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A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMAL BEHAVIOUR
OF INFANTRY RECRUITS AND CORPORALS

A Thesis

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PREFACE

The author wishes to express his thanks to all those who made the writing of this thesis possible. ~~First of all, acknowledgement must be given to~~ The Defence Research Board ^{made} ~~for making~~ available to the author ^{a portion of} the Army data gathered during the summer of 1952. Thanks must also be given to the other members of the team involved in the sociological research project for their general aid-- Audrey Wipper, Ted W. Rashleigh, Bruce A. MacFarlane, Tom F.S. McFeat, Frank E. Jones, and David N. Solomon, the research director.

The author also owes a special debt to David N. Solomon, Tom F.S. McFeat, and Frank E. Jones for a great deal of valuable advice which came out of numerous discussions which were held while the research project was under way. Liberal use has also been made of the material in an unpublished paper on the culture of the Army ^{by} ~~which~~ Tom F.S. McFeat. ~~wrote for the Defence Research Board.~~ While the author can truly say that the thesis has been improved by discussions with all of the members of the research team, they are not to be held responsible, in any way, for any of the faults or errors in this thesis.

~~A special debt is due, too, to the Canadian Army officers whose cooperation made the study possible, and to the NCO's and privates who bore the main brunt of our investigation. Their names, where used in this thesis, are fictional, in order that their anonymity may be maintained.~~

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Finally, the author owes most to Professor Oswald Hall, who directed the thesis, acted as consultant for the Defence Research Board team, and spent a previous summer doing field work of a similar nature. His first-hand knowledge of the Army was of incalculable aid.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. The Problem

The author spent three months during the summer of 1952 at a training camp with an infantry company of the Canadian Army. He spent most of his time with the recruits in the company, watching them while they were training, drinking in the canteen, hanging around the hut, and resting between training periods. He went on a three-day leave with them, and carried his pack and tramped with them on three different schemes. He ate in the same mess hall as the recruits, and slept in the same hut. During this time the recruits came into contact with many privates, and with several corporals, sergeants, and officers. The author saw them do many of the things he had expected they would do, as members of a military unit, in contact with each other and with their superiors. But the author also saw the unexpected. A good deal of their behaviour seemed to be completely unrelated to military behaviour, and in some cases it appeared to be opposed to military behaviour.

The military services have a big job to do, and must divide the work to be done among the different units comprising the services. Part of the job has been assigned to the Army, and within the Army there are many further

divisions, for example, into basic arms, supporting arms, services, and headquarters. Even the author, confined to a single infantry company, was able to see that many different jobs were ~~being~~ being done. For example, in the regimental area, there was the mess hall, quartermaster's stores, and rifle stores. Preparing food, issuing clothing, and issuing and maintaining rifles were the sorts of jobs one expected to find being done in the Army.

But the author found that unexpected things were being done, too, and with striking regularity. It is true that the men turned out for training regularly, but they also griped regularly. And when someone would "squeal" or "suckhole", they would, predictably, react hostilely. Thus, the author found that certain things were being done, like grilling, punishing "squealers", and punishing "suckholes", which appeared to be unrelated or opposed to the expected military behaviour.

The different jobs which must be done in the Army must be coordinated. One person cannot do all the work, and therefore we find specialization, both between corps and within the corps. And to coordinate the different work being done we find someone with authority. Of course, one person cannot coordinate everything that is being done, and for that reason we find that authority is delegated. This leads to a hierarchical organization. At the head of an infantry platoon, we find a first or second lieutenant,

who, along with the lieutenants of two other platoons, is under the authority of the company major. Subject to the authority of the platoon lieutenant is the platoon sergeant, and subject to the authority of the platoon sergeant are the corporals in charge of each of the three sections of the platoon. In this area, where authority is exercised, the author saw the expected thing. Orders went from superior to subordinate, from major to lieutenant, lieutenant to sergeant, sergeant to corporal, and corporal to recruit or private. The author, spending most of his time with the recruits, saw, for the most part, orders as they were given by the corporal to the recruit. The corporal called out the commands on the parade square, and the recruits obeyed. The corporal told three recruits to carry cases of milk into the kitchen, and the recruits obeyed. The corporal told the recruits to wash the hut floor, and the recruits obeyed. These demands, by superior of subordinate, were what we expected to find within the military unit.

But "orders" of an unexpected sort were given, too. The recruits and privates were effectively able to give "orders" to the corporal, who "obeyed". We did not expect to find demands made by subordinate on superior, and upon seeing this it seemed that we were observing behaviour which was not simply unrelated to military behaviour, but which appeared to be opposed to it.

There are many men in the Army, and many changes take place in the membership. Some men die, some go AWOL (Away Without Leave), some get leave, and some are discharged, honourably and dishonourably. Despite these personnel changes, the Army must carry on with its job. Thus, we find that the individual is not important, but the position held by the individual is important, and the impersonal rules governing the behaviour of the position incumbents are important. The emphasis on the impersonal rules makes for a high degree of predictability.

To the extent that the rules are formal and the expected activities attach to the office and not to the particular occupant, the organization can maintain a high degree of ~~predictability~~ stability with a changing personnel. (This principle is most strikingly illustrated, of course, in the organization of the army, where the most general rule is that a subordinate reacts to the uniform, and not to its wearer.)¹

1. Wilbert E. Moore, Industrial relations and the social order, 88.

The formal, impersonal rules specified, for the recruits, when they woke up, and when they had "lights out", when they trained and when they rested. The rules said that they must obey their superiors, or be punished for disobedience. These were the kinds of rules which one expects to find in a military unit.

But there were unexpected rules, too. It soon became apparent to the author that there were many seemingly non-military rules governing the behaviour of the recruits. The recruits did not expect each other to "squeal" on a peer, or to "suckhole", for example, and they did not expect the corporal to put one of them on charge unless he had to.

These rules were followed like the expected military rules, and there was also punishment for disobedience, as there was for disobeying the military rules. Thus, we found rules which were apparently unrelated, and even opposed to military rules.

In short, it became clear that within the infantry company there was a great deal of the unexpected-- unexpected things were being done, unexpected "authority" was being wielded, and unexpected rules were being followed. And, as we have already said, these unexpected items were unexpected precisely because they were apparently unrelated or opposed to military matters. This sets up our problem for us: How can we make sense of these unexpected items? Are they really unrelated or opposed to military matters? Do they really play no part in attaining military objectives? These are the questions that this thesis will try to answer.

2. Adjustment--A Related Problem

The Army is a bureaucratic type of organization. The total job to be done is divided into areas of specialization, or spheres of competence; authority is delegated to coordinate the work, thus giving the Army a hierarchical structure; and formal rules have been established to insure the predictability of behaviour. These characteristics are all characteristics of bureaucratic organization.²

2. See Max Weber, The theory of social and economic organization, 302-3; Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in sociology, 196; Moore, 34-91.

The Army, of course, is not alone in being organized along bureaucratic lines. Most modern industrial and political institutions are also bureaucratic. Specialization, hierarchical organization, and formal rules are to be found, in differing degrees, in all such institutions. Of course, we are not the first to indicate that the unexpected exists alongside of the expected in these institutions. Since the Western Electric research program³ many other

3. See Elton Mayo, Human problems of an industrial civilization; F.J. Roethlisberger and William J. Dickson, Management and the worker; Thomas North Whitehead, The industrial worker, 2 vols; F.J. Roethlisberger, Management and morale.

sociologists⁴ have pointed out the presence of unexpected

4. For example, see William Foote Whyte, Human relations in the restaurant industry; American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 51, Mar. 46; AJS, Vol. 57, Mar. 52.

items of behaviour in different institutions and occupations. These items are unexpected in terms of the institution as it is formally (by written rule) set up. But they are no longer unexpected insofar as the sociologist, and others acquainted with the field of sociology, are concerned.

organization
Rather, the ~~patterns~~ of behaviour which springs up spontaneously among the workers has come to be expected as an inevitable part of the total institutional organization, and has been termed the informal, as opposed to the formal (ly established) organization. .

Although the Army is, in some respects, similar to many other bureaucratic organizations, it is also, in some respects, different. Here, once again, we will begin to speak of that particular part of the Army which we studied. The recruits and privates, with whom we spent most of our time, are at the bottom of the authority hierarchy, and have no formal control over anyone. This is the same situation as one finds among workers in an industrial institution. But in the industrial institution in civilian society the worker is no longer subject to his superiors' orders once his eight-hour day is over. In the Army, the recruit is subject to his superiors' orders twenty-four hours a day. The civilian worker can quit his job; the Army recruit cannot. The civilian worker contracts to do a certain job; the Army recruit can be told to do (virtually) anything. Leave is a privilege, and the recruit's leave can be cancelled if necessary. Sleep is a privilege, and when out on an over night scheme, the recruit's sleeping hours are curtailed. In all cases, it is the recruit's superiors, or the rules which these superiors translate into action, which place demands upon the recruit, and restrain his behaviour. Because of this, the recruit often finds his action patterns blocked, as the following diary excerpts indicate:

Claghorn has a swollen eye. He gets off his bed and says, "I'm going on sick parade." It is then nearly noon. He walks out and returns five minutes later. "Jesus Christ, you can't even see a doctor around here. Tomorrow morning at a quarter to six. Jesus Christ, with my swollen eye I get poisoned."

Parkins: I want to get married, and they never told me that I couldn't get married without their permission. That's not right. They made everything sound like a civilian job, and once you get in you find that you can't do as you please at all. They just keep you copped up.

Observer (Obs): Where's Latadesau?

Seguin: Arf, arf.

Obs: What's that?

Seguin: He's with Dog Company

Obs: Why?

Seguin: He was too far back in his training. But he knew it anyway. He was in the last war.

Obs: What did he say when he was transferred?

Seguin: Nothing. You can't argue with the Army.

Interviewer (Int): Have you found, in your first few days here, that the Army is different from civvy street?

Dollard: Oh, yes, it's different. Civvy street is not as strict, while in the Army you have to be in a certain place at a certain time. You can't do what you want, you have to do what you're told.

After lights out Seguin took up his towel and started for the bathroom to take a shower.

Corporal Cliver: Get back into bed.

Seguin: I want to take a shower.

Cliver: You'll take it in the morning.

Seguin (returning to his bed, whispering): The next thing you know they won't let you take a s---.

That part of the Army which we studied differs from other bureaucratic institutions in another respect, too. The civilian worker, once the working day is over, need no longer associate with his peers. But in the company we studied, the recruit's peers were omnipresent. The recruit trained with his peers, ate with them, slept with them, and went on leave with them. Then he went to the canteen, his peers were there, and when he hung around the

but, his peers were there, too. And the omnipresence of his peers, like the demands of his superiors, often blocked the recruit's action patterns:

Private⁵: Give me a smoke, kid.

Carter: Aw, f---.

Private goes over to Carter's locker and helps himself to a cigarette.

5. Will be used to refer to any private, other than the recruits specifically studied. The formal position of the recruit and private, face-to-face with their superiors and peers, and the informal behaviour patterns of the recruits and privates, are the same.

During a breakoff in the drill period Munro went off to the side to smoke, evidently to keep from having to pass out cigarettes. Stuart followed him to the side and got a cigarette.

The padre, in his sermon, told the men of Peter and Paul, and how they did not let their pride keep them from serving Jesus. "In the same way, when there is a voluntary church parade, you men don't get out of bed because you're afraid of the ridicule of the men about you. But we must learn from St. Peter and St. Paul, and though we can't all be apostles, as they, who were the pillars of the Church, we can all be good Christians."

Filion was putting on his pack and wetting, and Anthony, who was looking on, began to laugh ~~xxxx~~ aloud. "You're basic pouches are on upside down," he said. Filion fixed them.

Sullivan surreptitiously placed some hair oil in his hand, under cover of his barrack box top, and quickly dashed it through his hair.

One of the recruit's saw this, and drew the attention of the others to it, saying, "Oh, you George!" he recruits laughed.

The recruit coming into the Army must learn to play his formally-prescribed role. He must learn to get along with his superiors and his peers. And, as we have pointed out, the demands made by his superiors and the omnipresence of his peers place many restraints upon the recruit's behaviour. It is a new and strange situation for the recruit, and he must adjust to it this situation. This, too, poses a problem: How does the recruit in the Army adjust to the formal situation, in interaction with his superiors and peers? An attempt will be made to answer this question, too, in this thesis. And we will find that the answer to this question is related to our first question, which seeks to explain the presence of the informal (unexpected) patterns of behaviour. We will try to show, as we go along, that the informal patterns of behaviour are functional for the recruit and help him to adjust to his superiors and peers in the formal situation. If this is the case, then the informal patterns of behaviour must be seen as an integral part of the total military organization.

3. The Meaning of "Functional"

We have said that we will try to show that the informal patterns of behaviour which we have observed are functional for the recruit, and not irrelevant to the military situation. We will now explain the meaning of "functional".

own value' depends".⁶ Norton, however, ~~affirms~~ uses

6. Robert K. Merton, Social theory and social structure,
22-3. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~Parsons, Essays in sociological theory
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

the term in a different sense, as it has been used by the anthropological functionalists (e.g. Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown), who modified the term as it is used in the biological sciences. It is in this sense ("functions are those observed consequences which make for the adaptation or adjustment of a given system"⁷) that the

7. Vernon, 50. See also Talcott Parsons, Essays in sociological theory pure and applied, 22 et passim, for a discussion of the concept.

term will be used in this thesis.

In discussing the concept, Merton indicates that the functional anthropologists made a number of false assumptions-- they assumed that every social or cultural item had a positive function; that every item was functional for the total social and cultural structure; and (in some cases) that every item was indispensable. Merton, however, indicates

that a given item can be dysfunctional; that a given item may be functional for one part of the social structure and dysfunctional for another part; and that ~~an~~ alternative items can perform the same function.⁸

8. Merton, 27-38.

Merton distinguishes between subjective disposition and function:

The concept of function involves the standpoint of the observer, not necessarily that of the participant. Social function refers to observable objective consequences . . . and not to subjective dispositions (aims, motives, purposes).⁹

9. Merton, 25-6.

It need not be assumed that the reasons advanced by people for their action are one and the same with the observed consequences of these patterns of behaviour. The subjective disposition may coincide with the objective consequence, but again, it may not. The two vary ~~in~~ independently. Then, however, it is said that people are motivated to engage in behaviour which may give rise to (not necessarily intended) functions, there is offered escape from the troubled sea of confusion.¹⁰

10. Merton, 26.

Merton also distinguishes between manifest and latent functions:

Manifest functions are those objective consequences contributing to the adjustment or adaptation of the system which are intended ~~ex~~ and recognized by participants in the system; latent functions, correlatively, being those which are neither intended or recognized.¹¹

11. Merton, 51.

In Chapter II we will see that the informal patterns of behaviour help the recruit to adjust to the restraints placed upon his behaviour by his superiors and peers, insofar as he is related to them because of the formal organization of the Army. If this is so, then, from the preceding discussion, it follows that the informal patterns of behaviour are functional for the recruit in the formal situation, and as such are not unrelated or opposed to what we have come to expect as (formal) military behaviour.

We will not make the assumption in this thesis that every item of behaviour has a positive function, and that every item of behaviour is functional for every (cultural, social, ~~and~~ or psychological) system involved. It will be shown, when discussing the corporal, that the patterns of behaviour which are functional for the recruit are dysfunctional for the corporal in the formal situation. Further, it must be remembered that we are considering these patterns of behaviour as they are functional for the recruit in the formal situation as we have described it. We do not wish to suggest that, from some other point of view, the same ~~item~~ pattern of behaviour could not be dysfunctional for the recruit. One example suggests itself here. We will discuss a number of patterns of behaviour which involve a repression of emotion on the part of the recruit. These patterns, could, therefore, be seen dysfunctionally, from a point of view other than the one we are taking in this thesis. But it must be remembered that other patterns of behaviour may allow for the release of emotional tension (e.g. drinking, using profanity, sampling, an emphasis upon sex), and thus counterbalance the dysfunctional

5
aspect of ~~this pattern~~ this pattern of behaviour.

"We will not attempt to deal with " the important problem of assessing the net balance of the aggregate of consequences."¹² But we do want to make it clear to the

12. Verton, 51.

reader that we are not implying that the behaviour patterns we will discuss are not dysfunctional (or functional) for the recruit of corporal in other respects than the one we are considering here.

Nor do we assume, in this thesis, that every ^{2nd} item of behaviour is indispensable. In all cases, the emphasis is upon the function which the pattern of behaviour serves, and in carrying out our functional analysis a variety of behaviour patterns, which at first glance appear to be unrelated, and, content-wise, are quite different, are shown to be integrally related, in that they serve the same function.

We have already said that the same pattern of behaviour may be dysfunctional as well as functional. Verton also points out that "the same item may have multiple functions."¹³

13. Verton, 35.

For example, although we will concentrate upon our problem, and point out in what respects the ~~ix~~ items of behaviour are functional for the recruit in the formal situation, we will also indicate, in passing, the manner in which some of

the items of behaviour are functional for the group of recruits, in that they maintain group solidarity.

Of course, we are not going to concern ourselves, in the body of the thesis, with the subjective disposition of the recruit. Admittedly, the recruit does not consciously take over the informal behaviour patterns in order to adjust to his superiors and peers in the formal situation. It is more likely that, in most cases, he takes the patterns over ~~un~~ unconsciously; in some cases, it appears that he takes over these patterns because he fears punishment from his peers. But, as we have already indicated, this does not mean that the behaviour patterns are not functional for the recruit in the formal situation. We have already discussed Merton's distinction between subjective dispositions and functions.

The behaviour patterns which we will be discussing have arisen spontaneously. For that reason, we would not expect them to lead to intended, or even recognized consequences. Therefore, in our functional analysis of these informal behaviour patterns, we will be discussing the latent functions of these patterns for the recruit in the formal situation, face-to-face with his superiors and peers, who impose restraints upon his behaviour.

4. The Method

A Defence Research Board team of seven, consisting of one typist, two interviewers, three participant observers, and one research director, spent approximately three months studying, for the most part, thirty-five recruits and several

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NCO's of an infantry company of the Canadian Army.

The author spent one week, the final week, as an interviewer, and the rest of the time as a participant observer. Notes were typed up as often as possible, sometimes ^{within} two days, sometimes several times during the day, but usually once a day. As soon as possible after an occurrence which the author deemed important, he made a note of it, in pencil, and it was from these short notes that the typing was done.

To a considerable extent the study was explorative, and the participant observers especially were not given any ~~it~~es to watch for. This gave the author welcome scope, and it was natural that his own interests should, to a large extent, govern his observations. Particular attention was paid, throughout the study, to the informal patterns of behaviour, as they manifested themselves during rest periods, in the canteen, in the hut, and on leave.

The problem, as it has been developed here, is to see in what respect the informal area of behaviour is functional (or dysfunctional) for the recruit and corporal in the formal situation. The fact that the author's attention was focussed upon the informal area of behaviour, and that most of the data gathered by the author was in this area, makes it possible to deal adequately with the problem. Whether or not the problem is adequately dealt with will depend on the extent to which light is shed upon the descriptive data through our discussion of the manner in which this behaviour is functional (or dysfunctional) for the recruit and the corporal in the formal situation.

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Most of the illustrative material which will be ~~used~~
~~used~~ quoted in the body of the thesis comes from the author's
notes, recorded while he worked as a participant observer.
The notes are recorded as objectively and accurately as
possible, with little in the way of interpretation interspersed
in these descriptive notes. The interpretive handling
is done here. A certain amount of illustrative material is
also quoted from the author's interviews, and the interviews
and notes of the other members of the research team.

CHAPTER II

THE INFORMAL BEHAVIOUR OF THE INFANTRY RECRUIT.

5. The Recruit Adjusts to his Superiors

The recruit is thrown into contact with his superiors when he enters the Army, and his superiors, in carrying out the rules of the Army, make many demands upon the recruit, and place many restraints upon the recruit's behaviour. The recruit cannot quit the Army; he must obey the commands of his superiors. How does the recruit adjust to his superiors in this new and strange situation?

In this section we will discuss some of the mechanisms which help the recruit to adjust to his superiors, and the authority they wield, in the formal situation. The mechanisms we will discuss are informal, and have arisen spontaneously. They were not devised by the recruits in order to fulfill a certain function. Nevertheless, we will see that they do fulfill a certain function--they help the recruit to adjust to his superiors in the formal situation. Thus, in carrying out our functional analysis, the informal behaviour patterns which at first appear to be unrelated or opposed to military behaviour, will begin to take on new meaning, and their presence within the military unit studies will begin to make sense.

1. "Knowing the ropes"

The recruits expect each other to "know the ropes", so that they can get along in relation to their superiors.

The formal demands which their superiors place upon them are ~~xx~~ difficult to evade, and the emphasis among the recruits upon knowing these demands enables the recruit to get along with his superiors and to escape punishment. The formal demand placed upon the recruit are of an impersonal nature (as we have already indicated, when we discussed the Army as a bureaucratic type of organization), and there is no excuse for failing to meet these demands:

Case 1 Lieutenant Stone read out the clause in R(Can) which told the men that ignorance was no excuse. After that he added, "In other words, you can't say, 'Jeez, I didn't know any better.'"

Case 2 Sergeant Kingcraft had Seguin double around the parade square, and Seguin moved slowly.

Kingcraft: Why can't you bloody well move?

Seguin: One of my legs is shorter than the other, sir.

Kingcraft: Well, you were passed by the M.O. - and that's good enough for me. Maybe some of you joined up because you were broke and have something the matter with you. Well, you better see the M.O. about that. Because if you come out here on the parade square you're going to have to do the same as the rest of the men.

The catch-all phrase used by the men, towards someone who has made some sort of error, when they discover the error, is, "I guess you know now, eh? 'Cause if you don't know now you never will," or some variation of this phrase. The recruit is expected to know. On the other hand, the catch-all phrase used to inform the recruit of his error~~x~~ is,

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"I got news for you."

Case 3 Corporal Oliver is inspecting the men in the morning, by their beds.

Oliver: Why didn't you put your name up on your locker door?

Private: I thought you do that, corporal.

Oliver: Well, I got news for you, lad. Go on, set it up there now.

Of course, the fact that a man is expected to ~~xxxxxx~~ ~~xxxxxx~~ "know the ropes" does not simply mean that he must know what is demanded of him, and how to carry out these demands. It does not mean that he must abide by all the formal rules and never evade them. He must also know how to evade the formal rules. In Case 5 we see that a man will tell you ~~xxxxxx~~ ("I guess you know") when he manages, somehow or other, to evade the formal rules:

Case 5 Corporal Kirkpatrick, wearing black oxfords, and no puttees, came into the hut, showing off.

Obs: Where are your boots?

Kirkpatrick: One pair is condemned and the other pair is being fixed.

Obs: What do you mean, condemned?

Kirkpatrick: It's cut across the sole, and there (indicating on his oxfords), and they can't fix them. So I guess you know how I walk around.

The fact that the emphasis is not simply upon meeting the formal demands, but rather upon meeting them to escape punishment, and evading them when possible, adds validation to our statement of the function played by the emphasis among the recruits upon "knowing the ropes". It helps the recruit to adjust to his superiors, by helping them to meet their demands, and to evade their demands when possible.

11. Believing the worst

The recruits constantly expect the worst. They believe that what they do not want to happen will happen, and that what they want will not happen. Functionally, these pessimistic beliefs can be seen as being related to the control the superiors exercise over the recruit. His ~~xxxx~~ superiors can make a promise one minute and change their minds the next minute, and the privates are well aware of the possibility of last minute changes.

Case 1 X Obs: What are the recruits doing this morning?
Corporal Oliver: I don't know. Even the sergeant major doesn't know yet. Nobody knows.
Obs: That's funny.
Oliver: They wait until the last f-----g minute until they tell you. That's the Army.
Corporal Day (making a wry face): They might even come in and tell us to get back to bed now.

Here, we see, in the first place, that corporals are interacting to a large extent in terms of informal patterns of behaviour. This problem will be dealt with in detail in Chapter III. We also see that the awareness of the possibility of last minute changes is not associated with pleasant news. Day's attitude indicates that it would be beyond the bounds of belief to get good news like being able to go back to sleep. Bad news rather than good news is to be expected. For this reason, you do not believe you are going to get something good until you actually have it:

Case 2 Sergeant Zingcraft, to the recruits: We have a bit of a problem in practising for the CGS parade. The company on duty now won't be able to practise, but'll have to parade next week. And next week we'll be on duty

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but that doesn't mean we don't have to turn out for the practise. That'll probably happen for the parade is that all of you who aren't actually doing something at the time will be rounded up and will have to turn out. Never think that you'll get off anything untill you're actually not on it.

Case 3 Munro: This is a fine holiday they give us, when they make us stay in the hut and work on our bit.

Private: In the Army there's no such thing as a holiday. Any holiday that they give you, you can expect that there will be sports or some other kind of work.

Case 4 Obs: You and Thomas are going to the NCO school, eh?

Masterson: Me and him and Carter. But don't believe anything you hear and half of what you see around here.

Obs: Didn't anybody tell you that you were going?

Masterson: It's mostly just talk. Probably we won't know until September when our Basic's over.

In the above cases, pessimism is defended on the grounds that the Army can do anything, and usually does. Thus, being suspicious of good news¹, whether it is setting off

1. See Samuel A. Stouffer and others, The American soldier: adjustment during army life, Vol. 1 of "Studies in Social Psychology in World War II", 422-3 and 428-9, for a discussion of the attitudes of the men toward Army promises. They point out, for example, that 76% of the enlisted men questioned agree with the statement that "when the Army says it will do something the men want, most of the time it ends up by not really doing it."

a parade, having a holiday, or going to NCO school, insulates the recruit against possible later disappointment. Further, unless the recruit is careful, he can be taken advantage of by his superiors, especially the corporals:

Case 5 - Corporal Trudel: Can anyone drive a truck?
Elton, Seguin, and Pepin indicated that they could.

- Trudel (to Pepin): Come with me.

Finlay: Oh, oh, there goes the old Army game.

Stuart: It's like the guy who came around and asked who could drive. Secretly said; "I can drive." "Well, then, drive this broom through the hut."

A few minutes Corporal Day came around and said: It's just as I thought. He has to drive the broom through the hut. You know what they say when you're in the Army--you keep your mouth shut and don't volunteer for anything.

Case 6 Corporal Oliver: Who's all ready for parade?

Carter: I am.

Oliver: Well, how'd you like to go over to the office and get me some 292's.

Thus, we find that in considering the patterned pessimism of the recruits we have come upon a "don't volunteer" pattern. In both cases, they serve, functionally, to insulate the recruit against the control exercised over him by his superiors, and thus they help the recruit to adjust to his superiors in the formal situation.

iii. Gripping

The impersonal rules of the Army and the recruit's superiors who act according to these rules, impose, as we have seen, many restraints upon the recruits behaviour. Because of the impersonal nature of the demands, and because of the formal emphasis upon obedience which makes disobedience a serious offence, the recruit must comply with his superiors' demands. We have already seen how the emphasis among the recruits upon "knowing the ropes" and believing the worst helps the recruit to adjust to his superiors. Gripping

also helps the recruit to adjust to his superiors.

Case 1 Elton: We have to shine our web belts for tomorrow, but f--- that, I don't care. There's too much chicken shit anyhow.

Obs: What do you mean, chicken shit?

Elton: You make a wrong movement and you get extra drill. You have to shine your brass. And after that you look around and you have to shine your boots. And after that you have to do your web belt, and then you have to shine your kit, and you have to work on your bedroll and pull your palias cover tight and do your laundry.

Case 2 Obs: Well, how are you doing, Trowbridge?

Trowbridge: Not hot. I don't like all this f----- ground.

Obs: What's that?

Trowbridge: This shining shoes and putting them on the barrack box for inspection. There's no sense to that. We can have them shined and ready to wear without putting them on the barrack box.

Obs: I guess they want it their for inspection.

Trowbridge: Well, mine are good enough. If they don't like it they can shove it up their a--.

xx

Although he complies with the demands made of him, the recruit will, in many cases, gripe about the rules which set these demands, or about ~~the~~ his superiors who make these demands. In this way, the recruit indicates his resistance to the demands which impose restraints upon his behaviour, and in this way the recruit is helped in his adjustment to those who make these demands, his superiors.

Gripping and general negativism, in the first instance, were symbolic affirmations of independence and strength, showing that the G.I. did not want to be considered a mere cog in the Army machine. Then, as it became ~~an~~ an almost universal mechanism to assuage and to hide an almost universal hurt, gripping came to be an earmark of social solidarity.²

2. Henry Elkins, "Aggressive and Erotic Tendencies in Army Life", in AJS, Vol. 51 (March 46), 409.

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The "affirmation of independence and strength" has been shown, in the military unit we studied, to consist, at least in part, of showing resistance to the demands of one's superiors ("there's too much chicken shit"; "if they don't like it they can shove it up their a--") and thus to help in adjusting to these demands.

As Elkin point out, griping can also ^{serve} ~~function~~ as "an earmark of social solidarity", and in that way it also functions to maintain social solidarity. Because this is not central to our problem, we will deal with it briefly. Insofar as griping spreads throughout the Army and comes into general use, we often find that the recruit gripes as a matter of course, the gripe being normative, and not directed at anything in particular:

Case 3 I passed Dollard and greeted him: "Well, how's it going boy?"
 Dollard: "No f-----g good at all."
 Obs: "What's wrong?"
 Dollard did not answer, but just looked at observer quizzically.

In this instance, Dollard's gripe is not a gripe about something. He is simply griping as a matter of course, and the quizzical look directed at the observer indicates that the observer's question was not expected. Dollard's reply is a stereotyped griping remark which functions to heighten the social solidarity of the group because it is the expected remark. In meeting each other's expectations, the recruits emphasize their shared expectations, and thus heighten, to some degree, their solidarity.

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Although it involves a departure from our central problem, we will continue our analysis of griping, and indicate two further points which come to light in examining the content of the recruits and privates' gripes. In the first place, they always gripe about some aspect of the formal organization of the Army, and never hint at the possibility of their own inadequacy in meeting the demands of the formal organization. In the second place, we find that they continuously gripe about certain things (meals; shining; excessive marching) and never about other things (rifle training; cleaning weapons). Both these points give us a clue as to what the recruit values--soldierly toughness.

In the first place, the recruit does not talk about personal inadequacy. He places a value upon being able to take care of himself. (This will be further clarified in 6i and ii.) He is tough.

In the second place, as we have already said, the recruit, in griping about the Army, does not gripe about everything. In other words, he accepts certain things, and does not accept certain other things. In this way, he indicates what he considers central to his job as a soldier. The private and recruit gripe about meals, church parade, the location of the camp, and the Army in general. These things are not central to the recruit's value of soldierly toughness:

Case 4 Private, behind observer, in meal line-up, does not take any soup. Observer asks why.
Private: I never take any soup because it's like making love in a canoe--f----- near water.

Case 5 Obs: How was the meal?

MacMahon: Okay, but the bacon and eggs could have been hot.

Pepin: They don't care in the Army; so long as you get enough nourishment.

MacMahon: They don't give a s--- even if you don't get enough nourishment. If you don't get enough you'd get sick, and they'd send you to the hospital, and then you'd get a good meal.

Case 6 Collier: That's no church parade that we have here. You go to church handcuffed.

Private: It's not a church parade--it's twenty minutes church and three hours parade.

Collier: I go to the RC Church one week and the Protestant the next. I wish they had sixty of them. I'd go to a different one every week.

Case 7 Corporal Oliver: The Church Parade is just a bloody racket out here. They line the men up for an hour and a half for inspection and then they go to church for a half-hour and then they march you about the camp for another hour. That's no Church Parade, that's just a bloody excuse for marching drill.

Case 8 Colliers (on seeing plane overhead): Jesus Christ, what do you know. That's the first f-----g plane I've seen since I've been out here. I guess that civilization is around here some place.

Stuart: It sure is a lonely neck of the woods. I guess the plane must be o f course.

Bewley: He's probably lost.

Case 9 Private: What are you guys doing out here?

Obs: We're here to see what's good about the Army and what's bad about the Army.

Private: Well, let me know as soon as you find anything good about it.

Most of the griping was with respect to "chicken shit", to demands which the recruits considered senseless and unnecessary. The demands upon the recruits to keep their equipment shined and polished were most frequently labelled "chicken shit", and the griping in this area, while it points out the content of what the recruits valued,

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of what they considered essential and unessential to the tough soldier's role, also points to the function of griving central to our problem, as did Cases 1 and 2:

Case 10 Obs: How long have you been in the Army?
 Private: Nine months.
 Obs: Have you finished your advanced yet?
 Private: No. That's because I was on the loose for two months. That's because this is a c---sucking, f-----g life here in the Army.
 Obs: Why is that?
 Private: Oh, all this business of shining and shining. I'll bloody well go on the loose again when I get back to camp after this scheme.

Case 11 Lieutenant Rockwell asked, in a lecture: Who knows the motto of the regiment?
 He asked Collier, who rose to his feet and mumbled, so that Rockwell could not hear him, "Spit and polish."
 He then said, for Rockwell to hear, "The motto?"

Case 12 Private: In the First Battalion they even had to press their shoe laces. Imagine that. Well, if they start doing that here, this is one boy that's going on the loose. I've never been Awol yet, but if they start that around here I'm going.

Case 13 Obs: How do you like this outfit?
 Private: There's too much chicken shit.
 Obs: Like what?
 Private: Oh, shining, sping, shining. What's all that good for? Sure, I know, discipline. But it pisses a guy off.

Case 14 Observer stopped to talk to Adam who was putting polish on the bottom of his shoes.
 Obs: What are you doing there?
 Adam: We're supposed to polish the soles. It's pretty senseless doing that.

The recruits also complain of the marching they must do, particularly on schemes:

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Case 15 Perkins: Ask some of the veterans what it's like when you fight. You don't have to go on fourteen mile marches. You didn't see any marching in the movies they showed us, did you?

Obs: They did a lot of running, though.

Perkins: That's easy. I used to do that as a kid when I played Conquero.

Case 16 Thomas: You don't do all the walking that you do here when you're in combat. There they bring you into the lines, pretty close. And if you march, they pick up your stuff. You don't carry your packs. And half the time you don't even have your pack. You don't change your clothes for a week, until you get back from the lines.

Case 17 Corporal Oliver: There's one thing I've been kidding myself in the a-- for. That's for n t saying anything in the recording machine in the interview about these marches. I don't see any sense to them. Sure, they toughen you up a bit. But as far as I'm concerned if a guy can do ten miles he can do twenty. Did you see all the guys on sick parade the morning after the last scheme?

Obs: No.

Oliver: Well, you should have seen them. There's no sense to the f-----g route marches. You can't bring a horse to a field that's ten miles away and then expect it to plow. Well, it's the same f-----g thing. A man is in no shape to fight after a march like this. The last war we once marched for three nights and two days. And the guys were going to sleep on the march. We stopped only a few times for a couple of hours sleep and then we moved off again. And every man held ~~his~~ his rifle at the barrel, and the man behind him held it at the butt. That's no s---. In that way we knew when a man fell asleep. And when we finally reached the front lines and faced the enemy the guys just ~~x~~ fell asleep at their guns. I looked around and they were ~~x~~ all sleeping, so I went to sleep, too. I was the last man there to go off to sleep.

It is clear that the marching is defined as being unessential. The recruit does not suggest that he cannot do it, but rather that it is unnecessary, though he can do it well ("that's easy"; "I was the last man there to go off to sleep"). In short, the recruit is a tough (I can do it) soldier (but marching, shining, etc., are not essential to real soldiering).

iv. Making demands on the Junior NCO

Formally, the Junior NCO has the authority to give orders to the recruit, and we have already indicated that he does, in many cases, give orders to the recruit, who obeys. But we have also suggested that the recruit "orders" the corporal, too, and that the corporal "obeys".³ Of course, in this informal area, the ordering and obeying is not exactly the same as the ordering and obeying we find in the formal area. For that reason, we will speak of the demands which the recruits ^{make} ~~make~~ on the Junior NCO, and which, for the most part, the Junior NCO carries out.

In the infantry ~~sixteenth~~ company we studied, the Junior NCO's slept in the same hut, ate in the same mess hall, and drank in the same canteen as the men. Officially, the Junior NCO retained his authority in these situations-- he was a corporal off as well as on duty. Actually, however, this was not the case. For example, though a private was officially expected to stand to attention before the corporal, when talking to him, this never occurred off duty.

3. For a similar discussion of informal twistings of formal authority see Orvis Collins, "Ethnic Behaviour in Industry: Sponsorship and Rejection in a New Zealand Factory," *AJS*, Vol. 51 (Jan. 46); Leachlister and Dickson, 448-49.

interview

As the following diary excerpts indicate, the recruits demand that the corporal be one of the boys off duty, especially in the hut:

Case 1 Int: Do you expect the NCO's to be friendly to you?

Munro: No, it's hard to say. Like on off-duty hours you don't expect them to go around and shout at you. You're human, you don't want guys yellin' at you. Most of them are okay, only Corporal Oliver is like that.

Case 2 Masterson: Corporal Nettle is a very good friend of mine. I worked with his brother for two years in civvy life, but I didn't know him until I came here to camp. He's just like one of the boys. Him and Corporal Davidson are one of the boys. After four-thirty, after our day is finished, they're just like one of the boys. They might as well take their stripes off and throw them in the corner. They don't recognize the stripes at all.

Int: What do you think of that way of doing it?

Masterson: I think it's a very good way.

Int: Why is that?

Masterson: Well, they get twice as much respect from the boys that way. Corporal Oliver is different. I have nothing against Corporal Oliver, but he's a soldier from sunrise to sunset. It doesn't matter where he is, what time of day it is, or what he is doing, he's on the ball. But I don't think he gets half the respect from his squad as Corporal Nettle and Corporal Davidson do from their squads.

Case 3 Pepin: Corporal Oliver is really a lug, if I ever saw one.

Int: What's wrong with him?

Pepin: Jeaz, he's not bad on the parade square, but in the hut there, holy jeaz. Like you know, when you're off the parade square you go in th hut and you call the corporal, you just call him by name, you know.

Int: You mean like by his first name?

Pepin: Yeh, like Joe Brown. But him, you talk to him, it's gotta be corporal. You sit on you bed to light a cigarette, he gives you s---. Well, you come in the hut and knock some dirt off your boots, he blows a fuse.

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The recruits also expect that the Junior NCO will not charge one of them unless he has to, as the following diary excerpts indicate:

Case 4 Corporal Trudel was smoking during one of the breaks, and Stuart asked him for a smoke. Trudel said that he thought that he had one, and opened his pack. There were about five cigarettes there, and Stuart and Munro each took one.

Trudel (jokingly): Jesus Christ, I'll have you on charge.

Munro: That's one thing you hear a lot of-- I'll have you on charge.

Trudel: Well, I know one thing, you don't hear that from me very often.

Case 5 Corporal Trudel had put Private 1 on charge, and a few minutes later Trudel was sitting on his bed shining his brass.

Private 2: Could you lend me that brush when you're through with it?

Trudel: Sure. I'm not hard to get along with. It's just when the guys start to yak at me that there's trouble. Private 1 just got too smart. I didn't want to put him on charge, but I had to.

Case 6 Corporal Day: I was bending over his barrack box, after I told him to get up, tying my ~~xx~~ laces. He starts bitching about me, and I looked up and said, "You're on charge." He jumped back and looked at me-- he hadn't even seen me! (Day laughs). But I decided that it was too much trouble to march him over to the pisscan. (Day laughs again.)

Thus, we see that the recruit is able, effectively, to make certain demands of the Junior NCO. The Junior NCO is "one of the boys" off duty, and he does not charge a man unless he has to. In this way, the recruit is able to bring under control the demands which the corporal can make of his behaviour, and in this manner ~~xxx~~ adjustment to the authority of the corporal becomes easier for the recruit.

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The same rule, of course, is applied to privates who try to act like a corporal:

Case 7 Seguin: Some of the boys, they go and get a wash in the morning, and they come back and Carter starts giving us s--- as if he was an officer or NCO or something.

Int: Oh, what about?

Seguin: Telling us to clean the floor, hurry it up, clean our brass. Boys don't like that very much.

Case 8 Pepin:: Thomas, I don't like him.

Int: Why not?

Pepin: Always plays corporal. Elkinston doesn't like him. A lot of the boys don't like him.

v. Punishing those who "swing the lead"

Among the recruits we studied, the "leadswinger", the man who did not keep up in his work with the others, was disliked, and punished.⁴ The recruits would talk about "leadswinging",

4. See Stouffer and others, 420-1, for a discussion of "leadswinging" ("goldbricking"). They point out, for example, that 84% of the enlisted men questioned agreed that "most soldiers lose respect for a man who is always trying to goldbrick".

and indicate their dislike for those who "swing the lead".

One of the recruits, Black, who was poor at training, was disliked, and often disliked by the recruits.

Case 1 During a group interview, on a scheme, there was some talk as to who gives the orders.

Pepin: They just keep going up.

Int: Going up? You mean going down. Who's at the bottom?

Chorus: We are, privates always are.

Easterson: But there's one thing lower. That's a f-----g leadswinger.

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Case 2 As in the last few days, the men in the hut were shouting at Black, as Sergeant Kingcraft does: "Black, pick up that bloody step." Several of the men picked up the phrase, and directed it at Black, ridiculing him. Papin said aloud, to one of the other recruits, "They'll bloody well keep after him until he gets onto it."

Case 3 As was usually the case, Black could not keep the step, and after the drill period Sergeant Kingcraft kept the squad marching five minutes extra because of Black. When broken off, the recruits cursed Black, and several of them, particularly Thomas, said that they would get him that night. They planned to throw him in the showers and to blackball him, and made no attempt to keep this information from Black. At night they got hold of him, and threw him into the showers and blackballed him.

The formal rules were impersonal and had to be met. When they were not met, as when someone did not keep up in his training, the whole squad was likely to suffer. Thus, the emphasis upon keeping up in the training and now "swinging the lead" helped the recruits to adjust to the demands made of them by their superiors by decreasing the demands that their superiors could make of them because of one "leadswinger".

vi. Punishing those who "suckhole"

The recruits disliked the "suckhole" ("brown-noser")--the man who sought too actively to put himself in the good graces of those in authority⁵--and they would punish the "suckhole". As Black was a deviant in that he did "swing the lead", so Carter was a deviant in that he "suckholed".

5. For a discussion on the attitudes of enlisted men toward those who "lucked for promotion" see Stouffer and others, 419-20. They point out that 37% of the enlisted men questioned agreed with the statement that "most soldiers lose respect for a man who is always lucking for promotion."

Although, in Carter's case, the punishment was not as apparent as in Fleck's case, it was clear that the dislike for Carter did lead to punishment of a more subtle sort.

A man could seek to put himself in the good graces of those in authority in two ways. In the first place, he could do a lot of work (such as shining and polishing his equipment) to impress his superiors. Secondly, he could be very eager to take orders from his superiors. ("In reference to those soldiers who readily accept authority we notice a strong stigma"⁶)

6. Frederick Elkin, "The soldier's language", AJS, Vol. 51 (Mar. 46) 421.

Carter was "guilty" on both counts.

Throughout the three months, without fail, insofar as the author is aware, Carter was always the first man among the recruits to wake. Often, he was up a full hour or more before everybody, working on his equipment, and several times he stayed up all night with work to do. Three times each day, morning, noon, and night, he polished his brass--more frequently than any other recruit in the company. In this respect, he was a deviant, and disliked.

Case 1 Seguin: Carter works too hard and goes to sleep around twelve o'clock, eleven o'clock, and if he's got work to do, then he gets up at three o'clock in the morning.

Int: How's he get along with the boys?

Seguin: Not too bad. If this keeps up, though, he's gonna get a regimental, he's gonna get a shower.

Case 2 Int: Which of the recruits do you think will get to be NCO's?

Finlay: You know Carter? He does a lot of suckholing around.

Int: What sort of things?

Finlay: Oh, things like he always wants to be the right-hand marker, or in the front row.

Case 3 Int: Would you say that there are any recruits interested in getting their stripes?

Filion: I don't know. One, I guess. Carter. Everybody knows that. He always just sticks around with the corporals. And he gets up at four in the morning. Everybody says that he's going to kill himself, the way he's working.

Case 4 Int: What recruits would you say were interested in getting their stripes?

Stuart: Well, there's Carter. He's looking for a stripe, but he's going about it in the wrong way because he's, I don't know, playing up to the corporals too much. Then when he gets up in the morning he's got a bad habit of shrieking his head off, shaking everybody around. The boys know damn well what time to get up.

Others aside from Carter were reiled for doing too much work, for being "suckholes".

Case 5 Collier came into the hut and Sullivan asked him where he had been.

Collier: In the dry canteen.

Sullivan: I've been here, working all the time since you left.

Collier: That's because you're a f-----g brown-noser.

Case 6 After we had camped on the overnight patrol from B--- Lake, Skeat took out his boots, after they had been drying in the fire, and he started to polish them.

Private: Look at that guy there. He wants his hock.

Skeat looked up and the Private continued: "That are you looking up for? Go on and brown-nose. Keep on working for you hock."

Skeat ignored the remarks and continued polishing his boots. Later, Major started to polish his boots.

Private: There's another guy that's working for his stripe.

Major stopped polishing and stood up. After a pause he said, "I don't think I'll shine these," and he dropped his boot to the ground.

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Case 7 Elkington: We were all up in front of the major. Well, I was up for negligence and Thomas was up for negligence. I lost my running shoes and he lost his bayonet, and both of us found them again. And I got a five dollar fine and he gets not guilty. I can't under-f-----g-stand it. And the bayonet is a weapon, it's more important than a pair of running shoes.

Obs: What about the others, what happened to them?

Elkington: They all got five dollar fines except him. He must be an a--hole, or if not an a--hole he must be a f-----g suckhole.

While we see that others were railed at for doing too much work, none were railed at as consistently as was Carter. Carter was also eager to take orders from his superiors, and this, too, was disliked by the recruits.

Case 8 Carter was awake and ready first in the morning, as usual.

Corporal Oliver (to himself): Sonofabitch, I forgot the roll call at the company office.

Carter: I'll get it.

Oliver: It's on the board in the sergeant major's office.

Case 9 Corporal Oliver comes around in the hut, inspecting the men by their beds.

Oliver: That water bottle is that?

Private: Mine.

Oliver: Well, do up the strap.

Oliver goes over to inspect Carter, who snaps to attention, parade-square style, and stands stiffly at attention. This is not done by any of the other men.

Private (whispering): Suckhole.

The "suckhole" is a threat to the recruit insofar as making an adjustment to his superiors is concerned. The eager ~~man's~~ obedience of the recruit tends to build up the authority of the corporal, rather than to cut it down. Further, the recruit who does a lot of work shows up his peers, who run the risk

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of having their superiors increase their demands, so that they keep pace with the "suckhole".

Case 10 Private: Well, the major came by, and he saw this bastard's kit shining, and he said, "If he can do it, there's no reason why you all can't do it."

Thus, by cutting down the amount of "suckholing", the recruit is helped in adjusting to his superiors, and the demands that they make on his behaviour.

vii. Punishing those who "squeal"

The recruits dislike and punish the "squealers"--the recruit that informs on his peers. Black, who was ~~xxxx~~ showered and blackballed one night for "leadswinging", was showered and blackballed again, the same night, for "squealing":

Case 1 At about seven, Black came into the hut in a wet bush uniform, complaining to the corporals that he had been pushed into the showers. Corporal Oliver went with him to his cubicle, and Black pointed out Thomas and Elkington as his attackers. Oliver asked them why they did it, and they replied that it was the only way of getting him for keeping the whole section overtime on the parade square. Oliver bawled them out and told them not to let it happen again.

Elkington was mad because Black had come into the cubicle yelling, "He's one of them that did it," and he promised to get Black again for running to the corporal.

When I returned to the hut later in the evening, Elkington called me over to his bed and said, "You missed a lot of fun. We got Black again and threw him in the showers, and blackballed him. We got a tin of shoe polish and rubbed it all over."

"We put it over his a--, too, for good measure," Thomas added.

In the interviews, the following hypothetical situation was set up for the recruits, to elicit their attitudes toward "squealing": "Say all the guys were going to get CB (confined

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to barracks) or extra drill for something that one of the guys did, and they know who the guy was, what do you figure they would do?" The following responses are typical:

Case 3 Finally: They wouldn't tell on the guy. We had that once. Guy was yawning. We were having LMG and a guy let out a big yawn. Corporal Oliver didn't see him, but he heard it, and he tried to find out who it was, but nobody would tell, and so he said he'd give all of us extra duty unless somebody would tell, but nobody did.

Int: Why wouldn't you tell on a guy?

Finlay: I don't know, you just don't do that in the Army. Maybe you'll do that once or twice, but you'd learn soon enough that the guys don't like it.

Case 4 Stuart: Well, if they knew who it was to blame, well they wouldn't report him, they'd handle it their own way, and that can mean quite a number of things, a regimental shower for one, or a can of shoe polish and a brush.

Int: Applied in the right places.

Stuart: Yes.

Int: Well, why do you figure the guys wouldn't report him?

Stuart: Well, they'd take the punishment. There's something about reporting a fellow you just don't like, you just don't like to do it. I know I wouldn't like to do it anyway, because you're feeling everyone is thinking that you're a suckhole or something.

We see, therefore, that this pattern of behaviour is related to the previous ones we have discussed, in that it helps the recruit to adjust to his superiors, by keeping information from them which they might use to impose further restraints upon the recruit.

This pattern, of course, is normative, insofar as the recruits are expected not to "squeal", and thus punishing a "squealer" serves another function, too, a group-integrative function, in that it underlines for the

recruits their common understandings and expectations.

A ~~xx~~ "no-squealing" pattern, of course, is common to most groups, and has been documented in sociological literature many times.⁷ Some of the other patterns here

7. Clifford R. Shaw, The Jack-roller, 67; William A. Westley, The Police: a sociological study of law, custom and morality, Unpub'd thesis, 187; Roethlisberger and Dickson, ~~xxx~~ 521-3.

have also been noted in other groups, and the patterns documented in 5iv,v, and vi, as well as the "no-squealing" pattern, have been noted by Roethlisberger and Dickson.⁸

8. Roethlisberger and Dickson, 522.

A case could probably be made that some of these patterns are to be found in any group with some degree of permanence, but that would be departing from the thesis problem.

6. The Recruit Adjusts to his Peers

The recruit is thrown into contact with his peers when he joins the Army, and he finds that their omnipresence imposes many restraints upon his behaviour. The recruits in the company we studied lived in a hut with approximately ninety peers, ate in a mess hall with approximately 350 peers, and shared the wet and dry canteens with many more. Wherever he turned, the recruit was faced with his peers, many of whom he does not even know. How does the recruit adjust to his peers in this new and strange situation, where he has little privacy?

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In this section we will discuss some of the mechanisms which help the recruit to adjust to his peers, and the restraints their omnipresence impose upon him. The mechanisms we will discuss are informal, and have arisen spontaneously. They were not devised by the recruits to fulfill a certain function. Nevertheless, we will see that they do fulfill a certain function--they help the recruit to adjust to his peers. Thus, in carrying out our functional analysis, the informal behaviour patterns which at first appear to be unrelated or opposed to military behaviour will begin to ~~em~~ take on a new meaning, and their presence within the military unit will begin to make sense.

1. "Knowing the ropes"

A recruit should "know the ropes", ~~xxx~~ in interacting with his peers as well as in interacting with his superiors. Functionally, in his relationship with his peers, it enables him to maintain himself without their help, and thus to adjust to the lack of privacy which their presence causes, by holding them off at a distance to a certain extent.

Case 1 Claghorn: How the f--- do you get the pouches on your belt?

Rivers: With your hands.

Claghorn: Aw, f--- off.

Rivers (getting up and fixing Claghorn's equipment)
There, now you know!

The recruit is expected to know how to get along without having to rely upon the help of his peers to any great extent.

The emphasis upon "knowing the ropes", upon being able to take care of oneself, also leads us into the area of

soldierly toughness. The tough soldier can take care of himself; he "knows the ropes"; he has "cuts":

Case 2 Corporal Staves: Some of the guys around here were sucking their mother's t--s when I was out marching. When I was fifteen I joined the Army, till they found out my age. Now they bring guys in that are cripples and blind. I know one guy, he's burned all the way down the side and can't bend his arm all the way. When you're examined the M.O. asks you how you're feeling and you say fine and he puts down one across. Well, I have a 2 under the L, and the last scheme we were on I was still carrying stuff for some of the other guys.

ii. Showing unconcern over personal problems

The recruit does not show any great concern over his personal problems. This behaviour pattern is closely associated to the behaviour pattern discussed above in that both refer to peer interaction, and function to help the recruit in his adjustment to his peers, by keeping what is personal and private hidden.

Problems which the recruit is liable to face are physical sickness, mental depression, and the threat of formal punishment. And in all cases, the recruit must not make an excessive show of his concern.

Case 1 Claghorn: Jesus Christ, you can't see a doctor around here. With my swollen eye I get poisoned.
Rivers: Don't tell me your troubles. Tell them to the padre.
Later, Obs: What happened to your eye, Claghorn?
Claghorn: I got this on the train. It's goddamn sore, too.
Rivers: Hey, Claghorn.
Claghorn: Yah?
Rivers: Tell it to the padre.

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Case 2 Int: Do you find it hard getting over it
 when you're feeling low?
 Masterson: No, I don't. There's always something.
 Some clown comes along.
 Int: Like one of the guys in the squad?
 Masterson: Yah, you know, somebody always got
 something to say to you. They rub it in so much that
 you have to get over it, or something.

Case 3 Obs: Were you put on charge today?
 Seguin: Yah, (Corporal) Cliver put me on charge,
 but I don't care.
 Obs: What do you mean, you don't care?
 Seguin: I just don't care.

Case 4: Obs: Were you put on charge today?
 Wilkinson: Yah. Couldn't care less.

Case 5 Norton: You know, you're still on charge.
 The sergeant called your name last night.
 Jackson: I don't give a f---. He can call
 my name a dozen times around
 Norton: Were you ~~xxx~~ last night when he called
 your name? No.
 Jackson: You're on charge from last night then.
 Norton:
 Jackson: I don't give a f---.

In Case 1 the trouble is physical, in Case 2 mental,
 and in Cases 3, 4, and 5 the trouble is impending punishment.
 And the unconcern of the man is caught in the situation
 where he does have a problem in, "I don't give a f---," or, more
 usually, "I couldn't care less." On the other hand the
 expression used as a negative sanction for the recruit who steps
 out of line, and shows concern over his problems is,
 "Don't tell me your troubles. Tell them to the padre."

Of course, the recruit does not withhold the personal
 element in all situations. Sometimes he lets down his
 hair. This may occur when he is confiding to a friend,
 in privacy, out of the earshot of others, or when he

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is talking to someone like the padre or the research interviewer, who does not hold up the informal pattern to him. It is also likely to occur in the canteen, while drinking. But as far as most of the situations are concerned, the personal element is withheld, as when the unconcern of the joking pattern apply.

The apparent unconcern over personal problems also throws into light the emphasis on soldierly toughness. The lack of concern can be looked at as being a reflection of the value of soldierly toughness. The tough soldier does not complain about personal difficulties--he is not "chicken":

Case 6 Private: Hey, shut the door. It's f-----g cold.

Elton: We're the RCR. We're not chicken.

Case 7 Elkington was putting a tattoo on Private's arm, using three needles tied to a toothbrush and India ink. Private jerks arm away, but Elkington holds it tight.

Private: F---, it hurts. But never mind, go ahead.

Elkington: Hold still. I can't feel f--- all.

iii. Joking

Interaction between peers may be seen as being marked by two dominant, but opposing tendencies--the tendency to share and the tendency to withhold. Insofar as our central problem is concerned, we will be interested in the withholding tendency--the tendency for the recruit to withhold what is personal and private. In this respect, the joking relationship helped the recruit to adjust to his peers.

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For the sake of completing the analysis of the joking relationship, however, we will deal with the sharing tendency, too.

The withholding tendency can be seen as a reaction or an adjustment to the recruit's lack of privacy ~~in~~ face-to-face with his peers. Cooley has written of such a functional adjustment as follows:

If one sees few people and hears a new thing only once a week, he accumulates a fund of sociability and curiosity very favorable to eager intercourse; but if he is assailed all day and every day he calls upon feeling and thought in excess of his power to respond, he soon finds that he must put up some sort of barrier. Sensitive people who live where life is insistent take on a sort of social shell whose function is to deal mechanically with ordinary relations and preserve the interior from destruction. There are likely to acquire a conventional smile and conventional phrases or polite intercourse, and a cold mask for curiosity, hostility, or solicitation.⁹

In the Army, the function of the "conventional smile", "conventional phrase", and "cold mask" which Cooley writes about will be seen to be carried out by the joking pattern.

9. Charles H. Cooley, Human nature and the social order, 146.

The sharing tendency can be seen developing because of the sentiments of liking which are developing as the men interact.¹⁰ This is indicated by the following excerpt:

10. George C. Homans, The human group, 112

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Perkins: That guy, Carter, I asked him if I could have a smoke off him the other day and he said no. Some are like that.

Int: Is he in your section?

Perkins: The same section. I mean like you live here, you're living in close quarters like that. You're sleeping together, just like sleeping in the same bed except you've got your own bunk. And you're more or less like brothers. You're all together in one hut. I ~~fix~~ figure that if a guy's out of a smoke, give him one, and if you want a smoke you can always get one.

The recruits were observed and interviewed, however, only up until the time that they had been in the Army for about three months. And these recruits were not separated from other men, except in training. Further, there were several changes, of unit and of section membership, while we were with the recruit, and for about half the time they were in mixed sections, with privates who had been in for about six or seven months. Because of the limited amount of time that they were in, as well as the number of persons with whom they were thrown into interaction during that time, the tendency to share was not fully developed:

Munro loaned Pillion \$10 for \$15, and took a watch as security, which he will keep unless he is paid back on payday. Then Munro told the observer about this, he said, "You can't trust a guy. You don't know them. Maybe after you get to know them it would be different."

The conflicting tendencies to share and withhold are resolved in the joking relationship. In this relationship the men interact by hurling phrases at each other which are largely stereotyped, and largely of homosexual

content, and each man tried to outdo the other. That there are elements both of sharing and withholding will be made clear.

Case 1 Black: Christ, who just s--- in the place?
 Zinsman: It's just your breath blowing back
 in your face.

Case 2 Dollard: Hey, Frenchie, you p---- you.
 Pajeur (holding his genitals): Here's my p----.
 You want to suck my p-----.

Case 3 Black: Suck my a--, Private.
 Private: All right. Take off your hat and we'll
 see what we can do about it.

In the above three cases, the withholding tendency is evident. The interaction, in the first place, is competitive, and apparently antagonistic, as it will be found to be in all cases. It must be remembered, however, that this is never defined as being antagonistic, and when it is so defined, as we will see later, we do not have a working relationship. The interaction above is also stereotyped, impersonal, and in this sense it enables the recruit to interact with his peers and to hide what is private and personal. The withholding of personal, private areas, and the "unpleasant" antagonism, also enable the recruits to interact in a threatening manner, as though they are going to fight, without reaching the fighting stage:

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Case 4 In meal lineup.

Private 1: What are you looking at me for, you c---sucker?

Private 2: "he the ~~fukki~~ f---'s looking at you?

Private 1: Do you want to make something out of it?

Private 2 steps forward threateningly, and steps back again.

Private 1: You're afraid, eh?

Private 3 (grabbing Private 1 by the collar): I'm not afraid.

Private 1: Button the buttons on your tunic.

Private 3: I have no buttons.

Private 1: That's no excuse (and he turns his attention elsewhere).

Case 5 Private 1 hits Private 2 on the head. Private 2 turns around and says: Aw, suck my a--, you dirty c---.

Private 1: Now, now, don't get hard.

Private 2: Consider yourself told off.

Private 1: Now, now, don't get hard.

Case 6 Collier takes Skeat's camera, with film in it and says: "There's one thing you have to watch. That's the groove here, not to let any light in." He then opens the camera.

Private 1: You're spoiling the film that way.

Collier: No, I'm not.

Private 1: Sure you are.

Collier: You want to bet five bucks I'm not.

Private 1: What do you mean, you're not?

Collier: All this does is let one glare of light in.

Private 2 comes over, hears conversation, and says, holding his genitals, "Here's a glare of light." The argument stops.

Case 7 Seaman (by Elton's bed): Come on, get the f--- up.

Elton: Get the f--- out of here or I'll hit you.

Seaman: Yah, let's see ya.

Elton: I'm warning you.

Seaman: Come on, let's see ya. You got a dirty yellow streak down your back.

Elton: Suck my a--.

Seaman (walking off): Well, move your nose over.

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Not only does the joking relationship enable the recruit or private to interact with others competitively and threateningly, without any further consequences, but it also enable him to end a situation in which a flare-up, with its concomitant personal ill-feeling, might arise. In Cases 6 and 7 this is what happens. In Case 6 the final "joking" remark by Private 2, ends the argument, while in Case 7 everything is serious until Elton's "joking" remark, "suck my a--," which enables him to escape the threatening flare-up, in an accepted manner, while at the same time setting up the situation to allow Seaman to "beat" him, within the confines of the joking relationship.

Of course, the joking relationship does not always take over from a serious relationship, in which ill-feeling threatens to arise. For example, in the following case, Edwards refuses to accept Sullivan's joking remark as part of the joking relationship.

Case 8 Sullivan: I tell you it's a mistake. I tell
~~xxxxx~~I just throw my hat down and picked it up in a hurry.
 Edwards: And it happened to be on my bed?
 Sullivan: There were two hats on your c---suckin'
 bed. How was I to know it was yours?
 Edwards: Some mistake that was. You took my
 bed for your bed?
 Sullivan: Go take a long suck of my a--.
 Edwards: That's on my bed is mine--anyway it's
 not yours.

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Nevertheless, it is clear enough that engaging in the joking relationship was obligatory among the men, when the relationship was set up by another, and Edwards, Black, and Zinsman, the three recruits who were observed to refuse, at one time or another, to define a "joking" remark as part of the joking pattern, or who were unable to hold up their end in the joking relationship, were among the low-ranking members of the group.

Case 9 Zinsman passed Pepin's bed, and as his hat lifted off his head. Zinsman turned about angrily, grabbing hold of a tin of tobacco on pepin's bed, and saying: If you don't give me my f----- hat I'll take your tin of tobacco.

Pepin: Lord, Jesus, if you can't take a joke you shouldn't be in the hut.

Case 10 Private jumped on top of Black who was lying face upward on his bunk. He told Black, "Get your legs apart," and forced him to do so. Then he took hold of Black's penis, saying, "Do you have a hard-on yet, Black?" Finally he spit on Black's penis. Several recruits and privates were standing around, enjoying what was going on. Black obviously didn't enjoy it, and ~~he~~ though he protested and told Private to get off he kept a ~~xx~~ ~~xxxx~~ smile on his face and did not resist actively.

In Case 10 we do not have a joking relationship because Black does not respond in the manner which would set up such a relationship. Because of this, there is actual antagonism, as there is in Cases 8 and 9. In Case 9 we see that the person who does not accept the initiation of a joking pattern as such "shouldn't be in the hut." Of course, some individuals find, after a while, that they are disliked and cannot enter into the joking relationship, even if they want to. This is what happens to Black in Case 11:

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- Case 11 Private: Do you have half a buck?
 Black: Suck my dick.
 Private (speaking seriously): Just invite me outside and say that.
 Black: You invite me outside.
 Private: Okay, come on outside.
 Black: Okay, wait a minute, I have to finish my laundry.
 Private: You a--hole.
 Later, Black calls out to Private who has gone away, "Hey, Private, suck my dick." Private does not reply. Black calls out again, "Hey, Private, suck my dick." There is still no response.

Thus far, the withholding tendency, in its competitive and impersonal aspects has been discussed. Another important aspect of the withholding tendency is suspicion, which is seen clearly in the cases listed below:

- Case 12 Private: I'm going Awol. Does anybody want to buy any of my stuff.
 Seaman: I want an MCR flash.
 Private: I have one. That will you give me for it?
 Seaman: What do you want for it?
 Private: That will you give me for it?
 Seaman: I'm buying it. What do you want for it?
 Private: Two dollars.
 Seaman: Up your a--.
 Private: That's what I thought you'd say.
 Seaman: Okay, I'll give you two dollars.
 Private: Do you know where I live?
 Seaman (suspiciously): Yab, sure.
 Private: Well, I moved.
- Case 13 Elton: Hey, Private. Hey, Private. Hey, Private.
 Private does not look over toward Elton, though he clearly hears him.
 Elton, nevertheless, says: Just checking a--holes.
- Case 14 Elton: Hey, Private.
 Private: What'd ya want?
 Elton: Just checking.
 Private (holding his genitals): How'd you like to check this.

Case 15 Carter: Do you bite?
 Masterson does not answer.
 Carter: Hey, do you bite?
 Masterson still does not answer or pay attention.
 Carter: Well, if you don't then you'll make a bloody good c---sucker.

Case 16 Private 1: Do me a favour?
 Private 2: What?
 Private 1: Kiss my a--.

Case 17 Private 1: Do me a favour?
 Private 2: I wouldn't give you the sweat off my balls if you were dying of thirst.

In Cases 13 and 15 suspicion takes the form of non-reciprocation to the opening remark, which is a trap, and therefore the final joking remark loses its force. In Case 14 a reply is made to the same lead as was used in Case 13 and the respondee falls into the trap. He recovers, however, and goes the initiator's final remark one better. In Case 16 we find Private 2 falling into a trap which Private 2 in Case 17 does not fall into, as he is properly suspicious of the apparently neutral leading remark of Private 1.

So far we have dealt only with the withholding tendency of the joking pattern, but there is also, as we have said, an opposing, sharing tendency. One aspect of the sharing tendency lies simply in the fact that the joking relationship is normative, and that the interactors share common understanding and expectations with regard to it, and are made to feel a part of the group when they engage in the joking relationship. In this light we can see Private's refusal to allow Black to set up a joking

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relationship with him in Case 11 as being a refusal to accept him as a full member of the peer group. As the competitive and impersonal aspects of the withholding tendency, the normative aspect of the sharing tendency can be seen as part of every joking exchange. As such, the joking relationship also functions to maintain group solidarity. The following excerpt indicates that some privates are clearly aware of this shared element:

Case 18 Perkins: You know, what you call a guy around here infun, you'd never get away with in civvie life.
Private: Sure, like "Kiss my a--," and the guy answers, "What part of your face is that?" And if you'd start to talk about my folks the way you can here, I'd have to bust you in the snot-box.

Another aspect of the sharing tendency, which comes to light in some of the joking exchanges, as the suspicious aspect of the withholding tendency comes to light in some of these exchanges, is the exchange of help or property:

Case 19 Sullivan: Give me a drag, will you?
Collier (going over to Sullivan and giving him a drag on his cigarette): Take my p---- and drag it along the floor.

~~xxxxxx@xxxxxxixxix~~

We see, therefore, that the joking relationship combines both the withholding and the sharing tendencies, and as such resolves the "dilemma" between these two conflicting tendencies in peer interaction.

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7. The Recruit Escapes

The recruit is thrown into a new and strange situation when he enters the Army. He comes into contact with his superiors and peers, and finds that they impose many restraints upon his behaviour. We have already discussed some of the mechanisms which help the recruit to adjust to his superiors and peers in their new situation. But what of the recruit who, for one reason or another, cannot make the adjustment or ~~xxx~~ does not want to make the adjustment? Of course, the Army weeds out, before admittance, those who are poor bets, and after admittance a particularly recalcitrant individual may be dishonourably discharged. But what of the recruit, what can he do?

The recruit has his own ways of escaping from the situation, so that he need not adjust to it. He cannot resign from the Army, but he can go AWOL. Rose points out that the typical AWOL is not well-adjusted to the Army--he is more neurotic, not as well-adjusted to his outfit, and more critical of the Army than those who do not go AWOL.¹¹

11. Arnold M. Rose, "The Social Psychology of Desertion from Combat", American Sociological Review, Vol. 16 (Oct. 51), 627-8.

If the recruit actually goes AWOL, he need no longer adjust to the Army. He really escapes. But aside from escaping realistically, we find that the recruit also escapes imaginatively. He talks of going AWOL as being

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a possibility, as something he might well do, particularly under certain conditions. He talks of going on leave, getting a transfer, or getting discharged, all of which offer him, imaginatively at the present, temporary or permanent escape for the future. And he talks of going to Korea and coming back and getting out of the Army. Escape is always possible, and the recruit feels that he can leave behind his superiors and peers whenever he wishes. Thus, through these imaginative escape mechanisms, he is helped in his adjustment to the formal Army situation.

1. Going AWOL

If one of the functions of going Absent Without Leave is to enable those who find adjustment to the formal situation difficult, then we would expect that most AWOL cases would occur early--as time passes, the recruit does tend to adjust to the situation. This is what was found among the thirty-five recruits studied. Of eight AWOL cases, six occurred during the first quarter of the time that we spent with the recruits (the recruits having arrived at camp from about three weeks ~~xxxxxx~~ before we did, to about one week after we did), one during the second quarter, one during the third quarter, and none during the final quarter.

We would expect, too, if the possibility of going AWOL functions to help the recruit to adjust to the formal situation, that most of the talk of going AWOL would take place soon

after the recruit enters the Army, with a decreasing amount of talk of going AWOL as the time passes. We found this to be the case, too. Of the thirty-seven references to going AWOL in the author's diary, twenty took place during the first quarter of the time we spent with the company, nine during the second quarter, five during the third quarter, and three during the final quarter.

Often, the reference made to going AWOL was made in the following manner: "I'll f-----g well go on the loose if . . .," or "If . . ., this is one boy that's going Awol." In such cases, the subordinate clause would refer to those in authority, and the excessive or "chicken shit" demands that they might make of the recruits.

Case 1 Perkins: All the last week I've been trying to figure out ways of getting out of here. As soon as I find a way, I'm going to get out. The first leave I get I'm going to get married, whether they say it's okay or not. I'll just take enough time if they don't give ~~it~~ it to me.

Case 2 Rawley got a telegram, telling him one of his family members was sick.
 Stuart: They'll give you leave. They'll have to.
 Rawley: If they don't give me leave I'll f--- off anyhow.
 Stuart: I don't blame you. I'd take off, too.

Case 3 Lollard: I've been pissed, but I don't care. They can put me in the pisscan for all I care. But as soon as I get the money the first chance I get I'll go Awol.

Case 4 Private: My brother-in-law was in the last war, and he has his belt just as they gave it to him. It's the first battalion that started all this chicken shit. They didn't have it during the war. In the first battalion they even have to press their shoe laces. Imagine that. Well, if they start doing that here, this is one boy that's going on the loose. I've never been on charge yet, or been AWOL, but if they start that around here I'm going.

The recruits are aware of the fact that the demands they refer to can be imposed upon them. If that happens, however, they can retaliate by going AWOL, and their patterned talk along these lines thus helps them to adjust to the formal Army situation.

Going AWOL under certain conditions, and talking of going AWOL if certain conditions would arise, are accepted by the recruits as the thing to do. As such, the talk which goes on in this area serves a group-integrative function, too, since in expressing the normative remark one is meeting the expectations of the other members of the group. The normative aspect of this pattern is illustrated below (see Case 2, too):

Case 5 Obs: Four of the recruits just took off yesterday.
Private: I f-----g well don't blame them. There's too much f-----g chicken shit. We're CB'd today because our huts weren't cleaning. I'll f-----g well take off too if things stay like this.

Case 6 Winsman (to observer, of Terry and Newley, who were supposed to go AWOL that night): I hope those guys get away. It's no f-----g good to keep a man in the Army that doesn't want to stay. He'd just take off again if he was caught. From the first day those two didn't like ~~xx~~ it.

Case 7 Corporal Trudel: The girl I was going to marry, she was in a car accident, and she died soon after that. I tried to get leave to go and see her, and they wouldn't give me leave. That's the only thing I have against the Army.

Skeat: Why didn't you go AWOL?

However, though the recruits accepted going AWOL as legitimate under certain conditions, some of them indicated that they, personally, would not go AWOL. In all cases, this was not because they thought there was something "bad" about going AWOL, but rather because they thought of it, in self-interest terms, as being unwise. Several of the privates who had been AWOL were being paid field rates (about \$5 per month) because of fines and payments for stolen clothing, and the recruits knew this. Their sergeant, for example, told them, "It doesn't pay (to go AWOL). You'll get CB'd, and they'll fine you, and it'll be about three months before you'll see any money." The following diary excerpts ~~indicate~~ illustrate the attitude toward going AWOL, as held by some of the recruits:

Case 8 Carter: Are you sticking it out?
Rawley: It's no use going on the loose. It'll cost you more than it's worth.

Case 9 Private told me that he had been AWOL for three and one-half months, and had been given thirty-eight days in detention camp.

Obs: Why did you go on the loose?

Private: I don't know, but I won't go again.

Obs: Why not?

Private: Jeez, I'll be eight months without pay now. I have no pay for the time I was AWOL, and I'm not paid for the time I was in detention, and I lost about two hundred dollars worth of kit that I have to pay for. Everything except my rifle was taken.

Case 10 Finlay: When Carstairs went on the loose, three or four of us tried to talk him out of it.

Int: Why was that?

Finlay: Because it's no good to go on the loose.

Int: Why not?

Finlay: Because when you come back it costs you a lot of money, and you have to do a lot of extra work. And then every time that you get caught with dirty boots they throw that up to you again. They always keep on bringing it up, that you were AWOL.

11. Going to Korea

The recruits, in expressing their desire to go to Korea, ordinarily say, "I want to go to Korea and to come back and to get out of the Army." The emphasis upon getting out of the Army, upon getting one's discharge, is functional for the recruit in adjusting to his formal situation, insofar as he realizes that he will eventually be able to escape from the situation. As Davis points out, "an existing situation is more tolerable if it is known that it will not last long."¹² Some recruits and privates

12. Winslow Davis, Human Society, 161.

do not only think of getting their discharge after their years' three ~~years~~ service is up, but of getting it whenever they want to:

Case 1. I'm just waiting to hear from my wife, and then I'll get my compassionate discharge. I'll go up and speak to the CO to get out. I have a reform record, I got a two-year sentence, and I shouldn't be in the Army at all because of that.

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Case 2 Private: Maybe I'll get a discharge.

Obs: How will you manage that?

Private: Oh, I have a P2 and I can get it changed to a P5.

Obs: How can you do that?

Private: I have a bad kidney. That's how I got the P2. If I have it taken out then I'll automatically have a P5. I went to a doctor back in civvy street, and he told me to have it cut. Well, I didn't do anything about it, but if I get an X-ray here, they'll have to take it out and I'll get my discharge. There are three things that I want. Either I want a transfer to ROTC, or I want to go on draft, or I want a discharge. But I don't want to ~~xx~~ hang around this hole. They're liable to put me on draft after I've been here for two years and eleven months, and keep me in the Army an extra year. And I want to get the f--- out.

The recruits give two reasons for wanting to go to Korea. In the first place, they see Korea as being an escape from a situation where unnecessary "chicken shit" demands are made of them:

Case 3 Private: I'm going to take the course as a camera projectionist, because it's a trade I can always use on civvy street. But I don't want to miss the next draft. I'll revert to a trained soldier to get the draft.

Obs: How come you want to go on the draft?

Private: Christ, that's ~~xxx~~ what I came in for in the first place. . . I want to go to Korea and see what it's like. I don't want to go to Europe. You're under the British there, and you always have to keep polishing.

Case 4 Obs: Do you want to go over to Korea?

Private: Sure. Half the fellas in the regiment would give their arm up to here (pointing to his shoulder) to go. And I know why, too. It's just to get away from this f-----g place.

Obs: It should be worse when you're fighting in Korea.

Private: It can't be much worse than this. A guy gets pissed off around here. I bet I know why we have all this chicken shit around here. It's just so that the guys get real pissed off, so when they go over they let it out on the enemy. Isn't that right?

Obs: I don't know.

Private: Well, I'll bet that's the reason why. I know that when I get over there and see one of those

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~~xx~~ bastards, I'll let him have it.

Thus, Korea offers an escape from the "polishing" and the "chicken shit" demands made upon the recruit, and thinking of going to Korea functions to help the recruit to adjust to his superiors.

Secondly, it is in Korea that the "tough soldier" can really go into action. We have already suggested that certain things, which give content to the "tough soldier" conception, are valued by the recruit. Shining and polishing ("chicken shit") are not essential to the soldier's role. Rifle training, and actual combat, however, are essential. And it is in Korea that the soldier will fight.

Case 5 Obs: Do you want to make the draft?

Private: You're f-----g right. It's no good pissing around here. All you do is go from one camp to another.

Obs: Isn't it safer here than in Korea?

Private: Yab, but you don't think of that. If everybody thought of that then nobody would go over. And besides, the guy next to you would call you chicken.

Case 6 On a scheme, three privates who were in a mixed section, with three recruits, were complaining, saying that they wanted to go to Korea. One of them said, "I came in to fight, not to be a Saturday night soldier. I've done all this before."

As we have already said, when talking of going to Korea the recruit usually talks of coming back from Korea and getting out of the Army, in the same breath. This escape pattern is illustrated below.

Case 7 Obs: Do you want to go over to Korea?
 Trowbridge: I want to go over and get back and get my discharge.

Case 8 Private: You live in an Army town and see what's going on there and still you haven't sense enough to keep out of the Army.
 Dollard: What did you go in for?
 Private: Just to see what it's like. I've had enough now. I want to go to Korea and then I'll really have had enough and I'll get the f--- out.

Case 9 Obs: Do you think you'll stay in the Army after your three years are up?
 Adam: Hell, no. I don't want to make a career out of it. I want to go to Korea and then to come back and to get out. I hope that I can do that in a year.
 Obs: How can you do that in a year?
 Adam: Well, you might get out as a casualty. Of course, I wouldn't want to come out useless. Some guys come out shellshocked and then they're useless.

Case 10 Obs: Do you want to go on draft?
 Seaman: I want to go over and then to get back.
 Sullivan: Yeah, the same here. I want to get back here and then to get out.
 Obs: Does it make any difference if you go over sooner or later?
 Sullivan: If you go over sooner then you go out sooner. As soon as you come back you get out. You don't get a discharge and they call you back if they need you, but they give you leave.

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We have discussed many of the informal behaviour patterns noted among a group of infantry recruits, but we have not discussed them all. Insofar as this thesis is carrying out a functional analysis of the behaviour, it cannot handle the behaviour in its totality. In carrying out a functional analysis, it must be remembered that we must at all ~~times~~ be clear of the question: Functional for what? Here, we have thus far dealt with the informal behaviour patterns as they are functional for the recruit in the formal situation, and for that reason, we have, of necessity, been forced to omit those patterns which were ~~essential~~ ^{neutral} in this respect.

But have we discussed all the informal behaviour patterns which are functional for the recruit in the formal situation? The answer to this question is not too clear. We have, as far as we are aware, discussed all of the major informal patterns of behaviour which are thus functional, and which we were able to observe, during the time that we were with the infantry company. But we were with the company for only a period of about three months, and during that time we were not observing all the time. Further, while we were observing, we could not observe all the men that were being studied at the same time. It is clear, therefore, that had we been able to remain with the infantry company for a greater period of time, we might have observed other informal behaviour

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patterns functional for the recruit in the formal situation.

It is interesting to see what occurs when an undefined situation arises. What solution will the men work out? Undoubtedly, had we remained longer, new situations would have arisen, and behaviour patterns to deal with these situations would have ~~arisen~~ been worked out. And we would expect that the new solutions would be in line with those previously made. Ruth Benedict makes the same point when she writes:

Any society selects some segment of the arc of possible human behaviour, and in so far as it achieves integration its institutions tend to further the expression of its selected segment and to inhibit opposite expressions.¹³

13. Ruth Benedict, Patterns of culture, 234.

Therefore, among the recruits, in a situation which ~~xx~~ is functionally significant for their relationship with their superiors or peers in the formal situation, and which is undefined, we would expect the solution to be functionally similar to those we have already discussed.

The ability to predict what would happen in a given undefined situation which is functionally significant for the recruit in the formal situation, on the basis of our analysis so far, would be one way of testing the validity of the analysis. Let us, therefore, set up a hypothetical situation, to see whether we can make an accurate prediction.

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A recruit is told to pursue and to catch another recruit who has been placed under arrest, and has run off. What would we expect the recruit to do?

In the light of our analysis, we would not expect the first recruit to catch the recruit who has run off. If he did, he would be increasing the control of his superior. If he did not, he would be decreasing the control of his superior over the recruits, and the restraints the superior could put on the recruits' behaviour. We would, therefore, expect that the pattern in such an (as yet) undefined situation would be to refrain from catching the runaway recruit.

Since the above situation is hypothetical, and never did arise while we were with the recruits, it would seem that we cannot check our prediction. However, the same situation, though it did not actually occur while we were there, was discussed by the recruits, as follows:

Corporal Day told Corporal Hettle and Collier of the private who had been placed under arrest, and who had run off. Some privates were listening, too.

Day: The guys were told to run after him and catch him, and they wouldn't, and six others were put on charge.

Collier: I'd bloody well run after him, but I'd make f-----g sure that I wouldn't catch him.

Day: When I heard that they were calling for somebody to go out and chase the guy I just hid in the piss-house.

Private: All the guys around here were hiding and xxx wouldn't go out after the guy.

Day: You should have seen the guy when he came back. All the guys were passing his stuff to him through the hut window.

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Thus, we see that the solution, as it had once been worked out, is in line with our prediction, the function of the new pattern being the same as the function of the patterns discussed in Chapter II, section 5--helping the recruit to adjust to his superiors.

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CHAPTER III

THE INFORMAL BEHAVIOUR OF THE INFANTRY CORPORAL

9. Conflict and the Corporal

To a large extent, the informal behaviour patterns of the recruit and private, as described in Chapter II, are also the informal behaviour patterns of the corporal (for example, see 5ii Case 1, 5iii Cases 7 and 17, and 6i Case 2). The following diary excerpts further illustrate the corporal's participation in the informal patterns of behaviour (threatening to go AWOL, joking, and griping respectively) of the recruits.

Case 1 Dollard: We're all set for the big scheme on Monday.

Obs: Which Monday?

Dollard: This Monday. All the boys are talking about it. We were supposed to go on it today, but it's postponed till Monday.

Corporal Nettle: There's a scheme Monday like f---. I have my weekend coming up, buddy, and I'd better get it. If not, I'll take it.

Case 2 Corporal Davidson was calling out to all the men, jokingly, as they came out of the hut on the way to take the troop train to Edmonton, that they hadn't shined the soles of their shoes. When Corporal Ivy passed, Davidson said: You didn't polish your shoes. Your shoes are brown.

Ivy: So's your a--.

Davidson: You'd know. You'd know all right.

Case 3 Corporal Cliver: The Church Parade is just a bloody racket out here. They line the men up for an hour and a half for inspection, and then they go to church for a half-hour, and then they march you around the camp for another hour. That's no Church Parade, that's just a bloody excuse for marching drill.

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We have seen that these informal behaviour patterns are functional for the recruit in the formal situation.

Are they also functional for the corporal in the formal situation?

In the formal situation, the corporal is the bottom link in the chain of authority. He is in control of the recruits, and must maintain his control over the recruits at all times. However, because he becomes enmeshed in the informal behavior patterns of the recruit, and interacts with the recruits to a considerable extent, as an equal, he finds it difficult to carry out his formal role.

Further, as we have already indicated, the corporal meets, for the most part, the recruits' demands that he be one of the boys, and not charge a man unless he has to, and here again we find interference with the formal role of the corporal. The work on the American soldier in World War II has documented the fact that the NCO adopts, to a large extent, the attitudes of the enlisted men:

(The NCO) lived and worked among his men and as a member of the enlisted class was subject to all the continuous informal pressures of other enlisted men . . . The NCO reacted to these informal pressures and to his continued membership in the enlisted class by adopting, for the most part, enlisted class attitudes. But the identification of NCO's with the rest of the enlisted class was by no means complete.¹

1. Stouffer and others, 402-3.

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Wray points out that the first-line supervisor (foreman or corporal²) has been regarded as a marginal

2. In a footnote, Stouffer and others, 410, point out "the analogy between the noncom in the Army and the foreman in civilian life."

man--a "man in the middle"--in that he is subject to the demands of management and of the workers' union.³ But

3. Donald E. Wray, "Marginal Men of Industry: The Foremen," AJS, Vol. 54 (Jan. 49), 298.

foreman
the ~~corporal~~ is a "man in the middle" where there are no unions, too. The corporal, for example, occupies a position in a group of recruits and privates, and as such, certain demands are made of him and a certain kind of behaviour is expected of him. He also occupies a formal position in the organization of the Army, and in this position, too, a certain kind of behaviour is expected of him and certain demands are made of him. Thus, we see that the corporal, too, is a "man in the middle".

To a considerable extent, the expectations of the informal recruit group and of the formal Army group are in opposition, and because of this, the informal patterns of behaviour are dysfunctional for the corporal in the formal situation.

If the corporal could escape from associating with the recruits off-duty then he would be able to drop the informal behaviour patterns which are dysfunctional for him in the formal situation. But in the company we studied, the

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corporals are in the same mess, slept in the same hut, and drank in the same canteen as the men, and they could not evade the recruits when they were off-duty. The following diary excerpts illustrate the fact that to a large extent the corporals could not help but to associate with the recruits off-duty:

Case 4 On leave, Corporal Day, Norton, Rivers, Kinsman, Edwards, and observer were playing billiards.

Norton: That (Corporal) Oliver, he's a p---- as far as I'm concerned.

Day: He's all right.

Rivers: Well, the first day we had him he turns us out on a road run.

Day: That's nothing. One louie we had, he had us out every morning. And he woke us up at five o'clock to get ready.

Case 5 Pepin, Carter, Corporal Oliver, several privates, and observer, sitting around in hut.

Pepin: Are we going to get a lift out on the scheme, corporal?

Oliver: That's the matter with you? Are you chicken?

Carter: I won't be able to make it. I don't have my double-soled shoes yet. After a few miles I'll fall out.

Oliver: Well, I got news for you, laddie. In this section, nobody falls out.

Case 6 At night, Corporal Trudel, who was in bed, vomited into the waste paper basket.

Private (coming over and sitting on his bed): How are you feeling?

Trudel: I'm all right.

Private: Are you sure?

Trudel: Yah.

Private (going back to his bed): Okay.

Case 7 In the canteen, Corporal Trudel, Carter, Anthony, Rudolph, Skeet, and observer were drinking at the same table.

Carter (slapping Trudel on the back): He's a good s---. But who likes s---?

Later, Anthony: Hoppie, hey, corporal.

Trudel: My name's John.

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Case 8 Major came over to Corporal Kirkpatrick, who was sitting on his bed, in his underwear, shining his brass.

Major: Look at the stain I got shining my f-----g brass.

Kirkpatrick: You should do your stuff in your underwear like me. Then you can't get any of your stuff dirty.

Collier walks over, sits down beside Kirkpatrick, and mumbles something.

Kirkpatrick: Did you say something?

Collier (walking off): No, that was just my ears wagging.

Because of the association of corporal and recruit, a degree of friendliness is built up between them, and the corporal no longer deals (universalistically) with a "private", as he should, formally, but he deals (particularistically⁴) with a friend. Because of this, he finds

4. See Talcott Parsons, The social system, 61-3.

it difficult to carry out his formal role.

Case 9 At about 2315 hours, Corporal Nettle closed the lights. A few minutes later that, Elington asked: Can I open the lights just for a second. I lost my f-----g water bottle.

Nettle: You'll get your water bottle tomorrow. If the orderly officer passed by with the lights on I'd get s---.

Here, we see that the corporal bases the legitimacy of his order not on the formal rules of the Army, but rather on the fact that he would be in danger unless he made such an order. The personal element had entered the situation. One corporal, when asked what was the hardest part of the corporal's job, summed up the situation neatly by saying, "The hardest part is having to charge a friend."

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10. The Corporal Adjusts to a Conflict Situation

The informal behaviour patterns were shown to be functional for the recruits in the formal situation, and dysfunctional for the corporal in the formal situation. The formal and informal demands made of the corporal often pull him in two different directions. How does he adjust to this conflict situation?

The fact that a distinction is made by the recruits, between the formal and informal situation, ^{helps} ~~helps~~ the corporal to adjust (see 5iv Cases 1, 2, and 3):

Case 1 Adam: Sergeant Kingcraft's hard on the parade square, but he's nice when you talk to him.

Obs: Have you ever spoken to him?

Adam: When we were giving blood he was talking to the fellows. He gave blood first, and the NCO's after, and then we did. And you should have heard him joking with the men.

The recruits accept the fact that they take orders while on duty, that their superiors are "hard" on the parade square. But off-duty they expect their superiors to be "joking with the men". To the extent that role-segmentation is effective, it functions to help the corporal to adjust to the conflict situation. But it is not completely effective. In the ~~fx~~ informal situation you become friends. And then, ~~xxxxix~~ despite the awareness of two different situation, it is still "hard to charge a friend".

Perhaps the most effective adjustive mechanism of the corporals in the conflict ~~xxxx~~ situation is to hang around with one another, and thus to restrict their contacts with the recruits. General (but certainly not always) they hang around together outside the messhall while the recruits and privates stand in line; they eat together; they sit together in the danteen; and they hang around together in the hut. In this way, they restrict their interaction with recruits, and thus keep to a minimum the demands which the recruits can make upon them, because of a personal, friendly relationship. Thus, they are helped in adjusting to the conflict situation, by limiting the informal demands of the recruits so that they can better fulfill the formal demands.

At times, too, the corporal will restrict his contacts with the recruit by not responding when the recruit talks to him. The corporal does this when the recruit's remark defines him as one of the boys.

Case 2 Zinsman returned the pen he had borrowed from observer, saying: Merci beaucoup.
 Obs: Bienvenue beaucoup.
 Corporal Oliver: There'll be no French around here as long as you can speak English.
 Zinsman (to LeLadeau): Do you hear that? You'd better watch your language. (To Oliver.)
 I wasn't speaking French. It's just the way to say thank you in Irish.
 Oliver does not reply.

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Case 3 Corporal Trudel was getting the recruits up, and several times, at intervals of about two minutes, he would call out, "All right, you guys, get up. Hit the floor."

Private: Why should I hit the floor. The floor never hit me.

Trudel does not reply. Later, he calls out again: All right, you guys, this is your last warning. If you don't get up now, you'll be on charge.

Seaman: On charge?

Trudel: You don't think I'll do it, eh?

Seaman (looking at Corporal Oliver, who is still asleep): Okay, Corporal Oliver, you're on charge.

Trudel does not say anything.

Case 4 Corporal Nettle passes by while Edwards is putting a tattoo on Black's arm.

Edwards: How's you like me to do this for you. I'll give you a special rate, only two dollars.

Nettle (holding his genitals): How'd you like to suck my c--- and I won't charge you a cent for it.

Edwards: For him it's \$1, but for you, because you're my friend, it's only \$2.

Nettle does not reply and walks off.

In Case 4 Corporal Nettle sets up the joking relationship, which Edwards ignores. Edwards continues the conversation as he had started it, and Corporal Nettle does not ~~xxx~~ reciprocate. Not only do we find that the corporal does not reciprocate when defined as one of the boys, but he may reciprocate by ~~xxxxxxx~~ redefining his position, formally, as in the following case:

Case 5 Elkington: Hey, chum, are the recruits going on the scheme tomorrow?

Corporal Ivy: It's not chum, it's corporal. No, you guys aren't going.

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By interacting among themselves, therefore, and by not reciprocating when defined as one of the boys, the corporals are able to cut down their off-duty interaction with the recruits. But they do not even come near to shutting off all interaction with the recruits, and they ordinarily do respond when defined as one of the boys. However, even when they interact with the recruits as one of the boys, they never really become submerged as just another member of the group-- they never completely become just one of the boys. Rather, they play a focal role in interaction with the recruits:

Case 6 Seaman comes into the hut and says, in reference to a remark of Corporal Nettle's, "You no-good c---." Nettle immediately gets up and chases Seaman, gives him a hammerlock, and leaves him sitting in the middle of the floor, rubbing his ear.

Case 7 Black: "Who's got a match?"
Corporal Kirkpatrick: "My a-- will make a good match for your face."
Black: "Yeh?"
Kirkpatrick: "If your a-- is anything like your f-----g face it must be f-----g awful."

Case 8 Corporal Davidson walked into the hut, and found some of the men gambling. He said, "Well, well, what's this, boys, gambling, eh? Well, remember, I get ten percent."

In the above situations, we see the corporal interacting with the recruits, but in all cases he is playing a focal part in the situation, indicating his underlying superiority. In Case 6 the corporal fights with a recruit and wins.

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In Case 7 the corporal engages in the joking relationship with a recruit, and wins. And in Case 8, although the corporal does not stop the gambling, he points out, though jokingly, ~~xxxx~~ that he does hold the upper hand, and could stop the gambling if he wanted to.

Although the mechanisms we have discussed do help the corporal to resolve the conflict situation in favour of the formal demands, by decreasing the informal demands, they do not, by any means, eliminate the informal demands. The corporal still is subject to the demands of the recruits, because he is in contact with them in the hut, in the mess hall, and in the canteen. And the corporal is aware of this fact:

Case 9 Corporal Ivy: The hardest part (of the corporal's job) is having to charge a friend.

Corporal Cliver: If we had separate rooms then he wouldn't be our friend.

Case 10 Corporal Kirkpatrick: There should be a corporal's mess. . . If we want a drink we have to go to the men's mess, and yet they tell us not to fraternize with the men.

The corporal wants his own sleeping quarters, and mess, as the sergeant's and officers have, in order to cut down their contact with the recruits and privates. But insofar as the corporal is the bottom link in the chain of authority, the "foreman" of the recruits and privates, there is a limit beyond which ~~xx~~ their contact with the men cannot be cut down.

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CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS

11. Summary

In the infantry company studied, we saw that recruits and corporals doing military jobs, giving and taking military orders, and following military rules. This was expected. But a good deal of the behaviour was unexpected in terms of the formal rules and regulations of the Army. We found that non-military things were being done, that non-military orders were being given, and that non-military rules were being followed. It was expected, for example, that the corporal would give orders to the recruit. But we also found ^{the} ~~that~~ recruit ~~was~~ giving orders to the corporal, who obeyed. This leaves us with the problem of making sense of the informal, unexpected, non-military behaviour.

In order to make sense of the informal behaviour which had developed spontaneously among the recruits, we saw that we had to deal with a related problem, and ask another sort of question: How does the recruit adjust to the formal Army situation, where he finds that the demands of his superiors and the omnipresence of his peers impose many restraints upon his behaviour? In this thesis, we attempt to show that the informal behaviour patterns are functional for the recruit in that they help him to adjust to his superiors and peers in the formal situation.

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The emphasis among the recruits upon "knowing the ropes", believing the worst, and griping, as well as the demands made by the recruits upon the Junior NCO, and the recruits' dislike for and punishment of "leadswingers", "suckholes", and "squealers", help the recruit to adjust to his superiors, and as such are functional for the recruit.

The formal demands made upon the recruit are rigid and impersonal, and the emphasis upon "knowing the ropes" helps the recruit to meet these demands and thus to satisfy his superiors, or to evade the demands, if possible, without being caught. The emphasis upon believing that the worst will happen helps the recruit to prepare for the worst, for example, any unwelcome, last-minute changes which his superiors may make. The emphasis upon griping helps the recruit to assert his independence, by indicating his resistance to the formal demands, though he follows them. As such, these help the recruit to adjust to his superiors in the formal situation.

The recruit makes certain demands upon the Junior NCO, the superior with whom he has the most contact. In the first place, he expects that the Junior NCO will forget about his stripes off-duty, and act like one of the boys, and in the second place he expects that the Junior NCO will not charge a man unless he has to. These demands are met, for the most part, by the Junior NCO, and thus, by limiting the Junior NCO's control to duty hours, and by limiting his ability to charge a man, the recruit effectively cuts down the demands which the Junior NCO can make upon him, and as such he is helped in his adjustment to the

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Junior NCO in the formal situation.

The recruit dislikes and punishes the "leadswinger", and thus, by cutting down on "leadswinging" the recruit cuts down the opportunities of his superiors for making demands upon them all because of one "leadswinger". The recruit also dislikes and punishes the "suckhole", and thus, by cutting down on "suckholing" the recruit cuts down on the opportunities of his superiors for increasing their demands upon him so that he keeps pace with the hard-working, eager-order-taking "suckhole". The "squealer" also constitutes a threat for the recruit, and the recruit's dislike and punishment of "squealers", by cutting down on the amount of "squealing" done, cuts down on the amount of information which his superiors get and can use to impose further demands upon the recruit. As such, the recruits dislike for and punishment of "leadswingers", "suckholes", and "squealers" helps him to adjust to his superiors in the formal situation.

The emphasis among the recruits upon "knowing the ropes", and upon showing unconcern over their personal problems, as well as the recruits' participation in the joking relationship help the recruit to adjust to his peers in the formal situation, and as such are functional for the recruit.

The emphasis among the recruits upon "knowing the ropes" helps the recruit to get along without calling on his peers for help, and thus helps him to maintain a

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degree of social distance with his peers. The emphasis among the recruits upon showing unconcern over personal problems helps him to keep what is personal and private hidden, and thus it, ^{too,} helps him to maintain a degree of social distance with his peers. As such these patterns help the recruit to adjust to his omnipresent peers in the formal situation.

By engaging in the joking relationship, the recruit had a common level upon which he can approach and interact with any of his peers. But insofar as interaction with his peers is confined to the framework of the joking relationship, the recruit maintains a degree of social distance between himself and his peers, as the interaction is stereotyped and rules out the introduction of what is private and personal. Further, the joking relationship is often brought into play to avoid an argument or fight, and in this way it also keeps out personal feelings. As such, the joking relationship is functional for the recruit in that it helps him to adjust to his peers in the formal situation.

The recruits regard going AWOL as a legitimate way of escaping from the formal situation, and in this way the maladjusted recruit can escape having to make an adjustment. At the same time, the recruit's talk of going AWOL, getting a discharge, or going to Korea and coming back and getting a discharge, in that it brings to his attention the fact that he can escape, at least, whenever he wants to, and

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at worst, when his three years are up, help him to adjust to the formal situation through the realization that he will eventually (or could immediately) escape.

Thus far, we have discussed the informal patterns of behaviour as they are functional for the recruit in that they help him to adjust to his superiors and peers in the formal situation. But the corporal, as well as the recruit, participates in these informal patterns of behaviour. In the first place, he was once a recruit himself, and learned these patterns. In the second ~~place~~ place, we have seen that he eats, sleeps, and drinks with the recruits, who demand that he ~~xxx~~ act like one of them. Therefore, we find that the corporal, as the recruit, engages in the informal patterns of behaviour. What consequences does this have for the corporal, insofar as his formal role is concerned?

The corporal's participation within the informal area of behaviour places demands upon him which conflict with the demands placed upon him because of his formal position. For example, the control which he should formally have over the recruits is considerably lessened because of his participation in the informal area of behaviour. Therefore, we find that whereas the informal patterns of behaviour are functional for the ~~recruit~~ recruit in the formal situation, they are dysfunctional for the corporal in the formal situation.

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Because of his informal and formal positions, the corporal is faced with contradictory demands which he cannot fully meet. How does the corporal adjust to this conflict situation?

We find that the corporal adjust to his conflict situation in three main ways. In the first place, he hangs around with other corporals, thus restricting his contact with the recruits. Secondly, he refuses, at times, to respond to the ~~xx~~ recruit who defines him as one of the boys. And in the third place, when he does interact with the recruits it is ordinarily a focal role that he plays. In these ways, the corporal restricts his contact with the recruits, and keeps himself from being completely defined as a recruit, and this is able, to a certain extent, to limit the demands the recruits can make upon him, and to resolve the conflict situation in favour of ~~xxxx~~ ~~xxxxxxx~~ the formal demands.

We have confined ourselves, in this section, to giving a summary of those sections of this thesis which are directly related to our problem. Because of this, we have not ~~xxxx~~ concerned ourselves with summarizing sections 3, 4, and 8, and we have not dealt with those parts of the analysis of certain informal behaviour patterns (e.g. griping, joking, going AWOL) which are not directly related to the problem.

Briefly, we have tried to show that the informal patterns of behaviour are functional for the recruit in that they help him to adjust to his superiors and peers in the formal situation, and are dysfunctional for the corporal

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in that they place demands upon him which conflict with the demands of his formal role.

12. Conclusions

Our answer to the problem we set up in this thesis enables us to conclude that the apparently non-military informal behaviour which we ~~found~~ found among the recruits actually does make sense in a military organization in that it enables the recruit to adjust to ~~xxxxxxx~~ the formal Army organization. This would suggest, and this generalization would need further testing to be confirmed, that wherever we find informal patterns of behaviour alongside formal patterns, no matter the extent to which the former appear to be unrelated or opposed to the formal patterns or objectives, that they are, in some sense, functionally related to these formal patterns.

Although we did not treat the development of the informal behaviour patterns as a problem, it is nevertheless clear that the patterns we dealt with developed spontaneously among the recruits (among some past "generation" of recruits, as the patterns we dealt with here were, for the most part, transmitted to the recruits by their peers), defining their behaviour in certain undefined situations. Roethlisberger, for example, points out the presence of undefined situations among workers at

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the very bottom of ~~xxx~~ an organization, by indicating that a formal organizational chart, while it refers to single positions as far as management^{ent} is concerned, refers to those at the bottom level as "workers", without giving any indication of how these people ~~xxxxx~~ are organized.¹ Thus, the formal organization of the Army gives little indication of what the ten recruits, who make up an infantry section, do when they are off-duty. It leaves ~~xx~~ any situations undefined, and, as we have seen, informal patterns of behaviour spring up in these undefined situations.

1. Roethlisberger, 73-4

We have also seen, in this thesis, that the informal patterns of behaviour which develop, do not develop in a completely arbitrary fashion.

With societies as with individuals any crucial choice is to a greater or lesser degree a determiner of later ones. Once a society starts down one road, the paths that would have opened up on another route that was physically available will seldom be traversed and, if they should be, the territory will be reacted to, not freshly, but in a fashion colored and shaped by the experience of the first road. The principle of "limitation~~x~~ of possibilities" is operative.²

2. Clyde Kluckhohn, "The Limitation of Adaptation and Adjustment as Concepts for Understanding Cultural Behaviour", in Adaptation, edited by John Romano, 111.

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Insofar as the situation is significant for the recruit as he relates himself to his superiors or peers in the formal situation, the pattern~~x~~ which will develop will be one which helps the recruit in his adjustment to his superiors and peers. The conclusion, therefore, would seem to be that there are certain limits set upon the developing pattern by the existing situation, and within these limits a number of patterns (in accordance with Merton's idea of functional alternatives³) could arise.

3. Merton, 35-6 and 52.

We saw that the recruit entering the Army comes ~~face-to-face~~ face-to-face with a new and strange situation. In interaction with his superiors and his peers, he finds that many of his action patterns are blocked. It is ~~that~~ to this situation that he must adjust. To step beyond the bounds of this empirical study once again, and to generalize, it would seem that where we find a person entering a new group in which his old behaviour patterns are blocked we would expect to find the development of certain mechanisms which help the new member to adjust to the situation.

Finally, we saw that the corporal is a member, in a sense, of two different groups--a formal group and an informal group. These two groups place

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contradictory demands upon the corporal, and he cannot fully meet both sets of demands. This conflict situation is, to a degree, resolved by the corporal through the development of certain of his own informal mechanisms. Generalizing, once again, we can say that where a person finds himself to be a member of two groups which impose contradictory demands upon him, and where he cannot meet both sets of demands, he will adjust to the conflict situation by developing certain functional mechanisms.

13. Suggestions for Further Research

In the previous section we discussed a number of general theoretical implications of this study, some of which have been documented many times in the ~~xxxx~~ social sciences, particularly in the fields of sociology and anthropology. Few studies, however, have been directly oriented by these theoretical implications, and a number of empirical studies will be suggested here which are guided by these implications, and which would seek to confirm, disconfirm, or modify them.

In line with the main conclusion drawn from this thesis--that the informal patterns of behaviour which develop in a situation where the ~~xxxxxx~~ recruits' behaviour is restrained by their superiors and peers are functional for the recruits in that they help them to adjust to their superiors and peers in such a situation--it would be valuable to analyze, functionally, the behaviour patterns

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which develop among a group of people in a situation similar to the one the recruits find themselves in. A study of another military unit, perhaps in another branch of the services, or in another Army corps, would be valuable, as long as the formal situation of the recruits or privates is similar to the formal situation in the infantry company studied here. What informal behaviour patterns are to be found? Are they the same patterns as were found here, or are they different, and (of primary importance) do they serve the same function as the patterns analyzed in this thesis.

Still bearing on the same problem, a valuable study would be one of a military unit where the same formal conditions were not to be found. For example, what informal patterns are to be found in a unit where the men return to their own homes after the training day is over? In such a situation, the restraints which their superiors and peers could impose upon their behaviour would be limited, and we would not expect to find patterns similar to those found here. A study of a military unit in which the men had private or semi-private rooms would also be valuable. Would the changed conditions, as imposed formally, alter the informal patterns which develop.

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Of course, a military unit is not the only unit that could be studied in the manner outlined above. The main theoretical implication of this thesis is applicable to any group in which we find a formal structuring, alongside of which an informal structuring has developed. Thus, in the same way as one could carry out a functional analysis of the informal patterns of behaviour to be found in a military group, one could carry out a functional analysis of the informal patterns of behaviour of, say, a work group. The important things to remember, of course, are, firstly, to describe the formal situation in which the worker finds himself, secondly, to determine whether this informal situation is such that it blocks certain of the action patterns of the worker so that he must make an adjustment to this formal situation, and finally, if the worker must adjust to this new situation, to analyze the informal patterns of behaviour to be found among the workers to see to what extent they are functional for him in that they help him to adjust to the formal situation.

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