

FORMAL ASPECTS OF METAPHOR:
A STUDY IN STRUCTURAL POETICS

by

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is concerned with the formal analysis of metaphor. It focuses particular attention upon metaphor in literary works. The framework for the analysis is developed from a theory of textual meaning originally formulated by Irena Bellert.

The proposals in the dissertation concern:

- 1) what entities are included in a "metaphorical extension"--that is, the class of conceivable entities to which a word or phrase can be taken to apply truly under a particular metaphorical interpretation;

- 2) what we conventionally understand a metaphorically interpreted word or phrase to mean or imply (as opposed to suggest or connote);

- 3) how we can understand propositions which are literally inconsistent to be consistent because of metaphorical interpretation;

- 4) what we conventionally understand a metaphorically interpreted word or phrase to suggest or connote.

RESUME

Dans cette thèse on discute de l'analyse formelle de la métaphore. On traite en particulier de la métaphore dans les oeuvres littéraires. Notre analyse se situe dans un cadre générale qui est basé sur une théorie sémantique du texte formulée par Irena Bellert.

Les hypothèses avancées dans cette thèse concernent les questions suivantes:

1) quelles entités sont comprises dans une "extension métaphorique"--c'est à dire, l'ensemble d'entités possibles nommées par un mot ou par un membre de phrase proprement dans une interprétation métaphorique particulière;

2) le sens ou les implications qu'il est convenu de donner à un mot ou à un membre de phrase interprété métaphoriquement (par opposition à la suggestion ou la connotation);

3) la façon de comprendre des propositions qui sont littéralement contradictoires mais compatibles sous une interprétation métaphorique;

4) ce qu'il est convenu de comprendre comme suggestion ou connotation dans un mot ou dans un membre de phrase interprété métaphoriquement.

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INTRODUCTION

At least since Aristotle, scholars have considered metaphor to be an important aspect of literary composition. However, although scholars generally consider metaphor to be a language device, theorists have not been able to develop language based analyses which adequately account for the characteristics of phenomena we call metaphor.

Nevertheless, in recent years a number of scholars have applied with a fair measure of success the techniques of analytic philosophy and linguistic semantics to the study of metaphor. Many of these efforts have either been pursued as part of or incorporated into an area of literary study known as "structural poetics."

Lubomir Dolezel in a recent article in Poetics outlined the basic approach of structural poetics in the following way:

The ontological mode of literature, its existence in language, means that literature is both language and art. This assertion can be taken as the basic ontological axiom of structural poetics.

...Epistemologically, the ontological axiom of structural poetics is translated into its traditional programme of research: to study literature in relation to language, i.e., to study procedures, devices, rules which transform a non-aesthetic system (language) into aesthetic structures (literature, poetry).

(Dolezel 1976:521)

In this dissertation, I attempt to use the techniques of analytic philosophy and linguistic semantics in order to formulate a language based analysis of metaphor. In my analysis I will be particularly concerned with what might be called the "logical" aspects of metaphors. By "logical" aspects of metaphor I mean those aspects which relate to inferences we can make from metaphors.

The main purpose of the analysis is to identify "logical" aspects of metaphor which will help us to better understand the linguistic properties of literary works. In fact, each condition which I propose for metaphorical interpretation I support with evidence from literary texts. The analysis then is an attempt to study literature in relation to language and for this reason it properly belongs to the field of study known as structural poetics.

In particular, I make proposals in this dissertation

concerning

1) what entities are included in a "metaphorical extension"--that is, the class of conceivable entities to which a word or phrase can be taken to truly apply under a particular metaphorical interpretation;

2) what we conventionally understand a metaphorically interpreted word or phrase to mean or imply (as opposed to suggest or connote);

3) how we can understand propositions which are literally inconsistent to be consistent because of metaphorical interpretation;

4) what we conventionally understand a metaphorically interpreted word or phrase to suggest or connote.

The dissertation is divided into eight chapters. In the first chapter, I discuss certain theoretical and methodological issues which are pertinent to the thesis. This discussion is divided into three major parts.

In the first of these, I examine various analyses of metaphor and, in so doing, try to present a larger theoretical context in which my own analysis can be "situated." I try to show that there is no one class of phenomena which scholars call metaphor, but that, as Wayne Booth (Booth 1978:48) points out, scholars apply the term to many different classes of phenomena.

In the second major part of Chapter 1, I stipulate what I will consider to be the domain of my inquiry. In order to do

this, I propose certain criteria which phenomena must meet in order to be considered metaphor within my analysis.

In the third part, I discuss certain methodological preliminaries to my analysis of metaphor. These methodological preliminaries are the basis upon which I build the theoretical framework I use for my analysis of metaphor.

In Chapter 2 I discuss the theoretical framework I use in my analysis. In order to do this, I first propose certain formulations. In terms of these formulations, phenomena I consider metaphors are said to express or imply propositions which are taken as literally false but metaphorically true.

I then attempt to show how these formulations can be applied to propositions expressed by fictional works. As part of this endeavor, I incorporate the formulations within a theory of textual meaning. This theory, which I present in a modified form, was first proposed by I. Bellert in Bellert 1980/81.

I then apply both the formulations and theoretical framework to utterances which are sometimes considered to be "semantically deviant" under a literal interpretation. I try to show how we can consider these utterances to express literally false propositions in terms of the proposed formulations and theoretical framework.

In Chapter 3 I try to relate the notions of "primary" (or "denotative") meaning and "secondary" (or "connotative") meaning to the theory of textual meaning I am using as a theoretical

framework. This is the final theoretical preliminary prior to my analysis of metaphor.

In Chapter 4, I examine what I call "metaphorical extension" (see #1 above). I use the term "metaphorical extension" to refer to the class of "conceivable" (or "possible") entities to which a word or phrase can be taken as truly applying under a metaphorical interpretation. I try to show how under a metaphorical interpretation a word or phrase has an extension different than its "literal extension"; that is, different than the class of "conceivable" entities to which a word or phrase can be taken as truly applicable under a literal interpretation. I formulate a proposal concerning the metaphorical extension of metaphorically interpreted words and phrases.

In addition, I attempt to show that the literal extension of a word or phrase can change as the result of the metaphorical interpretation of another semantically related word or phrase. I formulate a proposal concerning these "secondary shifts of extension."

In Chapter 5 I examine "primary metaphorical meaning"; that is, what metaphors mean or imply (see #2 above). More particularly, I try to determine when parts of the primary literal meaning of words and phrases are retained under a metaphorical interpretation.

I propose that parts of the primary literal meaning are retained when they are literally applicable in the context of the

metaphor. I propose that other parts of the primary literal meaning are retained when they are metaphorically applicable in the context of the metaphor. In arguing for the second proposal, I attempt to establish a link between primary metaphorical meaning and the secondary shifts of extension I discuss in Chapter 4.

In the sixth chapter I attempt to account theoretically for the fact that metaphors allow us to understand as consistent propositions which we understand to be literally inconsistent (see #3 above). I try, for example, to account for the fact that the statement "John is an old man" and the statement "John is a tattered coat" are inconsistent literally but consistent when "tattered coat" is metaphorically interpreted. In order to account for this consistency, I make two proposals concerning what can be metaphorically interpreted.

In the seventh chapter I examine what metaphors suggest or connote (see #4 above). I argue that we find metaphorical interpretation to be pointless or conventionally unacceptable unless we understand the metaphor to express a certain kind of secondary or connotative meaning. I formulate a proposal concerning metaphorical interpretation by means of which I try to account theoretically for this kind of connotation.

In Chapter 8 I present my analysis of metaphor in summary form and discuss some of its consequences. Then I try to show how my analysis can explain at least some cases of metaphor for

which it is difficult to give a literal paraphrase. Finally, I discuss my analysis in relation to what certain critics have said concerning the links between metaphor and literature.

CHAPTER ONE

THE BACKGROUND FOR THE ANALYSIS

As noted in the Introduction, I discuss in this chapter certain theoretical and methodological issues with which my thesis will be concerned. The discussion is divided into three parts.

In the first part I examine various analyses of metaphor. Booth (Booth 1979:48) has contended that there are more analyses of "what people from the Greek philosophers on called metaphor than any bibliography could show." Whether or not the number of analyses is that large, there can be no doubt that there is an enormous number (see, for example, Shibbes 1971). The large number of studies precludes anything even approaching a thorough review of the literature in any study which is intended to be an analysis and not an encyclopaedic survey of the field. Since I intend in this thesis to present a detailed account of metaphorical interpretation, only such a thorough review can show the points of contact between my analysis and other accounts.

For this reason, I have decided to examine closely analyses of only nine scholars and, where it seems pertinent, to refer

briefer to others. Moreover, in cases where the analyses I examine closely are presented in more than one work, I have based my exposition of the analyses primarily on the presentation in one or two of the works which I consider to be the most important. I have done this in order to present the analyses in a coherent rather than a piecemeal fashion.

Since my analysis can be considered part of a tradition of modern linguistic and philosophical treatments of metaphor (see Introduction), eight of the nine analyses I examine closely are part of that tradition. Listed in the order in which I discuss their work, the authors of these analyses are: I.A. Richards, Max Black, Monroe Beardsley, Paul Ricoeur, Samuel Levin, John Searle, Teun A. Van Dijk, and Irena Bellert. Each of these scholars has written one or more works which I believe represents an important language-oriented perspective on phenomena called "metaphor."

Prior to discussing these moderns, I examine Aristotle's treatment of metaphor. I do so because I believe Aristotle's treatment of metaphor to be the "bedrock" upon which many if not most modern language-oriented analyses of metaphor are built. The large number of such analyses which explicitly refer to Aristotle, I think, attests to this.

I do not discuss in chronological order the analyses I examine closely. Rather, I have tried to arrange my discussion of the literature so that it moves in a loose sort of way from a focus on methodology to a focus on theoretical frameworks.

The discussion of each of the nine analyses is itself divided informally into two parts. In the first part of each discussion, I present an exposition of the analysis. In the second part, I consider various aspects of the analysis which I believe relate to my own analysis. Through the discussion as a whole I hope to present a theoretical context in which the reader can "situate" the analysis I propose in subsequent chapters.

Among the points I try to make through the review of literature is one which Booth (Booth 1973:48) also makes (albeit in an exaggerated way) when he writes, "Metaphor has by now been defined in so many ways that there is no human expression, whether in language or any other medium, that would not be metaphoric in someone's definition." Throughout the review of literature, I try to show that there is no one class of phenomena which we intuitively consider to be metaphor and which theories of metaphor use as the domain of their inquiries.

Because I do not believe there is one domain of phenomena we all call metaphor, I devote the second major part of this chapter to stipulating a domain of phenomena which I consider metaphor for the purposes of my analysis. In order to establish the domain, I stipulate four conditions which a phenomenon must meet in order to be considered a metaphor in my analysis.

In the final major section of the first chapter, I discuss certain preliminaries to my analysis of this domain. I discuss certain aspects of the way in which I will view words and phrases

in texts, and the kind of evidence I will use to support my contentions concerning their use.

1

Aristotle

Aristotle discusses metaphor in both Poetics (Aristotle 1967) and Rhetoric (Aristotle 1924). Both discussions treat metaphor as a matter of diction; that is, as a matter of choosing appropriate words for a text.

In Poetics Aristotle writes:

Every noun is either:

1. the regular word for a thing...
2. a foreign word...
3. a metaphor, or
4. an ornamental...,
5. invented...,
6. lengthened...,
7. curtailed..., or
8. altered...word.

(Aristotle 1967:56; 57b1)

All words except authoritative words are embellishments which the writer employs in a text to make it less prosaic. In Rhetoric (Aristotle 1924:1404b), Aristotle writes: "Clearness is secured by using the words (nouns and verbs alike) that are current and ordinary. Freedom from meanness, and positive adornment too, are secured by using the other words mentioned in the Art of Poetry." The "other words" to which Aristotle refers are those listed above. As we can see, metaphor is included in this list.

Because Aristotle believes metaphor to be a matter of diction, he does not believe, as do some moderns (see, for example, Black 1963 and 1979), that metaphor can express a peculiarly metaphorical content. In fact, Aristotle does not believe words make statements. In De Interpretatione Aristotle writes:

A sentence is a significant portion of speech, some parts of which have an independent meaning, that is to say, as an utterance, though not as the expression of any positive judgement. Let me explain. The word 'human' has meaning, but does not constitute a proposition, either positive or negative. It is only

when other words are added that the whole will form an affirmation or denial.

(Aristotle 1926:10b)

Indeed, the whole question of diction is a question of the presentation, not the substance or thought. This, I think, is made quite clear in the following passage from Rhetoric:

The arts of language cannot help having a small but real importance, whatever it is we have to expound to others: the way in which a thing is said does affect its intelligibility. Not, however, so much as people think. All such arts are fanciful and meant to charm the hearer. Nobody uses fine language when teaching geometry.

(Aristotle 1924:1404a)

So, diction, being an art of language, is a matter of the way something is said rather than its substance. It is merely a matter of "fancy" and "charm," and, when these are not needed, the "fine language" which it is used to create can be dispensed with (as in the case of geometry), presumably with no effect on

the substance of what is said. It follows that since metaphor is a kind of diction, it--like all other kinds of diction--is a matter of the way something is said rather than the substance.

Within this context, Aristotle defines metaphor as "the application of a name of a thing to something else" (Aristotle 1967:57; 5751b). Considering his view of the arts of language, it is not surprising that Aristotle seems to feel it is possible to substitute a "prosaic" word for the metaphor without a loss in content. In the following passage, he notes that such substitution will result in a less distinguished style, but gives no indication that dispensing with metaphors and other ornaments of diction would affect anything else.

'It would be easy to achieve the same effect as Euclides did by making an unsuitable use of metaphors or foreign words or any of the other categories, with the deliberate intention of ridiculing them.) How much a proper use of them lends distinction to a style can be tested on epic verses by inserting the ordinary prose forms. So with foreign words, metaphors, or any of the other devices one can see that what we say is true if he will substitute the regular words.

(Aristotle 1967:60; 58b1)

According to Aristotle (Aristotle 1967:57-58;57b1), there are four kinds of metaphor. Each of these kinds is characterized by a particular kind of relationship between the "transferred" metaphorical word and a word (if it exists) for which it can be considered an ornamental substitute. The transference can work from genus to species, from species to genus, from species to species, or by analogy.

By transference from genus to species, Aristotle refers to the use of a word normally applied to a class in place of a word normally applied to something which is a species of that class. As an example of this kind of transference, Aristotle uses the sentence "My ship stands here." In this sentence, Aristotle writes, "stands" is used in place of the phrase "is anchored": being anchored is presumably a kind or species of standing (Aristotle 1967:57;57b1).

Transference from species to genus is the reverse of transference from genus to species. It involves the use of a word normally applied to a species in place of a word normally applied to a class of which the species is part. To exemplify this kind of transference Aristotle uses the sentence "Verily, ten thousand kind deeds hath Odysseus wrought." The "ten thousand" of this sentence is of course normally applied to a specific number, but, according to Aristotle, it is in this case applied to what "many" is normally applied (Aristotle 1967:57;57b1). For Aristotle, it would seem, the number ten

thousand is a kind or species of the class of great quantities to which "many" is normally applied.

The third kind of transference Aristotle discusses is transference from species to species. In such transference, both words must be members of the same class or genus. In Poetics, Aristotle uses the phrase "Draining off the life with bronze" as an example of this kind of transference. According to Aristotle, "draining off" in this phrase is used in place of "cutting." The species of activity to which each of these is normally applied both belong to the class of activities to which "take away" is normally applied (Aristotle 1967:57;57b1).

The fourth kind of transference is transference through analogy. There is an analogy whenever there are four terms and the relation of the second to the first is similar to the relation of the fourth to the third. In metaphor which is based on analogy, the word which belongs to the fourth term is used in place of the word which belongs to the second term, or vice versa. According to Aristotle, an example of this kind of transference is found in the phrase "the old age of the day." Aristotle notes that old age is to life as evening is to day and that in the phrase, "old age" is used in place of "evening." Thus, in this example, the second term is used in place of the fourth. Aristotle notes that sometimes the "relative" of the word which has been replaced is used along with the substituted word, as is the case in the above example, where "day" is used

along with "old age" (Aristotle 1967:57;57b1) .

Moreover, there need not always be a particular name for the entities involved in the analogy. "Thus to cast seed is to sow, while casting its flame with reference to the sun, has no particular name; but this action stands in the same relation to sunlight as the sowing to the seed-grain; hence we find the expression 'sowing the god-built flame'" (Aristotle 1967:57-58; 57b1). It would seem then that Aristotle believes a metaphor expresses something equivalent to a conventional meaning, even when there is no term which has as its conventional meaning what the metaphor expresses.

For Aristotle, "comparison" is closely related to metaphor. It would appear that by the term "comparison" Aristotle means that kind of comparison in which the words expressing the shared properties are metaphorically applied (explicitly or implicitly) to one or the subjects of the comparison. This would appear to be why Aristotle contends that comparisons are essentially metaphors and why all of his examples involve this kind of comparison, a fact to which the following selection from Rhetorica attests.

The following are examples of similes. Androton said of Idrieus that he was like a terrier let off the chain, that flies at you and bites you--Idrieus too was

savage now that he was let out of his chains:..In Plato's Republic those who strip the dead are compared to curs which bite the stones thrown at them but do not touch the throwers;...

(Aristotle 1924:1404b)

Marsh McCall (McCall 1969:31-53) argues that Aristotle uses the Greek term for which I use "comparison" as a generic term not only for simile but also for any other kind of explicit comparison. He notes, for example, that the original passage from the Republic, which Aristotle paraphrases in the quotation above, involves no use of the Greek equivalents of "like" or "as"--that is, the marks of simile. Nevertheless, McCall contends, the original passage does involve an explicit comparison (McCall 1969:34).

Although Aristotle considers comparison to be a sort of metaphor, he considers metaphor proper to be superior to comparison and, in fact, to all language devices used for ornamentation. Of all such devices "...the most important to have is skill at making metaphors...This is the only part of the job that cannot be learned from others; on the contrary it is a token of high native gifts, for making good metaphors depends on perceiving the likenesses in things." (Aristotle 1907:60-61; 59a4)

However, Aristotle at no point makes clear how he conceives metaphor to involve the perception of likenesses. The only species of metaphor which can be said to directly involve likeness is metaphor by analogy. In this kind of metaphor, there is a likeness in the way the first and second, and the third and fourth terms are related. Yet even in the case of this kind of metaphor it is not clear how the likeness in relations involves a likeness in things.

Nevertheless, in Rhetoric Aristotle does give us a clue as to the role he believes that likeness plays in metaphor. In discussing ways of best communicating ideas, he writes:

New strange words simply puzzle us; ordinary words convey only what we already know; it is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh. When the poet calls old age 'a withered stalk', he conveys a new idea, a new fact to us by means of the general notion of 'lost bloom,' which is common to both things.

(Aristotle 1924:1410b)

It should be noted that although Aristotle says in this passage that metaphor is the best way of communicating something fresh, he is not saying that metaphor is the only way of doing

so. While metaphor is quite important as a means of presentation, it is still just a means and does not involve for Aristotle the substance of what is said (cf. Ricoeur 1977:35ff). With this in mind let us look at the passage to see what it can tell us about the role of likeness in metaphor.

The passage appears to indicate that metaphor teaches through the genus (see Ricoeur 1977:41); that is, by making us look for a class or genus which is common to both the transferred word and the word for which it is substituted. Now, according to Aristotle, whatever can be predicated of a predicate can be predicated of the subject of the latter predicate. For example, Aristotle notes in Categoriae that "... 'man' is predicated of the individual man; but 'animal' is predicated of 'man'; it will therefore be predicable of the individual man also: for, the individual man is both 'man' and 'animal'" (Aristotle 1926:1a).

So, if a genus is predicated of two words, then it will be predicable of entities to which the words can properly be applied. Hence, the predicability of the genus is something shared by the entities to which both of the words are applied, and the entities in both classes can be considered alike in that they all have this predicability (and everything it implies about their nature) in common.

It would seem then that a good metaphor conveys a new "thought" through some genus shared by both the transferred word and the word for which it has been substituted: the genus can be

considered a property of the entities to which both words are applied, and hence a point of likeness between the entities in the two classes. The metaphorical transference points to this likeness, because the transferred word conventionally applies to the entities in one of these classes and metaphorically applies to at least one word in the other class.

The notion that the likeness involved in metaphor is a matter of sharing a genus is easily related to each of the four species of metaphor which Aristotle discusses. In the case of the first two species of metaphor--that is, species-to-genus and genus-to-species metaphor--it is easy to see what is held in common. In both of these cases it is clearly the genus. The genus is applicable to the entity for which it is the appropriate word, and, since it is applicable to the species involved in the transference, it is for Aristotle also applicable to an entity to which the species is applicable.

In discussing examples of the third kind of metaphor--that is, species-to-species metaphor--Aristotle notes that the two species have a common genus. As has already been noted a number of times, Aristotle considers whatever is predicated of a species to be predicable as well of the entities to which the species is predicated. So, since the genus is predicated of the two species, it is predicable of an entity of which either is predicated. Hence, here too the resemblance between entities can be considered a matter of sharing a common genus.

Nevertheless, it is true that Aristotle at no time says that the two species in the third kind of metaphor must have a common genus. However, the fact that he specifies common genera when discussing examples of species-to-species metaphor would seem to indicate that he does consider it to be a necessary condition for this kind of metaphor.

I noted above that likeness in relations between terms is a necessary condition for Aristotle's fourth kind of metaphor: metaphor by analogy. In the analogies upon which such metaphors are based, the second term is related to the first in the same manner as the fourth term is related to the third. This allows one to make metaphors in which the second term is used in place of the fourth or vice versa. As also noted above, the likeness here is not a likeness of entities but a likeness of relations.

However, this likeness, as we shall see, can also be understood to involve a likeness in the entities to which are applied the terms involved in the metaphorical transference; that is, the second and fourth terms. In Analytica Posteriora, Aristotle writes:

Yet a further method of selection is made by analogy: for we cannot find a single identical name to give to a squid's pounce, a fish's spine, and an

animal's bone, although those too possess common properties as if there were a single osseous nature.

(Aristotle 1926:98a)

No common category or genus exists for these analogies. Yet the analogy indicates that certain properties are held in common. Aristotle points out that this allows us to view the entities in question as though a common genus did exist. It would appear then that metaphor by analogy can involve a species-to-species transfer where no common genus exists to identify the commonality of the two species.

Now, if the second and fourth terms could have either a species-genus or genus-species relation, then the class of metaphors by analogy would overlap with the first and/or the second type of metaphor. If the second and fourth terms could involve a species-to-species transfer where the two species had a genus in common, then the class of metaphors by analogy would overlap with the third class of metaphors. So, it would appear that if the fourth class of metaphor is a distinct kind of metaphor, then it must involve a species-to-species transference where there is no common genus. It would seem then that metaphor by analogy indicates a likeness of entities as though a genus were shared by the terms involved in the transference--even though no such genus exists.

The sharing of a genus (or genus-like characteristics) and the likeness this sharing implies, does not appear to be the only important characteristic of metaphor, according to Aristotle. It should be noted that in the passage quoted just above, Aristotle does not say that it is the genus which the metaphor communicates. Rather, something is communicated through the genus. Aristotle notes in Rhetorica that for a metaphor to be good, 'there must be appropriate non-genus properties.

...if you wish to pay a compliment, you must take your metaphor from something better in the same line; if to disparage, from something worse. To illustrate my meaning: since opposites are in the same class, you do what I have suggested if you say that a man who begs 'prays,' and a man who prays 'begs'; for praying and begging are both varieties of asking...Again, somebody calls actors 'hangers-on or Dionysus,' but they call themselves 'artists': each of these terms is a metaphor, the one intended to throw dirt at the actor, the other to dignify him.

(Aristotle 1924:1405a)

It should be noted that the honor of praying and the disaonor of begging do not involve the genus of asking, which is the shared genus or the first two metaphors. In a similar fashion, the disrespect implied by 'hangers-on of Dionysus' and the respect implied by 'artists' do not involve the genus of 'followers of Dionysus,' which can be considered the shared genus for the last two metaphors in the passage above.

Nevertheless, these are properties which are communicated by the metaphors Aristotle mentions. The genus (or genus-like commonality) would appear to be the point of contact through which a word belonging to one thing can metaphorically be applied to something else. This, it would appear, is the reason Aristotle talks of the common genus as a means. Non-genus properties such as those Aristotle mentions in the passage quoted just above would appear to be what is communicated through the genus.

In his discussion of metaphor, Aristotle touches upon many issues or concern to both classical and modern scholars. In what follows, I would like to discuss briefly two sets of issues which will be relevant to my own analysis.

The first issue I would like to discuss is related to the question of what I call metaphorical extension. As I noted quite briefly in the "Introduction," I consider the extension of a word to be the class of entities to which the word can be taken as

truly applying under a metaphorical interpretation.

Now Aristotle defines metaphor as a transference of a name of one thing to something else. Such eminent classical scholars as Cicero (Cicero 1942, De Oratore Vol. 2., 123-125; 3.33-39. 157 and Cicero 1962 Orator: 373-375; 26-27. 91-96) and Quintilian (Quintilian 1961: Vol. 3, 303; 8.6.4-7--see also "Cicero" 1964: 343; 4.34.45) have followed Aristotle in treating metaphor as necessarily involving such "misapplication." Many moderns have incorporated this notion of "misapplication" as well. Monroe Beardsley, (Beardsley 1958 and 1962), Paul Ricoeur (Ricoeur 1975a, 1975b, 1976, and 1977), and Teun A. Van Dijk (Van Dijk 1975) are three scholars whom I discuss who have incorporated this idea into their analyses of metaphor.

Aristotle's discussion of the four species of metaphor, however, indicates that there are two different kinds of "misapplication." The second, third and fourth kinds of metaphor all involve a transference of a word to something to which the word cannot be appropriately applied "conventionally"--that is, something to which the word does not "belong."

If we transfer a name for the entities in a species to an entity which can only be named appropriately by a genus of that species, then the result will not be an appropriate application of the transferred word. Aristotle's own example of this kind of metaphor can illustrate the point. "Ten thousand" cannot be applied "conventionally" to a large number which is not ten

thousand.

Similarly, if a word which applies "conventionally" to entities of one species is transferred to something of another species, then the result will again be that the transferred word is not "conventionally" applied. Once again, an example of Aristotle's provides us with an illustration. "Draining off" cannot be "conventionally" applied to that to which "cutting" can be "conventionally" applied.

As noted above, to the extent that metaphor by analogy is distinct from the other three types of metaphor, it involves a species-to-species transfer where no genus is common to the species. Again, just as for the third type of metaphor, if a species which "conventionally" applies to entities of one type is transferred to an entity of another species, then the result will again be that the transferred is not "conventionally" applied. Again, Aristotle's examples make this clear. What, for instance, can "conventionally" be called "old age" cannot "conventionally" be called "evening."

However, although types two through four can be seen as involving an "unconventional" metaphorical application, type one cannot be seen in this way. A genus word can be applied "conventionally" to any entity which belongs to any of its species. For example, the term "animal" can always be "conventionally" applied to an entity of the species lion since the class of lions is a species of the class of animals. Now, in

Aristotle's first type of metaphor, a name for a genus is used in place of a name for a species. Since a genus word can be applied "conventionally" to any entity in one of its species, the result of this genus-to-species transference is a "conventional" application. Nevertheless, the genus word may not be considered to appropriately apply to the entity (i.e., to "belong") because it is not the "regular" word for the entity.

Some modern scholars limit the domain of what they consider metaphor to cases where a word is not appropriately applied literally. Among this group are the authors of Semiotique Générale (Dubois et. al. 1970), T. A. Van Dijk (Van Dijk 1973) and M. Beardsley (Beardsley 1958 and 1962). Other modern scholars--D. Davidson (Davidson 1979) and Joan Searle (Searle 1979a and 1969b), for example--take a more encompassing view and, like Aristotle, include among metaphors words which are appropriately literally applied.

The question of whether or not to include as metaphors literally appropriate applications of a word (or phrase) is not irrelevant to a theory of metaphor. What phenomena are included in a domain can affect what an analysis will posit concerning the phenomena.

In my analysis, I will use a domain which only includes cases where a word or phrase is given a "non-conventional" literal application. This domain, I believe, allows for a richer and more interesting analysis than would one which includes cases

where words and phrases are "conventionally" applied literally.

I would like now to turn to the second issue. I would like to discuss in relation to Aristotle. Above, I suggested that Aristotle's discussion of metaphor indicates that something is communicated through a genus or genus-like characteristics shared by both the entities to which the metaphorical word normally applies and the entity to which it is metaphorically applied. Within Aristotle's framework, a metaphorical word is a name for a species or a name for a genus. If it is a name for a species, there is a genus for that species. As we have seen, a genus is predicated of any entity to which one of its species is predicated.

Within the context of modern semantics, something which we can infer when we use a word we can consider part of the primary meaning of the word (see Chapter 3, section 1). Now, whether the word is a species or a genus, we can always infer that the genus applies "conventionally" to any entity to which the word applies. So, this genus can be considered part of the primary meaning. Now, Aristotle claims that genus or genus-like characteristics of a metaphorically used word are involved in what the metaphor communicates. So, in modern semantic terms, he is implying that parts of a word's primary meaning play a role when a word is used metaphorically.

Many modern scholars contend that this is indeed what happens when a word is used metaphorically. The idea is an

important part of certain linguistic semantic analyses of metaphor, such as Samuel Levin's (Levin 1977), Robert Matthews (Matthews 1971), and L. Cohen and A. Margalit's (Cohen and Margalit 1972). I too will incorporate this idea within my own analysis of metaphor.

Above I suggested that Aristotle's discussion of metaphor indicates that in metaphor, the shared genus communicates something other than itself. As I noted above, Aristotle suggests that calling an actor a "hanger-on or Dionysus" could communicate a disrespect for the person in question. On the other hand, he suggests that calling an actor an "artist," while still a metaphor, is intended to cast praise.

At least within the context of modern semantic theory, the disrespect communicated by the first metaphor and the respect communicated by the second are not considered part of what is sometimes called the primary or descriptive meaning. Rather, they are considered something merely suggested by words.

Literary critics such as William Empson (Empson 1951:339f5) have noted the importance of suggestion in metaphor. So, too, have certain modern theorists concerned with metaphor--for example, Max Black (see Black 1962, 1979a and 1979b) and Monroe Beardsley (Beardsley 1958 and 1962).

In my analysis, I will incorporate the idea that suggestion is an important part of metaphor. My account of the role of suggestion will be based on the work of a number of modern

scholars, particularly Beardsley. However, it is, I think, worth noting that the seeds of the idea that a metaphor is suggestive are found in the work of Aristotle.

While Aristotle touches upon many issues of interest to modern scholars, it should be noted that he does not concern himself with something many moderns consider to be quite important. The issue to which I refer is the question of the logical principles involved in metaphorical interpretation.

What principles or logic of interpretation do we use to understand what a metaphor is saying? What principles or logic of interpretation determine what a metaphorically used word or phrase can mean? What principles or logic of interpretation determine to what a metaphorically interpreted word or phrase can appropriately apply?

These are not questions which Aristotle or the ancients in general address. They are, however, the concern of many moderns. As noted above, they are questions which I try to address in this thesis.

I.A. Richards

I.A. Richards in The Philosophy of Rhetoric (Richards 1965) contends that meaning is a matter of the classification of phenomena. Even the most "lowly" meanings are classifications.

Now consider our own minds' simplest operations. Do we ever respond to a stimulus in a way which is not influenced by the things that happened to us when more or less similar stimuli struck us in the past? Probably never. A new kind of stimulus might give rise to a new kind of sensation, a new kind of pain, say. But even so we should probably recognize it as a pain of some sort. Effects from more or less similar happenings in the past would come in to give our response its character and this as far as it went would be meaning. Meaning of a lowly kind, no doubt, the kind of meaning that the least developed animals live by.

(Richards 1965:29-30)

Richards considers classification (or "sorting" as he calls it) a matter of grouping one thing with other things. For example, in the case Richards discusses in the passage quoted above, the sensation of pain is grouped with other sensations of pain. For Richards, "All thinking from the lowest to the highest--whatever else it may be--is sorting" (Richards 1965:30).

When we use a word, we are not, of course, actually putting into a collection or set of entities the entity (thing, sensation, etc.) to which we have applied the word. According to

Richards, what a word does is to take the place of the absent entities. It classifies entities without there being actual collections. Thus, words are "...substitutes exerting the powers of what is not there" (Richards 1965:32). In "exerting the powers of what is not there," the meanings of words have what Richards calls a "delegated efficacy" (Richards 1965:32).

As Richards points out, in the first passage quoted above, we do not in general experience entities (be they things, ideas, etc.) in isolation. Rather, we always--or almost always--experience them in relation to the "effects from more or less similar happenings..." (Richards 1965:30), and in this way make classifications.

Richards argues that even for "the simplest-seeming concrete object, its concreteness comes to it from the way in which we are bringing it simultaneously into a number of sorts" (Richards 1965:31). Richards would appear to consider an entity and the set of sorts to be what he calls a "context." For Richards, "context" used in this way is "a name for a whole cluster of events that recur together..." (Richards 1965:34).

As noted above, words can be used as substitutes for the collections into which we sort things. These collections are parts of the clusters of events which occur when we sort entities. So, words can be substitutes for parts of "meaning" contexts. The "delegated efficacy" they receive from being such substitutes is their meaning. As Richards puts it, "...what a

word means is the missing parts of the contexts from which it draws its delegated efficacy" (Richards 1965:35).

Richards argues that his proposal concerning the meanings of words indicates that words do not have "proper" meanings (Richards 1965:38ff). Rather, words mean whatever they have been used to mean. In fact, Richards contends, words are "over-determined"; that is, they can mean many things. As a consequence, a passage can have two incompatible meanings (Richards 1965:38).

We have seen that for Richards words have meaning as parts of contexts; that is, as elements in clusters of recurrent events. However, Richards does not believe that this is the only kind of context which is relevant to meaning.

Richards contends that the combination of words into sentences affects the meaning of words (Richards 1965:47ff). The degree to which words depend on their verbal contexts varies with the kind of discourse:

At one end of the scale, in the strict exposition of some highly criticized and settled science through technicalized and rigid speech, a large proportion of them <words--A.B.> are independent. They mean the same whatever other words they are put with; or if a word fluctuates, it moves only into a small number of stable

positions...The other end of the scale is in poetry--in some forms of poetry rather. We know very much less about the behavior of words in these cases--when their virtue is to have no fixed meaning separable from those of other words they occur with.

(Richards 1965:48)

In discourses which are not of an unemotional, scientific sort, there can be various meanings not only because words often have more than one meaning, but also because the sentences of which they are part are intended to have an emotive as well as a propositional meaning.

The extra meaning that comes in when a sentence, in addition to making a statement, is meant to be insulting or flattering, or is interpreted so--we may call it emotive meaning--is not so different from plain statement as we are apt to suppose. As the word means the missing part of its contexts and is a substitute for them, so the insulting intention may be the substitute for a kick--the missing part of its context.

(Richards 1965:40-41)

Understanding what at least certain non-scientific texts mean is not simply a matter of understanding what words with fixed meanings mean when combined to make sentences. Rather, we try out various hypotheses and strategies, and, in so doing, arrive at a set of possible interpretations (Richards 1965:53). From reaching in this way an understanding of whole utterances, we can then understand the meanings of individual words. So, for Richards, word meanings in at least many non-scientific texts "...are resultants which we arrive at only through the interpretive possibilities of the whole utterance" (Richards 1965:55).

The shifts of meaning which occur in metaphor are, for Richards, in no essential way different from the flux of literal word meaning. Richards contends that the "worst assumption" is "...that metaphor is something special and exceptional in the use of language, a deviation from its normal mode of working..." (Richards 1965:90). Rather than being a deviation, metaphor is "the omnipresent principle of all its <language's--A.B.> free action" (Richards 1965:90). Moreover, "That metaphor is the omnipresent principle of language can be shown by mere observation. We cannot get through three sentences of ordinary fluid discourse without it..." (Richards 1965:92).

For Richards, the term "metaphor" is applicable not only to the phenomena that Aristotle identifies as such but to any case where we can understand a word as having two effective meanings

which are relevant in a context: "If we cannot distinguish tenor from vehicle then we may provisionally take the word to be literal; if we can distinguish two cooperating uses, then we have metaphor" (Richards 1965:119). Richards takes his proposal to mean that included in the class of metaphors are such conventional word meanings as the meaning of "leg" when it is used in relation to tables. Richards contends that when we use "leg" in this sense, we can make it a live metaphor simply by comparing this use to "the plain or literal use of the word, in the leg of the horse ..." (Richards 1965:117).

For Richards metaphor is clearly a matter of thought and not a matter of words and their appropriate and inappropriate uses. Metaphor for Richards occurs whenever we understand an utterance to involve comparison (Richards 1965:120)--no matter whether by suggestion, explicit change of meaning, simile, etc. Thus, it is the thinking of a comparison which is metaphorical and not anything per se linguistic.

The traditional theory noticed only a few of the modes of metaphor; and limited its application of the term metaphor to a few of them only. And thereby it made metaphor seem to be a verbal matter, a shifting and displacement of words, whereas fundamentally it is a borrowing between an intercourse of thoughts, a

transaction between contexts. Thought is metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language derive therefrom.

(Richards 1965:94)

This claim is not surprising if one keeps in mind that thinking, for Richards, is sorting, and that such sorting is not random but based on a similarity of the entities--or at least of responses to them.

Richards introduces three terms in order to talk about metaphor: "tenor," "vehicle," and "ground." He defines the tenor of a metaphor as "...the underlying idea or subject which the vehicle or figure means" (Richards 1965:97). However, he gives no explicit definition of vehicle, although the term would appear to refer to the "literal meaning," and/or "secondary subject," and/or "image" which a metaphor expresses (Richards 1965:96-97). Common characteristics of the vehicle and tenor Richards calls "the ground of the metaphor" (Richards 1965:117). It should be noted that not only does Richards give no precise definitions of the terms, but he also gives no clear examples of how they are to be used. What a metaphor means, however, can be something other than what the tenor means:

...in many of the most important uses of metaphor, the co-presence of the vehicle and tenor results in a meaning (to be clearly distinguished from the tenor) which is not attainable without their interaction...with different metaphors the relative importance of the contributions of vehicle and tenor to this resultant meaning varies immensely.

(Richards 1965:100)

In addition, "...there are very few metaphors in which disparities between vehicle and tenor are not as much operative as the similarities" (Richards 1965:127).

Shared characteristics of vehicle and tenor need not involve actual resemblance. What is shared may simply be a matter of a common attitude towards the item or sets of items which the vehicle and tenor designate respectively (Richards 1965:117-118). Richards contends that we can, in fact, divide metaphors according to whether or not they work through "direct resemblance" or "common attitudes," although he notes "the division is not final or irreducible" (Richards 1965:118).

What I find most important about Richards' discussion of metaphor is the stress he puts on the idea that the meaning of a metaphor is not simply the literal meaning of some word (or

"possible" word) for which we can consider the metaphorical word a substitute. I believe he notes something quite important when he argues that metaphor, contrary to what Aristotle says, is not necessarily a stylistic ornament for which there could be a literal substitute.

Anyone familiar with modern discussions of literature is, without doubt, aware of the large number of scholars who either allude to or directly discuss non-ornamental aspects of "metaphorical meaning," as I will henceforth call it. They include linguists such as Van Dijk (Van Dijk 1975), and such philosophers as Max Black (Black 1962, 1979a, and 1979b) and Paul Ricoeur (Ricoeur 1975a, 1975b, 1976, 1977), as well as literary critics such as Northrop Frye (Frye 1965:122ff), and W. I. Nowotny (Nowotny 1965:49-98).

In my analysis of metaphor I try to account for at least part of what can be distinctive about metaphorical meaning. I try to show that we can at least partially account for this potential distinctiveness in terms of what I have called the logical or propositional qualities of metaphorically interpreted words and phrases.

Moreover, my analysis looks on metaphorical meaning as the result of an interaction, although not of the vehicle-tenor kind that Richards proposes. Rather, I look at metaphorical meaning as the result of an interaction between the literal meaning of a word or phrase and the context in which a word or phrase is used

metaphorically. The dualism which Richards and others propose, I believe, encounters difficulties. I will discuss these difficulties as part of my discussion of Black, who, I think, makes the nature of this dualism clearer than Richards does.

There is, in fact, one aspect of Richards' treatment which, I think, is more basic and which merits criticism. Richards argues that comparison involving thoughts is the essence of metaphor and that the metaphorical use of words derives from such metaphorical thought. The metaphorical process then can be discussed without referring directly to language and the linguistic properties of metaphor.

There is a major problem with an approach in which phenomena are considered a clothing for some underlying process. The problem occurs because the metaphorical process is considered not as something abstracted from behavior, but rather, as some apparently disembodied mental process which manifests itself in verbal metaphor. The manifestation cannot confirm or falsify statements about the process itself, since the manifestation is not the phenomenon about which statements concerning the process are made. Moreover, Richards posits no necessary condition relating the manifestations to the process itself.

In my analysis of metaphor, I try to use as my domain of inquiry observable (or potentially observable) linguistic phenomena rather than disembodied mental processes. Many modern philosophical and linguistic inquiries into metaphor do the same,

as I hope is made apparent in this review of the literature. So, in a sense, in trying to limit my domain of inquiry to linguistic phenomena, I could be said to be following a modern tradition.

Max Black

Max Black's essay "Metaphor" (Black 1962) is perhaps the most commonly referred to modern discussion of the subject. Recently, Black has elaborated and modified his views in two essays: "More About Metaphor" (Black 1979a) and "How Metaphor Works: Reply to Donald Davidson" (Black 1979b). While I rely in my discussion primarily on the original essay, I also often refer to elaborations and modifications Black later introduces, particularly in "More About Metaphor."

In "Metaphor," Black proposes a now famous characterization of metaphor. Then in terms of this characterization, he discusses three kinds of theoretical approaches to metaphor. In discussing the third of these, he makes a number of original proposals.

Contrary to the views of Aristotle, Black does not consider metaphor to be basically a matter of words (or phrases). For Black, metaphor, in its simplest form at least, involves a sentence "...in which some words are used metaphorically while the remainder are used non-metaphorically" (Black 1962:27).

Black contends that when all the words in a sentence are used metaphorically, the sentence is either a proverb, allegory, or riddle. Black suggests that these cases (as well as others) need special treatment and cannot be adequately accounted for by a preliminary analysis such as his own. Black does not consider such sentences in either his initial article, "Metaphor," or in the two later articles.

The literal part of a metaphor-sentence, Black calls "the frame." The part of a metaphor-sentence which is used metaphorically, he calls the "focus" of the metaphor (Black 1962:27-28). According to Black, the meaning of a metaphor can vary not only in relation to the focus of the metaphor, but also in relation to the frame. He illustrates this point by comparing two metaphors: "The chairman plowed through the discussion" and "I like to plow my memories regularly" (Black 1962:26-27). Black asks whether the two sentences involve the same metaphor, and answers the question as follows:

Our answer will depend upon the degree of similarity we are prepared to affirm on comparing the two "frames" (for we have the same "focus" each time). Differences in the two frames will produce some difference in the interplay between focus and frame in the two cases.

(Black 1962:28)

It would appear that Black believes that the determining context can involve more than simply the sentence frame. Both the general verbal context and various non-verbal factors may also play a role. Moreover, the general context can not only help to determine the meaning of a metaphor, it can also play an important--perhaps crucial--role in recognizing when there is a metaphor.

...we must also recognize that the established rules of language leave wide latitude for individual variation, initiative and creation. There are indefinitely many contexts (including all the interesting ones) where the meaning of a metaphorical expression has to be reconstructed from the speaker's intentions (and other clues) because the broad rules of standard usage are too general to supply the information needed. When Churchill in a famous phrase, called Mussolini "that utensil," the tone of voice, the verbal setting, the historical background, helped to make clear what metaphor was being used...This is an example...of how recognition and interpretation of a metaphor may require attention to the particular circumstances of its utterance.

(Black 1962:29)

Although in the passage I have just quoted Black mentions the role of context in recognizing metaphors, he makes it clear in "More About Metaphor" (Black 1979a:34-36) that he does not believe there is a procedure for recognizing metaphors. In this article, Black contends that deciding that some utterance is to be taken as a metaphor depends upon our general knowledge of what is supposed to be taken as a metaphor, and the specifics of the context which lead us to think a metaphorical interpretation is "preferable" to a non-metaphorical one (Black 1979a:35-36). So, it would appear that for Black the recognition of metaphors is a matter of "guesswork and inference," to use a phrase of Richards (Richards 1965:53).

Black focusses his account on metaphorical meaning, rather than on identification of metaphors. He is particularly interested in two aspects of such meaning. In "More About Metaphor" (Black 1979a:26-27), Black calls these aspects "emphasis" and "resonance."

For Black, a metaphor is more or less emphatic depending on the extent to which the "producer" of the metaphor will consider any change of the words (particularly in the focus) to effect a change in the meaning of the metaphor. The more emphatic a metaphor is, the more it is "intended to be dwelt upon for the sake of... unstated implications" (Black 1979a:26).

The degree to which a metaphor actually has such unstated "background implications" (Black 1979a:26-27) is the degree to

which a metaphor has what Black calls "resonance." In "More About Metaphor," he says that metaphors are resonant when they "support a high degree of implicative elaboration..." (Black 1979a:27). As we shall see, Black is particularly concerned with metaphors which are both "emphatic" and "resonant."

This is quite clear from Black's criticisms of "substitution" and "comparison" type theories of metaphor, as he calls them. He finds theories of these types to be particularly inadequate in accounting for metaphors which exhibit high degrees of both emphasis and resonance. In "Metaphor" (Black 1962), he describes these two approaches to metaphor and critically assesses their adequacy.

Substitution theories, according to Black, characterize metaphor as the substitution of a word or words for some other word or words whose meaning is the intended one in the text of which the metaphor is part. Black mentions Richard Whately (see Whately 1963:279-287) and Gustaf Stern (Stern 1964:298-330) as two scholars who have proposed theories of metaphor which he considers to be of the substitution type (Black 1962:31-34).

"According to a substitution view, the focus of a metaphor, the word or expression having a distinctly metaphorical use with a literal frame, is used to communicate a meaning that might have been expressed literally" (Black 1962:32). There are two possible motivations for this substitution. One is that there is no "brier literal expression" to which the writer has access

(Black 1962:32). When used for this reason, metaphor is a form of catachresis, "...the putting of new senses into old words" (Black 1962:33). However there is often a literal equivalent which might have been used. According to the substitution view, the metaphorical expression has been employed for stylistic reasons in such cases. "We are told that the metaphorical expression may (in its literal use) refer to a more concrete object than would its literal equivalent; and this is supposed to give pleasure to the reader..." (Black 1962:34).

The comparison type of theory can be considered a special case of the substitution type. In the substitution view proper, the expression "Richard is a lion" is seen as simply a substitution for some literal expression like "Richard is brave." In the comparison view of metaphor, the same metaphorical expression is seen as the substituted equivalent of "Richard is like a lion (in being brave)" (Black 1962:35-36). The difference between the two is that the more elaborate paraphrase of the comparison view involves a comparison between Richard and lions. So, while the substitution view holds that a metaphor is simply a substitute for some literal statement, the comparison view holds that it is a substitute for some literal comparison. Black mentions Richard Whately as a scholar who has formulated a comparison type theory (Black 1962:35-37; see also Whately 1963:279-287).

Black does not believe that either substitution or

comparison type theories provide an adequate account of metaphor. Theories of both types hold that a metaphor contributes no meaning that could not be supplied by some literal equivalent. Black believes that in most cases, at least most of the interesting cases, this is simply false. For Black, metaphors--at least interesting metaphors--are not simply "decoration" or a process to add to old words new senses which might have been expressed literally in a less efficient way (Black 1962:37).

Black does not believe comparison type elaborations of the substitution view give us a better account of metaphor. As we have seen, comparison type theories, according to Black, say that a metaphorical expression is a substitute for some literal comparison or analogy. He contends that "There is some temptation to think of similarities as 'objectively' given... (Black 1962:37). He believes, however, that to the degree to which a metaphor makes a formal statement of some "objective" reality, it also loses its effectiveness (Black 1962:37).

We need the metaphors in just those cases when there can be no question as yet of the precision of scientific statement. Metaphorical statement is not a substitute for a formal comparison or any other kind of

literal statement, but has its own distinctive capacities and achievements.

(Black 1962:37)

This would appear to be particularly true of the emphatic and resonant metaphors in which Black is particularly interested. However, the comparison view is of little help in accounting for emphasis and resonance. It "suffers from a vagueness that borders upon vacuity" and does not give us any way of accounting for similarities involved in metaphor (Black 1962:37). This is a lacuna of particular importance for those cases where "prior to the construction of the metaphor, we would have been hard put to find any literal resemblance..." (Black 1962:37).

Black argues in "More About Metaphor" (1979:31-32) that the fact that metaphors can imply statements of comparison does not mean that similes are equivalent to metaphors. In fact, Black does not believe that even the more poetic similes should be considered equivalent to metaphors. He contends that "<1>looking at a scene through blue spectacles is different from comparing that scene with something else" (Black 1979a:31). Black believes that this "looking through" property of at least interesting metaphors can be best accounted for by the type of theory he prefers; that is, what he calls "interaction" type theory.

Black cites I.A. Richards's (Richards 1965:esp. 89-138) as

well as W.B. Stanford's (Stanford 1972:esp. 101-105). discussions of metaphor as examples of theories of this type. However, although he takes the idea of interaction from Richards' discussion of metaphor, he uses it in an analysis of metaphor which is rather different than that of Richards (see discussion of Richards above).

According to Black, there are two subjects in a metaphor: the "principal subject" and the "subsidiary subject" (Black 1962:39 and 44). In the metaphor "man is a wolf," for example, the principal subject is man (or men) and the subsidiary subject is wolf (or wolves) (Black 1962:39).

In the essay "Metaphor," Black says that the principal and subsidiary subjects are not primarily the extensions of the compared terms, but rather the systems of properties which we associate with these terms. So, for example, in "More about Metaphor" he contends that the sea is the subsidiary subject of Wallace Steven's metaphor "Society is a sea," but that the metaphor is "...not so much about the sea (considered as a thing) as about a system of relationships (the 'implicative complex'...) signaled by the presence of the word 'sea' in the sentence in question" (Black 1979a:28).

Nevertheless, it should be noted that in "More about Metaphor" Black (Black 1979:28) says that he does not consider it necessary to consider the principal subject as such a system. He does not, however, say how he thinks it is necessary to view the

principal subject.

Black claims that the properties involved in the system are normally those we commonly associate with the subject and consider "characteristic" of it (Black 1962:44). These commonly associated properties he calls "associated commonplaces." Although involved in the literal usage of a word, Black notes that these associated commonplaces are not part of the "dictionary meaning" of a word; that is, those aspects which involve appropriate linguistic usage.

...Literal uses of the word "wolf" are governed by syntactical and semantical rules, violation of which produces nonsense or self-contradiction. In addition, I am suggesting, literal uses of the word normally commit the speaker to the acceptance of a set of standard beliefs about wolves (current platitudes) that are the common possession of members of the speech community... A speaker who says "wolf" is normally taken to be implying...that he is referring to something fierce, carnivorous, treacherous, and so on.

(Black 1962:40)

This is not to say that Black thinks only a "system of associated commonplaces" (Black 1962:40) can be a system of implications involved in a metaphor. He in fact contends that an author can establish "a novel pattern of implications for the literal uses of the key expressions," and that these can then be a part of the metaphorical uses of the expressions (Black 1962:43).

Black believes that a metaphor applies the "associated implications" (Black 1962:44) of the subsidiary subject to the principal subject. In so doing, "the metaphor selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes features of the principal subject by implying statements about it that normally apply to the subsidiary subject" (Black 1962:44-45). For example, in the metaphor "man is a wolf" the principal subject, man, has applied to it attributes such as fierceness and treacherousness which are associated commonplaces about wolves, the subsidiary subject. Certain features of men are emphasized and others suppressed, depending on how well they accord with seeing man in a wolf-like way. In "More about Metaphor" (Black 1979a:31) Black says that the description of man which results can be considered a kind of "analog model."

However, according to Black, metaphor not only changes our view of the principal subject, but our view of the subsidiary subject as well. "If to call a man a wolf is to put him in a special light, we must not forget that the metaphor makes the

wolf seem more human than he otherwise would" (Black 1979a:44). The metaphor does this by selecting features of the subsidiary subject which can be used to describe the principal subject and in this way emphasizing those aspects of the subsidiary subject which are "like" aspects of the principal subject: "The nature of the intended application helps to determine the character of the system to be applied..." (Black 1962:44-45).

Moreover, according to Black, we keep both subjects in mind when we understand the metaphor. He writes: "This use of a 'subsidiary subject' to foster insight into a 'principal subject' is a distinctive intellectual operation..., demanding simultaneous awareness of both subjects" (Black 1962:46).

There are, however, attributes of wolves which cannot be applied literally to men. Some of these implications of the subsidiary subject which cannot be literally applied to the principal subject may undergo metaphorical shifts of meaning and become subordinate metaphors. These subordinate metaphors, according to Black, are "...to be read less 'emphatically'" (Black 1962:45).

Other implications which cannot be applied to the principal subject in a literal way do not undergo metaphorical shifts. Instead, they undergo what Black calls "extensions of meaning," since "they do not involve apprehended connections between two systems of concepts" (Black 1962:42). Black does not attempt to describe how changes in the meaning of implications occur, since

this is a more complex task than he is willing to undertake (Black 1962:42).

However, because of such omissions, the nature of the application of the subsidiary to the principal subject was not clear to many readers. This prompted Black to attempt a more precise explanation in "More about Metaphor" (Black 1979a). There, he proposes that metaphor relates two implication systems--one (called G) for the principal subject and one (called M) for the subsidiary subject--in a way such that:

G consists of certain statements, say Pa , Qb ,..., and aRb , cSd ,..., while M comprises corresponding statements $P'a'$, $Q'd'$,..., and $a'R'd'$, $c'S'd'$,..., (where P is uniquely correlated with P', a with a', R with R', and so on).

(Black 1979a:30)

Thus the metaphorical projection of the subsidiary onto the primary subject involves what might be called a kind of isomorphism. Black claims, however, that, unlike mathematical isomorphism, it is possible to have not one but many relations which link the two sets in a metaphorical projection. Among the kinds of relations he mentions are: identity, extension,

similarity, analogy, and something he calls "metaphorical coupling" (Black 1979a:30).

The projection of the implication complex of the subsidiary subject onto the implicative complex of the principal subject may result in the perception of similarities which may not otherwise have been seen (Black 1962:37). In "More about Metaphor," Black makes this point in the following way:

If some metaphors are what might be called "cognitive instruments," indispensable for perceiving connections that, once perceived, are then truly present, the case for the thesis <that metaphor 'can' create similarities--A.B.> would be made out. Do metaphors ever function as such cognitive instruments? I believe so.

(Black 1979a:39)

In "Afterthoughts" (Black 1979b:192), Black indicates that the meaning that results from the projection may convey a "vision" or "view" which is at least in part propositional. Nevertheless, in "More about Metaphor," he contends that "It is a violation of philosophical grammar to assign either truth or falsity to strong metaphors" (Black 1979a:41)--that is, metaphors

which are emphatic and resonant.

According to Black, such metaphors are like charts, graphs, and other "devices for representing 'how things are' that cannot be assimilated to 'statements of fact'" (Black 1979a:41). He believes that for metaphor, just like for these devices, we can speak of correctness and incorrectness, but not of truth and falsity (Black 1979a:40-41).

In his analysis of metaphor, Black makes a number of points which I believe are quite important in analyzing metaphor. First of all, he stresses the role which context plays in recognizing and interpreting metaphor. Following Black (and Richards) I will in my analysis stress the importance of context in interpreting metaphors.

However, unlike Black, I do not think that there need be any literal sentential context--that is, what Black calls the frame of the metaphor. It is, I believe, quite possible to have metaphors--that is, phenomena which are the same in all essential respects as those Black calls metaphor--without the existence of a literal frame. For example, it is possible to apply metaphorically the phrase 'a rose blossom' to some pretty girl by exclaiming "O, a rose blossom." No literal frame is needed in such a case.

Moreover, there does not seem to be any principled theoretical reason for distinguishing, as Black does, between

metaphorically used words which occur within a literal frame and those which do not. Why claim that a sentence is a proverb, riddle, or allegory simply because it contains only metaphorically used words or phrases (Black 1962:27)? "The king plucked the flower" might be uttered metaphorically in relation to a common (but arrogant) man who has run away with some girl. Why consider such a case a proverb, allegory, or riddle simply because it contains only metaphorically used phrases? Is there any essential difference between such a metaphorically intended utterance and other literally false but metaphorically intended utterances which do contain literal parts? As far as I can see, there is no difference in the way we figuratively interpret an utterance such as the one described above and the way we figuratively interpret many a literally false utterance--for example, "the poor are the negroes of Europe" (Black 1962:38r)--which does contain literal as well as metaphorically interpreted phrases.

Because I do not think there is any principled reason for making such a distinction I will include in my domain both utterances which involve literal and metaphorically used words or phrases, and utterances in which all the words or phrases are metaphorically interpreted. In fact, I think my analysis indicates that this decision is appropriate in that my proposals are applicable to both kinds of utterance.

There is one other idea which Black discusses which I would

like to mention. I refer here to the idea that metaphor involves "redescription"; that is, seeing one thing in terms of another (man, for example, in wolf-like terms). In recent years, this idea has been discussed by many scholars, Paul Ricoeur and Marcus B. Hester's discussions being perhaps two of the more important ones (see Ricoeur 1975a, 1975b, 1977, and 1979; and Hester 1966 and 1967).

While I do not explicitly use this idea, I think that the idea of redescription is implicit in my account of metaphor. In my analysis, I treat a metaphorically interpreted word or phrase as applying to an entity to which it does not literally apply. It is, I think, plausible to say that we describe an entity when we apply a word or phrase to it. For example, it is plausible to say that when we apply the word 'man' to some entity we are describing that entity (as a man). So, it is plausible to say that in treating a metaphorically interpreted word or phrase as applying to some entity to which it does not literally apply, I am looking at a metaphorically interpreted word or phrase as describing an entity which it cannot literally be used to describe. In relation to literal descriptions of the entity, this metaphorical description can be considered to be a redescription of the entity. So, in treating a metaphorically interpreted word or phrase as applying to some entity to which it does not literally apply, I can be said to be treating the metaphorically interpreted word as a redescription of the entity.

Moreover, like Black, I consider the "redescriptions" to involve "implications" associated with the metaphorically used word or phrase (the focus). Nevertheless, I conceive of these associated implications rather differently than does Black. Unlike Black, I contend that among the associated implications can be included elements of the "dictionary" or (in my terms) "primary" meaning, as well as elements of the "non-dictionary" or (in my terms) "secondary" meaning on which Black focusses.

The difference between Black's conception of the associated implications and my own is not the only difference between the way in which his account treats metaphor as "redescription" and the way in which my account does. According to Black, the "redescription" involves a distinctive kind of thought in which both the principal and subsidiary subjects are simultaneously kept in mind. The notion that metaphor involves "stereoscopic vision"--that is, the co-presence in the mind of two thoughts or subjects--has been widely embraced. I.A. Richards (Richards 1965), W.B. Stanford (Stanford 1972), H. Katchedourian (Katchedourian 1968), and T. Reinhart (Reinhart 1976) are among the scholars who have used one version or another of this notion. However, it is not clear to me that it is at all appropriate to posit a simultaneous awareness of two thoughts or subjects in order to account for metaphorical meaning.

Without doubt, we may experience a metaphor in terms of juxtaposed subjects, thoughts or images. However, at least in

much contemporary semantic literature such psychological effects of utterances are considered phenomena distinct from the meaning of the utterances (see, for example, Fodor 1977:13ff and Lyons 1977:112-114). If we are to hold that an exception to this general principle is necessary in order to account for what can be distinctive about metaphorical expression, it would seem appropriate to show first that it is not possible to account for these aspects in relation to more conventional contemporary semantic conceptions of what is and is not linguistic meaning. In my analysis I try to account for a number of aspects of metaphorical expression by means of an analysis of phenomena which in most conventional contemporary semantic literature are considered to be related to the issue of meaning.

Monroe Beardsley

Monroe Beardsley has proposed a theory of metaphor which he calls at various times "Controversion," or "Verbal-opposition," and "self-controversion" theory (Beardsley 1958:138 and 1962:293-294). The original presentation of this theory is in a work entitled Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (Beardsley 1958:134-147). Beardsley amends his original proposal in an article entitled "The Metaphorical Twist" (Beardsley 1962). In my discussion, I rely primarily on the

original presentation in Aesthetics, although I note and discuss changes Beardsley made in the subsequent article.

For Beardsley, the problem of understanding metaphor is directly related to the problem of interpreting literary works. In Aesthetics (Beardsley 1958), Beardsley focusses on metaphor in order to argue against the idea that the interpretation or explication of a literary work is a purely "relativistic" affair.

Beardsley writes:

The Relativistic Theory implies that no explication is wrong, for explication makes no claim of objective validity when properly understood. That is because it depends at two vital points upon the idiosyncracies of the individual reader: his personal association with words, and his personal preferences about poems.

(Beardsley 1958:133-134)

Beardsley argues against this theory and the impressionist view of art which it represents. For Beardsley, "...there are principles of explication for poetry in terms of which disagreements about the correctness of proposed explications can be settled" (Beardsley 1958:49).

Beardsley believes that the meanings of a poem are part of the "objective" qualities of the literary aesthetic object; that is, those qualities of an aesthetic object which are invariant and, in being invariant, mark the object as a single aesthetic object. According to Beardsley, if there are different and equally valid meanings to a poem, as the "impressionists" hold, then "<t>here is no one poem; there are many poems; indeed as many as there are readings" (Beardsley 1958:49).

Beardsley tries to use metaphor as a "test case" for his argument against relativism. He tries to show that there are principles of interpretation for metaphor, which constitute "a nonrelativistic logic of explication" (Beardsley 1958:134). Thus, Beardsley attempts to use his account of metaphor not only as a rebuttal of the relativistic approach to metaphorical interpretation, but also as a rebuttal of the relativistic approach to literature in general. "If we can give a satisfactory account of what is involved in such nuclei of poetic meaning, and if we can then show in a general way that what holds for them also holds for larger entities, like whole poems, then we shall be in a position to give a reasonable reply to the Relativistic Theory of Explication" (Beardsley 1958:134).

According to Beardsley (Beardsley 1958:122ff), there are two kinds of meaning which a natural language sentence can convey. One kind he calls "primary meaning" and the other he calls "secondary meaning."

The primary meaning of a declarative sentence is the statement which it explicitly makes and that we normally take as an articulation of the speaker's beliefs: "Declarative sentences normally give utterance to beliefs; if one says, 'Napoleon was a great general,' we usually take him to be saying something he believes to be true" (Beardsley 1958:123).

We consider a sentence to be true or false depending on the truth or falsehood of what its primary meaning expresses. For example, let us assume someone says "Napoleon was bald." If what the sentence explicitly states--that is, that Napoleon is bald--is true, we consider the sentence to be true; if we consider it false, we consider the sentence false (Beardsley 1958:123).

Beardsley, however, notes that not all kinds of sentences make explicit statements. An imperative sentence, for example, does not explicitly make a statement which we can consider to express the speaker's beliefs. Nevertheless, "...indirectly it may show that the speaker has a belief even though he does not state it. Thus, if one says, 'Please shut the window,' we may infer that he believes the window should be shut, or perhaps that he believes it is chilly. These beliefs are not stated, but they are in a technical sense of the term, suggested" (Beardsley 1958:123). Such suggestions Beardsley calls the "secondary meaning" of a sentence.

According to Beardsley, the primary and secondary meanings a

sentence expresses may be quite independent of each other: "A declarative sentence can state one thing and suggest another, and what it states may be true or false, and what it suggests may be true or false" (Beardsley 1958:123). As I mentioned earlier, however, Beardsley notes that a declarative sentence will be considered true or false on the basis of its primary meaning. What a sentence suggests then may be misleading, but it will not make the sentence false.

Just as there is a difference between the primary and secondary meaning of a sentence, there is, for Beardsley, a difference between the central meaning of a word and "its marginal or accompanying meanings" (Beardsley 1958:125).

The word "sea" designates certain characteristics, such as being a large body of salt water; that is its primary word-meaning. It also connotes certain other characteristics, such as being sometimes dangerous, being changeable in mood but endless in motion, being a thoroughfare, being a barrier, and so on. These are its secondary word-meanings. "Sister" and "female sibling" have the same designation, but they differ in connotation, for two women who are not literally siblings may be "sisters under the skin."

(Beardsley 1958:125)

Beardsley builds his theory of metaphor upon this dichotomy between the two kinds of meaning. In Aesthetics he calls this theory the "verbal-opposition" theory of metaphor.

According to Beardsley, metaphor is a subclass of a kind of discourse he calls "self-controverting discourse."

The essential principle of "self-controverting discourse" is that a speaker or writer utters a statement explicitly, but in such a way as to show that he does not believe what he states, or is not primarily interested in what he states, and finally calls attention to something else that he has not explicitly stated--"If he wins, I'll eat my hat."

(Beardsley 1958:138)

For Beardsley, metaphor involves a particular kind of self-controversion which he says involves an "attribution." "Attribution" is Beardsley's term for certain linguistic expressions which contain two or more words. At least one of these words must denote a class and characterize it in some way. At least one other must express something which "qualifies or modifies" the denoting word(s) (Beardsley 1958:139). The word or words which are modified, Beardsley calls "the subject" of the

attribution. The word or words which modify the subject, he calls "the modifier" of the attribution (Beardsley 1958:139).

Beardsley contends that metaphor involves attributions in which the modifier "designates some characteristics incompatible with the characteristics designated by the subject" (Beardsley 1958:110). The meaning of "incompatible" here is not exactly transparent. However, the term would appear to refer to the idea of a phrase which, if applied to some entity, leads us to infer a set of logically inconsistent conclusions about the entity. This would appear to be why Beardsley also uses the term "self-contradiction" to refer to these attributions. (Beardsley 1958:140).

Beardsley believes that when we encounter such self-contradictory attributions we sometimes ignore the contradictory aspects of the modifier. If the modifier has some connotations which can be "meaningfully attributed to the subject, we ignore the contradictory aspects of the modifier" (Beardsley 1958:140). According to Beardsley, under these circumstances we understand the modifier to attribute its connotations to the subject. "Then the expression becomes a significant self-contradiction" (Beardsley 1958:141). He says that such significant self-contradictions can either be direct, as in oxymorons, or indirect, as in metaphors.

To call a man a "fox" is indirectly self-contradictory because men are by definition bipeds and foxes quadrupeds, and it is logically impossible to be both. To call streets "metaphysical" is indirectly self-contradictory because streets are by definition physical, not metaphysical.

(Beardsley 1958:141)

As noted above, Beardsley^W says that significant self-contradictions which are indirectly contradictory, are metaphors. However, this is not to say that he thinks that only indirect self-contradictions are metaphors. Beardsley notes that we construe obviously false attributions in the same way as we do significant self-contradictions:

It is probably too strong to say that in D.H. Lawrence's lines,

You who take the moon as a sieve, and sift

Her flake by flake and spread her meaning out
("The Sea"), it is self-contradictory to speak of spreading a meaning out. Yet there is evidently something queer about this expression that shows us it is metaphorical, not literal. For another example, it

is a saying among theatrical people that "Outside Broadway, everything is Bridgeport," which evidently applies the connotations of the name of my much-maligned native city to the hinterlands in general...

(Beardsley 1958:142)

The only kinds of attributions which can be metaphors, according to Beardsley, are the obviously false and the indirectly self-contradictory. So, for Beardsley, "...a metaphor is a significant attribution that is either indirectly self-contradictory or obviously false in its context, and in which the modifier connotes characteristics that can be attributed truly or falsely to the subject" (Beardsley 1958:142).

Having thus defined metaphor, Beardsley goes on to explain further the role of connotation in metaphorical attribution. In particular, he applies himself to answering the question of which connotations can be attributed to a subject of a metaphorical attribution. He contends that we attribute to the subject of a metaphor all connotations of the modifier which can be attributed to the subject. He argues that there are two general principles which guide us when we make such attributions.

First, there is the Principle of Congruence. "Laminated" can connote the isolation of parts, but not in "laminated modulation," for modulations cannot have isolated parts. This is what "fitting" has to mean, I think; in assembling, or feeling out, the admissible connotations of words in a poem, we are guided by logical and physical possibilities. But second, there is the Principle of Plenitude. All the connotations which can be found to fit are to be attributed to the poem: it means all it can mean, so to speak.

(Beardsley 1958:144)

It is at this point that Beardsley's account of metaphorical interpretation converges with his approach to literature in general. Beardsley believes that the focus on secondary meaning which is characteristic of metaphor is characteristic of literary works in general (Beardsley 1958:126). So, as can be seen from the passage quoted above, his two principles for interpreting metaphorical attributions are principles for interpreting the kind of meaning characteristic of literary works. This would appear to be the reason that Beardsley feels justified in using an account of metaphorical interpretation to talk about literary interpretation in general.

But what is the status of these principles? Are they

descriptions of the way we usually interpret metaphors and literary texts? Are they prescriptions? Beardsley answers these questions somewhat ambiguously. He argues that we should interpret metaphors and literary texts according to these principles, and that, in part, most literary critics do indeed read them this way. Beardsley first writes: "There can be no doubt that the method produces agreement among critics in a large number of cases" (Beardsley 1958:145). A little later he writes: "The explication, under the Principles of Congruence and Plenitude, show what constitutes a correct performance" (Beardsley 1958:146).

Be this as it may, there is still the question of what happens if we know offhand of no characteristic which the modifier connotes and which can be appropriately applied to the subject of the attribution. In Aesthetics, Beardsley does not address this issue directly. However, he does say that we never know all the connotations of a word "beforehand" (Beardsley 1958:143) and that we often discover connotations when a word is used as a metaphorical modifier.

But how can we discover these connotative aspects of meaning which we did not know of beforehand? If such meaning is, as Beardsley claims, "new contextual meaning," we presumably cannot find it in a dictionary. We are led back to the question of what we do when we know of no appropriate connotations beforehand.

In "The Metaphorical Twist" (Beardsley 1962), Beardsley does

recognize the problem and indirectly proposes a solution to it as part of an account of two different kinds of metaphor. In this article, he claims that the connotation of a word is taken from among the "accidental" properties which are nevertheless believed to be "characteristic" of the entities for which the word stands (Beardsley 1962:294). Beardsley claims that at any particular point in time, some of these properties function standardly as implications of the word. He calls these the "staple connotations" of the word at that point in time (Beardsley 1962:300).

This is not to say that other accidental but characteristic properties cannot be part of the connotation of the word. Beardsley claims such properties "...may wait, so to speak, lurking in the nature of things, for actualization..." (Beardsley 1962:300).

The distinction between staple connotations and potential connotations is, according to Beardsley, parallel to the difference between two types of metaphor. These two kinds of metaphor, he calls "Class I" and "Class II" type metaphors respectively.

Class I metaphors are those which, though not dead, somehow seem trite and banal. Beardsley offers "smiling sun" and "the moon peeping from behind a cloud" as examples of this type of metaphor (Beardsley 1962:300-301).

Class II metaphors are "...more complex than Class I

metaphors. They seem to say more about the object. They are thus more precise, more discriminating, as descriptions" (Beardsley 1962:301).

Beardsley suggests that we can account for the difference between these two types of metaphor by the difference between staple and potential connotations. He proposes that the more complex (Class II) metaphors have modifiers whose staple connotations are not appropriate for the subject of the metaphorical attribution. In these cases, Beardsley claims, we must examine the entities to which the word literally applies and see which accidental, characteristic properties of these entities could be attributed to the subject. Such properties, when so attributed, become for the moment part of the sense of the metaphorical modifier (Beardsley 1962:303). As an example of how this works, Beardsley uses the phrase "the inconstant moon."

Let us suppose that when the metaphor "the inconstant moon" is first constructed in English, it is the first time that "inconstant" has been used metaphorically--or at last the first time that it has been applied to an inanimate object...At this moment the word "inconstant" has no connotations. When, therefore, we find "inconstant moon," we seize upon the verbal opposition, all right, but when we look for

relevant connotation we are balked...<W>e look about among the accidental or contingent properties of inconstant people in general, and attribute these properties, or as many as we can, to the moon. And these properties would, for the moment at least, become part of the meaning of "inconstant," though previously they were only properties of people.

(Beardsley 1962:301-302)

If these newly discovered characteristics become commonly used implications of the word, then they also become staple connotations. Moreover, "when a connotation becomes so standardized for certain kinds of context, it may be shifted to a new status, where it becomes a necessary condition for applying the word in that context" (Beardsley 1962:303).

So, for Beardsley, the problem of what we do when we do not know of appropriate connotations is really the problem of how we interpret the more novel and complex metaphors. As I think can be seen from my brief description, Beardsley's solution is to posit a process by which we may create or find characteristics which can at least momentarily be connotations of the kind we lack for these cases.

There are a number of aspects of Beardsley's discussion

which I believe touch on important issues about metaphor. I would first like to discuss his proposal concerning self-contradiction and "evident" falsehood.

As we have seen, neither Aristotle, Richards, nor Black believes that metaphor necessarily involves falsehood--be it "evident" falsehood or logical inconsistency. Aristotle includes genus-to-species transference as one kind of metaphor. The application in an utterance of a name to an entity which is in one of its species will not yield a false statement. For example, calling a man "a human being" will not make false an utterance of which this appellation is part.

Richards says that we have a metaphor any time we have an utterance in which a word can be understood to express two separate thoughts. The literal falsehood of the utterance in which the word is used does not appear to be necessary in order for the word to express two separate thoughts. This indeed seems clearly indicated by Richards' discussion of the metaphorical potential of the word "leg" (see discussion of Richards above).

Black claims that there are no particular criteria which will allow us to recognize metaphor in every case. On these grounds he attacks Beardsley in "More About Metaphor" for suggesting falsehood as such a criterion (Black 1979a:34-35).

As we can see even from the brief descriptions I have just presented, these scholars do not appear to be using the term "metaphor" to refer to the same domain of phenomena. The issue

does not seem to be whether Beardsley is correctly characterizing metaphor when he claims that metaphors are not literally true (see also Kates 1980:222 and Lowenberg 1975:331ff)--while others like Aristotle are wrong when they do not. The issue rather seems to be which domain of phenomena should be labelled as the class of metaphors.

One might argue that we could appeal to some intuitive concept of metaphor. However, I am rather doubtful that such an appeal would help when, as we have seen, even the experts do not agree. It is likely that we would find differences in the conceptions of non-specialists as well. Moreover, the endeavor would, I think, be beside the point. It does not make a physicist wrong if what he calls energy is rather different than what non-physicists use the term to designate. What is important is that he can use his conception to make interesting theories.

The same point is, I think, valid in relation to conceptions of metaphor. What is important is not whether some scholar's conception of metaphor is the same as everyone's. Rather, what is important is whether the scholar can use that conception to create an interesting theory of metaphor.

In my own analysis, I will adopt Beardsley's conception that metaphor involves literally false statements. This is not to say that I completely accept Beardsley's characterization of metaphor as literally false. Most importantly, I do not think that it is crucial for an utterance to be actually false. Rather, I

think that what is important is that we consider it to be false (cf. Lovenberg 1975:331ff). In the second chapter, I discuss my reasons for thinking this to be the case and attempt to provide a framework in which this notion of "considering true or not true" can be understood theoretically.

It is perhaps worth commenting here upon Beardsley's claim that what metaphors attribute can be true or false. It should be noted that this contention puts Beardsley in direct disagreement with Black who, as I have noted above, argues that we cannot in any meaningful way talk about the truth or falsity of metaphors (at least not "interesting" ones).

I think Black is simply wrong in contending that we cannot meaningfully say that metaphors in general are true or false. It is, I think, quite possible to argue meaningfully about the truth or falsehood, for example, of what Shakespeare means by "Life's but a walking shadow" (Shakespeare 1975a:1068; Act 5, scene 7)--a metaphor which presumably Black would find "interesting" enough to consider covered by his claim. We may, for example, understand this metaphor to be expressing the idea that life is vacuous, and I see no reason to say that we cannot meaningfully discuss the truth or falsehood of this statement.

It should be noted that I am not claiming here that we all necessarily understand the metaphor to be saying the same thing. The variability of metaphorical interpretation is an interesting phenomenon, but I do not think it is pertinent to the question of

whether or not under a particular interpretation a metaphor will express true or false statements.

I do not think that the truth or falsity of what we understand a metaphor to be expressing is different than the truth or falsity of what is expressed by literally interpreted utterances. For example, the statement we can infer from Shakespeare's metaphor about life's emptiness can, I believe, be considered true or false in just the same way as a statement we can infer from a literally interpreted utterance.

What is distinctive about metaphor, I think, is the way in which we make inferences and the interrelations among these inferences. As I will try to show below, the way in which we make metaphorical interpretations (and hence metaphorical inferences) can be understood in terms of a rather different notion of metaphorical truth than the more empirical kind of truth to which Beardsley appears to refer. As will be seen below, my starting point in developing this notion will be Paul Ricoeur's proposal for metaphorical truth (see discussion of Ricoeur above).

I would now like to proceed to the second aspect of Beardsley's discussion which I find to be interesting: his discussion of connotation. As noted above, Black refers to "non-dictionary" aspects of meaning as an important part of metaphorical meaning. Beardsley's discussion, however, provides, I believe, a somewhat more precise account of the nature of the

"associated commonplaces" and "system of implications" to which Black refers.

Most importantly, Beardsley makes clear that what is under discussion are characteristics which are contingent rather than necessary. Black is not clear as to the nature of his "commonplaces" and "implications." In addition, Beardsley, unlike Black, stresses the fact that the properties in question are considered typical or characteristic of the entities to which the metaphorically used word is literally applied.

I will use these ideas as my starting point in analyzing the role of "secondary" meaning in metaphorical meaning. This, of course, implies that I do not find Beardsley's conception completely acceptable and indeed this is the case. However, I will discuss what I believe to be the shortcomings of his conception in the seventh chapter of this dissertation.

I would like now to turn to the final aspect of Beardsley's analysis which I would like to discuss: his account of complex metaphorical meaning. In his original discussion, Beardsley claims that his principles of Congruence and Plenitude allow us to read poems "as complexly and coherently as possible" (Beardsley 1958:141). It is true that in allowing for as many connotations as possible, Beardsley's principles of Congruence and Plenitude allow for complex relations among the connotations. However, the principles in no way constitute an account of the complexity.

In "The Metaphorical Twist" (Beardsley 1962:301), Beardsley says more about complex metaphorical meaning. He suggests there that metaphors are more complex when they involve the attribution of properties which are potential rather than staple connotations.

It is possible to surmise that the complexity to which Beardsley refers is a matter of the difficulty encountered in finding appropriate properties for a metaphorical attribution when none of the staple connotations will do. However, even understood in this way, Beardsley's proposal is not very informative about metaphorical complexity. Difficulty in finding a meaning does not necessarily imply complexity in meaning. Beardsley gives us no reason to think it does so in the case of metaphor.

Still, Beardsley is trying to account for an important property of metaphor. Many scholars believe that the fact that metaphor can express complex meanings is one major reason why metaphor is such an important language device in literary works. In Chapter 8 I will address this issue.

Paul Ricoeur

Paul Ricoeur has written a major work on metaphor entitled La métaphore vive (Ricoeur 1975a), which has been translated into

English under the title The Rule of Metaphor (Ricoeur 1977). In addition, he has devoted one of the chapters of his Biblical Hermeneutics (Ricoeur 1975b:75-106) to the subject and most recently written an essay on metaphor called "The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling" (Ricoeur 1979) (see also Ricoeur 1976:46-53).

In the discussion which follows, I rely primarily on The Rule of Metaphor (Ricoeur 1977). However, as is my practice throughout this chapter, I refer to works other than the "primary" one(s) when I believe such references to be pertinent.

In The Rule of Metaphor, Ricoeur discusses theories of metaphor, ranging from Aristotle's to those of such moderns as Richards and Black. Ricoeur tries to combine elements of a number of different theories in order to develop a comprehensive theory of metaphor. His discussions of the various theories are rather lengthy, and because of their length I will not try to paraphrase them. Rather, I will discuss them only in relation to what I believe are the main elements in Ricoeur's conception of metaphor.

Ricoeur divides theories of metaphor into four classes: those that view metaphor from the perspective of rhetoric, those that view metaphor from the perspective of the semantics of discourse, those that view it from the perspective of the semantics of the word, and those that view it from a hermeneutic perspective (Ricoeur 1977:3-7). Each type corresponds to a focus

on a different level of analysis.

Ricoeur begins The Rule of Metaphor with a discussion of Aristotle's treatment of metaphor. According to Ricoeur, Aristotle "...defined metaphor for the entire subsequent history of Western thought, on the basis of a semantics that takes the word or the name as its basic unit" (Ricoeur 1977:3). Ricoeur contends that for Aristotle metaphor involves three things: a "deviation from ordinary usage," a "borrowing from an original domain," and a "substitution for an absent but available word" (Ricoeur 1977:20). Ricoeur notes several times that Aristotle treats the "displacement" or "movement" which is implicit in this analysis as a displacement or movement of names (Ricoeur 1977:16, 18, 21, etc.); that is, as something that happens particularly to nouns.

This focus excludes the possibility of looking at metaphor as a statement making device. According to Ricoeur, this possibility is excluded even if we (as seems natural) understand Aristotle to be discussing metaphor in terms of "composite significant sound," which can be attributed not only to nouns but also to other parts of speech as well. Ricoeur contends that "...even in the broadest of interpretations, the 'composite significant sound' would at the most designate the word and not the sentence. This kernel, common to the noun and to other things besides the noun, cannot really designate specifically the unity of meaning of statements..." (Ricoeur 1977:16)

Moreover, the idea that metaphor involves a substitution, according to Ricoeur, implies that metaphor does not contribute anything distinctive to what is expressed. Since the replaced term can be reintroduced, presumably with no difference in meaning, the metaphorically interpreted word cannot be said to convey any new information (Ricoeur 1977:20).

Nevertheless, Ricoeur feels that Aristotle's treatment of metaphor does not entirely reduce metaphor to an ornament. For one thing, Ricoeur argues that while the notions of substitution and borrowing are closely linked in Aristotle's treatment of metaphor, they are nevertheless not linked by necessity. Ricoeur points out that Aristotle indicates that in some cases of proportional metaphor (i.e., metaphor by analogy), there is no term for which the metaphorical word can be considered a substitute (Ricoeur 1977:20).

Moreover, according to Ricoeur, there are aspects of Aristotle's treatment of metaphor which do not fit into his explicit nominalistic definition of metaphor as mere ornament. These aspects of Aristotle's treatment indicate that metaphor involves predication. Predication, Ricoeur contends throughout his work, can only be properly understood as a fact of discourse.

According to Ricoeur, one of the aspects of Aristotle's treatment which does not fit into his nominalistic definition relates to Aristotle's belief that metaphor involves resemblance. Ricoeur relates Aristotle's belief that metaphor involves

resemblance to his linking of simile to metaphor. Ricoeur notes that for Aristotle simile is a kind of metaphor and that both involve the "apprehension of resemblances" (Ricoeur 1977:27). Ricoeur, however, contends that in Rhetoric, Aristotle subordinates simile to metaphor because he believes that underlying the metaphorical transference of "...an alien name, a strange attribution operates...an attribution whose grounds simile makes clear only by displaying them in deliberate comparison" (Ricoeur 1977:26). In other words, metaphor makes an attribution--that is, a (presumably non-ornamental) predication--based on a resemblance (Ricoeur 1975:27). It is this resemblance which a simile displays (presumably as an ornament) (Ricoeur 1977:27).

For Ricoeur, Aristotle's discussion of metaphor as an element of diction, and, as such, as an element of poetic imitation (mimesis) also does not fit into Aristotle's explicit nominalistic definition of metaphor. Ricoeur argues that, as an element of poetic imitation, metaphor "...takes part in the double tension that characterizes this imitation: submission to reality and fabulous invention, unaltering representation and enobling elevation" (Ricoeur 1977:40). Ricoeur seems to be saying that metaphor has a non-ornamental predicative function; "<a>bstracted from this referential function, metaphor plays itself out in substitution and dissipates itself in ornamentation" (Ricoeur 1977:40).

Still, according to Ricoeur, rhetoric does not take from Aristotle aspects of his account which imply a predicative and hence discourse related theory, but rather aspects which imply a nominalistic substitution theory in which metaphor is treated as an ornament. Ricoeur examines Les Figures du discours by Pierre Fontanier (see Fontanier 1968:esp. 79-141 and 209-219) in order to show that a nominalistic approach which views metaphor in terms of word meaning cannot account for discourse related properties of metaphor. However, Ricoeur argues that rhetorical analyses such as Fontanier's both implicitly and explicitly indicate the existence of discourse related properties.

According to Ricoeur, rhetorical theories such as Fontanier's view metaphor as the borrowing of an "alien" term in order to apply to it something to which another word applies; that is, an "absent word...which is lacking or which one does not wish to use..." (Ricoeur 1977:46) "The price paid" for applying an alien borrowed word is that the application of this word is considered a deviation (Ricoeur 1977:46). The basis for the borrowing is a relationship of "resemblance" between the borrowed word and the absent word. However, this resemblance is not what the metaphor expresses. Rather, what it expresses is the meaning (or idea) of some proper word or expression for which it can be considered a substitute (Ricoeur 1977:46). "In principle restitutive paraphrase is exhaustive, so the algebraic sum of substitution and subsequent restitution is zero" (Ricoeur

1977:46; see also p. 45).

As we can see, such rhetorical theories try to explain metaphor solely in terms of words and word meanings rather than discourse and discourse meaning. Yet, Ricoeur argues, the very operation of borrowing a word from an alien sphere and applying it to some object would seem to have a close relation with the "predicative operation" (Ricoeur 1977:47), an operation which exists only within discourse.

Moreover, Ricoeur contends, the relation of resemblance "has to do with the character that things are believed to have..." (Ricoeur 1977:58). According to Ricoeur, "...characterization, as distinct from naming, is formed through comparisons of opinions, that is, within the realm of judgment" (Ricoeur 1977:58). This, Ricoeur believes, indicates that metaphor has a "quasi-predicative" nature (Ricoeur 1977:57).

Ricoeur contends the "quasi-predicative" nature of metaphor is also indicated by another aspect of the rhetorical perspective. Pontanier notes that metonymy and synecdoche are restricted to nouns, while metaphor, on the other hand, can involve "'all the species of words'" (Ricoeur 1977:57). Ricoeur seems to be arguing that metonymy and synecdoche are restricted to nouns because they involve only a designative kind of naming, while metaphor even when it does name, does so by characterizing. Hence not only nouns but parts of speech which do not designate--that is, adjectives, adverbs and verbs--"lend

themselves readily" to metaphor because they have a predicative characterizing function. (Ricoeur 1977:57). Again, it should be remembered that Ricoeur believes this predicative nature can exist and so be understood only within the context of discourse.

Ricoeur notes that Pontanier himself is forced to look at metaphor within the context of discourse in order to distinguish newly invented metaphor from both catechresis and dead metaphor (Ricoeur 1977:62-64). Ricoeur points out that for Pontanier newly invented metaphor is distinguished from catachresis by the fact that, unlike catachresis, the use (in discourse) of newly invented metaphor is not forced by a semantic lacuna--that is, by the need to change the meaning of some word in order to fill the vocabulary needs of some discourse. Newly invented metaphor is distinguished from dead metaphor in that newly invented metaphor, unlike dead metaphor, involves a use of a word (in discourse) not constrained by usage.

Because metaphor has so many discourse related properties, Ricoeur believes that the rhetorical perspective which focusses on the meaning of words rather than discourse cannot provide an adequate account of the phenomenon. This does not mean that Ricoeur sees nothing useful in the rhetorical perspective which focusses on word meaning. As noted above, Ricoeur does not see any necessary link between the notion that metaphor involves an ornamental nominalistic substitution and the notion that metaphor involves borrowing an "alien" word. For this reason, he is able

to take from the rhetorical perspective the idea that metaphor involves the borrowing of a word without also being committed to a substitution theory of metaphor (Ricoeur 1977:65-66). Ricoeur tries to introduce this notion into a rather different kind of theory, a kind of theory which looks at discourse--particularly the sentence-statement--as the unit in terms of which metaphor is to be understood.

Following Emile Benveniste, Ricoeur calls this perspective "the semantics of discourse" (Ricoeur 1977:66-76). For Ricoeur, Richards, Black and Beardsley are prominent among the authors ("English language authors") who use this perspective to account for metaphor.

From these scholars, Ricoeur takes the idea that metaphor involves a statement which "...consists in talking about one thing in terms of another..." (Ricoeur 1977:83). From Beardsley in particular, he takes the idea that the metaphor-statement involves "logical absurdity" on the literal level (Ricoeur 1977:96-98). This "semantic collision" (Ricoeur 1977:97), Ricoeur later suggests, can be characterized as a kind of "tension," a term he borrows from Richards (Ricoeur 1977:247 and Richards 1965:124).

The problem is how to characterize metaphorical meaning itself. Ricoeur argues that if we simply take metaphor as a semantic innovation which results from a "semantic collision" (Ricoeur 1977:97), then we in effect still have a substitution

theory of metaphor. "Instead of substituting (as does classical rhetoric) a literal meaning, restored by paraphrase, for the metaphorical expression, we would be substituting (with Black and Beardsley) the systems of connotations and commonplaces" (Ricoeur 1977:98).

Ricoeur contends that we should look at metaphor not simply as the semantic change which results from a semantic collision, but also as "...the construction of the network of interactions that causes a certain context to be the one that is real and unique" (Ricoeur 1977:98). For Ricoeur, metaphor should be viewed as a semantic event rather than simply a change of meaning. Moreover, the event occurs for the hearer rather than the speaker, since only from the hearer's point of view is the construction of the interpretation an identifiable event time and time again (Ricoeur 1977:98-99).

In order to characterize this event, Ricoeur takes from interaction type theories (that is, theories such as Richards', Black's, and Beardsley's) the idea that the metaphor-statement on the metaphorical level involves an attribution or predication. He writes:

A metaphor distinguishes some principal subject and, as modifier of this subject, operates like a sort of attribution. All the theories to which I referred

earlier <that is, interaction type theories--A.B.> rest on this predicative structure, whether they oppose 'vehicle' to 'tenor,' 'focus' to 'frame,' or 'modifier' to 'principal subject.'

(Ricoeur 1977:99)

In "The Metaphorical Process" (Ricoeur 1979), Ricoeur puts this point into more conventional logical terminology:

The interaction process does not merely consist of the substitution of a word for a word, of a name for a name...but in an interaction between a logical subject and a predicate...Metaphor...has to be described as a deviant predication rather than a deviant denomination.

(Ricoeur 1979:143)

The move from a literal interpretation to a metaphorical interpretation, Ricoeur characterizes as a second kind of "tension" (Ricoeur 1977:247). However, while Ricoeur takes much from interaction type theories, he does not accept their characterization of the metaphorical sense attributed in the metaphorical statement. For Ricoeur, neither Beardsley's nor

Black's proposal overcomes the basic problem.

...the 'potential range of connotations' (that is, what Beardsley says a metaphorical attribution attributes--A.B.) says nothing more than the 'system of associated commonplaces' (Black's term for the same--A.B.). Of course, we enlarge the notion of meaning by including secondary meanings as connotations within the perimeter of the entire meaning; but we have not stopped relating the creative process of metaphor to a non-creative aspect of language.

(Ricoeur 1977:98)

Even Beardsley's later proposals are not satisfactory, according to Ricoeur. As we have seen, in "The Metaphorical Twist" Beardsley claims that when we have no appropriate connotations we can create some by looking at typical properties of the entities to which the metaphorically used word literally applies. Ricoeur claims that this "is to admit that the new emerging meaning is not taken from anywhere, at least not from anywhere within the language..." (Ricoeur 1977:98).

This is not to say that Ricoeur believes that Beardsley's later contention is incorrect. However, he does not feel it

really solves the problem of metaphorical meaning (Ricoeur 1977:99), but only recognizes it "for what it is, namely, a creation of language that comes to be at that moment, a semantic innovation without status in the language as something already established with respect to either designation or connotation" (Ricoeur 1977:98).

It is at this point that Ricoeur returns to the contribution of word meaning to metaphorical meaning. This time the perspective from which Ricoeur looks at word meaning is that of what he calls--following Benveniste--the "semantics of the word." In particular, he examines the work of Stephen Ullmann.

The perspective of the semantics of the word is based on certain ideas of Ferdinand de Saussure (see, for example, de Saussure 1966). One of de Saussure's most important ideas for semantics was the idea that words have meaning or significance because they are part of a network, the units of which are other words. The word-elements of this network are connected by similarity and distinguished from each other by their differences. For de Saussure, as well as for others such as Ullmann who followed in his footsteps, the semantic links between the word-elements in the network are psychological associations (Ricoeur 1977:117f).

From this proposal of de Saussure, comes the idea that the words of a language are organized in a number of overlapping semantic fields or classes. The notion that these classes

overlap is important, because any word can belong to a number of different classes. For example, the word "bachelor" can be considered part of the class (male human) and the class (unmarried human). These overlapping semantic classes are related to each other through a hierarchy. For example, the classes (male human) and (unmarried human) are both subordinate to the class (human). Words which belong to semantic classes dominated by the same higher class share meaning, as may be seen by even a cursory examination of the three classes mentioned above.

From the theories of scholars such as Ullmann (see Ullmann 1963) who use the notion of semantic fields, Ricoeur derives the idea that metaphor creates new meaning. These semantic innovations can be understood in terms of the principle of association--that is, within the context of the theory of semantic fields mentioned above. "The usual association between...a meaning and...a word is found wanting; the idea seeks expression through another word associated with the first, sometimes by resemblance, sometimes by contiguity; what results is sometimes metaphor, at other times metonymy" (Ricoeur 1977:118).

So, the old "literal" meaning and the new "metaphorical" meaning are related to each other through their being elements in classes which are dominated by the same higher semantic class. Thus they share meaning with each other and may be said to

resemble each other insofar as they do so. This is an important theoretical insight for Ricoeur, because he believes that "Truly the key to metaphor is the perception of a resemblance between two ideas..." (Ricoeur 1977:119).

This does not mean, of course, that Ricoeur does not see problems in this analysis (Ricoeur 1977 126-133). For one thing, the words of a language are only partially structured and therefore their structure cannot supply a completely principled explanation of the relations between the explicit and implicit meanings. In addition, there are many characteristics of words which cannot be properly described without reference to discourse, in particular the predicating function of words. As we have seen, Ricoeur considers this to be an essential aspect of metaphor. Finally, only in actual discourse are the meanings of words fixed. Outside of discourse the meanings of words are vague. In discourse words have actual references and it is through these referents that the meanings of words are fixed.

In this way Ricoeur leads us back to an examination of theories which look at metaphor within the context of discourse. He examines the so-called "la nouvelle rhétorique" in order to see better how the idea of metaphor as a change of word meaning can be understood in terms of a theory which considers metaphor to be a fact of discourse (Ricoeur 1977:134-172). He refers in particular to the theories of the Groupe (see Dubois et. al. 1970). From his examination of these theorists of "la nouvelle

rhétorique," Ricoeur derives the idea that the change of word meaning which occurs in a metaphor allows for a "reduction of deviation"--that is, a resolution of the "deviation" which occurs on the level of discourse.

From "la nouvelle rhétorique," Ricoeur also adopts the idea that the discourse of "syntagmatic" deviation is best understood as a "semantic impertinence"--that is, a lack of "meaningfulness" or "relevance" (see Ricoeur 1977:151). This notion of impertinence replaces the less general one of "semantic collision" which Ricoeur uses in relation to Beardsley. The notion of semantic impertinence allows Ricoeur to include among potential metaphorical utterances not only those which involve the logical and obvious falsehoods which Beardsley discusses, but other kinds of "deviance" as well: semantic redundancy, and the irrelevance of an utterance relative to a context are examples of these other kinds of "deviance".

Nevertheless, although Ricoeur argues that metaphor involves the "reduction of a deviation," he does not accept the idea that the resolution simply involves a change in word meaning. He argues that what the theories of "la nouvelle rhétorique" leave out is that the change of meaning which "reduces" the semantic impertinence results in a new semantic pertinence (Ricoeur 1977:156).

Returned thus to its place, paradigmatic deviation recovers its full value. It corresponds, in the interaction theory, to the phenomenon of focalization on the word ...Metaphorical meaning is an effect of the entire statement, but it is focused on one word, which can be called the metaphorical word. This is why one must say that metaphor is a semantic innovation that belongs at once to the predicative order (new pertinence) and the lexical order (paradigmatic deviation).

(Ricoeur 1977: 156-157)

As I have noted above, in "The Metaphorical Process" Ricoeur seems to drop the idea that metaphor must involve a whole natural language sentence. In its place he introduces the idea that it involves a logical statement.

However, Ricoeur does not believe that an essentially interactional analysis of metaphor employing elements of a semantic field theory adequately explains the relation of the literal and new meanings of metaphor. "La nouvelle rhétorique" treats Black's "associated commonplaces" as though they were a part of the primary meaning. For Ricoeur, this is not satisfactory.

Can one say that 'fox' analyses into 'animal' plus 'sly' in the same way as 'mare' analyses into 'horse' plus 'female'?...There is, of course, no clearly marked border between the lexical code and the cultural code: expressions which are called figurative register the partial inscription of the latter in the former. But this semi-lexicalised status of commonplaces is not ignored by linguistic consciousness, which, even in the case of metaphor in common use, still distinguishes between literal meaning and figurative meaning.

(Ricoeur 1977: 168-169)

So, the innovations of the "la nouvelle rhétorique" do not resolve the problem of an adequate theoretical account of Black's "associated implications." Ricoeur identifies these "associated implications" with the figurative aspect of metaphorical meaning. In fact, it would appear that Ricoeur considers "associated implications" to be a characteristic of figurative meaning which distinguishes it from lexical (literal) meaning. A word-based analysis cannot therefore adequately account for them.

In order to account for the metaphorical meaning, Ricoeur examines what he calls "psycholinguistics." His discussion of the specificity of metaphorical meaning seems to derive particularly from Marcus B. Hester's The Meaning of Poetic

Metaphor (Hester 1967; see also Hester 1966).

Ricoeur reintroduces the concept of resemblance which he first discusses in relation to Aristotle. He argues that the notion of resemblance is necessary in order to characterize the "new pertinence" which is the metaphorical meaning of a metaphor:

The metaphorical meaning as such is not the semantic clash but the new pertinence that answers its challenge...It is in this mutation of meaning that resemblance plays its part...<I>f it serves some purpose in metaphor, resemblance must be a characteristic of the attribution of predicates and not of the substitution of names. What constitutes the new pertinence is the kind of semantic 'proximity' established between the terms despite their 'distance' apart. Things that until that moment were 'far apart' suddenly appear as 'closely related.'

(Ricoeur 1977:194)

So, the question for Ricoeur is how to characterize resemblance as a kind of predication--that is, in saying something about entities rather than in simply denominating and hence classifying entities (Ricoeur 1977:193-215). In order to

find an answer to this question, Ricoeur ultimately refers to the work of Hester (Hester 1967; see also Hester 1966).

Ricoeur takes from Hester the idea that the role of resemblance in metaphor is best understood as a "seeing as"--an idea Hester himself adopts from Ludwig Wittgenstein (see, for example, Wittgenstein 1958:193-208). According to Ricoeur, "seeing as" for Wittgenstein and Hester is not a matter of an hypothesis which can be verified, but rather, it is "half thought and half experience" (Ricoeur 1977:212).

Hester proposes that in relation to metaphor "seeing as" can be understood as a selection of the "relevant aspects" of the "mass of imagery one has on reading metaphor" (Ricoeur 1977:213; Hester 1967:180). On the basis of Hester's proposal, Ricoeur argues that metaphorical meaning involves first of all an "imaging" which is "beyond all voluntary control" (Ricoeur 1977:213). This, according to Ricoeur, is the aspect of metaphor which cannot be learned: "...the image arises, occurs, and there is no rule to be learned for 'having images'" (Ricoeur 1977:213).

However, this imaging, Ricoeur claims, is not "free." Rather, it is "tied" to the "seeing as": as Hester proposes, we select from the "imagistic fullness" those aspects which will be "relevant." For Ricoeur, this means selecting aspects which will allow us to see a resemblance: "In the case of metaphor, to depict time in terms of the characteristics of a beggar is to see time as a beggar" (Ricoeur 1977:212).

This metaphorical seeing of something in terms of an image of something else, Ricoeur later characterizes in terms of the copula often used to identify the two: he calls the relation the metaphorical use of the copula. The relation this metaphorical copula expresses involves for Ricoeur a third kind of tension: "between identity and difference in the interplay of resemblance" (Ricoeur 1977:247; see also p. 248).

This account of metaphorical meaning does not complete Ricoeur's account of metaphor. As has been noted above, metaphor above all else involves an act of predication; that is, an act of saying something about some entity or entities. So, the metaphorical meaning in a metaphor must be saying something about an entity or entities. This raises the question which Ricoeur addresses next: how to characterize what metaphor says about the entity of which it is predicated.

Ricoeur tries to answer the question in terms of texts, or more precisely, in terms of what metaphors say about things as parts of texts. For Ricoeur this is a question of the relation between texts and the world; that is, a question of hermeneutics, which, for Ricoeur, "...is simply the theory that regulates the transition from the structure of the work to the world of the work" (Ricoeur 1977:220). In trying to account for the relation between metaphor and its reference, Ricoeur examines, among others, works of Roman Jakobson, Nelson Goodman, Max Black, Mary Hesse, Philip Wheelwright, Colin Murray Turbayne, and Douglas

Berggren (Ricoeur 1977:215-256; see Bibliography for references).

Ricoeur argues that all texts ultimately refer to the world. However, certain texts, that is literary (or more precisely, fictional) ones, would appear to be exceptions to the rule. Not so, argues Ricoeur. They simply refer to a reality in a roundabout way.

Poetic language refers to an imaginary world which it creates. This imaginary world is a "heuristic fiction" through which the "poetic function" "...seeks to redescribe reality" (Ricoeur 1977:247). As a matter of fact, metaphorical truth is the poetic function of metaphor for Ricoeur: "We can presume to speak of metaphorical truth in order to designate the 'realistic' intention that belongs to the redescriptive power of poetic language" (Ricoeur 1977:247).

In Biblical Hermeneutics (Ricoeur 1975b), Ricoeur is quite clear as to how poetic language such as metaphor redescribes reality. The link with resemblance is clear: "Poetic language does not say literally what things are, but what they are like. It is in this oblique fashion that it says what they are" (Ricoeur 1975b:88). Ricoeur proposes that metaphor does the same. The metaphorical imaging is a fictional or mythic means of redescribing its referent. Paradoxically, metaphorical truth says what it is by means of a redescription, even while at the same time being literally false. This is the fourth and final metaphorical tension: the tension between a metaphorical truth

and the literal falsehood which the metaphorical truth includes (Ricoeur 1977:247ff).

The paradox consists in the fact that there is no other way to do justice to the notion of metaphorical truth than to include the critical incision of the (literal) 'is not' within the ontological vehemence of the (metaphorical) 'is.'

(Ricoeur 1977:255)

I would like to begin my comments on Ricoeur by noting that it is far from clear what linguistic phenomena Ricoeur considers metaphor. In discussing the difference between Pontanier's and Aristotle's conceptions of the domain of inquiry, Ricoeur writes:

Next, Aristotle treats metaphor as a genus, not as a species. Aristotle's metaphor is a trope for Pontanier; and Pontanier's metaphor corresponds approximately to the fourth species of metaphor in Aristotle's scheme. This difference seems more serious than the preceding one; however, it can be treated, up

to a certain point, as just a difference of glossary.

(Ricoeur 1977:55)

Up to what point? Ricoeur never says. Nor does he say whether he is referring to Pontanier's domain, Aristotle's, or some other, when he makes claims about metaphor. The issue is serious—as Ricoeur notes in the passage quoted above. What is included in the domain of inquiry can affect the truth value of proposals concerning phenomena in the domain. How can we know whether Ricoeur's proposals are right or wrong when we are not sure what he is making his claims about?

However, there is much in Ricoeur I find useful. In particular, there are three interrelated notions which I consider to be of importance for my analysis.

The first is the idea that only deviant but comprehensible predication is metaphor. It may be noted that Ricoeur considers that metonymy and synecdoche are cases of deviant denomination and, on this basis, distinguishes them from metaphor.

There is, of course, nothing absolute or necessary about characterizing metaphor as deviant predication. As I have tried to show throughout this chapter, the word "metaphor" is used to denote many different classes of phenomena. Some theories—for example, Black's—would appear to use the word "metaphor" to stand for a class of phenomena which might be said at least in

general, to involve deviant predications. Other theories--for example, Searle's and Bellert's (see discussions of Searle and Bellert below) --would appear to use the term to stand for a class in which the members do not necessarily have this characteristic.

However, even though there is no necessity for applying the term "metaphor" to deviant predications, I think it is useful to do so--at least if one wants, as I do, to look at the propositional qualities of phenomena in the domain. Not to limit the domain in this way means (a) including phenomena (such as instances of metonymy) which do not involve any predication, and/or (b) including phenomena where there is nothing deviant about the predication.

In the first case, the phenomena in question--at least in and of themselves--involve no propositions, since nothing is predicated. There is then, no point in looking for the propositional characteristics of such phenomena.

In the second case, there is nothing deviant about what is predicated. There is then presumably nothing about the propositions to investigate--that is, nothing that would justify separating such phenomena from a general investigation of propositions.

I would like now to go on to the second of Ricoeur's notions which I find useful. As noted above, Ricoeur proposes in "The Metaphorical Process" a way in which we can see metaphor as a

literally deviant predication. He suggests that we can look at metaphor as a matter of "a logical subject and a predicate" (Ricoeur 1979:143).

What Ricoeur would appear to be suggesting is that we can understand the metaphorically changed word (Black's "focus") as a predicate that is applied or is said to be potentially applicable to some entity or entities in the world. Metaphorically interpreted words and phrases, then, can be understood from a logical perspective in the same way that we paraphrase for logical purposes any other word or phrase which has an extension and is applied or is potentially applicable to an entity or entities as part of an utterance.

Applying such a logical perspective to metaphorically interpreted words and phrases has, I believe, at least one very important advantage. Metaphor, as Ricoeur notes, can involve words and phrases which function as many different "parts of speech" (see particularly Ricoeur 1977:57). I do not think there is any reason to assume that metaphors involving one part of speech are essentially different from metaphors involving another.

Treating a metaphorically interpreted word or phrase as a predicate applied to a subject or entity allows us to look at metaphor without being encumbered by irrelevant syntactic properties. Moreover, it allows us to do so within a framework which is conventionally used in logic to account for

propositional qualities of words and phrases in utterances (see, for example, Copi 1973:64-68). Thus it has the advantage of not being an ad hoc device invented merely to handle certain problems involved in a theoretical account of metaphor.

The third proposal of Ricoeur's which I find useful is the idea that the metaphorical predication says something which, though literally false, involves a redescription which in some sense is metaphorically true. The idea that metaphor can say something true or false is not what is at issue here. The proposal is not the same as the one Beardsley makes when he proposes that a metaphorical attribution is contingently true or false. What Ricoeur is proposing is not that the attribution is actually true, but rather that what is attributed metaphorically is intended as a different description (redescription) or "model" of reality (Ricoeur 1977:247-248).

But why does Ricoeur speak of the predication as true in some sense simply because it is intended to be true? Without doubt, Ricoeur's notion of metaphorical truth is not a formally defined one, but is rather more a labelling of an intuition. Yet I think that the speaker in speaking metaphorically is trying to produce, and the interpreter in interpreting is trying to identify and understand something which (at least ostensibly) is to be taken as true.

In the second chapter, I try to incorporate this concept in my idea of "true-for- an-interpretation." At the same time, I

will try to relate this notion of truth-for- an-interpretation to the widely held idea that a metaphor is in some sense literally false. I will do so by means of a notion of "false-for-an-interpretation."

None of this means that I accept Ricoeur's way of characterizing metaphor as a kind of predication. In particular, I do not accept what he claims a metaphorical predication attributes.

Ricoeur, as we have seen, contends that the metaphorical meaning, as opposed to literal meaning, is a matter of "seeing-as." It is based on seeing a resemblance which is "half thought and half experience." The imagistic poetic experience (Ricoeur 1977:213) is shaped by selecting those features of the free image which are pertinent to the metaphorical predication.

For Ricoeur then, it would seem that metaphorical predication is not propositional. Even if we understand the selection to involve a schema--as Ricoeur seems to suggest we should (Ricoeur 1977:213)--it is nevertheless imagery, not propositional content, which is selected and attributed to something in the metaphorical predication.

No doubt, metaphor, particularly poetic metaphor, causes many people to experience quasi-visual imagery. Nevertheless, this claim is open to the same criticism that I make in relation to Black. Like Black and others who have used the notion of stereoscopic vision, Ricoeur has not shown that it is impossible

to account for the distinctiveness of metaphorical meaning in relation to a conventional semantic account rather than psychological imagery. In my analysis I try to show that at least some of what can be distinctive about metaphor can be accounted for in propositional terms.

John Searle

Searle believes that metaphor can only be understood in terms of a relation between "word" or "sentence meaning" and "speaker's utterance meaning" (Searle 1979b:77). "Sentence meaning" is "what the words, sentences, and expressions mean" (Searle 1979b:77). Speaker's utterance meaning involves "possible speaker's intentions" (Searle 1979b:77).

Searle considers literal meaning to be a kind of speaker's utterance meaning. The meaning of an utterance is literal when the speaker means what the word or sentence meaning means. In other words, it occurs when "...speaker's meaning coincides with sentence meaning..." (Searle 1979b:80).

Searle, however, does not agree with the traditional semantic view that the literal meaning is the meaning of a sentence in a "zero context"--that is, independent of any context. For Searle, the literal meaning is not necessarily "...entirely determined by the meanings of its component words

(or morphemes) and the syntactical rules according to which the elements are combined" (Searle 1979b:117). Searle believes that quite often the literal meaning and hence the truth conditions (or fulfillment conditions for non-declaratives) only exist relative to context and background assumptions which are not themselves part of the sentence meaning (Searle 1979b:117).

Searle argues that this dependence is not simply due to the presence of indexical elements (such as verb tense and words like "here and "now") and definite descriptions (which are used to refer to specific individuals). According to Searle, there are other less obvious ways in which the literal meaning of sentences is context dependent. Searle believes "...most sentences...only determine a set of truth conditions against a background of assumptions that are not explicitly realized in the semantic structure of the sentence" (Searle 1979b:79). According to Searle, this is quite obvious in the case of sentences which involve relative terms; that is, terms like 'tall' and 'hot' which cannot clearly be truly or falsely attributed to entities except in relation to other contextually relevant entities and our assumptions concerning them.

However, the dependency, Searle claims, is far more general than this. To illustrate his point, Searle uses the sentence 'the cat is on the mat.' Searle first asks us to assume that both cat and mat are on the earth, subject to gravitational laws of the earth. He contends that under these circumstances we

generally have a good idea of the situation to which this sentence can be truly applied. Searle uses a diagram to depict the situation, but I think the reader can quite easily fathom to what conditions Searle is referring: the cat must be placed on top of and touching the mat (Searle 1979b:120f).

Searle then asks us to imagine a situation rather different than the one we normally assume for the use of this sentence.

...suppose that the cat and the mat are in exactly the relations depicted <i.e., the cat is touching and on top of the mat--A.B.> only they are both floating freely in outer space, perhaps outside the Milky Way galaxy altogether. In such a situation the scene would be just as well depicted if we turned the paper on edge <with the cat on top of and touching the mat--A.B.> or upside down since there is no gravitational field relative to which one is above the other. Is the cat still on the mat?

(Searle 1979b:122)

Searle contends that we cannot consider our normal assumptions about up and down or gravity to be part of the meaning of the sentence. He argues that it is quite possible to

use the sentence literally without meaning these assumptions.

For example, as we are strapped in the seats of our space ship in outer space we see a series of cat-mat pairs floating past our window. Oddly, they come in only two attitudes. From our point of view they are either depicted in Fig. 3 <i.e., the picture showing the cat on top of or touching the mat--A.B.>, or as would be depicted if Fig. 3 were upside down. "Which is it now?", I ask. "The cat is on the mat", you answer. Have you not said exactly and literally what you meant?

(Searle 1979b:123)

On the basis of examples such as those described above, Searle offers his contention that the notion of zero context literal meaning (see discussion of Levin below) is not applicable to a great many sentences. This contention Searle calls "the thesis of the relativity of meaning" (Searle 1979b:132).

However, although it is relative to certain assumptions, there is still a literal meaning for Searle which occurs when speaker's utterance meaning and word or sentence meaning coincide. When speaker's utterance meaning and sentence meaning

do not coincide--that is, when what the speaker means is not what the sentence means--then Searle contends we have the kind of speaker meaning which can be called non-literal. Searle includes in the class of the non-literal not only figurative language, but also indirect speech acts; that is, cases where an utterance is meant to imply something other than the speaker's meaning (Searle 1979b:81).

This divergence from sentence meaning distinguishes metaphorical utterances from literal ones. Figurative meaning is not distinguished from literal meaning by the fact that only figurative meaning involves a resemblance between objects. Searle argues that literal utterances by their very nature show a similarity between objects.

...the notion of similarity plays a crucial role in any account of literal utterance. This is because the literal meaning of any general term, by determining a set of truth conditions, also determines a criterion of similarity between objects. To know that a general term is true of a set of objects is to know that they are similar with respect to the property specified by that term. All tall women are similar with respect to being tall...

(Searle 1979b:81)

Searle believes that the divergence which marks metaphorical meaning can be described schematically as a relation between three sets of elements:

Firstly, there is the subject expression "S" and the object or objects it is used to refer to. Secondly, there is the predicate expression "P" that is uttered and the literal meaning of that expression with its corresponding truth conditions, plus the denotation if there is any. And thirdly, there is the speaker's utterance meaning "S is R" and the truth conditions determined by that meaning.

(Searle 1979b:83-84)

For Searle, the problem of metaphor in its simplest form is the problem of how to account for the fact that a speaker can utter "S is P" and mean and communicate "S is R" (Searle 1979b:83-84). As just noted above, Searle believes that in literal utterances sentence meaning and speaker's utterance meaning coincide, while in metaphor this is not the case. Thus for literal meaning, the truth conditions of the speaker's utterance meaning are "determined by" the truth conditions of the sentence meaning in relation to relevant background assumptions

(if any) within a context (see below Chapter two sections two and three).

This, however, is not the case with "metaphorical meaning. Searle claims that the word or sentence meaning of the uttered expression is not necessarily a part of the truth conditions or meaning of what is metaphorically asserted. In fact, Searle criticizes two kinds of theories for assuming that the contrary is the case. One of these kinds, Searle calls "comparison" type theories. Among the theories included in this class are Aristotle's and George Miller's (see Miller 1979 and Aristotle 1924 and 1967). The other kind he calls "interaction" type theories. Included in this class would appear to be Richards' and Black's theories, as well as Beardsley's controversion theory (see Richards 1965; Black 1962 and 1979a; and Beardsley 1958 and 1962; see also discussions of Richards, Black, and Beardsley in this chapter).

According to Searle, comparison theories claim that metaphorical utterances involve a comparison between entities; that is, that the meaning of a metaphorical utterance expresses such a comparison. Searle says comparison type theories contend that the metaphorical "S is P" means "S is like P with respect to R" (Searle 1979b:88).

According to Searle, in claiming that metaphorical meaning says some entity called S is like P, this kind of theory claims that the word or sentence meaning of P plays a part in the

metaphorical meaning of the utterance. Comparison type theories do so by saying that a metaphor first literally characterizes as P some entity(ies) which can be truly called P literally, and then saying that something thus characterized has by virtue of that characterization certain similarities (with respect to R) to an entity literally characterized as S. According to Searle, this means that the truth value of statements concerning an entity(ies) literally characterized as P--particularly those property(ies) in which P's are similar to S's--will necessarily affect the truth value of the metaphorical statement (Searle 1979b:88-90).

Not so, says Searle. To make his case, Searle uses the metaphorically intended utterance "Richard is a gorilla," where "Richard" is the name of some human being (Searle 1979b:89). This utterance, Searle says, he intends to mean literally "Richard is fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so forth." Searle asks us to assume that the hearer infers the above on the basis of his belief that "<g>orillas are fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so forth" (Searle 1979b:89). Searle says that according to comparison type theories, the paraphrase of what the utterance attributes to Richard and the hearer's belief about gorillas from which this attribution is deduced, justify the inference to "Richard and gorillas are similar in several respects; viz., they are fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so forth" (Searle 1979b:89).

However, such an inference, Searle argues, is not valid. He asks us to suppose that investigation has shown that gorillas do not have the properties just mentioned. Searle claims that that would make false the statement comparison type theories say one can make. But, he points out, it would not make false the statement about Richard which he uses the metaphor to express (Searle 1979b:89).

Thus we can see, Searle contends, that the metaphorical meaning--that is, the statement about Richard--can be true even though the statement of similarity is false. The above example, Searle argues, shows that the truth of the statement of similarity is not a necessary condition for the truth of the metaphorical statement--even if we use such statements of similarity to arrive at metaphorical assertion (Searle 1979b:88-89).

Searle contends that comparison type analyses go wrong because they assume that some metaphorically used word or phrase--in the case above "gorilla"--is used in a metaphor to convey what its literal word meaning conveys. He writes: "Their <comparison type theories--A.B.> endemic vice is the failure to appreciate the distinction between sentence or word meaning, which is never metaphorical, and speaker or utterance meaning, which can be metaphorical" (Searle 1979b:86).

Since the two kinds of meaning are distinct, there is no reason to assume that the word meaning has anything to do with

the metaphorical speaker or utterance meaning.

To put it crudely, "Richard is a gorilla"; is just about Richard; it is not literally about gorillas at all. The word "gorilla" here serves to convey a certain semantic content other than its own meaning by a set of principles...

(Searle 1979b:89-90)

So, the words used to convey a metaphorical assertion--that is, those which convey literally 'S is P'--need not have as part of their word meaning the semantic content they are metaphorically used to convey ('S is R').

Searle next discusses interaction type theories. According to Searle, interaction type theories hold that the metaphorical speaker's meaning of a sentence derives from an interaction of sentence elements--that is, from an interaction between the literal context and the metaphorical focus. Searle contends, however, that "...it is not in general the case that the metaphorical speaker's meaning is a result of any interaction among the elements of the sentence in any literal sense of 'interaction'" (Searle 1979b:92).

Searle argues that we can replace one literal element with

another and still have the same metaphorical attribution--even when one of the elements involved in the substitution has descriptive meaning and the other does not. As an example, Searle uses the utterance "Sally is a block of ice" (Searle 1979b:91-92).

He notes that "Sally" does not have meaning, at least not the same kind of meaning as the phrase "block of ice." As Searle points out, the kind of meaning which "Sally" does not possess is traditionally called "descriptive meaning."

Searle contends that in place of "Sally" a word which does have descriptive meaning can be "used to produce the same metaphorical predication" (Searle 1979b:92). As an example of a sentence which is the result of such a substitution, Searle uses "That girl over there in the corner is a block of ice." According to Searle, both sentences "could have been uttered with the same metaphorical utterance meaning" (Searle 1979b:92).

Although Searle is not explicit on the point, he seems to be saying that this outcome is contrary to what interaction type theories would predict. Presumably, if metaphorical meaning is the result of an interaction among sentence elements, then substituting for one element another with a different meaning should result in a different metaphorical meaning. Since the evidence that Searle presents does not show this to be the case, it presumably indicates that interaction type theories do not provide adequate accounts of metaphor.

As noted above, interaction type theories assume that metaphorical meaning results from the interaction of the meanings of the sentence elements. One of the elements in this interaction is the literal frame. So, interaction theories are in effect claiming that at least the word meaning of the literal frame is involved in the metaphorical meaning. Presumably, Searle's example is intended to show that this claim does not necessarily hold.

Searle is not content with simply arguing that word or sentence meaning is not necessarily involved in metaphorical meaning. In returning to comparison type theories, he contends that no matter what form of the comparison type theory is used, the central thesis is that the subject of the metaphor--that is, the entity designated by 'S' in Searle's schema--is said to have some of the traits of entities the metaphorical expression literally designates (Searle 1979b:93ff). In criticizing George Miller's elaboration of the comparison thesis (see Miller 1979), Searle argues that no part of the meaning of a metaphorically used word need be part of the metaphorical meaning of the term; that is, that there need be no (literally understood) characteristics R such that they are both literally and metaphorically attributed by a metaphorical utterance.

It is crucial to the simile <i.e., 'comparison--A.B.> thesis that the simile be taken literally; yet there seem to be a great many metaphorical utterances where there is no relevant literal corresponding similarity between S and P. If we insist that there are always such similes, it looks as if we would have to interpret them metaphorically, and thus our account would be circular. Consider..."Sally is a block of ice". If we were to enumerate quite literally the various distinctive qualities of blocks of ice, none of them would be true of Sally. Even if we were to throw in the various beliefs that people have about blocks of ice, they still would not be literally true of Sally. There simply is no class of predicates, R, such that Sally is literally like a block of ice with respect to R, where R is what we intended to predicate metaphorically of Sally when we said she was a block of ice.

(Searle 1979b:95-96)

Semantic relations between words and phrases are generally thought to involve shared semantic properties; for example, being members of some of the same semantic classes. So, Searle's argument would seem to indicate that there need be no semantic

relations between the word meaning of a metaphorical utterance and the metaphorical meaning.

For Searle, the problem is quite simply understood in terms of speech acts. Metaphor is a question of how it is "...possible for the speaker to say metaphorically 'S is P' and mean 'S is R', when P plainly does not mean R..." and how it is "...possible for the hearer who hears the utterance 'S is P' to know that the speaker means 'S is R'..." (Searle 1979b:103-104). So, the problem of metaphor for Searle is the problem for accounting of a kind of speech act: the act of uttering something and meaning by the utterance something different than its sentence meaning.

Searle believes that in the most general terms "the basic principle" on which metaphor relies is the principle that an utterance can "call to mind" a meaning (and corresponding truth conditions) which is not the sentence meaning of what is uttered. It should be noted that "calling to mind" clearly does not imply any semantic relation between sentence and metaphorical meanings.

Searle notes that a general condition for speaker and hearer to communicate metaphorically is that they share enough linguistic and factual knowledge to be able to communicate literally (Searle 1979b:112). If this condition is met, then Searle believes "the following strategies and principles are individually necessary and collectively sufficient to enable speaker and hearer to form and comprehend utterances of the form 'S is P', where the speaker means metaphorically that S is R

(where $P \neq R$)" (Searle 1979b:112).

According to Searle, these principles and strategies can be grouped into three "steps" (Searle 1979b:105 and 112). First of all, there are strategies shared by speaker and hearer by which the hearer can identify the utterance as not meant literally. Second, there are principles shared by speaker and hearer by which P can be associated with a set of possible values for R . Stating these principles, Searle believes, is "<t>he heart of the problem of metaphor" (Searle 1980:112). Finally, there are strategies shared by speaker and hearer which allow the possible values for R to be restricted to the actual values for R . Searle discusses the principles and strategies of these three steps from the viewpoint of the hearer.

According to Searle, the first step generally is based on the following principle: "Where the utterance is defective if taken literally, look for an utterance meaning that differs from the sentence meaning" (Searle 1979b:105). For Searle, the defects include not only "obvious falsehood" and "semantic nonsense," but also "violations of the rules of speech acts" and "violations of conversational principles of communication" (Searle 1979b:105). Moreover, an utterance need not be defective in any way in order to be interpreted metaphorically:

"Disraeli might have said metaphorically

5. (MET) I have climbed to the top of the greasy pole, though he had in fact climbed to the top of 'a greasy pole'

(Searle 1979b:105). All that there need be presumably is the speaker in some way conveying the fact that he is making a metaphorical speech act.

As just noted, Searle believes that once the speaker has identified the utterance as one that has a meaning other than its sentence meaning, the hearer must try to figure out what possible meanings or values can be attributed to R--the predicate which the utterance metaphorically expresses. There are, according to Searle, any number of principles which can be used to arrive at the range of values for R. The first principle he suggests is: "When you hear 'S is P', to find possible values of R look for ways in which S might be like P, and to fill in the respect in which S might be like P, look for salient, well known, and distinctive features of P things" (Searle 1979b:106).

Afterwards, Searle suggests eight strategies or principles which are somewhat more specific. These, he indicates, do not necessarily exhaust the possible ways of finding values for a given R. However, they will, he says, do "for a start" (Searle 1979b:107).

1. "Things which are P are by definition R. Usually, if the metaphor works, R will be one of the salient defining characteristics of P" (Searle 1979b:107).

2. "Things which are P are contingently R. Again, if the metaphor works, the property R should be a salient or well known property of P things" (Searle 1979b:107).

3. "Things which are P are often said or believed to be R, even though both speaker and hearer may know that R is false of P" (Searle 1979b:108).

4. "Things which are P are not R, nor are they like R things, nor are they believed to be R; nonetheless it is a fact about our sensibility, whether culturally or naturally determined, that we do just perceive a connection, so that P is associated in our minds with R properties" (Searle 1979b:108). As an example, Searle offers "Sally is a block of ice" (Searle 1979b:108). As noted above, Searle holds that blocks of ice have no attributes which can be construed as involving the lack of emotion we use 'block of ice' to express. For Searle, the link between the sentence and metaphorical meaning of this expression is a matter of sensibility.

5. "P things are not like R things, and are not believed to be like R things; nonetheless the condition of being P is like the condition of being R" (Searle 1979b:109). Using this principle, Searle says, we can understand the metaphorical meaning of "you have become an aristocrat" when this sentence is said about a man receiving a promotion. According to Searle, in this circumstance, what is being expressed is not that the person in question is like an aristocrat, but that the condition of being one is like the person's ^{new} status or condition (Searle 1979b:109).

6. "There are cases where P and R are the same or similar

in meaning, but where one, usually P, is restricted in its application, and does not literally apply to S" (Searle 1979b:109). For example, Searle says, only eggs can be "addled," but we can say metaphorically "his brain is addled" (Searle 1979b:109).

7. As his seventh principle, Searle claims that we do not treat "relational metaphors" involving verbs and predicate adjectives in any way essentially different than we treat metaphors of the "'S is P' means 'S is R'" variety. In these cases of relational metaphors, Searle claims, we have two S's--that is, two subjects--and a relational predicate which connects them. From an utterance whose sentence meaning has this form--that is, the form "S P-relation S"--we infer a statement of the form "S R-relation S." According to Searle, the introduction of such relational predicates brings nothing really new into his scheme (Searle 1979b:109-110).

8. If metonymy and synecdoche are included as kinds of metaphor then "When one says 'S is P,' and means that 'S is R,' P and R may be associated by such relations as the part-whole relation, the container-contained relation, or even the clothing and wearer relation" (Searle 1979b:110). The dynamic for Searle, is no different than for metaphor. Because the dynamic is the same and because the principles of metaphorical inference are diverse anyway, he feels these two "tropes" should be considered "special cases of metaphor" (Searle

1979b:111) .

Once the hearer has computed the possible values of R, the third and final step, as noted above, is to decide which can be attributed to the subject: "Go back to the S term and see which of the many candidates for the value of R are likely or even possible properties of S" (Searle 1979b:106).

How does one decide which properties are "likely" or "possible" properties of S? Searle is not explicit on this point. All he says is that the hearer must use his knowledge of "S things" and "P things" (Searle 1980:106).

It is clear from Searle's analysis how metaphorical meaning differs from literal meaning: metaphorical meaning is not identical to the word or sentence meaning of the utterance, whereas literal meaning is. However, it is not so clear how Searle's analysis differentiates metaphorical meaning from irony and indirect speech acts. Searle's discussion of metaphor concludes with a treatment of these issues.

For Searle, irony involves processes similar to those involved in producing and understanding metaphors. As with metaphor, an utterance expresses a meaning other than its sentence meaning. Again, as with metaphor, it "does not require any conventions, extralinguistic or otherwise" (Searle 1980:113). General conversational principles and rules for speech acts are all that are necessary to account for irony--at least on the most basic level. However, unlike metaphor we understand the

speaker's utterance to be "the opposite of its literal form" (Searle 1979b:113). Thus irony involves a specific semantic relation between literal and utterance meaning: that of "oppositeness." This would appear to differentiate irony from metaphor in two interrelated ways. First of all, irony unlike metaphor necessarily involves a semantic relation between sentence meaning and speaker's utterance meaning. The second difference between irony and metaphor is implied by the characterization of irony as having a meaning opposite to the literal meaning. If we have irony when speaker's utterance meaning is the opposite of sentence meaning, then whenever this is the case, the relationship between sentence and speaker's utterance meaning is ironical and not metaphorical. In other words, only irony and not metaphor can involve a speaker's utterance meaning which is the opposite of the sentence meaning of the utterance.

For Searle, indirect speech differs from metaphor in quite a different way (Searle 1979b:113-114). In an indirect speech act, the sentence meaning is included in the speaker's utterance meaning. Let us say someone says "Can you pass the salt" in order to request someone else to pass the salt. More is intended in this utterance than the sentence meaning. The speaker is not only asking can someone pass the salt but is also requesting someone to do so. It should be noted that, according to Searle, in such a circumstance the sentence meaning is included in the

speaker's utterance meaning. As we have seen, in metaphor speaker's utterance meaning does not include sentence meaning.

Searle contends that what a metaphor expresses cannot always be given an adequate paraphrase. This, he claims, is because

...the metaphorical utterance does more than just convey its truth conditions. It conveys its truth conditions by way of another semantic content, whose truth conditions are not part of the truth conditions of the utterance. The expressive power that we feel is part of good metaphors is largely a matter of two features. The hearer has to figure out what the speaker means--he has to contribute more to the communication than just passive uptake--and he has to do that by going through another and related semantic content from the one which is communicated.

(Searle 1979b: 114-116)

I find the most important proposal Searle makes is that not only metaphorical but also literal meaning can vary relative to context and background assumptions. In noting literal meaning varies in relation to context and background assumptions, Searle is more specific than Richards, who simply notes that meaning of

words and phrases in general fluctuates in relation to context.

There are certain sentences which in everyday contexts would seem literally logically inconsistent or semantically "meaningless." These sentences in certain contexts, particularly fictional contexts, can, however, be literally quite consistent and meaningful. For example, a sentence stating that flowers talk would in everyday contexts be considered literally either logically inconsistent or semantically meaningless. However, in Through the Looking-Glass, sentences such as this are literally quite consistent and meaningful. In the second chapter of this dissertation (see section three), I will propose an analysis which I believe can account in a principled way for this phenomenon. In so doing, I will use the idea that literal meaning changes in relation to background assumptions, just as Searle suggests.

However, Searle's treatment of metaphor makes few explicit claims. This, I believe, is one of its major weaknesses. Searle says that when we use a metaphor we use some utterance to mean something other than its word or sentence meaning. Nevertheless, Searle claims no necessary semantic relationship need exist between the two meanings. Moreover, he claims that no general principle of association leads us from one meaning to the other. What associative principles he does offer are, as he himself notes, quite diverse.

So, it would appear that the only claims he makes about

metaphorical phenomena in general are 1) that when we use a metaphor we use some utterance to mean something other than its word or sentence meaning; and 2) that a metaphorical speaker's utterance meaning, unlike ironical speaker's utterance meaning, is not the opposite of the word or sentence meaning of what is uttered. These claims do not constitute a theory of metaphor.

Moreover, Searle's claim that in metaphor, word or sentence meaning and speaker's utterance meaning are not necessarily semantically related implies that no theoretical semantic account can be given of the necessary ties between what is normally called the literal meaning and the metaphorical meaning. Searle's claim states that such ties do not necessarily exist.

Searle is not the only philosopher to propose that no semantic theory of metaphor is possible. Donald Davidson, in his article "What Metaphors Mean" (Davidson 1979:43-45), takes the point even further when he claims that we do not even need to assume that in general metaphorical meaning is propositional. According to Davidson, metaphor is simply a matter of bringing about certain effects: it reminds us of certain similarities, brings to our attention certain relations, etc. (Davidson 1979:43-45). Moreover, for Davidson, the understanding of metaphors is simply a matter of grasping a "vision" which the speaker wants to communicate (Davidson 1979:45). This idea is similar to Searle's proposal that the general principle for interpreting metaphors is simply a matter of calling to mind

something other than the word or sentence meaning of what is uttered.

Nevertheless, while there may indeed be no way of positing semantic ties between the literal and metaphorical meanings of everything that Searle calls metaphor, it is not so clear that we cannot restrict our domain of inquiry to one for which there are such ties between literal and metaphorical meaning. We may then be able to make explicit proposals by which we can characterize not only the semantic links between literal and metaphorical meaning, but also how we go from literal to metaphorical meaning and the nature of the metaphorical meaning at which we arrive.

Searle's claims concerning the phenomena which he considers metaphor may be quite correct. However, in considering any non-ironical utterance meaning which differs from what is normally called literal meaning, he is using a very large domain of inquiry. By making his domain so large, he may be missing generalizations concerning substantial subclasses of this domain. In my analysis, I will try to avoid this problem by using a more restricted domain than does Searle.

Samuel Levin

Samuel Levin in his book The Semantics of Metaphor (Levin

1977) tries to develop a semantic theory of metaphor which is in accordance with the general scheme of the interpretative semantics of transformational generative grammar. He expounds further on some of the ideas presented in the book in a more recent essay entitled "Standard Approaches to Metaphor and a Proposal For literary Metaphor" (Levin 1979). However, the whole of his theory is outlined only in his book, and for this reason I will refer primarily to it in the course of this exposition.

Since Levin's theory of metaphor is closely linked with the "standard theory" of semantics of transformational generative grammar, it is perhaps best to begin this exposition with a brief outline of the standard theory (see Levin 1977:60-62 and Katz 1972). The standard theory views as input to the semantic component, the "deep structure" produced by the syntactic component of the grammar. Within the context of the general "standard theory" of transformational grammar (of which the standard semantic theory can be considered part), there are two sets of rules which together produce the deep structure of a sentence: phrase structure rules and lexical insertion rules. Thus the input to the semantic component of a transformational grammar is the syntactic strings of categories which are generated by the phrase structure rules and into which lexical items have been inserted.

The semantic component of the grammar assigns semantic representations to the lexical items. These semantic

representations are representations of each of the senses of the lexical item, and are comprised of "primitive semantic markers." These semantic markers are the equivalent of what I have called above "semantic features": they represent constituent components of a sense of a lexical item.

However, not all of the constituent components of the lexical item are represented by the semantic representations assigned to a lexical item. Semantic features or elementary semantic markers are hierarchically organized. Thus a semantic marker like <artifact> implies a semantic marker like <physical entity>, because it designates a conceptual category which belongs to the conceptual category designated by the implied semantic marker. These implied semantic markers are represented within the semantic representation of a sense of a lexical item only after the application of "redundancy rules" which make explicit the implied semantic markers. The expanded representations of the senses of a lexical item are called "lexically interpreted underlying phrase markers" or "LIUPM's."

The semantic representation of a sense of a lexical item can include more than just a set of semantic markers which represent the sense. It can also include a "selection restriction." A selection restriction is a restriction on the class of senses with which a sense of a lexical item can be combined.

The restriction includes a set of semantic markers at least one of which must be "satisfied" in order for there to be a

meaningful reading. These markers specify the semantic markers the LIUPM's of other lexical items must have in order to combine meaningfully with the sense in question. They block a sense of a lexical item from combining with senses which include other markers with which the marker in the restriction is incompatible. One marker is incompatible with another if, when the redundancy rules are applied to both, the expansion of one yields a marker which is an antonym of a marker which is found in the expansion of the other. As will be seen below, these selection restrictions play an important role in Levin's definition of metaphor.

Once the semantic representation of the lexical items have been expanded into LIUPM's, a "projection rule" combines the senses of the LIUPM's into one or more readings for the sentence. There is only one reading for the sentence if there is only one possible set of senses which can be combined; more, if there are more possible combinations. Sentences with more than one reading are considered semantically ambiguous. The projection rule assigns a reading of "contradictory" or "contradiction" to those sets of senses which have assigned to the same constituent of the set two or more antonymous elementary semantic markers. The projection rule does not combine a set of senses in which one or more constituents of that set has a selection restriction which forbids its combination with another sense with which the projection rule would otherwise combine it. If there are no sets

of senses which are not blocked by selection restrictions, then the sentence is considered to be "semantically anomalous." It should be noted that within the version of the standard theory which Levin uses, the selection restrictions are found on verbs rather than nouns.

The senses which words have in standard theory are supposed to be the senses which they would have in a situation where context plays no role in determining the meaning of the sentence of which they are part. Such a context is conventionally called a "zero context." An example of such a context would be a one sentence anonymous letter.

This aspect of standard theory helps give Levin's analysis of metaphor a bent which is rather different than those of other analyses I examine closely in this chapter. Because standard theory looks at sentences only within a zero context, Levin in using this theoretical framework, must eliminate from his domain all metaphors which cannot be considered such in a zero context. In other words, he eliminates from his domain of inquiry all phenomena which can be considered metaphor only in relation to particular contexts.

Levin does not argue that there are no such cases of "contextual" metaphor. He feels, however, that a semantic theory of deviance--including a way of analyzing semantic deviance which is metaphorically construed--is necessary no matter how successful the attempt to develop a pragmatic theory of deviance

may be (Levin 1977:12-13).

It should also be noted that the only semantic features of words in the standard theory are those which can be considered part of the definition of a lexical item. They are never, unlike some features to which Teun A. Van Dijk refers, non-defining "characteristic" or "typical" features of the entities to which the word can be appropriately applied literally. Thus they can be considered part of what we have seen Beardsley call the "denotative" or "primary" meaning, rather than the "connotative" or "secondary" meaning. Because Levin deals only with the features of standard theory, his analysis is limited to what might be called primary meaning.

This too makes his analysis different from many of the theories I examine closely. Black, Beardsley, Ricoeur, Van Dijk all explicitly discuss in relation to metaphor phenomena which can be plausibly called "connotative" or "secondary" meaning. Aristotle, Richards, and Bellert allude or refer in passing to such phenomena. Levin, however, is concerned exclusively with what Beardsley calls primary meaning.

According to Levin, the only cases of semantic (as opposed to pragmatic or contextual) deviance which may be understood or construed metaphorically are those which are semantically anomalous. Levin believes that sentences which are semantically anomalous express "...truth conditions that contingently are not satisfied" (Levin 1977:36). In contrast, contradictory sentences

express "...truth conditions that analytically cannot be satisfied," and sentences which contain contradictions express "...truth conditions that logically cannot be satisfied" (Levin 1977:37). Levin argues:

...in contradictions and contradictory sentences... no scope is offered for interpreting them as anything beyond contradictions and contradictory sentences. This follows from the logical and analytical unsatisfiability respectively of their truth conditions. In the case of anomalous sentences, however, since the unsatisfiability of their truth conditions is only contingent, they permit of interpretations that are not simply a restatement of their semantic property.

(Levin 1977:38)

For Levin, the question of how we meaningfully interpret these semantically anomalous sentences is what a semantic theory of metaphor should address (Levin 1979:12-13 and 35ff). Nevertheless, Levin does not try to account for particular interpretations of such sentences which an interpreter might make in particular contexts. As noted above, Levin uses a standard

theory framework which looks at sentences only in relation to a zero context; in other words, without taking specific contexts into consideration. Levin's framework stops him from looking at contextual factors which determine the specific interpretation.

However, Levin feels that it is appropriate within the framework of the standard theory "...to ascertain the range (or a range) of interpretations that a deviant expression can support linguistically and...to determine the various construal routes that the speaker/author or hearer/reader employs in arriving at this range of interpretations" (Levin 1977:33-34). The theoretical rules which would describe these construals "...would ... define the notion of 'possible metaphor'" (Levin 1977:32). Levin, like J.J. Katz (Katz 1972:61-62), assumes that factors related to the specific context in which a sentence is uttered can guide the interpreter in selecting a specific interpretation from the range of interpretations which are considered to be linguistically possible within the semantic theory.

According to Levin, semantically anomalous sentences are construed through a transfer of elementary semantic markers from one constituent LIUPM of a reading to another so that the selection restrictions are satisfied. The transferred marker is always on the same hierarchical level as the semantic marker with which it is incompatible (Levin 1977:40-43). The particular construal that takes place depends on which constituents are involved in the transference, and the nature of the interaction

between the transferred marker and the marker with which it is incompatible (Levin 1977:43).

In order to illustrate the various kinds of construal, Levin uses the sentence "The stone died" (Levin 1977:34ff). In this sentence the selection restriction on the use of the verb "to die" is not satisfied by the noun "stone." The verb "to die" is restricted to use with <human>, <plant>, or <animal> and one of the markers of "stone" is <mineral> which is incompatible with the markers of the selection restriction. According to Levin, there can be a transfer of a marker from the verb to the noun or from the noun to the verb. The construal will also differ depending on whether the transferred marker displaces the marker with which it is incompatible (a process which Levin calls "displacement"), or whether the marker is seen as being in "conjunction" or "disjunction" with the marker with which it is incompatible. Both conjunction and disjunction involve an "adding on" of features, and so Levin classifies both under the label "adjunction."

According to Levin, there are six modes of metaphorically construing a simple anomalous sentence like "the stone died." Four involve "adjunction" and two involve "displacement":

Under adjunction a transferred feature can be analyzed as being either disjoint or conjoint with its

congeneric feature in the host semantic representation. Consequent on adjunction, then, we refer to the disjunctive or conjunctive reading of the production set. Since, further, the transfer of features may move in two directions <that is, a transfer going from verb to noun or noun to verb--A.B.>, the process of adjunction will yield four possible readings. In displacement there is no question of junction, since deletion eliminates the marker in the host semantic representation that would dis- or conjoin with the displacing feature...Displacement thus yields two possible readings.

(Levin 1977:43)

In conjunction the transferred marker is read alongside the marker with which it is incompatible. Thus, if the marker <human> is transferred from the selection restriction of the verb "to die" to the semantic representation of the noun "stone," the noun "stone" becomes a humanized or personified nonliving entity when the transferred marker is seen as being in conjunction with the marker with which it is incompatible (Levin 1977:44).

In disjunction the transferred marker and the marker with which it is incompatible neutralize and therefore delete each other. One looks instead at the least general marker which

hierarchically dominates the incompatible markers in question. Thus, if again the transferred marker is <human>, the markers <human> and <mineral> neutralize each other. One looks instead at the marker <natural physical object> which is the least general marker that dominates both of these incompatible markers. According to Levin, the construal in this case would result in a reading like "The natural physical object died" (Levin 1977:44).

In displacement, the transferred marker simply displaces the marker with which it is incompatible. Thus if the marker <human> is put in the place of the marker <mineral> and the reading which results can be something like "The dolt died" (Levin 1977:47).

In transfer from noun to verb the transferred marker is the marker blocked by the selection restriction. The blocked marker is transferred to the selection restriction of the verb. Then a "parallel" verb is found which has for a selection restriction the transferred semantic marker. This parallel verb has the same semantic markers representing its sense as the original verb, except for those necessitated by the changed selection restriction. Thus, the transfer of the marker <mineral> from the noun "stone" to the verb "to die" would involve the use of a parallel verb like "to disintegrate". Then all of the markers of the parallel verb (including the marker representing the selection restriction) which are incompatible with the markers of the original verb are used in the conjunction, disjunction, or displacement (Levin 1977:64ff; in particular 73-75).

To summarize then, the six interpretations of "the stone died" which for Levin constitute the range of metaphorical interpretations of this sentence are as follows:

By adjunction

- (a) N <--V; disjunctive reading: The natural physical object died.
- (b) N <--V; conjunctive reading: The stone (as if human) died.
- (c) N--> V; disjunctive reading: The stone ceased to exist.
- (d) N--> V; conjunctive reading: The stone died (as though die were predicable of objects jointly human and mineral).

By displacement

- (e) N <--V: The dolt died
- (f) N--> V: The stone disintegrated.

(Levin 1977:48)

Once Levin puts his description into formal terms (Levin 1977:60-77) and tries to show how his theory subsumes others (Levin 1977:78-103), he goes on to discuss the relation between

metaphor and truth. According to Levin, metaphoric construal mechanisms allow one to interpret a semantically anomalous sentence as non-deviant: "The effect...was a movement away from the given, literal expression, which ex hypothesi had no meaning, to a derived expression (the interpretation) which did" (Levin 1977:104). Thus one derives from a sentence which has no truth conditions in the actual world a sentence which does.

However, there are circumstances in which a semantically anomalous sentence can have truth conditions. A semantically anomalous sentence can have truth conditions, because, unlike contradictory sentences and sentences containing contradictions, they express not an unthinkable state of affairs but merely a state of affairs which is "absurd" in the actual world (Levin 1977:110-113). For this reason, we may understand semantically anomalous sentences to express states of affairs that we can conceive of as holding for some imagined world such as can be found in literary texts.

Because semantically anomalous expressions can be taken literally in literary works, Levin suggests that there are two kinds of metaphorical construal: one of them (the first one presented above) is associated with ordinary language; the other is associated with literary works, particularly lyric poems. According to Levin, "...every poem...that contains deviant linguistic expressions...enjoins upon the reader a need to construe the objects and events so described. Since the reader

takes those descriptions literally, however, the construal is not linguistic" (Levin 1977:132).

The construal is, rather, what Levin calls "phenomenalistic" construal. In other words, instead of construing the deviant linguistic expressions one construes an imagined world which is different from our own. For example, in the poem "Holy Thursday" (see Levin 1977:129-131) by William Blake the last line reads: "Then cherish pity, lest you drive an angel from your door." According to Levin, the angels of this line are intended to be construed as "real" angels in the imaginary world created by the poet. The fact that one can deduce from the poem that the angels of the last line refer to children does not change this. Levin believes that this only means that in the imaginary world of the poet the children become angels. The word "angel" has "both a direct and an indirect reference" (Levin 1977:131). The direct reference is an imaginary angel; the indirect reference is an imaginary child (Levin 1977:130-131).

Implicit in Levin's analysis is an emphasis on the role of what Beardsley calls "primary meaning"--that is, that which can be considered the defining characteristics of a word's meaning. As noted above, the standard theory of semantics which Levin employs as a theoretical framework allows only for such defining features and not for "typical" features of the kind Van Dijk discusses (see discussion of Van Dijk below). Levin's discussion

of which defining features remain implies that such semantic features--and hence what Beardsley would call aspects of primary meaning--can play a role in the metaphorical meaning of a metaphorically interpreted term. Descriptive or primary meaning is, I believe, a rather important aspect of metaphorical meaning. In my analysis I will try to treat it as such.

However, I believe Levin's analysis of the role of primary linguistic meaning encounters many difficulties. Many of the problems, I think, relate to Levin's having chosen to consider only "semantic" factors in trying to account for metaphorical interpretation. Levin looks only at factors which can affect interpretation in a zero context. He in no way looks at metaphor as a phenomenon which necessarily involves the particularities of the context--both verbal and non-verbal.

Levin sets himself the task of demarcating the range (or a range) of metaphorical interpretations of simple sentences. The rules of metaphorical interpretation which theoretically define this range, according to Levin, outline--or at least are supposed to outline--what is a "linguistically possible metaphor."

A simple example, I think, shows that Levin's rules of construal do not achieve this goal. Let us take Levin's own sentence type, "The stone died." Let us assume that the sentence is used in relation to the mind of a rather stupid man. Let us further say that "died" is used here in relation to the stupid man's mind in order to signify that at some point the dolt's mind

stopped working completely.

The sentence could be used this way in the following context:

"How did that dolt, John, perform in the seminar yesterday?"

"Well, you remember I told you I thought no ideas could penetrate his mind, that it was a living stone? Well, yesterday, the stone died: John was pathetic."

Clearly, neither the metaphorical interpretations Levin proposes for this sentence nor any simple amalgamation of them will suffice to account for this metaphor and the rather obvious interpretation of it. The reader can corroborate this for himself by looking at Levin's six construals listed above.

Nor is this the only example that one can construct which will not fall within the range that Levin specifies as "linguistically possible" metaphorical interpretations of this sentence. In fact, many cases where the particular context is important in the interpretation of the metaphor will not fall within Levin's range of possible interpretations.

It might, of course, be argued that by range of interpretations, Levin means that we can take a part of the meaning of one of his "linguistically possible" interpretations as a particular interpretation for a context. However, even if this is assumed the metaphor discussed above cannot, as far as I can see, be fitted into the range.

In addition, I do not think it is theoretically feasible to

specify such a range in a zero context. All that can be specified, even for simple sentences, is what must be changed in a metaphorically interpreted word or phrase if the inferences we draw from its use in the sentence are to be consistent with literally interpreted words applied to the same entity.

Levin seems to have proposed his construals with this intent in mind. For example, in saying that one possible metaphorical interpretation of "The stone died" is "the natural physical object died" Levin would appear to be changing the meaning of "stone" so that what we can infer from it about an entity will be consistent with what we can infer from "died." This, however, assumes that only one word or phrase, A, undergoes metaphorical change. As we can see from the example I presented above, this is not necessarily the case.

What will be a consistent metaphorical interpretation of A relative to other words and phrases in a sentence will depend upon the interpretations of these other words and phrases in the sentence. If these other words and phrases are metaphorically interpreted, there will clearly be not only possible metaphorical interpretations of A relative to the literal interpretations of the other words and phrases, but also possible metaphorical interpretations of A relative to each possible metaphorical interpretation of the other words and phrases in the sentence. Moreover, what will be possible metaphorical interpretations of these other words and phrases will depend on the possible

metaphorical interpretations of A.

As can be seen, the possible combinations can be quite large, and it is not at all clear that listing them will give us much theoretical insight. Nor does there appear to be any underlying principle except consistency of inferences. For these reasons, I do not think that specifying a range of interpretations in a zero context is a theoretically viable approach.

Ratner, I think it more theoretically viable to try to ascertain the principles by which we make specific interpretations relative to specific contexts. Such a "pragmatic" analysis will not yield a list of possible metaphorical interpretations for a sentence, for the simple reason that contexts can be infinitely variable. However, I will try to show in my analysis that it can yield theoretically interesting insights without being encumbered by having to account separately for every "linguistically possible" metaphorical interpretation for every linguistically possible sentence.

Levin is not the only theorist who uses semantic features and proposes that metaphor can be analyzed in terms of zero context or its equivalent. Robert Matthews (Matthews 1971), and Derek Bickerton (Bickerton 1969), for example, also use semantic features and consider metaphor independently of context. Nevertheless, I do not think there is anything in the concept of

semantic features which stops scholars from considering context. However, because semantic features are often thought of in relation to meaning in isolation from context, I think there may be a tendency to assume that a semantic feature analysis of any semantic phenomenon need not consider context.

I have two more criticisms of Levin which I think are important to state here. First of all, although Levin is not the only scholar to make the proposal, it is highly questionable that semantic anomaly but not contradiction is metaphorically interpretable. Within the standard theory of interpretive semantics an expression like "sleepy stone" is considered anomalous, while an expression like "male woman" is considered contradictory. However, as Manfred Bierwisch points out (Bierwisch 1969:164-165, fnnt. 13), both contain antonymous markers assigned to the same constituent. The only difference between the two is that the antonymous markers in the anomalous expression are hierarchically higher up in the semantic representations of the words in the expression "sleepy stone" than the antonymous markers in the words of "male woman." Levin admits as much when he says that a transferred marker is "incompatible" with the blocked marker alongside which it is put in a metaphorical construal (see, for example, Levin 1977:44). If this is the case then there would seem to be no essential difference between the deviation in semantically anomalous sentences and the deviation in sentences which are contradictory

or contain contradictions. Hence there does not seem to be any reason that at least some contradictory sentences or sentences containing contradictions could not be interpreted metaphorically. Indeed, I think no one would have trouble metaphorically interpreting "woman" in "That man is a woman" when this sentence is uttered in reference to a rather effeminate man.

Nevertheless, I think there is a kernel of truth in what Levin and others say about contradiction. In the sixth chapter I argue that there are certain textual contradictions which cannot be metaphorically interpreted (see Chapter 6, section 3). However, the scope of the restriction I propose is far more limited than what has been proposed by Levin and others.

Finally, I believe that Levin's claim that there is no such thing as semantic deviance in imaginative literature is inaccurate. It is one thing to claim, as Van Dijk does, that certain linguistic constructions which are normally semantically deviant are not deviant in certain imagined worlds (Van Dijk 1975:188-189). It is quite another to claim, as Levin does, that there are no semantically deviant expressions in imagined worlds. Someone who reads in William Yeats' "Sailing to Byzantium" that "An old man is but.../A tattered coat upon a stick" (Yeats 1956b) may very well see an old man as a kind of coat upon a stick. However, this does not preclude the same reader from understanding that this statement is anomalous even within the imagined world of the poem and therefore requires a metaphorical

interpretation in order to be fully understood. The fact is that readers do see certain sentences in imaginative literature as semantically deviant and therefore requiring metaphorical interpretation. In suggesting that there is no semantic deviance and thus no linguistic metaphors in imaginative literature, Levin is simply ignoring this fact.

This is not to say that in some fiction the literal interpretation of normally anomalous sentences does not pose some problems. In fact, it poses the question of how we can distinguish such interpretations from metaphorical interpretation. In the second chapter of this dissertation, I address this issue.

Teun A. Van Dijk

Teun A. Van Dijk in his essay "Formal Semantics of Metaphorical Discourse" (Van Dijk 1975) tries to outline a formal or logical semantics of metaphorical sentences and discourses (see also Van Dijk 1972:240-272). Van Dijk is only interested therefore in specifying "the conditions under which such metaphorical sentences may be said to have truth value..." (Van Dijk 1975:173). For Van Dijk this does not mean simply saying that metaphorically interpreted utterances are not true under a literal interpretation. Rather, it means specifying the

conditions under which metaphorically interpreted utterances have a certain truth value. He is not interested, as is Ricoeur, in issues concerning the structure and function of metaphorical sentences within a wider linguistic or psychological context (Van Dijk 1975:173).

However, Van Dijk holds that an account of metaphor which is concerned only with accounting for truth values cannot be complete without accounting for context. He contends that "...metaphorical sentences can be interpreted only in context-determinate models..." (Van Dijk 1975:173). Nevertheless, he says that he omits any "detailed discussion" of this (pragmatic) context. He focusses instead on the semantic aspects of metaphor (Van Dijk 1975:173).

Still, Van Dijk does make a general claim about the "pragmatic principle" upon which metaphor is based. He claims that in pragmatic terms when a metaphorically interpreted sentence is literally interpreted, it violates some basic principle of truth or relevance which we assume as a norm when conversing. In other words, a metaphorically interpreted sentence is either not true or irrelevant literally. However, when metaphorically interpreted, the sentence has a meaning which satisfies the principle(s) violated when it is literally interpreted (Van Dijk 1975:174-175).

There are three kinds of sentences, according to Van Dijk, which violate these pragmatic principles of conversation when

literally interpreted and, because of this, may be metaphorically interpreted. Van Dijk first distinguishes a group of sentences which are meaningless not because they are deviant on a phonological, morphological, or syntactic level, but because they involve on the semantic level the assigning of attributes to individual entities which are of a type, category, or sort that cannot possess the attributes assigned. Such sentences Van Dijk calls "sortally incorrect" (Van Dijk 1975:177).

Van Dijk accounts for these sentences in terms of a "sortal semantics" (Van Dijk 1975:180ff). I will not go into a description of this kind of semantics here, because I do not consider it necessary in order to describe Van Dijk's account of metaphor. However, I will do so briefly in the second chapter in relation to my general discussion of truth, falsehood and meaninglessness (see Chapter 2, section 3).

Among the examples of sortally incorrect sentences that Van Dijk presents is the sentence "the square root of Susy is happiness." This sentence is sortally incorrect, Van Dijk says, because "...in most normal contexts...Susy (when understood to refer to a girl) cannot have a square root, nor can square roots be identical with, or have as a value, something of the sort of happiness" (Van Dijk 1975:177). Sortally incorrect sentences are not simply false. Unlike false sentences, Van Dijk claims, the internal negation of such a sentence does not produce a meaningful statement. "The square root of Susy is not happiness"

is no more meaningful than the original sentence (Van Dijk 1975:177).

Van Dijk believes that some of these sortally incorrect sentences, although meaningless under a literal interpretation, may receive a meaningful interpretation and therefore be assigned a truth value in a given context. Among the examples that Van Dijk presents is the sentence "The car protested against such driving" (Van Dijk 1975:178). Sentences such as this one, Van Dijk says, are traditionally called metaphorical.

Van Dijk notes, however, that sortal incorrectness is relative and is based on "normal" contexts or "worlds." Thus a sentence in which a flower speaks may be sortally correct in a fictional context or world in which it is postulated that flowers may do this sort of thing (Van Dijk 1975:188-189). He claims, however, that the notion of meaningfulness is gradual and that while certain sortally incorrect sentences may receive such a meaningful interpretation in a fictional context, there are others which denote "a state of affairs which cannot even be conceived mentally" (Van Dijk 1975:177-178).

Sortally incorrect sentences are not, as noted above, the only kind that Van Dijk considers metaphorical (Van Dijk 1975:176-178). There are sentences which, while false within a given context, may be interpreted in such a way that they may be considered true under that interpretation (Van Dijk 1975:178). For example, one might say that "John went shopping" in a given

context even though John did not go shopping at all, but rather went out looking for girls. In the given context we might be able to understand the sentence to refer to just this fact, and therefore under this interpretation the sentence would be true in the context.

In addition, a sentence in a given context whose presupposition(s) is not satisfied, and thus has zero truth value, may be interpreted in such a way that under that interpretation its presupposition(s) is actually satisfied. As an example of this Van Dijk suggests the sentence "The king is back in office" uttered in a context in which there is no king and in which the presupposition of the sentence is therefore not satisfied. In this context, however, the speaker wishes to refer to an authoritarian boss. Since the sentence can be interpreted in such a way that it can refer to this person, it can be said that under this interpretation the presupposition of the sentence is satisfied in the context. A sentence which is false or whose presupposition is not satisfied, when interpreted in this way in a given context, may be said to be metaphorical (Van Dijk 1975:178).

Since the interpretation which makes the kinds of sentences mentioned above metaphorical is dependent upon the context in which the sentence is uttered, Van Dijk suggests that a semantic analysis of metaphor "...must guarantee that any form of identity or equivalence must be restricted to contexts with a specific

structure" (Van Dijk 1975:188). Thus the semantics of metaphor must be developed in such a way that it will restrict to certain contexts any particular metaphorical interpretation of a sentence. The description of the contexts would be left to a pragmatic theory which would also specify when a particular metaphorical usage would be appropriate (Van Dijk 1975:188).

According to Van Dijk, the traditional idea of a metaphor is that instead of a property G being predicated of an entity a to form the sortally correct and true sentence Ga, there is a property F which is predicated of a, such that the sentence *Fa would be either false or sortally incorrect under a normal interpretation. However, *Fa because it is interpreted metaphorically entails Ga, while the sentence Fa which is not interpreted metaphorically does not entail Ga. The sentence *Fa can be used in place of Ga only if there is a meaning relation between the predicates G and F (Van Dijk 1975:189).

Van Dijk attempts to explicate this traditional idea of metaphor in terms of formal semantics (i.e., in terms of the truth conditions of metaphorical sentences). More specifically, Van Dijk attempts to explain first the truth conditions of the sentence *Fa, and second explores various ways in which we might be able to view *Fa as entailing Ga: that is, so that the truth of *Fa may be said to imply the truth of Ga (Van Dijk 1975:189).

Before continuing, I would like to make a few remarks concerning the general framework which Van Dijk uses to approach

the issues he tries to address. First of all, Van Dijk looks at metaphor as Ricoeur does in his last essay: that is, as a logical proposition in which a predicate is applied to a logical subject. However, unlike the later Ricoeur, Van Dijk does not seem to view metaphorically interpreted words and phrases as necessarily being predicated of some (logical subject) entity. Rather, he argues that cases in which the metaphorically interpreted word or phrase is not used as a predicate linguistically can be looked at as derived from structures in which the word or phrase is used as a linguistic predicate.

The familiar scheme of such <metaphorical> sentences is then $*Fa$, where a is a constant for the intended referent and $*F$ is a METAPHORICAL PREDICATE, as in He is a bear or She is an encyclopedia, significantly assertable of humans in certain contexts.

However, there are also cases in which the metaphorical predicate appears in the descriptive referring phrase as in sentences like

(14) Peter preferred to pick one of the local flowers.

where

flower is intended to refer to a girl...

...We will...assume that metaphorical referring

phrases are derived from underlying structures in which the metaphorical term is introduced predicatively, e.g. as follows: 'the local girls are (like) flowers'.

(Van Dijk 1975:186-187)

Once Van Dijk has established the general framework in which he will analyze metaphor, he begins the analysis itself. However, before entering upon a description of Van Dijk's semantic analysis of metaphor, it is, I think, necessary to outline the notion of semantic features which Van Dijk uses. I think it is necessary to do so because Van Dijk's use of the notion requires a fuller knowledge of its application than did that of either Ricoeur or Levin (see Lyons 1977:250-335).

A word or phrase which is applicable to entities may be considered a member of a number of different semantic classes which are structured hierarchically. The names of the classes--that is, the names which denote them--can also be considered features (or the names of features) or predicates which are implicitly applied to an entity when the word is applied to that entity. For example, the word 'girl' may be said to be a member of the class of humans, females humans, non-adults, concrete entities, etc.

Now, the semantic class of 'human' is generally thought to include the class of female humans, and so the predicate 'human'

can be considered superordinate to the predicate 'female human.' The class of female humans is generally thought to include the class of girls, and so the predicate 'female human' can be considered superordinate to the predicate 'girl.'

The ordering, moreover, is transitive. So, for example, as 'concrete entity' is superordinate to 'human' and 'human' is superordinate to 'female human,' 'concrete entity' is superordinate to 'female human' as well.

However, the semantic ordering is not complete. Not every predicate (or possible predicate) is superordinate or subordinate to every other predicate. For example, the predicate 'human' is neither superordinate nor subordinate to the predicate 'female,' although clearly the classes they denote intersect. Some theoreticians have postulated that words (and phrases) can be said to have other kinds of semantic features. Hilary Putnam (see, for example, Putnam 1975b) classifies these among his "stereotypical" features; Van Dijk simply calls these features "typical." These features are at least approximately equivalent to what Beardsley calls connotation for words and secondary meaning for sentences (see discussion of Beardsley above). In fact, Putnam in one article labels as "connotations" features of the kind he elsewhere considers stereotypical (Putnam 1975c:128).

Van Dijk too talks of typical features in much the same way that Beardsley talks of connotations (Van Dijk 1975:191-192). These features are properties (or, more precisely perhaps, denote

properties) which are generally believed within a culture to be possessed by entities in the extensional class of a word. Such cultural beliefs can be expressed, according to Van Dijk, in terms of pragmatic postulates. He suggests that the cultural belief that pigs are typically fat can be expressed in terms of the following pragmatic postulate:

(For most x, and most y) [(member of cultural group)
(x) & (pig) (y) & Px (fat) (y)]

(Van Dijk 1975:191)

The ideas of semantic features and fields can be related to the idea of what I call extensional classes in this dissertation; that is, the class of possible entities to which a word or phrase can be truly applied ("extension" here is equivalent to Lewis' use of "comprehension" in Lewis 1971:19). The ordering of features or predicates which is effectuated by the class inclusion relations between extensions is the converse of the ordering which is effectuated by the class inclusion relations between semantic (conceptual) classes. While generally the semantic class 'female human' can be said to include within its meaning the semantic class 'human,' clearly the converse is not true of the extensional classes: any entity which is a 'female

'human' is a 'human' but not every entity which is a 'human' is a 'female human.'

Van Dijk uses notions somewhat different from the ones I have just outlined. First of all, instead of using the concept of sets of possible entities, Van Dijk, like R. Thomason (Thomason 1972:222-223), uses the idea of parts of "logical space" (see Van Dijk 1975:180ff). However, this notion of the logical space of a predicate is, for Van Dijk at least, essentially equivalent to the idea of extensional class of possible entities.

In addition, Van Dijk talks of the ordering of predicates by means of a "selection function" which operates according to a "similarity principle" (Van Dijk 1975:190-191). He does not, however, show in any way how this "function" based on some undefined "semantic principle" contributes to the general theory of the semantic relations between words and phrases.

The reader may have already seen that words (and phrases)--or more precisely, their senses--can be treated as we have been treating the more abstract features. The phrase 'female human,' for example, can be considered to be a "lexicalized" form of the feature 'female human.' Its meaning can be considered to include the meaning of 'human' just as the semantic class denoted by 'female human' can be considered to include the semantic class 'human.' The extension of the phrase 'female human' can similarly be considered to be included in the

extension of the word 'human' just as the extension of the feature 'female human' can be considered to be included in the extension of the feature 'human.'

Before returning to Van Dijk's treatment of metaphor, two more points should be made about so-called "typical" features. While the meaning of a word or phrase may in some sense be said to "possess" typical features, such possession is somewhat different from the possession of other features. Unlike other features, typical features of a word do not denote semantic classes which are included in the semantic-class of that word: 'fat' may be considered a typical feature of the word 'pig,' but it cannot be considered part of its meaning. Nor--unlike other features a word possess--does the extensional class of a typical feature include the extensional class of the possessing word: it is at most generally, but not always applicable to the possible entities in the extensional class of the possessing word. 'Fat' is at most generally, but not always applicable to entities which can be called 'pigs.'

Let us now return to Van Dijk's account of how a literally interpreted statement Fa which is not true is interpreted metaphorically as *Fa. Van Dijk suggests that when a word or expression is used metaphorically in a given context, it drops one or more of its normal features and thereby has under the metaphorical interpretation a more general meaning. This dropping of features is effected by an unspecified "selection

procedure" (Van Dijk 1975:190).

Van Dijk suggests that, in some cases at least, the predicate which results from this application of the procedure has no lexical expression in the language. This, he suggests, may be one reason why we use metaphor: "Since we have no predicate 'taking together' (con-ceiving) <fat>, <dirty>, <animate>, <stupid>, exclusively, we use a predicate, e.g., pig, signifying a possible object which has these properties inclusively" (Van Dijk 1975:192).

As an example of how this idea works, I will use the sentence "John touched the flower" which in a given context may be interpreted metaphorically to mean "John touched the woman." Under the metaphorical interpretation the word "flower" loses features such as (part of plant) while it keeps features such as (pretty object).

Which features are dropped and which are kept, according to Van Dijk, is not arbitrary. Although he offers no explicit criteria, Van Dijk suggests that "The intuitive criterion is that the features which must remain are somehow TYPICAL" (Van Dijk 1975:191). What this implies, according to Van Dijk, is that the features which remain cannot be too general: "We do not use a metaphorical predicate table to identify or qualify a flower because both are concrete objects" (Van Dijk 1975:191).

However, although the features which remain must in some way be typical of the metaphorical predicate, they do not--in fact

should not--be defining properties of the "possible object" to which the predicate is applied (Van Dijk 1975:192). "In fact, this can be explained by the function of metaphors: we want to pick out and assign a specific contingent property of an individual, not the property the individual has anyway" (Van Dijk 1975:192).

The predicate in a metaphorical statement can be applied to an entity to which it cannot normally apply because under the metaphorical interpretation it loses features which would forbid it from applying to the entity. Thus the meaning of the sentence $*F_a$ under a metaphorical interpretation is the same as a sentence $F'a$ under a normal interpretation. The truth conditions of the two sentences, $*F_a$ and $F'a$ are therefore the same as long as $*F_a$ is under a metaphorical interpretation. $*F_a$, then, is true if and only if the properties which F under a metaphorical interpretation assigns to a are in fact properties of a (Van Dijk 1975:193).

Next, Van Dijk discusses the relation between $*F_a$ and G_a . More specifically, he tries to think of a way in which we can understand $*F_a$ as implying G_a --even though the F_a from which $*F_a$ is constructed does not entail it.

Van Dijk proposes that in some respects metaphors are like conditionals. First of all, he argues that it is feasible to look at a metaphor as a conditional in which the first (unstated) part is a statement of the conditions under which the

metaphorical statement would be true (Van Dijk 194-195).
However, he writes:

A metaphor is not a shorter version of the comparison from which the 'like' and the tertius comparationis are deleted..., but a metaphor PRESUPPOSES a comparison. In that case the comparison should be true for the metaphor to have a truth value, whereas the metaphor would be indeterminate if the comparison is false.

(Van Dijk 1975:195)

Looked at in this way, a comparison is a kind of antecedent which if true allows one to make a metaphorical statement. But why is such a comparison not a necessary condition? Although Van Dijk does not say, it would appear that such a statement is not a necessary condition because even if one such statement is false, another one might be true and thereby allow the metaphorical statement to be truly asserted. Van Dijk suggests finally that we might include an implicit comparison for a metaphor in a conditional statement. This conditional statement would state the conditions under which the metaphorical statement could be true (Van Dijk 194-195).

So, a metaphor like "Peter picked a flower," where 'flower'

refers to a girl, could be paraphrased as a conditional statement of which the first part would be "If girls were as beautiful (as...,as...) as flowers..." The consequent here would be the metaphorical statement itself (Van Dijk 1975:194-195).

Nevertheless, Van Dijk feels that the problem with such a paraphrase is that it leaves out the counterfactual nature of metaphor. In addition, it in no way shows how *Fa entails any statement Ga not entailed by Fa. In order to make up for these gaps, Van Dijk suggests that metaphors might be indirectly asserted counterfactuals (Van Dijk 1975:195-196).

A counterfactual statement asserts something to be true not of the actual world, but of some other world which it posits. An if-then sentence such as "If he were a bear then he would be strong" is an example of the expression of a counterfactual statement. It posits a world in which the entity referred to is a bear, and hence, strong. In this way, it would appear that Van Dijk tries to find a way of having *Fa imply or "entail" a statement Ga (in the case above, "he would be strong") which Fa would not imply (Van Dijk 1975:196).

Van Dijk believes there are a number of similarities between directly asserted counterfactuals such as the one given above, and metaphors. According to Van Dijk, a metaphor like "He is a bear" is similar in meaning to an explicit comparison like "He is as strong as a bear" which is in turn similar in meaning to a counterfactual comparison like "he is as strong as if he were a

bear." This last statement is, according to Van Dijk, a "hypothetical explanation" (see Van Dijk 1975:196-197).

In a hypothetical explanation, the clause preceding the as-if connective asserts the consequence or "consequent" of the clause following the as-if connective. The consequent may be said to be entailed by the assertion of the clause following the as-if connective: in most worlds in which the assertion of the clause following the as-if connective is true, the consequent is also true. However, the as-if connective implies that the clause following the connective is not true in the "0" world, (i.e., the world under consideration), although the consequent is true in the "0" world (Van Dijk:196).

Van Dijk believes that the literal sentence Ga for which the metaphorical sentence *Fa has been substituted is a deleted consequent of the metaphorical sentence. It can be deleted because it is a typical consequence of the metaphorical statement (Van Dijk 1975:196-197). In other words, we are able to see that the metaphorical statement implies its literal counterpart, because not only are the metaphorical assertion and the literal assertion both true in most possible worlds, but the literal statement is one we see as a typical consequence of the state of affairs asserted by the metaphorical statement. The fact that there can be many states of affairs which have the same consequence, Van Dijk believes, explains the fact that there can be many metaphors which assert the same fact and hence can be

considered "equivalent metaphors." For example, "he is a bear" and "he is a bison" might in some culture have the same literal counterpart: "he is strong" (Van Dijk 1975:196).

Because Van Dijk sees $\underline{Ga}$ as the consequent of $*\underline{Fa}$, he is able to relate the literal sentence (called below p) and the metaphorical sentence (called below q) by the following truth conditions: $\underline{p}$ as if q if and only if (1) p is true in the "0" world, and (2) q is false in the "0" world, and (3) q is true in most worlds in which p is true (i.e., it is not the case that p is true and q is false in most possible worlds) (Van Dijk 1975:196).

I would now like to discuss some aspects of Van Dijk's treatment of metaphor. As I mentioned above, Van Dijk argues that it is possible to have equivalent metaphors. I find this idea to be extremely useful. In Chapter 7, I take the idea of equivalent metaphorical expressions into consideration in trying to account for the role of connotative or secondary meaning in metaphor.

In addition, I find it particularly significant that Van Dijk, as well as F. Guentner (Guentner 1975) and M. Bergmann (Bergmann 1979), use a formal semantic model to account for metaphor. Such a model is, I think, suited to the expression of hypotheses concerning logico-semantic properties of metaphor. Moreover, such a model, because it is--or at least attempts to

be--formal, allows for the possibility of formulating more precise and hence more easily tested hypotheses.

Van Dijk (Van Dijk 1975), Guenther (Guenther 1975), and Bergmann (Bergmann 1979) discuss metaphor as predication within a predicate calculus framework. In so doing, they explore in a formal fashion Ricoeur's suggestion that metaphor be viewed as the application of a logical predicate to a subject or entity. As I mentioned in my discussion of Ricoeur, I will adopt this perspective in my own analysis.

There is, I believe, one major drawback to using the kind of formal semantic model Van Dijk, Guenther, and Bergmann employ. While all three note the importance of context in the interpretation of metaphors (see Van Dijk 1975:173-175; Guenther 1975:200, 219-220; and Bergmann 1979:224-228), they do not articulate within a formal semantic model the role context actually plays.

Van Dijk, for example, notes that there are pragmatic aspects to metaphorical interpretation. However, he says that he will ignore such aspects (Van Dijk 1975:173). Bergmann deals only with "ideal contexts" and not with the partially determined contexts we are generally faced with in interpreting metaphors (Bergmann 1979:226 and 228).

At least part of the problem may be that the kind of formal languages Van Dijk (as well as Guenther and Bergmann) uses are the kind developed for use in logic and logical semantics. There

has been little work done on applying such logistic models to the contextual interpretation of natural language utterances. However, as many scholars, including Van Dijk and Bergmann (Bergmann 1979:224 and 228), have noted context plays an important role in how we metaphorically interpret predicates.

Because of the importance of context in metaphorical interpretation, I prefer to use a different model than the logical language model which Van Dijk, Guenther and Bergmann use. While not per se involving a formal logical language, the theoretical framework I will adopt can be used to account for the propositional aspects of natural language utterances just as logical language models have been. This text theory was first called "Sherlock Holmes (SH) Interpretation" (Bellert 1977; revised in Bellert 1980/81), and then later a theory of "The Comprehensive Meaning of a Text" (Bellert and Weingartner 1981:section 2).

I. Bellert first developed this theory in a series of papers. In the first of these, she specifically used the theory to propose certain necessary conditions for metaphorical interpretation (Bellert 1977 and 1980/81). Below I will briefly outline Bellert's text theory and then present and discuss the conditions for metaphorical interpretation which Bellert proposes in relation to it.

Various aspects of Bellert's analysis of metaphor are incorporated within my own analysis. However, the reader should

note that the version of her text theory which I use in making my own analysis of metaphor is not the version she uses for hers. Rather, the version I will use is based on Bellert and Weingartner (Bellert and Weingartner 1981). I will introduce this version in the second chapter (see section 2).

Irena Bellert

According to Irena Bellert, the "intuitive idea" behind her theory of textual meaning is that the full meaning of "a text T is identified with the set of conclusions that can be drawn from the linguistic meaning of the text (F_T (i.e., the propositional content of T)) jointly with the relevant Background Knowledge B_T and the relevant conjectures H_T " (Bellert 1980/1981:32). However, this does not mean that all conclusions that can be deduced from these three sets are included in the comprehensive meaning of the text. Clearly, conclusions which are inferred solely from background propositions and relevant conjectures are not part of the meaning of the text to which these sets are pertinent. So we must "subtract" these conclusions in order to arrive at the set of conclusions which can be identified with the full meaning. However, we must not subtract propositions already in the text itself, simply because they are also inferrable solely from the Background Knowledge and/or hypotheses (Bellert

1980/81:32). With these considerations in mind, Bellert proposes that the comprehensive meaning of a text (SHI) can be defined as follows (with Cn standing for conclusions):

$$SHI_T =_{df} Cn (P_T \cup B_T \cup H_T) - Cn((B_T \cup H_T) - P_T)$$

(Bellert 1980/81:32)

Bellert shows the way this model can account for text meaning by means of the following illustration:

Suppose I overhear my neighbor saying: "If you don't give me a candle, I will be unable to find the fuse." A state of affairs to which this text could be correctly applied may be, for example, one in which the electricity went out. The corresponding proposition would constitute, in such a case, a relevant hypothetical assumption, which jointly with the linguistic meaning of this text, and with the relevant Background Knowledge (e.g., "If the electricity went out and it is not daytime, then it is dark"), would yield the corresponding SH Interpretation of this text. The causal connection between the main clause and the

subordinate clause in this sentential unit would thus be interpreted on the strength of the additional hypothetical premise--which intuitively seems to be a very probable assumption to be made in the actual interpretation of this particular example.

(Bellert 1980/81:33)

In terms of this model of the SH interpretation of conventional texts, Bellert proposes five necessary conditions for metaphorical texts. These "...necessary conditions...correspond very closely to the interpretive statements on metaphor made by well-known theorists and often expressed metaphorically (so that they cannot be easily refuted)" (Bellert 1980/81:43). Below, I will present these five conditions and then note some of the links which Bellert makes between her proposals and the work of other theorists. In addition, I will try to indicate for each condition the way in which it relates to my own analysis of metaphor. To begin then, here are the five conditions.

- 1) "The interpretation of a metaphorical text is based, essentially, on the literal conventional intensions of the constituent linguistic units of the text" (Bellert

1980/81:35; italics omitted here and in the following conditions).

2) "There is at least one conventional rule violated on the semantic and/or syntactic and/or pragmatic level" (Bellert 1980/81:36).

3) "There is at least one contradiction in the full literal SH Interpretation of a metaphorical text" (Bellert 1980/81:36).

4) "The extension of a metaphorical text which is determined by its literal SH Interpretation is always null" (Bellert 1980/81:37).

5) "The SH Interpretation of a metaphorical text is one, or more than one, subset of its literal SH Interpretation, such that satisfies three conditions: (a) consistency, (b) novelty, and (c) reference to reality" (Bellert 1980/81:38).

By (1) Bellert differentiates metaphorically interpreted expressions from idiomatic expressions (Bellert 1980/81:33). Unlike idiomatic expressions, a metaphorical meaning is the

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By (1) Bellert differentiates metaphorically interpreted expressions from idiomatic expressions (Bellert 1980/81:33). Unlike idiomatic expressions, a metaphorical meaning is the

result of interpreting the text as a set of consequences derived from the text itself, the relevant background for the text and hypothetical premises. This condition, Bellert notes, is taken into account in both theories of metaphor and "individual analyses of metaphor" (Bellert 1980/81:35). She states that "the differences in the interpretation of metaphors pertain to the resulting meanings of the combinations of the constituent units, or to the corresponding references" (Bellert 1980/81:36). Among the authors she mentions who incorporate this idea into their analyses are Richards and Ricoeur (Bellert 1980/81:36).

Although it is nowhere explicitly presented per se in my analysis as a necessary condition, I think the reader will easily see that this condition is incorporated within the analysis I propose. The conditions I propose in relation to the "primary" meaning of a metaphor imply that metaphorical meaning involves operations on elements of the literal primary meaning of the word or phrase in question.

Bellert states that (2) "is also a commonly recognized property of metaphorical texts" (Bellert 1980/81:36). She notes that Ziff talks of metaphor in relation to syntactic deviance, Fyle in relation to the kind of semantic deviance he calls "category mistakes," and Chomsky in relation to both grammaticalness and selection restrictions (Bellert 1980/81:36).

No doubt many writers consider some kind of literal deviance to be necessary in order to have metaphorical interpretation.

However, by no means do all scholars take this view. As we have seen, Searle and Black are two notable exceptions (see discussions of Searle and Black above). Moreover, it is not clear that the first of Aristotle's four kinds of transference--that is, genus-to-species transference--involves any kind of deviance. It does not, at any rate, unless pragmatic deviance is thought to include cases where we might have chosen a more specific word (the species word) instead of a more general word (the genus word) (see discussion of Aristotle above).

This is not to say that Bellert is wrong in suggesting that we consider deviance as a necessary condition for metaphor. As I have tried to point out throughout this chapter, there is no one set of phenomena everyone calls metaphor. A domain of metaphor is at least to a certain extent a theoretical and not an intuitive class of phenomena.

I believe a number of interesting generalizations can be made about phenomena which meet the condition which Bellert suggests. For this reason, I use this condition in a modified form in order to demarcate my domain of inquiry. I consider as part of my domain only phenomena which can be considered in some sense semantically or pragmatically "deviant."

Bellert says that (3) is a property which though explicit in her proposal "is only metaphorically expressed, or rather alluded to, in the literature on metaphor" (Bellert 1980/81:37). She notes that Black, Beardsley, and Ricoeur speak of metaphorically

interpreted utterances as inconsistent. In my analysis, I too treat metaphors as leading to an inconsistent set of conclusions under a literal interpretation.

Condition (4), Bellert remarks, is "an automatic consequence of property (3)" (Bellert 1980/81:38). By the use of "extension" in this condition, She is referring to Wittgenstein's "states of affairs" to which propositions may be said either to correspond or not correspond. As Bellert points out, there can be no states of affairs which correspond to a contradictory set of propositions. She notes that this proposal can be related to Beardsley's claim that metaphor involves "a transfer of meaning, both in intension and in extension..." (Beardsley 1967:285; Bellert 1980/81:38). Since I do not use the notion of states of affairs, I do not incorporate this proposal in my own discussion of metaphor.

In relation to condition (5a), Bellert refers to Richards and Black. She notes that Richards contends that metaphor involves the selection of only a subset of the literally connoted characteristics. She also notes that Black contends that the secondary system of implications is used selectively to organize our view of the primary subject (Bellert 1980/81:38-39).

I completely incorporate within my analysis the idea that conventional metaphorical interpretations are consistent. In Chapter 6 I make certain proposals in order to account for this consistency in terms of my analysis.

Let us now turn to (5b). Bellert relates this condition to Black's contention that metaphor involves seeing A in terms of B (Bellert 1980/81:38-39). I do not think such "seeing as" necessarily involves a "novel" set of propositions. As Black notes (Black 1962:45-46), in many cases of simple metaphor we can often substitute a literal word for a metaphorical one. This would seem to indicate that such cases involve stylistic variation rather than a novel set of propositions.

Nevertheless, I think Bellert is in many ways correct. Intuitively, at least some metaphors--"complex" ones--do indeed express a "novel" set of propositions. In Chapter 8 I try to show in terms of my analysis how complex metaphors can involve a novel set of propositions.

In (5c) Bellert claims that metaphors--even metaphors in fiction--must ultimately refer back to the "actual" world. She links this claim with claims of Black, Hester and Goodman (among others) concerning the relation between metaphor and reality. While I think Bellert's claim is correct, I am not sure that what is at issue here is a matter of metaphor. Clearly, "non-fictional" metaphors are about the real world, just as all "non-fictional" statements are. The question seems to me to be whether all "fictional" statements relate to the real world.

However, whether or not Bellert (and Ricoeur, as we have seen--see discussion of Ricoeur above) are correct in claiming that "fictional" metaphors relate to the "actual" world, I do

think it is necessary to look at metaphors as making statements about something--be it something fictional or "actual." The reader will see that much of what I propose depends upon this assumption.

2

Throughout this chapter I have tried to point out that different scholars have different conceptions of what is metaphor. John Searle, for example, includes within the class of metaphor any instance in which sentence meaning is not included in utterance meaning and the utterance meaning is not the opposite of the sentence meaning. This does not only mean that Searle includes metonymy and synecdoche as metaphors. For Searle, there need not be any semantic relationship between sentence and utterance meanings. Aristotle, on the other hand, states that one of four semantic relations must hold between a metaphorical word and a word for which it can be considered substituted. Ricoeur takes a different point of view and excludes cases of metonymy and many cases of synecdoche by stating that only instances of predication in a logical sense are properly metaphors (see discussions of Aristotle, Searle, and Ricoeur in this chapter).

Whatever "intuitive" notions we may possess about the nature

of literal and figurative meaning, it would appear that there is no single, clear, intuitive notion of metaphor--none at least that is reflected in the literature on the subject. So, prior to beginning an analysis of metaphor it would appear necessary to stipulate what domain of phenomena will be considered "metaphor." Otherwise, the search for confirming evidence to support proposals could easily turn into an effort to find some class of phenomena for which the proposals would be true. The following four conditions together, I believe, demarcate a reasonably clear domain of inquiry. The reader should note that I discuss conditions (2) and (3) at greater length in Chapters Two and Four.

The degree to which one can "justify" a domain of inquiry is, I think, ultimately a question of the degree to which one can produce fruitful research using that domain. For this reason, I will not try to justify here the domain of inquiry I propose. The comments which follow each stipulation are only an attempt to elucidate the conditions and in this way clarify for the reader the nature of the domain.

1. I would like to stipulate first that I will consider as metaphor only cases in which the meaning or sense of a word is applied to or predicated of an entity. This condition is related to the proposal that metaphor be considered an application of a logical predicate to a logical subject (see my discussions of Ricoeur and Van Dijk above). If I say, for example, "John is a

boy," the sense or meaning of "a boy" can be considered predicated of or attributed to the entity called "John." Something is being said of John.

Indefinite reference poses no particular problem here. In order to consider a word or phrase meaning or sense to be applied to some entity, we need not know to which particular entity the word or phrase is applied. In the utterance "John married some local flower," we may consider the sense of "some local flower" to be applied or predicated of some girl without knowing which particular girl is involved. It should also be noted that the predication need not be in the form of a natural language syntactic predication. If someone says about John "That boy went to the store," the sense of "boy" is still being predicated of John. Moreover, the predication need not be true in order to be a predication. Let us assume again that the sentence "Peter picked a local flower" (from Van Dijk 1975:137) is uttered in relation to John choosing to marry a local girl. In this case, we can say that "a local flower" is predicated of a girl, even though it is not literally true of her.

There are words and phrases which are given non-literal interpretations but whose senses are not predicated of entities. I refer here to instances of metonymy and synecdoche. For example, in Shakespeare's As You Like It we find the following

utterance:

doublet and hose ought to show itself courageous to
petticoat.

(Shakespeare 1975c:236; Act 2, Scene 4)

Here, "doublet and hose" is used to designate men and "petticoat" is used to designate women. Nevertheless, it is clear in the context in which this utterance is found that women are not being characterized as petticoats nor men as doublets and hose. Condition (1) excludes such cases because they cannot be considered instances in which the sense or meaning of a word or phrase is applied to or predicated of an entity.

2. I will consider as metaphors only cases in which an attribution or predication is taken as literally false. By making this stipulation I wish to exclude from my domain of inquiry cases where a literal interpretation of a word or phrase is acceptable. In the second chapter, "taken as literally false" is given a meaning rather different than the formal logical sense of falsehood. There I try to give it a meaning which captures the intuitive sense of literal non-acceptability or "impertinence," as Ricoeur calls it.

3. I will consider as metaphors only cases where what is

expressed non-literally is taken as true--whether or not it actually is true. By means of this stipulation I wish to exclude from consideration all spurious non-literal interpretations. I wish to consider cases where someone interprets an utterance as something communicated as true--whether or not it actually is. I will try to give a more explicit account of what "taken as true" means in Chapters 2 and 4 (see Chapter 2, sections 1 and 2, and Chapter 4, section 1). For the moment, it need only be noted that the sense of "taken as true" is not the formal logical sense of truth.

4. I will consider as metaphors only cases which cannot simply be classed as instances of verbal irony. Verbal irony is generally considered to involve saying literally one thing and non-literally to be implying or assuming something quite different, often antithetical (see entries on irony in Abrams 1971:80-81; Princeton Encyclopaedia 1974:407-408; and Deutsch 1962:65-66).

Perhaps one of the most famous literary instances of verbal irony is found in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar. In this play Marc Antony calls Brutus and his co-conspirators "honourable men" (Shakespeare 1975b:829; Act 3, Scene 2). In this case, we understand Marc Anthony to be implying non-literally that Brutus and his friends are not honourable at all.

Before concluding this chapter, I would like to briefly discuss some theoretical preliminaries to my analysis. First, I would like to outline the way in which I speak of words and phrases in the rest of this dissertation. This theoretical apparatus is the basis upon which I describe and develop the textual model I use in my analysis of metaphor. Second, I would like to make a few brief remarks about the kinds of evidence I use to support my contentions concerning metaphor.

I assume "true" and "false" are applied directly to the statements or propositions expressed by the utterance of a sentence. In order to make the situation correspond to a formal language model, I assume that the sense of a word or phrase having an extension is a predicate and that the result of applying it is a simple proposition.

I assume that a simple proposition is formed in one of the two following ways. One way is by a predicate of a word or phrase being applied to a particular entity or entities. For example, in the utterance "John is a bachelor" the predicate "is a bachelor" is applied to the entity called "John."

Alternatively, a predicate of a word or phrase can be applied to some unspecified entity or entities. For example, in the utterance "there is something red" the predicate "red" is applied to some unspecified entity. For my purposes, it makes no

difference whether or not a word or phrase functions as a natural language subject or predicate as long as the word or phrase is applied to an entity. For example, in the utterance "the man goes to the store," I assume that a predicate expressed by 'the man' is applied to an entity. In so doing, I may be said to follow the Russellian tradition (see Russell 1971; 1973b).

However, unlike Russell, I consider an entity to be anything (real or imaginary) to which one can apply a predicate. It, for example, in a fictional text, something is said to be a flower, the something will be said to be "an entity." I am not concerned with the ontological issues related to "non-actual" entities (see, for example, Howell 1979 and Pavel 1979).

Finally, I assume that utterances which do not express statements or propositions--that is, questions and commands--can be treated in terms of propositions they imply. For example, the utterance "did the man go to the store?" is taken as implying the proposition *'there is a particular man.'

I distinguish typographically between utterances (and parts of utterances), propositions (and parts of propositions), and sentence (and parts of sentence) types. I put the utterances within double quotation marks (" ") as I have already done in this section. I also continue to put propositions within single quotation marks preceded by an asterisk (*' '). Single quotation marks which are not preceded by an asterisk are used to identify word, phrase, and sentence types.

I will now briefly discuss the evidence I use in my analysis of metaphor. The examples are of two kinds. One kind is comprised of utterances from literary texts. The other kind is comprised of what might be called "everyday" examples.

The latter involve hypothetical situations which presumably could actually occur in non-fictional contexts. The reader should note, however, that in saying this I do not mean to imply that they are likely to occur, but rather, only that it is conceivable that they could. In using these "everyday" examples, I follow a tradition in linguistics and the philosophy of language (see, for example, Lakoff 1971:332 and Donnellan 1971:45). I try to support each condition I propose for metaphorical interpretation with examples of both kinds.

CHAPTER TWO

"FACT" AND FICTION

In this chapter I discuss the theoretical framework I use in my analysis. More particularly, I attempt to develop the framework in relation to my stipulation that what I consider metaphorically interpreted must be taken as literally false.

First of all, I contend that what is pertinent to metaphorical interpretation is not whether a proposition is actually true or false in a scientific sense, but rather--as I indicate in Chapter 1 (see section 2)--whether they are taken as true or false. I suggest that the pertinent kinds of evaluations be called "true- and false-for- an-interpretation."

I then contend that these evaluations are relevant to our interpretations of fictional texts. I argue that when we say a proposition in a fictional text is true or false, it is true or false in the sense of true- or false-for- an-interpretation. I try to formulate certain conventions to account for the way in which we evaluate the truth of propositions in fictional texts. As part of this endeavor I incorporate my concepts of true- and false-for- an-interpretation within a theory of text meaning

developed by Irena Bellert.

In terms of the theory of text I use, I then try to show how "true- and false-for- an-interpretation" can be applied to utterances expressing "semantically deviant" (i.e., anomalous) propositions. I contend that these propositions can be considered false-for- a-literal-interpretation. I suggest that the same principle of evaluation underlies both the way in which we decide for fictional texts whether a proposition is "semantically deviant" and whether a proposition is false.

In making these proposals, I also try to show how within Bellert's theory of text meaning true- and false-for-an-interpretation can be used to make a principled distinction between the "meaningful" metaphorical interpretation of "semantically deviant" utterances and the "meaningful" literal interpretation of another set of utterances. These latter utterances involve sentences which in an everyday context would be "semantically deviant" under a literal interpretation, but in certain fictional texts are literally quite meaningful. I contend that this distinction provides us with a principled basis for excluding the latter from the domain of metaphor.

I would like to propose that what affects the interpretation of natural language utterances is not whether or not a proposition expressed under an interpretation is actually true in a scientific sense, but rather whether we take it to be true relative to what we assume at the time of the interpretation (cf. Woods 1974:92). My reasons for making this claim can perhaps be most easily illustrated through four hypothetical cases, each involving an utterance of the sentence 'John is swimming.'

In the first case, John is swimming and both the speaker and the interpreter know this. In such an instance I think that the interpreter will evaluate the proposition expressed under a literal interpretation of the utterance as true, and that it is extremely unlikely that he would make a metaphorical interpretation.

In the second case, John is not swimming and both the speaker and the interpreter know this to be the case. In such an instance I think the interpreter will evaluate the proposition expressed under a literal interpretation as false and may interpret the utterance metaphorically under the assumption that the speaker is intending to communicate something "true" through a metaphorical utterance.

In the third case, John is swimming but (for some reason) both the speaker and the interpreter believe that he is not. In

such an instance I think the interpreter will proceed in exactly the same manner as he will in the second case. He will evaluate the proposition expressed under a literal interpretation as false and may interpret the utterance metaphorically under the assumption that the speaker is intending to communicate something "true" through a metaphorical utterance.

We might conclude from this last case that the important factor in the interpretation of utterances is belief. However, by examining the fourth case we can see that the factors involved are more appropriately called assumptions.

In the fourth case, John is swimming, and the interpreter but not the speaker knows this. Moreover, the interpreter knows that the speaker does not know this. In order to understand what the speaker intended to communicate, the interpreter will, I think, assume the beliefs of the speaker and will evaluate the proposition expressed under a literal interpretation as false relative to these assumptions. Nevertheless, the interpreter may interpret the utterance metaphorically under the assumption that the speaker is intending to communicate something "true" through a metaphorical utterance.

The evaluations involved in the four cases clearly do not involve the formal semantic "truth." Rather, they may be considered to involve an evaluation in which we take a proposition as true or as false. A proposition we take as true under an interpretation I will say is "true-for-

an-interpretation." A proposition we take as false under an interpretation I will say is "false-for- an-interpretation." So, a proposition which we take as literally false will be "false-for-~~a~~-a-literal-interpretation"; a proposition we take as metaphorically true will be "true-for- a-metaphorical-interpretation," etc. For brevity's sake, I will call a proposition "true" when it is "true-for-an-interpretation"; "false" when "false-for- an-interpretation." I will use these terms in this way unless otherwise indicated.

Before I discuss fictional texts, I would like to propose some necessary conditions for true- and false-for-an-interpretation. In the first case above, the interpreter judges what is said to be literally true when it is logically consistent with what he assumes. In the second, third and fourth cases, the interpreter judges what is said as literally false when it is not logically consistent with what he assumes--independently of whether he believes the assumptions or whether these assumptions are actually true. However, if the interpreter metaphorically interprets in cases two through four, presumably he tries to find a meaning which is consistent with these assumptions and hence can be true relative to them.

In light of this, it would appear that one necessary condition for a proposition to be true-for- an-interpretation is that it be logically consistent with what we assume when making the interpretation. It would appear that one necessary condition

for a proposition to be false-for- an-interpretation is that it be logically inconsistent with what we assume at the time of the interpretation. I mention this here because consistency and inconsistency of propositions relative to assumptions play a role both in this chapter in my discussion of truth and falsehood in fiction, and in my discussion of metaphor in Chapters 4 and 6.

2

I will now try to apply to fiction the concepts of true- and false-for- an-interpretation. By "fiction" I mean any verbal presentation of feigned or imaginary phenomena. So, many non-literary as well as many literary texts are fictions under this definition. For example, I am creating a fiction, although not necessarily a literary text, if I pretend that I am the principal of McGill University and talk to you as if this were the case.

We do not generally react to fictional texts in the same way as we do to texts which at least purport to be about the "actual" world. Nevertheless, we do evaluate as true or false, propositions expressed by fictional texts.

In Oliver Goldsmith's The Vicar of Wakefield, for example, Dr. Primrose says that Mr. Burchell is a poor man. In so stating, he expresses a proposition which, in view of what we

learn in the novel we consider false: Mr. Burchell is "really" a very rich man (Goldsmith³ 1966:24 and 183).

In fiction these evaluations are involved in the interpretation of utterances, just as true- and false-for- an interpretation are involved in the interpretation of non-fictional utterances. In Robert Browning's Andrea del Sarto, for example, the protagonist says that he and his wife are fettered. This statement we evaluate as literally false, and the literal falsehood is one of the factors which lead us to interpret the utterance metaphorically (Browning 1966:199, lines 51-52).

In non-fiction true- or false-for- an-interpretation is assigned in relation to what we assume. Similarly, we consider a proposition in a fiction to be true or false in relation to what we assume about the fiction. For example, in The Vicar of Wakefield we evaluate the proposition that Mr. Burchell is a poor man as literally false when it is inconsistent with what we later assume--that is, that he is a rich man (Goldsmith 1966:24 and 183). In Pride and Prejudice we evaluate certain statements in Mr. Wickham's account of his leaving Pemberly as literally false and other statements in his account as literally true, when the former are inconsistent with and the latter are consistent with what we assume to be true--that is, Mr. Darcy's account of the same event (Austen 1959:96-102; 210-219).

There is no "reality" on which to base these evaluations.

It would appear that we simply take a statement in a fiction as true or false, rather than evaluate them as true or false in any scientific sense. True- and false-for- an-interpretation sense would then appear applicable to fiction as well as non-fiction.

In the next section I will discuss how true- and false-for-an-interpretation can be applied to "semantically deviant" (or anomalous) propositions. However, before going on to this question, I would like to discuss how we evaluate propositions in fiction as literally true or false.

Although this problem is not directly related to my analysis of metaphorical interpretation, it is nevertheless pertinent. Certain considerations which arise in trying to address this question lead me to modify various aspects of the theory of textual meaning I use in my analysis of metaphor. Through these modifications, I try to make the theory of textual meaning I use applicable to fiction as well as non-fiction. It is important that my theoretical framework be applicable to both kinds of texts, since my analysis of metaphor will concern instances in both.

One way we can account for the assumptions we make about fictions is by using the idea of fictional worlds (see, for example, Ingarden 1973; Lewis 1978; Woods 1974, Pavel and Woods 1979; for a discussion of "mythological" worlds which are neither "real" nor fictional, see Pavel 1979:187-189). A fictional world is generally considered to be both described and revealed by a

work of fiction. However, a fictional world is thought to be more than what is described and revealed by the fictional work. The "independence" of the world of a work is, for example, evidenced by the fact that we generally assume that the space and time of the fictional world extends beyond what is described and revealed in the work. We do not generally think, for example, that the world of Great Expectations (Dickens 1965) ends with the end of the novel.

But how do we gain access to the whole of a fictional world, particularly elements which are not described or represented in the work? Furthermore, how do we decide which propositions expressed by the text are to be taken as true descriptions of the fictional world? I try below to supply tentative answers to these questions using a theory of "the comprehensive meaning of the text." This is the theory of text I use in my analysis of metaphor.

This theory has been developed in Bellert 1980/81, Bellert 1978 and Bellert and Weingartner 1981 (see also Bellert 1970 and 1974). I present below a modified version of the theory as found in Bellert and Weingartner 1981.

According to Bellert and Weingartner (Bellert and Weingartner 1981:section 2.0), "intuitively and roughly speaking, the comprehensive meaning of a text COMP_{RM}(T) is the set of all relevant consequences of the text T --arrived at with the help of the relevant background B_R, hypothetical premisses H and the

explanatory sentences E ." Symbolically this is noted in the following way:

$$\text{ComprM}(T) = [\text{Cn}_R(T \cup B_R \cup H) - \text{Cn}_R((B_R \cup H) - T)] \cup E$$

(Bellert and Weingartner 1981:section 2.0)

A text (T) is a sequence of sentences which meet the following conditions: 1) there are at least two sentences (atomic or compound) which are separated by punctuation or a linguistic expression which can be interpreted as a (sentential) conjunction; 2) any sentence (s_i where $1 \leq i$) in the text has in conjunction with Relevant Background and hypotheses at least one logical consequence in common with at least one of its predecessors or has a common set of premises with at least one of its predecessors (Bellert and Weingartner 1981:section 2.1).

Bellert and Weingartner offer three definitions of a sentence (see Bellert and Weingartner 1981:section 1). Here I use only the second. In this definition a sentence (s) is considered to be the meaning content (e.g., a proposition) of a linguistic expression of the category type, sentence. In accordance with my own terminology, I will often substitute "proposition" for "sentence" in my discussion of Bellert and Weingartner 1981.

"The relevant background is a subset of the general background which consists of known facts, beliefs, assumptions, presuppositions, rules, value judgements, norms, etc., which the interpreter could be aware of and possibly use at the time of reading or listening to a text" (Bellert and Weingartner 1981:section 2.21).

The Relevant Background (B_T^+) is the part of the General Background which is actually relevant to the interpretation of a text. Since I will be concerned with propositions rather than sentences per se (see Chapter 1, section 3), I substitute "proposition" for "sentence" in giving Bellert and Weingartner's definition of this subset. The Relevant Background then includes 1) the logical background (some simple logical laws like the law of the excluded middle, and some elementary rules of reasoning like modus ponens); 2) those propositions which have at least one predicate in common with at least one proposition expressed by the text T (i.e., the propositional content of a sentence of T) (Bellert and Weingartner 1981:sections 2.221-2.238).

Clearly, the background knowledge we have is not infinite. In order to represent this finiteness formally, I would like to propose the following condition: (3) the Relevant Background (B_T^+) will include only some minimal subset of the set A formed from (1) and (2) such that for every other proper subset C_1 of A, if it is not the case that C_1 and B_T^+ have the same set of logical consequences, then i) $B_T^+ \vdash p^i$ for every proposition p^i which is

a member of C_1 , and ii) it is not the case that $C_1 \vdash p^r$ for every proposition p^r which is a member of B_T^+ . This condition allows us to identify the Relevant Background as some finite set from which we can deduce any proposition in the set defined by conditions (1) and (2).

It should be noted that background information is not a monolithic thing, but rather varies from culture to culture, individual to individual, and even for a single individual depending on the kind of text he or she is interpreting (cf. Bellert 1980/81:31).

Moreover, I do not mean to imply that all or even most interpreters of a fiction necessarily consider some particular set of propositions the appropriate General Background for a fictional text. One interpreter may use as appropriate General Background for all fictional texts he encounters his own knowledge and beliefs. Others may use as appropriate General Backgrounds--at least for literary fictions--the context critics reconstruct to accord with the General Background the author assumed. In relation to this discussion the point is not that one approach is right and another wrong, but that different approaches lead to different comprehensive meanings of the text.

Having made these remarks, I would like to return to the definitions which are pertinent to the theory of the comprehensive meaning of the text. Consequences are what we can infer from what a text says. Still, as Bellert notes, "...it is

not all the consequences (the number of which is infinite) that are necessary for fully understanding the meaning of a text. It is an interesting and open question as to what restrictions should be imposed on the consequences to limit them to a relevant subset of those which are necessary and sufficient for the interpretation of a text, for satisfying the conditions of its internal coherence or its coherence with the context" (Bellert 1980/81:31).

Four different sets of conditions for the class of Relevant Consequences are proposed in Bellert and Weingartner (see Bellert and Weingartner 1981:sections 2.51-2.54). Here I use only the second set which I proposed. According to this proposal, the set of Relevant Consequences ($Cn_r^+(A)$) of a set of sentences A is a minimal set of propositions which meets the following conditions: 1) $Cn_r^+(A)$ is a proper subset of $Cn(A)$; 2) for every other proper subset $Cn_1(A)$ of $Cn(A)$, if it is not the case that $Cn_1(A)$ and $Cn_r^+(A)$ have the same consequence class, then i) $Cn_r^+(A) \vdash c^i$ for every proposition c^i which is a member of $Cn_1(A)$, and ii) it is not the case that $Cn_1(A) \vdash c^r$ for every proposition c^r which is a member of $Cn_r^+(A)$ (Bellert and Weingartner 1981:section 2.52) (Again I have used "proposition" in place of "sentence.")

Bellert, in discussing such proposals for relevant conclusion classes, notes that

...it is not claimed that a speaker who understands fully a text actually draws all such conclusions; what is claimed is that a speaker can, or is capable of drawing such conclusions which follow from a text...Consider an example: "Paris has been the capital of France since the twelfth century," from which we can infer that Paris was the capital of France in 1335, or 194 A.D.... (assuming the Background Knowledge of arithmetic). All such and similar conclusions are potentially available.

(Bellert 1980/81:31)

In interpreting texts, we often make conjectures. In reading The Turn of the Screw (James 1968), for example, we may conjecture that the events described are "real" or "imagined" by the narrator.

Within the theory of ComprM, these conjectures are treated as Hypothetical Premises (Bellert and Weingartner 1981:section 2.3). Hypothetical Premises (H) for a text T are propositions which play a role analogous to that of conditional premises in a conditional argument. (Here again I substitute "proposition" for the word "sentence" found in Bellert and Weingartner's definition.). A set of Hypothetical Premises is then a set which meets the following conditions: 1) H is consistent; 2) no

proposition which is a member of H or conjunction of such propositions is identical to the propositions expressed by a member of T (i.e., the propositional content of a sentence of T) or a conjunction of such propositions; 3) when H is added to the text and the Relevant Background, the resulting set has a larger number of Relevant Consequences than the set would without H; 4) the novel consequences inferred with the help of H can be used to interpret the text in a consistent or coherent way; 5) H is consistent with everything the interpreter assumes in interpreting the text (Bellert and Weingartner 1981:sections 2.31-2.35).

In interpreting a text, we often develop explanations for things which a text says. For example, in Dickens' Bleak House we can explain the way in which Nemo's building burns down through the theory of spontaneous combustion (see Dickens 1964:viii and 463-464). In the theory of ComprM, these explanations are called "Explanatory" propositions (Bellert and Weingartner 1981:section 2.4. Again I use "proposition" in place of the word "sentence" found in Bellert and Weingartner's definition). A set of Explanatory propositions (E) for a text is then a set which meets the following conditions: 1) E is consistent; 2) no proposition which is a member of E nor any conjunction of such propositions is identical to the propositions expressed by a member of T (i.e., the propositional content of a sentence of T) or any conjunction of such propositions; 3) the

whole or some portion of the text T is derivable from E alone or together with the whole or some portion of the Relevant Background B (Bellert and Weingartner 1981:sections 2.41-2.44).

Using this theoretical framework, I will now try to answer the questions posed above; that is, how we gain access to those parts of a fictional world not described or represented in a text, and how we decide which propositions expressed by the text are to be taken as true. As a first approximation, we could say that the true propositions concerning a fictional world are the consequences of those propositions which are members of the Comprehensive Meaning of the text. We could then proceed to say that those true propositions concerning the fictional world which are not found in the text are those consequences which are not members of the text. In other words, we could claim that using certain Relevant Background assumptions as well as certain hypotheses and Explanatory propositions, we can deduce from a text a number of true propositions not directly expressed by the text itself.

This claim, however, would be too strong. First of all, the particular role of background assumptions in our comprehension of "historical" fiction leads me to suggest a restriction on the kind of propositions which can be considered elements of the Relevant Background B^+ for fictional texts. We generally assume for "historical" fiction that propositions concerning the "actual" world are general background for the fictional world of

the work. Nevertheless, most if not all "historical" fiction expresses propositions which are not true of the "actual" world, but which we consider to be true of the world of the fiction. In The History of Henry Esmond Esquire, for example, many propositions concerning the attempt of the Jacobins to retake the throne of England are simply false in relation to our knowledge and/or beliefs about the "actual" world (see Thackeray 1966:437-498 and Dodds 1963:162-163). Yet we consider these propositions to be true of the fictional world of the novel.

I would like to suggest that, apart from those in the logical background, only propositions about classes of entities, that is conditional general propositions, can be part of the Relevant Background for a fictional text (cf. Ryan 1980). This proposal can be formulated as follows.

For a fictional text T a proposition p is a member of the Relevant Background E^+ only if p is a member of the logical background or $p = \forall x(Ax \rightarrow Bx)$, where A and B are predicates and X is an individual variable.

Thus propositions concerning the Jacobins' "actual" world behavior would not be part of the Relevant Background for Henry Esmond. However, the proposition that all men are human, if

taken as part of the General Background could be part of the Relevant Background, if it met the other conditions for membership in B₁ outlined above.

My contention is, I believe, compatible with the way we use background propositions to evaluate textual ones. We clearly would not evaluate as false for the fiction a proposition concerning something Henry Esmond did (in the novel of that name) simply because we know or believe that he did not do this something in the "actual" world. On the other hand, we would evaluate as false for the fiction a textual proposition in that novel which stated that some man was not human.

Allusions, in particular allusions to propositions concerning individual entities would seem to be a problem for my proposal. Alluded to propositions may indeed concern individual entities rather than classes and yet still in some sense be pertinent to a fictional text. For example, in William Butler Yeats' "Leda and the Swan" (Yeats 1956a), the proposition that Jove rapes Leda while he is in the form of a swan is alluded to though never explicitly stated in the poem. Though this proposition is by no means a general proposition, it is for many readers quite relevant to Yeats' poem about a "staggering girl, her thighs caressed/by the dark webs..." (Yeats 1956a).

I would like to suggest that such alluded to propositions are relevant to a fictional text only when we can explain the presence of textual propositions through them or make the text

more understandable by using them. In the terms of the Theory of the Comprehensive Meaning of the Text, I am suggesting that alluded to propositions which are not conditional general propositions are pertinent to the interpretation of a fictional text only when they function as either Explanatory propositions (i.e., members of the class E) or Hypothetical Premises (i.e., members of H).

If we consider such allusions to be pertinent only when they function as Explanatory Propositions or Hypothetical Premises we can within the theory distinguish between propositions which are clearly pertinent as allusions and those which are not. For example, we can treat the proposition that Jove raped Leda as at least potentially pertinent to the interpretation of Yeats' poem, while at the same time treating as irrelevant propositions concerning Jove's role in the fight with the Titans.

There are still other problems. As noted above, there are often false propositions which a work of fiction expresses about its fictional world. These false propositions cannot be considered true simply because they are expressed by the text and are therefore consequences of propositions in the Comprehensive Meaning. So, in order to arrive at a set of consequences which are true, we must select only a subset T' of the propositions which are members of the text T. This poses the question of how we arrive at this subset.

At least some scholars believe that we make evaluations of

fictional statements on the basis of conventions. J. Woods (Woods 1974) and L. Dolezel (Dolezel 1973, 1979, and 1980), are among those who have proposed possible conventions. In the interests of furthering discussion, I would like in the next few pages to suggest some proposals which can be related to the theory of ComprM. However, the reader should note that these proposals are in no way related to my conditions for metaphorical interpretation. Furthermore, it should be noted that the conventions I propose are intended as a logical account of the evaluations which we conventionally make, and are not an account of the psychological procedures individuals use or, for that matter, of individual judgements.

I would like to suggest that in most cases there are two conventions which guide our choice of which propositions belong to T'; that is the set of true propositions in the text. I would like to propose that the first convention is that we assume that a proposition which is expressed by the text is true if it is consistent with every other proposition about the fictional world which we assume true about the fictional world (cf. Woods 1974:60ff). This convention, which I will call Convention 1, can be formulated as follows:

Convention 1

At some point in interpreting a fictional text T, a

proposition p which is a member of T is a member of the set of true textual propositions T' if it is consistent with every other proposition we assume true at this point in the interpretation.

Evidence to support the claim that we use a convention such as this in order to make evaluations is easily found in our reading of literary works. For example, when William Makepeace Thackeray writes in Vanity Fair that Becky Sharp "...said she had long had some notion of the partiality with which Sir Pitt honoured her..." (Thackeray 1906: Vol 1, 180) we assume that Becky Sharp did indeed say this within the fictional world of Vanity Fair. It is consistent with everything else we assume true for this fictional world. When Samuel Johnson writes that Rasselas "...was the fourth son of the mighty emperor, in whose dominions the Father of Waters begins his course..." (Johnson 1962:13), we assume that this is truly the case within the world of Rasselas: there is no reason to think otherwise.

In fact, I believe the same is true of what "mere" characters say. For example, we conventionally accept what Joe says in Great Expectations since it is consistent with everything else we accept as true in this novel (see, for example, Dickens 1965:2161r). Indeed, I think that we accept what Mr. Wickham says in Pride and Prejudice concerning his leaving of Pemberly

until we find it inconsistent with what is said subsequently (Austen 1959:96-102; 113-115; 210-219; 267-268; 326-327). It is, I think, reasonable to hold that the "reversal" in this novel depends upon not only Elizabeth but also the reader rejecting parts of Mr. Wickham's story only when they are found to be inconsistent with other propositions expressed by the text.

The first convention I have proposed states that we accept as true for a fictional world any proposition which a fictional text expresses and which is consistent with all other propositions we assume to be true for a fictional world. This convention, I think, follows from the general principle that we accept as true for a fictional world as many of the propositions expressed by a fictional text as logical consistency will allow.

This principle can be seen as following from two general assumptions which I think we make about texts we consider fictional. The first of these is the assumption that the propositions a fiction expresses are in general true of some fictional (i.e., imaginary) world. If we do not approach a text as generally expressing true propositions about some imaginary world, then we are not assuming the text is in general about anything imaginary. Since a fiction by definition is about something imaginary, if we assume that the propositions a text expresses are not true for some fictional world we are in effect not considering the text in general to be a fiction.

However, I do not think we can assume theoretically that all

propositions expressed by a fictional text are true of some fictional world. I think we must in general assume that the propositional members of the set of true propositions expressed by a text about a fictional world are logically consistent (relative to a Relevant Background).

Logicians have shown that from logically inconsistent propositions we can logically infer anything and everything. So, if we assumed for the purposes of a theoretical account that members of a set of true propositions expressed by a fictional text could be logically inconsistent, then our theory would be logically implying that we could infer anything and everything about the fictional world or worlds with which such a text was concerned. I do not think that we can infer from any fictional text that anything and everything is true for some fictional world.

There are, however, texts where we accept two logically inconsistent propositions as literally true. For example, in Ray Bradbury's "A Sound of Thunder" (Bradbury 1975:69-70 and 83-84) certain events are said to happen and not happen during the same time and space. However, even in such cases we do not treat the propositions in question as we do logically inconsistent propositions in a deduction. As Woods points out (Woods 1974:52), we do not use two (or more) such inconsistent propositions to infer anything else.

No matter how such problem cases are resolved (Woods

1974:49ff and 132ff; and Heintz 1979:92ff are among those who offer proposals), it is clear that by and large we do not accept as literally true two or more propositions which are logically inconsistent (relative to a relevant Background). Rather, we generally accept one or the other as literally true. In Andrea del Sarto either Andrea and his wife are free to walk about (Browning 199-204; see, for example, lines 51-52; 74-75; 211-212; 219-221) or they are fettered fast. In The Vicar of Wakefield either Mr. Burchell is a rich man or he is poor (Goldsmith 1966:24 and 183). This raises the question of what convention(s) we use to make such choices.

I have just argued that in principle we assume as true for a fictional text as many propositions as logical consistency will allow. It follows from this general principle that if we are presented with two or more inconsistent textual propositions in a fictional text, we conventionally assume to be true those textual propositions which allow us to consider true as many propositions as possible. In other words, we will conventionally choose a set of propositions as the set of true textual propositions T' , only if this choice allows us to assume true more propositions expressed by the text than would choosing any other consistent set of textual propositions.

But what is meant here by "most?" Not everything we can infer logically from a set of propositions can be included in our judgements. The number of such inferences which we can make is

infinite, and presumably not every inferrable proposition is relevant to such decisions.

A Relevant Consequence class (Cn_T^*) as described above is, I think, a plausible candidate for the pertinent subset. A set of relevant conclusions as described above, is a finite set of conclusions from which we can deduce any proposition we can infer from a text. So, such a subset contains or implies everything that we can logically infer from a set of propositions. We need not concern ourselves with the fact that there can be equivalent sets of relevant conclusions for any set of propositions. It can be shown that the number of constituent propositions in two equivalent sets of relevant conclusions is always the same.

At first glance it would seem plausible to say that what we consider in making our judgements of truth and falsehood are the relevant conclusions which can be inferred from sets of textual propositions. However, what a text--be it fictional or non-fictional--expresses is not simply what we can infer logically from textual propositions. In Tom Jones, for example, we understand the textual proposition that Mr. Allworthy has been decreed a large inheritance to be saying something more than just that the composite predicate *'decreed a large inheritance' is applied to some entity called Mr. Allworthy (Fielding 1950:4). We understand it to be saying that Mr. Allworthy has obtained a property worth much money, that someone else once possessed this property, that this someone has died, etc. In fact, we can

understand it to be saying anything we can infer from it using Relevant Background assumptions.

An examination of Volume 2, Chapter 18 of Vanity Fair (Thackeray 1906: Vol 2, 215-225) indicates the role hypotheses can play in understanding what a text is saying. In this chapter Rawdon finds his wife, Becky Sharp holding hands with Lord Steyne (Thackeray 1906: Vol 2, 222-223). The hypotheses we assume concerning what this act implies will evidently affect what we understand the text to be saying in reporting this scene.

So, in looking at what a set of textual propositions is expressing we are looking not just at what we can logically infer from the textual propositions themselves, but also at what we can infer from them using Relevant Background assumptions and Hypotheses. This is equivalent to saying that we are considering the Comprehensive Meaning of sets of textual propositions.

So, it would appear that when we judge a set of textual propositions to be the set T' of true textual propositions, conventionally this set of propositions has more constituent propositions in its comprehensive meaning than any other consistent set of textual propositions has. Understood this way, my proposal can be formulated as follows:

Convention 2

At some point in interpreting a fictional text T let p .

and q be mutually inconsistent members of T (relative to a Relevant Background). Then the set of true textual propositions will be the set of propositions T' including p, only if the Comprehensive Meaning of T' has a larger number of constituent propositions than the Comprehensive Meaning of any other consistent set of textual propositions.

A couple of examples will, I believe, serve to indicate the feasibility of the proposal. In The Vicar of Wakefield we reject the Vicar's earlier assertion that Mr. Burchell is a poor man and accept his later assertion that he is a rich one (Goldsmith 1966:14 and 183). To accept the proposition that Mr. Burchell is poor would mean considering false a rather large number of textual propositions in order to maintain the consistency of the set of true propositions. Aside from the proposition that Mr. Burchell is rich, we would have to consider false, among other things, the proposition that Mr. Burchell is really Sir William Thornhill (who is very rich), and the proposition that Mr. Burchell takes back from his nephew Squire Thornhill all the money that he had previously given to him (Goldsmith 1966:183ff). If, on the other hand, we evaluate as true the proposition that Mr. Burchell is rich, we need for the sake of consistency consider as false the proposition that Mr. Burchell is poor and

little else.

It would appear then that considering Mr. Burchell rich will allow us to understand the text as expressing more true propositions than would the alternative. As my proposal indicates, we do conventionally consider the proposition that Mr. Burchell is rich the true textual proposition and the proposition that he is poor the false one.

In the poem Andrea del Sarto we evaluate as false under a literal interpretation the proposition that Andrea and his wife, Lucrezia, are fettered fast, while we evaluate as true under a literal interpretation each of those textual propositions which imply that Andrea and Lucrezia are free to move as they please (Browning 1966). If we considered true under a literal interpretation the proposition that Andrea and Lucrezia are fettered fast, then in order to maintain consistency we would have to consider false each and every textual proposition which implies that they are free to move as they please (Browning 1966; see, for example, Browning 1966:200-204, lines 74-75, 211-212, 219-221). An examination of this poem shows that there are many such propositions.

If, on the other hand, we evaluate as true under a literal interpretation any of the textual propositions that imply that Andrea and Lucrezia are free to move as they please, then in order to maintain consistency we need evaluate as false under a literal interpretation very little but the proposition that

Andrea and his wife are literally fettered fast.

It would appear then that considering false the proposition that Andrea and Lucrezia are fettered fast will allow the text to express more true propositions than would considering it true. As noted above, we do conventionally consider this proposition literally false, just as my proposal indicates.

3

I will now try to show how the concepts of true- and false-for-an-interpretation I have proposed, and the theory of textual meaning I am using can be profitably applied to the analysis of "semantically deviant" utterances. The "deviance" of syntactically well-formed sentences and utterances is sometimes called semantic anomaly by linguists (see, for example, Katz 1972:90f; Fodor 1977:194-197; and Lyons 1977:327 and 329) and sortal incorrectness by scholars who use a normal semantic framework (see, for example, Thomason 1972, Van Dijk 1975, and Guenther 1975). No matter how labelled, the class is generally thought to involve utterances like the following: 1) "prepositions feel oily;" 2) "the stone died;" 3) "the animal was deduced from the proposition."

Before presenting my own suggestions, I would like first to briefly discuss the two main characterizations of "semantic

deviance" in natural language; that is, the characterization in linguistic semantics as semantic anomaly and its characterization in formal semantics as sortal incorrectness. I will use Jerrold J. Katz's Semantic Theory (Katz 1972) in order to discuss semantic anomaly, and K.H. Thomason's "A Semantic Theory of Sortal Incorrectness" (Thomason 1972) in order to discuss sortal incorrectness (see also Drange 1966). I have chosen to use Katz and Thomason because their views on "semantic deviance" in natural language have been widely used in explaining the role of "semantic deviance" in metaphor (see, for example, Levin 1977 and Van Dijk 1975).

Katz uses the notion of semantic anomaly to distinguish sentences which involve contradiction from sentences which seem to make no sense. Katz contends that the meaning contents or concepts (as he calls them in discussing anomaly) of words in a language each have "...a range of predication specified as a category that determines the concepts with which it can combine in forming assertions" (Katz 1972:91). Katz uses the notion of "selection restriction" in order to formally present this idea of the category of concepts with which a concept of a word may meaningfully combine (Katz 1972:43-44 and 89-98).

Thomason, on the other hand, does not restrict the range of terms with which a term may combine. Rather, he restricts the range of entities to which a logical predicate may apply. Thus "that is strawberry-flavoured" and "that truth is

strawberry-flavoured" are "semantically deviant" for the same reasons when the 'that' of the first utterance is used to refer to an entity which could be truly called 'a truth' (Thomason 1972:212-214).

The question then is how we are to know which predicates are to apply to which classes of entities. Thomason answers this question by using the notion of "logical space" (Thomason 1972:221-223). A logical space under Thomason's interpretation, is a net whose holes are a set of "roles." Each of these is identified by certain properties which are true of the entity or entities located at the point. The roles are interrelated to the extent that the properties are interrelated. A simple example of a set of interrelated properties is a set of temperature degrees.

...I will regard sorts as regions of logical space...

Van Frassen explains logical space as a collection of possible individuals; I prefer to think of it as a net whose holes consist of characters or roles. The logical space is generated by certain conceptual resources, the mesh of the net being as fine as possible given these resources. That is, each role must be portrayed with as much detail as the conceptual resources admit. A logical space is a state space.

(Thomason 1972:222)

The predicates in a formal sortal logic then are stipulated to apply meaningfully (that is, as either true or false) to certain regions of space. If a predicate is applied to an area of space of the "wrong" sort, the resulting proposition is sortally incorrect and hence, neither true nor false (Thomason 1972:223-253).

Despite their differences, both Katz and Thomason use the notion of category restrictions in order to account for "semantic deviance" in natural language. In what follows I will argue that this notion will not allow for an adequate account of the distinction between utterances literally "semantically deviant" though possibly meaningful under metaphorical interpretation and utterances literally meaningful under certain circumstances though involving sentence types normally interpreted as "semantically deviant" under a literal interpretation.

In many works of fiction we find instances of utterances of sentence types which, though normally considered literally "semantically deviant" when uttered, are within the context of the text quite meaningful under a literal interpretation. If we look, for example, at Lewis Carroll's Through The Looking-Glass, we find among other things flowers which talk:

"O Tiger-Lily!" said Alice, addressing herself to one that was waving gracefully about in the wind, "I

wish you could talk!"

"We can talk!" said the Tiger-Lily, "when there's anybody worth talking to."

Alice was so astonished that she couldn't speak for a minute: it quite seemed to take her breath away.

At length, as the Tiger-Lily only went on waving about, she spoke again, in a timid voice--almost a whisper.

And can all flowers talk?"

"As well as you can," said the Tiger-Lily. "And a great deal louder."

(Carroll 1970:200-201)

We can see the same sort of phenomenon in William Blake's "The Clod and the Pebble." In this poem inanimate entities are literally talking to each other.

"Love"seeketh not Itself to please,
Nor for itself hath any care,
But for another gives its ease,
And builds a Heaven in Hell's despair."

So sung a little Clod of Clay
Trodden with the cattle's feet,

But a Pebble of the brook
Warbled out these metres meet:

"Love seeketh only Self to please,
To bind another to Its delight,
Joys in another's loss of ease,
And builds a Hell in Heaven's despite."

(Blake 1982:37)

This phenomenon is a problem for the analyses of both Katz and Thomason. If, as Katz and Thomason seem to believe, category restrictions are an important part of the semantic description of natural languages, then we may truly be dealing with new dialects or languages in fictional works like the Alice novels which contain many "violations" of these category restrictions. However, only speakers of a particular language can understand utterances involving such changes in the category restrictions of the language. No matter how we label the effects of these changes, it seems clear that a theory which attempts to account for "semantic deviance" in natural languages through category restrictions should be able to account for changes in the restrictions, and thus to account for how speakers of a language are able to produce and comprehend these changes. If a theory does not do this, it becomes difficult if not impossible within

the theory to distinguish between sentences or utterances which are "semantically deviant" when literally interpreted but which may be open to a meaningful metaphorical interpretation and utterances literally meaningful under certain circumstances, but which involve sentence types normally interpreted as literally "semantically deviant." This leaves the way open to the theoretical confusion of literal and metaphorical interpretation.

How then do we account for "semantic deviance" in relation to fictional texts? As we have seen, a sentence type may be meaningless in one world and meaningful in another. Logically speaking, a "world" is constituted of a set of propositions concerning it. What differentiates one world from another is that certain propositions which are assumed true of one are not assumed true of the other and vice versa.

Since "semantic deviance" varies from world to world, it varies in relation to sets of propositions we assume true. Moreover, it would seem that a proposition is "semantically deviant" when it is not consistent with assumptions we make for a world about what can and cannot be true of various classes of entities under a literal interpretation. This leads me to suggest that "semantically deviant" propositions be considered propositions which we take as false- for- a- literal- interpretation.

W. Quine has proposed that the kind of statement I am calling "semantically deviant" be considered false. In Word and

Object he writes:

...apart from that technical context there has been a concern among philosophers to declare meaningless, rather than trivially false, such predications as 'This stone is thinking about Vienna' (Carnap) and 'Quadruplicity drinks procrastination' (Russell). Here we witness sometimes just a spontaneous revulsion against silly sentences and sometimes a remote project of cutting meaningful language down to something like empirical size. But since the philosophers who would build such categorial fences are not generally resolved to banish from language all falsenoods of mathematics and like absurdities, I fail to see much benefit in the partial exclusions that they do undertake; for the forms concerned would remain still quite under control if admitted rather, like self-contradictions, as false (and false by meaning, if one likes).

(Quine 1960:229)

The idea that such propositions should be considered false-for-a-literal-interpretation is derived from such proposals (see also Lakoff 1971:332ff; McCawley 1971:217-219;

Gopnik and Gopnik 1976; and Lowenberg 1975:322-324). The only change I have made is that instead of speaking of propositions which are actually false, I speak of propositions assumed to be false.

If "semantically deviant" propositions can be considered false-for-a-literal-interpretation, then the same principle we conventionally use in determining whether or not a proposition is false in a fictional text should play a role in determining whether or not a proposition is "semantically deviant" in a fictional text. However, the convention itself must be somewhat different. The pertinent question in relation to "semantic deviance" is not which of two propositions in a text is false. The question is rather whether we should take a proposition in the text as false or alternatively drop some Relevant Background assumption (i.e., consider the background assumption false). For example, should we take it as false that flowers in Through the Looking-Glass can talk, or should we drop our assumption that flowers cannot talk? Below I propose a formulation of such a convention.

The reader should note that the formulation below has the consequence of further limiting the set of propositions that can be found in the Relevant Background of a fictional text. Thus the proposal may be considered to constitute not only an evaluation convention, but also a fifth condition on the Relevant Background for fictional texts. The reader should also note that

there is no need to explicitly state in the condition whether or not a proposition q is a member of the Relevant Background. According to the necessary condition I proposed above for true-and-false-for-an-interpretation, if a proposition is true-for-an-interpretation--that is, a member of T' --then the assumptions under which it is interpreted must be consistent with the set of textual propositions (see above, section 1). So, the formulation can be put in terms of whether or not some textual proposition p with which q is inconsistent, is a member of the set T' of true textual propositions. Knowing whether or not p is a member of T' will tell us whether some proposition q which is a member of the General Background can be a member of the Relevant Background. Below is a formulation of the proposal:

Convention 3

At some point in interpreting a fictional text, T , let p and q be mutually inconsistent propositions. Let p be a member of T and q a member of the General Background, E . Then the set of true textual propositions will conventionally be a set of textual propositions T' which includes p , only if the Comprehensive Meaning of T' has a larger number of constituent propositions than the Comprehensive Meaning of any other consistent set of textual propositions.

A couple of examples will, I believe, serve to indicate the feasibility of the proposal. Let us look at the following passage from Charles Dickens' A Tale of Two Cities:

The little, narrow town of Dover hid itself away from the beach, and ran its head into the chalk cliffs, like a marine ostrich. The beach was a desert of heaps of sea and stones tumbling widely about, and the sea did what it liked, and what it liked was destruction.

(Dickens 1960:22)

In this passage we find the textual proposition *'the town of Dover hid itself.' I would like to suggest that most speakers of English accept as part of the General Background for Dickens' novel the proposition *'any entity which is a town is not an entity which can act.' Clearly, the textual proposition concerning Dover is inconsistent with this General Background proposition.

Let us say we accept the textual proposition as true-for-a-literal interpretation and hence a member of T'. We would have to exclude the General Background proposition mentioned above concerning towns as well as any others which imply it. Now there are many towns mentioned in Dickens' novel and none of them are

said to do any "acting" as Dover does (see, for example, Dickens 1960:23, 35, 161, 215, 311). So, if we consider the textual proposition concerning Dover hiding as true, then we would have to do without whatever conclusions we could infer from either the General Background proposition in question or whatever propositions in the Relevant Background imply it.

Now, let us say that we consider this textual proposition concerning Dover as literally false and the background proposition true. Using this background proposition or others which imply it, we could make all the inferences we could not make if we considered Dover to literally hide itself. Moreover, as noted above, no other textual proposition concerning towns claims that towns can "act." So, we need only consider the proposition concerning Dover to be literally false.

It would appear, according to Convention 3, that the textual proposition that Dover hides itself is literally false. This is, in fact, the choice we conventionally make.

Let us now turn to the passage from Lewis Carroll's Through The Looking-Glass which is quoted above (Carroll 1970:200-201). In this passage we find the textual proposition 'flowers talk.' I would like to suggest that most speakers of English accept as part of the General Background for this novel the proposition 'any entity which is a flower is not an entity which talks.'

An examination of this novel shows that there are few, if any, flowers which do not talk--indeed, most of one chapter is

devoted to talking flowers (Carroll 1979:Chapter 2, 199-213, esp. 200-204). The result of considering the background proposition true would mean, for the sake of consistency, considering almost the whole of Chapter 2 to be comprised of literally false propositions.

On the other hand, if we consider the background proposition in question false we can consider the textual propositions concerning talking flowers to be literally true. This would mean we could not conclude that flowers which do not talk cannot talk. However, no such flowers play any prominent role in this novel.

According to Convention 3 then, the textual proposition in question is true and the background proposition false for the world in question. This, I believe, is the choice we conventionally make.

CHAPTER THREE

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY MEANING

In this chapter I discuss two kinds of non-textual propositions we use to interpret texts. The first I call "conditional general propositions" and the second "non-essential generic propositions." In the first section of this chapter, I try to identify conditional general propositions in a text's Relevant Background with primary or descriptive meaning. In the second section I contend that when non-essential generic propositions are used to interpret a text, they function as Hypothetical Premises. I try to identify non-essential generic propositions used to interpret a text with secondary or connotative meaning.

1

A conditional general proposition is a proposition which states that if an entity can truly be called *'A,' then the entity can also truly be called *'B.' Put another way, a

conditional general proposition is a proposition which states that something *'B' will be true of an entity on the condition that it is a member of another class; that is, the class of entities truly called *'A.' For example, the proposition *'if an entity is a man, then the entity is mortal' is a conditional general proposition, because it tells us that something--that is, being mortal--will be true of an entity if it is a member of the class of entities which can truly be called *'men.'

In the second chapter of this dissertation, I discussed conditional general propositions in relation to the Relevant Background of fictional texts. In this chapter, I would like to discuss them in relation to what is called the "primary" or "descriptive" meaning of words and phrases in natural languages.

As just noted, a conditional general proposition will tell us something about an entity on the condition that the entity is a member of the class A with which the conditional general proposition is concerned. So, from (1) a textual proposition in which a predicate A is truly applied to an entity and (2) a conditional general proposition concerning the extensional class of A, we can infer something about the entity to which A is applied.

For example, let us say that someone applies the predicate *'bachelor' to some entity by uttering "John is a bachelor." Let us also say that as part of the Relevant Background for interpreting what is said, we have the conditional general

proposition *'if an entity is a bachelor, then the entity is unmarried.' Then if we assume that John is in the extensional class of *'bachelor' and thus that what the speaker says is true, we can infer that John can be truly called *'unmarried.'

A proposition we can infer from both a proposition about an entity and a conditional general proposition, semanticists often call an "implied" proposition. Within the discipline of symbolic logic, a proposition B is said to be implied by a proposition A if when A is true B is also true. The application of "implication" to what is expressed by natural language utterances is related to the use of the term in symbolic logic. Let us say that in our Relevant Background for a text we have a conditional general proposition concerning the extensional class of some predicate A. Let us say that this conditional general proposition states that whenever an entity is truly called A, we can also say that some predicate B is true of the entity. So, whenever there is in a text a proposition in which A is applied to some entity, we can infer that B is also true of the entity. It can be seen then that relative to this Relevant Background assumption, whenever the predicate A is true of some entity, so is the predicate B. Thus we can say that relative to the Relevant Background assumption, the proposition A implies the proposition B.

Semanticists sometimes consider implications (called "entailments" if the implication must always hold--see Lyons

1977:165) to be central to the "primary" or "descriptive" meaning of what is expressed by natural language sentences and utterances. John Lyons, for example, in his book Semantics describes how R. Carnap and W. Morris use pragmatic implications to define the meaning of utterances. In addition, he argues that the implications can be used to define sentence meaning (Lyons 1977:203-205). Donald Davidson in his article "Truth and Meaning" (Davidson 1971) notes the importance of entailment in arguing that logical truth can be used to account for meaning in natural languages. Davidson writes that if we have an acceptable notion of logical truth, "...related notions of logical equivalence and entailment will tag along. It is hard to imagine how a theory of meaning could fail to read a logic into its object language to this degree; and to the extent that it does, our intuitions of logical truth, equivalence and entailment may be called upon in constructing and testing the theory" (Davidson 1971:463; see also the treatment of meaning in Kempson 1977).

Conditional general propositions which we can use to infer other propositions are often called "meaning postulates" (see Lyons 1977:203f and Carnap 1956:222-229). Semanticists sometimes use meaning postulates as a device for describing at least part of the meaning of a sense of a word or phrase (see Lyons 1977:203-205 and Kempson 1977:188-191). Put into the terminology I am using, this is the same as saying that they often consider postulates to be a device for describing a part or the whole of

the meaning of a predicate.

The reason meaning postulates can be considered to play this role is reasonably straightforward: from the meaning postulates which hold for a predicate expressed by a word or phrase we can deduce the propositions which are implied when the predicate is applied to some entity. These implied propositions, as I have just noted, are considered central to the primary or descriptive meaning of natural language utterances.

It should be noted that "true" in relation to the implications of meaning postulates can be understood in the way in which I have been using the term; that is, as "taken as true" or "assumed true." In discussing the implications which can be made from meaning postulates Lyons writes "...the notion of truth involved here is a pragmatic concept: it is defined in terms of the speaker's belief that something is so, not in terms of either matters of fact or logical necessity. Pragmatic truth need not be either invariable or deterministic..." (Lyons 1977:204-205). My own use of "true" as "taken as true" simply involves understanding belief in a weak sense, corresponding to assumption.

There is one difference between conventionally accepted views of implication and meaning postulates, and my own. Many if not most scholars working in the field of semantics assume that at least some kernel of the meaning of a word or phrase in a language is shared by most speakers of the language and is

normally involved in their standard literal interpretations of texts. In Semantics Lyons explicitly discusses these assumptions. He writes:

Different speakers may hold partly different beliefs about the meaning and applicability of words, so that the set of implications that one speaker will accept as following from a given utterance may differ, to a greater or less degree, from the set of implications that another speaker will accept as following from the same utterance. But there will commonly be a considerable overlap in these two sets of implications; and the descriptive semanticist may generally limit himself to specifying the intersection of these sets of implications without being disturbed unduly about the indeterminate instances.

(Lyons 1977:205)

Lyons argues above that those implications (i.e., entailments) of a word on which speakers differ are indeterminate aspects of the word's meaning because they are not shared. The shared implications, on the other hand, constitute for Lyons the object of linguistic description. For Lyons these shared

implications--which he calls "pragmatic" after Carnap (see Lyons 1977:204)--by definition do not vary from text to text, at least under "normal" conditions:

...given that U_i and U_j are both statements, an utterance U_i , pragmatically implies an utterance, U_j , if the production of U_i would normally be taken to commit the speaker not only to the truth of the proposition expressed in U_i , but also to the truth of the proposition expressed in U_j . The word 'normally' is here intended to cover certain conditions which make it reasonable to assume or presuppose sincerity and communicative success; i.e. that the speaker not only says what he says, but both means what he says and says what he means...

(Lyons 1977:204)

My own view is somewhat different. As I tried to show in Chapter Two (see above Chapter 2, section three), implications we normally assume (for example, that flowers do not speak) need not hold for a fictional text. Since fictional texts are "normal" for my purposes, I do not assume that the literal meaning of a word or phrase in a "normal" text is the meaning which we use in

making inferences for all literally interpreted utterances which we take as "normal" sincerely intended and successful communications. "Entailment" is often used to indicate that a proposition is always true whenever some other proposition is true (see Lyons 1977:165). For example, the proposition *'x is a playing card' may be said to entail the proposition *'x is not animate': it is assumed that the latter is true whenever the former is true. However, as I just noted, I do not believe that such implications always hold (playing cards in Alice in Wonderland are, for example, animate). For this reason I will say that in a text one proposition is an "implication" of another rather than an "entailment." The term "implication" does not suggest, I believe, that in a text, if one proposition is true when another is, that this relation holds for all ("normal") texts.

2

There is a certain kind of proposition which we can use to interpret a text and which is distinct from but bears a resemblance to the conditional general propositions discussed in the first section of this chapter. Here are some examples of the kind of proposition to which I am referring:

- 1) *'Lions roam the plains.'
- 2) *'Bachelors are carefree.'
- 3) *'A politician is an untrustworthy creature.'
- 4) *'The dog is a friendly animal'

Like the conditional general propositions discussed above, these propositions state something which can be taken as characteristic of the entities of an extensional class. However, unlike conditional general propositions, these propositions do not state something that we take as true of all the entities in an extensional class. A lion who is in a zoo rather than outside roaming the plains does not in any way make (1) false. Nor does a bachelor burdened with worries falsify what (2) claims. These propositions claim only that entities in the class they concern generally have a particular property; not that any entity in the class must necessarily have it.

Semanticists sometimes call both kinds of propositions "generic propositions," because both state something is true of the entities in a class or genus (Lyons 1977:193-197). However, semanticists sometimes distinguish conditional general propositions from the kind I am now discussing, by calling the former "essential generic propositions" and the latter "non-essential generic propositions" (see Lyons 1977:195-197).

The term "essential" is used because it is sometimes thought that conditional general propositions concerning an extensional class involve properties essential to the nature of the entities

in that class. However, as I tried to show in the second chapter, "essential" properties of the members of an extensional class can vary from fictional world to fictional world. It would appear then that these "essential" properties are not always essential--at least in relation to the use of a natural language in fictional texts. Nevertheless, while I do not find the use of the term "essential" appropriate, I do think the distinction it is used to make is important. As noted above, the "essential" propositions ascribe something to every member of a class, while the "non-essential" propositions state that something is only generally true of the members of a class. For the sake of clear discussion, I will continue to call "essential generic propositions" by the term "conditional general propositions" or the term "meaning postulates" where the latter is appropriate. I will use the term "generic proposition" to refer to propositions of the kind with which I am concerned in this section; that is, propositions which are generally (but not always) true of a class of entities.

The difference mentioned above between conditional general and generic propositions underlies, I believe, another important difference between the two. As noted in the first section of this chapter, we can infer something about an entity from a textual proposition and a background general proposition. For example, from the textual proposition *'John is a bachelor' and the background general proposition *'any entity which is a

bachelor is male,' we can invariably infer the proposition *'John is a male.' However, from the same textual proposition and the background generic proposition *'bachelors are generally carefree' we cannot infer invariably that *'John is carefree.' We could of course infer that John may be carefree, but this would be a trivial inference in that we can say that any entity may have a great number of properties.

This is not to say that we cannot make non-trivial inferences using background generic propositions. From the textual proposition *'John is a bachelor' and the background generic proposition *'bachelors are generally carefree' we can infer that John is a member of a class of entities which are in general carefree. Such inferences can play a significant role in the interpretation of utterances. Say, for example, someone first expresses the proposition that John is a bachelor and then states that John is carefree. We can use the inference that John is a member of a class of entities which are generally carefree to interpret the speaker as implying some kind of causal link between John's bachelorhood and his carefree state. Furthermore, inferences which enable us to establish such links are not the only kinds of significant inferences we can make using generic propositions. Let us assume, for example, that we have a text which expresses the proposition *'John is the most carefree of bachelors.' Let us say that as part of the background we use for interpreting this utterance we have the generic proposition

*'bachelors are generally carefree.' In this case we will understand the speaker to be making quite a strong statement about how carefree John is.

Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that a generic proposition only suggests that a specific individual has a certain property. This is the case even when someone alludes to some set of background propositions. Let us say, for example, someone says, "John is a real bachelor." This utterance expresses the proposition that not only does John have all of the properties which we normally assume all bachelors have, but he also has properties which bachelors generally but do not always have. However, we cannot take this utterance to be implying that John is carefree simply because we assume as part of the background the generic proposition that bachelors are generally carefree.

Our inability to conclude anything definite about specific individuals may be one of the reasons that we cannot judge propositions in a fictional text false in relation to generic propositions which are in our General Background for the fiction. Take, for example, the following quotation in Joseph Conrad's Lord Jim concerning the protagonist of that novel: "He was gentlemanly, steady tractable, with a thorough knowledge of his duties; and in time, when yet very young, he became chief mate of a fine ship..." (Conrad 1931:10). I do not think we would consider the novel's assertions concerning Jim's qualities to be

false for the fiction simply because in our General Background for this text there are generic propositions to the effect that sailors are generally impolite, unsteady, intractable, and ignorant of their duties.

We might think Conrad's statements about Jim create a "false" portrait of what a sailor is like in the actual world. This, however, is a separate issue involving not truth and falsehood in the fiction, but rather the relation of the fiction to the actual world.

It is not only propositions about specific individuals which we will not consider false in a fiction in relation to a generic proposition in the General Background for the text. We will not even consider a generic proposition in a fiction false in relation to a generic proposition in the General Background for the text. In order to illustrate this point I will take another quotation from Lord Jim.

...while waiting, he associated naturally with men of his calling in the port...The majority were men who, like himself, thrown there by some accident, had remained as officers of country ships. They had now a horror of the duty, and the hazard of stormy oceans. They were attuned to the eternal peace of Eastern sky and sea. They loved short passages, good deck-chairs,

large native crews, and the distinction of being white. They shuddered at the thought of hard work, and led precariously easy lives, always on the verge of dismissal, always on the verge of engagement, serving Chinamen, Arabs, half-castes--would have served the devil himself had he made it easy enough.

(Conrad 1931:12-13)

In interpreting the passage quoted above, we need not understand it as saying that every single man thrown by accident into the port in question was lazy, had a horror of duty, etc. It is quite possible--indeed, quite plausible--to understand the text to be describing traits generally true of the men in question. In other words, it is plausible to understand this passage to be expressing several generic propositions.

It is possible to have as part of our General Background for this text, generic propositions inconsistent with those we understand this text to be expressing. Such inconsistency might suggest to us that the novel is not accurately representing sailors of this kind in the actual world. I do not think, however, that it would lead us to think that the generic propositions of the text were false for the fictional world of Lord Jim.

From the above discussion of generic propositions we can see

that we do not use generic propositions to interpret texts, be they fictional or non-fictional, in the same way as we use conditional general propositions. We can see, nevertheless, that we do use propositions of this kind in interpreting both kinds of texts. The question then is how we do use non-textual generic propositions in the interpretation of texts.

I would like to propose that we use non-textual generic propositions in interpreting a text as Hypothetical Premises. As the reader may recall from the discussion in Chapter 2, the set of Hypothetical Premises for a text is a set which meets the following conditions: (1) the set is consistent; (2) no member or conjunction of members of the set is identical to any proposition or conjunction of propositions in the text; (3) when the set is added to the propositions of the text and the Relevant Background, the resulting set of Relevant Consequences is larger than the set of Relevant Consequences would be if the set of Hypothetical Premises were not added; (4) the novel conclusions that are inferred with the help of the Hypothetical Premises help in interpreting the text in a consistent or coherent way; (5) the set is compatible with everything the interpreter uses as part of the General Background for interpreting the text (Bellert and Weingartner 1981:section 2.3. I have used "proposition" instead of the word "sentence" found in Bellert and Weingartner's definition).

These conditions, I believe, must be met if a non-textual

generic proposition is to be pertinent to the interpretation of a text. Some examples will, I hope, serve to illustrate this point.

Let us assume the proposition *'John is a carefree bachelor' is a member of a set of textual propositions. In addition, let us assume that in the General Background for the text we have the generic proposition *'bachelors are generally carefree.' Let us also assume that the text is discussing John as a typical bachelor and that without the generic proposition we cannot infer that John is typical of bachelors with respect to being carefree. If both the conclusion and the generic proposition are consistent with whatever else we infer from the text, the use of the generic proposition will clearly be pertinent to the interpretation of the text. It will help us to relate the statement about John being a carefree bachelor to the rest of the text. In other words, it will help us to interpret the text in a coherent manner.

Now let us assume for a moment that we cannot draw some novel conclusion from the text using the generic proposition. Let us say, for example, that the text does not express the proposition that John is a carefree bachelor or some other proposition relating to how carefree some bachelor is. In this case there is hardly any point in using the generic proposition to interpret the text: we can infer nothing at all from the text using the proposition. Alternatively, let us say that the only

proposition we can infer from the text using the generic proposition is that John is a typical bachelor insofar as he is carefree, and that we could infer this conclusion from the text without the help of the generic proposition. Here again there would be no point in using the generic proposition in interpreting the text. It would seem that we need to be able to infer something novel using this generic proposition in order for it to be pertinent.

Now let us assume for a moment that we can infer from the text a proposition inconsistent with either the generic proposition about bachelors or what we have inferred about John using this proposition. In this case, if we use the generic proposition in order to interpret the text, the result is an inconsistent interpretation. Alternatively, let us assume that there is as part of our General Background a proposition inconsistent with the generic proposition or with what we have inferred about John in using it. In this case, the result of using the generic proposition is one or more inferences from the text which are inconsistent with our general assumptions about the text. In either case, the result is one or more inferences which quite literally do not make sense in relation to other propositions we assume true for the interpretation of the text. The generic proposition in question then is of use in interpreting the text only if it is compatible with the assumptions we believe to be appropriate background for

interpreting the text.

In addition, it would be senseless to consider the generic proposition pertinent to the text if the only novel conclusion(s) we inferred using it had nothing to do with the rest of what we inferred from the text. Let us say that the proposition *'John is a carefree bachelor' is part of a text which simply states the facts of John's life, and aside from this proposition expresses nothing concerning bachelorhood. In this case the conclusion *'John is a typical bachelor insofar as he is carefree' is irrelevant to our interpretation of the rest of the text. I think the reader will agree that if this is the only novel conclusion we can draw with the help of this generic proposition, there is no point in considering this generic proposition pertinent to the interpretation of the text.

In sum, it would appear that the non-textual proposition that bachelors are generally carefree is pertinent to the interpretation of a text only if it is compatible with both background and text, and allows us to draw at least one novel conclusion from the text which we can use in interpreting the text in a consistent or coherent manner. In other words, it is pertinent to the interpretation of a text only when it meets the conditions for functioning as a member of the set of hypothetical premises.

"Sonnet 130" by Shakespeare can be used as another illustration that non-textual generic propositions are pertinent

to the interpretation of a text only if they function as Hypothetical Premises.

My mistress' eyes are nothing like the sun;
 Coral is far more red than her lips' red;
 If snow be white, why then her breasts are dun;
 If hairs be wires, black wires grow on her head.
 I have seen roses damasked, red and white,
 But no such roses see I in her cheeks;
 And in some perfumes is there more delight
 Than in the breath that from my mistress reeks.
 I love to hear her speak; yet well I know
 That music hath a far more pleasing sound:
 I grant I never saw a goddess go;
 My mistress when she walks, treads on the ground.
 And yet, by heaven, I think my love as rare
 As any she belied with false compare.

(Shakespeare 1970d)

In examining this sonnet, I will focus on the line which says "Coral is far more red than her lips' red." I would like to suggest that in interpreting this verse or the sonnet we can use the generic proposition *'women's lips as red as coral are

generally considered beautiful.' With this generic proposition we can understand the verse as implying that the woman in question lacks a particular attribute generally considered beautiful.

With other generic propositions we can in a similar manner understand other textual propositions as implying the woman lacks qualities generally considered beautiful. Without using such generic propositions or their equivalent in interpreting the sonnet, the discussion of the woman's attributes in the main octave implies little or nothing about the value for a woman of either possessing or lacking these attributes.

Saying, for example, that a woman's lips are not as red as coral is not necessarily saying anything about the value for a woman of either possessing or lacking the attribute of lips as red as coral. In other words, we do not normally assume as a meaning postulate for the predicate 'woman with lips as red as coral' any general conditional proposition relating to the value of the attribute which this predicate can be said to express. We do not, for instance, assume for this predicate a meaning postulate which says 'if any entity is a woman and has lips as red as coral, then the colour of her lips is considered beautiful.' Thus we cannot infer the value of the woman's attributes from the descriptive meaning of the predicate in question. The reader can, I think, see that the same is true of the discussion of other attributes in the main body of the sonnet.

Nevertheless, the couplet which ends the sonnet does discuss explicitly the value of the woman and by implication her attributes. Moreover, the use of the conjunctive "yet" implies that the main body of the poem does say something about the value of the woman. As noted above, generic propositions like the one I suggested concerning the colour of woman's lips will allow us to understand the main body of the sonnet as implying something about the value of the woman. So, the novel conclusions we can infer from the text using generic propositions can allow us to make a connection between the main body of the text and the concluding couplet. We can see then that the novel conclusions we can infer from generic propositions like the one I suggested above can help us to understand the text in a consistent and coherent manner.

Now let us assume for a moment that we infer from the sonnet that women who have lips as red as coral are not generally considered beautiful. I think the reader will agree that in this case we cannot use the generic proposition I suggested in interpreting the poem--not, at any rate, if we wish to interpret the poem in a consistent way.

Alternatively, let us assume that we believe it appropriate in interpreting the sonnet to assume that women with lips as red as coral are not generally considered beautiful. I think the reader can see that in this case as well it does not make sense to use the generic proposition I suggested--not, at any rate, if we wish

to interpret the poem in a way consistent with the general assumptions we believe are appropriate for such interpretation. It would appear then that the generic proposition I suggested must be compatible both with what we can infer from the text and the General Background used in the interpretation of the text.

Now let us suppose for a moment that the second verse of the sonnet is not in the sonnet at all, but rather part of some other text. Let us say further that in this text the verse in question refers not to some woman, but to some female chimpanzee. In this case we cannot use the generic proposition I suggested to infer anything--unless, of course, there is something else in the text from which the proposition in question could be used to draw conclusions. However, if this were not the case, I think the reader will agree that there would be no point in thinking the generic proposition I suggested would be of any use in interpreting the text.

Alternatively, let us assume that the verse in question is part of a text from which we can infer without the generic proposition all the propositions we can infer using it. I think the reader will agree that in this case the generic proposition will be of as little use in interpreting the text as it is for interpreting a text from which we cannot use it to infer anything. It would appear then that we must be able to draw novel conclusions from the generic proposition I have proposed if we are to use it in interpreting a text.

In summary, it would seem that we can use the generic proposition I have proposed to interpret the sonnet only because it can be seen as being compatible with everything we can infer from the text and everything in the background we assume appropriate for interpreting the text, and because it allows us to infer from the text novel conclusions. In other words, it can be used to interpret Shakespeare's "Sonnet 130" because it can meet the conditions for being a Hypothetical Premise for this poem.

Through the above illustrations I hope to have shown that it is feasible to consider non-textual generic propositions which we use to interpret a text as Hypothetical Premises. In Chapter 7 I will try to show how generic propositions functioning as Hypothetical Premises can be understood to play an important role in metaphorical interpretation. It may be noted that we can account for secondary meanings as Hypothetical Premises without the use of generic propositions. I. Bellert (personal communication) informs me that she has developed just such an account. However, since I treat meaning in terms of (background) propositions rather than features, I use the propositional account outlined above. I am indebted to Prof. Bellert for her help in developing this account.

It should be noted that the differences I have suggested between the role of general conditional and generic propositions in interpreting a text are quite similar to the differences which

literary critics often see in the roles of primary and secondary meaning in our understanding of a text. Beardsley's explanation of the differences between primary (also called "denotative") meaning and secondary (also called "connotative") meaning shows, I think, the similarity.

...we can make a...distinction between the standard, or central, meaning of a word and its marginal or accompanying meanings...

The distinction between these two levels of term-meaning is not sharp, but it is operative in all our ordinary speech. Some of the commonest and most important feats of language, especially those carried to a high degree of subtlety and power in literature, depend upon our feeling that the total meaning of a word divides in this fashion. The word "wolf," for example, designates certain characteristics that define a class of animals; it also denotes the animals that have those defining characteristics in common. But besides having the characteristics that make them wolves, many wolves have certain other characteristics, or are widely believed to have them: fierceness, persistence, and predatory clannishness. And these characteristics have been ascribed to wolves in

contexts that contain the word "wolf," whereas the contexts that contain its technical synonym, Canis lupus, have not so commonly ascribed such characteristics to them. Hence, when a person now uses the word "wolf" in certain contexts, we can infer that he probably believes that the entities referred to have some of the characteristics connoted by the term. And these characteristics, unless ruled out by the context, are part of what I call the full meaning of the word, though not of its strict, or dictionary, meaning-- that is, its designation.

What a word connotes, then, are the characteristics that it does not designate but that belong, or are widely said or thought to belong, to many of the things it denotes. This is the word's range of connotation. But what it connotes in a particular context--its contextual connotation--is always a selection from its total range; indeed, the range may include incompatible connotations-- "sea" connotes both being a barrier and being a highroad. In some contexts, all, or nearly all, its connotations may be kept out by other words; these are contexts whose meaning is fully explicit, not likely to mislead, as in the best technical and scientific writing. In other contexts, its connotations are liberated; these are

most notably the contexts in which language becomes figurative, and especially metaphorical...

(Beardsley 1958:125)

In the passage quoted above, Beardsley states that connotation involves properties which generally but not always belong to the entities in the extensional class of a word. Similarly, I say that generic propositions state that something is generally but not always true of the entities in the extensional class of a word or phrase.

Beardsley says that a connotation is not a part of the meaning of a word on every occasion when the word is used. Similarly, I say that a generic proposition can be used in interpreting a word or phrase in a text only when it meets certain conditions; that is, when it meets the conditions which hold for Hypothetical Premises.

Beardsley contends that a connotation will be part of the meaning of a word or phrase used in a text only when it is not "ruled out by the context." I argue to the same end that one of the conditions which a generic proposition must meet as a Hypothetical Premise is that it be compatible both with what we can infer from the text and with our general assumptions about the text.

There is, I think, an unmistakable resemblance between the

type of phenomena Beardsley identifies as connotations and the type I identify as generic propositions pertinent to the interpretation of a text. The resemblance I believe indicates that the classes of phenomena, if they are not identical, certainly overlap to a large degree. For this reason I will consider as secondary meaning (or connotation), non-textual generic propositions which we use to make inferences from the application of a predicate of some word or phrase in a text.

CHAPTER FOUR

METAPHORICAL EXTENSION

In this chapter I discuss the classes of entities to which a predicate can be taken as truly applied when it or a semantically related predicate is metaphorically interpreted. Before introducing the proposals I make in this chapter, I would like to discuss briefly some of the terminology I use.

The extensional (i.e., denotational) class of a term is sometimes considered the class of entities to which the term can be correctly applied (see, for example, Fodor 1977:15; Lewis 1971:19). For example, if some entity is truly said to be a *'girl,' then the entity is in the extension of *'girl.'

I use the term "extension" in a somewhat modified sense. First, the extension of a term is sometimes thought to include only actual entities and not imaginary ones (see, for example, Fodor 1977:39f; Lewis 1971:19). For example, only girls in the actual world and not Lewis Carroll's Alice are part of the extension of *'girl.' For my purposes, the extension of a word or phrase will include all conceivable entities and so be equivalent to C.I. Lewis' use of the term "comprehension" (see Lewis 1971:19; see also Montague 1972:144-146).

In addition, I consider extension in terms of assumed truth

or falsehood rather than actual truth or falsehood (see Chapter 2 and Lewis 1971:37). I consider the extension of a predicate to be whatever class of entities to which the predicate is taken as truly applied under an interpretation. So, in terms of my definitions, if an entity is in the extension of a word or phrase, the proposition which results from applying this word or phrase to the entity is true-for-the-interpretation under which the entity is considered in the extension. If, under an interpretation the entity is not in the extension of the predicate, the resulting proposition is false-for-the-interpretation.

There is one other difference between my use of the term "extension" and the way the term is often used. My discussion of semantic deviance in Chapter 2 implies that even under a literal interpretation the extension of a predicate can change, that it need not be the one assumed in interpreting everyday utterances. For example, in Alice in Wonderland, as we have seen, entities which speak English are truly called *'flowers,' although in everyday texts we generally assume that this predicate cannot be truly applied to such entities (see Chapter 2, section 3 and Carroll 1970:200ff).

In addition, I try to show in this chapter that it is feasible to consider the extension of a predicate under a literal interpretation to be different than under a metaphorical interpretation. For example, I try to show that in a text the

extension of *'flower' under a literal interpretation will be different than under a metaphorical interpretation.

Shifts of extension are not usually considered in discussions of extension. Neither Lewis 1977 nor Fodor 1977, for example, makes any mention of shifts of any kind (see, however, Bergmann 1979:268). However, in what follows it is assumed that the extension of a term can shift.

For this reason I call the class of entities to which a predicate under a literal interpretation can be truly applied in a particular text, the "literal extension" of that predicate for that text. I would like to emphasize that in a fictional text the literal extension of a predicate need not be the same as the literal extension of the predicate in an everyday text.

The extension of a predicate under a metaphorical interpretation, I will call its "metaphorical extension" under that particular metaphorical interpretation. I will assume that the extension of a predicate under one metaphorical interpretation need not be the same as under another metaphorical interpretation.

There is one other term I would like to introduce at this time. I will call one or more entities to which a predicate is applied metaphorically the "metaphorical entity(ies)." For example, if someone says à la Burns that his love is a red rose, his love is the metaphorical entity. I use this term to try to distinguish entities to which a term can only be applied

metaphorically from those to which it can also be applied literally ("real" roses in the example above).

I would now like to introduce the proposals I make in this chapter. In the first section of this chapter, I discuss metaphorical extension; that is, the class of entities to which a predicate can truly apply under a metaphorical interpretation. I propose that we consider the metaphorical extension of a predicate to include both the entities in its literal extension for a text and the metaphorical entity or entities. For example, I contend that if we say that some girl is a rose, *'rose' under the metaphorical interpretation should be considered taken as true for both ordinary roses and the girl in question.

In the second section of this chapter, I discuss the extensions of "literal superordinates" of a metaphorically interpreted predicate; that is, predicates whose literal extensions include the literal extension of a metaphorically interpreted predicate. More specifically, I am concerned with literal superordinates whose literal extensions do not include the metaphorical entity to which the metaphorically interpreted predicate is applied. The proposals I make in this section play an important role in my analysis of metaphorical meaning (see Chapter 5, section 2).

In the second section of this chapter, I propose that when a predicate A is metaphorically interpreted, a predicate B, literally superordinate to A, can shift its extension so that it

remains superordinate to A when A is metaphorically interpreted. I propose that at least at times such "secondary shifts of extension" can be considered to occur as a direct consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of the predicate A.

For example, let us say that we metaphorically interpret *'rose' when someone says, "Jane is a rose and, moreover, all flowers are beautiful." I contend that the extension of *'flower' in this context can be considered to shift so that it remains superordinate to *'rose' when *'rose' is metaphorically interpreted; that is, so that *'flower' includes in its extension not only all "real" roses but also Jane. I also contend that in an utterance such as the one above we can consider *'flower' to shift its extension as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of *'rose.'

1

In this section I examine the metaphorical extensions of predicates. I propose that the metaphorical extension of a predicate should be considered to include the entities in its literal extension and the metaphorical entity (cf. Black 1979a:31-32 and Ricoeur 1977:247-248). Below I present evidence to support this claim.

Let us assume that I say to a friend "My landlord is a

cockroach." We then have an utterance which is--or at least can be--metaphorically interpreted. Let us assume that the next thing I cleverly say is "As you know, cockroaches are quite repulsive." I think it is clear that in making the second remark I am implying something about my landlord; namely, that he is quite repulsive. Moreover, since I am still applying *'cockroach' to my landlord, I am still using the predicate metaphorically. However, we can infer from the second utterance that any cockroach we see is quite repulsive, and because of this we could validly contest the proposition expressed by arguing that in fact there are actually a few "real" cockroaches which are not repulsive.

It can be seen that in referring to those entities to which *'cockroach' can be taken as truly applied under the metaphorical interpretation, I am referring both to the metaphorical entity and to the entities in the literal extension of *'cockroach.' Since both the entities in the literal extension and the metaphorical entity are thus grouped together, it seems feasible to say that the entities in the literal extension of *'cockroach' and the metaphorical entity are in this case in the metaphorical extension of the predicate.

In the following verses from John Donne's "Hymne To God My God, In My Sicknesse," the metaphorically interpreted *'flat map' is used to group together the entities in the literal extension of this predicate and the metaphorical entity.

Whilst my Physitians by their love are growne
 Cosmographers, and I their Mapp, who lie
 Flat on this bed, that by them may be shewne
 That this is my South-west discoverie
Per fretum febris, by these streights to die,

I joy, that in these straits, I see my West;
 For, though their currants yeeld returne to none,
 What shall my West hurt me? As West and East
 In all flatt Maps (and I am one) are one,
 So death doth touch the Resurrection.

(Donne 1967b)

As we can see, no device other than the metaphorical
 assertion that John Donne is a flat map is necessary to make what
 is asserted of flat maps in general (i.e., of the entities in the
 extension of *'flat map') asserted of both the "real" maps in the
 literal extension and the metaphorical entity. This would appear
 to be consistent with my proposal. According to my proposal, the
 metaphorical extension of *'flat map' includes both the entities
 in the literal extension and the metaphorical entity. So,
 according to my proposal, when *'flat map' is metaphorically
 interpreted, what is attributed to flat maps in general--that is,
 to the entities in its metaphorical extension--will be attributed

to both the "real" flat maps and the metaphorical entity (John Donne).

We can also use the following poem by Lord Byron as evidence to support the claim that the metaphorical extension includes the entities in the literal extension and the metaphorical entity.

Yes! wisdom shines in all his mien,
Which would so captivate, I ween,
Wisdom's own goddess Pallas;
That she'd discard her fav'rite owl,
And take for pet a brother fowl,
Sagacious R.C. Dallas.

(Byron 1975a)

If we use 'brother' in the way Byron does in this poem we are saying that one entity is in the same class as another. Hence both can be said to be in the extensional class of a predicate which refers to this class. For example, if we say two men are brother workers, we are saying that both men are members of the class of workers. Hence we can say that both men are in the extensional class of the predicate *'worker' which has this class as its extension.

So, when Byron says that R.C. Dallas and Pallas' owl are

brother fowl, he is saying that both entities are members of the same class, the extensional class of *'fowl'. This is consistent with my proposal that the metaphorical extension of a predicate includes both the entities in the literal extension (in this case, Pallas' owl) and the metaphorical entity (in this case, R.C. Dallas).

What Byron says would seem trivially false if the metaphorical extension of *'fowl' did not include not only the metaphorical entity but also entities in the literal extension of *'fowl' such as the owl of Pallas. It would seem trivially false in the same way as, for example, it would seem trivially false to say that a man who was unmarried but not a knight, and a man who was married and a knight were both brother lachelors. In both cases the falsehood would be due to the entities in question each being a member of an extensional class of a different predicate (although both predicates in each case would be expressed by the same word type).

In the following poem by Alfred Tennyson the predicate *'violet' is used to characterize both the metaphorical entity and more than one member of the literal extension of the predicate.

Now fades the last long streak of snow,
Now burgeons every maze of quick
About the flowering squares, and thick
By ashen roots the violets blow.

...

...and in my breast
Spring wakens too; and my regret
Becomes an April violet,
And buds and blossoms like the rest.

(Tennyson 1897:518, section 115)

In the last stanza quoted above, Tennyson says that his regret has become a violet like the rest. In using the phrase "the rest," Tennyson is clearly referring to the other entities to which the metaphorically interpreted predicate *'violet' can be truly applied; in other words, he is referring to the other members of the metaphorical extension of *'violet.' From the stanzas quoted above, I think it can be seen that the entities thus referred to are the members of the literal extension of *'violet'; that is, the "normal" violets to which the predicate *'violet' is applied in the first of the two stanzas above. So, again it would appear feasible to say that the extension of a

metaphorically interpreted predicate includes both the metaphorical entity and the members of the literal extension of the predicate.

The stanzas quoted above provide additional evidence for my proposal. In the second of these stanzas, Tennyson says that his regret, the metaphorical entity, blooms just like "the rest," which, as I just noted, means just like "normal" violets. Since no entity called *'a regret' is in the standard extension of *'bloom,' the latter predicate is metaphorically applied to Tennyson's regret. However, in saying that this entity "blooms like the rest," Tennyson is applying *'bloom' while under the metaphorical interpretation to the "normal" violets which are referred to by the phrase "the rest." Hence it would seem feasible to say that while *'bloom' is under the metaphorical interpretation, it is applied to entities in its standard extension as well as to the metaphorical entity.

An examination of certain passages from Chapter 89 of Herman Melville's Moby Dick provides still another example. At the beginning of Chapter 89, Melville discusses the meaning of two terms: "Fast-Fish" and "Loose-Fish":

I. A Fast-Fish belongs to the party fast to it.

II. A Loose-Fish is fair game for anybody who can soonest catch it.

...

First: What is a Fast-Fish? Alive or dead a fish is technically fast, when it is connected with an occupied ship or boat, by any medium at all controllable by the occupant or occupants,--a mast, an oar, a nine-inch cable, a telegraph wire, or a strand of cobweb, it is all the same. Likewise a fish is technically fast when it bears a waif, or any other recognized symbol of possession; so long as the party waiving it plainly evince their ability at any time to take it alongside, as well as their intention to do so.

(Melville 1967:331-332)

Having thus defined the terms "fast-fish" and "loose-fish," Melville goes on to use the terms metaphorically.

...What are the sinews and souls of Russian serfs and Republican slaves but Fast-Fish, whereof possession is the whole of the law? What to the rapacious landlord is the widow's last mite but a Fast-Fish? What is yonder undetected villian's marble mansion with a door-plate for a waif; what is that but a Fast-Fish? What is the ruinous discount which Mordecai, the

broker, gets from poor Woebegone, the bankrupt, on a loan to keep Woebegone's family from starvation; what is that ruinous discount but a Fast-Fish? What is the Archbishop of Savesoul's income of £100,000 seized from the scant bread and cheese of hundreds of thousands of broken-backed laborers (all sure of heaven without any of Savesoul's help) what is that globular 100,000 but a Fast-Fish? What are the Duke of Dunder's hereditary towns and hamlets but Fast-Fish? What to that redoubted harpioneer, John Bull, is poor Ireland, but a Fast-Fish? What to that apostolic Lancer, Brother Jonathan, is Texas but a Fast-Fish? And concerning all these, is not Possession the whole of the law?

But if the doctrine of Fast-Fish be pretty generally applicable, the kindred doctrine of Loose-Fish is still more widely so. That is internationally and universally applicable.

What was America in 1492 but a Loose-Fish, in which Columbus struck the Spanish standard by way of waiving it for his royal master and mistress? What was Poland to the Czar? What Greece to the Turk? What India to England? What at last will Mexico be to the United States? All Loose-Fish.

What are the Rights of Man and the Liberties of the World but Loose-Fish? What all men's minds and

opinions but Loose-Fish? What is the principle of religious belief in them but a Loose-Fish? What to the ostentatious smuggling verbalists are the thoughts of thinkers but Loose-Fish? What is the great globe itself but a Loose-Fish? And what are you, reader, but a Loose-Fish and a Fast-Fish too?

(Melville 1967:333-334)

No distinction appears to be made between the metaphorical and the real Fast-Fish and Loose-Fish. It would appear that what is attributed to the members of the extensional class of the predicate is, under the metaphorical interpretation of the predicate, attributed to both metaphorical entities and members of the literal extension. This would appear to be the case even when it may be necessary to understand the attribute as applying metaphorically rather than literally to the metaphorical entities.

For example, Melville says that a Fast-Fish "belongs to the party fast to it." In order for a fish to be considered fast, it must "be connected with an occupied ship or boat, by any medium at all controllable by the occupant or occupants,--a mast, an oar, a nine-inch cable, a telegraph wire, or a strand of cobweb, it is all the same." An actual or potential physical control by the possessor and connection to that possessor is attributed to

all entities which are Fast-Fish.

Clearly, no such direct physical control could exist between Great Britain and Ireland. One country cannot physically control another as a ship can control a fish with an oar, a cable, or some other such "medium." Nevertheless, Melville asks rhetorically, "What to that redoubted harpioneer, John Bull, is poor Ireland but a Fast-Fish?" and we conventionally understand him to be implying that metaphorically England controls Ireland just as any Fast-Fish is controlled. Although Ireland is not and cannot be literally controlled in the same way that a "real" Fast-Fish is, we conventionally understand Melville to be implying that in a figurative sense the control is the same.

I think this is consistent with my proposal that, when a predicate is metaphorically interpreted, its extension includes both the entities in its literal extension and the metaphorical entity or entities to which it is applied. The property of being actually or potentially physically controlled (as with a cable, for example) is attributed to all the entities which are *'Fast-Fish'; that is, which are in the extension of this predicate. Since the metaphorical entity, Ireland, is in the metaphorical extension of *'Fast-Fish,' we take the attribute in question as implicitly applied to it--even though the only way we can understand it to be applicable is metaphorically.

This completes my discussion of metaphorical extension. In

concluding this section, I would like to formulate the proposal I have made as follows.

(4.1) If in a text a predicate is metaphorically interpreted, then its metaphorical extension will include: i) the entities in the literal extension of the predicate and ii) the metaphorical entity or entities to which the predicate is applied.

2

In this section I discuss shifts in the extensions of predicates literally superordinate to a metaphorically interpreted predicate. A predicate A is superordinate to a predicate B under an interpretation (for my purposes literal or metaphorical), when the extension of A set theoretically includes the extension of B under the interpretation. When this condition is met, the predicate A will be called a "superordinate predicate of B." Conversely, the predicate B will be called a "hyponym of A." The terms "superordinate" and "hyponym" are conventionally used for the purposes of indicating when an extension includes or is included in another extension (see Lyons 1977:291-295).

In this section I use two terms of my own making. In what follows, I call a predicate A a "literal superordinate" of a

predicate B when A is superordinate to B when both are literally interpreted. For example, the predicate *'cclcur' is a literal superordinate of the predicate *'red': when both predicates are interpreted literally the extension of *'cclcur' includes the extension of *'red.'

I say that a predicate A has undergone a "secondary shift of extension" when it shifts its literal extension so as to remain superordinate to B when B is metaphorically interpreted. For example, let us say that an idea is metaphorically said to be *'red.' The predicate *'cclcur' would be said to have undergone a secondary shift of extension if the predicate *'cclcur' changes its extension so that it can remain superordinate to *'red' when *'red' has its metaphorical extension.

In this section I would like to propose that when a predicate is metaphorically interpreted, predicates literally superordinate to it can undergo secondary shifts of extension. I contend that such secondary shifts of extension can be considered to occur as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of a literal hyponym.

However, to begin I would like to discuss an instance of a secondary shift of extension which can be said to occur because we understand the superordinate to be explicitly applied metaphorically in a text. The example I would like to discuss is found in "The Sheepheards Calfadill" by Michael Drayton.

Gorbo, as thou can'st this way
 By yonder little hill,
 Or as thou through the fields didst stray,
 Saw'st thou my Daffadill?

Shee's in a frock of Lincolne greene,
 The colour of Maydes delight,
 And never hath her Beauty seene
 But through a vayle of white.

Thou well describ'st the Daffadill,
 It is not full an hower
 Since by the Spring neere yonder hill
 I saw that lovely flower.

Yet with my flower thou did'st not meete,
 Nor newes of her doest bring,
 Yet is my Daffadill more sweete
 Than that by yonder Spring.

Through yonder vale as I did passe
 Descending from the hill,

I met a smerking Bonnie-lasse,
They call her Daffadill.

(Drayton 1956)

In the selection quoted above, both the predicate *'daffodil' and its superordinate *'flower' are applied metaphorically to the shepherd's beloved. In the first and fourth stanzas quoted above, the shepherd calls his beloved "my Daffadill." In the fourth stanza he calls her "my flower."

In addition, the shepherd applies both *'daffodil' and *'flower' to entities in their literal extensions. So, in this poem, it would appear that both of these metaphorically interpreted predicates apply to the entities in their literal extensions as well as the same metaphorical entity.

Now the literal extension of *'flower' includes the literal extension of *'daffodil.' Moreover, the metaphorical extension of both has shifted to include the same metaphorical entity. So, it seems feasible to say that *'flower' has shifted its extension and remains superordinate to the metaphorically interpreted *'daffadill.' According to my definition, *'flower' can be said to have undergone a secondary shift of extension.

However, I would like to contend that a secondary shift of extension does not take place only when both a predicate and its superordinate are applied as part of a text to the same

metaphorical entity. I would like to contend that such a shift in a superordinate's extension can occur as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of the literal hyponym.

From the following two lines from T.S. Eliot's Four Quartets, I think it is possible to see that a shift of extension can occur in a predicate as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of another predicate which is its hyponym under a literal interpretation.

I do not know much about gods; but I think that the river
Is a strong brown god--sullen, untamed and intractable,

...

(Eliot 1959:35)

The predicate *'god' can easily be considered in this poem a literal superordinate of the predicate *'strong brown god.' In addition, I think that when *'strong brown god' is metaphorically interpreted, we can consider the river to be a god. Indeed, I am not sure how we could interpret these two lines in a coherent way if we did not make such an inference.

It would appear then that *'god' undergoes a shift of extension. However, if *'strong brown god' were not interpreted metaphorically so as to apply to the river, I do not think that

in the context of these two lines we would understand its superordinate *'god' to apply to the river--particularly since in the two verses above *'god' is applied only to its extensional class in general and not specifically to the river. For this reason, I think it is feasible to say that in these two lines *'god' shifts its extension as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of its hyponym, *'strong brown god.'

We can understand such a shift in the extension of a superordinate to occur as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of its hyponym even in a case where the superordinate is not used in the text to designate either its extensional class or the metaphorical entity.

...Eve separate he spies,
 Veil'd in a Cloud of Fragrance, where she stood,
 Half spi'd, so thick the Roses bushing round
 About her glow'd, oft stooping to support
 Each Flow'r of tender stalk, whose head though gay
 Carnation, Purple, Azure, or speckt with Gold,
 Hung drooping unsustain'd, then she upstays
 Gently with Myrtle band, mindless the while,

Herself, though fairest unsupported Flow'r,
From her best prop so far, and storm so high.

(Milton 1935:285-286; Book 9, lines 424-433)

The reader can see, I think, that it is quite possible to assume for this passage from Paradise Lost that *'flower' has shifted extension so as to include the metaphorical entity, Eve. However, I do not think we would find it appropriate to consider *'flower' as applying to Eve if we did not understand its hyponym, *'unsupported flower' as applying to Eve metaphorically as well. For this reason I think it is feasible to say that *'flower' in this context shifts its extension as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of its hyponym *'unsupported flower.'

Such shifts in the extension of a superordinate also occur when a phrase expressing the hyponym (for example, "strong brown god" in the passage from Eliot) does not contain a word or phrase expressing the superordinate (for example, "god" in the passage from Eliot). In order to find such a case, let us look at the following stanzas from a poem by Henry David Thoreau.

I am a parcel of vain strivings tied
By a chance bond together,
Dangling this way and that, their links

Were made so loose and wide,
Methinks
For milder weather.

A bunch of violets without their roots,
And sorrel intermixed,
Encircled by a wisp of straw
Once coiled about their shoots,
The law
By which I'm fixed.

...

But now I see I was not plucked for naught,
And after in life's vase
Of glass set while I might survive,
But by a kind hand brought
Alive
To a strange place.

That stock thus thinned will soon redeem its hours,
And by another year,
Such as God knows, with freer air,
More fruits and fairer flowers

Will bear
While I droop here.

(Thoreau 1956)

In the last stanza of the poem quoted above, the reader can see that we can infer that *'flower' is applied to entities like the author; that is to entities to which the predicate *'violet' is metaphorically applicable, and perhaps as well to other entities which are not in the literal extension of the superordinate. In fact, it is difficult to imagine how the poem could be interpreted without making this construal.

However, there is no reason to consider the predicate *'flower' to be predicated of human beings except that the predicate *'violet,' a literal hyponym of *'flower,' is metaphorically applied to the author of the poem. The reader can, I think, test the truth of this claim by reading the last stanza quoted above by itself, and in this way taking the proposition concerning flowers out of the context of the metaphorical use of *'violet.' The reader will find, I believe, that out of this context it makes no sense to assume that the predicate *'flower' is applied to any entities other than those "normal" flowers in its literal extension. For this reason I think it is feasible to say that the predicate *'flower' shifts extension so as to include human beings as a consequence of the

metaphorical application of its hyponym, *'violet.'

I will attempt now to show that shifts in the extension which occur as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of a hyponym allow a literal superordinate to remain superordinate when the hyponym is metaphorically interpreted. In other words, I will try to show that shifts of extension which occur as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of a literal hyponym are secondary shifts of extension.

In order to show this, I would like to look first at the two lines quoted above from Eliot's Four Quartets. Considering the river to be a god because it is metaphorically a strong brown god in no way means that we do not consider as gods entities we more normally think of as such. The extensional class of *'god' is expanded to include the metaphorical entity, not shrunk to include only the metaphorical entity.

So, (1) the literal extension of *'god' includes the literal extension of *'strong brown god,' and (2) both the shifted extension of *'god' and the metaphorical extension of *'strong brown god' include both their literal extensions and the same metaphorical entity. It seems feasible to say then that *'god,' when it shifts extension remains superordinate to the metaphorically interpreted *'strong brown god.' In other words, it seems feasible to say that *'god' has undergone a secondary shift of extension.

Let us now look at a hypothetical example. Let us imagine

that I call some woman a rose by saying, "Jane is so pretty she's a rose." Let us also imagine that after saying this I add, "Moreover, all flowers are delicate."

In making this last statement I can be understood as saying something about Jane. Since we would not normally view the sentence 'moreover, all flowers are delicate' as saying something about a woman, it is, I think, reasonable to say that the shift in the extension of *'flower' occurs as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of *'rose' in the preceding sentence. In addition, speakers of English will, I think, agree that in the sentence concerning flowers I am saying something about "normal" flowers as well as Jane; that is, I am saying something about the entities in the literal extension of the predicate *'flower.'

It would appear then that the shifted extension of *'flower' includes everything which, according to the proposal I made in the first section, is in the metaphorical extension of *'rose'; that is, the metaphorical entity to which *'rose' is applied (Jane) and the entities in the literal extension of *'rose' ("real" roses which are, of course, flowers). Moreover, the shifted extension of *'flower' would appear to include all the entities in its literal extension and hence entities which are not roses either literally or metaphorically. So, it would appear reasonable to say that *'flower,' when its extension has shifted, remains superordinate to the metaphorically interpreted

*'rose.' In other words, it would seem feasible to say that the shift of extension which occurs as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of *'rose' is a secondary shift of extension.

A similar case is found in the following poem by Ben Jonson.

SONG

THAT WOMEN ARE BUT MEN'S SHADOWES

Follow a shadow, it still flies you;

Seeme to flye it, it will pursue:

So court a mistris, she denyes you;

Let her alone, shee will court you.

Say, are not women truly, then,

Stil'd but the shadowes of us men?

At morne, and even, shades are longest;

At noone, they are or short, or none:

So men at weakest, they are strongest,

But grant us perfect, they're not knowne.

Say, are not women truly, then,

Still'd but the shaddowes of us men?

(Jonson 1956)

We can see in this poem that statements about shadows in general can be taken as statements about women. We can also see that, despite this, statements about entities in the secondarily shifted extension are statements about "normal" shadows as well. It should be noted that our sense that this shifted extension includes both kinds of entities is so strong that we interpret statements that are literally true only of entities in the literal extension of *'shadow' as metaphorically true of women, the metaphorical entities.

There does not appear to be any reason to take *'shadow' as applying to women except that its hyponym, *'shadows of men,' does when we metaphorically interpret it. So, it would appear reasonable to say that *'shadow' shifts extension as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of its hyponym.

The shifted extension of *'shadow' then would appear to include those entities which, according to my proposal of section one, are included in the metaphorical extension of *'shadows of men'; that is the metaphorical entities to which *'shadows of men' is applied (women) and "real" shadows in the literal extension of *'shadows of men.' In addition, since *'shadow'

would appear to apply to all entities which are literally shadows, its extension would appear to include entities which are neither literally nor metaphorically shadows of men. So, it would appear reasonable to say that in this case too, a predicate which has shifted extension as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of a hyponym, has undergone a secondary shift of extension.

In this section I have tried to show that when a predicate is metaphorically interpreted, a literal superordinate can shift its extension and remain superordinate to the metaphorically interpreted predicate. I have contended that such shifts can occur even when the only reason for them appears to be the metaphorical interpretation of the literal hyponym. Before concluding, I would like to formulate the proposal as follows:

(4.2) Assume that in a text a predicate A is metaphorically interpreted, a predicate B in that text is a literal superordinate of A, and the literal extension of B does not include the metaphorical entity to which A is applied. Then (1) B can shift extension so as to remain superordinate to the metaphorically interpreted A, and (2) the shift can occur as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of A.

CHAPTER FIVE

METAPHORICAL MEANING

In this chapter I examine the primary meaning of metaphorically interpreted predicates. I use the term "primary meaning" to refer to those aspects of meaning which relate to the inferences we can make from a text with the help of Relevant Background meaning postulates (see above Chapter 3, section 1).

For example, let us say that in a text some entity is called *'a man.' From this proposition and a Relevant Background proposition such as *'any entity which is a man is human,' we can infer as a conclusion that the entity in question is human. Because we are making an inference from the text with the help of a Relevant Background meaning postulate, our inference involves primary meaning. Since the meaning postulate is a meaning postulate for *'man,' I say that the inference involves the primary meaning of the predicate *'man.'

Before introducing the proposals I make in this chapter, I would like to discuss some of the terminology I use. Let us say that in an interpreter's Relevant Background for a text, there is a meaning postulate A which states that any entity which is F is

also G. As I noted in Chapter 3, under an interpretation (literal or metaphorical) we can infer from this meaning postulate and a textual proposition stating some entity is F, that the entity in question is also implicitly G. Moreover, we can infer that if F is true of the entity under an interpretation, G will be true as well under that interpretation. Propositions inferred in this way can be said to be "implied" by the textual proposition and the Relevant Background meaning postulate (see above Chapter 3, section 1).

For example, let us take the utterance "There is a bird in the tree." Let us say that in some interpreter's Relevant Background is the meaning postulate *'any entity which is a bird is a flying animal.' From the proposition *'there is a bird' and the Relevant Background meaning postulate, the interpreter can infer as a conclusion the proposition *'the entity which is a bird is a flying animal.' This conclusion may be said to be implied by the proposition expressed by the utterance and the Relevant Background meaning postulate.

In relation to the meaning of any predicate A, what is particularly significant about such implications is that some predicate B is assumed to be implicitly applied to some entity if A is applied, and that B will be assumed true of the entity under an interpretation if A is assumed true under that interpretation.

For example, we can say theoretically that we conventionally assume as part of the Relevant Background for texts a meaning

postulate which states or implies the proposition *'any entity which is a car (automobile) is a concrete entity.' If such a meaning postulate is assumed, then any time the predicate *'car' is applied in a text to an entity, we can infer that the predicate *'concrete entity' is implicitly applied as well. Moreover, every time we take *'car' as truly applied to an entity, we take *'concrete entity' to be truly applied as well. What is important to the meaning of *'car' is not the particular meaning postulate but the fact that the meaning postulate allows us to infer that the entity called a car is also a concrete entity.

This does not mean that we assume for all texts that the same predicates are always implicitly applied to an entity when some predicate is explicitly applied to that entity in the text. In normal everyday discourse we can say theoretically that we assume for the predicate *'flower' there is some Relevant Background meaning postulate which states or implies *'any entity which is a flower does not speak English.' Whenever someone applies the predicate *'flower' to some entity we normally assume that we can infer that literally the predicate *'does not speak English' is also implicitly applied, and that the entity can truly be said to not speak English if it is truly a flower.

However, as we have seen in Chapter 2, we do not assume for the novel Through the Looking-Glass (Carroll 1970) that, whenever the term *'flower' is truly applied literally to some entity, we

can assume that *'does not speak English' can be truly applied literally to that entity as well (see above Chapter 2, section 3). We can say theoretically that in the fantasy world of this novel there is no meaning postulate under a literal interpretation which states or implies that *'does not speak English' is implied when *'flower' is applied, and that *'does not speak English' is truly applied whenever *'flower' is. I think the reader will agree that because we do not assume that flowers do not speak English in this novel, when some entity in Through the Looking-Glass is called a flower what is meant literally is something rather different than is normally meant when we interpret the predicate *'flower' literally.

Because the predicates which are implicitly applied are important to the meaning of a predicate, I would like to introduce a term for them. I will call a predicate G an "implied predicate" of a predicate F if we can say that there is in the Relevant Background for a text a meaning postulate which states or implies that any entity which is F is also G. So, for example, *'human' can be understood to be an implied predicate of *'man' whenever we can be said to assume a meaning postulate such as *'any entity which is a man is a human.'

A predicate G may be an implied predicate of a predicate F under a literal interpretation but not under a metaphorical interpretation. For example, let us take the proposition *'Donna Inez is a walking "calculation"' (derived from Eyrice 1975b:749;

Canto 16). Generally, under a literal interpretation *'calculation'* can be said to have *'not animate'* as an implied predicate: we generally assume that any entity which is a calculation is not animate. However, if *'calculation'* is metaphorically interpreted in the above proposition, we do not conventionally understand the woman, Donna Inez, to be inanimate. For this reason, it would seem theoretically feasible to say that in this case when *'calculation'* is metaphorically interpreted it does not have an implied predicate *'not animate.'* In other words, when we metaphorically interpret *'calculation'* in Byron's poem, it would seem feasible to say that there is no Relevant Background meaning postulate which states or implies that any entity which is a calculation is not animate.

I say that a predicate *G* is a "literally implied predicate" of *F* if we can say that there is under a literal interpretation a meaning postulate(s) which states or implies that any entity which is *F* is *G*. I say that a predicate *G* is a "metaphorically implied predicate" of *F* if we can say that there is under a metaphorical interpretation a meaning postulate(s) which states or implies that any entity which is *F* is *G*. So, for example, *'not animate'* is a literally implied predicate but not a metaphorically implied predicate of *'calculation'* in the context described above.

I would now like to introduce the proposals I make in this chapter. My proposals concern metaphorically implied predicates

of metaphorically interpreted predicates. A predicate A is an implied predicate of a predicate B only if there is a Relevant Background meaning postulate which states or implies that A is true of whatever B is true of. So, my proposals implicitly concern what meaning postulates are in the Relevant Background when we metaphorically interpret predicates in a text.

In the first section of this chapter I propose that a literally implied predicate be considered a metaphorically implied predicate if it is literally true of the metaphorical entity to which the implying predicate is applied. As an example, let us take the utterance "men are wolves" (derived from Black 1965:39ff). *'Animate entity' can be considered a literally implied predicate of *'wolf.' Moreover, it is literally true of men. According to the proposal I make in the first section of this chapter, *'animate entity' will then also be considered a metaphorically implied predicate of *'wolf' when *'wolf' is metaphorically interpreted in this context.

In the second section of this chapter I propose that literally implied predicates can be metaphorically implied--even though they are not literally true of the metaphorical entity to which the implying predicate is applied. I propose that these metaphorically implied predicates are themselves metaphorically interpreted. For the sake of convenience, I call metaphorically implied predicates which are not literally true of the metaphorical entity "MIFMLT'S" (=Metaphorically Implied

Predicates which are Not Literally True).

As an example, let us take the utterance "Jane is a rose," where Jane is a woman. *'flower' can be considered a literally implied predicate of *'rose.' *'flower,' however, is not literally true of humans. According to my proposal, *'flower' can be considered a metaphorically implied predicate of *'rose' if *'flower' itself is metaphorically interpreted in this context.

1

In this section I would like to propose that if B is a literally implied predicate of a predicate A, then B will be considered a metaphorically implied predicate of A if B is taken as literally true of the metaphorical entity to which A is applied. Below I provide evidence to support this claim.

Let us say that someone says about some married woman "Jane is a bachelor." In the proposition this utterance expresses, the predicate *'bachelor' is applied to the entity named Jane. This entity is not in the standard extension of *'bachelor' and the predicate *'bachelor' will be considered metaphorically interpreted when applied to it. So, this entity (Jane) functions in this instance as a metaphorical entity.

We can say theoretically that our Relevant Background

assumptions for the predicate *'bachelor' include some meaning postulate like *'any entity which is a bachelor is a human being.' In relation to such an assumption, we could infer that the speaker, in asserting that Jane is a bachelor, is implicitly asserting that Jane is a human being. Since we consider Jane to be a human being, we would consider such an inference concerning the metaphorical entity (Jane) to be true when the predicate *'bachelor' is literally interpreted.

When we metaphorically interpret the predicate *'bachelor,' we can make the same inference that we conventionally can when we interpret this predicate literally. Moreover, it is, I think, clear that the inference will be just as true when we metaphorically interpret *'bachelor' as when we interpret *'bachelor' literally.

It would appear feasible to say theoretically then that, when *'bachelor' is metaphorically interpreted in this context, we retain as part of our Relevant Background some meaning postulate(s) which states or implies the proposition *'any entity which is a bachelor is human.' So, as my proposal indicates, it would appear feasible to say that *'human' is a metaphorically implied predicate of *'bachelor' in this context.

Let us look now at the following passage from Molly Bloom's soliloquy in James Joyce's Ulysses.

...the day I got him to propose to me yes first I gave him the bit of seedcake out of my mouth and it was leapyear like now yes 16 years ago my God after that long kiss I near lost my breath yes he said I was a flower of the mountain yes so we are flowers all a womans body yes that was one true thing he said in his life and the sun shines for you today yes that was why I liked him...

(Joyce 1961:767-768)

In this passage Molly is called "a flower of the mountain." Since Molly is not in the literal extension for this predicate and the predicate conventionally is metaphorically interpreted when applied to Molly, we can consider Molly to function here as a metaphorical entity.

We can say that for this passage there is as part of the Relevant Background a meaning postulate(s) which states or implies *'any entity which is a flower of the mountain is a kind of animate entity.' We can clearly use this meaning postulate under a literal interpretation to draw an inference from the proposition in which Molly is called a flower of the mountain: we can infer that Molly is an animate entity. We take this inference to be literally true. So, *'animate entity' can be said to be truly applied to the metaphorical entity (Molly) in

this context.

I think it clear that we can make the same inference when *'flower of the mountain' is metaphorically interpreted. Moreover, if we do make this inference it will be just as true under a metaphorical interpretation of the predicate as when *'flower of the mountain' is literally interpreted.

It would appear feasible to say theoretically then that, when *'flower of the mountain' is metaphorically interpreted in this context, we retain as part of the Relevant Background a meaning postulate which states or implies that whatever entity is a flower of the mountain is also an animate entity. So, as my proposal indicates, *'animate entity' will be a metaphorically implied predicate of *'flower of the mountain' in this context.

"Sonnet 43" by Shakespeare provides another example. In this sonnet Shakespeare writes:

All days are nights to see till I see thee,
And nights bright days when dreams do show thee me.

(Shakespeare 1970c)

Here the predicate *'night' is applied to days. Clearly, entities which are literally days (in the sense intended here) are not in the literal extension of the predicate *'night.' Since

the predicate *'night' is conventionally considered metaphorically interpreted when it is applied to these entities, they can be considered to function as metaphorical entities.

Theoretically, we can say that we have as part of the Relevant Background for this poem a meaning postulate which states or implies the proposition *'any entity which is a night is a period of time.' From the proposition in which the predicate *'night' is applied to days and the above-mentioned meaning postulate, we can infer that the entities in question (days) are periods of time. I think the reader will agree that if this inference is made, it will be taken as literally true. *'Period of time' then is a literally implied predicate which is literally true of the metaphorical entities (days) to which the implying predicate *'night' is applied.

Clearly, the same inference can be made when *'night' is metaphorically interpreted in this context. As well, the inference will be true when *'night' is metaphorically interpreted, just as when this predicate is under a literal interpretation.

It would appear feasible to say that the meaning postulate(s) which states or implies that nights are periods of time is retained when *'night' is metaphorically interpreted in this context. So, as my proposal indicates, it would appear feasible to say that *'period of time' is a metaphorically implied predicate of *'night' in this case.

Finally, let us look at the following verses from William Shakespeare's "Sonnet 7."

Lo, in the orient when the gracious light
Lifts up his burning head, each under eye
Doth homage to his new-appearing sight,
Serving with looks his sacred majesty;
And having climbed the steep-up heavenly hill,
Resembling strong youth in his middle age,
Yet mortal looks adore his beauty still,
Attending on his golden pilgrimage;

(Shakespeare 1970a)

In this sonnet *'pilgrimage' is applied to the sun's crossing of the sky. Conventionally, *'pilgrimage' does not truly apply to the sun's crossing of the sky. In addition, *'pilgrimage' in this context is conventionally considered to be metaphorically interpreted. So, the sun's crossing the sky can be considered to function here as a metaphorical entity.

We can say theoretically that as part of the conventional Relevant Background for this poem, we have a meaning postulate(s) which states or implies that any entity which is a pilgrimage is a journey. From the proposition in which *'pilgrimage' is

applied to the sun's crossing and the meaning postulate in question, we can literally infer that the metaphorical entity is a journey. This inference is literally true, since the sun's crossing of the sky can be called the sun's journey across the sky. So, *'journey' can be considered a literally implied predicate which is literally true of the metaphorical entity to which *'pilgrimage' is applied.

There is no reason to think that we cannot make the same inference when *'pilgrimage' is metaphorically interpreted in this context. Moreover, there is no reason to think that when *'pilgrimage' is metaphorically interpreted, we cannot take the inference as true just as we do when we literally interpret *'pilgrimage' in this context.

So, it would appear feasible to say that when we metaphorically interpret *'pilgrimage' in this context, we retain as part of the Relevant Background a meaning postulate(s) which states or implies that any entity which is a pilgrimage is a journey. So, as my proposal indicates, *'journey' can be considered a metaphorically implied predicate of *'pilgrimage' in this context.

Before proceeding to the next section, I would like to formulate this proposal as 5.1. It should be noted that if A is an implied predicate of E, then there is a meaning postulate(s) in the Relevant Background of the text in which E is found which

states or implies that any entity which is B is A. So, this proposal concerning metaphorically implied predicates can be considered a proposal concerning the Relevant Background for texts in which there are metaphors.

(5.1) If a predicate A is metaphorically interpreted, then a predicate B will be a metaphorically implied predicate of A, if B meets the following conditions: (1) B is a literally implied predicate of A, and (2) B is literally true of the metaphorical entity to which A is applied.

2

In this section I would like to propose that a metaphorically interpreted predicate A can have as metaphorically implied predicates, literally implied predicates which are not literally true of the metaphorical entity to which A is applied. I would like to propose that these metaphorically implied predicates are themselves metaphorically interpreted (cf. Black 1962:40-43. Black talks of the metaphorical interpretation of "associated commonplaces."). As I noted in the introduction to this chapter, for the sake of convenience I call metaphorically implied predicates which are not literally true of the

metaphorical entity, "MIPNLT's" (=Metaphorically Implied Predicates which are Not Literally True).

Let us take the utterance "Joan is a rose" where the name 'Joan' refers to a woman. Let us say that 'rose' in this context is metaphorically interpreted. According to my proposal, 'flower' can be a metaphorically implied predicate of 'rose' (or, more precisely, a MIPNLT) if 'flower' is itself metaphorically interpreted.

Below I first present evidence to show it is feasible to say that a metaphorically interpreted predicate can have literally implied predicates which are MIPNLT's. I then argue that it is feasible to consider these metaphorically implied predicates to be themselves metaphorically interpreted.

In arguing that there are literally implied predicates which are MIPNLT's I first note that under an interpretation all predicates superordinate to a predicate A in a text are implied predicates of A and all predicates which are implied predicates of A are superordinates of A. I then try to show that in a text literal superordinates of a predicate A which secondarily shift extension are literally implied predicates of A which are MIPNLT's. I also try to show that all literally implied predicates of a predicate A which are MIPNLT's are literal superordinates of A which undergo secondary shifts of extension.

If a predicate B is a literal superordinate of a predicate

A, then under a literal interpretation B has an extensional class which includes the entities in the extensional class of A (see above, Chapter 4, section 2). For example, *'human' is a literal superordinate of *'woman' and, when these predicates are interpreted literally, the extensional class of *'human' includes all of the entities in the extensional class of *'woman.' Within my analysis an extensional class is by definition the class of entities to which a predicate can be truly applied under an interpretation. So, under an interpretation the class of entities to which a superordinate predicate B can be truly applied includes the entities to which the hyponym predicate A can be truly applied in the text.

So, if we assume that in a text the predicate B is superordinate to the predicate A under an interpretation, then we are assuming under that interpretation the proposition *'any entity which is A is also B.' For example, since *'human' is a literal superordinate of *'woman,' any entity which is a woman is a human under a literal interpretation.

The assumption that any entity which is A is also B is clearly a meaning postulate for A. If A is found in a text, this meaning postulate may be said to be stated or implied by a proposition in the relevant background. So, by definition, if A is found in a text, its superordinate B is an implied predicate for it under an interpretation. For example, as the predicate *'human' is (conventionally, for most texts) a literal

superordinate of the predicate *'woman'*, it is a literally implied predicate of the predicate *'woman'*. In everyday circumstances, whenever we hear someone called a woman, we understand this literally to imply that the person is also human.

I have just tried to show why under an interpretation all superordinates of a predicate A in a text are implied predicates of that predicate. I would now like to show why under an interpretation all implied predicates of a predicate A in a text are superordinates of A.

By definition, if a predicate E is under an interpretation an implied predicate of a predicate A in a text, E is a predicate which is taken as true of every entity of which A is true. For example, *'human'* is a literally implied predicate of the predicate *'woman'* (conventionally, in most texts). So, by definition *'human'* is taken as true of every entity of which *'woman'* is taken as true.

I stipulated in Chapter 4 that the class of entities to which a predicate can be taken as truly applied under an interpretation is the extensional class of that predicate (see above Chapter 4, section 1). So, if under an interpretation an implied predicate B can be applied to every entity to which A can be truly applied, then under that interpretation, the extensional class of B includes the extensional class of A.

As noted above, a predicate B is superordinate to a predicate A under an interpretation when the extensional class of

B includes the extensional class of A. So, if E is an implied predicate of A under an interpretation, then B is also a superordinate predicate of A under that interpretation. For example, since *'human' is a literally implied predicate of *'woman,' it is a literal superordinate of *'woman.'

As we have seen, if under an interpretation a predicate B is a superordinate of a predicate A it is an implied predicate of A under that interpretation. If a predicate E is an implied predicate of A under an interpretation, it is a superordinate predicate of A under that interpretation. Under an interpretation all implied predicates of a predicate A in a text are superordinates of A and all superordinates of A are implied predicates of A.

Now in the last chapter I argued that a predicate B superordinate to a predicate A under a literal interpretation could undergo what I called a secondary shift of extension (see Chapter 4, section 2). A predicate B which undergoes a secondary shift of extension remains superordinate to a metaphorically interpreted predicate A when A has its metaphorical extension. B remains superordinate even though B does not include the metaphorical entity in its extensional class. For example, in the selection from Thoreau (Thoreau 1956; see above Chapter 4, section 2), *'flower' can be considered a superordinate of *'violet' when *'violet' has a metaphorical

extension--even though *'flower' does not have in its literal extension the metaphorical entity (Thoreau) to which *'violet' is applied.

As I noted above, under an interpretation all superordinate predicates are implied predicates. It follows that literal superordinates of A which shift extension and remain /superordinate under the metaphorical interpretation of A are literally implied predicates which are also metaphorically implied predicates of A. Moreover, they are metaphorically implied predicates which are not true of the metaphorical entity to which A is applied. In other words, all literal superordinates undergoing secondary shifts of extension are literally implied predicates which are MIPNLT's.

Since under an interpretation all implied predicates of a predicate A are superordinates of A, the following is also true: all literally implied predicates of a predicate A which are MIPNLT's are literal superordinates of A which undergo secondary shifts of extension.

As an illustration let us look at the stanzas from Thoreau quoted in Chapter 4. In Chapter 4 I argued that in these stanzas *'flower' can be considered a literal superordinate of *'violet' which undergoes a secondary shift of extension (see Chapter 4, section 2). Now all literal superordinates which undergo secondary shifts of extension are metaphorically implied predicates which are not literally true of the metaphorical

entity. So, if *'flower' has undergone a secondary shift, it is a literally implied predicate of *'violet' which is a MIPNLT.

This, I think, is consistent with the way we metaphorically interpret. When we metaphorically interpret *'violet' in the Thoreau poem, we can understand that Thoreau in calling himself a violet is also implicitly calling himself a flower.

For the moment, I would like to focus upon the fact that literal superordinates of a predicate A which undergo secondary shifts of extension are literally implied predicates which are MIPNLT's. I would like to argue briefly that it is feasible to say that such literally implied predicates can become metaphorically implied predicates as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of their implying predicates.

I argued in Chapter 4 that a secondary shift of extension can be considered to occur as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of a hyponym (see Chapter 4, section 2). For example, *'flower' in the Thoreau verses can be considered to shift extension as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of its hyponym *'violet' (see above Chapter 4, section 2).

So, all superordinates which undergo secondary shifts of extension are literally implied predicates which are MIPNLT's, and vice versa. So, the fact that a secondary shift of extension can be considered to occur as the direct result of a metaphorical interpretation of a hyponym means that a literally implied

predicate can become a MIPNLT as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of its implying predicate (i.e., the hyponym).

Let us look again at the passages from Thoreau. According to my argument, since *'flower' is a superordinate which has a secondarily shifted extension, it can be considered a literally implied predicate which is a MIPNLT. This, I think, is consistent with the way we can metaphorically interpret *'violet' in Thoreau's poem (Thoreau 1956). We can understand that implicitly Thoreau is calling himself a flower as a consequence of metaphorically calling himself a violet.

A literally implied predicate need not even be a predicate of a word or phrase in the text in order to be a MIPNLT. This too would seem to lend credence to the idea that a literally implied predicate can become a MIPNLT as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of its implying predicate.

Let us look, for example, at a passage from one of Samuel Daniel's Sonnets to Delia.

Care-Charger sleepe, sonne of the Sable night,
 Brother to death, in silent darkness borne:
 Relieve my languish, and restore the light,

With darke forgetting of my cares returne.

(Daniel 1956)

In this passage Daniel calls sleep the "sonne of the Sable night." I think the reader will agree that conventionally we consider *'descendant' to be a literally implied predicate of *'son'; that is, we assume that any entity which is a son (of someone) is a descendant (of someone).

Conventionally, we interpret *'son' metaphorically when it is applied to sleep in this passage. It is, I think, conventionally acceptable to construe this application of *'son' to sleep as implying that sleep is a descendant of night--even though sleep, the metaphorical entity, is not literally the descendant of anyone or anything.

As just noted, *'son' in this context can be construed as implying *'descendant' metaphorically, just as it conventionally does literally. Since this is the case, it would seem feasible to say theoretically that the implication can occur metaphorically in this context in the same way as it does literally: by means of a meaning postulate. So, we can consider *'descendant' to be in this context a MIPNLT of *'son.'

It may be noted that *'descendant' can be considered a MIPNLT despite the fact that *'descendant' is not the predicate of any word or phrase in the passage. So, it would seem feasible

to say that the literally implied predicate can become a MIPNLT, as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of its implying predicate (*'sib') rather than on the basis of any independent use in the text.

Another example is found in the same passage. In the passage from Daniel sleep is called "Brother to death." Conventionally, *'sibling' is a literally implied predicate of *'brother'; that is, we assume that any entity which is a brother is a sibling. Although *'sibling' is not literally true of the metaphorical entity (sleep) to which *'brother' is applied, we can construe *'brother' as implying metaphorically that sleep is a sibling of death.

So, *'brother' in this context can be construed as implying *'sibling' just as it does literally. Since this is the case, it would seem feasible to say theoretically that the implication can be made metaphorically in this context in the same way as it is literally: through a meaning postulate. So, we can consider *'sibling' a MIPNLT of *'brother.'

It should be noted that here again the implied predicate is not expressed by any word or phrase in the passage. So, here too it would seem feasible to say that the literally implied predicate can become a MIPNLT, as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of its implying predicate (*'brother') rather than on the basis of any independent use in the text.

I would now like to turn to a stanza from Algernon Swinburne's "Mater Triumphalis."

I am thine harp between thine hands,

O mother!

All my strong chords are strained

with love of thee.

We grapple in love and wrestle, as each

with other

wrestle the wind and the reluctant

sea.

(Swinburne 1968:210)

In this stanza Swinburne is conventionally understood to be calling himself a harp. *'Harp' conventionally has as a literally implied predicate *'musical instrument.' Although Swinburne is not literally a musical instrument, when we metaphorically interpret *'harp' in this context we can construe it so that we can understand its application to Swinburne to imply that Swinburne is a musical instrument.

So, *'harp' can in this context be construed metaphorically as implying *'musical instrument' just as it does literally. It would seem feasible to assume that the implication can occur

metaphorically in this context in the same way as it does literally: through a meaning postulate. It would appear then that in this context *'musical instrument' can be considered a MIPNLT of *'harp.'

It may be noted that there is no word or phrase in this passage expressing the predicate *'musical instrument.' So, it would appear feasible to consider *'musical instrument' to be a MIPNLT as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of its implying predicate.

Let us look finally at another stanza from the same Swinburne poem.

I am thy storm³-thrust of the days that
darken,

Thy petrol in the foam that bears thy
lark

To port through night and tempest: if
thou hearken,

My voice is in thy heaven before the
lark.

(Swinburne 1968:211)

In this stanza Swinburne is conventionally understood to be calling himself a petrel. Conventionally, *'bird' is a literally implied predicate of *'petrel.' Although this literally implied predicate is not literally true of the metaphorical entity (Swinburne), we can nevertheless understand the application of *'petrel' to be metaphorically implying that Swinburne is a bird.

Since *'petrel' can be construed as metaphorically implying *'bird' in this context, it would seem feasible to assume that the implication can occur metaphorically in this context in the same way as it does literally: through a meaning postulate. It would appear feasible to say then that *'bird' can be a MIPNLT of *'petrel' in this context.

Again, the metaphorically implied predicate is not expressed by a word or phrase in the text. So, it would appear feasible to consider the predicate to be a MIPNLT as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of its implying predicate (*'petrel').

Hypothetical examples of an "everyday" kind can also be found. If I call some girl a rose what I say can be construed as implying that the girl is a *'flower.' The same kind of argument as I have made above can be used to indicate that in these circumstances, *'flower,' a literally implied predicate of *'rose,' is also a MIPNLT of *'rose.'

I would like now to discuss the second part of my proposal;

that is, that a literally implied predicate which is a MIPNLT is itself metaphorically interpreted. For example, according to my proposal, if, in the passage from Daniel quoted above, we understand *'sibling' to be a metaphorically implied predicate of *'brother,' then *'sibling' is itself metaphorically interpreted.

In what follows I attempt to show first that MIPNLT'S can be considered to meet the stipulations I made in Chapter 1 for a predicate to be considered metaphorically interpreted within my analysis (see Chapter 1, section 2). I then try to show briefly that the conditions I have so far proposed for metaphorically interpreted predicates (conditions 4.1, 5.1 and 5.2) apply to MIPNLT'S.

In trying to show that the predicates I am discussing meet my initial stipulations, I refer, for the purposes of illustration, to two specific instances of secondarily shifted predicates which I have discussed above. I refer first of all to the passage from Eliot discussed in Chapter 4. In particular, I refer to the predicate *'god.' In Chapter 4 (section 2), I argued that in the context of the Eliot verses *'god' can be considered a literal superordinate which has undergone a secondary shift of extension. As my argument in this section indicates, it can also be considered a MIPNLT of *'strong brown god.' This, I think, is consistent with conventionally acceptable metaphorical interpretations of *'strong brown god.' In calling the river a strong brown god, Eliot can be understood as implying that the

river is a god.

For my second illustration I refer to the first stanza from the Swinburne poem quoted in this section. In particular, I refer to the predicate *'bird,' which I have argued can be considered a MIPNLT of *'petrel' in the context of the quoted passage.

In Chapter 1 (see section 2), I stipulated that I would consider as metaphors only cases where something is attributed to or predicated of an entity (see stipulation #1). For example, if I say about someone "the man went to the store," then we can say *'the man' is attributed to some entity.

I think all the cases of MIPNLT's I have discussed meet this condition. For example, if in the passage from Eliot we understand *'god' to be implicitly applied to the river, I think it can be seen that we consider something to be predicated of or attributed to the river: that is, that it is a god. Similarly, in the Swinburne passage, if we understand *'bird' to be implicitly applied to the author, we consider something to be attributed to or predicated of him: that is, that he is a bird.

In Chapter 1 I stipulated that the only cases I would consider to be metaphors are those in which a predicate is taken as falsely applied to an entity under a literal interpretation (see stipulation #2). I also stipulated that cases I would consider as metaphors must be taken as expressing something true under a non-literal interpretation (see stipulation #3).

Stipulation #3 may be considered superceded by a proposal I made in Chapter 4 (see Chapter 4, section 1). In Chapter 4 I proposed that we could consider a metaphorically interpreted predicate to include in its metaphorical extension the metaphorical entity. In other words, I proposed that we consider a metaphorically interpreted predicate to be truly applied to the metaphorical entity.

The metaphorically implied predicates I have discussed in this section are not literally true of the metaphorical entity. So, they meet my first stipulation.

In Chapter 4 I contended that when a predicate has a secondarily shifted extension, it includes the metaphorical entity to which it is applied in its extension. Hence it can be considered truly applied to that entity when shifted. Since by definition this extension is not the extension of the predicate under a literal interpretation, the shifted extension must be considered an extension of the predicate under a non-literal interpretation. So, such predicates are truly applied to a metaphorical entity under a non-literal interpretation. Superordinate predicates with secondarily shifted extensions then meet both the third condition I stipulated in the first chapter and the proposal which superceded it in Chapter 4.

As noted earlier, all superordinate predicates of a predicate A in a text with secondarily shifted extensions are MIPNLT's. All literally implied predicates of A which are

MIPNLT's are superordinates which secondarily shift extension. So, the fact that secondarily shifted superordinates meet stipulations #2 and #3 (and the revised form of #3) also indicates that these conditions are met by MIPNLT's.

Let us look at the cases I mentioned above. It is clear that in the passage from Elict the predicate *'gcd' does not include the river in its literal extension. It is also clear that this predicate is truly applied to the river when the predicate *'strong brown gcd' is metaphorically applied to that entity.

Similarly, in the Swinburne passage, the predicate *'bird' does not include Swinburne in its literal extension. We can also see that if we construe *'bird' as implicitly applied to Swinburne when its hyponym *'petrel' is so applied, *'bird' can be taken as truly applied to Swinburne in just the sense that *'petrel' is.

Let us go on now to the fourth condition I stipulated in the first chapter (see stipulation #4). According to this stipulation, the only cases which I consider metaphors are those in which the non-literal meaning cannot be considered to be an instance of verbal irony. Verbal irony is generally considered to involve saying or implying one thing literally and non-literally something which is quite different and often antithetical.

I do not think that any instance of a MIPNLT or predicate

with secondarily shifted extension has a non-literal sense which can be considered an instance of verbal irony. For example, the predicate *'god' in the Eliot passage when interpreted non-literally in no way implies that the entities so-called are not gods. Similarly, the non-literal sense of *'bird' in the Swinburne passage in no way implies that the entity it is used to characterize is not a bird.

It would appear then that literally implied predicates which are MIPNLT's meet the conditions I initially stipulated to demarcate the class of phenomena I consider metaphors. I would now like to argue briefly that they also meet the other conditions I have proposed for that class.

In (4.1) I proposed that the metaphorical extension of a metaphorically interpreted predicate includes both the metaphorical entity and the entities in its literal extension. In the second section of Chapter 4, I argued that predicates with secondarily shifted extensions remain superordinate to their hyponyms when the hyponyms have a metaphorical extension. In trying to establish this, I showed that in various cases, superordinates which shift extension can be considered applicable to both the metaphorical entity and the entities in their literal extension (see Chapter 4, section 2). Since all secondarily shifted superordinates are literally implied predicates which are MIPNLT's and vice versa, it would appear reasonable to say that metaphorically implied predicates of the kind I am assuming

include in their shifted extension both the metaphorical entity to which they are implicitly applied and the entities in their literal extension.

As an example, let us look at the selection from Jonson quoted in Chapter 4 (see Chapter 4, section 2). In this passage we can understand *'shadows of men' to imply metaphorically that women are shadows. As I tried to show in Chapter 4 (see Chapter 4, section 2), when *'shadow' has a secondarily shifted extension the statements Jonson makes about shadows (i.e., the entities in the extension of *'shadow') are statements about both the metaphorical entities (women) and "real" shadows (i.e., the entities in its literal extension). For this reason it would appear feasible to say that the shifted extension of *'shadow' includes both the metaphorical entities (women) and the entities in its literal extension (real shadows). Since a predicate with a secondarily shifted extension is a MIPNLT, we can say that the MIPNLT *'shadow' includes both the metaphorical entities and the entities in its literal extension.

Let us look at another example. In Chapter 4 (see Chapter 4, section 2), I suggested that hypothetically someone might say about some woman "Joan is so pretty, she's a rose." We can understand this to mean that Joan is being implicitly called a flower.

In Chapter 4, I suggested that if the same speaker says immediately afterwards "Moreover, all flowers are delicate," we

could infer from this something about Joan as well as about "real" roses. For this reason, I argued, it would seem feasible to say that the shifted extension of *'flower' includes both the metaphorical entity (Joan) and the entities in the literal extension of *'flower.' Since a predicate which has a secondarily shifted extension is a MIPNLT, the MIPNLT *'flower' in this case includes in its extension both the metaphorical entity (Joan) and the entities in its literal extension.

Let us now go on to the proposals I have made in this chapter. In the first section of this chapter I proposed that a metaphorically interpreted predicate will have as a metaphorically implied predicate a literally implied predicate which is literally true of the metaphorical entity. It would appear that under their non-literal interpretation the predicates presently under discussion will also retain as implied predicates literally implied predicates which are literally true of the metaphorical entity.

Let us look, for example, at the passage from Milton where Eve is called an 'unsupported flower' (see Chapter 4, section 2). As I have noted above, we can consider *'flower' to be a MIPNLT of *'unsupported flower.' In other words, we can consider *'flower' to be implicitly applied to the metaphorical entity (Eve) when its hyponym *'unsupported flower' is.

Now *'concrete entity' is a literally implied predicate of *'flower': when someone calls some entity a flower and we

understand the statement literally, we can also understand the speaker to mean implicitly that the entity is a concrete entity. So, *'concrete entity' is a literally implied predicate of *'flower' which is true of the metaphorical entity, Eve.

Can we infer that Eve is a concrete entity from the non-literal characterization of Eve as a flower? I do not see any reason to say we cannot--particularly since the inference is literally true. Since *'flower' in this context implies *'concrete entity' just as it does when construed literally, it would seem feasible to say theoretically that the implication can be considered to occur in the same way as it does literally; that is, through a Relevant Background meaning postulate(s) which states or implies that an entity which is a flower is a concrete entity. So, it would appear that *'concrete entity' can be considered an implied predicate of the MIFNLT *'flower.'

Let us look at another example. In the second passage from Swinburne quoted in this chapter, Swinburne calls himself a petrel. I argued above that when we construe *'petrel' metaphorically we can understand it to be implying that Swinburne is a bird. In other words, we can understand *'bird' to be a MIFNLT of *'petrel,' even though *'bird' is not literally true of the metaphorical entity (Swinburne).

*'Animate entity' is a literally implied predicate of *'bird.' In addition, *'animate entity' is literally true of Swinburne, the metaphorical entity. Since *'animate entity' is

literally true of Swinburne, there is no reason why we cannot consider it implied by *'bird' if we consider *'bird' to characterize Swinburne non-literally. Again it would seem feasible to say theoretically that the implication occurs in the same way as it occurs literally: through a meaning postulate which states or implies that any bird is an animate entity. So, it would seem feasible to say that in the Swinburne passage *'animate entity' is an implied predicate of *'bird' which is literally true of the metaphorical entity to which its implying predicate is applied.

Let us now turn to the second proposal I have made in this chapter: that is, that metaphorically interpreted predicates can have implied predicates which are not literally true of the entity to which they are implicitly applied. I think that this proposal too is applicable to MIFNLT's themselves.

For the purposes of illustration, let us take the two metaphors in the passage from Daniel discussed above. In this passage sleep is called the son of night and the brother of death.

Let us look first at the metaphorical use of *'son.' I argued above that *'son' in this passage can be construed as metaphorically implying that sleep is a child (of night).

If an entity is literally a child of another entity it is animate. So, *'animate' is a literally implied predicate of *'child.' Although a characteristic of many animate entities,

sleep is itself, of course, not literally animate. Nevertheless, I think the reader will agree that conventionally we can understand the implicit characterization of sleep as a child to itself imply that sleep is animate. Moreover, it would appear feasible to say that we can make such an inference from the non-literal use of *'child' in the same way that we can when we literally interpret *'child' in a text; that is, through a Relevant Background meaning postulate which states or implies that any entity which is a child is animate. So, it seems feasible to consider *'animate' in this context to be an implied predicate of *'child' when *'child' is a MIFMLT. Since *'animate' is not literally true of the metaphorical entity in question, it can be considered an implied predicate which is not literally true of the entity to which it is implicitly implied.

Let us now look at the use of *'brother' in the same poem by Daniel. I argued above that in this context *'brother' can be considered to have *'sibling' as a MIFMLT. Any entity which is literally a sibling is considered literally animate. So, *'animate' can be considered a literally implied predicate of *'sibling.'

However, *'animate' is literally not truly applicable to sleep itself. Nevertheless, I think the reader will agree that we can in the context of the poem infer that sleep is animate from the fact that sleep is implicitly called a *'sibling.'

The same argument that I used to show that *'animate' can be

considered an implied predicate of the MIPNLT '*'child' can be used to show that '*'animate' can be considered an implied predicate of '*'brother'--despite the fact that '*'animate' is not literally true of the metaphorical entity (sleep) to which '*'brother' is implicitly applied. Here again it would appear feasible to say that a MIPNLT can have an implied predicate which is not literally true of the entity to which it is implicitly applied.

MIPNLT's appear to meet my initial stipulations for what I would consider cases of metaphor. In addition, MIPNLT's appear to meet the other conditions I have proposed so far within my analysis. It would seem feasible then to consider MIPNLT's of metaphorically interpreted predicates to be themselves metaphorically interpreted.

Before concluding, I would like to propose the following formulation of the claims I have made in this section. Again, it should be noted that, since the claims concern implied predicates, they concern the Relevant Background of a text.

(5.1) Assume that in a text a predicate E is a literally implied predicate of a predicate A and not literally true of the metaphorical entity to which A is applied. Then, under a metaphorical interpretation of

A, B can be a metaphorically implied predicate of A if
B is itself metaphorically interpreted.

CHAPTER SIX

CONSISTENCY AND METAPHOR

In this chapter I make two proposals concerning metaphorical interpretation. By means of these proposals I try to provide a systematic theoretical account of how metaphorical interpretation allows us to understand as consistent what is literally inconsistent.

I would like to look at an example in order to illustrate what I mean when I say that metaphorical interpretation can allow us to understand as consistent what is literally inconsistent. Let us assume that in speaking of the moon someone uses the phrase "the inconstant moon" (from Beardsley 1962:300ff). We conventionally infer from calling something a moon that literally the entity is is not and cannot be inconstant. From calling an entity inconstant, we conventionally infer that literally the entity in question is not the moon. Nevertheless, if 'inconstant' is interpreted metaphorically, we do not conventionally consider the phrase "the inconstant moon" to be expressing anything which is logically inconsistent.

Before introducing the proposals I would like to discuss

some of the terminology I use in this chapter. I use the term "textual propositions" to refer to those propositions we can infer from a text without such assumptions as are found in the non-logical Relevant Background, Hypothetical Premises, and Explanatory propositions. So, for example, *'a man went shopping' is a textual proposition for a text which contains the utterance "The old man went shopping at the store." The proposition in question can be inferred from the text without any assumptions such as are found in the non-logical Relevant Background, Hypothetical Premises, or Explanatory propositions.

I would like now to discuss the second term I introduce in this chapter. There are certain predicates which can be expressed by a word or phrase containing a single verbal particle of negation. These predicates, when applied to an entity, may be said to express the idea that the entity is not a member of a certain class.

For example, *'not human' can be expressed by 'not human,' a phrase containing a single verbal particle of negation ('not'). When this predicate is applied to an entity, it may impressionistically be said to express the idea that the entity in question is not of the class of humans. Similarly, *'not a rose' can be expressed by 'not a rose,' a phrase containing a single verbal particle of negation ('not'). When applied to an entity *'not a rose' can be said to express the idea that the entity in question is not a member of the class of roses.

The predicates with which I am concerned can be said to take the form *'not A.' In texts, there are occasions when the "A" part of a predicate of this form is itself understood to be metaphorically interpreted. For example, let us assume someone says about some person "Richard is a lion." The predicate *'lion' may in this context be metaphorically interpreted.

*'Lion' can in these circumstances be used as the "A" part of a predicate having the form *'not A.' We can say, for example, "Richard is a lion, but John is certainly not a lion." In such a context, we understand John not to be a lion in the metaphorical sense in which Richard is. My proposals will not be concerned with cases such as this.

I use the term "negated predicate" to refer to predicates of the form *'not A' which can be expressed by a word or phrase containing a single verbal particle of negation. However, I use the term "negated predicate" to refer to predicates of the form *'not A' only when A is not metaphorically interpreted. For example, in "Richard is a lion, but John is certainly not a lion," *'not a lion' is not a negated predicate since A is metaphorically interpreted in the text. However, *'not a rose' in the utterance "That flower is not a rose" is a negated predicate, presuming we do not consider *'rose' to be metaphorically interpreted in relation to the text of which the utterance is part.

I would now like to introduce my proposals. In the second

section of this chapter I propose that a predicate be considered metaphorically interpreted only if in a text it literally is falsely applied to an entity and not a negated predicate. For example, according to my proposal, *'not human' cannot be metaphorically interpreted in *'John is not human' if we assume John is literally human.

In the third section I propose that predicates which are not negated ones can be metaphorically interpreted only when they are applied in a text to some entity and the resulting proposition is logically consistent with those textual propositions we assume to be true.

For example, let us take the utterance "Although Mary is not a flower, she is a rose." let us say we presume *'Mary is not a flower' is true. According to my proposal, *'flower,' a literally implied predicate of *'rose,' cannot be considered metaphorically interpreted when *'rose' is metaphorically interpreted. Calling Mary a flower is logically inconsistent with a textual proposition we assume true (*'Mary is not a flower').

The first section functions as an introduction to the proposals I make in sections two and three. In this section I engage in a general discussion of the problem of consistency in relation to my analysis of metaphor.

My analysis implies that metaphorical interpretation of a predicate does not result in an inconsistent understanding of a text (i.e., an inconsistent ComprM for a text), although a literal interpretation of the same predicate does. I would like to begin by showing how my analysis implies this.

The complete set of valid inferences we can make from a logically inconsistent set of propositions will be logically inconsistent. The complete set of valid inferences we can make from a logically consistent set of propositions will be logically consistent.

In terms of the theoretical framework I am using, the Comprehensive Meaning of a text (ComprM(T)) is a set of relevant conclusions. This set is a subset of the set of valid inferences we can make from a text and the propositions we assume in the Relevant Background, Hypothetical Premises, and Explanatory propositions. From this subset we can deduce any inference we can make from the text and the assumptions. (See discussion of Comprehensive Meaning in Chapter 2, section 2.)

If a textual proposition is inconsistent with the assumptions we hold (i.e., in B_T , H, and E), the result will be an inconsistent set of inferences and hence an inconsistent Comprehensive Meaning. On the other hand, if the textual proposition is consistent with the assumptions we hold, then the

complete set of inferences will be consistent and so will the subset of these inferences in the Comprehensive Meaning.

According to condition 4.1, the metaphorical extension of a metaphorically interpreted predicate includes the metaphorical entity. So, if a predicate is metaphorically interpreted, the proposition resulting from applying the predicate to the entity in question is considered true under the metaphorical interpretation (see Chapter 4, section 1). In addition, according to my initial stipulations, a metaphorically interpreted predicate must be taken as literally false of the entity to which it is applied (see stipulation #1, Chapter 1, section 2).

Within my theoretical framework, a proposition we take as true under an interpretation is logically consistent with the assumptions we make at the time of that interpretation. A proposition we take as false is logically inconsistent with the assumptions we make when we give it a particular interpretation (see Chapter 2, section 1).

So, the metaphorical interpretation of a predicate will not result in an inconsistent Comprehensive Meaning. Within my analysis we take a metaphorically interpreted predicate as truly applied metaphorically and hence logically consistent with our assumptions when we give it the metaphorical interpretation.

On the other hand, the literal interpretation of the same predicate will result in an inconsistent Comprehensive Meaning.

Within my analysis, a metaphorically interpreted predicate is one we take as falsely applied literally and hence logically inconsistent with our assumptions when we literally interpret it.

The Comprehensive Meaning of a text is intended to represent theoretically our understanding of a text. So, saying that a metaphorical interpretation does not result in an inconsistent Comprehensive Meaning is the theoretical equivalent of saying that it allows us to understand a text in a consistent manner (cf. my discussions of Beardsley and Pollert in Chapter 1). Saying that a literal interpretation of a metaphor does result in an inconsistent Comprehensive Meaning is the theoretical equivalent of saying that what we understand metaphorically is not literally consistent with the rest of what we understand a text to mean (truly).

For the purposes of illustration, let us take the utterance "This old man is but a tattered coat upon a stick" (derived from Yeats 1956b). If 'a tattered coat upon a stick' is metaphorically interpreted, then, according to my analysis, we must take as literally false the proposition resulting from calling the old man 'a tattered coat upon a stick.' This means that this proposition is logically inconsistent with the assumptions we hold when we interpret it literally. Since the proposition is logically inconsistent with the assumptions held when we literally interpret it, the literal interpretation results in an inconsistent understanding of (i.e., CORPUS for)

the text.

However, according to my analysis, when we metaphorically interpret *'a tattered coat,' we take as true the proposition that the metaphorical entity (the old man) is *'a tattered coat upon a stick.' This means that this proposition is logically consistent with the assumptions we hold when we make the metaphorical interpretation. Since the proposition is logically consistent with the assumptions held at the time of the metaphorical interpretation, this interpretation allows us to have a consistent understanding of (i.e., a consistent comprehension for) a text.

The hypothesis that metaphorical interpretation allows us to understand as consistent what we take as literally inconsistent is, I believe, in accord with the way we conventionally interpret metaphors. Again let us take the utterance, "this old man is but a tattered coat upon a stick." We find it inconsistent for an entity to be literally both an old man and a tattered coat. We assume that something we take to be an old man is not something which can truly be a tattered coat. We assume that something we take to be a tattered coat is not something which can be an old man.

However, we find it consistent for an entity to be an old man and a tattered coat when we metaphorically interpret *'a tattered coat upon a stick.' The metaphorical interpretation allows us to understand as consistent what we would take to be

literally inconsistent.

The problem is to provide a systematic theoretical account of how metaphorical interpretation allows us to take as consistent what we take to be literally inconsistent. In terms of my analysis, true propositions lead to a consistent set of inferences from a text and false propositions lead to an inconsistent set of inferences because of the assumptions we hold at the time of the interpretation (see Chapter 2, section 1). In light of this, it would seem feasible to say that the assumptions we make for a literal interpretation are changed when we make a metaphorical interpretation.

Let us look, for example, at the metaphor I have adapted from Yeats: "this old man is but a tattered coat upon a stick." It would appear feasible to say theoretically that, when *'tattered coat upon a stick' is metaphorically interpreted, we can understand the utterance in a consistent manner because we drop certain assumptions we conventionally make when we interpret the utterance literally.

This, I believe is consistent with the way in which many modern scholars try to account for metaphor. Many modern scholars (for example, Levin 1977, Van Dijk 1975, and Cohen 1979) have tried to account for metaphor as a change of meaning (see Chapter 1 for discussion of Levin 1977, and Van Dijk 1975). In terms of the theoretical framework I use, the meaning of a predicate expressed by a word or phrase is a matter of the

assumptions we make about the entities to which the predicate is taken as truly applying. In the case of primary or denotative meaning, these assumptions are found in the Relevant Background. In the case of secondary or connotative meaning, the assumptions function as Hypothetical Premises. So, saying metaphorical interpretation involves a change of meaning implies within my theoretical framework that it involves a change in assumptions.

Nevertheless, saying theoretically that we drop certain assumptions when we metaphorically interpret poses certain questions. Which assumptions should we consider dropped? More particularly, which assumptions should we consider dropped in order to account for the fact that when we metaphorically interpret we view as consistent what we view as inconsistent when we interpret literally?

In the last chapter I argued that a metaphorically interpreted predicate can have as metaphorically implied predicates, literally implied predicates which are not literally true of the metaphorical entity. For example, calling sleep the brother of death can imply metaphorically that sleep is a sibling of death (see Chapter 5, section 2).

I argued that in order for such a literally implied predicate to be metaphorically implied, it must itself be metaphorically interpreted (see Chapter 5, section 2). In such cases presumably the assumption--or, more precisely, the meaning postulate--used to infer the implied predicate would not be

dropped under the metaphorical interpretation.

Now if a literally implied predicate is literally falsely applied to a metaphorical entity and is not metaphorically interpreted, within my analysis it cannot be an implied predicate of a metaphorically interpreted predicate (see the preceding chapter). The literally implied predicate would be neither literally nor metaphorically true of the metaphorical entity to which the metaphorically interpreted predicate is applied. In such cases, presumably the assumption--or, more precisely, the meaning postulate--we use to infer the implied predicate literally would need to be dropped under the metaphorical interpretation. So, by identifying classes of literally implied predicates which are literally falsely applied and cannot be metaphorically interpreted, we can identify assumptions which theoretically should be considered dropped under a metaphorical interpretation.

The proposals I make below are intended to identify such classes of literally implied predicates and hence literal assumptions which we can reasonably say theoretically are dropped under a metaphorical interpretation. By identifying these classes of literally implied predicates and hence literal assumptions, I try to account for cases where what is literally inconsistent is consistent under a metaphorical interpretation. In addition, by means of these proposals I try to explicitly identify certain non-literal interpretations of predicates which

I think are appropriately considered theoretically to be non-metaphorical.

2

I would like to propose first that a predicate in a text be considered metaphorically interpretable only if it is falsely applied and is not what I have called a negated predicate. For example, according to my proposal, the predicate *'not a boy' in the utterance "John is not a boy" could not be metaphorically interpreted if literally it is falsely applied and *'boy' is not itself metaphorically interpreted elsewhere in the text. The predicate *'not a boy' can be expressed by a word or phrase containing a single verbal particle of negation. Moreover, *'boy' is not itself metaphorically interpreted. So, the predicate *'not a boy' can be considered a negated predicate and hence, according to my proposal, cannot be metaphorically interpreted.

I would like to mention here that this proposal concerning what I have called "negated predicates" is not intended to exclude from the domain of metaphor negated predicates which are literally truly applied in a text to an entity; for example *'Jane is not a rose' where Jane is literally not a rose. These propositions have already been excluded by my first chapter

stipulation that I will consider as metaphorical only propositions taken as literally false (see Chapter 1, section 2).

My proposal is also not intended to imply that we should exclude from the domain of metaphor propositions which indicate that some entity is not in the metaphorical extension of a metaphorically interpreted predicate. Clearly, we can, for example, construe metaphorically both instances of *'rose' in the proposition *'although Jane is a rose, Mary is not a rose.'

However, in such cases, the unnegated predicate (in the example above, *'rose' as opposed to *'not a rose') must explicitly or implicitly be falsely applied under a literal interpretation and metaphorically interpreted. So, the predicate *'not a rose' cannot be considered a negated predicate.

I would now like to discuss my proposal in relation to both implied and textual predicates. I will begin with implied predicates.

If someone says "that woman is a rose" and we construe *'rose' metaphorically, I do not think we conventionally understand the speaker to be inconsistently holding that the entity in question is and is not a woman, is and is not human, etc. Literally, calling an entity a rose implies that the entity in question is not a woman, is not human, etc. Nevertheless, when we interpret *'rose' metaphorically, we seem to ignore such negative implications when such implications are not literally true.

I would like to look at one such implication in order to show how my proposal can be used to account for the fact that we seem to ignore certain implications when we metaphorically interpret. Literally, when we call some entity a rose we assume that the entity in question is not a woman. *'Not a woman' then can be considered a literally implied predicate of *'rose.' Clearly, when we metaphorically interpret we do not ignore the fact that something which is a rose is not a woman.

Since *'woman' is not metaphorically interpreted in the utterance "that woman is a rose, *'not a woman' can be considered a negative predicate. Clearly, *'not a woman' is literally false of the metaphorical entity (the woman) to which *'rose' is applied. According to my proposal, *'not a woman' then cannot be metaphorically interpreted.

So, *'not a woman' is not literally true of the metaphorical entity and, since it cannot be metaphorically interpreted, it cannot be true under a metaphorical interpretation. However, *'rose' is metaphorically interpreted and hence true of the metaphorical entity under a metaphorical interpretation. It would appear then that *'not a woman' cannot be true of the metaphorical entity when *'rose' is metaphorically interpreted and hence true of the metaphorical entity.

A metaphorically implied predicate must be true of whatever its implying predicate is true of under a metaphorical interpretation. So, it would appear that *'not a woman' is not a

metaphorically implied predicate of *'rose.' /

If this is the case, then, when *'rose' is metaphorically interpreted, there is no Relevant Background meaning postulate(s) which states or implies that any entity which is a rose is not a woman. We cannot then infer from the Relevant Background and the text a ComprM(T) proposition which states or implies that the entity in question is not a woman.

This, I think, is consistent with the fact that when we metaphorically interpret *'rose' we do not understand the utterance to be saying that the woman in question is not a woman. Rather, we seem to ignore the implication that the entity is not a woman.

Let us now look at the following passage from Lord Byron's Don Juan.

In short, she was a walking calculation,

Miss Edgeworth's novels stepping from their covers,
Or Mrs. Trimmer's Locks on education,

Or "Coelebs' Wife" set out in quest of lovers,
Morality's prim personification,

In which not Envy's self a flaw discovers;
To others' share let "female errors fall,"

For she had not even cre--the worst of all.

(Byron 1975b:749; Canto 160)

In this stanza Donna Inez is called "a walking calculation." Calling some entity a *'calculation'* literally implies that the entity in question is not animate, is not human, etc. Nevertheless, when we interpret *'calculation'* metaphorically in this context, we conventionally ignore such literally false negative implications. We do not understand the text to be implying inconsistently that Don Juan's mother is both animate and inanimate (in the sense of *'alive'*), human and not human, etc.

I would like to show how my proposal can be used to account for the fact that we ignore the implication that Donna Inez is not an animate entity. *'Not an animate entity'* is a literally implied predicate of *'calculation'*: when something is called a *'calculation'* we assume that the entity is literally not an animate entity. Moreover, *'not an animate entity'* is literally false of the metaphorical entity (Donna Inez) to which *'calculation'* is applied.

Since *'animate entity'* is not metaphorically interpreted in the poem, we can consider *'not an animate entity'* to be a negated predicate. According to my proposal, this means that *'not an animate entity,'* though falsely applied literally,

cannot be metaphorically interpreted.

*'Not an animate entity' is literally false of the metaphorical entity to which its implying predicate *'calculation' is applied. Since it cannot be metaphorically interpreted, it cannot be true of the metaphorical entity under a metaphorical interpretation either.

However, according to my analysis, under a metaphorical interpretation *'calculation' is truly applied to the metaphorical entity, Donna Inez. Since a metaphorically implied predicate must be true of the entities of which its implying predicate is true under a metaphorical interpretation, it would appear that *'not an animate entity' is not a metaphorically implied predicate of *'calculation' in this passage.

If this is the case, then, when *'calculation' is metaphorically interpreted, there is no Relevant Background meaning postulate(s) which states or implies that any entity which is a calculator is not an animate entity. When *'calculation' is metaphorically interpreted, we cannot then infer from the Relevant Background and text any Compr(T) proposition which states or implies that Donna Inez is not an animate entity.

This, I think, is consistent with the fact that conventionally when we metaphorically interpret *'calculation' we do not conclude that Donna Inez is and is not an animate entity. Rather, we seem to ignore the literal implication that she is not

an animate entity.

Let us now look at the following passage from a short poem by Milton.

How soon hath Time the subtle thief of youth,
 Stolen on his wing my three and twentieth year!
 My hasting dayes flie on with full career,
 But my late spring no bud or blossom shew'eth.

(Milton 1956)

In this passage, Milton calls time a "thief." We conventionally assume that time is literally an abstract entity. We also conventionally assure that a thief is not an abstract entity.. Nevertheless, when we metaphorically interpret *'thief' we do not, I think, conventionally understand Milton as inconsistently saying that time is and is not abstract. Rather, we ignore the literal implication that time is not an abstract entity. Below, I will try to show how my proposal can be used to account for the fact that when we metaphorically interpret *'thief' we do not understand its use in the poem to imply that time is not abstract.

*'Not an abstract entity' can be considered a literally implied predicate of *'thief.' Since *'abstract entity' is not

metaphorically interpreted in the poem, *'not an abstract entity' can be considered a negated predicate. In addition, *'not an abstract entity' is not literally true of time. According to my proposal, it cannot then be metaphorically interpreted because it is a negated predicate.

So, *'not an abstract entity' is not literally true of the metaphorical entity to which its implying predicate, *'thief,' is applied. Since it cannot be metaphorically interpreted, *'not an abstract entity' cannot be true under a metaphorical interpretation.

However, according to my analysis, *'thief' is true of the metaphorical entity when it is under a metaphorical interpretation. Since *'not an abstract entity' is neither literally nor metaphorically true of the metaphorical entity, it would appear that it cannot be a metaphorically implied predicate of *'thief' in this context.

If *'not an abstract entity' is not a metaphorically implied predicate of *'thief,' then, when *'thief' is metaphorically interpreted, there is no meaning postulate(s) in the Relevant Background which states or implies that any entity which is a thief is not an abstract entity. There is then no way of inferring from the Relevant Background and text a ComprM(T) proposition which states or implies that time is not an abstract entity. This, I believe, is consistent with the fact that when we metaphorically interpret *'thief' in this passage, we do not

understand the text as saying that time is and is not an abstract entity.

Let us look finally at the following passage from Shakespeare's "Sonnet 9."

Is it for fear to wet a widow's eye,
That thou consum'st thyself in single life?
Ah, if thou issueless shalt hap to die,
The world will wail thee like a makeless wife;
The world will be thy widow, and still weep
That thou no form of thee hast left behind,
When every private widow well may keep,
By children's eyes, her husband's shape in mind.

(Shakespeare 1970b)

In this sonnet Shakespeare says the world is his friend's "widow" (I ignore here questions of mood and tense). *'Widow' in this poem is conventionally metaphorically interpreted.

When some entity is called a widow we assume this means literally that the entity in question is not a world. Nevertheless, when we metaphorically interpret *'widow' we do not understand Shakespeare to be inconsistently saying that the entity in question is and is not the world.

'Not a world' can be considered a literally implied predicate of 'widow': we assume that literally when some entity is called a 'widow' it is not a world. Since 'world' is not metaphorically interpreted in this poem, 'not a world' can be considered to be a negated predicate.

'Not a world' clearly cannot be truly applied to an entity we consider to be a world. Since it is a negated predicate 'not a world' cannot be metaphorically interpreted. So, it cannot under a metaphorical interpretation be truly applied to the metaphorical entity (the world) to which 'widow' is applied.

However, according to my analysis 'widow' is truly applied to the metaphorical entity (the world) when it is metaphorically interpreted. 'Not a world,' on the other hand, is not literally true of the metaphorical entity, and, since it cannot be metaphorically interpreted, cannot be true of the metaphorical entity under a metaphorical interpretation.

A metaphorically implied predicate by definition must be true or whatever its implying predicate is true of when it is metaphorically interpreted. So, it would appear that 'not a world' is not a metaphorically implied predicate of 'widow' in this passage.

If this is the case, then when 'widow' is metaphorically interpreted, there is no meaning postulate(s) in the Relevant Background which states or implies that any entity which is a widow is not a world. This means that we cannot infer from the

Relevant Background and text any Compr(T) proposition which states or implies that the entity in question (this world) is not a world.

This, I think, is consistent with the way we metaphorically interpret the sonnet. As mentioned above, when we metaphorically interpret *'widow' we do not understand the text to be inconsistently saying that this world is and is not a world. Rather, we seem to ignore the literal implication that the entity in question is not a world.

I would like now to turn to textual predicates; that is, the predicates of propositions we can infer from a text without such assumptions as are found in the non-logical Relevant Background, Hypothetical Premises, and Explanatory propositions. Textual negated predicates can receive non-literal interpretations.

For example, it is possible to give *'not a rose' a non-literal interpretation where literally it is falsely applied to an entity. The utterance "that rose is not a rose" might be understood to mean non-literally something like *'that rose does not have properties we generally assume roses to have.'

We may find a similar instance in Spenser's Ancretti.

Yet she beholding me with constant eye,
delights not in my mirth nor rues my smart:
but when I laugh she mocks, and when I cry

she laughes, and hardens evermore her hart.
 What then can moue her? if nor merth nor
 mone,
 she is no woman, but a sencelesse stone.

(Spenser 1912)

We may give a non-literal interpretation to *'not a woman' in Spenser's line "she is no woman but a sencelesse stone" (Spenser 1912, line 16). We conventionally interpret this to mean that the woman in question does not have qualities (being kind-hearted, for instance) which Spenser associates with women in general.

When we interpret a textual negated predicate non-literally, it does not conventionally result in an inconsistent understanding of a text. When we give a non-literal interpretation to *'not a rose' in the utterance "that rose is not a rose" we do not conventionally understand it to be saying inconsistently that the entity in question which is a rose is not a rose. In giving a non-literal interpretation to *'not a woman' in the line from Spenser quoted above, we do not understand Spenser to be saying that the woman in question is not a woman. However, I know of no way of reflecting this consistency theoretically, if we assume--as I do for metaphor--that textual negated predicates which are not literally true of an entity can

be truly applied under a non-literal interpretation.

On the other hand, if we dropped the assumption that a predicate is truly applied under a metaphorical interpretation, then we fail to capture theoretically the fact that, when we interpret metaphorically, the metaphorical entity is grouped together with the entities in the literal extension. For example, we fail to capture the fact the utterance "Jane is a rose and all roses are beautiful" is conventionally understood to mean that both Jane and "real" roses are beautiful (see Chapter 4, section 1). In addition (with one exception I discuss below), I think it is possible to reflect theoretically the consistency of such non-literal interpretations of "positive" predicates while assuming that the "positive" predicates are truly applied under the non-literal interpretation. It would therefore seem appropriate theoretically to consider the non-literal interpretations of textual negated predicates to be non-metaphorical.

The exclusion of these non-literal interpretations from the domain of metaphor involves no major shift from what is considered metaphor in either classical or modern treatments of metaphor. In fact, I have been unable to find even a single classical or modern treatment of metaphor which cites as an example of metaphor phenomena of the kind I wish to exclude.

Moreover, there is, I believe, a characteristically mocking quality to the non-literal interpretations of many utterances

like "that rose is not a rose" or "she is not a woman (but a stone)." This mocking quality is often associated with verbal irony and sarcasm rather than metaphor. (see, for example, entry on irony in Princeton Encyclopaedia 1974:407-408, especially the mention of the "victim" of irony on page 407; see also entry on irony in Deutsch 1962:65-66.) While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to explore this possibility, I would nevertheless like to suggest that the non-literal interpretation of textual negated predicates can be most appropriately characterized as ironical.

However, another kind of inconsistency would still seem possible. For the purposes of illustration, let us again take the utterance "the old man is but a tattered coat upon a stick." If in relation to this utterance we metaphorically interpreted *'a tattered coat upon a stick' it would seem possible within my analysis to have included in or implied by the ComprM for this utterance both the proposition that the entity is not a tattered coat and the proposition that the entity is a tattered coat. The latter proposition would be included in or implied by the ComprM because of the metaphorical interpretation of *'a tattered coat upon a stick.' The former we could infer from the fact that the entity in question is literally and truly called *'an old man.' The predicate *'an old man' literally implies that the entity is not a tattered coat.

Nevertheless, it is clear that we ignore implications from literally true textual propositions and non-textual assumptions when they are logically inconsistent with a proposition we assume true because of a metaphorical interpretation. When we metaphorically interpret *'a tattered coat upon a stick' in relation to the utterance I am discussing, we do not understand what is said as inconsistent because we can infer from the entity being an old man that he is not a tattered coat. Below I will attempt to show how my proposal reflects the fact that we ignore such implications from literally true textual propositions.

The key to the account involves the fact that within the framework I have been using the Relevant Background we use in interpreting a text is a logical kernel of propositions. In other words, the Relevant Background is a set from which we can infer, using only logical laws, all assumptions which can bear on the interpretation of the text.

Now I have proposed that we cannot metaphorically interpret negated predicates which literally are falsely applied to an entity. In terms of the way I have conceived the Relevant Background this has certain consequences.

Let us say that a predicate B (*'not an old man') is an implied negated predicate of a predicate A (*'a tattered coat upon a stick') under a literal interpretation. Let us also say that in a text the predicate A is metaphorically interpreted. Finally, let us assume that B (*'not an old man') is under a

literal interpretation not true of the metaphorical entity to which A is applied. According to my proposal concerning negated predicates, the predicate E, because it is a negated predicate, cannot be metaphorically interpreted. Hence, E (*'not an old man') cannot be an implied predicate of A (*'a tattered coat upon a stick') when A is metaphorically interpreted. This means that, under the metaphorical interpretation of A, there can be no meaning postulate for A which has B as the predicate for its consequent.

However, this is not all. If we simply drop such meaning postulates from the Relevant Background we could still deduce the banished postulates from other propositions in the Relevant Background. So, in order to eliminate literally implied negated predicates which are not literally true of the metaphorical entity, we must, under the metaphorical interpretation, drop from the Relevant Background meaning postulates for A from which the banished postulates can be deduced.

Let us say we use a Relevant Background assumption to infer from some textual proposition another proposition in direct contradiction with a metaphorically asserted proposition about the same entity. For the sake of illustration, let us say that the text in question includes the utterance I have been considering: "the old man is a tattered coat upon a stick." Let us call the entity in question *'a.' *'A tattered coat upon a stick' will be the metaphorically interpreted predicate, and the

predicate of the literally true textual proposition will be *'the old man.' The proposition with the metaphorically interpreted predicate will be *'a is a tattered coat upon a stick' and the literally true textual proposition will be *'a is an old man.'

Now, in order to use the Relevant Background to infer from *'a is an old man' the proposition *'a is not a tattered coat,' there must be a proposition(s) from which we can infer that any entity which is an old man is not a tattered coat.

However, any time we can infer this proposition, we can also infer its contrapositive: *'any entity which is a tattered coat is not an old man.' If this were the case, *'not an old man' would then be an implied negated predicate of *'a tattered coat upon a stick' when *'a tattered coat' is under a metaphorical interpretation.

It should now be recalled that the textual proposition *'a is an old man' is literally true. So, the implication *'a is not an old man' cannot be literally true. However, if *'not an old man' is an implied predicate of *'a tattered coat upon a stick' when the latter is metaphorically interpreted, it must be true of *'a' under the metaphorical interpretation of *'a tattered coat upon a stick.'

Within my analysis a literally implied predicate can be a metaphorically implied predicate only if it is either literally true of the metaphorical entity or it is itself metaphorically interpreted. Since *'not an old man' is not literally true or

the metaphorical entity *'a,' it would need to be metaphorically interpreted in order to be a metaphorically implied predicate of *'a tattered coat upon a stick' in this context.

However, my first proposal states that negative predicates cannot be metaphorically interpreted when literally they are falsely applied to an entity. So, *'not an old man' cannot be metaphorically interpreted and cannot be a metaphorically implied predicate of *'a tattered coat upon a stick' in this context.

Moreover, as indicated above, we must drop from the Relevant Background any propositions from which we could infer that *'not an old man' is an implied predicate of the metaphorically interpreted *'a tattered coat upon a stick.' As we have seen, we can infer such a proposition from its contrapositive: *'any entity which is an old man is not a tattered coat upon a stick.' So, we must drop from the Relevant Background any proposition(s) from which we could infer that *'any entity which is an old man is not a tattered coat upon a stick.' When we do this, we cannot use the literally true textual proposition *'a is an old man' to infer *'a is not a tattered coat upon a stick.'

Above I have proposed that negated predicates which are falsely applied literally cannot be metaphorically interpreted. I have tried to use my proposal to account for the fact that metaphors are not conventionally understood to imply inconsistently that an entity is not something we assume it to

inconsistently that an entity is not something we assume it to be. In addition, I have tried to show how my proposal can account for the fact that we do not use literally true propositions (*'x is an old man') to make inferences logically inconsistent with propositions which have metaphorically interpreted predicates (*'x is a tattered coat upon a stick').

3

I would like now to discuss certain cases which my proposal concerning negated predicates does not cover. In Chapter 5 (see section 2), I tried to show that it is possible to interpret metaphorically literally implied predicates. I tried to show, for example, that the predicate *'flower' can be metaphorically interpreted and implicitly applied to a metaphorical entity, when the implying textual predicate *'rose' is metaphorically interpreted and applied to the entity in question. I tried to show that this can occur even in a simple metaphor such as a woman being called a rose.

However, let us imagine that someone says "although Joan is no flower, she is certainly a rose." In the context of this utterance I do not think we would understand the speaker to be saying inconsistently that the woman in question is and is not a flower.

In cases such as this, there is an explicit statement in the text that an implication we might otherwise draw from the metaphor (*'the woman is a flower') is not to be taken as true. Under these circumstances, we do not draw the metaphorical implication.

Such cases do not seem to occur frequently in literary works. Indeed, I have not been able to find even a single literary example. Nevertheless, in the interests of giving a general account of "metaphorical" consistency, I would like to make a proposal to account for such cases and to discuss the proposal briefly.

In order to account theoretically for such cases, I would like to propose the following: a "positive" predicate is metaphorically interpretable only if it is not the predicate of a proposition which is logically inconsistent with a textual proposition we assume true. As noted earlier, I mean by "textual proposition," a proposition we can infer from a text without any assumptions such as are found in the non-logical Relevant Background, Hypothetical Premises, and Explanatory propositions.

I would like to try to show how this proposal can be used to account theoretically for the fact that we conventionally do not metaphorically interpret *'flower' in the utterance "although Joan is no flower, she is a rose."

In calling Joan a rose we can literally understand the utterance to be implying that Joan is a flower, since *'flower'

is a literally implied predicate of *'rose.' However, *'Joan is not a flower' can be considered a textual proposition for this utterance: it can be inferred from the utterance without the use of any non-textual assumptions such as are found in the Relevant Background, Hypothetical Premises and Explanatory propositions. According to my proposal, then, *'flower' cannot be metaphorically interpreted, since *'Joan is not a flower' is logically inconsistent with this textual proposition we presumably take to be true.

'Flower' is not literally true of Joan (a human being). Moreover, since *'flower' cannot be metaphorically interpreted according to my proposal, it cannot be true of the metaphorical entity (Joan) under a metaphorical interpretation. It would appear then that *'flower' cannot be true of Joan when its implying predicate *'rose' is metaphorically interpreted and hence true of her.

It would appear then that *'flower' cannot be a metaphorically implied predicate of *'rose.' If this is the case, when *'rose' is metaphorically interpreted, there is no Relevant Background meaning postulate(s) which states or implies that any entity which is a rose is a flower. So, we cannot infer from the Relevant Background and text that the entity which in the text is said not to be a flower, is a flower. This, I think, is consistent with the fact that when we interpret *'rose' metaphorically, we do not understand the utterance to be

inconsistently saying that Jean is and is not a flower.

Let us look at one more example. "The king, though not a feline, is a lion." Since '*'feline' is a literally implied predicate of '*'lion,' we can infer, under a literal interpretation of '*'lion,' that the king is a feline. However, '*'the king is not a feline' is presumably a true textual proposition. We can infer this proposition from the text without the use of a non-textual assumption such as is found in the Relevant Background, Hypothetical Premises and Explanatory propositions. In addition, we presumably take the proposition to be true.

'*The king is a feline' is logically inconsistent with this textual proposition. So, according to my proposal, '*'feline' cannot be metaphorically interpreted. In addition, '*'feline' is not literally true of the metaphorical entity (the king) to which its implying predicate '*'lion' is applied. It cannot be metaphorically true of the metaphorical entity, since, according to my proposal, it cannot be metaphorically interpreted.

So, it would appear that '*'feline' is not true of the metaphorical entity when '*'lion' is metaphorically interpreted and hence true of the metaphorical entity, the king. '*'Feline' then is not a metaphorically implied predicate of '*'lion.' If this is the case then, when '*'lion' is metaphorically interpreted, there is no Relevant Background meaning postulate(s) which states or implies that any entity which is a lion is a

feline. This means that we cannot infer from the Relevant Background and the text that the entity which is said in the text not to be a feline, is a feline. This, I think, is consistent with the fact that when we metaphorically interpret *'lion,' we do not understand the text to be saying inconsistently that the entity (the king) which is, not a feline, is a feline.

Still, we can give non-literal interpretations to ("positive") predicates of textual propositions when these propositions are logically inconsistent with true textual propositions. Let us take the utterance "although he is not going to school, he is going to school." Let us assume that the boy referred to in the utterance is assumed to be literally not going to school. Let us also assume that this boy studies very hard even when the school term is over. I think the reader will agree that we can give a conventional non-literal interpretation to *'going to school' in this instance. We can, for example, understand it to mean that the boy is behaving as if he were going to school--even though he is not.

I believe such non-literal interpretations, like the non-literal interpretations of textual negated predicates, are best considered theoretically to be non-metaphorical. Similar arguments, I think, are applicable.

I do not think that, when we make these non-literal interpretations, we understand a text to be inconsistent as a result. I do not think, for example, that when we give a

non-literal interpretation to *'going to school' in the utterance discussed above, we consider the utterance to be saying something inconsistent.

However, I know of no way of reflecting this consistency theoretically, if we assume--as I do for metaphor--that these non-literal interpretations allow us to understand a predicate to be truly applied when literally it is falsely applied. On the other hand, if we dropped the assumption that a predicate is truly applied under a metaphorical interpretation, then we fail to capture theoretically the fact that, when we interpret metaphorically, the metaphorical entity is grouped together with the entities in the literal extension of the predicate. For example, as indicated above, we fail to capture theoretically the fact that we can say "Jane is a rose and all roses are beautiful" and be saying that both Jane and "real" roses are beautiful. So here again it would seem appropriate theoretically to consider the non-literal interpretations in question to be non-metaphorical.

Moreover, here again the exclusion of the non-literal interpretations involves no major shift from what has been treated as metaphor in either classical or modern discussions. I have been unable to find even a single classical or modern treatment of metaphor which cites as an example of metaphor phenomena of the kind I am presently suggesting we should exclude.

The non-literal interpretations of predicates like *'going to school' in the utterance discussed above, often have, I believe, a characteristically mocking quality. As with the non-literal interpretations of textual negated predicates, these interpretations may perhaps best be treated theoretically as ironical.

By means of the proposal made in this section, we can account theoretically for the fact that when we metaphorically interpret *'rose' for the utterance "Although Joan is no flower, she is certainly a rose," we do not understand the speaker to be inconsistently saying that Joan is and is not a flower--even though if it were not stated that Joan is not a flower, we might understand under a metaphorical interpretation that Joan is being implicitly called a flower.

The proposition that the entity (Joan) is a flower is logically inconsistent with the textual proposition that Joan is not a flower. My proposal states that we can metaphorically interpret a "positive" predicate only if the proposition of which it is part is logically consistent with textual propositions we assume to be true. The proposal thereby prevents the Comprehensive Meaning of the utterance from including in this case the proposition *'Joan is a flower.'

In concluding this chapter, I would like to cast the two proposals I have made in terms of the following formulation. The reader should recall that I use the term "negated predicate" to refer only to a predicate of the form *'not A' which can be expressed by a word or phrase containing a single verbal particle of negation. In addition, it should be noted that the *'A' part of a negated predicate cannot itself be metaphorically interpreted in the text in question. The reader should also recall that I use the term "textual proposition" to refer to a proposition we can infer from a text without any assumptions such as are found in the Relevant Background, Hypothetical Premises, and Explanatory propositions.

(6.1) In interpreting a text, a predicate is metaphorically interpreted only if 1) it is not a negated predicate which literally is falsely applied to an entity, and 2) it is the predicate of a proposition which is logically consistent with textual propositions assumed to be true.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONNOTATION AND METAPHOR

In this chapter, I would like to discuss the role of connotation (or secondary meaning) in metaphor. By "connotation" I refer to the assumptions we make about properties or traits which are generally, rather than always, true of the entities in an extensional class of a predicate. For example, let us say that in order to interpret a text, we assume that bachelors are generally (but not always) carefree. In this case, we are making an assumption that can be considered related to the connotations or secondary meaning of *'bachelor' in that text (see Chapter 3, section 2).

Again, I would like to discuss some of the terminology I will use in this chapter before introducing my proposal. The terms I would like to introduce concern the generic propositions I discussed in Chapter 3 (see section 2). As noted there, generic propositions state that something is generally true of the entities in an extensional class. For example, we could assume for the entities in the extensional class of *'lion' the generic proposition *'lions generally roam the plains.'

It can be seen that the aspect of such generic propositions which contributes to the connotative or secondary meaning of a word or phrase is the predicate which "expresses" the property which is generally true of the entities in the extensional class of the word or phrase. For this reason, I use a simple term to refer to the predicates in question. I call a predicate G a "generic predicate" of a predicate F when G is a predicate which, in a generic proposition, is said to be generally true of the entities in the extensional class of F. So, for example, *'roam the plains' would be the generic predicate in the generic proposition *'lions generally roam the plains.'

Some predicates are generic predicates not only for another predicate but also for one or more predicates superordinate to that predicate. For example, the predicate *'fierce' may be considered a generic predicate not only for *'lion,' but also for *'predator,' a predicate superordinate to *'lion.'

Other predicates are generic predicates for a predicate but not for any predicate superordinate to that predicate. For example, *'exceptionally beautiful' may be considered a generic predicate of *'rose' but not of any predicate such as *'flower' which is superordinate to it. In an impressionistic manner, we can say that because these predicates are generic predicates of no superordinate extensional classes, they typify or distinguish the classes for which they are generic predicates.

This kind of generic predicate will play a particularly

important role in a condition I will propose in this chapter. For this reason, I would like to introduce a simple name by which to refer to them. A predicate G is a "distinguisher" of a predicate F when G is a generic predicate for F but not for any predicate superordinate to F. So, for example, *'beautiful' can be considered a distinguisher of *'rose' if it is assumed to be a generic predicate of *'rose' but not for any superordinate of *'rose' such as *'flower.'

I would now like to introduce the proposal I make in this chapter. I would like to propose that in order for a predicate A in a text to be metaphorically interpreted in a conventionally acceptable way, there must be at least one generic proposition G in the Hypothetical Premises or in the text which meets the following condition: 1) G is a generic proposition for A; 2) G is a member of a set of propositions from which we can infer at least one Comprim proposition in which the generic predicate for G is attributed to the metaphorical entity, and 3) "the generic predicate for G is a distinguisher for A.

For the purposes of illustration, I would like to use the following example. Let us say that we metaphorically interpret *'wolf' in the utterance "Mar is a wolf" (from Black 1962:39ff).

According to my proposal, if a metaphorical interpretation of *'wolf' is to be conventionally acceptable, we must have as an hypothesis (or have present in the text) at least one generic proposition concerning wolves. For instance, in interpreting

*'wolf' we might assume that wolves generally are cunningly vicious.

According to my proposal, we must be able to use the generic proposition to infer ~~compr~~ propositions concerning the metaphorical entity. So, for instance, we might understand that, in calling men (the metaphorical entities) wolves, the speaker is implying that men are cunningly vicious.

My proposal also states that the generic predicate of the generic proposition must be a distinguisher of the predicate A (that is, of the predicate which is metaphorically interpreted). In other words, at least one generic predicate for A must be a generic predicate for no superordinate of A. So, for example, we might consider *'cunningly vicious' to be characteristic or generally true of wolves, but not say, of predators (*'predator' is a superordinate of *'wolf'). This, I think, is plausible, since I believe it would be difficult to suggest that men are cunningly vicious by saying that man is a predator (although this metaphor has its own negative connotations).

The reader should note that in saying that there must be at least one distinguisher for a metaphorically interpreted predicate, I do not mean that the characteristics involved are always easy to articulate. The articulation of complex connotations often involves highly developed skills in literary criticism. Nevertheless, I allow such complex connotations to be considered distinguishers--even where we cannot easily articulate

the pertinent characteristics involved.

For example, let us take the utterance "the old man is a tattered coat upon a stick." We may understand there to be properties generally true of tattered coats upon sticks that we do not consider generally true of tattered clothes (in general) which are placed upon sticks.

In particular, I think one could argue that a tattered coat upon a stick generally has a particular appearance that is not generally shared by tattered clothes when placed upon a stick. Though it is difficult to articulate the nature of that appearance, the assumption that there is generally a distinctive appearance to tattered coats upon sticks (not shared by tattered clothes in general) could be considered to involve a distinguisher for *'tattered coat upon a stick.'

The reader should note that my use of the term "distinguisher" has nothing at all to do with the use which Katz makes of the term (see Katz 1972:82-88). Katz uses the term "distinguisher" in relation to features of the primary meaning of words. As can be seen from the above discussion, I use it in relation to the secondary meaning of words and phrases.

I would now like to present my arguments for the proposal. I will begin by suggesting that we do not find a metaphorical interpretation conventionally acceptable if only one or more metaphorically implied predicates is literally true of that

entity. For example, I think most, if not all, fluent speakers of English would find it pointless to call a cat "a four-legged table" simply because the cat has four legs. I think we would also find it pointless to call a human being "a building" simply because the human being, just like the building, is normally assumed to be a concrete entity. The metaphor must convey something other than literally true aspects of its primary meaning in order to be conventionally acceptable.

In order to account for this "something else," I would like to examine what I believe to be an important proposal by Beardsley. Beardsley proposes that metaphor "...is a significant attribution that is either indirectly self-contradictory or obviously false in its context, and in which the modifier connotes characteristics that can be attributed, truly or falsely, to the subject" (Beardsley 1958:142; see also my discussion of Beardsley in Chapter 1). Beardsley's proposal has the virtue of taking into account the fact that even in the most trivial of metaphors, something is expressed other than what is conveyed by the primary meaning. In addition, Beardsley's proposal clearly identifies this meaning as connotative in nature.

For example, let us consider the rather trivial utterance, "this man is a lion." If *'lion' is metaphorically interpreted, we can understand it to mean something more than the primary meaning of *'lion' conveys; that is, that the man is brave.

Beardsley's proposal distinguishes this meaning from the primary meaning and identifies it as connotative in nature.

However, there are problems with Beardsley's proposal. I discuss here only those which relate to his contention that connotative meaning is necessarily a part of metaphorical meaning.

In attempting to understand metaphorical interpretation as objective, Beardsley suggests that the interpreter of a metaphor must have a great deal of knowledge. He writes: "What a word connotes, then, are the characteristics that it does not designate but that belong, or are widely thought or said to belong, to many of the things it denotes" (Beardsley 1958:125). He also notes: "Secondary meanings are sometimes called 'pragmatic meaning' or 'psychological meaning.' But the connotations of a word are no more 'pragmatic'--i.e., related to, or tending to produce, action?--than its designation and no more 'psychological'--i.e., irrelevant to belief?" (Beardsley 1958:149).

According to Beardsley then, in order to make a metaphorical interpretation we must be able to attribute connotations of the modifier to the subject. So, when making a metaphorical interpretation, we must have a knowledge of properties which are believed to be generally or typically true of the entity(ies) denoted by the modifier.

What happens, however, when we cannot think of any such

attributes offhand? Beardsley writes: "...the connotations of words are never fully known, or knowable, beforehand, and very often we discover new connotations of the words when we see how they behave as modifiers in metaphorical attributions. The metaphor does not create the connotations, but it brings them to life" (Beardsley 1958:143). Put in a somewhat more mechanical way, we might say that, according to Beardsley, when we do not have a connotation of the desired kind, we review in our minds what we know and/or believe about the metaphorical subject, and come up with some connotation.

While this seems at first glance quite plausible, more careful examination proves it to be somewhat less convincing. In order to show the difficulties this conception of connotation encounters, I would like to examine the following Hart Crane poem, entitled "The Bathers":

Two ivory women by a milky sea;--
 The dawn, a shell's pale lining restlessly
 Shimmering over a black mountain-spear:--
 A dreamer might see these, and wake to hear,
 But there is no sound,--not even a bird-note;
 Only simple ripples flaunt, and stroke, and float,--
 Flat lily petals to the sea's white throat.

They say that Venus shot through foam to light,
 But they are wrong....Ere man was given sight
 She came in such still water, and so nursed
 In silence, beauty blessed and beauty cursed.

(Crane 1966)

We can understand this poem as saying a particular dawn is metaphorically *'a shell's pale lining.' Now, I, for one, am familiar with no connotative properties concerning the linings of shells. Moreover, I have spent very little time examining the insides of shells and so have no way of knowing whether or not any properties I may think of are connotative properties of the linings of shells.

Nevertheless, according to Beardsley, I must know of some connotative property in order to make a metaphorical interpretation of "a shell's pale lining." So, it would appear that I cannot interpret this phrase metaphorically, until such time as I read some more about the linings of shells or talk to someone who has knowledge of facts or commonly-held beliefs about this subject.

If just one instance were involved, then there would be no reason to dwell on this point. However, there are all kinds of things about which I have no knowledge. According to Beardsley, every time I encounter a situation such as the one above, I am

unable to make a metaphorical interpretation offhand. Rather, I must go searching for more information. Since dictionaries stress "necessary" properties rather than typical or connotative properties, it is likely that my searches will be none too brief. Moreover, as everyone knows, literary works are filled with metaphors. So, my reading of literature must be of necessity fraught with interruptions.

I think the reality is somewhat different than what Beardsley's proposal suggests. If I possess no knowledge or commonly-held beliefs which could be used to interpret a metaphor, then in general I use my imagination in order to arrive at assumptions which seem appropriate. Although I may later check to see if my assumptions are in fact appropriate, my lack of knowledge does not prevent me from making an initial interpretation. Beardsley's proposal, however, gives no account of the role imagination may play in interpreting metaphor.

The issue here is not simply personal ignorance. There are metaphors which make rather obscure references, but which we can interpret in conventionally acceptable ways despite our lack of knowledge. Let us look, for example, at the final stanza of W.B. Yeats' "The Circus Animals' Desertion."

Those masterful images because complete
Grew in pure mind, but out of what began?

A mound of refuse or the sweepings of a street,
 Old kettles, old bottles, and a broken can,
 Old iron, old bones, old rags, that raving slut
 Who keeps the till. Now that my ladder's gone,
 I must lie down where all the ladders start,
 In the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart.

(Yeats 1956c:336)

I would like to focus on the metaphorical use of "rag-and-bone-shop." No reader of this poem whom I have questioned has had any knowledge of rag-and-bone shops. In fact, the phrase is not even found in the complete Oxford English Dictionary.

Upon considerable investigation I was able to ascertain that rag-and-bone shops are most likely the rag-and-bottle shops which Mayhew (Mayhew 1968) discusses in The London Labour and the London Poor. Mayhew mentions that these shops are foul-smelling and they often contain piles of bones (Mayhew 1968:108; see also Dickens 1964:294).

Nevertheless, I, like most readers' with whom I am familiar, was able to interpret this metaphor with reasonable accuracy even without this information. We simply used our imaginations and made hypotheses about what a shop which sold rags and bones would be like: foul-smelling (as indicated in the poem), dirty, repulsive, etc.

The point I wish to stress here is not that these interpretations were quite close to, if not the same, as my present knowledgeable interpretation. If, as Beardsley indicates, connotations must be "objective" (that is, involving either facts or widely-held beliefs or myths), then no interpretation would have been possible. I and those I have questioned had possession of no knowledge or commonly-held beliefs (or even myths) about such shops. We knew nothing at all about them. Nevertheless, we were able to interpret the metaphor in a way which--at least from a linguistic point of view--was conventionally acceptable.

The second problem I would like to mention involves the number of connotations a modifier expresses. Beardsley writes: "In explicating the metaphor we have employed two principles--and the same may be said of whole poems. First, there is the Principle of Congruence...in assembling, or feeling out, the admissible connotations of words in a poem, we are guided by logical and physical possibilities. But second, there is the Principle of Plenitude. All the connotations that can be found to fit are to be attributed to the poem: it means all it can mean, so to speak" (Beardsley 1958:144).

Beardsley justifies these two principles as follows: "If the value of a poem depends in part on its coherence and complexity, then in the long run adopting the two principles will maximize poetic value" (Beardsley 1958:146). Beardsley then

presents his principles as prescriptions rather than descriptions.

Nevertheless, we may take the prescription not as a personal preference of Beardsley, but rather as a statement of what Beardsley thinks our norms are for both metaphorical and literary interpretation. This, I argued in the first chapter, appears to be Beardsley's intent. However, if this is the case, Beardsley's two principles encounter difficulties.

His proposal treats the use of connotation as essentially a fact about literary interpretation. It does not take into account the fact that connotative meaning is a part of language use in general. At no time does Beardsley show us why we should consider to be of paramount importance the literary considerations to which he appeals. Since he does not, we must consider that his very important account is not complete.

The difficulties noted above can, I believe, be avoided by modifying and reformulating Beardsley's proposal as follows:

(1) A predicate A can be metaphorically interpreted in a text only if in the text or Hypothetical Premises at least one generic proposition G meets the following conditions: i) G is a generic proposition for A, and ii) G is a member of some set of propositions which we can use to infer conclusions in which the generic predicate of G is attributed to the metaphorical

entity.

I will now try to show how (1) is a reformulation and modification of Beardsley's proposal. I will also try to show how my formulation avoids the problems Beardsley's proposal encounters.

I have replaced Beardsley's "subject" and "modifier" with the terms "entity" and "predicate," respectively. In so doing, I have kept the idea of something attributing something to something else. However, in speaking of entities and predicates, I have tried to avoid confusing what is asserted of an entity with the entity itself. "Entity," clearly designates entities, and "predicate" clearly designates what is applied to them. There is, I think, no confusion with these terms as there may be with the terms "subject" and "modifier" (cf. Reinhart 1976:384, fnnt. 3).

Let us now go on to the second change I have made in Beardsley's terminology. I have replaced Beardsley's "connotations" by the term "generic propositions." In the third chapter, I argued that, at least on a pre-theoretical level, the phenomenon designated by the term "connotation" is at least approximately the same as the phenomenon designated by the term "generic background proposition" (see Chapter 3, section 2). In using the term "generic proposition," I am still retaining the idea that something generally (as opposed to always) true of an

extensional class is an intrinsic part of a metaphor.

Nevertheless, as I have tried to show above, there are problems with assuming that knowledge or beliefs about typical or generic traits are necessarily involved in connotations. In replacing "connotation" with "generic proposition," I have tried to avoid making any assumption that the statements concerning the connotative traits are necessarily part of our knowledge.

It would seem, however, that in avoiding one difficulty I have created another. If the generic propositions are not always part of our background beliefs or knowledge, then there are occasions when we must obtain these propositions from somewhere else. But from where can we obtain them?

My answer to this question is related to my final change in Beardsley's formulation. I have replaced Beardsley's proposal that the connotation be attributed truly or falsely to the subject with the following conditions. I have proposed, first of all, that the generic proposition must be either a proposition of the text or a Hypothetical Premise. Secondly, I have proposed that this generic proposition must be a member of a set from which we can generate conclusions in which the generic predicate is attributed to the metaphorical entity.

In replacing Beardsley's proposal with these two conditions, I have tried to keep the idea that something typical must be attributed to the metaphorical entity. I have tried to do this by stipulating that the Hypothetical Premise must let us generate

conclusions about the metaphorical entity.

However, in talking of generic propositions as either members of texts or Hypothetical Premises, I have tried to replace the idea of attributing something we know to the metaphorical entity with the idea that we are attributing something we assume. This does not mean that I am saying we cannot use generic propositions from the General Background in interpreting a metaphor. It does mean that when we do not have an appropriate generic proposition in the background, we can use our imagination and make one up--or, as Black suggests, use one from the text itself (Black 1962:43).

The last condition I have proposed allows us to admit the possibility that we not only know of no appropriate generic proposition, but also that we know of no appropriate information concerning the metaphorical entity. I say that the generic proposition must be a member of a set of propositions from which we can generate conclusions concerning the metaphorical entity. This admits the possibility that we use our imagination to make up not only pertinent generic propositions about the extensional class or the metaphorically interpreted predicate, but also properties of the metaphorical entity which will allow us to apply some generic proposition to that entity--even when we have little or no knowledge or beliefs concerning it. This, for example, could be considered to be the case in the Hart Crane poem quoted above, where we have little knowledge of the

particular dawn to which he is referring. In proposing that we may need to use a generic proposition as a Hypothetical Premise, I am developing Bellert's idea that we need Hypothetical Premises in order to interpret metaphors (Bellert 1980/81:38-41 and discussion of Bellert in Chapter 1).

I would like to mention one other advantage of my reformulation. As noted above, Beardsley's proposal is essentially a literary account which does not supply a general framework for us to understand our use of connotation in non-literary as well as literary texts. In treating secondary meaning in terms of generic propositions and Hypothetical Premises, I attempt to provide such a framework, and, in addition, I attempt to link our use of connotation in metaphor to our use of connotation in non-metaphorical contexts (see Chapter 3, section 2).

(1), as it stands, however, is not satisfactory. (1) says that there must be some generic proposition for the extensional class of a metaphorically interpreted predicate which meets the conditions I have proposed. However, as I try to show below, not every generic proposition which meets the conditions proposed above permits a metaphorical interpretation. Rather, it is necessary for the generic predicate of the generic proposition to be what I defined in the first section as a distinguisher; that is, a generic predicate for the metaphorically interpreted predicate but not for any superordinate of this predicate. There

are a number of indicators that this is the case.

First of all, it does not appear possible to metaphorically attribute a generic predicate to a metaphorical entity when the generic predicate is not a distinguisher. For example, we assume that *'having four legs' is generally true of the members of the extensional class of *'pig' (adapted from Van Dijk 1975:191-192). I think the reader will agree that, for instance, there is no circumstance in which we can metaphorically interpret *'pig' in an utterance of 'that cat is a pig' and understand the metaphorical application of *'pig' to be expressing the idea that the cat has four legs.

Let us take one more example. I think we generally assume that *'having hair' is generally true of most entities in the extensional class of *'human.' I think that any fluent speaker of English will agree that it is well-nigh impossible for *'human' to be metaphorically applied to some entity and be understood to express the idea that the entity has hair. For instance, I do not think it is possible to interpret *'human' metaphorically in 'that ape is human' and understand it to mean that the ape in question has hair.

In each of the examples discussed above, the generic predicate in question is a generic predicate not only for the metaphorically interpreted predicate in question, but also for at least one literal superordinate of that predicate. *'Having four legs' functions in everyday texts not only as a generic

predicate for *'pig' but also for its literal superordinate *'animal.' *'Having hair' is a generic predicate not only for *'human' but also for its literal superordinate *'mammal.'

Let us turn now to another kind of evidence. Van Dijk notes that it is possible to have metaphors which are "equivalent"; that is, which are synonymous (Van Dijk 1975:196; see also discussion of Van Dijk in Chapter 1). For example, let us take the sentences 'the man is a horse' and 'the man is an ox.' It is possible to use either of these sentences to mean exactly the same thing metaphorically; that is, that some man is very strong. In other words, the predicates *'horse' and *'ox' can both be metaphorically interpreted in such a way that they are synonymous. We can see then that it is possible for predicates which do not have a superordinate-hyponym relationship under a literal interpretation to be synonymous under a metaphorical interpretation.

However, according to my proposal, it should be impossible for a predicate A and its superordinate to be equivalent under a metaphorical interpretation. According to my proposal, when a predicate A is metaphorically interpreted, we understand that some distinguisher of this predicate is attributed to the metaphorical entity. By definition, we cannot infer that the distinguisher for A can function as a distinguisher for a superordinate of A. A predicate which is a distinguisher for a predicate is, by definition, not a generic predicate for any

literal superordinate of that predicate.

We can see in the following passage from the King James version of "The Song of Scrgs" that we do not obtain synonymy when we replace a metaphorically interpreted predicate with a literal superordinate.

1 I am the rose of Sharon, and the lily of the valleys.

2 As the lily among thorns, so is my love among the daughters.

3 As my apple tree among the trees of the wood, so is my beloved among the sons. I sat down under his shadow with great delight, and his fruit was sweet to my taste.

4 He brought me to the banqueting house, and his banner over me was love.

5 Stay me with flagons, comfort me with apples: for I am sick of love.

("Scrg of Solomon" 1974:620, Chapter 2)

In the passage quoted above the predicates *'rose of Sharon' and *'lily of the valleys' are both metaphorically applied to the speaker. I would like to focus on one particular connotation of these metaphors. In both cases we can infer that the generic

predicate for these terms, *'exceptionally beautiful,' is attributed under the metaphorical interpretation to the speaker.

Now let us say we substitute the predicate *'flower' for either of its literal hyponyms. It is true that we generally consider beauty to be a generic property of the extensional class of *'flower.' However, if we assume that in the above context its hyponyms are metaphorically attributing exceptional beauty to the speaker, I do not think we could attribute the same degree of beauty to the speaker by substituting *'flower' for either of these terms. Indeed, I think the reader would find that there is something "missing," just as my proposal indicates.

What is true of predicates directly expressed by words and phrases in a text is just as true, I believe, of metaphorically implied predicates which are metaphorically interpreted. If, on some occasion, there is no appropriate generic proposition with a distinguisher for an implied predicate, then the implied predicate cannot on this occasion be metaphorically interpreted when its implying predicate is metaphorically interpreted.

This at least would appear to account for a certain aspect of the metaphorical interpretation of *'flower' in the passage from Milton's Paradise Lost (Milton 1935:285-286; Book 9, lines 424-433) quoted in the fourth chapter of this dissertation (see Chapter 4, section 2). In this passage, the predicate *'unsupported flower' is metaphorically applied to Eve. When we interpret this predicate metaphorically in this context, we may

not infer that Eve is metaphorically *'a plant.' We can account for this quite simply by realizing that we often do not assume that there is a generic proposition for *'plant' which has a distinguisher which we can apply to Eve.

In ending this section, I would like to restate formulation (1) in such a way that it incorporates my proposal concerning distinguishers.

(7.1) A predicate A can be metaphorically interpreted in a text only if there is a generic proposition G in the text or Hypothetical Premises which meets the following conditions: i) G is a generic proposition for A; ii) G is a member of a set of propositions from which we can infer conclusions in which the generic predicate for G is attributed to the metaphorical entity, and iii) the generic predicate for G is a distinguisher for A.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I present and briefly comment upon the conditions I have proposed in my analysis of metaphor. I then discuss my analysis in relation to what various critics have said concerning metaphor and literature.

In this section I present and then briefly comment upon the proposals I have made in my analysis. In reviewing these proposals, the reader should note that they are intended to apply only to cases which meet the following conditions (see Chapter 1, section 2):

1) The meaning or sense of a word or phrase in a text (or more precisely, the predicate expressed by the word or phrase) is attributed to or predicated of the entity to which it is applied;

- 2) the predication is taken as literally false;
- 3) what is expressed non-literally is taken as true;
- 4) what is expressed cannot be simply classified as an instance of verbal irony.

In relation to the domain delimited above, I have made the proposals which are given below. It should be noted that the proposals concern the predicate which a word or phrase in a text can be said to express, not the words or phrases themselves (see Chapter 1, section 3). A glossary of terms follows the proposals.

4.1 If in a text a predicate is metaphorically interpreted, then its metaphorical extension will include: i) the entities in the literal extension of the predicate and ii) the metaphorical entity or entities to which the predicate is applied.

4.2 Assume that in a text a predicate A is metaphorically interpreted, a predicate B in that text is a literal superordinate of A, and the literal extension of B does not include the metaphorical entity to which A is applied. Then (1) B can shift extension

so as to remain superordinate to the metaphorically interpreted A, and (2) the shift can occur as a consequence of the metaphorical interpretation of A.

5.1 If in a text a predicate A is metaphorically interpreted, then B will be a metaphorically implied predicate of A, if B meets the following conditions: (1) B is a literally implied predicate of A, and (2) B is literally true of the metaphorical entity to which A is applied.

5.2 Assume that in a text a predicate B is a literally implied predicate of a predicate A and not literally true of the metaphorical entity to which A is applied. Then, under a metaphorical interpretation of A, B can be a metaphorically implied predicate of A if B is itself metaphorically interpreted.

6.1 In interpreting a text, a predicate is metaphorically interpreted only if 1) it is not a negated predicate which literally is falsely applied to an entity, and 2) it is the predicate of a proposition which is logically consistent with textual propositions assumed to be true.

7.1 A predicate A can be metaphorically interpreted in a text only if there is a generic proposition G in the text or Hypothetical Premises which meets the following conditions: i) G is a generic proposition for A; ii) G is a member of a set of propositions from which we can infer conclusions in which the generic predicate for G is attributed to the metaphorical entity, and iii) the generic predicate for G is a distinguisher for A.

Glossary

Distinguisher - A predicate F is a distinguisher of a predicate G if F is a generic predicate for G but not for any predicate superordinate to G.

Entity - Anything about which we can talk.

Generic predicate - In a generic proposition the predicate which expresses the property (or class) which the members of an extensional class are said to generally (but not always) possess.

Generic proposition - A proposition which states that

something is generally (rather than always) true of the entities in the extensional class of a predicate.

Literal extension - The set of entities to which a predicate in a text is assumed to be truly applicable under a literal interpretation.

Literally implied predicate - A predicate G is a literally implied predicate of a predicate F in a text when, under a literal interpretation, there is a Relevant Background Meaning Postulate(s) which states or implies that any F is a G.

Literal superordinate - A predicate G is a literal superordinate of a predicate F if under a literal interpretation the extension of G includes the extension of F.

Metaphorical entity - An entity which is not in the literal extension of a predicate and to which the predicate is applied when metaphorically interpreted.

Metaphorical extension - The set of entities to which a predicate in a text is assumed to be truly applicable under a metaphorical interpretation.

Metaphorically implied predicate - A predicate G is a metaphorically implied predicate of a predicate F when under a metaphorical interpretation of F in a text there is a Relevant Background meaning postulate(s) which states or implies that any F is a G.

Negated predicate - In relation to a text a predicate which meets the following conditions: (1) it is of the form *'not A'; (2) when it is applied to an entity it indicates that the entity is not a member of the extensional class of a predicate (the extensional class of the predicate A), and (3) A is not metaphorically interpreted in relation to the text.

Superordinate - Under an interpretation a predicate G is a superordinate of a predicate F if the extension of G includes the extension of F.

I would now like to offer some brief comments upon the proposals I have made. Condition 4.1 implies that we can consider a metaphorically interpreted predicate to be truly applied to a metaphorical entity. So, for example, let us say in a text we find the utterance "women are but the shadows of men" (adapted from Jonson

1956). If we interpret *'shadows of men' metaphorically, then according to my analysis, we can say theoretically that this predicate is taken as truly applied to women. By means of this condition my analysis indicates that, when we understand an entity to be characterized metaphorically, we consider the entity to be something we do not consider it to be literally (cf. Black 1979a:31-32 and Ricoeur 1977:247-248).

Conditions 5.1 and 5.2 (and 4.2) indicate that a metaphorically interpreted predicate can have implied predicates which are interpreted literally or are themselves metaphorically interpreted. So, according to my analysis, when we understand an entity to be characterized metaphorically as something, we can understand the characterization to involve not only aspects of the predicate's primary meaning which can apply literally to the entity, but also aspects of the predicate's primary meaning which can apply metaphorically to the entity. So, for example, if by means of a metaphor we characterize a woman as a rose, this characterization can involve not only aspects of the primary meaning of *'rose' which apply literally (for instance, animacy, concreteness), but also aspects which only apply metaphorically (for instance, being a

.flower).

By means of my condition (6.1) concerning negated predicates and literal inconsistency, I attempt to account for the fact that we do not consider metaphorical interpretation to be inconsistent. Through this condition I attempt to identify the implications we suppress because they would lead to a contradictory characterization. For example, by means of this condition I try to account for the fact that if in a text some woman is characterized as a rose, we do not understand the characterization to imply inconsistently that the woman is not a woman—even though if we understand some entity to be a rose literally, we take it to mean that the entity is not a woman.

By means of my proposal concerning connotation (7.1), I try to account for the suggestive element of metaphor in a more precise manner than in previous discussions. I contend that we can, if necessary, simply use our imagination and assume that certain properties are suggested. At least one suggested property, however, must distinguish the metaphorically used term from other more general terms. Otherwise, a more general term could have been used and the metaphor would seem pointless. So, for example, if we assume

wolves, but not predators (in general), are generally cunningly vicious, we can understand "man is a wolf" to suggest that man is a cunningly vicious animal. However, if we assumed that predators (in general) are generally cunningly vicious, then it would seem pointless to say that man is a wolf rather than simply a predator.

2

My analysis of metaphor allows us to account for certain occasions when a metaphorical interpretation of a word or phrase does not result in a meaning which is literally paraphrasable, as well as for occasions when it is possible to make such paraphrases.

It is possible for a predicate under a metaphorical interpretation to have as implied predicates only predicates which are literally true of the metaphorical entity to which it is applied. This can be considered the case, for example, in an utterance of 'that woman is a flower,' when this sentence is applied to a pretty woman. We can metaphorically interpret 'flower' here in such a way that whatever parts of its literal primary meaning are applied to the woman are literally true of her. For

instance, *'animate,' *'concrete entity,' and *'opaque' are all implied predicates of *'flower' which can be considered applied to the woman when *'flower' is metaphorically interpreted. All of these are clearly literally true of the metaphorical entity. It is, in fact, difficult to think of any "literally" implied predicates of *'flower' which could, in such a metaphor, be applicable to a woman because they are metaphorically interpreted.

In such cases, it is possible to give a literal paraphrase of the meaning of the metaphorically interpreted predicate. Theoretically, we can say that we use some "literal" superordinates to express the primary meaning of the metaphorically interpreted predicate. Since each implied predicate of the metaphorically interpreted predicate is literally true, each will have as its implied predicates, all of its "literally" implied predicates. Each is therefore equivalent to some literally interpreted predicate. So, there is some set of literally interpreted predicates which will imply exactly what the metaphorically interpreted predicate implies.

However, there are cases where the primary metaphorical meaning itself implies many "secondary" metaphors. In such cases, not only does the

metaphorically interpreted textual predicate have a set of implied predicates which differs from the set it has under a literal interpretation, but so do almost all of the predicates which it implies. What this means is that a whole set of semantic relations is different from what it is under a literal interpretation, just as a set of semantic relations in one language can be different from a set of semantic relations in another radically different language--even though the predicates in the network are applied to the same class of phenomena in both cases (see Quine 1960:26-79). The literal explication of a metaphor becomes a problem, in effect, of translation from one language to another. Just as with translation from one language to another, it is difficult, if not impossible to make a completely accurate paraphrase of a complex metaphor.

We can see the difficulty if we look, for example, at Macbeth's famous soliloquy:

To-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow,
 Creeps in this petty pace from day to day,
 To the last syllable of recorded time;
 And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
 The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief

candle!

Life's but a walking shadow; a poor player,
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more: it is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.

(Shakespeare 1975a:1068)

I would like to focus on the way the metaphor *'poor player' is applied to life. I think the reader will agree that it is possible to interpret *'poor player' in such a way that its "literally" implied predicate *'entity which does not perform as well as it should' is also metaphorically applied to life.

Now what happens if we try to explicate this "secondary" metaphor by means of a literal paraphrase? We could perhaps explain this metaphor by saying that what is meant is that life *'does not properly accomplish what it is supposed to do.' *'Entity which does not properly accomplish what it is supposed to do' is clearly another "literally" implied predicate of *'poor player' which can be considered metaphorically interpreted and applied to life because of the metaphorical interpretation of *'poor player.' The attempt to paraphrase the metaphorical implication leads to another metaphorical implication.

The above is not offered as a complete paraphrase of the

metaphorical interpretation of *'poor player.' All I mean to show is the difficulty of trying to provide a literal paraphrase of it. In trying to explain one metaphor I end up using another which, in view of my analysis, we can say is implied by the first. The linguistic means of making an accurate literal paraphrase seem as difficult to find as they are when translating complex writing from one language to another.

The reader should note that I am not trying to suggest anything new in saying that metaphorical language is in some way like a foreign language. What I am contending here is that my analysis can account for this perception in reasonably precise semantic terms. My proposal that there can be metaphorically interpreted implied predicates of a metaphorically interpreted predicate allows us, as I have tried to show above, to understand the distinctive nature of certain complex metaphors in theoretical terms.

Although my analysis can account for at least some occasions when literal paraphrases seem impossible, it does not in any way indicate that either literally paraphrasable or non-paraphrasable metaphorical meaning is, as some critics contend, essentially non-rational and hence "literary" in nature. John Crowe Ransom, for example, writes in "Poetry: A Note in Criticism":

The poetic impulse is not free, yet it holds out

stubbornly against science for the enjoyment of its images. It means to reconstitute the world of perceptions. Finally there is suggested some such formula as the following:

Science gratifies a rational or practical impulse and exhibits the minimum of perception. Art gratifies a perceptual impulse and exhibits the minimum of reason.

(Ransom 1968:130)

Figurative language is among the devices for gratifying this "perceptual impulse." Metaphor, according to Ransom, figures prominently among the varieties of this "device."

...I mention but one other kind, the device which comprises the figures of speech. A proper scientific discourse has no intention of employing figurative language for its distinctive sort of utterance. Figures of speech twist accident away from the straight course, as if to intimate astonishing lapses of rationality beneath the smooth surface of discourse, inviting perceptual attention, and weakening the tyranny of science over the senses. But I skip the

several easier and earlier figures, which are timid,
and stop on the climactic figure, which is metaphor;...

(Ransom 1968:132-133)

My analysis gives no indication that metaphor is non-rational and hence "literary" in nature. To the contrary, I have tried to show that many aspects of metaphorical interpretation can be understood to be quite logical and rational. Moreover, I have tried to show that these aspects are visible in both literary works and in everyday types of situations.

Nevertheless, I do think that my analysis gives a fuller account than previous discussions of aspects of metaphor which various scholars consider important in relation to literary works. I have noted above that my proposal concerning metaphorically interpreted implied predicates (see 5.2) allows us to see how some metaphors can effect a restructuring of a semantic network--in effect creating a "new" language. Through this new language a metaphorical entity can be "redescribed."

Winifred Nowotny argues that one reason metaphor is important in literature is that it allows a poet to talk of things in terms to which he would otherwise not have access.

One reason why metaphor is common in poetry is that metaphor vastly extends the language at the poet's disposal. Since metaphor uses terms in a transferred sense, this means that, subject to some not very serious limitations, a poet who wants to write about object X but finds its terminology defective or resistant to manipulation, can simply move over into the terminology of Y. By using Y-terminology to describe X, he opens to himself the linguistic resources available in connection with Y. The merit of a particular metaphor from the poet's point of view may be not simply that there are 'links' between love and a journey in a boat, but also that there is a much larger range of specialized terminology connected with boats and the sea than there is with love; once he chooses this as his analogy, he makes available to himself the whole terminology of seafaring--and, if he likes, of fishing and swimming and marine ecology too--as in Dylan Thomas's Ballad of the long-legged Fair. The importance of this bare linguistic fact is inexhaustible. To look at metaphor as a linguistic phenomenon is to begin to suspect that the basic explanation of the prevalence of metaphor in poetry

lies in the fact that metaphor, by extending the range of terminology at the poet's disposal, offers him a magnificent array of solutions to the major problems of diction.

(Nowottny 1965:67-68)

My proposal concerning metaphorically interpreted implied predicates gives, I believe, a more precise account than does Nowottny of at least one way in which metaphor can create new terminology.

In my analysis I have tried to understand in precise terms the role of connotation in metaphor. I have tried to understand this role in terms of propositions of a certain kind (generic propositions). These, I contend, when not found in the text itself, enter into interpretation (both metaphorical and literal) as Hypothetical Premises. As I tried to indicate in Chapter 1, Beardsley is one scholar who believes that such connotations, both with and without the use of metaphor, characterize literary works.

Discourses may be arranged, roughly, in an order with respect to their reliance upon secondary meaning, that is, the proportion of meaning presented implicitly, by

suggestion and connotation. Toward one end we put discourse that is highly charged with meaning, that condenses, so to speak, a great deal of meaning into a small space. Of course this spectrum is fairly continuous, but we can choose some standard discourse to mark off certain points along it, if we want to take the trouble. Moreover, we can draw a line, even if a somewhat vague one, between discourse that has a good deal of secondary meaning and discourse that has not. We may now try out a definition: a literary work is a discourse in which an important part of the meaning is implicit. This is a Semiotic Definition of "literature," since it defines "literature" in terms of meaning.

(Pearsonsley 1958:126)

Before concluding, I would like to mention one other way in which my analysis may help to understand properties of metaphor which scholars consider to play an important role in literature. Scholars have noted that metaphor can be viewed as an identity (A is B). At least one major critic, Northrop Frye, has argued that such metaphorical identity is a distinctive aspect of literature:

In the anagogic aspect of meaning, the radical form of metaphor, "A is B," comes into its own. Here we are dealing with poetry in its totality, in which the formula "A is B" may be hypothetically applied to anything, for there is no metaphor, not even "black is white," which a reader has any right to quarrel with in advance. The literary universe, therefore, is a universe in which everything is potentially identical with everything else. This does not mean that any two things in it are separate and very similar, like peas in a pod, or in the slangy and erroneous sense of the word in which we speak of identical twins. If twins were really identical they would be the same person...Identity is the opposite of similarity or likeness, and total identity is not uniformity, still less monotony, but a unity of various things.

(Frye 1965:124-125)

According to my analysis, when a predicate is metaphorically interpreted, the entity characterized metaphorically (the metaphorical entity) is put in the same class as the entities to which the predicate literally applies; that is, the metaphorical extension of the predicate. Insofar as this grouping together can be said to create an identity between the metaphorical entity

and the entities in the literal extension (between "real" roses and the woman metaphorically called a rose), my analysis may be said to give a more formal account than does Frye of the metaphorical identity of which he speaks.

At the beginning of this dissertation, I stated that this analysis would be carried out within the tradition of what is sometimes called "structural poetics." Structural poetics attempts to analyze the language of literature in rational and logical terms. I believe my analysis indicates that it is feasible to understand metaphor within such a rational and logical theoretical framework.

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