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THE "BODY OF CHRIST" CONCEPT IN ANCIENT AND MODERN

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THE "BODY OF CHRIST" CONCEPT IN THE LIGHT OF

HEBREW PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN PSYCHOLOGICAL

AND PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY

by

The Reverend John Leslie Rossner, M.A., B.D.

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THESIS ABSTRACT

Author: The Reverend John Leslie Rossner, M.A., B.D.

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Summary:

Recent Biblical scholarship provides us with evidence for the existence in the Old Testament of such universal and primitive solidarity concepts as (1) "psychic extension of personality", (2)"corporate personality", (3)"realistic representation", and (4)"cultic anamnesis". These concepts are found in the New Testament as the basis of the "Body of Christ" concept.

Modern insights useful to an understanding of the "Body of Christ" concept, in the light of such ancient concepts, may be derived from (1) process-thought, in (a) the concept of "objective immortality" of Whitehead, (b) the concept of objective memorial of Bergson, (c) the theory of personality development of Allport, and (d) the creation theology of Chardin, and from (2) phenomenology, in (a) the theory of objective intentionality of Husserl, (b) the theories of being and language of Heidegger, (c) the theory of creative intentionality of Sartre, and (d) the theory of the world as creative interior-relation of Merleau-Ponty.

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INTRODUCTION

There is evidence in the pre-philosophical Weltanschauung
of the ancient world for the prevalence of several solidarity concepts
by which primitive peoples tended to view the normative modes of social
relationship available within the human community. G. van der Leeuw
has written extensively of the presence of these concepts in the universal
experience of primitive religion. [1] Several Biblical scholars have viewed
such primitive solidarity concepts as the basis in Semitic thought for the
Old Testament understanding of the Israelite Covenant. H. Wheeler
Robinson, Johannes Pedersen, Aubrey R. Johnson, Russell Shedd, Max
Thurian, and others, have described the existence of the primitive
solidarity concepts in the Old Testament under such headings as:

(1) "Psychic Extension of Personality", (2) "Corporate Personality",

(3) "Realistic Representation", and (4) "Cultic Anamnesis". [2] Some

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[1] G. van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence & Manifestation, trans. J.E.
Turner (New York, 1963) Vols. I & II. (see p. 9 , note 1 this
essay)

[2] Aubrey R. Johnson, The One and the Many in the Israelite Concept of
God (Cardiff, 1942) see esp. pp 8, 17-26
The Vitality of the Individual in the Thought of Ancient Israel (Cardiff,
1949) see esp. p. 39 ff.
J. Pedersen, Israel: Its Life and Culture, trans. by A. Møller,
(London, 1926) Vols. I & II. pp 162-170. Esp. pp. 46-63.
H. Wheeler Robinson, "The Hebrew Conception of Corporate Personality"
in Werden und Wesen, Beihefte. Zur Zeitschrift fur die Alttest-
amentliche Wissenschaft 66, Berlin, 1936)
"Hebrew Psychology", in The People and the Book, ed. by A.S. Peake
(Oxford 1925) pp 353-382.
Russell Shedd, Man in Community, A study of St. Paul's application of
Old Testament and early Jewish Conceptions of Human Solidarity
(London, 1958) pp. 1-89 passim.
Max Thurian, The Eucharistic Memorial; Part I, The Old Testament
(London 1960) see esp. pp. 18-19.

writers have attempted to trace the influence of these concepts in the

formation of the images employed to describe the Church and the

Sacraments in the New Testament. J.A.T. Robinson, Russell Shedd,

Max Thurian, and others, have contributed in this way to our under-

standing of the Church as the "Soma Christou", and of Baptism and

the Eucharist as instruments of the relationship of the One to the many

in the New Covenant Community.[1]

But while the establishment of such primitive solidarity

concepts as: (1) universally present in the ancient world, and (2)

continuous between the Old and the New Testament, does indeed help us

to understand the thought forms in which the early Christian doctrines

of the Church were cast, it does nothing by itself to make either the

primitive concepts or the later doctrines based upon them any more

acceptable in their original form to the modern mind. The philosophical

revolution which occurred in the 5th Century B.C. in Greece, and the

scientific revolution which began in the West at the Renaissance, have

removed us from immediate contact with the primarily pictographic

and dramatic thought-world of the Heroic Age and of the Bible. Today

when Biblical scholars and students of comparative religion confront

us with evidence that early Christian doctrines of the Church were

originally framed under the influence of primitive solidarity concepts,

we are immediately faced with the positive challenge of demythologization.

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[1] J.A.T. Robinson, The Body, (London, 1952) see esp. pp 58-72.
   Russell Shedd, op. cit. pp. 93-199.
   Max Thurian, The Eucharistic Memorial, Part II, The New Testament
   (London) 1961) see esp. pp 5-33.

Some would feel that the ancient solidarity concepts are completely irrelevant to any modern understanding of the Church and Sacraments. But the difficulty with this position is that so much of the classical and normative language which has been used to describe the Church and Sacraments in Scripture, theological tradition, and worship, is intimately bound up with these ancient concepts, that little, if anything, remains of the "Body of Christ" concept when they are discarded as the mere "wrappings" of the Kerygma. The Christian Kerygma involves a declaration that many are saved in and through a corporate relationship with one Man. This would at least pre-suppose the possibility of the universal operation of some kind of corporate-identity principle akin to that enshrined in the ancient solidarity concepts. Therefore, a more constructive alternative to the abandonment of the primitive solidarity concepts in contemporary explanations of the Church and Sacraments will be found in the attempt to restate them in terms of 20th Century thought. When this approach is taken, the primitive solidarity concepts of the Old Testament which are cited above may be viewed as ancient reflections of timeless truths, or indications of the appreciation in an ancient Hebrew psychology of specific facts generally operative, but not always explicitly recognized, in human experience. As such they may be understood as essential pre-conditions of the Christian Kerygma, which were gathered to it during the process of an historical Revelation.

The possibility of such an hypothesis depends upon the presence, beneath differing modes of expression, of real parallels between ancient and modern insights into the question of human solidarity. It is precisely an indication of such parallels which may be seen as the emerging contribution of recent developments in process philosophy and phenomenology. From the process thought of philosophers from Alfred North Whitehead and Henri Bergson to the psychologist Gordon Allport and the theologian Pierre Tielhard de Chardin and from the theories of phenomenologists from Edmund Husserl to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, I believe there are to be found contributions to a rediscovery of the primitive thought-world and some of its insights into the human relational principles which lie at the root of the Biblical understanding of the Church and Sacraments.

There is already a history of the influence of phenomenology on recent psychological theory and of process philosophy on Christian theology. The influence of Heidegger and Sartre on the school of existential psychoanalysis from Binswanger onwards, and Heidegger's influence upon contemporary New Testament studies in works of Rudolf Butlmann and his disciples, especially Ernst Fuchs and Gerhard Ebeling, is well known to those familiar with the recent history

of these fields.[1] The influence of process-thought on theism in the

writings of such contemporary American scholars, as Henry Wieman,

Bernard Loomer, Charles Hartshorne, John B. Cobb, and

others, is also an increasingly appreciated fact.[2] But here I have

chosen to single out a few of the thoughts of several leading process

philosophers and phenomenologists and this time to link them

specifically to a review of the primitive solidarity concepts; I feel

that their works may in fact be employed to construct a bridge across

the post-Socratic and post-scientific centuries from the solidarity

insights of the Bible to modern man. They are representative of a

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[1] For illustration of the former, see the symposium Psychoanalysis and Existential Philosophy, ed. Hendrick M. Ruitenbeck (New York, 1964), "Daseinsanalytic and Psychotherapy", M. Boss, pp. 81-89 For illustration of the latter, see New Frontiers in Theology, Vol. I, "The Later Heidegger and Theology" and Vol. II, "The New Hermeneutic", ed. by James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. (New York, 1963- Vol. I and 1964- Vol. II), especially the focal essays in Vol. II by Ebeling, "Word of God and Hermeneutic", pp. 78-110, and by Fuchs, "The New Testament and the Hermeneutical Problem", pp. 111-146, and also Fuchs' "Response to the American Discussion", pp. 232-243.

[2] For illustration of the influence of Whitehead on theism in contemporary American philosophy and theology, see in particular the following works: Charles Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism (New York, 1941), The Divine Relativity (New Haven, 1948), Reality as Social Process (New York, 1953), Henry Nelson Wieman, "The Source of Human Good" (Glencoe, Illinois, 1964) Man's Ultimate Commitment (Glencoe, Ill., 1958), Bernard L. Loomer, "Christian Faith and Process Philosophy" in Journal of Religion (July, 1949) pp. 181-202., and John B. Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology (New York, 1965).

wider appreciation in the contemporary spiritual climate of the urgent

necessity for understanding the nature of the relationships that pertain

between the individual and the human community.[1] Each of these

writers envisions a world of interior relationships similar to that

found in the primitive world view of the Old Testament, in which,

either positively or negatively, other persons, places and things

participate in and somehow affect the creative formation of human

personality.

     After a synopsis of the primitive solidarity concepts as

they have been found in the Old Testament by recent Biblical

scholarship, I shall accept as a starting point conclusions of those

scholars who find in them the key to the New Testament presentation

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[1]As this project neared completion I discovered that a brief suggestion of the correlation between the Biblical view of reality as process and relation as seen by Johannes Pedersen, and contemporary process thought is made by E.R. Baltazar in the article "Teilhard de Chardin: A Philosophy of Procession", in New Theology, No. 2, (N.Y.,1965) ed.by Martin E. Marty and Dean G. Peerman., p. 142. Baltazar also touches, perhaps unintentionally, the issue of the correlation between process thought and phenomenology when he states that: "The major problem ... is how to approach man as subject without being subjectivistic." p. 148. This is, as we shall see, an accomplishment of phenomenology as well as of process philosophy, and is essential to an understanding of the primitive solidarity concepts and of the "Body of Christ" concept. (See pp. 82-85 this essay).

of the Church and the Sacraments. In the light of this understanding

I shall then proceed to select several relevant developments in

process philosophy and phenomenology and briefly to suggest ways

in which they may contribute to a contemporary restatement of the

ancient Hebrew psychology which underlies the "Body of Christ"

concept.

CHAPTER I

ANCIENT HEBREW PSYCHOLOGY
AND THE "BODY OF CHRIST"
CONCEPT

Section I Primitive Conceptions of the Natural Modes of Operation

of Human Solidarity found in the Old Testament by

Contemporary Biblical Scholarship

In the primitive psychology which seems to have

prevailed in the Ancient Near East from the 3rd and 2nd Millennia,

B.C., there is the curious but important assumption that every in-

dividual human personality or, self, is capable of effecting a kind

of intentional or psychic extension of its being in the other persons,

places, and things which are around it or associated with it in the

circumstances and purposes of its life. Egyptian, Babylonian, early

Hellenic, and Hebrew scriptures afford many examples of such a

belief in the extension of a man's personality, most notably in his

messengers or representatives, the members of his family, house-

hold or kin-group, especially his sons, through his name, his words,

his spirit, in his material possessions and in places where he has

dwelt.[1] Involved in this assumption is the idea that the individual human personality is not limited to what we today should call the self, but rather that it is diffused or shared by means of such extensions throughout a group. The group was then conceived, together with the individual, as a larger self.[2] This larger self was seen as embodying the man plus all of his personal extensions, the other persons, places, and things with which he shared his life and which were consequently thought to be parts of him. A corollary of this assumption is seen in the apparent conviction of the Biblical writers that any one individual could, conversely, sum up or embody the whole group of which he was a part, so that he could represent that whole group and the shared personality of its ancestral member either within the group or to those

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[1] This concept is referred to as "psychic extension of personality"
    For its Biblical documentation see pp. 12-21 of this essay)
    For its non-Biblical documentation, consult G. van der Leeuw,
    op. cit., on the general subject of "External Soul" in Babylonian,
    Egyptian, Jewish, Graeco-Roman, and Germanic concepts of
    psychic extension beyond the body, Vol. I, pp. 141-2, 289-298
    and on the subjects of "Angels", pp.141-146, "the Name",
    147-158.
    For examples of extension in material objects and places,
    see "Things and Power", pp.37-42, and "Sacred Stones and
    Trees" pp.52-58, and "Sacred Space", Vol. II pp.393-402.
    See also "The Sacred Word", Vol. II, pp.403-407 and the "Word
    of Consecration," Vol. II, pp.408 - 412.

[2] This concept is "corporate personality", for its Biblical documentation
    see pp. 22-26 of this essay.
    For its non-Biblical documentation see van der Leeuw, ibid,
    Vol.I, "The Sacred Community" p. 242-273, and "Souls in the
    Plural" pp.282-285.

outside of it. [1]

Basic to all three of these assumptions, which have respectively been called by Old Testament scholars "extension of personality","corporate personality", and "realistic representation", is a primitive thought mode which conceived of things "holistically" rather than individualistically. The individual derived his significance from the group, which was itself the basic unit for consideration. The group, not the individual, was viewed first; the individual was considered a real or whole entity only as he participated in a larger totality or sphere of existence. Because the individual never existed in the full sense of the word apart from the group, the whole could be thought of as somehow "extended" or "present" in him, and he was capable of "embodying" or "summing-up" the whole group in himself.

A fourth primitive assumption is the concept of "cultic anamnesis". [2] In the action of the cultic memorialization of an event,

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[1] This concept is "realistic representation". For its Biblical documentation see pp. 27-30 this essay. For its non-Biblical documentation see van der Leeuw, ibid, Vol. I, on the "representation" of the "King", pp.214-215, of "Medicine Man and Priest" pp.216-221 of the "Speaker", pp.222-226, of the "Preacher", pp.228-229.

[2] For the Biblical documentation of "cultic anamnesis" see Thurian, op. cit., Part I. For its non-Biblical documentation see Dom Odo Casel, The Mystery of Christian Worship, (London, 1962), Part I, Chapter 3, "The Ancient World and Christian Mysteries", pp. 50-62, esp. pp.53-54 and Part II, Chapter I, "The Meaning of Mystery", pp.97-165, passim. See also "Myth and Reality", Mircea Eliade, trans. by W.R. Trask (New York, 1963), esp. Chapter V, "Time Can be Overcome", pp. 75-91 and Chapter VII, "Mythologies of Memory and Forgetting", pp. 114-138.

involving its dramatic representation by persons and material objects,

the participant in the ceremony conceived of himself as actually

participating in the original event. There was thus the possibility

of a trans spacio-temporal participation in an important but already

past occurrence by the many members of a cultic group whose intention

it was to identify with the original agent(s) of the action so memorialized.

But before we can see the relevance of the primitive solidarity concepts

to the Christian doctrine of the Church and the Sacraments we must show

in greater detail precisely what these concepts were, and how they might

have developed into the New Testament presentation of the Church and

Sacraments. It is only then that we will be able to explore further

those points of contact with modern thought which will elucidate the

doctrine for us in meaningful terms. [1]

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[1] It should be noted that James Barr, in The Semantics of Biblical Language
(London, 1961), and Biblical Words for Time (London, 1964) argues
against the existence of much of the semantic evidence for the uniqueness
of Hebrew versus Greek and other versions of thought found in the Old
Testament by Biblical theologians, esp. Kittel, Pedersen, and Boman.
We should note that the existence of the primitive conceptions which we
are discussing here does not imply at all their limitation to the Hebrew
mind in antiquity, as many of the Biblical theologians seem to imply.
Lastly, the evidence for these concepts does not rest solely upon
linguistic evidence. As H. W. Robinson has said in The Hebrew Conception. .
op. cit., p. 51, the primitive solidarity concepts are documented
primarily by an anthropological and archaeological evidence and only
partially and secondarily are they reflected, if at all, by semantics.
Barr's objections, therefore, do not affect the topic under investigation
in this study.

CHAPTER I

Section I

Sub-section (i)   "Psychic Extensions" of Personality

The several instruments of self-extension most commonly found in the Old Testament are those which we have mentioned, i.e., messengers, sons, the name, words, the spirit, possessions, and places. In various ways appropriate to a particular given encounter of a person with his environment each of these "extensions" seems to have been capable of effecting the union of an individual with his larger sphere of existence in other persons, places and things. They were the means whereby one soul could, as Johannes Pedersen has expressed it, "partake of" another soul, as well as the means whereby the creation itself could be taken up into an intimate and personal relationship with man. [1]

The first two of these extensions were themselves personal, the messenger or representative, and the son or member of a family, or household, or kin-group. The Old Testament affords many concrete examples of each.

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[1] Johannes Pedersen, op. cit., Vol. I, pp.165-167.

a) <u>Messengers</u>, or representatives, were considered extensions of the personality of the one who had sent them. The messengers of Jephthah say, "What hast thou to do with me" when they speak to the Ammonites.[1] The eleven brothers of Joseph address Joseph's envoy as if they were speaking to Joseph himself: "With whomsoever of <u>thy</u> servants it be found, both let him die, and we also will be <u>my</u> lord's bondsmen." The envoy answers them in the person of Joseph himself: "He with whom it is found shall be <u>my</u> servant."[2]

b) The <u>father of a family</u> was regarded as personally extended in his sons. Thus, one could deal with the descendants of a man in just the same way as one might deal with the man himself. Yahweh tells Abraham "Arise, walk through the land ... for I will give it unto <u>thee</u>" and, in the perspective of the Pentateuch the promise is actually fulfilled nearly five hundred years later when Israel finally takes possession of Canaan.[3] The national family of Abraham was the extension of his being and of his person; thus the Hebrew people fulfill his personal life's history with regard to God's

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[1] Jud. 11:12 (Biblical quotations are from KJV)

[2] Gen. 44:10

[3] Gen. 13:17, Jos. 1:2

promise when they enter Canaan under Joshua. This principle also

seems to have been thought to operate just as well for punishment

as it did for blessing. Because the son was an extension of the

personality of the father, it was Hebrew custom to punish the son

when the father himself could not be seized. The Gibeonites slay

Saul's sons because he had broken the treaty made with them by

Joshua.[1] Ahab's son, Joram, in like manner, dies ignominiously at

the hands of Jehu to avenge the murder of Naboth.[2]

Other instances of the interrelation of a man's soul

with the souls of those over whom he stands as lord abound in the Old

Testament.[3] We shall see this illustrated again as we examine the

Hebraic concept of the name, which was borne by all who stood in a

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[1] Jos. 9:15, 25, 2Sl:14. [2] 2 K 9:24-26.

[3] See J. Pedersen, op. cit., pp. 62-70 for Biblical documentation.
Note that the king, priest, and prophet as the sender of a messenger,
and the father of a family were "Baalim" to their respective extensions,
sons, household, messengers, subjects, etc., inasmuch as the latter
were themselves personal. Lordship is a relationship which only
applies to persons, and cannot pertain to the other extensions of
personality, such as the name, word, spirit, possessions or places.
This distinction between personal and impersonal extensions of
personality refers, however, only to the instrument of extension itself,
for the relationship per se is always personal, since it is always a
person being mediated and extended. Any person being employed as
an instrument or extension of another loses nothing of his own in the
process. On this point see the article in Kittel's Bible Key Words,
Vol. 2, (New York, 1958) on the word "Lord". On the evolution of
the Biblical concept of "lordship", Kittel rightly says that lordship is
primarily seen in Biblical thought as a personal relationship, and one
which, as the drama of Revelation unfolded, was increasingly seen as
involving a free act of submission which does not diminish the truer
aspects of personality of the one who submits. This gradual under-
standing does not completely unfold until the full revelation of the
meaning of all lordship relationships is seen in Christ as Kurios
in the New Testament.

family or tribal or covenantal relationship of dependency to its owner.

c) The name of a man was thought to bear his character to all of those who used it as their own. A person was thought to be alive in his name.[1] The patriarch's character filled the household which bore his name, and his sons carried the honour or dishonour which attached to his person because they inherited his name. The passing on of the name meant also the passing on of the soul or life of the person.[2] This may be seen in the Hebraic institution known as "Levirate marriage". When a man died without progeny, his family line could be continued through the first-born male of a union between his brother, or kinsman, and his widowed wife. The child bore the name of the deceased, and so carried on his life. Because the name conveyed the life of the person, it was very important that "....his name be not put out of Israel".[3] Deuteronomic Law prescribes "Levirate marriage" with this intention. So important was the survival of the name to survival of personality that Absolom, who had no sons, and did not have recourse to the institution of "Levirate

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[1] See O.S. Rankin, "Name", A Theological Word book of the Bible, ed. Alan Richardson (London, 1957) pp.157-8.

[2] R.P. Shedd, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

[3] Deut. 25:6.

marriage", set up a pillar to bear his name. [1] The name of a man was thus thought to be capable of creatively extending his personality through spatial and temporal dimensions to a larger sphere of existence. [2]

      d) The spoken <u>words</u> of a man were thought to convey his personal being and his intentions with real and creative power. [3] The spoken words of Isaac bestowed in blessing upon Jacob, conveyed to him the continuity of his personal life and the inheritance of God's promises; even though it was a mistake this verbal action was considered so real and efficacious that it could not be retracted and given to Esau. [4] Words uttered either in blessing or curse were thought to work powerfully for the good or ill of their recipients.

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[1] 2S.18:18

[2] Johannes Pedersen, op. cit., Vol. I, pp.245-259
A.R. Johnson, The Vitality of the Individual, passim.
Levy-Bruhl, How Natives Think, cited by L.A.Clark, (London 1926) p. 121, cited R.P. Shedd, op. cit., p. 7, n. 10. "Such an understanding of the name must recognize the soul, not as limited to the ego as the conscious finished personality, but everything that fills it, i.e. renown, property, or realm in which it works."

[3] See Thorlief Boman, , Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, Trans. by J. Moreau, London, 1960, pp. 65-66.

[4] Gen. 27:33

There is a dynamic quality attached to the Biblical
concept of the spoken word. This is not necessarily seen in the
meaning or etymology of the Hebrew word. Rather, it is obvious
from the Biblical drama itself, where a word appears as one with
the action required to bring about the reality which it describes.
The Biblical writers usually did not emphasize the possible dichotomy
between the words and deeds of a man. If a person spoke promising
words which failed to become deeds, it meant that he had spoken
counterfeit or empty words which did not possess the usually inherent
dynamic power to accomplish their objectives.[1]

Several instances in the Old Testament of the concur-
rence of the Hebrew noun "word" as the subject of the verb "to do"
may illustrate the indissolubility of the concepts of speech and action.
Abraham's servant recounts to Isaac all the "words" that he had done.[2]
The author of I Kings states that "...the rest of Solomon's words, and
everything that he did, and his wisdom are recorded in the book of the
words of Solomon".[3] The word, as the effective instrument of a man's

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[1] Boman, op. cit., p. 65.

[2] Gen. 24:66

[3] IK. 11:41

intentions, was the extension of his personality across time and space; the particular moment and place of its accomplishment were eschatologically one. Likewise, words narrative of the deeds and intentions of a man were purposeful instruments in conveying the effects of his actions with dynamic power to many different persons in many different times and places.[1] Through the word, future generations could participate realistically in the past deeds of the patriarchs and prophets.[2]

e) The spirit of a man was another extentional instrument or agent by which he could effect his will and personality in situations external to himself, and bring them to bear upon other persons, places and things. Originally, the Hebrew word for spirit "ruach" meant "breath"; and, as man could create breath by blowing, which set

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[1] J. Pedersen, ibid, p. 167.

[2] It was through the word, both of the written and recited Pentatauch, in the celebration of the Passover, in the haggada shel pesah, in the rites of circumcision, proselyte-baptism, and the Temple sacrifices, that the individual Israelite was included in and partook of the first Passover and Exodus from Egypt with Moses. cf., W.G. Braude, Jewish Proselytizing in the First Centuries of the Common Era, (Providence, 1940), pp. 84-85. The "word" is in these instances seen to be an integral part of the Hebraic doctrine of sacramental participation in a past event, which we shall examine more fully at a later point in this thesis (pp. 55-59) in connection with cultic commemorations and the concept of "anamnesis" in the Old Testament.

a force in motion outside of himself, so could man's own actions

in accordance with his essential nature performed toward the

external world set forces in motion in other persons, and places,

and things, which made them also his own, or a part of his larger

self.[1] Thus Elisha asks for and receives a "double-portion of the

spirit" of Elijah in order to carry on the work of his ministry,[2]

Later, it would seem that the spirit of Elijah also rested upon John

the Baptist in such a way that, in a figure of speech, Jesus could

speak of him as Elijah himself.[3] Thus we find that in Hebraic thought

a group of "kindred spirits", as in this case of the prophets who were

forerunners of the Messiah in adversity, could be spoken of as bear-

ing one name and one personality;but we shall see more of this when

we examine the concepts of "corporate personality" and "realistic

representation".[4]

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[1] J. Pedersen, op. cit. p. 104. "(the spirit,('ruach') does not mean
the center of the soul, but the strength emanating from it and,
in its turn, reacting upon it. "
[2] 2K:9ff.
[3] Mt 11:13-14 "For all the prophets and the law prophesied until
John.
And if ye will receive it, this is Elias, which was for to come. "
[4] See pp. 27.-30, this essay.

f) <u>Possessions</u> were thought of as potential extensions of the personality of their owner. The bestowal of a possession as a gift or loan upon another was viewed as a sharing with him of one's own personality, and hence of its power. The staff of Elisha is given to Gehazi to effect the raising of the Shunammite woman's son.[1] The mantle of Elijah is used by Elisha to repeat his master's miracle of the parting of the waters; and in the narrative of Elijah's assumption there is an obvious and intended parallel between the mantle and the double-portion of spirit with which Elisha is endowed.[2] Possessions were viewed as parts of their owner's larger self. When Achan is destroyed for his sin, the contamination of his guilt attaches also to all of his possessions, which must be destroyed with him. "... and all Israel took Achan the son of Serah, and the silver and the mantle and the bar of gold, and his sons and daughters, and his oxen and asses and sheep, and his tent, and all that he had ... and stoned him ... and stoned them with stones."[3]

g) <u>Places</u> partook of the character and personal being of the persons with whom they were particularly associated. The place where Achan was stoned to death with all of his possessions partook of

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[1] 2K 4:29
[2] 2K2: 13-14
[3] Jos. 7:24-26

his curse, and subsequently bore a name which was a variation of

his personal name, e.g., "the Valley of Achor".[1]   To the Israelite

there was a fixed harmony which existed between a man and the place

where he dwelt, and between a nation or people and the land which it

possessed.[2]   For this reason, a piece of land that was to be used as

a burial place or dedicated as a personal offering to God had to belong

to the one who so disposed of it.   Thus, Abraham purchased the field

of Ephron, son of Zohar the Hittite, "... east of Mamre" as a burial

place for Sarah and himself rather than accept it as a free gift.[3]   A

gift retained something of the character of the giver, and Abraham

wanted no other personality associated with the place sacred to his

memory.   In like manner, David purchased the threshing floor of

Araunah in order to erect an altar to the Lord in a place which would

henceforth only be associated with his person.[4]   Araunah had offered

it to him as a gift, but David could offer nothing as a sacrificial gift

to God which did not originate in a commensurate sacrifice of goods

from his own personal sphere of material possessions.   Such a place

was filled with a definite psychic content emanating from the person and

from the specific event or occurrence for which it was primarily remembered

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[1]Jos. 7:26.   [2]J. Pedersen, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 198.

[3]Gen. 23:13   [4]2 S.24:24

CHAPTER I

Section I

Sub-section (ii)   "Corporate Personality"

In all of these ways the plurality of a group of persons, places and things was overcome by the unity of one man's life. The Old Testament consistently treats the whole larger sphere of individual personal existence created by these extensions as one corporate person.

The personality of one man, thus conceived corporately, transcended for the Hebraic mind any such hard-and-fast modern cleavage as is analytically and numerically posed by the difference between the one and the many. [1] Likewise, there was an obvious and concomitant transcendence of the many times or chronologically successive periods of the many lives, in the one time of the

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[1] A.R. Johnson, The One and the Many, p. 8 ff.

one unitive life.[1] It is for this reason that Edom, the numerically

and temporally extended family and national personality of Esau

is called Esau, treated as Esau himself, and consciously identified

with him in a "tether of life" transecting time.[2] In the same

manner, Israel is Jacob, the corporate group sharing his single life

as one person, throughout many chronologically successive centuries

which are considered as one single era in a single span of one personal

life time.[3]

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[1] Thorlief Boman, op. cit., pp. 137-154 passim. Boman calls the
Hebraic concept of time "psychic time" because its standard of
measurement was found in the inner consciousness of the
Israelite who thought of himself as one with the nation, past,
present, and future: "The patriarch and the tribe are one life
even though centuries separate them." The content of time, or
the meaning which an event in the past held for an individual in
his present life-situation, determined the nearness of that
event to him. Boman contrasts this with the Greek way of
measuring time as a chronological distance which was objectified
in spacially conceived sequence metaphors. (We must note,
however, that Walter Eichrodt doubts that there is a peculiar
Hebraic sense of time, cf.
"Heilsorfahrung und Zeitbestandnnis in Alten Testament",
Theologische Zeitschrift, XII 1956, 103-125.) The relationship
with Yahweh adds another dimension to the Israelite concept of
time. This idea of "psychic time" relates "corporate personality"
to "cultic anamnesis" (pp. 31-32 this essay) It should also be
kept in mind when we examine the concept of "objective memorial"
in the philosophy of Henri Bergson. (pp. 94-116 this essay).

[2] Gen. 36:8 "Esau is Edom"

[3] Gen. 35:10-11 "And God said to him, 'Your name is Jacob; no longer
shall your name be called Jacob, but Israel shall be your name'
So his name was called Israel. And God said to him '... a
nation and a company of nations shall be of thee, and kings shall
come out of thy loins.'

The biography of the common ancestor or source member whose personality was so extended and made corporate in the group was regarded also as the biography of the group.[1] As we have already seen, Israel as a nation received the fulfillment of the Divine promises to Abraham, and so completed a chapter in the patriarch's own personal biography. The past, present, and future members of a nation or family, precisely because they were all together the single communal personality of their ancestral source member across time and space, were capable of functioning as a single individual.

Just as Israel as a whole bore the personal name of Jacob, a "son of Abraham", so did each tribe within the nation bear the name of the particular one of the twelve "sons" of Jacob to whom its tribal origin was traced, e.g. "Benjamin", "Manasseh", etc.[2] The neighboring Semitic nations mentioned in the Old Testament also bore the common name of a personal ancestor; for example, as was Edom, so the whole people of Moab are addressed by a collective name, "Moab", which was thought of as "one person" and which could refer (1) to the ancestor, (2) to the whole people, or (3) to the king.[3]

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[1] Shedd, op. cit., p. 6. In point of historical fact the reverse was also probab as often true. The biography of the group was read back into a legendary account of the ancestor's life to produce a community conditioned social origins myth. But which ever way it might have worked, the process is still illustrative of the same principle of the solidarity which existed between the group and its common ancestor, whether an actual or partly fictional character.

[2] Gen. 48, 49.

[3] Thorlief Boman, op. cit., p. 70. "Moab and Edom speak and act when their kings have dealings with Israel, because the Moabite and the Edomite are revealed by and large in their words and actions".

The use of the personal collective name "Israel" for the king of Israel is commonplace in the Scriptures.[1] Other examples of the fluctuation in the use of a name from the one to the many persons are quite common.[2] Especially significant is the use of the personal singular forms for the collective and corporate nation of Israel in the Psalms and Servant Songs.[3] In some contexts, at least, this does not seem to be merely literary personification, but rather due to the natural viewing of the whole nation as ontologically one person.

Evidence for the Hebraic conception of the single-life and single-lifetime solidarity of Israel along these lines is far too abundant to be cited in full.[4] All of those who were within the group which comprised such a corporate person were spoken of as partaking of a common "life", a common "flesh", a common "blood", a common "spirit", as sharing a common "soul", and as possessing

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[1] W.O.E. Oesterley, "Early Hebrew Festival Rituals", in Myth and Ritual, pp. 143 ff; R.P. Shedd, op. cit., pp. 29 ff. "The king...is not the head as distinguished from Israel, his people, " cf. Ps. 28:8, Ps. 2:2, 20:7, and Ps 105:15, which Shedd cites as examples of the identification of the king with the nation. Most of the evidence for the solidarity of the king with the nation must be dealt with after the dimension of the Divine Covenant has been added, although in fact this identification stems from a completely natural Hebraic mode of typological thought which would have been equally operative in the human family or any kin-group with regard to its head member.

[2] H.W. Robinson, The Hebrew Conception, p. 53.

[3] Shedd, op. cit. pp.38-41.

[4] See Shedd, op. cit. pp.43-71, passim.

one "heart". [1]   These were metaphors for the various aspects

of human personality believed to have been derived from one man

and consequently shared by a group.   By means of them, he could

dwell in the many members of the group, making it his corporate

personality.   In a sense they were instruments of extension which

were at the same time component parts of his essential selfhood.

Such a group psychically and physically reproduced and embodied

in itself the character and the "multiplied" ontological being of

the one man.   In this way, the "life", "spirit", "soul", "flesh",

"blood", and "heart" of a family or national group was one and

singular because it was believed to be both spiritually and physically,

ontologically and really, derived from the single ancestor. [2]

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[1] Shedd, op. cit. pp. 28-29.

[2] ibid, p. 29.

CHAPTER I

Section I

Sub-section (iii) "Realistic Representation"

The idea found in many ancient societies and in the

Bible, that the king, or leader of a people could sum-up in himself

the whole corporate personality of the group and singly bear its name

and the name of its common ancestor is based upon another primitive

concept which is important to our understanding of the Hebrew view of

personality.[1] Shedd has called it the concept of "realistic repre-

sentation"; stated briefly it is the assumption that the whole of a

group or species is somehow mysteriously capable of being contained

or embodied in any individual member of that group or species.[2]

This concept rests upon a primitive tendency to view

the essence of a thing as collective, e.g. to see the whole as the reality

and the particular part or detail as a subordinate factor deriving its

reality only from the fact that it is a manifestation of that whole.[3]

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[1] van der Leeuw, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 214-235.

[2] H.W. Robinson, The Hebrew Conception... p. 55, the "individual"
who gathers to himself the force of the whole group".
Shedd, op. cit., p. 29, "As the individual manifestation or member of
the group bears the life of the group in himself, a prominent member
may incorporate the essence of the group."

[3] Thorlief Boman, op. cit., pp. 69-71, "The concepts of the Israelites
are...real totalities which include within them the individual things."

The primitive mind instinctively thinks of general

denominations first; these "types" or "patterns" revealed themselves

in the individuals (as in the collective whole) which were the "impressions"

or "copies" made from that "type" or "pattern" in the created world of

experience.[1] Traces of this kind of "generic thinking" have been found

in the speech of the Hebrew people which allowed for an oscillation

between the group seen as an individual or a plurality. [2]

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[1] J. Pedersen, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 109-112.

[2] H. W. Robinson, op. cit., pp. 53.
Shedd, op. cit., p. 27, cites the following Biblical evidence in which the
    same Hebrew word could be used for singular or plural references:
    a single tree or a forest (Gen. 3:3 w. Ps. 74:5)
    a single man or mankind (II Sam. 7:19, Jer. 21:6, 31:27, 50:3)
    a single chariot or chariotry in general (2 K. 13:7, Ex. 14:7, I K.
    22:35, 38.)
  Boman asserts that, in usual Hebrew grammatical construction the deri-
    vative "-îm" and "-oth" endings which designate the plural of a
    species, imply that the many individuals of a species are derived
    from the "type" of the whole. (Boman, op. cit., pp. 167-8).
Shedd adds (op. cit., pp. 28-9) that other examples of the "generic
    thinking" of the Hebrews may be found in the apparently real manner
    in which a particular class of individual is spoken of as possessing
    a common "life", "soul", or "heart". Thus we find in the Bible such
    phrases as "...the life (singular) of thy enemies, (I K 3:11) "the
    soul of thy wives" (II Sam. 19:6).
    This "generic thinking" provides the link between the inherently
    related concepts of "extension of personality", "corporate personality"
    and "realistic representation"; for, according to this mode of thinking,
    every individual member of a group would embody, manifest and
    represent in himself the extension of the whole of its entire membership.

In later writings such terms for groups as "the house of the evil doers" or the "sons of the needy" can refer at once to either the whole group (corporate personality) or to one individual embodying the "extended" characteristics of the whole group in himself. [1]

An illustration of all three of the Biblical concepts, "extension of personality", "corporate personality", and "realistic representation" is contained in the prophecy of Zechariah:

"Thus saith the Lord of hosts; In those days it shall come to pass, that ten men shall take hold out of all languages of the nations, even shall take hold of the skirt of him that is a Jew, saying, We will go with you: for we have heard that God is with you. "[2]

Here "you" is the whole nation of Israel corporately, of which the individual Jew, no matter how far geographically isolated from his fellows, is the ontologically inseparable manifestation, or

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[1] Is. 31:2, Ps. 72:4, cf. Pedersen, op. cit., Vol. 1, 54, and also cf. Thorlief Boman, op. cit., p. 70. Boman would designate these as "generalized terms", "terms of totality", or "class terms". Corporate personality could also be said to exist within such a category or class group of persons which could be referred to as one person. Likewise, the concept of "realistic representation" was present, in that in the use of such terms "The decisive" matter is not the number, whether several examples or only one is intended, but whether the peculiarity or the essence is embodied in the individual or individuals in question. "

[2] Zec. 8:23.

"extension" and "realistic representation".

The most obvious uses of the principle of "realistic representation" in the Old Testament relate to such figures as those of the king or priest in cultic rite, the righteous intercessor, the messenger, kinsman-avenger and the sacrificial victim.

We shall examine these when we discuss the primitive solidarity concepts within the context of the Divine Covenant.[1]

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[1]See pp.43-54 this essay.

CHAPTER I

Section 1

Sub-section (iv)   "Cultic Anamnesis"

There is a curious belief which seems to have been

fairly well disseminated throughout the ancient world in both Semitic

and Graeco-Roman cultures that many worshippers forming an ethnic

and/or cultic community could be united both together and to a common

god, lord, hero or other object of worship by means of a dramatic

ceremony or ritual in which all participated.[1]

The "mystery rite" consisted in the first place of a

cultic "anamnesis" or memorial in which it was thought that a particularly

important or salvation-bearing act once performed by the god or hero was

made present for the benefit of the worshippers.[2] The original event and

the original god or hero might be either historical, legendary, or

purely mythical, but they symbolized primordial or supernatural being

in which the worshippers were thought to participate by sharing in a

similar action.[3]

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[1] Dom Odo Casel has made an extensive study of extra-Biblical instances
     of the operation of this concept in The Mystery of Christian Worship,
     ed. by Burkhard Neunheuser OSB, (London, 1962). See esp.
     Part I, Chapter 3: "The Ancient World and Christian Mysteries"
     pp. 50-53, and Part II, Chapter I, "The Meaning of Mystery", pp. 97-141.

[2] Casel, ibid, pp. 53-54. "...in holy words and rites of present and future
     the reality is there once more." "The celebrant community is united
     in the deepest fashion with the lord they worship. There is no deeper
     oneness than suffering and action shared."

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[3] Casel, _ibid._, p. 53. In speaking of the "mystery rite" Casel says:
"... its aim is union with godhead, a share in his life".

This primitive concept of "cultic anamnesis" forms the

basis of the Old Testament understanding of the Passover Ritual, and the

New Testament and subsequent Christian understanding of the Eucharist.[1]

Because "cultic anamnesis", unlike the other three

primitive solidarity concepts is usually restricted in the literature

of most primitive societies to operation within a religious perspective as

a means of communication with the sacred rather than the profane or

ordinary, almost all of the Biblical evidence which we have for "cultic

anamnesis" is found only within the context of the Divine Covenant. For

this reason, we shall leave our summary of "cultic anamnesis" as a

Biblical concept, completely for the next section of this chapter in which

we shall make a survey of all four of the aforementioned primitive

solidarity concepts as they are taken up into the perspective of their

operation as media of man's communication with God in the Israelite

Covenant.

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[1] Max Thurian, op. cit., has not referred to any of the extra-Biblical
or non-Hebraic examples of "cultic anamnesis" in his study of it
in the Israelite and Christian usage; but it is obvious that there is
a common and universal primitive solidarity concept operative in
pagan and Biblical sources.
Compare the usage of this concept in Israelite and Christian worship,
as summarized on pp. 55-59 of this essay, with Casel's statement
of it as found in the general practice of antiquity.

CHAPTER I

Section 2

> The Old Testament Elevation of the Natural
>
> Modes of Operation of Human Solidarity into
>
> Instruments of Communion with God.

All four of the concepts which we have been discussing, "extension of personality", "corporate personality", "realistic representation" and "cultic anamensis" are but different aspects of a single primitive understanding of the ways in which human relationships can exist in society. This understanding seems to be taken up in the Hebrew Bible to describe the ways in which the relationship between God and man is implemented in the Divine Covenant. Our fullest evidence for any one of these four concepts, therefore, either as they may apply to purely human solidarity or to Divine-human relationships, will be found imbedded within the great mass of Biblical material which is set in the context of a description of the Divine activity within the Israelite Community. It is for this reason that we must examine these concepts with an added awareness of the Biblical understanding of the Divine Covenant. What has been thus far an

examination of concepts found in the Bible but also natural to the universal and primitive understanding of ordinary inter-personal relationships in human society must now become an examination of the specifically religious and sacramental usage of these same principles within the Divine Covenant.

It is a most likely conjecture that the primitive solidarity concepts were absorbed from the wider contemporary world-view prevalent in antiquity and applied to the usage within the context of the Divine Covenant which we discover in the Bible. In our Old Testament sources we find the primitive solidarity concepts in their natural and supernatural operations interwound together as parallel aspects of a single overall view of the relationships of God and man in society. The Old Testament writers expressed the ways in which Yahweh related himself to them in the same terms which were used to express ordinary means of relationship between the individual and other individuals, in the human group. Even in non-Biblical evidence for the existence of this concept in other primitive societies the religious and secular dimensions appear to be interwoven from the beginnings of recorded history, so that it would be wrong to suggest a radical differentiation between the instruments by which God operated and those by which man contacted fellow man in human society.

It appears that we are dealing with a common and natural, or secular, world-view which was taken up or elevated in the religious consciousness of Israel as an understanding of the means and instruments by which God communicated with men. All we can accurately say is that in ancient Israel the modes of social behaviour of universal man and those of the God of the Covenant are described in analogous solidarity symbols. Just as the whole human race is conceived of as the "corporate extension" of Adam, so are the People of the Covenant conceived of as the "corporate extension" of the patriarch Jacob; they bear his name, "Israel" and are dealt with as one person in the Covenant.

CHAPTER I

Section 2

Sub-section (i)   "Psychic Extension of Personality" in the

Divine Covenant

Within the cultic institutions of ancient Israel may
be found all of the instruments for the "extension of personality"
mentioned previously but now conceived of as "extensions" of the
Divine Personality in His relationships with man. Thus we find in
the Old Testament the "Word" of God, the "Name" of God, the
"Spirit" of God, the "Sons" of God, the "Household" of God, the
"Messengers" or "Prophets" of God, and mention of numerous
"holy places" and "holy objects", all of which are portrayed as
psychically conveying something of the Divine Presence into the
affairs of men.

For example, the "Word" of Yahweh was creative as
the extension of the power of Yahweh's personality whereby His
original purposes were effected in the creation and His present
sovereignty over the lives of men in the events of history
maintained.[1]

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[1] A.R. Johnson, The Vitality of the Individual, p. 21.

> So shall my Word be that goeth forth out of My Mouth;
> It shall not return unto Me void,
> But it shall perform that which I please
> And succeed in that whereto I sent it. [1]

The "word" was not a "mere" symbol; it was in some sense one with the thing which it symbolized, and one with the action which would bring that thing about. Thus the "words" of a prophet were thought of as instruments in bringing to pass what is pronounced; the Hebrew viewed the "words" of a prophet as synonymous with the purposes of Yahweh which they expressed. [2]

The "Name" of Yahweh, like that of a man, was capable of effecting the extension of His personality. It was efficacious in ritual. We find an example of this in the "P" material of Numbers:

> "So, when they put My Name upon the children of Israel then 'tis I (I myself) will bless them." [3]

And in the Psalter:

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[1] Isa. 55:10 f.

[2] Jer. 23:29, cf. Boman, op. cit., p. 60.

[3] Num. 6: 22-7.

"May the Name of the God of Jacob make thee prevail!"[1]
There is also evidence in Gen. 4:26, 12:8 and Zeph. 3:9 that the
phrase "to call with (or upon) the Name 'Yahweh'" is a formulaic
line for cultic observances; and in Num. 21:5, 11, 21, the
sanctuary is known as the place where Yahweh allows his Name
to dwell. To invoke the "Name", or to use the "Name" was to call
forth the power that proceeds from the named in that "extension"
of His person.[2]

The "Spirit" of Yahweh, as it enveloped men, made
tham effective instruments not only of God's purposes but of His
person.[3]

In the Old Testament significant examples of
extension relate to the use of creatures as "messengers" or
representatives of Yahweh; angels, holy men, and prophets, are
treated or speak in some instances as Yahweh himself. The
fluctuation of order from the Divine to the angelic is seen in
Hosea's reference to Jacob's struggle at Penuel:

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[1] Ps. XX, cf Ps. IV

[2] A.R. Johnson, The Vitality of the Individual, p. 23.

[3] 1 Sam. 10:6, 10; Eze. 2:2, Jud. 6:34, cf. J. Pedersen.
op. cit., Vol. I. p. 160.

> In his strength he strove with God (or a God:
> "Elohim")
> Yes, he strove against an 'Angel' and prevailed;
> He wept and made supplication to him. [1]

Here we are confronted with a mysterious figure, apparently sent

from Yahweh, who is alternately referred to (1) as God, or (2) as

an angel. In the same way that the human messenger was

indistinguishable from his human lord by the address and respect

he received as an extension of his master's personality, so were

the "angelic" messengers of Yahweh conceived of as, for all

practical purposes, identified with Him in the instances of

Divine-human encounter which we find in the Old Testament. [2]

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[1] Hos. 12:3b-4a.

[2] Gen 16:7-14, Jud. 6:11-24.

CHAPTER I

Section 2

Sub-section (ii)   "Corporate Personality in the

                                    Divine Covenant "

        We have already examined the primitive concept

of "corporate personality" as it is found in the Old Testament without

mentioning the essentially supernatural overtones which it takes on in

the religious perspective of the Divine Covenant.[1] The idea that God

has entered a covenanted relation with Israel raises its national

solidarity as the "corporate extension" of the patriarch Jacob, or

"Israel", to a new dimension and force.[2] Indeed, it is the general

agreement among many contemporary Biblical scholars that, in point

of historical order, the Mosaic Covenant gave actual unity to the tribes

of Israel, and that the readily available primitive conception of corporate

descent from a common ancestor for every national group became what

we might call an ethnic and historico-mythical symbol.[3] But the fact

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[1] See pp. 22-26 this essay.

[2] Shedd, op. cit., p. 21 "Through the Covenant the eternity and
    immutability of God were aligned directly with the nation of Israel."
    cf. also pp. 19-20,   n. 56.

[3] See Bernard Anderson, Understanding the Old Testament, (Englewood
Cliffs 1957) p.6 , n. 2.

remains that "the corporate personality", of Israel is a key concept
in the religious consciousness of the Israelite affecting the very core
of his understanding of his relationship to God.[1]

In Semitic antiquity the institution of a "covenant" seems
to have been an ordinary and natural every day occurrence, both in the
conducting of business transactions and in social and religious contexts.[2]
It is unnecessary to belabour the point here that this natural Semitic
conception of "covenant" and "covenant relationships" was taken up as
the basis of the Israelite's understanding of his relationship to God. But
I do want to make the point that "corporate personality" was a corollary
concept with that of "covenant", and that specifically it was the natural
"counterpart of the covenant", which was an "artificial" contract or a
relationship of brotherhood made in order to secure the same solidarity
rights that heredity or the "psychic extensions" conveyed naturally.[3]

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[1] Shedd lists the implications of the solidarity of Israel for early Jewish
religious consciousness under the following headings:
(1) "The Accessibility of the 'Merit' of the Fathers to All Members
of Israel", (2) "The Expiatory Value of the Suffering of Righteous
Martyrs" and (3) "The Corporate Implication of Israel in the Sin
of a Member", op. cit., pp. 59-71 passim.

[2] See George E. Mendenhall, Law and Covenant in Israel and the Ancient
Near East (published by the Biblical Colloquium, Pittsburgh, Pa.)
Reprinted from The Biblical Archaeologist, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (May
1954) pp. 26-46, and No. 3 (Sept. 1954) pp. 49-76.

[3] W.R. Smith, The Religion of the Semites, 3rd edition, (London, 1927)
p. 318. "A covenant means artificial brotherhood, and has no place
where the natural brotherhood of which it is an imitation already exists,"
quoted by Shedd, op. cit., p. 20. Shedd comments that the "no need"
clause does not apply in the instance of the Divine Covenant, for the
Deity is not linked by bonds of "natural brotherhood" to man.

We could argue that the Divine Covenant is, then, an "artificial" or "legal" bond of brotherhood between God and man, the purpose of which is to allow man to partake of a relationship with God to which he has no "natural" right by virtue of the operation of the human solidarity principles. But once the Divine Covenant is made, then the corporate body of the nation can be spoken of as bearing the Divine Personality in terms analogous to, but not univocal with, the terms used to describe ordinary human "corporate extension". Thus, Israel as a whole is God's people, and his witness before the other nations.[1]

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[1] Gen. 22:18, Exodus 14:4 b.

CHAPTER I

Section 2

Sub-section (iii)   "Realistic Representation" in the

Divine Covenant

The primitive conception of "realistic representation"
is central to the Israelite understanding of "justification" and
"Atonement" within the Divine Covenant. A quantity of Biblical
material illustrative of this fact has been collected by various Old
Testament scholars. Russell Shedd has made a thorough summary of
it in Man in Community, some of which I shall present here in an
abbreviated form. [1] A clear picture of what this concept meant to the
authors of the Old Testament is essential to our understanding of the
New Testament and its evaluation of the person and work of Jesus as
the Christ, of the Church as his "Body", and the place of the Sacra-
ments within the life of that "Body".

Shedd lists several prominent varieties of "realistic
representation" in the Divine Covenant. They are, respectively, the
"realistic representation" of the "national ruler", of the "priest", of
the "one tribe for the nation", of the "righteous intercessor", of a

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[1] Shedd, op. cit.,   pp. 29, -38, 59-71.

"messenger", of the "avenger", "kinsman", or "redeemer", of the

"community in sin", of the "corporate blessing", and of the

"sacrificial victim".[1] I shall discuss some of these as minimal

to our understanding of the "Body of Christ" concept in the New

Testament.

The "realistic representation" of the "national ruler"

is seen in the Israelite concept of the king as identified with his

kingdom.[2] The prince of Tyre is addressed in a dirge, and when his

destruction is mentioned it includes his entire city.[3] David so

embodies Israel that Joab envisions him as the cause of Israel's sin:

"Why will he be a cause of trespass to Israel?"[4] Israel would be

responsible for David's sin even though he alone decided to number

the people, for the king's actions were considered to embody

"realistically" the actions of the whole nation. Abimelech is warned

that if he marries Sarah he will be punished, and this punishment is

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[1] Shedd, ibid., pp. 29-38 passim.

[2] Material cited in this paragraph on this subject is further developed by Shedd op. cit., pp. 29-31.

[3] Eze. 28:7-19

[4] 1 Chr. 21:3

mentioned as corporate, including his whole kingdom. [1] The term "lamp" is used for David, in whom the life of all Israel existed as if personally embodied in him. This "lamp" would be put out if David died. [2] The "fading" of Moses means the fading of the people Israel. [3] The fact that the king was identified with the vital life of the nation may be seen also in the lamentation: "The breath of our nostrils, the anointed of the Lord, was taken in their pits..." [4] The "anointed" is a title which refers to the king, but also to the whole people as realistically represented by the king who alone actually underwent the ceremony of anointing. [5] The solidarity of the king with the nation from the standpoint of the religious and moral judgements of God may be seen in the cases of Asa, Jehoshaphat, Hezekiah, and Josiah who, because they were good kings, purified the nation. [6] Conversely, Jeroboam "made Israel to sin" because he did that which was evil

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[1] Gen. 20:7-9

[2] 2S 21:17, cf.Ps.132:17-18.

[3] Ex 18:18-19.

[4] Lam .4:20

[5] Examples of this may be seen in Hab. 3:13, Ps.18:50, Ps.28:8, Ps.2:2, Ps.20:7 and Ps.105:15

[6] cf.Shedd, op. cit. p. 31.

in the sight of God. Because the king was in himself a represen-
tative figure, his whole people, for better or for worse, partook
of his character.[1]

The next instance of "realistic representation" is that
of the priest.[2] The priest was the focus of the unity of the nation ,
the people of God, in carrying out the national liturgical worship.
Priestly mediation was based entirely upon this concept of national
unity realistically represented in the priest. As W. Eichrodt says,
it was impossible for the individual "... to become shut up in
himself and to achieve a private and isolated relation between God
and the soul".[3] The Covenant, as we have seen, was made with the
whole nation treated as one person by God; so in worship only the
whole group could approach and render the covenanted worship. This
was done by the priest who "incorporated the group in himself and
presented himself as a corporate personality to God."[4] S. H. Hooke
points out that the priest's function in performing the sacrifices of the

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[1]
  1 K:22-52, 15:30, 16:2.

[2] Material cited in the following two paragraphs on this subject is
    further explicated by Shedd, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

[3] W. Eichrodt, Man in the Old Testament, (London, 1951) p. 37,
    quoted by Shedd op. cit., p. 31 and n. 112.

[4] Shedd, op. cit., p. 31.

Old Covenant implies that he stood as a "vicarious substitute for the individual or the community in its relationship to God".[1] Likewise, the anointed priest who sinned brought guilt upon the whole people of God.[2] The action of the priest, in laying his hands upon the head of the scapegoat, was the action of the whole people of God: because he represented them in himself. He confessed over the goat all the sins and transgressions of Israel "putting them upon the head of the goat".[3]

As the priest was the "realistic representative" of the nation, he bore the sins of the whole group, and could transfer them to the scapegoat. The goat was then identified with the sins of Israel, and was sent off to Azazel, to remove the sins and guilt from the people.[4] In this representational worship the whole nation was one individual. W.O.E. Oesterley and T.H. Robinson point out that the single Israelite was only a "sub-unit" of the one person,

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[1] S.H. Hooke, "The Theory and Practice of Substitution", Vetus Testamentatum (Leiden, 1952) Vol. II, p. 11, quoted by Shedd, op. cit., p. 31, n. 113.

[2] Lev. 4:3

[3] Lev. 16:21

[4] Shedd, op. cit, 32.

"Israel", who, as a whole represented by priest and victim, was rid of her sins in the Atonement ritual.[1] This was no mere mechanical transference of sins to another, nor was it purely figurative or symbolic (in the modern sense of those terms). The basis of this principle of substitutionary atonement and sacrifice was, rather, founded upon the conception of the "realistic" representation"of a "corporate personality", which, was central to Hebrew psychology.[2] In this conception, the priest, and then, after the transfer of the sins in the Atonement ritual, the goat, were respectively the personal extensions of Israel's corporate being; as such they were her "realistic representations". In addition, any individual member of the group, as a "righteous intercessor", could confess the sins of the whole nation and gain God's forgiveness for Israel, as seen in Daniel's prayer of confession: "We have sinned, and have committed iniquity, and have done wickedly, and have rebelled, even by departing from thy precepts and from thy judgements..."[3] Nehemiah's prayer: "Howbeit thou art just in all that is brought upon us; for thou hast

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[1] W.O.E. Oesterley and T.H. Robinson, Hebrew Religion, (London, 1937) 2nd edn. p. 264, quoted by Shedd, op. cit., p. 32, n. 114.

[2] H.W. Robinson, Hebrew Psychology, p. 381.

[3] Dan. 9:5-19

done right, but we have done wickedly" illustrates the same

principle. [1] When the individual member who was the "righteous

intercessor" was also king, priest, or leader of the whole group,

the intercession is especially efficacious because he could fully

embody the group in himself, and realistically stand in its place.

Moses' intercession availed for the whole nation. [2] Lot is the one

righteous man, for whom the righteous intercession of Abraham

availed. [3] But in some cases not even the righteous intercession

or the leader or individual member of prominence could avail, if

the sin of Israel was too great. On such occasions the intercession

of Moses, and Samuel, as Jeremiah says, and the intercession of

Noah, Daniel, and Job, as Ezekiel says, would not avail for the

great sin of Israel. [4]

Another form of "realistic representation" was that of

the "avenger", "kinsman", "redeemer" which was based upon that

extension of personality which belonged to the member of a house-

hold, who embodied the household in himself as he acted in its interests.

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[1] Neh. 9:33

[2] Ex. 32:31-35

[3] Gen. 19:29

[4] Jer. 15:1 and Eze. 14:14

[5] Shedd, op. cit., pp.33-35.

The "redeemer" was one who claimed the payment for a trespass against the family (blood revenge) or who saved the family inheritance.[1] The "redeemer", as a "realistic representative" of the whole family, was usually the nearest of kin, either the son or the brother. The principle of the "realistic representation" of the "redeemer" was the basis of the laws regarding "Levirate" marriage.[2]

Another example of "realistic representation" is the Hebrew conception of the whole nation as definitely implicated in the sins of any individual member.[3] For the sin of Achan the whole people of Israel is judged, and the Lord says simply: "Israel hath sinned".[4] For the sin of Korah's rebellion God was "...wroth with all the congregation".[5] It was only by virtue of this membership within a "corporate personality" that the actions of one man had any bearing upon the whole group. His actions could also implicate the group in corporate blessings, as well as corporate punishment.

Because the whole group, Israel, was a corporate unity it became possible for an individual or sub-unit in the group to

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[1] Lev. 25:24-32, Ru. 2:20, 3:9, 4:1-8, 14.

[2] Deu. 25:5-10.

[3] Material in the following two paragraphs on this subject is further developed by Shedd, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

[4] Jos. 7:11-12.

[5] Num. 16:22-24.

represent the nation realistically. Just as the king and a priest

represented the whole group, so did the tribe of Levi stand as a

"vicarious substitute" for the whole nation in place of the "firstborn".[1]

They were called out by God to represent each family and thus the

nation. C. Lattey and S. H. Hooke find the principle of solidarity

as the sole basis of this vicarious substitution.[2] Shedd notes that

the same principle operated in God's punishment of the Egyptians by

the killing of their first-born as vicarious substitution for the killing

of the entire nation.[3]

      We are now confronted with yet another conception, that of

the substitution of a single victim who was a "realistic representative" of

the whole nation in atonement for its corporate guilt. The death

penalty was conceived of as necessarily consequent upon the commission

of sin against the Covenant. The death penalty was also envisioned as

corporately binding. All Israel deserved death as the penalty for the

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[1] Num. 3:11-13, 41, 45-51, 8:14-18, cited by Shedd, op. cit., p. 32.

[2] C. Lattey, "Vicarious Solidarity in the Old Testament", Vetus
    Testamentum (London, 1951) Vol. I, p. 271:
  S. H. Hooke, op. cit., p.12. cited by Shedd, op. cit., p. 32. n. 115.

[3] Shedd, op. cit., p. 32, n. 115

sins of one man in Israel, just as all men deserved death as the just

punishment for Adam's transgression. From this it follows that

whatever sacrifice could be made to atone for the corporate sin of

Israel and to allay the corporate death penalty would itself have to

be in the nature of a "corporate sacrifice". Both the priest, as we

have already seen, and the sacrificial victim, had to be corporate

representations of Israel in order that the sacrificial act be such a

"corporate sacrifice". By realistic substitution the sinner, i. e.

corporate Israel, was identified with the priest, who "transferred"

the sin, its guilt and its penalty, to the victim which was sacrificed.[1]

It is interesting to note that many of the ideas associated

with the ritual of the scapegoat and guilt offering seem also to be

present in the Old Testament picture of the Suffering Servant of Yahweh

in the "Songs of the Servant" in Isaiah.[2] Shedd finds indication that the

self-offering of the Servant is described in terms normally used to

describe an offering of the scapegoat.[3] Thus we may compare the state-

ment about the scapegoat in Leviticus 16:22. "And the goat shall bear

upon him all their iniquities to the land of cutting off" with the statement

about the Servant in Isaiah 53:8. "For he was cut off

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[1] Material in this and the following paragraphs of this section is further
developed by Shedd, op. cit., pp. 36-38.

[2] See C. R. North on "Sacrifice" in the Theological Word Book of the
Bible, ed. by Alan Richardson, cited by Shedd, op. cit., p. 38 and
n. 128.

[3] Isa. 42:1-4, 49:1-6, 50:4-9, 52:13-53:12.

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n. 128.

[3] Isa. 42:1-4, 49:1-6, 50:4-9, 52:13-53:12.

from the land of the living."[1]

This association of the Servant with scapegoat formulae is significant in view of the New Testament identification of Jesus with the Servant. For it is clear that the scapegoat ritual rested upon solidarity conceptions, and, if the association is made between Jesus and a Servant who follows the "type" of the scapegoat, it would imply that there might be a similarly "corporate" or "representational" understanding of Jesus' Servantship in the minds of the New Testament writers. Thus, Shedd is able to say:

> "Fundamental to both ritual elements (the scapegoat
> and the guilt offering) was the conception of the
> solidarity of the group. The atonement of the Servant
> is not possible without the prior identification with the
> group, whether Israel, or the world. It is because the
> Servant is the realistic representative of Israel, that
> he may suffer vicariously and bear the sins of Israel.
> (cf. Isa. 53:4-6, 10).... Thus, the Servant of the Lord
> is the culmination of the Hebrew conception of realistic
> representation in sacrifice. He stands as a substitute
> for Israel and for the whole world, yet not apart from
> the conception of the substitute as the embodiment of the
> nation and the corpus humanum in whose place be bows
> to receive the judgment of God."[2]

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[1] Shedd, op. cit., p. 38, n. 129.

[2] Shedd, op. cit., p. 38. Note also Shedd's quotation from Vischer, Jahrbuch der Theologishen Schule Bethel, ed. by Th. Schlatter (Bethel bei Bielefeld, 1930) p. 102., "The Servant so completely unites himself with the people that it is true to say that he is the people and the people is the Servant. We must recognize both, that he is throughout not the people, and yet nevertheless is the people". The principle of "realistic representation" thus explains the presence in the Old Testament of both singular and plural references to the Servant, (and to the Messiah as well). Such numerical fluctuation has been at times a point of dispute between Jewish and Christian scholars. The former often claimed that the Servant, and the Messiah, are purely corporate figures; the latter have claimed, in effect, that Jesus appears in the New Testament as the "realistic representative" of both the human race and of the spiritual Israel.

The conception of the "realistic representation"
of the "corporate membership" of a whole group by one man is applied
by New Testament writers to Jesus, as in Paul's reference to Christ
the new "Adam".[1] It has, as we shall see, important implications for
our understanding of the "Body of Christ" concept and for our under-
standing of Christian liturgical and sacramental usages.[2]

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[1] Rom.5:12-14, cf.Shedd, op. cit.,p. 112.

[2] See pp.55-9 this essay.

CHAPTER I

Section 2

Sub-section (iv)   "Cultic Anamnesis" in the Divine Covenant

Max Thurian has made an extensive study of the Biblical

concept of "memorial" in the Old and New Testaments in relation to

the Passover rites and the Christian Eucharist.[1] He finds a

continuity in the Biblical understanding of the principle underlying

the concept of cultic "anamnesis" in both Testaments. "Askarath"

and "Zikkaron" in the Old Testament and "Mnemosunon" and

"Anamnesis" in the Greek of the Septuagint and the New Testament

have the effect of the "Semeion" or "Sign" which makes a reality

concrete, an enactment which "memorializes" or brings an event

or thing before the memory (and hence into the presence) of God or

man.[2] The many times and places are thus transcended in the

corporate and cultic "anamnesis" of a once accomplished event such

as the Exodus, or the Death-Resurrection of Christ. The Biblical

concept of "anamnesis" is thus a corollary of the primitive conception

of "anamnesis" which, as we have seen in the summary of Dom Odo

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[1] M. Thurian, op. cit., Parts I and II.

[2] M. Thurian, ibid., Part I, pp. 20-39

Casel, was widespread in the Semitic, Egyptian, and Graeco-Roman mystery cults in antiquity. [1]

In "cultic anamnesis" persons and material objects were employed in the creation of a drama symbolizing and commemorating mythical and/or historical salvation-events. The whole group sponsoring such a cultic drama, even when numerically not all actually present, was envisioned as participating vicariously in the "representational" action of its celebrants, who in turn participated psychically in the force of the original life and event being commemorated. [2] Thus, the high priest of Israel bore the names of the twelve tribes on twelve stones affixed to his ephod so that he symbolically represented all Israelites in "memorial" before God as priest and righteous-intercessor:

> "Aaron shall bear the names of the children of
> Israel in the breast plate of Judgement upon his
> heart, when he goeth in unto the holy place, for
> a memorial before the Lord continually." [3]

In the case of the celebration of the Israelite Passover, the symbolical embodiments of the reality beyond (which was the Passover event itself) were the unleavened-bread, the bitter herbs,

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[1] O. Casel, op. cit., pp. 50-61, and, this essay, pp. 31-32.
[2] M. Thurian, Part I, op. cit., 57-62.
[3] Ex. 28:29 ff. quoted by Thurian, ibid., p. 57-58.

fruits and vinegar, the lamb and the blood, etc.

These were to be used in order to recreate symbolically, but also objectively and physically, the original conditions of the first Passover, so that it would be "present to" those taking part in the ceremony in a manner which would allow them dramatically to "re-live" the event as it is "memorialized".[1] They were to be "involved" with all of their senses as well as with the "heart" and "soul". Unleavened bread is eaten because there was no time for it to rise on the occasion of the Israelites' flight from Egypt at the original Passover. Bitter herbs must be "chewed" so that even the "taste" of bitterness present in the original event would be experienced by the participants in its sacramental re-enactment. Fruits and vinegar were to be consumed as a reminder of the mud of Egypt. The lamb that gave its blood to protect the Chosen People against the plague was to be slain and eaten, etc. Thurian calls this a "concrete re-living" of the Exodus experience.[2]

All of these objects were used in an action which had been given historical context and significance by the original event, i. e. the Passover and Deliverance from Egypt under Moses. By means of

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[1]Ex. 12:14.

[2]M. T. Thurian, op. cit., p. 19.

"realistic representation" it was believed that the many could in
fact participate with Moses in the crossing of the Red Sea and all
that followed, in and through the action of the celebrants who "me-
morialized" that occasion in which God had originally acted on their
behalf.

The "memorial" action itself was so conceived of as
capable of bearing into the present moment the reality or force of
the past occasion, or conversely, of transporting the participants
back in time into the original time of the original event. This seems
to have been envisioned dynamically as a "reliving" by the partici-
pants of the original time for themselves within the "timeless"
moment of the memorial, rather than as a static superimposition
of objectified "times". In other words, the worshippers were
"participants" and enactors of real events rather than observers of
a "dead past".

Thurian says:

"There was in the mystery of the paschal meal
a kind of telescoping of two periods of history,
the present and the Exodus. The past event
became present or rather each person became a
contemporary of the past event ..... 'It is....the
redemptive act accomplished once for all yet ever
renewed, present, and applied that the Church came to

designate by the word 'mystery' or 'sacrament' ...
(it) expresses the Biblical meaning of the 'salvation-
history' which was accomplished in time 'once-for-all'
but which is equally 'present' at all times 'by Word
and Sacrament'."[1]

Here we are indeed approaching the point at which we can see not

only the essential unity of the four primitive solidarity concepts

which we have examined, but also their special relevance to our

own better understanding of the "Body of Christ" concept, and of

the place of the Sacraments within that concept.

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[1] M. Thurian, ibid., p. 19.

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[1] M. Thurian, ibid., p. 19.

CHAPTER I

Section 2

Sub-section (v)   Implications of the Israelite Use of the

                       Primitive Solidarity Concepts in the Divine

                       Covenant.

        We have now seen how several otherwise quite natural

solidarity conceptions shared by many primitive peoples became

in the Bible the media of the contact of the many members of the

tribe or larger group in the many times and places with the

Supreme Being or Power believed to have been originally operative

in one original and salvation-bearing person or event.

        In the Biblical perspective, the patriarchs and the

prophets, and the historical Jesus are believed to be originally

significant as bearers (in differing ways) of Something beyond

themselves and the human community, specifically of Divine and Per-

sonal Being or Power which was variously portrayed as "behind",

"above", and "before" them, or operating "through" or "in" them,

giving them mission, "leading" them on or "guiding" them, and even

"luring" them to the fulfillment of a "higher" or Transcendent Will or

Purpose.   The desire for communion with them on the part of succeed-

ing generations of persons in Israel or the Church now takes on the

added dimension of the universal human desire for contact with

the Transcendent God, through (a now timeless) contact with them

in those very historical occasions in which the Divine Power is

originally disclosed and made available for human participation.

The psychic "extentional" media which we have already enumerated,

eg. "words", "names", "messengers", "sons", the "spirit", the

"corporate extentional group", the "realistic representative", and the

"cultic anamnesis" thus become the earthly instruments of

communication with Transcendent Divinity. Since in the Biblical

view "Holiness" is conveyed by contact with the "Holy One", and

since this contact is established through these earthly instruments,

"sanctifying" power is made available to man by his use of them to

communicate with (1) the original historical protagonists in the drama,

and through them with (2) the Transcendent God whose Power they

disclose. In this view, every member of the "corporate personality"

of Israel could potentially participate in the Divine Power through

such sacramental union with the heroes of the Biblical Faith, and by

that participation effect a sanctification in himself similar to that

originally effected in them. It is, therefore, primarily for the

sake of participation in Divine Power, and not merely for the sake of

a trans spacio-temporal psychic contact with admirable human beings

that the natural solidarity principles from the primitive Weltanschau-

ung are endorsed by Biblical religion.

Thus it is also that the Divine is conceived of as ordinarily made available in and through (rather than as usually communicable apart from) the earthly, the temporal, and the finite processes of natural and social life. The Transcendent God, is thus in the Biblical presentation also the same Divinity who is met within man's experience of the "transcendent" in those finite occasions when persons, places, and things immediately at hand become bearers of (1) other persons, places, and things in history and (2) of the God Beyond. By inference it could be said that in the Biblical understanding the Transcendence and Immanence of God are not objective bipolarities or aspects of being in God himself, but rather subjective avenues for man of the varying modes of His Presence and Action in relation to them. The Incarnational principle found by some Biblical scholars as implicit in the religious literature of ancient Israel, namely what we might call the theme of God who is a "fellow tent-dweller" in solidarity with his people, bears witness to this conception of the unity of God in man's Transcendental and Immanentistic experiences of Him in the primitive world-view of the Bible.[1] This becomes an important point

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[1] Anthony Hanson has presented a convincing argument for the thesis that the idea of the presence of the pre-existent Christ throughout Israel's history is held by most of the New Testament writers. This theory is quite compatible with the outlook of the present essay. See Jesus Christ in the Old Testament, (London, 1965), esp. pp. 1-9.

for those who would argue in light of the primitive solidarity concepts

and of modern parallels in process philosophy and phenomenology

for the universality of the modes of operation of the Divine Presence in

the world.

CHAPTER I

Section 3

The Primitive Solidarity Concepts of the Old

Testament viewed as the Basis for the "Body

of Christ" Concept in the New Testament.

In the New Testament we are confronted with a whole

series of images to describe the Church which are difficult to under-

stand in terms of the usual categories of modern thought, but which

are immediately clarified when interpreted in the light of the foregoing

solidarity concepts of the Old Testament. The concept of membership

"in Israel" parallels that of membership "in Christ".[1] The concept

of the People of God as the corporate extension of its progenitor

Jacob, or "Israel", is now to found in the

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[1] Gal. 6:16, Rom. 9:6, 8. See
Shedd, op. cit., pp. 136-150, and also E. Best, One Body in Christ,
pp. 1-33, 184-202. Note that Best recognizes the principle of
"corporate personality" in the New Testament but, unlike Shedd
gives it a non-realistic interpretation, calling it "metaphor".
The consequences of such a non-realistic interpretation as Best
would like to supply may be seen in the minority report of the
dissenting Methodists in the recent Anglican-Methodist conversations
in England, which by implication denies that the process of Christ's
Incarnation is in any sense continued or fulfilled in and through
the Church as His "Body". The theory that New Testament terms
for the Church are "metaphors" in the modern sense thus leads to
a failure of "ontological nerve" in some contemporary Protestant
thought on the nature of the Church.

concept of the "Body of Christ" as the corporate extension of its

head, Jesus the Christ.[1]   The other images for the Church in the New

Testament such as "Vine", "Household", "Bride" are taken directly

from Old Testament descriptions of the corporate Israel, now conceived of

as continued and fulfilled, not according to "the flesh", but by a new

dispensation", "in the spirit", in the corporate Christ.[2]   Now no longer

a lineal and ethnic inheritance by natural birth, membership in the New

Israel is conceived of as gained by a second supernatural "birth" in the

spirit, or to use another figure, by incorporation of the many into the human

nature of the one "only-begotten Son" through Baptism.[3]   Such terms

have been selected by the New Testament writers to describe for the

readers in the post-Socratic Hellenic world the reality of the relationship

of the many to the one which is already familiar to the New Testament

writers themselves from their own Hebraic religious background.

All of the instruments of the "extension of personality"

which we have found in the Old Testament are also present in the New. Thus

we have the creedal evaluation of Jesus as the "Word" of God, and the

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[1] 1 Cor. 6:15, 10:17, 12:27, Rom. 12:4-6, Eph. 5:23, 30, 32, cf. Shedd,
op. cit., pp. 157-165 and
J.A.T. Robinson, op. cit., p. 11 ff. The term "Body" is not found in
the Old Testament, but is taken by St. Paul from Stoic writings as
an equivalent of the Hebrew expressions of solidarity found in
Greek philosophical language.

[2] Jn. 15:1-11, Gal. 6:10, Eph. 2:19, 2 Cor. 11:2, Rom. 7:4-6, 12-17, See
Minear, Paul: Images for the Church in the New Testament
(Phila., 1960) pp. 42-4, 54-5, 165-172, 173-220.

[3] Jn. 3:3, 1 Cor. 12:13, Gal. 3:27, Rom. 6:3-4, cf.
Shedd, op. cit., pp. 185-188.

emphasis upon the efficacy of his spoken words.[1] We find in the

New Testament the same association of numinous power with the

utterance of the "Name" of Jesus as we found connected with the

"Name" of Yahweh in the Old Testament.[2] The "Spirit" is likewise

seen as the active extension of God himself in the world and is closely

associated with the person and work of Jesus as Messiah and Son of

God.[3] The "Spirit" is portrayed as sent by the Christ in the Pente-

costal experience to extend and continue the sphere of His messianic

presence and mission in the world through the Church.[4] This

extensional principle is attested to in the Book of Acts by the reproduction

by the many of the works of the One, in the proclamation of the Kingdom

of God by healing, exorcism, remission of sin, and teaching with authority.[5]

As in the Old Testament, physical objects also become the media of the

Divine Presence, and of the presence of Jesus ("the hem of His garment",

Peter's "shadow", etc.).[6] The story of the Baptism of Cornelius'

household in Acts mentions all of the instruments of the "extension of

personality" which we have seen in the Old Testament. Thus Peter,

the "apostle" or "messenger", preaches the Word in the "words" of the

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[1] Jn. 1:14, Mt. 8:16.

[2] Mt. 18:20, Acts. 3:16, 4:12, Eph. 1:21.

[3] Gal. 4:6. See Johnston, George, "Spirit", Theological Word Book of
    the Bible, ed. by Alan Richardson, (London, 1950)

[4] Jn. 14:26, 16:13, cf. Acts 1:2

[5] Mt. 10:5-9, Lk. 9:16-17, cf. Acts. 3:6-8, 14:3.
[6] Mt. 9:20, 14:36, Acts. 5:15.

Kerygma, the "Spirit" is outpoured. Cornelius' "household" or "kin-group"

is baptized in the "Name" of Jesus and becomes the first Gentile member-

ship of the Church.[1] The principle of the "extension" of the personality of

the Christ in individual members of His Church is explicitly stated in the

apostolic commission, "He who receives any one whom I send, receives me,

and he who receives me receives Him who sent me",[2] and in the dominical

injunction "Inasmuch as you have done it unto any one of the least of

these my brethren, you have done it unto me".[3]

The concept of "realistic representation" is found in the New

Testament in the idea of Christ as representative Man or new Adam,[4] as well

as in the idea of the corporate and representational role of the Servant

whose sufferings and death are viewed as expiatory on behalf of all. [5]

It is because of His "realistic representation" of all men in His life of

obedience to the Father, in which the first Adam had failed and likewise

implicated all men, that Jesus is viewed as the beginning or "first fruits"

of a new creation.[6] His life, death, and resurrection are viewed as con-

taining implicitly the key which had made available potentially to all of man-

kind the new kind of life, or new creation, seen at first in Him alone.[7] It

is also because of "realistic representation" that Paul can say to his readers

that they have died to the old life with Jesus in His death and have risen with

Him in His Resurrection to a new life.[8]

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[1] Acts 10:34-48   [2] Jn. 13:20   [3] Mt. 25:40

[4] 1 Cor 15:45, 2 Cor. 4:5, Col. 3:9-11, 2 Cor. 5:17 cf. pp. 43-54, this essay
and Shedd, op. cit., pp. 165-173.

[5] Heb. 2:9-11, 2 Cor. 1:5-7   [6] 1 Cor. 15:20-22

[7] 1 Cor. 15:23-24   [8] 2 Tim. 2:10-12.

This language is surely not merely metaphorical for a moral transformation incited in the Christian by the example of Jesus; it seems to imply an ontological identification of the many with their "realistic representative", Jesus. In the same way that we have seen the high-priest of Israel to "embody" the whole nation in his own person and actions in the Atonement ceremonies, we now find the New Testament speaking of Jesus in His life, death, and resurrection.[1]

The concept of "cultic anamnesis" is seen in the Eucharistic memorial, and continues the pattern familiar from the Old Testament ritual of trans spacio-temporal participation of the many persons of many times in the one Person in one sacred time.[2] As the many worshippers consume the common loaf and drink of the common cup, they conceive of themselves as participating in the one Person ("Body") and Life ("Blood") of Christ given for them in the (once for all) event of a redemptive death, and so by virtue of this union share in His Resurrection.[3] The Pauline presentation of Baptism as a "dying and rising again" with Christ, may also be seen as an embodiment of the principle of "cultic anamnesis".[4]

Thus, there is a unity in the solidarity conceptions of the Old and New Testaments.[5] We shall now continue our study by seeing if there might not in reality also be a kind of unity between the ancient and some at least of our modern thought-forms dealing with the various ways in which space, time, and numerical plurality can be overcome.

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[1] Heb. 2:17

[2] M. Thurian, op. cit., Part II, "The New Testament".

[3] 1. Cor. 10:16 and Gal. 3:27, cf. Shedd, op. cit., p. 189.

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[4] Rom. 6:3, Gal. 3:27, and Shedd, _Ibid,_ pp. 185-188

[5] See also Lionel Thornton's _The Common Life in the Body of Christ_
(London, 1944) for a study of the fulfillment of the Old Testament
solidarity concepts in the New Testament.

CHAPTER II

PROCESS THOUGHT FROM WHITEHEAD TO CHARDIN.:

ITS RELEVANCE TO A CONTEMPORARY UNDERSTAND-

ING OF THE "BODY OF CHRIST" CONCEPT IN LIGHT OF

THE PRIMITIVE SOLIDARITY CONCEPTS.

Section I

The Possibility of Interpreting the Primitive Solidarity

Concepts and the "Body of Christ" Concept in Terms of

Modern Thought.

At this point the case for viewing the "Body of Christ"

concept against the background of the primitive solidarity concepts

has been briefly summarized.from contemporary Biblical scholarships.

But several major problems relating to each of the four

solidarity concepts of the Bible remain for the theologian to solve:

'(1) How is it possible for one person to be "extended" or "reproduced"

in another, or "conveyed" to that other? (2) How is it possible for

one person to be "shared" by a group? (3) How is it possible for one

person to "represent" or "sum-up" in himself the whole group of which

he is part? And (4) How is it possible for the faculty of "memory" to

bridge the spacio-temporal gaps which objectively isolate individuals

from one another, in order to allow the processess involved in (1) - (3)

above ?

Several process philosophers and phenomenologists

have dealt with these questions in one form or another. I do not mean

to suggest that the Christian theologian would want to accept com-

pletely the philosophical systems of the men whose works will thus

provided him with inspiration. Only two of the writers to whom we will

allude in this study (Chardin and Allport) are formally Christian; two

more are theists of an unorthodox variety (Bergson and Whitehead),

and the remaining four (the phenomenologists Husserl, Heidegger,

esp. the early Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty) are all avowed

"non-theists" of one kind or another. Nor, were many of them

especially motivated by the desire to shed light on what I should like to

call the "holistic" world-views of primitive peoples. But I believe that

they have done precisely this by digging deeply into often forgotten

truths concerning the problem of man's relationships to his world. By

rendering this service they may also have opened new avenues of

contemporary insight into the thought-world of the Bible.

Each of these writers, both process philosophers and phenomenologists, will be seen to possess widely divergent philosophical premises. The "intuitionalism" of Bergson, for example, is in direct opposition to the rational empiricism of Whitehead. The transcendental "ego" of Husserl, the transcendental "being" of Heidegger, the transcendental "consciousness" of Sartre, and the primacy of the "lived-world" in Merleau-Ponty, are, when logically considered, all mutually contradictory pre-suppositions about foundational realities in human experience. And yet each of these writers provides something by way of insight, here in part or there in part, into those things with which the Christian theologian must be concerned when he attempts to explain the sacramental principles which underly the "Body of Christ" concept.[1] I believe that process philosophers and phenomenologists have unearthed in contemporary terms some of the ancient roots from which have grown both the primitive solidarity concepts and the Biblical understanding of the dynamic and creative relationships that exist between man and his world. All of them think of that world as a place which is constantly in a state of becoming, development, or a self-creational unfolding, in interaction with, and as a result of, the interior

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[1] For this reason I do not feel that I can justly be charged with promiscuity for gathering so widely from so many divergent philosophical positions. My purpose is to construct a broad contemporary apologetic for classical Christian concepts. In order to do this, it will, of course,

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be necessary to cite individual philosophers not for what they themselves are trying to prove in the religious sense, if anything, about God, man or the world by their philosophies (which is often as detrimental to the Christian cause as were some of the specific conclusions of the philosophy of an Aristotle or the religion of the devotees of the mystery cults), but rather for what they have in fact said about the ways in which man is related to his world. It is just such a wide ingathering of isolated secular insights as this which has always provided building materials for the Christian apologist, whether in the ancient, medieval or modern periods.

intentionality and pursuits of human consciousness. Taken together,

their works will provide the partial construction of a bridge across

the centuries to the primitive Weltanschauung of the Bible in which

the sacramental concepts of what Thorlief Boman has called

"interior space-time" and the creative objectivity of human intentionality

help to provide philosophical groundwork for the Western Religious

tradition.[1]

The legitimacy of constructing a Christian apologetic

from parts of divergent philosophical systems, which themselves are

inconsistent with one another and with inclusion in the overall scheme

of the Christian dogmatic perspective, will be questioned by some.

Those who believe with Adolph Harnack and Karl Barth in the radical

inadequacy of analytical or ontological speculation in the Greek tradition

to express the great themes and motifs of Semitic religion will perhaps

find difficulty in such an attempt to find equation between the Hebraic

solidarity concepts and modern psychological and philosophical

developments. But those who believe in the classical position that there

is a legitimate process involving adaptation of the terms of Greek

philosophy to Hebrew religion, beginning within the New Testament

itself and continuing throughout the central Patristic theological

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[1] T. Boman, op. cit., pp. 123-183.

tradition of the undivided Church from Clement of Alexandria and Irenaeus to John Damascene and Gregory Palamas in the East, and through Aquinas and the Schoolmen in the West, will allow that such an undertaking as this is at least feasible.

There is, nevertheless, some apprehension in "Neo-Orthodox" and some "Neo-Scholastic" circles, over the fact that process thought in its non-Christian form seems incompatible with an authentically Christian appraisal of the problem of evil and the "radical flaw" which exists in the processes of the life-development of intelligent organic beings.[1] Some are wary of a reversion to the naive doctrine of inevitable historical progress which reigned in 19th Century Liberalism.

Many elements present in the traditional Christian doctrine of man are missing from the secularist perspective of some of the process-philosophers and phenomenologists. They would seem to have little appreciation of the Biblical view of man's inability to act upon and to realize his potentialities apart from the help of a Power from beyond himself.

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[1] The Neo-Orthodox apprehension often stems from the usual Barthian rejection of "natural theology" in general. The Neo-Scholastic apprehension often stems from a conservative and dualistic attitude toward the question of God's relationship to the world. For an example of the latter see R.A. Markus and A.H. Armstrong, Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy (London, 1960), note esp. Armstrong's rejection of Chardin on this point, p. 42, n. 1.

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Although the non-Christian phenomenologists are informed by the existentialists' appreciation of the tragic dimension in life, they are nevertheless open to just criticism either for their fatalistic pessimism or, on the other hand, for placing a naive confidence in man's ability to save himself from error by cultivating proper mental attitudes, e.g. the performance of the "phenomenological reduction" and in the potentially limitless capacity of human consciousness to create its own values.

But it is not for these particular philosophical deficiencies providing no parallels to the tenets of Revelation that we search their writings in any case. For the Christian, wholeness of truth is sought on the level of Revelation, not on the level of philosophical speculation. It is rather that we hope to find useful concepts which will serve adequately to express the tenets of Revelation in a contemporary theological statement. This is precisely the relationship which existed in the classical and normative Christian theological tradition to which we have already alluded. In this tradition philosophy is the servant rather than the master of the data delivered into human experience through Revelation. As such, a Whitehead, a Heidegger, or a Sartre may be made to contribute to contemporary theology just as pagan Stoic and Platonic philosophers contributed to the New Testament writers and to the Greek Fathers of the Early Church.

CHAPTER II

Section 2   The Relevance of The Concept of "Objective

Immortality" in the Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead

to the "Body of Christ" Concept.

Earlier in this century Alfred North Whitehead

(1861-1947) predicted the issue with which we are faced today in the

challenge of so-called "Christian Atheism", with regard to the

question of the continued relevance of classical "God-concepts".

In 1926 he published the prophetic essay Science and the Modern

World in which he called for the reconstruction of metaphysics

upon the basis of the new physics of process and relativity.[1] He

envisioned that such a new metaphysical system would be more

adequate to the needs of contemporary religion in its attempts to

find adequate symbols with which to express the content of the Biblical

conception of the "Eternal" and of the "Transcendent" order. He

felt that the classical philosophies of Plato and Aristotle were no

longer adequate to this task. He saw them as based upon an outmoded

physical world view which presupposed a static conception of essences.

He feared that the failure to undertake the reconstruction of metaphysics

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[1] Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, (New York, 1926) pp. 1-28,
165-225, 259-276.

would ultimately lead to the rejection of traditional concepts of

God as irrelevant to modern man's experience of the world as

historical process.

In 1929 Whitehead published Process and Reality as the

reconstruction of metaphysics which would meet the need described

in his earlier essay for a philosophy compatible with the dynamic

world-view found in the contemporary natural sciences.[1] It is a

metaphysics which has as its aim the involvement of the eternal

and absolute in the temporal and contingent world of space-time.

In the metaphysics of Whitehead "objective immortality"

is achieved through the process of the evolutionary development of

concrete individual entities in the world of space and time.[2] Once

a concrete individual entity or "actual occasion", has come to exist

in the historical process, it then possesses an objectively immortal

quality, and forever thereafter remains what it has become after it

passes on and ceases to exist as a subjectively immediate concrete entity

in the world of historical process. As an "actual occasion" with "objective

immortality" it possesses and becomes potentially available as a model for

"concrescences" of new "actual occasions" as they come into existence

later in the historical process. Each new "actual occasion" is,

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[1] A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, (New York, 1929).

[2] Ibid., 27-39.

while dependent on previously developed "actual occasions" as its models, at the same time a unique and entirely different entity in itself.[1] For the individual "actual occasion" may "prehend", or take into itself, not only the models which it has derived from other past "actual occasions", but also models taken from any combination of "eternal objects", or "determinants of pure potentiality", which for Whitehead exist in the "primordial nature" of God.

Many concrete entities or "actual occasions" with their corollary "objective immortality" are produced in every "concrescence", or event in which there is a "coming together" of elements in the processes of creation in history. An already existing event in the historical process thus provides many models for later "concrescences". "Process" fulfills itself by the cooperation of the creative urge which blends pure potentiality of "eternal objects" with already existing events; together they produce a new synthetic combination of models for incorporation into newly developing concrete entities. They unite the "eternal objects" with models from particular past events. The result is the uniquely new individual.[2]

Many potential models are present in each event but unnoticed. The point of entry of the model into the developing being is a matter

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[1] Ibid., pp. 95-126.

[2] Ibid., pp. 321-325.

of importance for subjective "prehension"; if an event becomes such

a matter of subjective importance to another developing "actual

occasion", it then can be incorporated into its being.

Whitehead was unable to overcome the problem of the limit-

ation of God's creativity implied by the finite development of potent-

ially available past "actual occasions" possessing "objective immort-

ality" to serve as models at any given point in the historical process.

Whitehead was also unable to overcome the implication that God was

in Himself submerged in His involvement in the historical process and

hence imperfect or incomplete. He attempted to overcome the difficulty

of his position by distinguishing between the "primordial" nature of

God and the "consequent" nature of God.[1] The "primordial" nature of

God is God as He exists in Himself. The "consequent" nature of God

is God as involved in the historical process, which is fulfilling

itself, as yet incomplete or imperfect, until the creation is perfected.

From the standpoint of the Western theological tradition

such a distinction between the "primordial" and the "consequent" natures

of the Transcendent Being of God is unknown. But I am convinced that

in the Byzantine tradition the doctrine of the "uncreated energies" of God

affords a parallel.[2] Here a distinction

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[1] Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 91-126.

[2] See Vladimir Lossky, "The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church",
    (London, 1957), pp. 67-90.

is made within the nature of God between His "essence" and His

"energies". In this distinction God in His own "essence" is the

Absolute, Self-Sufficient, utterly Transcendent "Deus Absconditus",

the "unknown God" of the apophatic theology; and yet God in His

"energies" is also really the Transcendent God, but God as He is

found substantially involved in the world, transforming and redeeming it

by the union of creatures with His own Transcendent Being in "knowable"

"extensions" or "irradiations" from His "essence".[1] For Greek and

Russian theologians, from the Cappadocian formulators of Trinitarian

doctrine, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus, through

Dionysius the Areopagite and Gregory Palamas to Vladimir Lossky in

our own day, we find that there has been a real accommodation of the

Transcendent "Being" of God within the creation, in nature and history.[2]

Whitehead was also motivated by the desire to accommodate the Transcendent

God within the creation, and to preserve at the same time the Absoluteness

and internal self-sufficiency of God.[3]

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[1] Lossky, ibid., pp. 86-90.

[2] ibid., pp. 67-90 passim.

[3] This mode of accommodation of God within His Creation should not be
confused with the doctrine of Divine Immanence, which is found in
both Western scholastic and Eastern Orthodox thought. The Eastern
doctrine of the "uncreated energies" is an attempt to bring God in
His Transcendence, not merely in His Immanence, into a special
supernatural and sacramental (redemptive) relationship with His
creatures above and beyond the natural (creational) relationship
which He has with the world by virtue of His Immanence. This calls
ultimately for the complete and final "glorification" or "transfiguration"
of the cosmos by its union with the Transcendence of God.

In Whitehead's philosophy the doctrine of the "consequent" nature of God

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is likewise far more than a mere restatement of the Divine Immanence.
Whitehead is also concerned with the presence of God Himself in the
world in His Transcendence. For Whitehead, the "consequent"
nature of God involves the Divine Transcendence itself in the Creation
to the extent that God Himself can be spoken of as affected by His
relationship in His own Being with it.
cf. Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 532-3.
The difference between Whitehead and Eastern Orthodox theology is
that while for the latter God in His Transcendence is united to the
creation by the "uncreated energies", He is not in Himself necessarily
affected by the relationship. God is Himself somehow changed by
His relationship with the world in Whitehead's theory.

Some kind of accommodation of God's Transcendence to the
world is, of course, quite necessary if one would make sense out of the
primitive solidarity concepts of the Bible, in which God Himself is
portrayed as we have seen, as "really present" in a special mode beyond
that of His Immanence in and through His human and creaturely
"extensions", "corporate personality", and "realistic representations".[1]
The idea of the "consequent" nature of God in Whitehead, and the idea
of the "uncreated energies" of God in the Eastern Orthodox tradition are
both helpful concepts for those who would, with the Bible, link the
essentially "unlinkable", the Transcendence of God and His world.

Whitehead's attempt to accommodate God's Transcendence
within the world process results in a philosophical paradox. For in
traditional terms, it is indeed paradoxical to say that God, cannot exist
without time, and this is precisely what, in every sense, the Whiteheadian
system implies. But this "temporally limited" God is not God in His
"primordial nature", it is rather God in His "consequent nature".
Granting all of the problems this presents to the traditional Platonic
formulations of Christian theism, Christian process philosophers are
coming to appreciate the fact that these problems are no greater than the
old problems associated with "baptizing" the Platonic and Aristotelian systems.

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[1] Eastern theologians often suggest that the Western failure to provide a
satisfactory philosophical basis for consideration of special modes of
Divine Transcendental Presence in the Creation above and beyond the
usual consideration of the general Immanence of God has led to difficulties
in both Latin and Protestant doctrinal formulations of the dogma of the
"Real Presence" in the Eucharist.

For example, as far as the pre-Christian Greek philosophers were concerned, one could stop the clock, and real or eternal things of ultimate value, namely the "forms", would remain exactly the same. Space and time become an irrelevant after-thought to an independent eternity. The early Christian Fathers confronted this difficulty which arose from the employment of Greek philosophy in the service of Christian religion.[1]

In the view of many contemporary process philosophers this aspect of Platonic speculation was bound to remain at variance with the dynamic significance of time and historical process portrayed in the Bible. They view the later substitution of the philosophy of Aristotle (which does allow for the "perfecting" of objects in the world through the inherence of form in the dynamic potential of matter) for that of Plato by the Medieval Schoolmen as having allowed a greater place for potentiality, time, change, and matter in the production of objects in the physical world.[2] But this accommodation of the mere "perfectability" of objects in matter is not enough to satisfy process philosophers. For Aristotle and Aquinas, just as for Plato, the eternal "forms" or "essences" of things are still not essentially "created" in themselves through the historical process. This is what contemporary process thought demands. Whitehead meets this demand. For Whitehead, things with "objective immortality" are

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[1] See Richard A. Norris, Jr., God and the World in Early Christian Philosophy, (New York, 1965), esp. pp. 159-170 for further study on this point.

[2] For an historical survey of issues involved in the transition from Platonic to Aristotelian thought in the Middle Ages, see David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought, (New York, 1962), pp. 3-15, 221-234.

created as they unite "eternal objects" with other past "actual

occasions" in and through new "actual occasions".

Christian process philosophers and theologians are

disturbed by the fact that the old ontologies of Plato and Aristotle

still seem basically unbaptizable into the Christian framework on this

important count, that history, time, contingency, space, matter, and particular changeable existences of this world have no essential share in the creation of the eternal forms themselves. For the pre-philosophical religious perspective of the Bible this was not so. Time, history, space, and material things are the essential sphere of God's creative activity. With Whitehead in the 20th Century many feel that we have at last found a new ontology that will do justice to a dynamic Biblical concept of creation and to the modern scientific view of continual creation in and through the spacio-temporal processes of evolution, growth, fulfillment, decay, and in the interrelated processes of the individual life cycles of particular members of the species of organic life in the cosmos.

E.R. Baltazar, in a recently published article stresses the need in contemporary theology for a new ontology which will convert the notion of "substance" from the Aristotelian-Thomistic definition of it as something "self-enclosed", "well defined", and "able to exist of itself", into the more dynamic categories of process and relation. [1]

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[1] E.R. Baltazar, "Teilhard de Chardin: A Philosophy of Procession", an essay in New Theology No. 2, ed. by Martin E. Marty and Dean G. Peerman, (N.Y. 1965,) pp. 131-150. Baltazar's interest for us is all the greater because he suggests that there is some hint of the existence of as yet unsystematized components of a new and more satisfactory ontology to be found in contemporary phenomenology, as well as in what he calls the "philosophy of procession". He cites Pedersen in a passing reference to the fact that the primitive Old Testament view of "wholeness" is somehow akin to the insights to be gained from a study of Chardin and an acceptance of the principles of process thought. ibid., p. 142, cf. p. 6, n. 1, this essay.

While Baltazar cites Chardin he does not mention
Whitehead's contribution to such a new ontology. Nevertheless,
it should be clear to those who read Baltazar and who also know
Whitehead that this is precisely what has been done in Process and
Reality.

As Baltazar says, for Aristotle and for Aquinas,
"process" is merely an "activity" of "substance", which exists
in its own right by virtue of the inherence of a particular eternal
"form" in changeable "matter". While "substance" can change,
because of the "matter" in it, the "form", or the eternal part of
"substance", is changeless and is in itself independent of the
relational context of the union with matter in which it stands at any
given moment in time or any given localization of space.

Baltazar wants to make the transition from the idea
that such things as process and relation can be contained within
the category of "substance" as simple "activities". He wants to assert
that "process" itself, with its concomitant category of "relation", is
the basic category within which "substance" itself must be understood,
rather than vice-versa.

Baltazar sees that Scholastic philosophy has tended
to relegate evolution or process "...to the category of the phenomenal

or accidental as opposed to the metaphysical or substantial."[1] As

we have seen, this was precisely Whitehead's point in Science and Religion

when he called for a metaphysics which would accommodate the twin facts

of evolution and relativity.

In all fairness to it, and although Baltazar does not say so,

Scholastic philosophy does make an important distinction between "accidental"

and "substantial" change, and insists upon both. But what is meant by

substantial change does not allow for the growth, evolution, or mutation

of "forms" themselves. The entire substance changes because of the

pliability of matter, which allows for the progressive "perfection" of the

particular being as a hylomorphic unity of form-and-matter. Substantial

change allows for the emergence of "new" beings or creatures in history

only in the sense that already existent eternal forms, which themselves

never change or are never essentially affected by historical and finite

processes, may appear at a given point in historical or evolutionary

developments as a new species embodied in matter.[2] Within the historical

life of that particular formal species the form itself may be spoken of as

"active", but this simply means that it is actively and progressively per-

fecting its reception in matter so that a more perfect example of its

species may exist in the world. Growth is the

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[1] Baltazar, op. cit., p. 137.

[2] For a sympathetic description of "substantial change", in Scholastic
thought, see Introduction to Realistic Philosophy, John Wild,
(N.Y. 1948) pp. 403-4.

movement of a particular being in the world toward the telos or

perfection of an already assigned formal essence, or final cause

and is essentially unrelated to the evolution or mutation of the

eternal form or model itself into something novel. This is precisely

the reason why, no matter what apologetic is made for the "dynamism"

of matter, the "activism" of form, or the "substantiality of change"

in Scholastic philosophy by its protagonists, it inevitably misses

the point that contemporary physical science requires a philosophy

which will accommodate the ontology of change, or the need for

mutation of "eternal forms" themselves, if evolutionary theory is to

be metaphysically grounded. For Scholastic philosophy this mutation

of "eternal forms" is a contradiction in terms and an impossible

paradox. But it is quite compatible with the philosophy of Whitehead,

which allows for the creation of new forms, or objectively immortal

entities through the evolution of "actual occasions" or concrete

objects in the world.

The implications of Scholastic ontology for a theological

doctrine of man are that human individuals are assigned at conception

or birth a pre-established formal essence or soul which is individuated

by its union with the potential or indeterminate substratum of matter

into a person. The idea which we shall see when we examine the thought

of Gordon Allport to be so essential to some modern psychologists,
that a man in effect shares in his own continual creation through his
thoughts, actions, and words directed toward a selected goal or
"proprium", can not be accommodated by Scholastic philosophy, any
more than, can the idea of phenomenologists (such as Heidegger or
Sartre) that man is essentially a self-created being.[1] The contention
of many process thinkers would be that a 20th Century ontology adequate
to the task of providing a substantial metaphysical basis for the new
facts of the natural and social sciences must be found.[2] In specific,
the new facts which require an ontological grounding in our day are the
particular facts of the evolution, process, and relativity or relation
of all of the things known to man in the universe.

The process philosopher would say that we can no
longer subscribe to a metaphysic which views "substance" as self-
subsistent or capable of existing in itself, apart from its relationships
with everything else in the universe and its place in the particular
process in which it is constituted.

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[1] See pp. 148-166, this essay.

[2] For example, see Baltazar, op. cit., p. 136.

In the Whiteheadian system the basic category of thought
is process within which is an interpenetration of temporal beings by
eternal forms and, conversely, eternal forms by temporal being.
The particular immortalized object has not always existed _from_ eternity
but rather has developed _through_ a temporal being and only then transcends
time. It may then be incorporated into other developing, concrete
individualities in the world as a model. Potentially every other
creature in the cosmos can relate internally to every other creature
in this manner; and every form can relate to every other in eternity.[1]
All of this gives history, time, and place, a supreme importance to
eternity itself; in one sense, a "heaven" filled with immortalized
creatures cannot exist without "earth". This seems to follow the sequence
of the creation of the spiritual through the material implied in the
Bible. "First the man of the earth, earthy; then the man from Heaven,
heavenly."[2] For the Christian process philosopher the Biblical drama
of God's activity on earth and in history, in

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[1] Whitehead, _Process and Reality_, pp. 168-197.

[2] 1 Cor. 15:47.

dialogue and in cooperation with man, seems to suit the

philosophical terms of Whitehead's system better than it does

those of Plato or Aristotle and the Schoolmen. The Incarnation

becomes, symbolically, the revealed analogue of an innate secret

of the creation itself. The temporal and the finite become in this

way the abode of the eternal. The Christian doctrine that man's

relationship to God is "synergistic", i.e., that man is a fellow

worker with God, becomes the pivotal point of the redemptive and

sanctification processes for the Christian process philosopher.

Thus freed from the formal staticism of Plato and Aristotle alike,

Christianity no longer need inevitably open itself to those asthetically

world-denying tendencies which have so often opposed, in Richard

Niebuhr's terms, "Christ against Culture".[1] All life in this world,

the process of evolution, and the struggles of creaturely existence

for ascendency over the demonic forces and distortive influences

of moral and physical evil in human life, potentially become the

eternal battleground of God in history. This life suddenly assumes

a clear and consummate

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[1] The title of Chapter 2, pp. 45-82, in Richard Niebuhr's Christ
and Culture, (New York, 1955). This chapter surveys the effects
in Christian history of what Whitehead would call "misplaced
concreteness". (See p. 89, this essay.)

meaning. It is the place of our creation, the hammering out of our very beings on the anvil of time, and a process in which we share with God the shaping of our destiny in "objective immortality". Deliberation and creaturely free will, within the boundaries set by God for every species from the atom to man, can become significant in Whiteheadian terms as the potentiality in every developing "actual occasion" to incorporate into itself other "actual occasions" as models which have been arrested as matters of importance from the surrounding milieu of other present or past creatures.

All of this should help Christian theology to avoid what Whitehead calls "misplaced concreteness".[1] This is the placing of undue emphasis on eternity at the expense of time, on the "formal" at the expense of the "material" and the avoiding of responsibility in the actual world of event and experience for the sake of the ideal or intellectualized schema. Whitehead sees this as the greatest Achilles' heel in the Western philosophical tradition and of the Western civilization which has arisen out of it. For the Christian process philosopher "misplaced concreteness" is the price of maintaining Platonism at the expense of the Bible. Process philosophers would also suggest that it is a cause of the materialistic compensation taken by 19th Century Marxism, and that in the contemporary study of philosophy it has led

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[1] See Science and the Modern World, Chapter 3, for a fuller explanation of "misplaced concreteness".

in our time to a swing away from ontology altogether, in one direction toward logical positivism, and in another direction toward existentialism.[1] The Whiteheadian ontology attempts to avoid the dangers against which these varied compensations were staged. Whitehead's ontology therefore may be useful to the Christian theologian in recapturing the insights of these compensatory movements while avoiding their pitfalls. Whitehead is not a materialist; but he appreciates the ultimate significance of time and matter to eternity. Whitehead is not a positivist; but he appreciates the "misplaced concreteness" against which the positivist reacts, and he shares an existentialist's concern for the actual event as the truly real.

Whiteheadian terms easily relate to the ancient solidarity concepts which have recently enlarged our understanding of the Church and the Sacraments. These primitive concepts make excellent sense in terms of the new ontology of Whitehead. For example, "psychic extension of personality" can become, in Whiteheadian terms, the incorporation of one person into another after he has achieved "objective immortality", by becoming a model in the other's development. Such "extension of personality" becomes the means through which one can become an interior component in the new being of another. "Corporate personality" can now be thought of as the wider sphere of influence of a Whiteheadian "actual occasion" which has achieved "objective immortality" and become a model to many others, all of whom in this manner share a

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[1] For a contemporary survey and appraisal of the historical ill effects on Christianity of Platonism, and essentialism in general, see Christianity and Existentialism, by Wm. Earl, James M. Edie, and John Wild. (Evanston, Illinois, 1963).

common personality. "Realistic representation" may also be viewed

in Whiteheadian terms. Any one of the members of a group or class

sharing a common model are all equally capable by virtue of their

internal constitution of representing both the proto-type member

or first "actual occasion" and all other members of the group or class.

This type of representation is, therefore, not democratic but "realistic"

in that it depends not upon the consent of the group, but rather upon

the ontic identity of the "representative" with the group. In addition,

"cultic anamnesis" may be interpreted in Whiteheadian terms as the

moment in which an "objectively immortalized" "actual occasion" is

provided the means by which it may be incorporated into others as a

model. In these terms "cultic anamnesis" is the process by which one

object can become available to the newly developing "actual occasion"

even though that now "objectively immortalized" occasion may have

existed at a point in the spacio-temporal continuum far removed from

its model.

On the basis of such an interpretation of the primitive

solidarity concepts in the light of Whiteheadian philosophy, the

Christian creed may be stated as follows: The historical Jesus is the

"actual occasion" who has achieved " objective immortality" and become

a model for a new kind of human being (through the process of living an

actual life as the perfect fulfillment of the Divine in terms of the

human). As such the historical Jesus is the "Christ" or Messiah who bears

the Divine Life (Logos) to man. His new humanity is the pre-condition

of the union between the Divine and the human in his person. As the

human Christ he is a model from that point onwards in history, for

incorporation into the developing personalities of others of that new

type of humanity. The many thus become the "extensions", "corporate

personality", and "realistic representatives of the one in his new humanity.

This "corporate" and "representational" "extension" is at the same time

his "Church" and his "Body". The Sacraments, all of which involve "cultic

anamnesis" in the conveyance of an "objectively immortalized" past

occasion through the remembrance of an historical occasion, are the

points at which the new humanity becomes available to man through the

remembrance of the historical Jesus "made available" across the spacio-

temporal frontiers for incorporation into the many "actual occasions"

i. e. other men.[1]

These "others", the "Body of Christ", can therefore be

spoken of as actually being "remade after his image", or as in the

process of a "second birth", or becoming "new creatures". The

important thing about this is the realization that, in terms of

Whitehead's philosophy, the process by which Christ is related to his

Church is at root essentially the same as that natural process by

which every man

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[1] We shall examine this point further in light of Bergson's concept of
"objective memorial". See pp. 114-116 in this essay.

is, potentially, related to every other. This does not detract from
the uniqueness of Jesus as the Christ or from the reality of the
participation of the many in Him as the One. The theology of the
Church and Sacraments is also thus removed from its unfamiliar
primitive setting and is placed alongside the commonly accepted
solidarity data of modern psychology, sociology, and anthropology,
where the task of constructing a contemporary apologetic is made
easier for the Christian theologian.[1]

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[1] For examples of modern orthodox Christian theological constructions
indebted to the philosophy of Whitehead and dealing with the
Incarnation see Norman Pittenger, The Word Incarnate, (New York,
1955) and Lionel Thornton, The Incarnate Lord, (London, 1928).
The construction outlined above is my own, and is not based upon these
works, although I think it is fully compatible with them.
For an excellent short summary of Whitehead's metaphysics see the
introduction to selections from Whitehead written by Charles
Hartshorne and Wm. L. Reese in Philosophers Speak of God,
(Chicago, 1953) pp. 273-277, and for a discussion of the general
implications of process thought for theism see the Introduction to
this volume, by the same writers, entitled, "The Standpoint of
Panentheism", pp. 1-15.
Also worthy of note are William A. Christian, An Interpretation
of Whitehead's Metaphysics, (New Haven, 1959), and John B.
Cobb, Jr., A Christian Natural Theology, (New York, 1965).

CHAPTER II

Section 3

The Relevance of the Concept of "Objective

Memorial" in the Philosophy of Henri Bergson

to the "Body of Christ" Concept.

There is important application and implementation

of the relevance of process philosophy to the primitive concept of

"cultic anamnesis" in Bergson's understanding of the "memory".[1]

For Henri Bergson (1859-1941) as for Whitehead who was influenced

by his concepts of process and time, the "memory" is more than a

simple faculty of the mind for maintaining images received from past

perceptions. It is the unique faculty by which one apprehends in the

present the reality of past events. All events, regardless of when they

occur within the time-line or process of duration, are equally "past",

or "history", by the time the empirical sensations of them reach the

consciousness of an experiencing subject.[2] Therefore, the implication of

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[1] It is interesting to note that some Biblical scholars have seen a close
similarity between Bergson's conception of time and that found in
primitive Israelite thinking. Among them are Nathan Söderblom, in
Uppenbarelsreligionen, 2nd ed. (Stockholm, 1930) p. 163, and in
The Living God, (London, 1933) pp. 310 ff. and Thorlief Boman,
op. cit., p. 22. n.1, and pp. 126-7, 129.

[2] H. Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. by N.M. Paul and W.S.
Palmer, (New York, 1959) pp. 125-127.

this is, that for Bergson as it was for Whitehead, through the faculty

of "memory" one could be equally as close to something that happened

years ago as to something that occurred only milliseconds ago.

For Bergson the "memory" is a "psychical state" of

the person himself, rather than a "faculty" as such. A person incor-

porates in himself, all of his own past at all times.[1] A person also

potentially includes in himself all of the cosmic past, including the

universal history of the human race of which he is a part. The

"memory" is that particular "psychical state" in which a person

realizes in himself the presence of events either from his own indi-

vidual past or from the collective past history of mankind. This

"psychical state" is awakened by coming into contact with objects

(persons, places, things, actions, words, etc.) which serve to bring

one into an awareness of the presence of these events through the

formation of "images" in the memory. The objects which stimulate

such psychical awareness of one's "immediate present" are

what might be termed "objective memorials."[2]

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[1] ibid, p. 139, 141.

[2] ibid, p. 29. The term is mine. Bergson says: "Such an image, therefore, can not appear unless the external object has, once at least, played its part: it must, once, at any rate, have been part and parcel with representation... there is no image without an object."

The "objective memorial" serves to awaken the self

to the reality of its own present possession of the past event through

a direct and intuitive present participation in the creative process

in which that event was originally constituted for its first enactors.[1]

The past is thus always potentially "immediate" to one in an essential

sense. It provides the content of the "present". The present is

defined as that attitude of the self or state in which the "immediate

future" is determined by an ever on-going and dynamic creative

process within the free-will of individual persons.[2] Past and future

events, therefore, meet in a "creative present"; the "memory" is a

psychic action of the self working to make itself as fully aware as need

be of its "immediate present" and its creative potentialities for

determining the "immediate future".[3]

Since "memory" is an intuitive and psychical partici-

pation in past events, man can be brought through his memory into

the creative processes originally operative in those events where he

can release their "power" into the present for the creation of new events.

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[1] ibid, pp. 139-142.

[2] ibid, p. 130.

[3] ibid, p. 119.

The "objective memorial" which serves to awaken the "unconscious

memory" into a state of "conscious memory" (where creative engagement

with the future possibilities becomes a free action) is an empirically

perceived and externally constituted entity in the spacio-temporal world.

But the "memory" itself, as a psychic state of the subjective personality,

is not such an externally constituted entity.[1]

It is important to note that Bergson's theory of

"objective memorial" differs from Plato's theory of "reminiscence".

For Bergson the images of perception which reach the mind and

memory are true pictures of the objects of the world, a world which

has evolved within a space-time continuum.[2] Bergson's theory of

the creative capacities of the individual to construct future realities

(with the assistance of the intuitive power of the memory and its

capacity to re-enter the creative process of a past event, once within

but now outside

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[1] ibid, pp. 33-34.

[2] ibid, p. 35.   "The aim ... is to harmonize my senses with each other,
     to restore between their data a continuity which has been broken by
     the discontinuity of the needs of my body, in short to reconstruct, as
     nearly as may be, the whole of the material object. " (and p. 36)
     "Our perception of matter is, then, no longer either relative or
     subjective ... "

of the space-time continuum and existing in eternity) also differs from all

classical forms of Idealism. For, both the past events and their externally

perceived "objective memorials" are rooted in the time continuum (in the

sense that they were created within time) and are not merely constituents

of consciousness.[1] But for Bergson, as for Platonic Realism and classical

Idealism alike, the images of empirical perception will not reveal the

most essential nature of the world's objects. This is revealed

"intuitively", and, in fact, does not exist independently of the creative

action in which it is perceived.[2] Hence the "perception" and the "creation"

of the world's "essential nature" are inter-related in a constant process

of personal change and duration. For Bergson empirical perceptions

awaken the memory, which then provides in higher order the data to

create the reality which one actually perceives, with a higher intuitive

faculty, as already existing in a less essential order of being in the

world's objects. One could almost say that an "objective immortality"

in a Whiteheadian sense, is created out of the temporal order of

duration through the intuitive function of memory as it is stimulated by

"objective memorials", which are, in Whiteheadian terms, true "super-

jects". This is not pure subjectivism of the old order, since

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[1] ibid., pp. 57-58, 120-121, 218.

[2] ibid, p. 53. "...perception ends by being merely an occasion for
    remembering ... immediate intuitions ... are, in fact, part
    and parcel with reality."

the "objective memorial" is the concrete precondition of the memory's

functioning and provides it with models taken from the evolution of the

"real" world in the space-time continuum. Man is thus dependent

upon the actual world around him for the element of "objectivity".

But the persons, places, and things of the world of everyday experience

can thus be taken up into a higher order of being in which they can, in

the creative action of an individual consciousness, become the com-

ponents or models for the creation of the self into a new being capable

of enjoying an increased freedom in a higher form of life.[1]

There are, therefore, implications in Bergson's theory of the

"memory" for a contemporary understanding of the primitive solidarity

concepts, in particular that of "cultic anamnesis" as it relates to

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[1]ibid.,,p. 245. " Not only, by its memory of former experience, does the
consciousness retain the past better and better, so as to organize
it with the present in a newer and richer decision; but, living
with an intenser life, contracting, by its memory of the immediate
experienee, a growing number of external moments in its present
duration, it becomes more capable of creating acts of which the
inner indetermination, spread over as large a multiplicity of the
moments of matter as you.. please, will pass the more easily
through the meshes of necessity" ... " Spirit borrows from
matter the perceptions on which it feeds, and restores them to
matter in the form of movements which it has stamped with
its own freedom".

Christian sacramental theology. We can view Bergson's concept of the "memory" as the "intellectual" or "spiritual" consummation of the past in the present, and as the key to understanding the dogma of the Real Presence of Christ's Passion and Resurrection in sacramental action, particularly in the Eucharist. For Bergson, the "memory" can be said to be the place in which pure potentiality is made available for creative processes at all times. This kind of theory could also be helpful in explaining traditional sacramental concepts which have arisen out of the primitive concept of "cultic anamnesis" in other ways.

If "memory" is indeed what Bergson maintains that it is, a creative participation in an immediate "past-in-the-present", it becomes easier to see how a corporate and cultic drama, memorializing a past event of key significance, can transport and so recreate the living and eternal interiority of that event and its originally attendant energies across time and space from its original participants in their original setting to many others in different times and places.[1] It also becomes easier to understand the Pauline claim that the many who are receiving

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[1] ibid.,,p. 139. For Bergson, "consciousness" can, at the bidding of "my will at any given point of space" ... "go successfully through those intermediaries or those obstacles of which the sum constitutes what we call 'distance in space' ..." and "... jump the interval of time which separates the actual situation from a former one which resembles it."

such past realities across spacio-temporal distances are, thereby,

being themselves created, with the components of those past

realities into "new beings" .... "after the image" of the original

"occasion", i.e. the Christ event.[1]

The relevance of Bergson's theory of "objective

memorial" to a Christian theology of Creation and Redemption

through the Church and Sacraments can better be seen when it is

related to the ontology of Whitehead. Whitehead conceives of the self

as composed of other persons, places, and things, or "actual

occasions" as he calls them, which have become interiorized in a new

and unique combination.[2] This follows the same procedure we have

observed to operate in Biblical "extensions of personality". In White-

head's system, an "actual occasion" comes to its "satisfaction" or

interior completion and passes out of existence as a subjective reality

as far as the world is concerned; but it has already become objectively

immortal and has "real potentiality" as a model for incorporation into

the "concrescence" of a new "actual occasion". It is the external

aspect of the thing which is thus "created" and then immortalized and

made available for incorporation into another "actual occasion" in

the world. It is from the external experience of the thing, as a "real

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[1] Rom. 8:29.

[2] cf. p. 77. this essay.

potentiality", that it becomes an interior reality appropriated by a second entity. The second entity, in turn may be experienced by a third entity as an exterior reality in the same way. In Whitehead's system the exterior and the interior are thus necessary to one another as phases in a single process of becoming. [1] It is also necessary to claim something like this if we are to maintain the Biblical view of Sacramental extensions and their role in the formation of personality.

For Bergson, and for Whitehead who follows him on this point, the "memory" is precisely the medium in which all communication and integration takes place in the personality. This too is vitally important to maintain in support of the Biblical view. As we have stated at the beginning of this Chapter, even the so-called "direct" or empirical perception of an exterior reality is conveyed to the memory as the center of self-integration. [2] It is here that intuitions of realities must be sent by the senses. It takes milliseconds to receive impressions, and by the time they are received the events from which they came are already "history".

This puts so-called direct empirical perceptions of "present" realities on exactly the same basis as things "recalled"

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[1] cf. note 2, p. 136, this essay.

[2] cf. pp. 94-5, this essay.

from a far more remote past. The memory is the area of the living

self where alone all things can live at any given time for the self.

The things memorialized in the Passover Ritual, are just as "real

and present" as the things I perceive around me in this room as I

type this page. Both are, in this sense, "ancient history". Both are

real. The only difference is in the mode of their availability in the

memory process. The Passover Ritual requires a re-enactment of

some kind, in word, deed, and in a materially embodied "extensional"

symbol to make it real to me. In the present direct empirical

perception of the objects around me, the data are ready-made and at

hand from which their symbols, in sight, color, touch, and sound and

smell, are reproduced milliseconds later in my memory, which makes

them available to me. In this view the time dimension, as we tend to

picture it spacially, vanishes, and my interior self is just as "present",

through symbols in the memory, to Moses and the Exodus in the

Passover Meal, or to Christ and his Death-Resurrection event in the

Eucharist, as it is to the persons, places, and things around me in the

room. [1] Both are present through the symbols in the memory, and both

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[1]Spacial conceptualization of time was for Bergson psychologically
    natural but metaphysically an error,c. f. Matter and Memory, p. 126.
    "The capital error,associationism,is that it substitutes for this
    (temporal) continuity of becoming, which is the living reality,
    a discontinuous multiplicity of (spacial) elements, inert and
    juxtaposed. "
cf. Thurian, op. cit., Part I, p. 19.

are "history". But both can be made available for integration with

my interior being as "real potentialities" and made into the sub-

stance of myself if I choose to accept them as values for such

integration.

With such an understanding the radical opposition between

symbol and history, and between the past and present, dissolves

without destroying the distinction. Such a philosophical conception

of time and memory allows us to make greater sense out of the con-

temporary presuppositions of Biblical theology about "cultic

anamnesis". In an essay on the philosophy of Bergson and the work

of Proust, A. W. Levi points out that (in the view of memory which

Proust shared with Bergson) in the very act of recalling what was

initially an exterior and passing experience one creates "an almost

Platonic quality of essence" which was not found in the more trivial

context of its original occurrence.[1]

Some such conception would help to explain why the

liturgical act of anamnesis could be so important in the Biblical

perspective. This conception can be utilized also to point up the

creative aspects of sacramental action in the Christian liturgy.

The very act of the memorial itself would be creative in that it would

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[1] A. W. Levi, "The Creativity of Man: Henri Bergson", Philosophy and the Modern World (Bloomington, Ind., 1959) p. 72.

give the new dimension of an eternal or trans-temporal reality to

what was once in itself otherwise a merely passing phenomenon of

experience (lodged on the exterior surface of the personality of the

individual or group). Any phenomenon would then be enabled by means

of "objective memorialization" to "get down into" the deeper realms

of the self and become a part of it. It might also be suggested that

this is precisely the role of memory, in such physically involved

movements of the human personality as "falling in love". It is by

means of the integrating functions of memory, in which one's past

experiences of another person as an object are so "substantialized"

that those experiences become important enough to be made a part

of one's own interior being.

Levi points out that Proust's reflections on the role

of memory are significant to the issue of external material objects

and their symbolic function in the memory. Proust, with Bergson,

held that the intellect is impotent in man's attempts to recapture

the past. This recapturing of the past can only be done in and

through material objects, or by the symbols which come into the

memory from them.

"It is a labour in vain to attempt to recapture the
past, all the efforts of our intellect must prove
futile. The past is hidden somewhere outside the
realm, beyond the reach of intellect, in some
material object (in the sensation which that material
object will give us) which we do not suspect. And as
for that object it depends on chance whether we come
upon it or not before we ourselves must die." [1]

Levi comments:

"The entire enterprise of Proust is built upon the
mechanism of involuntary memory, upon those
occasions where, through the medium of analogous
sensations, the miracle of the recovery of the past
reality occurs. On the way to a reception at the
Princess de Guermantes', Marcel chances to touch
with his foot an uneven paving stone in her courtyard,
giving him immediately an overpowering sense of joy
and reminding him of the paving stones of the
Baptistry of St. Mark's in Venice. A footman at a
reception accidentally clanks a spoon against a plate
and Marcel is transported back to a fresh summer's
day in the country in a railway carriage of a train
which had stopped momentarily while the brakeman
clanked his little hammer against the wheels. A
servant brings him a glass of orangeade and a napkin
which, when it touches his lips, reminds him of the
blue of the sea at Balbec, for it is starched to the
same consistency as the towel which he used to dry
himself at that seaside resort. Everything by chance.
Everything mysteriously pointing to the experience of
a self lost somewhere in the labyrinth of Time." [2]

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[1] Marcel Proust, "The Swan's Way" in The World of Psychology, Vol. I,
ed. and trans. by C.B. Levitas, (New York, 1963) p. 151.

[2] Levi, op. cit., p. 73, Levi quotes Proust, The Past Recaptured,
trans. by F. Blossom (New York, 1933) "But let a sound already

For Bergson, and for Proust, the recapturing of

the past is not a matter within the intellectual power of man because it

is an intuitive function at the mercy of external objects over which

man has no control.

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2 (continued)

heard or an odor caught in bygone years be sensed anew, simultaneously
in the present and the past, real without being of the present moment,
ideal but not abstract, and immediately the permanent essence of
things, usually concealed, is set free and our true self, which had
long seemed dead but was not dead in other ways, awakes, takes on
fresh life as it receives the celestial nourishment brought to it. A
single minute released from the chronological order of time has
recreated in us the human being similarly released in order that he
may sense that minute. "

In the case of corporate liturgical memorial, however, the action is not by chance. There is a consciously enacted drama in which material objects (with the desired symbolical associations) are employed to recapture a collective past. Proust is right when he says that particular past occurrences are fully recaptured only by coming upon appropriate material objects which are symbols of them. But the liturgical scholar would insist that specific contents of the past, when known, can be recalled by deliberate recreation of these material symbols and the enactment of these events in question.

To illustrate this we need only draw attention to the interesting parallel between what Levi has said above about Proust's objective recalling of the past (in Marcel's experiences) with what Max Thurian has said in The Eucharistic Memorial about the Hebrew Passover Meal. For example, in the liturgical enactment the bitter herbs were to be chewed to yield the proper symbolical taste, the blood was to be seen and smeared, the bread taken and eaten, etc. All of the sense association, the memory, the objective symbols in conjunction with the "extentional" words of the narration, the questions and answers, the "Sedir", and the "Haggadah" and the "doing" by the participants, were to evoke the collective past of the corporate Israel, in which each Jew stood as a "whole-embodying part". [1]

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[1] Max Thurian, op. cit., Part I, pp 18-19

We should remember this, too, in conjunction with

Bergson's theory of the memory as that which achieves the unity of the

self. As we have said, for Bergson, the memory integrates and gives

continuity to the person. It is the act of the self which allows one to

recover the past, considered, in that very act, as a component of the

interior self. The Biblical presentation of "anamnesis" implies a

somewhat similar view.

The self, which is composed of past exterior experiences,

and realities and their embodied values, is freed in the act of memory

to re-live in the present new circumstances of its being, the originally

released energies of the past experiences, realities, and values which

the liturgical drama has singled out for cultic representation. When

this happens, the person is enabled to "incorporate" those events into

himself, so as to "correct" by them his present course of "becoming" in

accordance with their inherent values. Thus, the post-Exilic Jew

believed himself really present in the Exodus event through the Passover

Meal, and Christians can believe themselves "present in" the Death-

Resurrection event of Christ through the Eucharist. [1]

In both of these instances we seem to be dealing with

a similarly vital concept of time which is often quite foreign to many

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[1] cf. pp. 55-59, this essay.

other more static ancient and modern thought modes.[1] In this view
the past event is present as an alive, transpiring reality in the process
of personal fulfillment. There would seem to be a kaleidoscoping of
separate times in such a way that one personal subject is enabled to
participate in another. For Bergson, as for the Bible, the future is
also present as a potential, a "guiding image" or "telos" toward which
the actualities in process are somehow moving. For Bergson the
future is present as a goal in the creative act. In the Old Testament
the Exodus-Passover celebration looks forward to and stretches
toward the future eschatological event of the repossession of the
Promised Land and the deliverance of Israel from all her enemies.
In the New Testament; the Death-Resurrection event celebrated in the
Eucharist looks forward to the complete glorification of Christ's whole
Body the Church, as the fullness of the creation, at "His coming again".
Without this future dimension neither the present nor the past could be
explained in its real significance; the future is in this way also "present"
with the past and with the present in the memorial action.

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[1]
  See Thorlief Boman, op. cit., pp. 122-183.

There is yet another parallel between the thought of Bergson and the Biblical conception of the way Divine grace and human freedom operate together in sacramental actions.

According to Bergson, freedom is not the constant possession of any man. [1] It is experienced only at those rare moments when the self is integrated or "pulled together" in the face of a dramatic or enacted decision. This "pulling together" of the interior and exterior self on the basis of deep-set values (decided upon by the interior self) is done in the memory. Since the inner self is originally composed of the past experiences which are made real again in the memory, the memory itself is that which frees a person from following indiscriminately the flow of exterior actions, and it thereby permits him to make a fully personal choice and perform a truly unique individual action of his own. Under normal living conditions, Bergson claims that man does not very often exercise or realize his freedom, but merely goes along with the mechanical and habitual response to exterior circumstances. However, whenever deliberation and choice are forced upon a person, his memory may then integrate him for truly personal action in accordance with a value which is appropriate to him. In choosing to accept or reject this action, man realizes his freedom. [2]

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[1] Bergson, Time and Free Will; trans. by F.L. Pogson, (New York, 1910) p. 169 ff. c.f. Levi, op. cit., p. 71.

[2] Bergson, ibid., p. 185 ff.

In the Biblical presentation of cultic anamnesis, as understood by Pedersen and Thurian, and certainly as accepted in orthodox Christian liturgical theology, a man is brought to freedom of deliberation in the "cultic anamnesis", where he chooses to take upon himself the corporate Covenant of the group and thereby to assert his solidarity with it.[1] Each act of deliberation, when resolved, remolds or recreates the inner personality further, and strengthens it in its development in the direction it has freely chosen. The dynamic quality of becoming-through-action which is presented in the Biblical picture of response to vocation if found only in those actions which are truly free. Man does not "become" anything through actions which do not spring from his whole, integrated, free response to a challenge. But by an authentically free action in accordance with his own inner values, man is invited to be transformed, "to bear the image" of that which he freely accepts as his "telos" or goal.[2]

We could apply the insights of Bergson to interpretation of the Israelite cult or the Christian sacraments in the following manner. In the liturgical "anamnesis" a man is presented with the outward symbols of that "telos" or goal in objectified and material forms which serve to awaken the collective past and to release from his unconscious

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[1] M. Thurian, op. cit., Part I, pp. 27-39.

[2] 1 Cor. 15:49, 58.

inner self the psychical energy attendant upon all of his own similar
past experiences which have become objectified components of his
being. In this way an individual's response in favor of a "telos" or
goal is aided by the ready availability of those corresponding aspects
of his own inner personality. His affirmation is then not only free
but also freely chosen in accordance with his own authentic inner
value-pattern. The rejection of a cultic symbol would occur if one's
already established value-pattern were not in accordance with that
which the objectified cultic symbol presented to the memory.

For example, one who was not familiar with the
creedal affirmations about the God of Israel or the Covenant would
reject the outward symbols affirming God and Covenant, and hence,
with it, would reject the Covenant itself as the object from which that symbol
came. Thus a non-Jew, i.e., one who refused the faith affirmation or who
was unfamiliar with the corporate record of Yahweh's past actions, would
then reject both the symbol and the reality of the Covenant. The inner
model or image he possessed of his own goal or "telos" would be con-
stituted differently, and so prevent him from meaningful participation in
the cultic drama. This will, perhaps, also help us to understand the
stress which early Christian writers place upon the

Eucharist as a "holy mystery" in which only the fully instructed and faithful were allowed to participate.

It is important to see that in the Bible "extensional" or "sacramental" action is never automatic regarding its effect, but rather remains a free and pre-eminently personal affair. The "extensions" bring with themselves the Power and inherent strength of their Source to enable and empower a man in a nevertheless free deliberation process, to make a correct resolution. The acceptance or rejection of the challenge of the encounter with God, or with man, in word or in sacramental action, and the entering into consequent appropriation of grace to fulfill one's particular vocation, is a matter basically determined by the deliberator himself. The "memory" in the Hebraic-Christian liturgical perspective is not, any more than for Bergson, a function of the human psyche dealing in a routine fashion with images of past events which are no longer alive, or real. Bergson makes much the same distinction, in his conception of "objective memorial" as was made by the Schoolmen in differentiating between the "res sacramenti" and the "virtus sacramenti". For them, the sacrament or "extension" in itself always operates to convey the "thing", "reality," or "res" of which it is the extension, when

intentionally so employed by an agent; but the availability of

that reality to the individual (s) to whom the "extension" is addressed

depends upon a personal acceptance and appropriation. This

requires a living faith or trust in the "res", i.e. the person so

"extended", and in the "extension" itself.[1] For Bergson, as we

have seen, the effective use of an "objective memorial" depends

upon the free and creative action of the subject.[2]

A related function of "cultic anamnesis" is illuminated

by another point in Bergson's theory of the "objective memorial".

For Bergson, as for Whitehead, one event can become especially

significant for a person and so be singled out from the wider

stream of external events which occur in the course of his passing

relationships with other persons, places and things.[3] In this

moment of subjective importance he can appropriate, if he chooses

to do so, the living reality of that particular external event into his

own interior being.

It is not difficult to see the liturgical memorial as

providing similar occasions of importance, but now they are consciously

selected. One event from the stream of external collective occasions in

the corporate history of the nation or group, e.g., the Passover, or

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[1] For a fuller explanation of the Scholastic conception of the operation of
of effective grace in Holy Communion consult the <u>Summa Theologiae</u>
of Thomas Aquinas, Vol. 59, "The Eucharist", 3a, 79-83
Blackfriars Edition (London, 1963).

[2] Bergson, <u>Time and Free Will</u>, p. 185 ff.

[3] ibid., pp. 238-9.

Death-Resurrection event, is deliberately singled out and made into

a matter of conscious importance for the individual and for the

whole body, whether corporate Israel or the Church. It is accepted

and becomes interiorized, because it is important to the inner self

and its future free development. In the inner and subjective order

created by the person himself, present and past occurrences meet on

equal basis in the memory as "history" by the time of their per-

ception, so that there is no difficulty over the temporal or chronological

proximity of the event to the person.

For Bergson, as for Whitehead, and for the Bible,

and for the normative Christian liturgical tradition, events which

are made important by the "memoralizing" process in an enacted

drama, using material objects, are thought to be much more significant

in the process of personal self-becoming of a man than are those

casual and ordinary happenings of the present which go on at all times

and which are not singled out, recorded, or "objectively memorialized".

Bergson's concept of the significance of an "objective memorial" is

thus not unlike the Biblical concept of the cultic means of insuring

the trans-temporal significance of events. In both cases the "objective

memorialization" makes something otherwise external into an

interior component of the subject's own developing personality.

In these terms it could be said that the Christian Sacraments

are the occasions in which the external Christ comes to "dwell in"

the participants in a memorial action. The liturgical rite,

whether Baptismal or Eucharistic, becomes an occasion of

importance in which the faithful are "made one Body with Him".[1]

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[1] Phrase from the "Prayer of Oblation", in the "Order for Holy Communion".
Book of Common Prayer, Protestant Episcopal Church of the United
States of America, 1928, p. 81.

CHAPTER II

Section 4

The Relevance of the Theory of Personality

Development in the Psychology of Gordon

Allport to the "Body of Christ!" Concept.

It is appropriate at this point that we seek to

state more explicitly what kind of interpretation of human personality

development is implied in the primitive solidarity concepts and in the

"Body of Christ" concept. We have touched on this in dealing with

the philosophy of Whitehead and Bergson, but this will not satisfy

those who are accustomed to think in the categories and terms of one

or another of the contemporary psychological theories of personality.

Basically, the concept of personality development

which seems to be implied in the Biblical perspective is a dynamic

one which envisions each individual as living in a constant process of

"becoming". This process is one in which "relation to" other persons,

places, and things in the world is essential to the inner development

of the individual and to the very Redemption of mankind. And yet there

is, as we have just stated in commenting upon Bergson, an unimpaired

human freedom which is present in the inner being of the individual

who either selects, arranges, and appropriates or rejects particular

occasions from his consciousness.[1] In the Biblical view man could be said to participate with God and the world in the creation of his own selfhood.

If this Biblical interpretation of personality development could be expressed in the technical terms of modern psychological theory it would contribute greatly towards furthering a mutual understanding between psychologists and Christian theologians. A survey of the currently held theories of psychologists and psychiatrists on the subject of personality development reveals at least one North American psychologist whose ideas are already fairly complementary to the explication of personality development in light of the primitive solidarity concepts which I have just given above. It is for this reason that we shall next examine the theory of personality development in the psychology of Gordon Allport (1900-) for its relevance to the "Body of Christ" concept.

Allport describes his psychology as in the "Leibnitzian" rather than the "Lockean" tradition.[2] He departs from the North American preference for positivism and operational empiricism in favor of a purposive and dynamic theory of personality which conceives of the person as the "source" rather than simply the "locus" of his acts.

[1] See pp. 114 ff. this essay.

[2] G. Allport, Becoming, (New Haven, 1959) pp. 1-17.

He thus views activity as formative of personality, rather than with the behaviourists as "merely an agitation resulting from pushes by internal or external stimulation."[1] He admits his debt in certain points of dynamic cognition theory to the Gestalt movement, and his sympathy with such writers as Goldstein, Angyal, Cantril, Lecky, Revers and Sinnott who advocate self-actualization motive over instinct.[2] He adapts Adler's concept of the "life-style" to his own purposes and acknowledges Karen Horney's understanding of the "ideal self-image".[3] But his originality and his interest for us lies precisely in his balance, in his own particular combination of these elements of theory into a system which readily lends itself to a Christian interpretation of man in terms of a dynamic understanding of the Biblical doctrine of creation. Such a doctrine of man and the creation may be seen equally well in the light of the "evolutionary creationism" of Bergson, Whitehead or Chardin and in the futuristically oriented theory of personality develop- ment which denies the determinacy of pre-fixed essences found in the writings of Husserl, the early Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty.[4]

His general position owes much to the contemporary current of existential and phenomenological analysis of personality

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[1] ibid, p.,12.

[2] ibid, p.,16.

[3] ibid, pp. ,39 and 47 respectively.

[4] For Chardin, see Section 5 which follows in this chapter, pp 129 f.
We shall examine the phenomenologists in Chapter III, pp 136 ff.

development. Although he departs from writers like Sartre on several

essential points, especially in the direction of external formative factors

in character formation, like the existentialists he sees individuation and

personality development as dynamic and free self-creative processes.[1]

Allport points out that at first Freud spoke of assertive

and aggressive ego instincts and that later on he developed a concept

of the ego as "a rational, though passive, agency, whose duty it was to

reconcile as best it could through planning or defense the conflicting

pressures of the instincts, of conscience, and of the outer environment."[2]

Under these terms Allport asserts that positivism managed to retain,

unwittingly, the core of a pre-fixed or static idea of the "self" which

has, nevertheless, recently come alive at the hands of "more dynamically

inclined psychologists". The latter can now speak of such things as "self

image, self-actualization, self-affirmation, phenomenal ego, ego-

involvement, ego striving", and the like.[3] Allport points out that

there is always a danger that the "self" or "ego" can become a "deus ex

machina" to put back together the dismembered parts of personality

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[1] Allport, ibid., pp. 33-35.
[2] ibid.,p. 37.
[3] ibid., p. 37.

which have been analyzed apart by a still basically positivistic methodology.[1] He approves Bergson's criticism of the use of the pre-existent "ego" as an unsatisfactory device to put back into the picture of man some of the "coherence unity, and purposiveness" which they know they have lost through their use of empirical, analytical tools and "fragmentary representations".[2]

Allport suggests that the way to a possible solution may be seen in the statement made by Alfred Adler that "What is frequently labeled 'the ego' is nothing more than the 'style' of the individual". In other words, Allport declares that Adler's view of the "ego" or "self" as <u>including</u> the exterior processes of "life-style" in the world is a more adequate way of seeing man's situation than the introduction of the Freudian "ego" as a still separate and mysterious "other", or "deus ex machina".[3]

Allport sees empirical methodology as unable to deal with such a concept as the "ego" as a device for giving continuity and unity to the parts of man, which have been separated in the first place by positivistic analysis.[4] The suggestion that Allport makes is very

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[1] ibid., ,p. 37.

[2] ibid., ,p. 38.

[3] ibid., ,p. 39, and A. Adler, "The Fundamental Views of Individual Psychology", International Journal of Individual Psychology, I (1935), pp. 5-8.

[4] ibid., ,p. 38.

compatible with what we have seen as the Biblical view of personality

as a "self" inseparable from - for all purposes of measurement - its

"larger self" or "extentional-corporate self" in the relationships it

has in the world with other persons, places, and things. Allport says:

> "Life-style to Adler had a deep and important meaning. He
> is saying that if psychology could give us a full and complete
> account of life-style it would automatically include all
> phenomena now referred somewhat vaguely to a self or an ego.
> In other words, a wholly adequate psychology of growth would
> discover all of the activities and all of the interrelations in
> life, which are now either neglected or consigned to an ego that
> looks suspiciously like a homunculus". [1]

He then stresses the very same fact that we have already seen to be

relevant to the Biblical doctrine of "anamnesis", viz., that the importance

or significance of some of these activities and inter-relations in life

is greater in the development of a person than are others. [2] He makes

specific reference to Whitehead's doctrine of importance:

> "The first thing an adequate psychology of growth should
> do is to draw a distinction between what are matters of
> 'importance' to the individual and what are, as Whitehead
> would say, merely matters of 'fact' to him; that is,
> between what he feels to be vital and central in becoming
> and what belongs to the periphery of his being. Many facets
> of our life-style are not ordinarily felt to have strong personal
> relevance... innumerable tribal habits that mark our life-style
> are nothing more than opportunistic modes of adjusting... many
> of our physiological habits are... unconscious or semi-conscious
> ... not 'propriate', i. e., not really central to our sense of

[1] ibid.,p. 39.

[2] ibid.,pp. 39-41, 45.

existence... So it is with the myriad of social and
physiological habits we have developed that are never,
unless interfered with, regarded as essential to our
existence as a separate being."[1]

Allport attempts to balance, on the one hand, the

tribal or group factors which enter into the development of personality

with, on the other hand, those new and unique factors belonging to

each person individually which allow for an original process of self-

creation through living.[2] The former are inborn animal traits,

survival instincts or adaptation patterns, which are universal conditioning

factors. The latter are also inherited but allow for the composition of

the differing dispositions, potentialities to form particular structures,

or capacities, found in individuals. Many psychologists tend to

emphasize the former. But in the latter Allport finds the key to the

explanation of the manifold differences between individuals, the source

of novelty, and uniqueness of creativity.[3] This indefinable potentiality

in each individual to take variable components from the given, and

in accordance with his own unique motivations, to weave them into novel

structures, allows the development by each person of a "life-style", or

"schema of values." The personality is the "life-style"; it can be said

[1] ibid.,p. 39.

[2] ibid., pp. 34-35.

[3] ibid., pp. 39-41.

that the specific individual is always in the state of dynamic becoming; he is created by a process of ingestion of external factors and components, taken from already existent persons and things in the world. This goes on from the pre-natal stages to old age and death. The ingested external factors are freely selected in accordance with an "ideal self-image" or schema of values, and are creatively built into the production of a new creature. [1]

The value of such an explanation of personality development to behavioural psychologists who have not been able to explain satisfactorily the phenomena of novelty, uniqueness, freedom, and individuation is obvious. Neither can its value as a psychological augmentation to the contemporary Christian doctrine of man be overlooked. It undergirds the Christian understanding of man-in-society, that is to say, the essentiality of one to another in the very process of creation. It sheds light on the way in which persons are inherently related to one another in their very individuality; components from the many are taken by each one, and yet each one is in himself a novelty. In Allport's psychology the necessity for social and tribal affiliations in the early and continued information of the personality is stressed; but

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[1] ibid., p. 47.

at the same time the need for simultaneous individual initiative

and self-assertion in the development of a uniquely distinct selfhood

is equally stressed.

Allport's concept of the "self" is one which involves

a future dimension, in the present, through the continuous motivation

of an individual by an "ideal self-image". This "self" which is then

at once both in the present and in the future by virtue of its dynamic

state of becoming, he calls the "proprium", "our temporary neutral

term for central interlocking operations of personality".[1] "Propriate

striving" is thus itself the process of becoming, or the individual's

attempt at movement from his "actual self-image" to his "ideal self-

image".[2] The discrepancy between these two explains the problem of

"conscience", which register "anxiety" and "guilt" whenever a

person's "schema of values" (and, hence "life-style") is violated and

his true "propriate striving" is interrupted.[3]

Allport's concept of "propriate striving" can easily be

made to fit into a religious framework in the light of Whitehead's

philosophy of " objective immortality". One person is thus reproduced in

another as his "ideal self-image" (Whitehead's model from a past

actual occasion) and

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[1] ibid., p. 54.

[2] ibid., p. 47.

[3] ibid., pp. 72-74.

thus becomes a part of his character formation. We have already

seen how the primitive solidarity concepts of the Bible are trans-

latable into philosophical terms; we now have in Allport a modern

psychological explanation for the primitive solidarity concepts.

"Extension of personality" again ceases to be a strange pre-scientific

superstition, and becomes understandable as a constant reality in

the experience of any human personality development. "Corporate

personality" can be translated into Allport's terminology as occurring

whenever a group of persons share in a common "schema of values" or

"ideal self-image" which has come from one dominant personality,

and thus share together the "propriate striving" of the source

member of their group. "Realistic representation" would occur in

Allport's system whenever an individual member of such a group

becomes the purveyor to other persons of the personal characteristics

of the dominant or prototype member, those characteristics which

have already been incorporated into the group and into its individual

"representative" during his own process of becoming.

There is another possible point of reference between

the psychology of Allport and Bergson's insistence on the immediacy

of all past events to any existing subject's memory. For Allport

any person, place, or thing can potentially become a factor in the

"schema of values," of another person, provided that they can reach

him somehow in that area of creative ferment where he is able to

weave them into his "life style". As we have seen the Bergsonian

concept of "memorialization" is precisely capable of explaining how

the memory is not only the place of such creative ferment, but also

the means by which other persons, places, and things can be always

immediate to it.[1] In addition, there are also constructive parallels,

as we shall next observe, between the psychology of Allport and the

process theology of Chardin. Allport's stress on the mysterious

freedom of each new individual as he builds his own "schema of values",

and hence personality, complements Chardin's insistence that once

the stage of the "Noosphere", or stage of mental-activity, is reached,

there is no longer an inevitable, non-reflective evolutionary attain-

ment of the next stage, or the "Omega Point".[2] After the "Noosphere",

(or sphere of mental-activity) has been reached, freewill comes into

play, individually chosen objectives pursued by the operative

power and creative participation of specific human beings are

necessary to the attainment of the cosmic objectives.

There are, then, in summary, obvious parallels

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[1] See pp. 94-116, this essay.

[2] See p. 135, this essay.

between the "ideal self-image" or "schema of values" in Allport's

psychology, "objective immortality" in Whitehead's philosophy, the

"objective memorial" which is taken into the creative "memory"

in Bergson's theory, and the idea of freely accepted cosmic fulfillment

in Chardin's theology, which we shall next examine.

In all of these concepts we find the same underlying

belief in the capacity of the individual freely to accept into himself

the other external persons, places, and things with which he has

chosen to identify himself. This was, of course, also the underlying

presupposition of the primitive solidarity concepts of the ancient

world and of the Israelite idea of the Covenant. It is also the basis

of the New Testament understanding of the creative power of sacra-

mental action within the "Body of Christ".

CHAPTER II

Section 5

> The Relevance of the Creation Theology
>
> of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin to the
>
> "Body of Christ" Concept.

The process philosophy of Whitehead and Bergson, and the process psychology of Allport, will find their completion and integration into the Christian Faith within the framework provided by the process theology of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1981-1955). The primitive solidarity concepts and the "Body of Christ" concept are also accommodated extremely well by Chardin's great theological synthesis of contemporary scientific data and evolutionary theory with the insights of Christian Revelation.

Earlier in this century Chardin called for the same kind of philosophical reconstruction as Whitehead had asked for in Science and the Modern World and had then answered in Process and Reality.[1] In the Future of Man Chardin wrote:

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[1] See pp. 75-76,   this essay.

> "To our clearer vision the universe is no longer
> a State but a Process.... this... must lead... to the
> profound... modification of the whole structure
> not only of our Thought but of our Beliefs."[1]

Chardin spoke of the world of spirit, the eternal and transcendent

order of being, as an aspect of the whole unfolding reality of the

world. He wrote of a new understanding of the relationship between

matter and spirit.

> "... the most revolutionary and fruitful aspect
> of our present age is the relationship it has
> brought to light between Matter and Spirit:
> spirit being, no longer independent of matter,
> or in opposition to it, but laboriously emerging
> from it under the attraction of God by way of
> synthesis and centration."[2]

He questioned the emphasis in much traditional ascetical theology

which has tended to posit a Platonic dualism between the dimension

of Spirit and the world of matter. He called for a new direction

in the Christian's understanding of his relationship to the world:

> "... to participate in all the endeavours, all the
> anxieties, all the aspirations and also all the
> affections of the earth, in so far as these embody
> a principle of ascension and synthesis."[3]

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[1] Chardin, The Future of Man, pp. 261-2.

[2] ibid., p. 93.

[3] ibid., p. 95.

He proceeded to redefine Christian detachment in the light of

this principle:

> "Christian detachment subsists wholly in this
> wider attitude of mind; but instead of 'leaving
> behind' it leads on; instead of cutting off, it
> raises. It is no longer a break away but a way
> through, no longer a withdrawal but an act of
> emerging."[1]

The way of a Christian return to the primitive Biblical

perspective which saw a material and sacramental participation in

the world of persons, places and things, as the occasions of

"extension" of the Divine Personality, was needed. The opening

was made in Chardin's masterful "The Phenomenon of Man, in which

there was developed a cosmic view of the plan of God in creation,

nature, and history.[2] To many who sought to reconcile their faith

with the findings of the contemporary natural sciences it appeared

that orthodox Christian theology had at last battled its way back to the place

where Yahweh's lordship over history and nature had once been

affirmed, back past the rubble of buildings once inhabited by the world-

denying cults and philosophical schools of Athens and Rome.[3]

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[1] ibid., p. 96.

[2] Chardin, the Phenomenon of Man, trans. by Bernard Wall, (London 1959)

[3] Evolutionary insights have been widely accommodated by Roman
Catholic theologians. For an example of an attempt to reconcile
this type of thought with previous Vatican pronouncements see
Karl Rahner's Hominisation: "The Evolutionary Origin of Man as
a Theological Problem", No. 13, Questiones Disputatae. (Montreal,
1958) pp. 7-31.

For Chardin there is an inherent essentiality for the existence of the earth, the processes of development, growth and change in the spacio-temporal world. The "spiritual" is not, as it is for the Platonic or Aristotelian realist, in itself independent or unrelated fixed reality. For Chardin, who writes as a scientist with a Christian theological perspective, the "spiritual" is an inherent aspect of the reality of all physical beings, in varying degrees from the lowest to the highest order in the creation. It could be said that for Chardin the "spirit" of each creature develops with, in, and through the development of its material structures. [1]

But the "spirit" is, nevertheless, transcendent. In itself, once it has appeared, it is seen to be qualitatively of another, higher order from the physical being in which it has been born and sustained and through which it has been evolved. [2] This saves Chardin from the classical "Materialism" and "Evolutionism", which look upon the "spiritual" as no more than an "emergent" from the processes of material evolution. The spirit is in this sense created in and through the historical process, although its origin and its destiny, its "alpha" and its "omega", are of a higher order.

Each creature has a different

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[1] Chardin, The Future of Man, p. 262. "What we see taking place in the world today is not merely the multiplication of men but the continued shaping of Man."

[2] ibid., p. 277. "...in line with, and gradually replacing, the thrust from behind or below, we see the appearance of a force of attraction coming from above which shows itself to be organically indispensable for the continuance of the sequence..."
Chardin asks (p. 263) "The Higher Life, the Union, the long dreamed-of consummation that has hitherto been sought above, in the direction of some kind of transcendency; should we not rather look for it ahead, in the prolongation of the inherent forces of evolution?
Above or ahead - or both?" and in the following section (pp. 263-270) he answers the question by saying that both are needed, that man seeks the "Upward by way of (the) Forward." (p. 266).

type of spiritual nature just as it has a different type of physical structure.

Chardin's is a "holistic" or "hylomorphic" rather than a "dualistic"

view of reality.

One can see readily that Chardin's creation theology

would accommodate Whitehead's metaphysics, or Allport's psychology.

For Chardin, as for Whitehead, time and eternity, heaven and earth,

the material and the spiritual, are always evolving, "weaving in and out"

in a pattern to form the mosaic of creation. There is a progression in

development from the lower to the higher forms of creation for both

Chardin and Whitehead. Everything that has evolved and emerges as a

new individual or species is available for incorporation into the next

new species.[1] This complements Allport's theory of the inter-related

development of each individual in the progressive building up of a "life-

style" toward a "proprium", and also the Whiteheadian idea of the "actual

occasion" which has become "objectively immortal" and which is

henceforth available as a "model" for incorporation in a new developing

being.

For Chardin there have been several significant turning

points in the history of life in the cosmos. First was the stage in

which inorganic matter evolved to the point of the generation of life.

In terms of our planet, this gave rise to the "Biosphere", or the

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[1] ibid., pp. 25-29. cf. The Phenomenon of Man, Book Two: "Life".
    Chapter Two, "The Expansion of Life", pp. 103-140.

the "belt of life" surrounding the earth.[1] The next important stage was
the "Noosphere", or the point at which "thought turned in on itself"
or the point of "reflection", which characterized the appearance of
the uniquely different species "homo sapiens".[2] This is the stage
characterized by the appearance of mental-spiritual activity on
our planet. He suggests that once this stage has been reached, the
problem of the freedom of the will, with awareness of the reality of
good and evil, and the moral struggle, enters as a new factor in the
process of evolution. He stresses that the acceptance of the challenge
to go beyond this stage to the next is by no means an unconscious or
automatic one, as were the previous steps; man's further development
from this point on depends upon the free, conscious, and cooperative
acceptance by each individual and the corporate race of the new type
of creaturehood intended for mankind.[3]

Only in this way is man gathered into the "Christ Being".

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[1] The Phenomenon of Man, p. 78, and The Future of Man, pp. 254-259.

[2] ibid.,pp. 180-184. This parallels Whitehead's as well as Allport's
insistence upon the free acceptance of components of other persons,
places and things into one's being before they can be appropriated.
cf. pp.75 ff and 117 ff, this essay.

[3] ibid., p. 254-272.

For Chardin the historical Jesus can be viewed as the first example

of such a new creation, the highest stage in the evolution of the

human spirit at which point the fullness of God entered into complete

union with His Creation.[1] This "Christ-process" must be activated

in others. When the process is complete the "Omega" point will

have been reached, when the purpose of the physical creation, and

its spiritual result, will have been fulfilled, and "all things will be

summed up in Christ".[2] The "Body of Christ" can be viewed as

that portion of humanity in which this process has been activated.

The relationships of its members to one another and to their "Head"

or first member, the historical Jesus, become essential and formative

in a way which is consistent with the Weltanschauung seen already

in the primitive solidarity concepts.

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[1] ibid., pp. 291-293.

[2] ibid., pp. 294, 297.

CHAPTER III

PHENOMENOLOGY FROM HUSSERL TO
MERLEAU-PONTY: ITS RELEVANCE TO
A CONTEMPORARY UNDERSTANDING OF
THE "BODY OF CHRIST" CONCEPT IN
LIGHT OF THE PRIMITIVE SOLIDARITY
CONCEPTS

Section I   The Relevance of Phenomenology to Process Thought

and to the Primitive Solidarity Concepts

Perhaps the greatest single obstacle to a contemporary

understanding of the primitive solidarity concepts and to a wider

reception of process thought is to be found in the basic failure of

the Western philosophical tradition to bridge the gap between the

so-called "objective" and "subjective" orders of being.   The primitive

Weltanschauung which envisioned what Boman has called the world of

"psychic time" and "boundless space" requires the premise that

human subjectivity and intentionality are eminently real and concretely

productive factors in the ongoing life of the external world. [1]

Process thought, as we have seen, requires a similar premise. [2]

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[1] Boman, op. cit., pp. 137-154, 159-160.

[2] It is interesting to note that Whitehead had to redefine the nature of and
    interrelation between "subjective" and "objective" factors of human
    experience in order to accommodate the interplay that is required
    in his philosophy between "internal" and "external" elements involved
    in the creative process. (cf Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 243-
    246.) Note esp. "cognizance belongs to the genus of subjective
    forms which are admitted to, or not admitted to, the function of
    absorbing the objective content into the subjectivity of satisfaction",
    (p. 244) Here one notes an objectivity posited in the subjective con-
    sciousness, a point which, as we shall see, is paralled by Husserl
    (cf. pp. 143-47 this essay). Allport and Chardin also accept this
    accommodation of interplay between internal and external factors in
    the creative process (cf. p. 117ff. and p. 129ff. respectively
    this essay.)

But the Western philosophical tradition has generally tended either

to ignore the importance of subjectivity, as in the case of the

Realistic philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, or to secure its impor-

tance at the expense of objectivity, as in the case of the Kantian

and Kierkegaardian traditions.[1]

The result is that the Western mind has had, from the

beginning of Graeco-European speculations on the concepts of

"space" and "time", a great deal of difficulty in dealing with the pre-

philosophic and primitive conceptions with which we have been dealing

in this essay.[2] Today the clearest manifestation of this difficulty

is seen in the inability of the average Christian to explain the strange

and usually incredible idea, implicit in orthodox dogma, that the

interior and exterior worlds together are capable of objectively

being fashioned in one way or another through the operation of a sub-

jective human intentionality (when grounded in and united to Divine

Creative Power) and the psychic acts which proceed from it in prayer,

Word, Sacrament and one's sanctifying work in-the-world according

to vocation.

One real need, then, is for a philosophy which will

unite the "objective" and "subjective" orders in a creative interplay so

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[1] See pp. 138-142 this essay.

[2] See Boman, op. cit., pp. 123-128, 154-156, and Edmund Husserl,
    "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man", in Phenomenology and
    the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. by Quentin Lauer, (New York, 1965)
    pp. 185-191.

that this theological truth will become meaningful and easier

to accept. Such a philosophy is in fact already available in the

recently developed tradition known as phenomenology. It is for this

reason that I have included a survey of four prominent phenomenolo-

gists in this essay along with the survey of the four process philo-

sophers which we have just concluded.

I feel that without such inclusion of the phenomeno-

logists, and their possible contributions to our understanding of

the "Body of Christ" concept, the insights of the process philosophers

alone would be inadequate in themselves to bridge the centuries

from the pre-philosophical Weltanschauung of the Bible to modern

times. The specific need for a more systematic reconsideration

of the relationship between subjective and objective factors in

human experience will be met by the phenomenologists.

CHAPTER III

Section 2   The Place of Phenomenology in the

History of Western Philosophy

The main contribution of phenomenology to a contemporary

understanding of the Church and Sacraments in light of the primitive

solidarity concepts is precisely its breakdown of the dichotomy

which has prevailed in Western thought between "objective" and

"subjective" approaches to truth.   The classical Realism of Plato

and Aristotle treated the "essence" of the persons, places, and things

of the world as simply-constituted "objective" facts which had merely

to be ascertained, one way or another, by a perceiving subject.[1]   The

Cartesian revolution drove a wedge between subject and object and left

European man self-consciously aware for the first time of the subject-

ive processes by which he derived methodically whatever of the

calculable elements of things he could really know.[2] The radical

dualism posited by Descartes between the subjective quality of per-

ceiving mind and the objective quality of the perceived body broke the

hold on Western thought of the notion of an essentialistically constituted

universe inherited from classical metaphysics by introducing the element

of doubt in relation to the nature of the reality of all non-mental being

except for a few general laws or principles.

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[1] John Wild, Introduction to Realistic Philosophy, pp. 407-412.

[2] Rene Descartes, "The Nature of the Human Mind", Meditation on First
   Philosophy, trans. and ed. by E. Anscombe and P. Geach (London, 1954)
   pp. 66-75.

Next, Immanuel Kant saw in the subjective consciousness
the operation of the "understanding" which gave order and structure
to one's empirical perceptions of external "phenomena" in accordance
with certain "categories", or a-priori forms of the synthesizing
activity of the mind.[1] For Kant it was impossible to perceive or
intuit things-in-themselves, or "noumena". In order to know "phenomena",
it was necessary that they conform to the regulating "categories" of
the mind, rather than vice-versa. Knowledge depended upon an active
categorical regulation of the results of his experience of the world on
the part of man. It might be said that the Biblical conception of man's
dynamic capacity for a share in the Divine work of the ordering of the
world had indeed found reinforcement in Kant over the essentialism and
static "objectivity" of Plato and Aristotle.

Christian theologians could be found who saw in the secular
movement toward appreciation of this human potential for a subjectively
grounded re-ordering of experience nothing less than a new dispensation.
Following the philosophical insights of Kant, Friedrich Schleiermacher
led the way in a subjective reconstruction of dogmatic theology.[2] This
recovered for Western man some understanding of the morally compelling
forces beyond rational categorization which were available to him in the
operation of his own religious consciousness. This made it possible for
him to read the Bible.

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[1] Immanuel Kant, "Transcendental Aesthetic", Critique of Pure Reason,
by Norman K. Smith, (London, 1966).

[2] F.D.E.Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, trans. by H.R. Mackintosh
and J.S. Stewart (Edinburgh, 1928).

with a real appreciation once again of the redemptive power which the

primitive Hebrew mind had envisioned as released into the world by

man's Faith in God, and some awareness of the symbolic nature of

the religious language by which this was often expressed.

In full scale revolt, not only against classical metaphysics

and the then-predominant metaphysical Idealism of Hegel, but

also against Kant's own rejection of man's personal experience as

constitutive in the formation of a valid order in the consciousness

apart from the "categories" of understanding, Soren Kierkegaard

next developed even further the Kantian emphasis upon

subjectivity by making its experiences of particular persons,

places, and things in particular moments of time into actually

constitutive and creative occasions. Man's experiences themselves

provided all the conditions that were necessary for life.[1] Kierkegaard

now saw no more need for the "categories" of Kant than he did for

the "essences" of Plato or Aristotle. For Kierkegaard primary

experience itself constituted reality without any necessary recourse

either to a supposed "objective" order of reality as in the Platonic

"essences" or to the abstract forms of mental synthesizing activity

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[1] Kierkegaard's thought along this line is developed explicitly in
    Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by David J. Swenson
    and Walter Lowrie, (Princeton, 1953) and in
"Project of Thought", Philosophical Fragments, trans. by David J.
    Swenson, trans. revised by Howard V. Hong, (Princeton, 1962),
    pp. 11-27.

as in the "categories" of Kant. For Kierkegaard reality was found

in man's own personal "existence", as opposed either to any a-priori

or pre-supposed "essence" of "category".

This indeed left man free to conceive of himself as in some

sense the "creator" of his own subjective being. But it also posited

a serious problem for those who would reconcile the new "existentialism"

of Kierkegaard either with the rights of natural science or, in fact,

with all that the Bible actually has to say about the "objective"

reality of God, man, and the world...constituted as it is of other

persons, places, and things in dynamic relation to one another. Not

only natural science but the Bible as well implies an existence-in-

their-own-right for beings-in-the-world, an existence which is

not limited to being merely a component of my own subjective con-

sciousness, and, therefore, an "existence" which implies possession

of some kind of "essence". As we have seen in this essay, the

primitive solidarity concepts of the Bible require some kind of

acknowledgement of the formative, and hence "essential" effects

upon me in my development of other persons, places, and things, which

have themselves an essential existence before they can present them-

selves to my subjective consciousness for incorporation into it

as models.

But Kierkegaardian existentialism seems to make little

philosophical adjustment to this fact. The "Existenz" philosophy

of Martin Buber, Karl Jaspers, and Gabriel Marcel has made

theological adjustment to the role of external communal and

sacramental life in personal experience. It has, however, been

left for phenomenology to make the necessary philosophical adjust-

ments of existentialist insights toward rapprochement with "essences".

It has moved away from the pure subjectivity of Kierkegaard back

toward a concern for "objectivity" without losing the vision of the

creative role of consciousness contributed by the existentialists.[1]

Because phenomenology has done this, it is particularly relevant

to our study of the "Body of Christ" concept in the light of the

primitive solidarity concepts.

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[1] Edmund Husserl, as we shall see in the following pages of this study, developed the case for grounding objectivity in consciousness in his essay, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science". He claimed that "Every type of object that is to be the object of a rational propo- sition, of a prescientific and then of a scientific cognition, must manifest itself in knowledge, thus in consciousness itself, and it must permit being brought to givenness, in accord with the sense of all knowledge".
"Philosophy as a Rigorous Science", trans. by Quentin Lauer in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, (New York, 1965) p. 90.

CHAPTER III

Section 3   The Relevance of the Theory of Objective

Intentionality in the Philosophy of Edmund

Husserl to the "Body of Christ" Concept

How has the phenomenologist accommodated "objectivity"

within such an appreciation of a dynamic and creative human "subjectivity"?

This task was initially accomplished by Edmund Husserl, (1859-1938) the

founder of the school. Husserl, taking as his starting point an appreciation

of neo-Kantian insights into the regulative role of subjective consciousness,

and balancing these with Franz Brentano's understanding of intentionality

as "objectively immanent" to every thinking subject, proceeded to work

out the basic thesis common to all later phenomenologists, i.e., that

"objectivity" arises in the subjective consciousness from a relationship

of intentionality which one has established with other persons, places,

and things.[1]

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[1] Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. by Dorian Cairns, (The
     Hague, 1960) p. 54. cf. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomeno-
     logie,Vol. 1 (Halle, 1913). Nos. 143-49, and Formale und
     transzendentale Logik, (Halle, 1929) pp. 27-71.
     Precisely how such "objectivity" arises in the consciousness and the
     nature of its connection with the other beings encountered are points
     of disagreement between the various phenomenologists, Husserl,
     Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. As we shall see in the
     following sections of the present chapter each has a different answer
     to these questions.

For Husserl, I discover in myself, arising out of an
encounter with another being, a particular intentionality toward that
being which defines its "objectivity" for me. But its "objectivity"
is no mere function or by-product of my own subjectivity even though
I have experienced it there. It is really grounded in the other, and
has arisen in my own subjective consciousness as a revelation or
"message" from the other.[1] The other being, if it is a human being,
is also potentially affected in a similarly "objective" fashion by me
as I enter into his subjective consciousness. Husserl describes a
process of "phenomenological reduction" whereby one can potentially
at least, set oneself free to see things as they reveal themselves in a
particular intentional encounter, visible "in their very phenomenality",
or "stripped" as nearly as possible of all the presuppositions with
which one would normally approach and clothe them.[2] This vision
of things "in their phenomenality" is only obtained at the price of the
awareness of one's own subjective consciousness, to which one must
turn, rather than to the world of "objective" facts, in order to receive
such a phenomenological revelation of "essences". The result is that
Husserl relocated "objectivity" in the subjective consciousness, more
specifically, in that particular action of subjective consciousness known

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[1] Husserl, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science", Phenomenology and
    the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. and ed. by Quentin Lauer,
    (New York, 1965) pp. 85-86.

[2] The "reduction" theory is first proposed in Ideen, Vol. I, and is
    central to Husserl's thought thereafter in all of his writings.

as "intentionality"; he thus viewed the fundamental and "objective"

essence of the subject himself and all other beings as discoverable

only in the intentional relations which he has with the other persons,

places, and things of his world.[1]

Such a conception of the world tends to put man far

more at the center of things than did the classical ontological systems.

As a result it is more in keeping with the trend in contemporary

physical sciences since the "Einsteinian Revolution" to emphasize the

"relativity" of all perspectives and measurements without abandoning

the scientist's real need for "objectivity" of some kind in his pursuit

of "facts". With Protagoras, Husserl and his disciples can assert

that "man is the measure of all things"; and yet his "phenomenological

reduction" insures that this is not an arbitrary standard of measure-

ment.

The result of such a phenomenological conception of the

nature of man and his world is the provision of the same dynamic attitude

toward life and its infinite potentiality for change and the processes of

self-originated novel creations as is found in the primitive

Weltanschauung of the Bible and as is encouraged by contemporary

existentialism. But for Husserl and the phenomenologists

this general attitude also takes into consideration the part played in

such novel creations by the "objective" factor, i.e., the other

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[1] "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science", p. 90, n. 26, and p. 96 n. 32.

individual beings of the world in relation to one another. It is just

this kind of dynamic and fluid, and yet objective, world-view

which refuses to set arbitrary limits to the objective creative

capacities of the human mind and spirit in its relations with its

lived-world which is needed if men of the 20th Century are

to make sense out of the primitive solidarity concepts upon which the

"Body of Christ" concept and the traditional Christian view of the

Sacraments are based. For, as we have seen, in the primitive

world-view found in the Bible, the world is conceived of as "plastic".

The whole reality of things is portrayed not as consisting in some

non-relational, fixed, spacio-temporal world order, but rather in the

"intentionality" and relatedness of human minds and spirits which

rest upon an ultimate ground of Being, which itself is anchored beyond

but active within and constantly molding, the space-time continuum.

Following Husserl other phenomenologists have provided interpretations

of the creative significance of human "intentionality" and relatedness which

can also be used to complement the Biblical portrayal of the Church as

a sphere in which creative, therapeutic, and saving relationships make

possible man's recreation after the image of God in Christ. They can

be used to complement the Biblical presentation of the Sacraments as

human intentional and relational

activities in which man is enabled to reshape his future by utilizing

presently available occasions of an ultimate and creative Power.

For many of the phenomenologists there is no such Divine Power.

But for the Christian phenomenologists this Power would be envisioned

as entering the world through an intentional relationship with the

man Jesus, the Christ, in whose past historical life that Creative

Power was, and now is, significantly disclosed and embodied under

human conditions.

CHAPTER III

Section 4

> The Relevance of the Theories of
>
> Being and Language in the Philosophy
>
> of Martin Heidegger to the "Body of
>
> Christ" Concept

Sub-section (i)   Heidegger's Theory of Being

Martin Heidegger (1889-   ) takes Husserl's

phenomenological breakdown of the opposition between the "subjective"

and "objective" orders as the starting point of his philosophy. [1]

He goes beyond Husserl in the elaboration of theories of "being" and

"language" which can be of service to those who would understand

the primitive solidarity concepts and Christian doctrine on the subject

of the Church and Sacraments.

For Heidegger the radical opposition between "being" and

"becoming" which has been dominant in the history of Western philosophy

since Parmenides and Heraclitus is based upon a misunderstanding. [2]

For Heidegger "being" is always "revealed" "in-the-world", i. e. as

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[1] M. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. by Ralph Manheims
(New York, 1961) pp. 98-104, 151-163 and Being and Time, trans. by
J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (London, 1962) pp. 49-64.

[2] Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 81-83.

"there" before one can meaningfully speak of it at all.[1]

The "revelation" of "being" is, therefore, its <u>coming-to-be</u>

in the world. Being's subjectively perceived "appearance" ("Schein")

is not ontologically distinct from its own objective "appearing"

("Erscheinen"), or coming-to-be "in-the-world".[2] Its "unconcealment",

as Heidegger calls it, is the "truth" of being.[3] The opposition between

"being" and "appearance", dominant in Western philosophy since Plato

is also thus dissolved.[4] The "revelation", or "unconcealment", of

"being in-the-world" ("in-der-Welt-sein") is its coming-to-be "there",

and is also, per se, its "becoming".

In other words, for Heidegger, "being" thus simultaneously

creates itself in finite terms as it reveals itself to and in the world.

Being in this sense is, as far as the world is concerned, also a

process of "becoming" as it "appears", or reveals itself in the things

of the world. But this "appearance" is not the mere "subjective"

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[1] <u>Being and Time</u>, pp. 78-90.

[2] <u>Introduction to Metaphysics,</u> p. 85, and <u>Being and Time</u>, pp. 51-55.

[3] <u>Introduction to Metaphysics,</u> pp. 90-93.

[4] <u>ibid.</u>, pp. 83-97.

perception of "being"; it is also in fact the "objective" "appearing" of a creative process actually going on in the persons, places, and things of the world in a quite concrete fashion.[1] Heidegger also holds that this coming-to-be of things, *i. e.* their "revelation", is affected by the context of relationships in which they find themselves during the process itself.[2]

For Heidegger the human being is the place where being is seen most fully, the place of the highest degree of revelation of being.

Human being is the "Dasein", or the "there-ness" in the world, of transcendent being itself, the real key to the secret of being. Being has meaning only insofar as it has importance for human being and thrusts itself into such a human being in the world.[3] Furthermore, it is within the subjective personal existence of a human being-in-the-world that human being itself has authentic existence. The "Dasein" or human being in the world is not an objectified or abstract thing, but always the "my own" of a particular subject. Man needs being to be man, and, conversely, being needs man to be itself. Both belong together in interdependence.

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[1] Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 92.

[2] ibid., p. 121.

[3] Being and Time, p. 11.

It is not difficult to see how all of this relates directly to what Allport has said about the creative and formative effect of the being of other persons, places, and things upon a human being during the process of personality development.[1] Nor is it difficult to see how this relates to Whitehead's idea of the interrelation of "actual occasions" through "objective immortality" in the cosmic creative process.[2] Heidegger also complements Chardin's theory of "complexity" in the building up of the evolutionary process.[3] Lastly Heidegger provides modern terminology for contemporary comprehension of such primitive solidarity

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[1] See pp. 117-128 this essay.

[2] See pp. 75-93 this essay.

[3] Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, p. 43, 48, 64, 66, 86-87, 177, 301-2, 308-9.

concepts as are implied in the Christian understanding of the Word

and Sacrament as action in which new "being" is "revealed" in

creative and formative relationships between the mutual intentionality

of subjects and the other persons, places, and things of the world.

The fact that "becoming", can be formatively affected

by "appearance", (i. e., by way of one's own inward reaction to

the appearance one-has obviously made in the subjective consciousness

of other being when that consciousness is reflected back) explains

how there can be an <u>active</u> power in human consciousness which is

operative to produce concrete results in external "beings-in-the-

world". Just such an active power affecting the world's objects is

implied in the primitive solidarity concepts and in the Christian

belief in the active and transforming power of the Sacraments.

The idea that the highest form of "revelation" of

being is, on the "objective" side, an "appearing", or coming-to-

be present of a personal being "there" in-the-world ("Dasein")

will make clearer the Christian belief concerning the Real Presence

of God in Christ through "Word" and "Sacrament". In a discourse

on the Greek word "doxa" ("glory") in Hellenistic Greek, Heidegger

shows that this term, meaning the "appearance" or "aspect" of a

thing during its "appearing", or coming-to-be- present in-the-

world has, in its verbal form, the sense of "to place in the light

and thus endow

with permanence or being". He says that "the essence of (subjective)
'appearance' lies in the (objective) appearing of a being. It is
a self-manifestation, self-representation, standing-there, presence".[1]

This complements the Biblical understanding of
God's Revelation and His Real Presence in and through other
persons, places and things in the world and in history, as
merely varying aspects of a single fact. Revelation is never merely
"propositional" in nature; it is always a self-disclosure of the
Divine Presence in the world through the personal presence of the
Christ in "Word and Sacrament" within the context of "relationships"
of "beings-in-the-world". In the case of the New Testament that
"relationship" is, of course, the "Body of Christ".

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[1] Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 85.

.CHAPTER III

Section 4

Sub-section (ii)   Heidegger's Theory of Language

Heidegger's theory of language is equally significant

to the Christian theologian who would explain the primitive

conception of the creative and extensional power of "words",

and of expressive actions.

For Heidegger "being" reveals itself to man and itself

creates him and his consciousness of the world in that very act.

"Being" objectively causes intentional actions to arise in man's

consciousness.[1]   The revelation of being is both the creative process

and communication at once; it creates the man who hears, it also

creates his awareness, its own message, and the words or language

by which that message is conveyed to him.   Just as "being" always

appears as a "being" in the world, so, language appears as the

"revelation" of this "being", or a corollary experience witnessing

in the subjective consciousness of an individual to the response in

his own being, as it comes-to-be,   to the reception of messages

sent out by other "beings" in the world,

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[1] ibid., p. 117.   Note that this is unlike Husserl's theory, in which the
transcendental ego of man causes his consciousness of beings
through his intentionality toward them.   See pp. 143-7, this essay.

as those other "beings" are "becoming" and "appearing" there.[1]

The reception is not passive, but active and creative, in that it

forms "words" and other expressive actions which contribute to

the "becoming" of the other speaker or enactor who is communicating

as well as to the "becoming" of the receptive self who hears.

Language is thus conceived as "communication" in the widest sense

possible, inclusive of that idea of the creative inter-relationships bet-

ween persons, places, and things in the cosmos which we have found

in Whitehead, Allport and Chardin. In this sense "language" for

Heidegger can be said to be "creative". Through it "being" acts

and interacts upon the world of "beings" to create them into new

"beings" and to create other "beings".

Language is thus one mode of operation of "being"

itself; it is that particular mode which operates in a perceiving

subject as a corollary of the "self-appearing" of another "being-in-

the-world"

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[1] For Heidegger on language as creative: Introduction to Metaphysics,
   pp. 73, ff, 143-145, 155 and in Existence and Being, ed. by
   Werner Brock (Chicago 1949) the essays "What is Metaphysics",
   trans. by R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick, p. 391,
   "Remembrance of the Poet", trans. by Scott, p. 251-290 and
   "Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry", trans. by D. Scott, p. 291-
   316 and
   Being and Time, pp. 203-210.

as it comes "to be". "Being" thus "speaks" to man in-the-
world before man can think or speak the meaning which he both
(1) receives and (2) creates from that other "being". Man is
enveloped in "language" at all times by virtue of his very "being -
in-the-world", in a world of relationships in which "communication"
is a primary fact. Thus Heidegger can say:

> "Language is not something that man, among other faculties
> or instruments also possesses, but that which possesses
> man. " [1]

In this wide sense, language is the struggle, the encounter
of "beings", through which old "beings" are transformed and by
which new "beings" are created.

With such a theory of language the theologian may re-
state the Biblical and mythical conception of the creation of the
world by the spoken "word" of God, as well as the primitive cultic
and subsequent Christian liturgical conception that spoken "words"

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[1] Heidegger, from an unpublished course on Holderlin cited by
Vietta, trans. and quoted by Pierre Thévenaz in What is
Phenomenology ? ed. by James M. Edie, (Chicago, 1962) p. 62.

can evoke what they symbolize.[1]

In the case of the Biblical and mythical conception of the efficacious and creative "word" of God, it could be said that the self-expression of God in the act of creation is His "Word". The "language" of God, then, would be manifested in the act of creation itself; the creation would be the result of God's utterance, and history the place wherein the traces of His expression should be sought.

In the case of man's creative use of "words" and other forms of self-expressions in liturgical action the theologian using a Heideggerian frame of reference could say that, by the identification of human "intentions" with the creative and redemptive "intentions" of God in sacramental action, man is enabled to par-

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[1] Ernst Fuchs and Gerhart Ebeling, younger disciples of Rudolph Bultmann have made use of this thought of the "later Heidegger" on language and being in developing the school known as the "New Hermeneutic" in New Testament studies. According to the "New Hermeneutical" application of Heidegger's theory of language, interpretation of a text is itself a "happening", one in which the text speaks to us and forces a new self-understanding upon us in relation to the events which it bears to us and at the same time creates in us. This "language event", if it is "authentic language" can be a saving event through which God acts upon us in the present moment of our encounter with the text. The same theory would apply to the spoken proclamation of the Word through the words of a speaker.
See New Frontiers in Theology, Vol. II, "The New Hermeneutic". The entire volume is relevant.

ticipate as a co-creator with God in His creative Power, and to experience within himself its effects. Such effects are pledged by God, through His Christ, as the appropriate goals or objectives to be achieved in each particular sacramental action. The "language" of man, in the one instance of the performance of the Dominically instituted Sacraments, would become the vehicle of the "language" of God Himself.

Heidegger's understanding of "language" could thus deliver from the realm of ancient superstition the primitive world-view of the Bible, and together with it, the "Body of Christ" concept. In these terms the "Body of Christ" could be thought of once again as the sphere of "relationship" wherein the "language" or utterances of God and man unite in the creation of new "beings-in-the-world" according to God's own design in Christ.

The next question, which will be answered by Jean Paul Sartre, is, how are we to conceive of human intentionality? The Christian theologian needs a conception of "intentionality" which will accommodate the conjoining of the Divine and human "languages" in the manner constructed here with Heidegger's theory of "language".

CHAPTER III

Section 5   The Relevance of the Theory of Creative

Intentionality in the Philosophy of Jean-Paul

Sartre to the "Body of Christ" concept

In the same way that Husserl opposed the radical

opposition between the "subjective" and the "objective" and that

Heidegger opposes the radical opposition between "being" and

"becoming" and between "being" and "appearance", Jean-Paul

Sartre (1905-   ) opposes the radical opposition between

"being" and "doing" and "being" and "having". Sartre holds that

"being is defined by action", and that a man's actions are

ontologically creative of his being.[1]

Sartre feels that the tendency in the West, since

the appearance of   Kant's moral   philosophy, which has been

to consider man only as the "succession of his acts", is the

avoidance of the purpose of ethics, which, he says, should be

"...to raise man to higher ontological dignity."[2] In Sartre's

philosophy we have a dynamic ontology of "being" and "action"

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[1] Jean Paul Sartre, _Being and Nothingness_, trans. by H.E. Barnes,
(New York, 1965) p. 409.

[2] ibid, p. 407.

which can be extremely important to a contemporary understanding of

the ancient perspective which underlies the primitive solidarity concepts

and the Christian doctrines of the Church and Sacraments. The value of

this ontology is enhanced especially when it is linked, as it is for

Sartre, with a theory of "intentionality" which preserves man's free-

dom and allows for man's creative achievement of his future goals.[1]

For Sartre, these future goals are not predetermined

by a fixed essence, but freely selected by man in his freedom in a

creative interplay with that which is "other than self". Man's freedom,

and the indeterminate nature of man's being, requires that his novel

creations be conceived and executed in "detachment" from already

existent beings in the external world.[2]

The aim of consciousness is to tear itself away from

the world. Pure consciousness is not consciousness of the world, but

of the self. When the world is the object of the intentionality of

consciousness man is enslaved to it, not free, and thus incapable of

being himself. Consciousness is freedom when it directs itself away from

all essences, including its own, in order to move toward what it purposes to

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[1]
Being and Nothingness, Chapter One of Part Four, "Being and Doing;
Freedom", pp. 409-532.

[2] ibid., pp. 411-419. Note also that Sartre agrees with Heidegger against
Husserl in denying the existence of the transcendental ego, but on the
other hand he agrees with Husserl against Heidegger in setting the
existence of a transcendental consciousness prior to being itself.
Everything is exterior to the Sartrian transcendental consciousness.

be. Consciousness is existence. It arises as the source of its own
intention. For Sartre creativity is freedom of intentionality, and should
be spontaneous. The Sartrian "consciousness", like the "being", of
Heidegger, has to make itself, create itself. In order for this to be a
free act it must choose nothing but itself as the object of its own
intentionality. It must ignore both the essences of the individual him-
self and the external world in order to be an authentic, unique, and
novel act of creation.[1]

Sartre's philosophy has implications which are obviously in-
compatible with the Judeo-Christian emphasis upon the need for the
finding of the purposes of a Divine Transcendent within history and the
possibility of authentic inter-subjective dialogues between free beings
in the world. On the other hand it is equally essential to lay emphasis
upon the great themes of authenticity and creative freedom in an age
of depersonalized external compulsions and sub-human cultural automa-
tion. This, of course, is the positive contribution of the atheistic
existentialist's revolt against all the external frameworks or structures
of life, including those of theistic law and religion, which when they
have become idolatrized, appear to threaten the roots of man's creative
being. There is yet a further positive contribution in the Sartrian
concept of authentic self-creation.

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[1] Being and Nothingness, p. 411. "No factual state whatever it may be....
   is capable by itself of motivating any act whatsoever..." and p. 414,
   "Now freedom has no essence. It is not subject to any logical
   necessity; we must say of it what Heidegger said of the Dasein in
   general: 'In it existence precedes and commands essence'."

through action.

For Sartre to be is to act. To make oneself is to transform oneself constantly. Authentic intentionality involves the desire to transform the world, and the self in that very process. "To act is to modify the world."[1] Understanding, comprehension, and all the factors of consciousness go together with action to comprise the creative act; and, conversely, action enables one to see and to know truly and authentically.

This kind of philosophy of life, action, creativity, and knowledge is also important as the underlying dynamic of the primitive solidarity concepts and of the Christian doctrines of the Church and the Sacraments. In these terms corporate extensions of personality can be conceived of as psychically achieved through the intentionality of particular conscious and acting subjects who create realities by purposing and dramatically enacting them. For Sartre and for the Bible, man is not a disinterested spectator with an essence which will remain intact whatever happens to the world of space and time. The basic pre-supposition of the Biblical view of the world is that it is sacramentally pliable, that the eternal and ultimate destinies of men can be changed and

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[1] Being and Nothingness, p. 409. Note that for Sartre the essential world is the self in an intentional inter-action with and re-action to external factors, but it does not seem to include those factors. Here he differs from many of the other phenomenologists and from the Bible.

recreated by the intentions of the heart and the deeds of the hand.

In the Sartrian version of the "phenomenological reduction" man tears himself away from his past and from its negative determination; by his intention man projects himself out toward his future. Sartre also conceived of this projection as movement from the future toward the present. "The existent does not possess its essence as a present quality...But the essence comes from the ground of the future to the existent..."[1] For Sartre no "already there" exists in the future which cannot be operated upon and changed in the present through intentionality. This futuristic dimension of intentionality aims at the "not-yet", that which is latent, that which is open-ended, the basis of all creative possibilities. It is in this sense that Sartre says intentionality must have as its object "nothing". The "nothingness" which is the proper object of man's intentionality for Sartre is precisely the basis of man's hope, his glory, and his future. This always, by the very nature of things, is a present future.

Bultmann defines "grace" as the act in which God frees man from his own past and from the dead weight of its present and future catastrophic results.[2] Bultmann sees this as the principal significance of the Biblical concept of "remission of sins". Although

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[1] Being and Nothingness, pp. 169-170.

[2] Rudolf Butlmann, Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting, trans. by R.H. Fuller, (New York, 1963), pp. 182-184.
"While humanity is essentially openness for the future... When he [man] boasts he lays hold upon what he already has and is - upon his past. But to renounce such boasting....to surrender unreservedly to the grace of God, to believe - all this is simply radical openness for future." p, 184.

the Judeo-Christian idea of "repentance" seems to be without
parallel in the philosophy of Sartre, it does not require much
imagination to see that in his idea of the relationship of the past
and the future to the present through human intentionality he is
on the track of an insight which is essential to the Christian
theologian.

And it might even be said that Sartre and St. Paul
share at least the basis of a common synergistic doctrine; the
Pauline God, no less than Sartrian "authenticity", asks that
man actively participate in creating himself and his value-schemes.
For any doctrine which implies, as Christian theology does, the
working together of God and man in a special covenanted social sphere,
such as the "Mystical Body" of Christ, some such understanding of
the ultimate significance of human intentions and actions in the final
outcome of God's plan for his creation is essential.

At the root of the Sartrian concept of creativity-in-
freedom-from any transcendentally determinative factor one cannot
help but feel that there is the simple desire to assert the importance

and the reality of the human, the finite, and the immediately experienced motions of our consciousness to the outcome of life's drama. While the Christian theist will not be able to accept Sartre's rejection of Divine Transcendence per se, he should be able to sympathize with the refusal to accept those popular and widely disseminated misunderstandings of the theistic concept which in the past have tended to reduce man's role in the universe from that of a responsible and imaginative co-creator-with-God to that of a merely obedient subject in a royal court where Divine edicts have decided everything in advance. For Sartre, things are indeed "caused", but in a way which insures the reality of personal freedom.

Human causality is, for Sartre, both creative and free in its very nature.[1] While all things are caused, they are caused by our intentionality. The result is that causality, so understood, can not lead to determination, for "intention" is created by a personal being who must be "detached" from being bound to present actualities and be pledged to future possibilities. These future possibilities can never be fixed, and are always open ended, i.e. with no specific content. Freedom then exists in the causes themselves in this way. A person must "desire", have motivation, and "intend" something not yet in existence in order to "cause" something. All causality hinges therefore on "intentionality".

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[1] Being and Nothingness, p. 413 ff.

The application of all this to the primitive solidarity
concepts would be extremely illuminating. For example, one could
say that in all four of the principles of "psychic-extension", "cor-
porate personality", "realistic representation", and "cultic
anamenesis", the human "intention" is the precursor of the action.
It first conceives and defines that action, and in turn that action
creates and brings into ontological being that which did not exist
before except as a desired possibility within the free and authentic
personality of its originator.

In the case of the Biblical use of the primitve
solidarity principles to convey Divine Power, one could say that
the conjoining of an intentionality shared in common by God and man,
and the concomitant joining of Divine and human creative action,
would always allow the freedom intrinsic to the personality and the
desires of each party in his detachment from already existing beings.
Since God is never bound to things in a limiting way, it would follow
that the only problems might arise on the human side. In order to
overcome these, "detachment" from "slavery" to other persons
places and things would be a necessary counterweight to interrelation
with them in the "Body of Christ".

Classical Hebrew and Christian ascetical elements
have always emphasized "withdrawal" as a part of the creative
and redemptive process. As we have seen, Bultmann calls "grace"
the power which precisely enables man to be free from his past.
If Sartre is right, then it could also be said to make man "free"
from his "present". Another aspect of effective sacramental
participation within the "Body of Christ" would then be "detachment"
for the sake of creative freedom with which to "intend" a truly new
kind of being in Christ.

CHAPTER III

Section 6   The Relevance of the Theory of the World as

                 Creative Interior Relation in the Philosophy of

                 Maurice Merleau-Ponty to the "Body of Christ"

                 Concept.

We have seen that the primal order of reality for

Husserl is the transcendental ego and its consciousness of itself.

For Heidegger it is transcendental being which reveals and creates

itself in the world and in man. For Sartre it is neither transcendental

ego nor being, but a free-floating, creative consciousness. For

the next and last of the phenomenologists whose basic presuppositions

we shall examine there are no transcendentals, no realities prior

to the "lived-world".

        For Merleau-Ponty the true transcendental is the world,

and "...we are through and through compounded of relationships with the

world...."[1] For Merleau-Ponty the phenomenological reduction is

not a withdrawal from the world towards a pure consciousness as

it is for Sartre; it is on the contrary a full-scale invasion of the

world of perception, the natural, social, and "original" world.

All consciousness and

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[1] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. by
      Colin Smith, (London, 1962) p. xiii.

meaning arises from this world which is "already there". The

phenomenlogical reduction reveals that man is a subject wedded to

the world. Hence, for Merleau-Ponty, in opposition to Sartre,

pure consciousness can never be free of external intentions and

connections. "Truth does not 'inhabit' only 'the inner man', or

more accurately, there is no inner man, man is in the world, and

only in the world does he know himself".[1]

For Sartre, as we have seen, authentic knowledge and

creative intentionality depend upon freedom, which is defined as

the power of one's own pure consciousness to "tear itself away"

from intentionality toward already existent beings in the world.[2]

Merleau-Ponty points out the other half of the truth which he thinks

Sartre has forgotten. He declares that the power to "tear away"

is itself based upon a prior universal engagement in the world.

For Merleau-Ponty freedom is not something that can be secured

by the individual within his own consciousness simply by "intending "

nothingness. Freedom is granted to one by other beings and

appropriated in the relationship which one has with them. My freedom

depends on the ability of the other beings with whom I am

engaged at a given moment to allow my being to speak to them for

itself. Conversely, their freedom depends on my ability to do the

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[1] Phenomenology of Perception, p. xi.

[2] Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 411-19, and pp. 158-9, this essay.

same. Thus, true understanding and creative intentionality arise

as a by-product of freedom, as they do for Sartre, but freedom

itself arises only from the right kind of encounter between one

and the world.

> "Far from its being the case that my freedom
> is always unattended, it is never without an
> accomplice, and its power of perpetually
> tearing itself away finds its fulcrum on my
> universal commitment in the world. My
> actual freedom is not on the hither side of
> my being, but before me, in things....
> Consciousness holds itself responsible
> for everything, and takes everything upon
> itself, but it has nothing of its own and
> makes its life in the world".[1]

Because of his radical denial of the possibility of any

encounter between persons which would not curtail freedom, Sartre

destroys the "world" of internal creative participation in another's

freedom. It is Merleau-Ponty who restores this world wherein

"dialogue" is possible. This puts him closer to the Christian

existentialists or more accurately the "Existenz" philosophers than

it does many of the other "non-theistic" writers in the tradition of

either existentialism or phenomenology.

Merleau-Ponty sees the essentiality of a simultaneous

participation -in -detachment to the effecting of any true dialogue

between persons. The truth of the complementarity of participation

and detachment has, as we have seen, also been fully appreciated by

Allport. Insight into the fact that individuation, uniqueness,

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[1] Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 452.

and distance, are no real barrier to maximum participation,

sharing, and membership in a group, is of course, an underlying

factor behind the primitive solidarity concepts, and the "Body

of Christ" concept.

Like others affected by the existentialist movement

Merleau-Ponty was anxious to abandon all dominant theological

and ideological interpretations of history which posited either

on the one hand a supernaturally predestined course for human

events, or on the other hand a naturally fixed and rationally

fathomable master-plan in the operation of life on the basis of

which the outcome of things can be predicted. He tended at first

to side with Kierkegaard against Realistic and Idealist philosophies.

But he eventually disagreed with the Kierkegaardian tradition

as well, perceiving that its near cultic

dedication to the "irrational" and the "absurd" could be equally

as devastating to serious thought about the world as a place for

purposeful creativity as various forms of historical determinism

had been. He wrote:

> "There would be no history if everything had a
> meaning and if the evolution of the world were
> nothing but the visible realization of a rational
> plan; but there would not be history either if
> everything were absurd, or if the course of
> things were dominated by massive and unchangeable
> facts."[1]

Merleau-Ponty stands close to a Biblical and classical

Christian insistence upon the balance between the rational and the

non-rational factors which man encounters in his pursuit of the

ultimate truths about his world. It was an ancient Rabbinical

paradox that while, on the one hand, there is order and predictability

in the operation of things due to the constancy of the wisdom and

justice of God, there is also on the other hand, an awe-inspiring

unfathomable quality about God and his world which makes things

appear as if they had no meaning, as if the irrational and the accidental

were at the heart of things. In the Bible this paradox finds expression

in the books of Job and Ecclesiastes. While all existentialists,

Christian and non-Christian alike, from Kierkegaard to Jaspers

have reminded us of the "absurdity" and the "irrationality" in

life, few if any of them have balanced this with an appreciation

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[1] M. Merleau-Ponty, *Sens et non-sens*, (Paris, 1948), p. 343, trans.
by Thévenaz, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

of the orderliness of things, of the "logos" in things in which must

be found the keynote of any theistic system. As Tillich has pointed

out, existentialism presupposes the framework of an "essentialism",

just as "irrationalism" presupposes the framework of the "rational".[1]

Merleau-Ponty achieves the balance of this pair of contrasting concepts

and philosophical opposites in a way that many other existentialists

and phenomenologists do not. The order and meaning of "essentialism",

and the openendedness of existentialism are both necessary for a

contemporary approximation to the primitive world view underlying

the ancient solidarity concepts.

For Merleau-Ponty, as it was for Sartre and all of

the writers whose thoughts we have examined, the world is a product

of dynamic process in which human actions and relationships play

the formative and ultimate parts in the outcome of creation as the

"lived world" of man,

> "The human world is an open or unachieved system
> and the same fundamental contingency which
> threatens it with discord at the same time delivers
> it from the fatality of disorder and forbids us to
> despair of it. "[2]

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[1] See Paul Tillich, "Existentialism and Psychotherapy", in
Psychoanalysis and Existential Philosophy, pp. 3-16.

[2] M. Merleau-Ponty, Humanisme et Terreur, (Paris, 1947). p. 206,
trans. by Thévenaz, op. cit., p. 89.

But for Merleau-Ponty there is also order and meaning in the world

even though the world is an "open and unachieved system". That

order and meaning come not from the world as a finished product

in itself, nor from man's subjectivity in isolation from the world, but

rather from man's encounter with the world. In this Merleau-Ponty

follows in the tradition of Heidegger. But he parts company with

Heidegger in that he does not resort to a transcendental "being" to

provide order in the creation. For Merleau-Ponty there are no

transcendentals save the world itself.

The "world" of Merleau-Ponty is not the external world,

of the traditional philosophers, but rather the internal sphere of the

existential relationships of man.[1] Understanding, meaning and order

arise as a result of the encounter between man and his "world". On

the one hand there is no fixed, essential or objective meaning in the

thing itself outside of my relationship with it, and on the other hand

it is not my own consciousness that subjectively creates meaning

and value for itself. Rather it is the dialogue, the encounter, the

relationship itself out of which objective meaning is created in the

process of a subjective intercommunication between beings in the

world.

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[1] _Phenomenology of Perception_, pp. 346-365.

The creation of the real "world" then, requires

togetherness, community, and communication; and in that process

going on at all times, we can expect to find confusion, ambiguity and

the conflict of wills, as well as harmony, clarity, and order.[1] For

Merleau-Ponty the revelation of the "original" or real world is

the purpose of this "world"; and its values, by means of communication

and interrelationships between beings, hinge upon "perception" which

takes directly from the external world the data and the material with

which it creates the more important "world", or the world of

creative interior relations.[2]

It is interesting to note the similarity between Merleau-

Ponty and Bergson on the particular point of man's creation out

of the external world of a "higher" world, or inner world where the

most essential secrets of the objects of the external world are known

in their fuller revelation of being and harmonized.[3] In commentary

upon the philosophy in Bergson's Matter and Memory, Merleau-Ponty

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[1] Merleau-Ponty, Sens et non-sens, (Paris, 1947) p. 380.

[2] The Primacy of Perception, ed. and trans. by James M. Edie, (Evanston, Ill., 1964) p. 15 ff., and 24 ff.

[3] See pp. 94-116, this essay.

speaks approvingly of his idea of man's creation and unification

of the world in perception through the memory:

> "... Bergson said that this restitution of all durations
> to a unified whole, which is not possible at their (own)
> inner source... is achieved when incarnate subjects
> mutually perceive one another, that is, when their
> perceptual fields cut across and envelop one another
> and they see one another in the process of perceiving
> the same world ... What Bergson was doing here
> was outlining a philosophy that would make the
> universal rest upon the mystery of perception..."[1]

and:

> "Never before had anyone established this circuit
> between being and myself which is such that being
> exists 'for being'. Never had the brute being of the
> perceived world been so described. By unveiling it
> according to duration as it comes to be, Bergson
> regains at the heart of man a pre-Socratic and 'pre-
> human' meaning of the world."[2]

Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the real "world" as

the world of the interior and existential relationships between persons

also complements the Biblical idea of what Boman calls "interior

space" and "psychic time", the measurement of distance not in terms

of its place in space and time, but in terms of its nearness or distance

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[1] Merleau-Ponty, "Bergson in the Making" in Signs, ed. by John Wild,
     trans by, Richard C. McCleary, (Evanston, Ill., 1964) p. 186.

[2] ibid, p. 185.

from the emotional or intentional interior life of a subject who stands in a relationship to something.[1] The Church, as the "Body of Christ" can be seen in these terms as unlimited by the world of space and time while nevertheless superimposed upon it. And yet even in this inward dimension of interior and physically limitless psychical relationships the Church would not necessarily be a "supernatural" fact. Any ordinary instance of a human group possessing "corporate personality" would also possess the same trans spacio-temporal quality and would be unbound by space-time dimensions, as we have seen in examining Bergson's concept of memory and Whitehead's "objective immortality". The supernatural element in the make-up of the "Body of Christ" would be yet another factor, in fact a "third world" beyond both Merleau-Ponty's (which would be only a "second world") and the "first" world of space-time.

Karl Heim has written a Christian apologetic for such a perspective by describing the existence of three "worlds" or "dimensions" to the world.[2] For Heim the first is the ordinary perceptual world of physical space and time, the second is the world of inter-personal relationships where man lives out the drama of his

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[1] Boman, op. cit., pp. 123-183.

[2] Karl Heim, Christian Faith and Natural Science, trans. by N. Horton Smith, (New York, 1957), pp. 168-169.

interior thoughts, emotions, and enters into dialogue with others.
The third "world" for Heim is the supernatural dimension in which
God encounters his creatures and engages them in a relationship
with himself. Some such theological construction as this one of
Heim's would serve well as a Christian framework for Merleau-
Ponty's insights on the nature of the "world" of creative interior
relation, and for the world of "psychic time" and "interior space"
of the primitive solidarity concepts.

The primitive solidarity concepts are dependent
upon a "world" of creative interior relationships like that of Merleau-
Ponty. For the men who held these ancient concepts life and meaning
arose out of action and drama in the world exactly as it does for
Merleau-Ponty. The idea that the existence of another person can
itself speak to me and change me in my interiority as I live and
move in relationship with him is a premise which undergirds the
concepts of "psychic extension of personality", "corporate personality",
and "realistic representation". The primacy of interior intentional
relationships over physical space and time, and the simultaneous
dependency of these interior relationships on space and time, is a
paradox which is asserted no less in the ancient concept of "cultic
anamnesis" than in the modern thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

CONCLUSION

Section I   An Interpretative Summary

The "Body of Christ" concept, together with concomitant

Christian doctrines of the Church and Sacraments, may best be

viewed against the background of ancient Hebrew-psychology, which

was itself part of a wider and more universal primitive Weltanschauung.

In this primitive and pre-philosophical perspective the external

world was envisioned as the outward reflection of an interior and

psychic relationship of persons, places, and things in a constant

process of creation,which took place, through the interplay of human

intentions and actions within a social context. The religious language

of primitive peoples, including the Hebrews, reflects this ancient

psychology by clothing the realities of that inner and psychic world of

relation and intention with the symbols of the external and exterior

world of space and time.

The primitive mind does not seem to have made a dis-

tinction between these two worlds, or in the terms of later philosophy,

at least spoke of them interchangeably with analogous terms taken

from the world of space and time. This outer world was portrayed

as being realistically transcended by personal objects, particularly

in cultic ceremonies involving the corporate and dramatic memorial

of an historical and/or mythical hero or god. In a similar fashion, the

numerical separation of the one from the many could be transcended

by a realistically conceived "participation" of one person in another

person or in a group; and conversely, a whole group could be in-

corporated in one person. Thus, the four conceptions of "psychic

extension of personality", "corporate-personality", "realistic

representation", and "cultic anamnesis" were all merely varying

aspects of a single dynamic and "holistic" world-view, which in its

Biblical manifestation, portrayed man as a "co-creator" with

Divine Power in the building up of the world and in the movements

of Divine Providence in history. The New Testament completed the

Biblical development of this primitive world-view by envisioning the

whole creation as potentially summed-up in Christ, the New Being,

through His "Body", the Church.

The Church as the "Body of Christ" may in these terms

be conceived of as the spiritual, psychic and organic "corporate person-

ality" of all creatures who stand within the cosmic processes of the

Creation, Incarnation, and Redemption focally manifested in Jesus

the Christ. Within this "corporate personality" or "Body", all of

the other ancient solidarity principles, i. e. "psychic extension of

personality", "realistic representation", and "cultic anamnesis"

are conceived of as operating in the Sacraments to secure an internal

"participation" of the many members in the common life of the One

Head.

The now strange world view implied in the primitive

solidarity concepts, which were found in ancient Near-Eastern as

well as pre-Socratic Greek sources and even in post-Socratic Greek

religious cults, was gradually suppressed in the consciousness of

Western man with the advent of analytical thought in the Socratic

tradition, and finally met its demise at the European Renaissance

and in the course of the great Scientific Revolution from the Fourteenth

to the Nineteenth Centuries. The writers of the New Testament and

the Greek and Latin Fathers of the Early Church stand together

in an authentic tradition of adaptation of this primitive thought-

world to the terms of post-Socratic Greek philosophy.

Their formulations of Christian doctrine regarding the

Church and Sacraments, together with that of later writers in the

Orthodox East and the Catholic West, succeeded in preserving the

conclusions, without the basic perspective of the primitive solidarity

concepts. The Reformation in the West witnessed to the difficulties

which European man was then beginning to experience with the Patristic

and Medieval synthesis. This was in part due to the fading of the

primitive and "holistic" vision which has since then continued to give

Western man intellectual difficulties in comprehending the language,

the practices, and doctrines of his own essentially Hebraic religious

tradition.

In spite of these intellectual difficulties the Christian

churches have succeeded in preserving, in some places more and in other places less, an ecclesiology and a tradition of sacramental teaching which enshrines the primitive solidarity concepts and implies the universal reality of a psychic world of inward time and limitless space. The problem has been that for the most part neither theologians nor clergy at large have been able to understand or present to others the underlying roots of the conceptions with which they have been implicitly dealing while treating sacramental doctrine and the question of the modes of operation of Christ's relationship to the members of His Body, the Church. Mass defections from Christian allegiance mark the secular reaction to several centuries of a widespread non-comprehension of the now incomprehensible world-view undergirding the Christian religion.

Three movements in the religious and secular thought of recent times have begun to alleviate this situation. The first is the Biblical theology, which, under the influence of such writers as H.W. Robinson, J. Pedersen, A.R. Johnson, M. Thurian, R. Shedd, T. Boman and others, has uncovered in Biblical terms this now lost ancient world-view of psychic time and interior-space of which we have spoken, and presented it, at least to the attention of the scholars and clergy of Christendom.

This accomplishment should be appreciated fully, but

with an attending awareness, gained from a wider appreciation of
the comparative religion of antiquity, that the issue at stake is
not so much that there was sharp contrast between Hebrew and
Greek, or Hebrew and all other, thought forms in antiquity, but
rather that there was a sharp contrast between universal primitive
and "holistic" conceptions on the one hand, and the speculative and
analytic tradition of post Socratic philosophy on the other hand. This is
quite an important distinction to make if we are to avoid the sterile
post-Barthian tendency to isolate things Biblical and Hebraic from
the entire Lebenswelt of secular man, ancient or modern. We
must, rather, appeal to contemporary man in terms which we have
good reason to suspect are universal, and, therefore, real for modern
men as well as for the men of antiquity.

The Church's vocation to preach the Kerygma
does not necessarily involve a call to return to a "unique" and now
antiquated world-view of one particular people in the past; and yet
she must remain faithful to the understanding of herself which she
finds in a Scripture and a Tradition which come to her from antiquity.
The problem really is to ascertain if there are modern parallels to
the primitive and universal concepts of human solidarity held in
antiquity which underlie the "Body of Christ" concept.

Two modern philosophical and psychological developments
in particular do produce the parallels of contemporary insight into

the modes of human solidarity which will make the primitive

world-view more comprehensive for 20th Century man. Both

process philosophy and phenomenology view the external world

in the light of an inner psychic process and relation in which the

classical separation between the "objective" and the "subjective"

is broken down. They thus provide a framework of contemporary

thought within which the Biblical world-view can become less like

magic and more like good sense to the ordinary man. The Christian

theologian may construct an authentic synthesis between the

primitive Weltanschauung involved in the "Body of Christ" concept

and contemporary thought on the basis of their several contributions.

In the concept of "objective immortality" of Alfred North

Whitehead we find a parallel to the ancient and pre-Socratic idea

of a universe in which spiritual and psychic formal structures develop

and change through process and relation in the external world of

time and space. The ancient concepts of "psychic extension of

personality", "corporate personality" and "realistic representation"

become comprehensible in light of the Whiteheadian theory of the

ingression of immortalized occasions themselves products and aspects

of historical "concrescences", into the other persons, places, and things

of the world as models in their internal composition and development.

The Biblical conception of Christ "in" His Body, and

"in" the individual members thereof, is thereby clarified as part of a wider cosmic process involving the ingression into persons, places, and things of many other kinds of models as the very mode of operation of the creation itself.

In the concept of "objective memorial" of Henri Bergson we find a parallel to the ancient conception of "cultic anamnesis". For contemporary man it provides a universal and more acceptable basis for the mystery of trans spacio-temporal transcendence, or the availability for incorporation into one another of events and persons otherwise spacially and temporally separated. In the light of this concept the Christian doctrine of the Sacraments and the Eucharist in particular, can be made a part of a wider understanding of the means of such trans spacio-temporal transcendence available to all men at all times and places.

In the psychologist Gordon Allport's concept of personality development as a constant process of "becoming" in relation to others we find a parallel to the world-view of the primitive solidarity concepts and to the thought of Whitehead. For Allport, as for the Bible and Whitehead, other persons, places, and things are "taken into" one through a process of reaction to matters of importance arrested from the stream of events that occur around one in the external world. The same mysterious interplay

of freedom and determinacy, internal and external factors, is

found in the psychology of Allport as is found in the primitive

Weltanschauung of the Bible.

The creation theology of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin

provides a structure of Christian thought within which process

philosophy in general, together with the specific insights of

Whitehead, Bergson, Allport, and others, might be integrated.

In this theological structure the physical world and its dynamic

formal evolution is envisioned as unconditionally essential to the

spiritual fruition of the cosmos and the ultimate transfiguration of

all things in Christ. Spiritual transcendence and earthly develop-

ment are mutually inseparable but nevertheless distinguishable

aspects of a single process in which the vocation of man is central;

for it is in man, as taken-up into union with the Godhead in the

humanity of Jesus the Christ, that the "Omega" point is attained. This

attainment involves the whole creation as the new Being of the Christ

becomes incarnate in each person, and through each person in every

place and thing in the world as they are transformed by man into

noetic, psychic, and spiritual facts, and then cease to exist in the

world of space and time.

A solution to the problem of the relationship of

"subjective" human intentions to the "objective" and exterior physical

world is the special contribution of phenomenology. That solution provides several specific parallels to the primitive world-view of the Bible.

In the theory of human intentionality as an "objective" correlative in man to external factors in the physical and social world, Edmund Husserl has laid the foundation for a new ontology which avoids the choice between the unyielding formal objectivity of classical Greek metaphysics on the one hand and dependency upon the pure subjectivity of Descartes, Kant, and Kierkegaard on the other hand. Just such an alternative to this choice is needed if we are to accommodate the primitive conception that man can "objectively" affect his outer surroundings by means of the internal operations of his own consciousness of them psychically extended into the world of persons, places and things.

In the theories of "being" and "language" of Martin Heidegger we find an ontology in which the classical opposition between "being" and "becoming", and between "being" and "appearance" is dissolved, and an ontology in which "language" is viewed as an objectively creative communication between creatures bound together in mutual relationships and in a cosmic process of "becoming". This type of ontology of "being" and "language" parallels that implicit in the primitive solidarity concepts,

particularly in regard to the Divine Presence in the world through

God's self-disclosure or "Revelation" to man in Word and Sacrament

alike. Human and Divine "Language", when conceived in this way

as creative communication between "being" and "beings in the

world", and when conjoined in accordance with the Divine intention,

can become a single and integrated mode of operation of God's

threefold Creational, Incarnational, and Redemptive activity in the

world.

In Jean-Paul Sartre's conception of creative intentionality

we find a breakdown of the radical opposition between "being" and

"doing", and between "being" and "having", and a resulting ontology

which conceives of man's actions as creative of his own being.

This correlates with the dynamic world-view of process philosophy

and of Bible. With such a perspective the Sacraments can be viewed

as focal points of creative intentionality and action.

For Sartre freedom consists in the capacity to withdraw

the intentions from pre-established beings in the world toward creat-

ing not-yet existing potentialities. These potentialities are achieved,

then, when one is free to imagine them and move into the process of

creating them without hindrance by conflicting past or present

claims. In this theory we have the basis for a renewed contemporary

appreciation of the classical insights of Christian ascetical theology

concerning the modes and degrees of "detachment" which are appro-
priate to life in the Church and participation in the Sacraments. In
this context grace which enables a release from sin and the avoidance
of the negative and limiting elements in one's past life would be
conceived as the precondition of all human co-creativity with God
in the "Body of Christ".

The phenomenologist whose conception of the world
most nearly conforms to that found in the primitive solidarity
concepts is Maurice Merleau-Ponty. For Merleau-Ponty man's
freedom is achieved only in relationships with others when beings, as
they are in themselves and in the other specific persons, places, and
things of the world, are allowed to speak for themselves. This
process of authentic interior perception of relationships with the
external world is the pre-condition from which man can create
the real world, or the "lived-world", the higher world of inner
psychic relationships. This higher "lived-world" of man is not
merely subjective, but truly objective, since it arises out of authentic
"perception" of the external world. The higher, "lived-world" is the
place of creative psychic intentions, which in turn produce or realize
their objects in both "worlds".

Merleau-Ponty's conception of the "lived-world"
parallels Bergson's idea of the creation of a higher noetic and
psychic world from the objective material of the lower world of
exterior space and time. Something akin to this conception lies

behind the primitive solidarity concepts and the thought of all

of the process philosophers and phenomenologists we have studied.

Merleau-Ponty's conception of the higher "lived-world" may be

integrated into a Christian theological system as a second or "psychic"

world midway between the physical world of space and time and the

supernatural and spiritual realm in which God encounters His creatures.

All three of these "worlds" would be viewed as superimposed, inter-

penetrating aspects of one world, of one unified process in which

Heaven and Earth, both the physical and the noetic or psychical

Earth, are bound together in the task of creation itself. In these

terms the "Body of Christ" could be seen as that portion of the

Creation in which the Incarnational and Redemptive processes have

been activated through the life and person of the Christ.

CONCLUSION

Section 2   Suggestions for the Church's Future Apologetic

and Self-understanding as the "Body of Christ"

in light of Ancient Hebrew Psychology and

Modern Process Thought and Phenomenology.

The material which we have been reviewing

presents us with several suggestions for the Church's future

apologetic and self-understanding as the "Body of Christ".

(1) There is a drift away from positivism, rationalism, and

static varieties of essentialism in contemporary philosophical and

psychological developments. This is marked by both process

philosophy and phenomenology. Therefore, it would not seem

especially appropriate at this point to "reduce" the Gospel in an

ever futile attempt to state it in terms acceptable to those bred

within these particular perspectives. If the analysis of the

contemporary situation given here is accurate (, the thought-world

of the positivist and the rationalist is at best a dying world,

Greater relevance to modern natural and social sciences and

to the philosophy most recently generated by these disciplines

would be achieved by an understanding of the Christian religion,

with all of its ancient conceptions of "mystery" and "transcen-

dence", in light of process-thought and phenomenology.

Contemporary North American "Christian Atheism"
often provides an example of the excessive "reductionism" which
is necessary in order to state Christian Faith in terms of positivistic
and rationalistic philosophical categories. Apologetic for a fully
orthodox Christianity is impossible in such terms, but it is possible
in the terms provided by process-philosophy and phenomenology.
(2) The problem would then seem to be not one of retreat, but one
of attack. Rather than accepting the temporarily popular frame-
work of positivistic and rationalistic analysis dominant in the
world-view of the "average man", the Church's apologetic function
might better begin by an alignment with the best thought available,
i. e., with the kind of world-view currently held by those who are
knowledgable in the philosophy of process and relation and in pheno-
menological methodology, both of which are engendered by the latest
natural and social sciences. This kind of world-view, while still
not understood by the "man-in-the-street" today, will in all probability
become a more popular and intellectually credible world-view in
the near future.

The first step in the Church's apologetic mission is to
show in earnest how interested it really is in furthering the best and
highest attainments of purely human reason. This would be
accomplished partly at least by joining in the attempt of responsible

secular minds to dislodge the positivistic "common-sense" world-view of exterior time and space from the popular position which it still holds in Western society. Only when this is done can the Church's Gospel hope to make an appeal without contradicting radically the secular understanding of man and his world. Therefore, every opportunity should be seized for occasion to explain to ordinary men, in simple and modern terms, how they are and can be related to one another in a cosmic process of creation by means of the natural and universal operation of the type of solidarity principles which underlie the sacramental usages of the Church.

3) The Church's next step would then be to proceed to use all of the Sacraments, sacramental actions, all of the "mystery", the objectified symbols, drama and meaningful cult that it possesses in its worship and in its proclamation of the Kerygma. This liturgical language, which echoes strange primitive concepts, will, if these concepts are truly correlative of universal and natural principles in human experience, strike a corresponding note of response in the inner psychic being of the ordinary man. There may be released a powerful and haunting appeal in the interest of the Gospel.

By the utilization of her own self-knowledge as the "Body of Christ" in light of the primitive solidarity concepts and of modern thought, the contemporary Church may in these ways deepen the the religious experience of her own members and widen the scope of her appeal in a secular age.

(4) There are ecumenical implications to be derived from our study of the "Body of Christ" concept in light of the primitive solidarity concepts and modern process-thought and phenomenology.

If the modes of operation of God's saving communication with man are based upon principles which are naturally and universally operative in both ancient and modern societies, as this study would suggest, then the reality of the presence of the Church as the sacramentally constituted "Body of Christ" among any given community or group of Christians can never either be limited by or subordinated to questions of organizational or authoritarian principle nor be made to depend upon the "recognition" of an hierarchical structure, no matter what kind of legitimate place such considerations as these might otherwise have in the Church for the preservation of orthodoxy or discipline. Since the natural solidarity principles operate to call a particular "corporate personality" into existence, the minimal reality of the presence of the Church, as the "Body of Christ", would depend only upon the presence of the Word and Sacraments of Christ among His worshippers. In turn, the whole question of the "validity" or "efficacy" of such sacramental ministrations within any given context would come into a new perspective.

Everywhere in the creation "natural sacraments" are operative in the universal principles of "psychic extension of personality", "corporate personality", "realistic representation", and "cultic anamnesis". If we can believe the insights of process-thought and

phenomenology, their "validity" or "efficacy" depends only upon general observation of the natural rules governing their operation, and this observation is "innately natural" to all men in every society. Therefore, these human pre-conditions for the Sacraments of Christ would be met in full even in those ecclesiastical bodies which do not consciously cultivate a high sacramental theology or practice. Since the Church, as the "Body of Christ", is brought into being by such sacramental action, we could say that a minimal sacramental fullness (as distinct from a fullness of dogmatic understanding) of the One Church in its potential instrumentality would be recognizable "...wherever two or three are gathered together..." in His Name.

Such a "gathering" would, per se, be sacramentally linked with the one "corporate personality" of the whole "Body of Christ" through the operation of the other natural "extensions", "representations", "anamnesis", etc. In this way the classical opposition between the theory of the "gathered-church" and the theory of Church as a single, unified corporation with historical continuity, would be dissolved. The essential unity of the Church would cease to be an administrative, juridicial, or organizational matter; and, without becoming a purely "spiritual" consideration, the "Eternal Church" would become a sacramental reality securely grounded in persons, places and things on earth and in history, in the processes and phenomena of an ever-evolving world of space and time.

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