STATE POWER AND SOCIAL CLASSES IN TANZANIA

by

Ashley D. Saldanha

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science.

Department of Political Science
McGill University
Montreal, Canada

August 1984

ABSTRACT

This study examines the global evolution of the Tanzanian social formation, focusing on the basic shifts of power and production relations in its history. It begins with a discussion of the divergent social and historical conditions of capitalist development in metropolitan and peripheral societies, which bear directly on Tanzanian history. Elaborating on the historical formation of underdevelopment, the study situates colonial conquest against the prior background of social development in the territory. It then examines, in turn, the pattern of development under German and British colonialism. The study finally turns to the origins and course of the 'Tanzanian road to socialism': its peculiarities and affinities as a distinct type of state capitalism are examined, and the connection between class power and state power is explored at length. The study closes with reflections on the problems raised by Tanzanian history for any theory of underdevelopment in the third world.

RESUME

Cette thèse examine l'évolution globale de la formation sociale tanzanienne, se concentrant sur les transformations de base dans les relations de pouvoir et de production dans son histoire. Elle porte initialement sur les différentes conditions socio-historiques du développement capitaliste dans les sociétés métropolitaines et périphériques, qui sont directement pertinentes à l'histoire de la Tanzanie. Dissertant sur la formation sociale du sous-développement, l'étude situe la conquête coloniale dans le contexte antérieur du développement historique du territoire. Ensuite, les schémas de développement sous le colonialisme allemand et anglais sont examinés. Enfin, la thèse examine les origines et le déroulement de la 'voie tanzanienne au socialisme': ses caractéristiques en qualité d'espèce spécifique de capitalisme d'état au tiers monde sont exposées, et le lien entre le pouvoir d'état et le pouvoir de classe est analysé en détail. L'étude se termine avec des réflexions sur les problèmes soulevés par l'histoire tanzanienne en relation avec toutes théories du sous-développement dans le tiers monde.

CONTENTS

PREFACE

The present study is an attempt to provide a historical overview of the various transformations in State structure and class relations which have marked the trajectory of the Tanzanian social formation over the past century. It is primarily concerned with causal connections between forces and relations of production, and the configurations of social and political power associated with them. As such, the study is both something less and something more than a short case-history: something less because the analysis is restricted to a specific empirical terrain demarcated by a singular theoretical 'problematic'; something more because the study, so conceived, explores a number of analytical issues, currently in dispute, across the common historical field represented by the third world. The range of problems surveyed in this study extend from a discussion of the pattern of development in precolonial Tanzania, to reflections on the immanent logic and contradictions of state capitalism in the third world.

As indicated, the field of analysis is spatially delimited to a specific social and historical totality, Tanzania, a typically underdeveloped country but one whose postcolonial trajectory continues to animate a good deal of political and intellectual controversy. It therefore needs to be stressed at the outset that the arguments made in this study run counter to received opinion on the 'Tanzanian road to socialism', much of which is informed and tempered by an authority and sympathy which this study does not possess. Despite a sharp turn over the past decade towards critical reflection on the country's postcolonial trajectory, it

is still common to run across complimentary discussions of the merits of 'democratic socialism' in Tanzania that ring with praise for the 'progressive leadership' which has authored it. By contrast, one of the main theses of the present study is that 'Tanzanian socialism' represents a variant of authoritarian state capitalism, and that the ruling class which has consolidated itself in power since decolonization is a state bourgeoisie -- ugly nomenclature for what is far from being the ugliest regime in the capitalist periphery. But these categories have been developed out of an international intellectual tradition which dates back over a century, and their empirical validity is extensively argued in the following pages; the categories of 'African socialism' and 'one-party democracy' -- products of a vastly more local and recent imagination -- seem hollow by comparison. In any event, the terms used to classify the postcolonial party-state administration, and the material foundation which supports it, do not matter; what matters is the production and power relations they point towards. It is this network of domination and exploitation, not 'Tanzanian socialism', which forms the object of the present study.

Some final comments are necessary on the general character and limits of the analysis which follows. Although the theoretical infrastructure of the study descends from historical materialism, it claims no marxist pedigree. Over the past twenty years, there has been an enormous revival of interest in marxist theory, with the inevitable result of a fracturing of whatever unity the tradition may once have enjoyed. The arguments of the present study have drawn freely and heavily on recent advances in marxist theory across a wide range of academic disciplines; but within each of these fields, rival interpretations exist, and the

differences are available for comparison and criticism. The principle governing selection of one theoretical source over another in this study has been their relative consistency with a basic axiom of historical materialism — that the trajectory of history is governed by the course of the relations of production. This is not to deny that there are modalities of power in every form of social organism which do not derive directly from class relations; it is simply to register their absence from the present study.

A similar set of limits apply to the historico-empirical patterns sketched in this study. As a reflection on already published work, the present study suffers from all the lacunae and imbalances characteristic of third world historiography as a whole. In any comparative perspective, however, Tanzanian specialists are the authors of an impressive body of research, to which this study is heavily indebted; moreover, many of the advances in marxist theory referred to above have been pioneered or refined in the light of Tanzanian history. The occasional differences and divergences of the arguments made in the present study from other treatments of Tanzanian history centre not on the facts per se, but on their interpretation. In studies of Tanzania, as in every field of social research, it is theory (and, more arguably, politics) which ultimately decides the relative weight and importance to be accorded to the facts. In any case, the arguments of the present study are presented as a contribution to an ongoing discussion of the nature and development of the Tanzanian social formation.

Finally, this study has benefited from discussions with a number of friends and scholars, in addition to the sources on theory and

Tanzanian history already mentioned. Since space and memory do not permit an accurate and complete account of acknowledgments, only two people will be singled out from among the many who made the study possible. Baldev Raj Nayar supervised the formulation and execution of the research throughout, with a generosity of time and criticism for which the author is deeply indebted. Milena Collot supported the study with encouragement, translations and criticism, for which the author is again grateful. Both read successive revisions of the manuscript no doubt more times than they would care to remember. Needless to say, neither they nor anyone else are responsible for any errors, whether of fact or interpretation, which the present study may contain.

CHAPTER I

STATE POWER AND SOCIAL CLASSES IN THE CAPITALIST PERIPHERY

1. Analytical Problems

The social content and trajectory of the 'Tanzanian road to socialism', from the 'Arusha Declaration' onwards, forms a difficult and elusive problem for analysis. Few countries have been so widely studied; few have generated more controversy. Until recently, research on post-colonial Tanzania has tended to revolve around two distinct positions, frequently articulated through an aggressive theorizing of high quality and charged with an explicit political commitment. On the one hand, many scholars have seen in Tanzania a progressive, anti-capitalist and profoundly social democratic experiment, unique among the regimes of postcolonial Africa. On the other hand, however, there have been increasingly numerous attempts at demystifying the 'African socialism' of Julius Nyerere, and revealing the underlying structures of imperialist domination which are held responsible for the failure of 'Tanzanian socialism' and for fostering the development of a 'bureaucratic petit-bourgeoisie' in that country.[1] Analytical and political confusion has been compounded, not only by what Nyerere and other ideologues for the regime have said about their 'intentions', but also because the actual policies pursued by the postcolonial State have often been, or seemed to be, inconsistent and contradictory. The price of so much intellectual interest and confusion has been a predictable ambiguity: multiple and incompatible interpretations of the 'Tanzanian

road to socialism'.

There are, of course, good reasons for this. Both before and after 1967, when the regime openly declared for its own version of 'socialism', the foreign and domestic policies -- if not the actual achievements -- of the Tanzanian party-state administration had an international resonance, attracting to the country's educational and state apparatuses a number of scholars from the metropolitan centres of world capitalism. At the focus of this attraction lay two themes which, for a time, appeared to define the exemplary and effective features of the 'Tanzanian road to socialism'. Internally, the Tanzanian leadership advocated, with varying intensity, a form of democratic participation and an egalitarianism unlike that seen anywhere else in the third world; externally, Tanzania championed the cause of liberation movements in Southern Africa, refusing to buckle under pressure from the imperialist metropolises and international aid agencies, striving instead for the greatest possible measure of 'self-reliance'.

However, subsequent events have underlined the need to be at least cautious about how far the 'socialist' commitment of the Tanzanian leadership has ever corresponded to the actual practices of 'Tanzanian socialism': the extensive nationalizations of 1967 were quickly followed by management contracts with the firms affected; the income-restricting leadership code of the same year contained loopholes through which small fortunes continued to be accumulated; working class and peasant initiatives in collective self-management were first encouraged, and then crushed, by the postcolonial State; democratic themes have been succeeded by authoritarian practices; and a failing economy has led to greater, rather than less, 'dependence' on metropolitan capitalism. In short, the trajectory of 'Tanzanian socialism'

in the 1970s has so contradicted the assumed meaning of the earlier period as to make re-examination necessary.

Yet the analytical problems raised by the 'Tanzanian road to socialism' are conceptually inseparable from the theoretical infrastructure of discussions of it. In this connection, the major weakness in most studies of 'Tanzanian socialism' seems to be the unduly restrictive genealogy accorded to it, implicit in the object of controversy itself: the postcolonial regime's commitment to 'socialism and self-reliance' frequently appear as the product of one year (1967) and one individual (Nyerere), a commitment which otherwise might never have been made. The limitations of this type of explicative framework are obvious enough: accident overrules causality; contingency legislates necessity. The result is an exorbitancy of what might be called voluntarism, which becomes the final architect and arbiter of historical processes. The full and effective weight of historical and material determinations in structuring the present is sometimes acknowledged, but seldom adequately integrated into an analysis of the dynamic of Tanzanian economy and society.[2] What is needed, therefore, is a historical analysis of the total evolution of the Tanzanian social formation, which centres on the interconnections between State construction, class relations and patterns of economic development. The purpose of the present study is precisely to dismantle the concept of 'Tanzanian socialism', and reveal -- through a constant interchange between conceptual elaboration and empirical analysis -- its deep structures in Tanzanian history.[3]

Unfortunately, there exists no concrete and coherent theoretical perspective from which to embark on an analysis of the historical trajectory of the Tanzanian social formation. It is no accident that recent reassess-

ments of 'Tanzanian socialism' in the wake of apparent policy reversals have paralleled a growing and more general dissatisfaction with established paradigms of development and underdevelopment in the capitalist periphery.[4] The complexity and dynamics of social transformation in the third world gather little in the way of intelligibility when viewed through the prisms of either modernization or dependency theory, neither of which seems to offer much insight into the variant paths of capitalist development or state and class formation distributed throughout the third world. The theoretical crisis which now afflicts the field of 'developing area studies' demands, not new answers to the questions traditionally posed and debated by the established paradigms, but new theoretical questions about the conditions, rhythms and forms of social transformation in the capitalist periphery. To briefly chart the course and causes of this crisis may provide some initial signposts to be avoided in the formation of an alternative theoretical paradigm in the field.

The basic source of theoretical crisis in the evolutionary modernization paradigm has clearly been the absence of any obvious relation between the models it constructs and the actual history of the third world. This internal dissonance between its theories and the empirical terrain over which they claim to adjudicate is absolutely unresolvable within the paradigm, however, because it would necessarily entail abandonment of the central tenets of evolutionary modernization. For the entire theoretical edifice of this paradigm rests on the absurd premise that the master model of 'modernization' has been scientifically verified in the history of the metropolitan countries, and therefore what happens in the periphery is simply anomalous to an always already proven theory; thus the model is retained,

while the reality it should explain is dismissed as, in some sense, 'abnormal'.

The predictable scientific conclusion to the trajectory of modernization theory has been its degeneration into a sort of 'social pathology', in which the capitalist periphery figures as a veritable breeding ground for 'societal deviance': hence the proliferation of terms such as 'breakdowns of modernization', 'diseases of the transition', 'hurried and disordered sequences of Western development', and so on.[5] Such terms are eloquent testimony to the impotence of a paradigm unable to account for even the most minor peripheral detours from the path to metropolitan modernity it prescribed. In this case, however, analytical bankruptcy has found compensation in extensive institutional support from the established social order in the imperialist metropolises: for modernization theory takes the specific social relations of capitalism as natural, inevitable and desirable; objective explanatory power has here been sacrificed at the high altar of private property, in the interests of more subjective material redemption.

Modernization theory thus continues to lead a stagnant, but secure, existence within the field of 'developing area studies', permanently divorced from the actual political and economic history of the third world. Suppressed and denied in the ideological universe of abstract evolution, the actual history of the capitalist periphery predictably found a home in an alternative paradigm. By the 1970s, radical underdevelopment and world-systems theory had eclipsed evolutionary modernization, which tarnished and faded under the shadow of militant and effective criticism. Today, the thematic concerns of dependency and underdevelopment theory echo loudly, not only in

most studies of the capitalist periphery, but in the official rhetoric of a diverse array of postcolonial regimes as well. Yet the assimilation of the terms of dependency theory into a variety of academic and political discourses tells its own story: for the only consistent properties of dependency and underdevelopment theory are a vague radicalism and a critical interrogation of conventional development theory. Indeed, its theoretical content has been largely formed by the inversion of the conceptual categories and political positions which govern modernization theory into their opposites: the traditional and modern reappear as the satellite and metropole; development becomes underdevelopment; fair exchange is replaced by unequal exchange; comparative advantage is juxtaposed to unequal specialization; evolution gives way to revolution; and so forth.[6]

The result is somewhat paradoxical: on first approximation, the radical critique offered by dependency and underdevelopment theory takes the shape of a seemingly different paradigm, whose content consists in an absolute negation of conventional development wisdom; under closer inspection, however, precisely because it is only a 'negation' of received theory, radical underdevelopment theory does not and cannot transgress the principles of development as represented in evolutionary modernization theory. It provides a powerful and compelling critique of the theory and practice of 'modernization' in the capitalist periphery, without breaking with the system of axioms on which modernization theory rests. It gives diametrically different answers to the questions asked by modernization theory, but it does not raise new and qualitatively different questions about the problem

of underdevelopment in the capitalist periphery. It is sustained by a morality and ethics antithetical to the capitalist teleology of modernization, but it does not transcend denunciation and invective for a scientific exploration of the historical field of realities in the third world. In short, radical underdevelopment theory is unable to escape from the theoretical impasse in which polemical opposition to evolutionary modernization has imprisoned it.[7]

A radical sociology of underdevelopment thus offers no positive substitute for a conventional sociology of development -- their theoretical structure and problems are the same; only their terminology and solutions differ. But the fundamental constraint on their analytical capacity has yet to be indicated. For theories of modernization and underdevelopment have a common object, despite the very different indices they employ in discussion of it -- the third world. But this common object is just a residual category, established on the basis of 'difference' with another object whose features are absent from the first -- the advanced industrial societies. The consequences are significant: not only do both modernization and underdevelopment theory rest on a duality constituted, at each pole, by conflated and hyper-abstract categories (traditional and modern society in the one, imperialist metropolis and dominated periphery in the other), their range of analytic focus is essentially confined to relationships between the two.[8] The predictable result -- if not the design -- of argument grounded in such theories is typically the reduction of the traditional/periphery to a mere function or effect of the modern/metropolis, deprived of autonomous significance. The sheer weight and importance

of 'diffusion' in modernization theory and 'dependence' in underdevelopment theory suggests their lack of any serious theoretical interest in the third world as an object for reflection in its own right -- composed of divergent socio-economic structures and patterns of state and class formation, each plainly distinct within the common historical field represented by the capitalist periphery.

It follows that a theory of modernization or underdevelopment -- sharply demarcating a diverse array of societies in Asia, Africa and Latin America as its object, and assimilating them into a fixed and homogeneous category -- cannot locate or account for the different historical development of Tanzania within the capitalist periphery. To capture this specificity requires a very different type of approach altogether. For Tanzania is not just a component of the third world; it is also a distinct social formation, historically produced and continuously reshaped by social struggles, ideological patterns and political conflicts specific to it. In other words, the present study requires a theoretical approach to Tanzanian history and society which addresses precisely those issues that cannot be incorporated into the elementary models of 'modernization' or 'dependence'. The alternative in question is historical materialism.

2. The Historical Formation of Underdevelopment

The problem of underdevelopment in the third world has been the object of many studies inspired, directly or indirectly, by historical materialism. Modernization theory was, in part, originally formulated in opposition to it; radical underdevelopment theory has developed in

critical dialogue with it. But neither has been able to match its extraordinary range of thematic concerns or explanatory power as a general theory of historical development. The causal logic of marxist theory has been countered in modernization theory by a sometimes elaborate, but ultimately vacuous, classificatory formalism; its model of determination centres on a vague process of diffusion from one insulated zone of sociality to another, inside a tautological circle of structures and functions.[9] The marked superiority of radical underdevelopment theory over the random logic of evolutionary modernization has lain precisely here: the identification of the economy as the most crucial dimension, and determinant, of underdevelopment; but the price of this advance has been an unduly restrictive notion of the economy, reduced to market mechanisms and commerce, with the necessary and logical consequence of a narrow and rigid determinism, centred on 'dependence'.[10]

In marxist theory, by contrast, the dynamic of history and pattern of societal determination centre on the generative mechanics of modes of production -- articulated structures of forces and relations of production, which are necessarily linked to specific political and ideological superstructures and practices.[11] In every historical mode of production, structured as such, it is the relations of production which dictate a determinate pattern of development of the productive forces, whose rhythm and modalities are peculiar to it. In other words, historical materialism -- in theory, if not always in practice -- is innocent of any conception of development as a linear and cumulative process, or undevelopment and underdevelopment as stationary and stagnant conditions.[12] Situated historically, the emergence of these

terms has a specific social and temporal anchorage in the colonial expansion of world capitalism; grounded theoretically, they refer to empirical problems indissolvably linked to the social organization and trajectory of global capitalist accumulation. Thus, any marxist study of underdevelopment in the third world as a distinct pattern of development within the world economy must initially consider the overall configuration of capitalism as a historical mode of production. Only after the general contours of capitalism, so conceived, have been charted will the divergent history of the third world from the imperialist centres of world capitalism become intelligible.

The capitalist mode of production -- decisive invention of Western Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries -- resulted from the convergence of a number of distinct historical processes (among them, the emancipation of town from country, enclosures, colonial plunder and other forms of 'primitive accumulation'), whose historical conditions of possibility were provided by the classical matrix of European feudalism. From this plurality of processes, two in particular were ultimately conclusive: the absolute separation of the direct producers from the means of production and subsistence as a result of 'internal' transformation in feudal agrarian structure; and the constitution of money as capital 'outside' the feudal mode of production proper, in the wake of growing municipal autonomy and the rural migration of industry.[13] The decomposition of the feudal mode of production in Western Europe alone released both labourer from means of production and town from country to produce a 'spontaneous' capitalism. The solitary endogenous genesis of capitalism in Western Europe is inseparable from its feudal

past; later, the international impact of capitalist imperialism would stimulate a full capitalization of the relations of production only in Japan -- significantly, the sole homeland of classical feudalism outside the European theatre of world economy.[14] It was to be the non-feudal world -- separated by a socio-historical universe from the social formations of Japan, Western Europe and its overseas appendages -- which subsequently lapsed into the capitalist periphery.

Before considering how this came about, the radical originality of capitalism as a mode of production needs to be underlined. In marxist theory, 'the essential difference between the various economic forms of society...lies only in the mode in which...surplus-labour is in each case extracted from the actual producer, the labourer.'[15] It is enough to note, in this context, that all the distinctive features of capitalism -- incessant competition, sustained technological innovation, and so on -- are indissolvably linked to an essential property which goes unregistered in most sociological definitions: the wage-relation, as a unique mechanism of surplus-extraction.[16] Once the separation of the direct producers from the means of production has been rendered absolute in form and dominant in extent, mechanisms of surplus-extraction soon come to rest primarily on economic compulsion, rather than physical coercion: the direct producer must work for capital to avoid starvation; but 'he only works for it because he does not have the material means to work on his own behalf.'[17] By contrast, where the direct producer retains 'possession of his own means of subsistence,' surplus-labour 'can only be extorted...by other than economic pressure, whatever the form assumed may be'; the rhythm and tempo of development of the productive forces are thus

fixed within rigid social and technical limits.[18]

The social relations of capitalism orchestrate a different pattern of development altogether: accumulation, driven by competition between individual units of capital which forces the systematic re-investment of the surplus extracted from the direct producers in expanded and improved production. But it is the wage-relation which ultimately permits increases in the rate of surplus-extraction to be effected by raising the level of social productivity, because it deploys a type of labour -- at once potentially more flexible, intensive and skilled than its historical predecessors -- which alone is compatible with, and infinitely adaptable to, the revolutionary dynamic of capitalist productive processes. For only where labour has been dissociated from individuated and unspecialized productive processes, does it become 'not this or another labour, but labour pure and simple, abstract labour; absolutely indifferent to its particular specificity, but capable of all specificities.'[19]

> Only where labour has been separated from possession of the means of production, and where labourers have been emancipated from any direct relation of domination (such as slavery or serfdom), are both capital and labour power 'free' to make possible their combination at the highest possible level of technology. Only where they are free, will such combination appear feasible and desirable. Only where they are free, will such combination be necessitated. (20)

In short, capitalist relations of production impose on the forces of production a specific pattern of development, distinguished by its unprecedented rhythm and tempo of accelerated expansion and its irreversible orientation towards accumulation on an expanded scale. The absence of this dynamic in the third world, therefore, suggests not just a different pattern of development of the productive forces, but

a different historical configuration to the social relations of production, within whose framework technological progress advances, stalls or recedes, under the determination of the relationship between the direct producers and the organizers of production.

But the radical originality of capitalism as a historical mode of production is not exhausted in the dynamic it imparts to the forces of production. For capitalist relations of production also establish structural limits of variation for relations of sovereignty and dependence, within which a fairly wide variety of state forms can occur: republics, constitutional monarchies and fascist dictatorships have all proven compatible with (if not always optimally functional to) the reproduction of capitalist relations of production -- each represents a specific form of capitalist state, although none ever succeeds in directly and permanently responding to capitalist class interests.[21]

The fundamental determinant of this exceptionally wide range of variation in political forms -- in particular, the much-abused coincidence of capitalism and democracy -- derives from the peculiar nature of surplus extraction in the capitalist mode of production: for, once the direct producers have been separated from the means of production, the operation of the capitalist economy itself 'produces and eternalizes the social relations between the capitalist and the wage-earners,'[22] without any continuous extra-economic intervention. In other words, class power over production and appropriation in the capitalist mode of production does not depend directly on the coercive exercise of state power, because the rule of capital rests on monopolization of the decisive means of production, rather than simply and exclusively on

monopoly of the means of violence. The whole structure of sovereignty and dependence is thus dissociable from the economy of a universal capitalism, in a way lordship and landlordship could never be under feudalism, where the power of surplus-extraction is directly grounded in the coercive apparatus of the State.[23] The notable absence of this distinctly capitalist differentiation of class power and state power in the third world -- permanent theatre for 'regimes of open war against the popular masses'[24] -- once again suggests a different historical configuration of social and political power, embedded in the structure of 'incompletely' capitalized relations of production.

A panoramic 'capitalism', in short, can provide a common socio-economic foundation to both development in the metropolitan countries and underdevelopment in the third world, only at the risk of evacuating its specificity as a mode of production, with its own internal order and necessity producing structurally similar historical effects.[25] The fundamental determinants of the differential character and trajectory of the two major zones of world economy must be sought elsewhere -- not in the 'nature' but in the specific 'position' and 'incidence' of capitalism within the historical development of each. For the advent of the capitalist mode of production in Western Europe effectively terminated any purely endogenous evolution elsewhere; no linear time continuum, governed by necessary 'stages of development', can capture the interweaving of historical trajectories which henceforth ensued. The international radiation of capitalist imperialism, transmitted through a variety of channels, decisively altered the course of development in every non-European region of world economy, in directions in-

dicated by two distinct, but interconnected causal processes: determined by the specific modality and temporality of metropolitan capitalist 'pressure'; but overdetermined by the specific type of social organism on which capitalist 'pressure' was exerted.

In other words, the crucial difference between the metropolitan centres of world economy and the social formations of the periphery cannot be reduced to any simple distinction between endogenous and exogenous impulsion alone, as the cases of Japan and Russia amply demonstrate. In both countries, economic and military pressure from the imperialist metropolises forced the implantation of capitalism from above, before the feudal organization of their economies had begun to dissolve below; but Japan subsequently entered the orbit of metropolitan imperialism, while Russia temporarily withdrew from the universe of world capitalism altogether. 'Passive revolution' in Japan and 'permanent revolution' in Russia registered the extreme and opposite limits to a range of alternative trajectories contingent on the law of combined and uneven development: a common external catalyst issued in divergent internal outcomes, which were ultimately decided by the course of the class struggle within their separate social formations.[26]

By contrast, the descent of capitalist development in the third world proper was to be markedly different: for no advanced feudal complex existed outside Japan to receive and interiorize the impulses of metropolitan capitalist superiority. The uneven dispersion of the capitalist mode of production into the periphery found an inhospitable environment: natural economies of varying, but distinctly non-feudal socio-economic organization, stood indifferent to the commercial

messages of impending collapse announced by the arrival of European merchant capital in their respective geographical zones; trade and plunder -- the earliest forms of international capitalist transaction -- operated on the perimeters of these social formations, without rupturing their internal structure or undermining their solidity.[27] In the event, conquest -- chronologically distributed across a temporal spectrum which saw continuous alterations in the modalities of metropolitan imperialism -- was to be the primary vehicle of capitalist penetration into the third world, which never lost the scars of that cataclysmic experience.[28] Military subjugation, followed by a whole epoch of colonial domination, ultimately answered to the difficulties of subordinating the anterior communities of the non-feudal world to the rule of capital: the historical function of colonial conquest was precisely to impose the order and necessity of the capitalist mode of production on the third world from without -- an objective penalty for its failure to generate an equivalent political and economic power internally, from above or below.[29]

The full logic and significance of military subjugation, as the characteristic modality of capitalist penetration into the third world, needs to be underlined: for it is with conquest, rather than commerce or colonization, that the history of capitalism in the periphery properly begins; its authors are mercenaries, not merchants or settlers. A politico-military apparatus of repression was thus to be the first and most enduring contribution of the imperialist metropolises to the social formations of the periphery -- telling evidence of the inability of capital to master natural economy in the third world through other than

coercive mechanisms.[30] For the extension of metropolitan state power over new territory -- categorical object and immediate result of the colonial expansion of world capitalism -- was not convertible into any equivalent capitalist class power over subject communities and the processes of production which sustained them: violence provided the necessary medium of exchange between infrastructural and superstructural 'currencies' of power.[31]

The abstract 'superiority' of capitalism during the colonial epoch never fully corresponded to its real material efficacy, which was always to be limited within natural and artificial constraints: physical distances posed formidable problems of appropriation and administration; cultural barriers prevented any naturalization of metropolitan suzerainty; racial separation precluded any 'national' synthesis. In short, the vast historical distance separating the metropolitan centres of world capitalism from their colonial dependencies forbade any socio-economic fusion: the rule of capital in the third world had to lean more or less heavily on pre-existent political and socio-productive structures, which were paradoxically preserved, in altered format, within limits established by the process of accumulation in the imperialist metropolises. The imposition of colonial state order would unify the subjugated communities beneath it into a single political and territorial space, but it could not homogenize them into any new and coherent socio-economic system.[32] A 'combined' internal order to social formations in the capitalist periphery thus complemented their 'uneven' external determination by imperialism: various hybrid mechanisms of surplus-extraction came to coexist within a social and

economic 'amalgam', which had more the character of a metallic compound than a chemical fusion; each form of surplus-extraction retained its own specificity within an articulated regime of accumulation, whose immanent logic reflected the overall dominance -- but not predominance -- of the capitalist mode of production inside and outside it.[33]

The ulterior consequences of this combined and uneven pattern of development can be gauged from the general configuration of social and political power which resulted from it. For nowhere is the crucial distinction between the differential genesis of capitalism in the two major zones of world economy more evident than in the diametrically opposite relations between state power and class power, in the subsequent trajectory of each. In the imperialist metropolises, the critical transition to a capitalist type of State signalled the effective conclusion to the ascendancy of capital beneath it; the role of force in the 'history of its formation' was to be unnecessary -- and so forgotten -- in 'its contemporary history'.[34] In the periphery, by contrast, the state machinery installed after colonial conquest was precisely an instrument for the implantation of the rule of capital from without, on social terrain ultimately foreign and hostile to it; the measure of violence injected into social relations was to be necessarily and permanently greater.[35] An 'advanced' and repressive superstructure -- of capitalist origin and orientation -- was thus erected over a material infrastructure of comparatively 'backward' and severe crudity; the heightened social distance between ruling and subaltern classes prohibited any 'intermediate' space for the emergence of a 'civil society' proper, which could act as a buffer zone of ca-

pitalist hegemony, insulating economy from polity.[36] Instead, the military subjugation of the third world was succeeded by the installation and regular functioning of an enormous repressive apparatus, which alone permitted a super-exploitation of the direct producers beneath it. In this way, class power and state power were organically fused: the function of the State in the capitalist periphery was precisely to subordinate the direct producers to the rule of capital, in a synchronized and asymmetrical relationship of domination and exploitation; unmitigated coercion infested the whole regulative structure and dynamic of the 'political' regimes of accumulation which resulted.[37]

The general character and prevalence of political accumulation in the third world provides a necessary, if insufficient, part of any explanation of the divergent trajectory of capitalist socio-productive development within it.[38] For the social relations, on which the variant regimes of accumulation installed in the capitalist periphery came to rest, tended to be defined by the persistent unity of the direct producers with the means of production, presenting formidable obstacles to technological progress and rationalized exploitation.[39] Despite its militaristic posture, the 'critical mass' of industrial capital directed at the third world was never to be structurally sufficient to warrant any 'frontal assault' on natural economy: wholesale expropriation of the direct producers was neither objectively practicable, nor subjectively profitable, for metropolitan imperialism. In turn, this meant that capitalist production relations -- which alone connect surplus-extraction to continuous advances in the social productivity of labour -- were held within a constricted space: manufacture was condemned by

superior international competition from abroad, to inadequate markets at home. The exploitation of the direct producers was thus organized and conducted through largely mercantile structures, dissociated from material processes of production. Technique remained stationary as a result, for within an economic framework dominated by merchant capital, surplus-extraction proved possible and profitable without any sustained managerial intervention into productive organization and activity.[40] In short, the general pattern of development imposed on the capitalist periphery by 'political accumulation' can be encapsulated in a brief and simple formula: coercive commercialization of the productive forces without any dynamic capitalization of the relations of production, resulting in 'exploitation by capital without the mode of production of capital.'[41] In this critical disjunction lies one of the main secrets behind the specific nature and trajectory of underdevelopment in the capitalist periphery.

3. Actually Existing Capitalism in the Third World

These remarks are necessarily partial — elements for a 'general theory' of the common historical field represented by the capitalist periphery, they plot the coordinates of the empirical analysis of Tanzanian history which follows. The historical pattern of determination to underdevelopment suggested by the preceding arguments, and explored in the following chapters, can be summarized in the form of a set of short and concise hypotheses.

1. The anterior socio-economic formations distributed throughout the third world — representing distinct levels of historical development, which

differed from one zone to another — established a structural field of variation which inevitably 'limited' the range of potential outcomes contingent on capitalist penetration into each region.

2. In turn, it was the distinct temporality and modality of imperialist intervention -- in the sense of the type and phase of development of the capital deployed from the imperialist metropolis -- which 'selected' a specific outcome, in the form of the regime of accumulation eventually installed, from among the range of possible alternatives delimited by the antecedent pattern of historical development in each zone of the third world.

3. Finally, the reproduction and transformation of the regime of accumulation, once anchored, was 'mediated' through the field of the class struggle, which defined and decided the configuration of social and political power necessary to secure and sustain it.[42]

The structure of the present study reflects these thematic concerns in its conventional breaks. Chapter II surveys the socio-economic and political world of the geographical space claimed by the contemporary Tanzanian State, prior to colonial conquest; within its pages, a number of discrete problems are explored, which range from the relationship between male domination and class stratification, to the ambiguous impact of European merchant capital on the slave trade in the region. Chapter III situates colonial conquest against this prior background: it charts the course of capitalist penetration into the region, through German and English colonialism, identifying the basic shifts in the relations of production, sovereignty and dependence which resulted from the collision

of metropolitan imperialism with the socio-economic formations of the Tanzanian coastline and interior.

Chapters IV and V cover the postcolonial trajectory of the 'Tanzanian road to socialism', and form a single argument. These chapters stand somewhat apart from the two chapters which precede them: for if, in principle, the constitution of every social formation in the third world is amenable (mutatis mutandis) to a generic pattern of societal determination such as that proposed above, in practice, actually existing capitalism in the third world exhibits a far wider range of variation in structure and development, than do the imperialist metropolises or the countries of the 'post-revolutionary' world.[43] Tanzania -- singular object of the present study -- is strikingly distinct from adjacent Kenya, distant India, remote Taiwan; any discussion of underdevelopment which cannot or does not distinguish between the different patterns of development these social formations represent historically, has obviously and irreversibly lost its way.[44] A concrete and accurate typology of social formations in the capitalist periphery can only be advanced on the basis of a comparative study; but the principles which might govern such an effort are inscribed in the theoretical infrastructure of the present study nevertheless. For the law of combined and uneven development is precisely a theory of alternatives: it delimits a common historical field, but it does not plot the inevitable course of historical development -- only historically contingent possibilities, each necessarily dependent on the realization of certain specific conditions.[45]

Although the radical and distinctive features of Tanzanian history are a central theme throughout the present study, their full weight and

importance only become apparent in Chapters IV and V, where the post-colonial trajectory of the Tanzanian social formation -- from independence through statization of economy and civil society to contemporary crisis -- is subjected to a combination of structural and conjunctural analysis. For it is only with decolbnization that the multiple tensions and contradictions, pent up by decades of direct imperialist domination, finally explode to reveal and exaggerate the full range of differences in State structure and patterns of socio-economic development distributed throughout the third world. The historical break effected by independence therefore suggests two final hypotheses, which will be explored in this study:

4. In each social formation, decolonization left a dissimilar set of historical conditions of possibility -- in the form of different social property relations and balances of class forces -- which restricted the range of strategic options available to ascendant ruling classes that rapidly rose on the foundations laid by the decentralization of accumulation and social control from the metropolitan centres of world capitalism to the third world.

5. Conditional on this differential range of possibilities, specific outcomes -- extending from types of political regime to patterns of economic development -- were directly dependent on the intervention of the class struggle.

The explanatory force of historical materialism thus exercises its full power in Chapters IV and V, where the 'Tanzanian road to socialism' is dismantled to reveal the production and power relations on which it rests,

and its trajectory is systematically and causally related to definite processes of social struggle, emanating principally from the contradictory relations between direct producers and organizers of production. An interim assessment of 'Tanzanian socialism' is left to Chapter VI, which closes with some reflections on the problems raised by Tanzanian history for any general theory of development and underdevelopment in the third world.

Set against the background of the debate on Tanzania briefly surveyed at the outset, the general argument of the present study is simply this: the 'Tanzanian road to socialism' is not an isolated and arbitrary phenomenon of the postcolonial period alone, but the culmination of a long and coherent development; its structures lie deep in Tanzanian history, and are fully explicable within the terms of a historically sensitive theory which has as its object the common historical field represented by the capitalist periphery as a whole.

Considered as such, however, it is more than usually necessary to underline the inherent limits to such an exercise at the outset: for if the discussion, in Chapter II, of precolonial Tanzania has a necessarily provisional character because of the distance between past and present inscribed in the relative poverty of historical record and research, the arguments, in Chapters IV and V, are paradoxically probational due to a converse proximity. In the time of individual subjectivity, it is now well over twenty years since 'independence', and the balance-sheet of 'Tanzanian socialism' — indeed, of the entire postcolonial third world — is arrestingly poor. But in the time of history, less than a century has passed since the rudimentary and inchoate socio-economic formations of

the region were first subjected to the rule of capital, and little over two decades have expired since decolonization. In a period when the immediate outlook for the entire capitalist periphery is terrible famine, mounting debt, rampant inflation, declining agricultural production, thwarted industrialization, militaristic remedies, and -- more importantly -- fresh challenges to the order and rule of capital, it is worth recalling that 'twenty-five years in the scales of history, when it is a question of profoundest changes in economic and cultural systems, weigh less than an hour in the life of a man.'[46]

Notes

[1]The dimensions to the controversy raised by the 'Tanzanian road to socialism' can be gauged from a recent polemic between John Saul, The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), chap. 10, and Cranford Pratt, 'Democracy and Socialism in Tanzania: A Reply to John Saul,' Canadian Journal of African Studies, No. 3 (1978). Debate on the Left over 'Tanzanian socialism' was first launched by Issa Shivji, 'Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle,' in Lionel Cliffe and John Saul, eds., Socialism in Tanzania, Vol. 2 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972), with rejoinders from Tamas Szentes, '"Status Quo" and Socialism'; Walter Rodney, 'Some Implications of the Question of Disengagement from Imperialism'; and Saul, 'Who is the Immediate Enemy?'.

[2]The extent of this theoretical 'voluntarism' in studies of Tanzania is apparent in the commendation many scholars give to the attempt to build 'socialism' in the country, whatever their subsequent judgments on the successes and failures of that effort might be. Throughout the present study, socialism is understood in the sense in which it has figured in the classical marxist tradition: as a form of social organization materially and culturally superior to capitalism, which rests on the self-government and self-activity of the direct producers. Given this definition, the impossibility of building 'socialism-in-one-country', much less in a country of generalized material scarcity, should be obvious enough.

However, given the hopes which the metropolitan Left has invested in the prospects of 'socialism' in the third world over the years, it needs to be emphasized that such a possibility is indissociable from the actuality of socialism in at least one -- preferably more -- metropolitan countries. In this connection, Colletti has rightly and rhetorically asked:

'Why is industrial accumulation necessary? Why is it not

possible to construct socialism on the basis of small peasant production, or more simply by changing men's souls, appealing to altruism, converting everyone from cormorants into doves? Why is it not possible to abolish, here and now, the 'division of labour'? The innocence with which these questions are asked by so many intellectuals today is a witness of the radical destruction which theoretical Marxism has undergone in recent decades.

'It is, of course, true that the reply to these questions is not contained at any particular point in Marx's work. It is only to be found on every page that he ever wrote... The self-government of the masses presupposes: a high productivity of labour, the possibility of a drastic reduction in the working day, the progressive combination of intellectual and industrial work in the category of the worker-technician, masses conscious and capable of making society function at a higher historical level. In short, the self-government of the masses, the rule of the proletariat, presupposes the modern collective worker. These conditions can only arise on the basis of large-scale industry, and not of agricultural communes or production with the wooden plough.' Lucio Colletti, 'The Question of Stalin,' in Robin Blackburn, ed., Revolution & Class Struggle: A Reader in Marxist Politics (Glasgow: Fontana, 1977), p. 187.

[3]Other attempts at a total analysis of the Tanzanian social formation include the pioneering study of Issa Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), and the more recent study by Andrew Coulson, Tanzania: A Political Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). However, Shivji's work rests on certain political and theoretical positions which the present study does not share; Coulson's, on the other hand, appeared after the research for this study had been completed.

[4]Generalized dissatisfaction with received theories of development and underdevelopment is registered in the vast number of critical studies which have appeared over the past few years. Much the best among these are two studies by Henry Bernstein, 'Sociology of Underdevelopment vs. Sociology of Development?,' in David Lehmann, ed., Development Theory: Four Critical Studies (London: Frank Cass, 1979), and 'Industrialization, Development and Dependence,' in Hamza Alavi and Teodor Shanin, eds., Introduction to the Sociology of 'Developing Societies' (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982); see also, John G. Taylor, From Modernization to Modes of Production (London: MacMillan Press, 1979), Part I.

As in conventional usage, the categories of the 'third world' and the 'capitalist periphery' are used throughout the present study to denote the common historical field represented by the social formations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The adjective attached to 'periphery' is not meant to suggest that there exists a 'non-capitalist' periphery, but rather to underline that the third world as a whole constitutes a subordinate zone of a world economy dominated by the capitalist mode of production.

[5]S.N. Eisenstadt, 'Breakdowns of Modernization,' in Eisenstadt, ed., Readings in Social Evolution and Development (London: Pergamon Press, 1970); W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1960); Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Tradition-

al Society (New York: Free Press, 1964).

[6]Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967); Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1979). The differentation of radical underdevelopment theory from historical materialism proper is a contentious issue, receiving only passing treatment in the following pages; for alternative positions, see Colin Leys, 'Underdevelopment and Dependency: Critical Notes,' Journal of Contemporary Asia, No. 1 (1977), and Aidan Foster-Carter, 'Marxism versus Dependency Theory? A Polemic,' Journal of International Studies, No. 3 (Winter 1979-1980).

[7]In a pertinent comment on world-systems theory, Skocpol has suggested that this is a major methodological pitfall into which tumbles 'any attempt to create a new paradigm through direct, polemical opposition to an old one. Social science may, as is often said, grow through polemics. But it can also stagnate through them... For what seems like a direct opposite may rest on similar assumptions, or may lead one (through the attempt to work with an artifial, too extreme opposition) around full circle to the thing originally opposed.' Theda Skocpol, 'Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique,' American Journal of Sociology, No. 5 (March 1977), p. 1089.

[8]For a summary of the various critiques which have been leveled at 'dualism' in development discourse, see Witold Kula, An Economic Theory of the Feudal System (London: New Left Books, 1976), pp. 21-24.

The ancestry of the intellectual differentiation of the metropolitan countries from the third world -- dating back to Machiavelli's comments on the Ottoman Empire, through Marx's discussion of the 'Asiatic' mode of production -- is traced in Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: Verso, 1979), pp. 397-401, 462-483. Anderson concludes his magisterial survey of global precapitalist development thus: 'Asian development cannot in any way be reduced to a uniform residual category, left over after the canons of European evolution have been established. Any serious theoretical exploration of the historical field outside feudal Europe will have to supercede traditional and generic contrasts with it, and proceed to a concrete and accurate typology of social formations and State systems in their own right, which respects their very great differences of structure and development. It is merely in the night of our ignorance that all alien shapes take on the same hue' (pp. 548-549). Similar procedural guidelines should now inform studies of the 'third world'.

[9]See Ankie M.M. Hoogvelt, The Sociology of Developing Societies (London: MacMillan Press, 1976), pp. 50-62, for a discussion and documentation of the classic confusion of causality and classification in modernization theory.

[10]A market economy -- the object of conventional economic discourse -- is not the same thing as a capitalist economy -- one object of historical

materialism. For a lucid critique of the centrality accorded to the market in radical underdevelopment theory, see John Weeks and Elizabeth Dore, 'International Exchange and the Causes of Backwardness,' Latin American Perspectives, No. 2 (Spring 1979).

[11]For a comprehensive and comprehensible clarification of the basic concepts of historical materialism, see Göran Therborn, Science, Class and Society (London: New Left Books, 1976), pp. 353-413. Generally speaking, the terminology of marxist theory is well-enough known not to require lengthy definitions here. Where potential ambiguities in the precise meaning of the concepts employed in the present study arise, they are clarified in the text, or its accompanying apparatus of notes.

[12]The anti-teleological character of historical materialism in no way denies that history has shown a certain evolutionary trend towards higher, rather than lower, forms of society. It simply denies any necessary movement of this kind -- a point which should hardly need to be made, at a moment in human history when the prospects of global nuclear extermination loom threateningly on the horizon. To be sure, Marx and Engels held a philosophical vision of history (as distinct from the science they developed of it) which culminates in communist society (a philosophical position which the present study does not share). But both were clearly aware that, for example, the Dark Ages which succeeded classical Antiquity represented a massive historical regression. The decisive point that needs to be made here is that historical materialism differs from what Bernstein ('Sociology...') calls the 'positive teleology' of modernization theory -- which rests on assumptions of 'what will occur' -- and the 'negative teleology' of radical underdevelopment theory -- which insists on 'what can never occur'; by contrast, the proper object of marxist theory is not what can or cannot occur, but what does occur, in history.

[13]Balibar provides a concise theoretical commentary on Marx's treatment of 'primitive accumulation', in his contribution to Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital (London: New Left Books, 1970), pp. 276-283. Historiographic material relating to 'primitive accumulation' is collected in Rodney Hilton et al., The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1976); see also Pierre Vilar, 'Problems in the Formation of Capitalism,' Past and Present, No. 10 (November 1956).

[14]Rey argues forcefully that 'capitalism has spread rapidly only where it was protected during its youth by feudalism.' Pierre Philippe Rey, Class Alliances (Paris: Maspero, 1973), p. 5 passim. (Cited from the English translation by Milena Collot, 1983, mimeo, University of Concordia). For a parallel conclusion (which, however, accords a much longer ancestry to European capitalism), see Anderson, op cit., esp. pp. 401-431.

[15]Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 217. This position is expressed elsewhere with more subtlety: 'The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of direct producers, determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a

determining element. Upon this, however, is founded the entire formation of the economic community which grows up out of the production relations themselves, thereby simultaneously its specific political form. It is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers -- a relation always naturally corresponding to a definite stage in the development of the methods of labour and thereby its social productivity -- which reveal the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure, and with it the political form of the relation of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the corresponding specific form of the state. This does not prevent the same economic basis -- the same from the standpoint of its main conditions -- due to innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural environment, racial relations, external historical influences, etc., from showing infinite variations and gradations in appearance, which can be ascertained only by analysis of the empirically given circumstances.' Capital, Vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 772.

[16]Compare, for example, Wallerstein's definition of capitalism as 'production for profit in a market' (op cit., p. 16), with Weber's definition: 'where we find that property as an object of trade is utilized by individuals for profitmaking enterprises in a market economy, there we have capitalism.' Max Weber, The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations (London: New Left Books, 1976), p. 51. For Marx, by contrast, 'Capital presupposes wage-labour; wage-labour presupposes capital. They reciprocally condition each other; they reciprocally bring forth each other': Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), p. 83. In other words, capitalism is a system of social relations and not a question of intersubjective motivations. As Marx notes elsewhere, in a reply to a social critic: 'The capitalist, as capitalist, is simply the personification of capital, that creation of labour endowed with its own will and personality which stands in opposition to labour. Hodgskin regards this as a pure subjective illusion which conceals the deceit and the interests of the exploiting classes. He does not see that the way of looking at things arises out of the actual relationship itself; the latter is not an expression of the former, but vice versa.' Theories of Surplus Value, Vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), p. 296.

The theoretical importance of defining capitalists and capitalism hardly needs to be stressed: it affects not only classification of the third world, but of the 'post-revolutionary' countries as well. The definition given by world-systems theory implies that the so-called 'socialist' countries are actually capitalist, because of their inclusion in the capitalist world economy; however the definition is too indeterminate. Modernization theorists, on the other hand, employ a definition of capitalism (where the term figures at all) that is not a characterization of a whole social order, but rather of specific relationships -- between industry, market, democracy and so on -- within a social order; as such, their conception of capitalism is of extremely limited historical significance and, not surprisingly, they typically 'discover' capitalism only where and when they choose to find it.

For the purposes of the present study, the Soviet Union, China and other countries of Stalinist derivation, are considered bureaucratic

state capitalist regimes, not only because of their participation -- as state capitals -- in the world economy (as world-systems theory stresses), but because the dominant relations of production within them are those between wage-labour and capital. But this in no way implies a complete symmetry between the structures of power and production in 'East' and 'West', any more than it does between, say, North and South Korea, or North and South America. For the capitalist mode of production does not exist in a 'pure' state anywhere in the world economy, nor is its 'incidence' uniform from one social formation to another. For arguments on the so-called 'socialist' countries affiliated with (rather than identical to) the position of the present study, see: on the Soviet Union, Tony Cliff, State Capitalism in Russia (London: Pluto Press, 1974); on East Europe, Chris Harman, Bureaucracy and Revolution in Eastern Europe (London: Pluto Press, 1974); on the People's Republic of China, Nigel Harris, The Mandate of Heaven (London: Quartet Books, 1978); on Cuba, Nicaragua and, by implication, other countries of the 'socialist' periphery, Peter Binns and Mike Gonzalez, 'Cuba, Castro and Socialism,' International Socialism, No. 2:8 (Spring 1980), and Gonzalez, 'The Nicaraguan Revolution,' International Socialism, No. 2:17 (Autumn 1982).

[17]Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 330.

[18]Capital, Vol. 3, p. 771. Anderson (op cit., p. 403) sums this crucial difference up neatly: 'All modes of production in class societies prior to capitalism extract surplus labour from the immediate producers by means of extra-economic coercion. Capitalism is the first mode of production in history in which the means whereby the surplus is pumped out of the direct producer is "purely" economic in form -- the wage contract: the equal exchange between free agents which reproduces, hourly and daily, inequality and oppression.' On the limits to a rising social productivity imposed by slavery, see G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 189-193; for feudalism, see Guy Bois, Crise du Feudalisme (Paris: Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1976), pp. 160ff. See also, Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (London: New Left Books, 1974), pp. 25-28, 182-196.

[19]Marx, Grundrisse (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 29.

[20]Robert Brenner, 'The Origins of Capitalist Development: a Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism,' New Left Review, No. 104 (July-August 1977), p. 32; also Alex Callinicos, 'Wage Labour and State Capitalism,' International Socialism, No. 2:12 (Spring 1981). In a widely cited essay, Jarius Banaji has attacked the position taken in this study, arguing instead that capitalism is compatible with a variety of 'forms of exploitation', whose unity derives from a common motivating objective of production (e.g. accumulation): 'Modes of Production in a Materialist Conception of History,' Capital & Class, No. 3 (Autumn 1977). However, Banaji's argument seems to bring not more precision, but less, to the problem. For once it is accepted that there can be 'slave capitalism', 'serf capitalism' and 'wage capitalism', it is the adjective, rather than the noun, which becomes decisive, pointing back to the relations of production.

[21]In marxist theory, 'just as there can be no general theory of the economy (no "economic science") having a theoretical object that remains unchanged through the various modes of production, so there can be no "general theory" of the state-political (in the sense of a political "science" or "sociology") having a similarly constant object. Such a theory would be legitimate only if the State constituted an instance that was by nature or essence autonomous and possessing immutable boundaries ...': Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism (London: Verso, 1980), p. 19. In this connection, it may be noted that Marx's and Engels' famous statement that 'the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie' is nothing more than a statement of simple empirical fact, pronounced in England in 1847, a country which knew no universal male suffrage until 1918. In fact, 'if full political democracy is defined to exclude all racial, sexual, or class disqualifications, then its emergence is very recent: it was instituted in Britain in 1928 (when women, for the first time, had the right to vote on the same basis as men), in Germany in 1919 (later to be abolished by the Nazis and reintroduced in West Germany after the Second World War), in France and Italy in 1946, and in the United States as late as the 1960s (when blacks in the South were effectively allowed to vote': Geoff Hodgson, The Democratic Economy (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1984), p. 51. In other words, the trajectory of capitalist democratization belongs to the twentieth century, long after classical marxism -- from Marx and Engels to Lenin and Trotsky -- had run its course. For a fascinating survey of the history of capitalist democracy, see Göran Therborn, 'The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy,' New Left Review, No. 103 (May-June 1977).

[22]Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 578. 'The capitalist production process reproduces...the conditions which force the labourer to sell himself in order to live, and enable the capitalist to purchase him in order that he may enrich himself. It is no longer a mere accident, that capitalist and labourer confront each other in the market as buyer and seller... In reality, the labourer belongs to the capitalist class before he has sold himself to an individual capitalist' (ibid., p. 577).

[23]On this, see Ellen Meiksins Wood, 'The Separation of the Economic and Political in Capitalism,' New Left Review, No. 127 (May-June 1981).

[24]Poulantzas' apposite term for 'exceptional capitalist states': The Crisis of the Dictatorships (London: New Left Books, 1976), p. 9.

[25]The 'parallelism of action', inscribed in the capitalist mode of production, has been rightly stressed by Rey, op cit. The alternative, advanced most notably by Samir Amin, leads to the type of dualism referred to above, where 'metropolitan capitalism' is counterposed to 'peripheral capitalism': 'Accumulation and Development: A Theoretical Model,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 1 (August-November 1974). The problems, for marxist theory, inherent in Amin's position have been underlined by Ian Roxborough, Theories of Underdevelopment (London: MacMillan Press, 1979): 'It is not clear what is implied in the claim that there is a

specific kind of capitalism in the peripheral countries. Is it the case that peripheral dependent capitalism is a mode of production sui generis, with its own laws of motion? If not, why does it apparently not obey the laws of motion of capitalism (particularly capital accumulation)? (p. 65).'

[26]On the 'dialectic of the internal and the external' in Japanese development, see Jon Halliday, A Political History of Japanese Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), pp. 14-61; for Russia, see Leon Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974), chap. 1, where the 'law of combined and uneven development' is developed. 'Passive revolution', or 'revolution from above', is a concept developed by Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers, 1971), esp. pp. 105-120; 'permanent revolution', or 'revolution from below', is from Trotsky, The Permanent Revolution and Results and Prospects (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1974).

The law of combined and uneven development as a theory of alternatives, with passive and permanent revolution as two contingently possible outcomes, is reformulated by Callinicos, 'Trotsky's Theory of Permanent Revolution and its Relevance to the Third World Today,' International Socialism, No. 2:16 (Spring 1982). To deal briefly with the character of social revolutions in the third world, it will suffice here to argue that these revolutions begin with a 'permanentist' impulse, from below, but are necessarily 'deflected' -- for determinate material and cultural reasons -- into 'passive revolutions' from above.

North America, Australasia and the few other pockets of European colonization, stand apart from the limiting cases of Japan and Russia. These zones of the world economy were the scene of an expansion of capitalist nation-states, not just states, and capitalism was implanted in them by settlement and example, rather than pure force (which did not, of course, prevent the annihilation of the indigenous populations found there). On this distinction, see Giovanni Arrighi, The Geometry of Imperialism (London: New Left Books, 1978), pp. 36-37.

[27]For Marx's opinions on the limited efficacy of commerce in general, see Capital, Vol. 3, pp. 321-322, 326, and Grundrisse, p. 502; these comments form part of the basis of a thorough study by Geoffrey Kay, Development and Underdevelopment (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975). However, the classical statement, in marxist theory, of the resistance of natural economy to capitalist penetration is to be found in Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968), chaps. 27 and 29.

[28]The historical formation of Latin America underlines the necessity of differentiated analysis of the modalities of imperialism: victim of the overseas expansion of Iberian feudalism, Latin America constitutes a distinct sub-region of the capitalist periphery, whose posterior evolution separates it from the rest of the third world. For a useful synthesis of recent marxist periodizations of imperialism, see David Slater, 'Imperialism and the Limitations on Capitalist Transformation at the Periphery,' in Jean Carriere, ed., Industrialization and the State in Latin America (Amsterdam: Center for Latin American Research and

Documentation, 1979); also id., 'Towards a Political Economy of Urbanization in Peripheral Capitalist Societies,' International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, No. 1 (March 1978).

[29] Marx's considerations on the potential socio-economic results of conquest are illuminating: 'In all cases of conquest, three things are possible. The conquering people subjugates the conquered under its own mode of production...; or it leaves the old mode of production intact and contents itself with a tribute...; or a reciprocal interaction takes place whereby something new, a synthesis, arises...' Grundrisse, p. 98. Although Marx's own emphasis was on the first of these possible outcomes where metropolitan conquest of the third world was concerned, it was in fact the second and third that most closely correspond with what actually resulted.

[30] 'A natural economy thus confronts the requirements of capitalism at every turn with rigid barriers. Capitalism must therefore always and everywhere fight a battle of annihilation against every historical form of natural economy that it encounters... If capital were here to rely on the process of slow internal disintegration, it might take centuries: Luxemburg, op cit., pp. 369-370.

[31] An analytical distinction between state power over the organization of violence and class power over the organization of production is maintained throughout this study; other modalities of power (e.g. gender) fall outside its scope.

[32] This argument is related to the debate on modes of production in the third world, which derives from a source in marxist theory 'innocent' of any conception of combined and uneven development: for useful surveys of this literature, see Aidan Foster-Carter, 'The Modes of Production Controversy,' New Left Review, No. 107 (January-February 1978), and Anthony Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), chaps. 8 and 11. As Brewer notes, however, 'Much of the debate over modes of production has been about the use of words and no more. As such it is of little interest' (p. 273). By contrast, the present study is concerned with the regulation and dynamics of specific mechanisms of surplus-extraction, rather than their formal typology as modes of production.

[33] In a famous passage, Marx expressed the pattern of determination suggested here as follows: 'In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity. It is a particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every being which has materialized within it.' Grundrisse, pp. 106-107.

In the third world, the one 'specific kind of production which predominates over the rest' is capitalism. Despite the — often overwhelming — weight of an agrarian peasantry in the social formations of the periphery, the dominance of the capitalist mode of production proper within them can be gauged along several axes: the slow, but nevertheless

irreversible, ascendancy of capitalism in agrarian economies of a pre-capitalist type; the strategic location of capitalist productive enterprises in the most vital sectors of the economy; the superior productivity and output of the capitalist sector -- however constricted in terms of population and space -- in third world economies as a whole; and so on.

The term 'regime of accumulation' is introduced in the present study precisely in order to capture this hierarchy of articulated forms of surplus-extraction, under the dominance of the capitalist mode of production; borrowed from the 'regulation school' of marxist political economy, its use here is strictly provisional and -- quite unlike its status in the theory of regulation -- largely descriptive. The term itself is introduced and developed in Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation (London: New Left Books, 1979), p. 68 passim.

[34] In the original homelands of capitalism, only some of the methods of 'primitive accumulation' 'depend on the use of brute force, but without exception they all exploit the power of the State, the concentrated and organized force of society, to hasten violently the transition from the feudal economic order to the capitalist economic order, and to shorten the transition phase. Indeed, force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one. Force is an economic agent': Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 751; in short, 'the bourgeoisie, at its rise, cannot do without the constant intervention of the State (ibid., p. 737). However, capitalist methods of 'primitive accumulation' 'belong to the history of its formation, but in no way to its contemporary history, i.e. not to the real system of the mode of production': Marx, Grundrisse, p. 363.

[35] The current consensus in marxist studies of the third world was anticipated years ago by Debray: 'The state, culmination of social relations of exploitation in capitalist Europe, becomes in a certain sense the instrument of their installation in the third world. Regis Debray, 'Problems of Revolutionary Strategy in Latin America,' New Left Review, No. 45 (September-October 1967), p. 35. For alternative formulations of this inverse relationship, see Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, 1973), p. 334, and Ralph Miliband, Marxism and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 109.

[36] This phenomenon has come to be referred to as the 'overdeveloped' state, following the coinage of Hamza Alavi: 'The State in Postcolonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh,' in Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma, eds., Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973). The corollary to the 'overdevelopment' of the political-State is precisely the absence of any 'civil society'.

In Gramsci, the distinction serves to 'fix two major superstructural "levels" : the one that can be called "civil society", that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called "private", and that of "political society" or "the State". These two levels correspond, on the one hand, to the function of "hegemony" which the dominant group exercises throughout society and, on the other hand, to that of "direct domination" or command exercised through the State and "juridical" government.' Gramsci, op cit., p. 12. Elsewhere, Gramsci noted, in a famous passage: 'In Russia the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatin-

ous; in the West there was a proper relation between State and civil society...' (p. 238). The whole tenor of this contrast between 'East' and 'West' makes it clear, further on, that the former category is inclusive of all the 'backward countries' and 'colonies' (p. 243).

[37]In an interesting essay, Henfrey, referring to Brazil and Chile, has argued that 'the dominance of the political is a somewhat different matter in each case: in the one, a function of the absence of the capitalist class per se, in the other, of social relations of production which, being less typically capitalist, are reproduced largely by ideological and political rather than economic forms of coercion.' Colin Henfrey, 'Dependency, Modes of Production, and the Class Analysis of Latin America,' Latin American Perspectives, Nos. 3 & 4 (Summer and Fall 1981), p. 30. In large parts of Africa, and to a somewhat lesser extent Asia, it is clearly due to a combination of both.

[38]'Political accumulation' is taken from a recent essay by Brenner, 'The Agrarian Roots of European Capitalism,' Past and Present, No. 97 (November 1982). Brenner argues that this modality of exploitation was the distinguishing feature of feudalism, but it is unclear what precise significance he attaches to 'accumulation' in the feudal mode of production.

[39]The barriers to capitalist development presented by peasant household production are explored by Brenner, 'The Origins of Capitalist Development...,' pp. 33-37.

[40]'Nothing,' in the opinion of Marx, 'could be more absurd than to regard merchant's capital, whether in the shape of commercial or of money-dealing capital, as a particular variety of industrial capital.' Capital, Vol. 3, p. 323. It is the great merit of Kay's study, op cit., chaps. 5 and 6, to have explored thoroughly the differential consequences of merchant and industrial capital in the third world. It is also worth recalling, at this point, the significance attached by Marx to technique: 'Means of labour supply a standard of the degree of development of the labourer and they are indicators of the social relations in which he labours.' Capital, Vol. 1, p. 180.

[41]Marx, Grundrisse, p. 853.

[42]The 'model of determination' suggested here draws on the work of Erik Olin Wright, Class, Crisis and the State (London: Verso, 1978), pp. 15-26 -- a pioneering foray into the different modes of dialectical causality operative in marxist theory. Wright is also the author of a sophisticated attempt at theorizing the interpenetration (or 'articulation') of modes of production, although his reference is to the 'post-revolutionary' world, rather than the capitalist periphery: 'Capitalism's Futures,' Socialist Review, No. 68 (March-April 1983).

[43]For an introduction to recent debates on different patterns of development in Africa, see the series of essays by Bjorn Beckman, 'Imperialism and Capitalist Transformation: Critique of a Kenyan Debate', 'Imperialism and the "National Bourgeoisie" ', and 'Whose State: State and Capitalist

Development in Nigeria,' Review of African Political Economy, Nos. 19, 22, and 23 (September-December 1980, October-December 1981, and January-April 1982).

[44]To underline this point, it is enough to recall the polemic launched by Bill Warren, 'Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization,' New Left Review, No. 81 (September-October 1973), and the reply by Philip McMichael, James Petras and Robert Rhodes, 'Imperialism and the Contradictions of Development,' New Left Review, No. 85 (May-June 1974). Warren's argument implicitly excluded the most backward and symptomatic countries of 'underdevelopment', while McMichael et al. explicitly refused to consider the evidence mustered by Warren because it centred solely on 'special' cases. The relative merits of either discussion are clearly overshadowed by their common inability to account for deviations from the general pattern of development each identified in the third world.

[45]The formulation is from Callinicos, 'Trotsky's Theory...,' p. 107, who acknowledges another source: Colin Sparks.

[46]Trotsky, In Defence of Marxism (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1965), p. 16.

CHAPTER II

A GENEALOGY OF TANZANIAN UNDERDEVELOPMENT

1. Introduction

A lack of analytical interest in the diverse array of social formations distributed throughout the third world, prior to its incorporation into the world capitalist economy, has long been a characteristic feature of radical underdevelopment theory.[1] It goes back, in fact, to Paul Baran, whose seminal work, first published in 1957, was to become an elementary reference point for the dependency analyses which were to follow. The question which Baran initially posed is a familiar one now:

> why is it that in the backward capitalist countries there has been no advance along the lines of capitalist development that are familiar from the study of other capitalist countries, and why is it that forward movement there has been either slow or absent altogether? (2)

In Baran's work -- the first by a Western marxist to focus explicitly on the third world -- the answer to this question was to be sought in the division of the world economy into 'advanced' and 'backward' components, and in an analysis of their interrelations in terms of trade, flows of 'surplus' and balances of politico-military influence. This perspective nurtured a whole generation of progressive scholars concerned with the problems of development and underdevelopment.

Yet the very generality of the question originally posed by Baran conceals an ellipse which explicitly identifies all 'national' components of the world economy as 'capitalist', with their differentiation established on the basis of enormous variations in the development of socio-productive

power. Given that assumption, it was enough for Baran to claim that, prior to the development of capitalism 'in both the now advanced and the now underdeveloped parts of the world,' there was 'everywhere a mode of production and a social and political order that are conveniently summarized under the name of feudalism.'[3] The historical accuracy of designating as 'feudal' such diverse phenomena as, say, Zulu militarism, European absolutism and 'Oriental despotism', while registered as problematical by Baran, received no further attention in his work. Nor should it, since in terms of the question he posed, both development and underdevelopment are products of the 'modern world'; neither are historically anterior to the advent of the capitalist mode of production in Western Europe. From these premises, it logically follows that a study of the precolonial periphery would be (to extend a contemporary argument against historiography[4]) both scientifically and politically irrelevant to the problem of underdevelopment: scientifically valueless because incorporation into the world economy effected a radical discontinuity in the historical temporality of the third world -- a 'world-historical turning-point', as Wallerstein terms it[5] -- after which what had previously existed ceased to exist; politically worthless because the problem of underdevelopment exists and is reproduced in the present, over which the past has no material efficacy. In short, silence on the variant paths of precolonial peripheral development conceals a double presupposition: an assumption that precapitalist social relations have been 'superseded' (in the Hegelian sense), and a consequent denial that these social relations have any real causal consequences for the contemporary problem of underdevelopment.

The reasons for such a pervasive silence surrounding the differ-

ential structures and trajectories of social formations in the precolonial periphery are not difficult to locate: they reside in the origins of radical underdevelopment theory as a negative critique of conventional discourses on development, rather than a positive alternative to these. In fact, the initial address of dependency theory to the problem of precapitalist survivals in the third world initially took the form of a spirited denunciation of the conceptual status of, and explanatory weight borne by, the term 'tradition' in conventional studies of development.[6] Indeed, ontological controversy over precapitalist or 'traditional' survivals in the capitalist periphery was, for a time, the chief theoretical peg on which arguments for and against accelerated capitalist 'diffusion', from the metropolitan centres of world capitalism to the third world, rested. The legacy of these debates was an unfortunate counterposition of a socially homogenous world economy, on the part of radical underdevelopment theory, to the dualistic conception of autonomous 'modern' and 'traditional' sectors operative in the discourse of evolutionary modernization. The possibility of a dialectical combination and mutual conditioning of capitalist and precapitalist social relations, and particularly of the modes of surplus-extraction which these relations supported, was, in the process, placed outside the limits of theoretically 'legitimate' research in the radical underdevelopment paradigm. In effect, the reaction of dependentcistas to the conceptual category 'tradition' over-corrected the conventional paradigm to the point of theoretically suppressing the possible existence and causal consequences of precapitalist survivals in the periphery altogether, simply because the theoretical system of evolutionary modernization had come to depend on a vaguely equivalent notion.

But even if the complex issue of precapitalist survivals and their causal consequences for contemporary problems of development and underdevelopment in the third world are dismissed or otherwise set aside, a fundamental historical problem remains. For the utter inadequacy of smothering diverse social forms, immediately prior to either endogenous capitalist development or exogenous capitalist penetration, with the same 'feudal' or 'traditional' blanket is nowhere more apparent than in the inability of either dependency or modernization theory to answer two 'simple' questions: (i) if, immediately prior to the advent of the capitalist mode of production, there was everywhere a social form which can be labelled as 'feudal' or 'traditional', how came it that the endogenous genesis of capitalism occurred, not only first, but only in Western Europe and its North American appendage?[7]; (ii) given the subsequent primacy enjoyed by a few metropolitan centres of an emergent world capitalism, how are the variant socio-economic outcomes of exogenous capitalist pressure on different zones of the periphery to be explained?[8] The solution to these, and a whole series of other problems, can only lie in the diverse range of social organisms, representing manifestly distinct levels of historical development, which an expansive metropolitan power confronted in the periphery. Herein lies the necessity for historical exploration of the very real differences in structure and dynamics of the variegated social formations distributed throughout the third world, prior to its incorporation into a singular world economy.

This chapter surveys the differential structures and patterns of development which animated the various 'social and economic formations'[9] that could be found in the region of East Africa which is today Tanzania,

prior to colonial conquest. The mediation, through these diverse social forms, of the impact of incorporation into the world economy is explored, as a prologue to a consideration of the structural limits subsequently imposed on imperialist penetration of the region. The extent to which the precolonial pattern of historical development exercised determinations on the future rhythm and modalities of capitalist development in Tanzania is taken up in Chapter III.

2. Natural Economy: Gender and Class Formation

Like many other countries of the third world, the territorial boundaries imposed upon what is contemporary Tanzania by the colonial state order correspond to no anterior historically determinate social boundaries.[10] At the dawn of colonialism in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the region embraced a large number of distinct social and economic formations, some of which were entirely contained within the area, while others were the outer extensions of larger social and political orders.[11] At the centre of the region during the nineteenth century, most of these social and economic formations were constituted on the basis of a mode of production dominated by land and a natural economy; they were localized communities of kinship groups of a lineage type, in which ownership of land was communal, subject to periodic redistributions among specific clans in such a way as to require mutual cooperation in productive processes, both within and among lineages. Absence of private appropriation and the periodic redistributions of land, presided over by the leading elders of the lineages, prevented any vast social stratification. Permanent political authority was still rare, except in times of warfare when military leaders would assume command of the

community as a whole.

But these were not the bubolic and egalitarian communities which have come to animate the imagination of Julius Nyerere and a whole school of Africanist historiography.[12] In several important respects, conditions of human existence in even the most egalitarian of the social and economic formations at the centre of Tanzania were far removed from the idyllic portrait of life painted by the term 'primitive communalism'. The most systematically ignored of these was the very real oppression which nature exercised over humanity at this time, owing to a very low level of development of socio-productive power. To be sure, agricultural production was already largely settled, and irrigation and soil conservation techniques were widely practiced, with extensive usage of natural fertilizers; but means of production employed in labour processes seldom extended beyond axes, hoes and digging sticks, while animal labour was rarely utilized. In short, technology had not yet advanced to a level sufficient to even minimally attenuate the oppression of men and women by nature.

The 'natural' determination of social formation was everywhere evident in language and culture. The territorial space a community inhabited frequently gave it its primary nomenclature, and an individual's subjective identity as part of a wider community literally changed with spatial migration -- a significant fact which tells its own story: Tanzania knew no 'tribes' or other ethnic divisions in the sense in which these now figure in conventional discourses on Africa.[13] Surviving oral histories, distorted and repressed by 'modern' forms of political and ideological domination, are more likely to record the constant struggle against nature and animality than any social struggles which may have convulsed these communities. 'Official' history of the Shambaa, for ex-

ample, traces the indigenous origins of state power back to a 'stranger' who was crowned by a 'grateful people' for killing a lion which had been devastating their herds. Religion typically identified epidemics, wild animals and witches as 'our enemies', while 'Deliver us from death by starvation' seems to have been a prayer common to most of these communities. Famine, according to one historian, is 'the chief explanation of migration and social change in most Tanganyikan traditions.'[14] Contemporary attempts to romanticize some supposed 'harmony' between these communities and their natural environment -- and, implicitly or explicitly, the extremely low level of development of the productive forces on which this 'harmony' was predicated -- are thus fundamentally misplaced: the religions and superstitions which rationalized human existence at this low level of historical development were illusory compensation for the constant fear of death and, in general, for the tyranny which nature exercised over these backward social and economic formations.[15]

Still, two significant attenuations of the oppression exerted by the natural environment were already well established by this time: one was possession of livestock, which could be traded with more fortunate communities for grain in time of famine; the other was crop diversification. Both capacities were the prerogative of the elders within the lineages, a fact which has led several anthropologists to argue that, despite the absence of 'private' appropriation, these social and economic formations were already constituted on the basis of exploitative relations of production.[16] In this instance, relations of production are not founded on 'control of the means of production but of the means of physiological reproduction, used to reproduce the life of the human producer.'[17] Control of the means of reproduction -- for example, of certain means of subsistence,

the circulation of women, and exchange relations with other communities — conferred on the elders a coercive power over the juniors within the lineages, a power that derives especially from the elders' capacity to manipulate the bride-price and to 'punish' dissident juniors by barring access to the women of the community. In the opinion of some anthropologists, the exercise of this coercive power was sufficient to generate 'class antagonisms' between a dominant class of elders and a producing class of juniors, such that relations of kinship between them is simply an ideological cover,

> a light veil which hides, but may easily be made to reveal, the process by which the dominant class brings the producers under its control. (18)

Moreover, the historical evidence from Tanzania suggests that:

> Although exploitation was masked by every man's expectation of becoming an elder, generational conflict may have been the most important form of social conflict in all but the politically most sophisticated of Tanganyikan societies. (19)

If correct, these theoretical and historical assessments of 'generational conflict' already indicate the distance the social and economic formations at the centre of Tanzania had traveled, in terms of stratification, from any romanticized image of 'primitive communalism'.

Yet the fundamental social complement to the tyranny exercised by nature over these communities was not the degree of generational conflict between elders and juniors, but the <u>absolute subordination of women</u> on which this was predicated. Few matrilineal communities survived into the nineteenth century and, although there were important exceptions, for the most part women were treated as 'commodities' by virtue of their labour-power and fertility. Men generally engaged in the less productive activities of hunting and herding livestock, while women were consigned to perform most of the dull and repetitive tasks, such as preparation of subsistence, agri-

culture and child-rearing.[20] In short, the sexual division of labour in these social and economic formations allocated to women a disproportionately heavy workload compared to both elders and juniors. Denied possession of autonomous plots of land, rights to any portion of the surplus product they produced, and the benefits incumbent on child-rearing, women's subordination in these communities was permanent (unlike the temporary subordination of juniors to elders), their existence successively subject to the domination of first father, then husband, and finally son.[21]

It is important to insist that the sexual division of labour in these backward social and economic formations was neither 'natural' nor 'technical'; on the contrary, it was necessarily maintained by a whole range of determinate social practices — among them, mythology, ritual and kinship itself. While linked to biological differences between the sexes, women's subordination was not reducible to these alone.[22] To be sure, the oppression which men exercised over women was founded, in the last instance, on female reproductive capacities; but control over women as the means of reproduction seems to have already functioned in these communities in a manner analogous to the way in which control over the means of production functions in stratifying more advanced social and economic formations.[23] In this sense, female subordination may be said to have heralded the transition from the rudimentary social structures, found throughout the centre of Tanzania at the beginning of the nineteenth century, to the comparatively more complex societies and state systems found there on the eve of the colonial conquest. Throughout the nineteenth century, this process of transition was to receive constant and decisive impulses from a series of invasions emanating from the more historically advanced 'peripheries' of

the region, which formed distinct sub-zones within East Africa.

3. Warfare and Servitude

In the northern zone of Tanzania which now borders on Kenya, the major impetus behind the social transformations, which convulsed the area in the nineteenth century, began somewhat earlier than elsewhere with the southward expansion of the Maasai -- a social and economic formation with a predominately pastoral economy. Already by the eighteenth century, the Maasai had developed a highly complex 'age-class' system, which tended to generate repetitive raids and warfare, both between clans and against surrounding settled agrarian communities. The motor force of Maasai militarism seems to have been competition among junior-warriors for a particularly scarce and valuable 'commodity': the reproductive capacity and labour-power of women.[24] Plunder of rival clans and neighbouring communities provided not only livestock, which could lay the foundations of individual herds for the juniors, but also -- and more importantly -- the necessary bride price enabling juniors to purchase wives. Early in the nineteenth century, the Maasai developed particularly effective military tactics and weaponry which made them the terror of their neighbours, and forced refugee communities into long migrations. A veritable chain reaction was thus set in motion by the southward expansion of the Maasai, as weaker communities who fled before the onslaught found themselves compelled to adopt Maasai military technique and muscle into territory already populated by other social and economic formations.

A somewhat similar dynamic, but with very different social co-ordinates, upset the system of natural economy in the southern zone of the

region, now bordering on Mozambique, in the first half of the nineteenth century. In the north, where agricultural productivity had been somewhat higher than elsewhere, historical development in this period had been fueled by the conflict between the primarily pastoral economy of the Maasai and the settled agrarian communties which surrounded them.[25] In the more barren south, by contrast, the nineteenth century brought the catastrophic collapse of the simple social and economic formations which had populated the area, and their reconstitution into more highly developed and hierarchical state systems. The instrument of destruction in this zone was the northward expansion of the Ngoni -- a once agricultural community driven out of Southern Africa by the rise of Zulu militarism. Migration and constant warfare had forced on the Ngoni an unprecedented military organization: ruled by a warrior aristocracy and governed by strict rank and deference, the Ngoni reproduced as a social organism by integrating captured slaves into its war apparatus.[26] But Ngoni militarism was markedly economic in character: lacking territorial fixity, the object of their expansion was the subjugation of weaker social and economic formations which they transformed into tributary areas. For communities threatened by invasion, the only lasting alternative to becoming a zone of predation was imitation of the Ngoni 'military' mode of production — a motor force behind the development and consolidation of the still comparatively small, but nevertheless centralized and militarized sovereignties found there on the eve of the colonial conquest.

In the northwestern area of Tanzania which now borders on the modern state of Uganda, the early consolidation of dynastic kingdoms had similarly opened a period of predation on, and subjugation of, the more backward social and economic formations which bordered them. Large parts of

contemporary Tanzanian territory were annexed by the kingdom of Burundi early in the nineteenth century. But lasting impact on the area came as a result of the southward expansion of first Bunyoro and then Buganda; by the time of the German invasion of East Africa, several smaller communities now falling within the territorial boundaries of Tanzania had been reduced to the status of dependencies of the very much larger, and more powerful, sovereignty in southern Uganda. The mode of production on which the Bugandan social formation was constituted has frequently been described as 'feudal'; it was to be installed throughout the Tanzanian dependencies of Buganda (although, whether by external imposition or internal generated mimicry, it is not yet clear).[27] For with the earlier decline of the Bunyoro pastoral nobility and the rise of the Bugandan landed aristocracy, plunder of outlying regions of natural economy had declined in importance as a mechanism of surplus-extraction, and the subjugated communities had become increasingly forced into a routine of settled agrarian production. Much like serfs to the means of production, direct producers were tied to the land by a specific set of social relations, founded on a system of agrarian property controlled by a class of landlords who extracted corvée labour from the peasantry through politico-juridical mechanisms of coercion. During the nineteenth century, the area subjugated by Buganda was the home of Tanzania's 'most stratified and authoritarian society, and its cultivators' misery struck several early visitors.'[28] However, the absence of any expansionary drive and the relatively marginal areas affected made the pressure of Bugandan and Burundi 'proto-feudalism' less important on the overall trajectory of historical development in nineteenth century Tanzania than were the invasions of the Maasai and the Ngoni from the north and south.

It would be wrong to regard the invasions of the Tanzanian centre by the 'peripheries' as somehow effecting a period of severe checks on social and economic development in the region. The resultant raids and warfare, while certainly destructive, shook up the restrictive framework of natural economy, forced migrations in the face of superior military organization and thus an intermingling of diverse cultures, stimulated trade in the search for comparable and superior weaponry, and, in necessitating village fortification, quickened the growth of 'towns', increased pressures for surplus production, and ruptured the close connection between primitive industry and agriculture which characterized natural economies everywhere.[29] In socio-political terms, under the impact of these invasions there began to form hereditary aristocracies, exercising strategic power over ever larger social and economic formations. Dynastic quasi-royal lineages were emerging, which gathered around them retinues of warriors for raiding parties and defence, which cut well across kinship groupings. Largely recruited from fugitive slaves, witches and criminals of adjacent non-allied communities, these armed retinues quickly came to form the coercive foundation for permanent class division and institutionalized political authority.

On the other hand, nineteenth century tendencies toward political centralization should not be exaggerated, as factional struggles within emergent aristocracies — actively fanned by neighbouring rivals — increasingly broke out, thus preventing the consolidation of powerful state structures like Buganda in southern Uganda. Nor should the impetus to development of the productive forces induced by these invasions be overstated, for each was checked within rigid social and technical limits: livestock, as the basic form of property among the Maasai, could be in-

creased quantitatively, but not improved qualitatively; tribute, which provided the economic basis of reproduction for the Ngoni, preyed on existing systems of distribution, without altering the subject mode of production; and corvée, the foundation of the 'proto-feudalism' in the northeast, would feed the appetite of the landed aristocracy for luxury consumption, rather than lead to any systematic investment of surpluses. Nevertheless, the dynamics of state and class formation were well in motion on the eve of the colonial conquest. The reciprocity of these superstructural developments soon told on the economic infrastructure: for the emergence of more complex state structures in nineteenth century Tanzania came increasingly to rest on a material foundation provided by control over inland trade routes and -- more centrally -- servile labour.

There has been a tendency in Africanist and other schools of historiography to avoid allusion to the endogenous origins of slavery on the continent, a silence no doubt designed to underline the brutality of the slave trade conducted by European merchant capital. As if by agreed convention, evidence of precolonial African slavery is passed over, for fear of substantiating racist claims that Africans were, in some way, inherently suited and amenable to slavery. Even when the simple fact of the existence of servitude in precolonial Africa is admitted, it tends to be followed by a series of apologetics aimed at minimizing its significance and extent. Writing of plantation slavery in the antebellum American South, for example, Eugene Genovese has typically insisted that

> the brutality of American slavery confronted the African -- even the African who had been a slave in his homeland -- with something new. Under its mildest forms, Southern slavery had to be much harsher than its African counterpart. With the partial exception of the Dahomey, African slavery was patriarchal. Even slaves from

> a conquered tribe were sometimes assimiliated into the new culture... There was little racial antipathy, although it was by no means unknown. (30)

Yet this argument -- understandable enough in its own setting[31] -- has no place in a study of African history: for, whatever its 'form', slavery involves the private appropriation of one individual by another; it always recalls an initial act of violence -- the capture -- which caused it. That the forms of African servitude were ancient and varied, at times even 'patriarchal', is indisputable; but that the raids and warfare which wracked nineteenth century Tanzania were accompanied by a massive increase in the production and circulation of slaves is equally incontestable. Indeed, there is sufficient historical evidence to warrant the suggestion that, by the late nineteenth century, servitude in the interior of precolonial Tanzania had begun to undergo a significant transformation: from the sort of ancillary facility, which Genovese seems to refer to, into a <u>systematic mode of production</u>.

While 'peripheral' invasions of the Tanzanian interior set the stage for this transformation in the institution of servitude, the fundamental impulse behind the massive increase in the production of slaves in the nineteenth century was, of course, completely exogenous -- a structural consequence of the existence and success of another expansionary force, emanating from what was still a largely external environment: the world capitalist economy. The insatiable appetite of European merchant capital for slaves inevitably aggravated internal militaristic pressures, forcing the conversion of labour-power from agricultural cultivation to production of slaves. As this conversion accelerated, demand for servitude began to issue from multiple sources within Tanzania itself. By the late nineteenth

century,

> Zaramo headmen had gangs working their fields. Gogo exchanged ivory for slaves to cultivate their land, as did the Nyamwezi of Unyanyembe. In the 1880s the Makonde collected wild rubber and exchanged it for cloth with which they bought slaves to cultivate land in their absence. Arusha employed slaves to cultivate while young warriors raided. Ngindo bought slaves from Ulanga, Haya from Buganda, and Kerewe from Lake Victoria's eastern shore. Manyema slaves rarely reached Zanzibar, being absorbed in route; (32)

and so on. In fact, servitude in Tanzania only became a generalized phenomenon throughout the territory after the export of slaves from the mainland had been banned in the late nineteenth century. The rapidly developing complex state structures of the last century -- so often praised by Africanist historians as an exemplary instance of 'African initiative' -- were, in short, being erected over an enslaved work-force, which underlay the constant rivalries and aggressions of the period.[33]

4. The Commercial Dynamic

A final distinct zone of precolonial Tanzania remains to be considered, one whose historical trajectory separated it from the rest of the region. Already by the eighth century and perhaps earlier, the coast and offshore islands had encountered what was, at that time, the world's wealthiest and most advanced civilization: the Islamic empire. Indeed, the East African coastline,

> some fifteen hundred years before the coming of the Europeans, was already involved in regular and peaceful trade with the cities of the Red Sea, southern Arabia, the Persian Gulf, India, Ceylon, and countries beyond. (34)

The maritime environment and the strategically important geographical position within a major trading zone of the medieval epoch settled the basic social and economic ecology of the coastline: first the offshore islands and

then the coast itself were colonized by Shirazi Arabs during the great wave of Islamic expansion into the Indian Ocean, producing a synthetic Afro-Shirazi civilization --arguably 'the highest which existed at the time in Africa south of the Sahara.'[35] However, the arrival of the Portuguese on the coast of East Africa in the sixteenth century signalled the demise of Arab commercial monopoly over the Indian Ocean; thereafter, trade in the region was to be permanently dominated by European merchant capital and the pattern of development along the East African coastline would come under constant exogenous influence.[36]

The impact of these transformations in the external environment was soon registered in East Africa, revealing a crucial and enduring weakness in the economy of the Tanzanian coastline: its prosperity was dependent on success in the sphere of exchange, rather than production proper. Loss of control over the international shipping lanes which touched on the East African coast forced Afro-Shirazi merchant capital to turn into the Tanzanian interior, in search of commodities demanded elsewhere in the world economy -- in a trading circuit mediated through Swahili agencies, but continually harrassed by raiding parties from social and economic formations of the East African interior. The end result was to be two centuries of wars and rivalries among the localized sovereignties scattered along the coast, which sent the area into slow, but steady decline.[37]

The transfer of the Omani Sultanate -- a British client-state -- to the island of Zanzibar in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, however, recharged the commercial dynamic of the coastline. Ushering in a new period of relative peace and prosperity, the Sultanate actively

integrated the coast into the world economy, sending Arab and Swahili traders deep into the Tanzanian interior. Emigré Indian merchants and bankers accumulated large fortunes and the development of a landed aristocracy was encouraged, leading to the establishment of plantations throughout the islands and along the coast, around which emerged a small independent yeomanry. For perhaps the first time, coast and interior economies were articulated together in symbiotic relations of exchange. But the expanded merchant and banking activity of the coast characteristically left unchanged the natural economies of the interior. With the sole exception of a porterage system -- which may be said to have formally introduced the wage-relation into Tanzania -- there was no attempt by merchant capital at a managerial intervention into the processes of production which sustained the social and economic formations of the hinterland.[38]

At the same time, however, the opening up of trade routes throughout the interior had a decisive impact on the dialectics of state and class formation first set in motion by the Ngoni and Maasai invasions from the south and north. Impulses from the commercially induced dynamic of the world economy accelerated the processes of historical development already taking shape in the interior in a number of significant ways. Most important among these was, as indicated, merchant capital's insatiable appetite for slaves, which provided a further stimulus to predatory communities, increasing the frequency and intensity of their raids on the more politically disorganized social and economic formations. In turn, the vastly magnified scale of predation forced the pace of political centralization: fortified villages developed, not yet as centres of industry, but as local commercial trading posts and as strategic concentrations of institutionalised

authority. Monopoly control over trade routes passing through each community conferred the privilege of extracting tribute from the increasingly frequent caravans, which provided, in turn, the economic basis for the accelerated development of coercive class power -- technically reinforced now by advanced European means of warfare. In rhythm with the tempo of these major superstructural transformations flowed, more and more, an infrastructural river of human flesh: in the last instance, it was this formation of a class structured system generating, and being generated by, the production and circulation of slaves in the interior which overdetermined the pattern of socio-economic development in precolonial Tanzania as a whole. In the nineteenth century, no other area of the world economy witnessed a comparable inflation of the institution of servitude.

However, there were fatal twists in this process for the natural economies of the interior as well as for the commercial economy of the coast. Coastal demand for commodities and porters in the interior led to a further conversion of labour-power away from agricultural cultivation, and into the production of slaves and (to a lesser extent) ivory. The deployment of an enslaved work-force by the more advanced social and economic formations of the interior only partially compensated for the inevitable result: a marked decline in food production.[39] The resulting constant scarcity of means of subsistence, especially aggravated in periods of natural catastrophe, predictably unleashed a new cycle of predation, this time not for wives or slaves, but simply for food. It was in this respect that coastal commerce inflicted its ultimate damage on the interior: for the ensuing parasitism of one social and economic formation on another ensured a weak and thoroughly disorganized response to the colonial conquest which

was soon to come. As warfare and servitude tended to become absolute in form, an ideological atmosphere developed which reduced, in the consciousness of predatory communities, communites of predation to the status of 'barbarian' and 'non-human' -- its members to be raided and treated as livestock. In an ideological universe of this sort, political unity -- even when faced with a manifestly foreign and common enemy -- was out of the question.

But if the invasion of the Tanzanian interior by coastal merchant capital had evidently accelerated the collapse of the region's most backward social and economic formations, and their absorption into parasitic localized sovereignties, the commercial dynamic of the coastline tended to conceal the structural limitations and constraints of the mercantile base on which its economy had come to rest. The last quarter of the nineteenth century brought a final exhaustion of ivory supplies in the interior and a formal end -- by British-Zanzibari agreement -- to coastal participation in the international slave trade. Thereafter, the commercial prosperity which had followed active integration into the world economy came rapidly to depend on commodities produced, no longer in the interior, but by the expanding plantation economy of the coast itself. By the time of the colonial conquest, the coastline and offshore islands were the scene of sugar, clove and grain plantations, organized as advanced commercial enterprises on soil now claimed by a landed aristocracy. Not unlike the cotton complexes pioneered by European colonialism in the Americas, the plantations of the coast were sustained by the massive use of slave labour imported from the interior. In fact, from the moment the Omani Sultanate was installed in Zanzibar, the plantation economy had taken as much as half

of the enslaved work-force produced in the interior; the scale of production of servitude actually increased after the 'external' slave trade had been banned, in response to the vastly expanded 'internal' demand generated by the plantation economy of the coast.[40] However, the ready availability of both land and slaves guaranteed the absence of any productive dynamic in the coastal economy, since production within the economic framework of plantation slavery could be increased more rationally through the simple deployment of more slaves and cultivation of more acreage. The social relations of plantation slavery, in short, precluded both intensive cultivation and adoption of any technology in the labour process beyond the most rudimentary means of production -- in addition to delimiting a structural field of consumption by the enslaved work-force which was, naturally, unsupported by any effective demand.[41]

These impassable social obstacles to a productive, rather than just a commercial, dynamic were reinforced by the peculiar political configuration of the Zanzibari Sultanate. For while the coastal economy had come to depend on the success of plantation slavery and mercantile activity, and the prosperity of both had been invariably encouraged by the Sultanate, neither Arab landed aristocracy nor Asian merchants and bankers exercised any political power, comparable to their economic consequence.[42] The power base of the Zanzibari Sultanate had, from the moment it was installed off the East African coast, been provided by metropolitan power alone; the total lack of autonomy and decadence of this archaic autocracy was only to be fully revealed in capitulation to the imposition of German colonial state order along the coastline in the 1880s. Briefly joined to the mainland through symbiotic relations in the production and circulation of slaves, the histor-

ical trajectory of the island was thereafter to separate it from the rest of Tanzania.

5. Conclusion

On the eve of the colonial conquest, Tanzania was in a state of acute social crisis. Militaristic pressures from the north and south, along with the very different commercial pressure from the coast and beyond, had forced even the most backward social and economic formations towards greater internal social differentiation and higher levels of political and military organization. By the time German metropolitan state power intervened on the mainland, throwing the entire social organism into convulsion, both internal and external pressures had already taken Tanzanian communities a considerable distance from the idyllic portrait of precolonial society painted by much of contemporary Africanist historiography. An increasingly solidified warrior-aristocracy, rapidly coming to rest on an enslaved workforce, had, over significant areas of the territory, succeeded the rough original equality of 'primitive communalism'. The general climate of rivalries and aggression caused by the parasitism of one localized sovereignty on another — in turn, structural consequences of a tendential development towards a mode of production and circulation of slaves — made relatively easy the colonial conquest which was to come. Under the impact of this final cataclysmic invasion of the nineteenth century would eventually be born the contemporary Tanzanian social formation.

The ulterior pattern of development of the whole region would now come under the permanent and direct exogenous influence of metropolitan capitalism; but the subsequent course of events in the trajectory of the

Tanzanian social formation cannot be reduced to imperialism alone. For to what extent the impact of metropolitan capital on a social organism in the third world brought about a collapse of the anterior mode of production depended, in the first instance, on its solidity and internal structure; and where any process of collapse and reconstitution led depended, not only on the specific type of capital contacted, but on the character of the prior social organism itself. In Tanzania, the first half of the twentieth century would combine different historical trajectories from the past with a colonial present to produce different futures for its various social and economic formations: in the north, the mobility of the Maasai, supported by a pastoral economy, would ensure the survival and autonomy of that community down to the contemporary period; in the south, the Ngoni warrior-aristocracy, dependent on a 'military' mode of production, would inevitably clash with the colonial state power and perish in the confrontation; in the northwest, the feudal nobility, accustomed to a century of Bagundan suzerainty, would easily accomodate itself to a new foreign over-rule and prosper throughout the colonial epoch; on the coast, the landed aristocracy, conditioned by the rationality of plantation slavery, would be unable to adapt to the logic of a capitalist regime of accumulation and suffer a rapid, but painless death. In every case, the variant patterns of development in precolonial Tanzania bore crucially on their subsequent integration into the state order and regime of accumulation consolidated under colonial domination.

The historical collision of an expansive metropolitan capitalism with the backward social and economic formations of precolonial Tanzania thus set in motion a dialectical process of causal reciprocity: for while

the impact of capitalist penetration decisively modified or ruptured their previous trajectories, these social and economic formations, in turn, provided the initial conditions of existence for capitalist penetration of the territory and, therefore, could not fail but set structural limits on the possible forms the colonial regime of accumulation could take. The future combination and mutual conditioning of capitalist and precapitalist production and power relations which took shape during the colonial epoch, and the historical synthesis which finally emerged, will be considered in Chapter III.

Here it will be enough to simply indicate the most basic constraint which would be imposed on capitalist penetration of the region by the anterior pattern of historical development: for the relations of production predominant throughout the Tanzanian interior were defined by the persistent unity of the agricultural population with the land, which went unaffected by the generalized parasitism and predation that the region succumbed to in the latter half of the nineteenth century. With the partial exceptions of the coastline and the northeast, no ruling classes developed out of this period which could claim an ultimate sovereignty and control over the most basic means of production in any natural economy: the land. The colonial state power would thus stand virtually alone against a vastly predominant rural population, when confronted with the necessity of creating the most essential precondition of the capitalist mode of production proper: the existence of a class of 'free', absolutely impoverished, labourers, lacking any recourse for subsistence other than through the surrender of objective 'labour-power' to the command of capital. In the absence of this necessary condition of existence for the strictly 'economic' dominance

of the wage-relation, productive capital would be held within a constricted space, dependent on permanent recourse to the 'political' exercise of state power -- the consequences of which would be felt far into the future.

Notes

[1]It is also, of course, a characteristic feature of modernization theory, as Raymond Aron pointed out some twenty years ago in reference to the concept of 'tradition': 'All past societies are put into a single category, whether they be the archaic communities of New Guinea, the Negro tribes of Africa, or the old civilizations of India and China. But the only feature they have in common is that they are neither modern nor industrialized.' Cited in Henry Bernstein, 'Sociology of Underdevelopment vs. Sociology of Development?,' in David Lehmann, ed., Development Theory: Four Critical Studies (London: Frank Cass, 1977), p. 80.

[2]Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957), p. 136.

[3]Ibid., p. 137. Rodney's thesis that precolonial African societies 'were in a transitional stage between the practice of agriculture (plus fishing and herding) in family communities and the practice of the same activities within states and societies comparable to feudalism,' while unduly indiscriminate, vague and 'stagist', is nonetheless somewhat more accurate. Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1974), p. 38. For alternative discussions of precolonial Africa in terms of an 'Asiatic mode of production', see Jean Suret-Canale, 'Premières Sociétés de Classes,' Recherches Internationales, No. 57-58 (January-April 1967); and in terms of a distinctive 'African mode of production', see Catherine Coquery-Vidovitch, 'Research on an African Mode of Production,' in David Seddon, ed., Relations of Production (London: Frank Cass, 1978).

[4]Namely, that of Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst, Pre-capitalist Modes of Production (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975): 'The study of history is not only scientifically but also politically valueless. The object of history, the past, no matter how it is conceived, cannot affect present conditions. Historical events do not exist and can have no material effectivity in the present. The conditions of existence of present social relations necessarily exist in and are constantly reproduced in the present' (p. 312).

[5]Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 6. Elsewhere Wallerstein argues that 'the full task of a political economy of Africa must start with an analysis of the pre-capitalist modes of production' -- but 'pre-capitalist' in this passage seems to have the same conceptual status as 'feudalism' in

Baran's analysis: it is a largely residual category. Peter Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds., The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa (London: Sage Press, 1975), p. 7.

[6]In this connection, see especially Andre Gunder Frank, 'Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology,' Catalyst, No. 3 (Summer 1967); and Rudolfo Stavenhagen, Social Classes in Agrarian Societies (New York: Anchor Books, 1975).

[7]The answer of Rostow to this question is truly profound, and indicative of evolutionary modernization in general: the genesis of industrial capitalism (or the 'take-off', as Rostow prefers to call it) occurred first in England because 'only in Britain were the necessary and sufficient conditions fulfilled. This combination of necessary and sufficient conditions for a take-off was the result of a convergence of a number of quite independent circumstances, a kind of statistical accident of history.' W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 31. Now compare this with Wallerstein's answer to the same question: 'By a series of accidents -- historical, ecological, geographic -- north-west Europe...emerged as the core area of this world economy...' (op cit., p. 18). For a marxist discussion of the place of European development in world history, see Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: Verso, 1979), esp. pp. 397-431.

[8]In one of his more recent works, Frank has argued that the differential 'degrees' of underdevelopment distributed throughout the third world today are 'very substantially proportional to...degree of colonization in the nineteenth century.' At another point, he suggests that, in turn, these differential 'degrees' of colonization were due, in part, to pre-capitalist resistance encountered by metropolitan power. But if this perspective is to avoid simply transferring a subjectivist problematic from metropolitan capitalism to peripheral precapitalism, it is necessary to investigate the production and power relations which generated not only resistance, but also collaboration and alliances on the part of precapitalist ruling classes in the third world. Frank, Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), pp. 146,162.

[9]The superiority of the concept 'social and economic formation' over that of 'tribe' is argued by Maurice Godelier, Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 63, 93-96.

[10]Only a few nation-states in the contemporary third world continue to be spatially constituted on the basis of a state order established prior to their incorporation into the world economy: Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and Afganistan, for example.

[11]The regional typology of social forms employed here is extremely crude, vastly over-simplifying a very much more complex reality, but in the absence of any received typology to draw on, it will have to suffice for the limited purposes of this study. The best brief overview of the pattern

of development in precolonial Tanzania is Abdul M. Sheriff, 'Tanzanian Societies at the Time of the Partition,' in M.H.Y. Kaniki, ed., Tanzania under Colonial Rule (London: Longman, 1979).

[12]In Tanzania, where the 'development of underdevelopment' school of historiography is particularly strong, the precolonial past has been charged with a symbolic value and political significance beyond what is normal to most peripheral nationalisms. For Nyerere's specific version of 'African socialism' is derived, not from one of the 'actually existing socialisms' elsewhere, but from what he considers to be the characteristic features of 'traditional society': equality, freedom and unity, founded on the principles of the 'extended family' and 'joint ownership of basic property'. These features, in Nyerere's imagination, 'excluded the idea that one member of the extended family could kill or steal from another' and ensured that 'nobody starved, whether of food or human dignity, because he lacked personal wealth'. Nyerere insists that, with few exceptions, African communities were inherently 'democratic' and 'socialistic', and that there never was, prior to colonial conquest, any coercive institutionalized authority; such authority as did exist, he says, was consensual, exercised by the 'first among equals'. Nyerere's official aspiration is to resurrect and reactivate this 'traditional society' in a form appropriate to the modern world; his programme for the future is absolutely untenable without an account of the past travestied by romanticism. Unfortunately, but predictably, many Tanzanian historians have been willing accomplices in the systematic distortion and repression of the country's actual history. For Nyerere's views on precolonial Tanzania, see Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Unity (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), chap. 1, and his 'Introduction' to Freedom and Socialism (London: Oxford University Press, 1968). A summary and critique of trends in Africanist historiography can be found in A. Temu and B. Swai, Historians and Africanist Historiography: A Critique (London: Zed Press, 1981). For radical, but misplaced, defences of nationalist histories, see Renato Constantino, 'Notes on Historical Writing for the Third World,' Journal of Contemporary Asia, No. 3 (1980); and Jean Chesneux, Pasts and Futures, or What is History For? (London: Frank Cass, 1979), where he argues that postcolonial historiography should reflect 'each people's desire to locate itself in historical time and to become fully aware of its most ancient roots as a means of strengthening national cohesiveness and asserting its collective identity' (p. 74).

[13]The origins of whatever 'tribalism' there may have been, or still be, in Tanzania are spelled out in no uncertain terms in Chapter III of this study.

[14]John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 13. This important work, while theoretically eclectic, has been indispensible in writing this study. Indeed, much of this chapter, and parts of the next, should be seen as little more than a second order discourse on Iliffe's definitive study.

[15]For a powerful philosophical counter to idealistic temptations to admire a low level of development in socio-productive power (understood in its widest sense), see Sebastiano Timpanaro, On Materialism (London:

Verso, 1980), esp. pp. 29-54.

[16]Emmanuel Terray, Marxism and 'Primitive' Societies (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972); Claude Meillassoux, 'From Reproduction to Production: A Marxist Approach to Economic Anthropology,' Economy and Society, No. 1 (February 1972); and Pierre Philippe Rey, 'Class Contradictions in Lineage Societies,' Critique of Anthropology, Nos. 13-14 (Summer 1979).

[17]Meillassoux, op cit., p. 100.

[18]Rey, Colonialisme, néo-colonialisme et transition au capitalisme (Paris: Maspero, 1971), p. 210.

[19]Iliffe, op cit., p. 17.

[20]For example, where social and economic formations, like those of the Nyakyusa and Nyamzwezi, were constituted exclusively on the basis of settled agrarian production, men tended to pride themselves on their cultivating expertise.

[21]See Maxine Molyneux's lucid critique of the debate surrounding the 'class' structure of lineage societies: 'Androcentrism in Marxist Anthropology,' Critique of Anthropology, Nos. 9-10 (1977). For theoretical and historical discussions of female subordination in backward social and economic formations such as those considered in this section, see Meillassoux, Maidens, Meal and Money (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Part I; and Maurice Godelier, 'The Origins of Male Domination,' New Left Review, No. 127 (May-June 1981), who notes that even in matrilineal societies, 'in the last instance it is men who occupy the summit of the power hierarchy' (p. 10).

[22]'The sexual division of labour -- is it still necessary to point this out? -- is a "cultural" not a "natural" phenomenon... The only activities that women alone are able to undertake are those of birth and breast feeding... In fact nothing in nature explains the sexual division of labour, nor such institutions as marriage, conjugality or paternal filiation. All are imposed on women by constraint, all are therefore facts of civilization which must be explained, not used as explanations.' Meillassoux, Maidens, Meal and Money, pp. 20-21.

[23]Despite these few remarks, gender -- as a fundamental category of political and historical analysis -- receives little in the way of sustained attention in the present study. At the present time, almost every discussion of the capitalist periphery seems to be profoundly impregnated with the ideological premises of male domination. As a reflective study on already published work, the lack of any systematic treatment of gender relations in analyses of Tanzanian history and society is reflected in the following pages as well. However, the fact that gender relations receive little further attention in this study should not be taken to suggest that somehow, say, colonial conquest or independence brought an end to female subordination. On the contrary, in the highest echelons of the state

apparatus, it is to this day both an acceptable and common practice for males to physically humiliate female subordinates. The 'forms' of women's oppression have been subject to variations in the intervening period, but the 'content' remains the same.

[24]On the Maasai today, see the interesting articles by Hans Hedlund, 'Contradictions in the Peripheralization of a Pastoral Society: The Maasai,' Review of African Political Economy, Nos. 15-16 (May-December 1979), esp. pp. 22-26; and M.L. ole Parkipuny, 'Some Crucial Aspects of the Maasai Predicament,' in Andrew Coulson, ed., African Socialism in Practice: The Tanzanian Experience (London: Spokesman, 1979), esp. pp. 137-141.

[25]In this connection, it should be noted that the contradiction between pastoral communities and settled agriculturalists has been stressed as a determinant element in the genesis of European feudalism: see Georges Duby, The Early Growth of the European Economy (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 117-118; and Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (London: New Left Books, 1974), pp. 107-111.

[26]Jean Bazin provides a fascinating account of the problem of warrior-slaves in his contribution to the essays in Meillassoux, ed., L'esclavage en Afrique précoloniale (Paris: Maspero, 1975), where the phrase 'military mode of production' also appears. Bazin's article has been translated into English as 'War and Servitude in Segou,' Economy and Society, No. 2 (May 1974). The position on slavery present in this study draws largely on Bazin's essay. See also, Meillassoux, 'Historical Modalities of the Exploitation and Over-Exploitation of Labour,' Critique of Anthropology, Nos. 13-14 (Summer 1979), esp. pp. 9-11, where the structural tendencies of slavery to be transformed into feudalism are explored.

[27]For a characteristic example of classification of the Bugandan social formation as 'feudal', see Mahmood Mamdani, Politics and Class Formation in Uganda (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), p. 22. It is employed in the present study only with the necessary qualifications.

[28]Iliffe, op cit., p. 25.

[29]Production for personal need and the close connection between primitive industry and agriculture were the principle features emphasized in Luxemburg's discussion of natural economy, which she -- alone among the classical marxist theoreticans -- insisted could resist capitalist penetration. Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968), esp. pp. 402 ff. For an extended discussion, see Barbara Bradby, 'The Destruction of Natural Economy,' in Harold Wolpe, ed., The Articulation of Modes of Production (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), esp. pp. 93-108.

[30]Eugene Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South (New York: Pantheon Books, 1961), p. 80. Silence on the connection between African and American slavery in this passage is unfortunate, for 'had it not been for the outcome of the process-

es of class formation and class conflict in Africa, the development of Southern society, indeed society throughout the Western hemisphere, might have been very different.' Robert Brenner, 'The Origins of Capitalist Development: a Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism,' New Left Review, No. 104 (July-August 1977), p. 89. It should really be unnecessary to have to point out that without an African mode of production and circulation of servitude, no slaves beyond those seized by European merchant capital would have been made available for sale on the world market.

[31]As the editors of a recent volume on precolonial African history have recently noted: 'The motivating belief here was, ultimately, the simple refutation of racist slanders against African passivity and inertia... That ...precluded the study of another set of issues and problems, most notably those revolving around inequality, conflict, and division within Africa itself.' Donald Crummey and C.C. Stewart, eds., Modes of Production in Africa, The Precolonial Era (London: Sage Publications, 1981), p. 16.

[32]Iliffe, op cit., pp. 73-74. The complexity of the circuit through which slaves passed in the territory was no doubt necessary to the production of the condition of servitude, since the captured individual had to be physically as well as subjectively transformed into a slave. Capture itself was not enough. It was crucial that some sort of radical break be effected with the slave's original point of reference, in order to create an entirely new and servile personality. The cruelty with which slaves were often treated, especially during transport, was simply one phase in this total process of transformation.

[33]The tendency among Africanist historians to see the development of permanent class divisions as a sign of 'African initiative' is evident in several of the essays on specific social and economic formations collected in Andrew Roberts, ed., Tanzania Before 1900 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968). Nevertheless, these essays -- particularly those by Feierman, Redmayne, and Willis -- provide much evidence in support of the arguments advanced in this study.

[34]Basil Davidson, The African Slave Trade: Precolonial History, 1450-1850 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961), p. 169. Like so many others, Davidson manages to avoid any illusion to the African production process which made slaves available to European merchant capital. In fact, slaves had been an important export from East Africa long before the period Davidson discusses. While Europe was struggling through the Dark Ages, 'Lower Iraq under Abbasid rule in the 8th century was the scene of sugar, cotton and indigo plantations.../which/ precisely rested on massive use of African slaves imported from Zanzibar.' Anderson, Lineages..., p. 501.

[35]Neville Chittick, 'The Coast Before the Arrival of the Portuguese,' in B.A. Ogot and J.A. Kieran, eds., Zamani: A Survey of East African History (New York: Humanities Press, 1968), p. 116.

[36]Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974), pp. 327-329.

[37]See F.J. Berg, 'The Coast from the Portuguese Invasion to the Rise of the Zanzibar Sultanate,' in Ogot and Kieran, eds., op cit., pp. 119-136.

[38]'Merchant's capital is originally merely the intervening movement between extremes it does not control and between premises it does not create.' Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), p. 324. The study returns again and again to this feature of the operations of merchant capital.

[39]Deborah Bryceson, 'Changes in Peasant Food Production and Food Supply in Relation to the Historical Development of Commodity Production in Pre-colonial and Colonial Tanganyika,' Journal of Peasant Studies, No. 3 (April 1980), pp. 285-289. Bryceson points out that the so-called 'joking relationship' -- a widely system of 'playful robbery' practiced by members of one community on another -- degenerated into wholesale plunder during this period.

[40]E.A. Alpers, 'The Nineteenth Century: Prelude to Colonialism,' in Ogot and Kieran, eds., op cit., pp. 244-247. Alpers notes that the abolition of the 'external' slave trade 'inadvertently encouraged a final period of unprecedented outrage, during which the value of a human life was pitiably cheapened.' But there was likely nothing 'inadvertent' about it: the magnified scale of slave raiding followed on the fall in world market prices for primary commodities, which in turn was a consequence of the depression which struck world capitalism from 1873 to 1893, bringing to a close what Mandel calls the long wave of capitalist expansion fueled by the 'first technological revolution'. Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1978), pp. 108-146. The landed aristocracy of the Tanzanian coastline may simply have increased deployment of slave labour to offset falling prices on the world market.

[41]The argument that plantation slavery is of a capitalist or quasi-capitalist character continues to be aggressively asserted. Patterson, in a recent and representative discussion, argues that 'the only difference between the slave-master and the capitalist is the fact that the former is either less hypocritical about the labour force he exploits or less self-deluded. The slave variant of capitalism is merely capitalism with its clothes off.' Orlando Patterson, 'Slavery in Human History,' New Left Review, No. 117 (September-October 1979), p. 53. The effect of this type of argument, however, is simply to dissolve the specificity of forms of surplus-extraction into an undifferentiated modality of 'exploitation'. More important, it is surely only a glib abstraction which, in equating slave owner with capitalist, conversely finds no difference between a slave and a modern factory worker.

[42]Braudel notes that 'Muslim merchants enjoyed from earliest times the consideration, at least from their political rulers, which was already forthcoming in Europe. The Prophet himself is said to have said: " The merchant enjoys the felicity both of this world and the next"; "He who makes money pleases God".' Fernand Braudel, Capitalism and Civilisat-

ion, 15th-18th Century, Vol. II: The Wheels of Commerce (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), p. 558. However, the asymmetry of merchant capital's economic and political power under the Zanzibari Sultanate seems to have been a characteristic feature of Islamic rule in general. Rodinson argues that, in the Muslim world, the merchant class, 'conscious as it was of itself, of its strength and value, never achieved political power as a class, even though many of its individual members succeeded in occupying the highest appointments in the State.' Maxime Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 55.

CHAPTER III

THE POLITICAL REGIME OF ACCUMULATION IN COLONIAL TANZANIA

1. Introduction

Over the past two decades the 'Leninist' theory of imperialism has been revived and revised on a massive scale.[1] Lenin's dynamic conception of global capitalist development has seemed to promise theoretical emancipation from the static image of peripheral backwardness registered in radical underdevelopment theory. However, renewed interest in the analytical power of a theory of imperialism has not been accompanied by any consensus as to what 'imperialism' is. At the time of the first world war, the original function of the term in Lenin's own work was clear enough: his 'popular outline' was designed 'to explain the origins of the war and to account for the abandonment of internationalism by the majority of the working classes...'[2] Torn from its specific historical and political anchorage, the 'Leninist' theory of imperialism has since been adrift in a sea of ambiguity. Its most basic propositions have been inverted and displaced; the most important of these for any study of the third world — unaven development — 'by which Lenin referred to the reversal of the relative positions of advanced and backward countries, has come to assume the opposite significance of a widening gulf between such positions.'[3]

The reason for this conceptual inversion can be found in the trajectory of world capitalism since 1945: for the fundamental reality

of international capitalist relations since the second world war has seemed to be, not rivalry among the imperialist metropolises, but 'the development of underdevelopment' in the capitalist periphery. Whereas, within the terms of marxist political economy, imperialism originally referred to a structural tendency of the capitalist mode of production leading to the expansion and collision of capital beyond the territorial matrices of specific metropolitan countries, contemporary discussions of 'actually existing imperialism' largely focus on the domination exercised by the entire bloc of metropolitan countries of the third world. The whole emphasis of interest in the theory of imperialism has, in fact, shifted from the impulses to imperialist strategy in the metropolitan countries 'above', to the determination by imperialism of peripheral capitalism 'below'; simultaneously, the historical subject in discussions of imperialism has been displaced from (finance) capital to metropolitan countries.[4] The predictable result of these displacements has been an infinite extension in the explanatory burden borne by the theory backwards, to encompass the earliest forms of colonial plunder, and forwards, to capture contemporary (and presumably, future) situations of postcolonial 'dependency'. In short, the theory of imperialism has come to embrace within its empirical domain phenomena with vastly different social and historical coordinates; forced to explain too much, it has ended up explaining nothing.

Yet, for all this, the original 'Leninist' theory of imperialism has retained an irreducible core of truth and militancy which continues both to form an obstinate basis for 'anti-imperialist' politics the world over, and to represent an elementary reference point for any 'revisionist'

theoretical tendency. From among its many important and valid insights, there is, for example, one famous sentence in Lenin's essay on imperialism whose pertinence for historical investigation should be evident: ' "general" disquisitions on imperialism,' he wrote, 'which ignore, or put in the background, the fundamental difference between socio-economic formations, inevitably turn into the most vapid banality...'[5] This warning is respected in this chapter in three rather distinct ways, first among which is Lenin's own insistence that 'the colonial policy of previous stages of capitalism is essentially different from the colonial policy of finance capital.'[6] The point could be taken further: for all their common apellation as forms of colonial domination, there is no serious historical unity between the initial plunder of Latin America, which followed on an overseas expansion generated by an internal crisis of Iberian feudalism, and the annexation of African territory, which constituted one aspect in the spatial expansion of monopoly capitalism. Second, and still close to Lenin's intent, is the issue of the differential temporalities of imperialism: the historical times in which the general phases of capitalist development were, so to speak, 'concretized' in different metropolitan social formations.[7] Such differences are important in any historical study of Tanzania, for the country suffered both German and British colonial domination. Although the dates of the two periods are contiguous, they form part of very different times in the respective historical trajectories of the two metropolitan capitalisms.

There is a third and final significance which can be attached to Lenin's warning that research on imperialism must respect 'the fundamental difference between socio-economic formations' -- one which is totally absent

from his own work on imperialism, and plays only on the margins of Rosa Luxemburg's analysis of the historical process of capitalist accumulation: the variant paths of historical development in the periphery prior to imperialist penetration. In history, these precolonial social formations have never simply dissolved and disintegrated before the advance of metropolitan imperialism. On the contrary, capitalist penetration into the periphery everywhere encountered resistance, not only in the sense of armed resistance -- like the Maji Maji uprising which temporarily threw German colonialism in Tanzania into crisis -- but resistance in the very structure and internal solidity of the anterior social organisms penetrated. Such resistance forced a series of 'compromises' on metropolitan capitalism, exercising a negative determination over the field of possible regimes of accumulation which could be established in the colonies as an integral and subordinate element in the imperial accumulation process. No single regime of accumulation was thereby dictated, but several possibilities were necessarily eliminated due to their functional incompatibility with the variegated systems of production capital confronted in the periphery. The result has typically been a colonial history sharply punctuated by violence, and less sharply perhaps, but no less indelibly, stamped by popular struggles and resistance which finally culminated in nationalist movements of varying intensity.

This chapter records the dynamics of Tanzania's insertion into first the German, and then the British, 'imperialist chain'.[8] It argues that the lowly place the territory came to occupy in these systems of empire was, in large part, due to the fact that certain regimes of accumulation were continually being placed beyond the limits of variation imposed

by the changing 'internal' configuration of production and power relations which prevailed throughout the territory. Within these structural limits of variation, however, it was the type of capital -- primarily commercial capital -- deployed from the imperialist metropolis to the territory that led to the selection of a regime of accumulation which was largely unproductive (of surplus-value, in the marxist sense), articulated to the process of metropolitan capitalist accumulation in the sphere of circulation, and absolutely dependent on constant recourse to colonial state power. The consequences of this history in settling the basic class contours of the contemporary Tanzanian social formation, and in shaping the rhythm and modality of its capitalist development, are broached, and then taken up in detail in Chapter IV.

2. Origins of the State Apparatus

The depression, which first struck the world economy in 1873, sent the plantation economy of the Tanzanian coastline on a final annexation of slave labour in the interior, as prices for the primary products it produced fell drastically. On the other side of the world economy, however, the economic effect of the crisis was very much different. In Germany, the aftereffects of the rapid industrialization of the Ruhr and capitalist development of the Rhineland brought a major crisis of accumulation, necessitating a basic reorientation in the economic policy of the Wilhelmine State. A vastly accelerated tendential development towards finance capital eroded the conjunctural autonomy of the German State, compelling an unprecedented state intervention to counteract monopolistic overaccumulation and alleviate a growing crisis of overproduction.[9] Metropolitan generali-

zation of the protective tariff system forced on this conjunctural fusion of economic and politcal power a global perspective, giving birth to an imperialist policy which had three basic objectives:

> (1) to establish the largest possible economic territory;
> (2) to close this territory to foreign competition by a wall of protective tariffs; and consequently (3) to reserve it as an area of exploitation for the national monopolistic combinations. (10)

Glowing accounts of Africa's bounty and relative affluence brought back by European explorers of the time fed capitalist illusions of a final remaining unexploited market with almost unlimited capacity, thus setting German imperialism on a collision course with the backward social and economic formations of the Tanzanian coastline and interior.[11]

In 1884, with the unofficial encouragement of the Wilhelmine State and the fiscal backing of German finance capital, the Society for German Colonization was formed, and its agents sent forth to Africa in search of new economic territory. Early results from East Africa were encouraging: within three weeks the Society had obtained, through a series of 'diplomatic' manoeuvres, twelve treaties with locally dominant aristocracies, and could claim jurisdiction over 140,000 square kilometres of Tanzanian territory. Declared an Imperial 'Protectorate' the following year, political sovereignty and commercial monopoly over the territory were conceded to the newly-established German East Africa Company -- a mercantile syndicate with as many as thirty affiliates. By 1886, the northern borders had been fixed by agreement with Britain, the southern border had been settled with Portuguese Mozambique, and German suzerainty over the coastline had been conceded by the Zanzibari Sultanate. The relative ease with which Tanzania had been annexed evidently caused Bismarck some pleasure; the colony's specific mode of insertion into the

German imperialist chain accorded with his own personal preference that "a merchants' government be formed" in the Imperial protectorates, along the lines of indirect rule pioneered by the British and the Dutch in the East Indies.[12] But while in Germany imperialist euphoria raged over the diplomatic ease with which East African territory had been annexed, in Tanzania locally dominant social forces prepared their response.

The actual arrival of colonial administrative agents in Tanzania and the prospects of a new and strong foreign suzerainty imposing itself on the plantation economy of the coastline, rallied the local landed aristocracy, merchants and sections of the small independent peasantry into an alliance which temporarily succeeded in forcibly expelling the German East Africa Company from the mainland. Although sometimes expressed in such terms by participants,[13] the Abushiri Revolt of 1888-1889 was no anticipatory 'nationalist' reaction to foreign overrule as such; the suzerainty of the Zanzibari Sultanate over the coastline had been tolerated for more than half a century. The decisive cause of the revolt lay elsewhere: for under the reworked ideology of the 'civilizing mission', the imperialist metropolises had agreed to end the utilization of slave labour in the colonies. Bismarck would later remark that:

> Slavery has lasted for thousands of years and in many cases it was not all that bad: hence it would not have done any harm if it had been allowed to continue for another ten or twenty years. (14)

But this archaic representative of the Prussian feudal nobility and reactionary architect of the 'marriage of iron and rye' was undoubtedly aware of the political and economic obstacles plantation slavery in the new colony posed to finance capital in Germany and its mercantile agent in East Africa. Economically, the continuation of plantation slavery, with

its characteristically limited division of labour and minimal generation of effective demand, would have prematurely limited any possibility of developing the colony into a foreign market for German industrial capital; politically, it would have left the local landed aristocracy with an independent power base from which it could challenge the political and commercial monopoly of the German East African Company. In the face of this contradiction, the impossibility of "a merchants' government" revealed itself early. The stubborn resistance of the coastline compelled the armed intervention of German metropolitan state power; funds to 'suppress the slave trade and to protect German interests in East Africa' were obtained from the Reichstag, and a mercenary force was recruited and dispatched to Tanzania to suppress the uprising.[15] The solidity and internal structure of the territory's most advanced social and economic formation thus forced a first set of 'compromises' on German imperialism: under the terms of the peace, plantation slavery could continue in the colony, but its expansion would be halted, while the local landed aristocracy and merchants were incorporated, rather than eliminated, as a subordinate element in the colonial power constellation which issued from the uprising.[16]

The Abushiri Revolt inaugurated a whole sequence of popular resistance and class alliances in the interior of the territory, which were to form part of the price for German political and commercial monopoly within the colony. With the coastline finally pacified, colonial administrative agents attempted to secure control over the traditional trade routes which were thought to lead to a vast Central African market, thus precipitating a new period of rebellion and civil war which was to last a

decade. The basic pattern behind the different reactions of the territory's variegated social and economic formations to colonial penetration can be summarized into a set of brief formulas. Where coercive class power was still underdeveloped or non-existent, popular struggles against the encroachment of colonial authority often erupted. Where institutionalized political power was already unstable due to factional struggles within and between locally dominant lineages, colonial intrusion tended to fan latent rivalries into civil wars. And where powerful predatory aristocracies bordered one another, or plundered surrounding communities of natural economy, colonial authority typically found the weaker to be potent allies against the stronger and more recalcitrant. In short, wherever the extension of colonial authority posed a threat to the reproduction of locally dominant classes, it was resisted; and wherever it promised a new or expanded basis of reproduction, it met with varying degrees of passive and active acquiescence. But in every case it was the fact of simple German superiority in the means of warfare which finally sealed the fate of the territory. By 1898, a full twelve years after its borders had been diplomatically settled, Tanzania had been militarily subjugated and annexed.[17]

The impact of this military subjugation was soon felt on the already low level of development of socio-productive power which prevailed throughout the territory. The precarious balance between nature and Tanzania's backward social and economic formations was shattered by this final invasion of the nineteenth century, which brought with it a successive chain of epidemics from outside East African history and experience. Smallpox and dysentry took as many as 150,000 victims, weakening and reducing communities already diminished by the destruction of war. Lands

which had once supported settled agricultural production were depopulated and abandoned to tse-tse, as outbreaks of pestilence became endemic in many areas: swarms of locusts and sand fleas devastated crops, while rinderpest plagues claimed ninety percent of the livestock in many regions of the interior. The ecological collapse, compounded by German plunder of accumulated provisions in the communities through which its mercenary force passed, led to an inevitable and catastrophic famine of a scale previously unknown in the territory.[18]

The general effect of the colonial conquest was thus to retard the development of the forces of production and the process of state formation in the interior, while leaving unmodified the social relations of production within whose framework socio-productive and political power had been exercised. The tendential development of a slave mode of production, for example, was checked by German prohibitions on the production and circulation of slaves, but the institution of servitude itself remained intact. Recalcitrant aristocracies were deposed and their armed retinues demilitarized, but aristocratic power itself was preserved and in many cases stabilized, as its material basis of support slid from control over inland trade routes to alliance with, and dependence on, the repressive power of German colonialism.

In those social and economic formations which knew no prior institutionalized authority, or those which had succumbed to civil wars leaving a power vacuum, the colonial administration installed local petty tyrants for the express purpose of managing an oppressive tax system, designed to sustain an expanding state apparatus and to provide conscripts for colonial infrastructural projects. The sounds of an imminent popular rebellion

could be heard throughout the colony: of their newly installed tyrant, it was said among the Shambaa, 'Where once a lion sat, there is now a pig.'[19] Operating in an ideological void which indigenously generated dominant classes had never had to contend with, these petty tyrants were the local crystallization of a conspicuously foreign system of oppression whose weight fell massively on the direct producers. For German consolidation of the territory under the command of a coercive central authority was financed by the most crude and elementary forms of tribute: the simple extortion of labour and surplus from the conquered communities beneath it. Such a system, superimposed on subject populations with a vast numerical superiority, inevitably led to a new wave of popular rebellions.

While the real political control of the colonial administration was never to be spatially uniform, consolidation of state order throughout Tanzania was essentially complete by the turn of the century. But although in the central and western zones of the territory, the vast space made German plunder difficult and avoidance of colonial authority possible, on the coast and in the south of the country, the exploitation of the subjugated agricultural population became ever more marked. As the extortion of tribute in the form of taxes and conscripted labour were instituted, consumption fell to the level of subsistence. This relentless coercion of the agricultural population set off a vast rural insurrection in 1905 which was to be the final act of collective resistance to colonial conquest. Led by a diviner who preached popular unity and claimed possession of a medicine (the 'maji', from which the insurrection took its name) stronger than German weaponry, a composite popular force, drawn initially from the southern zone of the territory, attempted to arouse surrounding communities

against the imposition of foreign overrule. Plantations, military installations, trading posts and local petty tyrants became the immediate objects of an unmitigated popular outrage. The extreme social peril the spreading insurrection posed to German colonial authority can be gauged from the Wilhelmine State's reaction to it: although requests for more troops were refused for fear of further strengthening the legislative power of the Reichstag, naval detachments in the Pacific were ordered to the Tanzanian coastline. Unable to suppress the uprising militarily, due to the sheer numerical superiority of the insurrectionary forces, the colonial adminstration decided on a brutal 'scorched earth' campaign, inducing a new famine which was to leave another 300,000 Africans dead.[20] The Maji Maji Rebellion thus ended as it began: in a common and implacable repression of the population.

Culminating two decades of sporadic resistance to colonial conquest, the Maji Maji Rebellion nevertheless served as sufficient warning of possible insurrections to come if the colonial regime of accumulation was not somehow shifted from crude and obvious plunder to a more subtle and regulated system of surplus-extraction.[21] Indeed, after 1906 German colonialism underwent a significant transformation, as state power was now deployed in a more systematic exploitation of the territory. Levying of taxation and forced labour continued, but these came to be increasingly supplanted in economic importance by the fixation of agricultural prices coupled with the imposition of stern crop regulations and directives on the agricultural population. Nevertheless, these alterations in the regime of accumulation continued to require the direct exercise of coercive class power -- initially embodied in a small mercenary force dispatched

from the imperialist metropolis, but now increasingly institutionalised in an expanding state apparatus.

As its strategic objectives extended from simple military subjugation to regulation of a more complex system of surplus-extraction, the structural congruence of this State increasingly came to derive, not from the imperialist metropolis from which it had originally been deployed, but from the conglomerate character of the social and economic formations over which its domination was exercised. In the colonial period, of course, there would never be any question as to whose socio-economic interests this apparatus principally and permanently responded: metropolitan capital. But in Tanzania the rule of capital could only be secured through a fusion of class power and state power, the repercussions of which would be felt long after the last colonial administrators had departed from the country. For, on the one hand, unlike the countries of 'original' capitalism, the drama of capitalist development in Tanzania would witness no historical differentiation of class power and state power; on the other hand, the opening act of that drama had been exactly the same: capital had entered the stage 'dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt.'[22]

3. The Colonial Regime of Accumulation

In his essay on imperialism, Lenin wrote that finance capital 'finds most "convenient", and derives the greatest profit from, a form of subjection which involves the loss of political independence of the subjected countries and peoples.'[23] Yet his own statistics, as he conceded, indicated that German finance capital overwhelmingly invested, not in those

colonies over which its rule had been politically secured, but in other metropolitan capitalist countries.[24] The solution to this paradox lies in the very terms in which Lenin originally differentiated the imperialism of prior historical epochs and previous phases of capitalist development, from the imperialism of finance capital -- 'whose domination,' he insisted, 'is based on the exploitation of wage-labourers.'[25] It is thus no accident that German finance capital expanded into other capitalist countries rather than into its overseas colonies, for in Tanzania the wage-relation did not exist; it had to be 'produced'. Hilferding had pinpointed the limited potential the colonial periphery held for finance capital, and for capitalist development generally, in precisely these terms:

> The speed with which colonies and new markets are opened up today depends essentially upon their capacity to serve as outlets for capital investment. This capacity is all the greater the richer the colony is in products which can be produced by capitalist methods, have an assured sale on the world market, and are important to industry in the home market... The obstacle to opening up a new country is not the lack of indigenous capital, since this is eliminated by the import of capital, but in most cases quite another disruptive factor; namely, the shortage of 'free', that is to say wage, labour. (26)

From the moment the colonial conquest of Tanzania was secured, German capital was to be confronted with the permanent structural problem of 'producing' labour-power and forcing its insertion into commodity production.[27] A military-bureaucratic apparatus of coercion proved to be an equally permanent, objective necessity for the production of a class of wage-labourers in Tanzania; only on the basis of a fusion of class power and state power could German finance capital derive any economic benefit from the military annexation of the territory. The 'convenience' and 'profitability' of direct colonial domination, to which Lenin referred,

were mere illusions.[28]

In fact, by the turn of the century, the colonial economy had already begun to reveal the limits to its potential as new economic territory for finance capital. By 1901, investment in capitalist mining and plantation enterprises totaled 169,000 pounds, but returns amounted to only 13,650 pounds, while settler estates had met with repeated difficulties -- their common complaint: a shortage of labour-power.[29] The mere presence of capital in the colony, and the prospect of wage employment it posited, was not enough to induce a transfer of labour from the 'traditional' to the 'modern' sector, as long as the agricultural population retained possession of means of subsistence. Only in those areas where the presence of capitalist enterprises fuelled local 'class' struggles within lineages were labour shortages less severe, as juniors responded to the opportunity afforded by wage employment in order to escape the oppressive obligation of working in the households of their elders.[30] A more accurate index of the general difficulty in attracting labour to capitalist enterprises is the fantastic amounts (frequently exceeding total wage bills) which were spent to recruit, transport and distribute contract labour to the mines and plantations at the lowest possible wage rates and for periods rarely exceeding two years.[31] The specific mechanisms of this labour recruitment were described by one colonial administrator in the following manner:

> In Tabora we found that...recruitment officials had burned down entire villages and had taken men to the Coast in chains in order to supply labour for the Usambara plantations and collect their commissions from the same. (32)

Where 'private' coercion was unnecessary, the precondition for such recruitment was the prior intervention of the coercive power of the colonial state

apparatus in the reproductive cycles of natural economy. For as long as the agricultural population retained direct access to the means of subsistence, it was under no 'economic compulsion' to exchange the relative security of natural economy for the uncertainties and discipline of capitalist production.

The means the colonial State used to interrupt the reproductive cycles of natural economy were many and varied; only one was precluded by prior historical development: expropriation. In Tanzania there was no powerful feudal nobility which could expel the agricultural population from the land and thereby create the essential precondition for capitalist production. Wholesale expropriation by the colonial state power, in the absence of a feudal nobility, was therefore out of the question. The balance of social forces in the colony -- never more than 3000 colonial administrators and settlers to 6 or 7 million Africans -- forbade it. The alternative adopted in 1898 was a system of taxation, designed to artificially raise the costs of reproduction and so rupture the self-sufficiency of natural economy. Yielding little revenue after deductions for local expenditures had been made, taxation systems were instituted throughout East Africa by various ordinances which explicitly referred to shortages of labour as their justification and explanation:

> We consider that taxation is the only possible method of compelling the native to leave his reserve for the purposes of seeking work. Only in this way can the cost of living be increased for the native... (33)

However, while tax-systems of the sort instituted in Tanzania were clearly intended to produce capitalist 'effects', within the framework of the existing relations of production, tax levies amounted to the imposition of a quasi-feudal land rent, payable in cash or labour services, which

struck an agricultural population already reduced to bare subsistence by the ravages of war and ecological collapse.

Nevertheless, taxation by itself proved to be an ineffective technology for producing labour-power in Tanzania, because it could not overcome a fundamental obstacle whose elimination was essential for development of the wage-relation: due to a relatively low population density, further reduced by the warfare, epidemics and famines which accompanied colonial conquest, a relative abundance of 'free' land existed in the territory. While in some areas, the agricultural population defiantly stood its ground, necessitating the periodic deployment of armed force by the colonial adminstration to collect taxes, in many others the most typical form of resistance was flight, as regions penetrated by German authority were simply abandoned for uninhabited space elsewhere. By 1906, the efforts of the colonial state apparatus to produce the wage-relation had largely failed, broken by the resistance and mobility of the agricultural population.

Only one sector of the colonial regime of accumulation remained intransigent: the settler estate's which supported the most reactionary element of German, and later British, colonialism. A product of the terrritorial expansion of the declassé and petty bourgeois rejects of Prussian agrarian capitalization, German settlers in Tanzania attempted to recreate the feudal system of exploitation that had forced their expulsion form the metropolis. Between 1904 and 1913 the settler community grew fourfold, at a rate comparable to neighbouring Kenya. In relation to the colonial regime of accumulation as a whole, however, 'the settler community constituted a dead weight -- if not a parasitic and harmful

element. A competitive and anarchic sector, existing at the margins of dirigism and planning of the trusts, controlling only a small portion of the economy and consequently little aware of the imperatives of the whole, greedy for immediate profit, a great waster of manpower and resources,'[34] the settler community exercised a local political power totally out of proportion to their economic consequence. Typically allocated a 'feudal' fief of 200 hectares in the fertile zones of the northeast, the settlers claimed labour services from the surrounding agricultural population, which was thereby reduced to villeinage. Since the settler estates had access to both 'free' land and 'free' labour, they were under no compulsion to combine these with investment in new techniques, which alone would have laid the basis for agricultural transformation; 'free' land and 'free' labour provided, in short, no incentive to opt for a capitalization of productive processes. Subject to continuous coercion, the semi-serfdom of the local population was the sole basis of whatever prosperity the settler estates enjoyed.

The labour services which the settler estates claimed would, of course, have been inconceivable without support from the coercive power of the colonial state apparatus. In addition to expropriating the most fertile lands in the northeast to make way for the settler community, the colonial adminstration passed and enforced successive ordinances which eventually stipulated that the local population must work on settler estates at fixed nominal wage rates for periods of no less than one in every four months, or face conscription as upaid labour on public infrastructural projects.[35] The colonial adminstration even attempted at one point to constitute itself as a major 'feudal' proprietor, in a cotton scheme imposed

on the agricultural population of the southeast in 1901, which required adults to work a 'communal' demesne 28 days out of the year. However, in the absence of any locally dominant classes through which this 'state feudalism' could be mediated, the cotton scheme proved to be a dismal economic failure, while politically it served as a catalyst for the Maji Maji Rebellion. Locally dominant classes allied to, and dependent on, German colonial state power were thereafter to play an important part in the day-to-day administration of the regime of accumulation.

The most successful attempt at surplus-extraction on the basis of a class alliance between the colonial state power and local petty tyrants proved to be in the northwest, where the tendential development of a feudal aristocracy had been fixed prior to colonial conquest. Since coffee had been produced and consumed as a traditional ritual item, it took relatively little effort to enlist local landlords in commercializing the crop. The result was a reinforcement and expansion of feudalism in the area, which was not to be reversed until after independence.

At the other end of the territory, however, German attempts to stabilize the Arab plantation economy, and integrate its production into the colonial regime of accumulation, proved futile. Conditioned by a century of production on the basis of servitude, the landed aristocracy of the coastline was simply unable to recover from the abrupt abolition of the slave trade on which it had come to depend. With the alternative option of slave breeding pre-empted by carefully orchestrated colonial state ordinances on servitude, the decline of the Arab plantation economy moved in rhythm to the steady diminution of its 'means of production'. Despite attempts to stabilize a slave labour force, estimated to number

165,000 as late as 1912, by assisting in the recovery of fugitive slaves, the colonial State could offer no lasting salvation for the archaic system of production on which the plantation economy had come to rest. The cumulative result of the failure of one coercive system of surplus-extraction after another, culminating in the Maji Maji Rebellion, brought a major reorientation in colonial state policy whose net effect was to be the creation of the contemporary Tanzanian peasantry.[36]

After two decades of constant struggle against the natural economies which supported the territory's agrarian population, a rapidly declining rate of surplus-extraction finally revealed the limits to the tributary basis on which the initial colonial regime of accumulation had been constructed. Repeated commercial failures and the inability of the plantation and mining sectors to attract an adequate supply of cheap labour-power had warded off extensive private capital investment in the colony. Having consistently justified the imperial venture into Africa on the grounds that colonies there would reduce German dependence on other metropolitan countries for raw materials, the colonial administration increasingly came to assume direct responsibility for the regulation of a regime of accumulation whose function in the German imperialist chain would be maximum extraction of primary produce by the cheapest means for the strategic and industrial requirements of the Wilhelmine State and finance capital.[37] However, faced with a sullen and quiescent agricultural population after the suppression of the Maji Maji Rebellion, the colonial administration was forced to concede that the continual exercise of naked extra-economic coercion promised only future rebellions:

> In order to guard against risings of any kind in future more attention must be paid than has hitherto been done to see that

> as far as possible only such demands shall be made on the Native as shall result in benefit to himself and to the general welfare, the utility whereof is recognized by the Native himself. (38)

After successive and costly attempts to rupture and plunder the largely subsistence economy of Tanzania's agricultural population, the colonial administration finally decided to restructure and integrate that production into a more regulated and systematic regime of accumulation.

While the settler estates and plantations were stagnating due to an absence of any technological dynamic and chronic labour shortages, far-reaching changes were occurring in the rural natural economies which presaged the transformation of the territory's agricultural population into a peasantry. Under the impact of the initial colonial reign of terror, with its attendant warfare, epidemics and famines, the communal unity of the social and economic formations along the coast and in many parts of the interior had disintegrated, inducing a process of morcellation in the typical social unit of production. As simple reproduction became increasingly difficult, communities tended to divide into nucleated households supported by small plots of land. The colonial tax system, now including both Hut and Poll levies, reinforced this tendency towards morcellation of the basic socio-productive unit in the rural economy, while significantly reducing the impulses to collective resistance which the levy of tribute on whole villages and communities had produced. By increasing the cost of subsistence through the imposition of personal and family taxes, the colonial administration was able to successfully, if only partially, interrupt the autonomous reproductive cycle of household production; for, with the cost of subsistence thus raised, the household was compelled to 'produce' either labour-power or surplus crops to meet

the artificially expanded needs of reproduction.[39]

Furthermore, through a selective programme of infrastructural development, the colonial administration was able to indirectly determine which regions of the territory would specialize primarily in the production of labour-power, for in the absence of a marketing network surplus crop production was placed beyond the limits of household economic calculation. In this way, colonial policy aggravated the uneven spatial development of the territory already evident in the precolonial period. Following on the ecological collapse of the 1880's, which led to the depopulation of some areas, the effect -- if not the purpose -- of this programme of selective infrastructural investment was to leave some areas of the territory as labour reserves, while opening up others to agrarian commodity production. The coercive mechanisms through which this regional specialization was imposed would soon lead to a solidification of a new social division of the territory, whose consequences would be felt far into the future.[40]

The advantages of this new regime of accumulation for the colonial state apparatus, and the German finance capital which commanded it, became clear when the settler community mobilized against it. Neither willing nor able to submit to the economic rationality of capitalist production and competition, the settler estates — already angry with the monopoly marketing network operated by German mercantile syndicates — were absolutely unwilling to tolerate any competition from African cultivators. But when the settlers complained, 'We don't need black capitalists, we need black workers,' the colonial administration responded unequivocally:

> the supply of raw materials to Germany...is the object [of colonial policy], ...and whether it is achieved through plantation

agriculture or Native cultivation is a secondary consideration. (41) A widening divergence thereafter developed between the settler community and the colonial state apparatus, which came more and more to favour African cash crop production. This reorientation in the colonial regime of accumulation did not, of course, entail any reduction in the economic benefit that German capital derived from the territory. On the contrary, precisely because it enveloped the entire agricultural population touched by German authority, and yet required minimal coercion, investment and managerial intervention in the production processes of the rural economy, it led to an overall increase in the value and mass of surplus extracted from the colony. The result of the last decade of German colonial administration over Tanzania was thus the emergence and eventual dominance of an agrarian peasantry.

4. The Alloy of Class Power and State Power

The subsequent insertion of Tanzania into the British imperialist chain, under a League of Nations mandate after the first world war, would bring no major alterations in the colonial regime of accumulation established during the last decade of German rule. For, whereas the territory had been one of the first and most important possessions seized by German capitalism in rapid ascent, Tanzania was to be the last colony passively received by an English capitalism already in slow decline -- long after the most conscious and belligerent phase of British imperialism had run its course. The new colony thus paradoxically represented a relative superfluity for an over-extended English finance capital, and an expanded basis of reproduction for an archaically patrician English imperial State

and the caste of 'gentlemen civil servants' it had traditionally supported. If German colonial administration had been sadistically cruel, dispensing 64,652 sentences of corporal punishment between 1901 and 1913 alone, British colonial administration was to be supremely paternalistic, smothering the colony with its national and institutional egotism, its cult and culture of deference and authority. To the German regime of accumulation this new administrative mafia could impart no dynamic, only that stagnant solidity which is inscribed in all English institutions and bureaucratic procedures. The chief legacy of German colonialism to the Tanzanian social formation had been the basic shifts in the structure of its relations of production; Britain's would be a political superstructure and ideological universe which cemented those production relations into a new historical bloc.

The first decade of Britain's 'indirect rule' over the territory centred precisely on remoulding and polishing the crude machinery of class domination through which German colonial state power had been exercised. For while German authority had always been tenuous, particularly in remote areas of Tanzania, whatever political and economic unity it had imposed on the colony largely disintegrated as the first world war expanded into East Africa; the first task of the new British administration was therefore the re-establishment of colonial state order throughout the territory.

The major innovation in the colonial state apparatus in these years was the institution of 'Native Authority': the removal of those petty tyrants installed by German authority and enlisted in its war effort, and the return of local power to a mystical 'traditional' authority which had, in many areas, either never existed or long since ceased to exist.

Although there were many changes in personnel, in practice there was considerable continuity between this new system of 'indirect rule' and the previous system of 'direct rule', as British administrators scoured the countryside in search of village headmen and chiefs, creating such positions where none could be found, and staffing these with individuals whom one district officer described as 'the imbecile, the leper, the syphillitic, ex-convicts, ex-rickshaw boys, ex-domestic servants and so on.'[42]

The real significance of the Native Authority ordinance, however, lay not with the changes in personnel it brought to the localized system of petty tyrannies installed by German colonialism, but with the alteration it brought to that system's economic basis of reproduction. The British colonial administration granted Native Authority extensive powers, chief among which were revenue collection, from which their salaries were drawn on a percentage basis, responsibility for local marketing arrangements, and differential access to new productive techniques and education which would eventually lead to positions in the colonial state administration itself. With this transformation in the economic basis of local power -- from tributary to salaried and other forms of more 'modern' remuneration -- the Native Authority ordinance thus closed the history of precolonial ruling class formation, while opening another for its progeny.

In terms of recent marxist analyses of the dual functions of the capitalist State -- to disorganize the proletariat and organize the bourgeoisie -- the incorporation of Native Authority as a subordinate element in the functioning of the British colonial state apparatus could be interpreted as an attempt to integrate a potentially significant

stratum of Tanzanian society into a new colonial 'power bloc'.[43] Of more passing interest, within these terms, was the attempt by British colonialism to 'disorganize' the rural population through the invention and introduction of a new social unit, from outside Tanzanian history, over which Native Authority would be exercised: the 'tribe'. That the tribalization of African consciousness was in large part a product of a deliberate British campaign targeted at the threat posed to colonial domination by a Pan-African movement after the first world war is beyond question; as early as 1917, the governor of East Africa had proposed that a

> definite policy of encouraging strong and isolated tribal nationalism may be one of the most effective barriers against a Pan-African upheaval. (44)

However, whatever successes it may have enjoyed elsewhere, the attempt to address popular consciousness in terms of tribalism was never to gain a significant Tanzanian audience because it no longer corresponded to any objective social boundaries. The numerous social and economic formations which could be found throughout the territory on the eve of the colonial conquest had been subjected to a long and slow process of disintegration in collective identity and morcellation of the typical social unit of production. By the time British colonial state order had been secured, Tanzania had become, under the recurrent impacts of epidemics and warfare, a <u>singular social formation</u>, overwhelmingly composed of a small-holding agrarian peasantry, whose only real unity lay in the colonial state power which had been imposed on it and exercised over it. The stratification of this society lay in the future, not in the past.

The advent of British colonial domination thus brought no major alterations in the basic social boundaries laid down during the last

decade of German rule. Under the terms of its mandate, Tanzania was to be an 'African country', whose place within the British imperialist chain would never extend beyond functioning as a reserve of raw materials. British capital benefited most from the plantation sector of the Tanzanian economy, on which colonial state policy was primarily concentrated. But these European agricultural complexes were in only a restricted sense genuine capitalist enterprises, for while their production was consciously oriented towards metropolitan markets and they employed wage-labour proper, the labour processses employed lacked any technological dynamic and were sustained by continual coercion of the direct producers.[45] The plantation sector, nevertheless, remained the most productive element in the colonial regime of accumulation. There was no massive expansion of settler estates under British rule, nor would the settler community ever succeed in decisively influencing colonial state policy; and, while British colonialism would bring a vast immigration of Asian merchants into the territory, their commercial dominance in the countryside had already been consolidated before the first world war.[46]

Under a regime of accumulation commanded locally by merchant capital, productive industrial capital proper was held within a constricted space limited to construction of an economic infrastructure of roads, ports and railways, servicing the commercial economy, and only later extended to some minor processing enterprises. The incorporation of Tanzania as a subordinate economic space into an East African Common Market dominated by Kenya both determined, and was determined by, the continuation of this pattern: competition from more established and secure British colonies, with lower costs of production, coupled with the general

contraction of metropolitan 'investment' imperialism, starved the territory of productive capitalist investment. Even capital accumulated locally tended to find its way outside Tanzania, paralyzing the process of internal proletarianization and urban development, while sapping and halting a rural economy already confined within very rigid social and technical limits.[47]

But it was primarily the rural economy, rather than the settler, commercial or negligible industrial sectors, which posed impassable social obstacles to capitalist productive progress in the territory. For the relations of production predominant throughout the countryside were defined by the stubborn unity of the agricultural population with the land, which could not be broken within an economic framework dominated by merchant capital. Peasant household production impeded the total separation of the direct producers from the means of production -- which has historically been the precondition of the capitalist mode of production proper -- determining the limited extent to which capitalist productive processes would be possible, and profitable. Nor could the simple presence of merchant capital in the rural economy by itself induce any transformation in peasant household production: the uncertainties of the harvest, instability of prices and other related vagaries of the market for agricultural produce, combined to place dependence on the market outside the boundaries of social rationality in the rural economy. Peasant household production was instead oriented towards subsistence, deploying crude means of production, as far as possible, to produce the full range of basic necessities, while marketing only physical surpluses.

The consequence could only be a regime of accumulation based

on the redistribution, rather than creation, of surplus, thus limiting the development of the social division of labour and precluding any thorough specialization of productive units, systematic reinvestment of surpluses or regular technological innovation. In such circumstances, it was impossible for metropolitan capital to control either the quality or quantity of agricultural surpluses without recourse to extra-economic coercion. A fusion of class power and state power thus continued to be a distinguishing and constitutive feature of the regime of accumulation maintained throughout the territory right down to the moment of independence, and after.

Since the operational sphere of merchant capital -- both in the form of the small Asian trader and the giant European commercial syndicates -- was essentially external to the agrarian economy, it was primarily through the Native Authority that the colonial state power made its managerial intervention into the reproductive cycle of peasant household production. In conjunction with an 'agricultural extension service' which policed the countryside, the Native Authorities ensured a moderate flow of surplus from the peasant household to metropolitan capital through the familiar mechanisms of taxation, extensive crop regulations and unequal exchange.[48] But while these local petty tyrants performed extensive administrative and policing functions for the colonial State in their localities, receiving large salaries in return, this hardly exhausted the basis of their reproduction. For, in addition to the salaries they drew in exchange for administrative services, the Native Authorities continued to command relatively large landholdings and tributary labour from the agricultural population beneath them. Moreover, they received substantial 'indirect' benefits from their privileged position within the colonial regime of accumulation, which included the

use of surplus local tax revenues as a source of revolving personal credit, responsibility for and frequently control over local marketing cooperatives, in addition to control over the 'diffusion' of new productive technologies introduced by the colonial administration (which, more often than not, tended to be concentrated and monopolized in Native Authority hands).[49] Although rather modest in comparison to that of the European and Asian communities, the wealth and privileges of the Native Authorities -- an obvious product of their collaboration with the colonial State -- would be a constant source of resentment among the peasantry, which the nationalist movement would later be forced to articulate.

But it was not so much these very material privileges of the Native Authorities which were to be of fundamental significance in the class stratification of the Tanzanian social formation as another, more subtle process: for the progeny of the Native Authorities obtained preferential access to the religious and cultural apparatuses of the colonial State, and it was precisely on these children that the missionaries and colonial administrators concentrated their ideological narrative and enjoyed their greatest success -- thus producing Tanzania's first modern 'organic' intelligentsia.[50] Within an economic framework in which local African accumulation of the means of production was subject to strict limitations, a monopoly of technico-administrative and educational 'capital' radically differentiated this intelligentsia from the toiling masses 'below' it; yet within the racial structures of English colonialism, colour inherently separated this educated stratum from the European and Asian communities 'above' it. More importantly, within a 'political' regime of accumulation which fused class power and state power, this organic intelligentsia, along with a small group of

African traders and farmers which matured with it, found it impossible to thrive outside the ambit of the colonial state apparatus: positions in the lower levels of the administrative and other branches of the colonial State became the major occupational refuge for the one, while dependence on the colonial state power marked every step in the advance of the other. Together these two strata formed Tanzania's first modern African organization, which would eventually spearhead the nationalist movement and evolve into the country's current ruling party.

Founded in the late 1920s, the African Association could be said to have represented the subsequent nationalist movement in its embryonic, 'pre-political' phase of development.[51] Its social composition has already been indicated: indeed, the Association's steep membership fees and annual dues deliberately and effectively excluded other sectors of the African population. Inspired by, and modeled on, similar organizations of the European and Asian communities, the very existence of an 'African' association reflected the contradictions generated by the racial structure of English colonialism. Yet the subjectivity of the membership was nevertheless profoundly impregnated by British processes of selective ideological indoctrination: contemptuous of the uneducated African masses, the Association's members regarded themselves as the natural leaders of a backward and incorrigible Africa which had to be forcibly compelled to adopt 'modern' norms of rationality and behavior; jealous of the Asian community, they asked for higher salaries and access to middle level positions in state and productive apparatuses monopolized by Asians, on the grounds that it was they who were the 'vanguard' of civilization in Africa; overawed by the European community, they begged the colonial administration for official sponsorship, and police

surveillance of their activities in one town would report that 'The Association...is a dance club which meets about once a week and the members endeavor to ape European methods of dancing and dressing.'[52] The organizational structure of the African Association paralleled this cultural mimicry, and bore the stamp of the English colonialism which had fostered it: conditioned by their role in the colonial social division of labour, the membership amused itself with elaborate bureaucratic procedures, and organized itself into a rigid hierarchy strictly governed by rank and deference. On this narrowly elitist, corporatist and racialist basis -- aimed at narrowing the gulf separating the membership from their European and Asian counterparts, and widening the distance which stood between them and the African masses -- was formed the advanced guard of the nationalist movement.

But it was only after the second world war, when decolonization had already been placed on the agenda of the English imperial State, that this embryonic nationalist movement slid into a 'political intra-uterine' phase of development. In the 1950s, the African Association re-formed as the Tanganyika Africa National Union (TANU) with an explicitly political programme, under the leadership of Julius Nyerere. The child of a petty Native Authority, educated first by Catholic missionaries and later at the colonial government school and University of Edinburgh, one-time colonial civil servant, a teacher by profession, solidly entrenched now for over twenty years as president of an independent Tanzania -- in Nyerere's personal history can be read the truth of 'Tanzanian socialism': his individual career personifies that of the country's current ruling class as a whole, and symbolizes its continuity with those who collaborated with, and benefited from, British colonialism. But generational distance faded the connection between TANU's leadership and the Native Authority which had -- literally,

in many cases -- spawned it, and the former was able to claim autonomy from the system of colonial domination, presenting itself as an 'oppositional' force which represented the general interests of the African population as a whole.

Under Nyerere's direction, TANU thus moved rapidly from a 'minimalist' programme, which advocated the extension of the suffrage to wealthy and well-educated Africans, to a 'maximalist' programme that demanded immediate home rule. The minimum programme had been clearly and narrowly corporatist, as educated wealthy Africans and TANU's leadership were largely co-extensive; but the maximum programme was only subtly less so, since in a society with only 150 college graduates there could be little doubt as to who would operate the state machinery in an independent Tanzania. Moreover, the decisive impulses behind the transition from minimum to maximum programmes came not from 'inside' TANU, but from 'outside': for the 1950s were a decade of intense effort by the colonial administration to transform the territory's agrarian economy -- through successive attempts at expanding the settler estate sector, promoting capitalist agribusiness, and increasing the regulation of peasant household production -- and to prepare the political field for an 'orderly' decolonization by officially sponsoring, not TANU, but a European-financed United Tanganyika Party.[53] In danger of political marginalization, TANU necessarily, progressively and successfully expanded its positions, membership and programme to capture the most basic interests of the toiling masses it had originally viewed with contempt.

However, even in this 'political extra-uterine' phase of development, the nationalist leadership continued to bear the stamp of English cultural hegemony. In organizational structure, TANU rapidly became a

centralized political machine, consciously modeled on the British Conservative Party, while in ideological orientation it was heavily influenced by the unprincipled yet pragmatic, populist yet elitist, incompetent yet technicist, conception of social engineering pioneered by British Labourism.[54] Mixing sentimental references to a mythical past with ethical denunciations of a racial present into an emotional commitment to a 'socialist' future, TANU managed to produce a more or less nationally unified moral crusade, which the repressive apparatus of the British colonial State declined to crush. For, in the final analysis, Tanzania had been an administrative burden, in which metropolitan capital had shown little interest and from which it had derived little profit. The English imperial State prepared to abandon the colony in disgust.

5. Conclusion

The central peculiarity of the Tanzanian social formation at the time of independence was the markedly limited capitalization of the relations of production in the territory. Peasant household production -- extensively regulated by the colonial state power to produce both commercial crops and seasonal labour-power -- continued to occupy almost ninety percent of total cultivated land, and to provide minimum subsistence and social security for an equal percentage of the African population. Yet, in comparison to the overwhelming weight of the peasantry in the country's social structure, the dominant sector of the Tanzanian economy at independence was capitalist production proper: in agriculture alone, the settler estates and plantations accounted for some forty percent of monetary agrarian output by value -- an index of its superior productivity and surplus-generating capacity, despite

the continued reliance on extra-economic coercion. Nevertheless, it is the extreme backwardness of the Tanzanian economy as a whole which is most striking in any comparative perspective: the index of commercialization in agriculture remained low, manufactures were still few and rudimentary, and a natural economy continued to prevail over large areas of the country.

The consequences of this combined and uneven development would be felt long after the last colonial administration had departed. In the absence of any generalization of capitalist production relations due to pre-colonial patterns of historical development and the disinterest of metropolitan industrial capital in the territory, a crude machinery of 'political accumulation' had been installed, which rested on a fusion of class power and state power. Coercion reflected the alloy of class power and state power, as the sole common denominator of the various hybrid modalities of exploitation articulated in the colonial regime of accumulation. A curious historical substitution resulted: in place of the private 'economic' power invested in capitalist property, colonialism bequeathed only a hypertrophied state apparatus, in which the coercive power of surplus-extraction was centralized and concentrated. It was into this state apparatus -- a superstructural 'house' that had been constructed for very specific purposes, according to an architectural logic that could not fail but condition new occupants, with a foundation which could be precisely dated to a small mercenary force first dispatched from Germany in 1888 and to which all the other rooms were mere additions -- that the leadership of the nationalist movement moved at independence.

Just as the pattern of historical development in precolonial Tanzania had established structural limits to the range of outcomes contin-

gent on capitalist penetration of the territory, so too would independence be unable to fully cancel the legacy of colonial domination. Indeed, it was the sheer backwardness and rudimentary social homogeneity of the country which ultimately permitted TANU to establish a national-popular hegemony over the African population as a whole -- imposing its own concerns, within objective limits, and its own visions of the past and future on the entire social formation. It conducted the nationalist movement in ideological terms which were largely racial and ethical in connotation, divorced from questions of power embedded in the structure of the regime of accumulation. It presented itself as visibly superior to the practices of colonialism, proposing a more or less coherent future for the country. And it therefore manoeuvred across a political space which successive colonial administrations, under the permanent command of metropolitan capital, had never known.

But the precondition to these achievements was, precisely, the material underdetermination of the postcolonial party-state administration: no vital class necessity animated it; no aspirant domestic bourgeoisie competed with it; no metropolitan capitalist interests manipulated it; no expatriate settler or mercantile community conspired against it. The ruling class that rose on the foundations laid by decolonization in Tanzania thus had no exact equivalent elsewhere in East Africa: its unparalleled hegemony in the superstructural world of political and ideological leadership resulted from its conspicuous absence from the infrastructural world of the relations of production. In the extreme and dynamic tension between the two -- popular hegemony and class domination -- lies the secret behind the specific nature and trajectory of the 'Tanzanian road to socialism', explored in the next chapter.

Notes

[1]For a recent and extensive survey of classical and contemporary theories of imperialism, see Anthony Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981).

[2]Bill Warren, Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism (London: Verso, 1980), p. 49. Lukacs captured the historically determinate, and hence limited, value of Lenin's work as early as 1923, when he noted that: 'in an apparent paradox, the Leninist concept of imperialism is both a significant theoretical achievement, and contains as economic theory little that is really new. It is partly based on Hilferding and, purely as economics, by no means bears comparison in depth or sweep with Rosa Luxemburg's admirable extension of Marx's theory of capitalist reproduction. Lenin's superiority -- and this is an unparalleled theoretical achievement -- consists in his concrete articulation of the economic theory of imperialism with every problem of the present epoch, thereby making the economics of the new phase a guide-line for all concrete action in the resultant decisive conjuncture.' Georg Lukacs, Lenin: A Study in the Unity of His Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1974), p. 41.

[3]Giovanni Arrighi, The Geometry of Imperialism (London: New Left Books, 1978), p. 17.

[4]There are important exceptions to this consensual shift of emphasis which should be noted: see, for instance, the essays in Hugo Radice, ed., International Firms and Modern Imperialism (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975); Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1975), Part I; and for discussions of inter-imperialist rivalries, situated within the framework of radical underdevelopment theory, Stephen Hymer, The Multinational Corporation (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1979), esp. Part III, and Riccardo Parboni, The Dollar and its Rivals (London: Verso, 1981).

[5]V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. I (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), p. 731.

[6]Ibid.

[7]As Sutcliffe has argued: 'if the different phases of the imperialist relationship are systematically related to capitalist development, then it makes sense to compare imperialism not only in different epochs but between different countries in the same epoch, since the stages reached by capitalism were different in different countries at the same time.' Bob Sutcliffe, 'Imperialism and Industrialization in the Third World,' in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe, eds., Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London: Longman, 1972), p. 173.

[8]The notion of 'imperialist chain' is employed here for the purpose of capturing the hierarchical order in which colonial regimes of accumulation were linked to specific metropolitan centres. In this sense, usage

in this study is clearly closer to Frank's conception of 'metropole-satellite-subsatellite' relations, rather than to Lenin's own concept of the 'imperialist chain', by which he referred primarily to an order among the imperialist metropolises themselves.

[9]The actual causes of capitalist crises are a contentious issue in marxist political economy: for surveys of the relevant debates, see Manuel Castells, The Economic Crisis and American Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), chap. 1, and Chris Harman, 'Theories of the Crisis,' International Socialism, No. 2:9 (Summer 1980). But however one decides on fundamental causes in this case, in the view of France's representative to Berlin at the time: 'Industrial development which has resulted in over-production drives Germany to seek the acquisition of colonies.' Cited in Hans-Ulrich Wehler, 'Bismarck's Imperialism, 1862-1890,' Past and Present, No. 48 (August 1970), p. 132.

[10]Rudolf Hilferding, Finance Capital (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 326.

[11]On the 'illusion of a large Central African market', see Wehler, op cit., p. 137. For a thorough survey of the strategic issues weighing in imperialist calculation on East Africa, see David Arnold, 'External Factors in the Partition of East Africa,' in M.H.Y. Kaniki, ed., Tanzania under Colonial Rule (London: Longman, 1979).

[12]Bismarck is reputed to have said: 'To acquire territory is very simple in East Africa. For a few muskets one can obtain a paper with some native crosses.' Cited in John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 90. His preference for 'indirect rule' is documented by Wehler, op cit.

[13]Iliffe, for instance, cites one plantation owner as saying: 'What do I care about the Sultan. I hate him... Now I respect him even less for not being ashamed to sell our land to foreigners.' Iliffe, op cit., p. 93.

[14]Bismarck, cited in Deborah Bryceson, 'The Proletarianization of Women in Tanzania,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 17 (January-April 1980), p. 13.

[15]Iliffe, op cit., p. 95.

[16]Iliffe, 'Tanganyika under British and German Rule,' in Lionel Cliffe and John Saul, eds., Socialism in Tanzania, Vol. 1 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972), p. 8.

[17]The trajectory of military subjugation is surveyed in A.J. Temu, 'Tanzanian Societies and Colonial Invasion, 1875-1907,' in Kaniki, ed., op cit.

[18]The commanding study of this ecological collapse is by Helge Kjekshus, Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History

(London: Heinemann, 1977). He estimates that the Maasai, for instance, lost as much as two-thirds of their population due to famine in this period (p. 130).

[19]Cited in Steven Feierman, 'The Shambaa,' in Andrew Roberts, ed., Tanzania Before 1900 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), p. 16.

[20]On the Maji Maji rebellion, see Iliffe, A Modern History..., chap. 3. Incendentally,'scorched-earth' campaigns would later be rationalized and elevated into a basic principle of colonial warfare by Von Treitschke, who declared: 'It is pure mockery to apply normal principles of war in wars with savages. A negro tribe must be chastized by setting its villages on fire, because this is the only kind of remedy that is effective.' Cited in Michael Löwy, 'Marxism and the National Question,' in Robin Blackburn, ed., Revolution & Class Struggle: A Reader in Marxist Politics (Glasgow: Fontana, 1977), p. 157.

[21]See Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule, 1905-1912 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1969), chap. 3.

[22]Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), pp. 711-712.

[23]Lenin, op cit.

[24]This was not a fact peculiar to German finance capital alone: for an empirical discussion of this point, see Michael Barrett Brown, The Economics of Imperialism (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 186-193.

[25]Lenin, op cit.

[26]Hilferding, op cit., pp. 318-319. In Hilferding's opinion, 'Germany has no colonial possessions worth mentioning' from the perspective of finance capital, a problem, he foresaw, which was bound to 'lead to a solution by force' (p. 331).

[27]The centrality of the capitalist State in the production and management of the wage-relation has been rightly stressed by Suzanne de Brunhoff, The State, Capital and Economic Policy (London: Pluto Press, 1978). Any discussion of the State in the capitalist periphery which omits this dimension will be inherently deficient.

[28]Rey makes a similar point in arguing that 'the countries whose exploitation was most profitable to imperialism were those in which capitalism was already developed (i.e., those which generally already enjoyed formal independence) and that, consequently, the 'convenience' and the 'advantages' of direct political domination were mere illusions.' Pierre Phillipe Rey, Class Alliances (Paris: Maspero, 1971), p. 78.

[29]Iliffe, A Modern History..., p. 126.

[30]Von Freyhold links the reassertion of the elders' power and control

over the juniors to the decline of servitude. Michaela Von Freyhold, Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania (London: Heinemann, 1979), p. 62.

[31]'More often than not the young men were recruited from remote areas which had no access to markets or were otherwise unsuitable for cash crop production. Although colonialists complained of the great difficulties involved in persuading peasants in areas proximate to their mines and estates to sell their labour, it was nonetheless recognized that these peasants would be even more unstable in attendance at work than those recruited from further afield.' Bryceson, op cit., p. 13.

[32]Cited in A. Temu and B. Swai, Historians and Africanist History: A Critique (London; Zed Press, 1981), p. 46.

[33]The governor of the East African Protectorate, cited in Issa Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), p. 32.

[34]Arghiri Emmanuel, 'White-Settler Colonialism and the Myth of Investment Imperialism,' New Left Review, No. 73 (May-June 1972), p. 39. For another indictment of settler communities in the colonies, see Werner Biermann and Reinhart Kossler, 'The Settler Mode of Production: The Rhodesian Case,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 18 (May-August 1980).

[35]Iliffe, A Modern History..., pp. 152-155.

[36]While the process of proletarianization in the third world is a hotly debated issue, the 'making' of the peasantry has received little attention. Ken Post, 'Peasantization in Western Africa,' in Peter Gutkind and Peter Waterman, eds., African Social Studies: A Radical Reader (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), provides one of the few serious attempts to consider it. However, it should be noted that the exact social boundaries and characteristics of agrarian producers remain controversial, even where the differentiation of the peasantry is directly theorized and the plural 'peasantries', rather than a unitary 'peasantry', forms the object of analysis. For examples of the various ways in which peasants have been conceptualized, see the collection of essays in Teodor Shanin, ed., Peasants and Peasant Societies (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971). Moreover, the compatibility with historical materialism of the term 'peasantry' to designate a common location in the social structure cannot be taken for granted — despite the more or less frequent appearance of the term within Marx's and Engels' works. A recent study of classical marxist writings on the agrarian question in Germany and Russia has concluded that 'there is no pre-given and constant object called "the peasantry" which awaits discovery and description': 'since there is no fixed and identifiable social group called "the peasantry", it makes little sense to create such a unity through the citation of Marx's sometimes casual linguistic usage.' Athar Hussain and Keith Tribe, Marxism and the Agrarian Question, Vol. 2 (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981), pp. 140,141. For the purposes of the present study, how-

ever, 'casual linguistic usage' of the term peasantry -- as a sociological, rather than a marxist class category -- will have to suffice.

[37]By this time, of course, the world capitalist depression from 1873 to 1893 had ended, and a new long wave of capitalist expansion set in motion, lasting until the outbreak of the first world war. Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1978), pp. 108-146.

[38]The governor of German East Africa, cited in Deborah Bryceson, 'Changes in Peasant Food Production and Food Supply in Relation to the Historical Development of Commodity Production in Pre-colonial and Colonial Tanganyika,' Journal of Peasant Studies, No. 3 (April 1980), p. 292.

[39]Extended discussions of the integration of peasant household production (of cash crops and labour-power) into the circuits of the capitalist mode of production proper (as elements of constant and variable capital, respectively) can be found in two articles by Henry Bernstein, 'Notes on Capital and Peasantry,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 10 (September-December 1977), and 'African Peasantries: A Theoretical Framework,' Journal of Peasant Studies, No. 4 (July 1979). See also David Goodman and Michael Redcliff, From Peasant to Proletarian: Capitalist Development and Agrarian Transition (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981).

[40]The effects of capitalist accumulation on spatial differentiation is still a somewhat under-theorized topic in historical materialism, which continues to be dominated by models of 'internal colonialism' and 'metropole-satellite' relations. But see, for alternatives, Manuel Castells, The Urban Question (London: Edward Arnold, 1977), and David Harvey, 'The Geography of Capitalist Accumulation: A Reconstruction of the Marxian Theory,' Antipode, No. 2 (1975). For an interesting discussion of spatial differentiation in Tanzania, theorized in terms of modes of production, see Lionel Cliffe, 'Rural Class Formation in East Africa,' Journal of Peasant Studies, No. 2 (January 1977).

[41]Citations from Iliffe, A Modern History..., pp. 154,155.

[42]Cited in ibid., p. 324.

[43]Notably Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, 1973).

[44]Cited in John Lonsdale, 'Some Origins of Nationalism in Tanzania,' in Cliffe and Saul, eds., op cit., p. 26n. The fact that 'tribalism' has been a far more salient phenomenon in ex-British colonies than elsewhere confirms this observation. For a useful survey of approaches to the problem, see Saul, The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), chap. 14. But even where regional nationalisms have emerged in Africa, one wonders at the appropriateness of classifying these -- and these alone -- as manifestations of 'tribalism'. Mamdani writes: 'What is it that makes 2 million Norwegians a people and just as many Bagunda a tribe? A few hundred thousand Icelanders a people

and 14 million Hausa-Fulanis a tribe? There is only one answer: racism.' Mahmood Mamdani, Politics and Class Formation in Uganda (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), p. 3n.

[45]This was strikingly illustrated during the second world war, when the plantations required the systematic deployment of colonial state power to obtain forced labour. But even during 'normal' periods, the labour process on the plantations was based on the constant utilization of the 'kiboko' or whip, while labour recruitment agents for the plantations were known in the interior of the territory as 'mumiani' or 'people who sucked blood'. The 'precapitalist' social character of large scale commercial plantations in the third world -- usually referred to as the 'modern' sector in modernization theory -- is the subject of an extensive recent study by R.B.D. de Silva, The Political Economy of Underdevelopment (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), although the evidence deployed in this important work is drawn primarily from Asia, rather than Africa. Perhaps still the best marxist study of forced labour in Africa is a work originally published almost fifty years ago, and just recently re-issued: A.T. Nzula, I.I. Potekhim, and A.Z. Zusmanovich, Forced Labour in Colonial Africa (London: Zed Press, 1979).

[46]Although the European community increased from 8200 in 1913 to 22,000 in 1961, the number engaged in agriculture had increased by only 400; in 1957, fully 89 percent of the European community were employed in foreign -- particularly mercantile -- firms. Experience seems to have taught the English imperial State that settler colonies were a burden to be avoided where possible, and European settlement was never to be seriously encouraged in Tanzania. Indeed, the settler community in Tanzania was consistently in opposition to colonial state policy, and never ceased campaigning for incorporation of the area in which they had concentrated into neighboring, and settler-dominated Kenya. On the settler community and the Asian immigration, see Iliffe, A Modern History..., passim.

[47]On capital outflows, see Justinian Rweyemanu, Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 34-35. For comparisons of the Tanzanian economy with those in Kenya and Uganda, see Ann Seidman, 'The Inherited Dual Economies of East Africa,' in Cliffe and Saul, eds., op cit., and E.A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). The mandate and uncertain status of Tanzania as a British colony, especially amidst the imperialist resurgence of fascist Germany, is a somewhat contentious issue as a determinant in discouraging capital investment in the territory, as is the decline of English capitalism after the first world war. Mueller cites a contemporary opinion of the time which suggested that 'a general uneasiness arose, which, according to officials and businessmen, hindered investment of capital in the territory,' until the status of the colony was finally decided. Suzanne Mueller, 'The Historical Origins of Tanzania's Ruling Class,' Canadian Journal of African Studies, No. 3 (1981), p. 467. But see Attaki Mpakati, 'State and Society in Tanzania,' Journal of Eastern African Research and Development, No. 1 (1976), which documents Britain's official position as being intransigent

on the terms of its mandate. In any event, whatever the perception of individual capitalists on the security of their investments, Tanzania possessed little economic attraction: Iliffe, A Modern History..., p. 261.

[48]Crop regulations were so extensive that in one area peasants were under as many as fifty different ordinances which ranged from cattle taxes to prohibitions on the use of hoes to decorate houses. In one year alone, 75,000 peasants were convicted and fined for violations of ordinances such as these. Cranford Pratt, The Critical Phase in Tanzania, 1945-1968 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 25-26. On the extension service, see Cliffe, 'Nationalism and the Reaction to Enforced Agricultural Change in Tanganyika during the Colonial Period,' in Cliffe and Saul, eds., op cit. 'Unequal exchange' is a controversial topic in marxist political economy; it is used here in the sense in which it figures in Geoffrey Kay, Development and Underdevelopment (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975) -- 'buying cheap to sell dear' -- rather than in the more complex and debatable work of Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972). For example, the colonial State frequently forced peasants to grow surplus crops which it would sell back to them at vastly higher prices in times of scarcity; on this crude fiscal policy, see Von Freyhold, op cit., p. 17.

[49]For a thorough treatment of these 'indirect' benefits, see Philip Raikes, 'Rural Differentiation and Class-Formation in Tanzania,' Journal of Peasant Studies, No. 3 (April 1978).

[50]On the ideological practices of colonialism in Tanzania, see Karim F. Hirji, 'Colonial Ideological Apparatuses in Tanganyika under the Germans,' and Marjorie J. Mbilinyi, 'African Education during the British Colonial Period, 1919-61,' in Kaniki, ed., op cit.

[51]The periodization of the African Association and TANU suggested here, in terms of 'pre-political', 'intra-uterine' and 'extra-uterine' phases of development, draws on Umberto Cerroni, Teoria del Partito Politico (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1979).

[52]Cited in Iliffe, A Modern History..., p. 413.

[53]On the attempts in this period to transform the agrarian economy, see Andrew Coulson, 'Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 10 (September-December 1977), pp. 74-87. On the political alignments of the period, see Pratt, op cit., passim.

[54]Of the twin influences of British Toryism and Labourism on TANU, that of the Labour Party ('the alternative party of British capitalism') is undoubtedly the more important. But in the absence of any Tanzanian equivalent of the Trades Union Congress in Britain, the model of the British Conservative Party machine proved to be the most effective in diluting initiatives from the rank-and-file. The commanding study of the organizational structures and capacities of TANU, although somewhat dated now, continues to be Henry Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

CHAPTER IV

AN ANATOMY OF THE 'TANZANIAN ROAD TO SOCIALISM' - I

1. Introduction

The variant political outcomes of the complex dynamics of decolonization, from the second world war onwards, have been the subject of intense controversy. Although it has generally been agreed that the imposition of colonial state order, and the construction of regimes of accumulation articulated to the metropolitan centres of world capitalism, marked decisive ruptures with precolonial patterns of historical development throughout the third world, only where nationalist movements matured into anti-capitalist social revolutions were comparable historical discontinuities held to have accompanied decolonization. In the vast majority of peripheral societies, however, colonial state structures and systems of surplus-extraction connected to the imperialist metropolises were maintained, and even vigorously defended against internal and external 'aggression', by postcolonial nationalist regimes -- subject only to seemingly minor alterations and modifications.

Of these postcolonial modulations in the differential rhythms of capitalist development in the periphery, Andre Gunder Frank would write, in a sentence which reflected the consensus of a generation of dependentcistas: 'Neoimperialism and neodependence lead the new neocolonial lumpenbourgeoisies to impose a policy of lumpen- or underdevelopment.'[1] Already the multiple neologisms and related qualifications should have alerted radical underdevelopment theory to the inadequacy of the conceptual categories it had

come to employ. But it was not until the long wave of postwar capitalist expansion had obviously and irreversibly ground to a halt that the potentialities of capitalist transformation in the periphery began to receive serious attention, and the characteristic formulations of radical underdevelopment discourse appeared to be, not only historically limited, but theoretically unsophisticated and empirically inaccurate as well.

In the early 1970s, the prospects of a reversal to the 'development of underdevelopment' in the wake of a metropolitan industrial slump and a primary commodities boom focused fresh attention on the socio-economic and political results of decolonization. In a famous essay published in 1973, Bill Warren launched a sustained attack on dependency and underdevelopment theory from an evolutionary position, assessing the empirical record of postcolonial 'economic development' and concluding that the capitalist industrialization of the third world was not only an imminent potentiality, but already an actuality well in motion. As for the motor force behind this tendential industrialization, Warren was unequivocal:

> It has been fasionable on the Left to minimize the economic consequences of formal independence. Yet it is the post-war achievement of this, in conjunction with a complex of objective economic and socio-political trends, which has been the fulcrum of industrialization in many former colonial countries, both permitting and encouraging it. Independence has permitted industrial advance by breaking the monopoly of colonialist power and creating the conditions in which Third World countries can utilize inter-imperialist and East-West rivalries. Independence has been a direct cause (not just a permissive condition) of industrial advance in that it has stimulated popular pressures for a higher living standard where these have been a major internal influence sustaining industrialization policies. (2)

Although this 'marxist-diffusionist' perspective continues to inform many studies of the capitalist periphery,[3] Warren's predictions seem, a decade later, premature at best: for history has yet to produce a single

example of successful capitalist industrialization since decolonization -- notwithstanding the fact that definite advances have been registered in several third world countries.[4] Indeed, it is the continued unevenness in the global expansion of capitalism which reveals the ultimate anomaly in Warren's argument; from the salutary thesis that contemporary 'obstacles' to the capitalist development of the periphery 'originate not in current imperialist-Third World relationships, but almost entirely from the internal contradictions of the Third World itself'[5] -- a necessary corrective to the prior obsession with 'neo-colonialism' -- Warren moves to conclusions which amount to little more that the claim that all third world countries are in the throes of industrialization, except for those that are not.[6]

But at the root of these empirico-predictive infirmities in Warren's argument lie two fundamental theoretical confusions which have a direct bearing on analysis and assessment of the postcolonial trajectory of the third world. First, the whole tenor of Warren's argument comes close to suppressing the continued reality of imperialism as a determining factor with an autonomous efficacy in the reproduction of 'underdevelopment'; his position, in effect, equates decolonization with a decline of imperialism. This is nowhere more evident than in the argument that 'independence has permitted industrial advance by breaking the monopoly of colonialist power' -- a thesis which mixes a trivial, but correct, factual statement with a polemical, but erroneous, causal explanation. For while it is evident that, with the decline of European metropolitan power and the rise of peripheral nationalism, a partial disintegration of formal colonial empire issued from the second world war, the balance

of military power continued to be heavily weighted against the forces of national liberation; the European centres of imperialism still retained enough power to have reasserted formal political domination over most of their colonial possessions, had such a course been decided on. That this course was generally not taken had as much to do with the countervailing power of nationalist movements in the periphery, as it did with the post-war military and financial subordination of European capitalism to the United States. For after the second world war, American imperialism demanded the removal of all restrictions on the international mobility of investment capital and commodities, as a necessary condition of existence for a reorganized and singular imperialist chain under its hegemony.[8] Warren's silence on this fundamental transformation in the world capitalist economy leads inevitably to a voluntarist conception of postcolonial history, in which 'independence' is divorced from every objective contingency, and particularly from those tendential developments which 'permitted' both decolonization and the initial phases of peripheral industrialization: the post-war acquisition, by most dynamic components of metropolitan finance capital, of a supranational dimension, and the decentralization of accumulation towards areas where the balance of social forces has been more favourable to capital.[9]

A second theoretical error in Warren's argument follows naturally on the first: on the one hand, Warren is correct in locating 'obstacles' to the decentralization of accumulation within third world formations themselves, inasmuch as the impact of transformations in the world economy are always mediated through several layers of local reality; but, on the other hand, just as 'neo-colonialism' cannot account for the diverse and

divergent conditions of 'underdevelopment' in the third world, so too is 'independence' unable to account for the variant patterns of capitalist development in the postcolonial periphery. For 'independence' in the context of a restructured imperialist chain acquires its significance for the rhythm and modality of capitalist development in the periphery only in connection with specific, historically determined social relations of production and dynamic balances of social forces. Under diverse configurations of social and political power, the moment of 'independence' brought a new range of possibilities and constraints which differed in each case, conditioning the subsequent trajectory of capitalist development with divergent consequences for state and class formation in the postcolonial period.

In short, it was a prior pattern of historical development which determined the degree to which a particular third world formation would be affected by the internationalization of productive capital and the decentralization of accumulation. Only by taking into account these differential prior histories can the diverse 'internal' responses of various nationalist leaderships to similar 'external' conditions generated by post-war transformations in the world capitalist economy be understood. For this reason, the mechanism through which local regimes of accumulation (including by definition the various branches of the state apparatus into which nationalist leaderships invariably 'moved' at independence) were imposed, developed and reproduced, have to be placed at the centre of interpretation of the trajectory of any single postcolonial social formation.

This chapter, and the next, explore the intiatives and responses

of Tanzania's nationalist leadership, in the postcolonial period, to the possibilities opened by independence, within the structural constraints imposed by the colonial past and imperialist present, on two analytically distinct, but empirically interconnected levels: on the one hand, the 'economic' problem of increasing the pace of accumulation; on the other, the 'politico-ideological' problem of maintaining hegemony over the entire social formation. The 'national' specificity of the theoretical and political problems raised by the 'Tanzanian road to socialism' are then considered, prefiguring a discussion of their wider international typicality.

2. State, Power, Hegemony

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a fracturing of the world capitalist economy into conflicting imperialist blocs had set the Wilhelmine State on a collision course with the backward social and economic formations of the Tanzanian coastline and interior. Seventy-five years and two world wars later, the restructuring of world capitalism into a singular imperialist chain under American hegemony produced a unique international conjuncture, in which the global interests of US imperialism temporarily converged with the local aims of Tanzania's nationalist movement to place decolonization on the historical agenda of the English imperial State. Naturally, general American antipathy to the restoration of European empire did not translate into support for an indiscriminate programme of decolonization in the third world; but, in this case, the extreme moderation of Tanzanian nationalism set its goals decidedly within the parameters of American geo-political designs. Moreover, with

the favoured political project of the colonial administration, the United Tanganyika Party, completely routed in the pre-independence elections, metropolitan capital would necessarily have to turn towards TANU as the political instrument of its actual and potential interests in any independent Tanzania. In turn, it was made clear from the very beginning that no TANU policy would adversely affect the general preconditions, such as they existed at the time, for capitalist production proper in the territory. It was thus no accident that the formal 'transfer of power' in Tanzania coincided with a World Bank mission to the country, whose recommendations were promptly and automatically accepted by the new nationalist administration. In a scenario rehearsed throughout much of the capitalist periphery, decolonization in Tanzania saw the leadership of the nationalist movement, under the spell of victory and enticements of power, swooning at the prospects of a 'historic compromise' with 'Western capitalism' -- collaborating with the very forces which, moments before, had been publicly proclaimed to constitute the most fundamental obstacle to independence.

Yet beneath this typically 'neo-colonial' arrangement lay an infinitely more complex reality, deriving from the new power constellation which issued from independence. For the World Bank represented, in a sense, the 'vanguard' of international finance capital -- a qualitatively new form of capital which was at once more advanced and more indomitable than those which had previously penetrated the Tanzanian social formation: more advanced inasmuch as the internationalization of finance capital tendentially promoted the expanded reproduction of the practices of Taylorism and Fordism, extending both globally and within individual

production units capitalist control over the labour process, through mechanization and division of labour; more indomitable because supra-national control over world capitalist liquidity gave international finance capital a permanent structural place within every post-war 'power bloc', not only in the social formations of the capitalist periphery, but in the metropolitan centres of imperialism as well.[10] It mattered little that Tanzania, after eight decades of colonial domination, continued to possess minimal potential as economic territory from the global perspective of international finance capital; more important was that the country be 'protected' against any anti-imperialist dynamic which might lead it into the Soviet bloc, and that any future value the country might have be 'anticipated'.[11] The World Bank mission to Tanzania at independence thus did little more than tentatively secure the commitment of the new nationalist administration to relatively unrestricted international trade, finance and investment; whether any international corporations would actually follow still depended on whether or not the creation of a 'favourable investment climate' -- ranging from tax incentives to a sufficiently skilled and disciplined labour force -- would fall within the class interests and capacities of those who now operated the state machinery.

The answer to this question had, in fact, been predetermined: for whereas, in the absence of any alternative, international finance capital would have to come to terms with TANU necessarily, the new nationalist administration came to terms with international finance capital naturally and inevitably. The social mechanisms which insured this have already been indicated: a profound affinity on the part of

the nationalist leadership for the cultural norms and consumption habits of the colonial administration; a 'derived' politics, solidified now by the importation of institutions (liberally staffed with ex-colonial officers) and constitution from the former metropolis, so as to give the postcolonial regime every possible resemblance to that in England; the automatic concurrence with the recommendations of the World Bank, which amounted to little more than a reinstatement of the final phase of colonial policy -- all testified to the remarkable efficacy of the ideological appparatuses of British colonialism in 'subjecting' the nationalist leadership to the ever pre-givenness of the social order from which it emerged. Moreover, a conservative ideological universe had, in turn, 'qualified' the new administration for specific roles within, and only within, that social order. Without tangible objectives or specific interests rooted in the structure of the relations of production, TANU had no strategic programme for socio-economic transformation whatsoever. The new administration's commitment to abstract, and hence remote, goals of 'national development' and 'socialism', burnished with an appropriate measure of rhetorical radicalism, scarcely veiled the party's underlying pragmatism: one step at a time, plodding carefully towards an untheorized future.

There were thus from the start no fundamental 'antagonistic contradictions' between capital and the new nationalist administration. The sole contradiction which had initially driven the leadership into opposition -- between their qualification and equipment with the necessary cultural 'capital' to operate the state machinery on the one hand, and their subjection to the racial structure of British colonialism which constricted their mobility on the other --was effectively resolved by

independence.[12] The exercise of state power, which had historically been experienced by the Tanzanian popular classes as nothing more or less than oppression, had been anticipated by those who spearheaded the nationalist movement as destiny; consciously and unconsciously, TANU's leadership had from the beginning been both preparing, and been prepared, for 'power'.

Yet it was another social mechanism which ultimately guaranteed a supine decolonization in Tanzania. For the positions of power to which the nationalist leadership aspired were in branches of a state apparatus which had been constructed and expanded in response to one over-riding concern: the regulation of a capitalist regime of accumulation. The new administration took over positions which were inherently characterized by a specific internal mode of functioning, and historically charged with specific tasks in relation to the regime of accumulation: a treasury department securing state revenue; an agricultural department regulating peasant household production; a labour department disciplining the working class; a police department maintaining 'law and order'; and so on. To these branches of the state apparatus would be added new departments to perform tasks formerly executed by the metropolitan state power, but the basic form of state erected by metropolitan imperialism survived decolonization.[13] Incarnating a specific technology and social organization of power, the structure of the inherited state apparatus had both a causal and temporal primacy over human agency, which conditioned incumbents, patterning their attitudes and behavior into a mould whose shape was the product of a history of subjugation. In other words, the very structure of the state apparatus imposed on the new administration — irrespective

of individual or collective intention -- social division of labour, bureaucratic hierarchy and technical despotism, the objective rationality and inevitable necessity of which would be interiorized in the subjectivity of those who now operated the state machinery.[14] There was, in short, a fundamental structural continuity in the state apparatus which overdetermined the changes in personnel that accompanied the 'transfer of power' at independence.[15] The postcolonial State was thus predestined to become an apparatus of political domination over the popular classes in Tanzania because, in organization and practices, it had always been so; decolonization effected no rupture in its structural coherence or mode of functioning.

But the State in Tanzania had always been something more than just an apparatus of foreign political domination, an eminently practical instrument 'to subordinate the native social classes'.[16] In origin and substance, the State had developed -- and, indeed, presupposed -- popular resistance: no enormous apparatus of coercion would have been necessary had peasants willingly produced surplus crops of appropriate quantity and quality at the lowest possible prices, or if a sufficient number of workers had willingly submitted to the rigour and discipline of capitalist production at the lowest possible wage rates without complaint. The very dynamics of State construction in Tanzania were furnished, not by some imperative to subjugate the 'native social classes' to the rule of capital in a relationship of 'exteriority', but rather by the necessity of combining them together in an asymmetric network of exploitation and domination, within the framework of a 'political' regime of accumulation.

The full weight and importance of colonial state personnel

becomes clearer from this vantage point: selected through institutional mechanisms sanctioned in the imperialist metropolis alone, successive colonial administrations had been charged with the difficult task of structuring and stabilizing the social relations on which the regime of accumulation rested, purposely articulated to the process of accumulation in the imperialist metropolis. That colonial administrations invariably failed to produce 'optimal' results for metropolitan capital was certainly not due to any lack of effort on the part of state personnel; in a colonial environment devoid of powerful indigenous or settler concerns, no social distance separated the fundamental interests of the one from the other. While the state apparatus in colonial Tanzania rested on the domestic foundations provided by the regime of accumulation, state administrative personnel were manifestly foreign; moreover, their positions were underwritten, in the last instance, by the marked capacity and resolute preparedness of the metropolitan state power to inflict crushing defeat and hardship on the African population, should popular revolt or widespread collective resistance threaten.

In Tanzania, colonial state personnel thus principally and permanently responded to, and were dependent on, specific metropolitan capitalist interests, in a way the postcolonial administration could never be. For TANU had come to power, not under foreign military or administrative fiat, but electorally, on the shoulders of a nationalist movement which amalgamated different sectors of the African population into a 'negative unity', whose sole common denominator consisted of opposition to colonialism. Independence of a separate and sovereign Tanzanian nation-state — 'imagined', much as colonialism had been experienced, in different ways by different

social classes[17] -- was its major organizing principle. To be sure, TANU emerged out of the process of decolonization as a 'mass' party, organizing and controlling large sections of the working class and peasantry, with a vaguely reformist programme that ensured broad popular allegiance; but it was not, and could never be, a party 'of' workers and peasants. In origin and conception, TANU was instead a vehicle for the organization of the urban and rural masses 'around' the party leadership -- the veterans of the defunct African Association, who could conceive of no role for themselves in an independent Tanzania outside the ambit of the State. In contrast to the nationalist movement as a whole, the leadership thus formed a 'positive unity'; although drawn from diverse social backgrounds -- ranging from small traders to intellectuals, local 'kulaks'[18] to lower level civil servants -- the leadership nevertheless exhibited a certain political and ideological homogeneity, which ultimately derived from their relatively privileged, but internally differentiated, position in relation to the colonial regime of accumulation. Precisely because they had formed on different terrain for different purposes, the 'transfer of power' at independence would have a different effect on the mass base of the nationalist movement than it would on the leadership. The formal recognition of the political equality of the entire decolonized population would liquidate the 'negative unity' of the nationalist movement by removing the most immediate source of an apparently 'common' oppression, while the delegation of the power of sovereignty to TANU would solidify the 'positive unity' of the leadership by providing it with new conditions of existence -- to maintain the popular consent, to marginalize and eliminate opponents, to 'stay in power'. In turn, the heavily 'political'

character of accumulation in Tanzania would centre the process of class stratification on the state apparatus, and the exercise of state power by TANU would become, by a curious historical 'default', a mode of class formation, eventually forging the postcolonial administration into a social class and setting it in direct opposition to the Tanzanian popular classes.

The apparent paradox of this phenomenon is explicable only when measured in historical perspective. In the metropolitan centres of imperialism, the expanded reproduction and steady generalization of capitalist production relations had permitted -- and sometimes compelled -- a differentiation of class and state power. By contrast, in Tanzania -- for reasons already indicated -- no comparable separation of polity and economy had been possible, giving way instead to a 'political' regime of accumulation which rested on a fusion of class power and state power.[19] Just as the imposition of capitalist class power over production had come to require the exercise of state power in the colonial period, so too would the maintenance of the state power exercised by the nationalist leadership in postcolonial Tanzania come to require the imposition of the class power of capital over production. Taxation alone could never sustain the state apparatus, much less provide enough revenue to finance an expansion of the positions now occupied by the nationalist leadership. In short, the exercise of state power would soon compel the activization and reproduction of the class power on which it was reciprocally dependent, even though the most immediate problem confronting the nationalist leadership would be, not the maintenance and expansion 'of' the state apparatus, but rather the protection and fortification of their position 'in' it.[20]

While the social unity of these two constituent elements in the formation of a new ruling class -- retention of state power and financing of the state apparatus -- would find expression in a major crisis soon after independence, each retains its own place and importance in the trajectory of the 'Tanzanian road to socialism'.

But, in any comparative perspective, it is the politico-ideological hegemony exerted by TANU over the Tanzanian social formation which ultimately raises the country's postcolonial experience above those of its contemporaries. Set against a continental background of endless coup d'etats and cruel dictatorships, the sheer temporal continuity of the party-state regime installed after independence singles Tanzania out as one of the few stable and 'democratic' countries in the capitalist periphery. To be sure, the institutionalized supremacy of TANU and the permanent interpenetration of party and state personnel would fix the formal democracy of 'Tanzanian socialism' within narrow limits, even by conservative standards. But the retention by a universally enfranchised population of freedoms of assembly, press and speech, even where electoral choice is restricted to pre-defined range of (TANU) candidates, is far from being a matter of indifference in Tanzania.[21] The historical conditions of possibility for the peculiar political constellation of the postcolonial Tanzanian regime, therefore, demands some exploration.

In the first instance, the nationalist movement involved the mobilization of a large part of the population around TANU which, once massively present on the field of politics, could not be easily removed. Furthermore, given the weakness of the nationalist leadership and the fragility of the military and police apparatus it inherited, some measure

of national-popular unity was both necessary to accelerate the process of decolonization with an outcome favourable to TANU, and unavoidable after the 'transfer of power' to consolidate the postcolonial regime.

Second, the fragile national-popular unity achieved during the nationalist movement, and the localized conditions under which the struggle was largely waged, left no channels after independence outside of TANU's organizational structure through which militant popular pressures could be brought to bear on the new regime. Moreover, the massive predominance of a small-holding peasantry in the Tanzanian social structure kept the impulses to widespread collective political activity at a minimum.[22]

Third, the relative absence of regional, ethnic and religious -- not to mention 'tribal' -- antagonisms within the Tanzanian population, combined with the marked lack of any indigenous class polarity, provided the nationalist leadership with a fairly wide range of manoeuvre for restructuring 'state-society' relations. In such circumstances, TANU lacked both reason to consider, and capacity to install, an openly authoritarian regime.[23]

Fourth, given the extreme socio-economic backwardness of the country, independence opened a fairly wide space for a number of significant reforms, many non-pecuniary in nature, which were well within the capacity of the new regime to deliver.[24] Moreover, selective provision of material support to, and sanctioning of, different sectors of the population served to isolate different sociological groups within the population from one another, while partially cementing each to TANU.

Fifth, the memory, continually reactivated after independence, of the 'national' struggle against a colonialism which had supported a manifestly foreign social bloc provided the postcolonial regime with a permanent

source of imaginary, potential and actual 'enemies' which could be conjured up whenever necessary, deflecting and displacing popular-democratic and class antagonisms generated by the regime of accumulation.

Sixth, and significantly, contradictions between different factions of the nationalist leadership would be kept in check by the fact that none knew any power base separate from their common ascension to positions in the state apparatus and collective exercise of state power -- a self-perpetuating lubricant for the reduction of 'internal' frictions which would be supplemented, after independence, by constant policing and periodic purges of the 'ranks'.

Although far from exhaustive, this list suggests at least some of the historical and political conditions which made a stable, proto-democratic form of regime possible in postcolonial Tanzania. But what rendered the exclusive democracy of 'Tanzanian socialism' ultimately practicable has yet to be indicated: for the advent of the new regime was sealed by a repressive and totalizing statization of every sphere of civil society, effectively subordinating every potentially autonomous power centre -- from the organized labour movement to the Native Authority -- to the State. In short, the 'democratic' format of the postcolonial regime was underwritten by the progressive elimination of organized oppositional forces and alternatives to the nationalist leadership, and in the process made inoperative, as every popular organization, from trade unions to TANU itself, was effectively incorporated as branches of the state apparatus, smothered in a network of other apparatuses which escaped all democratic control, and converted into mere transmission belts of the postcolonial state administration.

The precise mechanics of statization, and the social struggles

surrounding them, will be considered separately below, insofar as each contributed to the overall determination of the general crisis which produced 'Tanzanian socialism'; here it will be enough to simply note that, while statization was at first randomly executed as opposition arose, it nevertheless derived, from the beginning, a certain structural coherence from the central location of the State in the ensemble of social relations on which the crude machinery of exploitation installed during the colonial period had come to rest. For independence, in and of itself, had left the basic structure of the regime of accumulation intact: no extensive conversion of the system of production, no noticeable weakening of imperial 'linkages' to the economy, no fundamental shifts in the balance of class power, followed decolonization. The postcolonial State in Tanzania continued to be a political instrument of capitalist class power, and revenue from an inflexibly 'political' regime of accumulation would remain the central spring of its existence. The immediate significance of decolonization lay elsewhere: for the historical fusion of class power and state power in colonial Tanzania would be momentarily dissolved by the advent to authority of a social force without the class subjectivity which comes from an objective location in the structure of the relations of production. But the iron whip of objective necessity would soon correct this subjective underdetermination, setting the postcolonial administration on a collision course with the popular classes which had carried it to power, and sealing its social destination at the close of a protracted and peculiar class trajectory.

3. The Advent of Authoritarian State Capitalism

As in so many other third world formations, then, independence in Tanzania was accompanied by no major alterations in the regime of accumulation. Instead, an anti-capitalist popular radicalization was precluded by a supine and serene decolonization, which saw the 'transfer of power' to a nationalist leadership which had succeeded in capturing, canalizing and ultimately confiscating the deep frustration and bitterness of the country's impoverished labouring classes.[25] To be sure, decolonization would bring some mitigation of the severe social poverty into which Tanzanian workers and peasants had been forced; but while independence would deliver them from the racial oppression and worst excesses of colonial domination, it left their social condition structurally intact. Similarly, the state machinery would now be 'Africanized', operated largely by Tanzanian personnel, but in its social organization and practices the state apparatus went unchanged. The ultimate results of decolonization were thus complex and contradictory. By rupturing the racial structures of colonialism, independence marked an indubitable socio-cultural advance for the Tanzanian population as a whole, while freedom from the fetters of a single metropolitan monopoly opened the possibility of a more historically progressive 'rationalization' of Tanzanian state and economy. But the heavy price paid for these advances would be an accelerated indigenous class stratification and increased economic exploitation of the labouring classes. The years after independence would henceforth witness a growing divorce and conflict between the nationalist leadership, on the one hand, and the popular classes which had rallied to it in the struggle for independence and carried it to

power, on the other.

The liquidation of the 'negative unity' of the nationalist movement and the advent of postcolonial social struggles was initially registered in the urban areas, where the new state administration discovered its first 'internal enemy' in the organized labour movement. Although geographically isolated and numerically small, the Tanzanian proletariat had historically exhibited a degree of militancy rare on the African continent, which TANU had succeeded in channelling into the nationalist movement.[26] After independence, however, the organized working class -- centralized and concentrated in the most strategically vital sectors of the regime of accumulation -- became the first to clash with the postcolonial regime on, precisely, the battlefield of conflicting 'nationalisms': for the workers, independence had been 'imagined' as bringing, minimally and immediately, an increase in wages and job security and a reduction in industrial work norms, while for union bureaucrats it meant a far more rapid and thoroughgoing Africanization of the state apparatus than TANU was willing or able to deliver. Strikes by workers anxious to translate independence into some material improvement succeeded one another in rapid succession. Union demands for wage increases reportedly threatened to absorb almost all of the meagre aid granted by Britain to its former colony, while the overall disruption of the economy caused by industrial unrest can be gauged by the 375 percent increase in man-days lost over the first year of independence.[27] In a desperate attempt to stem this upsurge in proletarian militancy, the new administration responded swiftly and decisively with a combination of concessions and repression. In 1962, minimum wages were increased, severance pay

introduced and further Africanizations promised, but strikes were made effectively illegal and trade union registration and compliance with government regulations were made mandatory.[28] Moreover, Nyerere warned that, in future,

> Trade Union leaders and their followers, as long as they are true socialists, will not need to be coerced by the government into keeping their demands within the limits imposed by the needs of society as a whole. (29)

But the 'needs of society as a whole' were to be solely the prerogative of the state administration to dictate. Indeed, it is in this regard, rather than in its economic implications, that the post-independence strike wave profoundly shook the confidence of the nationalist leadership. For the first time, the fragility of the new regime had been demonstrated by the widespread and protracted occurrence of popular activity outside the organizational framework and beyond the control of TANU.

The temporary social peace bought by the 1962 concessions came to an end two years later when the postcolonial regime announced a termination to the racially discriminatory policy of Africanization. When a reactive army mutiny demanding the immediate Africanization of the officer corps threatened to converge with a general strike, the regime found itself without any lines of defence. Besieged, Nyerere requested the armed intervention of British metropolitan state power, which suppressed the mutiny within twenty-four hours. The military would henceforward come under tight control of TANU and its personnel would be recruited largely from the TANU Youth League.[30] A month after the mutiny and threatened general strike, the Tanganyika Federation of Labour — once praised by Nyerere as 'the industrial wing' of the nationalist movement[31] — was legally disbanded and a state-controlled National Union

of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA) erected in its place. The grossly parasitic and authoritarian character of the new organization was manifestly evident from inception: its officers were to be nominated by TANU alone and remunerated through compulsory deductions from workers' wages.[32] Nyerere's declared principle of rationalization for the repression of trade unionism reflected the nationalist leadership's deepening 'statolatry':

> The same people are members of the trade union and of the political wing of the labour movement. How then can these two wings be separate? We believe that the institutions of society must bring into harmony all the different interests of man, and we do not understand how it helps a worker if the Trade Union he belongs to regards itself as independent from, and in conflict with, the political movement he himself helps to control. (33)

A similar logic of power, concealed behind a facade of pretexts, led the administration to declare the postcolonial regime a 'single-party state' in the same year, at the very moment when a political opposition was beginning to appear.[34] While both union and party nominally retained an institutionally separate existence, their very integration into the state apparatus underlined their permanent subordination to the state power, while signalling an end to any organized political or working class autonomy within the legal framwork of the postcolonial regime. The growing concentration of power in an increasingly centralized state apparatus was simply the objective complement of the liquidation of potential sources of opposition in civil society proper.

This repressive and authoritarian statization of civil society, however, remained a solitary triumph of the new regime in the urban areas; it was not repeatable in the countryside, where a different kind of social peace prevailed after the 'transfer of power'. For, paradoxically, at the very moment Tanzanian workers were being subjected to a new, postcolonial

disciplinary regime, the great mass of the peasantry was experiencing a degree of personal freedom from mechanisms of surplus-extraction unknown since the colonial conquest some eighty years earlier.

The direct cause of this increased peasant autonomy was, precisely, the initial retraction of the coercive power of the State from the rural economy after independence, the consequences of which were felt most immediately by the settler community. For the most reactionary and archaic segment of the colonial 'power bloc', decolonization -- followed by the legal nationalization of titulary landed property[35] -- represented an irrecoverable loss. Local political domination conferring access to practically 'free' land and labour-power had been the very foundation of whatever prospertiy the settlers enjoyed, while continual and unmitigated coercion had been their sole means of preserving their lucrative situation within the colonial regime of accumulation. No longer able to promote or even defend that situation on the basis of their 'rights' as citizens of the imperialist metropolis, the settlers slowly and reluctantly abandoned their collapsing estates and left the country.

Elsewhere in the rural interior, retraction of state power took shape in the 1963 abolition of the institution and oppressive practices of the Native Authority. Although these petty and tyrannical products of English colonialism were often simply renamed 'divisional executive officers' of the new regime and recharged with the tasks of enforcing regulations and collecting taxes, their capacity to do so now was to be strictly limited by the intransigent 'nationalism' of the peasantry. For independence had been 'imagined' by the vast majority of the Tanzanian peasantry as bringing nothing more or less than a complete and total

termination to every form of external interference in the process of small-holding household production. In short, political control over the agrarian economy was no longer enforceable, and would remain so for some time to come. The rural population was momentarily free, after independence, to translate an acquired hostility to dependence on the market into spontaneous withdrawal from 'participation' in the regime of accumulation -- an objective demonstration of its newly-won 'autonomy'.[36]

At the same time, however, a significant (though often exaggerated) transformation in the class structure of the Tanzanian countryside was occurring, amidst the more fundamental collapse of the rural order so laboriously constructed under German and British colonialism. Already in the years immediately prior to independence, colonial state policy had begun to effectively deprive Asian merchant capital and European agri-business of their previous monopolies over rural trade and capitalist agriculture, by encouraging the formation of peasant marketing cooperatives and promoting 'progressive farmers' within the rural population -- policies more rigorously pursued by the postcolonial state administration.[37] The economic opportunities opened by the 'focal point approach', as it was called, made possible and profitable a limited capitalization of agricultural production for a small stratum of agrarian proprietors, which invariably became the controlling force and major beneficiary of the cooperative movement, while simultaneously expanding into auxiliary commercial enterprises.

The result was, of course, the consolidation of a small, but relatively well-off, kulak stratum alongside the general mass of the peasantry. The fresh wealth of this group, while never to be matched

by any equivalent political power as a class, gave its individual members considerable local authority, and TANU officials would be quick to collaborate with such persons where political and economic power did not converge on the same individual to begin with.[38] But the gathering commercial impetus of petty capitalism in the countryside could not compensate for the decline of state control over peasant household production which followed independence. It could furnish a basis of political support for the party-state administration in the countryside, but it could not financially sustain the state power. In postcolonial Tanzania, an incipient agrarian petty capitalism -- stunted and belated -- could provide no cure for a state apparatus plagued by advancing fiscal paralysis.

Yet the decisive source of atrophy in the years after independence lay outside the country altogether: for the fragile health of the postcolonial regime, politically bolstered by an accelerating statization at home, was being economically and diplomatically undermined from abroad. As already seen, the nationalist leadership, on ascension to state power, had originally promoted few development programmes beyond those suggested by World Bank recommendations, resting confidently and complacently on the acceptance of an open-door invitation extended to international capital without, while anticipating the movement of Asian merchant capital into productive activity proper within. At the same time, the regime pursued a continental policy encouraging the moderate forces of national liberation in Portuguese Africa and the settler colonies of Zimbabwe and South Africa, while globally diplomatic relations were sought and established with the state capitalist countries of Eastern Europe and the third world.

By the mid-1960s, the ultimate results of this naive and contradictory strategy had been visibly registered in the Tanzanian economy. Between 1960 and 1966, per capita consumption rose by a mere 1 percent anually, while total wage employment fell by 20 percent; consumer prices rose by 15 percent, while primary commodity prices fell erratically; and a net disinvestment was recorded, while barely 40 percent of anticipated foreign financing for the First Five Year Plan materialized.[39]

The predictable political corollary to this unfolding economic crisis was increased social tension. Despite the enveloping statization of autonomous class activity, working class pressure for higher wages revived in the urban areas, where the comparative wealth and privileges of party and state personnel contrasted sharply with the severe austerity imposed on the general population, provoking widespread popular hostility towards the 'nizers' (beneficiaries of Africanization), the 'wabenzi' (operators of Mercedes Benz automobiles), and the 'wakupe' (bloodsuckers).[40] Meanwhile, in the countryside, as the coercive power of the State revived after long incapacity, peasant household production was slowly but steadily being rechannelled back into the regime of accumulation, where it fell prey to an ever more corrupt and exploitative marketing network, inciting fresh outbursts of rural discontent.[41] The economic stagnation and mounting popular pressure, accompanied by rumors of impending coup d'etats engineered by American imperialism in the wake of Nkrumah's overthrow in 1966, exposed the postcolonial regime to new strains and uncertainties, as its internal cohesion threatened to disintegrate before the crosswinds of more radical and more conservative opinion within the party-state apparatus. Converging crises of hegemony and accumulation

thus confronted an administration increasingly unable to respond with any clear and decisive policy to the multi-faceted problems now pressing in on it.

It was against this background of escalating crisis that, under Nyerere's authoritarian impulse, TANU issued decrees in 1967 officially committing the regime -- in practice now, as well as in rhetoric -- to 'Socialism and Self-Reliance'.[42] The exact terms of the 'Arusha Declaration' and 'Socialism and Rural Development' are widely known. The first was promptly followed by expropriation of the commanding heights of the economy, with 'full and fair compensation' to the firms affected, thus bringing a wide range of capitalist enterprises under effective state monopoly, while a 'leadership code' attempted to check corruption, individuated accumulation and political dissension within the party-state administration. The second outlined a relatively coherent strategy for extending state control over the rural economy, by restructuring agrarian production through what was at first to be a 'voluntary' concentration and centralization of the Tanzanian peasantry into village hamlets based on communal property, which would be at once more accessible to state provision of services and advanced productive technologies, and at the same time more conducive to state extraction of agricultural surplus-labour. The net effect of these decrees over the next five years, while somewhat meagre in the countryside, would be to bring a significant (but by no means predominant) proportion of the urban economy and <u>proletariat</u> under the direct command of 'parastatal' <u>capital</u>.[43]

But if this much is clear and incontrovertible, the exact po-

litical impact and socio-economic consequence of the 1967 decrees are far more contentious. For the political impact of these measures appeared, for a time, to recharge and reactivate the hegemonic paramountcy of the party-state administration in Tanzania: demonstrations in support of the new policies took place at home, while the critical acclaim of the radical intelligentsia for 'Socialism and Self-Reliance' was delivered from abroad. In fact, however, the driving force behind the demonstrations was supplied largely by students; the appeal of the 'Arusha Declaration' and 'Rural Socialism' found little echo in the factories or the countryside, where popular support for the postcolonial regime continued to be limited and conditional on the satisfaction of more material concerns. The aftermath to statization of the economy brought no noticeable improvement in working conditions; on the contrary, it was to mean the imposition of an even more oppressive disciplinary regime on the labouring classes, as required now by the new policies of 'Socialism and Self-Reliance'. Indeed, within a year of the 'Arusha Declaration', Nyerere would declare:

> It seems that some people have taken the emphasis on people in the Arusha Declaration to mean that there can be slackness in work, and that people in supervisory positions can do nothing about it. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Arusha Declaration demands more discipline, not less. (44)

The material effects of 'Tanzanian socialism' for workers and peasants were thus always to be considerably less than their ideological promise, and the gap between the two would actually increase, rather than decrease, over time.

Nevertheless, the 'Arusha Declaration' did achieve a temporary social pacification and limited popular support, enough to re-cement the decomposing internal unity of the postcolonial regime. The radical wing

of the party-state administration, which had been clamouring ravenously for more rapid promotions and Africanization, and grumbling over the profits of metropolitan and Asian capital, rallied immediately to 'Socialism and Self-Reliance'; while more conservative elements within the state apparatus, unable to counter the 'Arusha Declaration' with any coherent socio-economic programme of comparable scope, submitted to the new policies, and manoeuvered successfully around the legal restrictions on income contained in the 'leadership code'.[45] In fact, the real political import of the post-1967 statization of the economy lay primarily 'above', rather than 'below': for henceforth the tensions between various factions within the party-state apparatus, however temporarily acute, would never undermine their common social unity against the Tanzanian proletariat and peasantry. The very real and sometimes serious conflicts of interest and policy disputes which were to grip the postcolonial regime over the coming years would always remain within the structural framework of an increasingly authoritarian statism.[46]

But if the political impact of the 1967 decrees on the Tanzanian social formation as a whole was to be rather limited and temporary, their socio-economic consequences would, by contrast, be far more extensive and permanent in nature. In Tanzania, statization of the economy represented, in effect, the predictable economic sequel to political decolonization, rendered necessary by the progressive elimination of alternative options: for, six years after independence, domestic private capital formation was still practically non-existent, accounting, as late as 1974, for only 4 percent of total equity capital; discriminatory policies designed to encourage non-African traders and merchants out of commerce

and into productive activity had failed completely, leading instead to a net exodus of Asian capital; and the anticipated metropolitan state and private capital had never materialized, despite the labour repressive legislation and generous investment incentives provided by the postcolonial regime.[47]

Massive state intervention in the economy is everywhere a sign of bourgeois weakness; in Tanzania, it was an index of the bourgeoisie's absence altogether. Statization was, in fact, designed as a substitute for the Asian capital which was leaving the country and the African capital which had never appeared. It was never meant to counterpose the State to metropolitan capital, but rather to compliment it. The expropriations, once presented as a salutary anti-imperialist measure, were invariably followed by management contracts with multinational corporations, and a wide range of joint investment ventures were entered into, balancing metropolitan and Tanzanian state capital in varying proportions.[48] Yet the final judgment of metropolitan imperialism on the 1967 decrees can be more accurately gauged from the reaction of international finance capital to them: World Bank loans to the Tanzanian regime increased by over 700 percent between 1967 and 1972 alone; by contrast, when the Allende regime 'similarly' expropriated metropolitan capitalist interests in Chile in 1971, World Bank loans totalling $30 million which had already been promised were promptly frozen, as part of an internationally orchestrated destabilization campaign -- the consequences of which are now part of history.[49]

But, at the same time, the 1967 decrees and ensuing practice of 'Tanzanian socialism' -- separated by a universe from any effective socialization of production -- were nevertheless considerably removed from the

purely legal manoeuvres or ideological deceptions subsequent opinion has occasionally made them out to be. While initially modeled on the nationalization enacted under British Labourism,[50] the rapid formation of State property in Tanzania had no exact parallel with the projects of social democracy in the metropolitan centres of imperialism. It was to be a structural, rather than just conjunctural, alteration in the regime of accumulation, conferring on the party-state administration increasingly effective control, rather than simply juridical ownership, of the productive apparatus and the organization of commerce.

In short, unavoidable economic necessity had finally compelled a State-sponsored 'passive revolution' in the regime of accumulation, the objective logic and tendential mode of which could never be constrained within the boundaries of subjective design. For once capital investment was to be financed by, or funneled through, the agency of state power, dynamic pressures would necessarily lead to the imposition of some minimal planning, to surveillance and further interventions in commerce and the process of production, and to the institution of auxiliary forms of State property -- whose cumulative result would be the creation of an 'immature' state capitalism largely confined to the urban areas, and resting precariously above the vast mass of the peasantry in the Tanzanian countryside. Momentarily liquidated by the solvent of decolonization, the historical alloy of class power and state power -- a central distinguishing feature of the regime of accumulation in colonial Tanzania -- would be re-fused by the post-1967 statization of the economy.

If all this is so, it is necessary to draw the inescapable conclusion: the social class which emerged on the economic foundation

laid by State property in the means of production was now a state bourgeoisie, exercising a direct class power over production which the party-state administration had not known prior to the 1967 decrees.[51] The degree of this new class power can be accurately gauged along three intersecting axes which, precisely, define capitalist relations of production: (i) between 1967 and 1972, expropriations, particularly in the manufacturing, commercial and financial sectors of the economy, brought fully 80 percent of the physical means of production (constant capital) under State control; (ii) as a result, 80,000 workers, or approximately 20 percent of the Tanzania proletariat, were transformed into 'parastatal' employees, bringing about 25 percent of total remunerated wage labour-power (variable capital) in the country under State command by 1972; and finally, (iii) 'parastatal' investments accounted for about 50 percent of total national investment by, again, 1972, bringing resource allocation and the overall process of accumulation (surplus-value) under the direction of the State, in conjunction with international finance capital which came to provide, in turn, about 50 percent of 'parastatal' investment capital.[52] Moreover, the fundamental objective of production in the 'parastatal' enterprises, as consistently stated in official criteria governing State investment policy, was to be the 'valorization' and augmentation of the surplus-value produced in the urban economy,[53] supplementing the more traditional mechanisms of State revenue procurement through taxation and unequal exchange permitted by increasing State control over the means of realization of peasant surplus-labour in the countryside.

But if the class power indicated along these axes continued to

signify the rule of capital in the expropriated enterprises of the new 'parastatal' sector of the regime of accumulation, the social class which now exercised that power was notably unlike the capitalists it displaced. The functions of supervision and management of the productive apparatus which had previously fallen on the individual (private) capitalist now fell on the collective (state) capitalist as a structure: multiple agents in the party-state administration performing the fragmented tasks of surveillance and control over the productive apparatus, without any individual juridical rights to either the means of production or the surplus product.[54] Instead of issuing in a paradoxical 'capitalism without capitalists', the contradictory result of statization of the economy would be the formation of a relatively ample state bourgeoisie: a class of economic agents drawn from, but not exhausting, the ranks of the party-state administration, who now occupied positions in the expropriated enterprises and regulating ministries which conferred the 'quality' of being a capitalist on incumbents.[55]

The exact contours and boundaries of this state bourgeoisie on any class map of the postcolonial Tanzanian social formation are notoriously difficult to empirically demarcate.[56] For while the hierarchical ordering of <u>positions</u> in the state apparatus now came under the direct determination of the relations of production, the <u>agents</u> who occupied those positions continued to be selected and removed through volatile political methods, making the exact social composition of the state bourgeoisie, at any given moment, seem perceptibly fluid and amorphous.[57] Precisely because statization of the economy brought the whole range of socio-economic issues connected to class power under political jurisdic-

tion, individual members of the state bourgeoisie in Tanzania would never know the permanence and security of wealth and power which derive from private property in the means of production, sanctioned by the institutions and practices of civil society, and underwritten by a state power removed from the actual process of production.

Yet the re-fusion of class power and state power achieved in the aftermath of the 1967 decrees ultimately rendered their empirical differentiation anachronistic: controversy over the relative weight and importance to be attached to each has both obscured and underlined a central distinguishing feature of state capitalism, which is the indistinction of polity and economy inherent in political accumulation.[58] The separation of 'politics' and 'economics' -- a structural peculiarity of the capitalist mode of production proper, but only a conjunctural incident in the evolution of the Tanzania social formation -- simply dissolved and disintegrated with the advent of an 'immature' state monopoly capitalism in the country. For, once the material basis of the state apparatus had come to rest on State property, the 'political' agency supported by the one could never come into any fundamental contradiction with the 'economic' agency supported by the other. The permanent adversaries of an authoritarian statism that now enveloped both economy and civil society lay elsewhere: in the Tanzanian proletariat and peasantry.

Notes

[1]Andre Gunder Frank, Lumpenbourgeoisie:Lumpendevelopment (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), p. 94.

[2]Bill Warren, 'Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization,' New Left Review, No. 81 (September-October 1973). Warren's position has subsequently been expanded, with only minor shifts as to emphasis, in a posthumously published book: Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism (London: Verso, 1980).

[3]In works dealing directly with Tanzania, Warren's influence seems to be most pronounced in a recent series of essays by Suzanne Mueller: 'Retarded Capitalism in Tanzania,' The Socialist Register 1980 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980), 'Barriers to the Further Development of Capitalism in Tanzania: The Case of Tobacco,' Capital & Class, No. 15 (Autumn 1981), and 'The Historical Origins of Tanzania's Ruling Class,' Canadian Journal of African Studies, No. 3 (1981). Mueller, however, acknowledges another inspiration for her work -- in which parallels are drawn between TANU strategy and late nineteenth century Narodnism -- in Lenin's early essays on the agrarian question in Russia, without apparently being aware of the theoretical and empirical errors these contain, or the fact that Lenin later implicitly repudiated his earlier views. For a sustained critique of Lenin's works on the agrarian question in Russia, see Chantal de Crisenoy, Lénine face aux moujiks (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1978); and for Lenin's more 'mature' positions, see 'The Essence of "The Agrarian Problem of Russia",' in Collected Works, Vol. 18 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964).

The political and intellectual affinities of Warren's argument with the 'legal marxism' of the Second International have been explored by Michael Löwy, The Politics of Combined and Uneven Development (London: Verso, 1981), pp. 223-227 -- affinities which, particularly where political implications are concerned, seem to escape many analyses informed by his work. But it should be noted that, whereas much of the controversy inspired by Warren's polemic has revolved around the growing strength of a 'national bourgeoisie' in the third world, Warren was himself quite uninterested in this point ('Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization,' pp. 42-43).

[4]For three very different empirical and theoretical critiques of Warren, see Philip McMichael, James Petras and Robert Rhodes, 'Imperialism and the Contradictions of Development,' and Arghiri Emmanuel, 'Myths of Development versus Myths of Underdevelopment,' New Left Review, No. 85 (May-June 1974); and Alain Lipietz, 'Marx or Rostow,' New Left Review, No. 132 (March-April 1982).

[5]Warren, 'Imperialism...,' p. 6.

[6]An overly generic view of the capitalist periphery issuing in equally over-generalized descriptive statements and causal explanations

lies at the root inadequacy of many contemporary discussions of the capitalist periphery. 'It cannot even be accepted...that "the Third World" or "the periphery" actually designates a unitary reality. For while national per capita income varies from 1 to 3 in the OECD "centre", the corresponding spread is 1 to 27 in the rest of the world outside the eastern bloc.' Alain Lipietz, 'Towards Global Fordism?,' New Left Review, No. 132 (March-April 1982), p. 33.

[7]One need only recall, in this connection, that the FLN had been militarily defeated and physically expelled from Algeria prior to French withdrawal and decolonization of the territory; that US withdrawal from Vietnam hinged on rapprochement with China; that the victory of national liberation movements in Portuguese Africa were preceded by the fall of fascism in Portugal itself; and, more recently, that Britain (the oldest and most decadent of the imperialist metropolises) easily defeated Argentina (by any standards, one of the most advanced 'semi-peripheral' countries of the third world) in the contest over the Malvinas. It is, in this connection, somewhat curious that the record of metropolitan military interventions in the postcolonial third world finds no place in Warren's arguments on 'the decline of imperialism'.

[8]The fact that this singular imperialist bloc has been disintegrating under the pressure of new inter-imperialist rivalries, since the late 1960s, should not obscure the fact that decolonization took place in a conjuncture of 'ultra-imperialism': two decades of relative harmony among the metropolitan centres of imperialism, characterized by the internationalization of capitalist relations through the growth of multinational corporations, international currency markets and supranational mechanisms of global capitalist regulation. For a useful discussion of transformations in the organization of the world economy, see Giovanni Arrighi, 'A Crisis of Hegemony,' in Samir Amin etal., Dynamics of Global Crisis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982).

[9]Thus a recent, and thoroughly documented, study isolates 'four prime factors involved in the decision to relocate world market production to free production zones' in the third world: '(1) the availability of a practically unlimited supply of labour, (2) the utilization of an extremely productive labour-force, (3) the utilization of an extremely cheap labour-force, (4) the utilization of an extremely "compliant" labour-force.' Folker Fröbel, Jurgen Heinrichs and Otto Kreye, The New International Division of Labour (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 327-328.

[10]In studies of Tanzania, this thesis has been given its strongest formulation by Henry Bernstein, 'Notes on State and Peasantry: the Tanzanian Case,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 21 (May-September 1981), p. 48, who suggests that, 'given the scale and strategic nature of the World Bank, its Dar es Salaam office which is at the centre of a network of linkages connecting important Ministries and parastatals is effectively a state apparatus in its own right, albeit of a distinctive kind' (p. 48).

[11]On 'protective' and 'anticipatory' calculations in the deter-

mination of imperialist strategy, see Paul Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), pp. 302-303.

[12]For an extended discussion of ideology as a social process forming human subjectivity, and 'subjecting' and 'qualifying' individuals to a given social order, and specific roles within it, see the stimulating essay by Göran Therborn, The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology (London: Verso, 1980), esp. pp. 15-28.

[13]See Michaela Von Freyhold, 'The Post-Colonial State and its Tanzanian Version,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 8 (January-April 1977), p. 81 -- much the best discussion of the structure of the State in Tanzania, as opposed to the subjective class forces which contend for control over it.

[14]One illustration of how positions in the state apparatus pattern the behavior of the personnel who fill them is appropriate at this point. It concerns the relations between 'peasants and bureaucrats' which figure so heavily in much of the critical literature on 'Tanzanian socialism'. The exact problem is neatly summarized by Raikes in the following passage:

'Most administrators have imbibed liberal doses of elitism and "modernization" ideology with their education, during the colonial period, and this has been reinforced by their job-training (especially for extension officers). This tells them that they are the bearers of modernity to a traditional peasantry, who will resist their innovations through conservatism and ignorance. Acceptance of the "traditional-modern" framework leads to an uncritical attitude towards all "innovations" since they are by definition "modern". Thus failure by peasants to "adapt" leads not to critical scrutiny of the innovations and of their relevance but is seen simply as further evidence of the ignorance and stupidity of the peasants, and so often leads to the use of more coercive and heavy-handed methods of policy implementation. This in turn gives rise to further peasant alienation, expressed either as apathy or as passive resistance..., once again misinterpreted as dumb stupidity.' Philip Raikes, 'Ujamaa and Rural Socialism,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 3 (May-October 1975), pp. 40-41.

The point that needs to be made at this stage concerns, not the 'technical' rationality or irrationality of 'bureaucratic' approaches to rural development, but rather the political necessity of such an approach in order for party-state personnel to be effective in controlling the peasantry. The separation of intellectual and manual labour, as a technology of power, expressed in peasant-State relations simultaneously sanctions the dominance of party-state personnel and the subordination of the peasantry, while maintaining the peasantry at a permanent distance from 'knowledge', and hence power; modernization theory is simply the intellectual vehicle of capitalist domination on the terrain of ideology. In an environment of generalized cultural poverty, State monopoly of 'knowledge' seems to be a natural corollary of State monopoly of violence.

[15]The major implication of this argument is that the tendency of many scholars to 'label' party-state personnel as a unitary social class on the basis of a more or less common social background is mistaken: see, for a nuanced example of this approach, John Saul, The State and Revolution

in Eastern Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), chap. 8; and the critiques of his arguments by Colin Leys, 'The "Overdeveloped" Post Colonial State: A Re-evaluation,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 5 (January-April 1976), esp. pp. 44-45, and Gavin Williams, 'There is no theory of petit-bourgeois politics,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 6 (May-August 1976).

Poulantzas, around whose work much contemporary debate on the 'postcolonial' state revolves, argued clearly and forcefully in his first major work that the unity of the state administration 'is not determined by its class membership,' but by 'a specific system of organization and internal functioning of the state apparatus': Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, 1973), pp. 335,332. Put another way, it might be said that occupation of a position in a state apparatus confers on an individual -- irrespective of 'class background' -- the 'quality' of being the administrator of a certain type of State. This is undoubtedly one of the reasons why Marx insisted that 'the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes': Karl Marx, 'The Civil War in France,' in The First International and After (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 206. This argument on the primacy of structure over agency will be returned to below, in another context.

[16]Hamza Alavi, 'The State in Postcolonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh,' in Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma, Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), p. 147; also Saul, op cit., p. 172: 'Historically, the colonial state in East Africa became "overdeveloped" not so much in response to a need to "subordinate the native social classes" as from a need to subordinate precapitalist, generally nonfeudal, social formations to the imperatives of colonial capitalism.' For a conceptual and empirical critique of this theory, see W. Ziemann and M. Lozendorfer, 'The State in Peripheral Societies,' in Ralph Miliband and John Saville, eds., The Socialist Register 1977 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977). Moreover, despite the usual disclaimers, it does, in fact, suggest an 'instrumentalist' perspective on the State: the history of colonial state construction is ultimately reduced to the imposition of (foreign) class domination, rather than a continuously shaped and re-shaped product of popular resistance and class struggles.

[17]Benedict Anderson's apt expression: Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). The diverse ways in which different classes 'imagined' the outcome of independence, and the way these conflicted with the 'official nationalism' of the postcolonial regime, are considered below.

[18]Definitions and the specific weight of 'kulaks' in the Tanzanian social formation are a controversial issue. Von Freyhold argues that: 'If one defines a kulak as a type of rural capitalist who hires labour on his farm and who is also a businessman, there was no area in Tanzania where members of this class could not be found and where they were not increasing their economic power. The farms of many of these kulaks were still rather small compared to those found in many other third world countries -- 30 hectares of annual crops was considered a big farm in Tanzania -- and even

their commercial operations were still of a rather moderate scope; but the dynamic within which they operated and their impact on the common peasants resembled closely the social dynamic of the kulaks that were being discussed in the Soviet Union in the middle of the 1920s': Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania (London: Heinemann, 1979), p. 42. For a sampling of statistics on the distribution of land holdings in rural Tanzania, see Jannik Boesen, Birgit Storgaard Madsen and Tony Moody, Ujamaa -- Socialism from Above (Uppsala: Scandanavian Institute of African Studies, 1977), p. 28, and A. Awati, 'Ismani and the Rise of Capitalism,' in Lionel Cliffe et al., eds., Rural Cooperation in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1975). However, given the accepted estimate of approximately 200 'kulaks' with farms of 20 hectares at independence, it would seem that -- considered in any comparative perspective -- the extent of rural capitalism in Tanzania has been greatly exaggerated. The political significance of 'kulaks', as opposed to their economic consequence, is considered below.

[19]On Tanzania, see Chapter III of this study; on European feudalism, see Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: Verso, 1979), esp. pp. 397-431. For a historical and theoretical survey of the relationship of class power and state power, see Ellen Meiksins Wood, 'The Separation of the Economic and Political in Capitalism,' New Left Review, No. 127 (May-June 1981).

[20]The subjective pressures fueling this objective trend towards expansion of the state apparatus have been noted by Von Freyhold in all their ambiguity: referring to party-state personnel, she writes that 'Collectively they were in favour of the expansion of the economic and political power of the state; individually they hoped to become private and usually agricultural capitalists after their early retirement.' Ujamaa Villages..., p. 120.

[21]The paradox of electoral process in postcolonial Tanzania is well illustrated by the fact that, in 1980, national elections were held for the fourth time on schedule; the results returned Nyerere to office with a 93.04% majority, over the non-existent oppositional candidate. Yet, Bienefeld seems correct to criticize those who regard the regime as just another 'dictatorship of the bourgeoisie', on the grounds that 'it will lure people into the belief that a Ghanaian coup would make no difference.' M.A. Bienefeld, 'The Class Analysis of Tanzania,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 4 (May-October 1975), p. 108. However, the alternative view Bienefeld offers -- of a State controlled by a 'progressive fraction of the Tanzanian bureaucracy' -- is still inadequate, because it divorces the issues involved from the field of politics proper: i.e. power. Moreover, it is impossible to predict how Nyerere and TANU might react if in danger of being swept from power electorally, since such a possibility is institutionally precluded (a point utterly lost on supporters of Tanzania's 'democratic socialism'); but it is sobering to recall that such people elsewhere have always been willing, and anxious, to accept an exceptional form of regime should popular militancy threaten. The relationship between capitalism and democracy has been surveyed in two essays -- far superior to anything yet produced by sociology or political science -- by Therborn: 'The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy,' New Left Review, No. 103 (May-June 1977), and 'The Travail of Latin American Democracy,'

New Left Review, Nos. 113-114 (January-April 1979).

[22]'Parochialism cuts deep in the rural areas; the outlines of the broader exploitative environment, worldwide and territorial, which oppress them, are not easily perceived by the peasants and as a result "the aggregate of small producers" constitute themselves only with difficulty as a group capable of "a shared consciousness and joint political action as a class".' Saul, op cit., p. 299. For a much stronger statement on the limits to peasant political activity, see Nigel Harris, 'The Revolutionary Role of the Peasants,' International Socialism, No. 1:41 (December-January 1969-1970).

[23]Electoral appeals on the basis of ethnicity and religion are officially prohibited in Tanzania, by laws which are rigorously enforced: for example, when the head of the TANU 'Elders' Section' complained about the absence of Muslims from party candidate lists in 1957, he was promptly expelled from the party -- Harvey Glicksman, 'Traditional Pluralism and Democratic Processes in Mainland Tanzania,' in Cliffe and Saul, eds., Socialism in Tanzania, Vol. 1 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972).

On the other hand, juridical obstacles to ethnic and religious electoral appeals have not prevented the 'cultural' differentiation of party-state personnel (most of whom tend to be drawn, predictably enough, from those regions with the highest index of commercialization in agriculture) from the rest of the population. In a detailed study of the rural economy, Thoden Van Velzen has noted that 'the staff form a social grouping with distinctive prestige symbols. They speak Kiswahili, while the peasants use their tribal language... They enjoy a higher standard of living with all the symbols connected with this, e.g. clothing, housing, food and recreation. After working hours they associate more with each other than with peasants. Almost all staff people, with the exception of some messangers, are members of the Moravian Church, while the majority of the peasants are pagans.' H.U.E. Thoden Van Velzen, 'Staff, Kulaks and Peasants: A Study of a Political Field,' in Cliffe and Saul, eds., op cit., p. 156.

[24]'...Tanzania did remain, for a variety of reasons, one of the African countries least transformed by international capitalism and, also one of the world's most desperately poor countries. Ironically, as regards its prospects for breaking out of the syndrome of underdevelopment, it thus experienced some of the benefits of being a tabula rasa -- less distorted and therefore more open-ended.' Saul, 'African Socialism in One Country,' in Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, Essays on the Political Economy of Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), p. 256. For a brief official assessment of the type and scope of reforms -- particularly in health and education -- implemented by the regime, see Julius Nyerere, 'The Arusha Declaration Ten Years After,' in Andrew Coulson, ed., African Socialism in Practice: The Tanzanian Experience (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1979), esp. pp. 48-51.

[25]Given 'the memory of the "heroic" periods of mass mobilization, originally in the nationalist movement against foreign political rule, and "replayed" at the time of the Arusha Declaration,' which echoes loudly in

many analyses of 'Tanzanian socialism', a recent evaluation of the depth of TANU's impact and influence in the countryside, before and after independence, is worth reproducing at length: 'The anti-colonial mobilization of the 1950s was a more ambiguous social process than the political folklore recognizes. Certainly widespread peasant opposition to the regulations imposed by the rural development schemes of the late colonial period coincided with the campaign of TANU for national independence, and could be channeled into support for it, but...it is a sad comment on the leftist mythology of " peasant nationalism" in Tanzania, that it has been left to writers of the political modernization variety to point out (a) the limited and conditional nature of the support of most peasants for the demand of national independence, and (b) the subsequent decline in state control over the peasantry in the years after Independence...' Bernstein, op cit., p. 55.

[26]See, for example, the brief sketch of early union formation in Dar es Salaam drawn by John Iliffe, 'The Creation of Group Consciousness Among the Dockworkers of Dar es Salaam 1929-50,' in Richard Sandbrook and Robin Cohen, eds., The Development of an African Working Class (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1975); also M.A. Bienefeld, Trade Unions and Peripheral Capitalism (Brighton, U.K.: IDS Discussion Paper No. 112, 1977).

[27]On union demands for wage increases, see Ioan Davies, African Trade Unions (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1966), p. 11. Between 1961 and 1962, the number of man-days lost increased from 113,000 to 417,000: Justinian Rweyemamu, Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 47. Coupled with concessions, anti-labour legislation had reduced the number to 1862 by 1965: M.A. Bienefeld, 'Socialist Development and the Workers in Tanzania,' in Sandbrook and Cohen, eds., op cit., p. 258n.

[28]See Bienefeld, 'Socialist Development...,' p. 243.

[29]Nyerere, Freedom and Unity (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 169.

[30]See Henry Bienen, 'National Security in Tanganyika after the Mutiny,' in Cliffe and Saul, eds., op cit. Moreover, since the mutiny, the officer corps 'has been consistently coopted into official circles, on the one hand, and political commissars, political education, have been made features of the military structure, on the other.' Saul, 'African Socialism...,' p. 253.

[31]Davies, op cit., pp. 110-111.

[32]'A Presidential Commission appointed to investigate the new union...indicted the body as inefficient, bureaucratic and irresponsible, in terms difficult to exaggerate.' The administration replied that their own commission's 'report on NUTA was one-sided, though it acknowledged the existence of a problem. It rejected the major recommendation of the report -- to make the post of General Secretary elective -- and took little correct-

ive action in response to the serious problems exposed. The reason was undoubtedly its awareness that under the new policies control of trade unionism would be of particular importance, and this control would have to be maintained in the face of severe wage restriction. Thus the government announced that "...there is a change in the role of trade unionism brought about by the new policy of Socialism based on Self-Reliance. Under a colonial administration, even for as long as a system of unrestricted capitalism and private enterprise survived under an independent Government, the labour movement was justified in making profits the basis for higher wage claims. But Socialism now means centralized planning for economic and social development with resulting benefits spread equally throughout all sectors of the community: it does not mean freedom for the trade union movement, or any other organization or institution, to pursue group or sectional interests to the possible detriment of others".' Bienefeld, 'Socialist Development...,' pp. 249-250. This theme of workers as potential 'exploiters' of other sectors of the population -- a theme common to every capitalist State -- would become a permanent element in the official discourse of 'Tanzanian socialism'.

[33]Address to the First Annual Congress of NUTA, cited in Issa Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), p. 77.

[34]Contrary to those scholars who believe that the nationalist leadership squandered much of their popular support after independence, it would seem that, in fact, TANU extracted maximum mileage from its massive electoral mandate. For instance, the restructuration of TANU after independence led to the creation of an institutional space for the incorporation of every conceivable sociological sector of the population -- ranging from workers to elders and women to youth -- within the party structure, under the pretext of providing for their 'representation'; Nyerere would, in fact, argue in 1963 that 'No party which limits its membership to a clique can ever free itself from the fear of overthrow by those it has excluded. It must be constantly on the watch for signs of opposition...': Freedom and Unity, p. 201.

However, once 'represented' within TANU, there could be no reason for any autonomous organization outside the party machine; indeed, any such rival organization would automatically constitute an 'opposition', to be eliminated as such. Nyerere's 'philosophical' sophistries on the 'democratic' advantages of a single-party statism are belied by the profoundly authoritarian impulses behind the decision to erect such an apparatus in the first place, as his own instructions to the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One Party State demonstrate: 'it is not the task of the Commission to consider whether Tanganyika should be a One Party State. That decision has already been taken.' Report of the Presidential Commission, cited in Idrian N. Resnick, The Long Transition: Building Socialism in Tanzania (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981), p. 281n.

But the real significance of the decision to opt for a single party statism lay elsewhere: for the unitary party-state format chosen by the nationalist leadership in effect institutionalized TANU as a branch of the state apparatus, at precisely the moment a political opposition was

beginning to appear -- for which, see Henry Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 58-59.

[35]During the movement for independence, TANU -- playing on the communal symbols and values of the peasantry -- had expressed its ideological opposition to agrarian capitalism. But the nationalization of land in 1962 was aimed exclusively at halting the expansion of expatriate agribusiness; it left 'traditional' land tenure arrangements intact. It is absolutely essential, moreover, to distinguish between 'nationalization', which confers formal custody of means of production on the State, and 'statization', which involves effective control by state personnel. Needless to say, a radical programme of 'socialization' involves different principles altogether: see Karl Korsch, 'What is Socialization?,' in Douglas Kellner, ed., Karl Korsch: Revolutionary Theory (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974).

[36]'In some senses independence thus appeared as a victory of the peasants. The coercive power of state organs at the local level had been weakened and the prestige of the field staff had been undermined. Peasants expected to be left alone to do as they pleased after independence. The victory they had achieved was, however, only a local one, and the new state soon confronted the peasants with the same demands as the old one. For a decade government staff struggled to regain power over the peasants and to get their production under control.' Von Freyhold, Ujamaa Villages..., p. 35. On the Native Authority after independence, see Norman N. Miller, 'The Political Survival of Traditional Leadership,' in Cliffe and Saul, eds., op cit., who argues that the postcolonial 'situation closely resembles the relationship between chiefs and the colonial administration under indirect rule' (p. 146).

[37]The 'focal point approach' in the colonial and postcolonial periods are discussed, against the background of 'mass compulsion', in Andrew Coulson, 'Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 10 (September-December 1977), pp. 78-82.

[38]Rayah Feldman provides a useful discussion of the intersections of economic and political power at the village level: 'Rural Social Differentiation and Political Goals in Tanzania,' in Ivar Oxaal, Tony Barnett and David Booth, eds., Beyond the Sociology of Development (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975). However, since a number of important theoretical and political questions are involved here, some additional comments are in order.

Although 'cultural' mores focused on kinship continue to have their own autonomous efficacy, wealth itself has a very direct and obvious determination on the distribution of political power within peasant communities. Petty accumulation by 'kulaks' can sometimes be taken to indicate certain 'positive' character traits which may affirm in the peasant consciousness the rich peasantry's claim to leadership of the community as a whole. In turn, the 'kulaks' are invested with the roles of village organizer and arbitrator, as well as 'benefactor' through a range of so-called 'patron-client' relationships. The ambiguous nature of rural class

conflict is, perhaps, partially illuminated from this vantage point. For, on the one hand, as local leaders the 'kulaks' often become the effective translators of state policy to the peasantry, and party-state personnel will be quick to align with them. On the other hand, however, where the 'kulaks' obviously and deliberately violate state policy, the contempt shown for 'outside' interference in the rural economy may be widely felt, sympathized with, and admired by the peasantry proper, even if for very different social and historical reasons. But the price paid by the 'kulaks' for this local political security is an inability to express themselves as an organized political force at the national level. For to secure local leadership among the peasantry requires, precisely, that 'kulaks' be perceived locally and individually as 'just another peasant', who differs from the others only insofar as the 'kulak' seems to possess to a higher degree than average all those character traits common to, and respected among, the local peasantry as a whole. To act nationally as a class, by contrast, is to risk being perceived as a member of a 'foreign' group, whose interests are equally 'foreign' to the local population. Hence, the inability of 'kulaks' to constitute themselves as a class force influencing the formulation of state policy in Tanzania.

[39]Rweyemamu, op cit.; Gerhard Tschannerl, 'Periphery Capitalist Development: A Case Study of the Tanzanian Economy,' Utafiti, No. 1 (1976).

[40]These popular appellations for the party-state administration are relayed in Von Freyhold, 'The Post-Colonial State...,' p. 86, and Resnick, op cit., p. 78.

[41]Thus a Presidential Commission instructed to investigate rural cooperatives reported the following testimony of peasants: 'We complain of the very low prices which are paid for our crops...that the same crop bought from us by the National Agricultural Products Board would later sell at a price almost double that obtained by us even when there has been no transport involved before the second transaction. It is absurd to believe that a bag of maize which the Board buys for Shs.22/- is worth Shs.46/80 immediately after it has been removed from a society godown to the Board's godown which is just about 200 yards away. These boards fix prices for us, but they do not keep us informed of the prices which our crops fetch in outside markets. We are induced to join societies with the promise that... we would receive a second payment when the crop is finally marketed by the board. But now...instead we are told every year that our societies incur losses.' Cited in Resnick, op cit., p. 67. Surely, no further comment is necessary on the practices of corruption and unequal exchange in the Tanzanian countryside.

[42]On the formation of Nyerere's personal views 'Socialism and Self-Reliance', see Cranford Pratt, The Critical Phase in Tanzania, 1945-1968 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1976), chap. 8. The 1967 decrees are contained in Nyerere, Essays on Socialism (London: Oxford University Press, 1968) -- one of the several collections of Nyerere's 'works', ranging from TANU decrees to speeches at diplomatic tea parties. Nyerere seems determined to go down in history as a major political theorist; in fact, while occasionally quite eloquent, his contribution to political theory has been microscopic. The repetitious elements of

Nyerere's version of 'African socialism' emerge clearly in Jitendra Mohan's early survey of the ideological confguration of postcolonial Africa: 'Varieties of African Socialism,' in Miliband and Saville, eds., The Socialist Register 1966 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966).

[43]In this connection, it is crucial that 'capital' be understood as an objective social relation, rather than a subjective motivational 'drive', to avoid any unnecessary misunderstanding. 'The term "parastatals" is generally used to refer to those governmental organizations which fall outside the main lines of the departmental and ministerial hierarchies and which have, in consequence, some measure of quasi-autonomy in their day-to-day activities (though of course all are ultimately tied into the centralized decision making process).' John Loxley and John Saul, 'Multinationals, Workers and the Parastatals in Tanzania,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 2 (December-April 1974-1975), p. 55 -- a very good discussion of the operations of 'parastatals' in Tanzania.

[44]Nyerere, Freedom and Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 49. The themes of 'work' and 'discipline' in the official discourse of 'Tanzanian socialism' are explored in Harry Goulbourne, 'Some Aspects of Ideological Functions in the Development of the Post-Colonial State in Tanzania,' Utafiti, No. 2 (1978), pp. 388-391.

[45]The exact weight and import to be attached to the 'leadership code' is an extremely controversial issue in studies of Tanzania, reflecting the widespread theoretical significance attached to what is, from a marxist perspective, a relation of distribution only. Pratt, op cit. chap. 8, provides a fairly balanced discussion of the code and its 'loopholes'. In passing, however, it may be noted that much of the discussion around income inequality, or the lack of it, in Tanzania is somewhat misplaced. Sabot -- in what is, by any standards, an extremely orthodox economic account -- notes that income differentials between 'professionals' and 'unskilled workers' are higher in Tanzania (349:100) than those in Britain (266:100). He concludes that 'the ratio of wages and salaries of higher level government officials to those further down the occupational ladder is higher in Tanzania than in most developed countries,' however much less it may be than elsewhere in the third world. R.H. Sabot, Economic Development and Urban Migration, Tanzania 1900-1971 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 210-211.

[46]For all their differences, the notion of some fundamental conflict between factions of the party-state adminsitration, or between the party and the state, is common to such diverse scholars as: Saul, The State and Revolution..., p. 184; Shivji, op cit., p. 98; Leys, op cit., p. 46; and Von Freyhold, 'The Post-Colonial State..., p. 84. Needless to say, there is much of interest in each of these discussions, but conflicts within the party-state apparatus are surely secondary to the point made here. As far as conflict between the party and the state is concerned, it should be noted that state personnel frequently justify their actions by reference to party directives, while party personnel do the reverse -- they form an indissolvable unity. On this, see Von Freyhold, p. 83-84.

[47]The figure on domestic private capital formation is from Carol Barker and David Wield, 'Notes on International Firms in Tanzania,' Utafiti, No. 2 (1978), pp. 319-320. On Asian capital, see Shivji, op cit., pp. 80-84. And on the 'avoidance' of Tanzania by metropolitan capital in the early years after independence, see Rweyemanu, op cit., who argues that 'the leadership's overestimate of international capitalism's interest in the economy and its beneficient role as a growth-promoter was due to a fundamental misunderstanding of contemporary capitalism' (p. 40).

[48]The relations, frequently 'shady', between the 'parastatals' and non-state capital has been subject to some excellent investigative research within Tanzania: see especially, Shivji, 'Tanzania: The Silent Struggle,' in Cliffe and Saul, eds., op cit., Vol. 2; and the articles collected in Part III, 'Parastatals and Economic Management,' in Coulson, ed., op cit., pp. 175-213.

[49]The figure on Tanzania is calculated from Von Freyhold, Ujamaa Villages..., p. 108; the figure on Chile is from Ralph Miliband, 'The Coup in Chile,' in Robin Blackburn, ed., Revolution & Class Struggle (Glasgow: Fontana, 1977), p. 419.

[50]The first 'parastatals' were modeled on British experience, which gave management total independence, with instructions 'to use its best endeavors to secure that its business as a whole is carried on at a net profit taking one year with another.' Tanganyika National Development Corporation Act, cited in Robert Seidman, The State, Law and Development (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 263.

[51]Bettelheim argues that: 'The real significance depends on the real relations existing between the mass of the workers and the state apparatus...if the workers do not dominate the state apparatus, if it is dominated by a body of functionaries and administrators, and if it escapes the control and direction of the working masses, then this body of functionaries and administrators effectively becomes the proprietor (in the sense of a relation of production) of the means of production. This body then forms a social class (a state bourgeoisie) because of the relations existing between itself and the means of production, on the one hand, and the workers on the other.' Charles Bettelheim, Economic Calculation and Forms of Property (New York: Monthly Review, 1976), pp. 98-99. As his subsequent work on the Soviet Union and China demonstrates, however, Bettelheim's conception of the 'relations of production' in fact centre on political and ideological relations existing between the 'masses' and the 'party', rather than on the relations between immediate producers and the organizers of production. The differences between his argument and the one advanced in this study need to be underlined, since they are crucial to conceptions of 'capitalism' and 'socialism'.

[52]'The non-arbitrariness of the choice of these three dimensions of class relations is reflected in their correspondence to the three elements in the formal value equations of Marxist political economy (total value = C + V + S). The control over the physical means of production represents relations of control over constant capital; control over labour implies relations of control over variable capital; and control over

investments and accumulation implies relations of control over surplus value.' Erik Olin Wright, Class, Crisis and the State (London: Verso, 1979), p. 73n. On the extent of this class power (not, however, referred to as such), see Loxley and Saul, op cit.; Reginald Harbold Green, 'Tanzanian Political Economy Goals, Strategies and Results, 1967-1974: Notes Towards an Interim Assessment,' and Loxley, 'Monetary Institutions and Class Struggle in Tanzania,' both in Bismarck U. Mwansasu and Cranford Pratt, eds., Towards Socialism in Tanzania (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1979).

[53]Bettelheim argues that, under a situation of state capitalism, the state bourgeoisie disposes of the surplus product 'according to norms that are class norms, norms that include an obligation to allow the market and the "criteria of profitability" to play a dominant role' (op cit., p. 99). Loxley and Saul, in a concise discussion of the political regulation of 'parastatals', conclude that the primary considerations governing State investment policy in Tanzania are: profitability; national cost/benefit; and foreign exchange effects (op cit., pp. 63-71). These are precisely the sort of formal criteria identified by Bettelheim as constituting commercial profitability in a state capitalist economy. However, it should be noted that the operation of capitalist enterprises does not exhaust the economic activity of the Tanzanian State, any more than it does other capitalist states; for discussions of the different types of economic activity engaged in by capitalist states, see James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), chap. 1; and Ian Gough, 'State Expenditures in Advanced Capitalism,' New Left Review, No. 92 (July-August 1975).

[54]The 'structure' of a 'collective capitalist' performing the 'global function of capital' is explored by Guglielmo Carchedi, On the Economic Identification of Social Classes (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), chap. 1. In Chapter 2 of the same work, Carchedi also explores the class collocation of 'state employees' on the basis of distinctions between 'capitalist' and 'non-capitalist' state economic activities, productive and unproductive labour, surplus-labour and surplus-value appropriation, and so on. Unfortunately, space and competence preclude the presentation of such a sophisticated analysis of Tanzanian state capitalism here.

[55]Hugh Roberts, 'The Algerian Bureaucracy,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 24 (May-August 1982), suggests that the distinguishing feature of state capitalism is its structure as a 'capitalism without capitalists'. Yet a 'capitalism without capitalists' is as inconceivable as a 'capitalism without workers'.

[56]The problem as to precisely 'who', among the broad range of 'state employees' in Tanzania, is or is not a member of the state bourgeoisie is an empirical question, which can only be answered on the basis of empirical research which -- minimally -- succeeds in capturing relations of control over the total value advanced in 'parastatal' enterprises, producing a typology of class positions which range from the state bourgeoisie proper to ordinary workers. The wide range of 'intermediate strata' between the class positions of capital and labour, who have 'one foot in the proletariat and one foot in the bourgeoisie' (as Braverman puts it), should not be con-

fused with 'petit-bourgeois' class positions -- a term which has a precise meaning in marxist theory, referring to positions outside the polar class structure of the capitalist mode of production (specifically to self-employed individuals who do not employ the labour-power of others). Harry Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), p. 407.

For a thorough survey of contemporary marxist perspectives on class structure, see Wright, 'Varieties of Marxist Conceptions of Class Structure,' Politics and Society, No. 3 (1980); the political and ideological corollaries -- supervision, the dominance of intellectual over manual labour and so on -- to the relations of 'economic' control outlined earlier, are explored in Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1975).

[57] Carchedi writes: '...why is it necessary to distinguish between position and agents of production and why do we have to consider both elements? If we only considered the agents, disregarding the positions occupied by them, we would make at least two major mistakes. First, we could not identify those agents in terms of production relations and thus could not collocate them in the social structure in terms of these relations. We would then be left in the position of the bourgeois sociologist who classified "people" in terms of income (distribution relations which are determined by production relations), status (ideological relations, determined by production and distribution relations), etc. Secondly, ...we would identify the social system with the people making it up. Reasoning ad absurdum, even if all the capitalists suddenly disappeared, the nature of the capitalist system would remain the same because new people would fill up those positions conferring the quality of being a capitalist' (op cit., p. 171). The argument relates back to the discussion of the relation between state personnel and the state apparatus after decolonization.

[58] For a parallel argument, set against the background of a very different debate, see Robert Brenner, 'The Agrarian Roots of European Capitalism,' Past and Present, No. 97 (November 1982), p. 40. Having made the differential contours of the state bourgeoisie and the party-state administration clear earlier, no rigorous attempt will be made to distinguish between the two in the text henceforward, given the structural fusion of class power and state power which statization of the economy effected.

CHAPTER V

AN ANATOMY OF THE 'TANZANIAN ROAD TO SOCIALISM' – II

1. Class and Ideology

The major idiosyncracies underscoring the trajectory of the Tanzanian social formation in the first decade after independence can now be summed up as follows: the markedly limited capitalization of the relations of production in the territory, combined with the absence of any powerful settler concerns or severe 'internal' class polarity, had permitted the emergence and eventual political dominance of a compact and composite force, drawn from diverse social backgrounds into TANU, which succeeded in capturing and canalizing the most basic interests of Tanzanian popular classes, carrying the whole social formation through decolonization and beyond. At the same time, however, the material basis of this national-popular hegemony was being progressively undermined by the slow, but irreversible, collapse of the colonial regime of accumulation on which the State edifice was reciprocally dependent: subverted from below by the intransigence of the peasantry and proletariat, deserted from above by the exodus of the settler community and Asian merchants, unredeemed from abroad by a metropolitan capital which continued to maintain its traditional indifference to the territory. Against this background of eroding popular support and unfolding economic crisis, the original 'underdetermination' of the postcolonial regime would be rapidly succeeded by a deepening statolatry -- a predictable consequence of the elimination

of every alternative agency of socio-economic development. In any historical perspective, the post-1967 statization of the commanding heights of the economy simply confirmed what the earlier repressive statization of civil society had already signalled: the conspicuous absence of any powerful foreign or domestic capitalist interests in the country. The necessary international and national political space was thus left open for a State-sponsored 'passive revolution' in the regime of accumulation, which would impose an 'immature' state capitalism -- ultimately validated, rather than excommunicated, by imperialism -- on Tanzanian workers and peasants, shifting the coordinates of 'Tanzanian socialism' still further into the political format of an authoritarian statism. For once State property in the means of production and commerce had been instituted, the postcolonial regime stood directly counterposed to the proletariat and the peasantry -- there could not but be an authoritarian strengthening in its organization and practices.

In fact, the early 1970s saw working class militancy, after having been momentarily silenced by the ideological promise of 'Socialism and Self-Reliance', revive on a massive scale in the urban areas of Tanzania, where it now directly challenged the class power of the state bourgeoisie at, precisely, the point of production. Yet, the catalyst behind this recharged and reactivated proletarian class activity came, paradoxically, from within the party-state administration itself, where the repercussions from the overthrow of Obote in neighbouring Uganda and the Portuguese invasion of Guinea once again shook the confidence of the postcolonial regime. The 'TANU Guidelines' of 1971 -- like the 'Arusha Declaration' and so many other official decrees both before and after it -- must seem

a curiously radical document when measured against the objective position in power and production relations the party-state administration had come to occupy. Directly addressing the problems of safeguarding the regime against foreign aggression and domestic subversion, the party leadership appealed to 'the people' to defend the 'Tanzanian revolution' against the encroachments of 'imperialist enemies' and their 'local puppets'.[1] More than any other official document, then, the 'TANU Guidelines' raise the difficult question of the relationship between the ideology of 'Tanzanian socialism' and the material practices of authoritarian state capitalism.

There is never any simple and direct causality between objective power structures and the mediate social ideology which envelops them.[2] But if the ideological presentation of 'Tanzanian socialism' has never corresponded to its actual practice, neither is it reducible to pure 'propaganda'. Rather, the official discourse of 'Tanzanian socialism' provides an aperture into, precisely, the position of the party-state administration in Tanzanian social relations, by revealing how that position came to be 'represented' inside the party-state apparatus and externalized to those social classes with whom party-state personnel necessarily maintained relations. In other words, the ideology of 'Tanzanian socialism' operates as a process of 'legitimation' of the practices of the state apparatus, as well as of 'self-legitimation' of personnel within it.[3] To understand its origins and dynamic, it is necessary to refer back to the social and historical conditions of the nationalist movement, which alone render the language of 'Tanzanian socialism' intelligible.

A number of significant facts from the struggle for independence

are worth recalling in this connection. First, whatever its ultimate trajectory, the social force originally organized into TANU developed to political prominence in radical ideological confrontation with the colonial power bloc. By contrast, its sole competitor for leadership of the nationalist movement -- the United Tanganyika Party -- developed under the patronage of the ruling bloc; in a futile effort to translate the social ideology of colonialism into a national-popular language, it unwittingly abandoned the field of popular-democratic, anti-colonial struggle to TANU.

Second, because it began from an extremely narrow social base, TANU necessarily had not only to expand its programme to capture some of the most basic material interests of Tanzanian workers and peasants, but to absorb their different symbols and values into its official discourse, because these represented the only ideological 'raw materials' out of which a national-popular language could be constructed. Needless to say, without a language comprehensible to the popular classes, the political opposition of TANU to the colonial power bloc would never have found the vastly broader social base it did.

Finally -- and this was an essential condition for TANU's subsequent hegemony over the nationalist movement -- few of the symbols and values of the Tanzanian popular classes were incapable of being absorbed into the ideological discourse of TANU due to any fundamental conflict with the material interests of the party leadership. For the social category from which TANU's original leadership was drawn owed its political and ideological homogeneity to a common separation from the dominant relations of production and exchange in the Tanzanian economy. In the colonial period, no rigid social barriers, cemented by differential

class languages, prevented the absorption and translation of the spontaneous ideologies generated within the popular classes into the official discourse of TANU. In the event, virtually every distinguishable 'theme' in the ideology of the colonial power bloc was to be confronted by a counter-theme dissociated from the spontaneous class ideologies of the Tanzanian proletariat and peasantry, and then transformed and re-articulated into a consistent and systematic form by the nationalist leadership.[4]

It was thus possible for independence, when it came, to be represented in the official discourse of the postcolonial regime as the consummation of national-popular objectives and, moreover, to be experienced as such by both the popular classes and the new party-state administration. As if in a hall of mirrors, party-state personnel would, in the first years after decolonization, 'recognize' themselves in the ideological universe of 'Tanzanian socialism' as the legitimate 'leaders' of the Tanzanian 'people', and vice versa. It was this exceptionally symmetric ideological universe -- whose precondition was Tanzania's relative social homogeneity at independence -- that began to decompose, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, before the dialectic of objectivity and subjectivity. For Tanzanian workers and peasants did not only 'recognize' themselves as part of the 'people'; their subordinate insertion into the process of production -- unaffected by decolonization or the subsequent practices of 'Tanzanian socialism' -- would continue to generate a radicalism which remains permanently in the depths of the consiousness of every individual and class subject to exploitation. Temporarily absorbed and neutralized in the popular-democratic discourse of the postcolonial regime, the multiple tensions

which derive from the fundamental antagonisms inherent in capitalist relations of production and exchange threatened to erupt again after 1970, as the subjectivity of first the proletariat, and then the peasantry, began to drift outside the ideological orbit of 'Tanzanian socialism'.

The 'TANU Guidelines' of 1971 responded to both the perception of increased imperialist pressure on the country and the sensation of ideological drift among the popular classes by exacerbating the popular-democratic elements in the official discourse of the postcolonial regime, re-asserting the symmetrical relations between the 'people' and their 'leaders' against common 'enemies'. At the same time, however, the very language in which the document spoke was bound to produce an 'identity crisis' within the state apparatus: for the image of an organic relationship between the 'people' and their 'leaders' projected on the ideological screen of 'Tanzanian socialism' now formed part of a phase in the class trajectory of the party-state administration which had been superseded by the encircling statization of Tanzanian economy and civil society. Ten years of independence had seen the replacement of the open electoral process which initially brought TANU to power by more or less subtle mechanisms of self-perpetuation. The competition for popular support which was to originally regulate relations within the state apparatus had come to be supplanted instead by competition between differential qualifications and career trajectories -- with its accompanying hierarchy of titles and salaries -- among a 'permanent' cadre of personnel in virtually every branch of the state apparatus.

In short, the material framework of an authoritarian statism supported by state capitalism had come to exceed the ideological boundaries of popular-democratic hegemony laid down during an earlier period. 'Inside' the state apparatus, the ideology of 'Tanzanian socialism' represented a capitalist rationalization of organization, requiring the strictest surveillance of performance and opposition (in principle) to every form of nepotism and corruption, to homogenize party-state personnel into a distinct social category. 'Outside', it continued to appeal to the organic relationship between the 'people' and their 'leaders', providing the party-state administration with its ultimate sanction and expression of its social authority, while dissolving the fundamental antagonism between the Tanzanian state bourgeoisie and the popular classes into a matter of simple difference.

It was this contradictory duality in the official discourse of the postcolonial regime that now became the decisive terrain and battlefield of the urban class struggle. For the 'TANU Guidelines' were to rupture the neutralization and passivity of the Tanzanian proletariat which the ideological promise of 'Socialism and Self-Reliance' had effected, by projecting to the 'people' an ego-image of their 'leaders' which was utterly unrecognizable in the factories and on the shop floors. Clause 15 of the document ordered that 'for a Tanzanian leader it must be forbidden to be arrogant, extravagant, contemptuous and oppressive,' giving the signal for a generalized upheaval from below against an alter-image of oppressive capitalist management the working class identified -- from everyday experience -- with the organization and control of production in state and private enterprises

alike. In a series of militant class actions, ranging from spontaneous demonstrations and strikes in 1971 and 1972, to coordinated management lock-outs and factory occupations in 1973, workers seized the party directive as a weapon with which to challenge the personnel and structures which the 'Tanzanian road to socialism' had imposed on them.

Yet working class response to the 'TANU Guidelines' was inherently contradictory, registering simultaneously the politico-ideological hegemony which the postcolonial regime continued to exert, and its material limits. The directive seemed to re-animate proletarian support for the party-state administration in the state apparatus, at the same time as it appeared to sanction opposition to the class power of state and private capital over the productive apparatus. This fundamental ambiguity, in turn, echoed within the various branches of the state apparatus, where an equivocal range of diverse responses to the upsurge in industrial militancy was recorded among party-state personnel. Some, following Nyerere, welcomed the workers' actions without reservation, as a confirmation of their hegemony and an occasion to purge corrupt and incompetent personnel identified by the strikes. Others, more cautious, urged the workers to exercise 'restraint', while insisting that party directives be enforced through the established 'official channels'. Still others, alarmed by any instance of autonomous proletarian activity, raised the spectre of 'falling production rates' and overall damage to the 'national economy', and demanded that Clause 15 of the 'TANU Guidelines' be radically 'revised'.[5] In the event, however, the multiple subjective responses initially registered within the state apparatus were soon to be cemented into a singular reaction,

defined by the objective location of party-state personnel in the structure of power and production relations, and decided by the unfolding logic of the struggles being waged over control of the productive apparatus.

For working class militancy is an irreplaceable instrument in forming the class subjectivity of capital; without it, the Tanzanian state bourgeoisie, and the broader party-state administration ultimately dependent on it, could never recognize its class enemy.[6] When it became clear, however, that a class struggle was being fought over the social organization of production, and when that struggle threatened to permanently breach the institutional boundaries of an authoritarian statism which had previously bound and gagged the Tanzanian proletariat in a stifling network of 'workers' committees', 'party branches' and 'workers' councils' (each a mock organ of 'workers' participation' either indicted or ignored by striking workers for their complicity with management),[7] party-state personnel who had originally patronized the upsurge in industrial militancy retreated into an eloquent silence,[8] and the ideological apparatuses of 'Tanzanian socialism' were once again re-trained, as weapons, on the Tanzanian proletariat. Accusations of working class sabotage and refusals to work became common themes in a concerted campaign of the State-owned media, aimed at dividing and politically disorganizing the striking workers, isolating them from potential allies in the urban areas and surrounding countryside. Denunciations of proletarian militancy became a permanent feature in the pages of government and party newspapers, where workers were accused of deliberately 'misinterpreting TANU policies to suit non-productivity...

when they should be working day and night to compensate for the good things of life they are enjoying at the expense of the toiling peasants'. The postcolonial regime issued its own official condemnation of the escalating industrial turbulence, cloaked in veiled threats:

> TANU and the Government strongly deplore wild-cat strikes and indiscriminate downing of tools by workers without exhausting the machinery for settling of labour disputes laid down by law. Stern measures would henceforth be taken against any worker or group of workers who would violate the regulations for settling labour disputes as provided by law. (9)

But the original party directive had already aroused the expectations and self-confidence of workers throughout Tanzania. Ideological intimidations and ominous warnings, from an increasingly compromised party-state administration, about recharging an 'industrial relations machinery' -- which had dissolved independent trade unionism, effectively abolished the right to strike, and instituted compulsory State arbitration for labour disputes -- could no longer bar their way.

The 'TANU Guidelines' of 1971 had called for 'the elimination of oppression, exploitation, enslavement and humiliation'. Though politically inexperienced and deprived of any autonomous organizational capacity, the working class knew well enough the structures and agencies where the most immediate sources of these practices were located. In a series of extraordinary spontaneous class actions in mid-1973, workers occupied factories, locked out managerial staff and NUTA officials, and organized production themselves -- with reports of up to fifty percent increases in output, thereby precluding any official recriminations against their actions for disrupting the 'national economy'. Moreover, in one factory after another, workers explicitly justified the occupations and lock-outs with specific charges against management, in

privately-owned and 'parastatal' enterprises alike, for violating the regime's own policies of 'Socialism and Self-Reliance', charges which ranged from subtle forms of personal embezzlement to more blatant instances of company tax evasions.[10] In one factory, for example, workers emphasized that their action was fully 'in line with TANU policies,' and designed to 'support the economy and the security of the country.'[11] The ideological implications of the workers' position was thus patently clear, but, as is so often the case, the regime had a much keener awareness of the potentialities of the situation than did the workers themselves. For -- in addition to violating the sanctity of private property and challenging the dominance of intellectual over manual labour -- the Tanzanian proletariat was in the process of expropriating the national-popular language previously monopolized by the party-state administration, deploying it to working class advantage, and thereby undermining the hegemonic power of the postcolonial regime over the urban population of the country.

Class hegemony, however, is always protected by the armory of coercion. Where material concessions are impossible, and when fundamental contradictions are no longer able to be absorbed and neutralized in the official discourse of a ruling class, it always stands ready to assert its power by means of straightforward repression. The challenge posed by the Tanzanian proletariat to state and private capital centred, not on redistributive issues (a space where the postcolonial regime has always manoeuvred more or less successfully), but on the social organization of production in the factories, where the power of one class is always the weakness of its adversary. But, precisely

because their struggle concerned only the relations of production in the factories, and not their wider political conditions of existence, the balance was heavily weighted against the workers from the start. Evidently aware of their fundamental conflict with the rule of capital on the factory floor, the workers were still not yet in a position to recognize the Party-State as an ultimately unitary political instrument of capitalist class power. They stood defiant against both management and State attempts at arbitration, but submissively submitted their class actions to the jurisdiction of the Party -- an inherently alien body, despite working class membership in it. The Party, given the initiative and anxious to swiftly terminate a situation with explosive implications, ruled that its policies and directives 'did not mean and shall not mean that TANU and the Government have now permitted...workers to invade industries or that it should now be the method for nationalizing industries.'[12]

The original 'TANU Guidelines' of 1971 had referred to -- and subsequent events had made imperative -- 'the need to clarify the Party's policies on... workers', and so they were, unequivocally, in 1973: the workers were denounced by the Party for 'intolerable unruly behavior', their factory occupations terminated by the State, amidst arrests, victimizations of militants, mass dismissals, and the deportation of intransigents to their 'Native reserves' in the rural interior. The Tanzanian proletariat was thus given a bitter lesson on the fundamental unity of party and state personnel, which would soon be impressed on the mass of the peasantry as well. But the price paid by the post-colonial regime for its repression -- registered immediately by many of

its supporters both at home and abroad -- was nevertheless a high one: the instinctive solidarity displayed by Party, State and capital in reaction to working class militancy would leave permanently corroded the politico-ideological hegemony of the party-state administration over the Tanzanian social formation.

2. State Capitalism in the Countryside

Inevitably, the slowly shrinking social base of the postcolonial regime's national-popular hegemony found its natural compensation in a tremendous strengthening of the repressive apparatuses of the Tanzanian State, whose full weight would now be felt in the countryside.[13] For, by the mid-1970s, the new pattern imposed on the regime of accumulation by the 'Arusha Declaration' was already beginning to exhaust its potential avenues of expansion. The initial expropriations of 1967, far from being an isolated episode in the trajectory of the postcolonial regime, had led instead to a rapid and imposing advance of state capital throughout the economy. 'Parastatal' corporations, doubling in number between 1968 and 1974 alone, had expanded vertically and horizontally over the intervening years, extending their monopolies over marketing, transportation, storage facilities, provision of productive inputs and financial credit, and so on.

But this impressive advance was largely 'lateral' in character, achieved through statization of already operative sectors of the economy. The pace and limits of accumulation thus remained fixed by the routines of economic activity that survived decolonization, and the rate of substantive new growth registered in the 'national economy' -- while

respectable in comparative perspective -- consequently fell. In itself, statization of the economy could not surpass the structural constraints which had originally conditioned capitalist penetration of the territory. When it had run its course, 'primitive accumulation' by expropriation left Tanzanian state capitalism confined to commerce and finance, its mobility into industry proper securely checked. For the overwhelming weight of the peasantry in the Tanzanian social formation, scratching a miserably bare subsistence from the soil, precluded the development of effective domestic demand necessary for any extensive programme of import-susbstitution, condemning Tanzanian products to markets abroad, rather than at home. Nor could the territory -- poorly situated, naturally and socially, in the post-war imperialist chain, with its small and militant proletariat -- attract international corporations now in search of 'free production zones' in the third world.

Faced with the notorious internal contradictions of 'underdevelopment' -- stagnant agricultural production exasperated by recurrent drought, diminishing foreign exchange reserves, growing balance of trade deficits, and the ever increasing costs of 'public' debt servicing -- the postcolonial regime found itself forced to restructure the regime of accumulation in the only way left possible: export promotion sustained by expansion and diversification of the agrarian economy.[14] Peasant household production would now become the object of a 'frontal assault' by a state power grown both more powerful and more desperate over time.

From the colonial conquest onwards, social relations in the Tanzanian countryside had presented formidable obstacles to agrarian

transformation, resisting every attempt at economic 'fiscalization'. Between decolonization and the 'Arusha Declaration', however, the post-colonial regime -- militarily too weak to exert any coercive pressure on the peasantry -- had pursued an alternative pattern of development, concentrated on the urban areas of the country. Land, still largely unprotected by the legal conventions of capitalist property, had been 'nationalized' in 1962, and state order was extended to remote areas of the rural interior previously untouched by colonial authority.[15] However, beyond this, no consistent strategy for agrarian transformation was formulated or pursued.

But the programmatic basis for a social reorganization of the rural economy was nevertheless laid in the first years after independence, forecast in the frequent references by party-state personnel to the need to radically counteract the tendential disintegration of village communal production wrought by some eight decades of colonial domination. The first, proto-'ujamaa' villages, in fact, date from the early 1960s. Demonstrating both the productive potential and political risks involved in the communal organization of production, some of these villages achieved a remarkable economic self-sufficiency and -- consequently -- a wide margin of political autonomy, for which they were first praised, and then disbanded by the postcolonial regime on the grounds that they constituted a focus of opposition to TANU.[16] This necessary, but unacceptable, agrarian conjunction of increasing economic productivity and political autonomy was to shape the whole course of 'rural socialism' in Tanzania henceforth.

The body of decrees and measures introduced by the postcolonial

regime in the wake of the 1967 party directive on 'Socialism and Rural Development' had a specific objective drift and design: the extension of the class power of state capital throughout the rural economy.[17] Subjectively, of course, no such intentionality was present in the ideological universe of 'Tanzanian socialism' at the time; on the contrary, together with the 'Arusha Declaration', 'Socialism and Rural Development' seemed, to its supporters both at home and abroad, to propose a more or less coherent future for the Tanzanian social formation -- re-confirming the politico-ideological hegemony of the postcolonial regime. In the Tanzanian countryside, however, politics had never amounted to more than the installation and regular functioning of a repressive apparatus, which alone ensured the incorporation of peasant household production into the regime of accumulation, and rural ideology was correspondingly inscribed with a mutually instinctive hostility between peasants and local state agencies. Political 'leadership' and ideological 'persuasion' -- the technologies of agrarian transformation identified in party directives on 'rural socialism' -- were utterly alien to both the experience of the peasantry and the practices of personnel employed and patterned by an apparatus which secreted coercion through every pore of its structure.

In the event, although some villages would be initiated 'voluntarily' after 1967 (often by kulaks eager to gain access to additional land, machinery and credit),[18] the vast majority of the two million peasants officially moved into 'ujamaa' villages by 1973 had been 'recruited' through typically bureaucratic procedures by local party-state personnel anxious to link successful execution of central direc-

tives to their career trajectories. Some 'ujamaa' villages were created by simply designating existing villages as such; others were the result of subtle coercion, ranging from threatened terminations of famine relief to material inducements involving promises of provision of a wide range of services; and still others were erected through force alone.[19]

These methods were immediately, and sometimes sharply, denounced by prominent spokesmen for the regime as examples of local bureaucratic 'irrationalism' and 'authoritarianism', because they imposed new fiscal strains on the State without any compensating increases in agricultural production, while unnecessarily straining relations between the peasantry and TANU. In fact, however, the criticisms reflected the perceptual difficulty of personnel in the upper echelons of the state apparatus to adapt themselves to their class position in the new conjuncture, in which statization of the economy had come up against barriers of peasant household production, which only the coercive exercise of state power could surmount.[20] The practices of 'rural socialism' in Tanzania from 1967 to 1973 thus represented a kind of temporary 'interlude' in the trajectory of Tanzanian state capitalism, when it had finally confronted the imperative of restructuring the regime of accumulation on a firm agrarian base, but had not yet acquired either the coercive capacity necessary to engineer a 'passive revolution' in the countryside, or the resolution to deploy it.

This curious historical suspense was to be radically concluded towards the end of 1973 -- just after proletarian militancy had profoundly shaken the social relations of Tanzanian state capitalism in the urban areas of the country, and just before drought, with all its

attendant socio-economic consequences, would force the postcolonial regime to import almost half a million tons of grain in 1974 alone (more than the total of the previous seven years combined). The final months of 1973 would see the ideological apparatuses of 'Tanzanian socialism' -- still smoldering from their recent assault on the urban proletariat and re-fueled by anticipations of increased import-dependence -- now targeted on the countryside, where preparations for punitive action against a culprit peasantry were proceeding apace. In the wake of a new party directive calling for the total 'villagization' of the Tanzanian countryside by 1976, Nyerere attacked the rural population for contributing nothing to the 'Tanzanian road to socialism', and -- in a widely reported statement -- commanded: 'To live in villages is an order.'[21]

Proclamation of the new agrarian order was promptly followed by a series of rapid and fierce para-military expeditions into the rural interior, appropriately titled 'Operations'. During 1974 and 1975, special Presidential reconnaissance teams criss-crossed the countryside, formulating strategic plans for the forced 'resettlement' of the rural population into 'development' villages, which were subsequently executed by local party-state agencies with the logistical and coercive assistance of TANU Youth League and National Militia detachments. Peasant homesteads were often razed to discourage flight from the new villages, and campaigns to capture and return 'runaway villagers' were launched in some regions. Colonial mechanisms for regulating peasant household production were re-activated and extended to the new villages, in the form of minimum cultivation by-laws and work-identity cards, with

stiff penalties imposed for contravention. Control of the rural marketing network was captured by state capital, which now mediated every (legal) commercial activity of the peasantry through 'parastatal' monopolies. Potential political autonomy -- a problem for the regime with some of the early 'ujamaa' villages -- was precluded by an accelerated 'decentralization' of the party-state apparatus first begun in 1972, which eventually culminated in the complete subordination of local elected authority to appointed 'Managers' planted in the villages by a 1975 decree endowing rural municipalities with a corporate juridical identity.[22]

In short, the political organization of the agrarian economy was rationalized and modernized on a scale which had no precedent, and continues to have no parallel, in African history. At the beginning of 1977, Nyerere would summarize the results of 'villagization' in almost euphoric terms:

> we had talked about villagization since 1962 and...it was time to act... Now, there are about 13,065,000 people living together in 7,684 villages. This is a tremendous achievement. It is an achievement of TANU and Government leaders in cooperation with the people of Tanzania. It means that something like 70 percent of our people moved their homes in the space of about three years!... It is time that tribute was paid to all those leaders, in TANU and in the Government, who worked with the people and for the people's benefit over villagization. (23)

There were, of course, good reasons for this evident mood of satisfaction, for 'tribute' was indeed to be paid to the party-state administration after 'villagization'. Despite initial disruptions, fiscal yields from the countryside rose impressively. By 1980, surplus-extraction from the peasantry through unequal exchange alone would contribute an estimated TSh. 1 billion annually to State revenue, almost double the

total net profits registered by 'parastatals' in banking and finance in the first decade after the 'Arusha Declaration'.[24] But this extraordinary commercial income -- denied to both German and British colonialism alike -- would eventually and inevitably come up against the insuperable limits of the productive base which ultimately generated it.

For the characteristic mode of surplus-extraction from Tanzania's agrarian economy has continued to be founded on the coercive insertion of peasant household production into the regime of accumulation, rather than on any sustained increases in the relative economic rationality of the exploitation of the peasantry (such as enlargement of scale, mechanization, and so on). New social relations of production -- within whose framework alone more advanced technologies could take root and flourish -- have still not crystallized in the Tanzanian countryside, where the social organization of productive activity has yet to recover any systemic regularity or stability after the shocks of 'villagization'. In the interim, peasant household production has been reconstituted in the new villages as the predominant unit of labour organization. Communal production, de-emphasized by the party-state administration after 1972, has been quietly removed from the strategic agenda of 'Tanzanian socialism' -- a turn signalled by the virtual elimination of the ideological symbol of 'ujamaa' from the official discourse of the post-colonial regime.[25]

The real significance of 'villagization' and the imposing advance of state capital throughout the rural economy has lain elsewhere: first, 'parastatal' penetration into the countryside has provided state capital with a new format for joint investment ventures with interna-

tional finance capital, leading to the construction of a large number of advanced agricultural complexes and mounting foreign debt; second, the political relations installed in the villages by the 'decentralization' of the party-state apparatus have provided state capital with an institutional platform from which managerial interventions into the process of peasant household production can be launched.[26] Although the first of these developments has promoted the formation of a rural proletariat, in terms of social weight and import it is clearly the second which commands attention. An elementary framework for the consolidation of new social relations of production has been implanted in the organizational structure of the villages, which inescapably combines the peasantry with resident political agencies of state capital in an asymmetrical network of domination and exploitation, pervading every aspect of daily life in the countryside and generating a constant, silent social struggle on the land which can only increase in amplitude. It is these political relations which are currently shaping the dual forms of class confrontation, from above and below, between state capital and the peasantry in the Tanzania countryside.

Since the turn of the century, the rural economy has been the scene of practically uninterrupted warfare between contending class forces, driven by incompatible logics of economc calculation and norms of social rationality.[27] But this ceaseless battle for the potential surplus-labour of the agrarian population -- which continues to account for close to ninety percent of the total labour force -- has recently been shifted onto a new strategic plane, intermixing coercive tactics developed by the colonial State with advanced technologies of modern

agribusiness. The postcolonial regime -- with the assistance of international finance capital -- has attempted to increase the pace of accumulation in Tanzanian agriculture in two rather distinct ways. On the one hand, the agrarian policy of Tanzanian state capital has tried to achieve a far more 'extensive' incorporation of peasant household production into the regime of accumulation, over space and time. Commodity production has been spatially extended to regions where the reproduction of the peasantry still rests largely on natural economy; while, in areas where the index of commercialization is already high, the introduction of new crop strains has imposed temporally longer working years on the peasantry. In both cases, the direct role of party-state agencies in managing and supervising the actual process of production has increased enormously, under pressure from central apparatuses for greater agrarian output -- the scale of overt coercion testifies to the maintenance of 'political accumulation' in the country.

On the other hand, however, a more 'intensive' insertion of peasant household production into the regime of accumulation has been achieved through the introduction of modern technical packages developed by international agribusiness, which require more rigorous applications of labour to fertilization, irrigation and cultivation -- the subtle coercion of capitalist technology now imposing a disciplinary regime on peasant production which nature alone traditionally devised. Moreover, in addition to these 'extensive' and 'intensive' modalities of regulating peasant household production, the postcolonial regime has sought to maximize labour services within the new villages. The officially designated 'seasonally underemployed' peasantry has been periodically

conscripted and deployed as unpaid labour on local infrastructural projects often designed to increase the rate of commercial turnover.[28] Needless to say, without the level of political organization and control achieved by 'villagization', none of these new mechanisms for regimenting the agrarian labour force would have been feasible for state capital. Articulated together, they compose a coherent class strategy for increasing the rate of surplus-extraction from the Tanzania peasantry.

Capitalist strategy, however, represents only one pole of the class struggle currently being waged in the Tanzanian countryside. At the other pole lies the resistance of the peasantry. The sullen resignation of the rural population to 'villagization' in no way signified the active cooperation official opinion has tried to present it as. The combination of 'force' and 'consent' embodied in the 'resettlement' campaigns can be accuratly gauged from an often-cited report by the coordinator of one such 'Operation':

> In some instances houses were burned down when it was realized that some people, after having been moved, returned to their former homes again after a few days... Many more people moved on their own without waiting for Government assistance.../because/ there was news from neighboring...districts, that people's houses were being put on fire indiscriminately, sometimes with food and goods inside them. So the people decided not to wait for government help lest a similar catastrophe happened to them as well. (29)

In other words, the marked absence of any widespread collective resistance to the 'resettlement' campaigns was not due to any measure of popular consent to the 'legitimacy' of the party-state administration's programme of 'villagization', but rather to a perception of powerlessness before the impossible odds which any active opposition would clearly have confronted.[30] The evident 'backwardness' of the country's socio-

economic structure has, in this connection, tended to conceal the 'modernity' of its State superstructure: for it is not the politico-ideological hegemony of the postcolonial regime over the Tanzanian social formation which alone distinguishes it from its German and British predecessors, but also -- and more centrally -- the superior efficacy achieved by its apparatus of repression. The political subordination and regimentation of the Tanzanian peasantry which eluded one colonial administration after another, was attainable for their postcolonial successor precisely because of the superior coercive power at its disposal.[31]

But this same achievement ultimately represents a rather modest advance in any wider historical perspective, whose significance must diminish -- already has diminished -- over time. For coercion is a technology of capitalist domination with severely limited applicability to production: as a mechanism of surplus-extraction, it is an alternative which essentially excludes sustained technological innovation in the actual process of production. The 'inflated' coercive power which Tanzanian state capital has come to deploy in the countryside transmits no electricity to the forces of production, whose development alone would permit 'deflationary' repression; its major success -- 'villagization' -- was, significantly, a solitary 'event', rather than a dynamic 'process'. The 'resettlement' campaigns have shifted peasant household production over space, but not over time. The radical separation of the direct producers from the means of production, which would make a technical recomposition of agrarian labour processes possible, has yet to be effected. Stubborn unity with the means of subsistence com-

bines with the impossibility of continuous, uninterrupted surveillance to provide the Tanzanian peasantry with a measure of insulation from market tyranny and a final remaining space of policial autonomy in the villages, where new and old forms of resistance to current capitalist strategy are now materializing:

> refusal to adopt new cultivation practices or their sabotage (thus peasant 'conservatism'), bearing in mind that such measures introduce further elements of risk in the already precarious basis of household production; peasant 'strikes' involving the refusal to grow certain crops or cutting back on their production, that is, attempts to withdraw, at least partially, from commodity relations or to find alternative sources of cash income (e.g. labour migration); evasion of crop-grading regulations and of the terms of exchange imposed by state or other monopolistic agencies of merchant's capital (by smuggling and other forms of illicit marketing) in order to realize a higher return to labour; as well as political actions, including individual or collective acts of violence, against agents of capital and state functionaries in the rural areas. (32)

The structural limits on capitalist accumulation through coercive mechanisms of surplus-extraction are fully revealed in each of these silent, but ceaseless practices of resistance.

In the final analysis, however, these dispersed and isolated instances of peasant opposition to the rule of capital represent only one coordinate in a web of contradictions which has now gripped the Tanzanian social formation: individual acts of rebellion on the field of the class struggle, they lack any strategic objective and yield no fundamental results. But, from another vantage point, their importance cannot be exaggerated: for peasant resistance is, in one sense, a subjective class performance of a role assigned by the objective structure of antagonistic power and production relations, and capital must either advance or retreat before it.[33] The 1980s have seen the Tanzanian so-

cial formation enter a state of permanent emergency, charged by escalating economic crisis and mounting social tensions. The pattern of development imposed on the regime of accumulation in the mid-1970s long ago exhausted its potential and now stagnates amidst the vast mass of the peasantry, crippled by the burden of financing a bloated and parasitic state apparatus; while in the urban areas, the new politics of 'socialist' austerity demanded by international finance capital invite a fresh and more militant proletarian response.

But it is, of course, ultimately the abject failure of the postcolonial regime's agrarian policy which has been decisive for this regression of the Tanzanian economy as a whole. The impressive advance of class power and state power -- organically fused since the colonial conquest one hundred years ago -- into the countryside has effected no commensurate transformation of agrarian production relations; the seeds of technological momentum artificially inseminated into the rural economy by international agribusiness have miscarried in consequence; and no urban salvation for this rural malaise has materialized, for in the purgatory of the capitalist periphery, industry follows hard behind -- and always behind -- agriculture. The 'Tanzanian road to socialism' stands today on the verge of collapse: hammered by imperialist pressure above against the anvil of popular resistance below. The historical product currently being forged on the field of the class struggle has yet to appear; its shape and contours still lie hidden in the future.

3. Conclusion

The immediate results and prospects of 'Tanzanian socialism'

can now be briefly summarized. A supine and serene decolonization left the state machinery in the hands of an indigenous social category trained and privileged to operate it; a profound transformation in the personnel, but not the structure, of the state apparatus resulted. The internal unity of the nationalist movement soon floundered, amidst a fracturing of rival interests, after achievement of the goal of independence which had once held it together. Class stratification crystallized rapidly: capital was increasingly and necessarily assimilated to state; state was eventually and instinctively reconciled with capital; the popular classes were thrown back. The radical language of 'socialism' was draped over an encircling statization of economy and civil society, covering the postcolonial regime's subaltern dependence on imperialism. An official 'nationalism' clouded the internal repression and exploitation on which the regime relied, but could not conceal it. The popular classes were drawn into open, if hesitant and uneasy, confrontation with the institutions and practices of 'Tanzanian socialism', once the material base of the regime's popular hegemony had been exhausted. The Tanzanian economy contracted: ignored by metropolitan 'investment' imperialism, disappointed by domestic capital formation, checked by peasant and working class intransigence. As the pace of accumulation stalled, and then receded, fiscal paralysis gripped the State. Internal and external pressures were met by an authoritarian state capitalism.

The 'Tanzanian road to socialism' entered the 1980s in a state of acute social, economic and political emergency. Its immediate future inspires little confidence: in the countryside, agricultural production

stagnates amidst growing rural unrest; unemployment has risen rapidly in the urban areas, where the regime's modest industrialization programme has ground to a halt; mismanagement, inefficiency and corruption plague the state apparatus within, while mounting social tension and metropolitan pressure threatens from without. Such problems are not, of course, peculiar to 'Tanzanian socialism' alone; they afflict postcolonial regimes throughout the contemporary capitalist periphery.[34] If they acquire an added significance in the case of Tanzania, it is paradoxically because of a unique measure of prior success achieved by the postcolonial regime installed there, to which its sheer temporal continuity testifies eloquently enough. The history of the Tanzanian party-state administration's achievements, as well as the price paid for them by the popular classes, has already been charted; it remains to plot the coordinates of the crisis which currently grips the Tanzanian social formation as a whole.

In the Tanzanian countryside, where the vast majority of the country's population continues to subsist on the fringe of survival, an 'extensive' incorporation of peasant household production into the regime of accumulation has been effected, through re-activation, and exaggeration, of colonial agrarian policy. The circuits of exploitation established in the post-'ujamaa' villages operate through familiar mechanisms: strict cultivation directives from the party-state administration force the peasantry to produce export crops with technical packages advanced, at high rates of profit, by international finance capital; exchange takes place through state monopoly marketing networks, which return producer prices vastly incongruent with world market rates; ne-

cessary consumer goods are then sold to the peasantry at comparatively exorbitant prices, again through state marketing outlets; and when shortages or famine occur, official provision of services and relief subject the peasants to a servile and humiliating dependence on the State, which the ideological apparatuses of 'Tanzanian socialism' do not let them forget.[35]

The contradictions which surface from this cycle of exploitation are, however, already taking their toll. Political coercion exercised by local agencies of state capital force the direct producers onto the 'market', where economic exploitation through unequal exchange throws them back into necessary subsistence production. While the poor peasantry sinks into an ever deeper degradation, the more ambitious thrive on black marketeering, inserting, through bribery, a divisive wedge into the ranks of the party-state administration. In short, the political costs of maintaining a massive State presence in the countryside may soon come to seriously outweigh the fiscal benefits of coercing peasant household production into the regime of accumulation. Meanwhile, the 'take-off into sustained poverty'[36] and corruption launched in the rural economy is generating a silent, but ceaseless, social struggle on the land, as the formidable costs of resisting 'Tanzanian socialism' gradually come to outweigh the costs of not resisting. Yet the capacity of the peasantry to alter the course of agrarian development remains fixed within limits defined by its persistent unity with the means of production.[37] Until that unity is broken, peasant resistance will remain defensive; the initiative lies with capital.

The situation in the urban areas of Tanzania is equally bleak,

but nonetheless notably different. Despite restrictions on the mobility of the peasantry, rural migration has swelled 'the marginal pole of the economy' in the suburban shanty-towns.[38] The response of the regime to this mounting social peril has been periodic 'repatriation campaigns', which involve the arrest and deportation of the unemployed and politcally 'unruly' workers into the countryside -- 'as if they were temporary sojourners in South Africa.'[39]

The working class proper continues to occupy an isolated and minority position within the Tanzanian population as a whole. In fact, despite a planned shift in state investment from agriculture to industry, and an official invitation to international corporations which met with a far more favourable response than in the 1960s, the size of the proletariat has actually contracted.[40] After the industrial turbulence of the early 1970s, state capitalist policy towards the management and reproduction of labour-power in the urban economy has come to be grounded on the rapid physical exhaustion of easily replaceable workers. The cumulative results of repressive statization and regimentation of the working class has now been registered in the metropolitan capitalist press: Tanzania has been ranked sixth among sub-Saharan African countries, in terms of 'investment potential', for the years 1978 to 1988.[41]

Yet the historical costs of repression of the working class are clearly registered in the country's arrested development: for repression means the permanent suppression of a working class mode of consumption which could furnish the minimal sustaining basis for an import-substitution industrialization; it means increases in the rate of surplus-extraction through longer working days, rather than sustained

technical innovation; it means a tremendous waste of popular initiative and energy, in a zone of generalized material and cultural scarcity; it means the absence of any independent trade unionism, capable of wrenching concessions from capital and reforms from the State; and so it means that a 'frontal assault' on the institutions, practices and personnel of 'Tanzanian socialism' will be necessary to carry the Tanzanian social formation forward.

The 'laws' of politics, however, suggest that the precondition to any popular-democratic advance in contemporary Tanzania is a prior division or disintegration in the structural unity of the state apparatus. In fact, fissures are already traceable along the main axes of determination which make up 'Tanzanian socialism'. First, Tanzanian state capital does not form an undifferentiated unity; nor does the productive apparatus it controls represent a singular and structured 'corporation'. The three hundred 'parastatals' created since the 'Arusha Declaration' are endowed with varying degrees of institutional and fiscal autonomy. As an articulated set of different productive, commercial and financial activities, they compete over the distribution of labour-power, investment and markets, not only among themselves, but with international corporations supplying competitive commodities and services on the world market.[42] Second, the fracturing of the productive apparatus into individual units of production continually creates conditions of possibility for individuated accumulation, through bribery and corruption, which undermines unity and discipline both within the state bourgeoisie proper and the broader party-state administration, imparting to each an added instability, while undermining the regime's already constricted

basis of reproduction.

Third, the postcolonial regime has been forced to compensate for the erosion of its national-popular hegemony, by creating its own basis of support, through a continual expansion of the state apparatus: the creation of new positions into which an ever wider number of agents can move and circulate. In turn, the expanded reproduction of the state apparatus poses insuperable fiscal strains on the postcolonial regime. The diversion of revenue into state infrastructure and salaries impinges on the amounts available for acccumulation -- a problem which underlines the contradictory tensions between the economic, political and ideological apparatuses of 'Tanzanian socialism'. Finally, the expansion of positions in the state apparatus without any corresponding increase in state revenue has meant a growing stratification within the ranks of the party-state administration. The distance between the upper and lower echelons of the state apparatus has grown enormously since decolonization. The lower level cadres in particular have seen a considerable worsening of their living conditions; moreover, their working conditions have deteriorated as a result of the widening social division of labour effected by state expansion, which assigns them tasks of execution, and deprives them of any role in the direction or formulation of policy. In other words, subaltern personnel in the party-state administration have been increasingly isolated from the summits of power above, and exposed to the pressure of popular demands below.[43]

Confrontation between the popular classes and the postcolonial regime, competition between individual units of state and metropolitan capital, tension between individuated and 'collective' accumulation,

contradiction between productive and unproductive state expenditures, conflict between dominant and subaltern layers of the party-state administration: each indicates one site of the structural crisis which now grips the Tanzanian social formation. Its future will be defined and decided by their articulation and combustion.[44]

Notes

[1]The 'TANU Guidelines on Guarding, Consolidating and Advancing the Revolution of Tanzania, and of Africa,' are reprinted in Andrew Coulson, ed., African Socialism in Practice: The Tanzanian Experience (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1979), pp. 36-42.

[2]'Ideology' refers in this study to the ways in which different categories of people in different social positions think about the political world they inhabit, its past, future and so forth. The arguments presented in the following pages draw on the works of Chantal Mouffe, 'Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci,' in Mouffe, ed., Gramsci & Marxist Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979); Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London: Verso, 1979), esp. chap. 4; and Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism (London: Verso, 1980), esp. pp. 49-120.

[3]Raikes has drawn attention to a failure, in the literature on Tanzania, to take account of what he calls 'the self-mystification of the bureaucracy by its own ideology...that sane and intelligent men can really believe that /their policies/ will achieve socialism and/or development. Nor,' he argues, 'can this false consciousness be considered entirely and directly self-serving since it is hard to see that the policy serves the economic interests of anyone in Tanzania': Philip Raikes, 'Ujamaa and Rural Socialism,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 3 (May-October 1975). It is precisely this problem which the following pages aim to address, without recourse to the problematic of 'true' and 'false' consciousness.

[4]The Swahili word 'ujamaa' itself provides an interesting example of this type of appropriation of popular symbols and values, and their transformation into the official discourse of 'Tanzanian socialism': literally, it refers to the rights and obligations which connect (male) members of the peasant household; in the dominant ideology, however, it suggests the extension of those rights and obligations on a societal scale and, hence, on the State. For a brief discussion, see Göran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania (London: Heinemann, 1980), pp. 98-100.

[5]Hyden (ibid., chap. 6) provides an academic gloss to the latter

position. But his patronizing explanation for working class militancy — which centres on ascribing to the workers a kind of 'rational laziness' induced by 'the economy of affection' -- contravenes all the evidence: not only did production increase in some occupied factories, but, at the Mount Carmel Rubber Factory, the workers posted placards which read 'we are ready to work night and day if allowed to take over the factory', promising 'to increase the productivity to pay the amount of employer's capital invested in the firm'. For a fascinating account of that specific occupation, and the regime's reaction, see Pascal Mihyo, 'The Struggle for Workers' Control in Tanzania,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 4 (May-October 1975).

[6]For a powerful statement of the way in which capital learns from, and responds to, working class struggles, see Mario Tronti, Operai e Capitale (Torino: Einaudi, 1971); the concluding chapter of this important set of essays has been translated into English as 'Workers and Capital,' Telos, No. 14 (Winter 1972).

[7]The 'industrial relations machinery' to which the Tanzanian proletariat has been subjected epitomizes the interconnections between state capitalism and its authoritarian statist carapace. The 'workers' committees' were introduced earliest, in 1964, as NUTA organs; their function was clearly stated in 'parastatal' guidelines: 'The workers' committee deals mainly with discipline. It does not deal with politics or personnel policy or even with aspects of management.' TANU 'party branches' were launched in the factories in 1967, with the purpose of recruiting new members, ensuring the collection of party dues, and to 'cooperate', but not 'interfere', with other organs. Finally, 'workers' councils', which date from 1969-1970, were given the function of 'increasing production by creating a better working environment', under the leadership of...the enterprise manager (usually appointed by Nyerere personally)! In practice, these reactionary institutional arrangements sometimes culminated in situations where the enterprise manager chaired the 'party branch' as senior resident member of TANU, the 'workers' committee' as 'party branch' leader, and the 'workers' council' as enterprise manager. For an extended discussion, see Henry Mapolu, 'The Organization and Participation of Workers in Tanzania,' African Review, No. 3 (1972); see also Issa Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), esp. pp. 127-133.

[8]Amidst calls from more 'realistic' party-state personnel for revision or retraction of Clause 15 of the 'TANU Guidelines', Nyerere's initial response was: 'It was noteworthy that in the various strikes, workers were not demanding wage increases but protesting against the alleged unbecoming behaviour of certain people in the management and administration echelons. This is a clear indication that the workers understand the Guidelines very well...': cited in M.A. Bienefeld, 'Socialist Development and the Workers in Tanzania,' in Richard Sandbrook and Robin Cohen, eds., The Development of an African Working Class (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1975), p. 253. He subsequently retreated into silence, however, perhaps realizing that the workers understood the directive more clearly than they were supposed to, and wishing that wage increases had, in fact,

been demanded by the workers -- an area where concessions, at least, were possible.

In a review of one of the collections of Nyerere's 'essays' from the period, Ayoub Tabari notes the absence of the 'TANU Guidelines' from its contents, suggesting that 'probably this indirectly expresses Nyerere's own later day disapproval of the document and particularly of the consequences which it gave rise to in the field of industrial relations': 'Freedom and Development,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 3 (May-October 1975), p. 96. The regime's subsequent practice of repression, of course, made any official abrogation of the ideas expressed in the 'TANU Guidelines' absolutely superfluous.

[9]The first quotation is cited from Mapolu, 'The Workers' Movement in Tanzania,' Maji Maji, No. 12 (September 1973); the second is from Mihyo, op cit., p. 62.

[10]The trajectory of the factory occupations is recounted from press reports in the official government press by Mapolu, 'The Workers' Movement...'

[11]Ibid., p. 39.

[12]Cited by Mapolu, from the official Party paper, ibid., p. 39.

[13]As already indicated, the 'Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces' had been purged following the 1964 mutiny, and subordinated to TANU as insurance against any future military disloyalty to the regime. In 1971, a 'National Militia' was also to be formed, its rank and file recruited from rural youth anxious to escape village drudgery, commanded by army officers. By 1980, Tanzania would trail only Somalia and Ethiopia in Africa in terms of per capita investment in the means of warfare and repression: Nigel Harris, Of Bread and Guns: The World Economy in Crisis (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1983), p. 220. Without this coercive power, neither the 'villagization' of the Tanzanian peasantry, nor the 'successful' invasion of Uganda, would have been possible.

[14]See Michael Lofchie, 'Agrarian Crisis and Economic Liberalization in Tanzania,' Journal of Modern African Studies, No. 3 (1978); also R.H. Green, D.G. Rwegasira and B. Van Arkadie, Economic Shocks and National Policy Making: Tanzania in the 1970s (The Hague: Institute of Social Studies Report No. 8, 1980).

[15]This extension of state order involved a State 'colonization' of both land and labour: 'villagization' of communities which had escaped the coercive power of the colonial State on the one hand, and settlement of more or less 'virgin' land by landless peasants on the other. Known as the 'transformation approach', the programme dominated the agrarian strategy of the regime's First Five Year Plan and was financed largely by the World Bank; it was cancelled in 1965 as a failure. For a brief discussion, see Andrew Coulson, 'Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 10 (September-December 1977), pp. 86-89.

[16]See, for instance, the discussion of the Ruvuma Development

Association in Lionel Cliffe and Griffiths L. Cunningham, 'Ideology, Organization and the Settlement Experience in Tanzania,' in Lionel Cliffe and John Saul, eds., Socialism in Tanzania, Vol. 2 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972).

[17]Francis Hill argues cogently that increases in agricultural production have lain behind every state initiative in the countryside: 'Ujamaa: African Socialist Productionism in Tanzania,' in H. Desfosses and J. Levesque, eds., Socialism in the Third World (New York: Praeger, 1975). But it has been increasing control over agricultural surpluses rather than increased production per se, which has been the ultimate objective of state policy in the rural economy -- an objective underlined by the priority given to situating 'ujamaa' villages on or near roads, over situating them on cultivatible land. In other words, increased production has meant nothing to the party-state administration, unless it contributes to capital accumulation.

[18]Once again, the specific weight and importance to be attached to 'kulaks' has figured prominently in discussions of 'ujamaa', particularly after the assassination of an energetic official who attempted to raise poor against rich peasants in Ismani in 1970 -- an atypical region where 'by 1969 a few farmers owned over 500 acres, while many others were landless, holding land only through annual tenancy agreements': Rayah Feldman, 'Rural Social Differentiation and Political Goals in Tanzania,' in Ivar Oxaal, Tony Barnett and David Booth, eds., Beyond the Sociology of Development (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), p.157; also A. Awati, 'Ismani and the Rise of Capitalism', in Lionel Cliffe et al., eds., Rural Cooperation in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1975).

The primary object of the postcolonial regime's agrarian policy, however, has always been the vast mass of the peasantry, not the country's insignificant stratum of 'kulaks', whose role, as Bernstein has recently argued, 'has often been exaggerated in the service of polemics (e.g. kulak "power" as an explanation of the failure of ujamaa vijijini).' Henry Bernstein, 'Notes on State and Peasantry: the Tanzanian Case,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 21 (May-September 1981), p. 52. As a general rule, where kulaks stood in the way of the regime's agrarian policy they suffered; but where they did not, they more often than not became the principal beneficiaries of 'villagization'.

[19]The various modalities through which 'ujamaa' villages were erected in this period are discussed in Raikes, 'Ujamaa and Rural Socialism,' pp.42-46, who draws attention to the compulsory 'villagization' of the Barabaig pastoralists, 'whose grazing area has been enormously reduced both during and since the colonial period by a steady incursion of farmers, were considered to be lawless, and the stated purpose of villagization was the maintenance of law and order. When criticized in the press, the policy drew forth expressions of support demonstrating the most abysmal ignorance of transhuman pastoralism and some crassly colonialist identifications of the Barabaig as "ignorant and barbaric"

people whose minds were "small" and "undeveloped".' Social relations in the 'ujamaa' villages of this period are the subject of a lucid analysis by H.U.E. Thoden Van Velzen, 'Staff, Kulaks and Peasants: A Study of a Political Field,' in Cliffe and Saul., op cit., Vol. 1; see also the case studies by Michaela Von Freyhold, Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania (London: Heinemann, 1979), Part Two.

[20]For reasons discussed below, criticisms that 'villagization' was bureaucratically orchestrated are fundamentally misplaced; coercion was an indispensible instrument in the implementation of the 'resettlement' campaigns; as Gavin Williams has suggested, it could not have been otherwise: 'Taking the Part of Peasants: Rural Development in Nigeria and Tanzania,' in Peter C.W. Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds., The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976).

[21]For a sampling of headlines and captions from the State-owned media at the time, see Tabari, op cit., pp. 93-94.

[22]The course and scope of 'villagization' are discussed in detail in a number of works already cited: see especially Hyden, op cit., chap. 5; Coulson, 'Agricultural Policies...,' pp. 92-95; and Suzanne Mueller, 'Retarded Capitalism in Tanzania,' in Ralph Miliband and John Saville, eds., The Socialist Register (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980). See also the essays collected in Part III of Bismarck U. Mwansasu and Cranford Pratt, eds., Towards Socialism in Tanzania (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1979), which provide (or survey) a wide range of opinion on 'villagization': Jonathan Barker, 'The Debate on Rural Socialism in Tanzania'; Jannik Boesen, 'Tanzania: from Ujamaa to Villagization'; and Adolpho Mascarenhas, 'After Villagization -- What?'.

[23]Julius Nyerere, 'The Arusha Declaration Ten Years After,' in Coulson, ed., op cit., pp. 65,66. Incidentally, the areas bypassed by 'villagization' were those with the highest index of commercialization in export crops such as coffee and tobacco -- areas from which the majority of high-ranking party-state personnel originate. As a 'government planner' in one such region, Raikes noted 'a continuous stream of senior officials through Bukoba, making sure that their own home villages were untouched': Philip Raikes, 'Rural Differentiation and Class-Formation in Tanzania,' Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (April 1978), p. 312.

[24]The figure was calculated by Frank Ellis, 'Agricultural Marketing and Peasant-State Transfers in Tanzania,' Journal of Peasant Studies, No. 4 (July 1983); Ellis estimates total surplus-extraction from the peasantry from 1970 to 1980 to be in the vicinity of TSh. 4.6 billion, representing a levy of 26.6 percent on peasant household production. Although the comparison with banking and finance is, of course, statistically and theoretically inappropriate, it nevertheless gives some indication of the weight of the agrarian economy in the fiscal income of the Tanzanian State, since 'parastatals' in those areas are widely acknowledged to be among the most 'efficient' components of Tanzanian state

capitalism.

[25]A typology of the variant types of villages which have temporarily emerged from 'villagization' is advanced by Mueller, 'Retarded Capitalism in Tanzania,' pp. 213-218.

[26]The enthusiasm of imperialism for the postcolonial regime's new agrarian policy can be gauged from the vastly increased amounts of finance it has invested in it: 'agreements were signed in 1978 for a grand total of U.S.$1,800 million of which 140 million came from the World Bank, 250 million from Sweden, 143 million from Canada, 73 million from the U.K., etcetera': Zaki Ergas, 'Why Did the Ujamaa Village Policy Fail? -- Towards a Global Analysis,' The Journal of Modern African Studies, No. 35 (1980), p. 394n. Between 1975 and 1982, 'public' debt rose from $1.2 billion to $2.5 billion, despite the fact that imperialist consortiums have written off some substantial amounts of this debt in the intervening period.

[27]The distinct social basis of rationality and economic calculation involved in peasant household production, associated with the work of Chayanov, has figured heavily in debates on Tanzania's agrarian economy, e.g., Andrew Coulson, Tanzania: A Political Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). As already indicated, however, overemphasis on the inherent rationality of peasant production has tended to lead to an unsubstantiated notion of 'bureaucratic irrationalism', where no such irrationality exists. It is the contradiction between two distinct forms of rationality, rather than the relative rationality and irrationality of each, which is fundamental.

[28]A highly sophisticated analysis of the components of this strategy and of its overall coherence, has been provided by Bernstein, op cit.; see also, Musti de Gennaro, 'Ujamaa: the Aggrandizement of the State,' in Rosemary E. Galli, ed., The Political Economy of Rural Development: Peasants, International Capital, and the State (Albany: State University of New York, 1981).

[29]Juma V. Mwapachu, 'Operation Planned Villages in Rural Tanzania: A Revolutionary Strategy for Development,' in Coulson, ed., op cit., p. 119. This essay on the whole provides an interesting insight into the recesses of the bureaucratic mind, e.g.: 'The interesting point, however, is that the 1974 Operation Villages were not a matter of persuasion but of coercion. As Nyerere argued, the move had to be compulsory because Tanzania could not sit back and watch the majority of its people leading a "life of death". The State had, therefore, to take the role of the "father" in ensuring that its people chose a better and more prosperous life for themselves' (p. 116). Note, in particular, the presentation of 'persuasion' and 'coercion' as a mere technical choice, the self-identification of 'Tanzania' with the party-state administration, the suggestive association of 'State' as 'father' of the people and the use of the possessive adjective in reference to them, and so on.

[30]The ideological apparatuses of 'Tanzanian socialism', of course, reinforced this perception, as the following lines from an editorial in the Government paper testify: 'Those who think they can avoid living in such villages are deluding themselves. Those who try to resist going into such villages are also fighting a lost cause. Every Tanzanian peasant will have to move and live in such villages. Anyone who refuses will be taken there by force.' Cited in Tabari, op cit., p. 95.

[31]Von Freyhold seems to be one of the few analysts of 'Tanzanian socialism' to have explicitly argued along these lines, e.g.: 'Gone are the days when peasants could chase away an unwelcome official, burn down his house and openly defy his orders. The recent villagization campaigns have taught the peasants that such forms of resistance are no longer possible': 'The Post-Colonial State and its Tanzanian Version,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 8 (January-April 1977), p. 84.

[32]Bernstein, 'African Peasantries: A Theoretical Framework,' Journal of Peasant Studies, No. 4 (July 1979), pp. 432-433; see also, Raikes, 'Rural Differentiation...,' passim.

[33]Thus far, the postcolonial regime seems to have oscillated between these two options, mounting a coercive 'programme for economic survival' in mid-1981, while granting titles to land and raising producer prices -- the former objectively represents an extension of power into the countryside, the latter a retreat.

[34]For an extended discussion of this crisis and its contours in the third world, see Andre Gunder Frank, Crisis in the Third World (London: Heinemann, 1981). In his most recent articles, Frank has singled out 'Tanzanian socialism' for criticism: see, for example, his 'Crisis of Ideology and Ideology of Crisis,' in Samir Amin et al., Dynamics of Global Crisis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982), pp. 137-138.

[35]The 'agrarian programmes' of international finance capital are surveyed in Ernest Feder, 'Capitalism's Last-Ditch Effort to Save Underdeveloped Agricultures: International Agribusiness, the World Bank and the Rural Poor,' Journal of Contemporary Asia, No. 7 (1977). On the intersections of international finance capital and state capital in the Tanzanian countryside, see Mueller, 'Barriers to the Further Development of Capitalism in Tanzania: The Case of Tobacco,' Capital & Class, No. 15 (Autumn 1981), pp. 36-44; also D. Wadada Nabudere, Essays on the Theory and Practice of Imperialism (London: Onyx Press, 1979), pp. 54-58.

[36]Peter Gutkind's early assessment of the consequences of 'ujamaa', cited in Pratt, 'Reflections of a Democratic Socialist,' in Pratt and Mwansasu, eds., op cit.

[37]The single sphere of power and production relations where villagization does seem to have raised the threat of collective resistance is not class, but gender: Bernstein reports that 'the more "public" nature of village life has curbed some of the worst excesses of wife-beating at least' ('Notes on State and Peasantry...,' p. 51). However, to return to

a theme broached earlier, on the whole male domination has scarcely altered over the last century; by most reports, women continue to perform an estimated 80 percent of all agrarian labour, in addition to all the dull repetitive tasks associated with domestic life. On the postcolonial regime's attitudes to women, see Raikes, 'Rural Differentiation...,' who argues that the overwhelmingly male 'educated strata' of Tanzania approach gender relations with 'a sexual hypocrisy and double-standards of almost Victorian dimensions' (p. 310). See also, Deborah Bryceson, 'The Proletarianization of Women in Tanzania,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 17 (January-April 1980).

[38]Anibal Quijano Obregon, 'The Marginal Pole of the Economy and the Marginalized Labour Force,' in Harold Wolpe, ed., The Articulation of Modes of Production (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980). Between 1972 and 1979, the population of Dar es Salaam rose from 224,000 to 800,000, perhaps prompting consideration of the relocation of central state apparatuses to less populated Dodoma: Richard E. Stren, 'Underdevelopment, Urban Squatting, and the State Bureaucracy: The Case of Tanzania,' Canadian Journal of African Studies, No. 1 (1982), p. 78.

[39]Alex Callinicos and John Rogers, Southern Africa after Soweto (London: Pluto Press, 1978), p. 78.

[40]Thus a student demonstration was attacked by police in 1978, for protesting a decision by Parliament to increase members' salaries and benefits at a time when 20 percent of the proletariat had been laid off: see the 'Briefings,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 10 (September-December 1977), pp. 101-105.

[41]Namely by Business International, as cited by Frank in 'Crisis of Ideology...,' p. 198. For an extended discussion of the relationship between 'Tanzanian socialism' and international finance capital, see James H. Mittelman, 'International Monetary Institutions and Policies of Self-Reliance: The Tanzanian Experience,' Social Research, No. 1 (Spring 1980), who notes that the party-state administration is the major recipient of World Bank loans south of the Sahara.

[42]It is, for instance, not uncommon for (industrial) state capital producing commodities for the Tanzanian market to be placed in a situation of competition with (merchant) state capital importing similar goods from abroad, frequently at lower prices. Another example: a government paper reported in 1977 that 'a grotesque situation arose when one parastatal, the Power Company, had to issue threats to a number of parastatals and the Police Department to the effect that their electricity would be cut off if they did not pay their long-overdue electric bills.' Cited in Ergas, op cit., pp. 394-395n.

[43]For a masterly survey of the multiple tensions which now ripple through the party-state apparatus, see Bernstein, 'Notes on State and Peasantry...'.

[44]Events in Guinea suggest a possible scenario for the future of

'Tanzanian socialism', which might follow a similar course: the passing of Nyerere might act as a catalyst to military intervention in the small hours of the morning, which would lead to a reversal of the 'Tanzanian road to socialism'; Western sources have, in fact, already begun speculating on such a possibility (cf. The New York Times, 2 March 1982). Futurology of this sort must, however, be tempered by a number of significant facts which suggest that 'Tanzanian socialism' will outlast Nyerere: first, the permanent interpenetration of party and state was reinforced in 1975 by a decree establishing the primacy of the former; the purpose seems clear: to re-unify and homogenize the party-state administration, and to control and cement the cohesiveness of the state apparatus. Second, as far as Nyerere himself is concerned, his prominence is more the reflection of the dominance of executive authority under a state capitalist regime, than any personal abilities he might possess; indeed, it could be argued that it is state capitalism which has allocated Nyerere his predominant position, rather than the other way around. In any event, it is indisputable that Nyerere represents the apex of a vastly broader social and administrative network which no doubt contains several other Nyereres, waiting in the wings. For an analysis of the phenomenon of Presidentialism in Tanzania, see Harry Goulbourne, 'The Role of the Political Party in Tanzania since the Arusha Declaration,' in Goulbourne, ed., Politics and the State in the Third World (London: MacMillan Press, 1979).

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

From the 'Arusha Declaration' of 1967 onwards, the 'Tanzanian road to socialism' has posed intractable problems for analysis framed within theories of dependence and underdevelopment. The rise and subsequent decline of radical underdevelopment discourse on the third world is, in fact, traceable in the successive attempts in studies of Tanzania to come to grips with the postcolonial trajectory of the country. Developments internal and external to 'Tanzanian socialism' have now taken their toll on the intellectual hegemony of radical underdevelopment theory over analyses of the country, whose fluctuating tones and emphases were never, in any case, reducible to purely logical and linear theoretical evolution. But to briefly reconstruct the course of progressive reflections on the 'Tanzanian road to socialism' may cast an unwonted light on the specificity of the arguments which have been made in the present study, and the theoretical positions on which they rest.

The advent of independence on the African continent was generally met with some skepticism by radical scholars: negotiated decolonization smacked of 'neo-colonialism' while courageous wars of national liberation were still underway; and the social composition of the first postcolonial administrations, with their proclivity for a racialist rhetoric of 'negritude', counseled against accepting their equally rhetorical commitment to 'socialism' at face value.[1] Nevertheless, disillusionment with the drugged consensus which had been induced in the imperialist metropolises and the miserable

record of the Soviet bloc focused attention on the third world, as potential ground for a social order beyond capital and political universe beyond Stalinism, which the international radiation of the Chinese revolution -- apparently and increasingly uncompromising in its hostility to both -- intensified and exaggerated.

In any event, Tanzania occupied a special place within the otherwise dismal atmosphere of 'African socialism' from the very beginning. The geographical position of the country between impending social revolution in Southern Africa and the rest of 'neo-colonial' Eastern and Central Africa, combined with the political and ideological balance the ruling party attempted to maintain between 'Western social democracy' and 'Eastern communism', suggested a separate future for the Tanzanian social formation, at once more democratic and authentically socialist than elsewhere. The University of Dar es Salaam quickly came to constitute a pole of attraction for a radical intelligentsia committed to a socialist Africa, in much the same way that the University of Havana became a haven for those committed to the Latin American revolution. From among those who first launched a sustained attack against the then-prevailing orthodoxy of evolutionary modernization, Giovanni Arrighi, Henry Bernstein, Lionel Cliffe, Aidan Foster-Carter, Walter Rodney and John Saul took up positions there. At the same time, however, the intellectual fallout in the aftermath of the 1966 coup d'etat in Ghana ensured that acclaim for Nyerere and the postcolonial administration would be tempered by a more or less critical edge, when the hour of 'Tanzanian socialism' finally struck.

But when the moment did arrive in 1967, analysts had no diffi-

culty finding a terminology for it: a first, comprehensive monograph on the subject, written by Saul in the wake of the 'Arusha Declaration', was significantly entitled 'African Socialism in One Country'. In it, the conditions of possibility for a transition to socialism in Tanzania were carefully explored on two -- but only two -- levels: historically, Saul argued, Tanzania represented a 'tabula rasa', on which the ruling party could write almost anything it wanted; theoretically, Saul leaned heavily on the arguments of Amilcar Cabral, who once reflected that the future of a 'socialist' Africa might lie with a 'petit-bourgeoisie', willing and able to commit 'class suicide'. When Saul's lengthy essay was finally disseminated to a wider audience, in a collection of articles written in collaboration with Arrighi, it formed part of an integrated set of theses, which became a standard text of radical underdevelopment theory on Africa.[2] Subsequent reflections on 'Tanzanian socialism' over the next decade would largely endorse, rather than challenge, the major and implicit theme of Saul's essay: that Tanzania was indeed embarked upon a distinctive and tortuous path to 'socialism', whose outcome was by no means ensured.

Over the next few years, the number of detailed empirical analyses -- ranging over issues such as the growth of rural stratification and bureaucratic privilege -- increased in rhythm with a more directly political discourse and critical engagement with the institutions and practices of 'Tanzanian socialism'. In 1972, a formidable and comprehensive collection of articles appeared in two volumes, edited by Cliffe and Saul, under the title of 'Socialism in Tanzania'. The peculiar admixture of nationalist historiography, orthodox and radical social ana-

lysis and socialist policy prescription that the two volumes contained represented the climax of intellectual affiliation with the actual politics of the party-state administration; the second volume concluded with an exchange among Issa Shivji, Tamas Szentes, Rodney and Saul, which explored -- for the first time -- the objective results and prospects of 'self-reliant' national development, and the subjective forces which were contending and colluding for control of the country's state and productive apparatuses. The very title of the essay by Shivji which had originally launched the exchange -- 'Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle' -- was enough to indicate that the tone of comment on the 'Tanzanian road to socialism' had altered perceptibly.[3]

While Shivji and others pointed to the rise of a 'bureaucratic petit-bourgeoisie', aligned with metropolitan capital, in the party-state administration as the impulse behind their oppositional stance, the theoretical inspiration for the notable shift of focus they effected lay elsewhere. For the international diffusion of the Chinese 'Cultural Revolution' had now reached remote Tanzania, where its impact on radical analysis was to be substantial. Indeed, the Maoist experience in China seemed, for a time, to provide the radical scholars in Tanzania, as elsewhere, with an ideal 'model' against which to measure their own 'road to socialism'. Deeply influenced by Maoism and its sympathizers abroad, a new generation associated with the radical journal 'Maji Maji' took up from the 'Cultural Revolution' the basic axioms that the struggle for 'socialism' required mobilization of the poorer peasantry against the rich and more powerful, relentless vigilance over potential 'capitalist roaders' inside the party-state administration, and a more disciplined

and ideologically 'proletarian' party of committed cadres. By the mid-1970s, the polemical literature of a radical opposition had cast its critical and uncompromising shadow over the 'Tanzanian road to socialism', eclipsing alternative discussions of it.[4]

In the event, of course, the Chinese 'Cultural Revolution' turned out to be little more than a repetition and exaggeration of the Stalinist purges which wracked the Soviet Union in the 1930s. But whatever the ultimate distance between the real substance of Maoism and the ideal images projected of it abroad, its gravitational force was to pull the radical intelligentsia away from the institutions and practices of 'Tanzanian socialism', which seemed insubstantial and vacuous by comparison. The actual movement and direction of the 'Tanzanian road to socialism' in the 1970s was to confirm and intensify these initial suspicions: the brief and isolated episode of working class militancy was terminated by the party-state administration, amidst mass dismissals and victimizations; and when the postcolonial regime finally launched a 'frontal assault' on the rural economy, it was directed against the mass of the poor, rather than the rich, peasantry. In short, 'Tanzanian socialism' seemed not only to check popular advance and radical social change, but to be motivated by a different set of considerations altogether.

In 1976, the earlier verdict on the authenticity of the 'Tanzanian road to socialism' was decisively reversed by the publication of Shivji's pioneering work: 'Class Struggles in Tanzania'. It contained an entirely alternative account of the postcolonial trajectory of the Tanzanian social formation, and constituted a direct attack on the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' that had manipulated the post-'Arusha' natio-

nalizations to its advantage, at the expense of the Asian 'commercial bourgeoisie' and the popular classes. In a single dismissive gesture, Shivji leveled all the pretensions of 'Tanzanian socialism' to an ideological illusion, which hid, but was easily made to reveal, the process through which the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' had brought the state and productive apparatuses under its control.[5] The appropriate perspective for assessing the 'Tanzanian road to socialism' had now been challenged; subsequent replies that the ruling party was still committed to and moving 'towards socialism'[6] were too shallow and evasive to be convincing.

Shivji's sharp account of the evolution of the Tanzanian social formation since decolonization exercised a deep influence on subsequent studies, which came more and more to echo his depiction of the party-state administration as a dominant social class. In the late 1970s, as the regime sank into deeper 'dependence' on international finance capital, penetrating analyses by scholars such as Colin Leys and Micheala Von Freyhold pointed to the increasing weight and importance of the 'metropolitan bourgeoisie'[7] on the balance of class forces around the state apparatus; and as the rural economy began to recover from the shocks of 'villagization', the process of class formation in the Tanzanian countryside received new and searching attention in the works of Bernstein, Andrew Coulson, Philip Raikes and others, which revealed the 'bureaucratic' and authoritarian practices that had succeeded the earlier 'official' emphases on 'ujamaa'.[8] But, on the whole, the empirical analyses of the late 1970s endorsed and qualified, rather than contradicted, Shivji's arguments. Those, like Cliffe and Saul, who had once invested their hopes for an authentic 'socialism' in Tanzania now turned their atten-

tion to Southern Africa proper, where the victory of national liberation movements against intransigent metropolitan and settler concerns had finally been secured, or appeared imminent.

Meanwhile, the rapidly declining attraction of 'Tanzanian socialism' -- accentuated by more 'revolutionary' Mozambique to the south -- found no compensation in the fortunes of more 'neo-colonial' Kenya to the north, where the initial signs of unabashedly capitalist industrialization and development were being registered. By comparison, the 'Tanzanian road to socialism' appeared to represent, not a superior 'democratic socialism', but an inferior 'retarded capitalism' as the title of an article by Suzanne Mueller judged it in 1980.[9]

In fact, by the end of the decade, it was the diversity and development of capitalism in the third world, rather than the prospects of 'socialism' there, that commanded the attention of a new generation of progressive scholars. This shift of empirical perspective, occurring long after the most vital and productive period of radical underdevelopment theory had run its course, was necessarily followed by a search for a different analytical framework, capable of focusing it. As it happened, the restructuring of world capitalism, from the 1960s onwards, had coincided with a renaissance of historical materialism, which developed and expanded over the next decade, coming to represent a coherent and comprehensive theory of historical development -- at once more expansive, in its thematic concerns, than dependency or world systems theory, and more scientifically rigorous, in every sense, than modernization theory. Evolutionary modernization -- reluctant to engage with any conflicting theory or reality -- made no reply. But radical underdevelopment theory had,

from the beginning, developed in critical tension and appreciation of marxist theory; the transition from the characteristic intellectual concerns of the one to the other, in studies of Tanzania and the third world generally, was effected without any major discontinuity. Yet no real synthesis of the major advances in historical materialism over the past decade, with the equally formidable accumulation of empirical knowledge on Tanzanian history, has appeared.

The present study has ventured an analytical synthesis of this type, combining theory and history in an articulated argument. An attempt has been made to evaluate the cumulative discoveries of historical and empirical investigations into the structure and development of the Tanzanian social formation, and to translate the results through a conceptual apparatus fabricated out of some of the most important innovations in marxist theory over the past decade. At the outset, elements for a more 'general' theory of underdevelopment -- amenable to comparative studies within the common historical field represented by the capitalist periphery -- were proposed, and a 'model of determination' was advanced in the form of a set of hypotheses on the social and historical formation of third world societies. Structured as such, the arguments of the study have deviated from more orthodox treatments of the capitalist periphery in general, and from earlier discussions of Tanzania in particular, in a number of rather distinct ways.

First, the study has cast the evolution of the Tanzanian social formation into a historical time-span of epochal dimensions, congruent with the fundamental theses of marxist theory on modes of production and transitions between them. By contrast, in conventional procedure, co-

lonial and postcolonial history is often separated by a disciplinary division from precolonial history, which assigns the former to contemporary interest and resigns the latter to more peculiar specializations. The pattern of precolonial development, as surveyed in Chapter II of this study, has thus been abandoned to nationalist, and often frankly 'patriotic', historians, determined to demonstrate the equal -- if not higher -- dignity and civilization of indigenous African society. The evidence of socio-economic backwardness, women's oppression, coercive class domination, extensive warfare and widespread servitude (all of which are massively present in European history), is ignored because of metropolitan chauvinist claims that it proved that Africa, left to itself, was incapable of even the most insignificant advance towards 'civilization'. Colonial conquest, once presented by imperial historians as an honourable 'mission', becomes in some versions of Africanist historiography a malevolent instrument of European racism, capable of reversing the whole of African history from its previously progressive trajectory. Such historical judgements are manifestly unhistorical. To insist on the fact that precolonial social formations in the third world were, in general, more backward than those in metropolitan Europe is not to endow either with any natural traits of superiority or inferiority, but merely to register the <u>determinate historical conditions</u> which permitted one to colonize, and subsequently dominate, the other.

However, the real weight and importance of the diversity of precolonial patterns of development for any general theory of the common historical field represented by the capitalist periphery lies elsewhere; and the absence of any serious and critical treatment of it in moderniza-

tion and dependency theory is registered again and again in the obvious paradoxes its neglect produces. Diffusion -- the vehicle of 'modernization' in the third world -- cannot generate the modernization of the advanced industrial countries; it cannot generate itself. Dependence -- the motor force of 'underdevelopment' in the capitalist periphery -- cannot produce the prior dominance of the imperialist metropolises; the original conditions of capitalist development and underdevelopment cannot be originally produced by capitalism. The diverse and divergent trajectories of precapitalist development are thus not simply a remote historical problem, somehow 'external' to and superseded by contemporary history; they are an irreducible prior constituent of the formation of world capitalism. No materialist study of the historical formation of the capitalist periphery can avoid reference to them.

A second topical field where this study has departed from conventional procedure is directly related to the first: for if the 'making' of the third world began with the international radiation of capitalist imperialism, the 'raw materials' from which it was forged were the antecedent social organisms in the non-European zones of the world economy -- 'raw materials' which differed from one area to another in type, quality and texture, exhibiting marked differences in level of historical development. The critical distinction between the outcomes of metropolitan pressure on Japan and the rest of the non-European world, which subsequently lapsed into the capitalist periphery, is striking in this respect. It was not the geographical 'isolation' of the Japanese social formation that separated it off for a different future, but its social 'insulation' by an advanced feudal complex capable of absorbing Euro-American pressure and

channelling its superior impulses into an independent capitalist industrialization. By contrast, rudimentary and inchoate socio-economic formations succumbed to colonial conquest in East Africa, as elsewhere, after a desperate and futile resistance. Material and cultural 'backwardness' was not the result, but the permissive condition -- the 'historic presupposition' -- of colonial empire.

Yet, in the territory of Tanzania, the same social and historical conditions which 'invited' colonial conquest would ultimately 'refuse' capitalist penetration. The reasons for this have been considered at length in this study: the anterior tempo of historical development had been slow and halting, a natural economy prevailed throughout the interior, international commerce was a monopoly of the coast, towns were few and fragile, property in the means of production was still largely unknown, sovereignty was weak and decentralized in the extreme. Moreover, the natural milieu which had set the stage for this languoring social development was far from luxuriant: little of the land was arable, and no mineral wealth lay beneath it -- it is clearly a mistake to omit geographical determinations from a materialist account of underdevelopment, simply because they have figured so heavily in orthodox reflections on the subject. In short, the total configuration of nature and sociality, which would provide the initial conditions of existence for capitalist penetration in the region, was notably unpropitious for any rapid transmutation, contingent on colonial conquest.

In the event, colonial conquest -- protracted by two decades of resistance -- yielded what the heterogenity of the region had previously forbid: state order. As a matter of historical record, it needs to be

stressed that there was no space in East Africa named 'Tanzania' which lay waiting to be discovered and colonized by metropolitan imperialism. Rather, 'Tanzania' is the product of a distinctly capitalist mode of political and territorial organization; it knew no prior common language, culture, history or socio-economic foundation. The hybrid devices of surplus-extraction which were eventually installed during the colonial epoch were thus inherent in the diversity of the 'raw materials' on which they battened. The processes of production which sustained the population of the region were too socially and technically primitive to be channelled directly and immediately into the circuitry of metropolitan capitalism; unmitigated coercion provided the necessary conversion belt between the two. An 'advanced' and repressive superstructure was thus erected above a vast peasantry, homogenized by the ravages of war and ecological collapse. Throughout the colonial epoch, the direct producers continued to maintain their stubborn unity with the land, from which they have yet to be shifted.

The exact character of the social order constructed during the colonial epoch has been the subject of much dispute in recent years; a solution to the conceptual problems it raises -- at once theoretically consistent and empirically accurate -- was a central theme in Chapter III of this study. For many scholars, emphasizing the 'external' determination of the third world as a totality, the answer has always been simple enough: 'capitalism'. For others, concerned with the 'internal' complexity of specific third world formations, the reply has been more abstract and confused: an 'articulation of modes of production'. The position of this study has been that the issues involved are too complex and difficult to be resolved at the level of theory alone. Instead, an attempt has been

made to isolate specific groups of direct producers and specific 'bearers' of imperialism (state administrators, settlers, merchants and so on); to examine the concrete mechanisms of surplus-extraction which connected them together; to reveal the limits to technical advance imposed by the relations of production in each case; and to demonstrate the relationship between class power and state power which was rendered necessary to secure and stabilize them.

One of the conclusions of this study has been that the problem presented by the nature of the social order in the third world cannot be resolved by recourse to categorization: for classification always presupposes a fixed structure, which in this case has yet to be formed. The analytical difficulties of coming to terms with the shifting coordinates of the capitalist periphery is evidence enough that the 'social order' there has yet to assume a regulated and orderly form, which ensures the constant reproduction of the relations of production and sanctions the existing configuration of social and political power. The instability and multiformity of social formations in the third world do not permit any categorical precision in the definition of the social order which obtains there. It has therefore seemed preferable to refer in this study to concrete 'mechanisms of surplus-extraction', different 'regimes of accumulation', various 'types of capital', and diverse 'patterns of development', rather than to an undifferentiated 'exploitation', a homogeneous 'peripheral capitalism', an invariant 'imperialism', or a consistent 'underdevelopment'. The latter, more conventional, set of concepts attempts to establish the common identity of the historical field represented by the capitalist periphery as a whole; what is needed, however, are concepts which capture and convey

the range of diversity and development within it.

The final area where the present study has departed from other approaches has been the interpretation offered within it of the 'Tanzanian road to socialism'. The successive attempts at coming to grips with the country's postcolonial trajectory, surveyed at the outset of this chapter, have each suffered, to varying degrees, from an implicit or explicit assumption that the post-independence 'State' was somehow different from its predecessor, because the state machinery was operated by a nationalist leadership apparently committed to 'Socialism and Self-Reliance'. There has thus been a tendency to confuse and conflate two distinct problems: the change in administration of the state apparatus, and the structural continuity of the state apparatus itself. Concentration on the first, and corresponding neglect of the second, has suggested that the dramatic pronouncements and expropriations made by the postcolonial party-state administration should be interpretated as an attempt to 'halt' the whole prior course of Tanzanian history, and launch it on the 'road to socialism' -- however different scholars may have chosen to assess and judge that attempt.

This study began from different premises, unconvinced of the possibility of 'socialism in one country'.[10] Moreover, in the prior studies of others, the origins of 'Tanzanian socialism' were too closely linked to the subjective whims of Nyerere and TANU to be convincing; the 'nationalizations' of 1967 were not the result of any irresistible drive by the country's small and isolated proletariat, and when working class militancy did finally raise the issue of 'socialization', it was met with state repression; and when the deep social struggle on the land -- so often announced by scholars as 'imminent' -- finally did break out, it

pitted the party-state administration against, rather than with, the vast mass of the peasantry. In short, neither the historical and material conditions of possibility, nor the objective necessity, for an effective socialism in Tanzania were present.

However, if the normal angle of vision, from which 'Tanzanian socialism' has conventionally been viewed, is radically reversed, an internal necessity for it can be established: as Chapters IV and V of this study suggest, far from representing a conscious break with the past, the 'Tanzanian road to socialism' has been its objective chosen successor; it was not the presence of a 'progressive petit-bourgeoisie' but the absence of any foreign and domestic capitalist interests in the country which ultimately accounts for the origins of 'Tanzanian socialism'; and it was not 'bureaucratic irrationalism' or 'policy failures' but the unfolding objective contradictions and the contest of subjective class forces which governed the course of the 'Tanzanian road to socialism'. In short, where 'Tanzanian socialism' appears irrational and irresponsible, without class interest or strategic objectives, Tanzanian state capitalism acquires a very real coherence and urgency. The full and effective weight of the past on the Tanzanian social formation, as it emerged from the colonial epoch, denied the current ruling class any other option.

There is no point in exaggerating the differences between the arguments of this study and prior attempts at evaluating the 'Tanzanian road to socialism'; indeed, without the cumulative knowledge which others have yielded, this study could not have been written. Moreover, many of these differences centre on the passage of time alone: for those writing in the late 1960s and early 1970s were still not yet at a sufficient distance

from the processes they attempted to analyze, to know which were the most important problems to be addressed. The arguments in this study have their date as well. Events in Tanzania will no doubt soon overtake them.

Notes

[1]See, for example, Jitendra Mohan, 'Varieties of African Socialism,' in Ralph Miliband and John Saville, eds., The Socialist Register 1966 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966).

[2]John Saul, 'African Socialism in One Country: Tanzania,' in Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, Essay on the Political Economy of Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973).

[3]Lionel Cliffe and John Saul, eds., Socialism in Tanzania, 2 vols. (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972).

[4]For an accessible discussion of the 'Maji Maji' group, see Saul, The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), chap. 10.

[5]Issa Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976).

[6]See, for instance, Cranford Pratt, 'Reflections of a Democratic Socialist,' in Bismarck U. Mwansasu and Cranford Pratt, eds., Towards Socialism in Tanzania (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1979).

[7]Colin Leys, 'The "Overdeveloped" Postcolonial State: A Re-evaluation,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 5 (January-April 1976); Micheala Von Freyhold, 'The Post-Colonial State and its Tanzanian Version,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 8 (January-April 1977).

[8]Henry Bernstein, 'Notes on Capital and Peasantry,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 10 (September-December 1977); Andrew Coulson, 'Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 10 (September-December 1977); Philip Raikes, 'Ujamaa and Rural Socialism,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 3 (May-October 1975).

[9]Suzanne Mueller, 'Retarded Capitalism in Tanzania,' in Miliband and Saville, eds., The Socialist Register 1980 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980).

[10]'To aim at building a nationally isolated socialist society means, in spite of all passing successes, to pull the productive forces backward even as compared with capitalism': Leon Trotsky, The Permanent Revolution and Results and Prospects (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1974), p. 22.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Books

Aglietta, Michel. A Theory of Capitalist Regulation. London: New Left Books, 1979.

Alavi, Hamza, and Shanin, Teodor, eds. Introduction to the Sociology of 'Developing' Societies. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982.

Althusser, Louis, and Balibar, Etienne. Reading Capital. London: New Left Books, 1970.

Amin, Samir. Accumulation on a World Scale. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974.

Amin, Samir; Arrighi, Giovanni; Frank, Andre Gunder; and Wallerstein, Immanuel. Dynamics of Global Crisis. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982.

Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983.

Anderson, Perry. Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism. London: New Left Books, 1974.

_____. Lineages of the Absolutist State. London: Verso, 1979.

Arrighi, Giovanni. The Geometry of Imperialism. London: New Left Books, 1978.

Arrighi, Giovanni, and Saul, John. Essays on the Political Economy of Africa. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973.

Baran, Paul. The Political Economy of Growth. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957.

Barrett Brown, Michael. The Economics of Imperialism. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974.

Bettelheim, Charles. Economic Calculation and Forms of Property. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976.

Bienen, Henry. Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.

Blackburn, Robin, ed. Revolution and Class Struggle: A Reader in Marxist Politics. Glasgow: Fontana, 1977.

Boesen, Jannik; Madsen, Birgit Storgaard; and Moody, Tony. Ujamaa -- Socialism from Above. Uppsala: Scandanavian Institute of African Studies, 1977.

Bois, Guy. Crise du Feudalisme. Paris: Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1976.

Braudel, Fernand. Capitalism and Civilization, 15th-18th Century, Vol. II: The Wheels of Commerce. New York: Harper and Row, 1982.

Braverman, Harry. Labour and Monopoly Capital. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974.

Brett, E.A. Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa. London: Oxford University Press, 1972.

Brewer, Anthony. Marxist Theories of Imperialism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981.

Callinicos, Alex, and Rogers, John. Southern Africa after Soweto. London: Pluto Press, 1978.

Carchedi, Guglielmo. On the Economic Identification of Social Classes. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977.

Carchedi, Guglielmo. On the Economic Identification of Social Classes. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977.

Castells, Manuel. The Urban Question. London: Edward Arnold, 1977.

_____. The Economic Crisis and American Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.

Cerroni, Umberto. Teoria del Partito Politico. Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1979.

Chesneux, Jean. Pasts and Futures, or What is History For?. London: Frank Cass, 1979.

Cliff, Tony. State Capitalism in Russia. London: Pluto Press, 1974.

Cliffe, Lionel, and Saul, John, eds. Socialism in Tanzania. 2 vols. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972.

Cliffe, Lionel et al., eds. Rural Cooperation in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1975.

Cohen, G.A. Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Coulson, Andrew. Tanzania: A Political Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.

_____, ed. African Socialism in Practice: The Tanzanian Experience. Nottingham: Spokesman, 1979.

Crummey, Donald, and Stewart, C.C., eds. Modes of Production in Africa, the Precolonial Era. London: Sage Publications, 1981.

Davidson, Basil. The African Slave Trade: Precolonial History, 1450-1850. Boston: Little, Brown, 1961.

Davies, Ioan. African Trade Unions. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1966.

De Brunhoff, Suzanne. The State, Capital and Economic Policy. London: Pluto Press, 1978.

De Crisenoy, Chantal. Lénine face aux moujiks. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1978.

De Silva, R.B.D. The Political Economy of Underdevelopment. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982.

Duby, Georges. The Early Growth of the European Economy. Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1974.

Emmanuel, Arghiri. Unequal Exchange. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972.

Frank, Andre Gunder. Capitalism and Underdevelopment. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967.

_____. Lumpenbourgeoisie:Lumpendevelopment. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974.

_____. Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979.

_____. Crisis: In the Third World. London: Heinemann, 1981.

Frobel, Folker; Heinrichs, Jurgen; and Kreye, Otto. The New International Division of Labour. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Genovese, Eugene. The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South. New York: Pantheon Books, 1961.

Godelier, Maurice. Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Goodman, David, and Redcliff, Michael. From Peasant to Proletarian: Capitalist Development and Agrarian Transition. Oxford: Oxford Basil Blackwell, 1981.

Goubourne, Harry, ed. Politics and State in the Third World. London: MacMillan Press, 1979,

Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers, 1971.

Green, R.H.; Rwegasira, D.G.; and Van Arkadie, B. Economic Shocks and National Policy Making; Tanzania in the 1970s. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies Report No.8, 1980.

Gutkind, Peter, and Wallerstein, Immanuel, eds. The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa. London: Sage Press, 1975.

Halliday, Jon. A Political History of Japanese Capitalism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975.

Harman, Chris. Bureaucracy and Revolution in Eastern Europe. London: Pluto Press, 1974.

Harris, Nigel. The Mandate of Heaven. London: Quartet Books, 1973.

_____. Of Bread and Guns: The World Economy in Crisis. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1983.

Hilferding, Rudolf. Finance Capital. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1981.

Hilton, Rodney et al., eds. The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism. London: New Left Books, 1976.

Hindess, Barry, and Hirst, Paul. Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.

Hodgson, Geoff. The Democratic Economy. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1984.

Hoogvelt, Ankie M.M. The Sociology of Developing Societies. London: MacMillan Press, 1976.

Hussain, Athar, and Tribe, Keith. Marxism and The Agrarian Question. 2 vols. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981.

Hyden, Göran. Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania. London: Heimemann, 1980.

Hymer, Stephen. The Multinational Corporation. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Iliffe, John. Tanganyika under German Rule, 1905-1912. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1969.

_____. A Modern History of Tanganyika. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Kaniki, M.H.Y., ed. Tanzania under Colonial Rule. London: Longman, 1979.

Kay, Geoffrey. Development and Underdevelopment. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975.

Kieran, J.A., and Ogot, B.A., eds. Zamani: A Survey of East African History. New York, Humanities Press, 1968.

Kjekshus, Helge. Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History. London: Heinemann, 1977.

Kula, Witold. An Economic Theory of the Feudal System. London: New Left Books, 1976.

Laclau, Ernesto. Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory. London: Verso, 1979.

Lenin, V.I. Selected Works. 3 vols. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970.

Lerner, Daniel. The Passing of Traditional Society. New York: Free Press, 1964.

Löwy, Michael. The Politics of Combined and Uneven Development. London: Verso, 1981.

Lukacs, Georg. Lenin: A Study in the Unity of His Thought. Cambridge, U.S.: M.I.T. Press, 1974.

Luxemburg, Rosa. The Accumulation of Capital. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968.

Mamdani, Mahmood. Politics and Class Formation in Uganda. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976.

Mandel, Ernest. Late Capitalism. London: Verso, 1978.

Marx, Karl. Theories of Surplus Value. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972.

_____. Grundrisse. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973.

_____. Capital. 3 vols. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975.

Marx, Karl, and Engels, Friedrich. Selected Works. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968.

Meillassoux, Claude. Maidens, Meal and Money. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

_____, ed. L'ésclavage en Afrique précoloniale. Paris: Maspero, 1975.

Miliband, Ralph. Marxism and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Mwansasu, Bismarck U., and Pratt, Cranford, eds. Towards Socialism in Tanzania. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1979.

Nabudere, D. Wadada. Essays on the Theory and Practice of Imperialism. London: Onyx Press, 1979.

Nyerere, Julius. Freedom and Unity. Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1966.

_____. Freedom and Socialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968.

_____. Freedom and Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.

Nzula, A.T.; Potekhim, I.I.; and Zusmanovich, A.Z. Forced Labour in Colonial Africa. London: Zed Press, 1979.

O'Conner, James. The Fiscal Crisis of the State. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973.

Parboni, Riccardo. The Dollar and its Rivals. London: Verso, 1981.

Poulantzas, Nicos. Political Power and Social Classes. London: New Left Books, 1973.

_____. Classes in Contemporary Capitalism. London: New Left Books, 1975.

_____. The Crisis of the Dictatorships. London: New Left Books, 1976.

_____. State, Power, Socialism. London: Verso, 1980.

Pratt, Cranford. The Critical Phase in Tanzania, 1945-1968. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Radice, Hugo, ed. International Firms and Modern Imperialism. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975.

Resnick, Idrian N. The Long Transition: Building Socialism in Tanzania. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981.

Rey, Pierre Philippe. Colonialisme, néo-colonialisme et transition au capitalisme. Paris: Maspero, 1971.

_____. Class Alliances. Translated by Milena Collot. Montreal: University of Concordia, mimeo, 1983. (Paris: Maspero, 1973.)

Roberts, Andrew, ed. Tanzania Before 1900. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968.

Rodinson, Maxime. Islam and Capitalism. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977.

Rodney, Walter. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Washington: Howard University Press, 1974.

Rostow, W.W. The Stages of Economic Growth. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1960.

Roxborough, Ian. Theories of Underdevelopment. London: MacMillan Press, 1979.

Rweyemanu, Justinian. Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania. Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1973.

Sabot, R.H. Economic Development and Urban Migration, Tanzania 1900-1971. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.

Sandbrook, Richard, and Cohen, Robin, eds. The Development of an African Working Class: Studies in Class Formation and Action. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975.

Saul, John. The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979.

Seidman, Robert. The State, Law and Development. London: Croom Helm, 1978.

Shanin, Teodor, ed. Peasants and Peasant Societies. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971.

Shivji, Issa. Class Struggles in Tanzania. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976.

Stavenhagen, Rudolfo. Social Classes in Agrarian Societies. New York: Anchor Books, 1975.

Swai, B., and Temu, A. Historians and African Historiography: A Critique. London: Zed Press, 1981.

Sweezy, Paul. The Theory of Capitalist Development. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970.

Taylor, John G. From Modernization to Modes of Production. London: MacMillan Press, 1979.

Temu, A., and Swai, B. Historians and Africanist History: A Critique. London: Zed Press, 1981.

Terray, Emmanuel. Marxism and 'Primitive' Societies. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972.

Therborn, Göran. Science, Class and Society. London: New Left Books, 1976.

_____. The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology. London: Verso, 1980.

Timpanaro, Sebastiano. On Materialism. London: Verso, 1980.

Tronti, Mario. Operai e Capitale. Torino: Einaudi, 1971.

Trotsky, Leon. The Permanent Revolution and Results and Prospects. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1974.

_____. In Defence of Marxism. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1965.

_____. History of the Russian Revolution. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974.

Von Freyhold, Michaela. Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania. London: Heinemann, 1979.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic Press, 1974.

_____. The Capitalist World Economy. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Warren, Bill. Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism. London: Verso 1980.

Weber, Max. The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations. London: New Left Books, 1976.

Wolpe, Harold, ed. The Articulation of Modes of Production. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980.
Wright, Erik Olin. Class, Crisis and the State. London: Verso, 1978.

2. Articles

Alavi, Hamza. 'The State in Postcolonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh.' In Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia. Edited by Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973.
Amin, Samir. 'Accumulation and Development: A Theoretical Model.' Review of African Political Economy, No. 1 (August-November 1974).
Banji, Jarius. 'Modes of Production in a Materialist Conception of History.' Capital and Class, No. 3 (Autumn 1977).
Barker, Carol, and Wield, David. 'Notes on International Firms in Tanzania.' Utafiti, No. 2 (1978).
Bazin, Jean. 'War and Servitude in Segou.' Economy and Society, No. 2 (May 1974).
Beckman, Bjorn. 'Imperialism and Capitalist Transformation: Critique of a Kenyan Debate.' Review of African Political Economy, No. 19 (September-December 1980).
_____. 'Imperialism and the "National Bourgeoisie".' Review of African Political Economy, No. 22 (October-December 1981).
_____. 'Whose State: State and Capitalist Development in Nigeria.' Review of African Political Economy, No. 23 (January-April 1982).
Bernstein, Henry. 'Notes on Capital and Peasantry.' Review of African Political Economy, No. 10 (September-December 1977).
_____. 'African Peasantries: A Theoretical Framework.' Journal of Peasant Studies, No. 4 (July 1979).
_____. 'Sociology of Underdevelopment vs. Sociology of Development?' In Development Theory: Four Critical Studies. Edited by David Lehmann. London: Frank Cass, 1979.
_____. 'Notes on State and Peasantry: the Tanzanian Case.' Review of African Political Economy, No. 21 (May-September 1981).
Bienefeld, M.A. 'The Class Analysis of Tanzania: A Comment on the Debate.' Review of African Political Economy, No. 4 (May-Ocotber 1975).
_____. 'Trade Unions and Peripheral Capitalism.' Brighton: IDS Discussion Paper, No. 112 (1977).
Biermann, Werner, and Kossler, Reinhart. 'The Settler Mode of Production: The Rhodesian Case.' Review of African Political Economy, No. 18 (May-August 1980).
Binns, Peter, and Gonzaleas, Mike. 'Cuba, Castro and Socialism.' International Socialism, No. 2:8 (Spring 1980)
Brenner, Robert. 'The Origins of Capitalist Development: a Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism.' New Left Review, No. 104 (July-August 1977).
_____. 'The Agrarian Roots of European Capitalism.' Past and Present, No. 97 (November 1982).
Bryceson, Deborah. 'The Proletarianization of Women in Tanzania.' Review of African Political Economy, No. 17 (January-April 1980).

Bryceson, Deborah. 'Changes in Peasant Food Production and Food Supply in Relation to the Historical Development of Commodity Production in Pre-colonial and Colonial Tanganyika.' Journal of Peasant Studies, No. 3 (April 1980).

Callinicos, Alex. 'Wage Labour and State Capitalism.' International Socialism, No. 2:12 (Spring 1981).

_____. 'Trotsky's Theory of Permanent Revolution and its Relevance to the Third World Today.' International Socialism, No. 2:16 (Spring 1982).

Cliffe, Lionel. 'Rural Class Formation in East Africa.' Journal of Peasant Studies, No. 2 (January 1977).

Constantino, Renato. 'Notes on Historical Writing for the Third World.' Journal of Contemporary Asia, No. 3 (1980).

Coquery-Vidovitch, Catherine. 'Research on an African Mode of Production.' In Relations of Production. Edited by David Seddon. London: Frank Cass, 1978.

Coulson, Andrew. 'Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania.' Review of African Political Economy, No. 10 (September-December 1977).

Debray, Regis. 'Problems of Revolutionary Strategy in Latin America.' New Left Review, No. 45 (September-October 1967).

De Gennaro, Musti. 'Ujamaa: The Aggrandizement of the State.' In The Political Economy of Rural Development: Peasants, International Capital, and the State. Edited by Rosemary E. Galli. Albany: State University of New York, 1981.

Eisenstadt, S.N. 'Breakdowns of Modernization.' In Readings in Social Evolution and Development. Edited by S.N. Eisenstadt. London: Pergamon Press, 1970.

Ellis, Frank. 'Agricultural Marketing and Peasant-State Transfers in Tanzania.' Journal of Peasant Studies, No. 4 (July 1983).

Emmanuel, Arghiri. 'White-Settler Colonialism and the Myth of Investment Imperialism.' New Left Review, No. 73 (May-June 1972).

_____. 'Myths of Development versus Myths of Underdevelopment.' New Left Review, No. 85 (May-June 1974).

Ergas, Zaki. 'Why Did the Ujamaa Village Policy Fail? -- Towards a Global Analysis.' The Journal of Modern African Studies, No. 35 (1980).

Feder, Ernest. 'Capitalism's Last-Ditch Effort to Save Underdeveloped Agricultures: International Agribusiness, the World Bank and the Rural Poor.' Journal of Contemporary Asia, No. 7 (1977).

Feldman, Rayah. 'Rural Social Differentiation and Political Goals in Tanzania.' In Beyond the Sociology of Development. Edited by Ivar Oxaal, Tony Barnett and David Booth. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.

Foster-Carter, Aidan. 'The Modes of Production Controversy.' New Left Review, No. 107 (January-February 1978).

_____. 'Marxism versus Dependency Theory? A Polemic.' Journal of International Studies, No. 3 (Winter 1979-1980).

Frank, Andre Gunder. 'Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology.' Catalyst, No. 3 (Summer 1967).

Godelier, Maurice. 'The Origins of Male Domination.' New Left Review, No. 127 (May-June 1981).

Gonzalez, Mike. 'The Nicaraguan Revolution.' International Socialism, No. 2:17 (Autumn 1982).

Gough, Ian. 'State Expenditure in Advanced Capitalism.' New Left Review, No. 92 (July-August 1975).

Goulbourne, Harry. 'Some Aspects of Ideological Functions in the Development of the Post-Colonial State in Tanzania.' Utafiti, No. 2 (1978).

Harman, Chris. 'Theories of the Crisis.' International Socialism, No. 2:9 (Summer 1980).

Harris, Nigel. 'The Revolutionary Role of the Peasants.' International Socialism, No. 1:41 (December-January 1969-1970).

Harvey, David. 'The Geography of Capitalist Accumulation: A Reconstruction of the Marxian Theory.' Antipode, No. 2 (1975).

Hedlund, Hans. 'Contradictions in the Peripheralization of a Pastoral Society: The Maasai.' Review of African Political Economy, Nos. 15-16 (May-December 1979).

Henfrey, Colin. 'Dependency, Modes of Production, and the Class Analysis of Latin America.' Latin American Perspectives, Nos. 3-4 (Summer and Fall 1981).

Hill, Frances. 'Ujamaa: African Socialist Productionism in Tanzania.' In Socialism in the Third World. Edited by H. Desfosses and J. Levesque. New York: Praeger, 1975.

Korsch, Karl. 'What is Socialization?' In Karl Korsch: Revolutionary Theory. Edited by Douglas Kellner. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974.

Kossler, Reinhart, and Biermann, Werner. 'The Settler Mode of Production: The Rhodesian Case,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 18 (May-August 1980).

Lenin, Vladimir. 'The Essence of "The Agrarian Problem of Russia" .' In Collected Works, Vol. 18. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964.

Leys, Colin. 'The "Overdeveloped" Post Colonial State: A Re-evaluation,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 5 (January-April 1976).

_____. 'Underdevelopment and Dependency: Critical Notes,' Journal of Contemporary Asia, No. 1 (1977).

Lipietz, Alain. 'Towards Global Fordism?' New Left Review, No. 132 (March-April 1982).

_____. 'Marx or Rostow?' New Left Review, No. 132 (March-April 1982).

Lofchie, Michael. 'Agrarian Crisis and Economic Liberalization in Tanzania.' Journal of Modern African Studies, No. 3 (1978).

McMichael, Philip; Petras, James; and Rhodes, Robert. 'Imperialism and the Contradictions of Development.' New Left Review, No. 85 (May-June 1974).

Mapolu, Henry, 'The Organization and Participation of Workers in Tanzania.' African Review, No. 3 (1972).

_____. 'The Workers' Movement in Tanzania.' Maji Maji, No. 12 (September 1973).

Marx, Karl. 'The Civil War in France.' In The First International and After. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974.

Meillassoux, Claude. 'From Reproduction to Production: A Marxist Approach to Economic Anthropology.' Economy and Society, No. 1 (February 1972).

_____. 'Historical Modalities of the Exploitation and Over-Exploitation of Labour.' Critique of Anthropology, Nos. 13-14 (Summer 1979).

Mihyo, Pascal. 'The Struggle for Workers' Control in Tanzania.' Review of African Political Economy, No. 4 (May-October 1975).

Mohan, Jitendra. 'Varieties of African Socialism.' In The Socialist Register 1966. Edited by Ralph Miliband and John Saville. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966.

Molyneux, Maxine. 'Androcentrism in Marxist Anthropology.' Critique of Anthropology, Nos. 9-10 (1977).

Mouffe, Chantal. 'Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci.' In Gramsci and Marxist Theory. Edited by Chantal Mouffe. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979.

Mpakati, Attaki. 'State and Society in Tanzania.' Journal of Eastern African Research, No. 1 (1976).

Mueller, Suzanne. 'Retarded Capitalism in Tanzania.' In The Socialist Register 1980. Edited by Ralph Miliband and John Saville. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980.

_____. 'Barriers to the Further Development of Capitalism in Tanzania: The Case of Tabacco.' Capital & Class, No. 15 (Autumn 1981).

_____. 'The Historical Origins of Tanzania's Ruling Class.' Canadian Journal of Modern African Studies, No. 3 (1981).

Patterson, Orlando. 'Slavery in Human History.' New Left Review, No. 117 (September-October 1979).

Post, Ken. 'Peasantization in Western Africa.' In African Social Studies: A Radical Reader. Edited by Peter Gutkind and Peter Waterman. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977.

Pratt, Cranford. 'Democracy and Socialism in Tanzania.' Canadian Journal of Modern African Studies, No. 3 (1978).

Raikes, Philip. 'Ujamaa and Rural Socialism.' Review of African Political Economy, No. 3 (May-October 1975).

_____. 'Rural Differentiation and Class-Formation in Tanzania.' Journal of Peasant Studies, No. 3 (April 1978).

Rey, Pierre Philippe. 'Class Contradictions in Lineage Societies.' Critique of Anthropology, Nos. 13-14 (Summer 1979).

Roberts, Hugh. 'The Algerian Bureaucracy.' Review of African Political Economy, No. 24 (May-August 1982).

Skocpol, Theda. 'Wallerstein's World Capitalist System.' American Journal of Sociology, No. 5 (March 1977).

Slater, David. 'Towards a Political Economy of Urbanization in Peripheral Capitalist Societies.' International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, No. 1 (March 1978).

_____. 'Imperialism and the Limitations on Capitalist Transformation at the Periphery.' In Industrialization and the State in Latin America. Edited by Jean Carriere. Amsterdam: Center for Latin American Research and Documentation, 1979.

Stren, Richard E. 'Underdevelopment, Urban Squatting, and the State Bureaucracy: A Case Study of Tanzania.' Canadian Journal of African Studies, No. 1 (1982).

Suret-Canale, Jean. 'Premières Sociétés de Classes.' Recherches Internationales, Nos. 57-58 (January-April 1967).

Sutcliffe, Bob. 'Imperialism and Industrialization in the Third World.' In Studies in the Theory of Imperialism. Edited by Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe. London: Longman, 1972.

Tabari, Ayoub. 'Freedom and Development.' Review of African Political Economy, No. 3 (May-October 1975).

Therborn, Göran. 'The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy.' New Left Review, No. 103 (May-June 1977).

Therborn, Göran. 'The Travail of Latin American Democracy.' New Left Review, Nos. 113-114 (January-April 1979).

Tschannerl, Gerhard. 'Periphery Capitalist Development: A Case Study of the Tanzanian Economy.' Utafiti, No. 1 (1976).

Vilar, Pierre. 'Problems in the Formation of Capitalism.' Past and Present, No. 10 (November 1956).

Von Freyhold, Micheala. 'The Post-Colonial State and its Tanzanian Version.' Review of African Political Economy, No. 8 (January-April 1977).

Warren, Bill. 'Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization.' New Left Review, No. 81 (September-October 1973).

Weeks, John, and Dore, Elizabeth. 'International Exchange and the Causes of Backwardness.' Latin American Perspectives, No. 2 (Spring 1979).

Wehler, Hans-Ulrich. 'Bismarck's Imperialism.' Past and Present, No. 48 (August 1970).

Williams, Gavin. 'There Is No Theory of Petit-Bourgeois Politics.' Review of African Political Economy, No. 6 (May-August 1976).

Wood, Ellen Meiksins. 'The Separation of the Economic and the Political in Capitalism.' New Left Review, No. 127 (May-June 1981).

Wright, Erik Olin. 'Varieties of Marxist Conceptions of Class Structure.' Politics and Society, No. 3 (1980).

_____. 'Capitalism's Futures.' Socialist Review, No. 68 (March-April 1983).

Ziemann, W., and Lozendorfer, M. 'The State in Peripheral Societies.' In The Socialist Register 1977. Edited by Ralph Miliband and John Saville. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977.