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TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF IMAGINATION: A STUDY OF GILBERT DURAND AND PAUL RICOEUR

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TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF IMAGINATION

ABSTRACT

A satisfactory definition of the imagination has proved elusive in Western philosophy. Two contemporary French thinkers, Gilbert Durand and Paul Ricoeur, are concerned with establishing a fundamental philosophy of imagination. For Durand the imagination is the source of symbolic mediations that are both therapeutic and theophanic. His theory is grounded in a Platonist-esoteric tradition which he supports by a philosophy of the imaginal (coined and articulated by Henry Corbin, a French Islamicist). Ricoeur, in contrast, sees the imagination as a creative cognitive mediator in a dialectic model of knowledge. Within a critical framework the imagination functions at the limits of experience and expression as a catalyst provoking new insights and ways of being. Both theories support a philosophy that rehabilitates the imagination from its former denigrated and suspect categorizations, though Ricoeur's programme is more relevant to contemporary philosophical issues.

RESUME

Une définition satisfaisante de l'imagination échappe à la tradition philosophique occidentale. Deux penseurs contemporains français, Gilbert Durand et Paul Ricoeur, s'attachent à proposer une philosophie fondamentale de l'imagination. Si on examine leurs essais tour à tour, on trouve des interprétations différentes. L'imagination, pour Durand, est la source des médiations symboliques qui sont à la fois thérapeutiques et théophaniques. Sa théorie s'enracine dans une tradition de platonisme ésotérique qui s'appuie sur une philosophie de l'imaginal (un terme forgé et développé par Henry Corbin, un français islamisiste). Pour Ricoeur, au contraire, l'imagination fonctionne comme un médiateur cognitif dans un modèle dialectique. A l'intérieur d'un schème critique l'imagination fonctionne à la limite de l'expérience et de l'expression comme un catalyseur qui fait surgir de nouvelles façons de comprendre le monde et d'y vivre. Les deux théories soutiennent une philosophie qui revalorise l'imagination et la sort des anciennes catégorisations dénigrantes, mais c'est le programme de Ricoeur qui est plus pertinent aux questions philosophiques actuelles.

DEDICATION

Philosophic thought is one continuous, deeply muted hesitation, even when it is handing out pompous dogmatic assertions. Even while advancing, it doubles back on itself. Describe it as one and it shatters into pieces. Ought we perhaps to adopt Barrès definition of the poet and call the philosopher "a madman who propagates his alienation?" Indeed, when I look at myself, "I is someone else." The doubling of thought automatically involves a division of the person into two. At the edge of the awareness of being alone is always nostalgia for being two.

Gaston Bachelard,
"Fragment of a Diary of Man"

What poor delusiveness is all this "higher education of women." Men have set up a great mill called examinations, to destroy the imagination. Why should women go through it, circumstance does not drive them? They come out with no repose, no peacefulness, their minds no longer quiet gardens full of secluded paths and umbrage-circled nooks, but loud as chaffering market places. Mrs. Todhunter is a great trouble mostly. She has been through the mill and has got the noisiest mind I know. She is always denying something.

W. B. Yeats
Letter to Katharine Tynan, April 21, 1889.

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PREFACE

The two questions that have animated this investigation: What is imagination? How do the various Western philosophical systems account for it?, came to consciousness during my M.A. research. At that time I was studying myth and symbol from an interdisciplinary perspective—the names of Mircea Eliade, C. G. Jung and Northrop Frye come immediately to my mind—and could not find any philosophical principle, apart from phenomenological method, that would sustain such an approach.

The next year I fortuitously participated in a seminar at the University of Chicago, entitled "Images and Imagination," conducted by Eliade and Paul Ricoeur. It is to the latter of these scholars that I am particularly indebted for raising issues and examining relevant texts in a way that has helped me refine my own study of imagination. I must also thank him for the interest and support that he has offered on those occasions when our paths have crossed.

It is Dean Joseph C. McLelland, Faculty of Religious Studies, McGill University, whom I must thank for that combination of benevolent tutelage and critical acumen which has marked his direction of the thesis itself.

I must also extend my appreciation to the staff at le Centre de Recherche sur l'Imaginaire, Chambéry, France, habitat of Gilbert Durand, for allowing me generous access to their facilities during the academic year 1978-79 when I was in residence there.

I salute Richard Cooper, fellow student, exacting editor and agent provocateur of the first order, whose combination of skills helped this thesis over the hurdles of literacy and coherency.

Professor Katherine Young consented to read the final draft. I am indebted to her for her careful reading of the text and the critical suggestions she offered.

To Avril Bray I offer my sincerest thanks. Her skill and patience in dealing with my neophytic ignorance in all that has to do with word-processing and computer out-puts made the final phase of thesis production as painless as possible. My thanks are also due to Kerry Bray who assisted in this endeavour. The staff of the Computing Centre, particularly Nicola Richards and Frank Pettinicchio, provided invaluable technical assistance for which I am especially grateful.

Without the support and encouragement of my friends and family this task would have been impossible. In many different ways, often unknown even to themselves, they have provided sustenance and for this I thank them all.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge with gratitude the Doctoral Fellowships granted by the Canada Council for Humanities and Social Sciences during the academic years 1977-1981.

In quoting words and phrases from Durand I have encountered certain perplexities. These are due to Durand's idiosyncratic use of quotation marks and emphatic underlining. I have endeavoured to remain consistent in that when I quote an explanatory word or phrase I have underlined it and employed the same punctuation marks as Durand. When, however, I quote a phrase that is incorporated in my own sentence structure, I use quotations marks only.

In conclusion I wish that I could attribute whatever errors are contained herein to those superior, if highly predisposed skills of the computer. Apart from certain stylistic problems due to the equipment at our disposal, (e.g., the inability to raise foot-note numbers; to allot ellipsis marks to the initial space in a quotation; or to divide words, which leads to unnecessarily large gaps at line-endings), I must bear the brunt of any other deficiences in style or content.

I hope that this thesis can contribute in some measure to the ongoing interdisciplinary dialogue towards the philosophical rehabilitation of imagination as well as to discussion concerning method with reference to myth and symbol. It is the problems and deficiencies in both these areas that provided the impetus for this research.

INTRODUCTION

A satisfactory definition of the imagination and of its function(s) has proved elusive in the Western philosophical tradition. The mainstream development, with its emphasis on rationality and certainty, has regarded the imagination at best with caution, if not with contempt. Pascal succinctly illustrates such an attitude:

> If the greatest philosopher in the world find himself upon a plank wider than necessary, but hanging over a precipice, his imagination will prevail, though his reason convince him of his safety. (1)

Apart from such cursory defamations, there has been scant acknowledgement given to the place of imagination within a philosophical system. Subsequently there is little awareness, let alone analysis, of the ambiguities involved when the imagination is mentioned within a conceptual framework. For example, in Plato's theory of knowledge image-making was relegated to the realm of artists, Sophists and other sources of distraction from the rational pursuit of the True and the Good. There was a basic lack of distinction between such "false images" and those images which Plato himself employed to describe those conditions or events that eluded rational description. (2) Within their respective systems both Aristotle and Kant deemed images as dependent on prior sensation. Yet, although he states that the image is part of all thought, Aristotle, apart from one or two other ambiguous references, gives no systematic treatment of the place and role of imagination. (3)

Kant's treatment, while somewhat more receptive to imagination, is also hesitant. There would appear to be two distinct functions on the part of imagination. One is that reproductive mechanism, similar to Aristotle's in its dependency on prior perception, that is a synthetic function of thought. The other, which featured prominently in the first edition of the first Critique, allowed for an essentially productive and creative ordering of the manifold of experience. In the second edition, however, Kant tended to downplay this element. (4) Nevertheless in this awareness of a potentially creative ability on the part of imagination Kant had touched a sensitive nerve that was to find a quickening of response in the Romantic Movement. This development also enlarged on Kant's nebulous treatment of imagination in the third Critique and its analysis of genius and taste. Here it was implied that artistic creations are symbolic forms, endeavouring to express through structures supplied by imagination, those experiences that escape the conceptual categories. (5) Kant, however, did not elaborate these insights at length. Thus it is possible to conclude that none of the above-mentioned philosophic luminaries understood or referred to the imagination in a consistent or generally accepted frame of reference.

The notion of the creative imagination was wholeheartedly adopted by the Romantic Movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as one of its canons. Influenced by the German thinkers Herder and Schelling, the movement reached its culmination in the work of the English poets Coleridge and Wordsworth. Unfortunately the resultant depictions of imagination lack philosophic clarity and have resulted in two contending views that have, at times, also merged together, adding to the confusion. One attitude, resulting from Coleridge's depiction of the "primary imagination," sees the imagination as a type of awareness that allows one to merge with the "impress" of an object and so arrive at a loosely defined pantheistic mystical state. This orientation has allied itself with an essentially Platonist monistic world-view and will be studied in detail in the thesis. The other attitude, that of the "secondary imagination," focuses on the creative impulse of the artist. (6) This insight has since been refined by such neo-Kantian philosophers as Ernst Cassirer and Suzanne Langer. The latter refers to a type of "presentational immediacy" of intuitions in art that belongs to the imagination and that allows the artist to conceive of original forms which have neither been experienced nor created previously. (7) Langer's treatment of this theory of creative imagination has so far confined itself to aesthetic theory without reviewing traditional philosophic depictions of the imagination in non-aesthetic settings.

It would therefore appear that on the contemporary scene in philosophy there is a plethora of ideas as to the constitution and performance of imagination that remains divorced from any systematic philosophical presentation. These various approaches all help to reinforce that sceptical and denigrating tone that informs most official philosophic pronouncements on the imagination.

The situation, however, has not gone unnoticed. At the present time there are two French thinkers, Gilbert Durand and Paul Ricoeur, who are concerned with providing the beginnings of a fundamental philosophy of imagination. In their respective theories the workings of the imagination are acknowledged as something more than an arbitrary flight of fancy or a reproductive mechanism dependant on perception.

I have chosen to investigate the work of these two particular figures because they are representative of diverse philosophic trends. Yet both are concerned with the rehabilitation of the imagination as well as with the formulation of a philosophy of imagination.

The work of Durand situates itself within a Platonist-esoteric tradition that has always operated as an undercurrent in Western philosophy and usually occurs within a generalized variant of transcendental idealism. In its less exotic forms it is a viable option and finds contemporary expression not only in the legacy of the Romantic Movement but also in the work of such thinkers as Owen Barfield and the poet Kathleen Raine. In this setting the imagination has come to have a special prestige: "the royal road of the imagination." Nevertheless such an attitude towards the imagination was certainly not an acceptable position in the original Platonic works where it has its philosophic roots. This later reversal of the Platonic censure of image-making was a development of Middle Platonic and Neo-platonic emendations which combined with the via imaginativa of Renaissance magic to produce an entirely new hybrid--the creative imagination.

Durand's work is basically a-historical, which is one of the drawbacks of his approach, as it fails to take into account all the historical influences, especially those of the Renaissance, that contributed to the formation of a concept of creative imagination. Admittedly the supporters of such a theory, particularly since the time of Descartes, have been in a minority; yet this appreciation of a creative imagination does have a tradition in Western philosophy that Durand fails to unearth. He looks instead to Henry Corbin, a twentieth-century French Islamicist, to provide him with a philosophy of imagination that draws its sustenance from Avicenna and other Islamic idealists and mystics. Whether such a grafting ultimately succeeds will be examined in the thesis. Durand's work, whatever the final assessment, is immensely provocative. He has amassed a vast array of symbolic material from many fields of study and he has been the first to attempt to present many disparate elements and thinkers within a comprehensive philosophical system. In this connection, it is

Durand's work and the questions it raises that have forged the way towards the articulation of a philosophy of imagination. Here imagination is regarded not only as a creative activity, but as the locus of a form of transcendent intervention.

The work of Paul Ricoeur, in comparison, is still in its formative stages. He has not yet arrived at any final pronouncements as regards a philosophy of imagination. Yet his work cannot be considered as tentative or cursory. Throughout his projected philosophic investigation of aspects of human willing and acting, in spite of various "detours," his programme has presented evidence of a steadily developing insight into the nature of imagination. In that this theory has not yet been published, the coverage of Ricoeur in this thesis is not as extensive as that of Durand. Nevertheless it is possible to delineate the basic outlines of Ricoeur's philosophy of imagination from the indications he has given in his already published books and articles. It is also possible to assess it critically.

In contrast to Durand, Ricoeur belongs to a post-critical Kantian philosophic orientation. Ricoeur is attempting to present a dialectical model of knowledge where the imagination functions as a cognitive mediator between metaphoric language and speculative discourse. Imagination in this instance is the catalyst in a dynamic act of knowing. In conjunction with Ricoeur's notion of participation and the resultant "redescription of reality," imagination is also found at the crucial point in the development of Ricoeur's thought from epistemology and ontology.

Both of these philosophic ventures can be set in an intellectual climate that, because of developments both in hermeneutic theory and in the understanding of constructs of knowledge (in science as well as philosophy and theology), reflects a willingness to review its traditional distrust of the imagination. This thesis will examine in detail the relevant work of both Durand and Ricoeur. In the conclusion the evaluation of their work will be placed within the wider context of current philosophic scholarship as it interacts with this changing attitude towards imagination.

The thesis comprises five chapters and a conclusion. Chapter One surveys the pre-philosophical principles at work in Durand's accumulation and organization of images and symbols. Chapter Two evaluates the philosophical influences on Durand, principally Corbin, in the formation of his philosophy of imagination. Chapter Three investigates the history of the concept of the imagination particularly with reference to the esoteric tradition and the element of creativity. Chapter Four assesses Durand's position from a philosophic standpoint, in the light of the manner by which other philosophical systems have attempted to account for "images." Chapter Five is both a thematic review of Ricoeur's basic ideas on imagination and a pro tempore evaluation. (Final scrutiny must await the appearance of Ricoeur's fully-developed philosophy of imagination.)

My concluding remarks will focus on the essentially revolutionary change of perspective towards imagination that both Durand's and Ricoeur's theories demand. Imagination can no longer be defined as a mere ancillary function of knowledge or a useless distraction, but as an essential part of our knowing and being. This thesis, in providing an organized survey, analysis and appreciation of these movements in contemporary philosophy which support a rehabilitation of the imagination, makes its contribution as a preliminary step towards the clarification of these insights in a fully developed philosophical system. The work of Durand and Ricoeur provided both the stimulus and essential subject matter for this integrative endeavour.

CHAPTER I

THE FOUNDATIONS OF DURAND'S PHILOSOPHY OF IMAGINATION

Introduction

Gilbert Durand, a contemporary French scholar, has spent the last twenty years deeply involved in the study of imagination. At present the Director of the Centre de Recherche sur l'Imaginaire at Chambéry which he co-founded in 1967, he was previously Professor of Humanities and Social Sciences at Grenoble University where he was also Professor of Philosophy (1947-56). Durand's wide learning has enabled him to approach his subject from several perspectives and, as a result, his work is essentially interdisciplinary. This is illustrated by his understanding of the imagination: "L'Imaginaire m'est apparu alors, au carrefour de toutes les sciences anthropologiques de notre temps, comme le dénominateur commun...de toute l'activité humaine." (1) His first major work, Les Structures anthropologiques de l'Imaginaire, (2) (hereafter referred to as Les Structures) was an attempt to substantiate this claim. His second work, Le Décor mythique de la Chartreuse de Parme, (3) was an attempt to illustrate the method of mythocritical analysis that he delineated in Les Structures. His later works, l'Imagination symbolique (4) and Science de l'Homme et Tradition: Le "nouvel esprit anthropologique," (5) are philosophically oriented, both in historical justification and contemporary defence of his position. Figures mythiques et visages de l'oeuvre, (6) and L'Ame tigrée, (7) the last works to be published, mark a return to the mythocritical method. This approach, however, is here broadened in scope to become a mythoanalysis which attempts to decipher not only the distinctive mythic motifs of a particular work, but also the mythic complex of a particular epoch, i.e., Romanticism, and so arrive at a mythodologie.

It is in the Introduction of the next to last mentioned work that Durand acknowledges the thinkers who have inspired and guided him in his quest. This guidance has not been of a paternalistic nature but rather the shared convictions of similarly motivated scholars. These comrades-in-arms are Gaston Bachelard, C.G. Jung, Henry Corbin and Mircea Eliade, the latter three of whom Durand encountered at the annual meetings of the Eranos Circle in Ascona, Switzerland. As Durand observes of the work of his fellow participants: "Toutes sont animées par la conviction platonicienne en un réalisme primordial de l'image et une valeur kérygmatic du mythe." (8) It is in connection with his visits to the Eranos Circle that Durand has published many articles in the Eranos Yearbooks since 1964, as well as others of significance in les Cahiers internationaux de Symbolisme since 1962. It would be impossible to give a detailed analysis of all Durand's works. I have chosen, within the limits of this thesis, to concentrate on certain selected articles as well as those aspects of his major works that illustrate the development of his thought as he moves towards the articulation of a philosophy of imagination.

Durand's Models in Depicting the Role of Images and of the Imagination

In the opening sentence of *Les Structures* Durand states that Western, and particularly French, philosophy has undervalued the imagination. To support this contention, he offers as representative detractions Pascal's well-known qualification: "*maîtresse d'erreur et de fausseté*," (9) and the equally condescending estimation, supported by Alain, that imaginative productions, e.g., myths, belong to the infancy of intelligence. (10) Durand is aware that two other twentieth century scholars, Henri Bergson and Jean-Paul Sartre, also have been conscious of this unfavourable attitude and each has sought a corrective approach. These attempts, which will be considered briefly later in this chapter, do not, however, obtain Durand's approval.

Durand believes that the contemporary devaluation of the imagination results from a confusion of the word with the image. His own distinction between these two entities would distinguish between the word as a conventional sign, which as a semiotic unit is superficially interchangeable, (11) i.e., as a simple conveyor of meaning, and the word as a symbolic referent. He defines his position accordingly:

> L'analogon que constitue l'image n'est jamais un signe arbitrairement choisi, mais est toujours intrinsèquement motivé, c'est-à-dire est toujours symbole. (12)

The image, in relation to this latter symbolic sense, has deep roots which reach below the surface meaning and find themselves grounded in fundamental, dynamic drives and configurations. These, Durand attests, have an intrinsic, spontaneous ability to express themselves in images of a radical nature that precede and underlie verbal articulation. Indeed, if one follows through Durand's development, all representations of audio-visual significance appear dependent upon prior awareness on an affective-dynamic level. Durand calls this level of interaction "le plan locutoire" (13) (i.e., "verbal" in the sense of a vocally expressive dimension). He uses as an illustration of this type of communication the cry or shout. These are instances of elementary symbolic expressions of meaning. Durand also cites "the language" of a young child, grasping for words and making unintelligible sounds, as another example of this mode of communication. He does not wish, however, to argue in this instance for any ontogenetic or phylogenetic primacy of this aspect of meaning. It is the essential presence of this dimension, regardless of age or physical maturity, that Durand wishes to establish. Nevertheless from the perspective of developmental psychology it has a chronological precedence over verbal utterances. This is because the image, as a preverbal conveyor of meaning, is fundamentally related to this expressive dimension with its affective and physiological components. Symbolic expression, which is in turn dependent upon the image or a complex of images, is posited then by Durand as a multi-faceted means of depicting meaning that cannot be expressed in linguistic formulations. This basic state of awareness and communication leads inevitably to the conclusion that thought itself and linguistic expressions are image-based:

> C'est ce "sens" des métaphores, ce grand sémantisme de l'imaginaire qui est la matrice originelle à partir de laquelle toute pensée rationalisée et son cortège sémiologique se déploie. (14)

Durand, in first seeking to show the ubiquity of image-based symbol and metaphor that will provide the basis of an empirical study of the manifestations of human imagination, has already adopted an understanding of human thought that would be unacceptable to the Enlightenment tradition. But his intention in the first part of Les Structures is not to refute the rationalists. It is rather to lay the ground work for his classification or *archétypologie* of symbolic expressions, avoiding any metaphysical preconceptions:

> Ne voulant pas sacrifier aux préconceptions métaphysiques, nous sommes obligé de partir d'une enquête pragmatique qu'il ne faudrait pas confondre avec la méthode analogique. (15)

It is essential for Durand's pragmatic approach in this regard that he place his work within the broadly based *le trajet anthropologique* which incorporates all the sciences which study the human species. Such a broadly based understanding allows Durand to draw on many models and methods that have been used in studying *homo sapiens* without having to acknowledge a consistent philosophical frame of reference.

The first of the models that Durand adopts within the scope of this method of convergence is that of the biological functionalism of the Russian, Betcherev. This model permits him to situate the motivational forces of his image-based modes-of-being within basic physiological drives. In other words, the drive to affective-psychological expression in symbol is not goal-oriented, but the result of certain dynamic physiological processes. Betcherev, following Vedenski, posits three dominant reflexes of the central nervous system which co-ordinates sensory-motor activity. These are named respectively the *posturale* (balance), *digestive* (nutrition) and *copulative* (sex) *dominants*. (16) Such a system reinforces the essentially functional model of the imagination that Durand presents in the first part of the book, and it helps him to tie several strands of thought together. To do this he relates the Betcherev *dominants* to Piaget's theory of assimilation and accommodation and *le symbol functionnel*; to the topographical field-theory of Lewin; as well as to the dynamic model of the *le symbole moteur* of Bachelard. These can be all termed "operational models" and Durand sees them all supporting a notion of the imagination which functions within the *trajet anthropologique* as a mediation between the subjective drives (assimilation) and social and cultural demands (accommodation). For Durand this model of mediation on the part of the imagination results in the formation of what he terms generically *images motrices* (dynamic images), (17) as a means of avoiding confusion with the terminology of the other thinkers, though the reference is to the same entity. It is these essentially dynamic symbolic expressions that Durand intends to classify according to certain categories in *Les Structures*.

This systematization, however, is not undertaken until Durand has posited another model of the imagination to interact with that already delineated above. Before introducing this model, he observes the state of confusion in the terminology that is used to depict products of the imagination, and he avers that he will endeavour both to be consistent in his terminology and to use the minimum number of terms necessary. So it is that the *image motrice* is subsumed under a more generic term, *schème*, which he ackowledges as a composite borrowing from Sartre, Burloud and Revault d'Allonnes, (18) and the Jungian theory of archetype. "Le schème est une généralisation dynamique et affective de l'image, il constitue la facticitéet la non-substantivité générale de l'imaginaire." (19) Such a *schème* is not to be confused with Kant's use of this term where imagination is the agent that organizes the schemata to supply the manifold of experience with *a priori* categories and so arrive at concepts. Durand would see the imagination mediating by means of the *schèmes* to supply expressive forms to the basic dominant reflexes.

There has been a slight change of emphasis, however, in this model, for when Durand describes the dominant reflexes, they are now referred to as *les gestes inconscients de la sensori-motricité*. (20) This echoes Sartre's definition of scheme as as "le présentificateur" (21) of unconscious drives and actions. This model, in acknowledging the unconscious as the source of images, rests on entirely different assumptions from the biologically grounded theory of Betcherev, or the functional models of Piaget and Lewin. The schèmes, then, are generalized dynamic categories that are linked to their unconscious source by their specific expressions as archetypes. In this model the emphasis is on incarnate expressions, rather than theoretical formulations.

It is Durand's employment of the word "archetype" that is particularly striking in this connection. For the archetype is an essential component in C.G. Jung's system of symbolic interpretation. Jung, Durand ackowledges, borrowed this term from Jacob Burckhardt, and used it as synonymous with such other terms as: "l'image primordiale," "l'image originelle," "le prototype", "l'engramme". (22) Both Durand and Jung understand the archetype not as an original image (as in original sin), but as a type of patterning of fundamental experience , rooted in instinctual and affective forces, whose meaning finds expressions in iconic rather than verbal form. The archetypal symbol functions as the "substantification" of these tendencies, giving them a particular form and image.

The archetype performs in two ways within the Jungian framework. It serves as an intermediary between purely subjective content (assumed as furnished by the unconscious) and the impact of culturally determined forces. Secondly, it serves as a preliminary stage on the way to ideation: le stade prélimihaire, la zone matricelle de l'idée. (23) Here, once again the imagination, as a force in the formation of archetype, operates as a mediator. The three models, the biological, the schematic and the archetypal, combine together to provide a complex system of forces and pressures: physical, psychological, environmental and unconscious, that interweave to provide Durand with his conception of the mediating role of imagination. And it is on this basis that Durand builds his classificatory system.

Durand's Isotropic Classification of Images

I have elected to omit a detailed content analysis of Durand's division into the tripartite ways of being, thinking, acting and the symbols that are appropriate to each of these subdivisions. This analysis comprises Book II of Les Structures. Such an evaluation is intricate, subjective, and its anthropologically-based categories beyond the scope of the thesis. (24) Nevertheless it is appropriate to consider the organization of Durand's complex system of divisions. To the isomorphic convergence of certain schèmes and of archetypes as expressed in myths and imaginative productions, there is added another corresponding classification of basic units that Durand names structures:

> Le substantif de structure, adjoint a des épithètes à suffixes empruntés a l'étymologie du mot "forme" et que, faute de mieux, nous utiliserons métaphoriquement, signifiera simplement deux choses: premièrement que ces "formes" sont dynamiques...c'est-à-dire servant commodément à la classification mais pouvant servir, puisque transformables, à modifier le champ imaginaire. Deuxièment...ces "modèles" ne sont pas quantitatifs mais symptomatiques....(25)

The interrelationship of the schèmes, archetypes and structures is complex and difficult to comprehend. It would appear that the schèmes are dynamic tendencies which find expression in archetypal symbols, but also in three modes of reflective awareness called structures and respectively entitled: schizomorphe (hétérogénéisante), synthétique (équilibrante) and mystique (homogénéisante). These structures, in that they abstractly reflect for Durand those three dominant reflex drives of the organism posited by Betcherev, become the three basic categories of classification of the *schèmes* and archetypes. These *structures* are themselves finally subdivided into two major categories that Durand terms *régimes*: *régime diurne* and *régime nocturne*. This division refers to two basic tendencies of operation and organization in all thought and behavior. As such, they tend to be antagonistic. They have been observed and recorded by other thinkers in diverse studies as the opposition of linear/cyclic, analytic/synthetic, focus/field, apollonian/dionysian modes. At this stage Durand expands on their implications only from a structural perspective. In later works, however, he will return to their symbolic import in terms of his theory of imagination, and this development will be assessed in that context.

It would appear that this typological enterprise of Durand belongs to a branch of study named in France *la symbolique générale* or *la science des symboles* (26) or, according to Durand, *la symbolologie* (27). As Réné Alleau defines it, the discipline is essentially interdisciplinary. It involves the attempts to co-ordinate the symbolic data from the diverse fields of history of religions, ethnology, depth-psychology, the history of art, literary criticism and linguistics. The intention is that of providing a coherent, if not unified, perspective of the relationships that exist among these respective methods of study, their classifactory systems and their underlying presuppositions in dealing with symbolic material. As Alleau observes, the state of the discipline is "...encore confuse et embryonnaire." (28) The ordering of such a vast panopoly of symbols, without assuming some normative stance, would appear a virtual impossibility. Alleau himself admits that in any classificatory system there is a root concept at work which assumes that a certain principle is responsible for the production of raw data and hence influences the resultant analysis of this material.

It is interesting to determine Durand's adoption of the Jungian concept of archetype in this regard. Durand states explicitly that in undertaking this study he intends to avoid studiously "...toute présupposition ontologique, tout du psychologisme que du culturalisme." (29) He also observes that such a stance will allow him, after he has presented his study in the second section of the book, to advance a metaphysics of the imagination, based on his findings, in the third section of Les Structures. Durand is aware that the Jungian postulate of the archetype does not rest ultimately in its grounding in the personal unconscious, but has a certain collective, transcultural dimension that tends to develop spiritual overtones. Durand refuses to enter into any metaphysical speculations as to the ultimate source of the archetypes in the initial part of the book. Nonetheless he is content to adopt the position, at this introductory stage of the study, that his schèmes and archetypes imply a type of transformational effect, which is supported by the Jungian theory of individuation. It is this understanding that allows Durand to state the differences of this structured system from that of Lévi-Strauss.

Durand would see the fundamental properties that Lévi-Strauss articulates in his schemas of mythic formulas as mere semiological abstractions that remain static and quantitative. In contrast to this he feels that his groupings do not belong to such a mathematical format, but that in their dynamism, they are at once diagnostic and therapeutic. Both Lévi-Strauss and Durand have sought out cross-cultural subject matter for their respective classifications. Whereas Lévi-Strauss' aim in structuring his material is to arrive at logical patterns common to myths and tales, Durand wishes to find the common element (la forme commune) (30) that connects his heterogeneous collection of symbols. This sufficiently vague formula, linked together with a medical analogy underlying his previous observation, imply that a prescriptive, rather than a purely objective study, provides the motivation for Durand's programme. It must be observed, however, that in this initial stage of his research, though extremely eclectic in his adoption of certain theories amd models, Durand remains consistent with his intended pragmatic approach. It is in Book III of Les Structures that his approach will change. Here, having acknowledged that the preceding study, devoid of ontological presuppositions, has effected une convergence supreme (31) of all imagery, Durand notes its merely preparatory nature in the light of his overall purpose:

> ...d'aborder la théorie du sens suprême de la fonction symbolique et d'écrire notre troisième livre sur la métaphysique de l'imagination. (32)

This study of the pre-metaphysical stage of his work has served to illustrate the complexity of his structural model and the diverse influences, biological, functional and archetypal, that have informed it.

Durand's Understanding of the Imagination

It is in Book III, the concluding section of Les Structures, after he has presented his classificatory system and contents, that Durand finally formulates what for him constitutes the essential feature of the imagination and its functions. This, he believes, is demonstrated by his phenomenological typology to be the intrinsic human ability to perceive and hence experience, as it were, all entities through the lens of a second perspective. Images and symbols are the basis of this "filter" or "focus." They can therefore be said to establish a world-view which, in and of itself, furnishes meaning that, Durand alleges, has universal application.

This can be interpreted in two ways. In one sense, Durand would say that this universality of symbolic representations has been established from his study as characteristic of the human species. At the same time, in another sense, this imaginative function is an a priori component of all understanding. It is these two aspects together that allow Durand to outline the ideas that would comprise a philosophy of the imagination that he would call, after Novalis, "une fantastique transcendantale" (a transcendental fantasy function—where fantasy means image-making, not whimsy). (33) This model recalls Kant's transcendental imagination, but it would seem that Durand has appropriated Novalis' curious term specifically to differentiate his own conception of the workings of the imagination from that of Kant.

In Kant, the transcendental imagination operates between sense perception and understanding supplying schemata in the first Critique, and symbols in the third Critique. The symbols of the third Critique present the aesthetic ideas which are beyond reason and cannot be captured in concepts. For Durand, the "fantastique transcendantale" organizes its categories according to the different structures of the typology—schèmes generally, archetypal symbols particularly—to give meaning to the unformed imaginative material, which he posits is an essential part of a human being. Durand holds that these imaginative formations of image, symbol, provide meaning in a manner analogous to the Kantian schematization in the formation of concepts and symbols. (34) The contents of the respective processes, however, are entirely different. Kant was concerned with intellectual understanding and aesthetic appreciation while Durand emphasizes humanity's inherent propensity for image-formation and appropriation. Durand concludes that in this respect symbolic images are not inferior to conceptual expression but are of equal value. This precludes their dismissal as fanciful aberrations or as le résidu d'un déficit pragmatique. (35) Imagination is thus an intrinsic part not only of knowing, but also of being, and in this connection it is the evidence provided by his study that substantiates its role and identity as la marque d'une vocation ontologique. (36) In this way, Durand affirms that the imagination as la fonction fantastique (37) performs not simply heuristically, as a creative activity that gives meaning to reality, but therapeutically. In this guise it can transform the nature of reality (le monde) itself. (38)

Durand's Metaphysics of Imagination

This move, from an epistemological to an ontological position, is further developed in Durand's later appropriation of the imaginative domain as the common ground of mystics, poets, visionaries, depth psychologists. He even extends the boundaries of the territory to include all those philosophers and seekers (such as alchemists) who expressed their ideas as to the nature of life and its psychological processes in symbolic imagery. The underlying assumption here is that the rational operations of the mind and its definition of truth cannot grasp the profundity and complexity of that which Durand posits as the "ultimate reality"; if, indeed, "rationalism" (39) accepts its existence. Durand holds that it is possible, by imagination, to participate in that dimension which Kant postulated as beyond conceptualization:the noumena. This understanding assigns a metaphysical function to the imagination, which entails a different definition of truth from that established by the logical-scientific formulas.

From such an understanding Durand proceeds to the attestation that such an element in human nature, which supports not only the construction, but the personal appropriation of meaning, is characteristic of a "spiritual" dimension:

> Car la véritable liberté et la dignité de la vocation ontologique des personnes ne reposent que sur cette spontanéité spirituelle et cette expression créatrice qui constitue le champ de l'imaginaire. (40)

This term "spiritual" could at first be taken to mean simply an essentially dynamic (i.e., spirited) aspect of the creative mind at work. Durand, however, is not content with such a depiction, for he elsewhere states:

> Ainsi l'aube de toute création de l'esprit humain, tant théorique que pratique, est gouvernée par la fonction fantastique. Non seulement cette fonction fantastique nous apparaît comme universelle dans son extension à travers l'espèce humaine, mais encore dans sa compréhension: elle est à la racine de tous les processus de la conscience, elle se révele comme la marque originaire de l'Esprit. (41)

Such a conclusion, which is of a metaphysical nature, carries with it implications that cannot be deduced from the data presented in Durand's typology, however exhaustive it is. Nor can it be supported by Durand's observations of the three primary qualities of the image as: occularité (visualization), profondeur (psychic depth) and ubiquité (all-pervasiveness, unaffected by time-space qualifications). (42) This metaphysical leap is not justified by the empirical data, nor by the anthropologically grounded archétypologie transcendentale. The use of the words esprit, Esprit, spirituel, de l'âme, (43) become virtually interchangeable in the last section of Les Structures, and Durand does nothing to clarify his ambiguous usage of these words by placing them in a consistent philosophic framework. The only statement, indicative of a philosophic point of reference, is the comparison of Durand's own understanding of la fonction fantastique with Avicenna's use of the intellectus agens:

> Aussi rien ne nous semble plus proche de cette fonction fantastique que la vieille notion avicennienne d'intellect agent....(44)

But he chooses not to develop the idea further in this book. (The question of this usage of the *intellectus agens* will be treated in Chapter IV.) Yet it is difficult not to associate this postulate of *primordiale fonction de l'Esprit, rectrice du savoir de l'espèce humaine tout entière, principe spécifique d'universalité de vocation transcendante* (45) with a similar concept found in Jung that is just as ambiguously defined.

In Jung, the "transcendental function" would appear to be the agent at work in the constellation and appropriation of archetypal symbols as a person attempts to understand his/her own psychic process of individuation. For Jung "individuation" was used as a term to describe the end-product of a therapeutic analysis that involved conscious "negotiation" with particular dream images. Individuation *per se* cannot be regarded as a normative state, i.e., maturity, but rather as the realization of a full psychic identity or "wholeness" which Jung posited as potential within all human beings. Durand is not concerned with personal individuation; rather he is concerned with the restoration of balance that can be brought to the Western rationalist bias by a re-evaluation and emphasis on imaginative productions. Yet, as was observed earlier, he adopted Jung's understanding of the archetypal symbol and its therapeutic implications in a generalized theory. These archetypes were presented as biologically grounded, affectively related symbolic translations of spontaneous activity on the part of what Jung refers to as *psyche*, and Durand, the imagination. And it is this specific activity to which both Jung and Durand refer with the interchangeable adjectives *spirituel*, *de l'âme.* This appears to be the ground for the virtually imperceptible switch to a Platonist usage of *L'Esprit* and *L'Etre*, specifically in the work of Durand, though it is not absent either in Jung.

Jung's archetypes had a distinct relationship to the Platonic Ideas:

> They are ideas ante-rem, form-determinants, basic lines engraven a priori, assigning a definite formation to the stuff of experience; so that we may regard them as images (as Plato also conceived them), as schemata as it were, or inherited function-possibilities....This explains why even phantasy, the freest activity of the mind, can never roam in the infinite...but remains bound to the preformed possibilities, . . .the primordial images or archetypes. (46)

Jung attested that his analytical psychology, as an empirical science, regarded the image of God as the symbolic expression of a certain psychological state. The "soul," which he admits as an ambiguous and variously-interpreted concept, is also regarded as the "personification of unconscious contents." (47) From an empirical standpoint this leads to the conclusion: "God, therefore, is essentially the same as the soul, in so far as it is regarded as the personification of unconscious contents." (48) God and the soul, however, are not to be absolutely identified, as there is a distinct relationship between them:

> But the soul never forgoes its middle station. Hence its claim to be regarded as a function between the conscious subject and these (to the subject) inaccessible depths of the unconscious. The determining force (God) which operates from these depths is reflected by the soul, i.e. it creates symbols and images, and is itself only an image. Through these images it transveys the forces of the unconscious into the conscious; so that it is both receiver and transmitter, a perceptive organ, in fact, for unconscious contents. What it perceives are symbols. But symbols are shaped energies, or forces, i.e., determining ideas whose spiritual value is just as great as their affective power. (49)

This description of the soul by Jung is remarkably similar to Durand's depiction of the imagination. Were both Jung and Durand content to remain at the level of empirical study, as they both make claims to do, such descriptions, though problematical in terminology, would fit into a three-tiered model of human consciousness, where the imagination (or soul) performs a mediating function between the other two levels of conscious and unconscious. But just as Jung in a later work states:

> For it is not that "God" is a myth, but that myth is the revelation of a divine life in man. It is not we who invent myth, rather it speaks to us as a Word of God. The Word of God comes to us, and we have no way of distinguishing whether and to what extent it is different from God. (50)

so Durand, at the end of L'Imagination symbolique, can affirm:

> ...c'est que le symbole, dans son dynamisme instauratif à la quête du sens, constitue le modèle même de la médiation de l'Eternel dans le temporel. (51)

Durand's trajet anthropologique has theological implications; or perhaps it would be more precise to observe that there is an anagogic element underlying the philosophical position that informs Jung's and Durand's alleged empirical studies. Whether this stems from a personal belief system or from the fact that their tripartite analyses of symbolic consciousness falls easily under a Platonist schema that requires only the capitalization of certain letters, it is difficult to assess. As observed, both Jung and Durand never explicitly define their position in this regard. This leaves the reader in an ambivalent state of mind as to the intent of Durand's employment of the words spirituel, de l'âme, Esprit, Eternel.

Whereas the earlier empirically based studies of both thinkers would virtually imply that man himself/herself is the source of images and symbols, their respective later works posit that such images and symbols are, if not revelations per se, at least theophanic in design. Such a metaphysical outlook, with its monistic flavour, has certain in-built qualifications which then allow for the rebuttal of other theories of the imagination—notably those of Sartre and Bergson. Such a philosophical system also implies a self-referential conception of truth, as opposed to logical and propositional formulas of proof.

Durand's Rebuttal of Sartre and Bergson

The adoption of this metaphysical position by Durand enables him to refute other theories that have recently dealt with the imagination. Durand's assessment of Sartre's theory of the imagination is based on Sartre's early two works on that topic. (52) There is no reference to Sartre's later works where there is quite a different attitude towards both the unconscious and the imagination. (53) The latter was then regarded by Sartre, not as a signé dégradé, but in a manner somewhat akin to Husserl's idea of the sui generis nature of imaginative intentionality. (54) In Les Structures, however, Durand regards Sartre as having a limited and truncated view of the imagination, which is, indeed, consistent with Sartre's earlier formulations.

For Sartre the imagination, while constituting an essentially creative and necessary psychological function, did not involve its subject with reality, but only with fantasy. Ultimately, in that this evasion constituted a nihilizing act, it could be regarded only as an instance of "bad faith." (55) Durand could not accept this evaluation, which both devalues and works against any rehabilitation of the imagination as either creative and/or therapeutic. Durand's perceptive analysis observes that Sartre's phenomenological study, L'Imaginaire, was effectively a study of "Conscience-de-l'image-chez-Jean-Paul-Sartre." (56) It is to be regretted, however, that Durand did not address himself to those later thoughts of Sartre on that topic, where he came to understand the imagining consciousness not as a negating one, but as a free and creative intentionality, referring to new possibilities of thought and action.

The work of Henri Bergson, however, provides an altogether different attitude towards the image. Bergson, deeply influenced by the work of

Plotinus, sought to redress the metaphysical distrust that had been the Kantian legacy to the Western tradition. Bergson's basic undertaking in his philosophical works was to restore the notion that by intuition, one can have a direct apprehension of le réel (matter). Philosophy consists in placing "...oneself, by an effort of intuition, in the concrete flowing of duration." (57)

As well as this central concern, however, Bergson also studied the nature of fiction and myth-making (la fabulation), whose function he believed was essentially "...a defensive reaction of nature against the representation by intelligence of the inevitability of death." (58) In this regard Durand is certainly in accord with Bergson:

> C'est à Bergson que revient le mérite d'avoir de façon explicite établi le rôle biologique de l'imagination, de ce qu'il appelle la fonction fabulatrice. (59)

Both see the role of imagination as a vital, instinctual force that is both creative and affirmative of life.

Bergson's principle undertaking, however, was a criticism of Kant's theory of knowledge which was founded within a Newtonian physical universe. This system had repercussions in the scientific and philosophic definitions of Bergson's era, where "time" was treated as static moments. Bergson attempted to understand time as la durée (pure duration). Such an approach viewed time as a continuity that was beyond any subject/object categorization. This permitted a functional rather than structural convergence where la durée, in the sense of a timeless instant, was the concentration of images from past and present that thus provided the focus and impetus for an intuitive act. This direct insight into the nature of things was metaphysical in content, but was not to be construed as confirmation of any absolute principle.

Durand, however, cannot accept Bergson's thesis, referring to une intuition vague (60) in one rebuttal where he observes that both Bachelard and Jung explored this domain with greater precision in their studies of la poétique (poetic reverie) and of oneiric, cross-cultural symbols respectively. The basis of Durand's objection would appear to be that in Bergson's theory it is the "coalescence" of images that provides the ground for an intuition, which is itself an insight independent of images. On a metaphysical level Durand cannot accept this, for in this regard he has accepted the Jungian framework. Here image as symbol, based on an isomorphic archetypal principle of interpretation, provides both the ground and vehicle for clarification of one's psychic processes, (61) and for illumination of a personal truth. There is no intuition into the nature of reality itself.

There is, in addition, another ground of disagreement. Bergson has posited la durée as essentially a-temporal and a-spatial. Durand, however, wants to establish psychic space as the sole a priori form of la fonction fantastique and so cannot but reject Bergson's model. For Durand feels that even in Bergson's conception of la durée there is an emphasis on time, at the expense of space, which functions as obviously as the Kantian category of time, though the understanding of the concept is dissimilar:

> ...mais il n'en est pas moins paradoxalement vrai que chez Kant comme chez Bergson le temps possède une plus-value psycholgique que l'espace. "Donnée immédiate" ou "condition a priori de la généralité des phénomènes" minimisent l'espace au profit de l'intuition de la temporalité. (62)

Time cannot be a generally accepted a priori of psychic phenomena, for the symbol, the focus of Durand's work till now, always escapes temporal confinement in the sense of a static finality. In this context the basis of Durand's opposition is that he also wished to maintain the importance of the concrete in contrast to Bergson's idealism. At the same time, on the psychological level, he wants to ground his epistemology of the image in a "spatial" dimension that is the a priori condition of symbolic meaning. In itself this is a symbolic space which overcomes the antinomies of time and distance, yet through symbolic expression by a human agency it maintains a concrete connection. Durand neatly summarizes his differences from Bergson:

> ...il n'y a d'intuition que des images, au sein de l'espace, lieu de notre imagination. C'est pour cette raison profonde que l'imagination humaine est modelée par le développement de la vision, puis de l'audition et du langage, tous moyens d'appréhension et d'assimilation "à distance." C'est dans cette réduction euphémique du distancement que sont contenues les qualités de l'espace. (63)

Space, then, as a postulate works for Durand on both psychological and metaphysical levels, for finally l'espace imaginaire (64) moves beyond the bounds of simple perceptive images and constructs. In its ultimate meaning for Durand it becomes an affirmation of life itself. To delineate this process Durand once again employs the model of Kantian schematization, but again it is given a different emphasis and operation, for imaginative space and its schematization are not confined to empirical ordering.

In this connection Durand acknowledges that he agrees with Bergson's assessment of la fabulation as not constituting a flight from life, but a confirmation and support-system of life's values; its source not being fear, but affirmation in the face of fear. Indeed Durand carries this even further as he holds that la fonction fantastique is essentially une fonction euphémique. (65) Durand here employs the word euphemistic in its etymological sense, for imagination finally is neither the flight from life by fantasy or repression (as Sartre initially alleges), nor the denial of life by a disembodied intuition, but is the expression of a freedom of spirit in the face of mortality:

> ...l'imagination dans toutes ses manifestations: religieuses et mythiques, littéraires et esthétiques, ce pouvoir réellement métaphysique de dresser ses oeuvres contre "la pourriture" de la Mort et du Destin. (66)

In this salutary exaltation of imagination Durand understands l'espace imaginaire as providing room to move creatively and in so doing to negate the merely temporal and spatial categories of existence, and their implications of death.

> L'espace devient la forme a priori du pouvoir euphémique de la pensée, il est le lieu des figurations puisqu'il est le symbole opératoire du distancement maîtrisé. (67)

The mechanism of Durand's schématisme transcendantale is in fact predisposed towards a transcendent dimension. L'espace imaginaire is a transcendental category and the a priori condition of the euphemistic function. The ontological affirmation of life itself established by this creative dynamics finds expression in images and symbols. These images and symbols are not timeless insights but at once both a means of access to and the expression of a dimension that, for Durand, escapes finite encapsulation. Though concrete in specific personal expressions and manifestations, and thus rooted in the life process of individuals, images are the stuff of life and imagination is the life-force. In this sense Durand can posit all thinking (image-based) as life affirming:

> Mais ce schématisme, bien loin d'être selon la définition kantienne une "détermination a priori du temps" est au contraire une détermination a priori de l'anti-destin, de l'euphémisme qui va teinter, dans son ensemble toutes les démarches de formalisation de la pensée. (68)

So it is that "time" for Durand cannot be considered as a formal abstraction, but rather as a vital predisposition that works through image-formation to negate any fixed conceptual organization. The underlying assumption on Durand's part is that intelligence finds its liveliest and life-supporting expressions through image rather than concepts, which he views as the ground of static and life-denying systems.

Conclusion

In his defence and presentation of the workings of imagination in Book III Durand has given evidence of a shift of perspective in his thought. Whereas in Book I there was the assumption of the Jungian model with its unconscious and instinctual source of images and symbols, here Durand treats the nature of creative thought itself. This emphasis provides an introduction to Durand's treatment of the symbolic nature of all thought and of the root of language. Durand believes that all language formation is essentially based on image and metaphor and that words are intrinsically creative on their initial usage. Today, through repetition and tradition, language has degenerated into an exchange of simple one-dimensional signs or units of meanings. Durand believes it is the poets who have retained the pristine creative quality of word-making in their images and metaphors. This final shift, which allows his understanding of imagination to embrace the essential creativity of all language, leads Durand to conclude his work *Les Structures* with a paean to poets—affirming, however, that all symbols and metaphors are part of *l'euphémisme fantastique*, (69) an integral part of being human. In admitting and recognizing this aspect of human nature:

> Car la véritable liberté et la dignité de la vocation ontologique des personnes ne reposent que sur cette spontanéité et cette expression créatrice qui constitue le champ de l'imaginaire. (70)

Durand calls for a reconstruction of the educational process, asking that as much emphasis be placed on a pedagogy of the imagination as is on the cult of reason. This is part of a project which he entitles variously l'humanisme plénier, (71) or l'humanisme planétaire, (72) which would study the cultural inheritance of the humanities: l'archétypologie, la mythologie, la stylistique, la rhétorique et les beaux-arts (73) in order to balance the rational and scientific bias predominant in the contemporary culture. Durand's grandiose vision is merely sketched here. He believes that his study in Les Structures is simply a preliminary step towards such a therapeutic undertaking. The intention of the book has thus been multifaceted, but its different aspects can be incorporated under the all-inclusive aim of a rehabilitation of the imagination. The inchoate state of such an interdisciplinary endeavour allows Durand to justify the employment of such diverse and apparently inconsistent models and theories of the imagination. The metaphor which informs Durand's thesis would appear to be the vitality of all imaginative constructions ("mensonges vitaux"), (74) as opposed to the morbidity and mortality of strictly logical formulations of truth (les vérités mortelles) (75):

> Et plutôt que de généraliser abusivement des vérités et des méthodes que ne sont strictement valables qu'au terme d'une rigoureuse psychanalyse objective inapplicable à un sujet pensant,...mieux vaut essayer d'approcher par des méthodes adéquates ce fait insolite, objectivement absurde....(76)

Such observations provide a broadly based foundational construct from which Durand will essay to develop "le nouvel esprit anthropologique" in his later works. In Les Structures Durand has established a base for a study of the imagination that could be profitably pursued along a number of different routes. Theoretically, the imagination has been advanced as the mediating function in a dynamic model of polarity; as the restorative balance in a biological and psycho-social functional model; as the creative function in a metaphoric (poetic) psychological theory; as the theophanic agent (through archetypes and symbols) in a metaphysical theory of knowledge. In all of the above Durand observes the imagination as the virtual locus of the life force, providing a euphemistic world-view, that by way of images is at once heuristic and therapeutic. Modes of discourse from the psychological, philosophical and phenomenologial categories interact indistinguishably. It is virtually impossible to define Durand's fundamental philosophic position in Les Structures. At the time of writing this book he had not yet been introduced to the work of Henry Corbin. (77) The studies of this man were to affect profoundly Durand's exposition of a philosophy of imagination. The only indication as to the future direction of Durand's philosophical development can be gleaned from the already noted unsubstantiated statement comparing la fonction fantastique, "cette primordiale fonction de l'Esprit," with the intellect agent of Avicenna:

> Aussi rien ne nous semble plus proche de cette fonction fantastique que la vieille notion avicennienne d'intellect agent, rectrice du savoir de l'espèce humaine tout entière, principe spécifique d'universalité et de vocation transcendante. (78)

(As already noted, the usage of this term will be addressed at length in a philosophical analysis in Chapter Four).

CHAPTER II

THE INFLUENCES SHAPING DURAND'S PHILOSOPHY OF IMAGINATION

Introduction

The work of Henry Corbin has been pivotal in the development of Durand's philosophic understanding of the imagination. In encountering Corbin's thought, particularly as it is expressed in L'imagination créatrice dans le soufisme d'Ibn 'Arabī (1) and Avicenna and the Visionary Recital, (2) Durand found his philosophical vindication: "What I had always suspected." (3) His works and articles from 1964 onwards show the profound influence of Corbin's study of Islamic thinkers, particularly those of Iran, and of his assertion that the 'alām-al mithāl (called variously mundus imaginalis or monde imaginal)—the intermediary world of images, dreams, and visions—establishes a world as real as that of empirically verifiable data:

> 'alām-al mithāl, monde de l'Image, mundus imaginalis: un monde aussi réel ontologiquement que le monde des sens et le monde de l'intellect, un monde qui requiert une faculté de perception qui lui soit propre, faculté ayant une fonction cognitive, une valeur noétique, aussi réelles de plein droit que celles de la perception sensible ou de l'intuition intellectualle. (4)

Such an understanding, when transposed to Western culture, allows Durand to tie together many diverse strands that had stimulated his own interest in the imagination. These motivations are particularly polyglot, comprising romantic poets and surrealists; depth psychologists (the influence of C.G. Jung has already been treated); and more particularly the poetic explorations of his teacher, Gaston Bachelard. Once he had read Corbin's work, however, all of these influences are filtered, as it were through the structure and terminology of Corbin's thesis. Before, however, a study is made of Corbin's ideas and his profound effect on Durand, the impact of earlier encounters needs to be assessed.

The Formative Influence of Gaston Bachelard

The major cause of Durand's favourable predisposition towards the imagination was undoubtedly the work of his teacher at the Sorbonne, Gaston Bachelard. As Durand observes:

> L'immense mérite de Bachelard c'est d'avoir d'abord eu le courage—lui, Professeur de Philosophie des Sciences à la Sorbonne—d'affirmer, au savoir scientifique et à l'imagination poétique un droit égal à la vie de l'esprit. (5)

The development of Bachelard's own views on imagination indicate an unusual shift of attitude. His stated purpose in La psychanalyse du feu (6) had been the purification of objective knowledge from the residue of subjective memories and musings that hinder scientific investigations. Caught unawares in his own method, he began by examining each of the elements of fire, earth, air, water, and subjecting them to his process of "psychoanalysis." Curiously each book became itself a poetic exploration of the topic at hand. Bachelard became conscious of a process or power that had been liberated within him which he termed the "immediate dynamics" of an image. The elements of this "immediate dynamics," especially its attendant qualifications of surprise and gratuitousness, provided the initial inspiration for Durand's own investigations.

The two basic insights of Bachelard's theory of the imagination stemming from his "immediate dynamics" were the biological nature of the imaginative impulse and the transformative (creative) function it brought to sense perception. This transformation was not to be confused with mere fantasy, the difference being provided by the "conscious filter" of the poetic mind, which organized the experience. Bachelard's excursions into poetic association were also not to be identified with inspiration as in the poetic craft itself. His peculiar extravagance was confined to poetic reverie: "I am a dreamer of words, of written words." (7) The process followed the thematic development of memories evoked by a particular word or topic that presented itself while reading, e.g., childhood, fire. His work can best be understood as a "phenomenology" of poetic consciousness, and his definition of the underlying method of his project, where he was both reader and "reverizer," was that of a tensive awareness. "Reading always at the summit of images, stretched towards the desire to surpass the summits will give the reader well-defined exercises in phenomenology." (8) His studies were adverse to any analytical thought or to any reductive formulas of scientific psychology and of psychoanalysis. This attempt to remain faithful to capturing the creative consciousness at work had to observe Bachelard's own tenets of the dynamic, expansive, future-oriented nature of the experience: "The phenomenology of perception itself must stand aside for the phenomenology of the creative imagination." (9) Bachelard visualized the image as it emerged into consciousness as a direct product of the heart, soul, and being of man, apprehended in his actuality. Such a theory ultimately affirmed the "imagining being" as partaking in a fullness of experience, or a plentitude of being. This "phenomenological consciousness" provided at once the medium and the message of its own self-awareness and potentiality. It confirmed imagination as a principle of growth by:

> ...establishing a phenomenology of the imaginary where

> the imagination is restored to its proper, all-important place as the principle of direct stimulation of psychic becoming. (10)

Bachelard's vocabulary may seem fluid and imprecise in the light of contemporary anaylsis, both from a philosophic and a psychological perspective. Yet it was not his intention, even at the time of writing, to defend his insights within the thought-systems of that time. His great merit, as Durand acknowledges, was to establish the function of imagination as constituting an autonomous, autochthonous realm of self-awareness, which was itself a form of knowledge. Bachelard, however, was unwilling to develop his theory further than that. Indeed, though he had contributed to the rehabilitation of the imagination, he saw poetic consciousness as remaining distinct from rational thought:

> Perhaps it is even a good idea to stir up rivalry between conceptual and imaginative activity. In any case, one will encounter nothing but disappointments if he intends to make them cooperate. (11)

He confirmed this insight later in the same book:

> Dreaming reveries and thinking thoughts are certainly two disciplines which are hard to reconcile. At the end of a jostled culture, I believe more and more that they are the disciplines of two different lives. (12)

Nevertheless, the merit of his approach was that imaginative consciousness was not regarded as subservient to rational consciousness. Their separation into distinct modes of thinking was not the establishment of two polarities following the Hegelian dialectic model, but rather the acknowledgement of a desired and fruitful complementarity. His ideal figure was the philosopher or scientist who also knew how "to welcome the warmth of a fireplace." Within his approach, however, reveries and rational investigations, though no longer inimical, remained distinct areas of knowledge. For Bachelard reverie enriched reality, while science attempted to unravel its truths.

Durand, of course, has difficulty with this conclusion, evaluating

Bachelard as maintaining a reverence for the positivistic frame of mind and actually dichotomizing consciousness into two distinct and ultimately opposed positions: les deux axes opposés de l'activité intellectuelle: la science et la poésie. (13) He evaluates his mentor's contributions:

> ...c'est Gaston Bachelard qui devait instituer épistémologiquement le statut de la poétique face et contradictoirement au statut de l'esprit scientifique. (14)

Durand obviously cannot rest content with such a division, for in undertaking his own symbolic archétypologie he feels that poetic consciousness, l'imagination créatrice, as he now begins to call it, must be supported by something more than a mere acknowledgement of its status as a counterpoise to the rational:

> Un humanisme véritable ne doit-il pas prendre en charge tout ce qui plaît universellement sans concept et bien plus: tout ce qui vaut universellement sans raison? Une des convictions qui se dégage de notre enquête c'est qu'il faut réviser lorsqu'il s'agit de compréhension anthropologique, nos définitions sectaires de la vérité. (15)

Objectifying consciousness can no longer be regarded as providing the norm with its specialized formulaic definitions of truth. Neither can a simple phenomenology of the imagining consciousness either balance or build an opposing truth. The answer for Durand lies in Corbin's understanding of the mundus imaginalis, (16) an intermediary and independent mode of consciousness, the existence of which upholds his preliminary speculations in Les Structures:

> Une autre modalité de l'être est révélée par-delà le moi transcendantal, par-delà le moi brisé par l'existence, par-delà le monde phénoménal: c'est la modalité du "Mundus imaginalis" ce gigantesque filet tissé des rêves et des désirs de l'espèce et où viennent se prendre, malgré elles, les petites réalités quotidiennes. (17)

The dreams and desires of humankind, poetically formulated in visions, are accepted in Corbin's philosophic framework as belonging to an intermediary dimension, neither matter nor spirit, that in a Platonist system is regarded as the realm of the soul. This will provide the basis of Durand's philosophic understanding of the imaginal "truth" as it is to be related to imagination. Bachelard's "phenomenological" vindication of the imagination's autonomous activity, while providing Durand with the stimulus he needed to further investigate imaginal phenomena, remained on a psychological level. Thus it did not contribute to the revising of Western metaphysical categories of the imagination, which Durand has come to appreciate as essential to his work.

The Romantic Influence

Besides Jung and Bachelard, the other major influence on Durand has been the Romantic movement and its twentieth century off-shoot, surrealism. This amorphous movement was first articulated by the German philosophers Herder, Fichte and Schelling who all lived approximately in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The basic ideology, as expressed especially by the poets Hölderlin and Novalis, is a form of absolute idealism whereby through symbolic perception one has direct access to reality itself, i.e., the world of the noumena, which Kant had posited as beyond any mode of knowledge. For Kant symbolic appreciation, as well as conceptual knowledge, was confined to the world of phenomena. In expressing itself the Romantic idiom veered uncertainly between monistic and pantheistic modes of incorporating the noumena. There was also a modified version where Nature symbolized a transcendental reality, though it could not be identified with it. The imagination was accepted as the supreme agency of poetic/spiritual perception; the two modes being undifferentiated. Durand singles out

Coleridge, (1772-1834) the English Romantic poet, as the person who emphasized the creative role of imagination:

> ...et que Coleridge dissocie l'imagination créatrice,...de la simple servante reproductrice de la perception, de la simple retombée de la fantaisie [fancy].... (18)

In the Biographia Literaria Coleridge did indeed attempt to come to an understanding of both the creative poetic process which he termed the "secondary imagination" and the productive imagination of Kant, to which he gave the name "primary imagination." (19) Both were to be distinguished from mere fancy, or arbitrary musings. In another part of his work he also attempted to show how this "secondary imagination" enables a poet to be in touch with appearances that are beyond ordinary perception. (20) The Platonic overtones of this model were derived from Coleridge's reading of Cudworth and the Cambridge Platonists. In yet another instance he speaks of imagination as the power that helps "idealize and unify experience"; (21) the combining power that seeks out what is of universal significance in particular observations. Here the "secondary imagination" appears more akin to the Kantian productive imagination, the task of which is to impose order on the manifold of experience. Yet in neither of these understandings does Coleridge intimate that imagination leads to any grasp of truth that is apart from rational consciousness. Coleridge's philosophic theorizing is somewhat ambivalent and lacks coherency. There is something of an attempt to Platonize Kant for which he did not possess the necessary philosophic acumen. (22) (If indeed such a manoeuvre is possible.) Above all, however, Coleridge also wished to maintain his allegiance to orthodox Christian beliefs and not lapse into monistic or pantheistic world views. Nevertheless, he acknowledged the creative role of the imagination both in life and poetry. And it is this acknowledgement that attracts Durand's attention.

It must be observed, however, that Coleridge's lack of philosophic precision is a particular failing of most members of the Romantic movement. Its insistence on the primacy of the faculty of imagination is matched by an equally nebulous understanding of its actual role and definition. As a result, the emphasis on a transcendent or transcendental element depends upon the personal proclivities of the individual thinker. Durand, nevertheless, wishes to claim this wide-ranging legacy as part of his programme, as it supports the creative role of the imagination and encourages the exploration of image and symbol. Within Durand's system, the movement is placed in a Platonist context, and regarded as having certain truth claims:

> Avec la poétique romantique, l'exploration de l'imaginaire devient connaissance d'un domaine réel et cette connaissance d'un "sur-naturalisme" est par là même révélation. Et c'est là que réside le coeur de cette immense révolution romantique; par-delà les positivismes et le formalisme aristotélicien "réminiscence" platonicienne reprend signification: la théologie, devenu théosophie, s'intériorise dans l'exploration poétique elle-même. (23)

The Platonic theory of reminiscence is not, however, to be inserted within its traditional Greek mind-set but allowed to span the Western Platonist heritage where symbolic thought and the philosophia perennis have combined to provide the esoteric hybrid of theosophy. For Durand theosophy, as well as Romanticism, is dependent upon the imagination for access to the monde profond.

Surrealism

To this complexity of influences Durand then adds the final contributing members who focused on the rôle of imagination : the early twentieth century French iconoclasts, the surrealists. Initially viewed as a movement that was at once an attempt to subvert and to provide an "escape-valve" for the "over-rationalized" French mind, surrealism in time ceased to be reactive only and came to have an identity of its own. This identity depended upon the adoption of a world-view that admitted the dislocation of dream and unconscious imagery, and refused the accepted spatial categories, sequential chronology and norms of conduct. At the same time it portrayed telescopic vision, magical occurrences, and outrageous images designed to jolt accepted conventions. Such a development denied the primacy of logical and linear thought. This iconoclasm, though it functioned within a model of diagrammatic polarity with reference to scientific rationalism, is regarded by Durand as a continuation of the Romantic insurgencies on behalf of imagination:

> Cette décisive exploration allait se prolonger dans toute la poétique contemporaine, et, bien entendu, à travers ces héritiers du romantisme que furent les surréalistes. (24)

The Corbin Connection

Durand then sets this amalgam of influences--Jung, Bachelard, Romanticism and its contemporary heirs--against the background that he has adopted to provide its rationale, "une spiritualité concrète," the world of creative imagination:

> Et tout comme romantiques, surréalistes, psychologues des profondeurs redécouvrent dans la genèse de l'image l'expérience d'une spiritualité concrète, les penseurs shî'ites ou soufis déploient une théorie de l'Imagination créatrice d'une ampleur, d'une précision et d'une profondeur jamais atteinte en Occident. (25)

The philosophical opus of Henry Corbin will provide a coherent system, which can both integrate the multifaceted influences that have informed Durand's development, and allow him sufficient space to pursue further his own investigations. The influence of Bachelard and Jung had prompted Durand to explore the world of the symbol from a perspective that had been largely untreated in the Western tradition. Classical thought, in Durand's opinion, in dividing reality into matter and form, had reduced the soul to an appendage of matter. The spiritual dimension was treated according to the modalities of objective experience: the res cogitans being reduced to the res extensa. Durand believes that Corbin's work has resuscitated the secularized phantom, the soul, in the form of the creative imagination. Once such a system is accepted, the wholesale rehabilitation of the imagination can be undertaken. The evaluation of such a venture must however be postponed till a more thorough investigation of Corbin's work is pursued.

The Work of Henry Corbin

Henry Corbin, who died in October 1978, was a French scholar, who spent much time in Iran, both teaching and studying the works of Islamic mystics and visionaries, particularly Shī'as and Ṣūfis of the tenth till sixteenth centuries. His work served to bring certain aspects of Islamic thought to the attention of Western scholarship, though his interpretations have been debated by contemporary Islamic thinkers. Probably the most vital contribution to Durand's thought was the usage of the word "l'imaginal" derived from the Latin, imaginalis:

> De même que le mot latin origo nous a donné en français les dérivés "originaire, original, originel," je crois que le mot imago peut nous donner, à côté des l'imaginaire et par

> dérivation réguliere, le terme imaginal. Nous aurons ainsi monde imaginal, intermédiare entre le monde sensible et le monde intelligible. (26)

In the same article Corbin provided a rationale for the coinage of this term:

> J'en ai proposé la thématisation latine mundus imaginalis, parce que nous sommes en devoir d'éviter toute confusion, d'une part entre ce qui est ici objet de la perception imaginative ou imaginante et d'autre part ce que nous appelons couramment imaginaire. Cela, parce que l'attitude courante est d'opposer le réel à l'imaginaire comme à l'irréel, l'utopique, comme elle est de confondre le symbole avec l'allégorie,...tandis que l'apparition d'une Image ayant vertu de symbole est un phénomene-premier (Urphaenomen), inconditionnel et irréductible, l'apparition de quelque chose qui ne peut se manifester autrement au monde où nous sommes. (27)

This mundus imaginalis is the world of L'Imagination créatrice which supplies Durand with the needed base to ground the theory he had espoused in Les Structures. Imagination takes its place as the most important of the faculties, with its own criteria of truth:

> L'Imagination est bien montrée et experimentée comme la "reine des facultés," et l'exploration de la vision non perceptive, rêve, rêverie, épiphanies symboliques, peut nous faire atteindre, nous "figurer" un plan de vérité auquel n'accèdent ni les cheminements de la raison, ni les impacts utilitaristes des perceptions sensibles. (28)

A reading of the major work by Henry Corbin, En Islam iranien (29) reveals a quest that is philosophic in intent and at the same time a spiritual odyssey. Corbin's personal involvement in his investigations has enabled him to produce an original synthesis of complex and often conflicting strands of knowledge. Unfortunately, however, this synthetic vision, brilliant as it may be, lays itself open to charges of bias in certain of its presuppositionss and conclusions. In a perceptive article, Hamid Algar assesses the Corbin corpus posthumously as a type of spiritual colonization, while allowing that it may have been undertaken from the best of intentions. (30) The thread that links all of Corbin's thought is his acceptance of the intermediate universe of the imaginal--dreams, visions,revelations--as an ontologically real world with extension and dimension of a different order from that of physical reality. In Arabic this is the 'alām-al mithāl, which Corbin translates as mundus imaginalis. Though this term can also be used to refer to the world of Platonic Ideas, Corbin is careful to indicate the distinction made by Arab thinkers on this point:

> Car c'est le même mot qui sert à désigner en arabe les Idées platoniciennes....Seulement, lorsque le terme vise les Idées platoniciennes, il est presque toujours accompagné de cette qualification précise: mothol (pluriel de mithāl) aflātūnīya nūrānīya, les "archétypes platoniciens de lumiere." Lorsque le terme vise le monde du huitième climat, il désigne techniquement, d'une part, les Images-archétypes des choses individuelles et singulières;...(31)

It is worth noting that another Islamic scholar Fazlur Rahman, who does not subscribe to Corbin's interpretation, has written on the same concepts, (32) explaining them philosophically, without resort to a theory of archetypal imagination, translating 'alām-al mithāl as the Realm of Images. Nevertheless, once Corbin has established his view of the imagination, he uses it as the basis of an intricate study of certain Islamic thinkers and visionaries. This study culminates in the expression of an esoteric monistic world-view that Corbin names "Oriental philosophy." The ingredients of this construct are adopted also by Durand, who emphasizes different facets depending on the context of his investigation.

Corbin, as distinct from Durand, did not intend to present a generalized theory for the revitalization and rehabilitation of the imagination in the West. Nevertheless he shared Durand's opposition to scientific rationalism and historicism, both of which options exclude "imaginal" productions from consideration. His studies however were confined to the Islamic world, particularly Iran, where he believed that he had "discovered" a tradition that gave expression to and valorized the mundus imaginalis.

The Islamic Philosophic Tradition

It was quite in keeping with orthodox Muslim doctrine to hold a belief in angels, visions and dreams since the Qur'ān sanctioned both the angelic appearances to Muhammad and the Revelation that was given to him by this medium. Since the time of Muhammad, however, Islamic thinkers had made contact with Greek philosophical systems, both those of Aristotle and Plato, and they endeavoured to develop epistemological theories to support this received tradition.

The gradual infiltration of Islamic sources by Greek philosophy has been traced and analyzed by contemporary scholarship, (33) though there still remains much research to be done, particularly on the preliminary stages. It is wise to observe cautiously that the Greek-Hellenistic tradition, including the works of Plato and Aristotle, as it was absorbed into the mainstream of Islamic thought was corrupted by accidents of translation, wrongful attribution etc. As well as this, there were other extraneous influences on the works in their extensive journey through the schools at Alexandria, Antioch, Damascus, Baghdad, e.g., Hellenistic, gnostic elements. Perhaps the most remarkable of these inadvertent errors was the general acceptance of Porphyry's translation and commentary on extracts from Plotinus' Enneads as the work of Aristotle. This "Theology of Aristotle," admitted as the work of "the Greek sage," affirmed the existence of an "Intelligible Realm" that Plotinus had experienced, and provided philosophic arguments to support his claim. Another false attribution to Aristotle was the Liber de Causis of Proclus. Such mistaken authorities, together with certain Neoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle, helped to popularize a highly spiritualized interpretation of his work.

It was to this aspect of Islamic thought that Corbin was especially attracted. An emanationist structure of the world allowed for an intermediary realm of images, usually angels, that has its own ontological status. The works of Iamblichus and Proclus provided further complex sub-divisions of these angelic orders. These works of "Neoplatonic embroidery" were rendered in Islam by visionary tales and dream sequences as well as by direct translations of abstract formulations.

Corbin's Interpretation of the Islamic Tradition

In his attempt to formulate an "Oriental philosophy" that acknowledges the imagination, Corbin concentrated on the work of three thinkers: Avicenna (980-1037 A.D.), Suhrawardī (d.1191 A.D.) and Mullā Ṣadrā (d.1640 A.D.). Each of the three contributed an important component to Corbin's construct. Avicenna, born in Boukhara, North-East Iran of that time, sought to establish a coherent philosophical system on an Aristotelian-Neoplatonist base that would satisfy the rigorous demands of both philosophy and the religious tradition. So it is that in his work Kitāb al-Najāt (34) he defines the subject of imagination from a psychological perspective that is basically an emendation of Aristotle's treatment of it in De Anima. When he portrays, however, the world of the imagination in his later visionary tales bearing such titles as the Recital of Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān, the Recital of the Bird, the Recital of Salāmān and Absāl, (35) his work demonstrates the adoption of the hierarchically ordered emanations of Plotinus. The Imagination here is the intermediary world between the heavenly Pleroma and the earthly domain—the locus of angelic visitations, visionary inspirations and dreams. Thus the imagination, taken in the works of Avicenna as a whole, performs a dual function: psychologically it is the filter and organizer of empirically based perceptions; spiritually it is the receptor of "heavenly-based perceptions." This ambivalence is not resolved, and it remains a tension at the core of Avicenna's work which scholars interpret differently, depending on their Aristotelian, Plotinian or orthodox Islamic disposition. (36)

For those interpreters, such as Corbin, who are not seeking the vindication of a philosophic position, but rather material to support an esoteric theory, Avicenna's later works provide sufficient evidence. Corbin's treatment, however, was unusually selective, neglecting entirely to mention Avicenna's earlier epistemological study of imagination which Avicenna never repudiated. Corbin chose to focus on the angelic messengers and guides of Avicenna's visions, finding here, an essential element of his "Oriental philosophy." The subtle angelic bodies, their gradations consistent with the spiritual state of the seeker, define one aspect of the _mundus imaginalis_.

Corbin's emphasis on the esoteric elements was also supported by the work of Suhrawardī. The lifelong study of Suhrawardī was the backbone and inspiration of Corbin's whole enterprise. Suhrawardī is often referred to as _shaykh al-ishrāq_, the master of the philosophy of illumination. He wrote prolifically in both Persian and Arabic, his major ideas expressed didactically in four tomes that comprise the _Ḥikmat al-ishrāq_ (_The Philosophy of Illumination_). He also wrote symbolic narratives of spiritual journeys e.g., _'Aql-i surk_ (_The Red Intellect_), _Awāz-i par-i Jibrīl_ (_The Sound of Gabriel's Wing_), _Lughat-i mūran_ (_The Language of Ants_). (37) The roots of Suhrawardī's thoughts trail in different directions, drawing sustenance from sources as diverse as Peripatetic philosophy, Neoplatonic emanationism (Avicenna's legacy included), Hellenistic syncretism and remnants of ancient oriental religions. In regard to the latter, Suhrawardī regarded himself as the beneficiary and teacher in an unbroken line of esoteric lore, especially spiritual initiation, that descended from the ancient religion of Iran, Zoroastrianism. Such an eclectic compound was definitely of a theosophical nature and undoubtedly drew the wrath of Islamic orthodoxy; hence Suhrawardī's execution as a heretic.

It is difficult to portray exactly Suhrawardī's own ideas of the nature of the "Oriental philosophy," a term originally used by Avicenna. Ostensibly something of a hybrid of Neoplatonism and Zoroastrianism, it was further expanded by Corbin. Corbin believed that Suhrawardī's conception of "Oriental philosophy" had already been prefigured in the work of Avicenna. It is true that in the Letter to al-Kiyā Avicenna had referred to his division of scholars into two groups: the Occidentals (Maghribiyyūn) and the Orientals (Mashriqiyyūn). In a detailed study of the text S. Pinès (38) argues that in all probability the occidentals were the philosophers of the Peripatetic school at Baghdad, if not a specific philosopher, whose positions Avicenna opposed, and that "oriental" referred to philosophers such as Avicenna, who actually came from geographical regions further east. Corbin, however, chose to interpret the word Orient in another sense, that Pinès admits is possible, though by no means established by the Letter of Avicenna.

Corbin enlarged the terms of reference:

> ...we must no longer speak of "Oriental Sages" except in terms of an "Oriental Wisdom" (ḥikmat mashriqīya);...it is not enough to be Oriental in the geographical and political sense of the word in order, eo ipso, to pursue an "Oriental philosophy." There is here perhaps a relationship that we must bear in mind if we would discern the intention of an "Oriental wisdom" in Avicenna. (39)

Corbin then elected to interpret the Orient in a symbolic rather than geographic sense, accepting Avicenna's mystical journeys as voyages to the Orient of Enlightenment, where the words "oriental" and "occidental" are now changed to Ishrāqiyyūn and Mashshā'ūn respectively. This is because Suhrawardī had expanded the basic motif of spiritual pilgrimage to incorporate a cosmology where the Orient became identified with the Absolute Light (Ishrāq). Reality is here posited as a single continuum of Light, the gradations of angels being of the same essence. The Orient, as the realm of Light, becomes both the goal of the mystic quest and the symbol of illumination.

The opposition implied by this complex symbol can be diversely interpreted. There is the Zoroastrian dichotomy of the powers of light versus the powers of darkness; the "rivalry" between the wisdom of the esoteric tradition and the tenets of orthodox Islam; the divergence of the "philosophy of the heart" (illumination) and the "philosophy of the head" (logic). Corbin at various times alludes to all the above elements of the positive pole of Light either singly, or collectively, in his understanding of the "Oriental philosophy" with its spiritual implications, and Durand follows suit.

Following Suhrawardī's footsteps Corbin believed that he had uncovered a trail of Ishrāqiyyūn-i Īran (Iranian Illuminationists), which can be traced through Mullā Ṣadrā in the seventeenth century down until today. This picture, however, is not as clear-cut as Corbin indicates. (e.g., It is true that Mullā Ṣadrā was influenced by the work of Suhrawardī, but there were other forces that also impinged on his work, e.g., Ibn 'Arabī and the Hellenizing mutakallim of the Razi school, e.g., al-Tūsi.)

Together with his teacher, Mīr Dāmād (d. 1631), Mullā Ṣadrā (d.1640) is regarded as an outstanding figure of the "School of Isfahan." Once again he is a problematical figure, whose work consists of orthodox philosophical and theological expositions as well as elaborate visionary descriptions, e.g., the Four Spiritual Voyages, comprising the Asfār. (40) Corbin saw him well within the tradition he named "avicennisme sohrawardien," and emphasized the illuministic angelic components of his work at the expense of his detailed philosophical discussions. This narrow focus accentuated the beliefs that surround the doctrine of the hidden Imām of the Shī'ite branch of Islam. This branch found itself wielding political power in Iran from the 16th century only as the Safavid Empire. Thus Corbin's thesis linking the Shī'ite sect of Islam, which he regarded as its sole repository of esoteric knowledge, with an unbroken illuminationist tradition stretching back to Zoroastrianism, is somewhat tenuous.

It is this Shī'ite belief in the Imām as the spiritual heir of the Prophet and as the inheritor of an "interior" doctrine, that Corbin wished to incorporate in his "Oriental philosophy." The idea of the "Fellowship of the Hidden Imān" has as its premise (bāṭin), a hidden wisdom which is revealed to certain initiates, and which Corbin translated as gnosis. This secret gnosis is linked to a belief in an eschatological "Awaited-for Imām." Corbin believed this dual awareness has been expressly articulated in Mullā Ṣadrā's metaphysics of the Imāmate. Corbin's interpretation of Ṣadrā's detailed philosophy of existence (which affirmed existence as real), as a philosophy of metamorphosis, allowed him to expound his understanding of a vision of presence/Presence which could be aligned to his "Oriental philosophy."

> The secret of the Imām is therefore that of: the Witnesser-Witnessed, of the Contemplator-Contemplated in short, the very sense of the Theophany without which man would have no positive conception of God. (41)

This esoteric interpretation of the hidden Imām and of the gnostic undertones in Mullā Ṣadrā's works is added to the angelology-illuminist compound already drawn from the work of Avicenna and Ṣuhrawardī. And it is this complex that Durand will also incorporate into his work—the triad of angels, illumination and especially gnosis--without the Islamic trappings:

> Tout symbolisme est donc une sorte de gnose, c'est-à-dire un procédé de médiation par une concrète et expérimentale connaissance....Mais cette gnose, parce que concrète et expérimentale aura toujours le penchant à figurer l'ange dans des médiateurs personnels au second degré...de la voie symbolique:la reconduction du concret à son sens illuminant. (42)

It is natural to assume that Corbin's potent mixture of esoteric beliefs and theories has been subjected to rigorous criticism by Islamic scholars. The evaluation of the respective merits of both sides would involve research that is beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet it cannot be denied that despite certain generalizations and inaccuracies Corbin has put his finger on a genuine climate of thought. While such an entity need not be assigned the presumptuous title "Oriental philosophy," or portrayed as the backdrop of a Pan-Iranian Islamic tradition, it nevertheless featured as a pervasive current in the thought of the figures mentioned. This is the view of a spiritual imaginative capacity and imaginative activity, a faculty of the soul in a Neoplatonic world-view, that has its own noetic function. In Corbin's expanded vision, it is described as follows:

> This, in the last analysis, was the great aspiration of the philosophy of Ishrāq as Oriental philosophy: to perceive all things...in their Orient....It is this aspiration that leads to the constitution, as an intermediary universe having its own existence, of the world of symbol or of archetypal Images 'ālām-al mithāl....It is the world of the Imaginable, that of the Angel-Souls who move the heavens and who are endowed not with sensible organs but with pure Active Imagination. (43)

The World of the Active Imagination

The world of the Soul, of an Active Imagination, has much in common with the traditional philosophical category of the active intellect (intellectus agens). Whereas in Western philosophy this term has remained a philosophical concept and is defined with reference to specific psychological functions in different theories, in the Islamic tradition it finds itself depicted in both theoretical and fictional models. In Corbin's interpretation, this is especially evident in the emphasis given to the "placement" of the imagination; the locus, to be exact, which does not claim total affiliation with either the material or spiritual world, though it partakes of both. This designation helps to clarify the nature of the a priori category of space that Durand endeavoured to establish in Les Structures. (44) To clarify his understanding of the world of the imagination Corbin referred to a word he believed was coined by Suhrawardī, for it cannot be found in any Persian dictionary. (45) The word is Nā-Kojā-Abād which literally translated means "utopia." Corbin was not content with this rendering and sought to provide a format that would convey the geographical settings and beings of the visionary world to be as intelligible and real as those provided by the senses in time and space. But to do this it was necessary first to accept a world view that admits spiritual reality and manifestations. This is what Corbin believed the Islamic tradition had done, but specifically with reference to the intermediate state of visions, dreams, angelic visitations, i.e., hierophanies of a nature that cannot be identified with the Absolute, yet proceed from It. This is the system that the Neoplatonic division into body, soul and spirit both accommodates and substantiates:

> ...une schéma qui articule trois univers, ou plutôt trois

> catégories d'univers. Le monde physique sensible, englobant aussi bien notre monde terrestre que l'univers sidéral....c'est le monde sensible, le monde du phénomène (molk). Il y a le monde suprasensible de l'Ame ou des Anges-Ames, le Malakūt, dans lequel se trouvent les Cités mystiques....Il y a l'univers des pures Intelligences archangéliques. A ces trois univers correspondant trois organes de connaissance: les sens, l'imagination, l'intellect, triade à laquelle correspond la triade d'anthropologie: corps, âme, esprit....(46)

Corbin, however, added a further refinement, attempting thereby to dissociate himself from the Western empirical categories of space and time which cannot operate in the world of the imagination. This is that the world of imagination, of visions and dreams, can be understood only by an act of comprehension that is itself coterminus with that world. In other words "imaginative thinking" and "imaginative being" coincide. In this sense the visionary world has its own spatial and temporal categories. In itself these categories are difficult to define, for, according to Corbin, though they are not of themselves dependent on either spiritual or material states, they use the language, i.e., images of one state, the material, to translate and transmute another state: the inner, spiritual awareness. These visions-événements are symbols that of themselves:

> ...s'accomplit toute progression dans l'espace spirituel, ou plutôt cette transmutation est elle-même ce qui spatialise cet espace, ce qui fait qu'il y ait là-même de l'espace, des proximités, des distances et des lointains. (47)

This intermediary realm which spatializes its own space in the act of "perception"/transmutation cannot be tied down to a topographical location in the physical world, though it utilizes its vocabulary. It is at once a symbolic world whose sense of space (and time) is unbounded and infinite. As Corbin relates:

> C'est pourquoi l'on ne peut dire où est situé le lieu spirituel; il n'est pas situé, il est plutôt ce qui situe, il est situatif. Son ubi est un ubique. (48)

In terms of the traditional philosophical distinction between matter and form, in the world of Imagination there is Image and Form. To explain the manner of "perception" and the location of the image, the analogy of the mirror is often used by the visionaries:

> La comparaison à laquelle recourent régulièrement nos auteurs, est le mode d'apparition et de subsistance des Images "en suspens" dans le miroir. La substance matérielle du miroir, métal ou minéral, n'est pas la substance de l'image, une substance dont l'image serait un accident. Elle est simplement le "lieu de son apparition." Et l'on fut ainsi conduit à une théorie générale des lieux et formes épiphaniques,...si charactéristique déjà de la "théosophie orientale" de Sohrawardī. (49)

Corbin's programme was to establish the active imagination as the mirror par exellence, "the epiphanic place for Images from the archetypal world." Enlarging his scope beyond the Islamic world, Corbin alluded to the fact that other thinkers, e.g., Platonists and theosophists in the Western tradition, have also endeavoured to describe this world of imagination and imaginal perception. He quoted the expression spissitudo spiritualis, (50) coined by the Cambridge Platonist, Henry More, as an attempt to express the "immaterial materiality" intermediary world. He also quoted an extract from the theosophical thinker Swedenborg as another attempt to come to grips with the same problem. The conclusion of this extract runs accordingly:

> C'est ce que j'ai vu souvent et j'en ai été surpris. D'après cela il est de nouveau évident que la distance, et par conséquent les espaces, sont absolument selon les états intérieurs chez les Anges, et que, parce qu'il en est ainsi, la nature et l'idée de l'espace ne peuvent entrer dans leur pensée, quoique chez eux il y ait des espaces tout comme dans le monde. (51)

It is indeed difficult to find philosophical terminology adequate to describe the cognitive function of imagination and its manner of extension where the basic dualism inherent in the Western tradition divides reality into subject and object, mind and matter.

Within the Western tradition, since the time of Aquinas and especially of Descartes, those thinkers who have tried to vindicate a Platonist world-view in other than the traditional terminology have found themselves at a loss, and have usually ended up in erudite symbolic schematizations. In turning to Islamic philosophy Corbin has sought a frame of reference that respected imaginal realities and placed them in a coherent context. Nevertheless, as with the idea of space, he had to grapple with traditional notions in order to express adequately his ideas. (The Enlightenment tradition would question whether he has done so.) In the end he found himself in fellowship with other Western thinkers, Platonists and theosophists, who do not subscribe to the esoteric Islamic tradition (i.e., as adherents of Islam), yet in their symbology and abstractions they are trying to put into words experiences of such a nature that they require a similar spiritual frame of reference. For this the realist Aristotelian-Thomist tradition does not supply a suitable vehicle; here, the imagination is dependent solely on perception for expression. Only the Platonist tradition, as modified by Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism, allows for emanations from the Absolute that can accommodate in their multi-layered structure an intermediary realm. But this monistic universe is difficult to reconcile with that of the Creator God of the Judaeo-Christian-Islamic world-view. So it is that in the Western tradition Corbin's quest puts him in the company of other esoteric seekers, a strange fraternity that spans the spectrum from the Knights Templar to Swedenborg.

Durand's Appropriation of Corbin

It is this world-view with its complex ramifications that Durand has unhesitantly accepted, as is evident from his use of Corbin's terminology and frame of reference beginning in L'Imagination symbolique. Durand, however, does not explicitly support a world-view where visions are accepted, as in Islam, but concentrates on the symbol, the product of the imaginal experience, that within this Platonist system becomes the medium and the message of Transcendent meaning:

> ...le symbole apparaît bien comme débouchant par toutes ses fonctions sur une épiphanie de l'Esprit et de la valeur, sur une hiérophanie. (52)

Indeed it is the symbol that is to serve as the point of intersection of Durand's functional-archetypal model as expressed in Les Structures and the philosophic theory of L'Imagination symbolique. In fact it is the lynch-pin of Durand's oeuvre. In L'Imagination symbolique Durand refines the structural model he had presented in Les Structures. There, as earlier observed, he perceived that his groupings of archetypes and symbols, the tripartite isotrophic division of schèmes, structures and archetypes that resulted from his trajet anthropologique could be subdivided into two major divisions—régime nocturne and régime diurne. These dialectically opposed ways of being and thinking interact in a tensive manner that a symbol can hold in balance. This dynamic model of polarity is envisaged by Durand as a stabilising and cohesive influence on psycho-physiological and socio-cultural levels. The symbolic imagination emerges in this strategy as an agent of equilibrium amongst:

> ...des données symboliques bi-polaires, définissant à travers toute l'anthropologie, tant psychologique que culturelle et sociale, un vaste système d'équilibre antagoniste, dans lequel l'imagination symbolique apparaît comme système des "forces de cohésion" antagonistes. (53)

In an article written shortly after this book, however, Durand observes:

> ...nous nous sommes aperçu que ce que nous appelions

> "*structures*" et que nous étions tenter d'appeler dès 1960 "*régimes*" n'étaient rien d'autre que l'épiphanie de l'Image, l'Imaginaire et ses grandes *régions*, où se trouvent indissolublement conjoints dans leur visée significative les formes et les contenus. (54)

He acknowledges that his objective, functional analysis, *la tentative sémiologique—ou plus exactement symptomatologique*, (55) where he attempted to apply an extrinsic system of classification, and where symbols were merely synthemes, has been replaced by an appreciation of another dimension inherent in symbols. This change is due to his reading of Corbin:

> ...les images, se substituait peu à peu une méthode de poétique qui *réalisait* la structure comme une originale *région* avec ses paysages et ses climats, d'un terrain bien singularisé qui avait déjà été exploré
> ...par Ibn 'Arabī, Sohrawardī, Mollā Ṣadrā et la plupart des grands spirituels, spécialement dans les gnoses orientales....(56)

In this sense the symbol is the agent of personal enlightenment, of contact with the Absolute. What had been mere method and model in *Les Structures* has become a metaphysics of self-appropriation by the time of writing *L'Imagination symbolique*:

> L'Imaginal est le lieu des individuations, les structures sont les régions de ces individuations selon les Orients impératifs de l'Etre. (57)

This symbolic initiation is grounded for Durand in a philosophic understanding that equates the imagination with the function of the *intellectus agens* as it is presented in the work of Avicenna as opposed to its formulation in the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition. In the latter the *intellectus agens* is regarded as the power possessed by each soul and by which a being comes closest to the angels. It contains primary, pre-existent principles but it is dependent on the faculty of perception for activation. Durand feels this is pure psychologism and opts rather for a Platonist system which sees the *intellectus agens* as *Intelligence médiatrice* which receives Images from the Absolute which are conveyed to the *intellectus possibilis* that then interacts with reality. In the Platonist structure which he adopts, the medium is always a symbol:

> Logos et Sophia philonienne, procession et Hypostases plotiniennes, diacosmos de Jamblique, "séries" et hénades de Proclus, Angelos Christos des gnostiques...s'élèvent en faux contre toute tentative de réduire le Platonisme à un simple dualisme: le probleme, certes, est posé en termes dualistes, la solution est donnée en termes de triades, d'intérmédiares ou du moins de dualitude accordée. (58)

This emphasis on the *Ange du Plérome celeste*, "*Ange de connaissance*" *gnostique*, et "*de la révélation*," is as an agent of *hiérohistoire*. Durand, influenced by Corbin, in an effort to redress the historist and rationalist bias of the West, has focused attention on:

> ...le Monde de l'Intermédiare, le monde de la transcription et de l'apparition: elles [les âmes] sont l'Imaginal. (59)

This a-historical and non-rational emphasis has led Durand to set up a polarization where the Imagination, identified with the soul of Platonic philosophy and the *intellectus agens* of Avicenna, is the source of a personalized relationship with the Absolute. It is at once a monistic and gnostic world-view, and as such is inevitably expanded by Durand to include all who have adopted a similar stance within a individualized symbolic system. These symbolists—mystics, alchemists, hermetists—comprise an "honour-roll" of opposition to the prevailing Western emphasis on a mind-body, subject-object scheme of knowledge. (60) (This expansion will be explored in the following Chapter.) Durand sees this task as one that is both *gnostique* et *docétiste:*

> Entendant par "gnostique" le remplissement concret et significatif de la structure par les images symboliques, et par "docétiste" le refus de privilégier une situation historique (ici judéo- chrétienne) au détriment de la "pensée sauvage" de l'humanité toute entière. (61)

The basic insight of Durand thus far has been the limitations of the

Cartesian and Scholastic models of knowledge which posit external physical objects as the sole data-base of conscious reflections, and hence of statements of truth. As an heir of the Romantic tradition, Durand wishes to rehabilitate the data of the process of imagination—images—according to a perspective where they are not dependent on sense perception. Durand sees imagination as a singularized autonomous, autochthonous process rather than an internal "faculty" along the lines of the sensus communis. Such a process is posited as biologically grounded, socially influenced (by cultural norms etc.), yet open to a transcendent dimension that at once informs and "infuses" its content. This system, at once personalistic and essentially non-rational, runs a risk of reinforcing the polarization it seeks to correct. Removed from the moorings of a traditional faith structure, i.e., Islam, Platonic Christianity, this world-view posits its own solipsistic truth(s) which inevitably clash with the propositional truths of Western rationalism.

CHAPTER III

THE ESOTERIC TRADITION, PLATONISM AND THE IMAGINATION

Introduction

Durand's insistence on the gnostique and docétiste emphasis of his work, together with its immanentist and mediatorial flavour, leads him to develop the concept of a philosophia perennis. As he states in the first chapter of his work Science de l'Homme et Tradition: le "Nouvel esprit anthropologique," (1) such an understanding depends upon his "redefinition" of anthropology which he will no longer treat under the aegis of the progressivist myth of the Western scientific world-view. (In this instance the observation should be made that Durand is not referring solely to the blatant nineteenth century endorsement of this position, but the similarly based positivistic ideology that underlies the scientific models still employed in contemporary human sciences.) Durand believes that psychoanalysis, psychologically-based ethnological studies, as well as his own symbolic survey reaffirm the observation of Lévi-Strauss that: "Les hommes ont toujours pensé aussi bien." (2) This notion is expanded by Durand to support the thesis that for his purposes, thinking includes "...les mêmes désirs, les mêmes structures affectives, les mêmes images qui se répercutent dans l'espace comme dans le temps d'un bout à l'autre de l'humanité." (3) Durand would attest that such manifestations support a synchronic as well as a diachronic philosophical understanding not only of symbolic forms but also of the producer him/herself of those forms. This is the basis of Durand's philosophical anthropology, which will have as its focus, l'homme traditionnel. Such a stance is not a repudiation of the historical, evolutionary model, but in Durand's estimation the needed corrective to its universal adoption and application as the prevailing diachronic Western mind-set.

Durand also asserts, however, that the option of l'homme traditionnel has been designated as a distortion, an aberration, in terms of this generally accepted rationalist and scientific model. It is this world of l'homme traditionnel, a nexus of a symbolic and metaphysical outlook without a mind/body duality, that Durand wishes to recuperate with his philosophia perennis. (4) Here, as Durand would have it, the world of res is not opposed to the world of voces. Durand attributes the "occultation" of l'homme traditionnel and its emergence in various esoteric doctrines as the result of certain "metaphysical catastrophes" in the history of Western philosophy. These unfortunate happenings he summarizes as: 1. The temporal hegemony of the Catholic Church as established in the thirteenth century and the adoption of Aquinas' theology as its standard. This reinforced Aristotelian physics and Averroeist logic at the expense of the philosophy of Avicenna which had allowed a direct relationship with the transcendent. 2. The "objectivism" that resulted from the sixteenth century reform movements. Ranging from the Cartesian to the Galilean revolution in outlook, these changes reinforced the dualistic relation of mind and the physical world. 3. The nineteenth century hypostatization of history. (5) These allegations, while evidence of a switch from a predominantly participatory to an analytic mode of interaction with an Absolute on the part of the Western intellectual élite, cannot alone sustain the charge of wholesale iconoclasm with which Durand credits them. (From a historical perspective also, Durand's presentation of these issues needs further investigation and debate than this thesis allows.)

Durand's basic hypothesis is that there exists and has existed an irreconcilable difference between what he views as the position of the official party-line of the Western philosophical tradition, basically an unmediated empirical model, and the "underground" tradition of l'homme traditionnel. To substantiate his claim of l'homme traditionnel Durand undertakes an investigation in his work Science de l'Homme et Tradition of those methods of study, as well as their adherents, that would constitute a philosophia perennis. In these areas the symbol has retained the integrity of a revelation. Such a thesis seems somewhat ingenuous and untenable at first glance, and at times Durand's unsubstantiated polemic is discouraging, but further independent research has unearthed a body of knowledge and a specific philosophic position that has been a genuine undercurrent in Western thought. The historical studies of D.P. Walker and Francis Yates have done much to elucidate this tradition that Walker terms "the ancient theology": theologia prisca. Its combined ingredients of esoteric symbology, sympathetic magic, and a Platonist hypostatic philosophy have found various expressions in situations as diverse as the second to third century A.D. Revelations of Hermes Trismegistus and Paracelsus' sixteenth century A.D. medical/alchemical corpus.

From the Renaissance onwards this complex was associated with a definite favouring of the imagination, both as the central agency of transcendent communications, and the means of effective creative power in this world. In the first instance it became identified with the "soul," and in the second with "inspiration"—that creative madness of the Greeks. Both of these developments were peculiar to the Renaissance and reflect at once the inherent conflict of the spiritual and humanist claims that were its legacy. Till this time the Platonism that formed the backbone of the "ancient theology" had not singled out the imagination as inherently creative, but once the Renaissance made the association, it became an essential component of this mixture. With his established commitment to imagination as he has absorbed it from Corbin's studies, Durand detects a marked similarity between the Islamic "Oriental philosophy" and this Renaissance heritage, though he does not advert to its historical basis. He merely accepts it as supportive of the synchronic ideal of l'homme traditionnel, and incorporates both these elements in his vision of the philosophia perennis that he delineates in Science de l'Homme et Tradition.

Durand's honour-roll of members of his "anti-tradition" of Western philosophy, (6) comprising alchemists, visionaries, mystics, hermetists, philosophers and Romantic poets, seems on a superficial level an exercise in subjective bias and a synchronic disregard for historical facts and complex developments. There is, in fact, a specific phenomenon at issue that needs further investigation. This, for want of a better term at this stage, could be labelled as the "Dionysian element" of Western thought. Specifically this refers to the less emphasized element of the Hellenic heritage, that side of the Greek temperament that found expression in the mysteries, with its initiatory purifications and maenadic enthusiasm. This spirit never died but became incorporated finally in the Orphica, Chaldean Oracles and Hermetica of the second and third centuries A.D. It is this "irrational" gene in our inheritance that D.P. Walker investigates as an integral part of the "ancient theology." Durand, with his synchronic approach, and unaware of Walker's work, has focused solely on what could be termed later manifestations of this tradition. Informed by Corbin's analysis, he feels that it is the imagination in its imaginal capacity that would explain these appearances, and so supports their inclusion in his _philosophia perennis_. For Durand, it is the same elements of gnosis, illumination, and symbolic mediation which inform Corbin's "Oriental philosophy" that sustain his _philosophia perennis_. The historical studies of D.P. Walker provide an effective foil to Durand's a-historical interpretation, providing a rationale that upholds Durand's insights and rescues them from seemingly esoteric self-indulgence.

The Philosophia Perennis

This term has had something of a chequered career and has been invoked by different thinkers to support their particular appropriation of a facet of the Western philosophical heritage. According to the Renaissance scholar P.O. Kristeller, the term appears to have been coined by Augustine Steuchus, a Catholic theologian of the sixteenth century who wrote a book _De Perenni philosophia_ (1542), with reference specifically to the Platonist tradition. (7) This tradition was then believed to date back to the time of Hermes and Zoroaster, who were regarded as contemporaries of Moses. Kristeller himself is prepared to accord the term the same point of reference, but his historical studies would trace the roots of the Platonist tradition to Parmenides and Pythagoras. In another perspective, Jacques Maritain justifies his attribution of the term to the Thomist tradition. He states that it expresses the eternal and natural instinct for knowledge that found its justification in the truth formulations of the Aristotle-Aquinas connection. (8) Finally, Aldous Huxley employed the same phrase as the title of a book, The Perennial Philosophy, (9) which was virtually a survey of East-West non-dualist language used by philosophers and mystics with reference to an Absolute. It was grounded in a more-or-less Platonist humanism which stressed self-transcendence rather than Transcendence in a personalist sense. Durand is not quite as selective as the above writers in his appropriation of the term, for there is evidence of both Kristeller's and Huxley's understanding of the expression in his application of the phrase, without any obvious definition of its meaning.

Durand's lack of precision results from his virtual dependence on Corbin's delineation of the imagination and his own identification of this model with the Avicennan notion of the intellectus agens. (10) This, of itself, presents a philosophical problem (which will be discussed in the following chapter); nevertheless it provides Durand with the ground to link that intermediary world of dream, vision and illumination with the Platonic category of soul, psyche. In this generalized schema the Avicennan intellectus agens of the psychological studies is identified with the "imaginal" medium of spiritual communications of Avicenna's visionary tales, which is in turn identified with the Platonic soul. The basis, then, of Durand's philosophia perennis is founded in Corbin's "Oriental philosophy," which as we have seen, revolves round his concept of the "imaginal":

> Nulle philosophie religieuse ne donne, plus que la philosophie islamique l'image d'une Philosophia perennis. Et c'est cette pérennité originale de l'Islam que nous dévoile magistralement l'oeuvre d'Henry Corbin....(11)

Essential to this philosophia perennis is the work of the intellectus agens in its above noted identification:

> Il s'agit de l'Ange de la Connaissance qui, pour l'Islam et Avicenne est aussi celui de la Révélation et se confond avec l'Intellectus Agens....(12)

The work of this "agency" is of a spiritual nature:

> Là, [la psychologie islamique] décidément, "l'imagination est la reine des facultés," bien plus, le monde imaginaire est la procédure, le moyen essentiel du passage du psychique au pneumatique. C'est à cet "imaginaire" constitutif de la psychologie et instauratif de l'ontologie qui fonde la théosophie et toute l'axiologie que Corbin a été obligé...d'utiliser pour cette fonction fondamentale et ce domaine privilégié, le terme d'imaginal. (13)

This "metapsychology," however, does not regard the imagination as a mere passive recipient of revelatory communications; it is essentially creative:

> Le Mundus Imaginalis et cette pointe pneumatique de la psyché qui s'y applique, deviennent l'expérimentation même de la "mise en être" créatrice. (14)

For Corbin this perspective fits within the confines of the Islamic visionary orientation which, as has been observed, is heavily indebted to Platonism. Durand's application of this system, however, advances into territory untouched by Corbin and has initially the marks of a sleight-of-hand:

> Dans une extraordinaire synthèse, l'on retrouve intégrées l'intériorisation de l'histoire prophétique et l'intériorisation au sein de l'imaginal de toutes les autres "facultés" de l'âme. (15)

This wider world-view, incorporating the other "abilities" of the soul constitutes for Durand the philosophia perennis, which is the home-territory of the l'homme traditionnel:

> Quant à la psychologie pneumatique de l'Islam, elle nous révèle le modèle parfait de cette structure; elle repose tout entière sur l'extraordinaire valorisation de la notion de symbole—c'est-à-dire se fonde sur la fonction imaginale, sur la réalité du Mundus Imaginalis, comme lieu des existentiations créatrices--dans laquelle c'est du dénivellement entre le sens et son expression symbolique que naît à la fois la hiérarchie absolue entre le monde d'en bas de l'âme, où perceptions, sensations, raisonnements et jugements ne s'ordonnement que par rapport au monde d'en haut qu'est le Malakūt, le réservoir des modèles imaginaires qui constitue la nature véritable humaine,

> celles de l'Homme Parfait, c'est-à-dire de l'Anthropos céleste où tout est ordonné selon l'Ordre d'Archétype; (16)

This reveals a subtle shift from the Islamic world-view and terminology to a more broadly-based theosophical position that allows inclusion of vocabulary such as l'Homme Parfait, l'Anthropos, l'Ordre d'Archétype from fellow-travellers who have adapted the same Platonist model to contain their designs. This also allows the incorporation of poets, who for Durand partake in the Creative Act of world-making too, but within a specific Platonist context:

> Autrement dit, la perception du monde, les objectivations de la conscience, ne prennent un sens qu'à travers l'enchaînement "subjectif" de l'Imaginal, mais ce dernier à son tour—véritable "médiateur,"...véritable moyen terme entre la création matérielle et l'Acte Créateur—ne se comprend fonctionellement que si on le réfère à la Créativité Primordiale, la création n'étant qu'une théophanie,...c'est-à-dire une imagination divine créatrice. (17)

In another place Durand makes this link more specific:

> ...chez Platon, il y a une Intelligence médiatrice, qui n'est ni l'idée formelle ni le sensible, mais qui est donatrice des formes au sensible comme à la partie passive et attentive de l'âme, qui dans le monde du symbole instaure l'individuation d'un appel à l'être, constitue une convocation de l'âme et une épiphanie de l'être à l'Impératif. Le symbole, et cet ensemble symbolique qu'est le mythe platonicien, est déjà chez Platon même le lieu d'élection des épiphanies de l'invisible, le domaine intermédiare qui est le royaume des grands Intermédiares, des Médiateurs. (18)

Durand's interpretation of Plato in this sense is dependent on a concept of symbol that identifies it with the Ideas as they are received into consciousness, but not with their eternal Forms, which are immutable rather than creative and epiphanic. This version of creativity, specifically in its inclusion of poetic creation, would seem to account for inspiration in a way that is inconsistent with the pristine Platonic theory. Nevertheless, it is in keeping with the later developed Renaissance-Platonist interpretation.

Plato's Theory of Imagery and Inspiration

Plato did not develop a consistent philosophical system. Instead his work can be viewed as a mixture of logic (the Socratic method) and loosely related dialogues that explore ontological, epistemological and cosmological questions. These dialogues are often illustrated by a form of "higher myth" when he tries to portray the immutable truths of human existence (e.g., Republic, Phaedrus, Timaeus) as opposed to the early Greek myths of Homer, or the "likely stories" (eikoi mythoi) of approximate descriptions of the physical world. (19) In Plato's theory of knowledge, while he is not consistent in his terminology, the concept of anamnēsis (recollection) would seem to account for the assignation of meaning, where an object of knowledge, eikōn, (20) is but a shadow (image) of its real Form. This Form exists eternally in the transcendent world of Ideas. The artist, in imitating the eikōn, produces an eidōlon (image) (21) that is but a third-hand copy, and so markedly inferior. Besides this, there is also phantasia (appearance), (22) that combination of perception and judgement which results when the object of perception is indistinct. This latter usage is different from Aristotle's, and hence Avicenna's, use of the same word, which became identified with the faculty of imagination. Phantasma (semblance) also appears to be the equivalent of eidōlon, and it is possibly a combination of these two meanings that is at the root of the eventual identification of the imagination and fantasy. (23)

Though Plato did not develop his theory extensively, it is obvious that all images are in some way inferior. Their second and third hand removal from the world of Forms, whose ultimate Reality seems beyond description, rendered them suspect. In this original sense they cannot be equated with Durand's theory of image (symbol) as revelation.

It is Plato's awareness, however, of the divine madness (inspiration) of the poets, and his own use of "higher myths" that bears examination. Though fascinated by the workings of what we would term "the unconscious," Plato does not seem to have resolved the problem of the "divine madness" of prophets, seers and poets. He would, however, distinguish this state of possession from the mere manufacture of imagery as effected by everyday artists and craftsman who produce eidōla. The former condition remained a problem, but Plato nowhere elucidated the situation and it remains an enigmatic feature of Plato's work that is variously interpreted by later commentators. Under the influence of his Platonist theory of interpretation, it appears that Durand can quite happily reconcile all instances of "poetic" imagery, whether inspired or pedestrian. This interpretation is not supported by Plato's position, however imprecise it may appear.

Various authors have drawn attention to Plato's own seemingly contradictory employment of myth and imagery in his attempts to portray the human situation, the nature of the cosmos etc. (24) Today, rather than myth or symbol, these descriptions would be regarded as "heuristic fictions." (25) They are indicators or efforts to depict an entity that defies conceptual expression. Strictly speaking, though mediatorial, such devices cannot be equated with divine inspiration, nor anamnēsis, nor mimēsis. They constitute, in fact, a blind-spot in the Platonic repertoire that are absorbed into the Plotinian system and hence "spiritualized", as the

Platonic and Plotinian Demuirge are regarded as equivalents in a theological setting. This later incorporation, often regarded as the inevitable outcome of the Platonic direction, or attributed to the all-encompassing nature of a Hellenistic spiritualizing tendency, laid the groundwork for Durand's interpretation of Plato.

Durand's Interpretation of Plato

The basis of Durand's interpretation is the identification *anamnēsis* and the creative imagination:

> ...cette faculté d'intuition imaginative, de cette faculté réellement "poétique" puisqu'elle confond dans l'acte d'amour ou dans la vision imaginative l'acte créateur et la "reminiscence" (*anamnēsis*) créaturelle. (26)

Durand attempts to qualify this simplistic generalization by a distinction between such crass artists as are banned from the Republic, the already noted producers of *eidōla*, and those "infused" with knowledge by *anamnēsis*. This interpretation equates *eikōnes* with spiritual revelations:

> Platon exclut absolument de la *République* les "imitateurs," c'est-à-dire peintres et poetes pseudo-réalistes, qui ne font que singer l'apparence la plus superficielle des choses et mystifient en les donnant pour les choses elles-mêmes. La *mimēsis* est mystification, *l'anamnēsis* est itinéraire mythique, "realization symbolique." (27)

This is a somewhat tenuous appropriation of the notion of *anamnēsis*, for it becomes a comprehensive term, embracing all forms of knowledge including Plato's own use of "higher myths" as well as the enigmatic area (in Plato's own system) of inspired knowledge. Such a comment also points to a lack of consistency in Durand's own work, for he himself nowhere distinguishes between pseudo-realist and true poets or painters. The implication of

Durand's work, however, points to scientists and rationalists as the "imitators." Anamnesis serves Durand to incorporate all mediated forms of knowledge, in a theory of knowledge that virtually identifies the conceptual with the mythological:

> Cette "réminiscence," pouvoir médiateur qui transcende par l'évidence qu'elle accorde les vertus du raisonnement diaïrétique, ne s'épanouit-elle pas dans le domaine mythique qui permet à Platon de voir et faire voir, d'initier l'invisible? (28)

This understanding of anamnesis is then expanded to include all instances of figurative language employed by Plato:

> Cette médiation des impératifs de L'Etre apparaît de multiples façons dans le déploiement de la médiation platonicienne. (29)

The instances of this mediation that Durand specifically cites are: "ce fameux daimon, sorte d'ange personnel" (Apology 31d, Phaedrus 252c); "la pluralité des dieux du panthéon grec...orientée...à attribuer, à chaque âme individuellement, un dieu modèle et donateur des formes" (Phaedrus); le Démiurge du Timée "qui...agit exactement comme donateur des formes," (Timée 28a). (30) This expansion fails to discriminate between Plato's use of epistemological, logical and "mythical" languages and thus "reduces" anamnesis to an equivalent of Durand's own concept of symbolic knowledge.

Continuing his reaction against the spirit of scientific rationalism that he feels pervades modern thought, Durand marshalls his defence behind the intellectus agens (Avicennan variety) and places anamnesis under such a heading:

> C'est également la doctrine de la réminiscence, si mal comprise par nos modernes psychologismes, qui réduisent si facilement l'anamnesis à la simple mémoire, alors qu'elle est un pouvoir poétique et noétique, une puissance de récurrence au réel qui préface la théorie acceptée à contrecoeur et défigurée par les péripatéticiens--de l'Intellect agent. (31)

It would appear that Durand is attributing to Plato two positions that the various Platonic theories in themselves do not support. The first is this virtual identification of anamnēsis with the creative role of the intellectus agens as it is conceived in Avicenna's philosophy. If such a comparative leap could be taken at all, the Platonist idea of World-Soul would be far more consistent with Avicenna's intellectus agens. The second position is taken with regard to all forms of Platonic mediation, interpreting them as symbolic revelations, including Plato's own use of "heuristic fictions." Durand's argument is based on his alleged discernment in Plato of certain prefigurations that are justified by the later Neoplatonic emendations.

> C'est encore, dans le Phèdre, (246d/e 247) modèle de tout le néo-platonisme, la procession astrale et pneumatique qui sert de symbole à la médiation. (32)

Durand attempts to reread and reinterpret Plato in the light of a Renaissance Platonist theory of imagination, which sees the symbol as the pivot of any act of knowledge that is inherently creative. In so doing Durand is aware that he is stretching the Platonic categories (of whatever nature), and he attempts to justify such a move:

> Depuis le Souverain Bien, "au-delà l'Etre en dignité et en puissance," jusqu'à l'homme, les intermédiaires se multiplient dans la perspective platonicienne, Dieux et anges emplumés constituant les épiphanies de l'être à l'impératif tout autant que les donateurs des formes et des significations de ces formes. Certes, il peut paraître insolite de vouloir ainsi sortir le prince des philosophes des interprétations purement épistémologiques et dialectiques dans lesquelles l'ont enfermé les philosophes de l'Occident. Toutefois, le néo-platonisme aussi bien que les gnoses orientales répondent pour notre interprétation de Platon. (33)

Such manipulation is both suspect and somewhat subjective.

Durand's Hermeneutics

Durand's rationale for such a symbolic reinterpretation of Plato derives from his particular brand of hermeneutics. Elsewhere he states that his theory of hermeneutics is, as is that of Corbin, to "disclose the essence" of the symbol involved. It is not to be confused, however, with the eidetic approach of Husserl. Being markedly a-historical, Durand's approach tends to impose on the texts(s) an a posteriori strategy of interpretation that reads the data solely from its own viewpoint. This is distinct from a hermeneutical approach that seeks to understand what the text itself discloses or what the author himself intended.

> Autrement dit, ce que l'herméneutique symbolique apporte, et ce sur quoi elle fonde sa quête, c'est cette verticalité intérieure, cette transcendance dans et par l'horizontalité de la lettre et du fil du discours. (34)

Durand breaks the hermeneutic circle by making the hermeneutic process itself become a symbolic quest. The hermeneut does not merely affirm a subjective element, but sees it as essential to the process. So it is that Durand is involved in his own hermeneutical circle, but instead of functioning at an analytic level of consciousness, he operates at the symbolic level. As a result, Durand's investigations merely confirm his position, because each investigation is predisposed towards a particular understanding of the data that in turn reinforces the theory. Within this framework, the imagination virtually carries the role of reinterpreting itself. Symbolic interpretation understands all mediation symbolically—imagination interprets what it has produced. Symbolic hermeneutics, thus understood, constitute for Durand the ground of creative discovery and revelation:

> Ce milieu qui n'est ni matériel ni formel, mais qui est "sensible au coeur" et configuratif, qui n'a rien à voir avec le pur contour sémiologique non plus qu'avec le "sens propre" de la perception sensible, est le lieu spéculatif...où notre pensée a directement accès, où elle dialogue avec

> les autres pensées de même nature, où la Révélation ne fait qu'un avec la Connaissance. Le monde de l'herméneutique ne fait qu'un avec le monde de l'Imaginal: en termes aristotéliciens nous dirions que ce milieu intermédiaire est le "lieu propre" des sciences de l'âme, ~~de~~ l'angélologie certes, mais aussi de l'anthropologie. (35)

This hermeneutical circle of the symbolic approach at once reveals a being to him/herself and undergirds Durand's whole enterprise of the re-establishment of the l'homme traditionnel. Such an approach constitutes the new anthropology.

L'homme traditionnel and la "nouvelle science de l'homme"

Durand's philosophical anthropology, or science de l'homme, has then two central tenets. One is that the subject under consideration will always be viewed as l'homme traditionnel and he/she will be studied by a symbolic hermeneut as a participant-investigator. In both instances the symbol retains its revelatory force. As this orientation has tended to find itself on the fringes of traditional religion, particularly since the Renaissance, the impression fostered, and emphasized by Durand, is that it is restricted to esoteric cults. These are generally of theosophical nature, such as those alluded to by Huxley's philosophia perennis. While this element is undoubtedly a part of the vast Platonist heritage, it cannot provide the sole viable opposition, as Durand's polemic against twentieth century scientific secularism would indicate.

The work of Plato left many unanswered questions, including one of marked interest for present purposes: the source and role of "divine madness" and its relation to poetic inspiration. How this aspect came to be equated philosophically with the imagination is a long and intricate story. Corbin's resolution, as derived from Islamic thinkers, refers specifically to dreams and visions. Durand's adaptation of these categories to Western philosophy simplifies a process where discrimination and historical precision are needed. Durand has elected to concentrate on a morphological overview which risks distortion rather than to undertake a detailed philosophical and historical study. The unfortunate result might be that the unresolved problem at the heart of Western philosophical tradition, the place and function of the imagination, which Durand has perceived, would be dismissed. This appears an inevitable reaction to Durand's hermeneutic which tends to perpetuate the situation rather than diffuse it or treat it constructively. The latter may yet prove an impossible task. This aim, however, can be served better by a historical investigation of the tradition which stretches back to an aspect of Greek philosophy which Walker calls "ancient theology."

Prisca Theologia—The "Ancient Theology"

In his work The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition, R. Klibansky warns against oversimplifying the medieval Platonic heritage by labelling it either as Platonism or as Neoplatonism. As he sees it, different systems of thought are intricately mixed:

> ...we find a kind of Platonism which is neither the doctrine of Plato nor that of Plotinus or Proclus, but, based on Hellenistic thought, nourished by religious experience, Christian, Jewish or Islamic, of later centuries, and intimately fused with teachings from Stoic and other philosophies, is, in fine, something new and individual, difficult to bring under a simple heading. (36)

This continuity and complexity is equally evident in Renaissance Platonism. Since the time of Klibansky's admonition, however, scholars have undertaken painstaking research into the phenomenon of Renaissance Platonism, which has led to a re-evaluation of the whole situation. For Renaissance Platonism differs from medieval Platonism in one essential respect; to the above complex were added certain second and third century treatises. These had a strongly magical component that had a revolutionary impact, the reverberations of which are still being felt. The change in scholarly awareness of this phenomenon is due principally to the work of such scholars as D.P. Walker, P.O. Kristeller, Charles Trinkaus and Frances Yates. Walker is accredited with coining the term theologia prisca (the ancient theology) to refer to "...a certain tradition of Christian apologetic theology which rests on misdated texts." (37) These texts, supposedly ancient foreshadowings of Christian truths, were variously attributed to Zoroaster, Hermes, Orpheus, to name the most prominent. They were virtually unknown in Europe till the fifteenth century, except for the Aesclepius, a part of the Hermetica, which Augustine treated in the City of God. Their extreme antiquity was also generally accepted till in 1614, Henry Casaubon's critical study dated the Hermetica as written between 100-300 A.D. So the ancient wisdom texts not only of Egypt, but also those of Persia, Greece, and Israel, were immediately suspect. But in the century or so that their authenticity was accepted, their potent mixture of magic, mysticism and Platonist symbology had an irreversible effect on Western thought.

The Magical Connection

It is beyond the scope of the thesis to undertake a detailed exegesis of each of the works of the "ancient theology." It is also dangerous to attempt a general analysis of the climate of thought that produced such treatises. Yet there are certain common elements, specifically in regard to magical practices, which can be observed and are particularly pertinent to the matter at hand, because, as Walker notes, it was this magical strand and its connection with the imagination that was of greatest importance in the Renaissance.

Walker provides a succinct overview of the period from the third to the fifth centuries A.D., when there was a marked increase in the fascination with mystical cults, astrology and magic:

> Many and various kinds of religion interwove with each other: Christian, Gnostic, Manichaean, Hermetic, Orphic, neo-Pythagorean; in these the emphasis tended to be on astrological or magical practices, on theurgy, as opposed to theology, on works and ceremonies, rather than reason or thought. The Neoplatonists were more and more drawn into this religious and magical world....Plotinus was still primarily a philosopher in our sense of the word; but, though he disapproved of magic, he plainly believed in it, and he was one of the starting points for Ficino's Orphic magic. (38).

An extremely good survey of the basic principles of these theurgic practices is given by E.R. Dodds in an Appendix to his work The Greeks and the Irrational. (39) As regards their implementation within a specific cult, Hans Lewy provides a detailed analysis in Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy. (40) Though some of the reconstruction involves a certain amount of speculation, excerpts from a lost work of Porphyry: On the Philosophy of the Oracles, inserted by Eusebius in his Praeparatio Evangelica, provide sufficient support for the theory advanced. (Dodds also notes as the basis of his study a vast lost commentary by Proclus on the Oracles, from which a number of Byzantine texts by Psellus appear to have been derived.

These, Dodds records, have been collected and commented on by J. Bidez.) (41) The actual texts, originally attributed to Zoroaster of ancient Persia, are now acknowledged as written by a certain Julian, surnamed "the Chaldaen" and his son Julian, "The Theurgist." The latter lived in Rome in the second half of the second century A.D.

The basis of the system was a form of sympathetic magic whereby the Platonic Ideas in the World of Forms were replaced by certain symbōla. These "symbols" were in turn identified with different powers, which were responsible for the maintenance of the universe. A soul could be reawakened to the knowledge of these "symbols" by initiatory rites where certain sympathetic magical connections were made. These "symbols" or powers were variously identified as personified qualities, e.g., Justice, or as angels, formulae, images. There was a self-perpetuating motion to the procedure that was in keeping with the Neoplatonic emanational universe:

> Thereby the spiritual organism which guarantees the order of the universe becomes the medium of magical action and, on the other hand, the spiritual substance of the soul becomes the magic potency of the Theurgists. The soul with the help of the "symbols" thinks the noetic, unites itself with the cosmic power and accomplishes by means of it the theurgical action. (42)

In the system there was indeed a connection with the World Soul of Plotinus which pervaded the universe and was responsible for the harmonious interdependence of its members.

> This sympathetic connection of the "members" of the cosmic organism shows itself in the course of the stars, in the activity of the demons, in prophecy, in magic and also in the efficacity of prayer, which of itself progresses towards its goal by virtue of the natural connection of all psychic powers contained in the universe. (43)

It is worth noting, however, that Plotinus himself confined the operations of this system to the sensible world, as he regarded the noetic world as immune to any physical or magical influences.

Dodds, in his analysis of the procedures that involved the use of "symbols," sees nothing new in this aspect; both the invocation of gods and goddesses by naming certain sympathetic trees or animals, and the manufacture of imitative statuettes were standard fare of Graeco-Egyptian religio-magic cults. What is new is their accommodation, with astrological and alchemical variations, to an animated Platonist cosmology.

The Renaissance Appropriation of the Theurgic Element of the "Ancient Theology"

Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) saw himself as both a Christian and a Platonist. In fact, he saw their interpenetration as an essential part of the divine plan, and thus in his role as restorer of the Platonic tradition he was operating as an instrument of Providence. (44) In attempting to align himself with what he perceived as the ancient lineage of Platonism, however, Ficino adopted unquestioningly those apocryphal second, third and fourth century treatises with their pronounced magical bias. (45) In the Theologia Platonica he attested their antiquity by pronouncing his own genealogy of wisdom, placing in order: (1) Zoroaster, (2) Mercurius Trismegistus (Hermes/Thoth), (3) Orpheus, (4) Aglaophemus, (5) Pythagoras, (6) Plato. (46) In 1463 he completed the translation of the Corpus Hermeticum (postponing the completion of his translations of Plato until the following years). The Corpus, together with the Chaldean Oracles and the Orphic Hymns, profoundly affected his own philosophical writings, because in his synthetic works he believed that the revered authors of the "ancient theology" were not simply theologi, but Magi.

This concept of Magus is somewhat complex, having both theoretical and practical implications. As attested by their writings the "ancient theologians" were Magi because of their incorporation of magical practices within a philosophical framework. This interpretation was not problematical. At the same time, however, in the Corpus Hermeticum there was a version of an Egyptian Genesis which told the tale of the creation and fall of a divine man, who himself had divine creative power: Man as Magus. When Ficino himself began to dabble in incantations and talismans, he saw himself as working safely within a Christian-Platonic framework. The seed had nevertheless been sown of purely humanist understanding of the Magus, which Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494), Ficino's pupil and contemporary, expressed in his Oration on the Dignity of Man. In this work God addresses Adam (the magnum miraculum):

> Constrained by no limits, in accordance with thine own free will, in whose hand we have placed thee, though shalt ordain for thyself the limits of thy nature. Thou shalt have the power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brutish. Thou shalt have the power, out of thy soul's judgment, to be born into the higher forms, which are divine. (47)

This statement has been variously interpreted, the quibble being whether or not Pico meant to vindicate human freedom quite so absolutely. Nevertheless it is evidence of a strain of thought that henceforth will find expression in increasingly secularly oriented credos.

As all the authorities cited, Kristeller, Yates and Walker, are wont to express: the richness and complexity of sixteenth century Platonism renders its analysis extremely difficult. A delicate examination of its intricate patterns of ideas reveals the potential source of many later developments—monistic or dualist, pantheist or deist, Christian or humanist as well as those Stoic, Neoplatonic and Gnostic impulses—that have since existed in strange and wonderful mixtures. And it would indeed seem that it is this potent Platonist conglomerate that Durand visualizes as the contents of his philosophia perennis. It is the place and role of magic, however, that is of utmost importance in this instance, for it is through Ficino's elaboration of his own magico/philosophical system that the concept of the imagination was first used with reference to an innate human creative ability.

D.P. Walker, in his work Spiritual and Demonic Magic, (48) has undertaken an investigation of Ficino's spiritual magic. Though it was predominantly Neoplatonic in its underlying metaphysical structure, this magical system depended largely on a formula of macrocosmic/microcosmic correspondences. The macrocosmic divisions were astrologically based, as Ficino, by omitting spirits and demons from his repertoire, was avoiding entanglements with black magic and heresy. In this scheme of planetary influences, the vis imaginativa featured as "the fundamental and central force," (49) i.e., as the medium of the magical connection. It must be observed, however, that this usage was confined to Ficino's magical treatises, specifically De Vita coelitus comparanda, (50) as opposed to his epistemological works, e.g., Platonic Theology, (51) where his usage of the concept imagination did not differ from established Neoplatonic categories. While it was not initially accorded the status of an independent faculty, in subsequent magical and philosophical works the imagination ascended from its comparatively low-berth in the philosophical hierarchy. It became a vehicle of power and discovery, and finally the agency for divine communication. These subtle changes were reflected in the literature, but they have never been recognized philosophically. Their expressions appeared naturally as if they were part of the received tradition, without any indication of their novel usage. (Such general acceptance is also taken for granted on the part of the majority of contemporary commentators, most of whom are operating from a sympathetic position.) A philosophical survey of this development of the concept of imagination from the Renaissance to Kant awaits scholarly attention. Although Walker and Yates document the situation historically, they do not analyze its philosophical implications.

The "Development" of Imagination
and its Appropriation by Durand

Frances Yates, in her work Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, (52) has illustrated this evolution in the understanding of imagination with reference to one particular thinker. Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), together with Cornelius Agrippa (1487-1535) and Theophrastus Paracelsus (1493-1541), can be regarded as magician-philosophers in the line of Renaissance Magi descending from Ficino, whose Christian orthodoxy and magical practices both became increasingly suspect. The shift in emphasis reflected in their work is from the traditional theurgic relationship, where the Magus was a hierophant, to an increasingly self-referential system, where the Magus himself becomes the source of power. In practical application Yates analyzes this as an amalgamation of the classical art of memory and the Hermetic experience of mirroring the universe in the mind. (53) In Bruno this system of mnemonic harmonies culminated in:

> ...a magical and religious technique for training the imagination as the instrument for reaching the divine and obtaining divine powers, linking through the imagination with angels, demons, the effigies of stars and inner

> "statues" of gods and goddesses in contact with celestial things. (54)

It was Bruno who first made the link in his work De imaginum compositione, (55) between this inner imaginative power and the "divine madness" or furor (as Bruno calls it) of creative activity. This for Bruno constituted the essence of philosophy:

> True philosophy is music, poetry or painting; true painting is poetry, music and philosophy; true poetry or music is divine sophia and painting. (56)

This creative aesthetics of the imagination was also intimately related to Bruno's conception of the Magus:

> Why, I say, do so few understand and apprehend the internal power?....He who in himself sees all things, is all things. (57)

Gone are the fabrications by which Ficino attempted to incorporate the "ancient theology" within a Platonist-Christian framework. By the time of Bruno, an original vision of reality had taken shape, where there were no longer any gestures towards a Christian apologetic. Bruno envisaged himself as prophet and leader of a new movement, because by personal odysseys through the sphere he had obtained the Powers and become divine. He was at once the Magus and Man the Miraculum. His fate at the stake was thereby sealed.

This enlargement of the scope of imagination has had two consequences. On the one hand, it has led to a re-examination of the Plotinian schema, a process still of interest today. (58) In this connection clues are sought in the Plotinian terminology of the intermediary world of soul for a philosophical precedent of this Renaissance reformulation of the the concept of imagination. The other consequence has become part of the scenario of Western philosophical thought. Its expression varies, however, depending on the theory established to account for human creativity. The movement that is most pertinent for this thesis is that which maintains all the esoteric trappings of the "ancient theology." In this development magic is now incorporated under the heading of imagination, and it essentially divorces itself from the orthodox Christian world-view. The emphasis is on humanity's innate creative potential. It is related both to the search for gnosis and illumination that has always been a part of the "ancient theology" and that creative inspiration in art, music and poetry which has always presented a problem to philosophers. It is this syncretic and theosophical current that has ever since woven its way in and out of the Western mainstream, and it is this *mélange* that Durand adopts as comprising his *philosophia perennis*.

It is in this sense that Walker's "ancient theology" is one element of Durand's synthesis. Durand does not seek out its historical antecedents, but is content to name those who have honoured the imagination, in whatever guise. This is why the Renaissance excursion has been essential, for not only Ficino and Pico della Mirandola, but Cornelius Agrippa, Giordano Bruno and Paracelsus figure prominently in Durand's honour-roll. The seeming disparity of this complex network of connections warranted decipherment. The only clue given by Durand was their common involvement with the imagination.

An interesting detail to observe is that since the Renaissance the tradition has sprouted what can be classed as both secular and spiritual off-shoots. They both tend to maintain a monistic framework. The former movement, however, virtually posits man as the centre of the cosmos, whereas the latter retains the traditional Platonist system, though the vocabulary varies with different esoteric sub-groups. Durand includes both of these developments within his world-view; it is as if the

Imagination, either sacred or secular, has become the sole arbiter of membership within his version of the *philosophia perennis*. This accounts for Durand's inclusion of such other diverse elements as Rosicrucians and Freemasons, as well as alchemists and astrologers, Swedenborg, Fritjuof Schuon, René Guénon and Rudolf Steiner, among the coterie of the elect. Imagination now accounts for all creative strivings, from the mysterious Dionysian stirrings of the early Greek religious quest to that later, but not wholly unrelated phenomenon of the Imagination as the royal road of creativity that resulted from Romantic Idealism.

The Mystical Connection

Another feature of Durand's system untreated so far is the admission of certain mystics and holy men into his select company. Most of these belong to what Durand terms: *le Moyen Age: à Averroès,* (59) and they include Hugh of St. Victor, John Scot Erigena, Honorius Augustdunensis, Bernard of Clairvaux and John of Salisbury. It would appear that what appeals to Durand in this context is the marked Platonic element in most of the above mentioned authors. Such an indiscriminate categorization needs further qualification, but apart from a reference to their usage of "'la symbolique romane' dans une figuration non occultée de l'homme," (60) Durand is content to incorporate them "synchronically," i.e., according to his hermeneutic, as thinkers who respected *l'homme traditionnel*. Their link to the imagination would be solely through the Platonic element, which Durand has already "re-interpreted."

Another set of mystics comprises Nicholas of Cusa and the Rhenish mystics, Eckhart, Tauler and Suso. It has been observed that the ideas of both Eckhart (b. ca. 1260) and Nicholas of Cusa (d. 1464), to name the most prominent, escape traditional systematization. Yet, there is a marked Platonic influence in both cases, largely filtered through the work of Dionysius the Areopagite. Once again an apocryphal figure, probably from Syria and the fourth century A.D., Dionysius nonetheless presented himself as the sole success of St. Paul's Athenian excursion. He betrayed himself, however, in referring to Ignatius of Antioch (d. 117 A.D.). The Dionysian influence, and its connection with an apophatic understanding of the Absolute, which is central to this approach fits essentially within a Neoplatonic emanational model. The only difference is that the ultimate "experience" is imageless, the path of access littered with discarded images and symbols. This is distinct from the increasingly luxuriant imagery of the visionary path. The purgative way has indeed been connected with and has fostered negative "imagery," yet in the final act of "unknowing," all contradiction virtually negates itself.

Durand has no trouble including the mystics of both the via negativa and the via affirmativa within his topographical category of l'homme traditionnel in his philosophia perennis. Both types are on a symbolic quest for gnosis and illumination, and the hierophanic language that discloses the nature of this Ultimate Reality, while negative in one case and positive in another, fits within Durand's synchronic interpretative schema. The fundamental question that remains, however, is Durand's own understanding of the constitution of Ultimate Reality. His synthetic vision incorporates both sacred and secular symbolic systems. His emphasis on esoteric, mystic and theosophical doctrines points towards an inherently spiritual interpretation whereby gnosis is something that is revealed to humanity from a transcendent source. His inclusion of poets, surrealists, as well as of humanistically inclined alchemists and hermeticists points, however, to a tension within Durand's own vision. It is not the tension of immanence or transcendence, but rather that of the assignation of Man or God as the axis mundi.

"The Tradition" and "le nouvel esprit anthropologique"

While initially Durand's work may appear somewhat novel and eclectic, particularly if viewed from the perspective of the synchronic fusion that comprises la nouvelle anthropologie or, as it is otherwise called la science de l'homme, it is essentially the restatement of an old insight. For la nouvelle anthropologie, though it is to be made up of all the "sciences" that deal with humanity, operates under the agency of a symbolic hermeneutics which in fact seeks only to articulate l'homme traditionnel. The world of l'homme traditionnel is, to all intents and purposes, lived out against the backdrop of Durand's understanding of philosophia perennis. Durand's appropriation of the philosophia perennis, has, as it has been observed, elements of both Kristeller's and Huxley's definition of that term. Kristeller rerouted the Renaissance Platonist source of the tradition from the pseudonymous Orpheus, Zoroaster and Hermes to Parmenides and Pythagoras. The latter two were obvious historical influences on that aspect of Plato's work that became incorporated into the philosophia perennis. Kristeller would not insist on a rigorous and purist reading of Plato as essential to the tradition. Indeed he sees it as a fundamental intellectual current in Western civilization that will surface and find reformulation continuously:

> For Platonism, if regarded not as the literal repetition of Plato's theories but as a constant adaptation and amalgamation of his basic motives according to the insight and convictions of each new thinker, will continue to be restated and revived in the future in many different ways as it has been in the past. (61)

Huxley, instead of acknowledging a type of process model as Kristeller does, seeks instead to ground his interpretation as a vision of timeless wisdom. In this sense his monistic world-view has much in common with that of Huston Smith's recent Forgotten Truth:The Primordial Tradition. (62) Huxley and Huston Smith both advocate a Platonist humanism that emphasizes a form of self-transcendence, rather than an absorption into the Christian Absolute, which characterized the Renaissance interpretation. The humanist streak, circumventing this Christianized Platonism, returns deliberately to the supposedly ancient symbols and systems of the second, third and fourth centuries A.D., drawing parallels with the language of mystics and visionaries from Hindu, Islamic and Buddhist as well as Christian sources.

The result of these endeavours is a philosophic paradigm that is idealist and monistic, expressed in esoteric symbols that only gnostically inclined initiates may penetrate. It is advanced as a counterbalance, if not the salvation, of the prevailing realist-scientific tradition that it alleges as dominating the West. This conglomerate can be variously slated as secular Science and/or History, or as the Transcendent God of orthodox Christianity. There is usually a heavy apocalyptic thrust to the philosophy. This can basically be traced to the inherent dualism and distrust of matter that pervade the Platonist oeuvre or else it bespeaks a deep and instinctive human need that the Platonist philosophy expresses most adequately.

Durand's naming of honoured members of the tradition is also an accepted custom. Ficino himself, as noted, inscribed one. D. Hirst, in a book, Hidden Riches, (63) illustrates how the Renaissance Platonist tradition was absorbed into the English literary tradition, and how acknowledgment of this was made:

> The appearance of this tradition in any kind of literature, is always heralded by reference to a list of venerable authorities which varies little from the age of Ficino to the time of Richard Clarke [late eighteenth century]. Except that the list grows. Those who earlier cited Hermes Trismegistus, Zoroaster, and Plotinus, like Pico della Mirandola, his master Ficino, Georgio and Cornelius Agrippa, begin themselves to be added to the list. (64)

Durand's net is certainly spread wide and he has trapped a heterogeneous set of specimens. They can, however, virtually all be accounted for by their allegiance to a species of the Platonist system.

The most troublesome inclusions in Durand's list are the Romantic poets and thinkers and the surrealists. Durand would undoubtedly defend their incorporation because of their valorization of the imagination. The Romantic understanding of the imagination, as the source and agency of the poetic vision, finds contemporary expression in the work of the poet, Kathleen Raine, who sees herself in the tradition of English visionary poets, including Blake and Yeats:

> In whatever form, under whatever name, all imaginative poets have, like Yeats, hailed "the superhuman," whether as heavenly Muse, or as "woman wailing for her demon lover"; the intention in all cases is the same—to evoke the wisdom of the memoria whose nature Blake understood so well:
>
> "...I rest not from my great task.
> To open the Eternal Worlds, to open the immortal Eyes
> Of Man inwards into the Worlds of Thought, into Eternity
> Ever expanding in the Bosom of God, the Human Imagination." (65)

This interpretation of the Imagination sees it as the personal power that puts the poet in touch with certain universal forms that are then embodied in symbols and images. It is envisaged as a spiritual power that allows a poet "to converse with eternal wisdom." (66) The poet, then, is viewed as a Magus figure and is linked with the theosophical branch of the philosophia perennis stretching back through the Renaissance, to Hellenistic times and to that fabled wisdom of the East whose esoteric symbols haunt the tradition.

Conclusion

This phase in Durand's development, with its spiritualist underpinnings, has perhaps a more exalted perception of the Imagination than that of the Romantic poets. Nevertheless, a basic understanding of the Imagination as the source of poetic inspiration and expression is accepted by both groups. The Renaissance world-view, which for the first time associated the imagination with the creative power of magic, led in time to this remarkable and generally acknowledged "revisioning" of the the role of imagination. Generally situated within an idealist framework, Imagination becomes for Kathleen Raine, as it is for Durand, the equivalent of poetic inspiration, that troublesome "divine madness," as well as the source of all myths and symbols of mediation. Both a power and "faculty of spiritual perception," it is used interchangeably within a loosely formulated Platonist system as synonymous with the traditional Platonic understanding of soul. This inevitably presents certain philosophic problems. For just as it has been noted that within the Plotinian appropriation of the Platonic schema, the soul can be interpreted in accordance with an ontological dimension, or with a realist-psychological bias, Durand's own employment of imagination as soul seems to fluctuate between these two possibilities. At times, as with Jung, the emphasis falls on the transcendent backdrop of the world of the One. At other times the focus of attention seems centred on the multiple psychological manifestations of the realm of the soul, without any acknowledgement of its hypostatic connection. In a fine study, Pagan Mysteries of the Renaissance, Edgar Wind observes that: "Poetic pluralism is the necessary corollary to the radical mysticism of the One." (67) Kathleen Raine, working within a monistic setting also echoes this insight: "...for all poets are by nature polytheists." (68) Durand appears to take full advantage of this obversion. In his earlier works the monistic philosophy, as espoused by Corbin, takes precedence. Content with a generalized transcendent background that occasionally takes on a sharper focus, Durand concentrates on images and symbols as modes of understanding and interpreting, which function as actual revelations of Reality. In his later work, however, he is obviously influenced by the work of a contemporary Jungian, James Hillman. The latter's book, Revisioning Psychology, (69) sees polytheistic images rather than diagnostic pathology as more helpful therapeutic devices for the "soul building" of analytic work. In his latest books Durand himself has opted for applied imaginative technique, mythocriticism or mythanalyse of literary works and worlds, as his own contribution to La nouvelle anthropologie. In contrast to the earlier monistic and transcendent emphasis, Durand here tends towards the more pluralist and secular pole of an understanding of imagination.

The final solution for Durand appears to be that if we accept his symbolic hermeneutics and thus oppose imaginative to reflective and rational judgments, the option is for the ultimacy of the poetic vision, in the broadest sense of that term. While within a Platonist system this can lead to contemplation of the Absolute, Durand's more secular inclinations seem finally to eschew any ultimate spiritual reference. In his latest works he appears to locate his model in the context of a *humanisme ouvert*, where the mediator becomes that ecumenic go-between Hermes, and the Absolute a gene-pool of polytheistic/pluralistic images that reduce metaphysics to mythopoetics. In this regard, the Imagination appears as that power by which Man creates Him/Her self in his/her own image. While these obverse perspectives are not in themselves contradictory, they point to an ambivalence at the heart of Durand's philosophy, a problem that his interpretation of imagination intensifies rather than clarifies.

CHAPTER IV

DURAND'S FINAL PHILOSOPHICAL ORIENTATION TOWARDS THE IMAGINATION

Introduction

Though originally attributed to Corbin, Durand's appropriation and application of the concept of imagination is a composite of many disparate strands that weave in and out of the Western intellectual tradition. On one level his conception of l'homme traditionnel can be appreciated as a revalorization of the shaman figure of Scythia and Thrace, whose identity of poet-seer-prophet has been variously postulated (1) as an undifferentiated precursor of those later Greek separations into poet, philosopher, priest/medium. This differentiation, as it slowly crystallized through Homer, Hesiod, and the various pre-Socratic philosophers, emphasized certain traits that finally found articulation in Plato. A central tenet of the tradition was the belief that certain individuals, through a combination of ascetic discipline, innate disposition and social approbation of their role, are the privileged recipients of divine knowledge which is usually communicated in a heightened state of consciousness. As the reflective and philosophic tendency became more manifest in the Greek world-view, this type of consciousness was more and more refined in the process. Finally Plato saw it as the preserve of an elect, suitably trained, who would become the guardians of his Republic. Philosophy itself was now regarded as a way of life, an askesis seeking to purify the soul in order to promote its union with Truth; a case of "like seeking like". In this regard Plato's definition of happiness (eudaimonia): to become as like God as possible (Theaetetus 176b: "to fly away [to heaven] means to become like God, as far as this is possible;"), has a special importance. It evokes the Platonic paideia as a combination of self-discipline (askesis) and instruction that mirrored the three-fold "way" of the Pythagorean academy in its search for truth, righteousness and goodness. (The later theological schools followed suit.) (2)

In this context the ecstatic and enthusiastic elements were sublimated, and in the Phaedrus Plato assigns such possessed states to the "divine madness" of poets, oracular priests/priestesses, cultic worshippers and lovers. (3) Such types were barred admittance to the Republic. Both in his awareness of these manifestations, and in his own use of "higher myth" (already mentioned in Chapter Four), there remain in Plato's oeuvre vestiges of that prephilosophic emotional and/or inspired disposition which characterized the mantic medium. While reflective consciousness, which culminated in the contemplation of the True and the Good, represented the ideal of the Platonic system, there remained certain areas in Plato's depiction of the psyche that were both incomprehensible and inexplicable, except in figurative language. These figurative expressions were absorbed into the Platonist repertoire where they were often interpreted with complete disregard of Plato's own understanding of the primacy of the noetic nature of consciousness. The result, as demonstrated in the last chapter, was somewhat kaleidoscopic. Plato's psyche (soul), the realm of mediation between the mind/spirit and matter/body, became indiscriminately incorporated within the Platonist framework to account for any form of mediation, such as the Plotinian emanations; or any manner of mediator, such as the figures of poet, prophet, gnostic, magus, philosopher, seer. In these contexts psychic has both psychological and spiritual implications. This development culminated in that Renaissance identification of imagination with the soul, as the medium or locus of such corresponding or revelatory images as were the mainstay of those essentially esoteric, if not gnostic, systems. Such a designation of imagination is not Platonic, nor does it find confirmation in any realist system of philosophy.

As the historical survey of this understanding in the preceding chapter demonstrated, however, such an attribution arose to fulfill a need seemingly unmet by the current philosophical categories. The question thus poses itself: What is that area of experience that imagination, conceived in this way, describes? Of the possible off-shoots from this question two others appear worthy of consideration: How have other philosophical systems, i.e., other than Platonist, attempted to deal with this entity? And, as a result of these considerations: What is the contemporary status of the understanding of imagination in philosophy? Rather than treat each question chronologically, this chapter will address these questions thematically and indirectly, as they arise within the specific issues discussed.

The Scope and Terms of Reference Inherent in Durand's Use of the Term "Imagination"

It would appear that what Durand wishes to substantiate and to account for by his use of the term "imagination" are those non-rational incursions into consciousness and expression that can be communicated only through images and figurative language. Durand assigns these figurative expressions the status of symbol. This sense of "imagination" is indeed intimately connected to that domain called the "unconscious". Plato had indeed been fascinated by the promptings from this area of the psyche, though there did not then exist adequate understanding (if there does today) to map out this territory. Formerly regarded as the province of the poet, seer, prophet, and later of a certain type of Platonic philosopher and the mystic, the well-spring of these charisms was shrouded in mystery that was assumed to have a divine connection.

Since the Renaissance however, and the growing concern with the human element in creative activity, inspiration has ceased to be identified solely with a transcendent source. Poetic consciousness, though still linked in a mysterious manner with the unconscious, and so inevitably with at least a transcendental dimension, has usurped the property of its former associates. But in so doing it remains tinged, particularly in Durand's appropriation, with spiritual nuances. As a result, while the imagination cannot be designated specifically as a divine emissary, it becomes instead "the divine spark" in man/woman. While indeed this may be merely a shift in emphasis that accommodates the modern consciousness, it does in fact indicate precisely that enigmatic area already mentioned in both Durand and Jung, where the frame of reference is never quite clear-cut. The language used can be interpreted either psychologically, or theologically, and it seems that both of the above thinkers wish "imagination" to carry the force and tension implicit in the interaction and co-existence of these two words/worlds. Whereas formerly there was divine inspiration and metaphysics, today there is metaconsciousness and metapoetics.

Imagination, inserted as the mediating activity between the realms of matter and spirit within a Platonist structure, still retains a transcendent/immanent ambivalence that can be exploited according to context. So it is in one context that Durand can posit the philosophy of imagination as the corrective to the mind/body dualism of Cartesian rationalism and contemporary science (4), while a contemporary English Platonist, Owen Barfield, echoes the remark in a more transcendental perspective. In an article "Matter, Imagination and Spirit," he states:"...it is to Imagination, in the first place, that we must look for the healing of that Cartesian sword-thrust between matter and spirit." (5)

In this way Durand's use of imagination appears to fill a need in contemporary consciousness. On the one hand it can serve those like Barfield who are quite content within the traditional format of a Platonist world-view, where, however, imagination is now equated with soul. On the other hand, it also can accommodate those, such as Jung who are not totally at home in this context and lean towards a crypto-Platonist adaptation. Though Durand, Jung and others cannot subscribe to the tenets of Platonic contemplation nor of Christian orthodoxy, they detect in the unconscious and its symbolic forms a transcendent sense that neither realist nor critical philosophies treat adequately. This is because Durand and Jung and company acknowledge that imaginative constructions have equal standing with rational and reflective procedures. It is only within a

Platonist model that they can find a vindication of their appreciation of this creative and dynamic process. Within a broadly-based Platonist understanding of the imagination, Jung and Durand have the scope to explore the human dimensions of creativity without totally abandoning the ultimate source of these expressions which remain, as for Plato, obscured in mystery.

The Philosophical Question and the Problem of the intellectus agens and its Relationship to Imagination

The underlying philosophical question in all of these proceedings revolves around the task of explaining the presence in the mind of images or "phantasms." The Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition employs the concept of the *intellectus agens* to account for the abstraction of these "impressions" from their corresponding sense data. The idealistic tradition, from Plato through Augustine to Durand, opts instead for variations on the theme of infused knowledge to describe the same phenomena. This preference posits an intermediate world, which can neither be identified with sense and matter nor with intellect and spirit, as the ground of humanity's being and knowing. In this regard the realist Aristotelian-Thomist theory, which sees the *intellectus agens* as an internal sense or intellectual faculty, chooses instead a dyadic epistemology and ontology. So it is surprising when Durand, in attempting to explain his understanding of imagination, refers to Avicenna's *intellectus agens*.

It is in *Les Structures* that Durand first mentions Avicenna's intellectus agens:

> Aussi rien ne nous semble plus proche de cette fonction fantastique que la vieille notion avicennienne d' intellect agent, rectrice du savoir de l'espèce humaine tout entière, principe spécifique d'universalité et de vocation transcendante. (6)

At this time, as Durand acknowledges, he had not discovered the work of Corbin. But even after that encounter he again returns to the notion of intellectus agens according to Avicenna. In an article "Tâches de l'Esprit et Impératifs de l'Etre," he conceives of the intellectus agens as an inhabitant of the mediated world of the Platonist system, after the revelatory mode of Corbin:

> C'est aussi que l'Intelligence agente n'est plus du tout cette entité formelle et psychique qu'elle devient dans tout l'aristotélisme, de Thémistius à Thomas d'Aquin en passant bien entendu par Averroès; elle n'est pas non plus l'intervention directe de Dieu chez Alexandre d'Aphrodise ou les augustiniens. L'Intellect agent est ici bel et bien un intercesseur séparé et individué par rapport à l'intellect humain, un Ange du Plérome céleste, Archange de l'Humanité, Esprit-Saint, "Ange de la connaissance" gnostique et "de la révélation," c'est-à-dire de la hiérohistoire. (7)

This understanding of the intellectus agens is markedly different from that of Aristotle and Aquinas and needs further exploration to determine the precise sense in which Avicenna used the term. A short preliminary excursion into its use by Aristotle also seems necessary to establish its exact philosophical pedigree, as well as its subsequent adaptations.

In his book De Anima Aristotle firstly explains how imagination in the body-soul entelechy is dependent upon sensation. At the same time he asserts that the soul never thinks without an image (De Anima III, 7, 431a16). Thus the imagination acts as an liaison between sensation and thinking. The image, abstracted from sensation, has its own particular form, and it is acknowledged as the work of the intellectus agens to extract from sensations that element of "intelligibility" which constitutes this image or phantasm. In a much discussed passage (De Anima III, 5, 430a17-25), (8) however, Aristotle's own understanding of the intellectus agens itself appears somewhat ambiguous. The problem is whether the intellectus agens is a universal entity that is common to all beings, or whether it can be considered as a separate entity peculiar to each individual.

In a perceptive article: "On the Soul: A Philosophical Exploration of the Active Intellect in Averroes, Aristotle and Aquinas," (9) Ruth Reyna analyzes how Averroes and Aquinas each interprets the text in a different manner. Averroes would seem to have interpreted the passage according to the most apparent meaning, positing the intellective soul as a unity, an impersonal substance that is immortal and shared by all beings. Aquinas, however, convinced of the immortality of the individual soul, interpreted the text in a manner that emended the Aristotelian implications. Reyna acknowledges that while this is "surgery" to bring Aristotle in line with the Christian concept of the soul, understood as a compound of Augustinian qualifications of incorruptible and immaterial, it is not a total distortion of Aristotle. (10)

For Aquinas, then, this immortal and personal active intellectual principle, or intellectus agens, bridges the gap between the spiritual and the material. In itself it contains the primary or pre-existent principles of knowledge, but these can be activated only by connection with sensible objects, except in the case of their direct apprehension by intuitive knowledge, as in mysticism. In this formulation Aquinas can be seen struggling to balance the immortal and embodied aspects of the soul, as well as trying to accommodate another Augustinian postulate, that of illuminative knowledge. This latter element was a Platonic bequest, harking back to his particular model of man's/woman's innate and luminous disposition for knowledge of the True; in Augustine's context, God. While, for Aquinas, the _intellectus_ _agens_ cannot be identified with the body or the soul, it partakes of their unity. In that it is closely allied to the soul, it survives the death of the body; then, however, it appears that its services, being dependent on the body, would no longer function or be necessary, as the soul is now in contact with Absolute Being, Truth and Goodness.

In this dualist system Aristotle's _intellectus_ _agens_ emerges as an alternate to the Platonic triadic structure of body-soul-spirit to explain the presence of mental images. This exposition has remained a mainstay of the realist tradition, though certain modern commentators, among them W. Jaeger and A.E. Taylor, (11) reject this concept, alleging that it does not fit within Aristotle's psychology, and labelling it as a mythical segment of his thought; a left-over from his early Platonism. This modern tendency to eliminate a knotty element of Aristotle's system, in the interests of logic and consistency, is an attempt to eradicate those spiritual questions that had challenged Aristotle's own intellect. Whereas his treatment of the imagination can be regarded from a strictly psychological perspective, the _intellectus_ _agens_ cannot. It points once again to that problem of divine/human interaction and its relation to human creativity in thought or expression with which virtually every thinker mentioned previously has grappled. It is these early articulations of "divine madness" and "higher myth" in Plato, as well as the construct of _intellectus_ _agens_ in Aristotle that circumscribe the situation and pose tentative solutions.

Avicenna, in his usage of the word _intellectus_ _agens_, is obviously indebted to Aristotle, but his understanding of this term was unwittingly influenced by Plotinus' work, a sizeable portion of whose Enneads was (as already noted in Chapter Two), attributed to Aristotle as the "Theology of Aristotle." Plotinus' own philosophy is somewhat ambiguous, if not contradictory, containing both Platonic and Peripatetic ideas, often promiscuously juxtaposed. This is compounded by a lack of consistency in terminology. Plotinus' work is something of an amalgam of Plato and Aristotle, and has been described, if somewhat simplistically, as a mixture of Aristotelian psychology and Platonic ontology. Added to this, however, is Plotinus' own solution to the mind/body problem. While his hierarchically ordered emanations from the One can be viewed as an elaboration of the Platonic mediation of soul, these processions of Intelligence and the Soul allow for more subtle interrelationships of mind and body. At the same time, however, Plotinus employs the Aristotelian psychological explanation of imagination in his treatment of the soul's interaction with the world. Yet he does not employ the notion of intellectus agens, its function seemingly supplied by the hypostatic nature of the Intelligence. (12)

It is such a composite as this to which Avicenna is heir. Labouring to relate this monistically ordered universe to his own monotheistic religious tradition, he forges his own theory, synthesizing the elements in a manner that is incompatible with his Islamic religion. He covers his tracks, however, and avoids condemnation and the death of a heretic by his own visionary excursions into the still suspect, but increasingly popular, route of Islamic mysticism. (13)

Avicenna and the Imagination

In his various works Avicenna (960-1037 A.D.) juggles the diverse formulations that seek to explain the source and role of images. Two critical texts for understanding his presentation of this increasingly complex area are: *Les notes d'Avicenne sur la "Theologie d'Aristote,"* edited by G. Vadja, (14) and the already cited section of the *Kitāb al-najāt*, itself an abridgement of his massive work *Kitāb al-shifā*, edited and annotated by F. Rahman under the title *Avicenna's Psychology*. (15) In addition to this Corbin has elaborated his own interpretation of Avicenna's use of the *intellectus agens* in his visionary tales in *Avicenna and the Visionary Recital*. (16)

In the *Kitāb al-najāt*, Avicenna presents an intricate exposition of the place and role of imagination. In the first place, as a faculty within the practical intellect, he describes it in a manner analogous to Aristotle where its activation, within a body-soul complex, depends on external stimuli. In contrast to Aristotle, however, when it receives its impressions of the universal forms from the theoretical intellect, their source is the *intellectus agens*, functioning as the tenth emanation of the Soul from the Intelligence. Avicenna's division of this Soul into potential and active intellects passes through three gradations whereby the potential intelligibles from the practical intellect are transformed into actual intelligibles. The subtleties of this metamorphosis are not the issue at hand, yet the process itself has marked implications for a new understanding of the imagination:

> Similarly some power emanates from this active intellect [*intellectus agens*] and proceeds to the objects of imagination which are potential intelligibles, and makes them actual intelligibles, and the potential intellect [practical intellect] an active intellect. (17)

It is not so much the actual description of the mechanics of the intellectus agens which differs from that of Aristotle, but its insertion in Avicenna's comprehensive setting. Whereas Aristotle envisioned the soul as intimately yet mysteriously related to the Absolute, Avicenna adopts Plotinus' format and the emanative status of the Soul. As one of the Soul's sub-divisions, the intellectus agens has an intermediary nature for Avicenna that is absent in Aristotle's theory.

It is also through the agency of the intellectus agens that Avicenna attempts to account for the phenomenon of prophecy which is a central tenet of Islam:

> Thus there might be a man whose soul has such intense purity and so firmly linked to the rational principles that he blazes with intuition, i.e., with the receptivity of inspiration coming from the active intelligence concerning everything. So the forms of all things contained in the active intelligence are imprinted on his soul either all at once or nearly so,...This is a kind of prophetic inspiration indeed its highest form and the one most fitted to be called Divine Power; and it is the highest human faculty. (18)

Elsewhere Avicenna refers to this highest human faculty as a genus of intellectus in habitu, the highest of the three divisions of the theoretical intellect, but he does not elaborate further. It is the manner in which this communication is received and expressed, however, that is of particular pertinence:

> It is not unlikely, indeed, that some of these actions attributed to the "Divine Intelligence" because of their powerful and lofty nature overflow into the imagination which symbolizes them in sense-imagery and words....(19)

Here for the first time a link is forged between a psychological understanding of imagination as a faculty of the practical intellect, and imagination as the medium of expression of divine communications, where, however, it is the intellectus agens which philosophically operates as the go-between. Imagination becomes both the filter, as it were, of those impressions received from the physical world and the "translator" of spiritual communications and insights received through the intellectus agens. This double function implies both receptive and active components that have since become the property of the imagination whenever it is employed in connection with creativity. Yet it does not appear that Avicenna himself had any such autonomous creative activity in mind. He would appear, however, to initiate a new synthetic ability on the part of imagination, in conjunction with an "internal receptive sense," wahm, the fifth faculty, that Rahman asserts is Avicenna's particular contribution to the history of philosophy. (20) It is this discriminatory faculty that is incorporated with the already existing function of image-making and indiscriminately labelled "imagination" by later Islamic and Western thinkers. They fail to draw any distinction between its Aristotelian psychological connotations and those spiritually related image translations that are a result of prophetic inspiration.

While Avicenna can perhaps be faulted for lack of precision in allowing "imagination" to expand its range of reference to encompass these two distinct operations, he cannot be held entirely responsible for this later development. Both he and his successors had at their disposal the so-called "Theology of Aristotle," and while Avicenna did have doubts about its authenticity, he incorporated its Plotinian spirituality without seeming to question the discrepancy of the absence of the intellectus agens. In this work the soul is posited as a compound of variously termed elements (with the already noted Plotinian lack of consistency). The two major divisions appear to be those of a higher and a lower power that E.W. Warren translates as "sensible" and "conceptual imagination." (21) This is indeed evidence of a modern rereading of the Plotinian terminology, as Plotinus himself refers merely to the higher and lower soul. A crucial text as it appears in the "Theology of Aristotle" is: "Toute âme possède une chose qui dans le bas rejoint le corps et une autre qui en haut rejoint l'intelligence." (22) Avicenna's comment on this text is as follows:

> Toute âme possede deux puissances: l'une est disposée à ce que par elle l'âme perçoive sa contiguité avec le monde de l'intelligence, l'autre remplissant le même office à l'égard du monde de la sensation. La première est l'intellect hylique et l'intellect par habitus, la seconde (qui est plus proche de l'âme) est l'intellect [la raison] pratique, c'est-à-dire les sens internes et externes. (23)

By not delineating carefully the terms and understanding of this bi-modal capability Avicenna left an opening for the later extrapolation of the two "powers" to account for the Aristotelian-Plotinian compound of imagination bridging the gap between the material and the spiritual worlds:

> The higher and the lower powers of the soul meet in the imaginative faculty which is the psychical organ of memory and self consciousness. (24)

It is but one synthesizing step from this to the later Platonist identification of imagination with soul itself that characterizes the work of Durand and other contemporary Platonists.

The 'Alām al-Mithāl

Whatever the spiritual and psychological interrelationships and ambiguities in the treatment of the image in Avicenna, it is clear that the image itself did not have an independent ontological status. This particular development, a feature of medieval Islamic mysticism, drew heavily on Avicenna's concept of the prophetically enlightened being. As this concept was later developed, it asserted that certain spiritual individuals may ascend to the 'Alām al-Mithāl (World of Pure Figures), which is henceforth regarded as the world of visions and prophetic revelations, as well as the site of the resurrection of the body and the realization of all other eschatological predictions. It was first articulated by Suhrawardī (d. 1191 A.D.) who, as Rahman states, "...was the first to announce formally the existence of a new Realm between the spiritual and the physical." (25) Within this world imagination undertakes it's function as the distiller of perceptions in a manner analogous to that within the Aristotelian psychology, except that here the objects of its "perception" are spiritual entities. It is not just an intermediary mode or faculty, but an intermediary world, replete with its own contents, that has been interposed between the material and spiritual dimensions. Except that one item has been added. Individual souls can create new elements in this (i.e., the spiritual) world which can further be projected into the material world. Specifically this helps to explain miraculous events. Its ramifications, however, do not end here. As Rahman expounds:

> Since, as we learnt before, imagination takes the place of, and becomes sense-perception in, the World of Figures and since, according to the holders of this doctrine, physical resurrection is a phenomenon of that world, it follows that in the hereafter physical or quasi-physical reality will follow the creative activity of imagination. (26)

Such an unrestricted vista leaves the decoration of the "World of Figures" virtually at the mercy of those fanciful elaborations that have aroused the distrust and distaste of all realists since philosophy began defining its terms. Rahman is himself aware of such potential extravaganzas:

> Further, once the flood of imagination is let loose, the World of Figures goes beyond the specifically religious motivation that historically brought it into existence in the

> first place and develops into the poetic, the mythical and the grotesque: it seeks to satisfy the relatively suppressed and starved artistic urge. Much of the contents of the *'Ālam al-Mithāl* as it develops later has, therefore, nothing to do with religion but indirectly with the theatre. (27)

The 'Ālam al-Mithāl and the Intellectus Agens

In this connection it is particularly ironic that when Henry Corbin focuses on Avicenna's visionary tales and this thinker's appreciation of the imaginal world, it is the two above-mentioned controversial concepts that he selects as the principal elements of Avicenna's thought. It is obvious that Corbin's interpretation of Avicenna is somewhat suspect when, towards the beginning of the book *Avicenna and the Visionary Recital*, he states:

> But it is not very often that the philosopher attains such a consciousness of his effort that the rational constructions in which his thought was projected finally show him their connection with his inmost self, so that the secret motivations of which he himself was not yet conscious when he projected his system lie revealed. (28)

Corbin asserts this to support his contention that the visionary tales of Avicenna disclose figures and details of a personal spiritual quest that his earlier intellectual constructions in the *Kitāb al-Shifā* prefigured in an abstract fashion. But there is another implication that is central to Corbin's interpretation of the *Recital of Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān*, the *Recital of the Bird* and the *Recital of Salāmān and Absāl*, Avicenna's visionary tales. This is the understanding that in these tales the definition of the *'ālam al-mithāl*, which was not defined formally till Suhrawardī's exposition two centuries later, was here already intimated (albeit "unconsciously") by Avicenna. (29) Avicenna's work, with its complicated accounts of imagination and his own symbolic narratives, is trimmed of its ambiguities and inconsistencies in a retrospective effort to see his work as an embryonic statement of a view of imagination that Corbin feels was burgeoning in the Islamic mind. Rather than view Avicenna's understanding of the imagination as a hybrid of Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic ideas from an historical perspective, Corbin's anticipatory assignation of the term *'alām al-mithāl* to Avicenna helps him to account for the understanding of the *intellectus agens* in an ingenious manner.

Corbin's exegesis of Avicenna's work presupposes an acceptance of the correlation of spiritual and philosophical terminology:

> Philosophical readiness to conceive the universe and intelligible essences is henceforth complemented by imaginative ability to visualize concrete figures, to encounter "persons." (30)

If one accepts such a system, which is essentially Platonist, one accepts the obvious concomitant intermediary universe of the world of figures, *'alām al-mithāl*. It is then that the *intellectus agens* finds its specific role, that is expressed both in symbolic and philosophic language, as an inhabitant of this world:

> It is the [intermediate] world of the Imaginable, that of the Angel-Souls who move the heavens and who are endowed not with sensible organs but with pure active Imagination. (31)

The *intellectus agens* as the tenth emanation of the divine Intelligence finds itself symbolized as an angelic messenger from the Pleroma and thus virtually co-opted as another symbolic inhabitant of the Platonist cosmology. It is, however, given special force as the agency of personal illumination:

> The figure of the Active Intelligence, which dominates all this philosophy [Oriental philosophy], reveals its proximity, its solicitude. The Angel *individuates himself* under the features of a definite person, whose annunciation

> corresponds to the degree of experience of the soul to which he announces himself: it is through the integration of all its powers that the soul opens itself to the transconscious and anticipates its own totality. (32)

Yet it is nowhere evident in Avicenna's own writing that the link was made between his philosophic understanding of the intellectus agens and the angelic companions of his visionary adventures such as Corbin posits. Such a reading is plausible, according to the canons of Durand's own hermeneutics, and it is this that must be kept in mind when understanding both Corbin's and his disciple's interpretation of Avicenna's intellectus agens. It is no longer the simple tenth emanation of Intelligence that Avicenna proposed in his philosophical works, but rather a symbolic figure, a hierophanic guide and messenger that communicates to us by way of the Imagination. It is this understanding that is absorbed into Corbin's world-view which has already been examined, that of the "Oriental philosophy." In this guise the intellectus agens ceases to have the same denotation as that it has within an Aristotelian-Thomist realist system, and Durand's intitially puzzling usage of this term is thus clarified.

The Contemporary Situation

It may appear that this voyage into esoterica has clouded the issue of the philosophical status of imagination and the area designated by the use of that term. But it is apparent in reading the work of Durand and that of other contemporary Platonists, such as Barfield, that within this tradition the imagination has come to portray that creative element which is often couched in symbolic language. This understanding has divorced itself from the realist-Aristotelian meaning of the sense-perception construct, to focus on a productive element in our make-up that, while it finds its fullest expression in images, verbal or pictorial, cannot quite delineate its source. Thus within its far-ranging history, as an element in the Islamic tradition, and in the Western, particularly the Renaissance understanding, the image and its (ultimate) referent/source have been given diverse philosophic and symbolic explanations.These include the quasi-theogonic manoeuvres of the contemporary polytheistic model of "soul-making." (33)

Throughout the development of this understanding of the imagination, however, insofar as this thesis has been able to sketch it with reference to the changes in consciousness that were mirrored in the language of different epochs, there has been evident a tendency, which is particularly insistent today. This is to grant the imagination its own independent ontological status. In part this movement does not appear conscious of its own motivations, save in the commonly held expectation, from Blake through the Romantics to Durand, that imagination constitutes the liberating force from all rigid dogmatisms. It appears to summon those resources in each human being that militate against convention and forge new possibilities of seeing and doing. In that this has traditionally required "superhuman" effort, and its channels of expressions can be unorthodox, the seemingly spiritual nature of its source has been invoked as a safeguard against recrimination. "Mad" poets and divine fools can still be encountered today as in Plato's time, with just as little social approbation. There is something unleashed by the catch-phrase "Liberate imagination," (34) which is interpreted by the conservative as dangerous, yet by the adventurous as a call to exploration, if not blessedness.

This latter tendency, with all its interdisciplinary confusion and category mistakes, is illustrated neatly in a recent book by Roberts Avens, Imagination: A Way Toward Western Nirvana. (35) Basically a superficial study of the work of Jung, James Hillman, Cassirer and Barfield, it also indulges in East-West comparisons of a somewhat dubious provenance. Admitting that the way of imagination "cannot be restricted to any conceptual framework," (36) Avens then adopts a predominantly Romantic understanding of imagination:

> ...that characteristically human faculty--some have called it the divine power in men--which works towards self-transcendence and the reconciliation of spirit and world. (37)

to explore modes of liberation both Eastern and Western. For Avens imagination can be the means of liberation, not because it has any objective or transcendent referent, but because by seeing through or beyond its configurations, one can come to a recognition of the way the human psyche constantly envisions itself. This breakthrough to the underlying creative flux that is the fundamental principle of the structuring of world-views, makes us aware of the imagination's polyvalency or, as Hillman would call it, polytheistic tendency. Such a differentiation can be compared, in Avens' opinion, to Zen Buddhist and Hindu frameworks where the experiences of realization, nirvāṇa and mokṣa respectively, indicate a similar penetration of the multiplicty and "suchness" of psychic constructs. The upshot of Avens' thesis would appear to be that by giving imagination its due we come to the realization that when we are imagining, we are aware that we are imagining. Avens also ranges himself with those who rail against "the centuries-old Western alliance of the scientific-technological spirit and religion." (38) This essay on imagination however, adds nothing new to our understanding of what imagination is or how it functions. In fact, any analysis of Avens' thesis, as well as the insight into psychic processes that he advocates, would appear to require a sizeable input from that department of rational consciousness for which imagination is supposedly the antidote. Yet this relationship is ignored.

Indeed Avens' thesis indicates the central problem in any contemporary attempt to come to grips with the role and meaning of imagination. The Platonist-Romantics, among whom Durand is a charter member, see the imagination as a force apart, entirely unrelated to any other mental functions. It has a special role to perform, namely the realignment of human consciousness, which has become narrowed by its alleged emphasis on scientific rationalism. But it would appear that it must perform its reconstructive task in a vacuum. Or perhaps this illustrates the basic difficulty of attempting to justify philosophically an experience for which there is as yet no adequate philosophical construct. It appears, however, that in this connection a certain anti-rational bias interferes with the philosophic justification of imagination.

In contrast to this position contemporary transcendental Thomism, which is the heir apparent of the intellectus agens, appears to have allowed this concept to fade into the background. (39) It nonetheless acknowledges the mysterious role of imagination, which it links to the unconscious, in providing images that are unique and original. This tradition, however, does not credit imagination with special status. Basically all images are "heuristic devices" that, if they are not to degenerate into mere "picture-thinking," are to be submitted to the superior exigencies of critical and responsible consciousness.

There thus appear to be two entirely different understandings of the word "imagination" current in philosophical circles. One is the essentially realist and psychological depiction of imagination as the stage between perception (either external or internal) and reflective consciousness. Attached to this definition are such provisos as that of Bernard Lonergan above against "picture-thinking," since the imagination is regarded as a preliminary insight rather than a deliberated conclusion. The alternative Platonist conglomerate understanding posits imagination as the source of all that is creative, vital and of ultimate meaning for existence. The prevailing convictions underlying each definition would appear to be at odds. Whereas the Realist-Thomist tradition posits rational consciousness as the principle and superior mode of clarifying meaning from the welter of experience, the contemporary Platonist understands imagination as the means of negotiating awareness and identity unfettered by rational constraints. The two camps appear to be in a state of wary vigilance towards each other: one distrusting the vagaries and solipsism of imaginative exploration; the other disdainful of the dehumanized achievements of the rational and scientific mind-set. In this respect the situation seems at an impasse.

The Problem

From a philosophical perspective it appears that one arrives at that seemingly irreconcilable conflict between two modes of structuring our experience and understanding that have been traditionally labelled "realism" and "idealism." However there is a development in contemporary philosophy and theology that, rather than focusing on external criteria for absolute definitions of truth and "reality," seeks to understand the process of consciousness itself. This enterprise of critical reflection investigates not only the structures of meaning, but the very language of their expression. The movement undoubtedly has its roots in Kant, but has been fertilized by certain aspects of phenomenology, specifically Husserl's notion of intentionality and the Anglo-American ordinary language school. These strands are merging together in the work of Paul Ricoeur.

Since his initial explorations of the human will in Le Volontaire et l'involontaire (40) and L'Homme faillible, (41) Ricoeur has remained equally fascinated by those spontaneous acts of sabotage, both physical and mental, of the human organism, and by those acts of affirmation and spontaneity by which the "embodied-cogito" defies these constraints. The overriding intention of all his projects is the articulation of a "poetics of the will," which has not yet come to fruition. An understanding of imagination that reflects the tension of the bound/free condition of all human acts and thoughts is a central concern of this immense undertaking. Beyond any subject-object dichotomy, Ricoeur's quest mirrors one of the central problems at the heart of the contemporary philosophical and theological enterprise. Struggling to express insights that at once reflect the recognition of the limited nature of any formulation—conceptual or figurative—and the co-existent infinite ground that ever eludes, yet constantly provokes attempts to capture it, Ricoeur looks to imagination. Imagination begins to emerge as a sui generis mode of intentionality, a playful and conscious indulgence in open-ended possibilities of thought, word and deed, fully aware of their tentative nature. Imaginative thoughts, words and deeds are neither the Romantics' ultimate salvation, nor the rationalist's passport to delusion, but the approximate mode of mediating the middle-ground between mystery and control. This project has since become for Ricoeur the expression of a "poetics of existence" rather than simply a "poetics of the will."

Ricoeur's self-reflective journey, and his difficulty in finding adequate means of expression, is symptomatic of the need to maintain a complexity of interrelated modes of being within an overarching system. In that this tendency remains an issue within the philosophical mainstream, it would appear that imagination could serve as the means by which diversity can be entertained. The alternative, of course, is to allow for a pluralistic universe, where philosophical diversity is unrelated to any comprehensive theological enterprise, and imagination, accordingly, will find itself categorized according to the tenets of various separate world-views. In that Ricoeur's monumental effort to wed "poetics" to the structures of intentional consciousness and to its expressions through the medium of imagination remains an issue of vital concern to many contemporary thinkers, it merits further examination.

CHAPTER V

THE UNDERSTANDING OF IMAGINATION IN PAUL RICOEUR

Introduction

In the traditional systems--whether the broadly based approach of realism or of idealism--imagination performed a mediatory function in an effectively dependent capacity. Since the Renaissance and the impact of an increasingly humanist emphasis on humanity's innate potential, imagination has come to be associated with an autonomous creative power that finds expression not simply in artistic endeavours, but modes of thinking and being. This comprehensive notion of poetics is not a return to the Aristotelian concept of the practical intellect. It is rather an attempt to understand the role of both coming to understand and to structure the meaning of existence and of one's place in it as a creative task. Such a development has shifted attention from predominantly objective and classificatory definitions of meaning and truth to a more subjectively based appreciation of the disposition and expressive abilities of the person in search of meaning. Consequently logical propositions quantifying the nature of truth are no longer absolutely applicable. This is a world-view that is aware of those personal components of bias and relativism, as well as the provisional nature of any conclusion. All constructs of meaning are set within an ongoing process of knowledge. The role and place of imagination within such a process has not yet been fully articulated. The work of Paul Ricoeur, however, has been oriented from the beginning towards the delineation of a "poetics of will." (1)

This monumental project has had to undertake extensive detours in recent years as Ricoeur has endeavoured to answer the challenges of structuralism and ordinary language philosophy. As well as this, Ricoeur has been preoccupied with the question of biblical hermeneutics. With his latest book, La métaphore vive (2), the end of Ricoeur's quest appears in sight. From this work, and several recent articles, there are intimations of Ricoeur's philosophic revaluation of the role of imagination that is underscored by his appreciation of the function of metaphor. While it is too early to substantiate definite conclusions on Ricoeur's part, there is sufficient material available to assess Ricoeur's programme. The adequacy of his ideas cannot be measured against the norms or polemics of the traditional conceptualizations of imagination, but evaluated in terms of the philosophic movement since Kant to formulate modes of reflective consciousness. Such an enterprise, in fact, cannot be resolved by recourse to any absolute standard.

Influenced by Husserl's phenomenology and Heidegger's philosophy, Ricoeur has tried to come to terms with the hermeneutical circle by notions of intelligibility and self-understanding. This critical self-reflection, with its movements of participation and distanciation that culminate in appropriation, is intimately connected with the word which expresses this awareness in language, in both written and spoken forms. Such a dialectical situation is fraught with tension that Ricoeur has come to understand as creative. The possibilities for new meaning within this situation are virtually limitless. It is this creative potential, particularly as evident in language, that has intrigued Ricoeur. Its repercussions, however, are not confined to the world of the word, but have a capacity to change one's reality or life-world (Lebenswelt, following Husserl).

Ricoeur would situate imagination at the heart of this process. Initially it would appear that Ricoeur confines imagination to that ability to sustain tension between old and new meanings that he defines as the mark of metaphor. The thrust of Ricoeur's work, however, points to an understanding of this tensional capacity as the nucleus of all prospective revolutions in life. This results from the new meanings that Ricoeur postulates are born of this dialectical interaction. Imagination at the level of word, specifically metaphor, holds the tension, yet acts as the catalytic agent for the subsequent changes. In this model imagination remains in a mediatory capacity, but has an autonomous and seemingly generative ability. So that while it requires material from diverse realms of discourse, the imaginative process is independently activated.

Any evaluation of such a philosophy entails a revision of notions of truth. Unlike Durand, Ricoeur is not claiming an ultimate status of truth for his construct of imagination. Nevertheless his relational stance with its classical realist overtones and his self-proclaimed "post-Hegelian Kantism," place Ricoeur at the cutting-edge of the debate in contemporary philosophy. This chapter will undertake an examination of the essential elements that have helped Ricoeur to formulate his position. It will also briefly compare his stance with that of Gilbert Durand, and then place Ricoeur's work and understanding of the imagination in the context of contemporary philosophy. This task involves confronting the problem of the referential dimension that besets epistemological and ontological concerns today.

The voyage that Ricoeur has made from eidetics and empirics to the hermeneutics of expression in symbol and metaphor has been variously documented. (3) His own encounter and appropriation of the different influences on Western philosophy since the Kantian "Copernican revolution" have produced a subtle and complex blend of ideas. It is difficult to pinpoint any specific figure that has had a predominant effect on Ricoeur's thought. It is therefore hard to locate a point-of-entry into his system apart from that of the obvious chronological development (which has already been done). It seems appropriate, however, to undertake a thematic focusing on those figures and/or movements that have dramatically influenced Ricoeur. Throughout his work there is an obvious constant and careful attention to the subtle nuances of earlier made distinctions. As a result his ideas, while in some sense they remain familiar, have the capacity to "shake the foundations" as they are readdressed in the light of a new question. It is in this manner that the formative influences of Marcel and Husserl on Ricoeur must be assessed.

Existential Phenomenology: The Legacy of Marcel and Husserl

Gabriel Marcel was Ricoeur's professor during his years of graduate study, and his emphasis on the Mystery of Being and its incarnate modes of hope, trust, commitment, initially fascinated Ricoeur. His quest for a "reconciled ontology" within an existential base has remained an underlying motif in Ricoeur's own investigations. Ricoeur, however, has carried his investigations further. Initially he sought a more rigorous method than Marcel's discursive reflections. This led him to Husserl's eidetic phenomenology which he employed to explore those areas where there was a discrepancy between human endeavour and achievement. Yet throughout his later developments Ricoeur has also remained faithful to Marcel's existential commitment of personal involvement in one's reflections.

It was while he was interned during World War II that Ricoeur translated and commented on Husserl's Ideen I (4). From Husserl he adopted that rigorous method which categorized Husserl's approach to philosophy and which has also become a trademark of Ricoeur's own work. In the book that is generally regarded as the beginning of Ricoeur's programme of a delineation of a "poetics of the will," Philosophie de la volonté. 1: Le Volontaire et l'involontaire, (5) Ricoeur employed a method, which he termed eidetics, that was influenced heavily by Husserl's phenomenological method. He bracketed, in accordance with Husserl's postulate of epoché, any subjective evaluation of fault or symbolic formulations of limitation or transcendence. Ricoeur sought to describe the intentional consciousness as it engages in voluntary movements of decision, action and consent, yet finds itself inevitably influenced by involuntary aspects, such as bodily drives and emotional needs. His conclusions as to the finite/infinite paradox within all human willing prevented Ricoeur from aligning himself with Husserl's transcendental idealism. The findings also caused him to pursue his resultant empirical studies of the human dialectic in L'Homme faillible (6) et La Symbolique du mal, (7) under the rubrics of the Kantian concept of limit.

Nevertheless Ricoeur had been intrigued by Husserl's treatment of the imagination. Husserl's reflections on this topic are unsystematic and intrinsically ambivalent. At one time he posits imagination as a central, if not essential, aspect of the phenomenological method yet on another occasion he denies it primary recognition within an epistemological system. Husserl regarded phenomenology as a "rigorous science," the intention of which was to formulate:

> ... *a universal conformity to laws of structure on the part of conscious life*, a regularity by virtue of which alone truth and actuality have, and/are able to have, sense for us. (8)

Through application of the phenomenological method, which abstracted data from the empirical level, Husserl's approach aimed at reaching an "eidetic intuition" of the essence of things. This essence was an *a priori* core, virtually beyond sense experience, which Husserl named the *eidos*. Husserl defines the *eidoi* as universals "...not conditioned by any fact." (9)

In Husserl's depiction of this method the exact nature of this eidetic insight or intuition remained somewhat nebulous, but an act of imagination seemed to constitute an essential part of the procedure. In this context Husserl related the imagination to absence rather than presence, and accordingly to possibility rather than actuality. Thus removed from "the real world," imagination, by a process of free-association within a structure of open-ended possibility, selected the "essential possibility," or *eidos*, of an experience:

> Starting from this table-perception as an example, we vary the perceptual object, table, with a completely free optionalness....Perhaps we begin by fictively changing the shape or the colour of the object quite arbitrarily, keeping identical only its perceptual appearing. In other words: Abstaining from acceptance of its being existence , we change the fact of this perception into a pure possibility, one among other quite "optional" pure possibilities....We, so to speak, shift the actual perception into the realm of non-actualities, that realm of the as-if [*als-ob*] which supplies us with "pure" possibilities, pure of everything that restricts to this fact or to any fact whatever. As regards the latter point, we keep the aforesaid possibilities, not as restricted even to the co-posited de facto ego, but just as a completely free "imaginableness" of phantasy. (10)

This idea of imagination, however, was itself restricted to the realm of non-reality, i.e., fiction or fantasy, and thus inevitably remained within the suspicious categorizations to which the "rationalist" philosophical tradition had relegated it. It was this long-held prejudice that was probably responsible for Husserl's final and inconsistent denial of the imagination's worth within an epistemological framework.

This bias is articulated by Husserl in his analysis of mental activity, where imagination is relegated to a position that is inferior to that of perception. It is named as a mode "presentification" (vergegenwartigen, i.e., "to make intuitively present to mind"), in a system where perception and rational consciousness are accorded epistemological priority. (11) These seeming contradictions in Husserl's treatment of imagination bespeak the imagination's ambiguous status within the Western philosophical tradition; a situation that has provoked Ricoeur's attention. "To my mind a philosophy of imagination is badly needed." (12)

The Husserlian investigations have percipitated certain questions that have "teased" Ricoeur's own thought and are evident in his efforts to delineate a "poetics of the will." At one level the unresolved problem of presence/absence in the received theory of the imagination has led Ricoeur to articulate a much more coherent theory as regards the potential of fiction to "redescribe reality." In another direction, though without specific reference to Husserl, the internal tension inherent in contradictory statements has provided Ricoeur with the basis of his theory of metaphoric "similarity in difference." This model functions as a paradigm for the creation of new meaning.

In both the above procedures it is the imaginative capacity of an individual, grounded in the world of lived-experience, that plays the pivotal role. Hence the inconsistencies within Husserl's treatment of the imagination nevertheless indicated a creative potentiality on the ~~part of~~ imagination that Ricoeur's work is now bringing to light. But before Ricoeur could address this problem directly, he has had first to undertake research in the field of language itself. For Ricoeur became aware that it was not at the conceptual level, even when couched in existential or phenomenological terms, that one accounts adequately for experience. The basic problem is the issue of language itself, the means by which one endeavours to express in word and symbol the perplexities of human existence. The initial investigation of this dimension of imaginative production was undertaken by Ricoeur as a hermeneutical study.

Hermeneutics: The Legacy of Dilthey and Schleiermacher

In those studies that were basically considered as an exercise in empirics, L'Homme faillible and La Symbolique du mal, Ricoeur came to the conclusion that language itself could no longer be taken for granted as an innocent instrument in the assignation of meaning. The mere literal decipherment at the level of first intentionality, such as presupposed by the methods of eidetics and empirics, was inadequate to investigate what Ricoeur perceived as the level of second intentionality. This referred to that realm of multiple meanings indicated by the use of symbolic language whereby human beings strove to express dimly felt, or obscurely understood, areas of experience.

To aid comprehension of this type of language, Ricoeur introduced the hermeneutic method. At this stage Ricoeur saw hermeneutics as a type of tool that could be applied within the framework of the "hermeneutic circle." In this method one suspended initial belief and understanding, as characterized by a first naïveté, in order to undertake reflection on historical and cross-cultural possibilities of interpretation. This "objective stance" was adopted, however, with the prospect of a return to a second naïveté of enriched understanding. Ricoeur's thought at this time could be summarized by a statement in his article "The Symbol...Food for Thought":

> In the end symbols speak to us as an index of man's position at the heart of being, where he moves and exists. The task of the philosopher guided by symbols is to break down the enchanted wall of self-consciousness and subjectivity, to strip reflection of its exclusive rights, and to go beyond anthropology. All symbols in fact aim at reinstating man within a whole, the transcendent whole of sky, the immanent whole of vegetation and death and rebirth. (13)

This somewhat simplistic vision was shattered in two ways. Firstly, in his work De l'interprétation: Essai sur Freud, (14) Ricoeur became aware that hermeneutics itself could be used in a reductive fashion, e.g., Freud's particular usage of symbols to interpret other symbols, just as easily as they could be employed in a constructive manner. The resulting "conflict of interpretations" led Ricoeur into reflection on the whole problem of hermeneutics. His dialogue with the questions raised by this investigation remains a central concern of his work till today. The basic issue became the problem of self-knowledge and how it was mediated by structures of meaning, principally the linguistic modes of text and discourse.

The basic shift was that from a primarily subjectively ordered task of understanding to a deeper awareness of the dialectic process that underlies all linguistic procedures. This led to a reformulation of the hermeneutic task itself. Now the interaction or "conflict" generated the dynamics of interpretation where explanation and understanding functioned in a dialectic relationship. With this model Ricoeur attempted to reconcile those two opposing elements at the heart of the hermeneutic programmes of Dilthey and Schleiermacher. Thus the stage of explanation, comprising both pure description and interpretative reconstruction, and characterized by Ricoeur as the stance of distanciation, worked in tandem with understanding or the stance of appropriation. This dialectic interrelationship did not remain a methodological paradigm that was confined to hermeneutic and linguistic analyses. Instead it was posited by Ricoeur as having ontological resonance, mirroring the creative tension of the life process itself.

This tensive ground, where determinative and prospective modes of meaning interpenetrate to disclose possible new ways of being-in-the-world, would appear to be the domain where Ricoeur will situate the imaginative function. Ricoeur, however, has not yet fully articulated his position as regards the imagination. It would seem, nevertheless, to be an integral part of the movement described above, where mediation and tension function constructively. This "strategy", which can be postulated as the ability to entertain "similarity in difference," is illustrated by Ricoeur's further adoption of metaphor and the concept of split-reference as the paradigm of creative disclosure in language, thought and experience.

In this development Ricoeur's understanding of the hermeneutic endeavour has also undergone change. In 1971 he redefined his position accordingly:

> Now I should tend to relate hermeneutics to the specific problems raised by the translation of the objective meaning of written language into the personal act of speaking which a moment ago I called appropriation. In that way the broader question, What is it to interpret a text?, tends to replace the initial question, What is it to interpret symbolic language? (15)

In another article written a few years later, Ricoeur expanded on his understanding of what it was to interpret a text. Here the task was not an historical or regulative quest, but essentially one of disclosure:

> If we can no longer define hermeneutics as the search for another person and his psychological intentions that hide

> behind the text, and if we do not want to reduce interpretation to the identification of structures, what is left to be interpreted? My response is that to interpret is to explicate a sort of being-in-the-world unfolded in front of the text. (16)

Then in his latest work, La métaphore vive (1975), Ricoeur explains in more detail what this "sort of being-in-the world" actually implies. Central to this explication is Ricoeur's distinction between speculative and poetic discourse. Yet this distinction has something of a familiar ring. Just as in the metaphorical model tension had been generated by the interplay of sameness and difference at the level of discourse, where literal and figurative meanings clash, so at the reflective level there is conflict between the established conceptual mode of thinking (speculative) and the heuristic mode of poetic description. Ricoeur now seeks " a hermeneutic style" where "...L'interprétation répond à la fois à la notion du concept et à celle de l'intention constituante de l'expérience qui cherche à se dire sur le mode métaphorique." (17) Hermeneutics itself thus becomes a form of discourse that operates at the point of intersection of two possible ways of describing experience. This mediatorial role is possible only through the agency of imagination:

> Ce qui est dit ici éclaire notre propre notion de métaphore vive. La métaphore n'est pas vive seulement en ce qu'elle vivifie un language constitué. La métaphore est vive en "penser plus" au niveau du concept. C'est cette lutte pour le "penser plus," sous la conduite du "principe vivifiant" qui est "l'âme" de l'interprétation. (18)

Whereas previously it was the symbol that had "given rise to the thought," attention is now narrowed to focus on metaphor as that symbolic moment that provides the impetus "to think more." For Ricoeur, all such exercises in reflective expansion are stimulated by imaginative constructions.

The Transcendental Imagination: Kant and Heidegger

The Kantian postulate of the transcendental imagination, particularly as reflected upon by Heidegger, has also provided Ricoeur with much "food for thought." (In his reading of Kant, Ricoeur places emphasis on the constructive and creative role that Kant accords the productive imagination in the first edition of *The Critique of Pure Reason*, (19) as opposed to Kant's more conservative treatment of the same topic in the second edition.)

It was in his study of Heidegger's *Kant and ~~the~~ Problem of Metaphysics* that Ricoeur recognized a similar quest as his own for a fundamental ontology that described the human subject in his/her existential situation rather than at the level of formal concepts as in Kantian *Critiques*. Ricoeur would be in full agreement with Heidegger when he observes that the transcendental imagination is the foundation of ontological knowledge, because it is an ontological condition that is required for the realization of the self as a knowing being. (20) In this interpretation the categories of the transcendental imagination do not remain, as they do for Kant, restricted to the realm of knowing, albeit from a critically reflective standpoint, but are extended to the realm of being. Nevertheless Ricoeur parts company with Heidegger on two counts, each of which delineates the extension of Ricoeur's investigations beyond Heidegger's conclusions. The first deviation is on the question of method. In an article "Existence et Herméneutique," Ricoeur observes that Heidegger has opted for the short and direct way to an "ontologie de la compréhension" where understanding is "non plus comme un mode de connaissance, mais comme un mode d'être." (21) In contrast, Ricoeur's project entails those detours into the world of the sciences and linguistics for "diagnostic" (22) engagements with methods and models other than philosophic. These, Ricoeur believes, will help the reflecting-subject better understand his/her situation through interdisciplinary dialogue. "Comprehending" by itself is too wide a term to designate the various means of expression and understanding that Ricoeur has come to appreciate as constituting meaning. While Ricoeur has no trouble accepting Heidegger's basic hermeneutical undertaking:

> ...to understand a text, we shall say, is not to find an inert meaning which is contained therein, rather it is to unfold the possibility of being which is indicated by the text. (23)

he has expanded the manoeuvre of explication observed in the previous section. It now incorporates that imaginative disclosure of possible modes-of-being which function at the level of semantic reference and that of personal appropriation. Hermeneutics is no longer restricted to a format of textual interpretation.

It is with reference to the transcendental imagination and its ontological status that Ricoeur also subtly rethinks the role of the image in the functioning of the schemata. In this sense Ricoeur is seeking to express the exact nature of that shift from literal to figurative sense that is the essence of metaphor. Whereas within the Kantian frame-of-reference the schemata are the means by which images are given to concepts, Ricoeur establishes metaphor as a schematic function by which metaphorical attribution is effected.

> Ce schématisme fait de l'imagination le lieu d'emergence du sens figuratif dans le jeu de l'identité et de la différence. Et la métaphore est ce lieu dans le discours où ce schématisme est visible, parce que l'identité et la différence ne sont pas confondues mais affrontées. (24)

While Ricoeur himself admits that this function of imagination operates at a psycho-linguistic crossroads, it also forms the basis of his later adoption of the semantic theory of split-reference, which in turn becomes the model of creative tension at the ontological level. (This development will be treated in detail in the following two sections.)

The other area where Ricoeur disagrees with Heidegger is in the latter's works such as On the Way to Language and Poetry, Language, Thought, where he ascribes to poetry and art the ultimate means of expression of "being." Such a stance is set against the failure of traditional metaphysics:

> ...without fear of the appearance of godlessness he [the poet] must remain near the failure of the god, and wait long enough in the prepared proximity of the failure, until out of the proximity of the failing god the initial word is granted, which names the High One. (25)

Echoing his adaptation of Hölderlin's inscription of "poetically man dwells," Heidegger in Poetry, Language, Thought posits poetry as expressing the basic character of human existence--"dwelling." "Poetry is what first brings man onto the earth, making him belong to it, and thus brings him into dwelling." (26) It is by poetry that human beings take the measure of their existence, hence it functions for Heidegger as the preconceptual means of disclosure of the primordial ontological ground of being. At the same time Heidegger posits poetry as the fundamental naming of the gods. This "onto-theology," as Ricoeur calls it, would appear to function within a reciprocal arrangement where it is the gods who initially bestow the gift of language and thus preside over their ultimate manifestation through language.

Though Heidegger himself discriminates between this poetic language and thinking, as Ricoeur will do himself, Ricoeur has difficulty in accepting the priority accorded poetry by Heidegger. Ricoeur feels that rather than the hermeneutic clash between explanation and experience that featured in Dilthey's and Scheiemacher's epistemological systems, in Heidegger's world-view it is epistemology and ontology that find themselves at odds. Ricoeur's reading of Heidegger takes issue with Heidegger's inversion of what Ricoeur feels is the basic operation of understanding, speaking, for the receptive mode of hearing. For Heidegger "disclosure" comes to the receptive being in poetic speech, where "saying" (reden) appears as superior to "speaking" (sprechen). (27) Ricoeur feels that the epistemological world of speaking, with its components of linguistics, semiology and philosophy of language, is just as crucial an area of "expression" of one's self understanding as poetic "saying." Ricoeur will himself opt for the primacy of the ontological mode in his own theory, but he will not identify it as Heidegger does, with poetic disclosure.

Ricoeur's understanding of language has become by this stage markedly divergent from such a symbolic framework as Heidegger's. His excursion into the world of symbolic expression in De l'interprétation: Essai sur Freud has alerted him to the polysemic nature of all linguistic expressions:

> This polysemic feature of our words in ordinary language now appears to me to be the basic condition for symbolic discourse and, in that way, the most primitive layer in a theory of metaphor, symbol, parable etc. (28)

It is from this base that Ricoeur has constructed his own ontological awareness which starts from this fundamental tension at the level of meaning but reverberates through all levels of experience and expression. When set against a horizon of Kantian "limiting" categories: "limit-expressions," "limit-experiences," "limit-concepts," the ultimate destination of Ricoeur's project appears as the possibility of the transcendence of these horizons. The implication can be drawn from his work thus far that it is the imagination itself that will provide the vehicle for transcendence. It is imagination that facilitates the entertainment of conflicting possibilities of meaning. By this inherent capacity to maintain the tension of dissonant frames of references at the lexical and semantic level, imagination encourages, supports and "detonates" personal "reconciliations of reality." Its effectiveness is not confined to a mediatory function at levels of discourse, but to its seeming catalytic action within the ontological sphere. Linguistic transgression and semantic impertinence prefigure the ontological mode of transcendence that lies at the heart of Ricoeur's search to delineate "a poetics of will."

Such a linguistic turn was not within the scope of Heidegger's theory, whose appeal to the word in his later philosophical works appeared as an attempt to wed speculative and poetic language. Ricoeur admits in _La métaphore vive_ that such an identification will always present a temptation, but this resort to an easily accessible ontology represents for Ricoeur an escape from the inherent complexities of thinking and being.

The Linguistic Turn

Ricoeur's encounter with linguistic theory and ordinary language philosophy was motivated by the fact that he felt the theory of metaphor initiated by the work of I.A. Richards in _Philosophy of Rhetoric_ (29), Max Black in _Models and Metaphors_ (30), as well as by Beardsley and Turbayne could not adequately portray the final composite that Ricoeur himself envisaged. This was because it failed to assign "a _semantic_ function to what seems to be mere _psychological_ features...." (31) In other words, Ricoeur was on the track of the semantic role of imagination.

Ricoeur's initial questions focused on the fact that most traditional descriptions of metaphor tended to include references to some pictorial aspect inherent in the trope, e.g., "appearance," "form." As Ricoeur observed, these attributions were themselves "figures of speech" and tended to obscure rather than clarify the situation. These definitions generally accorded metaphor its original rhetorical designation as a decorative device and accounted for its function at the linguistic level by a process of substitution. This substitution was regarded as deviance from the traditional usage, though it served the interests of coining appropriate names for new objects, experiences or ideas. It was this novel aspect that tended to be overlooked. In this regard Ricoeur felt that there was more at stake than the simple divergence from accustomed usage, which the classical viewpoint emphasized. Ricoeur turned his attention to the neglected prospective element provided by the "impertinent" employment of a word. Viewed from this perspective, metaphor is the basis of semantic innovation. The semantic innovation occurs, however, not at the level of the word itself, but with reference to the predicative meaning that depends on the metaphoric utterance as a whole--the sentence.

There was a further dimension of interest in the use of novel metaphor that intrigued Ricoeur. If one takes a semantic overview there is an evident incongruity that results from the interaction of two levels of meaning: one, the accepted meaning or denomination; the other, the innovative prediction. This semantic incongruence provided Ricoeur with the kernel of that dialectic of sameness and difference which activates those insights and discoveries that resound through all aspects of one's being. In this instance metaphor exploits the polysemic nature of language itself, or, as Ricoeur delights in observing, it deliberately commits those category mistakes that are anathema to Gilbert Ryle.

The role of the imagination in this operation remained something of an enigma, and Ricoeur was not content to resort to any easy conclusions as supplied by Romantic ideologues:

> The problem is a semantic one, not a psychological one. How do we make sense with self-contradictory statements? In invoking imagination, we lose sight of the decisive factor that in novel metaphors the similarity is itself the fruit of metaphor. We now see a similarity that nobody had ever noticed before. The difficulty therefore is to understand that we see similarity by construing it, that the visionary grasping of resemblance is at the same time a verbal invention. The iconic element has therefore to be included in the predicative process itself. (32)

Ricoeur's investigations here are concerned with that borderline area between the verbal and the non-verbal. He is patently dissatisfied with existing formulations of the imagination as they pertain to this area. It is by pursuing this notion of the iconic that he hopes "to adjust a psychology of imagination to a semantics of metaphor or, if you prefer, to complete a semantics of metaphor by having recourse to a psychology of imagination." (33) The procedure which Ricoeur now follows is to explore the role of imagination in the semantics of metaphor from two positions: the quasi-verbal and the quasi-optic or sensible.

The quasi-verbal and quasi-optic aspects of imagination would both appear to be confined to the work of preconceptual structuring. Ricoeur locates the quasi-verbal function of imagination in the ability to entertain disparate frames-of-reference. Imagination again performs with both mediatory and catalytic effect, permitting the emergence of that new semantic pertinence that is the property of a meaningful metaphor:

> Imagination, accordingly, is this ability to produce new kinds by assimilation and to produce them not above the differences, as in the concept, but in spite of and through the differences. (34)

The quasi-optic or iconic function of imagination is linked by Ricoeur to the Kantian theory of schematic apperception in the workings of the productive imagination. Here the image is connected with emergent meaning rather than with that unsatisfactory perceptual residue postulated by Humean psychology. Within the semantics of metaphor this iconic ability has to do with the "grasping of similarities in a preconceptual way." (35) Here the icon is to language what the schema is to concept. Yet as observed in the previous section, Ricoeur understands these "images" as the basis, not of the concept as they are for Kant, but of that disparate/familiar predication which constitutes metaphoric attribution.

The verbal and iconic elements are intrinsically related in this process, yet it is extremely problematic for Ricoeur, given the traditional hiatus between these two modes, to express appropriately their intimate relationship. At this stage of his work Ricoeur finds defining the areas of difficulty somewhat simpler than articulating a fully developed theory. Yet his work gives indication of the nature of the insights to be developed.

> The enigma of iconic presentation is the way in which depiction occurs in predicative assimilation: something appears on which we read the new connection. The enigma remains unsolved as long as we treat the image as a mental picture, that is, as the replica of an absent thing. Then the image must remain foreign to the process, extrinsic to predicative assimilation....Imaging or imagining, thus, is the concrete milieu in which and through which we see similarities. To imagine, then, is not to have a mental picture of something but to display relations in a depicting mode. (36)

This change of focus from a perceptual to iconic understanding of imagination helps Ricoeur to delineate more clearly the process of imagining, but nevertheless it finds him grasping for metaphors himself, or resorting to apparent inconsistencies, as illustrated by his use of the concept "seeing-as," in an effort to illustrate his understanding of this process. He acknowledges the complexity of the situation and the "infancy" of his theory, but at the same time he forecasts his programme for a philosophy of imagination:

> In popular terms, figurative thinking is the presentation of abstract ideas and their concrete appearance. But what is a concrete presentation of an abstract idea, if not the learning and teaching of a genus thanks to the interplay of sameness and difference? To my mind a philosophy of imagination is badly needed. Could we not say by anticipation that imagination is the emergence of conceptual meaning through the interplay between sameness and difference? (37)

The Wittgensteinian formula of "seeing-as" provides a tentative solution to the problem. Wittgenstein had confined his usage of this concept to the perceptual realm only, principally as illustrated by the contexual influence in the famous duck/rabbit Gestalt experiment. Ricoeur, however, employs "seeing-as," which invokes a paradigm of image resemblance rather than identity, as it has been expanded by Marcus B. Hester. In his book The Meaning of Poetic Metaphor, (38) Hester develops the construct of "seeing-as" to account for the iconic element in poetic metaphor. This expansion of Wittgenstein's concept holds the key for Ricoeur to the semantic-psychological fusion that is the essence of the imaginative "perception" at the heart of the metaphorical process:

> ...le "voir comme" est la face sensible du language poétique; mi-pensée, mi-experience, le "voir comme" est la relation intuitive qui fait tenir ensemble le sens et l'image. Comment? Essentiellement par son caractère sélectif. (39)

Ricoeur then continues with a quotation from Hester:

> Seeing as is an intuitive experience-act by which one selects from the quasi-sensory mass of imagery one has on reading metaphor the relevant aspects of such imagery. (40)

This juncture of thought and experience, of the verbal and non-verbal, supplies Ricoeur with the theory he needs to support his dynamic semantics of metaphor. In itself it has provided a schema for his own intimations:

> Ainsi le"voir-comme" joue très exactement le role du schème qui unit le concept vide et l'impression aveugle; par son caractère de demi-pensée et de demi-expérience, il joint la lumière du sens à la pléntitude de l'image. Le non-verbal et le verbal sont ainsi étroitement unis au sein de la fonction imageante du language. (41)

A central concern of Ricoeur's in this articulation of the semantic role of imagination has been a desire to avoid the division of positivism which unilaterally opposes cognitive, objective language to the descriptive and emotive language of poetry. Such a thesis, which is also evident in the linguistic distinction between denotation and connotation, and has been inferred from Frege's separation of Sinn (sense) and Bedeutung (reference), (42) restricts poetic meaning to a purely self-referential structure. This is particularly evident in the Romantic genre, both in its own self-image, as well as in its objective assessment as egocentric.

In order to maintain a non-subjective referential function of poetic language, Ricoeur appropriates Roman Jakobson's theory of "split reference," but adapts it to suit his own purposes. The referential function of the "semantic impertinence" of a metaphoric statement accordingly has a dual allegiance. This model of "split-reference" subsumes happily at the semantic level the metaphorical dialectics of sameness and difference. In this model, the primary reference is that traditional meaning within the lexical framework which is destroyed by its novel application within the metaphoric utterance. The secondary or figurative reference activates that necessary semantic tension from which new possibilities of meaning are projected. Ricoeur will explore the implications of this semantically based theory of "split-reference" on both epistemological and ontological levels. For as he states:

> This reference is called second-order reference only with respect to the primacy of the reference of ordinary language. For, in another respect, it constitutes the primordial reference to the extent that it suggests, reveals, unconceals—or whatever you say—the deep structures of reality to which we are related as mortals who are born into this world and who dwell in it for a while. (43)

It is now apparent that Ricoeur's so-called "detours" into the worlds of hermeneutics and linguistics constitute an essential part of a delicate operation. This is an attempt to discriminate carefully the place and role of imagination as it performs at all levels of human activity in concrete situations, not simply in abstract formulas. Ricoeur has been concerned with portraying the emergence of meaning at both linguistic and conceptual levels. He has also been interested in defining the ways that one shapes these experiences by interpretative devices. Throughout his analysis Ricoeur has been careful to stress the focal role of imagination in all these procedures. Though his own conceptual terminology has not always proved adequate to the task, he has nevertheless provided the foundations for a fully developed philosophy of imagination. This is at present in preparation. He has also set the stage for his initial reflections on the place of imagination within what would now appear to be a "poetics of experience," rather than his originally forecast "poetics of will."

The Ontological Imagination

In his linguistic studies Ricoeur examined the tension generated by metaphor both at the lexical level, by the clash between literal and figurative languages, and at the semantic level by the impertinent predication of the metaphorical statement. Ricoeur wishes to explore further, however, the dynamics of the split-reference. This is to substantiate the claim that a metaphorical utterance can not only shatter normative language use, but also shatter and restructure reality itself. Ricoeur states his intentions: "Pour l'exprimer le plus radicalement possible, il faut introduire la tension dans l'être métaphoriquement affirmé." (44) To achieve this, Ricoeur introduces a third level of tension: that which exists in the relational function of the copula. In other words, at the level of discourse there is tension between the "is" and "is not" of the two modes of being interacting in the metaphoric interplay of sameness and difference. Yet what Ricoeur wishes to declare is that this new predicative description is actually a "redescription" of reality. To delineate precisely what he intends by this assertion, Ricoeur resorts to the theory of scientific models presented in the works of Mary Hesse and Max Black. As a means of expediting this comparison of models and metaphors, Ricoeur establishes a correspondence between the theory of models as complex networks of statements and the metaphoric theory as applied to extended metaphors. An example of the latter would be narrative and other modes of fiction. The other component incorporated at this stage is literary critic Nelson Goodman's famous adage, fiction "reorganizes the world." (45)

Just as for M. Hesse scientific models are heuristic devices whose aim is to "reshape" reality by a process of discovery, for Goodman symbolic productions "make" and "remake" the world. Ricoeur's strategy is to connect the theory of models with his own theory of metaphor and with his nascent philosophy of imagination. "Redescription" of reality by means of heuristic fiction provides the formula that allows Ricoeur to combine these ideas and to gain access to an ontological dimension. Ricoeur then liberates this manoeuvre from bondage to Goodman's essentially nominalist philosophical position by making a connection with his already established referential category.

The onus of this subtle manipulation, however, rests upon the exact meaning Ricoeur ascribes to the word "redescription." This "redescription" involves components of both "invention" and "discovery" which in turn result from Ricoeur's freeing of the concept of image from its traditional association with a replica or picture (à la Hume) to align it with that iconic augmentation posited by his referential model. In this instance, there is no previous entity of which this "new image" is a copy. Integral to this new understanding is that shift which Ricoeur made in the preceding section from a perceptual to a linguistic and iconic grounding of his theory of imagination. Thus "redescription" is intimately linked to that imaginative capacity to entertain "is" and "is not" which ultimately can restructure world-views.

Such a theory of models and redescription permits Ricoeur to revise Aristotle's connection of *mimēsis* and *mythos* within a more general understanding of *poiesis*. *Mimēsis* as redescription, constitutes the denotative dimension of *mythos*, the heuristic fiction. (46) *Mimēsis*/ redescription, in this light, marks the ultimate point of reference or horizon of all creative endeavour. This is, naturally, human experience itself. Beyond all categories and levels of tension, the life-world (*Lebenswelt*) provides the ontological setting for all those devices of meaning by which a person attempts to structure and to understand experience. The metaphoric moment and its imaginative factor is paradigmatic as it captures for Ricoeur the moment of intersection of the mind of man/woman and the world at the point of growth. So it is that, for Ricoeur there is tension inherent in being itself.

Within such a setting questions naturally arise as to the truth-claims of knowledge that are established by this dialectical system. While Ricoeur refuses to attribute to the poetic and metaphoric process of invention and discovery any absolute authority or autonomy, he does not let it be subjugated to the demands of rational consciousness. For Ricoeur any growth in meaning is a result of the "thinking more" that is provoked at the conceptual level by the metaphoric utterance. Nevertheless, though there is a reciprocal relationship between what Ricoeur terms poetic and speculative discourse, he maintains a clear-cut distinction between them:

> Le gain en signification est ainsi inséparable de l'assimilation prédicative à travers laquelle il se schématise. C'est là une autre façon de dire que le gain en signification n'est pas porté au concept, dans le mesure où il demeure pris dans ce conflit du "même" et du "différent," bien qu'il constitue l'ébauche et la demande d'une instruction par le concept. (47)

Against the horizon of a speculative logos, knowledge itself is a tensional on-going process, where the experience of poetic participation interacts with speculative distanciation. Truth can no longer be confined to certainty but becomes an awareness of a philosophical process where "...tout gain en signification est à la fois un gain en sens et un gain en référence." (48) The world of philosophic discourse mirrors the dynamics of being itself:

> ...j'incline à voir l'univers du discours comme un univers dynamisé par un jeu d'attractions et de repulsions qui ne cessent de mettre en position d'interaction et d'intersection des mouvances dont les foyers organisateurs sont décentrés les uns par rapport aux autres, sans que jamais ce jeu trouve le repos dans un savoir absolu qui en résorberait les tensions. (49)

This interaction of participatory poetic consciousness with the distanciation of speculative discourse is, as has been described earlier, the essential movement of Ricoeur's new hermeneutical proceedings. Here it is imagination that permits and sparks the new insight that is then incorporated by the movement of appropriation into the repertoire that constitutes one's reality or life-world (Lebenswelt).

In this manner Ricoeur establishes imagination as an essential part of the ontological enterprise, the agency of mediation and creativity, that permeates all levels of a "poetics of existence":

> Imaginative variation, play, metamorphosis—all of those expressions seek to discern a fundamental phenomenon, namely, that it is in imagination that the new being is first formed in me. Note that I said imagination and not will. This is because the power of letting oneself be grasped by new possibilities precedes the power of deciding and choosing. Imagination is that dimension of subjectivity which responds to the text as poem. When the distanciation of imagination responds to the distanciation which the "issues" of the text unfolds in the heart of reality, a poetics of existence responds to a poetics of discourse. (50)

Conclusion

In an interesting commentary on Ricoeur's work "Metaphoric Imagination: Kinship Through Conflict," Mary Schaldenbrand observes:

> Remarking the need for a philosophy of imagination, Ricoeur implies its present absence. And yet, when I return to his major works, I find that all of them assign to imagining the pivot-function. Though represented as stages in a "Philosophy of Willing," they could as well be taken as stages in a developing philosophy of imagination. In effect, what Ricoeur calls for is already underway in his work. (51)

She then continues to support her thesis by a study of Ricoeur's work, illustrating the essential mediating function of imagination throughout. At the same time Schaldenbrand demonstrates that these are but the indications of the route a systematic treatment of imagination would cover. Her conclusions in this regard are similar to those of this thesis, and highlights a pertinent question that remains at the end of Ricoeur's investigations. How is Ricoeur's developing understanding of imagination to be related to the classical and empiricist definitions of the same entity? If the imagination is no longer a faculty (albeit internal) in the traditional sense, is it now to be regarded as a process? a form of intentionality? a poetic mode of consciousness (in the widest sense of that term)? or a tensional way-of-being? Ricoeur's work at various times supports all these interpretations.

In her study of Ricoeur, Schaldenbrand sees the essential feature of imagination as one of mediating oppositions. She elucidates this development from his early work where its inchoate formulations smack of psychologism to the later more sophisticated elaborations of the transcendental and poetic functions. Her catch-phrase of "kinship through conflict" underscores the Hegelian contribution to Ricoeur's agenda. Indeed Ricoeur has characterized himself as a post-Hegelian Kantian:

> Mais le kantisme que je veux maintenant développer est, paradoxalement, plus à faire qu'à répéter; ce serait quelque chose comme un kantisme post-hégélien....(52)

Yet there is a proviso. For Ricoeur, there can never be a simple return to original naivété, nor a synthetic reconciliation of opposites. There is always that urge "to think more" engendered by the encounter of "other" that militates against any stasis at the conceptual or existential spheres. It is in this sense that Ricoeur's own understanding of imagination can be posited as still in a state of evolution itself. His own philosophic quest mirrors the tensity of the dialectic process operating in each of his philosophic dialogues--with Kant, Hegel, Marcel, Husserl, Heidegger and ordinary language, to name the most prominent. Within this complex framework Ricoeur's phenomenological exploration and reformulation of the subject-object conundrum by means of the referential model has rejuvenated the fundamental questions of epistemology and ontology insofar as entertaining these questions is still a matter of concern for late twentieth century philosophy. (53)

Ricoeur's still tentative insights as to the nature of imagination present a marked divergence from Durand's exhortations. Ricoeur's metaphoric strategy does not support a naive ontology that fosters revelatory disclosures or intuitions into the nature of reality itself. In the final chapter of La métaphore vive he refutes the position of Philip Wheelwright whose metapoetics in The Burning Fountain acknowledges the tensive awareness of metaphor in the relation of diaphor and epiphor; his variation on the mechanics of vehicle and tenor. (54) Wheelwright, however, succumbs to a type of immanentist temptation, locating in this tensive awareness an intuition into "What is." For Ricoeur this identification with the participatory and poetic pole destroys the possibility of a creative dynamics with the world of "is not". His fundamental disagreement with Durand's theory of imagination would result from the similar polarization that Durand establishes by his system.

On the other hand Ricoeur also dissociates himself from that positivist reductionism that spurred Durand to undertake his inquiry. Ricoeur cites the literalism of logical empiricism as also being responsible for denying the polysemic character of language which is essential to his programme. Ricoeur's investigations then, productively engaged at the intersection of these two world-views, i.e., the speculative and the poetic, provide at once a constructive and challenging intervention in the contemporary debates of philosophical theology. Durand's advocacy of a reinterpretation of the imagination along the lines of a divine and privileged medium of communication, though laudable, bespeaks a spiritual elitism that is contrary to the existing climate of ideas and foreign to the questions philosophers are asking. Although Ricoeur's struggle to define the nature of imagination, at once circumspect and adventurous, has not yet culminated in an articulated philosophy, his meticulous preparations indicate its eventual reformulation. In anticipation it must be remarked that this philosophy will not be a final solution. For Ricoeur's work has all the earmarks of how Mary Gerhart synthesizes David Tracy's description of the shift in emphasis central to today's scholarship (of the transcendental-realist variety):

> ...from a pre-occupation with the changeless and immobile to an emphasis on change, movement, and development; from apodictic necessity to "empirical, historical de facto intelligibility"; from a concern with universality to an emphasis on the particular and on concrete facts in their "mutually intelligible relationships of actual unfolding, development and decline"; from a focus on formal objects to a focus on a field of objects; from the utilization of logic to the construction of method; from preoccupation with essences to recognition of complex realities and multiple perspectives; from concentration on the individualistic and that which is permanent to interest in the "collaborative and that which is always open to further development." (55)

Ricoeur would easily identify himself in this pluralistic climate, recognizing that it is the imagination that encourages and sustains such a development.

In Volume Three: The Ecumenic Age of his four volume magnum opus, Order and History, Eric Voegelin envisions history as a process of divine flux within which man/woman participates. (56) In a recent article he characterizes the human predicament as a dialogical movement between intentionality and mystery where the human intentionality of the quest is surrounded by the divine mystery of the reality in which it occurs:

> Of intentionality and mystery, we shall speak as "structures" of consciousness. With the caution, however, that they are not fixtures of a human consciousness in the immanentist sense, perhaps an *a priori* structure, but moving forces in the process of reality becoming luminous. Plato and Aristotle recognized these forces in the experiences of a human questioning (*aporein*) and seeking (*zetein*) in response to a mysterious drawing (*helkein*) and moving (*kinein*) from the divine side. (57)

In a similar vein Ricoeur reflects towards the end of *La métaphore vive* on the tensional truth he has come to perceive as the primordial experience of being. Ricoeur's approach, however, is a refinement and detailed examination of those very processes themselves that Voegelin is content to define simply as those intentional struggles between ignorance and knowledge. Admittedly, Ricoeur expresses his insight with specific reference to the semantic level, but from the inferences that he has since made, the ontological implications of his statement are clear:

> ...d'une part, en ce qui concerne le sens, elle [la métaphore] reproduit la forme d'un mouvement dans une portion de la trajectoire du sens qui excède le champ référentiel familier où le sens s'est déjà constitué;...d'autre part, elle fait venir au language un champ référentiel inconnu, sous la mouvance duquel la visée sémantique s'exerce et se déploie. Il y a donc, à l'origine du procès, ce que j'appellerai pour ma part la véhémence ontologique d'une visée sémantique, mue par un champ inconnu dont elle porte le pressentiment. (58)

It is with distinct anticipation that one awaits Ricoeur's "poetics of experience" that will elucidate a developed philosophy of imagination and address the human experiences of radical faith, love and trust.

CONCLUSION

The works of both Durand and Ricoeur are attempts to reformulate the role and understanding of imagination within the Western philosophical tradition. Each, however, has approached the task from a different direction and has provided a different option. Durand has chosen to identify imagination with that element of human experience where man/woman feels touched by or in touch with power(s) that transcend those of the everyday "empirical" self. Imagination is the channel of communication and expression of these powers in the form of images, metaphors, symbols.

For Durand such communications have the force of "revelations," though their exact nature remains unspecified. This would seem to be the result of Durand's adoption of a monistic Platonist universe where various symbolic expressions perform in a generalized rather than personally Transcendent manner. In fact Durand is not attempting to describe the experience itself, merely the phenomena associated with its occurrence. The inference is that such experiences are unique and for initiates only.

Within this framework Durand envisions the imagination as fulfilling two functions. Firstly it is a source of personal equilibrium, operating along the axis of psycho-social influences that establish the dynamics for any subjective encounter with another object (custom, fact, person etc.). In the second instance it strengthens the bulwarks of the psyche against the encroachments of the materialistic and scientific world-view that Durand views as the bane of the twentieth century. In this light his work cannot be regarded as a plea for the irrational, but rather a defence of those non-rational elements of our make-up that strictly logical and technical systems tend to ignore as out-dated or to disregard as irrelevant.

From a philosophical point of view Durand's work is provocative, if it cannot be acclaimed as revolutionary or corrective. He has amassed vast symbolic data from the fields of anthropology, depth psychology, the history of religious and literary criticism. This has been used to support a theory of the all-pervasiveness of symbolic mediation in human endeavours. This theory in turn has been grounded in a philosophy of imagination that draws heavily on Islamic sources, themselves strongly Platonist, as interpreted by Corbin. From a contemporary philosophical perspective such an undertaking can be viewed as a rear-guard action that appeals to a gnostic and esoterically inclined cabal, whose allegiance is to a timeless and salvific knowledge. In contrast, philosophy today is addressing certain issues whose concerns have moved beyond the dichotomy of those rationalistic and imaginative modes Durand posits as the crux of the matter.

In this respect Durand's work can be criticized from two points of view. The first is in regard to his use of language, and it is the work of Ricoeur that here provides the criterion. The basic problem is that of distinguishing the different levels of discourse that Durand employs when discussing the imagination. As Ricoeur has shown, it is necessary today for any treatment of the imagination and its processes to treat the linguistic dimension of creative discourse as well as the psychological and philosophical nuances of the relationship between thought and expression. Electing instead a traditional model of Word/word interaction, Durand as a result does not differentiate the various types of language he employs. These include the "anthropological" language of his archétypologie of images; the anthropological language of the bio-socio-psychological model of humanity; the meta-psychological language of the Jungian model of the psyche; the philosophical language of the transcendental function of imagination (following Kant); the theosophical language of gnosis, and the metaphysical language of Plato and Avicenna. Such a disregard for discrimination at the level of language admits facile simplifications and over-riding generalizations that are philosophically unacceptable.

The other criticism stems from Durand's essentially metaphoric vision. Today Heidegger, too, has presented an approach to poetic disclosure, but his solution is markedly different from that of Durand. Perhaps it is this comparison that highlights the crucial limitation of Durand's model. Unfortunately, he fails to confront those philosophers of the West, such as Nietzsche and Heidegger, who have raised just as pertinent, if not shattering questions, as to the basic constructs of Western rationalism. Durand does not address their work, and this is a distinct lacuna in his programme. Durand's postulate of transcendent revelations by means of symbolic imagination functions within a traditional metaphysical world, whose foundations and edifices Heidegger has set out to dismantle. Heidegger proposes his solution to the quagmire in which he believes the Western philosophical enterprise has floundered by his own understanding of poetic disclosure. Heidegger sees this form of knowledge as exemplified by the poet Hölderlin, who is not just any poet-philosopher, but the poet who "waited for" the disclosure of God. Durand himself cites Hölderlin, in company with Novalis and Coleridge, as representative Romantic poets, but he nowhere alludes to Heidegger's exaltation of him. Thus, while Durand has seen fit to castigate what he feels are the distortions of knowledge in the contemporary enterprise, he nowhere replies to Heidegger's charges or proposed alternative philosophical blueprint. (Heidegger's iconoclasm would abolish the imagination as well as the existing conceptual network.)

Durand remains finally rooted within the traditional structures of the Western intellect, vindicating his own interpretation of the imagination, which virtually confirms two antagonistic modes of knowledge. Admittedly the struggle is dynamic, but all creativity is awarded to the imaginative pole, whereas rational thought is regarded as something of a necessary evil. The imaginative mode is venerated as the sole repository and means of arriving at that knowledge which Durand sees as essential to life. This is in distinct contrast to Ricoeur's understanding of the imagination, which allows for the invigorating interplay of two equally respected modes of knowledge. Durand's expansive programme fails to accord his own rational and reflective processes due acknowledgement for their contribution to his theory. His own system ironically employs the tools of systematic thinking to establish a philosophical position that virtually sabotages its validity. This blind-spot in Durand's approach prevents him from seeing the dynamic dialectics that underlie his own work in the various structural models of imagination that he originally proposed. These dynamic models, as presented in Les Structures, where imagination functioned as mediator between personal (bio-psychological) and social forces, point towards the tensive theory of interaction that Ricoeur has articulated to uphold his understanding of imagination. There appears an inherent contradiction between Durand's early psycho-dynamic functionalism and his adoption of the innate/inspired imaginative powers that are part of a Platonist world-view. In this sense Ricoeur's model, which has sought to remain consistent to empirical observations, while affirming creative impulses, has culminated in a much more coherent and relevant appreciation of the imagination.

One can be sympathetic with the aim of Durand's opus and his distaste for the empirically based methods that have reduced the human sciences to ciphers of a computer programme, yet his treatment of imagination in the interests of their rétablissement is somewhat ineffectual. Nevertheless Durand must be credited in promoting philosophical discussion as regards possible structures of interpretation of non-rational phenomena, particularly those modes associated with the unconscious. The basic problem is in his discussion of the imagination itself: terms are left ambiguous, modes of consciousness stay undifferentiated, and the mechanics of divine/human interaction remain blurred. Despite his masterly synthesis of hitherto unrelated data within a philosophy of knowledge, Durand's theory of imagination is reactionary rather than constructive.

Ricoeur's treatment of imagination, on the other hand, has been undertaken within the confines of critical realism. Ricoeur himself was troubled by the imprecision or omission of philosophy in defining that ability to entertain productive tension at the lexical, semantic and ontological levels. For Ricoeur this is the domain of imagination, and he has undertaken to substantiate its existence philosophically. In contrast to the polarized model of knowledge that Durand depicts, Ricoeur adopts a dialectical model. Ricoeur regards any increment in knowledge as a result of a two-way action between poetic (metaphoric) and speculative modes of consciousness. Within this system imagination functions as a dialectic process between the given and the possible in an essentially creative manner. Ricoeur is aware of the conceivable distortions within the process such as literalism (ideology) in one direction, and fantasy (utopia) in the other, but the ideal proposed is essentially heuristic.

In this manner Ricoeur expands the traditional realist concept of imagination as being dependent on perception. His growth-oriented model embraces that intentional mode of possibility that supplies projected modes-of-being. Ricoeur has also moved from the traditional objective epistemological framework to a participatory understanding of consciousness. For Ricoeur a person is involved at an ontological level in the awareness of his/her own development and the tension that is inherent in that process. Ricoeur also emphasizes the role of language and its importance as the vehicle by which one articulates and so comprehends the different modes of consciousness. Even at the linguistic level, however, Ricoeur has been careful to delineate the tension involved.

Imagination, for Ricoeur, operates at the point of growth. It indicates and contains the creative moment. Of itself it cannot complete the process, for the reflective in-put is also necessary. Ricoeur's understanding of imagination as vital and dynamic depends on the dialectics of the poetic and the speculative, and it is in this context that Ricoeur parts company with Heidegger. Ricoeur has elected to continue working within the given structures of Western philosophy and does not attempt a radical revisioning of its bases. In that Ricoeur advances a comprehensive programme for understanding and systematically treating the imagination, his work can be regarded as a development in contemporary epistemological and ontological concerns. Final assessment of his philosophy of imagination will, however, have to await the completion of his projected volume on the "poetics of experience."

As a task for future research, an investigation of Heidegger's notion of "poetic disclosure" and Ricoeur's disagreement with Heidegger's formulations could be profitably pursued. Certain lines of enquiry immediately suggest themselves.

In the conclusion of La métaphore vive Ricoeur accuses Heidegger and his adherents of laziness in their repudiation of accepted Western categories:

> L'unité de "la" métaphysique est une construction après coup de la pensée heideggerienne destinée à justifier son propre labeur de pensée et le renoncement dont il voudrait qu'il ne soit plus un dépassement. Mais pourquoi cette philosophie devrait-elle refuser à tous ses devanciers le bénéfice de la rupture et de la novation qu'elle s'octroie à elle-même? Le moment est venu, me semble-t-il, de s'interdire la commodité, devenue paresse de pensée, de faire tenir sous un seul mot--métaphysique--le tout de la pensée occidentale. (1)

Ricoeur bases his opposition to Heidegger on two questions that he poses, both of which need further elaboration than that provided in the closing pages of La métaphore vive. Firstly, Ricoeur challenges the actual novelty of Heidegger's approach. In fact, Ricoeur sees Heidegger's speculative explorations as part of that metaphoric process which he himself has advanced as the model of all creative thought, and which has existed as long as philosophy:

> Quel philosophe digne de ce nom n'a pas, avant lui, médité sur la métaphore du chemin, et ne s'est pas tenu pour le premier à se mettre sur un chemin qui est le langage lui-même s'adressant à lui? Quel n'a pas cherché le "sol" et le "fond," la "demeure" et la "clairière"? Quel n'a pas cru que la vérité était "proche" et pourtant difficile à apercevoir et plus difficile encore à dire, qu'elle était cachée et pourtant manifeste, ouverte et pourtant voilée? Quel n'a pas d'une manière ou de l'autre, lié le mouvement de la pensée en avant à sa capacité de "regresser", de faire un pas "en arrière"? Quel n'a pas mis son effort à distinguer le "commencement de la pensée" de tout début chronologique? Quel n'a pas conçu sa tâche la plus propre comme un travail de la pensée sur elle-même et contre elle-même? Quel n'a pas cru que pour continuer, il fallait rompre, procéder à un "saut" hors du cercle des idées acceptées?...Quel philosophe enfin n'a pas, avant Heidegger, tenté de penser l'identité autrement que comme tautologie, à partir de la coappartenance même de la pensée et de l'être? (2)

The difficulty in replying to these queries is the very evasiveness with which Heidegger circumvented such questions even when posed to him during his lifetime:

> Nor can I make it visible. I don't know anything about how this thinking "works." It could also be that thinking's path today leads to silence in order to protect itself from being devalued within a few years. It could be also that it might require three hundred years in order to "work." (3)

Ricoeur would also question Heidegger's diagnosis presented in the same article that states:

> Only a God can save us now. The only chance left for us is to prepare a Preparedness, in thinking and poetry, for the appearing of God or for the absence of God who has perished; that we perish in the presence of the absent God. (4)

Such an abstruse formula, which positions itself beyond the confines of the accepted constructs of matter and form, essence and existence, subject and object, rests on certain key words. The issue to be investigated, and which is the basis of Ricoeur's second question, is whether or not Heidegger's key words, such as Ereignis and Erörterung, are actually metaphors in the sense that Ricoeur understands the word, or whether they are indicators of that state of "Preparedness" which cannot be included within the grounds on which Ricoeur wishes to conduct his debate. This controversy is at the heart of philosophical concerns today, between those followers of Heidegger, such as Jacques Derrida and the "deconstructionists," who believe they are operating on the far side of metaphysics, and those who remain within its borders.

Ricoeur's appeal to language as speech and discourse, as the mode of self-expression and understanding, differentiates his model from Heidegger's view of speech as poetic disclosure. Yet Ricoeur needs to expound with more precision his distinction between poetic metaphor and philosophic metaphor if his model of poetic and speculative interaction is to provide an adequate response to Heidegger's proclaimed post-metaphysical stance. No doubt the battle will continue to be waged by proponents of each cause, and one has the feeling that the "dialogue" has just begun.

It is in this context that the ongoing discussion of a philosophy of imagination must be inserted. The problem that needs to be pursued in this regard is whether the source of human creativity is to be located in a medium, such as the unconscious, which is then accorded transcendent qualities, as in an idealist orientation. The alternative, as for Ricoeur, is to see it as a creative process which operates at the limits of human experience. Whatever the decision, it seems today that imagination is intimately related to the creative dimension. Perhaps it is Northrop Frye who has advanced the most penetrating insight into the situation:

> The terms "Word" and "Spirit", then, may be understood in their traditional context as divine persons able and willing to redeem mankind. They may be also understood as qualities of self-transcendence within man himself, capable of pulling him out of the psychosis that every news bulletin brings us so much evidence for. I am suggesting that these two modes of understanding are not contradictory or mutually exclusive, but dialectically identical. Certainly the goal of human recreation, whenever we try to visualize it, bears a curious resemblance to the traditional vision of divine creation at the source. (5)

Following in Frye's footsteps I would like to conclude this exploration of the imagination with a modest proposal for an extension of Ricoeur's dialectic model so that the tension he presents operates not only at the lexical, semantic and experiental /ontological levels. Could it not also be that it is the agency of imagination which sustains the fusion of the transcendent and the human in that creative instant when all antinomies such as subject/object are momentarily overcome. Such a participatory instance seems markedly akin to that experience Heidegger has nominated as "disclosure." The articulation of this tensive encounter remains a challenge, particularly if the intention is to move beyond a realist/idealist impasse. Ricoeur's as yet tentatively drawn model of imagination, initiating insights at the limit of experience and expression offers a possible solution. The tensional truth of any metaphoric statement will never engender an ultimate truth—it will encourage that "thinking more" that is the mark of authentic, if "mutable" human existence. Ricoeur posits imagination as the indispensable agent of this creative insecurity. In contrast to such admonitions as issued by Pascal to distrust the imagination, the appropriate task today would appear to be to invite its conceptual precocities, or, as Ricoeur calls them, "semantic impertinences."

Whatever the final outcome of this on-going discussion on the status of imagination within a philosophical orientation, there is one obvious conclusion that can be drawn from the debate illustrated by this thesis. Imagination can no longer be slighted by such epithets as "deceitful," "frivolous," "merely associative." Imagination is a vital process at the heart of all being and knowing; to imagine is to foster and to generate not only thought, but life.

APPENDIX I

CLASSIFICATION ISOTOPIQUE DES IMAGES

REGIMES ou POLARITES	DIURNE		NOCTURNE			
STRUCTURES	*SCHIZOMORPHES* (ou Heroiques) 1° idealisation et « recul » autistique. 2° diairetisme (Spaltung). 3° geometrisme, symetrie, gigantisme. 4° antithese polémique.		*SYNTHETIQUES* (ou Dramatiques) 1° coïncidentia oppositorum et systématisation. 2° dialectique des antagonistes, dramatisation. 3° historisation. 4° progressisme partiel (cycle) ou total		*MYSTIQUES* (ou Antiphrasiques) 1° redoublement et persévération. 2° viscosite, adhesivité antiphrasique 3° realisme sensoriel. 4° mise en miniature (Gulliver)	
PRINCIPES d'explication et de justification ou LOGIQUES	Representation objectivement heterogénéisante (antithese) et subjectivement homogeneisante (autisme) Les Principes d'*EXCLUSION*, de *CONTRADICTION*, d'*IDENTITE*, jouent a plein.		Representation diachronique qui relie les contradictions par le facteur temps Le Principe de *CAUSALITE*, sous toutes ses formes (spec *FINALE*, et *EFFICIENTE*) joue a plein.		Representation objectivement homogeneisante (perseveration) et subjectivement hetérogeneisante (effort antiphrasique) Les Principes d'*ANALOGIE*, de *SIMILITUDE* jouent a plein.	
REFLEXES DOMINANTS	Dominante *POSTURALE* avec ses dérivés *manuels* et l'adjuvant des sensations à distance (vue, audiophonation).		Dominante *COPULATIVE*, avec ses dérives moteurs *rythmiques* et ses adjuvants sensoriels (kinesiques, musicaux rythmiques etc.)		Dominante *DIGESTIVE* avec ses adjuvants *coenesthesiques thermiques* et ses dérives *tactiles, olfactifs gustatifs*	
SCHEMES « VERBAUX »	*DISTINGUER* SEPARER ≠ MELER	MONTER ≠ CHUTER ←	*RELIER* → MURIR PROGRESSER	REVENIR RECENSER ←	*CONFONDRE* → DESCENDRE, POSSEDER, PENETRER	
ARCHETYPES «EPITHETES»	PUR ≠ SOUILLE CLAIR ≠ SOMBRE	HAUT ≠ BAS	EN AVANT, A VENIR	ARRIERE, PASSE	PROFOND, CALME, CHAUD, INTIME, CACHE	
Situation des « categories » du jeu de TAROTS	LE GLAIVE ←	→ (Le Sceptre) ←	→ LE BATON ←	→ LE DENIER ←	→ LA COUPE	
ARCHETYPES « SUBSTANTIFS »	La Lumiere ≠ Les Ténèbres. L'Air ≠ Le Miasme L'Arme Héroïque ≠ Le Lien. Le Baptême ≠ La Souillure.	Le Sommet ≠ Le Gouffre Le Ciel ≠ L'Enfer. Le Chef ≠ L'Inférieur Le Heros ≠ Le Monstre. L'Ange ≠ L'Animal. L'Aile ≠ Le Reptile.	Le Feu-flamme. Le Fils. L'Arbre. Le Germe.	La Roue. La Croix. La Lune. L'Androgyne Le Dieu pluriel.	Le Microcosme. L'Enfant, le Poucet L'Animal gigogne. La Couleur, La Nuit La Mère. Le Récipient.	La Demeure. Le Centre. La Fleur La Femme La Nourriture. La Substance
Des Symboles aux Synthemes	Le Soleil, L'Azur, L'Œil du Père. Les Runes, Le Mantra, Les Armes, Les Cuirasses, La Clôture, La Circoncision, La Tonsure, etc .	L'Echelle, L'Escalier, Le Betyle, Le Clocher, La Ziqqurat, L'Aigle, L'Alouette, La Colombe, Jupiter, etc	Le Calendrier, L'Arithmologie, La Triade, La Tétrade, L'Astrobiologie.			
			L'Initiation, Le « Deux Fois Né », L'Orgie Le Messie, La Pierre Philosophale La Musique etc	Le Sacrifice, Le Dragon, La Spirale L'Escargot, L'Ours, L'Agneau, Le Lievre, Le Rouet Le Briquet La Baratte etc	Le Ventre, Avaleurs et Avalés, Kobolds, Dactyles, Osiris, Les Teintures, Les Gemmes, Mélusine Le Voile Le Manteau, La Coupe, Le Chaudron etc	La Tombe, Le Berceau, La Chrysalide, L'Ile, La Caverne, Le Mandala, La Barque La Hotte L'Œuf, Le Lait, Le Miel, Le Vin, L'Or, etc

APPENDIX II

Durand's list of thinkers who represent the tradition of "anti-philosophy," as given in Science de l'Homme et tradition, p. 33, and "Défiguration philosophique et figure traditionnelle de l'homme en Occident," Eranos-Jahrbuch 1969, pp. 60-61. As listed:

Nerval, Eliphas Levi, Ballanches, Bonald, Maistre, Baader, Schlegel, Weishaupt, Goethe, Novalis, Schubert, Saint-Martin, Hamann, Martines de Pasqually, Swedenborg, Eckhartshausen, Etteile, Barchusen, Ashmole, Gaffarel, Morel de Villefranche, Blake, Angelus Silesius, Paracelsus, Cornelius Agrippa, Robert Fludd, Kunrath, Valentin Weigal, Giordano Bruno, Pico de la Mirandola, Marsilio Ficino, Gilles of Viterbo, Patricius Patrizzi, Georges of Venice, Basil Valentine, Blaise de Vigenère, Nicholas of Cusa, Nicholas Flamel, Meister Eckhart, Tauler, Suso, Roger Bacon, Albertus Magnus, Scotus Erigena, Honorius Augustdunensis, Hugh of St. Victor, Venerable Bede, Bernard of Clairvaux, John of Salisbury.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

(1) B. Pascal, Pascal's Pensées (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1958), No. 82, p. 25.

(2) Plato, The Dialogues, 4 vols., 4th ed., trans. B. Jowett (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1953). All Plato references use this edition. See especially Vol. I, The Sophist 231b-244b, 263e-268d; Vol. II, Republic, Bk. 6, 502d-509c, Bk. 7, 514a-521b.

(3) Aristotle, De Anima, vol. 3, The Works of Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross, trans. J. A. Smith (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1931). All subsequent references use this edition. Bk. 3. 3, 427b15-20, 427b28-30, 428a15-18; Bk. 3. 7, 431a14-19, 431b1-9; Bk. 3. 8, 431b1-5, 432a5-12.

(4) I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1961). All references use this edition, which includes Kant's first and second editions. A 123-124, pp. 145-146; B 151-152, pp. 164-165.

(5) I. Kant, Critique of Judgment, rev.ed. trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner Publishing, 1951). No. 9, pp. 63-67; No. 10, pp. 67-69; No. 49, pp. 197-198.

(6) S. T. Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (London: E. P. Dutton, 1906), pp. 159-160.

(7) S. Langer, Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 47.

CHAPTER I

(1) Gilbert Durand, "L'Anthropologie de Gilbert Durand," *Panorama des sciences humaines* (Paris: Collection Etudes Supérieures, 1968), p. 130.

(2) Durand, *Les Structures anthropologiques de l'Imaginaire*, 2e éd. (Paris: P.U.F., 1963).

(3) Durand, *Le Décor mythique de la Chartreuse de Parme* (Paris: Corti, 1961).

(4) Durand, *L'Imagination symbolique*, 2e éd. (Paris: P.U.F., 1968).

(5) Durand, *Science de l'Homme et Tradition* (Paris: Téte de Feuilles, Sirac, 1975).

(6) Durand, *Figures mythiques et usages de l'oeuvre* (Paris: Berg International, 1979).

(7) *L'Ame tigrée* (Paris: Denoel-Gonthier, 1980).

(8) Durand, *Figures mythiques*, p. 12.

(9) Durand, *Les Structures*, p. 11.

(10) Ibid., p. 11.

(11) Durand can be understood in this context to reject the philosophical position of linguistic analysis and structuralism, insofar as these methods acknowledge assuming such a position.

(12) Durand, *Les Structures*, p. 19.

(13) Ibid., p. 21.

(14) Ibid, p. 22.

(15) Ibid., p. 33.

(16) W. Betcherev, *La Psychologie objective* (Paris: Alcan, 1933), pp. 221 ff., as cited by Durand, *Les Structures*, p. 39.

(17) Durand, *Les Structures*, p. 38.

(18) Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'Imaginaire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1940), p. 137. A. Burloud, *La Pensée conceptuelle* (Paris: Alcan, 1928), pp. 105 ff. Revault d'Allonnes, *Art Revue philosophique* (sept.-oct. 1920), p. 165; as cited by Durand, *Les Structures*, p. 51.

(19) Durand, *Les Structures*, p. 51.

(20) Ibid., p. 52.

(21) Sartre, L'Imaginaire, p. 137, quoted by Durand, Les Structures, p. 52.

(22) C.G. Jung, Types psychologiques (Geneve: Georg, 1950), pp. 310, 387, 454 sq., quoted by Durand, Les Structures, p. 52.

(23) Jung, Types, p. 456, quoted by Durand, Les Structures, p. 53. For a further expansion of Durand's understanding of an archetype, see l'Imagination symbolique, p. 62.

(24) Appendix I, Durand's Isotropic Classification of Images. Les Structures, pp. 472-473.

(25) Durand, Les Structures, p. 55.

(26) René Alleau, La Science des symboles(Paris: Payot, 1976), pp. 12, 26.

(27) Durand, l'Imagination, p. 124.

(28) Alleau, La Science, p. 20.

(29) Durand, Les Structures, p. 50.

(30) Ibid., p. 56.

(31) Ibid., p. 50.

(32) Ibid., p. 51.

(33) Ibid., p. 410.

(34) Ibid., p. 52.

(35) Ibid., p. 466.

(36) Ibid., p. 466.

(37) Ibid., p. 430.

(38) Ibid., p. 466.

(39) Durand's use of the term rationalism embraces the French Cartesian heritage and the scientific rationalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In addition, he also indicts "classicism," i.e., Aristotelian realism as it influenced philosophy from the time of Aristotle to Descartes. His position can thus be viewed as a broadly based anti-rationalism, where rationalism is understood as adopting logical or mathematical formulas as paradigmatic for human understanding. He posits materialism, determinism and positivism as off-shoots of this orientation. In addition see Les Structures p. 463.

(40) Ibid., p. 464

(41) Ibid., p. 431.

(42) Ibid.,p. 444.

(43) Ibid., pp. 444-5

(44) Ibid., p. 431.

(45) Ibid., p. 431.

(46) C. G. Jung, Psychological Types, trans. H. Godwin Baynes (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1923), p. 378.

(47) Jung, Types, p. 306.

(48) Ibid., p. 306.

(49) Ibid., pp. 310-311.

(50) C.G. Jung, Memories, Dreams and Reflections, ed. A. Jaffé, trans. R. and C. Winston (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 341.

(51) Durand, l'Imagination, p. 125.

(52) Jean-Paul Sartre, l'Imagination, (Paris: P.U.F., 1950), cited by Durand, Les Structures, p. 12 and L'Imaginaire (Paris: Gallimard, 1940), cited by Durand, Les Structures, p. 51.

(53) An excellent analysis of this later development in Sartre's work is the thesis of Stuart Charmé, "Meaning as Myth: Psychoanalytic Interpretation and the Thought of Jean-Paul Sartre," Diss. Chicago, 1980.

(54) Edmund Husserl, Ideas, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Macmillan, 1958), pp. 57, 200.

(55) Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (London: Methuen, 1957), pp. 47-70.

(56) Durand, Les Structures, p. 15.

(57) Henri Bergson, "An Introduction to Metaphysics," The Creative Mind, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1946), p. 187.

(58) Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R. Ashley Audra and C. Brereton (New York: Henry Holt, 1935), p. 121.

(59) Durand, l'Imagination, pp. 112-113.

(60) Durand, "L'exploration de l'Imaginaire," Circé, No. 1 (Paris: lettres modernes, 1969), p. 26.

(61) C. G. Jung, "Answer to Job," Psychology and Religion: West and East, trans. R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 469.

(62) Durand, Les Structures, p. 433.

(63) Ibid., pp. 441-442.

(64) Ibid., pp. 439-443.

(65) Ibid., p. 439.

(66) Ibid., p. 439.

(67) Ibid., p. 442.

(68) Ibid., p. 451.

(69) Ibid., p. 462.

(70) Ibid., p. 464.

(71) Ibid., p. 463.

(72) Ibid., p. 466.

(73) Ibid., p. 465-466.

(74) Ibid., p. 462. This would appear to be an unacknowledged borrowing from Ibsen.

(75) Ibid., p. 462.

(76) Ibid., p. 462.

(77) Ibid., p. 431, (91). Durand retrospectively acknowledges in this 2nd edition his former lack of awareness of Corbin's opus l'Imagination créatrice dans le soufisme d'Ibn 'Arabī, (Paris: Flammarion, 1959).

(78) Ibid., p. 431.

CHAPTER II

(1) Henry Corbin, L'Imagination créatrice dans le soufisme d'Ibn 'Arabī (Paris: Flammarion, 1959).

(2) Corbin, Avicenna and the Visionary Recital (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960). Where there is an adequate translation of a book or article that is difficult to obtain, I have used the English translation of the work.

(3) Personal interview with Gilbert Durand, 26th June, 1979.

(4) Corbin, "Mundus imaginalis ou l'imaginaire et l'imaginal," Cahiers internationaux de Symbolisme, No. 6 (1964), p. 8.

(5) Durand, "L'exploration de l'Imaginaire," Circé, No. 1 (Paris: lettres modernes, 1969), p. 35.

(6) Gaston Bachelard, La psychanalyse du feu (Paris: Gallimard, 1938). In English The Psychoanalysis of Fire, trans. Alan C. M. Ross (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

(7) Bachelard, The Poetics of Reverie, trans. D. Russell (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 17.

(8) Ibid., p. 204.

(9) Ibid., p. 14.

(10) Ibid., p. 8.

(11) Ibid., p. 52.

(12) Ibid., p. 177.

(13) Durand, "L'exploration," p. 26.

(14) Ibid., p. 26.

(15) Durand, Les Structures, p. 462.

(16) Durand, "L'exploration," pp. 25, 33-35.

(17) Ibid., p. 25.

(18) Ibid., p. 21.

(19) Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (London: J. M. Dent, 1906), pp. 159-160.

(20) Coleridge, Notebooks, ed. Kathleen Coburn (New York: Pantheon

Books, 1959), Vol. 2, Pt. 1, No. 2484.

(21) Coleridge, Biographia, p. 159.

(22) Mary Warnock, Imagination (London: Faber and Faber, 1976), pp. 94-96 give a good evaluation of Coleridge's philosophic capability.

(23) Durand, "L'exploration," pp. 20-21.

(24) Ibid., p. 25.

(25) Ibid., pp. 34-35.

(26) Corbin, "Mundus imaginalis," p. 15.

(27) Ibid., pp. 14-15.

(28) Durand, "L'exploration de l'Imaginaire," Circé, No. 1 (Paris: lettres modernes, 1969), p. 35.

(29) Corbin, En Islam iranien, 4 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1971-73.)

(30) Hamid Algar, "The Work of Henry Corbin," Religious Studies Review, 6, No. 2 (April 1980), pp. 85-91.

(31) Corbin, "Mundus imaginalis," p. 9.

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(35) Roberts Avens, *Imagination: A Way toward Western Nirvana* (Washington: University of America Press, 1979).

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