

MARCUSE'S CRITICAL THEORY AS RELATED TO SOCIAL EDUCATION:

a Critical Examination towards the Development
of a Philosophical Foundation of Social Education
Adequate to the North American Context

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines several possible contributions and limitations of Herbert Marcuse's Critical theory towards the development of a philosophical foundation of social education adequate to the North American context.

In particular, the study attempts to critically examine Marcuse's Critical theory as a standpoint from which to critique, re-work and supplement Paulo Freire's philosophical theory. In so doing, the thesis attempts to draw from and build on, supplement and at times critique, recent work in the area by Henry A. Giroux, Stanley Aronowitz, Kathleen Weiler, Ira Shor, as well as the Critical Pedagogy and Cultural Studies Group of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education.

Aspects of Marcuse's theory which are examined as contributive towards the above aim are his approach to societal structural relations and ideology, as well as his approach to the realm of the unconscious and the structure of needs. It is proposed that while Marcuse's work in these areas does indeed contribute to the development of a philosophical foundation of social education adequate to the North American context, such a contribution nonetheless remains incomplete and problematic.

It is maintained that socialist feminist theory is required as a standpoint from which to critique, supplement, and redefine central categories of both Marcuse's and Freire's theories, in order to arrive at a more liberatory development of a philosophical foundation of social education adequate to the North American context.

RESUME

Cette thèse tentera d'établir quelques apports et certaines limites de la théorie critique de Herbert Marcuse face au développement d'une fondation philosophique de l'éducation sociale convenant au contexte nord-américain.

Cette étude examinera particulièrement la théorie critique de Marcuse en tant que point de vue selon lequel évaluer, re-travailler et développer l'approche philosophique de Paulo Freire. Ainsi, cette thèse s'intéressera aux écrits récents de Henry A. Giroux, Stanley Aronowitz, Kathleen Weiler, Ira Shor, et à ceux du Critical Pedagogy and Cultural Studies Group de l'Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, pour s'en inspirer, explorer certains thèmes et parfois les critiquer.

Les aspects de la théorie de Marcuse visant l'objectif déjà cité seront observés: son approche des relations structurales et de l'idéologie dans la société, et son étude du domaine de l'inconscient et de la structure des besoins. Il sera proposé que si le travail de Marcuse dans ces domaines contribue en effet à une fondation philosophique de l'éducation sociale, une telle contribution reste néanmoins incomplète et problématique.

On proposera ensuite la théorie socialiste féministe comme base de critique, de complément et de redéfinition des grilles de Marcuse et de Freire, afin d'élaborer plus librement une philosophie de l'éducation sociale en Amérique du Nord.

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i.

Preface

This thesis has grown out of my involvement with various community groups and community centres in Montreal, Quebec, in which questions were informally raised by co-workers and myself as a result of the day to day functioning of such centres and groups.

Specifically, these questions usually focussed on the day to day and long-term obstacles to and as well as possibilities for social change through our actual efforts and those of other social groups and movements. These questions were catalyzed by everything from government grant refusals accompanied by anguished moments as well as unexpected acceptances by project funding agencies; difficult, tense moments as well as collective laughter in staffperson development meetings relating to Creole literacy and French language programs; and strategizing for demonstrations and coalitions, to personal interactions with people with whom I worked on issues.

However, this thesis, while connected to my involvement with various social movements, is also connected to a need for understanding myself, and my relation to others. This is especially so in relation to my experience as lived through unequal social relations of power, and the (often resulting) contradictions which I and others live out --contradictions which produce, on the one hand, anger, fear and paralysis, and on the other hand, heightened spirit, confidence and hope, renewed activism and solidarity work.

While these contradictions still exist, working on this thesis (indeed one the contradictions in my life, given the time and energy it has taken away from more 'active' work in social movements!) has made my mediation of these contradictions more conscious; I am perhaps more aware

of the historical causes and potentialities of these contradictions. I feel more grounded and accepting of myself as a result of this, and paradoxically perhaps, at the same time, I have more enthusiasm for pushing these contradictions further.

This has occurred in tandem with perhaps a greater facility in drawing out or recognizing contradictions which occur in the day to day functioning of social movements, accompanied by an attempt to view them within a wider historical context. Instead of avoiding these contradictions, because they are either too scary or overwhelming, I find that I more easily play with them, trying to draw out their limits and liberatory potential.

When I began this thesis, my thesis director, Stanley A. Nemiroff, offered that what I'd likely get out of the endeavor is a better understanding of some books on the subject of Critical theory and education. This was true, and yet I'm also convinced that through interacting with the thoughts in these books, and discussing them, I've also gained a better understanding of both myself and the historical context in which I live --mostly through attempting to understand the relation between myself and that historical context which continuously makes me and is being made by others and myself.

While this thesis may sometimes appear to touch only indirectly on some of the issues raised above, the process of researching and writing often led to more directly meaningful results for me than the formal content which ultimately formed the final draft. The work is in preparation for both more hopeful social activism, and a larger theoretical work, based on Alison M. Jaggar's socialist feminist theory, Paulo Freire's philosophical theory and Marcuse's Critical social theory.

CHAPTER ONE:

Introduction

1. Objectives of the thesis:

a. To critically examine several possible contributions of Herbert Marcuse's Critical social theory towards critiquing, revising and re-working Paulo Freire's philosophical theory. This will be attempted for the ultimate general purpose of pointing towards a philosophical foundation with which to inform social education adequate to the context of contemporary North American society.

The framework of Marcuse's possible contribution towards this ultimate aim will be organized with specific reference to his analyses of:

i. the relationship between the supra- and infra-structural realms of contemporary North American life, and the historically specific ideology which is constructed through such relations;

ii. the realm of the unconscious and the structuring of needs and, in particular, the realm of the psycho-sexual.

b. To critically examine the possible limitations of Marcuse's Critical social theory towards adequately critiquing, revising and re-working Freire's philosophical theory. This will be attempted towards the same general aim as outlined above.

These limitations will be made with specific reference to:

i. a lack of a rigorous political economy of the North American context, as well as of a rigorous examination of the state's relation to domination and liberation;

ii. a lack of an adequate and thorough analysis of the political limits and possibilities of social movements in contemporary North America;

iii. a lack of an accessible form of a critical social theory for popularization with non-academic North Americans;

iv. Marcuse's contradictory and perhaps elitist approach to leadership;

v. a lack of a rigorous analysis of that social domination which is constructed through racism in North America, and the relation between social domination based on racism and other forms of social domination;

vi. a lack of a rigorous analysis of the relations of domination which exist between Canada and the United States, as well as between North America and Third World countries; and,

vii. a lack of a rigorous approach towards the domination and liberation of women, and to patriarchal relations of power.

c. To raise relevant questions and issues, and to provide a specific direction, towards the (further) development of an adequate philosophical foundation of social education appropriate to the context of contemporary North American societal conditions.

Given the contributions and limitations of Marcuse's Critical social theory to the reconstruction of Freire's philosophical theory with regard to the aforementioned aim, I will conclude that socialist feminist theory, particularly as interpreted, developed and elucidated by Alison M. Jaggar is required to most adequately (yet perhaps not completely) respond to the questions and issues left unresolved, distorted or avoided by both Marcuse and Freire.

The above objectives will be attempted with scholarly reliance

upon both Marcuse's central works (1955, 1958, 1960, 1964, 1969a, 1969b, 1970, 1972, 1978), and selected recent works of his interpreters, most notably of David Held (1980), Douglas Kellner (1984), Barry Katz (1982), Joan B. Landes (1979), Nancy Vedder-Shults (1978), Gad Horowitz (1977) and Robert Pippen, et al. (1988).

The theoretical works, and interpreters, of other theorists associated with the Frankfurt School of Critical social theory (1), such as Theodore Adorno, Erich Fromm and Max Horkheimer, will provide supporting and additional insight to that of Marcuse's theory, yet will be clearly demarcated from Marcuse's theory proper. Be that as it may, there will also arise moments in which Marcuse's theory will be contrasted to those of other members of the Frankfurt School.

Importantly, the recent work of Henry Giroux (1981, 1983), as well as his collaborative work with Stanley Aronowitz (1985), will be instrumental towards informing and achieving the aim of this thesis. Be that as it may, Giroux's work will itself, at times, be critically evaluated given both the scholarly work of David W. Livingstone, et al., (1987) and Alison Jaggar (1983), in particular, and the guiding critical spirit which informs the thesis, in general.

The recent scholarship of Alison Jaggar (1983, 1984), rather than being a central focus of study for this thesis, will significantly be considered as the main avenue for future study relevant towards re-constructing and transcending Marcuse's possible contributions and limitations towards an adequate philosophical foundation for social education adequate to the North American context. This conclusion will be supported by the recent socialist feminist scholarship of Kathleen Weiler (1988), as well as the work of other feminist theorists and

educators, such as Nancy Vedder-Shults (1978) and Mary O'Brien (1983).

2. General organization of the thesis

I will attempt to achieve the aims of the thesis as outlined above, in their respective order. As well, within each objective, I will examine the associated themes or concerns, respectively, as offered above.

3. Definition of terms

1 "Social, popular, critical, or transformative education"

The terms 'social education', 'popular education', 'critical education' and 'transformative education' have collectively been used to refer to diverse educational approaches and activities. Rather than seeking to synthesize a unified statement regarding their similarities, I will focus on, for the purpose of this thesis, what I regard as one particular approach and associated practice, and identify that as adequately and appropriately defining the above interchangeable terms. The theoretical, practical and partisan reasons for this will be clarified in the following section, that of the rationale of the aims of the thesis.

Social, popular, critical or transformative education theory and practical activity are ultimately aimed towards generating the emancipation of all people from unnecessary social repression towards the freeing of their individual and collective creative productive activity.

This specific approach and associated practice will refer to education which may take place both internal and external to a formal school or university environment.

Broadly speaking, such education is informed by a 'critical', 'social', 'popular' or 'transformative' approach insomuch that:

a. the analysis or stance which informs, evaluates, and is actually implemented as a learning aim for the participants to become (more) conscious of through the educational practice, is critical of the existing or any social and material relations of power which structure inequality and oppression in the lives of a specific group of people;

b. it is aimed towards analyzing and acting effectively to transform those social or material relations of power, be they capitalist, patriarchal and heterosexist, racist, anti-semitic, ageist and/or other, which structure specific situations of oppression within which the participants of the educational activity live their lives;

c. it is aimed towards strengthening the leadership and organizing efforts of those groups of people who do not, in a specific historical situation, primarily benefit by the status quo unequal social and/or material relations of power. Thus, it is people of these historically defined groups who are the participants in such an educational activity;

d. it is aimed towards strengthening and creating solidarity among diverse, progressive, social movements towards the

transformation of society's structure and everyday life, with the aim of non-oppressive societal relations and a minimally alienating everyday life (as opposed to replacing those social movements);

e. it assumes that the actual educative process itself must be one in which all the participants are minimally alienated from their productive educative activity and hence maximally controlling, producing and profiting from the process and content. Thus, the act of knowing, including knowledge production, is primarily a collective activity, with the resulting knowledge practically and consciously owned by both the individual participants of the group, and the group as whole, simultaneously;

f. the specific relation between theory and practice within the educational practice ensures the requirement of critique and transformation of the process and content which informs and is the result of that relation, by those who participate in it;

g. it is not necessary for an educator external to the historical social group to initiate, participate, lead, evaluate, or even label the educative activity as 'social education', 'popular education' and so on; if such an educator does participate, the educator is to be partisan to the side and stance of those who do not presently and primarily profit from the existing historical, unequal, social relations of power;

h. it represents a long-term commitment to and an

on-going activity with a specific and actual group of people;

1. it embodies a simultaneous grounded spirit and practice of: critiquing and imagining the possible; hating situations which dehumanize, and loving people; and, denouncing existing situations and structural relations of oppression which create human despair, and announcing hope through actively changing those situations and structural relations.

Social, popular, critical or transformative education is not taken to mean, for the purpose of this thesis:

- a bag of participatory methods or techniques for involving people more actively in an educative process;
- implementing a methodological framework or grid onto an educative activity, without reference to the specific content or context of the educational activity;
- indiscriminately, any educational activity with adults in a non-formal setting;
- educational activity (no matter how participatory) with a group of people who are themselves primarily privileged members of society;
- educational activity in which the situations of oppression through which the participants live are limited to being only analyzed as the individual's problem, thus requiring an individual solution;
- educational activity which understands and aims towards 'transformation' and 'empowerment' as limited to the transformation and empowerment of the individual participants, as opposed to a dialectic of individual empowerment and historical social group/class empowerment through individual transformation and societal transformation.
- educational activity which does not lead to an analysis of a conflict of interests among various social and economic groups, in general, and, in particular, towards identifying the collective interests of the participants of the social education activity as in conflict with the collective interests of (an)other group(s);
- educational activity which is a short-term (e.g. one day or a weekend workshop) commitment, and not in the context of a long-term,

ongoing educative process.

ii. "Philosophical foundation (of education)"

For the purpose of this thesis, I will attempt to limit the focus of what is meant by 'philosophical foundation (of education)' to theoretical considerations of:

- examining the general historical societal context of North America, within which social education activity takes place, insomuch as examining this context may have a significant bearing towards practically attaining the goals and features of social education;
- examining the general relation of this historical societal context to the individual participant of such a social education activity, insomuch as this relation may have a relevant bearing towards practically attaining the goals and features of social education; and,
- examining epistemological implications of the above examinations, insomuch as these implications may have a bearing towards practically attaining the goals and features of social education.

It should be clear that while this thesis is indeed a philosophical examination, within the expansive terrain of philosophical landscape what I ultimately will count as worth considering for theoretical examination is that which I see as giving rise to significant implications towards achieving the practical goals and features of social

education, as characterized above. Philosophizing for 'its own sake', while perhaps appropriate in certain conditions, is not what ultimately guides this thesis. Nonetheless, it has also become clear during the process of research, that such a philosophical study also (paradoxically) gives rise to implications regarding the practical goals of social education, themselves. Thus, the practical goals of social education apparently undergo refinement, expansion and revision as a result of such an inquiry.

Rather than viewing such a contradiction as detrimental to either achieving the practical goals of social education, or to pursuing a philosophical inquiry aimed at facilitating certain practical goals, it appears that it is not only inevitable but desirable to a process of study which is consciously critical in spirit. For, to exalt the aims of social education to the point of exempting them from critical revision is to affirm a reified conception of reality, thus serving to negate practical attempts to transform reality.

iii. "Adequate to the North American context".

For the purpose of this thesis, the meaning of 'adequate to the North American context' takes on a multi-fold character. This character includes that such a philosophical foundation of education takes into account, or recognizes, at least in a general manner:

- the specific historical realities of those non-North American contexts wherein philosophical foundations of social education have been developed and implemented (e.g. Brazil 1960's, Freire; Nicaragua early 1980's,

Nicaragua Ministry of Education), when those foundations or instances of implementation are drawn on;

- the specific historical realities of the North American context, including the international relations within North America between Canada and the United States;

- the specific historical experiences and concerns of those groups of people who are oppressed within North America and who are organizing to end their oppression;

- the specific historical experiences of those implementing social education within the North American context, and the insights, problems, limitations, questions and successes they have had and are sharing.

More particularly, such an 'adequate' philosophical foundation must not only include consideration of the above, but actually be able to inform a social education practice which will achieve the goals and features of social education, as previously outlined. Thus, the 'adequacy' of such a philosophical foundation will ultimately be judged and revised with respect to its actual ability to inform practical considerations, rather than by some abstract notion of philosophical 'purity'. As Critical Marxist theory, in general, such a philosophical foundation is simultaneously theory for human action, and theory which is consciously constructed through historical action.

While Marcuse's analysis of 'advanced-industrial capitalist societies' was most particularly an analysis of Western Europe and the

United States, I will assume that his examination has relevance for the Canadian context. Nonetheless, while the focus of the thesis is on 'adequacy for the North American context' in general, I will attempt, at times, to be sensitive to the specificities of the Canadian context, in particular.

4. Rationale of the aim of the thesis

There is a need to locate, guide and evaluate the practice of social pedagogy in contemporary North America with a social-theoretic referent which is both adequate to the reality of such a context, in the interest of emancipatory educational practice, and accessible and sensitive to those engaged in social education. While Freire's social-theoretic framework provides a solid foothold for a point of departure in the development of such a referent, North Americans must step towards the specificities of their own societal conditions, constraints and potentialities, in order to critically make use of Freire's ongoing achievements (Freire, 1985; Freire and Shor, 1987; Giroux, 1981, 1983; Livingstone, et al., 1987).(2)

While Freire's approach to education has been popular among North American social educators for over fifteen years, the fact that it has developed both from within a social context quite different from that of North America, as well in a language distinct from French or English, has been a major problem for North American social educators and theorists.

Through engaging in this problematic, some educators and theorists have resolved that Freire's approach and 'methods' just don't work in an industrially-advanced capitalist society. That Freire's

approach is unusable and has been completely ineffective in such a context has been adequately refuted (Giroux, 1983; Shor and Freire, 1987). That his literacy methods don't work in urban North America cities as they do in the Brazilian, Chilean and Nicaraguan countryside is an insightful conclusion on the part of many North American social educators and literacy teachers. At the same time, the apparent inability of many social educators to 'recreate' Freire's theory beyond a mechanical transference of it to the North American context has been evident. Little has been said or problematized, however, regarding the reasons why this apparent inability exists in the first place, towards the practical transcendence of such causes.

a. The problematic of 're-inventing' Freire's theory and practice

The relation of social educators themselves to their praxis cannot be seen without reference to the larger context of this relation: when 'borrowing' a foreign theory or practice, its value and limitations become usurped by the tide of ideological and material restraints and relations of the "borrowing" society.(3) For social educators themselves, much like any other people, are not immune to the social relations which construct the relationship of their thought to their practice. They, too, participate in everyday material and cultural conditions which subtly yet surely structure certain conceptual and practical modes to the detriment of other manners of approaching 'texts', be they books by Latin American educators, their own lives or their social education practices.

This analysis underlines the necessity of viewing social

educators as learners who need to present their own practices, and thinking about their practices, to historical consideration and reconsideration. In practical terms, the question of "How do we, as social educators, change the way the students understand their historical relation to culture, and productive activity, in general, and to their practical existential situation, in particular?" is complemented by and perhaps superseded by a more primary or pressing question relating to social educators themselves, and the historical relations of their own practices to their specific social context. This latter question and its problematization is in the interest of social educators and those who learn with them, and contributes to the practical achievement of the aims and features of social education.

That North American social educators and theorists have often apparently avoided such a self-reflective approach through collective practice, e.g. through adequate social education training, is simultaneously indicative of the material and ideological limitations and dynamics of the context they live in and through, and perhaps explanatory of much of the difficulty in 're-working' Freire's educational theory and practices for relevance to their own context.

What is being argued is that despite Freire's plea to North American educational theorists and social educators to 're-work', 're-create' and 're-define' his theory and practice, such a 'transformation' of his works happens inevitably, and the manner in which it is transformed is determined, though not in a mechanistic way, by and within the existing historical material and ideological relations of their society. The question of 'Will social educators 're-define' Freire's theoretical approach and practice in light of their own

context?' is then brought to, and even replaced by the different and more accurate question of 'Will such a 're-definition' by them be done' in a manner which is conscious of their own relation to that context?' In other words, will their inevitable re-working of Freire's theory and practice be achieved through interpreting and re-defining them via a historical mediation which is rigourously conscious, or not conscious, of the historical societal relations which construct their own structured needs, thinking processes, 'common sense', and parameters of practice? If such a historical mediation is not rigourously conscious, and there is sufficient reason to believe that such is often the case, then Freire's theory will be 're-worked' but in a manner which will most likely reproduce the dominant mode of relating to and understanding the world.

In consequence, Freire's theory and practice, finding themselves often 'read' or interpreted in mid-stream of the dominant streamlining liberalism (positivistic or pragmatic), have been 're-worked' through the less than rigourously conscious human mediation of material and ideological relations, to a set of participatory methods and techniques, often used with little respect to content and context. This mechanistic historical mediation is both constructed and reinforced by the immediate practices of everyday life and work.

Thus, it makes sense to approach a social theorist, such as Marcuse, who may aid social educators in understanding their own relation to a society which has a constant tendency towards creating a reifying misconception of that relationship. Indeed, a relevant theory with which to approach Freire's theory must make clear the general and specific psycho-social relations which construct the specific act of knowing that proceeds during a textual or contextual analysis. Perhaps then, social

educators may have more of the theoretical distance or space to be able to 'rework' or 'reconstruct' Freire's theory to their own advantage and to the advantage of those with whom they work. Indeed, Marcuse's theory possesses the strength of not imposing a 'new' theory upon North American social educators, or even of helping to interpret Freire's works 'as Freire meant it' (surely an impossible and perhaps irrelevant task). Rather, the significance of Marcuse's theory for social educators may indeed lie in its use towards aiding them in understanding the complexity of their own relationship to society. This, in turn, may allow them to more critically and consciously engage with any theoretical or practical 'text' they may wish to 'read' and 'rewrite'.

It would be arrogant to assume that using Marcuse's Critical social theory to attempt to clarify such a complex relationship in order to promote a more conscious mediation by social educators of their transformation of a Freirean approach and practice, would automatically lead to an acceptance and mediation of such transformation via that standpoint. While I will, though not uncritically, argue for such a mediation, it is ultimately intended that the exercise of such an analysis in this thesis will broaden choices for social educators and philosophers of social education, as opposed to limiting them.

b. Other scholarly work and this project

The two realms of Marcuse's theory which will be examined as possible contributions to the aim of this project, were chosen with not only the above in mind, but also with recognition of other scholarly research which has attempted to relate Marcuse's Critical social theory to considerations of education, particularly that of Henry A. Giroux

(1981, 1983; with Aronowitz, 1985), and to a lesser extent Ira Shor (Freire and Shor, 1987), David Livingstone (et al, 1987), and Stanley Aronowitz (1981; and Giroux, 1985). Giroux has insightfully examined Marcuse's approach to contemporary North American societal structural relations, as well as his considerations of mass culture, technological rationality and epistemology.

Given the fundamental importance of Marcuse's approach to societal structural relations, and of his general approach towards situating contemporary ideology, I have included an examination of them in this research project. However, much of this thesis constitutes an examination of Marcuse's social psychology, based on a critical revision of psychoanalytic theory, and his dialectical-materialist approach to the psycho-sexual realm. This choice is significantly based on the relative lack of such research by Giroux, as well as others. While researchers in this area have at times pointed towards or stressed aspects of Marcuse's approach to the unconscious and the structuring of needs, I propose that these aspects are perhaps most noticeable in the relevant research by the absence of their sufficient consideration and examination. This research project thus attempts to complement, supplement, and at times critique other scholarly research which has been carried out in the area of the relation of Marcuse's Critical social theory to the development of a philosophical foundation of social education appropriate to the North American context.

5. Setting the context: A brief overview of the relationship between Freire's and Marcuse's philosophical theories.

The purpose of setting this context is to briefly outline the relation between the philosophical approaches of Freire, born in 1921, and Marcuse (1898 - 1979). This will be achieved towards situating the theories, in an introductory fashion, so that an adequate bridge is constructed on which to travel back and forth between them in order to carry out the aim of the thesis. I will especially concentrate on how their respective philosophical approaches are compatible and convivial, especially as regards method, aims and discourse, yet at variance in emphasis and scope with regard to content and focus.

In defining this context, I will refrain from providing an overview, thumbsketch or precis of Freire's philosophical and educational approach. This has been more than adequately provided elsewhere (Collins, 1977; Giroux, 1981; Mackie, 1981; Martin, 1975; Williams, 1974). I will assume that the reader has sufficient familiarity with Freire's central works (1970a, 1970b, 1985; and Macedo, 1987; and Shor, 1987) as a basis upon which to approach this study.

a. The Critical theory of Marcuse, and Freire's dialectical materialism and educational theory are related more thoroughly and with more complexity than the latter simply laying claim as being partially inspired by the former. For, while Freire indeed does locate Marcuse's theory as a source of philosophic inspiration (Freire, 1970a: 11), he seems hardly to critically appropriate its depth, range and focus. This is surely comprehensible, as Marcuse's theory is located in an analysis of the contradictions held within industrially-advanced capitalist countries, most notably of Western Europe and the United States. Freire's project lay in a context (peasant villages and urban

slums of Brazil in the early 1960's, and later of Chile) that holds as many discontinuities as similarities to the context to which Marcuse lends himself.

b. Both Marcuse and Freire attempt to apply their own dialectical and historical analyses to Marx's dialectical materialism, each in their own particular manner responding to the oft-referred to "crisis" in Marxist theory. (4) They each claim that their critical appropriations of Marx are more truly "Marxist" than traditional Marxism in that they represent a more thoroughly dialectical and totalistic account of traditional Marxist categories, such as the realm of the superstructure and its relation to the societal infrastructure, and traditional Marxist "questions" such as the role of the working class and of women in achieving liberation. (5) They claim as well that they employ a more rigorous application of the dialectical materialist methodology than those whom they would call mechanistic Marxists. While I presume there to be little doubt that this is true, I will nevertheless attempt to argue and conclude in this thesis that the rigour of their application of the Marxist method has indeed room for improvement, and that each of them has yet to take seriously the socialist feminist application of the Marxist method in understanding the historical contradictions of society, towards its liberatory transformation, despite their respective considerations of and apparent solidarity with socialist feminism.

With a view towards examining the origins of the development of their critical Marxist stances, while Freire developed his dialectical materialist approach through working on educational programs with middle-class Christians, peasants, and workers in Brazil, Marcuse

responded to the "rise of Fascism and Nazism, on the one hand, and to the failure of the orthodox Marxism on the other" (Giroux, 1983: 10).

Marcuse, politically involved with various worker struggles in Germany in the very early 1900's (Kellner, 1984: 16) was more specifically challenged by the state of traditional Marxism through:

The rise of Stalinism, the failure of the European or Western working class to contest capitalist hegemony in a revolutionary manner, and the power of capitalism to reconstitute and reinforce its economic and ideological control... (Giroux, 1983: 10).

Thus, it is evident that the theories of both Freire and Marcuse are lodged within practical considerations; they share a starting point in which their problematic is situated within a definable political reality and struggle. This is both an indication of their concerns or aims, and of their substantially shared dialectical materialist methodology.

Nonetheless, it is no accident that Marcuse is pointed out as having had elaborated more extensively, thoroughly and perhaps more creatively a philosophical basis for analyzing domination and liberation than Freire. Marcuse published no less than eighteen books, several of which include some of his one-hundred and nine essays, articles, reviews and published lectures (Katz, 1982: 222-229). For, Marcuse, while having been himself sparked by political praxis, developed ultimately as an intellectual, a theorist, and an enthusiastic catalyst of the political praxis of others. His political partisanship and militancy ended almost as soon as it began, in the early 1900's.

Freire, on the other hand, is still active in traditional politics, being an active member of the Worker's Party of Brazil (6); he has and is still directing or aiding, as a consultant, educational

projects from the local to the national level around the world; and writes, it seems, when he has time. Indeed, his most recent publications have been edited transcriptions of dialogues, rather than essays or academic scholarship (Freire and Macedo, 1987; Freire and Shor, 1987).

It is thus relevant to state at this point: 1. that it appears logical that, sharing a similar dialectical materialism with Freire, Marcuse's theory would deserve consideration for enriching, extending and critiquing Freire's comparatively introductory theoretical works, towards the purpose of developing a more adequate philosophical foundation with which to inform social education practice in North America; and 2. that Marcuse's works are in need of being closely scrutinized for theoretical abstraction which distorts rather than illuminates political and educational practice. For, while much of his work focusses on elaborating the workings of ideology which aids and abets such distortion, his relative lack of actual political involvement for much of his life may perhaps be reason for wanting reassurance that his theory is indeed relevant to historical praxis. I propose that relating Marcuse's theoretical analyses to the considerations of social education re-infuses those analyses with new meaning and with an applicability which enriches Marcuse's theory through not only extending its usefulness, but through offering a grounded social and political activity with which to critically approach his theory as related to considerations of actual praxis.

c. Both Freire and Marcuse, as Western or critical Marxists (Gouldner, 1980), attempt to reject any account of, or application of Marxism which is either objectivistic or subjectivistic,

mechanistic or idealistic. They have no problem with appropriating segments of (any type of) Marxist, as well as non-Marxist, theories and utilizing the potential within these segments, as interpreted with a more thoroughly dialectical materialist method. This eclecticism is not without its attendant problems and contradictions. For example, Freire appropriates Althusser's "overdetermination of the dialectic" while merely implying a rejection of his structuralist and mechanistic Marxist stance, thus leaving open for gross misinterpretation the context of its usage (Giroux, 1983: 82).(7) As well, Freire has no reservations about appropriating and developing the radical potential of the Prophetic tradition within the historically repressive Catholic religion. Marcuse appropriates the radical potential of Freud's psychological and anthropological theories, only to find himself bereft of an adequate theory of the state, functional to politically strategize and thus realize the implications for liberation which he draws from Freud.

Despite such problems and paradoxes, such an eclectic usage of diverse strains of Marxist and non-Marxist (yet, for the most part, dialectical) theories serves as one of the greatest strengths of the two proponents of dialectical materialism. For, it is a consistent extension and practice of their similar dialectical materialist methods to re-examine any theories (and practices) in order to realize the radical and emancipatory moment held within them, as part of the totality of those theories.

This re-examination is also an extension of their shared epistemological approach to the gnosiological cycle, as elaborated by Freire. For, "what is" is not a completion of this cycle; it is merely one aspect of the dialectical totality. Its potential to be humanized

and thus also humanizing, to be an object of emancipatory intentionality and practice, is beckoned by both its incompleteness and the incompleteness of humans, who are in a constant process of "becoming". The historicity of people, based on the incompleteness of the state of reality, spurs people on to re-learn, to re-know and thus towards completion of the gnosiological cycle through radical praxis, by attempting to realize the subversive or liberatory moment, image or aspect.

The theory or practice which is in need of "re-interpretation" depends fully on the particularities of the existential context of those who are in need of knowing. For Freire, a list of the crimes and collusion of the Catholic Church in the domination of the peasants and workers of Latin America is no reason to reject that church as "not worth knowing". For such a rejection would be a far-reaching contradiction of his own epistemological theory (Freire and Macedo, 1987: 114). To "know", once again, is not to "accept"; it is to subvert the appearance in order to "create" its radical underside, in both theory and practice. Here is the epistemological basis for Freire's "hope and faith". The church in Latin America, as such an engrained part of life of (rural) people is an appropriate locus of epistemological activity for Freire, as its acceptance by many of that context is one of the major obstacles to critical thought and action, as well as one of the major liberatory (as used in Freire and Shor, 1987: 198) forces. Similarly, for Marcuse, given the almost materiality of hegemonic ideology within the industrially-advanced capitalist countries he studies, it makes good sense to approach a dialectical psychological theory, despite its apparent oppressive qualities, in order to 're-examine' it with the aim of understanding and transcending the limitations of such a pervasive

ideology.

Above, I have briefly reviewed some shared aspects of the epistemological theories of Freire and Marcuse. Both share a similar, though not identical, radical epistemology based on both theoretical, and to a different degree, practical grounds. Theoretically, their dialectical stances attempt to ensure the distancing, though not the dichotomizing, of 'what is' and 'what can be', of appearance and potential. Their specifically dialectical materialist accounts of reality attempt to ensure that by re-creating, through critical thought and radical liberatory praxis, their specific reality, people themselves change towards a revealing of their possibilities -- indeed, humanizing themselves.

d. As implicitly indicated above, both Marcuse and Freire, as critical Marxists, understand the contemporary historical juncture, in general, as requiring a problematization and radical transformation of the cultural superstructure towards the aim of social emancipation. While both insist on the importance of a thoroughly dialectical relationship between the superstructural and infrastructural realms, they nonetheless focus their respective intellectual energies on the former. While they both justify this preponderance on the cultural realm of society by the historical realities of this century in general, it is, in addition, well to situate their shared focus in each one's specific historical context and practical preoccupations.

Freire, prior to being greatly influenced by Marx's dialectical materialism had been developing a keen interest and practice in education. Rather than starting out as a theoretical critic of

education, he began his interest in education through teaching the Portuguese language in the secondary school milieu (Collins, 1977: 5), and then through the Catholic movement of adult education among the middle class of Brazil. Looking for more effective and emancipatory theories of society in relation to his educational practice, he was pointed towards Marxism "by the people". Thus, the principal context for his interest in Marxism was and still is, its relationship to his educational practice and projects. His activity and interest, as located in the cultural realm, seem to logically situate his stance towards Marxism as one regarding its ability to explicate and locate the possibilities for change in that realm. Thus, while he continuously points out the limits of the cultural realm for emancipatory social change, he nonetheless directs the bulk of his attention towards it, with his dialectical critique of the traditional Marxist conception of culture, ideology and consciousness. Falling short of surmising that Freire concentrates almost exclusively on the cultural realm because of his narrow interests in education (as a cultural activity), I merely point out his own insistence that knowledge is related to one's (personal and social) interests and needs, and loosely apply it to Freire himself.

Marcuse, on the other hand, did not start out with specific practical and theoretical interests in education, but rather with a theoretical concern to "construct a more sufficient basis" (Giroux, 1983: 10) in sympathetic reaction to the practical, lived, failings of (German) orthodox Marxism in the early 1930's, preoccupied as it was with mechanistic and economic analyses of the societal infrastructure. Thus, according to Giroux (1983: 11),

It is not surprising, then, that the focus of the

Frankfurt School's research de-emphasized the area of political economy to focus instead on the issues of how subjectivity was constituted and how the spheres of culture and everyday life represented a new terrain of domination.

As both Freire and Marcuse, for different historical reasons, turned their attention towards study of the cultural superstructure, their focus on the centrality of praxis for liberatory social transformation was almost unavoidable, as opposed to a concentrated focus on the structural implications (or potential) for social change. Concern with praxis extends outwards to consideration of the potential and limitations of and to it in general, and in historically specific situations in particular. While this inevitably leads back to consideration of the relationship between the superstructure and the infrastructure, the relation of which constitutes the structure of society, it is evident that both Freire and Marcuse have focussed on the cultural particularities which both limit and facilitate praxis.

However, while Marcuse also tends to focus on the specifically cultural limitations to emancipation, he nevertheless does ultimately assert, as does Freire, the limitations of capitalist relations of production to liberation, and thus the necessity of the radical transformation of capitalist relations of production for liberation. This is a significant factor in the choice of studying Marcuse's critical theory in relation to that of Freire, as opposed to Habermas, a more contemporary member of the Frankfurt School. While Habermas has proved to be a more popular complement to studying Freire, he is clearly a less radical and satisfying choice, given the historical context of how Freire's theory is often approached by North Americans: in a pragmatic,

instrumentalist manner which strips the theory of its relational quality, and searches for techniques to apply within a liberal framework. As Giroux (1983: 26 and 27) notes,

In ...opposition to Habermas, Marcuse (1964) argues that radical change means more than simply the creation of conditions that foster critical thinking and communicative competence. Such change also entails the transformation of the labour process itself and the fusion of science and technology under the guise of a rationality stressing cooperation and self-management in the interest of democratic community and social freedom.

What I've attempted above is to introduce the similarity between Freire and Marcuse in their emphasis on the cultural realm as a focus of study. In particular, they focus on the cultural limitations and possibilities of liberatory praxis. At the same time, they both insist that all consideration of the cultural realm must ultimately be dialectically related to the realm of economic relations of production. That Freire and Marcuse direct their intellectual energies primarily towards the cultural realm is both one of their greatest strengths and perhaps their singular greatest weakness. This will be elaborated in the main exposition of the thesis.

e. Their respective concerns with liberatory praxis gave rise to its immanent problematization. Thus, a study of such praxis led necessarily to the obstacles to such praxis. Both theorists significantly identify the relations constituting ideology, within their respective contexts, in their studies of such obstacles. Freire has readily agreed that ideology is a much graver obstacle to liberatory praxis in North America than in the geographic Third World (8). Hence, it is not surprising that Marcuse devoted much of his analyses to

ideology within the contemporary Western European and North American contexts.

Their common concern with consciously engaging in the dialectics of the ideology of domination, each within its respective context, gave rise to a rather similar dialectical approach to ideology, though each with a different content, an approach best articulated in the English language by Henry A. Giroux. With the aid of Aronowitz (1981; with Giroux 1985) and Gramsci (1971), Giroux has elucidated a notion of ideology which he believes is that shared by both Marcuse and Freire.(9) As such, he is worth quoting at length:

Ideology, as used here, refers to the production, interpretation, and effectivity of meaning. It contains both a positive and negative moment, each of which is determined, in part, by the degree to which it promotes or distorts reflexive thought and action. As a distortion ideology becomes hegemonic; as an illumination it contains elements of reflexivity and the grounds for social action. It is the positive moment in the dialectic of ideology that has been ignored by educational critics...One important clarification to this definition is that as a form of reflexivity, ideology is not synonymous with liberation, particularly since it is exercised within economic and political conditions that ultimately determine its influence or effect (Giroux, 1983: 66 and 67).

Certainly, it is such an approach to ideology⁶ that allows Freire to pedagogically utilize the practical embodiment of ideology in language characterizing the lived experiences and routines of oppressed groups of people, towards subverting that ideology in the practical interest of both critical consciousness and political organization and militancy.

f. While the philosophical theory of Antonio Gramsci (1971) lays the most useful groundwork for Freire's specific epistemology and especially pedagogical approach, Marcuse, I propose, both provides a

more indepth, accurate and conclusive study of the subjective and material obstacles to liberatory praxis as well as possibilities latent within alienated praxis, in contemporary industrially-advanced capitalist societies, and offers a more solidly located analysis of the relation between trends in ideology and the totality of North American society. It is useful to quote Gramsci on his view of contradictory consciousness and common sense, both in order to situate his relevance to both Freire and Marcuse, and because Gramsci's theory has been historically important to the development of radical adult education theory:

The active man-in-the-mass has a practical activity, but has no clear theoretical consciousness of his practical activity, which nonetheless involves understanding the world insofar as it transforms it. His theoretical consciousness can indeed be historically in opposition to his activity. One might almost say that he has two theoretical consciousnesses (or one contradictory consciousness); one which is implicit in his activity and which in reality unites him with all his fellow workers in practical transformation of the real world; and one, superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed. (Gramsci, in Giroux, 1983: 152).

As Freire,

What Gramsci argues for is a mode of analysis that uncovers contradictory moments in discourse so they can not only be used to reveal their own underlying interests but also so they can be restructured into a form of critical consciousness that can, in Gramsci's words, "make coherent the problems raised by the masses in their practical activity". (Giroux, 1983: 153).

While Freire is perhaps more modest in articulating the philosophical basis of his pedagogical theory (e.g. incessantly maintaining the necessity of approaching dialectically the relation between subjective and objective aspects of reality), Gramsci offers a more elaborate basis, one which is not only shared, in general, by

Marcuse, but is also rendered more problematic within the North American context by Marcuse, and thus more useful towards the goal of the project of developing an adequate foundation for social education in North America.

What I've attempted above, with the aim of situating the relationship between Freire's and Marcuse's theories, is to introduce the notion that both Marcuse and Freire share a similar dialectical and dynamic notion of ideology and consciousness, and of the relations of the latter two to the political and economic social relations which both structure and subvert the potentialities of each of the former. I've used Gramsci's notion of the common sense, as outlined by Giroux, to facilitate this introduction, as it bridges the main philosophic stances towards ideology by Freire and Marcuse. I will develop more thoroughly the contributions of Marcuse's analysis of ideology, especially as it relates to the structuring of consciousness and unconsciousness, as well as domination and liberatory activity, in the main body of the thesis. Therein, I will also remark on several of the dissonances of Marcuse's approach to these themes with that of Freire's approach to the same themes.

g. A final consideration of the context of the relationship between the theories of Freire and Marcuse relates to the theme of the largely uncritical reception of them by people attempting to change society in the interest of liberation. Each of them has, at particular moments of their public lives, been charismatic figures for large numbers of people. Both, indeed, have been (pejoratively) qualified as the latest "guru" for 'liberation theory' at certain

historical junctures.(10) Nonetheless, while many educators, particularly in the area of adult education, have perhaps heard of and have talked about Freire and Marcuse, it appears that relatively few have given a serious reading of their theoretical works.

While Freire seems to enjoy public recognition of his work and ability as an educator, he is also highly critical of any and all unquestioning approaches towards both his written work and practices as an educator. Certainly, regardless of Freire's personal openness to (self-)criticism, it is counterproductive to view his theory and practice in a magical manner, as static entities worthy of mechanical emulation regardless of the particular historical reality one is situated in.

While Martin (1975:2), maintains that Freire had ceased being a "fad" in 1975, he is nonetheless still popularly regarded with fascination. Freire partially locates an uncritical approach towards himself, his theory and his practice in the lack of clarity of one's goals in approaching him, his theory or practices (Freire, 1985: 171). As well, along with Ira Shor, Freire points towards the ideological conditions specific to North America for this uncritical trend towards his work and himself.

Marcuse, having been a "prophet of the revolutionary student movement" (11) in the late 1960's is, I propose, more easily (re-)approached now, almost two decades later, with a stance which is problematizing, rather than naïve or rejectionist. Marcuse, thus, due to the distance imposed by both time and the ideologically-based social amnesia(12) may perhaps be more easily critically approached now, and thus more critically appropriated for the search for a more radical philosophic basis for emancipatory education in North America.

Having attempted in the above sections to set a context for the relationship between the theories of Freire and Marcuse, so that a more thorough examination may be facilitated, I will now proceed with that examination. In the following two chapters, I examine several ways in which Freire's dialectical materialism and educational theory can benefit from Marcuse's social theory, with the aim of pointing towards a philosophical foundation of social education appropriate to the conditions of North America. This examination is followed by Chapter Four, in which I propose and briefly examine the limits of Marcuse's social theory towards that aim.

Notes of Chapter One

1. For an excellent elaboration of the history of the Frankfurt School of Critical social theory, see Jay's The Dialectical Imagination: a history of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923 - 1950 (1973).
2. This point is consistently and repeatedly argued by Freire, not only for its theoretical value, but towards posing a practical challenge to North American educators to engage in such theoretical/practical work. The predominant contexts of these sympathetic challenges to the author were seminars and community discussions in Amherst and Springfield, Mass., U.S.A., 1985.
3. It is also relevant that North Americans adequately understand the context in which Freire's theory and practice was situated, especially as they were originally formulated. Martin's Reappraising Freire (1975) is valuable towards exploring this Brazilian context. Also, for a comprehensive feminist analysis clearly situated in the Brazilian context, see Safioti's Women in Class Society (1978).
4. For two elaborations of the "crisis" in Marxist theory, see Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism (1984), and Aronowitz, The Crisis in Historical Materialism (1981).
5. Gouldner in The Two Marxisms (1980), and Jaggar in Feminist Politics and Human Nature (1983) provide excellent accounts of the general claims by 'Critical Marxists' of their improvements over 'Scientific Marxism'.
6. Freire, stated during a seminar discussion with students of University of Mass., Amherst, Mass., 1985.
7. Surely Gramsci's more dialectical approach towards the sphere of the cultural realm, as cultural hegemony, would have been just as effective and more consistent.
8. Freire, stated during a seminar discussion with students of University of Mass., Amherst, Mass., 1985.
9. See Giroux, Theory and Resistance (1983) p. 148, for Marcuse; and Giroux, in Freire, Politics of Education (1985) p. xii, for Freire.
10. For Marcuse: see Kellner, Herbert Marcuse (1984), p.1; for Freire: see Giroux, Ideology, Culture and the Process of Schooling (1981), p. 128.
11. See, for example, the synopsis of Katz's Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation (1981), on the back cover of the paperback edition.
12. I refer here to social amnesia in the sense developed by Jacoby, in his Social Amnesia (1975).

CHAPTER TWO:

Marcuse's Approach to the Structure of North American Society, and its Relation to Ideology in that Context.

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I will attempt to locate and examine several relevant aspects of Marcuse's Critical social theory which may serve to supplement, enrich, and critique Freire's dialectical materialism and educational theory, with the aim of pointing towards a philosophical foundation for social educational theory and practice adequate to the contemporary North American context.

Towards achieving the above aim, I will attempt to examine and subject to scrutiny Marcuse's approach to the structure of contemporary North American society, i.e. to the historically specific relations between that society's infrastructure and superstructure, especially as related to Freire's general approach to societal structural relations. This will serve towards contextualizing and informing Marcuse's specific approach to ideology. I will then examine Marcuse's approach to ideology, proper, as he problematizes it in relation to the contemporary North American context. In particular, I will briefly examine Marcuse's analyses of: technological rationality; mass culture; and contemporary human nature as historically constructed through relations of domination and subordination in North America.

Dialectically, I will also offer analyses of Marcuse's approach to liberatory culture, critical art and liberatory epistemology, which will not only help define the moment of ideology as domination (through

positing what it is not), but also identify, as Marcuse views it, the moment of liberation in ideology and culture.

I will commence with an attempt to ground Marcuse's specific concern with and approach to ideology and ideology critique within Freire's framework of the relation between the superstructural and infrastructural realms of society, in general, as well as the historically specific relation between the two. I will conclude that Freire's general framework and analysis is quite similar to that of Marcuse, although their specific analyses of the historical relations which constitute the contemporary North American societal structure differ in degree, with Marcuse's orientation and examination being more focused, greater in scope, depth and, I will argue, more insightful. Reference will be made to Louis Althusser's structuralist framework, as well as Antonio Gramsci's social theory for situating Freire's general analytical orientation towards the superstructural realm of society in relation to the infrastructural base.

2.a. Marcuse's approach towards structural relations as related to that of Freire's

Freire, while insisting on a genuinely dialectical relationship between infrastructure and superstructure(1) in general, posits that the particular historical dialectical relationship between the two is such that the latter sphere is "superdetermined" or "overdetermined" (Freire, 1985: 32 and 54). He refers to Althusser in justifying this specific relationship, yet leaves it bereft of elaboration. Williams quotes Althusser's Four Marx to offer substance to Freire's reference (Williams,

1974: 41 and 42):

(Marx and Engels)...draw...the basic notion that the capital-labour contradiction is never simple, but always specified by the historically concrete forms and circumstances in which it is exercised. It is specified by the forms of the superstructure (the state, the dominant ideology, religion, politically organized movements, and so on); (and) specifically by the internal and external historical situation which determines it on the one hand as a function of the national past, and on the other as a function of the existing world context.

What can this mean but that the apparently simple contradiction is always over-determined.

Williams (1974: 43) interprets that:

(Althusser) is saying that to attribute Marxist meaning to concepts like labour and capital is to conceive of them simultaneously as universals (within capitalism) and relatives (existing only in particular socio-historical situations). Their behavior in any specific situation is therefore determined by their universal nature and "overdetermined" by the specific conditions of their existence. Althusser, like Freire, emphasizes superstructure (in its aspect of dominance vis-a-vis base and structure) as the critical factor in over-determination.

Williams (1974: 46) correctly argues that taking Althusser's distinction between the dialectic of the universal and relative, the essence and the existence of a given phenomenon (in this case capitalist society), Freire places emphasis on the nature of existence or activity within and in relation to the structural totality; thus, Freire situates his existentialist preoccupations.

However, while Althusser provides such a distinction and places the superstructural realm, and in particular the "state ideological apparatus" in a relatively autonomous yet ultimately determined setting, thus offering it special consideration, Althusser's work ceases to be

useful in illuminating and enriching Freire's approach towards the superstructure, and towards ideology in particular. While Williams implies that Althusser's theory 'emphasizes' an essentialist or structural approach, the latter's 'emphasis' clearly negates the dialectical materialism and educational theory of Freire. For, as Giroux notes (1983: 81, 82, 142, 143), Althusser, while pointing towards potentially useful notions of the superstructural realm, including ideology and especially as related to the unconscious mediation of it, ultimately destroys even the possibility of liberatory praxis, a central feature of Freire's anthropological and political philosophy, as well as his educational theory and practice, in part by denying the possibility of conscious, active mediation within the superstructural realm by those who participate in it.

In contrast, Marcuse's approach to the superstructural realm and ideology appears to not only converge with Freire's but extends, rigorizes and provides a sympathetic location for critique of it. While Freire, unlike Althusser, argues for a more dialectic relationship between domination and liberation, theory and action, consciousness and unconsciousness, concrete reality and possibility, Marcuse not only similarly argues for the above but provides qualitatively and quantitatively more substance or content to the plea which Freire issues.

Marcuse converges with Althusser, Gramsci and Freire, in believing that "the maintenance of the existing system of production and power arrangements depends on both the use of force and the use of ideology" (Giroux, 1983: 79). Freire is in agreement that the significance of ideology is greatly increased with the industrialization

and sophistication of capitalist economies.(2) While both Marcuse and Althusser devote themselves extensively to studying ideology, given its importance within their comparatively shared contexts, it is Marcuse (as well as Gramsci) who develops his fundamental notion of ideology in confluence with Freire:

Within this perspective, ideology refers to the production, consumption, and representation of ideas and behavior which can either distort or illuminate the nature of reality. As a set of meanings and ideas, ideologies can be either coherent or contradictory; they can function within the spheres of both consciousness and unconsciousness; and, finally, they can exist at the level of critical discourse as well as within the sphere of taken-for-granted lived experience and practical behavior. (Giroux, 1983: 143)

As do Freire, Marcuse, and Gramsci, Giroux (1983: 144) qualifies the above by linking it to the notions of struggle and critique. As such,

ideology illuminates the important relationships among power, meaning and interest. ...The linkage of ideology and struggle points to the inseparability of knowledge as power; it emphasizes that ideology refers not only to specific forms of discourses and the social relations they structure but also to the interests they further.

It is within such a dialectical approach towards ideology, as situated within a dialectical notion of culture, that Marcuse analyzes the general form, process and content of ideology of contemporary Western society, which Freire believes to be so instrumental (for the ruling classes) in blocking liberatory praxis in this context. Nonetheless, both Freire and Marcuse, while not minimizing the obstacle which ideology in this context poses, also adhere to Gramsci's notion that ideologies "organize masses...and create the terrain on which men (sic.) move, acquire consciousness of their (class) position, struggle, etc." (Gramsci, quoted in Giroux, 1983: 144) Thus, both Marcuse and Freire theoretically

ascertain their hopefulness against the "strength" of domination, as well as provide a theoretical notion of ideology which legitimates a pedagogy based on a radical notion of the problematization of ideology in order to (theoretically and practically) realize its emancipatory moment.

In summary, Marcuse views ideology as one of the major contemporary forces constituting, mediating, and potentially subversive of domination. Through his social theory, the location of domination, shared by Freire as oppression, in "objective exploitation" as well as (other sources of) the stunting and repression of liberatory praxis, is further clarified by him as the means, extent and consequences of such repression are elaborated on, as situated within his specific social context. Thus, major ideological (as opposed to military or police force) obstacles to liberatory praxis are outlined and investigated, as well as 'spaces' and contradictions which contain emancipatory desires, dreams and practical possibilities for experiencing the liberatory praxis, and (thus) for abolishing the subjective and objective constraints on that practice for all people of society. Ideology critique, then, for Marcuse as well as Freire, includes not merely denouncing the 'apparent' or 'surface' aspect of ideology, but also announcing and attempting to realize within it the 'hidden' or 'deep' emancipatory moment.

2.b. Marcuse's notion and critique of ideology within North America

Having set a brief theoretical context for introducing Marcuse's notion and critique of ideology in the general sense, I will now outline his specific notion and critique of ideology. Marcuse's dialectical materialism is grounded in the particular historical context of industrially-advanced capitalist nations, particularly those of the

United States and West Germany, and his analysis of such a context informs and offers substance and meaning to his general notion of ideology. I will attempt to compare, or juxtapose it with Freire's approach and findings regarding ideology within Third World contexts as well as his allusions to ideology as within the geographic First World context.

Marcuse (1964: xii) grounds his critique of industrially-advanced nations in his social theory, which he outlines as being concerned with vision and hope, indeed,

with the historical alternatives which haunt the established society as subversive tendencies and forces. The values attached to the alternatives do become facts when they are translated into reality by historical practice. The theoretical concepts terminate with social change.

Be that as it may, Marcuse's specific study of ideology in advanced industrial society appears to be a systematic examination indicating the extent and nature of the difficulty of not merely completing social theory in such a context with radical social change, but of the survival of both radical social theory itself and of the dialectical nature of the subject who mediates such a theory and practice ('the people') as one capable of subverting the relations of domination he or she lives through. Marcuse argues that domination in the advanced industrial society has almost succeeded in constituting the "whole" of the reality, thus potentially erasing the subversive negation of such domination. Nonetheless, he asserts that he

vacillate(s) throughout between two contradictory hypotheses: 1. that advanced industrial society is capable of containing qualitative change for the foreseeable future; (and) 2. that forces and tendencies

exist which may break this containment and explode the society. ...Both tendencies are there, side by side --and even the one in the other. The first tendency is dominant, and whatever preconditions for a reversal may exist are being used to prevent it. (Marcuse, 1964: xv)

Marcuse thus, in his critique of ideology, offers the historical subject a challenge, rather than, tragically, a eulogy for social theory and transformative change. While he offers a sobering statement to social educators regarding the facility of promoting change in people's historical analyses and of effecting social change, he also offers a systematic and rigorous basis with which to help 'make sense' of the continuous difficulties faced by them in achieving these goals. His dialectical social theory, like Freire's (3), does not support unreflective action, (or 'keeping on' for the sake of keeping on), but rather the former is explicated as a means for informing action. Hence, Marcuse's specific critique of ideology perhaps allows the social educator to feel more secure in scientifically acknowledging the very real limits to social education confronted by the educator in this context, and at the same time rationally challenges her or him to keep on, based on a more thorough understanding of the context worked in and through.

While usually maintaining the above dialectical (and thus hopeful) approach towards his specific ideology critique, it does, nonetheless, become clear that the latter must be clearly situated within the context of the totality of his theoretical works. For, in some of these works, such as "Some Social Implications of Modern Technology" (1941) and One Dimensional Man (1964), his apparent restraint in applying such a general dialectical approach throughout the studies leads him towards a pessimism and exaggeration which offer little recourse to

the possibility of collective liberatory praxis. Indeed, I propose that Marcuse's specific notion and critique of his object of study, at times requires a revision by the rigorous application of his general notion and approach towards critique and examination, more evident in his other written works, such as An Essay on Liberation. This revision, I propose, makes him more "useful" for change agents in society, but only inasmuch as it makes him more consistent with and truthful to his own overall theoretical tenets and outlook. (Geoghegan, 1981: 77-79)

Having situated Marcuse's specific approach to ideology in the context of industrially-advanced capitalist societies within his general, more consistent dialectical critique of ideology, I will continue with an elaboration of the content of his former critique.

2.c. Marcuse's specific ideology critique

Marcuse finds that, within the context of advanced industrial capitalist societies, the sphere of domination has significantly merged with the totality of existence. Indeed it brings into question Freire's specific analysis of the dialectic of domination and liberation, as being insufficient for the context which is the object of our study. I will illustrate this with a statement by Freire, outlining his notion of the "internalization of the oppressor" and follow it with Marcuse's analysis of the same phenomenon as situated in advanced industrial capitalist nations.

One of the basic elements of the relationship between oppressor and oppressed is prescription. Every prescription represents the imposition of one man's choice upon another, transforming the consciousness of the man prescribed to into one that conforms with the prescriber's consciousness. ...The oppressed, having internalized the image of the oppressor and adopted his

guidelines, is fearful of freedom. Freedom would require them to eject this image and replace it with autonomy and responsibility. ...The oppressed suffer from the duality which has established itself in their innermost being. They discover that without freedom they cannot exist authentically. Yet, although they desire authentic existence, they fear it. They are at one and the same time themselves and the oppressor whose consciousness they have internalized. The conflict lies in the choice between being wholly themselves or being divided; between ejecting the oppressor within or not ejecting him; between human solidarity or alienation... (Freire, 1970a: 32-33)

Marcuse, while validating the notion of the internalization of the oppressor, renders Freire's utilization of it problematic. It is worthwhile to quote Marcuse at length. For,

the "introjection" perhaps, no longer describes the way in which the individual by himself reproduces and perpetuates the external controls exercised by his society. Introjection suggests a variety of relatively spontaneous processes by which a Self (Ego) transposes the "outer" into the "inner". Thus introjection implies the existence of an inner dimension distinguished from and even antagonistic to the external exigencies -- an individual consciousness and an individual unconscious apart from public opinion and behavior. The idea of "inner freedom" here has its reality: it designates the private space in which man may become and remain "himself."

Today this private space has been invaded and whittled down by technological reality. Mass production and mass distribution claim the entire individual, and industrial psychology has long since ceased to be confined to the factory. The manifold processes of introjection seem to be ossified in almost mechanical reactions. The result is, not adjustment but mimesis : an immediate identification of the individual with his society and, through it, with the society as a whole. (Marcuse, 1964: 10)

This is consistent with and informative of Giroux's criticism regarding Freire's misunderstanding of (the extent and nature of) ideology within highly industrial contexts:

Freire appears to have misconstrued the extent and nature of the ideological hegemony that exists in North America, particularly in the United States. For instance, while visiting the United States in the early seventies, Freire claimed:

this is one of the most alienated of all countries. People know they are exploited and dominated, but they feel incapable of breaking down the dehumanized wall.

The alienation, exploitation and domination to which Freire refers is certainly an objective fact, but it is far from a subjective perception recognized by most Americans. Not only the context and nature of domination need to be documented in this case, but the very fact of domination has to be proven to most Americans. In North America, technology and science have been developed so as to create immeasurable greater conditions for the administration and manipulation of individuals. (Giroux, 1981: 136 and 137)

By evidence of his discussions with community groups, it is apparent that now, more than ten years later, Freire is more cognisant of the nature and extent of ideology in North America. While insisting that alienation and its accompanying fatalistic attitude is, worldwide, the greatest in the cities of highly industrialized nations (he cites New York City and Toronto as examples), he places ideology within such contexts as problematic, and in great need of further study in order to advance a coherent, relevant, and practical pedagogical and political approach in the interest of liberation in North America. While he appears to hold back on developing such a rigorous examination of ideology in this context himself, he has no hesitation to challenge North Americans to develop it themselves, especially in relation to constructing an appropriate pedagogical approach for this context. (4)

2.d. Technological rationality

Marcuse views the specific relations of production of early capitalism as progressive towards sustaining individualistic rationality, viewed as^o relatively critical and oppositional, inasmuch as the economic subject:

derived freedom of action from the unrestricted liberty of thought and conscience and measured all social standards and relations by the individual's rational self-interest. (Marcuse, quoted in Geoghegan, 1981: 64)

With the transformation of early capitalism into monopoly capitalism, Marcuse argues that the economic basis for individualistic rationality was transformed, constituting one which gave rise to technological rationality. Geoghegan (1981: 64) locates this transformation in "the demands of the market (which) induced greater and greater mechanization and rationalization". Referring to the transformation of individualistic rationality, he outlines and quotes Marcuse from Five Lectures :

it was precisely this dimension which, Marcuse believed, mass production and distribution had effectively eradicated. The relationship between individuals and between them and their society is now an immediate, mechanical identification so thorough that autonomy is considered a curse:

The antenna on every house, the transistor on every beach, the jukebox in every bar or restaurant are as many cries of desperation --not to be left alone, by himself, not to be separated from the Big Ones, not to be condemned to the emptiness or the hatred or the dreams of oneself. (Geoghegan, 1981: 78)

Marcuse (1969: 7) lodges this transformation within the historically specifically-capitalist relations of production, pointing towards the "escalation of commodity production and productive exploitation".

Within these material changes, the contemporary ideological

hegemony' also transformed, and in so doing dialectically transformed ideology, especially with regard to its scope, depth and relation to materiality and the body. Marcuse feels this to be so much the case, that by consequence, human nature (thus indicating its historicity) was also transformed. Outlining this transformation, Marcuse (1969: 11) finds that:

The so-called consumer economy and the politics of corporate capitalism have created a second nature of man which ties him libidinally and aggressively to the commodity form. The need for possessing, consuming, handling, and constantly renewing the gadgets, devices, instruments, engines, offered to and imposed upon the people, for using these wares even at the danger of one's own destruction, has become a "biological" need... The second nature of man thus militates against any change that would disrupt and perhaps even abolish this dependency of man on a market ever more densely filled with merchandise --abolish his existence as a consumer consuming himself in buying and selling. The needs generated by this system are thus eminently stabilizing, conservative needs: the counterrevolution anchored in the instinctual structure.

Thus, for Marcuse, the historical material or economic relations dialectically changed the ideological realm, which had the profound effect of changing another realm of materiality. This analysis points towards not only the specificities of this historical situation, but also of Marcuse's consideration of the body in applying a dialectical-materialist method and approach. Unlike traditional Marxists, he attempts to de-dichotomize the body and mind, through demonstrating how they are dialectically related at this historical juncture. Of pedagogical importance, he points out this historically-specific "second nature" of "man" (sic.) not merely to testify the difficulty engendered by corporate capitalism for liberatory transformation, but also to delineate the sites on which ideological

struggle and political action must take place: "unless the revolt reaches" into this "second nature", into these ingrown patterns, social change will remain "incomplete, even self-defeating." (Marcuse, 1969: 11)

In order to subvert, or negate the given state of this specific ideology, it is necessary to have an adequate account of how it is actually manifested. This subversion, in turn, is necessary to liberatory transformation, not only to 'complete' social transformation, but because in many cases it may be a necessary precondition to such a political praxis. It is not merely that lacking a subversion of such ideology helps to 'betray' social change, but that its positive or operational acceptance precludes the historic 'need' for such social change in the first place. Certainly collective political praxis hastens such ideological subversion and allows a more complete view of the nature of such ideology; however, to initiate and continue it (democratically) often requires a felt need on the part of those participating, and more specifically, those who do not share the historical interests of privileged groups.

The form of this specific 'second nature', as Marcuse calls it, contains echoes of Freire's 'internalization' of the oppressor. Nonetheless, as has been already pointed out, the latter has need of being significantly revised as to its depth and content. Freire's traditional conception of 'internalization', as developed within the Brazilian context, is one which not only focuses on the 'oppressor' as an identifiable, and thus (directly) contestable object of praxis, but one which is also relatively superficially lodged. Freire acknowledges that his conception is historically specific to his social context; he recently related that it is a relatively easy task to convince a Latin

American peasant that it is not the will of god that is the cause of her or his oppression. In contrast, he pointed out, the task of de-mystifying and subverting the repressive ideology of the oppressive classes, with North Americans, is immeasurably more difficult.(5) While Freire apparently sidesteps the 'biological' aspect of such repressive ideology, I propose that this oversight perhaps has less to do with his lack of capacity to apply a Marxist analysis to human physicality, than with his relative lack of concern with relating the political to the bodies of people and vice versa.

If, according to Marcuse's conception of technological rationality, (the content of) people's 'needs' are made relatively identical to those of the capitalist class, where is one, then, to begin on a practical or pedagogical level? (6) Certainly, it would seem to be with those needs. For, if one takes Marcuse's Hegelian dialectic, such needs contain in themselves their negation or subversive 'truth'. Drawing on Marcuse's Freudian dialecticalism, if people's actual needs are repressed in order to be replaced by the needs of the capitalist class, rather than the former needs evaporating, they always maintain and thus exert an (unconscious) 'counter'-force which required the active force of repression in the first place. Thus, his dialectical approach would appear to approve starting with the positive or conscious needs, in the (materially -substantiated) knowledge that the negative, subversive or unconscious needs would surface if given the theoretical, including emotional, 'room', space or context, for its de-repression.

For example, the need for a higher salary with which to buy more (or bigger or improved) commodities may be the motivating factor of a group of mid-income workers to exert pressure on the owners of a company.

The political and educational implications of Marcuse's theory would seem to be, as a catalyst contributing to the liberatory formation of the working classes, to listen well to their demands, encourage and support political action based on these demands, and provide a theoretical context in which to clarify, reflect on and revise the group's personal and political objectives. Based on the extensively manipulated but nonetheless contradictory consciousness or intentionality of the workers, the hidden 'truth' of their initial demands (as these demands cannot be separated from the contradictory whole of the socio-economic realm), and the political praxis which such demands spurred on, the theoretical context would serve to relate the three in such a way as to study their interrelated social contradictions, including those contradictions related to race and gender; caucuses may facilitate such a process. Such a 'de-repressing' is both directive, sympathetic and aimed towards subverting the given ideology, towards a recognition of the group's 'true' (class and other) interests and needs -- interests and needs which are irreconcilable with the minority capitalist class, and thus require (further) collective political action.

The implications of Marcuse's specific analysis of domination related to those who are most directly within the field of mass administration should come as little surprise. Marcuse, in an address at the Korcula Summer School, relates that:

What we have in the highly developed industrialized countries is a class society: there is no doubt that all idle talk about "popular capitalism" or an equalization of classes is pure ideology - but it is a class society in which the working class no longer represents the negation of the established order. (Katz, 1982: 178)

Indeed two years later in a 1966 address in Prague, he was still certain

in his analysis that

The present period seems to be characterized by a stalemate in the dialectic of negativity... Today (the) development of negativity within the antagonistic whole is barely demonstrable. (Katz, 1982: 183)

Rather than regard other groups as replacements for the seemingly 'lost' role of the traditional Marxist revolutionary subject, Marcuse retains his belief in (the necessity of and practical possibility for) a 'long-range formation of a socialist working class'; his focus, however, is turned towards 'a force that had developed outside of the administered system of needs'. This force, as an actual catalyst to such a formation, was to be found by him in the 1960's in the (expressedly political and cultural movements within the) New Left, and in the 1970's in the ecological and feminist movements. As well, and included in the above, were those who felt the oppression of industrially advanced nations most rawly --in addition to women, the poor, unemployed, racial and some ethnic minorities, also were seen as catalysts for liberation.(7) By the 1970's, Marcuse saw the historical necessity of the left movement of recognizing " itself as one component of that potential agent (the working class as revolutionary subject)" thereby not only catalyzing but also allying with the working class. (Katz, 1982: 196)

A qualitative account of the specific form and content of technological rationality is offered by Marcuse, although rarely in the style of specific given illustrations or examples. What he offers is a theoretical analysis of the areas which such a rationality has invaded: (mass and "high") culture and art, sexuality, the sphere of leisure, the family, schooling, and other realms of alienation which have normally been either ignored, trivialized or mechanistically oversimplified within

a traditional Marxist discourse. Marcuse's analysis provides the theoretical basis upon which educational theorists such as Giroux and Aronowitz may claim that:

technological domination goes beyond the schools. It permeates every sphere of social existence, especially the work situation and what we may designate as leisure activities... in the last half of the twentieth century, the degree to which mass audience culture has colonized the social space available to the ordinary person for reading, discussions, and critical thought must be counted as the major event of social history. Television, film and photography, far from making culture democratic, have fostered the wide dissemination of industrialized entertainment so that the capacity of persons to produce their own culture in the widest meaning of the term has become restricted. We mean the production of speech that modifies language socially, that expresses together with popular art the frustrations and the aspirations of a people. We are referring to patterns of interaction in ordinary situations that allow for a relatively autonomous system of interpersonal arguments, to develop explanations of social events that may counter those that are considered authoritative. (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1985: 51)

In order to more adequately draw meaning, depth and relevant practical applications from Aronowitz's and Giroux's remarks, it is relevant to examine their basis in contemporary critical social theory, especially that of Marcuse's. What follows is a brief analysis of Marcuse's elaboration of 'mass culture', what he views as the historically-specific dominant cultural form.

2.e. Mass culture and the culture industry

For Marcuse and fellow Frankfurt School members, the necessity of creating a sociology/critique of 'mass culture' was commensurate with the practical developments of both liberalism (and its extension into fascism) and the monopoly capitalism with which it became increasing

interlocked. (Held, 1980: 77, 78) (8) As the meld of the two created a context caught up in administration, the Frankfurt School turned their interests to a critique of the cultural sphere, which, they felt, could not be fully explained by traditional political economy.

Increasingly, attention was focused on an assessment of the mode in which ideas and beliefs are transmitted by 'popular culture' - the way in which the personal private realm is undermined by the external (extra-familial) socialization of the ego and the management and control of leisure time. (Held, 1980: 77)

Mass culture, as one of the means of anaesthetically one-dimensionalizing the working class and others, rather than being created by the wishes, attitudes and needs of the "masses" was created by what the Frankfurt School termed the "culture industry". Culture (both material and intellectual) (9) was being infused with the (ir)rationality, interests and needs of the capitalist relations of production and consumption, with the specific purpose and function of maintaining the status quo repression which was both required by and produced by those relations. The extension of capitalist industry into culture had its expected consequence of industrializing culture. However, in addition to culture being produced solely within the organizational base of an industry (e.g. the film industry), the industrialization of culture also meant that culture became more and more synonymous with the alienation and degradation of work in monopoly capitalism. Rather than serving predominantly as a counter-force to the repressive labour process, culture increasingly took on the characteristics of that process itself, and melded the forms, if not the content, of industrial labour.

Repetition, predictability, lack of meaningful control by those who both produce it and receive it; lack of concentration, imagination, awareness and thought required to produce and receive it; and predictable scheduling within various layers of culture converged with the form of the labour process. Culture, rather than being composed of stretches of imaginative creation and rigorous concentration became subservient to (capital's) need of 'renewing' (much as 'the pause that refreshes') the labour force and containing the frustration which developed out of dissatisfaction engendered by an alienating labour process. Pleasure, rather than being the liberatory criterion against which labour is placed, becomes the formulated respite from labour --encapsulated and packaged in the very form of alienated labour itself, thus perverting pleasure into something which is compatible with socially unnecessary repression.

As well, and seemingly overlooked by Marcuse, is the monetary cost of leisure commodities which serve to materially sustain and reinforce the need to passively support alienating labour. For, this often serves to lower worker resistance to a call for more financial remuneration, in order to pay for more and better leisure/pleasure commodities, rather than call for a changed labour process which would more likely reduce the psychological, material (and biological) need for 'tension-management' and escape through channels similar to those which produced such tension and need for escape in the first place. Nonetheless, this is accompanied by a contradictory moment; for such a situation does ignite conflict with management, which is ever-reluctant to pay increases.

Having briefly discussed Marcuse's concepts of technical

rationality and mass culture, as well as their relation to each other, I will proceed by briefly examining Marcuse's analysis of mass culture by way of his specific analysis of authentic or liberatory culture and art.

2.f. Liberatory culture and critical art

A dialectical examination of Marcuse's approach to mass culture should also relate the specific context of his critique on the one hand, and his notion of liberatory culture, including 'authentic' or critical art, on the other. For, it is within the juncture of the former and the latter that the critique of mass culture, or preferably the culture industry (10), is at least partially informed and thus rendered more comprehensible.

The context of Marcuse's critique is firmly situated in the historically-specific conditions of monopoly capitalism, as the prevailing economic form, content and relations of domination. Not unlike Critical social theory itself, liberatory culture is that whose "truth-value...resides in its capacity to create awareness of and thematize, social contradictions and antinomies." (Held, 1980: 84) It "gives word and tone and image to that which is silent, distorted, (or) suppressed in the established reality." (Marcuse, in Held, 1980: 85) The established reality, or context of such culture, being one (primarily though not exclusively) of domination, liberatory culture or art necessarily becomes a negative or subversive force. Far from being neutral, it is partisan to the core. For, offering a voice or 'subversive' image as opposed to right-wing fascism, which is usually suppressed in its most vulgar forms under monopoly capitalism (at least

in the politics of the countries within North America), would not constitute a 'negative culture' as: 1. it continues to hide social contradictions rather than highlight them; and 2. its goal of "freedom" is inauthentic and makes a farce of the critical notion of freedom.

Liberatory culture is committed, explicitly or implicitly, to that interpretation of 'liberatory' which has the releasing of the actual and potential productive activity from all unnecessary social repression, in the interest of the totality, or all the people. The primary universal characteristics of human nature or essence would more thoroughly, in existential life, materialize as given universally. Thus, to a greater extent, the dialectical tension between essence and existence would be resolved.(11) Nonetheless, Critical social theory seeks to confirm that any such resolution, theoretical or practical is impossible; if present, such a resolution is, for example, usually the function of an illusory attempt to quell yearnings for real freedom without a prior resolution of antagonistic social tensions of contradictions, such as those between the collective interests of labour and capital.

As such, liberatory culture simultaneously attempts to highlight antagonistic social contradictions which inhibit universal freedom, and to highlight the false pretences of attempts to reconcile essence and existence (in the sense outlined above) within the present order of domination, with its unresolved social contradictions. Hence, one of its aims is to negate the posited or operational state of affairs as one of freedom already attained. Implicitly or explicitly, through such a negation a possible (future) alternative is upheld, achievable not merely, as in idealistic bourgeois art, via the 'soul' but rather through

rational collective political action. Hence, culture, including art, is authentic or autonomous to the extent that it breaks from the demands or necessity of the posited reality. (12) Such a precondition exists for 'negative' art because it is largely incompatible with prevailing, dominant historical discourses of the aesthetic. Sustaining its necessarily "mediated" alienation, autonomous art represents a transcendence and critique of alienated existence. And, according to Marcuse (in Held, 1980: 86), "in so doing it unites...with all those forces engaged in the critique of ideology and the revolutionary goal of 'changing the world'."

Be that as it may, liberatory art is not without its own dialectical contradictions. For,

'the claim of art is always ideology too'. Art legitimates prevailing patterns of life by suggesting that 'fulfilment lies in their aesthetic derivatives'. Nonetheless, in the very failure to establish identity, art preserves - unlike many forms of conventional expression - a critical perspective. The truth-value of (liberatory) art lies in its capacity to sustain a discrepancy between its projected images (concepts) of nature and humankind, and its objects' actuality. ((first parenthesis added by thesis author)) (Held, 1980: 82)

As well, the very rejection of prevailing consumer tastes, art or cultural norms and market tendencies which are often required by the partisanship of autonomous art ensures its liberatory critique, yet simultaneously often escalates its relative inaccessibility and subjective irrelevance for a majority of people. Despite the fact that this contradiction was acknowledged by both Marcuse and Theodor Adorno, it unfortunately appears that neither offered a substantial attempt of its transcendent practical resolution.

In addition, Marcuse's approach proper to liberatory art,

especially with regard to the potential, function and relation of such art to social liberation, appears to contain contradictions. Over time, Marcuse seemed to locate the revolutionary aspect of liberatory art from its association with liberatory political movements, to its disassociation from any type of political movement. For, after An Essay on Liberation (1969), Marcuse seemed to locate the critical aspect of art not in its relation to allegiance to a political movement, but in its independence with regard to form. Kellner notes that in Counterrevolution and Revolt (1972) and The Aesthetic Dimension (1978) Marcuse suggested that critical art

is not equivalent per se to revolution, but stands in a relation of tension with political struggles. Art and political revolution are united in wanting to change the world, but they contain a 'unity of opposites' which must preserve their own autonomy and distinct practice of liberation and transformation. (Kellner, 1984: 352)

Nonetheless, Marcuse observes that his new emphasis, as opposed to his former praise of guerilla street theatre, protest music and the general politicalization of art, is due to a response to new historical developments rather than a change in theoretical stance. In the late 1970's, Marcuse

claimed that 1960's folk and protest music, the songs of Bob Dylan, radical theatre and other forms of movement art successfully combined aesthetic form with political messages, and by contributing to a large-scale radicalizing process were playing an important part in a political movement. In the 1970's, Marcuse claims, the dissident cultures were losing, for the most part, both their aesthetic and political quality, sacrificing both concern with the formal qualities which he ascribes to authentic art and political content and effects. (Kellner, 1984: 353)

It thus seems evident that Marcuse's subsequent foray into the liberatory

aesthetic value of great art of classical bourgeois heritage was merely to highlight the aspect of form, which he saw as being disregarded in the 1970's. Rather than having negated the politicalization of art, it appears that he may have attempted to rigorize attempts to politicize it.

Be that as it may, it is relevant to relate Marcuse's theoretical attempts to relate art within power relations of inequality and domination with the aim of liberatory individual and social transformation, to the experiences and reflection on those experiences of social educators and educational theorists presently working in the sphere of the arts. For, it is they who may most profitably contribute to extending, critiquing and making more rigorous Marcuse's theoretical stances towards liberatory art.

For example, the practical and theoretical work of dian marino (lower-case characters as in her publications) and Deborah Barndt of Toronto, Ontario, have attempted to construct a critical art which uses mass culture, for example advertising photos and slogans, in a manner which transforms both its form and content to highlight social relationships of domination and subordination and to catalyze, within social movements, political action towards transforming such relations (Marino, 1981; Marino and Barndt, 1983). Importantly, such liberatory art is collectively produced with (overlapping) groups who do not primarily benefit within Canadian social and economic structural relations, for example women and immigrant workers. Equally important, this cultural production is achieved through a minimally alienating pedagogical process which makes the mediation of such mass art forms by the people of such groups more conscious and critical. Thus, such autonomous art directly makes use of mass culture (which is accessible,

by definition, to most people) and turns it on its head, through artistic creation which incorporates both ideology critique and socialist relations of production, and is directed towards political praxis.

Others, such as the feminist art-for-action group 'Artifact' of Montreal, Quebec, rather than critically incorporating mass culture in their art production, have been integrating social critique with community research through the democratic production of large murals in both the street and factory.

Such attempts to render critical or liberatory art both more pedagogical and accessible may be partly informed by (e.g. Marino, 1981) and contributive towards an immanent critique of Marcuse's analyses of critical aesthetics.

Having briefly explored Marcuse's notion of liberatory culture and art, in part with the aim of dialectically exploring mass culture by examining that which it is not, I will at present briefly examine Marcuse's Critical epistemology. This latter examination will, in a similar methodological vein, contribute towards the understanding of what Marcuse terms as technological rationality, by positing aspects of that which stands in contrast to it.

Not unlike autonomous art, Critical epistemology is, for Marcuse, a fundamental sphere for maintaining both the survival and development of a liberatory rationality or critical consciousness, and the development of a radical political praxis.

2.g. Marcuse's Epistemology

In order to grasp Marcuse's epistemological stance, it is necessary to understand its relation to the approach which informs his understanding of societal relations, culture, human nature, ideology, daily practice and the precipitated matrix they constitute as a result of the centrifugal force of unequal power relations and the heat of the struggles engendered by those relations of domination. I will thus proceed to briefly review and examine this approach, with the aim of solidly situating Marcuse's epistemological consideration therein. I will then follow this with a brief examination of his epistemology proper.

Writing of the problem faced by many 'mainstream' curriculum theorists of misunderstanding the relation between curriculum theory and cultural reproduction, Giroux (1981: 148) expresses that:

Part of the problem lies with the depoliticized notion of culture that permeates mainstream social science. In this view, culture is defined as simply a people's total way of life, the entirety of those goods, services and labour produced by human beings. Adorno sums up this definition well when he writes, 'culture is viewed as the manifestation of pure humanity without regard for its functional relationship to society'. Divorced from notions of class, power and ideology, such a definition becomes an empty social science category that relegates 'culture' 'to the atmosphere of a presumably harmonious Olympus'.

Marcuse hints at the functional and dialectically-grounded nature of culture in Negations (1969b :94), in writing that culture

signifies the totality of social life in a given situation, in so far as both the areas of ideational reproduction (culture, in the narrower sense, the 'spiritual world') and of material reproduction ('civilization') form a historically distinguishable and comprehensible unity.

This 'unity', for Marcuse, is internally distinguishable by a dialectical

tension of historical contradiction and change, rather than by mere mechanistic reflex. As Stanley Aronowitz (1981: 239) elaborates,

Working within the the Freudian tradition of philosophical anthropology, Marcuse attempted to account for the development of civilization by relating the psychological and social aspects of human activity in a complex totality. Here, the sharp separation of base and superstructure, in which production is not only accorded primacy with respect to the historical development of the human species, but is also the basis for all social, cultural, and ideological forms of discourse, is rejected. Instead, for the Frankfurt Marxist, within a complex totality, cultural phenomena cannot be accorded the status of merely a "reflex" of the relations of production.

Indeed, cultural phenomena, as do material relations of production, contain dialectical contradictions within them (being human creations) which themselves form a subset of unity --one which represents simultaneously a totality and a partiality. The totality is embodied in the dialectical relation of the negative or subversive aspect or moment which lies within the content or form of the apparent or given cultural artifact or mode, and the operational or positive moment. This contrasts with orthodox Marxism, which characterizes ideology, for example, as a cultural mode which is simplistically and undialectically viewed as 'illusion'. As Kellner (1984: 213 and 214) reiterates,

On the Orthodox Marxist analysis of the relations between the economic base and ideological superstructure, all ideology is an 'illusion' (Schein): mere ideas which reflect one set of class interests that exclude all conflicting or dissenting ideas. As a 'reflection' of the base, ideology represents reality but in a false form --false because they are one-sided-- the ideas of the ruling class which claim universal validity.

However, as Marcuse makes clear in Soviet Marxism (1958), the above traditional Marxist version of ideology is actually only one subset of

the content and function of ideology. Ideology also contains within it an aspect which serves to negate its given or operational aspect. Thus, it is not so much the task then, to 'erase' ideology with 'the truth', but rather to dialectically distinguish the contradictory antagonisms held within ideology, raise the spectre of the moment which is in the interests of liberation, judge the value of the other moment in relation to the first, and attempt to change the existential conditions which gave rise to the suppression of the latter.

Ideology, thus, is not dead wood in need of absolute life; it functions not merely as stilts to repressively structure and uphold the domination of the status quo. In Soviet Marxism (1958 :110), Marcuse indicates that,

the function of ideology goes far beyond such service. Into ideology has entered material which--transmitted from generation to generation-- contains the perpetual hopes, aspirations and sufferings of man (sic.), his suppressed potentialities, the images of integral justice, happiness and freedom. They find their ideological expressions chiefly in religion, philosophy and art, but also in the juristic and political concepts of liberty, equality and security.

Epistemology, then, as located within the particular realm of ideology, itself situated within the sphere of culture, is infused, for Marcuse, with this dialectical nature. Its function and content form a sort of all-inclusiveness which is as yet partial in relation to the dynamic potential of such a unity. Within contemporary North America, knowledge, the criteria and methods with which to obtain and verify it, as well as the discourse used in order to construct it, contain, according to Marcuse, both that which is potentially liberating and that which is repressive of liberation. It includes images of knowledge in

the interests of liberation, as well as in those of the ruling or dominant classes and social groups.

This is necessarily so, as within the dynamics of unequal power relations between differing class and social groups, knowledge which represents the goal of liberation will certainly be repressed and censored. Yet, repressed knowledge remains ever-present, as either 'unofficial' knowledge (Shor and Freire, 1987: 10), or knowledge which is relegated to the realm of the unconscious. It is the negative moment of knowledge, because content-wise it is not (often) readily observable in the positivistic sense, and because it is functional towards negating the (unrepressed) given, through both epistemological critique and informed practice; practice which is conceived as pedagogical practice as well as practice of social action aimed towards radically restructuring the conditions which repressed the negative epistemological moment. Giroux (1981: 81) outlines this admirably:

A radical pedagogy of critical thinking would help students reflect on the hermeneutic meaning beneath falsified appearances; it would also help them to recognize and act upon those social processes and forces which prevent them from creating their own meanings.

Knowledge of that which is repressive or repressing is both fundamental and instrumental for social educators. Indeed, 'liberating knowledge' includes that which is repressive of it. For, if the former is structurally censored and repressed, it becomes necessary to identify that which is repressing it, in order to attempt to dislodge the repressive obstacle, theoretically and actively, thus allowing awareness of that which is repressed.

Marcuse thus gives a more solid theoretical background to

Freire's process of 'naming' a social situation of domination (or limit situation). 'Naming', in this sense, means creating knowledge of that which is repressive of knowledge, thus representing and integrating the dual functions of knowledge production and knowledge critique. Knowing that which hinders, censors, and represses 'dangerous' knowledge, is dangerous knowledge in itself. For, in identifying knowledge which is constructed to repress that knowledge which is functional to one's (social) interests, the latter may be realized and serve the ends of unmasking further repressive aspects of one's reality.

It is apparent that for Marcuse, the problem of the need on the part of people for engaging in the 'naming' process is a vastly more complex process than for Freire, presumably because they each have been dealing with differing historical circumstances. Marcuse's foray into ideology and epistemology is rationally viewed as logical, given their almost 'materiality' within the context of industrially-advanced monopoly capitalist society. As Aronowitz (1981: 239) states with insight,

At certain historical periods, particularly in the era of late capitalism, ideas, mores, and mass culture become material forces because they have gripped masses of people and serve, on the whole, to maintain social cohesion of the existing order, despite frequent economic crises and wars that tend to produce the "objective conditions" for revolutionary change.

This converges with John Gaventa's analysis relating to a social transfer or extension of power from property relations to relations of the production of knowledge (13), as well as with the analysis of Samuel Bowles. Jeff House reports on Bowles' stance towards the transformation of property relations in the United States:

Property, said Bowles, used to be land and objects, but is now, increasingly, knowledge. And it is a quality of

knowledge, he claimed, that it does not lend itself to becoming private property to the same extent as do material things. Therefore, more and more social labour must be, in a capitalist society, directed to guarding knowledge, and preventing its free reproduction. He claimed that 25% of all labour in the U.S. is now (1985) guard-labour, and that the proportion increases yearly. That irrationality, he suggested, was being confronted by a new politics, which defined itself by asserting rights far removed from traditional concepts of property (14).

Epistemological concerns are thus increasingly political concerns under such historical conditions. As such, epistemology increasingly represents appropriate and strategic terrain within which social power struggles are and must be fought out, although, as House later suggests, not to the exclusion of "the traditional struggle between the haves and the have-nots." (House, 1986).

This is, in part, the reason for Marcuse's unceasing concern for the survival of Critical social theory. For, on the one hand, he sees that it is fast falling prey to an increasing control over the epistemological realm by ruling class interests within contemporary capitalist societies. Thus, Critical epistemological concerns, while traditionally relatively on the periphery of the grasp of the logic of economic relations of production, were quickly becoming casualties of the spread of domination. On the other hand, never was the need greater for Critical social theory, as being that ideology which is "conscious distance or disassociation from, even opposition to, the repressive reality" (Kellner, 1984: 215, quoting Marcuse). That relations of the production of knowledge have been increasingly becoming "material relations" of society, has given impetus for the pressing importance of struggle on the epistemological terrain. Nevertheless, Marcuse consistently situates this theoretical struggle within its ultimate

relevance to collective praxis related to the very practical class struggle and other struggles aimed towards ending social domination, rather than to itself as an end to behold.

The task engaged in appears to be the unraveling and examination of the epistemological underpinnings of Aronowitz and Giroux's approach to 'critical literacy', one which is worth quoting at length:

In the first instance, critical literacy would make clear the connection between knowledge and power. It would present knowledge as a social construction linked to norms and values, and it would demonstrate modes of critique that illuminate how, in some cases, knowledge serves very specific economic, political and social interests. Moreover, critical literacy would function as a theoretical tool to help students and others develop a critical relationship to their own knowledge. In this case, it would function to help students and others understand what this society has made of them (in a dialectical sense) and what it is they no longer want to be, as well as what it is they need to appropriate critically in order to become knowledgeable about the world in which they live. Thus, critical literacy is linked to notions of self- and social empowerment as well as to the processes of democratization. In the most general sense, critical literacy means helping students, teachers, and others learn how to read the world and their lives critically and relatedly; it means developing a deeper understanding of how knowledge gets produced, sustained, and legitimated; and most importantly, it points to forms of social action and collective struggle (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1985: 132).

The nature and role of Critical social theory (including radical epistemology itself), as well as its relation to human, and therefore social, action is of central concern to Marcuse, as well as to the imperative of addressing a philosophical basis of social education appropriate to North American conditions. While much of the nature of Critical social theory has been briefly elucidated earlier in this chapter, I will attempt to further clarify the nature of dialectical thought in particular, and its centrality to Marcuse's epistemology.

Marcuse elaborates:

Dialectical thought starts with the experience that the world is unfree; that is to say, man (sic.) and nature exist in conditions of alienation, exist as "other than they are." Any mode of thought which excludes this contradiction from its logic is faulty logic. Thought "corresponds" to reality only as it transforms reality by comprehending its contradictory structure....to comprehend reality means to comprehend what things really are, and this in turn means rejecting their mere factuality. Rejection is the process of thought as well as of action.... Dialectical thought thus becomes negative in itself. Its function is to break down the self-assurance and self-contentment of common sense, to undermine the sinister confidence in the power and language of facts, to demonstrate that unfreedom is so much at the core of things that the development of their internal contradictions leads necessarily to qualitative change: the explosion and catastrophe of the established state of affairs (Giroux, 1983: 18-19, quoting Marcuse from Reason and Revolution).

Dialectical thought is not only thought which scrutinizes thought critically and intentionally; it is necessarily thought about language, as language itself is 'intentionalized' by and functional to the various interests of antagonistic social groups struggling within an arena of unequal power relations. Freire, of course, highlights this relationship, and more than a few involved in the development of social educational theory and practice in North America have been fairly quick to deepen their understanding of this relationship with studies of Habermas (1971, 1984), and occasionally Vygotsky (1962). It has been to the credit of Michael Apple (1979, 1982), Henry Giroux (1981, 1983), Ira Shor (1980; with Freire, 1987), and Kathleen Weiler (1988) to additionally follow through on Marcuse's insight regarding the concretization of ideology in contemporary North American society. In other words, they have, each in their distinctive manner, taken as a concern the way in which epistemological ideology as hegemony (15) has

been structured into the daily practices which constitute education, specifically curriculum and pedagogical practices in schools.

Apple, Giroux, Shor and Weiler have attempted to redefine the relationship between theory and practice in the area of schooling. All view as vital towards regenerating a viable theory of radical education, the manners in which curriculum and classroom practices have been not only structured (in silence) for hegemonic reproduction, but importantly how these structured practices are mediated by those who participate in classroom relations. Giroux's and Shor's emphasis, in particular, is aimed towards engaging students and teachers alike in creating new theoretical contexts in which to critically examine their own practices, including that of knowledge production, with the aim of producing knowledge with which to inform a more intentional and effective mediation of those practices.

Maintaining an approach based on critical theory, Giroux (1983: 21) elucidates the relation between theory and practice as he views it:

Theory...should have as its goal emancipatory practice, but at the same time it requires a certain distance from such practice. Theory and practice represents a particular alliance, not a unity in which one dissolves into the other.

Such an approach to epistemology is thus 'critical' of itself, rejecting any absolute pretense to having uncovered unchanging truths. Nonetheless, by acknowledging critical epistemology as self-reflective and thus in development, there is no abdication to relativism. One set of goals with which to inform knowledge production is not equal to another; critical epistemology is a partisan epistemology. As Giroux explains, in Theory and Resistance (1983 :19):

According to the Frankfurt School, all thought and theory are tied to a specific interest in the development of a society without injustice. Theory, in this case, becomes a transformative activity that views itself as explicitly political and commits itself to the projection of a future that is as yet unfulfilled. Thus, critical theory contains a transcendent element in which critical thought becomes the precondition for human freedom. Rather than proclaiming a positivist notion of neutrality, critical theory openly takes sides in the interest of struggling for a better world.

In recognizing that not only is knowledge socially constructed, but socially constructed within specific power relations of (often antagonistic) social and economic interests, Giroux and Marcuse consciously direct their epistemology with a goal and vision which necessarily conflicts with the dominant epistemological paradigms, such as liberal positivism (16), liberal relativism (17) and conservative absolutism (18). For, while the dominant paradigms do contain liberatory moments, they are, according to Marcuse, constructed out of interests which are partisan, wittingly or unwittingly, to 'the other side' --that of capitalist relations of production, social repression and ultimately, the dehumanization of people.

What I have attempted above is a brief examination of Marcuse's epistemological approach. I have attempted to situate it within his Critical social theory, in general, and to present the former as a logical outcome of the latter.

2.h. Mass culture, liberatory culture and human action

As Held (1980: 108) notes, the specific transformation of capitalism and culture within the era of monopoly capitalism in North

America, in dialectical fashion, increasingly:

- establishes a (false) harmony between public and private interests;
- reinforces privatization and consumption orientations;
- spreads an advertising aesthetic;
- undermines indigenous working-class culture;
- increases the domination of instrumental reason; and
- manipulates sexuality - leading to the general pursuit of false and limited wants and needs, repressive desublimation.

The outline above serves to highlight the interrelation among the various facets of mass culture; an interrelation which weaves a totality as threaded by the development of monopoly capitalism, and abetted by mass production and consumption by virtue of capital's usage of the advanced technological means available.

Rather than review the first five facets of the above effects and manifestations of the culture industry, already briefly discussed or noted in the previous sections, I will attempt to presently set the context for an examination of the sixth facet, namely that of the manipulation of sexuality and the structure of needs by discussing the relation between culture, as theoretically understood in general, the historically specific form of mass culture, and contemporary human nature (19). Thus, more directly than before, I will turn to introducing the biological/ psychological/ social aspects of the people who mediate these effects and manifestations --the simultaneous subjects and objects of mass culture. This will be attempted with the aim of furthering an understanding of both the (often contradictory) praxis of the popular classes as well as their allies, in relation to such conditions of

domination, and the potential of their present praxis towards one which is more consciously mediated, hence towards a less alienated praxis and one which is more radical and consciously political.

Just as monopoly capitalism is based on, according to Marcuse, an irreconcilable social contradiction and thus is a totality in movement towards reconstituting itself, so is it with the specific form of culture and ideology which it reproduces. While the specific form and content created by the culture industry does indeed, as Marcuse laments, serve to negate the potential negation of monopoly capitalism by the traditional revolutionary subject (the working classes) and other social groups, at no time is the potential negation of monopoly capitalism smothered to the point of disappearance. The contradictions created by and within the culture industry do not disappear; they are present despite the function of the culture industry of erasing such contradictions. While social/economic contradictions are ever-present and even much intensified historically in North America, the culture industry does make them more difficult to perceive and to act against by those people who actively mediate it.

An implication of special importance to social educators is that while the contradictions held within mass culture may be pedagogically useful towards exploding the myths of the culture industry and thus allowing an everyday life which is more consciously mediated, this cannot remain the sole or ultimate goal and even focus of social education. For, while Critical theory elevates the importance of everyday life (and hence not only life at the away-from-home workplace), it nonetheless recognizes that everyday life is dialectically structured by capitalist relations of production. Critiquing and transforming mass culture and

the culture industry is indispensable for individual and social transformation towards liberation. However, mass culture or the culture industry is a historical symptom of a more basic cause, according to Marcuse, and as is well-substantiated by Braverman (1974). As social education is aimed ultimately towards the freeing of human productive activity, participatory socialist relations of economic production are required to transform alienated capitalist relations. For, as long as capitalist relations of production form the economic mode of society, individual and social liberation will be limited and subservient to domination as structured by alienated economic relations of production.

Held (1980) questionably argues that the difficulty of theoretically and practically transcending contemporary ideology is, it seems, due to the changing structure of ideology by and in the era of monopoly capitalism.

The transition from autonomous to standardized /pseudo-individualized cultural forms also marks a transformation in the nature of ideology. The critique of ideology, as the immanent critique of an object - a critique which (to put it crudely) assesses an object in terms of its own standards and ideals - is possible only in so far as 'ideology contains a rational element with which the critique can deal'. Capitalist exchange, for example, can be assessed in light of its own, substantial claim to be just. But when people become 'objects of calculation', as the consumers of the culture industry, then the ideology which informs this calculation is no longer simply false by its own standards - for it has none. It represents nothing other than 'manipulative contrivance'... Ideology is no longer just socially necessary illusion. Rather, it is rapidly becoming a planned construct which duplicates and enforces the status quo .(20)

Be that as it may, Held's interpretation of the Frankfurt School's sociology of ideology seems to be bordering on the abandonment of the dialectical materialism he so highly regards and sees as so central to

that School. Certainly, individual aspects of the ideology which stem from the culture industry, as isolated facts, may be devoid of a rational(ized) ideal. However, when one understands the reality of the culture industry as part of the material processes which constitute it, ideology always has a dialectical and contradictory nature, one which both enables and facilitates its critique and historical transformation. For, ideology can only be understood in relation to the totality which gives it reason, function and significance.

Giroux, I argue, more successfully grasps the internal dialectics of Marcuse's analysis of ideology, as well as those of other Frankfurt School members. In Giroux's assessment, contemporary culture and ideology are never reduced to an impasse, thus more correctly, I propose, interpreting the underlying theory which informs Marcuse's analysis of ideology in advanced industrial society. Giroux quotes Adorno:

(The conventional view of culture) overlooks what is decisive; the role of ideology in social conflicts. To suppose, if only methodologically, anything like an independent logic of culture is to collaborate in the hypostasis of culture, the ideological proton pseudos. The substance of culture...resides not in culture alone but in relation to something external, to the material life-process. Culture, as Marx observed of judicial and political systems, cannot be fully "understood either in terms of itself...or in terms of the so-called universal development of the the mind." To ignore this...is to make ideology the basic matter and to establish it firmly (Adorno, in Giroux, 1983: 22).

Regardless of the condition of ideology and mass culture in advanced industrial society, Marcuse, as opposed to Habermas, never abandons the above supposition, which Adorno states so clearly (Giroux, 1983: 26).

Consistent with his interpretation, Giroux does not dismiss the challenge provided by Marcuse, Adorno and Horkheimer regarding the degree and extent of the influence of culture industry. While Marcuse

acknowledges the contemporary absence of the working classes as the negation of monopoly capitalism, he regards this absence as superficial; other contemporary groups more marginal to the culture industry may be 'revolutionary', yet only inasmuch as they may catalyze and link up with a widespread (organized) socialist working class.

Hence, Giroux admirably does not hesitate to study working class culture as problematic yet dialectical. He sidesteps both romanticizing it as a finished 'ideal' to be placed on a pedestal, on the one hand, and (with pessimism and elitism) viewing it as totally eclipsed of truth, passion and vision. He critiques both 'culturalist' and 'structuralist' Marxist positions, positing the weakness of each in their loss of sight of the dialectical relationship between their respective and distinct emphases.

In approaching the relation of culture and ideology as experienced by the individual, Giroux substantiates a dialectical view of consciousness by situating working class consciousness, as well as that of other social groups, within his broader dialectical materialist theory.

While Giroux follows Gramsci in his interpretation of human behavior, I propose that it is Marcuse who best offers substance to it. Giroux (1983: 146) argues that

human behavior is rooted in a complex nexus of structured needs, common sense, and critical consciousness, and that ideology is located in all of these aspects of human behavior and thought so as to produce multiple subjectivities and perceptions of the world and everyday life. That is, the referent point for the interface of ideology and individual experience can be located within three specific areas: the sphere of the unconscious and the structure of needs, the realm of the common sense, and the sphere of critical consciousness.

In Chapter Three, I intend to critically examine Marcuse's approach to the first of these three spheres, namely that of the unconscious and the structure of needs. This examination will be undertaken in relation to and will have implications for the realms of critical consciousness, and at times, of common sense.

3. Summary

In this second chapter, I have examined Marcuse's approach to the structure of contemporary North American society, especially as related to Freire's approach to societal structural relations. This examination set the context for a discussion of Marcuse's general theoretical approach to ideology, and his analysis of that ideology which is historically specific to contemporary North America. I have briefly examined the latter with respect to his notions of technological rationality, mass culture or the culture industry, as well as of liberatory culture, including critical art, and of liberatory epistemology. A brief analysis of the relation of mass culture, liberatory culture and human action was then offered, with the simultaneous aims of expanding on the nature of ideology within North America, and introducing the subject of the following chapter, namely an examination of Marcuse's approach to the realm of the unconscious and the structure of needs.

Notes of Chapter Two

1. Freire, related in a lecture during a plenary session of the Participatory Research Conference, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass., June, 1984.
2. Freire, The Politics of Education (1985), p. 88, as well as in several group discussions at U. of Mass, 1985. In particular, when animating a group of Amherst-area community workers and organizers, Freire encouraged them to collectively study ideology owing to its significant relevance to their specific context.
3. Freire mentioned the importance of acknowledging the limits of one's historical context and action, not only as a pedagogical tool for challenging them, but also as a means of offering a (constructive) sense of security to those historical actors. At a community meeting in Springfield, Mass., 1985.
4. Freire, in community discussions, Amherst, Mass., 1985.
5. Freire, in a dialogue with community workers at Springfield, Mass, 1985.
6. It is recognized that Marcuse did not view all groups as being equally 'imbued' with the ideology perpetuated by capitalist relations of production, and other structural relations of domination. See the following sections for elaboration.
7. Katz, Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation (1982), p. 179. Marcuse ultimately recognized the New Left as a small and homogeneous force, cut off from any serious working class base and lacking the vital synchronization with liberation movements abroad. See Katz, (1982), p. 183 for elaboration.
8. Marcuse's notion of the culture industry is shared with Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno of the Frankfurt School.
9. Marcuse differentiates material and intellectual or artistic culture. See Held, Critical Theory (1980), p. 80.
10. The Frankfurt School's initial usage of 'mass culture' gave way to the term 'culture industry'. See Held, Critical Theory (1980), pp. 90 and 91 for elaboration.
11. Similarly, the tension between the individual and his or her society would be more fully, yet never completely, reconciled.
12. This may refer to various contexts: the requirements of the art dealers within capitalist commodification; the habituated expectations of consumers; and so on.
13. John Gaventa, in a general address at the Participatory Research

Conference, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass., June, 1984.

14. House, "Education/Samuel Bowles", in FUSE, Dec.-Jan. 1986.
15. See Gramsci, Selections From the Prison Notebooks (1971) for a full elaboration of the the dialectical concept of hegemony.
16. For excellent critiques of positivist epistemology and culture, see Aronowitz, The Crisis in Historical Materialism (1981), and Giroux, Ideology, Culture and the Process of Schooling (1981).
17. See James, Pragmatism (1955) for a classic discussion of epistemology from the standpoint of liberal relativism. See also, Morris, Existentialism in Education (1966) for a discussion of relativism from an Existentialist perspective.
18. Martin, Realism in Education (1969) offers a discussion of epistemology, especially as related to considerations of education, from a conservative perspective. Also, see Chesterton, St. Thomas Aquinas (1956) for a conservative approach to knowledge from a religious perspective.
19. That Marcuse, in referring to 'human' nature, refers to the nature of all people and not only the nature of the male gender, is sometimes debatable. Indeed, that Marcuse sometimes focusses narrowly on men in defining and discussing human nature is especially evident in parts of his analysis of psychoanalytic theory. This points towards a severe limitation of Marcuse's Critical social theory, namely that of his often androcentric approach, despite his proclaimed solidarity with the feminist movement of the 1970's.
20. Held, Critical Theory (1980), pp. 106 and 107. Held, here, refers to Aspects of Sociology of the Frankfurt School, 1956.

Chapter Three:

The Unconscious and the Structure of Needs:

Marcuse's approach to the psycho-sexual realm

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I will attempt to examine Marcuse's approach to the realm of the unconscious and the structure of needs, and more specifically, his approach to the psycho-sexual realm, as they are historically constructed in the contemporary North American context. Finding the theoretical and historical justification for extending a dialectical ideology critique and analysis to the psycho-sexual realm and the structure of needs, Marcuse transforms aspects of Freud's clinical and meta-psychology by focussing on their relevance to the contemporary context of North America through subjecting them to a well-honed dialectical materialist analysis. While I argue that his examination of the realm of the unconscious and the structure of needs suffers from being, at times, androcentric, I also nonetheless conclude that, if critically evaluated with reference to the above significant shortcoming, his findings do have relevance and significant implications to the work of social education.

In achieving the aim of this chapter, I will first offer a brief context of this study, and then focus on Marcuse's interpretation of Freud's psychoanalytic theory, and in particular, Marcuse's approach to repression, in the general sense, especially as it is partially constructed through unequal social power relations within North America. Woven into this study at times are possible implications of such an

interpretation for social education and 'liberatory praxis in North America.

2.a. Setting the context

Marcuse's critique of the culture industry and the capitalist relations of production through which it has developed, points toward the necessity of (self-)reflection and ideology critique in relation to (one's) needs, desires, experience and unconscious process. He offers an exposition on how, and to what extent and forms these areas are mediated within the culture industry and rendered problematic in relation to liberatory thought and praxis. Marcuse concludes, in the vein of Freire, that (permanent) cultural revolution is a necessary aspect of truly radical social transformation. Unlike Freire, however, Marcuse provides significantly more depth and breadth to his notion of cultural revolution specifically with regard to the study of the obstacles facing such a cultural revolution, of the (latent and actual) possibilities of overcoming these obstacles, and of the necessity of such resistance in the face of domination as it is specifically manifested in contemporary North America.

Marcuse problematizes the popular acceptance of fascism in the 1930's and 40's, the de-radicalization of socialist politics in Europe in the mid-1900's, as well as the relative popular acceptance of, and adaptation to, the demands of monopoly capitalism. For, tracing the changing context of industrial capitalism to monopoly capitalism (1) and its structural effects on culture and labour is a matter distinct from the actual acceptance of these structural effects by those who participate in and mediate such culture and labour.

At the same time as Marcuse is looking for reasons for such a popular acceptance of what was essentially against the interests of the popular classes and their allies, he is simultaneously searching for reasons for a future refusal of the demands of monopoly capitalism. He is in search of defining the operational or affirmative moment, with a view towards apprehending, raising the specter of and catalyzing the negative or subversive moment. Traditional Marxism had neglected this area of study, and seemed hesitant to problematize the failure of one of Marx's predictions, being that of (class-conscious) proletarian revolution in the industrially-advanced countries.

Marcuse, in this specific project, turns towards psychoanalytic theory, historicizing and otherwise creating a Marxist revision of it (2). Freud's theory, as a theory of socialization of the individual, provided for Marcuse a materialist foundation for psycho-social development in biological processes and drives, as well as a dialectical discourse (yet one lacking in historical rigour), and thus a theory which to a great extent spoke the same language as Marcuse's dialectical materialism. Marcuse attempts to apply more rigour to Freud's own dialectical and materialist approach, taking Marxist categories as the basis for historicizing it. Marcuse, in doing so, effectively and simultaneously, yet not unproblematically, made Marx's dialectical materialism more rigorous with regard to the latter's treatment of human nature and of the subjective factors of social domination and liberation.

If human behavior and the intentionality which guides it is partially rooted in the sphere of the unconscious and the structure of needs, and exists within and in relation to a specific historical social structure (as the interplay between between the infrastructural and

superstructural realms), the question beckons: What is the historically particular dialectical relation between the unconscious and the structure of needs on the one hand, and the specific conditions of domination within monopoly capitalism and its attendant culture industry on the other hand?

Marcuse set out to explore this question, and I will proceed by outlining and examining some of his findings, with the aim of providing an enriched theoretical basis of the dialectical relation between subjectivity and objectivity under monopoly capitalism, inasmuch as it may provide implications for the goal of engaging liberatory political praxis and means towards engaging it, particularly as catalyzed by social education.

2.b. Marcuse's examination of psychoanalytic theory

In order to guide our examination of Marcuse's exploration of Freud (1856 - 1939), it is of paramount importance to locate the tensions within Freud's psychoanalytic theory which Marcuse sees as relevant to his own concerns regarding the dialectics of domination and liberation.

A general tension which Marcuse finds in Freud's theory is the dialectic Freud posits between culture and the individual; ultimately, in Freud's view, the two are antagonistic in that they each hold conflicting needs and demands. Freud claims that culture or human society requires the repression of many individual needs and the freedom to satisfy those needs -- indeed, cultural processes aim towards structuring the needs of the individual through the general means of repression, towards sublimation, deflection and repression proper (3) in an attempt to quell those aspects or needs of the individual which are inimical to the

maintenance and indeed the development of culture. Marcuse problematizes this tension which Freud posits within the context of the former's concern for the desirability of social liberation which would engender individual freedom, including the maximal freedom from social repression to satisfy individual needs. Simultaneously, Marcuse problematizes such a tension in his search to understand the given context of contemporary North American society, of which the repression of human needs is so inherent.

Particularly relevant in the contemporary historical context for Marcuse is the dominant public approach of fatalism towards social liberation and liberatory praxis, as well as towards analyzing contradictions between frustrated human needs and the claims of societal benevolence and societal freedom by and within contemporary institutions. Hence, Marcuse questions whether this historically specific society based on relations of domination and subordination may indeed sustain such relations by structuring and managing the structure of needs of the individual through social and psychological / instinctual repression in such a way that the need itself for freedom by the individual is repressed out of consciousness. This stands in contrast with Freire's reliance upon Fromm's analysis of the 'fear of freedom' (4). For, the latter concept is apparently based on a recognition that the individual is aware of wanting the freedom to satisfy socially repressed needs, yet that individual is afraid of that freedom, thus avoiding it.

Approaching such concerns, Marcuse takes seriously the materialist dimension of Freud's psychoanalytic theory, thus viewing humans not only in terms of their historicity but also of their bodies. Thus, Marcuse questions whether there is, given Freud's positing of the

death instinct (Thanatos) as complementary and antagonistic to the life instinct (Eros), a material basis of hope that humans, as active subjects, can and will negate the present (and future) conditions of domination. (5) Or, as Freud concluded, is the material basis of human nature, insomuch as humans are both biological and cultural beings, such that people are subtly yet surely to forsake true personal and social liberation? If Freud was correct in his assertions related to such obstacles to personal freedom and liberatory social freedom; that is, if there is a material basis, located dialectically in the structural relationship between the biological and the cultural spheres of human existence, to the above obstacles; then, 1. is it permanent, and immutable, thus leaving no recourse for hope, regardless of change or developments in the structuring or organizing of society?; and 2. if it is not permanent, then what is required to escape or reduce the hold of such a problematic material / cultural dialectic?

Posed another way, under what historical conditions would the dialectical relationship between the biological and the cultural spheres reduce its reactionary or counter-revolutionary tendency, and how are those specific historical conditions to be achieved if they are not, at present, manifest? As well, if there is a basis of hope lodged within the dialectical relationship of biology and sociality, then what characterizes this hope and how can it be strengthened as well as rendered more pedagogically functional towards the end of individual and social liberation?

These questions are of crucial relevance to those working in social education. For, it is they who are directly, practically and purposefully concerned with the people who mediate the dialectic of

domination and liberation through their lives. The work of social educators is with those people of the oppressed classes and groups, towards the strengthening of their liberatory praxis (including ideology critique and the political action which it simultaneously informs and is catalyzed by), within social change movements. This is functional towards the freeing of these people's productive activity and the creation of a minimally-alienated existence. Of equal importance, such questions may be directly useful to social educators themselves, towards their own self-reflection and immanent critique, especially in relation to their own educational praxis, proper.

2.c. Marcuse, Fromm, Freire and the realm of material relations

Indeed, as Bertell Ollman's opening sentence to Social and Sexual Revolution locates the book's object of study, namely "Why haven't workers in the advanced capitalist countries become class conscious?" (Ollman, 1978 :3), Marcuse's study of Freud is, to a great extent, similarly inspired (see Geoghegan, 1981: 43). As Kellner (1984: 154) notes,

In a 1978 interview Marcuse told me that he turned to intensive study of Freud because he was aware of the absence in Marxism of emphasis on individual liberation and the psychological dimension. Marcuse claimed that he wanted to produce a theory that would explain why revolutionary consciousness had failed to develop and which could identify the subjective conditions which led individuals to conform to fascism, Stalinism and consumer capitalism.

Marcuse takes seriously the notion that such subjective conditions are not only dialectically related to the external forces and contradictions of economic material reality, but also to those of the internal or biological material reality. As opposed to both Freire and

Fromm (whom Freire often refers to in elaboration and justification of his view of the psychological sphere of human nature), he takes a stance towards human nature which is, I believe, more rigorously dialectically materialist. Both Freire and Fromm, it seems, locate the materially-based variable in the definition of human nature in the external environment, for example including the economic relations of production and cultural relations, and to a superficial extent familial relations. According to this outlook, if human nature is to be transformed, it is towards these realms that the dialectic of reflection and action must be directed, through political activity. Through such political activity, as both an end and a means, the 'true' nature of humans is developed, expressed and experienced.

Thus, for both Fromm and Freire, human nature is historical, and exists in dialectical relationship to the external material relations one participates in. It is also to be remembered that for Freire, human nature is an ontological, as well as historical, vocation. Thus, as well as 'making' ourselves through our social and economic relations, we are by the nature of our very being self-directed autonomous beings directing our praxis against forms of destruction and domination, and towards forms of freedom, of solidarity and love. This unqualified acceptance or belief is, perhaps, evidence of Freire's religious idealism (6).

Marcuse, on the other hand, problematizes the 'ontological vocation' of humans as a construct which is inadequately grounded in the body, and undialectical and abstract in its idealism. His study of human nature led him to Freud's theory as one which provides a further material basis of human nature. In the acceptance of Freud's post-1920 instinctual model, Marcuse believed that he was making more rigorous the

dialectically materialist nature of social psychology (Kellner, 1984: 161). Indeed, I propose that Marcuse saw in Freud's positing of the dialectical relation between the life and death instincts a more rigorous dialectical theory than that accepted by Fromm, as well as Fraire (7).

Thus, while for Freire hope is historically and spiritually based, in relation to the material economic relations of production, Marcuse, in contrast, attempts to found his hope in the historical, and the material realm of not only economic relations of production, but also of the human body. For, along with the death instinct, Marcuse found a biological tendency which strove towards unlimited freedom and satisfaction. This provides for him a repository or cache of hope in both the individual and in society, given the sheer weight and breadth of the nature of domination within monopoly capitalist societies. That this tendency or force is an active force sustaining pressure against its repression, indeed increasing its counter pressure or force with the increase of repression, provides Marcuse with (additional) reason to be hopeful.

Hence, as Marx had previously attempted, Marcuse probes and attempts to find hope in the nature of and contradictions within the given material reality, this time expanding the definition and scope of material reality. Going beyond Marx in applying Marx's dialectical materialism, Marcuse (basing himself on psychoanalytic theory) enunciated another primary material sphere of contradictions which may 'motor', though not independently, and guide individual and social reality. This consideration of the body as a relevant material realm has been approached by many feminist social theorists, in various different ways

(e.g. O'Brien, 1981; Miles and Finn, 1982; Chodorow, 1978; Jaggar, 1983), several focussing on a (re-)consideration of psychoanalytic theory in particular (Mitchell, 1975; Rubin, 1975; Chodorow, 1978; Dinnerstein, 1977), though not always unproblematically (Jaggar, 1983: 127). Several of these feminist social theorists appear to argue that masculinist social theory neglects such consideration of the body because of both the social interest men as a group maintain in their control over women's bodies, and the relation of alienation with which men exist with regard to the productive activities of childbearing and, more historically, childrearing. Not unlike many feminist theorists, as well as several other social theorists, such as Michel Foucault (1978, 1980), Marcuse approaches the body and sexuality as political, constituted within power relations of domination and subordination, as well as with the intent of liberatory political goals. (8)

Several implications of Marcuse's more dialectically materialist reading of psychoanalytic theory, i.e. its retention of the 'death' instinct, as opposed to Fromm's stance, as an instinct in contradiction to the life instinct, are relevant. First, given the structural conflict of Eros and Thanatos as it relates to the 'outside' world, it is not necessarily given that changing the economic, political and cultural relations of society through collective praxis will result in the 'freeing' of human nature of aggressiveness, destructiveness, anxiety, guilt, unhappiness, and irrationality. (9) For, as materially grounded phenomena in the structure of the human psyche and body, if they are overlooked, then no matter what changes may occur in the 'other' (external) material realm, liberation may either be incomplete and/or betrayed. Worded differently, if conflicts and contradictions (both

antagonistic and reconcilable ones) are not problematized and acted on in the realm of the psycho-sexual, then liberation itself may be both partial and plagued by the renunciation of liberation by a (collective) psychic structure which threatens to counter liberation itself. This will be briefly elaborated upon and examined, shortly.

Second, if the 'internal' material realm is ignored, human consciousness and behavior may be (unconsciously) guided by the (hidden) 'logic' of that realm -- a logic which no amount of dialogue, in the traditional Freirean sense, or political action can surface and expose to critical mediation by the subjects of that dialogue. People who consistently act counter to their immediate and long-term interests may not merely be 'prescribed' by the internalization of the oppressor, by Erich Fromm's 'fear of freedom', or simply by the common sense 'logic' engendered within and by monopoly capitalism. For, there may indeed be another material process in which such action (or the lack of it) is rooted, and, if left inactively- or non-consciously mediated, will function dialectically (and hence significantly) with the consciously mediated conflicts and contradictions within the material process of the economic relations of production as well as relations within the superstructural realm which the former have 'overdetermined'.

Such a possibility must, according to Marcuse, be taken seriously, given especially: 1. the problematic of the Marxist historical subject (the working classes), along with other catalyst social groups, as historically not yet an effective force of negation of monopoly capitalism within industrially advanced contexts; 2. a less than thorough, or unrigorous, dialectical materialist approach to human nature and psychology as apparently adopted by many of those working

within and for liberatory social and political movements; and 3. the historically recent 'irrational' mass atrocities and genocides (e.g. the destruction and murder of 30 million African Blacks through imperialist slavery, as well as of 6 million Jews across Nazi-occupied Europe during the World War Two era) which Marcuse believes have been insufficiently problematized towards the prevention of similar genocides in the present and future (e.g. nuclear war) (10).

The psychic structure, as dialectically and materially related to the external objective historical reality, functions, according to Marcuse (as well as to Freire and Fromm), under the 'rule' of the contradictions of domination. However, to Marcuse the psychic structure itself, being biologically and dialectically grounded in Eros and Thanatos, engenders and contains 'internal contradictions, conflicts, possibilities and limitations relatively independent of the immediate external historically specific objective reality. Fromm and Freire apparently disagree with this, as for them the psychic structure, while biologically based is so historical that it is 'highly modifiable'. Indeed, Fromm seems to historicize the instincts to such a degree as to make their biological basis inconsequential. (11) This fault, it would seem to be, lies with an undialectical view of the biological and social bases of the structure of the psyche.

In interrelation with and by extension of the above differences between Marcuse on the one hand, and Freire and Fromm on the other, Marcuse places a far greater relevance than does either Freire or Fromm, on sexuality and the problematic of sexual repression as related to the subjective factors inhibiting economic, political and cultural liberation. As well, Freire and Fromm appear to ignore the contributive

factors of sexuality and its de-repression towards individual and, importantly, social liberation. From Marcuse's standpoint, Fromm's

de-emphasis on sexuality (while mis-understanding Freud's theory) also led to a neglect of the antagonisms Freud uncovered between the individual and society, between the individual's search for gratification and existing forms of civilization. (parenthesis mine) (Held, 1980: 115)
(12)

Having briefly reviewed and contrasted several aspects of Marcuse's approach to psychoanalytic theory and human nature with that of Fromm's, and by extension Freire's, I will continue with an examination of Marcuse's problematization of Freud's theory.

Freud held few reservations that the answer to the question "Is human freedom and happiness possible?", is no, although he (for example, in unelaborated and isolated conjectures, usually buried safely in footnotes) perhaps harboured a modicum of speculation to the contrary.
(13) Indeed, his analysis of the relationship between culture and the individual pointed not only to the inability of people to attain freedom and happiness, but also to the inevitability of increasing individual (and thus potentially collectivized) expressions of anxiety, guilt, self-destructiveness and exteriorized aggression, with the 'development' of society. Marcuse set out to examine the justification of Freud's pessimism, convinced that while the (clinical) underpinnings of psychoanalytic theory were quite accurate, their full (social) implications were misguided by the latter's specific social and class interests, and thus distorted by the affirmative moment of ideology, functional of domination. (see Held, 1980: 121; Geoghegan, 1981: 44; Giroux, 1983: 29-31; Kellner, 1984: 157)

2.d. Freud's instinct theory: Eros and Thanatos

According to Freud's later or post-1920's psychoanalytic theory (from Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1922) onwards), the biological and psychic bases of human existence are rooted in two complementary and antagonistic drives, energies, instincts or tendencies: Eros, or life, and Thanatos, or death (see Brown, 1973: 43; Geoghegan, 1981: 44 and 48; and Heller, 1979: 7). The theory of these instincts, along with the theory of instinctual repression, underlie this examination of Marcuse's revision of Freudian psychoanalytic theory, and, rather than fully elaborate on them, I will assume familiarity with these theories by the readers of this thesis. To do otherwise would require elaboration beyond the framework and scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, a brief outline of that theory will be interwoven into the discussion.

The aspects of Freud's psychoanalytic theory which are of immediate interest to the subject under study relate to its 'meta-theory' or philosophical and anthropological theory. These aspects have been most fully developed and articulated by Freud in Civilization and its Discontents. In it, Freud forwarded his views, based on his psychoanalytic theory, on the dialectical relationship between the individual and society.

According to Freud, in stark contrast to Freire, self-determined collective praxis directed against oppression in solidarity with the totality of humanity is not enough to engender freedom and happiness, and indeed may even result in more 'unfreedom' and more unhappiness within the individual than prior to such activity, as well as under the social conditions which existed previous to it. This is, according to Freud, because Eros, or the life instinct, in such

activity, is betraying its quest or aim: individual happiness (through) unrepressed sexual relations within a unity of two people (see Freud, 1930: 55). Indeed, this 'betrayal' is necessary to collective liberatory activity because it is directed towards unifying 'humanity' and developing altruism among all people (see Freud, 1930: 55 and 56). While the life instinct serves to unify or libidinally bind people into larger groups, this service is a sublimation of its original aim. Much more significantly in serving as the cause of such a necessary betrayal is the fact, according to Freud, that in order for people to survive in society, they must perform work or labour to sustain themselves. This work, according to Freud, necessarily entails the significant repression of libido, and thus sexuality is structured in such a way as to form a psyche which is capable of renouncing instinctual (libidinal) gratification in the interest of being able to 'make a living' and to provide for oneself and one's society (see Geoghegan, 1981: 46). Such goals and activities (i.e. the building of community, and especially labour) require the repression, in the form of sublimation, of the immediate aim of Eros, thus having the effect of weakening its 'neutralizing' effect on the death instinct, hence engendering or releasing more aggressive or destructive tendencies within both the individual and society (14). Indeed, the situation is created wherein:

1. sexuality is repressed (in the general sense) in the psyche; and 2. aggressiveness and a self-destructive tendency is released in the psyche.

According to Freud, in the first case, the repressed erotic aim, subjugated into the unconscious process, equates its freedom (de-repression) with the individual's freedom and happiness. It thus, then, exerts a 'liberatory' force despite, or rather because of, its

repression.

In the second case, the repression of sexual energy, or libido, into a more 'cultural' sublimated direction effects the loosening of the death instinct, due to the decreased availability of the life instinct to bind or alloy with it. This unbinding of the death instinct strengthens its expression in the psyche (Geoghegan, 1981: 51 and 52). As I will outline below, this strengthening of Thanatos adds an additional sense and burden of unhappiness and unfreedom to that engendered by the repression of Eros itself, as offered in the first case above. For, this releasing of the death instinct is manifested as self-aggression, self-destructiveness or as more commonly known, guilt (Freud, 1930: 66). As such repression is internal, both unconscious as well as conscious aggression constitutes the requirement for guilt (Freud, 1930: 71).

Thus, with the repression of the aim of Eros, which Freud regards as necessary to culture and its development, there are two simultaneous pressures within the unconscious: 1. that of a yearning for freedom, for happiness, for liberation; and 2. that of a malaise, felt in the form of guilt (as explained above) and anxiety (as will be discussed further in section 2.h.) --indeed a pressure exerted on the ego indicating that despite what the conscious process is aware of, all is not well.

2.e. Marcuse's examination of the dialectics of repression

To Freud, it is unfortunate that such repression occurs, for, as it is necessary to him, it condemns 'man' to (at least an unerasable feeling of) unhappiness and unfreedom, which indeed increases in intensity with the ongoing development of culture. However, to Marcuse,

in contrast with Freud, this repression and its attendant pressures, as outlined above, have been redefined as both liberatory (negative or subversive) and oppressive (positive or operational) moments in the context of the domination of monopoly capitalism.

It is a liberatory moment, according to Marcuse, in two simultaneous but distinct manners in that the present specific form of instinctual repression:

1. produces unconscious pressures or demands on the conscious which contradict that which the conscious is predisposed (or 'prescribed') to be aware of under the conditions of monopoly capitalism. Given the active mediation of monopoly capitalism by those who participate in it, the unconscious thus contradicts (and hence problematizes) the claims of that historically specific mode of economic relations and organization to true freedom and happiness, and by implication, to the satisfaction of the true needs and interests of those subjects; and
2. conversely, supports their 'hunches', tendencies, thoughts and acts of resistance which reveal that the claims of monopoly capitalism are both false and lies.

The present form of instinctual repression, according to Marcuse, in Western industrially-advanced capitalist contexts presents itself as a moment of domination, or as an affirmative moment, in that:

1. inasmuch as the historical structure of instinctual repression is structured and maintained within oppressive societal relations, it

maintains a conservative force on such social relations. The unconscious, as an active process which partially determines and contributes to meaning, aims and behavior of the individual, thus contributes to the hegemonic social domination. Such 'contributions' include receptivity to and prescription by such ideology. Hence, the affirmative moment of ideology is located in the sphere of the unconscious, and as such is a conservatizing force in the interests of those who dominate, rather than the dominated, albeit mediating, subject;

2. as the demands of the repressed instincts are located in the unconscious process, they are not relatively available for conscious, and thus potentially critical and resistant, mediation by the subject. For, by the very nature of the psychological process of repression and sublimation, the (content of the) unconscious is actively kept out of the conscious process; and,

3. the guilt engendered by the repression of outwardly expressed aggression results not only in tendencies towards self-destruction, but is manifested in both the fear of authority, and the dominant moral code which is internalized by the super-ego process, as structured by this guilt (see Freud, 1930: 74). Thus, as regards (even thoughts of and wishes for) liberatory praxis, this guilt works against its planning and, especially, execution.

Given the dialectical relationship between the affirmative and the negative moments of the present structure of instinctual repression, the unconscious process is distinguished by its tendencies towards both

conserving and towards subverting the social domination inherent to industrially advanced capitalist societies. This dialecticity is based not only on the actual dialectics inherent in instinctual repression, nor on the dialectical nature of ideology as containing moments of domination and resistance, but also on the dialectical relationship between the unconscious process and the conscious process. It is this latter relationship to which I will now briefly offer attention.

While to Louis Althusser, the unconscious is seen to be a major location for the ideology of domination, the relationship between the unconscious and the conscious is seen as determined in such a manner that the ability of the conscious process to actively mediate the ideology located in the unconscious process is decimated to the point of the impossible. This, perhaps, is accurately consistent with his overly structuralist, and thus undialectical, approach towards Marxism (see Giroux, 1983: 129-139 and 147). In contrast, Marcuse stresses that the above relationship is dialectical and thus practically transcendable (Giroux, 1983: 148). Thus, he is able to sustain the conjectures made above that: 1. the conscious process is able to be aware of both a malaise, and the sense that there are needs of freedom and happiness that are not met by the current situation or definition of needs and their fulfillment; and 2. that ideology which is located in the unconscious process is indeed accessible to the conscious process, and thus accessible to intentional mediation (and hence critique and resistance) by the subject, in the interest of individual and social liberation. This dialectical view of the relationship between the conscious and unconscious processes is based, it is argued, on a more accurate reading of psychoanalytic theory. As well, it is based on a more materialist and

historical reading of it, inasmuch as through the conscious mediation of domination, people may historically challenge the basis of the necessity of such a (repressive) structuring of the instincts, given the present material resources, towards societal and psychic structures which are minimally repressive and functional towards the maximization of freedom, gratification and happiness. Thus, it is not only the case that the unconscious process is potentially accessible to and thus influential on the conscious process, but also that the conscious process, as combined with collective liberatory political action, can potentially have the long term effect of radically redefining the structure of instinctual repression, and thus influence the unconscious process. This point will be elaborated further on in this chapter.

Having briefly summarized the dialectical relationship between the affirmative and negative moments of the structure of instinctual repression, I will now continue to briefly examine Marcuse's revision of the social conclusions of Freud's analysis of the relationship between the psychic structure and society.

2.f. Marcuse's redefinition of Freud's conclusions

Marcuse's redefinition, or the turning on their heads, of the consequences Freud drew of instinctual repression is allowed by the former's: 1. (relative) historicizing of the prevailing structure of instinctual repression (and thus of psycho-sexuality), as posited by Freud as both 'normal', healthy and ultimately necessary, based on both a dialectical materialist analysis as well as on an analysis of the current historical capacity of the industrially-advanced nations to materially sustain the people who participate in them with the available resources;

and 2. Marcuse's redefinition or refinement of the goals of the life instinct and death instinct. I will examine each of the two main areas in their respective order.

Marcuse makes Freud's theory more rigorous through historicizing it, based on concepts which Freud himself offered or implied, as opposed to distorting them beyond psychoanalytic recognition (15). As Kellner remarks, much of the transformation of Freud's theory is based on a "Marxian modification of Freud" (Kellner, 1984: 164). I will elaborate this within a brief examination of the main aspects of Marcuse's 'historicizing' of Freudian theory.

Adorno leads one well into such an examination. From his "Sociology and Psychology", he notes that

Rigorous psychoanalytic theory, alive to the clash of psychic forces, can better drive home the objective character, especially of economic laws as against subjective impulses, than theories which, in order at all costs to establish a continuum between society and psyche, deny the fundamental axiom of analytic theory, the conflict between id and ego (16).

In Adorno's condemnation, 'above, of positivistic and neo-Freudian theories of the psyche is lodged the emancipatory edge of Freudian psychoanalytic theory: the irreconcilability between id and ego; the pleasure principle and the reality principle (17); the demands of sexual gratification, pleasure and individual happiness against the demands of culture, such as it historically is, based on toil, unpredictability, scarcity, and thus the renunciation of pleasure. It becomes evident that Adorno, as well as Marcuse, group the super-ego with the ego in this contradiction. The two represent, together, restriction of the 'id' in the service of 'culture'.

Based on the above contradiction, Marcuse attempts to dialectically sift apart the irreconcilable and the reconcilable tensions within it. This is achieved by indicating that the contradiction is antagonistic under the present prevailing historical conditions, but not necessarily so under other realizable historical conditions, those based on a rational organizing of society, one not based on personal and social domination. Indeed, the latter is made possible, according to Marcuse, by the development of technology, inasmuch that he believes that it has (potentially) allowed the redundancy of alienated labour.

In other words, the possibility comes into view of humans functioning on a reconciliation of the pleasure principle with the reality principle, because the latter poses relatively few restrictions on the former. However, this tension can never, according to Marcuse, be totally reconciled, under any historical conditions. There will always remain, according to him, the necessary restraint of the id by the ego (although it is not clear whether by the superego as well) to allow the process of individuation and the continuation of the human species.

2.g. Surplus and basic repression

Marcuse provides the categories of surplus and basic repression which serve to distinguish between what he views as the historically reconcilable and the irreconcilable aspects of the contradiction between the pleasure principle and the reality principle. Horowitz (1977: 2) concisely and accurately introduces these categories:

Marcuse calls the 'restraints, constraints and suppressions' necessarily involved in human growth and development 'basic repression', and those unnecessary for

anything other than domination 'surplus repression.' The conceptual disentanglement of the 'basic' from the 'surplus' aspects of repression is no simple matter, since they are empirically tightly intertwined. Nevertheless, it is one of the most important conditions for the integration of the discoveries of psychoanalysis and of historical materialism, the fusion of Freud and Marx.

Through unraveling those facets of libidinal repression which are 'surplus', from those which are 'basic', one may:

1. identify and understand more thoroughly those psychical factors (socially repressed) which structure and maintain a specific organization or mode of psycho-sexuality, one which inhibits gratification of the life instinct, and thus causes undue unfreedom, unhappiness, socially and self-destructive tendencies, and submissive (as well as authoritarian) personalities; and,
2. identify, support, and act within specific terrains of socially-structured psycho-sexual repressions which are necessarily political sites of struggle over power. These power struggles are between: super-ego and id, as consciously mediated by the ego, at the level of the individual; and between potentially ~~and~~ presently progressive groups, and the guardians of the repressive status quo, as consciously mediated by the collective intentionalities of the two opposing groups, at the social level. (18)

The specific reality which engenders such surplus repression of sexuality is named by Marcuse the 'Performance Principle', the prevailing historically-specific reality principle or dominant trend. The values

which drive this principle include:

profitable productivity, assertiveness, efficiency, competitiveness; in other words, the Performance Principle, the rule of functional rationality discriminating against emotions, a dual morality, the 'work ethic', which means for the vast majority of the population condemnation to alienated and inhuman labour, and the will to power, the display of strength, virility. (19)

Marcuse (1955: 34) outlines that

the modifications and deflections of instinctual energy necessitated by the perpetuation of the monogamic -patriarchal family, or by a hierarchical division of labour, or by public control over the individual's private existence are instances of surplus repression pertaining to the institutions of a particular reality principle (emphasis his).

By locating these modifications of instinctual energy within an organized scarcity (the consumer economy) as opposed to genuine scarcity, Marcuse feels justified in the above quote to name the cited institutions as surplus-repressive (Marcuse, 1955: 37; Brown, 1973: 94). Indeed, the above institutions are perpetuated not only because of the 'development' of culture, as Freud believed, but because of the historical development of domination (Marcuse, 1955: 36 and 37). It is evident that in the above quote from Marcuse's work, Eros and Civilization, he relates the relations of patriarchal sexual organization to those of capitalist labour to those of the state and the individual, and finally as noted above, to the organized relations of scarcity. It is in the nexus of these relations that Marcuse locates social domination, and hence aspects of its dialectical negation, liberation.

Using the reference point of the organization of sexuality, I will proceed with an elucidation of the matrix of the above relations. Gad Horowitz's Repression (1977) will be pivotal towards serving to

inform this discussion.

I will organize this examination by positing five dialectically interrelated aspects of Marcuse's theory of the repression and liberation of sexuality. While serving to outline his theory, I propose that these five aspects of it save such a theory from lapsing into the oversimplification and ultimate conservatism of many of those who have attempted to argue for a liberated sexuality, perhaps most notably Norman O. Brown (1959) and Wilhelm Reich (1974)

These aspects, which will be examined in respective order, are:

1. the extension of the liberation of sexuality to the de-repression of pre-genital sources of gratification;
2. the extension of (a redefined) sexuality to eroticize all spheres of human social and economic relations;
3. the necessarily collective nature of sexual de-repression;
4. the necessity of libidinal de-repression extending into a social struggle against, and transformative of, oppressive social and economic relations; and,
5. the notion of repressive de-sublimation.

1. Sexuality in contemporary North America is generally organized as heterosexual and genitally defined. (20) Of the many factors which structure this organization (via repression) of libidinal energy, perhaps the most significant one is alienated labour (Kellner, 1984: 168). As Marcuse, albeit with his patriarchal focus, remarks,

Men do not live their own lives but perform pre-established functions. While they work, they do not fulfil their own needs and faculties but work in alienation. Work has now become general, and so have the restrictions placed upon the libido: labour time,

which is the largest part of the individual's life time, is painful time, for alienated labour is absence of gratification, negation of the pleasure principle (Marcuse, quoted in Kellner, 1984: 169).

What is necessarily repressed in order to sustain this alienated labour is pleasure derived from the pre-genital modes of sexuality. Such modes of gratification, on a collective or social level, are repressed according to Marcuse because

They establish libidinal relationships which society must ostracize because they threaten to reverse the process of civilization which turned the organism into an instrument of work (Marcuse, 1955: 46).

According to Horowitz,

Surplus repression stunts the human capacity not only for directly sexual pleasure but also for its derivatives, the aim-inhibited and sublimated pleasures of love and work...Crucial to Marcuse's argument is the proposition that increasing repression begins to weaken Eros at the point where it has become surplus rather than basic repression. It is surplus repression that dries up the instinctual (directly sexual) reservoirs of cultural activity and of affection. According to Marcuse the release of free aggression and the stunting of the affectional capacities are the functional prerequisites of class society: affection would interfere with the impersonality and discipline of the alienating division of labour, and unbound aggression is the essential fuel for the conquest and domination of internal and external nature. Surplus repression of infantile sexuality results in the internalization by human beings of a generalized restriction on pleasure - pleasure in sexuality, in friendship, and in cultural activity (Horowitz, 1977: 68).

Specifically, what is predominantly left sexually and socially unrepressed, as structured by such surplus-repression, is monogamous heterosexual genitality. What had begun in early childhood, according to Freud, as a sexuality which could be gratified with both or either female and male (e.g. the mother, the father and the infant her or himself), and

diffused through multiple zones of the body was later to be repressed and thus localized, rejected and degraded (Horowitz, 1977: 82). Restated, Kellner (1984: 168) provides that

Marcuse suggests that in order to ensure conformity to the requirements of the labour system, there was a desexualization of the body and a 'subduing of the proximity senses'. Restrictions were put on sexuality, and sexuality was put in the service of reproduction. Certain sexual acts, like oral or anal sex and homosexuality, which did not serve reproduction, were tabooed. Further, sex was channelled into 'monogamic reproduction' within the structure of the family. Pre- and extra-marital sex were also prohibited (see also Horowitz, 1977: 180).

Gad Horowitz (1977: 93) reinforces and expands on this, especially with regard to the patriarchal relations structured by (or rather, perhaps, which results in) this specific organization of sexuality:

In the genital embrace... some of the activity of the female is surrendered, as it were to the male, and some of the passivity of the male is surrendered to the female.. The desire for the genital embrace presupposes some movement away from the equal bisexuality of infancy in the direction of an intensification of activity (renunciation of passivity) in the male and of passivity (renunciation of activity) in the female. Insofar as genital embrace becomes the sole means of sexual expression, the entire libidinal organization of the woman is in some sense thrown back onto its passive desires and that of the man onto its active desires. But restriction of sexual activity to the genital embrace is a requirement not of maturation but of surplus repressive civilization.

and, that

Only an extremely surplus-repressive society makes use of the image of active penis in passive vagina as a model for the development of the total sexuality and personality of the man and women and punishes all deviations from this model as 'perverted', 'maladaptations to the 'biological function.' (21)

Marcuse, as elaborated on by Horowitz, recontextualizes Freud's

notion of polymorphous perversity. To Freud, the collective, and thus social, repression of polymorphous perversity, that is of modes of sexuality and sexual gratification which are pre-genital, is an unfortunate, indeed sometimes unjust and cruel, but yet seemingly necessary social condition for the 'development' of culture (22). Indeed, for Freud the maximal development of mental health culminates in genitality, with the requisite successful repression of pre-genital modes of mental operation. According to him, this is universally linked to the successful repression of pre-genital modes of sexual desires and gratifications. As Freud wrote in "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego",

In the process of a child's development into a mature adult there is a more and more extensive integration of his personality, a coordination of the separate instinctual impulses and purposive trends which have grown up in him independently of one another. The analogous process in the domain of sexual life...(is) the coordination of all the sexual instincts into a definitive genital organization (23).

To both Marcuse and Horowitz this is but another universalizing by Freud of a historically particular problem (see Horowitz, 1977: 65 and 66). In his more philosophical works, Freud supports his claim by positing that such sexual repression is necessary to allow people to support toil and (thus) to keep intact civilization, which might otherwise be thrown into chaos if a (collective) de-repression of sexuality occurs (Freud, 1930: 51; see also Kellner, 1984: 186). Marcuse and Horowitz both view such toil in the present as a condition of organized scarcity and domination, and thus of unnecessarily (from the point of view of the totality of society) alienated labour (Marcuse, 1968: 261 and 262; Kellner, 1984: 164 and 165; Horowitz, 1977: 187). While such a de-repression of sexuality

would certainly, according to Marcuse, facilitate the overthrow of capitalist labour relations, such a feat would not create chaos (as Freud feared) but the conditions for creating new labour relations which would transcend the alienated labour and everyday life of capitalism (Kellner, 1984: 183 and 186). Kellner (1984: 182) asserts that ultimately,

(Marcuse) stresses that this transformation of sexuality would be a result of radical social change and would lead to a defusion of sexuality rather than an explosion. Within a repressive society, a sudden release of suppressed sexuality might lead to an orgy of sex mania, but in a non-repressive society, Marcuse argues, sexual energy could be channelled into creating eroticized personalities, non-repressive institutions, and an aesthetic-erotic environment.

Horowitz renames Freud's polymorphous perversity as polymorphous genitality in recognition of not only the possibility of the combination of a mature polymorphous sexuality and a mature genital mental organization (which Freud disagreed with), but the ultimate desirability of it (Horowitz, 1977: 71 to 77 and 187).

According to Horowitz, a genital organization of sexuality which does not exclude sexual activity which is pre-genital prior to genital embrace, is to be distinguished from polymorphous perversity. This is because in the former case, such pre-genital or polymorphously perverse activity is always 'fore-pleasure' and thus merely a detour on the way towards genital embrace. Horowitz turns on its head the apparently neo-Freudean location of exclusively heterosexual genitality as the 'normal' and 'healthy' disposition. For he locates the essence of perversity not in "the hypertrophy of some non-procreative form of sexual activity, but in the exclusivity of the sexual aim." Continuing, Horowitz notes that

Our society defines a sexual act as a perversion 'if it has given up the aim of reproduction and pursues the attainment of pleasure as an aim independent of it' (Freud, 1917, 316). But the 'essence of perversions' in the psychoanalytic sense, according to Freud, is to be found 'not in the extension of the sexual aim, not in the replacement of the genitals, not even always in the variant choice of the object (homosexuality), but solely in the exclusiveness (Freud's emphasis) with which these deviations are carried out...One component instinct has gained the upper hand...It...is either the only one observable or has subjected the others to its purposes' (Freud, 1917, 322-3). (in Horowitz, 1977: 69 and 70).

And, according to him, this exclusiveness functions to "bolster the pathological defences against the others; it is counterphobic pseudo-sexuality with little or no consideration for the partner." (Horowitz, 1977: 78). It is in this context that he argues, although not simplistically, that, "In fact, much apparently normal adult genital sexuality is counterphobic, and thus similar to perversion" (Horowitz, 1977: 69). His renaming of polymorphous perversity as polymorphous genitality is thus truer to a historicized yet still faithful reading of psychoanalytic theory.

Horowitz, though, does not read into Marcuse's account of the liberation of sexuality a necessary disbanding of forms of genital sexuality. According to Kellner (1984: 431, fn.46),

In Horowitz's view, rather than displacing genital sexuality by pre-genital sexuality, Marcuse is advocating activation and intensification of 'all erotogenetic zones'...Rather than strait-jacketing Marcuse into an either/or model of sexual advocacy, (i.e. either non-genital 'polymorphic perversity' or straight genital sex), Horowitz suggests that Marcuse's ideal advocates both enlarged and intensified activity.

Geoghegan (1981: 57) elaborates:

To abandon exclusive heterosexuality in favour of

exclusive homosexuality would be to miss the point, which is to libidinize the organism and its environment by transforming sexuality into Eros, in which the erotic impulse would not be partial (i.e. centered exclusively on objects such as the genitals, members of the opposite sex, etc.) but all-encompassing: the body in its entirety; all individuals; the whole environment.

Having viewed Marcuse's stance towards the liberation of sexuality as related to the de-repression of pre-genital sexuality, I will proceed to discuss how this freeing of libidinal energy is seen by him as necessarily entering in and infusing all social and economic relations.

2. For Marcuse, such a de-repression or de-sublimation of libidinal energy would necessarily go beyond the body for gratification and demand. He attempts to reconcile the whole of social activity to the biological aims of the libido, in order that the individual would be gratified in accordance with her or his biological and erotic need for pleasure and gratification. For, it is indeed a symptom of social domination that the demand for pleasurable and gratifying activity is reduced to the sphere of (even a highly repressed and disfigured) sexuality.

Under the Performance Principle, sexuality and eroticism become defined and accepted as a local phenomenon (genital heterosexual sex), rather than an aim, approach towards, and criterion for judging the rationality and goodness of, the totality of living. Much as the search for an aesthetic which goes beyond the realm of art and makes demands on all facets of living, this is a search for an eroticism which infuses all aspects of societal relations and modes of economic and social organization (see Kellner, 1984: 168 and 189).

Libidinal energy demands gratification in all realms. As Kellner (1984: 161) remarks,

A liberated Eros (instinctual energies which seek pleasure and gratification), Marcuse claims, would release energies that would not only seek sexual gratification, but would flow over into expanded human relations and more abundant creativity. The released Eros would desire, he suggests, a pleasureable aesthetic-erotic environment requiring a total restructuring of human life and the material conditions of existence.

It is such that the aims of Eros must be repressed in order to engage alienated labour. Marcuse calls for the eroticization of personal, social, political and economic relations, and significantly, rationality and reason itself. Thus, to him, all human activity would be guided by the aim of maximizing gratification and pleasure in accordance with Eros, continually binding people in larger and larger union of libidinal bonds. We have seen that polymorphic genitality would facilitate the overthrow of capitalism because of the demands of de-repressed libido in the face of alienated labour. It is just so because such a release of libido extends over the terrain of sexuality into all other human activity.

A minor diversion from the aim of our discussion becomes necessary. For Marcuse, while believing that scarcity in industrially advanced societies is organized in the interest of a minority owning class, is nonetheless faced with the apparent problem posed by the contradiction of the de-repression of surplus-repressed libido, on the one hand, and the ability to perform any type of work which delays pleasure or gratification on the other. For, if the pleasure principle demands only gratification, how would any type of work or cultural

/economic activity which demanded the postponement of instantaneous libidinal gratification be tolerated? Would not such activity still be necessary in a post-surplus repression society?

Kellner (1984: 178) approaches this problem by quoting Marcuse:

Marcuse claims that the unreleased Eros would evolve 'new and durable work relations', new social relations and a new erotic reality. This non-repressive civilization would transform

"the human existence in its entirety, including the work world and the struggle with nature...The struggle for existence then proceeds on new grounds and with new objectives: it turns into the concerted struggle against any constraint on the free play of human faculties, against toil, disease and death."(EC, p. 157)

This transformation presupposes a reversal between working time and free time, or labour and play.

He also correctly notes that:

Marcuse assumes that as more restrictions are taken away from the instincts and as they freely evolve, they will seek 'lasting gratification' and will structure relations that will make continual gratification possible. In this way, 'Eros redefines reason in his own terms. Reasonable is what sustains the order of gratification'...

He even suggests that there might be elements within instinctual life itself which would defer and postpone immediate gratification, if only in the interests of more intense, enhanced pleasure later (Kellner, 1984: 179 and 180).

It is evident, then, that non-repressive de-sublimation of libidinal energy is compatible with play (24) as well as work which is not alienating, but rather self- and collectively-directed, and freely chosen. Horowitz (1977: 167) elaborates:

Freely chosen, pleasurable work involves a 'dialogue relationship' (Milner, 1957) between the internal and external worlds of the worker...In and through this reciprocal interchange, infantile wish-fulfilling fantasies are brought into relation with 'the solid realities of the external world'; they are thus

integrated into adult secondary process thinking; they are simultaneously displaced onto external reality and modified, neutralized...

When the dialogue relationship with the external world - a relationship Marx called 'labour' or 'praxis' - is interfered with, a result of the external world's incapacity to relate to human desire, ...the result is 'dictatorship of the external world' (Milner) - tyranny of the object, alienation of the worker from his or her own labour and its products.

Ultimately, freed from the Performance Principle, 'productivity' would cease to be repressive, and instead, as Marcuse writes, would serve a function which "impels the free development of individual needs." (Marcuse, quoted in Kellner, 1984: 191).

Hence the contradiction raised at the outset of this brief diversion is merely an apparent one; Marcuse has not reconciled it, for it never, according to him, required reconciliation in the first place. Rather than twisting psychoanalytic and Marxist theory beyond recognition, he seems to arrive at a logical extrapolation of both which together merge in their utopian implications.

Consistent with Marcuse's notion of the political economy of instinctual energy, the release of libido tied up by surplus-repression would strengthen the life instinct to the detriment of death instinct (see Marcuse, 1968: 258; also, Kellner, 1984: 162). While, then, the aim of the Pleasure Principle would challenge that of the Performance Principle, such a challenge would be met with less resistance, for the binding of the death instinct by a strengthened Eros would result in less guilt regarding the overthrow of the status quo situation of domination. The subversive moment of the return of the repressed (the de-sublimation of sexuality) would defuse, bind or neutralize its reactionary moment (the re-instatement of the primal father on the phylogenetic level, as

further explained in the upcoming section 2.1.; as well as the predominant prescriptive relation to authority on the more existential level, due to guilt).

3. Marcuse goes beyond an individualist humanism by calling for the necessity of the collective nature of such a liberation of sexuality. Clearly, to reduce such a "liberation" to the individual level would have little effect upon challenging social structures of domination, and would easily fall into the liberal humanism which issues calls for the possibility of the liberation of the individual in the midst of social domination. Geoghegan (1981:57) writes that

Such a transformation must be a total and collective affair if the polymorphous perverse nature of sexuality is to unite and not to isolate.

As well, Kellner (1984: 184, and quoting Marcuse) makes clear that Marcuse believed that .

As an isolated individual act, released polymorphic sexuality might lead to merely individualistic pleasure that strengthens the existing repressive society; consequently, an emancipatory release of Eros 'must be a supra-individual process on common ground'.

4. Marcuse sees the necessity of such a collective de-sublimation of libidinal energy as extending into the social struggle over power, against a repressive order of domination towards a social order confluent with the aims of Eros. While I have demonstrated above that such an accompanying struggle would be facilitated by the 'loosening' of libidinal energy, it need not necessarily result in such a struggle. For, it is certainly possible to envision small rural communities of middle-class urban people who have 'opted-out' of the fast-paced city

life, peacefully co-existing unantagonistically with the rest of society, and enjoying a de-repression of sexuality. Kellner (1984: 184) contrasts Wilhelm Reich's theory of sexual liberation with that of Marcuse in this regard:

While Reich's theory can be interpreted as a programme of sexual therapy to increase sexual pleasure within the existing society, Marcuse is proposing thoroughgoing social change, and argues that the full potentiality of Eros can only be released as part of a process of social transformation.

It becomes apparent here that there exists a certain tension and anomaly held within Marcuse's approach to sexuality. For, organizing against the power of social domination takes tremendous and exhausting work (as many engaged in the task believe), which however much combined with social events is certainly not predominantly libidinally satisfying. Faced with the values and practices of life under the Performance Principle, Marcuse hesitates, in contrast to Fromm, to place the 'productive human' as the developmental aim of humankind. For, that aim simply converges with the Performance Principle, thus sustaining it rather than posing a challenge to it (Kellner, 1984: 191). Marcuse prefers, then, to see people as aspiring to a type of peaceful receptivity. Yet, he also poses the necessity of radical political action -- indeed political struggle -- in the face of the Performance Principle, and surplus-repressive society in general (Marcuse, 1968: 236; also, Katz, 1982: 79). The latter activity requires, as made explicit above, individual and social praxis which, according to his views on political strategy (which include violent revolution), seem to be in conflict with an Orpheus-type existence.

While this contradiction is apparent in Marcuse's theory, he

does, at times, appear to attempt to reconcile it. For, especially during the student movements of the 1960's, Marcuse glorified that 'social praxis', poetically termed by him as 'The Great Refusal', which clearly broke with the Performance Principle. Marcuse appeared to be involved with redefining political praxis and struggle, maintaining that perhaps the dominant approach to them was itself infused with and thus victim to the Performance Principle. Nonetheless, with the advent of the mid-1970's, Marcuse appeared to maintain that such political activity, though indeed challenging the Performance Principle ideologically, was not enough to challenge the economic basis of it. Indeed, Marcuse's later approach appears to contain the seeds of Freire's recent insistence that if a group of people have the utopian desire to redefine power, they must first take power from those groups or classes who at present predominantly define and maintain the status quo. (25) Be that as it may, Marcuse's search for a revolutionary praxis which could manifest, embody and enhance his call for an eroticization of social relations on the one hand, and effectively challenge dominant class and social interests on the other, beckons a realization of such a praxis in the contemporary context.

5. All of Marcuse's beliefs examined above regarding a liberatory sexuality as organized within the above four interrelated aspects of his theory, would be either nullified or rendered extremely problematic without his notion of repressive de-sublimation, and ultimately, the contextualization of his theory of sexual liberation within his overall critical theory of industrially-advanced capitalist society. For, without such a grounding in the existential contemporary conditions of

this context, his positing of repressive de-sublimation and the collective de-repression of libido would have (at least tentatively) proved to be a benign adjustment to and, in some cases, a reactionary response towards contemporary domination. For, in this context, the social restrictions on sexuality have lessened considerably since the Victorian Era, and even since the 1950's. (26) This has occurred despite increased productivity and the exponential advancement of technology to further reduce alienated labour, on the one hand, as well as increased social domination and monopolization of economic control by the owning class, on the other. Kellner (1984: 179) realizes this dialectical trend

The more viable the possibility of eliminating alienated labour and surplus repression, the more rigid, Marcuse believes, is the opposition of the system to radical social-economic change. To contain the possibility of emancipation and to maintain the status quo, the society becomes increasingly totalitarian, establishing new forms of social control.

However, if this were fully true, how then could sexuality be socially and structurally de-repressed under such conditions? Would not the opposite occurrence be in effect? Marcuse overcomes this problem by situating sexuality within his analysis of the diffusion of domination into the totality of human relations and life activity, as most fully elaborated in One Dimensional Man (1964). Thus he could forward the concept of repressive de-sublimation, inasmuch as

while the opportunities for sexual freedom are extended, at the same time this de-sublimation is directed into prescribed institutional channels, and one of the effects is to restrict the aims of sexuality to modes and forms which reduce and weaken erotic energy. Sexuality... can be integrated into commerce and industry, entertainment and advertising, politics and propaganda. "To the degree to which sexuality obtains a definite sales value or

becomes a token of prestige and of playing according to the rules of the game,... it is itself transformed into an instrument of social cohesion." (Brown, 1973: 160, and quoting Marcuse).

Repressive de-sublimation is the co-optation of sexuality which, rather than neutralizing the death instinct, increases the strength of the latter's hold. Rather than libidinal gratification aiming towards the free expression of polymorphic genitality and hence towards eroticism and sensual timelessness, it is aimed towards the exploitation of heterosexual sexuality which is both monogamous and expressive of the relations of domination which are the fount of the patriarchal family. Contemporary indications of this, perhaps, are: the proliferation of pornography, which eroticizes male violence and the domination of women (Lederer, 1980); and the increase of sexual assault and child and woman battering.

Horowitz (1977: 78) best elaborates on the specific nature of repressive de-sublimation of libidinal energy:

much of the contemporary 'free' (commercialized) sex is not an expression of polymorphous genitality, but a counter-phobic, anxiety- and hostility- ridden release demonstrating incapacity for full, lasting and affectionate relationships. Its function is to undermine the oppositional forces, that is, to eliminate the conscious experience of frustration and oppression, and thus to strengthen the established surplus-repressive order within the individual. 'Free' sexuality is, as Margaret (Mary) Daly says, 'expensive'; it is a 'truncated' and distorted version of the 'complete configuration' of sexuality.

As Adorno and Horkheimer realized in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, albeit in different terms, "Love as pure spirit, sex as pure body, are opposite and complementary expressions of the same repressive reality principle." (Horowitz, 1977: 79).

What I have attempted above is an examination of Marcuse's approach towards the freeing of libidinal energy, as presented through the discussion of five interrelated aspects of such an approach. What I propose to do at present is to continue this examination of Marcuse's theory of sexuality with a brief analysis of his views related to the structure and organization of the family, and its implication in the sustenance of domination, as well as its implications for the utopian possibility of liberation. For he maintains that it is ultimately through the forum of the family that the organization of psycho-sexuality is predominantly formulated historically. Marcuse, indeed, seems to have accepted Freud's concept of the Oedipus complex as the crucial event in personality formation (Kellner, 1984: 194).

2.h. Marcuse's approach to the Oedipal situation

I will now offer a brief critical examination of Marcuse's approach towards childhood psycho-sexual development as it relates specifically and historically to the development and the dehumanization of the individual in industrially-advanced North American capitalist society. Taking as his guide the particular late-Freudian stance towards the dialectic of instinctual structure and socialization, Marcuse delves into the importance which Freud placed on early childhood psycho-sexual development, especially through the Oedipal conflict, in ego-formation and other forms of instinctual repression in the individual.

Psychoanalytic theory as a radical theory of socialization can only be one which views psychological processes as dialectically, historically and materially related to other human processes and

relations in society.

As John David Ober reminds readers of Marcuse,

No attempt to discuss Marcuse's theory of psychological development would be accurate if it failed to take into account the relationship between the individual personality and the socio-historical content embodied in the forces of socialization at the present time. And today more than ever, those forces are an amalgamation of political pressures operating for the preservation of the established powers. (28)

And, reinforcing the above, Wilhelm Reich (in Brown, 1973: 48) points out that

Our psychological criticism of Freud (began) with the clinical finding that the unconscious inferno is not anything absolute, eternal, or unalterable, that a certain social situation and development has created the character structure of today and is thus perpetuated.

Marcuse shares the above critique of Freud with Reich, and approaches psycho-sexual development with the specific intent or quest for further understanding: 1. the present contributing and shaping factors of social domination and the self-abdicating restraint of the individual in the face of oppression; 2. the emancipatory moments in such status quo psycho-sexual process and organization; as well as 3. the utopian possibilities which are born out of these two historical moments.

In particular, I will examine Marcuse's approach towards the traditional importance of primary ambivalence and the Oedipal conflict in socialization and instinctual repression, and their relevance to contemporary industrially advanced Western societies, as related to the processes of individual and social domination and liberation. In relation, questions of the function and existence of guilt (superego process), the function and strength of the ego, and the existence of

sibling ambivalence will necessarily be discussed briefly within the examination.

The discussion will begin with a fundamental question: what is the relation, according to Marcuse's approach to Freud's theory, between the Oedipal situation on the one hand, and basic and surplus repression on the other? As located within the context of Marcuse's theory of contemporary social domination and the liberatory possibilities held within it, I will attempt to introduce the transformation of the above relation from pre-monopoly capitalism to monopoly capitalism.

Situating the Oedipal situation within the historical context of the process of individuation, Ober remarks that in

show(ing) how Marcuse approaches the transformation of the Oedipal situation within the contemporary period commensurate with the changing conditions of domination...it is useful to more clearly distinguish basic from surplus repression in the process of maturation in the infant. For, according to both Freud and Marcuse, frustration, ambivalence and repression are necessary steps in the process of ego formation. (27)

In order for the infant to individuate, and thereby distinguish her or himself from an 'other', aim-inhibited libido is inevitable.

Consistent with Marcuse, Horowitz (1977: 49) concisely summarizes:

Repression and sublimation are inevitable concomitants of individuation, the formation of the self, for the self is constructed out of its relations with others, and these others never fail to frustrate, and thus to require repression, simply by being "other", i.e. unable to provide total and immediate gratification as though they were parts of the self.

and reiterates that:

There can be no reciprocity in the relationship between self and other, no love in any mature sense, without (basic) repression and sublimation. Repression and

sublimation are necessary concomitants of that identification with others out of which the ego is built (Horowitz, 1977: 52).

Horowitz (1977: 52) identifies this maturation as an innate tendency, "to extend libidinal interest from body to the outside world".

The Oedipal conflict is yet another, albeit later, source of frustration, ambivalence and repression; crudely explained, hate towards the 'Other' who frustrates libidinal gratification exists simultaneously with desire for love or continued long term gratification which the Other may provide. Repression is the manner of overcoming or dealing with this ambivalence caused by frustration. The Oedipal conflict, according to both Freud and Marcuse (and as against such neo-Freudians as Fromm and Melanie Klein), is traditionally (in pre-monopoly capitalism) the crucial event in socialization, personality formation or ego-development and consolidation (Kellner, 1984: 194). It is ambivalence which is greater in degree, though not in source, than that which is encountered in the earlier processes of initial ego-formation. And as such, the repression required is also greater in degree. It is, then, according to Freud and Marcuse, the decisive mark in ego-development through repression.

How then is this marked, or primary, ambivalence, as well as its resolution, related to surplus repression? In the historically-specific traditional pre-monopoly capitalist patriarchal family, the ambivalence of the Oedipal situation is both created and resolved (repressed) in a historically-specific manner. Marcuse is in agreement with Freud in that in such a context, as the child's libido transfers or focuses towards the genital region (from the mouth and then anal region) the child develops incestuous desires towards the parent of the opposite sex (as well, to a lesser extent to the parent of the same sex). These desires for

exclusive attention and possession of the parent are modelled, to a certain degree, on the content and form of desire of the parents towards each other. As Freud notes in Female Sexuality, as the male child develops an understanding of the "relationship between his father and mother, the former is bound to become his rival." (29) What is not dependent on the specific historical form of the means of socialization is, according to Marcuse, primary ambivalence, or separation anxiety due to libidinal frustration. In contrast to Reich, who proposed that the Oedipal situation would disappear (along with monogamous inclinations which serve to resolve such a situation) in a liberated context of child socialization, Marcuse seems to accept

the central Freudian hypothesis that even the most healthy infant finds it difficult to separate from the parents, that all anxiety is ultimately separation anxiety, that a monogamous inclination in the adult, for whom husband or wife is mother and/or father substitute, is therefore not necessarily a sign of 'pathology' (Horowitz, 1977: 139).

Nonetheless, separation anxiety from the parents within the traditional patriarchal family is exaggerated. As Horowitz (1977: 138) outlines, drawing on Reich's and Marcuse's shared approach to this specific aspect of Freud's theory of socialization:

In a social context in which father and mother were not the only significant adults, in which parents did not unconsciously seduce their children in order to satisfy their own unmet libidinal and hostile needs while at the same time threatening to punish the children (castration, loss of love) for any 'inappropriately' positive response to the seduction, in which spouses were not 'exclusive possessions' and in which genital desires could be satisfied with non-incestuous objects, the 'relation between father and mother' would be 'understood' differently by the child, and the desires for the exclusive possession of one and destruction of the other significantly attenuated.

The above is hinted at by Freud in Civilization and its Discontents

(1930: 79), in which he remarks in passing,

So long as the community assumes no other form than that of the (patriarchal) family, the conflict (due to ambivalence) is bound to express itself in the Oedipus complex, to establish the conscience and to create the first sense of guilt. (parentheses added by author)

Through the Oedipal situation, specifically within the traditional patriarchal family, the child usually resolves her or his ambivalence through introjection of the rival parent, by assuming the predominant identity and value system of that parent. Through such a sequence of frustration, ambivalence, and introjection, the child may be hoped to have successfully repressed incestuous desires modelled, to a certain extent, on the relationship between the parents themselves. Through this process of separation anxiety, conflict and introjection, the ego process of the child is, in a historically particular manner, dramatically consolidated, and the superego process is initially founded. According to Marcuse, these two simultaneous but distinct processes are crucial events in character or personality formation.

While primary ambivalence and separation anxiety which require the repression of the Oedipal desire may be an eternal fact of the human condition, the degree of ambivalence, as well as the means by which it may be repressed are, according to Marcuse, open to historical change. The introjection of the identity and value system of the father by the son, and of the mother by the daughter, is surplus-repressive inasmuch as it contributes towards: 1. the child's identification with the prevailing historical reality principle of the era as one infused and functional of social domination; and 2. the foundation of the superego process which manifests itself in feelings of guilt in the child when s/he wishes

and/or acts contrary to the values and deeds of the prevailing reality principle.

It is through this specific introjection that the greatest ban on polymorphous desires is implemented. While the patriarchal family within the pre-monopoly capitalist context tends to heighten orality and anality, it also serves to severely frustrate (and prematurely, at that) those heightened desires (Horowitz, 1977: 137). Through introjection, the male child develops to a great degree an identification with the masculinist orientation of the patriarchal father, in all its facets from recognition of having a penis as meaning having power over those without one, to an exclusively heterosexual orientation. For the female child, introjection of the mother apparently results in the above orientation as well as relative acceptance of the socially-defined inferior 'place' and value of her sex.

It cannot be overstated that this introjection is not merely unconsciously mediated by the parents of the child: socialization within this familial context is achieved simultaneously through the conscious repression of the polymorphously perverse desires of the child and the conscious promotion of "appropriate sex-role development". Indeed, that the social organization of the family achieves a patriarchal mentality and instinctual repression cannot be isolated from other historical social relations which act to reinforce and shape 'appropriate' personalities.

It is also through attempts of resolution of the (exaggerated) Oedipal situation that sibling ambivalence is created. As Marie Bonapart, albeit with her patriarchal standpoint, notes,

Fortunate ...are the women who have a brother upon whom

to transfer the emotions aroused by their thwarted oedipal sexuality! For them, indeed, the brother may well have been the rescuer of their heterosexuality! The sexuality of the girl too deeply disappointed by the father, if she finds no other male to whom to cling may ... forever turn from the male... The brother had rendered his sister a signal service in teaching her not to continue hankering after her impossible oedipal love... In the same way, the sister, as substitute from that unsatisfactory initiator into sexuality, the oedipal mother, may play an analogous part for her little brother. (30)

Marcuse realizes that dialectically and paradoxically, however, through the Oedipal separation anxiety and the resulting ambivalence and introjection on the part of the young (four to six year old) child, the important and potentially subversive process of individuation is furthered, despite the identification with the parent and with the prevailing (repressive) reality principle. For, ego development (distinction between oneself and others, or individuation) is concurrent with introjection of the parent. The separation-anxiety based on the frustration of libidinal gratification, always the source and motor of ego development, in the specific case of the Oedipal situation within the pre-monopoly capitalist patriarchal family, is thus resolved in contradictory yet simultaneous consequences.

It is this dialectic of the traditional Oedipal situation which Marcuse upholds in Freud's theory when the former is confronted with analyzing the socialization of the child in the context of monopoly capitalist society, which functions on the Performance Principle.

For, with the transformation of pre-monopoly capitalism to monopoly capitalism, with its attendant Performance Principle as the functioning reality principle, the socialization of the child, according to Marcuse, has been radically transformed. While Marcuse accepts

Freud's analysis of the Oedipal situation for Freud's time, he nevertheless accedes that Freud's classic or traditional Oedipal complex has become obsolete with the advent of industrially-advanced monopoly capitalist society. Based on his analysis of the historically changing mode of social domination, as most completely outlined in One Dimensional Man (1964), Marcuse views the main event in the socialization of the child as occurring within a massified form of the family, one which underdevelops the child's process of individuation and ego autonomy. This transformed and contemporary form of socialization will be elaborated upon in the following section of this chapter.

While not apparently harkening back to the 'good old days', Marcuse seems to attempt to highlight the dialectically negative or subversive moments of socialization and individuation within the traditional patriarchal family, much to the criticism of such feminist critical theorists as Joan B. Landes. Landes argues that,

While Marcuse, like other members of the Frankfurt School, has criticized the fundamental connection between reason and aggressive masculinity, he remains committed to a theory of individuality deriving from Freud in which ego development requires the internalization of paternal authority. This tension in Marcuse's work means that the promise of an alternative form of ego identity and individuality rooted in communal forms of mutuality and solidarity --an individuality for which women appear to have a potential-- remains theoretically ungrounded.(31)

Indeed, while it appears that Marcuse attempts to derive a Freudian theory of individuation which is liberatory, he has left an ambiguous legacy: he seems to have valued the internalization of paternal authority for strategic or tactical reasons for liberation; and yet he apparently saw as fundamental the domination inherent in the internalization of paternal authority; and the repressive function it

embodies.

While Marcuse attempts to dialectically relate the two, the ambiguities and tensions in the relation may also be related to ambiguities and tensions in Marcuse's personal history, to which he perhaps gave insufficient attention. His own position of power within patriarchal society as a man, as well as a possible sympathetic yearning for lost Germanic traditions of patriarchal family relations, may have been contributing factors to the ambiguity and anomaly which Marcuse brought to his theoretical writings on the patriarchal family and its historical evolution under monopoly capitalism.

2.1. Transformation of the collective instinctual structure

In the preceding section I briefly examined Marcuse's notion of the structural transformation of the material, yet subjective, relations of the instincts within the general collectivity of pre-monopoly capitalist North American society, specifically through the transformation of the Oedipal situation. This structural transformation of the bodily instincts has important bearing on the critical or radical transformation of both human consciousness and society. This is because of Marcuse's insistent dialectical materialist (yet radically unorthodox Marxist) standpoint that the individual is created not only through his or her relations within the context of the material basis of society as economic production, but also within the context of the material basis of one's body. As such, this structural transformation of the instincts deserves further elaboration and explanation, and may be of particular relevance to those educating or organizing with the aim of social liberation.

I will proceed then to more fully, yet nonetheless briefly, examine Marcuse's approach to the contemporary transformation of the collective instinctual structure. Given that Marcuse believes that the traditionally-defined Oedipal situation has been transcended by a 'massified' process of individuation in the contemporary context, two questions of concern are raised:

1. How has this process of individuation been historically structured by and within the past and present nexus of power relations and the changing economic conditions within North America?; and,
2. What are several implications for the ability of the individual and the collective to distinguish theoretically or consciously between their own needs and interests on the one hand, and the needs and aims of those who structurally benefit from and purposefully maintain their social, political and/or economic domination on the other hand, and to act on that knowledge?

These questions will be examined in their respective order. Nonetheless, they each thematically inform the other and as such their respective discussion may be found to overlap in areas of the examination. The discussion will be primarily, though by no means exclusively, informed by Marcuse's Five Lectures (1970).

1. The Freudian analysis of the development of the ego in relation to both the id and the superego on the one hand, and the development of the individual in relation to both his/her authentic needs and those which

were required by society on the other, quite accurately captured, according to Marcuse, the reality of socialization of the historical period prior to the 1930's. Essentially, the ego was in conflict with and in contradiction to the superego; the individual stood in contradiction to society. Likewise, there existed a relative ability --indeed, perhaps, a tendency-- for the ego to weigh rationally (and by definition, consciously) the demands of the superego against the demands of the id; and similarly, for the individual to weigh the demands of society against those of his/her own needs and aims.

As pointed out earlier, to both Freud and Marcuse, the crux of this ability or tendency has historically lain in the socialization of the individual and the ego specifically and primarily within the context of the traditional Oedipal situation. As Marcuse (1970: 46), albeit with his androcentric concern, outlines:

According to Freud, the fatal conflict between the individual and society is first and foremost experienced and fought out in confrontation with the father; here, the universal struggle between Eros and Thanatos erupts and determines the development of the individual. . . And it is the father who enforces the subordination of the pleasure principle to the reality principle; rebellion and the attainment of maturity are stages in the contest with the father. Thus, the primary "socialization" of the individual is the work of the family, as is whatever autonomy the child may achieve --his entire ego develops in a circle and refuge of privacy: becoming oneself with but also against the other. The "individual" himself is the living process of mediation in which all repression and all liberty are "internalized," made the individual's own doing and undoing.

Thus, reviewing the problem, individuation / socialization through repression of the traditional Oedipus complex poses a perplexing contradiction: while it is the established means of organizing a biological-psychological structure which entrenches both basic repression

and surplus-repression, it also provides, according to Marcuse, a context of individualized struggle of which the resolution contributes towards an awareness of antagonism, conflict and self as distinctly opposed to other --of individuation.

However, Marcuse views this contradiction as accurately descriptive of the result of the historical structuring of the instincts in North America prior to the Second World War. Searching for the historical forces which Marcuse believes to have entwined with the biological forces of the instincts to bring about the general transformation of this specific contradiction, one finds that he locates them within the dialectical contexts of: a. the individual's personal and familial (or ontogenetic) history; b. industrial capitalism of the late 19th century and early 20th century as transformed into monopoly capitalism of the mid and late 20th century; and c. the phylogenetic history of humankind. I will attempt to provide an overview of each one, simultaneously examining the interrelationship among the three historical contexts.

The Frankfurt School theorists collectively introduced the notion of the transformation of the instinctual structure in relation to a changing familial context in the Institute's Aspects of Sociology . Their analysis was significantly sparked by the rise of fascism in Europe during the 1930's, and marked the departure from the traditional Freudian notion of socialization. It is worth quoting from at length, noting that their analysis limits itself to the male child:

in the early phases of his development the child still undergoes the same experiences of hate and love with respect to the father, which constituted the Oedipus complex...More rapidly than before, however, the child discovers that the father by no means embodies the power, justice and goodness that the child had initially expected. The actual weakness of the father within

society...extends into the innermost cells of the psychic household: the child can no longer identify with the father, no longer can accomplish that internalization of the familial demands, which with all their repressive moments still contributed decisively to the formation of an autonomous individual. Therefore there is today actually no longer the conflict between the powerful family and the no less powerful ego; instead the two, equally split apart...From his relationship to his father the child now carries away only the abstract idea of arbitrary, unconditional power and strength and then searches for a stronger, more powerful father than the real one, who is truly adequate to his image, a super-father, as it were, like the one produced by the totalitarian ideologies (in Held, 1980: 131 and 132).

Based on such initial studies of the changing instinctual structure, Marcuse analyzes changes which he hypothesized to the later context of post-World War Two. Examining this newer context, Marcuse concludes that the Frankfurt School's analysis, as offered above, is one in need of revision, given the changing historical situation. Indeed, Marcuse finds an instinctual structure in which "The ego-ideal becomes embodied in economic laws: 'the technical code, the moral code, and that of profitable productivity are merged into one effective whole'" (Held, 1980: 137, and quoting Marcuse). Thus, the ego, rather than being forged in struggle with a person-authority, no matter how remote (even a "super-father" political leader or star), is left all the more weakened in relation to the super-ego in a "society without fathers" (Held, 1980: 137).

It becomes apparent that Marcuse bemoans the demise of the traditional patriarchal father in the family because the growing (male) adult offspring is paradoxically better psychologically and biologically constituted to reject the father after an intense childhood (Oedipal) experience of identifying with and internalizing the latter. Under

contemporary conditions, the child ultimately rejects the father too early, thus significantly impairing the former's ability to engage in conflict with authority, and particularly arbitrary authority, later in life when external, more impersonal social domination is confronted. In Marcuse's words (1970: 47),

The socially necessary repressions and the socially necessary behavior are no longer learned --and internalized-- in the long struggle with the father (who has lost educational and economic power) --the ego ideal is rather brought to bear on the ego directly and "from outside," before the ego is actually formed as the personal and (relatively) autonomous subject of mediation between him self and others.

Certainly Marcuse has criticized the patriarchal family for creating the exaggerated expectations on the child's part of the father's grandeur, power and authority. These expectations are historically and socially structured within the repressive relations between the parents which structure the Oedipal conflict. Marcuse raises the 'problem' of the rejection of the internalization of the father as the traditional 'denouement' of Oedipal ambivalence, significantly because he believes that the repressive relations between the parents which ultimately structure that ambivalence have not significantly changed. Had they indeed changed (in such a way that was not repressive desublimation), the problem for him of the decline of the patriarchal father may not have been significant. Rather, what actually happened, according to him, was that the patriarchal family relations were conservatively retained while merely the role of the patriarchal father diminished due to changing historical and economic conditions.

These changing societal conditions which gave rise to this predicament, namely those following World War Two, are outlined by

Marcuse (1970: 46) as embodied in the:

transition from free to organized competition, concentration of power in the hands of an omnipresent technical, cultural, and political administration, self-propelling mass production and consumption, subjection of previously private, asocial dimensions of existence to methodical indoctrination, manipulation, control.

The father's traditional role as principal socializing agent is thus undermined, through the increasingly massified cultural institutions (entertainment, the media, school) and through the monopolization of the capitalist economy. According to Marcuse (1970: 47), with the father's function redefined and much replaced by the contemporary social structure,

The mediation between the self and the other gives way to immediate identification. In the social structure, the individual becomes the conscious and the unconscious object of administration and obtains his freedom and satisfaction in his role as such an object; in the mental structure, the ego shrinks to such an extent that it seems no longer capable of sustaining itself, as a self, in distinction from id and superego. The multidimensional dynamic by which the individual attained and maintained his own balance between autonomy and heteronomy, freedom and repression, pleasure and pain, has given way to a one-dimensional static identification of the individual with the others and with the administered reality principle.

Marcuse also situates this transformation of the structuring of the instincts within the phylogenetic history, or that which is the history of humankind and the development of culture in general. This is due to his fundamental agreement with the idea that "Freud expresses so often . . . that the history of mankind is still dominated by "archaic" powers, that prehistory and early history are still at work in us." (Marcuse, 1970: 26). Indeed, in accordance with Freud's psychoanalytic theory, Marcuse (1970: 45) relates that,

The conflict (namely the Oedipal complex) has its roots, not merely in the private case history of the patient but also (and primarily!) in the general universal fate of the individual under the established reality principle: the ontogenetic case history repeats, in a particular forms, the phylogenetic history of mankind.

In the latter context, Marcuse is referring to the archaic memory of the primal horde and the beginnings of culture, namely the process of "father"-domination, the overthrow of the father by the sons, and the re-institution of the father by the sons, in symbolic form engendering guilt, surplus-repression and unhappiness (32). While Freud, in conservative fashion, believes in the necessity of reconciling the patient to the consequences of this repeated history in clinical work, Marcuse (1970: 45) stresses that the conflict was at least available to the patient, and that the adopted reconciliation to the 'inevitable' fate of the relationship between people and cultural or social progress was consciously accepted as 'reasonable' to him or her. This will be briefly elaborated upon at present.

2. Within the transformation of the traditional structure of the instincts, Marcuse views as significantly problematic, in relation to the aim of social liberation, that the ontogenetic expression of the phylogenetic history of humankind is no longer relatively retained through the Oedipal situation, an intensely personal experience. Despite this lack of retention, the archaic history, he believes, still remains to plague contemporary efforts towards a utopian organization of society; for, the Oedipal situation is not the cause of the archaic memory, but rather exists in converse relation. Within the traditional Oedipal

situation, the archaic trace memories of resistance, of domination, rebellion, and the persuant guilt of having betrayed the life of freedom through reinstitution of the father are all acted out, lived and made real to the individual child and then to the adult as personal memories. In this way: a. those potentially subversive memory traces were kept alive and relatively accessible to each individual; and b. the recognition of the politically -conservative aspect of the 'counterrevolutionary' tendency within individuals (Freud, 1930: 78 -80) was structured into one's real-and lived process of individuation, thus keeping in awareness the possibility of consciously and critically transcending it. While Freud focussed on the observable positive (and hence conservative) aspects of the archaic memory traces, for example the reinstitution of the father engendering guilt, Marcuse stresses, from a more liberatory stance, the dialectical or negative aspects of them, for example approaching such guilt as installed because of the betrayal of freedom."

With the general obsolescence of the Oedipal situation, the archaic memory traces of phylogenetic history become obscured through the absence of a well-defined expression in individual history or development. As such, these traces become more abstract, and thus less easily cognicised by people. For Marcuse, this is truly a disastrous situation, yet not a surprising one as the forces of domination in North American society become increasing complete, complex and instilled into the realm of subjectivity. For, to him this abstraction of liberatory archaic memory traces is, in dialectical fashion, increasingly incumbent on North American society as it moves closer to the actual possibility of objective material conditions able to realize utopian society. Such a

historical situation makes repressive sublimation increasing irrational and hence more easily identifiable and consciously reversed by the general population through individual and social action. As previously discussed, North American society's dominant classes' means of obscuring the growing possibility of identifying and grasping the tension of this contradiction on the part of the general population is found in repressive de-sublimation. This is facilitated by, according to Marcuse, the general obfuscation of the liberatory aspects of the archaic memory traces, the absence of early personal memories of conflict, antagonism and lived struggles of individuation, and a resulting instinctual structure in which ego is related to superego in a more biological, automatic and less conscious manner. This obfuscation, as evidenced through the transformation of the traditional Oedipal complex, is reinforced, according to Marcuse, by the cultural debilitation of critical art, fantasy and non-positivist theories.

2.j. The transformation of the ego-ideal in contemporary North America

Having examined several aspects of Marcuse's approach to the transformation of the instinctual structure of the North American collectivity, it is the purpose of this section to continue such an examination by discussing the transformation of and resulting obsolescence of the traditionally defined ego-ideal or superego, within North American monopoly capitalist society, as approached by Marcuse. As well, the consequence of such an obsolescence for the relatively 'autonomous individual' and his/ her intellectual, emotional and practical activity towards progressive social change will be examined. Again, the examination is ultimately pursued with respect to its possible

relevance towards indicating an adequate base for a social theory of liberatory education. As Giroux (1983: 29) reiterates such a relevancy:

by focussing on Freud's theory of instincts and metapsychology, the Frankfurt School devised a theoretical framework for unraveling and exposing the objective and psychological obstacles to social change. This issue is important because it provides significant insights into how depth psychology might be useful for developing a more comprehensive theory of education.

An introduction to the transformation of the superego among the collectivity in contemporary North American society would well begin with a restatement of the condition and nature of the traditional Freudian conception of it previous to any such change. I will draw primarily on Marcuse's Eros and Civilization (1955) for this task.

The superego, according to Freud's account, is constructed within the antagonistic dialectic of the life and death instincts, as situated within a specific set of historical conditions (Marcuse, 1955: 72). The ego-ideal is structured in tandem with the development of the ego, and the former's development is dependent, at its core, on parental influence (Marcuse, 1955: 29). Such influence, over time, then gives way to a broader dependence on other social institutions. As Marcuse (1955: 29) explains,

the external restrictions which first the parents and then other societal agencies have imposed upon the individual are "introjected" into the ego and become its "conscience"; henceforth, the sense of guilt -- the need for punishment generated by the transgressions or by the wish to transgress these restrictions (especially in the Oedipus situation) -- permeates the mental life.

Such guilt, and the 'reactionary' personality it engenders is infused with Thanatos, and exhibits itself as a force against the expression of libido. Such guilt is felt as aggressive and destructive impulses

towards oneself, and potentially towards one's environment.

Nonetheless, the same resolution of the Oedipal situation, according to both Freud and Marcuse, is also the work of Eros. For, the installation of the superego thwarts the Oedipal desire. The desire to return to the mother, for both theorists, clearly signifies Thanatos. For the Oedipal desire is ultimately a death wish --an expression of the Nirvana Principle or impulse (Marcuse, 1955: 24 and 152) , that longing and tendency for peace, lack of tension and comfort experienced by the child in the womb, before the limitations existent in the external environment. Thus, by averting such an expression of the Nirvana principle, "love, too, operates in the formation of the superego." (Marcuse, 1955: 72) Marcuse also attempts to locate the subversive, liberatory moment of the Nirvana Principle. For the values it appears to embody as a tendency are counter to that of the Performance Principle, and indeed are potentially available to all as a memory; indeed, one which may set a subversive criterion with which to judge the operational dominant tendency in North American society.

Dialectically and perhaps paradoxically, the 'separation' of the child from the mother is the work of Eros (for such separation detracts from the Nirvana Principle's ultimate aim of death); and simultaneously the 'uniting' of the child with other people, and then with other social institutions, actually builds up both guilt and externally-directed aggression, the work of Thanatos (Marcuse, 1955: 72 and 73). This is, of course, one of the major dialectical paradoxes which Freud regards as fundamentally problematic for human happiness and freedom. According to him,

That which began in relation to the father is completed

in relation to the community. If civilization is an inevitable course of development from the family to humanity as a whole, then-- as a result of the inborn conflict arising from ambivalence, of the eternal struggle between the trends of love and the death-- there is inextricably bound up with it an increase of the sense of guilt, which will perhaps reach heights that the individual finds hard to tolerate (Freud, 1930: 80).

Assuming, and Marcuse does, that the transformation of the superego in contemporary society leaves intact Eros's role in diverting the child from the Nirvana impulse, one may well question what could possibly be damaging or deplorable about a superego which is weak, rather than strong. For, with a weak, or 'underdeveloped' superego, the question which beckons is: Wouldn't the traditional severity of the superego as well as the resulting unleashing of guilt and aggression be reduced?

The above question, however, in this context is an irrelevant query because, according to Marcuse, it is not a question of the transformation of the 'traditionally' strong superego into a weaker one, but rather of a qualitative change which transcends the relational notion of strong/weak. For, the nature of the superego is itself radically altered. In apparent agreement with Adorno, Marcuse maintains that the 'modern' superego lacks the same meaning that Freud traditionally infused it with (33). As Marcuse elaborates:

In the corporate system with its vast bureaucracies, individual responsibility is as diffuse and as intertwined with others as is the particular enterprise in the national and international economy. In this diffusion, the ego ideal takes shape which unites the individuals into citizens of the mass-society: overriding the various competing power elites, leaders, and chiefs, it becomes "embodied" in the very tangible laws which move the apparatus and determine the behavior of the material as well as the human object; ... (Marcuse, 1970: 54).

Marcuse (1955: 85) calls this transformation the "automatization" of the superego, and elaborates upon it more fully in Eros and Civilization. Therein he reiterates the rationalization of the relationship between the 'de-personalized' formation of the superego, and the societal abdication of the individual through bureaucratization. Marcuse is worth quoting at length on this subject:

Formerly the superego was "fed" by the master, the chief, the principal. These represented the reality principle in their tangible personality: harsh and benevolent, cruel and rewarding, they provoked and punished the desire to revolt; the enforcement of conformity was their personal function and responsibility. Respect and fear could therefore be accompanied by hate of what they were and did as persons; they presented a living object for the impulses and for the conscious efforts to satisfy them. But these personal father-images have gradually disappeared behind the institutions. With the rationalization of the productive apparatus, with the multiplication of functions, all domination assumes the form of administration. At its peak, the concentration of economic power seems to turn into anonymity: everyone, even at the very top, appears to be powerless before the movements and laws of the apparatus itself (Marcuse, 1955: 89).

Thus, the formation of the 'modern' superego in contemporary North American capitalist society is differentiated from the traditional Freudian formation in that the traditional Oedipal struggle which gave rise to it is a 'struggle' no more. Rather, it resembles a relatively frictionless developmental relationship between the child (or more accurately, in Marcuse's examination, boy) and the masquerade of benign benevolence of the 'Other'. Within such a context, Marcuse contends that the ego lacks the leverage with which to define itself. For, under the Freudian concept of individuation, the boy's ego, in order to 'become' of its own, must internalize the father. This internalization, in turn, is only possible through the initial process of the ego (under the primary

reign of the pleasure principle) being against the father. It is this antagonism which is the hallmark of the Freudian model of psychic development. Lacking this marked antagonism, a 'superego' is formed which represents not the clearly defined values, prohibitions and limits of a human 'Other', but rather an amorphous world view historically structured by a nearly all-encompassing day to day reality, which is indistinct from one's own frame of reference.

It is relevant to reiterate that the superego, almost by definition, traditionally functions at the unconscious level. However, during the early process of individuation, this is not the case. The superego at its genesis proceeds as a function of the ego and thus, by definition, in a conscious manner. It is only after time that the 'superego functions predominantly unconsciously, and hence automatically:

"As a rule the ego carries out repressions in the service and at the behest of its superego." However, the repressions soon become unconscious, automatic as it were, and a "great part" of the sense of guilt remains unconscious... (Marcuse, 1955: 30)

When Marcuse refers to the 'automatization' of the ego, he refers, though surely not exclusively, to the above meaning. Written differently, the 'modern' superego, since it is engendered under conditions so bereft of antagonism, functions exceedingly rapidly and more fully in an unconscious manner. The ego, in a manner qualitatively different from its traditional relationship to other mental processes, ceases to be an intermediary between the demands of the id and those decreed by the historically-specific external world. The ego relatively no longer has the room to distinguish itself from its censor. Marcuse refers to Franz Alexander in elaborating this central concern. The latter psychoanalyst

writes of the

"transformation of conscious condemnation, which depends upon perception (and judgement), into an unconscious process of repression"; he assumes a tendency toward a decrease of mobile psychic energy to a "tonic form" -- corporealization of the psyche. The development, by which originally conscious struggles with the demands of reality (the parents and their successors in the formation of the superego) are transformed into unconscious automatic reactions, is of the utmost importance for the course of civilization...Adherence to a status quo ante is implanted into the instinctual structure (during childhood). (last parenthesis added by the thesis author) (Marcuse, 1955: 30).

Marcuse views as continuous with this psychic phenomena the social phenomena of the bureaucratic administration functioning hand in hand with monopoly capitalism. Since the psychic structure is transformed due to the political and economic transformation of societal relations and institutions (the family, mass culture, bureaucratization of the state, monopoly capitalism, and so on), the former is, more than ever before, a politically-charged domain. The "private" sphere of one's psyche (and hence thoughts, emotions, and tendencies which one is or is not aware of) is increasingly a function of the social relations of domination of the "public" sphere. Surely it always was accorded, according to both Freud (34) and Marcuse, (at least partial) definition by power relations within the societal sphere, but never, according to Marcuse's analysis, to the pervasive and subtle extent and depth as it is during the contemporary conditions of monopoly capitalist North America.

Indeed, Marcuse is arguing that the material relations of childhood, as historically structured under the conditions of modern social domination, give rise to a historically -specific biological/mental structure. This latter structure is then reinforced

through daily praxis. In other words, daily life is structured within the matrix of skewed power relations in such a way that it itself serves to maintain an instinctual structure set in place during childhood. It is no accident that the angry, frustrated citizen or service-client often feels and submits with a sense of resignation and self-reproach in front of a row of benign-looking administrators and reified leadership, much like the ego, prompted by the frustration of libido, finds itself with a certain futile and fatalistic manner in the face of the modern, transformed superego. The latter, in its amorphous shroud, lacks the demarcation which it once had; a demarcation created through the ego's confrontation with a physically distinct person who could be touched, named, placed at an arms length, so to speak, critically evaluated and challenged.

This situation, rather than 'weakening' the transformed superego, reinforces and provides progressively more instinctual energy to be bound up in the modern form of the ego-ideal. For, it is worthwhile to be reminded of Freud's postulation (supported by Franz Alexander), in Civilization and its Discontents that,

The 'unduly lenient and indulgent father' is the cause of children's forming an over-severe super-ego, because under the impression of the love that they receive, they have no other outlet for their aggressiveness but turning it inwards... Apart from a constitutional factor which may be supposed to be present, it can be said, therefore, that a severe conscience arises from the joint operation of two factors: the frustration of instinct, which unleashes aggressiveness, and the experience of being loved, which turns the aggressiveness inwards and hands it over to the super-ego (Freud, 1930: 76, fn. 2).

Under contemporary conditions within North America, the individual develops within an evermore repressive personal and social

reality in which 'love' is defined as the operational functioning of such a reality. This undialectical or ungrounded notion of love is internalized by the individual through both the propagation of untested mythical, abstract ideals of society (e.g. 'Here in North America we are free; we live in a democratic society based on the principles of equality and choice...') and an actual massified existential acceptance and promotion of such a reified reality through the structure of everyday life. The result is that the developing individual's libidinal energy (Eros) is frustrated to ever new depths, structurally accompanied by a deeply internalized view of the infallibility of the goodness and benevolence of the system which is actually the source of such frustration. Because that system, or nexus of social relations, is so highly institutionalized and structurally interconnected with the relations of everyday life, the mere suspicion or doubt of the developing child or adult of this system's professed 'love' and benevolence (e.g. it's concern for one's true interests) borders on being heretical. To doubt, question or contradict the 'love' of the system, beyond its minor reform, is perhaps psychologically too threatening. For, one's entire lived existence is placed into question (as domination in such a context is, as never before, so infused in the totality of one's personal and social relations). One's dependence on that love, specifically through the sense of belonging and identity created, is such that the built up antagonism to the system is censored out of consciousness in an automatic way, before it even reaches it, and is perhaps even despised, ridiculed and debased more emphatically, precisely because it is censored or repressed.

This situation stands in clear contrast to that context in which

the ruling class maintains its domination primarily through a clearly despotic political or military leader whose power is based on the general use of physical force or the threat of its usage. In the latter situation, one psychologically has relatively much more room for critical evaluation and dissent, even though the overt political repression of 'freedom of speech' is far greater. This paradoxical situation is not, perhaps, accidental. Indeed, as a society becomes more enmeshed with industrially-advanced monopoly capitalist social relations, those of the ruling class may maintain and extend their domination through overt democratic reforms. (35)

Thus, under contemporary North American conditions, the instinctual structure of the individual is such that increasingly, further self-directed aggression is built up within the psyche, levels of which Marcuse designates similar to archaic stages, in which Freud conceded that, "aggressiveness... reigned almost without limit" (Freud, 1930: 60). Marcuse (1970: 59) suggests that this large surplus of aggression is politically manipulated to serve the military-industrial complex of North America:

Shrinkage of the ego, and collectivization of the ego ideal signify a regression to primitive stages of the development, where the accumulated aggression had to be 'compensated' by periodic transgression. At the present stage, such socially sanctioned transgression seems to be replaced by the normalized social and political use of aggressive energy in the state of permanent preparedness.

Thus it is that Marcuse points towards the historically structured biological relation of the instincts within contemporary North America as not only contributing to, but in dialectical relation with, material social relations of domination (e.g. capitalist interests in the 'defence

economy') which give rise to an increasingly militaristically-oriented society.

The collectivization of the superego, while unleashing accumulated aggressive energy touted as 'rationally' directed towards 'the enemy' and for the 'healthy' maintenance of the domestic capitalist economy, also creates the conditions for this same energy to be directed towards existing political institutions. However, far from being a potentially critical, progressive intervention of the 'people', Marcuse claims that the situation in toto gives rise to increasingly irrational demands by the citizenery. This in turn gives rise to political conditions which make both an illusion and folly of truly democratic social relations. Marcuse (1970: 60) explains that,

By virtue of this constellation, the masses determine continuously the policy of the leadership on which they depend, while the leadership sustains and increases its power in response and reaction to the dependent masses. The formation and mobilization of masses engenders authoritarian rule in democratic form... The masses are not identical with the "people" on whose sovereign rationality the free society was to be established. Today, the chance of freedom depends to a great extent on the power and willingness to oppose mass opinion, to assert unpopular policies, to alter the direction of progress.

Indeed, one of Marcuse's central aims in examining the realm of the unconscious and the structure of needs is to help build the above power and willingness among people to engage in social transformation; to transcend in and through practice the fatalism with which so many approach everyday life. As such, he attempts to examine the basis for such a fatalistic standpoint, in locating the obstacles structured within material relations of reality in tandem with cultural and superstructural relations. As well, he attempts to locate, as part of such an

examination, subversive moments which may point towards overcoming such obstacles.

2.k. Several implications of Marcuse's analysis

With the above analysis, one may perhaps gain a greater depth of understanding of the historical demobilization of the North American individual as potential social change agent, as previously noted by Giroux (1981: 136 and 137):

The alienation, exploitation and domination (of North American society, to which Freire refers) is certainly an objective fact, but it is far from a subjective perception recognized by most Americans. Not only the context and nature of domination need to be documented in this case, but the very fact of domination has to be proven to most Americans.

This, then, is a primary implication of Marcuse's psychoanalytic examination of contemporary North American society: the debilitation of autonomous, critical thought and action on the part of the majority of the population, a debilitation which is actively and historically structured in the collectivity of psyches.

Nevertheless, rather than leaving liberatory educators at a theoretical impasse, Marcuse draws out contradictions in this situation which may drive forward possibilities of conscious liberatory agency. Far from pessimism, he ultimately describes contemporary (psychological and political) reality with the aim of perceiving and analyzing the tensions within it which may negate that reality towards dialectically and materially transcending it through liberatory praxis.

Perhaps the primary contradiction within the realm of the contemporary psychic structure according to Marcuse is the tension

between the subjective structure of the psyche and the objective material conditions of North American society in general. For, with the erosion of societal conditions which objectively necessitate alienated labour, the rationality of surplus repression of libidinal energy is, dialectically, further eroded. With this phenomenon, social forces which have vested interests in maintaining such surplus repression must further repress cognizance and the naming of this widening gap and the tension which it provokes. This creates an escalating repression, both politically and psychologically speaking, which in turn strengthens the tension generated by the evergrowing contradiction. While they may be further repressed into the unconscious realm, the pleasure principle and the liberatory aspects of the phylogenetic or archaic memory traces continually build up, following Marcuse's appropriation of Freud's quantitative-mechanical relationship between instinctual energies. Such a build up cannot simply dissipate; rather it exerts a force, a pressure, indeed a practical threat of 'breaking through'. As Held (1980: 123) affirms, while the superego, once created, implants into the instinctual structure an adherence to the demands of the past and to the status quo relations of domination, nonetheless,

The memory of gratification is at the origin of all thinking, and the impulse to recapture past gratification is the hidden driving power behind the process of thought.

For, regardless of the sophistication of the repression by the social forces of domination of the demands of the pleasure principle and the subversive aspects of the archaic memory traces, the principle remains (albeit a controversial one) that the more the repression, the more what is repressed threatens to surface with a counterforce. (Held, 1980: 122

and 123).

In existential and psychological terms, the guilt and anxiety level felt among people is raised to an ever greater degree, for the guilt of one's betrayal of freedom is heightened due to the contradictory situation described above. This guilt produced by the existential or lived human relation to objective material conditions provides a personal experience on which the archaic memory trace of the reinstallation of the primal father may be tagged, brought forward and retrieved. As such, the source of existential anxiety produced by guilt as one of unnecessary social domination may be more readily made conscious.

Second, the aggression caused by the increasing repression of libido and of Eros generally, is afforded inadequate release, save through politically managed group scapegoating and 'cold' or actual national war enemies. The interiorization of this aggression and actual hatred engendered by oppressive conditions which are not materially transcended and which apparently have a diffuse cause, results in a substantial increase of guilt. This guilt raises a sense of 'malaise' and contributes towards a pressure against total identification with society.

Third, in mere quantitative terms, the high level of libidinal repression (and repressive de-sublimation is included here) and strength of the superego in relation to a submissive ego may themselves produce anxiety to an intolerable threshold. As this is or would be a socially-shared malaise, people may be more likely not only to identify it collectively as a social problem, but, in combination with the previous consequence, identify it critically as a problem of unnecessary social domination. In other words, due to the strength posed by the

contradiction under examination, people may, because of the specific historical relation of their instinctual structure to their objective material conditions, (have) develop(ed) a tendency to critically realize the contradiction itself, and act to transcend it through social change. Just as the capitalist Performance Principle generates the material conditions for its own negation (Held, 1980: 125), so too the 'massification' of individuation may generate conditions for a transcendence of the contradictions which such massification engenders.

That it may do so partly relies existentially on Marcuse's appropriation of Freud's necessary equation of freedom and happiness. For his theory is based on the assumption that through unhappiness, people will come to act towards freedom. Conversely, freeing themselves from surplus repression, people will be freeing themselves from guilt and anxiety, experienced existentially as painful, towards experiencing greater happiness, through a reduction of pain, and an increase in libinal gratification. While Freud concludes that unhappiness or a social condition of malaise is inevitable, this is because he viewed an instinctual structure which denied significant freedom of libidinal energy or Eros, as inevitable, given the (apparently) positive relationship between instinctual repression and progress, or the development of culture (Marcuse, 1980: 32, 33 and 36).

Significantly, the aim of social liberation becomes intimately entwined with the personal interests of freedom, the lessening of suffering, and the increase of experienced happiness. By locating these subjective interests within social power relations of domination and subordination, Marcuse connects such personal interests and needs with the necessity of transforming social and economic relations. A further

implication of Marcuse's theoretical approach is that pedagogically, social education may play a significant part towards the involvement of people in their understanding of the social, economic and psychological contradictions which they experience and through which they live. Nonetheless, while heightening the analysis of the intrusion of social domination into the subjective realm, Marcuse is insistent on the limitations of liberatory practice within this context. He insists that objective economic relations of production be transformed, and he believes that certain social overlapping groups, for example students, intellectuals, and women, without the traditionally-defined working classes are incapable of doing this (Marcuse, 1970: 69). By implication, for social education to be truly effective towards personal and social liberation, according to Marcuse, it must be linked and contributive to working class and other progressive social change movements.

Rather than undialectically lamenting the lack of potential of movements towards social change in contemporary North American society, Marcuse attempts to understand more fully the nature and depth of the conditions within which these movements must function. He focuses on the dialectical interface of historically-structured material impasses towards radical social critique and action, located in instinctual relations and the economic relations of production, and the historical demobilization of those people who live their lives through these material relations. Marcuse passionately engages in such a study with the utopian intent of hope, freedom and peace, through a dialectic of individual and societal transformation.

3. Summary

In this chapter, I have attempted to examine Marcuse's dialectical materialist approach to the realm of the unconscious and the structure of needs. In particular, I have attempted to critically explore aspects of his approach to the psycho-sexual realm which were selected as relevant to the aim of the larger project. Marcuse's theory explores historical obstacles within this realm to the development of liberatory subjectivities and radical praxis, as well as historical possibilities for such development as related to this sphere. He approaches Freud's psychoanalytic theory with a dialectical, materialist and Critical Marxist concern for situating the psycho-sexual realm within contemporary historical social and economic relations of inequality and oppression. Marcuse attempts, ultimately, to historicize those aspects of Freud's theory which he believes is ossified by an ahistorical psychological approach, albeit one that is nonetheless potentially critical and materialist. Nonetheless, Marcuse's historicization of Freud's theory must itself be approached critically, as it fails, much as Freud's theory proper, to take fully into account the particular historical presence and experience of girls and women as subjects of what psychoanalytic theory purports to analyze and theorize about. Thus, his examination potentially distorts those experiences and furthers androcentric social interests.

Having examined several aspects of Marcuse's Critical social theory in this chapter and the one previous to it which may be contributive towards a philosophical foundation of social education adequate to the North American context, I will now turn to what is proposed as possible limitations of this theory to such a project.

Notes of Chapter Three

1. This is well-traced in Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital (1974).
2. This project, in various ways, is shared by others of the Frankfurt School, yet with differing interpretations and conclusions. Marcuse, for example, in opposition to Fromm, yet in accordance with Horkheimer and Adorno, retains Freud's theory of the death instinct. See Geoghegan, Reason and Eros (1981), p. 47; also, Held, Critical Theory (1980), p. 113.
3. Unless otherwise noted, I will refer throughout to psychological repression in the general sense, namely that force which is directed against an instinct. The particular expressions which this general conflict may result in are multifold: repression, in the specific sense; sublimation; deflection; and so on. For elaboration, see Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (1930), p. 44; also, see Horowitz, Repression (1977).
4. See Fromm's Escape From Freedom (1941), and Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970), for elaboration of the concept of the 'fear of freedom'.
5. The thesis author tentatively accepts, along with Marcuse, the validity of Freud's positing of the life and death instincts. While I am aware of many of the arguments to the contrary, including perhaps the most convincing and brilliant of them, namely Agnes Heller's On Instincts (1979), I nonetheless tentatively consider their central hypothesis of the non-existence of the instincts to be essentially flawed and incorrect.
6. Indeed, possibly, of Fromm's as well -- of all the members of the Frankfurt School, it was he who was most interested by and perhaps most sympathetic to the religious aspect of Judaism. See Martin Jay's The Dialectical Imagination (1973) for elaboration.
7. see Held, Critical Theory (1980), p. 114 for an elaboration of this, especially with regard to Adorno's critique of Fromm, a critique shared by Marcuse.
8. Marcuse's approach thus seems to transcend the androcentric aversion to taking the body seriously as a significant realm of consideration in analyzing the politics, and the potential and limitations, of individual and social liberation. This, I propose, is in contrast to Freire, who appears to have fully neglected this. Be that as it may, while Marcuse's examination does give rise to considerations and conclusions which may well be consistent with and helpful towards feminist analyses, his examination remains, I suggest, ultimately from a standpoint which often neglects the historical specificities of women's experience and subsumes them within that of men's experience.

The analysis which results in fact distorts rather than illuminates the experience of women. Indeed, this distortion may be functional to rendering the specific interests of women subordinate to those of men.

9. Irrationality is used as defined both in clinical terms and in Marcuse's sense --see his One Dimensional Man (1964), p. 142.
10. For this third concern in relation to Marcuse, see Geoghegan, Reason and Eros (1981), pp. 47 and 48.
11. For Fromm, see Held's Critical Theory (1980), p. 112.
12. See Kellner, Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism (1984), p. 161, for further elaboration.
13. For example, see Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (1930), pp. 61 and 79.
14. Aggressive and destructive tendencies are visssitudes or modifications of the death instinct. See Geoghegan, Reason and Eros (1981), p. 48.
15. See Kellner's Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism (1984), p. 429, footnote 31; also see Horowitz's Repression (1977), introductory remarks.
16. Adorno, in Friedman's The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School (1981), p. 87.
17. See Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1922) for elaboration.
18. The second of these two implications is directed more towards those progressive groups which are reluctant to placing these terrains of struggle on their agenda. For, those within feminist, lesbian and gay social /political movements have had little difficulty in knowing of the necessity of the struggle for a socially unrepressed organization of (psycho-)sexuality, and acting on that knowledge.
19. Marcuse, "Marxism and Feminism", in Kellner, Marcuse (1984), p. 173.
20. See the recent scholarship of Kinsman, The Regulation of Desire (1987) for elaboration.
21. See especially pp. 82 to 123 of Horowitz, Repression (1977), for elaboration of this theme.
22. Freud, "'Civilized' Sexual Morality", in Horowitz, Repression (1977), p. 76.
23. Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego", from his Collected Works, pp. 79-80, in Horowitz, Repression, p. 63.
24. For an excellent feminist study of the relation of play and women's

learning, see Melamed, Play and Playfulness in Women's Learning and Development (1986).

25. Freire, in a seminar discussion at University of Massachusetts, Amherst Mass., 1985.
26. This trend in the late 1980's shows signs of reversing however, given the right-wing dominance in the political struggle over interpreting and dealing with the A.I.D.S. virus.
27. Ober, "Sexuality and Politics in the Work of Herbert Marcuse", in Critical Interruptions (1970), ed. Breines.
28. See Ober "Sexuality and Politics", p. 114, for Marcuse; for Freud, see his study The Ego and the Id (1923).
29. Freud, Female Sexuality, in Horowitz, Repression (1977), p. 138.
30. Bonapart, Female Sexuality (1953), pp. 130-6, in Horowitz, Repression (1977), p. 138.
31. Landes, "Marcuse's Feminist Dimension", in Telos, #41 (Autumn, 1979), p. 161.
32. Marcuse, Five Lectures (1970), p. 45; also, see pp. 37 - 39 for further elaboration.
33. For Adorno's view, see Held, Critical Theory (1980), p. 136.
34. For an elaboration as related to Freud, see his Civilization and its Discontents (1930).
35. Paz Buttedal offers an example of such a situation: the extension of democratic elections within Brazil by the military government in the 1980's. Paz Buttedal, during a seminar on popular education in the context of the Third World, Canadian Association for the Study of Adult Education, Learned Societies, Guelph, Ontario, 1984.

CHAPTER FOUR:

Limitations of Marcuse's Theory

1. Introduction

In this fourth chapter of this thesis, I will attempt to briefly examine what I propose as several limitations of Marcuse's Critical social theory as an adequate enrichment, complement and stance from which to critique Freire's philosophical theory. This is ultimately for the purpose of indicating an avenue towards a theoretical foundation for social education within the contemporary North American context. In particular, I will examine the following limitations of Marcuse's theory, in their respective order:

a. a lack of a rigorous: (i.) political economy of contemporary North America, and (ii.) analysis of the state's relation to domination and liberation, in contemporary North America;

b. a lack of a concise and consistent analysis of the praxis of social movements in the struggle for social liberation in contemporary North America;

c. a lack of accessibility to a majority of people within North America. The theory remains relatively inaccessible to those whom Marcuse would probably argue could benefit from it most;

d. a lack of consistency within Marcuse's approach

towards leadership, both in small-group situations and in the larger context of leadership within and of social movements. Indeed, there exists a tendency in Marcuse's approach to leadership which, despite his general anti-authoritarian stance, is clearly vanguardist and perhaps both ignorant of and condescending towards leadership within social groups other than (bourgeois) intellectuals, in the traditional sense;

e. a lack of an adequate consideration of and rigour in examining that social domination which is based on racism in North America, and the relation between social domination based on racism and other forms of social domination;

f. a lack of consideration of those relations of domination which exist between Canada and the United States, as well as a lack of an adequate and rigorous consideration of those relations between North America and Third World countries;

g. a lack of rigour in the examination of the domination of women in North American society, and patriarchy, in general. As such, his Critical theory remains androcentric and thus seriously questionable as to both its scientific validity and its ability to guide and critique a praxis which is truly liberatory for both men and women.

1.a. Setting the context

Certainly, one theory, or group of works, of one person cannot deal with all that is required to accurately pose all of the essential questions, and even less, to answer some of the essential questions. To

hope for that is not only all too common within the current historical conditions, it is indicative of the general ahistorical approach of many of those who mediate these conditions. As Max Horkheimer (1982: 287) writes of the contemporary fetishism of ideas:

Today ideas are approached with a sullen seriousness; each as soon as it appears is regarded as either a ready-made prescription that will cure society or as a poison that will destroy it. All the ambivalent traits of obedience assert themselves in the attitude towards ideas. People desire to submit to them or to rebel against them, as if they were gods... This taking of ideas only as verdicts, directives, signals, characterizes the enfeebled man of today.

Nonetheless, Horkheimer avoids a lapse into liberal relativism, or the taking of one idea as as good or true as another. The above is intentionally written within the context of a critical epistemology; indeed, for him, "The truth of ideas is demonstrated not when they are held fast but when they are driven further." (Horkheimer, 1982: 287), a quote which quickly draws to mind Freire's epistemological stance

I suggest that Marcuse's critical theory remains of value only if 'driven further', critiqued, related to changing historical conditions and to theoretical strides gained through social praxis towards radical social change within those changing historical conditions. The task of finding value in his theory requires the 're-valuing' or 're-considering' of it. This task is necessary in order to 'know' his theory, for included in 'knowing' a theory is to know what of it is of value in relation to one's praxis for social change, and conversely, what is of little or no value to it, given the specificity of one's historical situation. Surely Marcuse would agree that this happens anyway, regardless of the aim of one's praxis; the point for those whose aim and

interests lie in social liberation, is to make it a task infused with intentionality and rigour.

Nonetheless, as Douglas Kellner (1984: 374) notes, ambivalence or strong responses towards Marcuse's theory may also relate to complexities and anomalies held within that theory, which many of Marcuse's readers and critics have dismissed:

Most of Marcuse's critics have erred, I believe, by failing to perceive these anomalies and have consequently presented (or dismissed!) Marcuse as, for example, a historicist or essentialist, a bleak pessimist or a starry-eyed utopian, an elitist individualist or a dogmatic Marxist, a stubborn rationalist or a blatant irrationalist. All these one-sided characterizations and criticisms fail to grasp the complex, protean nature of Marcuse's thought and the difficulties conceptualizing it in traditional categories. ...Thus, Marcuse's widespread and contradictory attraction and repulsion can be partly attributed to the tensions and ambiguities in his thought and one-sided receptions of his work.

Given the above, it is well to examine the limitations of Marcuse's theory taking into consideration its complexities and anomalies, as adequate to the aim of this project in general. While I have discussed several limitations of Freire's theory in relation to Marcuse's, earlier in the thesis, I will argue that both Freire's and Marcuse's theoretical stances are in need of critique and enrichment from another standpoint, namely socialist feminist theory, to draw out their value and limitations, supplement and redefine central categories with respect to the aim of this project.

Having introduced this chapter, I will at present turn to briefly examining several general limitations of Marcuse's theory with regard to the aim of this project.

2.a.(1.) Marcuse's lack of an adequate political economy

Marcuse's analysis of contemporary North American capitalist society appears to lack a much-needed rigorous political economy of that context. Indeed, despite a dialectically materialist approach towards human nature and culture in general, I submit that he misunderstands North American 'society' as: a. too undialectically homogenous regarding class; b. too devoid of worker struggle and resistance to domination as mediated by the various strata and kinds of workers in North America (1); and c. from an androcentric analysis of structural relations, which gives rise to a faulty and patriarchal analysis of what constitutes both the realm of the infrastructural base of society, and the catagories of production and labour.

He misapprehends individual and collective radical praxis within such a context as apparently not requiring an informed and rigorous political economy of historically general and specific concrete situations, a misapprehension that has quite severe consequences, given the context of an ahistorical, pragmatically-inclined consciousness on the part of many social change agents within North America in general.

While certainly calling people's attention to the importance of a theory of social change which takes into account an economic analysis of historical situations, without necessarily being economistic, Marcuse seems to avoid, at times, taking his own advice. It may have been true that within the early context of the German-based Frankfurt School collective, Marcuse may have had the contextual leeway to probe almost exclusively into interdisciplinary work which excluded political economy. However, the newer context of an American-based Frankfurt School, in the late 1930's, posed a qualitatively different situation.

For, within the former context, the political economy work of Neumann, Gurland and Pollock provided both a complement and a point of challenge to Marcuse to undertake more 'cultural' analyses. (2) However, within the North American context, quite different conditions reigned. The explicitly Marxist nature of their work was largely repressed by the conditions within Columbia University, where the School re-established itself, during the period which followed their flight from Nazi Germany. Rather than reacting against the traditional Marxist economic interpretations of society (which was at that time was predominant within his theoretical circles in Germany), post-1930's North American society beckoned the challenge of reacting against a liberal instrumentalist or liberal positivist approach. While Marcuse took up this challenge in relation to philosophy, and epistemology in particular, as well as social psychology, he seems to have neglected it in relation to a situated and rigorous political economy.

Held contends that, "With respect to political economy the position of critical theory is clear: political economy is crucial but too narrow a base when taken alone for the development of Marxist concerns." (Held, 1980: 360) Nonetheless, he also argues that,

While categories of conflict -- including class and class conflict -- remain even in the Frankfurt theorists' late work, they are not adequately elaborated. A conception of society is presented which overestimates its internal homogeneity; society appears in their writings as steered from above rather than as the outcome... of a continuous process of struggle over rules and resources. (Held, 1980: 365)

Freire, to his credit, seems to recognize the danger of such a tendency. He does not hesitate to recommend to North American social activists, educators and theorists to seriously study such contemporary

works of political economy as Braverman's Labour and Monopoly Capital, while in the same breath recommending Marx's almost poetic "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844)" as crucial reading. While Freire himself may, at times, have lacked an adequate political economy to inform his praxis (3), he nonetheless takes pains to point out to North American audiences the importance of a rigorous political economy to a conscious and effective radical praxis. While certainly not offering such a political economy analysis of North American contexts himself, he at least points out the necessity of it for North Americans and refers them to several appropriate theoretical resources.

Marcuse himself warns that political economy must be historically situated, yet neither gives reference to studies of this nature nor offers research of his own. Nevertheless, he feels confident to draw conclusions about the contemporary working class regarding their historical potential.

Indeed, Marcuse (in Kellner, 1984: 302) states that,

when someone claims to be a Marxist, they must beware of fetishizing the class-concept. With the structural transformations of capitalism, classes and their situations also modify themselves. Nothing is more inappropriate and dangerous for a Marxist than to use a reified concept of the working class.

Yet, in order to dispell a reification, one must examine a concept in relation to the actual reality to which it apparently refers. Marcuse never quite does this, yet he nonetheless

insists that today the industrial working class is no longer the radical negation of capitalist society and is therefore no longer the revolutionary class. It has no monopoly, he claims, on oppression and immiseration, and is in fact better organized, better paid and better off than many members of racial minorities, women, and service, clerical and agricultural workers, as well as

the unemployed and the unemployable (Kellner, 1984: 302).

While such may indeed be the case, Marcuse never forwards references to either empirical data or to case studies regarding this situation, nor has he cared to analyze the contradictory practices specific to the industrial working class, nor indeed, specific to any other part of the working class; nor for that matter, to any class in particular.

Always attempting to avoid a lapse into either Germanic Idealism or mechanistic 'scientific' Marxism, Marcuse appears to have at times succumbed to both in relation to radical praxis. For, on the one hand, his interpretation of domination within North American society in One Dimensional Man may leave many wondering about the use, or even the possibility, of radical praxis 'n that context, and on the other hand, his interpretation of social domination within the biological realm may leave many with a hopeful and optimistic outlook for radical praxis, but without the actual tools for realizing the tantalizing utopian vision which he proposes is a potential reality. I propose that such a situation, either way, tends to paralyze people, a tendency all the more grave considering the strong fatalism engendered by the hegemonic ideology of North America. Indeed, as Kellner (1984: 346) summarizes,

Marcuse does not provide much analysis of what sort of institutions and practices might help create the needs and struggles that he envisages. Although he does discuss --in much more detail than most of his critics allow-- what sorts of values, goals and reality principle could guide the process of social reconstruction, he does not really specify the sociological and political mediations that would make possible liberation and the construction of genuine socialism.

Marcuse's political economy, while created through a Critical Marxist perspective, is nonetheless indicative of an androcentric theory

which, I propose, both ideologically distorts scientific reality and contributes to the oppression of women. His consideration of the economic foundation of society is unduly narrow and patriarchal, and central categories, such as the realm of production exclude the serious consideration of women's traditional work. While Marcuse has indeed extensively analyzed the effects of the patriarchal family on the dialectics of a collectively-based psyche and sexuality which contribute to both productive liberatory resistance and acceptance of moments of domination, he has failed to provide an adequate account of the social, political and economic context which is so defined by mysogeny and the relations of male supremacy. These considerations will be briefly elaborated below in the section regarding Marcuse's inadequate account of patriarchy and the oppression of women.

2.a.(ii.) Marcuse's insufficient theory of the state

I propose that Marcuse's theory of the state is inadequate for informing social education within North America. Rarely does he analyse the state's nature, function and contradictions, in any detailed sense. When he does, he usually associates qualities of the state with those of the economic 'ruling class', without providing any examination of the relation between the state and class. Certainly the state's traditional alliance to the economic elite needs little elaboration (4), however given Marcuse's apparent support for a (non-authoritarian) state structure for a liberatory society, the contradictions specific to the state would warrant more analysis. (5) Such analysis would be advantageous to social education leading towards radical praxis, as: 1. social educators and others may more easily and critically weigh

Marcuse's arguments for the state's liberatory potential, as opposed to a more strictly anarchist approach towards the state; and 2. people may be able to more critically and effectively use contradictions of the state to enable social education and political praxis towards transforming the state, and/or other sites of relations of domination. The latter concern is all the more necessary as so many groups organized or organizing against various forms of domination live a precarious dependency on state funding for operation or projects, many of which include social education efforts.

2.b. Marcuse's inadequate analysis of social movements

Although Marcuse champions, supports and compassionately critiques various liberatory social movements, I suggest that he does not offer an adequate situated analysis of them. Such an analysis is exceedingly relevant to a philosophical basis for social education in North America, as major aims of social education are to help develop grass-roots leadership within these movements, and to support these movements in their quest for transforming society.

Certainly, Marcuse's appraisal of the traditional Marxist revolutionary potential of the proletariat in the historical era of the mid- and late-twentieth century within North America formed a motivational backdrop for his interest in other social groups which could help bring forth a new society. For the most part, Marcuse found social groups which were 'on the margins' of society with regard to their integration with the hegemonic forms of domination, as important groups in the struggle for a liberatory society. However, he appears to have failed to provide an examination of their historic mediation of hegemonic

forms of domination; his approach towards these groups remains undialectical in the sense that he apparently views them one-dimensionally, as 'finding' themselves on the margins of hegemonic integration due to structural reasons.

Marcuse (in Kellner, 1984: 305) comments on these groups:

One will have to contend with groups which were of no significance whatsoever to original Marxist theory; for example, the renowned marginal groups organized by students, oppressed racial and national minorities, women (who comprise no minority but rather the majority), citizens' initiatives, etc. These are not substitute groups who are to become the new revolutionary subjects. They are, as I call them, anticipatory groups that may function as catalysts, and no more than that.

Marcuse, I believe, tends to approach these groups as metaphors for 'the negation', the 'Great Refusal', the 'new sensibility', the 'break with technological rationality', and the fusion of new (and archaic) liberatory needs. It is perhaps for this reason that Marcuse approaches these groups of people without much consideration of their specific mediation of relations of domination, or of their actual and specific contradictions within the realms of needs, consciousness, and behavior. For, it may be argued that as metaphors of symbolic value, these groups of people are abstracted from reality by Marcuse, rather than being seen by him as of reality and hence situated within its complexity.

Nonetheless, Marcuse is true to his view that these groups were not to be substitutes for 'the revolutionary subject', but rather function as catalysts for a revolution. This is born out in practice through Marcuse's open critique of the Western student movement during the 1970's regarding their failure to securely engage in coalition or even, at times, in communication with, either the organized or

non-unionized working class (Kellner, 1984: 286).

Be that as it may, it appears that Marcuse's theory would have offered little to the task of building such alliances and solidarity.

Kellner (1984: 315) notes that

Although Marcuse calls for a 'United Front' against capitalism and for coalitions between different groups and struggles, he does not really provide much analysis of how groups-in-struggle are to be fused into a revolutionary movement, or what forms that movement should take.

Vincent Geoghegan (1981: 91) is in agreement regarding:

Marcuse's failure to consider in any depth what (apart from the shaky ground of a shared opposition to aspects of capitalist society) could possibly unite the disparate elements of the Great Refusal in political activity and a concomitant failure to specify --other than at the highest level of abstraction-- precisely how these forces were to be co-ordinated both prior to and during a revolutionary upsurge.

Such an analysis is all the more crucially missed in Marcuse's theory, for in the contemporary North American situation such an analysis is of dire import. Kellner (1984: 317), although not unproblematically, offers insight:

The problem for revolutionary theory today is the thorny issue of how to fuse groups-in-struggle into a revolutionary movement. Although there has been a proliferation of new social movements and struggles in recent years, many of these groups are fighting for specific interests or goals (i.e. peace, nuclear disarmament, women's rights, black or brown power, etc.). Whereas many of these struggles are worthy and worth supporting in their own right, the challenge to the Left is to build linkages between the various groups-in-struggle to provide the basis for an anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist movement.

Nevertheless, Kellner will remain far from such a goal if he retains an overly narrow view of other social movements. For example, much of the

feminist movement goes beyond the liberal call for "women's rights" towards the call for the freeing of women from patriarchal social relations, by ending patriarchy. As well, many within the movement for "black or brown power" maintain that racism is a structural relation of domination within North American society. Thus, for many of these movements, an "anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist movement" will not (if kept solely within those parameters) serve their specific interests related to social liberation. Such a movement would necessarily also have to be "anti-patriarchal and anti-racist"; not simply for tactical reasons in order to "build linkages" among various groups, but for reasons of listening to people in other social movements, understanding and respecting what they have to say, and standing together in human empathy and solidarity. This often requires many of those within the "Left" to recognize their own privileges vis-a-vis other social groups, as historically-constructed within a multiplicity of oppressive structural relations, and take a closer look at their own personal and social interests and actions.

2.c. Marcuse's relative inaccessibility

Marcuse consistently lacks an adequate means with which to mediate his theory, with those of oppressed and exploited groups and movements of resistance. His association with the student movement of the 1970's, rather than with other popular movements, remains unaccidental. For his means of communicating his theory, and the realities of contemporary North American society, both impose severe limitations on, I propose, who will have access to it.

For examining Marcuse's Critical theory often requires high-level

university training in an area that is not commonly the territory of the non-privileged. Indeed, such training: a. has relatively little job-market value and is thus more accessible to those who are in relatively privileged economic circumstances; and b. is often actively avoided or ignored within universities by administrators and teachers, given that Marcuse's theory runs counter to the dominant theoretical paradigms, as well as the dominant social and economic interests, of the North American context. As well, that Marcuse's Critical theory assumes at least a working knowledge of both Marxist and Freudian theories, also further limits its accessibility. Thus, even the well-schooled, while forming the group most cognizant of Marcuse's theory, do not have such wide accessibility to examining Marcuse's theory.

Thus, a problem with Marcuse's theory is that it remains relatively unintegrated to the intellectualization of people's praxis within social movements and social education, outside of that of a minimally few of the university-schooled milieu. This is not to say that it must be integrated into other people's praxis, but that the opportunity for it to be evaluated, critiqued and potentially of use to them is practically nonexistent.

Leadership from various groups of people in resistance is then limited, and truly democratic participation in the examination of praxis, and the guiding of it may be negated, thus, I would claim, negating the liberatory project itself. Representatives of groups other than the socially privileged indeed have some relative access to Marcuse's theory; for example, Angela Davis chose to be one of Marcuse's Ph.D. students at the University of California (Pippen, et al., 1988 : x). Nonetheless, these representatives appear to be far and few between others who are

from relatively privileged groups.

As well, Marcuse's theoretical discourse appears to be one which is transposed onto, rather than being based on that which is created within social change movements (at least as a starting point for analysis or discussion). The problem of a discourse which is both accessible to those engaged in grass-roots social movements, and respectful of and based on that discourse which is created within those social movements, is not only specific to Marcuse, but also, as Wexler, Matusiewicz and Kern (1987) point out, to other contemporary social education theorists such as Henry A. Giroux. Referring to Roger Simon's and Giroux's works, the former authors argue that

The danger is that a critical pedagogy, as currently conceptualized, may be appropriating the place and voice of existing, practically-inspired education movements as well as more informal critical education discourses within far broader social movements. (6)

If such is indeed the case, then the relative inaccessibility of Marcuse's Critical social theory stands out as an even more problematic limitation towards the aim of pointing towards a philosophical foundation of social education adequate to the North American context.

There are many possible reasons for Marcuse's failure to make his theory more accessible to those whom he would likely agree are of the most oppressed of the people within North America, some reasons being:

a. that the logic of his theory as dialectical is relatively inaccessible, foreign to, and 'difficult' for the general North American consciousness of logic as linear, syllogistical, or pragmatic. As a central goal of his project is to keep dialectical materialist logic and

thought alive, to compromise the complexity of it might have been, to him, to fail in his project;

b. that Marcuse's own personal and academic backgrounds in the Germanic philosophical and literary traditions limited the style of his writings and lectures to an elaborate, often overly intricate, obtuse and sometimes convoluted manner of communicating, at least to North Americans, notwithstanding his dialectical logic;

c. that Marcuse's own upper-middle class background made it difficult for him to either cognize the possibility of communicating Critical social theory to other less-schooled groups of people, or simply express his Critical theory in terms accessible to other less-schooled groups of people;

d. that Marcuse's androcentric stance may have alienated many women from the reality of their own experience and lives, and hence did not 'speak' to their experience and needs; and,

e. that Marcuse apparently views the well-schooled intellectuals as the potential leaders of a revolutionary movement; as such he may have thought that it was of no danger to such a movement if that group had almost exclusive access to his theory. Indeed, with such a view of revolutionary leadership, Marcuse may have intentionally directed all his theoretical endeavors towards the well-schooled class. For, to him it would be they who ultimately require theoretical rigour in order to guide a revolutionary movement.

The last of some of these possible reasons leads us to the next possible limitation of Marcuse's Critical theory with respect to the aim of the overall project, namely contradictions and anomalies in Marcuse's approach towards social and revolutionary leadership.

2.d. Marcuse's contradictory and perhaps elitist approach to leadership

Marcuse's social theory and practice (including practical advice to social change groups) are laden with contradictions and anomalies regarding the nature of leadership, who should be in leadership roles, and the relations between those who lead and those who accept that leadership. While it may be inevitable to have such contradictions in both theory and practice over a span of approximately fifty years, it is to the fault of Marcuse that his overall approach to leadership remains both unclear and open to the possibility of being elitist, vanguardist and sexist. As such, Marcuse's approach towards leadership remains questionable as to its usefulness towards the creation of a liberatory society for the benefit of all.

The issue of leadership is an extremely relevant one for an adequate philosophy of social education, given the present particular context of political 'liberatory' groups and struggles as well as the general context of the dominant and hegemonic authoritarian, racist and patriarchal approaches to leadership in society. If one of the tasks of a social theory of social education is to catalyze the affinity of various different progressive social change groups, the issue of leadership is clearly a crucial matter.

Marcuse's theory of leadership appears to vacillate between a

decentralized, anarchist and participatory approach, and one which is based on a patriarchal, authoritarian and vanguardist approach. While he never offered a systematic account or study of the issue of leadership, various references to the issue surface in his writings and interviews.

Certainly, Marcuse's critique of authoritarian leadership was motivated and heightened by the rise to power of the Nazis in his German homeland. In perhaps direct reference to the rise of Hitler, Marcuse (1968: 4) writes of the image of the 'heroic man',

bound to the forces of blood and soil--the man who travels through heaven and hell, who does not reason why, but goes into action to do and die, sacrificing himself not for any purpose but in humble obedience to the dark forces that nourish him. This image expanded to the vision of the charismatic leader whose leadership does not need to be justified on the basis of aims, but whose mere appearance is already his "proof", to be accepted as an undeserved gift of grace.

In opposition to this type of political leadership, Marcuse offers a call for 'rational' leadership, based on a decentralized, anarchistic model, to student radicals of the 1970's who at the time wanted to organize a political party to connect various groups towards leading a revolutionary movement. Kellner (1984: 301) notes that rather than supporting the formation of a political party,

Marcuse proposed revolutionary affinity groups, based on worker's councils, loosely organized into a mass movement and united by demonstrations, confrontations and, when appropriate, direct action.

The leadership of the various affinity groups was apparently to be based on authoritativeness rather than on irrational authority. In Five Lectures, Marcuse (1970: 81) outlined that

In Marxian theory and long before it a distinction was made between rational authority and domination. The authority of an airplane pilot, for example, is rational authority. It is impossible to imagine a condition in which the passengers would tell the pilot what to do. The traffic policeman is another typical example of rational authority.

However, despite such democratic and apparently anarchist inspired pronouncements, Marcuse alludes to the desirability of an "intellectual dictatorship" in works as diverse as Eros and Civilization , One Dimensional Man , Essay on Liberation and most strikingly in a review of Rudolf Bahro's "Proto-socialism and Late Capitalism" (see Kellner, 1984: 464). While Marcuse would often respond that he proclaimed such desirability as a matter of rhetorical style in order to provoke, Marcuse's agreement with, and even the exaggeration of, the theory of Rudolf Bahro (1977) indicates that there may well be more than stylistic considerations at work:

Marcuse believes that Bahro's analysis implies that 'intellectuals' --taken as a broad category for scientists, technicians, cultural workers, the 'new working class', etc. --are the primary bearers of 'surplus consciousness' which stands against the 'compensatory interests of the masses'....Marcuse describes this group as a potential 'democratic elite' who would assume certain educational-cultural functions that would articulate emancipatory interests and spread critical consciousness throughout the society, creating the possibilities of democratizing and humanizing society. He claims that Bahro's analysis once more requires consideration of Plato's 'educational dictatorship of the intelligentsia' and Rousseau's dictum that people must be 'forced to be free' (Kellner, 1984: 311).

Indeed, Kellner (1984: 466) reiterates that in Marcuse's review of Bahro's work, Marcuse clearly argues for the desirability of an educational dictatorship, in that "an elite provides the most promising

way to lead the people to a 'real democracy'. And yet, Marcuse argues in "Theory and Politics", based on discussions with Habermas: "Perhaps educational dictatorship within democracy but not simply educational dictatorship." (in Kellner, 1984: 313) The two positions appear to contradict each other. For, the question beckons as to how Marcuse could support an educational dictatorship only within a real democracy, when the same intellectual dictatorship is required to lead 'the people' into such a democracy, presumably from and within a political situation which is not a real democracy. (7)

The contradictions and uncertainties held within Marcuse's thoughts regarding leadership place under serious question the adequacy of not only his notion of leadership but also of his epistemology in particular, and his approach towards liberation in general. While it is certainly true that cultural workers and other (activist) intellectuals have been instrumental in educational and organizing work, it is equally true in North America that they have often held back liberatory educative and organizing efforts because their approach to leadership has maintained their own group's leadership rather than developing the leadership in the development of both liberatory theory and radical practice of people of other oppressed social groups, e.g. based on the historical relations of classes, ethnicity, racial, age, gender (see Giroux in Freire, 1985: xxii). This is something that, despite Freire's influence in North America, continues to be one of the major problems of the praxis of this class of intellectuals. Marcuse's theory, rather than offering valuable insights into the transformation of such a problematic situation, indeed at times provides justification for its continuation.

2.e. Marcuse's lack of consideration of race relations within North America

Marcuse neglects to consider race relations, as constructed and resisted within power relations of domination and subordination, within North America, as well as how these historical relations are related to other structural and cultural relations of domination and subordination, such as capitalism, and patriarchy. As well, Marcuse does not consider how liberatory social change and resistance by social movements against oppressive race relations in North America are related to other social movements. Such analyses are relevant and necessary towards informing social education in North America, for not only must oppression based on race relations be taken into account in any praxis aiming towards personal and social liberation, but, as argued by both Johnella Butler and John Bracey, social education within the Black community has a long and distinguished history which is invaluable to those working in the area of such education. (8)

As well, Marcuse himself appears to overly homogenize ethnic and cultural diversity within North America. He often subsumes the particular experiences of minority cultures and ethnic groups under a 'general' North American culture, thus potentially distorting and misrepresenting those experiences. This may be especially so regarding aspects of Marcuse's examination of the realm of the unconscious and the structure of needs. For example, the familial and community life of many Native North Americans and Chicanos may be widely divergent from that which Marcuse describes and analyzes. Distinctions such as these are in need of being made explicit, for reasons not only related to the scientific validity of analyses and claims made in a research study, but

also related to ethical concerns of minimizing ethnocentric accounts which are potentially oppressive of certain minority cultural and ethnic groups.

2.f. Marcuse's lack of an adequate consideration and account of relations between Canada and the United States, and between North America and Third World countries

Essential to a philosophical foundation of social education in North America is an adequate account not only of the structural relations of power and of subordination and domination within the countries of Canada and the United States, but also between the two countries. It is relevant to point out that Marcuse's analysis of North America has never distinguished between Canada and the United States. While there are undoubted similarities shared by the two political contexts, there are also, perhaps, important differences, many created through the larger context of relations of subordination and domination between the two countries, economically, politically, culturally and otherwise. (9) This must be taken seriously for Canadians to benefit from social education foundations and practice, as well as Americans.

As well, Marcuse's theory is bereft of an adequate analysis of the relations of subordination and domination between North America and Third World countries. While at times, for example, he definitely points towards such an analysis, albeit condescendingly, he stops short of providing one. Nonetheless, he does indeed view the importance of social change in North America within the larger larger context of liberating the shackles of North American political and economic interests from Third World countries, and considers as well, the impact of Third World

liberation movements on North America. In 1969, Marcuse noted that,

the preconditions for the liberation and development of the Third World must emerge in the advanced capitalist countries. Only the internal weakening of the superpower can finally stop the financing and equipping of suppression in the backward countries. The National Liberation Fronts (of the Third World) threaten the life line of imperialism; they are not only a material but also an ideological catalyst of change. The Cuban revolution and the Viet Cong have demonstrated: it can be done; there is a morality, a humanity, a will, a faith which can resist and deter the gigantic technical and economic force of capitalist expansion.

Yet, notwithstanding the above, and other scattered remarks in An Essay on Liberation (1969a), a thorough analysis of the above relationships is wanting in his works, and thus requires not only supplementation, but also revision. Such revision is necessitated not only by more recent historical events and developments between North America and Third World countries, but also by Marcuse's apparent paternalism and ethnocentricity, for example, evident in his labelling of the Third World as 'backward'.

As well, Marcuse's analysis of the technological capacity of the First World to objectively support non-alienated labour raises a political question regarding the Third World. For, if the technological potential of the First World allows the elimination of alienated labour in only that context, then that part of the world would need to (continue to) economically and otherwise dominate the rest of the world. Thus, not only would such a situation perpetuate the unfreedom of Third World nations, but those of the First World would also remain unfree in their role as dominators. That this question is not raised by Marcuse may perhaps be indicative of his lack of an adequate analysis of the relations between the First World and Third World contexts.

2.g. Marcuse's lack of an adequate account of patriarchy

Marcuse fails to provide an adequate analysis of the patriarchal relations of domination within North American society within which women, and other groups such as children, are oppressed. As well, the manner in which he relates patriarchal relations of domination to capitalist relations of domination is inadequate.

While Marcuse, in the 1970's, was aware and supportive of feminism, and particularly of socialist feminism, he held a naive, abstract and romantic understanding of women, their labour and their oppression. Indeed, his analysis is one which ultimately further oppresses women, as argued by Joan Landes, as well as by Nancy Vedder-Shults. As Vedder-Shults (1978: 6), from a socialist feminist perspective explains,

we saw his conception of women as idealized: separated from actual women in their struggle for liberation, such 'feminine characteristics' can only function as a model for a potential utopia, not mediated by the process to attain such a future. There is no connection between today's evaluation of 'femininity' as weak and inferior and the future society Marcuse posits where these characteristics will be viewed positively. In fact, in some undefined fashion, Marcuse expects the women's movement to bring about the future socialist utopia, using feminism in a way which several West German and American women's groups vehemently opposed.

Marcuse's philosophical analysis of North American society does not appear to probe the basic causes of the specific oppression of women, thus neither does it adequately serve to struggle against those causes. Rather, Marcuse seems to interpret the essential importance of feminist theory as being in the utopian values or 'sensibility' which he

apparently ascribes to women. The 'creative receptivity' which seems to be ascribed by him to women as a group, ultimately, according to Marcuse due to their praxis and thus 'culture', is used by him as a liberatory image of negation of the dominant Performance Principle. (10)

Kellner (1984: 192) critiques Eros and Civilization with respect to Marcuse's neglect of consideration of the specificity of women's oppression and his abstraction of women, a critique which is well-founded even in relation to his later works:

Marcuse fails to make gender distinctions in EC, and does not analyse the specificity of women's oppression. He does not address the problem of domestic labour, or the overcoming of oppressive sex roles and divisions of labour in the new society he envisages. For instance, although automation may liberate human beings from some types of economic bondage, this does not necessarily entail the liberation of women from domestic labour, unless the specificities of labour in the home are dealt with. Although labour time could be significantly reduced by automation and free time could be increased, under the system of patriarchy that coexists with capitalism, male free time might very well be increased at the expense of women.

Indeed, as Nancy Vedder-Shults (1978: 12) points out, Marcuse's conception of women's traditional labour and its relation to capitalist and patriarchal relations are distorted because "Marcuse is still using an androcentric model -- male human beings and their work constituting his central category". Vedder-Shults (1978: 12) elaborates:

According to Marcuse, the social and material base for male dominance has been eroded in the twentieth century through women's increasing participation in the work force. Since he defines production narrowly, including only work which creates profit, Marcuse views housework as a form of "surplus exploitation," above and beyond women's "productive" labor. Women's oppression is thus a type of "surplus repression," a repressive moment which, since it is not based in economic conditions as defined by Marcuse, can only help to maintain certain forms of domination in capitalism. Consequently, feminism is a

political force which can merely aggravate already existing contradictions in commodity production.

As well, again due to his androcentric stance, Marcuse often takes the meaning of 'man' or 'human' to include women, even under situations in which he himself is aware that he is only analyzing specifically men's experience. In particular, Marcuse's foray into Freud's contribution to Critical social theory includes almost exclusively analyses of male biology and experience; he then leaps towards perhaps unjustifiable conclusions about the relation between the 'human' psychic structure and processes, and domination and liberation within contemporary North America. Marcuse's consideration of the actual experience of women as relevant to analyzing contemporary conditions is notably absent, as is an appreciation of the specifically patriarchal hegemony through which the discourse of epistemological analysis is defined and elaborated.

Much like Freire who admires the 'women's movement' as 'fantastic', and apparently idealistically believes that he has ejected all traces of sexism from himself, Marcuse displays simultaneous support for feminism and patriarchal self-deception and denial.(11) Mary O'Brien, with her characteristic wit, lucidly refers to Freire's "patriarchal genius" (12); indeed, as Freire in 1985 still appeared woefully ignorant of the theory and practice of both North American and Brazilian feminists (13), Marcuse seems to have touted feminist considerations, while at the same time viewing women's traditional 'creative receptivity' as one-dimensionally being their major contribution to 'human' liberation.

Henry Giroux, as well as Freire, have more recently approached

feminist teachers and the feminist movement in less abstract terms than Marcuse, truer to a dialectical notion of ideology, as well as to a dialectical fusion of resistance and reproduction theories. Nonetheless, I propose that they both, much as Marcuse, view the significance of feminist theory and social movement as being merely in the consideration of the cultural 'subjective' side of life, and its focus on consciousness, as well as in the cultural politics associated with and derived from consideration of the body (see Giroux and Freire in Livingstone, et al., 1987: xv). Giroux, I suggest, apparently refuses to take seriously the value of socialist feminist theory in its redefinition of the 'wider' structural cause of domination, as lying in, though not exclusively, a dialectical relation of the sexual division of labour and the capitalist economic relations of production.

As in his introduction to Women Teaching for Change (Weiler, 1988), despite what I view as the author's socialist feminist emphasis to the contrary, Giroux, writing with Freire, notes that Kathleen Weiler:

attempts to bridge the most critical aspects of reproduction theory, its emphasis on how wider social forms reproduce the class-specific dimensions of inequality, with those aspects of feminist theory that stress the importance of consciousness, experience, and the subjective side of human relations. (Weiler, 1988: ix)

I propose that Giroux and Freire still apparently misapprehend socialist feminist theory, in that they appear to 'existentialize' it, much as Marcuse interpreted socialist feminist theory as a romantic cultural 'sensibility', rather than as a theory equally concerned with redefining the androcentric socialist view of the economic infrastructure of patriarchal-capitalist society, and its relation to institutional and cultural hegemony and liberatory resistance. As Alison Jaggar (1983:

136) elaborates:

Socialist feminists do not believe that the sexual and procreative aspects of production are determined ultimately by what is defined ordinarily as "the economy"; in other words, sexuality and procreation are not part of the superstructure. Neither, however, do socialist feminists believe that they alone constitute the material base of society as a whole. Instead, sexuality and procreation are a part of the economic foundation of society, partially determining "the economy" in the narrow sense, and partially determined by it.

As well, Jaggar maintains that

one solid basis of agreement among socialist feminists is that to overcome women's alienation, the sexual division of labor must be eliminated in every area of life.

I propose that if Marcuse's and Freire's theories, and even that of their most distinguished interpreter as related to education theory and practice, Henry Giroux, are to be more helpful towards adequately serving to develop a philosophical basis for social education in North America, they require serious reconsideration in light of, through a more rigorous consideration of, socialist feminist theoretical and practical developments. Indeed, many of what I view as Marcuse's general limitations, e.g. issues related to leadership, political economy, accessibility, may be revised and profitably redefined through a consideration of the questions and answers-in-development of socialist feminist theory, particularly as developed by Alison M. Jaggar, and other contemporary philosophers and social theorists.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have attempted to briefly examine several limitations of Marcuse's Critical Social theory as an adequate enrichment, complement and stance from which to critique Freire's

philosophical theory, towards the purpose of indicating an avenue towards a theoretical foundation of social education within contemporary North America. I have noted that Marcuse's theory lacks an adequate and rigorous: analysis of political economy, theory of the state; analysis of the praxis of social movements; accessibility to those within North America who are not much-schooled; account of social and political leadership; analysis of that social domination which is based on racism; analyses of the relation between Canada and the United States, and between North America and Third World countries; and finally, analysis of patriarchy and the domination of women. I propose that a rigorous consideration of socialist feminist theory, particularly as researched, interpreted and developed by Alison M. Jaggar (1983, 1984) is required to critique, redefine and supplement both Marcuse's and Freire's theories towards the aim of developing a theoretical foundation of social education adequate to the North American context.

Notes of Chapter Four

1. That the contemporary period is indeed characterized by not only pervasive domination but also active worker struggle was compellingly argued and illustrated by Stanley Aronowitz at the First Working Conference on Critical Pedagogy, on Feb. 22, 1986 at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass.
2. See Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination (1973) for elaboration.
3. For elaboration, see Martin Reappraising Freire (1975); also, Walker, "The End of Dialogue", in Mackie, ed., Literacy and Revolution (1981).
4. For example, see Leo Panitch, "The Role and Nature of the Canadian State", in Structured Inequality in Canada (1980).
5. See, for example, anarchist accounts of the state: Harrison, The Modern State: an Anarchist Approach (1983); Clark, The Anarchist Moment (1984); Woodcock, ed., The Anarchist Reader (1977); and, Krimerman and Perry, eds., Patterns of Anarchy (1966).
6. Philip Wexler, Rebecca Martusewicz and June Kern, "Popular Educational Politics", in Livingstone, et al., Critical Pedagogy and Cultural Power (1987).
7. See also Lichtman's article, "Repressive Tolerance", in Pippen, et al., Marcuse (1988), for a discussion of Marcuse's (developing) tendency to advocate for an authoritarian leadership.
8. Johnella Butler and John Bracey each forwarded this at the First Working Conference on Critical Pedagogy, February 21, 1986 at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass.
9. For example, see Niosi, The Economy of Canada: a Study of Ownership and Control (1978); also, Naylor, Dominion of Debt (1985); and Roussopoulos, ed., The Political Economy of the State: Canada, Quebec; U.S.A. (1973).
10. See Katz, Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation (1982), pp. 208 and 209 for elaboration.
11. Freire elaborated on this during a community discussion on the theme of sexism which he participated in and led, in Amherst, Mass., 1985.
12. O'Brien, "Feminism and Education: A Critical Review Essay", in Resources for Feminist Research Vol. XII, No. 3, November 1983, p. 11.
13. See Saffioti, Women in Class Society (1978), for a translated feminist historical account of patriarchy and capitalism in Brazilian society.

CHAPTER FIVE:Conclusion of thesis

In this thesis, I have attempted to critically examine several possible contributions of Marcuse's Critical social theory towards critiquing, revising and supplementing Freire's philosophical theory, towards the aim of pointing to a philosophical foundation of social education adequate to the North American context. As well, I have attempted to indicate several limitations of Marcuse's theory in regard to the above aim. Finally, I have attempted to indicate a specific direction or avenue for future research, given the dialectics of the possibilities and limitations inherent to Marcuse's theory for the above project as examined and put forth in this thesis.

It was deemed appropriate to examine Marcuse's possible contributions towards the aim of this project as lying in: a. his approach to the structural relations of North American society and the relation of those historically-specific relations to the production, reproduction and historical mediation of ideology; and b. his approach to the unconscious and the structure of needs. Such an exploration of these two main fields of his Critical social theory necessitated detailed descriptive and interpretive analyses, and an immanent critique of his work in these areas.

This exploration points towards a need for further research on Marcuse's theory proper, most notably that of examining selected questions which are indicative of contradictions or tensions within his work, which I feel have not been adequately addressed and explored in the relevant scholarship. These contradictions or limitations are

relatively, yet not fully, independent of those raised specifically in relation to the adequacy of Marcuse's theory towards the goal of this thesis project, as a whole. Some of the former, then, are:

- contradictions in his approach to critical art, the culture industry and technocratic rationality. In particular, the dialectical tension between the liberatory moments and moments of domination of critical art have not been sufficiently explored, both as approached within Marcuse's theory per se, and regarding the relation of his theory and the liberatory praxis which may be based on such a theory

- contradictions and anomalies created by the juxtaposition of his approach to sexuality and the eroticization of everyday life on the one hand, and his approach to political praxis and struggle on the other. It remains unclear how Marcuse attempts to reconcile his call for living an existence of peaceful receptivity, with his call for militant political struggle. For, Marcuse apparently argues that the former is not merely a utopian goal, but an existential necessity for an ongoing social transformation.

- contradictions in his theory of sexuality, in which he at times seems to vacillate between condemnation of the internalization of paternal authority (as structured within patriarchal relations) for psycho-social development, and the reverence of such a model of internalization. While such tension in Marcuse's theory of social psychology not only exists, but is seen as pivotal to liberatory concerns, there has been little research which actually explores Marcuse's theory in depth to fully clarify this contradiction, as

well as to study it in relation to other alternative theories of ego development which may critique and extend or revise his theory in this regard.

- a general contradiction between Marcuse's aim of social liberation and the androcentric standpoint which at times informs his theory of social liberation. This contradiction is evident in not only his social psychology, but also in such realms as his interpretation of structural relations of North American society. While this contradiction has been noted by scholars such as Nancy Vedder-Shults (1978), there has been no major theoretical study carried out on the extent and full consequences of it. Such scholarly work is pressing if Marcuse's work is to be of maximal use towards achieving the ends of personal and social liberation.

Nonetheless, despite the limitations, contradictions and anomalies I have raised and noted in these areas, I have argued that Marcuse's analyses in the two above-mentioned spheres serve as important considerations towards the task of developing a philosophical foundation with which to inform social education adequate to the North American context.

Be that as it may, I conclude in the examination of the limitations of Marcuse's theory towards the above aim, that even those two spheres of his theory which I view as relevant towards developing such an adequate philosophical foundation, as well as other areas of his Critical social theory, are often in need of revision, redefinition and critique from another (albeit related) philosophical standpoint, namely socialist feminist theory, particularly as researched and developed by

Alison M. Jaggar (1983, 1984), and others.

In particular, it may be seen that many of the limitations of Marcuse's theory towards the ultimate aim of the thesis project may stem from Marcuse's often androcentric standpoint towards, for example, political economy, theory of educational and political leadership, social-psychological theory and epistemological theory. I offer that these limitations are profitably highlighted and often transcended by what is forwarded as a more rigorous dialectical-materialist theory (in development), socialist feminist theory.

As noted in the introduction to this thesis, two of the factors which must be taken seriously into account, recognized and researched, in attempting to develop a philosophical theory adequate towards informing social education in the North American context, are the experiences of, and the reflection on those experiences by, those engaged in social education. Such research is, then, also put forth as an important and necessary avenue for future study, especially as related to those social educators who are actively and consciously attempting to mediate their work with a socialist feminist commitment and analysis, particularly within the Canadian context. The latter context is proposed, given the specific historical situation of Canada (as one on the subordinate end of unequal power relations) with the United States, and the political consequences of such a situation.

Developing a philosophical foundation of social education adequate to the North American context must ultimately be the result of work which actively confronts the dominant social tendency to dichotomize theory and practice, and the resulting alienating and oppressive practical tendency for 'theorists' to produce the bases which guide and

evaluate the work of 'practitioners'. The practice of, and reflection on such practice by, social educators must thus be integral to and constitutive of any developed basis of social education in North America.

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