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Outline of a Theory of Mediation: Anamnesis in Urban France

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Abstract

This project suggests a method of conflict analysis, anchored in Bourdieu's social theory, that weds approaches within sociological, political, and international relations theory. I focus on the contemporary conflict between the French state, and the substantial population considered "foreign" within France. This tension has regularly exploded into physical confrontation, most notably in the fall of 2005, though violence has been a persistent feature of the urban periphery for more than two decades. Moreover, tensions within France have often been co-opted into a larger "East vs. West" discourse, and this complex relationship is folded into an international conflict to which it may not belong. With this in mind, the project undertakes a thorough analysis of these complexities as they exist in France, proposing finally a means of transforming the conflict from violent to non-violent through a new theory of mediation.

Résumé

Cette thèse s'inspire des methodes de Pierre Bourdieu dans l'objectif d'analyser les conflits sociaux ; cette approche est a l'intersection de la sociologie, la théorie politique et les études des relations internationales. Je me concentre sur les conflits d aujourd hui dans les cités françaises, qui oppose l'État aux populations qu'il nomme « étranger », alors meme qu'ils s'agissent de la deuxième ou la troisième génération. Cette violence entre le peuple et l' État, qui se poursuit depuis plus de 20 ans, explose souvent en émeutes, notamment lors de l'année 2005. De plus, par forte meconnaissance, le conflit francais á souvent été repris plus largement dans le « debat Est/Ouest ». Par consequent l'ensemble de ce projet propose une analyse des conditions de conflit qui finalement transformera les conflits de violence en nonviolence, dans une reformulation de la theorie de la médiation.

If I could, I would have each of you together at a table, the wine would flow, and it would be a great and raucous night. I am surely forgetting some, but this is an open invite. Feel free to pass it along and let everyone know that the first round is on me.

Thomas, you have gracefully tolerated the idiocy that can only come from the process of trying to create something intelligent. For all of your patience, and for everything that I could not understand until you illuminated it for me, I am in awe of you. You stun me with your love, and I hope I give you a moment of the same.

Each of you who are my family. Richard, you keep me sane by letting me go a little insane, and I'll love you forever for it. Marie-Françoise and Alain, je vais la traduire (je vous le promet), Julien (le malin), Alban (le doyen), Adeline (la sage-femme), je ne peux pas imaginer ma vie sans vous. Ora, I have been listening to you this whole time, I promise, and it has made me better. Milan, we made it, both of us. Sofiane (I am a *hittiste* in training due to your good guidance), Sean (the cupcakes saved my life that night), Doug (you challenge me even over paint fumes), Mike (who put the you back in you). Vin, Jen, Madeleine and Olivia, I am sorry for the moments I have missed, but you have always been here with me. And my Lucy, how it was heaven here with you.

Every one of you who took time from the work that you have to help me understand my own. Aleksandra Wagner (my first academic love), Rex Brynen (who bothered to look up 'anamnesis'), Jacob Levy (I have stopped for now), Frédéric Merand (a good midfielder needs some boundaries). Vincent Pouliot, for the confidence that you have shown in me, I am honored. And Khalid Medani, my inspiring friend, who blends in so perfectly.

Christina Tarnopolsky. To critically examine one's beliefs (and flaws) and the way that one sees oneself is courageous; to be able to laugh about it and recognize in this the very essence of being human is wisdom. You have taught me these things both by design and example, and I am humbled. Thank you.

And of course, Marcos. You gave me my mood, whether you know it or not. In the pages that follow, I will try to do nothing else but convince you, knowing fully well that I might not. But if you give me time, I will get there. This I promise to you, because we are not done yet.

And then I would make a toast to my parents, Vincent and Nancy, catalysts for my own small anamnesis. You gave me life not once but twice, and I only hope that after all this time, you are as proud to know me, as I am to know you.

Conflict between humans always involves a conflict of ideas, and the sites of the most acute conflict are always the boundaries of these ideas. Even conflict that occurs between ethnicities for example, if we were to imagine ethnicities as cardinal elements of our constitutions, is never over ethnicities *as such,* but it occurs when the ideas that generate around ethnicity are fixed in opposition to one another. The same can be said of states just as it can be said of individuals, of communities just as it is of classes and religious groups. Imagine a boundary as that space between us all that we dare not bridge, the points at which we intersect and briefly touch yet cannot predict what the other will say in response to the point that we have posed. Boundaries are the precarious specters in which we do not recognize ourselves, where we cannot see ourselves, where we fear that we cannot find ourselves. Yet they are palpable, undeniable chasms; they are the precipitous drops between us, the lumps in our throats that frighten us at the same time that they remind us that we are alive.

We are men and women who cannot know our own gazes, as Barthes recalls[1]; we see ourselves in the reflections of others, and the more alike those others are to us, the more peacefully we step away from our ideological precipice. Such is the nature of intersubjectivity, the manner in which we know ourselves through another, and such becomes the discourse within which we live. However, the discovery of intersubjectivity is not the end of discourse: intersubjectivity framed dialectically *(I am because I am* not *you)* engenders the relationships that perpetuate conflict; however, framed dialogically *(We are because the other is as well),* intersubjectivity may be the most crucial element in the movement of conflict from combative to constructive. For while there are boundaries they are not often clearly delineated and they do not keep out clearly identifiable enemies. We assent to "knowing it when we see it", or "having a feel for it". We try to make our ideas so exceptional, so finite, that there is no question

[1] *The Eiffel Tower and Other Mythologies*, Richard Howard, Trans. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, page 4.

left answered, no other side of a story to be told. But when we edge toward those boundaries, those precipitous drops, we know better. We hear multiple voices at once, and our efforts to fortify these margins are almost never independent of this schizophrenic cacophony.

The task of this project follows this idea, and my overall objective is to prove that conflict can be transformed from violent to non-violent through mediation by directing efforts toward interrogating the epistemologies that underlie practices within protracted conflict. Each chapter is meant to shed light on the problematic aspects of research and scholarship on conflict, and offer an alternative method of analysis. While I ultimately believe that each of these suggestions apply to multiple cases, in this project I focus on conflict within contemporary France, particularly in the urban peripheries of the country.

The first chapter is meant to address the deficiencies in descriptive traditions of conflict analysis by looking extensively at the development of the *sensibility* which drives conflict and violence in France. I do so by sketching the development of palimpsests in France which have led to the misrecogntion of an entire population as "foreign". Chiefly, I set out four notable points in both space and time which exemplify the graduated sense of belonging in France. This sketch is meant to identify the binary spaces of ideological conflict as they are constructed dialectically; from here the present climate in urban France emerges not as a newly constructed "other" portending a "clash of civilizations", but as a logic embodied in both theory and practice, the nuances of which have been refined over generations.

Thus the first chapter concludes by identifying the communities on the periphery of the French state, where they are classified as foreigners even while they are legal citizens, external actors in an internal state. How best to explain this unique position? The second chapter takes issue with perspectives employed analytically to understand this type of conflict, where prevailing conceptions in international relations literature, as well as literature that focuses more

specifically on collective violence and riots, often misses the underlying factors that fuel these episodes. As such, I suggest that the sociological work of Pierre Bourdieu is a more useful perspective to employ as a means of understanding the inculcation and practice of violent conflict, as his methods encompass a multitude of behaviors, habits, and relations in social life. In order to illustrate the utility of his methods, I also sketch a portrait of his methods in practice within urban France, giving a firmer sense of the relationship between these different populations and making clear the need to address the conflict as a political dilemma, and not simply a series of failed social initiatives.

Taking this into account, the third chapter proposes an alternative method of mediation in conflict. It departs from Bourdieu's understanding of *anamnesis*, or recollection, which I contend can act as a catalyst for change in the binary structure of social life. Departing from Bourdieu, I look at the development of this concept in its ancient forms through Plato and Aristotle; finally, I identify the movement of conflict from dialectical to dialogical through anamnesis, using Bakhtin's dialogism as a prescriptive guide. Ultimately, mediation which uses a theoretically pedagogical approach as its foundation has the potential to initiate fundamental change in protracted conflict.

The Problem with Protracted Conflict

Locating protracted social conflict in societies poses a challenge to descriptive notions of conflict behavior within political science analyses, not least due to the dependence of those notions on state actors as the relevant unit of analysis . For his part, Azar questions the applicability of state models in analyses of non state conflict with his definition of protracted social conflict, identifying a type of on-going and seemingly irresolvable conflict that takes as its unit of analysis the group[2]. His points are crucial, for the absence of an adequate

[2] Edward A. Azar, "Protracted Social Conflict: Ten Propositions" *International Interactions*, 12, 1, (1985), page 62.

understanding of the group does not prevent it from entering into the decisions made by states[3]. Still, the group as a unit of analysis deviates from the traditional practice in international relations by "[disturbing] the neatness of the models at hand": as a consequence, the professional debate has "ignored the group totally" and "basic needs" - such as the recognition of a distinctive identity -are often subsumed under the study of state level security[4].

Azar's idea of "basic needs" is a crucial yet underappreciated element to the articulation of conflict, as it defines not only the material interests that may be involved (as in a recognizable border for a group, the security to move freely through that border, and the resources to flourish within those areas) but also the more intangible social needs that will define, however latently, a group's participation in struggle. Moreover, he notes that in protracted social conflict, violence may be present at acute levels throughout a conflict's lifespan, *though punctuated by cooperation between groups in dispute,* and that these "cooperative events are not sufficient to abate protracted social conflict"[5]. Thus, protracted social conflict operates not with a *specific* and *identifiable* objective in mind into which all "basic needs" can be collapsed, but rather as *iterative* and *embedded* characteristics of the *dispositions* and *sensibilities* of the group.

No contemporary theorist understands the importance of the dispositions and sensibilities on social life quite like Pierre Bourdieu, and no other offers a more complete account of the propagation of conflict even in the face of periods of cooperation. As such, the second chapter applies the conceptual schema developed by Pierre Bourdieu to protracted social conflict as it has developed in the French urban periphery. Although most accounts look at the violence that

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[3] Paul Brass, "Riots, Pogroms, and Genocide in Contemporary India: From Partition to the Present" (Prepared for the Hiroshima peace Institute Conference on Comparative Research into Genocide and Mass Violence, Hiroshima, Japan, 22-26 March 2004), page 3.

[4] Ibid. page 63.

[5] Ibid. page 62

has developed over more than two decades[6], using Bourdieu's framework situates the conflict in the periphery within a larger historical push *throughout* France to establish a dominant and totalizing narrative of belonging. That the conflict is inscribed as a palimpsest on colonial ruins is manifest and widely documented; indeed, Silverstein and Tetrault suggest that "the response to the present crisis points to an *enduring logic* of colonial rule within post colonial metropolitan France"[7]. However, the "enduring logic" of colonial rule is not the only logic that operates within the country, and it did not develop in isolation. Challenging the notion that contemporary conflict in France is but a reproduction of colonial practice also challenges the assumption that colonial events were somehow isolated with the formation of a dominant ideology within the country. This challenge also demonstrates the imperative of catalyzing the drive from dialectic to dialogic in conflict. For emphasizing historical domination consequently enforces historical submission; in order to escape this circle, as Bourdieu himself might say, we must 'twist the stick in the other direction'.

A Word on the Dialogic

The divide between the dialectic and the dialogic is not immediately apparent, and because of the myriad form that 'dialectic' may take, I want to make clear the manner in which I understand the difference. Bakhtin's methods towards this end are unambiguous, and I follow him throughout this text:

> Bakhtin 'emphasizes performance, history, actuality, the openness of dialogue, as opposed to the closed dialectic of Structuralism's binary oppositions. Bakhtin makes the enormous leap from dialectical, or partitive, thinking, which is still presumed to be the universal norm, to

[6] For coverage of the 2005 riots and the history which it follows, see "Paris Burning", by Robert Spencer, FrontPageMagazine.com, 4 November 2005, and "Pourquoi Marseille n'a pas explosé", in *Le Monde,* 16 December 2005. Additional chronologies can be found in the archives of the *New York Times, Le Monde, Le Figaro,* and *The Guardian* between October and December 2005.

[7] Paul A. Silverstein and Chantal Tetrault, "Urban Violence in France" *Middle East Report Online,* November 2006, Particularly as the curfew *(couvre-feu)* imposed to remedy the violence in 2005 was originally a method for combating the Algerian insurgency during French colonial rule throughout the 1950's, the allusions toward a continuous pattern of colonial domination within the country by law enforcement organs are manifest.

> dialogic or relational thinking'...the difficulty posed by Bakhtin's dialogic theory 'is to avoid thinking from within an all-pervasive simultaneity without at the same time falling into the habit of reducing everything to a series of binary oppositions: not a dialectical and/or, but a dialogic both/and"[8].

Let us say then, that I am suggesting we make this enormous leap with Bakhtin and apply this sensibility to mediation. In so doing, I would like to propose a theory of mediation that facilitates the movement from dialectical to dialogical in conflict through a process of anamnesis. For, as Bakhtin describes the difference between dialectic and dialogic, it is not hard to imagine the intimate connection that the former has to violence, and conflict:

> Take a dialogue and remove the voices (the partitioning of voices); remove the intonation (emotional and individualizing ones), carve out abstract concepts and judgments from living words and responses, [then] cram everything into one abstract consciousness—and that's how you get dialectics[9].

Adapting Bakhtin's approach to conflict allows us to critically examine a number of the contentious narratives that remain constitutive of the conflict by capturing contemporary events as the intersubjective discord that has emerged through the confluence of narrative accounts of the Republican project. These ideological narratives operate both in tandem and in opposition, and it is only when we view them as antithetical yet dialogically interdependent that the intricacies of everyday life in the French *cités* are properly illuminated. This gives to the French case the same depth of understand as Steinberg's analysis of conflict gave to nineteenth century London, where a dialogic perspective on discourse

> maintains that the production of meaning is collective and historical. To understand this discourse and the meanings it conveys

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[8] Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, in David Krasner, "Dialogics and Dialectics: Bakhtin, Young Hegelians, and Dramatic Theory", *Bakhtin: Ethics and Mechanics,* Valerie Z. Nollan, ed. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2004; page 4.

[9] Mikhail Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays,* Trans. Vern W. McGee, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986; page 147.

> requires an analysis of the experiences of the actors, the contexts and situations of meaning production and the historical inventory of past usage and production. The analysis of ideology therefore starts from the standpoint of the collective praxis of discourse in particular historical spaces[10].

A Study in Practice: Anamnesis as Mediation

The movement embodied by Bakhtin becomes the aim of mediation, realized through anamnesis, which begins by sketching the histories upon which we stand. Indeed, we cannot understand and appreciate the totality of the project without engaging in all of these separate yet intertwined moments. As a process, anamnesis is two fold, a remembrance of what has been forgotten and a re-emergence from the condition of forgetting. Thus, the first chapter is a suggestion of how this first step is accomplished, as it outlines the way that identity has congealed around ideas, how the boundaries of these ideas have become ever more concretized, and how this has engendered violent conflict in contemporary France.

[10] Marc Steinberg, "The Dialogue of Struggle: The Contest over Ideological Boundaries in the Case of London Silk Weavers in the Early Nineteenth Century", *Social Science History,* Vol. 18, No. 4 (Winter 1994), page 512.

Chapter One

Républicain and *Racaille*[11] in Opposition

This chapter outlines the evolution of conflict in urban France by identifying four points of dialectical intersect which I characterize as: *public and private, internal and external, exceptional and common,* and *native and alien.* These sites are not coterminous; each of these streams builds upon the other, and each answers a part of the questions that in part define the conflict in contemporary France: What has it meant, and what does it mean now, to "be" French? Who did Nicolas Sarkozy address when he called for the *"racaille"* to be cleaned out of the *banlieues*[12], and who was listening? These questions will permeate every aspect of the project that follows, whether implicitly or explicitly, and it is within these contending narratives that they persist.

Having said this, I do not intend to set forth an historical account of France and its colonies, where each of the four tropes should be considered discrete periods in time. While there are certainly historical periods in which the overlay of each stream occurred, and while these narratives have become enriched over time, there are, and there should be, significant overlap in these courses. Moreover, the line that I trace should not be seen as teleological, where the violence of today is an inexorable culmination of the violence that has preceded it. Rather, it should be appreciated as the sketching of a palimpsest[13] spread over both the domestic and the foreign, where patterns of action and

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[11] *"Racaille"* means technically "scum" and is used to refer often to people, characterizing them as criminal, or undesirable generally. However, within the urban periphery the word is used self-referentially and its connotation takes on a less insulting form (somewhat similar to the use in English of the word "gangsta"). Of course, when Nicolas Sarkozy uses the same word in a recorded speech, it is difficult to read the term as anything but pejorative.

[12] See for example, "La boîte de Pandore de Sarkozy" (Sarkozy's Pandora's Box), *L'Humanité,* November 3, 2005; media coverage of the riots and Sarkozy's statement was widespread, recorded by a number of print, electronic and video media.

[13] For applications of palimpsests on political and social life, Andreas Huyssen's work is among the most authoritative. See *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory,* Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2003.

interaction are traced over each other, reinvented as they are regenerated yet always retaining a glimpse of their former selves. The violence of contemporary France is thus not only the transplanting of a "colonial logic" onto a metropolitan terrain, nor is it straightforward evidence of a crumbling of the Republican model. If there is a system of logic it is a system of numerous logics, the parameters of which are nebulous, colliding and reinscribing themselves on the *cités and* its inhabitants.

Public and Private, or the Ideal of Revolutionary France

> *"The 'France-idea' is one of the richest in existence, thanks to the manifold expressions its assumed in the course of its creation... France is an idea just as the diamond might be called the idea of the soil: in other words, the issue of thousands upon thousands of years of almost imperceptible pressure, a pressure almost imperceptibly crushing, almost imperceptibly creative. What a long labour we represent! What myriads of men died to raise the pyramid on which we stand!"*[14]

The invention of the guillotine, meant to "despectacularize" the torture inherent in capital executions, was one of the chief innovations of the Age of Enlightenment[15]. The machine allows for a quick death which can be rationalized as a more humane form of dismissal, as it were; it also allowed for death to be mechanized, routinized in such a way that the blood thirst of the crowd would be subdued, giving way to a more cultivated, more sophisticated treatment of the harshest penalty. Subsequently, all other forms of torture (the wheel, drawing and quartering, tarring and feathering) would be considered "barbaric"; after the work of the guillotine on the other hand, the executioner (*bourreau)* displayed to the crowds the heads of only the most notable victims[16]. Enlightenment had

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[14] Pierre Alix, *Les Destins de la France,* in Raymond Rudorff, *The Myth of France,* London : Hamish Hamilton, 1970, page 11.
[15] Antoine De Baecque, *Glory and Terror: Seven Deaths under the French Revolution,* Trans. Charlotte Mandel, New York and London: Routledge, 2003, page 63. See also Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison,* New York: Vintage, 1995; pgs. 12-13.
[16] Ibid. page 64.

brought with it a new sensibility to the people as a whole; a head would now suffice where once an entire mutilated body would have been barely sufficient.

Yet it was still a head that the *bourreau* showed to the waiting crowds, and death by guillotine was still a rather grisly end, even if it was more subdued than a public disemboweling. Indeed, Enlightenment thinking had a profound impact on the sensibilities of French people in those early years of revolution and reinvention, and its progress was palpable in both word and deed. However, as much as it was progress, Enlightenment thought, and perhaps that of Kant in particular, also exerted an influence on the construction of the Republican state that formed the nucleus of the particular (and sometimes peculiar) conception of the divide between public and private in modern France, a divide whose paradoxes become the foundation for the opposition that would follow.

To be sure, the guillotine was as much a part of the Republican contract as was the innovations and uses of reason which created it. Though Kant supported the Revolution while rejecting the Terror[17], one cannot help remarking that the latter might not have flourished without the force of the former, and that conversely the banal brutality of the guillotine was the clearest expression of the merits of Enlightenment reason. It is striking that Kant would have shown his support for the French Revolution, that he would have remarked on the "wishful participation that borders closely on enthusiasm"[18]. Further, that Kant's philosophy took hold in France decades after the Revolution[19] points to the interdependence of the development of his thought and the formulation of public and private behavior in France. Thus, the first point of intersect is that of Kantian Enlightenment thought and the formulation of French Republicanism,

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[17] William Farr Church, The *Influence of the Enlightenment on the French Revolution*, London: D.C Heath and Company, 1974, page 202.

[18] Immanuel Kant, *The Strife of the Faculties*, 1798, in Harry Van der Linden, *Kantian Ethics and Socialism,* London: Hackett, 1988, page 57-58. Kant did not, however support revolution, and his work on Enlightenment points much more to a call for *evolution,* if one would like. There were a good number of reasons for this, both practical and moral, the stuff of which is best reviewed at another point.

[19] Ferenc Fehér, Ed. *The French Revolution and the Birth of Modernity,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, page 201.

where the divide between public and private was interpreted in a manner which strongly discouraged diversity and difference in the public sphere, as cultural identities were privatized in a particular relationship between citizenship and identity[20].

Indeed, it was Abbé Grégoire, the well known monastic scholar, who first inquired about Kant's doctrine; presumably looking to Kant's texts on religion, the Abbé was exposed, through correspondence, to a good deal of Kant's thought[21]. Similarly, Sieyès was most probably aware of Kant's political philosophy, as he engaged with his moral and ethical work[22], and Constant's public debate with Kant over the character of ancient illiberalism was fairly well known[23]. That the crisis of what should follow the Revolutionary experiment should have permeated the interests of these scholars is clear, as they were among the vanguard of those charged with reordering French society in the wake of both the Revolution and the Terror.

As the Revolution transformed into the Republic, and particularly as the formulation of a notion of citizenship required a near complete break with the class divides that had preceded the revolution, the manner in which debate and dissent could occur within the public sphere had to be profoundly reconsidered. It is telling, then, that Kant's work may not have reached the majority of French thinkers until sometime after both the Revolution and the Terror: once the violence of the Jacobins had subsided and left in its wake a traumatized young Republic, there was an urgent need to carve out a space for reason, to avoid both further wanton bloodshed and a reversion into the aristocracy which the revolution had destroyed. However, old habits tend to die hard and old sensibilities even harder. Thus, the divide between private and public in France, while in a sense according with Kant's prescription for the evolution of a people

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[20] Cecile Laborde, "The Cultures of the Republic: Nationalism and Multiculturalism in French Republican Thought", *Political Theory,* Vol. 29, No. 5, October 2001, page 717.
[21] Fehér, 202.
[22] Arsenij Gulyga, *Immanuel Kant,* Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983, p. 280
[23] Benjamin Constant, *Des réactions politiques*, Paris, 1797.

into maturity, afforded the state an opportunity to close ranks from within while furnishing a justification for expansion and interference in the world outside of the Republic.

Sapere Aude, dare to know. In his opening to "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" Kant encourages the cultivation of one's own mind, in thinking and doing for oneself, to be freed from the "yoke of immaturity", or the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another. "Indeed, if it is only allowed freedom, enlightenment is almost inevitable"[24]; particularly in granting freedom of public speech, the public will become enlightened. However, enlightenment in this way is only attained *slowly;* overthrowing a despotic regime might rid a populace of that particular association of oppressors, but if the regime change is done before the public has attained enlightenment, the new regime is likely to be as detrimental to progress as its predecessor.

Crucially, Kant argues that freedom of speech is the beginning, and not the end, of this process; therefore even in an environment that may encourage dissent through a free press or public exchange of ideas, the population must continue to obey the laws of the government in place without argument or protest, for it is gradual progress in this case ensures meaningful change. Moreover, he insists that scholars or clerics, while free to speak out against policies of the current government, or anything else that may foster immaturity, must not protest against these same policies in their private occupations. Pastors must continue to teach the Scripture exactly as it has been taught, even if they have just spoken out about it. Even a man, who is part of the law making process, while he might in his daily life be partly responsible for man's immaturity, is free to speak, as a public scholar, against his own work. But, he

[24] Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" 1784.

must continue this work in his private occupation, as any transgression in that realm could provoke widespread insubordination[25].

How does this correspond to the French experience of citizenship? Let us not forget that, contrary to Kant's counsel of a slow progression from immaturity to enlightenment, France had been the site of a profound, and relatively rapid, revolutionary disjuncture. The French "had become a people full of wants and devoid of habits. They had become a people who were no longer what they had been and not yet what they would become. They were a people full of appetite and desire"[26]. It is in this profound absence that a new understanding of citizenship, for which there existed no templates and no points of reference in any other countries, would be formed. As such, I would like to suggest that in France, the private station, i.e. the "civic post or office that has been entrusted to him" is that of a *citizen* in the Republic. Conversely, the "entire literate world"[27], where the freedom to use reason publicly in *all* matters is the foundation of enlightened self-governance, would pertain to the interactions *outside* of the French state. Therefore, while French citizens could do as they like abroad, while they could publicly espouse the need for France to build an empire and expand the doctrine of the rights of man around the world, within the country, there could be no critique of either philosophy or deed propagated by the government. The world may be broken and in need of a sure fix, but France could be only a strong and solid republic. This ethic was not only rhetorical; in both word *and* deed the internal cohesion and harmony of citizens *had* to be maintained.

Why was this so important? Surely one cannot forget the blood through which the country had just been born anew, and must appreciate the abject fear that accompanied the Terror and the trauma left in its aftermath[28]. Consequently,

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[25] Ibid.

[26] Anne Norton, *Bloodrites of the Post-Structuralists: Word, Flesh and Revolution*, New York and London: Routledge, 2002, page 151.

[27] Kant, "What is Enlightenment?"

[28] Even Kant, in his exchange with Constant, offered what Constant considered a deeply insensitive rejoinder to their debate when he portrayed the absolute moral duty of the individual to truthfully answer

while the French people had shown themselves to be passionate, brave and fiercely independent during the revolution, the post-war landscape needed a foundation built on constancy, on stability, and on uniformity. Barthes' words haunt this sentiment: in a climate where so much had changed so quickly, and where so little remained of what once been the foundational ordering principle of one's worldview, it was a challenge indeed to know oneself in the gaze of another. The French Revolution may have been the most extreme effort to break down the barriers between classes and reinvent the country anew, but in its wake there was shame, fear, and profound insecurity. The Republic, while built *upon* the universal rights of man and the liberating principles of Enlightenment thought, was built *with* the tools and materials of this great insecurity. It should be no surprise then, that Kant's counsel on the nature of private and public stations would have held a particular appeal, particularly when considering his words on the danger of dissent in the private station.

> In many affairs conducted in the interests of a community, a certain mechanism is required by means of which some members must conduct themselves in an entirely passive manner so that through an *artificial unanimity* the government may guide them toward public ends, or at least prevent them from destroying such ends. Here one certainly must not argue, instead one must obey... [thus] *it would be disastrous if an officer on duty who was given a command by his superior were to question the appropriateness or utility of an order. He must obey*[29].

The paradoxical designation of citizen as a private distinction, where one must not argue but obey the orders of his superior, and where dissent could lead to disaster, opens an important avenue for the formation of a Republican identity. For there is within Kant's formulation the assurance that this adherence is not a blind submission to the will of a leader, but to the doctrine of

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the inquiry of a murderer who comes to our house to inquire about the whereabouts of an innocent victim. Having occurred frequently throughout the terror, the idea of the murderer showing up unannounced in search of an innocent person that had been judged in violation of any number of schizophrenic laws was far from the theoretical contemplation on which Constant, and many of his countrymen, could have preferred to contemplate. See Fehér, 203.

[29] Kant, "What is Enlightenment?" (emphasis added)

Enlightenment thought and evolution. Thus, security and uniformity is maintained along with a progressive sensibility that states explicitly that the revolution has not failed. The spilled blood, the frenzy, was not all in vain if its leads to a secure and egalitarian state. Moreover, the French state redeems itself as a rational body, a site of deliberation rather than destruction.

Foucault's critique of Kant's private reason is telling as well, and goes some way to support my suggestion on the private nature of citizenship in France. In Foucault's words,

> Man, Kant says, makes a private use of reason when he is 'a cog in a machine'; that is, when he has a role to play in society and jobs to do: to be a soldier, to have taxes to pay, to be in charge of a parish, to be a civil servant, all this makes the human being a particular segment of society; he finds himself thereby placed in a circumscribed position, where he has to apply particular rules and pursue particular ends. Kant does not ask that people practice a blind and foolish obedience, *but that they adapt the use they make of their reason to these determined circumstances*; and reason must then be subjected to the particular ends in view[30].

These "determined circumstances" are less the quotidian tasks of civil life than they are the very essence of belonging to the Republican ideal, and adhering to them becomes a task that forms the basis of an immensely powerful Republican narrative, where man begins to know himself again through the gaze of another. If we look closely, there is here the beginning of that particular gravitational pull from whence boundaries emerge, where the like swim with the like and the undertow only gets stronger.

If there is no room for dissent in the state, where does difference reign? For if the task of the Republic is to fortify a uniform adherence to citizenship ideals, championing diversity within the state is anathema. However, with the first large scale incursions of the French army, and later the substantial settler populations, into their future colonies, a new rhetoric of diversity and respect for

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[30] Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?", in Rabinow, Ed., *The Foucault Reader*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1984, pp. 32-50, (emphasis added).

difference is carried with the army along with the universalist values inspired by the Enlightenment. Debate and difference conducted domestically become very different from that which occurs internationally; this forms the core of the crucial paradox of French Republicanism which carries on to the present day. Then, as now, diversity may be considered a positive attribute on the world stage but may well be discouraged inside of the country. Thus, the counter-narrative upon which the French approach to the world will in no small part be built begins with the colonial expeditions into Egypt, and especially, Algeria.

Amselle calls the Egyptian expedition at the opening of the nineteenth century "a true laboratory for French expansionism" and was based on three divergent yet interdependent theories: regeneration, natural law, and racial and linguistic classification[31]. Just as a concept of rational citizenship had taken hold within France, a form of rational colonization would be applied to areas without. This rational formation depended on both relativism and universalism, where difference among peoples was categorized yet was simultaneously framed in terms of developmental lag rather than cardinal properties. The 'new man' that the Enlightenment intended to create was not excluded or absent from these uncharted territories, under this perspective; it was rather a matter of discovering these peoples who lived in darkness, and showing them the light of reason. Here again were the heroes of the Revolution and the return to reason: Abbé Grégoire, whom we saw earlier in his interest in Kant, espoused further interest in restoring to the Black man their "full dignity as free men" by way of exposing them to "Christianity, which is more advanced than most anything else"[32]. Regeneration in this sense was a restoration of man to his ideal state, where 'full dignity' could be realized by induction to the universal values that

[31] Jean-Loup Amselle, *Affirmative Exclusion: Cultural Pluralism and the Rule of Custom in France,* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003, page 32.
[32] Abbé Grégoire, De la littérature des négres ou recherches sur leurs facultés intellectuelles, leurs qualités morales et leur littérature, (1808), Paris : Perrin, 1991, page 280.

the Enlightenment, and the Republican interpretation of it, had transfigured into their own school of thought.

Natural law was the cornerstone of a number of Enlightenment thinkers' perspectives, but its strength as a basis for invasion was tenuous. However, the numerous constitutions drafted after the Declarations of both the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789 an 1793, respectively), and particularly the Constitution of 1795, referred to the rights and duties of man in society, rather than being based on a law common to all men[33]. As a result, a distinction was now made between physical freedom and political independence, and this distinction "made it possible to legitimate the colonial conquests"[34]. In order to bring back to the Egyptians the former glory by which their societies were founded, it was necessary to regenerate the people based on these "natural laws" which were, to many in the colonial administrations, extensions of physical laws[35]. Common to all men would thereafter not be physical freedom, but the emancipation of the spirit and the political system based on universal Republican principles. The incorporation of scientific laws and their application to colonial doctrine made racial classification an integral part of the project. The essential elements of raciology were meant to discover in the Egyptian races the same kind of mixing that had occurred between the Francks and the Gallo-Romans in France[36], fostering the idea that assimilation could occur between these different groups to create a uniform and homogenous race, as it was felt that France had done. These elements, as rational extensions of the Enlightenment project abroad, would become the foundational tenets in the colonial period.

Following this logic as it was put forth in the colonies, authorities were not fixed on uniformity in the countries they conquered, and there were no

[33] Amselle, page 37.
[34] F. Gauthier, Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en révolution (1789-1795-1802), Paris : PUF, 1993, page 185.
[35] Amselle, page 25.
[36] Amselle, page 40 and passim. The myth of origin within the mixing of the Franck and Gallo Roman civilizations is one of the most powerful in French lore, and its significance has found its way into pop culture references and cartoon shows such as "Asterix and Obelix" and the enduring myth of Vercingetorix.

overtures toward a crushing or repressive form of rule by the French. Rather, it was within a regeneration of the cultures of the colonies and a freeing of the people from their ignorance by an exposure to the wisdom of the Republican project that would ultimately save the forlorn people of these foreign countries. Thus, while the "civilizing" mission of colonial conquest is well documented, I would suggest viewing the French project as a "*re*-civilizing" mission, where the different peoples would have their dignity "*restored*", their values "*renewed*", and their own civilizations "*redeemed*". Difference here was paramount, as long as it's under girding was in the universal principles of Republicanism. Napoleon's declaration to the Egyptian people following the landing in Alexandria provides the most illuminating example:

> Egyptians, you will be told that I have come to destroy your religion: do not believe it! Reply that I have come to restore your rights against the usurpers, that I have more respect for the Mamluks, for God and his prophet, Muhammad, and for the glorious Koran. Tell them that all men are equal before God and differ only in wisdom, talent and virtue[37].

The conquest of Algeria, beginning in 1830 and definitively taking hold in 1847, would take these hyperbolic themes and fortify them into a library of colonial policies that would profoundly affect the formation of the modern Algerian state along with the progressive meaning of Republicanism in France. Under what conditions the initial drive towards the interior of Algeria took place are still a subject of debate; some scholars attribute the venture to an insult by the *Dey* of Algiers to a French emissary, while others attribute events to an obscure matter of debts incurred from the grain trade to France during the Napoleonic wars[38]. Whatever pretense led the French state to Algeria has been lost under the weight of the centuries that followed, and the painfully complex history that was to be made between the two nations.

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[37] H. Laurens et al. *L'expédition d' Egypte (1798-1801)*, Paris : Armand Colin, 1989.
[38] Albert Hourani, *The History of the Arab Peoples,* New York and London: Warner Books, 1991, page 269.

Importantly, the system that was experimental yet ultimately a failed enterprise in Egypt became an institutionalized structure in Algeria, where "military officials and scholars collaborated with the colonial state in detailing a particular Berber identity independent of the larger Arab polity in Algeria"[39]. Stereotypes of the "democratic" and "free spirited" Berber people abounded in the early colonial era, perpetuated by ethnographic accounts of French officials who traveled throughout the country. Here again was the classification of a people as 'naturally' inclined toward democracy or normative universal principles, lacking only the "regeneration" that a French state could provide. While initially coexisting in an occupied zone alongside Abd el-Kader's state, the zone would eventually spread, bringing along with it the promise of a restoration of civilization; this commitment spawned the Arab Bureaux, which balanced between policies of indirect and direct rule and ideas of assimilation and association[40]. These two ideas, however, shared a belief in the idea of a fusion between the Algerian and French people, and their preponderance would influence the official decision to incorporate Algeria into the French state as a *departement* of metropolitan France. Nonetheless, violence was utilized both to project and to protect, and the need to solidify a core of the French state became inscribed in both formal policy and quotidian attitudes.

The Internal and External, or *La Capitale et La Provence*

The elevation in status of Algeria from colony to *departement* did not, however, suddenly change the Escher-esque alleys of the Kasbah into the boulevards of Paris; to be sure, *departements* within France were often subject to treatment by the centralizing state that put them closer in league to colonies than to the mainland. The divide between *internal* and *external* is most sharply delineated in these chasms, and the violence displayed against rural French

[39] Paul A. Silverstein, *Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race and Nation,* Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2004, page 39.
[40] Amselle, page 59-60.

people reaches its zenith. Primarily in the sphere of language, symbolically violent practices emanate from the capital outward, forcing assimilation policies onto regions that had previously felt a nominal attachment to the state. The narrative of internality is overlaid on the private station of citizenship, hardening the divide between those within the state, and those without. It is within this manifestation of ideology that the notion of "Frenchness" takes tangible form in language and culture, and that the policy of assimilation moves from an ideal to an institutionalized structure.

With the solidification of Republicanism as ideology, the project of unification emerges throughout metropolitan France, centered in the modern turn in Paris. While laden with pragmatic objectives and sensible rationales, assimilation policies did much more than unite the country by land or government; each of these dictates was meant to stamp out difference, from the explicit display to the imperceptible nuance. Eugen Weber's account of the period locates the provincial school as the locus of assimilation efforts, where the prevailing belief held that areas and groups were uncivilized, "unintegrated into, unassimilated to French civilization: poor, backward, ignorant, savage, barbarous, wild, living like beasts with their beasts. They had to be taught manners, morals, literacy, a knowledge of French, and of France"[41]. This prescription had its roots in the Jacobin desire for uniformity and the extinction of particularisms, which persisted and grew more concentrated. As Weber notes, "'Reaction...speaks Bas-Breton' insisted the Jacobins, 'The unity of the Republic demands the unity of speech...Speech must be one, like the Republic'"[42]. Thus it is by design that "France is the only French-speaking country that is officially monolingual, and speaks French rather than a particular variety of the

[41] Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976, page 5.
[42] Ibid, page 72.

language"[43]; suppression of regional language has been for over a century a critical aspect of French national unity.

Indeed, the suppression of regional languages and the forced assimilation of provincial communities into the larger French nation are comparable to the colonial project[44]. Throughout the 19th and 20th century, comparisons between provincial groups and colonial populations were common, particularly to North Africans. The sentiment was reciprocal: Weber recalls that in Franche-Comté in the 20th century, it was remembered that people had for many years been buried facedown as a protest of the regions annexation by France[45], this protest was not the only and nor was it the most drastic. The battles between the Breton and the French state were the most extreme example of the violence that could erupt between the regions and the capital, but these instances were but the most overt manifestations of policies and reactions that had been in the country for centuries. Recall the assertion by colonial authorities that the French had perfectly fused the Franck and Gallo-Roman races, and that theirs was evidence of the ability to seamlessly assimilate different races based on the triumph of reason. There again one cannot help but remark that the insistence of the state to assimilate its regional populations, and the violent manner in which this was done, existed as a trope for the success of reason in steering the country into the future.

The French language spread by force through the country; when force did not, or could not apply it spread through shame. None less than Ernest Renan insisted in 1889 that "no work of science, philosophy, or political economy could be produced in patois", and business was conducted when the merchant would

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[43] Heather Williams, "'Séparisianisme', or internal colonialism", in *Francophone Postcolonial Studies: A Critical Introduction*, Charles Forsdick and David Murphy, Eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, page 102.

[44] See Anthony Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, New York and London: Routledge, 1998, pages 57-61, Williams, 2003, Rudhorff, 1970, and Weber, 1976, pages 485-514.

[45] Weber, 1976, page 487.

"try to impress his hearers by turning to (terrible) French"[46]. Patois became a signal of exclusion, of modernity passing one by, whereas French became emblematic of progress, sophistication, and culture. From this, a conception of what "being French" entails begins to take shape: while it was necessary to *want* to produce the works in science or philosophy that Renan declared could only be produced in French, it was also necessary to do it *well*. The aping of the noble, cultivated man by the uncouth peasant was just as bad, or even worse, than the peasant who refused to speak the dominant language at all. *Being French* became a performance, an attempt to achieve the same "pseudo-*gemeinschaft*" which Goffman characterizes as an element of the presentation of the self[47]; like any good performance, however, there must be a seamlessness to the portrayal, a flawless depiction of a part that one plays to perfection. Such became the parameters of the internal in France, defined by location, by dress, by the tone and timber of one's voice. The inability to achieve this communion signaled one's exit, one's externality. Ultimately, whether colonies existed within the territory or without, the oppressive violence of the *being French* persisted: with one hand it beckoned and invited everyone in to become a part of it, with another it pushed those unworthy into the cold.

The Exceptional and the Common, or *le Vulgaire et la Culture*

Solidification of a French core within the country, to which peasants were expected to seamlessly assimilate and perpetually adhere, was an insidious process; Weber notes that peasants' dress, as the most visible evidence of improvement, drew the most criticism from urban dwellers: "clothes...were used as a status symbol, designed to demonstrate an equality of rank that did not in fact exist"[48]. Urbanization had spread to the countryside, and with it, new expectations came. Visible again is the seamless ideal that was meant to be

[46] Ibid, page 85.
[47] Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life,* New York: Doubleday, 1959, page 59.
[48] Weber, 1976, page 21.

transmitted from the center to the periphery; this sensibility was absorbed even further into the aesthetic fabric of the country. One need only regard Balzac's Rastignac, the peasant whose ruse of affluence brings him into the most exclusive salons of Paris, to appreciate the fullness of this ideal and the attitudes it engendered.

> Fifteen hundred *francs* and clothes *ad lib*! At that moment the poor son of the South no longer had any doubts about anything...A penniless student snatches a crumb of pleasure like a dog snapping up a bone amid a host of dangers...but the young man who can jingle a few fleeting gold coins in his pocket savors the full flavor of his pleasures, the word 'poverty' for him no longer holds a meaning, the *whole of Paris is his*[49].

This 'poor son' of the South is emblematic of the peasant and his or her struggles to belong, to pretend, to mimic without being seen; Rastignac's ruse and the tragic downfall that plays out over Balzac's pages are as well a story that may have been more biography than fiction at the time. For there emerge in these times, in the glow and shine of modernity the peasant who cannot get it right, who cannot avoid downfall, dirt, exposure. This is the peasant, the foreigner in his or her own country who can only hide an accent, a manner of dress, an unceremonious action for so long; in modern France, belonging and thus the privilege of citizenship hinged on these and other details. The civilizing mission that was so widespread abroad yet met with such ancient challenges was exercised in the cities of France in a way altogether more nuanced, more subtle, yet with equal humiliation and shame. There was a standard to which the civilized were held and to which they voluntarily held themselves; they did this because they *knew better.* Knowing better and doing better thus paved the singular path towards the refinement which would indicate to all others that one belonged, that one was worthy of *la culture.* Being told and yet still not knowing, being shown and still not doing or not doing correctly, indicated an inability or

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[49] Honoré de Balzac, *Old Goriot*, Trans. Marion Ayton Crawford, Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1951, page 119 (emphasis added).

worse, a refusal to uphold the aesthetic core of the state; such comportment left one wallowing in *le vulgaire.*

There is a line that can be traced from "the vulgar" in Machiavelli's *The Prince* as those who may "see how you appear" but cannot "touch what you are"[50] to the vulgarity of Sartre's existentialism; this line often intersects with the maturity of Republicanism within France. Both the popular and the offensive, *le vulgaire* in its contemporary adaptation captures the particular tension between "native" and "foreign" populations within France. While not the first example, the "unassimilated" communities in the provincial areas of France reveal most pointedly the condition of *le vulgaire,* the crude and offensive peoples that spurn Republican progress in both substance and style, even when it is placed before them as a kind of civilizing gift. The common, the *vulgaire,* will not go away; consequently hindering the fulfillment of a grand illusion that is seen as so crucial to the French and particularly Parisian *imaginaire.* It is as Bruckner notes: "[*le vulgaire*] constitutes the awful dissonance that emerges from the cross fertilization of different milieus and the intermingling of separate classes that do not know well enough to stay in their proper places"[51].

This dissonance between the internal and the external within France is crystallized in *le vulgaire;* its expression is found throughout French literature and art as "the articulation of unwanted meanings"[52]. Le *vulgaire* is simultaneously "offensive" or inappropriate as well as "common" or popular; importantly, both meanings refer to one another. The common is thus offensive, what is popular is alternatively inappropriate. Power, then, becomes that which is uncommon, unique, refined, and appropriate. Power, in the French case, is implicit in the kind of education that refines, that cultivates. Power makes one

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[50] Nicolo Machiavelli, *The Prince,* Trans. Harvey Mansfield, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, page 71.
[51] Pascal Bruckner, "The Ambivalence of Vulgarity", *South Central Review,* Vol. 24, No. 2, summer 2007, page 5.
[52] Ewa Lajer-Burcharth, "Modernity and the Condition of Disguise: Manet's 'Absinthe Drinker'", *Art Journal,* Vol. 45, No. 1, Manet, spring 1985, page 19.

exceptional, and the exceptional gaze is fortified when it is returned by another with equal stature. The presence of the common, the ordinary, disrupts this project by suggesting the exact opposite, that one is banal, common, and crude. It is moreover the obstinacy of the common, the sheer volume of it which creates an acutely uncomfortable tension for those who wish to maintain their uniqueness as it is continually challenged by those who are seen to typify the exact opposite. The common, the *vulgaire,* will not go away; consequently hindering the fulfillment of a grand illusion so crucial to the nation's survival.

Indeed, aesthetic representations may be the most eloquent examples of this tension. Manet's "absinthe drinker", for example, which was refused for submission to the 1859 salon, depicts an unapologetic rag collector as exactly this: a common, inappropriate reminder of what modernity meant apart from the great bourgeois project, a thing made ugly not by the lack of talent that physically created it but by the aesthetic that had produced it. It was in Baudelaire that the rag picker found his place as the artist of modernity, "everything that the big city threw away, everything it lost, everything it neglected, everything it crushed, he catalogues and collects"[53]. Marshall Berman gives a brilliant commentary on Baudelaire's work and its significance as a "translation of modern life", where Baudelaire's work in *Paris Spleen* #26 shows "how hard it is for people to understand one another, how incommunicable thought is" when the poverty stricken family is shooed away from the glittering new Paris café in "The Eyes of the Poor"[54]. Baudelaire's period, that of the Haussmannian urban project which tore down many of the *bidonvilles* (shantytowns) in the middle of Paris where *le vulgaire* ran rampant, made way for the grand boulevards that signaled the entrance of France into modernity. These unwanted meanings were pushed further out of the eye of the city, for their actual status as citizens of the country was subordinate if they were

[53] Charles Baudelaire, *Ouvres Complètes,* Paris: Claude Pichois, 1975, Vol. 1, page 381.
[54] Marshall Berman, *All that is Solid Melts into Air: the Experience of Modernity,* Penguin Books: New York, 1982, pages 149-150.

incapable of returning the crucial gaze in which the modern French individual could know themselves.

Barnes points to this condition in his account of the nature of vulgarity, which becomes a critical aspect in the construction and reification of difference in France. "Vulgarity is indifference to the distinction between better and worse. If I know, *or should know*, that one thing is better than another, but my actions are those of a person who has no such knowledge, I am being vulgar"[55]. Consider this in relation to the previous conditions I outlined as tropes in French thought and practice: the founding of the modern Republic was forged in the spirit of the Enlightened man, whose reason triumphed over ignorance. The core of the nation was solidified through the dissemination of language and aesthetics, and just as we have seen in the colonial project, difference was supposed to fade away into a universal fusion. However, unlike the colonial projects, where races were mapped and immutable distinctions applied, those within France were *supposed to know better.*

Against the backdrop of *le vulgaire,* the ideal of French society is further refined in order to sustain the existence of what Laborde calls *la culture.* She refers "both to the German *Kultur* (national values and heritage) and *Bildung* (cultivation of the mind), and her description similarly encompasses the English notions of *the arts, entertainment,* and *heritage*"[56]. Specifically, *la culture* is meant to encompass the life of the spirit, the characteristics that make *being French* something that "cannot be reduced to Frenchness"[57]. This condition is defined in opposition to *le culturel,* an "anti-intellectual notion" which favors the "popular culture of easy hedonism and gratification of the senses or tends to elevate any type of human activity-*however banal, tasteless, or degrading*-to the status of culture"[58]. If we imagine *le culturel* as an aspect of *le vulgaire,* and I find sufficient

[55] M.W Barnes, "Vulgarity", *Ethics,* Vol. 91, No. 1, October 1980, page 75.
[56] Laborde, 2001; page 724 (emphasis in original).
[57] Alain Finkelkraut, *La défaite de la pensée,* Paris : Gallimard, 1987, page 139.
[58] Laborde, 725, emphasis added.

cause to do so, Laborde's problematic captures the manner in which this particular interpretation of Enlightenment thought has resulted in a Universalist version of liberal neutrality, which then fosters a normative account of citizenship and identity.

This point nuances Dominique Schnapper's argument on the relationship between nation and citizen[59]. As a corollary to the *ethnic* or *cultural core* thesis[60], one might imagine that French citizenship is built on a *semiotic core,* where *being French* becomes a nebulous bundle of explicit and implicit code which dictates the substance of public life. As semiology addresses the specific shared symbolic meaning between individuals and groups, and as the semiological imagination emerges to search for value in meaning[61], the *semiotic core* might be the locus around which meaning is defined and redefined, the meaning ascribed to *being French* and the value laden in it. Consequently, *le vulgaire,* the "articulation of unwanted meanings", detracts from the imputation of value into the meanings so crucial to the Republican project, and must be removed from both sight and mind. In this way, meaning and the semiotic that emerges from it *cannot* be reduced to ethnicity, and it's historical becoming *does not* form a locus around which a shared cultural history can be appreciated. It's language is predicated on the value of meaning, which is itself a process of hardening the semiotic of *being* in the face of an assault by "unwanted meaning".

However, the standard for what "being" entails may shift constantly; meaning changes frequently and abruptly in the same schizophrenic manner that violence has operated in the colonial enterprise, and been an instrumental factor in post colonial orders[62]. This turn intersects again with the external French

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[59] Dominique Schnapper, "Histoire, citoyenneté, et démocratie", *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d' histoire,* No. 71, July-September 2001, page 102. Schnapper points out that the link between the nation and the citizen is not logical but historical, thereby establishing a cultural core of citizenship that results from a shared national history, very often contingent on a founding myth of origin.

[60] Arash Abizabeh, "Liberal nationalist versus postnational social integration: on the nation's ethno-cultural particularity and 'concreteness'", *Nations and Nationalism,* Vol. 10, No. 3, 2004, passim.

[61] Roland Barthes, *The Semiotic Challenge,* Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1985, page 134.

[62] Achille Mbembe, "Necropolitics", Trans. Libby Meintjes, *Public Culture,* Vol. 15, No. 1, passim.

project, where the "civilizing" mission, the opportunity to integrate, to "become", was set forth in many instances as the great possibility resulting from the colonial project. Remembering Abbé Grégoire's words that the colonial mission would restore "dignity to free men", one cannot help but notice that the project of exporting excellence becomes an explicit manifestation of the universal good. In the colonies then, and especially in Algeria, where so much effort was invested by the French state in a successful fusion, the spurning of this beneficence was really the most acute expression of *le vulgaire.* For, as Barnes notes, "it is vulgar to be indifferent to orders of goodness. Thus doing anything that lowers the dignity of a person is wrong, but *making it obvious* that *human dignity does not matter is vulgar*"[63].

Particularly in the case of *laïcité,* the secular imagination that became the fourth pillar of Republicanism and which prohibited the French state from recognizing religions, maintaining this level of affiliation in the public sphere becomes an acutely vulgar trait, as it emphasizes difference in a frightfully obvious way. Hence, while Algerians had been Muslim since the seventh century, and have traditionally considered religion a separate matter from that which is legislated in government[64], secularity has not been expressed as an erasure of religion from sight. Because the veil was a present, if not constant condition of social life in Algeria, and because no amount of "civilization" or *la culture* erased this, *le vulgaire* grew to permeate French relations with their most intimate colony. When "flaunting practically anything is likely to be vulgar"[65], the people in which the French project was most invested become the symbolic core of those who most blatantly dismissed the goodness offered to them. In religious matters especially, the fact that Algerians claimed a kind of secular worship while maintaining an aesthetic allegiance to Islam indicated their

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[63] Barnes, page 76.
[64] See Marnia Lazreg, "Islamism and the Recolonization of Algeria", *Arab Studies Quarterly,* Vol. 20, No. 2, spring 1998, page 43.
[65] Barnes, page 76.

indifference to, or worse, their mockery of Republican principles. When these principles become the measure of an appreciation of human dignity, the spurning of them can do no less than foster a climate of alienation between those who have offered and those who have refused. In the colonial experience, this alienation took the most violent forms as "the relations between life and death, the politics of cruelty, and the symbolics of profanity...[came] into being [as] a peculiar terror formation"[66]. This terror would color the colonial project, and the Algerian experience especially, profoundly altering the terrain on which *le vulgaire et la culture* collided.

Native and Foreigner, or *Républicain et Racaille*

In a very important way, Walter Benjamin's depiction of life in Naples instructs the divide between inclusion and exclusion in contemporary France if we imagine his observations in Italy coloring the French landscape, and it is worth noting at length.

> Similarly dispersed, porous, and commingled is private life. [The] house is far less a refuge into which people retreat than the inexhaustible reservoir from which they flood out. Life bursts not only from doors, not only into front yards...Just as the living room reappears on the street, with chairs, hearth and altar, so, only much more loudly, the street migrates into the living room. Poverty has brought about a stretching of frontiers that mirrors the most radiant freedom of thought[67].

Benjamin's snapshot is, in the face of all that we have seen , an assault on the very foundation of the Republican enterprise, the commingling of the public and the private with little regard, and even less respect for the very essence of the requirements of citizenship. If we transpose Benjamin's observation onto the French *bidonville*, the shantytowns into which countless immigrants were absorbed, joining those who had lived as the internally colonized, the subversion

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[66] Mbembe, page 22.
[67] Walter Benjamin, *Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings,* Trans. Edmund Jephcott, New York: Schocken Books, 1986, page 171.

of this type of public display is clear. Moreover, when the *bidonville* was replaced by the *banlieue* or, more accurately, the *cité*[68], moving *le vulgaire* further into the periphery of the great cities, the penalty for this subversion was realized. For what could be more offensive than to not only disregard the universal lessons of Republican education but to completely disengage from this enterprise by declaring one's independence as a nation? Moreover, emigration from former colonies to France increased exponentially in the aftermath of the colonial period, the flaunting of this disregard was everywhere, invading the *imaginaire* of the Frenchman, coloring his "worst nightmares-Paris translated into Arabic"[69].

This is the nightmare of the Frenchman, and the Parisian in particular, with all of the particularities that go along with *being* a Parisian: that a culture could be so resilient, could survive and even thrive in direct contrast to the tenets of the Republic, and that it could survive *amidst* the Republic constitutes the apex of unwanted meaning, and the most direct assault on the semiotic core of the French state. And this, in the context of the myth of France being exposed as myth, ugly and painted alive as the Vichy feasted on its own, threatened the Republican semiotic in a way that could hardly find a comparison. Thus the nature of becoming, of preserving the myth of the Republic has left few unscathed, and that the resulting "cultural schizophrenia"[70] shows itself as much a phenomenon of internal discord as it is external ambition. For as we have seen, Republicanism has always defined itself in opposition to another and that other has as often existed within the country as it has without; it has always been a narrative designed to show what one *is not* as much as it reminds of who one *is*. However, the narrative of the foreigner, the alien on French soil, inevitably

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[68] *Banlieue* denotes any suburb on the periphery of French cities, which in many cases means those affluent suburbs as much as it does the poorer housing projects that have become synonymous with conflict and violence. *Cité,* however, denotes the housing projects specifically, and is a more accurate term for the sites in which deprivation and exclusion are most present. However, much of the literature, both scholarly and journalistic, conflates these two terms and often preferences the term *banlieue* over *cité.* The distinction is further clarified and longer discussion of this conflation follows in Chapter 2.

[69] Emily Apter, "'Untranslatable Algeria'", *parallax,* Vol. 4, No. 2, 1998, page 47.

[70] Eugen Weber,"Of Stereotypes and of the French", *Journal of Contemporary History,* Vol. 25, No. 2/3, May-June 1990, page 198.

reminds the Republican of their failure not only to assimilate other populations into their particular streams but the equal (and perhaps more profound) failure of the Republic to maintain its ideals in the face of the fascist wave.

More than ever, the *Republicain* needs his gaze returned in the face of another, and he needs his state to defend the pillars of an enterprise that has limped through the centuries, however crumbled and crumbling they may actually be. However, as the presence of the other continues to assert itself, and as it literally burns in the purview of the state, the threat becomes real, and more horrific than ever. Thus Nicolas Sarkozy's depiction of *la racaille,* instead of an aberration in a culture blind society, is the culmination of *le vulgaire* and all of its permutations not as a specific group of people, but as an completed actualization of "unwanted meanings". Alienation of the Frenchman from France, which is in essence the expression of the dual traumas of the 20th century (the Vichy regime as well as the loss of the Algerian *departements)* engenders the intense need to separate "native" from "alien". Culture blindness, in this case, is a willful blindness, for the "alien" in contemporary France is in fact a product as tied to the state as the semiotic core it offends. Thus, when "native" cannot suffice for citizen, the paranoia of the Frenchman only mounts.

Abdelmalek Sayad puts its perfectly when describing "immigrants" in France, whose twofold nature as both insider and outsider leaves them in a state of "double absence" from the country of ancestral emigration (in his case Algeria) as well as the country of previous immigration (France).

> They are divided by their *dual nationalities.* They are of Algerian nationality by descent but they were automatically granted French nationality. One of the effects of this 'division' is that they are still 'emigrants' even though they never actually emigrated from Algeria, they disappear as 'immigrants'. The French nationality they have been granted denies their existence; they are but foreign immigrants in France. Both products and victims of this double history, they are also a living reminder of it. They are its anachronistic actualization[71].

[71] Abdelmalek Sayad, *The Suffering of the Immigrant*, Trans. David Macey, Cambridge : Polity Press, 2004, page 83.

As such, the "immigrant" in France has as its symbolic representation the Algerian, formerly depicted as the temporary worker, now transformed into the frustrated and aggressive youth. It is these youth who make up the popular *imaginaire* of the *racaille;* moreover, the *racaille* have become superimposed over an entire population of "immigrants". Defined against and in stark opposition to the *Republicain* palimpsest, this label operates as a definitive justification of the alienation of populations not considered appropriate for the Republican model. *La Racaille* is the extreme manifestation of *le vulgaire,* and unwanted meaning brought to life, and the boundaries of this meaning extend far beyond those who engage in violence in the urban periphery. The violent response of law enforcement to these areas then becomes not an egregious use of force by the state against itself, but a necessary defense from foreign invasion, all in the name of the sanctity of the Republic.

To be sure, the reaction to disturbances in the *banlieue* is closer to Algiers in 1954 than it is to Paris in 1968; protests in the areas are treated not as expressions of a collective desire for change, but as yet another instance of *le vulgaire* biting the hand that feeds them, having the "right" choice within their reach and spurning it to remain in the mire. It is at this moment that the superimposition of palimpsests is most alive, creating a tableau at once old and new, encouraging action and reaction that escalates in both violence and intimidation, on all sides.

Certain Uncertain Terms: *Les Sans Attache*

This is not to say, however, that the peoples treated as 'foreign' or 'alien' in contemporary France are a mere logical replacement for those who came before. Indeed, the advent of the colonial period and particularly the experience of French domination in Algeria have added to this problematic a profound layer of trauma, which is both perverted and superimposed on populations within

France. However, the conflict has often been predicated on a misidentification of "who" lives in the *banlieue,* and "who" makes up the state in France. Indeed, the nature of conflict is to harden identity and to fix it around recognizable points: this has occurred in France based on ancestry, geography, and religious affiliation. In order to avoid reproducing the same categories that perpetuate violence, and in order to clarify where and between whom violent exchanges occur, new categories must be suggested.

There are a number of factors that necessitate this, and this necessity will color the remainder of these pages; for now I will briefly consider two. First, qualifying the populations of the *banlieue* as "foreign" ignores Sayad's contention that a significant number of people in these areas are *not* foreign born and are in fact legal citizens of France. Many Algerians living in France are so by ancestry, and not by country of birth; many more are not Algerian by ancestry at all. If we allow the "Algerian youth" to remain the poster child for every level of violence in France, this inquiry has offered nothing constructive to the actual state of affairs in the country, and is ultimately a hypothesis the results of which we might wait in vain.

More than this, underneath the umbrella of "the alien" or "the immigrant", there exist innumerable variations, many more than those of Algerian ancestry. While the experience of France in Algeria has been arguably the most profound penetration of a colonial state into its colony, it was far from the *only* colonial venture that the French state undertook. Depicting the demographic of the *cité* as Algerian renders invisible the many other populations which also experience the double absence in France; this neglect is indeed an expression of the same symbolic violence that has colored the exchange of "native" and "foreign" in the country. Finally, and perhaps most paradoxically, there are as many people in the *cités* whose ancestry is as "native" as those who would be considered "native", yet who are painted into the portrait of the *banlieue* as an area outside of the confines of the Republican state. Thus, labeling

a population "foreign" does little to clarify exactly *who* it is that finds themselves in opposition to the Republican ideal, and it says nothing of the disparities in class that are certainly and explicitly invoked in the making of this conflict.

Second, categories need to be renegotiated in order to clarify the treatment of religious identification in the *cités,* as this element of the populations is constantly invoked to explain the immutable difference between "native" and "foreign". However, just as the Algerian "immigrant" does not suffice to characterize the demographic of the periphery, neither does the conflation of "foreign" with a uniform adherence to Islam provide any insight into the constitution of the population. While it is arguably true that there is a significant number of people who would define themselves as Muslim in the *banlieue,* the idea that these areas have served as "hotbeds of fundamentalism" or "pockets of Islamic extremism"[72] is a caricature that borders on the absurd. Moreover, as Cesari points out, the "symbolic allegiance" to Islam and the use of this allegiance is often a means for Muslims in France to define themselves in opposition to "native" French people[73]. This depiction is dangerous not only for its misidentification within France; engaging with a dichotomy of "Islam vs. the West" misplaces a complex dialectical development in a global discourse of a "clash of civilizations" which, its possible applicability in other contexts notwithstanding, is a dangerous line of reasoning in the French case. While the treatment of religious affiliation may be an important element in the substantive conflict within France, the riots which have recurred in France for nearly twenty years are not religious wars, and the treatment of them as such does more to obscure than illuminate the crucial problematic involved in violent exchange.

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72 See Paul A. Silverstein, "Realizing Myth: Berbers in France and Algeria", Middle East Report, No.200, "Minorities in the Middle East: Power and the Politics of Difference", July-September 1996, page 13. The depiction of the banlieue as a site of fundamentalist Islamic incubation is common and almost rampant, and it invades scholarly discourse almost as frequently as it constitutes political rhetoric in France.

73Jocelyne Cesari, "Islam in France: Social Challenge or Challenge of Secularism?" in Muslim European Youth: Reproducing Ethnicity, Religion, Culture, Steven Vertovec and Alisdair Rogers, eds. Dansk Center for Migration's Research in Ethnic Relations Series, Ashgate: Aldershot and Brookfield USA, 1998, page 31.

In offering another category to populations 'opposed' to the Republican ideal, I want to briefly mention three other labels that have been either suggested or put into use in the popular narrative as a replacement for the "immigrant" category that has been so problematic. The first is that of *banlieusard*, which can be loosely translated to "suburbanite". As I pointed out above[74], the *banlieue* is not always a poor area, and many of the *banlieues* in France are among the more wealthy areas of the country. Indeed, Nicolas Sarkozy served as city councilor in Neuilly-sur-Seine, one of the wealthier *banlieues* of Paris; residents of these areas are *banlieusards* just as much as those living in Seine-Saint-Denis, an area most often associated with the most frequent outbreaks of violence in France. Even within Seine-Saint-Denis, there is enormous variation in economics and demographics, making the term *banlieusard*, while an admirable attempt to disaggregate the label of "foreigner" from those in opposition to the Republican ideal, an untenable solution.

Jennings, in his investigation of citizenship in France, calls these populations *les exclus*, the excluded, in line with the political and academic debate begun in the late 1980's in France [75]. While this label goes farther to capture the disparities between populations based not only on location but on a *sense* of difference, it does little to differentiate between circumstances of exclusion within the country, nor does it lend anything to the particular character of exclusion in France. As he points out, part of the debate has focused on "who exactly the excluded are: the old? The homeless? The poor?" While Jennings agrees that these questions are valid, he is nonetheless prone to agree that those young people "of North African descent..."who have found themselves cast out to the suburbs of the big cities, *les banlieues*"[76] can be considered *les exclus*. More than this, Jennings fails to ask the equally important question: who excludes *les*

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[74] See FN 60.
[75] Jeremy Jennings, "Citizenship, Republicanism, and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France", *British Journal of Political Science,* Vol. 30, No. 4, October 2000, page 580.
[76] Ibid.

exclus? Again, we're faced with a depiction of a magically marginalized population without any insight into *who* has played a part in all aspects of this process.

I have already pointed out the error in considering *banlieue* a sufficient description of the areas in which these groups live, and the idea that *les exclus* may be those excluded from enjoying certain aspects of the French state, "the old" or "the poor" tell us nothing significant about whether these populations are excluded from the Republican *ideal*. Moreover, calling groups "excluded" fails to attend to the dominance of the Republican narrative and the resilience of its counter-narrative; in this sense, exclusion implies again that there is something within this narrative into which people *should want* to be included but are denied entry. While there may be merit to this, there is also the reminder of the ignorance of *le vulgaire* to know better, and to want to *be* better, according to criteria set forth by the Republican state. As such, *les exclus* does little to liberate the discourse from its antiquated cage.

Sayad's discussion of the double absence of the "immigrant/emigrant" considers these groups "inassimilable", and it is a label that Bourdieu incorporates as well into his comments on the work[77], and there are merits to this category. The "inassimilable" implies both an inability as well as a refusal to "assimilate" into the dominant narrative, and it goes farther to locate groups outside of the continuum of the Republican ideal. Moreover, this label points to the necessity to interrogate this narrative, as Sayad goes to great lengths to argue for the legitimate presence of these populations within the country.

However, this label misses the crucial point that there may well be a level of assimilation which has and does occur *within* the *cité*, and it thereby risks denying a unique sense of agency to these populations. Many of the youth in question, those who have become the main signifiers of violence in the urban periphery, are legally and in many ways culturally part of France, insofar as their

[77] See Sayad, preface (by Bourdieu) xi-xiv and passim.

first language is French and they have grown up and been educated in French schools. Moreover, the popularity of certain art forms, particularly rap music, which comes from and expresses an intimate knowledge of this life, may function as a form of solidarity between these populations, assimilating groups not into the Republican narrative, but assimilating them all the same[78]. Finally, because not every person who may be "inassimilable" engages in violent action, and not every person engaging in violent action lives within a "double absence", conflating those who may feel profoundly disconnected to the state with those who take violent action against it may serve to perpetuate, rather than dispel, the misconception that the riots in urban France are a product of "foreigners" who bite the hand of the state that feeds them.

However, there is the hint of something crucial within the idea of disconnection, and it is this sentiment that I believe should form the basis of a more sufficient categorization of the populations in opposition to the French state. What I will call *les sans attache*[79] should be considered as a general category within which many other groups would be included, and I will outline three reasons in favor of considering this category. First, *sans attache*, or those without attachment, captures both the sense of difference that Jennings noted as well as the inability to identify with, or integrate into, the dominant narrative which formed the nucleus of Sayad's label. Moreover, the sense of being without attachment invokes the geographical separation of the core from the periphery, where *la cité* is segregated by distance, both physical and metaphorical, from *la ville*.

Second, *les sans attache* avoids the identification with one group in particular, therefore allowing for a more thorough appreciation of the different groups which make up the "other" in contemporary France in terms both of

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[78] André J.M. Prévos, "The Evolution of French Rap Music and Hip Hop Culture in the 1980's and 1990's", *The French Review*, Vol. 69, No. 5, April 1996, page 713.

[79] I am grateful to Thomas Bourreau, Julien Paul, and Alban Thibault of the Université Toulouse-Mirail for their assistance in suggesting and developing this category.

populations which have emigrated from either former colonies or current territories as well as those who are, by all accounts, ancestrally indigenous to France. *Sans attache* avoids ethnic or religious determinism and makes the point of contention not the differences of groups from those "native" to France but the alienation of these groups *regardless* of their ancestral point of origin. Thus it is possible to incorporate into this category: immigrants who have recently arrived in the country, those who are ancestrally immigrants from any number of countries but presently citizens of France, those of Maghrebian (North African) descent but not specifically Algerian, indigenous French citizens living within peripheral areas, those groups who have exhibited a level of organization against the state and engaged in non-violent protest against racism or discrimination[80], as well as those who engage in riots and violent behavior (*les émeutiers).*

All of these individual groups may exhibit a profound sense of isolation from the dominant narrative of the French state, even while some may be included in many different aspects of French social life; importantly, each group will express their isolation differently. *Les sans attache,* then, does not intend to collapse these groups into one another, and it does not give one group a monopoly on the others. Though in the following chapters greater attention will be given to the expression of violence between *les sans attache* and the French state, the same distinction that is applied to organs of the state (the *Compagnie Républicaine de Securité,* or CRS, for example) to make clear that the excessive violence of these organs is not emblematic of the entire state will be applied to the groups against which they are most commonly in conflict. Third, *les sans attache* differs from *les exclus* in that the onus of integration does not fall on the unattached to attach as it does on the excluded to be included. To say that *les sans*

[80] See Silverstein 2004 for an in depth discussion of the *Beur* (second generation Maghrebians who organized a number of protests and campaigns for further recognition within France) Movement as well as groups such as *SOS Racisme* (a widespread organization that protests discrimination in housing, employment, and treatment by the law) and *Ni Pute ni Soumise* (Neither Whore nor Submissive, an organization aimed at providing support to women living in the *cités* who are often victims of sexual harassment or attack).

attache exist without attachment to the state is not to say that there is a refusal, a failure, or an offense, and it does not privilege one location over another. Most importantly, it allows for the legitimation of conflict within the state where each of these groups may have both the right and the mutual recognition to dictate the future of their interactions. This will be a crucial point in the next chapters where I will consider the manner in which violent conflict can be transformed.

The sketching of French palimpsests and their violent formation into dialectical narratives of citizenship and belonging in the country evinces the ideological boundaries of these positions, and it shows how each has nourished the other into existence, how the hardening of one has signaled the same need in the other. This chapter has been an attempt to realize these divides in theory, as a *sensibility* inscribed and reinscribed over generations. The next chapter will move, with the same spirit, into the realm of practice, where these shadows are cast over the violence of everyday life.

Chapter Two

Embodied History, Embedded Violence

"I want diversity at all levels of our public posts, or a part of France will not recognize itself in the Republic. France is a nation founded on unity: not on uniformity and not on purity, but on equality and fraternity. And I must be severe and firm, but just. I want everything to be done so that each of us feels proud to be French. I no longer want to see the youth hissing at the National Anthem. To detest one's country is to detest one self. Being French means having rights, and it means having responsibilities...let me speak frankly: no one will be helped, supported, no one's hand will be held if they are not ready to do for themselves those things that will shape them up. Whoever is ready to do something themselves, the State will help them. Those who will not help themselves, the State will do nothing for them."[81]

Nicolas Sarkozy's words, as he announced his "Plan Banlieue" on 8 February 2008[82], echoed the problematic that has persisted within France, outlined in the preceding pages: as the State continues to define what it means to "be French" along the continuum that has evolved over these many years, it further disenfranchises those who do not fall under this category. In its essence, Sarkozy's "Plan Banlieue" digs its heels into the palimpsest upon which much of the violent conflict that occurs throughout the *cités* rests. Importantly, the Plan, along with innumerable other programs and policies provide the sustenance upon which violence in the periphery feeds. This tangle of policy and sensibility forms the core of conflict in contemporary France, and any useful analysis of the conflict must take be as cognizant of the palimpsests of the country as it is of the surface.

If the preceding chapter is any indicator, conceiving of conflict as a series of discrete and isolatable human events is a profound misrecognition. Let me suggest that there are no such discrete human events and that most, especially

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[81]Nicolas Sarkozy, Discours de présentation de la politique pour les banlieues et l'égalité des chances (Press conference for the presentation of « Plan Banlieue ») 8 Feb 2008, elysee.fr, Présidence de la République, http://www.elysee.fr/webtv/index.php?intChannelId=3&intVideoId=356

[82] For coverage of Sarkozy's *Plan Banlieue* and the reaction with which it was met by those who would potentially benefit from it as well as those who might potentially pay the cost for it, see Le Monde, "Nicolas Sarkozy fait des banlieues un 'enjeu de civilisation'" ,"Plan banlieue: beaucoup d'annonces mais peu de moyens", 2 February 2008.

those which culminate in conflict, can be linked to all that which they have preceded and much of that which will follow. The project of instituting meaning, of asserting and defining, acutely present in the struggle with which we have become acquainted in France, is a labour at once synchronic and diachronic, embodied in practice just as its spectre haunts theory. The struggle over contested meanings, which lies at the root of conflict, is the basis of any insights into the dimensions of conflict, and especially those which are realized through physical force. Beneath each act there is a purpose, and this purpose concerns the assertion of an idea, and that this idea is realized through the body upon which it is inscribed: when I speak of ideological conflict, as in the preceding chapter, it is this notion of ideology that I have in mind [83].

It is this type of underlying struggle that may get lost in the analyses, both theoretical and empirical, of violent conflict: violence is sometimes posited as "wanton and senseless" or as a conscious calculi of costs and benefits based on "signaling the cost of defection and thus [deterring] it"[84]. This is not to say that these aspects may not be present, but what they fail to do is get us any closer to understanding how conflict is almost always a struggle for meaning and definition, ideas inscribed on historical templates. We get closer to this when conflict is recognized as both synchronic (the practices that take place at the moment of struggle) *and* diachronic (the framework, developed over time, within which these practices take place), where the choices made are not always a series of conscious, "cost-benefit" calculi. Due perhaps to the reliance of "mainstream" work on conflict, which operates on this "rational" perspective, little has been done to address this underlying struggle for meaning. And mainstream thought is just that: a unified stream that carves an ever deepening groove into the ground over which it spills, appearing after some time as the most visible, and

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83 For a more sustained meditation on the "rescue of ideology" from its political and linguistic purgatory, see Terry Eagleton, Ideology, London: Verso, 1991.

84 Stathias Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria", Rationality and Society, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1999, page 257.

then the only path for a current to travel. Perhaps, then, we are in need of a deluge.

In this spirit, this chapter applies the conceptual schema developed by Pierre Bourdieu to protracted social conflict as it has developed in the French urban periphery between *les sans attache* and organs of the French state, over at least two decades[85]. An application of Bourdieu's corpus onto violent conflict does so with an eye towards answering the lacunae in political science analyses action; the first section of this chapter highlights the utility of Bourdieu's perspective to the study of conflict. His work highlights the embodied nature of belief and disposition through action, and the structures under which these beliefs are both implicated and complicit. In so doing, he calls attention not only to the sensibilities of groups engaged in struggle, but those of theorists and practitioners who have made their work around the study of these struggles.

Moreover, his framework appreciates the structure under which interactions occur while still granting agency to the actors involved. This ability to negotiate the structure/agency divide is the cornerstone of a more profound understanding of violent conflict. Bourdieu was fond of *bricolage,* and it formed the basis of both his method of analysis as well as the social conditions he took to studying[86]; as a result, his perspective is comprised of elements that must be understood individually before their components can be appreciated as a comprehensive set of principles. The second part of this chapter will identify these aspects of his system and explore the manner by which this analysis is then unified into a holistic perspective of practice.

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[85] For coverage of the 2005 riots and the history which it follows, see "Paris Burning", by Robert Spencer, FrontPageMagazine.com, 4 November 2005, and "Pourquoi Marseille n'a pas explosé", in *Le Monde,* 16 December 2005. Additional chronologies can be found in the archives of the *New York Times, Le Monde, Le Figaro,* and *The Guardian* between October and December 2005.

[86] See David Swartz, Vera L. Zolberg, *After Bourdieu: Influence, Critique, Elaboration,* Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004; page 83. The use of the term *bricolage* (to build, but more specifically to construct or to cobble together) was pervasive in Bourdieu's work both as a means to understand the construction of societies as well as way to approach his system of analysis.

The third part of this chapter will propose an outline of an application of this schema to the urban periphery of France, where Bourdieu's methods are used to compose a structure and genesis of the contemporary conflict in the *cités* of urban France. The *peripheral field,* as I will provisionally call it, becomes the site where *les sans attache* are most often in direct conflict with the State in an altogether different environment than that which exists in the rest of the country. It is fitting that Bourdieu's work is once again turned back onto France, whose most profound ruptures and shifts were transmitted through the war in which Bourdieu found himself as an ethnographer. For Bourdieu's work could not have become his *opus operatum* without the Algerian war, and the subsequent experience of post-war France.

Finally, I will note briefly the manner by which change is realized under his perspective, and the steps that must necessarily be taken in order to enact this change. Many readings of Bourdieu find him resistant to change, and his critics may even see in him the same grand theoretical structuralism that he speaks so loudly against[87]. However, the particular form of 'socioanalysis'[88] that he advocates is meant to engender societal change through an awakening of consciousness. Bourdieu recognizes the disconnect between his approach and its reception when he notes, "freedom is a form of expansion of the consciousness...Paradoxically, there are those who would stigmatize as 'deterministic' analyses that, by working to enlarge the space open to consciousness and clarification, offer those being studied the possibility of liberation"[89].

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[87] See Axel van den Berg, "Is Sociological Theory too Grand for Social Mechanisms?" in *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory,* Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

[88] See Jacques Hamel, "Sociology, Common Sense, and Qualitative Methodology. The Position of Pierre Bourdieu and Alain Touraine", *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 22, 1997, pages 95-112 for a sustained discussion on "socioanalysis".

[89] Pierre Bourdieu, *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power,* Lauretta C. Clough, trans. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996, page 395, FN 5.

Reflections, from the Rational to the Repertoire

In Azar's classic text on protracted social conflict, he notes that "those involved in protracted social conflicts seem to have difficulty in articulating what it is that leads them to violent protest and even war"[90]. To its credit, international relations discourse has expanded its understanding of conflict to include non state actors and made efforts towards investigating these elusive motivations. Yet even this literature has acknowledged that "if interveners are to undo the security dilemma, they need to understand the social and perceptual factors"[91] that shape conflict; and, we might also add, that it shapes.

As one example of this analytical need, Toft's[92] choice of El Salvador as a case of a "resolved" or "settled" conflict excludes any consideration of the embeddedness of violence in societies. Her hypothesis addresses a country which was engaged in a decade's long class and civil conflict, dating back at least to the *Matanza* (Massacre) of the 1930's where 30,000 people were killed as a result of political disputes. Therefore as a formal war, one may consider the civil war of 1980-1994 an isolated case but one would be remiss in neglecting fifty years of state sponsored political murders, and one would be equally irresponsible to ignore the significant urban violence that has emerged in the wake of the "peace agreement" in the country. Contrary to what might be considered durable settlements to civil wars, protracted conflicts, rather than "settling", engender militarized societies and increase the capacity for violence.

Both Tilly[93] and Brass have extended the notion of the political to include much more than the State as unit of analysis, and consequently widened the consideration of political violence to include collective acts with varying levels of

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[90] Azar, 1979, page 60.
[91] Jack L. Snyder. and Robert Jervis, "Civil War and the Security Dilemma" in *Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention,* Barbara F. Walter and Jack L. Snyder, Eds. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, page 24.
[92] In reference to an unpublished paper delivered at McGill University/ Université de Montréal's Research Group in International Security (REGIS) titled "Peace through Security: Making Negotiated Settlements Stick", 17 November 2006.
[93] See Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

organization and participation. In so doing, their work proves invaluable to any study of violence in social life; however, at varying points their respective analyses neglect a more profound understanding of the mechanisms that propel social violence and the way in which violence is interwoven into others spheres of social life. Consequently at certain points it becomes difficult to provide any more comprehensive answer to the challenge of articulating "basic needs".

Brass, for his part, recognizes these tendencies towards "terror as usual"; in his focused studies of Gujarat pogroms in Northwest India, he finds that "riots have, in effect, become a grisly form of dramatic production in which there are three phases: preparation/ rehearsal, activation/enactment, and explanation/interpretation"[94]. While his emphasis on the performative aspects of collective violence is well taken, he assigns to actors roles which are of a wholly fixed nature. As such, his analysis does not follow the actor as they shed their role, it does not explore the other roles that these actors may assume within their social life, and thus it treats the riot as an event which is isolatable from other aspects of the agent's worldview. Moreover, Brass's work tends towards the assumption that these outbreaks of horrific violence are solely a means of acquiring material political influence (again a kind of 'cost-benefit' perspective); as Hegde notes, he must sharpen the historical and sociological tools of analysis to give a more holistic understanding of these events[95]. Brass fails to attend, for example, to "issueless" riots, such as those identified by Gary Marx; instead he contributes to "the exclusive contemporary focus on protest riots [which] may obscure certain general predisposing factors, psychological states, social

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[94] See Paul R. Brass, *Theft of an Idol* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997, for a more detailed discussion on Institutionalized Riot Systems. The above quoted passage, taken from the book, is cited by Brass on the Social Science Research Council project on Gujarat in his essay, "The Gujarat Pogrom of 2002" at archives.ssrc.org.

[95] Paul R. Brass. *The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003, Reviewed by Dr Sasheej Hegde, University of Hyderabad, India for H-Net, Published by H-Asia (October, 2004)

processes, and consequences found in the most diverse types of riots"[96]. Even while Marx's comments may come closer to locating the domain of "basic needs", both he and Brass miss the opportunity to highlight even "issueless" riots as a confluence of synchrony and diachrony in social life.

Tilly offers a much more nuanced meditation on the nature and structure of collective violence, assembling a *corpus* of his own that employs historical events to trace the development of violence from "primitive" to "reactionary" to "modern" and bases these shifts on both the organizational bases of groups and their relations to structures of power[97]. Indeed, even while designing a schema that identifies no less than seven typologies of interpersonal violence, he urges, with Gurr and Laitin, to resist building a research program around public coding[98]. This indicates both his recognition of the particularities of the context of conflicts as well as his dedication to a meaningful engagement of theory with practice. Additionally, his employment of *repertoire* as a means to explore collective action is at once elegant and compelling:

> The metaphor is obvious, once stated: any group who has a common interest in collective action also acquire a shared repertoire of routines among which they make a choice when the occasion for pursuing an interest or a grievance arises. The theatrical metaphor draws attention to the limited number of performances available to any particular group at a given time, to the learned character of those performances, to the possibility of innovation and improvisation within the limits set by the existing means, to the likelihood that not only the actors but also the objects and the observers of the action are aware of the character of the drama that is unfolding and, finally, to the element of collective choice that enters into the events which outsiders call riots, disorders, disturbances and protests[99].

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[96] Gary T. Marx, "Issueless Riots", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol. 391, Collective Violence, September 1970, page 21.
[97] Charles Tilly, "Collective Violence in European Perspective" in Graham and Gurr, *Violence in America,* New York: New American Library 1969.
[98] Charles Tilly, "Violent and Non-violent Trajectories in Contentious Politics" in *Violence and Politics: Globalization's Paradox*, Eds. Kenton Worchester, Sally Avery Bermanzohn, and Mark Unger, New York and London: Routledge, 2002, page 18-24.
[99] Charles Tilly, "Charivaris, Repertoire, and Politics", Center for Research on Social Organization (CRSO), Working paper No. 214, April 1980, page 7-8.

However, within this depiction of collective action, two questions emerge which find their answers not in his work but in Bourdieu's. First, he talks about the development of repertoire but does not go into the requisite detail as to *how* these dispositions develop, in terms of the cognitive and pre-cognitive processes that shape and form these dispositions, as well as the interplay between these subjective dispositions and the objective conditions under which these dispositions are emergent. While he alludes to this, Bourdieu makes this an explicit part of his corpus, and this needs to be an explicit part of understanding violent exchange.

Second, like Brass but to a lesser extent, Tilly tends to view collective violence and contentious politics as *isolatable* from other aspects of the life of a society; while he acknowledges that actors engaged in violent action may also be members of a family, a congregation, or a workforce[100], he fails to hint at the *contingent* nature of these roles, and the interdependence that each role may in part have upon the other. Under Bourdieu's purview, that which is insidious is inexorably linked to that which is manifest, and this is an essential factor in the exercise of symbolic violence, upon which so much physical violence is predicated. It is in Bourdieu's work that these elements crystallize, and it is because of this that his perspective provides crucial insights into the nature and structure of protracted violence.

The first chapter argued that art, literature, architecture, and schooling are all as deeply implicated in the conflict present in contemporary France as the burning of a car or the presence of a headscarf. Bourdieu's attention to these elements of *distinction* make his analysis a more nuanced perspective where the boundaries of the political are made more fluid, a project that Tilly would certainly acknowledge as important; taking liberty with his own words one might suppose that everything which is "un-political" is only judged so by a

[100] Ibid. page 10.

standard which dismisses everything but national politics as insignificant[101]. In the same vein, what constitutes collective action is as political as collective action itself, even if it is not directly implicated or named in the commission of those actions. Bourdieu's strength of analysis comes from this type of recognition, and in this way it is a crucial set of tools both for locating and articulating the "basic needs" that permeate conflict in its latent and manifestly violent expressions.

The *Bricolage* of Pierre Bourdieu

Social science was always, for Bourdieu, an indirect way of doing politics, a way of being that he sustained throughout his life in the place of a direct party affiliation and the partisan obligations that come with it[102]; thus, when "everything is social"[103], and social science is inherently political, it is not difficult to find the thread that pulls Bourdieu's work into political science analyses. It is, however, ironic that his work has for so long remained outside of the purview of most political paradigms. Perhaps due to the nature of his writing and the manner in which he forged a theory of practice *through* practice, thus steadfastly resisting the boundaries of discipline and eschewing familiar phraseology in favor of a more esoteric mixture of concepts and applications, much of his work is seen as obscure, impenetrable, or just plain fussy. This opacity is deliberate:

> When I write, I dread lots of things-that is lots of bad readings. This explains the thing for which I am most often reproached-the complexity of some of my phrases. I try to discourage in advance the bad readings which I can often foresee. But the cautions which I slip into a parenthesis, an adjective, or in inverted commas, etc., only register with those people who don't need them. In a complex analysis, people retain the aspect which disturbs them least[104].

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[101] Ibid. page 8.
[102] Loïc Wacquant, "Pointers on Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics", *Constellations,* Vol. 11, No.1, 2004, page 5.
[103] An often repeated refrain of Bourdieu's in public lecture and throughout his work; see Wacquant, "An Inventive and Iconoclastic Scientist", *Berkeley Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 47, 2002, page 1.
[104] Pierre Bourdieu, *Questions de sociologie,* Paris : Editions de Minuit, 1980, page 14.

Two points of contention are immediately clear from this discussion, and neither is insignificant. First, his tendency toward opacity and complexity has arguably led to *more* inaccurate analyses than it has deterred, particularly as his popularity increases; not least among these is the conflation of his work with those more readily identifiable with the "post-structuralist" or "postmodern" tradition, where the difficulty of his words is subject to the same logic as that of Derrida, to cite one example. Mistaking these stylistic commonalities for substantive similarities obscures the objectives of each thinker: where Bourdieu meant to preserve the content of his concepts, Derrida's work was a labor meant to communicate incommunicability, to put it crudely.

Second, as his political and social engagement increased over the course of his career (particularly with the project and publication of *La Misere du Monde* (The Weight of the World) and his emphasis on "provoked and accompanied self-analysis" or "socioanalysis", the concepts that he had worked so hard to protect became exposed to a larger audience, who may have had neither the background nor the desire to wade through the murkiness of his concepts. Thus as a sociologist whose main concern was "everyday life", his work more often precluded those groups or populations he found most compelling. Therefore, adapting his work to protracted social conflict requires a brief meditation on the components which comprise his approach, in order to appreciate the interplay between the subjective dispositions and objective conditions that he saw as central elements of social life. While his *corpus* is an assemblage of nearly interminable parts, I will focus specifically on seven of the concepts that I would argue are most germane to an analysis of protracted conflict: *habitus, doxa, field, capital, libido, illusio* and *practice.*

Habitus

For Bourdieu, "of all oppositions that artificially divide social science, the most fundamental, and the most ruinous, is the one that is set up between subjectivism and objectivism"[105]. His conceptual schema is an attempt to renegotiate that divide by disaggregating the subjective from the objective and locating them as separate yet interdependent mechanisms in a larger, open system-"to move beyond the antagonism between these two modes of knowledge, while preserving the gains from each of them (including what is produced by self-interested lucidity about the opposing position)"[106]. Robbins picks up on Bourdieu's use of 'elective affinity' as an "apt and suggestive phrase" through which to understand the concept of habitus:

> All individuals possess a 'habitus' -which is a set of manners and attitudes which amount to a disposition to act distinctively. Our tastes and interests-our choices of affinities, whether personal, aesthetic, or intellectual-are expressions of that disposition. But it is not a predisposition, in the sense of being fixed or intrinsic. We inherit dispositions which condition our *social and moral* choices, but we are able to modify this conditioning somewhat by making circumscribed, new choices[107].

Habitus is a constant feature of Bourdieu's work, and it forms one part of the crucial interplay between subjective dispositions and objective structures that interdependently form the nexus of social life. His *Logic of Practice* identifies the way in which habitus forms and is fortified "through the embedded perception of logical practice based on an embodied history internalized as second nature and so forgotten *as* history"[108] . This conceptual organization sees the system of dispositions and responses as "providing individuals with a sense of how to act

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[105] Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice,* trans. Richard Nice, Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1990; page 25.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Derek M. Robbins, "The English intellectual field in the 1790's and the creative project of Samuel Taylor Coleridge-an application of Bourdieu's cultural analysis" in *Reading Bourdieu on Society and Culture,* Ed. Bridget Fowler, Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, page 187, emphasis added.
[108] Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice,* page 52.

and respond in the course of their daily lives" where certain responses are catalogued as automatic and "correct"[109], organized and codified into a logical structure with identifiable parameters.

The logical structure is operationalized when appropriate responses to a given situation are undertaken; the logical parameters invoked here suggest that there is "a necessary yet unpredictable confrontation" between actions that occur and the responses that meet them. However, though there is allowed "an infinite number of practices that are relatively unpredictable" they are ultimately "limited in their diversity"[110]: depending on the context within which societal actors operate there will be a number of options that are recognizably available to them. All of these options, however, correspond to this internal logic and depending on the context will vary in their viability as options. More importantly, the dominant response will likely be that which the actor experiences as *second nature* and thus perceived as objectively optimal or natural.

This perception is a crucial aspect of the development of disposition, as Bourdieu makes clear when he evokes Sartre's contention that "there are qualities that we acquire only through the judgments of others"[111]. Bourdieu's work in *Distinction* identifies the subjective and often imperceptible structures around and within which tastes, opinions, and beliefs move, nourished by the deeply held beliefs that arise through our interactions with others and the impressions they leave[112]. However, he distances himself from the totality of Sartre's thought, and his distance comprises an important element of habitus: "refusing to recognize anything resembling durable dispositions or probable eventualities, Sartre makes each action a kind of antecedent-less confrontation

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[109] Bourdieu, *Ce qui parler veut dire. L'économie des échanges linguistiques*, Paris : Editions de Minuit, 1982; 13. Additionally, this point was elaborated on in personal correspondence with Dr. Robert Bracewell, 7 November 2006.

[110] Logic of Practice, page 55.

[111] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Qu'est ce que c'est la literature?* Paris: Gallimard, 1948, page 98, in Bourdieu, "The Market of Symbolic Goods", *Poetics,* Vol. 14, No. 1-2, April 1985, page 6.

[112] Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique on the Judgment of Taste*, Trans. Richard Nice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982.

between the subject and the world"[113]. His negation of Sartre's absence of place is simultaneously his affirmation of habitus. "If agents are possessed by their habitus more than they possess it, this is because it acts within them as the organizing principle of their actions, and because this *modus operandi* informing all thought and action (including thought of action) reveals itself only in the *opus operatum*"[114].

Doxa

Habitus implies a cyclical relational pattern, beginning with action: once they have occurred, and from their most spectacular to the most mundane, actions constitute history, both shared and individual. This history then informs beliefs which correspond to or reaffirm a particular idea and through this correspondence or reaffirmation grounds all of those elements of the social world and our place in it as axiomatic, second nature. Such is the rough constitution of *doxa,* "an uncontested acceptance of the daily lifeworld [which] when it realizes itself in certain social positions, [represents] the most absolute form of conservation"[115].

Doxa is the foundation of every established order: the "naturalization of its own arbitrariness" where "schemes of thought and perception can produce the objectivity that they do produce only by producing misrecognition of the limits of the cognition they make possible, thereby founding immediate adherence [to] *the world of tradition experienced as a natural world and taken for granted*"[116]. Thus, doxa is, in a manner not far from its ancient roots, the opinions that become ingrained and inculcated as "second nature". Doxa delineates the axiomatic parameters of thought and belief, both of which are translated through

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[113] Logic of Practice, page 42.
[114] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice,* Trans. Richard Nice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, page 18.
[115] Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, page 73-74.
[116] Outline of a Theory of Practice, page 164.

the body in both its conscious and unconscious movements through the embodiment of habitus, thus situating doxa as the subjective well from which habitus drinks. "A whole universe of ritual practices and also of discourses, sayings, proverbs [is] all structured in concordance with the corresponding habitus...what is essential *goes without saying because it comes without saying"*[117].

Importantly, doxa does not imply a kind of primordial belief system or fixed universe of pre-historic tendencies which can then be reduced to a universal, or alternatively overly essentialist, reading of social structures, such as in Schultz's reading, which "takes for granted" the existence of dispositions and predilections among a community of men[118]. Nor should doxa be confused with a permanent or static set of beliefs or conditions: "what today presents itself as self evident, established, settled once and for all, beyond discussion, has not always been so and only gradually imposed itself as such" as a "historical evolution which tends to abolish history"[119]. The parameters of doxa, what is accepted and regulated by habitus as appropriate and worthy of inclusion into the universe of perception, are nourished by a history which forgets itself, forging itself as an axiomatic element of "identity", "ideology", or "worldview". These parameters become the very mechanism by which domination is sustained, and it is only in times of a crisis of perception that doxa reveals itself as a construction rather than a foundation. However, "crisis is a necessary condition for questioning doxa but is not in itself a sufficient condition for the production of a critical discourse", for while "the dominated classes have an interest in pushing back the limits of doxa and exposing the arbitrariness of the taken for granted, the dominant classes have an interest in defending the integrity of doxa or, short of this, of establishing in its place the necessarily imperfect substitute, *orthodoxy"*[120] .

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[117] Ibid, page 167, emphasis in the original.
[118] Pierre Bourdieu, *Méditations Pascaliennes,* Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1997, page 208.
[119] Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations,* Trans. Richard Nice, Stanford: Polity Press, 2000, page 174.
[120] Outline of a Theory of Practice, page 169.

Field

The site of this struggle between the dominant and the dominated over the representation of the social world takes place in the *field*, the objective set of relations between actors in a relatively autonomous, structured space, where the positions of actors are objectively defined "by their present and potential situation in the structure of the distribution of species of power as well as their objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, etc.)"[121]. The field is that space where actions occur based on the necessary confrontation of habitus and the objective conditions that ground it and allow it to be expressed in interactions. It is the positions of the field where particular connotations exist to suggest what acts and types of acts are optimal. More than this, while the field is determined by the interplay of both objective position and subjective disposition, the stakes at hand are specifically attenuated to the particular structure of the field in question. Actions appropriate to the objective conditions of one field may not correspond to another; it is for this reason that the field is often defined in the colloquial as "the rules of the game".

To be sure, the concept of field is one of Bourdieu's more elusive, and it is perhaps for this reason that it is so often illustrated by the metaphor of the game. While Bourdieu often used the example of the rugby game, Robbins gives another, more helpful example in the tournament, which appreciates the complexity of multiple fields operating simultaneously, which should be quoted at length.

> Imagine [a] large hall in which chairs and tables are laid out in clusters and in which, in groups, people are playing board games. [Rather than playing each game separately], you realize that what is really happening is that all the players are playing all the games simultaneously with a view toward winning the game of games. All the players seem to be strategists. You realize that the performance of some players [shows] that they are strategically deploying their tokens, but you also notice that other players seem to hold significant 'trump cards'. But there do seem to be other players who have the capacity to make strategic moves which

[121] Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, page 97.

> constantly bend or break the rules of the games. This flagrant disregard not just for the rules of behavior in playing but for the rules of the games without which the devising of strategies seems meaningless, seems inexplicable until, finally, it becomes clear that the players were playing for long before you started to watch and that previous winners carried forth their tokens to new games. Dismayed, you try to withdraw from the hall. Of course, it cannot be done. You have been playing along with the players all the time. Your perception of the game is part of your strategy within it[122].

Thus the field is a multivariate space divided just as it is unified, where the game that occurs in one place does so with relative autonomy from others, but as the players are the same, they will bring into each game the experience and influence they have gained in another. Consequently, when Bourdieu talks about the "objective" relations that structure and color the field, it is important that these relations are always contingent, always temporal, and subject to change. The rules of the games we all play exist as principles that precede us and whose terms are incumbent upon us to learn in order to play the game with conviction and ultimately to "win". However, "winning" in Bourdieu's understanding does not entail the same material costs and benefits that color myriad social analyses; the "prize" in these, in all, social struggles, is the legitimate mode of perception of the social world[123]. It is in revealing this struggle that Bourdieu sheds light on the "basic needs" of groups in conflict, needs that may well propel someone to engage in violence, from the latent to the manifest, without being able to articulate "the reason for it".

Illusio

Robbin's Kafkaesque re-creation of the tournament, where everyone is playing even if they are standing on the side lines, leads one to ask how it is that

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[122] Derek Robbins, *The Work of Pierre Bourdieu: Recognizing Society,* San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991, pages 85-89. The above passage has been significantly shortened and abridged from that which Robbins presents and as such takes the most skeletal pieces of a metaphor that spans five pages.

[123] Pierre Bourdieu, "The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups", *Theory and Society,* Vol. 14, 1985, page 730.

one *enters* into the game, and why it is that so many actors, even those who are losing terribly, still bother playing. For again, even though habitus implies a dispositional predilection for having a "sense of the game" and field implies an understanding and engagement with the "rules of the game", neither implies an army of automatons shifting from one table to another, fully controlled by the tournament in which they all inexorably participate. Instead, the relation is predicated on an investment in the game and a motivation to keep playing.

> [A] field can function only if it can find individuals who are socially predisposed to behave as responsible agents to pursue the objectives and obtain the profits which the field offers and which, seen from another point of view, may appear illusory, as indeed they always are because they rest on that relation of ontological complicity between the habitus and the field which is the basis of entry into the game and commitment to the game, that is, *illusio*[124].

Illusio is the moment of synthesis between habitus and field, where value is imparted from the objective relations and structures that constitute the field and transposed onto the tableau of habitus; where, one might say, the actor, knowing the rules of a game and having a sense of it, "buys into" the game as a game worth playing. It is illusio that solidifies the field *as* field, for without the investment of actors who value what is at stake and acquire the interests prescribed by the field the field would have no objective value and thus could not be sustained in the interplay between structure and agent. It is to this that Bourdieu alludes when he formulates his complicated understanding of "structuring and structured structures" that appears throughout his work. Illusio as a sense of investment in the game is not an illusion, it is not an "opiate of the masses"; it is only an illusion when apprehended from the outside, when viewed as an object of analysis rather than "taken for granted" as a natural principle. More importantly, the universe of fields furnishes agents with much more than the immediate or manifest ends that are so often given to economic or material

[124] Pierre Bourdieu, "A lecture on the lecture" (Leçon sur la leçon) in *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology*, Trans. Matthew Adamson, Cambridge: Polity, 1990, page 194.

goods, and the hunt for the domination of the stakes of the game counts as much, if not more than, the capture. "There is a profit to be found in action which exceeds the explicitly pursued profits and which consists of emerging from indifference, and in affirming oneself as an active agent, taken up in the game and engaged in it, an inhabitant of the world who is inhabited by the world, projected towards ends and endowed, objectively and thus subjectively, with a social mission"[125].

Libido

The hunt, and the stakes, both imply that there is a profound interest in participation in the game, in engagement and success, but also that this success is directed towards the desire to dominate the game, to come out on top and stay there, to define and redefine, the game itself. This drive towards domination, which is felt as palpably in the dominated as in the dominating, is the *libido dominandi*, "an unfaltering assertion of virility which pits men against each other in agonistic games of self assertion"[126]. While Bourdieu first observed these mental structures in his Kabyle ethnography, he contended that they were still alive and well in contemporary societies and that indeed these forces, operating as they do in a more diffuse and insidious fashion in highly differentiated societies, were even more threatening in the contemporary social world[127].

The inculcation of libido is the fundamental step in acquiring the disposition necessary to invest in the game, to have a sense of the game, to learn the rules of the game, and to have the drive to master the game. Libido is this

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[125] *In Other Words*, page 195.

[126] Lois McNay, "Gender, Habitus, and the Field: Pierre Bourdieu and the Limits of Reflexivity", *Theory, Culture and Society,* Vol. 16, No. 95, page 107. Bourdieu's use of the male form to express *libido* is the subject of some critiques leveled against him, McNay's being only one. However, the point here that I want to emphasize is the agonism inherent in interactions where *libido* is most palpably felt, particularly when it is directed towards physically violent ends, as this in effect affirms the particular capital of physical force in certain fields. This will become clearer in the following section which attends specifically to capital of physical force in the peripheral field.

[127] Pierre Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, Trans. Richard Nice, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001, page 4.

drive, tamed and tempered in imperceptible progression, formed and cultivated by each rite of passage through family, home, school and institution. As Bourdieu notes, "the work of socialization of drives is based on a permanent transaction in which the child makes renunciations and sacrifices in exchange for recognition, consideration and admiration"[128]. This process and the drama by which it is inculcated and obtained is charged with desire, repressed and subsumed in the deepest recesses of the body where they become "guilts, phobias, or, in a word, passion"[129]. There again, we are reminded of Sartre's words on the judgment of others and the way in which the individual as member will be defined by others and their relationship to others, the point at which habitus begins its labors. However, this is no tautology; while I have returned in a sense to the point of departure, I have done so in order to illustrate the fundamental paradox at the heart of Bourdieu's work, which it its most important contribution to the analysis of conflict: "the domination of the dominant by his domination"[130].

Capital

The concatenation of field and habitus cannot occur without the embodiment of the values of the game being imparted by one and inscribed on another. The values of the game are capital, the "species of power whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field"[131]. Capital in this sense goes far beyond the economic or material connotation it has received in capitalist or post-capitalist era: Bourdieu's use of the term encompasses all of those goods, tangible and intangible, whose value is either consciously or unconsciously recognized within the field and through the habitus. Glory, honor, credit, fame; all of these forms of recognition, are an aspect

[128] Pascalian Meditations, page 167.
[129] Ibid.
[130] Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, page 173.
[131] Ibid, page 97.

of the forces that institute the drive in actors to engage in the field, and the different forms of capital that are valued within the field in question will define its boundaries, as the extent to which actors will be driven to engage in the field will be determined by the forms recognition takes.

It is the introduction of capital that differentiates one field from another: political capital will be directed toward the accumulation and domination of recognition just as in other fields, but it will be more specifically tailored to the expressions that recognition takes as a political force. Cultural capital in the literary field, such as the talent to produce works and the corresponding talent to interpret or appreciate those works, will determine the position that an actor occupies in the field, and the higher one's particular capital in these respective fields, the more dominant one's position. Alternatively, as in the tournament metaphor, species of cultural capital can be transferred from one field to another, as the esteemed scientist may well find herself the guest of honor at a table of journalists, whose symbolic capital in the journalistic field will afford them the ability to recognize the status of the scientist and treat her accordingly. However, that scientist is but a visitor and her time in the seat of honor is limited: she is not in the place where her position attains its maximum value, and everyone knows it.

Capital comes in many forms, from the manifest to the latent; the capital of physical force, which figures prominently in the next section, plays a central role in affirming the monopoly of force a state holds as does economic capital determine to a great extent the lifestyle that one may lead. However, the strength of symbolic capital lies in its ability to go unrecognized *as* capital; instead, it is "rather mistaken for competence within a natural social order"[132]. Therefore symbolic capital is the ultimate indicator of one's ability to "fit in", or to have a "sense of the game".

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[132] Bradford Verter, "Spiritual Capital: Theorizing Religion with Bourdieu against Bourdieu", *Sociological Theory,* Vol. 21, No. 2, June 2003.

Practice

In *Distinction,* Bourdieu offers an equation to demonstrate the concert of these movements, dispositions, and sites, all of which culminate into practice, the holistic understanding of each of these components as interdependent parts in a deceptively simple mechanism:

{(habitus) (capital)} + field= practice[133]

To translate: the specific value imparted to capital through the dispositions embodied in habitus will indicate the positions and composition of the field, and each will work together to outline the structure of the differentiated yet connected spheres of social life. This work is practice, the everyday occurrences that emerge from this interplay and give substance to everything that is done. This is the convergence of the synchronic and the diachronic, and the culmination of all of the previous elements of Bourdieu's perspective. Each is present, whether implicitly or explicitly, in the practices that comprise social life. Therefore, and contrary to Alan Warde's five suppositions on the disappearance of practice from Bourdieu's work, there is hardly a need to "revise" these concepts [134]; instead, practice is the execution of the subjective aspects of individuals in concert with the objective conditions under which we live, and if it has been understated in Bourdieu's work it is perhaps because it has been implicitly ubiquitous.

Practice is the culmination of history, philosophy, and social science, realized not in the words that are written but in the actions that are undertaken, and it can only be perceived in a reconstruction of these actions and their situation within these delicate components. Practice is seeing the social world as it is, in its imperfections and refusals to conform to a theoretical paradigm: "to be able to see and describe the world as it is, you have to be ready to be always

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[133] Distinction, page 101.

[134] Alan Warde, "Practice and Field: revising Bourdieusian concepts", CRIC Discussion Paper, April 2004, pages 8-10.

dealing with things that are complicated, confused, impure, uncertain, all of which runs counter to the usual idea of intellectual rigor"[135].

Proposal for a Structure and Genesis of the Peripheral Field

If manifest violence occurs within a particular field, it is implicated in the entire structure of the field, for no part exists in isolation to the others. Physical violence stems from symbolic violence, which is inflicted by dominant holders of symbolic capital over dominated actors, "through suggestions inscribed in the most apparently insignificant aspects of the things, situations, and practices of everyday life"[136]. Symbolic violence is the deprivation of recognition, the naturalization of positions in the field so that one becomes 'naturally' entitled to benefits and authority while another is 'naturally' unworthy of this allotment. Violence, from the symbolic to the physical is, with Nagler, a "failure of imagination"[137] where the relationship of individuals to each other is subordinated to the relationship of individuals to forms of capital and the fetishized recognition that the possession and exertion of capital produces. As such, physical violence in the field is only one, and the most superficial, expression of violence.

This is not to suggest that the challenge of locating the boundaries of a field in which violence is a prominent practice is in vain. Quite the opposite: identifying the field of violent conflict allows us to attend to the more profound conditions that account for the perpetuation of violence in everyday life as well as an understanding of the dialectic of iteration and cooperation that colors protracted conflict. Therefore, sketching both the structure and the genesis of the

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[135] "Meanwhile, I have come to know all the diseases of sociological understanding", an interview with Pierre Bourdieu by Beate Krais, in Pierre Bourdieu, Jean-Claude Chamboredon, Jean-Claude Passeron, *The Craft of Sociology: Epistemological Preliminaries,* Trans. Richard Nice, Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyer, 1991, page 259.

[136] Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power,* Ed. John B. Thompson, Trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991; page 51.

[137] Michael Nagler, *Is There No Other Way? The Search for a Nonviolent Future,* Berkeley: Berkeley Hills Books, 2001, page 57.

field wherein violent exchange occurs is a crucial exercise in a preliminary diagnosis of the manner in which the struggles of the field are disaggregated from the violence which torments and stunts it. As a method of analysis, "there is no more potent tool for rupture than the reconstruction of genesis: by bringing back into view the conflicts and confrontations of the early beginnings and therefore all the discarded possibilities, it retrieves the possibility that things could have been (and still could be) otherwise"[138].

At the risk of sounding cryptic, I would offer that the struggle *in* the peripheral field composes the peripheral field, where the stakes are on the one hand, of both diachronic difference and synchronic inequality; on the other the desire for obliteration of difference and dissolution of opposition in order to reaffirm the myths of Republicanism. As such, to say that Nicolas Sarkozy's "Plan Banlieue" is a change in philosophy when he talks about "the very idea of the nation" at stake and his willingness to rewrite the constitution in order to recognize diversity is to say that a palpable change in tactics has emerged in the struggle for the field[139]. The more vocal, the more resonant the expressions of dissent from the periphery, the higher the stakes to excise it become.

If it emerges that a peripheral field exists, it is crucial to first point out that this field is not a discrete territory with physical or impenetrable borders. I could hardly amalgamate each physical *cité* into a singular *periphery,* wherein the relations and production of domination are synonymous and capable of being transposed one over the other. Equally, implying that there exists a peripheral field does not imply that this field exists in direct opposition to a "core" field, in the Marxist tradition. It is to say, instead, that the objective relations that exist between *les sans attache* and the State are marked by their isolation from the practices that have come to define "being French", *on both sides.* Where uniformity is axiomatic in the bureaucratic, intellectual, and scholastic spheres in

[138] Pierre Bourdieu, Loïc Wacquant, Samar Farage, "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field", *Sociological Theory,* Vol. 12, No. 1, March 1994, page 4.
[139] "Sarkozy's 'Marshall Plan' for France's Ghettos", *La Times*, 9 February 2008.

France, difference colors the practices of the peripheral. As such, the boundaries of the peripheral are the frontiers between these contending practices, where the drive towards uniformity and submission on the side of law enforcement (as a representative of the State) is met with resistance grounded in the unattachment of the *sans attache* to the narrative of France.

To undertake the labor of identifying the field, Bourdieu offers "three necessary and internally connected moments"[140]:

-First, one must analyze the position of the field vis-à-vis the field of power.[141].

-Second, one must map out the objective structure of the relations between the positions occupied by the agents or institutions who compete for the legitimate form of specific authority of which this field is the site.

-Third, one must analyze the habitus of agents, the different systems of dispositions they have acquired by internalizing a determinate type of social and economic condition, and which find in a definite trajectory within the field under consideration a more or less favorable opportunity to become actualized.

Therefore, to sketch a structure and genesis of a peripheral field, each of these directives must be overlaid and made tangible in the *cités.* Due to the sheer volume and nature of data that is necessary to fully explore and construct the field, what I offer here is necessarily incomplete but does hope to reaffirm the idea that field analyses are meant to break with the tendency to emphasize datum at the expense of relations, a factor which resists quantification in most instances[142]. My goal in this passage is to suggest that a peripheral field does exist in urban France, that the struggles in it are specific to the movement of the types of capital invoked and the positions of the actors implicated in its maintenance. I would hope also to offer a window into the way in which research on protracted conflict might be undertaken so that its foundations, its

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[140] An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, pages 104-105.

[141]The field of power acts as a type of "meta-field" with emergent and specific properties which is not situated on the same level as other specific field but encompasses each of these fields in part. See *Invitation,* page 18, FN 32.

[142]Language and Symbolic Power, page 229.

"basic needs" may be more holistically addressed in the practices of theory and policy, even those which seem not to directly pertain to the violent exchange. Returning to the passage with which this chapter began, the words of Nicolas Sarkozy as he introduced the "Plan Banlieue" communicate volumes not only about the *banlieues,* and perhaps the peripheral field, but equally about the political field and the field of power in France, all of which operate in concert as much as they are independent, all vying for a monopoly of perception and recognition.

The Position of the Field

The State[143], through a cumulative process of concentration of different species of capital, gains a hold on the meta-capital that allows it to exert its influence over a number of different fields and thus maintain a monopoly on the capital that will become divided through the struggles of different actors over the specific interests contained in the separate fields. In France, the State held this concentrated monopoly through the exertion of physical, economic, and symbolic force, some instances of which were pointed out in the first chapter. The state in France exercises its dominance of the field of power by penetrating nearly all facets of social life, from the most obvious (social services, bureaucratic institutions) to the most subtle (the Academie Française). The peripheral field is both *subordinate* to and *penetrated* by the field of power at the same time as it is neglected, occupying a position that is at once beneath, beside, and within the State.

Wacquant points to this position with his discussion of the "advanced marginality" of the *cités,* where "rather than being disseminated throughout

[143] Again, calling "the State" the site of the field of power does not mean to transmogrify in some way the boundaries of the field to the physical boundaries of a territory. In the colonial era, for example, the dominance of the State was expressly predicated on its ability to transcend its borders and envelope countries outside of its explicit domain; today, the influence of the State and its unique ability to engage in international affairs, coupled with its dominance as the most recognizable paradigm in most international relations work also evidences the transcendence of the State beyond its borders.

working class areas, advanced marginality tends to concentrate in isolated and bounded territories increasingly perceived by both insiders and outsiders as social purgatories" within which "only the refuse of society would accept to dwell"[144]. However, there simultaneously occurs within and around these 'penalized spaces' a "discourse of vilification, 'from below' in the ordinary interactions of daily life, as well as 'from above' in the journalistic, political, and bureaucratic fields"[145]. Therefore while the peripheral field is stigmatized by its subordination and absolute domination within the field of power, it is also intimately implicated in the functioning of the same field. Imagine a splinter in the finger, insignificant in relative size and potency from the human body it inhabits, yet so nagging and eerily painful that removing it becomes an obsession. The peripheral field functions much the same way in the relation to the field of power.

The penetration of the peripheral field is also evinced by the presence of the State within it, and this presence takes all forms from the naked to the subliminal. Silverstein recounts the penetration of the State into the urban periphery in the 1970's as an attempt to counter the corporate flight that was rapidly de-industrializing the areas and leaving them barren of industry and economic sustainability. However the French government did so by "establishing a framework for increased corporate penetration into the service sectors of the housing projects, obviating the need for *direct* state investment and suturing the future of the banlieues to the anticipated utopia of the 'New Economy'"[146]. By exercising its influence on the business field, the State can then make promises of a "New Economy" without having to bear the charge of delivering on it while simultaneously penetrating the peripheral field even

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[144] Loïc Wacquant, "Territorial Stigmatization in the Age of Advanced Marginality", *Thesis Eleven,* No. 91, November 2007, page 67.
[145] Ibid.
[146] Paul A. Silverstein, "Guerrilla Capitalism and Ghetto-centric Cosmopolitanism on the French Urban Periphery" in *Frontiers of Capital: Ethnographic Reflections on the New Economy*, eds. Melissa S. Fisher and Greg Downey, Durham: Duke University Press, 2006, page 280, emphasis added.

further through the deployment of "zones franches" (free zones of which businesses can take advantage by relocating and enjoying substantial tax relief), a process which works both to survey the space and further fracture its continuity and potential as community.

However, the presence of the state is as manifest as it is latent in the *cités*, and this acts as one of the primary mechanisms by which the peripheral field is positioned in relation to the field of power. Indeed it is this presence that Wacquant invokes with his use of the "anti-ghetto" of France as opposed to the "hyperghetto" of the United States[147]: "the management of space and impoverished populations in the object of strict political-administrative oversight that mobilizes a dense network of local, regional, and national agencies and for which public officials are held accountable"[148] in France, making the peripheral field a site *par excellence* for the State to exercise and demonstrate its domination. The peripheral field is marked by domination that comes not as a result of neglect but rather as a result of intense and unrelenting infiltration, the extent of which is unique to the French experience, seen by the use of surveillance "drones" in the area of the urban periphery[149].

The police presence in the urban periphery is the most visible embodiment of the concatenation of the field of power and the peripheral field, and the one which most marks the *imaginaire* of the struggles and inscribes itself on the bodies of both the dominated and the dominant. Mobilization by *les sans attaches*[150] often occurs in solidarity with police related incidents[151], and efforts directed at "stimulating" the industry of the peripheral field through economic incentives or refurbished social policies is proposed conjointly with an increase

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[147] Loïc Wacquant, "Ghettos and Anti-Ghettos: An Anatomy of the New Urban Poverty", forthcoming in *Thesis Eleven,* 2008, page 1.
[148] Loïc Wacquant, "French Working-Class *Banlieues* and Black American Ghetto: From Conflation to Comparison", *Qui Parle,* Vol. 16, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2007, page 29.
[149] See rue89.com, "Comment l'Etat maintient l'ordre dans les banlieues", 17 January 2007 and David Dufresne, *Maintien l'ordre, l'enquête,* Paris : Hachette, 2007.
[150] See Chapter 1, pgs. 28-36.
[151] Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, "Reflections "À Chaud" on the French Suburban Crisis", from Social Science Research Council, "Riots in France", riotsfrance.ssrc.org, Published 28 November 2005.

in police presence. Indeed, Sarkozy's "Plan Banlieue", which calls for the increase of police officers in *quartiers sensibles* by four thousand, along with the utilization of *groupes d'interventions régionaux* (GIS)[152] along with satellite schooling programs and economic investment[153] is far from the first of its kind. Alain Juppé's 1995-1996 "Marshall Plan", established twenty "zones franches" and the promise of paid internships to lure youth away from the informal street economy, and brought 200 additional plainclothes police officers to "lawless" areas. When this was deemed insufficient to institute "the law", it was augmented by Lionel Jospin in 1999, who added thirteen thousand additional riot police (CRS) and seventeen thousand military gendarmes[154]. The militarization of the periphery is profound, and the simultaneous assertion that the areas are "lawless" reveals the paradoxical confrontation of the field of power with the peripheral field.

Relations between positions in the field

As the relations of the specific field are defined by the objective positions actors assume and the capital that they possess or dispossess in order to maintain that position, defining the relations entails identifying the actors present in the field and the specific types of capital that flow between them. Identifying the actors present does not mean the compilation of an exhaustive list, and the types of capital that flow between them are many and varied. Therefore I will briefly identify five types of actors in the peripheral field and their positions corresponding to three types of capital, starting with the latter in order to situate the former.

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[152] Loosely translated as a "joint task force", the GIS is composed of a cross section of law enforcement organs established in 2002 to combat black and grey market economies as well as organized crime and drug trafficking, and is given an extraordinarily wide berth per the force and intrusion by which their operations can take place. See "Recontre avec les responsables des Groupes d'Intervention Régionaux", 19 October 2005 at www.interior.gouv.fr for an outline of the structure of the GIS and L'Assemblée Nationale, Rapport d'Information No. 1098, 1 October 2003 at www.assemblee-nationale.fr for economic dispensations and lobbies to institute the GIS on a permanent basis.

153 "Nicolas Sarkozy fait des banlieues un 'enjeu de civilisation'", Le Monde, 8 February 2008

154 Silverstein, 2007, page 288.

Capital of Physical Force

Capital of physical force implies that "the institutions mandated to guarantee order are progressively becoming separated from the social world; that physical violence can only be applied by a specialized group, centralized and disciplined, especially mandated for such end and clearly identified as such within society"[155]. This reveals the dispossession of the potential for and instruments of physical force by the dominant groups in a field against the dominated. In the peripheral field, the numbers and concentrated presence of law enforcement, and their mandate to use violent means in order to enforce the "civilizing process"[156] make this species of capital particularly potent. However, though forces of coercion (army and police) maintain an exponential advantage over the dominated groups (particularly *les sans attaches*), the capital of physical force, which is to say *all* physical expression, is not held by coercive actors.

The instances of rioting, most well documented in 2005 but present for nearly twenty years and a frequent feature of the peripheral field, is a struggle using the capital of physical force amassed by groups within the *sans attaches* who, owing to their subordinate position, utilize tools that give the appearance of savagery to dominant actors (who also hold an exponential store of informational and technical capital). However, those who engage in rioting, burning, and confrontations with the police expend the capital that they have gained from other relations within the field, such as having "gained respect" in informal economic markets. Alternatively, an increase in one's capital of physical force nourishes other sources of capital[157], be it economic or symbolic, to cite only two species. Thus, when rap groups like NTM bring the themes of rioting into their lyrics, intimating to anyone who listens to them that they would be willing

[155] Bourdieu, 1994, passim. For purposes of clarity, I follow the general categories of capital laid out by Bourdieu in "Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field", as this is one of the most clearly defined reconstructions of a field available.

[156] See Norbert Elias, *State Formation and Civilization,* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982.

and ready to riot themselves, this intimation towards the accumulation of capital of physical force nourishes their symbolic (and surely economic) capital as well[158].

Economic Capital

The capital of physical force is buttressed by the establishment of an efficient fiscal system, which solidifies the hold of a State on its domain; the monopoly of economic capital (which includes the collusion of the State and the private sector) is as important to the display of physical dominance as it is to the recognition of dominance within the field. In the peripheral field, where the French State has made its presence felt by the *deprivation* of a diffusion of economic capital (it is a popular refrain among residents and researchers alike that "what people really need is jobs"[159]), it is equally in the cooptation of forms of popular expression in the peripheral field, such as those of sport and music[160]. As Silverstein argues, this process of absorption and cooptation creates an ambivalent role for those sports and music stars that come from, and maintain ties to, the *cités*. Even as they are able to carve out a place for themselves within the larger and more symbolically rich fields within the country, these artists and athletes must contend with the economic dominance of the State, knowing that their success will ultimately sustain their domination.

Due to the importance of economic domination for the solidification by the State over the legitimate mode of perception, the informal economy that exists within the peripheral field and is one of its most powerful features, is a particularly discomfiting form of capital for the State. It is no surprise that Nicolas Sarkozy has proposed that the GIR occupy a place in the maintenance of "order"; one of the most threatening elements of the peripheral field in its

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[158] See Paul Silverstein and Chantal Tetrault, "Urban Violence in France", *Middle East Report Online,* November 2005 for an explication of the 2005 riots which invokes NTM's 1995 "Foutre le Feu".
[159] Pierre Bourdieu et al, *the Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society (La misere du monde),* Trans. Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson et al, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993, page 191.
[160] See Silverstein, 2006, op. cit, passim.

relation to the field of power is its ability to circulate economic capital outside of the State's purview. Silverstein's characterization of "guerrilla capitalists" is that much more intriguing in this light, as the "voyous" (criminals or gangsters) against whom Nicolas Sarkozy directed such vitriol[161] are in a very real sense much more invested in the struggle of the field than those who struggle over the capital of physical force.

Symbolic Capital

Each of these two latter categories of capital, and many others, gain their potency as symbolic capital, "the form taken by any species of capital whenever it is perceived through categories of perception that are the product of the embodiment of divisions or of oppositions inscribed in the structure of the distribution of this species of capital"[162]. Put more simply, symbolic capital is distinction, or status. Physical force is read through symbolic capital because the ability to exercise it is the thing which distinguishes one actor from another, and it is what reaffirms dominance or subordination. Symbolic capital is the good which allows one to speak, and the amount of symbolic capital held by an actor determines the extent to which he or she will be heard. Thus it is no surprise that Nicholas Johnson says of riots: "A riot is somebody talking. A riot is a man crying out 'Listen to me mister. There's something I've been trying to tell you and you are not listening'"[163]. Symbolic capital is as present in the hoisting of an Algerian flag at a Paris football stadium as it is in wearing of the Islamic headscarf in a secular school, for it communicates through its presence a steadfastness of place that demands recognition.

Symbolic capital provides the means by which actors engage in the struggle over the definition of boundary and perception within the peripheral

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[161] "Guerre sans merci aux voyous", *Le Journal de Montréal,* 9 February 2008.
[162] Bourdieu, "Structure and Genesis of the Bureaucratic Field", page 9.
[163] In Cathy Lisa Schneider, "Police Power and Race Riots in Paris", *Politics and Society,* Vol. 35, 2007, page 524.

field. Therefore, the actors involved exercise their reserves of symbolic capital within the field. This of course includes the State in the form of the central government, where the most intense concentration of capital rests. Additionally, law enforcement organs, which operate in tandem with, but in a position subordinate to, the State (as they must follow directives and implement plans designed by the State), occupy positions enforced primarily by their concentrated possession of the capital of physical force.

Bureaucratic actors operate in this same domain, with a concentration of informational capital (a form which space did not allow for exploration) and a high level of symbolic capital imparted by their well known link to the State. Industrial actors occupy slightly higher positions due to the concentration of economic capital, which translates into symbolic capital received by both dominant and subordinate actors, as they are turned to, in the case of Juppé's "Marshall Plan", to fix the dysfunctions of the economy of the peripheral field.

Relationships of domination do not imply an absolute concentration of capital, however, and the positions occupied by the dominated within the peripheral field do not signify a total absence of capital, though there is a marked disparity between the levels held. Indeed it must be said that the persistent maintenance of symbolic capital by the dominated is a form of symbolic capital, as it indicates and allows for the struggle over meaning to continue. In the peripheral field, the primitive means by which *les émeutiers* (rioters), as a subgroup of *les sans attache,* exercise physical violence is a potent, if short lived and diffuse, expense of the capital of physical force, which is ironically nourished as symbolic capital as the State increases the levels and concentration of the forces of coercion in the peripheral field. This dialectical accumulation of symbolic capital characterizes much of the process by which capital is obtained by the dominated, and it positions those actors within the wider category of *les sans attaches* that value the capital of physical force on a level somewhat below that which is occupied by the forces of coercion.

Actors in the informal economy may occupy a higher position within the peripheral field, as their ability to navigate the field and accumulate economic capital in opposition to the institutions and industries founded or sanctioned by the State impart on them a higher level of symbolic capital[164]. Religious actors may possess somewhat significant levels of symbolic capital predicated on their possession of recognized religious capital, as Cesari's point[165] regarding the tendency of actors to identify as Muslim in opposition to the secular nature of the State, but this leaves open the question of the salience of this symbolic capital if recognition of it is instrumentalized in this way.

Finally, rappers and athletes occupy a unique place within the peripheral field, as the successful among them may have amassed high levels of economic capital and their success has afforded them entry and distinction into elite fields within France. Athletes who may have otherwise passed through the State without distinction due to their original positions in the peripheral field are, by virtue of their prowess, held up by dominant and dominated alike as alternatively heroes or examples[166]. However, this dual recognition can often be as poisonous as it is gratifying, for if an athlete is too warmly embraced by the state, he or she risks being disenfranchised within the peripheral field.

Rappers in France, however, with their continued (though not uniform) emphasis on lyrics that are critiques of the State[167] and commentaries on the everyday life in the peripheral field, maintain a hold on symbolic capital within this field, although this hold is also precarious when the influences of economics and industry begin to make themselves known[168]. However, the continued connection of rappers to the peripheral field constitutes one of the principal

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[164] As a corollary to this point, see Loïc Wacquant, "Negative Social Capital: State Breakdown and Social Destitution in America's Urban Core", *Netherlands Journal of Housing and the Built Environment,* Vol. 13, No. 1, 1998, page 27.
[165] Op. Cit.
[166] See Paul Silverstein, 2004, for a sustained look at the symbolic importance of the mulit-ethnic French football team who won the World Cup in 1998.
[167] Prévos, 1996, page 713.
[168] Silverstein, 2006, page 280.

forms of symbolic capital in the field, as these artists call attention to a much wider audience and make themselves heard in a manner that few others can. Addtionally, the connection between rappers and social movements, such as the invocation of SOS Racisme in the lyrics of a number of rappers, lends this symbolic capital to movements, thus allowing for an improvement of position for these groups in relation to other actors.

This is neither an exhaustive list, nor is it based on static profiles and in-depth explorations of these actors and their positions. It does, however, give substance to the idea that the conflict in the peripheral field is a living thing which is inscribed into the practices of each of these actors. More importantly, it opens up the possibility that while conflict may exist at each of these levels and it may always exist, physical violence does not, and does not have to, exist as a permanent feature of the field.

Actualization of Habitus

Identifying the habitus requires a sustained investigation, and any attempt to do so in a cursory manner would harm the project more than it would shed light on it. However, I would submit the first chapter of this work as a preliminary sketch of habitus, as a socio-historical investigation of the dialectic that has come to delimit the boundaries between "what is French" and "what is not". That this could be the basis of a doxic inculcation, where the peripheral field is nourished by the negative sentiment of being in some way "foreign" or "not French", and that this sentiment works to develop the subjective dispositions which inform the relations established and the positions assumed in the field.

The symbolic violence exercised by the State and the dominant agents of the peripheral field is directed toward the same project which has, over time, inculcated a naturalized Republican ideal. This disposition, having developed over time through the exercise of educational, political, and social dominance,

situates these different actors within the field and allows them to take as *natural* the positions they occupy. Thus it may ultimately be unthinkable for Sarkozy to amend the constitution, and it may be so based not on the logistical or practical impositions that it may cause, but because it creates a dissonance in the subjective constitution upon which Republicanism has been founded.

Catalyzing Change in the Peripheral Field

Capital does not exist and function except in relation to the field[169] and the flows of capital alternatively define the positions in the field; each of these elements corresponds to the particular desires and preferences that are embodied in the habitus. Therefore, the field is necessarily an *open system* which is always subject to change based on the shifts and movements of any of the elements which constitute it. The field is a site in constant flux, often occurring at imperceptible levels and speeds, with values and perspectives gradually shifting and expanding to accommodate the dominant preferences contained within it, the most profound of these held within the doxa that informs habitus.

Transformation of the habitus comes from a realization and awareness of habitus, and of the doxa that informs it. However, as I mentioned above, awareness of doxa, which lies at the heart of habitus, is not enough to engage these axiomatic foundations in a critical discourse. For while we may all have moments where it occurs to us that the world as it is, is not the only way it *could be,* these moments are unsustainable glimpses upon which we can hardly base our predictions for a transformation of social conditions. Rather, Bourdieu invokes the process of"provoked and accompanied self-analysis" to realize the habitus[170]. This method, heavily dependent on interviews between the researcher and the subject, embody the entirety of his perspective: "social research is something much too serious and too difficult for us to allow ourselves to mistake

[169] An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, page 101.
[170] See Hamel, 1998, pp.1-19

scientific *rigidity* for scientific *rigor* and thus to deprive ourselves [of] the full panoply of intellectual traditions"[171]. Thus to shake the foundations of habitus, to "twist the stick in the opposite direction" in order to invite change, the process must be correspondingly a scientific method that shakes the foundation of the scientific habitus. However, Bourdieu does not advocate an irresponsible or haphazard form of social science: "the extreme liberty I advocate here has its counterpart in the extreme vigilance that we must apply to the conditions of use of analytical techniques and to ensuring they fit the question at hand"[172].

That being said, the challenge of catalyzing transformation of the field is a project which depends upon but is much larger than provoked and accompanied self-analysis. As a singular process, it is insufficient on its own to invoke the kind of change that the crises that color protracted social conflicts require. However, this does not mean abandoning the project, and it certainly does not mean disregarding the spirit with which it was conceived. Rather, addressing social conflict with this spirit in mind necessitates a further understanding of the principles that underlie the provoked and accompanied self analysis, and using these principles in concert with others to reformulate a role for the researcher by redefining the concept of mediation.

Chapter Three

Anamnesis as Practice

> *"Hence, this very process of revolution must give rise to an art teaching in what way the change will be most easily and most effectively brought about. Its object*

[171] *Invitation,* page 227.
[172] Ibid.

will not be to generate in the person the power of seeing. On the contrary, it assumes that he possesses it, though he is turned in a wrong direction and does not look towards the right quarter; and its aim is to remedy this defect."[173]

One of the central hypotheses that I want to highlight in this chapter is the need not only to interrogate the historical conditions of the field but the dialectical relationships that develop in this same process. In furtherance of this hypothesis, and to offer a response beyond a deconstruction of historical relationships, anamnesis interrogates the dispositions of actors, which makes possible the movement of the social space from oppositional to collaborative; I want to suggest that this is a necessary step to be taken before significant transformation of conflict can occur. This chapter addresses this hypothesis by asking four separate yet related questions, moving backwards through texts to finally arrive at an understanding of anamnesis that responds to contemporary political dilemmas. First, how does Bourdieu himself read anamnesis, and to what extent does he recognize it as a method for change? Second, how is his reading of social life fortified while the possibilities for change are widened through a reading of anamnesis through its ancient origins? Third, how might this reframed perspective be applied to mediation in order to effectively transform situations of violent conflict? Fourth, who should be charged with carrying out this project?

To address these questions, I will first look at the expectations Bourdieu had for anamnesis in his project, identifying the strengths and weaknesses of his interpretation. In order to more fully appreciate the potential for anamnesis, and particularly its potential as a political tool, it must be seen not only to uncover the arbitrary foundations of the field but the adversarial interactions that result in the symbolic violence that Bourdieu seemed to paradoxically take as axiomatic. Thus where Bourdieu falls short is by advocating a type of anamnesis that interrogates *habitus* without going further into interrogating *doxa.*

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[173] Plato, *Republic,* Trans. John Llewelyn Davies and David James Vaughn, 1997, 518c.

To rectify this disconnect, I want to look back at the Platonic and Aristotelian uses of the term, where it is understood as a recovery not only of the origins of knowledge but a recognition of the structures of thinking by which knowledge is transmitted. This substratum allows us to look more directly at the adversarial manner that conflict engenders and the dialectic structures that govern these oppositions. This more profound structural concern highlights the need to supplement the Platonic view of anamnesis read through Bourdieu with Bakhtin's work on dialogism as a circulation of interactions based less on the adversarial patterns of the dialectic and more on a polyphonic relational order. Politically, this allows for thinking of transformation in conflict as the movement away from a closed dialectical pattern of relations towards an open, dialogical code.

Recognizing both the potential of this movement and the fleeting moments which may give rise to it necessitates that this movement be gently directed as a political device, which will lead me to propose that a method of conflict mediation be directed towards taking hold of and nurturing this movement. Because conflict mediation rarely turns its gaze on its subject in this way, determining who might mediate means thinking through standard conceptions of mediators and reformulating the role of the "public intellectual", where there may well be a place for Bourdieu's "socioanalysis". Finally, I will conclude with some remarks about the outcome we might reasonably expect this type of intervention to give rise, and how this theoretical approach transforms the paradigms that underlie conflict mediation.

Bourdieu's Stunted Anamnesis

Though mentioned sparingly throughout his corpus, anamnesis plays a crucial role in Bourdieu's thought. As he explains, the "transformation of [the]

historical conditions of production" requires a "rediscovery...with each of the relations of opposition and with the network of relations of direct or mediated equivalence which binds each of them to all others in a system, thereby conferring on it its *objective and subjective necessity*"[174]. However, the discovery and rediscovery of this bond "is not the familiarity supplied by the acquisition of a simple knowledge [*savoir*], but the familiarity gained by the reappropriation of a knowledge [*connaissance*] that is both possessed and lost from the beginning"[175]. Put differently, the work of anamnesis forces a change in the field by interrogating the arbitrary foundations of legitimacy in the field and the struggles over the establishment of this legitimacy, which necessitates a reassessment of the weight imputed on the forms of capital that dominate the field. However, it operates by mining the origins of systemic relations in order to uncover that which has been buried by and with history, and in so doing allows one to interrogate the very systems of thought under which one has lived.

Without this work of anamnesis, the conditions of the field flourish as objective structures which are given *universal and axiomatic validity* by sole virtue of their gradual and insidious institutionalization within the field. In this spirit, Bourdieu says of social science, as one example, that it

> analyses the specific logic of the various social universes which generate symbolic systems claiming universal validity as well as the corresponding cognitive structures, and relates the supposedly absolute laws of logic to the immanent constraints of the field and in particular to the socially regulated activity of discussion and justification of utterances.[176]

As a result, the act of analysis is constantly turning back against itself, and the work of interrogating the field, as it always goes on *in the field*, can only see itself refracted through the filters which become substantiated through the positions taken in the field. It follows from this that Bourdieu often eschewed the

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[174] Pierre Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, page 55, emphasis in original.
[175] Ibid.
[176] Pascalian Meditations, page 115.

idea that the subject was the sole unit of analysis, and why he, against Lacan, made both subject and object the focus of his work[177]. For while the subjective experience of the individual was formative and would, by instantiating habitus, go far towards determining the individual's position in the field, truly interrogating the field meant looking further outside of oneself and including the objective structures which are as implicated in the dynamics of social interaction as those which are solely our own.

This is a sensitive point in Bourdieu's work, and one for which he has often been criticized as taking a superior position or as envisioning himself able to step outside of his own perspective and to see his world in the objective or impartial terms he so often criticized in scientific research[178]. And it is clear that he is aware of the tendency that engaging predictively with anamnesis carries with it the danger of formulating another totalizing vision for social interactions. Indeed, he points to the normative expectations of the field, the possible misinterpretation of his work as a "prescriptive description" of the field in question, and the incredible difficulty that arises when one tries to engage in the work of anamnesis from within the field:

> Does not the 'subject' of this performative representation in some sense situate himself outside of the game, which he perceives as such, from an external, superior position, thereby asserting the possibility of a sovereign, totalizing, objective viewpoint, that of the neutral, impartial spectator?[179]

What I would like to suggest is that, rather than reaffirming a problematic in these transformative processes, the dual tensions of envisioning oneself

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[177] See Jean-Francois Fourny, "Bourdieu's Uneasy Psychoanalysis", Trans. Meaghan Emery, *SubStance,* Vol. 29, No. 3, 2000, Issue 93: Special Issue: Pierre Bourdieu. In his employment of terms more familiar to psychoanalysis, Bourdieu frequently traversed a thin line between individual and collective history. However, socioanalysis was, in his words, tasked with analyzing "aspects of reality that psychoanalysis dismisses as secondary or insignificant" (Fourny, page 110).

[178] See *Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993, especially LiPuma, Dreyfus and Rabinow, and Calhoun. While the aforementioned offers a well rounded discussion of these and other perceived weaknesses in Bourdieu's corpus, it is far from the only work to critique his position in this way.

[179] Pascalian Meditiations, page 117.

outside of the field as well as engaging predictively with anamnesis both point to the misconception that conflicts within the field can be solved "only through consciousness"[180]. However, Bourdieu makes it clear that "the work of emancipation...is a question of mental gymnastics as much as consciousness-raising"[181]; one must not only realize themselves as a product and producer of the historical production of the field, but must also recognize *and redirect* their profound engagement with the struggle for legitimacy in the field, exercised as it is through domination and violence. Therefore, one is "outside" of the field insofar as they refrain from engaging in the struggle for legitimate domination which is the central characteristic of the field, but this is not to say that one has taken an *objective* or *impartial* position somewhere outside of the realm of time and space.

So, while this in some sense answers the questions raised by Bourdieu himself, it brings to the fore two considerable flaws that speak to the incompleteness of his interpretation of anamnesis. Bourdieu notes, "only if one were to mobilize all the resources of the social sciences would one be able to accomplish this kind of historicist actualization of the transcendental project which consists of reappropriating, through historical anamnesis, the product of the *entire historical operation* of which consciousness to is *(at every moment)* the product".[182] Bourdieu is right to stress the importance of historical anamnesis, as it must demonstrate beyond all doubt the arbitrary foundations on which legitimacy in the field is predicated. However, simply revealing these arbitrary foundations *does not ensure that they will be appreciated or transformed,* nor does it give an automatic insight into the deeper processes that the historical reification and naturalization of the logic of the field inculcates in the individual collective, or the sociological. As Dreyfus and Rabinow make clear, "you cannot get out of

[180] Pierre Bourdieu and Terry Eagleton, "Doxa and Common Life", *New Left Review,* 1992, page 114.
[181] Ibid.
[182] Pierre Bourdieu, "The Historical Genesis of a Pure Aesthetic", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,* Vol. 46, Analytic Aesthetics, 1987, page 202, emphasis added.

your own *sens pratique* just by realizing that you have one"[183]. Again, the difference here between Bourdieu's above comment is the *getting out,* the transformation, which makes the project of anamnesis worthwhile as a tool to be utilized as a social project.

More problematic, however, is the extent to which Bourdieu recognizes the possibility of change within the social space, and the subsequent limits he assigns to the project of anamnesis. Recall that above, he consistently mentions the work of "historical" anamnesis, meant to transform the "historical" conditions of production. Indeed, he urges his reader never to forget that "*status,* and the habitus that is generated within it, are products of history that can be changed, with more or less difficulty, by history"[184]. However, of fields themselves, and the structure that they take, Bourdieu is less accommodating:

> I tend to think that the structure of most of the fields, most of the social games, is such that competition-a struggle for domination-*is quasi-inevitable*[185].

And again, reading his work through Wacquant offers an even less optimistic perspective:

> A final political implication of Bourdieu's agonistic conception of the social world, *as suffused by relations of domination ultimately anchored in the necessarily unequal distribution of symbolic capital and the inescapable dialectic of distinction and pretention it activates,* is that democracy is best conceived not as an affirmative state - of formal equality, equal capacity, or shared freedoms - but as a historical process of negation of social negation, a never-ending effort to make social relations *less* arbitrary, institutions *less* unjust, distributions of resources and options *less* imbalanced, recognition *less* scarce[186].

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[183] Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, "Can Their be a Science of Existential Structure and Social Theory?", in *Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives,* Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma, and Moishe Postone, Eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993; page 43.
[184] Pierre Bourdieu, "The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups", *Theory and Society,* Vol. 14, 1985, page 739.
[185] Bourdieu and Eagelton, "Doxa and Common Life", page 116.
[186] Loïc Wacquant, "Pointers on Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics", emphasis added.

How is it that Bourdieu (and Wacquant after him) can determine the level to which change is possible, and how can the historical processes of "social negation" be rectified without changing the "necessarily unequal distribution of symbolic capital" and the "inescapable dialectic" of social life? Is the most that we can hope to accomplish as a political application of anamnesis really a *less arbitrary* or *less unjust* system of social relations? Ultimately, if anamnesis mines the past in order to recover the arbitrary foundations of social life but only gives way to relations that are less arbitrary and still based on the same dialectic of domination and violence, what is the point of the project? Has Bourdieu put so much emphasis on symbolic violence as an organizing principle of *any* field that he can see no other core upon which social life can revolve?

These questions ultimately lead one to wonder why, on Bourdieu's own formulation and with the components that he sketched out in painstaking detail, he never imagines anamnesis as the interrogation of *doxa,* where it might be a process to liberate or expand "the undiscussed, the intuitive embodiment of opinion in *sens pratique*"[187] beyond the binaries of domination and subordination. For if doxa is the point where 'things go without saying because they come without saying', then this is the area where our very structures of thinking and relating in social life find their roots. How then, can Bourdieu purport to engage in anamnesis without getting to these more fundamental levels? Moreover, if symbolic violence is "deeply doxic", as Moi finds it to be[188], shouldn't anamnesis as a method be able to reach these deeper levels of belief and transform them through the same process that Bourdieu outlines? Why does he give anamnesis such limited scope?

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[187] John Myles, "Making Don't Knows Make Sense: Bourdieu, Phenomenology, and Opinion Polls", *The Sociological Review,* Vol. 56, No.1, 2008, page 107.

[188] Toril Moi, "Appropriating Bourdieu: Feminist Theory and Pierre Bourdieu's Sociology of Culture", *New Literary History*, Vol. 22, No. 4, Papers from the Commonwealth Center for Literary and Cultural Change, Autumn, 1991, page 1029.

Recovering Anamnesis: Plato, Aristotle, Ricoeur

Nothing in Bourdieu's reading of anamnesis suggests that interrogating the dominant historical narrative will not simply replace it with another, equally dominant or totalizing version of how things came to be what they are. There is also nothing that guards against this dominating vision being taken as telos, an ultimate and singular possibility in the social world. I say instead that anamnesis has an even greater potential than acknowledged by Bourdieu, and that the project *should* aim to address the relations of domination and the seemingly inescapable dialectic which we have seen give rise to violent conflict within the field. Anamnesis through Bourdieu shows itself incapable of conceiving of this level of change; however, the project is given a much wider scope by looking back at the origins of anamnesis, reading the concept briefly through its Platonic origins.

This is not such a stretch: Bourdieu reveals himself as "with Plato"[189] on several aspects of analysis, and while he does not make explicit his debt to Aristotle, the "practice turn" in social thought can be seen to fold into both the Aristotelian and Marxian traditions[190]. Thus looking backwards to the origins of theories of anamnesis provides a more complete picture of what is actually interrogated in the process, and what is actually transformed. For anamnesis in Plato is *not* strictly limited to eidetic content[191], and looking back at it through Platonic dialogues does not entail engaging in a "Platonic fetishism"[192]. Instead, anamnesis through Plato shows how concept formation and the deeply held beliefs that constitute societal structure and boundaries *can* be transformed through anamnesis. This is a crucial instruction towards the framing of conflict as dialectical battles where there can only be one winner, where "either/or" is

[189] Pierre Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990; page 171.
[190] D.F Pilario, Back to the Rough Grounds of Praxis: Exploring Theological Method with Pierre Bourdieu, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005; pg, 100.
[191] Bourdieu, Masculine Domination, page 55.
[192] Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditiations, page 115.

the price of doing business in the field. Further, Aristotle's contribution to anamnesis grounds it as an activity that interrogates habits and one which depends on time and critical reflection.

I will not pretend to offer an exhaustive account of the origins of anamnesis in Platonic or Aristotelian thought; such a project is a work beyond the pages and capability that I currently possess. However, I want to highlight the profundity of anamnesis as an original concept to show how it can act in concert with other forms of political action and is indeed closely related to deliberation and deduction in Aristotle's thought. What I want to show, then, is that anamnesis can reach and transform the very organizing principles of social life, as it is through this recollection that we remember not only the arbitrary foundations of our world but also the binary method of thinking *in* this world that we employ to understand this world, which lies at the heart of the social field.

Anamnesis in the Meno and the Phaedo

Plato first develops the concept of recollection as a conduit to knowledge through his recounting of Socrates' interaction with Meno's slave child as a way to prove to Meno that "what we call 'learning' is really recollection and, because all nature is interrelated, every memory can lead eventually to every other"[193]. His demonstration of anamnesis comprises three stages[194]: first, the slave boy comes to realize that what he had previously believed to be right was in fact wrong, which leaves him in *aporia*[195], even though he is now aware that he does not know. After this, the slave boy moves from *aporia* towards the acquisition of true opinions; he does not yet have knowledge. Finally, through further interrogation the slave boy acquires knowledge, for "when we have tied down

[193] Jane M. Day, *Plato's Meno in Focus,* Jane M. Day, Ed. London and New York: Routledge, 1994; page 2.
[194] Dominic Scott, "Platonic Anamnesis Revisited", *The Classical Quarterly,* New Series, Vol. 37, No. 2, 1987; page 351. The stages that follow are taken from this reading.
[195] At a loss, or perplexed.

an opinion with a 'causal reckoning' we convert it into knowledge, and this is nothing but anamnesis"[196].

> *Soc:* So someone who doesn't know something, whatever it may be he doesn't know, has true opinions in him about the very thing he doesn't know?
> *Meno:* It appears so.
> *Soc*: And at present it's as though in a dream that these opinions have just been aroused in him. But if someone questions him many times and in many ways about the same things as now, you may be sure he will end up knowing them as precisely as anyone does.
> *Meno:* It seems so.
> *Soc:* And it won't be through being taught by anyone that he knows, will it, but through being questioned, recovering the knowledge from within him for himself?
> *Meno:* Yes.
> *Soc:* And recovering knowledge which is within one for oneself is recollecting, isn't it?
> *Meno:* Yes indeed.
> *Soc:* Well, the knowledge which this boy has now-he either acquired it sometime or else has always had it, didn't he?
> *Meno:* Yes.
> *Soc:* Then if he always had it, it follows that he was always in a state of knowledge. On the other hand, if he acquired it sometime, it could certainly not be in his present life that he has done so. Or has someone taught him geometry? For he will do just the same with anything in geometry or any other subject of knowledge. *Has* someone taught him everything, then?[197]

Even granting that Socrates "can bring off his neat pedagogical trick with the slave boy only by contriving to leave his interlocutor with no real choice but to follow in the steps of his subtly concealed instruction"[198], this presentation of anamnesis is innovative. Read differently, what he presents with anamnesis is not so much that knowledge is *a priori* and that the soul has an eternal grasp of it, but that he brings this knowledge out in Meno's slave boy. What I want to emphasize then, is that the knowledge that Socrates imparts (or catalyzes) in the slave boy is that which stands in contradiction to the boys' position *as a slave*, and that by eschewing the convention that a slave would have neither use nor

[196] Ibid.
[197] Plato, *Meno*, Trans. Jane M. Day, in *Plato's Meno in Focus*, 85c5-85e2 (55-56).
[198] Christopher Norris, "Deconstructing Anti-Realism: Quantum Mechanics and Interpretation Theory", *SubStance*, Vol. 26, No. 3, Issue 84, 1997; page 22.

capacity for the stuff of geometry[199], Socrates in fact catalyzes a change in the *disposition* of the boy. This episode speaks to the potential of anamnesis to not interrogate the stuff of knowledge but the manner of learning and the stations to which this learning designates us.

This follows with Scott's reading of anamnesis as revisited through Kant[200], where he notes that even while anamnesis through Socrates is invoked to explain the movement from opinion towards knowledge of *a priori* truths, with Kant , "beginning from an analysis of prepositional thought into its conceptual components it makes Plato answer a problem about the formation of concepts that make language and thought possible"[201]. This is precisely the subversive account of anamnesis that I would like to postulate as being crucial to its implementation as a political tool; anamnesis not only brings the slave boy to knowledge through 'unforgetting', it changes *the order of things* when a supposedly ignorant servant is guided into the world of knowledge. This idea parallels Vlastos' reading of the stages of inquiry in the *Meno*: "in that second stage of his inquiry [which] would take the boy from true belief to true knowledge, the evidence of his eyesight would be absolutely excluded as a *reason* for any of his assertions. But there is no suggestion that this would involve the slightest change of *method*"[202]. Thus there is a distinction made between the *substance* of anamnesis (what is uncovered) and the *process* (how this uncovering occurs). While Scott wants to limit the work of anamnesis to the problem of how the slave boy got the answers and won't use anamnesis to explain "how he could

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[199] Slaves in ancient Greece, contrary perhaps to other areas or periods, were thought not to possess the *capacity* to reason along the lines of free men, and moreover this was thought to be a natural state of being, one which carried over even into Aristotle's thought. See Jill Frank, "Citizens, Slaves and Foreigners: Aristotle on Human Nature", *American Political Science Review,* Vol. 98, No.1, Feb 2004, for a full account of Aristotle's defense of natural slavery. This is why the above interaction between Meno's slave and Socrates is a truly subversive exchange.

[200] Scott disapproves of this Kantian reading while presenting full, and rather rich, account of it. Because I am not convinced that he negates the value of this thesis, I present it through his works, which was, I feel sure, not his intention.

[201] Scott, "Platonic Anamnesis Revisited", page 351.

[202] Gregory Vlastos, "*Anamnesis* in the *Meno*", in *Plato's Meno in Focus*, page 95.

converse with Socrates in the first place"[203], I propose that reading anamnesis as method, with Vlastos and others, allows for precisely this scope. For though Scott wants to posit that the task of recollection is not given to everyone, and that in fact "most people do not recollect"[204], it will be the progressive development of a *method* of anamnesis that will prove indispensable as a form of mediation for this very reason.

Indeed, anamnesis in the *Phaedo* takes a more sophisticated path which allows for some commentators to see recollection as an account of concept formation as well as the ability to gain knowledge of forms and particulars (which I will tentatively call the orthodox reading of Platonic anamnesis)[205]. One of the key differences between the presentation of anamnesis in the two texts is the manner in which Simmias, in contrast to Meno, wishes to apply the thesis of recollection to himself[206]. In so doing, the method of anamnesis as a continuous process in which the individual may be frequently engaged, emerges as the more intriguing possibility vis-à-vis political life.

What is now presented, unlike the discussion in the *Meno*, is "an immediate transition from the sensible to the intelligible world...Plato is apparently saying that the fact that we attain this conceptual level in describing what is given in sense-experience constitutes recollection of Forms"[207]. He does this by presenting to Simmias another way of understanding recollection apart

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[203] Scott, page 353.
[204] Ibid., page 356.
[205] See J.L Ackrill, "*Anamnesis* in the *Phaedo:* Remarks on 73c-75c" in *Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlatsos,* E.N Lee, A.P.D. Mourelatos and R.M Rorty, Eds. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1973; page 192.
[206] I.N. Robins, "Recollection and Self-Understanding in the *Phaedo*", *Classical Quarterly,* Vol. 47, No. 2, 1997, pgs. 438-439.
[207] Norman Gulley, "Plato's Theory of Recollection", *Classical Quarterly,* New Series, Vol. 4, No. ¾, Jul-Oct 1954, pgs. 197-198. I read the Forms here with Bluck as standards, exempt from constant change: "the Form of the Beautiful is contrasted with that which is 'in one respect beautiful, in another ugly, or at one time beautiful, at another not, or in relation to one thing beautiful, in relation to another ugly, so as to be beautiful in the opinion of some and ugly in the opinion of others" R.S Bluck, "Forms as Standards", *Phronesis: A Journal of Ancient Philosophy,* Vol. 2, No. 2, 1957, pgs. 115-116. Well aware of the sustained investigation that the Forms necessitates, I have neither the space nor the capacity to develop this further, though I hope that the above passage grounds the idea of the Forms enough to continue on with the discussion. .

from the geometric configurations presented in the *Meno*[208]. This second understanding has Plato considering examples of association, where the present perception of one thing reminds the person of something else, so that recollection becomes not only the recovery of universal but also particular knowledge, which we might see, along with Gulley, as the difference between concepts and precepts[209]. Thus, Plato shows in this further discussion of anamnesis that not only can we call back to mind specific concepts which may linger latently in our persons (such as Meno's slave being able to comprehend geometric concepts even though no faculty that seems evident in his station as a slave would suggest he could), it can also bring back to us the associations that these concepts may suggest in the person. Again, the ability to transform one's conceptual basis is established by reading the *Meno* with a particular attention to whom Socrates chooses as interlocutor, followed by a further explication of the way that anamnesis can call to mind the patterns of conceptual thought that constitute the epistemological foundations of the mind.

> Well, you know what happens to lovers: whenever they see a lyre, a garment or anything that their beloved is accustomed to use, they know the lyre, and the image of the body to whom it belongs comes into their mind. This is recollection, just as someone, on seeing Simmias, often recollects Cebes, and there are thousands of other such occurrences.
> Thousands indeed, said Simmias.
> Is this kind of thing not recollection of a kind? He said, especially so when one experiences it about things that one had forgotten, because one had not seen them for some time?—Quite so.
> Further, he said, can a man seeing the picture of a horse and a lyre recollect a man, or seeing a picture of Simmias recollect Cebes?—Certainly.
> Or seeing a picture of Simmias, recollect Simmias himself?—He certainly can.
> In all these cases the recollection is occasioned by things that are similar, but it can also be occasioned by things that are dissimilar?—It can[210].

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[208] *Phaedo*, 73b, , Trans. G.M.A Grube, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981.
[209] Norman Gulley, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, London: Butler and Tanner, 1962; page 28.
[210] *Phaedo*, 73d4-74a1.

The possibilities for transformation are twofold: first, one can transform the epistemological foundations of the individual which, previous to anamnesis, were taken as a natural state of being (the slave who should have no interest or knowledge of geometry now may have both). Second, anamnesis goes further to also interrogate the associated thoughts and concepts that may emanate from this foundation, so that *patterns and processes of thought which develop subsequently might also be transformed.* This is the absolutely crucial part of the anamnestic possibility, and one that will form the core of the application of anamnesis to mediation.

Aristotle on Memory and Recollection

It becomes difficult, though, to operationalize anamnesis through Plato as "the doctrine of anamnesis, if it is to be of any use, implies a previous direct knowledge of disembodied ideas"[211]. However, Gulley also notes that Aristotle criticizes Plato's theory of anamnesis because it necessitates an actual prior knowledge of a transcendent reality, which he considers unnecessary to solve the problems presented in the *Meno*[212]. Indeed, in the *Posterior Analytics,* Aristotle declares, "the Forms we can dispense with, for they are mere sound without sense; and even if there are such things, they are not relevant to our discussion"[213]. Instead, the process of recollection, occurring as it does in experience, is a syllogistic practice from which one preference or tendency can be uncovered based on the activity of examining another and their relations in time: "if the movement of the thing occurs separately from the movement of time, or if the latter occurs separately from the former, then one does not recall"[214].

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[211] W.D Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas,* Oxford: Clarendon, 1951; page 35.
[212] Ibid., 197.
[213] *Posterior Analytics,* 83a, in Robert G. Turnbull, "Aristotle's Debt to the 'Natural Philosophy of the Phaedo", *The Philosophical Quarterly,* Vol. 8,No. 31, April 1958, page 142.
[214] David Bloch, *Aristotle on Memory and Recollection: Text, Translation, Interpretation and Reception in Western Scholasticism*, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007; pg 47.

Thus the empiricist account of knowledge-acquisition that Aristotle offered in place of the innate knowledge thesis bases itself on induction and habit formation[215], which in turn makes the doctrine of recollection more amenable to operationalization. For Plato illuminates the potential of the anamnestic process to transform individual concept formation and the associated patterns that arise from these concepts, in Aristotle memory and recollection are embodied as *activity* and *practice*, so that the process is subject to a more pragmatic inquiry. As such, Aristotle's treatise *On Memory and Recollection* in his *De Anima* sets out to delineate different kinds of memory in a manner that is more reminiscent of a psychological, rather than philosophical investigation[216].

Aristotle articulates the division between memory and remembering in his treatise, and he gives an indication that recollection is an operation separate from other types of knowledge. In so doing, he refines anamnesis to signify an operation that deals specifically with things which are *sensed* or *experienced,* and that the associations that are made through recollections are done so through habit, and *not* necessarily in the order by which experiences or sensations occurred. It is worth quoting at length his explanation of this process:

> When he recovers the knowledge, sensation or some other previous experience, the having state of which we call memory, then this is to recollect one of the named objects, and remembering occurs and memory follows[217]... For it is possible that the same person learns and discovers the same thing twice, and this recollecting must differ from learning and discovering, that is, recollecting must occur because of an immanent starting point that goes beyond that from which we learn... When we recollect, we are moved by some previous moments, until we are moved to the one, after which the one we need habitually occurs... *For it is by habit that the movements follow one after the other in a particular*

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[215] Mark Gifford, "Aristotle on Platonic Recollection and the Paradox of Knowing Universals: Prior Analytics B.21 67a8-30", *Phronesis,* Vol. 54, No. 1, 1999, page 1.

[216] Julia Annas, "Aristotle on Memory and the Self" in *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima,* Martha Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, Oxford: Clarendon, 1992, page 297.

[217] Bloch's translation calls this passage corrupt, or at least not to be taken literally, "since memory does *not* necessarily follow upon recollecting"(page 37). However, leaving this distinction aside still allows us to see that memory is a different action than remembering, as Aristotle's distinction of the "having state" of memory and the "[recovery] of knowledge" in remembering still holds. Whether they occur in a fastidious order, and whether Aristotle believes this to be so, does not I think obscure the central point.

order...If, then, one is moved on an old path, one is moved to what is more habitual; habit here takes the role of nature[218].

Aristotle thus takes anamnesis further as a process that responds to, and interacts with, the habits that we develop to act in the world and to make sense of the world. For when we search out a thing in our minds (let us say the experience of love) the associations that emerge alongside this experience are those which we *habitually* associate with this experience (let us say the images of our spouse, our wedding day, our first kiss, etc.) and not *necessarily* those things which might still have the same potential to bring us back to the sensation of love yet do not routinely occur alongside those experiences. For it is not the image itself that we remember, but the imprint, the specter; taken alone, these images are fragments of a past, but perceived through these imprints, they become a representation of a thing past, the beginning of a narrative which helps us define who we are. Thus it may be true that the more time that passes the less "correct" a memory becomes, but because it is a sensation that is called to mind through memory, it is not for the "correct" that we are searching. We search for moments because of what these moments call to mind; habitually doing so without recollection produces the same associations to the same images, and frequency makes it seem natural.

Whereas memory is a passive state where it is in the present but of the past, recollection implies a an active search and, more provocatively, a type of deduction[219]. For as Aristotle notes, "the man who is recollecting deduces that he has previously seen or heard something of this sort, and this is like a sort of search. But this belongs naturally only to those who also possess the faculty of deliberation; for deliberating is also a sort of deduction[220]. This is a telling statement, for when Aristotle links the faculty of recollection to that of

[218] *De Memoria et Reminiscentia,* 451b1-451b27, emphasis added.
[219] Bloch, page 73.
[220] De Memoria, 453a14.

deliberation, he gives reason (especially to our modern sensibilities) to critically examine the stuff of recollection through deliberation. Read this way, Aristotle's work on memory and recollection in fact does more than refine Plato's calculus: he gives us the beginning of a narrative conception of recollection, and more than this, he shows us how to transform it.

Thus Aristotle's consideration of anamnesis addresses and answers the problem of "innateness" that Platonic anamnesis raises while still retaining the character of the theory. Moreover, by linking it to a process of deduction in the same spirit of deliberation, and by locating memory as akin to imagination[221], he allows for the recollection of the past and the refiguring which allows for future change to share a similar space; politically, this means that addressing *both* the substance of memory and the structure of recollection offers the possibility of encouraging innovative change. "For to recall is the internal presence of a moving potential; and this, as has been stated, must be understood in the way that the person is moved by himself and by the movements he has"[222].

Anamnesis in Ricoeur

For Ricoeur, the profound truth of anamnesis consists in the action of it, the intention, and the aim, respectively: "seeking is hoping to find"[223]. The inquiry itself contains the promise of unveiling, and in so doing it opens the way to transformation: for why would we hope to find if not to find another way of seeking? [224]. Anamnesis is then a process for uncovering the imprints of the past and recovering the associations made and remade around them. Thus his treatment of anamnesis extends both the Platonic and Aristotelian mediations by allowing for further explications of the different types of memory evoked and the relationship of these memories to both collective experience and political action.

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[221] *De Memoria,* 450a22, "As regards the question to which part of the soul memory belongs, it is, then, clear that it belongs to the same part as imagination".
[222] Ibid., 454a10-12.
[223] Ibid., page 435.
[224] Ibid., page 4.

Ricoeur outlines three typologies under the heading of 'the exercise of memory': repressed, manipulated, and forced. "This act of exercising memory itself presents the most complete superimposition in a single act, of the cognitive aim and the practical operation—the act of remembering, direct heir to the Aristotelian anamnesis and indirect heir to Platonic anamnesis"[225]. Ricoeur brings together the structural and the substantive with these typologies, as he links the exercises of memory with abuses of memory. As such, he links the associative aspects of recollection with the manipulation to which collective memory is subject; this is nowhere more clear than in his discussion of collective historical existence. "There is no historical community which is not born from a situation that we can assimilate without hesitation to violence"[226]; the immediate association of myths of origin to violence highlights the need to keep in mind the Aristotelian reading of recollection directed towards uncovering habitual association. Ricoeur brings this directly to the discussion of conflict, where the founding of a community (a state, a community, an organization) becomes associated with violence and domination and thus any alternatives border on the absurd. Ricoeur goes on to sketch this habitual inclination towards violence:

> ...there is no historical community that has not been born from a relationship that we can name an original relation to war. What we celebrate under the names of founding events are essentially acts of violence, legitimized after the fact by a State of precarious rights, legitimized, at the limit, by their ancient, outdated character[227].

This should remind the reader of Bourdieu, and with good reason. But where Bourdieu lacks the ability to see past violence as the central principle around which fields are organized, Ricoeur sees a pathological interpretation of memory and the associations which emerge. Consequently, he acknowledges the potential for anamnesis to transform the latter associations while realizing the

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[225] Ricoeur, page 57.
[226] Ricoeur in Hammoun, page 125. Hammoun's article follows his own translation of Ricoeur's text from the French, and as I tend to agree more with his reading on this phrase than that found in the English translation of *La Memoire, L'Histoire, L'Oubli,* I go with it when it is available.
[227] Ibid., page 126.

impossibility (and undesirability) of erasing the imprint of memory. For it is not that anamnesis calls to mind what was forgotten and uses it to replace that which may be presently there (however dysfunctional); rather, anamnesis forces us to let speak each of these narratives, particularly (but not only) those which have been repressed by dominant ideologies, inscribed in everyday practices.

Through his investigation, anamnesis emerges as a device that can instantiate in the individual the capacity for both the disaggregating of memory from recollection and the ability to focus on the epistemological foundations which form the basis of habitual, oppositional practice. In this way the archive of memory which is gathered *through* recollection is allowed to emerge in its multiplicity and be valued precisely for this, rather than being taken as a source of objective, "official" history. As Hammoun notes, "unlike memory that establishes a fiduciary contract between the sender and the receiver, the archives are made of multiplicity of sources, voices. One could borrow the expression of Bakhtin and say that they are polyphonic"[228]. This is exactly what I intend to do, and through this reading I want to return to the puzzle posed by Bourdieu in his discussion of anamnesis:

> But is it possible-without invoking a *deus ex machina*- to escape from a circle that is present in reality, and not just in the analysis?[229]

This examination of anamnesis answers this question in the negative. However, in so doing it simultaneously offers an innovative addition to both the methods and objectives of political mediation that engages the palimpsests upon which social life is inscribed and reinscribed:

> The search for definition, pursued in the familiar Socratic way (a replay of the *elenchus* to show it as a dead-ending), lands in impasse. A radically new start is called for. Thereupon a *deus ex machina* is unveiled: the glorious doctrines of transmigration and its pendant, *anamnesis*, are revealed[230].

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[228] Ibid., 128.
[229] Pascalian Meditations, page 117.
[230] Gregory Vlatsos, "Elenchus and Mathematics: A Turning-Point in Plato's Philosophical Development", *The American Journal of Philology*, Vol. 109, No. 3, 1988; page 374.

I want to force a different conception of the idea of the *deus ex-machina,* to perhaps envision it as a moment whose unpredictability is something on which we depend and whose import we do not hesitate to recognize. Suggesting so entails that anamnesis, when realized as both theory and method, allows for a radical reconsideration of not only the substance of the field in question, but of the organizing principles that comprise our understanding and interaction with the field. Interrogating structures of memory is asking how the substances of memory are catalogued and how associations between are made, reified, and naturalized and how, following Aristotle and Bourdieu after him, these naturalized associations are inscribed in and around the body.

If the *elenchus,* or the Socratic method of learning is what calls forth (by virtue of the impasse it reaches) anamnesis, then anamnesis must do more than reproduce that same order of understanding in order to avoid arriving at the same impasse. For Marx is correct to decry the abuses of memory employed by revolutionaries "in order to drug themselves concerning their own content"; however, letting the "dead bury the dead"[231] and operating as if there can be a future divorced from the past is unrealistic and irresponsible. Instead, the imprints of the past must be given voice in the formulation of a new order, and anamnesis is what makes this radical reformulation possible.

How Could We Collide? Expanding the Paradigm of Mediation

Ironically, the above proposition puts me into Marcuse's camp, where in essence I too might be attempting "to harness the energies of recollection for revolutionary purposes"[232]. While Marcuse's point is well taken, it is not, as I see

[231] *Karl Marx: Selected Writings,* David McLellan, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977; page 302.
[232] Martin Jay, "Anamnestic Totalization: Reflection's on Marcuse' Theory of Rememberance", *Theory and Society,* Vol. 11, No.1, Jan 1982, page1. Marcuse's theory of recollection in fact stemmed from a refusal to engage with the Ancients, only occasionally referring to their ideas as he found them

it, within the context of uprisings or insurrection that the work of recollection is most effective. As I have hopefully outlined above, the work of anamnesis is delicate and elusive. More than this, it has been so often the case that memory and recollection are conflated, and this tendency makes it vital that the work of anamnesis is theorized and understood in its specificity *apart* from 'memory'.

However, it remains to be asked, toward what kind of order should this reformulation be directed? I would like to suggest that rather than relying on a reproduction of dialectic, and therefore opposing principles of organization, which we see leading to domination and singularity, that the dialogic understanding, typified by Bakhtin, provides an entry into meaningful and productive deliberation in political life. In order to more clearly illustrate this point I want to look at the dominant paradigms of mediation in practice to point out their goals and to locate exactly where each falls short of achieving the goal of epistemological transformation in conflict. At that point the movement from dialectic to dialogic that is facilitated through anamnesis is more properly situated, and I will outline precisely what this movement means in Bakhtin's words.

For What Tomorrow? Mediation as Dialogic Catharsis

Kleiboer's survey on the successes and failures of mediation techniques offers a useful typology of 'standard' mediation practices, categorized as 'prototheories' of international mediation[233]. It is useful to briefly look at her findings to note what these approaches lack and what anamnestic mediation offers beyond, or in addition, to these methods. As she states, there may be no "golden formula"[234] to mediation, and her point is well taken; however, it does

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'mainstream'. Thus it seems, at least to me, ironic that in reflecting back through the Ancients I should arrive at a conclusion which says that anamnesis can catalyze fundamental change in social life. Just an observation.

[233] Marieke Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation", *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol. 40, No. 2, June 1996, page 379.

[234] Ibid. page 360.

not follow that the list of 'formulae' is exhaustive, nor that these methods cannot exist in concert. The aspects to which I want to attend, however, lie in the scope of the mediator's tasks and the way in which mediation is framed in conflict.

Her model identifies mediation as falling into four rough categories: International Mediation (IM) as Power Brokerage, IM as Political Problem Solving, IM as Re-establishing Social Relationships, and IM as Domination. This first category concerns itself primarily with state to state interactions, where the mediator will likely be representatives of major powers whose leverage will reside in the ability to provide face saving measures to the parties by the material advantages gained, or to provide for a better settlement than would have been achieved without their participation. In this case, the benefits that the mediator can provide to the parties, coupled with the leverage that may compel parties to accept settlements they might otherwise have refused, is a paramount feature of their participation. Touval and Zartman's principal mediator strategies of communicator, facilitator and manipulator fall roughly within this category[235].

The second proposition, IM as Political Problem Solving, relates to studies in political psychology, drawing on Fisher's work in negotiations; this perspective is predicated on the belief that a complete resolution of conflict, defined as a fundamental change in the attitudes and behavior of parties, should be possible[236]. While the first model relies on an objectivist epistemology in mediator-disputant relations, the Political Problem Solving approach privileges a subjective, context driven environment. To this end, the conflict must be appreciated in its specificities, namely the institutional context in which conflict takes place, the process of sense making among parties, and the implications of

[235] These three strategies provide for a range of activities in which a mediator may engage, as a "passive conduit" for information between parties, an innovator capable of reframing disputes and engaging in constructive formulations for addressing problems, and in manipulating parties into agreement by using tools of leverage to induce agreement. However, as their work deals specifically with interstate conflicts, and as manipulation in their definition is confined to that of tools of leverage to force compliance, their typologies can be generally considered exclusive to this category.

[236] Roger Fisher, *The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution*, New York: Springer, 1989.

this sense making for the strategies of decision makers. Following on Stein's work[237], success in mediation in this case depends on going beyond traditional one track forms of diplomacy and utilizing communities and organizations. Often termed pre-negotiation, the process of engagement and information gathering may compel decision makers to consider options previously ignored or unknown, and may thus create more elastic parameters once parties have begun formal negotiations.

IM as Re-Establishing Social Relationships shares both the ontological and epistemological concerns of the previous but differs in viewing conflict as an opportunity for social change[238]. Because conflict is indicative of a status quo relationship wherein basic human needs are unsatisfied, it is not a problem of order but an opportunity to restructure social relationships which may have been illegitimately maintained. This model again implies a subjectivist epistemology where the specific issues at hand and the social actors involved will dictate the climate of the conflict, and the mediator will be one who is dedicated to fundamental social change towards a more equitable society, recalling Lederach's model. As such the mediator must exercise an even deeper understanding of the context in which the conflict takes place, and this works both as an advantage and a detriment: as a consequence of the existing and presumably inequitable status quo, the mediator may be dissuaded by one or more of the parties in the conflict from any profound change.

The final model of IM as Domination sees international conflict as endemic to a global capitalist system and thus the result of institutionalized structures of inequality and "the desire of deprived groups to set themselves free from exploitative relationships"[239]. Conflict resolution will only follow structural changes when the balance of global order is addressed, so that even the

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[237] Janice Stein, ed. *Getting to the Table: The Processes of International Negotiation,* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.
[238] Kleiboer, page382.
[239] Ibid., page 383.

resolution of one conflict does not indicate that any lasting change has been achieved. For the most part, this typology seems more idealistic than strategic, as negotiations will rarely encapsulate the entire global system and allow any practitioner the scope and time to affect this type of change. Moreover, its far reaching prescriptions may encourage interpretations that threaten both the credibility of the mediator as well as the potential for significant change within a specific conflict setting. For mediation should have goals, and these goals can sometimes be met; however, when the goals of the *mediator* are seen as overshadowing the actors themselves (such as the overhaul of the global system), the sensitive matters of negotiation assume an unfortunate position.

What I would like to do at the outset is locate these 'prototheories' under the rubric of frame analysis, so that each approach is more properly understood as "interpretive schemata that signifies and condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of action in one's present and past environment"[240]. For one of the central problematics of mediation is that it assumes itself to operate independently of the space in which it operates. Indeed, even in IM as Political Problem Solving or Establishing Social Relationships (the two models which may seem to most directly correspond to the theory I'd like to advance) where mediation is to be guided by the context of the specific conflict, the *mediation itself* is not implicated in this process. There is still a sense that mediation operates under the interpretation that order must be kept between parties, and while this may be achieved through creative solutions and should address "sense making" in conflict, there is nothing that indicates a drive to establish (or re-establish) meaning. The *structure* of conflict is still intact. This is obvious as well in the way that Kleiboer's typology delineates 'objective' from 'subjective' in forms of mediation: as we now by now, social life under Bourdieu recognizes the

[240] David Snow and Robert Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest", in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory,* Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClung Mueller, eds., New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992; 137.

subjective *with* the objective and does not collapse these typologies into strict binaries. For doing so begs the question: in this context, what does the 'objective' and 'subjective' divide even mean? As a corollary, if mediation is so dominated by this painfully reified structure, how could it possibly identify the same dilemmas in conflicts?

Now, no one is forsaking structure here; indeed, without it this work would be a collection of fragments that would hardly cohere into the project I want to propose. However, I do want to entertain the idea that structure is not Structure, and more than this that structures may be multiple and varied. More than this I want argue that mediation should take as *both* its structure and aim the opening of a space amenable to a polyphonic epistemology, where multiple narratives act as both process and outcome. Bakhtin's work on dialogism is illuminating in this respect:

> Dialogism's drive toward meaning should not be confused with the Hegelian impulse toward a single state of higher consciousness in the future. In Bakhtin there is no one meaning being striven for: the world is a vast congeries of contesting meanings, a heteroglossia so varied that no single term capable of unifying its diversifying energies is possible[241].

Importantly, Bakhtin's dialogism is in some ways *more* faithful to the Socratic tradition than the dialectical approach. Hayman notes that "Bakhtin defines the 'socratic dialogue' as a seriocomic genre deriving from the carnival debates rather than as a purely rhetorical tactic. If...the carnival is profoundly ambivalent and unresolved and the carnival mentality is un-conventional, then Socrates' refusal to resolve the dialogue and his questioning in it of received ideas...do indeed suggest the carnival mood or mode"[242].

By addressing the propensity towards dialecticism in conflict and moving it towards a dialogic order, mediation in this case does not look to *resolve* conflict

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[241] Michael Holquist, *Dialogism: Bakhtin and his World,* London and New York: Routledge, 1990; page 24.

[242] David Hayman, "Toward a Mechanics of Mode: Beyond Bakhtin", *NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction,* Vol. 16, No.2, Winter 1983; page 104

but rather to *interrogate, and in so doing, transform the plane on which it exists*, quite apart from the models outlined by Kleiboer. For when Lederach speaks of conflict transformation, to cite one example, he does speak to the need to address the "immediate situation, the deeper patterns, and the conceptual framework" and he even suggests that it should be done "through dialogue"[243], However, 'dialogue' for him is "direct interaction between people and groups"[244], thereby stripping the concept of dialogue of any explanatory value and reducing it to *talking*. Dialogue, in Bakhtin, is not simply talking: "dialogics, like atoms, collide, respond, and rebound off one another in an endless give and take"[245]. Mediation which takes this movement toward the dialogic as its guide, and does so through anamnesis, asks for much more than *talking*. It necessitates the shattering of an order based in opposition and the allowance of each splinter of social life to be given voice as an embodiment of that social space.

Anamnestic mediation, then, aims not a specific goal of resolution *towards* or even transformation *to* a particular order; its project involves realizing the possibility of moving the epistemological landscape upon which protracted conflict is performed and predicated. Dialogic transformation follows Cornell's depiction as "change radical enough to so dramatically restructure any system—political, legal, or social—*that the identity of the system itself is altered*"[246] . The way that this possibility is actualized is a matter of thinking dialogically, which produces self-implication and self-reflexivity. Linking this to anamnesis means that in the act of recollection, we not only locate the associative circuits that we have habitually formed and the way that we have come to frame both subjective and objective experience under these dialectical conditions, we are also forced to see *our part in the process*. This is one of the central ways that anamnestic

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[243] John Paul Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation,* Pennsylvania: Good Books, 2003; pgs. 3-23.
[244] Ibid., page 22.
[245] Krasner, page 5.
[246] Drucilla Cornell, *Transformations: Recollective imagination and sexual difference*, London and New York: Routledge, 1993; page 1.

mediation differs from the typologies outlined above, and the crucial link between anamnesis and dialogism is the ability of this theoretical synthesis to dynamically restore agency to the actors in conflict. Hawes expresses this accordingly:

> Dialogics, framed transformatively, is conversation that goes beyond the present material and spiritual conditions of existence. Such dialogic conversations are projected as the boundaries, borders, and limits of the known. Selves are implicated in these conversations by means of circuits of structured relations that are both self-referential and self-organizing. Denying self-implication and self-referentiality is a pretext for denying answerability and accountability[247].

The material result of anamnestic mediation is then *not* framed in advance, which is to say that there is no telos to which this process is driven. Rather, its aim is an uncovering of both pattern and palimpsest and in so doing, a dislodging of the patterns of interaction among actors in conflict. Through anamnesis those associations founded on arbitrary distinctions are interrogated and the aspects which foster violence and domination reformulated; however, interactive elements that are *not* inherently violent (while they may still be arbitrary in some ways) may well be retained by groups in conflict. After all, if we begin to think of our daily lives, most of the practices in which we engage are arbitrary, aren't they? However, not all of these practices give rise to violence. The strength of anamnestic mediation is that it allows actors to make real these distinctions and to change the relationships that give rise to violence while retaining that which may constitute parts of individual and collective 'identity'. This may well get us to a meaningful appreciation and actualization of Fraser's "multiple publics"[248], where conflict in and between them is not necessarily abated and solved for good, but the communication between allows for dissonance, and does not stifle it in favor of totalizing order.

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[247] Leonard C. Hawes, "The Dialogics of Conversation: Power, Control, Vulnerability", *Communication Theory,* Vol. 9, No. 3, August 1999; page 235.

[248] Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy", *Social Text,* No. 25/26, 1990; page 69.

> The domination implicit in dialogue is that of the world by the dialoguers; it is the conquest of the world for the liberation of humankind[249].

Who Mediates? The Philosopher Kings Revisited

It is left to understand what kind of mediator the anamnestic approach necessitates, and it is again from Friere that the outline of the role of mediator begins to take shape:

> For since dialogue is the encounter in which the united reflection and action of the dialoguers are addressed to the world which is to be transformed and humanized, this dialogue cannot be reduced to the act of one person's 'depositing' ideas in another, nor can it become a simple exchange of ideas to be 'consumed' by the discussants[250].

Additionally, Scott sees in the anamnesis of the *Meno* that it "aims to show that we can attain knowledge and how we can do so, but it shows anamnesis starting only after contact with a certain type of stimulus or catalyst[251]; philosophically this may be problematic, but as a cue for the role of a mediator it is ideal. Indeed in this formulation the mediator is closer to the midwife of Socrates. Considering anamnestic mediation as a pedagogical project of the kind described in Plato's Theaetetus, where "all that is true of their art of midwifery is true also of mine, but mine differs from theirs in being practised upon men, not women, and in tending their souls in labor, not their bodies"[252]. The mediator in this sense, by catalyzing anamnesis and building upon the reflexivity that this process makes possible, serves a similar purpose. As it has been said, there are moments when the reflexivity that conjures anamnesis occurs with no prompting, or no direct intervention, and these moments might well spur the kind of recognition in the individual (or group) that makes anamnesis possible. However, just as "midwives should know better than

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[249] Paulo Friere, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed,* Trans. Myra Bergman Ramos, New York and London: Continuum, 1970; page 89.
[250] Ibid.
[251] Scott, 1987; page 351.
[252] *Theaetetus*, 150b.

anyone else who are pregnant and who are not"[253], the mediator must be able to recognize and build upon moments that are amenable to anamnesis[254]and build upon them.

Friere's critical pedagogy gives support as well to the idea of a mediator in this sense, as it is similar to that of Socrates' 'midwife', but he gives depth to this by forcing the mediator to see themselves as implicated in the same processes of domination. Thus mediation is not an exercise that goes on "out there" but is something wherein the mediator must also make a commitment to reflexivity, engaging themselves in the same process that they may ask of another. This does not suggest either that the process is fixed, and keeping with the dialogic movement in anamnestic mediation, the mediator is never "finished" or ultimately "wiser" than the parties involved. Instead, the mediator is that individual who can speak to the process of anamnesis, disaggregate types of memory from each other, and force the recognition of relations of domination. This stance is not vastly different from that of the "engaged ethnographer" where "one's location on a given trajectory of meaning determines one's structure of understanding...which challenges the rules of engagement for researchers and advocates alike"[255]. We are all implicated in the projects and products of our research; for the mediator to take him or herself out of these stakes is to commit the fallacy Bourdieu warned against above, mistakenly asserting the possibility of a sovereign, totalizing, objective viewpoint, that of the

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[253] Ibid., 149c.

[254] At first glance, this may conjure an association to Zartman's concept of 'ripeness' (1990) where the parties to conflict must be 'ripe' for resolution by having, for example, reached a hurting stalemate where it becomes clear that neither party will win. However, the 'ripeness' thesis has, at best, a minimal descriptive value but is actually incredibly dangerous as a prescriptive notion of mediation (suggesting as it does that parties should be left to exhaust their resources and energy until they can no longer fight) as it substitutes exhaustion for reflexivity, thus giving the mediator little to do but wipe up the blood between parties. Though I am also making reference to a mediator's need to recognize opportunities for transformation, I hope that what I am describing is in no way confused with this idea.

[255] Victoria Sanford, "Excavations of the Heart: Reflections on Truth, Memory and Structures of Understanding" in *Engaged Observer: Anthropology, Advocacy, and Activism*, Victoria Sanford and Asale Angel-Ajani, eds. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2006; page 21.

neutral, impartial spectator. When mediation is designed to combat this very syndrome, it must at all costs avoid reproducing it.

And it is back to Bourdieu that I will finally turn to complete the idea of mediator as midwife: here the notion of a 'public intellectual', again so important to Bourdieu's corpus, is broadened even further. For Bourdieu envisions the role of the intellectual as one who is engaged in research as a living thing, and who treats the subjects of the research with the same reverence as the findings. Indeed, his vision of the public intellectual reveals this:

> My dream would be to create an *international* of artists and scientists which would become an independent political—and moral—force capable of intervening, with authority and with a competence founded on their autonomy, about problems of general interest[256].

This wish seems extravagant in some ways I suppose, and at the very least it makes one wonder how Bourdieu might have reconciled his critique of "Platonic fetishism" with his own emulation of the philosopher-king. However, I think that Bourdieu's point is clear underneath the grandeur: the intellectual who remains disengaged from political and social life risks a profound disenchantment with the fruits of his or her labour, and this is a dangerous proposition. However, we must also consider *how* the intellectual can integrate their position into the many narratives that give rise to social life, and how best this position can function in the world. For Bourdieu in some ways depicts an intellectual that is *outside* of the political and moral forces into which they are meant to intervene. However, bringing back his 'socioanalysis', and linking it to what a mediator could be and do resurrects the idea of an engaged practitioner who recognizes their involvement in the project, even if it is as 'midwife'. For while we are all complicit, just as Socrates in his dialogues or Friere in his pedagogy, linking the anamnestic project to the 'provoked and accompanied self-analysis' means that we too go along for the ride, that we are charged with

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[256] Loïc Wacquant, "From Ruling Class to Field of Power: an Interview with Pierre Bourdieu on *La Noblesse d'Etat*", *Theory, Culture, and Society,* Vol. 10, 1993; page 38.

learning as much as with teaching. The autonomy of the intellectual comes then from the same freedom of consciousness that Bourdieu talked about earlier, and it involves engaging in political action not only under the guise of an 'outsider' but as one who is conscious of the "arrogance of the intellectual with cultural capital":

> The behavior and the many struggles of left-wing parties are related to that: intellectuals hate and despise the workers, or they admire them too much—which is a manner of despising them. It is very important to know all these things; and so, for that reason, the process of self-criticism, which one can practice by studying the intellectual, academic mind is vital—it is, as it were, a necessary personal condition for any kind of communication on ideology.[257]

If the mediator is to be midwife and engaged in a project of critical pedagogy towards anamnesis, then they too must be released from the temptation of their ivory towers and be encouraged to struggle to take control of their instruments of intellectual production and validation[258]. However, and more importantly, the project of anamnesis must be seen with new eyes, as a transformative process that gives its players the courage not only to inch towards the boundaries of ideas, but to look over the edge and leap.

Conclusion

Imagining the Dialogic

> I am enthusiastic over humanity's extraordinary and sometimes very timely ingenuities. If you are in a shipwreck and all the boats are gone, a piano top buoyant enough to keep you afloat that comes along makes a fortuitous life preserver. But this is not to say that the best way to design a life preserver is in the form of a piano top. I think that we are clinging to

[257] Eagleton and Bourdieu, page 118.
[258] Pierre Bourdieu, *Political Interventions: Social Science and Political Action*, Trans. David Fernbach, London and New York: Verso, 2007; page 216.

> a great many piano tops in accepting yesterday's fortuitous contrivings as constituting the only means for solving a given problem[259].

The story that I have tried to tell in these last pages is in the same spirit of He of the Geodesic Dome, as I see in protracted social conflict; a great many piano tops have become naturalized as both ways of relating to one another, and ways of studying those relations. Each chapter has been an attempt to understand conflict differently and perhaps more meaningfully, though by design these chapters do not directly correspond in the following way, I hope that each section offers something to descriptive, explanatory, and prescriptive paradigms of conflict analysis. Ultimately I have tried to do *with* this text the same thing that I suggest doing *in* the text: opening a polyphonic space where there is no one way of thinking and doing, and where a dominant narrative, whether one that tells the story of a nation or of a theory, is only one of many voices. If it succeeds in becoming a convincing work, so much the better; however, the aim is simply to entertain the possibility of many possibilities in both theory and practice, and to imagine how it might look in word and deed.

The first chapter offers the possibility of a critical examination of the development of Republicanism in France, not as a chronological succession of policies and edicts, but as a gradual process of inculcation and naturalization of ideology. Rather than see this as an historical "case study", I wanted to sketch the tropes upon which a sensibility of belonging is inscribed. More than this, I wanted to show that in fact Republicanism did not spring up fully formed as it exists today, and that there were multiple streams that contributed to its culmination as a worldview. In effect, I am suggesting through this reading a type of dialogic reconstruction, where rather than treating the French citizen and the *sans attache* as archetypes with insoluble differences, we see in each many different narratives embodied and operating in practice. Without undertaking

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[259] R. Buckminster Fuller, *Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth,* Southern Illinois University Press, 1969, page 9.

this work, the presence of the *sans attache* is appreciated only as a continuation of a "colonial logic", which only deepens the divide between groups in conflict within France. As the first chapter showed, there are many more logics that have led to the development of conflict in contemporary France, and giving voice to them allows us to see clearly what it is that drives conflict.

The second chapter explored the possibility of using analytical frameworks that may not be part of the traditional library for analyzing violent conflict, and while Bourdieu's work has been used in countless contexts, I believe that his work is ideally suited to uncovering the sensibilities that develop and drive people towards violent conflict. Uncovering the relationships that exist in urban France today has to be followed by dissecting the many elements of these relationships, both as subjective realities and objective conditions. Bourdieu's approach allows for this, and it is his particular (and at times peculiar) depiction of the social landscape that allows us to see these many threads by which social life, however dysfunctional, is woven together. For "social research is something much too serious and too difficult for us to allow ourselves to mistake scientific *rigidity* for scientific *rigor* and thus to deprive ourselves [of] the full panoply of intellectual traditions"[260]. "Twisting the stick in the opposite direction" for Bourdieu does not mean yanking it out of the ground; it does however mean considering alternative paradigms or frameworks in order to better understand the circulation of the social world.

Moreover, Bourdieu does not advocate an irresponsible or haphazard form of social science: "the extreme liberty I advocate here has its counterpart in the extreme vigilance that we must apply to the conditions of use of analytical techniques and to ensuring they fit the question at hand"[261]. By sketching the structure and genesis of a peripheral field as the space where the *sans attache* and the State are most directly in conflict, I have kept in mind the need to negotiate

[260] *Invitation*, page 227.
[261] Ibid.

the delicate divide between liberty and vigilance with the result that an external space which is internal to a state is allowed to be seen as a unique site of struggle. Only when we allow the field to come alive as a unit of analysis can we begin to understand the ways in which it can be transformed.

Transformation of the field comes from a realization and awareness of habitus, and of the doxa that informs it; this consciousness is the beginning of anamnesis in Bourdieu. However, while he is instructive in directing our attention to the project of historical anamnesis, he does little to offer a vision of what the social space becomes once anamnesis has begun. For while we may all have moments where it occurs to us that the world as it is, is not the only way it *could be,* these moments are unsustainable glimpses upon which we can hardly base our predictions for a transformation of social conditions. More than this, Bourdieu does not give his reader the impression that he believes in the possibility of a fundamental transformation of the symbolic violence upon which so much of our interactions are predicated.

But I am stubborn, and I refuse to believe that the possibility of fundamental change in the very frameworks of our knowledge is unachievable. And I have good reason: looking back at anamnesis as it was conceived by both Plato and Aristotle evinces the possibilities inherent in anamnesis, possibilities for which Bourdieu himself never accounted. Thus the third chapter was a look back at the manner in which the Ancients conceived of anamnesis, and the way that through them, along with Ricoeur, the possibility of fundamental change through anamnesis is manifest. However, the challenge of catalyzing transformation of the field through anamnesis is large, as the spontaneous moments that we might all recognize as anamnestic are weak on their own. The task of the third chapter, and indeed the point to which the entire project has spoken, is to develop a theory of mediation by transforming violent conflicts which are, at their core, struggles to define and delineate meaning. Mediating social conflict with this spirit in mind necessitates operationalizing the reading of

anamnesis that I have given and bringing it back into the universe of possibilities that socioanalysis can become along those who engage in it. These components, when used in concert, reformulate a role for the researcher by redefining the concept of mediation, and they may finally lead back to a societal circulation that engenders a dialogic order, where the multitude of narratives speak, where the boundaries are blurred, where the edges are frayed. Perhaps then, the lumps in our throats that frighten us just as they remind us that we are alive will be a welcome sensation as we allow ourselves to explore the spaces between us without fear that we will no longer recognize ourselves.

If it sounds chaotic, then maybe it is chaotic; but perhaps the opposite of chaos is not order, and all chaos is not violent, frenetic conflict. Indeed, the picture that I have painted is an agonistic one, and I have neither reason nor evidence to suggest that it should be otherwise. I do not want to suggest that conflict can or even should be resolved for once and all, and that the struggle over meaning is something that can be put into a vacuum by a professional with the skills of a mediator. However, agonism articulated dialogically is profoundly different from that which is exercised dialectically: while the latter conditions responses that are in direct confrontation to one another and thus must try to drown each other out in order to be heard, the former frames conflict as a plurality where a panoply of narratives can coexist. Perhaps the last possibility that I have to offer is that centralized dominance is no more or less feasible than decentralized harmony. Perhaps the piano top has had its day.

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