The Transformative Power of *Paideia* or *Paideia* Transformed?

Paideutic Culture during the Second Sophistic

Darren A. Hunter

Department of History and Classical Studies
McGill University, Montreal
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Abstract

The present study contends with the commodification and decadence of Hellenism and *paideia* (intellectual and cultural sophistication) during the Second Sophistic. It charts the path that Hellenism took from an esoteric ethnic essence to a universal and inclusive ethic. Given this inclusiveness, anyone in the empire who adopted a *paideutic* character had the chance of becoming a "Hellene," especially sophists. Upon establishing an ecumenical Hellenism, competition for audiences with other forms of entertainment compelled sophists to adopt a more theatrical lecture style, where the aesthetics of performance were more important than edification, and laid the foundation for commodification. The socio-political Roman context encouraged dissembling, actively commodifying the role of the sophist and philosopher. In the end, the empty pleasures of spectacle allowed for a new moral code to adopt and adapt Greek philosophic education, heralding a slow decay of ancient Hellenism.

Résumé

L'étude présentée ici discute la marchandisation et la décadence de l'Hellénisme et de la *paideia* durant la Seconde Sophistique. L'essence de l'Hellénisme a dû changer d'une ethnique ésotérique à une éthique universelle et inclusive. La compétition pour une audience obligea les sophistes à adopter un style de cours davantage théâtral, dans lequel les apparences et le divertissement étaient plus importants que l'enseignement. Le contexte socio-politique romain encouragea également la dissimulation en marchandant activement le rôle du sophiste et du philosophe. À la fin, les plaisirs superflus du spectacle permirent à un nouveau code moral d'adopter et d'adapter une éducation philosophique grecque, annonçant un lent déclin de l'Hellénisme ancien.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Lucian's works (selection)

Abbreviation	Latin title*	English title
Ana.	*Anacharsis*	Anacharsis
Apol.	*Apologia*	Apology
Asin.	*Asinus*	The Ass
Bis Acc.	*Bis Accusatus*	Twice Accused
D.Meretr.	*Dialogi Meretricii*	Dialogues of the Courtesans
Dem.	*Demonax*	Demonax
Eun.	*Eunuchus*	The Eunuch
Fug.	*Fugitivi*	The Runaways
Herm.	*Hermotimus*	Hermotimus
Hist. Conscr.	*Quomodo historia conscribenda sit*	How to Write History
Icar.	*Icaromenippus*	Icaromenippus
Imag.	*Imagines*	Essays in Portraiture
Ind.	*Adversus Indoctum*	The Ignorant Book Collector
Pro Laps.	*Pro Lapsu inter Salutandum*	A Slip of the Tongue
Lex.	*Lexiphanes*	Lexiphanes
Merc. Cond.	*De Mercede Conductis potentium familiaribus*	On Salaried Posts
Nig.	*Nigrinus*	Nigrinus
Philops.	*Philopseudes*	The Lover of Lies
Pisc.	*Piscator*	Fisherman
Pro Imag.	*Pro Imaginibus*	Essays in Portraiture Defended
Pseudol.	*Pseudologista*	The Mistaken Critic
Rh.Pr.	*Rhetorum praeceptor*	The Teacher of Rhetoric
Salt.	*De Saltatione*	The Dance
Scyth.	*Scythianus*	The Scythian
Somn.	*Somnium [sive Vita Luciani]*	The Dream or Lucian's Life
DDS.	*De Dea Syria*	The Syrian Goddess
Tox.	*Toxaris*	Toxaris
Vit. Auc.	*Vitarum Auctio*	Philosophies for Sale

Philostratus's works (selection)

Abbreviation	Latin title*	English title
VS	*Vitae Sophistarum*	The Lives of the Sophists
VA	*Vita Apollonii*	The Life of Apollonius of Tyana

*Titles are not given in Greek as most scholarship refers to these works by their Latin title.

INTRODUCTION : DEFINING HELLENISM

"La seconde sophistique performe l'héllenisme."
-Barbara Cassin, *L'effet sophistique*, 451

In the fourth century BC, the Athenian logographer, teacher of rhetoric, and publicist Isocrates (*Panegyricus* 4.50) put forward a radical claim that education and culture (*paideia*) rather than birth (*genos*) constitute one as a "Hellen":

> τοσοῦτον δ᾽ ἀπολέλοιπεν ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν περὶ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους, ὥσθ᾽ οἱ ταύτης μαθηταὶ τῶν ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι γεγόνασι, καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὄνομα πεποίηκε μηκέτι τοῦ γένους ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας δοκεῖν εἶναι, καὶ μᾶλλον Ἕλληνας καλεῖσθαι τοὺς τῆς παιδεύσεως τῆς ἡμετέρας ἢ τοὺς τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως μετέχοντας.
>
> Our city [Athens] has so far surpassed other men in thought and speech that students of Athens have become the teachers of others, and the city has made the name "Hellene" seem to be not that of a people (γένους) but of a way of thinking; and people are called Hellenes because they share in our education (παιδεύσεως) rather than in our birth.[1]

Regarding this statement, Jonathan Hall rightly argues that "Isocrates was not just *extending* the definition of 'Hellene' to include barbarians but rather *restricting* its usage to those who have passed through an Athenian education."[2] This *Athenocentric* education laid out a standard set of authors and a dialect by which others could more easily attain the name and identity of "Hellene."[3] The implications and realization of this statement presented themselves in the following centuries.

Later in the fourth century BC, Alexander the Great spread the Attic dialect of Greek and an Athenian education throughout the Near East. By the time the Romans

[1] All translations are my own, unless specifed.
[2] J. Hall 2002, 209. See also Too 1995, 129, "being Athenian ultimately takes precedence over and eclipses being Greek;" Kaldellis 2007, 18-9. On Isocrates, *Paneg.* 4.50, see Swain 1996; Malkin 2001; Said 2001; Mellor 2008, 79-86; Cartledge 1993. *Cf.* Thuc. 2.41.1: Ξυνελών τε λέγω τήν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν εἶναι, "In summation, I say that the whole city [Athens] is the educator of the Greeks."
[3] Sourcebooks tend to offer Homer, Demosthenes, Plato, and the tragedians as the educators of Greece, e.g. Joyal 2009.

conquered the Greek *poleis* (cities, sg. *polis*) of Achaea, Asia Minor, the Levant, and Egypt, other Greek *poleis* (Alexandria, Smyrna, Ephesos, Pergamon) had risen to cultural authority while Athens, a nostalgic *topos*, had itself become a backwater.[4] Athenaios of Naucratis (*Deipnosophistae* 4.83.6-7) tells us that the Alexandrians were now the ones who educated not only all of the Greeks but also the barbarians: ὅτι Ἀλεξανδρεῖς εἰσιν οἱ παιδεύσαντες πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους. By the time the East was finally subdued in 31 BC, Rome itself had effectively usurped the place of Alexandria as the cultural capital of the world.[5] The triumph of Rome led to the creation of Greece (the provinces of Achaea and Asia), and Greek unity came only at the subservience to this outside power.[6] The individual Greek *poleis* still squabbled with each other, but in new forms: they competed for imperial favours; beautified their cities through euergetism; attracted students and prestige through sophistry.

Rome's culture was heavily imbued in, intertwined with, and indebted to Classical Athenian education, Isocrates's παιδεύσεως (*paideia*).[7] Romans approached Hellenism and the Greek world actively as philhellenes, not to admire it passively but instead to shape it according to their pre-existing idea of Greek tradition and the Greek past.[8] Turning to Pausanias (2.23.6) we see how Romans engaged with Greek tradition: "the many [Romans] who want to hear what they already believe."[9] Thus sojourns to Greece

[4] Romeo 2002; Swain 2007b.
[5] Diod. Sic. 1.4.2-3; cf. Athen. *Deipn.* 2b-3d.
[6] Alcock 1993, 129.
[7] E.g. see Cato the Elder's many rebukes but deep knowledge of Greek culture.
[8] Swain 1996, 66-72; Kaldellis 2007, 39, the Romans were less interested in contemporary Greeks than in their own idealized vision of the classical past; Whitmarsh 2004, 139-158; Whitmarsh 2001a, 1-35.
[9] Pausanias ii.23.6: οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ αὐτῶν λέληθεν Ἀργείων τοὺς ἐξηγητὰς ὅτι μὴ πάντα ἐπ᾽ ἀληθείᾳ λέγεταί σφισι, λέγουσι δὲ ὅμως. See also Pliny, *Epis.* viii.24; Aulus Gellius i.2.1; Tacitus, *Annals* ii.55.1.

were less about a contemporary journey than an encounter with the ancients.[10]

Classical Athens provided the essence of the cultural outlook—a plethora of themes and motifs, and the Attic dialect of Greek—while Rome was fundamental to the very existence of a Hellenic renaissance in the second century AD. Roman military and political power, the *pax Romana,* which embraced the entire Mediterranean, provided the stage on which sophists performed. Furthermore, Roman legislation established chairs of Philosophy and Rhetoric in both Athens and Rome,[11] provincial elites were granted Roman citizenship,[12] in 212 the emperor Caracalla extended Roman citizenship to all freemen throughout the empire,[13] and local festivals incorporated the emperor.[14] Thus Athens and Rome provided the cornerstones of paideutic culture for all citizens of the empire, whether Roman, Greek, or barbarian, from the centre of empire or its outer backwaters.[15]

In the cultural and paideutic renaissance of Hellenism of the second century AD, commonly referred to as the Second Sophistic, sophists and philosophers emerged as the custodians of *paideia,* an untranslatable term that encompasses simultaneously education, culture, and social status.[16] Sophists toured the Greek cities of the empire giving a variety of extremely elaborate and meticulously contrived yet extemporaneous rhetorical performances. Competitive behaviour performed in public, dazzling audiences, and demonstrating one's own linguistic, literary, and cultural superiority were the essence of

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[10] Horace, *Odes* 1.3; *cf.* Mellor 2008, 102-6. *Cf.* Philostratus, *VS* 624: Aelian was a Roman who *Atticized* as if he were from the interior of Attica. For the interior of Attica as representing the purest Attic speech, see Philostratus, *VS* 553.
[11] Sidebottom 2011, 92-9; Swain 1996; Whitmarsh 2001a; Whitmarsh 2004; Bowie 2004; Habicht 1985; Joyal; Swain 2007a; Philostratus, *VS* 587, 589.
[12] Swain 2004.
[13] The *Constitutio Antoniniana.*
[14] Price 1984a; Price 1984b; Coleman 2010, 666, spectacle connected empire to the emperor.
[15] Nesselrath 2009, 121-135.
[16] Marrou 1956, 96-101 and 217-26, brilliantly characterizes this world as "The Civilization of *Paideia.*"

the Second Sophistic. I use the term *sophist* in the sense of "public literary performer"[17] to characterize a sophist's skill as "rhetorical," "dramatic," and "literary." Sophists frequently depended for their success not only on the mastery of traditional techniques and themes—the cultivation of classical Greek history and literature alongside that of classical Attic syntax and diction, known as "Atticism"—but also on an affective appeal to the audience's sense of its cultural identity. As a public performer, a sophist's task was entertaining a sophisticated audience of men "whose ideal was the ability to recall large chunks of precise and exquisitely shaped material, internalized by memory at an early age" and who "knew only too well what it was like to rummage in a silt of memories for the perfect citation, for the correct word, for the telling rhetorical structure."[18]

The literature of the Second Sophistic reflected a cultural atavism marked by a deep and pervasive fascination with classical Greece. Flavius Philostratus, himself a sophist and author of one of our most significant texts *Vitae Sophistarum*,[19] tried to claim a link between the sophists of the classical period and those nearer to his own times who were noted for their public performances and outstanding rhetorical abilities, deliberately calling the contemporary sophistic "second" rather than "new."[20] Yet, contemporary sophists differed from their classical peers. Sophists of the "First" sophistic discussed abstract philosophical themes, whereas those of the "Second" specialized in declamations

[17] For this use of *sophistes*, see Bowie 1970, 5.
[18] Brown 1983, 3.
[19] See Bowie 2009, 19-32, Flinterman 1995, 5-14, Bowersock 1969, 1-16, for a biography of Philostratus and the number of authors named Philostratus and the attribution of their different works; *cf.* Connolly 2001a, 90, "It is true that much of the evidence [for this period] relies on Philostratus, an eccentric reporter with his own intellectual and cultural agenda. This should not disqualify [him]." We must also account for the ways in which the rules of virtuous behavior are broken, especially when the men who do so do not lose but make significant gains in economic and symbolic capital; see also Swain 2009, 33-47, where one of Philostratus's aims was to bring forward a more exclusive model of Hellenic culture, and to present this as the natural culture of his elite peers.
[20] Philostr., *VS* 480-4; 490-513 esp. 507, 510-11.

based on historical events.[21] Moreover, the lectures of the past had an edifying quality while the performances of the Second Sophistic concentrated on the aesthetics of performance. Thus, the first sophists aimed at persuasion and instruction, while the second sophists merely exhibited rhetorical skill.

Not only does the altered role of a sophist set the second century AD apart from its classical antecedent, but it also separates it from the political rhetoric of the Late Republic. Both Greek and Roman education focused on oratory where students would write and perform practice speeches (*meletai*) in the personae of great historical figures of the past.[22] In numerous works on oratory, Cicero likened political oratory to performance.[23] Yet, performance or not, political oratory still had a deliberative purpose, whereas the sophists employed epideictic oratory which spoke in praise or in blame of a topic or theme before an audience of whom no decision was demanded save applause and admiration.[24] Philostratus lauded epideictic oratory, a sphere into which more and more oratorical talent had been exclusively diverted[25] and an impulse that Ewen Bowie views as indicative of the Greeks' loss of political autonomy.[26] Epideictic oratory, a strangely theatrical form of oratory that achieved remarkable popularity, empowered the Greeks,

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[21] Philostr., *VS* 481.

[22] Marrou 1956; Connolly 2011. For the centrality of dramatic impersonation, see e.g. Philostr., *VS* 541: σοφιστῇ δὲ ἐντυχὼν ἀλλᾶντας ὠνουμένῳ καὶ μαινίδας καὶ τὰ εὐτελῆ ὄψα ὦ λῷστε, εἶπεν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ Δαρείου καὶ Ξέρξου φρόνημα καλῶς ὑποκρίνασθαι ταῦτα σιτουμένῳ, "Upon coming across a sophist buying cheap cooked sausages and small fried fish, [Polemon] said, 'My good friend, there is no way to convincingly mimic the spirit of Dareios or Xerxes eating food such as that!'"

[23] Cicero refers to his friend, the actor Roscius, who habitually offered him pointers for effective performance.

[24] See Appendix One. There were three types of oratory: deliberative, forensic, and epideictic. Deliberative oratory delivered before public assemblies argues for or against a particular course of action; forensic oratory accuses or defends past actions, commonly found in the courtroom; epideictic oratory does not necessarily persuade at all, but rather speaks in praise or in blame of a topic or theme before an audience of whom no decision is demanded. The declamations, *meletai*, of sophists were of this type, as are encomia, panegyrics, etc.

[25] On diverted talent, Brunt 1994, 37.

[26] Bowie 1970.

fostered an identity, and provided an unquestioned sense of cultural superiority and status in the Roman Empire.[27] Performance of the past thus served to elevate those individuals, the *pepaideumenoi*, who were able to master it. Yet under the influence of Roman political and cultural hegemony, the definition of "Greek" and "Hellene" were contested as everyone vied for social status using a Classical Athenian programme as their educational regime. This forces us to re-examine Hellenic identity and the implications such a re-definition has on Greek *paideia* of the Second Sophistic.

What is meant by "Hellenism," "Greekness," "Greekdom," or "*Hellenicity*?"[28] These terms appear ubiquitously in scholarship, but they are never defined, save J. Hall's neologism "*Hellenicity*", which is concerned with fictive kinship.[29] Many scholars latch onto the cultural definition, never questioning the intrinsic semantics of the term as it relates to ethnicity.[30] In order to clarify my usage of the terms "Hellenism" and "Greekness" for the second century AD, I put forward a neutral term for Hellenism that at once captures the essence of a cultivated and cultured individual while tacitly referring back to its ethnic provenance: *paideutic* identity. My use of the term *Greekness* always connotes Greek ethnicity, and *Hellenism* refers to a cultural character. *Paideutic* identity reflects all facets of *paideia*, but it is released from the ethnic parameters that bind the other terms. This is important as a great many of the sophists, philosophers, and educated elite were not ethnically Greek.[31] The need for such a term reflects the nature of education and the political situation of the Roman Empire. Hellenism and *paideutic*

[27] Branham 1989, 2-3.
[28] Many authors use these terms in a nebulous fashion, one which straddles ethnic and ethic lines; e.g. Goldhill 2001; Goldhill 2002; Whitmarsh 2001a; Whitmarsh 2005; Schmitz 1999; Shmitz 2012; etc.
[29] See J. Hall 2002.
[30] E.g. Swain 1996, 9-10, intermarriage between Greek and indigenous populations in Asia, the Aegean, and Sicily makes a cultural definition more apt than a racial definition.
[31] See the many examples in Philostratus's *VS*.

identity, then, during the Principate were transformed into Roman Hellenism. The governing concept of Roman Hellenism and *paideutic* culture was born out of a complex of interrelated factors: Rome's construction of Greece as a cultural marketplace, Greece's desire to anchor identity in the prestigious past, and the necessity of creating a new discourse of social distinction to stratify the new Romanizing ruling classes.[32]

Glen Bowersock claims that the old standard of ethnically-based Hellenism broke down in the second century AD, and in so doing made way for "a new kind of Hellenism, an ecumenical Hellenism that could actually embrace much that was formerly barbaric."[33] Based on Philostratus's reconstruction of the period in his *Vitae Sophistarum* (*VS*), Ilaria Romeo correctly points out that the Second Sophistic started in Western Anatolia (Smyrna) and that the majority of sophists were from Asia Minor.[34] Smyrna, Ephesus, Pergamon, and other Anatolian cities, rather than Athens, were the most vibrant intellectual *lieux* of the Second Sophistic, yet Athens remained a *topos* of nostalgia that helped link the Greek cities and provided a means for Romans to exert both political control and influence on their eastern empire.[35] Thus Smyrna and Asia Minor presented the ideal model of Hellenism to the Roman world which disseminated it to the fringes of empire.

The present study contends with the commodification and decadence of Hellenism and *paideia* (intellectual and cultural sophistication) during the Second Sophistic. It charts the path Hellenism took from an esoteric ethnic essence to a universal

[32] Whitmarsh 2004, 139-158.
[33] Bowersock 1994, 53.
[34] Romeo 2002, 35-6.
[35] The appearance of Herodes Atticus somewhat refocuses the movement back to Athens, but even Herodes Atticus deferred to Polemon, the eminent sophist of Smyrna (Philostr., *VS* 538). On Roman control, see Woolf 1994.

and inclusive ethic. Given this inclusiveness, anyone in the empire who adopted a *paideutic* character had the chance of becoming a "Hellene," especially sophists. Upon establishing an ecumenical Hellenism, competition for audiences with other forms of entertainment compelled sophists to adopt a more theatrical lecture style, where the aesthetics of performance were more important than edification, and laid the foundation for commodification. The socio-political Roman context encouraged dissembling, actively commodifying the role of the sophist and philosopher. In the end, the empty pleasures of spectacle allowed for a new moral code to adopt and adapt Greek philosophic education, heralding a slow decay of ancient Hellenism.

Chapter one is an exposition of an ecumenical and inclusive Hellenism based on *paideia* rather than birth.[36] In order to investigate the inclusiveness of Rome and the exclusiveness of Greece (Greekness), I examine two figures from outside traditional mainland Greece and Asia Minor: Lucian (Λουκιανός) from the city of Samosata in Syria on the banks of the Euphrates River, and Favorinus (Φαβωρῖνος) of Arelate in Gaul. An analysis of Lucian's writings paints him as an insider to Greek culture and yet, at the same time, still an outsider and a barbarian. He wrote in Greek but expressed sentiments of an ecumenical Hellenism, staking his place in the Greek-barbarian matrix. Favorinus, too, espoused an ecumenical Hellenism as opposed to the insistence of M. Antonius Polemon (Πολέμων) of Laodicea (in Asia Minor near Smyrna) on Greek racial superiority. An examination of Polemon's *Physiognomy* captures the battle of ideologies, but it was a Roman world and Rome's view, in the end, won out. Rome's affiliation with a cultural *paideia* set up the basis that Hellenism was not an ontological essence but rather a positioning: in the culture of empire, anyone could aspire to a *paideutic* identity.

[36] See Bang 2010.

The first three centuries of the Roman Empire were ones of urbanity and urbanism, where pleasure was no less legitimate than virtue.[37] In the pursuit of pleasure and with extending the membership of "Hellene," the roles of philosopher and sophist (a virtuoso rhetor) rose to the fore and clashed. Chapter two explores sophistic spectacle as an element of the greater cultural scene of spectacle in the Roman Empire. It does this by defining the roles of a sophist and a philosopher,[38] and highlighting the axiological clash between the two professions. Philosophy and the philosopher are taken as a whole, not separated into the many various sects, similar to the sources themselves.[39] One of the most prominent individuals of the Second Sophistic, M. Antonius Polemon of Laodicea, a rhetor and sophist (c. 90-146 AD),[40] vividly reifies the performative and *paideutic* elements of sophistic declamation, effectively performing history in mimetic fashion,[41] and provides solid support for viewing sophists as entertainers (among other roles). Following Polemon's *paideutic* and entertaining declamations, Favorinus of Arelate (born circa 90 AD)—a Gaul, hermaphrodite, and the leading sophist of his adoptive city Ephesos—brought a burlesquing element to declamation, emphasizing the aesthetic and sensual over the edifying and noetic.

Both Polemon and Favorinus were eminent sophists who had immense success in Ionia, but chapter three focuses on Lucian of Samosata (born circa 120 AD), a rhetorical-satirical author who wrote from the fringes of the empire. Achieving wealth and renown in Gaul, and an imperial post in Egypt, Lucian failed to find success in Ionia, the

[37] Veyne 1997, 183-206. See also Dalby 2000.
[38] Philosopher is a generic term that encompasses all philosophical sects throughout the paper.
[39] E.g. Lucian often takes the figure of Philosophy as a catch all personification for all the different sects.
[40] Polemon was an eminent teacher, orator, and politician in Smyrna, his adopted city. He was trained as a sophist by Dio of Prusa (Chrysostom) (Philostr., *VS* 539) and by Scopelianus and the Stoic Timocrates (Philostr., *VS* 536); his own pupils included P. Aelius Aristides.
[41] See Schmitz 1999.

heartland of the Second Sophistic.[42] This allowed him a unique and privileged position to comment on Roman Hellenism and the *paideutic* culture of empire. To obtain *paideia*, one had to walk a labyrinthine path fraught with bafflement, error, and pitfalls, and few ever ascended to the citadel of virtue at its centre. Through Lucian's satires I propose that we are able to understand the theatrics of patronage and commodification that reify the turn to spectacle over philosophic instruction. The *paideutic* individual was no longer valued for their instruction but as a theatrical prop to elevate the dubious social position of the patron: appearance trumped instruction. In such a context, the rigors of traditional *paideia* gave way to pseudo-*paideia*, a path of effortless vice that relied on appearance, duplicity, and spectacle. In essence, spectacle reified the commodification of *paideia* and Hellenism.

I have based my arguments on close readings of primary literary sources, often translating them critically to bring forward the flavour and excitement of spectacle while retaining an accurate version of the historical narrative. Sophists of the second century AD were distinct from their Classical peers. The political and cultural environment had changed drastically, as had the face of Hellenism. In light of this evolution, I propose a more nuanced reading and understanding of sophistic Hellenism, one that recognizes the transformative power of Roman cultural hegemony in the eastern empire and within that traditional realm of *Greekness*.[43] Hellenism now encompassed Romans and barbarians, and the focus of sophistry was no longer abstract philosophical themes, but dramatized declamations of the classical past.[44] *Paideia* was not a static entity, but one that

[42] Gaul, *Bis Acc.* 27, *Somn.* 18, *Apol.* 11-12, 15; Egypt, *Apol*. 12; Ionia, *Bis Acc.* 27. See C.P. Jones 1986, 6-23.
[43] See Woolf 1994 for the influences of Roman culture on the identity of the "Greek" east.
[44] Philostr., *VS* 481.

conformed to its times, it was now Roman Greek *paideia*, or simply Roman Hellenism. Significantly, it was shaped by a Roman idealization which created an image of classical Greek history and literature as a realm of pure culture:[45] "Others may perfect the arts of sculpture, oratory, and astronomy, but you, Roman, remember to rule peoples with empire."[46]

[45] Whitmarsh 2004, 139-158.
[46] Virgil, *Aen.* 6.851-2.

CHAPTER I

THE CHANGING FACE OF HELLENISM

σοφῷ ἀνδρὶ Ἑλλὰς πάντα καὶ οὐδὲν ἔρημον ἢ
βάρβαρον χωρίον οὔτε ἡγήσεται ὁ σοφὸς.

"To a wise man Greece is everywhere, and he will
not believe any place desolate or *barbarous*."

- Philostratus, *Vita Apollonii* 1.35

The dichotomy of Greeks and barbarians was still prevalent in the second century AD.[47] Two case studies, those of Lucian and Favorinus, will help us locate and contest the membership of Hellenism in this time period. Due to Lucian's paideutic immersion, his work is now the *locus classicus* for examining the complexities of "being Greek" under Roman rule,[48] while Favorinus's personal confrontation with Polemon marked the polarizing struggle between Greeks and barbarians as they vied to define Hellenism. Both case studies reveal that Greeks are Greek but that Hellenism, being a *pepaideumenos*, was open to all.

Becoming Greek, Remaining Syrian: Lucian and *Otherness*

Είμεθα ένα κράμα εδώ· Σύροι, Γραικοί, Αρμένιοι, Μήδοι.
"We are a mixture here: Syrians, Greeks, Armenians, Medes."
- *In the city of Osrhoene*, C.P. Cavafy

Lucian of Samosata came from the fringes of empire. He was born at the banks of the Euphrates on the Mesopotamian frontier circa 120 AD in the former kingdom of

[47] See Herodotos; Hartog 1988; Gould 1989, for the incipient of this oppositional trend. See also Hall 1997 and 2002 for the switch from 'aggregative' Hellenism to an 'oppositional' one. In general, see Cartledge 1993; Gruen 2011; Malkin 2001.
[48] Vout 2007, 213. See also Goldhill 2002, "Being Greek, with Lucian." He could be classified as a Hellenized Syrian or an oriental Syrian.

Commagene in the Roman province of Syria.[49] While the Comagenean royals were Hellenized in culture, the common people were of mixed origin, the majority being Semitic and speaking an array of languages, predominantly Aramaic/Syriac.[50] To the north and west of Samosata lies the barrier of the anti-Taurus mountains. Thus by nature the area was focused southward and eastward onto the small kingdom of Osrhoene, which stretched along the opposite bank of the Euphrates River. Its capital Orhai became the centre of a revived Aramaic culture, with Syriac as its language, and Christianity as its religion, in the late second century AD.[51] Thus the *topos* of Lucian's birth defined him

[49] See *De Dea Syria* 1; *Bis accus.* 27, 14, 25-34; *Ind.* 19; *Pisc.* 19. The emperor Vespasian annexed the kingdom of Commagene to Syria in 72 AD. *Pisc.* 19: Σύρος, ὦ Φιλοσοφία, τῶν Ἐπευφρατιδίων. See *Hist. Conscr.* 24: where he reveals that he was from Samosata. One should not consider the fringes of the Empire as desolate and bleak places, but rather as centres of cultural exchange with neighbouring empires. Wallace-Hadrill 2011, 415-427, has shown that Pompeii has been taken as a standard "Roman" city for too long, that in fact Pompeii was instead a composite city, reflected the subtleties complexity of the town's cultural identities given its position on the frontier between cultures. He states that "Pompeii was a good deal more "Roman" before it became a colony than is generally allowed and perhaps less "Roman" than generally allowed thereafter. Pompeii occupied a persistent role as frontier zone between cultures. Strabo's account (5.4.3-8) suggests that not only should we expect to find different cultures at different points of the Pompeian past—Oscan, Etruscan, Samnite, and Roman—but that one of the cultural characteristics of the city is the complexity of its ethnic history, and that we might expect to see these differences simultaneously present in the now of Pompeii. Pompeii acquired this cultural variety as it "hinged" between different cultures, giving the city a certain cultural power of speaking different languages simultaneously and playing them off against each other. Commagene, in a similar frontier zone, may have had a similar cultural experience as Pompeii. Wallace-Hadrill asserts that Pompeii is not an exceptional case, but that similar stories can be told of other locations.

[50] The Greek language made few inroads among the rural population, with non-Hellenic language(s)—probably Aramaic—as the rural language but, as Maurice Sartre (2005) has indicated, even the cities were far from being completely Hellenized. Christopher Jones (1986) imputed "the majority of the population seem[ed] to have been Semitic" with Syriac experiencing a literary "renaissance" in the second century AD. The earliest evidence of this was the Epistle of Mara bar Sarapion. This letter, written in Syriac by a man from Samosata, criticized the Roman treatment of Syrians as the author was a victim of forced displacement. However, while Aramaic seemed to have been prevalent, the prestige of Greek remained paramount in higher forms of education. See Sartre 2005, 291-296, noting that rural areas offered virtually total resistance to Hellenization, apart from some superficial aspects that affected only the elites. See also Isaac 2011, 506. Gawlikowski, p.46, claims with the re-emergence of Aramaic in late antiquity, we are forced to admit the continuous, if concealed, presence of a non-Hellenic rural population around Antioch and other urban enclaves. Millar 1993, 99-111, both Dura-Europa and Palmyra provide good archaeological evidence for the multicultural milieu of the Roman frontier, with trilingual inscriptions: Latin, Greek, and Palmyrene (or another Semitic language); See also Salmeri 2004 on the numerous mistakes in spelling and syntax that prove that mastery of Greek was far from perfect for provincials; Jones 1986, 6-7; Cureton 1855, 70-76; Swain 1996, 302; Lightfoot 2003, 184-208; Millar 1993, 460-1; Gawlikowski 1997, 52.

[51] Swain 2007b, 18.

as a barbarian, yet it did not circumscribe him.[52] To be a "Hellene" for Lucian and other barbarians in the second century AD meant that they constantly negotiated a position on the matrix of "ethnic Greek" and "ethic Greek."

Lucian's position on the Greek-barbarian matrix was nebulous. Syrians were not held in high repute in antiquity. Livy believes that the Macedonians who settled in Syria had lost their ancestral virtues through contact with Syrians, and had come to resemble barbarians themselves.[53] This corresponds with the widely-held view that Syria was a place that turned its conquerors into barbarians.[54] Livy recounts that Syrians were believed to be born for slavery: "Syrians and Asiatic Greeks *(Asiatici Graeci)*, the most worthless peoples among mankind and born for slavery."[55] In fact, the term *Asiatici Graeci* is noteworthy. Not only did miscegenation obscure and confuse identity in the eastern provinces, it also pointed to the distinction between the pure old Greek *poleis* of Achaea and those of the impure Asiatic Greeks.[56] It has been suggested that the term "Greek" in Asia Minor gradually aligned with Roman practice, in which by the Augustan period "Greek" was used of the eastern provinces to refer broadly to aliens.[57] This alien

[52] He calls himself a barbarian and a Syrian: *De Dea Syria* 1; *Bis accus.* 27, 14, 25-34; *Ind.* 19; *Pisc.* 19.
[53] Livy 38.17.1.
[54] Sartre 2005, 511 n. 2.
[55] Livy 35.49.8, *Dahas et Medos et Cadusios et Elymaeos, Suros omnis esse, haud paulo mancipiorum melius propter servilia ingenia quam militum genus*; 36.17.4-5, *hic Syri et Asiatici Graeci sunt, vilissima genera hominum et servituti nata.*
[56] In this respect, determining who is "Greek" and who is not was nearly an impossible task. The Greeks of Asia Minor identifed themselves in at least four different ways. In a decree dating from sometime between 85/4 and 70 BC and modified in 17 BC, the Greeks identified themselves as: the league of the Greeks; the Greeks; the peoples and tribes of Asia; the league of the Greeks in Asia. See *SEG* 89.1180; see also Ando 2011, 36-7.
[57] Ferrary 2001, 19-35.

characteristic of Asiatic Greeks was disparaged in Rome[58] as the Latin satirist Juvenal describes:

> And now let me speak at once of the race which is most dear to our rich men, and which I avoid above all others; no shyness shall stand in my way. I cannot abide, Quirites, a Rome of Greeks; and yet what fraction of our dregs comes from Greece [the province of *Achaei*]? The Syrian Orontes has long since poured into the Tiber, bringing with it its lingo and its manners, its flutes and its slanting harp-strings; bringing to the timbrels of the breed, and the trulls who are bidden ply their trade at the Circus.[59]

Juvenal denounces the Greek Rome of his day, expressing dismay that the Achaean Greek model had given way to a more *oriental* Hellenism. Authentic *Hellenism*, then, was foreign to Syrians, and thus to Lucian.[60]

Lucian's *oriental* Hellenism, his *paideia*, reflected not a static and antiquarian learning, but rather an engagement with the world around him: being both ethnically Syrian and culturally Greek, and a citizen of the Roman Empire. In examining Lucian's writings, we can trace an anxiety in that he feels a need to emphasize that his barbarian birth and *topos* did not diminish his own worth or his cultural standing. We can read this anxiety in his *Zeuxis and Antiochos* (12), but he thrust into the debate more self-assuredly with his works *Anacharsis* and *The Scythian*. In the former, Lucian calls upon Anacharsis, a legendary Scythian prince of the early 6th century BC and a martyr for his

[58] See Woolf 1994, 121, were he states that contemporary Greeks lacked *gravitas.* Turning to Juvenal or Tacitus, Greeks exemplified *volubilitis, ineptia, arrogantia, impudentia,* and *levitas*. Lucian in *Adversus Indoctum*, 19-20, inferred that Syrians were deceitful, lacking morals and rectitude. See also Lucian's *Philopseudes,* 16.

[59] Juvenal *Satire* III.58-5, *Quae nunc divitibus gens acceptissima nostris et quos praecipue fugiam, properabo fateri, nec pudor opstabit. non possum ferre, Quirites, Graecam urbem; quamvis quota potio faecis Achaei? iam pridem Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes, et linguam et mores et cum tibicine chordas obliquas nec non gentilia tympana secum vexit et ad circum iussas prostare puellas*. Loeb translation.

[60] See Vout 2007 for an interesting discussion of Greekness as foreign to Lucian through an analysis of the emperor's mistress Panthea, a Greek from Smyrna, in his work *Pro Imag.*

Hellenophilia whom the Greeks considered wise,[61] to authenticate the claim of equality between all peoples. Anacharsis goes to Athens to learn about the Greeks from the great law-giver Solon, with whom he debated the value of athletic education in the gymnasium. This debate acted as a framework to expose the absurdities of the contemporary Greek world, the continuing observance of an ancient Greek tradition that was misaligned with the Roman reality of the present.[62] The foreigner's misconstrual yet empirically accurate understanding of Athenian athletics reflected that a barbarian had wisdom.[63] The dialogue also demonstrated an *Athenocentric* Hellenism, a Hellenism that was rigid, exclusive, and unaccepting of outsiders and foreign ways: "Anacharsis, these exercises which are our own are sufficient for us; we really do not consider foreign ways worthy of emulation" (39).[64] Though the foreigner might have been right, the Athenians were portrayed as stubbornly continuing their traditional and non-progressive ways.

In much the same way, *The Scythian* gives us a glimpse of a foreigner's encounter with a Greek city. Anacharsis is again thrust in the role of the foreigner: *ξένος καὶ βάρβαρος* (3). Ridiculed for his dress and foreign tongue, he regrets travelling to Athens

[61] Herodotos 4.76-77.
[62] The *ephebeia* had decidedly military-political objectives; it was oriented to the idea of an identity as citizen and soldier and was to serve the strengthening of the military capacity and traditional polis patriotism. This was obviously unnecessary and absurd under the *pax Romana.* During the Principate, the *ephebeia* became an element of athletic agones and training. The ephebes' participation in cultic activities (sacrifices, processions, religious festivals) was striking. The intellectual and cultural education was highly valued; teachers of rhetoric and philosophy participated in it. The ephebeia was from now on an institution of education for the elite (instructive examples *IK* 19,1: Sestus; *SEG* 27, 261: Beroea; *IG XII* 9, 234: Eretria; IPriene 112). Particularly due to this, it represented a fundamental factor in the self-conception and in the self-awareness of the Greek cities. However, over and beyond this it was also (in connection with its most important location, the gymnasium) a specific characteristic of urban Greek life; and insofar as Hellenic culture defined itself in this period primarily via education, the *ephebeia* was a substantial element of Greek identity (2 Macc. 4,7-12; Str. 5,4,7).
[63] Elsner 2001, 140-1; König 2009, 26-40; Goldhill 2002, 82-9; Lightfoot 2003, 184-208. See *Tox*. 5 where the Scythian Toxaris stated that the nobility of the soul knows no bounds. See also Cartledge 1993, 65: If even one barbarian could achieve Hellenic standards of moral and political conduct, then merely belonging categorically to the *genos* of barbarians was not by itself sufficient reason for a person's being denigrated as inferior by nature.
[64] Ὅτι ἡμῖν ἱκανά, ὦ Ἀνάχαρσι, ταῦτα τὰ γυμνάσια οἰκεῖα ὄντα· ζηλοῦν δὲ τὰ ξενικὰ οὐ πάνυ ἀξιοῦμεν.

(3). Toxaris, a fellow Scythian who has completely assimilated to Greek ways—so much so that he was described as an autochthonous Athenian—comes to Anacharsis's aid. Toxaris had abandoned his wife, children, and all his possessions for such a cultural transformation (4, 7). He introduces the foreigner to Solon who gladly accepts him and teaches him Greek ways, and eventually makes him an Athenian citizen.[65] Here, the story shifts focus, back to the present, where Lucian urges his readers to compare himself, also a barbarian, with Anacharsis (*Scyth.* 9):

> φημὶ δὴ ὅμοιόν τι καὶ αὐτὸς παθεῖν τῷ Ἀναχάρσιδι—καὶ πρὸς Χαρίτων μὴ νεμεσήσητέ μοι τῆς εἰκόνος, εἰ βασιλικῷ ἀνδρὶ ἐμαυτὸν εἴκασα· βάρβαρος μὲν γὰρ κἀκεῖνος καὶ οὐδέν τι φαίης ἂν τοὺς Σύρους ἡμᾶς φαυλοτέρους εἶναι τῶν Σκυθῶν.
>
> I say that I myself endure a similar thing as Anacharsis—and by the Graces do not begrudge me this likeness, if I compare myself to this royal man; since even that man was a barbarian and no one would say that Syrians are more base (inferior) than Scythians.

Scythians represented the *Other* in its purest, polarized form, being the ideal type of the anti-Greek: non-agricultural, non-urban, uncivilized, nomadic.[66] The logic was that if Syrians were at worst equal to Scythians, then he too should have been welcomed by the citizens of Greek cities if they followed Solon's example with Anacharsis. However, Lucian's reception was quite the opposite. He faced unwelcoming faces where he had to say and do everything he could to make the elite, the patrons, his friends (*Scyth.* 11). The

[65] Lucian also commented that if Solon had not past away, he doubted if whether Anacharsis would have returned to Scythia.

[66] Cartledge 1993, 71. See Herodotos book IV. See also Hartog 1988 and Gould 1989. The Roman and Greek attitudes of Syrians during the Empire directly corresponded to the desert landscape of Syria and its nomadic inhabitants. The Syrian desert and countryside in the early Roman empire were the domains of nomadic tribes and bandits, vast areas devoid of cities, and little Hellenized. A common view in antiquity placed nomads among a lower level of civilization than regular non-Greek and non-Roman urban society, for it was assumed that nomads represented a totally unstructured form of society in social, political, and economic respects; see See Gawlikowski 1997, 37-54, esp. 43; Tate 1997, 55-71.

Greeks were not welcoming of a foreigner as one of their own, deeming Lucian a barbarian. Lucian's analogy was designed to combat the *Hellenocentric* assumption that only ethnic Greeks could possess wisdom by activating a repertoire of tales concerning barbarian wisdom.[67]

In *Bis Accusatus*, Lucian tells us that Rhetoric found him as a barbarian and educated him, that she "inscribed me [the Syrian, who is Lucian] into the class of the Greeks" (*Bis acc.* 29.27, 30). Lucian's statement highlights that elite education in the Roman Empire was Greek, and that the term "Greek" no longer solely designated ethnicity but instead a cultural proclivity.[68] In *Piscator* 19, Lucian, in the guise of *Parrhesiades* ("Frankness") and put on trial by all the founders of the philosophical schools for slander, addresses Philosophy outlining that the content of an idea, the

[67] See Whitmarsh 2001a, 122-8. For other tales, see Fronto, *Ad Marcum Caesarem et invicem (lib. 1),* 10.5.1-9: εἴ τι τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς ταύταις εἴη ἄκυρον ἢ βάρβαρον ἢ ἄλλως ἀδόκιμον ἢ μὴ πάνυ Ἀττικόν, ἀλλὰ [*lacuna*] τοῦ ὀνόματος σ΄ ἀξιῶ τήν γε διάνοιαν σκοπεῖν αὐτὴν καθ΄ αὑτήν· οἶσθα γὰρ ὅτι ἐν αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασιν καὶ αὐτῇ διαλέκτῳ διατρίβω. καὶ γὰρ τὸν Σκύθην ἐκεῖνον τὸν Ἀνάχαρσιν οὐ πάνυ τι ἀττικίσαι φασίν, ἐπαινεθῆναι δ΄ ἐκ τῆς διανοίας καὶ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων. παραβαλῶ δὴ ἐμαυτὸν Ἀναχάρσιδι οὐ μὰ Δία κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ βάρβαρος ὁμοίως εἶναι. ἦν γὰρ ὁ μὲν Σκύθης τῶν νομάδων Σκυθῶν, ἐγὼ δὲ Λίβυς τῶν Λιβύων τῶν νομάδων, "If any word in this letter be obsolete or barbarous, or in any other way unauthorized, or not entirely Attic, look not at that, but only, I beseech you, at the intrinsic meaning of the word, for you know that I spend time on mere words or mere idiom. And, indeed, it is said that the famous Scythian Anacharsis was by no means perfect in his Attic, but was praised for his meaning and his conceptions. I will compare myself, then, with Anacharsis, not, by heaven, in wisdom, but as being like him a barbarian. For he was a Scythian of the nomad Scythians, and I am a Libyan of the Libyan nomads;" and Apuleius, *Apology* 24-5: *De patria mea uero, quod eam sitam Numidiae et Gaetuliae in ipso confinio….non enim ubi prognatus, sed ut moratus quisque sit spectandum, nec qua regione, sed qua ratione uitam uiuere inierit, considerandum est….quando non in omnibus gentibus uaria ingenia prouenere, quanquam uideantur quaedam stultitia uel sollertia insigniores? apud socordissimos Scythas Anacharsis sapiens natus est, apud Athenienses catos Meletides fatuus….praeterea eloquentiam Graecam, patriam barbaram?* "Then there was the issue of my native town. It is situated on the boundary between Numidia and Gaetulia [the city of Madauros]….You must not judge a man's district of origin but his disposition, not *where* but *how* he has commenced his life….Is it not a fact that different talents have come forth in all nations? To be sure, some nations seem remarkable for their stupidity or smartness, but the wise Anacharsis was born among the inert Scythians and the foolish Meletides among the clever Athenians….My eloquence is Greek, but my native tongue is barbarous."

[68] Yet, among ethnic Greeks, an emphasis on birth and blood still remained, as evidenced by the Panhellenion; see note 147.

meaning and thought, not the language, is that which was important, that a barbarous birth made no difference in acquiring *paideia*:[69]

> Σύρος, ὦ Φιλοσοφία, τῶν Ἐπευφρατιδίων. ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο; καὶ γὰρ τούτων τινὰς οἶδα τῶν ἀντιδίκων μου οὐχ ἧττον ἐμοῦ βαρβάρους τὸ <u>γένος</u>· ὁ τρόπος δὲ καὶ ἡ <u>παιδεία</u> οὐ κατὰ Σολέας ἢ Κυπρίους ἢ Βαβυλωνίους ἢ Σταγειρίτας. καίτοι πρός γε σὲ οὐδὲν ἂν ἔλαττον γένοιτο οὐδ' εἰ τὴν <u>φωνὴν</u> βάρβαρος εἴη τις, εἴπερ ἡ γνώμη ὀρθὴ καὶ δικαία φαίνοιτο οὖσα.
>
> I am a Syrian, Philosophy, from the banks of the Euphrates. But what of this? Since I know that even some of my accusers are not lesser barbarians than me with respect to their birth (*genos*); but in manner and education (*paideia*) they are not like men of Soli or Cyprus or Babylon or Stageira. Yet as far as you are concerned, it would not be inferior if a man had a barbarian accent (*phonē*), if only his opinion were correct and manifestly just.

Lucian has *Parrhesiades* claim that *paideia* could be acquired and mastered by everyone regardless of *genos* as evidenced by the philosophers who had gathered to accuse him of slandering their philosophies. This highlights Lucian's ambivalent self-positioning in relation to Hellenism, both fully saturated in Hellenic *paideia* and an outsider/barbarian.[70]

The most explicit example of Lucian's ambivalent self-positioning is his work *De Dea Syria* (*On the Syrian Goddess, DDS*). Jas Elsner describes the work as presenting Lucian with "multiple, logically exclusive yet mutually constitutive, identities."[71] Lucian states: γράφω δὲ Ἀσσύριος ἐών, "I myself that write am an Assyrian" (*DDS* 1).[72] This simple statement embodies and encapsulates Lucian's ambivalent identity. He was simultaneously both the outsider looking in and the insider looking out.[73] He wrote in Greek for a Greek-speaking audience, using the language, terms, and concepts familiar to Greeks in order to describe the Syrian goddess, while at the same time he wrote as one

[69] Kaldellis 2007, 31; Swain 1996, 298-329; Isaac 2004, 335-351.
[70] Whitmarsh 2001a, 125.
[71] Elsner 2001, 133.
[72] See Frye 1992 for the use of Syrian and Assyrian interchangeably.
[73] Lightfoot 2003, 184-208. Goldhill 2002, 78-82.

who belonged to Syria.[74] The work straddles the geographical and historical genres of *periegesis* where the style foregrounds the foreignness and barbarian character of the subject, while the form is that of the specialist local monographer.[75] As the narrative advances, it progressively shifts, having begun on a much more *Hellenocentric* note than the one on which it ends.[76] Near the beginning, the narrator ties his account of temple foundations in the Near East with that of Herodotos and Greek myth.[77] The Syrian elements of the cult are constantly subjected to a Greek framing and critic. However, his tone changes when he speaks of the god Apollo, reporting the Syrians as critiquing the Greeks (*DDS* 35-7).[78] The Syrian Apollo is bearded, and Syrians find fault (*κατηγορέουσιν*) with the Greeks for worshiping, in their opinion, a boy:

> Ἑλλήνων δὲ κατηγορέουσιν καὶ ἄλλων ὁκόσοι Ἀπόλλωνα παῖδα θέμενοι ἱλάσκονται. αἰτίη δὲ ἥδε. δοκέει αὐτέοισι <u>ἀσοφίη μεγάλη</u> ἔμμεναι <u>ἀτελέα</u> ποιέεσθαι τοῖσι θεοῖσι τὰ εἴδεα, τὸ δὲ νέον <u>ἀτελὲς</u> ἔτι νομίζουσιν (*DDS* 35).[79]

The language of this passage is marked. Syrians viewed their propitiation of Apollo as superior to that of the Greeks, thinking it very unwise (ἀσοφίη μεγάλη) to depict a god in images as imperfect (ἀτελέα), since they themselves viewed childhood as imperfection (τὸ δὲ νέον ἀτελὲς ἔτι νομίζουσιν).[80] The dialogue gives way to a celebration of Syria, and, by the end, we are told that all Syrians who make the pilgrimage to the temple are

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[74] Elsner 2001, 123-33. *Cf.* Whitmarsh 2004, 161-76, where he stated that Greek literature always committed to a Greek view of the world. See also Goldhill 2002, 78-82, who described the *DDS* as an act of 'cultural translation', from the Syrian East into the cultural values of Greece.
[75] Lightfoot 2003, 86-91. The *De Dea Syria* written in the Ionic dialect, in emulation of the early geographers, especially Herodotos and Hekataeus, while Pausanias is a proponent of the historical genre, documenting the antiquities and monuments of a more or less narrowly defined locale.
[76] Elsner 2001, 133.
[77] See especially *DDS* 12 and the myth of Deucalion and *DDS* 2-3 for the Egyptians as the first to conceive of the gods and the Heraklean temple of Tyre, which followed Herodotos's account.
[78] Elsner 2001, 140-1.
[79] See also Lucian's *Herakles* for the representation of Herakles by the Gauls as old. They identified him with eloquence rather than the Greek practice of attributing eloquence with Hermes.
[80] See Lightfoot 2003, 456-69 for the Assyrian Apollo. Cp. Lucian's *Herakles* where instead of depicting Herakles in his prime, the Gauls depict him as an old man.

marked: Στίζονται δὲ πάντες, οἱ μὲν ἐς καρπούς, οἱ δὲ ἐς αὐχένας· καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦδε ἅπαντες Ἀσσύριοι στιγματηφορέουσιν, "All are marked (tattooed), some on the wrist, others on the neck; it is because of this that all Assyrians wear tattoos." (*DDS* 59). This tattoo stands as a mark of Syrian identity, and since our narrator also made the pilgrimage, he too is marked.[81] In addition to the tattoo, all young men dedicated a lock of hair to the goddess (*DDS* 60). The final word of the text is τὸ οὔνομα (*sic*), "name," but in Lucianic fashion his name is withheld in the text.[82] Instead, his identity lies in the very heart of the temple in Syria: ἔτι μευ ἐν τῷ ἱρῷ καὶ ὁ πλόκαμος καὶ τὸ οὔνομα, "still to this day in the temple are the lock and my name" (*DDS* 60). He opened his dialogue by identifying himself as an "Assyrian" so that he was simultaneously representing himself as an Oriental 'insider', adopting the pose of the amazed, naive traveller, and putting a distance between the cult described and himself.[83] But here, at the end, the ethnic identity of the narrator was confirmed: Syrian.[84] Thus Lucian was both Syrian and Greek, as well as Roman.

Lucian's story provided justification that barbarians could possess Hellenic *paideia*. The Roman Empire was polyethnic, and reinforced integration, universal institutions, inclusivity, and a culture stressing excellence over mere birth rather than

[81] See Hdt. 5.6.2, where tattoos were mentioned as a badge of ethnic identity among foreign peoples, particularly of the Thracians. For the Greek and Roman view of a mark on the body which designated a slave, see Jones 1987, 147-50; Lightfoot 2003, 529-531.
[82] See Goldhill 2002 were he list but four times in the whole corpus of Lucianic works where his name was mentioned, two of which were in titles which were most likely added by later editors.
[83] Millar 1993, 243-256, esp. 245-8.
[84] See also *Hist. Conscr.* 24; *Pisc.* 19; *Bis Accus.* 14. There are questions as to the authenticity of the attribution of this dialogue to Lucian. See Elsner 2001, 153, where he asserts Lucian was the author, and Lightfoot 2003, 184-208, where he concludes after extensive philological comparison with other Lucianic texts that the *DDS* is correctly attributed to Lucian, though he interjects strong caution in this conclusion, that it is not secure, saying that "ultimately…we can never know the extent to which Lucian the individual and *DDS*'s narrator overlap" (205).

exclusivity.[85] The *paideia* of empire was no longer a purity of *genos* but rather constituted a balancing act that positioned one on the matrix of being Greek and being a barbarian. Let us now consider Favorinus's story to further investigate the polemic of *genos* and *paideia*.

A Roman among Greeks: Favorinus

Amongst Favorinus's extant works and known deeds, there was a pervasive presence of Roman culture. Born in Gaul during the reign of Trajan,[86] he was a Roman citizen of the Equestrian order[87] and proficient in Latin,[88] he quarreled with the emperor Hadrian, which may have resulted in his exile,[89] and his statue was erected (and taken down due to the emperor's influence) in the *Roman* colony of Corinth.[90] Yet, alongside this Roman

[85] See Bang 2010.
[86] *Suda*, *Lexicon*, Φ 4.4.
[87] *Cor. Or.* 37.25; Aulus Gellius, *NA* 4.1.18. Holford-Strevens 2003, 118-129, convincingly demonstrated Favorinus's Latin and Roman side via Aulus Gellius's *Noctes Atticae* and the fragments of Favorinus's works as collected in Barigazzi 1966.
[88] Proficiency in Latin was rare for any of the Greeks. Aulus Gellius's presentation of Favorinus's salon performances bears witness to his familiarity of Latin literature and his capacity for treating it on equal terms with Greek (*NA* 17.10, 8.2, 2.26, 2.22; 3.3.6, 2.5).
[89] See Philostratus *VS* 489-492; Favorinus's treatise *On Exile*. Favorinus's relations with Hadrian present him as both friend and enemy. Hadrian liked to be right, and Favorinus let Hadrian win a grammar war deeming it unwise to offend a man with thirty legions under his command (*HA,* Hadrian 15). Favorinus tried to refuse a religious position; he had been appointed flamen of the Narbonensian *consilium*, a highly expensive honour for which he tried to claim an exemption as a philosopher (see Bowersock 1969, 30-42, on the privileges enjoyed by philosophers**)**. Hadrian deemed Favorinus a sophist and denied his exemption (Philostratus, *VS* 489-492). A consul accused Favorinus, an eunuch, of adultery with his wife (Philostratus, *VS* 489), which Favorinus denied (Ps.-Dio, 37.33-4). Favorinus seems to have fallen out with Hadrian (Philostratus, *VS* 531), where Hadrian transferred his favour to Polemon and Smyrna.
[90] See Pausanias 2.1.2, 2.3.7 on Corinthians as Romans; Ps.-Julian, *Letter* 198, 409c-d, on the Roman spectacle culture in Corinth; Ps.-Dio, *Corinthian Oration*, on the deficient *Greekness* of the Corinthians; *contra* Aelius Aristides, *Oratio* 46; König 2001. Corinth was destroyed by Mummius in 146 BC and re-founded by Julius Caesar in 44 BC as a Roman colony. See Alcock 1993, where she states that the colony of Corinth is generally agreed to have served as the provincial capital of Achaia, and Corinth, the provincial capital, has rightly been described as the centre of *Romanitas* in Greece; see also Aristides 46.27; Acts of the Apostles 18.12-17. As a result, its own claims to Hellenism were only skin-deep, see Whitmarsh 2004, 175-6. Corinth the city had an ancient name, though it depended for its Hellenic credentials on a performative self-presentation, see Alcock 1993, 168, and König 2001; on its Roman architecture, Kyle 2007 for its Roman style entertainment.

element, Favorinus claimed to be the best of the Greeks, an example for everyone, and the paradigm of the transformative power of *paideia*.[91] A brief survey of his life, along with an exegetical discourse on the polarity of *genos* and *paideia* will establish the premise from which we can determine just how "Greek" or "Roman" he was.

Favorinus presented himself as a paradox, three in fact: being a Gaul but speaking Greek, being an eunuch but standing trial for adultery, and having quarreled with an emperor but lived.[92] The apodosis of each paradox represented how Favorinus lived his life: adopting Greek culture;[93] fervently sexual;[94] and having come to no harm (οὐδὲν ἔπαθεν, Philostratus *VS* 489) in a dispute with the emperor Hadrian, though perhaps this meant exile and served as an euphemism for "survived."[95] Favorinus was of Gaulish race and Hellenic education, the pupil of Dio Cocceianos of Prusa (Chrysostom), and friend of L. Mestrius Plutarch, Herodes Atticus— one of the most important and influential sophists of the Second Sophistic and consul in 143—, M. Cornelius Fronto, and Aulus Gellius.[96] Our main sources for Favorinus's life and thought are his three extant declamations—*Corinthiaca*, *De fortuna*, and *De exilio*—, his brief biography in Flavius Philostratus, a hateful polemic by his rival M. Antonius Polemon of Laodicea, Galen's

[91] Ps.-Dio *Cor. Or.* 37.22, 25-7.
[92] Philostratus, *VS* 489, Γαλάτης ὢν ἑλληνίζειν, εὐνοῦχος ὢν μοιχείας κρίνεσθαι, βασιλεῖ διαφέρεσθαι καὶ ζῆν.
[93] Dio Chrysostom, 37.25.
[94] Philostratus, *VS* 489; Polemon, *Phys.* A20, "libidinous and dissolute beyond all bounds."
[95] Cassius Dio, *Historia Romana* LXIX.3-4.1; Philostratus, *VS* 489-490; *Historiae Augustae*, Hadrian XV.12-13; as an euphemism, *cf.* Aristophanes, *Wasps* 385-7.
[96] The surname "Atticus" indicated that Herodes had mastered the Attic dialect. Language proficiency acts as a qualifier for *topos*: Cicero remarking on his friend Titus Pomponius who spoke Attic so well that "you would have thought that he had been born in Athens", thus earning the name Atticus (Nepos, *Atticus* 4.1; see also Aelian "who Atticized like the Athenians of the midlands even though he was a Roman," Philostratos *VS* 624). Maud Gleason 1995, 145, affirmed that to be Herodes's friend was a statement; he was the epitome of Hellenic culture. This list of friends also demonstrated that Favorinus had risen to the top of sophistic culture, unlike Lucian who was always an outsider, being isolated by the culture he tried to champion (*Bis Accusatus* 27, not accepted in Ionia; *Pro Imaginibus*, not part of Verus's court) as a result of his ambivalent self-positioning in relation to Hellenism, both fully saturated in Hellenic *paideia* and an outsider, see Whitmarsh 2001, 125, Swain 1996, 308-12, Vout 2007, 214-8.

polemic against him,[97] and the miscellaneous memoirs of his pupil Aulus Gellius. These texts portray all the afore mentioned paradoxes, and more besides. His declamation on exile lauds ἀρετή (virtue), yet *De fortuna* is an encomium to the vicissitudes of τυχή (fortune), and *Corinthiaca* stresses memory and fame, not to mention the precedence of *paideia* over *genos* as a marker of Hellenism. The paradox of virtue and fortune is beyond the scope of this chapter,[98] as we must first unravel the enigma of Favorinus himself by elucidating Hellenism and its relationship with imperial culture and power.

Favorinus was born in Arelate on the Rhone River in the province of *Gallia Narbonensis,* which had a flourishing Greek cultural tradition.[99] Greeks had settled the Rhone valley long before the Romans arrived; it had a long tradition of urban life and is by no means a cultural backwater.[100] The main *polis* of the Rhone valley, Massalia, was thoroughly Hellenized,[101] and it had been the preeminent Greek educational centre in the western provinces.[102] From at least the Hellenistic age, Celts went to Massalia to learn Greek manners and language as well as Latin and Roman customs; this city was a school for the barbarians.[103] In Narbonensis the atmosphere among the cultivated was bilingual as a result of its re-founding as a Roman legionary colony in 46 BC.[104] It is difficult to know how much Greek, how much Latin, and how much Celtic dialect was spoken in

[97] See Holford-Strevens 2003, 111, for the uncertainty of fairness in Galen's argument.
[98] See chapter three on virtue and vice. See also Duff 1999.
[99] Swain 1996, 44. The three Gauls were also some of the richest provinces in the Empire, see Le Glay 2007, 319-403.
[100] Gleason 1995, 3-4; Isaac 2011, 507; See also Momigliano 1975, 50-73, where he discussed the interaction (or lack thereof) between the Greeks of Massalia and the Celts. The Greeks did not venture out to conduct ethnographies of the Celts. It was only as a result of the Romans that Greeks eventually conducted an ethnography on the Celts. He proceeded to discuss how Polybius wrote some history/ethnography of coastal Gaul.
[101] Herodotos 1.163ff.
[102] Mellor 2008, 122.
[103] Strabo, 4.15; Justin, 43.4.1.
[104] Suetonius, *Tiberius* 4.1

Favorinus's family household[105] since Favorinus may have had a Greek-speaking wet nurse.[106] His bilingual proficiency in Latin[107] and Greek suggests that his formal education took place at Massalia, where the exemplary Agricola, Tacitus's father-in-law, received his education,[108] and a wider selection of good teachers would have also been available.[109]

Favorinus's education, however, would not have been enough in and of itself for him to claim a "Greek" identity, and to say Favorinus is "Greek" is over-simplistic. He used the Greek language and presented himself as Greek, but he was also a Roman and a provincial native from outside mainland Greece.[110] Cicero lumps Gauls, Spaniards, and Africans together: they were all monstrous and barbarian peoples.[111] Yet, when considering the Romans, we must keep in mind their *mores* and values, and how these inform their *humanitas* (civilization). In the same passage, Cicero provides an explanation that elucidated Roman *humanitas*, in that it provided Romans with a means of understanding their own cultural history: rather than having been Hellenized, the primitive Romans had been civilized.[112] Since the Romans had been civilized, it was now their destiny, in the words of Pliny (*Natural History* 3.39), "to gather together the scattered realms and to soften their customs and unite the discordant wild tongues of so many peoples into a common speech so they might understand each other, and give civilization to mankind." The geographical parameters and political stability of the *pax*

[105] Gleason 1995, 3.
[106] Soranus, *Gyn.* 2.19.15.
[107] See Gellius for Favorinus's proficiency in Latin.
[108] Tacitus, *Agricola* 4.
[109] See Rivet, *Gallia Narbonensis* 1988, 86.
[110] See Jones 2004.
[111] Cicero, *Ad Quintum fratrem,* 1.1.27.
[112] Woolf 1994, 119. See also S. Said 2001, 294-5, where she stated that the new emphasis on a cultural definition of Greekness among the Greeks themselves echoed the views of the Romans.

Romana provided the unprecedented means for barbarians to be accepted within the inclusive culture of the Roman Empire.[113] Favorinus himself was a Roman citizen of the equestrian order (*Cor. Or.* 37.25), but to prove his "Greekness" required an ongoing performance of *paideia* that stressed culture over birth, *genos*.

Genos vs. *Paideia*: Polemon's Polemic

Greek literature and society of the Second Sophistic placed a paramount emphasis on Greek ancestry. In Polemon's *Physiognomy*, he was aware that the "pure" Greeks were under threat from "others" who wanted to take them over because of the "pleasantness of their life and their moderate temperament…or out of a desire for their knowledge, their good way of life, and their laws" (*Physiognomy,* Leiden B32).[114] Who, exactly, were these "others" who wanted Greek *episteme* (knowledge/science), *tropoi* (manners/ways/character), and *nomoi* (laws/customs), and who had "become numerous among them" (Leiden B32)? Here we have a tacit mention of the Romans.[115] There is more than a sense of regret here: the Greeks were being taken over.[116] Polemon's *Physiognomy* reflects the anxieties felt by educated and elite ethnic Greeks as education potentially provided non-Greeks with the resources to acquire an elite, "Greek," identity. This anxiety is particularly visible in pseudo-Plutarch's treatise *On the education of children* (*De liberis educandis*). This text extols the importance of *eugeneia* (good birth,

[113] Woolf 1994; *Cf.* Bang 2010.
[114] On Polemon's *Physiognomy*, see Swain 2007a. The *Physiognomy* survives in an abridged Greek version by Adamantius, which is undoubtedly fourth-century, and an Arabic translation (the Leiden), which exists in a single manuscript. We also have the fairly free working of the Anonymous Latinus. All translations from the Arabic by Robert Hoyland, except where noted.
[115] *cf.* Dio 11.150: "both Greece and Asia are subject to others"; 34.48: "leadership and rule are in the hands of others"; Aelius Aristides, *Or.* 24.22; Polemon cited in Philostratus, *VS* 532.
[116] The political scope of this is extremely fascinating. See Bowersock 1969.

1b), correlating low birth with poor *physis* (nature, 1b-c).[117] For Polemon also *Greekness* was to be bound to *genos*.[118]

This idea first manifested itself in the works of Soranus of Ephesus, who advised the use of "pure Greeks" as nurses.[119] It also appeared in the orations of Dio Chrysostom, where he flatters the Prusans telling them that they are in fact "pure Greeks" (48.8), and again in Aelius Aristides's *Rhodian oration* (24.23). The focus, however, of Dio's and Aristides's orations was to remind the citizens of their ancestry and their self-respect; Polemon aimed at cultural superiority: "I will mention the forms of the Greeks whose forms are pure and nothing from the other races is mixed with them" (B32). Polemon's thought, however, was not new. Since antiquity, Greek culture considered Greece as a superior breeding ground for talent.[120] The famous Hippocrates treatise, *Airs Waters Places*, identifies environmental factors as determinants of racial character.[121] It states that Greece had a "well-mixed" and favourable climate that consequently produced well-tempered people. Greece, as geographic centre of moral and physical excellence, was

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[117] On the different connotations of *genos*, see Josephus, Vita 1-2: "My ancestry (genos) is not inconspicuous, but can be traced back to priests, and just as among different peoples there is a different basis for nobility (eugeneia), so with us participation in the priesthood is a great sign of brilliance of lineage."

[118] It was a belief in blood-links that made Hellenic identity an ethnic identification, even if the Greeks had no word for "ethnicity" in its modern sense. (*Ethnos* itself was too ambiguous as it could refer to any kind of group with a common identity). When used in connexion with groups larger than the πόλις that were believed to have a common descent, the basis of ethnos was *genos* and *syngeneia* (birth and kinship); *cf.* Jones 1996b; J. Hall 1997, 34-40; Aristotle Politics 7.4 (1326b3-5). J. Hall 1997, 34-40, By attributing the social solidarity of an *ethnos* to *genos* (birth) and *συνγενεία* (kinship), the Greeks came about as close as they could to our concept of ethnicity; Fowler: For all of Polemo's claims to "pure" Hellenism, we can see here that the very concept of "Hellas" and "Hellenism" are constructions of genealogy. Fluidity and selective memory reflect revisions which represent the desired changes/status in the present era. See also Hdt. 5.49.2 where 'blood' was remembered in crisis and diplomacy, and Hdt. 1.143.2 where Greeks are presented collectively as a *genos*.

[119] *Gynaecology* 2.44.2: αἱ καθαρῶς Ἑλληνίδες. See also Aulus Gellius (*NA* 12.1) where Favorinus warned against the unsuitable milk of a slave or foreigner, only the milk of the mother was proper for an infant.

[120] *Cf.* Perikles's funeral oration (Thucydides 2.41.1).

[121] In *Airs Waters Places* 16, Hippocrates talked about Asiatics being inferior due to climate, but also its customs: monarchal rule, which sapped a brave and stout character.

defined as the mean between extremes where the true Greek became the ideal of all peoples. This idea also finds expression in the works of Aristotle and Herodotos.[122] Polemon's physiognomic description of the pure Greeks is accordingly one of moderation: "medium stature, between tall and short, broad and weak…neither small nor large of head…[the Greek's] nose is pointed and evenly proportioned" (B32). Most importantly in Polemon's physiognomics are the eyes, and the Greeks have the most perfect eyes, "moist, bluish-black, very mobile, and very luminous," characteristics that denoted intelligence and kindness (B32).[123] Given the political and cultural situation, the idea of Greek superiority and purity took on new urgency during the Second Sophistic. It becomes significant, then, that Polemon only accepted "pure Greeks" into his school.[124] Polemon's bent on purity actively denied the chance for non-Greeks to learn rhetoric from one of the most eminent sophists of the period. Favorinus's prominence and success as a sophist[125] could only have had the effect of accentuating Polemon's anxiety.

Through physiognomy, Polemon diagnosed Favorinus, his bitter rival, as an effeminate and treacherous individual. Polemon describes Favorinus's neck, limbs, and voice as womanly, and depicts his eyes as wide open with a brilliance like that of marble, going on to state that this type of eye indicates a lack of modesty and belongs to the most evil of people, eunuchs (A20, B3).[126] A key sign of membership of the elite, and

[122] *Politics* 1327b; Herodotos 3.106.
[123] Polemon focused on the eye to deem comportment and vice; most examples were of non-Greeks.
[124] Philostratus, *VS* 531. Contrast this with Scopelian, his teacher as well as Favorinus's, who accept students from all over the empire, both Greek and barbarian alike (*VS* 518).
[125] Favorinus styled himself as a philosopher, however Hadrian, Polemon, and Philostratus all inferred that he was a sophist. *Suda* Φ 4*:* φιλοσοφίας μεστός, ῥητορικῇ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπιθέμενος, [he was] full of wisdom (philosophy), but rather being placed as a rhetor; Polemon, *Physiognomy* A20, "a sophist"; Philostratus, *VS* 489.
[126] Adamanius's version: ὀφθαλμοὶ ἐκπεπετασμένοι ξηροὶ μαρμαρύσσοντες ἱλαρὸν καὶ λαμπρὸν δεδορκότες ἀναισχύντους καὶ παντόλμους δηλοῦσιν.

important for Polemon's *Physiognomy*, was 'manliness' (*andreia, andreion*).[127] Favorinus's indeterminate gender made him easy prey for Polemon to deem as a deviant. Philostratus calls him διφυὴς δὲ ἐτέχθη καὶ ἀνδρόθηλυς (double-sexed, a hermaphrodite, *VS* 489), while Favorinus labels himself an eunuch as one of the famous three paradoxes of his life (*VS* 489). As for Polemon, he expressly states that Favorinus was born without testicles (Leiden A20).[128] In Lucian's *Demonax* (12), Favorinus, in the character of Bagoas, confronts the Cynic Demonax about the Cynic's lack of educational qualifications, which allows his opponent the opportunity to clinch the debate of what makes a philosopher with a brutally succinct claim to the one credential that Favorinus, for all his training, could never duplicate: "testicles" (*orcheis*).

Polemon mentions in another section of the *Physiognomy* that "no one is more perfect in evil than those who are born without testicles" and that "eunuchs are an evil people, and in them is greed and an assembly of various (evil) qualities" (B3). Here, Polemon connects vice with the absence of testicles. Favorinus had no testicles, and according to Polemon's physiognomic exegesis, he is "greedy and immoral beyond all description" (A20). Polemon even alleges that Favorinus is a "deceitful magician," a teacher of evil, and a collector of fatal poisons (A20). According to Polemon's *Physiognomics*, Favorinus was the antipodes of the physically pure Greek since he lacked *gravitas* and *andreia*.[129] Given such an evocative description and his prodigious success,

[127] For manliness, see Gleason 1995.
[128] It is generally agreed among scholars that Favorinus had Reifenstein's syndrome with cryptorchidism. See Gleason 1995 and Swain 2007a for references. *Suda*, *Lexicon*, Φ 4, stated that he was a hermaphrodite: γεγονὼς δὲ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν ἀνδρόγυνος (ὅν φασιν ἑρμαφρόδιτον).
[129] See Holford-Strevens 2003, 129-130, where he states that Favorinus was not a profound thinker and that the virtue of *gravitas* was not accorded to him. Yet this was presented as a positive since his performances could be viewed as a relief from the compulsory parade of virtue. *Cf.* Woolf 1994 on Roman impressions that Greeks in general lacked *gravitas*.

Favorinus was certainly a notable figure[130] and the perfect candidate to vouch for the supremacy of *paideia* over *genos*.[131]

Favorinus's treatise *De Exilio*[132] confronts the effects of displacement away from friends and family and fatherland, in a word *genos*. Favorinus encourages his listener to confront these things with one's will and mind (φρόνημα, 5.3; γνώμη 14.1, 14.2, 28.2). He exclaims that a fatherland is nothing more than the land one's forebears have settled who themselves had once been colonists and foreigners (10.1). Delving back to the most distant time, one would find that "all people everywhere [were] foreigners and exiles" (10.3). In this way, Favorinus positioned himself on the same footing as the "pure" Greeks. It was with this attitude that he was able to confidently ascribe citizenship to himself to wherever he would roam (14.1-2):

> If some of the locals will consider me a foreigner and a stranger, well, I shall treat them as my fellow citizens, and this land as my fatherland…for it is not laws, nor the metic tax, that make men foreigners, but will (γνώμη)…[and] with my will, I enroll myself into the city.

It was with his will, his mind, his learning, his *paideia* that he confronted exile, and every land in which he travelled; he did not count *genos* as valuable.[133] The most damning piece of evidence that Favorinus marshalled in his attack on *genos* was cosmogony: ἢ οὐκ οἶσ|θ[α ὅτι ἐ]ς πάσα[ς] τ[ὰς] παλαιὰς ἐκείνας εὐγενεί|ας ἀναφέρων ἀνοίσεις ἢ εἰς τὸν

[130] Whitmarsh 2001b, where he states that Favorinus was one of the most prominent figures of the second century.
[131] See Porter 2001, 90. The sheer fascination exerted by a figure like Favorinus surely stemmed, not from the oddity of his physical appearance alone, but also from the spectacle of identities at odds and overcome which he staged through his performance of himself; *cf.* Gleason 1995, esp. p.16.
[132] *On Exile,* firmly attributed to Favorinus (Barigazzi 1966, 349). This treatise detailed how to overcome the adversaries of one's love for their fatherland (πατρίς), attachment to friends, wealth and station, and liberty while in exile. Regarding exile, Aristotle wrote, "a human is an animal which belongs in a πόλις," and to be "without a πὸλις [ἄπολις] is to be either greater or lesser than a human" (Arist. Pol. 1253a 1-4).
[133] See the *Epistle of Mara bar Serapion* which interestingly echoes Favorinus's *On Exile* oration in that it takes up a diasporic mentality: "But thus reckon thou, that for wise men every place is equally the same; and for the virtuous, fathers and mothers abound in every city," in Cureton 1855.

Προμηθέ|ως πηλὸν ἢ εἰς τοὺς Δευκαλίωνος λίθους; "Do you not know that if you trace back all those ancient, noble ancestries, you will trace them back to Promethean mud or the stones of Deucalion?" (20.5). This deduction elucidates the worthlessness of genealogy: all genealogy traces back to the same common source. The search for origins can only ever reveal mythical narrative.[134] He implores everyone to strip off their symbols of ancestry, of purple robes, and of handsome bronze portraits set up in public.[135] The true test was not *genos*, but one's own *paideia*. If, when stripped naked of all these accoutrements, people still marvelled and honoured a man, Favorinus encourages one to then go and publicly inscribe their ancestry, starting with themselves: κἂν τότε σέ τις ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς θαυμάσῃ ἢ τιμήσῃ, προσιὼν τὸ *genos* ἀπὸ | σαυτοῦ ἀνάγραφε (20.5). Effectively, this process rendered Greek *genos* as worthless in defining a Hellene.

In his *Corinthian Oration* (37.26-7), which discusses the case of Favorinus's missing statue, Favorinus says that the gods have equipped (κατεσκευάσθαι) him to be the example (παράδειγμα) for the Greeks, the Romans, and the barbarians to emulate in their pursuit of wisdom (συμφιλοσοφῆσαι). The verb κατεσκευάσθαι (27) connotes the idea of "to furnish, equip, construct." Read in concert with *De Exilio* (20.5), where genealogy is taken back to Promethean mud, we see here that Favorinus implied that he had been fashioned by the gods to encourage Greeks, Romans, and barbarians to pursue *paideia*. In this, he heralded a new age where Greek *genos* no longer functioned as the

[134] Whitmarsh 2001a; Whitmarsh 2001b.

[135] Cp. Seneca (*On Tranquility of Mind* 17.1): "Every time we are looked at we think we are being assessed." He urges one to be oneself, and not put on a mask for public display; See also Marcus Aurelius (*Meditations* 7.2): "what is outside my mind has absolutely no relevance to my mind." See Bhabha 1990, 210ff, where he articulates that culture is a signifying or symbolic activity, that all cultures are symbol-forming and subject-constituting. Favorinus's suggestion to strip off the symbols of ancestry has the effect of de-*Hellenization*, which is to remove ethnic genealogy so that nothing but one's self is judged; it creates a level playing field, but also anxieties for ethnic Greeks.

determinate of paideutic culture, but instead made Hellenism available to everyone through emulation. His statue was thus paramount as a manifest representation of the paideutic paradigm.[136] Specifically and significantly he was set up to show the Greeks ὡς οὐδὲν τὸ παιδευθῆναι τοῦ φῦναι πρὸς τὸ δοκεῖν διαφέρει, "that education is no different from birth in respect to appearance" (27).[137] Here, Favorinus exalted the power of νόμος, of being educated into Hellenism, over that of φύσις, nature. In this way, he was the example that should be learnt and emulated by all peoples, and not least the Corinthians themselves, since he, like they, ὅτι Ῥωμαῖος ὢν ἀφηλληνίσθη, "though Roman has entirely Hellenized" (26),[138] οὐδὲ τὴν φωνὴν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γνώμην καὶ τὴν δίαιταν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐζηλωκώς, "having emulated not only the language but also the mindset, lifestyle, and attitude of the Greeks" (25).[139] It was by taking all of this into

[136] It was set up in the library of Corinth with a "front row seat" (προεδρία, 37.8).
[137] The juxtaposition of cultural and genetic models is deliberately provocative: Favorinus was declaiming under the emperor Hadrian, the founder of the Panhellenion which defined a city's membership on the basis of genealogy.
[138] ἀφηλληνίζω appears in a list of words, under the heading ἑρμηνεύς (interpreter), which primarily pertained to language and speech in Julius Pollux's thesaurus *Onomasticon*, 154. However, the clause immediately preceding ἀφηλληνίζω, μεταβάλλων μεταφέρων μεταπλάττων, indicates much more than solely interpretation. Rather it infers an altered state. μετα-πλάττω alone infers the process of change and remolding. The verb πλάσσω, Attic πλάττω, means to mould, to form, and the noun πλάσμα refers to anything formed or moulded, like plastic, which is etymologically derived from the verb. The term, however, also connotes something counterfeit, something made in imitation of that which is genuine; imitated, forged. This fits Favorinus as he mentioned his act of emulating Greek culture, ἐζηλωκώς (25).
[139] Despite his evidently sophisticated knowledge of the Greek language, the Atticist Phrynicus at times pilloried Favorinus for his 'barbaric' solecisms: Phryn., *Ecl.* 140, 141, 152, 161, 218, etc., Fischer; Swain 1996, 45; Whitmarsh 2004, 294; Jones 1986, 149-159; On Galen's polemic against Favorinus, see Swain 1996, 61; Swain 2007a; On Phrynicus, see Swain 1996, 53-5. Phrynichus (70) addresses the pronunciation of "little pomegranate": "The ignorant say *rhoïdion* with the diaeresis, we say *rhoidion*." Barigazzi's lengthy analysis confirmed that Favorinus's Atticism was neither strict nor consistent. Holford-Strevens indicates that Polemon's vocabulary was no purer, 2003, 107, n.54. *Cf.* Lucian, *Bis Accus*. 27, "barbarian in voice;" and his worries of speaking properly, 28. 19, "I am a Syrian…but what of it? […] For you at least, it should not matter if a person's speech is barbarous if his judgement is sound and patently just." On solecism, see Salmeri 2004, 181-206. Philostratus also noted that though Favorinus's style of eloquence was both learned and pleasing, it was careless in construction (*VS* 491). See Whitmarsh 2001a, on emulation and imitation (mimesis).

consideration that he could claim Ἕλληνι δοκεῖν τε καὶ εἶναι, "not just to seem but in fact also to be a Hellene" (*Cor. Or.* 37.25).[140]

To summarize, two of the most popular and successful sophists were ideologically opposed on the issue of Greekness/Hellenism. Polemon supported genealogy and pure *genos*, while Favorinus espoused a cultural definition of Hellenism. Let us briefly trace the development of these two polar ideas through Greek texts so as to let us define what Hellenism was in the Roman context in the second century AD.

Roman Hellenism: Greekness and Identity, Becoming a *Pepaideumenos*

The definition of Greekness attained in antiquity a particular sharpness and concision through its opposition to Persia, the barbarian 'Other.'[141] Herodotos defines Greekness as blood, language, religion, and customs (Hdt. 8.144.1-3).[142] However, Christopher Jones has commented that this is not an attempt at a definition of Greekness, but meant simply "the fact that the people are of one blood and one tongue."[143] Dionysus of Halicarnassus,

[140] See Denniston 1954, 515, for this translation of the particles τε…καί. On becoming Greek, or any other identity, see 1 Corinthians 9.20-22, where Paul became as the other in order to save them. S. Said, Greekness required many factors, such as "ancestors, gods, customs (*ethos*), and festivals" (Dio 38.46).
[141] Hdt. 8.144.2, see Hartog 1988; on tragedy, E. Hall 1989; for a general view, Cartledge 1993. During the Second Sophist, the dialogue and dichotomy of Greek vs. barbarian was still prevalent, though it was beginning to wane with the imposition that not all non-Greeks were barbaric. See Woolf 1994, 129; Kaldellis 2007, 24, at the conclusion of Strabo's *Geography* (14.2.28), he discussed Eratosthenes's view that the peoples of the world should be classified not into Greeks and barbarians but rather according to their virtue—between good and bad—since many Greeks were bad and some barbarians, including Romans and Carthaginians, lived in cities and according to sophisticated political institutions. Compare also Antiphon *On Truth*, Fragment B, col. 2: Antiphon: "we are all by nature alike fully made to be either barbarians or Hellenes;" and Plato's *Phaedo* (78a): Socrates says, "Greece is a spacious land and there are many virtuous men in it, but many too are the races of the barbarians that you must search through." True philosophy knew neither ethnic nor cultural boundaries.
[142] αὖτις δὲ τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, ἐὸν ὅμαιμόν τε καὶ ὁμόγλωσσον, καὶ θεῶν ἱδρύματά τε κοινὰ καὶ θυσίαι ἤθεά τε ὁμότροπα. See Thomas 2001, "In reference to Hdt. 8.144, we see throughout Herodotos that he lays emphasis upon customs and culture, alongside descent, as decisive determinants of ethnicity." However, she further states that he tended unquestionably toward the effect of *nomos*. Customs, laws, and a way of life are much more important than the physical environment. *Cf.* the debate b/w Xerxes and Demaratus (Hdt. 7.101-104).
[143] Jones 1996b, 315 n. 4.

writing in the 1st c. BC, reiterates Herodotos's Hellenic characteristics save the mention of blood. For him, Greekness (now quickly becoming our defined Hellenism) relies on purely cultural factors, language (*phone*), customs (*epitedeumata*), and religion as well as "fair laws" (*nomous epieikeis*).[144] The constant redefinition of Hellenic identity[145] seems to have shifted to that which could more easily be shared and transmitted than blood: a Greek frame of mind (*dianoia*) and a way of life (*ethos*).[146] Dio exhorts the Prusians to educate (*paideuein*) their children well in order to make their city "truly Greek" (Dio 44.10). Here we have an author from the Second Sophistic who supported *paideia* as the defining characteristic of Hellenism. The observed trend de-emphasizes *genos* and seems to support Favorinus's claim of genealogical bankruptcy, yet it is instructive to note the persistence of conservative forces that insisted upon provenance as a means of defining a Greek identity.[147]

All these differing definitions reflected the inherent uncertainties in Greek identity, especially under the Roman Empire.[148] Tim Whitmarsh has suggested two fundamental criteria for defining "Greekness," which are not always complementary: first, "Greeks" were the inhabitants of the old *poleis* and their colonial offshoots; second, "Greeks" were an elite group from a range of cities which covered the entire eastern

[144] Dion. Halicarnassus *Antiquitates Romanae* 1.89.4; See also J. Hall 2002, 224.
[145] Malkin 2001, 6-24.
[146] See Said 2001; Spawforth 2001.
[147] See Whitmarsh 2001a, 128; Kaldellis 2007, 37-8. For example, the Panhellenion, a league of the Greeks organized by the emperor Hadrian required member cities to prove their Greek genealogy. The realities of ethnicity face the choice between exclusive, blood-related, primordial definitions, and open-ended, acquirable cultural commonalities (Malkin 2001, 24). David Konstan (2001, 43) expressed that during the Roman period instead of appeals to blood, religion, or *mores*, Greekness was predicated on a shared sense of tradition. On the Panhellenion, see Spawforth and Walker 1985, Spawforth and Walker 1986, Spawforth 1992, Spawforth 1999; Jones 1996; Romeo 2002.
[148] Porter 2001, 90.

Empire, united solely by their ability to write or speak in Attic.[149] For provincial elites, "Greekness/Hellenism" was a stake in an empire-wide competition for status, not coterminous with ethnicity, but rather a socially constructed identity. Hellenism had broadened in meaning: it was "scattered among many places" (Dio 31.18) and "to be found in Asia as well as in Europe" (Dio 12.49); "those who have in common Hellas" share not a place but Hellenism or maybe Greek language (*Olympicus*).[150] Finally, Jonathon Hall has made it persuasively clear that biological features, language, religion, or cultural traits do not ultimately define the ethnic group. They are, instead, secondary *indicia*. The primary indicia, which determine membership in an ethnic group, are a subscription to a myth of common descent or kinship, an association with a specific territory, and a sense of a shared history.[151] Accordingly, an ethnic group is never static since it is subjected to processes of assimilation or differentiation from other groups. As a result of Greek interaction with Roman power and hegemony, Hall states "it may be the case that the Greeks had irremediably defined *Hellenicity* in terms of cultural criteria."[152] Taking this cultural stance allowed Hellenism under Rome to influence the shape of contemporary Greek culture, above all by highlighting the achievements of ancestral Greeks as the chief merit of Greek civilization.[153] "Hellenized" peoples looked to what Romans idealized as Hellenic and used these as mimetic filters of ethnic perceptions.[154]

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[149] Whitmarsh 2001b, 272-3. See Hall 1997, 34-66, on the importance of genealogical descent from the 'original' tribes. For a discussion of the relationship between *genos* and *paideia* as arbiters of identity in the Second Sophistic, see Bowie 1991.
[150] Said 2001, 287.
[151] J. Hall 1997, his study did not include the period of the Roman Empire, but set up from archaic times to the Hellenistic period the foundation of Greek ethnicity. On fictive/mythic genealogy, see Fowler 1998. *Cf.* Bowersock 1990, Hellenism represented "language, thought, mythology, and images that constituted an extraordinary flexible medium of both cultural and religious expression."
[152] J. Hall 2002, 223, this study only cursively touched on Greeks under the influence of Rome.
[153] Spawforth 2001, 392.
[154] Malkin 2001, 24.

The whole fascination with old Greece reflected a Hadrianic and Antonine fashion led not by subject Greeks but by Rome, where Romans fashioned the Greek past to their own idealism.[155] Cultural Hellenism,[156] then, would seem to be the new standard of Greekness in the Roman period of the second century AD.[157]

The corollary of the development of a cultural Hellenism was that non-Greeks could "become" Greek through education. Apollonius of Tyana's sidekick, Damis, hoped that by associating with his master he would "cease to be an unwise philistine (*idiotes*) and seem wise; cease to be a barbarian, and seem educated," and hence to "become Greek."[158] Similarly, in *Epist. 71*, Apollonius asks the Ionians why they think that family (*gene*) or status as colonies constitutes a sufficient reason to be called Hellenes. After which he declares that "practice and laws and language and private life," and their "appearance and looks," comprise Hellenism. He seems to be saying that Hellenism is not constituted by ethnicity or decent, but by behavioural patterns, language, and physical appearance.[159] However, this was not a universal definition or attitude. Consider the king of the Crimean Bosporus (Philostr., *VS* 535), equipped with a full Greek education, who came to Smyrna in the course of his study of Ionia. Polemon refused to visit him, forcing the Pontian king instead to visit Polemon and pay ten talents for the privilege. Polemon stood aloof and looked down on him, even though Philostratus tells us that this Pontian king was thoroughly educated in a Greek manner.[160] Hellenism, then, was not a given or

[155] Spawforth 2001, 390. *Cf.* Pliny *Epis.* viii.24; Aulus Gellius i.2.1; Tacitus *Annals* ii.55.1.
[156] The view that Hellenism is cultural and can be acquired has the corollary that those who are Hellenes by *genos* can cease to be Hellenes; *cf.* Athenaios *Deipnosophists*; Dio 31.158, 160-1.
[157] Yet Hadrian's founding of the Panhellenion on genealogical grounds ruptures the idea of an all-pervasive cultural Hellenism. See note 147.
[158] Philostratus, *VA* 3.43.
[159] *cf.* Isocrates 4.50. See Bowie 1989.
[160] Cp. Braund 1997, 131-135.

fixed concept, but a contested, embattled term.[161] There is no definition that adequately captures the semantics of Hellenism as different individuals with different affiliations manipulated identity in different ways at various times.[162]

Yet, as Tim Whitmarsh astutely points out, all *pepaideumenoi* were foreigners as they used an archaic dialect of Greek, Attic, eschewing the language of the present, *koine*, for the sake of an artificial one.[163] The implication was that the *Hellenization* enacted by *paideia*, even in the case of 'ethnic' Greeks, was never simply a consolidation of an earlier identity but the emergence of new positions in relation to ancient Greek culture.[164] What this meant was that *culture* did not replace the *ethnic* or *genealogical* paradigm.[165] Both the ethic and the ethnic co-existed as legitimate claims to a "Greek" identity.[166] What must be understood is that the cultural identities of all *pepaideumenoi* (ethnic Greeks included) were not innate but constructed and vied for in social space. The power of the *pepaideumenoi* lay in the field of display and performance, where identities were created and contested discursively. In other words, Hellenism was not an *essence* but a *positioning*.[167] Hellenism, embodied in paideutic culture, was performed and created, where it represented not the act of "becoming Greek," but the act of becoming a *pepaideumenos*.

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[161] Whitmarsh 2004, 172; Malkin 2001. See Rutherford 1990, 10-11; Weeks 1990, 98, there is no one homogeneous and definitive culture, nor is culture monolithic; fear of the other, fear of difference, creates polarities and polemics that embody argument and debate. For anxiety of the citizenship in a culture, see Joseph 1999, 70.

[162] It is for this reason that the term is nebulous in scholarship.

[163] Whitmarsh 2001a, 127-8; see also Swain 2007b, 18-23.

[164] See Bhabha 1990, 207-221, for a discussion of the term and concept of hybridity that enables other positions to emerge rather than two cultures producing a third.

[165] See Fowler 1998 for the idea of genealogy as fictive and narrated through mythology.

[166] My definition (see the introduction) shows that the ethnic claim is tied to Greekness, and that Hellenism is a new term that emerged when the ethic began to diverge from the ethnic.

[167] See S. Hall 1990, 222-237, esp. 225-6 for this theory of identity. "Greekness" on the other hand was an essence.

Let us now examine this positioning through an interesting case of confrontation between the pure Greek and the *pepaideumenos*. Turning to Philostratus's *Vitae Sophistarum*, we encounter the story of Agathon and Herodes Atticus. The former the Greeks called Herakles, or more specifically Herodes's Herakles (Ἡρώδου Ἡρακλέα).[168] Herakles represented a primitive Greek purity in culture, language, and being. He clothed himself with wolf-skins, contended with wolves, bears, and bulls, and some even said that he was "earthborn" (γηγενῆ, 553)[169] as if he were a primeval Greek from a mythic age. He was a rustic hero (ἔστι δὲ ἥρως γεωργός, 553) who, when asked by Herodes if he were immortal, replied: ἤρετό τε τὸν Ἡρακλέα τοῦτον ὁ Ἡρώδης, εἰ καὶ ἀθάνατος εἴη, ὁ δὲ θνητοῦ ἔφη μακροημερώτερος, "I am only longer-lived than a mortal man" (Philostr., *VS* 553). Not only was he a man seemingly from legend, but he mainly lived on milk, suckled by goats and cows.[170] And his language was of the purest sort: educated in the interior of Attica (μεσογεία), an area where the speech had not been corrupted (παραφθείρονται) by barbarians, as it had in Athens. In this view, the language of the city had been corrupted by barbarians, but in the interior, where barbarians did not tread, the language had remained healthy and pure, being unmixed and untainted by any barbarisms.

Herodes Atticus (Lucius Vibullius Hipparchus Tiberius Claudius Atticus Herodes), on the other hand, represented the epitome of Hellenic culture in the second century AD and of the *pepaideumenos*. He was both Greek and Roman:[171] born in Athens and having lived in Rome as a child, he combined a Roman career with activities as a

[168] Philostratus *VS* 552-4; Lucian, *Demonax* 1.
[169] There is much to say on autochthony, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis.
[170] Breast milk in Gellius *NA* 12.1.
[171] His father is Greek while his mother is Roman.

sophist and local politician. His political career began with a delegation to Hadrian 117/118, then pregressed to *archon* (126/7) of Athens and *agonothetes* of the Panhellenia, and most likely first archon of the Panhellnion in 133-137, and archon of the Panathenaia in 140.[172] Rising through the ranks of *quaestor, praetor,* and special legate for the order of the towns in the province of Asia, his Roman career culminated as consul in 143 AD. Herodes was so successful at straddling both Greek and Roman spheres that the emperor Antoninus Pius appointed him teacher of his sons Marcus Aurelius and L. Verus.[173] His identity at any one moment depended on the context and the angle from which one looked.

Regarding Herodes's oratory, Philostratus praised him as a brilliant rhetor and benefactor of Greek cities.[174] His declaiming style was elegant and distinguished by its rich simplicity, and recalled that of his Attic exemplum Kritias. As a result of Herodes's central position and magnanimity all sophists of his age felt his influence, so much so that an inscription claims Herodes as "the tongue of Athens."[175] Philostratus offers an apt anecdote that captures Herodes's magnetism. When Alexander (Clay-Plato) arrives in Athens to declaim, he discovers that no youths and students are in the city because they have all followed Herodes out to the Marathonian countryside. Alexander writes to Herodes asking him to bring the Greeks back, to which Herodes replies that he too along with the Greeks will come at once.[176] Examining his life, political activities (both Roman and Greek), euergetism and beneficence, not to mention his sophisitic school and his

[172] Philostr., *VS* 549-50.
[173] Cassius Dio 72.35.1.
[174] As a rhetor see Philostratus, *VS passim*; Aulus Gellius (19.12.1); Lucian, *De morte Peregrini* 19.
[175] Philostr., *VS* 574. *IG* 14.1389.38: Ἡρώδεω, γλῶσσάν δέ τέ μιν καλέουσιν Ἀθηνέων, "Herodes, 'the tongue of Athens'."
[176] Philostr., *VS* 571-4.

perfect Attic oratory, Herodes operated as if his local identity was coterminous with a universalizing Hellenism.[177]

The story of Herakles suggests an inherent and integral tie between place and purity and, juxtaposed to that of Herodes, elucidates the dilemma of Greekness within a Roman context. The story represents an opposition between interior (*mesogeia*) and civic (*asteios*), between the local and the *translocal*.[178] Herakles, the paradigm and the flesh of the ideology of 'pure' Greekness, represented the rustic and was centripetal towards the centre of Attica. This figure was an ideology welded to the rugged, static, primitive, and esoteric traditional past, which adhered to the ancient ingrained authority of the *topos*.[179] Herodes, on the other hand, represented the urban and urbane, projecting this ideology centrifugally from Athens, outwards to Rome, the Empire, the *oikoumene*. He was the progressive cosmopolitan of the present, encouraging a modern, pluralistic, and inclusive *paideia* accessible to the Roman elite across the empire.[180] In these two figures, we have the opposition of the *ἀγροίκος* and the *πεπαιδευμένος*.

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[177] Gleason 2010, 161.

[178] For the concept of *translocal*, see Whitmarsh 2010a.

[179] See Goldhill 2002, 89-93, where he maintains that speech and identity are linked in a topographical discourse.

[180] *Cf.* Aristides, *Ad Rome* 63: not Greeks and barbarians, but Romans and non-Romans. Greek distinction was defined through exclusion whereas Roman self-definition was premised on inclusion (Parca 2001, 57-72; Woolf 1994). Greg Woolf (1994, 130-5), remarking about Romanization, said that it had the specious appearance in the east of not having occurred. However, by valuing the Greek past and permitting the Greek language to operate as an official one throughout the early empire, Romans made no assault on the central defining characteristics of Hellenism—namely that their identity was underwritten by a unique language or common descent. The Romans changed aspects, such as material culture of cities, that were not integral to Greek self-definition or presentation, and therefore Greeks continued being Greek under Rome while the west was utterly transformed. The introduction of the emperor cult served to make the distant emperor manifest, and symbolized his claim as the guardian of civilization, the *oikoumene* (Pliny, *Ep.* 10.52; Dio Chrysostom, *Or*. 1; Aristides, *Or.* 26. See also Price 1984a; Bang 2010). It also formed part of a visual semantics of power that demonstrated the universal authority of the Roman emperor. Edward Said (1978) observed that these phenomena should be treated as constitutive of culture and society rather than symbolic paraphernalia. Thus empire was not primarily an arrangement of military domination, but rather a hegemonic system of knowledge, ideology, and culture, reordering the world and its subjects. As the empire was multi-ethnic, the strategy of accepting provincial elites into the government had the effect of widening the appeal of the conquering culture by defining it more in terms of the achievement of

The pluralist, multicultural, Roman-inspired Hellenism contradicted the old-style and exclusivist Greekness based on genealogy. This cultural and paideutic Hellenism flourished under the stability and peace of the *pax Romana* which brought about a new prosperity and an intellectual renaissance. In this, the Roman Empire proved to be a potent force of cultural integration. Imperial power is hegemonic power. Lucian and Favorinus both demonstrate that the Roman apparatus favoured a cultural definition of Hellenism. The Greek-barbarian dichotomy, though present in rhetoric, was in fact less prevalent. Rather, it was a positioning on the matrix of Hellenism, one that was performed and created. The next chapter starts from the presumption of Hellenism as a positioning, that Hellenism, imbued in the mimetic and hence open to everyone, represents the act of becoming a *pepaideumenos*, and focuses then on the aspect of *performing* Hellenism.

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excellence rather than birth. A culture stressing excellence, *virtus* and ἀρετή, over mere birth enabled aristocratic groups to distance themselves from the *hoi polloi* by emulating the standards set out by the imperial court. This had the effect of unifying the aristocratic elites in a moral economy of honour; on honour, see Lendon 1997.

CHAPTER II

THE AESTHETICS OF *PAIDEIA*: PHILOSOPHY, SOPHISTRY, AND SPECTACLE

πρὸς ἄμιλλαν ἢ δόξαν ὥσπερ ὑποκριτὰς εἰς
θέατρον ἀναπλάττοντας ἑαυτοὺς ἀνάγκη.

"[Public figures] must fashion themselves in their
competition for glory, like actors in the theatre."

-Plutarch, *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae* 2; 799A

Τιμή (*time*) or "honourable distinction" is no less something that is pursued than something that is received from others, and the tension between striving for and being granted lies at the heart of the notion of *philotimia* (lit., "the love of honour"). This chapter sets out to prove that epideictic oratory came to dominate Second Sophistic rhetoric because *philotimia* could be earned through performance and spectacle. Spectacle publically fashioned the glory and honour of individuals, while sophistry used the authority and costume of philosophy to earn that honour. Since social status and honour were acquired and preserved performatively,[181] performance and oratory gained importance in Greek cities where sophists increasingly aligned themselves with display (*epideixis*), ambition (*philotimia*), glory (*doxa*), and luxury (*khlide*) over and above that of philosophical discussion, restraint (*engkrateia*), and moderation (*sophrosyne*).[182] This

[181] Whitmarsh 2001a, 290, "the power of the *pepaideumenos* lies in the field of display and performance."
[182] Concerning ambition, *philotimia*, Tim Duff 1999, 83, writes that without it, nothing of value can be accomplished, but at the same time, it can also lead to extremely disruptive and destructive behaviour. See also Lucian *On Salaried Posts* and *Nigrinus*; Herodotos 3.53 where he calls *philotimia* a mischevious possession; Thucydides 2.65 for the negative impact of *philotimia* as only self-serving. The philosophic schools tried to define φιλοτμία: the Stoics define it as an immoderate desire for honour (*Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* 3.397: ἐπιθυμία ἄμετρος τιμῆς) which should be completely eradicated, and fame as something to be avoided (*SVF* 1.559); the Epicureans sought an "unnoticed life" and ridiculed those who preferred empty and unnecessary desires. Regarding the ephemeral and material things, see Plutarch, *De virtute et vitio* 100C: τὸ δ' ἡδέως ζῆν καὶ ἱλαρῶς οὐκ ἔξωθέν ἐστιν, "a pleasant and happy life comes not from external things."

created a clash between sophists and philosophers, the one elevating pleasure, the other self-improvement.

In order to demonstrate this clash, I will paint the cultural scene of spectacle in the Roman Empire, and examine the role of the sophist through the text of Philostratus's *Vitae Sophistarum* (*VS*), which reifies the cultural ideal of the virtuoso rhetor through his numerous portraits and biographies of prominent sophists, where the appreciation of the latter's skills was of an artistic kind which discounted the epistemological and ethical aspects of the discourse.[183] In examining the role of the philosopher, I will engage with the texts of Plutarch of Chaeronea, a Greek philosopher who wrote at the incipient of the Second Sophistic. Through an examination of these texts, we can chart the axiological shift from philosophy towards pedantry and decadence. Putting all this together, I will examine one of the most renowned orators of the Second Sophistic, Polemon of Laodicea, and his sophistic spectacle. The chapter concludes with sophistic performative decadence, taking Favorinus as its exemplum, where sophists used corrupt techniques to ingratiate themselves with their audience, and in the process burlesqued *paideia*.

Spectacle in the Roman Empire

Greco-Roman culture was above all a visual culture, a culture of "seeing and of being seen" (Tertullian, *De Spect.* 25).[184] As a result, many actions were essentially theatrical, and an individual's identity and status only took on their full meaning in the eyes of

[183] On Philostratus's cultural ideal, see Flinterman 1995, 30-2.

[184] *nemo denique in spectaculo ineundo prius cogitat nisi videri et videre*, "no one going to a spectacle has any other thought but to see and be seen;" Greek as a visual culture, see Goldhill 1999: 1-29; Konig 2009; van Nijf 1999; Rome as a visual culture, Coleman 1990; Coleman 2010; Coleman 2011; Duncan 2006, 188-217; Le Gray 2005; Kyle 2007. Plato attacked Athens as a theatocracy, a society ruled by the danger's of the crowd's pleasure in spectacles, Laws 700a-701b: "Our once silent audiences have found a voice, in the persuasion that they understand what is good and bad art; the old 'sovereignty of the best' in that sphere has given way to an evil 'theatrocracy.'" See Wallace 1997 on theatocracy.

fellow Romans and Greeks.[185] "The culture of spectacle expressed the values of the political elite but also served as a vehicle for communication between all citizens, as all participate together in celebrating and reaffirming the common values, [and] shared goals."[186] Thus, Donald Kyle rightly highlights that cultural performances, including oratory, processions, and games, contest and encode culture, involving both metaphor and metamorphosis.[187] They are fields of play, contested terrain, with mimesis, reflexivity, and theatricality.[188]

Spectacular mass entertainment was a vital part of life at Rome and in the provinces.[189] The spectacles of the arena and circus were a pervasive cultural force in Roman society, yet more pervasive in the towns and cities of the Roman world than the gladiatorial spectacles and other expensive shows were the informal entertainers: the animal-tamers, acrobats, tightrope-walkers, jugglers, conjurors, fire-eaters, strongmen, puppeteers, fortune-tellers, street-musicians, and other itinerant showmen of antiquity, like sophists.[190] However, spectacle could be dangerous. Anne Duncan argues for the convergence of appearance and reality in Roman spectacle, a blurring of the line between

[185] See Duncan 2006, identity was an act, a fiction, put on for spectators, full of dissembling, and composite.
[186] Flower 2004, 322-343.
[187] Kyle 2007, 17-18.
[188] See Goldhill 1999, 1-29. See also Whitmarsh 2001a: 296, who asserts the role of performance and imitation in his creation of a Greek identity.
[189] See Flower 2004, 322; Leppin 2012. On games and athletics, see Konig 2005; van Nijf 1999, 176-200. On the significance of the emperor's cult, see Price 1984a; Price 1984b. See also Swain 1996, 68, and Kyle 2007, 303, who goes on to say that spectacles were markers of Romanization, effective instruments of cultural imperialism. Harriet Flower asserts that Roman culture was one of spectacle where it was at the heart of their understanding of the identity of their community, and Leppin affirms that the programme of *ludi* (games) became larger and richer during the imperial period, as *agons* (contests, games) and festivals increasingly entered Roman culture. Simon Price's seminal study on emperor cult in Asia Minor tells us that, during the Empire, the emperor placed himself at the centre of cult and festival, magnifying the culture of spectacle, while simultaneously placing Rome at the centre of Greek festivals.
[190] Coleman 2010, 651-2.

mimesis and reality.[191] The audience, no longer content with mere performance, wanted to see blood and death. Kathleen Coleman, in her seminal study on what she calls "fatal charades," relates how criminals condemned to death were dressed as tragic characters who died in myth or tragedy, which was then enacted in front of thousands of spectators with the criminal killed onstage.[192] As Thomas Schmitz and Joy Connolly explain, while criminals donned the *personae* of mythical-historical characters, sophists—mostly in the Greek speaking cities of the Roman East, but also in Rome and Gaul—donned the *personae* of historical classical Greek figures, such as Demosthenes or Xenophon.[193] At the same time, pantomime and mime, both of which were arrogant, provocative, and stereotypically effeminate, rose in popularity.[194] In order to compete with the dance of pantomime,[195] sophistry itself became more theatrical, focusing on entertainment rather than instruction and *paideia* (cultivation of culture and education). Aelius Aristides, one of the most prominent orators of the second century AD, reads the heavy use of rhythm and ornament in sophistic oratory as the product of a close proximity between oratory and theater, and used theatrical terms to describe the oratorical scene, noting that there was a popular set of sophists who "burlesque the mysteries of oratory" with "mincing, drunken behavior" pleasing the crowds like "dancing girls, mime-artists, and magicians" (*Or.* 34.55).

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[191] Duncan 2006, 188, 191. See Connolly 2001 and Schmitz 1999 for this same phenomenon regarding the sophists.
[192] Coleman 1990.
[193] Schmitz 1999; Connolly 2001. For sophists in Rome, see Philostratus *VS passim*; Gaul, see Lucian, *Apol.* 15.
[194] Lucian, *Salt.*; Duncan 2006, 188-217. Connolly 2001a, 84, one feature of some sophistic oratory is the singing or dancing routine, whose popularity is ascribed by critical sources to audience demand: Lucian, *Rh.Pr.*. 19; Aristides, *Or.* 34; Philostratus, *VS* 513.
[195] *Cf.* Philostr., *VS* 589.

The Roman moralists viewed sensual pleasure as dangerous, at least in part because its power, its appeal, is universal.[196] The prodigal pose a threat to society, because by surrendering to the attractions of the life of pleasure they call into question the desirability of the life of virtue.[197] Greek-speaking philosophers, also perceived this fear.[198] The clash of two paideutic cultures, philosophy and sophistry, the one striving to improve its audience, the other merely to display dazzling rhetorical performances for pleasure, was at the heart of the Second Sophistic.

Classifying Sophists

A sophist in the second century AD differed from the sophists of classical Greece. Philostratus describes the rhetoric of the first sophistic as 'philosophizing' as early sophists took philosophical themes, though unlike the philosophers they expounded them in continuous discourse, and laid down what they claimed to be true *ex cathedra*, whereas Philostratus says later sophists, those of the second sophistic, were only concerned with

[196] Even the Stoic philosopher Seneca could be seen attending spectacles, see Cagniart 2000, 607-18. See Joy Connolly's (2001a) stance that Greek rhetoric was purposefully in direct conflict with Roman moralists, that the performative has the capacity to contest convention, and to resist on some level the dominant structures: "In the context of the cultural differences between Greeks and Romans in the high empire, what now appears most remarkable about Greek sophistic oratorical and practical performance is the degree to which the things singled out for special note by Philostratus in his biography, or by the sophists themselves in their own writings, are precisely those elements of oratorical performance singled out by Roman rhetoricians for the harshest critique. It seems, then, that these Greeks play up Roman vices: they imitate, pose, wear perfume, play the woman. Above all, they do not conceal the mimetic habits that Roman orators treat with fear and disgust. We might say, then, that the Greek sophists reclaim the theatrical aspects of rhetoric which Roman rhetoricians are so eager to disavow and demonize…. As their performances actively reclaim the classical Greek tradition, especially its achievements in mimetic drama, they shoot a politically edged glance at the deepest anxieties of Roman rhetoric."

[197] Edwards 1993, 173-206. *Cf.* Dalby 2000.

[198] Pseudo-Plutarch certainly perceived this and his problem with rhetorical training, which is first described, tellingly, as the "panegyrical babble" taught in the schools, is the threat it poses to the young man's acquisition of a morally healthy education (6A). Learning to "please the many," or "the rabble" (6A), leads to not only moral decay but, worst of all, loquacious rudeness (6C).

declaiming on particular incidents in the past.[199] These two definitions are a bit unsatisfactory as sophists of the first sophistic were not exclusively philosophic but also taught skill in disputation, while sophists of the second sophistic also had political roles as emissaries of their respective cities.[200] However, in their declamations later sophists "handled their themes according to art (*techne*), the earlier according to what they believed (*kata to doxan*)" (Philostr., *VS* 480f.). Pollux sharpens this distinction in his *Onomastikon* (4.41, 47) where he associates the related terms of "sophist" and the use of "*sophistike*" to designate not only teacher but also artifice: διδάσκαλος, παιδευτής, ἐξηγητής, ὑφηγητής, ἡγεμών […] γόης, ἀπατεών, ἐπίβουλος, ἀπατητικός ἐξαπατητικός, δολερός, ὕπουλος, "teacher, instructor, advisor, teacher, guide […] cheat, rogue, insidious, fallacious, calculated to deceive, deceitful, false."[201] Thus, the first sophists aimed at persuasion and instruction, while the second sophists merely exhibited rhetorical skill.

Aristotle's treatise on classical rhetoric distinguishs three basic types of oratory: *symbouleutikon, dikanikon, epideiktikon* (deliberative, forensic, demonstrative).[202] Deliberative oratory delivered before public assemblies argues for or against a particular course of action; forensic oratory accuses or defends past actions, commonly found in the courtroom; epideictic oratory does not necessarily persuade at all, but rather speaks in praise or in blame of a topic or theme before an audience of whom no decision is demanded. Rhetors performed and delivered all these types of declamation, but not all

[199] Philostratus was at pains to connect the two eras of sophistic, deliberately calling the contemporary sophistic "second" rather than "new." Connecting it to classical Greece lent authority.
[200] Sidebottom 2009: 92-99.
[201] Pollux defines "sophist" and "*sophistike*" as distinct from *rhetorike* (4.16), "the art of speaking," which includes 'political rhetoric', symbouleutic and forensic oratory, and also 'sophistic rhetoric', presumably epideictic.
[202] Aristotle, *Rh.* 1358a36-1359a36.

rhetors were sophists. Plutarch (*De tuenda sanitate praecepta* 131A) and Dio (32.62) speaks of rhetors and sophists as distinct classes, and Plutarch further divides rhetors into advocates and sophists (*De fraterno amore* 486E), and speaks of the 'rhetorical sophists' giving epideictic performances (*De laude ipsius* 543E). The ancient evidence indicates that there was a distinction between ὁ ῥήτωρ and ὁ σοφιστής. Galen of Pergamon (*De praenotione ad Posthumum* 14.627) relates that the sophist Hadrian was initially a rhetor and only later acquired the name sophist, indicating that there was a process of evolution in becoming a sophist. With this realization, we can see that sophists represent a category within the general group of rhetors.[203] Philostratus explains that the title of sophist went to rhetors of surpassing eloquence (*VS* 484). Thus, rhetors during the early empire were teachers of eloquence, yet Peter Brunt maintains that there is a "sharp distinction in principle between sophists whose aim is merely to display their rhetorical skill and teachers who employed it as an instrument for edification or instruction."[204] Sextus Empiricus confirms that the sophists had brought rhetorical technique to its peak, marking the sophist as a virtuoso epideictic rhetor, but that these virtuosos were dumb as fish in the courts (*Adv. Math.* 2.18), and Philostratus himself contrasts the forensic and sophistic styles of oratory.[205] The rhetor, then, seems more in line with deliberative and

[203] Bowersock 1969, 11-14. Sidebottom 2009, 70-2, provides evidence that the role of sophist and rhetor could be combined: Dionysus of Miletus is found on an inscription as "rhetor and sophist," *IK* XVII.i, no. 3047; also Hordeonius Lollianus of Ephesus on *IG* II^2 4211; Antoninus Pius uses the terms interchangeably, *Dig*. 27.1.6.2; *cf.* Philostratus *VS* 614 where sophists spend most of their time teaching boys.
[204] Brunt 1994, 41. See also Sidebottom 2009, 70.
[205] *VS* 500, 511, 569, 606, 614. Virtuoso: the guests of Athenaios's *Deipnosophistae* are sophists because of their virtuosity with which they practice their art; Sidebottom 2009, 70-2; Flinterman 1995, 30-2; Bang 2010; Connolly 2001a; Bowersock 1969; *contra* Brunt 1994, 33, where he concludes that sophist, when it relates to any class of rhetor, signifies either teacher of rhetoric or epideictic orator or both.

forensic oratory, while the sophist with epideictic. The primary function of the sophist was to entertain.[206]

The declamations, *meletai*, of sophists were epideictic, as were encomia, panegyrics, and funeral and festal orations. Declamation did not have a specific practical purpose of winning a case through legal argumentation (forensic rhetoric) or convincing an assembly through political address (deliberative rhetoric). Its goal was not to persuade the listeners to form a judgment about the past or make a decision about the future. Rather it sought simply to impress the audience and win their applause.[207] Declamation revolved around invented topics and served as practice for the speaker (*μελέτη/melete* = exercise), as entertainment for the public, and as display of the rhetorician's talents (thus, *epideictic* rhetoric).[208] To this effect, Dionysius of Halicarnassus laments that after Alexander the Great the "old philosophic rhetoric"—that which was expressed in *politikoi logoi* (political accounts) inculcating *arete* (virtue) and policies beneficial to each city and all the Greeks—had been displaced, especially in the cities of Asia, by "the theatrical style" of men "ignorant of philosophy and all learning."[209]

In the second century AD, epideictic oratory came to be regarded as the highest form of eloquence and gained the greatest renown.[210] Quintilian teaches that epideictic oratory was essentially for display (*ostentatio*), while Cicero claims that the *ex tempore*

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[206] There was less of a need for forensic oratory as the extent of city jurisdiction was certainly limited by the possibility of reference to Roman tribunals. The decline of the Greek *polis* and the rise of the Roman principate profoundly affected the oratory and rhetoric in the Mediterranean world. When significant political decisions were no longer arrived at through democratic debate but were made by a single monarch, deliberative rhetoric lost much of its *raison d'etre*. When serious judicial decisions were not reached through local courts with juries of peers, but transferred to imperial officials who came in from the outside, forensic rhetoric was drained of much of its life's blood.
[207] Cicero, *Orator* 65.
[208] On declamation and *melete*, see Connolly 2001a; Schmitz 1999; Schmitz 2012; Whitmarsh 2005; Schaps 2011; Reader 1996; Brunt 1994; Sidebottom 2009; Marrou 1956.
[209] *Vet. Orat.* 1.
[210] Bowersock 1969; Swain 1996; Brunt 1994; Whitmarsh 2001.

style had become the specialty of "those who have been called sophists," whose sole purpose was to give pleasure to the audience.[211] Plutarch adds that a sophistic performance was an especially acute expression of a "theatrical" life.[212] Given this, the objectives of sophistry confirm Aristotle's statement that audiences of epideictic oratory were merely "spectators."[213]

The sophists in Philostratus's *VS* excelled in epideictic oratory. The beauty of their style, their delivery and voice, their invention and ingenuity, and their virtuosity in extemporizing were all elements on which Philostratus focused and praised. Their purpose was manifestly not persuasion or instruction, but the exhibition of their skill and the enchantment of their audiences, whom they affected both by their melodious speech and by carrying them into another world, as the dramatist would do.[214]

Clash of Sophistry and Philosophy: The Aesthetics of *Paideia*

The clash of two paideutic cultures, sophistry and philosophy, was at the heart of the Second Sophistic. For those who pursued advanced studies during this period, there were essentially two types of schools: the rhetorical and the philosophical.[215] That a rivalry developed between these two schools was natural. Both of them claimed to be a complete education for a man of culture, a *pepaideumenos*, where the two leading intellectual roles were that of sophist and philosopher.[216] The vast majority of rhetors, sophists, and

[211] Quintilian 2.10.10-12; Cicero, *Orator* 37-9, 65.
[212] See Plutarch *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae* 4, 800B, where the life of the elite is under constant observation, to educate their character and put it in order since they are to live "as on an open stage"
[213] Arist., *Rhet.* 1.2.3.
[214] Plutarch, *De audiendo* 41D; Brunt 1994, 25-32.
[215] Schaps 2011, 136-7.
[216] Sidebottom 2009, 69.

philosophers tended to come from the same social class,[217] they had a shared intellectual background and a similar education, operated in a nuanced overlap of functions,[218] and possessed certain transferable skills.[219] But it is how they differ that is most interesting, as well as that which fueled the paideutic clash. The proclivity of sophistry was towards aesthetics and performance, while philosophy's objective was improving their audience, directing humanity to the only satisfying and worthwhile goal, virtue, not just beautiful sounding speech and pleasure.[220]

Sophists were overwhelmingly concerned with their appearance, and the symbolic role of the sophist called for a display of outward beauty.[221] Their dress was expensive, ostentatious, and colourful, they sported elaborate hairstyles, they were clean and wore perfume, and they practiced depilation.[222] Hippodromus even compared sophists to peacocks.[223] Sophists paraded their wealth with extreme flamboyance, which was intended to mark them as among the richest and most successful of the elite: their homes were elaborate; they travelled the empire; and they had students, a source of pride for the

[217] See Brunt 1994, 25, 34, where he remarks that the majority of sophists came from affluent families anyway, discrediting the role of sophist as "social elevator," insisting that only a minority attained high esteem and public influence. He also says that there must be countless sophists of whom we know nothing. Yet in Lucian's *Fugiviti*, 12-3, we can put a face on some of these unknown sophists, and they were not from affluent families. Instead, they were "an abominable class of men, for the most part slaves and hirelings," tradesmen and labourers. This corresponds to Brunt's later argument that most sophists were not active beyond the confines of a single city.
[218] Advising cities, and settling civic discord.
[219] Sidebottom 2009; Marrou 1956 is still the seminal study for education in the ancient world. See also Connolly 2001b, and 2011.
[220] Epict. 2.1.34-6; 2.17.34-6; 3.23.1-38 esp. 33-8; Philostr., *VA* 8.6; Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 1.1-5; Plut. 42A.
[221] *Cf.* Hermocrates's beauty and charm, Philostr., *VS* 612; and "Clay-Plato" (Alexander), *VS* 570; Lucian, *Rh.Pr.*. 20. *Cf.* the *schema* of Prodicus's Vice, Dio's Lady Royalty, and all the Vices of ps.-Cebes's *Tabula*; *Paideia* in Lucian, *Somn.*
[222] Dress, *VS* 587, 600-1, 623; Luc., *Rh. pr.* 15-16; *cf.* Epict. 3.3.35; hairstyle, *VS* 571, 623; Luc., *Rh. pr.* 11, 12; Clean: Philostr., *VS* 570, 571; Perfume: Philostr., *VS* 571, Luc., *Rh. pr.* 11; depilation, Philostr., *VS* 536; Luc., *Rh. pr.* 23.
[223] Philostr., *VS* 617.

sophist, who paid high fees.[224] Entering the profession of sophist signified an opportunity to change one's personal style. Aristocles of Pergamon (Philostr., *VS* 567) demonstrates just how the symbols of the sophist and the philosopher contrasted.[225] In his youth Aristocles had devoted himself to the teachings of the Peripatetic school, though later he went over entirely to the sophists. So long as he was a student of philosophy he was slovenly in appearance, unkempt and squalid in his dress, but as a sophist he became fastidious, and enjoyed all the pleasures of the lyre, the flute, and the singing voice, and where before he had lived with such austerity, he was now immoderate in his attendance at theatres. The sophist Scopelian of Clazonmanae was given to "pitch-plasters and professional hair-removers" (*VS* 536), and attracted a brilliant band of devoted students with his powers of delivery: swaying excessively as though in a Bacchic frenzy when he performed (*VS* 518-521). Alexander *Peloplaton* ("Clay-Plato") was conspicuous for his beauty and his charm—always arranging his hair, cleaning his teeth, and polishing his nails, and always smells of myrrh[226]—but was rumored to rely on cosmetics (*VS* 570). The Athenians considered his appearance and costume/outfit so exquisite that before he even spoke a word a buzz of approval circulated among the audience as a tribute to his perfect elegance.[227] However, Plutarch warns that,

> τοὺς δ' ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγους ἀφαιροῦντα χρὴ τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος δόξαν αὐτοὺς ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ἐξετάζειν. ὡς γὰρ πολέμου, καὶ ἀκροάσεως πολλὰ τὰ κενά ἐστι. καὶ γὰρ πολιὰ τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ πλάσμα καὶ ὀφρῦς καὶ περιαυτολογία, μάλιστα δ' αἱ

[224] Homes, *VS* 603, 606; 556-7; travel, Polemon, *VS* 534; *cf.* 587, 603; students, *VS* 518, 520, 526, 531, 562, 613;
[225] *Cf.* Timocrates the philosopher who was very hirsute and his feud with Scopelian the sophist who practiced depilation (Philostr., *VS* 536); Epictetus, a Stoic philosopher, encounters a student of sophistry with elaborately dressed hair and a highly embellished appearance (3.1.1), and Epictetus imagines the youth saying that the philosopher could have set his hair right, stripped him of his ornaments, and stopped his depilation (3.1.14).
[226] Philostr., *VS* 571.
[227] Philostr., *VS* 572.

κραυγαὶ καὶ οἱ θόρυβοι καὶ τὰ πηδήματα τῶν παρόντων συνεκπλήττει τὸν ἄπειρον ἀκροατὴν καὶ νέον ὥσπερ ὑπὸ ῥεύματος παραφερόμενον.

In a philosophic discussion we must set aside the repute of the speaker, and examine what he says quite apart. For as in war so also in lectures there is plenty of empty show. For example, a speaker's grey hair, his formality, his serious brow, his self-assertion, and above all the clamour and shouting of the audience as he brings them to their feet, combine to disconcert the younger and inexperienced listener, who is, as it were, swept away by the current.[228]

As with the sophist, the symbolic representation and presentation of the philosopher was constructed in terms of characteristic appearance, behaviour, and statements. The beard, a symbol of all philosophers,[229] uncoiffed hair,[230] hirsute,[231] and the rough cloak known as the τριβώνιον (*tribonion*)[232] or the ἱμάτιον (*himation*)[233] were all external symbols of the philosopher.[234] These external semiotics were easily duplicated, and since the philosopher rather than the sophist was held in higher esteem, others could gain authority as a speaker by associating with philosophy and philosophers.[235] There was certainly confusion between true and false philosophers.[236]

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[228] Plutarch, *De audiendo* 41B-C.
[229] Epict. 1.16.9-14; 2.23.21; Luc., *Eun.* 8; *Demon.* 13; *Pisc.* 11, 12, 31, 37, 41, 42, 46; Philostr., *VA* 7.34.
[230] Epict. 3.1.42; 4.8.5; 34; the long hair of the Cynic and the Pythagorean: Luc., *Vit. Auct.* 2; Philostr., *VA* 1.8, 32, 7.34; cropped hair of the Stoic: Luc., *Fug.* 27, *Bis Acc.* 20.
[231] Epictetus did not approve of depilation, Epict. 3.1.27-35; 42; 22.10; Philostr., *VA* 4.27; *cf.* Luc., *Fug.* 33; *Demon.* 50.
[232] Epict. 3.1.24; 22.47; 4.8.5; 34; Luc., *Fug.* 14; 27; *Bis Acc.* 1.6; *Pisc.* 11.
[233] Epict. 1.29.22; Luc., *Vit. Auct.* 15.
[234] See also Dio, *Or.* 12.9.
[235] Lucian, *Fug.* 12; Lauwers 2012; See also Bang 2010: 678ff., philosophers held in esteem as Roman culture stressed excellence, *virtus* and ἀρετή.
[236] Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 14.8, κολακεύει καὶ σοφιστὴς φιλόσοφον· οὗτος μὲν κολάκων ἀκριβέστατος, "The sophist imitates/flatters the philosopher. He is the most scrupulous imitator/flatterer of them all," 20.3, μιμεῖταί που καὶ φαρμακοπώλης ἰατρὸν καὶ συκοφάντης ῥήτορα καὶ σοφιστὴς φιλόσοφον, "Drug-sellers mimic doctors, sycophants mimic orators, sophists mimic philosophers"; *cf.* 27.8; Bowersock 1969, 11, claimed that this overlap made it easy for the common people to confuse and conflate philosophers and rhetors; *contra* both Peter Brunt 1994, 38-40, and Sidebottom 2009, 69-70, claim that philosophers were set apart from other men, especially rhetors and sophists by their external appearance. Lucian, *The Hall* 2: the elite were 'the educated', πεπαιδευμένοι, the masses 'the idiots/private citizens', ἰδιόται, proves that the *hoi polloi* could easily be duped but not the *pepaideumenoi*; see Goldhill 2001; we also see this in the *Ignorant Book-Collector*. Roman legislation separated the two roles by setting up Chairs of Rhetoric and Philosophy at Rome and Athens, and by granting immunities: Vespasian ruled in favour of doctors, rhetors, and teachers as qualifying for tax immunities, while philosophers did not; Hadrian re-affirmed Trajan's wide

Charlatan philosophers could fake the external symbols of the philosopher's profession,[237] the beard and cloak,[238] since the masses judged by symbolic representation.[239] Having "stolen" the symbols[240] and "disguised" themselves,[241] sophists and charlatans appeared plausible as philosophers,[242] and it was not easy to tell true philosophers from false,[243] leaving Lucian of Samosata, a rhetorical-satirical writer of the Roman Imperial period, to deplore that the cheats were often more convincing than the genuine philosophers.[244] Sophists also adopted the externals of philosophers in portrait sculpture. The extant portrait sculptures of Herodes Atticus depict him with a down-turned head and a lined brow with a hair style and beard in the likeness of the ancient orators Demosthenes, Lysias, and Aeschines, whom Philostratus calls the founder of the

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immunities to, among others, rhetors and philosophers; Antoninus Pius limited the number who could claim it, and he also removed philosophers from the list, see *Dig.* 27.1.6.2, 8. Asking for an exemption proved that one could not be a philosopher, see *Dig.* 27.1.6.7, Philostr., *VS* 490 (Favorinus); see Bowersock 1969, 30-41.

[237] Charlatans and hypocrites who assumed the style of philosopher, see Dio 71.34f.; Plut. 43F, 325C; Epict. 2.19, 3.21, 4.8; Galen, *Prognosis* 124N. Lucian's frequent satires on professed philosophers, which draws on contemporary experience, see *Conv., Fug., Pisc. passim*, esp. 41-3*; Bis. Acc* 21, *Dial. Mort.* 333, 369-74, *Herm.* 9f., 59, 75, 80; *Icarom.* 21, 29f.; *Men.* 4f.; *Nigr.* 24. Cassius Dio, a consul of Roman, says that there was a large crop in his reign because of his patronage of philosophy (71.35.2) See also Brunt 1994, 37-50.

[238] *Cf.* Plutarch, *De adulatore et amico* 52C-D; Lucian, *Bis accus.* 6-7; *Merc. Cond.* 25; *Piscator* 11 and 42.

[239] *Cf.* Lucian, *Rh.Pr.*. 20; see Sidebottom for a discussion of sophistic portrait sculpture that played up the links to the ancient sophistic; symbolic representation: Epictetus 4.8.10 where the philosopher is judged on the externals alone.

[240] Philostratus, *VA* 2.29.

[241] Epictetus 2.19.8.

[242] Lucian, *Fug.* 4, 10, 13, 14, 16, esp. 13.

[243] Lucian, *Fug.* 15.

[244] Lucian, *Pisc.* 42: πιθανώτεροι γὰρ οἱ γόητες οὗτοι πολλάκις τῶν ἀληθῶς φιλοσοφούντων. *Cf.* Maximus of Tyre, *orat.* 1.8a, and 26.2g, where he draws the conclusion that the great majority of contemporary philosophers are in reality sophists. See also Maximus of Tyre, *orat.* 26.2g-h, where the philosophers focus too much on words rather than actions, and in the end none of them still cares about what is really important: the good. See Maximus of Tyre, *orat.* 26.1c, where he defines philosophy as the source of virtue and noble thoughts.

Second Sophistic (*VS* 507).[245] Thus, sophists wanted to be seen as playing an old cultural role by accentuating links to the ancient sophistic.[246]

Philosophers, however, could be distinguished from sophists via their deeds, which reflected their differing virtue.[247] According to Maximus of Tyre, a philosophical orator of the second century AD whose main topic was ethics, human virtue is a matter of deeds not words, and the philosopher must bring his passions under control and create a virtuous disposition in his soul.[248] Plutarch elaborates on this idea (*De virtute et vitio* 101D-E):

> οὐ βιώσῃ φιλοσοφήσας ἀηδῶς, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ ζῆν ἡδέως μαθήσῃ καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων· εὐφρανεῖ σε πλοῦτος πολλοὺς εὐεργετοῦντα καὶ πενία πολλὰ μὴ μεριμνῶντα καὶ δόξα τιμώμενον καὶ ἀδοξία μὴ φθονούμενον
>
> Being a philosopher you will not pass your life unpleasantly, but you will learn to subsist pleasantly from everywhere and from everything. Wealth will give you gladness for the good you will do to many, poverty for your freedom from many cares, repute for the honours you will enjoy, and obscurity for the certainty that you shall not be envied.

In Plutarch's view, wealth was only good to help the philosopher perform good and virtuous deeds (εὐεργετοῦντα). Wealth itself provided no pleasure since it was poverty that set the philosopher free from material concerns and cares, whereas repute would be earned for the honourable deeds the philosopher performs.[249] Finally, for the philosopher, fame was eschewed in preference for obscurity; fame was not a concern of the philosopher and should not be sought.

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[245] Sidebottom 2009, 87-92.
[246] See Philostr., *VS* 480-4; 490-513 esp. 507, 510-11 where Philostratus attempts to link the "ancient" and "second" sophistics.
[247] Maximus of Tyre, *orat*. 20.3b.
[248] Maximus of Tyre, *orat*. 15.7c: ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ οὐ λόγος ἀλλ' ἔργον. Maximus was not alone among philosophers in his belief of *praxis*, in fact it was commonplace, see Lauwers 2012: 193. For Plutarch too, the soul and not the body was the focus of a philosopher, *De virtute et vitio* 100F, 101B.
[249] *Cf.* Seneca, *Epist*. 102.17, below n.88.

Yet sophists and charlatans, while donning the cloak and beard of philosophy, shamed it with their actions. Philosophers were expected to control their behaviour in food and drink,[250] shun admiration,[251] not seek crowds,[252] and to collect no fees for their instruction.[253] But as we have seen, sophists collected fees,[254] attracted crowds,[255] ate and drank in excess,[256] and fawned after fame and glory.[257] In Lucian's dialogue *Fugitivi*, Philosophy states:

> Εἰσίν τινες, ὦ Ζεῦ, ἐν μεταιχμίῳ τῶν τε πολλῶν καὶ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων, τὸ μὲν σχῆμα καὶ βλέμμα καὶ βάδισμα ἡμῖν ὅμοιοι καὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐσταλμένοι· ἀξιοῦσι γοῦν ὑπ' ἐμοὶ τάττεσθαι καὶ τοὔνομα τὸ ἡμέτερον ἐπιγράφονται, μαθηταὶ καὶ ὁμιληταὶ καὶ θιασῶται ἡμῶν εἶναι λέγοντες· ὁ βίος δὲ παμμίαρος αὐτῶν, ἀμαθίας καὶ θράσους καὶ ἀσελγείας ἀνάπλεως, ὕβρις οὐ μικρὰ καθ' ἡμῶν.
>
> There are some, Zeus, who occupy a middle ground between the multitude and the philosophers. In their deportment, glance, and gait they are like [philosophers], and similarly dressed; as a matter of fact, they want to be enlisted under my command and they enroll themselves under my name, saying that they are my pupils, disciples, and devotees. Yet, their utterly abominable way of living, ignorance, temerity, and ample licentiousness, is no trifling outrage against [philosophy].[258]

Philosophy further remarks that the uneducated masses, the philistines (*idiotai*), spit scornfully at her as a result of assumed hypocrisy, and that as a result of the debasement of philosophy by charlatans and sophists, she finds it near impossible to recruit new students (21). In Plutarch's writings,[259] younger students—indicative of what was to

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[250] Epict. 3.15.10; 4.8.10; Luc., *Nigr.* 24; 26-7; *Pisc.* 24.
[251] Epict. 1.27.1-4; 26-9; 3.23.19; 24; 4.8.24; Luc., *Demon.* 48; *cf.* Luc., *Pisc.* 31.
[252] Epict. 3.23.19; 3.23.27.
[253] Epict. 4.1.139; Luc., *Nigr.* 25; *Fug.* 14; *Eun.* 3; *Pisc.* 12, 34, 35-6, 41, 46; *Vit. Auc.* 24; Philostr., *VA* 2.39; 8.21.
[254] *VS* 591; Lucian, *Hermotimus* 9.
[255] *VS* 491-2, 589.
[256] Lucian, *Hermotimus* 11, 18.
[257] *VS, passim.*
[258] Luc., *Fug.* 4.
[259] *De aud.* 47C-D, two kinds of students, one excessively shy, the other too self-confident and too ambitious; *An seni* 796A, the young have many names for "envy," an emotion not fitting at any time of life: "competition," "zeal," "ambition;" *De defectu oraculorum* 412E, regarding pedantic conversations on some finer points of grammar; *De aud.* 39E-F, Plutarch describes an inappropriate and exaggerated ambition

come during the Second Sophistic proper as Plutarch was writing at the incipient of the period—were more likely to undertake rhetorical studies,[260] which favored competition, and were more prone to import the rhetorical and sophistical spirit into philosophical discussions.[261]

Sophistic declamation and epideictic activities served as an outlet for the competitive spirit (*philotimia*, lit. "love of honour") that pervaded both Greek and Roman-imperial society.[262] This "love of honour," unified Mediterranean elites in a moral economy of honour where they strove and competed for distinction.[263] Competitive behaviour performed in public, outdoing one's fellow sophists, dazzling audiences, and demonstrating one's own linguistic, literary, and cultural superiority were the essence of the second sophistic, a cultural movement which Graham Anderson has called "cultural one-upmanship."[264] Proving oneself a *πεπαιδευμένος* (*pepaideumenos*; a cultivated, educated individual; the educated) was tantamount to demonstrating one's worth as a member of the educated elite, and thus being able to compete successfully in this social context was a form of cultural capital that provided and enhanced social status.[265]

The spirit of competition, *philotimia*, and sophistic "one-upmanship" was a serious attack on the credentials of philosophy, and Plutarch's texts construct a clear opposition between sophistic competitiveness and philosophical modes of discussion.

(φιλοδοξία ἄκαιρος καὶ φιλοτιμία ἄδικος) where a young sophist is unable to listen to a lecture because he sees it as an occasion for competitive behaviour, not as an opportunity to profit from philosophical teachings. He is upset by the public recognition the speaker obtains. See Plutarch, *De Pythiae oraculis* 394F-395A, for Plutarch's ideal of a peaceful collaboration free from personal ambition and inappropriate competitiveness between listeners and interlocutors in their philosophical quest for truth.

[260] See Plutarch, *De sollertia animalium* 959C.

[261] See Schmitz 2012; E.g. see Luc., *Solecist*; *Lexiphanes; Pro Lapsu.*

[262] Schmitz 2012, 308. On *philotimia*, see Frazier 1988.

[263] Lendon 1997.

[264] Anderson 1993, 124; on sophistic competitiveness, Whitmarsh 2005, 37-40; see also De Pourcq 2012, 7; and Whitmarsh 2004: 146.

[265] See Schmitz 2012.

Furthermore, students were attracted to a rhetorical or sophistic education as the sophists used words ambitiously to gain status and fame in their rivalry with true philosophers.[266] Plutarch remarks that philosophical discussion aims at and strives for the truth of the subject matter, not at being victorious (*De Stoicorum repugnantiis* 1036A-B),[267] as such a competitive and contentious attitude would be unworthy of a true philosopher.[268] Those seeking *paideia* (intellectual and cultural cultivation or competence; education) in the words of Seneca "should pursue *claritas* [renown] among the good rather than *gloria* [glory, fame] among the multitude,"[269] yet young students were more prone to dwell on the finer points of style and grammar instead of concentrating on philosophical content (*De recta ratione audiendi* 42D-E):

> ὁ δ' εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐμφυόμενος ἀλλὰ τὴν λέξιν Ἀττικὴν ἀξιῶν εἶναι καὶ ἰσχνὴν ὅμοιός ἐστι μὴ βουλομένῳ πιεῖν ἀντίδοτον, ἂν μὴ τὸ ἀγγεῖον ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς κωλιάδος ᾖ κεκεραμευμένον […]ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ νοσήματα πολλὴν μὲν ἐρημίαν νοῦ καὶ φρενῶν ἀγαθῶν, πολλὴν δὲ τερθρείαν καὶ στωμυλίαν ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς πεποίηκε, τῶν μειρακίων οὔτε βίον οὔτε πρᾶξιν οὔτε πολιτείαν φιλοσόφου παραφυλαττόντων ἀνδρός, ἀλλὰ λέξεις καὶ ῥήματα καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀπαγγέλλειν ἐν ἐπαίνῳ τιθεμένων, τὸ δ' ἀπαγγελλόμενον εἴτε χρήσιμον εἴτ' ἄχρηστον εἴτ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴτε κενόν ἐστι καὶ περιττὸν οὐκ ἐπισταμένων οὐδὲ βουλομένων ἐξετάζειν.
>
> But he who at the very outset does not stick to the subject matter, but insists that the style be pure Attic and severely plain, is like the man who is unwilling to swallow an antidote for a poison unless the cup be of the finest Attic ware […]. Indeed, this sort of unhealthiness has produced much barrenness of mind and of good sense, much sophistry and persiflage in the schools, since younger men do

[266] Korenjak 2012, 255. See also Whitmarsh 2010b, 133-141, where the voice becomes the locus of identity in Lucian's *The Ass*.
[267] ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἄτοπός ἐστι τοὺς φιλοσόφους τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον οἰόμενος δεῖν τιθέναι μὴ μετὰ συνηγορίας ἀλλ' ὁμοίως τοῖς δικολόγοις κακοῦντας, ὥσπερ οὐ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀλλὰ περὶ νίκης ἀγωνιζομένους, εἴρηται πρὸς αὐτὸν δι' ἑτέρων, "Now, that it is monstrous of him to believe it necessary for philosophers to state the opposite argument without putting the case for it but after the fashion of barristers maltreating it like contenders for victory and not strivers after the truth, this retort has been made to him in other writings."
[268] See Solon (fr. 15 West = Plutarch, *Sol.* 3.3) where he already declared that he would never exchange the great wealth of others for his own virtue, where true fame rests not on material possessions but on intelligence and *paideia*. See also Aristotle where the philosopher's *philotimia* should be directed at honourable goals: *Rhet.*, 1379a36; 1387b33; *Pol.*, 1324b30.
[269] Seneca, *Epist.* 102.17; See De Pourcq 2012, 1-8, esp. 5.

> not keep in view the life, the actions, and the public conduct of a man who follows philosophy, but rate as matters for commendation points of style and phrasing, and a fine delivery, while as for what is being delivered, whether it be useful or useless, whether essential or empty and superfluous, they neither understand nor wish to inquire.

Plutarch laments the barrenness of mind among the young students who heed not the content of the lecture but rather the form. Similarly, Maximus of Tyre confirms the abundance of sophists and the penury of students seeking a philosophical education: "if […] philosophy is simply a matter of nouns and verbs, or skill with mere words, or refutation and argument and sophistry, and of the time spent on accomplishments like that, then there is no problem in finding a teacher."[270] Christian Habicht refers to this period as an age that applauded form not content, "praising the technical brilliance of oratory, not the ideas expressed."[271] The pedantic infatuation with style obscured any higher value of a lecture. In effect, it deprived the lecture of its improving qualities and rendered it as entertainment. Polyainos of Macedonia, a rhetor and a jurist at Rome under M. Aurelius and L. Verus, remarks that at least some of the audience attends the theatre to see the star actors: the content of the drama was not critical.[272]

Theatre had become more and more a place not of education but of entertainment. Rhetoric and philosophy soon took over part of the paideutic function that tragedy once possessed.[273] Yet sophists, for all their education,[274] sought fame by appealing to the *demos*, as artists who worked purely for their craft.[275] Rather than being "wounded" from

[270] *Or.* 1.8: Εἰ μὲν οὖν τις τοῦτ' εἶναι φιλοσοφίαν λέγει, ῥήματα καὶ ὀνόματα, ἢ τέχνας λόγων, ἢ ἐλέγχους καὶ ἔριδας καὶ σοφίσματα καὶ τὰς ἐν τούτοις διατριβάς, οὐ χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν τὸν διδάσκαλον.
[271] Habicht 1985, 126.
[272] *Strateg.* 6.10.
[273] Wallace 1997, 110. *Cf.* Duncan 2006, 188-217, where she indicates that there was a decline in the production of tragedy and comedy, which made room for other forms of entertainment to fill the void.
[274] Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 27.8, regarding sophists: "those garrulous polymaths stuffed with learning."
[275] *Cf.* Arist. *Pol*. 1342a16ff.

a philosophical lecture, the audience desired pleasure and entertainment.[276] Fame became a reason to pursue performance. Lucian relates in his *Harmonides* (1-3) that fame was the reason the eponym took up the *aulos,* an aerophone instrument. Indeed, Plato charges in the *Laws* that taste formed by aristocratic values had given way to taste formed by the mob and the 'theatrocracy': ὅθεν δὴ τὰ θέατρα ἐξ ἀφώνων φωνήεντ' ἐγένοντο, ὡς ἐπαΐοντα ἐν μούσαις τό τε καλὸν καὶ μή, καὶ ἀντὶ ἀριστοκρατίας ἐν αὐτῇ θεατροκρατία τις πονηρὰ γέγονεν, "Our once silent audiences have found a voice, in the persuasion that they understand what is good and bad art; the old "sovereignty of the best" in that sphere has given way to a base 'theatrocracy'."[277] Theatrical performance devolved into public entertainment, entertainment for which popular approval was its *raison d'être*.

Spectacle of Words: Performance, Pleasure, and Paideutic Flavour

Λολλιανὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρτοπώλης, ἀλλὰ λογοπώλης
"Lollianus does not sell bread but words."
-Philostratus, *Vitae Sophistarum* 526

The defining moment for a sophist was *ex tempore* declamation.[278] The audience, ready to explode with anticipation, shouted and applauded,[279] jeered and hissed,[280] nodded amicably,[281] and stood[282] as the sophist leapt up,[283] slapped his thigh,[284] stamped his

[276] Lucian described listening to the philosopher Nigrinus was like a wound, *Nig.* 35, 37; Epictetus believed that the audience should leave in pain after listening to a philosopher, 3.23.30. Entertainment: Habitcht 1985, 126. See Swain 2004, 355-360, where he remarks that most philosophers were only technical exponents of the words of the great founders of their schools and had nothing original to say themselves. In this regard, they failed to satisfy the appetite of the public.
[277] Plato, *Laws* 700a-701b; *cf. Laws* 659b-c; *Gorgias* 501e, 502b; Aristotle, *Poetics* 1453a.
[278] Schmitz 2012, 73; Schmitz 1999, 71-6; Webb 2006, 27-46.
[279] Philostr., *VS* 582-3.
[280] Philostr., *VS* 604.
[281] Philostr., *VS* 540.
[282] Lucian, *Rh.Pr.*. 20.
[283] Philostr., *VS* 537, 572, 619.
[284] Philostr., *VS* 519; Lucian, *Rh.Pr.*. 12.

feet,[285] strode about,[286] and swayed from side to side[287] while delivering his declamation with the hypnotic charm of a beautifully controlled, melodious and rhythmic voice in full spate,[288] sometimes in singing tones.[289] The sophist's declamation extended beyond dry words on paper or a plain recitation of a speech; the sophist's performativity also encompassed physical exhaustion: the sheer sweat of exertion in projecting an unamplified voice before a large outdoor audience; the demands of managing the heavy folds of the speaker's cloak; the exhilarating risk of "stumbles and solecisms lying in wait for a moment's loss of nerve…[and] the intoxicating sense of power that surged through the performer" as the sophist mastered the crowd and balanced the terror of defeat and public humiliation.[290] The sophist had to demonstrate his rhetorical brilliance, his secure knowledge of the classical language and culture, and above all his panache in front of a real audience.[291]

The courage required to risk both defeat and humiliation vividly demonstrates the game of upwardly mobile *philotomia* (*ambitio*) and the performative aspect of epideictic oratory of the second century AD. Sophistic competition provided an outlet for the spirit of *philotimia* which was so essential for élite self-perception and self-presentation, in effect an *epideixis* of social self-positioning.[292] Since sophistic declamations were highly

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[285] Philostr., *VS* 537.
[286] Philostr., *VS* 623.
[287] Philostr., *VS* 520.
[288] Philostr., *VS* 489; 519.
[289] Philostr., *VS* 492, 513, 567-8, 589.
[290] Gleason 1995, xx. *Cf.* Philostratus, *VS* 541: Upon seeing a gladiator dripping with sweat out of sheer terror of the life-and-death struggle before him, Polemon, one of the greatest sophists of the second sophist, remarked, οὕτως εἶπεν ἀγωνιᾷς, ὡς μελετᾶν μέλλων, "you are in as great an agony as though you were going to declaim."
[291] Schmitz 2012b, 307.
[292] Schmitz 2012a, 71-2; Schmitz 2011, 308. See Schmitz 2012b, 308, social status in the society of the Roman Empire was not something you simply possessed once and for all; rather, a member of the elite constantly had to demonstrate his superiority by performing in public. These performances could be of different kinds: public offices; priesthoods; euergetism; sophistic declamation; public generosity; et cetera.

public occasions, it was especially important to demonstrate one's abilities and thus give a performative display of one's cultural and social status in the status-driven world of elite *philotimia*.[293] In this extremely competitive atmosphere, the audiences of *meletai* were usually packed with connoisseurs, students of rhetoric, and envious colleagues who were just waiting for an occasion to trip the declaimer up and prove that he was wearing a mask that was "too big for his head."[294] *Paideia* was a field for formal competition; rhetorical *agones* existed at a number of local festivals, but competitive *paideia* was best seen in the general combative atmosphere that surrounded sophistic declamations.[295] As Maud Gleason says, "One reason that these performances were so riveting was that the encounter between orator and audience was in many cases the anvil upon which the self-presentation of ambitious upper-class men was forged."[296] Another reason was the creation of a meaningful past where sophistry presented a history that created a feeling of community that was grounded in the glory of the classical past, and which emphasized its relevance to the present.[297] Theatricality and pleasure rounded-out the riveting reasons for the popularity of sophistic declamations. Most of the spectators were merely looking for entertainment, and sophistic declamation, which must have been a fairly common form of

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Each one of these presented a real danger of failing. As public figures, members of the elite constantly had to "fashion themselves in their competition for glory, like actors (dissembler, hypocrite, pretender) in the theatre," Plutarch, *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae* 799A: πρὸς ἅμιλλαν ἢ δόξαν ὥσπερ ὑποκριτὰς εἰς θέατρον ἀναπλάττοντας ἑαυτοὺς.

[293] See Whitmarsh 2004, 146.

[294] Lucian, *Nig.* 11; Schmitz 2012b, 306; Schmitz 1999, 73; *cf.* Lucian, *Rh.pr.* 20; for the audience as far from passive, see Sidebottom 2009, 75-82, and Wallace 1997, 97-111: the role of the audience, whether it be clapping, hissing, or throwing food.

[295] Schmitz 2011a, 308-9.

[296] Gleason 1995, xx; Schmitz 2012b, 303f., describes the sophistic declaimer as constantly running the risk of being exposed as a fraud, likening it to wearing a mask too big for one's head (Lucian, *Nig*. 11). For a sophist unmasked, see Lucian, *Pseudologista* where a sophist, who instead of improvising his speech, recited a work that had already been published, thereby plagiarizing a modern sophist rather than imitating the great classical models. The audience detected his fraud, unmasking him.

[297] Schmitz 1999, esp. 91-2. See Bowersock 1994, 2: "History was being invented all over again; even the mythic past was being rewritten."

pastime in the Eastern Empire,[298] was among the most powerful events in a Greek city of the Antonine era.[299]

A sophistic performance was an especially acute expression of a "theatrical" life.[300] Epideictic speeches performed no legal or political "real-world" function, and display was consistently linked in ancient rhetorical discourse to the production of a strong emotion, usually pleasure.[301] The capacity to make strong, emotional speeches was central to Philostratus's praise of the best sophists: Aristides overcame Marcus Aurelius with a report of the devastation of earthquake-stricken Smyrna (Philostr., *VS* 582), and when the famous sophist Hadrian arrived in Rome, senate meetings were disrupted in their frantic rush to hear him declaim (Philostr., *VS* 589). As part of their dazzling rhetorical performance, outward appearance (flamboyant attire) and appropriate gestures (manly gait) played an important role.[302] These were not just a small part of sophistic declamation, but were just as important as the proper use of classical Attic and the proper knowledge of classical history and literature.[303]

The most important part of a sophistic declamation was the *meletai*, a speech in which the sophist assumed the role of and spoke in the *persona* of a classical hero.[304] Accurate imitation of the proper Attic word or phrase was matched by the sophists' expertise in the application of stylized theatrical techniques: his voice, expression, smile,

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[298] Brunt 1994, 25.
[299] Schmitz 1999, 71, 91-2.
[300] Plutarch, *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae* 800B.
[301] Connolly 2001a, 83.
[302] See Gleason 1995 regarding the masculinity of declamation.
[303] See Connolly 2001a; Schmitz 2012b; Gleason 1995; Schmitz 1999, 76, "The entire body of the sophist was involved in self-fashioning."
[304] Schmitz 2012, 306. See Connolly 2001a, 77; Connolly 2001b, 350; Schmitz 1999, 71-6. As the word *meletai* ("exercise") suggests, this rhetorical genre first developed in schools. Students of rhetoric would train for their future profession by writing and declaiming fictitious historical pleas: what would Demosthenes say when he confronted king Philip of Macedon? Or giving voice to Xenophon's imagined plea to be executed alongside Socrates. See Russell 1983 on Greek declamation.

dress, and any mannerism of diction or delivery.[305] In an extended episode in book 4 of Aristides's *Sacred Tales*, he recalls a dream where Asclepius commands him to give impromptu performances in the style of Socrates, Demosthenes, and Thucydides. After making the traditional preparations for declamation—arranging his clothing, standing in a certain way, and making a few introductory remarks, and a typical sophistic theme suggested by a bystander—Aristides begins the declamation "in the voice of Demosthenes."[306] In Philostratus's *Vitae Sophistarum*, Herodes Atticus closely imitates the sonorous style of Kritias (κριτιάζουσα ἠχώ; Philostr., *VS* 564) and the style of Proclus of Naucratus resembles that of Hippias and Gorgias (ἱππιάζοντί τε ἐώκει καὶ γοργιάζοντι; Philostr., *VS* 604). Joy Connolly postulates that Philostratus's observations on the sophists' interest in the styles of classical models suggest that the sophists 'marked' their quotations with vocal tones or gestures, which would help the audience identify the original author, or, at the very least, alert them that a quotation was being made.[307] The challenge lay in delivering the quotation in such a way as to leave no doubt as to its classical provenance. Enlivening a direct quotation or a rephrasing of these authors with the appropriate delivery, and managing vocal emphasis and gestural accompaniment in order to match the cadence of the period were crucial.[308] The sophist would not just imitate the style and grammar of the classical figure—for example substituting the characteristically Attic double *tau* for the Ionic double *sigma*, reinserting the optatives that had dropped out of *koine* (the vernacular Greek)–but also Plato's stoop, Aristotle's

[305] This includes the outfit as well as all the theatrical properties of the sophist. Polemon was the model, the mirror of fashion for the sophists; they imitated his effects as though he had been a popular actor.
[306] Aristides, *Or.* 4.31. *Cf.* Philostr., *VS* 542: Polemon based his reputation in part on the accurate imitation of Demosthenes.
[307] Connolly 2001a, 87.
[308] The exhaustive taxonomies of style provided by imperial rhetoricians like Demetrius (*Peri ermeneias*) and Hermogenes of Tarsus (*Peri ideon*) suggest the importance of mimetic periodization.

lisp, or Alexander's up-twisted neck, a practice that Plutarch attacked.[309] In this way, the sophists' choice to speak in the voices of the ancients pushed the refined habits of the imperial *pepaideumenos* into the realm of the theatre.

Sophists were expected to charm their audiences with melodic and harmonious pronunciation, yet their speech retained a paideutic flavour insofar as it advertised the speaker's ability to copy pure Attic Greek, to employ obsolete grammatical forms and only use words with a classical precedent, and to demonstrate their knowledge of classical history and literature, all while extemporizing. Since each spoken word and literary reference was filtered through the lexical and cultural sieve of the imperial Greek vision of classical Athens, the sophistic speech was always already a mimetic act. The most popular types of epideictic declamations were the most directly mimetic "*genera* of *eidolopoeia* and *ethopoeia,*" the dramatic representation of character (*ethos*) of mythical or historical figures.[310] Polemon will provide a good example to examine the paideutic flavour and theatricality of declamations.[311]

The text of Polemon's extant orations, only one pair of elaborate ethopoetic *meletai*[312] in the voices of two Athenian fathers whose sons, Kynaigeiros and Kallimachos,[313] died at the Battle of Marathon, and the fragments of his style preserved in Philostratus display both the paideutic and the theatrical of epideictic rhetoric.[314] The

[309] Plutarch, *De audiendis poetis* 26B; *De adulatore et amico* 53C-D; Schmitz 1999, 72; Connolly 2001b, 349.
[310] Connolly 2001a, 85.
[311] For a biography of Polemon, see Reader 1996, 7-25.
[312] These are a pair of corresponding *controversiae* speeches.
[313] Kynaigeiros was the son of Euphorion and brother of Aischylos. Kallimachos was *archon polemarchos* in 490 BC at the Battle of Marathon. In the stalemate among the ten generals his vote led to the adoption of Miltiades's plan to confront the Persians in an open battle.
[314] For these fragments, *cf.* Philostr., *VS* 537, 539, 542, 543, 595.

theatrical externals, what Philostratus calls Polemon's σκηνὴ (*VS* 537, 595), were integral to his delivery style:

> παρήει μὲν ἐς τὰς ἐπιδείξεις διακεχυμένῳ τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ τεθαρρηκότι […] τὰς ὑποθέσεις οὐκ ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἐπεσκοπεῖτο, ἀλλ' ἐξιὼν τοῦ ὁμίλου βραχὺν καιρόν. φθέγμα δὲ ἦν αὐτῷ λαμπρὸν καὶ ἐπίτονον καὶ κρότος θαυμάσιος οἷος ἀπεκτύπει τῆς γλώττης […] ἀναπηδᾶν τοῦ θρόνου περὶ τὰς ἀκμὰς τῶν ὑποθέσεων, τοσοῦτον αὐτῷ περιεῖναι ὁρμῆς […] καὶ κροαίνειν ἐν τοῖς τῶν ὑποθέσεων χωρίοις οὐδὲν μεῖον τοῦ Ὁμηρικοῦ ἵππου.
>
> He would come forward for the declamations with a face relaxed and confident […] When the themes had been proposed, he did not gather his thoughts in public but withdrew from the crowd for a brief time. His utterance was clear and incisive, and there was a wonderful ringing sound in the tones of his voice […] He would jump up from his chair with such a pitch of excitement when he came to the most striking conclusions in his argument […] and at certain places in the argument he would stamp the ground just like the horse in Homer (*VS* 537; Homer's horse, *Iliad* 6.507)

Polemon's voice—incisive, ringing, resonant and far-echoing (*VS* 539)—is matched by his excitement and his actions, physically stamping the ground and jumping up from his seat.[315] Furthermore, Polemon not only references the horse in Homer, but actually mimics it, confirming that mimesis acted beyond the mere reproduction of Attic Greek and classical literary references but also connoted drama.[316]

In his extant *meletai*, Polemon used a wide-ranging vocabulary, most of which was attested in classical authors, virtually every type of classical condition (past, present, future, real, and unreal), and the whole range of classical prepositions.[317] William Reader summarizes strong historical evidence for the existence of both Kynaigeiros and Kallimachos, both of whom were heroes of the battle and depicted in the painting commemorating the victory in the *Stoa Poikile* in Athens.[318] Each of the fathers Polemon

[315] In spite of his paralyzing pain caused by arthritis, Philostr., *VS* 537.
[316] Connolly 2001a, 85.
[317] Reader 1996, esp. the appendices.
[318] Hdt. 6.109f.; see also Pausanias 1.15.3.

impersonated hoped to win the right to give the funeral oration honoring the Athenian dead by most persuasively describing his son's feats of bravery.[319] Both speeches focus unwaveringly on the gruesome details of the two deaths: Kallimachos is pierced by such a large number of projectiles that his body remains standing upright on the battle field even after death, while Kynaigeiros, having fruitlessly attempted to restrain with his bare hands the fleeing enemy ships as they put to sea, has them cut off with an axe and he bleeds to death on the beach of Marathon. As a polished speaker Polemon utilized the entire available spectrum of rhetorical and grammatical figures, especially chiasm and pleonasm, alongside parechesis, paronomasia, and hyperbole. The climaxes consisted of extraordinary exclamations beginning with ὦ, which addressed the severed hands and the upright corpse:

> ὦ χεῖρες Μαραθώνιαι […] ὦ Μαραθῶνος δόξα […] ὦ δεξιὰ βιαιοτέρα πνευμάτων· σὺ γὰρ κατέσχες ναῦν ἀναγομένην· ὦ κρείττων ῥοθίου βαρβαρικοῦ χείρ.
>
> O Marathonian hands […] O glory of Marathon […] O right hand more forceful than winds; for you held fast a ship trying to put to sea; O hand stronger than barbarian [oar] thrashing. (*The Father of Kynaigeiros*, 34-5)

> ὦ καὶ καλλίμαχε καὶ καλλίνικε […] ὦ κοινὲ τῆς Ἀσίας σκοπέ […] ὦ σχῆμα ἐλευθέριον, ὦ σχῆμα Μαραθώνιον· ὦ μὴ κλίνας τὴν Ἑλλάδα· ὦ τῆς φύσεως περισσότερε.
>
> O noble fighter and noble victor […] O common target of Asia! […] O figure of freedom, O figure of Marathon! O [one] not making Greece lie down! O [one] more extraordinary than nature. (*The Father of Kallimachos*, 51-2)

The severed hands and the upright corpse become the dramatic focus, with the audience hungering for the battle scene, blurring the line between mimesis and reality.[320] Such

[319] As much as the sons were historical figures, the situation of a funeral oration delivered by the fathers of the dead is fictional, or at least never historically documented.
[320] See Duncan 2006, 188-217.

exclamations surely carried the audience away with pleasure and wonder,[321] and one can imagine Polemon gesticulating excitedly to carry home the point of his impersonated character.

Polemon was no stranger to performance, beguiling even the formidable Herodes Atticus. Upon watching Polemon declaim three times, Herodes claimed that he listened to Polemon the first time as do impartial judges, the second as those who desire to hear more, and the third declamation as those who stand in amazement.[322] Polemon, through declaiming and acting, through his mimetic drama sprinkled with *paideia*, left an indelible mark of pleasure on his audience. As much as it was said that Lollianus[323] sells words, Polemon proves that the sophists also sell drama, theatre, and pleasure.

Spectacle and Rome: Burlesquing *Paideia*

During the second century AD Rome was one great spectacle, an aggregate of all the visual marvels of the empire. Aristides famously claims that only an 'all-seeing Argos' could view the entire city.[324] Where Polemon sprinkled his orations with *paideia*, other sophists went too far in their pursuit of staging pleasure, recognizing that the climate of Empire embraced aesthetic sophistication.[325] Even Polemon's stamping as part of his sophistic performance risked violating the conventional proprieties that ancient rhetoric was designed to inculcate. Such spectacles and aesthetic sophistication led to decadence.

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[321] *Cf.* Plutarch, *De audiendo* 41B-42A, 42C: "Sophists so sweeten their voice by certain harmonious modulations and softenings and rhythmic cadences as to ravish away and transport their hearers."
[322] Philostr., *VS* 538: ἀκροᾶσθαι δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν μὲν πρώτην, ὡς οἱ δικάζοντες, τὴν δὲ ἐφεξῆς, ὡς οἱ ἐρῶντες, τὴν δὲ τρίτην, ὡς οἱ θαυμάζοντες.
[323] A sophist and first holder of the chair of rhetoric at Athens (Philostr., *VS* 526-7).
[324] Aristides, *Ad Rom.* 6.2; 11.2-3. Juvenal, *Satire* 10.78-81: Romans surrendered their freedom to autocracy in exchange for shows and state support: the people only care about "bread and circuses," *panem circenses*.
[325] Duncan 2006.

Richard Gilman provides a useful definition: the sense of having seen it all, a desire for novelty; a moribund corrupted state with ideas of excess, loss of vigour, tyranny at the hands of the past, a concern with manner at the expense of substance, a hunger for the deviant as a positive experience.[326] Sophistry, as one of the many forms of spectacle,[327] acted as a performance of self-presentation in an age that applauded form, not content, and praised the technical brilliance of oratory, not the ideas expressed.[328] In this respect, a sophist's audience wanted entertainment, especially extemporaneous speeches of impeccable Attic where it could grade the speeches by the number of mistakes. Orators—the *pepaideumenoi*—needed to absorb books so completely so as to "exhale them as speeches."[329] In such a competitive atmosphere, sophists looked for any advantage that would set them apart from other sophists as well as other performers, who vied for the attention of the masses. These innovating sophists incorporated the form of ancient rhetoric alongside the theatrics of contemporary (and decadent) performance. Aristides's oration *Against Those Who Burlesque the Mysteries* (Κατὰ τῶν ἐξορχουμένων, *Or.* 34) provides a good example of sophistic performative decadence.[330]

When the great orator Aristides arrives to perform for the provincial games, he expects to take precedence over any local teachers since he is a distinguished out-of-town visitor. However, there is a confrontation where Aristides yields to one of the locals who then performs first. By noon this local sophist at last relinquishes the stage, and Aristides rises to declaim. His oration proceeds to excoriate the effeminate rhetoric of sophists who

[326] Gilman 1979, 15.
[327] On spectacle culture, see Coleman 2010, 651-670; Duncan 2006, 188-217; Le Glay 2007, 382-394; on performance, see Lowrie 2010, 281-294.
[328] Habicht 1985, 126.
[329] Gleason 1995, xxiv; Brown 1983, 3.
[330] Book four of the Sacred Tales, *Or.* 51.38-4, give the circumstances for this oration.

aim only to please the crowd. The audience loves it, and insist that he declaim again; he continues to declaim until sundown. Interestingly, Aristides did not object to pleasing the crowd, conceding that the goal of oratory was mastery of the audience (κρατεῖν τῶν ἀκουόντων, *Or.* 34.33). Rather, he objected to the use of corrupt techniques to achieve this mastery, and likens oratory to the mysteries. Like the Stoic Epictetus who claims that "those who casually take up sophistry"[331] vulgarize (*exorchein,* ἐξορχέομαι) the mysteries by lecturing in the wrong dress, voice, and hairstyle, Aristides too remarks on *exorchein*: bad orators have vulgarized the mysteries of oratory by transvestite dancing.[332] Good orators are like Olympic athletes, whereas bad orators display "enervated and intoxicated behaviour" and "twist about like dancing girls" (23). He goes on to say that such lascivious gyrations would disgrace even the legendary Queen Omphale, who made Herakles do women's work (60). By singing and dancing to ingratiate themselves with their audience, bad orators debased oratory.

However, bad orators did not confine their vulgarities to gesture alone, they also indulged in indecent vocal acrobatics. Aristides describes the antics of one particular sophist who sang, modulating his voice, while he added the same final clause at the end of each sentence. The audience caught on quickly and began to chant the catch phrase. However, the audience began to chant it before the orator, who looked the fool chiming it after his chorus. In addition, the audience kept adding improvised insults until the polyphony of the recitative degenerated into a humiliating spectacle for the sophist (47). Yet, the sophist Hadrian of Tyre used the singing style to great effect, whose rhythmic vocal flourishes enabled him to compete with dancers (Philostr., *VS* 589). His recitative

[331] Arrian, *Diss.* 3.21, esp. 13 and 16.
[332] For making fun of mystery cults by burlesquing them in drag compare Alcibiades in Athens and Clodius in Rome.

even enticed Latin speakers to attend his orations.

These burlesquing characteristics, especially of the voice, bring us to Favorinus. When he delivered orations in Rome, the interest was universal. So much so that even those in the audience who did not understand the Greek language shared in the pleasure of his lesson in rhetoric. He beguiled them with the assonance and sonorousness of his voice, his expressive glance, and the rhythm of his tongue,

> Διαλεγομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὴν Ῥώμην μεστὰ ἦν σπουδῆς πάντα, καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ὅσοι τῆς Ἑλλήνων φωνῆς ἀξύνετοι ἦσαν, οὐδὲ τούτοις ἀφ᾽ ἡδονῆς ἡ ἀκρόασις ἦν, ἀλλὰ κἀκείνους ἔθελγε τῇ τε ἠχῇ τοῦ φθέγματος καὶ τῷ σημαίνοντι τοῦ βλέμματος καὶ τῷ ῥυθμῷ τῆς γλώττης. (*VS* 491).

Spellbound, his speech (λὀγου)—delivered as an ode (ᾠδὴν), a term that connotes both a sing-song and an incantation—charms his listeners. Cicero tells us that the Asianists[333] indulged in a sort of chant that suited their metrical rhythms (Cicero, *Orator* xxvii), and this seemed to have been particularly the case in the epilogue, where all the rhetorical effects, especially of pathos, reached their highest pitch.[334]

As a result of his indeterminate gender, his appearance and especially his voice made him a novelty.[335] His birth as a hermaphrodite helped him distinguish himself from other sophists: he could not grow a beard, and his voice was high-pitched, thin, and modulated, like that of an eunuch (*VS* 489). He used his voice to great effect. Yet, an interesting quirk that made Favorinus even more infamous was his ardent sex drive

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[333] Goldhill 2002, 91, Attic is clear, direct, controlled; Asiatic is florid, effeminate, excessive, uncontrolled. See also Cicero *Pro Flacco* 61ff: Athenian and Spartan Greeks deemed better than Asiatic Greeks. And Cicero *Epist. Ad fam.* 13.1 (Epicurus), regarding how Romans despised (Asiatic) Greeks for having lost civilization.

[334] *cf.* Lucian *Demonax* 12; *Teacher of Rhetoric* 19.

[335] Philostratus gives us physical descriptions of the sophists, much like Polemo's *Physiognomy*, and he tells us that Favorinus was able to "beguile" and charm the crowds, while Polemo's eloquence was bright and inspired, as if delivered by an oracle. Philostratus's book gives us a remarkable image of the centrality of the voice for a sophist's fame. Thus, speaking was the key to success and fame as a sophist; see König 2009, 90-92.

(θερμὸς δὲ οὕτω τις ἦν τὰ ἐρωτικά, *VS* 489). A consul charged him, an eunuch, with adultery, and his quarrel with Hadrian,[336] the emperor, certainly raised his public profile; these are two of the three paradoxes of his life. It is interesting to note that Lucian's *Teacher of Rhetoric* encourages his pupils to abandon all moral inhibitions. He teaches them to use an absolutely uninhibited singing voice, to use provocatively sexual gestures, and to wear translucent clothing (15, 19). This teacher also advises sophists on how to conduct themselves socially in ways that would enhance their professional notoriety. Drinking, dicing, and lechery are highly recommended, especially lechery: "You should boast of adultery, whether truly or not; make no secret of it…and many will attribute this to your rhetorical eminence, which has penetrated even to the women's quarters" (23). The teacher concludes this sizzling disquisition on success with the various uses of the tongue, where it can be used not only to *solecize* (commit a solecism) or *barbarize* (make grammatical or vocabulary mistakes), but also "to pay tribute to another thing (ἄλλο) by night" (23).[337] The ambiguity of ἄλλο is made clear by the sexual context that precedes it.

Favorinus even tantalized his Corinthian audience while defending himself against the charge of adultery. Favorinus had just articulated that none of the elite have the power to escape slander, not even the gods were immune to such things. Anticipation swelled as he worked his way to the reason why he had been charged, leaving the key word to be declaimed last in its clause: ἐπαφροδισίαν, "charm of his eloquence" (37.33). The word itself was not scandalous, but hidden in the word is ἀφροδισία, "sexual

[336] See Swain 1989; Holford-Strevens 2003.
[337] ἡ γλῶττα ὑπηρετείτω καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ὁπόσα ἂν δύνηται. δύναται δὲ οὐ σολοικίζειν μόνον καὶ βαρβαρίζειν οὐδὲ ληρεῖν ἢ ἐπιορκεῖν ἢ λοιδορεῖσθαι ἢ διαβάλλειν καὶ ψεύδεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ νύκτωρ τι ἄλλο ὑποτελεῖν.

pleasures," doubtless it was meant to provoke. This use of words even concurred with Polemon's description of Favorinus (Leiden Polemon, A20):[338]

> He would take great care of himself and his abundant hair, and he would apply medicaments to his body afterwards. (He would give in) to every cause that incited a passion for desire and sexual intercourse. He had a voice resembling the voice of women with slim lips. I never before saw looks like his in the general populace or such eyes…. He was an itinerant visitor in the towns and markets, gathering the people so that he could display his wickedness, and he sought out immorality. He was also a deceitful magician, and would swindle, telling people that he could give life and bring death, and thereby he would dupe a group of people until the crowds of women and men around him increased. He would tell the men that he had the power to compel women to come to them, and likewise the men to the women. He was a leader in evil and a teacher of it. He would collect kinds of fatal poisons, and the whole sum of his intellect was engaged in one of these matters.

Favorinus's over attentive care for his hair, wearing aphrodisiacs, and a mind bent on magic and sex did not emulate the philosophers of the past, or constitute the civilized and intellectual values stemming from the rich moral legacy of the Greek tradition: *πραότης* (gentleness), *σωφροσύνη* (self-control), *ἐπιείκεια* (decency), *φιλανθρωπία* (benevolence).[339] Rather, this lusty eunuch-magician used all these saucy and flamboyant devices to acquire honour and fame.[340]

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[338] We need to be cautious in taking this description as accurate since Polemon was Favorinus's bitter rival. However, the text does not actually name Favorinus, which lends some credibility. Polemon also conceded in the text that Favorinus was "thoroughly schooled in the Greek language" (Arabic translation by Margaret Malamud). See J. Hall 1995 for an argument that language alone did not make one an ethnic Greek.

[339] According to the *Suda*, Favorinus wrote a treatise, now lost, on the way of life of the Philosopher, Περὶ τῆς διαίτης τῶν φιλοσόφων. It would be very interesting to compare this work with the manner of Favorinus's own life. On moral terms, see Whitmarsh 2001, 21, 117-8. These terms were employed in Plutarch's *Lives* to evaluate ethical behaviour. For Plutarch, to be Greek meant to think and to act in an ethical way.

[340] See Appendix 4 on *philotimia* and fame. It is interesting to note that in *Corinthian Oration* 37.34 Favorinus, in an effort to absolve himself of any crime or wrong doing that incited the Corinthians to pull his statue down, asserts that, while in Corinth, a city of the greatest sexual license (cult of Aphrodite), he was not part of that scene. He finally asks a rhetorical question: amidst the city of the greatest sexual license and indulgence, would he have suffered a transformation at Rome under the watchful eye of the emperor?

Sophist and philosopher, Roman and Hellene, insider and outsider, Favorinus defied social categories no less than those of sex and gender; but his verbal and intellectual performance permitted him to project his quasi-identities at will. Whatever Polemon might have alleged about magic and poisons, the charms by which Favorinus attracted audiences and pupils were those of speech and personality. For Polemon, Favorinus's sing-song style of oratory chimed the end of Greek *paideia*, but for Favorinus it confirmed his place in Roman Hellenism, one imbued in spectacle, and allied with Roman imperial power. From *genos* to *paideia* to spectacle, "everything is Greece for the wise man."[341]

[341] Philostratus, *VA* 1.35.

CHAPTER III

PATHS TO COMMODIFICATION: LUCIAN AND ROMAN GREEK *PAIDEIA*

τί σοι τῆς σοφίας τὸ τέλος, ἢ τί πράξεις
πρὸς τὸ ἀκρότατον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀφικόμενος;

"What is the purpose of your wisdom, and what will
you do when you reach the summit of virtue?"

-Lucian, *Vitarum actio* 23

The conditions of empire and Roman hegemony had changed Greek *paideia* into something foreign and other. There was an axiological shift away from philosophical protreptic lectures to the aesthetic and spectacular. Roman hegemony had altered Greek *paideia* in accordance with Roman idealism, where it became Roman Greek *paideia*, altering not only its membership beyond the narrow scope of *genos* but also its value.[342] It was a simple thing to deceive an audience with pseudo-rhetoric, and nothing more than that was needed since *paideia* had been subjected to Roman commodification. Lucian of Samosata had a privileged position as an outsider, a (true) *pepaideumenos* (*Rh.pr.* 8, 26), and one who had not achieved much fame in his lifetime,[343] which allowed him the perspective to witness and comment on Roman Greek *paideia.* His treatise *The Dream* presents *paideia* as a desirable goal, encouraging young men to persevere with education instead of pursuing a trade, as the former brought wealth, renown, and mobility. But education is a long road, and the *The Dream*'s praise of this path seems at odds with Lucian's ironic self-disparaging dialogue *The Teacher of Rhetoric* which advocates for young men to abandon the difficult path to *paideia*, and to find the easy path to fame and riches. How can we account for *The Dream'*s message amidst Roman Greek *paideia*?

[342] See Cassin 1995; Swain 1996, 66-7, 72.
[343] Consider his exclusion from Philostratus's *VS*. Perhaps it is hindsight and the sparse extant texts that make Lucian seem so quintessential of the period. See Jones 1986, 21.

Polemon's performances of *paideia* and Favorinus's self-positioning within Hellenism and performative aesthetics captured the essence of Roman Greek *paideia*, but in order to fully appreciate and understand Lucian's satiric commentary, we need to know the process of indoctrination into sophistic spectacle, the axiological clash of moral and sensual values. First, I will examine the baffling choices, and a seemingly endless number of vices, presented to young men through the *Tabula* of pseudo-Kebes and Lucian's *Hermotimus*, and then I will illustrate the specious nature (*schema*) of *paideia* in Lucian's *The Dream* and *The Teacher of Rhetoric*, which both point to Roman commodification as elaborated in *Vitarum actio, Piscator, Nigrinus,* and *On Salaried Posts.* In his treatises *The Dream* and *The Teacher of Rhetoric,* Lucian presents an ironic and satiric snapshot of what passed for *paideia* in the Empire, while *Vitarum actio* and *On Salaried Posts* depict *paideia*'s descent into commodification.

Labyrinthine Vertigo: The Path(s) to Virtue and Vice

ἄλλη γὰρ ἀλλαχόσε ἄγει.
"Different paths lead to different places."
-Lucian, *Hermotimus* 27

Quando uberior vitiorum copia?
"When was there ever such abundance of vices?"
-Juvenal 1.96

The *Tabula* of ps.-Kebes is a unique document for examining the clash of the sophist and the philosopher as it offers a glimpse at the life choices available to a young man embarking on a paideutic path in the first and second centuries AD.[344] The protreptic objective of the text is intended to demystify the labyrinth of life and guide the reader

[344] On dating the text, see Fitzgerald & White 1983, 1-4; Trapp 1997, 160; Seddon 2005, 176-180; Elsner 1995, 40-46. This dating thus renders the name of the author as *pseudo*-Kebes as Kebes himself in the extant literature was a member of Socrates's circle.

along the right path while acknowledging the many pitfalls that await the paideutic life. The *Tabula* itself is an exegetical account of an allegorical cipher consisting of concentric enclosures representing the difficulty of accessing true *paideia* and the ascent to (the citadel of) virtue.[345] The subject matter is good and bad lives, and the achievement of human happiness, where happiness and the good life are to be found in the exercise of social and affective self-restraint (*σωφροσύνη, ἐγκράτεια*), not in the pursuit of sensual and material indulgence. In this, it fits very comfortably into familiar traditions of ancient moral allegory.[346] The *Tabula* offers itself as a guide and a template for the young men so as to curb the growing trend of students who had taken up sophistry and the pleasures it offered[347] as opposed to the rigors of the strict but rewarding philosophic life. Sophistry is thus tacitly denounced as False-*Paideia* (*Pseudopaideia*) as a result of consorting with pleasure, while philosophy, with its intent to improve its audience, is presented as True-*Paideia*.

Since the *Tabula* is a relatively unfamiliar text, it will be helpful to begin with a summary of its contents.[348] Ps.-Kebes portrays a world in which the landscape is divided into enclosures in which may be found personifications of the Virtues and Vices, along with others including Deceit, Punishment, Repentance, Fortune, and *Paideia* (Education). Across the landscape wander all those who inhabit the world, not knowing how best to

[345] See Elsner 1995, 40-6; Fitzgerald & White 1983; Trapp 1997; Seddon 2005.
[346] See Appendix 2. Elements of allegory are present in Greek literature from the earliest stage: in Homer, in Phoenix's Prayers (Λιταί, *Iliad* 9. 502–12), and Achilles's image of Zeus's jars (*Iliad* 24. 527–33); in Hesiod, the fable of the hawk and the nightingale (*Opera et Dies* 204–12) and the personifications of *Aidos, Nemesis*, and *Dike* (*Opera et Dies* 197–201, 256–62). Larger-scale allegorical tableaux and narratives begin to be composed in the late 5th and early 4th c.: Prodicus's Choice of Heracles (Xenophon *Memorabilia* 2. 1. 21), and Plato's myths (esp. *Phaedo* 108eff.; *Respublica* 524aff., 614bff.; *Phaedrus* 246aff.). Thereafter, literary allegory remains largely the territory of philosophers and moralists (e.g. Cleanthes in Cicero *De finibus* 2. 69; Dio Chrysostomos *Orationes* 1. 58ff. and 5; Plutarch *De genio Socratis* 590aff.).
[347] See Chapter Two.
[348] For a fuller summary, see Appendix 3.

proceed towards happiness who sits enthroned in the citadel of the highest enclosure. Beguiled by Fortune, the people come to be enamoured of her gifts that are dispensed and then reassigned at random, and they come to believe that their happiness depends upon receiving her gifts. Some find their way to False-Education (*Pseudopaideia*), where we find poets, orators, dialecticians, and philosophers of all schools who have mistaken *Pseudopaideia* for True-*Paideia*, thinking that in remaining here they possess happiness. But it is within *Pseudopaideia*'s enclosure that a very few will find the steep and rough path to True-*Paideia*, where Happiness and the Virtues abide, and where the successful traveller is crowned with a power whereby they become immune to the Vices, and are from that moment on able to roam the other enclosures in complete safety.

The *Tabula* polarizes the good and the bad, the philosophic and the sophistic. An old man, who will be our exegete, approaches a group of young men, puzzled by an enigmatic tablet (*tabula,* πίναξ). Before it can be explained, the old exegete warns his young audience that his explanation comes with a danger: those who fail to understand it will become foolish, unhappy, sullen, and stupid, and will fare badly in life, while those who do will live a life of happiness.[349] As it is revealed in the *Tabula,* this lack of understanding, called *Pseudopaideia*, is associated with those who cluster around her: poets, orators, dialecticians, musicians, hedonists, and all of their like (12-13). The sophists were orators, and they also likened themselves to poets.[350] The reason misunderstanding brought only failure was because sophists provided no improving qualities in their *meletai*, only ephemeral joy. Superficial pleasures only titillate for so

[349] Ps.-Kebes, *Tabula* 3: φρόνιμοι καὶ εὐδαίμονες ἔσεσθε, εἰ δὲ μή, ἄφρονες καὶ κακοδαίμονες καὶ πικροὶ καὶ ἀμαθεῖς γενόμενοι κακῶς βιώσεσθε.
[350] Connolly 2001a, 84: "as the artfully modest comparisons in panegyric orations by Aristides and others suggest, the sophists were artists of language equal to poets."

long until one realizes that pleasure is an active agent devouring and violating any who consume her (*Tabula* 9.3). This echoes Plutarch's concern of warning young men of empty pleasures, which are ephemeral.[351] But the enlightened individual, saved by Repentance, sought True-*Paideia* in the vale of the Happy alongside the Virtues.[352] However, the choice and path presented in the *Tabula* was by no means easy or clear.

Implicit in the *Tabula* is the idea of many choices, many roads down which one could choose, and turn to others as they are encountered. The multiplicity of choices and paths calls to mind the multivalent image of the labyrinth,[353] and the symbolic ramifications of labyrinths most accurately reflect the axiological sophistic shift of the second century, replete with its pitfalls, wrong turns, deceiving dead ends, and (perhaps) its central resolution. As such, the labyrinth provides a profitable frame of reference for either the ascent to the citadel of Virtue for the few or the descent into Vice for the "whole trashy lot of us ground-crawlers" (Lucian, *Hermotimus* 5). In other words, the *Tabula* presents a labyrinth to attain a noetic aspiration rather than a sensual one.[354]

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[351] Plutarch, *De audiendo* 41D.

[352] See Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 1.1-5, where philosophy equals virtue.

[353] See Philostratus, *VS* 587 where he refers to the sophist's curriculum (*dromos*, "path") as culminating in the practice of declamation.

[354] Though Trapp explains that the *Tabula* has fallen into obscurity, see Trapp 1997, 159, for a listing of the "trickle of scholarly studies" on the *Tabula*, common contextual frames for analyzing the *Tabula* have been Socratic dialogue and *ekphrasis.* See Seddon 2005, Trapp 1997, Fitzgerald 1983, Elsner 1995. Socratic dialogue provides one contextual frame for the *Tabula*. The experiences depicted in the *Tabula* reflect those described in the allegory of the Cave and the Myth of Er in Plato's *Republic*. However, the balance of authority between the young interlocutors and the old exegete, with him providing authoritative answers to the young men's questions, has more in common with post-Platonic instructional dialogues than with those of Plato, and fits more with the genre known as *erotapokrisis*, "questions and answers" (see Fitzgerald & White 1983, 11, 13-14; Trapp 1997, 167). Another readily available context is as a verbal description of a work of art, conventionally referred to as *ekphrasis* (Seddon 2005, 175-6; Elsner 1995, 40-6; Fitzgerald 1983, 11-12). The painting is presented in an imprecise, brief, and synoptic description, which parallels the initial puzzlement of the young temple visitors (1). Then, bit-by-bit, the elided visual details from the initial synoptic view are revealed in the exegete's exegesis that simultaneously explains the deeper significance of the painting (2-32). As the text advances through each enclosure, it both constructs a progressively detailed image of the visual artefact, and enacts the gradually-growing awareness of what it actually signifies. The *Tabula* keeps the presence of the visual artefact, the picture (*πίναξ*, 1), firmly in mind throughout its

The labyrinth is a powerful polyvalent image, applicable to a wide range of experiences.[355] It is enough to observe that the moral life can be imagined in terms of walking a maze, which can be a place of error, bafflement, and danger. Further conceptual density is introduced with the distinction between two different kinds of maze: the unicursal maze leads its walker by an immensely circuitous route to its centre, but allows no choices on the walker's part (explicitly teleological when unicursal: persistence necessarily attains the goal); and the multicursal maze that confronts its walker with a potentially endless sequence of choices, that may or may not lead its walker to the centre.[356] Yet the two forms can also be made to join together in certain circumstances: the initially baffled, helpless walker in the multicursal maze can be given a clue, an exegete, or a guide that in effect converts it for the walker into a unicursal maze. The walker can come to see the labyrinth as unicursal by completing it successfully, and thereby achieving a panoptic view from the centre.[357]

The centre contains something so valuable as to warrant protection and/or an arduous ascent to reach it. In a multicursal path, alternative routes present themselves to the walker, some of which may lead to failure for people who cannot learn, concentrate, persevere, or choose properly, but other paths may prove and perfect the wanderer before providing enlightenment, which may well be presented as mental or physical extrication from the labyrinth, a rising above it to see its pattern, and a transformation of confusion

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ekphrasis. There are several examples in the literary tradition of descriptions of visual artefacts, namely the shields of Achilles, Herakles, and Aeneas (*Il.* 18.478-608; [Hesiod] *Sc.* 139-320; Virg. *Aen.* 8.625-731). All three shields subdivide space into a plurality of distinct scenes, all the separate scenes are made up of self-sufficient groups of significant figures, and all three shields can be read as offering a synoptic vision of some great and important whole: Life or the World for the shields of Achilles and Herakles, and the History of Rome in the case of Aeneas's. Furthermore, by the time of the *Tabula*, the most celebrated shield, that of Achilles, could be read as either a cosmological or moral allegory.

[355] See Doob 1990 for an excellent analysis of the labyrinth.

[356] Doob 1990, 54.

[357] See Geertz 1983, the view from the centre demystifies the labyrinth and renders comprehension.

into understanding.[358] However, the fact that labyrinths have centres does not imply that every maze-walker knows there is a centre, since maze-walkers may not even know they are in a maze if it is a metaphorical one.

We can postulate the need for such a text that implored those who read it, namely the *pepaideumenoi*, to take its philosophical teachings to heart. The *Tabula* was written during the axiological shift away from the philosophic values endorsed by ps.-Kebes and Plutarch towards the pedantry peddled by sophists. Thus ps.-Kebes in the *Tabula,* as Xenophon and Hesiod before him, promotes virtuous toil and the difficult road to attain happiness through *paideia*. In as much as the *Tabula* is a cipher, once explained it seems to offer a kind of map for the onlooker towards a life of happiness. However, in an age of many competing philosophies and moralities,[359] as well as duplicity, one's guide may not know the way to virtue.

The constant quarrels between philosophers of all denominations are outlined in Lucian's *Icaromenippus* (5-9)[360] where Lucian as Menippus describes his vain efforts to get answers to his questions about life: each philosopher tells him something different, but nevertheless each one has the "pretension" (ἀλαζονείαν*,* Lucian, *Icar.* 6) to claim that he alone is in possession of the truth. Which philosopher should one believe? The same quandary occurs when a student is searching for a teacher of philosophy to lead him

[358] Doob 1990, 56.
[359] Note that the *Tabula* does not unilaterally support any one philosophical school of thought, though it is more closely aligned with Stoicism and Cynicism, see Seddon 2005 for the Stoic view, Fitzgerald and White 1983 for a thorough discussion of the elements and scholarship of the five different philosophical bents (Socratic, Platonic, Stoic, Cynic, Neo-Pythagorean) found in the *Tabula*, and their support for the Cynic view though they state "a dogmatic conclusion concerning the basic orientation(s) of the *Tabula* is unwarranted" (26), and Trapp 1997 argues that a distortions is practiced if the points of contact for any one philosophy are made the grounds for assigning them formally to one or another school as the *Tabula* reflects many philosophical influences.
[360] See also *Piscator* for a vivid depiction of how the various philosophical schools vie with each other. See Nesselrath 2012, 153-167, for Lucian's mockery of the competition of philosophers.

down the right path to virtue. Such is the case in Lucian's *Hermotimus*. Lucian's alter ego Lycinus wants to know about training in virtue to achieve happiness (13), knowing as a result of having read Hesiod that the path is long, steep, and rough (2, cf. 25) and that Virtue lives on a summit (4).[361] Hermotimus states that the virtuous will not be a slave to anger, fear, lust, gold, pleasures, and glory nor will they know grief (8, 22). Yet the example contemporary philosophers set was one not of toil but of vice: Hermotimus's teacher, who was a Stoic, became very angry with a student who could not pay his fee (9), and angry again at a symposium where he ate and drank in excess, counted the meat he had taken from the banquet and locked it up to ensure that his servant could not steal any, and finally resorted to violence to win an argument against an Epicurean (11, 18). Thus, playing the fool, Lycinus asks Hermotimus if happiness is riches, glory, and unsurpassable pleasures (7).[362] Given this duplicitous display, and the number of different philosophical schools, Lycinus poses the question to Hermotimus if he is to distinguish the best philosophers by their appearance, their gait, their hair, and their meditative manner (18) seeing that form is valued more than content.[363] However, knowing that form would never get him to the citadel of virtue, Lycinus is perplexed on how to choose the true philosopher to guide him there (15). Even the sharp-sighted have difficulty detecting the qualities of the soul beyond the external semiotics of the beard and cloak, the "external coverings" (19). Virtue is secret and not visible, showing itself in conversation and discussion and corresponding deeds,[364] and then only with difficulty after a long time (20, cf. 16):

[361] This is a direct reference to Hesiod's *Works and Days* 287-292. See Appendix 2.
[362] Lucian, *Herm.* 7: ἦ που τινὰ πλοῦτον καὶ δόξαν καὶ ἡδονὰς ἀνυπερβλήτους.
[363] *Cf.* Habicht 1985, 126.
[364] See Maximus of Tyre for the deeds of a philosopher as a marker of virtue.

> Πῶς οὖν οἷόν τέ σοι ἦν ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἔφησθα ἐκείνων τῶν γνωρισμάτων διορᾶν τὸν ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντα ἢ μή; οὐ γὰρ φιλεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὕτω διαφαίνεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ἀπόρρητα καὶ ἐν ἀφανεῖ κείμενα, λόγοις καὶ συνουσίαις ἀναδεικνύμενα καὶ ἔργοις τοῖς ὁμοίοις ὀψὲ μόλις.

Lycinus asks Hermotimus how anyone can distinguish the true philosopher from the false by the marks and characteristics of their external semiotics of their beard, cloak, and pensive manner since virtue is not usually shown in that way (20).

For the new student, then, it was impossible to discern the true philosopher amongst the false. Lycinus compares the philosophers representing the various schools to guides who each claim that they alone know the way to the city of virtue, while the others do not (26):

> ἀνὴρ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἀτραποῦ ἑκάστης ἐφεστὼς ἐν τῇ εἰσόδῳ μάλα τις ἀξιόπιστος ὀρέγει τε τὴν χεῖρα καὶ προτρέπει κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπιέναι, λέγων ἕκαστος αὐτῶν μόνος τὴν εὐθεῖαν εἰδέναι τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους πλανᾶσθαι μήτε αὐτοὺς ἐληλυθότας μήτε ἄλλοις ἡγήσασθαι δυναμένους ἀκολουθήσαντας. κἂν ἐπὶ τὸν πλησίον ἀφίκωμαι, κἀκεῖνος τὰ ὅμοια ὑπισχνεῖται περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ ὁδοῦ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους κακίζει, καὶ ὁ παρ᾽ αὐτὸν ὁμοίως καὶ ἑξῆς ἅπαντες.
>
> A man who stands at the beginning of each path at the entrance, a very trustworthy person, stretches out his hand, and urges me to set out along this road, and each one of them says that he alone knows the direct route and that the others are astray, since they have neither gone there themselves nor followed others able to lead them. And if I go to his neighbour, he makes similar promises about his own road and vilifies the others. The man next to him acts similarly, and so do they all in turn.

In such an environment, Lycinus is naturally bewildered as the spirit of competition, *philotimia*,[365] between philosophers had eroded away any and all lucidity as to which path to choose (26):

> τό τε τοίνυν πλῆθος τῶν ὁδῶν καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον αὐτῶν οὐ μετρίως ταράττει με καὶ ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἡγεμόνες ὑπερδιατεινόμενοι καὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστοι

[365] See Nesselrath 2012 and Mossman 2012 for the concept of *philotimia* between philosophers in Lucian.

> ἐπαινοῦντες. οὐ γὰρ οἶδα ἥντινα τραπόμενος ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον αὐτῶν ἀκολουθήσας ἀφικοίμην ἂν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν.
>
> The number of roads, then, and the differences between them, troubles me immoderately and makes me uncertain, and especially the way the guides overstrain themselves, each sect praising its own. I do not know which way to turn or which one to follow to reach the city [of Virtue].

Lycinus is at a loss. He expresses the danger of choosing the wrong guide, that one might lead him astray, to Babylon or Bactra (28)—both locations in the effeminate East and perhaps a jab at sophists and their aesthetic performances. Confounded by all the competing guides and the endless choice of paths, Lycinus dares not trust Fortune to take the best path to Virtue: οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐκεῖνο καλῶς ἔχει τῇ τύχῃ ἐπιτρέπειν ὡς τάχα ἂν τὴν ἀρίστην ἑλομένους, "it is in no way good to trust Fortune that perhaps we shall take the best road" (28). He fears that, after following one of these specious guides, he will never know if he has seen the city he should have seen or whether he has arrived at some other city that he thinks and is told is the city of virtue (27, 28; cf. 25).

Let us return to consider the *Tabula* and its set of concentric enclosures defining a route to be travelled through time, the narrative of one's life. The route, for all lives and any life, will work out differently for each individual. There is no predetermined inevitability, but instead a multiplicity of choices to be made in each new case, just as Hermotimus was confronted with endless choices. The existence of a centre does not imply that everyone will reach it.[366] The *Tabula* reads more as a multicursal labyrinth, in which the danger of going astray and never reaching the ideal end is as real as the prospects of ultimate arrival and success. The one who arrives at the centre, which is also the labyrinth's highest point, is conducted back down to the lower reaches, thus achieving the synoptic view that converts the potentially multicursal into the effectively unicursal,

[366] Doob 1990, 55.

even though those who fall short remain locked in multicursal error (*ambages, "*a circuitous path").[367]

It is precisely because the image described in the *Tabula* is of a predominately multicursal labyrinth that it can tell not just one story, but many. It tells the story of the successful and the unsuccessful, of the unicursal and the multicursal: the one who advances to his goal with no false steps, and the story of the pilgrim who takes the longer route via Indulgence, Retribution, Misery, and Repentance, and the stories of those who fall short at Indulgence, False-Education, or at the very threshold of Happiness itself. The *ambages* of the multicursal (and to an extent unicursal) route(s) are educational, leading the maze-walker to a conclusion—even transcendence—greatly to be desired, stressing that a circuitous route may be the only effective way to reach a goal.[368] Furthermore, the *Tabula* is a challenge to its reader or viewer. The old exegete warns the young men contemplating the image (3) that they are entering the labyrinth of life in which ethical and interpretive choices are fraught with risk.

The *Tabula*'s warning came at a time of moral decline in the empire amongst the elite, where the pursuit of sensual and material indulgence had subdued the appeal of social and affective self-restraint (*σωφροσύνη, ἐγκράτεια*).[369] These subdued virtues were only realized once someone had walked the labyrinth of the *Tabula,* attained the summit of the steep and difficult path to Happiness, and had drunk the potion from *Paideia*, cleansing one of ignorance and error. Perhaps the *Tabula* was meant as a warning against

[367] Doob 1990, 53.
[368] Doob 1990, 82-3.
[369] See Bowersock 1994 for the Emperors Caligula and Nero as the incipient of this decline to decadence. See Lucian's *Nigrinus* and *On Salaried Posts* for the decline in philosophy. See especially Whitmarsh 2001a, 279-293, for Lucian's *On Salaried Posts*; *cf.* Konig 2009. See also Duncan 2006, Edwards 1993, and Dalby 2000.

the growing trend of falseness and the decadence of luxury, profligacy, and incontinence, of a preference for the external tokens of philosophy rather than its edifying content,[370] and it functions as a useful heuristic when examining the risks and different paths of alternate influences on society. The infinite choices of Hermotimus and the multicursal pathways of the *Tabula* provide a framework to view the changing face and form (σχῆμα, *schema*) of *paideia* during the Second Sophistic.

The *Schema* of *Paideia*

On the surface, *The Dream* is an autobiographical work with a protreptic purpose.[371] It describes an important moment in the life of its nameless narrator, henceforth Lucian, a *rite-de-passage* from youth to adulthood.[372] The text opens with a scene from Lucian's childhood. His parents make the decision to send him to learn a trade with his uncle rather than continuing his education, since they had little money for his higher education. Lucian is keen to try this trade, but after he clumsily ruined a block of stone on his first day, his uncle beats him harshly with a stick. That night, two women, Craft (*Techne*) and Education (*Paideia*), appear to him in a dream, and each one tries to persuade him to follow and spend his life with her. Craft, an unattractive woman resembling his uncle,

[370] Compare Lucian's ironical treatise *Rhetorum praeceptor* where Lucian uses mock precepts for a would be sophist in order to criticize what he perceives as flaws in contemporary rhetoric; *cf.* the personified character of Rhetoric in Lucian's *Bis Acc.*; see also Duncan 2006; Dalby 2000; Coleman 1990.
[371] Most biographies of Lucian state that he was a sculptor from Syria before turning to oratory; e.g. Swain 1996. Only recently have scholars begun to question the veracity of Lucian's autobiography. See Goldhill 2002, who nevertheless uses *The Dream* as autobiography; Whitmarsh 2001a; Lightfoot 2003; Hopkinson 2008. It is clear that *The Dream* was inspired by Prodicus's *Choice of Herakles*, but there is more mimesis. Abandoning sculpture recalls the life of Socrates who trained as a stone-carver before turning to Philosophy (Paus. 1.22.8; Diog. Laer. 2.19) and is directly referred to in the text (12). *The Dream* as a type of sensational conversion piece should not be taken as literally true because it is so clearly indebted to the masonic apprenticeship of Socrates and the Prodican parable. It most likely contains nuggets of truth, but is more beneficial as an etiological myth for pursuing *paideia* and elucidating the decadence of Roman Greek *paideia*.
[372] See van Gennep 1909.

speaks haltingly of the fame resulting from excellence in *techne*; Education, a beautiful woman in fine clothes with eloquent speech, promises fame, wealth, and high social position. The boy Lucian chooses Education. He gets into her chariot and she shows him the world and the fame he will reap.

The Dream functions as an etiological myth for the rhetorical success and social prestige of its narrator, and seemingly the purpose of Lucian's dream-narrative is to encourage many youths of moderate means to persevere and pursue higher education.[373] The broken stone was emblematic of his break with banausic craft, and his choice of Education led from a life of anonymity to one of glorious and enviable social prominence and wealth.[374] Thus the treatise functions as a myth of the author's self-fashioning: returning home in triumph, he presents himself as a paradigm for others to follow, where the allegorical debate between Craft and Education dramatizes a choice between trade and culture. Education set him on the road to fame and fortune, and it was through that talent—jointly to entertain and to instruct—that Lucian recounts his dream.[375]

Yet, if the lesson of *The Dream* was to encourage young men to persevere with education, taking Lucian as their paradigm (*Somn.* 18), then his ironic self-disparagement of *The Teacher of Rhetoric* is at odds with *The Dream*. *The Teacher of Rhetoric*, one of Lucian's satirical essays on education, confronts the reader with two paths that lead to the mastery of rhetoric: one steep, difficult, and lengthy, requiring abstinence and sleepless nights in study; the other easy and effortless (*Rh.Pr.* 6-8). The guide of the difficult path, a tough and knowledgeable old man, praises virtuous effort, while the other, an effeminate and vacuous poseur, exhorts effortless vice. Neither guide escapes Lucian's

[373] The dream was based on a dream of Xenophon, an unimpeachable classical source.
[374] Hopkinson 2008, 93-7.
[375] We may question Lucian's actual fame since Philostratus makes no mention of Lucian.

satire.[376] The teacher guiding the student on the rough road to eloquence is an imposter (*alazon*), an "old man of Kronos's time" who "puts dead men up for imitation" (10). He utters gibberish (*lerous*) about Demosthenes and Plato, and severely punishes the smallest deviation from their Attic path (9). The effeminate guide recommends memorizing fifteen or twenty Attic words, and using recent exercises (*meletai*) as classical cribs: "Mention Marathon and Kynaigeiros everywhere […] pack in Salamis, Artemisium, and Plataea," he says, and the crowds will be astonished "at your appearance, voice, gait, your striding about, your sing-song tone, your sandals, and those 'divers things' (Attic dialect *ta atta*) of yours" (18, 20).[377] Whereas the two teachers shared many vices, notably vainglory and ignorance, their worst faults were strikingly different. The soft rhetorician was attacked for his deceitful effeminacy; the hard rhetorician, for his obsession with ancient history and Attic purity.

In order to reconcile these two treatises, the one seemingly lauding education and the other disparaging it, we will need to examine the representation of *Paideia* and her association with the virtuous path in *The Dream,* which is clearly inspired by Prodicus's parable of the *Choice of Herakles,* and I would argue ps.-Kebes's *Tabula*.[378] The key term that we can extract from both Prodicus and Lucian is *schema* (σχῆμα). There is a vast array of shadings to the basic definition of *schema*: "form, shape, figure, appearance,

[376] See Connolly 2001b, 357-8.
[377] See Chapter Two where both of Polemon's *meletai* concerned Marathon, one particularly on Kynaigeiros, in which he left the crowd clamoring for more.
[378] The *Tabula* seems to be influenced by this text as well. The three occurrences of the exclamation, "Herakles," seem to have an additional function. The exclamation is placed at the points where the context of the expression seems to point to the parable of Prodicus: 4.1, 12.1, 19.1. For Lucian's attested knowledge of *The Tabula*, see *On Salaried Posts* 42. Perhaps the ultimate antecedent is the Pythagorean Y, but Lucian had a literary technique of recycling motifs from a fairly limited repertoire, and his range of quotation and allusion shows not extensive acquaintance with classical culture but ingenious variations on a handful of themes; see G. Anderson 1976a, 1976b, and 1978; see also Swain 2007b, 23; Householder 1941. See Elsner 1995, 40-46, on the *Tabula*: the purpose of *The Tabula* was allegorical exegesis leading to salvation.

character, attitude, manner," among others.[379] At the heart of the word, it expresses the embodiment of *epideixis*, display.[380] We will see how *schema* colours the representation of *Paideia, Techne, Virtue,* and *Vice.*

In Book 2 of his *Memorabilia*, Xenophon retells Prodicus's parable.[381] Herakles, poised in the liminal space between childhood and youth, had a vision of two women, one decently dressed and characterized by modesty, prudence, natural beauty, and liberty, while the other made herself superficially attractive. These women are Virtue (Ἀρετή) and Vice (Κακία). Vice speaks first, explaining that if Herakles were to follow her, the path would be easy, replete with sensual indulgence and material gain. Virtue, on the other hand, beseeches him to be worthy of his upbringing (Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.27 ἐν τῆν παιδείαι) so as to perform deeds that are *ἀγαθός* and *σεμνά*, good and pious. She warns him that progress on the path to ἀρετή (*arete*, virtue) will be full of πόνος (*ponos*, toil). Yet, the reward for all that toil will be great. The life of *arete* brings immortality (Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.33) just as a life of *paideia* ensures that their works will be read eternally by *pepaideumenoi*, the educated and cultivated (*Somn.* 12).

The *Choice of Herakles* presents an alternative between a life of superficial attractions lacking in real achievements and a life of unremitting toil crowned with true glory. If Lucian's *The Dream* follows the mold of Prodicus's *The Choice of Herakles*, it does not retain the moral allegory. Prodicus's character of Vice was plump and soft, her face made up to heighten her beauty, and she was dressed so as to disclose all her charms by adjusting her natural figure (τὸ δὲ σχῆμα ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθοτέραν τῆς φύσεως εἶναι), which made her appear vain and narcissistic. She offered a life of pleasure with no

[379] LSJ s.v. σχῆμα, *cf.* Chantraine 1968.
[380] Goldhill and Osborne 1999.
[381] Prodicus's own model was Hesiod, *Op.* 288-92. See Appendix 2.

hardships, and a life living off the toils of others (Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.22-5), promising to lead Herakles by the short and easy road to happiness (Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.29). However, the characteristics of Vice do not match well with the characteristics of Lucian's *Techne*. She presented no charms to her perspective mate: ugly, manly, and resembling Lucian's uncle. Her clothes were stained and filthy with marble dust, and she humbly admitted an unappealing figure (τοῦ σχήματος τὸ εὐτελὲς, 8). This was hardly the alluring Vice of Prodicus. Beyond the physical appearance, she spoke with a great deal of stuttering and mangled (*βαρβαρίζουσα*)[382] grammar. She comforted with the familiar and the traditional: καὶ οὔποτε ἄπει ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλοδαπήν, τὴν πατρίδα, καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους καταλιπών, "you will never go abroad, leaving your native land and your kinfolk behind" (7). Not once did she hint that her path led to effortless happiness. Instead, her path was fraught with banausic labour and toil.

Toil is the key word of Prodicus's Virtue. She was fair to look upon with a free nature, and her body was adorned with purity, wearing a white robe, and having a moderate appearance (σχῆμα σωφροσύνῃ). She claimed to speak the truth, not veiling her words in deception. She extolled toil and hard work, τῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν οὐδὲν ἄνευ πόνου καὶ ἐπιμελείας θεοὶ διδόασιν ἀνθρώποις, "of those things which are good and genuine, the gods grant to humankind nothing without toil and pain" (2.1.28). Nor did she discriminate. She was beloved by artisans (τεχνίταις), masters, and servants (παραστάτις οἰκέταις, 2.1.32). The followers of Ἀρετή were ultimately held in honour in their native land, τίμιοι δὲ πατρίσιν (2.1.33). The path to her was difficult and long, and full of toil. In comparison, Lucian's *Paideia* was full of vice. She dressed in splendid

[382] See Sartre 2005 and van Nijf 2011 on the manner of speech of uneducated Syrians.

clothes (11), had a very beautiful face, and a specious form (σχῆμα εὐπρεπὴς, 6).[383] In a diatribe, she denounced banausic labourers as low-born (ἀγεννῆ), humble-minded (ταπεινὸς τὴν γνώμην), insignificant and invisible, and they inspired no fear, envy, or jealousy. If he were to follow *Techne*, he would just be a labourer from the masses: ἀλλ' αὐτὸ μόνον ἐργάτης καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ πολλοῦ δήμου εἶς (9).[384] However, if he followed her, he would have power (13) and immortality would be within his grasp (ἀθάνατοι γίγνονταί τινες ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, 12). Not only did she offer him immortality, but she released him from the bonds of his *πατρίς* by offering him the world (ἀρθεὶς δὲ εἰς ὕψος ἐγὼ ἐπεσκόπουν ἀπὸ τῆς ἕω ἀρξάμενος ἄχρι πρὸς τὰ ἑσπέρια πόλεις καὶ ἔθνη καὶ δήμους, 15). The thrust of her argument was that trades were for the low-born (11, 13): χαμαιπετὴς καὶ χαμαίζηλος καὶ πάντα τρόπον ταπεινός (13). She did laud the fruits of her path: prudence, justice, piety, gentleness, understanding, perseverance (10), but only in a cursory fashion, brushing them off as thought they were unimportant. In fact, she also brushed over the toil of attaining these traits saying that she would teach him these things "in no time at all": οὐκ εἰς μακρὰν σε διδάξομαι (10).[385] This *Paideia* inspired fear, envy, and jealousy (9), and she was always flamboyant and conspicuous, a mark of social status. Clustered around her were fame, wealth, envy, reputation, nobility, and jealousy.[386] Unlike *Techne,* she would never be invisible in the spectacle culture of Empire. In fact, Lucian himself plays with this identity by performing this *melete* in front

[383] εὐπρεπής can also be defined as "specious," LSJ A.3.
[384] The Loeb translates this as "one of the swarming rabble."
[385] This same idiom, οὐκ εἰς μακρὰν, occurred at *Somn.* 1 in reference to the money he would earn from *τέχνη*.
[386] Wealth and fame: *Somn.* 9-13, 11-16; *cf.* 18; *cf.* Swain 1996, 308-312, where he notes the stress is on being rich and famous.

of an audience of young men where he displays his *paideia*, his education, for all to see so that they may emulate him. This *Paideia* was display oriented,[387] and decidedly false.

Each of the four women had a certain *schema*, a way that she presented and displayed herself to the world. Vice altered her natural look, while Virtue appeared moderate; *Techne* was unpretentious and ugly, while *Paideia* was appealing and beautiful but specious. Each pair contrasted visually with each other. Both Virtue and *Techne* presented their true selves/form, while Vice and *Paideia* artificially enhanced their natural *schema*, Vice with makeup and *Paideia* with a specious appearance. This reversed the natural pairing by associating *Paideia* with Vice, and imbuing a certain falseness on her character and on her path. Lucian's *Paideia* had more in common with Vice than Virtue; she had become ps.-Kebes's *Pseudopaideia*.

The *Tabula* of ps.-Kebes made a distinction between True-Education (Ἀληθινὴ *Paideia*) and *Pseudopaideia.* The latter appeared (δοκεῖ) altogether pure and neatly adorned, but like Lucian's *Paideia*, these were fallacious and superficial external semiotics. Many vices, all dressed as prostitutes, consorted with her. These vices were: Incontinence, Profligacy, Insatiate Desire, and Flattery: Αὗται τοίνυν ἡ μὲν Ἀκρασία καλεῖται, ἡ δὲ Ἀσωτία, ἡ δὲ Ἀπληστία, ἡ δὲ Κολακεία (*Tabula* 9.1).[388] They sexually enticed (συμπλέκονται, 9.2) the men in False-Education's enclosure and flattered them, all while devouring and violating the ignorant: αἰσθάνεται ὅτι οὐκ ἤσθιεν, ἀλλ' ὑπ' αὐτῆς

[387] Lucian is explicit in this display. When an uneducated man upon seeing a *πεπαιδευμένος*, as a result of his external semiotics, he would nudge his neighbour and point him out with his finger: ἕκαστος τὸν πλησίον κινήσας δείξει σε τῷ δακτύλῳ, 'Οὗτος ἐκεῖνος,' 11. The figure of *Paideia* in *The Dream* stated that she marked (τὰ γνωρίσματα) her followers (11). These marks, the beard and the cloak, were counterfeited by pseudo-philosophers, so much so that they are nearly indistinguishable from true-philosophers. See *The Teacher of Rhetoric* 16; *Bis Accus.* 6-8, 11; *On Salaried Posts* 25; See Dio 36.17 for the beard as denoting authenticity of the Borysthenians. See *Pisc.* 41-43 for the indistinguishability of philosophers.

[388] See Lucian *Apol.* 9, where he denounced Flattery as the most servile and worst of all the vices.

κατησθίετο καὶ ὑβρίζετο (9.3).[389] As a result of a dalliance with the vices, one became their slave, losing all freedom (9.4). Thus *Paideia*, in her association with False-*Paideia*, became her slave, and in essence became one and the same thing. Lucian abandoned his 'wife' Rhetoric, who had educated him, on the grounds that she no longer behaved modestly, but had become a promiscuous embarrassment by courting young men on the easy path: Ἐγὼ γὰρ ὁρῶν ταύτην οὐκέτι σωφρονοῦσαν οὐδὲ μένουσαν ἐπὶ τοῦ κοσμίου σχήματος… κοσμουμένην δὲ καὶ τὰς τρίχας εὐθετίζουσαν εἰς τὸ ἑταιρικὸν, "she was no longer modest and did not continue to clothe herself in the respectable way that she did once…but made herself up, and arranged her hair like a courtesan" (*Bis Acc.* 31).[390] *Paideia* had been lured away from her own enclosure to fraternize with the many who pursued *Pseudopaideia*.

Since *Paideia* consorted with *Pseudopaideia* and became false herself, we can now fully understand the introductory lines of Lucian's dream. The words of Homer introduced Lucian's dream, seemingly lending it authoritative weight from hallowed antiquity: θεῖός μοι ἐνύπνιον ἦλθεν ὄνειρος ἀμβροσίην διὰ νύκτα, "a god-sent dream appeared to me in my sleep out of immortal night" (Iliad II.56-7; Luc., *Somn.* 5). These lines, however, introduced Agamemnon's false and misleading dream in the Iliad, a dream which we have been told was sent by Zeus to deceive him.[391] Taking this line as an indication that what followed was meant to deceive (or in this case to satirize), we can

[389] See Athenaios, *Deipnosophistae* VIII.582f., for the sexual reading of ἐσθίειν, ὑβρίζειν, and κατεσθίειν.
[390] This is not to imply that Lucian's education was false, but rather the opposite, that education itself was becoming false. That True-*paideia* and False-*Paideia* had become conflated. Or, to use the imagery of *The Tabula*, that *Paideia* had descended from the difficult path and now consorted with False-*Paideia*.
[391] Only Goldhill 2002 and Hopkinson 2008 have mentioned this, though briefly and neither pursued the thought. Whitmarsh 2001a, 122-128, merely says that the biography is not factual. Lightfoot 2003, 86-91, cautioned that "The problem with using Lucian is that we need to ask ourselves if we can trust him. His satirizing certainly impairs our trust in him and deforms the facts. But we must be receptive to the many other questions which the text poses, well beyond the level of *Realien*."

finally resolve the identity crisis of *Paideia*, and understand the satiric intent of *The Dream*.

Lucian gave the attributes of *Pseudopaideia* to his character *Paideia* in order to comment on the metamorphosis that *Paideia* had endured at the expense of Roman commodification.[392] Lucian's *The Ass*, has the protagonist transformed into an ass and then forced to live as one. However, when his "mask" has fallen away and he returns to his human state, he is rejected as useless (56): the fiction revealed and reality rejected. *The Ass* engages with questions of the mutability of identity - cultural, literary, ontological.[393] *Paideia* has been transformed into *Pseudopaideia*, and a change back would equally be rejected, as it would be useless in the spectacle driven world of Rome.[394] The transformative power of *paideia* has itself been transformed. It is now something performed, something fictive.

The Dream, then, cannot act as a corrective to the commercialization of *paideia*, as Tim Whitmarsh suggests, but rather that it takes part in Roman commodification.[395] The intensification of the theatrical element in Rome during the early Empire converted *paideia* into a commercial spectacle, into a banausic labour just like *techne*. The final lines of the work, "If nothing else, no less inglorious than a stone-carver," εἰ καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο, οὐδενὸς γοῦν τῶν λιθογλύφων ἀδοξότερος (18), have caused editors difficulty. They quibble over whether it means "any stone-carver at all" or "any stone-carver here."[396] However, in light of the deception both *techne* and *paideia* are now trades, both

[392] See commodification below.
[393] Whitmarsh 2010b, 133-141.
[394] This validates Lucian claim to the usefulness of his story, *Somn.* 17.
[395] See Whitmarsh 2004, 139-158, where he argues that Lucianic satire does act as a corrective to the commercialization of *paideia*.
[396] Hopkinson 2008, 108.

are equal as employment options; the one no longer offers a philosophic training, but rather a sophistic training suited for the theatre. The fruits that *Paideia* peddled were no longer Prodicus's ἀρετή, a pure and venerated objective, but ἔργα (works, deeds, acts). The path of Lucian's *Paideia* led not to the citadel of virtue, but to the stage of the theatre, as an actor. The *pepaideumenoi* lay in the field of display and performance, the falsehoods of spectacle, where the temperance and perseverance of the hard path (ps.-Kebes, *Tabula* 16.2) were not needed for the acquisition of Roman Greek *paideia*. The falsehoods of Rome (*Nig.* 25) had enveloped *Paideia* and Lucian.

Roman Commodification

In Rome, *paideia* was shorn of its true values and sucked into the spectacular system of commerce and financial exchange.[397] Lucian's writing frequently recurred to the conflicts between the high-minded idealism of Greek *pepaideumenoi* and the shallow, sordid, mercantile preoccupations of the contemporary world dominated by Rome.[398] The Lucianic texts *Vitarum auctio, Piscator, Nigrinus,* and *On Salaried Posts* amply demonstrate the commodified state of philosophy in the Roman Empire.

Lucian's *Vitarum Auctio* and its companion piece *Piscator* vividly mock the commodification of *paideia*. In the former, Zeus and Hermes, the god of mercantile transactions and heralds (among other roles), hold a slave auction, selling off a series of "philosophical lives" or "philosophies" each of which personify the respective sects: Academic; Stoic; Cynic; Pythagorean; Democratean; Heraclitean; Sceptic. The satire is

[397] On commodification, see Whitmarsh 2001, 15, 257-265, 293-4; Whitmarsh 2004, 143; Swain 1996, 6, 312-329; J. Hall 2001, 172; Vout 2007, 228-9; Rutherford 1990, 11.
[398] Whitmarsh 2001, 258.

directed against both the practitioners of philosophical education and the buyer, as well as the commercial and patronal systems that treat *paideia* as a form of commercial exchange, where the slave auction reduces the philosophical life to a series of superficial signs.[399] Wealth creates the spectacular, and the slave auction is no exception. Diogenes is described by his appearance: he is dirty (αὐχμῶντα, 7) and has a scornful and sullen countenance (τὸ σκυθρωπὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ κατηφές, 7), he carries a wallet (πήραν, 7) and a stick (ξύλον, 7), and he wears the philosopher's cloak (τριβώνιον, 8). These external semiotics reduce philosophy (in this case Cynicism) to display, and in this context makes philosophy readily recognizable for sale. At the outset of the dialogue, Zeus instructs an attendant to beautify (κοσμήσας, 1) the philosophers so that they may appear fair on the surface[400] and attract a crowd of buyers (ὡς εὐπρόσωποι φανοῦνται καὶ ὅτι πλείστους ἐπάξονται, 1). Further, he has the philosophers stand in a line (στῆσον ἑξῆς, 1) as if to prostitute themselves for their potential buyers.[401] Lastly, the philosophers are "brought forward" (παραγών, 1, 2, 6, 13) one by one for inspection and questioned by the buyers. The word παράγω is used for display, meaning "to introduce into public view," "bring onstage."[402] As we can see, the "philosophical lives," encompassing all philosophies, are ready to be bought and sold as commodities via the theatrical display of an auction.

Piscator brings forward from Hades the august founders of the various philosophical sects satirized in the *Vit. Auc.* Lucian, in the guise of "Parrhesiades" ("son of free speech"), successfully defends himself against their charges, and then is given a

[399] See also Chapter Two.
[400] LSJ II s.v. εὐπρόσωπος : "fair in outward show, specious."
[401] See GWH Lampe's *A Patristic Greek Lexicon,* 1961, s.v. ἵστημι, A.2. for this definition. This lexicon sets as its parameters the authors from Clement of Rome (circa 90 AD) to Theodore of Studium (circa 800), a contemporary timeframe for Lucian.
[402] LSJ s.v. παράγω III.

plenipotentiary mandate to root out false philosophers, whom he lures to the Athenian Acropolis with gold. These philosophers, who number many, fawn before the rich and fall agape before money (*Pisc.* 34). The declining standards in philosophical ethics were interlinked with the commercialization and commodification of *paideia*. It was the desire for wealth and power that motivated the philosophers to act, where "philosophy has become a means of arrogating to oneself the superficial trifles of conventional society that it once sought to displace."[403] Thus there was a rupture between the canonical past and the decadent present. As a result of the overwhelming numbers of false philosophers, philosophy had been reduced to spectacle and display.

In Lucian's *Nigrinus,* the eponym, a philosopher in Rome, praises the love of learning (φιλοσοφίαν), and ridicules wealth and reputation, asserting that such things are servile and vulgar (Lucian, *Nig.* 4, 15-16). Rome in particular had become full of trickery, deceit, and falsehood: ἀνάπλεως γοητείας καὶ ἀπάτης καὶ ψευδολογίας (*Nig.* 15.6-7). Most of all, Nigrinus finds fault with false philosophers. At *symposia* they stuff themselves with food and they get drunk conspicuously, being the last to leave the table (24-5). But he draws special mention to those who taught philosophy for pay, treating virtue as a market-ware on display in the *agora* (25).[404] Nigrinus's comments stemmed from the growing trend of Roman patronage to hire "Greek" *pepaideumenoi* as status and cultural symbols. As a philosopher, Nigrinus rebelled and condemned the decadence of Empire and the commodification of *paideia*.

[403] Whitmarsh 2001a, 261.
[404] Lucian, *Nigrinus* 25: ἐμέμνητο τῶν ἐπὶ μισθῷ φιλοσοφούντων καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὤνιον ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀγορᾶς προτιθέντων.

The Lucianic text *On Salaried Posts* warns against the Roman practice of commodification and against the trend for the educated to accept the patronage of wealthy Romans.[405] Intellectuals increasingly became employed as clients to magnify the achievements of their patrons, and Lucian tries to dissuade his addressee, a young intellectual looking for patronage, from taking a position in a Roman house (*On Sal. Posts,* 25):

> δεῖται δή σου ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνα μὲν οὐδαμῶς, ἐπεὶ δὲ πώγωνα ἔχεις βαθὺν καὶ σεμνός τις εἶ τὴν πρόσοψιν καὶ ἱμάτιον Ἑλληνικὸν εὐσταλῶς περιβέβλησαι καὶ πάντες ἴσασί σε γραμματικὸν ἢ ῥήτορα ἢ φιλόσοφον, καλὸν αὐτῷ δοκεῖ ἀναμεμῖχθαι καὶ τοιοῦτόν τινα τοῖς προϊοῦσι καὶ προπομπεύουσιν αὐτοῦ· δόξει γὰρ ἐκ τούτου καὶ φιλομαθὴς τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν μαθημάτων καὶ ὅλως περὶ *paideia*ν φιλόκαλος. ὥστε κινδυνεύεις, ὦ γενναῖε, ἀντὶ τῶν θαυμαστῶν λόγων τὸν πώγωνα καὶ τὸν τρίβωνα μεμισθωκέναι.
>
> He does not want you at all for that purpose [i.e. to instruct him]; but because you have a long beard and a serious appearance and you are dressed modestly in a Greek cloak and everyone knows that you are a grammarian, rhetorician, or philosopher, it seems good to him for such a man to be mixed in with his retinue and escort. For this will make him seem a lover of Greek knowledge and altogether a man of taste when it comes to education. As a result, my friend, there is a danger that you have hired out your beard and cloak, rather than your splendid speeches.

Lucian argues that accepting a position as a private tutor in a Roman household is a form of refined slavery[406] that cannot fail to disgust the intellectual, reducing him to a sycophantic existence, which is even more embarrassing because it was entered into voluntarily (5, 24). Wealth and luxurious living are temptations that enslave freemen, not for the lack of necessities, but rather for the lust of luxury's superfluities (*On Salaried Posts* 7). As Tim Whitmarsh has suggested, Lucian satirically reverses ps.-Kebes's *Tabula* where the *pepaideumenos* progresses towards dissolution, ruin, and moral

[405] Whitmarsh 2001a, 279-293; Schmitz 2010, 303; Connolly 2001b, 358.
[406] Lucian, *On Salaried Posts* 1, 5, 8, 17, 22, 23, 24, 26.

bankruptcy, instead of advancing towards True-*Paideia*.[407] However, the model is not only reversed, but more accurately reflects the changing social values of the Roman elite: a paideutic culture that focuses more on appearance than substance.[408] Contemporary materialism and Roman economic patronage constitute the explanation for the "parlously vapid state of contemporary *paideia*."[409]

The Roman patron did not want the *pepaideumenos* for instruction, but rather to seem cultured, a man of taste when it came to *paideia*. From outside the patron's house, life within looked extremely alluring (*On Salaried Posts* 21), and those wishing to cross the various boundaries were led on by "hope" (ἐλπίς, 7, 21-2, 42) to covet "initiation" into the inner circle of power, prestige, and influence.[410] Once employed by a Roman patron, the objective would be to reach the symbolic centre of the house, the centre of power. However, the symbolics of power depended fundamentally upon the symbolic relations between centre and periphery, where the centre was mystified by theatrical effects.[411] The exploitation of the *pepaideumenos* was theatrically disguised as friendship and sharing (*On Salaried Posts*). Power is primarily a symbolic attribute, always concealing its tracks and mystifying itself; it cannot be displayed or revealed, for revealing the secret would rob it of its mystery; power depends on secrecy.[412] Once the very thing that the elaborate mystique of ceremony is supposed to conceal is exposed, the

[407] Whitmarsh 2001, 279-293.
[408] *Cf. Bis Accus*. 27, where Rhetoric is trying to defend herself through a pastiche of forms, in a manifest occurence of form over content. Whitmarsh 2001, 265. *Cf. The Ignorant Book Collector.* See also *On Salaried Posts* 14-5, where looking is omnipresent here, and each is a different kind of looking. Some is gazing in wonder, others are more sinister being designed to judge, see Konig 2009, 26-40.
[409] Whitmarsh 2001, 258.
[410] The teletic imagery of mystery religion recurs throughout in a particularly significant way, see Whitmarsh 2001, 279-293.
[411] Geertz 1993, esp. 143.
[412] Whitmarsh 2001, 289.

majesty dissipates.[413] Thus, the gesturing and posturing of patron and *pepaideumenoi* resulted in the latter being used as a theatrical prop so that the Roman patron would *seem* educated. The *pepaideumenoi* simply became part of the spectacle of Roman power. Through this treatise, Lucian accentuated the root cause of Roman Hellenism: the competitive desire for status in the eyes of others, *philotimia*.[414] This also allowed for *pseudopaideia* to take root and flourish.[415] If your patron never needed you for *real* philosophical work, it became that much easier to fake it, taking the lessons of Lucian's *The Teacher of Rhetoric* to heart.

The climate of the Empire embraced aesthetic sophistication, where elites would compete with each other for honour.[416] An elite's *atrium* displayed statues plundered from Greek sanctuaries, either copies or originals, to impress upon visitors and clients the owner's cultivation, and Greek intellectuals increasingly became employed as clients to magnify the achievements of their patrons. This process redefined and commodified the role of the philosopher by tearing it free of its original referent, the canonical past.[417] The intensification of the theatrical element in Rome converted *paideia* into a commercial spectacle; philosophy and Greek *paideia* were now reduced to a matter of show and performance, to Roman Hellenism.[418] In Lucian's *The Teacher of Rhetoric,* the narrator (presumably Lucian himself) encouraged students to take the easy path, even instructing them on how to overcome the blunders of a superficial education.[419] *The Dream* likewise

[413] Geertz 1993, 124.
[414] See Mossman 2012, and Nesselrath 2012 for the concept of *philotimia* in Lucian.
[415] Whitmarsh 2010c, 728-747.
[416] Lendon 1997; Whitmarsh 2010c, 728-747.
[417] See Rutherford 1990, 11.
[418] Whitmarsh 2001, 293-4.
[419] *The Teacher of Rhetoric* 13-25. We learn that Lucian himself took the difficult path, 8, but see Anderson 1976a for some short cuts that he took along that difficult path.

encouraged a cursory education and ostentation. Rome and the empire had become a spectacle fraught with many vices and duplicitous paths all claiming to reach the citadel of Virtue, in which dissembling became a survival strategy and sincerity became dangerous.[420] The effect of this trend was to put into cultural currency a revised conception of the self as a player of roles, a dissembler, an actor.[421] In such a climate, Hellenism became a commodity and a spectacle, one that was open to everyone who engaged in a *paideutic* identiy.

[420] Duncan 2006.
[421] Duncan 2006, 191. See also Tacitus *Agricola.* Lucian often wore masks that hid his identity in his literary works.

Conclusion: Hellenism Revisited

Any study of Hellenism cannot cover every diachronic and synchronic aspect, yet focusing on the Hellenism of sophists during the Second Sophistic provides insight on one part of the larger whole. Greg Woolf states that the diffuse nature of Hellenism as a cultural system was held together by loosely defined institutions, such as the gymnasium and symposium, fostered by the absence of any single authority to rule on the purity of Greek culture,[422] whereas Glen Bowersock defines Hellenism (ἑλληνισμός) as representing "language, thought, mythology, and images that constituted an extraordinary flexible medium of both cultural and religious expression."[423] This definition provides the means for a more articulate and a more universally comprehensible expression of local traditions. While Woolf argues for concrete institutions and Bowersock for abstract qualities, it is sophistry that connects these two statements. Sophistic declamations of the Second Sophistic were performed at festivals and theatres, both common institutions of Greek cities, while the content of the declamations created tradition and thus fabricated a past that tied the speaker and audience into a community.[424] These declamations emphasized the relevance of the glorious classical past to the present, while the festivals in which they took place simultaneously validated Roman rule, since the emperor placed himself at the centre of cult and festival, which had the effect of magnifying the culture of spectacle.[425]

I hope to have shown through my study of sophistic spectacle and the clash with its *paideutic* counterpart, philosophy, that sophistry was influenced by the Roman

[422] Woolf 1994, 128.
[423] Bowersock 1990, 7.
[424] See Schmitz 1999, 91-2 for the creation of a common heritage between speaker and audience.
[425] See Price 1984a and 1984b on the emperor cult.

idealism of the classical past and a ubiquitous spectacle culture.[426] In doing so, I hope to have shown *paideia*'s progression from virtue to vice, from edifying lectures to spectacle and finally to commodification. The ramifications of this are that the appeal of paideutic declamations to contemporaries was rooted in the fact that sophists supplied, created, and fabricated history, within certain parameters, which also doubled as entertainment.

Balancing this account is the philosophic backlash that tried to steer young men away from spectacle and back to instruction. Plutarch warns that a lecture should not provide pleasure as an end in itself, and Maximus of Tyre cautions against those "garrulous polymaths stuffed with learning" who set up shop in the agora and sell virtue.[427] Lucian, however, who must be seen as portraying contemporary experience,[428] widens the scope of these garrulous polymaths (sophists) to include charlatan philosophers, demonstrating that the trend during the second century was towards dissembling and not philosophizing.[429] The sophistic slide towards pleasure reflected the desires of the audience, and the intense competition (*philotimia*) between sophists, while the Roman commodification of virtue and *paideia* into the realm of spectacle reified the underlying agent of this change.

The wider scope of my paper is to show that spectacle with its alluring decadent façade was one factor, among many, that ruptured ancient Hellenism, one which even ruptured the very path to *paideutic* moral virtue. Just as Hermes delighted in leading the traveller astray, so the sophists and pseudo-philosophers led their acolytes, through

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[426] There was a sudden increase in festivals in the early empire, see Newby 2006.
[427] Plutarch, *De audiendo* 42C; Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 27.8: τὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν γένος, τὸ πολυμαθὲς τοῦτο καὶ πολύλογον καὶ πολλῶν μεστὸν μαθημάτων, καπηλεῦον ταῦτα καὶ ἀπεμπολοῦν τοῖς δεομένοις· ἀγορὰ πρόκειται ἀρετῆς, ὤνιον τὸ χρῆμα.
[428] Brunt 1994, 37-50.
[429] See Brunt 1994 where he posits philosophy as the true centre of intellectual activity during the Second Sophistic pointing to Plutarch, Epictetus, and Galen who did not fall into spectacle and vice.

thickets of diction, into labyrinths of eloquence without substance, providing the right conditions for another moral ideology to replace it.[430] The great Christian theologian Origen (184/185 – 253/254 AD) observed,

> οὕτως ἡ προνοουμένη θεία φύσις οὐ τῶν πεπαιδεῦσθαι νομιζομένων μόνον τὰ Ἑλλήνων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν συγκατέβη τῇ ἰδιωτείᾳ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀκροωμένων, ἵνα ταῖς συνήθεσιν αὐτοῖς χρησαμένη λέξεσι προκαλέσηται ἐπὶ ἀκρόασιν τὸ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν πλῆθος.
>
> The divine nature, which cares not only for those supposed to have been educated in Greek learning but also for the rest of humankind, came down to the level of the ignorant multitude of hearers, that by using language (λέξεσι) familiar to them it might encourage the mass of the common people to listen.[431]

The Hellenism endorsed by Rome, that of a mimetic performance of the past replete with classical diction, was too foreign for contemporary Greeks. Changes in the grammar, morphology, and pronunciation of *koine* Greek (common or non-elite Greek) were at odds with the archaizing Attic of the sophists, rendering sophistic declamation inaccessible and incomprehensible.[432] Thus Greeks sought an ideology that had synchronic impact. That ideology was Christianity.[433]

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[430] See Schmitz 1999, 85-86: Identity falls apart when large strata of the population derive their self-image from sources other than this tradition, such as the religious identity that early Christianity offered.
[431] Origen, *Contra Celsum* VII.60.
[432] See Swain 1996; Swain 2007b. It was an esoteric Greek, whose composition required a mastery of ancient forms. The complex constructions of classical Greek were no longer possible in *koine* Greek. In the verb, the subtle difference of mood between the subjunctive and the optative could not be sustained because key forms had fallen together as the oral distinction between long and short vowels disappeared. Other grammatical forms simply became obsolete.
[433] See Brown 1971 and Brown 1978 for excellent analyses to late antiquity. For a more recent survey, see Bowersock, Brown, and Grabar 1999. For the relationship of *paideia* and power in late antiquity, see Brown 1992. For the relationship between rhetoric and Christianity, see Cameron 1991.

APPENDIX 1: DECLAMATION IN THE SECOND CENTURY AD[434]

Aristotle's treatise on classical rhetoric distinguished three basic types (*γένη*) of speech: *symbouleutikon, dikanikon, epideiktikon* (deliberative, forensic, demonstrative).[435] The literary genre known as "declamations" (*μελέτη*) was regarded as belonging to the third group. Declamation did not have a specific practical purpose of winning a case through legal argumentation (forensic rhetoric) or convincing an assembly through political address (deliberative rhetoric). Its goal was not to persuade the listeners to form a judgment about the past or make a decision about the future. Rather, it sought simply to impress the audience and win their applause. Declamation revolved around historical or quasi-historical topics and served as practice for the speaker (*μελέτη* = exercise), as entertainment for the public, or as display of the rhetorician's talents (thus, *epideictic* rhetoric). That is to say, declamation is at home not in the courtroom or the assembly but in the school, and with it the school took on the character of a theatre in which the rhetorician was at centre-stage, not as a pedantic teacher but as a virtuoso performer whose performances were called declamations.

The decline of the Greek *polis* and the rise of the Principate profoundly affected the oratory and rhetoric in the Mediterranean world. When significant political decisions were no longer arrived at through democratic debate but were made by the emperor, deliberative rhetoric lost much of its *raison d'être*. When serious judicial decisions were not reached through local courts with juries of peers, but transferred to imperial officials who came in from the outside, forensic rhetoric lost much of its appeal. With the rise of the empire, however, epideictic rhetoric did not suffer the same negative effects.

[434] In general, see Schaps 2011, 130-140, for a very short overview; for an in depth study, see Russell 1983.
[435] *Rh.* 1358a36-1359a36

Education remained important, for they provided a means to increase one's influence or to raise one's station within a society built around class and hierarchy. In a world of patrons and clients, the skilled orator is always at an advantage. Thus epideictic rhetoric and declamation became especially popular in the imperial period.

Declamations fell into two basic groups. The main sub-categories were the *suasoriae* and the *controversiae*. The former presented a persuasive argument for or against something, much like deliberative rhetoric.[436] The latter usually comprised a pair of antithetical speeches which argued two sides of a case or presented two opposing positions, similar to forensic oratory. In *suasoriae* the speaker typically 'advised' famous characters from the past what to do at critical junctures in their careers. In *controversiae* the speaker assumed the role of the litigants or their advocates in an imagined law-suit.

The subjects or themes of declamations, largely based on tradition, were fictional since they were made up by the speaker, often determined on short notice, or proposed by the audience right on the spot. On the one hand there were subjects dealing with mythological or historical situations, and on the other hand there were subjects treating legal or moral dilemmas postulated in the present. As audiences often proposed themes and topics, the rhetorician had little time for organizing his thoughts. This process sharpened one's skills at speaking extemporaneously, but it was not the faint of heart.[437] In both types of declamation, literary license allowed the distortion of received history or the fabrication of convoluted situations.[438]

On occasion teachers of rhetoric would declaim before their students to provide a model to emulate, and as teachers became more recognized their declamations could be

[436] *Cf.* Quintilian 3.8.6.
[437] See Polemon and gladiator in Philostratus.
[438] See Bowersock 1994 on the fictive element of literature of this period.

presented in front of a larger audience. In cases of accomplished performances this practice brought fame, even renown to the rhetor. The 42 sophists of Philostratus's *Vitae Sophistarum* certainly rose to celebrity status through their impressive declaiming. Advanced students were expected to master both types of declamation. After beginning with grammar and then working through the *progymnasmata* (*προγυμνασμάτα*, "preparatory exercises"), the curriculum[439] culminated in the practice of declaiming.[440] Of the two types, *controversiae* were viewed as by far the more challenging.[441]

However, the declamations were criticized harshly from many quarters because of their hackneyed themes, their distortions of history and reality, and their bombastic style.[442] The orator Cassius Severus remarked that "everything is superfluous in declamation; declamation is itself superfluous."[443]

[439] Interestingly Philostratus refers to the curriculum as a *dromos* (path), *VS* 587, which recalls ps.-Kebes's *Tabula.*
[440] *Cf.* Marrou 1956 on education in antiquity.
[441] Tacitus, *Dial.* 35.4.
[442] Philostr., *VS* 595-6; Lucian, *Rh.Pr.*. 10, 17-8; Seneca, *Contr.* 7.6.24.
[443] Seneca, *Contr.* 3.12: *In scholastic quid non supervacuum est, cum ipsa supervacua sit.*

APPENDIX 2: THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE *TABULA* OF PS.-KEBES

The *Tabula*'s ultimate antecedents were Hesiod (*Op.* 287-292) and Prodicus, both of which were reproduced serially in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 2.1.20-34. Hesiod presented the life of effortless ease and the life of virtuous toil as a choice between two roads, the one easy but ultimately destructive, the other hard and steep but ultimately rewarding. Prodicus combined the diverging roads with a pair of contrasting allegorical figures in his myth of Herakles at the crossroads, exposed to the blandishments of Virtue and Vice.

In Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, we find a discussion between Socrates and Aristippus concerning what education is fit for a ruler and what for pleasure (2.1.1-34). They determine that the one who can neglect one's own needs and desires, such as food, thirst, sleep, and sex, for the benefit of the many is best equipped for this education. When Socrates asks Aristippus which educational training he would pursue, he replies "pleasure": ἐμαυτόν γε μέντοι τάττω εἰς τοὺς βουλομένους ᾗ ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἥδιστα βιοτεύειν, "to be sure, I station myself with those who desire to live the easiest and most pleasurable life" (2.1.9). In order to prove that the virtuous path of abstention is better, Socrates then quotes Hesiod (*Works and Days,* 287-292):[444]

> τὴν μέν τοι κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἑλέσθαι
> ῥηιδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει·
> τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν
> ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν
> καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται,
> ῥηιδίη δὴ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπὴ περ ἐοῦσα.
>
> Vice is easily taken in abundance;
> The path is smooth, and it lies quite nearby;
> But in front of virtue the immortal gods have placed sweat [for Mortals];
> long and steep is the path to her [Virtue]

[444] Concerning these lines, refer to M. L. West's superb commentary where he translates *κακότης* and *ἀρετή* not "vice" and "virtue" but as "inferior" and "superior" standing in society (material prosperity, see line 284), Hesiod (287-292), M.L. West 1978, 229.

> And it is rough at first; but when one reaches the top,
> Then the path becomes easy, although it was difficult.

According to Hesiod, mortals should strive towards a virtuous life, which therefore entails toil. When Herakles approaches the two paths of life, Virtue and Vice personified as two women appear before him. Each implores him to follow her on their respective paths. Their appearances are striking. Virtue has a modest appearance (σχήμα σωφροσύνη), her body is adorned with purity and a white robe, and a proper (εὐπρεπῆ) nature, whereas Vice, who calls herself Happiness, is soft and plumb, made up (κεκαλλωπισμένην) to heighten her natural colour. She was also dressed so as to disclose all her charms. She offers Herakles a life of ease, having all the food, drink, and sex he pleases, as well as living off the toil of others. Virtue approaches next, appealing to Herakles's divine parentage, and declares, much like Hesiod, that all good things in life come through toil. Then she goes on to disparage Vice's easy road, finally extolling the long road of toil as it is honoured among the gods and brings praise among men. The tale ends there, but in Dio (1.58ff) we encounter the tale of Herakles who chooses the noble path.[445] Hermes was sent as his guide and he conducted him over a secret path untrodden by men (αὐτὸν ἄφραστον καὶ ἄβατον ἀνθρώποις ὁδόν, 66) to one mountain with two peaks, Peak Royal and Peak Tyrannous, though Dio explains that the mountain appears to only have one peak to the observer at its base. When Herakles beheld Lady Royalty she was beautiful and stately, clothed in white raiment, and her countenance was at once radiant and full of dignity. Lady Tyranny, however, had a multi-coloured robe, wore a leer of false humility instead of a friendly smile, and was in love with gold. In general,

[445] See especially 1.64-65 where Herakles is said to have noble impulses and desired to rule not for pleasure and personal gain, but rather to do the greatest good for the greatest number of people.

things were in disorder, and everything suggested vainglory, pretension, and luxury (ἀλλὰ πρὸς δόξαν ἅπαντα καὶ ἀλαζονείαν καὶ τρυφήν, 1.79). Thus Herakles picks Lady Royalty, saying that he considers Lady Tyranny "utterly odious and abominable" (ταύτην δὲ τὴν ὑστέραν ἐχθίστην ἔγωγε ἡγοῦμαι καὶ μιαρωτάτην, 83). But while the *Tabula* is so phrased as to recall the Prodicean myth at several significant points,[446] it also recalls over exempla,[447] and went on to influence other works of the Second Sophistic.[448] Lucian's *Hermotimus,* for instance, clearly grafts onto the motif laid out in Hesiod, but also that of the *Tabula*. The discussion of Virtue living in a citadel (2, 4, 22), the long and arduous path to reach it (2-5), the many who begin but turn back (5), and the city of virtue being devoid of the desire for gold, glory, and pleasures certainly have their parallels in the *Tabula*.

[446] See Fitzgerald & White 1983, 144-5, on the use of the exclamation ὦ Ἡράκλεις, "Herakles!", where it is "placed at those points where the content of the expression seems to point toward the Prodicus myth."
[447] See Simonides, fr. 579 PMG, where Virtue is located at the top of a cliff; Parmenides for the view of purposeful progression and confused wandering to express the difference between true and deluded views of reality, DK 28 B 2, B 6.3-9; multiple allegorical figures where the Virtues were subservient to Pleasure in Chrysippus's attack on Epicurean hedonism, Cic. *Fin*. 2.21.69; see also Plato's myths of life's pilgrimage, the *Republic*'s Myth of Er (617de, 620d-621a); comparison can also be drawn between the upward path of Virtue and Happiness, followed by a return to the regions of the unenlightened, with the course sketched in the allegory of the Cave, which likewise involves upward progress followed by a return to the lower darkness, *Rep.* 514a-518b, esp. 517d. See also Matthew 7:13-14, the choice between the broad path to destruction and the narrow way to life. Finally, see the Pythagorean Y, a graphic symbol that abstractly represents the diverging paths of evil and good, easy and hard.
[448] Fitzgerald and White 1983, 7, say that "the *Tabula* was clearly an influential work…Lucian and Tertullian know the work and it is likely that Julius Pollox does as well." Lucian in *On Salaried Posts* and in *The Teacher of Rhetoric* directly mentions Kebes's and his*Tabula*, while the theme of multiple paths to virtue and vice appear to tacitly refer to ps.-Kebes's *Tabula* in *Hermotimus* and *The Dream*. For satire to be successful, the audience must also know the foundation text, ps.-Kebes's *Tabula*.

APPENDIX 3: SUMMARY OF THE *TABULA* OF PS.-KEBES

The *Tabula* opens with a group of young men who enter the temple of Kronos where they find many votive offerings. Amongst these offerings is a tablet (*πίναξ*) on which is painted a scene depicting neither a city nor a military camp but three enclosures. The painting is populated by many female figures. At the entrance to the first enclosure stands a crowd of people waiting to go into the enclosure. An old man also stands at this entrance instructing those who are entering. What this tablet means is a mystery to the young men who are viewing it.

Another old man, the old exegete, approaches the young men seeing their confusion and offers to explain the meaning of the *Tabula*, for he had been taught its secrets by the philosopher who dedicated it to the temple many years before. The old exegete cautions that inherent in the explanation of the *Tabula* there is a certain risk and danger: those who fail to comprehend it properly were doomed to inextricable folly and misery.

The old exegete begins his exegesis of the *Tabula*. The outer enclosure represents Life, and the old man at the entrance to Life is called Daimon. He tells those entering which path to take in Life, to never trust Fortune, and to be indifferent towards her gifts, to trust only in the safe and secure gift of Education (*Paideia*): true knowledge of what is advantageous. After receiving their instructions from the Daimon, but before entering the enclosure Life, they meet an enthroned woman, counterfeit in character (γυνὴ πεπλασμένη τῷ ἤθει, 5), sitting by the gate. Her name is Deceit and she makes everyone entering Life drink her potion of error and ignorance, which causes them to forget the Daimon's instructions. When the crowd enters the enclosure of Life three groups of

women (Opinions, Desires, and Pleasures) leap forth and embrace/entwine (πλέκονται, 6)[449] themselves around those entering one-by-one. They lead them off in all directions, some to their doom, others to their salvation. Close by is Fortune (Τυχή), who stands on an orb dispensing and taking back such things as wealth, reputation, noble birth (εὐγένεια, 8), children, tyrannies, and kingdoms. She is blind, mad, and deaf. The gifts she disperses are neither safe nor secure.

The old exegete next directs our attention to another enclosure within Life, that of Luxury. Standing at the gate to Luxury are four women: Incontinence, Profligacy, Covetousness, and Flattery. They are all dressed as courtesans, and they leap forth, sexually embrace (συμπλέκονται), flatter, and coax those who have received something from Fortune, trying to persuade them that within Luxury lays the good life. After those who have entered Luxury have become slaves to these women and are acting disgracefully and indulging in every vice for their sake, they are handed over to Retribution. Grief, Sorrow, Lamentation, and Despondency are her companions. Those who are not chosen by Repentance to escape this place are thrown into the House of Unhappiness to live out the rest of their lives in total misery (10).

The lucky few are taken by Repentance to different Opinions and Desires, who take them to another enclosure, that of False Education. False Education stands at the gate to her enclosure and appears altogether pure; most rash men call her Education. Clustering around False Education, these men—poets, orators, dialecticians, Hedonists, Peripatetics, and others—have been deceived into thinking that they are consorting with True Education. However, as outside the enclosure, Incontinence and the other Vices roam within False Education's enclosure. Deceit's potion of ignorance and error still

[449] See the sexual connotations of this word in Lucian's *Dialogues of the Courtesans*.

obscures the judgement and opinions of those within False Education's enclosure, and it is not until drinking True Education's purifying drink that Deceit's potion will be overcome. The only path to True Education and Happiness is through the enclosure of False Education. False Education can bestow helpful gifts for those about to embark on the journey to True Education and Happiness, but they are not necessary for success on the steep path to True Education (33-5).

The path to True Education is arduous, and few take this path (15). It tracks through a deserted wasteland, both rough and rocky, then a narrow mountain ascent with a deep precipice on either side. At the summit is a great rock with sheer sides, atop of which stand Temperance and Perseverance stretching forth their hands to help and encourage those who make it this far to surmount the boulder, and to give them strength and courage before setting them upon a more easy path which leads to a beautiful meadow. Within the meadow is the enclosure of Happiness. Standing beside the gate is True Education, a beautiful woman with a composed countenance, mature in judgement, and wearing a simple, unadorned robe. She stands on a square, firmly set rock[450] with her two daughters, Truth and Persuasion. True Education cures those arriving at her enclosure with a drink of her purifying powers, riding them of all the evils of Deceit and all the vices of the first enclosure. Then she leads them into the enclosure to Knowledge and the other Virtues: Courage, Justice, Goodness, Moderation, Propriety, Freedom, Self-Control, and Gentleness (Ἀνδρεία, Δικαιοσύνη, Καλοκἀγαθία, Σωφροσύνη, Εὐταξία, Ἐλευθερία, Ἐγκράτεια, Πρᾳότης, 20.3). The Virtues are seemly with simple, non-luxurious dress, and they present themselves in their natural (ἅπλαστοί) form, and in no way embellish (κεκαλλωπισμέναι) their appearance like the Vices do. The Virtues then

[450] Compare this rock with Fortune's unstable orb.

lead those who have managed to persevere to their mother, Happiness.[451] It is Happiness who crowns the paideutic soul with her power as do all the other Virtues just like those who have won victories in the greatest *agons* (22). Having mastered all the vices, the Virtues lead them back to the first enclosure of Life, where they live nobly, understanding the plight from which they themselves have escaped.

The path to True Education is, however, too arduous for most. They turn back in a sad wretched state having been either rejected by Education or having failed to ascend to Perseverance. Griefs, Pains, Despondencies, Dishonours, and Ignorances surround them, and when they arrive at Luxury's enclosure they slander Education and those who have attained Happiness, and they praise Profligacy and Incontinence. At this point the story portrayed on the πίναξ is complete, and the discussion of the text turns towards the meaning of the *Tabula*, in particular two points which still puzzled the young men: the value of education (33-5); and the denial that the gifts of Fortune are truly good (36-43). True knowledge is thus defined as knowledge of what is truly advantageous in which the paideutic soul knows that only the Virtues are advantageous. The dialogue concludes with a final exhortation by the old exegete to take his teachings to heart.

[451] Happiness is surrounded by numerous daughters: Knowledge, Freedom, etc.

APPENDIX 4: *PHILOTIMIA* IN THE *CORINTHIACA*

The pursuit of *time* (*τιμή*, "honour") was paramount to identity, and "competition" (*philotimia*, lit. "love of honour") was a central concept of this pursuit that oscillated between public service (euergetism) and personal ambition.[452] All sophists relished fame,[453] and nowhere else in Philostratus's *Vitae Sophistarum* do the words and cognates of *φιλότιμος* and *φιλοτιμία* occur more often than in his section on Favorinus. Five of the seven occurrences in his work cluster around the fierce competition between Favorinus and his rival Polemon; τιμή and its cognates appear over 20 times in the *Corinthian Oration*. However, Favorinus was concerned with much more than mere temporal honour. In the wake of his missing statue, he had to resort to other less tangible/manifest means of acquiring honour; he acquired it through a metamorphosis of λίθος into λόγος, stone into speech.

A quick summary of the oration is as follows. Favorinus's statue is missing from the library in Corinth; this injustice and dishonour must be addressed. Favorinus's opening gambit compares himself with prior distinguished visitors to Corinth (1-7).[454] The honour of setting up his statue "in a front row seat" in the library constitutes the climax of the catalog of distinguished visitors, and the *peripeteia* of Favorinus's fortunes. Next follows the mythic and just past of the city of Corinth, and the tacit comparison that

[452] On *philotimia*, see Plut. *Otho* 10.1; Jos. *BJ* 5.310-1. On honour in general, see Lendon 1997. *Euergetism* is beyond the scope of this paper. But see Dio of Prusa on his discussion of *philotimia* and *euergetism* and the men who strove "for accretions to their reputation and honours and greater power than others and crowns and seats of honour and purple garments, and having fixed their gaze upon them and hanging upon them, they do and say those things which will gain them reputation" (34.29, δόξας καὶ τιμάς). It is a good passage for bringing out the disproportion between the desire for power and the desire for prestige. *Cf.* Philostr., *VS* 551-2; Pliny, *Ep.* 5.11.

[453] Gleason 122.

[454] Even Arion, whose magical voice enticed dolphins to save him after Corinthian sailors had forced him overboard, was not received so warmly. Favorinus did not explicitly state "Corinthian" but subtly reminded the Corinthians of their past.

present day Corinth does not measure up to its illustrious past (10-23). Favorinus, himself a non-Greek, establishes himself as the paradigm for everyone to follow in regards to the transformative power of *paideia* (25-27). He then covers an array of topics ranging from his accusation of adultery, the city of Corinth, and the nature of statues. The tone, however, changes in his peroration (43-7). Human honour and fame are ephemeral, and a material statue is not the essence of a man. Rather, a man acquires eternal fame through the spoken word, through oral narrative. It is memory not stone or bronze that transmits a man into posterity, memory recalled and vocalized to present a multiplicity of presences so that the man is not forgotten and cheated of honour.

Human honour is ephemeral (9). To suggest the poignant impermanence of worldly glory, Favorinus appropriates a line from Homer, *Od*. 11.222, substituting one word, "honour" for Homer's "soul" which introduces a number of themes that would be important later on in the oration (ps.-Dio, 37.9):

> τιμὴ δ' ἠΰτ' ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται
> "Honour, dreamlike, flitters about and flies away"

The Homeric lines appear in the *Nekuia* where Odysseus talks to the *ψυχή* (soul) of his mother, Antikleia. He desperately tries to embrace her three times, but each time she flutters through his arms like a shadow or a dream (Od. 11.208-9). Since Favorinus's statue is missing, his honour was likewise as insubstantial as Antikleia's flittering soul. The statue itself was Favorinus's honour made manifest, to take it down was a loss of honour. Honour functioned as a sort of "common currency," by means of which various individual attributes could be tallied, thus providing an overall estimation of a man. However, the calculation was accomplished in the context of a highly varied and variable

opinion-community; hence, honour is seldom static.[455] The notion that statues should be valid for all time (29) in reality is proven false as they are subject to the whims of humanity, or buffeted by nature (20). It is with this in mind that we can understand Favorinus's statement that statues are mortal, Ἥιδειν θνητὸν γεγεννηκώς (37).[456] However, it is not just statues that are mortal, but materiality. Time left only the words of the bronze self-announcing (ἀυτάγγελε) maiden who marked Midas's tomb, for which they sought but never found (38-9). Time devours all materiality, and one should not expose the body to the vicissitudes of stone or bronze (43). The mislabelling of statues in the wake of the Roman conquest of Greece, the misappropriation of Greek character to Roman fortune (τρόπον μὲν Ἑλλήνων <ἔχουσι>, τύχας δὲ Ῥωμαίων, 40), cheats men of honour, and highlights the ephemeral nature of human honour (40-2). Much like Ovid who contrastes the mortality of the world of law and the forum with poetry's lasting fame (*fama perennis, Amores* 1.15.7-8), Favorinus sought eternal fame through memory. Stone withers away, but spoken utterances have a life of their own, perpetually bringing forth life to the departed man. Horace's *Odes* 3.30 implies the metaphor of writing (performance): it surpasses bronze, both statuary and inscription. Its longevity is not due to materiality but to the author's continuing to be spoken of after death (*dicar*, 10). Favorinus wishes it were possible to be set free from the body (εἴθε γὰρ εἴη καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀπηλλάχθαι, 43). The body (σώμα) itself is a container—a sack (θύλᾰκον; περικείμενος, 45)—, a mere material repository for the essence of a man, without blood or soul (ἄναιμος, ἄψυχος, 45).[457] Referencing the soul, Favorinus wished to project his

[455] See Lendon 1997.
[456] *Cf.* Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* 2.55.2.
[457] Much philosophical thought has been written on the metaphysics of the soul, e.g. Plato, *Phaedo* 115E and *Axiochus* 365E.

essence into the metaphysical realm, transcending materiality and the ineluctable fate of stone, bronze, and the body.

The malleability and loss of honour intrinsic in statuary leaves only one option: the metaphysical topos of fame. Favorinus bid farewell to stone, bronze, imitative crafts, and both Daedalus and Prometheus, χαιρέτω δ' ὁ Δαίδαλος καὶ τὰ Δαιδάλου μιμηλὰ τεχνήματα· ἄδην Προμηθέως, ἄδην πηλοῦ (44). By leaving Daedalus, a master craftsman, and Prometheus, the fashioner of man's body from clay, behind he transcends the body, clearly placing himself into the realm of the metaphysical. Favorinus's next example is the strongest proof that he wanted to achieve immortal fame. He conjures up the memory and legend of Aristeas of Proconnesus (Hdt. 4.13-15). Herodotos recorded the strange stories of Aristeas in his *Histories*. Aristeas went into a fuller's shop in Proconnesus and died there; the fuller shut up his shop and went to tell Aristeas's family. Then a man of Cyzicus arrived, who said that he had just met Aristeas between Artace and Cyzicus and conversed with him.[458] The fuller disputed this vehemently, but when he went back to his shop with the family they did not find Aristeas inside, alive or dead. Seven years later Aristeas appeared in Proconnesus and composed the epic poem now called the *Arimaspeia*, and, when he had finished it, disappeared a second time. Two hundred and forty years later Aristeas appeared at Metapontum in southern Italy,[459] and ordered the people to set up an altar to Apollo and a named statue of himself to stand beside it. He said that Apollo came to them alone of the Italiote Greeks and that he himself accompanied him in the shape of a raven. On advice from Delphi the

[458] Artace is the port of Cyzicus.
[459] Metapontum was in the district of Lucania, which had been colonized predominantly by Ionians. The man to whom Favorinus compared himself in regards to worthiness for a statue came from Lucania (37.24-5).

Metapontines did as the apparition told them.[460] Favorinus, after comparing his experience with that of Aristeas, proclaims ἀλλὰ καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον ἔζη Ἀριστέης, "Aristeas was alive then, lives now, and will live always" (46).[461] Just as Aristeas will always live, so too will Favorinus. Borrowing a couple of lines from Hesiod (*Opera et dies* 763-4), Favorinus intones:

> φήμη δ' οὔ τις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἥντινα πολλοὶ
> λαοὶ φημίξουσι· θεός νύ τίς ἐστι καὶ αὐτή.
>
> But fame is never utterly destroyed
> Which many people voice; a goddess she.

A silent stone statue ("O mute semblance of my eloquence," 46) has no narrative, whereas λόγος on the lips of another perpetuates fame beyond the parochial boundaries of space and time. Favorinus bid farewell to banausic craft (44), preferring a statue of λόγος to λίθος.[462]

[460] See also Plutarch, *Romulus* 28, where he made him appear after death near Croton; Strabo 589c called him a magician as well as a poet.
[461] This is reminiscent of Hesiod, *Theogony* 38, where the Muses know τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα.
[462] Gleason 1995 (and König 2001 following her lead) seems to focus too much on the quasi-physical resurrection of Favorinus's statue, but given the preceding phrases it is clear that Favorinus was not resurrecting his statue but instead establishing himself in the unforgettable and untouchable realm of fame and memory. His statue is but a "silent semblance of [his] eloquence" (46), whereas memory and fame can be audible utterances, thus an audible narrative. Statues have the potential and have in the past "cheated sundry others" of remembrance (47).

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