Educating for Meaning:

Who am I, *really*?

(Identity and Creativity: Putting Two and Two Together)

A Critical Analysis *in*-formed by Poetic and Narrative Perspectives

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If it were not for McGill's DISE (Department of Integrated Studies in Education), there would be no dissertation on identity and creativity (at least not mine). Reticent at first to approach my *alma mater* with an understandably less-than-concrete proposal for studying an invisible and indefinable subject, I was more than pleasantly surprised when Dr. Anthony Paré assured me that, indeed, McGill would be interested in what I might have to offer. Words cannot express the gratitude I feel for having had the ensuing good fortune to meet Dr. Teresa Strong-Wilson who is my Academic Supervisor. Dr. Strong-Wilson exemplifies for me the meaning in 'educating for meaning'. In her role as my educator/supervisor, not once did she tell me what to write or how to write, but many times over she gave me, instead, pivotal suggestions and showed me ways for more clearly expressing what I wanted to say. If there is any mastery and mystery to the mundane and practical aspects of the present dissertation, credit must go to Dr. Strong-Wilson. I am very grateful for her patient and intuitive presence in my work, for her close attention in reading my drafts and for the provoking feedback she provided. In the educative process under the supervision of Dr. Strong-Wilson, I came to know who I am *really*.

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I would like to acknowledge the publications that have provided a welcoming context for my work: *LEARNing Landscapes*, Editor, Dr. Lynn Butler-Kisber; *The International Journal of the Arts in Society,* Editor, Dr. Bill Cope; and the 2012 anthology *A Heart of Wisdom: Life Writing as Empathetic Inquiry,* Editors, Drs. Cynthia Chambers, Erika Hasebe-Ludt, Carl Leggo and Anita Sinner. Chapter I "A Question of Identity" is a reconfiguration of a chapter published in *A Heart of Wisdom* under the title "Conscious Awakening: From Impersonator to Loving Teacher" (Dobson, 2012, p. 252). "Identity and Creativity: Putting Two and Two Together" (Dobson, 2012,

pp. 201-214) appeared under the same title in an article published in *LEARNing Landscapes* 2012, 6 (1), *Creativity: Insights, Directions, and Possibilities*. Chapter X of the dissertation is a reconfiguration of this article.

Lastly, I am deeply grateful for the intrepid explorers who have preceded me in my quest. In the hard-won perspectives of these outstanding scholars and thinkers (see Chapter II), I have uncovered a wealth of knowledge and information that has not only guided my steps along the way, but has inadvertently formulated the strong framework on which my work depends.

Abstract

Motivated by a strong resonance between my lived experience and Arendt's (1974) astute appraisal of the human condition—especially her observation that we have lost *who* we are in *what* we do—I begin this exploration with a question of identity. Who am I *really*? While personal to me, the question is also integral to education. How on earth can we know *what* we are doing if we don't know *who* we are? By elucidating the mystery of *who*, and by examining the formal and informal educational conditions and practices that may support and/or stifle the experience of *who*, I uncover a vital connection between identity and creativity.

"Questions, not method, are the heart of research" (Munro Hendry, 2010). Can there be any question more urgent than the question of identity? The question *who* at the heart of this inquiry challenges the "construction of identity" at the heart of modern schooling whereby *raison d'être* (meaning) has been eclipsed by *savoir faire* (know-how). This thesis holds that education (from the Latin, to draw forth from within) and schooling (to indoctrinate from without) are not the same. Poetic and narrative perspectives inform the methodology of an inquiry intended to serve as a living example of an educational quest for meaning in a concurrent search for self. Poetic inquiry—a way of finding out by finding in—evokes the meaningful uncertainty of *doing* research by *being* in the work; and storytelling invokes the *élan* of lived experience from which meaning can most certainly appear. In the telling of tales out of school, I look for relevant insights, not fixed answers. Theoretical links between *being* and thinking (who), as distinct from *doing* and knowing (what) are subtly woven into an open-ended living story in which "the question of truth as it emerges in the experience of art" (Gadamer, 2011) illuminates the way and moves the inquiry forward. In putting two and two together, I mediate an artful and heartfelt reconciliation between formerly never-the-twain-shall-meet pairs of estranged opposites. In the invisible third dimension between a complementary of differences, and in sheer human togetherness, the mystery of the indefinable, yet identifiable *who*, the elusive subject of this dissertation, is finally unveiled. The implications of the unveiling form the practical grounds for discussing the contributions of this dissertation towards the reinvigoration of the meaning of education and the revision of the purpose of schooling.

Résumé

Inspirée par la finesse de l'évaluation de la condition humaine proposée par Hannah Arendt (1974)—surtout son observation que nous avons perdu *qui* nous sommes dans le *quoi* de nos réalisations—je pose la question suivante: Qui suis-je *vraiment*? La question, au fond très particulière à moi, s'implique autant profondément dans l'éducation. Comment savoir *quoi* faire sans connaître *qui* être? En élucidant le mystère de *qui*, et en cherchant les conditions éducatives et les pratiques professionnels qui puissent ou soutenir ou étouffer l'expérience vécue de *qui*, j'arrive à découvrir un lien essentiel entre l'identité et la créativité.

"Ce sont les questions, et non pas la méthode, qui animent la recherche" (Munro-Hendry, 2010). [Ma traduction] Est-ce qu'il y aie une question plus urgente que la question d'identité? La question d'identité au coeur de cette enquête met en question la "construction d'identité" au coeur des réformes scolaires modernes où la raison d'être fut éclipsée par le savoir-faire. La présente thèse tient en principe que l'éducation (du Latin, *educare*, amener ...) et la formation scolaire (entraîner ...) ne sont pas pareilles. La perspective poétique ainsi que la méthode narrative mènent l'investigation exemplaire d'une quête de raison d'être personnellement conçue qui s'embrasse aussi la recherche concourrante de soi. L'enquête poétique—un moyen de comprendre le visible par reconnaître l'invisible—évoque l'incertitude d'une véritable découverte conceptualisée comme "*faisant* le travail *étant présent* au travail" (Butler-Kisber, 2010). [Ma traduction] Par contre, la raconte des histoires invoque l'élan de l'expérience vécue d'où la raison d'être puisse certainement se réaliser. Dans les intérprétations qui suivent la raconte de "contes racontés hors de l'école", je m'intéresse plutôt à retrouver des perspicacités éclairantes qu'à établir les réponses conclusives. Les liens théoriques entre *être* et réfléchir (*qui*) sont différentiés des liens théoriques entre *faire* et savoir (*quoi*). Ces distinctions-là se trouvent subtilement incorporées dans l' histoire vivante de la thèse où "La question de vérité telle qu'elle s'élève de l'expérience de l'art ... (Gadamer, 2011) [Ma traduction] illumine le chemin et guide la quête. En remettant ensemble deux côtés qui sont idéologiquement opposés ainsi qu' habituellement séparés, j'obtiens par une médiation artistique et empathique une brave réconciliation entre les deux anciens étrangers. A la troisième dimension invisible qui existe *entre* les deux anciens combattants, un complément de différences semblable aux rencontres sympathiques entre les personnes qui se réunissent pour les raisons de *qui* et non pas pour les buts de *quoi*, le mystère de l'évasif, indéfinissable, mais quand-même identifiable sujet de cette thèse, c'est à dire "je" *sans nom*, est enfin dévoilé. Les implications du dévoilement formulent le base pratique qui fournit la discussion des contributions de cette thèse à la revigoration de la raison d'être de l'éducation et à la révision du sens de l'école.

Chapter I

A Question of Identity

The question holds the lantern.

(John O'Donohue, 2005)

"Who are you?" For most people such a question calls for a simple, straightforward answer that will likely include their name, address, family background, nationality, marital status, academic and/or vocational training, achievements, occupation, aspirations, beliefs, and other unique characteristics such as color of eyes and hair, weight and height. For me, however, things have never been quite so cut and dried. I have always been bothered by the niggling awareness that there was much more to my identity than can be acquired, derived, achieved, qualified, quantified and described. I grew up with no concrete facts or supporting evidence to verify my abstract notion of a larger, deeper invisible identity other than, of course, some religious or philosophical concepts I was taught about the 'soul'. Over time, like most people, I became accustomed to acting out the prescribed scripts of social, practical, political and professional life in order to live and find meaning within the parameters of the culture and worldview into which I was born. Behind the scenes, however, the gnawing awareness that an essential component of my identity was not being adequately incorporated into the picture continued to aggravate my resolve. In truth, I often felt more like an impersonator than a real person.

Eventually I became so skilled at pretence that even I began to believe in the veracity of my own performance. I have always had a wonderful imagination, and I learned to play just about any role to the hilt. I knew intuitively that I was not the person I pretended to be, and yet I had no difficulty identifying with the assigned or assumed role for the sake of affected authenticity. At the best of times, I could completely lose myself in my character. Sometimes my make-

believe depictions consisted of real-life *personae*, and at other times I took on the actual portrayals of characters on the stage. Acting the part became as easy as child's play. To me, it was all the same. The line between my contrived personality and my imagination had become so blurred that I could no longer tell where I left off and my character began. While the vague feeling that I was not the person I appeared to be persisted, overall I enjoyed being caught up in the everyday action of everyday life. In fact, I began to feel quite at home in the familiar all-the-world's-a-stage scenario that was being represented and accepted by most people around me as 'reality'.

Until one day. Things didn't start out well that morning. My husband had dropped me off at school during one of those nonsensical newly-weds' arguments. I was very upset by the discord. By the time I reached the door of my classroom, I found myself all worked up into a thick lather of funk. Stepping through the classroom door into the brightness of my students' eager anticipation, I was barely able to assume my role as their teacher, let alone feign the usual vibrancy and enthusiasm that my students had become accustomed to, and enamored with, in their pretty, young French teacher.

The daily lesson began on schedule. I was a 'pro' and had no trouble automatically taking my charges through the paces of an oral French class. Part of the drill consisted of modeling and repetition, in unison, of French vocabulary, phrasing and pronunciation. A lyrical rhythm of ebb and flow ensued as the students' voices echoed in choral response the sequences of tone and sounds that I set forth. Before long, the entire room was filled with a joyful cadence that could be likened to that of a well-tuned orchestra playing in sync with their conductor. The shining faces of my teen-aged students let me know that all thirty-three of them were as aware as I that something truly extraordinary was occurring between us. Then sharply and suddenly the bell rang, and the class was over.

"I just had the best time of my life, and I wasn't even there," I exclaimed to a colleague in an effort to articulate the incredible phenomenon that had just transpired in my classroom. The dramatic shift of the 'before' me, an ego-centered person-in-a-funk, to the 'after' me, a real person totally alive and exuberant held a crucial lesson for me. It turned out to be a turning

point from which there was no return. I became aware that the impersonator was no longer present in the teacher-student relationship that took form. I saw my new radiant 'self' reflected in my students' beaming faces. Before my very eyes was the actual evidence of an identity that up until now I had only sensed as present. If not the impersonator, then, I asked myself, who was the real teacher in the classroom that day? That is the question that has prompted my relentless personal quest for an identity that includes, but goes beyond, the socially derived and personally contrived version I had almost resigned myself to accept as "I".

After many years of study and exploration on the subject, the experiences and discoveries of my dogged search have brought me full circle. Wondering about the possible implications that my research may have in the raising of children in general, and in teaching and learning in particular, I have come back to the figurative drawing board in the form of a doctoral program in the Department of Integrated Studies in Education at McGill University. It has taken me a while to get here—it has been a long, circuitous and challenging road—but I have finally turned my personal experience and quest, begun in earnest on that fateful day in my classroom many years ago, into an overarching question for my doctoral work. Just as I was unforgettably transformed from an ego-centered human impersonator into a real person in loving relationship with my students, today I ask the following question: Can the social, political and economic program of schooling—a systematic *régime* of teaching and learning designed to *make* something of our 'selves'—be transformed into education (from the Latin, *educare,* to lead forth *from within*) as a determined search for 'self' that is not socially, politically or economically engineered, but inwardly generated?

The question of this admittedly large inquiry includes a question of purpose. What is the purpose of education in the 21st century? Is it to continue to train up future generations in the upholding of a worldview that is in the throes of a major transformation with a very uncertain outcome? Or, is the purpose of education to provide the conditions for the emergence of a newly conscious human identity that is no longer dependent on external qualifications, quantifications and justifications for its sense of worth and meaning? Would not a self that is

powerfully generated and expressed from within also generate an integral sense of belonging and fulfillment? If we do not know who we are, how on earth can we know what we are doing?

The "before" person who entered her classroom that memorable day many years ago would not only have been unable to teach her class properly, she could have done harm to her students had she not been willing to let go of her preoccupation with herself in order to do her "real" job as a teacher. In a similar way, in retrospect, it seems to me that ego-centered, separate human identities will not serve us well in the 21st century as we step together, interdependently, into the uncertain future of the global village. My personal experience of a shift in identity from impersonator to "real" person, as I have attempted to describe it, may seem insignificant at face value; nevertheless, the change in identity, because it was recognized and consciously articulated—"'I' just had the best time of my life, and 'I' wasn't even there"—could hold possible significance for educators. The awareness of the two "I's", as articulated, may contain at least two important clues as to the essential nature of the shift in consciousness: (a) the letting go of a self-centered, self-preoccupied "I", and (b) the giving in to a loving "I" in relationship with others (especially others for whom one holds a sacred responsibility such as in the teacher-student relationship).

This is the question of identity at the heart of this inquiry. How the question may translate into a doctoral dissertation, and potentially into a transformed approach to education remains to be seen. Since "real" is not a concept, and since only concepts *about* reality can be taught, I am left with a dilemma. The last thing I want to see in education is a new and improved course or methodology for teaching "who I am" even if such an approach were to get past school policy makers and parents' committees. In all probability, a modern technique for teaching 'authentic identity', or some other facsimile, would not only be rejected outright by the powers that be, the results of such an unlikelihood would be disastrous at worst, or more of the same, at best.

My hope for education, and consequently for the possibility of new beginnings for mankind (Arendt, 1974), is that parents and teachers will become self aware through their own reflective living practice. There are strong indicators that such conscious awakening is well underway in many areas of human endeavour, but I see it as especially critical for teachers to do the inner

work. Through the living example of their mentors, children and students would have the opportunity to grow up knowing the fullness of *who* they are, and no longer be reduced in their thinking to *what* they have been conditioned to become. This dissertation puts forth an example of that inner work, as well as a rationale for why such work is critical to education.

"Only where things can be seen by many in a variety of aspects without changing their identity so that those who gather around them know that they see sameness in utter diversity can worldly reality truly and reliably appear" (Arendt, 1974, p. 57). I envision a world that is not conceptually produced, but artfully created by the thoughts, words and actions of people who know who they are. In the space of "in between" (Arendt, 1974; p. 242), I am fully confident that the healing of current rifts between people and nations can occur, diversity can flourish, and originality can bear the unprecedented. This is the world I have always imagined possible, but now I see that what I once only sensed to be true behind the scenes can become a practical, down-to-earth reality by reason of awakened and awakening human hearts and minds. It is after all a question of identity.

Chapter II

Exploring Identity in Education

How is it that we are conscious of the world around us, that we know what we know, and that we know that we know?

(Antonio Damasio, 1994 p. xvii)

By reading across different disciplines, for example, philosophy, humanities, psychology, biology, neuroscience, and education, this exploration will address the question of identity with a specific focus on the links between being and thinking (*who*) as distinct from doing and knowing (*what*). I first introduce Antonio Damasio (1994; 1999; 2003; 2010) who asks a question that strongly resonates with the question at the heart of this inquiry. Damasio elucidates the role of emotion and feelings in the ability to reason, and proposes a revised view of human beings more accurate that the one available today. Next, by way of contrast, Hall and du Gay (1996) support a rationale for the "construction of identity" as it currently appears in Western education. The "Quebec Education Program" (QEP) is presented as an example of an educational reform that adheres to constructivist theories. Highlighting the differences between constructivist and essentialist theories, Charles Taylor (1989; 1991) gives an account of the origins of the constructivist's view of modern identity that recognizes only the order of scientific explanation; and suggests, by way of comparison, that there may be retrievable truths in the Romantic ideal of 'self' as a revelation of the creative imagination. Henri Bergson (1998/1907; 2005/1908) joins the conversation and suggests that intelligence (the predominant experience of modern consciousness) and intuition (a lamp almost extinguished) represent two divergent aspects to one and the same problem. Bergson sees in the equal development of intellect and intuition the possibility of the reconstitution of a complete and perfect humanity. Following Bergson, Roy (2005) and Al-Saji (2005) offer their unique perspectives of Bergson's theories of duration and pure memory. Further complicating the question, Hannah Arendt

(1974) introduces the notion of identity in plurality in which the disclosure of 'who' in contradistinction to 'what' somebody is ... is implicit in everything somebody says and does (p. 179). By underscoring the distinctions between thinking and knowing and *who* and *what*, Arendt substantiates the links between thinking and being (*who*) and between knowing and doing (*what*). Higgins (2011) and Nussbaum (2010) express concern over the detrimental effects of the instrumentalist age on education and on the quality of modern life in general. Halstead (1996) describes what is happening in schools as a clash between economic liberalism and political liberalism for the control of education. Meanwhile the inspiring works of eminent visionary scholars, Maxine Greene (1965; 1973; 1984; 1995; 1998; 2008) and Elliot Eisner (1991, 1998, 2005; 2008), continue to shine a bright light on the dark, embattled grounds of a public education system embroiled in a struggle for control. Along with the voices of Greene and Eisner, the voices of Ted Aoki (1991; 2005) and Jerome Bruner (1969) are discernible above the fray. Put all together, the inspiring and thought-provoking perspectives in the following sections articulate a solid foundation for beginning a daunting exploration of the dynamic, multi-faceted, complex, "annoyingly subtle" and "most vexing" (Damasio, 1994, p. xvii) subject of this thesis, namely identity.

Identity, Creativity and the Study of Consciousness

To begin *in medias res* an exploration of the complementary of topics at the heart of this inquiry—identity, creativity, meaning and education—I turn to the rich source of information and inspiration I have discovered in the work of Antonio Damasio (1994; 1999; 2003; 2010). Damasio is David Dornsife Professsor of Neuroscience, Psychology and Neurology, and director of the Brain and Creativity Institute at the University of Southern California. For Damasio (1994), the most vexing of all questions is "How is it that we are conscious of the world around us, that we know what we know, and that we know that we know" (p. xvii)? To trace the progression of Damasio's thought through the first of his three books in order of their publication, namely *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain* (1994); *The Feeling*

of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (1999); and *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain* (2003), is to venture forth on a remarkable journey of self-discovery, and to find, by wonderful surprise, a scientific explanation for some of my deepest untutored intuitions about life. Damasio is sceptical of science's presumptions of objectivity and definitiveness. He says that he wrote *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain* as his side of the conversation with a curious and wise imaginary friend who knew little about neuroscience but much about life. Damasio "corrects" (quotation marks added) Descartes' error in the following statement: "The soul breathes through the body, and suffering, whether it starts in the skin or a mental image, happens in the flesh" (1994; p. xvii). In contemplating a case study of one of his patients who had received extensive damage to the right side of his brain, Damasio realized that at first he was overly concerned with the state of the patient's intelligence and the instruments of his rationality. He had not paid enough attention to the patient's emotions, he said. What soon became evident to Damasio in "Elliot's" behavior, however, aside from his extraordinary ability to demonstrate superior intellectual function on all standardized intelligence and psychological tests, was his complete inability to decide properly, especially when decisions involved personal or social matters. Elliot's predicament was to know, but not to feel. Damasio asks of such a predicament, "... is it fair to say that his soul was diminished or that he lost his soul" (p. 19)?

"Whatever questions one may have about who we are and why we are as we are, it is certain that we are complex living organisms with a body proper and a nervous system" (1994; p. 86). Damasio calls intuition "the covert, mysterious mechanism" by which we arrive at the solution of a problem without reasoning toward it (p. 188). Because the creative process on which the progress of science is based operates on the level of the subconscious, when we witness signs of creativity, explains Damasio, we are probably witnessing the integrated operation of sundry combinations of these devices (p. 191). The above observation holds important implications for understanding creativity and the role of creativity in the integrated processes of reason.

In *The Feeling of What Happens* (1999), Damasio states that the main purpose of the book is to present a progress report on the nature and human significance of feelings and related

phenomena as he sees them in his capacity of "neurologist, neuroscientist and regular user" (p. 6). He says, "Feelings are not a mere decoration added on to the emotions. Feelings can be and often are revelations of the state of life within the entire organism … lifting the veil in the literal sense of the term" (p. 6). Elucidating the neurobiology of feelings and their antecedent emotions contributes to our views of the mind-body problem, a problem of disconnectedness that is central to our understanding of who we are, he says. And, here is the crux of the matter as it pertains to education: "... understanding what feelings are, how they work, and what they mean is indispensable to the future construction of a view of human beings more accurate than the one currently available. Why? *Because the success or failure of humanity depends on large measure on how the public and the institutions charged with the governance of public life incorporate that revised view of human beings in principle and policies"* (p. 8, emphasis added).

Spinoza, as cited by Damasio, intuited that "[t]he striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing" (p. 36). Damasio carries the notion one step further to show the link between the integrity of emotion and feeling that is necessary for human social behavior, and for ethical behaviors which he calls a "subset of social behaviors", a "cornerstone of virtue" for a generous ethical system, according to Spinoza. Feelings help solve the non-standard problems involving creativity, judgment and decision-making, problems that require the display and manipulation of vast amounts of knowledge and allow us to process saliently. Damasio ascertains that until recently, the matter of creativity, judgment and decision-making has been a philosophical topic outside the realm of empirical science. It is only during the past decade that "the problem finally entered the scientific agenda, largely as a part of the investigation of consciousness" (p. 184). The ultimate step in the evolution of consciousness, according to Damasio, is the making of "conscience", from the Latin *con* (with) and *scientia* (knowledge), which suggests the gathering of knowledge (p. 230).

In the fourth and latest publication, *Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain*, Damasio (2010) describes the three perspectives from which he studies the mind: the introspective, the behavioral, and the neurological. From an evolutionary perspective, Damasio traces the biological process by which a living organism develops a consciousness of a human

self. The self-as-object, the material *me*, is for Damasio connected by *feelings of knowing* to the self-as-subject, as knower, a more elusive presence and sometimes "so annoyingly subtle" that it is there, but almost not there (p. 9 emphasis in text). The subtle nature of these *feelings of knowing* has been described in Chapter I as "gnawing background awareness".

Following lengthy and intricately detailed scientific explanations of how the brain and the conscious mind are put together, Damasio focuses his vision on the importance of educating what he calls the "cognitive unconscious" (p. 280). Knowing cognitively an ethical theory or principle does not take into account the role of the cognitive unconscious in the realm of actions, he says. In other words— to cite an example from my own experience in educational leadership—teaching or talking *about* ethics as part of a school's curriculum is not enough to ensure ethical behavior. Of this example, as well as other educational, social, political and cultural endeavors designed with the aim of making people behave according to moral and ethical standards, Damasio says the following: "... lawyers, judges, legislators, policy makers and educators need to acquaint themselves with the neurobiology of consciousness and decision-making. This is important to promote the writing of realistic laws and to prepare future generations for responsible control of their actions" (p. 283). Storytelling, "something brains do naturally," says Damasio, and the arts are the means to induce nourishing emotions and feelings. Furthermore, he says, art is a way to explore one's own mind and the minds of others. "Ultimately," Damasio suggests, "because the arts have deep roots in biology and the human body but can elevate humans to the greatest heights of thought and feeling, they become a way into the homeostatic refinement that humans eventually idealized and longed to achieve, the biological counterpart of a spiritual dimension in human affairs" (p. 296).

A mere sampling of information and insight gleaned from the above four volumes of Damasio's work has revealed more than empirical evidence with regard to the evolution of human consciousness; valuable insights proffered through Damasio's introspection and keen observation of life inspire a radical change in thinking about the neurobiological foundations of mind and self. As a result, a revised view of human beings that challenges the long-standing

idea that consciousness is somehow separate from the body has thus been scientifically and artfully gained.

Identity in Contemporary Education

To further establish a basis for exploring the implications of a revised view of human beings, as proposed by Damasio, we next examine the definitions and cultural formations of identity as they currently appear in contemporary education. “Who Needs ‘Identity’?” asks Stuart Hall (1996) in the title of a collection of essays assembled by Hall and du Gay (1996). The essays are about cultural identities and their meaning in contemporary social formations. The aim of the collection, as explained by the authors, is to open up a wide range of significant questions and possible lines of analysis on the question (and/or need) of identity in education. Hall, author of *Formations of Modernity* (1992a) and *Modernity and its Futures* (1992b), elaborates on the book’s debate: “There has been a veritable discursive explosion in recent years around the concept of identity, at the same moment as it has been subjected to a scorching critique” (1996, p. 1). “How is this paradoxical development to be explained?” Hall asks. “And where does it leave us with respect to the concept” (1996; p. 1)?

In answer to the above questions, Hall presents the paradox as a deconstruction critical of the notion of an integral, originary and unified identity, or what he calls “essentialist concepts”. Hall suggests that, in contrast to “essentialism”, a discursive approach sees identification as a “construction,” a process never completed, always in process (p. 3). What Hall is describing is the widely accepted notion of identity in contemporary education, a “process of becoming rather than being” (p. 4). It is not who we are or where we came from that matters so much as what we might become, how we have been represented, and how that bears on how we might represent ourselves. Identities are constituted within, not outside, representation, says Hall. He adds that the procedural construction of identity is not a “so-called return to roots, but a coming to terms with our routes” (p. 5).

In the same anthology, Bauman (1996) says that identity entered the modern mind and practice dressed from the start as an individual task. Bauman traces the individual's history as a pilgrim through time where time was no longer a river, but a collection of ponds and pools. In such a world, Bauman observes, "identities can be adopted and discarded like a change of costume" (p. 23). From pilgrim, the modern individual has progressed to "stroller," "vagabond," "tourist" and "player". For such "seekers," according to Bauman, "the world turns into a pool of potentially interesting objects, and the task is to squeeze out of them as much interest as they may yield" (p. 34).

The Québec Education Program (QEP) is an example of contemporary education that is based on a constructivist theory of identity. Building on previous reforms that have incorporated many of the innovations in Western education over the past two decades, the Québec Education Program was launched in 2001 at the elementary level and in 2005 at the secondary level. The QEP is a competency-based, cross-curricular program that targets its one objective "success for all" by adhering to behaviourist and constructivist theories. In Section 1.2 of the program outline, "Changing School: A Societal Choice", the QEP is described as a reform that "responds to social expectations" (p. 4). In response to society's demand for preparing students for a changing world, the QEP formulated its threefold mission statement: to provide instruction in a knowledge-based world; to socialize students in a pluralistic world; and to provide qualifications in a changing world. To this end, the three principal aims of the program are "the construction of a world-view", "the construction of identity" and "empowerment" (p. 6). Of particular relevance to the present inquiry on identity, creativity and meaning in education, the central focus of the QEP mission statement is the "construction of identity". (See Appendix I) What are the consequences of adhering to a constructivist theory of identity in education? Where does the contemporary idea of identity come from?

The Making of Modern Identity

An account of the origins of the constructivist view of modern identity, prevalent in contemporary education, can be found in Charles Taylor's (1989) *Sources of the Self: The*

Making of Modern Identity. According to Taylor, the origin of modern identity can be seen as a strand of "internalization." Meticulously following this strand, Taylor leads the reader through fundamental changes in the meaning of "moral reason," a concept analogous to "the good," or to "that which makes life worth living" which is at the core of Western thought. The classical notion of reason, as presented in Plato's *Ideas*, is "a vision of order in the cosmos" (Taylor, p. 21). This vision is central to Plato's idea of internalization or "self-mastery" as well as in the reasoned inward direction in Augustine's contemplation of God. By contrast, a derivative and deviant of classical internalization, the rationale for "the stance of disengagement which Descartes inaugurates and Locke intensifies" (p. 177) is defined procedurally "in terms of instrumental efficacy, or maximization of the value sought, or self-consistency" (p. 21). It is the latter stance of disengagement that is at the root of modern identity "constructed" to achieve a "quite self-sufficient certainty" based on "scientific evidence" (Taylor, p. 156). The rationale for this stance was reason itself; but not the inwardly turned moral reason of Plato and Augustine. Taylor explains the difference: "... the order of ideas ceases to be something we *find* and becomes something we *build*" (p. 144). Thus, modern identity, according to the constructivist's view, becomes some*thing* that can be "worked on" (p. 159). The growing ideal in modern society in this regard, says Taylor, is a human agent "who is able to remake himself by methodical and disciplined action" (p. 159).

Taylor's approach is one of retrieval. What has been forged over time, says Taylor, is a certain interiority of conscience that stands, in its best form, in stark contrast to what the critics of the modern era (the knockers) have to say about the modern self's self-serving atomistic tendencies. Taylor calls these misinterpretations and perversions of internalization "slides", i.e. digressions from the original creative impetus at the core of modern individualism. According to Taylor, there may well be retrievable essential truths in the Romantic ideal of "self" as a revelation of the creative imagination (p. 419) and, in particular, in Rousseau's theory of "the voice of nature within," which Taylor says is a deep source of benevolence, or grace, to be tapped (p. 411).

The potential contribution of these ideas is at the heart of Taylor's vision of interiority of conscience forged over time. In the Preface to *Sources of the Self*, Taylor makes explicit what he means by modern identity: "With this term, I want to designate the ensemble of (largely unarticulated) understandings of what it is to be a human agent: the senses of inwardness, freedom, individuality, and being embedded in nature which are at home in the modern West" (p. ix). In articulating the elusive nature of the voice within, Taylor cites a passage from Rousseau's *Emile ou de l'éducation* that underscores the "prejudices which usurp its [the voice of nature within] place" and are its "worst enemies" (p. 355). "Their noisy voices drown her words so that she cannot get a hearing; fanaticism dares to counterfeit her voice and to inspire crimes in her name. She is discouraged by ill-treatment; she no longer speaks to us" (p. 355). Again, Taylor cites Rousseau, whom he names as the source of modern identity, when he suggests that to regain contact with the voice of nature within would be to transform our motivation, to have a wholly different quality of will (p. 358). The will of "calculating reason" is one of the signs of corruption, according to Rousseau. It flourishes only where conscience, i.e. the inner voice of nature, is stifled (p. 358).

In contrast to the essentialist's and expressionist's view of nature and creativity, the instrumental stance involves objectifying nature. It is the stance of separation, Taylor says, that blocks us. "The life of instrumental reason lacks the force, the depth, the vibrancy, the joy which comes from being connected to the *élan* of nature. But there is worse. It doesn't just lack this; the instrumental stance towards nature constitutes a bar to ever attaining it" (p. 383). Taylor explains the postmodern dilemma as follows: The two sides, one the vast universe and the other the nature we feel within, have drifted apart, and it is not clear how we can hope to relate them, especially given that one way to cope with the problem has been for one side to suppress the other as irrelevant or illusory. Thus we have disengaged naturalism which recognizes only the order of scientific explanation.

Taylor (1991) suggests that creative imagination is central to modern culture. In *The Malaise of Modernity*, he affirms the "expressivism" (p. 61) of the modern notion of the individual. Artistic expression becomes the paradigm mode in which people can come to self-definition, an idea

especially true in the modern era where art is no longer defined by *memesis* of reality; art is understood now more in terms of creation. Rousseau's *sentiment de l'existence*, because of the feeling of belonging to nature it embodies, connects us to the wider whole. Taylor concludes: "Perhaps we need few things more today than such articulation" (p. 91).

Intelligence, Instinct and Intuition

Expanding upon Rousseau's articulation of the *sentiment de l'existence,* a distinguished French scientist and philosopher, Henri Bergson (1998/1907), offers a unique perspective on the science and philosophy of the human connection to the wider whole. In many respects, Bergson's theories of creative evolution, compiled over a century ago, bear a striking resemblance to the recent discoveries and insights of the work of Damasio published within the past two decades. An intriguing comparison can be made, for example, between Bergson's theory of instinct and intuition, and Damasio's study of emotions and feelings, including the critical role that instinct and feelings play in the evolution of self and consciousness. In both perspectives, an evolved identity belongs in a wider web of relationship. Over a century ago, Bergson envisioned *intuition* as a barely perceptible, yet still viable, means of connection in the reconstitution of "a complete and perfect humanity" (p. 267). *Creative Evolution*, the 1998 translation of the first publication in France in 1907 of *L'évolution créatrice,* Bergson's most famous and influential work, elucidates the subject of this dissertation from a different, yet complementary, angle.

Key to understanding the scientific and philosophical premise of Bergson's theories of creative evolution, as well as culling possible implications for our present consideration of identity and creativity in education, is a correction of what Bergson calls a "cardinal error from Aristotle onwards" (p. 135). Just as Damasio (1994) in *Descartes' Error* "corrects" the theory of disengaged dualism, Bergson sets to rights the habitual tendency in most of the philosophies of nature "*to see in vegetative, instinctive and rational life three successive degrees of*

development of one and the same tendency, whereas they are three divergent directions of an activity that has split up as it grew. The difference between them is not a difference of intensity, nor, more generally, of degree, but of kind" (p. 135, emphasis in original). Just as we can see in the case of vegetable and animal life, says Bergson, how they are mutually complementary and mutually antagonistic, now "we must show that intelligence and instinct also are opposite and complementary" (p. 135). In other words, for Bergson, one is not superior to the other; they have not succeeded one another, nor can we assign them different grades. We are bound to dwell on this point, he says, because it is of utmost importance: "In reality [intelligence and instinct] accompany each other only because they are complementary, and they are complementary only because they are different, what is instinctive in instinct being opposite to what is intelligent in intelligence" (p. 136).

Intelligence and instinct represent two divergent solutions to one and the same problem. Instinct and intuition are seen by Bergson in the same way that emotions and feelings are seen by Damasio. In other words, instinct precedes intuition for Bergson in the same way that emotions precede feelings for Damasio. From the perspective of this dissertation, Bergson's intuition and Damasio's feelings are complementary concepts. Following is the *pièce de résistance* with regard to an education of intuition and/or feelings in a revised notion of modern identity and in the possible reconstitution of "a complete and perfect humanity":

> Consciousness, in man, is pre-eminently intellect. It might have been, it ought, so it seems, to have been also intuition. Intuition and intellect represent two opposite directions of the work of consciousness: intuition goes in the very direction of life, intellect goes in the inverse direction, and thus finds itself naturally in accordance with matter. A complete and perfect humanity would be that in which these two forms of conscious activity should attain their full development. And, between this humanity and ours, we may conceive any number of possible stages, corresponding to all the degrees imaginable of intelligence and of intuition. In this lies the part of contingency in the mental structure of our species. A different evolution might have led to a humanity either more intellectual still or more intuitive. In the humanity of which we are a part, intuition is, in fact, almost completely sacrificed to intellect. It seems that to conquer matter and to conquer its own self, consciousness has had to exhaust the best part of its power. (1998/1907, p. 267)

Bergson later explains what he means by intuition being the "best part" of the power of consciousness. He says that it is only when we place ourselves in intuition that we can pass from intuition to intellect. From the place of the intellect we shall never be able to pass to intuition, he says. Yet, it is the intellect that has dominated intuition in the present-day humanity of which we are a part. The consequence of the pre-eminence of the intellect in human affairs is explained in the following continuation of the above citation:

> This conquest, in the particular conditions in which it has been accomplished, has required that consciousness should adapt itself to the habits of matter and concentrate all its attention on them, in fact determine itself more as intellect. Intuition is there, but vague and above all discontinuous. It is a lamp almost extinguished, which only glimmers now and then, for a few moments at most. (1998/1907, p. 268)

Bergson suggests that what he calls "fleeting intuitions" ought to be seized by philosophy, first for the purposes of sustaining them, and then for expanding them and uniting them together. According to Bergson, the rationale for advancing in this work stems from the fact that the more one advances, the more one will perceive that intuition is mind itself and, in a certain sense, life itself.

Bergson and Education

In a paper entitled "An Untimely Intuition*:* Adding a Bergsonian Dimension to Experience and Education," Kaustuv Roy (2005) has seized and expanded upon the above "fleeting intuitions" to advance his work in education. Roy says that despite the ample interest among philosophers, writers, artists and poets, Bergson has rarely been discussed in education. He sees that Bergson's work allows educators to sense the creative potential within the apparently mundane, lining the instant with an aesthetic of its own … making time come alive in experience (p. 443). The topic of Roy's essay concerns an awakening of intuition. This

> freeing of the 'Will' that allows it to move forward, regain spontaneity, and leave behind reified forms of thought … resides in re-educating the senses to regain the fresh momentum, wherein may lie the increasing rift between the experience of formal

> education and lived life that Dewey feared and that, for Bergson, results from slowing down the Will. (2005, p. 444)

Despite the relevance to the experience of education, the word intuition rarely appears in educational discourse, rues Roy. (A notable exception, according to Roy, is the work of Nel Noddings and Paul Shore (1984) who demonstrate in their *Awakening the Inner Eye* the possibilities of an intuitive approach in curriculum deliberation.) Bergsonian time is seen not as repetition, but as *duration*. Because a discussion of intuition cannot be separated from a discussion about time, according to Roy, he goes to great lengths in his paper to explain Bergson's complex theories of *duration.* It is important for educators to understand *duration*, says Roy, "for all too often education is seen as the accumulation and accreditation of finished ideas and rarely as the cultivation of sensitivity to transition and continuous change" (p. 452). Al-Saji (2005) elaborates on Bergson's theory of duration, as explained by Roy, and shows how *duration* is linked to the Bergsonian idea of "pure memory" within which concept lies the potential for a revised notion of modern identity and for a theory that Al-Saji develops as "intersubjectivity." This is the subject of the next section.

Intersubjectivity and the Memory of Another Past

As has been established in the previous section, the theme of creative evolution rooted in, and connected to, the wider whole is prominent in Bergson's work. In a paper entitled, "The Memory of another Past: Bergson, Deleuze and a New Theory of Time," Alia Al-Saji (2005) explores, with the help of Deleuze, the Bergsonian theory of memory called *la durée*. Duration of time conceives the relation of past-present in a way that escapes the enclosure of presence, is open to the novelty of the future and permits an innovative and differentiated role for memory in the lives of subjects and in relations of intersubjectivity (p. 203). Based on Bergson's theory of the cone of "pure memory", i.e. non-chronological time, "a virtual and active reality that exceeds consciousness and presence" (p. 230) and that accounts for the different rhythms and intensities of diverse levels of being, Al-Saji developed a theory of intersubjectivity. In the

realm of intersubjectivity, explains Al-Saji, an encounter with others is based on affective attunement rather than spatial perspective, proximity rather than distance, entanglement and interpenetration of pasts rather than stagnant and exclusive histories (p. 230). The complexities of Al-Saji's theory hold vital insights for consolidating the perspectives being explored in this dissertation. Al-Saji`s discovery, as we shall soon see, echoes the perspectives of Hannah Arendt (1974) regarding the nature of *being* and the essential role of the public sphere in the actualization of the relations of intersubjectivity.

From the diverse yet complementary perspectives of an exploration of identity and creativity, the means for connecting to "a revised view of human beings" (Damasio, 1994, p. 8) may be summarized as follows: a developed and non-stifled capacity for emotion and feelings (Damasio, 1994); an enhanced capacity to perceive the "voice of nature within" (Taylor, 1989, p. 355); a fully developed intuition (Bergson, 1998; Roy, 2005) ; and a refined sensitivity for experiencing "affective attunement" (Al-Saji, 2005, p. 230). All accounts point to a potential human identity intimately connected to the wider whole through an embodied means of connection. The opposite may hold equally true. Underexplored abilities and underdeveloped capacities of feeling, inward listening, intuition, and affective attunement can, and did (as exemplified in the case study of Elliot, cited earlier), lead to disability, disengagement, and disenchantment. The social and moral implications of such a disassociated stance deserve the fuller attention they will be given in the following section.

Identity, Plurality and Moral Conscience

For Hannah Arendt (1974), plurality is the place of identity. Moreover, from Arendt's perspective, a person's real identity appears in plurality and nowhere else. "Human distinctness is not the same as otherness," she explains (p. 176). "Otherness [an important aspect of plurality] ... is found only in the sheer multiplication of inorganic objects, whereas all organic life already shows variations and distinctions, even between specimens of the same species. But only man can express this distinction and distinguish himself" (p. 176). Thus Arendt introduces the critical difference between *who* a person is and *what* qualities a person may

possess or *what* a person may do. Because of the essential nature of *who*, it is only through action and speech that the answer to "Who are you?" can be disclosed, according to Arendt (p. 178). "In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world. The disclosure of 'who' in contradistinction to 'what' somebody is ... is implicit in everything somebody says and does" (p. 179).

The revelatory character of *who* stems from the fact that such a disclosure comes to the fore "where people are *with* others and neither for or against them—that is in sheer human togetherness" (p. 180, emphasis in text). The space where people meet as *who* they are is a public space. Arendt calls this space an "in-between". "But for all its intangibility, this in-between is no less real than the world of things we visibly have in common. We call this reality the 'web' of human relationships, indicating by the metaphor its somewhat intangible quality," she says (p. 183). The person himself cannot see *who* he is, ascertains Arendt. A person can only disclose himself to others through his words and actions; hence the vital importance of the in-between of the *polis* in Arendt's *vita activa*.

In many aspects similar to Bergson's cone of "pure memory," as described by Al-Saji in the theory of intersubjectivity, the in-between of Arendt is not just any common space between people. Arendt describes the essential conditions that will allow the revelation of the unique character of a person. She says that only love (in the private realm) or respect, love's counterpart (in the public realm) is fully receptive to *who* another person is (p. 242). *Who* is "the unchangeable identity of the person" (p. 193).

It is Arendt's distinction between the *who* and *what* of identity that I find to be a most plausible explanation for, and insight into, the perplexing *Question of Identity* posed in Chapter I. Following the shift in identity I experienced while teaching a high school French class came the pivotal articulation: "I just had the best time of my life, and I wasn't even there." From Arendt's perspective, what occurred in the classroom that day was a shift in identity from *what* to *who*, a shift that transpired *because of* the loving and respectful nature of the "in-between" in the student-teacher relationship. In the face of this plurality, the "person-in-a-funk", separate

identity (i) was transformed into a radiantly "real" self (I) who was consequently reflected in, and through, the beaming faces of the students. This is no small discovery. The affective attunement of Al-Saji's intersubjectivity is a deeply personal experience that occurred, in this particular case, between a teacher and her students. Had I remained a disconnected, disinterested "impersonator", I am sure the story would have had a very different outcome.

Arendt further extends the implications. It is in action that the insertion of ourselves into the public sphere, i.e. the school or the classroom, is not forced upon us by necessity, like labor, nor is it prompted by utility like work. Thus she makes clear the connection between action, identity and freedom: freedom to begin, to initiate, as opposed to re-acting, obeying an external directive or executing a pre-conceived plan in labor or in work. "With the creation of man, the principle of beginning came into the world," says Arendt (p 177). However, the people who meet on the exchange market are primarily not persons but producers of products, and what they show there is never themselves but their products. The impulse that drives the fabricator to the market place, according to Arendt, is the desire for products, not people (p. 209). We have lost *who* we are in the impersonality of the market place. (This observation reflects the poignant pathos depicted in Arthur Miller's *Death of a Salesman*. Willie Loman, the protagonist in pursuit of the American Dream, realized all too late that he had traded the authentic *who* for the artificial "smile and a shoeshine" of a salesman). Along with the loss of initiative (the capacity to begin) is the loss of the source of creativity: "... for this source springs indeed from *who* they are and remains outside the actual work process as well as independent of *what* they may achieve" (1974, p. 211). The revelatory character (who) and the source of creativity are in this way one and the same. By leaving little, or no, room for creativity in education, we leave little or no room for reality or for the distinguishing of *who* we are in that reality.

In the Prologue to *The Human Condition,* Arendt (1974) says that what she proposes is very simple: "it is nothing more than to think what we are doing" (p. 5). What are we doing? What are we doing in education? What are we doing *to*, as opposed to *with*, students? Along with losing *who* we are in our constructions of a separate 'reality', it would seem we are losing

reality itself. Not only have we managed to build a successful human artifice, we have engineered, according to above accounts, a "constructed" artificial identity. This identity has no "roots" by which to feel at home in the universe; but follows, instead—like a vagabond, a tourist or a player—the superficial "routes" of the latest societal trends (Bauman, 1996). Arendt calls the present condition "world alienation" (1974, p. 254) and offers a unique perspective on the underlying cause of disenchantment. Arendt explains the modern disconnect as follows: science wrought by instrumental reason was seen to be preferable to the "unpredictable" consequences of action, especially given the increasing lack of faith in the "given" (as "given" by the natural senses) and above all, considering the perceived "frailty" of the human condition. The price to be paid for the semblance of "certainty" is loss of reality itself.

Thinking and Knowing

As worrisome as the apparent separation from reality may seem, there is yet more to the story. In "Thinking and Moral Considerations, A Lecture", Arendt (1971) makes clear that her position is to examine the facts regarding moral considerations that have stemmed from her experience as a reporter at the trial of Eichmann in Jerusalem. However monstrous his deeds were, said Arendt, Eichmann demonstrated throughout the trial "a curious, quite authentic inability to think" (p. 417). Arendt edifies the phenomenon of unthinking, a phenomenon, she adds, that may well apply to very intelligent people, even intellectuals: "Clichés, stock phrases, adherence to conventional, standardized codes of expression and conduct have the socially recognized function of protecting us against reality, that is, against the claim on our thinking attention which all events and facts arouse by virtue of their existence" (p. 418).

Delving further into the complexity of the phenomenon of unthinking, Arendt credits Kant for the distinction between thinking and knowing, "between reason, the urge to think and understand, and the intellect, which desires and is capable of certain verifiable knowledge" (p. 422). Arendt sees the activity of thinking as "the habit of examining and reflecting upon whatever comes to pass, regardless of specific content and quite independent of results ..." (p. 418). Socrates likened thinking to the wind, an ever-moving animation by which thought is

constantly done and undone. Thinking, in this sense, allows one to change one's mind and/or to take a stand, as reason commands. Moreover (and here is "the more" to the story), "[a]ctualized in every thinking process" is "conscience," "to know with and by myself" (p. 418). Conscience is described by Arendt as a dialogue one has with oneself. According to Socrates, as cited by Arendt, it is always better to have been wronged than to wrong. One always has to live with oneself (one's own conscience) and be "cross-examined" at the end of the day. Conscience is the "two-in-one:" "I" am "I."

Knowing, on the other hand, says Arendt, is results-oriented and is "no less a world-building activity than the building of houses" (p. 421). Thinking can often feel unnatural to a constructivist, according to Arendt. Rather than the scientist's thirst for knowledge for its own sake, thinking is a quest for meaning. How could anything relevant for the world we live in possibly arise out of so "resultless an enterprise", she asks (p. 426)? We have to trace experiences rather than doctrines, says Arendt. "Thinking goes beyond knowing, in that thinking … deals with invisibles and is itself invisible, lacking all the outside manifestation of other activities" (p. 433). Where does that leave us with respect to the problem of the inability to think and the capacity for evil? Arendt says that we are left with the conclusion that only people filled with the love of wisdom, beauty and justice are capable of thought as a prerequisite for thinking (p. 438). "If it should turn out to be true that knowledge ... and thought have parted company for good, then indeed we would become helpless slaves, not so much of our machines as of our know-how ..." (1974, p. 5).

The Instrumentalization of Education

Sharing the concern that there is very real possibility that Arendt's forewarning could come to pass, Chris Higgins (2011) addresses what he sees to be the cause of the current crisis in education. In a paper entitled, "The Possibility of Public Education in an Instrumentalist Age," Higgins argues that regardless of what new plans may be hatched for chartering or funding the public school, it is the ongoing instrumentalization of education that threatens the very possibility of its continued existence: "… in the culture of performativity, not only the public

school but public life itself is hollowed out and debased" (p. 451). In the same way, according to Higgins, that Arendt regarded schooling as the ultimate public responsibility and as the means by which students are enabled to realize the opportunity for public action (p. 460) Higgins sees the classroom as the place of plurality. Arendt's work is helping us to reclaim the "lost treasure" of personal service, freedom and public happiness, says Higgins. In an instrumental society, "institutions tend to get mistaken for the practices they were built to serve" (p. 463). Drawing on the thinking of Arendt and Alasdair MacIntyre, Higgins explores three areas which he names the "re-generation, re-cultivation and re-creation" of the human conditions for freedom: schools as sites for communal concern; schools as social worlds for the young to be capable of their own surprising and revitalizing deeds; and classrooms sheltered from the "glare of the public" (p. 459).

Like Higgins, Martha Nussbaum (2010) is alarmed by what is happening in education. She identifies the problem as "the silent crisis." From the perspective of this dissertation, the silent crisis and the crisis in education Higgins brings to light in citing Arendt's "lost treasure" of public service is an identity crisis. We have lost *who* we are in the ongoing instrumentalization of education and the ongoing materialization of public life. We have instrumentalized ourselves.

Facing the Crisis

Nussbaum (2010) sees the crisis in education as a loss of the humanities and the arts at a time when nations are cutting away what are deemed "useless frills" in order to stay competitive in the global market (p. 2). "The crisis is facing us, but we have not yet faced it", she avers (p. 2). Few people today would deny that there is a crisis in education. Just how far-reaching and how damaging the consequences on a global scale may turn out to be has not as yet been fully realized, as Nussbaum suggests. Few people, however, see the crisis as an identity crisis. Radio talk shows, newspaper editorials and television commentaries are rife with opinions as to what the problems are, who's to blame, and what should be done about it. In Quebec, for example, the crisis in education is seen as "one of the congenital shortcomings of Quebec society, namely

its persistently elevated—and alarming—high-school dropout rate, the highest of any province in the country" (The Gazette View, 09/02/11). Quebec economist Pierre Fortin is quoted in the letter as saying that his research shows that "high-school dropouts earn on an average $500,000 less in their lifetime than those who complete at least their secondary education. Quebec's employers' organization, the *Conseil du patronat*, calls the dropout rate disastrous for taxpayers, since each dropout means fewer tax dollars and more pressure on social programs". There are high hopes for a new program, to which the provincial government is contributing $1.5 million, aimed at encouraging young Quebecers to complete their high school education (The Gazette View, 09/02/11). The crisis is seen here as an economic crisis.

Traditionally, liberal education has been thought to be opposed to strictly utilitarian ends. Over the past two decades there has been a renewed emphasis on utilitarian goals to facilitate effective competition in the international market place resulting in a crisis of values in education (McMurty, 1992). "The result of this trend is that the enterprise culture and free market approach now play a prominent part in school organization and management, and not an insignificant one in the curriculum" says Halstead (1996, p. 119). What is happening, explains Halstead, is a clash between economic liberalism and political liberalism for the control of education.

Schools have become war zones; classrooms the battle grounds; teachers the field marshals and students the occupied territory. According to Statistics Canada, if Canada could raise the literacy levels of the average citizen by a mere 1%, it would translate into an $18 billion annual jump in national income. In their efforts to attack illiteracy in Ontario, the government has created SWAT teams of educators, sent literacy coaches to the rescue, dispatched an army of specialists to help teachers apply research to practice, and strategized mass literacy campaigns to fight the war on illiteracy (Hibbbert, Heydon, Rich, 2008). The 750-member "high-powered grassroots task force" meeting in Quebec City for the purpose of putting Quebec education "under the microscope" carries with it "high hopes" for a new program to tackle the problem of dropouts (Branswell, The Gazette 09/28/11). No doubt teachers have already begun to armour their resolve and stockpile ammunition in preparation for the inevitable onslaught to ensue.

Teachers have been besieged, beleaguered, and belittled as a result of the neoliberal corporate takeover of their profession. Authentic teaching is a calling, according to George Steiner (2003). "The teacher is aware of the magnitude, and, if you will, mystery of his profession, of that which he has professed in an unspoken Hippocratic Oath. To teach seriously is to lay hands on what is most vital in a human being; it is to seek access to the quick and the innermost of a child's or adult's integrity" (p. 18). Steiner's vision is a far cry from today's teachers' 'reality'.

Teachers have been assigned jobs to do, not children to teach. Teachers are considered to be civil servants; as such, they are members of a general work force. The job description of teachers—to prepare children for adult life (Winch, 1999)—carries with it "instrumentalized" implications (Higgins, 2010, p. 451). School reforms are seeking to produce adults of proficiency, efficiency, competency and autonomy. To that end, teachers are being held accountable for building cognitive skills, developing social skills, and qualifying students for future employment. Knowledge, science and technology have become serious business in the business of education. Standardized testing and competition have become the driving forces. In the US (and increasingly in Canada), the concern that others are matching and surpassing American educational attainments is cause for concern: "We're living in a global world" where "we must compete with education systems in China and India" and where failure to give our students the skills necessary to compete in the world of the twenty-first century means "the jobs will go elsewhere" (President Bush, 2006, as cited by Hursh, 2007, p. 499).

The aggressive tactics that are at the base of the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) law that was passed by the United States government in 2001 are in response to a perceived threat that the nation was at risk of losing its pre-eminence in commerce, industry, science and technology and was being overtaken by global competitors (Barrett, 2009). The US Education Act "represents the widest ranging and most penetrative incursion by the federal government into local and state educational policies in American history" (Barrett, 2009, p. 1019). Furthermore, the assault on teachers' professional practices and identities is signaling a profound shift in the delivery and purpose of education (Apple, 2007/1992). Despite the arduous task of the job at hand, it is teachers, nonetheless, not technicians, functionaries, jobholders or civil servants,

who are keeping the world's humanity alive. Keeping alive the flame of Bergson's (1998/1907) lamp of intuition *presque éteinte* (barely perceptible; almost extinguished) has become the responsibility of even the most beleaguered of teachers.

Keeping the Flame Alive

> The humanities and the arts are being cut away ... in virtually every nation in the world. Seen by policy-makers as useless frills, at a time when nations must cut away all useless things in order to stay competitive in the global market, they are rapidly losing their place in curricula, and also in the minds and hearts of parents and children. (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 2)

Amidst the din of battle cries for control of education, the quiet inner voice of the heart and intuition has tended to go unnoticed or unheeded by the majority of people. When contemplating the place of the arts and humanities in contemporary education, however, two vibrant voices are clearly discernible above the fray. Visionary scholars, Maxine Greene and Elliot Eisner have made significant contributions to teaching and research in the arts and education in their seminal work. For Greene, a *leitmotiv* is freedom while for Eisner, it is the educational *connoisseur*.

Greene's perspectives on freedom and Arendt's on political action meet "I" to "I" in the "in between", the space that opens between two people when they come together as *who*. "There are worldly relationships, and over that, there is the delicate web of human relationships," says Greene (1998, p. 23). While I have not had the privilege of meeting Greene in person, I know *who* Greene is through the medium of her writing. She is a passionate, caring, creative, courageous, hopeful educator-philosopher with a unique gift for seeing the world "otherwise" and for envisioning the possibility in "not yet." Of her close alliance with the thinking of Arendt, Greene says, "I hate to quote Hannah Arendt, but I always do" (1998, p. 23). Greene's work suggests the same purpose as that of Arendt (1974): to think what we are doing; to "do

philosophy" in Greene's words. In wanting to change things, Greene (2008) proposes political action as well as the creative "act" of the arts that "aims at a total renewal of the world" (Sartre, 2000, as quoted by Greene, 2008, p. 19).

Greene sees in imagination the untapped inner resources of youth; she sees educating for freedom as letting people choose their own way of being in the world. "Freedom ... is the capacity to take initiatives, to begin" (1988, p. 55). Inherent in the meaning of Greene's freedom is the capacity to distinguish *who* one is. Doing art, for Greene, is learning how to be. The challenge Greene has set out for educators, according to Botstein (1998), is "to make the arts not a marginal part of how we deal with children and young people, but an integral part of their lives and their minds" (p. 62). A lover of questions, Greene leaves us with two critical questions for our ongoing consideration: "How much does the possibility of freedom depend on critical reflectiveness, on self understanding, on insight into the world?" "How much does it depend on the integration of the felt and the known, the subjective and the objective, the private and the public spheres" (1984, p. 53)?

How can educators bring together two opposing forces, as described by Greene, while the very means for reconciliation (the arts and humanities) are being "cut" from our minds and hearts by programmers and policy makers, the majority of whom come from the finance and business sectors? How can we initiate a marriage between technology, the humanities and the liberal arts that yields the results that make our hearts sing (Jobs, 2011) when all odds seem to be piled up against the very possibility?

Elliot Eisner is unequivocal: "We are all a part of what we see and what we see is part of us" (1997, p. 97). Integration is central to Eisner's vision of arts-based education in both schools and in research. "Seeing rather than mere looking, requires an enlightened eye: this is as true and as important in understanding and improving education as in creating a painting," says Eisner (1991, p. 1). An artist (he is a painter), Eisner has been inspired as an educator by the work of John Dewey, and especially by the collection of Dewey's Harvard lectures, *Art as*

Experience (1958/1934). For both Dewey and Eisner, education is a holistic endeavor. In the ongoing battle between the positivistic scientifically provable objective "legitimacy" of quantitative inquiry and the immeasurable, non-provable subjective, therefore, questionable "validity" of qualitative inquiry, Eisner has been a groundbreaker.

"Far from being merely decorative, the arts stimulate, refine, and convey meanings that cannot be expressed in any other form of representation," claims Eisner (2008, p. 23). Quantifiably and qualitatively enriching our exploration of an enlightened I/dentity, Eisner (2008) teaches us what education can learn from the arts. As an educational *connoisseur*, the major focus of Eisner's work is educational criticism. "We ought to be helping our students discover new seas upon which to sail rather than old ports at which to dock," suggests Eisner (2008, p. 28).

Voices of Being in Education

Along with Greene and Eisner, many other educators are keeping alive the flame of intuition and creativity. Two such visionaries are Ted T. Aoki and Jerome S. Bruner. In their unique ways, Aoki and Bruner shine a light on the importance of exploring the living experiences of teaching and learning. Task forces will, no doubt, continue to meet with determination to design programs for the classrooms that are designed to 'attack' problems that interfere with economic plans and projections. Meanwhile, quietly and unobtrusively, but with unequalled passion and dedication, educators such as Aoki and Bruner are going about the business of exploring the under-explored (Bruner, 1969). They are uncovering alternative, integrative approaches to research, pedagogy and practice.

"Education is Being." So announced a banner mounted outside the Institute for Education of the University of Heidelberg, Germany (Aoki, 1991, xi). The banner flies in the face of the education-is-doing rationale predominant in North America. Aoki says of the five educator-authors in the preface of *Toward a Curriculum of Being: Voices of Educators* they felt a deep concern for the erosion of educators' personhood due to the fact that they, like many of their

colleagues had generally become enamored of scientism and instrumentalism, in the wake of which they have become "inured to the texture of the half-life of who they might be as educators" (ix).

In writing about Ted Aoki in his Introduction to *Curriculum in a New Key: The Collected Works of Ted T. Aoki*, William Pinar (2005) draws attention to "Beyond Identity" in which Aoki articulates the possibility of identity "in-between" two nouns where there is dwelling in the tensionality of difference. Here "it is the difference that really matters" and our work as educators is "not so much the elimination of differences, but more so the attunement of the quality of the tensionality of difference that makes a difference" (p. 61). Inviting his listeners (and readers) to "work from within" (p. 20) Aoki suggests creating a gap where tensionality can be seen as a place to learn. It is by lingering in the spaces in-between that Aoki creates "bridges" and "walking sticks" to help others see the link between *being* and *becoming*, as "life as I have experienced it," (p. 60) or to experience the reality of theory and practice as "situational praxis" (p. 3). It is from the in-between place of identity in tensionality—where we come face to face in a "synthesized totality" of intersubjectivity fused into "we" (p. 25)—that Aoki evokes a vision of possibility for the coming together of opposite conceptualizations such as those articulated by Greene (1984). Aoki's living landscape of pedagogy is "both this and that, and more" (p. 295).

The voice of Jerome Bruner (1960) also sounds a different key in curriculum. In *The Process of Education*, Bruner aims to address three questions: "What is uniquely human about human beings? How did they get that way? How could they be made more so? *In Knowing: Essays for the Left Hand*, Bruner (1962) writes, "I find myself a little out of patience with the alleged split between 'the two cultures' (the sciences and the humanities) for the two are not simply external ways of life; they are ways of living with one's experience" (p.3). Bruner suggests the intuitive "left hand", the dreamer, might tempt the orderly "right hand", the doer, to draw freshly again, as in art school when the task is "to find a means of imparting new life to a hand that has become too stiff with technique, too far from the scanning eye" (p. 8). The

comprehensive analysis to follow underscores the urgent need for the integration of artistic means for imparting new life to contemporary identity and public life.

An Analysis

An analysis of the perspectives explored thus far in what Vincent de Gaulejac (2009) describes as a crisis in post-modern identity (*identité hypermoderne*) highlights the urgent need for a revised view of human identity in education. De Gaulejac (2009) has written a comprehensive analysis of the central theme of this dissertation. The work is appropriately entitled, *Qui est "je"?* The third person verb "*est*" placed in intimate association with the first person pronoun "*je*" portrays the dilemma of disassociation, and echoes the idea, as presented by Arendt (1974), that we have lost *who* we are in *what* we have become. "I" is no longer a *sujet*, but has been reduced to "i" an *objet*.

De Gaulejac begins an extensive treatise on *le sujet "je"* by citing a case study of Lise, a forty-year-old woman who one day "decided" to change her mind: *"J'ai décidé d'être"* (I decided to be) (p. 9). After almost a lifetime of feeling that she did not "measure up" to the expectations of her family or of society (*comme si je n'étais rien* (as if I were nothing) (p. 9), Lise one day had enough, according to de Gauljac. *"Je pensais avant que je n'avais rien à dire. J'étais un objet utile, utilisé."* "*Je sais ce que c'est de devenir un sujet"* (Before I thought I had nothing to say; I was a useful object, used. Now I know what it means to become a subject) (p. 18). *"Faire à ma manière, exercer comme je le sens"* (To do it my way is to act as I feel) (p. 19). [My translation]

Of particular intrigue to sociologist de Gaulejac, and of relevance to the present investigation, is the contradiction in the following sentence spoken by Lise: "*Vers quarante ans, indépendant de moi, j'ai voulu être sujet"* (by the age of 40, independent of myself, I wanted to be a subject) (p. 21). The scientific explanation which de Gaulejac lends to the phenomenon is a contradiction between a reflexive and voluntary process, *j'ai voulu* (I wanted), and an unconscious and

involuntary process, *indépendent de moi* (independent of myself). As well as seeing the phenomenon from the scientific perspective of sociology and psychology, I also see the possibility that *indépendent de moi* may be interpreted as Lise awakening to "I/dentity" and becoming conscious of herself as *sujet* rather than *objet* ": i/dentity". In other words, thinking can 'occupy' knowing, as represented in the two-in-one dialogue of Socrates, "I am I". In the case of Lise, awakening is articulated, "*je suis sujet*; *je ne suis pas objet utile et utilisé"* (I am a subject; I am not a useful object to be used) (p. 18). [My translation] Echoing Damasio's (1994) question, "How is it that we are conscious of the world around us, that we know what we know, and that we know that we know?", de Gaulejac poses a similar conundrum, "What is this involuntary will that propels the subject to take hold of his or her autonomy" (p. 23)? This most perplexing question has insinuated itself throughout the present inquiry as "Who am I, *really*?"

Chapter III

Linking Thought and Method

Musical Musing

Little strips of ivory paper
Pasted neatly side by side
Along the thick dark edge of the country-kitchen table
My imaginary piano

Head tossed back in sheer delight
I play with all my might
Up and down the carefully crafted keyboard
My imaginary song

Laugh all you want
At this childish game
Bewildered by your merriment
I wonder
Can you not hear the music with no sound?

*

A Baby Grand piano
(RCM) Levels I to VIII
Taught by a professional
Spine straight
Imaginary oranges under the palms
Scales, chords, arpeggios
Extraordinary technique

Exclaim all you want
Over my digital agility
Surprised by your acclaim
I ponder
Can you not hear the sound with no music?

(Dobson, 2010, p. 136)

"Musical Musing" incorporates the theories explored in Chapters I and II and extends the perspectives in the direction of methodology. The poem's interconnected themes of identity and creativity, along with its form and process, offer a unique *point de départ* for an exploration of methodological approaches towards qualitative inquiry that can best support an exploration of identity in education. The poem and its process contain helpful insights for exploring the links between thought and method, and between *being* and *doing*, conceptualizations that are central to the question of identity at the heart of this dissertation.

I did not sit down with the intention to write poetry. On the contrary, I was expecting to write the customary prose for a creative writing course I was taking at the time. Prompted by the word "music"—the theme suggested by the writing group the previous week—the poem appeared on the page unannounced and seemingly of its own volition.

> In turning to the poetics of self-study to represent my research interests, I have been able to explore language in an effort to break out of the traditional moulds of academic investigation to get to the heart of the matter. I want to convey the invisible, the immeasurable, and the intrinsic as essential elements of education. I feel that half the picture has been left out of the educational equation because we haven't been able or quite ready, perhaps, to talk about things like "intuition" or "heart" or "soul". Scholarly writing with its matter-of-fact intellectual tone can be a harsh medium for the expression of the delicate and passionate matters of the heart. '... poetry, rather than being a phenomenology of the mind, is a phenomenology of the soul' (Bachelard, 1958/1994, p. xxi). (Dobson, 2010, p. 141)

As I re-examine this strange little artifact, I hear echoes of Damasio's earlier reference to the "cognitive unconscious" (2010, p. 280). Piquing my curiosity are the pivotal phrases, "I wonder" in the first stanza, and "I ponder" in the second stanza. The barely perceptible change from wondering to pondering serves to emphasize—by the slight alteration of the consonant "w" to "p"—the unchanging nature at the heart of the *thinking* "I", an idea that is central to Arendt's notion of an unchangeable identity and to the distinctions she draws between thought and cognition (1971; p. 433). I note as well that the exterior i/dentity and external circumstances change from one stanza to the next—first a child is playing a childish game on her carefully crafted imaginary piano; next an adolescent is practising her scales, chords and arpeggios on a Baby Grand piano—but the same I/dentity is *informing* both childhood and its evolved form,

adolescence, thereby evoking the Bergsonian idea of *duration*. The pivotal phrases not only highlight Arendt's perspective of *who*, as formerly discussed but also substantiate my inwardly generated intuition. As a result, meaning reverberates in my experience from within as well as from without. *Who* is "the unchangeable identity of the person" (Arendt, 1974, p. 193).

Another core aspect of the poem that captures my attention is the reference to the "music with no sound" of the child's playing, and the "sound with no music" of the adolescent's performing. In an overarching statement on his website, John O'Donohue (2007) wrote, "the inner music never abandons you." Complementing Bergson's idea of *intuition* as differing not "in degree" but "in kind" from *intellecte* (1998; p. 135), the *felt* experience of O'Donohue's "inner music" allows me to *be* in the poem, to *do* the research at the kitchen table, to *see* the strips of ivory paper pasted neatly side-by-side, to *hear* the imaginary song, and to *feel* the delight in playing the imaginary piano. (Although unmentioned in the poem, so vivid is my memory of this event, I can even conjure up the *smell* of the suppertime potatoes baking in the oven!) Bergson's *duration* also allows me to remember what Damasio's neurobiological explanation of the nature of *feelings* elicits, namely, the indelible bewilderment, rooted in emotions, of adult derision (merriment) of the child's creative sensibility, and natural tendency, to imagine the world otherwise (Greene,1995). Without *feelings*, and the accompanying emotions permitted by memory (*duration*), I would not have been inspired to attempt to create the imagery that gives the ideas for the poem their potential life and meaning.

In the second stanza, I perceive a change in the adolescent's mood that might suggest a loss of creativity. The "RCM" (Royal Conservatory of Music); "Level VIII" (advanced knowledge and technique); and "spine straight" all indicate a performance according to musical standards of excellence. "Surprised by your acclaim" is telling of the self-awareness of loss despite the "extraordinary" accomplishment. Damasio (1994) might point to the emotional deterrent and/or damage caused earlier by adult "merriment" at the expense of the child's *feelings*; Bergson might attribute the loss to a state of consciousness that has allowed itself to be "squeezed" and "narrowed-down", and is no longer "whole and undivided, [spreading] itself over a wider and wider surface" (1998; p. 14). Arendt (1974) would likely say that not only is

creativity being lost in the over-bearing mechanisms of the technical performance; a sense of *being* is also being dissipated and 'lost' in the over-emphasis of *doing.*

Doing Research Differently

In "Musical Ways of Knowing*:* A Personal Approach to Qualitative Inquiry in Education", Christine McMillan (2005) describes the series of events in which she learned (the hard way) to trust her musical sensibilities to inform her educational research. It was while McMillan was preparing to defend a rigorous quantitative study which had been "controlled carefully for variables" and for which she had painstakingly developed a "valid and reliable instrument" (p. 1) to measure student gains in sight-singing ability, that she first became aware of the fact that the unremitting factual nature and deductive logic of quantitative reasoning was not resting well with her.

> I can still recall the dissatisfaction that surfaced as I thumbed through the bound copies of my study before my defence. The avid interest that had initially fuelled my research seemed to have dissipated. Instead I felt only a curious distance from the work I had poured myself into for the better part of a year. As I marshalled supporting arguments to justify my sample size and my use of stepwise multiple regression analysis, the language in my document appeared increasingly foreign to my expressive identity as a musician. Consequently, I felt somewhat removed from the proceedings during my thesis defence, as if I were discussing someone else's research. (McMillan, 2005, p. 2)

Near the conclusion of her defence, one of the committee members asked McMillan to rejoin the discourse by asking an intriguing question, "If you could change any aspect of this study," she asked, "what would you do differently?"

> I remember being momentarily taken off guard by her question, coming as it did amid seemingly endless deliberation about predictors, variables, interventions and gains. 'Just about everything,' I wanted to reply. But following a long pause during which I determined to speak honestly, I attempted to explain why the completion of my thesis felt so unsatisfying to me. (McMillan, 2005, p. 2)

> I've spent much of my life in pursuit of musical goals... so it was difficult for me when quantitative inquiry demanded that I put aside my most highly developed ways of thinking and working while undertaking the research....I would like to think that there might be a way to use my musical ways of knowing to inform my research....I think I would tell stories of the children who participated in my study. I would share their tales of frustration as they struggle to learn to sight-sing, and I would describe their exhilaration as they began to master this new skill....If I could do it differently, I would design my research in such a way that I could *use* my musical sensibilities rather than disregard them....If I had been able to exploit the beauty of language to engage those who care deeply about children and music education, then perhaps I would have written something that musicians would understand, and that music educators would want to read. (McMillan, 2005, p. 2, emphasis in original text)

According to McMillan, it was at this moment, in retrospect, that her interest in qualitative inquiry was ignited. In turning to Eisner (1985a, p. 185, as cited in McMillan, 2005) *et alia* for guidance in writing her comparative essay, as well as for help in analyzing both educational and musical themes, McMillan found that thematic *structural corroboration* results in putting the pieces together and forming a whole that makes sense to her. She realized that in educational research she is concerned with the same interpretive issues that she must carefully consider when preparing to perform a piece of music, namely, *perspective*, *communication* and *audience* (p. 9). Upon completion of her initial degree, it became clear to McMillan that she needed to investigate important questions her research had generated; she admits that she failed to reach this goal. McMillan's confession might serve as a practical guide to the ways of qualitative inquiry.

Turning To Qualitative Inquiry

Comparing my experience using "poetic ways of knowing" in the writing and interpretation of "Musical Musing" to McMillan's new-found experience using "musical ways of knowing" brings to the fore our shared concern as researchers to be personally involved in our work. McMillan concludes, "When I restricted myself to the voice and conventions of solely quantitative inquiry, dissatisfaction resulted from my sense that I had neglected personal involvement in my

own research project. Having faced this condition, it is unlikely that I will ever again risk losing connection with affective and aesthetic ways of being and thinking ....” (p. 14). In drawing similar conclusions from my experience in poetic inquiry, I discern a slight variation on McMillan’s theme of personal involvement. As a result of the subtle distinction, when I begin to explore research approaches that may support identity and creativity in education, I must look for more than can be found in the dichotomy of “distancing” quantitative methodologies and “connecting” qualitative approaches. From my experience in writing and interpreting “Musical Musing”, I know that something quite different from “connection” occurred in the process.

I see identity as being *in* the work as well as *of* the work. In that sense, identity is not connected *to* the poem, but instead *informs* the poem, *inspires* the interpretations, and *reveals* the meanings. On face value, this slight variation may seem to be of little consequence; upon further reflection, however, the nuanced difference makes all the difference with respect to understanding what Damasio describes as a “revised view of human beings” (1994, p. 8).

The revised view, as symbolized by “I wonder” and “I ponder,” is not a separate i/dentity seeking to stay connected *to* affective and aesthetic ways of being and thinking. The distinction I detect between “poetic ways of knowing” and “musical ways of knowing” has revealed to me what John Dewey discerned: “The poetic as distinct from the prosaic, esthetic art as distinct from scientific, expression as distinct from statement, does something different from leading to an experience. It constitutes one” (1934/1958; p. 84, as cited in Barone & Eisner, 1997, p. 75). As I hold firmly to that constitution, I am no longer looking for *approaches;* I am looking for *ways* that will allow me to *experience* my research as art. Having now constituted my understanding of art as experience, and experience as art, I am prepared for the next step in my exploration of qualitative inquiry.

What’s My Angle?

The imagination is hard at work in poetic ways of knowing. Working with imagery involves a particular kind of photographic memory that demands a sharp focus and a critical lens.

According to Eisner (1991), educational research of any kind requires an enlightened eye. "There are multiple ways in which the world can be known: artists, writers, and dancers as well as scientists, have important things to tell about the world," he says (p. 7). Knowing the particular angle from which I view the world will play a key role in my ability to "help others see and understand" (p. 3) the important things I have to tell. In order to better understand my personal perspective, I shall reflect on two key questions that are raised in McMillan's appraisal of her initial dissatisfaction as a quantitative researcher. Hopefully, finding answers to the following two questions will serve to sharpen the focus, clarify the lens and distinguish the particular angle from which I see the world.

What will keep alive the avid interest that is fuelling my research? In one word, writing. In "putting doctoral writing centre stage," Kamler and Thompson (2006) argue that there is a startling lack of explicit attention given to *writing* (emphasis in their text) the doctoral dissertation, and that the attention that *is* given is diminished when it treats writing as a set of de-contextualized skills, rather than as a social practice (p. 5). Writing is seen by Kamler and Thompson as a vital part of the research process, not a separate "mechanical act of reportage" (p. 3). The authors maintain that doctoral writing *is* thinking, and that it is through writing that researchers become members of their various scholarly communities. "We have imagined ourselves building a conversation space as we write" (p. 60). Paraphrasing Kamler and Thompson, I have imagined myself building what I call a community of 'in-between' as I write. I write in that space to find out what I don't know I know; I write to 'talk it over' with others. The process of poetic inquiry, as described above, is a good example. Finding out by finding in (my writing) is what keeps alive the interest that is fuelling my research. On that note, I find it interesting to pay attention to the word "interest", from the Latin, *inter esse*, meaning "to be within." Writing is thinking between the lines; writing is the "in-between" (Arendt, 1974) of scholarly discourse. It is no wonder, therefore, that my avid interest is kept alive in writing.

What are the sensibilities that I have developed over the years that can be exploited in my work? The word "sensibilities" immediately conjures up Barone and Eisner's notion of "perceptivity" (1997, p. 93). Perceptivity puts sensibilities into their proper framework. The

context in which perceptivity was first introduced in the 1997 article entitled, "Arts-Based Educational Research: Complementary Methods for Research in Education" was a discussion towards the end of the essay in which the authors were suggesting an expansion of what learning to do arts-based educational research requires. The authors' views with respect to perceptivity are worth noting.

The development of technical skills and aesthetic sensibilities (all manner of which had been introduced *a priori* as possibilities for enhancing educational research) must, of course, be related to ideas worth creating. If a scholar's initial perceptions lack insight, technical skills and even refined sensibilities are likely to lead to little more than superficial productions, though, at times, glittering ones. The content for artistic creation initiates in ideas that are fed by what is called perceptivity: seeing what most people miss (Barone & Eisner, 1997, p. 93).

> Associated with perceptivity is the matter of providing deep interpretation, or, as Geertz (1973) has said, a thick description of the events portrayed. Just what does this episode signify? What is the theoretical import? How does it relate to other matters within the situation? Answers to questions like these demand sophisticated analytic skills and imaginative extrapolation. What a researcher does with what he or she sees is critical. That doing depends on imaginative extrapolation. (p. 93)

From Barone and Eisner's perspective, any sensibilities that have been developed over the years may come in handy to educational research; however, it is in serving the ideas that are fed by perceptivity that the sensibilities will find their rightful place. Eisner (1991) compares an educational *connoisseur* (from the Latin, *cognoscere*, to know) to a *connoisseur* of the visual arts where "to know depends on the ability to see, not merely to look" (p. 6). The aim of the educational critic, according to Eisner, is to "illuminate a situation or an object so that it can be seen or appreciated" (p. 7). Neither educational *connoisseur* nor educational critic, by Eisner's definition, requires expert technical abilities or refined aesthetic sensibilities. ("Musical Musing" is a case in point. I would not attempt to justify the poem on its aesthetic merits; I am prepared, however, to defend the poem for its potential value in educational research.) The following quote from the French classic, *Le petit prince*, captures the essence of perceptivity as I see it: "*Mais les yeux sont aveugles. Il faut chercher avec le coeur"* (de Saint-Exupéry, 1946; p.

81). (The eyes are blind. One has to [re]search with the heart.) [My translation] From finding answers to the above two questions adapted from McMillan's account, I have been able to identify two key areas—writing, and educational *connoisseurship*—that provide a practical angle from which I may envision my work. Having established my personal perspective, I next turn to the research communities to which I feel I belong.

Entering the Field

In heeding Bruner's (1969) call for educational researchers to explore the under-explored conditions of creativity (p. 17); in paying attention to the plight of intuition described by Bergson (1998) as "the best part" of consciousness as well as a "lamp almost extinguished" (p. 267); in taking into account Damasio's (1994) explanation of the role of emotions and feelings in the human capacity to reason; in agreeing with Rousseau's *sentiment de l'existence* as cited by Taylor (1989); in distinguishing Arendt's (1974) *who* from *what*; in differentiating thought from cognition (Arendt, 1971); in joining Greene's (1995) passionate plea for releasing the imagination and educating for freedom; in seeing through the opening of Eisner's (1991) enlightened eye; in listening to the voices of *being* of educators who are living in the throes of an education of *doing* (Aoki, 2005; Berman et al. 1991); in seeking a more satisfying experience for researchers, teachers and students (MacMillan, 2005); and, in paying tribute to the creative accord of my colleagues at the 2004 Oxford Round Table on Education (see Chapter X), I have landed, like Alice through the looking glass, into a strange-yet-familiar territory. After many years of tilling and toiling in the traditional fields of public education with only half-hinted-at hunches to go by, I now find myself belonging to research communities who are imagining the world otherwise (Greene, 1995) and who wish to be personally involved in their work. The lay of the landscape for exploring the under-explored and getting to the heart of the educational matter is being prepared in innovative and alternative ways.

As an old timer to education but a newcomer to educational research, I am learning about the hard-earned gains in the social sciences and in education in an ongoing struggle for a legitimate place in academia for different ways of knowing. In the evolution of qualitative inquiry,

according to Denzin and Lincoln (2005, pp. 14-20, as cited by Butler-Kisber, 2010; p. 3), the push against the dominant positivistic ways of knowing has passed through seven critical phases: the *traditional* phase (1900-1942); the *modernist* phase (1940-1970); the *blurred genres* phase (1970-1986); the *postmodern* phase (1990- 1995); the *postexperimental* phase (1995-2000) during which time new arts-informed ways were used to study and portray lived experience; and the *methodologically contested* phase (2000-2004) where methods were being questioned for their validity. Denzin and Lincoln suggest that the current time is the *fractured future* phase (2005-) "... when qualitative inquiry will have to confront conservative measures attempting to rein in qualitative inquiry and align it more closely with positivistic orientations" (2005, pp. 14-20, as cited by Butler-Kisber, 2010, p. 3).

From the above historical account, as well as from other accounts (Eisner, 1991; Barone and Eisner, 1997; Prendergast, Leggo & Sameshima, Eds., 2009), I can see that the trend taking hold of the imagination and intellect of innovative educators began in earnest over thirty years ago. As an old-timer to education, I have observed first-hand the change of orientation being reflected in the conversations of colleagues and in the discourses of scholarly literature that embrace epistemologies of "critical thought"; "facilitation"; "elicitation"; "participatory action"; "voice"; "auto-ethnography"; "self-study"; "reflexivity"; "qualitative interpretation"; "arts-based research"; "arts-informed inquiry"; "memory work"; "integrated studies"; "authenticity"; "collaboration"; "partnership"; "reinvigoration"; "journaling"; "discovery writing"; "life writing"; "inclusion"; "empathetic inquiry"; "agency"; "professional learning community"; "mentoring"; "multiple perspectives" and so on. What all words have in common is a fundamental understanding of research, pedagogy and practice as *e-ducation*, a qualitative *emergent* process, from the Latin root *educo, educare*, a drawing forth of meaning from within. This alternative approach stands in stark contrast to the traditionally conservative view of a quantifiably objective application of the tried-and-true, i.e. 'reliable', positivistic scientific methodologies to research, pedagogy and practice from without. McMillan's 2005 account of the personal dissatisfaction she experienced as a researcher when she found herself so far removed from her work that she hardly recognized the words she herself had written, coupled with the resultant disinterest in her work on the part of other musicians and music educators—

the very people she was trying to reach—gives every good reason to press forward in support of an alternative qualitative methodology in educational research.

The purpose of research is to discover, or uncover, meaning. From the above cluster of words and their commonality, it can be reasonably argued that meaning may be artfully exposed and understood through a process of *e-ducation* and *in-terpretation.* My experience in poetic inquiry as exemplified in "Musical Musing" brought forth many insights that I deem valuable to me personally; and hopefully of value generally in the reinvigoration of education that I envision. Given the Latin root meaning of education, it may be equally ascertained that only partial meaning can be scientifically observed, proven and/or applied through positivistic quantitative research methods. In keeping with the central ideas of this dissertation that weave together the links between being and thinking, as distinct from doing and knowing, three genres of educational scholarship emerge as inclusive of the above epistemologies, and compatible in context with the thinking of this dissertation: feminist visual methodologies for social change (de Lange, Mitchell, Stuart, Eds., 2007; Lykes 2001); *currere* , memory and agency in teacher development (Aoki, 2005; Strong-Wilson, 2007; 2012); and qualitative inquiry (Butler-Kisber, 2010). Of the three genres, the one most conducive to facilitating the invisible, immeasurable and intrinsic aspects of education and the emergent reality at issue in this thesis, the question of identity, is qualitative inquiry. The possibilities afforded by a methodology that sees inquiry as "the way of being in and doing the work from its inception to its conclusion" (Butler-Kisber, 2010, p. 3) would appear to hold the greatest potential for supporting an exploration of identity as the "source of creativity" (Arendt 1974). The obvious willing accomplices, partners and mediators are the Arts.

Qualitative Inquiry and the Arts

"The immediate source of art work is the human capacity for thought..." says Arendt (1974, p.168). As has been demonstrated in the exploration of theoretical perspectives throughout this dissertation, thinking and action, which includes the "creative act" as described by Greene (2008), are the media through which identity may be expressed and distinguished in the public

sphere as *who*. As has been suggested by Damasio (2010), it is storytelling and the Arts that will induce the nourishing emotions and feelings that form the base of the human spirit or soul. Based on John Dewey's perspective of the living phenomenon of *Art as Experience* (1958/1946), all indicators point towards the Arts as natural mediators for an exploration of identity and creativity in education. Constituted in the *experience* of I/dentity, the Arts are implicated in the *expression* of I/dentity.

The 2012 conference theme of the *Arts Education and Research Association* (AERA) was "Non Satis Scire: To Know Is Not Enough" which suggests a movement beyond the limiting boundaries of cognition toward action "for the public good". The 2012 theme of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities was "ArteFacts. Knowledge is Art—Art is Knowledge" suggesting a unity that will yield results to make the heart sing (Jobs, 2010). Scholarly journals such as *LEARNing Landscapes,* the *International Journal of Arts in Education,* and the *International Journal for the Arts in Society*, offer a welcoming context for innovative, artful reflection and thought. Of the complementary nature of qualitative inquiry and the Arts, Eisner says this:

> Educational critics and critics of the arts share a common aim: to help others see and understand. To this aim, one must be able to use language to reveal what, paradoxically, words can never say. This means that voice must be heard in the text, alliteration allowed and cadence encouraged. Relevant allusions should be employed and metaphor that adumbrates by suggestion used. All of these devices and more are as much a part of the tool kit of those conducting qualitative inquiry as analysis of variance is for those working in conventional quantitative research modes. In short, qualitative thought is ubiquitous in human affairs. (1991, p. 3)

In having now narrowed the field to qualitative inquiry and the Arts, I find the range still broad in scope for the specifics of my work. Butler-Kisber's (2010) book, *Qualitative Inquiry: Thematic, Narrative and Arts-Informed Perspectives*, was written with the purpose of helping graduate students at this juncture. "They need to be able to choose, match and then defend their inquiry approaches with their research focuses and questions, their beliefs and assumptions, and their communicative abilities and passions" (Patton, 2002, as cited by Butler-

Kisber, 2010, p. 1). The following section addresses the core issues I encounter and the meaningfulness I discover in the process of narrowing my focus and finding a match.

Inner Tensions Emerge

I began an exploration of methodology with an interpretation of "Musical Musing" that involved an attentive engagement with the theories and perspectives under consideration. Based upon that artful experience, I detected a slight variation on the theme of musical ways of knowing—described by McMillan as connected *to* the affective and the aesthetic—and poetic ways of knowing I described as art as *experience*. What I did not foresee was the unexpected turn of events that arose from the subtle yet persistent conflict caused by the slight variation on the theme of involvement, an event detected and foreshadowed earlier. This event, in turn, has brought the inquiry full circle through a process of *dénouement* and back to the beginning. In the following paragraphs, I shall attempt to explain what I mean by full circle, and show how this unexpected turning has led to a surprising outcome with consequences for my work in particular and possibly for educational research in general.

Making a choice between what I had come to understand as the two methodological options available to me, namely "quantitative" and/or "qualitative" methods, has been crucial to my process of learning which perspectives best match my questions, my view point and natural tendencies and interests. When it came down to choosing one side of the dichotomy over the other, however, the ideological center of my thinking/writing started to wobble. The premise began to feel unstable; inner tensions arose. At this critical juncture, the feeling of being stuck at a crossroads and not knowing which way to go literally stopped the process in its tracks. I was called to rethink my direction. I realized that the very integrity of the theory and method of my dissertation was at stake. *If*, theoretically, I/dentity is revealed in plurality, and I/dentity is known in the "in-between" as *who* (Arendt, 1974); and *if*, theoretically, *intuition* and *intellecte* are to be equally and fully developed, as Bergson suggests, in order to facilitate a "complete and perfect humanity" (1998, p. 167), or a "revised view of human beings" (Damasio, 1994), *then* methodologically, it stands to reason that I/dentity must be viewed [w]holistically and not

be subjected to a one-sided "qualitative" method in opposition to another-sided "quantitative" method. To be true to my subject in question, therefore, I had to find a way to incorporate both the arts *and* the sciences; to marry thought *and* cognition (Arendt, 1971); to reunite the left hand with the right hand (Bruner, 1969). I/dentity and creativity constitute a living experience, and a living experience, like Bergson's *élan vital*, is "whole and undivided" and cannot be "squeezed" and "narrowed down" to fit the convenient conventional or non-conventional requirements of a one-sided, lop-sided methodology.

In further contemplating the disruptive tensions that have arisen in the concluding phase of my methodology exploration, I gratefully recalled Anne Sullivan's (2007) essay "On Poetic Occasion in Inquiry: Concreteness, Voice, Ambiguity, Tension and Associative Logic". Sullivan talks about the presence of tension as being part of the complex architecture of associative logic, a "poetic" logic she describes as more web-like than linear (p. 122). Moreover, explains Sullivan, the associative logic (of a poem) arises from a nexus of tensions. "Tensions do not operate apart from or even within the logic of the poem; they are integral and essential to that logic" (p. 123). Coming full circle in my inquiry to the links between art and experience, poetry and I/dentity, has helped me to understand the meaning behind the intense discomfiture. Accustomed to prosaic lines of linear thinking, I expected to be able to choose, as the next "logical" step in the procedure, between "qualitative" and "quantitative" ways of knowing. What I had missed in the cognitive equation was the complex architecture of associative logic, a "poetic" logic Sullivan describes as more web-like than linear. A way *out* of the dilemma has turned out to be a way *in* to understanding two new conceptualizations: "research as narrative", a concept proposed by Hendry (2010); and "relational inquiry" (Clandinin, Murphy, Huber, and Orr, 2010) in which tensions are seen as "markers of inquiry" and are used as "key strategies" by "wide-awake" researchers.

Research as Narrative

"Questions, not method, are the heart of research," says Petra Munro Hendry (2010, p. 73) who also suggests that all research is narrative. "Resituating all research as narrative, as opposed to characterizing narrative as one particular form of inquiry, provides a critical space for rethinking

research beyond current dualisms and bifurcations that create boundaries that limit the capacity of dialogue across diverse epistemologies," she says (p. 72).

> It could be argued that narrative research is the first and oldest form of inquiry. If this is the case, then all research traditions originate from narrative. *Narrative* means "to account" and is derived from the term *gno*, meaning to know. The oral storytelling traditions of earliest man were narrative inquiries that sought to address questions of meaning and knowing. From the beginning, narrative embodied multiple ways of knowing. For the Greeks, there were both *episteme*, knowledge of the practical or everyday (also termed logical-rational thought) and *gnosis* or *poesis* (also termed mytho-poetic) knowledge related to the larger questions of meaning. Both modes were accounts of knowledge; they were narratives that were not seen as oppositional but rather as complementary (Davis, 2004). The epistemological roots of the scientific and the humanistic traditions can be traced to narrative when narrative is understood as the primary way in which humans make meaning (Bakhtin, 1981; Barthes, 1996/1974; Bruner, 1986; Ricoeur, 1981). If research is understood as meaning making, then all inquiry is narrative. (Hendry, 2010, p. 74)

Citing Feyerabend (1975/1978), Bruner (1986/1996), Clandinin (2000), *et alia*, Hendry presents a convincing argument for the repositioning of science as one type of narrative (account) thereby providing a potential rupture in current constructions of science as absolute and the only legitimate mode of inquiry. The binary nature of conceptualizing inquiry, says Hendry, is almost taken as a fact. According to Hendry, the most common conceptualization of inquiry is quantitative versus qualitative (p. 74). Hendry proposes a theory of narrative as an epistemology of doubt (questioning) that can address three major domains: "the physical (science), human experience (symbolic), and the metaphysical (sacred)" (p. 74). These three narratives all engage in the asking of questions but require unique approaches to the doubt they stimulate, explains Hendry. From the perspective of this thesis, what is important to note in Hendry's perspective is that these modes of narrative are not incommensurable; on the contrary, they are interconnected and interdependent. By suggesting that narrative is not a method, but rather a process of meaning-finding, Hendry has helped me to see beyond the dilemma of choice making, an act of inquiry that would *not* have matched the associative requirement of a research question of I/dentity. Furthermore, Munro-Hendry has helped me better understand the most common conceptualizations of inquiry, namely "quantitative" and

"qualitative". According to Munro-Hendry, in the epistemological roots of the scientific and humanistic traditions, knowledge of the practical was termed "logical rational thought"; and knowledge related to the larger questions of meaning was termed "mytho-poetic thought" (2010, p. 74). The epistemological distinctions have helped to clarify the root cause of the tensions I experience particular to this dissertation. In Butler-Kisber's (2010) argument that inquiry *is* the method, I see beyond method to the meaningful experience of *being* in and *doing* the work from its inception to its conclusion (p. 3 emphasis mine). As such, I envision qualitative inquiry as creating a space and place for the coming together of formerly-seen-as-opposite, but now-seen-as-complementary, conceptualizations, namely, "logical rational thought" and "mytho-poetic thought". The concepts merge in the narrative process of *being* in and *doing* the work. What is critical in such an *e-mergence* of creative tensions is a possibility for re-visioning and re-positioning qualitative inquiry, for the purposes of this dissertation, as narrative inquiry. It is in rethinking the concept that I find the "match" that ignites my work. A conceptualization of "method as narrative" accommodates a "revised view of human beings" as an integrated I/dentity known only in plurality and distinguished in the in-between. What are the implications of this match for educational research, and more specifically, for educational research on the subject of I/dentity and creativity?

Tensions as Markers for Inquiry

The following account, entitled "Negotiating Narrative Inquiries: Living in a Tension-Filled Midst" (Clandinin, Murphy, Huber and Orr, 2010), demonstrates the narrative of relationship and the importance of tension in a study of the experiences of children, teachers and families in schools shaped by the Alberta government's achievement testing practices. In their exploration of narrative inquiry as relational inquiry, the authors were drawn to considering the central place of tension. At the heart of the inquiry is their shared concern for the question of how tension may be shifting storied landscapes and shaping the diverse lives of their participants. What emerged from their study is a critical understanding of tensions in a relational way--a way of creating space between people, events or things. The emergent view of the positive role of

tensions in relational inquiry stands in sharp contrast to the usual view of tension in schools. Tensions are customarily seen as problematic, as needing to be solved, fixed or smoothed over in the concerted school mission or success plan that is designed to ensure a safe and caring, i.e. tension-free, environment.

The starting point of the study was the researchers living "alongside" the participants. "Therefore, our lives and who we are and are becoming on their and our landscapes are also under study" (2010, p. 82). The authors made spaces to hear the stories children and families told in their home and school places, and wrote about them and about their responses to them in field notes that were later transcribed. Sometimes, when they or the children found it difficult to express their experiences in words, they would draw or take photos. On occasion, the children were asked to create memory boxes of artifacts or to create collages or metaphors with photos and stories. The authors talked with, and worked alongside, teachers for over a year and heard and felt their stories (p. 83). What the authors discovered by surprise was that they were "most awake" to what was happening for children, families , teachers and themselves when they noted tensions as they lived alongside their participants or in their tension-filled stories. "... attending to tensions could help us illuminate what it means to engage in narrative inquiry as a relational methodology," they said (p. 83). A term the authors frequently used to describe experiences of tensions was "bumping up against" ... the lived and told stories of others (p. 83). Soon they began to use tensions as a key methodological strategy:

> And, ever so slowly we awakened to understand that tensions can only emerge from relationships. Without living in relation in wide-awake ways, that is by engaging in narrative inquiry as relational inquiry, we cannot know, feel, understand, and recognize tensions between an individual's storied life and his or her landscapes, tensions within individual's storied knowledge, tensions we experience as researchers alongside participants as we live on their landscapes. (p. 83)

Thinking metaphorically about their experiences in attending to tensions brought to mind geodes, rocks that appear grey and plain on the outside, but on closer inspection, what becomes visible through the cracks are "the multicolours, maybe the sparkles of quartz and amethyst, maybe veins of gold or red" (p. 84). According to Clandinin, Murphy, Huber and Orr,

beginning to attend to the cracks under what may have appeared, at first glance, to be a smooth story, creates spaces where inquiry is made possible. Thus, tensions became markers for inquiry. To communicate their findings, the authors used what they called "fictionalized research texts" (p. 85) in an effort to ethically address the fear, for example, that teachers may be seen as living a conflicting story with a school's story of compliance around dominant stories of assessment. The "I" of the fictional research text represents several "I's": researchers who lived alongside teachers over time. Through relational narrative inquiry, the authors have come to see tension as a central component in understanding the experience of people in relationship. This study in relational narrative emphasizes the integrity of the organic nature of lived experience. This study is a case in point of qualitative inquiry, of being in and doing the work from its inception to its conclusion. The researchers were not afraid of the inevitable tensions that arise in living experience; in fact tension was seen as the place in-between where the authors felt "most awake". Noteworthy is the fact that consistently throughout the study, it was the *question* of shared concern that determined the variety of perspectives for gathering knowledge. From all accounts, the narrative process was allowed to unfold as organically as the circumstances permitted. Such relational narrative work makes for compelling inquiry of lived experience.

In "Narrative Understandings of Lives Lived In and Out of School," another recent project, Clandinin (2010), alongside a group of ten other researchers, became intrigued by the life-composing of ten youth of diverse rural and urban experience who had left school prior to high school completion. By learning about the students' lives, the researchers hoped to learn more about their lives as educators and about schools in general. The procedure was as follows: first the researchers composed narrative accounts of their unique experiences with the youth with whom they had engaged in conversation. Next they identified six threads that resonated in their accounts of the youth's stories, namely, the importance of *conversational spaces*; the importance of *relationships*; a noting of the fact that identity composition of the youth did not include the passivity of accepting a label of "dropout"; the complexity of stories lived; relational tensions; and the embedding of lives in society, culture, institutions and family. The youth's stories ultimately called the researchers to re-imagine schooling as well as places where

> we are interested in openings, in unexpected possibilities, not in the predictable or the quantifiable, not in what is thought of as social control. For us, education signifies an initiation into new ways of seeing, hearing, feeling, moving. It signifies the nurture of a special kind of reflectiveness and expressiveness, a reaching out for meaning, a learning to learn. (Greene, 2001, p. 7, as quoted in Clandinin, 2010, p. 27)

The concept of "narrative as inquiry" (Hendry, 2010) provides for the tension-filled spaces and places where opposites can merge, dialogue can exist, diversity can flourish and all manner of creativity can occur. Interested in "openings" and "unexpected possibilities", Clandinin *et al* (2010a, 2010b) have demonstrated practical, authentic ways of being in and doing the work ("living alongside" the participants) so that their experience of inquiry becomes an integral part of the process.

Finding a Match between Thought and Method

A variety of aspects has been explored regarding possible research methodologies and arts-informed perspectives that would best support an investigation of identity and creativity in education. For the purposes of this thesis, qualitative inquiry, defined by Butler-Kisber (2010) as "the way of being in and doing the work from its inception to its conclusion," (p. 3) has been shown to be the best "mode of holding oneself and advancing of one who questions," (Blanchot, 1993, p. 4, as cited in Strong-Wilson, 2008, p. 4). Incorporating the "affective attunement" of the theory of intersubjectivity (Al-Saji, 2008), and including Gadamer's (1975/1998) theory of *phronesis* as "the cultivating of a way of being in the world with others" (as cited in Strong-Wilson, 2008, p. 4), narrative inquiry seems the only way of doing research in support of identity and creativity. From the perspective of identity and creativity, nothing less than being in or "personal involvement," as described in "musical ways of knowing" (McMillan, 2005), can accommodate the complexity of the question at the heart of this inquiry.

By narrowing (and broadening) the field of inquiry, a lesson learned from a living experience of the "tensionality" (Aoki, 2005) between logical-rational thought and mytho-poetic thought has

underscored the importance of finding a match between thought and method. For the integrity of the subject under consideration, “poetic ways of knowing” in which tension is integral to the relational process has been demonstrated to best facilitate a web-like process of inquiry and “associative logic” (Sullivan, 2008) that is more conducive to “finding out by finding in” than “prosaic ways of knowing” that tend to follow a methodical step-by-step procedure.

The implications of finding a correct match are expanded upon in Hendry’s (2010) theory of narrative inquiry in which inquiry is envisioned as a narrative process that encompasses the scientific, the humanistic *and* the spiritual aspects of the lived experience. Furthermore, the practical application of the compatible conceptualization of relational narrative is demonstrated in two recent studies by educator/psychologist Clandinin, *et al* (2010) in which working “alongside” and seeing tensions as “markers” for “wide-awake” research speaks volumes to the potential of narrative inquiry for exploring I/dentity in educational research. A practice of inquiry that sees *being* in and *doing* the work as a way to opening unexpected possibilities for imagining the world “otherwise” (Greene, 1998) has the potential for reinvigorating the meaning and purpose of education.

From all above accounts, It would seem that ‘not knowing’ is a prerequisite to inquiry; it would seem that story-telling is the most natural (and ancient) way of living with doubt (questioning); it would seem that relationship, as opposed to avoidance (of conflict), can create tensions integral to being “most awake” to meaning-finding; it would seem that the Arts by their very “uselessness”; and thinking by its very “resultlessness” are not only useful, but critical to the awakening process called education. From the perspective of the above-named educators, and for many others cited in this chapter, education signifies new ways of seeing, new ways of hearing and new ways of being in the world.

As a researcher, I am learning that the space of ‘not knowing’ is the place where meaning can best be found. I am learning that wakefulness is more closely associated with meaning than answers. I see education as a process of awakening akin to the process of inquiry where questions, not answers, are the heart of learning. Implied in O’Donohue’s (2005) statement, “the question holds the lantern,” is illumination, not answers. In that light, it will be in the open

spaces of an uncertain inquiry that my imaginings of the world “otherwise” (Greene, 1995) can most certainly appear.

Chapter IV

An Uncertain Proposal

To open spaces for learning is to give learners a sense of absence, of open questions lacking answers, of darkness unexplained.

(Maxine Greene, 2008, p. 18)

As was discussed earlier in Chapter II, one of the assumptions held fast by the current worldview in Western societies is that human identity is constructed. Bauman suggests that identity entered the modern mind and practice dressed from the start as an individual task. It was up to the individual, he said, to escape modern uncertainty (1996, p. 19). Identities are constructed within, not outside, representation, says Hall, adding that the procedural construction of identity is not a "so-called return to the roots, but a coming to terms with our routes" (1996, p. 5). According to Taylor, it is the stance of disengagement that is at the root of modern identity "constructed" to achieve a "quite self-sufficient certainty" based on scientific evidence (1989, p. 156). Thus, modern identity, according to Taylor's account of the constructivist's view, becomes something that can be "worked on" (p. 159). The growing ideal in modern society in this regard, explains Taylor, is a human agent "who is able to re-make himself by methodical and disciplined action" (p. 159).

"Construction of identity" is not only central to the QEP (Quebec Education Program), as was indicated in Chapter II, but is the broadly accepted premise undergirding most school systems that have been built around a commonly held Western ideal of "individual success". As a by-product of this deeply rooted belief, education has been viewed as a social, political, and economic "program" in which future generations are trained to "make something of their 'self'". (Note the word some*thing.*)

Contrary to the popular notion of a constructed identity, my life's experience, along with the explorations of the first three years of my doctoral program, have consistently revealed to me

the invisible, non-measurable and non-quantifiable 'evidence' of I/dentity while, at the same time, generating many more questions than answers. Due to the essential nature of my life's experiences coupled with my research findings to date, as a former educator and as a current doctoral candidate, I am faced with a dilemma in the writing of a research proposal. I have learned through trial and error that the problem I have encountered cannot be solved by tried-and-true problem-solving methods. Having reached a standstill caused by the subjective nature of my research subject, namely "I", I am heartened by the sudden recollection of a possible alternative that I experienced firsthand when previously faced with a similar dilemma and an identical feeling of uncertainty. The alternative solution that has relevance to my current situation occurred in a vivid dream I dreamt many years ago.

In the dream, I was alone in a convertible sports car. The top was down. Somehow I had veered from the main road and had come to an abrupt stop in a thick clump of bushes in the darkness of a forest night. I remember noticing with matter-of-fact aplomb that not only was there no steering wheel in the car; there was no power switch with which to turn on the headlights. Having only my own inwardly generated "vision" to guide me, I remember, tentatively at first, but then with increasing confidence as I became more acclimatized to the situation, placing my hands firmly, with fingers spread out, on the dashboard; and ever so gently moving the car ahead. Slowly and surely I "felt" and "sensed" and "willed" my way forward ... and out of the woods.

Likewise I am beginning to trust the inherent 'vision' of the question that will determine the way forward at this juncture of my work. Gratefully, I find encouraging reassurance in the words of Petra Munro Hendry who affirms, "Questions, not method, are the heart of research" (2010, p. 73). The process of inquiry (questioning) has turned out to be the very means by which I have gained a deeper understanding of I/dentity as *who* along with a broader conceptual grasp of i/dentity as *what* (Arendt, 1974). The most willing accomplices in the inquiry have been a poetic imagination (a sensibility left over from childhood, it would seem) and the untrained proclivity of an *amateur* artist going hand-in-hand with an educational *connoisseur* (Eisner, 1991). In other words, by reason of my question, the meaning I seek is *e*-

merging and *un*-folding by sudden surprise ... and by way of inwardly generated thinking that is not the same as externally constructed knowing. Creative writing, poetic inquiry ("generated" and "found") and narrative inquiry are proving over time to be the most generous media for exploring through artistic expression the question of identity at the heart of my research.

A substantial theoretical base coupled with a sound rationale for arts-informed perspectives notwithstanding, the daunting *question du jour* remains: How do I couch a process of an open-ended, meaning-finding inquiry that is intended to engender insights (not answers) from the subjectively "felt" and "sensed" and "willed" lived experience when, from all indications to date, such potential findings would seem to go above and beyond, over and under, around and in between the objectively defined parameters of the "Research Proposal" that normally "normalizes" (Starke-Meyerring, 2012, p. 75) a goal-oriented, data-collecting, fact-finding, step-by-step, linear and positivistic procedure? The present uncertain proposal is an attempt to address the above conundrum by giving an inside scoop on the creative process of writing a research proposal as artistic expression.

Indeed, the show-and-tell approach is intended to highlight the intuitive process of an informal education in being (*who*) interactively at work with the intellectual parameters of a formal schooling in doing (*what*). By attempting to demonstrate the dynamic interplay between artistic expression and scientific statement in the writing of a proposal, I hope to enhance the distinction between being (*who*) and doing (*what*) that will promote a reasonable understanding of the necessity of both. The present proposal is an artist's, albeit *amateur* artist's, attempt to explore, through creative narrative writing and poetic inquiry, the question of identity. The purpose of my uncertain proposal is to restore equilibrium to the currently overbearing, predominantly positivistic, instrumental-utilitarian enterprise of modern schooling (and contemporary research practices) by demonstrating reconciliation between tentative artistic expression and positivistic scientific statement.

Looking Back: Amplifying Resonance

In my preliminary explorations of identity, I began to consider possible arts-informed perspectives that would support my investigation. It became apparent that whatever form a future exploration might take, a key component of the work would be *resonance*. Not only did I want to learn *about* i/dentity (what); more to the point, I wanted to express I/dentity (who) in creative and art/felt ways. At the heart of my thinking was the desire to be able to contribute my voice to the resonant conversations of like-minded, like-(and light!) hearted, empathetic, life-loving, educational researchers, leaders, teachers and learners. At the 2012 AERA (American Educational Research Association) Conference held in Vancouver, B.C., for example, participants were commenting on a panel presentation of poetic inquiry when they enthusiastically noted the growing strength in the foundation of the arts-based SIG of AERA. As a new timer to research, but an old timer to education, I suggest that the increasingly 'solid' foundation of arts-based and arts-informed perspectives in educational research is being created by the collective amplification of *resonance,* and not only by a growing accumulation of knowledge and increasing numbers of proponents and adherents.

I predicted over a year ago in my exploratory proposal that a more precise and detailed outline would follow. As anticipated, following the completion of the Comprehensive Exams, a more comprehensive theoretical conception of "essential" identity as distinct from "constructed" identity, and a deeper understanding of the perspectives of qualitative and narrative inquiry have emerged. However, due to the indefinable nature of the subject "I", coupled with the non-quantifiable arts-informed perspectives I am choosing in support of my inquiry, it is proving impossible to put forward a preconceived, goal-oriented plan. What I do have to propose instead are more questions: What does an experience of essential I/dentity (who) look like and feel like? In what ways have we lost who we are in what we do? What are the educational conditions (formal and informal) that may support and/or stifle the experience of *who*? What (or who) is creativity? How would making room for *who* in expression (Taylor, 1989) and *who* in action (Arendt, 1974) in teacher development programs and in school curricula contribute to the reinvigoration of the meaning of education and the revision of the aims of schooling?

Going Forward

From lessons learned from preliminary preparations, the evidence suggests the necessity of thinking through a viable research process by starting with writing as *thinking*. The surprise element of unexpected insights that emerged in the process of "putting doctoral writing centre stage" (Kamler and Thompson, 2006, p. 3) along with the inherently rigorous requirements of perceptivity—defined by Barone and Eisner as "seeing what most people miss" (1997, p. 93)—make attempts to pin down a future plan both counterintuitive and counterproductive. I must see where the writing, taken in the spirit of Socrates' metaphor of the wind (as cited by Arendt, 1971, p. 418), 'wants' to go in terms of research design, function, practical application, implication and final outcome. The *thinking* of the research orientation I am proposing, unlike the world-building activity of *knowing* that Arendt likens to the building of houses (1971, p. 421), is more akin to unearthing "found" treasures of insight, a process akin to Anne Sullivan's (2007) poetic analogy of finding the hidden David within the stone.

Despite the decision not to pre-plan a study that is purposefully intended to be experiential and open-ended, this is not to say there is no vision for my work. Through the example of my own writing, I hope to demonstrate a fruitful interaction between the evidence I seek and the method with which I seek that evidence. My purpose is to find an equal and complementary relationship between *intuition* and *intellecte* (Bergson, 1988, p. 268) that will reflect the hypothesis of the theoretical links I detect between identity and creativity, between *being* and *thinking* and between *doing* and *knowing*. In my personal engagement in the work I am proposing, I intend to continue to experiment with the process of creativity as experienced in the writing of Chapters I, II and III and to methodically document the process of my findings. The experimentation I suggest comes with a new-found trust in the creative process. I expect an unusual outcome to emerge from a spontaneous experience of *being* in the work as well as from schooled, predictable and reliable methods of *doing* the work. I plan to incorporate both ways—*being* and *doing*—to provide a living *resonance* in the work as well as to articulate an informative content of the work.

Methodological Integrity

From a collection of poems, essays and narratives written over a two-year period of a creative writing course taken at McGill's Institute for Learning in Retirement (MILR), along with other relevant poetic and narrative pieces, I will choose 'artifacts' for close examination. I will think through the selections in search for insights pertaining to identity and creativity in education. In keeping with my experience of the creative process in the writing of the above-named collection as well as that of Chapters I, II and III, I expect that the writing process will continue to be more web-like than linear and, in keeping with the art/felt writing experience of the Comprehensive Exams, evoke a "tensionality" (Aoki, 2005) conducive to "wide-awake" methodological strategy for the merging of relational opposites (Clandinin *et al.*, 2009). In the case of the present proposal, the relational opposites at work and play are represented as *who* and *what*; meaning (*raison d'être*) and know-how (*savoir faire*); thinking and knowing; intuition and intellect; education and schooling.

Carrying forward the theoretical and methodological explorations of Chapters II and III, the proposed dissertation will attempt to prove through an ongoing process of writing as thinking, and reflection as practice, that identity (*who*) is not some*thing* that is artificially engineered and willfully designed through a systematic program of instruction, socialization, and qualification (the QEP mission statement, cited earlier); but, instead, identity (who) is an original way of *being* and *thinking*, an authentic some*one who* is inwardly generated, embodied in feelings and emotion (Damasio, 1999) and outwardly revealed through artistic expression (Taylor, 1989) and public action (Arendt, 1974).

Emerging from the exploration of theoretical perspectives in Chapter II is the notion that *who* is elusive and invisible, but nonetheless, identifiable. With deference to the indefinable nature of identity, therefore, I am compelled to look within my lived educational experience for glimpses and glimmers of authentic being and for a deeper *under*standing of essential meaning. With respect to the subject of my thesis, therefore, a study of external data *about* the subject "I" as experienced and reported by others and interpreted by me as a third-person onlooker, would not only lead to second-rate, second-hand information; but would fail, in my opinion, to *e-duce*

the *in*-sights I wish to garner from my work. The most important outcome of the investigation I wish to undertake will be the integrity I am hopefully able to generate between the evidence I seek and the way in which I seek that evidence. From this perspective, only firsthand experience will do. Thus I am stuck with me, myself, and "I" as integrated subject *and* object of my proposed investigation of identity and creativity in education.

As was determined in the preceding explorations of Chapter III, the method I choose is inquiry, defined by Butler-Kisber as "being in and doing the work from its inception to its conclusion" (2010, p. 3). The arts-based perspectives that seem to best suit the purposes of an in-depth exploration of identity in education are narrative inquiry and poetic inquiry. This choice is in keeping with Damasio's (2010) suggestion that storytelling and the Arts are the ideal inducers of feelings and emotions, the essential connectors to a "revised view of human beings" (1999, p. 8) that I am proposing as 'real', i.e., not 'fabricated' or 'constructed'. Through a personal lens of telling-it-like-it-is, and through "poetic ways of knowing" described in Chapter III as "finding out by finding in", I expect to incorporate in my work the feelings and emotions engendered by the lived experience of the situations I encounter and recount. By introspectively examining selected stories and poems that have emerged from the experiences of my formal and informal education, I expect to challenge constructivist views and validate essentialist perspectives.

The Lived Experience

By reason of insights drawn from previous explorations, I ascertain that it is "the lived experience" that embodies feelings and emotions; it is "the lived experience" that is artful and heartfelt. As a lifelong learner and long-time educator, I have had privileged access to a broad range of educational experiences. I plan to draw from a repertoire of lived educational experiences accumulated over time. A pool of inner resources consisting of narrative and poetic 'artifacts' will serve as springboards for the hoped-for generation of thoughtful, art/felt perspectives, as well as potentially provide opportunities for meaningful interpretations offering practical educational possibilities. The composition of the above components, similar

in texture to the analysis undertaken in the poem "Musical Musing", will involve a web-like interweaving of thinking and knowing, theory and practice, being and doing. The intention is for the process to occur within the generous and generative confines of Damasio's reason, (1994), intricately connected to, and embodied in, feelings and emotion. I resist, therefore, my own well schooled inclination and/or temptation to design at the outset an overly structured organization of material in which thought could be controlled by, and con*formed* to, onerously unyielding (and unwieldy) goal-oriented premeditations, prearrangements and preconditions. "The immediate source of art work is the human capacity for thought ..." says Arendt (1974; p. 168). The overall vision for my work includes the wondrous possibility that my dissertation will emerge as a product of thought; and as such, possibly even, as a work of art.

By paying attention to *who* and not just focusing on *what* and *how*; by tapping inner resources and nurturing inherent abilities and tendencies; by inducing natural-born interests and talents; by facilitating art/felt imagination along with rigorous scholarship development and apprenticeship; by encouraging fresh thoughts, new expressions and innovative actions, identity, the "source of creativity" (Arendt, 1974), will be authorized to author a unique process of meaningful educational discovery. I envision a possible return to the epistemological roots of education, to draw forth from within, to let unfold the bold potential and untold possibilities of *be*-coming and "not yet" (Greene, 1998).

Thinking My Way Through

In the writing of the preliminary ideas for my uncertain proposal, I understood that there would be no calculated, measurable hard-copy outcomes or results for the problem of identity I was proposing to explore. Nor was I interested in finding an ultimate answer or a new and improved reform to latch onto, or bandwagon to climb aboard. Instead, it was my hope that I could contribute my thinking to an ancient Greek aphorism, "Know thyself." For reasons I cannot explain because I don't know where the idea came from (other than perhaps from my high-school Latin class), I have always believed that it was the role of education to provide conditions

conducive to the living experience of an indefinable identity in order to maintain a balance between the *raison d'être* (meaning) of education and the *savoir faire* (know-how) of schooling.

Arendt proposed in the Prologue of *The Human Condition* that we "think what we are doing" (1974, p. 5). By reason of the word "think", I link Arendt's proposal directly to my proposal: *who* is thinking; *who* is doing? Who am I, *really*? An exploration of identity and creativity in *being* will allow me to *think* through firsthand, down-to-earth, face-to-face living educational experiences. The non-specifics of the theoretical framework and methodology, as outlined above, will not only afford me the luxury (from the Latin, *lux*, meaning light) of a meaningful inquiry, but will also hopefully contain a germination of unexpected insights with as-yet-untold educational possibilities.

As an educational researcher following through on an uneducated guess and an untutored intuition, I must take the leap of faith, i.e. take my hands off the steering wheel and place them firmly on the dashboard. I must "sense" and "feel" and "will" my way through a veritable learning process towards an education in *being*. I must learn to live comfortably and confidently with the uncertainty I propose. From the above account, it seems most certain that 'not knowing' is a vital prerequisite to a meaningful inquiry.

Chapter V

A Work in Process

Beginning is the supreme capacity of man.

(Hannah Arendt, 2000, p xxi)

A New Beginning

"Every birth is a new beginning," says Arendt, echoing St. Augustine whose life and thought provided the inspiration for her doctoral dissertation (2000, p. xxi). Furthermore, adds Arendt, beginning is "the supreme capacity of man". The heralding of a new beginning at the outset of a work in process whose aim is to uncover meaningful insights from within the lived experience of identity, creativity and education (as opposed to garnering information from an externalized study *about* personhood, creativity and education) seems a most apt *point de départ*.

From this point forward, I expect tensions, roadblocks and detours to be integral components of the uncertain process at hand. I make no apologies for the uncertainty. My work in process is intended to be a live recording of an educational experience as it currently unfolds in all of its newness and awkwardness. This is my living laboratory educational experiment and I have no intention to circumvent the inevitable pitfalls of trying things out for the first time. Identity, creativity, education and meaning are up close and personal. The demands of academic rigour and the requirements of validity do not permit the subject "I" of my thesis to be studied askance or pondered from afar. With no place else to go, and no other way to get there, here is a momentous new beginning for an admittedly risky educational experiment that will be filled, I expect (I hope), with the vulnerability that is worthy of "the supreme capacity of man".

Getting Started

"Life is like a box of chocolates." The distinctive tonal inflection of the voice of Tom Hanks' now-famous character, Forest Gump, is an unusual source of inspiration, perhaps, for getting started. Nonetheless, this popular invocation came vividly to mind this morning and signalled a long-awaited exit from a long-standing dilemma. Like Forest Gump just before he set out to run his mammoth marathon, I, too, have been sitting on the proverbial veranda in a rocking chair for quite some time (perhaps my entire life) contemplating the impossible task of writing a thesis that would even begin to do justice to the grandeur of my chosen subject.

Back and forth, forward and back I rock, gathering ethereal momentum while painstakingly attending to the imagined practical details of potential material and prospective thought. Assembling a variety of "chocolates" into a coherently meaningful arrangement, I have come to realize, will take more than a confectioner's skill for concocting single pieces from tried-and-true recipes; it will take a large measure of imagination. Amassing the complexity of the multi-faceted subject of my dissertation into one "box" will require extraordinary mindfulness and a renewed capacity for inner listening—a childhood sensibility I once knew by heart; but now seem scarcely to remember. "*Mais les yeux sont aveugles. Il faut chercher avec le coeur*" (de Saint-Exupéry, 1946, p. 81). (But the eyes are blind. We have to [re]search with the heart.) [My translation] From the little I can recall of the phenomenon, I know for certain that the kind of educational envisioning that I am attempting will take what Eisner calls an "enlightened eye", defined by Eisner (a painter as well as an eminent educational scholar) as a visual artist's ability "to illuminate a situation or an object" (1991, p. 7). Stretching further the intellectual flexibility of the researcher, and rigorously testing the intuitive fibre of the amateur artist, Barone and Eisner (1997), as previously cited in Chapter III, suggest that "[t]he content for artistic creation initiates in ideas that are fed by what is called perceptivity: seeing what most people miss" (1997; p. 93). The significance of what I, and most people, have tended to miss in our various approaches to education has to do with what Arendt has called the "in between", an invisible reality no less meaningful than the world of things we visibly have in common (1974, p. 183).

Besides the prerequisite for seeing beyond the appearance of things, the artistic endeavour will also involve the need for tools, aka strategies and methods—wide-angled implements for carving the occasional broad swath as well as laser-sharp instruments for penetrating surfaces and a magnifying glass for elucidating mysteries. Equally important to the task, I am certain, will be softly rounded utensils such as spoons, scoops and ladles with which to tease out, turn out, and dish out the diverse samplings as they emerge, hopefully in all their eagerly anticipated glory, from the inquiring process. And finally, a theoretical framework with capacity large enough to contain all manner of "chocolates" in their infinite variety of textures, exotic array of ingredients and myriad sorts of flavours will have to be at the ready, ready to fulfill the ambitious overall intent of this thesis. Once stirred, mixed and blended into a smooth consistency of interlacing relevance and interfacing relationship, the pieces of the final assemblage will have to be displayed in a manner that will showcase their integrity and allow each unique piece to remain distinct and intact in its own right.

Attempting to keep alive a metaphor for identity, creativity and education *and* a simile for life, this "box of chocolates" is a very tall order, a call for no other than an educational *connoisseur* (from the Latin, *cognoscere,* to know) who knows that "... to know depends on the ability to see, not merely to look" (Eisner, 1991; p. 6).

Starting on the Right Foot

Finding the exact place to begin takes time. I ponder multiple pivotal questions around which the precision of where to begin, and the manner in which to start, revolve. I know instinctively that starting out on the right foot is critical to a true execution of any of life's worthwhile endeavours. The wild spectrum of directional possibilities swings from far left to far right, and somewhere *in medias res*; from top to bottom; and from inward to outward and back again. Should I go this way or that way? How can I be sure I have a workable angle and an appropriate lens for viewing and re-viewing the mysterious subject of my work *who*, by all accounts, will emerge reticently (if at all) as 'evidence' only *if* permitted (from the Latin, *per* through; and

mittere, to send) to appear of free volition, under conducive conditions and within particular circumstances.

Damasio says that the spirit or soul of a person (*who*) is "so annoyingly subtle" that it is there, but almost not there (2010, p. 9). "The Soul is Shy" iterates Parker J. Palmer (2004, p. 57) who advocates a "circle of trust" composed of "a group of people who know how to sit quietly 'in the woods' and wait for the shy soul to show up" (p. 59). To complicate matters further, Arendt says that *who* can be revealed in plurality and nowhere else. "Human distinctness is not the same as otherness", she explains (1974, p. 176). Given the mysterious, elusive, evasive and uncompromising nature of the subject of this dissertation, any intention to demonstrate the significant role of education in facilitating "the soul of society as it passes from one generation to another" (Gilbert K. Chesterton as cited in *The Montreal Gazette*, 11/24/12, p. 1) borders on the impossible. Nevertheless, to dare to attempt an exploration of such magnitude requires more than a blind leap of faith. The work in process requires the staying power of patience and humility, the exigency of dogged investigative skills, the agility of open-mindedness; and, most important to the task, the willingness to imagine the world "otherwise" (Greene, 1995).

I find reassuring consolation in knowing that Forest Gump didn't suddenly up and decide that he was going to get out of his rocking chair and run for his life; neither did he arbitrarily determine a time to stop running a few years later having inadvertently attracted a crowd of self-deceived followers in his wake. There was a larger compulsion at work, and there were strong impulses involved in the triggering of the events of his life as they unfolded—carefully selected chocolate-covered pieces picked out and unwrapped from an enticing assortment of possibilities ... then tasted, swallowed, and lived, one by one. The subject of the dissertation may appear on the outside to be about identity, creativity and education; nevertheless, having now tasted a *soupçon*, a small bite (or two), of the delicious "chocolate" inside, I have come to a deeper understanding of what I had only suspected all along. In essence, the real subject of the work of the uncertain inquiry at hand may be life itself.

Maybe

Agonizing uncertainty
Unlikely possibility
Teetering on the verge
Of yes or no

My interest is piqued
My hopes are dashed
Back and forth
Up and down
I go

Indefinitely tantalizing
Indecisively tormenting
Through mystery and intrigue
Persistent thoughts grow
Into potential success

Then hang in the air
Between no and yes

Perhaps
We'll see
Maybe

It May Be

It may be
Well, what if it isn't?

True or false
RigIht or wrong
Good or bad

What if we have it backwards?
Or, what if it is both?

It may be
I don't know for sure
Do you?

Emergence

Listening for that vital cue; feeling for that irresistible urge; groping for the *je ne sais quoi* that would eject me from the worn-out seat of veranda incertitude and rocking-chair ineptitude has, over the past many weeks, relentlessly focused every ray of attention I could garner, and voraciously consumed every ounce of energy I could muster. It is, therefore, with utmost relief that I finally announce the arrival of the long-awaited propitious moment. The event came at precisely 3:00 a.m. this morning. My resolve was figuratively jerked from its metaphoric rocking-chair stupor, pushed off the veranda onto the grass below only to be sent flying across the front lawn and mercilessly launched into the final compelling breakout of a long run, a beginning with no ending in sight. My attention was literally shaken, awakened and propelled out of bed and into the seat of the task chair in front of my computer where the Blank Page of a Word doc glared back in red-flagged alert. As I stared at the expectant screen, I began to discern an emerging layout, a potential design blueprint that outlined a hopeful start to what I had been ardently awaiting: a workable working draft for an introductory account of an emergent process of inquiry into personhood, education, creativity and the meaning of life.

Feeling at once both the weight of indecision lifted and the onus of the meaning of the simile sinking in, slowly and deliberately, I began to write on the blank page: "Life is like a box of chocolates." In the throes of the instigation, I became acutely aware of the familiarity of the incomparable inner stirrings—the agony and the ecstasy of a mother's bittersweet labour. And, just as surely as a mother can tell the nature of her newborn within the first moments of birth, I knew that I had just participated in the onset and the outset of a research narrative essay that would account for my experience of personhood and education, creativity and meaning as

embodied in the lived experience of my process of inquiry. In thinking what I do (Arendt, 1974), I do philosophy (Greene, 2008) with the implicit intention of reinvigorating the meaning of education and of re-imagining the purpose of schooling. Although written some time ago, the following poetic essay aptly describes the creative process of my lived experience:

Emergence

Invisible, visible
Intensifying

A thought, an image
A surge of feeling
Resonating intention
Open to outcome

Waiting, watching
Allowing, listening
Vibrant
Sanguine
Resolute

A sudden glory
And then a shape appearing
Small and timid at first
Groping, seeking
Becoming
Being

Throbbing with potential
Filled with promise
An Idea
Makes her *début*
And a living story begins

Meaning

What is the potential meaning of a living story that is born from an idea? Barone and Eisner (1997) have offered an important reminder in emphasizing the crucial role of the scholar's ideas and perceptions in the creation of artistic work that would be meaningful. Underscoring Barone and Eisner's premise, Munro Hendry ascertains that "questions, not method, are the heart of research" (2010, p. 73) thereby supporting the potential significance of a living story that originates in an idea in the form of a question: "Who am I, *really*?" Munro Hendry pre-supposes that if research is understood as meaning-making, then all research is narrative. The implications of her argument are reiterated here for their importance and relevance: "Resituating all research as narrative, as opposed to characterizing narrative as one particular form of inquiry, provides a critical space for rethinking research beyond current dualisms and bifurcations that create boundaries that limit the capacity of dialogue across diverse epistemologies" (p. 72). Given the all-inclusive and unlimited character of life itself, heretofore likened to a "box of chocolates", a critical space for rethinking research in a [w]holistic manner is in keeping with the emergent nature of a living story initiated in ideas that are fed by perceptivity. Repositioning Barone and Eisner's (1997) and Munro Hendry's (2010) foundational perspectives within the context of my lived experience contributes to a deeper understanding of the substance and texture of the "chocolate" essences soon to be poetically released from the exploration of meaning underway. If research is understood as the discovery of meaning—and if, as expressed above, ideas and the questions stemming from those ideas, not method, are the heart of research—then the next logical question associated with the emerging work in process has now been organically uprooted.

What Does Meaning Mean?

Meaning and meaning making, I have discovered, mean different things to different people. According to Eisner, for example, meaning-making is a construction: "The construction of meaning depends upon the individual's ability to experience and interpret the significance of

the environment, including the ways in which others in the culture have constructed and represented meaning" (1998, p. 7). From the perspective of the present inquiry, aside from constructing, representing and reproducing meaning by "concept of method" (Gadamer, 2011, p. xx), meaning-finding is conceived as a way of being in the work (Butler-Kisber, 2010) and thinking what we are doing (Arendt, 1974). Additionally, Barone and Eisner have suggested that meaning-making emanates from an inquirer *who* has developed the perceptivity to see, and not merely to look. By comparison, experience has shown that open-hearted "seeing" permits new "understanding" to "occur" (Gadamer, 2011); whereas goal-oriented "looking" reproduces cognitive information. From the visionary perspectives of Barone and Eisner (1997), it may reasonably be deduced, therefore, that a "seeing" inquirer participates *in* the inquiry in the hopeful anticipation of uncovering qualitative meaning, i.e. awareness and understanding; whereas a "looking" researcher examines the data in order to reformulate quantifiable meaning, i.e. information and knowledge. These are different interpretations of meaning. For some, meaning is 'made'; for others meaning is 'found'. One kind (meaning finding) presents things whole and in their context; the other kind (meaning making) looks at things abstracted from their context, broken into parts from which it then reconstructs a whole which is "something very different" says McGilchrist (2009, p. 26). From the perspectives of Gadamer and McGilchrist, 'understood' meaning and 'cognitive' meaning are not the same; likewise, from the perspective of the present thesis *en cours*, education and schooling are not the same. In *The Kind of Schools We Need: Personal Essays,* Eisner envisions schools where "[e]ducation can be regarded as a process concerned with expanding and deepening the kinds of meaning people can have in their lives" (1998, p. 7).

To that same end, the purpose of the present inquiry is to explore the above-described process of education as it pertains to the present work, as well as to openly communicate a living encounter with the thoughts and feelings involved in a qualitative transaction of meaning finding. The exploration is intended to lead towards an expanded and deepened understanding of personhood, creativity and education that will broaden the scope of research, teaching, and learning to include emotion, feelings, insights and intuitions—what Damasio (1994) calls the connectors to the spirit or soul of personhood, *who*. The process will be shown to bring about a

different kind of seeing; and as a consequence, to demonstrate a different kind of meaning. The motivation for the inquiry is a desire to reach beyond today's limited (and limiting) utilitarian-instrumental conceptualization of education as a training ground for future employment, and as the building site for the construction, representation and reproduction ... not only of information and knowledge *per se*, but of ourselves (Hall and DuGay, 1996).

The exploration, as such, aligns more closely with the French meaning of meaning—*vouloir dire*—than with the English meaning of meaning-making, a reconstruction of a deconstructed whole (McGilchrist, 2009, p. 26). Hidden within the French expression, *vouloir dire*, of particular significance to this dissertation is the meaning of personhood (*who*), desire, truth-telling and integrity. *Je veux dire* means "I mean (what I want) to say".

A Story with a Difference

Despite the certainty of the exterior design that has emerged from an uncertain process of inquiry, I know I must proceed cautiously. The emerging dissertation may resemble a story in outer appearance. A mother's instinct, however, tells me that this living story will be a story with a difference. The difference, I hazard to guess, will be found not so much in the telling of the story which is a human story, but in the way in which the living story is permitted to reveal itself—as freely and unencumbered with preconception as possible—as in the very *élan* of life itself.

From the above perspective, I can tell from the essential nature of the conception and inception of this living story that it will not fit comfortably into preconceived genres such as "autobiography", "auto-ethnography", "fiction", "non-fiction", or even "self-study". Instead of aligning with, and subsuming to, the parameters of the above categories, the life of the story may push limits and challenge prefabricated structures while unabashedly including in its composition many of the above-named narrative elements, and then some. The "then some", I suspect, will have to do with a poetic leaning, an oblique perspective that is not inclined to take a hard, straight look at the separated facts of the matter; but rather, prefers to steal glimpses

into the heart of the matter and suggest possible [w]holistic meaning in softly *un*spoken nuance found hiding behind the facts, between the lines and 'beside' the point.

From its dramatic and surprising initial outburst, the living story seems to be more intrinsically poetic than extrinsically prosaic, perhaps more "French" in nature than "English" in comportment. I surmise, therefore, that a series of events will most likely continue to emerge in the complex architecture of associated logic (Sullivan, 2007) that is more web-like than linear. The cause underlying the conundrum of what I presume to call a poetic narrative essay is the pervasive character of the protagonist *who* refuses, in the end, to succumb to characterization or to caricature. The protagonist of this narrative inquiry may be personified as a runaway and may possibly even turn out in the end to be a transformer. A habitual 'outsider' *who* is accustomed to being left out of the equation all together, and is well used to being forgotten, ignored, overlooked, dismissed, and otherwise "under erasure" (Hall and DuGay, 1996; p. 2), the main character of this particular living story nevertheless steadfastly remains a formidable presence, an 'insider' *who* is omniscient in the way that life is ever-present in life.

A Runaway

People say
that running away
is cowardly

They say
that we should stay
and face the music

Not I

I pride myself in running away
Each time I run away
I run closer to myself

I run away from pettiness
and narrow-mindedness

I make a mad dash away from sameness

I leave behind
Oppression
Outdated rules and regulations
Stifling beliefs
Stalemates (and stale mates!)
Organizational restrictions
And external restraints

Irreverence and irrelevance are not for me
I am a runaway

(Dobson, 2010, p. 137)

Chapter VI

Ways of Being in the Work

(aka Chocolate Ingredients)

Prelude to a Living Story

In Chapter VII (to follow the present Chapter VI) I shall explore "a living story" as my chosen methodology for conducting an in-depth search for the elusive main character of my inquiry, namely *who* without a name. Before taking a closer look at the characteristics of a living story specifically suited to the present endeavour, however, I want to first examine some of the tendencies I look for in the main character I seek to disclose. What are the ways of being in the work that will help me find *who* I am looking for? The ways by which I discern the invisible aspects of an otherwise hidden protagonist may help to elucidate the mysterious elements of a living story as well as provide clues for understanding the elusive nature of my indefinable subject. Too, I suspect, an exploration of my own peculiar ways of being in the inquiring process will play a crucial role in the integration of my thought with my method. In other words—and in keeping with the Forest Gump metaphor—I wish to first sample the inwardly generated ingredients before I stir, mix and blend the taste-tested essences and flavours into a consistency worthy of the simile that has inspired the present work. Indeed, a "box of chocolates" seems an apt metaphor for the assortment of living stories soon to unfold, one by one, in "Telling Tales out of School" Parts I and II, Chapters VIII and IX. But first, a look at the inside scoop to follow.

Inherent Qualities

In “The Stories We Live by: Personal Myths and the Making of a Self”, Dan McAdamm, as cited by Gubrium and Holstein (2000) asks a provocative question: “What do we know when we know a person” (p. 242)? A variation on the theme of McAdamm’s stories we live by, this living story asks, “*Who* do we know when we know a person?” As I intend to demonstrate throughout the writing of my dissertation, asking a different kind of question at the outset will make all the difference in the way the story unfolds. Remaining true to character from a first-person point of view, the central storyteller may be “known” through circumstantial evidence, i.e. through expression (Taylor, 1989) and through word and action (Arendt, 1974). Eisner says, with reference to qualitative inquiry, that quality may refer to the value of the expression as well as to the sensory features of someone or something (1991, p. 83). From the perspective of the present storyteller, therefore, personhood cannot *really* be “known” as *what*; but personhood may possibly be “understood” as *who* by reason of the expression of his or her inherent qualities of being.

Tomato Sandwiches

I cannot see your face
But I remember you dearly
By the special things you did
For us

On the dining room table
Four brown paper bags
Our lunches
Prepared for the grabbing
And taking for granted
On the way to the bus

To open my bag
And undo the carefully folded waxed paper
In the school lunch room by winter
Or under the hot-scented pine trees by summer

Was to feel your love
Transformed
Into white bread
Turned pink

Resonance

Experience and understanding conjure up a vital ingredient that is proving essential to thinking through my research endeavour. Resonance quickens something "alive" in me, something I already "knew" or "felt I knew" beforehand, but hadn't quite thought about in the same way before. What I mean by resonance is not unlike *déjà vu*, but goes beyond recognition of a person or situation "already known" and touches a deeper dimension of emotion and feelings, often evoking childhood memories of an intimately *felt* connection with the natural world. In resonance, I don't recognize someone or an idea that I have "met" or "seen" previously. Instead, I *sense* someone (or something) as ringing (re-sounding) true; or at least true for me. Resonance is a re-minder for me of *who* I am. As portrayed in the following poetic essay, resonance reveals not only a kinship with the natural beauty of the land-sea-and-sky scapes of the rugged west coast of Ireland, but also portrays a deep accord with the intellectual beauty of a remarkable man who embodied the phenomenon he portrayed in the internationally acclaimed *Beauty: The Invisible Embrace* (O'Donohue, 2004). Resonance is an affair of the heart: "... and in thy voice I catch/The language of my former heart" (Wordsworth, "Tintern Abbey", as cited by O'Donohue, 2004). Composed by a peat fire under a thatched roof in a little cottage in Ballyvaughan, a seaside village in County Clare, Ireland, my "poem" now stands as a loving tribute to the ongoing living resonance I experience with the spirit and soul of the late Irish poet, philosopher and friend, John O'Donohue.

The Contented Heart

You opened your heart
And through the portal of your words
You invited the vast loneliness
Of the world's exiled mystics
To enter
And gently walk upon
The landscape of your desire

With you
Step by careful step
We traversed the uneven, rugged
Beautiful land of your knowing

Hungrily
We delved
Deeply
Into the mystery
Of your sky's earth

Only to find there,
By sudden surprise
The elemental treasures

Of our own heart's
Longing for herself

Resonant Touchstones

The rugged landscape of the west coast of the Emerald Isle seems an apt symbol for a touch stone, defined by Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary as "a test or criterion for determining the quality or genuineness of a thing"(1999, p. 1247). A touchstone, in the present context, symbolizes the authenticity, or reality, of someone or something. In *Bringing Memory Forward*, Teresa Strong-Wilson (2008) cautions teachers in social justice education to be wary of "storied" touchstones that can be ponderous: "a memory evoked too often, and expressed in the form of a story, tends to become fixed in a stereotype ... crystallized, perfect, adorned"

(Levi, 1988 in King, 2000, p. 25, as cited in Strong-Wilson, p. 1). In an attempt to illustrate an important, yet subtle, distinction between "storied" touchstones and "resonant" touchstones—a distinction I make that is critical to my work in process—I offer the next "poem", not for its aesthetic quality, as you will see, but for the uncanny ability of imagery, rhyme and rhythm to evoke *feelings*, what Damasio (1994) calls the "connectors" to the soul or spirit of the person. The touchstone, in the way I describe the phenomenon, is a feeling connection with the unchanging presence of personhood. In *The Feeling of What Happens*, Damasio says, "Feelings can be and often are revelations of the state of life within the entire organism ... lifting the veil in the literal sense of the term" (1999, p. 6). In subtle, but distinct contrast to McAdamm's provocative question, "What do you know when you know a person?" I ask a question that pertains to resonance: "*Who* do you know when you know a person?" Resonance is a *feeling*, a fluid perception of *who*; not a "fixed" conception of *what*. When I probe my lived experience, I find resonance. I find touchstones left over from childhood.

Touchstones

A child's barefoot
At water's edge
Thick gray clay
Claiming untamed urges
Oozing
Then coaxed into shape
By eager potter's hands
Clumsy clods and clumps
Original pieces
Painted red, yellow and brown
Left in the sand
To dry
In the sun

A pile of rocks to climb
One especially fine for sitting
And gazing
Upon the Lake of Two Mountains
Another perfect for scribbling
A tablet

An old wooden rowboat
Rusty pail afloat
Rain water to be bailed
Elusive frogs to catch
In jars
Or put down the backs
Of scaredy cats

Speckled pebbles everywhere
Poison Ivy, too
“I dare you to roll in it”
“I will, if you do”

Wild grasses blowing
Growing tall ‘round mounds
Of sandy warmth and smells
Dead fish with whiskers
Flung there
By wanton swells

A few simple treasures
Found by the lake
Pondered one by one
In the palm of my heart

Touchstones rough-hewn
By childhood pleasures
An indelible mark
Leaving trustworthy measures

A standard for telling
The true
From the fake

Serendipity

An aspect of the event of resonance that occurs in the process of hermeneutics (Gadamer, 2011) involves serendipity, defined in the Merriam-Webster’s dictionary as “the faculty or

phenomenon of finding valuable or agreeable things not sought for" (1999, p. 1069). Serendipity plays a significant role in my sensory ability to tell the true from the fake. On occasion, for example, in my desire to connect deeply and meaningfully with the world, I have been prompted by a nebulous feeling of lack, or a sensing that someone or something was amiss. I followed the compelling urge all the way to the library or bookstore. There, as I perused the books on the shelves, my hand would oftentimes fall on just the right book at just the right time. Picking up the book and beginning to read, I would inevitably find serendipity within the written words of the author. When I perceive a familiar inner accord with the content of the book, I am also struck by a sense of a personal connection with the author. Greene, a visionary educational scholar whose work I greatly admire, and with whom I easily resonate although I have never met her in person, puts the phenomena of resonance and serendipity succinctly: "There are worldly relationships, and over that, there is the delicate web of human relationships" (1998, p. 23). Greene borrows her idea from Arendt (1974) who describes the "in between" as the space that opens between two people when they come together as *who* they are, and not *what* they are. As was noted earlier, for Arendt, the intangible "in between" is no less real than the world of things we visibly have in common (1974, p. 183). One of the ways in which I experience and understand the intangible "real" is resonance. When the experience of resonance occurs, I call the happy accident serendipity.

When least expecting to find insights to questions I hadn't yet fully articulated while writing the present section of my thesis, resonance dropped serendipitously into my McGill email Inbox in the form of two provocative Calls for Papers. The first email I opened came from the University of Ottawa, sent on behalf of the 6th Biennial Provoking Curriculum Studies Conference, 2013. The hosts of the conference were seeking proposals that poetically engaged the "blind impresses" and took cues from "strong poetry". In the words of Richard Rorty (1989), the conference hosts elaborated on what they mean by "strong poetry": "strong poets are those who not only have the language but also the vision to tell us something new, or invent the unknown in an unknown language." The invitation for proposals stated that to educate as a strong poet requires "a vision, an imagination, an intense desire (usually for social change), a faculty of reason, and a talent for speaking differently."

I heard the familiar ring of resonance in the words. I wanted to know more. I wondered if I "belonged" at this conference. I *felt* I may have something to contribute to the conversation. Educating with "a vision, an imagination and an intense desire (usually for social change) ..." is right up my alley! I was intrigued to know what the conference hosts mean by "blind impresses"? What more do they mean by "strong poetry"? What constitutes a "talent for speaking differently"? What do other scholars think about the inference that "speaking differently" is educating as a "strong poet"? How do others perceive the implications of poetry for education? The mysterious Call for Proposals continued as follows: "To pedagogically fail in life, as Rorty concludes, 'is to accept somebody else's description of oneself, to execute a previously prepared program, to write at most, elegant variations on previously written poems'" (as cited in [CSSE-CACS] Provoking Curriculum Studies Conference 2013, University of Ottawa, Call for Papers, October, 2012; Conference, February 22-23, 2013).

The resonance was music to my ears! The above citation touches to the very quick, the sore point and *leitmotiv*, of the central argument of this thesis. Stemming from my experience as a student, parent, teacher and educational leader, as well as supported by my faculty of reason (which very much includes emotion and feelings) I argue that schooling (as distinct from education) is contributing to the loss of *who* we are by placing an over-emphasis on the reconstruction and reproduction of knowledge by utilitarian-instrumental *doing* (what), and by assigning little or no value to facilitating the expression and action of essential *being* (*who*). "Each needs the other," says neuropsychologist McGilchrist (2009) in describing basic differences between the two hemispheres of the brain. The left hemisphere of the brain is "parasitic" on the right hemisphere, explains McGilchrist, although it seems to have no awareness of this fact. "Indeed it is filled with an alarming self confidence" (p. 6). In light of McGilchrist's statement, the "loss" is indeed a "pedagogical failure". I have not heard my argument put quite this way before. The timing of the email is, indeed, a happy accident of serendipity. The resonance I found in Richard Rorty's (1989) words fortuitously underpins and *re*-enforces the development of my own work in process.

In the same week, the second provocative Call for Presentations came from Lynn Butler-Kisber, McGill University; Mary Stewart, LEARN Quebec; and John J. Guiney Yallop, Acadia University. The theme of the Fourth International Symposium on Poetic Inquiry would be *Poetic Inquiry: Resonant Voices*. The hosts invited submissions that "through a range of lenses will broaden and deepen our thinking about research, representation, social justice and inclusion". They said, "We encourage texts that illustrate possibilities, advocate for silenced voices, and address challenges and tensions" (A Call for Papers, October, 2012; Symposium, October 23-26, 2013). As a burgeoning educational scholar, I felt encouraged and energized by the resonant accord of my senior colleagues. Inspired by the Symposium on Poetic Inquiry, I identified another essential ingredient to be incorporated into my artful research endeavour, a natural co-conspirator, yet one often overlooked and underestimated, namely 'interest'.

Interest

The word "interest" (from the Latin *inter,* "inside" or "between" and *esse,* "to be") holds important significance in my ongoing process of meaning-finding. Whenever I am interested in a person or a topic, for example, it is usually because I discern the "real" in Arendt's (1974) "in between". Here I see an important distinction between educational interests and business interests. Business interest is "looking to get something out of" someone or something; whereas educational interest, in the way I mean the term, is "seeing into" an already shared reality. There is a sense of an invisible heartfelt connection. For this reason, I see a *vital* connection to be made when one "has to" tell one's own story, and not someone else's story. When I first read the above resonant invitations, I thought, "At long last!" Implied in such passionate "interest" is a heartfelt sigh of relief, "I am not alone (after all) in my (different) way of thinking about education and life!" I think of the hundreds of teachers and students I have worked with over the years who, like me, have felt alone in a utilitarian-instrumental program of schooling that has not only *not* heard their voices, but has tried to write their stories (and their poems) for them! These teachers and students have known from first-hand experience the failure of pedagogy; they have not been "*inter esse*" in a program of schooling designed by

others for others, or a curriculum that did not *educe* (permit) a revelation of *who* they are, and instead, systematically closed off the portals to the possibility of experiencing a different kind of meaning in their lives.

Another resonant connection on the subject of pedagogical failure and meaning in life is found in a passionately written article by Jacques Quintin (2011) who says that the painful disconnect between real identity and education is a crisis of modern schooling. Quintin titles his recent article "*La souffrance à l'école: un malaise éthique*" (Suffering in School: An Ethical *Malaise*). [My translation] Quintin says that to reflect on the meaning of school is to try to understand *who* we really (*vraiment*) are. There is no point in questioning the meaning of school without questioning the meaning of life, says Quintin (p. 120). [My translation] Quintin's use of the French word "*sens*", as in "... *réfléchir sur le sens de l'école sans poser la question du sens de la vie ...*" (2011, p. 120) translates as "meaning and direction"; whereas the French word "*but*" is the word most often used to determine the aims (purpose and goals) of schooling, thus differentiating education and meaning (direction) from schooling and purpose (goals).

I am certain that Aoki (1991) would agree with the premise of Quintin's argument. Aoki says of the five educator authors of *Toward a Curriculum of Being: Voices of Educators ...*"they felt a deep concern for the erosion of educators' personhood due to the fact that they, like so many of their colleagues, had generally become enamoured with scienticism and instrumentalism, in the wake of which they had become 'inured to the texture of the half-life of who they might be as educators'" (1991, p, ix).

Finding meaning, I am learning, has everything to do with making connections—not useful social and/or political "affiliations"—but meaning-full connections with people and ideas that go beyond *what* there is to know *about* a person or thing and reaches *into* the *"in-between"* (Arendt, 1974) where "interest" is to be found. Because of strong resonance, the above invitations from colleagues at the Universities of Ottawa and McGill, a timely article written by a colleague at *l'Université de Sherbrooke*, and the voices of educational scholars from the University of British Columbia hold much interest for me, and I suspect, for many other teachers, researchers, and learners who find themselves "thinking differently" about education.

From the perspective of having to tell one's own story and not someone else's story, meaning originates in the resonant voices of the scholars *who* initiate the conference invitations and proposals and *who* write (and read) timely and thought-provoking articles.

Voice

I like to think that it is authenticity of voice that 'authorizes' expression and action with meaning. There is meaning—the allure of *je ne sais quoi*, for example—that is not explainable, yet remains eternally and universally relevant. Quebec artist, Jean-Paul Riopelle (1923-2002), whose large and colourful impressionist *tableaux* are exhibited at the *Musée de Beaux Arts* in Quebec City, is cited on a plaque beside his work as saying that the artist must reveal his soul in his art for the art to be meaningful ... or words to that effect.

For Gadamer, as has been noted, understanding "occurs" as an "event" that goes beyond a concept of method as set by modern science and belongs to human experience of the world in general (2011, p, xx). The same thing is true of the experience of art, says Gadamer (2011, p. xxi). Inner meaning derives from a source of personhood, an embodied *who* expressing emotion, feelings, insights, instincts and intuitions. Put simply by French philosopher Gaston Bachelard (1958/1994) "the soul inaugurates". For Bachelard, "... poetry, rather than being a phenomenology of the mind is a phenomenology of the soul" (Bachelard, 1958/1994, p. xx). I do not presume to call myself a poet or even an artist; however, I do call myself an *amateur* (lover) of the meaning I experience in the intimate spaces of the "in-between" when I sense a soulful, authentic voice in expression. If that is called poetry, so be it. For my way of thinking, experimenting with poetic composition as a means for facilitating inner meaning permits understanding to occur for me in a manner that prose alone does not. Poetry "slows down" the writing process in a way that allows me to pay close attention to the *élan vital*, the embodied pulse of life beating at the heart of emotion, feelings, and intuitions. I write prose to find things out; but I listen to poetry to find things in.

In the way a *leitmotiv* dictates and permeates the musical score of a symphonic composition, I hear my own voice as a compelling motive for exploring experience while pushing forward, and weaving through, the resultant outcomes as they appear on the page. Variations on the theme are incorporated into the overall context as seems appropriate. When I perceive my voice to be out of tune, off key or 'untrue', I may stop the process and wait to feel the ignition of resonant touchstones. Or, I may listen for cues from my inner circle (aka doctoral committee) *who* in their physical absence are nevertheless present in the "in between". Beginning anew, often in an attempt to realign the tone, I will incorporate the voices of others to provide balance or to create counterpoint.

At times the theme becomes a sound so faint I can barely hear the melody in the background; at other times I hear a loud, clear surge that soars above the lumbering efforts on the page. Mostly, however, I find that it is the *leitmotiv*—the dominant recurrent thematic element—that is deciding for me what to include and what to exclude. It is the *leitmotiv* that determines the direction, content, texture and coverage of the overall dissertation. I am intrigued by the vital threads of "associated logic" (Sullivan, 2007) that are insinuated throughout the inter-weaving process between emergence, experience, understanding, resonance (including serendipity and interest), theme, poetry (creative literature) and voice.

In speaking of voice, Carl Leggo says,

> I hope to court contradiction and confusion and consternation in my commitment to shake up and explode the notion of voice in writing in my interrogation of the rhetorical function of and concept of voice, and my conviction (the only conviction I am ready to defend) that the experience of voice, the device of voice, the personality of voice, the tone of voice, the politics of voice, the intertextuality of voice, the authenticity of voice, the origin of voice, the ubiquity of voice, the energy of voice cannot be conceptualized, schematized, and classified anymore than beach stones can be categorized and labelled. (1991, p. 143)

Given the impossibility of reconstructing and manufacturing beach stones, what, then, is the particularized role of voice in meaning finding? What is the possibility for voice to be heard above the standardized rules and regulations of what Starke-Meyerring (2012) calls the

"normalization" of doctoral writing? In the introduction to the works of John Keats, Briggs (1951) draws attention to Keats' ability to write in his authentic voice; and, points to the universal consequences of such a unique ability.

> Too frequently ... an author is hidden behind the conventions of his art and of his times or is unable to escape them. But Keats found the power to create works of almost perfect art that... show the living writer, the unique, full, living personality. At his best (unfortunately, too, in a way, at his worst) he achieved sincerity and thus uniqueness and thus, also, universality. In flashes of intuitive insight he is almost without equal. (Briggs, 1951, p. xxxi)

The "universality" that Briggs accredits to Keats' sincerity, uniqueness and "flashes of intuitive insight" appears to be the unifying ingredient that binds together all ingredients in the finding of meaning. From the perspective of the present research narrative, all the "chocolates", in terms of validity and "generalizability" (Butler-Kisber, 2010) are placed in the one "box" of hoped-for resonance with an authentic "universal" voice. The taste is in the pudding; or in this case, the flavour is in the "chocolates". I strongly suspect that the authentic voice of John Keats has everything to do with Keats' ability to tap into the universal "in between" that Arendt (1974) describes as the intangible "real" that exists between people when they come together as *who* they are.

By contrast, as noted earlier, a "pedagogy of failure" silences the authentic voice, and as a result, causes suffering in school (*la souffrance à l'école*). Silencing what J.J. Rousseau calls "the voice of nature within" underscores the "prejudices which usurp its place" and are "its worst enemies" (Rousseau, as cited by Taylor, 1989, p. 411). Moreover, claims Rousseau in *Emile ou de l'éducation*,

> Their noisy voices drown her words so that she cannot get a hearing; fanaticism dares to counterfeit her voice and to inspire crimes in her name. She is discouraged by ill-treatment; she no longer speaks to us. (Rousseau, as cited by Taylor, 1989, p. 355)

According to Taylor, to regain contact with the voice of nature within would be to transform our motivation, to have a wholly different quality of will. The will of "calculating reason" is one of the signs of corruption, according to Rousseau. It flourishes only where conscience, i.e. the inner voice of nature, is stifled (1989, p. 358). Furthermore, says Taylor, "The life of instrumental reason lacks the force, the depth, the vibrancy, the joy which comes from being connected to the *élan* of nature. But there is worse. It doesn`t just lack this; the instrumental stance towards nature constitutes a bar to ever attaining it" (p. 383). Taylor insists that creative imagination is central to modern culture. In *The Malaise of Modernity*, he affirms the "expressivism" of the modern notion of the individual (1991, p. 61). According to Taylor, in the retrieval of an authentic voice, artistic expression becomes the paradigm mode.

Intuition

It was "in flashes of intuitive insight" that Briggs considered Keats to be almost without equal. Thinking through the process, I see a direct connection between feelings and intuition and the "real" (Arendt, 1974) or "authentic" (Taylor, 1991) "voice of nature within". Damasio (1994) calls intuition "the covert mysterious mechanism" by which we arrive at the solution of a problem without reasoning toward it (p. 188). As was also acknowledged earlier, Damasio (1994) sees emotions and feelings as the connectors to the soul or spirit of the person. Storytelling and the arts, according to Damasio (2010), are the best inducers of nourishing emotions and feelings that would permit an awareness of identity more accurate than the one we have available today. "Ultimately," suggests Damasio (2010) in *Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain*, "because the arts have deep roots in biology and the human body but can elevate humans to the greatest heights of thought and feeling, they become a way into the homeostatic refinement that humans idealized and longed to achieve, the biological counterpart of a spiritual dimension in human affairs" (p. 29).

Carrying further the significance in Damasio's statement above, Henri Bergson (1998/1907) calls intuition the "best part" of the power of consciousness (p. 268). He says that it is only when we place ourselves in intuition that we can pass from intuition to intellect. Bergson comes to a similar conclusion to that of Damasio (2010) with regard to the essential role of intuition, a "lamp almost extinguished, which only glimmers now and then" (p. 268) in the reconstitution of a "complete and perfect humanity" (p. 267). Bergson's rationale for advancing the work of "fleeting intuitions" stems from the fact that the more one advances in the exploration, the more one will perceive that intuition is mind itself, and in a certain sense, life itself. Thus, says Bergson, is revealed the "unity of the spiritual life" (p. 268).

Poetic symbols of Bergson's "fleeting intuitions" are the pervasive little meadow flowers found throughout the world wherever there are fields and grasses ecologically fertile enough to permit the uncultivated little gems to flourish in all of their delicate beauty. Wild violets are barely noticeable in the grand scheme of things; yet, for me this lovely little meadow flower represents the quiet strength and confidence that is well rooted in my memory of early childhood. Bergson (1998/1907) might have called the symbolic phenomenon *élan vital*, the vital essence that animates our lives. "Attention to life" is described by Bergson (1998) as a "greater dilation of the whole personality" ... "the unscrewing of the vice in which it has allowed itself to be squeezed" (p. 14). "A state of consciousness that has not been 'narrowed down'", says Bergson, is "whole and undivided, spreads itself [like wild violets] over a wider and wider surface" (p. 14).

Wild Violets

Purple and mauve
Newly born shy
Nestled sweetly in the meadow grasses
Safely hidden
From the irreverent eye

(I must fall down
Flat on my belly
Just for a glimpse)

The large grey field stone
Stands solid there
Shielding the tiny *protégés*
While revealing,
By gracious contrast,
The tender reticence
Of crimson blue

Do not be fooled
By their *naïveté*
There is nothing shrinking
About these *fleurs sauvages*!

Slowly and surely
Throughout the years
Their tiny roots
Have grown strong and deep
Insisting their way
Through my unconscious sleep

What once appeared harsh and dark
Is now overcome
By the lavish hue
Of wild violets

(Dobson, 2010, p. 134)

Being

Scholarship need not be cold and calculating, says Eber Hampton. “Human beings—feeling, living, breathing, thinking humans—do research” (1996, p. 51). In “Research that Matters: Finding a Path with Heart”, Cynthia Chambers (2004) says that as a scholar she often uses her own life as a site of inquiry. Like Chambers, I want to find (and stay on) a research path with heart. And, like Laurel Richardson (2008), I write because I want to find something out. To that end, I find voice and intuition to be essential ingredients in the artful exploration, expression and finding of meaning.

Experience over time has shown that voice doesn’t appear out of thin air. Voice and intuition come from an embodied experience in *being*. Thinking through the phenomenon of being, I see that *being* cannot be constructed without *be*-coming *what* being is not: a human artifice. Being is *who* we are—feeling, living, breathing, thinking—not *what* we become—schooled, socialized, cultured, qualified and politicized.

Adding to the complexity of meaning that I discern in being, Arendt says, “With the creation of man, the principle of beginning came into the world” (1974, p. 177). Arendt is not explicit in making a connection between being and beginning; however, based on my experience of initiation in the emergent process of my present inquiry, I see *being* as the place of beginning in the same way Arendt sees “the unchangeable identity of the person” (p. 193); moreover, I see *being* as “the source of creativity” (p. 211) that is independent of outer achievement. On the phenomenon of beginning, Arendt also says that “the miracle that saves the world, the realm of human affairs, from its normal natural ruin is the fact of natality, in which the faculty of action is ontologically rooted” (p. 247). From the perspective of the present thesis, the ontological root is *being*. The link I make between being and natality, and thinking and creativity supports the ‘real’ possibility I envision for human beings to experience a world “not yet” (Greene, 1995). From the perspective of natality and possibility, presence can be understood as the revelation of humans *being*, i.e. living, breathing, thinking, feeling, speaking and/or acting in the world.

Presence

A human being is said to 'have' presence. In thinking through my work in process, I have come to understand that being and presence exist 'now', or not at all. Being cannot *be* in the past just as presence cannot *be* in the future. What, then, is the role of presence in educational research, teaching and learning? What are the implications of presence in finding (and staying on) a path with heart? What are the qualities and characteristics of presence in voice? As a researcher using my living experience as a site for research (Chambers, 2004), I realize that I can be present now in order to authorize my thinking now, even when writing about things from the past, or of events pertaining to the future. The expression and action of presence affords the possibility of a new beginning while, at the same time, making room for imagining the world "otherwise", and envisioning the "not yet" (Greene, 1998, 1995).

Earlier in the writing process, I used the term 'presence of mind' which I equated to freedom. Having the presence of mind to know whether my voice is 'true' or 'real' and 'alive' and/or whether my voice has *be*-come "normalized", "false", "contrived", "stale", and or "flat/sharp" takes every ounce of Barone and Eisner's (1997) perceptivity and much more. Presence of mind requires not only the "enlightened eye" of the educational *connoisseur*, as suggested by Eisner (1991); presence of mind also demands that the educational critic remain "conscious"—at all times present—and aware of the internal landscape as well as observant of the terrain further afield. Since there are no "rules and regulations/ external restraints" for the freedom-loving "runaway", a conscientious researcher is left to his or her own inwardly generated devices and resonant touchstones. Such freedom of conscience, I have discovered, comes with great responsibility. The result is a firsthand assumption of mastery over one's own expression and actions, a responsibility that carries far greater weight than second-hand "accountability" to someone else's concept, program or story. Presence of mind is not for the faint of heart; nor is conscious awareness easy to come by. Consciousness and conscience require disciplined practice; presence occurs in a different kind of time.

Nowhere

"I'm late; I'm late
For a very important date
No time to say
Hello Goodbye
I'm late; I'm late; I'm late."
(Lewis Caroll's White Rabbit)

It's a postmodern habit
We're short on time
We're out of breath
We have no rhyme
Or reason left

Hurry, scurry, and worry
We quicken the pace
A frantic endeavour:
The human race

We must save the planet
We must win the war
On terror, on greed, on problems galore
We must get ahead
Be fast on our feet
We must beat the crowd
To make our ends meet

a.s.a.p.
No time for delay
For time is money
The bankers say

(We are running
Out of both
The naysayers say)

There has to be another way!

Now Here

Once upon a time there was time
Do you remember that time?
There was time for tea
Time for play
And time to just be

Time to climb a tree
Or lie in the grass
To gaze at the clouds
And fly
High in the sky

Time for a song to sing
Time to reach for the tips of the leaves
With the tips of your toes
On the old rope swing
To and fro'
Ebb and flow
The natural rhythm
Of time

Time to bake a cake
Time to contemplate
The shape of an iris
Beside the lake

With time on your hands
You could hold the baby chick
And feel and smell
The soft pungent promise
Of magic

The robin's song tells
The time to go to bed
The kitten purrs
The time to get up

There *is* always time
Once upon a time

(Dobson, 2010, p. 139)

The Duration of Time

Bergson (2005/1908) addresses the complex problem of time as represented in "Nowhere" and "Now Here". Bergson says of his *Matter and Memory*, "This book affirms the reality of spirit and the reality of matter, and tries to determine the relation of the one to the other by the study of a definite example, that of memory" (p. 9). According to Bergson, the difficulties in perception are due, for the most part, to extreme views, now realistic, now idealistic, which philosophers have of matter. To solve the problem, Bergson asks that we place ourselves at a point of view of a mind that is unaware of the disputes between philosophers, and consider matter before the disassociation which realism and idealism have brought about. Being able to *feel* the *experience* of time through the imagery, rhyme and rhythm of poetry helps me to better understand Bergson's theories of perception and memory. What Bergson calls a "capital error" is a point of view that sees only a difference in intensity instead of a difference in nature between pure perception and recollection (p. 67). The poems allow me to *feel* and *hear* the difference in nature.

If we are to solve the problem of the relation between soul and body, between spirit and matter, says Bergson, it is with memory that we have to deal (2005, p. 12). For Bergson, memory is more than a recollection of events of the past. Memory is the intersection of mind and matter, a connection that is real, even intimate he says (p. 13). The complexity we experience in time is due to the complexity of reality itself says Bergson. He asks, "How is it that the same images can belong *at the same time* to two different systems" (p. 26, emphasis added)? According to Bergson, the realist is bound to make perception an accident, and consequently a mystery. Furthermore, he says, science sees perception only as a confused and provisional state (p. 28). In fact, says Bergson, there is no perception which is not full of memories. With the immediate and present data of our senses, we mingle a thousand details out of our past experience (p. 33). John Keats equates presence of mind to imagination: "I now feel more and more every day, as my imagination strengthens, that I do not live in this world alone, but in a thousand worlds" (1963/1818, p. 383). Time, perception and memory, thus understood, may well account for the phenomenon of imagination and of the ability to 'have'

presence of mind, what Bergson calls *la durée*. “However brief we suppose any perception to be, it always occupies a certain duration, and involves, consequently, an effort of memory which prolongs, one into another, a plurality of moments” (Bergson, 2005, p. 34).

Contracting a number of external moments into a single internal moment constitutes the principal share of individual consciousness, according to Bergson. To dissolve the problem of consciousness caused by the extreme viewpoints of realistic vs. idealistic philosophers, Bergson suggests that we “[r]estore the true character of perception—a system of nascent acts which plunges roots deep into the real; and at once perception is seen to be radically distinct from recollection” (2005, p. 34). The matter of consciousness next joins the growing list of ingredients to be gathered into the meaning-finding endeavour underway.

Consciousness

McGilchrist identifies the problem between realism and idealism, materialism and spiritualism, body and soul as fundamentally a problem of opposed realities.

> My thesis is that for us as human beings there are two fundamentally opposed realities, two different modes of experience; that each is of ultimate importance in bringing about the recognizably human world; and that the difference is rooted in the bihemispheric structure of the brain. It follows that the hemispheres need to cooperate, but I believe they are in fact involved in a sort of power struggle, and that this explains many aspects of contemporary Western culture. (2009, p. 3)

What is consciousness? All attempts at explanations depend on drawing parallels between things, says McGilchrist (2009), but the fundamental problem in explaining the experience of consciousness is that “there is nothing else remotely like it to compare it with: *it is itself the ground of all experience*” (p. 19, emphasis added). Moreover, continues McGilchrist, there is nothing else that has the inwardness that consciousness has. Phenomenalogically, and ontologically, it is unique. The analytical process cannot deal with uniqueness, he says. To the question, “is consciousness a product of the brain?” McGilChrist answers, “The only certainty

here is that anyone who thinks they can answer this question with certainty has to be wrong. We have only our conception of consciousness and the brain to go on" (2009, p. 19).

By reason of the above scientific/philosophical accounts, the concerted attempts to understand the meaning of personhood and education and the meaning of life by means of *thinking through* an educative process arrive at a plausible open-ended working hypothesis. *If* permitted to continue on a path with open-ended educational access to the complex reality of the lived experience, the inquirer may possibly end up on the "ground of all experience"—a living, breathing, feeling, thinking human *being*.

Out beyond ideas of wrong doing and right doing,
there is a field. I'll meet you there.

When the soul lies down in that grass,
the world is too full to talk about.

Ideas, language, even the phrase *each other*
doesn't make any sense.

from *Essential Rumi*
by Coleman Barks (1995, p. 36)

Conscience

Rumi's "field" (re)sounds very much like Arendt's "in between". Taylor (1989; 1991), Damasio (1994, 1999, 2003, 2010); Bergson (1998/1907); and Arendt (1974; 1971) do not let the educative process stop there, however; nor do they permit the intrepid inquirer to "lie down in that grass" ... at least, not yet. Another essential ingredient needs to be added to the eclectic mix for creating a "box of chocolates". According to the above eminent scientists and philosophers, the educative process, *if* allowed to run its full course, in the long run, will culminate in "conscience".

Taylor's (1989, 1991) approach to modern identity is one of retrieval of the inwardly turned moral reason of Augustine, and the turning inward of the "I" or "eye" of Plato towards an identity in *being*, a certain interiority of conscience that is forged over time. In *The Feeling of What Happens*, Damasio (1999) says that the ultimate step in the evolution of consciousness is the making of "conscience" from the Latin *con* (with) and *scientia* (knowledge) which suggests the gathering of knowledge (p. 230). Arendt (1971) equates the activity of thinking, "...the habit of examining and reflecting upon whatever comes to pass ..." to conscience (p. 418). Actualized in every thinking process is "conscience" ... "to know with and by myself" says Arendt (p. 418). Bergson's (1998) ideas of a "complete and perfect humanity" (p. 267) and the "unity of the spiritual life" (p. 268) and Damasio's (2010) "spiritual dimension in human affairs" (p. 296) refer to what Damasio (2010) calls a homeostatic refinement that humans eventually idealized and longed to achieve. Eisner views education as a process of "deepening and expanding the kinds of meaning people have in their lives" (1998, p. 7). Meaning making, and/or meaning finding, in the fullest sense, would idealistically *and* realistically include the educative (drawing forth) of conscience, "to know with and by myself".

A Living Process of Education

Thinking through a work in process has turned up several "chocolate ingredients" essential to a meaningful understanding of personhood, creativity and education. Furthermore, allowing an understanding of meaning to occur beyond the standardized reconstructions and representations of meaning-making methods permits an experience of the *élan* of life itself. A simile for life, the "box of chocolates" has provided not only a helpful place to start, but the metaphor has also contributed to the creation of an imaginative setting conducive to understanding different kinds of meaning while serving to spawn a theme generative of a living experience of inquiry, in other words, a living story. The thesis subject cannot be analyzed because *who* is unique and cannot be compared to anything else—not even to a box of chocolates—without losing its "real" meaning in the representation. Consciousness, according to McGilchrist (2009), is "the ground of all experience" (p. 19) and cannot be compared to

anything else. Meaning may be authorized, however, by reason of an author/protagonist *who* thinks, feels and breathes "real" life into the question at the heart of the search for meaning.

The intention from the outset was to permit each "ingredient" to emerge organically in its own way and on its own time. In addition, it was hoped that, by reason of the inquirer's presence in the work from the beginning through to the end, an example of a living process of education might be demonstrated. Prompted by an instinctual nudge rather than a conceptual plan, the poetic essays, with their inherent qualities of imagery, rhyme and rhythm opened a space for emotion, feelings, instincts and intuitions. Thus, inherent qualities, as defined by Eisner (1991), were permitted to participate in the creation of a lens through which the "enlightened eye" could see and not merely look.

In "On Poetic Occasion in Inquiry: Concreteness, Voice, Ambiguity, Tension and Associative Logic", Anne Sullivan (2009) calls the art of perceptivity, "spotting the occasion for poetry". The concluding poem "An Occasion for Poetry" (Dobson, 2011b, p. 164) was gratefully and serendipitously "found" within Sullivan's essay.

An Occasion for Poetry

Learning to spot the occasion for poetry
Is learning to see the sculpture
That is already in the stone
Then chipping away everything
That is not David

Poems hide.
What we have to do
Is live in a way that lets us find them
I am not going to get straight to the point
I want to examine the intuitive
Without reasoning towards it

Occasions for poetry
Must be concrete, straightforward

The everyday sensory stuff
Getting the poem into the body
Renders the “lived experience”
Of wheat fields, flocks and sheep

Resonant with powerful feelings
Recollected in tranquility
Bearing sensory information
Charged with emotion
Highlighted in the colours of idiosyncrasy
The human voice
May be the true occasion for their existence

Possibility wide open
No meaning trapped, enclosed, contained
The everyday and unresolved
Circuitous thoughts of you and me
Rife with complexity and mystery
May be found occasions for poetry

Word connecting with word
Line with line
As with the spider web
Touch it at any part
And the whole structure responds
In associated logic

A nexus of tensions
Integral and essential
Avoiding the habit of conclusion
I would have to unlearn tidy linearity
I would need to make leaps
As the mind leaps
As impulses fire across synapses
With unexpected turns
And surprising connections

The doors and windows are open
You decide

Dobson (2011a; 2011b)

Chapter VII

A Living Story

"—there is no *ending* to a tale—"

(Carol Brightman, 1995, p. xxx, emphasis in original)

A Story with a Difference

Having now undergone the rigours of phase one— the back-and-forth tensions between the invisible and visible aspects of the creative process as portrayed in "Emergence"— I have gained a certain degree of *terra firma* with regard to the elusive presence of *who*, the artful protagonist of my living story. I stand quietly reassured in the awareness that I am authorized to tell my own living story, and no one else's. As previously noted, this story is a story with a difference. Asking the question "*Who* do you know when you know a person?" elicits a very different kind of response than asking the question "*What* do you know when you know a person" (McAdamm, as cited by Gubrium and Holstein, 2000, p. 242)? Further complicating the difference is the problem of plurality. Not only can *who* be felt and known singularly; *who* is also experienced (known) in relationship with others.

The intangible "in-between" of human relationship is nevertheless as "real" as the world of the things we visibly have in common (Arendt, 1974, p. 183). Al-Saji's (2005) theory of intersubjectivity (Chapter II) presents a unique view of the same "real" as seen from the angle of Bergson's (2005) theory of time. In accord with Bergson's concept of pure memory as a principal element of a living story, Al-Saji bases her theory of intersubjectivty on Bergson's theory of *la durée*. Duration is a non-chronological time that exists at the intersection between mind and matter (Bergson, 2005, p. 13). Al-Saji describes intersubjectivity as an encounter with others that is based on affective attunement rather than spatial perspective, proximity rather

than distance, and entanglement and interpretation of pasts rather than stagnant and exclusive histories (2005, p. 230). Al-Saji's description of the differences between a resonant living story—affective attunement, proximity, and entanglement and interpretation of pasts—and a "stagnant and exclusive" story—spatial perspective, distance, and stagnant and exclusive histories—points to the suitability of a living story for exploring *who* one knows, as opposed to *what* one knows, when one knows a person.

In addition to the affective aspects of a living story found in Al-Saji's (2005) theory of time and intersubjectivity, there is another set of differences that are of particular relevance to a living story as a way of doing educational research. Arendt (1971) does not make explicit the connection between *who* and thinking, and *what* and knowing; however, I perceive an implicit alliance between Arendt's notion of thinking and *who* and a resonant living story; and between Arendt's notion of knowing and *what* and a "stagnant and exclusive" story. On the one hand is "reason, the urge to think and understand"; and on the other hand is "the intellect, which desires and is capable of certain verifiable knowledge" (Arendt, 1971, p. 422). Putting two and two together, I see that a living story accommodates both thinking and knowing. A valuable method for exploring the invisible *who* of personhood and education (thinking) and the visible *what* of constructed attributes and schooling (knowing) has thus emerged from yet another complex complement of differences.

Arendt likens thinking to Socrates' metaphor of the wind and equates knowing to the building of houses (1971, p. 421). Like the wind, *who* is invisible to the physical eye; but, like the wind, *who* can be felt (known) in the lived experience of a living story. Indeed, from the perspective of this thesis, *who* can be seen and expressed through the enlightened eye of the artist (Eisner, 1991); *who* can be disclosed in a public space of "sheer human togetherness" (Arendt, 1974, p. 180); *who* can be narrated by the poetic eye ("I") of the storyteller, and *who* can be understood (known) by the discerning ear of the reader. In short, the disclosure of *who* in contradistinction to *what* somebody is ... is implicit in everything somebody says and does (Arendt, 1974, p. 179).

Explicit by comparison, *what* a person does can be defined (known) by the name of his or her profession or occupation. In striving to meet regulatory codes for the building of houses, for

example—or, in this case, for the production of a poetic narrative dissertation—*what* a person does by definition (building contractor or doctoral candidate) will likely require a design blueprint (building regulations or academic requirements); draw on acquired knowledge and skills (craftsmanship or developing scholarship); and work with solid materials (bricks and mortar or actual events) and concrete details (architectural plans or verifiable facts) in order to build a foundation strong enough—in the case of the present poetic narrative dissertation— to support the "real" of identity, a framework flexible enough to withstand the "real" of elemental forces; and a vision compelling enough to open a space for "real" time in-between past and future, the "now" of the "infinite forward-pushing force of the 'no longer' clashing against the infinite backward-driving force of the 'not yet'... the opposite of our usual experience of the unilateral progression of time"(Kohn in the Introduction to *Between Past and Future*, Arendt, 2003, p. xix).

Evidently, making a house a home—or, in this case, making a narrative dissertation a living story—means adding another story. The 'home' and/or 'living story' calls for a third dimension, what Damasio calls "the homeostatic refinement ... the biological counterpart of a spiritual dimension in human affairs" (2010, p. 296). For the purposes of our present exploration, I call this third dimension the "in-between" borrowing from Arendt (1974). "Now Here" is the invisible (spiritual) dimension of time where *who* is found to live and breathe in-between past and future. In keeping with the requirements of the third dimension, the living stories I tell are tales drawn from my lived experience. As illustrations of formal and informal education, the tales are presented from an inside-out point of view and interpreted from an intimate poetic slant, that of the inquirer/storyteller whose personal quest unfolds 'now' in-between the "no longer" and "not yet" in response to the question "*Who* am I *really*?"

The Story Selection Process

Choosing the tales and deciding on the how, what and when of interpreting the tales is not a random process; nevertheless, there is an intuitive aspect to my meaning-finding endeavour that cannot be intellectually explained. In keeping with the *élan* of the first phase of the inquiry, each tale is intended to appear as a story within a story in the open-ended context and expanding framework of the living narrative *en cours*. No matter how well thought through, nor how well intentioned an attempt at providing a guideline may be, a living story will continue to create surprising outcomes. An unforeseen 'happening' in phase one, for example, dramatically shifted the course of events of the second phase. The subject/question of the dissertation (namely *who* without a name) made a reticent but undeniable *début* in phase one, a phase initially intended to be a more inwardly oriented exploratory phase in preparation for the more outwardly oriented interpretive phase that was intended for the second segment of the dissertation. "An Uncertain Proposal" of Chapter IV offers a helpful reminder at this pivotal juncture. While there may be no definite guideline to follow, there is definitely an artful vision for proceeding. A critical component of this vision is making room for uncertainty, described earlier in Chapter III as the dark places of "not knowing" where meaning may most certainly appear. The selected poems and stories come from this different place.

The different place is a way of thinking in which there is no overt or covert agenda. Apart from fulfilling a desire for self-expression, the tales I tell were initially written with no ulterior motive in mind. Like the dream of Chapter IV in which I found myself—having apparently veered off the main road—landed in a thick clump of bushes on a dark forest night, this different place requires a different way of seeing and a different way of manoeuvring. (In the dream, as may be recalled, I was in a top-down convertible with no steering wheel and no headlights. Left to my own devices—intuition and insight—I placed my hands on the dashboard and sensed, and felt, and willed my way forward and out of the woods.) The different place is a place of open-mindedness. In fact, curiosity—a compelling desire to see *what* the process might bring in terms of doing and *who* the process may reveal in terms of being—is the real 'driving force' behind a living story.

For the most part, the living stories I choose to explore In Chapters VIII and IX are made up of material that was originally written with the sole purpose of meeting the purposeless requirements of a creative writing course. Subsequent to my retirement from a career in education with its standard penchant for professional writing geared to the instrumental-utilitarian purposes of school administration, I wanted to explore the act of writing for its own sake. I wanted to see if there was an original thought left to be had. A creative writing course offered by the McGill Institute for Learning in Retirement (MILR) appealed to me for its open-ended invitation to writing. The design for implementing the course was overseen by two MILR-appointed facilitators. Each week the twenty participants (retired professionals as well as accomplished authors and poets) would bring to the table a sample of their own writing—a short story, an essay or a poem—that had been triggered, or perhaps inspired, by one of three possible word prompts chosen by group consensus the previous week. The writing samples were limited to a certain number of words in order to allow equal time for each participant to present his or her work. Starting with two different volunteer animators each week, going around the table in order, the authors would read their work, and then receive feedback from those who felt inclined to offer a critique. Needless to say, with the exception of the common one-word prompt appearing in everyone's writing sample, there was an astonishing array of creative expression. We soon came to know each other's writing style and genre preference; but we were constantly amazed by the wide range and variety of context and content that could emerge from a simple one-word prompt. In stark contrast to the dry, often arduous administrative task of writing official reports, formal letters and standard grant applications, the invigorating creative impulses triggered by the word prompt were indeed a refreshing elixir! You may recognize some of the prompts in my story and poetry selections—"impersonator"; "violet"; "fourth"; "runaway"; "inspection"; "screen door"; "jelly beans", "carnival", to name only a few—as the instigators of the strange little artifacts that sprang, seemingly of their own volition like wild violets in the summer's grass, onto my course assignment pages. When I enrolled in a creative writing course six years ago, I had no idea that I would one day find such a 'useless' exercise to be such a 'useful' resource for my doctoral explorations on identity, creativity, education and meaning.

Where do these “wild violets” come from? Why does most of my so-called ‘creative writing’ spring from childhood experiences? Is there no creativity left to be found in adulthood? According to Arendt, the immediate source of artwork is the human capacity for thought (1974, p. 168). What happens to thinking in adulthood? The ‘artwork’ I was fortunate enough to be engaged in at MILR surely got me thinking in terms of my experience (and responsibility) as an educator. What happens to uncertain creativity in a quest for certain success? What is the link between creativity and *who* I am *really*? Along with the stories, essays and poems, the above questions and many more were triggered by the invigorating power of a one-word prompt.

Like the unforeseen outcomes of a creative writing course, the events of the creative process cannot be figured out in advance, but they can be allowed expression in the present. In putting two and two together (*who* and being, and thinking and useless artwork; and *what* and doing, and knowing and useful results), I have inadvertently discovered the artful protagonist *who* lives in the present time between formerly perceived never-the-twain-shall-meet pairs of estranged opposites. Yet, in-between two strangers is the “source of creativity” described by Arendt as remaining “outside the actual work process” as well as independent of *what* we may achieve (1974, p. 211). The “different place” from whence the living stories come is a familiar place after all. This is a place of inner resourcefulness that is, strangely enough, independent of outer achievement. What is the role of inner resourcefulness in education? What is the role of a living story as a methodology for educational research? In light of the illuminating darkness of a “different place”, what does educating for meaning *really* mean?

Inquiry as Narrative

In an attempt to address the above leading questions as they pertain to a living story and educational inquiry specifically, I shall first review aspects of the narrative in inquiry in a more general context. Munro-Hendry suggests all inquiry is narrative (2010, p. 74). To underscore the argument that narrative is the first and oldest form of inquiry, Munro-Hendry cites oral traditions that embodied multiple ways of knowing. For example, she cites the Greek *episteme* or knowledge of the practical or everyday (also termed logical rational thought) and *gnosis* or

poesis (also termed mytho-poetic thought) as knowledge related to the larger questions of meaning. “Both modes were accounts of knowledge; they were narratives that were not seen as oppositional but rather as complementary” (Davis 2004, as cited by Munro-Hendry, 20010, p. 74).

A neuroscientist who would likely endorse Munro-Hendry’s argument, Damasio says that storytelling is “something brains do naturally” and the arts are the means to induce nourishing emotions and feelings, the connectors to the soul of the person (2010, p. 296). Susanne Langer, as cited by Eisner, concurs: “Artistic form is congruent with the dynamic forms of our direct sensuous life; works of art are projections of ‘felt life’ as Henry James called it, into spatial, temporal and poetic structures. They are images of feeling that formulate it for our conception” (1991, p. 27). A living story, from the perspective of the present inquiry, is intended to convey “felt life”. Additionally, Damasio (2010) sees art as a way to explore one’s own mind and the mind of another, a central feature of the inquiring process of a living story (quest) that begins with a personal question that is inclusive of the ‘other’, “*Who* am I *really*?”

Not only has the living story emerged from the present inquiry as an integral means for addressing the central thesis question; most significantly, “being in and doing the work from its inception to its conclusion” (Butler-Kisber, 2010, p. 3) is the proposed educational premise on which the work stands. Finding one’s unique way of being in the world, the “dialectic of freedom” proposed by Maxine Greene (1984), is constantly being put to the test by the vigorous (and invigorating) demand for the integrity of the complement of opposites inherent in the creative process itself. Slowly but surely through the present work in process, a living story is proving itself capable of facilitating the singularity and the plurality of personhood (*who*) while offering the open-endedness necessary to foster mystery and intrigue, essential components of a “real” adventure into the indefinable, yet knowable experience of identity and creativity, education and meaning. A vital gift offered by a living story to educational research, then, is a hospitable environment (a different yet familiar place) where thinking like the wind is welcomed; where knowing like the building of houses is appreciated; where thought can create artwork and cognition can produce results; and where both modes of human experience (being

and doing) are intentionally interwoven into a living narrative, the first and oldest form of inquiry. The different place provided by a living story methodology is "beyond current dualisms and bifurcations that create boundaries that limit the capacity of dialogue across diverse epistemologies" (Munro-Hendry, 2010, p. 72). Painted within Munro-Hendry's articulation is an inspiring image of Aoki's living landscape of pedagogy: "both this and that, and more" (Aoki, as cited by Pinar, 2005, p. 295). I can think of no better place than this place for exploring the "more" of identity, creativity, education and meaning.

Intuition and Intellect at Play

The term "living story" first appeared unexpectedly in my earlier poetic rendition of the creative process entitled "Emergence". It was following the writing of this poem that the idea of a living story as a method of inquiry first came to light. Slowly at first, then resolutely appearing out of the intensifying relationship between intuition and intellect— conveyed in the opening lines as "Invisible, visible/Intensifying"—the living story made "her" *début*. A significant aspect of a new beginning as portrayed in the poem is personification. Insinuated in the name "Idea" is an invisible link between being and thinking. In the ongoing tension-filled evolution of the creative process depicted throughout the body of the poem, the dark "invisible" aspect of the creative process (intuition) was eventually brought to the light "visible" aspect of awareness (intellect) in the last lines: "An Idea/Makes her début/And a living story begins". Thus, a living story/person was born of a relationship between equally developed intuition and intellect.

This timely poetic reference revisits Bergson's (1998/1907) theory with regard to the two distinct aspects of the power of consciousness, *intuition* and *intellecte*. For Bergson, the two aspects are different in "kind", not in intensity. According to Bergson, *intuition*, the "best part" of the power of consciousness, moves in the direction of life; whereas *intellecte*, the aspect of the power of consciousness predominantly known in modern times, moves in the opposite direction, towards matter (1998, p. 267). (In order for the full experience of human potential to be actualized, suggests Bergson, there would be an equal development of both *intuition* and *intellecte* as complementary aspects of the power of consciousness.) Following Bergsonian

thinking, it stands to reason that a living story may be discerned intuitively and understood spiritually thereby invoking the necessity of a third dimension mentioned earlier. Such an event "occurs" ... "because this insight is something that is not under our control in lived experience" (Gadamer, 2010, p. xvii). By contrast, a person's life story that is factually told relative to events that happened in the past may be grasped intellectually and re/constructed cognitively by reason of the re/collection of a specific series of fact-checked chronological events that took place in the birth-to-death cycle. As noted earlier, this is a very different story.

The tales I tell are called "living stories" not because the tales fall under a particular literary category—biography or autobiography, for example—nor because the tales belong to a specific genre of narrative writing—self-study or auto-ethnography, for instance—but because each tale tells a story about a unique lived experience; and, most significantly, tells that tale artistically (poetically) with emotion and feeling, as if 'living'. It is the embodiment of emotions and feelings of the storyteller ("I") that differentiates a resonant living story from a "stagnant and exclusive" story objectively recounted from a removed third-person-observer position ("me"). Coming from a different place—described earlier as a dark place devoid of overt or covert agenda—a living story carries the emotion and feelings expressed by the storyteller through an act of creativity *for its own sake*. The story is brought to life by reason of the unassuming presence of *who* (a person being) as distinct from the presuming *persona* of a *what* (an educator doing research). In short, a living story is embodied and conveyed by the involved storyteller in the momentary *élan* of lived experience. As such, the tales In Chapters VIII and IX are left 'free' to express particular aspects of the multiple facets of invisible (yet identifiable) personhood. The tales thus proffer valuable resources for exploring two specific questions of significance to the central question of the present dissertation: in Chapter VIII, "Telling Tales out of School", Part I, the first question is "Who's *Who*?" and in Chapter IX, "Telling Tales out of School" Part II, the second question is "What Happens to *Who*?"

It's all in the Timing

Introduced earlier in Al-Saji's new theory of time and intersubjectivity (2005, p. 230), a crucial difference between a living story and a life story is found in the difference between "real" time and chronological time. A living story is told from the Bergsonian perspective of "pure memory", which, according to Al-Saji, "is the relation of past-present in a way that escapes the enclosure of presence" (p. 203). The present is a "gap in the continuum of time, a gap that appears to the human mind as an abyss when there is no longer a bridge of inherited concepts to traverse it," says Jerome Kohn in the Introduction to *Between Past and Future* (Arendt, 2006, p xiii). Portrayed in the poems, "Nowhere" and "Now Here", Chapter V, "real" time occurs "now here" and "nowhere" in the past or the future. Embodied in the two poems, the difference in temporality is palpable: in the feeling of the two poems, the stark contrast between the frenetic breathlessness (lifelessness) of "nowhere" and the peaceful mindfulness (meaningfulness) symbolically and phonetically experienced, in the "gap" between now and here in "Now Here". From this perspective, a lived experience told "now" is a living story.

Living beyond a Lifetime

In *Narrating the Self*, Adriana Cavarero (2000) uses the term "life-story" to describe a means for narrating *who* of selfhood. Similar in perspective, context and meaning to a living story in the present inquiry, the term "life-story", although slightly different in concept, is a powerful reinforcement of the poetically found "living story" as a means for supporting a thesis on identity, creativity, education and meaning. Cavarero explains her choice of the term based on the inspiration she draws from the work of Arendt (1957; 1995). Cavarero's premise, echoing the thinking of Arendt, is that *who* of a life-story is not reducible to *what* of a life-span. For this reason, according to Cavarero, autobiography is not the same as "auto-narration", a term she conceptualizes to incorporate the difference in temporality between a life-span that has a beginning and an ending, and a life-story that lives beyond the narrow confines of a lifetime. "To be alive means to live in a world that preceded one's own arrival and will survive one's own departure" (Arendt, 1957, in Cavarero 2000, as cited in the Introduction by Kottman p. xviii).

It is at this point that the striking similarities between Cavarero's "life-story" and what I mean by "a living story" slightly diverge. The divergence hinges on the exclusive emphasis Arendt and Cavarero place on plurality for the disclosure of *who*. (Arendt changes her stance on this point after experiencing what she calls "a crisis of identity" (2003, p. 11). The significance of Arendt's change in perspective with regard to the role of singularity in self-awareness—a critical aspect of the present conceptualization of a living story—will be discussed later in this section.) According to Arendt's thinking prior to the event of a crisis of identity, *who* can only be seen by others, and in relation to others, in the *polis* of the *vita activa*: "In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world" (p. 179). Based on Arendt's theory of the critical role of the "other" in storytelling—an idea reinforced by Cavarero in her citation of storyteller Karen Blixen's adherence to "the theory of the link between identity and story [that] seems to move from autobiography to biography, bringing into play the need for the *other*"— Cavarero takes a firm stance on storytelling and selfhood: "If, in the heart of everyone beats the question, 'Who am I?', and if the question needs in response one's own story narrated by another, then this other is no longer the rhetorical site of interrogation, but rather its decisive hinge" (2000, p. 136). Herein is the subtle, but significant, point of divergence. The revelation of *who* in the telling of a "living story" does *not* depend on narration by another. By way of *being* in the work, I am able to tell my own living story; furthermore, in the telling of my own living story, I may possibly disclose my "real" identity to others.

In support of the argument that *who* can be discerned inwardly and expressed outwardly in the telling of a living story, Arendt (2003) addresses the distinction that she experienced personally between her private "inner self" and her "public *persona*" in a later work titled *Responsibility and Judgment*. Arendt bases her private/public distinction on Kant's moral "invisible self" who saves him from "being a mere speck in the infinity of the universe" and whom Kant places ahead of "duties to others" (2003, p. 67). Upon receiving Denmark's Sonning Prize in 1975 in recognition of her contribution to European civilization, and in a rare moment of personal disclosure, Arendt says the following: "... I could truthfully say that the fact of this prize has had

its most immediate, and in my case, its most logical consequence in setting off a 'crisis of identity''' (2003, p. 11).

> We always appear in a world which is a stage and are recognized according to the roles which our professions assign us, as physicians or lawyers, as authors or publishers, as teachers or students, and so on. It is through this role, sounding through it, as it were, *that something else manifests itself, something entirely idiosyncratic and indefinable and still unmistakably identifiable,* so that we are not confused by sudden change of roles, when for instance a student arrives at his goal which was to become a teacher, or when a hostess, whom socially we know as a physician, serves drinks instead of taking care of her patients. In other words, the advantage of adopting the notion of *persona* for my considerations lies in the fact that the masks or roles which the world assigns us, and which we must accept and even acquire if we wish to take part in the world's play at all, are exchangeable; they are not inalienable in the sense we speak of 'inalienable rights', and they are not a permanent fixture annexed to our inner self in the sense in which the voice of conscience, as most people believe, is something the human soul constantly bears within itself. (2003, p. 13, emphasis added)

Most significantly in support of the premise of the present thesis, Arendt describes the freedom of knowing an indefinable, but identifiable inner self as some*one who* is very different from the annexed exchangeable role of the public *persona*, i.e. some*thing* played upon the world stage:

> It is in this sense that I can come to terms with appearing here as a 'public figure' for the purpose of a public event. It means that when the events for which the mask was designed are over, and I have finished using and abusing my individual right to sound through the mask, things will snap back into place. Then I, greatly honoured and deeply thankful for this moment, shall be free not only to exchange the roles and masks that the great play of the world may offer, but free even to move through the play in my naked 'thisness' identifiable, I hope, but not definable and not seduced by the great temptation of recognition, which in no matter what form, can only recognize us *as* such and such, that is as something which fundamentally we are *not*. (2003, pp. 13-14, emphasis in original)

I agree with Cavarero's premise that no one can "author" or "invent" a "life-story" narrated by another. However, when I am "free to move through" a living story in my naked "thisness", I am able to tell my own living story; and, consequently, I need not rely on the narration of another to reveal *who* I am *really*, as Cavarero suggests. Where "pure memory" emerges at the

intersection between mind and matter (Bergson, 1998/1907), there "I" am. Because the "I" of personhood is not interested in inventing a storied life (*what*), but in telling a "living story" (*who*), the tales In Chapter VIII and IX come from a very different place. The different place is a way of thinking of 'so and so' as distinct from knowing 'such and such'; moreover, it is a way of seeing that is distinct from observing, and it is a way of telling that is distinct from recounting. In fact, all of the imaginative abilities and creative sensibilities highlighted in Chapter IV, aka "chocolate ingredients", come into play in narrating a living story whereby "resonance", "serendipity", "interest", "voice", "intuition", "being", "presence", "duration", "consciousness" and "conscience" are artfully blended into a delectable mix of freely available inner resources to be tapped. Comparable to Michelangelo's technique of chipping away the stone to release the statue "David", as cited by Sullivan in "spotting the occasion for poetry" (2007, p. 197), a poetic narrative essay, aka a living story, is a way of being in the midst of a living inquiry by which the inherent qualities of *who* I am *really* may be released and known.

A Veritable *Cause Célèbre*

Personified as *who* in the poem, "Emergence", the term "living story" first appeared by sudden surprise as an overarching methodology that would not only support this thesis, but most importantly, that would integrate the meaning of the thesis with its subject:

A sudden glory
And then a shape appearing
Small and timid at first
Groping, seeking
Becoming
Being

Throbbing with potential
Filled with promise
An Idea
Makes her début
And a living story begins

The simile and metaphor found in “life is like a box of chocolates” is not lost in the idea of a living story. This story is about life in all its wonderfully wild, i.e. not yet tamed, schooled, trained and/or otherwise domesticated originality, uniqueness, variety, diversity and plurality. Life in its fullness can only be known and lived in the present “Now Here” and “Nowhere” in the past or future. How easily and quickly life can become ‘lost’ in the busy/ness of modern-day utilitarianism! “What’s the use?” has come to symbolize the ubiquitous practicality of utilitarianism on the one hand; and on the other, to signify the overwhelming sense of meaninglessness so poignantly articulated in *The Malaise of Modernity* (Taylor, 1991) and in *La Souffrance à l’école*: *un malaise éthique* (Quintin, 2000).

Life in its myriad possibilities, its infinite varieties, and its complex interrelatedness and interconnectedness is the veritable *cause célèbre* of “Telling Tales out of School”. The invisible grandeur of the subject (*who*) would be impossible to consider as a thesis subject were it not for the fact that the revelation of *who* in the living experience of babyhood, childhood, adulthood and personhood is “narratable” (Cavarero, 2000) and not ineffable as some would have us believe. Cavarero points out that it is philosophy’s asking the question “*What* is Man?” that confuses the issue and determines a conclusion of ineffability. In turning the question around and asking, instead, “*Who* is man?” intriguing possibilities for knowing an invisible yet identifiable identity are made possible. Because of the complexity, diversity and plurality of a multi-faceted living story, this story, by reason of its quest/ioning nature, is intricately linked to, and inevitably implicated in, education. From the perspective of the Latin root meaning of *educare,* education may be seen as an inner quest, a searching from the inside-out. The proverbial quest for meaning, so passionately portrayed in *The Glass Bead Game* by Hermann Hesse, is a “striving for truth” (2000/1946, p. 339). In his epic novel about education, Hesse discovers through the telling of his own living story that “truth is lived, not taught” (p. 73). “Truth is lived, not taught” has serendipitously emerged as the basic principle on which the present thesis on identity, creativity, education and meaning is founded.

Chapter VIII

Telling Tales out of School

Part I: Who's *Who*?

Research in the Crib

My first recollection of doing research is a vivid image I have of myself as a baby sitting in my crib trying to figure out the answer to a very perplexing question. My legs and feet, clothed in soft yellow flannelette sleepers at the time, were sticking out through the side iron bars of my crib. I can visualize the exact placing of my crib in the room, and the exact spot where I was sitting in the crib. It was early evening. Keenly aware of my surroundings, I remember pondering, ''If my legs and feet are out there, then why can't the rest of me get out?"

The above vignette illustrates the lack of sophistication in a baby's thinking, yes; but more importantly for the purposes of the present inquiry, the tale gives evidence of consciousness (thinking) in babyhood. The vivid memory of such an illogical inquiry may appear on the surface to be mere baby babble or childish gibberish. However, on deeper reflection, I see a lived experience that contains a valuable preliminary insight for addressing the question under our present investigation, namely "Who's *who*?" "*Who* was present in the crib that evening?" From the perspective of the present storyteller, "I"—the unchangeable identity of the person (Arendt, 1974)—was present in the crib that evening. A living story about an early experience of identity (*who*) begs further questioning: Does thinking exist before knowing? Where does thinking come from? When does the 'unchangeable identity of the person' (*who*) start to exist? Why did the baby think (illogically from the perspective of an adult observer) that "all" of her should be able to get out of the crib since "part" of her was out? Is a baby's thinking 'illogical'; or does a baby have a different way of thinking, or see through a different kind of lens? These are big questions. Some are beyond the scope of this thesis; nonetheless, the questions and the

implications that do fall under the jurisdiction of this investigation can be considered as circumstantial evidence in support of the preliminary argument that *who* exists, i.e. *who* has not always been 'lost'. Personhood is not "under erasure" along with its essentialist concepts as constructivist theorists such as Stuart Hall (1996, p. 2) would have us believe. Recognizing the thinking presence of babyhood is an ideal way to begin an investigation of "Who's *who*?" The following tale affords a close-up view of the developing consciousness of a child who reveals *who* she is by running away.

Running Away

"Ha! Ha! Ha! There she is! She won't do it! She's too scared! Ha! Ha! Ha!

The taunts of my older brother and sister punched their way through the darkness and into my small quivering frame. Petrified, I stood cowering behind the large walnut tree in our front yard. Having bravely declared to my tormenters just moments earlier that I was going to run away, I suddenly found myself paralyzed by fear and derision. The pitch black of the night loomed foreboding on one side of the tree; and on the other side, the mean-spirited jeers of my older siblings tolled their equal promise of doom.

"I'll show them!" I began to muster the courage to match my resolve. Just as I was about to leap into the nothingness that was by daylight my entire world, a third option appeared. I could barely make out the form of my mother whose familiar gentleness now graced the veranda that once launched the merciless insults of my oppressors.

"Come home, darling," she said. "You'll catch your death of cold."

With enormous relief, and my pride intact, I went safely back into the house.

"Running Away" is a factual account of an incident that occurred in exactly the manner described above. According to the calculations of my two older siblings who were implicated in the drama, I was four years old at the time. The significance of the story for me, however, is symbolic not factual. Following my initial thinking and writing about the incident in the poem, "A Runaway", cited earlier in Chapter VI (Dobson, 2010, p. 137), a poetic afterthought revealed that "running away" meant "running closer to myself". What does this revelation say about

who I am? In what ways am I still running away (from *what*) in order to run closer to myself (*who*)?

Does this tale hold valuable insights for education, I wonder? What could running away symbolize in terms of identity, creativity, freedom and education? What is the source of courage—for anyone, not just for a four-year-old—to leap into 'the unknown' for the sake of *who* one is? Why does it take courage to "leap" into the unknown? What are the risks involved? What consequences are there to be afraid of? What might the act of running away say about educating for freedom, defined by Greene (1984) as letting people choose their own way of being in the world?

I wonder, too, what the "third option" that appeared in the form of my mother on the veranda might symbolize in terms of the capacity to survive the tensions of an either-or scenario in order to discover the possibility in "not yet" (Greene, 1995)? A third possibility not evident in the initial struggle between the two 'known' options, namely fear and derision, allowed for an 'unforeseen' third option to appear. Could "pride intact" symbolize the integrity of *who*? Could "Come 'home', darling ..." symbolize the third option of "in-between"?

As is the wont of poetic narrative inquiry, more questions than answers have been generated. In the comprehensive discussion to follow in Chapter XI, "A Critical Analysis", some of the questions will be addressed. Other questions will remain open-ended, as integral aspects of an ongoing living story. In the anticipation of uncovering further clues and gaining deeper understanding, I turn next to a long view of my siblings and my ongoing relationships with them as experienced over time. I do this in order to begin to fill out the complexity of scope, dimension and interconnection of the nature of the now 'highly suspect' plural reality of *who.*

The long view will be presented in a cluster of three poetic narratives. Each tale has been inspired by the unique quality of the relationship I knew with each of my three siblings. Together the depictions portray a family unit of four children that includes the storyteller and the protagonist (me). In order to let the living stories breathe for themselves, both individually and collectively, I first present the artifacts one after the other without interruption. My comments and questions will follow. Since I was third in a line of four children in my family, I

shall explore the nature of my relationships with my siblings from the perspective of my position as the middle-child experiencing the dynamics of sibling interconnectedness. The poetic renditions were initially written as tributes to my brothers and sister *who* are no longer present in person, but *who* are very much present in the 'in-between'. As parts of a living story, the tales are offered in anticipation of gaining deeper insights into the nature of identity (*who*) as it appears in, and through, the interwoven, tightly interconnected pattern of my living story as it is intimately experienced as a part of the pattern of my brothers' and sister's lives. The illustrations will hopefully contribute additional glimpses of identity (*who*) to be incorporated into the infinite variety of life's "box of chocolates". The question remains "Who's *who*?"

No Explanations

I patted her swollen belly
You have a fat tummy, I said
She just smiled
No explanations in those days

Where's Mummy?
I asked the new housekeeper
Why don't you see if she's in the cupboard?
My older siblings snickered
I couldn't find her there
Or anywhere

The house smelled
Of Ivory Snow and Johnson's Baby Powder
He was wriggling on the change table in the bathroom
His name was Keith
He was the fourth

Sitting on the fence in the meadow
I grappled with my new-found dilemma
What if my new brother turns out to be a French baby?
No one in my family could speak French
I would learn just in case

Un, deux, trois, quatre, cinq, six, sept, huit, neuf ... Dix!
He couldn't pronounce his name
"I like bacon, but I don't like it bont"
"Ohhh!" the small boy simulated the "errr" sound of his toy car
As he assimilated his new language:
Baby talk

He let me dress him up any way I chose
Hats, scarves, boots, he didn't mind
I put him in a sleigh, wrapped him in a blanket
And pulled him over the snow bank and down the mill road
Oops! Out he tumbled
Doctor Pedley said his collar bone was broken
He had to wear a sling

Anywhere I went, he went
In his yellow sweater one day
With its empty arm hanging down between us
He sat beside me at my desk at school
When we played games in the gym
Someone had to hold his sleeve

We moved into town
Everything changed
Keith went to grade two; I went to junior high
He went to junior high; I went to senior high
He went to senior high; I went to university
He went to university; I went to work
I hardly knew him
He grew tall
Six foot two

His huge hands held my newborn son
I have the photo
He was on his way out west with his friends that summer

The phone rang
"This is Uncle Jim ...
Keith was killed in a car accident this morning"
He was only twenty-one

Down to Earth

My brother George died peacefully this morning
In his hospital bed
His wife and son and daughter-in-law
Held his hands
While he gave his last breath

No longer will I be able to visit my brother
His person now has left
My tears fall gently, but gratefully
For I know I am not bereft
Of his familial spirit

Waves of knowing between us
Unspoken understanding
Just “getting it” when no one else did
Or could

A look
A gesture
Was all it took

He let me rub his feet
Massage his back
Run my hands through his thick black hair
And even over his face
For a moment

I took the liberty he gave me
At last
To love him
And he loved me back

So simple
So real
Nothing fanciful
Only down-to-earth truth allowed
By my big brother George

Coming Full Circle

Giggling and whispering in the dark
Under that green-and-white-striped bedspread
Do you remember?
I swear we could hear the faeries dancing in the garden
Below our window

The hollyhocks grew tall
In the summer light
Do you remember?
Their regal stalks gladly yielded
The perfect princess dolls
We deftly fashioned from their royal blooms
Of pink and red

I often wonder why Mummy...
Do you remember when Daddy...?
Our memories popped open
Slowly at first
Like morning glories in the early sun
And then the turning...

Tumbling one into the other
Soft-woven hues
A blanket of cherished moments spun
Pinks, blues, mauves
Yellows and golds

Unforgettably fragranced sweet peas
Climbed all over our garden fence
Erasing forever
Any illusion of line
Between then and now

Our beginning and our ending
Coming full circle
Bringing two sisters
Home

According to Butler-Kisber, a poetry cluster can be "a powerful and compelling way of getting a prism-like rendition of the subtle variations of a phenomenon" (2010, p. 95). In looking through the lens of my poetry cluster, I begin to discern subtle aspects of identity, facets of *who* I am that can only be perceived by reason of my relationships with my siblings. The subtleties are not evident in the lines of the tales; found hiding in the tacit places in-between the lines and in the unspoken spaces between the words are significant clues regarding the nature and presence of *who*. Put simply, *who* I am seeing through the prism of a poetic cluster is the "more" than meets the eye; and is more than the individual "i". Through the prism-like rendition of a poetry cluster, I look with my eyes at the worldly relationships I have shared with my siblings; but *avec le coeur* (with my heart) (de Saint-Exupéry, 1946), I am also able to see (feel) the subtle human relationships I continue to share with my siblings. (I note with interest the unintentional use of the past tense of the verb "experienced" with reference to "worldly relationships" and the present tense of the verb "share" with reference to "human relationships".) My eyes are not blind to the facts of the childhood trauma and the little-sister rebuffs that I experienced at the hands of my older siblings, a fact attested to earlier in "Running Away". Sibling rivalries, family squabbles, petty and not-so-petty misdeeds, seemingly endless and merciless teasing, incidents of downright meanness and times of outright bullying would probably, if statistically tallied, add up to more "bad" than "good" as far as my recollection of our worldly relationships might go. Nevertheless, the poetry cluster's prism allows for heartfelt retrospection and introspection that reveals, via the long view, that the unity of the "in-between" (Arendt, 1974: Greene 1998) that I share with my siblings within the delicate web of our human relationships remains for some reason whole and intact. How is this unity possible? What does this unity mean in terms of the question, "who's *who*?" What might this unity mean with respect to identity (*who*), creativity, education and meaning?

When I look closely at "No Explanations", I see my younger brother's poetic narrative not only as an account of his shortened individual "life-span" of only twenty-one years, but as a tribute to a unique "living story" of infinite duration. In the overall discussion to follow the telling of tales (with their self-generated questions in tow) Bergson's (2005/1908) theory of duration (*la durée*) will be re-examined for the clear perspective Bergson offers with regard to the vital

distinction between a life-span and a living story, a distinction that has been critical to my inquiry since the term "living story" first emerged in Chapter V. Added to the discussion at that time will be the role played by narration in revealing *who*, what Adriana Cavarero (2006) calls the "narratable self" of a life-story, as distinct from *what*, the "narrated self" of a life-span. As was noted in Chapter VII, "... the time of a life-story is not reducible to the time of that life" (2000, p. xxi). The notion that the life of identity (*who*) cannot be reduced to the parameters of a life span (*what*) carries significant implications for understanding personhood, and provides yet another powerful incentive for rethinking the meaning and purpose of education (drawing forth *who*) as differentiated from the instrumental rationale and utilitarian aims of most modern Western school reforms (constructing *what*).

"Down to Earth" leaves a strong impression of the reality that, despite the fact that the worldly "person" of my older brother "now has left", the enduring "familial spirit" of our human relationship has not gone anywhere. Some might call this awareness wishful thinking on my part, or a figment of my imagination; nevertheless, it is my experience that "a look/a gesture/ was all it took"... and *is* all it takes today for the identity (*who*) of George's living story to be alive and relevant for me, and possibly even for others who may later read this story. How is such relevance possible? Again I turn to Bergson to offer a key explanation for the lived experience of the "in-between" of personhood, depicted in both "No Explanations" and "Down to Earth". The phenomenon, according to Bergson, has to do with memory. For Bergson (and also for me, according to my experience of a living story) memory is more than a recollection of events of the past. Memory is the "intersection of mind and matter", a connection that is real, even intimate, he says (2005/1907, p. 13). For Arendt, and, also for me in my experience of a living story, the space "in-between" is no less real than the world of things we visibly have in common (1974, p. 209). I can attest to the "real" intimacy I know in my relationships with my brothers. One might say of my younger brother Keith that the intimacy is due to the fact that we were very close in person during the first years of my brother's lifetime, as recounted in "No Explanations"; but more surprising, I find, is the intimacy I experience in relationship with my "big brother George". As indicated in "Down to Earth" the "real" between us is especially noteworthy because the intimate connection did not emerge until the end of my brother's

lifetime when our worldly relationship was just about over, and everything was just about said and done between us. I acknowledge the poignant meaning of "at last" in the lines, "I took the liberty he gave me/at last/to love him/and he loved me back".

While scanning my living 'data' with the "I/eye" of my heart and seeing through the poetic cluster with the strong feelings of emotion generated by the narrative encounters, I gaze deeply into the experience of love I know in relation to my siblings. For the most part, as has been pointed out, the experience of love is not because my older siblings were "good" to me or even "nice" to me growing up; nor is it because they are "family". The only plausible explanation for love as it pertains to *who* I am in relationship with my siblings is offered by Arendt who says,

> For love, although it is one of the rarest occurrences in human lives, indeed possesses an *unequalled power of self-revelation* and an *unequalled clarity of vision for the disclosure of who* precisely because it is unconcerned to the point of total un-worldliness with *what* the loved person may be, with his qualities and shortcomings no less than with his achievements, failings, and transgressions. (1974, p. 242, emphasis added)

Here is a remarkable edification of identity (*who*) and an astounding revelation of the meaning of love for *who* is "identifiable" in a person that goes beyond the concept of "love" for *what* is "definable" *about* a person. From henceforth, to talk about *who* is to talk about love. And so it is that I begin to understand how the experience of *who* is intertwined in the love I feel in *telling* the tales of a living story. Arendt (1974) maintains that only love is fully receptive to *who* somebody is. The question *who* with regard to education thus becomes also a question of love. As educators, are we receptive to *who* our students are or do we see only *what* they have become? How does the quality of seeing affect the quality of relationship between teaching and learning and between teacher and student?

In an excerpt from "Bread Crumbs: Finding My Way in Poetry", Carl Leggo (2012) expresses his view of the vital threshold of the intimate relationship of in-between: "we stand in the still place/where the end is the beginning/and the beginning is the end" (p. 23). I liken my present work in process to Leggo's "bread crumbs": tidbits of insight and morsels of understanding

picked up in front of me as I proceed along the path in the woods, and then dropped one by one behind me to help me find my way home. To more closely examine the role of memory and belonging in finding my way home, I next turn to "Coming Full Circle". What constitutes home? Where is home? The question might be better phrased for the purposes of the present inquiry, "*Who* is home?"

> Where you are is who you are. The further inside you the place moves, the more your identity is intertwined with it. Never casual, the choice of place is the choice of something you crave. (Mayes, 1996, p. 28, as cited by Shira, 2012, p. 147)

I have been taken by surprise to learn, after several long, slow readings of the poetry cluster, how inextricably bound with place— the gardens, the flowers, the beach, the yacht club, the Johnson's Baby Powder, the green-and-white striped bedspread, and all the other familiar (and familial) objects of home— is identity (*who*). I am also surprised to see how inextricably bound in sisterhood is identity (*who*). The sense of the "familiar" and the sense of "family" are intricately tied to the sense of *who* I am and to where I am to an extent that I had not realized before. I begin to understand why my frequent return trips to Como (now known as Hudson) Quebec always feel to me like a kind of pilgrimage. I can feel *who* I am there. Even though much has changed since I lived in Como, I feel 'at home' in that place in a way I have rarely experienced elsewhere. Furthermore, other places where I may feel at home will inevitably contain objects, elements and essences of "home" as experienced in Como, Quebec and as expressed in "Coming Full Circle". I am also discovering through my work in process that the familiar place doesn't stop with a family residence in a bucolic village in rural Quebec. As the next tale will tell, my experience of belonging and "home" is much larger than can be housed in any particular location. Paradoxically, however, the expanded view of *who* still remains firmly rooted in the particular details and events experienced in a larger context of time and place.

The Screen Door

Click-Clack!

A special spring attached to the top of the screen door of the back porch allowed my brothers and sister and me as well as our dog to run in and out of the house at whim. No worry of flies or mosquitoes escaping the quick wham of the latch as the door swung open before us, and sprang shut behind us. In mid-summer, the screen would be covered with shad flies, their large lazy wings barely moving in the hot mid-day breeze.

Click-Clack! In and out we would go.

On the "out", we dashed eagerly into our world of natural wonders. Where would we go today? The pebble beach, the lakeside rocks, the apple orchards, the farmers' haylofts, the berry patches, the turtle pond, the sheep fields, the horse barns, the saw mill, the neighbours' vegetable gardens, the woods, or the winding roads and trails? Indeed, the choices were endless. In every nook and cranny of our out-the-back-door universe was a mystery to behold. What would it be today? Acorn pipes by the driveway; tadpoles and frogs hiding in the bull rushes; trilliums and dog-tooth violets by the bunches; an orange-and-black striped caterpillar inching its way across the hot grey pavement; tiny wild strawberries by the railroad tracks; rainbow-colored sweet peas climbing over the neighbour's fence; piles of sun-warmed sawdust from Mr. Hodgson's mill under our bare feet; ripples of the river around our soft-dipping oars, or crisp green beans snapped fresh from their vines? The variety held infinite promise.

On the "in" at the end of the day, tired and hungry, often soaking wet from having fallen into the pond or the lake, bedraggled and exhausted, we would wend our weary way home from the day's escapades.

Click-Clack! The screen door would announce our arrival one by one.

Kitchen aromas of slowly baked beans and freshly baked bread would greet our ravenous appetites. The sight of our mother in her apron preparing our supper was all we ever needed to know we were home.

"What are we having for dessert?" In her usual calm but firm manner, she would answer, "You'll have to wait and see."

Click-Clack! The memory and echo of childhood is but a heartbeat away.

How might intimate encounters and interactions with the natural world in childhood, or the absence thereof, affect an experience of *who*? What part does childhood play in the experience of *who* in adulthood? Why do recollections of childhood events often echo feelings of home?

De Saint-Exupéry, for example, referred to his childhood as his homeland (Des Vallières, 2003). What if memory of childhood were to evoke unpleasant, chaotic or traumatic recollections? How would such an experience of childhood echo in our memory then? How would that echo affect our experience of identity? To what degree does the way we "see" our childhood affect our memory of childhood; and, as a result, affect the sense of *who* we are in adulthood?

Why do siblings who grow up with the same childhood conditions by all outward appearances report a completely different take on the inward experience of those same outer conditions? My older siblings, for example, would, no doubt, find "The Screen Door" to be an idealistic view of our childhood—possibly even annoying to them would be my use of the inclusive pronoun "we". In fact, had my brother George read the above rendition that is "real" to me, he would likely have flown off the handle! For the most part, my brother refused to talk about our childhood, with the exception of one memory he held dear, that of playing hockey with his friends on the outdoor rink. While it is true that he was often sick with asthma and bronchitis as a child, I also remember George being happy while making and sailing an ice boat with his friends, or packing and riding a bobsled run. Why did my brother spend the best part of his school years "on the lam" or "in trouble" outside the principal's office? By contrast, why was I an "A" student who loved school? Are people born with a heart of darkness? Are people born with a sunny disposition? Does it matter which to identity (*who*)? Does it matter to the experience of identity? How would an education (drawing forth) of *who* alongside a schooling (indoctrinating) in *what* make a difference in a person's experience of identity and quality of life? Many questions requiring deft handling and open-minded consideration have been raised by "The Screen Door". These are sobering, heart-wrenching reflections that I didn't see coming. I will set these questions aside for a quieter contemplation. Perhaps in the discussion soon to follow, some of these issues may be addressed in a larger context. In the meantime, two more little tales need to be told to complete this segment of a living story inquiry, "Who's *who*?" The names of the characters in the following tales are fictitious.

The Doll's Pajamas

Helen Carson and I loved to play dolls. Immersed in our world of make-believe, we would spend hours on her veranda inventing games to satisfy our childish fantasies. Sitting amidst piles of tiny items of clothing strewn across the floor of the porch, we would dress, undress and change our dolls' clothes over and over again to suit whatever season or occasion we wished to imagine. Sometimes it was "going out for tea"; other times it was "getting ready for dinner" or "going for a walk". No matter what the special event or activity of the day, there was the constant banter of let's pretend to accompany the endless chatter of playing house.

One late afternoon it was time to get our dolls ready for bedtime. That day, I had brought with me my favourite doll, Angel. Rummaging through the communal pile of dolls' clothes in search of just the right outfit for "going to bed", I pulled out a pair of pink-and-white-striped cotton pajamas that I had not seen before. I put the pajamas on Angel and carefully buttoned up the tiny pearl buttons. The pajamas fit my doll perfectly! How I loved those pajamas! In fact, I loved them so much I couldn't bring myself to part with them at the end of the day. When it was time to go home, I sneaked the coveted pink-and-white-striped treasure into my doll's suitcase. At home in my bed that night, I didn't sleep well. I took the pajamas back the next morning.

In an earlier vignette, "Research in the Crib", an experience of "consciousness" in babyhood was presented for examination and discussion. Of interest in the above scenario is the experience of "conscience" as it is portrayed in a tale of early childhood. No adult was aware at the time of the "stolen" pajamas; therefore, no parental lesson was forthcoming on the ethics of right doing and wrong doing. As a small child, I knew the difference. Even though I couldn't resist the initial temptation, in the end, I *felt* my conscience and returned the stolen goods.

Conscience is described by Arendt (1971) as a dialogue one has with oneself. One has always to live with oneself and be "cross-examined" at the end of the day, she says. According to Arendt, with every thinking process, there is conscience, defined earlier as the ability to "know with and by myself" (p. 418). From the perspective of the investigation of *who*, conscience is seen as an integral aspect of identity (*who*) i.e. not some*thing* that needs to be "taught" through religion, ethics and/or schooling, but rather is an inherent aspect of identity (*who*) that may be "drawn forth" through education and expressed, as in this particular case, through a child's simple act of returning the coveted pilfered items to their rightful owner.

Given the evidence, found in a living story, that thinking, consciousness and conscience are integral aspects of *who* in babyhood and childhood, how might this awareness change the way in which we see children and youth? How might a premise of education to facilitate an open-ended "evolution in consciousness" as opposed to the present-day notion of schooling as preparation for adult life change the purpose of schooling? The next and last tale of Part I, "Who's *Who*?" offers another inside-out view of identity as experienced in early childhood.

The Jelly Beans

"I know you stole the jelly beans." Mr. Lancaster glared down at me through his thin-rimmed glasses and over his thick round belly. His calm, self-righteous, self-assured demeanor made his absolute conviction of my five-year-old guilt even more frightening than any bogey man or creepy monster I could have conjured up. I stood frozen in front of the large glass display case that held the Como Corner Store's chocolate bars, B-B-bats, licorice sticks, jujubes, lollipops, toffees and ... jelly beans. Barely able to open my mouth, I stared back at him in utter disbelief.

"No, I didn't," I muttered at last.

"Yes, you did. I know you did," he said.

"No, I didn't," I said.

"Yes, you did. A little birdie told me." Mr. Lancaster loomed his holier-than-thou-owner-of-the-corner-store-and-judge-of-the-stolen-jelly-beans Supreme Self all over me.

"No, I didn't," was the only defence I could manage as I slid shamefully out the door.

Alone, with no adult in sight to help me out of a bizarre and very disturbing predicament, I remember the incident as if it happened yesterday. What keeps the incident "fresh" in my memory—memory being the "intersection between mind and matter" (Bergson (2005/1908, p. 13)—are the strong feelings and emotion that this incident evokes. Intuitively I knew (felt) that what was happening that day in the Como Corner Store didn't make sense. Intuitively I knew

(felt) that Mr. Lancaster's towering know-it-all "authority" was misaligned. Intuitively I knew (felt) that, as a small child, there was nothing I could do to convince Mr. Lancaster otherwise since his mind had been firmly made up. Although bewildered by the perplexing situation, I was nonetheless able to know (feel) my way through the trauma by reason of feelings connected to a strong sense of my own unwavering, unassailable "unchangeable identity" (Arendt, 1974), namely personhood, and in this case, childhood (*who*).

Given the importance of feelings in my ability to reason as a five-year-old in the face of a towering misaligned 'adult authority', how might the emphasis on the development of cognition (with little or no interest in the development of intuition) in modern schooling contribute to the loss of the power of intuition, and the consequent loss of the feeling connectors to personhood (*who*) in adulthood?

A child being accused of something she didn't do may seem of little significance to the dispassionate intellectual observation of an adult; however, to a five-year-old, such an accusation is a life-threatening event. Not only was *who* of childhood being falsely accused of stealing the jelly beans, there was worse: *who* of childhood was being affronted with the shocking spectre of indifference. (Does Mr. Lancaster not know *who* I am?) It is this "indifferent and alienating effect of ... name-calling that accounts for much of its (often) hurtful or violent impact" (Cavarero, 2000; introduction by Kottman, p. xix).

> Indeed, one may well imagine oneself in ways that are quite to the contrary of how one is socially constituted; one may as it were, meet that socially constituted self by surprise, with alarm or pleasure, or even shock. And such an encounter underscores the way in which the name wields a linguistic power of constitution *in ways that are indifferent to the one who bears the name.* (Butler, 1997, p. 31 as cited by Kottman in Introduction to Cavarero, 2000, p. xix, emphasis in original text)

In how many ways is childhood assaulted by name-calling (*what*) that does not correspond with identity (*who*)? How many times is *who* disregarded, discounted, or "erased" (Hall, 1996) in complete ignorance of the existent presence of identity? As an example of the human tragedy of indifference, Adriana Cavarero (2000) cites the tragedy of *Romeo and Juliet* ... the pain, even

the death, that name-calling carries with it. “The name carries death for the one who bears it, because the name has no regard for the life of its bearer: it is destined to survive that life, and thus announces its death” (Cavarero, 2000; Introduction by Kottman, p. xxiii).

The person *who* stood her ground at the candy display case is the same person *who* sur/vived to tell the tale and contemplate the meaning of the event today. In my experience, there is no disconnection in time or in memory. In other words, I do not “identify” with the “name” of that story, but with the “life” of that story. “By a name/I know not how to tell thee who I am” (*Romeo and Juliet*, as cited by Kottman in Translator’s Introduction to Cavarero, 2000, p. vii). What implications might this lived experience of *who* in childhood hold for education? What part do feelings and emotions play in the experience of “real” identity? Even though innocent of the accused misdeed, why did I experience the “shame” of the misnomer as indicated in the line “I slid shamefully out the door”? In broader terms, how might practices of socialization, colonization and assimilation alienate children from *who* they are; and, consequently, block off, or circumvent, access to an experience of life as *who*, the unassailable, unchangeable identity of the person (Arendt, 1974)?

As a result of schooling’s concerted self-making efforts, as exemplified earlier in “the construction of identity” of the Quebec Education Plan (QEP), how are children and youth left bereft and on their own to mourn the “loss” of their identity (*who*) without understanding the reason for their despair? I can think of no more poignant an articulation of the *malaise* of such an ‘unidentified’ loss than the heart-wrenching sorrow expressed by the nineteenth century French poet Paul Verlaine.

Il pleure dans mon coeur

Il pleure dans mon coeur
Comme il pleut sur la ville
Quelle est cette langueur
Qui pénètre mon coeur?

Paul Verlaine (1844-1896)

How does pedagogy deal with conscious and/or unconscious grieving over the loss of identity (*who*)? How might pedagogy facilitate the eventual retrieval of lost identity (*who*)? The critical questions hearken back to the statement by Jacques Quintin (2011) in *La souffrance à l'école: un malaise éthique*, "To reflect on the meaning and purpose of school is to try (*tenter*) to understand "*qui nous sommes vraiment*" (*who* we are really) (p. 120). [My translation] A discussion of the means by which education may "retrieve" a lost *who* from *un malaise éthique* will be resumed in Chapter XII, "Contributions to Education". But first, there are more tales to be told and there is more thinking to be done.

Chapter IX

Telling Tales out of School

Part II: What Happens to *Who*?

The previous tales (Chapter VIII) have provided a living context for recognizing distinct aspects of the presence of *who* in babyhood and in early childhood. Grounded in a lived experience, a basic premise for knowing *who* as "the unchangeable identity of the person" (Arendt, 1974, p. 193) has been forwarded. Inadvertently, the tales have generated several questions with regard to the potential role of education in the retrieval of a 'lost' *who* from a 'tragic' *what*. Notwithstanding the similarities in the way the stories are narrated in Parts I and II, there is a notable difference in the quality and quantity of the ensuing reflections in the tales to follow. The difference is in the intensity of interpretation. Because the tales in Part II are being considered in response to a different question, namely "What Happens to *Who*?" there is a consequential difference in orientation and response. In a determined attempt to understand what happens to *who*, the critical analyses in Chapter IX tend to delve more deeply into the theoretical complexities and lived-experience perplexities of the unfathomable, nonetheless identifiable, *who*. As in Chapter VII, the names of the characters in the tales to follow are fictitious, and the names of the places and institutions have been changed.

The Inspection

With over twenty years' experience as first-grade teacher at Harrington High School, Mrs. Brown was known in the community for her no-nonsense approach to discipline. She would take charge of her squadron of six-year-olds from the moment we stepped off the bus in the morning to the moment we climbed back onto the bus at the end of the day. On this particular morning after recess, as custom would have it, we lined up outside in the schoolyard before

entering the building via the back door. We trooped single-file along the main corridor towards Room 4, our current Home Room and Harrington High's primary school classroom since 1919.

"Time for Inspection," snapped Mrs. Brown. Still chattering excitedly over an invigorating game of tag played at recess, we quickly dropped our boisterous enthusiasm and fell deadly silent at our teacher's pronouncement. With all of our attention brought to focus by Mrs. Brown's crack-of the-whip command, we forward-marched lively and smartly into the classroom like little toy soldiers on parade. We stopped and stood erect in the neatly straightened rows between our desks. At the anticipated signal—a slight nod of our teacher's head—we broke rank and scurried obediently into our seats. We knew the routine: sit up straight; put your hands on your desks; spread out your fingers; display your fingernails; wait your turn. Mrs. Brown's stern voice, hands-on-hips posture, and dagger-like stare over the tops of her dark-rimmed glasses didn't faze us one bit. We were used to the harsh demeanour of our first-grade teacher.

Because I was tall for my age, my desk was the last in its row which was second from the cloakroom door, at the back of the room. Along with the other children, I sat quietly in my seat and waited my turn. I gazed proudly at my fingernails. They were short and clean. "Just as they should be," I thought.

"What's this I see?" Mrs. Brown stood towering beside my desk and was staring down at my hands in a disapproving manner, her anger targeting my fingernails. I could tell by the way my entire body shook at the sound of her voice that Mrs. Brown wasn't just mad; she was furious!

"That is *dirt*!" she roared, pointing at an invisible-to-me speck of left-over-from-tag-at-recess schoolyard sand under my right-hand middle fingernail.

Dumbfounded, I sat upright in my seat. Before I had a chance to respond that I didn't see any dirt, and that there couldn't possibly be any dirt because I had thoroughly scrubbed my nails before going to bed the night before, Mrs. Brown grabbed me by my right arm, lifted me from my seat, and pushed me through the classroom doorway and into the cloakroom. She opened the door of the broom closet and shoved me in. From the blackness inside the closet, I heard the key turn and the door lock. The pungent smell of Javex Bleach and Old Dutch Cleanser soon overcame my initial sense of shock and bewilderment.

Through the thickness of the broom closet door, I could hear the hushed liveliness of the classroom. I found comfort in the subdued humming of the voices of my classmates and the soft shuffling of their feet under their desks and in the aisles. I happily recognized the whirring noise made by the pencil sharpener. I sat down on the floor beside the large metal wash bucket and listened intently to the soothing effect of familiar classroom sounds.

Before long, Mrs. Brown announced to the class that there would be a movie in the gym. I could discern the subdued excitement of my classmates as they quietly filed out of the room, row by row, leaving behind nothing but empty silence. The classroom door closed behind them.

"What about me?" "Did Mrs. Brown forget about me?" I rose from where I was seated on the floor beside the wash bucket, and stood up straight in the pitch black. "What about me?" "Did Mrs. Brown forget about me?" I listened and waited.

After a time that seemed eternal, the classroom door finally opened and my classmates filed back into the room. I could visualize each one as they scraped the legs of their chairs on the floor and shuffled into their seats. I could hear their barely audible breath as they whispered to one another. The key of the lock on the closet door turned. The door opened. Squinting to adjust my eyes to the daylight coming in through the cloakroom window on the opposite wall, I looked up to see Mrs. Brown's stern silhouette standing in the frame of the open doorway.

"It's lunchtime. Class dismissed."

What can be learned about personhood and education and the meaning of life from this tale? The memory is as vivid today as the day when the incident occurred many years ago. Why was I not in a panic or even slightly frightened by my teacher's wrath and unreasonable execution of unfair punishment—solitary confinement—over a perceived wrongdoing that amounted, in reality, to no more than a speck of sand? Why did I not kick and scream and bang on the door? Why did I not even tell my parents or report to the principal what had happened? Any insights pertaining to the above questions, it would seem, would have to include a broad and generous consideration of the context of the times as the main contributor to the content of the event.

This was post WW II. The importance of military training and the reliance on absolute obedience to external command for a sense of national and personal safety exerted an obvious influence on the way school classrooms were run in those days. Uniforms; inspections; orderliness; central authority; rules and regulations; rank-and-file discipline; obedience; and punishment were part and parcel of most "effective" wartime institutional endeavours, including those of schooling. Children were to be seen, not heard. A child growing up in such a social context had to learn very quickly to adapt to the "way it is". Most importantly, at least from the perspective of the present inquiry on personhood and education, a child growing up in an environment where the notion of unthinking obedience to external adult command was entrenched was inadvertently, as well as intentionally, being "socialized", and/or—at the extreme end of socialization— "assimilated" into becoming a "product" of the times: in this

case, a product that was designed, “for its own good”, to be “good”, i.e. unthinking, obedient, docile, taciturn ... and “lost” as far as any possibility for affirmation and expression of the creative power of personhood (*who*) was concerned.

Most significant to the development of the present thesis, however, to which further and deeper examination of this tale will attest, personhood was not altogether “lost” in this incident, at least not in the way that outer appearances might suggest. In generalized terms, especially as seen within the long view of retrospect, the degree to which the military context of post WW II highlights the influence exerted by the social milieu on the lived experience of childhood and personhood is obvious. It would also seem plausible, and even probable from the point of view of the powerful influence of socialization, that the teacher herself had become “lost” in *what* she perceived to be her “teacher identity”. In other words, the teacher had become identified with her “constructed self”—a “strict teacher” *persona* akin to that of a commanding officer in the army—and had seemingly lost touch with *who* she *really* was as a person. (I surmise that no person in touch with *who* she *really* is would behave under any circumstances in such a manner towards a child placed in her care.) The teacher’s actions may be rationalized by some as having been “shaped” by the social context of post WW II; however, from an ethical or moral standpoint, there can be no *real* reason to justify the teacher’s behaviour towards a pupil in her charge ... except for the possibility that the teacher didn’t know *who* she *really* was, and as a result, didn’t think *what* she was *really* doing. “Or, did she?” one might reasonably ask. From the perspective of this thesis, the question of self-judgment is an important one; but one that only the person in question can answer. Kant’s perspective on self-judgment, as cited by Arendt in *Responsibility and Judgment,* is insightful and helpful to our present investigation: “Moral conduct ... seems to depend primarily upon the intercourse of man with himself” (as cited by Arendt, 2003, p. 67). Kant’s perspective on morality and self-judgment, “Know thyself”, is consistent with Socrates description of conscience, as cited earlier in Chapter II, a “dialogue one has with oneself”, the “two-in-one”: “I am I” (1974, p. 418).

Quite apart from the teacher’s actions as related in the above tale, a possibility that is more subtle and, therefore not so readily discernible shines brightly through the series of events: the

seemingly innate ability of the child to remain calmly and confidently in touch with *who* she *really* is despite the extreme shock to her integrity of the external circumstances being harshly and unfairly inflicted upon her. Thus, the question of greatest significance arising from this particular tale becomes critically aligned with the question at the heart of the dissertation: Who am I, *really*? An adjunct to the central question, the question, "What happens to *who*?" now runs a critical parallel course alongside that of the main question.

Was there mere "unthinking" obedience on the part of the child to the externally imposed harsh treatment at the hand of an adult in a position of authority; or is there instead (or perhaps in tandem) strong evidence of the unique presence of the innate intelligence of personhood in childhood *who* was naturally inclined to pay closer attention to the signs and sounds of life coming from the other children in the classroom than to the deadening sounds of misplaced authority, unreasonable anger and wrongful deeds on the part of a teacher playing out *what* she conceived to be the requirements of the role of her "constructed self"? As was emphasized in an earlier citation of the work of Henri Bergson (1998/1907), "attention to life" is the hallmark of personhood (*who*). What I have learned from an examination of the above tale is that whether or not human beings in their *be*-coming, i.e. in their developing into maturity or in their stifling into immaturity within an inevitably influential (powerful) social context of one form or another, will depend on the direction to which their attention is paid. To *whom* (life) or to *what* (matter, i.e. deadening concepts *about* life) is the question?

Up until the act of telling and exploring the above tale, I had not realized the extent of the significance of "attention" in education and the evolution of consciousness, at least not in the specific way in which Bergson has described. I appreciate more deeply the meaningfulness of Bergson's difference in "kind" between *intuition* and *intellecte*; intuition moving in the direction of life, and *intellecte* moving in the opposite direction toward matter. This is a critical insight for my inquiry that I have gleaned from the above tale. From the perspective of educating (drawing forth) personhood (*who*) in childhood, there can be no insight more crucial than that of "attention to life", a factor to be taken seriously into account when providing the context (emotional, psychological and physical environment) and content (curriculum) of education.

"Pay attention!" we say. To *what* and/or to *whom* do we require children to pay their utmost attention? The 'happy ending' of the above tale is that the child's awareness of the integrity of *who* she *really* is (life) had not yet been "lost" in *what* (matter) she was perceived by her elders to be: a 'product' of the society that surrounded her to be trained in the ways of the world and shaped by the agent of society in order that she be adequately "prepared" for a future "adult life" (Winch, 1999).

All Aboard for Guinea Pig Town

We knew instinctively there was something strange or 'not right' about Clarissa's behaviour. For a reason we could not understand, she would invariably find a way to sneak into the cloakroom and steal our lunches, or parts of our lunches, from our cubby holes. Each day one of us would discover something missing from our lunch bag; and each day we would report the stolen apple, peanut butter sandwich or piece of maple fudge to the teacher. It wasn't long before Clarissa was caught in the act. From that moment on, her life at school became a living hell.

The worst was at recess. The taunts were merciless. An otherwise normal group of eight-year-olds had turned into a pack of vicious curs on a single-minded mission: attack, kill and devour one of our own. "Guinea Pig" was the name thrown repeatedly and with increasing intensity at our chosen victim. On the merry-go-round, the relatively innocuous teasing of the verbal slurs turned into downright cruelty as the outburst of repetitive chants grew louder and louder in a horrible unwavering chorus: "All aboard for guinea pig town/All aboard for guinea pig town".

When I felt sure that no one would see us, or hear us, I took Clarissa aside to let her know that I didn't *really* mean it, that I wasn't *really* one of them. "I'm sorry," I said. "I want you to know that you are not alone; but I can't let them know that I am your friend."

The elementary school yard at Harrington High School, like most school yards all over the world, held equal potential for happiness—a sense of well being and belonging to the in-group; or unhappiness—a sense of isolation and rejection from the popular community. In the above tale, Clarissa was being deliberately and systematically ostracized by a peer group of eight-year-olds bent on seeking revenge as a direct consequence of her stealing from our lunch bags. Whether or not Clarissa was able to survive the onslaught, I'll never know; but the impact of the

event has left me wondering to this day about what happens to *who* in situations that incite otherwise kind, sensitive and sensible children to participate in (or stand by and do nothing about) a collective attack on a seemingly defenceless and vulnerable peer.

With the hope of gleaning some tiny fragment of insight with respect to the complex phenomenon portrayed in a tale of children ganging up on a classmate, I will examine what I remember about my role in the incident. What is at stake in my investigation is the alarming, at least by all appearances, "loss" of conscience on my part that would allow such infliction of emotional and psychological pain on another to occur. Whatever happened to the strong sense of right and wrong that was not only felt and known intuitively, but promptly acted upon, for example, in the earlier tale of the four-year-old child returning the "stolen" doll's pajamas?

I was there. I know what I saw, what I heard, and what I felt. I also know what I did and what I did not do. So indelible was the impact of this incident on my consciousness, I can hear to this day the merry-go-round chant being played over and over in my head, "All aboard for guinea pig town/All aboard for guinea pig town". I don't remember joining in the chorus; but I do remember being on the merry-go-round with those who were chanting the insults, thereby making me a willing participant. The other strange thing that I remember about my part in the event was that I spoke to Clarissa "on the side". Making sure that no one else could see me talking to her, I remember letting Clarissa know that I was sorry about what was happening to her. I wanted her to know she wasn't alone, even though I couldn't do anything about it. Again, I ask, why didn't I do more? Why didn't I report the incident to the teachers on yard duty? Why didn't I tell my parents? Why didn't I try to stop the cruelty myself? If I was truly sorry, which I was, and if I knew the bullying was wrong, which I did, why did I just let it happen? There is perhaps more to be seen than meets the eye.

The point of the tale is that, as an eight-year-old, I was self-aware: I knew *who* I was *really*. As self-righteous as it may seem to proffer the following insight, I think in retrospect that there was wisdom—or at least a strong sense of the fitness of things—that prompted me, as a child, to act (or not act) in the way I did. Given the social context of the peer group, to "tattle tale" to the teachers would be unfitting; given the social context of the peer group and my place in it, to

have taken it upon myself to "moralize" to the others would also have been unfitting. However, to have acted freely on my own account in an effort to alleviate some of the pain for Clarissa, even though I was only one person, seems to have been a simple, yet possibly powerful (only Clarissa could attest to the effect of my action and/or lack of action) gesture of personhood (*who*) despite all appearances to the contrary. And, who knows? Perhaps others in the group may have acted in a similar manner unbeknownst to the rest of us.

A Defining Moment

"Are you Jewish?" This was the first question put to me by a gaggle of curious Grade 6 girls that swooped in and surrounded me during my first day of recess at my new school in Montreal, Quebec. It was a Monday morning following the first heavy snowstorm of the season, November 26th, to be exact. Having just moved into town from a small village in rural Quebec that weekend, I had not heard the word "Jewish" before. I was familiar with "French" and "English" and even "Yugoslavian" due to the bilingual community in which I had grown up, and thanks to the twin sisters with the intriguing double-looped braids, Frida and Astrida, who had joined our class and community earlier that year. But "Jewish" was an enigma to me. Picking up on the seriousness of the tone with which the question was being presented, however, I knew in no uncertain terms that my answer would hold the key to determining where, and with whom, I would belong and/or not belong at my new school.

"I don't know," I replied. "I'll go home and ask my mother."

When I returned to school after discussing the matter with my mother at lunchtime, I was fully prepared to give my answer. I felt confident in my new knowledge. As I climbed over a high hard-packed snow bank near the entrance to the fenced-in playground, I could see in the distance a group of my new classmates huddled together in the far corner of the yard reserved for 'seniors'. They flocked towards me in a flurry of excitement. I could tell that they had been eagerly awaiting my return; but more importantly, they were anticipating my answer.

"No," I said. "I am not Jewish. I am Christian; Protestant and Anglican." As if to underscore the defining moment, the bell rang. Together we entered the building through the side door marked GIRLS; but I knew from that moment on that things would be different between us.

When Fannie stood up to answer a question in French class that afternoon, I couldn't take my eyes off her so-called "Jewishness". Prompted by the little information I had gathered over lunch, I was determined to understand in what ways Fannie's way of being was different from my way of being. I examined her features and mannerisms looking for historical clues. I became

taken up with the fascinating 'reality' of difference. Such an idea—that we were not the same; that we were different—seemed very sophisticated to me. I began to make a point of discerning and categorizing the differences in my classmates, not in a judgmental way, but simply out of curiosity and interest.

We got along well together in our Grade 6 all-girls class — we even attended each others' birthday parties—but, we didn't ever *really* 'mix' together at recess or out of school. We knew we were different, that's all.

The tale of a school girl's awakening to the social significance of cultural and religious difference has brought to light for me an awareness of the role of differentiation in the educating process. Through an abrupt change in my circumstances, I was brought to the startling realization of the importance of cultural and religious difference in the determination of my place in the world. "No, I am not Jewish" meant that I was no longer 'one' with a large number of my classmates, nor was I 'one' with many other people I knew. I had learned *what* it was to be different.

Far from being shocked by the experience, I acquired a new taste for differentiation, or what I would now call urban sophistication. With hindsight I can easily see that up until the transition from country living to city living, I had belonged to a bilingual rural community where cultural and religious differences, although existent (mainly French/English; Catholic/Protestant), were much less pronounced and bore much less weight in terms of separation and division in the village community than were the counterparts of urban culture and civilization I encountered for the first time (mainly Christian/Jewish). My newly discovered 'reality'— that I belonged to a particular cultural and religious group; and, that I didn't belong to a different cultural and religious group—turned out to be my first formal and conscious act of assuming an identity with a 'part' of the world—by definition a *what*—in contrast to the previously held informal and intuitive assumption of identity with the 'whole' world, namely *who*. Thus the difference between "I am not Jewish; I am Christian" and "I am *who* I am" became for me the first significant experience (now documented) of a separate identity (a *what*) as distinct from the interconnected identity of my childhood (*who*). From the above tale of differentiation and identification emerges a simple and straight-forward insight with respect to the question, "What happens to *who*?" Simply put, *what* happens to *who*.

But the story doesn't end there. It is a more complicated tale than the initial glimpse of the above insight might suggest. The lessons learned from a narrowed-down version of my identity with the consequential perception of a reduced (particularized) place in the world involve, strangely enough, lessons learned from a simultaneous awakening to an awareness of a larger, more 'sophisticated' internal space. Admittedly, this is a peculiar trade-off that will be very difficult to explain. In an attempt to convey the complex phenomenon of a simultaneous awakening to a) the differentiation of a particular identity (a *what*) with the accompanying loss of *who* and b) the enlargement of a sense of internal space, with the accompanying loss of external space, I use the analogy of a telescope. The lens of a telescope becomes larger to encompass a more generalized view of the whole picture; and the lens becomes smaller in order to focus on diverse aspects, or particular characteristics, of the whole picture.

Bergson articulates the experience I describe as follows: "... our psychic life may be lived at different heights, now nearer to action, now further removed from it, according to the degree of our *attention to life*" (2005, p. 14, emphasis in original). I can feel the physical and emotional effects of zooming in and zooming out in which I try to describe the dramatic shift in spatial awareness that occurred synchronically with the shift in consciousness that took place when I moved from a place of being *who* I am to a place of being defined by *what* I am.

Although different in orientation and texture from the other tales—the following passage is a more outwardly-contrived rendition of an event than an inwardly-derived 'living story'—the account is an attempt at best to describe and understand a puzzling phenomenon. The change in consciousness that I try to convey in words came about as a result of a geographical shift from rural setting to urban setting. What might be the symbolic significance of such a transition from country living to city living within the context of an inquiry on identity, creativity, education and meaning?

Of Spaces and Places

The urban landscape had closed in around me. During the first days and weeks of walking to and from my new school, I felt stifled by the towering massive brick and stone structures of urban architecture. The open sky I once knew intimately as a vital aspect of *who* I was could now barely be seen peeking out intermittently from narrow passageways, or making elusive appearances now and then above ornate dormers and embellished rooftops. I found the close proximity of the neighbourhood houses oppressive. I desperately missed my 'real' home in the country. As time went on, and as nostalgia took firm hold, the small front and back yards of the neighbourhood properties compared more and more unfavourably to the vast playgrounds (and skies) of apple orchards, flower beds and vegetable gardens; lake vistas, pebble and sand beaches; turtle pond, woods, meadows and fields of my former habitat. No amount of 'green space'; no high quality of landscaping would do. In fact, none of the oft-touted public spaces and communal facilities offered by the municipality's Parks and Recreation department could appease my longing for the 'natural' world.

Ironically, out of such a negative start in my new environment—a diminished experience of connection to the sky and land with the resultant loss of the feeling of *who* I was— developed an unexpected positive outcome. The urban life that once seemed over-bearing by reason of its external density began to turn into a place of internal intensity that shed a positive light on the formerly negative space. This strange turn of events can be likened to the turn of the telescope lens mentioned earlier. Zooming in on the particulars of differentiation and identification (*what*), I felt the squeezing out of the interconnectedness of personhood (*who*). Despite the distinct feeling of being 'lost' in my new urban surroundings, I also remember the distinct feeling of being unusually wide-awake in my new setting. I began to notice an inner excitement and a heightened sense of purpose in my walks to and from school. In short, I began to feel 'sophisticated'. Writing as an adult on behalf of my then twelve-year-old self, I can best describe the phenomenon as an awakening to a different 'reality' in which outer spaciousness was slowly but surely being gathered up and transformed into expanded inner awareness.

In *Matter and Memory*, Bergson describes the strange inverse expansion in reverse: "That which is usually held to be a greater complexity of the psychical state appears ... to be a greater dilation of the whole personality, which, normally narrowed down by action, expands with the unscrewing of the vice in which it has allowed itself to be squeezed, and, always, whole and undivided, spreads itself over a wider and wider surface" (2005, p. 14). Based on my experience described in the essay "Of Spaces and Places", inverse and reverse are dynamic simultaneous occurrences, not separate chronological events. The inherent implications for the question at the center of Part II of "Telling Tales out of School", "What happens to *who*?" are subtle and

powerful and will be addressed forthwith. But first, an exploration of the possible factors involved in the strange alchemy seems in order.

Most likely a combination of factors conspired to affect the dramatic outside-in, inside-out exchange. For one thing, there must have been a considerable influence exerted by the much larger interior of my city home with its high ceilings, long hallways and winding stairways compared to the cozy interior of the 19th century clapboard cottage I inhabited in the country. Other contributing factors may have been the larger-by-far elementary school building with its echoing halls and vast corridors and the much larger class sizes and the generously funded, forward-leaning educational programmes and learning facilities provided by the municipal school board. A diverse urban population compared to the rural community "family" I once knew may also have played a catalytic role for the unexpected twists and turns. Whatever the factors, or combination of factors, it seems clear that gain and loss go hand in hand in the dynamic process of education (both formal and informal), and in the rigorous internal negotiation one has with oneself in the cultivation and development of wisdom.

Returning to the matter of implications *à propos* the gain and loss experienced in the transition from childhood to young adulthood—symbolized in the above tales as a move from country living to city living—the Penguin Canadian Dictionary defines the verb "sophisticate" as follows: "make experienced or cultured by shedding one's natural simplicity" (1990, p. 702). Looking back on "Telling Tales out of School" Part I, it is easy to see that the 'natural simplicity' of childhood has been consistently portrayed in the tales about a child's intuitive intelligence, innate sense of consciousness and conscience, and feelings of interconnectedness with the invisible spiritual world as well as identifying with the visible material world. The preliminary tales of Part II of "Telling Tales out of School" suggest that naiveté, although appropriate in childhood, and possibly even necessary in the laying of a foundation for conscious evolution, is being 'shed' in favour of sophistication. The implication that narrowing down one's view of the world allows for a sharper (more objective) focus is subtle and powerful. It may reasonably be stated from the implication that differentiation and division are prerequisites for objectivity; and that objectivity is necessary for perceiving and/or defining the diverse and the particular in

the world. Both exercises are thereby seen as positive developments in the educational process; however—and here is the crux of the matter—division and differentiation involve an apparent loss of subjectivity (in this I mean *who*, the subjective "I/dentity, not *what*, the objective "i/dentity"); and subjectivity is necessary for experiencing, perceiving and expressing the wholeness of personhood (*who*). From this perspective, subjectivity and objectivity are seen as two different versions of the same 'reality'. Bergson asks: "How is it that the same images can belong at the same time to two different systems ... (1998, p. 25)? The question holds significant implications for education. Can the gain of objectivity (*what*) be reconciled with the loss of subjectivity (*who*), and *vice versa*, in the educating process?

McGilchrist asks a similar question: "How do we understand the world if there are different versions of it to reconcile" (2009, p. 5)? The problem, according to neuropsychologist McGilchrist, is not that there are different versions, but that

> we [in the Western world] are obsessed, because of what I argue is our affiliation to left-hemisphere modes of thought, with *what* the brain does—after all isn't the brain a machine, and like any machine, the value of it lies in *what it does*? ... The difference I shall argue is not in the 'what' but in the 'how'—by which I don't mean 'the means by which' (machine model again) but the 'manner in which,' something no one ever asked of a machine. I am not interested purely in 'functions' but in ways of being, something only living things can have. (2009, p. 3; emphasis in original)

McGilchrist brings to life the two hemispheres of the divided brain by telling a story about the Master (right hemisphere) and his Emissary (left hemisphere), a story McGilchrist attributes to Nietzsche. Following is an abridged and adapted version of the story:

> The master was the ruler of a small but prosperous domain. He was known for his selfless devotion to his people. As his people flourished and grew in number, the bounds of his domain began to spread. In order to keep his rightful distance while taking care of the matters that needed closer attention, the master nurtured and trained his emissaries in order that they could be trusted with the tasks at hand. Eventually, the cleverest and most ambitious vizier used his position to advance his own wealth and position. He saw his master's temperance and forbearance as weakness, not wisdom. He adopted his master's mantle as his own. And so it came about that the master's role was usurped. He was betrayed by his emissary. (2009, p. 14)

Similar to the above story, the tale "A Defining Moment" gives an account of two different versions of reality. One version, the former world of *who*, is portrayed as an interconnected, interdependent 'whole' requiring 'rightful distance' for perspective; and the other version, a world of *what*, is portrayed as a world divided into differentiated 'parts' requiring 'closer attention' to the tasks at hand. The gain of sophistication (*what*) and the loss of 'natural simplicity' (*who*) are seen, from the perspective of the present thesis, as events that occur simultaneously in the maturing process. In other words, the two different aspects (*who* and *what*) are portrayed as interchangeable, interdependent partners (not enemies) in the same dynamic equation, thus demonstrating an open-ended possibility for reconciliation by way of education. McGilchrist, on the other hand, although hopeful that the two versions of reality will eventually be reconciled, sees the present-day Western world dominated by left-hemisphere modes of thought as a 'betrayal' of the right hemisphere's trust. "An increasingly mechanistic, fragmented, decontextualised world, marked by unwarranted optimism mixed with paranoia and a feeling of emptiness has come about, reflecting, I believe, the unopposed action of a dysfunctional left hemisphere," says McGilchrist of the present-day situation (2009, p. 6). By way of contrast, in the follow-up to the essay "Of Places and Spaces", it is not so much a betrayal of trust and a usurpation of *who* (by *what*) that is being portrayed as it is a momentary blinding, and potentially overwhelming, fascination with differentiation and sophistication. Here is found the hopefully warranted optimism of the present dissertation for the reconciliation between two different versions of reality within the ongoing process of education. ("Ongoing" is a key word in the dynamic educational process I portray.) Both versions work together in the above essay as integral aspects of the same process, seen here as complementary 'turns' that happen to occur simultaneously at a critical 'turning point' in the evolution of consciousness.

The subtle difference between McGilchrist's story (attributed by McGilchrist to Neitzche) and the narrative essay's perspectives is significant to the present thesis. From an "educational *connoisseur*'s" (Eisner, 1991) viewpoint, I discern, in school reform parlance, 'a window of opportunity', albeit a small and fleeting one. Fascination with the separate and the particular, if/when left unbridled or, possibly, arrested, could/would lead to the eventual usurpation and

betrayal of *who*—a modern-day phenomenon described by McGilchrist above—not the adolescent momentary turn of the head (or the turn of the figurative telescope lens) that is being suggested in "Of Spaces and Places". In other words, *who* is not being portrayed as completely 'lost' ... only momentarily 'addled' by the ongoing process of 'turning' in the cycles of education (from the Latin, *educare*, to draw forth from within) and schooling (to indoctrinate from without). The 'window of opportunity' mentioned above suggests the possibility for a [w]holistic (reconciled) view of subjectivity and objectivity and of education and schooling: "Every image is within certain images and without others; but of the aggregate images we cannot say that it is within us or without us, since interiority and exteriority are only relations among images" (Bergson, 2005, p. 25). The 'window of opportunity', according to the above tales, occurs at a particular point in the cycles of time.

As it turns out, the "defining moment" in "A Defining Moment" happens to be the pivotal year between the ages of twelve and thirteen. Significantly, the defining moment in modern-day schooling happens to be the year of transition from elementary school to high school, a time in which there is a major shift in focus with regard to the context and *curricula* of schooling. The transition between elementary school and high school, like the transition between country living and city living portrayed in "A Defining Moment" and "Of Spaces and Places", is seen as a critical moment to be seized by educators *who* understand that two different versions of reality can be reconciled within the ongoing educating process. As it turns out, the defining moment turns in ... to a moment of ultimate choice: "At its simplest ... [the choice would be between] a world where there is 'betweenness' and one where there is not" (McGilchrist, 2009; p. 31).

Parallel Thinking on Reconciliation

As McGilchrist insists with regard to 'right-hemisphere' and 'left hemisphere', and as the present thesis argues with respect to *who* and *what*, "[t]hese are not different ways of *thinking about* the world; they are different ways of *being in* the world. And their difference is not symmetrical, but fundamentally, asymmetrical" (p. 31; emphasis in original text). In reflecting on the question "What happens to *who*?" from McGilchrist's perspective, I see an important

parallel between McGilchrist's story about the divided brain in *The Master and his Emissary* and Henri Bergson's (1998/1907) theory about *intuition* and *intellecte* in *Creative Evolution*. Although Bergson uses a different terminology, he sees the problem of reconciliation between opposites in much the same way as does McGilchrist ... not as a problem of opposites, per se, but as a problem of our (Western world's) perception of the *nature* of opposites. For Bergson, "[i]n reality, intelligence and instinct accompany each other only because they are complementary, and they are complementary because they are different; what is instinctive in instinct being opposite to what is intelligent in intelligence" (1998 c. 1907; p. 136). For Bergson, intelligence and instinct represent two divergent solutions to one and the same problem. They are different in "kind" not in intensity; one moving in the very direction of life and the other moving in the inverse direction towards matter. McGilchrist tells a strikingly similar version of the story about how and why the brain is divided into left and right hemispheres:

> In the one [right hemisphere], we –*experience*—the live, complex, embodied world of individual, always unique beings, forever in flux, a net of interdependencies, forming and reforming wholes, a world with which we are deeply connected. In the other [left hemisphere] we 'experience' our experience in a special way: a re-presented version of it, containing now static, separable, bounded, but essentially fragmented entities, grouped into classes, on which predictions can be based. This kind of attention isolates, fixes and makes each thing explicit by bringing it under the spotlight of attention. In doing so it renders things inert, mechanical, lifeless. But it also enables us for the first time to know, and consequently to learn and to make things. This gives us power. (p. 31)

Thinking of the two hemispheres as 'ways of being' and not as mechanical 'functions' helps me understand the content of the tale "A Defining Moment" and the essay "Of Spaces and Places" within the context of a complementary of opposites, namely 'natural simplicity' (being *who*) and a re-presented 'experience' of sophistication (constructing or defining *what*) within the context of the living dynamics of an ongoing educational process. If, indeed, the educational context and content were meant to reconcile opposites as integral and complementary aspects of one dynamic process, as McGilchrist and Bergson strongly suggest, then it stands to reason that it will be in the fertile ground of *experience* that reconciliation will occur; and not, as McGilchrist indicates, on the premise of a re-presented 'experience' of power and control.

From a Western viewpoint (dominantly left-hemisphere modes of thought) that sees the brain as a machine that 'functions' in ways that may or may not be useful to the Western enterprise, reconciliation will be seen as useless. From a Western viewpoint that sees in opposites potential for conflict and/or one-upmanship; where one side of the complement is "right" and the other is "wrong"; or where one side is "better" and the other is "worse", reconciliation will be seen as weakness. From all above accounts, however, reconciliation is quite the opposite. McGilchrist's position on the matter is unequivocal.

> My thesis is that for us as human beings there are two fundamentally opposed realities, two different modes of experience; that each is of ultimate importance in bringing about the recognizably human world; and that their difference is rooted in the bihemispheric structure of the brain. It follows that the hemispheres need to co-operate, but I believe that in fact they are involved in a sort of power struggle, and this explains many aspects of contemporary Western culture. (2009, p. 3)

Bergson's theory, cited in Chapter II, and repeated here for comparison and emphasis, expresses Bergson's unequivocal view of the same problem as follows:

> Consciousness in man is pre-eminently intellect. It might have been, it ought, so it seems, to have been also intuition. Intuition and intellect represent two opposite directions of the work of consciousness: intuition goes in the very direction of life, intellect goes in the inverse direction, and thus finds itself naturally in accordance with matter. A complete and perfect humanity would be that in which these two forms of conscious activity should attain their full development. (1998/1907; p. 267).

Envisioned in the present thesis is the responsibility of education to play a supporting role the reconciliation of opposites. By providing the context and the content in which the two forms of conscious activity may attain their full development, education can help to conceive of, and give birth to, a "new beginning" (Arendt, 1974). Before tackling the larger discussion of reconciliation, however, there are yet two more tales to be told in "What Happens to *Who*?"

Famous Last Words

"Just be yourself," they said.

"Nothing could be more simple or straightforward," I thought. "No problem! I'll just go in there and be myself. That should be easy." Or so it seemed at first.

"They are looking for personality and character as well as for beauty in this year's Carnival Queen," my nominators reminded me. I was sitting on the locker-room bench, along with several other contestants, nervously awaiting my turn to enter the formidable chamber of judges. A panel of four gentlemen had been selected by the McGill Winter Carnival Committee for their renowned accomplishments—as well as for their apparent expertise in feminine beauty, personality and character—to determine the best candidates for the final three places.

What my Alpha Gamma Delta sisters didn't realize when they chose me for their best shot at this year's title of Carnival Queen was that I didn't have a clue as to who "myself" was supposed to be. Now they tell me! I hadn't studied for this exam; nor was I prepared for the interrogation that would ultimately decide my success or failure at just being myself.

I sat on the bench in the woman's locker room and grappled, for the first time in my seventeen-year-old life, with the age-old question, "Who am I?" Who is this "myself" that my eager sponsors say I am just supposed to be? But, it was too late. There was no time and no wherewithal for coming up with an answer that would at least carry the day. By now anxiety had turned into full-blown fear. Before long, fear had morphed into sheer panic. Paralyzing terror soon followed. The inevitability of failure loomed in a fog of pending unconsciousness.

Through the fog, I heard my name being called. Automatically I stood up. Like a wound-up mechanical model on a fashion runway, feigning poise and confidence, I glided towards the disaster about to befall me. By now completely out of my mind with dread, I allowed "myself" to be lifted, propelled and transported into the examination room and gracefully seated on the wooden chair before the judges' bench. Composure, as it turned out, was a cultivated asset.

And then I saw him. One of the judges sitting up high on the judging dais was Sam Estovan, the popular quarterback of the Montreal Alouettes football team, and *the* heart throb of every young Montreal female! I was no exception. This was the final undoing. It was Sam Estovan who launched the fatal blow from his lofty judge's perch. He asked a simple question.

The question was immaterial. Deafened by confusion, immobilized by terror and totally smitten by a teenaged-crush on my interrogator, I was finally floored. The hefty weight of being judged on the performance of an elusive "self" about whom I had no idea whatsoever was more than I could bear. In a well-brought-up effort to be polite, I tried to respond to the question I didn't hear. I sputtered some inanity in a pathetic attempt at contrived authenticity. Out of character and out of place, I made a total fool of "myself" on that momentous occasion. Mortification set in swiftly and thoroughly; the sting of the memory piques to this very day.

"Just be yourself," my friends had advised. Ha! That's easier said than done.

What happens to *who* when, seemingly, nothing more than the rejoinder 'just be yourself' is required? Palmer, cited earlier in Chapter V, would likely remind us first off that the soul, or what he calls the 'true self', is shy (2004, p. 57). "Like a wild animal, the soul is tough, resilient, resourceful, savvy, and self-sufficient: it knows how to survive in hard places," he writes. "Yet despite its toughness, the soul is also shy. Just like the wild animal, it seeks safety in the dense underbrush, especially when other people are around" (p. 58). In the tale, "Famous Last Words", not only is the individual 'true self' being put to the test in a competition over beauty, personality and character, the entire women's fraternity's (AG's) reputation is at stake in the enterprise. Moreover, there are four gentlemen 'experts' selected by a committee to judge the best three candidates among the chosen few for the title of McGill Carnival Queen. Hardly a situation conducive to the appearance of a shy soul! "If we want to see a wild animal", says Palmer, "we know that the last thing we should do is go crashing through the woods yelling for it to come out" (p. 59).

In *A Hidden Wholeness: The Journey Toward an Undivided Life*, Palmer proposes the creation of "circles of trust", what he calls that "rare form of community" that "supports rather than supplants the individual quest for integrity" (2004, p. 25). Assuming that what is meant by the advice of my supporters—'just be yourself'—is the integrity of what Palmer calls "an undivided life", then, I am certain that Palmer would declare the McGill Carnival Queen competition, or, for that matter, any beauty contest (even with the inclusion of personality and character) unfit for habitation by the human soul, and an unlikely setting for the appearance of a "true self".

Be that as it may, I would like to explore a different reason for the abject failure that occurred. From what I remember of the occasion (besides the humiliation), my downfall wasn't a result of my "soul" feeling unsafe or my "true self" feeling that it would be judged harshly by the people around it. The quagmire I fell into, as I remember it, was the blank I drew—"no idea whatsoever"—with respect to what "myself" was supposed to be! A lethal combination of not knowing *what* that was; and, at the same time, knowing *what* was expected of me comprised the terrifying predicament. The nightmare (a recurring one for me) was likened in the tale to having to take an exam I hadn't prepared for. Up until the moment I was advised by my older

fraternity sisters to just be myself, I had not given any thought to *what* I should be or to *what* was at stake. Presumably I was just being myself; and presumably I would have continued to just be myself during the interview. In the clarity of hindsight, I see that it was the directive "just be yourself" that set off the maelstrom; and, therefore, it would not be accurate to say that I was floored because I was "shy" and because I didn't feel "safe" in that competitive environment.

Palmer refers to the tough resilience of the soul. I am learning from the present explorations that *who* is not only resilient, *who* is unstoppable. She/he can't help but be herself/himself! Like the blade of grass that mysteriously and miraculously makes its blithe appearance through even the hardest of concrete slabs, I have learned that *who* can and will show up anywhere and in any circumstance ... even at a Carnival Queen competition, if need be! When permitted—from the Latin *per* meaning "through" and *mittere* meaning "to send"—*who* will be there! What *who* cannot do, and will not do—and of this I am now thoroughly convinced—is be something *who* is not, namely *what*. The data from the previous tales have consistently shown that *who* can be identified, but *who* cannot be defined. Even the slightest suggestion "just be yourself" is more than *who* can bear because in the mere act of thinking about *who*, *who* be-comes a *what*; and, therefore, is "lost" or covered over by whatever name is given. Regardless of how 'true' a 'true self' strives to be, the most that can be hoped for is a replica, an accurate representation or a close approximation. In retrospect, I can see that I sensed intuitively that the locker room dilemma was an impossible situation for my "self" to be in for the simple reason that it is impossible for *who* to be *what*. To reiterate McGilchrist, thinking about *experience* renders *experience* an 'experience,' which is something entirely different (2009, p. 31).

Palmer understands the problem of naming the unnameable. He chooses, nonetheless, to name the indefinable "call-it-what-you-will" for reasons that are of vital importance to him.

> Philosophers haggle about what to call this core of our humanity, but I am no stickler for precision... *What* we name it matters little to me, since the origins, nature and destiny of call-it-what-you-will are forever hidden from us, and no one can credibly claim to know its true name. But *that* we name it matters a great deal. For "it" is the objective,

> ontological reality of selfhood that keeps us from reducing ourselves, or each other, to biological mechanisms, psychological projections, sociological constructs, or raw material to be manufactured into whatever society needs—diminishments of our humanity that constantly threaten the quality of our lives. (2004, p. 33; emphasis in original)

I have no quarrel with Palmer's rationale for naming the 'core of our humanity' or the 'ontological reality of selfhood' our 'true self'. However, the problem of naming 'it', from the standpoint of the present thesis, is that as soon as *who* is named *what*, it is no longer *who*. In "Famous Last Words", the conundrum that was ignited by naming 'it'—"just be yourself"—is an experienced evidence of the problem of naming the indefinable, yet identifiable *who*. Given the modern world tendencies that Palmer cites as 'diminishments of our humanity that constantly threaten the quality of our lives,' I understand why acknowledging the existence of a 'soul' and examining the ways in which the 'true self' functions from an objective standpoint is important to Palmer. But, I am wary of naming "thisness" (Arendt, 1979) or "betweenness" (McGilchrist (2009), and I am weary of the requirement for a rationale that objectifies a subjective reality for the sake of argument. Furthermore, it has not been my experience that a translation of one way of being (*who*) on the terms of, and in the language of, another way of being (*what*) helps to foster the actual *experience* of the different version of reality. *Au contraire*, wrestling with others' concepts about what is 'true' and what is 'not true' have been the most challenging 'experiences' of my lifetime! Is it not possible in today's modern world to live and let live *sans* translation *sans* definition and *sans* rationale? How might education, a process of drawing forth from within, facilitate such a freeway (and freeing way) of self knowledge?

I look to my former experience as a teacher of high school French for perspective. In relishing the memory of my young students' enthusiastic responses to any and every opportunity they were given to express *who* they were in French, I find in their creative expression the inspiration I am looking for. My Grade 13 students loved to act out scenarios excerpted from Molière's *Les femmes savantes* or adapted from de Saint-Exupéry's *Le petit prince*, for example, in which they communicated (and communed) fluently with each other in French. It didn't matter to them that there were grammar mistakes and English accents mixed in with the

content of their work; what *really* mattered to them (and to their teacher) was the *joie de vivre* they experienced from expressing *who* they were within the context of a foreign language. The grammar and the accents could be worked on later, I realized; but the *élan vital* could only be experienced in the present moment. With the students' props and costumes on colourful display in every corner of the room, *Ici on parle français* looked more like a theatre arts studio than a language arts classroom. The parents would tell me that their sons or daughters would spend hours on the phone with their French-class mates practicing a *dialogue* for presentation the next day. When frequently asked by their parents, "What does it mean?"—meaning what does it mean *in English*—inevitably the students' answer would be, "I don't know." On hearing a complaint from a parent that their daughter could speak French fluently, but that she didn't know what it meant, I knew that my aim and purpose as teacher of French was a *fait accompli*. I explained to the parent that Marie-Louise may not know what each word means in English, but that she certainly knows what the words mean in French! I learned from my eager students that we do not have to translate meaning into *what* we already know in order to understand our lives.

Like Bergson's *intuition* and *intellecte* that are different in "kind" not in intensity; and like McGilchrist's right-hemisphere and left-hemisphere that are different ways of being and not different modes of functioning, English and French are different ways of expressing two different versions of reality. The two different versions were delightfully (and delightedly) reconciled in the students' creative *dialogues*. Without having to name "it", the students knew, and in no uncertain terms, that *who* was the source of their creativity (Arendt, 1974; p. 211). *Ergo* an expansion of the educational question at the heart of this dissertation has emerged from the tale "Famous Last Words". The question with regard to how education can facilitate the expression of *who* becomes a question not only about *what* to teach and *how* to teach it, but *who* is teaching and in what manner?

On the question of *who* is teaching and in what manner, there is much to learn from Palmer's work with "circles of trust". "The relationships in such a group are not pushy but patient; they are not confrontational but compassionate; they are filled not with expectations and demands

but with an abiding faith in the reality of the inner teacher and in each person's capacity to learn from it" (2004; p. 59). Envisioning the modern-day classroom as a place of support and encouragement for the 'inner teacher' can serve as an excellent signpost as well as provide an inspiring *point de départ*. Based on the above accounts, however, a word of caution is in order. I am wary of *what* happens to *who*. The concept "inner teacher" bears an uncanny resemblance to the well-intended advice "just be yourself" and, therefore, carries with it equal potential for causing unnecessary confusion and untold harm. "Famous Last Words" has been a cautionary tale about how easily and quickly *who* can become "lost" in translation. The next and final tale of the series is a tale about betrayal.

The Graduation Ceremony

The following event took place in the fall of the late 1990's. In my administrative role of high-school vice principal at the time, I was a member of the platform party seated on the stage. The formal graduation proceedings were about to come to a close. The graduates, decked out in their black 'scholarly' caps-awry-and-gowns-askew, had by now performed their ceremonial rites with their usual youthful flair. On a scale of shy to cocky they had shuffled, walked, strolled, stomped and strutted their unique ways of being across center stage to receive their hard-won diplomas and the official platform handshake. Individual moments of glory flashed before flashing cameras and proud parents. Each jubilant graduate had earned his or her personal acclaim—some for having barely passed the Quebec Ministry exams, and others for passing with flying colours, honours, awards and prizes.

The valedictorian, second to last to speak at the podium, had been well chosen that year for his academic excellence and for his outstanding popularity with the teachers and students, to say nothing of his natural ability as an orator. As is the custom in the valedictory address, the young man highlighted the many funny, touching and heartfelt moments of the past five years of their high school life together. Anecdotes abounded. From the hilarious to the serious, the stories resounded from the classrooms, halls, science labs, art studio, music room, drama room, library, dance floor, and football and soccer fields. Put all together, the tales of teen-age shenanigans, academic accomplishments, artful creations, and athletic feats painted a colourful canvas of youthful spontaneity, creativity and originality. The cheering, whistling and clapping during, and following, the valedictorian's speech punctuated with wild exclamation marks their vibrant approval of the exciting rendition of their collective experience. This was school life at its best, and they knew it!

Next on the program was the final address to be given in the form of "parting words" from the school board official. Suddenly, and without warning, the joyously upbeat mood turned sombre. In all sincerity and with unquestionably good intentions, the school board official launched his well prepared speech of possible (and probable) post-graduation doom and gloom. His weighty words loomed menacingly over the assembly. Armed with a plethora of alarming statistics, the senior board administrator proceeded to warn the graduates of the dire economic and social consequences they would face if they did not apply themselves to their studies more seriously in the future, and work harder to better prepare themselves for adult life. There was no doubt about the aim of the well meaning scare tactics: to realistically and responsibly underscore the facts of life for these young people about to fly the high school coop. The message was clear. Young people about to set foot into the 'real' world needed to understand that their future happiness and the ultimate value of their lives would depend on their "working hard" to "get a good education" to "get a good job" in order to "get ahead".

There it was again. The rubber stamp mantra that had caused me to cringe for its misaligned placement of blame for poor results or failure on students' report cards had now made its persistent way into the graduation ceremony, only this time as a warning of possible (probable) poor results and/or student failure in the future. The pervasive rubber stamp MORE EFFORT REQUIRED assaulted my every educational instinct and human sensibility. The official parting words, seemingly so benign, so normal, so sincere, so responsible, and so matter of fact, were, to my way of listening, bullying and threatening. From where I sat on the literal and figurative educational platform, I witnessed the graduates being hustled right out of their graduating door on a ritualized conveyor belt that projected them straight through into their future "adult life" (Winch, 1999) before they could bask, even for a moment, in their moment of glory.

Amongst an infinite variety of affects that can happen, and usually do happen, to *who* in the progression of schooling, the most virulent of happenings is the "construction of identity", the central aim and purpose of the Quebec Education Program (QEP) and of most modern school programs throughout the Western world. Examining "The Graduation Ceremony" for what I expect will be a delicate insight with respect to a serious issue, I choose first to acknowledge my strong 'allergic' reaction to the official "rubber stamp" message. What *really* bothered me that evening—and on this I seemed to stand alone—was the unchallenged assumption being proselytized by the school board official that the students *who* had only moments earlier demonstrated such remarkable agility, aplomb, spontaneity, originality, creativity, sensibility, responsibility and community would have to work harder in the future in order to make some*thing* better of their 'selves'. Within the context of the present inquiry, the brilliant countenance of the students' present 'selves' (*who*), the assumption that the students had to

make some 'thing' (*what*) more of their future 'selves' seemed a bizarre and macabre notion. Logically speaking, from the standpoint of 'self' construction, *what* the students were admonished to make of themselves could only exist at the expense (loss) of *who* they already were. In light of their present reality, this 'self' would be, at best, a paltry substitute for the 'real thing'. Moreover, the stark contrast in the feeling atmosphere between the assembly's joyful celebration of student life and the speaker's anxious projection of *what* might become of that life in the future was most telling. The students' present reality shone far more brightly than the dismal 'realistic' picture being projected onto the screen of their "not yet" (Greene 1984).

In thinking about my visceral reaction to the official school board message within the context of the present thesis, I see "The Graduation Ceremony" to be a not-so-unusual tale about the well-meaning intentions of most school board officials and policy makers who want what's best for future generations. The Quebec Education Program (QEP) mission, for example, to "instruct; socialize; and qualify" speaks to the widely accepted view that the purpose of education is to prepare children for adult life as articulated by Winch (1999). When parents and school board officials see education as the means of securing their child's future happiness based on their own past experience of the-world-the-way-it-is, understandably they concern themselves with their children's competency to manage their 'selves' autonomously and successfully in that future 'reality', especially when it comes down to their economic security. Will there be enough jobs to go around? Will the students be well enough trained to do those jobs, especially in today's highly competitive global market? On its own, the official message from a school board administrator whose responsibility is to help prepare children for adult life based on a central premise of "construction of identity" (QEP) does not seem out of place. The message is consistent with the notion of making some*thing* of one's "self'. On this 'realistic' basis, the "construction of identity", like any mechanical exercise, would of necessity require the acquisition of new-and-improved skills and the dedication to working harder, and doing a better job in the future. Also consistent with a central premise of "construction of identity" would be the supreme importance of jobholder status that says *what* you do is *who* you are. Some jobs hold higher status for self-esteem than others. Given the above rationale, there should be no surprise and no problem with the precautionary warnings offered by a senior

school administrator from a high school auditorium platform. Why, then, was I so very deeply affected by what happened at "The Graduation Ceremony"?

Looking back on the event from the perspective of the present thesis, I can see that the official message was perfectly well justified on the outside, especially given the ideological context in which the speech was delivered. But on the inside the message tells me a very different story. The inside (*felt*) version of the story uncovers an age-old, deeply entrenched betrayal of trust that is comparable to the betrayal of the master's trust by his emissary in the story *The Master and his Emissary* (McGilchrist, 2009, p. 14). Let me explain what I mean in light of the present tale. In the tale's modern-day version of the betrayal, instead of the master (teachers) sending his or her emissary (students) into the world with the rejoinder to re-member *who* they are; and to manage, on the master teachers' behalf, the growing number of tasks required by an expanding domain of responsibility, a school board official, having "usurped" the position of the master teacher, is re-minding the students of *what* they are, and extolling them to do *what* they must in order to maintain power and control, not only over their own lives, but over the master's domain. The betrayal of trust, according to the present tale, is found deeply buried within the message of an official rite of passage: the usurpation of *who* by *what*. What made the betrayal unconscionable for me that evening was the fact that the betrayal (I *felt*) came at the behest of the very institution whose purpose (I *thought*) was to preserve, nourish and safeguard mastery.

Earlier in Chapter IX, there was talk of reconciliation. Parallel visions for the bringing together of opposites—*intuition* (life) and *intellecte* (matter)—and two different versions of reality—right-hemisphere ways of being and left-hemisphere modes of thought; master and emissary —were presented in citations from the works of Henri Bergson (1998/1907) and Iain McGilchrist (2010) respectively. Through these insightful perspectives, we were able to see that reconciliation was not only possible, but necessary to a reconstitution of the "complete and perfect humanity" envisioned by Bergson (1998/1907, p. 267). Bergson called intuition a lamp almost extinguished; McGilchrist portrayed right-hemisphere thinking usurped by left hemisphere

modes of thought. McGillchrist brought the defining moment down to a simple choice: either a world where there is" betweenness" or one where there is not (2009, p. 31).

From the standpoint of "The Graduation Ceremony", the question becomes one of reconciling the realism of "experience" with the reality of "*experience"* (McGilchrist 2010, p. 31). How can we bring the cognitive program of schooling—instruction, socialization and job qualification—into a fruitful interaction with the thoughtful process of education—drawing forth, being, thinking, and be-coming? What would an experience of pedagogy and curriculum within the context of McGilchrist's *experience* look like and feel like? How do we reconcile *being* and *doing*? How do we reconcile *raison d'être* (meaning) with *savoir faire* (know-how)? How do we reconcile *who* we are with *what* we do? How can our jobs fulfill our lives, rather than the other way around? How can we restore mastery and mystery to the mundane and the practical?

Chapter X (next) demonstrates in the telling of the final two "Tales out of School" that reconciliation between opposites is not only possible and desirable, but also timely. The chapter serves as a review of the main ideas as well as a consolidation of the main thesis. A living story about the coming together of different, yet complementary, versions of reality and different, yet interdependent, aspects of consciousness will reveal the source of creativity in a combination of opposites that will make the heart sing (Jobs, 2010).

Chapter X

Identity and Creativity: Putting Two and Two Together

Out beyond ideas of wrong doing and right doing,
there is a field. I'll meet you there.

(*Rumi*, translated by Barks, 1995, p. 36)

In the following attempt to probe more deeply into the mystery of what (or who) constitutes identity and creativity, the intent is to look for ways in which the seemingly antagonistic differences between opposites may be reconciled. At this juncture of my work in process, reconciliation appears to be the only way to go. The differences between 'essentialist' and 'constructivist' theories of modern identity have played out their conflicting viewpoints on the pages of history as well as on the pages of this dissertation. From my newly acquired perspective of educational *connoisseur*, I can see that the battle between essentialist and constructivist theories, and between qualitative and quantitative methodologies, has run its course. Signs of modern society point to the victory of the constructivists over the essentialists, and the predominance of quantitative analyses over qualitative inquiry. Just as Hall and DuGay have suggested, constructivism has put essentialism "under erasure" (1996, p. 2); and just as Denzin and Lincoln have predicted, the "fractured future phase is when qualitative inquiry will have to confront conservative measures to reign in qualitative methodology and align it more closely with positivistic orientations" (2005, pp 14-20). Judging from all outward appearances, therefore, it would seem reasonable to conclude, alas, that it's too late: *who* has lost to what; being has lost to doing; intuition has lost to intellect; thinking has lost to knowing; right-hemisphere ways of being have lost to left-hemisphere modes of thought; and not surprisingly, the meaning of education has lost to the aims of schooling. The choice between a world where

there is “betweenness” and one where there is not (McGilchrist, 2009, p. 31) would seem, from all appearances, to have been made with finality. The choice is “one where there is not”.

The battle may be over; but the story is far from over. Seeing from the inside-out (as opposed to looking from the outside-in) I detect a very different possibility of outcome. Within the loss-gain realism of outer appearances, I perceive the inner reality of a win-win situation. My [w]holistic viewpoint has been forged over time in the writing of this dissertation and in the combining and interweaving of my own lived educational experiences with the artistic, scientific, educational, political and philosophical perspectives of others. In putting two and two together, I am beginning to discern the invisible ‘in-between’ as the very time and place when/where reconciliation may occur. In fact, I can see from a firm footing in my newly attained vantage point that there is, after all, both a ‘real’ and a ‘realistic’ third option available at this time. The third dimension is the living extension of a living story. This is an as-yet-untold story about the ‘whole’ space that exists ‘in-between’ the once seemingly separate and conflicted, yet really only different and complementary, pairs of opposites.

Exploring the Identity-Creativity Connection

I shall begin the following exploration of the in-between as it pertains to identity and creativity by re-examining two narrative pieces I wrote to highlight events that occurred during my former teaching and educational leadership experience. The two accounts are intended to form a backdrop for the present investigation as well as to elicit useful prompts to propel the inquiry forward. I expect to find evidence to substantiate the intimate relationship I detect between identity and creativity. Understanding the nature of the identity-creativity connection, I suspect, will heighten my awareness with regard to the nature of the third option, that of the creative potential in-between essentialism and constructivism; in-between qualitative and quantitative perspectives; and in-between being and doing; thinking and knowing; intuition and intellect, right-hemisphere ways of being and left hemisphere modes of thought; and ultimately, in-between education and schooling.

The process of inquiry, as I have come to know it throughout my "work in process", has been instigated by untutored intuitions in the form of questions. Former forays into questions of identity and creativity have taught me through trial and error that the mystery I am investigating will not lend itself readily to a step-by-step procedure; nor will the conundrum succumb easily to attempts to unravel or compile information. *Au contraire*, investigative work of this nature has repeatedly shown that identity and creativity shy away from positivistic analyses, categorizations and definitions. I have discovered, instead, that meaningful insights "occur" in the same manner that Gadamer describes the happenstance of hermeneutics, the phenomenon of understanding that "goes beyond the limits of the concept of method as set by modern science" and "belongs to human experience of the world in general" (2010, p. xx). I suspect, again from past experience, that any clues to the mystery I am presently investigating will tend to reveal themselves by sudden surprise, and only *if* I am attentive to the rigorous demands of "perceptivity", defined earlier by Barone and Eisner as "seeing what most people miss" (1997, p. 93). No longer trying to figure it all out, I am interested in putting two and two together based on my lived experience of the mystery under investigation.

For the inquisitive process I am engaged in, storytelling is proving to be the best way I know for paying close attention to the regular, irregular and downright peculiar aspects of lived experience. A recounting of events has exposed significant truths that may otherwise be overlooked. Most importantly for my research purposes, storytelling has generated more questions than answers while providing the necessary time and space for introspection and reflection. This time is no exception. The following two stories took place several years apart: one many years ago in Ontario; and the other, more recently at St. Anthony's College at Oxford University. The *leitmotiv* in both scenarios is the mystery presently under the magnifying glass, namely the intimate relationship I detect between identity and creativity.

Stumbling upon the Wow! Factor

Like most young people starting out in their careers, I didn't give any thought whatsoever to the meaning and purpose of the profession I was about to enter. Compared to my preoccupation

with lesson plans and classroom management skills, or lack thereof, the intrinsic meaning of education lay carefully and conveniently buried beneath the fascinating and daunting details of my extrinsic to-do list. For all I knew, or cared to know at the time, I was hired by the County Board of Education to do "a job". My job was simply to teach French to high school students according to the latest methods prescribed by the ministry-approved program that was handed to me on day one. The program was part of a broader curriculum that was part of a larger school system designed and operated by the Ontario government, and legislated by the Canadian government to be delivered according to provincial standards by the local school board officials. For my small part in the big picture, it was all I could do just to do my job. *C'est déjà ça*! Little by little, and quite by surprise, however, I began to discover I *loved* my job! In fact, I took to the classroom like a duck to water. To this day I can remember the surge of confidence I felt when my first district inspector's report came back: "Natural born teacher".

Because I was only a few years older than my Grade 13 students, I learned very quickly that authority in the classroom comes from personal authenticity, not from expertise or know-how which was understandably still very much under construction. Despite my newness to the role, I made sure that my lesson plans were as good as done; my methodology *comme il faut*; and my students' test results commendable. For reasons beyond the obvious quantifiable predictable factors for success, however, there was an unpredictable yet undeniable wow! factor to be taken into serious account: my students *loved* their French classes; and incidentally, so did their French teacher! Whatever the content of *matières,* the French class environment was consistently alive with *joie de vivre*. We were on to something that I definitely did *not* learn at the Ontario teachers' college! And like a grass fire, word of this mysterious, mystical, unquantifiable, unqualified, unknown wow! factor got around. I was asked by the school officials to spread that fire, and was appointed to the role of Supervisor of Moderns for the County to do just that. Soon I was invited to co-author the high-school segments of a new K-13 audio-visual program with a team from the Ontario Ministry of Education. And yet another inexplicable *fait accompli* led to facilitating teacher workshops in Canada and the US, and to animating an ETV program for teaching FSL in classrooms across Canada. The teaching "job" that I was initially hired to do had quickly morphed into a juggernaut of responsibilities for which I didn't really, at heart, feel prepared. How *do* I teach a wow! factor phenomenon that I had only just recently, just by accident, stumbled upon?

At one of the workshops I came face to face with the core issue, or problem, that I had intuited. In my usual animated interpersonal style of presentation, I could tell that the response of the audience was for the most part warmly receptive to the methodology of the *contexte globale* philosophy I was advocating. Suddenly, however, and seemingly out of the blue, one of the teachers whose tone of voice and rigid posture immediately let me know that she was not happy with the "newest and latest", stood up in a rage. She was not just angry; she was furious! "What about the grammar?" she yelled at me from her entrenched position half way back in the auditorium. For this teacher, what mattered were the mechanics of the language, "the grammar", both literally and figuratively. There was no trying to convince her otherwise.

I continued to teach and to lead in a variety of privileged positions and circumstances in Ontario and Quebec schools, but the impact of that incident, along with the questions and theoretical

hunches evoked by the events of the first few years of my career, have continued to haunt me. How do I advocate the wow! factor when it is so difficult, if not impossible, to define and explain the intangible within the parameters of an institution firmly established in the concrete traditions, concepts and principles of utilitarian and instrumental aims, where *raison d'être* (meaning and purpose) has been eclipsed by *savoir faire* (skills and knowledge)? Who wants to be reminded that there is more to education than learning "the grammar" or getting "the job"? How do I find ways to convey in a scholarly manner the invisible, immeasurable, nuanced, creative aspects of education? Does it matter anymore *who* is doing the teaching, or *who* is doing the learning? Does it matter as long as "the job" gets done according to standardized tests and ministry guidelines? How do we integrate *what* we do with *who* we are in ways that will allow not just the acquisition of knowledge and competencies, but also the flourishing of the human spirit? Can the wow! factor that seems to have everything to do with *joie de vivre* and passion for what we do *in relationship with others* be taught? How do we create conditions for a creative interplay between teacher and students that can evoke mastery *and* mystery?

Before attempting to respond to the pressing questions generated from the above narrative, I want to present the second account for the purposes of expanding the base and opening up a larger arena for a discussion of related factors. Please fast forward to an international gathering of educational leaders—"The Superintendency and The Principalship"—invited in 2004 to present papers on "Designing Leadership Practices for the Future of Public Education" at the Oxford Round Table on Education at St. Anthony's College at Oxford University.

Is There Room for Creativity in Our Schools?

An air of scholarly tradition pervaded the historical setting of the prestigious Oxford Union, the ambiance tangibly influencing the formality of the day-long proceedings. Each morning we would enter the hall quietly, almost reverently, and take our appointed places around the dark hand-carved oak tables. Delegates' words sounded especially weighty in the echoing chambers of this hallowed space.

Somewhat dishevelled from having just abandoned his early morning duties inspecting Oxford schools, Bill Laar burst through the door and into the chambers like an unexpected gust of wind. Laar had come to speak to his scheduled topic, "Is There Room for Creativity in the UK?" Along with Laar, the proverbial 'breath of fresh air' blew strong and mighty into our midst. The rather stuffy atmosphere of the previous deliberations was stirred up and undone in one fell swoop. The timbre of the 2004 Round Table on Education was changed for the duration.

Laar was grappling with the alarming statistics of the teacher drop-out rate in the UK, and the resultant chaos for British schools. He also named many of the all-too-familiar problems faced by public education everywhere: the underfunding and overtaxing of human and material resources; the intolerable pressures on teachers and students exerted by society's high expectations for inhuman results; the as yet unmet challenges to truly meet the needs of a diverse student population; governments' insistent and pervasive implementation of external standardized testing routines despite the cry of educators to the contrary; and the ubiquitous, unrealistic, and often misaligned, top-down reforms aimed at school-improvement coupled with the exponential increase in numbers of parents choosing private schools over public schools—or home-schooling or un-schooling (the latest trend)—in their attempt to protect their children from the real or perceived "degradation" of the public education system.

Laar's presentation, however, wasn't just about what was tragically wrong with the present-day situation. His talk soon took an impassioned turn into an envisioning of what education could/should really be all about, namely, creativity. Is there room for creativity in the UK, or anywhere else for that matter? Laar's vision lauded a well-rounded education that would include every possible kind of exposure to every possible kind of human experience. Through the prolific examples and metaphors he offered, we could literally feel the critical importance in the developing life of a young boy or girl of experiencing the thrill of sailing a boat into the wind, for example; or the sense of accomplishment in learning to play a Mozart minuet on the piano, or the joy of participation in team sports or a school play or musical production.

"Yes, but ... creativity costs money that cash-strapped public schools just don't have," was the gist of the initial comments from the delegates who were only too well-versed in the bottom-line of school administration. It's the politicians and the economists who hold the purse strings; and, therefore, make the decisions as to what constitutes an education, not educators," continued the thread of conversation. The irony did not go unnoticed: as productivity and fiscal responsibility continue to squeeze out "expensive" creativity from the public school curriculum, the costs of public schools' problems appear to be on the rise in equal or greater measure.

It was unanimous. We agreed that creativity, in whatever form it takes, is absolutely essential to education. "Creativity is a way of living; it's a way of being human" declared one delegate. "Is there room for spirit in our schools?" asked another. Rather than continue to complain and bemoan the fact (as we were) that education is no longer in the hands of educators, but under the dictates of policy-makers who have little or no interest in creativity, it was thought by some delegates to be high time that we, as educational leaders, roll up our sleeves and take back our calling. There was talk of drawing up a collective statement to that effect that would represent the delegates' unequivocal agreement on the essential place of creativity in education. A pre-programmed, heavily packed agenda and lack of time—the usual culprits—prevented that statement from ever being written. Perhaps, in some small way, the doctoral work in which I am presently engaged will help to make that unwritten statement one day a reality.

The 2004 Oxford Round Table on Education has not only raised a roof in the Oxford Union, it has also raised several more questions of critical importance to the investigation at hand. What (or who) constitutes "creativity"? Can creativity and productivity work together in harmony in

our schools, each potentially enhancing and enriching the other? Does creativity have to cost money that cash-strapped schools just don't have, or is creativity a luxury only for the privileged few who can afford it? And finally, how could/would creativity and all that creativity might entail in the UK and elsewhere contribute to nurturing and nourishing the complexity and diversity of a worldwide web, the interconnected, interdependent ecological, political, social and economic reality of the 21st century?

Enter Hannah Arendt

Arendt (1974), in her remarkable work *The Human Condition*, has given much thought to the question I am posing: "Is there a link between identity and creativity?" For Arendt, the source of creativity springs indeed from *who* we are (p. 211). This is a significant insight in light of the intuitive question at the heart of this chapter. The source of creativity, according to Arendt, springs from the identity of the person. To further substantiate the validity of my finding, I reiterate Arendt's statement that *who* "is the unchangeable identity of the person" (p. 193). Arendt's essentialist perspective contradicts the widely accepted constructivist perspective of identity that is central to most contemporary Western education programs and reforms.

Based on my early teaching experience, "Stumbling Upon the Wow! Factor", I find Arendt's perspectives to be the most plausible explanation for the mysterious wow! factor. Moreover, Arendt's thinking *à propos* the in-between makes perfect sense to me thanks to the resonance I feel between my lived experience and the phenomenon she describes. In putting two and two together, I ascertain that the unpredictable, uncalculated, unplanned wow! factor that transpired in my classroom was the consequence of the inadvertent presence of *who*. In fact, it would seem that *who* was able to be present in-between my students and me due to the very *absence* of skills and know-how that were still very much under construction. Furthermore, a "teacher identity" that would have subsumed the "real" identity of the teacher was yet under-developed. If the wow! factor is the "real" we have in common, where's the mystery in that? "What about the grammar?" I hear the resounding echo of the teacher's angry protest.

How differently we might approach teaching and learning if we were to seriously consider the premise that human identity is not some*thing* that is socially, politically and economically "schooled" and/or "constructed", but that human identity is inwardly generated as *who* one is, the source of creativity. Arendt says that the purpose of her book is to inspire a generation of "job holders" to "think what we are doing" (1974, p. 5). Aligning the purpose of the present investigation with the purpose of *The Human Condition*, I ask *who* is thinking and *who* is doing; *who* is the source of creativity? The pivotal question that remains at the heart of the present investigation with regard to the possible link between identity and creativity is "Am I 'essentially' *who* or am I a 'constructed' *what*?" My newly educated guess is that the seemingly ineffable mystery of identity and creativity— the wow! factor—may be understood and known (experienced) in the putting of two and two together. Identity and creativity are born (sourced) from one and the same "I". Identity is thus seen as being outside the work process as well as apart from outer achievement. Amplifying the resonance of the newly discovered complements, Arendt's (1971) following distinction between thinking and knowing serves to substantiate the connection and move the present inquiry forward.

Thinking and Knowing

Being able to see from the third dimension of a living story sheds new light on the complementary nature of opposites. Arendt (1971) gives credit to Kant for the important distinction she makes between thinking and knowing, "between reason, the urge to think and understand, and the intellect, which desires and is capable of certain verifiable knowledge" (p.422). A literature review confirms the fact that Arendt sees the activity of thinking as "the habit of examining and reflecting upon whatever comes to pass, regardless of specific content and quite independent of results ..." (p. 418); and that knowing, on the other hand, is results-oriented and "no less a world-building activity than the building of houses" (p. 421). In the case of the wow! factor, knowing pertains to subject content and material, lesson plans, classroom management skills and teaching strategies. Thinking, on the other hand, goes beyond knowing, in that thinking "deals with invisibles and is itself invisible, lacking all the outside manifestation

of other activities" (Arendt, 1971; p. 433). Arendt cites Socrates as having used the metaphor of the wind for thinking. In thinking about the first narrative piece "Stumbling upon the Wow! Factor", I make a direct link between Aristotle's wind that does, un-does and re-does thought, and Arendt's (1974) portrayal of *who* as indefinable (ungraspable) yet identifiable (knowable). Any "natural born" teacher knows that it is good practice to have on hand sound knowledge of subject material, lesson plans, teaching strategies and classroom management skills in the same way that the sailor must have a boat, rudder, sails, maps, compass and the wherewithal to sail the high seas. However, the teacher and the sailor worth their salt both know that it is the wind that determines the momentary course of action, the momentum and the nature of the voyage into life's perplexities or into the teaching of French grammar!

"If it should turn out to be true that knowledge ... and thought have parted company for good, then indeed we would become the helpless slaves, not so much of our machines as of our know-how..."(Arendt, 1974, p. 3). This is an alarming prediction in light of the fact—again according to Arendt—that we have lost *who* we are in *what* we do. It would seem from the above statement that thinking is an integral aspect of *who* that has been 'lost' in the knowing construction of *what*. In carrying the notion further, I make a distinction between education and schooling that is critical to this inquiry. It would seem from the above consideration, that thinking (thought) is central to creativity, and can be drawn forth (*e-duced*) through education; whereas knowing (cognition) is central to productivity, and can be taught (*in-duced*) through schooling. In putting two and two together, I begin to discern an important connection between "essential" identity (*who*), thinking, creativity and education; and "constructed" identity (*what*), knowing, productivity and schooling. Education and schooling are not the same. Has schooling overtaken education? Have education and schooling parted company for good? How would a fruitful interaction between education and schooling enrich the quality of our lives?

Along with the distinct, yet complementary, essential *who* of identity and the constructed *what* of a constructed *persona*, and the distinct, yet interrelated and interdependent aspects of thinking and knowing, another related duo of distinction conspires to both complicate the

matter and elucidate the mystery. The next elusive pair to come forward for examination is intuition and intellect.

Reigniting the Lamp of Intuition

Bergson (1998/1907) examines the complexity of relationship between intuition and intellect. Bergson suggests that intuition, what he calls, "the best part" of the power of consciousness, has been sacrificed to intellect (p. 267). A literature review of Bergsonian perspectives with regard to intuition and intellect substantiates the resonance I detect between Bergsonian theory of human consciousness and Arendt's (1971) distinction between thinking and knowing:

> ...consciousness is essentially free; it is freedom itself; but it cannot pass through matter without settling on it, without adapting itself to it: this adaptation is what we call intellectuality; and the intellect, turning itself back toward active, that is to say free, consciousness, naturally makes it enter into the conceptual forms into which it is accustomed to see matter fit. It will therefore always perceive freedom in the form of necessity; it will always neglect the part of novelty or of creation inherent in the free act; it will always substitute for action itself an imitation artificial, approximative, obtained by compounding the old with the old and the same with the same. (1998, p. 270)

Thus Bergson explains that it is only when we place ourselves in intuition that we can pass from intuition to intellect. From the place of the intellect we shall never be able to pass to intuition, he says. Yet, it is the intellect that has dominated intuition in the present-day humanity of which we are a part. Echoing Arendt's concern that thought and cognition may part company for good, Bergson points out the consequences of a pre-eminence of the intellect:

> This conquest, in the particular conditions in which it has been accomplished, has required that consciousness should adapt itself to the habits of matter and concentrate all its attention on them, in fact determine itself more as intellect. Intuition is there, but vague and above all discontinuous. It is a lamp almost extinguished, which only glimmers now and then, for a few moments at most. (p. 268)

Bergson suggests that what he calls “fleeting intuitions” ought to be seized by philosophy, first for the purposes of sustaining them, and then for expanding them and uniting them together. According to Bergson, the rationale for advancing in this work stems from the fact that the more one advances, the more one will perceive that intuition is mind itself and, in a certain sense, life itself, “the unity of the spiritual life” (p. 268). Thus another significant pair of opposites is put together in a compelling argument for the complementary and equal partnership of distinct opposites. The equal development of intuition and intellect in a balanced *curriculum* of education and schooling would create fertile conditions for the “wow! factor”. As Bergson suggests, intuition may be mind itself, and in a certain sense, life itself. Leaving mind and/or life out of the educational/schooling equation makes no sense at all.

Emotion, Feeling and Reason

The French word *intuition* more closely approximates the English word “feelings” than that of the word “instinct” which is the commonly used English translation to be found in Bergson’s work. According to Damasio (2003), until only recently little has been understood about the nature of feelings. “Elucidating the neurobiology of feelings and their antecedent emotions contributes to our views on the mind-body problem, a problem central to our understanding of who we are” (2003; p. 7). Moreover, maintains Damasio, understanding what feelings are, how they work, and what they mean is indispensable to the future construction of a view of human beings more accurate than the one available today. Why? “Because the success or failure of humanity depends in large measure on how the public and the institutions charged with the governance of public life incorporate that revised view of human beings in principles and policies” (2003; p. 8).

According to Damasio, “Feelings form the base for what humans have described for millennia as the human soul or spirit” (1994; xvi). Damasio sees identity and creativity in the same light that Arendt (1974) and Bergson (1998) envision a complete and perfect humanity in which both aspects of consciousness are equally developed and fully incorporated.

The most vexing of all questions writes Damasio in *Descartes' Error* is this: "How is it that we are conscious of the world around us, that we know what we know, and that we know that we know" (1994; xvii)? The intriguing question at the heart of this investigation brings me full circle to the conundrum of the first narrative piece. The "wow! factor" that I accidently stumbled upon as a beginning teacher, and the unplanned phenomenon that I wasn't able to articulate at the time, or "teach" in my workshops, could not have been reasonably addressed because there were few scientific explanations and little scientific interest to substantiate the mysterious occurrence. "Only during the past decade has the problem finally entered the scientific agenda, largely as a part of the investigation of consciousness", says Damasio (2003, p. 184).

Damasio calls intuition "the covert, mysterious mechanism" by which we arrive at the solution of a problem without reasoning toward it (1994, p. 188). Because the creative process on which the progress of science is based operates on the level of the subconscious, when we witness signs of creativity in contemporary humans, explains Damasio, we are probably witnessing the integrated operation of sundry combinations of these devices (p. 191). Damasio's astute, all-encompassing observation moves this investigation towards a broader comprehension of the link between identity and creativity and the important implications to the present phase of inquiry of "the integrated operation of sundry combinations of these devices" (1994, p. 191).

Making the Connection

Understanding the mystery of identity and creativity requires that we think what we are doing (Arendt, 1974); that we reignite the flame of intuition (Bergson, 1998/1907); and that we include emotion and feelings as integral aspects of reason (Damasio, 1994; 2003). Making the connection between essentialism and constructivism; *who* and *what*, knowing and thinking, intuition and intellect, and mind and body may turn out to be the "real" job of the modern-day

educator. A dynamic interplay of the differences may make all the difference in how we envision ourselves and our world in the future.

The concerns for the future of public education as expressed by the educational leaders at the 2004 Oxford Round Table on Education challenge the status quo of modern schooling and advocate a revised rationale for a *reason*able accommodation of creativity. By all accounts, it would seem that a revised view of human beings more accurate the one currently available as suggested by Damasio (2003) is in the hands (and minds and hearts) of educators. Reverberating from the hallowed halls of the Oxford Union are two remaining questions: Is there room for creativity in our schools? How could/would creativity contribute to nurturing and nourishing the fragile wellbeing of the interdependent, interconnected worldwide web?

The more I understand the mystery at the heart of this investigation, the more I doubt the sustainability of present-day conceptualizations of constructed identity and utilitarian-instrumental productivity as useful rationales for individual success in Western school programs and reforms. The propensity for *savoir faire* (knowledge and skills) no longer seems feasible if we are to take seriously into account the list of all-too-familiar problems cited by Bill Laar and the delegates at the 2004 Oxford Round Table. In advocating room for creativity, the educational leaders envisioned the possibility of moving toward a well-rounded education that would include both *savoir faire* (knowledge and skills) and *raison d'être* (meaning and purpose). The health (wholeness) of the interconnected, interdependent world in which we live might very well hang in the balance.

The delicate web of human relationships that I have experienced in schools tells me that creativity does not need money as much as it needs will. When room is made for creativity in the hearts and minds of educators (room for *who* we are, and room for the "in between"), I am convinced that all manner of means will quickly materialize to accommodate the intangible wow! factor. As I recall school life—the vibrancy of reading circles, the excitement of awards assemblies, the exuberant all-school singing, the dancing, the musical extravaganzas, the costumes, the art work displays, the science fairs, the hard work, the lunch-hour sports, the math videos, the larger community involvement, the partnerships with universities, the student

council's voices, and the tension-filled growing pains generated between stakeholders in the collaborative creation of their school's Success Plan—I can vouch for the fact that creativity (the "real" we have in common, Arendt, 1974, p. 183) does not cost money that cash-strapped public schools just don't have. As one teacher put it very simply, "When we're all together, stuff happens!"

Chapter XI

A Critical Analysis

L'essentiel est invisible pour les yeux.

(Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, 1946)

From the perspective of the present dissertation, critical analysis is a form of meaning-finding. Critical analysis has been, and continues to be, an integral aspect of the telling of a living story. The self-same determined search for meaning that has compelled the quest from the beginning continues to propel the adventure (and the adventurer) along its winding, woodsy path toward an as-yet-untold ending ... in the event that such an ending should occur. Open-ended possibility aside, given the quality (nature) and quantity (length) of the ground covered in Chapters I to X, it seems appropriate to pause for a moment, to open Eisner's "enlightened eye" (1991) to a wider lens; and to stand back and appreciate from a distance—a view that remains up-close-and-personal, but one that can also encompass a larger picture—*who* and *what* the story may have to show and tell us at this juncture, and from this angle.

The first thing I notice from the wider perspective of Eisner's artistic eye is that "critical analysis" is part of a long-standing tradition. In "A Closer Look at Educational Criticism", Chapter VII of *The Enlightened Eye: Qualitative Inquiry and the Enhancement of Educational Practice*, Eisner says that although the roots of criticism are located in the observations and judgments of daily life, criticism reaches its most sophisticated form in literature and the arts. "Educational criticism is part of a tradition that has long flourished in the arts and humanities, in philosophy, and later in the social sciences," explains Eisner (1991, p. 121). To approach the writing of a critical analysis, therefore, is to tread softly on the ground of a tradition in which critics are "commentators, interpreters, evaluators, and, at their best, educators" (1991, p. 121).

The abilities to make fine-grained discriminations among complex and subtle qualities is an aspect of Eisner's educational *connoisseurship* (1976, 1985b). The subject of the present thesis (identity and creativity in education) has consistently revealed identifiable aspects of the indefinable uniqueness and the indivisible wholeness of *who* I am *really*. Before delving into the overall analysis for the purposes of further elucidating the present thesis, there is first a "fine-grained discrimination" to expose and discuss, a distinction that is critical to understanding the subtle yet vast difference between "*who* I am *being*" and "*what* I am *doing* or *what* I am named". The discrimination can be found in two distinctly different meanings of the word "analysis", a word that is a key to the present undertaking. The Merriam-Webster Collegiate dictionary defines "analysis" (from the Greek *analyein*, to break up) as "a separation of the whole into its component parts"; and/or "an examination of a complex, its elements and relations" (1999, p. 41). Under the parameters of the first of the two definitions, a critical analyst would likely approach the subject matter under investigation with the intent of separating the whole into its component parts for the purposes of deconstructing and reconstructing 'meaning' according to positivistic methods of examination, identification, categorization, comparison and generalization. A classical example of such an analysis—an example that I shudder to recall from high school biology class—is the dissection of a frog. The example I give is *à propos* the task at hand.

Presumably to understand the 'meaning' of a frog, i.e. to observe how the frog functions and for what purpose, the biology experiment would require that we anaesthetize the frog before killing it so that we would be able to 'study' and 'learn' and 'know' "the frog" by our rational ability to name, locate and reconstruct its severed segments. What was not lost on me—a squeamish onlooker in the experiment—was the fact that what was 'lost' in the analysis was the *life* of the poor frog! From where I stood, once we were finished with the dissection, there was no 'frogness' left to be studied. And sadly, the same would often hold true for the analysis of a poem or a novel in high school literature class. For the most part, such analytical 'dissections' were heartless exercises; rarely was the analysis of even an exceptional literary piece a meaningful experience. Due to the lack of heart, i.e. feeling appreciation for the *life* of the work under study, the "real" meaning was lost. Furthermore, when the object of the

exercise was to extract and identify the various parts of the content with little or no regard for the context, nothing made sense really.

Because identity (*who*) is wholly unique and [w]holistically alive, the present analysis cannot in good faith break down the complex and subtle qualities of *who* as if to name the parts would be to 'know' the whole; nor can the analysis—no matter how rigorously presented, or how true to the subject the critique—meet scholarly research standards of "generalizability" (Butler-Kisber, 2010, p. 15). What the critical analysis can do, and hopefully will do, in keeping with the second dictionary definition, and in accord with Eisner's thinking on the practice of educational criticism, is to examine the complex, elements and relations; and to comment, interpret, evaluate, and, possibly educate (from the Latin, to draw forth) meaning. "Who", as we have come to know "self" or "I/dentity" or "personhood" throughout the ongoing work in process, is alive and well. Thinking through the data by means of "finding out by finding in" (Dobson 2011b, p. 161) has been established in the preceding chapters as a way of "being in the work from its inception to its completion" (Butler-Kisber, 2010, p. 3); and as a way of "thinking what we are doing" (Arendt, 1974, p. 5), the intended purpose of the present work. By commenting on and evaluating the work, and by interpreting a composite portrait drawn from the living stories, "Telling Tales out of School", I intend to honour and celebrate the life of an invisible grandeur: the indefinable yet identifiable complex I have come to know as "who I am *really*".

To portray self and meaning in a way that incorporates the complex, elements and relations of an analysis, I remain steadfast in the established tried-and-true method of this dissertation, namely storytelling and the arts. By means of my intended resolution to allow a living portrait to emerge through my meaning-finding endeavour, I hear a faint sound of resonance not too far off in the distance. Paying closer attention to the intuitive reverberation, I soon discern the enchanting echo of the voice of *le renard* (the fox) in *Le petit prince* (de Saint-Exupéry, 1946) *who* has managed across a span of many decades to consistently sound and re-sound a universally *felt* resonant touchstone pertaining to the elements of critical analysis and/or meaning-finding: "*Voici mon secret*. *Il est très simple*: *on ne voit bien qu'avec le coeur*. *L'essentiel est invisible pour les yeux*" (de Saint-Exupéry, 1946, p. 72). (Here is my secret. It is

very simple. One can only *really* see with the heart. The essential [meaning] is invisible to the eyes. [My translation] In the following artistic rendition of a conversation that took place between a fox and a little prince in the middle of the Sahara Desert sometime ago, de Saint-Exupéry reveals *le secret*—an unequivocal inside-out view of the elements that are critical to any "real" (heartfelt) meaning-finding enterprise.

Finding the Unique in the Ordinary

"*Va revoir les roses. Tu comprendras que la tienne est unique au monde*" (de Saint-Exupéry, 1946, p. 70). (Go and revisit the roses. You will understand that yours is unique in the world. [My translation] De Saint-Exupéry's advice, as spoken by *le renard* (the fox), proposes an intriguing entry point for a meaningful interpretation of the unique (*who*) in the ordinary (*what*). Poetic licence will perhaps allow me to find the rose in de Saint-Exupéry's extraordinary tale to be an apt symbol for "identity and creativity" in the ordinary tales I tell. Taking to heart the advice of *le renard*, I shall revisit the roses, an ordinary bunch of roses by all outer appearances; but on the inside, because of the love I feel for one of the roses I have come to know as "I", my "rose" is *unique au monde*. Indeed, through the rigorous work of a work in process—*aka* "education" from the perspective of the present thesis—I have uncovered, discovered and retrieved the vital presence of "self" and the vibrant meaning of "I".

A key component in my discovery, and one that strongly resonates with the secret of *le renard*, is the "real" (heartfelt) meaning of the French word *apprivoiser* (p. 67). "Qu'est-ce qui signifie 'apprivoiser'?" (What does 'apprivoiser' mean?) asks *le petit prince*. "C'est une chose trop oubliée," dit le renard. (It is something only too well forgotten, says the fox.) "Ça signifie 'créer des liens'" (p. 68). (It means to create ties or connections.) [My translation] A French-English dictionary's prosaic translation tells us that *apprivoiser* means "to tame" (Collins-Robert French-English English-French Dictionary, 2nd edition, 1989, p. 34), thus implying the exertion of external power and control. From a poetic way of seeing (with the heart), *apprivoiser* means quite the opposite. Thus, the ability to understand the unique (*who*) in the ordinary (*what*), from de Saint-Exupéry's point of view (a perspective that strongly resonates with my own lived

experience) has everything to do with the creation of relationship, and nothing to do with the exertion of external power and control.

But that's not all there is to *le secret*. To *really* see the unique (*who*) in the ordinary (*what*)—at least according to the hard lesson learned by *le petit prince*—there is an element of responsibility to be taken into account: "*Je suis responsable de ma rose* (1946, p. 74). The prosaic meaning of responsibility implies "accountability", presumably to someone or something other than, i.e. separate from, oneself. However, an interpretation of the love found within the verb *apprivoiser* (to create ties or connections) is more in keeping with the meaning of responsibility in "*je suis responsable de ma rose*", and more in accordance with the *élan* of our present consideration. Arendt understands the meaning of love in the context of the relationship under consideration. She says that only love is fully receptive to *who* somebody is because "only love possesses an *unequalled power of self-revelation*" (1974, p. 242, emphasis added). In other words, "I" am responsible for the 'other' once I have created ties (*liens*) with the 'other' because "I" and the 'other' are now one and the same "I". ("*Unique au monde*" contains a *double entendre*. Unique means "unequalled" or ''singular'; unique also means "one" or "single" as in "*sens unique*" which means "one way".) Regardless of *what* the 'other' may say or do in a worldly sense, "I" am responsible for the inner "reality" (*ma rose*) in the connections (*liens*) I create, no matter *what*. Critical to understanding Arendt's meaning of love—articulated above as the "unequalled power of self-revelation"—and the responsibility of love---represented by the French verb *apprivois*er—is the following citation from Arendt's original doctoral dissertation, subsequently translated, *Love and Saint Augustine*:

> The love of my neighbour, or generally love between human beings, derives from a source altogether different from appetites and desires. A different concept of love comes into play ... (Arendt, 1929 c. 1996, p. 43-44).

A different concept of love, a concept that is central to the critical analysis underway, comes into play in the following revisiting of "*les roses*"; and, in particular, an unexpected first encounter with "*ma rose*". A heartfelt glimpse of my "real" identity was described in the tale "A Question of Identity" as follows: "I just had the best time of my life, and I wasn't even there." This was the first articulation of an identity that I had "felt", but didn't consciously "know".

According to the tale, a "self" that I had for a long time perceived to be "true" behind the scenes was finally being acknowledged up front as a "real person" who had momentarily, inadvertently subsumed the "impersonator" (what) in the classroom on that eventful day. When I first wrote the account, I named the "I" a radiant "transcendent self" in "loving relationship" with my students. Subsequently, I noticed the immature, preconceived separation of identities. This naming was indicative of an as-yet-under-developed conceptualization of my unique I/dentity (upper case) as being above and beyond that of my ordinary i/dentity (lower case) as well as separate from the ordinary identities of my students. Towards the completion of my work in process, I have come to understand that there *really* is no separate, transcendent "I" *per se*; but instead there is embodied "I" whose *experience* is interdependent, interconnected ... in fact, intertwined within the same "I" *experience* with everyone and everything else with whom I create *les liens*: "*Tu comprendras que ta rose est unique au monde"* (op. cit.). Embodied emotion and feelings (McGilchrist's "betweenness") are the proven connectors to "who I am *really*", just as Damasio (1999) has suggested. Moreover, through the rigorous process of writing this dissertation, I have come to intuit identity and creativity to be *life* itself, just as Bergson (1998/1907) has suggested. My use of the italicized word "*experience*" invokes McGilchrist's distinction between living *experience* and having an "experience"; and my use of McGilchrist's term "betweenness" (2009, p. 31) invokes the invisible, indivisible, identifiable and knowable *who* as distinct from a separate *what* identity.

Part I: Who's Who? Revisited

As I revisit the roses in "Telling Tales out of School" Part I, Who's Who? I find a hybrid of elements to be considered. "Research in the Crib", for example, tells a tale of the conscious experience of the unchangeable identity of personhood found, surprisingly enough, existent in the thinking (questioning) of babyhood. This tale informs me that thinking is distinct from, and antecedent to, the construction of knowledge. Before knowing, there was thinking. This vivid memory of an *experience* of babyhood provides solid grounds for understanding the resonant touchstones I found in Bergson's *Creative Evolution* (1998/1907) and in *Matter and Memory*

(2005/1908); and in particular, with regard to Bergsonian theories about "pure memory" and "*la durée*", discussed at length in earlier chapters. The vividness of my memory of this event (as if the *experience* were occurring now) coupled with the inner awareness that "I" am exactly the same person "I" was then, albeit in an evolved (older) form of body and a different (more knowledgeable) frame of mind, allows me to know an element of my reality ("*ma rose*") as "thinking" as distinct from "knowing" (Arendt, 1971, p. 422). The phenomenon that has permitted such important insights to emerge is memory. As noted in an earlier discussion of Bergsonian theory, according to Bergson, to solve the classical problem of the relation of body and soul, it is with memory that we have to deal. "Memory is the intersection between mind and matter" (2005, p. 13).

In revisiting the tale "Running Away" I encounter the feisty four-year-old version of "*ma rose*" as she faces off oppression and adversity. I see no shy wall flower in this depiction; instead, I see someone who knows who she is despite her small size, and despite the concerted efforts of her older siblings to squelch and/or eliminate her determined sense of self. In telling this tale, I equate my desire to run away to Maxine Greene's notion of freedom in education, freedom to choose one's own way of being in the world, and the "capacity to take initiatives, to begin" (1984, p. 55). How does Greene envision educating for freedom? From this tale, Greene's most pertinent and challenging question arises "How much does the possibility of freedom depend on critical reflectiveness, on self understanding, on insight into the world" (1984, p. 53)?

Next, using the tool of a "poetic cluster" as a "powerful and compelling way of getting a prism-like rendition of the subtle variations of a phenomenon" (Butler-Kisber, 2010, p. 95), I revisit the roses to re-examine my relationship with my three siblings. In reviewing "No Explanations", "Down to Earth" and "Coming Full Circle" with my eyes, I see ordinary accounts about ordinary events that took place sometime in the past; however, with my heart, I am able to see elements of the living portrait of "*ma rose*", *unique au monde* because of the love I feel for my brothers and my sister. Their *life* endures in the "I" of our plural identity. "I" am singular, but "I" am not separate from my family. In anticipating the possible contributions for education (Chapter XII), I wonder what the practical implications might be of an awakened understanding of the

individual student who is an aspect of a plural conglomerate (*who*). Would we not see an invisible complexity of this magnitude differently? Would being aware of the intricate interweaving of relationship in a family cluster, for example, allow for a more comprehensive, more compassionate, more respectful education (drawing forth) of the reality of "*ma rose*" *unique au monde*? Because family ties do not stop with worldly relationships, as the above poetry cluster may illustrate, how would we take into account the ancestral ties also present in our schools and classrooms?

The plural relationship does not end with interpersonal relationships as the revisiting of the next tale will tell. "Where you are is who you are. The further inside you the place moves, the more your identity is intertwined with it" (Mayes, 1996, as cited by Shira, 2012, p. 147). The surprise element of the tale "Coming Full Circle" is the discovery of the intricate bonds of sisterhood present in my felt sense of identity. The familiar material things of my childhood home have also proven to be an intimate part of me, another unexpected surprise. Even more astonishing to discover from my lived experience is that the place of my identity extends out beyond my physical home, as portrayed in "The Screen Door", and includes "shad flies" and "turtle pond" and "green beans snapped fresh from their vines" where the variety held "infinite promise". Thinking through the implication of my childhood *experience* of home as *who*, I am wondering in what ways the context of modern schooling encourages a broadening of the learning field to encompass "infinite" landscapes and intimate connections; and/or in what ways the context of modern schooling tends to standardize and minimize the horizons to fit the customary frameworks of known facts?

The last two tales told in Part I: Who's Who?—"The Doll's Pajamas" and "The Jelly Beans"—reveal secret elements of a critical analysis that can only be seen with the heart. On the outside, the tales relay ordinary childhood experiences; but, on the inside, from a heartfelt perspective, the stories proffer unique insights with regard to the complex components of "*ma rose*". Arendt describes conscience as knowing "with and by myself" (1974, p. 418). Damasio advocates an education of the "cognitive unconscious" because, he says, knowing cognitively an ethical theory or principle does not take into account the cognitive unconscious in the realm

of actions (2010, p. 280). For Damasio, the ultimate step in the evolution of consciousness is the making of conscience, from the Latin *con* (with) and *scientia* (knowledge) which suggests the gathering of knowledge (2010, p. 230). The above perspectives on conscience, coupled with the tales of my lived experience of consciousness and conscience in childhood, strongly suggest there is a critical role to be played by education (as differentiated from schooling) in the development of consciousness and in the drawing forth of conscience.

Part II: What Happens to Who? Revisited

The first tale of Part II, entitled "The Inspection", offers an insightful perspective with regard to "constructed identity" (Hall and DuGay, 1996) and with respect to the principal theory in Bergson's work, "attention to life" (1998/1907; 2005/1908). In the time when the storied event took place, Kindergarten was not yet a part of mainstream schooling. Formal education in post-WW II Quebec began at the age of six or seven, depending on date of birth. The first tale of Part II, "The Inspection", reveals a child's sense of *who*, presumably sufficiently developed (as conveyed in "Who's Who?" Part I) to withstand the onslaught of a perplexing disciplinary action inflicted by the misplaced identity of a first-grade teacher. In paying closer attention to the *son et lumière* of life (heard in the voices and movement of the children through the broom closet door) than to the harsh and dark 'reality' of the event taking place, the child managed to survive an otherwise traumatic experience ... and live to tell the tale! A modern-day educator would no doubt wonder what would/could have happened to the integrity of a younger child or of a child who had not yet had the opportunity to develop such a strong affinity for life. Another question that arises from this tale is the question of identity of the teacher. What might have happened in this teacher's experience that would cause her to have so little empathy for the children in her care? What happened to her capacity for emotion and feelings? Were the teacher's intentions malicious as apparent; or was there a misguided notion of a teacher's duty?

The next ordinary rose I revisit is found in a rather ordinary tale about a regrettably ordinary phenomenon. From this particular tale, the question arises as to what happens to the ability to act from conscience in a child who participates in a collective act of cruelty towards another classmate. Why, in her awareness of wrong-doing, did the eight-year-old not do anything to try to stop the chorus of chanting? First to emerge is the recognition of the presence of "*ma rose"* despite all outer appearances. Along with the awareness of wrong-doing, there was also the more subtle evidence of wisdom. In the action taken 'on the side', "*ma rose*" is identifiable. The intention, at least so it seems, was to support her classmate in a situation that was beyond both of their abilities to control. Given the circumstances, this may have been the only appropriate action to be taken.

The loss of identity (*who*) that occurs as a result of acquiring a social and cultural identity (*what*) is exemplified in the next tale. In "A Defining Moment", the essentially [w]holistic identity (I am) literally and figuratively becomes 'lost' in the socially, culturally and religiously defined identity (I am a Christian; I am not Jewish). For the purposes of the educational investigation underway, the fact that the defining moment portrayed in this tale occurs between the ages of twelve and thirteen is significant. From the perspective of schooling, the defining moment also happens to occur in the transition between elementary and secondary school, a critical threshold and/or 'window of opportunity' in the ongoing development of consciousness and conscience conveyed throughout this thesis as a process of educating for meaning (drawing forth from within *who* I am *really*).

"Famous Last Words" is a cautionary tale about what immediately happens to *who* in the simple transaction of definition, naming or translation. "*Ma rose*" is unequivocal on this point. The very moment *who* is defined (or translated) as a *what*— or, even at the mere suggestion that *what* is *who*, as in "just be yourself"—*who* disappears altogether. Looking at the reality of this ignored, or undetected, fact from an educational *connoisseur*'s perspective, I see the crux of the educational matter revealed in this tiny nugget of insight.

The most tragic of all tales in "Telling Tales out of School, Part II" is "The Graduation Ceremony". The official message with its rubber stamp mantra "more effort required"

exemplifies a Western worldview of education's aim to train up new generations of children for a successful adult life. In the ensuing reflection, the detection of a betrayal of trust at the heart of the platform policy is likened to the ancient betrayal of the "master" (right-hemisphere ways of being) by his "emissary" (left-hemisphere modes of thought) cited earlier from *The Master and his Emissary*: *The Divided Brain and the Making of Western Civilization* (McGilchrist, 2009, p. 14). In light of "The Graduation Ceremony", an 'untruth' was found deeply embedded in the premise of an institution presumably established in the interests of 'truth'. (By 'untruth' I mean 'impossibility', as I shall explain further along.) The admonishment to work harder to *make* a better future i/dentity was absurd in the face of the present I/dentity being shown (shone) by the graduates. In the end, it was the dark cloud of officialdom that cast the paltriest of shadows over the living reality of "*ma rose*". Along with the betrayal of trust, the difference between a meaning-making endeavour and a meaning-finding event was lost on the assembly. The 'untruth' felt on the inside turned out to be the impossibility of what was being taught on the outside. To think what we are doing (Arendt, 1974, p. 5) in education is to realize that no matter how much more effort students apply to their studies, nor how hard they try to be some*thing* they fundamentally are not, a feat of meaning-making by reason of the "construction of identity" is not only self-defeating, but humanly impossible! The 'truth' revealed in "Telling Tales out of School" Parts I and II is that w*ho* cannot be, nor ever become, a *what*! A rose is a rose. Truth is *lived*, not taught (Hesse, 2000 c 1943, p. 73, emphasis added).

In *Sources of the Self*: *The Making of Modern Identity*, Charles Taylor (1989) sums up the tragedy of *what* happens to *who*: "The life of instrumental reason lacks the force, the depth, the vibrancy, the joy which comes from being connected to the *élan* of nature. But there is worse. It doesn`t just lack this; the instrumental stance towards nature constitutes a bar to ever attaining it" (p. 383). The present exploration has exposed the impossibility of making *who* into a *what*. Furthermore, under the guise of "education", formal schooling, with its aim to 'make' some*thing* of one's 'self' has usurped the root meaning and purpose of education, to draw forth (meaning) from within. Does the modern-day system of schooling, based on a platform of instrumental reason, constitute a "bar" to ever experiencing (knowing) "the force, the depth,

the vibrancy, the joy which comes from being connected to the *élan* of nature", as Taylor suggests?

Chapter XII

Contributions to Education

What are the contributions of this work to education? Because the dissertation is written as a poetic narrative—more along web-like lines of associative logic than along straight lines of linear logic—I anticipated from the beginning the probability of generating more questions than answers. My intent was to think through my own writing process as a living example of an educational quest for meaning. Intuiting the links between *who* and meaning, and the ancient Greek aphorism, "Know thyself" and education, I wanted to conduct concurrently a determined search for 'self'. In my interest to explore the underexplored (Bruner, 1960) I sought to uncover insights more than I looked for conclusions. Accordingly, a consideration of the contributions of this work to education will include the possibility of resonance as well as the possibilities of content. Resonance, like artwork, implicates others by involving the emotion and feelings of others as well as by inviting the interpretation of others. The open-endedness I am suggesting is perhaps better expressed in the last two lines of "An Occasion for Poetry", Chapter VI: "The doors and windows are open/You decide" (Dobson, 2011b, p. 164).

For the pragmatic purposes of this final chapter, then, knowing that the last word on the contributions of this work will be decided in collaboration with others has inadvertently opened my poetically biased "doors and windows" to a more prosaic –dare I say, more "objective"?—point of view. As a result, I hope to contribute well grounded as well as well rounded possibilities from the perspective of a 'practised' classroom teacher and an 'experienced' educational leader. With a realistic eye 'out' for the bottom line of *what'*s possible coupled with a newly enlightened eye 'in' for the real aspects of *who'*s possible, I intend to bring both my re-presented experience and my living *experience* to the investigation. Assuming a newly educated stance of on-looker from a third dimension, i.e. (Arendt's (1974) "in-between"; McGilchrist's "betweenness"; and Damasio's "homeostatic refinement", I look for both the realistic and the real in the possible.

In keeping with the advice of *le renard* in Chapter XI, I begin the last phase of inquiry *à point* by revisiting the *raison d'être* of my study. Motivated by a heartfelt resonance with Arendt's (1974) appraisal of the human condition— especially her astute observation that we have lost *who* we are in *what* we do—I began this exploration with a question of identity. It became increasingly evident to me during the inquiring process that the question I had in mind, while personal to me, was integral to education. By elucidating the mystery of *who*, and by examining the formal and informal educational conditions and practices that may support and/or stifle the experience of *who,* I hoped to discover *who* I am *really*. Most importantly, I hoped to contribute the possibilities of my discovery to education. Now that I know *who* and *what* I know, I am wondering what it would take to affect a change of heart (will) that would be compelling enough to bring about a change of formation generous enough to incorporate the uncertain, invisible, non-measurable, nonetheless very 'real' possibilities of *who* within the apparently more certain, visible, measurable 'realistic' constructions of *what*? As noted earlier, Taylor, citing Rousseau, suggests that it is the will of "calculating reason" that flourishes only where conscience, i.e. the inner voice of nature, is stifled (1989, p. 358). Given the status quo of calculating reason in modern education, how can we retrieve a lost *who* from the utilitarian-instrumental program of schooling as we know it? How might we balance the educational/schooling equation; and, while we're at it, enrich our lives as researchers and educators? How might we return the promise of "new beginnings" (Arendt, 2000, p. xxi) from whence it came to where it belongs— in the living *experience* of youth?

To provide a context for addressing the above questions as well as to respond to the questions arising from the Critical Analysis, Parts I and II, I shall use as a framework the five questions (see Chapter IV) that have guided my inquiry from its inception to its completion.

1. What does an experience of *who* look like and feel like?

2. What are the educational conditions (formal and informal) that support and/or stifle *who*?

3. In what ways have we lost *who* we are in *what* we do?

4. What (or who) is creativity? What role does creativity play in facilitating *who* and vice versa?

5. How would/could making room for who in expression (Taylor, 1989) and in action (Arendt, 1974) in teacher development programs and in school curricula contribute to the reinvigoration of education and the revision of the aims of schooling?

Question #1: What Does an Experience of *Who* Look Like and Feel Like?

My experience in life strongly resonates with the distinction McGilchrist (2009) makes between *experience* and "having an experience". *Experience* is "the live, complex, embodied world of individual, always unique beings, forever in flux, a net of interdependencies, forming and reforming wholes, a world with which we are deeply connected"; and "an experience" is "the way we experience our *experience* in a special way: a re-presented version of it, containing now static, separable, bounded, but essentially fragmented entities, grouped into classes, on which predictions can be based" (2009, p. 31). I can say, therefore, with an authority that comes with 'knowing from experience' that the *experience* of *who* looks and feels nothing like "an experience" of *what*. Moreover, due to the uniqueness of *experience* that can only be lived to be known, no comparisons with other "experiences" can be made. Ironically, "an experience" of a separate self (a *what*) is completely 'lost' in the *experience* of a connected reality (*who*). In Chapter I "A Question of Identity", the sentence, "I just had the best time of my life and I wasn't even there" speaks to the loss of a separate "in a funk" i/dentity (*what*) in the finding of a connected "radiant" I/dentity (*who*).

Along with the idea of letting go of a separate identity in the assumption of connected Identity, the statement, "I just had the best time of my life and I wasn't even there" reveals two more important clues with regard to the look and feel of *who*. "The best time of my life" implies *la joie de vivre* which, according to the above statement, is not only superlative, but is also unprecedented. Also recognized in "A Question of Identity" is that *experience* of I/dentity is reflected in "the beaming faces" of the students. Although *who* is invisible to the eye, *who* is nonetheless identifiable by reason of a *felt* radiance. Offering a scientific explanation for what happens in the experience of *felt* life, Damasio suggests that emotion and feelings are the connectors to "the state of life within the entire organism ... lifting the veil in the literal sense of the term (1999, p. 6). Arendt describes the revelation of *who* in the public realm as a "shining

brightness we once called 'glory'" (1974, p. 180). From these clues, as well as from other clues revealed through other tales, it may be surmised that *who* not only feels alive, but is joyful; and *who* not only appears radiant, but is luminous.

Further investigation reveals two related possibilities with respect to the look and feel of *who*. There is the example of "betweenness" (McGilchrist, 2009, p. 31) of the plurality of *who* described in "A Question of Identity" above; however, included in the look and feel of the *experience* of "betweenness" is naked "thisness". Arendt describes "thisness" as "the feeling of freedom" that "snaps back into place" when the events on the world's stage for which the roles and masks were designed are over (2003, pp. 13-14). How, then, are plural "betweenness" and singular "thisness" related? I think they are one and the same "I". In putting two and two together, I realize that "I" in my naked "thisness" am an integral aspect of "I" in my plural "betweenness", and *vice versa*. In other words, in reality, there is no separate "I". Resonant

with my thinking of the connectivity (oneness) between plurality and singularity, Arendt makes the following remarkable statement: "Only where things can be seen by many in a variety of aspects without changing their identity so that those who gather around them know that they see sameness in utter diversity can worldly reality truly and reliably appear" (1974, p. 57). Arendt's statement, in direct support of the discoveries in this inquiry with respect to what *who* looks like and feels like, is possibly the most meaningful contribution to education that can be made by reason of this dissertation. An accepted notion of "sameness in utter diversity" as a practical educational premise would transform, from the inside-out, the meaning and purpose of education as we know it.

What are the implications of "without changing their identity" in terms of the diversity of human beings finding their way into the universities, colleges, schools and classrooms of the 21st century? For the sake of argument, letting go of the idea, wrought by instrumental reason, of an interchangeable "constructed identity" (*what*), and assuming for a moment the idea being proposed in this thesis that *who* is "the unchangeable identity of the person" (Arendt, 1974, p. 193) opens the "doors and windows" to a broader and more practical interpretation of the educational possibilities embedded in the phrase "sameness in utter diversity". Such a

possibility, if allowed to flourish in education by reason of a change of heart (will) and by means of the inevitable changes in *praxis* that would accompany such a change of will, would permit, as Arendt suggests, "worldly reality to truly and reliably appear". The appearance of a true and reliable "worldly reality" would be no small educational feat! In fact, in light of the 'impossibility' of constructing a separate 'individual' identity, the possibility of educing a 'unique' singular/plural I/dentity is not only sound in political theory, but also supported by scientific theory and grounded in educational practice. The identity of the teacher and her students, as described in Chapter I, is experienced as "one and the same 'I'". The *experience* of "betweenness" and "thisness" contained in "sameness" contributes to both the real and the realistic possibilities in education.

Question #2a: What are the educational conditions that support *who*?

The premise of this thesis holds that education and schooling are not the same. From its Latin root meaning, education is a process of drawing forth '*who* we are' as distinct from schooling's mission to construct '*what* we are' by means of calculating reason. Given the internal requirement of the educational premise, the paramount condition for supporting *who* in any educational setting would be an educated person who knows *who* he or she is *really ...* or, a person who is open to the possibility of an indefinable, yet identifiable inner reality that is distinct from the constructed realism of outer appearances. Classroom teachers, for example, would know "the feeling of freedom" that comes with placing their identity in "thisness" or "betweenness"; most importantly, they would find their bearings in the *experience* of consciousness. McGilchrist says there is nothing else remotely like consciousness to compare it with: it is itself *the ground of all experience*" (2009, p. 19, emphasis added). (Now there is a solid foundation for teaching and learning!) By seeing their role for *what* it is—an interchangeable definition of *what* they do, not *who* they are—teachers would be less inclined to permit the requirements of their role to mask their authentic identity. In fact, teachers who know *who* they are would act from a place of 'conscience'. Conscience, according to Damasio, is "the ultimate step in the evolution of consciousness" (1999, p. 230); and according to Arendt, a

dialogue one has with oneself, a kind of knowledge that is actualized in every thinking process (1971, p. 5). In good conscience, therefore, teachers would not re-act according to a prefabricated notion about how a teacher would/should behave. Nor would teachers feel the need to succumb to pressures, professional and/or otherwise, to construct their teacher identity according to school reformers' and policy makers' concepts about the function of their roles. Instead, teachers would be highly motivated to perfect their unique style of self-mastery through the acquisition of new knowledge, improved skills and effective strategies, i.e. professional development for its own sake.

Because teachers who find their identity in *who* would see in their students "sameness in utter diversity", they would likely share a powerful sense of "betweenness" with their students. De Saint-Exupéry's poetic meaning of the French verb *apprivoiser* (to create ties or connections) (1946, p. 67) would hold a place of honour in such teachers' classrooms where the opposite, prosaic meaning of *apprivoiser* (to tame by wielding power and control) would hold no place whatsoever. Thus, teaching and learning would no longer be separate functions—teaching assigned to the role of teacher and learning assigned to the role of student; but in the shared "I", as articulated in "A Question of Identity", teaching and learning would become a way of being together in the living *experience* of education. Acquiring the necessary competencies for making progress as appropriate to the task at hand would be seen in the light of attaining self-mastery; thus cognitive learning would not be shrouded under a vague, future-oriented mantra of effort and drudgery. In the radiant public space where a self-revelatory "different concept of love comes into play" (Arendt, 1996, p. 43-44), all manner of possibilities would serendipitously conspire in support of *who*. (I know a unique version of this possibility from my experience as a former school principal, as related earlier in Chapter X.)

Given society's current anxieties with regard to the *what* and *how* of spending an ever-diminishing school funding allotment, it is refreshing as well as practical to consider the most important, yet most often ignored and/or overlooked, question of education, namely, *who* is teaching and *who* is learning... and to what purpose, *really*? Ironically, as suggested in the tale, "Is there Room for Creativity in our Schools?" the pivotal condition in support of *who* in both

formal and informal educational settings doesn't cost money that cash-strapped public schools just don't have. The condition requires a change of will; it calls for a change in orientation from the outside-in to the inside-out. The condition is very simple: it is nothing more than to think what we are doing (Arendt, 1974, p. 5). If one thing has become crystal clear with regard to educational conditions in support of *who*, it is that the teachers and educational leaders *who* are open to making room for the *experience* of *who* in their districts, schools and classrooms are paramount. Without *who*, there can be no education, only schooling. In truth, we teach by example, not by the book. As a wise old adage goes, "It takes one to know one."

Question # 2b: What are the educational conditions that stifle *who*?

In *The Quest for Certainty*, John Dewey personifies education as the agent of society (1960/1929). As society's agent, it stands to reason that education would be expected to reflect society's views and to serve society's needs according to those views. The Québec Education Program (QEP) cited earlier, for example, was written in response to social expectations. Given the QEP's threefold mission to "instruct", "socialize" and "qualify" students for a changing world (see Chapter II), it is clearly evident that the root meaning of education has been lost in the modern-day program of schooling. Not surprisingly, Arendt's (1974) astute appraisal—that we (a generation of jobholders) have lost *who* we are in *what* we do—is reflected in the loss of the meaning of education in the pragmatic programming of schooling.

Having now undergone the rigours of a determined search for meaning that is inwardly generated and not outwardly constructed I see that this loss of the core meaning of education is the all-pervasive educational condition that stifles *who*. But there is worse. Schooling, under the guise of education, not only stifles *who*; schooling, because of its instrumental stance, constitutes a bar to ever attaining the *experience* of who, as Taylor suggests is the case whenever and wherever calculating reason is in charge (1989, p. 383). Proposing the "construction of identity" as the central aim of schooling (see QEP diagram Appendix I) defeats the meaning of education and stifles the expression of *who* ... before *who* has had even a chance to begin!

Question #3: In what ways have we lost *who* we are in *what* we do?

A poignant example of "loss" is portrayed in the post-WW II tale, "The Inspection". This is a story about a common educational condition in which the teacher sees herself as a functionary of teacher identity. In this particular tale, the teacher identity, indicative of the times, was akin to the *persona* of a commanding officer in the army. The teacher acted mindlessly in compliance with a presumed and/or prescribed definition of her role rather than from a heartfelt place of conscience. Had the child in the story not paid greater attention to the sounds of life coming from her classmates through the broom-closet door than to the cruel and unthinking behaviour of the teacher, the inflicted punishment would surely have had more devastating results. In comparison to today's more evolved educational conditions, this story of loss of identity and the consequences of a teacher's wielding power and control over her students may seem extreme and even absurd; nevertheless, conditions that stifle *who* continue to exist whenever and wherever personal identification as a *what* is involved.

The stifling of *who* is especially virulent when a teacher or senior board official ("The Graduation Ceremony") is unaware of *who* he or she is *really*, yet holds a dominant position of authority in determining the education and well being of children. To think what we are doing in education is to realize that children are society's new beginnings, not society's future human resources to be trained and shaped according to society's projected needs. What Greene calls "the untapped inner resources of youth" (1988, p. 55) have their own ways of being in the world and come to school with an as-yet-uncluttered and unburdened creative potential. To think what we are doing in education is to ponder the possibilities and implications of freeing up space for new beginnings. According to Arendt, "beginning is the supreme capacity of man" (2000, p. xxi). "It is the nature of beginning that something new is started which cannot be expected from whatever may have happened before" (Arendt, 1974, p. 177-178). In thinking what we do in education, I ask a hard question of conscience: "Does the 'agent of society' have the right to stifle "the supreme capacity of man" in order to fulfill its assumed responsibility to serve society's presumed future needs?" What would the educational possibilities be, I wonder, if society's "untapped inner resources" were allowed to flourish and prosper in the

reinvigoration of the meaning of education and in the revision of the purpose of schooling? Asking hard questions of conscience is one of the contributions of this work to education.

Question #4: What (or who) is creativity?

The question, "What (or who) is creativity?" evokes the memory of a teaching and learning *experience* as told in the tale "Stumbling upon the Wow! Factor", Chapter X. The "wow! factor" is a critical aspect of the contributions of this dissertation to education. In "Putting Two and Two Together", the initially intuited link between *who* and creativity was explored through storytelling and critical analysis and was found to be compellingly true. Understanding occurred in the way Gadamer (2011) suggests understanding happens: in the living resonance that took place between theory and practice. In putting together Arendt's thought ("Enter Hannah Arendt") and my lived classroom *experience* ("Stumbling upon the Wow! Factor"), I found the understanding I was looking for to explain an educational phenomenon I experienced. The "wow! factor", experienced in loving relationship with my students, occurred by reason of identity in creativity. A grounded, albeit astounding, revelation emerged from the coupling of theory and practice. Not only is *who* the "real" we have in common, but *who* is the source of creativity! The knowledge that creativity springs from *who* we are and remains "outside the actual work process" as well as independent of what we may achieve (Arendt, 1974, p. 211) holds enormous significance for education. The educational implications of *who* as creator and/or co-creator, as distinct from *what* as producer and consumer are considerable.

Question #5: How would /could making room for *who* in expression (Taylor, 1989) and *who* in action (Arendt, 1974) in teacher development programs and in school curricula contribute to the reinvigoration of the meaning of education and the revision of the aims of schooling?

The above question prompts a very different kind of response than is characteristic of most question/answer scenarios. In most cases, a question is a blank waiting to be filled with an answer; for example, *why, what* or *how* does one teach math or Canadian history? In the case of Question #5, however, the phrasing "How could/would 'making room for'..." elicits a different kind of thinking about teaching and learning. Thinking about creating space for learning implicates *being*; whereas thinking about *what* or *how* to teach something implicates *doing*. Thinking about "making room for" *who* in expression (Taylor, 1989) and *who in* action (Arendt, 1974) is to realize that the question is open-ended. In other words, I am not looking for an ultimate answer; I am seeking *a way through*. Clarifying my orientation in thinking about Question #5 brings me full circle to a deeper and more appreciative understanding of the educational possibilities in 'not knowing'. The unusual educational possibilities are eloquently expressed by Greene, cited earlier in Chapter III: "To open spaces for learning ... to give learners a sense of absence, of open questions lacking answers, of darkness unexplained" (2008, p. 18). For the purposes of addressing Question #5, then, the question, in general terms, becomes "*Where* are the educational 'spaces' in teacher development programs and school *curricula* that would permit teachers and students to freely express, act and be *who* they are *really*?"

Because schooling, under the guise of education, has seemed for the most part to be about knowing the answers and filling in the blanks, when faced with a question like Question #5, it is difficult at first to think in reverse. Where are the "open spaces"? Are unfilled blanks even thinkable in a culture where knowing the answers means you're smart, and not knowing the answers means you're stupid? Is the value of 'not knowing' seen for what it's worth in teacher development programs and in school *curricula*? Does "darkness unexplained" have any room in today's School Success Plans? How would "absence" contribute to the reinvigoration of education and the revision of the aims of schooling? Thinking my way through the question in reverse is to rethink Taylor's statement with regard to calculating reason. Calculating reason is a "bar" to ever attaining "the force, the depth, the vibrancy, the joy which comes with being connected to the *élan* of nature (1989, p. 383). Emboldened by the reminder that calculating reason *lacks* the force, the depth, the vibrancy and the joy of *who* in *experience*, I turn the question around once again, and ask instead, "In what learning landscapes would it be

impossible to measure the value and results of learning according to calculating methods and calculated standards of assessment?"

Artistic expression, suggests Taylor is "the paradigm mode in which people can come to self [realization]" (1991, p. 61). (My word "realization" replaces Taylor's word "definition" to maintain a consistency of language, not to alter Taylor's meaning.) In *Self Comes to Mind*, Damasio recommends the Arts and storytelling for their ability to induce nourishing emotions and feelings, the connectors to the "soul" (2010, p. 283). In conjunction with Taylor's suggestion and Damasio's recommendation, I see the Arts and storytelling as compelling contributors to teacher development programs and school *curricula* because, as educational *media*, they draw a blank when it comes to measurement and comparison. There are no 'end results' in artwork or storytelling, only open-ended creative expression. An expression emanating from *who* is inwardly generated and, therefore, cannot be compared with anything outwardly produced. *Who* we are creates unique thoughts and original artwork; whereas *what* we do produces cognitive thoughts and comparable products. Is the contribution of this dissertation, then, to suggest the possible inclusion of "the Arts and storytelling" in teacher development programs and student *curricula* in order to "make room for" *who*?

An earlier cautionary tale, "Famous Last Words", has taught me to be wary. It is neither the definition of the role nor what the person does that is of relevance to the meaning I am seeking. Like any other commodity, the Arts and storytelling could/would be 'produced' for a particular end or monetary gain ... *if* so intended by the fabricator. What I am looking for is an activity *for its own sake*. The McGill Institute for Learning in Retirement's (MILR) creative writing course, described in Chapter VII, is an example of artistic expression for its own sake. *Who* creates art and *who* tells the story? *Who* is teaching and for what purpose? That is the question. Only too quickly do my former habits of thinking turn the question back into "*What* do we *do* in order to achieve the results we desire?" In the cautionary reminder that *being* seeks an uncertain 'way through' while *doing* looks for 'certain results', I have found my way back into thinking in reverse.

It is true that in their steadfast refusal to proffer answers, the Arts and storytelling provide "open spaces" through which teachers and students may feel free to express *who* they are and thereby come to know themselves as the "source" of creativity (Arendt, 1974, p. 211). Doing art for Greene is learning how to be (1988, p. 55). The challenge Greene has set out for educators, according to Bolstein, is "to make the arts not a marginal part of how we deal with children and young people, but an integral part of their lives and minds" (1998, p. 62). How the Arts and storytelling would/could be included in teacher development programs and student *curricula*, however, would depend on the will of others and on the creativity of others. As noted earlier, the 'how' and 'what' of *who* cannot be taught; *who* is unchangeable, un-teachable ... and incorrigible! Also, because *who* is unique, no two teacher development programs would/could look the same. For example, I have been privileged as a doctoral student to experience *who* in a variety of university courses, seminars and *colloquia*. I chose my courses according to the course descriptions that resonated with my interests. However, the joy of learning I experienced was not only because I was given the opportunity to express my thoughts freely in open-ended creative writing exercises, in meaningful self-reflections, in eye-opening group discussions, and in seminar presentations; the joy of learning also came through the mastery of the professors who knew *who* they were. They imparted their self-knowledge through unique ways of being with their students while attending to the specific matters of course requirements. In openly sharing their thoughts, emotion, feelings and expertise, the professors were able to *e-duce* (draw forth) genuineness and developing scholarship in their graduate students. My cautionary tale has reminded me that artistry and mastery call for the in-between of *who* and *what*. We need both the real and the realistic in education.

For Arendt (1974) action is a form of art. Given that Arendt's action is the capacity to begin something new, "something that always appears in the guise of a miracle" (1974, p. 178), it is not difficult to see the connection between art and action. Arendt says,

> It is in action that the insertion of ourselves into the public sphere is not forced upon us by necessity, like labor, nor is it prompted by utility, like work. It may be stimulated by the presence of others whose company we may wish to join, but it is never conditioned by them; its impulse springs from the beginning which came into the world when we

> were born and to which we respond by beginning something new on our own initiative. To act, in its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to begin. (1974, p. 177)

Arendt's *vita activa* is a living reality. The common usage of the term "to take action" in the sense of *doing* something to fill an apparent void holds an entirely different meaning. The question, therefore, with regard to making room for action in education evokes the same "open spaces" for new beginnings as do the Arts and storytelling for creative self-expression. Thus, artistry and action have a condition of "darkness unexplained" in common. Where are the educational conditions conducive to action? From Arendt's perspective, cited above, the *polis* is a place where human plurality—for Arendt, "the basic condition of both action and speech" (1974, p. 175)—affords the necessary conditions for men and women to express their distinction and distinguish themselves as *who* they are. The ultimate condition for the purposes of our consideration, and according to Arendt, cited above, is that the expression of *who* cannot be "conditioned by the presence of others". Where are the opportunities for unconditioned acting and unconditioned speaking in educational programs and *curricula*? Again, I must look in reverse for blanks, not answers. Instead of turning to *what* educational activities could/would possibly offer a public space for new beginnings—for example, open forums for debate, classroom discussions, town hall meetings, conferences, small-group sessions, etc.—I see that wherever *who* is in action, there will be conditions for unconditioned thinking and speaking. In other words, regardless of the subject matter—geography, physics, research methodologies, curriculum studies or French grammar—*who* could/would be present providing a way through for distinctive speech and action in all its myriad forms and inimical ways. Like the blade of grass that miraculously appears through a slab of concrete—or, like the classroom teacher under enormous pressure to make her students conform to the program and produce acceptable results on standardized tests—if given half a chance, *who* will find a way through any conditions!

Jackie Seidel is an associate professor in the Faculty of Education at the University of Alberta where she teaches undergraduate and graduate courses. Seidel's essay "A Curriculum for Miracles" speaks to the vision and integrity of *who* in a classroom setting. (Seidel offers several

meanings for the word “miracle”, one of which comes from the Latin *miraculum* meaning “an object of wonder”.) Following is an excerpt from her essay:

> A Curriculum for Miracles walks gently on this earth. It leaves footprints of love, compassion, and forgiveness everywhere. It breathes the oxygen of life, photosynthetic miraculous gift. Its blood hums with iron and air from the rocks. It bathes and drinks from the one well from which all life flows.
>
> A Curriculum for Miracles laughs at small ideas such as preparing ‘children to be future workers in the global economy’, at measuring ‘children to one-size-fits-all’. It knows such thoughts are ridiculous and hilarious; it leaves them behind. It knows that life is wondrous and takes up *life* itself as its topic. It knows that each life is but a brief flash. Unique. Alive now. Days, months, years. Immeasurable and impossible, yet here it is. Here we are together. There is no other place of time except this place and this time. (2012, p. 278 in *A Heart of Wisdom: Life Writing as Empathetic Inquiry*, Chambers, Hasebe-Ludt, Leggo, and Sinner, Eds.)

The contributions of the present dissertation with regard to the vital importance of *who* in education could/would inspire a change of heart (will) compelling enough to affect changes in educational/schooling *praxis* that would ensure a living context wherein teachers and students would no longer feel coerced into fitting into a standardized ‘ideal’ of selfhood nor would they need to struggle under adverse human conditions to be *who* they are *really*. Instead, teachers and students could/would be supported in the discovery of their unique inner resourcefulness (possibly by way of programs and *curricula* that included the Arts, storytelling, speech and action, as suggested above, as well as other powerful means of education such as vocational training and artisanal apprenticeship) and then, *in turn,* would discover *what* is uniquely theirs to *do* in terms of their work, i.e. a way of thinking about education and schooling in reverse.

From the *how*, *what*, *where*, and *who* of Question #5 has emerged the final question of supreme importance to our investigation: “*When?”* In *Between Past and Future*, Arendt discusses an interval in time which is altogether determined by things that are no longer and by things that are not yet. “In history,” she says, “these intervals have shown more than once that they may contain the moment of truth” (2006, p. 9). When does this interval or “moment of truth” occur? Seidel, above, says there is no other place of time except this place and this time.

"Alive now", she avers. Bergson's theories of *la durée*, discussed earlier, describe "real" time, conveyed in the poem "Now Here" and differentiated from man-made time in "Nowhere". The difference in the felt *experience* of the poems is the most telling of time. McGilchrist's *experience* as distinct from "an experience" (2010, p. 31) prompts the question "When does *experience* occur?" According to Arendt, *experience* is thinking in the abyss between past and future. She says, "This kind of thinking is different from such mental processes as deducing, inducing and drawing conclusions whose logical rules of non-contradiction and inner consistency can be learned once and for all and then need only be applied" (2006, p. 13). Thinking for its own sake and not for the sake of a future based on concepts of the past runs counter-clockwise to traditional modes of thought. From the *experience* of finding my way in reverse through Question #5, I have stumbled upon a way for "making room for" *who*. It is a way of *thinking and feeling in the gaps* as distinct from knowing and filling in the blanks.

Room for New Beginnings

Can there be any question more urgent than the question of identity? Taylor suggested some time ago that the growing ideal in modern society is a human agent "who is able to remake himself by methodical and disciplined action" (1989, p. 159). The notion that new and improved 'human agents' will succeed in the future denies the reality of 'human beings' in the present. Yet, the belief in self-improvement is directly reflected in school reforms where mission statements touting the building of useful competencies and the constructing of successful identities are the norm. Most Western school programs, as discussed in Chapters IV and XI, duplicate the instrumental-utilitarian concentration by filling in the gap between elementary school and high school with an increased emphasis on math, science and technology; and by eliminating, or leaving little room for, the 'expensive' and 'useless' arts and humanities. Unlike speaking and acting in a public space, producing and consuming information, no matter how current the knowledge nor advanced the technique, does not disclose *who* a person is. "To dispense with this disclosure, if indeed it could ever be done, would mean to transform men

into something they are not; to deny, on the other hand, that this disclosure is real and has consequences of its own is simply unrealistic" (Arendt, 1974, p. 183).

The poetic ways of finding-out by finding-in have determined that the one area of human experience that will *not* succumb to human fabrication is human identity. Because of the intrinsic meaning of education, and because of the possibility of "new beginnings" inherent in children and youth, education has a potential beyond all other human endeavours for "making room for" *who*. By paying attention to Bergson's principle "attention to life" (education) while at the same time attending to important matters of the intellect (schooling), all manner of wonders could/would possibly occur. *Who* knows what could/would happen in the interval?

In keeping alive the "real" possibilities inherent in the contributions of this work to education, therefore, rather than draw a conclusion, this dissertation draws a blank. The blank represents an open space, a way through that has been artfully gained from the tension-filled rigours of an uncertain work in process. By way of thinking and feeling in the gaps as distinct from knowing and filling in the blanks, *des soupçons* (small tastes) of the surprising elements, infinite varieties and intricate complexities of identity and creativity have been 'found', like found poetry, then stirred, mixed and blended into an eclectic assortment of a unique "box of chocolates". The artistically drawn 'blank page' provides a place of honour for the living portrait of *who* without a name, the indefinable, nonetheless identifiable protagonist "I" of my living story. Between the discovery of the meaning of education—*who* I am—and the understanding of the purpose of schooling—*what* I may say and do to disclose *who* I am—thinking in reverse and feeling in the gaps has opened a way through *what* matters and shown (shone) the reality of *who* matters. In the process of educating my 'self', I hope to make a personal contribution towards the reinvigoration of the meaning of education and the revision of the purpose of schooling. In the end, there is no ending to a living story; there is only room for new beginnings.

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