

Challenges in attributing avoided deforestation to policies and actors: lessons from provincial forest zoning in the Argentine Dry Chaco

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1 Abstract

2 Rigorous impact assessments test for causal effects of interventions on outcomes of
3 interest. When findings of such assessments become part of political and scholarly
4 controversies, they can be interpreted in unintended ways. The value of the ensuing
5 debate is enhanced by a shared understanding of key concepts, methodological
6 approaches, and evaluative criteria. Here we illustrate the importance of such shared
7 understanding by example of a recent controversy surrounding the estimated impacts of
8 decentralized zoning on deforestation in a major agricultural frontier, the Argentine Dry
9 Chaco. In a recent analysis, we concluded that provincial zoning plans had significantly
10 reduced deforestation in three provinces; critics suggest it had not. In attempting to
11 resolve this debate, we identify six areas in which shared understanding can support
12 more productive interaction. These include: (1) the distinction between impact and
13 other measures of effectiveness, (2) an appreciation of recent advances in methods for
14 causal inference, (3) the distinction between effective and perfect enforcement, (4) the
15 challenge of attributing impacts to mechanisms and actors, (5) transparency in
16 standards used to judge the desirability of observed outcomes, as well as (6) caution in
17 the generalization of findings to other geographies.

18 **1. Introduction**

19 Conservation is shaped by conflicts of interest (McShane et al., 2010). Whether a
20 community protects a sacred forest, local fisheries devise harvest rules, or national
21 agencies adopt conservation laws, the conservation of an environmental good implies
22 that at least one actor will not use the good in ways it would otherwise have liked to.
23 For that reason, the design, implementation, and evaluation of conservation policies is
24 often accompanied by debate and controversy, with interest groups drawing from
25 different sources of evidence to advocate for specific goals or means. Scholars
26 interested in the effectiveness and impacts of conservation policies can find themselves
27 implicated in such controversy – intendedly and unintendedly – when research findings
28 enter the public sphere and are interpreted by colleagues, politicians, and the media
29 (e.g., Brandt et al., 2016; Karsenty et al., 2017). Such debate can be valuable if
30 participants share an understanding of the conceptual and analytical dimensions at
31 hand; its usefulness can be constrained by disagreement on key dimensions of the issue,
32 the misinterpretation of methods and inferential statements, or the application of
33 different standards to judge observed outcomes.

34

35 A recent debate on the impacts of decentralized land use zoning on deforestation in the
36 Argentine Dry Chaco, a globally relevant agricultural frontier (Baumann et al., 2016;
37 Bucher and Huszar, 1999) illustrates these dimensions of scientific controversy. In 2007,
38 Argentina passed a Forest Law which required provinces to establish land use zoning for

39 their remaining native forests (García Collazo et al., 2013; Gautreau et al., 2014).
40 Because provinces had substantial leeway in the implementation of the law (Gautreau
41 et al., 2014; Gobbi, 2015) and faced strong incentives to implement zoning plans that
42 would not inhibit agricultural expansion, skeptics believe that the policy did little to
43 affect deforestation. However, using a rigorous empirical estimation strategy, we
44 estimated that provincial land use zoning did reduce deforestation significantly in each
45 of the three provinces that accounted for more than three quarters of pre-law
46 deforestation: Salta, Santiago del Estero, and Chaco (Nolte et al., 2017a).

47

48 Within one year of publication of our analysis, three studies appeared in the peer-
49 reviewed literature with findings that seem to contradict our own. Of main interest here
50 is the response by Volante and Seghezze (2018) who, “emphatically rebut [...] the
51 alleged causal relationship between deforestation trends and decisions made by
52 subnational administrations”, offering numerous reasons for their disagreement (see
53 below). They also suggest that our analysis had “negative political consequences at the
54 local level” and was used by “governmental officials [...] to publicly justify their past and
55 present policies”. Their rejection of a causal effect of zoning on deforestation seems to
56 be supported by two empirical studies of deforestation patterns in individual provinces.
57 Ceddia and Zepharovich (2017) find that the Forest Law was “not effective at slowing
58 down deforestation and habitat loss” in Salta. Camba Sans et al. (2018) suggest that the
59 Forest Law was “ineffective for avoiding deforestation in categories of high conservation
60 value” in Santiago del Estero.

61

62 These perspectives provide an opportunity to enrich the scholarly debate on the
63 effectiveness of conservation policies in general, and of decentralized zoning in the
64 Argentine Dry Chaco in particular. Reporting “positive” causal impacts of conservation
65 policies raises legitimate concerns when the stringency and implementation of such
66 policies leaves much to be desired from the viewpoint of social and environmental
67 advocates: notably, large-scale deforestation in the Argentine Dry Chaco continued, and
68 a substantial proportion of that deforestation was not in compliance with the Forest
69 Law. However, rigorous evidence should not be dismissed in the heat of the argument.
70 While the responses do offer valuable insights that complement and enhance our
71 understanding of the observed impacts, they also contain inaccuracies or
72 misinterpretations that stand in the way of a shared perspective.

73

74 In what follows, we attempt to reconcile the diverging views on the impacts of
75 provincial zoning in the Argentine Dry Chaco. In doing so, we identify several lessons for
76 empirical scholars engaged in debates on impacts of conservation policies. These
77 lessons are about: (1) the difference between policy “impact” and other measures of
78 effectiveness, (2) recent advances in methods to identify the causal impact of policies in
79 the presence of other spatial and temporal factors that influence outcomes
80 (confounders), (3) the distinction between perfect and effective enforcement, (4) the
81 challenge of attributing impacts to actors, (5) standards used to judge the adequacy of
82 impacts, and (6) the generalizability of findings. We discuss these issues for the case of

83 regulatory land use policies, yet many of these lessons are applicable across policy
84 domains.

85 **2. Discussion**

86 *2.1. Distinguishing “impact” from other measures of policy effectiveness*

87 Impact evaluations measure the causal effect of interventions on outcomes. “Impact” is
88 defined as the difference between outcomes observed in the presence of the
89 intervention and outcomes that would have been observed in its absence (Ferraro,
90 2009). This counterfactual definition of impact is arguably identical to that of a “causal
91 effect”, and used across domains of social intervention, including health (Habicht et al.,
92 1999; Pullin, 2001), education (Slavin, 2002), finance (McKenzie, 2010) and development
93 (Baker, 2000). It is also implicit in statements that claim whether or not an intervention
94 “affected”, “reduced/increased”, “avoided” or “slowed down” an outcome of interest.
95 Impact is thus a continuous measure: it can be small or large, and its estimated effect
96 can be statistically significant or not.

97

98 Estimating impact requires making assumptions about *counterfactual* outcomes, which
99 are never observed and can only be inferred. Recent years have seen an increase in the
100 application of rigorous impact assessment methods that infer counterfactual outcomes
101 of land use policies through advanced statistical methods (Andam et al., 2008; Börner et
102 al., 2016; Miteva et al., 2012; Nolte et al., 2013). Such rigorous evaluations can be quite

103 demanding in terms of system understanding, data, and methods. Firstly, most
104 approaches depend on the existence of suitable control observations (comparable units
105 that were not affected by the treatment in question) and are thus not applicable in
106 contexts where such controls do not exist. Secondly, analysts need to understand the
107 dynamics of both the outcome (e.g., deforestation) and the intervention (protection) to
108 identify variables that affect both (cf. 2.2. Estimating policy impacts). Thirdly,
109 successfully controlling for those variables requires data for both treated and untreated
110 units, before the treatment was assigned. Fourthly, analysts and their audience need to
111 be familiar with the statistical approaches used to infer impact. Combined, these
112 demands can stand in the way of rigorous impact assessment in many real-life contexts
113 (Margoluis et al., 2009).

114

115 In the absence of rigorous impact assessments, policy analysts often resort to methods
116 that do not involve counterfactuals. Such methods might also rely on measurements of
117 observable outcomes, but they differ in the standard against which such outcomes are
118 compared. For instance, a common conceptualization of “effectiveness” refers to the
119 extent to which certain goals or standards have been reached (Nathan and Pasgaard,
120 2017). Selecting such goals or standards is inevitably a social and subjective process (cf.
121 2.5 Judging policy impacts). If this standard corresponds to a legal rule, the analysis
122 becomes an assessment of regulatory compliance. The works by Volante and Seghezze
123 (2018), Cedia and Zepharovich (2017), and Camba Sans et al. (2018) all contain
124 language that infer an ineffectiveness of the Forest Law from an observed lack of

125 compliance (Table 1): in all provinces, deforestation occurred in zones which, according
126 to the national Forest Law, as well as selected provincial interpretations of it, should not
127 have allowed any deforestation (“red” and “yellow” zones).

128

129 Compliance analysis is useful when analysts wish to highlight discrepancies between
130 legal goals and observed outcomes. However, compliance is rarely a good proxy for the
131 impact of a regulatory policy: it does not attempt to measure whether or not a policy
132 made a difference. A regulatory policy may have an impact even if some level of illegal
133 activity persists (cf. 2.3 Attributing deforestation reductions to mechanisms). Similarly,
134 compliance does not imply impact: when protected areas are placed in areas of low
135 conversion risk, their impact might be negligible, even if compliance is perfect (Nolte et
136 al., 2013). As our interest lies in the measurement of impact, we focus on the difference
137 between deforestation observed in reality and deforestation that we estimate would
138 have occurred in the absence of the Forest Law (Nolte et al., 2017a).

139 *2.2. Estimating policy impact in the presence of spatial and temporal confounders: did*
140 *decentralized zoning reduce large-scale deforestation?*

141 Inferring policy impact from observational data requires particular care when outcomes
142 are influenced by factors other than the policy of interest that also co-vary across space
143 and time. Such spatio-temporal “confounders” are present in most landscapes where
144 conservation policies are implemented. For the Argentine Dry Chaco, Volante and
145 Seghezzo (2018), Camba Sans et al. (2018), and Ceddia and Zepharovich (2017) identify

146 several factors that complicate assessments of policy impacts. Deforestation can vary
147 across space as a function of agricultural productivity, accessibility, distance to previous
148 deforestation, and the willingness of local stakeholders to protect forests (Gasparri et
149 al., 2015; Volante et al., 2016). It can vary across time as a function of global agricultural
150 prices, exchange rates, macro-political change, and climate variability (Bravo et al.,
151 2010; Piquer-Rodríguez et al., n.d.; Richards et al., 2012; Siegert et al., 2001). As a result,
152 deforestation rates fluctuated across the Argentine Dry Chaco even before the adoption
153 of the Forest Law (Baumann et al., 2016; Vallejos et al., 2015).

154

155 Recent advances in empirical methods have strengthened our ability to infer causal
156 policy impacts in the presence of such confounders (Ferraro and Hanauer, 2014a). In our
157 analysis of the Argentine Dry Chaco, we combine two methods – paired matching and
158 differences-in-differences (DID) – to isolate the effects of stricter zonation on
159 deforestation from confounding effects (Table 1). Each method has distinct advantages,
160 and their combination is particularly powerful.

161

162 Paired matching is a quasi-experimental technique that identifies pairs of treated and
163 untreated observations (in our case, properties in stricter vs. less strict zones) that were
164 similar in terms of *observable* confounders (i.e., confounders for which analysts were
165 able to obtain data) before the treatment occurred (Ho et al., 2007). Paired matching
166 attempts to emulate a random experiment: if treatment and control groups were not

167 systematically different *before* the treatment, differences in observed outcomes *after*
168 treatment can be assumed to be the causal effect of the treatment itself.

169

170 In practice, analysts rarely observe (i.e., obtain data for) all relevant confounders. For
171 instance, unobserved differences in the willingness of local stakeholders to protect
172 forests can affect the likelihood of both stricter protection and deforestation, and thus
173 bias findings. Paired matching cannot remove unobserved heterogeneity. However, DID
174 can control for unobserved confounders as long as their effects are time-invariant, i.e.,
175 their influence on the outcome does not change over time. DID infers policy impact
176 from the differences in outcomes between treated and control observations before and
177 after the assignment of treatment. In other words, if the difference in outcomes
178 between treatment and control groups *changes* after the treatment, this “difference in
179 differences” can be interpreted as the impact of policy. DID not only controls for time-
180 invariant unobservables that might differ systematically between groups; it also reduces
181 threats to inference that stem from unobserved confounders that vary over time, but
182 whose effects on outcomes do not vary systematically between groups. Combining
183 paired matching and DID provides a powerful inferential strategy to test for policy
184 impacts in the presence of both observed and unobserved confounders (Brandt et al.,
185 2015). In our analysis, we apply this approach to data from 30,126 parcels in three
186 provinces to estimate the impact of stricter zonation (“red” or “yellow”) on parcel-level
187 deforestation rates, using parcels in less strict zones as controls.

188

189 Responses to our paper largely ignore the inferential properties of this approach.
190 Volante and Seghezzo (2018) and Camba Sans et al. (2018) claim that we do not control
191 for time trends. Yet we do: our DID estimates reduce, if not eliminate, the risk of
192 temporal confounders. Volante and Seghezzo (2018) suggest that we do not account for
193 the contagiousness of deforestation in the Argentine Dry Chaco. Yet we do: one of the
194 observable variables we balance through matching is the level of nearby deforestation
195 that occurred prior to the adoption of the Forest Law. Volante and Seghezzo (2018) also
196 suggest that we “zon[ed] land units prior to actual land use planning”. This reflects a
197 misreading of placebo tests that we conduct to ensure that deforestation rates and
198 trends on matched control and treatment units did not differ prior to the assignment of
199 treatment. A failure of such a test would indicate the presence of unobserved bias
200 between matched groups, and thus cast doubt on the success of paired matching. The
201 fact that we do not find significant differences in pre-treatment deforestation trends
202 bolsters the strength of our inference.

203

204 Closer attention to inferential methods allows scholars to engage more productively
205 with research findings. Our approach offers critics at least three points of leverage
206 against our conclusions, none of which have been comprehensively addressed:

- 207 1. Matching-based approaches have the shortcoming of allowing causal inference
208 only for treatment and control units that are considered comparable. Non-
209 comparable units that diverge too much in terms of key confounders are
210 dropped. The fact that, on average, we found controls for only 71% of treated

211 units implies that our analysis remains silent about policy impacts for a
212 substantial part of the landscape. If excluded properties differed systematically
213 with respect to the impact of zonation, this could affect the validity of our
214 findings. However, precisely due to the absence of such comparable units, it is
215 difficult to test for the absence of this risk without extrapolation, which requires
216 additional assumptions about the functional relationships between treatment,
217 outcome, and confounding variables (Morgan and Winship, 2007).

218 2. Our impact estimates could be biased in the presence of unobserved (i.e.,
219 unmatched) variables whose effect on deforestation varied systematically
220 between stricter vs. less strict zones, but only *after* treatment occurred
221 (otherwise, we would observe different pre-treatment deforestation rates and
222 trends), and *not* as a result of such treatment (otherwise, it would count as a
223 policy impact). We do not know whether such a variable exists. The presence of
224 smallholders and/or indigenous groups raised by Volante and Seghezzeo (2018)
225 might be a candidate. However, it is not clear what factors other than the Forest
226 Law and its zonation would have conferred these groups increased leverage
227 against deforestation, and only so after zonation was implemented. Another
228 possible candidate might be external random variation in large-scale contiguous
229 natural events such as fires (Boletta et al., 2006; Bravo et al., 2010) that may
230 disproportionately affect parcels in one zone. Whether such large-scale fires
231 occurred to an extent that affected results remains to be studied.

232 3. The potential presence of leakage – a policy-induced displacement of

233 deforestation from one geography to another (Atmadja and Verchot, 2012; le
234 Polain de Waroux et al., 2017) – inhibits our ability to quantify the *net* impacts of
235 the Forest Law on deforestation. Firstly, stricter zonation might have displaced
236 deforestation to less strict zones within our study area, which could result in an
237 overestimation of differences between treatment and control groups. While we
238 tested for localized leakage by ignoring controls units that are situated too close
239 (<10km) to treated units (which did not affect findings), it is more difficult to
240 control for long-distance leakage within a study region. Secondly, the Forest Law
241 might have displaced deforestation to locations outside our study region. We
242 agree with Volante and Seghezzo (2018) that it is possible that some of the
243 reduction in deforestation observed in stricter zones led to a displacement to
244 other provinces like Formosa, or to neighboring countries like Paraguay and
245 Bolivia. In sum, while our analysis leaves us confident that stricter zones lowered
246 deforestation as compared to less strict zones, it does not allow us to separate
247 net reductions from displacement effects, which would be required to quantify
248 overall impact. For that reason, the exact quantity of net deforestation reduction
249 has to remain elusive. However, emerging evidence suggest that such leakage is
250 unlikely to offset impacts entirely: one recent study estimates that Argentina’s
251 regulations displaced only 6.8% of deforestation to Paraguay and Bolivia (le
252 Polain de Waroux et al. 2016); another study finds no evidence that regulation
253 displaced deforestation across South America’s deforestation frontiers (le Polain
254 de Waroux et al., 2017).

255 2.3. *Attributing deforestation reductions to mechanisms: what role did enforcement*
256 *play?*

257 When causal impacts of a policy are identified, analysts often wish to explain *why* such
258 impact was observed. Recent work has showcased rigorous methods that allow to test
259 for the existence of causal mechanisms through which a policy affected outcomes
260 (Ferraro and Hanauer, 2014b; Flores and Flores-Lagunes, 2009). We did *not* conduct
261 such analysis before suggesting that the observed impacts of zonation on deforestation
262 were likely a result of increases in regulation and enforcement capacity. Instead, we
263 based our proposition on a diverse range of anecdotal evidence, collected over 13
264 weeks of field research and 122 interviews by the three first authors, that enforcement
265 capacity appeared to have increased across the three provinces studied. Among other
266 things, we noticed increased remote detection capabilities, higher reported frequencies
267 of field visits, higher legal levels of sanctions, and an increase in the numbers of
268 sanctions issued.

269

270 Volante and Seghezzo (2018) reject the assertion that enforcement led to significant
271 deforestation reductions. They join Ceddia and Zepharovich (2017) and Camba Sans et
272 al. (2018) in highlighting that the enforcement of the Forest Law has been “ineffective”
273 and “poor” across the Dry Chaco, as evidenced by high levels of illegal deforestation
274 (i.e., deforestation surpassing legal property-level restrictions) and deforestation in
275 strictly protected zones. Illegal forest conversion is indeed widespread in the Dry Chaco.
276 In Santiago del Estero and Salta, more than 50% of deforestation occurred in zones were

277 deforestation was supposedly prohibited (Camba Sans et al., 2018; Ceddia and
278 Zepharovich, 2017). Yet, impacts of enforcement can co-exist with illegal activity, as
279 enforcement does not have to be perfect to achieve a deterrent effect (Robinson et al.,
280 2010). A recent example is the Brazilian government's massive crackdown on illegal
281 deforestation in the Amazon region, which achieved a 70% reduction in forest loss, in
282 spite of illegal forest conversion continuing throughout the region (Assunção et al.,
283 2013; Börner et al., 2015; Godar et al., 2015).

284

285 Conclusively assessing the role of enforcement in reducing deforestation in the
286 Argentine Chaco requires not only a robust and spatially consistent estimate of
287 enforcement activity, but also a model of how such activity translates into a deterrent
288 effect (Nolte, 2016). In the absence of such estimates, anecdotal evidence from field
289 research suggests that land managers adopt a wide range of strategies to respond to
290 regulation, from "waiting and seeing", to pre-emptive deforestation, to the adoption of
291 silvo-cultural practices associated with a slow, steady loss of forest cover over time. A
292 recent study also finds that enforcement significantly deterred land investments, and
293 thus deforestation, by large agricultural companies across the Dry Chaco (le Polain de
294 Waroux et al., 2016)

295

296 Even if the deterrent effect of current enforcement was found to be negligible, other
297 mechanisms could explain the observed impacts of regulatory zoning on deforestation.
298 For instance, a mere expectation of *future* enforcement likely affects the net present

299 value of future returns of agricultural production and, by extension, returns to forest
300 clearing. Similarly, expectations about the development of production-friendly
301 environments in less strict zones (e.g., clustering of agricultural services) can pull
302 agricultural investments away from more regulated zones (Garrett et al., 2013).
303 Identifying the relative importance of these different causal mechanisms in reducing
304 deforestation would be an g subject of future research.

305 *2.4. Attributing deforestation reductions to actors: what can be inferred about the*
306 *willingness of provinces to reduce deforestation?*

307 Environmental policy making is a political struggle in which multiple interest groups
308 attempt to influence decisions towards their preferred outcomes, sometimes through
309 unobserved channels of influence. Deducing the specific causal influence of any actor
310 group from a mere observation of adopted policies and impacts can be a challenging, if
311 not impossible, endeavor (Nolte et al., 2017b). In-depth research into the political
312 ecology of decision making provides illuminating clarifications and insights (Seghezzo et
313 al., 2011). While providing conclusive evidence of the willingness and ability of actors to
314 influence a policy outcome will remain challenging, advances in qualitative methods
315 offer some promising avenues (Brannstrom, 2011).

316

317 Provincial zoning in the Argentine Dry Chaco was shaped by intense struggles between
318 the interests of agricultural industry, smallholders, indigenous groups, environmental
319 activists, and the national government (Gautreau et al., 2014; Gobbi, 2015; Seghezzo et

320 al., 2011). Given the difficulty in reconstructing these complex interactions *a posteriori*,
321 we decided to keep inferences about the specific role of the final decision makers –
322 provincial governments – in swaying decisions towards stricter or less strict zonation
323 outside the scope of our analysis. When we ask whether our findings can serve as an
324 indicator of provincial “willingness and ability” to reduce deforestation, we make no
325 conclusive statements, but instead acknowledge the challenges of isolating the role of
326 provincial priorities from those of other actors. Indeed, provincial zoning plans would
327 likely look different if the national government, indigenous groups, and environmental
328 activists had not actively advocated for more forest conservation (Volante and Seghezze
329 2018). However, jurisdictions with similar levels of economic dependence on agriculture
330 tended to favor agricultural expansion over conservation, as observed in neighboring
331 Paraguay, Bolivia, and Formosa (Nolte et al., 2017b). More research is needed to better
332 characterize the role of provincial governments in negotiating these trade-offs between
333 competing interests.

334 *2.5. Judging policy impacts: how much deforestation is acceptable?*

335 If decentralized zoning reduced deforestation, but illegal deforestation continued,
336 should the zoning plans be judged as a success or failure? The answer to this question
337 depends on the standard against which outcomes are compared. Scholars and
338 practitioners can resort to a wide range of analytical devices to suggest or define such
339 standards – including cost-benefit analysis, environmental valuation, participatory
340 deliberative institutions, moral reasoning, reference to legal or political goals, and, of

341 course, personal opinion (Spash and Vatn, 2006). Different stakeholders are likely to set
342 different standards, ranging from any deforestation being interpreted as a failure to any
343 reduction in deforestation being interpreted as a success.

344

345 As a group of authors, we share a concern for the ecological and social impacts of the
346 large-scale land use change in the Argentine Dry Chaco. However, our opinions differ, or
347 are ambiguous, when it comes to the desirability of specific deforestation outcomes in
348 the Argentine Chaco. We thus refrained from setting such standards (for instance, we do
349 not refer to policy outcomes as “success” or “failure”), but instead focused on whether
350 or not decentralized zoning can reduce deforestation in a major agricultural frontier. In
351 doing so, we may have implicitly set a standard that any change from the status quo is a
352 potentially *interesting* outcome. In any case, what we do reject is the assertion that the
353 only valid interpretation of remaining (and illegal) deforestation is that of a failure of the
354 Forest Law, given that the law did have a measurable effect towards reaching its goal.

355

356 In spite of our attempts to refrain from judging the desirability of policy outcomes,
357 Volante and Seghezzo (2018) mention that “government officials in at least one
358 province took advantage of the overall message [...] to publicly justify their past and
359 present policies with respect to deforestation and related law enforcement”. The two
360 news articles cited to corroborate their claim actually reproduce our findings correctly.
361 However, it is certainly possible that officials may have referred to our work as a proof
362 of success of their policies, which would not be the first time that “academic analysts

363 [...] find their scholarship appropriated in unexpected ways” (Jasanoff, 1996). In fact,
364 readers might have interpreted our findings as an *implicit* judgment of provincial actors
365 and policies. Such misinterpretations are difficult to avoid altogether but could have
366 been forestalled by being more explicit about what we did and did not say: specifically,
367 that we did not confer praise or blame to any particular actor group or action taken.

368 *2.6. Generalizing insights to other contexts*

369 Our findings have been criticized for being affected by selection bias in the choice of our
370 study area (Volante and Seghezzo, 2018). We chose our study area based on relevance
371 and data availability. Salta, Santiago del Estero, and Chaco accounted for 79% of forest
372 loss observed in the Argentine Dry Chaco before 2007, with the remaining 21%
373 distributed across nine provinces. Parcel data for Formosa covered only a fraction of the
374 territory, most of which was situated in the Humid Chaco, making it impossible to
375 conduct analyses of the same level of rigor as we did for the other three provinces.
376 Whether or not Argentina’s Forest Law affected deforestation in provinces and
377 ecosystems other than those studied thus requires further analysis. Pending such work,
378 the assertion that increasing deforestation in Formosa implies the absence of an effect
379 of Formosa’s zoning plan is premature, as deforestation in that province had been
380 following an upward trend before 2007. Meanwhile, other omitted provinces had
381 declining deforestation trends (e.g., Córdoba). Whether or not such trends were an
382 impact of land use zonation can only be inferred from analyses that control for spatial
383 and temporal confounders.

384

385 To which extent is our main finding – that decentralized land use zoning can reduce
386 deforestation – generalizable to locations beyond the Argentine Chaco? We do not
387 make strong claims to this effect. Prior evidence about the effects of decentralization on
388 forests remains inconclusive. Studies have found decentralization to increase
389 deforestation (Burgess et al., 2011), to have no effect on forest loss (Andersson and
390 Gibson, 2007; Pfaff et al., 2012), to produce similar forest outcomes as state-led
391 conservation (Somanathan et al., 2009), to reduce deforestation in some locations and
392 time periods but not others (Lund et al., 2015; Santika et al., 2017; Wright et al., 2016),
393 or to reduce deforestation in the short run (Blackman et al., 2017). Synthesis across
394 studies is difficult due to considerable variations in examined administrative levels
395 (states, districts, municipalities, villages, indigenous communities), types of
396 decentralization (subdivision of districts, creation of federal vs. state parks,
397 decentralization of forest management rights, communal titling of land, etc.), and in the
398 rigor of analytical methods used to identify causal effects. Few studies have analyzed
399 the effects of participatory land use zoning processes mandated by a higher
400 administrative level but whose implementation was determined by a lower level that
401 *already had* the legally recognized right to define and allocate land rights. Policies with
402 such a specific administrative setup are likely infrequent. However, the growth
403 management acts passed in several U.S. states in the 20th century might provide a set of
404 related examples, as they also obligated communities to engage in land use planning
405 (Meyer et al., 2012). One study from Oregon finds that this approach provided “a

406 measurable degree of protection to forest and agricultural lands” (Kline, 2005), which
407 aligns with our findings.

408 **3. Conclusion**

409 Informed scholarly debate is a key ingredient of the scientific enterprise. We identify six
410 areas where a shared understanding of concepts, methods, and perspectives could
411 foster a more insightful appreciation of apparently contradictory research findings.
412 Firstly, counterfactual reasoning needs to be a key ingredient of any inference of policy
413 impact, whereas alternative approaches, such as studies of compliance, can provide
414 important complementary perspectives. Secondly, methods to infer policy impacts in
415 the presence of spatial and temporal confounders have advanced considerably; literacy
416 in such methods and attention to detail can inform a productive critique. Recent
417 advances in methods have also increased our ability to identify causal mechanisms; in
418 the absence of their use, the identification of the relative importance of specific linkages
419 between policies and impacts is empirically challenging. Thirdly, enforcement does not
420 have to be perfect to have a deterrent effect, though assessments of compliance will
421 likely continue, as they are easy to communicate and frequently offer environmental
422 advocates political leverage. Fourthly, ascribing policy outcomes to individual actors or
423 groups is a challenging endeavor, which will likely entail a non-negligible degree of
424 speculation. Fifthly, whether an observed policy outcome is a success or failure depends
425 on the reference of the observer; the setting of such a standard is inevitably subjective,
426 but contributors can forestall criticisms by identifying their own upfront. Finally, caution

427 should be exercised when generalizing findings beyond a given study area; where
428 possible, assumptions regarding the generalizability of findings should be tested
429 empirically.

430

431 Did provincial governments in the Argentine Dry Chaco implement land zoning plans
432 that inhibited agricultural expansion and reduced deforestation in Salta, Santiago del
433 Estero, and Chaco? Our empirical answer remains cautiously affirmative. We maintain
434 our conclusion that large-scale deforestation in major agricultural frontiers can be
435 slowed down by subnational decisions within a national framework that prescribes
436 processes (here: timelines, types of policy instruments, degree of stakeholder
437 participation, information requirements), not outcomes (such as deterministic rules
438 regarding the size and location of stricter zones, or on the amount of remaining
439 deforestation). We do not judge whether the observed impact is satisfactory, or
440 whether it occurred at an acceptable speed or level of legal compliance. We recognize
441 that illegal deforestation is prevalent across the Argentine Dry Chaco, and that the
442 provincial implementation and enforcement of the Forest Law did not satisfy the
443 expectations of numerous stakeholders, including the national government, indigenous
444 groups, and conservation advocates. We remain cautious about the generalizability of
445 our findings, and certainly do not suggest that provincial zoning will always result in
446 similar reductions. Finally, none of our findings should be construed as a claim that the
447 implemented policy was more effective, efficient, or equitable in avoiding deforestation
448 than any other option. These are important knowledge gaps that future scientific inquiry

449 could, and should, attempt to narrow. More and better research and disciplined
450 controversy will help build a stronger evidence base for effective environmental
451 governance.

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Table 1: Key differences in approach and conclusions of the four studies. All four studies base their quantitative analyses on the same deforestation dataset (Vallejos et al., 2015) and thus cover the same ecoregion (Dry Chaco).

Reference	Provinces; Unit of Analysis	Measure to infer policy effect	Inferential method	Interpretations regarding policy effect
Camba Sans et al. 2018	Santiago del Estero; 11,196 parcels*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Differences in forest loss in stricter vs. less strict zones before vs. after the FL - Compliance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - BACI (before vs. after, control vs. intervention); not controlling for confounders - Compliance with provincial regulations in one sub-zone (empirical analysis) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “it is difficult to determine the relative contribution of the [FL] in reducing deforestation” - “the zoning policy was ineffective for avoiding deforestation in categories of high conservation value” - “deforested area in [parcels] that did not comply with restrictions [...] was higher than for those that did”
Ceddia & Zepharovich 2018	Salta; 6 departments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Differences in forest loss before vs. after the FL (no comparison of zones) - Compliance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Panel regression model, using a FL dummy for post-2009 years, controlling for agr. production, pop. density, indig. land - Compliance (citing secondary data on estimated illegal deforestation) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “[results] point out to the ineffectiveness of the Forest Law in Salta at deterring the process of deforestation and natural habitat loss” - “The fact that a large amount of illegal deforestation occurred [...] indicates that the law is ineffective”
Nolte et al. 2017	Salta, Santiago del Estero, Chaco;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Differences in forest loss on properties in 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Quasi-experimental matching to control for observable confounders (rainfall, soil, accessibility, distance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “land use plans [...] effectively reduced deforestation over counterfactual scenarios, at least in some time periods. These restrictions were effective immediately,

	30,129 parcels	stricter zones vs. similar properties in less strict zones before vs. after the FL	to water, nearby deforestation, forest cover, property size); DID to control for time-invariant unobservable confounders	with measurable impacts within years after the approval of the land use plans” - “provinces with high historical deforestation rates can effectively reduce forest loss if prompted to do so”
Volante & Seghezzo 2018	Salta, Santiago del Estero; no further subdivision	- Differences in forest loss in stricter vs. less strict zones before and after the FL - Compliance	- BACI (before vs. after, control vs. intervention); not controlling for confounders - Compliance with national goal of achieving zero deforestation in red/yellow zones	- “anything more than zero deforestation in yellow and red zones can be interpreted as a failure of provincial governments to enforce this law” - “provincial governments were apparently unable to adequately enforce the mandate of the Forest Law” - “declining trends in the Argentinian Chaco cannot be directly attributed to law enforcement” - “provincial governments were [...] unable to [...] enforce the Forest Law since deforestation in protected zones continued or even increased [...]”

* estimated: no number is provided in original article, but authors use the same cadaster dataset that we use