Islam was the nucleus of zealous believers, i.e. the <u>kiyais</u> and ^c<u>ulamā</u>, who formed the core of the <u>santri</u> life pattern. Initially, the <u>santri</u> civilization appears to have been limited to the trading coastal towns; later it penetrated into interior regions of Java.⁹⁶

The center of the Islamic idea rested in the conception of <u>ummah</u> (Muslim community). The new converts were tied together by a common adherence to Islamic precepts. <u>Pesantren</u> became a major channel for the penetration of Islam into village life. Large <u>pesantrens</u>, headed by famous <u>kiyais</u>, grew up in various villages, and the smaller <u>pesantrens</u> appeared all over the island. Later, in almost every village there appeared some <u>pesantren</u>-trained men who could give instruction in Islamic ritual and chanting the Quran.⁹⁷

The religious community around a <u>pesantren</u>, which consisted of <u>kiyai</u> and <u>santris</u>, was responsible for the esbablishment of Islamic orthodoxy, due to the absence of any ecclesiastical hierarchy or missionary society. The <u>pesantren</u>, as the nucleus of the pious Muslim community, formed a common ritual community. The atmosphere within which the Muslim lived constituted the <u>ummah</u>. This was the locus of the impulse to Islamization in Java.

Islam in Java in its earliest period was strongly coloured by Javanese culture. This was because elements of the aristocracy preserved Hindu-Javanese tradition, and also because the <u>walis</u>, as the first generation of Islamic preachers, were brought up in the Javanese environment. They did not have direct contact with the center of Islamic world in the Middle East.⁹⁸

In this period, Islam was propagated by attaching it to local practices and by making it answer a Javanese need. On the other hand, many Javanese customary practices were sanctified by the addition of

Islamic ritual. Islam in Java in its early stage made large concession to the syncretic system of belief in which Hindu-Buddhist teachings were intermingled with indigenous elements.⁹⁹ It made conversion less difficult or in any case less objectionable.

Mahmud Junus, who delineates the history of Islamic education in Indonesia, maintains that Raden Patah, the son of king Brawijaya of Majapahit and a santri of the pesantren in Ampel Denta before he became the king of Demak, was given authority to establish pesantren anywhere in Java. In 1475 he founded a pesantren in Glagah Arum, the southern part of Japara in central Java. This place was later known as Bintara, the center of the Islamic kingdom of Demak. In 1476 the organization of Bayangkare Islah (Vanguard Corps for Improvement) was established to accelerate the spread of Islam among the Javanese. It was the first organization to carry out the systematic programme as follows: (1) The islands of Java and Madura were divided into several working-areas in which every wali should be responsible for the work of conversion. A badal (substitute) was to assist the wali. (2) In order to accelerate the spread of Islam, an attempt should be made to reconcile Islam and the Javanese tradition. (3) In order to establish a central location for Islamic education, a central mosque should be built. (Before the central mosque was completed, the mosque Sekayu, near Semarang, was erected for temporary use. It was probably the first mosque established in central Java).¹⁰⁰

Islam in Java did not lead to the creation of a separate community or a division between Hindus and Muslims; rather, Javanese Islam was forced to turn inward and to operate within the framework of Javanese traditional religious beliefs. The methods of conversion to Islam corresponded to those used earlier in spreading Hinduism, for the <u>walis</u>, especially Sunan Kalijaga, went to the interior, established religious settlements there, and competed with Hindu-Javanese <u>ajar</u> (learning) in supernatural power. Everywhere a special effort was made to convert the <u>ajar</u> and to propagate Islam by means of <u>wayang</u> (puppet shadow play).¹⁰¹

When the ruler converted to Islam and legitimized himself as Muslim prince and introduced Islamic law into the royal domain, the people then converted to the new faith. The ^C<u>ulamā</u>' fulfilled their function by becoming consellors, judges and religious teachers within the social, cultural and political limits posed by the Javanese aristocracy, the preservers of Hindu-Javanese tradition. Though Islamic law became the judicial norm, primarily in matrimonial matters, it could not completely supersede the prevailing <u>adat</u> (customary law). The Javanese <u>kraton</u> (court) did not necessarily become a Muslim court.

The cooperation between the <u>walis</u> and the kings resulted in an Islam which was at first more or less adapted to the world outlook and interests of both the religious leaders and the aristocracy. The family relationship between some of the walis and

the aristocracy made a compromise even easier. However, the influence of both elites was different.

To one part of society, the world outlook of the <u>ulamā</u>' as an elite group was more dominant than the world outlook of the aristocracy. This part of society lived in the environs of <u>pesantrens</u> and mosques. In an other part of society, the world outlook of aristocracy much more dominant. Usually this society lived in the environs of <u>kraton</u>, the residence of the king and nobility, the center of the realm, of high culture and the center of art.

The development of two groups of people following two different elites, namely the <u>kiyai</u> or ^C<u>ulamā</u>' and the aristocracy, was a proof of the existence of two different world outlooks and orientations. From that time on, the Javanese people have had to distinguish between those basing their world outlook on the Islamic principles, the <u>santri</u>, and those basing their world outlook on the Javanese cultural tradition, the <u>abangan</u>. Accordingly, the Javanese Muslims have been bifurcated into <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>. This does not mean that the borderline between the two groups is very sharply drawn. Nuances between these two groups are possible.¹⁰²

For long time in south central Java the real victor was traditional Javanese religion and the Javanese <u>adat</u>, not Islam or <u>figh</u> (Islamic jurisprudence) or Islamic civilization. In the greater part of this area Islam had been forced to adapt itself to the old Javanese tradition, partly indigenous, partly Hindu-Buddhist.

In the process of conversion in Java, especially in the regions where Hindu tradition was still influential, Islam lost some of its doctrinal rigidity. It is understandable that one of the factors in the success of Islamic conversion, indeed, was its concessions to the old custom.¹⁰³ The consequence was the emergence of Javanese Muslims, the so-called abangan.

It was at this time that religious elements deriving from orthodox Islam were incorporated into Javanese literatures. The synthesis of elements of the old Javanese tradition and Islam received strong state support during the Mataram period in the early seventeenth century. Documents attributed to the synthesis include; <u>Het Boek van Bonang</u> (The Book of Bonang), <u>Een Javaansche Primbon uit de Zestiende Euw</u> (A Javanese Primbon from the Sixteenth Century), <u>Suluk Sukarso</u>, <u>Suluk Wijil</u>, <u>Cabolek</u>, <u>Centini</u>, <u>Hidayat Jati</u>. At a later period appeared the book <u>Serat Wirid</u> (The Book of Sacred Teaching) which revealed Islamic teaching strongly imbued with traditional Javanese elements.

No wonder that in the early period the <u>walis</u> used the conceptions of Javanese philosophy to intensify the emotional and intellectual appeal of their massage. Consequently, they brought about a certain amount of synthesis.¹⁰⁴ Following is an example of the synthesis from the book <u>Babad Tanah Jawi</u>: (History of the Island of Java):

This is the history of the kingdom of Java, beginning with Prophet Adam, who had a son, Sis. Sis had a son Nurtjahja. Nurtjahja had a son Nurasa. Nurasa had a son Sanghyang Tunggal The court of Batara Guru was called Sura Laja (name of Hindu paradise).105

The introduction of elements of Islam into the book of <u>Centini</u>, for example, is probably an indication that the author, R.Ng. Sastradipura, wished to demonstrate the sympathy of the Javanese court towards Islam. However, the court's attitude towards the <u>shari^ca</u> should be understood in the context of Javanese tradition. The <u>shari^ca</u> was regarded as merely a cover or a <u>wadah</u> (container) which remained outside of the system of Javanese belief, and was not its essence.

From the traditional Javanese point of view, changing the wadah by professing oneself to be a Muslim presented no obstacle to maintaining the Javanese belief in the attainment of the <u>makripat</u> (<u>ma^crifah</u>), which is the Javanese <u>pamoring kawula Gusti</u> (the union between servant and the Lord).¹⁰⁶

The Javanese considered conciliation to be an effort to "domesticate" Islam, which was felt to be a threat to the continuity of Javanese tradition of the court. On the contrary, the reconciliation was a result of the ever growing infiltration of Islam into the declining court tradition.

It might be concluded that variations could be seen in Java from one place to another. In some regions where Hindu culture was

less influential, particularly in the north coastal area, Islam was stronger and was able to penetrate into social life of the <u>santri</u> community. On the contrary, where the Hindu was still strongly influential, Islam tended to seek a compromise and such a compromise often meant the readiness to create synthesis with other cultural factors which came earlier. The result was syncretic Islam as the world outlook of <u>abangan</u>. This could be found in a major part of south central Java.

From the latter part of nineteenth century onward Islam in Java gradually started to shed its syncretic characteristics and drew strength from contact with Mecca. The improved sea transportation, particularly after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, increased the numbers of Javanese pilgrims significantly.¹⁰⁷ Some of them spent years in Mecca participating in the Middle Eastern Muslim way of life. When they returned home to Java these <u>kajis</u> (<u>hājjs</u>) acted not only as carriers of an orthodox Islam but also brought home the ideas of Islamic reform.¹⁰⁸

An influx of Hadramaut Arabs added to the growth of Islamic orthodoxy in Java. The pilgrimage to Mecca (<u>hājj</u>) and the rural Quranic schools (<u>pesantrens</u>) were the two Islamic institutions which constituted the social structure of the Islamic tradition during the hundred years of the Dutch colonial rule in Java. ¹⁰⁹ The growth of <u>hājjs</u>, <u>kiyais</u> and <u>pesantrens</u> became a major channel of effective communication between the <u>pesantren</u>, as the center of the Islamic

orthodox theological school in Java, and Mecca, as the center of the Islamic world. It was the period of the rapid expansion of <u>santri</u> civilization, and Islamic orthodoxy gained predominance over Islamic mysticism in Java. Around <u>pesantrens</u> and around the mosques grew the centers of Islamic orthodoxy representing the <u>santri</u> cultural pattern in Java.

With the founding of the <u>Muhammadiyah</u> in 1912 and the birth of <u>Sarekat Islam</u> (Islamic Association) in the same year, Islamic orthodoxy spread beyond the towns and villages. Orthodox Islam was beginning to play an increasingly important political role in that the <u>pesantrens</u> were growing into centers of anti-Dutch sentiment.

3. The Characteristics of Santri and Abangan in Religious Beliefs and Practices.

In order to maintain a basic understanding on the religious beliefs and practices of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>, it would be useful to place the religions influencing the Javanese in chronological order.

After pre-historic times and a period of animistic religion, Hinduism came to Java. According to most conjectures, Java and the surrounding islands professed the Hindu faith from the first century of the Christian era, but the Indian civilization began to make progress in Java only in the fifth century.¹¹⁰ The Hindu-Javanese kingdom lasted from the eight century to the beginning of the sixteenth century and was divided into two parts; the Central Javanese and the East Javanese kingdoms.¹¹¹

The Hinduism that came to Java was a form of Shaivism, but because of the insufficient data on the beginning of this period, it is difficult to know what kind of Shaivism. There is evidence that Buddhism also came to Java in the last decades of the seventh century. It was Mahāyāna that acquired a firm footing in the island, while earlier the sect of Hīnayāna must have been introduced into Sumatra.

Thus, there were in Java during the Hindu period two recognized state religions; Shaivism and Mahayana.¹¹² From the

middle of the tenth century till the middle of the fifteenth century Hindu Javanese culture flourished. It is clear that the Hinduism and Buddhism brought to Java by the Indians were accepted by the Javanese.

It was mentioned in the previous section that the beginning of the Muslim kingdom in Sumatra was about the thirteenth century and conversion was carried out in Java in the fifteenth century. Beginning with the north coast, Islam finally took over the Hindu kingdom of Majapahit at the end of fifteenth century.

After the fall of Majapahit Islam began to penetrate into the interior of the island. The Islamization of Java got its impetus during the reign of Sultan Agung of Mataram in the seventeenth century.¹¹³

It is clear that the island was at various periods pervaded by different religions; Islam has for the last 350 years been the dominant religion in Java. Despite these changes, the bulk of the Javanese population, the so-called <u>abangan</u>, remain to some extent influenced by the ancient beliefs and practices.

The basic Javanese conceptions concerning the invisible world are founded on the idea that all phenomena in life are caused by personified thinking beings with wills of their own. This animistic idea can be formulated thus: everything in nature, in the world of animals and plants, every object, either big or small, has a soul of its own. The souls or spirits which dwell in these beings or things are capable of leaving them to roam around at will or to take possession of another body or object. The practice of fetishism, spiritism, and shamanism are closely related to the basic concept of this unseen world.¹¹⁴

The religious beliefs of <u>abangan</u> are a peculiar mixture of animistic worship of the natural elements and of ancestor souls, with beliefs rooted in Hinduistic religions, on all of which the Islamic teachings are superimposed.

The spirits worshipped by the Javanese are generally called <u>hyang</u> or <u>yang</u> meaning deity. God in the Javanese language is sometimes called <u>Hyang Maha Kuwasa</u> (the Omnipotent God). The daily ritual prayers or <u>salah</u> in Javanese are called <u>sembahyang</u>, derived from the word sembah meaning reverence and yang meaning deity.

No one could enumerate the number of <u>yangs</u>. Among them are <u>dayang desa</u> (the guardian spirits of the village). The Javanese consider that every village has its own protecting spirit dwelling in a large shady tree of that village. The people imagine that guardian spirits had already been living in that place before the ground was cleared for building the village.

Many villagers, desiring to secure blessings or asking protection from calamities, bring offerings of some incense and flowers to the altar of that big tree, and reveal their trouble and need for protection to the danyang desa. The prayer in the

Javanese is called <u>donga</u>, derived from the Arabic $\underline{du^{c}a'}$, and consisting of Arabic formulas which are called <u>donga slamet</u> (the prayer aiming to procure safety).

Not only villages have <u>danyang</u>, but also <u>sawah</u> (the irrigated rice field), <u>pasar</u> (the market), big buildings and so on. The places which are dominated by <u>danyang</u> and cannot be inhabited or entered by people are called in Javanese <u>angker</u> meaning unapproachable.

Other innumerable spirits, good as well as evil, live in every object, in the forests, caves, wilderness, and water. Even epidemics, such as cholera, smallpox, and malaria are cosidered to be the influence of evil spirits.¹¹⁵

In order not to fall a victim to these evil spirits, most of the Javanese will remain awake till midnight. During their waking hours they read some verses of the Qur!an or ricite <u>puji-pujian</u> (the hymns of praise) praying to God that they may be spared from the affliction. Sometimes they use the written amulet which is called <u>jimat</u>, drawn from the Arabic ^Cazīmah, meaning the talisman containing a quotation from the Qur!an or another Arabic formula. The usual purpose of this <u>jimat</u> is to have everything go smoothly, and to have a peaceful life. Various protective devices are placed above the doors, for example, a <u>beruk</u> (coconut shell) filled with water, flowers, and a piece of paper inscribed with <u>rapal</u> (a phrase) in Arabic formulas. All these serve to ward off evil spirits.¹¹⁶ Hinduism and Islam have added a number of synthetic supernatural beings to the world of spirits of the Javanese. Aside from <u>danyang</u>, the Javanese believe in the <u>dewa</u> (deity) and in the <u>widadari</u> (celestial nymph) of Hinduism. Their belief in <u>jim</u>, taken from the Arabic <u>jinn</u> meaning demon, and <u>setan</u> (devil) is rooted in Islam. Accordingly, supernatural beings of various origins are incorporated into the supernatural world of the Javanese.

The religious elaboration of <u>abangan</u> includes rites of passage, spirit worship, agricultural ceremonies and curing practices, all of which are based on the belief in good and evil spirits. The central ceremony in the traditional Javanese religious system is the <u>slametan</u> (the communal feast). It is the most common religious ritual among <u>abangans</u>, and symbolizes the mystic and social unity of those participating in it.

The <u>slametan</u> and the symbols surrounding it provide a clear picture of the way in which the <u>abangan</u> beliefs, which are animistic and Hindu-Buddhistic, are blended with the Islamic element to form the central value of village society.

The <u>slametan</u> is given in almost every occasion which has ritual significance for the Javanese, such as pregnancy, birth, circumcision, marriage, death; calendrical Muslim holidays, such as <u>Lebaran</u> (^C<u>Id al-fitr</u>), <u>Muludan</u> (the Prophet's birthday), harvest ceremonies and so on. If a man wishes to celebrate or sanctify any occasion relating to his individual rite or if he wants to secure

a blessing or asking protection from calamities, the <u>slametan</u> must be given.

The main purpose of <u>slametan</u> is to seek the state of <u>slamet</u> (to be safe), in the sense of being unbothered by either natural difficulties or supernatural annoyances. In the <u>slametan</u>, the Javanese asks not for joy or an increase of wealth, but merely that nothing should happen to upset and sadden him, to impoverish or make him ill.¹¹⁷ It is also the aim of one who gives <u>slametan</u> to be without aggressive feelings toward others, or emotional disturbances.

If a man wishes to give a <u>slametan</u>, he usually holds it in the evening after sunset. He calls the male relatives and neighbours in his house. After the guests are gethered the host makes a formal speech in high style Javanese sublanguage stating the reason he is giving the feast, requests of God that the evil spirits not bother him and his family. One of his guests, who is a <u>santri</u> living in the neighbourhood, and is familiar with religious matters chants some verses of the Qur'an for a few minutes and recites <u>donga</u> in Arabic, while the assembled guests raise their had upward saying "amen" at appropriate points.

When the prayer is finished, the food is served. Incense is burned throughout the <u>slametan</u>. A few minutes after that the guests go home and take with them food, the so-called <u>berkat</u>, derived from Arabic <u>barakah</u> meaning blessing, to share with their families.¹¹⁸ This kind of <u>slametan</u> for the <u>abangans</u> symbolizes the necessity for cooperation and social cohesion.

Beside <u>slametan</u> for special occasions, every year the villagers offer to the guardian spirit a festival meal which is known as <u>sedekah bumi</u> (offering to the earth). This is celebrated in the open air under a tree or in the rice field under a tent. For this ritual banquet a buffalo is slaughtered, whose head, bones and remnants are buried on the spot.

The modernist movement is strongly against the un-Islamic offering and <u>slametan</u> for two reasons. First, it opposes the pronouncement of the <u>donga</u> by the <u>kiyai</u> or the <u>santri</u>, since this prayer endangers the recognition of the One God. Praying to God must be done directly without intermediaries. Making a <u>wali</u> or the head of mystical order a mediator endangers the principle of <u>tauchid</u> (<u>tawhid</u>, the unity of God). Modernists consider that the <u>donga</u> can be best recited after obligatory prayers and not in the <u>slametan</u>. Second, the slametan is a burden to the person or family. In order to finance such an expensive ceremony, a person has to sacrifice his budget sometimes they fall into the hand of the usurer.¹¹⁹

Worshipping the souls of the dead, especially the souls of ancestors or of the original founder of the village, the so-called <u>cakal bakal</u>, plays an important religious role among the <u>abangans</u>. Of the same importance is the veneration of sacred graves known as kramat, derived from Arabic karamah meaning to be noble.

There are many sacred burial places in Java which are considered to be <u>kramat</u>. The most famous ones are the tombs of the <u>walis</u>. Thousands of people from all parts of the island come to visit these tombs in order to obtain blessings.¹²⁰

The general ceremony for the dead usually takes place in the eight month of <u>Hijrah</u>, which the Javanese call <u>Ruwah</u>, taken from Arabic word <u>arwah</u>, the plural form of <u>ruh</u> meaning soul. The veneration of the dead is expressed by cleansing the grave and in part by a ritual meal which is considered by the Javanese to be either an offering to or an offering for the soul of the dead.

Another object for which the <u>abangan</u> has much respect is the <u>keris</u> (Javanese dagger). Javanese stories are full of accounts about sacred and miraculous <u>kerisses</u>. These weapons occupy a preeminent place among the regalia of a prince, as well as among the <u>pusakas</u> (sacred heirlooms) which are handed down from generation to generation. Though the <u>keris</u> originally belonged to the equipment of a Javanese warrior, it is now only a ceremonial part of the costume. It is worn especially by numerous personnel of the court.

According to <u>abangan</u> belief, the <u>keris</u> possesses a special power which could be transferred to the person who either holds or wears it, and there are <u>kerisses</u> which can bring good fortune.

When the <u>keris</u> maker, the <u>empu</u>, is going to make a <u>keris</u>, he has not only to choose a propitious time to begin, but he must also go through a period of strict abstinence and meditation. He must fast for a certain numbers of days, and for a certain number of weeks he must also not touch meat or fish or certain other food stuffs. In order to win divine benevolence he must subdue and abstain from all desires of the flesh. This way is the <u>tapa</u> which is a combination of fasting, abstinence, meditation and concentration.¹²¹

The Javanese, particularly the <u>abangans</u>, believe in the ability of the <u>dukun</u>, the one who is able to control the spirits and make them instruments of a person's wishes and desires. Some of the conservative <u>santris</u> seemingly also still acknowledge the capacity of the dukun.

To acquire such means of controlling the spirits the Javanese pursue the <u>ngelmu</u> (knowledge or science of getting into communication with the spirits).¹²² With the <u>ngelmu</u> the <u>abangans</u> hope to attain power, riches and greatness, and also to gain vengeance by bringing misfortune on the one who has harmed him. The <u>ngelmu</u> is also used to assure his salvation in the next world or hereafter.

Actually, the <u>ngelmu</u> consists of a queer mixture of various elements of philosophical and theological theses and definitions, formulas, incantations, and exorcism. The words and expressions

used in the <u>ngelmu</u> have a wide variety of derivations, including Hindi, Javanese and Arabic.

Special mention should be made here of the fact that the conservative <u>santris</u> are somewhat more flexible about <u>abangan</u> rituals than the modernist <u>santris</u>, though their flexibility does not indicate a great tolerance. They also attack the "infidel" practices of non-Muslims. Among the conservative <u>santris</u>, the <u>slametan</u> goes on but is somewhat simplified for the sake of economy, and the Islamic elements are accentuated at the expense of the non-Islamic. Apparently, among the modern <u>santris</u>, the <u>slametans</u> often disappear almost completely.¹²³

It is clear from the preceding paragraphs that the religious beliefs of <u>abangan</u>, in contrast to the <u>santri</u>, were the outcome of a centuries-long synthesis of animistic, Hindu-Buddhist and Islamic beliefs. These beliefs are mainly based on the conception of cosmic and social orders determined in all their aspects.¹²⁴

The <u>abangan</u> world outlook is based on the conviction of the essential unity of all life and all existence. It views human existence within a cosmological context, and the individual human being plays a very small part in a total social-natural world.¹²⁵

According to the Javanese conviction, the principle points of human life are already fixed because they are part of a general order of nature. The order of social life and social prescriptions

are conceived by the <u>abangan</u> to flow directly from metaphysical necessity. Therefore human society is carefully regulated to harmonize with that general order and to be in a state of innerharmony itself.

Various rules operate to harmonize human society within itself and with the general order of the universe. The rules of <u>tatakrama</u> (the Javanese etiquette) regulate interpersonal behaviour. The rules of <u>adat</u> (the customary law) regulate the inner-harmony of society. The religious rules and practices regulate the relationship to supernature. The moral rules, which emphasize <u>narima</u> (acceptance), <u>sabar</u> (patience), <u>eling-waspada</u> (cautious and ready) and <u>andap-asor</u> (modesty) regulate human drives and emotions.¹²⁶ The unconditional submission to the precise system of social and religious rules and etiquette causes a person to "be human".

There is an internal coherence between macrocosmos and microcosmos, between the universe and man. Man participates in universal life, and his participation is demonstrated in various actions and in different ways.¹²⁷ From this philosophical view point, the Javanese emphasize inner-tranquillity, harmony and stability, the acceptance of events as they come, and subordination of the individual to society and of society to the universe.

Accordingly, men should be in quiet equilibrium with the universe. The real dimensions of life are to be found in <u>ngelmu</u> and

in the experience of a relationship to God. Life on earth, as the Javanese generally believe, has already been charted and is laid down in all the rules of etiquette, tradition or <u>adat</u>, of religion and morals. Thus worldly conditions are clear and fixed; and the unworldly condition, the reality behind the reality, forms the interesting field of endeavour which the Javanese call the domain of <u>kebatinan</u> (the inner-life of man).¹²⁸

The general doctrinal differences between <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> can be seen in various aspects. Among the <u>santris</u> the concern with the doctrine of Islam almost entirely overshadows the ritualistic aspects. For the <u>santris</u> the importance rests not only on the knowledge of ritual details, especially the daily prayers, fasting, alms and so on, but also on the application of Islamic doctrine to life.

The self-consciousness of religious superiority of the <u>santris</u> to the <u>abangans</u> is based on the strong belief and faith in the absolute truth of Islam, and it is maked by their intolerence of the <u>abangan</u> beliefs and practices which they consider to be heterodox. The <u>santris</u> also insist that they are true Muslims, and their commitment to Islam dominates most of their lives. It is embodied and easily recognized through the practice of the <u>shari^ca</u>.

Strictly speaking, the <u>santris</u> are more concerned with doctrine than with ritual, while <u>abangans</u> place stress on ritual details. They are tolerant of various religious beliefs, holding

that "many are the ways and the truth is one". 129

In the matter of social organization, there are different concepts of the social unit between <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>. For the <u>abangan</u>, the basic social unit to which all ritual refers is the household, members of a family. It is the household which gives the <u>slametan</u>, and it is the heads of other households who come to attend it.

The communal ceremony or super-household ritual, for example <u>bersih desa</u> (cleaning of the village), is considered a compound of separate <u>slametan</u> contributions from each of the village's household rather than a ritual of the village as a whole.

Actually, there is no organic religious community among the <u>abangans</u>. There is nothing in <u>abangan</u> religious life which can be called a religious organization. Their harmony of religious activities rests on their sharing a single tradition. For the <u>santri</u>, on the other hand, the sense of community or <u>ummah</u> is of primary importance. Islam is seen by the <u>santri</u> as a set of social circles ranging from individual <u>santri</u> to a great society of the equal believers and the whole of the Islamic world. The sense of equality and of belonging to the <u>ummah</u> is based on the Islamic pillars, beliefs and practices.¹³⁰

In contrast to the <u>abangan</u> ritual pattern around <u>slametan</u>, the santri ritual life is regulated in time by the fixed five prayers repeated day after day in the same form. It is performed either at home, in langgar (prayer house) or in mesjid (the mosque).

Fidelity and piety in performing the daily prayers and the Friday prayer is limited to the <u>santris</u>. The <u>abangans</u> almost never perform the five prayers and the Friday prayer. In other words, performance of the obligatory prayers distinguishes the pious Muslim individual as well as the group adhering to the prescribed rules of Islam. Any other old religious beliefs and practices could not find any acceptance in it, nor is there any degree of mixture of the two.¹³¹ Strictly speaking, the <u>santri</u> ritual pattern draws a line between in-group and out-group, between <u>ummah</u> and non-<u>ummah</u>, that is between <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>. Participation in this ritual pattern shows a sense of belonging to the Muslim community, that is the <u>santri</u> community.

Primary and elementary training in religion for the <u>santri</u> family is first given within the family circle for the first ten years of a child's life. Often the child visits a teacher who uses his house or <u>langgar</u> as a school. The aim is primarily to learn to read and recite the Qur'ān. Besides learning the Qur'ānic recitation the pupils are also given instruction in prayers. Some theological questions are also studied concerning <u>imān</u> (faith) and <u>tawhid</u> (theology). Those pupils who want advanced studies go to a <u>pesantren</u>.

In a traditional <u>pesantren</u>, the <u>santri</u> lives together with his <u>kiyai</u>, who gives him food and clothes while initiating him into the secret teachings. In return, the <u>santri</u> obeys the <u>kiyai</u> unconditionally and <u>serves</u> him by helping to work his land or performing any other task he may impose.

The <u>pesantren</u> was, in its early times, the best traditional religious institution to prepare youths emerging into society. In its location, routine, spirit, and institutional structure, the santri provided the ideals framework for preparation.

Usually, a <u>pesantren</u> is situated outside the larger community, either at the outskirts of a village or in the remoter countryside. This physical isolation symbolically represents the real withdrawal of the <u>santri</u> from society. Since many of the <u>pesantrens</u> are economically self-contained units in which <u>santris</u> live from the products of <u>pesantren</u> land, the sense of isolation is compounded by a strong consciousness of communal autonomy. Furthermore, the austere routine of work in the fields, prayer and study contributes to building up a special atmosphere and spirit which has an impact on the <u>santri</u> and sharply distinguishes the <u>pesantren</u> from its surroundings. Something striking in the <u>santri</u>'s character is the personal quality of simplicity, cooperativeness, solidarity, and selfless sincerity.¹³²

Simplicity is an expression of the inner sense of santri

withdrawal from the ties and hierarchies of Javanese society which are much influenced by court culture. The concept of sincere devotion without calculation of profit and loss, which is the so-called <u>keikhlasan</u>, is expressed in the relationship among <u>santris</u> themleves, and particularly between the <u>santris</u> and their <u>kiyai</u>.

Respect shown to the <u>kiyai</u> constitutes an obligation for every individual. Perhaps the position of the <u>kiyai</u> is a continuation of that enjoyed by the <u>guru</u> (teacher) in Hindu Java, or a remnant of respect for the <u>dukun</u>, the man who was able to control a powerful spirit which enable him to perform miraculous acts in the animistic period. A <u>kiyai</u>'s words are in general indisputable. He is followed often without any thought and his <u>fatwa</u> (legal opinion) is considered final.¹³³

What could be called a class in <u>pesantren</u> is merely a group of pupils, sitting around the <u>kiyai</u>, who receive instruction in a particular discipline. Here they usually start by learning Arabic and <u>fiqh</u>. In the <u>pesantren</u> the <u>kiyai</u> usually reads and translates certain portions of books to the <u>santris</u> and comments on what he reads. A <u>santri's</u> progress depends solely upon his devotion and industry. It takes him five to ten years to gain sufficient result from this traditional method. Many of the <u>santris</u> drop out because of the hardships and difficulties involved during these

long years.

Usually after the students finish their training, they open a new <u>pesantren</u>. Many <u>pesantrens</u> in Java, especially in the eastern part of the island, are connected with each other through the blood relationship of the <u>kiyai</u>.

FOOTNOTES

¹J. Wach, <u>Sociology of Religion</u> (12th impression; Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 56.

> ²<u>Ibid</u>. ³<u>Ibid</u>., p. 57.

⁴B.R. Scharf, <u>The Sociological Study of Religion</u>, First Harper Torchbook Edition (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 40.

⁵Wach, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 207-211.

⁶Mojokuto is the fictitious name for the city of Pare in east central Java wherein Clifford Geertz pursued his field work during May 1953 to September 1954.

⁷C. Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u>, First Free Press Paperback Edition (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 6.

⁸D.H. Burger, <u>Structural Changes in Javanese Society</u>: <u>The Supra-Village Sphere</u>, trans. by Leslie H. Palmier. Translation serie (Ithaca, New York: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1956), p. 12.

⁹D.H. Burger, <u>Structural Changes in Javanese Society</u>: <u>The Village Sphere</u>, trans. by Leslie H. Palmier. Translation series (Ithaca, New York: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1957), p. 8.

¹⁰Soejatno, "Revolution and Social Tensions in Surakarta 1945-1950", <u>Indonesia</u>, no. 17 (April 1974), p. 79.

¹¹R.M. Koentjaraningrat, "Pembitjaraan Buku Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java" (Book Review of Clifford Geertz's The Religion of Java), <u>Madjalah Ilmu-Ilmu Sastra Indonesia</u> (Magazine of Indonesian Social Sciences), I, no. 2, September, 1963, pp. 188-198.

See also his essay "The Javanese of South Central Java", <u>Social</u> <u>Structure in Southeast Asia</u>, ed. by George Peter Mudock, Viking Fund Publication in Anthropology (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960), p. 92. Further study on the Javanese kinship structure and behaviour see his discussion in <u>A Preliminary Description of the Javanese</u> <u>Kinship System</u>, Cultural report serie (New Haven: Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1957); cf. Clifford Geertz, <u>Peddlers and</u> <u>Princes, Social Change and Economic Modernization in Two Indonesian</u> <u>Towns</u> (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1963).

¹²R. Van Niel, <u>The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite</u> (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1960), pp. 15-16.

¹³Koentjaraningrat, "The Javanese South Central Java", pp. 89-91.

14<u>Ibid</u>., p. 92.

¹⁵C. Geertz, "Religious Belief and Economic Behavior in Central Javanese Town: Some Preliminary Consideration", <u>Economic Development</u> <u>and Cultural Change</u> (Massachusetts, 1956), p. 7.

¹⁶Koentjaraningrat, "The Javanese South Central Java", p. 91.

¹⁷C.C. Berg, "Indonesia", <u>Whither Islam</u>, ed. by H.A.R. Gibb (London: Victor Gollanca Ltd., 1932), p. 257.

¹⁸M. Chaturvedi and B.N. Tiwari, <u>A Practical Hindi-English</u> <u>Dictionary</u> (Delhi: Rashtra Printers, 1970), p. 627.

¹⁹H.W. Bachtiar, "The Religion of Java: A Commentary", <u>Indonesian Journal of Cultural Studies</u>, V, no. 1 (January 1973), p. 109.

²⁰<u>Abdi dalem pametakan</u> literally means the white slave of the residence of aristocratic family. <u>Abdi</u> is derived from ^C<u>abd</u> (slave), <u>dalem</u> means feudal aristocratic residence, <u>pametakan</u>, drawn from the root <u>petak</u>, means white.

²¹H.J. De Graaf, "Southeast Asian Islam to the eighteenth Century", <u>The Cambridge History of Islam</u>, ed. by P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lambton and Bernard Lewis, II (Cambridge: University Press, 1970), pp. 132, 152; see also Soedjito Sosrodihardjo, "Religious Life in Java", <u>Indonesian Descriptive Sociology and Adat Law</u> (Jogyakarta: Yayasan Pembina Hukum Adat, 1963), p. 21. Further discussion on <u>desa perdikan see Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië</u>, the article on "Desa's (Vrije)", I ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff and Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1917).

²²R.R. Jay, <u>Santri and Abangan, Religious Schism in Rural</u> <u>Central Java</u>, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1957, p. 160.

²³R.A. Kern, "Pesantren", <u>Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam</u>, ed. by H.A.R. Gibb and J.H. Kramers (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961), pp. 460-462; see also Abubakar, "Sedjarah Pesantren, Pengadjaran Dalam Pesantren" (History of Pesantren, Education in Pesantren), <u>Sedjarah</u> <u>Hidup K.H.A. Wachid Hasjim</u> (The Biography of K.H.A. Wachid Hasjim) (Jakarta: Visser & Co., 1957) chs. 12 and 13, pp. 43-52; Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u>, ch. 14.

²⁴W.F. Wertheim, <u>Effect of Western Civilization on Indonesian</u> <u>Society</u> (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relation, 1950), p. 52.

²⁵According to a pronouncement of an Indonesian government spokesman 90,05% of the Indonesian population is regarded as Muslim, 3,43% as Protestant, 1,21% as Roman Catholic, 2,14% as Hindu, 1,8% as animist, and 0,47% as professing other religions. See <u>Indonesian</u> <u>Observer</u> (Jakarta: May 26, 1959).

²⁶Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u>, p. 127.
²⁷Burger, <u>The Supra-Village Sphere</u>, p. 22

²⁸Koentjaraningrat, "The Javanese South Central Java", pp. 91-92.

²⁹B.H.M. Vlekke, <u>Nusantara</u> (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1959), p. 150.

³⁰Koentjaraningrat, "Pembitjaraan Buku Clifford Geertz", pp. 188-191.

³¹J.D. Legge, <u>Indonesia</u>, ed. by Robin W. Winks (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 52; see also H.W. Bachtiar, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 88-90.

³²R.R. McVey, "Nationalism, Islam and Marxism: The Management of Ideological Conflict", being an introduction to <u>Nationalism</u>, <u>Islam and Marxism</u> by Sukarno, trans. by Karel H. Warouw and Peter D. Weldon (Ithaca, New York: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1970), pp. 14-15.

³³Koentjaraningrat, "The Javanese South Central Java", p. 92.

³⁴B.J. Boland, <u>The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia</u> (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 4-5 quoting <u>Mengapa Aku</u> <u>Tetap Memeluk Agama Islam</u> (Why I Still Adhere to Islam) by H.M. Rasjidi (Jakarta, 1968), pp. 10-11.

³⁵Koentjaraningrat, "Ahli Asing Tentang Indonesia" (Foreign Expert on Indonesia), <u>Berita Antropologi</u> (Anthropological News), ed. by Faculty of Arts, University of Indonesia (October, 1973), 5th year, no. 12, p. 8.

³⁶Boland, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 4.

37 Ibid.

³⁸Koentjaraningrat, "Ahli Asing Tentang Indonesia", pp. 5-6.
³⁹Bachtiar, "The Religion of Java: A Commentary", pp. 90-92.
⁴⁰Boland, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 5-6.

⁴¹G.W.J. Drewes, "Indonesia: Mysticism and Activism", <u>Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization</u>, ed. by G.E. von Grunebaum (4th ed.; Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 299-300.

⁴²Berg, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 253.
⁴³Legge, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 54.
⁴⁴Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u>, pp. 149-150.

⁴⁵Further detail on the Javanese sublanguage structure consult Koentjaraningrat, "Social Levels in the Javanese Language", <u>A Preliminary Description</u>, pp. 14-18.

⁴⁶Selosoemardjan, <u>Social Changes in Jogjakarta</u> (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 132.

⁴⁷Koentjaraningrat, <u>A Preliminary Description</u>, p. 14.
⁴⁸Selosoemardjan, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 132.
⁴⁹Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u>, p. 232.
⁵⁰Selosoemardjan, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 134.

⁵¹C. Du Bois, <u>Social Forces in Southeast Asia</u> (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 18.

⁵²R.R. Di Meglio, "Arab Trade with Indonesia and Malay Peninsula from the 16th to 18th Century", <u>Islam and the Trade</u> <u>of Asia</u>, ed. by D.S. Richards (Bruno Cassirer Oxford and University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), p. 116.

⁵³<u>Ibid</u>., p. 117.

⁵⁴<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 117-118; see also Charles A. Fisher, <u>South-East</u> <u>Asia, a Social, Economic and Political Geography</u> (London: Methuen, 1964), pp. 92, 249-251. ⁵⁵Vlekke, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 66-67; see also T.W. Arnold, <u>The Preaching of Islam</u> (Kashmiri Bazar - Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1968), p. 371.

⁵⁶Vlekke, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 67.

⁵⁷HoeseinDjajadiningrat, "Islam in Indonesia", <u>Islam the</u> <u>Straight Path</u>, ed. by Kenneth W. Morgen (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1958), p. 376.

⁵⁸B.J.O. Schrieke, <u>Het Boek van Bonang</u> (The book of Bonang), Ph. D. dissertation, Rijksuniversiteit, Leiden (Utrecht, 1916), p. 28; see also S.Q Fatimi, <u>Islam Comes to Malaysia</u> (Singapore: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute Ltd., 1963), p. 88.

⁵⁹Schrieke, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 28.

⁶⁰<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 28-29; see also Arnold, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 383; Kraemer, <u>Agama Islam</u> (Islamic Religion) (Jakarta: Badan Penerbit Kristen, 1952), p. 119.

⁶¹M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofsz, <u>Asian Trade and European Influence</u> in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 105.

⁶²<u>Ibid</u>, pp. 107-108.

⁶³C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze, "The Legacy of Islam in Indonesia", <u>The Muslim World</u>, LIX (1969), p. 215.

⁶⁴Vlekke, op. cit., 83.

65 Geertz, The Religion of Java, p. 6

⁶⁶Legge, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 47.

⁶⁷J.C. van Leur, <u>Indonesian Trade and Society</u> (The Hague -Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1955), p. 113.

68 Ibid.

⁶⁹Van Niel, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 277.

⁷⁰W.F. Wertheim, <u>Indonesian Society in Transition</u> (The Hague -Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1956), p. 196.

⁷¹C. Geertz, <u>The Development of Javanese Economy, a Socio-</u> <u>Cultural Approach</u> (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1956). p. 93.

⁷²B.J.O. Schrieke, <u>Indonesian Sociological Studies</u>, II (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1957), p. 237.

⁷³Drewes, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 299.

⁷⁴Kraemer, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 263-265.

⁷⁵<u>Ibid</u>.; see also A.M. Brouwer, "De Bronnen van Salatiga", <u>Het Gemeenebest</u>, IX (1949), pp. 322-336; Jay, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 167, Drewes, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 288.

⁷⁶Schrieke, <u>Sociological Studies</u>, p. 233.

⁷⁷<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 235.
⁷⁸<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 236.
⁷⁹Wertheim, <u>Transition</u>, p. 198.
⁸⁰Schrieke, <u>Sociological Studies</u>, p. 238.
⁸¹<u>Ibid</u>., p. 239.

⁸²The <u>Babad Tanah Djawi</u> is well-known as the Javanese historical chronicle and historical literature. It was composed during the period of Mataram kingdom in the beginning of seventeenth century. Sultan Agung's court-poets composed the <u>Babad tanah Djawi</u> which was meant to replace the old historical narrative of Java and served to adapt the records of the past to the requirements of the present. It was revised and enlarged several times during seventeenth and eighteenth century. It has been edited by J.J. Meinsma in two volumes for the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal, Land en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch Indië in 1874-1877. It has been reprinted with additional notes by W.L. Olthoff in 1941. ⁸³Di Meglio, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 119.

⁸⁴Abubakar, <u>Pengantar Sedjarah Sufi dan Tasawwuf</u> (Introduction to the History of Sufi and Tasawwuf) (Bandung: Penerbit Cerdas, 1962), p. 302.

⁸⁵<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 299-304; see also De Graaf, <u>Geschiedenis van</u> <u>Indonesië</u> (History of Indonesia) ('s-Gravenhage - Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1949), pp. 80-90; Mukti Ali, <u>The Spread of Islam in Indonesia</u> (Jogyakarta, 1970), pp. 15-16.

⁸⁶De Graaf, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 81.

⁸⁷Drewes, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 298.

⁸⁸The exact date of Majapahit's fall is obscure. The <u>Encyclo-paedia van Nederlandsch-Indie</u> maintains that the date of 1478 is the time of the fall of Majapahit, and about 1525 is the date of its last remnants. Cf. Van Niel, "The course of Indonesian History", <u>Indonesia</u>, ed. by Ruth T. McVey (New Haven, 1963), p. 276; Schrieke, <u>Sociological Studies</u>, p. 289.

⁸⁹Cf. Schrieke, <u>Sociological Studies</u>, pp. 12-15, 274-275.

⁹⁰Jay, <u>op. cit</u>., pp. 167-168.

⁹¹R.R. Jay, "History and Personal Experience, Religious and Political Conflict in Java", <u>Religion and Change in Contemporary</u> <u>Asia</u>, ed. by Robert F. Spencer (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), p. 147.

⁹²Vlekke, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 97.
⁹³Meilink-Roelofsz, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 113.
⁹⁴<u>Ibid</u>.
⁹⁵Geertz, <u>Javanese Economy</u>, p. 100
⁹⁶Van Niel, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 277.

⁹⁷C. Geertz, "The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker", <u>Comparative Studies in Society and History</u>, II, no. 2 (January 1960), p. 232.

98 Sosrodihardjo, op. cit., p. 18.

⁹⁹K.P. Landon, <u>Southeast Asia Crossroad of Religion</u> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 136.

¹⁰⁰M. Junus, <u>Sedjarah Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia</u> (History of Islamic Education in Indonesia) (Jakarta: Pustaka Mahmudiah, 1960), pp. 190-191.

101 Schrieke, <u>Sociological Studies</u>, p. 237.

102 Sosrodihardjo, op. cit., p. 19.

103_{Berg}, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 253.

¹⁰⁴Jay, <u>Santri and Abangan</u>, pp. 176-177.

¹⁰⁵W.L. Olthoff, ed. <u>Babad Tanah Djawi</u> (History of the Island of Java) (The Hague: M. Nijhoff - 's-Gravenhage, 1941), p. 7.

¹⁰⁶Soebardi, "Santri Religious Elements as Reflected in the Book of Tjentini", <u>Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde</u>, vol. 127 (1971), pp. 348-349.

107C.S. Hurgronje, Mekka in the Latter Part of the 19th Century
(Leyden: E.J. Brill Ltd., 1931), pp. 249-254; see also Drewes, op. cit.
p. 291; J. Vredenbregt, "The Haadj, Some of Its Feature and Functions
in Indonesia", <u>Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde</u>, vol.
118 (1962), pp. 91-152.

¹⁰⁸H.J. Benda, <u>The Crescent and the Rising Sun</u> (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1958), p. 45.

¹⁰⁹A. Cabaton, <u>Java, Sumatra and the Other Islands of the Dutch</u> <u>East Indies</u>, trans. by Bernard Miall (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1911), p. 137.

¹¹⁰H. Hadiwijono, <u>Man in the Present Javanese Mysticism.</u>
Ph. D. dissertation Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam (Baarn: Bosch & Keuning N.V., 1967), p. 5.

¹¹¹Further study on religious belief and ecclesiastical organization in fourteenth century of Majapahit consult T.G.Th. Pigeaud, <u>Java in the 14th Century. A Study in Cultural History</u>, in <u>Koninklijk</u> <u>Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde</u>. Translation series 4,4, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 479-493.

112 Van Niel, "Indonesian History", pp. 272-273.

113 Jay, <u>Santri and Abangan</u>, pp. 176-177; see also H.J. Benda, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 9.

¹¹⁴R. Supatmo, <u>Animistic Beliefs and Religious Practice</u>, trans. by The East Indie Institute for the Naval School for Military Government Administration, Colombia University, New York, 1944, pp. 1-2.

115<u>Ibid</u>., p, 1, 5.
116<u>Ibid</u>., p. 5.
117_{Geertz}, "Religious Belief", pp. 7-10.
118<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 8-9.

¹¹⁹H. Shadily, <u>A Preliminary Study on the Impact of Islam on</u> <u>a Community and Its Culture in Indonesia</u>, unpublished M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1955, p. 103.

120 The Javanese people usually come to visit the tombs on every Friday, particularly in the month of <u>Ruwah</u> (<u>Sha^cban</u>, eight month of Hijrah).

¹²¹Supatmo, <u>op. cit</u>., pp. 12-13.

¹²²Further study on the <u>dukun</u> and the <u>ngelmu</u> consult Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java, pp. 86-111;</u> Supatmo, op. cit., pp. 1-5.

¹²³Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u>, pp. 153-154.
¹²⁴Geertz, "Religious Belief", p. 7.
¹²⁵Drewes, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 228.

¹²⁶J.A. Niels Mulder, "Aliran Kebatinan as an Expression of the Javanese Worldview", <u>Journal of Southeast Asian Studies</u>, I, no. 2. (September 1970), p. 105.

<u>Aliran Kebatinan</u> is literally translated as "current of inwardness". It is the term to name the Javanese mysticism conducting the inner life of man, and the aim of which is to achieve peaceful life or perfection of life by doing one's utmost to obtain noble character.

127 Drewes, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 288. 128_{Mulder}, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 105. 129_{Geertz}, <u>The Religion of Java</u>, p. 128. 130<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 128-129. 131_{Shadily}, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 76.

¹³²S. Asjari, <u>Kedudukan Kyai Dalam Pondok Pesantren</u> (The Position of Kyai in Pondok Pesantren), unpublished M.A. thesis University of Gajah Mada, 1967, pp. 84, 102-105; see also B.R.O'G. Anderson, <u>Java in a Time of Revolution, Occupation and Resistance</u> <u>1944-1946</u> (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 5-6.

133D. Noer, <u>The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia</u> <u>1900-1942</u> (London and New York: Singapore, Kuala Lumpur Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 15-16.

CHAPTER II

SANTRI AND ABANGAN: SOCIO-POLITICAL POWERS

1. Santri and the Birth of Muslim Political Parties

In discussing <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> as socio-political powers in contemporary Indonesia, particularly in Java, one should glance at the last period of the Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia which was marked by a rapid growth of political self-consciousness as the result of social and economic changes, the impact of Westernstyle education,¹ and the ideas of reformist Islam from Egypt.²

It was a time when new ideas were introduced and adopted, the native traditions were changing or defending themselves in a new way, and the spread of different styles of thought was stimulated by the growth of native mass media. This period was the socalled the <u>masa kebangkitan nasional</u> (period of national awakening) beginning at the turn of the century.

The consequence of this situation was the emergence of modern style political associations and the rise of self-conscious political thinkers. This was the period of the birth of <u>Budi Utomo</u> (Noble Endeavour) in 1908, <u>Sarekat Islam</u> (Islamic Association) in 1911, <u>Muhammadiyah</u> in 1912, <u>Partai Komunis Indonesia</u> (Indonesian Communist Party) in 1914, <u>Taman Siswa</u> (Garden of Pupil) in 1922,

<u>Nahdatul Ulama</u> (Renaissance of ^C<u>Ulamā</u>') in 1926 and <u>Partai Nasional</u> Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party) in 1927.

It was also, of course, the time of the emergence of the leaders of these organizations such as Dr. Tjipto Mangunkusumo, H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, H. Agus Salim, Sutan Sjahrir, Tan Malaka, Ki Hajar Dewantoro, Ir. Sukarno, Dr. Mohammad Hatta, Mohammad Natsir, K.H. Wachid Hasjim, Mohammad Roem and others.³

The consequence of the development of the national awakening was, then, crystalization of latent differences in political and philosophical outlook and initiation of a period of ideological debate and conflict.

In the 1920's the main political antagonism was between Islam and Communism, and in the 1930's the polemic was between Islam and secular nationalism.⁴ Throughout there was political divergence between <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> from which the members of different political associations were recruited. The political contrast of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> had occasionally erupted in violence and persecusion.⁵

The political significance of <u>santri</u> stems basically from the fact that in Islam the border line between religion and politics is very thin. Islam is a religion as well as way of life.⁶ Historical evidence has proved that Islam and politics had become entangled with each other during the process of Islamization of Java.⁷ It has been mentioned in the foregoing chapter that <u>kiyai</u> and ^c<u>ulamā</u>' constituted from the very beginning the core of <u>santri</u> civilization. It became a distinct social element in the Javanese society. It had strong influence upon religious, social and political life in Java, and all over Indonesia. Furthermore, "the history of Indonesian Islam is the history of this expanding <u>santri</u> civilization" says H.J. Benda "and its impact upon the religious, social and political life in Indonesia".⁸ As a result of the dominance of Islam in Java, then, the <u>kiyai</u> and ^c<u>ulama</u>' came to play an increasingly important political role in rural Java, not only numerically but psychologically and ideologically.⁹

During the Dutch colonial period the foremost exponents of the spiritual authority of <u>santri</u> were the <u>kiyai</u> and ^c<u>ulamā</u>, who refused to become tools of the princely authority or of the Dutch colonial ruler. They were the opponents of the secular government and were regarded by the secular authority as trouble-makers.¹⁰

Against the background of intensified religious emphasis among the populace, a major influence on the national awakening was the unifying force of religion. Islam, in this case, was the one unifying factor among the Javanese, and among Indonesians in general. It divided the foreign ruler from the native ruled and in so doing provided an emotional basis for nationalism.

This situation was the most strikingly evident in times before independence. Islam increasingly became a symbol of Indonesian

nationalism. The union of religion and nationalism was sustained by the establishment of Islam as a mark of differentiation between the indigenous population and the foreign ruler. 11

It must be added to this religious factor that the economic domination, racial superiority and political control by the Dutch intensified the series of grievances in the dual society under a colonial regime.¹²

Apropos of the political role of Islam in Indonesia, G. McT. Kahin says:

> One of the most important factors contributing to the growth of an integrated nationalism was the high degree of religious homogeneity that prevailed in Indonesia, over 90 per cent of the population being Mohammedan The Mohammedan religion was not just a common bond; it was, indeed, a sort of in-group symbol as against an alien intruder and oppressor of a different religion.¹³

Thus, for many Indonesian, Islam had become the symbol of the resistance to colonialism and the majority of Indonesians found Islam a unifying force.¹⁴ It meant that the core of the Islamic community, the <u>kiyais</u>, ^c<u>ulamā</u>' and the <u>santris</u>, assumed an increasingly important political role.

The <u>santris</u> took pride in the fact that the first modern, national movement organized in Indonesia at the turn of the century was spearheaded by the <u>Sarekat Islam</u> (Islamic Association) under the leadership of Haji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto. It was initially organized to act as a counter-weight to Chinese economic power by strengthening the economic position of the rising Javanese middle class which consisted mostly of <u>santris</u> or those with <u>santri</u> leanings.¹⁵ It arose from its forerunner the <u>Sarekat Dagang Islam</u> (Muslim Trading Association) founded in 1911 by Haji Samanhudi, a great Javanese merchant and <u>batik</u> (traditional Javanese textile) manufacturer in Surakarta.¹⁶

The <u>Sarekat Islam</u> stood in the vanguard of the movement against Dutch colonialism and in a short period became very successful in rallying the people under the banner of Islam. To most Indonesian Muslims, Islam was not only a matter of religious conviction, but also of nationality, the element that bound all Indonesians together particularly in relation to the colonial power in the country.¹⁷

Unity in the <u>Sarekat Islam</u> rested on its Islamic ideology, as specified by its constitution, that only Indonesian Muslim could be accepted and that the <u>pangreh praja</u> (native civil servants) as far as possible were to be barred from membership. The Association's goal and its Islamic ideology were expressed in its guide lines as follows:

Keeping in mind the regulations of Islam;

- a. to promote the interest of the native population in agriculture, trade, industry, health and education, for which the members would establish co-operative associations or commercial companies, and schools.
- b. to advance living standards according to the rule of Islam and wipe out false conceptions concerning Islam,

and to promote religious life among the native population.

c. to develop a feeling of brotherhood and mutual assistance among members.¹⁸

The <u>Sarekat Islam</u> in screening from membership non-Indonesians and <u>pangreh praja</u>, and in defending its ideological opposition to European intrusion and Javanese <u>adat</u>, had consequently shaped bulwarks against the <u>abangan</u>.¹⁹

The main support of the developing <u>Sarekat Islam</u> lay, then, in the middle class of larger urban centers and members of labour organizations. The latter, in common with the labour-oriented organizations of the proletariat everywhere, quickly turned out to be strongly secularist.²⁰

In 1915 a small number of young Indonesian members of a radical socialist organization infiltrated the <u>Sarekat Islam</u>. In order to gain control of its leadership, they worked within the labour organization in the <u>Sarekat Islam</u> and began to attack the Islamic leaders of this organization by raising the issue of the inclination of the <u>Sarekat Islam</u> leaders to bourgeois capitalism and antisocialism. Among those who launched an attach were Semaun, later to become the leader of the <u>Partai Komunis Indonesia</u> (Indonesian Communist Party) until its break up in 1926, Darsono and Tan Malaka.²¹

The increasingly bitter struggle of the left wing came to a peak in the <u>Sarekat Islam</u> party congress of October 1921. During this party congress H. Agus Salim introduced a motion backed by

Abdul Muis calling for party discipline and requiring that no member of the <u>Sarekat Islam</u> could at the same time hold membership in any other party.²²

The <u>Sarekat Islam</u> was, then, cut almost in half, and the dissident branch was at first called the <u>Sarekat Islam Merah</u> (Red Muslim Association) and later called the <u>Sarekat Rakyat</u> (People's Association). Shortly after the dissidence, the <u>Sarekat Rakyat</u> was absorbed within the Communist Party organization, the origin of which will be discussed in the following section.

It is clear that from the very beginning the religious association of the <u>Sarekat Islam</u> found itself in bitter competition with Communist influence, the strongest ideological foe of the <u>santris</u>.

It should be taken into account that a cultural association the so-called <u>Budi Utomo</u>, which was founded in 1908, and which originally called for the development of traditional and Western education among the Javanese peoples - was steadily drawn into the political issue and finally became active in the political arena. However, the more successful organization was the association of young Indonesian intellectuals of the so-called Study Club, in which were discussed contemporary problems under the leadership of Sukarno and Sutomo. It emerged as a nucleus for the development of nationalist feeling and political consciousness. The Study Club broadened, eventually, into a mass political organization, and on June 4, 1927 the <u>Partai National Indonesia</u> (Indonesian Nationalist Party) was established by the members of the Bandung Study Club under the chairmanship of Sukarno. This party, which obtained mass support especially at the expense of the Communists' collapse in 1926, rejected both Islam and Communism as ideological standards, and emphasized nationalism.²³

By the end of the 1920's, the basic differences had been publicly defined between the nationalist party with main support from the <u>abangans</u> and the <u>Sarekat Islam</u> from the <u>santris</u>. It is true that among the supporters of the nationalist party were found a few Christians, but the majority were the <u>abangans</u> or <u>Islam statis-</u> <u>tik</u>, who regarded Islam primarily as a religion, in the sense of a personal religious concern, and not as an ideological system to be put into practice in the area of government or politics. On the contrary, Islam for the <u>santris</u> was an inseparable blend of religion and politics.²⁴

The competitive action among the political parties had the consequence of breaking up the ties between Islamic leaders of <u>santris</u> and the local adherents of traditional Javanese <u>abangans</u>. The religious and social exclusiveness of Islam was stressed, and the cultural pressure of orthodox Islam upon community was intensified. For example, in some communities, in which the <u>santri</u> civilization was predominant, the traditional Javanese <u>wayang</u> and <u>gamelan</u>

were banned, and the orthodox <u>santri</u> figure rose to dominate village government.²⁵

Special mention should briefly be made here that the Islamic reform movement from Egypt, which aimed at a kind of compromise between Western rationalism and Islamic fundamentalism, took hold in Java about the turn of the century. The consequence of this was the emergence of a division in the <u>santri</u> communities between modern fundamentalists combining rational and fundamental views, on the one hand, and conservative traditionalists based on the concepts within the Islamic tradition of the <u>kiyai</u> and ^C<u>ulamā</u>, on the other hand.

From this time on, Muslim leaders have been of two kinds. There were Muslim intellectuals with Western upbringing, on one side, and the traditional <u>kiyais</u> and ^C<u>ulamā</u> on the other. The most important reformist organization of the modern fundamentalists is the <u>Muhammadiyah</u> founded by Kiyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan in 1912.²⁶ In reaction, the conservative traditionalist Kiyai Haji Hasjim Asj^Cari developed the parallel organization of the <u>Nahdatul Ulama</u> in 1926.²⁷ Each of these two organizations has its auxiliary organizations of women and youth, as well as educational institutions.

For the first time in over three decades <u>santris</u>, as a political power, had succeeded in demonstrating their strength and in a halt to Dutch governmental interference. In order to strengthen the Islamic political force and finally to narrow the gap between

modern fundamentalists and conservative traditionalists, the <u>Muhammadiyah</u> and the <u>Nahdatul Ulama</u> could jointly sponsor the creation of a new Islamic federation, the so-called MIAI, the initials of <u>Majlis Islam A^Cla Indonesia</u> (Supreme Islamic Council of Indonesia) which was set up at Surabaya in September 1937. The <u>Sarekat Islam</u> in 1929 had changed its name to <u>Partai Sarekat</u> <u>Islam Indonesia</u> (Indonesian Muslim Association Party) as a result of the policy of non-cooperation with the Dutch.²⁸

During the Japanese occupation (1942-1945), the Japanese seemed more ready to make concessions to Muslim demands rather than to those of nationalists. It was natural, of course, that the Japanese occupying power should try to use religion for its own wartime ends, since they considered Islam to be one of the most effective means to penetrate into the spiritual lives of Indonesians. Consequently, there was, in the Japanese period, an obvious rivalry between Muslim and nationalist groups. The Indonesian Islamic leadership stood in striking contrast to the Western-educated political intelligensia of nationalists.

In connection with the steadily increasing political power of <u>santris</u>, three important political institutions were benefits from the Japanese period.

(1) The first was the establishment of the <u>Kantor Urusan Agama</u> or, in Japanese, the so-called <u>Shūmubu</u> (Office for Religious Affairs).²⁹

Though this institution more or less took the place of the Dutch colonial Office for Native Affairs,³⁰ it expanded to later manage all kinds of affairs formerly divided among the Departments of Home Affairs, Justice and Education.

The <u>Kantor Urusan Agama</u> was the first governmental institution which the Japanese entrusted to an Indonesian. Hoesin Djajadiningrat, on October 1, 1943, was put in charge for the first time as the successor of Colonel Hori.³¹ On August 1, 1944, Kiyai Haji Hasjim Asj^cari, head of the <u>Pesantren Tebuireng</u> in Jombang East Java, was appointed to this post. At the same time he was the chairman of the <u>Masjumi</u>, the name being a contraction of <u>Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia</u> (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims).³²

To manage this office in Jakarta, Kiyai Haji Hasjim Asj^cari appointed his son, Wachid Hasjim, while the father continued to hold his great authority as a <u>kiyai</u> in <u>Pesantren Tebuireng</u>. Later, in 1950, the son became Minister of Religious Affairs in the first cabinet of the United Indonesian Republic after the recognition of independence by the Dutch.

(2) The second institution dating from the Japanese occupation was the <u>Masjumi</u>.³³ It may be considered as the successor of the MIAI which was dissolved in October 1943, probably because this organization had been set up through the Muslims' own initiative or because it was federation of Islamic organizations whose leaders

were strongly anti-colonial, non-cooperative, anti-foreign and potentially anti-Japanese.³⁴

(3) The third benefit emerging from the Japanese period was the establishment of the <u>Hizbullah</u> (God's force or party of God), a kind of military organization for Muslim youth. The <u>Masjumi</u> leaders appointed Zainul Arifin, one of the <u>Nahdatul Ulama</u> delegates in the Masjumi executive, to head this organization in 1945.

The importance of the establishment of <u>Hizbullah</u> was probably that its members were later included in the Indonesian national army. This meant that in the Indonesian army there was an important infusion of <u>santris</u>.³⁵

The significance of all these developments was that, during Japanese occupation, the Islamic leaders generally distrusted by the Dutch authorities became a closed group in direct contact with the highest governing body. The Japanese brought about a fundamental change in the traditional method of governing by increasing the power of the <u>santri</u> group. The formation of the Office of Religious Affairs, the <u>Masjumi</u>, and the <u>Hizbullah</u> meant - whatever had been Japanese intentions regarding them - that an apparatus had been provided for Indonesian Islam that would be of great importance for the future. It also meant that the separation of Islam and politics, which had been the main Dutch Islamic policy,³⁶ came practically to an end, and religion was associated more overtly with political aims and war necessities for the time being.³⁷

On the basis of these three benefits, it is understandable that Islamic leaders looked foreward with great expectation to an independent Indonesia. With these three important achievements the Indonesian Muslims set themselves in motion. The <u>santris</u>, as a socio-political power, had had their wings clipped during the Dutch colonial period, but would soon be able to play their part via the <u>Masjumi</u>, which in November, 1945, was recognized as a Muslim political party in independent Indonesia.³⁸

The <u>Masjumi</u>, though it bore the name of a political association established during the Japanese occupation, was a distinct new organization since Indonesian independence. It enrolled the prewar Islamic political organization of <u>Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia</u> as well as non-political Islamic organizations such as the <u>Muhammadiyah</u> and <u>Nahdatul Ulama</u>. Because of support by the large non-political Muslim associations and particularly because of its support by the <u>kiyais</u> and ^Culamā' in rural areas, the <u>Masjumi</u> was able to build up a huge mass backing.

Strictly speaking, the adherents of the Islamic political leaders were from the modernist and traditionalist <u>santri</u> communities, while the traditional <u>abangan</u> peasants mostly found political representation in the Communist party, and the <u>abangan priyayi</u> as the bearers of high culture found their outlet in the nationalism of <u>Partai Nasional Indonesia</u>. Moreover, the different economic as well as cultural orientations and commercial attachments of the

<u>santris</u> made a very different set of interests from the bureaucratic priyayi and the abangan peasant as well.³⁹

The rivalry between the Islamic political force of <u>santri</u> and the non-religious force of secular-minded <u>abangan</u> not only marked the concluding stages of Japanese occupation, it survived into the years of independence. Indonesian politics was becoming increasingly dominated by tensions between two ideologies: the <u>Pancasila</u> upon which the Indonesian state in its present form is founded and the ideas of an Islamic state as propagated by the <u>Masjumi</u>. This was to be the most controversial problem on a national scale. The marked division between those identifying more or less with the orthodox-Islamic <u>santri</u> orientation, on the one hand, and adherents of the <u>abangan</u> world view, on the other hand, became one of the basic determinants of Javanese social and political history since independence.

Unfortunately, the <u>Masjumi</u> did not maintain its initial unity and strength. The first schism took place in 1947 when the <u>Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia</u> separated itself, partly because of the increasing dominance of the young Muslim leaders within the <u>Masjumi</u>, and partly due to political manoeuvres made by some leaders of <u>Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia</u> to gain seats in the left-wing cabinet of Amir Sjarifuddin, while the <u>Masjumi</u> went into opposition.⁴⁰ The second schism occurred in 1952 when the <u>Nahdatul Ulama</u> became a political party and left the <u>Masjumi</u>, due to the difference

between the Muslim leaders who had received Western education and the <u>kiyais</u> and ^C<u>ulamā</u>' who had gone through the <u>pesantrens</u> and who might have received religious education at Mecca or Cairo. The relationship between these two groups of Muslim leaders of such different educational backgrounds was an uneasy one.

One other reason for the split of <u>Nahdatul Ulama</u> from the <u>Masjumi</u> was that the <u>kiyais</u> and ^C<u>ulamā</u>, thought the <u>Masjumi</u> leadership was dominated by the Muslim Western-educated leaders in the party executive, while the <u>kiyais</u> and ^C<u>ulamā</u>, in the party council no longer developed their activities. The <u>kiyais</u> and ^C<u>ulamā</u>, converted the <u>Nahdatul Ulama</u> from a purely religious organization in the <u>Masjumi</u> into their own political organization.⁴¹

The consequence of this Islamic political development was the emergence of Muslim political parties and of <u>santris</u> as political powers in Java embodied in three Muslim political parties: the <u>Masjumi</u>, <u>Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia</u>, and <u>Nahdatul Ulama</u>.

2. Abangan and the Birth of Communist and Nationalist Parties.

It has been mentioned in the previous section that the <u>santri</u> political association which was embodied in the <u>Sarekat Islam</u> from its early beginnings faced a new significant rival in the <u>abangan</u> political power, whose representation was either in the Communist or nationalist movements.

<u>Sarekat Islam</u>'s followers were united by their profession of faith, though they were not agreed on their interpretation of religion or on the role it should play in the <u>Sarekat Islam</u>'s activities. In fact, the <u>Sarekat Islam</u> movement attracted many <u>santris</u> who wished to see advancement either on the side of modern fundamentalists or conservative traditionalists. However, it also included the Javanese <u>abangans</u> whose Islamic faith was still mixed with pre-Islamic beliefs and who opposed the religious purism of <u>santris</u>. It also drew support from the Javanese traditionalists who opposed the programme of Westernization put forth by younger Javanese <u>priyayi</u> in the <u>Budi Utomo</u>.

Strictly speaking, the <u>Sarekat Islam</u> was, to some extent, heterogeneous in composition, including those whose dissatisfaction towards foreign ruler took contradictory forms.⁴² Describing the heterogeneous elements in the <u>Sarekat Islam</u> G. McT. Kahin says that it included educated young Javanese, religious leaders, merchants, peasants and labourers.⁴³ This varied following made it most

difficult for the leaders of <u>Sarekat Islam</u> to evolve a coherence within the movement. Moreover, the one obvious element that could appear to be an obstacle was based on santri and abangan rift.

The basic division in the <u>Sarekat Islam</u> reflected in some ways a separation between the religious oriented <u>santris</u> and secularminded <u>abangans</u>, and was to become a division in Indonesian politics. The labels used widely to identify both groups were the <u>Sarekat Islam</u> <u>Putih</u> (White Muslim Association) and the <u>Sarekat Islam Merah</u> (Red Muslim Association). The former group were those <u>santris</u> who held the idea of the incompatibility between Islam and Communism, while the latter were those <u>abangans</u> who tended to prefer a religiously neutral attitude towards Islam,⁴⁴ and tried to reject its religious label.

The religiously neutral attitude of <u>abangan</u> was later changed to a left deviation, so far as to reject the support of nationalism as such and to continue aiming for a socialist, not a national-democratic revolution. Subsequently, the <u>abangans</u> consistently opposed cooperation with non-Communist movements, and argued that their movement was in its essence neither bourgeois nor nationalist.⁴⁵

Hendrik Sneevliet, a former member of the Social Democratic Labour Party in the Netherlands, in 1914, shortly after his arrival in the Indies, founded the Indies Social Democratic Association with the help of the Ducth socialists H.W. Dekker, Bergsma, and

Brandsteder.46

Contact was made with socialistically inclined Indonesian leaders from the Semarang branch of <u>Sarekat Islam</u> who subsequently joined the Social Democratic Association and became active proselytizers in its behalf throughout the ranks of <u>Sarekat Islam</u>. Among those were Semaun and Darsono.

With the growing number of increasingly Marxist-oriented local branches of <u>Sarekat Islam</u>, its central leadership lacked effective means of disciplining such dissident elements. Though H. Sneevliet was arrested by the government and forced to leave Indonesia in 1918, this did not retard the process of infiltration by Indonesian members of the Social Democratic Association into positions of leadership in local branches of Sarekat Islam.

When the fourth congress of <u>Sarekat Islam</u> met in 1919, by which time the organization's total membership had reached almost two and a half million, it refused the extreme proposal of Semaun's faction. He and the other leaders of the Social Democratic Association undertook to convert their organization into a Communist party of the Indies, the so-called <u>Perserikatan Komunis di Indies</u> or PKI as it was gerally known. This new party emerged at Semarang, north Central Java, on May 23, 1920, with Semaun as president, Darsono as vice-president, Bergsma as secretary and H.W. Dekker as treasurer. It developed a close relationship with the Comintern, joining that organization at the end of 1920.⁴⁷

When considerable success had been achieved by the <u>Sarekat</u> <u>Islam</u> in organizing labour unions, Semaun's group attempted to get control of the <u>Pergerakan Kaum Buruh</u> (Trade Union Central) which united twenty-two Indonesian trade unions, totaling 77,000 members.⁴⁸ At the Union's first congress in 1920, Semaun was elected as chairman, Suryopranoto as vice-chairman and H. Agus Salim as secretary. It was due to the effort of H. Agus Salim that Semaun and his group were unable to take control the Trade Union Central from the Sarekat Islam's central leadership.

Because Semaun failed to wrest labour unions from the <u>Sarekat</u> <u>Islam</u>, he set up a parallel rival organization of trade unions, the so-called <u>Pergerakan Kaum Buruh Revolusioner</u> (Revolutionary Trade Union Central), and in the process was able to detach considerable strength from the older organization.⁴⁹

The increasingly bitter struggle between the central leadership of <u>Sarekat Islam</u> and the Communists for control of the organization's branches and the growing trade union movement, on the one hand, and their different outlook on the questions relating to religion, on the other hand, lead to a formal rupture between them in the sixth national congress of <u>Sarekat Islam</u> in 1921. H. Agus Salim, in the increasingly heated situation introduced a motion backed by Abdul Muis calling for party discipline and requiring that no member of <u>Sarekat Islam</u> could at the same time hold membership in any other party, as has been mentioned in the foregoing

section.

In the course of the struggle for control of the local branches, most of the large peasant membership of these branches melted away. This probably was due principally to two reasons: firstly, the government's increasingly effective barring of contact between the leaders and the peasants; and secondly, that the religion became a principle issue in the struggle, which violated religious sensitivities of the peasants or at least those of their religious leaders.⁵⁰

The struggle came to a head. In order to win control over the local branches, the Communists at their congress held in 1922, at Semarang, decided to set up the <u>Red Sarekat Islam</u> headquarters and continued to spread Communist influence. The name of the Communistcontrolled units was changed to the <u>Sarekat Rakyat</u> (People's Association). These units were conceived as the foundation of the Communist Party among the masses of the Javanese population.

During the course of 1925, the more extreme elements within the Indonesian Communist Party came under the control of Dahlan and Sukra, who continually agitated for revolution and even resorted to terroristic methods in order to dominate the party. In their efforts they were backed by Alimin and Musso, two important party leaders.

In October, 1925, a decision was made at the meeting of the party's executive committee and the leaders of the Communistcontrolled trade unions to begin a revolution. A general strike was

then called for, beginning with the railroad workers and developing into major strikes of labourers in metallurgical concerns and dock workers in Surabaya.⁵¹

In the suppression of those strikes the government arrested the important labour leaders and the three remaining Communist leaders in Indonesia - Darsono, Aliarcham and Mardjoba - while the others fled abroad.⁵²

During the year of 1926, more and more of the Communist leaders were arrested and the party was forced to operate as an underground movement, and its activities became less co-ordinated. With the failure of rebellion, the Communist organization was crushed and the large majority of the leaders were arrested and deported to the concentration camp of Tanah Merah in New Guinea (West Irian).⁵³ After these arrests the power of the Communists was broken for the remainder of the period of Dutch rule and only reappeared in the early years of independence.

Although the Communists were able to split the ranks of the <u>Sarekat Islam</u>, they were not able to achieve the position of leadership in the overall independent movement. This failure was partly due to the struggle the Muslim organizations launched against them, and partly due to the suppression by the Dutch government in 1927.

The Partai Nasional Indonesia was established in 1927, though

it was shortlived due to suppression by the Dutch, and was dissolved in 1931. But its ideas were carried on by other parties such as <u>Partai Indonesia</u> (Indonesian Party), <u>Club Pendidikan Nasional</u> <u>Indonesia</u> (Indonesian National Education Club) and <u>Partai Indonesia</u> <u>Raya</u> (Great Indonesian Party), all of which adopted a neutral attitude towards Islam as the common basis of the <u>abangan</u> political outlook.

Actually, the religiously neutral attitude of nationalists was mainly a product of the Dutch educational system in Indonesia, based in particular on the Dutch Islamic policy of Snouck Hurgronje, who envisaged a division of Islam into two parts, religious and political. He favoured toleration or a policy of neutrality towards religious life. Moreover, he wanted to stimulate the tendency of Indonesian Islam towards mysticism, in order to make Islam a religion of the soul.⁵⁴ The enemy for the Dutch colonial ruler was not Islam as religion but Islam as a political doctrine which must be met by force.⁵⁵

In contrast to the <u>santris</u>, the religiously neutral nationalists took a stand on the separation between religion and state, a division which had long been the case in the West. For the nationalist, religion was an individual business. Within the context of the <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> groups in Java, the intellectual nationalists could be said to belong to the latter.⁵⁶

The Western-educated nationalists came out with a forceful slogan of <u>kebangsaan</u> (nationalism) comprising all people of Indonesia irrespective of faith and ethnic origin. <u>Kebangsaan</u> should be the exclusive vehicle for driving away the colonial power.

The employment of the term of <u>kebangsaan</u> was widely spread in the late 1920's, especially at the height of the controversy between the Islamic-oriented <u>santri</u> and the religiously neutral nationalist <u>abangan</u> concerning the relationship of religion to politics.

In 1927, Sukarno, chairman of the Bandung Study Club, founded the <u>Partai Nasional Indonesia</u> in the hope of creating a united national movement. The party's aim was complete independence for Indonesia, economic as well as political, with a government elected by and responsible to the whole Indonesian population.

Such independence could be reached, according to Sukarno, only on a basis of non-cooperation with the Dutch and would come only as the result of the united efforts of the Indonesians themselves. Almost all members of the <u>Perhimpunan Indonesia</u> (Indonesian Society), an association of Indonesian students studying in Holland joined this national movement after returning home.⁵⁷

Sukarno frequently stressed that the <u>Partai Nasional Indonesia</u> could not have an Islamic basis, because independence was the objective of all Indonesians irrespective of religion and ethnic

origin. The party's programme and leadership, particularly Sukarno's oratorial skill, brought about rapid large-scale growth. Within two years the party had over 10,000 members. Some of this number was drawn from the former membership of the <u>Sarekat Rakyat</u> and formerly Communist-dominated trade unions.⁵⁸ It became the most powerful nationalist organization in Indonesia.

Though various events had sharpened the competition and even the conflict between <u>santri</u> political power in the <u>Sarekat Islam</u> and the religiously neutral <u>abangan</u> who championed the <u>kebangsaan</u>, special mention would be made here only on their basic differences.

Radjiman Wedijodiningrat and Singgih of the religiously neutral nationalists published articles in a periodical <u>Timbul</u> to attack the <u>Sarekat Islam</u> and H. Agus Salim, saying that the <u>Sarekat</u> <u>Islam</u>, which was originally a people's organization, had fallen under the influence of H. Agus Salim, had become a clerical party which neglected the people's social and economic interests in favour of purely religious interests, and had carried out Pan-Islamic activities which endangered the nationalist movement.⁵⁹

The controversies between the Muslim and the religiously neutral nationalists were increasing when the latter discouraged the pilgrimage to Mecca, for it was considered a useless pursuit and a draining of funds and man power from Indonesia, particularly since the number of the pilgrims was increasing.⁶⁰

The principle factor which caused estrangement between the Muslims and the religiously neutral parties around the 1930's was the view about Islam in general and its role in the establishment of new Indonesian state in particular. The rift between the <u>santri</u> and the <u>abangan</u> in political outlook is represented in the difference of opinion between H. Agus Salim and Mohammad Natsir, on the one hand, and Sukarno and his circles, on the other hand.

Sukarno, belonging to the group of religiously neutral nationalists, showed that religion could and had to be separated from the state, for it was an individual business. For him, reason rather than religion seemed to be the final judge. Though he suggested a reinterpretation of Islam in all its aspects, this reinterpretation reduced Islam to religious practices.

To arouse the people's patriotic feeling and to maintain unity, Sukarno stressed the importance of love for the fatherland; sincere preparedness to serve and devotion to the fatherland. Moreover, he elevated the fatherland to a position above everything.⁶¹

Mohammad Natsir, on the contrary, championed Islam and its concern with political affairs, in other words the unity of religion and politics in Islam. Nevertheless, he did not give a complete picture of the future state of Indonesia.

In an attempt to counter the rivalry between the two groups, H. Agus Salim said that there was no difference between the

<u>Sarekat Islam</u> and the <u>Partai Nasional Indonesia</u> concerning the aim, purpose and operational field of the both parties, but he stressed that the two parties did differ in their respective principles. According to him, in loving the fatherland one should place one's ideals above any materials aims. These ideals included the realization of rightousness, justice and virtue, whose form and measure had been decided by <u>Allāh</u> (God). For the realization of these ideals, one should be in the service of <u>Allāh</u> as commonly pronounced by the <u>santri lillāhi ta^cālā</u> (for the God alone) and the <u>kebangsaan</u> should not be elevated as an idol to be worshipped and adored.⁶²

Mohammad Natsir also expressed his views on Indonesian nationalism, that it was the Islamic movement which first paved the way in this country for political actions aimed at independence, that Islam first planted the seeds of Indonesian unity, of brotherhood with those of the same faith outside the boundaries of Indonesia.⁶³ He emphasized that the Muslims, in fighting for independence, were also fighting for the freedom of Islam in order that Islamic rules and regulations could be realized for the well-being of Muslims as well as of God' creatures. Therefore, he called on the Muslim community to choose as leaders those whose Islamic devotion was not doubted.⁶⁴ As for nationalism, he argued that the religion of Islam, as the common heritage of Indonesians, should be the strong tie of brotherhood between those who had professed the faith and called for sacrifice when this heritage was suppressed.⁶⁵

The above-mentioned differences in principle caused the estrangement of the religiously neutral intellectuals from Islam. They would probably return to the fold of Islam if reason was admissable as a tool in interpreting Islam, as suggested by Sukarno, regarding the flexible nature of the Islamic laws which had been able to change in accordance with the need of time and place.⁶⁶

In this connection Sukarno seemed to agree with Kemal Attaturk who, according to Sukarno, said that Turkey had freed Islam from the state in order that Islam might become strong, and on the other hand that the state might also become strong. However, he was cautious in his judgment that only the future would be able to judge whether Kemal Attaturk's actions in this respect were right or wrong.⁶⁷ He predicted that any proposal to incorporate Islam into the constitution would certainly be rejected, because the non-Muslim representative would reject it with all efforts. Finally, he concluded that in a country like Indonesia there would be only two alternatives; unity of religion and state, but without democracy, or democracy with the state separated from religion.⁶⁸

The deterioration of relations between the Muslims and the nationalists led eventually, in December, 1930, to the withdrawal of the <u>Sarekat Islam</u> from the <u>Perhimpunan Partai-Partai Kebangsaan</u> <u>Indonesia</u> (Council of Indonesian Political Parties), a federative body of Indonesian political parties held in 1927.

The withdrawal reflected a realization that the unity in such a federative body was more an illusion than fact, due to the existing differences in principles.⁶⁹

When Sukarno and other leaders of the <u>Partai Nasional Indonesia</u> were arrested, the party members were absorbed by three new nationalists parties, two of which adopted much more cautious policies towards the government and operated more moderate programmes than had the older organization.

The first was the <u>Partai Rakyat Indonesia</u> (Indonesian People's Party) under the leadership of Mohammad Tabrani, an outstanding Indonesian journalist in 1930. Its programme was based on co-operation with the Dutch and called for achievement of Indonesian selfgovernment by parliamentary means.

The second was the <u>Partai Indonesia</u> (Indonesian Party), usually called by its contraction the <u>Partindo</u>, convened in 1931 under its leader Sartono. The party's aim was a complete independence on a basis of non-cooperation, but was more moderate in methods.

The third was the <u>Club Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia</u> (Indonesian National Education Club), which arose from its forerunner the <u>Golongan Merdeka</u> (Independent Group), under the leadership of Sutan Sjahrir and Mohammad Hatta.

FOOTNOTES

¹Wertheim, <u>Effect of Western Civilization</u>, pp. 4-9. ²Drewes, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 301.

³Alfian, "Indonesian Political Thinking", review of Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965 by H. Feith and L. Castles, <u>Indonesia</u>, no. 11 (April 1971), p. 193.

⁴Jay, <u>Santri and Abangan</u>, p. 194.

⁵J.M. Van der Kroef, <u>The Communist Party of Indonesia, Its</u> <u>History, Program and Tactics</u> (Vancouver: University of British Colombia, 1965), p. 56.

⁶H.A.R. Gibb, <u>Modern Trends in Islam</u> (New York: Octagon Books, 1972), p. 69.

⁷Van Leur, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 113.
⁸Benda, <u>op. cit</u>., pp. 13-14.
⁹<u>Ibid</u>., p. 16.
¹⁰Wertheim, <u>Transition</u>, p. 195.

¹¹F.R. Von der Mehden, <u>Religion and Nationalism in Southeast</u> <u>Asia, Burma-Indonesia-The Philippines</u> (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), p. 10.

12<u>Ibid., pp. 12-13.</u>

¹³G. McT. Kahin, <u>Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia</u> (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 38.

¹⁴Wertheim, <u>Transition</u>, p. 205.

15 Jay, Santri and Abangan, p. 184.

¹⁶Kahin, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 67.

¹⁷J.M. Van der Kroef, "Adat and Islam in Indonesian Nationalism", <u>United Asia</u>, IV, no. 6 (1952), p. 317.

¹⁸T. Jaylani, <u>The Sarekat Islam Movement, Its Contribution to</u> <u>Indonesian Nationalism</u>, unpublished M.A. thesis, McGill University, Montreal, 1959, p. 55.

¹⁹Jay, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 189. ²⁰<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 190. ²¹Kahin, <u>op. cit</u>., pp. 71-72; Jay, <u>Santri and Abangan</u>, p. 190. ²²Kahin, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 76; see also J.M. Van der Kroef, <u>Indonesia</u> <u>in the Modern World</u>, II (Bandung: Masa Baru Ltd., 1956), pp. 305-306. ²³Kahin, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 90. ²⁴Boland, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 8. ²⁵

²⁵Jay, <u>Santri and Abangan</u>, p. 196.

²⁶Further study on the <u>Muhammadiyah</u> consult A. Mukti Ali, <u>The Muhammadijah Movement. A Bibliographical Introduction</u>, unpublished M.A. thesis, McGill University, Montreal, 1957.

²⁷An account on the establishment of the <u>Nahdatul Ulama</u> see Abubakar, ed., <u>Sedjarah Hidup</u>, pp. 496-509.

²⁸Kahin, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 94; Benda, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 89-90.
²⁹Benda, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 111.

³⁰D.S. Lev, <u>Islamic Courts in Indonesia. A Study in the</u> <u>Political Bases of Legal Institution</u> (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 44.

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<sup>31</sup>Benda, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 126.

<sup>32</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 166.

<sup>33</sup><u>Ibid</u>.
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³⁴C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze, <u>Aspect of Islam in Post-Colonial</u> <u>Indonesia</u> (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1958), p. 51; see also Noer, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 242; Boland, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 11.

³⁵Boland, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 12-13.

³⁶H.J. Benda, "Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundation of the Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia", <u>Continuity and Change in</u> <u>Southeast Asia</u> (New Haven: Yale University, 1972), p. 87.

³⁷Nieuwenhuijze, <u>Aspect of Islam</u>, p. 50.

³⁸Boland, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 12.

³⁹McVey, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 11-12.

⁴⁰Kahin, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 120; see also R. Anwar, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia", <u>Man, State and Society in Contemporary</u> <u>Southeast Asia</u>, ed. by R.O. Tilman (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 118; Boland, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 45.

⁴¹Anwar, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 118-119.

⁴²R.T. McVey, <u>The Rise of Indonesian Communism</u> (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 10-11.

⁵²<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 80-81.
⁵³<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 83, 86.
⁵⁴Boland, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 14.
⁵⁵Benda, "Dutch Islamic Policy", p. 87.
⁵⁶Noer, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 319
⁵⁷Kahin, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 90.
⁵⁸<u>Ibid</u>., p. 91.

⁵⁹Noer, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 250 quoting <u>Timbul</u> (The Rise) (February and March 1927).

⁶⁰Noer, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 320. ⁶¹<u>Ibid</u>., p. 254. ⁶²<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 254-255.

⁶³<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 260; <u>Pembela Islam</u> (Defender of Islam), no. 36 (October 1931), pp. 14-17.

CHAPTER III

SANTRI AND ABANGAN IN INDONESIAN POLITICS

1. The Problem of the Fundamental Basis of the State.

The political thinking which came to the surface in Indonesia in the first half-decade after independence (1945-1950) had its roots in the thinking of the last decades of the colonial period. There were three kinds of political thought: Nationalism, Islam and Communism. Sukarno, in 1926, wrote of these three as the main ideological categories into which all Indonesian political organization fitted.¹

Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, two Australian scholars, have tried to collect and analyze the schools of political thinking in their book <u>Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965</u> (Ithaca and London 1970). According to them, Indonesian political ideas could be divided into five streams of thought: radical nationalism, Javanese traditionalism, Islam, democratic socialism and Communism.² Although only few political thinkers explicitly formulated their ideas in written form, nevertheless, their political ideas continued to live in society as revealed by political action of large numbers of their followers.

Indonesian political development, generally, was divided into three different periods. The first was the period of the

armed revolution (1945-1949), beginning with the proclamation of independence and ending with the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands.

The second was the liberal period or the period of parliamentary democracy, when the political parties were in the ascendant (1949-1959). This period was deeply marked by inter-party conflict and extreme ideological antagonism.

The third was the period of guided democracy (1959-1965) which was characterized by the compulsory acceptance of President Sukarno's political ideas of guided democracy as the unifier of Nationalism, Islam and Communism.

The political thought in the first period was clearly linked with the previous colonial era. At that time, it was still a privilege of a small group of educated people who had pioneered the national movement and who, therefore, regarded themselves as the leaders of the Republic.³

The main theme of political thinking in the first period was the search for a common basis for the national struggle. It was characterized by a struggle among the political forces concerning the best way to achieve political independence, either by negotiation or confrontation with the Dutch.

Though no dominant group supported either the policy of negotiation with the Dutch or that of uncompromising armed struggle,

generally, groups in power supported negotiation.4

One of the most important products of this period was the achievement of the <u>Pancasila</u> (Five Principles) as the fundamental basis of Indonesian state philosophy. This section, accordingly, attempts to sketch the different standpoints of the Muslim leaders, representing the ideas of the <u>santri</u> group, and of the leaders of the religiously neutral nationalists, representing the political outlook of the <u>abangan</u> groups.

It has been mentioned in the previous chapter that during the Japanese occupation the Muslim leaders looked forward with great expectation to independence. They had set themselves in political motion with three important achievements: the establishment of the Office of Religious Affairs, of <u>Masjumi</u> and of <u>Hizbullah</u>⁵

The situation changed just before the declaration of independence. In this period the Muslim leaders and the leaders of the religiously neutral nationalists confronted one another. The most crucial point was the problem concerning the fundamental basis of Indonesian state philosophy, whether independent Indonesia should be based on Islam or nationalism.

When the Japanese were being forced to retreat from many parts of the South Pacific, in 1944, they promised Indonesian independence in the near future.⁶ At the same time, they began to open high administrative posts to Indonesians, both to persons from the old aristocratic civil service who mainly belonged to the <u>abangan</u> group, and to some of the younger group of religiously neutral nationalist intellectuals.

From June through August 1945, the Indonesian leaders prepared for independence by drafting a constitution. The constitutional discussion took place in two successive committees established under Japanese auspices to consider the problem of independence. The first was the <u>Badan Penyelidik Kemerdekaan Indonesia</u> (Investigating Committee for Indonesian Independence) held in March 1945, with representatives from several main currents of the nationalist movement. It numbered sixty-two members, and the Japanese appointed Radjiman Wedijodiningrat to chair the meeting.⁷

The <u>Badan Penyelidik Kemerdekaan Indonesia</u> was succeeded by the <u>Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia</u> (Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence) established on August 11, 1945, for which the Japanese appointed Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta as chairman and vice-chairman. The membership consisted of the following representatives: Abdul Abbas from the Batak country, Mohammad Amir from West Sumatra, Mohammad Hasan from Aceh, Ratulangi and Andi Pangeran from southern Sulawesi, Hamidhan from Kalimantan, Pudja from Bali, Latuharhary from Ambon, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta from Java, Radjiman Wedijodiningrat and Supomo from <u>Badan Penyelidik</u> <u>Kemerdekaan Indonesia</u>, Wachid Hasjim and Hadikusumo from Muslim group, Otto Iskandar Dinata and Abdul Kadir representing <u>Barisan</u> <u>Pelopor</u> (Vanguard Corps)⁸ and <u>Peta</u>, the abbreviation of <u>Pembela</u>

<u>Tanah Air</u> (Fatherland Defense Force),⁹ Pandji Suroso and Sutardjo from the <u>priyayis</u>, Purubojo and Surjohamidjojo representing the princely court of Jogyakarta and Surakarta, Subardjo serving as an adviser and Yap Tjwa Bing representing the Chinese minority.¹⁰ In reality this committee was mainly dominated by non-Islamic politicians.¹¹

It is noteworthy that the first major debate in an official body between Islamic and nationalist leaders over the character of the future Indonesian state, before it was discussed in the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence, took place secretly during the months of February through April 1945, in the so-called <u>Sanyo Kaigi</u> (Advisers Council). The Council had been created in late 1944, and consisted primarily of senior Indonesian advisers to administrative departments in the Japanese occupation government.¹² It met in secret sessions to consider problems on which the Japanese wanted advice.

The members of the Council were Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Buntaran Martoatmodjo, Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, Mohammad Hatta, Rasjid, Samsi, Sartono, Singgih, Soekardjo, Soewandi, Supomo and Wurjaningrat. The majority of these men were nationalist political leaders who had little sympathy for Islamic demands.¹³

The most outspoken Islamic figure among the Council's members was Abikusno Tjokrosujoso who for the first time raised

questions concerning Islamic issues: should Friday be the national day of rest ? what should be done about the position of Islamic courts, the mosque treasury and <u>pengulu</u> (administrator of mosque) ? He forcefully argued for granting the Muslims privileges that would come close to creating an Islamic state.¹⁴

When the Indonesian constitution was framed in the months before the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945, the Muslim leaders wanted a state based on Islamic principles under the leadership of a Muslim president.¹⁵ Muslim leaders stressed the idea of Islamic state. This point had certainly been a divisive factor in Indonesian politics.

The basic factor in the subsequent split of the Indonesian leaders was the question of the Islamic basis of the state versus the secular philosophy of the nationalists. Both the Muslims and the nationalists were essentially attempting to provide a new social basis for the Indonesian state.¹⁶

Sukarno and his circle, although many of them had at times been under Islamic influence, considered themselves to be nationalists first, and Muslims second. Generally speaking, they were willing to recognize the position of Islam in man's private life, but not in his political activities.

The religiously neutral nationalists asserted that the important factor to be emphasized was the unity of all Indonesian peoples. Many members of the secular nationalist movement were

neutral towards religion, but a number of them were sometimes antagonistic towards Islam.¹⁷ The Islamic political leaders, hence, were forced to cope with the vigorous Western-oriented nationalist faction which considered any religion as a hindrance to Indonesia's progress unless separated from the state.

Sukarno opposed the ideal of an Indonesian state based on Islam and insistently proposed the <u>Pancasila</u> as the foundation of the Indonesian state. He argued that the separation of religion and state was an historical necessity, thus the secular state was as indispensable. He formulated with clarity the idea of the <u>Pancasila</u> before the Investigating Committee for Indonesian Independence on June 1, 1945. The first principle which must underlie the philosophical basis of an independent Indonesia, according to Sukarno, was nationalism. He did not mean nationalism in a narrow sense.

In conjunction with Renan's definition of nationalism, that is "le désir d'être ensemble" and Otto Bauer's idea of nationalism, that is "eine aus Schicksalgemeinschaft ewachsene charaktergemeinschaft", Sukarno added and took into consideration the additional requisite of "unity between men and place", so that according to geopolitics, Indonesia in its entirety should be the country for the Indonesians.¹⁸

The second principle was internationalism or humanism which aimed at making one family of all nations while recognizing the identity of every nation.

The third principle was representative government which would be the strength of the Indonesian state. In answering the arguments of the Muslim leaders who desired an independent Indonesia to be organized as an Islamic state, Sukarno explained:

> If we really are an Islamic people, let us work hard so that most of the seats in the people's representative body we will create are occupied by Islamic delegates We say that ninety per cent of us are Muslims, but look around you in this gathering and see what percentage give their votes to Islam ?19

The fourth principle was that of social prosperity or social justice, where a man has enough to eat, to wear, live in prosperity. The fifth was that the organization of Independent Indonesia should be in the light of a belief in One God.

A parallel effort was made by Sukarno and his collegues among the religiously neutral nationalists to emphasize religious tolerence. He said:

> Not only should the people of Indonesia have belief in God, but every Indonesian should believe in his own particular God. The Christian should worship God according to the teachings of Jesus Christ; Muslims according to the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, Buddhists should discharge their religious rites according to their own books. But let us all have belief in God. The Indonesian state shall be a state where every person can worship God in freedom without religious egoism. And the state of Indonesia should be a state incorporating the belief in God. Let us observe, let us practise religion, whether Islam or Christianity, in a civilized way the way of mutual respect.²⁰

More important, however, was the debate which continued and intensified between the Islamic leaders and religiously neutral nationalists. For this reason, a special committee was installed with Sukarno as chairman, in which the Islamic and nationalist interests were represented equally.

At a meeting on June 22, 1945, a special committee which consisted of nine persons - Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, Maramis, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Abdul Kahar Muzakir, H. Agus Salim, Achmad Subardjo, Wachid Hasjim, Muhammad Yamin - worked together to achieve a compromise.²¹

They formulated a gentlemen's agreement which was intended to become the preamble of the constitution the so-call <u>Piagam Jakarta</u> (Jakarta Charter), which defined the Indonesian people's right to independence and its philosophy and aspirations as set out in the <u>Pancasila</u>, and also determined the relationship of the state and Islam in Indonesia. For translation of the <u>Piagam Jakarta</u> see appendix III.

In order to win over Muslim leaders without explicitly declaring Islam to be the state religion, the <u>Piagam Jakarta</u> stipulated that the Indonesian state should be based on belief in God with the obligation to practise the <u>shari^ca</u> (Islamic law) for the adherents of Islam.²²

However, at the plenary meeting of the Investigating Committee for Indonesian Independence, the crucial sentence of <u>Piagam</u>

Jakarta was a stipulation that the state was to be founded on belief in God with the obligation for the adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law.

Some <u>kiyais</u> such as Hadikusumo, Achmad Sanusi and Abikusno objected that the <u>Piagam Jakarta</u> was a vague and discriminatory provision. They argued that the Islamic majority of the population should be clearly acknowledged.²³ Notwithstanding, the religiously neutral nationalists opposed further concessions, arguing that the matter was settled by the <u>Piagam Jakarta</u>, and the state could only be either secular or Muslim.²⁴

At the beginning of August 1945, the pace of events accelerated. The Japanese High Commad in Saigon, on August 7, 1945, one day after atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima, agreed that a committee should be formed in Indonesia to make preparation for transfer of authority. On August 11, 1945, the <u>Panitia Persiapan</u> <u>Kemerdekaan Indonesia</u> (Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence) was established. Besides the chairman, Sukarno, and vicechairman, Mohammad Hatta, the committee consisted of nineteen members.²⁵

After an informal discussion between Mohammad Hatta and representatives of the Islamic faction such as Mohammad Hasan, Hadikusumo and Wachid Hasjim on August 18, 1945, one day after the proclamation of Indonesian independence, the conclusion was reached

that in fact Indonesia only could become and remain a unity if the constitution contained nothing that was directly connected with Islam. Therefore, articles relating to Islam as the official religion of the state, to the requirement that the president be Muslim, and to the obligation for Muslims to practise Islamic law, had to be removed.²⁶

Finally, Mohammad Hatta announced at the last meeting of the committee that for the sake of national unity, the <u>Piagam Jakarta</u> was to be deleted from the preamble of constitution, and that the provision requiring the president to be a Muslim would be omitted.²⁷

The discussion concerning the secular or Islamic basis of the Indonesian state was, then, of secondary importance in relation to the real problem of the unity of the nation.

With regard to the place of Islam in independent Indonesia, Kiyai Haji Wachid Hasjim, the vice-chairman of <u>Masjumi</u>, stated:

> Our history has shown that we have not yet achieved unity. In the interest of this unity, which we most urgently require in our endeavour to establish our Indonesian state, in our mind the most important question is not "what ultimately shall be the place of Islam in that state". The important question should rather be "by what means shall we assure the place of our religion in free Indonesia". I therefore once again repeat; what we need most of all at this time is the indissoluble unity of the nation.²⁸

The statement of Wachid Hasjim apparently indicated that the Muslims were in principle ready to compromise, and tended to

acknowledge the leadership of Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta as the rallying points of the nation's aspiration.²⁹

Even so, the Muslims who were much concerned with religion that is, the <u>santri</u> group - had lost the symbolic advantages of the Jakarta Charter. Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta were able to persuade crucial Islamic leaders to relinguish their concession for the sake of national unity.

Political events such as the surrender of the Japanese, uncertainty about Dutch intentions, and the kidnapping of Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta by youth leaders just before the proclamation of independence, made it possible to win Islamic acquiescence by focussing all attention on national unity, and on the acceptance of <u>Pancasila</u> as the fundamental basis of state.

Many Muslim leaders felt betrayed, However, others accepted this situation, hoping that by legal democratic procedures the Republic of Indonesia would eventually develop into an Islamic state. Thus, the <u>Pancasila</u> was accepted as the national philosophy of Indonesia. Otherwise, the efficacy of <u>Pancasila</u> depended on the common agreement among Indonesian leaders concerning the traditional way of life of the population. Though the climate of opinion was by no means homogenous, the <u>Pancasila</u> was regarded as a rallying point for national loyalty among different groups. It could be concluded that the Indonesian state came into being neither as an Islamic state according to the orthodox Islamic concept, nor as a secular state which would consider religion merely a private metter. It was, really, a compromise in that the state recognized religious principles and considered religion as an indispensable contribution to nation-building and character-building.

2. The Unity in Common Struggle and Internal Rift.

After the proclamation of independence, the Indonesian people engaged in an armed struggle against the Dutch and British occupation forces, and for the time being, the issue of an Islamic state was irrelevant.

Political parties reappeared as the result of the government decree issued on November 3, 1945, which stated that government favoured the establishment of political parties so that all currents of thought in society might be channeled into a regulated course. The decree further stipulated that the political parties should serve to strengthen the national struggle for defence of independence and to preserve the security of the nation.³⁰

This development was not new, because political parties had existed even during the colonial period as the main vehicles of growing national awareness. Within a few months the establishment of the major political parties had become a fact.

The <u>Masjumi</u>, established on November 7, 1945, was to embody the religious way of life. It enrolled all the non-political Islamic organizations such as the <u>Muhammadiyah</u> and the <u>Nahdatul Ulama</u> as well as such prewar Islamic political organization as the <u>Partai</u> <u>Sarekat Islam Indonesia</u>. On December 17, 1945, the <u>Partai Sosialis</u> <u>Indonesia</u> (Indonesian Socialist Party) was born; the <u>Partai Komunis</u> <u>Indonesia</u> (Indonesian Communist Party) openly rose on

November 7, 1945, and the <u>Partai Nasional Indonesia</u> (Indonesian Nationalist Party) reappeared on January 29, 1946.³¹

However, these political parties might be understood not as parties in the Western sense of the word, but rather as movements concerned not only with a political programme but even more with an entire way of life and philosophy of social order.³² This was due to the small number of literate and politically conscious people within every political party. Therefore, political parties represented, in the first place, a mental and psychological climate rather than clearly defined political opinions. Consequently, the particular choice of one party over another was mostly determined by one's personal sympathy or loyalty to a particular leader.³³

The competition among parties was partly competition among systems of ideas. In order to attract members and followers, the parties had to provide answers to ideological problems concerning matters of companionship, values to be upheld, collective activity and opportunities for personal advancement.

The ideological conflict of the parties was mainly among the intellectual-led groups of urban communities and did not yet involve large segments of the society. Only a small number of the members of most political parties were fully acquainted with the ideologies and platforms advocated by the leaders of their parties.³⁴

However, for the mass of the population, the climax of the process of ideological cleavage came in the years preceding the

parliamentary election of 1955. It was a period of intense organizational activity, in which each major party built new party branches in small towns and villages throughout the country. Time and again, the single political issue which dominated the political campaign was whether the state should be based on the <u>Pancasila</u> or explicitly on Islam, and the social conflict was mainly between the <u>santris</u> and the <u>abangans</u>. It is, however, beyond the present study to cover this period of bitter social conflict.³⁵

The three prevailing influences of Islam, Nationalism and Communism clearly demonstrated the rival ideologies in Indonesian politics of the so-called <u>alirans</u> (currents or streams). The term <u>aliran</u> denotes not only a political party, but also the organizations more or less closely connected to the party. All the major parties had peasant and labour unions, women and youth clubs, and a variety of educational institutions and charitable associations which, formally or informally, were closely related to the party.³⁶

The Muslim political party, the <u>Masjumi</u>, due to the <u>aliran</u> pattern, was finding its adherents in the <u>santri</u> group, and the <u>Partai Nasional Indonesia</u> and the <u>Partai Komunis Indonesia</u> were looking for their followers mainly among the <u>abangan</u> group.

The competition of various associations brought about some modification in the traditional social structure in Java based on <u>aliran</u> pattern. In this competition the <u>Partai Nasional Indonesia</u> and <u>Partai Komunis Indonesia</u>, both rooted in the abangan group,

drew closer together to resist the Islamic political influence, while the <u>santri</u> community was split by the reforming activities of <u>Muhammadiyah</u> centered in the <u>Masjumi</u> and the opposition of the <u>Nahdatul Ulama</u>.³⁷

Thus the Javanese society in the 1950's might be roughly divided into four groups: on the one hand, the reformist and orthodox <u>santri</u>, and on the other hand, the administrative and peasant <u>abangan</u>. Corresponding to these were the four major parties: the <u>Masjumi</u> - <u>Nahdatul Ulama</u> and the <u>Partai Nasional Indonesia</u> -Partai Komunis Indonesia.³⁸

Within the <u>santri</u> group, the <u>Masjumi</u> drew most of its support from the merchant class of the cities and urban business men, and the <u>Nahdatul Ulama</u> found most of its support in the countryside.³⁹

In the <u>abangan</u> community the situation was less clear-cut. The <u>Partai nasional Indonesia</u> had its roots in the civil servant class, and those of the general population who continued to work as white-collar administrators, clerks, technicians and others. The <u>Partai Komunis Indonesia</u> drew mainly on the landless and poor peasants, the plantation workers, and the labourers in manifacture.⁴⁰

The period of the armed revolution (1945-1949) was characterized as the period of relative unity in common struggle, a unity among Muslim leaders and their factions as well as between the Muslim and the religiously neutral nationalists. The main aim for everyone in this period was the defence of freedom and independence against the common enemy from abroad.

During the physical revolution, the existence of the young Republic was twice endangered by the Dutch military offensive; the first was on July 21, 1947, when the central government was forced to move from Jakarta to Jogyakarta in Central Java, ⁴¹ and the second was on December 19, 1948, when Jogyakarta was surrounded by Dutch parachute troopers. The government was forced to surrender, but Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, the Minister of Finance and a prominant member of <u>Masjumi</u>, was empowered to take over the emergency government, since he was at that time visiting Sumatra.⁴²

The spirit of <u>santri</u> communities in their fight against the Dutch for political freedom was at the same time a struggle for the freedom of Islam. It was the continuation of what had been urged by the leadership of the <u>Masjumi</u> during the Japanese occupation, that is, to prepare Muslims for the liberation of their country and their religion.⁴³

In this respect, on October 22, 1945, the <u>Nahdatul Ulama</u> announced the <u>resolusi jihād</u> (resolution concerning the Holy War) which was to be regarded as an authoritative <u>fatwā</u> (legal opinion) of the <u>kiyais</u> and ^C<u>ulamā</u>. In this resolution, the <u>jihād</u> for the defence of the fatherland was declared to be the individual duty of every Muslim, wherever he might be. To some extent, the outbreak of fighting between the Indonesian youths and the British troops

in Surabaya on November 10, 1945, had been provoked by this resolution. 44

Throughout the years of the armed revolution the <u>Masjumi</u> sometimes co-operated with nationalist and Communist parties in a coalition cabinet.⁴⁵ During this co-operation the Muslim political party was always caught in unavoidable dualism. On the one hand, the <u>Masjumi</u> had to agree to the multi-interpretable formulas of the <u>Pancasila</u>, and on the other hand, the party wanted to strive for the realization of Islamic principles in state and society in a democratic way.

Besides encouraging the fight in the way of God, the <u>Masjumi</u>'s party programme of 1946 also emphasized the realization of the ideals of Islam in state affairs and the formation of a society which was based on justice in accordance with the teachings of Islam.⁴⁶ At the same time the party was also believed it necessary to strengthen the <u>Pancasila</u> in order to realize an Islamic society. In other words, the strength of the <u>santri</u> community had to be concentrated to defend religion, country and nation.

On June 6, 1947, the party reemphasized in its programme that the Republic of Indonesia, the people of which were largely Muslim, should be a state with a constitution based on principle which were in agreement with this religion or not in conflict with the teachings of Islam. This was followed by the decision of the party's congress in March 1948, that the government should be urged to make religious instruction compulsory in elementary and secondary schools. 47

It was only after July 1947 that the first split in the <u>Masjumi</u> took place. The increasing dominance of the young Muslim leaders within the <u>Masjumi</u> created a negative reaction among the older leaders of the prewar <u>Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia</u> within the party. The latter felt that their positions in the <u>Masjumi</u> were not as high as they merited on the basis of the positions they had held in the prewar Islamic movement. Another reason for the split was that the group of Abikusno Tjokrosujoso opposed the agreement of the leaders of the <u>Masjumi</u> with Sjahrir's policy of negotiation with the Dutch. The process of separation was accelerated when a number of members under the leadership of Wondoamiseno and Arudji Kartawinata re-established the old <u>Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia</u> in order to take part in the left-wing cabinet of Amir Sjarifuddin, while the Masjumi became the opposition.⁴⁸

However, a more serious tension took place in April 1952, between the progressive wing of the <u>Masjumi</u> and its conservative group of <u>kiyais</u> and ^c<u>ulamā</u>', resulting in the withdrawal of the <u>Nahdatul Ulama</u> from the <u>Masjumi</u> and its development into a political party.

The reason for the withdrawal was that the <u>kiyais</u> and ^Culama' came to be regarded as merely an advisory body and no longer engaged in the political struggle. Moreover, every problem was considered by the party executive only from a political point of view, without religious guidance from the <u>kiyais</u> and ^C<u>ulamā</u>¹.⁴⁹ The immediate cause of the withdrawal was probably the struggle for the post of Minister of Religious Affairs in the Wilopo cabinet, which then in the hands of Kiyai Haji Fakih Usman from the <u>Muhammadiyah</u>, whereas the <u>Nahdatul Ulama</u> continued to claim this post for Kiyai Haji Wachid Hasjim.⁵⁰

The statutes of <u>Nahdatul Ulama</u> described a party based on Islam, aimed at upholding Islamic law in accordance with one of the four schools of law (<u>Shāfi^cī, Mālikī</u>, <u>Hanafī</u> and <u>Hambalī</u>), and bringing about the application of the precepts of Islam in society.⁵¹

Besides the above-mentioned party strife, attention should be called to the so-called <u>Darul Islam</u> (House of Islam or Islamic State). It arose in West Java under Kartosuwirjo. The idea was to establish a purely Islamic state based on Islamic law as incorporated in the <u>Qur'ān</u> and <u>Hadīth</u>. Kartosuwirjo was appointed as the imām (leader).⁵²

After the Dutch had begun their first military offensive against the Republic, Kartosuwirjo called for a Holy War against them. He established the <u>Tentara Islam Indonesia</u> (Indonesian Muslim Army) under the command of Kamran.⁵³

Kartosuwirjo consistently opposed every sort of compromise with the Dutch. He also refused to accept the Renville Agreement made between the Republic and the Netherlands in January 1948, which, among other decisions, concerned the military boundary and free plebiscite.⁵⁴ In this way he clashed with the leader of the Republic and also with the leaders of the <u>Masjumi</u> who had officially accepted the Renville Agreement.⁵⁵ After the establishment of the <u>Majlis Ummat Islam</u> (Council of the Islamic Community) and Kartosuwirjo was appointed as the <u>imām</u> of <u>Darul Islam</u> the <u>Negara Islam</u> <u>Indonesia</u> (Indonesian Islamic State) was apparently proclaimed in May, 1948.⁵⁶

However, by March 1948, the Dutch policy had led to the formation of the State of <u>Pasundan</u> in the Dutch-controlled areas, particularly in towns of West Java, whereas Kartosuwirjo's troops controlled the larger part of the countryside. At this point, the government of the Republic did not wish to consider Kartosuwirjo's action as a rising against the Republic, but only as a regional counter-move against the Dutch-made State of <u>Pasundan</u>.⁵⁷

An open clash between Kartosuwirjo's troops and the Republic's began in January 1949, when the pro-government troops of the <u>Siliwangi</u> Division moved from Central Java to West Java to control the Republic's territory. The first incident was unavoidable. Then, a government committee was formed under the leadership of Mohammad Natsir to look for a solution to the <u>Darul Islam</u> movement, but it could do very little.⁵⁸

The <u>Darul Islam</u>, in the following years, began to degenerate into terrorizing gangs which could not easily be reintegrated into

society. Kartosuwirjo's followers began to disperse, many of them deserted or were taken prisoner. In 1962 Kartosuwirjo was captured.⁵⁹

The internal rift which was revealed during the period of armed revolution was also the product of Communist initiative culminating in the so-called Madiun Affair in 1948. Ostensibly, the issue at stake on this occasion was how much should be conceded by the government of the Republic in its negotiations with the Dutch. But underlying the overt issue was a bid for power on the part of the Communist Party.⁶⁰

The intellectuals and democratic socialists in the Socialist Party split away to form the <u>Partai Sosialis Indonesia</u> (Indonesian Socialist Party) and the left wing, the core of the Communist Party, was reorganized as the <u>Front Demokrasi Rakyat</u> (People's Democratic Front) under Amir Sjarifuddin. The latter refused to accept a junior position in the Hatta cabinet and soon launched strong attacks against the cabinet.⁶¹

When Musso, after over twenty years of exile in the Soviet Union, returned to Indonesia on August 11, 1948, he drew up a resolution calling for the reorganization of the Communist force into the national united front policy. ⁶² The Communist Party, which had supported negotiations with the Dutch up to the Renville Agreement, changed its attitude. It now advocated the breaking off of negotiations with Dutch and abrogating the Renville Agreement which Amir Sjarifuddin himself had signed when he was Prime Minister. It was the first issue on which the Communist withdrew its support from the government.

The second issue concerned the demobilization of the armed forces, which the Communists opposed, fearing that this would mean the demobilization of armed units under Communist control. The Madiun rebellion began when the Communist and pro-Communist civilians and army officers in Madiun panicked at the government's plan to demobilize many of the Communist-led armed units.⁶³

After the military incident at Solo between the <u>Senopati</u> Division (which was regarded as the Communist stronghold within the Indonesian army) and the pro-government troops of the <u>Siliwangi</u> Division, the Communist units under Sumarsono and Djokosujono on September 18, 1948, occupied the government offices, telephone exchange and army headquarters at Madiun and called on other Communist units to follow their example.

The Communist leaders who arrived at Madiun, among whom were Musso, Amir Sjarifuddin, Setiadjid and Wikana, were presented with a <u>fait accompli</u>. Seeing that it was too soon to attempt a coup, they reasoned that they had no choice but to associate themselves with this new revolutionary phase.⁶⁴

At ten o'clock on the night of September 19, 1948, Sukarno stated in a radio address that the Communist Party was making a clear bid for power throughout the country. He called on the population to choose between Musso and his Communist Party who would obstruct the attainment of an independent Indonesia, and Sukarno and Hatta who would lead the Republic of Indonesia to independence without subjecting it to any other country.⁶⁵

An hour and a half later, Musso broadcasted a reply calling on the people to overthrow Sukarno and Hatta, whom he accused of leading the national bourgeois class which had always been uncertain in its stand in facing the imperialists in general and America in particular.⁶⁶ The rebellion went on for several weeks.

On October 28, 1948, the last large rebel military unit, numbering about 1,500 men, was captured and the back of the rebellion was definitely broken. Three days later Musso was killed in a skirmish. On November 29, 1948 Djokosujono and Maruto Darusman were captured. The same fate befell Amir Sjarifuddin and Suripno on December 1, 1948.⁶⁷

The Indonesian National Army headquarters annouced the final termination of the rebellion, on December 7, 1948, and stated that approximately 35,000 persons had been arrested. ⁶⁸ During the Madiun Affair, several hundred civil servants and school teachers were executed by the Communists. In particular, members of the <u>Masjumi</u> were put to torture and executed.⁶⁹ During the internal crisis in the Republic, the United States government put pressure on the Netherlands not to intervene.⁷⁰

It could be concluded that the period of the armed revolution was characterized as being a period of relative unity in the common struggle against the Dutch. Of course, there occured a great number of incidents, and an intense rivalry and struggle for power among the political parties. However, all the internal rifts could be traced back to basic divergence between <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> which had been long rooted in the Javanese people.

FOOTNOTES

¹Sukarno, <u>Nationalism, Islam and Marxism</u>, trans. by Karel H. Warouw and P.D. Weldon with an introduction by Ruth T. McVey (Ithaca, New York: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1970), pp. 37-62.

²H. Feith and L. Castles, <u>Indonesian Political Thinking</u> 1945-1965 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 13.

³<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 2-3, 12.

⁴A. Jasunaka, "Basic Data on Indonesian Political Leaders", trans. by Kenichi Goto, <u>Indonesia</u>, no. 10 (Ithaca, New York: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1970), p. 108.

> ⁵See pages 77-79. ⁶Kahin, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 115. ⁷<u>Ibid</u>., p. 121.

⁸<u>Barisan Pelopor</u> (Vanguard Corps) was intended to be the driving activist vanguard to mobilize and control of population in the Japanese occupation. See Anderson, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 29.

⁹<u>Peta</u>, the abbreviation of <u>Pembela Tanah Air</u> (Fatherland Defense Force), was established in October 1943 by the Japanese. It was intended as an auxiliary guerrilla force to be employed in the even of an Allied invasion of Java. See also Anderson, <u>ibid</u>., p. 20.

¹⁰B. Dahm, <u>History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century</u>, trans. by P.S. Falla (London: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 108; see also Anderson, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 20.

¹¹Anderson, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 64. ¹²Lev, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 35.

¹³<u>Ibid</u>., ¹⁴<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 35-37. ¹⁵<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 40-41.

¹⁶J.M. Van der Kroef, "Society and Culture in Indonesian Nationalism", <u>The American Journal of Sociology</u>, LVII (July 1952-May 1953), p. 17.

¹⁷Von der Mehden, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 76-78.

¹⁸Sukarno, <u>The Birth of Pancasila. An Outline of the Five</u> <u>Principles of the Indonesian State</u> (Jakarta; Department of Information Republic of Indonesia, 1960), pp. 18-20.

¹⁹<u>Ibid</u>., p. 24. ²⁰<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 27-28. ²¹Boland, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 25.

²²See the last paragraph of Jakarta Charter in appendix III; cf. Boland, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 25-26.

²³Dahm, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 106; see also Lev, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 42-43. ²⁴Dahm, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 106.

²⁵The members of the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence see pages 99-100.

²⁶Boland, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 35-36.

²⁷<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 36; Lev, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 43; see the Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945 on appendix IV. The expression of Belief in God had been amplified to Belief in the One and Omnipotent God.

²⁸Benda, <u>Rising Sun</u>, p. 189 quoting "Agama Dalam Indonesia Merdeka" (The Religion in Indépendent Indonesia), <u>Indonesia Merdeka</u> (Independent Indonesia) I, no. 3 (May 25, 1945), p. 3. ²⁹Ibid., p. 190.

³⁰Soedjatmoko, "The Role of Political Parties in Indonesia", Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia, ed. by W. Thayer (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), p. 130.

³¹Kahin, <u>op. cit</u>., pp. 156, 158-159; Anderson, <u>op. cit</u>., pp. 203, 217, 220, 227.

³²Van der Kroef. "Society and Culture", p. 14.

33 Soedjatmoko, op. cit., p. 133.

³⁴Kahin, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 304.

³⁵Further discussion on the social conflict of political campaign preceded the general election of 1955 consult H. Feith The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, New York; Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 353-366.

³⁶The names of organizations associated to the political parties see appendix V.

³⁷Dahm, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 172. 38_{Ibid}.

³⁹C. Geertz, Peddlers and Princes. Social Change and Economic Modernization in Two Indonesian Towns (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 16.

40 Ibid., p. 16. ⁴¹Dahm, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 129. 42Ibid., p. 137. 43_{Benda, Rising Sun, p. 176.} 44 Abubakar, Sedjarah Hidup, p. 478. ⁴⁵The composition of cabinet of the Republic Indonesia 1945-1950 see T.S.G. Mulia and K.A.H. Hidding, eds., <u>Ensiklopedia</u> <u>Indonesia</u> (Bandung - 's-Gravenhage: N.V. Penerbitan W. van Hoeve, n.d.), pp. 21-26.

⁴⁶Kahin, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 306-307.

47 Boland, op. cit., p. 44.

⁴⁸G. McT. Kahin, "The Indonesian Politics and Nationalism", <u>Asian Nationalism and the West</u>, ed. by William L. Holland (New York: Macmillan Company, 1953), pp. 81-82; Boland, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 45.

⁴⁹ Abubakar, <u>Sedjarah Hidup</u>, p. 478.
⁵⁰ <u>Ibid</u>., p. 563.
⁵¹ <u>Ibid</u>., p. 509.
⁵² Nieuwenhuijze, <u>Aspects of Islam</u>, p. 162.
⁵³ <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 170-171.
⁵⁴ Dahm, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 130.
⁵⁵ Nieuwenhuijze, <u>Aspects of Islam</u>, p. 169.
⁵⁶ <u>Ibid</u>., p. 171.
⁵⁷ Boland, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 58.
⁵⁸ <u>Ibid</u>., p. 59.

⁵⁹<u>Ibid</u>., p. 62. Further discussion on <u>Darul Islam</u> consult Nieuwenhuijze, <u>Aspects of Islam</u>, pp. 161-179; Kahin, <u>Nationalism and</u> <u>Revolution</u>, pp. 326-331.

⁶⁰Legge, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 133.

⁶¹Dahm, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 131; Kahin, <u>Nationalism and Revolution</u>, p. 259.

⁶²D. Hindley, <u>The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963</u> (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), p. 20.

CONCLUSION

In order to understand Muslim society in Java, historical interpretation is needed which operates along the two dimensions of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>. The history of Islam in Java is almost the history of orthodox Muslim or <u>santri</u> civilization; the history of the <u>abangans</u> (who are not less than the <u>santris</u> in numbers) has been left almost untouched.

This study of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u>, therefore, is made through an integrated approach and is concerned with historical events as manifestations of a deep-seated religious divergence along with its implications for social and political life in Java.

In the course of history, the Javanese Muslims have been bifurcated into <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> as a continuous outgrowth of the different social and environmental backgrounds. This process resulted in two typologically distinct groups with different aspirations and orientations. No wonder that it is sometimes difficult to understand how Islam came to be variegated in its practice and apparently influenced by Hindu-Buddhist and indigenous elements.

Many social, cultural, economic and political factors have influenced the growth of these two groups. Especially, the structure of Islamization and the concessions to old custom paved the way for the creation of these groups. While the great majority of the

Javanese follow the Islamic faith, there exists wide variation in the practice of the religion. Therefore, paying attention to <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> in Java will afford a better understanding of Islam as it is professed in this island.

The general differences between <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> can be seen in various aspects concerning doctrine and matters of social organization. Among the <u>santris</u> the concern with doctrine almost entirely overshadows all ritualistic aspects; moreover, they emphasize the application of Islamic doctrine to life, while the <u>abangan</u> are apparently indifferent to doctrine, but more fascinated by ritual detail.

In terms of social organization, Islam is seen by the <u>santri</u> as a set of social circles ranging from the individual to a great <u>ummah</u> and even to the whole of the Islamic world, while for the <u>abangan</u>, there is no real organic religious community. Only their sharing in a single tradition constitutes harmony of religious activities.

The rapid expansion of Islamic orthodoxy in Java as the result of the increasing number of <u>hājjs</u>, <u>kiyais</u>, ^C<u>ulamā</u>' and <u>pesantrens</u>, as well as the influx of Hadramaut Arabs to Java, tended toward the strengthening of a uniform Islam through religious education, publication, and the activities of Ministry of Religious Affairs. Some indigenous beliefs and customs are gradually being eliminated with the passage of time, but many of them have remained

as they were. That is why the existence of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> is an inevitable factor in Javanese Muslim society.

Whenever <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> play increasingly important political roles in Java, the rivalry between the Islamic political force of <u>santri</u> and the non-religious political power of <u>abangan</u> become one of the basic determinants of Javanese social and political history in independent Indonesia.

During early independence, liberal, democratic and socialist currents of thought merged with nationalism and produced an ideological formulation with which Islam was forced to cope.

The political attitudes of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> diverge under the influence of different political ideologies. An example is the controversy concerning the <u>Pancasila</u> versus Islam as the basis of the state. Consequently, the political powers of <u>santri</u> and <u>abangan</u> find themselves divided and competing for support and influence.

Among the reasons for the failure of Islam to become the predominant political power are, apparently, the lack of unity among the Muslim political powers, limited ability to mobilize Muslim strength in government and politics, and the tendency toward exclusivism of the <u>abangan</u> group.

GLOSSARY.

This clossary is intended to identify the Javanese, Indonesian and Arabic terms, including the Arabic terms which are modified into Javanese or Indonesian use. It also clarify the names of organizations and their abbreviations.

А

abangan	- Javanese Muslim who is little concerned with the precepts of Islam and whose way of life is still much influenced by the Ja-
	vanese pre-Islamic tradition.
abdi dalem	- official of the king.
abdi dalem pametakan	- white official of the king.
adat	- customary law; Arabic ^C adah.
agama Java	- Javanese religion.
ajar	- Javanese learning; a sage.
aliran	- current, trend.
andap-asor	- modesty.
angker	- disapproachable.
	В
badal	- substitute; Arabic badal.
Badan Penyelidik Kemerdekaan	
Indonesia	- Investigating Committee for Indo-
	nesian Independence.
bahasa Indonesia	- Indonesian language.
Barisan Pelopor	- Vanguard Corps.
batik	- traditional Javanese textile.
Bayangkare Islah	- Vanguard Corps for Improvement.
bersih desa	- cleaning of the village.

beruk	- coconut shell.
Budi Utomo	- Noble Endeavour.
	C
cakal-bakal	- the original founder of the village.
candi	- temple.
Club Pendidikan Nasional	- Indonesian National Education
Indonesia	Club.
	D
danyang	- guardian spirit.
danyang desa	- guardian spirit of the village.
Darul Islam	- House of Islam; Islamic State.
desa keputihan; desa mutihan;	- village of the whites.
desa pamutihan	
desa perdikan	- village granted freedom from
	taxes and service.
dewa	- deity.
donga	- prayer; Arabic du ^c ā'.
donga slamet	- prayer aiming for procure safety.
dukun	- man who is able to control a
	spirit; magician.
	Е
	E
eling-waspada	- cautious and ready.
empu	- dagger maker.
	_
	F
fatwa	- legal opinion; Arabic fatwā.
	G
gamelan	- Javanese orchestra.
Golongan Merdeka	- Independent Group.
2	- •

- teacher, especially in mystical sense.
Н
 pilgrim. God's Force; Party of God. deity. The Omnipotent God.
- belief; Arabic īmān. - statistical Muslim. J
- the age of the saints. - demon; Arabic jinn. - talisman; Arabic ^C azīmah K
 pilgrim, one who has made the pil- grimage to Mecca. Office for Religious Affairs. a quarter around the mosque where
 santris usually live. mass of people; the ruled. nationalism. inner-life of man. sincere devotion. Javanese dagger. teacher of Islamic religious school; old respected man or char- ismatic independent religious teacher.

Konggres Bahasa Indonesia Pertama - First Indonesian Language Congress. - black velvet cap like fez. kopiyah - white cotton cap for the pilgrim. kopiyah kaji krama inggil - honorific sublanguage. krama madya - middle sublanguage. - miracle; sacred; Arabic karamah. kramat - court; palace. kraton L - prayer house. langgar - closing ceremony of the fasting lebaran month of Ramadan. lillahi ta^Cala - for the God alone. М Majlis Ummat Islam - Council of Muslim Community. masa kebangkitan nasional - period of national awakening. Masjumi (Masjlis Sjura Muslimin - Council of Indonesian Muslim. Indonesia) - mosque. mesjid MIAI (Majlis Islam A^Cla Indonesia) - Supreme Islamic Council of Indonesia. - Modernist social and educational Muhammadiyah Muslim movement. - religious scholar; ^culamā' mullah or mohalla muludan - ceremony of the Prophet's birthday; Arabic mawlud. Ν narima - acceptance. Nahdatul Ulama - Council of Muslim Scholar; Renaissance of ^CUlama'.

ndara	- the nobility.
ndesa	- village.
Negara Islam Indone sia	- Indonesian Islamic State.
ngelmu	- knowledge of getting into com-
	munication with the spirit; eso-
	teric knowledge; Arabic ^C ilm.
ngoko	- low sublanguage.
	P
pamong praja	- civil servant.
p a moring kawula Gusti	- the union between servant and God.
Pancasila	- Five Principles as the Indonesian
	state philosophy; Belief in the
	One and Omnipotent God, Umanity
	based on justice and civility,
	The national unity of Indonesia,
	Democracy and Social justice.
pangreh praja	- civil ruler.
Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan	- Preparatory Committee for
Indonesia	Indonesian Independence.
Partai Indonesia (Partindo)	- Indonesian Party.
Partai Indonesia Raya	- Great Indonesian Party.
Partai Komunis Indonesia	- Indonesian Communist Party.
Partai Nasional Indonesia	- Indonesian Nationalist Party.
Part a i Rakyat Indonesia	- Indonesian People's Party.
Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia	- Indonesian Muslim Association
	Party.
Partai Sosialis Indonesia	- Indonesian Socialist Party.
pasar	- market.
penyantren	- traditional Islamic religious
	school in Madura.

Pergerakan Kaum Buruh - Trade Union Central. Pergerakan Kaum Buruh Revolusioner- Revolutionary Trade Union Central. Perhimpunan Indonesia - Indonesian Society. Perhimpunan Partai-Partai Kebang-- Council of Indonesian Political saan Indonesia Parties. Perserikatan Komunis di Indies - Communist Association in Indies. - traditional Muslim center of pesantren learning; Islamic religious school. - Fatherland Defence Force. Peta (Pembela Tanah Air) Piagam Jakarta - Jakarta Charter. - traditional Islamic religious pondok school; see also pesantren. - bureaucrat; administrative civil priyayi servant. puji-pujian - hymns of praise. pusaka - sacred heirloom. R Raden; Raden Mas - title of Javanese nobility. - traditional Islamic religious rangkang meunasah school in Aceh. rapal - Arabic phrase; lafz. resolusi jihad - resolution concerning the Holy War. - soul. ruh, arwah (pl.) - eighth month of Hijrah; Sha^cban. Ruwah S sabar - patient; Arabic sabr. _ prayer; Arabic salah. salat

santri

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santana dalem
Sanyo Kaigi
Sarekat Dagang Islam
Sarekat Islam
Sarekat Rakyat
sarengat
sawah
sembah
serimpi
setan
shahbandar
sharī<sup>c</sup>a
shāstra
shāstrī or çāstrī
slamet
slametan
sudagar
sultan
surau
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Taman Siswa

tani tapa

tatakrama tauchid

Tentara Islam Indonesia

-	pious Muslim who practise the
	Islamic instruction seriously.
-	family of the king (ruler).
-	Advisers Council.
-	Muslim Trading Association.
-	Islamic Association.
-	People's Association.
-	Islamic law; Arabic sharī ^c a.
-	irrigated rice field.
-	reverence.
-	Javanese classical dance.
-	devil.
-	harbour master.
-	Islamic law.
-	scripture; a religious treatise.
-	man who knows the holy book.
	to be safe; Arabic salamah.
-	communal feast.
-	trader.
-	ruler; Arabic sultan.
-	traditional Islamic religious
	school in Minangkabau.
Т	
T	
-	Garden of Pupils, nationalist
	school system founded by Ki Hadjar
	Dewantoro.
-	farmer.
-	to practise asceticism.
-	Javanese etiquette.
_	the Oneness of God

- the Oneness of God.
- Indonesian Islamic Army.

	U
^C ulamā'	- religious scholar.
ummah	- Islamic community.
	W
wadah	- container.
wali	- Islamic saint.
waliyu Allah	- friend of God.
wayang	- Javanese puppet shadow play.
widadari	- celestial nymph.
wong cilik	- little people.
wong dagang	- merchant.
	У
vang	- deity.

THE DUTCH ACADEMIC TITLES AND RELIGIOUS TITLES.

Mr.	(Meester)	-	Master of Laws.
Ir.	(Ingenieur)	-	a title for the graduates in En-
			gineering, Architecture, Agri-
			culture and Forestry.
Drs.	(Doctorandus)	-	a title for the graduates in
			Economics, and Nederlands Indies
			Studies.
Dr.	(Dokter)	-	a title for Medical and Dental
			graduates.
K.	(Kiyai)	-	Islamic religious teacher.
H.	(Haji)	-	one who has made the pilgrimage
			to Mecca.

APPENDIX I.

CONVERSION TABLE FOR JAVANESE/INDONESIAN-ARABIC

PROPER NAMES

- CAbd al-Qahr Mudhakkir Abdul Kahar Muzakir - ^CAbd al-Mu^Cīz Abdul Muis - Amir Sharif al-Din Amir Sjarifuddin - Dar al-Islam Darul Islam - Darajah Drajad - Fatimahbint maymun Fatimah binti Maimun - Hizb Allah Hizbullah Ja^Cfar Sadiq - Ja^cfar al-Sādiq Majlis Islam A^Cla Indonesia - Majlīs al-Islām a^Clā Indonesia Majlis Syura Muslimin Indonesia - Majlis Shura Muslimin Indonesia - Majlis al-ummat al-Islam Majlis Ummat Islam - Mawlana Malik Ibrahim Maulana Malik Ibrahim Mohammad Hasan - Muhammad Hasan - Muhammad Hatta Mohammad Hatta - Muhammad Nasr Mohammad Natsir - Muhammad Rum Mohammad Roem - Muhammadiyah Muhammadiyah - Muhammad Yamin Muhammad Yamin - Nahdat al-Culama Nahdatul Ulama - Fattah Patah - Rahmah Rakhmat - Rashid Rasjid - Rāshidī Rasjidi - Salim Salim - Shamsi Samsi




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Sarekat Islam
Sarekat Rakyat
Sultan Malikul Salih
Sultan Malikul Zahir
Syahid
Syarif Hidayatullah
Wachid Hasjim
Zainul Arifin
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
- Sharīkat al-Islām
- Sharikat al-Ra^Ciyah
- Sultān Malīk al-Sālih
- Sultān Malīk al-Zāhir
- Shahid
- Sharif Hidayat Allah
- Wahid Hashim
- Zayn al-^CĀrifīn

APPENDIX II.

THE DIAGRAM OF JAVANESE SOCIAL STRATIFICATION.



HORIZONTAL-VERTICAL



APPENDIX III.

JAKARTA CHARTER.*

Since independence is the right of every nation, any form of subjugation in this world, being contrary to humanity and justice, must be abolished.

The struggle for Indonesian's independence has reached a stage of glory in which the Indonesian people are led to the gate of an Indonesian state which is independent, united, sovereign, just and prosperous.

With the blessing of Almighty God and moved by the highest ideals to lead a free national life, the Indonesian people hereby declare their independence.

Further to establish a government for the Indonesian state; to protect the whole Indonesian people and country; to promote the public welfare; to improve the educational level of the people; and to participate in establishing a world order which is founded on freedom, eternal peace and social justice; national independence is set forth in a constitution of the Indonesian state, which is a republic resting upon the people's sovereignty and founded on the belief in God, "with the obligation for the adherents of Islam to practise the <u>sharī^ca</sub> (Islamic law)"¹</u>, in accordance with the principle of rightous and moral humanity, the unity of Indonesia, and a democracy led by the wise policy through consultation/representation, ensuring social justice for the whole Indonesian people.

Jakarta, June 22, 1945.

Ir. Sukarno Drs. Mohammad Hatta Mr. A.A. Maramis Abikusno Tjokrosujoso Abdul Kahar Muzakir H.A. Salim Mr. Achmad Subardjo Wachid Hasjim Mr. Muhammad Yamin

* Muhammad Yamin, "Piagam Jakarta" (Jakarta Charter), <u>Prokala-</u> <u>masi dan Konstitusi Republik Indonesia</u> (Proclamation and Constitution of the Republic Indonesia) (Jakarta: Penerbit Jambatan, 1958), p. 17. Translation into English is based on <u>Constitutions of Asian Countries</u>, prepared by The Secretariat of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, New Delhi (Bombay: N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd., 1968), p. 415.

A phrase between quotation marks is the crucial point.

APPENDIX IV.

PREAMBLE

OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC INDONESIA 1945.

Since independence is the right of every nation, any form of subjugation in this world, being contrary to humanity and justice, must be abolished.

The struggle for Indonesian's independence has reached a stage of glory in which the Indonesian people are led to the gate of an Indonesian state which is independent, united, sovereign, just and prosperous.

With the blessing of Almighty God and moved by the highest ideals to lead a free national life, the Indonesian people hereby declare their independence.

Further to establish a government for the Indonesian state; to protect the whole Indonesian people and country; to promote the public welfare; to improve the educational level of the people; and to participate in establishing a world order which is founded on freedom, eternal peace and social justice; national independence is set forth in a constitution of the Indonesian state, which is a republic resting upon the people's sovereignty and founded on the belief in "the One and Omnipotent God"¹, rightous and moral humanity, the unity of Indonesia, and a democracy led by wise guidance through consultation/representation, ensuring social justice for the whole Indonesian people.

¹The expression of belief in God, in the text of Jakarta Charter, has been amplified to belief in the One and Omnipotent God.

^{*}English translation is adopted from <u>Constitutions of Asian</u> <u>Countries</u>, prepared by The Secretariat of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, New Delhi (Bombay: N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd., 1968), p. 415.

APPENDIX V.

THE FOUR MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR ASSOCIATE ORGANIZATIONS.

I. MASJUMI:

1. Muslimat Masjumi (Masjumi Woman Association).

- 2. Serikat Buruh Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Labour Association).
- 3. Serikat Tani Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Peasant Association).
- 4. Serikat Dagang Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Trader Association).
- 5. Himpunan Seni Budaya Islam (Muslim Artist Group).
- 6. Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Youth Movement).

II. NAHDATUL ULAMA:

- 1. Muslimat N.U. (N.U. Woman Association).
- 2. Serikat Buruh Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Labour Union).
- 3. Persatuan Tani N.U. (N.U. Peasant Union).
- 4. Lembaga Seni Budaya Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Artist Institution).
- 5. Gerakan Pemuda "Ansor" ("Ansor" Youth Movement).
- 6. Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Student Movement).
- 7. Ikatan Pelajar N.U. (N.U. Pupil Union).
- 8. Fatayat (Young Woman Organization).

III. PARTAI NASIONAL INDONESIA:

- 1. Gerakan Wanita Marhaen (Marhaen Woman Movement).
- 2. Gerakan Buruh Marhaen (Marhaen Labour Movement).
- 3. Gerakan Tani Marhaen (Marhaen Peasant Movement).
- 4. Gerakan Pemuda Marhaen (Marhaen Youth Movement).
- 5. Geråkan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Student Movement).

IV. PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA:

- 1. Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Indonesian Woman Movement).
- 2. Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (Central All Indonesian Trade Union).
- 3. Barisan Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasant Troop).
- 4. Pemuda Rakyat (Peoples' Youth).
- 5. Central Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia (Central Indonesian Student Movement).
- 6. Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat (Institute of Peoples' Culture).

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