

Al-Ḥusayn Ibn ʿAlī: A Study of his Uprising and Death
Based on Classical Arabic Sources (3rd and 4th Century
A.H./9th and 10th Century A.D.).

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation deals with al-Ḥusayn's uprising and death based on the classical Arabic sources. It is argued that al-Ḥusayn's uprising and opposition to Yazīd's caliphate were directly connected to the matter of the caliphate and the caliph's qualifications. He refused to recognize Yazīd's caliphate because he considered it as illegitimate due to the fact that Yazīd was not qualified to assume such an important office. It is also argued that because of Mu'āwiya, who attempted to secure Yazīd's succession by forcing all Muslims to pay homage to him, Yazīd became caliph. Wanting to remove the real meaning of the caliphate and intending to transform it to a kingship (*mulk*) inherited among his offspring, Mu'āwiya himself rejected the principle of the early Companions of the Prophet by choosing the caliph.

Al-Ḥusayn refused to listen to those who advised him to submit to the established authority (de facto) and to enter into whatever the community had entered into and agreed upon. Yazīd's caliphate, in al-Ḥusayn's eyes, was a deviation from the Sunna of the Prophet and the conduct of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, and represented corruption in the community of his grandfather. As the Prophet's grandson, he believed that he was committed to following in the footsteps of his grandfather and was more responsible than anybody else for preventing corruption. Even when he became convinced of the Kūfans' failure to stand with him, al-Ḥusayn refused to give the *bay'at* to Yazīd and also felt obliged to revolt against him. Furthermore and apart of his strategy, he did decide to take his family with him in order that they would play a significant role after his death.

Amongst the results obtained during this research were the three different patterns of writing in our sources; namely, pro-Sunnī, pro-Shīʿī and a moderate, who escaped being classified as pro-Sunnī or pro-Shīʿī.

RÉSUMÉ

Ce mémoire est une étude de la révolte et mort de al-Ḥusayn qui se base sur les sources arabes classiques. Nous proposons que la révolte de al-Ḥusayn et son opposition au califat de Yazīd sont étroitement liées à l'institution du califat et aux conditions que le calife devait remplir. Il a refusé de reconnaître le califat de Yazīd, le considérant illégitime, puisque Yazīd n'avait pas les compétences pour occuper la charge d'un devoir aussi important. Nous proposons d'ailleurs que c'est à cause du califat de Mu'āwīya, qui, lui a tenté d'imposer la succession de Yazīd en obligeant les Musulmans à lui rendre hommage, que Yazīd est devenu calife. Puisqu'il voulait se débarrasser du vrai sens du califat et avait l'intention de transformer cette fonction en une royauté héritée par sa progéniture, Mu'āwīya, lui, a rejeté les principes des premiers Compagnons du Prophète en choisissant ainsi le calife.

Al-Ḥusayn s'obstinait à suivre les conseils de ceux qui voulaient qu'il se soumette à l'autorité officielle (*de facto*) et se plie à ce que la communauté de Musulmans avait accepté. Le califat de Yazīd, aux yeux de al-Ḥusayn, n'était qu'une dérogation de la Sunna du Prophète et la conduite des quatre (Califes bien Guidés), et représentait une corruption dans la communauté de son grand-père. En tant que petit-fils du Prophète, il croyait qu'il était obligé de suivre la conduite de son grand-père et qu'il était plus responsable que personne d'autre pour combattre la corruption. Même quand il s'est aperçu que les gens de Kūfa n'allaient pas l'appuyer, al-Ḥusayn s'est obstiné à donner la *bay'at* à Yazīd se sentait obligé de se révolter contre lui. De plus, une autre stratégie qu'il

s'est proposé était de garder sa famille avec lui car ils pouvaient témoigner de sa tragédie après sa mort.

Les résultats obtenus pendant cette recherche démontrent qu'il y a trois types de positions représentées dans nos sources: la position Sunnite, la position chiite, et une position modérée, ni Sunnite, ni chiite.

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NOTES ON transliteration

The system of transliteration of Arabic terms and phrases follows the style adopted by the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University. The transliteration of the feminine ending *tā' marbūṭa* is rendered as {a} where it is not pronounced, in words such as *sunna*. The respective *hijrī* and Christian dates are separated by an oblique. If only one date is mentioned, it refers to the common era. The word *ibn* has been always capitalized as *Ibn*.

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INTRODUCTION

Al-Ḥusayn Ibn ʿAlī (d. 61/680), grandson of the Prophet Muḥammad and third Imām of the Shīʿa, was born in Medina in the fourth year A.H.¹ He was brutally killed on the plains of Karbalāʾ, in Iraq, on the tenth day of the Muslim month Muḥarram along with the male members of his family and a group of his followers, at the hands of the Umayyad authorities. The only reason for al-Ḥusayn's killing was that he refused to acknowledge Yazīd (d. 64/683) as caliph after Muʿāwīya's death (60/680).

The reasons for al-Ḥusayn's refusal to acknowledge Yazīd's claim to the caliphate were twofold: 1) that Yazīd was not qualified for such a sacred office and, 2) that he, al-Ḥusayn, belonged to the family of the Prophet and, as such, would not pay homage to an impious man like Yazīd. Al-Ḥusayn himself explained his opposition to Yazīd's caliphate by stating:

We are the household of the Prophet, frequented by angels and are the heart of the descent of divine mercy. Yazīd, on the other hand, is a reprobate, a drinker of wine and a killer of the innocent and openly practices all means of corruption. A man of my status, therefore, cannot give *bayʿa* (homage) to a man like Yazīd.²

¹ Muḥsin al-Amīn, *Aʿyān al-Shīʿa*, 10 vols. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1406/1986, 1: 578. Muḥammad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Nuʿmān al-Mufīd, *al-Irshād*, 2 vols. Qum: Muʿassasat Āl al-Bayt, 1413/1993, 2: 27.

² Aḥmad Ibn Aʿṭham al-Kūfī, *Kitāb al-Futūḥ*, 4 vols. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1406/1986, 3: 14.

In this thesis, it will be argued that al-Ḥusayn's uprising and his opposition to Yazīd's caliphate were directly connected to the nature of the caliphate and the caliph's qualifications. The cornerstone of al-Ḥusayn's uprising and his consequent fate was that he refused to acknowledge Yazīd's caliphate when the latter threatened him to do so or be killed. Al-Ḥusayn's refusal of Yazīd's caliphate was not based on personal reasons, rather it was based on religious grounds; he believed that Yazīd was not qualified for the caliphate, and that he, al-Ḥusayn, was more entitled to it because of his merits and his relationship to the Prophet.

In order to understand al-Ḥusayn's uprising, it is essential to deal with the following questions: On what bases was the caliphate after the Prophet Muḥammad (d. 11/632) established? What were the qualifications of the Rightly Guided Caliphs (*al-Khulafā' al-Rāshidūn*)? What were the opinions of 'Alī and his sons, al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn, in regard to the caliphate, on the one hand, and the opinion of Mu'āwiya and his son, on the other?

The caliphate, after the death of the Prophet Muḥammad and until 'Alī's death (40/661), was based on three foundations: 1) early merits (*sābiqa*) and service in the cause of Islam (*faḍīla*) were the criteria for the choice of the caliph;³ 2) the caliph should

³ These merits are, for instance: migration with the Prophet from Mecca to Medina, participating in the Battle of Badr, the Battle of Uhud, etc. In his argument with the helpers (*al-Anṣār*), Abū Bakr (d. 13/634) contended that the immigrants (*al-Muhājirūn*) were more entitled to the caliphate than the *Anṣār* because of their virtues and early merits in Islam. Muḥammad Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh al-Umam wal-Mulūk*, 8 vols. Beirut: Mu'assasat al-A'lamī lil-Maṭbū'āt, 1403/1983, 2: 457. Abū 'Ubayda b. al-Jarrāḥ (d. 18/639) believed that Abū Bakr was the best of the *Muhājirūn* and had merits in Islam, and because of Abū Bakr's merits, he paid homage to him. Ibid., p. 458. A similar account is attributed to 'Umar (d. 23/644) as well. 'Abd Allāh Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma wal-Siyāsa*, 2 vols, Qum: Manshūrāt al-Raḍī, 1388/1969, 1: 26. According to Ibn Qutayba and al-Ṭabarī, before he swore allegiance to Abū Bakr, 'Alī mentioned his *sābiqa* and *faḍīla*. Ibid., p. 33. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 448. Before his death, Abū Bakr transferred the caliphate to 'Umar and told the people that he was transferring the caliphate to a person who was the best among them. Ibid., p. 253. Before his death, 'Umar wanted to transfer the caliphate to one of the Companions who had merits in Islam and whose conduct the Prophet was satisfied with. Ibid., p. 570. 'Umar also nominated six

follow the Book of Allāh (al-Qur'ān) and the conduct, Sunna, of the Prophet; otherwise the people were not obliged to submit to him;⁴ and 3) the caliphate could not be established and the caliph could not be acknowledged as legitimate unless the people paid homage to him. In fact, the *bay'at* was the cornerstone of the caliphate and without it the caliph could not be accepted by the Muslims and they had no obligation to submit to him unless they swore allegiance to him. The Muslims deemed the *bay'at* as a covenant (*'ahd*) between them and the caliph which could not be dissolved unless the caliph deviates from acting according to the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet.⁵

Although they adhered to the conditions of the caliphate mentioned above, 'Alī and his sons, al-Ḥasan (d. 50/670) and al-Ḥusayn, believed that they were more entitled to the caliphate than anybody else because of their close relationship to the Prophet.⁶ They were

persons for the caliphate only because of their merits and their leading position among the Muslims. Ibid., p. 602. According to Ibn Qutayba, 'Umar explained that he nominated these six because the Prophet was satisfied with their conduct. *al-Imāma*, 1: 42. 'Abd al-Raḥmān Ibn 'Awf (d. 32/652-3) admitted that both 'Alī and 'Uthmān (d. 35/655) had *sābiqa* and merits in Islam and, consequently, were entitled to the caliphate. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 604. See also Aḥmad Ibn Yaḥyā al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf*, 13 vols. ed. Suhayl Zakkār and Riyāḍ Zarkalī, Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1417/1996. 3: 25, 278.

⁴ When Abū Bakr became caliph, he told the people that they should obey him only if he followed in the footsteps of the Prophet; otherwise, they did not have to submit to him. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 450. When 'Umar became caliph, he announced that he was going to follow the right path, the Qur'ān and the Sunna of the Prophet. Ibid., p. 456. After 'Umar's death, 'Abd al-Raḥmān Ibn 'Awf, who was to be followed by the Muslims in his decision to nominate the caliph, according to 'Umar's will, told both 'Alī and 'Uthmān that he would pay homage to them only on the condition that they should follow the Book of Allāh, the Sunna of the Prophet, and the conduct of Abū Bakr and 'Umar. Ibid., pp. 609-10. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 45.

⁵ For this reason, al-Ḥusayn, when he was asked to revolt against Mu'āwiya after the truce between al-Ḥasan and Mu'āwiya in 41/661, declined stating "We paid allegiance to him [Mu'āwiya], and, therefore, we cannot dissolve our *bay'at*." Aḥmad Ibn Dāwūd al-Dīnawarī, *al-Akḥbār al-Ṭiwāl*, Qum: Maṭba'at al-Amīr, 1408/1988, p. 203. Ibn Qutayba narrates that when Fāṭima (d. 11/632), Alī's wife and the daughter of the Prophet, demanded from the helpers that they pay homage to 'Alī, they told her that if 'Alī had come to them before Abū Bakr they would have paid homage to him, but since they already paid homage to Abū Bakr they could not dissolve it. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 29-30. For the significance of the role of the *bay'at* among the Arabs and the Muslims, see Muḥammad Mahdī Shams al-Dīn, *Nizām al-Ḥukm wal-Idāra fīl-Islām*, Qum: Dār al-Thaqāfa, 1412/1992. p. 48, 70.

⁶ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 604, 608. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 11. Although 'Alī admitted Abū Bakr's merits in Islam, he argued that he was more entitled to the caliphate than him because of his close relationship to the Prophet. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 3: 295-6. See also, Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 28-9, 32. According to al-Balādhurī, 'Abd Allāh Ibn 'Abbās (d. 68/697) asked 'Umar to nominate 'Alī as his successor because of his relationship to the Prophet and his merits and virtues in Islam. *Ansāb*, 6: 120-1. After 'Alī's assassination, Qays Ibn Sa'd Ibn 'Ubāda (d. 60/679) described to the Kūfans his merits in Islam and his relationship to the

also of the opinion that they were the guardians of the principles of the caliphate, the conduct of the Prophet and the principles of Islam.⁷

Since Mu'āwiya Ibn Abī Sufyān had witnessed the events of the caliphate after the Prophet's death, he was not unaware of the conditions of the caliphate and the qualifications of the caliph, and had also realized that he himself lacked these qualifications. He belonged to the former enemies of the Prophet who converted under duress at the time of the Muslim conquest of Mecca. Mu'āwiya was *ṭalīq*, one of those pardoned and released by the Prophet at the time of the conquest of Mecca, and did not have the status of *muhājir* (one who had made the migration from Mecca to Medina), and, therefore, had no right to the caliphate because he lacked early merits in Islam.⁸ For this reason, Mu'āwiya did not contest 'Alī's entitlement to the caliphate, rather, he announced that he refused to swear allegiance to 'Alī because he was seeking to avenge his kinsman 'Uthmān's murder, and for that reason only the Syrians swore allegiance to him.⁹

Prophet and encouraged them to swear allegiance to his son, al-Ḥasan, who, according to Qays, was entitled to the caliphate because of his merits and his relationship to the Prophet. Ibid., 3: 278, 279. On the occasion of his accession to the caliphate (40/660), al-Ḥasan addressed the people of Kūfa. In his speech, he emphasized that he was more qualified for this office due to his merits. He also praised the virtues of the family of the Prophet and his close relationship to the Prophet. Ibid., p. 279. Abū al-Faraj al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil al-Ṭalibiyyīn*, Beirut: Mu'assasat al-A'lamī, 1407/1987, p. 62.

⁷ Ibid. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1:12. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 279. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 608.

⁸ Khalīfa Ibn Khayyāt, *Ta'rikh*, ed. Suhayl Zakkār, Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1414/1993, p. 160. Ibn A'ṭham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 341. 'Alī Ibn Muḥammad al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj al-Dhahab*, 2 vols. Qum: Manshūrāt Dār al-Hijra, 1404/1984, 2: 372. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1:93. Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 65.

⁹ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 66, 103. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 99, 122. According to al-Balādhurī and Ibn Qutayba, when Mu'āwiya refused to pay homage to 'Alī the people of Syria pledged allegiance to Mu'āwiya as an *amīr* not as a caliph. *Ansāb*, 3: 82, 103. *Al-Imāma*, 1: 99. Al-Balādhurī narrates that when Mu'āwiya decided to fight 'Alī, a man called 'Abd al-Raḥmān asked Mu'āwiya for the reason he was fighting 'Alī since he, Mu'āwiya, lacked 'Alī's merits and relationship to the Prophet. In response, Mu'āwiya admitted 'Alī's merits and his relationship to the Prophet but declared that he was fighting him only to avenge 'Uthmān's killing. *Ansāb*, 3: 66, 73, 103. Al-Balādhurī also relates that Abū Mūsā al-Ash'arī (d. 50/670-1), a prominent companion of the Prophet, refused to pay homage to Mu'āwiya because he lacked the qualifications to be caliph. When he was asked by 'Amr Ibn al-Āṣ (d. 42/662), who praised Mu'āwiya for his ability in politics and administration, about his refusal to swear allegiance to Mu'āwiya, Abū Mūsā answered that ability in politics and administration was not a criterion of the caliphate; rather, the caliphate was restricted exclusively to the people of piety and priority (*fadl*). Ibid., p. 124.

It was only after the end of the battle of Şiffin (37/657), in the last months of ʿAlī's caliphate, that Muʿāwīya made many expeditions into the territories under ʿAlī's rule and tried to force their inhabitants to swear allegiance to him.¹⁰ Muʿāwīya realized that he could not challenge ʿAlī for his entitlement to the caliphate and that he, Muʿāwīya, had no right to it; therefore, he tried his best to demand the *bayʿa* from the people, which was the only means he could resort to in order to be recognized as caliph. Once the people swore allegiance to Muʿāwīya, his caliphate would be binding on them, and afterwards they could no longer dissolve their *bayʿa*; this was to become a key strategy of Muʿāwīya's.

After ʿAlī's assassination, the people of Kūfa paid homage to al-Ḥasan because of his merits in the cause of Islam and his relationship to the Prophet.¹¹ Muʿāwīya refused to acknowledge al-Ḥasan's caliphate and tried to assume it for himself. Muʿāwīya, however, did not base his arguments for the caliphate on the principle of *sābiqa* and early merits in Islam, which had been recognized by the Rightly Guided Caliphs and the early Companions of the Prophet as the criteria for choosing of the successors to the Prophet. Rather, he claimed that the criteria for leadership of the community should be based on worldly abilities, efficiency in controlling and leading subjects, ability in politics and administration, the ability to expand the empire and skill in defending Muslims, and that therefore, he was more qualified for the caliphate than al-Ḥasan.¹²

In order to make al-Ḥasan abdicate his caliphate and impose the *bayʿa* on the people of Kūfa, Muʿāwīya utilized many devices, as will be described in the thesis. After al-

¹⁰ Ibn Aʿtham al-Kūfī, *Futūḥ*, 2: 103-7, 215-36. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 225-33. Aḥmad Ibn Abī Yaʿqūb, better known as al-Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh al-Yaʿqūbī*, 2 vols. Beirut: Sādir, n.d. 2: 196-7. Khalīfa Ibn Khayyāt, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 150. During his expeditions, Muʿāwīya instructed the commanders of his armies to assault the inhabitants of the territories and force them to pay homage to him.

¹¹ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 278. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 121. Al-Hasan adopted Islam while he was young and he was one of the members of the family of the Prophet on their behalf some verses were revealed. Also on his special attitude many statements were uttered by the Prophet.

¹² Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, pp. 66-7. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 280

Hasan's abdication, the people of Kūfa paid homage to Mu'āwiya unwillingly.¹³ Although al-Ḥusayn was resistant to accepting al-Ḥasan's abdication and did not recognize Mu'āwiya's right to the caliphate, he followed his brother's orders and swore allegiance to Mu'āwiya reluctantly.¹⁴

Not only had Mu'āwiya deviated from the conduct of the Rightly Guided Caliphs in regard to the criteria for choosing the caliph, but he was also trying to transform the caliphate into a kingship which would be inherited by his offspring. Therefore, he tried his utmost to pass on the caliphate to his son Yazīd, who also lacked the necessary qualifications. In addition, Yazīd was well-known for his wrong-doings and his deviations from Islamic norms, and, therefore, was in no way entitled to the caliphate. Although Mu'āwiya, before his death, tried to secure Yazīd's accession and force the people of Mecca and Medina to swear allegiance to him,¹⁵ some of the prominent elites, whose support was crucial to Mu'āwiya, refused to recognize Yazīd's caliphate. The most important of these nobles was al-Ḥusayn, because of his leading position, especially among the people of Kūfa.

When Yazīd became caliph, (60/680) he ordered his governor in Medina, al-Walīd Ibn 'Uqba (d. 61/681), to compel al-Ḥusayn to pay homage to him and to accept no excuse if he would not comply. Al-Ḥusayn refused to recognize Yazīd's caliphate.

Realizing that he could not stay in Medina unless he swore allegiance to Yazīd or otherwise face a perilous fate, al-Ḥusayn fled to Mecca seeking refuge there. When this

¹³ Ibid., 3: 290. Al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rīkh*, 2: 217.

¹⁴ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 293. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 203. According to Ibn A'tham, al-Ḥusayn refused to pay homage to Mu'āwiya. *Futūḥ*, 2: 297.

¹⁵ The *bay'a* of the people of the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina (*al-Ḥaramayn*) was very important. Al-Balādhurī narrates, on the authority of Mu'tamir Ibn Sulaymān, that the real *bay'a* is the *bay'a* of the people of *al-Ḥaramayn*. *Ansāb*, 3:9. Realizing the importance of the *bay'a* of the people of Mecca and Medina, Mu'āwiya, in order to secure their allegiance to Yazīd, came in person to Medina and Mecca. Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 339-42. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 183, 188-9. Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 160.

news reached the inhabitants of Kūfa, they wrote to al-Ḥusayn pressing him to come to Iraq and lead them against the Umayyad rulers. In response, he sent his cousin Muslim Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 61/680) to the people of Kūfa as his emissary, to examine the situation and report back with assurances of their loyalty and readiness for his arrival. Ibn ʿAqīl wrote a very optimistic letter to al-Ḥusayn, informing him of the success of his mission and sending him thousands of pledges signed by Kūfans urging him to come to them.

The supporters of the Umayyad regime in Kūfa, on the other hand, reported the latest developments to Yazīd and exhorted him to rescue Kūfa from Ibn ʿAqīl. Yazīd, who no longer trusted the governor of Kūfa, al-Nuʿmān Ibn Bashīr (d. 64/683), thereupon handed over control of Kūfa to ʿUbayd Allāh Ibn Ziyād (d. 67/686), the then governor of Baṣra, ordering him to execute Ibn ʿAqīl. Ibn Ziyād arrived in Kūfa in disguise and took effective measures that terrified Kūfa's inhabitants. Ibn ʿAqīl's mission to control the situation in Kūfa failed and he was publicly executed by the new governor.¹⁶

Meanwhile, al-Ḥusayn, unaware of the recent turn of events in Kūfa, had set out from Mecca to join the people of Kūfa. Ibn Ziyād had stationed his troops on the roads leading from the Ḥijāz to Kūfa and had given orders forbidding all entry and departure. Parties of horsemen were scouring the region. On their way to Kūfa, al-Ḥusayn and his small group of followers were intercepted by a thousand horsemen under the command of al-Ḥurr Ibn Yazīd al-Riyāḥī (d. 61/680), sent by Ibn Ziyād. Al-Ḥurr prevented al-Ḥusayn from advancing towards Kūfa and forced him to stop at Karbalā', a place belonging to the district (*nāḥiya*) of Nīnawā. Ibn Ziyād sent for ʿUmar Ibn Saʿd Ibn Abī Waqqāṣ (d. 66/685) to subdue the rebels. Refusing to comply with Ibn Ziyād's demands, al-Ḥusayn,

¹⁶ Full details of these events with all sources related to them are mentioned to in Chapter three.

his followers and most of the male members of his family went into battle and were killed. Al-Ḥusayn was the last to be killed. The decapitated heads were taken to Kūfa and then to Yazīd in Damascus.¹⁷

Al-Ḥusayn had left his grandfather's city, Medina, and taken up residence in Mecca, only because he refused to acknowledge Yazīd's caliphate. He left Mecca and decided to move to Kūfa when its inhabitants confirmed to him that they refused to acknowledge Yazīd's caliphate and urged him to lead them against the Umayyad régime. Al-Ḥusayn, the only living grandson of the Prophet at this time and the son of the fourth Rightly Guided Caliph ʿAlī, declared openly that he, more than any other Muslim, was responsible for reviving the religion of his grandfather and saving Islamic principles from the corruption that had been committed by Yazīd. According to al-Ḥusayn, the caliph is endowed with the duty, particular to his status, of protecting Islamic laws from any violation. The Imām of the Muslim community is the one "who judges according to the book (Qur'ān) and the Sunna of the Prophet; dealing justly with people; devoting himself to the religion of truth (*dīn al-ḥaqq*); and restraining himself from all else but God."¹⁸ Al-Ḥusayn describes the conduct of Yazīd and his followers by stating that these "people, following the footsteps of Satan, took away submission to God, disseminated corruption, and permitted what God forbade and forbade what God permitted." Al-Ḥusayn, as the grandson of the Prophet, therefore, believed that it was his responsibility to change this situation.¹⁹

¹⁷ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 35-67. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 262-285. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 416. Muḥammad Ibn Saʿd, *Maqāt al-Ḥusayn min al-Qism Ghayr al-Maṭbūʿ min Kitāb al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā*, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Qum: Muʾassasat Āl al-Bayt, 1416/1996, p. 53, pp. 64-67.

¹⁸ Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 262.

¹⁹ Ibid., 4: 304, Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 91. Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 171.

What was the attitude of the people in regard to al-Ḥusayn's refusal to recognize Yazīd's caliphate and his movement against him? Aside from the supporters of the Umayyad government, who stood strongly with Yazīd and played a significant role in paving the way for him to defeat Ibn ʿAqīl's mission in Kūfa and execute al-Ḥusayn, the people can be classified into four factions.

First, we have a group of prominent people who lived mainly in Mecca and Medina. Among them were Companions of the Prophet and sons of the Ṣaḥāba. They criticized Yazīd for his violation of Islamic norms and did not acknowledge his entitlement to the caliphate. They also admitted al-Ḥusayn's status and his close relationship to the Prophet. They predicted that al-Ḥusayn would be killed at the hands of the Umayyad authorities if he rose against Yazīd, and that this would cause damage to the Muslim community. Therefore, they were of the opinion that if al-Ḥusayn swore allegiance to Yazīd it would be better for the community than to revolt against him. They tried to persuade al-Ḥusayn not to comply with the call of the inhabitants of Kūfa.²⁰ Some of them believed that al-Ḥusayn should comply with whatever the community (*jamāʿa*) agreed upon, and, therefore, recommended to al-Ḥusayn to stay in his home and pay homage to Yazīd.²¹

Second, we have a group of prominent leaders of the tribes in Kūfa called *ashrāf al-qabā'il*. They sent a letter to al-Ḥusayn while he was in Mecca, urging him to lead them against the Umayyad regime. Although they shared with al-Ḥusayn his opposition to the Umayyad officials, they were mostly looking out for their own interests. Their intention was to secure their positions and protect their property and the ties among their tribes. As soon as the new governor arrived and affairs in Kūfa had turned against Ibn ʿAqīl, they

²⁰ Ibid., 3: 368. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 28. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 253.

²¹ Ibn Saʿd, *Maqtal al-Ḥusayn*, p. 57.

changed their attitude and turned against al-Ḥusayn and his emissary. Their attitude was well described by a group of people, who, when questioned by al-Ḥusayn about the situation in Kūfa, informed him that the leaders of the tribes had been bribed to support Ibn Ziyād.²² Moreover, the tribal leaders played a significant role in pressuring their tribes and the inhabitants of Kūfa to withdraw from Ibn ʿAqīl's cause. They were also among the commanders of the Umayyad army who murdered al-Ḥusayn in Karbalā'.

Third, according to all our sources, we have the majority of the inhabitants of Kūfa and supporters of al-Ḥusayn, who had sent many letters urging him to lead them against the Umayyads. They refused to acknowledge Yazīd's caliphate and acknowledged al-Ḥusayn's status and his close relationship to the Prophet. They believed that al-Ḥusayn was more entitled to the caliphate than Yazīd. Although they were enthusiastic supporters of al-Ḥusayn's movement and swore allegiance to Ibn ʿAqīl, they could not fulfill their promises to al-Ḥusayn. Because of the threats of the Umayyad officials, they withdrew from Ibn ʿAqīl and remained in their homes out of fear. Al-Farazdaq (d. 110/728) described their attitude towards al-Ḥusayn by stating, "their hearts are with you, but their swords are against you."²³

Fourth, we have a small group of al-Ḥusayn's supporters and followers who stood fast in their promises and sacrificed themselves for al-Ḥusayn.²⁴

The killing of al-Ḥusayn became the prototype of Shīʿī martyrdom and occupies a particularly important role in Shīʿī piety. Shīʿī communities regard the killing of al-Ḥusayn at the hands of the Umayyad authorities as an immoral massacre of the just and rightful ruler at the hands of an usurper. Thus, remembering al-Ḥusayn's death "combines

²² Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 382. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 306.

²³ Ibid., p. 290. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 80. Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 254.

²⁴ The names of the fourth group were recorded by some sources and have been discussed in Chapter Three.

grief over his death with a strong condemnation of tyranny and injustice.”²⁵ Al-Ḥusayn became a historical figure and “his death became a cosmic event, the central focus of human history.”²⁶ The slogan “vengeance for al-Ḥusayn,” which played a significant role in the downfall of the Umayyads, became a symbol for all future Shi‘ī movements.²⁷ Thus, one of the goals of this thesis will be to clarify the circumstances of his uprising and death.

Sources of this study

While much has been written about al-Ḥusayn’s uprising and death, to the extent that it is extremely difficult to locate or even enumerate all these works, it is quite strange that no single historical study based on the classical Arabic sources has been compiled on the subject. Most of the writings on al-Ḥusayn’s death are narratives and are based primarily on Shi‘ī sources. Some of them which carry the title *Maqṭal al-Ḥusayn* (*The Killing of al-Ḥusayn*), focus exclusively on the tragedy of Karbalā’.²⁸ These works are not without exaggeration and generally reflect a Shi‘ī perspective. A substantial number are written in Persian. Murtaḍā Muṭahharī (d. 1399/1979), the famous Iranian scholar, dedicates a large part of his best-known piece, *al-Malḥama al-Ḥusayniyya*, to refuting some of these

²⁵ Peter Chelkowski, “Rawzah-Khavānī,” *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987, 12: 220. See also his “Ta‘ziya: Indigenous Avant-Garde Theater of Iran,” In *Ta‘ziyah Ritual and Drama in Iran*. Edited by Peter Chelkowski, New York: New York University Press, 1979, pp. 1-11.

²⁶ Mahmoud Ayoub, *Redemptive Suffering in Islam: A Study of the Devotional Aspects of ‘Āshūrā’ in Twelver Shi‘ism*. New York: Mouton, 1978, p. 94.

²⁷ Sayyed Hossein Nasr, “Shiism: Ithnā ‘Ashariyya,” *Encyclopedia of Religion*, 13: 262.

²⁸ Muḥammad Bāqir al-Maḥmūdī, in his book *‘Abarāt al-Muṣṭafayn*, 2 vols. Beirut: Dār al-Maḥajja al-Bayḍā’, 1417/1997, 1: 6-7, enumerates the earlier works of the *Maqātil* literature from the 1st century to the 6th century. These works, however, are not extant. To take a glance at the nature of “*Maqṭal al-Ḥusayn*” writings, see, for instance, Akhtāb Khawārizm, *Maqṭal al-Ḥusayn*, 2 vols. Qum: Maktabat al-Mufīd, n.d.; ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Muqarram, *Maqṭal al-Ḥusayn*, Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Islāmī, 1399/1979; Muḥammad Taqī Bahr al-‘Ulūm, *Maqṭal al-Ḥusayn*, Beirut: Dār al-Zahrā’, 1405/1985; Muḥammad Ḥusayn Kāshif al-Ghiṭā’, *Maqṭal al-Ḥusayn*, ed. Hādī al-Hilālī, Qum: Intishārāt al-Sharīf al-Raḍī, 1419/1998.

Persian works,²⁹ while focusing on the philosophy of the social and religious aspects of al-Ḥusayn's uprising.³⁰

Many modern works have been compiled on al-Ḥusayn by famous Shī'ī scholars. Although these works deal mainly with al-Ḥusayn's life, his killing and its impact on the Muslim community, there are no clear attempts to analyze these events, particularly in regard to the classical Arabic sources that may depict the origin of reference, which is imperative for examining the authenticity of the reports.³¹ In this respect, two works compiled by non-Shī'ī scholars are worthy of being mentioned. One is by the famous Egyptian author 'Abbās Muḥmūd al-'Aqqād (d. 1383/1964), *Abū al-Shuhadā': al-Ḥusayn Ibn 'Alī*³² and the other is by a religious Lebanese scholar 'Abd Allāh al-'Alāylī (d. 1416/1996), *Al-Imām al-Ḥusayn: Sumuw al-Ma'nā fī Sumuw al-Dhāt*.³³ Both writers focus on the religious motives of al-Ḥusayn's uprising and the philosophy and ideals of his deeds.

As for academic studies, relatively little has been compiled on al-Ḥusayn and his uprising. In this respect, we should mention two works. First is Mahmoud Ayoub's celebrated work, *Redemptive Suffering in Islam*, which focuses exclusively on the devotional aspects of the martyrdom of al-Ḥusayn. Referring to the Shī'ī point of view,

²⁹ Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, *al-Malḥama al-Ḥusayniyya*, 3 vols. Qum: al-Markaz al-'Ālamī lil-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya, 1413/1992; 1: 5-87, 3: 235-269.

³⁰ Ibid., 1: 137-259; 2: 5-259; 3: 163-231.

³¹ See, for example, Muḥsin al-Amīn, *A'yān al-Shī'a*, 1: 578-629; Bāqir Sharīf al-Qurashī, *Ḥayāt al-Imām al-Ḥusayn*, 3 vols. Qum: Intishārāt Madrasat al-Irawānī, 4th ed. 1413/1992; Hāshim Ma'rūf al-Ḥasanī, *Sīrat al-A'imma al-Ithnay 'Ashar*, 2 vols. Beirut: Dār al-Ta'āruf lil-Maṭbū'āt, 1409/1989, 2: 7-105; Muḥammad Mahdī Shams al-Dīn, *Thawrat al-Ḥusayn: Zurufūhā al-Ijtimā'iyya wa Āthāruhā al-Insāniyya*, Beirut: Dār al-Ta'āruf lil-Maṭbū'āt, 1401/1981, and, *Thawrat al-Ḥusayn fī al-Wijdān al-Sha'bī*, Beirut: al-Dār al-Islāmiyya, 1400/1980. Ibrāhīm Baudūn, *Thawrat al-Ḥusayn Ḥadathan wa-Ishkāliyyāt*, Beirut: Sharikat al-Maṭbū'āt lil-Tawzī' wal-Nashr, 2001.

³² 'Abbās Muḥmūd al-'Aqqād, *Abul-Shuhadā': al-Ḥusayn Ibn 'Alī*, Cairo: Dār al-Hilāl, n.d.

³³ 'Abd Allāh al-'Alāylī, *Al-Imām al-Ḥusayn: Sumuw al-Ma'nā fī Sumuw al-Dhāt*, Beirut: Dār Maktabat al-Tarbiya, 1986.

Ayoub notes that his purpose “will not be to document the historicity of any particular event of his [al-Ḥusayn’s] life, nor to investigate the authenticity of anything that he may have said.” Rather, his intention is “to look at his life from the point of view of popular devotion and deal primarily with the community’s understanding of his life.”³⁴ The second academic work, Ibrāhīm al-Ḥaydarī’s *Trājīdyā Karbalā’*,³⁵ is a sociological study of the Shī‘ī practices and ceremonies in Iraq during the month of Muḥarram and makes no attempt to deal with the historical facts of the events. It should be noted that, in his two articles, “Rawzah-Khavānī,” and “Ta‘ziya,” Peter Chelkowski focuses on the Shī‘ī ritual of public lamentation for al-Ḥusayn’s murder, especially in Iran.³⁶

Four historical works deserve special attention, although they do not focus exclusively on al-Ḥusayn. Two were compiled by Julius Wellhausen and the other two are by S.H.M. Jafri and Wilferd Madelung. In *al-Khawārij wal-Shī‘a (The Religio-Political Factions In Early Islam)*, Wellhausen relies mainly on the version of al-Ṭabarī, on the authority of Abū Mikhnaḥ (d. 157/773). It seems that Wellhausen was often influenced by al-Ṭabarī in narrating the details of the events. For example, Wellhausen relates many insignificant details about Muslim Ibn ‘Aqīl’s mission, and his death.³⁷ On the other hand, certain important events, such as the dialogues between al-Ḥusayn’s followers and the Umayyad authorities are dealt with quite sketchily.³⁸ Moreover, Wellhausen ignores Mu‘āwīya’s attempts to secure homage for his son Yazīd. In my

³⁴ Ayoub, *Redemptive Suffering in Islam*, p. 16.

³⁵ Ibrāhīm al-Ḥaydarī, *Trājīdyā Karbalā’*, Beirut: Dār al-Sāqī, 1999.

³⁶ Peter Chelkowski, “Rawzah-Khavānī,” *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, 12: 220-1, and “Ta‘ziya,” *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, 14: 358-9.

³⁷ Julius Wellhausen, *al-Khawārij wal-Shī‘a (The Religio-Political Factions in Early Islam)*. It should be mentioned that this book was translated into Arabic from the German version, *Die religiös-politischen Oppositionen parteien im alten Islam*, tr. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Badawī, Kuwait: Wakālat al-Maṭbū‘āt, 1976, p.122.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 124.

thesis, I give considerable attention to the significance of these dialogues and also deal thoroughly with the importance of Mu^cāwiya's attempts to secure allegiance for Yazīd.

In his second book, *al-Dawla al-^cArabiyya wa Ṣuqūṭuhā* (*The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall*), Wellhausen again relies on al-Ṭabarī's account, although he also refers to *al-Kāmil fīl-Ta'rīkh* by Ibn al-Athīr (d. 630/1233), who adds almost nothing to al-Ṭabarī's version. Referring to Ibn al-Athīr's version, Wellhausen wrongly believes that Mu^cāwiya's violent attitude in the Ḥijāz while attempting to secure support for his son Yazīd, was unknown in the early sources.³⁹ In dealing with the events concerning the abdication of al-Ḥasan and his truce with Mu^cāwiya, Wellhausen depends exclusively on al-Ya^cqūbī, al-Dīnawarī and al-Ṭabarī.⁴⁰ In their versions, both al-Ya^cqūbī and al-Dīnawarī, following their custom of summarizing events, do not provide comprehensive accounts of the circumstances surrounding al-Ḥasan's abdication in 41/661. In his narration, al-Ṭabarī depends exclusively on al-Zuhrī's reports and omits other accounts.⁴¹ Perhaps he did so in order to avoid being classified as an ^cAlid supporter.

Although Jafri compares different versions of al-Ḥasan's abdication in his book, *The Origins and Early Development of Shī'ī Islam*, he never cites al-Balādhurī, Ibn Sa^cd or Ibn A^ctham among his references. In dealing with al-Ḥusayn's uprising and its consequences, Jafri relies mainly on al-Ṭabarī's version and pays little attention to other sources. Unlike his section on al-Ḥasan's abdication, Jafri here acknowledges various sources only briefly and does not compare different versions. He adopts Abū Mikhnaf's

³⁹ Wellhausen, *al-Dawla al-^cArabiyya wa-Ṣuqūṭuhā* (*The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall*). This book has been translated into Arabic from the German version, *Das Arabische Reich und sein Sturz*, tr. Muḥammad ^cAbd al-Hādī, Cairo: Lajnat al-Ta'līf wal-Tarjama wal-Nashr, 1986, p. 138. In fact, this incident is narrated by many sources. See Ibn A^ctham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 339-348. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma wal-Siyāsa*, 1: 182-191. Khalīfa Ibn Khayyāt, *Ta'rīkh Khalīfa Ibn Khayyāt*, pp. 160-164.

⁴⁰ Wellhausen, *al-Dawla al-^cArabiyya*, pp. 99-106.

⁴¹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, 4: 121.

version since he agrees with some scholars, such as Wellhausen and Sezgin, that “Abū Mikhnaf was generally the most reliable and authentic writer on the annals of Kūfa and Iraq under the Umayyads.”⁴² Jafri’s main source for al-Ḥusayn is al-Ṭabarī since the latter used Abū Mikhnaf’s work in full.⁴³ Following Veccia Vaglieri’s finding that al-Balādhurī almost used the same sources as al-Ṭabarī, Jafri omits him.⁴⁴ In fact, some important accounts are provided by al-Balādhurī which are not recorded by al-Ṭabarī.⁴⁵ Because Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1372-1373) accepts most of the material of Abū Mikhnaf, Jafri refers to him. For the same reason he cites al-Mufīd and al-Isfahānī.⁴⁶

When Jafri deals with al-Ḥusayn he adopts a more narrative style and changes his historical approach. For instance, when considering the speeches of al-Ḥusayn’s followers, Jafri uncovers the philosophy of martyrdom,⁴⁷ but pays scant attention to the stages of Mu‘āwiya’s attempts to secure allegiance for Yazīd. For these important incidents, Jafri unfortunately depends on al-Ṭabarī and al-Mas‘ūdī, who do not have complete or thorough accounts of Mu‘āwiya’s endeavor to secure Yazīd’s accession.⁴⁸ Although he occasionally provides a condensed account of pertinent events, such as the response of the nobles of Baṣra to al-Ḥusayn’s call,⁴⁹ at times he ignores other important events, such as “al-Ḥusayn’s will and testament to his brother, Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya (d. 81/700), and the dialogue between Muslim Ibn ‘Aqīl and Ibn Ziyād.” All these key events are thoroughly discussed in my thesis.

⁴² S.H.M. Jafri, *The Origins and Early Development of Shī‘ī Islam*, London: Longman Group Ltd., 1979, p. 212.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 213.

⁴⁵ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf*, 3: 366-7, 374, 390 and 5: 128-30.

⁴⁶ Jafri, *The Origins*, pp. 213, 215.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 202-208.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 167-168.

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 180-181.

The abdication of al-Ḥasan is treated at length by Madelung in his book, *The Succession to Muḥammad*. Generally speaking, Madelung depends on al-Madā'inī's reports which were provided by the accounts of al-Balādhurī, al-Isfahānī and Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd. Dealing with the correspondence between Mu'āwiya and al-Ḥasan, he stresses that Mu'āwiya was prepared to resort to any means to get al-Ḥasan to renounce his caliphate, commenting that "The proper course could be to treat him [al-Ḥasan] with dignified condescension, to cajole and dupe him with false promising."⁵⁰ Concerning the conditions of the agreement between Mu'āwiya and al-Ḥasan, he relies on the versions of al-Balādhurī and Ibn A'ṭham. Accepting the accounts that Mu'āwiya refused to fulfill his promises to al-Ḥasan, Madelung states, "No keen observer of the game of politics could have been in doubt that Mu'āwiya ever had had any intention of fulfilling his exorbitant promises made for the noble purpose of shortening the war."⁵¹

In refusing al-Ḥasan's caliphate, Mu'āwiya's intention was not to become a caliph who follows the Book of God, the Sunna of the Prophet and the conduct of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, but rather to have full control over the masses and to become a king. Describing Mu'āwiya's caliphate, Madelung affirms, "The caliph became counterpart and successor to the Roman-Byzantine emperors. He took over the old crown lands conquered by the Muslim armies as his divine right. He ruled Muslims as his subjects, absolute lord over their life and death."⁵²

Madelung refuses to accept al-Zuhri's account, quoted by al-Ṭabarī, that al-Ḥasan was the first to ask Mu'āwiya for an agreement and enumerate the conditions under which

⁵⁰ Wilferd Madelung, *The Succession to Muḥammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 315.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 324.

⁵² Ibid., p. 326.

he would obey him. He believes that al-Zuhrī's account is unreliable, describing it as Umayyad propaganda against al-Ḥasan.⁵³

In order to pave the way for the succession of his son Yazīd, Mu'āwiya had to remove any rivals from the scene; al-Ḥasan was the first challenger to be removed. In this respect, Madelung accepts the reports that al-Ḥasan was poisoned by his wife Ja'da at the instigation of Mu'āwiya, commenting that, "These reports are not, as often suggested, accepted only by Shi'ite sources, but also by the major Sunnite historians al-Wāqidī, al-Madā'inī, 'Umar b. Shabba, al-Balādhurī and al-Haytham b. 'Adī."⁵⁴

Al-Ḥusayn rejected Mu'āwiya's caliphate and condemned him for killing innocent people, but refused to respond to the call of the people of Kūfa to rise up against him, honoring the agreement between Mu'āwiya and al-Ḥasan. Al-Ḥusayn condemned Yazīd's caliphate and conduct as he had done with Mu'āwiya. Neither was entitled to the caliphate and neither was considered legitimate. The relation between Mu'āwiya's caliphate and al-Ḥusayn's uprising, which is not discussed by any of the above-mentioned works, is carefully considered in my thesis.

Veccia Vaglieri's, "al-Ḥusayn B. 'Alī B. Abī Ṭālib," is the only academic work that focuses on the history of al-Ḥusayn. In this encyclopedia entry, Veccia Vaglieri depends exclusively on al-Ṭabarī and al-Balādhurī, ignoring other important sources, such as, Ibn Sa'd, Ibn Qutayba and Ibn A'ṭham.⁵⁵ This is perhaps why she does not deal with the lengthy process of Mu'āwiya's attempts to secure Yazīd's caliphate, recorded in Ibn Qutayba, Ibn 'Aṭham and Khalīfa Ibn Khayyāṭ. However, this process is very important

⁵³ Ibid., p.329.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 331.

⁵⁵ Veccia Vaglieri, "al-Ḥusayn B. 'Alī B. Abī Ṭālib," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971, 3: 608.

for the present study, since it shows that Yazīd became caliph only because of his father's manipulation; otherwise, he was not entitled to the caliphate. Moreover, Mu'āwiya tried to compel the prominent persons of Medina to recognize Yazīd's caliphate. Al-Ḥusayn refused to submit to this demand, and consequently, was killed.

In the section of her article entitled, "Attitude towards Mu'āwiya," Veccia Vaglieri claims that al-Ḥusayn "went often to Damascus where he received further largesse,"⁵⁶ although there is no proof in the sources for this claim. She also ignores al-Ḥusayn's letter to Mu'āwiya, in which he condemns Mu'āwiya's crime of killing Ḥujr Ibn 'Adī al-Kindī (51/671) and some other followers of 'Alī, in spite of the fact that a complete narration of this letter was recorded by al-Balādhurī on whose accounts she relies.

A brief narrative description of the killing of Muslim Ibn 'Aqīl, the journey of al-Ḥusayn from Mecca to Karbalā' and the battle of Karbalā' is recorded in this article,⁵⁷ but the reason for al-Ḥusayn's uprising and his arguments for the illegitimacy of Yazīd's caliphate are not discussed.

In another section entitled, "Events after the battle," the author states that when al-Ḥusayn's head was placed in front of Ibn Ziyād and Yazīd, "each reacted differently." She maintains that while the former "was insulting, knocking out some teeth with his switch," Yazīd, "according to most of the traditions, was respectful and appeared to regret the haste with which his governor had acted..."⁵⁸ In fact, both al-Ṭabarī and al-Balādhurī, on whose accounts the author based her article, report that Yazīd treated al-Ḥusayn's head in the same manner as his governor Ibn Ziyād.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.607.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 608-611.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.611.

⁵⁹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 356. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf*, 3: 416.

The rest of Veccia Vaglieri's article focuses on "The legend of Ḥusayn, Marvels connected with his death", "Supernatural attributes of Ḥusayn which caused marvels" and "Judgments on Ḥusayn."⁶⁰

In another entry, "al-Ḥasan B. ʿAlī," Veccia Vaglieri briefly describes al-Ḥasan's caliphate, the letters between al-Ḥasan and Muʿāwīya, and the circumstances under which al-Ḥasan renounced his caliphate, but does not mention the sources used.⁶¹ However, this entry does mention the conditions of the agreement concerning al-Ḥasan's abdication. The author argues about certain conditions that were recorded by several important sources, such as the question of the caliphate after Muʿāwīya's death and Muʿāwīya's promise to follow the "Book of God, the Sunna of the Prophet and the conduct of the righteous caliphs..."⁶² Veccia Vaglieri forgets the fact that Muʿāwīya was ready to submit to any conditions laid down by al-Ḥasan, as noted earlier, and that he did not fulfill his promises. A small part of this entry deals with "Al-Ḥasan's physical and moral attributes," and the rest of it focuses on the Shiʿī view of al-Ḥasan.⁶³

It is evident from the various works dealing with al-Ḥusayn cited above that no complete historical study of the subject has been compiled from the classical Arabic sources. This thesis is not a narrative account of al-Ḥusayn's life, but rather an analytical study of al-Ḥusayn's uprising and his killing, based exclusively on references to the classical Arabic sources, which were compiled in the third and fourth century A.H. In my thesis, I discuss and reconstruct all the events and circumstances from the time when al-Ḥusayn moved from Medina, his grandfather's residence, to when he was killed at

⁶⁰ Veccia Vaglieri, "al-Ḥusayn B. ʿAlī B. Abī Ṭālib," 3: 612-15.

⁶¹ Veccia Vaglieri, "Al-Ḥasan B. ʿAlī B. Abī Ṭālib," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 3: 241.

⁶² Ibid., p. 242.

⁶³ Ibid.

Karbalā'. I also examine different accounts of these events. My aim is to investigate the purpose of al-Ḥusayn's uprising and how it ended with his killing.

The fullest and most comprehensive account of al-Ḥusayn's uprising and the battle of Karbalā' was narrated by the famous historian Abū Mikhnaf (d. 157/773), who is our main source of knowledge for the study of Iraq in general and for the events surrounding al-Ḥusayn's uprising in particular.⁶⁴ Abū Mikhnaf, who was considered by both Shī'ī and Sunnī scholars as one of the outstanding Shī'ī historians,⁶⁵ was the first historian to produce a comprehensive account of Karbalā' and his work on al-Ḥusayn has been quoted by many historians and is generally regarded as reliable and authentic. Jafri states that Abū Mikhnaf "has been thoroughly and critically studied by scholars such as Wellhausen and others, and recently by Ursula Sezgin; all have found him generally the most reliable and authentic writer on the annals of Kūfa and Iraq under the Umayyads."⁶⁶

Regardless of the fact that Abū Mikhnaf's account contains myths and exaggerated events, according to Jafri "the whole account is reliable."⁶⁷ According to Dixon, "On the whole, Abū Mikhnaf, though at times showing Iraqi and Shī'ī sympathy, is generally accurate in his information and more reliable than other sources."⁶⁸ Veccia Vaglieri affirms that Abū Mikhnaf's accounts, when "taken all together... form a coherent and

⁶⁴ Kāmil Salmān al-Jubūrī, *Nuṣūṣ min Ta'rīkh Abū Mikhnaf*, 2 vols. Beirut: Dār al-Maḥajja al-Bayḍā', 1999, 1: 5.

⁶⁵ Miḥmī, *al-Mu'arrikhūn al-'Arab wal-Fiṭna al-Kubrā*, Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalī'a, 1998, p. 27. Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd (d. 655/1257) wrongly claims that Abū Mikhnaf was not Shī'ī and by no means considered among Shī'ī scholars. See his *Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāgha*, 20 vols. Cairo: Dār Ihyā' al-Kutub al-'Arabiyya, 1965, 1: 147.

⁶⁶ Jafri, *The Origins*, p. 212. For Sezgin and her book *Abū Mikhnaf: Ein Beitrag zur Historiographie des Umayyadischen Zeit*, Leiden: Brill, 1971, I depend on Jafri.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

⁶⁸ Abd al-Ameer Dixon, *The Umayyad Caliphate 65-86/684-70*, London: Luzac and Company, 1971, p. 11. Dixon does not discuss al-Ḥusayn in his work. It should be mentioned also that in his article on Yazīd's caliphate, Lammens does not deal with al-Ḥusayn's uprising and death; he focuses only on Yazīd and Mu'āwiya. See his "Le Califat de Yazīd 1^{er}," *Mélanges de la Faculté Orientale*, London: Luzac and Co. 1910, pp. 233-312.

credible narrative.”⁶⁹ Wellhausen considers Abū Mikhnaf the grand authority (*ḥujja kubrā*) on the history of the Kūfa events, even though “he was a Shīʿī, Kūfī and his sympathy was with ʿAlī.”⁷⁰ In his two books mentioned above, Wellhausen depends exclusively on the works of Abū Mikhnaf in relation to the events in Iraq and affirms that many other versions agree with Abū Mikhnaf’s account.⁷¹ He maintains that Abū Mikhnaf’s accounts “do not have any real discrepancy in the main points and the whole picture of the events is complete and coherent.”⁷² Gibb believes that Abū Mikhnaf presents an Iraqī or Kūfān, rather than purely Shīʿī, point of view in his account,⁷³ and al-Dūrī states that Abū Mikhnaf “is more favorably inclined to Iraq as opposed to Syria.”⁷⁴ Consequently, Abū Mikhnaf’s account is one of the major sources of the present study.

From which sources did Abū Mikhnaf collect his accounts of these events? His strength lies in the fact that he uses the accounts of eyewitnesses who participated in, or at least were present at, these happenings. There are two categories of eyewitnesses; 1) a few of the individuals who were with al-Ḥusayn’s camp but who survived, such as ʿUqba Ibn Simʿān (d. 70?/689), who was the slave (*mawlā*) of al-Rabāb, al-Ḥusayn’s wife; and 2) those who were with the Umayyad forces, who comprise the majority of the eyewitnesses. Some of these latter were sympathetic to al-Ḥusayn and were reluctant to fight against him; for example Ḥumayd Ibn Muslim (d. 72?/691), many of whose traditions were narrated by Abū Mikhnaf. Ḥumayd Ibn Muslim had a strong relationship with the Umayyad government but later participated with al-Tawwābūn (the penitents)

⁶⁹ Veccia Vaglieri, “Al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib,” *EF*, 3: 610.

⁷⁰ Wellhausen, *al-Khwārij wal-Shīʿa*, p. 133.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ H.A.R. Gibb, “Abū Mikhnaf,” *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 1: 140.

⁷⁴ A. A. al-Dūrī, *The Rise of Historical Writing Among the Arabs*, ed. and tr. by Lawrence I. Conrad, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 44.

and al-Mukhtār (d. 67/686). ‘Alī Ibn al-Ḥusayn (d. 94/712), who was with al-Ḥusayn in his journey from Medina to Karbalā’ and who escaped the massacre at Karbala’, was another of the narrators and eyewitnesses utilized by Abū Mikhnaḥ.

The classical Arabic sources are remarkably rich in information about al-Ḥusayn. The fullest and most comprehensive account of Abū Mikhnaḥ’s version of events was narrated by al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) in his celebrated book *Ta’rīkh al-Umam wal-Mulūk*. Al-Ṭabarī relied almost entirely on the narrative of Abū Mikhnaḥ’s version of the events on the authority of the latter’s student Hishām Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Sā’ib al-Kalbī (d. 204/819).⁷⁵ Sezgin confirms that “Ṭabarī’s main source of Abū Mikhnaḥ was Ibn al-Kalbī.”⁷⁶ According to Wellhausen, all of Abū Mikhnaḥ’s accounts depended on a complete and real chain of transmission.⁷⁷ One of the obvious concerns of al-Ṭabarī was to pay particular attention to the narration of complete chains of authorities. However, we do not know whether Hishām narrated the whole of Abū Mikhnaḥ’s account, or whether he selected only the parts that he liked. The imperative question here is whether al-Ṭabarī modified the comprehensive account of Hishām or whether he narrated the whole account without any changes. It seems that al-Ṭabarī did not record all of Hishām’s account and omitted at least some of his reports. In dealing with Abū Dharr’s (d. 32/652) deportation

⁷⁵ Wellhausen, *al-Khawārij*, p. 131. Al-Maḥmūdī, *‘Abarāt al-Muṣṭafayn*, 1: 9. Like his father, Muḥammad (d. 146/763), Hishām was interested in all branches of knowledge of his time and compiled many works. Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-A‘yān wa-Anbā’ Abnā’ al-Zamān*, 8 vols. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1977/1397, 6: 83. Due to his strong relations with the ‘Abbāsīd authorities, Hishām al-Kalbī was criticized for being biased against the Umayyads in his narrations. Jawād ‘Alī, however, affirms that recent research shows that this criticism is invalid; rather, Hishām tried his utmost to expose the actual events. Jawād ‘Alī, “Mawāriḍ al-Ṭabarī, *Majallat al-Majma‘ al-‘Ilmī al-‘Irāqī*, Baghdad: al-Majma‘ al-‘Ilmī al-‘Irāqī, 1 (1954): 22. W. Atallah states, “Some Arab writers were fiercely critical of him, but such criticisms, sometimes based on scholarly rivalry, were often sectarian or motivated by religious fervor...” Attallah confirms, “Present-day research is confirming Ibn al-Kalbī’s eminent role in the history of Arab literature.” W. Attallah, “al-Kalbī,” *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 4: 496.

⁷⁶ Jafri, *The Origins*, p. 215.

⁷⁷ Wellhausen, *al-Khawārij*, p. 131.

from Syria to Medina, al-Ṭabarī states that “Many things (*umūr*) were related concerning his deportation, but I was reluctant (*karihnā*) to narrate most of them.”⁷⁸ The same statement is uttered by al-Ṭabarī in regard to ʿUthmān’s murder.⁷⁹

Another version of al-Ḥusayn’s murder is narrated by al-Ṭabarī and inserted within Abū Mikhnaḥ’s account. This version was narrated by Muḥammad Ibn ʿAlī Ibn al-Ḥusayn (d. 114/732)- known as al-Bāqir, on the authority of one of his followers, ʿAmmār al-Duhnī (d. 133/750). ʿAmmār requested that Muḥammad al-Bāqir describe to him the battle of Karbala’ as if he, ʿAmmār, had been present. Despite the fact that al-Bāqir and his father ʿAlī witnessed all of the events from al-Ḥusayn’s departure from Medina until his killing, this account has little significance since it is very brief and unclear. In this version, al-Bāqir talks about Muslim Ibn ʿAqīl at length, yet ignores al-Ḥusayn’s killing.⁸⁰ In addition, this version adds nothing to Abū Mikhnaḥ’s account. Accordingly, it may be concluded that this account was abbreviated, perhaps either by ʿAmmār or al-Ṭabarī.

Very occasionally, al-Ṭabarī narrates from Muḥammad Ibn ʿUmar al-Wāqidī (d. 207/822) and Muḥammad Ibn Saʿd (d. 230/847).⁸¹ However, al-Ṭabarī undermines al-Wāqidī’s version by using the expression *zaʿama* (‘he alleged’).⁸² In regard to various events connected with Damascus, al-Ṭabarī narrates from ʿAwāna al-Kalbī (d. 147/764), on the authority of Hishām al-Kalbī .⁸³ It seems that Hishām had met ʿAwāna and narrated directly from him.⁸⁴

⁷⁸ Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 3: 353.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 399.

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 259-60. Although al-Bāqir was born in 57/676 and he was a child at the events of Karbalā’ he acquired his information from his father and his women relatives who witnessed these events.

⁸¹ Ibid., pp. 290, 301.

⁸² Ibid., p. 254.

⁸³ Ibid., pp. 254, 296-97.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 290.

According to Fück, Ibn Saʿd (d. 230/847) compiled his famous book, *al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā*, from the works of his predecessors, especially al-Wāqidī and al-Kalbī.⁸⁵ He usually gives the full *isnād*. For the events of al-Ḥasan's abdication and al-Ḥusayn's uprising and death, Ibn Saʿd does not provide a complete picture of the events and his accounts are not organized into a series of narratives. It seems that Ibn Saʿd did not arrange his information but added details as he gathered them. His habit was to collect many accounts from different people and different chains of authorities and present them in one single version. It is difficult to uncover Ibn Saʿd's own point of view on the events, because his accounts are narrated without comment.⁸⁶ Sometimes, he uses the word *yuqāl* ('it was said') to give the impression that the account might be weak.⁸⁷ Ibn Saʿd often relates accounts without naming his authorities.⁸⁸

On the subject of al-Ḥusayn's killing, Ibn Saʿd collected information from many different authorities, some of whom like al-Wāqidī, are named, though others are not specified.⁸⁹ He sometimes provides many versions of the event at hand,⁹⁰ and on some occasions narrates details that are not found in Abū Mikhnaḥ's account.⁹¹ He seems, for some reason, to have deliberately abridged the material at his disposal. His list of al-Ḥusayn's male family members who were killed at Karbalā' includes mistakes in regard to their names⁹² and he sometimes narrated many contradictory accounts of a single event

⁸⁵ J. W. Fück, "Ibn Saʿd," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 3: 22.

⁸⁶ Ibn Saʿd, *Tarjamat al-Imām al-Ḥasan min al-Qism Ghayr al-Maṭbūʿ min Kitāb al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā*, ed.

ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Qum: Muʾassasat Āl al-Bayt li-lḥyāʾ al-Turāth, 1416/1996, pp. 62-63, 76.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 77.

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 77, 83, 96.

⁸⁹ Ibn Saʿd, *Maqtal al-Ḥusayn*, p. 51.

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 57-59.

⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 57, 66-68, 81.

⁹² Ibid., p. 75.

without mentioning the discrepancy.⁹³ The importance of Ibn Sa'd to this study is that he provides many accounts from different chains of transmissions in regard to al-Ḥasan's abdication and his death.⁹⁴ As far as al-Ḥusayn is concerned, Ibn Sa'd collects many accounts in regard to some prominent persons who advised al-Ḥusayn not to comply with the Kūfans' call, which are not found in other sources.⁹⁵ Al-Ḥusayn's journey from Mecca to Karbalā', Ibn 'Aqīl's death, the description of the battle at Karbalā' and the role of the captives after al-Ḥusayn's death are all also recorded by Ibn Sa'd from different authorities.⁹⁶

Although Khalīfa Ibn Khayyāt (d. 240/854) relates from different historians, he narrates nothing from Abū Mikhnaf.⁹⁷ Being himself a traditionist, as were his father and grandfather, Khalīfa adopts the method of the traditionists in mentioning full *isnāds*.⁹⁸ Although Khalīfa deals only very briefly with the events of al-Ḥusayn's killing, the importance of his work for the present study rests on the fact that he narrates a detailed and clear version, on the authority of al-Zuhrī and of Dhakwān (a slave of 'Ā'isha), of Mu'āwiya's endeavors to secure Yazīd's succession. In this respect, and although he uses a different *isnād*, Khalīfa's report is more or less in agreement with the versions of Ibn Qutayba and Ibn A'ṭham.⁹⁹

Al-Imāma wal-Siyāsa, known as *Ta'rīkh al-Khulafā'*, compiled by Ibn Qutayba al-Dīnawarī (d. 276/889), is an indispensable work for the present study. The *isnāds* and

⁹³ Ibid., pp. 81-83.

⁹⁴ Ibn Sa'd, *Tarjamat al-Imām al-Ḥasan*, pp. 62-3, 76-86, 94-96.

⁹⁵ Ibn Sa'd, *Maqtal al-Ḥusayn*, pp. 56-61.

⁹⁶ Ibid., pp. 61-91.

⁹⁷ Dixon, *The Umayyad Caliphate*, p. 3.

⁹⁸ Khalīfa Ibn Khayyāt, *Ta'rīkh Khalīfa Ibn Khayyāt*, pp. 160, 161, 176, 179.

⁹⁹ Referring to all these accounts, it is obvious that Wellhausen was incorrect when he stated that the tradition of Mu'āwiya's attempts to secure Yazīd's succession was not an actual event. See, Wellhausen, *al-Dawla al-'Arabiyya*, p. 138.

dialogue in this book are connected to eye-witnesses narrators.¹⁰⁰ For a single tradition, Ibn Qutayba provides many different *isnāds* on the authority of different narrators.¹⁰¹ He typically collects many accounts from different authorities, all of which have the same meaning, and presents them in a single tradition.¹⁰² For many well-known events, it was sufficient for Ibn Qutayba to utilize the word *dhakarū* or *qālū* ('they have said') instead of naming his authorities.¹⁰³ Ibn Qutayba provides a comprehensive account of Mu'āwiya's attempts to secure his son's succession. His version is very detailed and the reader is provided with a clear picture that other sources have omitted. Indeed, Ibn Qutayba's version shares strong similarities with that of Ibn A'ṭham. However, it should be mentioned that exaggerations have been incorporated in order to give a more interesting description of events.¹⁰⁴

Aḥmad Ibn Yahyā al-Balādhurī (d. 279/892) is a famous Arab historian of the 3rd /9th century. Gibb states that al-Balādhurī studied under both Ibn Sa'd (d. 230/845) and al-Madā'inī (d. 255/840).¹⁰⁵ Referring to al-Balādhurī's *isnāds*, Humphreys infers that he "had studied with the great biographer of the previous generation, Muḥammad Ibn Sa'd, and through him had a close acquaintance with the tradition of al-Wāqidī (d. 207/823)."¹⁰⁶ Dixon believes that al-Balādhurī is one of the few historians to have dealt

¹⁰⁰ Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 1.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 1-2.

¹⁰² Ibid., pp. 27-28.

¹⁰³ Ibid., pp. 84-89, 119, 175-77.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 181-183.

¹⁰⁵ H. A. R. Gibb, "Ta'rikh," *Studies on the Civilization of Islam*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962. p. 116.

¹⁰⁶ Stephen Humphreys, *Islamic History : A Framework for Inquiry*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974. p. 99.

objectively with the Umayyads.¹⁰⁷ *Ansāb al-Ashrāf* is one of the two great historical works, the second being *Futūḥ al-Buldān*, that have won general acclaim for al-Balādhurī's reliability.¹⁰⁸

Many of Abū Mikhnaḥ's accounts are preserved in the chronicles of al-Balādhurī as well as al-Ṭabarī,¹⁰⁹ including those of al-Ḥusayn's uprising and the tragedy of Karbalā'.¹¹⁰ Based on his in-depth knowledge of the 'Abbasid period and its authorities, Ibrāhīm Baydūn, a professor of history at the University of Beirut, asserts that al-Balādhurī must have had access to specific materials which could not have been obtained by other historians such as al-Ṭabarī.¹¹¹

Unlike al-Ṭabarī, who interrupts the sequence of his events from time to time, al-Balādhurī focuses on only one topic which he follows to its end. He has no desire to incorporate insignificant details into his accounts and, according to al-Dūrī, subjects his sources to criticism "before taking material from them."¹¹²

When the *isnād* is well known, al-Balādhurī considers it sufficient to use the word *qālū* ('they said').¹¹³ When using the terms, *wa-yuqāl* ('it was told'), *wa-qad qāla* ('it was said'), *wa-ruwiya* ('it was narrated'), *wa-za'ama ba'duhum* ('somebody alleged'), he might have been trying to give the impression that the reports were weak.¹¹⁴ Although the names of al-Ḥusayn's supporters are cited in al-Balādhurī's work, some of these are not

¹⁰⁷ Dixon, *The Umayyad Caliphate*, p. 3. Concerning al-Balādhurī's objectivity, see also Baydūn, "Masā'il al-Manhaj fil-Kitāba al-Ta'rīkhiyya fi Nihāyat al-Qarn al-Thālith al-Hijrī," *al-Muntalaq*, no. 43, Beirut: Al-Ittiḥād al-Lubnānī lil-Ṭalaba al-Muslimīn, 1408/1988, p. 61.

¹⁰⁸ C.H. Becker-[F. Rosenthal], "Al-Balādhurī," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 1: 972.

¹⁰⁹ Gibb, "Abū Mikhnaḥ," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 1: 140.

¹¹⁰ Veccia Vaglieri, "al-Ḥusayn Ibn 'Alī," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 3: 608.

¹¹¹ Ibrāhīm Baydūn, "Masā'il al-Manhaj," p. 59.

¹¹² Al-Dūrī, *The Rise of Historical Writing*, p. 62.

¹¹³ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 275-6, 280, 285, 287, 289.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 3: 295, 298-299, 390, 374.

mentioned by al-Ṭabarī.¹¹⁵ In one account that relates to the present study, al-Balādhurī narrates directly from a member of the Banū Hāshim without mentioning his name.¹¹⁶ In addition to the fact that al-Balādhurī enables us to check al-Ṭabarī's account, his importance to this study rests on the fact that he provides some important versions of events which are not recorded by al-Ṭabarī, especially, al-Ḥusayn's attitude towards Mu'āwiya's caliphate and his condemnation of Mu'āwiya's crime of killing Ḥujr Ibn 'Adī and some other followers of 'Alī.¹¹⁷

Al-Akhbār al-Ṭiwāl is the only extant work of the many collections of writings by Aḥmad Ibn Dāwūd al-Dīnawarī (d. 282/895),¹¹⁸ and most of the historical sources from which he gathered his material are no longer in existence.¹¹⁹ Al-Dīnawarī uses a narrative style and makes no attempt to judge his sources. He shows no interest in mentioning full chains of authorities, since he tries to "present a summary derived from other works,"¹²⁰ and does not furnish "parallel traditions on the same subject."¹²¹ At times, he does not mention his authorities, but instead uses the word *qālū* ('they said'), or the word *ruwiya* ('it was narrated') without providing a personal commentary on these accounts.¹²² Although his accounts of al-Hasan's abdication are brief, they present a clear picture of events. Complete yet brief accounts of Ḥujr's protest, Muslim Ibn 'Aqīl's death, and al-Ḥusayn's uprising and killing are also narrated by al-Dīnawarī.¹²³

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 3: 398-407.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 412.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 3: 366-7, 374, 398-407 and 5: 128-30.

¹¹⁸ Baydūn, "Masā'il al-Manhaj," p. 62.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Al-Dūrī, *The Rise of Historical Writing*, p. 69.

¹²¹ Erling Landewig Peterson, *'Alī and Mu'āwiya*, tr. P. Lampe Christensen, Copenhagen: Scandinavian University Books, 1964, p.161.

¹²² Al-Dīnawarī, *al-Akhbār al-Ṭiwāl*, pp. 217, 221.

¹²³ Ibid., pp. 223-5, 228-259.

Al-Yaʿqūbī (d. 284/897) is often classified as a Shīʿī historian.¹²⁴ Baydūn states that this classification lacks solid proofs and is without justification, claiming that the content found in the works of any historian does not necessarily reflect that historian's own opinions.¹²⁵ Al-Dūrī confirms that al-Yaʿqūbī is fair in his presentation of *akhbār* and generally accurate in the information he puts forward.¹²⁶ It is difficult to classify al-Yaʿqūbī as Shīʿī since his materials generally concur with other sources and contain some reports on behalf of Muʿāwīya.¹²⁷

Unfortunately, the accounts of al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn that are included in *Taʾrīkh al-Yaʿqūbī* are very brief and do not provide a clear picture of events. However, al-Yaʿqūbī makes hints during his account as a way of prompting the reader into thinking that there are other important incidents behind the events.¹²⁸ Al-Yaʿqūbī does not consider it essential to provide *isnāds* for his accounts, and is, therefore, content to give condensed versions from his authorities.¹²⁹ Although his accounts of al-Ḥasan's abdication are brief, the circumstances under which al-Ḥasan renounced his caliphate for Muʿāwīya can be comprehended. The same applies to al-Yaʿqūbī's accounts about al-Ḥusayn. The complete contents of Ibn ʿAbbās's letter to Yazīd, condemning his deeds and accusing him of being responsible for al-Ḥusayn's killing, are also recorded by al-Yaʿqūbī.¹³⁰

Aḥmad Ibn Aʿtham al-Kūfī al-Kindī (d. 314/926), was an Arab historian of the 4th/10th century and the author of the famous historical work *Kitāb al-Futūḥ*. Although

¹²⁴ Elton L. Daniel, "Al-Yaʿqūbī and Shīʿism Reconsidered." In *ʿAbbasid Studies: Occasional Papers of the School of ʿAbbasid Studies*, ed. James E. Montgomery, Leuven: Peeters, 2004, pp. 210-11.

¹²⁵ Baydūn, "Masāʾil al-Manhaj," p. 62.

¹²⁶ Al-Dūrī, *The Rise of Historical Writing*, p. 66.

¹²⁷ Al-Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2: 229, 238.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 2: 115.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 2: 200. Milḥim's claim that al-Yaʿqūbī takes his information directly from al-Wāqidī's work has no basis. See Milḥim, *al-Muʿarrikhūn*, p. 54.

¹³⁰ Al-Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2: 248-250.

little information is available about the author, Shaban claims that his work “proves to be a major source for the early history of the Arabs.”¹³¹ The names of Ibn A^ctham’s authorities are given in the introductory paragraphs of his book, and include Hishām al-Kalbī, Abū Mikhnaḥ, al-Wāqidī, al-Zuhrī (d. 124/741) and al-Madā’inī (d. 225/839). Since he combines all these accounts into connected historical narratives, he does not mention his authorities sequentially throughout the book.¹³² However, for some important events, Ibn A^ctham does refer to his authorities¹³³ and occasionally uses the word *qāla al-rāwī* (‘the narrator said’), though without naming the specific authority.¹³⁴ Although Ibn A^ctham presents pro-ʿAlīd viewpoints, he does not always provide accounts which can be classified as Shīʿī.¹³⁵

In the beginning of his book, Ibn A^ctham affirms that he is presenting what has been circulated and agreed upon by the ʿulamāʾ, without inserting any additions from the narrators. Therefore, the criterion for Ibn A^ctham is to accept traditions if they have the consensus of the scholars. His book is one of the major sources of the present study and provides important information that is omitted in other sources. His account sheds much light on events during the caliphate of al-Ḥasan and his abdication, although he condenses the traditions.¹³⁶ His narration concerning al-Ḥusayn is clear, comprehensive and coherent.

¹³¹ M. H. Shaban, “Ibn A^ctham al-Kūfī,” *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 3: 723.

¹³² Ibn A^ctham al-Kūfī, *Futūḥ*, 1: 368-69, 2: 215, 324.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 2: 496-97, 3: 299, 4: 260. Shaban affirms that Ibn A^ctham quoted his master, al-Madā’inī, in his lifetime. This statement has no valid reference. See, M. A. Shaban, “Ibn A^ctham al-Kūfī,” *E.I.* 3: 723. Commenting on Shaban’s claim, Humphreys states, “some of his more daring assertions seem very weakly supported by the sources.” Humphreys, *Islamic History*, p. 139. Milḥīm states that the resemblance between Ibn A^ctham and al-Madā’inī’s accounts is to be expected due to their reference to the same authorities, like Abū Mikhnaḥ. ʿAdnān Milḥīm, *al-Muʿarrikhūn al-ʿArab*, p. 37.

¹³⁴ Ibn A^ctham, *Futūḥ*, 1: 14.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 3: 153.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 2: 292-298.

°Alī Ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Masʿūdī (d. 346/956) is one of the best-known Arab historians. In his renowned book, *Murūj al-Dhahab*, al-Masʿūdī notes that he collected his information exclusively from such historians as Abū Mikhnaf, al-Wāqidī and Hishām al-Kalbī.¹³⁷ Al-Masʿūdī's accounts are generally very brief and without *isnād*, except on one occasion when he mentions Hishām al-Kalbī.¹³⁸ Sometimes he narrates two different versions of a particular event, indicating a preference for one over the other¹³⁹ and he has new *isnāds* that cannot be found in the other sources.¹⁴⁰ Referring to well-known events, al-Masʿūdī uses the word *dhukira* ('it was told').¹⁴¹ His accounts about al-Ḥasan are condensed and without *isnād*; nevertheless, they cannot be ignored. Al-Masʿūdī glosses over Muʿāwiya's attempts to secure his son's succession¹⁴² and provides a very brief account of al-Ḥusayn's murder, yet he lists the male members of the Banū Hāshim who were killed at Karbalā'.¹⁴³ He also dedicates a section of his work to describing Yazīd's corrupt violation of Islamic norms.¹⁴⁴

Abū al-Faraj al-Isfahānī (d. 356/967) studied with many scholars, including al-Ṭabarī.¹⁴⁵ Muḥsin al-Amīn asserts that al-Isfahānī is reliable because he pays close attention to chains of authorities for his reports. Al-Amīn also confirms that when he compiled his second book, *al-Aghānī*, al-Isfahānī was very objective and was not influenced by any circumstances or any person.¹⁴⁶ Al-Isfahānī's work *Maqātil al-Ṭālibiyyīn* is a valuable source for the present study. Because of its importance, al-Mufīd

¹³⁷ Al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj al-Dhahab*, 1: 21-23, 26.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 2: 387.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 2: 409-410.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 2: 427.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid., 3: 27-29.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 3: 61-62.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 3: 67-68.

¹⁴⁵ Abū al-Faraj al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil al-Ṭālibiyyīn*, p. 17.

¹⁴⁶ Al-Amīn, *Aʿyān*, 8: 200-201.

and Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd (d. 655/1257) both relied exclusively on his account for the events of al-Ḥasan's abdication.¹⁴⁷ Al-Isfahānī narrates different traditions for one incident and selects the most reliable one with full *isnāds* and various authorities, such as al-Wāqidī, Ibn Sa'd, Abū Mikhnaḥ, al-Madā'inī and al-Sha'bī (d. 104/725).¹⁴⁸ His account of the circumstances of al-Ḥasan's abdication, which is complete, sequential and clear, relies mostly on Abū Mikhnaḥ's version and cannot be found in any other source, even in al-Ṭabarī, who was al-Isfahānī's teacher.

For the events surrounding al-Ḥusayn's killing, al-Isfahānī narrates three chains of authorities; (1) Abū Mikhnaḥ on the authority of 'Umar Ibn Sa'd, the leader of the Umayyad troops at Karbalā'; (2) al-Madā'inī on the authority of Abū Mikhnaḥ and 'Awāna Ibn al-Ḥakam; (3) Muḥammad Ibn 'Alī al-Baqir on the authority of his follower 'Ammār al-Duhnī.¹⁴⁹ Al-Isfahānī confirms that these three authorities were not always in agreement in their versions.¹⁵⁰ He also provides a list of the Banū Hāshim who were killed with al-Ḥusayn.¹⁵¹ Al-Isfahānī went to great lengths to find out the exact dates for his accounts and to exclude the weak versions.¹⁵² The significance of his second piece, *al-Aghānī*, lies in his narration of the full account of Ḥujr's protest and his execution, on the authority of Abū Mikhnaḥ.¹⁵³

Chapter one of this dissertation studies the circumstances under which al-Ḥasan abdicated his caliphate and thoroughly investigates the truce between al-Ḥasan and Mu'āwiya, as well as the conditions demanded of Mu'āwiya by al-Ḥasan in order for him

¹⁴⁷ Muḥammad Ibn Nu'mān al-Mufid, *al-Irshād*, 2: 9-14. Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāgha*, 16: 29.

¹⁴⁸ Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, pp. 59-62, 77, 80, 84.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 89-99.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 99.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 87-98.

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 92.

¹⁵³ Al-Isfahānī, *al-Aghānī*, 25 vols. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 1407/1986, 17: 140-157.

to be acknowledged as caliph. When he became caliph, did Mu^cāwīya adhere to his promises and his covenant with al-Ḥasan? This important question will be dealt with in the first chapter.

The main purpose of this chapter is to show the connection between Mu^cāwīya's caliphate and the uprising of al-Ḥusayn. Because of Mu^cāwīya's caliphate and his attempts to secure Yazīd's succession, the latter became caliph. Al-Ḥusayn, who did not recognize Mu^cāwīya's caliphate and condemned his conduct, also refused to recognize Yazīd's caliphate. In al-Ḥusayn's view, neither Mu^cāwīya nor Yazīd was entitled to the caliphate; both had committed crimes against innocent people and violated Islamic principles. There was, therefore, no way in which al-Ḥusayn could recognize their illegitimate caliphates.

Ḥujr Ibn ^cAdī al-Kindī, an ardent supporter of ^cAlī and one of the prominent leaders of Kūfa, protested against Mu^cāwīya's policies, especially the cursing of ^cAlī.¹⁵⁴ Ḥujr's protest was a source of trouble for the Umayyads in Kūfa and had far-reaching effects on the Kūfan community; his capture and execution provoked widespread condemnation of Mu^cāwīya's conduct by prominent Muslims,¹⁵⁵ in particular, by al-Ḥusayn. Motivated by Ḥujr's execution, the people of Kūfa called al-Ḥusayn to lead them in revolt against Mu^cāwīya. In fact, Ḥujr's protest encouraged the people of Kūfa to object to the Umayyad officials openly and paved the way for al-Ḥusayn's uprising. Ḥujr's protest and its significance will be discussed in Chapter One as well.

Mu^cāwīya attempted to secure Yazīd's succession by forcing all Muslims to pay homage to him. For Mu^cāwīya, the most important individuals among the prominent

¹⁵⁴ Al-Tabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 189.

¹⁵⁵ ^cĀ'isha (d. 58/678), the Prophet's wife, was one of the prominent Muslims who condemned Mu^cāwīya. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 183.

notables who refused to acknowledge Yazīd's accession were the four sons of the Prophet's Companions: al-Ḥusayn Ibn ʿAlī, ʿAbd Allāh Ibn al-Zubayr (73/692), ʿAbd Allāh Ibn ʿUmar (74/693) and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Abī Bakr (53/673). By nominating his son Yazīd as his successor and imposing his *bayʿa* on Muslims, Muʿāwīya wished to make a strategic transfer of the caliphate from the Prophet and the institution of Rightly Guided Caliphs, to an institution that would be inherited by *mulk* (kingship). However, without the acknowledgment of Yazīd's caliphate by the four above-mentioned prominent notables, Muʿāwīya could not achieve his task. The process of Muʿāwīya's maneuvers, which took him many years to carry out and his intention to transfer the caliphate to Yazīd will be discussed in Chapter Two.

In order to consolidate his caliphate after Muʿāwīya's demise, Yazīd ordered his governor in Medina to force al-Ḥusayn to pay homage or, if he refused, to kill him. Al-Ḥusayn, who stood by his refusal to make the *bayʿa* to Yazīd, did not intend to fight the Umayyad officials in Medina and asked the governor to delay, under the pretext that, in order for his act of homage to be valid, it had to be made in public. Al-Ḥusayn succeeded in delaying for two days and finally left the town with his family to reside in Mecca. Yazīd's effort to get homage from al-Ḥusayn, and al-Ḥusayn's escape to Mecca, will also be studied in Chapter Two.

As soon as the inhabitants of Kūfa heard of Muʿāwīya's death and al-Ḥusayn's refusal to recognize Yazīd's caliphate, they sent him many messengers and letters inviting and urging him to revolt against the Umayyad authorities. Before his arrival in Kūfa, al-Ḥusayn had sent his cousin, Muslim Ibn ʿAqīl, to assess the situation there. However, in spite of thousands of pledges of allegiance made to him by the people of Kūfa, Ibn ʿAqīl

failed to gain control of the situation in Kūfa and was decapitated by the new governor. The failure of Ibn ʿAqīl’s mission will be discussed in Chapter Three. Meanwhile, al-Ḥusayn, under the impression that the inhabitants of Kūfa would remain true to their word, headed towards Kūfa, but was intercepted by Umayyad forces and killed on the plains of Karbalā’. Also in chapter three, the circumstances which led to the battle of Karbalā’ and, consequently, to al-Ḥusayn’s killing, will be examined in detail.

Finally, in Chapter Four, we will look at the aftermath of al-Ḥusayn’s death. The Kūfans felt especially remorseful about al-Ḥusayn’s death. They realized that they had invited the Prophet’s grandson to unite with them and lead them, but they had failed to fulfill their duty by abandoning him and leaving him and his family alone in the desert. They blamed themselves, regretting their immoral betrayal of the grandson of the Prophet. But who was, in fact, responsible for al-Ḥusayn’s killing? Were Yazīd’s hands clean? Was he really unhappy with the hasty demise inflicted upon al-Ḥusayn by his governor, Ibn Ziyād? If so, why did Yazīd reward the governor rather than punishing him and the others involved in al-Ḥusayn’s killing? Yazīd’s responsibility for al-Ḥusayn’s killing cannot be revealed unless we pursue the events leading up to the displaying of al-Ḥusayn’s head and the flaunting of the women of his family upon their return from Karbalā’ to Damascus. Muslims in the surrounding cities knew nothing of what had happened in Karbalā’ to the Prophet’s family and grandson at the hands of the Umayyads. The Umayyads propagated the view that because al-Ḥusayn was a rebel *khārijī*, who had protested against the legitimate caliphate, his killing was, therefore, a victory for Yazīd.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta’rīkh*, 4: 349-350, Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 139-141.

In the course of their journey from Karbalā' to Damascus, the captives played a significant role in exposing the true events of Karbalā' and what had happened to the family of the Prophet at the hands of the Umayyads. The captives blamed the people of Kūfa for abandoning the Prophet's grandson, reminding them of their immoral deeds. Regretting their failure to support al-Ḥusayn's cause, the people of Kūfa declared their readiness to support the family of the Prophet and condemned Yazīd's conduct. Sounds of grief and lamentation echoed over all the cities as the captives passed by during their journey. When Yazīd's family in Damascus joined the Prophet's family in their grief for the dead, Yazīd himself was induced to deny his responsibility for al-Ḥusayn's killing. In Chapter Four, I will deal with the consequences of the return of the captives to Medina and will look closely at Yazīd's responsibility for the tragic end of al-Ḥusayn.

My methodology in selecting and arranging my sources is as follows: for each event or episode, I choose a report which is not contradicted by other accounts and is supported by them. I will also mention the reports which reflect Sunnī or Shī'ī viewpoints, which are not enhanced by other accounts.

My principal sources are: al-Ṭabarī's *Ta'rīkh al-Ṭabarī*, al-Balādhurī's *Ansāb al-Ashrāf*, Ibn A'ṭham's *Kitāb al-Futūḥ*, Ibn Qutayba's *al-Imāma wal-Siyāsa*, Ibn Sa'd's *Tarjamat wa Maqāt al-Ḥusayn* and al-Isfahānī's *Maqātil al-Ṭalibiyyīn*. Indeed, I draw all of my sources from the earliest accounts embodied in these Classical Arabic sources by those historians who decided to set down the events in question in writing. No history of the events in question would be possible without these earliest histories.

CHAPTER ONE: Historical Background

Part One: The Abdication of al-Ḥasan

The main purpose of this section is to find out the connection between Mu^ʿāwīya's caliphate and al-Ḥusayn's uprising and, consequently, his killing. What was the attitude of al-Ḥusayn towards Mu^ʿāwīya's caliphate? Did he actually recognize Mu^ʿāwīya's caliphate or did he reject it and why? In fact, al-Ḥusayn rejected Mu^ʿāwīya's caliphate, though he refused to criticize the agreement between his brother, al-Ḥasan, and Mu^ʿāwīya. In addition, al-Ḥusayn condemned Mu^ʿāwīya for not fulfilling his promises to al-Ḥasan and for violating Islamic norms. Even so, he refused the frequent calls of the inhabitants of Kūfa to rise against Mu^ʿāwīya because of the truce between the latter and al-Ḥasan.

Mu^ʿāwīya's caliphate had a direct connection to Yazīd's caliphate. It is only because of Mu^ʿāwīya's power as a caliph and his attempts to secure his son's accession to the throne that the latter became caliph, since he was not otherwise entitled to the caliphate. Moreover, by forcing people to pay homage to Yazīd, Mu^ʿāwīya deprived al-Ḥusayn who, being more entitled to the caliphate than Yazīd, refused to recognize Yazīd's claim, of his rights. In fact, Mu^ʿāwīya was the main cause of Yazīd's accession to the caliphate and, consequently, for al-Ḥusayn's uprising and murder.

Here, the essential question is: How was Mu^ʿāwīya recognized as caliph, even though he was not qualified to hold such an office?¹ Did the people of Kūfa and *al-ḥaramayn*

¹ In his letter to Mu^ʿāwīya, ʿAbd Allāh Ibn ʿAbbās told him that he had no right to the caliphate because he lacked early merit and service in the cause of Islam which was recognized as the criteria for the choice of the successor to the Prophet. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 114-5.

(Mecca and Medina), the most important provinces for Mu^cāwiya, pay homage to him willingly or were they forced to do so? Mu^cāwiya, in fact, became caliph only when al-Ḥasan renounced his right to the caliphate after his father's death. This leads to another set of questions: Why did al-Ḥasan surrender his caliphate even though the people of Kūfa paid homage to him? Under what circumstances did al-Ḥasan abdicate his caliphate? Did al-Ḥasan abdicate because he was a man of peace and had no desire to fight Mu^cāwiya, or was he forced by circumstances to do so? Part one of this chapter will deal with all of these questions in an attempt to reconstruct the events leading up to al-Ḥasan's abdication.

In dealing with al-Ḥasan's abdication and his truce with Mu^cāwiya, al-Ṭabarī, surprisingly enough and contrary to his usual style of narration, depends on selected accounts, al-Zuhri, ^cAwāna and al-Masrūqī's, suppressing other accounts narrated by his major authority, Abū Mikhnaḥ.² In his narration, al-Ṭabarī does not provide the exact sequence of events and, therefore, it is difficult to gain a clear and complete picture of the circumstances under which al-Ḥasan renounced his caliphate.

My own analysis relies on the following versions: 1) al-Balādhurī's account, on the authority of Abū Mikhnaḥ, ^cAwāna al-Kalbī,³ al-Madā'inī and others, since this account is more comprehensive than any other; 2) al-Isfahānī's version, most of which was narrated on the authority of Abū Mikhnaḥ; this account provides a clear sequence of the events. Al-Isfahānī, unlike his teacher al-Ṭabarī, narrates a complete account of al-Ḥasan's

² Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 121-145.

³ ^cAwāna Ibn al-Ḥakam al-Kalbī (d. 147/764) was a Kūfan narrator and scholar of poetry and genealogy. He was accused of being pro-^cUthmān, fabricating traditions on behalf of the Banū Umayya. Concerning this accusation, El-Ali states, "Although he is charged with partiality towards the ^cUthmāniyya and the Umayyads..., the quotations from his works show little evidence of prejudice...." Saleh El-Ali, "^cAwāna b. al-Ḥakam al-Kalbī," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 1: 760.

abdication on the authority of Abū Mikhnaḥ with additions from other chains of authorities;⁴ 3) and Ibn Aṭṭam's reports, based on the authority of a number of historians.

According to al-Isfahānī, following the assassination of ʿAlī, al-Ḥasan was declared as caliph in Kūfa (40/660) without dispute.⁵ In fact, ʿAlī had, on various occasions, expressed his conviction as to the merits of the Prophet's *ahl al-bayt* and their entitlement to the caliphate;⁶ and had appointed his eldest son al-Ḥasan as his legatee.⁷ Except for Muʿāwiya, who rejected al-Ḥasan's caliphate, the sources have not recorded any conflict over al-Ḥasan's succession and, therefore, it may be concluded that the people of Medina and Mecca did not oppose al-Ḥasan's caliphate.⁸ Al-Ḥasan's immediate succession following the death of his father also illustrates that the people of Kūfa recognized the entitlement of the line of the Prophet's descendants through his daughter Fāṭima (d. 11/632) to the caliphate.

Following the custom of his predecessors, al-Ḥasan made a speech on the occasion of his accession to the caliphate. In his speech, he emphasized that he was the most qualified for this office. He praised the virtues of his family and his father, emphasizing his close relationship to the Prophet. Al-Ḥasan also affirmed that he was of the "Family of the Prophet from whom God has removed grime and has purified, and whose love is required

⁴ Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, pp. 59-80.

⁵ Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 62. See also, Ibn Saʿd, *Tarjamāt al-Imām al-Ḥasan*, p. 76. Al-Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2: 204. al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 121. Ibn Aṭṭam asserts that following ʿAlī's death, the people of Kūfa paid homage to al-Ḥasan as his successor, followed by his brother al-Ḥusayn. Ibn Aṭṭam, *Futūḥ*, 2: 284. This report, however, has Shīʿī leanings and is not supported by the other sources.

⁶ Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 11. Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāgha*, 9: 84, 164, 237.

⁷ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 257, 263.

⁸ Donaldson maintains that al-Masʿūdī, in his work *Murūj al-Dhahab*, reports that the people of Mecca and Medina "had declared allegiance to Ḥasan, while ʿAlī was living." Dwight Donaldson, *The Shīʿite Religion* London: Luzac and Company, 1993, p. 2. I could not find such a report in al-Masʿūdī's work.

in His Book.”⁹ In this speech, al-Ḥasan perhaps wanted to emphasize that he was more entitled to the caliphate than Mu‘āwiya, who had earlier refused to recognize ‘Alī’s caliphate and would probably also refuse to acknowledge al-Ḥasan’s caliphate.

According to al-Balādhurī, Qays Ibn Sa‘d Ibn ‘Ubāda al-Anṣārī (d. 60/679), the son of a Companion of the Prophet, an ardent follower of ‘Alī and a trusted commander of his army, addressed the people describing ‘Alī’s merits in Islam, his priority (*sābiqa*) and his relationship to the Prophet. He also pointed to al-Ḥasan’s merits and his entitlement to the caliphate after his father, asking them to pay homage to al-Ḥasan and to submit to his orders. He was the first person to swear allegiance to al-Ḥasan.¹⁰ According to al-Ṭabarī, Qays tried to impose a condition on al-Ḥasan regarding the *bay‘a*, demanding that it should be based on the “Book of God, the Sunna of the Prophet and the obligation to fight against the violators (*qitāl al-muḥillīn*).” Al-Ḥasan rejected Qays’ demand, declaring that the third obligation was included in the first two.¹¹ The focal question here is: Why did al-Ḥasan reject Qays’ demand to add “fight the violators” as a third condition for receiving the *bay‘a*? Was al-Ḥasan a man of peace, trying to avoid confrontation with Mu‘āwiya?

⁹ A complete account of al-Ḥasan’s speech is narrated by al-Isfahānī in his *Maqātil*, p. 62. In his account, al-Balādhurī reports that al-Ḥasan requested the people of Kūfa to pay homage to him and submit to him. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf*, 3: 279. Al-Mada’inī reports that after ‘Alī’s demise, ‘Abd Allāh Ibn ‘Abbās addressed the people of Kūfa stating, “The Commander of the Faithful has died and left vicegerents (*khulafā*) after him.” Mentioning to al-Ḥasan, Ibn ‘Abbās said, “It is your decision to listen to him or not.” The people cried and told Ibn ‘Abbās about their wish to see him. Therefore, al-Ḥasan addressed them with a speech in which he said, “We are your *Amīrs* and your *Imāms*, and we are the family of the Prophet whom God has purified.” The people of Kūfa then paid homage to him. Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāgha*, 16: 22. Ibn A‘tham does not mention al-Mada’inī’s account in his narration about the abdication of al-Ḥasan. Contrary to al-Mada’inī’s account, Ibn ‘Atham mentions neither ‘Abd Allāh nor ‘Ubayd Allāh Ibn ‘Abbās who invited the people of Kūfa to swear allegiance to al-Ḥasan. Therefore, Jafri’s affirmation, “The complete narrative of Madā’inī has come down to us through Ibn A‘tham,” and his statement “Ibn A‘tham has recorded a complete description of the course of events from Madā’inī” is absolutely invalid. See Jafri, *The Origins*, p. 139.

¹⁰ Al-Balādhurī, on the authority of Abū Mikhnaḥ, ‘Awāna, and Ṣāliḥ Ibn Kaysān, *Ansāb*, 3: 278. See also al-Ṭabarī, *Ta’rikh*, 4: 121.

¹¹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta’rikh*, 4: 121. Al-Ṭabarī does not mention the chain of authorities for this report.

Although its *isnād* is omitted, this account was perhaps narrated by al-Zuhri,¹² due to the fact that al-Ṭabarī depends heavily on al-Zuhri's reports regarding al-Ḥasan's abdication. Furthermore, only al-Ṭabarī quotes al-Zuhri's explanation that "al-Ḥasan did not favor fighting, but intended to take for himself what he could from Mu'āwiya."¹³ Therefore, al-Zuhri, a spokesman for the Umayyad authorities and whose accounts reflect pro-Umayyad sentiments, perhaps attempts to give the impression that the latter was a man of peace who was afraid of fighting with Mu'āwiya.

Al-Ḥasan's decision to refuse the third condition demanded by Qays perhaps was due to the fact that this requirement was not considered by the early Companions of the Prophet as one of the conditions for *bay'at*. Al-Ḥasan maybe was also trying to avoid having any obligation imposed on him. However, if al-Ṭabarī's account is valid, Qays Ibn Sa'd must have had full knowledge of Mu'āwiya's aspirations to the caliphate and must have anticipated that Mu'āwiya would not acknowledge al-Ḥasan's caliphate, but would instead take action against al-Ḥasan as he had previously done against his father.¹⁴ Therefore, Qays wanted to push al-Ḥasan to proceed against Mu'āwiya before the latter moved. However, the pledge of allegiance to al-Ḥasan, according to many sources, in addition to the usual support for the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet, included

¹² Muḥammad Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhri (d. 124/743) is one of the greatest scholars of traditions and genealogy in the Hijāz. He had such a close relationship with the caliph's court in Damascus that he acted as spokesman for the Umayyad authorities. Due to this fact, al-Zuhri was accused of creating many traditions on their behalf. Peterson, *Alī and Mu'āwiya*, p. 51. Milḥim, *al-Mu'arrikhūn*, p. 23.

¹³ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 121.

¹⁴ Regarding Mu'āwiya's expeditions against 'Alī's territories, See, Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 103-107, 215-236. Al-Baladhuri, *Ansāb*, 3: 197-217. Al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 196-197. Khalīfa Ibn Khayyāt, *Ta'rikh*, p. 150. In all these expeditions, Mu'āwiya instructed the commanders of his armies to assault the inhabitants of the territories and to murder 'Alī's supporters as well as anyone who refused to pay him homage.

“the commitment to declare war on whomever al-Ḥasan declared war on and to make peace with whomever he made peace.”¹⁵

Al-Isfahānī tells us that when news of ʿAlī’s death and al-Ḥasan’s succession reached Damascus, Muʿāwiya wrote to his commanders to assemble them. He informed them that ʿAlī’s companions were currently divided and that a group of Kūfan nobles had written to him, requesting safe-conduct for themselves and their tribes. Muʿāwiya also instructed his commanders to prepare to come to him “with your soldiers, your determination, and your best equipment, for you shall obtain your revenge and attain your hope, and God shall ruin the people of rebellion and aggression.”¹⁶ No longer able to hide his aspirations to the caliphate after ʿAlī’s death,¹⁷ Muʿāwiya, who had no right to the caliphate, now wanted to reveal his refusal to recognize al-Ḥasan’s caliphate by attacking al-Ḥasan and forcing the inhabitants of Kūfa to pay homage to him.

Muʿāwiya, moreover, tried to convince the people of Syria that he was more entitled to the caliphate than al-Ḥasan, due to the latter’s immaturity and ignorance of warfare. Al-Balādhurī narrates that Muʿāwiya addressed the people of Syria, condemning al-Ḥasan’s election to the caliphate. He told them that Kūfa was now governed by al-Ḥasan, who was young, inexperienced and knew nothing about warfare.¹⁸ This account suggests that certain prominent Kūfans wanted to avoid war with Muʿāwiya and that al-Ḥasan had decided to take action against Muʿāwiya. This is supported by al-Balādhurī’s narration

¹⁵ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 279. Ibn Saʿd, *Tarjamat al-Ḥasan*, pp. 62-63. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futuh*, 2: 285. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma wal-Siyāsa*, 1: 163.

¹⁶ Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 69. See also al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 280.

¹⁷ As mentioned earlier, Muʿāwiya refused to acknowledge ʿAlī’s caliphate (36/656-41/661) only under the pretext of avenging ʿUthmān’s murder. He never contested with ʿAlī that he, Muʿāwiya, had the right to the caliphate and the people of Syria paid homage to him to avenge ʿUthmān’s murder. According to some sources, Muʿāwiya was recognized as *amīr*, not as caliph. See al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 66, 82, 103, 205. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 99, 122.

¹⁸ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 280.

that al-Ḥasan wrote to Mu'āwiya informing him about the *bay'at* of the people and demanding that Mu'āwiya submit to him.¹⁹

Mu'āwiya's refusal to recognize al-Ḥasan's caliphate took the form of a series of measures designed to undermine al-Ḥasan's position. Al-Isfahānī tells us, on the authority of Abū Mikhnaḥ, that Mu'āwiya had secretly sent two spies to Kūfa and to Baṣra whose mission was to write reports to Mu'āwiya informing him about the affairs of al-Ḥasan. However, they were both discovered and executed by al-Ḥasan's supporters.²⁰ Regarding the two spies, al-Ḥasan wrote to Mu'āwiya condemning his actions and threatening war, stating, "You sent men to use deception and you sent out spies as if you want to meet in battle. That is something that will soon happen."²¹ Abū Mikhnaḥ's account seems to suggest that al-Ḥasan anticipated Mu'āwiya's intention to attack him and prepared himself to take action against Mu'āwiya.

Correspondence continued between al-Ḥasan and Mu'āwiya. Al-Ḥasan wrote a letter to Mu'āwiya arguing his right to the caliphate on the grounds that the members of the Prophet's family, who were closest to him in every aspect, were best qualified for the leadership of the community. Rejecting Mu'āwiya's attempt to secure a position that he was not worthy of, al-Ḥasan explained the reasons why Mu'āwiya was not entitled to the caliphate. He argued that Mu'āwiya had "no obvious virtues to be recognized in religion or any admirable merits in Islam." On the contrary, al-Ḥasan contended that, Mu'āwiya was "the son of the greatest enemy of the Prophet from among the Quraysh." Moreover, al-Ḥasan asked Mu'āwiya to quit his falsehood (*bāṭil*) and to join other people who paid

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 62. Al-Mufīd states that the mission of the spies was to write to Mu'āwiya with news of al-Ḥasan's business and to spoil his actions. Al-Mufīd, *Irshād*, 2: 9.

²¹ Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 63. The same source informs us that 'Abd Allāh Ibn 'Abbas wrote a letter from Baṣra censuring Mu'āwiya's decision to send the two spies.

homage to the Prophet's grandson. Because, al-Ḥasan explained, "You are aware of the fact that I am more entitled to the caliphate than you, before God and in the eyes of all trustworthy people." Finally, al-Ḥasan advised Mu'āwiya to abandon rebellion, restrain from shedding the blood of Muslims and submit to him.²² Al-Ḥasan based his arguments regarding entitlement to the caliphate on two bases: first, his priority (*sābiqa*) and merits in the cause of Islam; second, his close relationship to the Prophet. According to al-Ḥasan's arguments, Mu'āwiya lacked these qualifications and, therefore, had no right to the caliphate.

Mu'āwiya, on the other hand, did not base his arguments about the qualifications of the caliph on the principles of priority (*sābiqa*) and early merits in Islam (*faḍīla*). Rather, he asserted that the criteria for leadership of the community should be based on worldly abilities. In his response to al-Ḥasan, Mu'āwiya did not deny the excellence of the Prophet's family, their station in Islam or al-Ḥasan's relationship to the Prophet, but argued that these were not the criteria for leadership of the community. The qualifications for leadership, according to Mu'āwiya's arguments, were efficiency in controlling and leading subjects, ability in political affairs and administration, expansion of the empire and skill in defending Muslims. Mu'āwiya maintained that if he knew al-Ḥasan to be more qualified than himself in these respects, he would readily respond to his summons.²³

Was Mu'āwiya serious in his description of the criteria for the caliphate? Was Mu'āwiya truly ready to acknowledge al-Ḥasan if it could be shown that he was better qualified for this office? The truth was that Mu'āwiya was ambitious and wanted to gain

²² Ibid., pp. 65-66. Ibn A'ṭham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 286-87. According to Ibn A'ṭham, al-Ḥasan contended that, prior to his death, his father, 'Alī, nominated him as his successor. Since this addition of al-Ḥasan's letter is not included by al-Isfahānī, it was most likely added by Ibn A'ṭham.

²³ Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, pp. 66-7. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 280.

full control over the Muslim world and thus was prepared to make any concessions in order to attain this position. Mu^cāwiya even stipulated, in the last part of his letter to al-Ḥasan, that if al-Ḥasan withdrew, the caliphate would belong to him after Mu^cāwiya's death. He also promised that al-Ḥasan could take over the treasury of Iraq, and that Muslim affairs (*al-umūr*) would not be decided without his consultation.²⁴ Indeed, he wrote yet another letter to al-Ḥasan warning him that he would be assassinated if he persisted with his claim to the caliphate and promised that if al-Ḥasan paid him homage, the caliphate would be his after Mu^cāwiya's death.²⁵ Insisting on his right to the caliphate, al-Ḥasan replied, "If you follow the right path (*al-ḥaqq*) you will know I am worthy of it,"²⁶ and the correspondence and negotiations between Mu^cāwiya and al-Ḥasan ended without resolution.

It is obvious from these exchanges that Mu^cāwiya was not ready to acknowledge al-Ḥasan's caliphate and prepared to attack Iraq. Meanwhile, al-Ḥasan refused to renounce his right to the caliphate and decided to take action since he believed that Mu^cāwiya had no claim to the caliphate. According to al-Ḥasan, who based his arguments on religious grounds, if Mu^cāwiya became caliph, he would deviate from the conduct of the Sunna of the Prophet, the Book of God and the conduct of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and would consequently violate Islamic norms. Al-Ḥasan also believed that it was his responsibility to protect the course of the righteous caliphate and defend the Sunna of the Prophet and Islamic norms from any deviation. He, therefore, insisted that he would not renounce his caliphate. This was understood based on Mu^cāwiya's conduct at the time of ʿAlī's caliphate when, as noted earlier, he launched many raids on ʿAlī's territories and killed

²⁴ Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, pp. 66-7. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 36. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 218.

²⁵ Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 67.

²⁶ Ibid. The chain of authority is not clear in this letter but it is most likely narrated by Abū Mikhnaf.

many innocent people. Al-Ḥasan was not mistaken in his expectations about Mu^ʿāwīya's conduct, as we will see later, when all his promises to al-Ḥasan were broken and he nominated his son Yazīd, who lacked qualifications for the caliphate. Yazīd would openly violate Islamic norms by his corrupt conduct and the true meaning of the caliphate would be lost. As a grandson of the Prophet and a caliph who was chosen by the people, al-Ḥasan refused to allow any kind of corruption in the community by Mu^ʿāwīya's caliphate and, therefore, persisted in his right to the office.

Mu^ʿāwīya wrote to summon his commanders to his residence. As soon as his army assembled in Damascus, he left al-Ḍaḥḥāk Ibn Qays al-Fihrī (d. 64/683) as his deputy in Damascus and headed towards Iraq until he neared the bridge of Manbij, a district on the outskirts of Kūfa. When news of Mu^ʿāwīya's approach reached al-Ḥasan, he sent for Ḥujr Ibn ^ʿAdī al-Kindī (d. 51/671), an ardent supporter of ^ʿAlī and a notable of Kinda, and ordered him to call the people of Kūfa to confront Mu^ʿāwīya's troops. Al-Ḥasan addressed the people of Kūfa with a passionate war speech, emphasizing the importance of *al-jihād*. By using the term "*al-jihād*" al-Ḥasan, like his father when he had used the same word in fighting against Mu^ʿāwīya, wished to inform the people of Kūfa that they were fighting against the enemies of Islam. This is supported by a letter written by ^ʿAbd Allāh Ibn ^ʿAbbās to al-Ḥasan. Ibn A^ʿtham narrates that ^ʿAbd Allāh Ibn ^ʿAbbās wrote from Baṣra to al-Ḥasan, urging him to take action against Mu^ʿāwīya and not to accept a compromise with him. Ibn ^ʿAbbās described Mu^ʿāwīya and his supporters as enemies of

the Prophet and of God, stating that they were those who had made war against God and his Messenger previously.²⁷

Al-Ḥasan told the people of Kūfa that Mu^ʿāwīya, having learned that they intended to march against him, had now begun to move against them; al-Ḥasan, therefore, urged them to assemble in their war camp at al-Nukhayla.²⁸ Al-Ḥasan, in fact, was conscious of the unpredictable nature of the people of Kūfa and was afraid that they would fail to respond to his call since he had witnessed their failure to respond to his father's call summoning them against Mu^ʿāwīya.²⁹ Al-Isfahānī reports that, in his speech, al-Ḥasan expressed his fear that the people of Kūfa would disappoint him and indeed he received no response from them. Their failure to respond to their Imām's call prompted criticism from ʿAdī Ibn Ḥātam al-Ṭāʾī (d. 68/688), a Companion of the Prophet, who urged them to prepare to fight. Al-Ḥasan decided to camp at al-Nukhayla, a place for assembling troops on the outskirts of Kūfa, and was joined by ʿAdī. Then, other loyal supporters of al-Ḥasan accused the people of failure to report for duty and urged them to follow their Imām. As a result, the people of Kūfa joined al-Ḥasan at his camp, and al-Ḥasan appointed al-Mughīra Ibn Nawfal as his deputy in Kūfa, ordering him to incite the people to join his cause.³⁰

²⁷ A full account of this letter was recorded by Ibn A^ʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 285-86. Al-Balādhurī mentions this letter briefly, stating that ʿAbd Allāh Ibn ʿAbbās wrote a letter to al-Ḥasan urging him to fight against Mu^ʿāwīya. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 279-80. Al-Isfahānī also mentions this letter but does not record it. Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 63.

²⁸ Ibid. According to al-Isfahānī's account, Mu^ʿāwīya had just started to take action against al-Ḥasan when he learned that al-Ḥasan and his supporters intended to march against him. This contradicts Madelung's assumption when he says, "Mu^ʿāwīya was aware of al-Ḥasan's peaceful disposition and knew from his spies that he was not about to attack." Madelung, *Succession*, p.315.

²⁹ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 198, 201-2, 212. Ibn ʿAtham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 102-103, 234-235. Al-Ya^ʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2: 197-200.

³⁰ Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, pp. 69-70. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 280-1.

In this light, the value of al-Zuhrī's account is called into question, especially as it was not recorded by any source other than al-Ṭabarī. In fact, al-Zuhrī abbreviates the events at hand in a blurred and very brief account. He maintains that al-Ḥasan did not favor fighting, but intended to take for himself what he could from Mu'āwiya and then join the community. Al-Zuhrī also relates that al-Ḥasan dismissed Qays Ibn Sa'd from his office because he knew that Qays would not agree with his point of view and appointed 'Abd Allāh Ibn 'Abbās as the new commander of his army.³¹

Contrary to al-Zuhrī's account, Ibn A'tham, Ibn Sa'd, al-Dīnawarī and al-Ya'qūbī narrate that al-Ḥasan appointed Qays as the commander of his vanguard.³² In another account, al-Ṭabarī narrates, on the authority of 'Awāna and al-Masrūqī, that al-Ḥasan sent Qays Ibn Sa'd ahead of him to take charge of his vanguard and check the enemy until al-Ḥasan himself joined them with the main army.³³ None of these accounts speaks of al-Ḥasan dismissing Qays, nor does any of them mention the name of 'Abd Allāh Ibn 'Abbās as the commander of al-Ḥasan's army. This leaves us in further doubt with respect to al-Zuhrī's account.³⁴ According to al-Isfahānī and al-Balādhurī, al-Ḥasan appointed 'Ubayd Allāh Ibn 'Abbās as commander of his vanguard and instructed him to consult Qays Ibn Sa'd and Sa'id Ibn Qays, who were to be second and third in command in case 'Ubayd Allāh was killed.³⁵

³¹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, 4: 121.

³² Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 289. Ibn Sa'd, *Tarjamat al-Ḥasan*, p. 63. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akbār*, p. 217. Al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rīkh*, 2: 214.

³³ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, 4: 122-123.

³⁴ Wellhausen's argument that al-Ḥasan appointed 'Abd Allāh Ibn 'Abbās as the commander of his vanguard is invalid and has no proof in the sources other than al-Zuhrī, whose account, according to Wellhausen himself, is not clear and has discrepancies. Wellhausen, *Al-Dawla al-'Arabiyya*, p. 106.

³⁵ Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 71. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 281.

Because of the Kūfans' reluctance to be engaged in fighting against Mu'āwiya and, therefore, their poor response to al-Ḥasan's call, he wanted to clarify their position, ascertain his followers' stance towards him and assure himself of their loyalty, so that they would not disappoint him on the battlefield as they had previously done with his father. On his way to confront Mu'āwiya, al-Ḥasan halted in a place called Muḏlim Sābāt, in the outskirts of al-Madā'in, quartered his army there and addressed the people of Kūfa. Al-Ḥasan is said to have announced to his people, "I do not entertain any feeling of malice against a Muslim." Al-Ḥasan also told his men that he was looking out for their best interests and that reconciliation was better for them than dissension. He therefore asked them not to reject whatever decision he might take.³⁶ In his narration, al-Dīnawarī states that al-Ḥasan added "And I notice that most of you were disinclined to go to war and failed to fight [against Mu'āwiya] and, therefore, I am not going to push you to something you do not like."³⁷

Hearing this, al-Ḥasan's men assumed that he intended to seek a truce with Mu'āwiya and surrender his authority to him. They interrupted his speech and some of the *khawārij* amongst his people shouted at him, accusing him of having become an unbeliever (*kāfir*) "like your father before you," and attacked him violently. They sacked his tent and took his prayer mat from beneath him. Al-Ḥasan called for his horse and escaped, surrounded by his servants and a few of his supporters. However, as they were passing by Muḏlim Sābāt, a Khārijite warrior called al-Jarrāḥ Ibn Sinān, struck al-Ḥasan's thigh with a pick-

³⁶ Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, pp. 71-72. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 282. Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 289. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akḥbār*, pp. 216-7.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

axe. Al-Ḥasan's supporters killed al-Jarrāḥ and al-Ḥasan himself was taken to al-Madā'in to be treated for his wound.³⁸

Did Mu'āwiya play a role in the mutiny of al-Ḥasan's forces? Many reports clearly indicate that he instigated numerous rumors and false announcements in al-Ḥasan's camp with the aim of dispersing soldiers from al-Ḥasan's cause. Al-Ya'qūbī reports that Mu'āwiya sent spies to al-Ḥasan's camp in order to disseminate the news that Qays Ibn Sa'd, the commander of al-Ḥasan's army, had made peace with Mu'āwiya. At the same time, Mu'āwiya's men announced in Qays's camp that al-Ḥasan had no desire to fight Mu'āwiya and decided to come to terms with him.³⁹ This report is supported by Ibn Sa'd's narration, on the authority of group of narrators, and by al-Ṭabarī, on the authority of al-Masrūqī. They report that al-Ḥasan sent Qays Ibn Sa'd ahead of him with a large number of the Kūfans. Meanwhile, Mu'āwiya marched with his Syrian army until he halted at Miskan. While al-Ḥasan was at al-Madā'in, an announcement spread in his camp that Qays Ibn Sa'd had been killed and al-Ḥasan's men, therefore, began to desert the camp and attacked al-Ḥasan.⁴⁰

Al-Ya'qūbī also narrates that Mu'āwiya attempted to win over al-Ḥasan's supporters by proposing an offer of one million dirhams to Qays if he joined his cause or withdrew from the battle, but Qays refused.⁴¹ Mu'āwiya then attempted the same stratagem with 'Ubayd Allāh and this time succeeded. 'Ubayd Allāh accepted Mu'āwiya's offer and fled during the night to the camp of Mu'āwiya with most of his troops.⁴²

³⁸ Ibid., p. 217. Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 72. Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 289-90.

³⁹ Al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 214.

⁴⁰ Ibn Sa'd, *Tarjamat al-Ḥasan*, p. 76. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 121-2.

⁴¹ Al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 214. Al-Balādhurī reports that when Qays Ibn Sa'd was 'Alī's governor of Egypt Mu'āwiya tried to entice him to his side and desert 'Alī's cause, but Qays refused. *Ansāb*, 3: 161-2.

⁴² Al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 214. See also al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 73.

Another account narrated by al-Yaʿqūbī states that while al-Ḥasan was at al-Madāʾin, Muʿāwīya sent three mediators to talk with him confidentially. When Muʿāwīya's men left al-Ḥasan, they announced publicly that al-Ḥasan intended to avoid war and to spare the blood of Muslims, and had, therefore, decided to hand over the caliphate to Muʿāwīya. Consequently, al-Ḥasan's camp was disturbed and the people of Kūfa began to assault him.⁴³

According to al-Balādhurī and al-Isfahānī, Muʿāwīya, in order to further shake the faith of al-Ḥasan's men and to destabilize their fighting strength, sent an envoy to al-Ḥasan's camp. Muʿāwīya instructed him to announce there that Muʿāwīya had received letters from al-Ḥasan, assuring him that he was ready to come to terms with Muʿāwīya and that he, Muʿāwīya's messenger, had come for that purpose. The task of Muʿāwīya's emissary was also to talk secretly with ʿUbayd Allāh Ibn ʿAbbās, the commander of al-Ḥasan's army, in order to persuade and bribe him to go over to Muʿāwīya's side. At a private meeting with ʿUbayd Allāh, Muʿāwīya's messenger swore to him that al-Ḥasan had asked Muʿāwīya for a truce and that the latter offered him one million dirhams, half the amount to be paid immediately, the other half in Kūfa, if he joined Muʿāwīya's men. ʿUbayd Allāh accepted the offer and crept away in the night with his close associates to join Muʿāwīya's camp. This defection caused a division in the ranks of al-Ḥasan's men.⁴⁴

While ʿUbayd Allāh Ibn ʿAbbās was accepting Muʿāwīya's offer, al-Ḥasan was still in al-Madāʾin recovering from his injuries and Qays Ibn Saʿd had taken command of the remaining vanguard. When Qays noticed his troops' desertion, he wrote to al-Ḥasan informing him of their situation. Upon receiving Qays's letter, al-Ḥasan assembled the

⁴³ Al-Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2: 215.

⁴⁴ Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 73. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 284. The name of Muʿāwīya's envoy, according to al-Balādhurī, was ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Samura (d. 50/670).

Iraqi leaders and nobles, addressing them in sadness and with a certain distaste, telling them that he had been informed by Qays that even the prominent people of Kūfa (tribal leaders) had run off to Mu^cāwiya. Blaming them for having disappointed his father, ^cAlī, when he called them to fight Mu^cāwiya, al-Ḥasan told them that

After the death of my father, you yourselves paid allegiance to me of your own accord. I accepted your homage and came out with full zeal and spirit against Mu^cāwiya. Now you are turning your faces against me in the same manner as you had done previously with my father.⁴⁵

According to al-Zuhrī's account, the reason for al-Ḥasan's decision to come to terms with Mu^cāwiya was his love for peace, his reluctance to go to war and his dislike of bloodshed. According to al-Ya^cqūbī, al-Balādhurī, al-Isfahānī, Ibn A^ctham and al-Ṭabarī, on the authority of al-Masrūqī, al-Ḥasan decided not to confront Mu^cāwiya and to come to terms with him for two reasons: first, the fickle nature of the people of Kūfa and their reluctance to fight Mu^cāwiya; and second, Mu^cāwiya's role in spreading rumors in the camps of al-Ḥasan's troops.

In fact, the leaders of the tribes in Kūfa played a significant role in regards to al-Ḥasan's decision to withdraw from fighting Mu^cāwiya and compromise with him. As noted earlier, al-Balādhurī narrates that when Mu^cāwiya decided to attack Iraq, a group of prominent leaders in Kūfa wrote to Mu^cāwiya, promising him their readiness to desert from al-Ḥasan and asking him for safe-conduct.⁴⁶ Al-Balādhurī also reports that when al-Ḥasan prepared to fight Mu^cāwiya, a group of prominent leaders of the tribes in Kūfa joined Mu^cāwiya and paid homage to him on behalf of their tribes. When the news reached al-Ḥasan, he is said to have addressed his men "O people of Iraq! You forced my

⁴⁵ Ibid., 3: 284-5. Ibn A^ctham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 291.

⁴⁶ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 280.

father to comply with the Syrians' call and to stop fighting Mu^cāwīya and deserted from him. The news reached me that the people of *sharaf* [the tribal leaders] among you joined Mu^cāwīya and swore allegiance to him."⁴⁷ Indeed, the leaders of the tribes of Kūfa had forced ʿAlī, who was about to win the war, to stop fighting Mu^cāwīya at Ṣiffīn and comply with the maneuver of Mu^cāwīya's men to submit to the Qur'ān's judgment.⁴⁸ They also played an important role in undermining al-Ḥasan's affairs and, consequently, influenced his decision to come to terms with Mu^cāwīya. They played a vital role and were one of the main causes, as we will see later, of aborting Ibn ʿAqīl's task to control Kūfa and of al-Ḥusayn's killing.

Who was the first to write and ask for an agreement: al-Ḥasan or Mu^cāwīya? And what were the conditions stipulated in this agreement? According to al-Zuhrī's account, which was recorded exclusively by al-Ṭabarī, al-Ḥasan was the first to write to Mu^cāwīya and set out the conditions by which he would abdicate his caliphate. Mu^cāwīya received this letter after he had sent al-Ḥasan a blank sheet over his seal so that al-Ḥasan might stipulate whatever he wished. Al-Ḥasan seized this opportunity to double his previous conditions. However, Mu^cāwīya had retained al-Ḥasan's original letter. Consequently, when the two met they argued about which of the two letters was valid, even though in the end Mu^cāwīya fulfilled the conditions of neither.⁴⁹ Al-Zuhrī's account wants to depict al-Ḥasan as a man of peace who, since he did not favor fighting, was therefore, the first to reach a compromise with Mu^cāwīya. In regards to the truce, al-Zuhrī also points out that al-Ḥasan's main concern was to secure his own benefits. He does not mention any of the

⁴⁷ Ibid., 3: 284-5.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 3: 103. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 34-5. Al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, 2: 390. Al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 188-9.

⁴⁹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 121.

conditions that al-Ḥasan demanded from Muʿāwiyā; rather he states that al-Ḥasan intended to secure whatever he could from Muʿāwiyā.⁵⁰

Two other reports were narrated by al-Ṭabarī: al-Masrūqī's and ʿAwāna's. According to al-Masrūqī's account, when al-Ḥasan realized that leadership was beyond his grasp, he sent to Muʿāwiyā seeking peace and Muʿāwiyā sent ʿAbd Allāh Ibn ʿĀmir (d. 59/680) and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Samura to him. When they reached al-Ḥasan at al-Madā'in, they granted him what he wished and arranged peace with him. Although al-Masrūqī states that al-Ḥasan imposed many conditions (*fī ash-yā' ishtarāṭahā*) on Muʿāwiyā, he mentioned only one condition: al-Ḥasan was allowed to take five million dirhams from the treasury of Kūfa. According to ʿAwāna's report, al-Ḥasan not only was the first to ask Muʿāwiyā for a truce, but also demanded from Muʿāwiyā safe-conduct. Besides money, ʿAwāna narrates that al-Ḥasan came to terms with Muʿāwiyā on the condition that the cursing of ʿAlī, a practice of Muʿāwiyā's since ʿAlī's caliphate, should be abolished in al-Ḥasan's presence.⁵¹ Based on the reports of al-Masrūqī and ʿAwāna, al-Ṭabarī wants to tell us that al-Ḥasan was the first to ask for an agreement with Muʿāwiyā and was the first to stipulate his conditions, but al-Ṭabarī does not cite all these conditions.

A different version of the agreement is provided by Ibn Aʿtham and al-Balādhurī, on the authority of Abū Mikhnaḥ, ʿAwāna and Ṣāliḥ Ibn Kaysān, who both narrate that Muʿāwiyā was the first to request a settlement. According to this version, Muʿāwiyā sent ʿAbd Allāh Ibn ʿĀmir and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Samura as his envoys to al-Ḥasan. Both of them implored al-Ḥasan to spare the blood of the people of Muḥammad, and confirmed

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid., 4: 122-3.

that Mu^ʿāwīya would appoint him his successor and grant him whatever he desired. Al-Ḥasan initially accepted the offer and sent ʿAmr Ibn Salama and Muḥammad Ibn al-Ash^ʿath to confirm this agreement. Mu^ʿāwīya assured al-Ḥasan that he would make peace with him on condition that the caliphate would belong to al-Ḥasan after Mu^ʿāwīya's death. In addition to the money to be granted to al-Ḥasan, Mu^ʿāwīya also confirmed that he would commit no harm against him. However, al-Ḥasan was not completely satisfied with these terms. He replied that he would surrender reign over the Muslims to Mu^ʿāwīya on these conditions: 1) that Mu^ʿāwīya must act according to the Book of God, the Sunna of the Prophet and the conduct (*sīra*) of the righteous caliphs; 2) that Mu^ʿāwīya had no right to nominate a successor after him but the caliphate would be decided by *shūrā* (consultation); 3) that the people were granted safety wherever they lived, with respect to themselves, their property and their successive generations; 4) that Mu^ʿāwīya must seek no harm, wrongdoing or dangerous act, secretly or openly, against al-Ḥasan; and 5) that Mu^ʿāwīya must not intimidate any of al-Ḥasan's companions.⁵²

According to the above-mentioned account, al-Ḥasan refused to hand over his caliphate to Mu^ʿāwīya unless he imposed his own conditions on him, although Mu^ʿāwīya was ready to accede to whatever al-Ḥasan wished. One of al-Ḥasan's condition was that Mu^ʿāwīya should conduct himself according to the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet. This condition was agreed upon by the early Companions of the Prophet, as noted previously. In fact, the legitimacy of the caliph would be called into question if his conduct deviated from the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet. Before renouncing

⁵² Al-Baladhurī, on the authority of Abū Mikhnaḥ, ʿAwāna and Ṣāliḥ Ibn Kaysān, *Ansāb*, 3: 287. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 293. Al-Isfahānī mentions this account briefly. *Maqātil*, p. 74-75. It should be noted that according to Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 136 and al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 218, al-Ḥasan handed over his caliphate to Mu^ʿāwīya on condition that after Mu^ʿāwīya's death the caliphate should revert to al-Ḥasan.

his authority, al-Ḥasan wanted to be sure that Mu^ʿāwiyah would not violate Islamic norms and that would follow the Rightly Guided Caliphs. In order to protect the caliphate from any deviation, al-Ḥasan, according to al-Balādhurī and Ibn A^ʿtham's version, imposed the further condition that Mu^ʿāwiyah had no right to nominate his successor; the caliphate should be left to be decided by consultation. Al-Ḥasan also wanted to secure the safety of ^ʿAlī's followers by imposing the condition that Mu^ʿāwiyah must not terrorize any of al-Ḥasan's companions.

Now, the question is: Did the people of Kūfa swear allegiance to Mu^ʿāwiyah willingly? Although they were reluctant to fight against Mu^ʿāwiyah, they refused to acknowledge his caliphate after al-Ḥasan's abdication. When he entered Kūfa in 41/661, Mu^ʿāwiyah noticed that the people there were reluctant to pay him homage and, therefore, demanded that al-Ḥasan make a speech to the people confirming that he had renounced his authority and pledged allegiance to Mu^ʿāwiyah. Once again, al-Ḥasan wanted to clarify the fact that he had a greater entitlement to the caliphate than Mu^ʿāwiyah, who had no right to it. In his speech, al-Ḥasan reminded the people that he and his brother al-Ḥusayn were the only grandsons of the Prophet, that he had a right to the caliphate and that Mu^ʿāwiyah contested this right which belonged to him. Al-Ḥasan affirmed that he had renounced his right to Mu^ʿāwiyah in the best interest of the community. He also reminded the Kūfans that they had pledged allegiance to him on the bases that they would make peace with whomever al-Ḥasan made peace and that they would fight whomever he fought.⁵³

⁵³ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 287-8. Ibn A^ʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 295. Ibn Sa^ʿd, *Tarjama*, p. 80. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 163.

Al-Isfahānī reports that as soon as al-Ḥasan abdicated (41/661), Mu^cāwiya ordered him to address the people of Kūfa. In his speech, al-Ḥasan wanted to clarify the meaning of the true caliph, explaining that the caliph is the one who acts according to the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet: he is not the one who acts unjustly; the latter is only a king.⁵⁴ According to this account, al-Ḥasan intended to confirm that Mu^cāwiya's caliphate would not be considered legitimate unless Mu^cāwiya acted in accordance with the Sunna of the Prophet and the Book of God.

Mu^cāwiya then addressed the people of Kūfa, stating that when any disagreement had occurred in the community after the death of the Prophet, the people of the wrong (*bāṭil*) prevailed over the people of the right. When Mu^cāwiya realized that he condemned himself by this statement, he regretted his words and added: "Except for this nation." At this point, Mu^cāwiya decided to disclose his intention to succeed to the caliphate and have full power over the people of Kūfa. He continued:

By God, I have not fought against you that you might pray, nor fast, nor perform the pilgrimage, nor pay alms, since you are doing that already. Rather, I fought you in order to command you as your ruler, and God had granted that to me against your desire.⁵⁵

Mu^cāwiya also announced to the people of Kūfa that he had no intention of fulfilling his promises to al-Ḥasan and went on to declare, "all conditions I have promised al-Ḥasan are now under my feet."⁵⁶ Mu^cāwiya's speech clearly indicates that he would not follow in the footsteps of the Prophet and the Rightly Guided Caliphs. Hearing this, the people of Kūfa, who earlier swore allegiance to al-Ḥasan because of his merits and close

⁵⁴ Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p.80.

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 77-8. Ibn A^ctham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 295-96

⁵⁶ Ibid. Al-Isfahānī, p. 77-8. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 289. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 164.

relationship to the Prophet, would not accept Mu^cāwiya as the new caliph and the legitimacy of his caliphate was to be called into question. This is indicated by the following accounts.

Al-Balādhurī narrates that the people of Kūfa swore allegiance to Mu^cāwiya only when they were threatened by him. He reports that Mu^cāwiya warned the people about punishment if they did not come forth and pay him homage within a respite of three days. “Whoever has not pledged allegiance by then will have no protection and no pardon.” The people of Kūfa hastily came from every direction to pay homage to Mu^cāwiya.⁵⁷ Al-Ya^cqūbī confirms that the people paid homage to Mu^cāwiya unwillingly and with abhorrence. He also reports that Sa^cd Ibn Mālik saluted Mu^cāwiya as a king. When Mu^cāwiya asked Sa^cd why he had not saluted him as “The Commander of the Faithful,” Sa^cd replied, “We did not elect you; you are but a usurper.”⁵⁸

Ibn A^ctham tells us that when they heard about al-Ḥasan’s abdication, the people of Fārs refused to pay homage to Mu^cāwiya. He also narrates that when the news of the abdication of al-Ḥasan reached the people of Baṣra, they rioted, declaring that they would not accept Mu^cāwiya’s caliphate. Ḥumrān Ibn Abān of Banū al-Namir rose in revolt; he took over the town and called for al-Ḥusayn’s leadership. Upon hearing the news that Mu^cāwiya had sent a force to Baṣra in order to subdue the riot, the people who had protested scattered and remained in their houses.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 290.

⁵⁸ Al-Ya^cqūbī, *Ta’rīkh*, 2: 217.

⁵⁹ Ibn A^ctham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 298-300.

Was al-Ḥusayn satisfied with al-Ḥasan's decision to come to terms with Mu'āwiya? And, what was his attitude towards Mu'āwiya's caliphate? According to some sources, al-Ḥusayn declared to his brother that he was reluctant to consent to his agreement with Mu'āwiya.⁶⁰ In spite of the fact that al-Ḥusayn resisted al-Ḥasan's renunciation of his authority, he honored the truce with Mu'āwiya and paid homage to him. Although the sources do not mention al-Ḥusayn's *bay'at* directly or the way he swore allegiance to Mu'āwiya, it is clear that al-Ḥusayn followed his brother's decision and paid homage to Mu'āwiya. This is indicated by al-Balādhurī and al-Dīnawarī's accounts according to which al-Ḥusayn rejected the Kūfans' call to rise against Mu'āwiya, explaining that he could not dissolve his *bay'at*.⁶¹

Ibn A'ṭham, on the other hand, reports that al-Ḥusayn refused to pay homage to Mu'āwiya and that al-Ḥasan advised Mu'āwiya to leave al-Ḥusayn, explaining "Al-Ḥusayn will never swear allegiance to you unless he dies and he will not die unless all the Banū Hāshim die with him."⁶² In fact, Ibn A'ṭham's account reflects a pro-ʿAlīd' tendency and is not supported by any other source.

Acting on Mu'āwiya's declaration that he would not fulfill his promises to al-Ḥasan, a group of al-Ḥasan's followers, headed by Sulaymān Ibn Ṣurad al-Khuzāʿī (d. 65/684), who was an ardent follower of ʿAlī and one of the penitent leaders, came to visit al-Ḥasan following his abdication. Sulaymān reminded him of Mu'āwiya's statement that he would ignore all the conditions that he had promised al-Ḥasan and asked him therefore to break

⁶⁰ Ibid., 2: 297. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 122. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 293, 363.

⁶¹ Ibid., 3: 363. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhhār*, p. 203.

⁶² Ibn A'ṭham, *Futūḥ* 2: 294.

the truce and fight Mu^cāwiya. Al-Ḥasan, however, refused and confirmed that he intended to make peace with Mu^cāwiya in order to avoid shedding the blood of Muslims.⁶³

Realizing that al-Ḥusayn was reluctant to accept al-Ḥasan's truce with Mu^cāwiya and conscious of his entitlement to the caliphate after his brother, a group of ^cAlī's followers were ready to break their allegiance with Mu^cāwiya and make a new *bay'at* with al-Ḥusayn, provided that the latter would rise against Mu^cāwiya. Al-Ḥusayn, however, refused to comply, advising them to wait until Mu^cāwiya's death.⁶⁴ Although al-Ḥusayn agreed with these people that Mu^cāwiya had no right to the caliphate, he did not want to break his brother's truce. Furthermore, al-Ḥusayn believed that Mu^cāwiya had the ability to abort any attempt to revolt against him, since he had witnessed Mu^cāwiya's role in undermining al-Ḥasan's affairs. Al-Ḥusayn, in fact, believed that Mu^cāwiya would not act according to the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet and would not follow in the footsteps of the righteous caliphs, since Mu^cāwiya had declared that he would not fulfill any of al-Ḥasan's conditions. Mu^cāwiya would also deprive those who were entitled to the caliphate of their rights, as he had done with al-Ḥasan, and would nominate somebody who was not qualified for it. Since this would have hazardous consequences for the Muslim community and was also an obvious deviation from the true caliphate and from Islamic norms, al-Ḥusayn would not accept this violation and would not stay silent. Al-Ḥusayn, therefore, advised his followers to stay calm so long as Mu^cāwiya was alive and wait for further action after his death.

⁶³ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 290-1. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 164. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, pp. 220-1. Ibn ^cAtham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 296. Instead of Sulaymān, Ibn A^ctham mentions al-Musayyab Ibn Najaba, one of the penitents' leaders.

⁶⁴ Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, pp. 220-1.

Part two: The Significance of Ḥujr's Protest

We have seen in the first part of this chapter that al-Ḥasan handed over his right to the caliphate and paid homage to Mu^ʿāwīya only when he realized that he could not fight him with hesitant supporters. However, al-Ḥasan's abdication was made after setting terms with which Mu^ʿāwīya agreed to comply. Many questions present themselves here:

1) Did Mu^ʿāwīya adhere to these conditions? As mentioned earlier, Mu^ʿāwīya publicly declared to the people of Kūfa that he would not fulfill any of his promises to al-Ḥasan. According to many sources, as we will see below, Mu^ʿāwīya violated his agreements with al-Ḥasan: he killed Ḥujr and his companions, he nominated his son Yazīd as his successor and he poisoned al-Ḥasan. In Kūfa, Mu^ʿāwīya even cursed ʿAlī in the presence of al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn following al-Ḥasan's abdication.⁶⁵

2) Why did Mu^ʿāwīya deliberately break all his promises to al-Ḥasan and why did he not adhere to the conditions of the truce? Originally, Mu^ʿāwīya accepted al-Ḥasan's conditions and, moreover, was ready to give al-Ḥasan whatever he asked in order to gain full power over the masses without fighting, as he had already announced to the people of Kūfa.

Since he had gained the Kūfans' recognition for his caliphate, Mu^ʿāwīya was not obliged to hold fast to any conditions concerning it. His intention was to create a new policy and a new phase in his caliphate. He was not prepared to follow the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet; rather he wanted to rule the masses and act according to his own discretion and his own policy. Nor was he ready to follow in the footsteps of the

⁶⁵ Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, pp. 77-8.

Rightly Guided Caliphs concerning the succession to the caliphate. Instead, he wanted to change the caliphate into a kingship, based neither on the merits of defending Islam nor on any qualification for the caliphate, so that he could be sure that the caliphate would remain in his family. Whether or not he was qualified to succeed to the caliphate, Mu^ʿāwīya intended to nominate his son as his successor to that office. Simply, Mu^ʿāwīya was not ready to be controlled by any Islamic regulations, but wanted to control people according to his own regulations. 3) What were the consequences of Mu^ʿāwīya's new strategy for the Muslim community and what was the connection between this new policy and al-Ḥusayn's uprising? Part two of this chapter deals with these questions.

Having secured the *bayʿa* from the Iraqī people, Mu^ʿāwīya attempted to consolidate the legitimacy of his power. However, for the followers of ʿAlī in Kūfa, who strongly believed that the Prophet's family was entitled to the caliphate, Mu^ʿāwīya's caliphate was always in doubt. In spite of his abdication, al-Ḥasan was regarded as the leader of the Shīʿa after ʿAlī's death, as his brother al-Ḥusayn had emphasized. As noted earlier, when al-Ḥasan renounced his caliphate to Mu^ʿāwīya, some of ʿAlī's supporters in Kūfa came to al-Ḥusayn and declared their desire to pay homage to him, provided that he would fight Mu^ʿāwīya. Al-Ḥusayn refused their appeal, explaining that he would not accept their oath of allegiance as long as al-Ḥasan was alive.

Although cursing ʿAlī was to have been banned according to the truce between al-Ḥasan and Mu^ʿāwīya, regular public cursing of ʿAlī in the congregational prayer was imposed by Mu^ʿāwīya as a propaganda measure. Marwān Ibn al-Ḥakam (d. 65/679), one of the most important Umayyad leaders, clearly recognized that the cursing of ʿAlī was an

important tool of government. According to al-Balādhurī, on the authority of al-Madā'inī, when asked by ʿAlī Ibn al-Ḥusayn, grandson of the fourth caliph ʿAlī, about the reason for the cursing, Marwān replied: “Our reign would not be sound without that.”⁶⁶

In fact, Muʿāwīya continued his policy of cursing ʿAlī, which was practiced during ʿAlī's lifetime, becoming a regular institution after prayer times even in Kūfa, the residence of ʿAlī and his followers. Although Muʿāwīya had gained full power over Kūfa, he insisted on the cursing of ʿAlī in public. Was Muʿāwīya's intention in cursing ʿAlī to bring out into the open the opposition to the Umayyad officials in order to facilitate his measures of repression? In practice, Muʿāwīya actually intended to breach his contract with al-Ḥasan and demonstrate to the people of Kūfa that he would not fulfill any of his promises to him. He also intended to show that he had full power over them and that they had no choice but to submit to the orders of the new caliph. By cursing ʿAlī, Muʿāwīya perhaps intended to arouse ʿAlī's supporters' open opposition to him, thus subjecting them to execution.

When al-Mughīra Ibn Shuʿba was appointed governor of Kūfa in 41/661, one of the orders imposed on him by Muʿāwīya was that he should “Never desist from abusing and censuring ʿAlī, from praying for God's mercy and forgiveness for ʿUthmān, from disgracing the followers of ʿAlī, from removing them and not listening to them.”⁶⁷ Al-Mughīra carried out these instructions although he was reluctant to involve himself in a confrontation with the followers of ʿAlī. Ḥujr Ibn ʿAdī al-Kindī (d. 53/672), a companion of the Prophet, an ardent supporter of ʿAlī and a prominent leader of Kinda, could not

⁶⁶ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 407.

⁶⁷ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 188. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 252. Al-Ṭabarī and al-Balādhurī report this account on the authority of Abū Mikhnaf and other narrators.

tolerate the cursing of ʿAlī and acted as spokesman of ʿAlī’s followers. Whenever he heard the governor cursing ʿAlī and praying for ʿUthmān in the mosque, Ḥujr would rise and protest, quoting the Qur’ān (IV: 135): “Stand up in justice unto God and give witness that the one whom they censured and blamed was more worthy of excellence.”⁶⁸

In fact, Ḥujr was not protesting exclusively against the cursing of ʿAlī. Rather, he objected to Muʿāwiya’s policies as a whole and complained that Muʿāwiya was not acting according to the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet. By his conduct, Muʿāwiya had broken all his promises, as indicated by the account of how, when al-Mughīra was cursing ʿAlī and his followers in the mosque of Kūfa, Ḥujr objected and loudly shouted, “You do not know whom you are cursing, you have become an old man! Give us our stipends and shares of the treasury of which you have deprived us, although you have no right to do so.”⁶⁹ A group of thirty or more people agreed with Ḥujr, insisting that the governor should give them their stipends and telling him that his speech was of no use to them.⁷⁰ According to al-Ṭabarī, Ḥujr also told al-Mughīra that he had become “... interested in condemning the Commander of the Faithful [ʿAlī] and praising the murderers.”⁷¹ Ḥujr and his partisans clearly believed that ʿAlī remained the only person worthy of the title “Commander of the Faithful” and censured Muʿāwiya, whom they considered an usurper of the rights of the house of ʿAlī. Obviously, Muʿāwiya’s policy of

⁶⁸ Al-Isfahānī, *Aghānī*, 17: 138. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 188. Al-Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2: 230. Al-Balādhurī adds that al-Mughīra, after cursing ʿAlī, said, “He deviated from the Book, left the Sunna of the Prophet, split the unity of the Muslims, shed blood and was killed while he was not innocent.” Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 252.

⁶⁹ Al-Isfahānī, *Aghānī*, 17: 138. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 252. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 188-9. Unfortunately, no further information on the economic factors of Ḥujr’s movement is provided by the sources. Perhaps al-Mughīra was instructed by Muʿāwiya to deprive ʿAlī’s supporters of their stipends in order to force them to stop opposing the Umayyad officials.

⁷⁰ Ibid. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 252. Al-Isfahānī, *Aghānī*, 17: 138.

⁷¹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 189.

denying them their stipends and shares was condemned not only by Ḥujr but also by the people of Kūfa.

Al-Mughīra warned Ḥujr of the dreadful consequences of displeasing the ruler, but avoided confrontation with him and his supporters. His associates advised him to take action against Ḥujr and his followers, warning him that his indulgence would undermine his power and infuriate Mu^ʿāwīya. Al-Mughīra told them that he was not prepared to commit a great sin and, thereby, lose the next world by shedding the blood of the most excellent men of the city for the sake of securing Mu^ʿāwīya's power in this world, and predicted that Ḥujr would certainly be executed by his successor.⁷² Al-Mughīra was probably aware that Ziyād Ibn Abīh (d. 53/679), then the governor of Baṣra, would be the new governor of Kūfa and would take severe measures against Ḥujr. It should be mentioned that al-Mughīra himself admitted that Ḥujr and his supporters were the most excellent men of the city, the shedding of whose blood was forbidden, since they had not committed any crime for which they could be executed. In fact, they were simply demanding the rights of which they had been deprived. However, in order not to bring the wrath of the caliph on his head, al-Mughīra did not stop cursing ʿAlī and praising ʿUthmān until the end of his governorship.

Al-Mughīra's successor was Ziyād in 50/670, who governed both Kūfa and Baṣra after al-Mughīra's death, and used to spend his winter in Baṣra and his summer in Kūfa. His deputy in Baṣra was Samura Ibn Jundab (d. 60/679) and his deputy in Kūfa was ʿAmr Ibn Ḥurayth (d. 85/704), both of whom were leaders of Mu^ʿāwīya's army.⁷³ Ziyād Ibn

⁷² Ibid. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 253. Al-Isfahānī, *Aghānī*, 17: 139.

⁷³ Ibid., 17: 140. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 254.

Abīh had been an old friend of Ḥujr's at the time of ʿAlī when Ziyād was his deputy in Fārs in 37/657. He changed his attitude towards ʿAlī and became his enemy only when he was won over by Muʿāwiya, who claimed that he was his bastard brother.⁷⁴ In his first speech in Kūfa, Ziyād threatened Ḥujr with severe punishment if he persisted in opposing the Umayyad authorities,⁷⁵ but Ḥujr and his followers continued to protest against Muʿāwiya and his governor in Kūfa while Ziyād was absent. Hearing his speeches and his condemnation of Muʿāwiya, the people of Kūfa started to rally around Ḥujr.⁷⁶ Al-Isfahānī narrates that ʿImāra Ibn al-Walīd, an ardent supporter of the Umayyads, informed Ziyād about the situation, expecting open revolt on the part of Ḥujr and his followers. Ziyād again summoned Ḥujr and warned him against rebellion.⁷⁷ Al-Balādhurī tells us, on the authority of ʿAwāna, that Ziyād had tried but failed to win over Ḥujr. He was willing to elevate Ḥujr's position on the condition that he would end his support for ʿAlī's cause and his opposition to the Umayyads.⁷⁸ However, Ḥujr's condemnation of Muʿāwiya's policy ended with an open protest.

What was the main reason for Ḥujr's arrest and execution? According to al-Ṭabarī, on the authority of Muḥammad Ibn Sīrīn (d. 110/728), Ziyād delivered such a long speech in the Friday sermon in the mosque of Kūfa that it went beyond the prayer time. When Ḥujr reminded Ziyād about praying, the latter ignored him and continued his speech, whereupon Ḥujr stoned Ziyād and, joined by the people, started to perform his prayers.

⁷⁴ Full details of the story of Muʿāwiya's recognition of Ziyād as his bastard brother is provided by al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 202-3 and al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 6-8. See also al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 163-4. Al-Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2: 218-9.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 2: 230. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 253-4. Al-Isfahānī, *Aghānī*, 17: 140. According to al-Balādhurī, Ziyād threatened several times to shed Ḥujr's blood in case the latter continued opposing the ruler.

⁷⁶ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 253-4. Al-Isfahānī, *Aghānī*, 17: 140.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 251.

Noticing this, Ziyād cut short his speech and started to lead the prayers. When Ziyād wrote to Mu^cāwiya about Ḥujr's protest, Mu^cāwiya ordered him to handcuff Ḥujr and send him to Damascus. Ziyād did so and Mu^cāwiya executed him.⁷⁹ For many reasons, this report cannot be accepted. First, Ḥujr, according to this account which is contradicted by other reports, did not protest against the policy of the Umayyad authorities and did not condemn Mu^cāwiya's conduct. Second, it is unlikely that Ḥujr and his companions would have openly opposed Ziyād, who was known for his harsh measures against his opponents. Third, this report was not recorded by any other source.

Another description of these events is narrated by al-Isfahānī, al-Balādhurī and al-Ṭabarī, on the authority of Abū Mikhnaf and ^cAwāna. During Ziyād's absence, the companions of Ḥujr went repeatedly to the mosque, gathered around him, made known their unflinching support and publicly condemned Mu^cāwiya's policy. Al-Isfahānī's account reveals the large number of ^cAlī's followers, who used to occupy a third or even half of the mosque of Kūfa.⁸⁰ ^cAmr Ibn Ḥurayth, Ziyād's deputy in Kūfa, urged them to submit and warned them against dissension, but they disregarded his warning and dared to stone him during a Friday sermon, forcing him to take shelter in the governor's palace. ^cAmr therefore wrote to Ziyād, informing him of the danger of the uprising in Kūfa. Hearing of this open rebellion in the mosque, Ziyād hurried back to Kūfa and, in the presence of Ḥujr and his companions in the mosque, delivered a sermon warning the people of Kūfa not to oppose the authorities. Ziyād threatened Ḥujr with death, setting him as an example to anybody who opposed the ruler.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 190.

⁸⁰ Al-Isfahānī, *Aghānī*, 17: 140.

⁸¹ Ibid. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 190. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 254-5.

Ziyād first sent some of his men to summon Ḥujr. However, Ḥujr's companions refused to hand him over. Ziyād now turned to the tribal chiefs, accusing them of sympathy with Ḥujr, and stating, "Your bodies are with me but your hearts are with Ḥujr."⁸² Ziyād threatened to attack them with the Syrian forces unless they proved their loyalty to him and withdrew their support from Ḥujr. Afraid of losing their relationship with the governor, thereby forfeiting their benefits,⁸³ they assured him of their submission and loyalty to the caliph and confirmed their readiness to oppose Ḥujr. Ziyād then ordered them to stop their families and relatives from supporting Ḥujr. Although the majority of Ḥujr's supporters finally deserted him, a large group refused to leave him and tried to prevent his capture.⁸⁴

The significant role of the leaders of the tribes of Kūfa in facilitating the way for the Umayyad officials to subdue Ḥujr's protest and for Ziyād to capture him is further illustrated by al-Ṭabarī. He narrates, on the authority of Abū Mikhnaf, that Ziyād ordered the tribe of Midhḥij and the tribe of Hamadān to gather at the graveyard of Kinda in order to surround Ḥujr and arrest him. Ziyād also instructed the people of Yemen, to whom Ḥujr belonged, to go to the cemetery of al-Ṣā'idiyyīn in order to arrest him.⁸⁵

Finally, Ḥujr remained alone, seeking protection from the tribes, and for a while found shelter by moving from one tribal area to another. Although Ziyād's men followed him, they failed to capture him. Because Ḥujr was protected by the Kūfan tribes, the only way for Ziyād to arrest him was to resort to Ḥujr's tribe Kinda. He therefore threatened to

⁸² Ibid., 5: 255. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 191. Al-Isfahānī, *Aghānī*, 17: 140-42.

⁸³ See footnote 69.

⁸⁴ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 191, Al-Isfahānī, *Aghānī*, 17: 140-2. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 255.

⁸⁵ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 194.

kill Muḥammad Ibn al-Ashʿath (d. 67/686), a prominent leader of the tribe of Kinda, and to destroy his properties unless he arrested Ḥujr. In order to protect his tribes' members from Ziyād's punishment, Ḥujr sent his *mawlā*, Rushayd, to Ibn al-Ashʿath, offering to surrender voluntarily if Ziyād provided him safe-conduct. Ziyād accepted Ibn al-Ashʿath's demand and granted Ḥujr safe-conduct. When Ḥujr surrendered, he was imprisoned for ten nights by Ziyād, who was awaiting orders to dispatch him to Muʿāwīya.⁸⁶

According to the accounts of al-Isfahānī, al-Balādhurī and al-Ṭabarī, the reason for Ḥujr's arrest was his open protest and opposition to Muʿāwīya's new strategy. He condemned Muʿāwīya for breaking his promises, for cursing ʿAlī and for his unjust treatment of the people of Kūfa. Muʿāwīya's policy was, in fact, the main cause of Ḥujr's protest. The followers of ʿAlī agreed with Ḥujr's demands, rallying around him and condemning Muʿāwīya's strategy. Ḥujr insisted on his demands and was not ready to submit to the Umayyad governor. He surrendered only when he did not find enough supporters to confront the Umayyad officials, realizing that his tribesmen would expose themselves to Ziyād's ruthless treatment if they insisted on protecting him.

Ziyād's mission was now to pursue Ḥujr's companions. Some of them had escaped from Kūfa to find shelter in other places, while others were captured and imprisoned. When they refused to agree to Ziyād's demand to curse ʿAlī, some of Ḥujr's followers

⁸⁶ Al-Isfahānī, *Aghānī*, 17: 146-7. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 259. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 195-6.

were beaten and then imprisoned. Ziyād continued to seek out Ḥujr's supporters until he had gathered twelve of them.⁸⁷

In order to condemn Ḥujr for his protest against the Umayyad officials, Ziyād asked the heads of the four quarters of Kūfa to testify to what they had witnessed with regard to Ḥujr's protest, and they agreed on the following charges: 1) Ḥujr Ibn ʿAdī had gathered the people around himself; 2) he openly reviled and cursed the caliph; 3) he called the people to fight against the Commander of the Faithful; 4) he believed that the caliphate was not for anyone except the family of ʿAlī; 5) he expelled the caliph's deputy from Kūfa; 6) he praised ʿAlī and believed that he was completely innocent of all accusations; he also incited people to condemn the enemies of ʿAlī and all those who fought against him.⁸⁸

The charges stipulated in this document against Ḥujr by the four chiefs of Kūfa were apparently accurate, reflecting the feelings and actions of the opposition party embodied by Ḥujr and his companions. The charges laid down in the document dealt almost exclusively with Ḥujr's personal point of view — his preference for the house of ʿAlī and his condemnation of Muʿāwiya's policy. However, these charges and signatures were insufficient for Ziyād's censure of Ḥujr. In fact, Ziyād was looking for more charges and more witnesses, in order to put the party spokesman to death and to silence the opposition party in Kūfa. After studying the document, he said, "I do not think this condemnation is

⁸⁷ Ibid., 4: 198-9. Al-Isfahānī, *Aghānī*, 17: 147-9. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 260-2. Al-Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2: 231-2. Al-Balādhurī numerates fourteen persons including Ḥujr to be gathered and put in prison by Ziyād. *Ansāb*, 4: 220-1.

⁸⁸ Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 198-9. Al-Isfahānī, *Aghānī*, p. 149. It should be noted that the charges, 3, 4 and 5 are not recorded by al-Isfahānī. Since al-Isfahānī recorded almost the same account as al-Ṭabarī on the authority of Abū Mikhnaḥ, either al-Isfahānī omitted these charges or al-Ṭabarī added them. According to al-Madāʾinī's account, the charges were that Ḥujr and his companions reviled both ʿUthmān and Muʿāwiya and dissociated themselves (*bari'ū minhumā*) from them. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 263.

decisive enough, I want the attestations of more witnesses than just these four chieftains to be affixed to it.”⁸⁹ Therefore, another document was arranged by Abū Burda, one of the four chiefs of the four divisions of Kūfa, who dictated the following accusations: 1) Ḥujr Ibn ʿAdī had denounced his allegiance to the caliph; 2) he defected from the unity of the community; 3) he cursed the caliph; 4) he called for war and created discord; 5) he gathered the people around him and exhorted them to break off allegiance to the Commander of the Faithful and remove him from office; and 6) he did not believe in God.⁹⁰ Ziyād was satisfied with these new charges and believed that Ḥujr would be executed. After looking at the accusations, he swore by God that he would do his best to have Ḥujr beheaded.⁹¹

The difference between the two documents is important. While the first places much emphasis on Ḥujr’s views in support of ʿAlī’s cause and devotion to his family, the second replaces these charges with an accusation that Ḥujr had broken his allegiance to the caliph⁹² and that he disbelieved in God, both of which entailed his execution. Perhaps some of the charges listed in the second document were fabricated. This explains the report that Muʿāwiya was hesitant about accepting the indictment and reluctant to take drastic action against Ḥujr.⁹³ Moreover, as will be seen below, the only condition given by Muʿāwiya for Ḥujr and his partisans to save their lives was that they must curse and denounce ʿAlī. This also indicates that their main offence was their faith in ʿAlī’s cause and not crimes against the state and the caliph, as laid down in the second document.

⁸⁹ Al-Isfahānī, *Aghānī*, 17: 149. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 199.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 4: 200. Al-Isfahānī, *Aghānī*, 17: 149. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 262.

⁹¹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 200. Al-Isfahānī, *Aghānī*, 17: 149.

⁹² It should be mentioned that when Ḥujr was brought to Ziyād, he confirmed that he did not break his allegiance to Muʿāwiya. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 197. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 259.

⁹³ Ibid., 5: 265. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 203.

Ziyād tried his best to prove the legitimacy of the second document. He summoned the prominent people and the tribal leaders to attest to the authenticity of the indictment, and seventy witnesses put their signature on the document. Al-Mukhtār Ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafī and ʿUrwa Ibn al-Mughīra did not present themselves so that they would not have to testify to these charges.⁹⁴ Some of these signatures were certainly forged. For example, the signature of al-Sarī Ibn Waqqās was written down although he was absent. The prominent *qāḍī* Shurayḥ Ibn al-Ḥārith (d. 50/697), whose testimony would evidently have been most crucial for the governor, protested about the use of false testimony under his name. In his letter to Muʿāwiya, Shurayḥ argued that he had never signed the document and that his name had been listed without his knowledge. He moreover testified that Ḥujr was a pious Muslim who performed prayer, gave alms, observed the fast of Ramaḍān, practiced the ritual of *ḥajj*, enjoined what was righteous and prohibited what was reprehensible, and whose blood was forbidden to be shed.⁹⁵ Shurayḥ Ibn Hānī (d. 78/697), one of the commanders of ʿAlī's army, protested that his signature was put down without his knowledge.⁹⁶

Ziyād was eager to see Ḥujr executed, and sent him and his companions to Damascus. Muʿāwiya wanted to get rid of the prisoners as soon as possible and, therefore, ordered them to be imprisoned ten miles outside Damascus in a place called Marj ʿAdhrāʾ. In fact, Muʿāwiya hesitated about executing them and sought opinions from the people of Syria concerning the prisoners. Some advised Muʿāwiya to distribute them

⁹⁴ Ibid., 4: 201. Al-Isfahānī, *Aghānī*, 17: 151. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 263.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 5: 264. Al-Isfahānī, *Aghānī*, 17: 151. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 202-3.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 4: 203. Al-Isfahānī, *Aghānī*, 17: 151.

around the cities of Syria in order to avoid any rebellion; however, Mu^cāwiya did not listen to them.⁹⁷

Meanwhile Ḥujr, according to al-Ṭabarī and al-Isfahānī, wrote to Mu^cāwiya from prison assuring him that he and his supporters would stand by their oath of allegiance to him and that only their enemies had testified against him. However, Mu^cāwiya ruled that the testimony of his governor, Ziyād, was more accurate than Ḥujr's.⁹⁸ In his account, al-Ya^cqūbī narrates that Ziyād wrote a letter to Mu^cāwiya, urging him to execute Ḥujr and his companions and claiming that Ḥujr and his followers refused to curse ^cAlī and condemned the Umayyad officials and, therefore, had deserted from submission (*tā^cah*) to the authorities.⁹⁹

Certain prominent people asked Mu^cāwiya to release their respective clansmen and, in the end, six of the fourteen accused were released. However, Mu^cāwiya did not listen to the advice of his associates, nor did he look at Shurayḥ's testimony concerning Ḥujr. He also refused the intercession of Mālik Ibn Hubayra for Ḥujr's release. The final decision for Ḥujr's fate was in Mu^cāwiya's hands. He intended to give the followers of the family of the Prophet no alternative but to submit to his will. Persisting in not to fulfilling any of his promises, especially with regard to the cursing of ^cAlī, he ordered that Ḥujr and the other seven be released if they publicly cursed and denounced ^cAlī; they refused and were thereupon executed.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Ibid., 17: 152. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 265. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 203.

⁹⁸ Ibid. Al-Isfahānī, *Aghānī*, 17: 154.

⁹⁹ Al-Ya^cqūbī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 230.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 2: 230. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 205-6. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 266-7. Al-Isfahānī, *Aghānī*, 17: 155-7. Al-Mas^cūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 4.

Mu^cāwiya, without a legitimate reason to execute Ḥujr, was condemned for his act. Al-Balādhurī tells us that, in his will, Ḥujr asked the people not to remove blood from his body for, he explained, “I will meet Mu^cāwiya hereafter; I have killed nobody and I have committed no offense.”¹⁰¹ Surprisingly enough, Ḥujr, according to his own account, was executed in a place where he had been the first Muslim to fight the unbelievers on behalf of Islam.¹⁰²

Ḥujr’s execution prompted many people to protest against Mu^cāwiya’s violation of Islamic norms. For instance, Mālik Ibn Hubayra, whose intervention had failed to release Ḥujr, gathered a large number of his people from Kinda and other tribes in order to avenge Ḥujr’s execution, but was again unsuccessful.¹⁰³ Al-Balādhurī narrates that when the news of the execution of Ḥujr and his companions reached Khurāsān, al-Rabī^c Ibn Ziyād called the people to revolt against Mu^cāwiya, but nobody dared to comply with his call.¹⁰⁴ Even ‘Ā’isha, the Prophet’s widow, and ‘Abd Allāh Ibn ‘Umar protested vehemently against Ḥujr’s execution. In spite of her aversion to ‘Alī and his partisans, ‘Ā’isha felt that she could not remain silent. She is said to have sent the noble Makhzumite, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Ibn al-Ḥārith, to intercede with Mu^cāwiya for Ḥujr and his companions, but he arrived only after the execution had taken place. She condemned Mu^cāwiya for killing such a pious man.¹⁰⁵ According to another report, Mu^cāwiya paid ‘Ā’isha a visit during the pilgrimage. She condemned Mu^cāwiya for the murder of Ḥujr

¹⁰¹ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 270.

¹⁰² Ibid., 5: 271. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta’rikh*, 4: 205.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 4: 207. Al-Balādhurī, 5: 270.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 5: 275-6.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 5: 274, 276. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta’rikh*, 4: 208.

and his companions and threatened him with revenge.¹⁰⁶ Al-Ṭabarī narrates that al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī considered the killing of Ḥujr as one of the four main pernicious crimes committed by Mu^cāwiyā.¹⁰⁷

The main reason for Ḥujr's execution was not based on committing a crime or an infidelity; he did not commit any grave sin that deserved punishment by death. Mu^cāwiyā wanted to apply his own policies and regulations against the followers of ^cAlī, and a dialogue between Mālīk Ibn Hubayra and Mu^cāwiyā clearly indicates that the latter killed Ḥujr and his partisans not because of deeds they had performed that justified their murder, but rather to weaken the opposition party that objected to his politics. When Mālīk met with Mu^cawiyā, he condemned him for killing Ḥujr and his companions, stating that they had not committed a crime that justified the death penalty. Mu^cāwiyā admitted that they did not deserve death, but tried to defend himself; he claimed that he had been about to release them, but said that Ziyād had told him in his letter that they were the leaders of the *fitna* (civil strife), so that "I killed them in order to eliminate the *fitna* at its source."¹⁰⁸ Al-Dīnawarī himself confirms that Ḥujr and his companions did not commit any crime. He narrates that Ziyād sent Abū Burda Ibn Abī Mūsā, Shurayḥ and Abū Hunayda al-Qaynī to Mu^cāwiyā to be witnesses against Ḥujr and his partisans. They, however, testified before Mu^cāwiyā that Ḥujr and his companions had only stoned ^cAmr Ibn Ḥurayth; nevertheless, Mu^cāwiyā ordered them to be executed.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 274. Al-Ya^cqūbī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 231.

¹⁰⁷ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 208.

¹⁰⁸ Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 224.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

The execution of Ḥujr had a far-reaching effect on Mu^ʿāwīya and put his illegitimate caliphate into question. The people of Kūfa were affected particularly deeply, reacting profoundly because Ḥujr was one of the greatest companions of ʿAlī as well as their spokesman. They had observed Mu^ʿāwīya's actions and had come to realize that he would not fulfill any of his promises or adhere to any of his commitments, since he would not stop applying his new policy of cursing ʿAlī, treating them unjustly and executing anyone who objected to his rule. They realized that their *bayʿa* to Mu^ʿāwīya no longer had any meaning, since he had broken all his promises. They had paid allegiance to Mu^ʿāwīya on condition that he would act according to the Book of God, the Sunna of the Prophet, and the conduct of the Rightly Guided Caliphs. Mu^ʿāwīya, according to his truce with al-Ḥasan, should have stopped cursing ʿAlī and should not have done any harm to his followers. Now, since he had not fulfilled any of these conditions and because his caliphate had lost its legitimacy, they decided to pay their homage to the legitimate caliph, and ask him to rise against Mu^ʿāwīya. For the people of Kūfa, the grandsons of the Prophet were the only persons who were entitled to the caliphate. After his brother's death, al-Ḥusayn was their choice, so they sent a delegation to al-Ḥusayn at Medina, urging him to lead an armed revolt against Mu^ʿāwīya.

What was al-Ḥusayn's attitude towards Mu^ʿāwīya's deeds? Taking into account that he had given his homage to Mu^ʿāwīya, even though he was reluctant to do so, al-Ḥusayn refused their call, advising them, as noted earlier, to stay calm until Mu^ʿāwīya's death. Al-Ḥusayn also realized that he could not confront Mu^ʿāwīya with people who had failed his father and his brother in dealing with Mu^ʿāwīya. He preferred to wait until Mu^ʿāwīya's death. However, the Kūfans' delegation continued to visit al-Ḥusayn.

Mu^cāwiya was alarmed by these delegations to al-Ḥusayn, especially when he received a letter from Marwān Ibn al-Ḥakam, his governor in Medina, warning him that the delegation from Kūfa was staying in Medina and making frequent visits to al-Ḥusayn. Upon receiving this news, Mu^cāwiya wrote a threatening letter to al-Ḥusayn, reminding him of his *bayʿa* and warning him against discord.¹¹⁰ In fact, Mu^cāwiya was afraid that al-Ḥusayn, after Ḥujr's execution and the frequent demands of the Kūfans to rise against Mu^cāwiya, might break his allegiance to him and comply with the delegation from Kūfa. Although al-Ḥusayn in his reply told Mu^cāwiya that he had no intention of breaking his allegiance or fighting him, he condemned Mu^cāwiya and blamed him for breaking his commitments and for his crimes against innocent people. Al-Ḥusayn also condemned and blamed Mu^cāwiya for his severe measures against Ḥujr and his companions, and for divergence from the conduct of the Prophet. He wrote:

Are you not the one who killed Ḥujr, brother of Kinda, and those who are the pious men, who condemn injustice? You killed them after you gave them a guarantee that you would not execute them; have you not killed ʿAmr Ibn al-Ḥamiq al-Khuzāʿī (d. 53/672), the friend of the Prophet and a pious man, after you granted him safe-conduct? Have you not claimed falsely that Ziyād Ibn Sumayya was your father's son? And in this you have deliberately deviated from the Sunna of the Prophet and followed your own desire... Have you not killed al-Ḥaḍramī (d. 53/672) just because he was following the religion of ʿAlī and the religion of ʿAlī is the religion of his cousin Muḥammad, because of whom you are sitting in your place.¹¹¹

In order to secure the *bayʿa* of the people of Kūfa, Mu^cāwiya had told al-Ḥasan to write down whatever conditions he wished. Once he had gained the Kūfans' recognition of his caliphate, Mu^cāwiya declared that he would not fulfill any of his commitments.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 224-5. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 744. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 2: 180-1.

¹¹¹ Full details of Mu^cāwiya's letter and al-Ḥusayn's reply is recorded by al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 128-30. See also Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 2: 180-1. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, pp. 224-5

Moreover, he did not follow the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet, but rather applied his own policy. Cursing ʿAlī and treating the people of Kūfa unjustly with regard to their stipends aroused them to rally around their spokesman, Ḥujr, and protest openly against Muʿāwīya's new strategy. Although they did not commit any crime, Ḥujr and his followers were killed by Muʿāwīya.

Even though Ḥujr's protest was aborted and he was, consequently, executed, he had encouraged the people of Kūfa to criticize Muʿāwīy's policy openly and thereby call his caliphate into question. Because of Ḥujr's objection to Muʿāwīya's new strategy of treating the people of Kūfa unfairly and breaking all of his promises to al-Ḥasan, and furthermore because of Ḥujr's execution, the Kūfans decided to break their allegiance to Muʿāwīya and ask al-Ḥusayn to lead them against him. In fact, Ḥujr's protest paved the way for al-Ḥusayn to lead his movement against the Umayyad officials. Al-Ḥusayn now became their leader and they awaited his word. However, from his letter to al-Ḥusayn, Muʿāwīya was not unaware of the fact that al-Ḥusayn was the obvious choice of the people of Kūfa as the new leader. He had been afraid that the Kūfans would ask al-Ḥusayn to rise against him, but now, after receiving al-Ḥusayn's letter, he was contented that al-Ḥusayn would not comply with their request. However, as the grandson of the Prophet, the potential leader of the Kūfans and the spokesman of the opposition party, al-Ḥusayn was still a great threat for Muʿāwīya.

Therefore, in this chapter, we have seen how Muʿāwīya was able to impose his caliphate on the people, even though he did not have the necessary qualifications. What was most important was his use of the *bayʿa* to oblige people to be loyal to him no matter

what he might do. In the next chapter, we will see how he would go on to use the *bayʿa* to secure the caliphate for his son Yazīd. Nevertheless, we will also see the mounting tension between the Umayyads and al-Ḥusayn. Although al-Ḥusayn could not take his pledge of allegiance away from Muʿāwiya, he would not be able to allow this transformation of the caliphate to go on under Yazīd.

CHAPTER TWO

Part One: Mu^cāwiya's Attempts to Secure Yazīd's Accession

Al-Ḥasan, as mentioned earlier, conceded his right to the caliphate and came to terms with Mu^cāwiya only when he had received promises that he would carry out all of the conditions agreed upon in the truce. However, Mu^cāwiya, as shown in Chapter One, disavowed these conditions one by one. He did not desist from cursing ^cAlī, he persecuted his followers and treated them unjustly. This led him to be strongly condemned by Ḥujr and his supporters, resulting in their execution. Because Mu^cāwiya broke his promises and pursued and executed ^cAlī's followers, the people of Kūfa started to break their allegiance to Mu^cāwiya and asked al-Ḥusayn to lead them against him. Al-Ḥusayn advised them to wait until Mu^cāwiya's death. Mu^cāwiya, however, continued to carry out his own plans; he refrained from acting according to the Book of God, the Sunna of the Prophet and the conduct of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and adhered to his own discretion.

One of the most important conditions that al-Ḥasan was concerned about was the issue of the succession to the caliphate after Mu^cāwiya's demise. Al-Ḥasan perhaps was not unaware of Mu^cāwiya's ambitions to the caliphate and his plans to transform it to a kingship (*mulk*). In order to protect the caliphate from any deviation, al-Ḥasan imposed the condition on Mu^cāwiya that he had no right to nominate a successor. As mentioned previously, the caliphate, according to some sources, should be restored to al-Ḥasan or,

according to others, should be left to be decided by consultation. In spite of Mu'āwiya's acceptance of this major condition, his plan was to perpetuate the caliphate in his house and to nominate his son Yazīd as his successor. For this, Mu'āwiya had to eliminate al-Ḥasan's claim. In fact, Mu'āwiya not only wanted to remove al-Ḥasan but also intended to eliminate all rivals to the caliphate in order to pave the way for Yazīd's accession.

The majority of our sources report that the cause of al-Ḥasan's death was poisoning by one of his wives, Ja'da, daughter of al-Ash'ath Ibn Qays, at the instigation of Mu'āwiya. Mu'āwiya is reported to have promised her a large sum of money and to marry her to his son Yazīd if she would poison al-Ḥasan.¹ Al-Mas'ūdī reports that, prior to his death in, al-Ḥasan declared that Mu'āwiya had achieved his desire by poisoning him.² According to some sources, al-Ḥasan was poisoned several times.³

Mu'āwiya's role in al-Ḥasan's death, according to al-Isfahānī, was well-known at the time. He narrates that it was reported that the people generally believed that Mu'āwiya poisoned both al-Ḥasan and Sa'd Ibn Abī Waqqāṣ, one of the most famous Companions of the Prophet, in the same year.⁴ Mu'āwiya's reaction to al-Ḥasan's death may provide further evidence of his significant role in al-Ḥasan's death (50/670). It is reported that upon receiving the news of al-Ḥasan's death, Mu'āwiya could not hide his feelings of relief and even joy. Moreover, he informed Ibn 'Abbās that al-Ḥasan had died from drinking honey.⁵ According to this report, Mu'āwiya perhaps was the first to hear about

¹ Ibn Sa'd, *Tarjama*, p. 84. Al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, 2: 427. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 295. Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 80. Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 318-9. Ibn A'tham narrates that Marwān Ibn al-Ḥakam was the mediator between Mu'āwiya and al-Ḥasan's wife, Ja'da.

² Al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, 2: 427.

³ Ibn Sa'd, *Tarjamat*, p. 96. Al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, 2: 427. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 295. Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 81. Surprisingly enough, al-Ṭabarī does not mention the cause of al-Ḥasan's death.

⁴ Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 73.

⁵ Ibn Sa'd, *Tarjama*, p. 95. Al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rīkh*, 2: 225-6. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 222.

al-Ḥasan's demise and the way he died, such awareness providing further proof of Mu'āwiya's involvement in al-Ḥasan's death.

While Mu'āwiya seized the opportunity of al-Ḥasan's death to accomplish his plans to secure Yazīd's nomination to the caliphate, 'Alī's followers in Kūfa made a bid to restore the caliphate to the house of the family of the Prophet (*ahl al-bayt*). As soon as they heard the news of al-Ḥasan's death, they held a meeting and wrote a letter to al-Ḥusayn, inviting him to rise against Mu'āwiya. Al-Ḥusayn, honoring his brother's truce with Mu'āwiya, once again refused to respond to their call and advised them to refrain from rebellion and to stay calm as long as Mu'āwiya was alive.⁶

Mu'āwiya was aware of the fact that the people of Kūfa would choose al-Ḥusayn as their leader after al-Ḥasan's death. He also realized that unlike al-Ḥusayn, the only remaining candidate from the Prophet's family, his cousin, 'Abd Allāh Ibn 'Abbās had no aspiration to the caliphate and would not be the preference of the people of Kūfa as long as al-Ḥusayn was alive. He tried his best to deprive al-Ḥusayn of his right to the caliphate and the leadership of 'Alī's followers, pointing out that Ibn 'Abbās had now become the lord of the Banū Hāshim. Ibn 'Abbās realized Mu'āwiya's intention of eliminating al-Ḥusayn and confirmed to him that al-Ḥusayn indeed was the lord of the Banū Hāshim. Ibn 'Abbās declared, "So long as Abū 'Abd Allāh (the nickname of al-Ḥusayn) is alive, surely I am not the lord of the Banū Hāshim."⁷

The most important task for Mu'āwiya before his death was to strengthen the basis of the caliphate of his son Yazīd, who, because of his immorality, was opposed by a large

⁶ Ibid., p. 220. Ibn Sa'd, *Tarjama*, p. 54. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 366.

⁷ Ibn Sa'd, *Tarjama*, p. 95. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 298-9. Al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 226.

group of Muslims.⁸ Even some of his supporters in Damascus and governors opposed Mu'āwīya's nomination of Yazīd as his successor. It is significant to mention that, immediately after the news of al-Ḥasan's death, Mu'āwīya began to carry out his plan.⁹ The questions to be considered at this juncture are: Did Mu'āwīya succeed in persuading people to accept Yazīd's accession? What devices did he resort to? It was not to be an easy task for Mu'āwīya and he had to tread with great caution and utilize different devices to achieve his goal. Persuading Muslims to accept Yazīd, who lacked the qualifications for the caliphate, was extremely difficult and Mu'āwīya had to employ various schemes. For instance, he tried to portray Yazīd as a righteous person, giving the people of Mecca and Medina money and employing poets to describe Yazīd as a pious man who followed in the footsteps of the Prophet.¹⁰

Mu'āwīya also had to remove any rivals to Yazīd. Realizing that the Syrians were his real support and that the matter of succession would not be decided without them, Mu'āwīya informed the Syrians that he was getting old and wished to appoint a successor. When he asked them whom they would consider suitable for this office, they named 'Abd al-Raḥmān Ibn Khālīd Ibn al-Walīd (d. 46/664), one of the loyal commanders of his army. Mu'āwīya was expecting them to mention Yazīd, but now realized that 'Abd al-Raḥmān was an unexpected rival of Yazīd, and therefore, decided to get rid of him. After his arrival from the regular summer campaign in Anatolia, one of 'Abd al-Raḥmān's slaves served him a poisoned drink prepared by Mu'āwīya's Christian physician Ibn

⁸ Both al-Mas'ūdī and al-Balādhurī dedicate a section describing Yazīd's conduct in violation of Islamic norms. Al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 67-8. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 299-301. Al-Balādhurī states that Yazīd was the first caliph who violated Islamic norms publicly.

⁹ Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 312. Al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 228.

¹⁰ Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 333-4.

Uthāl, at the instigation of Mu^cāwiya himself, and thus easily disposed of a potential rival.¹¹

In fact, one of the most vigorous devices that Mu^cāwiya used to accomplish his mission of securing Yazīd's accession was to poison his competitors. Al-Isfahānī tells us that when Mu^cāwiya prepared to nominate Yazīd as his successor, he decided to remove his rivals and therefore poisoned al-Ḥasan and Sa^cd Ibn Abī al-Waqqāṣ.¹² Mu^cāwiya summarized his method — using honey to poison his enemies — by stating that, “God has soldiers made of honey.”¹³ In this way, Mu^cāwiya paved the way for Yazīd's succession.

Although Mu^cāwiya intended to secure Yazīd's accession, he did not expose his desire publicly, expecting that he would be disappointed by his associates. Mu^cāwiya dared to announce his desire only when his governor of Kūfa, al-Mughīra, mentioned Yazīd as his successor.¹⁴ Al-Mughīra developed this idea to win the favor of Mu^cāwiya and Mu^cāwiya seized this opportunity to expose his intention to the people. Many sources report that Mu^cāwiya decided to replace al-Mughīra with Sa^cīd Ibn al-^cĀṣ (d. 59/679) as the new governor of Kūfa. When al-Mughīra heard of this, he went to Damascus and suggested to Yazīd that he was the most qualified person for his father's succession. Hearing this from Yazīd, Mu^cāwiya was delighted and decided to reappoint al-Mughīra to his office, urging him to work for guaranteeing the Kūfans' recognition of Yazīd's accession. Realizing that Mu^cāwiya was aware of the difficulties of this, al-Mughīra assured him that he would secure the allegiance of the people of Kūfa and that Ziyād,

¹¹ Al-Ṭabarī, on the authority of Maslama Ibn Muḥārīb, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 171. Al-Ya^cqūbī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 223.

¹² Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 74.

¹³ Al-Mas^cūdī, *Murūj*, 2: 410. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 168. According to some sources, when Mālik al-Ashtar (d. 38/658) was nominated by ^cAlī as the governor of Egypt, he was murdered by a drink of poisoned honey at the instigation of Mu^cāwiya. Al-Mas^cūdī, *Murūj*, 2: 409. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 167-8. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 71-2.

¹⁴ Contrary to all other sources, Ibn A^ctham reports that ^cAmr Ibn al-^cĀṣ was the first to propose to Mu^cāwiya the idea of nominating Yazīd as his successor. Ibn A^ctham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 322.

then the governor of Baṣra, would secure it from the people of Baṣra, telling him, "After these two *miṣrs* (towns) nobody could go against you."¹⁵

In order to further impress Mu^cāwiya, al-Mughīra, according to al-Ya^cqūbī, also revealed to him that he had already called the chiefs of the tribes of Kūfa to pay homage to Yazīd and they had complied with his call.¹⁶ In fact, al-Mughīra's statement was false since the Kūfan tribal leaders had refused to acknowledge Yazīd's succession, as we will see later. Al-Mughīra actually made the fake claim to Mu^cāwiya in order to remain in his office. This is indicated by al-Ya^cqūbī's account that when al-Mughīra returned to Kūfa, he told his secretary that he had implicated Mu^cāwiya in a deep scandal from which he could not be saved except by bloodshed.¹⁷ According to this report, this means that the people of Kūfa, contrary to al-Mughīra's claim, would not accept Yazīd's accession and, consequently, their refusal would result in bloodshed. This report also indicates clearly that al-Mughīra believed that Yazīd was not qualified for the caliphate and that the people of Kūfa, therefore, would not regard him as a legitimate caliph and, consequently, would protest against his nomination. By nominating Yazīd to this important office Mu^cāwiya was putting himself in disgrace and bringing severe consequences to all Muslims. However, as soon as al-Mughīra arrived in Kūfa, he started working for Yazīd's benefit, summoning supporters of the Umayyads' newly emerging dynasty and calling on them to pay homage to Yazīd.¹⁸

Mu^cāwiya was aware of the fact that his son Yazīd was not qualified for this important office and he was afraid that even his own supporters would refuse to comply

¹⁵ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'riḫ*, 4: 224. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 165. Al-Ya^cqūbī, *Ta'riḫ*, 2: 219-20. Instead of Sa^cīd, al-Ya^cqūbī mentions ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Kurayz.

¹⁶ Ibid., 2: 220.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'riḫ*, 4: 224.

with his idea. Therefore, Mu^ʿāwīya, according to al-Ya^ʿqūbī, wrote to his governor of Baṣra, Ziyād Ibn Abīh, asking him to get allegiance from the people of Baṣra for Yazīd. Ziyād was not satisfied with Mu^ʿāwīya's decision and was conscious of the fact that Yazīd was not entitled to the caliphate. For this reason, he refused Mu^ʿāwīya's demand, explaining that Yazīd used to spend his time playing with dogs, monkeys and singing; "he is addicted to wine, while among them are more pious persons, such as al-Ḥusayn, Ibn ʿAbbās, Ibn al-Zubayr and Ibn ʿUmar." Ziyād, therefore, advised Mu^ʿāwīya to instruct his son to behave like these nobles of Quraysh for one or two years in order to be acknowledged by the masses.¹⁹ Al-Ṭabarī also reports, on the authority of Maslama, that Ziyād refused Mu^ʿāwīya's demand to work for Yazīd's accession. He explained his refusal by describing Yazīd as a neglectful person who devoted himself to hunting. Ziyād also believed that because of Yazīd's dissolution and his breaking of Islamic codes, the people would not acknowledge his succession to the caliphate. Ziyād, therefore, suggested to Yazīd that he abandon his abominable deeds in order to facilitate Mu^ʿāwīya's task of nominating him as his successor.²⁰

It is clear that even Mu^ʿāwīya's deputies in Kūfa and Baṣra were conscious of the fact that Yazīd was not qualified to the caliphate because of his improper conduct. They were also aware that not only the people of Kūfa but also the people of Mecca and Medina would not accept his accession while some more prominent and nobler persons were still alive. Nevertheless, Mu^ʿāwīya disregarded his supporters' suggestions, insisting on carrying out his plan to impose his decision on the people.

¹⁹ Al-Ya^ʿqūbī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 220.

²⁰ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 224-5.

Ibn A^ctham tells us that Mu^cāwiya wrote to all of his deputies in his provinces, asking them to take allegiance to Yazīd from the people. Marwān Ibn al-Ḥakam, Sa^cīd Ibn al-^cĀṣ and ^cAbd Allāh Ibn ^cĀmir Ibn Kurayz, the most reliable supporters of the Umayyad family, advised Mu^cāwiya to keep his desire unexposed until he had verified the Medinans' position. They had surely realized that the people of Mecca and Medina, whose approval of Yazīd's accession was very important to Mu^cāwiya, would not recognize Yazīd's caliphate since some of the sons of the Companions of the Prophet who were more entitled to the caliphate than Yazīd were still alive. Accepting their advice, Mu^cāwiya tried to win over the people of Mecca and Medina by bestowing a lot of money on them.²¹

Did Mu^cāwiya succeed in his mission to win over the people of Mecca and Medina by this means? Ibn A^ctham narrates that some of them kept silent and did not show their opposition to Yazīd's succession, whereas others protested against this nomination. Ibn A^ctham also tells us that the poet of Baṣra, ^cUqayba Ibn Hubayra al-Asadī, and the poet of Kūfa, ^cAbd Allāh Ibn Humām al-Salūlī, who used to criticize Yazīd's misdeeds in their poetry, reluctantly recognized Yazīd's succession. Apparently, Mu^cāwiya had succeeded in buying their silence by granting them money.²²

Knowing that many people were dissatisfied with his plan to secure Yazīd's succession, Mu^cāwiya resorted to various methods to win them to his idea. He worked hard, according to al-Ya^cqūbī, to follow Ziyād's suggestion to depict Yazīd as a pious

²¹ Ibn A^ctham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 333.

²² Ibid. 2: 333-4.

man, but all of his efforts were in vain because Yazīd's character was beyond redemption.²³

Ziyād had advised Mu'āwiya to postpone the nomination of Yazīd and, after Ziyād's death, Mu'āwiya summoned his leaders and supporters from all the provinces for a special meeting in Damascus to discuss Yazīd's succession. At this meeting, Mu'āwiya wanted his close associates to make his Syrian supporters acknowledge Yazīd's accession by any means. Therefore, prior to the meeting, Mu'āwiya ordered al-Ḍaḥḥāk Ibn Qays, the leader of the Damascus army, to take his side and urge the people of Syria to swear allegiance to Yazīd. Mu'āwiya also instructed 'Abd al-Raḥmān Ibn 'Uthmān al-Thaqafī, 'Abd Allāh Ibn Mas'ada al-Fazārī, Thawr Ibn Ma'an al-Salamī, and 'Abd Allāh Ibn 'Iṣām al-Sha'arī, his close associates and prominent persons in Damascus, to comply with al-Ḍaḥḥāk's call. During the meeting, Mu'āwiya pointed out that the people should submit to the orders of their rulers and mentioned Yazīd's entitlement to the caliphate, his merits and knowledge in politics, and called the participants to pay homage to him. Then al-Ḍaḥḥāk, as instructed by Mu'āwiya, interrupted Mu'āwiya, confirming that the people should have a caliph after Mu'āwiya's death and urged Mu'āwiya to nominate his son for this office. Some other prominent persons agreed with al-Ḍaḥḥāk's words and talked in the same vein.²⁴

It seems that the people who were present at the meeting did not comply with al-Ḍaḥḥāk's call and were not willing to pay homage to Yazīd; they kept silent until they were threatened, as indicated by some accounts. Al-Mas'ūdī and Ibn Qutayba tell us that al-Aḥnaf Ibn Qays, one of the prominent Iraqi leaders in Baṣra whose approval of Yazīd's

²³ Al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rīkh*, 2: 229.

²⁴ Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 165-8. Al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 27. Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 336-7.

succession was important to Mu^cāwiya, opposed Yazīd's nomination to the caliphate and refused to pay homage to him, advising Mu^cāwiya to be cautious in his decision. He also advised Mu^cāwiya not to impose his own desire on the people and to look for the benefit of the community in nominating his successor.²⁵ The refusal of the Iraqī leaders to comply with Mu^cāwiya's decision is further confirmed by al-Mas^cūdī and Ibn Qutayba's accounts. They both narrate that al-Ḍaḥḥāk in his speech condemned the Iraqi leaders' refusal to acknowledge Yazīd's succession and threatened them with death; ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn ʿUthmān, one of Mu^cāwiya's prominent supporters, followed in the footsteps of al-Ḍaḥḥāk.²⁶

Ibn A^ctham also narrates that a man from Medina called Muḥammad Ibn ʿAmr objected to Yazīd's succession and asked Mu^cāwiya to be God-fearing in nominating a leader over the Prophet's community.²⁷ In his very brief account, Khalīfa, whose narration usually reflects a pro-Umayyad viewpoint and whose authorities for this account are unknown, reports that when Mu^cāwiya called the people of *Shām* to pay homage to Yazīd in 50/670 they responded positively and paid allegiance to him.²⁸

According to Ibn A^ctham, Ibn Qutayba and al-Mas^cūdī, Mu^cāwiya's call for Yazīd's succession after al-Ḥasan's death in 50/670 did not pass without opposition: the leaders of the Iraqis, who had been called by Mu^cāwiya to Damascus in order to witness Yazīd's nomination, refused to acknowledge his accession. This opposition is further confirmed by Ibn Qutayba, who narrates full details of the events.

²⁵ Al-Mas^cūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 27-8. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 169-70.

²⁶ Ibid. Al-Mas^cūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 27-8. According to al-Mas^cūdī, the Syrians paid homage to Yazīd in 56/676.

²⁷ Ibn A^ctham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 336.

²⁸ Khalīfa, *Ta'rikh*, p. 159.

Realizing that both the people of Ḥijāz and Iraq believed that the family of the Prophet were more entitled to the caliphate than anyone else, al-Aḥnaf, according to Ibn Qutayba, affirmed that they would not accept Yazīd's caliphate as long as al-Ḥasan was alive. He also reminded Mu'āwiya of his agreement that the caliphate should be restored to al-Ḥasan after Mu'āwiya's death. Furthermore, al-Aḥnaf threatened Mu'āwiya by the swords of the Iraqi people if he did not fulfill his promises. However, al-Aḥnaf's speech provoked the anger of the Syrian leaders, who reproached him for his words and supported Mu'āwiya's nomination of Yazīd. Hearing al-Aḥnaf's disapproval of his decision, Mu'āwiya tried to put an end to the disagreement by threatening whoever opposed his decision. Finally, Abū Khanīfa, another supporter of Mu'āwiya, put an end to the meeting. He pulled out his sword and said, "You are the Commander of the Faithful; if you die Yazīd will succeed you," pointing to Mu'āwiya. "Whoever does not acknowledge this fact, this will be for him," pointing to his sword.²⁹

Ibn A'ṭham and al-Mas'ūdī support Ibn Qutayba's account by narrating that an ardent supporter of Mu'āwiya stood up and said: "O people! The Commander of the Faithful is this one," and he pointed to Mu'āwiya, "his heir is this one," pointing to Yazīd; "If anyone refuses I will use this," pointing to his sword. At this point, the people started to pay homage to Yazīd.³⁰ According to the above-mentioned accounts, the people refused to acknowledge Yazīd's nomination and they did so only when they were threatened with death. For this reason and due to al-Aḥnaf's refusal to acknowledge Yazīd's succession,

²⁹ Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 169-70. It should be noted that, according to this account, the meeting was held before al-Ḥasan's death. However, the exact date is not recorded by Ibn Qutayba. It should be also mentioned that usually the sources are not in agreement in regards to the dates.

³⁰ Ibn A'ṭham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 337. In his account, Ibn A'ṭham mentions the name of the person as Yazīd Ibn al-Muqanna' al-Kindī. Al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 28. Al-Mas'ūdī does not mention Ibn al-Muqanna' in his account, instead he says a man from the Azd.

the meeting failed, and, according to Ibn Qutayba, Mu^ʿāwīya avoided mentioning Yazīd's succession until he visited Medina in the year 50 A.H.³¹ Mu^ʿāwīya realized that he could not secure Yazīd's accession from the people of Ḥijāz unless he won over the prominent nobles in Medina, and this could not be achieved unless he went himself to Medina. Therefore, he decided to visit Medina in order to inform these men about his decision in regards to Yazīd's nomination and to test their viewpoint.

According to Ibn Qutayba, as soon as Mu^ʿāwīya reached Medina he sent for ʿAbd Allāh Ibn ʿAbbās, ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Jaʿfar, ʿAbd Allah Ibn al-Zubayr and ʿAbd Allāh Ibn ʿUmar for a close meeting. Mu^ʿāwīya informed them about his choice and asked them to reply favorably. Ibn ʿAbbās and Ibn Jaʿfar insisted that the caliphate should be restored to the family of the Prophet. Moreover, Ibn Jaʿfar told Mu^ʿāwīya that if he followed the Qurʾān, the Sunna of the Prophet and the conduct of Abū Bakr and ʿUmar he would find that nobody was more entitled to the caliphate than the family of the Prophet. In his reply, Ibn al-Zubayr mentioned that the caliphate should remain within those people of Quraysh who enjoy high-quality conducts (*afʿāl marḍiyya*) and outstanding ancestors, and that Mu^ʿāwīya lacks these qualifications. In his turn, Ibn ʿUmar protested that the caliphate was not a kingship to be transferred from fathers to sons, arguing that, otherwise, he, Ibn ʿUmar, should have succeeded the caliphate after his father's death, which he did not. When Mu^ʿāwīya realized that some of the most prominent nobles in Medina insisted on rejecting Yazīd's succession, he decided to return to Damascus, desisting from mentioning Yazīd's succession until al-Ḥasan's death.³²

³¹ Ibn Qutayba, 1: 72.

³² Ibid., 1: 172-4.

This account requires some comment: (1) the name of al-Ḥusayn, the most influential Hāshimite noble and whose approval of Yazīd's succession was extremely important to Mu'āwiya because of his leading position among the people, does not appear in this account; (2) it is unlikely that Ibn Ja'far, 'Alī's nephew and an ardent supporter of the Banū Hāshim, would mention the conduct of 'Umar and Abū Bakr but ignore 'Alī's; and (3) it is unlikely and contrary to all other accounts that Ibn 'Umar, who used to avoid any confrontation with the Umayyad authorities, would answer Mu'āwiya with such aggressive words. Perhaps some details of this account are exaggerated and, as a result, cannot be accepted. Even if Ibn Qutayba's report is invalid, the fact remains that Yazīd's succession could not be accomplished unless the *bay'at* was taken from the prominent nobles in Medina, especially al-Ḥusayn, whose entitlement to the caliphate was upheld by the people of Kūfa and Ḥijāz. Mu'āwiya realized that if al-Ḥusayn paid homage to Yazīd, his *bay'at* would be binding on him, just as his *bay'at* to Mu'āwiya at the time of al-Ḥasan had been. Therefore, al-Ḥusayn would not be able to revoke his homage to Yazīd by announcing his entitlement to the caliphate, even if the people of Kūfa called him to rise against Mu'āwiya.

Concerning the importance of the *bay'at*, al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī (d. 1402/1981), the prominent 20th century Shī'ī scholar from Iran, says, "Paying homage (*bay'at*) was an old Arab practice, which was carried out in important matters such as kingship and governorship." When the people gave their *bay'at* to their king or prince, according to al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī, they showed their support for his actions. Violating the *bay'at* was considered a disgraceful and dishonorable act.³³ This explains why al-Ḥusayn refused to answer the calls of the Kūfans

³³ Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī, *Shī'a*, tr. by Ḥusayn Naṣr. Qum: Anṣāriyyān Publication, 2000, pp. 196-7. See also E. Tyan, "Bay'a," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 1: 1113-4.

to rise against Mu^cāwiya after al-Ḥasan's death, mentioning that he had given his pledge of allegiance to Mu^cāwiya; it also explains why Yazīd's succession could not be legitimate without the *bay'at* of the prominent nobles.

Medina was the most important province Mu^cāwiya needed to secure the acknowledgment of Yazīd's succession, since it was the residence of most of the prominent nobles, followers of the Companions of the Prophet (Ṣaḥāba) and sons of the Ṣaḥāba. The questions to be considered here are: Did Mu^cāwiya eventually win over the people of Medina to acknowledge Yazīd's caliphate? Did they pay homage to Yazīd willingly or were they forced by Mu^cāwiya to do so?

After managing, with the help of his leaders of the other provinces, to secure Yazīd's succession from the people, Mu^cāwiya was now more concerned about winning the allegiance of the prominent nobles of Medina. The most important were the four sons of the Ṣaḥāba: namely, al-Ḥusayn Ibn ʿAlī, ʿAbd Allāh Ibn ʿUmar, ʿAbd Allāh Ibn al-Zubayr and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Abī Bakr. In order to establish the legitimacy of Yazīd's succession, Mu^cāwiya had to secure the acknowledgement of these four persons, and without their approval, his task could not be accomplished. Therefore, before coming to Medina, Mu^cāwiya wrote to his governor, Marwān Ibn al-Ḥakam, informing him that the people of Egypt, Syria and Iraq had paid homage to Yazīd, and ordered him to pay homage to Yazīd also and secure the allegiance of the people of Medina. Upon receiving the letter, according to Ibn Aʿtham, Marwān asked the people of Medina to assemble in the mosque, and informed them about Mu^cāwiya's choice to nominate Yazīd as his successor, asking them to pledge their allegiance to him. Knowing Yazīd's character and his violation of Islamic norms, the people of Medina fell silent and nobody complied with

Marwān's call. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Abī Bakr openly objected to Marwān's call, stating that, "Yazīd is an unfit character to us, but Muʿāwīya wants to transform the caliphate into *hirqaliyya* (Byzantine polity)." The discussion between ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and Marwān then became a verbal fight.³⁴ At this time, Marwān failed to secure Yazīd's succession from the people of Medina.³⁵

Ibn Qutayba, on the other hand, tells us that when he received Muʿāwīya's letter, Marwān himself as well as the people of Quraysh refused to acknowledge Yazīd's succession. He wrote to Muʿāwīya informing him that his people (the Qurayshites) refused to comply with his call to acknowledge Yazīd's succession. Upon receiving Marwān's letter, Muʿāwīya decided to overthrow Marwān from his office and nominate Saʿīd Ibn ʿĀṣ in his place.³⁶

Protesting against Muʿāwīya's nomination of Yazīd, according to Ibn Qutayba and al-Masʿūdī, Marwān went to Damascus with some of his associates in order to persuade Muʿāwīya to change his decision. Mentioning Yazīd's unsuitability for the caliphate, Marwān advised Muʿāwīya to be cautious in promoting young people (*ṣibyān*) like Yazīd [who has no experience in the matter of the caliphate] to the leadership of Muslims.³⁷ Marwān, who had immense experience with the caliphate, having been ʿUthmān's secretary and carried out superior service to the benefit of the Umayyad dynasty, perhaps had his own great ambitions to the caliphate and believed that he was more qualified and entitled than Yazīd, who had no experience for such an important office. Muʿāwīya realized Marwān's ambition and, according to al-Masʿūdī, succeeded in winning over

³⁴ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 338-9. See also al-Isfahānī, *Aghānī*, 17: 375.

³⁵ It should be mentioned again that the dates of Muʿāwīya's attempts to secure Yazīd's succession occurred after al-Hasan's death in 50/670. However, the exact dates of the events are unknown in our sources.

³⁶ Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 175-6.

³⁷ Ibid., 1: 176-7. Al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 28.

Marwān by assuring him that he would be Yazīd's successor, but he failed to fulfill his promise.³⁸ Ibn Qutayba, on the other hand, tells us that Mu'āwiya wanted to buy Marwān's silence; he narrates that Mu'āwiya won over Marwān by assigning him a thousand dinars every month and a hundred dinars for everyone in his family.³⁹

In another account, Ibn Qutayba reports that Mu'āwiya dismissed Marwān from his office because he had failed to fulfill his duties and nominated Sa'īd Ibn al-Āṣ as the new governor of Medina. This time, Mu'āwiya took new measures for securing Yazīd's succession from the people of Medina. He wrote to his new governor in Medina, ordering him to call the people to acknowledge Yazīd's succession and to take severe measures against whoever refused to submit to the caliph's orders. Sa'īd called the people of Medina to pay homage to Yazīd, threatening and forcing them and showing rudeness. In spite of Sa'īd's insolence, most of the people did not respond to his call, especially the Banū Hāshim: none of them responded. Ibn al-Zubayr strongly condemned Yazīd's succession. Having failed to get homage from the people of Medina, even by threatening them, Sa'īd wrote to Mu'āwiya, informing him that he had no power over the people of Medina and that homage to Yazīd could not be obtained except by "using horses and men or by coming yourself."⁴⁰

It is obvious that the people of Medina stood firm against Yazīd's caliphate and that the new governor failed in his task. Moreover, he realized that this matter would not be finished unless Mu'āwiya came with his troops and forced the people to pay homage to Yazīd. Whether Marwān or Sa'īd was the governor of Medina, the fact remained that the people of Medina refused to comply with the governor's call, and Mu'āwiya realized that

³⁸ Ibid., 3: 29.

³⁹ Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 177.

⁴⁰ Ibid. The exact dates of these events are not recorded by Ibn Qutayba.

he could not secure their allegiance to Yazīd's succession unless he came to Medina himself and took new measures.

Before doing so, Mu'āwiya tried to resort to another scheme; he turned to the most influential nobles in order to persuade them to acknowledge Yazīd's accession. Ibn Qutayba reports that Mu'āwiya wrote four letters: to Ibn 'Abbās, Ibn al-Zubayr, Ibn Ja'far and al-Ḥusayn, ordering and threatening them to submit to his decision, or face severe consequences.

Trying to force Ibn 'Abbās to pay homage to Yazīd, Mu'āwiya resorted to charges against 'Alī's supporters. He accused Ibn 'Abbās of having participated in the killing of the third caliph, 'Uthmān, and wrote, "I have been told that you are slow in giving *bay'at* to Yazīd. I have the right to kill you, because you urged the people against 'Uthmān." Mu'āwiya then ordered Ibn 'Abbās to hurry to the mosque of Medina to curse those who had killed 'Uthmān and to pay homage to Yazīd publicly.⁴¹

Mu'āwiya also accused Ibn Ja'far of doing "bad things," although he did not mention them. In his letter to Ibn Ja'far, Mu'āwiya wrote, "Bad things reached me from you; if you pay homage to Yazīd you will be thanked for that, otherwise you will be forced."⁴²

Mu'āwiya wrote to al-Ḥusayn stating that, "many unexpected things reached me about you," but he was reluctant to name them. He asked al-Ḥusayn to keep his *bay'at* to him and warned al-Ḥusayn not to cut off his relationship with him by refusing to acknowledge Yazīd's succession.⁴³

⁴¹ Ibid., 1:178.

⁴² Ibid. 1:179.

⁴³ Ibid.

Finally, Mu^cāwīya sent a poem to Ibn al-Zubayr, warning him of a bad fate if he continued his opposition to Yazīd's caliphate.⁴⁴

Mu^cāwīya's intention was to threaten the prominent nobles of Medina and to force them to accept Yazīd's succession, so that if they did so, the people of Medina would follow them and pay homage to Yazīd. Did Mu^cāwīya succeed in his endeavor? All these prominent persons responded to Mu^cāwīya individually, defending themselves and expressing their refusal to accept his decision. The first one who answered Mu^cāwīya was Ibn ʿAbbās, who denied that he had participated in ʿUthman's killing, contending that he was more angry about his assassination than anyone else, whereas "you were absent from that event."⁴⁵

Ibn Ja^cfar wrote to Mu^cāwīya: "As for your saying that you will force me to acknowledge Yazīd's succession, indeed, we forced you and your father to accept Islam until both of you entered it reluctantly."⁴⁶ In his turn, Ibn al-Zubayr sent a poem to Mu^cāwīya, describing him as an unjust man and telling him that he was too strong to be afraid of his threats.⁴⁷

Al-Ḥusayn's letter to Mu^cāwīya deserves special attention. Ibn Sa^cd and al-Dīnawarī narrate that after al-Ḥasan's death in 50/670, a group of prominent Kūfan leaders visited al-Ḥusayn in Medina. Marwān Ibn al-Ḥakam, the governor of Medina at the time, informed Mu^cāwīya about the danger of these meetings. Upon hearing this, Mu^cāwīya wrote to al-Ḥusayn, threatening him and reminding him to hold his *bayʿa*. Then al-Ḥusayn wrote his letter to Mu^cāwīya. However, both Ibn Sa^cd and al-Dīnawarī

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 1: 179-180.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 1: 180.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

abbreviated al-Ḥusayn's letter and ignored many important points, which were narrated by other sources.⁴⁸

Al-Balādhurī, on the other hand, narrates that some people from Iraq and the elite nobility from Ḥijāz used to visit al-Ḥusayn frequently in 51/671, asking him to be their leader. They did not suspect that the people would choose al-Ḥusayn as the new caliph after Mu'āwiya's death. When 'Amr Ibn 'Uthmān Ibn 'Affān noticed their frequent meetings with al-Ḥusayn, he warned Marwān about the danger of these meetings. Marwān then wrote to Mu'āwiya informing him of the critical situation. Mu'āwiya wrote to al-Ḥusayn, warning him against any rebellion or opposition. In his letter to Mu'āwiya, al-Ḥusayn condemned Mu'āwiya's action of adopting Ziyād as his bastard brother and killing Ḥujr.⁴⁹

On the other hand, Ibn Qutayba reports that al-Ḥusayn sent his letter to Mu'āwiya when the latter wanted to secure allegiance from the people of Medina for Yazīd and when Sa'īd Ibn al-'Āṣ was the governor of Medina. A full account of this letter, similar to al-Balādhurī's version with some additions, is recorded by Ibn Qutayba. In the beginning of his letter, al-Ḥusayn advises Mu'āwiya not to listen to those hypocrites and liars who are seeking trouble. Al-Ḥusayn confirms that he is not willing to fight Mu'āwiya or oppose him, although he has all the right to fight Mu'āwiya and his party: "the unjust party and the supporters of the *shayṭān*." He reminds Mu'āwiya of his criminal conduct and his deviation from Islamic codes, writing:

Are you not the one who killed Ḥujr and his pious companions, those who order good (*ma'rūf*) and forbid evil (*munkar*)? You killed them after you

⁴⁸ Ibn Sa'd, *Maqtal al-Ḥusayn*, pp. 53-4. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 224. In his account, Ibn Sa'd reports that the Kūfans asked al-Ḥusayn to break his *bay'at* to Mu'āwiya, but he refused.

⁴⁹ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 128-30. Al-Ḥusayn's letter, according to al-Balādhurī's account, was mentioned earlier.

gave them a guarantee that they would not be followed and executed. You did this only because you did not respect God's covenant. Are you not the one who killed ʿAmr Ibn al-Ḥamiq al-Khuzāʿī after you granted him a safe-conduct? Are you not the one who adopted Ziyād, who was born on ʿUbayd's bed, as your bastard brother? You claimed that Ziyād was the son of your father, Abū Sufyān, and deviated from the Sunna of the Prophet, which stipulated that the child should belong to his father's bed. Are you not the killer of al-Ḥāḍramī, because he followed the religion of ʿAlī, which is the same religion as his cousin Muḥammad's? And because of this religion, you acquired your position... Be aware of the fact that Allāh would not forget your killing of the innocents and your nomination of a child [Yazīd], who drinks wine and plays with dogs..."⁵⁰

When the letters of al-Ḥusayn, Ibn ʿAbbas, Ibn Jaʿfar and Ibn al-Zubayr reached Muʿāwiya, he instructed his governor in Medina, Saʿīd, to ask all the people of Medina to pay homage to Yazīd, excluding none of the Muhājirūn (emigrants), the Anṣār (helpers) or their descendants. Despite his rudeness, Saʿīd failed for the second time to force the Medinans to pay homage to Yazīd and wrote to Muʿāwiya, informing him that they followed the decision of the prominent nobles in refusing to recognize Yazīd.⁵¹ After his failure to impose Yazīd's *bayʿa* on the people of Medina, Muʿāwiya realized that Yazīd's succession could not be completed without the acknowledgement of the nobles of Medina and that this would not happen unless he came to Medina himself. Khalīfa tells us that Muʿāwiya brought with him one thousand soldiers from Damascus⁵² and Ibn Qutayba states that Muʿāwiya reached Medina accompanied by a great number of the Syrian people.⁵³ This indicates that Muʿāwiya intended to threaten the people of Medina and the four nobles and even to force them to pay homage to Yazīd by bringing such numerous troops from Damascus.

⁵⁰ Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 180-1.

⁵¹ Ibid., 1: 182.

⁵² Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 160.

⁵³ Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 183.

According to Ibn A^ctham, as soon as Mu^cāwiya reached Medina, the four persons came to meet him in the outskirts, but he confronted them with a very harsh manner and threatened them with severe punishment if they insisted on their refusal to swear allegiance to Yazīd.⁵⁴

Mu^cāwiya in 56/676 entered the mosque and delivered a sermon, emphasizing his decision to nominate Yazīd as his successor, and confirming that he did not see any deficiency in Yazīd and that nobody was more qualified than he for the caliphate.⁵⁵ When ʿĀ'isha, one of the prominent wives of the Prophet and a very influential person in Medina, heard that Mu^cāwiya intended to impose Yazīd's succession on the people of Medina and had threatened the sons of the Ṣaḥāba into acknowledging him, she came to him and said, "Was it not enough for you that you killed my brother Muḥammad and burned his body?"⁵⁶ She also condemned Mu^cāwiya for threatening the sons of the Prophet's Companions and forcing them to pay homage to Yazīd, stating that, "Now you come to Medina to do harm to the sons of the Ṣaḥāba of the Prophet, whereas you are from those who were set free (*ṭulaqā*) by the Prophet and had no right to the caliphate." Finally, she threatened him with death in revenge for her brother. ʿĀ'isha continued, "I have been told that you are threatening my brother ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, Ibn ʿUmar, my nephew, Ibn al-Zubayr and al-Ḥusayn the son of Fāṭima, the daughter of the Prophet. You have no right to do so."⁵⁷ According to Ibn A^ctham, Mu^cāwiya tried to apologize to her,

⁵⁴ Ibn A^ctham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 339-40. In his account, Khalīfa mentions only Ibn al-Zubayr, Ibn ʿUmar and Ibn Abī Bakr. Khalīfa, *Ta'rikh*, p. 160.

⁵⁵ Ibid. Ibn A^ctham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 341.

⁵⁶ Mu^cāwiya killed Muḥammad Ibn Abī Bakr and burned his body when the latter was ʿAlī's governor of Egypt. See, for instance, al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 1: 230.

⁵⁷ Ibn A^ctham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 341. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 183.

explaining that all Muslims had paid homage to Yazīd and, therefore, he could not revoke this completed *bayʿa*, but ʿĀʾisha denied his claim.⁵⁸

In her condemnation of Muʿāwīya, ʿĀʾisha focused on three points: that he had no right to the caliphate, that he had killed innocents, which entailed punishment and revenge, and that he intended to force the sons of the Prophet's Companions, who were more entitled to the caliphate than he, to acknowledge the succession of Yazīd, who had no right to it.

Ibn Qutayba and al-Ṭabarī relate that Muʿāwīya tried to win over the five sons of the Ṣaḥāba: Ibn ʿAbbās, Ibn ʿUmar, Ibn al-Zubayr, Ibn Abī Bakr and al-Ḥusayn by deceiving them. He met each one of them individually beginning with al-Ḥusayn and confirmed to them that all the people of Medina had pledged allegiance to Yazīd except the noble persons. Each of them, except Ibn Abī Bakr, confirmed to Muʿāwīya his readiness to pay homage to Yazīd if the rest of the nobles did so.⁵⁹ This account contradicts all other accounts, even those of Ibn Qutayba and al-Ṭabarī, as we will see, that al-Ḥusayn and Ibn al-Zubayr refused to acknowledge Yazīd until the end of their lives. Besides, although Ibn Qutayba and al-Ṭabarī mention five nobles, only four of them met with Muʿāwīya; Ibn ʿAbbās was ignored.

In fact, Ibn Qutayba contradicts himself, for he relates that on the next day, Muʿāwīya summoned Ibn ʿAbbās and al-Ḥusayn. When he described Yazīd's merits and his entitlement to the caliphate, al-Ḥusayn rejected Muʿāwīya's statement and Yazīd's entitlement to the caliphate. Al-Ḥusayn started to argue that Yazīd was violating Islamic practices and he condemned Muʿāwīya for deceiving the people by nominating Yazīd as

⁵⁸ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 341.

⁵⁹ Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 183-84. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4:225-6.

his successor. Al-Ḥusayn also condemned Mu'āwiya for his endeavor to keep him (al-Ḥusayn) from his right to the caliphate.⁶⁰

Ibn A'ṭham, on the other hand, narrates that Mu'āwiya, while he was in Medina, decided to meet with the four nobles individually, in order to listen to their objections and to persuade them to acknowledge Yazīd's succession. He then sent for Ibn Abī Bakr, Ibn al-Zubayr and Ibn 'Umar, but he was told that they had all left for Mecca.⁶¹ They perhaps left Medina because they were afraid that Mu'āwiya might take severe action against them in case they showed any protest, especially when we remember that Mu'āwiya had come to Medina with a huge group of Syrian troops.

According to Ibn A'ṭham, Mu'āwiya, while he was in Medina, did not send for al-Ḥusayn, but rather complained to Ibn 'Abbās about al-Ḥusayn's objection to Yazīd's nomination. Realizing that Mu'āwiya might force al-Ḥusayn to submit to his decision, Ibn 'Abbās advised Mu'āwiya to avoid doing any harm to al-Ḥusayn, otherwise he "would be harmed by all the people of the earth."⁶² Having failed to secure Yazīd's succession from the prominent nobles in Medina by threats, Mu'āwiya in 56/676 decided to set off to Mecca with his troops.

Mu'āwiya's main task was to persuade the four nobles, especially al-Ḥusayn, to acknowledge Yazīd's nomination by utilizing different devices. Ibn A'ṭham tells us that when Mu'āwiya reached Mecca, its people came forward to meet him, including the four nobles. At Mecca, Mu'āwiya changed his attitude towards them and tried to win them

⁶⁰ Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 184-5.

⁶¹ Ibn A'ṭham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 342.

⁶² Ibid.

over by treating them kindly and granting them some gifts; nevertheless, al-Ḥusayn refused to receive Mu'āwiya's gift.⁶³

For a short period of time, Mu'āwiya did not mention Yazīd's succession, but then decided to accomplish his task by meeting each of the four nobles individually, trying to treat them leniently and thus persuade them. This time, Mu'āwiya first sent for al-Ḥusayn, informing him that all the provinces had paid homage to Yazīd and telling him that he had left the people of Medina to the last, because they were Yazīd's root and tribe, and they would not object to his succession. Mentioning al-Ḥusayn and the other prominent nobles who had objected to Yazīd's succession, Mu'āwiya said that some people, who were not better than Yazīd, had refused to acknowledge his succession, and explained his decision in choosing Yazīd as his successor by stating, "If I knew that there was somebody better than Yazīd for the benefit of the Community of the Prophet I would not nominate Yazīd."⁶⁴

Al-Ḥusayn objected to Mu'āwiya's viewpoint, emphasizing that there were many nobles, whom Mu'āwiya ignored, who were of better descent and breed than Yazīd. Mu'āwiya admitted that al-Ḥusayn's mother was better than Yazīd's mother and that al-Ḥusayn's father had merits in Islam and a closer relationship to the Prophet than anybody else, but he denied that al-Ḥusayn was more qualified than Yazīd. Mentioning Yazīd's unsuitability for the caliphate and his corruption, al-Ḥusayn replied, "How can Yazīd, who drinks wine and commits debauchery, be in the best interest of the Muslim community?"⁶⁵ According to Ibn A'ṭham, Mu'āwiya ended his discussion with al-Ḥusayn by resorting to another device. As mentioned earlier, Mu'āwiya did not come alone from

⁶³ Ibid., 2: 342-3.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 2: 343-4. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 188-9.

⁶⁵ Ibid. According to Ibn Qutayba, this discussion took place in Medina. Ibn A'ṭham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 343-4.

Damascus; he brought with him an army of one thousand soldiers in order to consolidate his power and threaten those who objected to his decisions. Therefore, he threatened al-Ḥusayn with death at the hands of these soldiers who were “your enemy and your father’s enemy,” in case al-Ḥusayn refused to acknowledge Yazīd.⁶⁶

Ibn Qutayba, on the other hand, narrates that Mu‘āwiya defended his decision in nominating Yazīd by stating that, before his death, the Prophet did not nominate a successor and that the Muslims paid homage to Abū Bakr; the latter acted according to the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet. Before his death, Abū Bakr nominated ‘Umar as his successor and he followed the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet. Before ‘Umar’s death, the caliphate was subjected to a *shūrā* among six nominated Companions, according to ‘Umar’s instructions. Mu‘āwiya argued that Abū Bakr did not follow the Prophet’s conduct and ‘Umar did not follow in the footsteps of Abū Bakr; they followed their own discretion only, for the benefit of the community. Mu‘āwiya, therefore, concluded that despite people’s disapproval of Yazīd’s succession, he would follow his own discretion and nominate Yazīd only for the sake of the community.⁶⁷

Expressing these opinions about the caliphate, Mu‘āwiya perhaps was trying to draw a new picture of Yazīd’s conduct and affirm to the people that Yazīd would rule himself according to the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet, and that his caliphate required only their acknowledgment to be legitimate. But the question is: Did Mu‘āwiya succeed in persuading the sons of the Ṣaḥāba to draw new picture of Yazīd’s conduct?

When he was presented to Mu‘āwiya, Ibn Abī Bakr confirmed that the matter of the caliphate could not be left to Mu‘āwiya’s own desire to nominate his successor, but rather

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 189.

should be decided by *shūrā*. Ibn Abī Bakr told Mu'āwiya that he would not pay homage to Yazīd, "the one who drinks wine and plays with monkeys."⁶⁸ According to Khalīfa and Ibn Qutayba, Mu'āwiya warned Ibn Abī Bakr against being killed by the Syrian troops.⁶⁹ Al-Ṭabarī also tells us that when Mu'āwiya sent after Ibn Abī Bakr, he reproached him for disobeying his decision. When Ibn Abī Bakr insisted in his refusal to acknowledge Yazīd's succession, Mu'āwiya informed him that he intended to kill him for his objection to his decision.⁷⁰

When Ibn 'Umar was presented to Mu'āwiya, he warned him against disobedience, informing him that the people had paid their allegiance to Yazīd "except your group (*raḥṭ*)." Ibn 'Umar's disagreement with Mu'āwiya was based on the Rightly Guided Caliphs' conduct and he argued that they also had sons, to whom Yazīd was not superior, but they had not nominated any of them. Being a peaceful man who preferred not to go against the community's unity, Ibn 'Umar, nevertheless, asserted to Mu'āwiya that he would not stand against Yazīd's succession if all the people paid homage to him.⁷¹

According to al-Ya'qūbī, Ibn 'Umar refused Mu'āwiya's request to acknowledge Yazīd's succession, protesting that he could not pay homage to a person whose conduct violated Islamic norms.⁷² In fact, Ibn 'Umar was one of the four nobles who refused to acknowledge Yazīd's succession, but probably under Mu'āwiya's threat, he changed his attitude and was ready to give in. This is emphasized by Khalīfa's account where, in one

⁶⁸ Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 344.

⁶⁹ Khalīfa, *Ta'rikh*, p. 161. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 188.

⁷⁰ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 226.

⁷¹ Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 344. Khalīfa, *Ta'rikh*, p. 161. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 187-8.

⁷² Al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 228.

of his speeches at Medina, Mu^cāwiya mentions that he would kill Ibn ^cUmar if he refused to pay homage.⁷³

Reiterating that all Muslims had pledged allegiance to Yazīd, Mu^cāwiya warned Ibn al-Zubayr against instigating a rebellion. Ibn al-Zubayr denied that he was rebellious, warning Mu^cāwiya against establishing a new foundation for the caliphate among Muslims. He advised Mu^cāwiya to follow in the footsteps of the earlier pious men (*al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ*), who had left the caliphate to be decided by *shūrā* among Muslims. Furthermore, Ibn al-Zubayr asked Mu^cāwiya to be God-fearing and to remember that he would be asked about his deeds on the Day of Judgment.⁷⁴ According to Ibn Qutayba, Mu^cāwiya threatened Ibn al-Zubayr with death if he persisted in his refusal to recognize Yazīd's succession.⁷⁵

From these accounts, it is obvious that Mu^cāwiya tried to win over the four nobles but failed. He warned each of them that they would be killed at the hands of the Syrian troops if they persisted in opposing Yazīd's nomination. Except for Ibn ^cUmar who, under Mu^cāwiya's threat, expressed his readiness to pay homage to Yazīd if all the people swore allegiance to him; the other three sons of the Ṣaḥāba persisted in their belief that Yazīd was not qualified to be caliph, that Mu^cāwiya had no right to nominate his son for this office and that it should be left to be decided by consultation.

Many questions present themselves at this juncture: Did Mu^cāwiya really try to force the sons of the Ṣaḥāba to acknowledge Yazīd's succession, even by threatening them with being killed by the Syrian troops? Did he really intend to kill them if they persisted in their refusal to recognize Yazīd? Or do these reports represent anti-Umayyad sentiment

⁷³ Khalīfa, *Ta'rikh*, p.161.

⁷⁴ Ibn A^ctham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 343-4. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 188-9.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 1: 188.

intending to depict Mu^ʿāwīya as an unjust man who treated the sons of the Prophet's Companions brutally? In response to these questions, two things deserve to be taken into consideration: 1) some of these accounts are narrated by Khalīfa Ibn Khayyāt who habitually reflects a pro-Umayyad viewpoint; 2) we have seen previously that, according to many sources, Sa^ʿd Ibn Abī Waqqāṣ, al-Ḥasan, Mālīk al-Ashtar and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Khālīd Ibn al-Walīd had been killed at the instigation of Mu^ʿāwīya; all of them were killed by poisoned honey. Perhaps Mu^ʿāwīya was not serious in threatening them with death but rather wanted to force them to accept Yazīd's accession. This is true in the case of al-Ḥusayn, as we will see later, but in the case of Ibn al-Zubayr, Mu^ʿāwīya, according to his will to Yazīd, was serious about getting rid of him.

It is also obvious that Mu^ʿāwīya failed to convince the sons of the Ṣaḥāba to accept Yazīd's entitlement to the caliphate or that he would act according to the Book of God, the Sunna of the Prophet and the conduct of the Rightly Guided Caliphs. Therefore, Mu^ʿāwīya tried to force them to pay homage to Yazīd, even by threatening them, in which their *bayʿa* to Yazīd would be binding on them.

Mu^ʿāwīya, however, realized that he had failed to convince the nobles of the Quraysh to acknowledge Yazīd as his successor. This also meant that Mu^ʿāwīya would not be able to win over the people of Mecca and Medina and that Yazīd's succession would not be completed. Therefore, he thought of utilizing some other ways to accomplish his task. He tried to force the Banū Hāshim to comply with his desire. Since al-Ḥusayn was the head of the Banū Hāshim, Mu^ʿāwīya tried to secure his acknowledgement of Yazīd's succession by resorting to his tribe. Ibn ʿAṭham and Ibn Qutayba tell us that while residing in Mecca, Mu^ʿāwīya excluded the Banū Hāshim from receiving his gifts, which

were to be bestowed on the people of Quraysh. When Ibn ʿAbbās asked him about the reason for this exclusion, Muʿāwiyā replied that it was only because al-Ḥusayn had refused to pay homage to Yazīd. Ibn ʿAbbās was not satisfied with Muʿāwiyā's answer, arguing that some other prominent nobles had also refused to acknowledge Yazīd but were not excluded. When he did not receive an answer from Muʿāwiyā, Ibn ʿAbbās warned him that he would incite the people to rise against him if Muʿāwiyā insisted on depriving the Banū Hāshim of his gifts. Realizing the importance of Ibn ʿAbbās's position in both Mecca and Medina, Muʿāwiyā sent some gifts to the Banū Hāshim; al-Ḥusayn, however, refused to accept any of them.⁷⁶

When Muʿāwiyā wanted to leave Mecca, he resorted to another device to convince the four nobles to acknowledge Yazīd's succession. According to Ibn Aʿtham and Khalīfa, Muʿāwiyā asked them to be summoned in his presence and suggested there be a committee of consultation behind Yazīd's caliphate. Muʿāwiyā explained to them that he was not demanding much from them and expressed his desire that they would acknowledge Yazīd as caliph in name only; in fact, they would have the real power of the caliphate.⁷⁷

However, Muʿāwiyā's maneuver did not work with these elites. They expressed their refusal to comply with Muʿāwiyā's suggestion. Perhaps they realized that Muʿāwiyā was not serious and that, therefore, he would not fulfill his promise; his intention was to do away with their objections to Yazīd's succession. They also realized that Muʿāwiyā intended to deviate from the conduct of the Prophet and the Rightly-Guided example and transfer the caliphate to kinship. Therefore, Ibn al-Zubayr insisted that Muʿāwiyā should

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 191. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 343.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 2: 346. Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, pp. 163-4. 163.

follow the example of the Prophet, who left the issue of the caliphate to be decided by the Community, or the example of Abū Bakr, who nominated ʿUmar, other than his son, or the example of ʿUmar, who left the caliphate to be decided by *shūrā*, ignoring his son and his family. When Muʿāwiya asked the opinions of the other three nobles, they all agreed with Ibn al-Zubayr.⁷⁸

Muʿāwiya's maneuvers to convince the sons of Ṣaḥāba to accept his decision failed once more, and, therefore, he decided to resort to one last device; namely, the sword and deception. This time 56/676, Muʿāwiya decided to force the four nobles to accept his decision publicly. Before leaving Mecca, he intended to deliver a final speech on the pulpit. He summoned the four nobles and warned them not to disavow his statement; otherwise, their fate would be in the hands of the Syrian troops. Muʿāwiya is said to have assigned to each of the four nobles two armed Syrian soldiers, ordering his soldiers to behead whoever objected to his decision.

When the people were assembled in the mosque, Muʿāwiya declared, "These four people, mentioning to the four sons of the Ṣaḥāba, are the masters of the Muslims and they have accepted Yazīd's nomination." In order to silence anyone who might oppose Muʿāwiya's speech and to threaten the people (including the four persons), a group of Syrian soldiers then stood up and asked Muʿāwiya to allow them to behead the four nobles, but Muʿāwiya refused. Muʿāwiya's maneuver worked this time and the people, thinking that the four nobles had agreed to swear allegiance to Yazīd, started to pay homage to him.⁷⁹ In order to silence any sound of objection that might arise from the four nobles, Muʿāwiya probably instructed his soldiers to threaten them and to acquire

⁷⁸ Ibid. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 346.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 2: 351-2. Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 164. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 190.

permission from him to behead them. It is clear that Mu^ʿāwīya brought such a great army with him from Damascus only to facilitate his task in nominating Yazīd.

The four persons, however, declared to the people that they disagreed with Mu^ʿāwīya's decision to nominate Yazīd. When the people asked them about the reason why they did not object to Mu^ʿāwīya's statement, the four nobles, according to Ibn A^ʿtham, explained that the red death (*al-mawt al-aḥmar*) was in front of their eyes; namely, in the swords of the Syrian soldiers.⁸⁰ When the people of Mecca blamed al-Ḥusayn for paying homage to Yazīd after he had refused to acknowledge his accession, he denied this, swearing by God that he had not recognized Yazīd.⁸¹

Khalīfa also tells us that it was circulated among the people that Ibn ^ʿUmar, Ibn al-Zubayr and Ibn Abī Bakr had paid homage to Yazīd, but the latter denied that.⁸² According to Khalīfa's account then, not only al-Ḥusayn refused to recognize Yazīd's succession, but also Ibn Abī Bakr. Khalīfa states that it was only a rumor circulated among the people that some nobles had accepted Yazīd's succession.

Ibn Qutayba narrates that, before leaving Mecca, Mu^ʿāwīya distributed a lot of money among the people.⁸³ In doing this, Mu^ʿāwīya wanted to buy their silence and suppress any opposition to his decision. He utilized the same device with Sa^ʿīd Ibn ^ʿUthmān Ibn ^ʿAffān who, being the son of the third Caliph, believed that he was more qualified for the caliphate than Yazīd. He is said to have disputed with Mu^ʿāwīya about the reason why he, Sa^ʿīd, had not been nominated as his successor instead of Yazīd. Sa^ʿīd argued that his parents were better than Yazīd's and that he was superior to Yazīd.

⁸⁰ Ibn A^ʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 352.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Khalīfa, *Ta'rikh*, p. 161.

⁸³ Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 191.

Mu^ʿāwīya admitted that Sa^ʿīd's father was better than Yazīd's but refused to admit that he was better than Yazīd. However, Mu^ʿāwīya won him over and bought his silence by nominating him as governor of Khurāsān.⁸⁴

Did Mu^ʿāwīya succeed in persuading the people of Mecca and Medina and the four nobles to pay homage to Yazīd? Was Yazīd's succession assured when Mu^ʿāwīya announced that the four nobles of Quraysh had paid homage to Yazīd? Was al-Ḥusayn satisfied with this *bayʿa*? As mentioned earlier, al-Ḥusayn, according to many sources, continued to protest against Yazīd's nomination and against Mu^ʿāwīya's severe measures against the followers of ʿAlī. Some people of Ḥijāz and Kūfa, who believed in his entitlement to the caliphate, continued to visit al-Ḥusayn, urging him to rise against Mu^ʿāwīya, but he refused.

Despite the fact that Mu^ʿāwīya utilized many ploys to force the people of Mecca and Medina, especially the four prominent nobles, to acknowledge Yazīd's succession, he actually failed. Even when he tried to deceive the people by falsely claiming that the four nobles had paid homage to Yazīd, he did not succeed. Mu^ʿāwīya may have believed that he had succeeded in his mission and that the acknowledgment of Yazīd had been completed, but he was wrong. If it had been so, Yazīd, upon becoming caliph, would not have had to demand that the four nobles pledge allegiance to him and then take the same measures as his father in order to consolidate his caliphate, as we will see in the next part of this chapter.

In spite of Mu^ʿāwīya's threats, Ibn Abī Bakr insisted on his refusal to recognize Yazīd's accession to the caliphate up to his death.⁸⁵ As we will see, al-Ḥusayn and Ibn al-

⁸⁴ Ibid., 1: 191-2. Ibn A^ʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 309-10. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 226-7.

Zubayr refused to pay homage to Yazīd until the last moments of their lives. Ibn ʿUmar was the only one of the four nobles who was ready to acknowledge Yazīd's succession, although he expressed his opinion that Yazīd was not qualified for the caliphate, and, as mentioned previously, he did so only when he was threatened by Muʿāwiya.

⁸⁵ Ibn Qutayba tells us that Ibn Abī Bakr died under blurred circumstances soon after Muʿāwiy's departure from Medina. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 191. The question that presents itself here is: What was the reason behind Ibn Abī Bakr's death and did Muʿāwiy play any role in it?

Part Two: Yazīd's Demand for Allegiance

We have seen, in part one of this chapter, that Mu^ʿāwiyā utilized various devices in order to secure Yazīd's succession. The most important persons for him were the sons of the prominent Companions of the Prophet, who persisted that Yazīd was not entitled to the caliphate. Mu^ʿāwiyā failed to persuade them to acknowledge Yazīd's succession, even by force. They refused to submit to Mu^ʿāwiy's desire because of Yazīd's violating of Islamic codes and his lack of qualifications for the caliphate. In fact, Mu^ʿāwiyā, as mentioned earlier, did not fulfill his promises when he nominated his son for the caliphate because after Mu^ʿāwiyā's death, according to the truce between Mu^ʿāwiyā and al-Ḥasan, the caliphate should have reverted to al-Ḥasan or to have been decided by *shūrā*. Surprisingly enough, Mu^ʿāwiyā asked al-Ḥusayn, who had honored his brother's agreement by not breaking his *bayʿa* to Mu^ʿāwiyā and by not complying with the Kūfans' call to rise against Mu^ʿāwiyā, to keep his promises, although Mu^ʿāwiyā himself had broken his.

Mu^ʿāwiyā was fully aware of the outstanding position of al-Ḥusayn among the people of Ḥijāz and Kūfa, and, having failed to secure his acknowledgment of Yazīd's succession, Mu^ʿāwiyā warned his son of this danger. Since the Kūfans had called al-Ḥusayn to rise against Mu^ʿāwiyā and since al-Ḥusayn refused to acknowledge Yazīd's succession, Mu^ʿāwiyā had no doubt that, after his death, the Kūfans would call al-Ḥusayn to rise against Yazīd. Not only al-Ḥusayn, but also Ibn Zubayr and Ibn Abī Bakr had refused to recognize Yazīd. Therefore, Mu^ʿāwiyā, before his death, wrote his will to

Yazīd, warning him of the danger from those nobles and the consequences of their protest:

O my son, I have spared you the effort, made things smooth for you, subdued your enemies for you, subjected the necks of the Arabs for you, and created unity for you. I am only afraid that four individuals of Quraysh might challenge you for this matter [the caliphate] which was established for you-- al-Ḥusayn Ibn ʿAlī, ʿAbd Allāh Ibn ʿUmar, ʿAbd Allāh Ibn al-Zubayr, and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Abī Bakr. As far as ʿAbd Allāh Ibn ʿUmar is concerned, he is a man whom righteousness has overwhelmed, and if no one else were left, he would acknowledge you. As far as al-Ḥusayn is concerned, the people of Iraq will not leave him alone until they make him rebel. If he rebels against you, and you should defeat him, then pardon him, because he has close kinship and a great claim. As far as Ibn Abī Bakr is concerned, he is a man, who, if he should see his companions doing something, he would do likewise. He is only interested in women and pleasure. As for the one who crouches for you as a crouching lion and tricks you as a sly fox, and if an opportunity enables [him] he would spring, that is ʿAbd Allāh Ibn al-Zubayr. If he does that to you, and you are able to overpower him, then tear him limb from limb.⁸⁶

Muʿāwiyah's will deserves attention. It is clear from it that his efforts to secure the approval of the four prominent nobles had not been successful, even though he had forced them to keep silent and had announced to the people that they had paid homage to Yazīd. Muʿāwiyah was still anxious that they would persist in refusing Yazīd's caliphate. Ibn ʿUmar and Ibn Abī Bakr in Muʿāwiyah's viewpoint posed no danger to Yazīd; the former was a man of peace, and had no aspiration to the caliphate, and the latter had occupied himself with women and enjoyment. In fact, Ibn ʿUmar had expressed to Muʿāwiyah his readiness to swear allegiance to Yazīd if all the people were to acknowledge his caliphate.

Realizing that Ibn al-Zubayr aspired to the caliphate, Muʿāwiyah predicted that he would not give up resisting Yazīd and would attack him whenever he had a chance to do

⁸⁶ Al-Ṭabarī, *The Caliphate of Muʿāwiyah. The History of al-Ṭabarī (Taʾrīkh al-Rusul wal-Mulūk)*. XVIII, Translated and annotated by Michael G. Morony, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987, p. 209. The content of Muʿāwiyah's will is also narrated by al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 226. A similar account to al-Ṭabarī's is recorded by Ibn Aʿtham with some additions. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 2: 351-2.

so. Mu'āwiya believed that Ibn al-Zubayr was very dangerous for Yazīd and that the only way to deal with his protest was to give him no chance and attack him brutally in order to get rid of the danger. It is very understandable that Mu'āwiya was ready to assassinate anyone who objected to his desires and stood against Yazīd's caliphate, as he had done with al-Ḥasan and Sa'd Ibn Abī Waqqāṣ. Mu'āwiya perhaps believed that Ibn al-Zubayr's killing constituted no harm to Yazīd's caliphate and, therefore, did not take Ibn al-Zubayr's kinship into consideration.

The real danger for Yazīd was al-Ḥusayn because of his outstanding place among the people and his relationship to the Prophet. Mu'āwiya had also received the news that, after al-Ḥasan's death, the Kūfans expressed their readiness to pay homage to al-Ḥusayn and had called him to rise against Mu'āwiya, but that al-Ḥusayn had asked them to wait until Mu'āwiya's death. Based on all these considerations Mu'āwiya had no doubt that, after his death, the Kūfans would reject Yazīd's caliphate, call al-Ḥusayn to rise against Yazīd and swear allegiance to him as their caliph.

The question here is: Was Mu'āwiya's reason, when he advised Yazīd not to do harm to al-Ḥusayn, because of al-Ḥusayn's relationship to the Prophet? If Mu'āwiya's intention was to protect al-Ḥusayn's dignity, the questions here are: Why did Mu'āwiya poison al-Ḥasan, who had the same relationship to the Prophet as his brother al-Ḥusayn? Why did Mu'āwiya not consider Ibn al-Zubayr's relationship to the Prophet, even though it was not close like al-Ḥusayn's? Perhaps Mu'āwiya realized that the killing of al-Ḥusayn would entail a very severe consequence for Yazīd's caliphate and would put Yazīd in a serious situation. Therefore, in order to protect Yazīd from this risk, Mu'āwiya advised him to deal with al-Ḥusayn gently.

Did Yazīd follow his father's will and advice, especially with regard to al-Ḥusayn? Did he intend to deal with al-Ḥusayn kindly, even if he refused to acknowledge his caliphate? In fact, Yazīd did not adhere to his father's will or listen to his advice, as we will see soon.

Ibn Aʿtham narrates that Yazīd was not in Damascus when he received the news of his father's death. When he arrived there, his intention was to prepare the Syrians for a confrontation with the Iraqi people, declaring, "We are the people of justice and the supporters of the religion." He also informed them that there would be a war between him and the Iraqi people, claiming that he saw in his dream a river of blood which he could not pass until ʿUbayd Allāh Ibn Ziyād, the governor of Baṣra, "came and passed it before me while I was looking at him." Hearing this statement the Syrians expressed their readiness and willingness to fight against whomever he wanted to fight.⁸⁷

From his father's will, Yazīd had no doubt that the Kūfans would call al-Ḥusayn to rise against him. In order to prepare himself for a confrontation against the people of Iraq, Yazīd wanted to test the loyalty of the Syrians, the real supporters of his power, and their readiness to fight against the Iraqi people. For this reason, perhaps either Yazīd created the story about the dream or the historians did.

Ibn Aʿtham also reports that Yazīd wrote to his deputies in all the provinces, ordering them to take the oath of allegiance from the people. The Syrians not only swore allegiance to him, but also acknowledged his son, Muʿāwiya (d. 64/683), as his successor. Grateful for their allegiance, Yazīd bestowed money on them.⁸⁸ It is clear that

⁸⁷ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 6. See also al-Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2: 241.

⁸⁸ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 7-8.

Mu^cāwīya's plan to transform the caliphate to be inherited within his family had worked out, at least in Damascus, the seat of the Umayyad authorities.

Even though the Syrians paid homage to Yazīd, his caliphate could not be consolidated and its legitimacy would not be secured unless the people of Mecca and Medina acknowledged him, especially, the prominent nobles in Medina. In fact, Yazīd's first concern after his accession to the caliphate was to take allegiance from the four nobles.⁸⁹ Moreover, he feared that the Iraqi people would refuse to acknowledge his caliphate and would rise against him as long as al-Ḥusayn disapproved of it. Yazīd was not unaware of the fact that al-Ḥusayn would refuse to comply with his call, as he already had in Mu^cāwīya's lifetime, and, therefore, spared no time in obtaining his approval. Therefore, Yazīd attempted to get al-Ḥusayn's concession by force and he did not follow his father's instructions to deal with al-Ḥusayn kindly.

How did Yazīd deal with the prominent nobles in Medina in order to secure their allegiance? In his very brief account and contrary to other accounts, Ibn Sa^cd maintains that Yazīd wrote to his new governor in Medina, al-Walīd Ibn ^cUtba Ibn Abī Sufyān (d. 75/694), instructing him to treat al-Ḥusayn and Ibn al-Zubayr kindly when taking the *bay^ca* from them.⁹⁰ Ibn Sa^cd perhaps wanted to eliminate any responsibility from Yazīd and put the blame on al-Walīd in case he committed any harm to al-Ḥusayn. Ibn Sa^cd narrates that al-Walīd insulted al-Ḥusayn and fought with him when he refused to pay homage to Yazīd.⁹¹ In addition to the fact that Ibn Sa^cd's account is not supported by any other sources, it is unlikely that al-Walīd would oppose Yazīd's orders and not follow his instructions by dealing with al-Ḥusayn cruelly.

⁸⁹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 250.

⁹⁰ Ibn Sa^cd, *Maqtal al-Ḥusayn*, p. 55.

⁹¹ Ibid.

Al-Ṭabarī, al-Balādhurī and al-Dīnawarī narrate that Yazīd wrote to al-Walīd, informing him of Muʿāwiyā's death and a small parchment attachment instructed his governor to seize al-Ḥusayn, Ibn al-Zubayr and Ibn ʿUmar, to deal with them brutally and to give them no respite until they paid homage to Yazīd.⁹²

Ibn Aʿtham concurs with the above-mentioned sources that Yazīd attached a small parchment to his letter to al-Walīd, but disagrees with its contents. He reports that Yazīd ordered al-Walīd to take allegiance from the four nobles and to behead whoever refused to submit.⁹³ However, it is unlikely that Yazīd would have ordered his governor to decapitate Ibn ʿUmar and Ibn Abī Bakr, since they constituted no danger to Yazīd's caliphate, according to Muʿāwiyā's depiction. If Yazīd had ordered his governor to behead some of the nobles, he would have certainly specified al-Ḥusayn and Ibn al-Zubayr, the most dangerous opponents to his caliphate. This interpretation might be supported by al-Yaʿqūbī's account that Yazīd ordered al-Walīd to seize and behead al-Ḥusayn and Ibn al-Zubayr at once if they refused to give the *bayʿa* to him.⁹⁴

The question that presents itself here is: Why did Yazīd send a small parchment to al-Walīd, instructing him about how to deal with al-Ḥusayn and Ibn al-Zubayr, rather than stating this in his original letter? Yazīd must have given a special instruction to al-Walīd in regard to taking homage from al-Ḥusayn and Ibn al-Zubayr. He perhaps did not want to expose the contents of the small parchment publicly but rather keep it a secret between him and his governor in order to bear no responsibility if al-Walīd followed his instructions and beheaded them. Yazīd, therefore, would easily be able to announce to the

⁹² Al-Ṭabarī, on the authority of Abū Mikhnaf, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 250. Al-Balādhurī, on the authority of Abū Mikhnaf, ʿAwāna and others, *Ansāb*, 5:313. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 227.

⁹³ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3:9.

⁹⁴ Al-Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2: 241. In his references to this report, Jafri wrongly mentions al-Balādhurī and al-Ṭabarī. In fact, neither of them narrates this account. See Jafri, *The Origins*, p. 176.

public that he had ordered al-Walīd not to commit any harm to al-Ḥusayn and Ibn al-Zubayr, but that al-Walīd had not followed his instructions and, therefore, was the only one responsible for this crime.

The news of Mu'āwiya's death and Yazīd's orders with respect to the four nobles weighed heavily on the new governor. He therefore sought help from the former governor of Medina, Marwān Ibn al-Ḥakam, in spite of the enmity between them.⁹⁵ Marwān advised him to call for al-Ḥusayn and Ibn al-Zubayr before they learned about Mu'āwiya's death and execute them if they refused to pay homage to Yazīd. If they learn of Mu'āwiya's death, Marwān explained, "Each of them will rise up from a different direction, proclaim opposition, and summon men to himself."⁹⁶

Many points of this account deserve attention. First, it is obvious that al-Walīd was worried about the consequences of following Yazīd's commands; otherwise, he would not have had consulted anybody in fulfilling the orders of the caliph. Second, it is unlikely that Marwān, who had been dismissed from his office by the caliph and who needed to keep Yazīd contented, would oppose Yazīd's instructions by suggesting to al-Walīd that he behead al-Ḥusayn and Ibn al-Zubayr in case they persisted in their refusal to give their *bay'at* to Yazīd. Third, Ibn 'Umar and Ibn Abī Bakr, according to Mu'āwiya's will, constituted no danger for Yazīd's caliphate and, therefore, should not have been included in Yazīd's attached letter. These considerations give more credibility to al-Ya'qūbī's account that Yazīd had ordered al-Walīd to behead al-Ḥusayn and Ibn al-Zubayr in case they refused to pay homage to him and that Marwān was just following his orders.

⁹⁵ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 250. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 313-4. Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 9. In his account, Ibn A'tham tells us that Marwān was deprived of his office by Yazīd's orders and was replaced by al-Walīd.

⁹⁶ Al-Ṭabarī, on the authority of Abū Mikhnaf, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 250-1. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 314. Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 9-10. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 227. Al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 241. Al-Ṭabarī and al-Balādhurī include Ibn 'Umar in their report. In his account, Ibn A'tham includes Ibn Abī Bakr also.

However, al-Walīd sent for al-Ḥusayn and Ibn al-Zubayr at an unusual time of the night to be summoned to the governor's palace. Unlike Ibn al-Zubayr, who wanted to escape from Medina, al-Ḥusayn decided to meet the governor. He predicted that he would be asked by the governor to pay homage to Yazīd, as he had told Ibn al-Zubayr when the latter had asked him about his intention. Al-Ḥusayn also realized that he might be seized by the governor's men if he declined to comply with his demand. Therefore, al-Ḥusayn, in order to protect himself from the governor's men in case of serious confrontation, decided to meet the governor accompanied by a strong band of his followers and his household. However, he ordered his followers to stay at the door, instructing them to come in only when they heard his voice rise.⁹⁷

Informing him about the news of Mu'āwiya's death, al-Walīd demanded al-Ḥusayn's immediate recognition of the new caliph. In order to avoid any confrontation with the governor, al-Ḥusayn did not expose his objection to Yazīd's caliphate, telling him that he would not pay homage to Yazīd in private: "When you summon the people to swear allegiance to Yazīd, then call me with them."⁹⁸ Al-Walīd tried to avoid any fight with al-Ḥusayn and was hesitant to confront him because he was acquainted with the dangerous consequences of this conflict. He wanted to deal with al-Ḥusayn peacefully and might have believed that al-Ḥusayn would pay homage to Yazīd in public. Therefore, al-Walīd was satisfied with al-Ḥusayn's suggestion and permitted him to go home without paying homage to Yazīd.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 227. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, p. 251. Ibn A'ṭham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 11. According to Ibn A'ṭham, when he was asked by Ibn al-Zubayr about his intention, al-Ḥusayn declared that he would never pay homage to Yazīd, who violated Islamic norms publicly.

⁹⁸ Ibid. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, pp. 227-8. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 251. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 316-7.

⁹⁹ Ibid. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 251. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, pp. 227-8. Ibn A'ṭham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 13.

Did al-Ḥusayn really feel that a private *bayʿa* was not satisfactory and, therefore, prepare to pay homage in public? It is not clear from al-Ḥusayn's dialogue with the governor that he was prepared to swear allegiance to Yazīd in public; rather, al-Ḥusayn pointed out that he would be summoned with the people, when the governor called them to be summoned. He perhaps intended to announce to the people, in public, that he refused to recognize Yazīd's caliphate, as he had done during Muʿāwiyā's time, thus proclaiming Yazīd's unsuitability for the caliphate and urging them to protest against him.

Al-Ḥusayn's intention not to recognize Yazīd's caliphate is further understood from Marwān's argument with al-Walīd. Marwān rebuked the governor's decision to permit al-Ḥusayn to go home without recognizing Yazīd, explaining that al-Ḥusayn would never pay homage to Yazīd if he left the governor's house. Marwān, who perhaps intended to demonstrate his loyalty and sincerity to Yazīd, advised al-Walīd to seize this opportunity to coerce al-Ḥusayn to submit to Yazīd's orders before leaving the palace. He stated that if al-Ḥusayn left without paying homage, "You will never have the same power over him except by much bloodshed between you and him." Moreover, Marwān asked the governor to imprison al-Ḥusayn and not permit him to leave until he had paid homage to Yazīd or had been beheaded. Hearing this, al-Ḥusayn reproached Marwān for his statement and left without paying homage to Yazīd.¹⁰⁰

According to Ibn Aʿtham, al-Ḥusayn not only censured Marwān for his proclamation, but also disclosed that he would never acknowledge Yazīd's caliphate. Al-Ḥusayn stated,

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 3: 14. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 251-2. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 317. According to al-Balādhurī, the governor also reproached Marwān for his severe statements against al-Ḥusayn.

“We are the family of the Prophet, Yazīd is dissolute, a drunk, and a killer of the innocent; someone like me would never pledge allegiance to someone like him.”¹⁰¹

However, al-Ḥusayn realized that his life was in danger if he persisted in his refusal to pay homage to Yazīd, and, therefore, decided to leave his residence in Medina, taking refuge in Mecca. Al-Ḥusayn’s main reason for leaving Medina was his refusal to submit to recognizing Yazīd’s caliphate; otherwise, he would be exposed to harassment. Al-Ḥusayn’s dangerous situation in Medina is emphasized by Ibn Sa’d. He reports that Yazīd complained to Ibn ‘Abbās about al-Ḥusayn’s refusal to recognize his caliphate and about his correspondence with the Kūfans. Yazīd also requested Ibn ‘Abbās to dissuade al-Ḥusayn from being opposed to him. In response, Ibn ‘Abbās told Yazīd that al-Ḥusayn had taken refuge in Mecca only because of the harassment by Yazīd’s agents. Ibn ‘Abbās, however, promised Yazīd to do his utmost to calm the situation.¹⁰²

Ibn A’tham’s account provides further evidence for the fact that al-Ḥusayn refused to acknowledge Yazīd and that he could not stay in Medina because his life was in danger. Ibn A’tham tells us that when Ibn ‘Umar was in Mecca, he confirmed to al-Ḥusayn that no harm would reach him if he went back to Medina and stayed at his house, even without paying homage to Yazīd. Al-Ḥusayn replied that the Umayyad officials would never leave him alone if he did not pay homage to Yazīd or be killed.¹⁰³

Al-Ḥusayn’s expectation that he would be killed if he refused to recognize Yazīd’s caliphate is also supported by Ibn Muṭī’c’s statement. ‘Abd Allāh Ibn Muṭī’c al-‘Adawī (d. 73/692), a prominent noble in Medina and one of Ibn al-Zubayr’s associates, was imprisoned in Medina by the governor’s men because of Ibn al-Zubayr’s refusal to

¹⁰¹ Ibn A’tham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 14.

¹⁰² Ibn Sa’d, *Maqtal al-Ḥusayn*, pp. 59-60.

¹⁰³ Ibn A’tham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 28-9.

comply with Yazīd's demand. He realized that al-Ḥusayn's life was in danger in Medina and, therefore, advised him to take refuge in Mecca. When he met with al-Ḥusayn, Ibn Muṭīʿ expressed his fear that al-Ḥusayn would be killed at the hands of the Umayyad authorities if he refused to submit to Yazīd's claim and complied with the Kufans' call. Moreover, Ibn Muṭīʿ predicted that al-Ḥusayn's killing would create disastrous consequences for the Muslim community, declaring to al-Ḥusayn that if the Umayyad officials were to kill him "we will become slaves after you."¹⁰⁴

Al-Ḥusayn decided to leave Medina, but before doing that, he wanted to announce the reasons for his decision. Ibn Aʿtham narrates that, before leaving Medina, al-Ḥusayn wrote to his half brother, Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥanafīyya (d. 81/700), who had advised him to stay in Mecca as long as it was secure for him:¹⁰⁵

I have not left my residence out of joy, in gratitude, corruption, or injustice; rather, I have left to seek a reform (*iṣlāḥ*) in the community of my grandfather Muḥammad. I want to command morality (*maʿrūf*) and to forbid wrong (*munkar*) and follow the conduct (*sīra*) of my grandfather, my father, and the rightly Guided Caliphs.¹⁰⁶

According to this account, al-Ḥusayn declared that Yazīd's caliphate would lead to corruption in the Muslim community because of Yazīd's violation of Islamic norms. As the Prophet's grandson, al-Ḥusayn believed that he was committed to following in the footsteps of his grandfather and that he was more responsible than anybody else for preventing corruption. Al-Ḥusayn realized that his responsibility was to call for good and seek reform, not to support corruption through legitimizing Yazīd's caliphate. Therefore, al-Ḥusayn declared that he could not stay in Medina to swear allegiance to Yazīd and

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 3: 25. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 368. Ibn Saʿd, *Maqatal al-Ḥusayn*, p. 56. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 261. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akḥbār*, 228-9.

¹⁰⁵ Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 253. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 22-3.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 3: 23.

decided to leave that city accompanied by most of his household and some of his followers.¹⁰⁷

The governor, al-Walīd, most likely was delighted with al-Ḥusayn's decision to leave Medina because he wanted to avoid confrontation with al-Ḥusayn and, therefore, not be blamed if his blood was shed. However, al-Walīd also needed to prove his loyalty to the caliph. Therefore, he sent many messengers after al-Ḥusayn and Ibn al-Zubayr, summoning them to the governor's palace. It was reported that Ibn al-Zubayr refused to comply with the governor's call, and, therefore, the governor's messengers threatened to kill him. However, Ibn al-Zubayr sent his brother, Ja'far, to ask the governor to stop harassing him and promising that he would bring Ibn al-Zubayr to the governor himself. Al-Walīd accepted Ja'far's intercession and stopped irritating Ibn al-Zubayr. Ibn al-Zubayr seized this opportunity and left Medina with his brother under the cover of night. They avoided the main road for fear of pursuit and headed for Mecca. Following Marwān's advice, the governor sent horsemen in order to pursue Ibn al-Zubayr, but they were not able to find him.¹⁰⁸

As far as Ibn 'Umar is concerned, al-Balādhurī and al-Ṭabarī tell us, on the authority of Abū Mikhanf, that al-Walīd, according to Yazīd's instruction, sent for Ibn 'Umar and asked him to swear allegiance to Yazīd. Ibn 'Umar expressed his readiness to submit to Yazīd's order on the condition that he would do so only after all people had paid their homage to him.¹⁰⁹ According to another account, al-Ṭabarī narrates, on the authority of

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 3: 24. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 317. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 228. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, 4: 253.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 4: 252-3. Ibn A'ṭham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 15-6. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 228. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 314-5.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 5: 316. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, 4: 254.

al-Wāqidī, that Ibn ʿUmar and Ibn ʿAbbās were in Mecca at the time of Muʿāwiyah's death and that they both swore allegiance to Yazīd.¹¹⁰

As for Ibn ʿUmar, there is no reason to doubt that he paid homage to Yazīd since he had confirmed, on many occasions, as mentioned earlier, that he would recognize Yazīd's caliphate when all people had sworn allegiance to him. As for Ibn ʿAbbās, it is unlikely that he paid homage to Yazīd since Ibn ʿAbbās continued to condemn Yazīd's conduct and criticize his offenses against al-Ḥusayn and his family.¹¹¹ It is perhaps for this reason that al-Ṭabarī undermines al-Wāqidī's account by stating, "al-Wāqidī claimed" (*zaʿama al-Wāqidī*).¹¹²

Ibn al-Zubayr, who reached Mecca before al-Ḥusayn, gathered people around him and urged them to stand against Yazīd. Although he had ambition to the caliphate, Ibn al-Zubayr was reported to have been concealing this ambition from the people.¹¹³ As soon as al-Ḥusayn settled in Mecca, the people abandoned Ibn al-Zubayr and gathered around him. Ibn al-Zubayr had realized that the people would not follow him and embrace his aspiration so long as al-Ḥusayn remained in Mecca, because of his outstanding position among people. In their eyes, al-Ḥusayn was more respected and more capable of commanding the people's obedience than Ibn al-Zubayr.¹¹⁴

For this reason, Ibn al-Zubayr started to visit al-Ḥusayn and, unlike some other people who advised al-Ḥusayn to remain in Mecca, recommended that he go to Iraq. Ibn al-Zubayr further recommended that al-Ḥusayn answer his followers' call in Iraq, urging

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 321-22. Al-Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2: 248-50.

¹¹² Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 254.

¹¹³ Ibn Saʿd, *Maqtal al-Ḥusayn*, p. 56.

¹¹⁴ Al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 55-6. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 229. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 261. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 368.

him to fight the tyrannous people, the Umayyad authorities.¹¹⁵ Ibn al-Zubayr was reluctant to see al-Ḥusayn residing in Mecca and his intention was to get rid of him in order to have full control over the Ḥijāz.

Ibn al-Zubayr was anxious about seeing al-Ḥusayn residing in Mecca. His discomfort is further indicated by the story that when al-Ḥusayn decided to leave Mecca, Ibn ʿAbbās said to Ibn al-Zubayr that, after al-Ḥusayn's departure, he would achieve his goal and become master of the Ḥijāz.¹¹⁶ However, Ibn al-Zubayr tried to demonstrate that he was not bothered by al-Ḥusayn's stay in Mecca and that he was even ready to pledge allegiance to al-Ḥusayn. According to Ibn Saʿd and al-Balādhurī, Ibn al-Zubayr confirmed to al-Ḥusayn his entitlement to the caliphate and asserted that if al-Ḥusayn called the people to swear allegiance to himself, all the people of Ḥijāz would comply with his call, including Ibn al-Zubayr.¹¹⁷

It is obvious that Ibn al-Zubayr was aware of the fact that al-Ḥusayn was his only strong rival for the caliphate because of his leading position among the people of Ḥijāz and Kūfa. He also admitted that al-Ḥusayn was more entitled to the caliphate than Yazīd and, because of his kinship to the Prophet, was more entitled than anyone else to fight the Umayyad officials.

Hearing of Muʿāwiya's death and of al-Ḥusayn's refusal to acknowledge Yazīd's caliphate, the Kūfans once again seized the opportunity and called on him to rise against the new caliph. They had no doubt that this time al-Ḥusayn would not disappoint them, since they had followed his advice and waited until Muʿāwiya's death. As soon as they

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 5: 325. Ibn Saʿd, *Maqtal*, p. 56.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 61. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 374.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 3: 375. Ibn Saʿd, *Maqtal*, p. 61.

received the news that al-Ḥusayn had moved to Mecca, the Kūfans gathered in the house of Sulaymān Ibn Ṣurad al-Khuzāʿī (d. 65/684), a Companion of the Prophet and one of the prominent followers of ʿAlī, and held a series of meetings, discussing the new situation and expressing strong support for al-Ḥusayn.¹¹⁸

Knowing that the Kūfans had failed al-Ḥusayn's father and his brother in fighting against Muʿāwīya, Sulaymān wanted to be sure of their loyalty and devotion to him before calling him and exposing him to any danger. He told them that they should write to al-Ḥusayn only if they knew that they would be his helpers and fighters against his enemies and that they should be ready to sacrifice themselves on his behalf. Otherwise, if they feared failure and weakness, they should not "lure the man to risk his own life." They all declared their readiness to fight against al-Ḥusayn's enemies and sacrifice their lives for his sake.¹¹⁹ Most of our sources narrate, with some insignificant differences, that the Kūfans sent out numerous letters and a succession of messengers urging al-Ḥusayn to come to Kūfa to lead them, as they had no Imām other than him.¹²⁰

The first letter that reached al-Ḥusayn was the most important one for him since it was signed by the prominent supporters of ʿAlī in Kūfa. In this letter, they condemned Muʿāwīya for his usurpation of the caliphate, his unjust conduct in killing the best men of the community and for dividing the property of the community among the tyrants and wealthy men. They also invited al-Ḥusayn to guide and unite them, informing him that they boycotted al-Nuʿmān Ibn Bashīr, the governor of Kūfa, and did not join him in the

¹¹⁸ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 29-30. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 261. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 229.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 29-30. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 261.

¹²⁰ Ibid., Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 29-30. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 229. Al-Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2: 241. Al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 55. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 369-70.

prayers. Finally, they assured al-Ḥusayn of their readiness to drive the Umayyad governor away from Kūfa as soon as they learned of his coming.¹²¹

The followers of ʿAlī in Kūfa continued to inform al-Ḥusayn of their wish that he come soon. After two days, they sent him a great number of letters; each was signed by one or more than one individual for the same purpose. Two days later, al-Ḥusayn received another letter signed in the name of his Shīʿa, asking him to make haste and telling him that they were waiting for his coming. The last letter was sent to al-Ḥusayn by a group of the leaders of the tribes, who later turned against him when Ibn Ziyād arrived in Kūfa, telling him that they had arranged everything for his arrival and confirming their readiness to fight by his side.¹²²

Although the last letter was signed, “Your Shīʿa and you father’s Shīʿā,” surprisingly enough, al-Ḥusayn, according to Ibn Aʿtham, wanted to investigate the names signed in this letter. When he asked the two messengers who brought the letter, they told him that it was signed by the leaders of the tribes of Kūfa.¹²³ Perhaps al-Ḥusayn was waiting for the call of the leaders of the tribes in Kūfa, who had a very strong power over Kūfan society; and wanted to be sure that their position was against the Umayyad officials and be confident of their desire for his coming. For this reason, al-Ḥusayn did not respond to the Kūfans’ repeated call until he received the last letter.¹²⁴

However, al-Ḥusayn wanted to be certain about the loyalty and sincerity of the people of Kūfa, their readiness to die for his cause and that they would not disappoint

¹²¹ Ibid., 3: 369. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 31-2. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 261-2. Al-Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2: 241-2. Al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 45.

¹²² Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 31-34. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 261-2. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 369-70. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 229.

¹²³ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 33-4.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

him. Since they insisted on their demand and sent a huge number of letters to him, al-Ḥusayn decided to answer them at once. In his letter, al-Ḥusayn told them that he understood why they had invited him to come, stating “you have no Imām, and my arrival would unite you under truth and guidance.”¹²⁵ But since he had witnessed their failure to stand fast in their support for his father and brother, al-Ḥusayn was not quite confident about their determination to fight against the Umayyad officials and, therefore, told them that he had decided to send his cousin Muslim Ibn ʿAqīl in order to test the ground and to make sure of their devotion, as they had promised in their letters to him.¹²⁶

Al-Ḥusayn, who had condemned Yazīd’s conduct in violating Islamic norms, thus disqualifying him for the leadership of the community, explained to the Kūfans the qualifications of the real Imām, to whom the people should submit and whose cause they should follow. According to Ibn Aʿtham and al-Ṭabarī, al-Ḥusayn declared, “The Imām is only the one who follows the Book of God; the one who upholds justice; the one who professes the religion of the truth; and the one who dedicates himself to the service of God.”¹²⁷

Likewise, when the followers of ʿAlī in Baṣra received the news of al-Ḥusayn’s refusal to give the *bayʿa* to Yazīd and of his taking refuge in Mecca, they started to hold a series of meetings. In these meetings, they discussed the new developments and, consequently, what would be their obligation towards al-Ḥusayn, the grandson of the Prophet. Al-Ṭabarī narrates, on the authority of Abū Mikhnaf, that these meetings were held in the house of a woman called Māriya; the Shīʿa of Baṣra used to discuss their

¹²⁵ Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 262.

¹²⁶ Ibid. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 230. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 35-6. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 370. Al-Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2: 242.

¹²⁷ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 35-6. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 262.

affairs in this house. Yazīd Ibn Nubayt, an ardent supporter of al-Ḥusayn, along with his two sons decided to join al-Ḥusayn; they succeeded in joining al-Ḥusayn at Karbalā' and, finally, were killed defending him.¹²⁸ Hearing of their meetings, al-Ḥusayn wrote to the nobles of Baṣra, informing them of his determination not to submit to the Umayyad officials and asking them to support him. According to Ibn A'ṯam and al-Ṭabarī, al-Ḥusayn wrote his letter to the nobles of Baṣra before his departure from Mecca.¹²⁹

As mentioned earlier, al-Ḥusayn declared that the Umayyad authorities would force him to pay homage to Yazīd (which he refused powerfully) or he would be killed at their hands. Therefore, he intended to prepare himself for a brutal struggle and he sought as much support as he could. In fact, this was not the only reason for al-Ḥusayn's letter to the Baṣrans. Al-Ḥusayn believed that Yazīd had distorted the Sunna of the Prophet and had revived innovation (*bid'ā*) by his irreligious practices; therefore, al-Ḥusayn, as the Prophet's grandson, was responsible for protecting the Sunna of the Prophet and the Islamic norms from any deviation. Al-Ḥusayn's responsibility was to guide the people to the right course and explain to them their obligation to follow him and submit to his decisions.

Al-Ḥusayn addressed his letter to the nobles of Baṣra, stressing the fact that he belonged to the family of the Prophet, who were entitled to the caliphate more than anyone else. He asked them to follow the Book of God and stay the course of the Sunna of the Prophet, which had been suspended by the conduct of Yazīd, while innovation had been revitalized. In order to keep the course of the Sunna of the Prophet and the Book of God, the people should follow al-Ḥusayn as their legitimate leader. Therefore, al-Ḥusayn

¹²⁸ Ibid., 4: 263.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 4: 265. Ibn A'ṯam, *Futūḥ*, 3: 42.

told the nobles of Baṣra that if they listened to his call and submitted to his orders, “I will guide you along the path of righteousness.”¹³⁰

Due to ʿUbayd Allāh Ibn Ziyād’s tough treatment of the followers of ʿAlī, each one of the nobles who received al-Ḥusayn’s letter kept silent, except al-Mundhir Ibn al-Jārūd, who was Ibn Ziyād’s father-in-law. Fearing that al-Ḥusayn’s messenger might be a plotter sent by Ibn Ziyād, al-Mundhir exposed the letter and brought the messenger to the governor, who ordered him to be beheaded.¹³¹ Because of Ibn Ziyād’s violent measures against his opponents, al-Ḥusayn lost the support of the people of Baṣra.

Thus, just as we saw in Chapter One, the *bayʿa* was a key means through which Muʿāwiya tried to secure the caliphate for himself and then for his son. However, in this chapter, we have seen that Muʿāwiya also had to resort to force to secure allegiance for Yazīd because his lack of qualifications was too obvious-especially for the sons of the Prophet’s Companions. Al-Ḥusayn, for example, was not at all willing to compromise Islamic principles for politics. Like his father, Yazīd tried to use both the *bayʿa* and force to secure his caliphate. However, although al-Ḥusayn had been obliged to keep his pledge of allegiance to Muʿāwiya, he could oppose Yazīd’s succession, as we shall see in the next chapter.

¹³⁰ Ibid. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 265. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, pp. 231-2. Al-Ḥusayn’s messenger to the nobles of Baṣra was called Sulaymān.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 232. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 266. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 43.

CHAPTER THREE

I. Part One: Ibn ʿAqīl's Mission

Due to his refusal to acknowledge Yazīd's caliphate and harassment from Umayyad officials, al-Ḥusayn left Medina and took refuge in Mecca. Given that Mecca was the religious center of Islam, al-Ḥusayn, by taking refuge there, perhaps intended to seize the opportunity to gather the Muslim community together and announce his opposition to Yazīd's caliphate and its illegitimacy. Mecca was also the sanctuary so he should have felt safe there. In spite of the repeated appeals and hundreds of letters sent by the Kūfans who were waiting for this opportunity to rise against the Umayyad authorities, al-Ḥusayn did not make a hasty decision to answer them and go to Kūfa. As a precautionary measure, al-Ḥusayn sent his cousin, Muslim Ibn ʿAqīl, as his emissary with instructions to ascertain the truth and conviction of their appeals.

Before Ibn ʿAqīl's departure from Mecca, al-Ḥusayn instructed him to make sure that the Kūfans were united and that they had committed themselves to an agreement to support his cause.¹ Ibn ʿAqīl hired two guides for his journey. Although the two guides missed the way and were overcome by thirst and, consequently, could not continue the journey, Ibn ʿAqīl succeeded in reaching Kūfa. Once there, he held a secret meeting in the house of al-Mukhtār al-Thaqafī (d. 67/686), a prominent Kūfan who later became a revolutionary Shīʿī leader. At this meeting, only the nobles among al-Ḥusayn's followers

¹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 264. Ibn Sa'd, *Maqtal*, p. 64. Al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 45. Al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 242. Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 38. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akḥbār*, p. 230-1. Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 99. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 334-5. Ibn Sa'd narrates that al-Ḥusayn also instructed Ibn ʿAqīl to reside in Hānī's house.

were present. In order to test the sincerity of those who had written to al-Ḥusayn and invited him to be their Imām, Ibn ʿAqīl read them a letter, addressed to the Kūfan leaders. In his letter, al-Ḥusayn wanted to examine the truthfulness of their call and their readiness to support him. In response, they all declared their undying support for al-Ḥusayn.²

When the news of Ibn ʿAqīl's arrival circulated among the Kūfans, they started to come regularly to see him and to give him their oath of allegiance to al-Ḥusayn, thus confirming the eagerness and sincerity of their support for him.³ Ibn ʿAqīl started to collect their names to keep track of their number and ascertain that al-Ḥusayn would find enough supporters. Al-Masʿūdī tells us that the number of people who registered their names and swore allegiance to al-Ḥusayn is variously reported as being between twelve to eighteen thousand.⁴ Al-Ṭabarī also relates, on the authority of ʿAmmār al-Duhnī, that twelve thousand people gave their *bayʿa* to Ibn ʿAqīl.⁵ Confident of the Kūfans' sincerity in their claim to support al-Ḥusayn, Ibn ʿAqīl wrote to his cousin, informing him of the Kūfans' eagerness for his arrival and urging him to come as soon as he received his letter.⁶

On the other hand, Ibn Saʿd reports that when Ibn ʿAqīl reached Kūfa, he concealed himself from the people and the Shīʿa started to visit him, until finally, eighteen thousand people swore allegiance to al-Ḥusayn. At this time, Ibn ʿAqīl wrote to al-Ḥusayn, telling him about the people's allegiance and urging him to come to Kūfa.⁷

² Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2:344-5. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 264. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 38. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, pp. 230-1. See also Al-Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2: 242.

³ Ibid. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 38. Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 99.

⁴ Al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 54.

⁵ Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 258.

⁶ Al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 54.

⁷ Ibn Saʿd, *Maqtal*, p. 65.

The Kūfans began to visit Ibn ʿAqīl so frequently and knowledge of his affair became so widespread that the governor of Kūfa, al-Nuʿmān Ibn Bashīr, learned of his whereabouts. Al-Nuʿmān warned the people about divergence and of the dreadful consequences of their sedition against the officials. He also told them, “I do not fight anyone who does not fight me, nor do I disturb those of you who remain quiet.”⁸

Because of his peaceful declaration, al-Ṭabarī describes al-Nuʿmān as a man of peace.⁹ In fact, al-Ṭabarī erred in his description since we know that al-Nuʿmān was one of Muʿāwīya’s army leaders, and as such had launched many expeditions against ʿAlī’s territories, as mentioned earlier. Al-Nuʿmān realized that he was out of power and had few supporters to fight against Ibn ʿAqīl, since a great number of the Kūfans, including their prominent nobles, had pledged allegiance to al-Ḥusayn and expressed their readiness to fight with him against his enemies. He perhaps realized that Ibn ʿAqīl’s mission was to test the Kūfans’ loyalty to al-Ḥusayn, but not to fight against the Umayyad officials. Therefore, al-Nuʿmān intended to avoid a confrontation with Ibn ʿAqīl and his supporters and preferred a peaceful approach in order to calm the situation. Nevertheless, al-Nuʿmān warned the people not to stand against the Umayyad officials and not to abolish their allegiance to Yazīd, declaring that otherwise, “I will strike you with my sword as long as its hilt remains in my hand.”¹⁰

Some of the Umayyad’s supporters were not satisfied with al-Nuʿmān’s approach to the new situation, considering it as a sign of weakness. Therefore, they wrote to Yazīd, informing him about Ibn Aqīl’s arrival in Kūfa and that al-Ḥusayn’s followers had sworn

⁸ Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 264. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 39. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 334-5. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akḥbār*, p. 231.

⁹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 264.

¹⁰ Ibid., Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 39. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 335. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akḥbār*, p. 231.

allegiance to him. They also told him that “the governor is a weak man or he is acting like a weak man,” urging Yazīd to send a tougher governor who could deal with Ibn Aqīl in a different way.¹¹

Realizing the dangerous consequences of Ibn ʿAqīl’s mission and the support given to him by al-Ḥusayn’s followers, Yazīd decided to remove al-Nuʿmān and replace him with a harsher governor who could deal strongly with the new developments in Kūfa and suppress Ibn ʿAqīl’s mission. Since Yazīd had no experience in power, he asked for help from Sarjūn, Muʿāwiya’s *mawlā* and adviser. Sarjūn counseled Yazīd to nominate ʿUbayd Allāh Ibn Ziyād, who was then the governor of Baṣra, to be in charge of Kūfa as well, explaining to him that Ibn Ziyād was the only person who could handle the problems in Kūfa and end the rebellions. Following Sarjūn’s advice, Yazīd decided to nominate Ibn Ziyād as the new governor of Kūfa.¹²

To explain why Sarjūn advised Yazīd to nominate Ibn Ziyād, al-Ṭabarī narrates that Sarjūn told Yazīd that, before his death, Muʿāwiya was about to nominate Ibn Ziyād as governor of Kūfa. Al-Ṭabarī also relates that although he was ambivalent toward Ibn Ziyād, Yazīd did not want to oppose his father’s desire and decided to follow Sarjūn’s advice.¹³

It is most likely that Muʿāwiya intended to nominate Ibn Ziyād as the governor of Kūfa although his father had refused to acknowledge Yazīd’s succession to the caliphate, and Muʿāwiya, as mentioned previously, did not disclose Yazīd’s accession to the public until after Ziyād’s death. Probably Yazīd was ambivalent toward Ibn Ziyād because of his

¹¹ Ibid. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 264-5. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 39-40. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 335. Al-Dīnawarī narrates that Muslim Ibn Saʿīd and ʿImāra Ibn ʿUqba were both Yazīd’s spies in Kūfa.

¹² Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 40-1. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 335. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 231. Ibn Saʿd, *Maqātāl*, p. 65. In his brief account, Ibn Saʿd does not mention Sarjūn.

¹³ Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 265.

father's attitude towards his accession. In fact, Sarjūn had considerable experience in handling such problems, having been Mu^cāwiya's adviser. He perhaps realized that Ibn Ziyād was the perfect man for the Kūfans, because of his cruelty and severe measures in Baṣra against the opponents of the Umayyad officials, and because of his father's reputation for brutality among the Kūfans at the time of Mu^cāwiya. Yazīd wrote to Ibn Ziyād, ordering him to go at once to Kūfa to search for Ibn ^cAqīl and kill or expel him.¹⁴

According to al-Ya^cqūbī, Yazīd wrote to Ibn Ziyād, telling him that the people of Kūfa had called al-Ḥusayn to be their leader, and that, therefore, al-Ḥusayn was heading to Kūfa. Yazīd ordered Ibn Ziyād to kill al-Ḥusayn, otherwise "you will go back to your real kinship and to your [grand] father ^cUbayd," and warned him not to miss al-Ḥusayn.¹⁵

How would Ibn Ziyād succeed in his task? In fact, Sarjūn's advice to Yazīd regarding Ibn Ziyād was perfect, because Ibn Ziyād followed in the footsteps of his father in his maneuvers and in his severe measures against the opponents of the Umayyads.¹⁶ The day before leaving Baṣra, Ibn Ziyād, as mentioned earlier, beheaded al-Ḥusayn's messenger, Sulaymān, who had been sent to some of the tribal leaders of Baṣra. Ibn A^ctham tells us that Ibn Ziyād beheaded al-Ḥusayn's messenger and then crucified him without giving him the opportunity to utter a word.¹⁷ With his ruthless procedures, Ibn Ziyād intended to give the people of Baṣra a lesson and make al-Ḥusayn's messenger an example for whoever thought about revolting against the Umayyad authorities.

As soon as he received Yazīd's letter and before leaving Baṣra, Ibn Ziyād warned the Baṣrans against any rebellion or sedition against the authorities. He also notified them

¹⁴ Ibid. Ibn A^ctham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 3:41. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 335. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhhbār*, p. 231. Al-Mas^cūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 57.

¹⁵ Al-Ya^cqūbī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 243.

¹⁶ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 266. Ibn A^ctham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 42. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 335.

¹⁷ Ibn A^ctham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 42.

that if he heard of anyone opposing the officials; he would execute that person, his ^ʿ*arīf*,¹⁸ his guardian, and his relatives. Ibn Ziyād then left Baṣra having left his brother ^ʿUthmān as his deputy. In addition to his entourage and household, Ibn Ziyād took with him to Kūfa some of the nobles of Baṣra in order to help him in his mission.¹⁹

Ibn Ziyād knew that the situation in Kūfa was favorable to al-Ḥusayn and that the Kūfans were expecting al-Ḥusayn's arrival at any time. Since he had come to Kūfa with a few men, he therefore intended to deceive the Kūfans and rode into the city in disguise in order to protect himself from assassination. It was reported that when Ibn Ziyād reached Kūfa, he was wearing a black turban and was veiled. The people had no doubt that he was al-Ḥusayn and began to come out from their houses to greet him. As soon as they recognized Ibn Ziyād, they remembered how much they had suffered under his father and rushed back to their houses in fear.²⁰

In another account, al-Ṭabarī narrates, on the authority of ^ʿUmar Ibn Shabba, that when Ibn Ziyād left Baṣra, he had chosen five hundred persons to take with him. Because he was in a hurry and wanted to reach Kūfa as soon as he could, the rest could not keep up and fell on the ground before reaching Kūfa. Ibn Ziyād, impatient to reach Kūfa before al-Ḥusayn, arrived in Kūfa alone in disguise. When he reached the governor's palace, the governor, al-Nuʿmān, had no doubt that he was al-Ḥusayn and, therefore, did not allow him to enter the palace. However, the governor told Ibn Ziyād that he did not intend to

¹⁸ ^ʿArīf (pl. ^ʿ*urāfāʾ*) is the person who is in charge of the distribution of the stipends among the inhabitants of a specific district. "He was furthermore responsible for security inside his own ^ʿ*irāfa*, and probably also had other responsibilities, such as collecting blood-money and arbitrating in disputes among the members of the ^ʿ*irāfa*. See Saleh A. El-Ali and Cl. Cahen, "Arīf," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 1: 629.

¹⁹ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 43. Al-Ṭabarī, on the authority of Abū Mikhnaf, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 266. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 335. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 232.

²⁰ Ibid. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 266-7. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 335-6. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 44. Ibn Saʿd, *Maqātīl*, p. 65. Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātīl*, pp. 99-100.

fight him. As soon as the governor realized that he was Ibn Ziyād, he opened the doors for him. The people who had been behind Ibn Ziyād, greeting him as the grandson of the Prophet, were dispersed.²¹

This account needs some comment. It is inconceivable that none of the five hundred who accompanied Ibn Ziyād from Baṣra reached Kūfa with him. Indeed, they must have reached Kūfa after Ibn Ziyād and played a significant role there. Nevertheless, none of the sources mention their role, even al-Ṭabarī himself. This sheds many doubts on the credibility of Ibn Shabba's account. Perhaps Ibn Shabba intended to exaggerate the details of Ibn Ziyād's arrival in Kūfa and his ruthless attitude. However, a similar version of Ibn Shabba's description of Ibn Ziyād's arrival in Kūfa is narrated by al-Mas'ūdī, except that the latter does not mention the five hundred people. Rather, al-Mas'ūdī relates that when the people discovered that the man who had arrived in Kūfa in disguise was Ibn Ziyād, they started stoning him but he escaped and entered the palace.²²

The next day, Ibn Ziyād asked that all the people be summoned to the mosque and informed them that the caliph, Yazīd, had appointed him as the new governor. He also told them that Yazīd had instructed him to treat whoever submitted to his orders kindly but to be ruthless with those who opposed him, and that he was going to follow Yazīd's instructions.²³

Ibn Ziyād had no support to rely on when he arrived in Kūfa and perhaps did not want to agitate the people against him; perhaps he intended rather to test the Kūfans' attitude and their reactions towards him. Since no opposition was raised against his

²¹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'riḫ*, 4: 268.

²² Al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 57.

²³ Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 44. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'riḫ*, 4: 267. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 355-6. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akḥbār*, p. 232-3. Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 101. Al-Ṭabarī adds that Ibn Ziyād also said "and my sword will be against whoever is opposed to my orders."

appointment and his speech, Ibn Ziyād felt that they were afraid of him. According to Ibn Aʿtham, Ibn Ziyād, on the day after his speech, came out to the people showing a different character and another face. He told them that he would punish even the innocent people because of their relatives' mistakes and disobedience.²⁴ Now Ibn Ziyād exposed his real attitude to the Kūfans and his father's face and character which terrified them and from which they had greatly suffered for several years.

Ibn Ziyād's immediate tasks were to crush those who constituted a threat for the Umayyad officials and to find out Ibn ʿAqīl's whereabouts. Al-Ṭabarī tells us that Ibn Ziyād started to treat the people very harshly. He ordered the ʿurafāʾ to write to him about troublemakers: "those among you who are sought by the Commander of the Faithful, the troublemakers whose concern is discord and turmoil." He also threatened those among the ʿurafāʾ who did not submit to his orders that he would shed their blood and destroy their property, and told them that if he found anyone who was wanted by the Commander of the Faithful in any ʿarīf's area, the ʿarīf would be crucified at the door of his house and be deprived of his payment (ʿaṭāʾ).²⁵ In order to protect themselves, their property and their fellow tribespeople from Ibn Ziyād's severe punishments, the ʿurafāʾ submitted to Ibn Ziyād's orders and, therefore, facilitated his task. In fact, they were the easiest means by which the new governor enhanced his power in Kūfa.

After Ibn Ziyād's arrival in Kūfa, his threatening speech and harsh treatment of the ʿurafāʾ, Ibn ʿAqīl realized that he was in danger and, therefore, decided to change his place of residence and move to the house of Hānī Ibn ʿUrwa, one of the prominent Kūfan leaders. Although Hānī was reluctant to host Ibn ʿAqīl, fearing Ibn Ziyād's wrath, he was

²⁴ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 45.

²⁵ Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 267.

not able to reject Ibn ʿAqīl's request and allowed him to stay in his house. Meanwhile, al-Ḥusayn's supporters continued to visit Ibn ʿAqīl and swear allegiance to al-Ḥusayn secretly in order to keep their affair hidden from the brutal new governor.²⁶

At this time, according to al-Ṭabarī, Ibn ʿAqīl wrote to al-Ḥusayn, informing him that he had collected twelve thousand oaths of allegiance from the Kūfans and urging him to come.²⁷ It is very likely that Ibn ʿAqīl did write to al-Ḥusayn and urge him to come to Kūfa at this time, since he had received such strong promises of allegiance and was certain that the Kūfans were sincere in their letters and their call to al-Ḥusayn.

At about this time, Ibn ʿAqīl had a unique opportunity to assassinate Ibn Ziyād and, in so doing, gain full control over the situation in Kūfa, but he did not seize this opportunity. Our sources tell us that Sharīk Ibn al-Aʿwar, who was one of ʿAlī's followers and who had come with Ibn Ziyād from Baṣra, became sick while he was residing in Hānī's house. When Ibn Ziyād heard of his sickness he decided to visit him. Sharīk told Ibn ʿAqīl, who was residing in Hānī's house as well, to seize this opportunity to assassinate Ibn Ziyād and get rid of him. When Ibn Ziyād visited Sharīk, Ibn ʿAqīl refused to murder him, even when Sharīk raised his voice, reciting some poems as a sign to Ibn ʿAqīl to come out and kill Ibn Ziyād. However, Ibn ʿAqīl failed to kill Ibn Ziyād and the latter escaped the assassination, leaving Ibn Hānī's house. When Sharīk reproached Ibn ʿAqīl for not killing Ibn Ziyād, Ibn ʿAqīl explained that he refused to do so for two reasons: first, Hānī was reluctant to see Ibn Ziyād killed in his house, and, second, because he remembered the Prophet's statement that the true Muslim does not

²⁶ Ibid., 4: 270. Ibn ʿAṭham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 45-6. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akḥbār*, p. 233. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 336. Al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 58.

²⁷ Al-Ṭabarī, on the authority of ʿAmmār al-Duhnī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 258-9. As noted earlier, Ibn Saʿd reports that Ibn ʿAqīl wrote to al-Ḥusayn, urging him to come to Kūfa when eighteen thousand swore allegiance to al-Ḥusayn. Ibn Saʿd, *Maqṭal*, p. 65.

commit assassinations and, therefore, Ibn ʿAqīl had no desire to disobey the Prophet's instructions.²⁸ In addition to the fact that Ibn ʿAqīl was not instructed by al-Ḥusayn to attack the Umayyad officials, it would have been shameful for Ibn ʿAqīl, among the people of Kūfa, to assassinate a visitor without fighting.

In his narration of this event, Ibn Saʿd provides a different account. He does not mention Ibn ʿAqīl's chance to assassinate Ibn Ziyād; rather, he reports that Ibn ʿAqīl did not know when Ibn Ziyād visited Sharīk in Hānī's house while he was sick. Ibn Saʿd also relates that Hānī and Sharīk both decided to murder Ibn Ziyād. They prepared thirty men to assassinate Ibn Ziyād as soon as he came to Hānī's house. However, Ibn Ziyād had noticed that something bizarre was going on in Hānī's house and, therefore, escaped the assassination and left the house rapidly.²⁹

It is difficult to conceive that Ibn ʿAqīl was unaware of Ibn Ziyād's visit to Hānī's house, given that he was hiding from him. Therefore, a vital question which needs to be answered in regards to Ibn Saʿd's narration is: Why did Hānī and Sharīk not tell Ibn ʿAqīl that they had prepared to assassinate Ibn Ziyād? Perhaps they knew that Ibn ʿAqīl would not agree with their intention and he would be hesitant to murder Ibn Ziyād, therefore, hid their plan from him.

The most important task for Ibn Ziyād was to find out Ibn ʿAqīl's whereabouts in order to cut off the opposition at its root. In order to achieve his purpose, Ibn Ziyād resorted to trickery; summoning his *mawlā*, Maʿqil, and giving him three thousand dirhams to look for Ibn ʿAqīl and search out his followers. Ibn Ziyād ordered him to pose

²⁸ Tabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 270-1. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 47-9. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akḥbār*, pp. 234-5. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 337. Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 101-2. Al-Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2: 243. Al-Yaʿqūbī contradicts other sources by stating that Hānī was sick.

²⁹ Ibn Saʿd, *Maqtal*, p. 67.

as one of al-Ḥusayn's supporters who had come to give money to Ibn ʿAqīl's agent in order to strengthen Ibn ʿAqīl's position. Ibn Ziyād's *mawla* succeeded in finding Muslim Ibn ʿAwsaja, who was in charge of receiving the oath of allegiance for al-Ḥusayn, and told him his story. Ibn ʿAwsaja introduced him to Ibn ʿAqīl who in his turn took the money from him and accepted his allegiance. Ibn Ziyād's *mawla* started to visit Ibn ʿAqīl regularly; he was the first to enter Hānī's house and the last to leave it each day in order to become acquainted with all the details of Ibn ʿAqīl's affairs, as he had been instructed by Ibn Ziyād.³⁰

Ibn Ziyād, now knew about Ibn ʿAqīl's whereabouts from his *mawla*, and, therefore, arranged to bring Hānī to the palace in order to capture Ibn ʿAqīl. He complained to the nobles of Kūfa about Hānī's failure to visit the governor and asked why he did not come to visit him like the others. He asked Hānī's associates to persuade him to come to the governor's palace. Since Hānī was protecting Ibn ʿAqīl in his house, he was afraid to visit Ibn Ziyād in his palace and pretended that he was sick. Although Hānī expressed his fear of meeting with Ibn Ziyād because of the latter's ruthless character, a group of prominent persons of his tribe, Madhhij, succeeded in convincing him to come with them to the governor's palace.³¹

Hānī's associates did not know about the story of Ibn Ziyād's *mawla* or that Ibn Ziyād knew everything about Ibn ʿAqīl's affairs through him. Furthermore, because of Hānī's leading position in his tribe, they did not anticipate that Ibn Ziyād would treat Hānī in such a very merciless way. By bringing Hānī to his palace, they merely intended to

³⁰ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 46-7. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, pp. 235-6. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 337. Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, pp. 100-1. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 270. It should be noted that al-Ṭabarī does not mention the name of Ibn ʿAwsaja; instead he cites the word '*shaykh*.'

³¹ Ibid., 4: 272-4. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 52-5. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, pp. 263-8. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 337-8. Al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 57.

prove their loyalty to Ibn Ziyād and their submission to him in order to protect themselves from his brutality and to maintain their *‘aṭā’*. In fact, these prominent leaders of the tribes in Kūfa had sent a letter to al-Ḥusayn while he was in Mecca, urging him to lead them against the Umayyad officials. Although they shared with al-Ḥusayn his resistance to the Umayyad authorities, they had a habit of looking out for their own benefits. Their priority was to secure their position and protect their property and the ties among their tribes. Therefore, as soon as affairs in Kūfa turned against Ibn ‘Aqīl, they changed their attitude and turned against al-Ḥusayn and his emissary. In fact, they played a significant role in facilitating Ibn Ziyād’s task of subduing Ibn ‘Aqīl’s mission by influencing the members of their tribes and the inhabitants of Kūfa to withdraw from Ibn ‘Aqīl’s cause.

Ibn Sa‘d narrates that Asmā’ Ibn Khārija and ‘Amr Ibn al-Ḥajjāj, prominent associates of Hānī’s, promised Hānī that no harm would reach him from Ibn Ziyād, but when the latter killed him, it was obvious that they could not keep their promise and none of them dared to raise a voice in protest in front of the governor.³²

Meanwhile, Ibn Ziyād ordered his men to keep watch over the main roads of Kūfa, searching for Ibn ‘Aqīl’s supporters and searching whoever entered or left Kūfa. According to Ibn A‘tham, ‘Abd Allāh Ibn Yarbū‘ al-Tamīmī, one of Ibn Ziyād’s men, noticed a man leaving Kūfa rapidly. Suspecting that he might be one of al-Ḥusayn’s followers, al-Tamīmī searched the man and found that he was holding a letter. He told Ibn Ziyād about the man and handed him his letter. When Ibn Ziyād examined the letter, he found out that it was from Ibn ‘Aqīl to al-Ḥusayn. In his letter, Ibn ‘Aqīl informed al-Ḥusayn that more than twenty thousand people had pledged allegiance to him and urged

³² Ibn Sa‘d, *Maqatal*, p. 67

him to come to Kūfa as soon as possible, explaining that the people did not have any desire for Yazīd. When Ibn Ziyād asked the man, who was named ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Yaqtīn, about the origin of the letter, the latter declined to tell him. Consequently, Ibn Ziyād ordered him to be executed.³³

When Hānī was brought to the palace, Ibn Ziyād reproached him for protecting Ibn ʿAqīl in his house and for collecting men and raising an army to support Ibn ʿAqīl's mission. At first, Hānī denied that he was hiding Ibn ʿAqīl in his house, but when Ibn Ziyād brought in his spy who knew every single detail of Ibn ʿAqīl's affair, Hānī admitted that Ibn ʿAqīl was hiding in his house. However, Hānī explained to Ibn Ziyād that he did so only because Ibn ʿAqīl had made a request to stay in his house, at which point Hānī could not refuse him. Furthermore, Hānī promised Ibn Ziyād that he was ready to ask Ibn ʿAqīl to leave his house, but Ibn Ziyād refused this offer, demanding that he bring Ibn ʿAqīl to the palace immediately. Hānī strongly rejected this demand from Ibn Ziyād and swore by God that if Ibn ʿAqīl were at Hānī's two feet, he would not lift them and allow him to be given to Ibn Ziyād. Hānī also explained to Ibn Ziyād that it would be a shame on him, Hānī, until the rest of his life, if he did not protect his guest. Hānī believed that his men would be able to protect him from Ibn Ziyād, but he was wrong. When Hānī persisted in refusing Ibn Ziyād's demand, Ibn Ziyād struck his face with his cane and ordered him to be imprisoned in the palace.³⁴

In his account, al-Dīnawarī narrates that Ibn Ziyād killed Hānī when the latter refused to give him Ibn ʿAqīl.³⁵ In addition to the fact that this account contradicts other accounts,

³³ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 50-1.

³⁴ Ibid., 3: 52-3. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 272-4. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 337-8. Al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 57. Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 102.

³⁵ Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, pp. 263-8.

it is unlikely that Ibn Ziyād killed Hānī at this time since he would have lost the support of Hānī's tribe, whereas he was still in need of them to maintain his power.

Ibn Sa'd also tells us that Hānī was killed at the hands of Ibn Ziyād after a harsh dispute between them. He narrates that when Hānī was asked by Ibn Ziyād why he had hidden his enemy, Hānī responded that Ibn 'Aqīl had come to the people of Kūfa with a truth which was "more authoritative than your claim and your family's claim." Therefore, Ibn Ziyād struck Hānī's head until he died.³⁶ According to Ibn Sa'd's account, Hānī confronted Ibn Ziyād with the fact that he and his family had no right to rule the people in the name of the caliphate and that Ibn 'Aqīl was calling for the truth when he asked the people to support and pay homage to al-Ḥusayn. In addition to the fact that Ibn Sa'd's account is not supported by the majority of our sources, it is unlikely that Hānī would confront Ibn Ziyād with such a strong statement while he was powerless. Perhaps Hānī did so, if we accept for a moment Ibn Sa'd's account, because he thought that he could still rely on the support of his tribe and his associates to protect him from the wrath of Ibn Ziyād.

Rumors had begun to spread among the people of Kūfa that Hānī had been killed in the governor's palace. Hearing of these rumors, 'Amr Ibn al-Ḥajjāj, one of the members of Hānī's tribe who had submitted to Ibn Ziyād, came to the governor's palace with a great number of Hānī's tribe, the Madhhij, in order to avenge Hānī's killing. He told Ibn Ziyād that the members of Hānī's tribe had not abolished their loyalty to the governor and were not seeking sedition, but that they had heard that Hānī was murdered and, therefore, had come to be sure that he was still alive. Ibn Ziyād ordered Shurayḥ al-Qāḍī (d. 78/697), one of the judges who worked on behalf of the Umayyad authorities, to look at

³⁶ Ibn Sa'd, *Maqatal*, p. 66.

Hānī and tell them that he was alive. Trusting Shurayḥ's testimony and his trustworthiness, when they heard that Hānī was still alive, his men became calm and left the palace.³⁷

According to al-Ṭabarī, on the authority of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Shurayḥ, when Shurayḥ came to look at Hānī, the latter, who had recognized the sounds of his men outside the palace, asked Shurayḥ to inform his people about his fate and to request them to come to his rescue. Shurayḥ claimed that he intended to tell them about Hānī's situation and ask them to rescue him from prison, but he was afraid of Ibn Ziyād's spy, Ḥumayd Ibn Bukayr, who was following him. Shurayḥ only told the Madhḥij that Hānī was alive.³⁸

It is clear that the people of Kūfa had lost their power and determination because of Ibn Ziyād's severe measures against whoever opposed him. Even Shurayḥ al-Qādī, who was responsible for establishing justice among the people, lost his resolution out of fear and was not able to object to Ibn Ziyād's harsh treatment of Hānī. They were all terrified of the dangerous consequences of opposing Ibn Ziyād's orders. It is reported that when Ibn Ziyād imprisoned Hānī, he wondered whether the people of Kūfa would revolt against him. Therefore, he enjoined them to keep their loyalty to their leaders and not oppose them. Otherwise, he warned, they would expose themselves to being deprived of their rights, humiliated and killed.³⁹

Since Ibn Ziyād had taken severe measures against Ibn ʿAqīl and his supporters, imprisoning Hānī, Ibn ʿAqīl, in his turn, decided to attack the Umayyad officials. He prepared to assault the governor's palace in order to rescue Hānī from his prison and

³⁷ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 274-5. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 55. Al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 57.

³⁸ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 274-5.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 4: 275. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 55. Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, pp. 102-3.

spread the battle cry. Eighteen thousand men responded to his call. He sent forward his vanguard and drew up his right and left wings, and he himself advanced with the center toward Ibn Ziyād's palace. When Ibn Ziyād was informed of Ibn 'Aqīl's coming, he barricaded himself in the palace and locked the gates.⁴⁰

Although Ibn 'Aqīl was not instructed to fight against the Umayyad authorities, he was forced to call for a movement against Ibn Ziyād because of his severe measures and ill treatment of al-Ḥusayn's supporters. Ibn 'Aqīl recognized that Ibn Ziyād's intention was to crush his supporters and abort his mission and, therefore, decided to attack him. The most important question that presents itself here is: Why did Ibn 'Aqīl not succeed in controlling the situation in Kūfa although he had surrounded the governor's palace with his men? At the beginning, Ibn 'Aqīl had succeeded in his mission when al-Ḥusayn sent him to Kūfa; the people of Kūfa had rallied around him and he had collected the names of more than twelve thousand people who pledged allegiance to al-Ḥusayn. The situation had changed only since Ibn Ziyād arrived in Kūfa. Three main reasons were behind Ibn 'Aqīl's failure to control the situation upon Ibn Ziyād's arrival in Kūfa: first, the Kūfan's failure to keep their word; second, the role of the nobles of Kūfa; and third, Ibn Ziyād's severe measures and maneuvers. We have already mentioned Ibn Ziyād's harsh treatment of the 'urafā' and his ploy to uncover Ibn 'Aqīl's whereabouts using his spy.

Although eighteen thousand people had pledged allegiance to Ibn 'Aqīl, according to al-Balādhurī, only four thousand followed him to the governor's palace, which means that most of Ibn 'Aqīl's followers did not keep their word. In addition, al-Ṭabarī narrates, on the authority of Abū Mikhnaf, that four thousand people were with Ibn 'Aqīl when he

⁴⁰ Ibid. Ibn A'ṭham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 56. Al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 58. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 338. Al-Balādhurī narrates that although eighteen thousand men complied with Ibn 'Aqīl's call, only four thousand followed him to the governor's palace.

decided to attack the palace. Although the people had gathered in the mosque and in the market, only three hundred persons followed Ibn ʿAqīl to the palace.⁴¹ Ibn Saʿd reports that four hundred people responded to Ibn ʿAqīl's call, but only sixteen of them followed him to the governor's palace.⁴² All these accounts confirm that most of Ibn ʿAqīl's supporters, despite pledging allegiance to him, failed to keep their promises to join him in fighting against the enemy.

Indeed, Ibn Ziyād's power was limited; he had no supporters except some of his close associates who had come with him from Baṣra and a small number of the tribal leaders (*ashrāf al-qabā'il*) who, out of fear of his brutality and his severe measures, turned away from Ibn ʿAqīl and took Ibn Ziyād's side. Al-Ṭabarī narrates that some of the tribal leaders started to withdraw from Ibn ʿAqīl and join Ibn Ziyād in his palace.⁴³ It should be mentioned that some of these nobles who wrote to al-Ḥusayn and expressed their readiness to fight with him against the Umayyad authorities, were from among the *Khawārij* who had fought against his father and had injured his brother, as mentioned earlier. They had called al-Ḥusayn, not because they believed in his right to the caliphate, but because they shared in his opposition to the Umayyads and, therefore, intended to fight alongside him in order to remove the Umayyad officials from their offices. Since they had experienced Ibn Ziyād's severe measures against their friends in Baṣra, they tried to avoid his wrath and, therefore, turned against Ibn ʿAqīl and took Ibn Ziyād's part.

Noticing that the Kūfians were leaning towards al-Ḥusayn and that his hold on power was tenuous, Ibn Ziyād used the nobles to threaten and influence the members of their tribes to withdraw from Ibn ʿAqīl. Ibn Aʿtham, al-Ṭabarī and al-Isfahānī narrate that

⁴¹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 275-6.

⁴² Ibn Saʿd, *Maqtal*, p. 66.

⁴³ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 276.

Kathīr Ibn Shihāb, one of the Kūfan nobles who was from the *Khawārij*, was shouting to the people, warning them not to kill themselves and their families. He explained to them that the Syrian army was coming and that Ibn Ziyād had decided to deprive them of their payment (*ʿaṭā*), to scatter their men in the Syrian campaigns and to kill even the innocents among them if they persisted in fighting him. When the Kūfans heard his statement, they scattered and withdrew from Ibn ʿAqīl, advising each other not to expose themselves to the wrath of the governor and to stay in their houses.⁴⁴

In fact, the nobles played a major role in threatening the people and making them withdraw from Ibn ʿAqīl's cause. They also played a significant role in the fight against Ibn ʿAqīl and imprisoned some of his supporters. Al-Ṭabarī, al-Isfahānī and al-Dīnawarī tell us that Ibn Ziyād summoned these nobles and ordered them to go around Kūfa, dissuading the people from disobedience, making them afraid of the Syrian troops and threatening them with punishment. Ibn Ziyād also instructed them to guarantee safe-conduct to those people who withdrew from Ibn ʿAqīl and joined him. He offered additional money and kind treatment to those who would submit to the Umayyad officials and terrified the disobedient with threats of dispossession and terrible punishment. Following Ibn Ziyād's orders, the nobles of Kūfa warned the people not to expose themselves to death, telling them that the army of the caliph was approaching. They also warned the people that the governor would deprive their offspring of their rights to the state allotment of money (*ʿaṭā*) and that he would scatter them in Syrian campaigns if they persisted in opposing him. Hearing this, and in order to protect themselves, their

⁴⁴ Ibid., 4: 277. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 56. al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, pp. 103-4.

relatives and their property, the people of Kūfa started to disperse and the women began to come to their sons and brothers, asking them to withdraw from Ibn ʿAqīl.⁴⁵

Not only did the tribal leaders of Kūfa withdraw from Ibn ʿAqīl's cause, but they also fought against him. Al-Ṭabarī reports that these nobles, with some of their tribesmen, confronted Ibn ʿAqīl and his supporters as they approached the governor's palace while Ibn Ziyād, his family and his close associates took refuge in the palace.⁴⁶ According to al-Dīnawarī and Ibn Saʿd, a small confrontation between Ibn ʿAqīl's supporters and Ibn Ziyād's men took place at the gate of the governor's palace.⁴⁷ Although al-Dīnawarī and Ibn Saʿd do not mention the names of Ibn Ziyād's men, they were most likely the Kūfan nobles who were used by Ibn Ziyād. This is clearly indicated by Ibn Aʿtham's account, according to which a great fight between Ibn ʿAqīl's men and Ibn Ziyād's men took place outside the governor's palace while Ibn Ziyād and his close associates watched from the top of the palace.⁴⁸ Since Ibn Ziyād had no men with which to confront Ibn ʿAqīl's huge group of supporters,⁴⁹ there should be no reason to doubt that it was the tribal leaders of Kūfa who indeed confronted and fought against Ibn ʿAqīl on behalf of Ibn Ziyād.

The tribal leaders of Kūfa also played a noteworthy role in pursuing Ibn ʿAqīl's followers and bringing them to Ibn Ziyād. Al-Ṭabarī reports that the Kūfans' tribal leaders captured some of Ibn ʿAqīl's supporters and brought them to Ibn Ziyād who, in turn, imprisoned them and, consequently, beheaded them.⁵⁰ Al-Balādhurī also narrates

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 104. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 276-7. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 239.

⁴⁶ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 276-7.

⁴⁷ Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 239. Ibn Saʿd, *Maqtal*, p. 66.

⁴⁸ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 56.

⁴⁹ Al-Ṭabarī and al-Balādhurī narrate that Ibn Ziyād had only fifty persons with him in the palace. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 276. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 338.

⁵⁰ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 276, 284-6.

that when ʿUmāra al-Azdī wanted to join Ibn ʿAqīl, Ibn Ziyād's men captured him and brought him to Ibn Ziyād, who beheaded him and sent his head to Yazīd.⁵¹

The failure of Ibn ʿAqīl's followers to keep their word and fight alongside him is further indicated by the report that they continued to slip away from him, so that Ibn ʿAqīl, when the darkness spread, found himself alone with no support. He had no shelter to resort to until an old woman called Ṭawʿa permitted him to stay in her house as soon as she recognized him.⁵² Having secured himself from the Kūfans' rebellion and Ibn ʿAqīl's attack, Ibn Ziyād's task, after the failure of Ibn ʿAqīl's movement, was to capture Ibn ʿAqīl himself. Therefore, he summoned the people to the mosque, ordering them to keep their allegiance and submission to Yazīd, and warning that whoever protected Ibn ʿAqīl in his house was to be killed. Ibn Ziyād also promised a large reward for the one who could bring Ibn ʿAqīl to the governor. He also asked al-Ḥuşayn Ibn Tamīm, the leader of Ibn Ziyād's army, to search for Ibn ʿAqīl in the streets of Kūfa and in every house.⁵³

The son of the woman Ṭawʿa was one of Ibn Ziyād's supporters and was searching for Ibn ʿAqīl in order to gain the reward. When he came to his mother's house, he recognized Ibn ʿAqīl and, consequently, told Ibn Ziyād about his whereabouts. Ibn Ziyād sent the commander of his police together with seventy men to arrest Ibn ʿAqīl. They surrounded the house and Ibn ʿAqīl fought them energetically until he was exhausted but initially refused to surrender. He finally surrendered and accepted their offer to go with

⁵¹ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 431.

⁵² Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 277-8. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 58-9. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 338-9. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akḥbār*, p. 239. Ibn Saʿd, *Maqtal*, p. 66. Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 104.

⁵³ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 278-9. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 59.

them to the governor's palace only when Muḥammad Ibn al-Ash^ʿath, the commander of Ibn Ziyād's men, promised him safe-conduct from the governor.⁵⁴

On the other hand, Ibn A^ʿtham narrates that Ibn Ziyād, in fact, arranged to offer safe-conduct to Ibn ^ʿAqīl in order to protect his men from him. Ibn A^ʿtham tells us that Ibn Ziyād sent three hundred men with his commander Ibn al-Ash^ʿath to capture Ibn ^ʿAqīl. When Ibn Ziyād was told that Ibn ^ʿAqīl had killed a large number of his men, he tried to deceive Ibn ^ʿAqīl and, therefore, arranged with Ibn al-Ash^ʿath to guarantee safe-conduct for Ibn ^ʿAqīl. Nevertheless, Ibn ^ʿAqīl refused to surrender and continued fighting until he was exhausted from thirst.⁵⁵

It is most likely that Ibn ^ʿAqīl would not have accepted safe-conduct since he knew that Ibn al-Ash^ʿath had no power to keep his promises. Ibn ^ʿAqīl had also witnessed that Ibn al-Ash^ʿath and his associates were not able to raise their voices in front of Ibn Ziyād and had not dared to save their leader Hānī from the hands of Ibn Ziyād when the latter imprisoned him. Therefore, it is more conceivable that Ibn ^ʿAqīl surrendered only when he was unable to fight, even if Ibn al-Ash^ʿath did promise to guarantee him safe-conduct. This is further supported by al-Ṭabarī and al-Balādhurī's account that, when Ibn al-Ash^ʿath told Ibn al-Ziyād about his safe-conduct to Ibn ^ʿAqīl, Ibn Ziyād reproached Ibn al-Ash^ʿath for his promise, informing him that he had no authority to give such a guarantee.⁵⁶

When Ibn ^ʿAqīl was brought to the palace, a crucial dialogue between him and Ibn Ziyād took place. Ibn Ziyād considered Ibn ^ʿAqīl to be a rebel against the rightful caliph

⁵⁴ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 279-80. Al-Mas^ʿūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 58. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 338-9. Al-Dīnawarī, *Aḥkbar*, p. 240. Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, pp. 106-7.

⁵⁵ Ibn A^ʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 60-65.

⁵⁶ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 281. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 339.

and his officials, accusing him of creating mayhem by dividing the people and making chaos among them. He said to Ibn ʿAqīl, “You came to the people while they were united and their affairs were solid; you came to them only to divide their unity and to disturb them.” Ibn ʿAqīl denied that he had come for this purpose, arguing that the people of Kūfa were claiming that “your father killed their best men and shed their blood.” He declared that his mission was to enjoin justice among the people of Kūfa and to call them to follow the rules of the Qurʾān. Ibn Ziyād tried to undermine Ibn ʿAqīl’s position by accusing him of violating Islamic norms by drinking wine. Ibn ʿAqīl, however, rejected this accusation and pointed out that it was Yazīd who was more correctly described as a drinker of wine. He further described Yazīd as one who bathed in the blood of Muslims, killed the innocent, and shed sacred blood, while acting as if he had done nothing. Ibn Ziyād denied Ibn ʿAqīl’s assertion that he had come to prevent corruption caused by Yazīd’s conduct, insisting that Yazīd was entitled to the caliphate. He ordered Ibn ʿAqīl to be taken to the top of the palace and beheaded.⁵⁷

Because of the Kūfans’ lack of resolution and their failure to support and to fight alongside him, Ibn ʿAqīl was confident that if al-Ḥusayn came to Kūfa he would not find any supporters there and, consequently, would be killed. Therefore, before his death, Ibn ʿAqīl requested that ʿUmar Ibn Saʿd send a messenger to al-Ḥusayn, informing him of his fate and the instability of the Kūfans, and advising him not to trust them and not to come to Kūfa. Ibn Ziyād, who was instructed by Yazīd to strive to his utmost not to allow al-

⁵⁷ Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 282-3. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 62-7. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 339-41. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, pp. 240-1. Al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 58. Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, pp. 107-9.

Ḥusayn to enter Kūfa in order to keep him from his supporters and avoid rebellion against the Umayyad authorities, permitted Ibn Saʿd to send an envoy to al-Ḥusayn.⁵⁸

Muḥammad Ibn al-Ashʿath, who had brought Hānī to Ibn Ziyād, feared the enmity of Hānī's tribesmen because of Hānī's leading position among his people and, therefore, requested that Ibn Ziyād release Hānī. Although Ibn Ziyād had promised Ibn al-Ashʿath that he would liberate Hānī, he changed his mind and ordered Hānī to be taken to the market and beheaded. In the market, Hānī looked for help and called for his tribe to release him, but nobody dared to help him and, consequently, he was beheaded.⁵⁹

Ibn Ziyād intended to make Hānī an example for anyone who intended to oppose the Umayyad authorities. For this reason, he broke his promise to Ibn al-Ashʿath and beheaded Hānī. Furthermore, by this act, Ibn Ziyād showed to Kūfans his brutal treatment of his enemies, so that the people of Kūfa would realize the dangerous consequences of supporting or joining al-Ḥusayn.

Finally, Ibn Ziyād sent Ibn ʿAqīl's and Hānī's heads to Yazīd with a letter, informing him of his acts. Yazīd was satisfied with Ibn Ziyād's treatment of his enemies and admired his behavior and loyalty. However, Yazīd was still very concerned about al-Ḥusayn, who had decided to comply with the Kūfans' call. Therefore, Yazīd instructed Ibn Ziyād to put his troops on the roads and detain any suspicious people, and to arrest anyone who was accused of being with al-Ḥusayn. He also instructed Ibn Ziyād to write to him about any new developments.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Ibn Saʿd, *Maqatal*, p. 66. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 282. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 66. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akḥbār*, pp. 240-1.

⁵⁹ Ibn Saʿd, *Maqatal*, p. 66. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 67-8. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 340. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 284.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 4: 285-6. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 69-70. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 2: 342.

II. Part Two: Al-Ḥusayn's Route to Kūfa

As mentioned earlier, Ibn ʿAqīl wrote to al-Ḥusayn, informing him of the pledges of allegiance he had collected from the Kūfans and their readiness to sacrifice themselves for his cause, urging him to come to Kūfa as soon as his letter reached him. Upon receiving Ibn ʿAqīl's letter, al-Ḥusayn decided to go to Kūfa. A group of prominent people who mostly lived in Mecca and Medina, among whom were some Companions of the Prophet and sons of prominent Companions, disagreed with al-Ḥusayn's decision. A group of the Banū Hāshim, including Ibn ʿAbbās, Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya and Ibn Jaʿfar, requested that al-Ḥusayn stay in Mecca and not expose himself to death at the hands of the Umayyad authorities, but al-Ḥusayn refused to comply.

Ibn ʿAbbās opposed al-Ḥusayn's plan, believing that Kūfa was an unsafe place. He argued that al-Ḥusayn should depart for Kūfa only when he was sure that its inhabitants had full control over their city and had expelled their enemies from it. Since the people of Kūfa did not have full power over the situation in Kūfa, they, according to Ibn ʿAbbās' argument, were, in fact, calling him to war but, might fail to support al-Ḥusayn. In fact, Ibn ʿAbbās was not unaware of the changeable attitude of the Kūfans, given that he had witnessed their failure to support both ʿAlī and al-Ḥasan against Muʿāwiya. For this reason, he strongly disagreed with al-Ḥusayn's intention to comply with the Kūfans' call. In order to reduce the danger from the Umayyads, Ibn ʿAbbās recommended that al-Ḥusayn go to Yemen, where many supporters of ʿAlī resided. Ibn ʿAbbās also suggested that al-Ḥusayn write to the people of Kūfa while he was residing in Yemen until he

became confident of their loyalty. However, al-Ḥusayn refused Ibn ʿAbbās's suggestions and told him that he had already made his decision to go to Kūfa.⁶¹

Ibn ʿAbbās' suggestion that al-Ḥusayn reside in Yemen is likewise attributed to Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya, al-Ḥusayn's half-brother. According to Ibn Aʿtham, Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya advised al-Ḥusayn to stay in Mecca. When al-Ḥusayn refused, Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya suggested that he go to Yemen. He also advised al-Ḥusayn not to make a hasty decision but to wait for the development of affairs in Kūfa. Nevertheless, al-Ḥusayn did not listen to his brother's advice and decided to leave Mecca for Kūfa.⁶²

ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Jaʿfar tried his utmost to prevent al-Ḥusayn's departure, but failed. Al-Ṭabarī reports that while Ibn Jaʿfar was in Medina, the news of al-Ḥusayn's decision to go to Kūfa reached him. Ibn Jaʿfar sent a letter to al-Ḥusayn with his two sons, requesting that he stay in Mecca and wait for him to come. In order to protect al-Ḥusayn from any harassment by the Umayyad officials in Mecca, Ibn Jaʿfar succeeded in securing safe-conduct for him from the governor of Mecca. Nevertheless, al-Ḥusayn refused the governor's guarantee of security and decided to continue his journey to Kūfa.⁶³

It should be noted that these prominent members of the Banū Hahsim who advised al-Ḥusayn to stay in Mecca did not recommend that he recognize Yazīd's caliphate or put his hand in Yazīd's; rather, they merely advised him not to go to Kūfa but to take refuge in any other place.

Another group of prominent persons, on the other hand, also disagreed with al-Ḥusayn's decision to go to Kūfa but were of the opinion that al-Ḥusayn should pay

⁶¹ Ibid., 3: 373-4. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 288. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, pp. 243-4. Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 110. Ibn Saʿd briefly mentions this account. Ibn Saʿd, *Maqatal*, p. 56.

⁶² Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 22.

⁶³ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4:291-2.

homage to Yazīd. Although they criticized Yazīd for his violation of Islamic principles, did not acknowledge his entitlement to the caliphate and also admitted al-Ḥusayn's higher status given his close relationship to the Prophet, they disagreed with al-Ḥusayn's revolt against Yazīd. They predicted that al-Ḥusayn would be killed at the hands of the Umayyad authorities if he rose against Yazīd, and that this would cause damage to the Muslim community. Therefore, they believed that if al-Ḥusayn swore allegiance to Yazīd it would be better for the community than to revolt against him. They thought that al-Ḥusayn should agree to whatever the community (*jamā'a*) agreed upon and, therefore, tried to persuade him not to comply with the call of the inhabitants of Kūfa. They recommended that al-Ḥusayn stay in his home and pay homage to Yazīd.

In this respect, Ibn Sa'd collects many names of those inhabitants of Mecca and Medina, who asked al-Ḥusayn not to revolt against Yazīd and advised him to go back and stay in his home. For instance, Ibn Sa'd relates that 'Abd Allāh Ibn 'Amr Ibn 'Ayyāsh (d. 67/686) asked both al-Ḥusayn and Ibn al-Zubayr to return to Medina and enter in whatever the people had agreed upon.⁶⁴ Ibn Sa'd, who usually does not comment on his reports, in this case gives his own opinion. He concurs with Ibn 'Umar's opinion that whatever the people (*al-jamā'a*) agree upon is better than rebellion, even if they recognize that Yazīd lacks the qualifications for the caliphate and, therefore, has no entitlement to it. Ibn Sa'd narrates that Ibn 'Umar is reported to have said that given that al-Ḥusayn witnessed the Kūfans' failure to support his father and his brother, he should not revolt against the caliph for the rest of his life and should enter in whatever the people

⁶⁴ Ibn Sa'd, *Maqtal*, p. 57.

agreed upon. Ibn ʿUmar clearly expressed his opinion by stating, “*al-jamāʿa* is better than uprising.”⁶⁵

As mentioned earlier, Ibn ʿUmar was one of the four prominent nobles of Medina who refused to acknowledge Yazīd’s accession and opposed Muʿāwīya’s desire to nominate his son as his successor. However, Ibn ʿUmar was a man of peace and worship, as described by Muʿāwīya in his will to Yazīd. Therefore, when he was asked by Muʿāwīya, and later by the governor of Medina to swear allegiance to Yazīd, he responded that he would recognize Yazīd’s caliphate only when all the people had paid homage to him. By opposing al-Ḥusayn’s decision to revolt and by recognizing Yazīd’s caliphate eventhough while it was illegitimate, Ibn ʿUmar, in fact, was trying to avoid turmoil and bloodshed within the community.

Moreover, Ibn Saʿd depicts al-Ḥusayn as somebody looking out for his own interests by revolting against Yazīd. He reports that Ibn ʿUmar advised al-Ḥusayn not to go to Kūfa, telling him that his grandfather had preferred the hereafter to this world, and stating, “You will not get this world.”⁶⁶ Ibn Saʿd is presenting Sunnī perspective when he reports that al-Ḥusayn was revolting against his Imām and that, consequently, he was killing himself. He narrates that Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī (d. 74/693), a companion of the Prophet, asked al-Ḥusayn to be God-fearing, not to revolt against his Imām, Yazīd, and to stay in his home.⁶⁷ In another account, Ibn Saʿd narrates that Abū Wāqid al-Laythī (d. 73/692)) received the news of al-Ḥusayn’s departure to Kūfa in grief and commented that he was killing himself.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

Full details of al-Ḥusayn's conversation with Ibn ʿUmar and Ibn ʿAbbās are provided by Ibn Aʿtham, who, in this respect, presents Shīʿī point of view. He reports that Ibn ʿUmar and Ibn ʿAbbās were already at Mecca when al-Ḥusayn left Medina and reached Mecca. Ibn ʿUmar warned al-Ḥusayn about the animosity of the Umayyads and that he might be killed at the hands of Yazīd's supporters, and, therefore, asked him to pay homage to Yazīd in order to save his life. Al-Ḥusayn responded that he would neither pay homage to Yazīd nor make any compromise with him, reminding him that the Umayyad officials had expelled him from his residence and intended to murder him. Ibn ʿAbbās agreed with al-Ḥusayn's statement and declared that whoever fought against al-Ḥusayn was, in fact, fighting the Prophet, and, moreover, expressed his readiness to fight with him. Ibn ʿUmar disagreed with Ibn ʿAbbās' position and asserted to al-Ḥusayn that if he stayed at home he would be safe from the Umayyads, even if he did not swear allegiance to Yazīd. Al-Ḥusayn dismissed Ibn ʿUmar's assertion and insisted that the Umayyad authorities would not leave him alone until he had pledged allegiance to Yazīd or they had killed him. Al-Ḥusayn also asked Ibn ʿUmar to support him.⁶⁹

As for Ibn ʿAbbās, Ibn Aʿtham contradicts other sources when he reports that he expressed his readiness to support al-Ḥusayn's uprising against Yazīd. Ibn ʿAbbās, as noted above, strongly disagreed with al-Ḥusayn's decision to comply with the Kūfans' call. As for Ibn ʿUmar, according to al-Ḥusayn, his responsibility was to stand against the illegitimate caliph. Yazīd, as mentioned previously, was not unaware of the fact that his caliphate would not be legitimate unless it was recognized by the four sons of the Ṣaḥāba.

⁶⁹ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 26-9.

The questions that need to be answered at this juncture are as follows: Why did he refuse Ibn al-Zubayr's offer to stay in Mecca with all the people, including Ibn al-Zubayr himself, offering to swear allegiance to him and support him?⁷⁰ Why was al-Ḥusayn insistent on leaving Mecca and why did he refuse to listen to all those who advised him to stay there? Why did he not pay heed to prominent nobles, such as Ibn ʿUmar and Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī, when they advised him to stay in his home in Medina?

According to some accounts, al-Ḥusayn, because of his refusal to acknowledge Yazīd's caliphate, believed that he would be killed by the Umayyads if he remained in Mecca. Both Ibn Saʿd and Ibn Aʿtham narrate that when Ibn ʿAbbās advised al-Ḥusayn to stay there, al-Ḥusayn refused to comply, explaining that he would prefer to be killed outside Mecca so as not to violate its sanctity.⁷¹

Moreover, al-Ḥusayn was confident that the Umayyad authorities would murder him wherever he lived if he insisted on refusing to recognize Yazīd's caliphate. Ibn Aʿtham narrates that when Ibn Jaʿfar told al-Ḥusayn not to rush in going to Kūfa, promising him that he would secure safe-conduct for him from the Banū Umayya, al-Ḥusayn responded that the Umayyad authorities would not leave him alone until he acknowledged Yazīd's caliphate or until they had killed him wherever he might be.⁷²

Ibn Aʿtham also reports that a man from Kūfa called Abū Hūdha al-Azdī met with al-Ḥusayn on the way to Kūfa, in a place called al-Thaʿlabiyya. Al-Azdī was astonished that al-Ḥusayn had left Mecca and Medina and was going to Kūfa. When al-Azdī asked why

⁷⁰ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 375. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 289.

⁷¹ Ibn Saʿd, *Maqātīl*, p. 61. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 73-4.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 3: 74.

he had left the holy cities, al-Ḥusayn replied that the Umayyad officials were looking for him in order to kill him and that, eventually, they would achieve their goal.⁷³

Al-Ḥusayn's conviction that the Umayyad officials had arranged to assassinate him in Mecca is supported by al-Ṭabarī and al-Balādhurī. They report that when Ibn al-Zubayr asked al-Ḥusayn to stay in Mecca--asserting that all the people including himself would swear allegiance to him--al-Ḥusayn declined his offer, explaining that he would prefer to be killed outside Mecca in order to protect its sanctity.⁷⁴ In another account, al-Ṭabarī narrates that al-Ḥusayn claimed that the Umayyad authorities would not leave him alone until they had killed him.⁷⁵

For this reason, he did not listen to the advice of his associates, including the Banū Hāshim, and decided to leave Mecca. However, it should be noted once again that those Banū Hāshim who advised him to stay in Mecca did not insist that he recognize Yazīd's caliphate or that he put his hand in Yazīd's; rather they recommended that he take refuge somewhere other than Kūfa.

Now the question is: Why did al-Ḥusayn not follow Ibn ʿAbbās and Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya's advice to go to Yemen, where he would have found many supporters and would have been more safe from the Umayyad danger?

After the abdication of al-Ḥasan, as mentioned earlier, the people of Kūfa, on many occasions, requested al-Ḥusayn to fight against Muʿāwiya. Al-Ḥusayn, however, refused, asking them to wait until after Muʿāwiya's death. After Muʿāwiya's demise, the people of Kūfa repeated their demand that he lead them in order to establish justice and remove the corruption caused by Yazīd. Then al-Ḥusayn agreed to comply with the Kūfans' call and

⁷³ Ibid., 79.

⁷⁴ Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 289. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 375.

⁷⁵ Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 296.

to protest against the legitimacy of Yazīd's caliphate. Since al-Ḥusayn had received a confirmation from his cousin Ibn ʿAqīl that, before Ibn Ziyād's arrival, the people of Kūfa had rejected Yazīd's caliphate and expressed their readiness to support him, al-Ḥusayn believed that he was obliged to go there.

Al-Balādhurī tells us, on the authority of al-Shaʿbī, that when Ibn ʿUmar advised al-Ḥusayn not to go to Iraq, he responded that he had received the Kūfans' letters and their allegiance to his cause and, therefore, it was his duty to comply.⁷⁶ For this reason, al-Ḥusayn refused to listen to those who advised him not to go to Kūfa, even if his decision ended in dangerous consequences. The horrible consequence of al-Ḥusayn's killing at the hands of the Umayyad officials was also expected by ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Muṭīʿ (d. 74/693), who is reported to have told al-Ḥusayn that, if he remained in Ḥijāz, all the people would swear allegiance to him, but, if he decided to go to Kūfa, he would be killed by the Umayyads and that all the people would become slaves after his death. However, al-Ḥusayn refused to listen to Ibn Muṭīʿ's advice and decided to continue his journey to Kūfa.⁷⁷

Even ʿAmr Ibn Saʿīd, the governor of Mecca, according to some sources, tried to prevent al-Ḥusayn from leaving Mecca, demanding that he should not answer the Kūfans' call. Ibn Saʿīd predicted that, because of his sedition, al-Ḥusayn would be killed. He also confirmed to al-Ḥusayn that he would be safe from any harassment if he stayed in Mecca. Al-Ḥusayn declared that he was not seeking treason, but rather, that his departure from

⁷⁶ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 375.

⁷⁷ Ibid. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 261. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 24. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akḥbār*, pp. 228-9.

Mecca was for the sake of God and for practicing good deeds. He also rejected Ibn Saʿīd's assertion that he would be safe in Mecca.⁷⁸

According to this account, ʿAmr Ibn Saʿīd used a gentle approach with al-Ḥusayn to prevent him from going to Kūfa, although he believed that al-Ḥusayn was going to make a mutiny among the community and that, consequently, he would be killed because of his sedition. Furthermore, Ibn Saʿīd confirmed to al-Ḥusayn that he would be safe if he remained in Mecca. Many questions may arise in this respect: Would Ibn Saʿīd have been satisfied with al-Ḥusayn's residing in Mecca without paying homage to Yazīd? Could he have opposed Yazīd's instruction that al-Ḥusayn should pay homage to him without any compromise? Did Ibn Saʿīd intend to prevent al-Ḥusayn from reaching Kūfa by telling him that he would be safe with him? As mentioned earlier, al-Ḥusayn had left his residence in Medina because the governor of Medina had tried to force him to pay homage to Yazīd, according to Yazīd's instruction. In fact, Ibn Saʿīd would not have been satisfied with al-Ḥusayn's remaining in Mecca unless he had sworn allegiance to Yazīd. Otherwise, Ibn Saʿīd would have brought upon himself the wrath of the caliph and, consequently, would have lost his office, as had happened to the governor of Medina.

However, a different account of this event is narrated by al-Ṭabarī and al-Balādhurī. They report that when al-Ḥusayn was leaving Mecca, the governor's men tried to prevent him from continuing his journey, asking him to stay in Mecca. When al-Ḥusayn refused to stop his journey to Kūfa, a small fight took place between the governor's men and al-

⁷⁸ Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 291-2. Ibn Saʿīd, *Maqātīl*, p. 59. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 75. In his narration, on the authority of Abū Mikhnaḥ, al-Ṭabarī states that ʿAmr Ibn Saʿīd wrote to al-Ḥusayn upon the request of Ibn Jaʿfar.

Ḥusayn's followers; they came to blows and hit one another with whips. Finally, al-Ḥusayn succeeded in leaving Mecca.⁷⁹

According to this account, the intention of the governor of Mecca was to prevent al-Ḥusayn from reaching Kūfa and, perhaps, to put him under his control in order to force him to pay homage to Yazīd. Probably, because of the leading position of al-Ḥusayn among the people and his close relationship to the Prophet, the governor of Mecca, like some other people mentioned above, realized that al-Ḥusayn's decision to go to Kūfa would bring about a confrontation with the Umayyad authorities, leading to al-Ḥusayn's murder. And, his murder would have dreadful consequences not only for the community, but for the Umayyad officials as well. For this reason, the governor of Mecca tried his utmost to prevent this outcome.

Perhaps for the same reason, Marwān, if we accept Ibn Saʿd's account, warned Ibn Ziyād against committing any harm to al-Ḥusayn. Ibn Saʿd reports that when al-Ḥusayn departed from Mecca, Marwān Ibn al-Ḥakam wrote to Ibn Ziyād, informing him that al-Ḥusayn was heading to him: "He is the son of Fāṭima and Fāṭima was the daughter of the Prophet;" warning him against doing mischief to al-Ḥusayn, as such actions would not be forgotten by the masses.⁸⁰ Ibn Aʿtham also reports that the governor of Medina, al-Walīd, wrote a letter to Ibn Ziyād, warning him against harming al-Ḥusayn.⁸¹ Muʿāwiya himself, in fact, was not unaware of the dreadful potential effect of al-Ḥusayn's killing. As mentioned previously, Muʿāwiya, in his will, warned Yazīd against committing any harm to al-Ḥusayn in the event the people of Kūfa called him to rise against him.

⁷⁹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 289. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 375.

⁸⁰ Ibn Saʿd, *Maqtal*, p. 62.

⁸¹ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 78.

During his journey from Mecca to Kūfa, al-Ḥusayn passed by many places and met with many people. One was al-Farazdaq, the famous poet, who was coming from Kūfa to Mecca for pilgrimage. Al-Farazdaq was astonished that al-Ḥusayn was leaving Mecca during the time of pilgrimage. When he asked him about the reason for his departure, al-Ḥusayn responded that he would be killed if he remained in Mecca and performed the pilgrimage. However, al-Ḥusayn wanted to investigate the situation of the Kūfans to see if they were still loyal to him. When al-Ḥusayn asked about the Kūfans, al-Farazdaq responded, "Their hearts are with you, but their swords are with the Banū Umayyad," and al-Ḥusayn did not deny this statement.⁸²

The questions that present themselves here are: Why did al-Ḥusayn decide to continue his journey, although he was informed, through al-Farazdaq's statement, that the Kūfans had no determination to support him and fight for him? Why did he not change his plan and go to Yemen, where he would have found more supporters? Before making his decision, al-Ḥusayn perhaps wanted to be more confident about the Kūfans' attitude.

When al-Ḥusayn passed by a place called al-Tan'īm, he encountered a caravan coming from Yemen loaded with jewelry and other goods. The caravan had been sent to Yazīd by his governor in Yemen, Baḥr Ibn Raysān. Al-Ḥusayn seized the goods in the caravan and distributed them amongst his followers. He also gave those who were in charge of the caravan the option of joining him in his journey to Kūfa or of leaving him, after he had given them their fees.⁸³ Why did al-Ḥusayn seize the property of the caravan which did not belong to him? Did he need to distribute it among his men in order to

⁸² Al-Ṭabarī, on the authority of ʿAwāna, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 290. An account similar to al-Ṭabarī's is narrated by Ibn Sa'd with a different chain of authorities. *Maqal*, p. 63. Al-Farazdaq's meeting with al-Ḥusayn is also narrated by Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 80, al-Dīnawarī, *Akhhbār*, p. 245 and al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 376-7, but they do not mention al-Ḥusayn's reply that he would be killed if he did not leave Mecca.

⁸³ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 375-6. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 289-90. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhhbār*, p. 245.

strengthen his cause? Perhaps he believed that this property did not belong to Yazīd, since he was not a legitimate caliph and had, therefore, no right to take it.

While al-Ḥusayn was heading towards Iraq, Ibn Ziyād, after killing Ibn ʿAqīl and Hānī, brought Kūfa under full control. He blocked all the roads leading from the Ḥijāz to Kūfa and gave strict orders forbidding anyone from entering or leaving the territory of Kūfa. He sent al-Ḥuṣayn Ibn al-Numayr, the commander of the bodyguard (*shurṭa*), to al-Qādisiyya, the normal route that links Kūfa with the Ḥijāz. Similarly, other areas which linked Kūfa to Baṣra and other parts of Iraq were heavily patrolled by the Umayyad cavalry.⁸⁴

Unaware of Ibn ʿAqīl's fate, al-Ḥusayn, when he reached a place called al-Ḥājir, dispatched Qays Ibn Mushir al-Ṣaydāwī with a letter to the Kūfans, informing them of his coming. In his letter, al-Ḥusayn said, "Ibn ʿAqīl's letter came to me, informing me of your sound judgment and the agreement of your leaders to support us and to seek our rights," and he told them that he had left Mecca. Al-Ḥusayn also instructed them to be united and watchful in their affairs, because he was coming to them within the next few days. Qays went towards Kūfa and when he reached al-Qādisiyya, Ibn Numayr apprehended him and sent him to Ibn Ziyād. Realizing that he was al-Ḥusayn's messenger to the Kūfans, Ibn Ziyād ordered Qays to curse al-Ḥusayn on the pulpit. Contrary to Ibn Ziyād's order, Qays praised al-Ḥusayn and told the Kūfans of his coming. He also urged them to be ready for al-Ḥusayn's arrival and to support him. However, Ibn Ziyād ordered him to be thrown from the roof of the palace, and he was killed.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 263. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 297. 3: 378. Ibn Sa'd, *Maqtal*, p. 68.

⁸⁵ Ibid. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 297-8. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 378.

Different contents of al-Ḥusayn's letter to the Kūfans are narrated by Ibn A'ṭham. In his letter, al-Ḥusayn, according to Ibn A'ṭham, stated that one of the religious duties of any Muslim is to rise up against an oppressive ruler who changes God's norms, opposes the Sunna of the Prophet and rules the people with injustice and aggression. He also reminded them that they had pledged allegiance to him and had expressed their readiness to support him, and asked them to keep their allegiances and promises. Qays tore up the letter before he was detained by Ibn Ziyād's men. When Ibn Ziyād asked him about the names stipulated in this letter, Qays refused to tell him and, finally, was thrown from the top of the palace.⁸⁶

Al-Ḥusayn, according to Ibn A'ṭham's account, confirmed that it was not only his responsibility to revolt against the illegitimate Umayyad authorities, but the duty of all Muslims to rise against them and fight for his cause.

According to al-Ṭabarī and al-Balādhurī, al-Ḥusayn dispatched 'Abd Allāh Ibn Yaqtur, his step-brother, with a letter to Ibn 'Aqīl, without knowing that the latter had already been killed. The cavalry of Ibn Numayr met him at al-Qādisiyya and sent him to Ibn Ziyād. Ibn Ziyād ordered him to be thrown from the roof of the palace when Ibn Yaqtur refused to curse al-Ḥusayn. Before his death, he asked the Kūfans to support al-Ḥusayn against Ibn Ziyād, "the son of Marjāna, the grandson of Sumayya, a man who claims a false grandfather."⁸⁷

According to Ibn Sa'd, al-Ḥusayn dispatched Ibn Yaqtur to Kūfa while he was in Mecca and Ibn Ziyād executed Ibn Yaqtur the very day he arrived in Kūfa.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Ibn A'ṭham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 81-82.

⁸⁷ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, 4: 300. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 379.

⁸⁸ Ibn Sa'd, *Maqtal*, p. 65.

On the other hand, Ibn A^ctham mentions the name “Ibn Yaqṭīn” instead of “Ibn Yaqṭur,” and reports that he was apprehended by Ibn Numayr, the leader of Ibn Ziyād’s forces, while Ibn Yaqṭur was leaving Kūfa. Ibn Numayr found a letter with him addressed to al-Ḥusayn from Ibn ^cAqīl, telling al-Ḥusayn that more than twenty thousand of the Kūfans had pledged their allegiance to him and urging him to come in haste.⁸⁹

From al-Ḥusayn’s letters to the Kūfans, it is obvious that he was aware of their changeable character, since they had disappointed his father and his brother, and he wanted to be sure that they were still loyal to him and ready to support him, so that he could rely on them.

Al-Ḥusayn not only sought to have as many supporters as he could in order to strengthen his position for the expected confrontation with the Umayyads, but also wanted to explain to everyone he met in his journey to Kūfa the reason for his uprising and demand that they fulfill their duty by supporting him against the oppressive authorities. Therefore, whenever al-Ḥusayn met with a group of people or an individual during his journey, he invited them to join him.

Al-Ṭabarī and al-Dīnawarī report that al-Ḥusayn met Ibn Muṭī^c for the second time when he reached one of the watering places of the Arabs. When Ibn Muṭī^c asked why al-Ḥusayn had come to such a place, he explained that the Kūfans had written to him urging him to lead them against the Umayyads and that it was his obligation to answer their call. Aware of the ruthless treatment of the Umayyads toward their opponents, Ibn Muṭī^c feared that al-Ḥusayn would be killed. Ibn Muṭī^c expressed his anxiety that if they dared to kill al-Ḥusayn, they would never hesitate to kill anyone after him. Therefore, Ibn Muṭī^c

⁸⁹ Ibn A^ctham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 50-1.

continued, "It will be the sacredness of Islam that is violated, the sacredness of the Quraysh and the sacredness of the Arabs." He also requested that al-Ḥusayn not confront the Umayyad authorities, but al-Ḥusayn did not listen to his warning and decided to continue his journey.⁹⁰

Zuhayr Ibn al-Qayn was traveling from Mecca along with his wife and followers and was taking the same route as al-Ḥusayn. He is reported to have been reluctant to travel alongside al-Ḥusayn and tried to avoid meeting him at every halting place. In a place called Zarūd, Zuhayr had no choice but to stop near al-Ḥusayn's camp. Al-Ḥusayn seized this opportunity and sent his messenger to Zuhayr, calling him for a meeting. Zuhayr was surprised and was reluctant to accept al-Ḥusayn's call, but his wife urged him to go and listen to the Prophet's grandson. Zuhayr went to al-Ḥusayn and it was not long before he returned and announced that he would join al-Ḥusayn. He explained to his companions that he was obligated to fight alongside the grandson of the Prophet and turned to them stating, "Whoever wants to follow me may do so, and otherwise, it is the end of our association."⁹¹

Although Zuhayr was reluctant to meet with al-Ḥusayn, when he finally met with him, he decided to join him and fight for him, and, later on, sacrificed himself for the sake of his cause. Most probably, al-Ḥusayn explained to Zuhayr the reason for his revolt against the Umayyads and Zuhayr's duty to join him.

When al-Ḥusayn reached Qaṣr Banī Muqātil, ʿUbayd Allāh Ibn al-Ḥurr al-Juʿfī (d.73/692), a brave and prominent person from Kūfa, was already there. When al-Juʿfī heard of al-Ḥusayn's coming to Kūfa, he left it in order not to be involved in the

⁹⁰ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 298. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhhbār*, pp. 246

⁹¹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 298-9. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 378-9. Al-Balādhurī states that Zuhayr was an ʿUthmānid.

expecting fighting. Although al-Ju'fī admitted al-Ḥusayn's merits and his relationship to the Prophet, he was reluctant to be killed with him and, therefore, tried to avoid meeting him. When al-Ḥusayn asked al-Ju'fī to join him, al-Ju'fī replied that he did not want to fight. Then al-Ḥusayn warned him not to fight against the family of the Prophet, affirming, "By God! Anyone who hears our cry and does not help us, he will not be spared from God's wrath," and al-Ju'fī confirmed that he would never fight against the family of the Prophet.⁹²

Al-Ṭabarī and al-Balādhurī narrate that whenever al-Ḥusayn passed by a watering place, the people followed him.⁹³ Among those who joined him after they had finished their pilgrimage were 'Abd Allāh Ibn Sulaym and al-Madharī Ibn Mashmal. They are reported as saying that when they approached al-Ḥusayn's camp at Zarūd, they noticed a man coming from Kūfa. When the man recognized al-Ḥusayn's camp from a distance, he avoided meeting al-Ḥusayn and changed his route. Noticing this, al-Ḥusayn wanted to talk to the man in order to investigate the situation in Kūfa and asked the two newcomers to follow him and make inquiries. He told them that Ibn 'Aqīl and Hānī had been killed and dragged by their legs into the market place. When they told al-Ḥusayn about the fate of Ibn 'Aqīl and Hānī, they exhorted him not to go to Kūfa because there were no more supporters for him. At this point, al-Ḥusayn summoned Ibn 'Aqīl's brothers, informing them of his death, and asked their opinion. They all declared that they would not go back until they had taken vengeance for their brothers or faced the same fate. Therefore, al-Ḥusayn decided to continue his journey.⁹⁴

⁹² Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 307-8. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 384. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, pp. 250-1. Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 83-4. It should be noted that Ibn A'tham's narration contains many unimportant additions.

⁹³ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 300. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 379.

⁹⁴ Ibid. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 299-300. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 247. Al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 60.

Ibn Sa'd narrates that when the news of the deaths of Ibn 'Aqīl and Hānī reached al-Ḥusayn, his son, 'Alī al-Akbar, asked him to abandon his decision and go back to Medina. He mentioned the disloyalty and treachery of the Kūfans and argued that there would be no more support for al-Ḥusayn in Kūfa. Ibn 'Aqīl's brothers disagreed with him and decided to go to Kūfa and fight their enemies, urging al-Ḥusayn to continue his journey. Hearing this, al-Ḥusayn turned to his followers and asked for their opinions. All agreed that the Kūfans would disappoint him. Al-Ḥusayn, however, did not listen to his son's and his followers' opinions and decided to continue his journey. But he permitted whoever wanted to, to withdraw from him. Ibn Sa'd states that most of those who had joined al-Ḥusayn during his journey withdrew.⁹⁵ In his account, which is not supported by other sources, Ibn Sa'd wants to tell us that al-Ḥusayn's decision to continue his journey to Kūfa was even opposed by his son and his followers.⁹⁶

Al-Ḥusayn, according to al-Ṭabarī and al-Balādhurī, waited until the news of the death of his step-brother, Ibn Yaqtur, came to him in a place called Zubāla. There al-Ḥusayn read a written statement to his followers. He informed them about the deaths of Ibn 'Aqīl, Hānī and Ibn Yaqtur, and said, "Our Shī'a have deserted us. Those of you who would prefer to leave us, may leave freely without guilt." The people started to disperse until there were left with him only those followers who had come with him from Medina."⁹⁷

According to the above-mentioned accounts, al-Ḥusayn was not quite sure about his journey to Kūfa when he had received news of the killing of Ibn 'Aqīl and Hānī. He decided to go to Kūfa only to avenge Ibn 'Aqīl's death, although he was acquainted with

⁹⁵ Ibn Sa'd, *Maqtal*, pp. 67-8.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, 4: 300-1. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 379-80. See also, al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 247.

the fact that the Kūfans would fail him in his battle against the Umayyads. Moreover, al-Ḥusayn, according to Ibn Saʿd's account, asked his followers to withdraw from him despite the fact that he was more in need of their support at this time. The most important questions in this juncture are: Why did al-Ḥusayn decide to go on to Kūfa even though he had received news of Ibn ʿAqīl's death and had become more confident that the Kūfans would fail to support him in his fight? Was he really satisfied with the opinion of Ibn ʿAqīl's brothers to seek revenge for Ibn ʿAqīl's killing and to die like him?

Al-Ṭabarī states that al-Ḥusayn permitted his followers to withdraw from him because he realized that most of the Arabs followed him only because they thought that there would be no fight; they believed that al-Ḥusayn was going to a subdued land where the obedience of its inhabitants to him had already been assured. Additionally, al-Ṭabarī asserts that, al-Ḥusayn wanted in his company only those persons who were fully aware of the danger they were facing and who were prepared to share his fate and to die with him.⁹⁸ According to al-Ṭabarī's statement, al-Ḥusayn was not unaware that he and his followers were going to face death, and, therefore, he wanted them to be conscious of their fate. Al-Ṭabarī asserts that al-Ḥusayn was fully aware of the unreliable character of the Kūfans and that he would face death if he complied with their call and went to Kūfa. He narrates that, when he learned about al-Ḥusayn's intention to continue his journey, Lūdhān, who met with al-Ḥusayn on his way to Kūfa, advised him not to approach the city. Lūdhān told al-Ḥusayn that he would not come to anything but the points of spears and the edges of swords. He opined, "If those who sent for you were enough to support you in battle and had prepared the ground for you, and you had then come to them, that

⁹⁸ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 301.

would have been a wise decision. However, in light of the new situation, I do not think that you ought to do it.” Al-Ḥusayn confirmed to him that the wise decision was not hidden from him, commenting, “The command of God cannot be resisted.”⁹⁹

According to al-Ḥusayn’s statements, he believed that the Umayyad authorities would not leave him alone until he had either submitted to Yazīd or been killed. And, al-Ḥusayn’s obligation was not to recognize the illegitimate caliph, but rather to fight against him. Therefore, al-Ḥusayn perhaps preferred to be killed in fighting the Umayyad authorities even without supporters.

As noted earlier, Ibn Ziyād sent Ibn Numayr al-Tamīmī, who was in charge of his police, to take up position at al-Qādisiyya, place lookouts and control the area from al-Qādisiyya to Kūfa. Al-Ḥurr Ibn Yazīd al-Tamīmī was sent in advance from al-Qādisiyya with one thousand mounted men to prevent al-Ḥusayn from entering Kūfa. Some of al-Ḥusayn’s followers saw al-Ḥurr’s cavalry vanguard from a distance, and when they told al-Ḥusayn, he asked them for a place of refuge in case there was a fight. Following the advice of his followers, al-Ḥusayn turned left toward Dhū Ḥusum, a well-fortified place near Karbalā’. When al-Ḥurr and his cavalry reached al-Ḥusayn, the latter ordered his attendants to provide the one thousand horsemen and their mounts with water to drink. However, al-Ḥurr positioned his forces opposite al-Ḥusayn’s until the time for the midday prayer drew near. Al-Ḥusayn seized this opportunity to explain to the people the reason for his coming and addressed them:

I did not come to you until your letters were brought to me by your messengers, informing me that you had no Imām and urging me to come so that, through me, God might unite you under guidance and truth. Since this was your view, I have come to you. Therefore, if you give me what

⁹⁹ Ibid.

you guaranteed in your covenants and sworn testimonies, I will come to your town. If you will not and are reluctant about my coming, I will leave you and go back to the place from which I came.

Nobody answered al-Ḥusayn and they remained silent before him, and al-Ḥurr and his horsemen joined al-Ḥusayn in his prayer.¹⁰⁰

According to al-Ṭabarī, on the authority of Hishām al-Kalbī, after finishing the prayer, al-Ḥusayn reminded the people of his relationship to the Prophet and again wanted to clarify to them the reason for his coming, but this time he wanted to know their response. He turned his face to al-Ḥurr's men and said:

We are the family (*ahl al-bayt*) of Muḥammad and as such are more entitled to the authority (*wilāyah*) of this government (*amr*) over you than these pretenders who claim what does not belong to them. They have brought tyranny and aggression among you. If you dislike us, or do not know our rights, and if your view has now changed from what came to us in your letters and what your messengers brought, then I will leave you.¹⁰¹

In his statement, al-Ḥusayn confirmed that, given his relationship to the Prophet, he was more entitled to the caliphate than Yazīd, who did not follow in the footsteps of the Prophet and who had no entitlement to the caliphate. He asserted that Yazīd's caliphate was illegitimate and that the Umayyad authorities brought injustice to the community. Al-Ḥusayn once again informed al-Ḥurr and his men that he had gone to Kūfa only when he received the letters and messengers of the Kūfans, inviting him to be their leader and lead them against the Umayyads.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 4: 303. Al-Ṭabarī, The Caliphate of Yazīd b. Mu'āwiya, *The History of al-Ṭabarī (Ta'rikh al-Rusul wal-Mulūk)*. XIX. Translated and annotated by I.K. Howard, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990, p. 93. Ibn A'ṭham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 85-8. Al-Balādhurī, 3: 380. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, pp. 248-50. Ibn Sa'd, *Maqtal*, p. 68. In his very brief narration, Ibn Sa'd states that al-Ḥusayn Ibn Tamīm sent al-Ḥurr with one thousand men to prevent al-Ḥusayn from reaching Kūfa and to aggravate him.

¹⁰¹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 303. Al-Ṭabarī, The Caliphate of Yazīd b. Mu'āwiya, *The History of al-Ṭabarī (Ta'rikh al-Rusul wal-Mulūk)*. XIX, p. 94. See also Ibn A'ṭham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 88.

However, al-Ḥurr responded that he had no idea about the letters and messages of the Kūfans. Al-Ḥusayn asked ʿUqba Ibn Simʿān, his wife's *mawlā*, to bring out the two saddlebags in which the letters were kept, and scattered them in front of al-Ḥurr. Al-Ḥurr confirmed that he was not among those who wrote to al-Ḥusayn and told him that he had been ordered by Ibn Ziyād to prevent him from entering Kūfa and to take him to Ibn Ziyād. Al-Ḥusayn strongly refused to submit to al-Ḥurr, stating, "Death is nearer than what you are demanding," and ordered his followers to rise and depart. When they set off, al-Ḥurr's men stopped them. Al-Ḥusayn insisted that he would not follow him and al-Ḥurr also affirmed that he would not let al-Ḥusayn go anywhere else. When their conversation got more intense and fighting between the two sides was about to commence, al-Ḥurr tried to avoid confrontation with al-Ḥusayn and to reach a compromise. He told him that he was not ordered to fight against him, but rather to take him to Ibn Ziyād. Al-Ḥusayn accepted al-Ḥurr's suggestion that he should not take any road that would either bring him into Kūfa or take him back to Medina until al-Ḥurr received new orders from Ibn Ziyād.¹⁰²

Al-Ḥusayn, therefore, set off with his followers with al-Ḥurr's men marching by him. In one of the halting places, al-Ḥusayn seized the opportunity provided to describe the real character of the Umayyad rule, its tyranny and its violation of Islamic codes. He also declared that the religious duty of any Muslim is to rise up against an oppressive ruler who changes God's norms, opposes the Sunna of the Prophet and rules the people by injustice and aggression. Al-Ḥusayn referred to the Prophet's statement:

¹⁰² Ibid., 3: 89. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 303-4. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 380-1. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhhbār*, pp. 249-50.

When anyone sees a tyrannical ruler making permissible what God has forbidden, violating God's covenant, and opposing the Sunna of the Apostle of God by acting against the servants of God sinfully and with hostility, when anyone sees all these incidents and does not reproach him by deed or by word, it is God's decree to make that person subject to the same fate as that ruler.¹⁰³

Since the Umayyad rulers, according to al-Ḥusayn, were an obvious example of an oppressive authority and since he was from the family of the Prophet, al-Ḥusayn believed that he was more responsible than any other Muslim for changing this situation:

Indeed, these authorities [the Umayyads] have adhered to obedience to Satan and have abandoned the Merciful; they have made corruption visible; they neglect the punishment (*ḥudūd*) laid down by God; they have seized the booty (*fay'*) exclusively for themselves; they have permitted what God has forbidden, and they have forbidden what He has permitted. I am more responsible for changing this than anyone else.¹⁰⁴

Al-Ḥusayn, according to al-Ṭabarī and Ibn A'ṭham, again reminded the assembly of their letters and their promises to support him, asking them to fulfill their pledges of allegiance to him. He affirmed that he would lead them to the right path if they fulfilled their promises and did not break their allegiance. He said:

Your letters were brought to me, and your messengers came to me with your oath of allegiance that you would not hand me over or desert me. If you fulfill your promises, you will arrive at the right path, for I am al-Ḥusayn Ibn 'Alī, the son of Fāṭima, the daughter of the Prophet. My life is with your lives; my family is with your families. In me, you have a perfect example (*uswa*). However, if you break your covenant and rebuke the oath

¹⁰³ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 304. Al-Ṭabarī, The Caliphate of Yazīd b. Mu'āwiya, *The History of al-Ṭabarī (Ta'rikh al-Rusul wal-Mulūk)*. XIX, p. 95.

¹⁰⁴ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 304-5. Al-Ṭabarī, The Caliphate of Yazīd b. Mu'āwiya, *The History of al-Ṭabarī (Ta'rikh al-Rusul wal-Mulūk)*. XIX, pp. 95-96. Ibn A'ṭham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 91. Ibn A'ṭham reports that al-Ḥusayn sent his statement to his supporters in Kūfa with his messenger Qays Ibn Mushir. Al-Balādhurī mentions this statement briefly. *Ansāb*, 3: 381

of allegiance that you have given, it is not a thing that is unknown of you. You have done it to my father, my brother and my cousin.¹⁰⁵

Since al-Ḥusayn received no answer from al-Ḥurr's men, he realized that he would not be able to expect support from the Kūfans. He decided to reach no compromise with the Umayyad authorities and that battle would be the upshot of his journey. Al-Ḥusayn, therefore, turning to his remaining followers, declared his determination to fight and explained to them the duty of the believer. He said that he could not live with the illegitimate caliphate without enjoining good and forbidding evil, and that he preferred to die than to live under tyrannical authorities (the Umayyads). He affirmed that this was the duty of any believer. Al-Ṭabarī reports, on the authority of °Uqba, that al-Ḥusayn addressed his followers:

You see what this matter has come to. In deed, the world has changed, and it has changed for the worse... Can you not see that truth (*al-ḥaqq*) is no longer something that men practice and falsehood (*al-bāṭil*) is no longer desisted from, so that the believer rightly desires to meet God. I can only regard death but martyrdom and life with these oppressors as a tribulation. (*la arā al-mawt illā shahāda wal-ḥayāt ma'a al-zālimīn illā baramā*).¹⁰⁶

Al-Ḥurr and his men traveled on one side while al-Ḥusayn and his followers traveled on the other, until they reached a place called °Udhayb al-Hijānāt. A group of four persons were coming from Kūfa in order to join al-Ḥusayn. When they tried to approach al-Ḥusayn's camp, al-Ḥurr attempted to prevent them, claiming that they were not among the party who came with al-Ḥusayn and that, therefore, they had no right to join him. Al-Ḥusayn declared that they were his supporters and helpers and that he would defend them in the same way as he would defend his own life. Al-Ḥurr insisted

¹⁰⁵ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 305. Al-Ṭabarī, The Caliphate of Yazīd b. Mu'āwiya, *The History of al-Ṭabarī (Ta'rikh al-Rusul wal-Mulūk)*. XIX, p. 96. Ibn A'ṭham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 91.

¹⁰⁶ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 305. Al-Ṭabarī, The Caliphate of Yazīd b. Mu'āwiya, *The History of al-Ṭabarī (Ta'rikh al-Rusul wal-Mulūk)*. XIX, p. 96.

on detaining them or sending them back, but al-Ḥusayn asked him to carry out the agreement between them or he would fight against al-Ḥurr. When al-Ḥurr realized al-Ḥusayn's seriousness, he backed down.¹⁰⁷

It is very clear that al-Ḥurr tried to avoid confrontation with al-Ḥusayn. Al-Ḥurr, who had one thousand fighters with him, could easily have defeated al-Ḥusayn and his followers, and that would have pleased his leader Ibn Ziyād, who wanted to get rid of al-Ḥusayn as soon as possible. Al-Ḥurr, however, declined to do that. Why did al-Ḥurr avoid fighting against al-Ḥusayn? Was it because he was not instructed to fight him? Or because he knew of al-Ḥusayn's position among his people and of his relationship to the Prophet and, therefore, did not want to be involved in his killing? Al-Ḥurr, in fact, was not unaware of al-Ḥusayn's position and of his close relationship to the Prophet and, for this reason, he performed his prayers behind him, as mentioned earlier. Moreover, when al-Ḥurr, as we will see later, saw that the intention of the Umayyad officials was to fight against al-Ḥusayn, he decided to join al-Ḥusayn's camp and finally died for his sake.

Still concerned about the situation in Kūfa, al-Ḥusayn asked the group who joined him for the news. They informed him that the tribal leaders had been bribed and that their coffers had been filled so that their support for Ibn Ziyād was won. As for the rest of the people, "Their hearts are inclined toward you, but soon their swords will be drawn against you."¹⁰⁸

Al-Ḥusayn had a unique opportunity to protect himself from the threats of the Umayyad officials, but he preferred to keep his agreement with al-Ḥurr. When al-

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 4: 305-6. Al-Baldhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 382.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 306.

Ṭirimmāḥ Ibn ʿAdī, the guide of the four persons who had joined al-Ḥusayn's camp, noticed the small number of al-Ḥusayn's followers compared to the one thousand troops of al-Ḥurr, he told al-Ḥusayn that he would be defeated even if he confronted al-Ḥurr's men only. Al-Ṭirimmāḥ informed al-Ḥusayn that, before his departure from Kūfa, he had seen a great number of people that had been recruited to station themselves at the outskirts of Kūfa and were ready to march against him. Therefore, al-Ṭirimmāḥ appealed to al-Ḥusayn not to move towards Kūfa and advised him to settle in a land where he could find protection. He invited al-Ḥusayn to come to al-Ṭirimmāḥ's tribe and to settle in their unassailable mountains, promising him that he could call as many as twenty thousand men to fight with him. Al-Ḥusayn replied that he had an agreement with al-Ḥurr and that he could not break this agreement and that, therefore, he could not accept al-Ṭirimmāḥ's suggestion.¹⁰⁹

Al-Ḥurr, who was waiting for new instructions from Ibn Ziyād, continued to accompany al-Ḥusayn and his followers until they reached the village of Nīnawā. Suddenly, there appeared a rider on a fast mount coming from Kūfa who handed al-Ḥurr a letter from Ibn Ziyād. In this letter, Ibn Ziyād ordered al-Ḥurr to force al-Ḥusayn to stop in an open place without protection or water. Al-Ḥurr decided to obey. Fearing Ibn Ziyād's messenger, al-Ḥurr rejected the request of al-Ḥusayn's followers to let them stop at Nīnawā or any other village. Finally, al-Ḥusayn and his followers settled at Karbalā' on the second of Muḥarram in the year 61 (October, 2nd, 680).¹¹⁰ Thinking that the situation would get worse and that more troops would come from Kūfa to fight

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 4: 306-7. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 383.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 3: 384-5. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 308-9. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 91. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, pp. 252-3.

against them, Zuhayr Ibn al-Qayn suggested that al-Ḥusayn fight al-Ḥurr and his men. Al-Ḥusayn declined to begin the fighting.¹¹¹

¹¹¹ Ibid. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'riḫ*, 4: 309. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 385. Ibn A'ṭham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 92.

III. Part Three: The Murder of al-Ḥusayn

When Ibn Ziyād heard that al-Ḥurr had carried out his instructions and detained al-Ḥusayn, he started to recruit as many troops as he could to fight against al-Ḥusayn. For this difficult mission, he decided to nominate ʿUmar Ibn Saʿd as the leader of his troops. Why did Ibn al-Ziyād chose him instead of al-Ḥusayn Ibn al-Numayr, then the commander of his troops, since Ibn Ziyād had already witnessed the latter's loyalty to the Umayyad authorities? Perhaps Ibn Ziyād wanted to send somebody that the Kūfans were familiar with. He probably assigned ʿUmar Ibn Saʿd because of the reputation of his father, Saʿd Ibn Abī Waqqās, who was one of the prominent Companions of the Prophet and was the first to reside in Kūfa.¹¹² Therefore, he thought perhaps that ʿUmar would be able to deal with the Kūfans without much difficulty. Perhaps Ibn Ziyād was looking for somebody who knew al-Ḥusayn's position and would be able to negotiate with him and accordingly he chose ʿUmar for this hard task.

In fact, Ibn Ziyād had already commissioned ʿUmar with four thousand men to fight the people of al-Daylam who came to overrun Dastabā, a large district between al-Rayy and Hamadhān in Iran. Ibn Ziyād also promised ʿUmar in writing to appoint him as the governor of al-Rayy if he carried out this task. When the affair of al-Ḥusayn developed, Ibn Ziyād recalled ʿUmar and ordered him to go at once to negotiate with al-Ḥusayn. Realizing that the two parties, al-Ḥusayn and Ibn Ziyād, would not reach a compromise and that fighting was inevitable, ʿUmar tried to avoid taking part in shedding the blood of al-Ḥusayn and, therefore, requested that Ibn Ziyād relieve him of

¹¹² See for instance, Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 3: 447.

this task. Ibn Ziyād initially accepted ʿUmar’s refusal but with the condition that ʿUmar would no longer be nominated as governor of al-Rayy. Therefore, ʿUmar asked Ibn Ziyād to give him time to make his decision, and the latter agreed.¹¹³

ʿUmar consulted his family and close associates and they warned him against being involved in fighting against al-Ḥusayn. Among them was his nephew, Ḥamza Ibn al-Mughīra. He advised ʿUmar to avoid confronting al-Ḥusayn, asserting that he would be committing a crime before God and breaking the bonds of his kinship with al-Ḥusayn. He also told ʿUmar that even if he lost all of his wealth, property and his position it would be better for him than to meet God after having shed the blood of al-Ḥusayn.¹¹⁴ Ibn Saʿd relates that even ʿUmar’s tribe, the Banū Zuhra, warned him against involving himself in al-Ḥusayn’s killing.¹¹⁵

ʿUmar was not unaware of the dangerous consequences of al-Ḥusayn’s killing and tried to avoid this crisis, but meanwhile, he was not ready to lose his promised office as governor of al-Rayy. Although ʿUmar promised Ḥamza to follow his advice, he decided not to give up the governorship of al-Rayy. He asked Ibn Ziyād to relieve him of this task while keeping him in his office, but Ibn Ziyād insisted that ʿUmar would keep his office only on the condition that he submitted to his orders and fought against al-Ḥusayn. ʿUmar preferred to keep his office and decided to command of Ibn Ziyād’s troops.¹¹⁶

Here, however, Ibn Saʿd contradicts other accounts; he narrates that only under Ibn Ziyād’s threat did ʿUmar accept to confront al-Ḥusayn. According to Ibn Saʿd’s

¹¹³ Ibid., 4: 309. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 95. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 385. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akḥbār*, p. 54.

¹¹⁴ Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 310. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 95-6. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 385-6.

¹¹⁵ Ibn Saʿd, *Maqātāl*, p. 69.

¹¹⁶ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 386. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 310.

account, Ibn Ziyād threatened to discharge ʿUmar from his office, to destroy his house and to behead him if ʿUmar refused to submit to his orders.¹¹⁷

Not only was ʿUmar reluctant to fight against al-Ḥusayn, but so too was Shabath Ibn Ribʿī, who was one of the prominent nobles of Kūfa and who played a significant role in Ibn ʿAqīl's killing, as mentioned earlier. He pretended to be sick in order to avoid fighting al-Ḥusayn, but under Ibn Ziyād's insistence and threats he was placed in charge of some of Ibn Ziyād's troops.¹¹⁸

ʿUmar's quandary demonstrates the dilemma which the people of Kūfa were facing. On the one hand, they understood very well al-Ḥusayn's prominent position among the people, based on his relationship to the Prophet, and, therefore, the enormous offense represented by his killing. On the other hand, they had lost their determination to resist Ibn Ziyād, who threatened severe punishment to whoever disobeyed his orders to assemble his troops against al-Ḥusayn.

In the meantime, Ibn Ziyād continued to recruit the people of Kūfa against al-Ḥusayn. He asked them to stay loyal to Yazīd, telling them that Yazīd had increased their stipend. He also ordered them to join ʿUmar and threatened whoever failed to obey his order and declined to join his troops. Ibn Ziyād summoned some of the nobles of Kūfa and ordered them to roam the streets of Kūfa to discourage the people from supporting al-Ḥusayn, to persuade them to continue their submission to the caliph and to warn them against the hazardous consequences of disobedience.¹¹⁹

Ibn Ziyād's severe punishment for whoever disobeyed his orders and failed to join his troops is indicated further by al-Balādhurī, who reports that a man from Hamadhān

¹¹⁷ Ibn Saʿd, *Maqātīl*, pp. 68-9.

¹¹⁸ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 387. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 99. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akḥbār*, p. 245

¹¹⁹ Ibid. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 387. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 99.

had come to Kūfa, looking for his bequest. One of the leaders of Ibn Ziyād's troops arrested him. Ibn Ziyād killed the man in order to make him an example for whoever remained in Kūfa and did not join his troops. Witnessing this, the people started to leave Kūfa rapidly.¹²⁰

The people of Kūfa who remained were unwilling to be recruited against al-Ḥusayn and tried not to avoid involvement in this crisis. According to al-Balādhurī and al-Dīnawarī, many people sent out by Ibn Ziyād scattered before reaching Karbalā'.¹²¹ Moreover, some people decided to desert 'Umar's camp and go to al-Ḥusayn's. Ibn Sa'd reports that some people started to slip away from Kūfa to al-Ḥusayn's camp; including twenty men from 'Umar's camp.¹²² 'Ammār Ibn Abī Salāma, according to al-Balādhurī, tried to put an end to this crisis; he tried to assassinate Ibn Ziyād at al-Nukhayla, but failed. However, 'Ammār managed to escape from Kūfa and joined al-Ḥusayn, later being killed with him.¹²³

'Umar's intention was to avoid confrontation with al-Ḥusayn and to reach a compromise with him.¹²⁴ He tried to identify al-Ḥusayn's intentions and to determine the reason for his coming. Many of 'Umar's leaders declined to comply with 'Umar's call to be messengers to al-Ḥusayn. They refused to meet with al-Ḥusayn because they were among those who had written to him and called him to lead them against the Umayyad authorities. Finally, Qurra Ibn Qays agreed to meet with al-Ḥusayn. When Qurra asked al-Ḥusayn about his intentions and the motive for his coming, al-Ḥusayn confirmed that the Kūfans had called him to come and urged him to lead them against

¹²⁰ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 387.

¹²¹ Ibid. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 254.

¹²² Ibn Sa'd, *Maqtal*, p. 69.

¹²³ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 388.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

the Umayyads. Al-Ḥusayn added, "If they have now come to dislike me, I will leave them."¹²⁵

In his narration, al-Dīnawarī reports that al-Ḥusayn, in his reply to Qurra, asserted that the Kūfans had written to him and confirmed to him that eighteen thousand men had pledged allegiance to him. Since they had failed to keep their promises, al-Ḥusayn continued, he had decided to go back from where he had arrived but al-Ḥurr had prevented him from that.¹²⁶

With al-Ḥusayn's response, ʿUmar was very satisfied. He was in no doubt that al-Ḥusayn's intention was to avoid war and that ʿUmar would reach a compromise with him, expecting that, with this reply, Ibn Ziyād would be satisfied too. However, ʿUmar's expectation was incorrect. In fact, the Umayyad authorities, according to Yazīd's instructions, would not leave al-Ḥusayn alone unless he acknowledged Yazīd's caliphate, and this was unknown to ʿUmar. Ibn Ziyād would not accept any compromise with al-Ḥusayn unless he swore allegiance to Yazīd. For this reason, Ibn Ziyād wrote to ʿUmar, ordering him to ask al-Ḥusayn and his followers to submit to him and pay homage to Yazīd.¹²⁷ According to al-Dīnawarī, al-Ḥusayn confirmed that he would never pay homage to Yazīd, declaring that he would prefer death to swearing allegiance to Yazīd.¹²⁸

Ibn Ziyād realized that al-Ḥusayn had decided to stand by his refusal to pay homage to Yazīd and, therefore, he tried to force him to change his decision and submit to him. According to some sources, Ibn Ziyād wrote another letter to ʿUmar, ordering

¹²⁵ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 310-1. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūh*, 3: 98.

¹²⁶ Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhhbār*, p. 254.

¹²⁷ Ibid. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4:311. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 386.

¹²⁸ Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhhbār*, p. 254.

him to prevent al-Ḥusayn and his followers from drinking water. Following these instructions, ʿUmar sent ʿAmr Ibn al-Ḥajjāj with five hundred horsemen to take up positions along the river in order to prevent al-Ḥusayn and his followers from reaching the water.¹²⁹ Ibn Ziyād's endeavor to compel al-Ḥusayn to submit to him is emphasized by Ibn Aʿtham's account. Ibn Aʿtham narrates that a man from ʿUmar's camp screamed at al-Ḥusayn, stating that Ibn Ziyād's men would not allow him to drink a drop of water unless he submitted to Yazīd's and Ibn Ziyād's orders.¹³⁰

However, al-Husayn did not lose hope of reaching water. It is reported that when the thirst of al-Ḥusayn and his companions became severe, al-Ḥusayn sent his brother al-ʿAbbās with thirty horsemen and twenty-foot soldiers with twenty water skins to get water at night. At their head with the standard was Nāfiʿ Ibn Hilāl al-Jamalī. When ʿAmr Ibn al-Ḥajjāj, who had been ordered to keep al-Ḥusayn from reaching the river, refused to permit them to get water, Nāfiʿ ordered the foot soldiers to fill their water skins. A small battle between the two sides took place and, finally, al-Ḥusayn's followers succeeded in reaching the river and returned with full water skins.¹³¹

Having realized that no compromise could be reached between al-Ḥusayn and Ibn Ziyād, Ḥabīb Ibn Muẓāhir al-Asadī, a companion of the Prophet and one of al-Ḥusayn's supporters from the Banū Asad, endeavored to seek support from his tribe, who were settling near Karbalā'. He took permission from al-Ḥusayn to go and call them to join him. Seventy of them answered Ḥabīb's call and tried to join al-Ḥusayn. When ʿUmar found out about them, he sent some horsemen under the commander of al-Azraq Ibn al-

¹²⁹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 311-12. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 389. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 102.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 312. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 255.

Ḥārith and successfully prevented them from reaching al-Ḥusayn's camp after a fierce battle.¹³²

At the request of al-Ḥusayn, a meeting was held between him and ʿUmar at night between the two camps. ʿUmar, who was reluctant to be involved in a battle against al-Ḥusayn, seized this opportunity and accepted the meeting hoping that they could reach a compromise. The questions here are: Did al-Ḥusayn intend to concede and to reach a compromise with ʿUmar, even to the extent of paying homage to Yazīd? Or, did he insist on his goals and wish to persuade ʿUmar to dissociate from Ibn Ziyād and join him?

In this respect, al-Ṭabarī provides three accounts on the authority of Abū Mikhnaḥ but with different eyewitnesses. The first account is narrated by Hānī Ibn Thubayt al-Ḥaḍramī, an eyewitness from ʿUmar's camp. He reports that ʿUmar came out with about twenty horsemen, as did al-Ḥusayn. When the two met, their men stayed away at such distance from them that they could not hear their voices. ʿUmar and al-Ḥusayn talked together for a long time until a great part of the night had gone. The people made guesses about what had occurred between them. They speculated that al-Ḥusayn had asked ʿUmar to leave the two camps and come with him to Yazīd. ʿUmar did not accept this suggestion as he was afraid that his house would be destroyed or his estate would be seized as a consequence of following al-Ḥusayn. Although al-Ḥusayn promised him to rebuild his house and to give him better property than his current property, ʿUmar was still unwilling to comply. The narrator, Hānī, says that this alleged suggestion of al-

¹³² Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 100-1. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 388.

Ḥusayn's started to spread among the people, even though none of them knew the actual content of the conversation.¹³³

The second account is narrated by Mujālid Ibn Saʿīd and al-Saqʿab Ibn Zuhayr and some other narrators. They report that al-Ḥusayn proposed that ʿUmar choose one of three options for him: 1) that they permit him to return to the place from which he had come, 2) that he put his hand in Yazīd's hand, or 3) that they send him to any one of the Muslim frontiers, where he could share the same rights and responsibilities of the inhabitants.¹³⁴

The third version is narrated by ʿUqba Ibn Simʿān, a *mawlā* of al-Ḥusayn's wife who was with al-Ḥusayn's camp and who escaped from death. He is reported to have asserted that he has accompanied al-Ḥusayn at all times during his journey, from Medina to Mecca and from Mecca to Iraq, and that he had not left him until after his death. He also affirmed that he had heard all of al-Ḥusayn's speeches and conversations and that what was being circulated among the people about al-Ḥusayn's offer to ʿUmar to go to Yazīd and put his hand in Yazīd's hand or be sent to a Muslim border area was baseless. Rather, ʿUqba affirmed, al-Ḥusayn said, "Leave me, and I will travel this broad land so that we may see how the people's affairs develop."¹³⁵

If al-Ḥusayn actually offered to put his hand in Yazīd, the question which arises is: Why did he decide to continue his journey to Kūfa, although he had received the news that there were no more supporters for him there and that those same supporters had

¹³³ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 312-3.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 4: 313. See also, al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 114. It should be noted that al-Isfahānī's narration is identical to that of al-Ṭabarī, with some abbreviations. Similar to this account is also narrated by al-Balādhurī, who does not mention his authorities. *Ansāb*, 3: 390. According to another account, al-Balādhurī reports that al-Ḥusayn asked ʿUmar only to permit him to go back to Medina. Ibid.

¹³⁵ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 313.

been recruited to fight against him? He could easily have changed his path to go back to where he had come from or to any other place, as soon as he had received the news of Ibn ʿAqīl’s death and before he was detained and forced by al-Ḥurr to stop in Karbalā’. ʿUmar, from the very beginning, was reluctant to march against al-Ḥusayn and be involved in al-Ḥusayn’s killing and, therefore, tried to reach a compromise with him. Since nobody heard the authentic contents of the conversation between al-Ḥusayn and ʿUmar, the latter perhaps put these words in al-Ḥusayn’s mouth in his letter to Ibn Ziyād in order to persuade him to avoid fighting and to release himself from being involved in al-Ḥusayn’s killing.

Ibn Aʿtham, without providing a chain of authorities, does not mention al-Ḥusayn’s proposals to ʿUmar. He narrates that al-Ḥusayn tried to persuade ʿUmar to dissociate himself from the Umayyad authorities and join him, but that he failed. ʿUmar refused al-Ḥusayn’s offer, fearing that his house would be destroyed and his estate would be seized by Ibn Ziyād if did not comply with his orders.¹³⁶ Ibn Aʿtham, who used to provide Shīʿī accounts, wants to tell us that al-Ḥusayn did not propose to put his hand in Yazīd’s and that he was not ready to acknowledge Yazīd.

The same is the case of al-Yaʿqūbī’s account. Although al-Ḥusayn’s suggestions to ʿUmar are not recorded by al-Yaʿqūbī, he reports that before the battle between the two sides took place, al-Ḥusayn reminded ʿUmar’s men of his rights as the Prophet’s grandson. He also asked them to permit him to go back to his home, but they refused, telling him that either they were to take him to Ibn Ziyād or kill him.¹³⁷ On the other hand, Ibn Saʿd, whose authorities are unknown, does not mention any meeting between

¹³⁶ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 101.

¹³⁷ Al-Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrikh*, 2: 244.

al-Ḥusayn and ʿUmar. He reports that when al-Ḥusayn asked the assembly about the reason for their coming against him, they replied that they were afraid that their stipend (ʿaṭāʾ) would be taken from them if they disobeyed Ibn Ziyād's orders. Al-Ḥusayn realized that the Kūfans' intention was to submit to Ibn Ziyād's orders and to fight against him so he tried to reach a compromise with them. At first, he asked them to permit him to go back to the place from which he had come, but they refused. Then, he asked them to allow him go to al-Rayy in order to fight against the Daylam, but they also rejected this suggestion. Finally, al-Ḥusayn requested that they let him go to Yazīd in order to put his hand in Yazīd's, but they rejected his appeal. They declared that they would refrain from fighting him only if he put his hand in Ibn Ziyād. This time al-Ḥusayn refused their demand.¹³⁸

The question that presents itself here is: Why did the Kūfans refuse al-Ḥusayn's proposal to give *bayʿa* to Yazīd? Yazīd's demand was only to secure al-Ḥusayn's acknowledgement of his caliphate and, therefore, he would have been very satisfied with al-Ḥusayn's suggestion. Besides, the Kūfans who had called al-Ḥusayn to come to Kūfa would not have been content in fighting him; in fact, they had been compelled by Ibn Ziyād to fight against al-Ḥusayn. Therefore, they should have been very satisfied with this suggestion. Did they receive any orders from Ibn Ziyād that al-Ḥusayn should put his hand in Ibn Ziyād's instead of Yazīd's? In fact, Ibn Saʿd does mention this. Perhaps, Ibn Saʿd who provided Sunnī accounts wanted to give the impression that the Kūfans were the only ones responsible for al-Ḥusayn's killing since they had refused to

¹³⁸ Ibn Saʿd, *Maqatal*, p. 69.

allow him to put his hand in Yazīd's, and thus to absolve the Umayyad authorities of any responsibility.

However, ʿUmar was satisfied with al-Ḥusayn's proposals, expecting that Ibn Ziyād would be satisfied too and would accept a compromise with al-Ḥusayn. Consequently, ʿUmar would be released from fighting al-Ḥusayn. Therefore, ʿUmar, according to al-Ṭabarī, wrote to Ibn Ziyād, informing him of al-Ḥusayn's proposals. So pleased was ʿUmar with al-Ḥusayn's meeting that, at the end of his letter to Ibn Ziyād, he said, "And in this," mentioning al-Ḥusayn's proposals, "will be your satisfaction and the benefit of the community."¹³⁹

Initially, Ibn Ziyād was satisfied with ʿUmar's letter and seemed to want to permit al-Ḥusayn to go to the place he wished. However, Shamir Ibn Dhī al-Jawshan, one of the prominent people in Kūfa who was among those who wrote to al-Ḥusayn, changed his mind. He told Ibn Ziyād that if he permitted al-Ḥusayn to leave, he would be in a position of power and strength and Ibn Ziyād would be in a position of weakness and impotence. Shamir suggested that Ibn Ziyād ask al-Ḥusayn and his followers to submit to his authority, and, in this case, Ibn Ziyād would have the opportunity to act toward al-Ḥusayn the way he wished. He also informed him that al-Ḥusayn and ʿUmar had been sitting between the camps talking at night. Ibn Ziyād accepted Shamir's suggestion and wrote a letter to ʿUmar.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 313-4. It should be noted that ʿUmar's letter to Ibn Ziyād is reported by al-Ṭabarī exclusively.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. Although Ibn Sa'd does not mention ʿUmar's letter to Ibn Ziyād, he states that Ibn Ziyād intended to permit al-Ḥusayn to go to any place he wished but Shamir changed his mind. *Maqatal*, p. 69.

According to al-Ṭabarī's account, Shamir, who knew about ʿUmar's hesitation to lead Ibn Ziyād's troops against al-Ḥusayn, might have had aspirations to take ʿUmar's position and, for this reason, intended to bring Ibn Ziyād's wrath upon him.

In his letter to ʿUmar, recorded by many sources, Ibn Ziyād reproached ʿUmar for holding meetings with al-Ḥusayn. He told ʿUmar that he had not sent him to al-Ḥusayn in order to restrain from fighting, nor to give him time, nor to promise him peace, nor to be an intercessor on his behalf. Then Ibn Ziyād ordered ʿUmar to ask al-Ḥusayn and his followers to submit to his authority and, if they refused, to march against them and to kill them. He also instructed ʿUmar, "If al-Ḥusayn is killed, make the horses trample on his chest and back, for he is a disobedient rebel and an oppressor." Finally, Ibn Ziyād told ʿUmar that if he carried out his orders, he would be rewarded for it; otherwise, ʿUmar was to leave the command of the army to Shamir.¹⁴¹

According to this letter, Ibn Ziyād regarded al-Ḥusayn as a rebel who deserved death and did not intend to permit him to go anywhere. By ordering ʿUmar to mutilate al-Ḥusayn's body after his death, Ibn Ziyād expressed his animosity toward al-Ḥusayn and showed that he would not be satisfied with his killing only. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the account that Ibn Ziyād intended to release al-Ḥusayn from his control and to allow him to go to the place he wished.

However, when he received Ibn Ziyād's letter, ʿUmar decided to submit to his orders, and prepare to march against al-Ḥusayn on the evening of the ninth of Muḥarram. He rode out among his men and approached al-Ḥusayn's camp. Noticing their coming, al-Ḥusayn asked his half-brother, al-ʿAbbās, to meet ʿUmar and his men

¹⁴¹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 314. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 391. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 103. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akḥbār*, p. 255.

and to ascertain the reason for their approach. When al-^ʿAbbās investigated their intention, they answered that, according to the governor's demand, al-Ḥusayn and his followers should submit to his authority or be killed. Then al-Ḥusayn requested a respite of one night, and, after a discussion with ^ʿUmar's men, they agreed.¹⁴²

Al-Ḥusayn was sure that the mission of the Umayyad authorities was to kill him only, since he had refused to pay homage to Yazīd and, therefore, he believed that there was no reason for his followers to expose themselves to death. He is reported to have summoned them and his family and permitted them to leave under the cover of darkness, telling them there would be no further obligation on them. They all expressed their readiness to sacrifice themselves for him and declared that they would never leave him alone.¹⁴³

Realizing that ^ʿUmar and his men would attack him as soon as darkness vanished, al-Ḥusayn mobilized his followers after the morning prayer. He had with him thirty-two horsemen and forty foot soldiers. He put Zuhayr in charge of his right wing, Ḥabīb in charge of his left wing and gave his standard to his brother al-^ʿAbbās. He ordered the firewood and cane which was behind the tents to be set on fire, so that the enemy could only approach them from one side.¹⁴⁴

Meanwhile, the next morning, ^ʿUmar mobilized his followers and came out towards al-Ḥusayn's camp. ^ʿAmr Ibn al-Ḥajjāj was in command of his right wing, Shamir of the

¹⁴² Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 316-7. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 392-3. Ibn Sa'd, *Maqatal*, p.70.

¹⁴³ Ibid., pp 70-1. Al-Ṭabarī, *T'arikh*, 4: 317. Ibn A'ṭham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 105-6. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 393. Al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 44.

¹⁴⁴ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 395. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 320. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akḥbār*, p. 256. Ibn A'ṭham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 108. Ibn Sa'd reports that with al-Ḥusayn there were fifty of his followers, nineteen of the Banū Hāshim and twenty persons joined him from ^ʿUmar's camp. *Maqatal*, p. 69.

left wing, ʿAzra Ibn Qays was in command of the cavalry and Shabath Ibn Ribʿī of the foot soldiers. He gave his standard to his *mawlā*, Dhuwayd.¹⁴⁵

Al-Ḥusayn's long speech to the assembly is worth paying attention to. It was his last chance to convince the troops to change their minds and withdraw from fighting him. It is reported that, before fighting, al-Ḥusayn rode on his mount and approached Ibn Ziyād's troops. He raised his voice in a way that most of them could hear it. He asked them to listen to his advice and the reason for his coming, warning them about making a hasty decision. He said:

...Trace back my lineage and consider who I am. Then, look back at yourselves and remonstrate with yourselves. Consider whether it is right for you to kill me and desecrate my inviolability. Am I not the son of the daughter of your Prophet, the son of the executor of his will (*waṣī*) and his cousin...? Have you not heard the words that circulate among you that the Prophet of God said concerning myself and my brother: 'These are the two lords of the youths of the inhabitants of heaven'? ... Is this (statement) not sufficient to prevent your shedding my blood? ... If you are in doubt about this, do you have the slightest doubt that I am the son of the daughter of your Prophet?¹⁴⁶

Wondering about their gathering against him, al-Ḥusayn declared that he had committed no crime and had not done any harm to them. When they all kept silent and did not respond, al-Ḥusayn called out the names of the commanders of ʿUmar's troops who had written to him and urged him to come to Kūfā. He addressed them: "Did you not write to me that the fruit has ripened, the dates have grown green, the water has overflowed and you will come to an army which has been gathered for you?" When they denied this statement, al-Ḥusayn then asked them to let him go to a place where he

¹⁴⁵ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'riḫ*, 4: 321. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 395.

¹⁴⁶ A full narration of this account is reported by al-Ṭabarī, on the authority of Abū Mikhnaḥ, *Ta'riḫ*, 4: 322-3. Al-Ṭabarī, *The Caliphate of Yazīd b. Mu'āwīya, The History of al-Ṭabarī (Ta'riḫ al-Rusul wal-Mulūk)*. XIX, pp. 123-4. Similar to al-Ṭabarī's account, with some abbreviation, is the version of Ibn Sa'd, *Maqatal*, p. 72. Al-Balādhurī briefly mentions this report. *Ansāb*, 3: 395.

could find safety. When Qays Ibn al-Ash^ʿath, one of the chiefs of the tribes, asked him to submit to the Umayyad authorities, al-Ḥusayn refused, stating, “I will neither give them my hand like a man who has been humiliated, nor will I flee like a slave.”¹⁴⁷

It should be mentioned that, in his speech to ‘Umar’s army, al-Ḥusayn did not state that he was ready to put his hand in Yazīd, rather, he told them to allow him to choose a place where he could find safety. In addition, when Qays Ibn al-Ashath asked al-Ḥusayn to submit to the Umayyad authorities, he insisted that he preferred to die rather than be humiliated.

Following al-Ḥusayn’s endeavors, some of his followers tried to persuade Ibn Ziyād’s men to withdraw from fighting against al-Ḥusayn. Zuhayr Ibn al-Qayn, who had met with al-Ḥusayn on his way to Kūfa and decided to join him, warned Ibn Ziyād’s men about God’s affliction if they insisted on fighting al-Ḥusayn. He called on them to support the family of the Prophet and to withdraw from Ibn Ziyād. However, they persisted in their attitude and told him that their intention was to kill al-Ḥusayn and his followers if they refused to submit to Ibn Ziyād. He told them that supporting Fāṭima’s offspring was more noble than supporting the son of Sumayya (Ibn Ziyād). Realizing their intention was not to withdraw from fighting against al-Ḥusayn, Zuhayr told them that Yazīd would be satisfied with them even without killing al-Ḥusayn.¹⁴⁸

Burayr Ibn Khudāyr, a prominent reciter of the Qur’ān in Kūfa, reproached the gathering for failing al-Ḥusayn and his family, and reminded them of their letters to al-Ḥusayn. He also criticized them for depriving him and his followers of water,

¹⁴⁷ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta’rīkh*, 4: 323. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 396-7.

¹⁴⁸ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta’rīkh*, 4: 323-4. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 397. Al-Ya’qūbī, who briefly mentions this account, omits the last sentence, *Ta’rīkh*, 2: 244.

addressing them, “Do you not accept that al-Ḥusayn go back to the place from which he came?” However, Burayr received no answer.¹⁴⁹

It is inconceivable that all the people who were present at Karbalā’ persisted in fighting al-Ḥusayn, demanding that he and his followers submit to Ibn Ziyād. In fact, most of these people had written to al-Ḥusayn, urging him to lead them against the Umayyads. They marched against al-Ḥusayn only when they were under Ibn Ziyād’s threat and, therefore, were enthusiastic about reaching a compromise with al-Ḥusayn and avoiding a fight. As mentioned earlier, many of them scattered before reaching Ibn Ziyād’s camp when they were recruited to march against al-Ḥusayn and some of them slipped away from Ibn Ziyād and succeeded in joining al-Ḥusayn. Some others tried to reach al-Ḥusayn but failed. Many others still were willing to withdraw from Ibn Ziyād’s side and join al-Ḥusayn but did not dare to do so. They came to confront al-Ḥusayn, not because they believed that he was a rebel against the legitimate caliph, Yazīd, but because they had lost their resolution to support al-Ḥusayn. Their situation, as mentioned earlier, was well described by Farazdaq when he said, “Their hearts are with you but their swords are against you.”

The situation of these people is also indicated by al-Ṭabarī and al-Balādhurī. They narrate that a group of Kūfans who were in ‘Umar’s camp were standing on a hill, crying and asking God to send down a victory to al-Ḥusayn. Noticing this, Ibn ‘Ubayd, who was in ‘Umar’s camp as well, reproached them and said, “Why don’t you go yourselves and support him?”¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ Ibn A‘tham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 112. Al-Balādhurī narrates that Burayr and others advised ‘Umar’s men to keep their promises and reminded them of their letters to al-Ḥusayn. *Ansāb*, 3: 397.

¹⁵⁰ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta’rīkh*, 4: 295. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 424.

Even al-Ḥurr, who was not among those who had written to al-Ḥusayn, tried to avoid confrontation with him along his journey to Karbalā'. As soon as he became aware of 'Umar's intention to fight against al-Ḥusayn, he asked him whether he had really decided to fight against the grandson of the Prophet and 'Umar answered in the affirmative. Al-Ḥurr was astonished and asked 'Umar whether he had accepted any of al-Ḥusayn's proposals which he had offered him. 'Umar replied that the matter was out of his hands and that he had to act according to the governor's instructions, who refused any alternative. Therefore, al-Ḥurr decided to join al-Ḥusayn and started gradually to draw closer to him until he reached al-Ḥusayn's camp and decided to sacrifice himself on behalf of al-Ḥusayn.¹⁵¹

After getting permission from al-Ḥusayn, al-Ḥurr tried to persuade the Kūfans to refrain from fighting al-Ḥusayn. In his speech, al-Ḥurr reproached them for not fulfilling their promises to al-Ḥusayn and for preventing him and his family from going to a safe place. He also reproached them for depriving al-Ḥusayn of drinking water.¹⁵²

Al-Ṭabarī tells us that when Qurra Ibn Qays learned about al-Ḥurr's departure to al-Ḥusayn's camp, he declared that if al-Ḥurr had told him about his intention to join al-Ḥusayn, he would have joined him.¹⁵³ In fact, Qurra still had the opportunity to withdraw from 'Umar's camp and join al-Ḥusayn, even after al-Ḥurr had left, but he lost his courage to follow al-Ḥurr's lead.

In fact, the chiefs of the tribes, such as Shabath Ibn Rab'ī, Ḥajjār Ibn Abjar, al-Ash'ath Ibn Qays, and Shamir, played a major role in abandoning al-Ḥusayn and

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 3: 397. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 324-5. Ibn Sa'd, *Maqatal*, p. 72.

¹⁵² Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 397-8. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 325-6.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 4: 325.

supporting the Umayyads. As noted earlier, they influenced the people of Kūfa to stop supporting Ibn ʿAqīl and played a significant role in suppressing his mission, and now they influenced them to fight against al-Ḥusayn. They were at the head of Ibn Ziyād's troops and the leaders of his army. When he reproached those who had written to him, al-Ḥusayn mentioned some of their names. These appear in most of the events of the battle of Karbalā', as was the case in the events surrounding Ibn ʿAqīl's mission and murder.

Although these tribal leaders had written to al-Ḥusayn and urged him to come to Kūfa, their sole concern was to maintain their own positions and the narrow interests of their tribes. As noted earlier, the tribe of Madhḥij surrounded the governors' palace only when they heard that Hānī, one of the prominent leaders of their tribe, had been killed. Although they were fundamentally opposed to the Umayyad authorities, they submitted to them and put their power at the Umayyads' disposal in order to secure their own benefits. As mentioned earlier, when al-Ḥusayn asked him about the situation of the people in Kūfa, Muḥammad^c replied that there had been much bribery among the chiefs of the tribes and noted, "Their coffers have been filled."¹⁵⁴

However, Shabath Ibn Rabʿī, one of these tribal leaders, tried to avoid fighting al-Ḥusayn by pretending that he was sick. It is also reported that, during the battle, the people noticed that Shabath was reluctant to fight. He is also reported to have stated that he had fought along with ʿAlī against Āl Abī Sufyān, (the family of Abū Sufyān) but that then he was fighting with Muʿāwiya and the son of Sumayya, Yazīd, against al-Ḥusayn, and reproached himself for this fickleness.¹⁵⁵ Ibn Ziyād's troops did not listen

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 4: 306.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 4: 332.

to the advice of al-Ḥusayn and his followers and decided to follow Ibn Ziyād's orders. The fight began when ʿUmar shot an arrow towards al-Ḥusayn's camp. ʿUmar's intention was to prove his loyalty to Ibn Ziyād and his submission to his instructions. ʿUmar also asked his *mawlā*, Dhuwayd, to be his witness in front of Ibn Ziyād that he had been the first to shoot.¹⁵⁶

According to al-Ṭabarī and al-Balādhurī, ʿAbd Allāh Ibn ʿUmayr al-Kalbī was the first one to be killed of al-Ḥusayn's followers, after he had killed Ziyād's *mawlā*, Yasār, and Ibn Ziyād's *mawlā*, Sālim.¹⁵⁷

Some women in al-Ḥusayn's camp also tried to participate in the fighting. Al-Ṭabarī narrates that when Ibn ʿUmayr, who was living in Kūfa, was told that the people at al-Nukhayla were drawn up to be sent against al-Ḥusayn, he decided to escape from Kūfa and join him. When he told his wife about his intention, she decided to accompany him, and they succeeded in reaching al-Ḥusayn. She intended to fight alongside her husband, but al-Ḥusayn asked her to go back to the women, stating that there was no fighting for the women.¹⁵⁸ Al-Ṭabarī also reports that when al-Kalbī was killed, his wife came out and sat beside him. Noticing her, Shamir ordered his *mawlā*, Rustam, to hit her with a pole. Rustam hit her on the head and she was the first woman to be killed.¹⁵⁹

The fight became one-on-one hand-to-hand combat and many of ʿUmar's men were killed. Noticing this, ʿAmr Ibn al-Ḥajjāj, the commander of the right wing, cried out to his men not to fight in one-on-one. He asked the people to keep their submission to the

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 4: 326. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 398.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 326-7.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 398. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 147. According to Ibn Aʿtham, the first to be killed from al-Ḥusayn's side was al-Ḥurr.

¹⁵⁹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 333-4.

Umayyad authorities, encouraging them to fight against al-Ḥusayn who had “deserted religion and disobeyed his caliph.”¹⁶⁰

It seems that al-Ḥusayn’s supporters (al-Anṣār) decided to fight first and did not let the Banū Hāshim proceed before them because of their relationship to the Prophet. Although al-Ḥusayn’s supporters declined his invitation to escape from the battle and expressed their readiness to die on his behalf, as mentioned earlier, al-Ḍaḥḥāk Ibn Qays al-Mashriqī, who was one of Abū Mikhnaf’s eyewitnesses, escaped death. He promised al-Ḥusayn that he would fight with him only as long as there were fighters with him. When he saw that all of al-Ḥusayn’s supporters had been killed, al-Ḍaḥḥāk reminded al-Ḥusayn of their agreement, and, finally, was successful in escaping.¹⁶¹

Al-Ḥusayn’s followers fell one by one, and after this, it was the turn of the Banū Hāshim. ‘Alī al-Akbar was the first of the Banū Hāshim to be killed and he was followed by the rest of them.¹⁶² Although the four half-brothers of al-Ḥusayn were granted safe-conduct from Shamir on the request of their relative, ‘Abd Allāh Ibn Abī al-Maḥall, they refused his guarantee of security and eventually were all killed.¹⁶³ It is reported that some children were killed as well in the battle, such as al-Ḥasan’s sons, al-Qāsim and ‘Abd Allāh as well as al-Ḥusayn’s infant son¹⁶⁴

When al-Ḥusayn was alone, he fought fiercely and tried to reach water but ‘Umar’s men prevented him and his strength was finished.¹⁶⁵ Although al-Ḥusayn was lying on

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 4: 338.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 4: 339.

¹⁶² Ibid., 4: 340. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 406.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 3:391. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta’rīkh*, 4: 341-5, 343-5. Ibn A’tham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 103-5.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 3: 131-2. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta’rīkh*, 4: 342, 344. Ibn Sa’d, *Maqtal*, pp. 73-4. Al-Ya’qūbī narrates that al-Ḥusayn’s son, who was born at that time, was killed in his arms. *Ta’rīkh*. 2: 245.

¹⁶⁵ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta’rīkh*, 4: 343. Ibn A’tham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 134-6. Ibn Sa’d, *Maqtal*, p. 74.

the ground, ʿUmar's men avoided killing him until Shamir ordered them to do so, and, finally, a number of ʿUmar's men participated in killing al-Ḥusayn.¹⁶⁶

Al-Masʿūdī confirms that all those who confronted al-Ḥusayn and who were involved in his murder were from Kūfa; nobody from Syria was present. He also reports that the number of those who were killed with al-Ḥusayn was eighty-seven.¹⁶⁷

While describing the forceful fighting of al-Ḥusayn's son, ʿAlī, Ibn Aʿtham, who habitually presents the pro-ʿAlid point of view, states that he killed a great number of Syrians.¹⁶⁸ Moreover, Ibn Aʿtham does tell us when and how the Syrian troops arrived at Karbalā' and who their commander was. But he does not mention the Syrian troops when he describes al-Ḥusayn's last moment. He reports rather that when al-Ḥusayn was alone, he came out and addressed the Kūfans. He reproached them for their wavering attitude and their failure to keep their *bayʿa* to him.¹⁶⁹

Therefore, in this chapter, we have seen how many factors led to the death of al-Ḥusayn. Firstly, the brutality of Ibn Ziyād is very important because he was willing to do anything in order to secure the favour of Yazīd. Although others might have spared al-Ḥusayn or come to a compromise, Ibn Ziyād, under Yazīd's order would not do so.

The fickleness of the Kūfans is also a key element. On the one hand, the tribal leaders were not completely loyal to al-Ḥusayn, but rather were more interested in their own benefit. On the other hand, the people of Kūfa who agreed with al-Ḥusayn's cause were not strong enough to oppose their leaders and were held back by their fear of Ibn Ziyād. Nevertheless, knowing this, especially after learning of the murder of Ibn ʿAqīl,

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 75. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, 4: 246. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 408-9. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 136.

¹⁶⁷ Al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 61. In his narration, Ibn Aʿtham reports that seventy-two were killed of al-Ḥusayn's supporters and thirteen of the Banū Hāshim, *Futūḥ*, 3: 131.

¹⁶⁸ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 130-1.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 3: 133-4.

al-Ḥusayn did not turn back. He felt that it was his obligation to oppose the illegitimate caliphate of Yazīd and could not give in. He was willing to die before pledging allegiance to Yazīd and, as we shall see in the next chapter, he left his family to bear witness to the brutality and illegitimacy of the Umayyads.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Role of the Captives After al-Ḥusayn's Murder

We have seen that al-Ḥusayn decided to comply with the Kūfans' frequent calls to come to Kūfa only when he had received confirmation from his envoy, Ibn ʿAqīl, of their sincerity and their readiness to support him and his cause. More importantly, al-Ḥusayn received their oath of allegiance, collected by Ibn ʿAqīl.

Al-Ḥusayn received much advice from the Banū Hāshim and other prominent persons that he should avoid the Kūfans, predicting that, because of their fickle attitude, they would disappoint him, as they had disappointed his father and brother. Nevertheless, al-Ḥusayn did not listen and persisted with his plan. He also did not pay attention to Ibn ʿAbbās' recommendation that he leave behind his womenfolk and children. Fearing that al-Ḥusayn would be killed just like ʿUthmān who was killed while his womenfolk and children were watching, Ibn ʿAbbās warned al-Ḥusayn not to expose them to this jeopardy.¹

Al-Ḥusayn was sure that, because he had refused to recognize Yazīd's caliphate, the Umayyad authorities would not leave him alone until he had paid homage to Yazīd or they had killed him wherever he resided, even in Mecca, the sanctuary for all Muslims. As already noted, al-Ḥusayn responded to Ibn ʿAbbās and others that he would prefer to

¹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 288. al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 374. Ibn Saʿd, *Maqtal*, p. 60. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 73-4.

be killed a few inches outside Mecca than to be killed a few inches within it, in order to protect its sanctity.

But here the question is: Why did al-Ḥusayn decide to go to Kūfa rather than any other place? If he wanted to protect the sanctity of Mecca from violation, he could have gone to Yemen where he could have found many of his father's supporters, as was suggested by Ibn ʿAbbās and his half-brother, Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya. Contrary to the Kūfans, who, since Muʿāwiya's time, had called al-Ḥusayn several times to lead them and to rise against the Umayyad authorities, al-Ḥusayn did not receive any calls or letters from the people of Yemen. This is also supported by the fact that al-Ḥusayn did not send any letters or envoys to them, asking them for support as he had done with the people of Baṣra. In fact, our sources are silent in regard to the existence of ʿAlī's supporters in Yemen and whether or not they were ready to support al-Ḥusayn.

As mentioned earlier, al-Ḥusayn refused the Kūfans' offer to break their allegiance to Muʿāwiya and to rise against him, asking them to wait until his death. With their insistence, after Muʿāwiya's death and with Ibn ʿAqīl's optimistic letter about their attitude, al-Ḥusayn believed that his obligation was to comply with the Kūfan's call to fulfill his promise. Even with al-Ḥusayn's conviction that his duty was to respond to the Kūfan's appeal and to go to Kūfa, the question arises: Why did al-Ḥusayn refuse to follow Ibn ʿAbbās' suggestion and take his womenfolk and children with him? Did he intend to utilize them to influence the Kūfans to fight with him? Or, did he bring them in order that they play a role after his death and expose to the masses what had happened in Karbalā'?

At any rate, after the battle of Karbalā', the captives, during their journey from Kūfa to Medina and through their speeches, played an important role in reproaching the Kūfans for not fulfilling their commitment to al-Ḥusayn and his family. They reminded them of their allegiance, their promises to al-Ḥusayn and their failure to fulfill their duties. This caused the Kūfans to regret their deeds and stirred up their wrath against the Umayyad authorities. Confronted by the situation of the captives and their statements and reproaches, the Kūfans started to blame themselves and to accuse the Umayyad officials for what had happened to the grandson of the Prophet.

Although the Kūfans admitted the leading position of al-Ḥusayn and, therefore, called him to lead them to rise against the Umayyads, they did not keep their commitments and turned against him. Under Ibn Ziyād's threat, they lost their determination and fought against al-Ḥusayn, though they were unwilling to participate in his killing and their sentiments were with him. This is made more understandable by the account of Ḥumayd Ibn Muslim, a frequent narrator of Abū Mikhnaf's and an eye-witness who was in 'Umar's camp. He reported that, after killing al-Ḥusayn, some people in 'Umar's camp reproached Sinān Ibn Anas, who had beheaded al-Ḥusayn. According to al-Ṭabarī, they told him, "You killed the son of 'Alī and the son of Fāṭima, the most important person of the Arabs who came to remove the Umayyads from their sovereignty." They also addressed him, "If they [the Umayyad authorities] give you all their wealth in exchange for al-Ḥusayn's murder, it will be little for you."²

² Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'riḫ*, 4: 347.

Sinān himself admitted his high esteem for al-Ḥusayn's position and the importance of his kinship. It is reported that when he came to ʿUmar's tent, Sinān recited some verses in which he announced that he had killed a saintly man, stating:

Fill my stirrup with silver or gold
For I have killed the sacred master
I have killed the best man in regard to mother and father.³

Although Sinān beheaded al-Ḥusayn, he confessed that al-Ḥusayn was the best descendent of the best parents and that he did not kill him because he believed that he was a rebel against the caliph; rather, he killed al-Ḥusayn only for the sake of money.

Soon after the battle of Karbalā', the Kūfans recognized their fault in deceiving al-Ḥusayn. Even the women, who played a momentous role in the failure of Ibn ʿAqīl's mission by influencing their relatives to desert him, now performed a different function after al-Ḥusayn's death. They reproached their husbands for participating in al-Ḥusayn's killing, causing them to feel regret for their deeds. It is reported that Khawālī was in charge of al-Ḥusayn's head and was instructed by ʿUmar to hand it over to Ibn Ziyād. When he saw that the doors of the governor's palace were closed, he came to his house. Noticing al-Ḥusayn's head in her house, Khawālī's wife, al-Nawwār, criticized him for holding al-Ḥusayn's head and decided not to talk to him anymore.⁴

It is also reported that when Ka'b Ibn Jābir, who had killed Burayr, one of al-Ḥusayn's prominent supporters in Kūfa, returned to his house, his wife condemned him for killing Burayr, "the master of the readers of Qur'ān." She also reproached him for

³ Ibid. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 410. Ibn Sa'd, *Maqātīl*, pp. 75-75. Al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 61. Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 40. Ibn Sa'd, Ibn A'tham and al-Mas'ūdī narrate that these verses were recited in front of Ibn Ziyād, and, according to Ibn Sa'd and Ibn A'tham, Khawālī was the person who beheaded al-Ḥusayn.

⁴ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, 4: 348. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 411.

taking part in al-Ḥusayn's killing, telling him that he had committed a great sin and that she had decided to abandon him.⁵

The guilty feelings of the Kūfans after al-Ḥusayn's death were amplified by the captives in their deeds and speeches. They exposed the disastrous consequences of the Kūfans' desertion of al-Ḥusayn's cause and their shameful treatment of the household of the Prophet. They also moved the masses against the Umayyads by causing them to suffer more remorse for betraying al-Ḥusayn.

It is reported that the captives, who were taken to Kūfa with ʿUmar, passed by al-Ḥusayn's body. Noticing it, his sister, Zaynab, cried out: "O Muḥammad! This is al-Ḥusayn, covered with his blood; his organs are cut to pieces, your daughters are prisoners and your progeny are killed." She reportedly made every enemy and friend weep.⁶ According to this account, even the supporters of the Umayyads who had participated in al-Ḥusayn's killing were moved by the captives.

Ibn Aʿtham and al-Yaʿqūbī narrate that, as the captives approached Kūfa, its people received them with sorrow and weeping. Noticing their grief, ʿAlī Ibn al-Ḥusayn expressed his surprise and commented, "If these people are crying for us, then who killed us?"⁷

According to Ibn Aʿtham, Zaynab protested their weeping, accusing them of being hypocrites for abandoning al-Ḥusayn to be killed alone. She also informed them that they had committed a crime against the Prophet's grandson which could not be repaired. Mentioning their fickleness and their failure to keep their promises, she said, "You

⁵ Ibid., 3: 399. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 329. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 115. According to Ibn Aʿtham, Baḥr Ibn Aws killed Burayr. His cousin censured him for killing a pious man, stating, "In which face will you meet Allāh tomorrow (in the hereafter)," and Baḥr regretted what he had done.

⁶ Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 349. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 411-2. Ibn Saʿd, *Maqātīl*, p. 79.

⁷ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 139. Al-Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2: 245.

became just like a woman who unraveled the thread, after she had made it strong, making your oaths deceit between you.” Zaynab told them that with the crime of al-Ḥusayn’s killing, “You have come to the wrath of God and humiliation surrounds you.” She explained that they had violated the sanctity of the son of the last Prophet and said:

Do you know what liver of the Prophet you have split? What blood of him you have shed? What women of his family you have dishonored? Surely, you have committed a disastrous thing, whereby the heavens are almost torn, the earth split and the mountains fallen in ruins.”

She finally warned them of a punishment in the hereafter and God’s vengeance, and the Kūfans became embarrassed and regretful.⁸

How impressed were the Kūfans by the appeal and call of the captives and by Zaynab’s speech? Ibn Sa’d narrates, on the authority of ‘Alī Ibn al-Ḥusayn, that upon leaving Kūfa, the captives could not pass the streets of Kūfa until night, because they were crowded by Kūfans who were weeping for them.⁹ Even ‘Umar Ibn Sa’d, the commander of Ibn Ziyād’s troops, was reported to have regretted what he had done to al-Ḥusayn. He said, “I have submitted to the unjust man, Ibn Ziyād, disobeyed God and cut the bond of my kinship with al-Ḥusayn.”¹⁰

However, Ibn Ziyād was holding an assembly for the people of Kūfa, celebrating the victory of the caliph over his enemies. Ḥumayd Ibn Muslim reported that when he went to visit Ibn Ziyād, he found that delegations (*wufūd*) had already come to the governor’s palace. Ḥumayd noticed al-Ḥusayn’s head in front of Ibn Ziyād; who was poking his teeth with a cane. When Zayd Ibn Arqam (d. 68/687), a companion of the Prophet, saw what Ibn Ziyād was doing, he ordered him to raise the cane from al-Ḥusayn’s teeth, crying out,

⁸ Ibn A’tham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 140-1.

⁹ Ibn Sa’d, *Maqātāl*, p. 89.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 81. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 414.

“I have seen the lips of the Apostle of God kiss those lips.” Zayd also, after watching Ibn Ziyād’s disrespect toward al-Ḥusayn’s head, predicted what would happen to the whole community, announcing:

A slave (Yazīd) has given power to a slave (Ibn Ziyād) and has made the people his inheritance. You, Arabs, are the slaves after today. You have killed the son of Fāṭima when Ibn Marjāna (Ibn Ziyād) ordered you. He will kill the best among you and enslave the evil among you. You have accepted humiliation. Let destruction come to those who accept humiliation.¹¹

This was the first open protest against Ibn Ziyād since his arrival in Kūfa. Before al-Ḥusayn’s killing, nobody had dared to raise a voice against Ibn Ziyād. When he had imprisoned the leader of Madhhij and later killed him, no member of his tribe had dared to save him or even object to Ibn Ziyād. Now Zayd criticized him openly for his disgraceful treatment of al-Ḥusayn’s head. He also condemned the Kūfans for their failure to oppose Ibn Ziyād or protest against him. Zayd Ibn Arqam described the Kūfans as slaves who had lost their determination, since they had submitted to Ibn Ziyād’s orders and killed the Prophet’s grandson after they had invited him and paid him their allegiance.

Another account is narrated by Ibn Sa’d and al-Balādhurī who report that when Mālik Ibn Anas (59/679), a companion of the Prophet, saw Ibn Ziyād poking al-Ḥusayn’s teeth, he said to him, “I will make you displeased.” He told him that he had seen the Prophet kissing the place on al-Ḥusayn’s lips where Ibn Ziyād was poking.¹²

¹¹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta’rīkh*, 4: 349. Al-Ṭabarī, *The Caliphate of Yazīd. The History of al-Ṭabarī*, XIX, p. 165. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 312-3. Ibn Sa’d, *Maqātāl*, p. 80. Zayd’s last statement is not included in Ibn Sa’d’s version.

¹² Ibn Sa’d, *Maqātāl*, p. 80. Al-Balādhurī, on the authority of Anas Ibn Mālik, *al-Balādhurī*, 3: 421.

It should be mentioned that neither Anas nor Ibn Arqam had objected to Ibn Ziyād when he had killed al-Ḥusayn's envoy, Ibn ʿAqīl. They also did not show their resistance to Ibn Ziyād when he recruited the Kūfans to fight against al-Ḥusayn. After al-Ḥusayn's murder and the ill-treatment of his family, and after their coming to Kūfa as prisoners, many voices were raised against Ibn Ziyād, focusing on his treatment of al-Ḥusayn's head.

Another assembly was held by Ibn Ziyād in which he ordered the captives, with al-Ḥusayn's head, to be presented in his palace. Zaynab is reported to have disguised herself so that Ibn Ziyād could not recognize her. When Ibn Ziyād was told about her presence, he tried to provoke her by expressing his pleasure at killing al-Ḥusayn. He also wanted to persuade the attendees that killing al-Ḥusayn was a victory for the caliph, bestowed on him by God. Ibn Ziyād sought to clarify that al-Husayn had claimed that Yazīd's caliphate was illegitimate and that he was more entitled than he, but that God aborted his false claim. Mentioning what had happen to al-Ḥusayn and his followers, Ibn Ziyād said to Zaynab, "Praise be to God, who has disgraced you (*faḍaḥakum*), killed you (*qatalakum*) and abolished the false nature of your claim (*akdhaba uḥduthatakum*)." In her response, Zaynab wanted to emphasize that al-Ḥusayn was among the family of the Prophet whom God had purified, as He mentioned in the Qur'ān,¹³ and that, therefore, he would never commit any transgression. Refuting Ibn Ziyād's statement, she replied, "Praise be to God, who has favored us with the Prophet Muḥammad and has purified us completely from sin. He only disgraces the great sinner and eliminates the false nature of the reckless." Then, Ibn Ziyād asked her, "What do you think of how God has treated

¹³ Qur'ān, 33: 33. "...Allāh only desires to keep away the uncleanness from you, O people of the House [of the Prophet] and to purify you a thorough purifying."

your family?" Again, Ibn Ziyād wanted to claim that what had happened to al-Ḥusayn and his family was only a punishment by God for al-Ḥusayn's rebellion. She replied, "God decreed death for them and they went forward bravely to their resting places, and God will gather you and them (in the hereafter) and you will dispute with each other before Him." Ibn Ziyād became enraged with anger but ʿAmr Ibn Ḥurayth intervened and asked Ibn Ziyād not to hold her responsible for anything she said and not to blame her mistakes, as she was "only a woman." Ibn Ziyād wanted to claim to the audience, as he had done before with Ibn ʿAqīl, that al-Ḥusayn and his followers deserved death because of their rebellion against the caliph. Ibn Ziyād said to her, "God has healed my soul from the tyrannical, rebellious, and disobedient members of your family."¹⁴

Ibn Ziyād tried to announce to the masses that al-Ḥusayn was a rebel against the legal caliph, Yazīd, and that his killing was a victory for the caliph granted to him by God. He summoned the Kūfans in the great mosque and delivered a speech to them, saying, "Praise be to God, who has disclosed the truth and its followers; He has given victory to the Commander of the Faithful, Yazīd Ibn Muʿāwiyah and his party. He has killed the liar who is the son of a liar, al-Ḥusayn Ibn ʿAlī and his Shīʿa."¹⁵ ʿAbd Allāh Ibn ʿAfīf al-Azdī, who had been one of ʿAlī's supporters and who had lost both of his eyes at the battles of the Camel and Ṣiffīn,¹⁶ was present in the mosque. He interrupted Ibn Ziyād and shouted to him, "Son of Marjāna, the ones who are liars and sons of liars are you, your father and the man who appointed you and his father. You are killing the sons of the Prophets and trying to speak the language of true men." Ibn Ziyād was astonished to see somebody confronting him and rejecting his statement; he ordered his men to seize Ibn ʿAfīf. Upon

¹⁴ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 349-50. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 124-134. Ibn Saʿd, *Maqatal*, p. 79.

¹⁵ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 351. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 413. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 144.

¹⁶ Ibid. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 351. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 413.

being seized, Ibn ʿAfīf gave the battle cry of his tribe, al-Azd, asking for help. The people of Azd, who numbered as seven hundred men in Kūfa, rescued him from Ibn Ziyād's men and took him to his family.¹⁷

Although al-Ṭabarī reports this account on the authority of Ḥumayd Ibn Muslim, the main narrator of Abū Mikhnaḥ, he abbreviates this event, stating that Ibn ʿAfīf was brought to Ibn Ziyād, who ordered him to be crucified.¹⁸ Even though neither mentions authorities for this account, the full account of Ibn ʿAfīf's protest is provided by al-Balādhurī and Ibn ʿAṭham with some differences.

According to this account, Ibn Ziyād followed in the footsteps of his father, who had exploited the chiefs of the tribes by suppressing Ḥujr's protest. Since Ibn ʿAfīf was protected by his tribe, al-Azd, Ibn Ziyād resorted to the tribal leaders and sought their assistance, and they, once again, played a vital role by capturing Ibn ʿAfīf. Following ʿAmr Ibn al-Ḥajjāj's suggestion, Ibn Ziyād, according to al-Balādhurī, imprisoned some of the prominent people of al-Azd in order to compel their tribe to stop protecting Ibn ʿAfīf. Meanwhile, Ibn Ziyād sent some of his troops from Yemen to arrest Ibn ʿAfīf. After a fierce battle between the people of Yemen and the people of Azd, Ibn Ziyād's troops succeeded in capturing Ibn ʿAfīf. When Ibn ʿAfīf was brought to Ibn Ziyād, he was ordered to be crucified.¹⁹

Following his father's course, Ibn Ziyād subdued Ibn ʿAfīf's protest only when he manipulated the feud amongst the tribes and by resorting to the tribal leaders of Kūfa. According to Ibn ʿAṭham, the tribal leaders of Kūfa suggested to Ibn Ziyād that he imprison the prominent persons of Azd, because they had rescued Ibn ʿAfīf from Ibn

¹⁷ Ibid. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 351. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 414.

¹⁸ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 351.

¹⁹ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 414.

Ziyād's men. Following their suggestion, Ibn Ziyād imprisoned the leaders of Azd, trying to force their tribe to bring Ibn ʿAfīf to him. He also sent some tribal leaders, who were the leaders of ʿUmar's troops at the battle of Karbalā', such as, ʿAmr Ibn al-Ḥajjāj, ʿAmr Ibn al-Ashʿath and Shabath Ibn Ribʿī to capture Ibn ʿAfīf. Ibn Aʿtham narrates that some tribes of Yemen refused to submit to Ibn Ziyād's order to fight the Azd; rather, they decided to join al-Azd in protecting Ibn ʿAfīf. Hearing this, Ibn Ziyād gathered the tribes of Muḍar and ordered them to join Ibn al-Ashʿath's men. A vigorous fight between Ibn Ziyād's men and the defenders of Ibn ʿAfīf took place, and, finally, Ibn Ziyād's men reached Ibn ʿAfīf's house, captured him and brought him to Ibn Ziyād.²⁰ Avoiding the actual reason of Ibn ʿAfīf's protest against the Umayyad authorities, Ibn Ziyād tried to provoke the wrath of the people against Ibn ʿAfīf by accusing him of being a rebel against the legitimate caliph and saying that he was making slurs against the third caliph, ʿUthmān. He asked Ibn ʿAfīf, "What is your opinion about ʿUthmān?" Realizing Ibn Ziyād's intention, Ibn ʿAfīf turned away from talking about ʿUthmān and tried to focus on Ibn Ziyād and Yazīd. He replied, "You have nothing to do with ʿUthmān, whether he committed good or bad deeds... but ask me about you and your father, and Yazīd and his father." Hearing this, Ibn Ziyād discontinued his discussion, telling Ibn ʿAfīf that he would not ask him about anything before he had tasted death, and ordered him to be beheaded and crucified.²¹

Ibn Ziyād, who had taught the Kūfans to submit to his orders without objection when he arrived in Kūfa was, after al-Ḥusayn's killing and the arrival of the captives, attacked by Ibn ʿAfīf. Ibn ʿAfīf's opposition was transformed into a movement against Ibn Ziyād

²⁰ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 144-5.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 3: 145-6.

when his tribe, al-Azd, and, according to Ibn A^ctham, some of the tribes of Yemen, tried to defend him from the governor's men. A battle took place between Ibn ʿAfīf's defenders and Ibn Ziyād's men. The questions that arise here are: Why did these tribes fail to defend Ibn ʿAqīl or fight for him? Why did the tribe of Madhḥij not dare to save Hānī from Ibn Ziyād's prison? What was the impact of the captives on the people of Kūfa?

Having fulfilled his task of preventing al-Ḥusayn from entering Kūfa and killing him, and also by controlling the situation in Kūfa, Ibn Ziyād now decided to inform Yazīd about this great victory. He also intended to send al-Ḥusayn's head and those of his followers along with the captives to Damascus, but he was waiting for Yazīd's orders.

According to Ibn Saʿd and al-Ṭabarī, on the authority of ʿAwāna, Yazīd sent his messenger to Ibn Ziyād, asking him to send him al-Ḥusayn's women and the rest of his family.²² Before doing this, Ibn Ziyād dispatched Zaḥr Ibn Qays with al-Ḥusayn's head and the heads of his followers, ordering him to describe to Yazīd what had happened at Karbalā'. Zaḥr considered al-Ḥusayn's killing a triumph for the caliph bestowed on him by God, and hailed Yazīd for this great victory. Describing the battle at Karbalā', Zaḥr told Yazīd that al-Ḥusayn and his followers had refused to submit to Ibn Ziyād's order and had chosen to fight. According to Zaḥr, when al-Ḥusayn and his followers were surrounded by the troops, they scattered, trying to escape and to find shelter, and in no time, they were all killed. He went on to say, "These are their naked bodies, their clothes overwhelmed by blood, and their cheeks burned by the Sun."²³ Hearing this, Yazīd expressed to his men that he would have been satisfied with them even without killing al-

²² Ibn Saʿd, *Maqatal*, p. 81. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'riḫ*, 4: 354.

²³ Ibid., 4: 351-2. Ibn Saʿd, *Maqatal*, pp. 81-2. Ibn A^ctham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 148-9.

Ḥusayn and cursed Ibn Ziyād for his deed.²⁴ According to some sources, Yazīd's eyes were even filled with tears when he heard the story of al-Ḥusayn's killing.²⁵

The questions presenting themselves here are: Did not Yazīd really intend to kill al-Ḥusayn if he refused to acknowledge his caliphate? Would Yazīd have been satisfied with Ibn Ziyād and the people of Iraq if they had left al-Ḥusayn go free without paying homage to him? Did he curse Ibn Ziyād in order to remove any responsibility from his shoulders for killing al-Ḥusayn and to avoid the wrath of the people against him? If Yazīd was not satisfied with al-Ḥusayn's killing, then why did he allow Ibn Ziyād to send al-Ḥusayn's head to him and treat it in a humiliating way?

It is reported that when al-Ḥusayn's head was brought before Yazīd, he looked at it and recited:

We will split the skull of men who are dear to us
But they were more disobedient and oppressive.²⁶

In his account, Ibn Sa'd narrates that Yazīd was poking al-Ḥusayn's mouth while he was reciting this verse. Hearing of Yazīd's treatment of al-Ḥusayn's head, a man from al-Ansār protested and asked him to keep his cane away from al-Ḥusayn's mouth, explaining, "I have seen the Prophet kissing the place where you put your cane."²⁷

Al-Ṭabarī and al-Balādhurī narrate that when Marwān's brother, Yaḥyā, heard Yazīd's verse, he protested, reciting the following:

The heads on the plain (*taff*) were closer in kinship (to Yazīd)
than Ibn Ziyād, the slave with the false lineage.
The offspring of Sumayya (Yazīd's mother) have become as numerous as stones
while the daughter of the Apostle of God has lost her offspring.

²⁴ Ibid., 3: 149. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 351-2. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 415. Ibn Sa'd, *Maqtal*, p. 82.

²⁵ Ibid. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 352.

²⁶ Ibn A'ṭham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 150. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 416. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 352.

²⁷ Ibn Sa'd, *Maqtal*, p. 82

Hearing this, Yazīd struck his hand against the chest of Yaḥyā and ordered him to be silent.²⁸

According to many sources, when Abū Barza al-Aslamī (d. 65/684), a companion of the Prophet, saw what Yazīd was doing with al-Ḥusayn's head, he cried out to Yazīd to take away his cane from al-Ḥusayn's mouth, explaining:

As for you, Yazīd, you will come forward on the Day of Resurrection (*yawm al-qiyāma*) and Ibn Ziyād will be your advocate (*shaff'uk*). But this man (al-Ḥusayn) will come forward on the Day of Resurrection and the Prophet Muḥammad will be his advocate.²⁹

According to the above-mentioned accounts, it is clear that many people, including a Companion of the Prophet, condemned Yazīd's treatment of al-Ḥusayn's head and charged him with the main responsibility for al-Ḥusayn's killing. Because of Yazīd's order, Ibn Ziyād had dared to kill al-Ḥusayn.

It is also reported that when al-Ḥusayn's family were brought to Yazīd, he summoned the nobles of Syria to witness his victory. In his discussion with ʿAlī Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Yazīd wanted to explain the reason for al-Ḥusayn's killing: "Your father cut the bond of kinship with me, showed ignorance of my rights and tried to deprive me of my position of authority. God has treated him in the way you have seen."³⁰

According to this account, Yazīd believed that he was a legitimate caliph and that al-Ḥusayn was a rebel and a wrongdoer when he did not acknowledge his caliphate. He believed that because of his refusal, God had punished him. It should be noted that, in this account, Yazīd did not mention to the assembly that Ibn Ziyād had killed al-Ḥusayn. This

²⁸ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 352. Al-Ṭabarī, *The Caliphate of Yazīd. The History of al-Ṭabarī*, XIX, p. 170. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 421.

²⁹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 356. Al-Ṭabarī, *The Caliphate of Yazīd. The History of al-Ṭabarī*, XIX, p. 176. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 150. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 416. Al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 61.

³⁰ Ibn Saʿd, *Maqātāl*, p. 83. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 352. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 152.

means that Yazīd was satisfied with al-Ḥusayn's killing, but intended to demonstrate that he was not responsible for it; instead, he claimed, it was a consequence of al-Ḥusayn's rebellion, and done by God.

Moreover, Yazīd considered al-Ḥusayn's killing to be a victory bestowed on him by God and that his women, according to al-Ṭabarī, were captives with whom he could do anything he wanted. Al-Ṭabarī reports, on the authority of Abū Mikhnaḥ, that when the captives were brought to Yazīd, a man from Syria thought that the captives were slaves brought from war. He asked Yazīd to allow him to keep Fāṭima, 'Alī's daughter, in his house as a slave girl. Because of this demand, a heated exchange between Zaynab and Yazīd took place. Zaynab explained to the gathering that they were not slaves captured by war. Rather, she argued, they belonged to the Prophet and nobody had the right to have control over them. She retorted to the man that neither he nor Yazīd had any right to enslave them. Yazīd angrily responded, "You lie. By God I have the right to do so, and if I want to do that I will do it." Zaynab answered, "God has not permitted you to do that, and if you do, you will have departed from our religion and assumed another religion." Yazīd responded, "Your father and your brother (al-Ḥusayn) deserted the religion." She said, "Because of God's religion, my father's religion, my brother's religion and my grandfather's religion, you and your father were guided." The discussion ended when Yazīd refuted Zaynab's statement, stating, "You lie, O enemy of God."³¹

In his brief report in regard to the above-mentioned discussion, Ibn A'ṭham, unlike his Shī'ī accounts in describing Yazīd, narrates that when a man from Syria asked Yazīd to give him "this slave girl," mentioning a girl from among al-Ḥusayn's womenfolk,

³¹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 353. Al-Balādhurī briefly mentions this account. *Ansāb*, 3: 417.

Yazīd reproached him, stating, “She is the daughter of ‘Alī and Fāṭima.”³² This means that some accounts want to exaggerate Yazīd’s treatment of the captives.

Yazīd’s attitude regarding al-Ḥusayn’s killing was not consistent; according to some accounts, he condemned Ibn Ziyād as being responsible for al-Ḥusayn’s murder; according to others, he believed that al-Ḥusayn’s killing was a punishment by God because of his rebellion. Although Yazīd outwardly articulated regret for al-Ḥusayn’s killing, still he did not hesitate to poke his head with his cane. Yazīd’s unsettled attitude would be more clear from the reports below.

Al-Ṭabarī reports that when Yazīd’s wife, ‘Ātika, heard that Yazīd had put al-Ḥusayn’s head in front of him, she came out and angrily condemned him for humiliating al-Ḥusayn, “the son of Fāṭima, the daughter of the Prophet.” Hearing this, Yazīd asked her to lament for him and said that Ibn Ziyād had killed him and that Allāh would punish Ibn Ziyād for his deed. Nevertheless, al-Ṭabarī reports that after this, Yazīd permitted the people to enter his palace in order to watch him poking al-Ḥusayn’s mouth.³³

Al-Ṭabarī and al-Balādhurī report that when the women captives were brought to Yazīd’s family, Yazīd’s women and Mu‘āwiya’s daughters shared with them the lamentation of al-Ḥusayn’s killing.³⁴ In another report, Yazīd ordered his women to lament al-Ḥusayn’s killing.³⁵

Did Yazīd intend to calm the situation by permitting his wife and his women to lament al-Ḥusayn and by expressing his regret for al-Ḥusayn’s death?

³² Ibn A‘tham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 153.

³³ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta’rīkh*, 4: 356.

³⁴ Al-Ṭabarī, on the authority of ‘Awāna. *Ta’rīkh*, 4: 355. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 417.

³⁵ Ibid., 3: 417. Ibn Sa‘d, *Maqātīl*, p. 83.

Al-Ṭabarī reports, on the authority of ʿAwāna, that Fāṭima, al-Ḥusayn's daughter, reproached Yazīd for their plight, stating, "O Yazīd! The daughters of the messenger of God are captives!" Yazīd answered that he was unwilling to see that.³⁶

The fickle attitude of Yazīd towards al-Ḥusayn's killing is more understandable from Ibn Saʿd's account. Ibn Saʿd narrates that when the womenfolk of al-Ḥusayn were brought to Yazīd, Sakīna, al-Ḥusayn's daughter, said, "O Yazīd! The daughters of the messenger of God are captives!" He replied that their situation was harder on him than on her, declaring that Ibn Ziyād was responsible for al-Ḥusayn's death. He expressed that he would have been satisfied with the Iraqīs' obedience to him without killing al-Ḥusayn, but that "Ibn Ziyād killed him rapidly."³⁷

According to Ibn Saʿd, Yazīd also confirmed that if he could have prevented al-Ḥusayn from being murdered, he would have done so, even at the expense of his own life. Nevertheless, he still believed that al-Ḥusayn was a rebel and wrongdoer for denouncing his caliphate, and that he had deserved this fate, which had been inflicted on him by God. Then Yazīd turned to ʿAlī Ibn al-Ḥusayn and told him that his father had cut the bond of kinship with Yazīd and had tried to deprive him of his position of authority, and that, therefore, God had treated him in this way because of his deeds.³⁸

Ibn Aʿtham also reports that when Yazīd heard the story of al-Ḥusayn's killing, he cursed Ibn Ziyād and confirmed that he would have prevented al-Ḥusayn's death even at the cost of the killing some of his sons. Yet, after that, he put al-Ḥusayn's head in front of him and started poking it with his cane.³⁹ However, ʿAlī Ibn al-Ḥusayn believed that

³⁶ Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 355.

³⁷ Ibn Saʿd, *Maqātāl*, p. 83

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 149-50.

Yazīd was responsible for al-Ḥusayn's killing. According to Ibn A'ṭham, he condemned Yazīd for what he had done to his father and his family and for degrading al-Ḥusayn by putting his head up on the main gate of Damascus.⁴⁰

Ibn A'ṭham also narrates that Yazīd called for a general assembly in his palace to explain to the people the reason for al-Ḥusayn's killing. He asked a preacher to stand on the pulpit and tell the people about al-Ḥusayn's disobedience to him, that al-Ḥusayn had done wrong to Yazīd, and to praise Yazīd and his father. The preacher followed Yazīd's request. When he finished, 'Alī Ibn al-Ḥusayn asked Yazīd to permit him to deliver a speech to the people. Initially, Yazīd refused 'Alī's demand, fearing that he would give a bad impression of Yazīd and his family. Only at the insistence of some nobles did Yazīd reluctantly allowed him to speak. At the beginning of his speech, 'Alī introduced himself to the audience and started to enumerate the merits of his ancestors. When he came to his father and described the way he was killed, the people started to weep. Fearing a disturbance, Yazīd interrupted 'Alī's speech and he ordered the preacher to call for the prayer.⁴¹

Yazīd insisted that al-Ḥusayn was a rebel against the legitimate caliph and that he had been killed because of his rebellion. Therefore, Yazīd, according to Ibn Sa'd and al-Balādhurī, sent al-Ḥusayn's head to his governor of Medina, 'Amr Ibn Sa'īd.⁴² Perhaps Yazīd intended to announce his victory over al-Ḥusayn's rebellion to the people of Medina and to make al-Ḥusayn an example for whoever else wished to oppose the Umayyad authorities.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 3: 153-4.

⁴¹ Ibid., 3: 154-5.

⁴² Ibn Sa'd, *Maqatal*, p. 84. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 419.

Not only Yazīd, but also the governor of Medina, changed his attitude in regards to al-Ḥusayn's killing. At the beginning, when he received the news of al-Ḥusayn's killing, ʿAmr was pleased with the news and announced his death to the people of Medina,⁴³ and, according to al-Balādhurī, displayed al-Ḥusayn's head to the people.⁴⁴ But, when ʿAmr saw the grief of the people of Medina who were agitated by al-Ḥusayn's head and weeping for him, he changed his attitude and declared that he wished that Yazīd had not sent al-Ḥusayn's head to him.⁴⁵ Ibn Saʿd also reports that ʿAmr declared that he wished that al-Ḥusayn's head was still on his body and that he had not been killed.⁴⁶

Although Yazīd cursed Ibn Ziyād and accused him of al-Ḥusayn's killing, he neither punished him nor deprived him of his office; he only condemned him in front of the people. Ibn Aʿtham reports that, Ibn Ziyād remained in his office as the governor of Baṣra and Kūfa and that his position became stronger than before. Moreover, Yazīd granted him one thousand dirhams as a gift for his submission to his orders.⁴⁷ Al-Masʿūdī also narrates that Yazīd met with Ibn Ziyād after al-Ḥusayn's killing and Yazīd praised Ibn Ziyād's loyalty in verse.⁴⁸

Yazīd was also satisfied with the Kūfans who had participated in al-Ḥusayn's killing and rewarded them for their submission to the Umayyads. According to al-Balādhurī, on the authority of Mujālid Ibn Saʿīd, Yazīd asked Ibn Ziyād to increase the payment of those people in Kūfa who were loyal to the Umayyads.⁴⁹

⁴³ Ibid., 3: 417. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 356-7. Ibn Saʿd, *Maqātāl*, p. 85.

⁴⁴ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 418.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 3: 417, 418.

⁴⁶ Ibn Saʿd, *Maqātāl*, p. 85.

⁴⁷ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futuh*, 3: 165.

⁴⁸ Al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 67.

⁴⁹ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 420.

According to al-Ṭabarī, Ibn Ziyād declared that he had followed Yazīd's order in killing al-Ḥusayn. Al-Ṭabarī reports that Yazīd sent a letter to Ibn Ziyād, ordering him to kill Ibn al-Zubayr, who refused to recognize Yazīd's caliphate. Realizing that killing Ibn al-Zubayr, who took refuge in Mecca, would mean invading the holy city, Ibn Ziyād refused to comply. He affirmed that he was not ready to commit two crimes through following Yazīd's orders: killing al-Ḥusayn and invading Mecca.⁵⁰ According to Ibn Ziyād's statement, Yazīd, who ordered him to invade Mecca and to kill Ibn al-Zubayr, had also ordered him to kill al-Ḥusayn.

According to al-Ya'qūbī and al-Balādhurī, Ibn 'Abbās had no doubt that Yazīd was responsible for al-Ḥusayn's killing and that he had ordered Ibn Ziyād to kill him. They report that Ibn 'Abbās refused Ibn al-Zubayr's request to pay allegiance to him. Hearing this, Yazīd was pleased and tried to coax Ibn 'Abbās to his side. He sent a letter to Ibn 'Abbās, praising him for his attitude towards Ibn al-Zubayr and asking him to prevent his relatives from paying allegiance to Ibn al-Zubayr. Ibn 'Abbās refused, reminding Yazīd of ordering Ibn Ziyād to fight and kill al-Ḥusayn and his followers. He also condemned Yazīd for taking al-Ḥusayn's family as captives to Damascus.⁵¹

In his will to Yazīd,⁵² Mu'āwiya expected that the people of Kūfa would call al-Ḥusayn to lead them against the Umayyad authorities, as they had called him frequently in the time of Mu'āwiya. He also predicted that al-Ḥusayn would comply with the Kūfans' call and revolt against Yazīd, since he had refused to recognize Yazīd's caliphate. Mu'āwiya realized that, because of his close relationship to the Prophet and his

⁵⁰ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 371.

⁵¹ Al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 248-50. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 5: 321-2. This account contradicts Hawting's statement that Ibn 'Abbās is said "...to have spoken favorably of him [Yazīd]..." See his "Yazīd (I) B. Mu'āwiya," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 11: 310.

⁵² See page 115, footnote, 85.

leading position among the people, al-Ḥusayn's death would cause immense upheaval among them and, consequently, would undermine Yazīd's caliphate. Therefore, Mu'āwiya warned Yazīd against committing any harm to al-Ḥusayn.

Yazīd did not listen to his father's advice and was anxious to get the *bay'at* from al-Ḥusayn. According to his letter to the governor of Medina, Yazīd decided not to leave al-Ḥusayn alone unless he paid homage to him. He ordered Ibn Ziyād to go to Kūfa and permitted him to take whatever measures he might need to in order to subdue al-Ḥusayn's revolt. He showed that he was satisfied with what Ibn Ziyād had done to al-Ḥusayn; he did not deprive him of his office but rather rewarded him and did not even ask him why he had ordered his troops to trample on al-Ḥusayn's body after his death.

Yazīd considered al-Ḥusayn's killing as a victory and took his family as captives. He did not realize that al-Ḥusayn's killing would move the people to the extent that even Yazīd's own family would lament al-Ḥusayn. Al-Ḥusayn's family, who were taken as prisoners from Karbalā' to Kūfa and from Kūfa to Damascus with al-Ḥusayn's head, incited the people against the authorities. Realizing this, Yazīd changed his attitude and treated al-Ḥusayn's family leniently.⁵³ He expressed his regret for al-Ḥusayn's killing and declared that Ibn Ziyād was responsible and cursed him.

Thus, al-Ḥusayn's family played a very significant role after his murder. He could have left them behind many times but he did not. He needed them to tell the people what had happened to him and agitate them against their illegitimate rulers. They did this in Kūfa and Damascus and Yazīd could not help but be affected by it. He knew he had to placate the people and so, condemned Ibn Ziyād publicly while supporting him privately.

⁵³ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, 4: 355. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 417.

Yazīd was able to hold on to his caliphate, but, just like his father Mu^cāwiya, he could not hide all the evidence of his lack of qualifications. Through al-Ḥusayn's murder and the role of his family, the people were reminded of the illegitimacy of the Umayyad regime.

Conclusion

In this thesis, we have been looking at the circumstances surrounding al-Ḥusayn's uprising and murder, using the classical Arabic sources on the subject. Our reading of these sources has led us to several conclusions about what led to al-Ḥusayn's uprising, his actual uprising and death and finally, the aftermath of these events. Let us now provide a summary of what our findings have been.

Our first finding is that al-Ḥusayn's uprising and his consequent death are directly connected to the matter of the caliphate. He refused to recognize Yazīd's caliphate because he considered it as illegitimate due to the fact that Yazīd was not qualified to assume such an important office. Not only al-Ḥusayn, but also the prominent nobles of the Muslim community rejected Yazīd's caliphate because of his irreligious behavior.

Furthermore, al-Ḥusayn, his father and his brother, had accepted the criteria acknowledged by the early Companions of the Prophet for choosing the caliph, and were of the opinion that they, due to their relationship to the Prophet, were more qualified for the caliphate than anybody else. Al-Ḥusayn believed that Yazīd's caliphate would lead the Muslim community to depravity and that he, al-Ḥusayn, was more responsible than any other Muslim for preventing this moral corruption.

However, on what bases did Yazīd become caliph and how did he assume the caliphate while, among the Muslims, were the sons of the prominent Ṣaḥāba, such as al-Ḥusayn, Ibn al-Zubayr, Ibn ʿUmar and Ibn Abī Bakr, who were more qualified for the caliphate than he? We have seen that except for the people of Syria-who were the real supporters of Muʿāwiya-the people refused to recognize Yazīd. Even the close associates

of Mu^ʿāwīya and some of his supporters, such as Ziyād and Marwān, were opposed to his accession.¹ Mu^ʿāwīya was not unaware of Yazīd's misconduct and his lack of qualifications for the caliphate. Nonetheless, he nominated him as his successor and imposed his caliphate on the people. Wanting to remove the real meaning of the caliphate and intending to transform it to a kingship (*mulk*) inherited among his offspring, Mu^ʿāwīya himself rejected the principle of the early Companions of the Prophet by choosing the caliph, as he articulated clearly in his letter to al-Ḥasan.²

The most important and effective measure utilized by Mu^ʿāwīya was the imposition of Yazīd's *bayʿa* on the people. In fact, it was the only way to secure Yazīd's caliphate. Once the people had sworn allegiance to Yazīd, they had no chance to revoke it. The most important cities for Mu^ʿāwīya to secure the *bayʿa* for Yazīd were Medina and Mecca (al-Ḥaramayn), since many of the sons of the prominent Ṣaḥāba were living there. With his Syrian troops and using threats, Mu^ʿāwīya, before his death, succeeded in securing the *bayʿa* for Yazīd from the people of the two cities.³

Meanwhile, the people of Kūfa continued to call al-Ḥusayn to rise against Mu^ʿāwīya, but al-Ḥusayn, honoring al-Ḥasan's truce with Mu^ʿāwīya, asked them to wait until the latter's death. Receiving the news of al-Ḥusayn's meetings with the Kūfan delegation at Mecca, Mu^ʿāwīya became more aware that al-Ḥusayn would not recognize Yazīd, that he would comply with the Kufans' appeal and, consequently, would rise against Yazīd. Due to al-Ḥusayn's leading position among the Muslims, especially in Mecca, Medina and

¹ According to al-Isfahānī, when Mu^ʿāwīya imposed the *bayʿa* for Yazīd, the prominent Umayyads in Medina, Marwān, Saʿīd Ibn al-Āṣ and ʿAbd Allāh Ibn ʿĀmir expressed their disapproval of Yazīd's accession. *Al-Aghānī*, 18: 71.

² Al-Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, pp.66-7. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf*, 3: 280.

³ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, p. 2: 351-2. Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 164. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma*, 1: 190.

Kūfa,⁴ and his relationship to the Prophet, Mu'āwiya realized that al-Ḥusayn's assassination would result in hazardous consequences for Yazīd's caliphate. Therefore, Mu'āwiya, in his will, advised Yazīd not to cause any harm to al-Ḥusayn if he rose against him.

However, as soon as he assumed the caliphate, Yazīd wasted no time in asking al-Ḥusayn to pay homage to him. He gave al-Ḥusayn no alternative but to submit to his demand, ordering his governor of Medina to take allegiance from al-Ḥusayn. Because of the Umayyad officials' harassment, al-Ḥusayn decided to leave Medina, declaring that he would never recognize Yazīd. As soon as the Kūfans received news of al-Ḥusayn's refusal to give *bay'at* and his departure from Medina, they started sending letters and delegations, calling him to lead them against the Umayyads.

Thus far, we have been dealing with what came before al-Ḥusayn's uprising. Our second finding has to do with why al-Ḥusayn actually revolted. There were four reasons for his revolt; first, his refusal to acknowledge Yazīd's caliphate. According to al-Ya'qūbī, Yazīd ordered al-Walīd to behead al-Ḥusayn in the event that he declined to comply.⁵ According to another account, al-Ḥusayn also declared that he had decided to leave Mecca because of the Umayyad threat. Upon asking him the reason for leaving Mecca, the most protected place for Muslims, al-Ḥusayn confirmed that the Umayyad officials were plotting to assassinate him there and that he wanted to protect the sanctity of the place. On many occasions, al-Ḥusayn also announced that the Umayyad authorities would not leave him alone unless he gave the *bay'at* to Yazīd. When Ibn 'Umar told al-

⁴ Al-Ḥusayn's leading position was acknowledged by Ibn al-Zubayr himself. When al-Ḥusayn decided to leave Mecca, Ibn al-Zubayr told him that if he stayed in Mecca and assumed the caliphate, all the people would pay homage to him and that nobody would argue against his entitlement to the caliphate. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 375. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 289.

⁵ Al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, 2: 241.

Ḥusayn that no harm would reach him if he stayed in his home, even without paying homage to Yazīd, al-Ḥusayn dismissed this claim.⁶

With Yazīd's caliphate, Mu'āwiyā had created a new system in regard to the caliphate, destroying the principles acknowledged by the early Companions of the Prophet and wishing to transform it into a kingship for his family.⁷ Through his refusal to recognize Yazīd's caliphate, al-Ḥusayn intended to stand against this new system, which required no qualifications for the caliph, and to revive the principles of the early Companions of the Prophet.

The second reason for al-Ḥusayn's uprising was the Kūfans' frequent calls to lead them against the Umayyad officials. Al-Ḥusayn received many warnings from prominent persons about the fickleness of the Kūfans. Fearing that al-Ḥusayn might be killed at the hands of the Umayyad officials, Ibn 'Abbās and Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya suggested he to go to Yemen or to any other place where he could find many supporters and where he would be safer. Although al-Ḥusayn was not unaware of the Kūfans' attitude, he decided to pursue his plan. He believed that their *bay'ā* was binding on him and that, therefore, it was his duty to comply with their call.

Unlike the Kūfans, neither the people of Yemen nor of Baṣra requested that al-Ḥusayn rise against the Umayyads. As for Yemen, al-Ḥusayn did not even send any letter or any envoy asking for support. This leaves us in doubt of there being any supporters in Yemen. Unlike the supporters of al-Ḥusayn in Kūfa who had full control over their city before Ibn Ziyād's arrival, Baṣra was under the control of Ibn Ziyād; the supporters of al-Ḥusayn had lost their power there because of Ibn Ziyād's brutality against opponents of

⁶ Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4:289. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 375. Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 72, 79.

⁷ According to Ibn A'tham, the Syrians gave homage to Yazīd as the new caliph, and his son, Mu'āwiyā, as his successor. *Futūḥ*, 3: 7-8.

the Umayyads. Furthermore, al-Ḥusayn's envoy to Baṣra was handed over to Ibn Ziyād by one of the nobles from whom al-Ḥusayn had asked for support.⁸ Therefore, the people of Kūfa were the strongest supporters of al-Ḥusayn and Kūfa was the only place for him to rise against the Umayyads.

A third factor could be added to the reasons for al-Ḥusayn's uprising; namely, the economic factor. For example, Ziyād Ibn Abīh deprived the followers of ʿAlī from their share of the booty in reign of Muʿāwīya. He did this in order to silence the party that was opposing the Umayyads. And that was one of Ḥujr's objections to Ziyād. The same procedure was taken by Ibn Ziyād against the followers of al-Ḥusayn. He tried to keep them from following al-Ḥusayn by threatening to take their property and withhold their shares from the treasury.

In one of their letters to al-Ḥusayn, the people of Kūfa condemned Muʿāwīya for his unjust conduct in killing the best men of the community and for dividing the property of the community among the tyrants and wealthy men. They invited al-Ḥusayn to guide and unite them. They repeated their demand that he lead them in order to establish justice and remove corruption caused by Yazīd.⁹ Al-Ḥusayn's objection to the Umayyads unjust treatment of ʿAlī's supporters in Kūfa can be seen in his statement:

Indeed, these authorities [the Umayyads] have adhered to obedience to Satan and have abandoned the Merciful; they have made corruption visible; they neglect the punishment (*ḥudūd*) laid down by God; *they have seized the booty (fay') exclusively for themselves* (italic is mine); they have permitted what God has forbidden, and they have forbidden what He has permitted. I am more responsible for changing this than anyone else.¹⁰

⁸ Ibid., 4: 366. Al-Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 232. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 43.

⁹ Ibid., 3: 31-2. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 369. Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 261-2. Al-Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2: 241-2. Al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, 3: 45.

¹⁰ Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 304-5. Al-Ṭabarī, *The Caliphate of Yazīd, The History of al-Ṭabarī*, XIX, pp. 95-6. Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 91. Al-Balādhurī mentions this statement briefly. *Ansāb*, 3: 381

Therefore, al-Husayn's uprising was also motivated by his desire to give the people back their economic rights and benefits.

The fourth and most important reason for the uprising was proclaimed by al-Ḥusayn himself. Before leaving Medina, al-Ḥusayn wanted to make an announcement about the reasons for his decision. He stated:

I have not left my residence out of joy, or gratitude, or corruption, or wrongdoing; rather, I have left to seek reform (*iṣlāḥ*) in the community of my grandfather Muḥammad. I want to command morality (*ma'rūf*) and to forbid corruption (*munkar*) and to follow the conduct (*sīra*) of my grandfather, my father and the rightly Guided Caliphs.¹¹

Yazīd's caliphate, in al-Ḥusayn's eyes, was a deviation from the Sunna of the Prophet and the conduct of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, and represented corruption in the community of his grandfather. He announced that the reason for his refusal to recognize Yazīd and for his revolt was to prevent this corruption and to establish justice in the community. Because of Yazīd's irreligious conduct, al-Ḥusayn was not ready to lend legitimacy to his caliphate by paying homage to him.

Al-Ḥusayn did not listen to those who advised him to submit to the established authority (de facto) and to enter into whatever the community had entered into and agreed upon. They were fully aware of Yazīd's unsuitability for the caliphate and had opposed Mu'āwiya's desire to nominate Yazīd as his successor. But, when the *bay'at* to Yazīd was imposed on them, they asked al-Ḥusayn to compromise and to follow the community (*al-jamā'a*). They believed that paying homage to Yazīd would be better than an uprising which might lead to the division of the community. Al-Ḥusayn rejected their advice to submit, even if

¹¹ Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 23.

it was agreed upon by most of the Muslims, explaining that their obligation was not to accept an unjust ruler who allows tyranny and aggression but to rise against him. For this reason, al-Ḥusayn told Ibn ʿUmar, the pioneer of this opinion, that his duty was to support him against the illegitimate caliph.¹²

Even when he received the news of the killing of his envoys and the failure of the Kūfans to defend Ibn ʿAqīl and learned that their swords had turned against him, al-Ḥusayn did not change his plan and continued his journey to Kūfa. On many occasions, al-Ḥusayn told those who had written to him that he came to Kūfa only because of their appeal, asking them to fulfill their promises. When he became convinced of their failure to stand with him, he asked them to allow him to go back to Medina or to any other place. Did al-Ḥusayn prepare to withdraw from his duty to rise against Yazīd and decide instead to recognize Yazīd? If so, why did al-Ḥusayn take his family with him and expose them to jeopardy?

Let us remember that, according to some sources, Shamir Ibn Dhī al-Jawshan, one of ʿAlī's supporters who had turned against him and become one of the leaders of Ibn Ziyād's troops, advised Ibn Ziyād not to allow al-Ḥusayn to go anywhere, explaining that he would not withdraw from his plan and that he would call his supporters to stand with him against the Umayyads. Ibn Ziyād did not hesitate to accept Shamir's advice.¹³ Al-Ḥusayn's continued defiance to acknowledging Yazīd's caliphate is also illustrated by his refusal of the governor of Medina's request-according to Yazīd's instruction-to give the *bayʿa* to Yazīd.

¹² Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 29.

¹³ Al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 4: 313-4. Ibn Saʿd, *Maqatal al-Ḥusayn*, p. 69.

The final finding that we wish to highlight has to do with the role of al-Ḥusayn's family. When al-Ḥusayn refused to pay homage to Yazīd and was harassed by the Umayyad officials, he decided to leave his residence in Medina. Upon leaving Medina, al-Ḥusayn took his family with him. Apparently, there was no danger to them. None of his family were bothered by the Umayyad officials and, according to our sources, there was no intention on the part of the Umayyad officials to force al-Ḥusayn, through his family, to submit to Yazīd's demand. Therefore, there was actually no reason for al-Ḥusayn to take his family with him.

But he did take his family with him when he decided to comply with the Kūfans' call. When asked by Ibn ʿAbbās about this, al-Ḥusayn did not disclose his intentions. Fearing that al-Ḥusayn would be killed just like ʿUthmān, who was killed while his womenfolk and children were watching, Ibn ʿAbbās advised al-Ḥusayn not to expose them to this jeopardy. Although al-Ḥusayn did not deny Ibn ʿAbbās' statement, he told him that he had made his decision.¹⁴ This leaves us in no doubt that al-Ḥusayn was aware of the dangerous fate that his family might face, especially when we remember that he was fully aware of the wavering attitude of the Kūfans and the probability of betrayal.

Even when al-Ḥusayn had received the news of the killing of Ibn ʿAqīl and his other envoys in Kūfa and the Kūfans' failure to keep their commitments, and aware that a confrontation with the Umayyads was unavoidable, he did not send his family back to Medina. This leaves us with the impression that this decision was a part of his strategy and uprising so that they would play a significant role after his death in blaming the Kūfans for their failure to stand with him, and in agitating the masses against the

¹⁴ Ibid., 3: 73-4. Ibn Saʿd, *Maqatal*, p. 60. Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, 4: 288. Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 3: 374.

Umayyads for their treatment of the family of the Prophet. The role of his family was to testify to the ongoing illegitimacy of Yazīd's caliphate after the death of al-Ḥusayn and also to clarify the circumstances of his death for the people.

Although we admit that the details of al-Ḥusayn's uprising may be subject to some ambiguities, we have nevertheless uncovered several important factors that can help us to understand this event. Namely, we see that his uprising is first of all related to Mu'āwiyā's caliphate and his transformation of that institution for the sake of his son Yazīd. Al-Ḥusayn could not approve these changes and therefore refused to give the *bay'ā* to Yazīd and also felt obliged to revolt against Yazīd and his unjust rule. Yazīd naturally had to eliminate al-Ḥusayn as a rival and arranged to have his revolt suppressed. Although, al-Ḥusayn died because of his resistance to Yazīd, he left his family to remind the people that the true caliphate had been destroyed and their Umayyad rulers were unjust.

I have tried to make an original contribution in this study by bringing up several points that western scholars¹⁵ of the subject have neglected. First of all, I connected al-Ḥusayn's uprising to al-Ḥasan's abdication. None of the scholars have emphasized this. I argue that without al-Ḥasan's abdication, Mu'āwiyā would not have had full control over the Kūfans and without his father, Yazīd would not have become caliph. Furthermore, because of al-Ḥasan's abdication, the followers of 'Alī in Kūfa started to look to al-Ḥusayn as their leader and offered him their *bay'ā*.

I also showed the importance of Ḥujr's protest, his execution and its relationship to al-Ḥusayn's uprising; I demonstrated that Ḥujr paved the way for al-Ḥusayn's uprising.

¹⁵ I am referring to the studies of Wellhausen, Jafri, Vaglieri and Madelung.

After his execution, the Kufans prepared to visit al-Ḥusayn and ask him to lead them against the Umayyads.

I have also made a point of discussing Mu'āwiya's attempts and maneuvers for securing Yazīd's caliphate at length. Unlike Wellhausen, who believed that this matter was not recorded by the sources, and unlike other scholars who were oblivious to this matter, I paid due attention to this issue and discussed how Mu'āwiya used different means to reach his goal.

Ibn Aqīl's mission and his failure are fully discussed in my study as well as in other works, but I have concentrated on the role of the leaders of the tribes and of Ibn Ziyād. Needless to say, Ibn Aqīl's mission affected al-Ḥusayn's plans to reach his followers in Kūfa. Because of Ibn Aqīl's failure and his execution, al-Ḥusayn could not reach Kūfa and, consequently, was killed.

Finally, I also wanted to discuss the aftermath of al-Ḥusayn's death in my study. The role of the captives has been neglected by other scholars.¹⁶ The captives not only changed the attitudes of the Kūfans about al-Ḥusayn and the Umayyads to the extent that they began to oppose the Umayyads openly, but they also changed the attitude of Yazīd himself about al-Ḥusayn's murder. This last point is very important because at first, Yazīd was satisfied with Ibn Ziyād, but because of the captives and their agitating the masses, he condemned Ibn Ziyād and cursed him, although he later rewarded him and did not deprive him of his office.

As far as our sources are concerned, some issues need to be clarified. First of all, we should highlight the fact that all our sources are basically in agreement about the events

¹⁶ Jafri mentions the events of the captives return briefly but he does not discuss their role. *Origins*, pp. 193-4.

of al-Ḥusayn's uprising and his death. Regardless of their intentions or whether they are classified as pro-Shi'ī or pro-Sunni, they all acknowledge the incident of al-Ḥusayn's killing; its beginning and its end.

Second, it should be clarified that a full account of this event was first recorded by Abū Mikhnaf and that al-Ṭabarī is the only historian who provides us with his version. Although Ibn A'ṭham, al-Balādhurī and al-Dīnawarī deal with al-Ḥusayn in detail, they do not give a full account of the events; other sources only look at some aspects of al-Ḥusayn's killing or provide mere segments of the events. This is why al-Ṭabarī takes more space than other sources.

However, three patterns of writing can be distinguished in our sources. First, that of al-Ṭabarī, who does not provide his own comments or interpretations of the events. He usually provides several different accounts of the same event without commenting on them; he leaves the reader to make his own judgment or analysis. He did not provide his own comments and omitted at least some of his reports fearing that they would be rejected by the public, as he himself mentions when he deals with Abū Dharr's deportation from Syria to Medina and in regard to 'Uṣayn's murder,¹⁷ or that he might be classified as pro-Shi'ī. Al-Balādhurī could be classified in this category since he follows al-Ṭabarī's pattern.

The second pattern belongs to Ibn Sa'd, who presents Sunni viewpoint in some of his reports with different *isnāds*. Although he agrees with other sources about the events and Yazīd's lack of qualifications for the caliphate, he recorded his own comments on al-Ḥusayn's revolt. He seems to agree with Ibn 'Umar and other prominent persons who

¹⁷ Al-Ṭabarī, states, "Many things (*umūr*) were related concerning his (Abū Dharr) deportation, but I was reluctant (*karihnā*) to narrate most of them." *Ta'rīkh*, 3: 353. The same statement is uttered in regard to 'Uṣayn's murder. Ibid., p. 399.

believed that al-Ḥusayn should have given *bayʿa* to Yazīd and entered into whatever the Muslims agreed upon. He explains that if al-Ḥusayn would have paid homage to Yazīd, even though he was not qualified for the caliphate, this would have been better than dissension and revolt. Although he does not comment on this account, Ibn Saʿd seems to be leaning to Ibn ʿUmar's viewpoint that al-Ḥusayn was seeking to worldly power. He also seems to be of the opinion that Yazīd was not responsible of al-Ḥusayn's killing.¹⁸

A third pattern is to be found in Ibn Aʿtham, who does not cite his authorities. Contrary to Ibn Saʿd, Ibn Aʿtham presents a Shīʿī perspective and gives many exaggerated accounts about al-Ḥusayn's life and death. He defends al-Ḥusayn's decision to revolt against Yazīd and insists that the latter was responsible for his killing.¹⁹

Finally, my arguments have not been about the events of al-Ḥusayn's death itself because all the sources agree that it took place. My study is about interpreting the reasons for al-Ḥusayn's uprising, interpreting why he was killed, as well as the role of Muʿāwiya in securing his son's caliphate and Yazīd's culpability for al-Ḥusayn's death.

¹⁸ Ibn Saʿd, *Maqatal*, pp. 57, 67-8, 81.

¹⁹ Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, 3: 152-3.

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