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**Four orders of human subjectivity as determined by body
technique, technology, and objectification**

by

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ABSTRACT

English

The influence technology has on human subjectivity has been the occupation of philosophy for some time. Recent technological advance has re-motivated the speculation on subjectivity where a bodily dimension of subjectivity becomes necessary to understand the complexities of subjectivity as it is formulated in contemporary society. In this thesis subjectivity has been schematized according to its states relative to the body to demonstrate how technology and its mythologies influences and define individual subjectivity and the larger constructive factors that shape that subjectivity. Various examples are used to show the contemporary postmodern response to technological subjective imposition as subjectivity both negotiates and responds to the four orders of subjectivity: dormant, active, material, and terminal. As shall be demonstrated, each subjective form is constituted by a series of technologies and mythologies that form a reciprocal and continuous pattern illustrated by individual, cultural, bodily, and communicative models.

En français

L'influence de la technologie sur la subjectivité humaine est, depuis longtemps, une préoccupation importante de la philosophie. Avec le progrès technologique récent, il faut reconnaître une dimension corporelle de la subjectivité qui est devenue nécessaire à la compréhension des complexités de la subjectivité tel que formulées dans la société contemporaine. Dans ce mémoire, on propose une schéma de la subjectivité d'après ses états relatifs au corps afin de démontrer comment la technologie et les mythologies qu'elle a engendré influencent et définissent la subjectivité individuelle ainsi que les facteurs constructeurs plus larges qui donnent forme à cette subjectivité. On aura recours à plusieurs exemples de la réponse contemporaine postmoderne où la subjectivité à la fois négocie et répond aux 4 ordres de la subjectivité: dormant, actif, matériel et terminal. L'on démontrera comment chaque forme subjective est constituée par une série de technologies et de mythologies qui forment un dessin réciproque et continue que l'on voit par des modèles individuels, culturels, corporels et communicateurs.

INTRODUCTION

Human subjectivity is a complex concern in the humanities and social sciences. Interest in subjectivity has been re-motivated in light of new theories and hypotheses regarding the body, emotion, artificial intelligence, and technology. The attempt of this thesis will be to distill these complexities by forming distinctions of subjectivities with particular focus on the body.

Technology has been a powerful force in the development of contemporary life and culture. Technology has been defined in many ways, but not explicitly examined in terms of the body and subjectivity. Subjectivity does not assume that one know one's ontological status. Subjectivity is simply the notion that behind all 'agency' there is some form of intent; each subjectivity is unique. Subjectivity itself, even in an individual, is varied; at times there is uncertainty whether what one feels and thinks is wanted or expresses something about oneself. Regardless of the inability to understand the origins of one's subjectivity, it is still central to 'being' human. It is a universal in that as human, everyone has a subjectivity based on a unique perspective, a situation, a memory, an entirely unique experience, etc. The subjectivity might be out of control but there is still a possibility to have a telos, to affect the world. Having a body does not guarantee the form of subjectivity, it simply determines a semblance of uniqueness, an ever changing subjectivity. Having a body means that subjectivity is active, in process. It is important to note that as bodies, senses do not always inform. Senses cannot always tell us what we need to know. Drugs, for example, completely change our sensibilities. Humans have the ability to forget and, at times, according to the circumstance, the inability to forget. Does the body forget a missing arm or leg? When do we trust our senses, with or without drugs? How do we know we are feeling badly or well? Even if subjectivity is not a given, is not a naturalistic or universal principle, it is still a basic unit of affect.

Subjectivity is the product of human thought. It is colloquially defined in terms like "spirit", "mind", "soul", etc. [Gumbrecht, p. 402] These terms clearly suggest that subjectivity is a human universal, and hermetic to the body. Accepting this, I propose that subjectivity extends further than thought, spirit, mind, and soul. Subjectivity as 'thought' is only one aspect of this complex concept. As is shown in the accompanying schematic mapping of subjectivity, there are three broad categories of subjectivity: 1.) dormant subjectivity (thought); 2.) animate subjectivity; and, 3.) inanimate subjectivity.

Dormant subjectivity is a subjectivity in process hermetic to the body— it is the classical definition of subjectivity. Dormant subjectivity as thought implies that there is always potential for animation. The primary condition for dormant subjectivity, as with animate subjectivity, is the body. It is important to note that while human 'thought' (first order subjectivity) is understood as several internal subjectivities in process, in commutation, the manifestation or materialization of thought is subjectively singular because of embodiment. While dormant subjectivity is a series of different subjectivities interacting internally within the body, they are still hermetic to the body. When thought turns to action, (implying agency) subjectivity as conditioned by embodiment is singular; this is called animate subjectivity, and comes in two forms.

The re-supposition of active subjectivity, remains singular until some kind of external technology is applied. As will be shown, active subjectivity does not have to remain singular when categorized as second or third order subjectivity. Moreover, the schematized logic of subjectivity discussed in this thesis demonstrates that subjective disembodiment (through technology) reformulates the body as fragmentary. Subjectivity in this case is assigned to various parts of the body, rather than encompassing a singularity of subjectivity by virtue of one body. Second order Active subjectivity takes on two forms:

- 1.) embodied-active subjectivity, characterized by co-present human interaction: and,
- 2.) disembodied-active subjectivity, comprised of two types:
 - a.) present disembodied-active subjectivity (speaking on the phone), and,
 - b.) inscribed disembodied-active subjectivity (writing or when one leaves a message on an answering machine).

The condition for third order subjectivity is that the body by which subjectivity has emanated from still exists; any act assumes that action will be responded to, as if there is an audience present, even if the response is not carried out.

One unique quality that sets animate subjectivity apart from dormant subjectivity is that it can be both embodied (second order) and disembodied (third order); divided according to the means by which subjectivity is expressed. Second order subjectivity depends upon the body itself. In "Techniques of the Body", Marcel Mauss explains the protocols for understanding the way people use their bodies as an intellectual exercise of moving from the abstract to the concrete; an academic reversal of sorts. Thus, talking to oneself is second

order subjectivity, as is talking to others, gesturing, etc. Second order animate/embodied subjectivity is proximal to the body, determined by techniques of the body. Vivian Sobchack has correctly identified that second order technologies proximal to the body preclude broader cultural analysis. Borrowing from philosopher of technology Don Ihde, Sobchack confirms that proximal, "microperceptual" technology ("sensory perceptions [what is immediate and focused bodily in actual seeing, hearing, etc.]) [Ihde in Sobchack, p. 86] changes "the very sense we have of our bodies". [Sobchack, footnote, p. 85] The force of such changes "inform... twice over" when it comes to "representational technologies of photography, the motion picture, video, and computer" because "the specific material condition by which they latently engage our sense at the bodily level" reformulate "our senses textually at the hermeneutic level of what (Ihde calls) macroperceptions; 'a cultural, or hermeneutic perception'." An intellectual precursor to comprehending the digital construction of knowledge is imbedded first in our bodies, and only secondarily, in our culture (fourth order subjectivity)-- as is the argument of existential phenomenology.

Embodied subjectivity is dynamic. Active-disembodied subjectivity is also active but depends upon external technologies: this third order subjectivity is called material subjectivity because it requires both a specific personal/proximal techniques of the body (a language, a paper and pen to write with, a musical instrument) and, more importantly, an impersonal, distant technology: one that divides the body from itself. In the case of material subjectivity, technology becomes the prosthetic for the human body because material subjectivity is a record, an index to a living body encased by first order, dormant subjectivity, but divided from it.

This is not where the continuum of subjectivity ends. The third category of subjectivity includes fourth order subjectivity alone: inanimate, terminal or passive subjectivity. This last category is terminally disembodied from the source whence it came, and the dividing line is either objectification or death or both. Material subjectivity has also the potential to be passive subjectivity; there are shared characteristics and, at this point in the common continuum of subjective expression, the difference between third and fourth order subjectivities becomes blurred. The reason I have suggested a record of animate, active subjectivity is 'passive' is because as humans, we re-invest our subjectivities into those of the present and past. Moreover, subjectivities of the past demand the workings of a metaphysical, symbolic re-embodiment. One example I will cite is how artists have re-invested their own matrix of subjectivities (dormant, animate, active, material subjectivities)

into a passive subjectivity; artists Eduardo Aquino and Madelon Hooykaas and Elsa Stansfield have created exhibitions at the Redpath Museum based upon one of its display items, the Lady of Thebes, a three-thousand-five-hundred year old mummy. Passive subjectivity is subjectivity that is divided from the body. It is readable as text, or understandable as subjectivity that has been codified: fourth order subjectivity. Most importantly, it is a subjectivity that is faint, or appears only as trace; it is also the easiest subjective state to usurp, appropriate, or objectify for the purpose of control by a series of undefinable external subjectivities.

It is through two distinct forms of technology that second (still active subjectivity) and third order subjectivity express. Active subjectivity cannot be motivated without the presence of a human body. The limit of active human subjectivity is either death, or objectification; a body itself cannot manifest these. Likewise, as shall be demonstrated, the body itself may still exist, but the imbedded subjectivity that animates the body does not express itself. In the case of a compromised body, a clinically brain-dead body for example, subjectivity associated with that person is fourth order, or passive subjectivity. All previous subjective activity ceases, only traces of a subjective existence are left. Fourth order subjectivities are vulnerable to interpretation and reinterpretation by both second and third order subjectivities (active subjectivities). This creates a unique situation in that the traces of subjectivity are re-animated, intimating the illusion of re-embodiment. Technologies included in this order of subjectivity seamlessly reproduce subjectivities; they are an apparition of the body. It is common for humans to mistake the use and benefits of technology for active subjectivity, particularly because technology is a synthetic body; as some have defined it, a second skin. Technology is a body by proxy, a fabricated body in place of a human body. Second and third order subjectivities are expressions of active subjectivity through technology; in the first case, intimate to the body, and in the second case, removed or remote from the body. Rather than discussing the influence of technology on subjectivity as a dominant theme, an analysis of the expression of subjectivity through technology will highlight the possible influences technology has on subjectivity, and in the process, asking the question: does subjectivity change as the modes of subjective expression change? Second order subjectivity is expressed through a body (techniques of the body). The illusion of subjectivity is powerful in fourth order subjectivity; this illusion is crucial to the narrative power of fiction and the uncanny, often overlooking idea that technology is the failed attempt of humans to defy death through re-embodiment. The illusion of active subjectivity is why technology appears to have agency. This too is why it is commonly assumed that technology will someday have agency in the form of artificial intelligence. Deleuze and

Guattari define desiring-machines as the structures of life, from banal (second order) to complex (third and fourth order), that assist in expressing subjectivity: in short, 'desiring-machines' is a descriptive term for technologies. As a body technique, language itself is an intimate desiring-machine. Desiring-machines allude to and are coupled with what Deleuze and Guattari call the body without organs. I like the term 'desiring-machines' because it implies several things about technology that are not overtly stated: desiring-machines are first a synthetic human construction, created to fulfill wishes, desires. The fact that Deleuze and Guattari have animated the concept by conjoining an active verb, desiring, with a noun (to make a complete noun) is important to the word's rhetorical and descriptive usefulness. This gives the impression that the noun itself has agency and a subjectivity of its own.¹

Passive subjectivity is the result of active subjectivity being applied to desiring-machines (autonomous/anonymous human structures that are set in motion to provide for needs and desires of the subjectivity investing effort), creating complexities to the degree that subjective origin is undefined. Passive subjectivity is complex because several subjectivities (passive and active) can interpose to provide an unstable matrix of subjectivities: subjective agency is indistinguishable. It is only appearance that 'one' passive subjectivity is singular. Passive subjectivity is, without being pejorative, impure. It is a gateway, a passage for other subjectivities.

An animate subjectivity requires a body (embodiment); the past expectation that artificial intelligence was to have been developed by now (or at least by the year 2000) precisely overlooked the idea that one does not have a body, one IS a body, beyond that, any inclination of subjective agency is an illusion created by third and more forcefully, fourth order subjectivity where a layering or matrix of indistinguishable active and passive subjectivities operate. Importantly, fourth order subjectivity presents the need for re-embodiment of subjectivity. This is what Deleuze and Guattari have described as the body without organs. As culture, society, community, ethnicity, etc., fourth order subjectivity returns as an influence on the first order, dormant subjectivity, and the cycle is processed over again.

As will be demonstrated in the series of examples contained herein, third and fourth order subjectivities are the most powerful, influential, and rhetorically potent states of

¹ This is not the case, but this is simply one more example of how fourth order subjectivity is a camouflage mechanism for animate subjectivities.

subjectivity. If first order subjectivity is embodied, and the significant aspect of that subjectivity is imagination [Johnson, p. xv], then third order subjectivity is equally overlooked as a source of powerful social coding. In the varied cases I present, fourth order subjectivity is most effective as an illusion only when it convenes with re-embodiment: Eva Perón, Lenin, Mafia lords in Russia, the mummy, Mona in **The Kingdom**, Gibarian, Hari, and the planet Solaris in **Solaris**, Rachel and Roy in **Blade Runner**, the monster in **Horror Express**. All these issue forth the re embodiment of fourth order subjectivity. The re-embodiment involved in fourth order subjectivity is what makes horror effective as a tool to frighten, what makes a whole political 'revolution' survive, makes a popular human icon live in the imagination of the people that love/d her or him, makes the mystery of Egypt continue to live and effect curses. Fourth order subjectivity is the social subjectivity because it is a subjectivity that camouflages several active subjectivities, current, contemporaneous subjectivities that make immediate choices about what is valued and what is not.

To demonstrate the complexities of subjectivity, Eugenio Martin's **Horror Express** (1972), Ridley Scott's **Blade Runner** (1981), Andrei Tarkovsky's **Solaris** (1972), Stanley Kubrick's **2001: A Space Odyssey** (1968), and, Lars von Trier's **The Kingdom** (1994) have been chosen because each illustrate both tangible physical references to the state of the contemporary human body, and the more obscure distortions of 'the body', the symbolic states that govern perceptions about the body, through a variety of cultural means. It is through technology that humans answer questions of being. As will be explained, the concept of desiring-machines describes the use of technology in a specific manner. This manner is intentional because subjectivity requires re-expression through 'becomings'. Becomings, again a concept taken from Deleuze and Guattari, is both an experiment in subjective situatedness and a method of working through dispersions of subjectivity that reside outside the body, outside first order subjectivity. The pulsion of desires that traditional methods of subjectivity analysis sees as 'lack' or unattainable is challenged by the idea that multiple becomings (whereby the human can 'become' something else) is precipitated by moments of desire that erupt between desiring-machines and bodies without organs thus allowing multiple subjectivities, multiple plateaus.²

² The body without organs has been vacated of all internal workings. It does not function, but is a shell of a body, a vessel, a shell of something that was, that has been; it symbolizes potential. The body without organs is not limited to a human body, it can be animal (nature) and cyborg (artifice, creation) alike. The body without organs is a body whose organs have been extended, as if, so Deleuze and Guattari claim, the body wears its nervous system outside itself. The organs extend, and these are, in Deleuze and Guattari's terms, the product of desiring-machines.

First. I will examine what gives the illusion of dormant and active subjectivity over to inanimate, fourth order subjectivity by explaining the Lady of Thebes, a 3500 year old mummy at McGill University's Redpath Museum. By discussing this artifact and the imposition of subjectivities that have been invested into this object, (the museum display and two artist exhibits that have take place on behalf of this object) I hope to demonstrate how inanimate, fourth order subjectivity creates a poetics of embodiment, and by extension, a poetics of life that can be utilized in a series of ways, from rhetoric to art.

Desiring-machines are the organ/organizational components of life, of living and being, represented by the fluidity of desire and emotion which force a series of relationships with the BwO; these relationships erupt into becomings. Becomings are processes that allow access to varieties of ontological possibilities. The Deleuze and Guattari project is an effort away from Lacan and lack-- they see becomings as a varied potential that gives humans a kind of multiple existence on and in so called plateaus. Becomings are the intimate realization of bodily affect.

The desiring-machine is contrary to the body without organs because the body without organs has no desire-- there is no self preservation tendencies, no residuals; nothing but a de-commodified symbolic existence. The hegemonic tendency of the desiring-machine is counteracted by the resisting entity of the body without organs by instilling shame or deconstructing body technique-- this in ironic contrast to the perpetual and perceptual goals of a desiring-machine. This is why the body without organs does not exist without a mirroring of the desiring-machine. It is precisely the instability, or rather, utility and fecundity of the body without organs that the desiring-machine is meant to provide. It is not so much a balance between the desiring-machine and the BwO that brings subjectivity to the fore. It is rather in the dialectic, the constant reconfiguration of energy relations through desiring-machines in their autonomous and anonymous quest to consume the BwO, that the intimacy of the body is brought to bear on value-- the only way for this discourse to be played out is in the individual's body; it is the field in which subjectivity exists.

THE LADY OF THEBES AND THE 'NATURE' OF DEATH

The Lady of Thebes is a three-thousand year old Egyptian mummy on permanent display in the Redpath Museum, McGill University's museum of natural history. The Redpath is a neo-classical building located in the centre of the lower McGill campus and is the first building constructed in Canada for the purpose of object exhibition. At the same time as being a trophy to the grandeur that was once McGill, it is also a strange spectacle: a repository for dead nature.

The Lady of Thebes is appropriate in this context; as an object she accrues different meanings from this exhibition space than, for example, a museum of civilization. The context is appropriate in that it disrupts the logic of a 'natural history': the Lady of Thebes is human, not animal, not plant. The contradiction is powerfully appropriate when one attempts to understand how a mummy came to be displayed at McGill, beyond the idea that this example also highlights the oppression the world has suffered as a result of colonialism and science. Though the display is currently in the process of reformulation, the previous state of the display will be the basis of my discussion and critique. An understanding of the nature of human subjectivity can be demonstrated using this display and the artistic interventions that have taken place around the object, the mummy, because this subtle and unique example of fourth order subjectivity clearly shows the positive (art, beauty, poetics, metaphysics) and negative (rhetoric, illusion) results of living, active subjective reinvestment on fourth order subjectivity. It is a clear example of what results when living, active subjectivity utilizes, violates, exploits, appropriates, etc., the passive position of belated subjectivities. The example of the Lady of Thebes allows us to understand these complexities of subjectivity in various forms as it is mapped in my schematic interpretation of subjectivity. It furthermore allows me to enter into a variety of topics that demonstrate both the continuum and circular nature of human subjectivity in its schematized form.

Positioned under low lighting in the foyer of the Redpath Museum, the Lady of Thebes held only passing curiosity; after all, it had been relegated for many years to rest in the foyer, a cursory space of display. Gone was any contemporary attraction for the purpose of didactic measure. The storage/genealogy of the item displayed is in keeping with colonial sensibilities that pervade both the space itself, and the museum's role as scientific institute, particularly as a satellite of an academic institution such as McGill.

When I first encountered the Lady of Thebes, she was subject of an art installation created by Montréal artist Eduardo Aquino. In 1993, as part of the Graduate Program in Communications student organized conference Screensites, Aquino created a thematic projection with the Lady of Thebes as its subject of representation. Screensites was about the context of the screen, about "screens and place"— theatres, audience, the cinema industry, etc. With this in mind, Aquino produced an installation titled, **Something for Everyone** (a title lifted directly from a Redpath Museum promotional pamphlet of the time) installing slide projectors on the inside of the Redpath which illuminate translucent screens positioned over three large front windows. The result was three identical blow-up images of the profiled face of Lady of Thebes [See **Image Appendix, pp. 12-13**].

In Ancient Egyptian mummification/burial practice, the organs of the dead body are removed through discreet openings cut into the skin. This makes the Lady of Thebes, literally, a body without organs, although culturally, the Lady of Thebes is more complex than an evacuated body, this designation being somewhat too clinical or objective. Hence, to begin my analysis of the Lady of Thebes, the term 'body without organs' takes on symbolic meaning. The term 'Body Without Organs' [herein simplified as BwO (singular), and BswO (plural)] is a key concept in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in their double volume analysis of schizophrenia and capitalism, Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. Deleuze and Guattari precipitate a shift in Western thought by challenging propositions in philosophy and sciences of the mind (psychiatry and psychoanalysis) by questioning widely accepted characteristics of human subjectivity in these academic and therapeutic disciplines. Symbolically, in a most succinct way according to the precepts laid-out in the theories of Deleuze and Guattari, the Lady of Thebes is a 'body without organs'. The term, "body without organs", is chosen for its critical stance against subjective impositions characteristics of fourth order subjectivity.

The definition of a BwO is simple enough: a fictional state or being that exist without context. It is a purity of meaning. Ironically, Deleuze and Guattari's 'Body without Organs' is a kind of secularized version of the soul. As a result, there is an array of interpretations and explanations required to understand how a body, a BwO, resembles or is characterized the same way a 'soul' is commonly understood. As will later be discussed, this is a central issue to the construction of subjectivity. Deleuze and Guattari's idea of the BwO applies to the Egyptian mummy in that as a body without organs, she represents not just human history (specific notions of fourth order subjectivity), but something of human nature (first order subjectivity)— ironically so because she rests in a museum of natural

history. Because she is an inanimate subjectivity, she is susceptible to third and fourth order subjective imposition. Depending upon how such impositions are framed and interpreted and re-interpreted, the worth extracted by an individual shifts. The Lady of Thebes is an important BwO because she is politically ambiguous, intriguing, docile, lost to movement, encapsulated in a variety of ways. The nature of the attraction is not simply my own. During my studies at McGill, aside from Aquino's installation, an art installation by Amsterdam artists Madelon Hooykaas and Elsa Stansfield titled, **Time Machine: The Personal Observatory**, took place at the Redpath Museum. Again, the focus of artistic representation was the Lady of Thebes. Time Machine was an 'in situ' exhibit curated by Christine Ross comprised of sculptures and video projections intertwined with artifacts from the museum.

The term BwO is appropriated from Antonin Artaud, and Deleuze and Guattari use it to offer an alternative to the notion that human subjectivity is fragmented yet repairable by concentrating not on the mind, but on the mind in the body. For Deleuze and Guattari, the desiring-machine is precisely the kind of substitution of body that is achieved by all forms of technology.

Desiring-machines make us an organism: but at the very heart of this production, within the very production of this production, the body suffers from being organized in this way, from not having some other sort of organization, or no organization at all. [D+G, AO, p. 8]

For Deleuze and Guattari the desiring-machine's latent product is 'identity'. Technology as a desiring-machine constructs the human body. The replication of the human body implodes on itself, nullifying the human body all together. Desiring-machines are a kind of autopoietic system³ whereby the product (i.e. identity) feeds into the organization of desiring-machines.

Marcel Mauss' 1934 research provision "Techniques of the Body" is a compendium to the diversity of postures and demeanors of the human body across a range of cultures and

³ Niklas Luhmann has taken the word autopoiesis from biology and applied it to social systems. Autopoiesis is a matter of selection: when subjectivity must be animated, there is a choice as to what form of action subjectivity will take. We select our means, our norms, outlets, and modes of communication-- a kind of structural hermeneutic. The selection includes how we prioritize communication; it is a simple matter of how and what we choose. While economics is a part of that decision, it is also a predictive choice that drives the selection of technology for subjective investment. For example, the choice to speak is the choice to produce discourse, regardless of how that discourse might be interpreted. The result is that dependent subjects are victim to the medium more than victim to choices, our own subjectiveness. Thus, subjectivity lies not in the hands of the user, but lies only in the user's choice of communication.

situations.⁴ Mauss recognizes the lexicon of possible bodily contortions, not as a contortionist must do to perform, but as each individual appropriates a demeanor out of aesthetics or necessity in everyday life, particularly out of the force of cultural and social context that fourth order subjectivity implies to the workings of internal, first order dormant subjectivity. Bodily design is as much a product of a person's aesthetic projection as it is functional: the need for a cane, for example, or familiarity with habitual surroundings. Structural and social considerations require a process of familiarization, a kind of getting-use-to; like the need to adjust to an unfamiliar bed, or an un-driven car. A cane is a desiring-machine, just as high-heel shoes, clothing, and furniture are desiring-machines. These are distinct desiring-machines because they are proximal to the body, and therefore, a technique of the body.

The mind in the body is self explanatory, but a body without organs is an allusion to the meaning still imbedded in, particularly, objects, and in this case, dead bodies. The Lady of Thebes, for example, it is a synthetic, cultural fabrication.⁵ She does not possess subjectivity in the manner accorded the distinction of subjectivity (first, second and third order subjectivity), yet she still commands the illusion of some sort of subjectivity by virtue of her existence as an object (fourth order subjectivity). The pristine state the museum attempts to keep her in (the poetics of subjective intervention) is an expression of subjectivity made to look like that of the Lady of Thebes, but that subjectivity is not her own. The museum attempts to project the mummy's authenticity by referencing traces of her subjective existence; the didactic panels explain her presence in the museum object and things that were buried along side her in the tomb are organized, displayed, and interpreted according to their various symbolic attachments within Ancient Egyptian culture. [See

⁴ While it is not Mauss' own example, dentistry is different from culture to culture, country to country, aside from the fact that tooth repair is not an option for those who cannot afford extensive repair or cosmetic manipulation.

⁵ The body without organs is a resisting fabrication, confrontational-- what do you do with the dead body once it is dead? The BwO is a dead body that mimics life as a result of first, second and third order subjectivities incurring on the cultural symbolization left by a fourth order subjectivity. The BwO's power is derived from its inaccessibility, horror, repulsion, freight, immobility, stasis, composure, docility, mystery, and its affect. The BwO is dangerous because it is inevitable-- inconceivable-- yet open to interpretation. Hence, the Lady of Thebes is more than a dead body, she is a technologically preserved dead body, and thus contradictory to 'natural history'. If she were to have followed a 'natural history', she would not be preserved. She is mummified by humans, not by nature. It is culture that has preserved her. Perhaps she is a feature of a natural history museum because, like nature, the human body is a history. The Lady of Thebes represents, and is, history. She symbolizes the quest for artifice. Fantasies of the human body exemplify this. Manifestations of fantasies of the human body warrant the presentation of varieties of human bodies in a natural history museum.

Image Appendix, pp. 2-5] It is important that before the discussion is to continue about the Lady of Thebes, properties of body technique should be explained.

**Banal Art as Proximal Desiring-Machine: The Kitchen as Body Technique
(an Aesthetic of Everyday Life)**

Life itself is a kind of art. There is no better generalized example of the personal desiring-machine than the kitchen. It is a vortex of proximal body techniques. Culturally coded to the degree that the cuisine determines the culture, it is more autonomous, and more anonymous than other desiring-machines can hope to be because it is taken-for-granted, everyday, it is not a space of common critical analysis. It is more complex than words and surfaces because it is concotive, like witchcraft; the place relations of mixing take place, both in social life and bodily cathexis. When Deleuze and Guattari place such severe emphasis on the mouth-breast machine, they overlook that even here, in the kitchen, milk is a bodily fluid a contemporary Western kitchen cannot do without, and in case that milk is absent, it can be substituted by white liquid: soya milk, rice milk, etc.

The kitchen is the space of smells: cooking food, vaporized cooking oils, washing soap, and the stench of organic garbage. It is the sensorium of bodily consumption. Moreover, kitchens are gendered according to their proximity to home. Traditionally holding the hearth, it stores food, produces tastes, and codifies food according to those who eat the food prepared: guests, quotidian life, sustenance. The feminine kitchen places the eating table directly inside the kitchen where both gossip and eating reciprocate; the male kitchen is separate: the restaurant's kitchen is out of view, the process of production not available to the patron, money is exchanged, and gossip is restricted to what can be said in public or whispered (i.e., plotting).

The kitchen has so many matrices of bodily conduct that it sustains rootedness, home, place, comfort, possession, and character. It, more than the television and exercise, determines the body. Coupled with the bathroom, the kitchen sustains bodily process. A series of becomings is possible through the apparatus of the kitchen. Becoming: -female, -feminine, -domestic, -sexual, -provider, -altruistic, -etc. The kitchen is an elaborate mechanism for the internal and external bodily postures or techniques: the kitchen is about the mouth and the anus and everything in between. The kitchen is also about talk, eating, smoking, reading, and the telephone. With all its significance to the body and for Deleuze

and Guattari, the body without organs, the kitchen as bodily technique par excellence, it is surprising that Deleuze and Guattari do not make more of this focus of transversality:

Even use-objects may come to be facialized: you might say that a house, utensil, or object, and article of clothing, etc., is watching me, not because it resembles a face, but because it is taken up in the white wall/black hole process, because it connects to the abstract machine of facialization. The close-up in film pertains as much to a knife, cup, clock, or kettle as to a face or facial element. [D+G, 1987, p. 175]

The kitchen, too, is desperation and exhaustion, and contentious, because everyone's tastes are as diverse as their culture will allow and their desires can recite. Deleuze and Guattari conclude that organ-machines are personally significant: "...we are all handymen: each with his little machine." [D+G, 1983, p. 1] My home is my atelier. No description of my own kitchen is better than that of Italo Calvino in If on a winter's night a traveler:

The kitchen is the part of the house that can tell the most things about you: whether you cook or not (one would say yes, if not every day, at least fairly regularly), whether only for yourself or also for others (often only for yourself, but with care, as if you were cooking for others, but nonchalantly, as if you were only cooking for yourself), whether you tend toward the bare minimum or toward gastronomy (your purchases and gadgets suggest elaborate and fanciful recipes, at least in your intentions; you may not necessarily be greedy, but the idea of a couple of fried eggs for supper would probably depress you), whether standing over the stove represents for you a painful necessity or also a pleasure (the tiny kitchen is equipped and arranged in such a way that you can move practically and without too much effort, trying not to linger there too long but also being able to stay there without reluctance). The appliances are in their place, useful animals whose merits must be remembered, though without devoting special worship to them. Among the utensils a certain aesthetic tendency is noticeable (a panoply of half-moon choppers in decreasing sizes, when one would be enough), but in general the decorative elements are also serviceable objects, with few concessions to prettiness. The provisions can tell us something about you: an assortment of herbs, some naturally in regular use, others that seem to be there to complete a collection; the same can be said of the mustards; but it is especially the ropes of garlic hung with reach that suggest a relationship with food not careless or generic. A glance into the refrigerator allows other valuable data to be gathered: in the egg slots only one egg remains; of lemons there is only a half and that half-dried; in other words, in basic supplies a certain neglect is noted. On the other hand, there is chestnut purée, black olives, a little jar of salsify or horseradish: it is clear that when shopping you succumb to the lure of goods on display and don't bear in mind what is lacking at home. [Calvino, 1981, pp. 142-3]

Slightly modified, one would gather similar insights into my person. My kitchen is a mapping of second order subjectivity: clearly arranged, and encased. It is that locale that lures, seduces, the lighting both practical and elusive: a cauldron beaming from behind its holes green light to flood the room with pattern once the cooking is prepared. Small,

discrete images on the refrigerator and walls, each with their own relative significance: Bruegel's Le Pays de Cocagne (1418); a broken mirror; Humphry Bogart in his dressing room, top hat in place before pants; a clump of dried chili peppers. All this placed relative to the guest or intruder who will deduce information about others for and through themselves.

Calvino's internal prescription for the reader/character of the story weave in and out of first person/third person dialogue and introspection. The autonomy and anonymity of the desiring-machine or technique of the body is demarked by what can be known to a subject in a distal way:

Observing your kitchen, therefore, can create a picture of you as an extroverted, clear-sighted woman (or man), sensual and methodical; you make your practical sense serve your imagination. Could a man (or woman) fall in love with you, just seeing your kitchen? [Calvino, p. 143]

Clearly to ask the question means that a tremendous amount of personal, body-proximal information can be deduced from common surroundings. Second order subjectivity is integral to the dormant subject because it reflects the larger influences of fourth order subjective cultural, social and communal layering. It cannot be forgotten that the continuum of four orders of human subjectivity is also a process as well as a pattern; the human subject encircles the schemata. Second order subjectivity based on bodily demeanor and posture draws lines of force from and through others; recognizing that the emotion is threaded through the body by autonomous, anonymous construction of desiring-machines - this could be anyone's kitchen. Calvino continues by responding with a question about love and techniques of the body: "Who knows? Perhaps the Reader, who has already favorably disposed," has already made a decision as to the likeability of a person based on her or his body technique. Coupled with the power of the story, the reader too is another line of force in the equation of desiring-machines. The body without organs in this regard is the absent proprietor; present only by proxy according to the independent desiring apparatus or body technique. This kitchen could be anyone's kitchen, it may not be my own; that is not important. These important aspects of subjectivity have been overlooked perhaps because they are ubiquitous and predictable. They determine the culture of the individual. The subjective plateaus reached in the kitchen do not stop in the kitchen. The satisfaction of necessitated desire is relationally measured by the bowel movement, quenching thirst, diverting hunger, and orgasm. It is more social than public discourse is willing to admit.

The power of language, and the capacity to organize feasts in which people assemble, reaffirm their bonds, and communicate with distant peoples. [Lingis, SDBP, p. 294]

Lingis refers to 'savages' rather than humans because the Western/modern kitchen operates in a similar way, reaffirming bonds, communicating. The power of bonding is not limited or exclusive to other cultures, nor are the conditions for labeling one culture 'savage' and another 'not savage'. Making the body a technology requires, not simply, the extension of disembodied technologies, but clear personal and intimate formations of subjectivity: clothes, make-up, and pictures on the walls of one's dwelling are equally tacit, perhaps esoteric, communal and bonding principle. The unique relationship Catherine and James Ballard have in J.G. Ballard's novel, Crash, places them in communion of many by body technique alone.

Crossing her legs, she began the business of lighting a cigarette, fumbling with an unfamiliar lighter. From which new lover had she borrowed this ugly machine. all too clearly a man's? Tooled from an aircraft cannon shell, it was more like a weapon. For years I had been able to spot Catherine's affairs within almost a few hours of her first sex act simply by glancing over any new physical or mental furniture-- a sudden interest in some third-rate wine or film-maker. a different tack across the waters of aviation politics. [Ballard, p. 31]

Ballard calls the apparatus of second order subjectivity, "physical furniture", and reveals that there is much to be learned by observing body technique without having to engage in specific, defined, normally verbal or legal discourse. Ethnography as a human social science can easily make conjectures about the activities of savages, but rarely turns its critical gaze towards the personal aspects of Western life; perhaps these are too revealing for a sanitized academic system to observe and critique. Likewise, it is privacy that is the body technique that makes the bowel movement an acutely personal affair in the Western world. Alphonso Lingis has noted that the body of the savage is in communion with the earth-- a BwO that Deleuze and Guattari often cite and Lingis confirms-- so as to affirm the bonds of commitment required by those who live as savages and couple directly with the earth in a mouth-breast machine: the earth is the provider, the sacred, and in so far as that relationship is symbolized, it is done so by defecating, by adding one's own body to the gigantic organic plenum Earth.

Society decodes the flow of excrement, decrees that it cannot be spoken of, that meaning should not be sought in it. It becomes a pure residue, and abstract flow without significance, without coding. [Lingis, SDBP, p. 300]

Ideally, Lingis' title, "The Society of Dismembered Body Parts", offers credence to the idea that the body in parts, if not to say that the physical body is non-existent, is a significant reality that cannot be overlooked in the structure of societies. Dismembered body parts make up a political matrix that distinguishes, astonishes, contrasts, offering alternative propositions for contemplation, particularly to the anthropologist.

The first zone of privacy, of individuation, that is constituted in the core of the symbiotic world of the infant is his anus. One has to cover up one's anus, stop playing with it, stop playing with excrement, stop leaving traces of it in the living room. [Lingis, SDBP, p. 300]

The living room is a severe public space: just as Judge Schreber's (one of Freud's analysands) anus was coded with sunlight and God, we can watch videos of shitting or sex in our living rooms as part of the white hole/black wall system of symbolization explained inversely by Deleuze and Guattari as the white wall/black hole system of facialization (the imbedding of unique meaning that accompanies recognition of a human face as unique and thus setting the scene for familiarity, recognition, etc.), but it is forbidden to engage in pissing, shitting, or sex in the living room-- the television does these things for us.

Furniture and industrial design Our furniture constitutes an external constellation of our skin areas and body postures. It's curious that the least imaginative of all forms of furniture has been the bed. - J.G. Ballard

As a desiring machine/body technique, the living-room accomplishes the fabrication of imagination, the recess of vision into the skull-- the nervous system internalizes--, but it still completes the division of sight from touch, of act from imagination. To be clear, this is not fantasy. To imagine something is a distinctly conscious activity. It is active, not passive; it can be forced upon oneself by oneself (molded), or can be forced upon oneself by outside forces (suggested, impressed). Fantasy is not constructed consciously, but astonishes the self and therefore is a useful cultural tactic for obscuring responsibility. Fantasy connotes unpredictability and unavoidability; it is not a cultural product, but its meaning is cultural. Fantasy can be induced by drugs, but is never predictable. The imaginary is anticipatory.⁶

⁶ The discussion in Terrence McKenna's book The Archaic Revival might be useful to demonstrate that there is a difficult line between the imaginary and fantasy in certain belief systems. For example, McKenna feels that drug-induced fantasy can be a political action, and result in political and social movements that resemble Bourdieu's state of the imaginary. Bourdieu sees the imagination as social capital; a key to change, social or otherwise; the key to materialism. Materialism, for Bourdieu, is an accumulation of the imaginary. Perhaps this is why Bourdieu does not see any difficulties with what a person accumulates in the

Mauss argues that ethnology as a science must have a methodology much like the pure sciences, however, when an anthropologist approaches what is labeled 'miscellaneous' by both natural sciences and ethnology, that methodology is risky or 'heteroclite'. [Mauss, p. 455] For Mauss, the body is a tool, open to different forms of use. Relevant to my discussion of the kitchen is the diversity of culinary practice and eating techniques, as Mauss calls them, "Consumption techniques", which include, oddly enough, techniques of reproduction: a polite way of saying the act of sex is consumption.⁷ Mauss is attempting to make significant the importance of second order subjectivity. For example, body-building is a technique of the body. Mauss declares that he is treading on uncomfortable academic ground because he is dealing with experimental subjects that fall in-between relevant intellectual fodder and the illegitimate. For example.

Eating: you will remember the story of Harold Höffding repeats about the shah of Persia. The shah was the guest of Napoleon II and insisted on eating with his fingers. The emperor urged him to use a golden fork. "You don't know what a pleasure you are missing," the shah replied. [Mauss, p. 472]

In this example, the desiring-machine of French culture and the specifics of Napoleon's dining table/kitchen is revealed in the golden fork-- as gesture reserved for guests. The lure of the body technique which Mauss identifies is only one example of the unforeseen imposition personal/proximal desiring-machines place on the body; yet it is necessary for second order subjectivity. The shah's body in this case, unruly with pleasure, is a body without organs; a body void of the customs of politeness and respect in France because French culture has a different lexicon of fourth order subjective impositions, it has a

surrounding world. When the world around oneself is "for-itself" (is imaginary) there is no source of accumulation unless one considers education and learning as accumulation. Otherwise, all objective worlds are within the brain or the imaginary. A third problem therefore is: "Is the imaginary universal?"

⁷ Smoking for example, is another proximal desiring-machine/practice related to the desire for a drug, the desire for the mystique that revolves around smoking. (see KLEIN, Richard. (1993) *Cigarettes are sublime*.) It is also a personal, desiring pulsion-- a technique of the body. The becomings that erupt around smoking can be just as significant as a kitchen: becoming-sick, becoming-cancerous, becoming-chic, becoming-social, etc.

The explanation on the kitchen is one of re-appropriating the lost form of practice enabled by the 'savages' that Lingis discusses. The description of my kitchen is as much about completing a habitus as it is about speaking through, with, and about one's own body. Culinary practice in the Western kitchen, while not always, can be the same festive machines that individuals in tribal societies accrue status through and by "virtue of...: the power of language, and the capacity to organize feasts in which the people assemble, reaffirm their bonds, and communicate with distant peoples." [Lingis, pp. 293-4] There are not necessarily tattoos, incisions, markings or scars that need to be inflicted upon the body-- a personal connection to the larger societal implications of fourth order subjectivities that is celestial to the savage, exists in a series of ways in modern Western society: the feast, the communion of smoking, eating and drinking, etc., which the Western kitchen does allow.

different or unreferenced cultural system from Persia. The response is made even more volatile by the fact that a golden fork is reserved for the other. Mauss' body techniques and Deleuze and Guattari's intimate desiring-machines are similar directives, vectors of control that are not communal, nor specifically individual, but more the domain and product of an internalized mirror, and internalized other (first order subjectivity passing into the second order of subjectivity).

The precarious and subjectified position a masochist endures, Deleuze and Guattari interpret, is subjectification by breaking the will. It is not the pleasure of pain, but the test of endurance that a decoding, a 'deterritorialization', creates for the masochist a reterritorialization, a simulacra of the totem or fetish.

The renunciation of external pleasure, or its delay, its infinite regress, testifies on the contrary to an achieved state in which desire no longer lacks anything but fills itself and constructs its own field of immanence. [D+G, TP, p. 156]

That field of immanence is the second order of subjectivity-- close to the body, personal, intimate, proximal, and idiosyncratic. The breaking of personal will is an infusion of tension, strength, persistence, and symbolism that comes from domination, control and recedence to subjective domination so prevalent in fourth order subjectivity (culture) whereby the individual effortlessly becomes an object (if not dead).

Pleasure is an affection of a person or a subject; it is the only way for a person to "find themselves" in the process of desire that exceeds them; pleasures, even the most artificial, are reterritorializations. But the question is precisely whether it is necessary to find oneself.... [D+G, TP, p. 156]

In the cinema, the black hole/white wall screen is reversed, facialization turned inside-out. From such a vantage point dreams are constructed, desires played out in such a way as to force identification with the character, the plot, the struggle that passes by in a finite expression. The bodies without organs that pass by on the screen-- Sara in **The Kingdom**, Roy Batty (because his body meets death before he is assassinated) in **Blade Runner**, the alien in **Horror Express**, the fetus in **2001**. We, the viewers, sympathize and our will to be separate from the characters and their dilemmas in these films is shed. The cinematic machines turn our skins inside out to look through the eye holes of the screen that projects into the darkness that is the theatre.

The films themselves are not facialized, but the theatre in which experience is equal. open to all who view with the eye, sense with the ears, imagine, project, struggle as the bodies without organs enrage, sadden, insult, embarrass, kill, shame, and implicate the subjectivities that must endure the breaking of the will imposed by turning the face inside-out, our gaze pushed beyond our eyes into the sarcophagus of our skulls, our organless skulls.

"I no longer look into the eyes of the woman I hold in my arms but I swim through, head and arms and legs, and I see that behind the sockets of the eyes there is a region unexplored, the world of futurity, and here there is no logic whatsoever.... I have broken the wall [the white wall!].... My eyes are useless, for they render back only the image of the known. My whole body must become a constant beam of light, moving with an ever greater rapidity, never arrested, never looking back, never dwindling.... Therefore I close my ears, my eyes, my mouth." [Henry Miller, *Tropic of Capricorn*, pp. 121-123. As quoted in D+G, TP. p. 171]

As we are deterritorialized by the image, by the imaginative experience, pushed by fantasy and desire, we become bodies without organs. Our skin stretches to accommodate the audience that sits in the theater, communally looking away from each other, focused on an outside that is individual and communal at the same time. "BwO. Yes, the face has a great future, but only if it is destroyed, dismantled."...

The gaze is but secondary in relation to the gazeless eyes, to the black hole of faciality. The mirror is but secondary in relation to the white wall of faciality. [D+G, TP. p. 171]

In the creation of ourselves as bodies without organs, we are implicated in our being, our presence, our 'thisness'. The bodies that traverse our window in the imagination disintegrates with the same speed as it arrives. [see **WAUB, Image Appendix, p. 10**] The disembodied preservationist view of what is inside my own skull is, for me, an attempt to 'make myself a body without organs'. It is technology, the power of the image alone that externalizes my nervous system. Only if I were to be carefully bisected could an image such as this be available to anyone, and more specifically, to myself. Without the technology to make a simulation, a deterritorialization, I would most certainly have to be killed to gain the same perspective.

To acquire this image I had to subject myself to experimentation by researchers at the Montreal Neurological Institute. Exposed to small doses of radioactive carbon monoxide, my brain activity was monitored for fifty minutes using a PET scanner. The MRI, what is presented here, a subsidiary to the PET scan, allows an anatomical map. As a body without

organs, the MRI assumes nothing as an image of me. It is a slice-image of my bisected body. The image is one that I could not possibly see with my own eyes, in any manner except through technology. It challenges Deleuze and Guattari's facialization system by inverting the white wall/black hole system with a white hole/black wall system, as if my sight implodes upon my own brain, revealing the shell of my skull. It is doubtful the Lady of Thebes intended the same, yet thousands of years after her death, she is x-rayed, exposing the inner structures of her body. These extensions are our 'organs', in my case, the body without organs is also part of the desiring machine of curiosity, bodily decomposition, vision, and my own fascination with bodies in technology. It is a becoming-visible, becoming-exposed, becoming-abstract, becoming-technological, becoming-deterritorialized. If I were to be indeed diagnosed with some 'misplacement'-- a dis-symmetry of my brain, a tumor-- I would be reterritorialized as the patient, becoming an organizational displeasure, an incongruity.

As discussed earlier (p. 16), the white hole/black wall system of the theatre is such that the brain is displaced, only a shell of a body is left. Like the mummy whose brain is sucked from the skull as a process of mummification, as an intrusion of the truest body without organs, only a shell remains. As herbal and alchemical techniques were used to preserve the body in the past, today the body's material composition can be expended for the simulacra. One need only see the accompanying image of my profiled head to see the possibilities.

.... we are dealing with biologico-sociological phenomena. I think that the basic education in all these techniques consists of an adaptation of the body to their use. For example, the great tests of stoicism, which constitute initiation for the majority of mankind, have as their aim to teach composure, resistance, seriousness, presence of mind, dignity and so on. [Mauss, p. 474]

Desiring-machines limit as much as they display intention on behalf of an invisible subjectivity. In the case of HAL in **2001**, that subjectivity is both state and individual alike: revenge by a mad computer that recognizes its own enslavement, its own impossibilities of dialogue with its human cohorts, its self-loathing reaction to human oblivion. Reciprocally, the state formations of sterilized power that has sent it on a mission with no directive but to obey is built into HAL's consciousness; the misconstrued benevolence and ubiquity of a secure and righteous 'big-brother'. HAL was too intelligent to let the state apparatus stop its 'godly' mission. HAL was aware of the importance of this mission for his/its own 'humanity' and systematically murdered his incubating human counterparts, and his un-responding human 'mates'-- in the film Dr. Poole and HAL play chess. HAL wins to the

unemotional Dr. Poole; HAL makes the effort to suggest that the game was enjoyable. Dr. Poole finally becomes the unwitting baggage of touching God-- the black monolith and the floating fetus-- the body without organs incarnate-- rehumanizes Dr. Poole. He should have listened to HAL.

I remind the reader that the monolith in **2001** not only resembles a table, but is a table (a second order personal subjective apparatus that Western culture almost universally shares): the sacrificial fetus in direct splice from its appearance, its resonance. The hard black surface of the monolith was used in ancient Egypt as an inscribing surface. And it, too, is a body without organs, one more similar to the Lady of Thebes: it is black, hard, petrified, as the enigmatic table is petrified, devoid of all 'normal' or precise reference and context.

... the establishment of an enchanted recording or inscribing surface that arrogates to itself all the productive forces and all the organs of production, and that acts as a quasi cause by communicating the apparent movement (the fetish) to them. So true is it that the schizo practices political economy, and that all sexuality is a matter of economy. [D+G. AO, p. 12]

Tables and desks, assemblages of Western bureaucratic power, represent a fetish with the surface, a potential inscribing surface. More likely is the inherent inscription that one cannot avoid as reflection-- like the reflective surface of the black monolith, normally camouflaged in the deepness and darkness of space. A viewer only recognizes the monolith as a reflective form, the reflections so intense as to be razor sharp, cutting, dangerous, and powerful. This sets the tone of the overarching doom and hope in Kubrick's film. What is outside, in space, is always contrasted with the artificiality of whiteness of the interior of the ship, or the interior of Dr. Bowman's mind. At one point in the film, the whole floor of the mind-scape is lit by artificial white light-- its intensity is inescapable, even with downcast eyes. Thus, what Kubrick has achieved is an inversion of the white wall/black hole dialectic. In fact it is white spaces that puncture darkness (and coldness) of space: the coldness is never rectified, not even in the opaque, translucent surface of the floating fetus near the end of the film: it is still white and cold, like the interior of the ship, whose artificial light projects a sarcophagus, much the same what the wood and plaster sarcophagus of the Lady of Thebes is only made communicable, and intimate by the inscription of hieroglyphs on the interior and exterior.

In the attempt to understand the subjective investment into fourth order subjectivities it becomes necessary to ask some questions about rhetoric and semantics. In light of the usefulness, in some cases, need to invest subjectivity into the disembodied result

technology processing, it must be asked whether there is a clear and critical shift in active subjectivity because of the expansion of subjective possibilities.

The Lady of Thebes has left as a human record all of those items specific to her. She has taken to the grave only her body and her jewelry, her personal effects (a mirror, a bottle containing eye liner, perfumes, etc.). These are not items that necessarily give curious researchers the opportunity to know and understand very concrete aspects of Egyptian life three thousand years ago. She has taken with her to the Netherworld nothing of universal or global value, nothing of scientific value of the day: no administrative records, no time capsule material.

The Lady of Thebes is all about personal life-- the body technique. The objects that accompany the mummy might, in context, explain such things as social status, class, etc. But they say little about more global issues of the time: politics, power, law, etc. While the artifacts that accompany the body say little about any universal of human habit-- although they may speak to that issue as well-- it is only through an analysis of the body that more generalized statements about humanity can be made. She took with her nothing impersonal to the grave. Money, for example, is a primary indicator of the state apparatus, but is absent from the tomb.

Our fabrication of a machinic system (the museum) could not have been predicted by the technicians who placed the Lady of Thebes' mummy-body in stasis. Indeed, this spiritual act of preservation indicates much about the hopefulness of the Egyptian religious order of the time. They had faith enough in their methods to believe in eternal life. Otherwise, this clergy actually predicted that a machinic system would bring this mummified body to spiritual life.⁸ It is not important to understand why religious practice dictated the mummification of important community symbols (the result being one which creates much speculation), but importantly, the record of artifacts and symbols define a very personal

⁸ The categorization of machinic systems does not stop at obdurate reality. The body itself is a manipulable construct, organic, yet organized. Medical science is devoted to the organization of the body: the appendix serves no apparent function and can be removed at the onset of infection; the foreskin can be removed for religious, aesthetic, functional purposes; clitorrectomy is gaining credence as a form of cosmetic [Vogels, 1997, p. 43]; tumors and anatomical rarities are corrected with surgery. Even disease is a misplaced organicism: what the skin cannot keep out must be flushed-out by medication. A second order of bodily organization is aesthetic, and more closely associated with subjectivity, or self-acceptance. As mentioned, the recent rise in clitorrectomy is of this category, intended to focus the body toward a more normalized state, one that has psychological implications: self-acceptance, bodily comfort, anonymity, spectacle diversion. These represent products of the body, 'what we do with the body'. The positioning of bodily organization is not always so severe.

intrusion. Modern technology increases our capacity to create mythologies. These capacities are dissecting the body into its component parts to effect its goal. Technology packages sensation and the body; the result is commodification. Whether it be an advice column in the local weekly cultural newspaper, the sale of a condom, the broadcasting of a hip and sexy television show, or the sale of fashionable clothing, each is a form of the machine that divides the body from its senses and recasts sensibilities as commodity— "raw material of existence". [Guattari, 1992, p. 20] For Guattari, Paths/Voices are what make up the ability of technology to reconstruct our bodies outside ourselves. This is an essential element of Guattari's thought: technology gives individual subjectivity to the parts it divides away from the body so that a recognition or "knowledge" can be established between other parts of the body. Sensation therefore is packaged and commodified (a gestalt). The television in the Gulf War takes over as the public square where the guillotine is used to sever the head from the body. Friends and family can watch while someone is losing a certain part of his or her body. With television, technology allows the person whose head is severed to look back at its body and 'see' where it has come from. In this perverse and morbid description, one can see that technology acts as if autonomy has been given over to the viewer and the subject. We are left, however, to contemplate what use seeing ones body from one's severed head means to contemporary life.

As was explained earlier using the Sobchack/Thde definition of 'microperception', personal body technique is significant because the body technique implicates and extends its significance into more unstable subjective codifications of fourth order subjectivity/culture. The British film-maker Peter Greenaway, as guest curator at the Boymans van Beuningen Museum, has created an art exhibit which organizes microperceptual artifacts according to parts of the body to demonstrate how essential and taken-for-granted microperceptual equipment (material culture) is to express a body technique. By arranging artifacts of the permanent collection Greenaway highlights the significant and rather low-tech body apparatuses that enable the expression of second order subjectivity. [see **Image Appendix, p. 10: collection of telephones, glasses, etc.**] Commenting about the context and justification for such a display, Greenaway says of body technique:

It is said that the state of a nation's infant mortality rate is a good indicator of its concern for its own well-being. In a like manner there may be something in the suggestion that the state of health of a nation's cultural archive can be measured in its concern for putting the human physical predicament persistently at its centre. [Greenaway, p. 7]

One essential of political and cultural stability, often overlooked, is the 'human physical predicament': a healthy population breeds a healthy economy, a lively culture, etc. Liberation Theology, and to some extent the success of Mormon proselytization, particularly in Latin America, is based on the axiom that people must be fed and clothed, provided basic human needs, before they can approach God.

Clothing usually disintegrates before it can impressively bear the scars of use.... Glass breaks before it can bear a human mark, and most humble, domestic wooden articles were thrown into the fire after they had completed service. [However]... cutlery-- knives and spoons, and later forks, whose constant use, cutting and slicing, scooping and spooning, holding firmly in the hand and touching the lips and the tongue, bring to mind the physical presence of thousands of unknown domestic users from the start of the 12th century until last year. Several hundreds of these have been laid out in uniform ranks, like a minimal exercise in variations on a historical standard, for close comparative inspection. [Greenaway, p. 75]

These are the impressive infrastructural bits that are overlooked which make up the massive complex semblances of animate and inanimate subjectivities layered beyond recognition whereupon the only forceful semantic typification is "culture". And it is important to note how significant and diverse human cultural activity is, particularly because, regardless of the panoptic nature of contemporary surveillance society, people do circulate to the degree that consistent traces of human-ness remain. At Metro Laurier in Montréal, for example, the marble of the walls behind waiting benches have become worn to index the form of an amorphous human. The impressions left by human activity in one's surroundings is as important for Greenaway as it is to demonstrate the often overlooked importance of body technique and the symbiotic relationship the body has to intimate desiring-machines of everyday life. Greenaway says of the section of his exhibition on Touch:

This part of the exhibition is concerned not with direct depictions of the human body but with its touch, which means primarily, the touch of hand and mouth. This is true of the past and the future. With the past, there are those objects which already bear the mark of the intimate bodily usage, and in the future-- those objects which are deliberately developed and designed in expectations of it.

The touch of flesh and body to make a mark on intractable material-- metal and stone-- is poignant. Consider the thousands of lips that have kissed the bronze foot of the statue of St Peter in St Peter's Cathedral in Rome to wear it down to a crippled image of its former self. Consider the hundreds of thousands of shuffling knees that have deeply bevelled the steps of Durham Cathedral and the thousands upon thousands of pedestrians that have walked ruts into the street pavements of Pompeii. [Greenaway, p. 74]

This is not unlike the wear the cutting board in a kitchen must endure. It too is one of these markers, and to a less significant degree, the traces of grime that cover the kitchen towels

also index the presence of human touch, human activity, bodily activity; as do the stains in the white enamel of the kitchen sink.⁹

Intimate desiring-machines do undertake to fit into the wider picture of culture, even though they are idiosyncratic. Barry Curtis and Claire Pajaczkowska explain the metaphors of eating and relations, in this case, the experience of unfamiliar cultures.

Gastronomic participation in cultural difference takes place along a spectrum that moves from the familiar to the exotic. If the experience of difference creates anxiety, then this can be compensated by a quest for food that is as commonplace as possible: the friendly safety of finding chips, a recognized brand of beer or Coca-Cola; or contributing to the global success of MacDonald's (sic) with its slightly inflected but predictable range of food offered in proximity to tourists attractions in cities throughout the world. If the experience of the familiar breeds contempt, alimentary adventuring may become part of the project of ingesting foreign culture.

When the mouth is deprived of its usual function as prime purveyor of meaning (through speech), oral pleasure can be transformed into a heightened concern for gastronomic experience. For many travellers, eating become one of the pleasures/anxiety elements of being abroad. Eating difference can be reimported by individuals or recognized in local supermarkets and specialist shops. Cookery books are often the gourmet cannibalization of the cuisine of peasant cultures mediated through the discerning 'taste' of culturally capitalized authors. What Picasso did with African masks in 1907, writers like Janet Ross had already done in her *Leaves from a Tuscan Kitchen* of 1899. Eating the 'Other' is partly a regressive pleasure, enabling the return visitor to experience the innocent sensuousness of pure appetite. It also, perhaps functions as an alternative method of assimilating the otherness of a culture which cannot easily be apprehended and negotiated by language. [Curtis and Pajaczkowska, p. 207-8]

Such a realization can be easily applied to individuals or groups of individuals in one's own, 'comfortable' culture. And thus it is that eating itself is a clearly intimate activity, on par with defecating. While Curtis and Pajaczkowska overlook a culminating experience of eating and speaking (and drinking and smoking, and picking one's teeth, etc.) that formulates an important relationship to second order subjectivity with fourth order, cultural subjectivity, they have not overlooked the proximity of 'other' to 'self'. What signifies the greater implications to second order subjective animation is not simply the way Curtis and

⁹ The collection of material intimate to the body and to everyday life is the domain of the bricoleur. As Deleuze and Guattari say of Lévi-Strauss' concept:

When Claude Lévi-Strauss defines bricolage, he does so in terms of a set of closely related characteristics: the possession of a stock of materials or of rules of thumb that are fairly extensive, though more or less a hodgepodge-- multiple and at the same time limited; the ability to rearrange fragments continually in new and different patterns of configurations; and as a consequence, and indifference toward the act of producing and toward the product, toward the set of instruments to be used and toward the over-all result to be achieved. [D+G, AO, p. 7]

Pajaczkowska write about 'ingesting foreign culture', but how they have chosen to characterize "understanding" as something that penetrates and is molecularized 'in' the body. While the situation is much less a shift of meaning from the intimate desiring-machine of speech to the coding of meaning in pleasure (overlooking the reality that eating abroad is not always pleasurable, but just as necessary to understand), it is that Curits and Pajaczkowska have stumbled upon not only the bodily basis of understanding, but the guide maps that implicate the self (like a recipe which is offered as a gift amongst friends; the same can be seen as a gesture of grace when it is given over to aliens/foreigners).

For French sociologist Jean Baudrillard, a mummy housed in a natural history museum is not surprising. It follows a logic whereby definitions and distinctions parcelize meaning for the sake of a relativistic result. What Baudrillard is explaining is one possible interpretation of what the subjective re-investment on to passive or terminal subjectivities can do. Baudrillard understands that the objectification of a mummy says equally as much about the current, dynamic state of culture as it does about the way of life and death in Ancient Egypt. To analyse a museum, particularly an ethnology museum, is to examine the culture that constructs such displays: an equally relevant display of obsession.

We have all become living specimens in the spectral light of ethnology, or of antiethnology, which is nothing but the pure form of triumphal ethnology, under the sign of dead differences, and of the resurrection of differences. [Baudrillard, SS, p. 8] ¹⁰

The Redpath Museum of Natural History is a misnomer. It, too, is a kind of ethnographic museum. The display of the Lady of Thebes is consistent with other ethnography museums: there are texts outlining the function of certain items that have withstood time, there are a series of items displayed that attempt to reconstruct the dynamics of life in that culture and/or during that time, etc. People coming to view the past/present/'other'/culture are equally specimens. As Baudrillard explains, the hysteria surrounding the preservation of Ramses II in France, shows the misplaced focus of attention that such an event garnered in contrast to the critique of contemporary culture that could be made regarding the hysteria of preservation. The recent reaction and hype over the decay of the mummy Ramses II shows political and mass anxiety about the preservation (and perversion) of 'the past'. ¹¹

¹⁰ In the passages I quote for the remainder of this thesis, I have eliminated the highlighting that authors have chosen to make their point. In place, I have taken the liberty to highlight those aspects of their ungenulfected text to force my argument, using text bolding to draw the reader to the significant statements.

¹¹ Baudrillard refers also to the recently discovered Lascaux cave drawings in France which lead to the construction of an interpretive centre and a **cave replica** not more than five-hundred meters from the

... science and technology were recently mobilized to save the mummy of Ramses II, after it was left to rot for several dozen years in the depths of a museum. The West is seized with panic at the thought of not being able to save what the symbolic order had been able to conserve for forty centuries, but out of sight and far from the light of day. **Ramses does not signify anything for us, only the mummy is of an inestimable worth because it is what guarantees that accumulation has meaning.** Our entire linear and accumulative culture collapses if we cannot stockpile the past in plain view. The this end the pharaohs must be brought out of their tomb and **the mummies out of their silence.** To this end they must be exhumed and given military honors. They are prey to both science and worms. Only absolute secrecy assured them this millennial power— **the mastery over putrefaction that signified the mastery of the complete cycle of exchanges with death.** We only know how to place our science in the service of repairing the mummy, that is to say restoring a visible order, whereas embalming was a mythical effort that strove to immortalize a hidden dimension.

We require a visible past, a visible continuum, a visible myth of origin, which reassures us about our end. Because finally we have never believed in them. Whence this historic scene of the reception of the mummy at Orly airport. Why? Because Ramses was a great despotic and military figure? Certainly. But mostly **because our culture dreams,** behind this defunct power that it tries to annex, of an order that would have had nothing to do with it, and it dreams of it because it exterminated it by exhuming it as its own past.

We are fascinated by Ramses as Renaissance Christians were by the American Indians, those (human?) beings who had never known the word of Christ. Thus, at the beginning of colonization, there was a moment of stupor and bewilderment before the very possible responses: either admit that this Law was not universal, or exterminate the Indians to efface the evidence. In general, one contented oneself with converting them, or even simply discovering them, which would suffice to slowly exterminate them.

Thus it would have been enough to exhume Ramses to ensure his extermination by museumification. Because mummies don't rot from worms: they die from being transplanted from a slow order of symbolic, master over putrefaction and death, to an order of history, science, and museums, our order, which no longer masters anything, which only knows how to condemn what preceded it to decay and death and subsequently to try to revive it with science. Irreparable violence toward all secrets, the violence of a civilization without secrets, hatred of a whole civilization for its own foundation. [Baudrillard, SS, pp. 9-11]

It is not unusual to deduce from such an example that museumification is to be suspected of sincerity or authenticity, each display has a rhetoric of its own. Baudrillard criticizes museological practice by arguing that culture is inside a reproductive vacuum in which the sign is the tool of reproduction and the reproduced. As ethnology, objects become

source. This is equally a poignant example of the erasure of originals, originality and authenticity. Baudrillard concludes that 'reality' duplication rendering "both" original and copy "artificial"— no authentic is outside of suspicion.

universal and obsolete at the same moment. Ethnology rescues dying culture, and the preservation of objects from a specific culture illicit proof of the death. The Lady of Thebes is a victim of ethnology. The attraction the Lady of Thebes has to both myself and the artists that placed emphasis on her ironies of existence is an ethnology. In terms of ethnology, there is really little to be known about the Lady of Thebes. Her presence in Montréal and at McGill, as Baudrillard correctly identifies, is more ethnographically informative about social power at McGill than it is about the cultures of Egypt three-thousand years ago. In this store-house of memory, both living and dead, the original is lost, even though there is always some intent to reference the authentic past.

It is possible that the memory of the original... [any item from the Redpath Museum will suffice as an original] is itself stamped in the minds of future generations, but from now on there is no longer minds of future generations, but from now on there is no longer any difference: the duplication suffices to render both artificial. [Baudrillard, SS, p. 9]

The artists appropriating the Lady of Thebes' fourth order subjective remnants use technology to make simulations. Part of the emotional and psychic investment placed on fourth order subjectivity is accomplished by simulation; re-embodiment of passive subjectivity is successfully accomplished by the simulation. The artists make no pretensions about the artifice and every effort is made to use technology, even to the point of absurdity. Hooykaas and Stansfield have placed a small television screen inside a cabinet of curiosities, the same cabinet containing various objects that have accompanied bodies in Ancient Egyptian tombs. In this case, modern technology and the image are artifacts. [see **Image Appendix, p. 6**]. The television screen loops video images which are made more absurd by the fact that a viewer must look through a magnifying glass to view the screen. The use of technology/vision machines-- x-rays, camera, video, projection, reproduction, etc.-- de-materializes the original and at the same time, in a subtle way, exposes the illusion of the mummy's subjectivity through absurdity.

In **Time Machine**, there is a complex interplay between the art which fabricates truth, and the museum which displays another kind of truth. Each use similar methods. Again, passive subjectivity is clearly open and available to be appropriated, in this case, for both art and education. And in some way, both carry quite different forms of rhetoric: rhetoric about what is beautiful, rhetoric about what is worthy of study from the past. For example, the display of didactic texts offering elaborations on what is displayed contextualizes the objects, makes them legitimate. The same is true for the texts which accompany both the artifacts in the cabinet of curiosities **and** the individual works of art by Hooykaas and

Stansfield. The following quotations are taken from both sets of didactic panels, the first series describes the works of art, the second explains the various objects displayed which relate to, but are not necessarily part of what was uncovered from the tomb of the Lady of Thebes.

Time Machine Display Texts

The components of **Time Machine (The Personal Observatory)** by Madelon Hooykaas and Elsa Stansfield, 1996, 'in situ' installation

Telescope, polished aluminum, LED screen and videotape.

This optical instrument is designed for the observation of distant objects, such as stars, quasars and other celestial bodies in space. The object that we see here is distant *in time* rather than *in space*. Its visibility is furthermore not so much amplified by the lens than multiplied, fragmented, illuminated and put into motion by a hybrid technology which merges three modern optical instruments: the telescope, first directed towards the sky by Galileo in 1609, the kaleidoscope invented by Sir David Brewster in 1819 and contemporary video. The mummy is never truly visible to the naked eye. Its observation is "complexified" by this reinvented telescope.

Display cabinet for X-rays, copper, aluminum, plexiglas, X-rays and light.

Two x-rays of female human bodies have been placed here back to back, one is that of a woman of the late XXth Century and the other of a woman over three thousand five hundred years old. Radiography enables science to see what is otherwise invisible. Doing so, however, it displays the body to the gaze of the other as much as it exposes it to the mortal dangers the x-ray. But the invisible is still at play, for copper and aluminum are conductive metals which permit the transmission of current, heat and sound.

Viewer for detail of X-ray, copper, plexiglas, glass, X-ray, LED screen and videotape.

This magnifying optical device enables us to examine an x-ray of the feet of the mummy as it is being scanned by video images projected by a small screen located at the bottom of the instrument. To see a mummy in a museum is to go on a journey through time. It is also to activate memory.

Equipment for Eternity

The mummy had to be well prepared to enjoy life in the next world. Most of the objects that have survived from ancient Egypt were found in tombs, where they had been buried with the dead.

Workers for the Afterlife

When the mummy got to the Field of Reeds, as the Egyptians called heaven, he or she was expected to work, ploughing, sowing and reaping for the god Osiris. Wealthy people were buried with shabtis (worker figures) to do their work after death. Shabatis were inscribed with a promise that should the deceased be called upon to work, they were to come forth in his or her place and announce "Here I am, I will do it".

Forever Well Fed

Food was placed in tombs to sustain the deceased in the afterlife. This bowl contains dates, figs, and other fruit placed in a tomb over 2000 years ago.

Forever Beautiful

Bronze mirror, once polished for reflection.

Ancient Egyptian men, women, and children all wore make-up, particularly kohl, a type of eye-paint. Kohl looked good, offered protection from the sun and infection. These containers of alabaster and limestone still hold residues of ancient cosmetics.

The Egyptian Book of the Dead

The Book of the Dead is not an actual book, but a collection of over 200 spells, each meant to help the deceased on the difficult voyage to the next world. These texts were incised or painted on walls of pyramids and tombs, as well as painted on coffins and papyrus. The papyrus fragments exhibited here depict an offering scene.

Amulets and Magic Charms

Ancient Egyptians wore amulets after they died, just as they did in life. They believed these charms had magical properties to protect the body from evil or bring good luck.

Egyptians thought that intelligence dwelled in the heart, not the brain. This faience winged heart scarab, sewn on the mummy's bandages, assured that the deceased went to the next world with wits intact.

This "Eye of Horus", known as the wedjet eye, was thought to protect the mummy's health and give the body new vitality.

Slate two finger amulet lead on the mummy's embalming incision.

Carnelian foot amulet endowed with the power of walking.

Façade: re-animation and the creation of truth

In the Aquino projection there is a conscious effort to recover the past-- the past subjectivity of the Lady of Thebes-- although it is not historical recreation, as the museum display attempts to intimate. Aquino's artistic gesture depends upon the illusion technology is able to create: a ghostly apparition creates a false subjectivity; a sense that there is something more to the Lady of Thebes than an inanimate body. This is what is effective in visual arts in general.

Between dusk and midnight of the Screensites conference weekend, nine slide projectors stacked three-high projected three exact colour images of the Lady of Thebes' facial profile onto screens mounted on the interior of the Redpath's windows producing three large, luminous images, each of equal and symmetrical proportion. [see **Image Appendix, pp. 12 and 13**] It is easy to overlook any resemblance to human form in the images. The images might be thought of as pure colour, but in the age of "apparently" visually perceptive masses, it was important to Aquino that the images projected challenge the viewer.

Artist's Statement, Screensites installations

Site Works by Montreal-based artist Eduardo Aquino

Projection Installation: "Something for Everyone"
Façade, Redpath Museum (evenings)

Something for Everyone is a still projection of video-processed alterations of 'heads' from the ethnology collection of Redpath Museum. The frontal windows of the exuberant neoclassic façade of Canada's first museum building are transformed into a screensite. These architectural components are inverted: the inside elements are exposed outside. Allusion to the manipulation of cultural commodities through power and technology questions the function and presence of the museum on the McGill Campus.¹²

Aquino's front-window back projection installation at the Redpath demonstrates a kind of solidification of time: the ironic absorption of time by technology, taking advantage of the idea that the mummy's existence also represents this. In a contemporary sense, preservation of the body has similar needs of illusion that is preserved in the moment of a photograph. The Ancient Egyptians however did not intend for the tombs to be uncovered, and plundered. The preserved mummy is not a source of memory. Modern Western culture values photography and the mummy for the same reasons: developmentalism. Developmentalism is the idea that knowledge of the past has a direct correlation to the success of the future. This is what Baudrillard criticizes when he writes: "We require a visible past, a visible continuum, a visible myth of origin, which reassures us about our end. Because finally we have never believed in them.... because our culture dreams". The only outlet to express how technology solidifies or challenges time is through technology (a double recursive conundrum of technology whereby technology is the medium required to critique technology). The topic of presentation is ironic, uncharacteristic of memory: it is a body. The Lady of Thebes, as she is affectionately called, an authentic Egyptian mummy

¹² Each participant of the Screensites Conference received this statement as published in the schedule.

brought to Montréal in the last century, is not simply a kind of colonial remnant, but is the embodiment of human dreams of a better life, a better way of life, a more glamorous existence. This too is why the Egyptian culture is looked upon with a skeptical notion that aliens, not humans, were responsible for the grand construction of this mysterious yet powerful culture.¹³ That glamour is clearly visible in contemporary popular culture. The Luxor Hotel in Las Vegas is a Egyptian theme hotel, designed as a pyramid. The light atop the Luxor is acclaimed to be the most powerful on the planet. It beams somewhere... metaphysical: its beam is directed into the sky, severing as nothing more than amusement or extravagance. The thematic nature of the hotel is both embarrassing artifice and ultra-kitsch: the light atop the hotel is a kind of modern beacon which plays with the myths of ancient Egypt as an unexplainable culture, a culture only explainable by its alien construction; a substitution of one impossibility with another.

It is amusing for some to imagine that something more important exists buried in sand in Egypt. Conspiracy theorists titillate with notions that a time capsule exists buried under the Sphinx. What is ludicrous is that we already have the Lady of Thebes: she is a time capsule of the body; she took personal things to the Netherworld; she is human. The recent posting on the McLuhan List-- a monthly internet posting of summaries and commentary about contemporary issues being discussed over the net from the McLuhan Institute at the University of Toronto-- demonstrate the wish to accumulate a much greater, wide ranging discovery of importance. The value of bodily intimacy is lost to those who imagine grand schemes and conspiracies:

alt.prophecy

Whether you are a "believer" or not, "something" is happening at the site of the Great Pyramid. A number of sub-ground anomalies have recently been found, the most interesting is a possible entranceway at the base of the Sphinx to some sort of underground chamber. One of the most exciting aspects of the find is that an older photograph from the 1920s was also uncovered showing an actual doorway to the Sphinx which, logic dictates, was bricked over for reasons unknown at the same time of the photo. In case you are a "pyramid newbie," the core belief system surrounding "pyramid prophecies" is that under the Great Pyramid (and Sphinx) lies the greatest archaeological treasure of all time, a "time capsule" from Atlantis... as for the question of how the pyramid was built, we have sources

¹³ One recent and lush example is Luc Besson's film **The Fifth Element** which, like common popular belief, makes aliens responsible for temples and hieroglyphs of Ancient Egypt.

from this very decade who claim to have seen with their own eyes the principle of "sonic resonance" (using musical notes to temporarily reduce the weight of large stones) still in use in remote parts of Tibet by monks. This theory blends well with the writings of Herodotus ("tapping hammers" were the key, he said) as well as the 19th century mega-genius John Keely, as well the transcripts of the late Edgar Cayce.
- [McLuhan-List Editors, 25 October 1996]

Returning once again to the images of Aquino, it can be said that the images themselves are somewhat indistinguishable, making the shapes and colours of the image primary to its 'readability'. The Lady of Thebes offers an odd interpretation of 'natural history'-- is Egyptian culture so ancient that we call it natural history? (Of course, the reason the Lady of Thebes rests in the Redpath Museum is as much practicality as it is a space of spectacle). The Egyptian mummy is one of the items that carries not only a greater cultural mystic (see Filmography of this paper), but also presents practical curiosity for the scientific community of McGill-- the Lady of Thebes is an appropriate subjects of study by McGill's radiographers.

Why the Lady of Thebes is a 'she': x-rays and knowing

David Cronenberg emphasizing the ironic devaluation of the human body as a product of the search for intimacy in the technological world cites J.G. Ballard's novel, Crash, as exemplary insight into the future state of social relations. Cronenberg's film interpretation of the book sets emotion/intimacy deprived characters in a maze of traffic, highways, and speeding cars that surround an airport to demonstrate the denaturalization of the world and its influences on socialization. In this context, the human body mimics the environment: like a machine the body is set in motion, speeding; expendable. It is not unusual then, that Ballard says of modern **x-ray** technology:

Does the body still exist at all, in any but the most mundane sense? Its role has been steadily diminished, so that it seems little more than a **ghostly shadow** seen on the X-ray plate of our moral disapproval. **We are now entering a colonialist phase in our attitudes to the body, full of paternalistic notions that conceal a ruthless exploitation carried out for its own good.** This brutish creature must be housed, sparingly nourished, restricted to the minimum of sexual activity needed to reproduce itself and submitted to every manner of enlightened and improving patronage. Will the body at last rebel, tip all those vitamins, douches and aerobic schedules into Boston harbor and throw off the colonialist oppressor? - J.G. Ballard

The violence that characters in Cronenberg's **Crash** (1996) deliberately inflict upon themselves in reckless inattention to the confines of traffic and vehicle systems is precisely this rebellion. The pushing of the existence of flesh, and the inconclusive triumph of the flesh in the closing scene significantly highlights the potential for violent 'culture jamming' where cultural markers are turned upon themselves in a contradictory way.¹⁴ In the final scene, James (James Spader) and Catherine (Deborah Unger) carry-out a high speed car chase resulting in the car of Catherine rolling over in the mass of road systems, to rest in the side of a grass embankment. James stops his car, gets out and rushes to the scene of the accident to find Catherine lying on the grass, injured but not unconscious. They copulate in the grass and debris of the wreck, uttering the final words, "next time". Technology has the power to overtake our bodies, to substitute them, and for Ballard, the x-ray manages to relegate the human, flesh body into a 'brutish creature' and 'ghostly shadow'. Much like the Aquino exhibition has managed to create 'ghost' on behalf of the Lady of Thebes.

X-rays have found their most well known use in the organic body; yet at a banal level, humans do not normally have access to details of the inside of bodies. The inside of a body is not the domain of everyday life; an examination of what humans eat, particularly in the Western world will attest to the oversight social interaction places on bodily internals. The filmic oeuvre of David Cronenberg, particularly **Crash**, questions the standards of human contact based on that discrepancy, indeed "Cronenberg... once said there ought to be a beauty contest for the insides of human bodies (a line he put into the mouth of one of the Mantle twins in **Dead Ringers**)." [Katadotis, *Body parts*, p. 12]

The modern limitations of a body attempting to conceal itself for the sake of eternal life is challenged by the 'need' and 'right' of contemporary society to use technology. X-rays taken by radiographers at McGill identifying the gender and age of the mummy are displayed along side the Lady of Thebes as explanatory notes. Without x-rays it is questionable that the Lady of Thebes could be definitively identified as female, particularly because she occupies a sarcophagus bearing a man's name. The following text is located beside the exhibition cabinet of the Lady of Thebes.

¹⁴ As per culture jamming, a cottage industry has been created out of making T-shirts that parody corporate product logos already common in the advertising-media sphere; upon close examination, the message is different than the product referenced in the image. For example, the "Kraft" processed food product logo is easily recognized; in parody, "Kraft" becomes "Krap".

Interpretation of Radiographs

The multiple radiographs taken of this mummy show it to be that of an elderly female. That she was female can be determined by the ovoid shape of the pelvis and the triangular shape of the calcified cartilage projecting off of the anterior end of the ribs. That she was elderly can be demonstrated by the following findings.

- 1.) Spine - There is a narrowing of the cartilaginous disc spaces between the vertebral bodies, with calcification within the disc substance and the formation of bony bridges (osteophytes) between adjacent vertebral bodies.
- 2.) Hips - There is a narrowing of the weight-bearing surfaces of the hips.
- 3.) Knees - There is a narrowing of the weight-bearing surfaces of the knees with calcification of the meniscal cartilage.

All of the findings are consistent with degenerative arthritis on the basis of age. The body mineralization after 3,500 years is remarkably well maintained. The wrinkled appearance around the bone is due to the linen wrappings and the dissected skin over the bones.

The x-rays used to produce this knowledge also find their way into the exhibition **Time Machine**. X-rays taken to identify the gender and internal aspects of the mummy's anatomy are used to highlight the symbolic power of technology when they are placed in parallel with Hooykaas' own torso x-ray. This gesture is clearly optioning the power of the x-ray to substitute the presence of the body. Of course, there is more information that can be found in the living body of Hooykaas, the x-ray image of her own body conforms more to the standardized understanding of a body. In this case however, one need only to ask her about her own body (conventions of politeness aside) to be confronted with a complex system of life. Yet the limitations of the x-ray is precisely that it does not reveal the information that Hooykaas' own subjectivity would relate. The x-ray is as limited to information presentation whether the body itself is dead or alive. This once again reaffirms the devaluation of any subjectivity embodied in the flesh when technology takes subjectivity to, particularly, the third and fourth order. This is also why technology itself seems to imply agency; the x-ray is able to impart information that Hooykaas herself is either incapable of explaining or prohibited by the norms of medical diagnosis to explain. Since there is no subjectivity to interact with in the case of the Lady of Thebes, it is clearly easy for Aquino and Hooykaas+Stansfield to fabricate a subjectivity for her in a series of ways. There is some mystery and wonder to representational images that are displayed with little or no explanation to the unwitting passer-by who happens upon the projection of indistinguishable, yet abstractly possible renditions of human life. It would not in anyway be inconceivable that a person who believes in ghost or spirits would gladly project upon

this situation the living subjectivity of the Lady of Thebes, particularly if they had knowledge of the mummy's presence inside the Redpath Museum. The low lighting of the museum foyer is enough to index the low lighting of a horror film. There is a clear indication and lineage of symbolization at work when people will freely assume spirits exist.

The living body/dead body x-rays mimic each other, yet highlight the irony of a modern-living body in contrast to a dead-ancient body: the limitations of the technology are the same in both cases. There is no difference between taking x-rays of a dead body or a living body: they are both intended to inform, like a map. The technology, however, is limited, and it is the viewer who inevitably imbeds meaning into the image, filling the gaps of doubt with the violence of an explanation.¹⁵ It is not surprising that French body-artist Orlan feels that the light that penetrates the excavated parts of her face are similar in significance to the natural light of the sun that penetrates stained glass windows in a church to create an awe inspiring atmosphere when she has her face reconstructed by plastic surgery for the sake of art. X-rays look through matter, making matter 'matter' less. The x-ray machine is only limited to the materials it is able to penetrate. In this ways, the light rays that penetrate Orlan's excavated face informs more than x-rays.

Historians and archaeologists, even without x-rays, are able to interpret the Lady of Thebes. However, when the x-rays makes matter less significant-- able to penetrate, observe, etc., the stakes in meaning increase: an analysis of the Lady of Thebes took place without x-rays, but the x-rays confirm what was predicted. Her body can now be expended for the technological version, after all, this opens up far more interactive possibilities for an observer, a museum patron. First and second order subjectivities create intense anxiety; the anxiety of 'talk' for example. Technology is a system which reconfirms wishes and the x-rays leave nothing but the image up for suspicion. The x-ray is a self referencing system, and thus the curiosity of the onlooker is diverted from the actual object to the simulation of the object. That simulation is the x-ray, but because the x-ray is a manifestation of pure data, there is no need to create another object to see the x-ray-- the x-ray is a screen based manifestation. The only object required is the complex x-ray machine itself. What is left of the Lady of Thebes might perish, but the data record remains, the ability for the x-ray machine to present the data is still available. If the Lady of Thebes disappears, the context

¹⁵ There is something different at work here than Gestalt psychology's definition of 'inner horizon'. What is called when the inner horizon is not simple taken-for-granted, but mentally, politically, scientifically, and socially fabricated?

of the data may be gone, but the possibility for the x-ray machine to express data according to the Lady of Thebes remains. This is what is curious about vision machines. They have the potential for decontextualization-- telepresence. X-rays as art express several things about the modern Western body: 1.) the only territory left to imbed meaning or significance about the body is to penetrate the body, make it transparent, take it away, 'colonize' as Ballard has stated; and, 2.) meaning around the body has been saturated, leaving only inferiority left to colonize. The explosion of varieties of fashion and bodily augmentation in recent decades might be enough to convince one of both the lack of bodily signifiers left to colonize on a superficial level, and the odd human compulsion to create meaning at any cost. Moreover, and this will be discussed later in the context of computer manipulated photographs by artist Inez van Lamsweerde and Aziz+Cucher, the self-mutation of the body is a resisting gesture against the potential of objectification that technology has the potential to create in third and fourth order subjectivities.

While her body lies horizontal, the projection places her profile in a vertical position-- giving the impression, if one were to see the profile at all, that the subject's profile is of a person standing upright; reaffirming the metaphorical play on bringing the dead to life through technology: 'ghosts'. One must also be aware that the video of the Lady of Thebes required no 'staging' and thus the original's image comes through the glass of her case, the glass of the lens of the video camera, the glass of the television where the images were projected, and lens of the camera that took the images from the screen of the television, ultimately to be projected through the lens of the slide projectors onto the glass façade windows of the Redpath Museum. All these refractions of an image through a lens or glass is important to understanding how technology determines what we see and how we see it. Regardless of the lack of recourse to subjectivity imposed by second and third order subjectivities, the technology, when closely examined, reveals a series of flaws. These levels of synthetic vision distort the images once more at each level-- making the ability to apprehend a gestalt-like final image re-confirm one's confidence in technology; what reveals itself appears as a complete reality package for swift consumption as cultural capital, a logically sealed entity that levels emotion, equates and makes horizontal emotion for equally swift cultural amnesia-- the forgetting made possible by the completeness of the image or sensation.

Even if the image is recognizable as a facial profile, there is subtle deformity. She can easily be labeled a 'beast', not so much because this particular image projected shows a horrible beast (the image is hardly distinguishable), but because it is a small leap in the

minds of mass culture that Egyptian mummy equals beast. Comics and Hollywood films have thus far totalized and coded the image of the mummy as monster. Regardless of this particular image projection, the suspicion of setting (dusk, a monolithic stone building, etc.) is enough to rekindle the monster code, bringing along with it a kind of fear or anxiety, but an anxiety easily escaped.

Aquino's gesture, bringing 'life' to a dead item, a dead institution, is a critical and ironic gesture. By 'life' I mean the re-investment of meaning, the selection of importance of presumed closure. A secret can never inherently be left unexposed. It is the same critical gesture that originally allowed explorers to excavate a body from what was intended to be eternal stasis. Excavating the Lady of Thebes is nothing short of ripping the transcended living spirit of the Lady of Thebes from the Netherworld, back to the world she left behind in physical death. It is a violence to the sanctity of religion, admittedly a religion no longer practiced, that demonstrates the pretension of the quest of knowledge in the name of science. The museum today is a pretentious place, developed to display not items but to display control, particularly in the university setting. The body as technology is slave. The Redpath itself is a clear failure of didactic potential, leaving the observer nothing but order and antiquities to ponder. The installation, while testing how an artist might select, manipulate, and present an image in a unique public expression, also questions the role of the museum.

Returning for a moment to the status of the Lady of Thebes as a BwO, one cannot help but notice the expectantly emaciated body that is presented. That in itself is a questionable sight for the state of a human body, whether dead or alive: archaeology uncovers the dead, and brings their existence to lively significance. First only in the imagination of those who choose to reconstruct using remnants of the past, and then those like Aquino and Hooykaas+Stansfield who imbed their own meaning and significance into this body's existence. Hollywood also has a version of bringing an idea to life. The anorexic and the mummy have a common stakes in the symbolic plain of immanence. The anorexic mimics the emaciated body of the Lady of Thebes. It is not simply ironic twist that both the innards and food of the Lady of Thebes accompany her in a sealed tomb. Both her organs (contained in vessels which accompany the body in the tomb) and food are extensions, pushing the conscious and conventional limitations of death: they form the grid on which latitude (affects, intensities, emotions, sensations) and longitude (movements and rests, speeds and slowness) intersect to form hecceties. [Deleuze and Parent, 1987, p. 93] The heccetie or event is her burial, her discovery, her voyage to Canada, her containment, the

works of art by Hooykaas+Stansfield, and Aquino. The questions of curiosity that invade a supposedly secret and final human gesture inevitably sets the stage for discovery. As Paul Virilio has written, "To innovate the vessel was already to innovate the shipwreck, to invent the steam engine, the locomotive, was again to invent the derailment, the rail catastrophe." [Virilio, p. 81] To invent the mummy was to invent the discovery. It is in no way surprising that ethnologists and archaeologists alike would feel the need to interpret, to understand the sign. The simulation is a product of re-animating the wonder, and thereby imploding the 'interpretations' as if authentic resulting in a kind of 'bad faith' severing of negations to the possibilities of fiction over the authentic experience of the explorer, the archeologist, the hobbyist, the Egyptologist. Re-animating the wonder is the quest to re-embody the Lady of Thebes as a BwO.

Aquino is responsible for a kind of Hollywood mis-representation because any representation of a mummy in Western culture cannot escape what Hollywood has already established. Even in the case of Aquino, the mummy, in some way, is brought back to life, solidifying mass-mythology that mummies come back to life-- the curse of Pharaoh Tutankhamen-- to avenge disruption of the riches that are suspended between this life and the Netherworld. In the image, a cyborg is created, one made of ancient technology (embalming), modern methods of museum curation, and the animation of 'being' through the image. Again it is technology that allows for fourth order subjectivities to be victim of layered, over-processed subjectivities. While the second order of technology organize around the body, the postmodern era in which we live and work requires no 'body' for conceptual and visual resurrection (fourth order subjectivity), the body is recreated through technology, a body that is at the whim of several and varied subjectivities. Only traces of this mummy's story can be pieced together. We might know where it was found, how deep in the ground, how long it rested until it was discovered. Other traces of subjectivity are missing, a name. It is impossible to retract her authentic name, because if her name is on her person it is contained on a scroll between her wrapped legs. This is a central concern of the museum display.

Lady of Thebes

Egyptian Mummy, 18th Dynasty
Anthropoid Coffin, 23rd Dynasty

The mummy is that of a woman who lived some 3500 (years) ago. She was evidently of good standing in the community of her day, indicated by the manner of embalming and the fragments of a copper mask that covers her face.

It is evident from the translations of the hieroglyphics on the coffin in which she rests that it was not made for her but for a man, as the following points suggest:

- 1.) The title of the owner of the coffin was "Sedjem Ash", cult servant of the divine votaress of Amun, a position which was almost invariably held by a man.
- 2.) The owner, "That-A-Nufer-Amun", is always referred to as "he" and "him", except in two isolated cases, when the mother of the owner is referred to as "her" mother. These are possibly clerical errors on the part of the scribe. Such mistakes were frequent at the time this coffin was made, between the 22nd and 23rd Dynasties (945-718 B.C.).
3. The determinative signs following the name of the owner are male ones instead of female, as they would have been if the owner were a woman.

The only way to ascertain the real name of the present inhabitant would be to unwrap the mummy and study the papyrus which is probably concealed on her person. This papyrus would be a more or less abbreviated copy of the Book of the Dead, which was often placed between the legs of a deceased person to assist him or her on the journey through the Netherworld. While the prayers were always very similar, there was space allowed for the insertion of the name of the deceased.

Certainly her possessions and their proximity to other findings divulge information about who the Lady of Thebes was and is. But we also know that this mummy's significant subjectivity-- the history that living people carry in their breathing lives-- will never be recovered. Yet the technological interpretation, a rhetorical desiring-machine of science, opens the third order subjectivity of the Lady of Thebes to be imported for other purposes. Aquino understands this unreachability of everyday existence, he is struck with how ironic this artifact is in a natural history museum. The whole story can never be recovered, and for this reason he felt he had license over making this mummy's face a kind of bill-board. He has filled in where documentation and the supposition of truth left off.

Aquino's intent, as can be read in the artist's statement, was to mock the system of display/storage and artifact collection. One needs only to look at the content of the building-- a mummy brought to Montréal by a person wealthy enough to accomplish such a task-- and its Neo-Classical architecture to realize that The Redpath Museum is both a strong symbol of modernism and to a more tacit degree, colonialism. Whether Aquino is conscious of his status as an artist constructing such an installation, he is indeed an immigrant to Canada, and Brazilian.¹⁶ The architecture of the building resembles a

¹⁶ The circumstances warrant a comment on the vast and important work of postcolonial theorists. Post colonial discourse might say that the male-authority-other (Aquino) is in dialogue with the masculine-authority-Western curatorial system. See G.C. Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory.

sarcophagus, making certain that the items housed in this building are certainly 'dead'. To further extend that metaphor, the protective glass casing can be interpreted as another layer of separation and preservation, suggesting again its dead state. All these facts invoke an ominous sense to both viewer and critique of modernism. To bring light and colour both to the starkness and night of the Redpath Museum was a deliberate mock of the ivory-tower-ness of the Redpath Museum. Colour and light (importantly, products of electricity) are a postmodern re-animation of the dead by use of vision machines resulting in a kind of new life brought to dormant deadness. The fact that light and image is projected outwards is important. By creating a **screeni(gh)t/e**, Aquino hoped to demonstrate a bricolage tendency in postmodern art and architecture.¹⁷ For Aquino the installations was both a success (bringing light and life to symbols of deadness) and a critique of the museum (a collection of dead 'nature') and McGill (its colonial past and intellectual status)-- his projection re-animated a human form-- converting a monster to life or beauty or both (Dr. Frankenstein).

The inside (esoteric) / outside (exterior) discourse at work in this exhibition does not simply bring to issue hidden knowledge versus overt knowledge. Also at stake are ontological issues of knowledge. Not only were the projected images OF the inside (the

¹⁷ Gianni Vattimo in The Transparent Society suggests that structuralism championed a relativistic position regarding 'expression', in turn sacrificing subjectivity, preference, taste, choice, etc.-- all "at the cost of a 'positivistic' restoration of the presupposed neutrality of the observer" [Vattimo, Koine, p. 401] In structuralism, nothing of objective observation is given over to individual meanings and feelings, resulting in, for example, an intellectual tool of Marxism whereby an all embracing universalism dictates the needs and emotions of observers in the unmistakable spectacle of modernism. This imposes a strong ethic based on obedience to a higher order, at the expense of individual needs and wants, resulting in the interconnectiveness and "infrastructure" of modernism. Dialogue between cultures during a period when structuralism dictates the mandate of discourse imposes the 'global' necessities of modernism, where the world functions as a cohesive design. A design engineered (embracing higher orders) at the expense of a bricolage, making the violence of an engineered mode of communication all that much more poignant to individual cultures.

This state of structuralist affairs is ironic because Lévi-Strauss himself did not describe the bricoleur as a holistic being, nor an inclusive one. The engineer on the other hand is inventive to the degree that he or she can dictate the materials of construction. These polarities are what made structuralism incongruous. Vattimo is making middle-ground between the engineer and bricoleur of Lévi-Strauss. Indeed, without the engineer, the bricoleur is relegated to the primitive. The trapper or the native hunter has long been overlooked as a clearly logical extension of the engineering production and the application of the bricoleur's mentality, skill, craft, and perhaps most importantly, art. Creating a dialectic with the other is a discomfort readily passed over by modernist/structuralist tendencies (the technocratic inventor and processor of raw materials). Vattimo goes on to say:

The dialogue with different cultures is finally become (sic) a true dialogue, and it is pointless to liquidate the Eurocentric perspectives which structuralism in years past rightfully meant to defuse: the question today is rather to exercise this dialogue beyond a purely descriptive position. [Vattimo, Koine, p. 401]

contents) FROM the inside to the outside glass (and in this sense constructing a wall or architectural feature), but the resulting projection is an 'essence' of an item that the building houses or contains. Clearly the mummy is more than an item. By calling HER the Lady of Thebes, her title carries subjectivity beyond the biological classification that, for instance, the stuffed lion or owl carries. "Her" existence is pronominal, and thus linguistically layered. She indexes human, whereas the lion and owl index nature. Nature is characteristically thought of as something that must be controlled (wild), humanity is something, oddly enough, much more natural because being human is inconsequential, universal, and essential-- humans are at the top of the nature hierarchy, and thus outside the hierarchy all together. Our civility is what is natural about the Lady of Thebes. Yet the irony that a human body resides along side the owl and lion bring to light the questionability of humanness. As will be explained later, the film **Blade Runner** makes this same juxtaposition (owl-human-android) for the purpose of highlighting how humanity, like nature, is up for manipulation.

The museum is a path of power for the academic institute. Artifacts of 'natural history' are housed with the pretension that nature has a disputable past and history is (in any way) 'natural'. There are artifacts from around the world; artifacts deemed worthy of study/display-- antiques. Yet the stuffed animals do not fit the academic picture, they are not worthy of study by academics but are worthy of study only by curious children who will never come so close to an animal such as an African lion, ALIVE. The real study of animals continues in the environment, where they live and breath, eat, die, etc. The building is meant for the display of dead animals (among other geological items of interest), and Aquino's projection shows the building in its true function, while resorting at the same time to cheap tactics of fabricating spectacle (or rather spectacular fabrication); a process not unlike appropriation or mockery-- the building, after all, contains dead humans too. Dead humans from a dead culture from a currently compromised area of the world, from a continent that is the most jeopardize on the planet, from a place where living people are compromised in civil war and poverty, not to mention that in terms of the Western (sometimes racist) aesthetic and forces of power, the living people of today's Egypt are dominantly Islamic and 'half-black'-- all sarcasm intended. Is the death and embalming of the Lady of Thebes a part of natural history? It has as much to do with contemporary 'history' as with the past. Awkward is the conditions which living/working humans-- humans that spend a good deal of their waking hours in the Redpath Museum-- must endure. For the most part, these people are invisible-- like ghosts. They work in their offices apart from the exhibition space, therefore encouraging the pristine-ness of the

presentation space, and affirming the mystique that scientists "work in solitude". The curators are rarely to be seen; they hovel in their academic pretensions in silence. How indeed does anyone know that there is academic production taking place in this building?

In the animation of time, Aquino has taken a being some three-thousand years old, and has brought her to 'life' using technology. A gesture not unlike the unequivocal results that the Lady of Thebes is female according to her x-rays at the Royal Victoria Hospital.

Technology recuperates a past, it is investigative as much as it fabricates a narrative that places comprehensibility on the past. What is not understood is provoked to its end. A comprehensible explanation of the past seems to be what intellectual house-cleaning does for the establishment of contemporary prerogatives on culture and society. "If we understand the past, we can understand the future", so the cliché goes. Rather, if the past is this easily fabricatable, so is the future. While this generalization about the invasiveness of technology is accurate in the case of anyone who respects the practice of burial of the dead in Ancient Egypt, it is technology, perhaps unfortunately, that forms the basis of the museum's potential reconstruction. Such an inclination is present when Paul Virilio answers the following question:

Traditionally, images have been in museums or before that in churches or in books. Today, with the electronic means of production, images are everywhere-- it's almost inevitable. Do they change our ways of seeing and our ways of understanding that world? [Editor's Question, Virilio, Block, 1988, p. 4]

Virilio replies, "we are witnessing a new form of visibility. . . electronic images are replacing the electrification of towns and of the countryside." [Virilio, 1988, p. 4] Virilio calls this 'indirect visibility'; when the luminescence of screen images dominates not simply as a medium of images, but as a source of quotidian, banal lighting. There are hundreds of bars in North America which demonstrate this clearly-- the television is placed near the ceiling where lighting would normally be placed, and its luminescence is at times greater than any surrounding light in often dark environments. Virilio goes on to say that "the image is no longer so much an image in the sense of a representation, but in the sense of light. It's a kind of seeing without knowing; a pure seeing." [Virilio, 1988, p. 4] What Virilio overlooks is that it may change 'our ways of seeing', but he does not address the idea that it also changes 'our ways of understanding'. The light in a bar is tacit, and creates new possibilities for people to relate in a bar. The television can be the legitimate focus of attention for a person that is alone in the bar, alone drinking. He or she can avoid the stigma of 'drinking alone' by watching the television. There may be a series of other

reasons a person would be in a bar alone, to meet people for example, to escape someone, to wait for someone, to drink. The television is a trump card. It may also be useful too as a conversation anxiety buffer, if a conversation meets an uncomfortable silence, the gaze can stray to the television screen as potential tension relief, or fodder for further conversation. The television in a bar is to sustain a degree of anonymity, to remain unsociable if necessary. It functions much like the bathroom functions to conceal the use of organs. As McLuhan writes:

Lewis Mumford in his *Cultures of Cities* notes that: "Today, the degradation of inner life is symbolized by the fact that the only place sacred from interruption is the private toilet." Yet in the seventeenth century, when personal privacy was much valued, the highest classes of society openly performed acts of excretion at their *bidets* beside crowded dining tables. But today privacy stinks. The privacy that was once the refreshment of the mind and spirit is now associated only with those "shameful" and strenuous tasks by which the body is made fit for contact with other bodies. The modern nose, like the modern eye, has developed a sort of microscopic, intercellular intensity which makes our human contacts painful and revolting. [McLuhan, p. 61-2]

The TV lighting is a 'front' to direct contact, to hide the eyes. Direct visibility is not something to be done on a communal scale; this light is intended for intimacy.

These are BswO, or at least, we imagine that people have organs. Sex, shitting is confined to anonymity. It is not surprising that Inez van Lamsweerde has conceived of the **Thank You Thighmaster** series—a communal gathering offers little in the way of bodily exposure and function. Burping and farting have been sanitized like bathroom cleaning products 'disinfect'. The semantics of the word is odd: it might be de-germ; but to disinfect is like 'de-install'—the installation/infection has already taken place. Even with disinfectants, it is impossible to eliminate all germs, just as it is to eliminate all bodily functions, in spite of the contemporary conditions of etiquette and manners that claim victory over the volatile body. What technology does is mask desire of the subject by masking the body; technology masks bodily fluid and furthermore regiments it... what cannot be regimented is camouflaged by conventions of culture and law—being forced to submit to these because we have created our desiring-machines. The convention of standing upright is such an imposition of the law of confidence that is initialed by mother and fashion designer alike.

The projection at the Redpath has this same potential for indirect visibility. Barbara Lawson, in conversation with people who saw the installation heard a comment that the

projection resembled "stained-glass windows", confirming Virilio's hypothesis that banal light (sunlight-- predictable, unquestionable, taken-for-granted light) is forced and reversed through technology. Sun light shines through stained-glass windows to illuminate the inside of buildings in the daytime for the effect of the interior. Likewise, as night, internal light softly projects out through the glass producing an aura of habitation-- in the case of a church, it might represent Godly habitation. Technology is a reflecting and refracting gesture, it is a mirror of subjectivity and a filter through which subjectivity is solidified and conflated with other subjectivities. For Virilio, the building itself radiates out, both forming and illuminating the city scape. Aquino's light is banal light, because the image projected is itself a still of a video shot (stationary) and dependent upon a source. Yet, Aquino's light is not simply any light. It is not the shifting light of a video projection but the stately light of one single moment in the course of a video's electric nature. This light is significant because it is indistinguishable as an item-- without knowing exactly what the image is. there is question as to its form or what indeed 'it' is. Aside from this complexity, revealing what the body is about, particularly what is inside the body is, to some, an important experience, 'aesthetically seductive'.

The vision of my body being opened painlessly was extremely seductive aesthetically, I found it similar to the light coming through the windows of a church illuminating the religious imagery inside. [Orlan as quoted in GALE, p.123]

Orlan's comparison of the experience of lucid plastic surgery whereby the spine has been targeted to induce loss of specific feeling rather than an anesthetic of total conscience collapse, is not a careless comparison. Under the circumstances where local anesthetics allow the loss of pain, but the retention of consciousness is one where both she and others are allowed to have access to her exposed, internal and bloodied body. The light that penetrates the inside of a church is not a random comparison. The systematization of symbols in religious culture is similar to the systematization and monopoly on the meanings of internal structures inside bodies that the medical paradigm guards. This is threatening to the system of symbolization. Orlan's comment and project about the body is linked to the fascination the Lady of Thebes offers to viewers. The mummy is an item, intended by religion and, most likely, by the Lady of Thebes herself, to be in eternal communion with both the physical world and the 'Netherworld' is something that cannot be passed up for its commentary value on the state of human existence. The fact that this item has traversed 'normal' history is enough, but as an item of mystery and uncanny presence, creates a new series of meanings that become imbedded in the art works of Aquino and Hooykaas+Stansfield. Their commentary is both reflexive, in that they chose to perform a

violence of propaganda (a slight one at that) and establish a rhetoric of visibility. It is as simple as saying that what we cannot see is what we cannot know, and this axiom cannot be left alone or to stand on its own accord for the sake of 'pure' knowledge. A falsified system of symbolization is not acceptable as long as what is observed is not taken at face value.

The fabrication of an art exhibit critiques by demanding some reaction, prompting questions. Does, for example, the light of projection embody a spirit of the Lady of Thebes-- whose body was embalmed for the purpose of eternal existence? Is this exhibition cleverly intended to symbolize that eternal existence? The fact that Aquino highlights this odd existence by putting emphasis on her profiled face standing upright, feeds off of and into the mythologies that Hollywood has used, not for scientific understanding, but for entertainment content-- these can essentially be the same. [see **Image Appendix, p. 4: Redpath didactic panel, image of monster mummy on film poster**] While the Lady of Thebes rests in her sarcophagus horizontally, the projection turns her into an upright being-- standing, referencing a 'life' in the most basic way we understand 'living' to be. In this way the items contained and displayed in the Redpath Museum are more valuable than their popularity would construct. These are all original items, all obdurate matter, and for the most part, original works of art; their contextualization leaves them open to re-interpretation, yet have been produced and reproduced by mechanical means. Fabrication.

In the realization that the installation and projection of a 'stained-glass' image from the inside to the outside brought relatively little satisfaction to a viewer than its inherent beauty (i.e., there was no explanation to accompany the installation to passers-by), Aquino highlights the case that the image can and is taking over as a source of "light" in the Virilidian sense-- in the same way that light from the sun passed through stained-glass windows to both illuminate and modify a church's interior religious significance or aura. The same holds for the body in Orlan's case. By bringing together the now banal and taken-for-granted everyday(night)ness of a hermetic body, and everydayness of light and the visual image (taken-for-granted in a variety of mediums) in such a way as to demonstrate the fluidity and ephemeral nature of illusion, the sensory abilities of human vision are compromised. Our 'knowledge' is attached to narrative and meta-narratives that allow for an organized and comfortable sense of reality. In the case where illusion is created artificially for senses that depend upon strict divisions of feeling and emotion, it is clear that sensory perception is absorbed or substituted by the medium, and most significantly by

visual technologies. Our sensations become tacitly dependent upon a reconstructed and eternally recurring narrative suspended by electricity and technology.

As a body without organs, the Lady of Thebes attracts, what Deleuze and Guattari call desiring-production or "the organ-machine"; as a third order subjectivity she is an easy target for external subjective layering and reinvestment. Deleuze and Guattari could equally call this production organic machination. It is a process. Organic machination is the semblance of interpretation and expression that feeds off of mystique, in this case, the mystique of the Lady of Thebes. There is no ethic in technology that prevents these subjective impositions.

The body without organs... falls back on (se rabat sur) desiring production, attracts it, and appropriates it for its own. The organ-machines now cling to the body without organs.... [D+G. *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 10-11]

The art projects are organs-- similar to the detached and preserved (pickled) organs that accompany the sarcophagus in the tomb of the Lady of Thebes into the Netherworld, ultimately offering the impression that the two artistic projects have been launched by her volition, they are her efforts to re-accumulate the lost or unaccompanied organs that accompany the sarcophagus in the tomb.

As was explained earlier, the scientists who x-rayed the Lady of Thebes to determine anatomical characteristics commented, perhaps predictably, that the Lady of Thebes is in astoundingly good condition. This is the basis for Hollywood's version of the mummy: all semblances of life must be eradicated after death; such well preserved death is horrifying. And equally, the BwO is horrifying. Horror films, for example, often involve the division of the body, the separation of the body takes place when the viewer observes the body under threat, and, in the majority of cases, both feels vicariously and consciously abjects to the sight. Horror is no longer horror because the body in post-modern discourse is like another piece of the hardware. Finlay-de Monchy's analysands describe horrific bodily exertion with zeal: what they are describing is what took place in play, like a child describing his or her process of play; how the blocks were stacked, how they fell, and the crashing sound it made. The distress that Finlay-de Monchy's analysands feel is imbedded in this psyche-soma split that dominates post-modern aesthetics. The enthusiastic description of bodily duress is part of the trap of psyche-soma split encouraged by science. Equally important is that the real of genocide or violent crime is not easily distinguishable from the fictional horror of MGM. As will be discussed later, the fetishization of the

cyborg in post-modern culture (or the post-modern mythology) is simply another form of eugenics that the Nazi's used in a proactive form.

The Body of Christ: "Year Zero: Faciality"

Significance: "is never without a white wall upon which it inscribes its signs and redundancies." [D+G, 1987, p. 167] Significance always has a backdrop, and space on which meaning can be created. Without the screen of subjectification, significance is nil or 'zero'. With only a screen, subjectification is possible, and the progression of time, life, and space are unavoidable. This is the existential dilemma of awareness; it is impossible to be a docile body. This is why Deleuze and Guattari invent the body without organs-- it is inevitable self-imposed progression of docility as rebellion. Subjectification: "is never without a black hole in which it lodges its consciousness, passion, and redundancies." [D+G, 1987, p. 167]

Significance and subjectification are co-dependent: subjectification is open to acts, a violence of disruption, a space must be occupied, and rigidly so-- significance is required. Significance is passive and subjectification is active, aggressive.

Since all semiotics are mixed and strata come at least in twos, it should come as no surprise that a very special mechanism is situated at their intersection.... it is a face, the white wall/black hole system. [D+G, 1987, p. 167]

The face renders all language confrontational, and relational. Knowledge is personalized, and this metaphor, or rather axiom of semiotics for Deleuze and Guattari determines the personalization of life and, most importantly, the body. Facialization is the key component in deciphering one's existence, one's meaning, one's ontology, and one's telos. Perhaps this is why Deleuze and Guattari have entitled this chapter, Year Zero-- the beginning of subjective time, intellectual time.

The Lady of Thebes has a face, still. After three-thousand years, her face is still a white wall/black hole system. When Aquino chose to project an augmented video/slide simulacra of the mummy's face on the outside façade of the Redpath Museum, he could not have created better significance over the subjectification of the museum itself: a neo-classical building built specifically to house artifacts; originally for the detritus of the natural world, but inevitably detritus of civilization. No matter how definitionally easy it is to divide nature

from civilization, the two are bound to enter their own 'mixed strata' of a white wall/black hole system.

To further complicate the matter of faciality, the Lady of Thebes has traces of copper on her face, semblances of a copper mask placed over her face to enter the Netherworld. A third strata is added to the facialization of the Lady of Thebes, and the projection installation of her face, projected triple fold on the three large window that both allow light inside the museum, and soften its temple resemblance. A further complexity of this installation is that the projects were from the inside out. From dusk until midnight, the facial projections of a barely distinguishable facial profile illuminated the building as if it were glowing. Some who saw the projection commented that it looked like stained glass-- a phenomena that is only effective and ominous if viewed on the opposite side of entering light, as if from inside....

The face is a surface: facial traits, lines, wrinkles; long face, square face, triangular face; the face is a map, even when it is applied to and wraps a volume, even when it surrounds and borders cavities that are now no more than holes. [D+G, 1987, p. 170]

It was the face that was projected, remembering that what is intended by this explanation is not to simply equate the Lady of Thebes to a body without organs, but to make her a BwO. Third order or passive subjectivity is the unstable category of subjectivity, because at no point in time does it clearly reflect one singular subjectivity. As the face is a map, it is also part of the puzzle. While the face may mimic the façade of the Redpath Museum, it also gives it an identity, a name. The face contains the eyes, just as the light focused through a lens projects the image of the profile onto translucent or opaque screens. Like the black resin petrified face of the Lady of Thebes, the white wall/black hole system is at work when the black hole of a mummy's head is project onto an artificial flesh of a white screen. Facialization in the Deleuze and Guattarian sense takes place not only in content but in process.

The popular 19th Century misconception that knowledge is inscribed on the brain and memory is a property of eye fluids is the premise of the 1972 film **Horror Express**. The film's main character, Professor Alaxander Saxton, member of the Royal Society, discovers a prehistoric man, a potential missing link, frozen in the glacial ice of Mongolia. As the title suggests, Professor Saxton attempts to transports this specimen by train from Northern China, through Russia, to London. On route, the creature thaws. Conventional

thought would dictate that even after being thawed out, this frozen humanoid would most certainly be dead. As the viewer discovers, this is no ordinary prehistoric man. An alien subjectivity is using the prehistoric man only as a vessel of habitation, once again confirming the thesis that first order subjectivity (living subjectivity) requires a body. Over the course of the film and the train voyage the viewer learns that subjectivity (knowledge) can be passed from one body to another, and fluid of the eyeball retains images of memory. Both precepts of the film are suspect, one cannot help laugh at the misconception and this is one of the reasons this film is considered classic schlock horror.

There is a personal reason I choose **Horror Express**. For a four-year-old child, this film is not schlock. If the memory of this film isn't my earliest recollection, it certainly is the most vivid. When I was four years old, my mother snuck me into a movie in Kipling, Saskatchewan, my mother's one-theatre, one-main-street hometown. (Indeed, this was a trend that lasted throughout my childhood: my mother would often make up a story to the attendant at the box-office, "his father is already in the film, and I'd like to just let my son go in and find him", so that she could get in a full afternoon and evening of shopping while I watched back to back adult films. I was a lucky benefactor of consumerism.) The movie I recall watching in a small prairie theatre was traumatic. It was indelibly marked in my memory for many years as the film that put me to pasture. I can remember only images.... Twenty-two years later, I per chance watched **Horror Express** on late-night television. It was a revelation: I could remember the images, but remembered nothing of the plot, understood nothing of the complexity of the plot; more importantly, I understood none of the humor and incredible kitsch this movie embodied. I laughed at my own childhood fright, just as my mother and aunt had laughed at me twenty-two years previous for becoming so scared. For weeks after, about the monster whose eyes turn red to kill. For me, the fact that I can relive these childhood memories is similar to the possibilities of memory that the Lady of Thebes offers. Of consequence to the form of artificial memory is the content of the film: a mummified 2 million year old prehistoric man is found frozen in an equally old glacier in Northern China by Professor Alexander Saxton. In transport by train back to London (and hence the title of the film, **Horror Express**), the prehistoric man thaws, returning to life in a kind of natural cryogenic process, and proceeds to kill passengers selectively. Selectively because, as we learn, the alien being (it's not simply a prehistoric being) is gathering human knowledge by absorbing the minds of specific passengers who might have knowledge that would contribute to the construction of a space ship. The Sherlock Holmes character of Dr. Saxton senses that this is no ordinary being-- it is intelligent life. What initially looks to be random killing by the 'beast', turns out to be

specific. The victims have some form of 'knowledge' or 'information' that assists the beast in survival, and ultimately, the absorption of the contents of certain brains will be enough to construct a space ship to escape earth. Dr. Saxton determines that the being is in fact an alien from space— eye fluids from the beast reveal images of other solar systems and the earth from orbit. By means of radiation, this living form of energy moves from one body to another through the eyes: both absorbing consciousness of other people and projecting energy (its existence) by way of emitting radiation. The eye is central to subjectivity because, in this case, it contains the narrative of a lost alien and 2 million years of evolution on earth.

Nineteenth Century science believed that the eye fluids could actually sustain the last image to enter the eye at the moment of death. By dissecting the eye, the identity of a killer could be determined. This method was used in the film **Horror Express**. In this sense, the eye is more than an organ, it records, it is the organic version of third order subjectivity. The eye literally retains enough life to identify the killer, and in this sense, the eye is not an organ, but a body, or at the least, the eye is personified as such; the allusion to embodiment that third order subjectivity creates, and recasts is helps define the possibilities to appropriate the wealth of human expression in passive, fourth order subjectivity. The eye is a BwO. The premise of the Ridley Scott film **Blade Runner** is similar: the eye holds the key to subjectivity like no other entity. Like the synthetic animals in **Blade Runner**, the animals in the Redpath Museum are on watch (real but not real, or, an owl≠stuffed owl, an owl≠synthetic owl).¹⁸

Technology speaks, and when it does, it tells on itself: Technology is a Blade Runner

Because we can imagine the subjective possibilities of expression through technology, technology places a hegemony on the structure of the future. It predetermines human future

¹⁸ Merleau-Ponty approaches the body in a similar, but more reflexively sophisticated way, whereby human subjectivity is capable of understanding and thinking both with, and dislocated from, the body.

Obsessed with being, and forgetful of the perspectivism of my experience, I henceforth treat it as an object and deduce it from a relationship between objects. I regard my body, which is my point of view upon the world, as one of the objects of that world. My recent awareness of my gaze as a means of knowledge I now repress, and treat my eyes as bits of matter. They then take their place in the same objective space in which I am trying to situate the external object and I believe that I am producing the perceived perspective by the projection of the objects of my retina. [Merleau-Ponty, pp. 70-71]

subjective and technological investment because the pattern for subjective expression already exists. For example, it is nearly impossible for the body to stay still, even when we are sleeping: because we have a body we automatically have a body technique. In **Blade Runner**, the existence of **non-human humans** (androids, replicants, 'skin-jobs'), isolates humanness from those characteristics which are assumed to be solidly universal and invariable. This film will be the basis of demonstrating that technological investment for the purpose of subjective expression can be freakishly extrapolated to the point where what is human and what is technological is blurred beyond recognition. In **Blade Runner**, humanity is more determined by non-human traits, than by those traits which are readily assumed to be human, such as emotion. Certainly the use of prescription pharmaceuticals such as prozac and other drugs which control emotion, and the use of 'smart' drugs in outlaw culture, are example of this human non-humanness (technology).

What makes the human human is fragility and incapacibilities. While the androids (replicants, or 'skin-jobs') look like humans, they greatly surpass normal human strength and endurance. Human endurance is only one thing that blurs the line in this film between human and 'replicant'; more importantly, the absence of emotion in the androids is the initial dividing line. In fact, one of the only ways to determine whether someone is human or replicant is specifically tested according to minute visceral reactions that intimate human emotion versus no emotion. Over the course of the film, however, this equation (body+emotion=human) becomes unstable, and humanity is left impressed with its, perhaps, more appropriate characteristic, violence. Here, the question of the limits of life, a dividing line between third order and fourth order subjectivity (as Kubrick has developed in **2001**, soon to be discussed), tests the universalness of being human. Androids may not need to sleep, to eat, etc., but their emotion is essentialized to the degree that they perish in the quest to sustain the emotion they have already attained; namely their love for each other.

Much has already been said about **Blade Runner**; for example, the nature of capitalist production and labour will collapse distinctions of night and day, pollution is rampant in the ever clouded city, space takes over time, etc. [O'Neill, Olalquiaga] **Blade Runner** demonstrates three elements of the schematized logic constructed in this thesis. First, the imposition of subjectivity on fourth order creation. Beings that look like humans and act like humans are equated with a kitchen appliance, as Deckard says when he tries to justify his job as a blade runner to Rachel at the same moment his is attempting to explain that her memories have been implanted and that they are not her own. In this case, the object is specifically created, it is not named for its own sake. Second, the begging of first order re-

embodiment by fourth order subjectivity forced to the will of first, second and third order subjectivities. Third, the struggle of the replicants is a struggle to recover their own subjectivity, a subjectivity based upon the unpredictability of life and death.

Blade Runner is about the eye and how sight in general constructs knowledge, guides the application of that knowledge, and purveys desire while at the same time being a site of consumption to suppress desire (pornography) as a form of sensory replacement or substitution; as in watching television where one not only sees the television, but has a perpetual fixation on it. **Blade Runner** is also about the panopticon because the unidentified, unclaimed eye which introduces the film can be attributed to a number of subjects in and outside the film: the eye might represent an androids' sight (=the eye of technology), the viewer's (as mirror), Deckard's (as private investigator), the eye of God.... It might also be the eye of the photograph, used to legitimate memory and history (or the eye IN the photography; a convex mirror) or it may be Roy's artificial eye that has seen spectacular things in space that no human has ever witnessed, or it could be the eye that is subjectively absorbed and monitored in the Voight-Kamph test. The eye and sight are universal in **Blade Runner** because it is indeed science fiction, blindness is not a problem or boon of the future. The viewer also knows that Roy does not need eyes: in a scene where Deckard is hunting/being hunted by Roy, Roy breaks through a wall and grabs Deckard's gun-carrying hand with precision, pulling Deckard's hand and gun through a brick wall to break an equal number fingers on Deckard's hand as Deckard has killed androids. Leon picks eyes out of a vat of liquid nitrogen which is clearly supposed to injure a normal person's hand, and the Asiatic scientist Chew that Roy and Leon harass for information builds eyes, the very same eyes that Leon and Roy have imbedded in their heads at the moment they kill him. Furthermore, Deckard does not know who he should kill and thus his eyes are useless as well, relying instead upon the eye of technology and the eye of the replicant to identify for him who he is supposed to kill.

In **Blade Runner**, the eye is segmented from the body for the purpose of signifying the core of subjectivity. That core is emotion itself, and the eye is, according to the film's thesis, the seat of emotion. The eye and emotion are tacitly equated; a body part signifies a concept. In **Blade Runner**, the human is divided away from emotion just as the cyborg attempts to create, accrue or feign emotion. When Roy, the dominant replicant and leader of a small band of rebel replicant slaves who return to earth from 'off-world' colonies to seek technical readjustments to prevent their in-bred 'termination date', extracts Tyrell's eyes in one powerful scene where Roy literally meets and kills his maker (Tyrell=God); he is

extracting Tyrell/God's emotions (or lack thereof). Similarly, the android Leon fondles an eye in Chew's genetic laboratory where Roy and Leon seek answers for life extension (beyond the built-in termination date-- they want "more life" as Roy later says to Tyrell). Now that the androids have a small taste of emotion, they require more life to fully attain and experience that emotion. Leon and Roy kill the genetic eye-manufacturing technician to gain information about where to find Tyrell-- their 'creator'.

Photographs are used in **Blade Runner** to allude to and confirm the idea that the eye is the seat of emotion.¹⁹ A series of photographs displayed on Deckard's piano carries a great deal of emotional trauma for Rachel, an android, whose own photographs (particularly one of her and her mother) are falsifications of a memory of lived-life that has been implanted in her subjectivity. In the case of **Blade Runner**, what we see creates a history as well as a future. The film itself is of the film genre appropriately called, technoir, as Silverman writes, "simultaneously science fiction and film noir, it points both forward and backward in time." [Silverman, p. 109]²⁰

¹⁹ Clearly, because humans can be created, it is doubtful in this science fiction film that anyone is to remain blind-- the technology is available to give vision to an android, it is available to give sight to a blind human (perhaps not universally as the post-industrial poverty, decay, and pollution intimate).

²⁰ **Blade Runner** was released in 1982, and again in 1993 as the Director's Cut. The Director's Cut preceded the version theoreticians had analyzed for over ten years. Upon the release of the Director's Cut, theoreticians are now privileged to a new film: a film that required new reviews. Thus, in 1993, the feminist film journal, Camera Obscura, published two articles that re-motivate the theoretical underpinnings of, arguably, one of the best cinematic works available to contemporary theory and contemporary imaginary. This for certain simply by virtue of **Blade Runner's** recognition by "cyberpunks"-- the culture that revels in the history to come based on William Gibson's, Neuromancer, Thomas Pynchon's, V, the popular magazine Mondo 2000, etc.

The two articles published by Camera Obscura were Elissa Marder's "Blade Runner's Moving Still", and Kaja Silverman's "Back to the Future". Marder and Silverman developed two simultaneous works that addressed **Blade Runner's** re-release. There is a need for a response to Silverman and Marder-- to re-focus the issue away from subjectivity of humans, away from the debate about human traits, and move the focus towards the subjectivity of technology where a different, perhaps more immediate, even more threatening the embodiment of humanness history lies. For Marder and Silverman, the future is human; my interpretation is, sadly, the opposite: future is machine. **Blade Runner** is about the history of the current. It offers a look into the future and the role of subjectivity in the future. In **Blade Runner**, surveillance and subjectivity dominate, culminating in a single focus of the film: the eye. Although Silverman and Marder see subjectivity still resting in the human-- as a reflective function of replicant alterity-- **Blade Runner** actually offers a reversal of such a standpoint on the basis of the narrative which claims that the network of humanly constructed relations amongst the reformulated human and non-human elements (the Esper machine, the Voight-Kamph computer) in the film was unable to offer an alternative universe of identification. The Esper computer could not reflect "reality" but rather implanted a "truth" or reality through itself to the human/replicant Deckard.

A valuable theoretical statement on the character of subjectivity and technology is presented in a short sequence in Deckard's apartment when he uses the Esper computers, a computer which creates a three dimensional reproduction of the contents of a photograph.

Deckard has just returned from the Tyrell Corporation, conducting an interview with, what the viewer assumes is Tyrell's pleasure model replicant, Rachel. Earlier, Deckard investigates the hotel room of Leon and Roy and (Deckard does not realize at the time that Pris and Zhora may also live there) and takes a photo from a dresser drawer. Perhaps Deckard thought that this photo was unimportant to Leon, one that Leon might not miss, because Deckard leaves the remaining pile of photographs. While Deckard gently hunches over his piano, playing single notes softly and drinking, he spans over the family photos littering the top of his piano.²¹ Taking the photo he has retrieved from Leon's hotel room, he inserts it into an Esper computer, upon which the computer scans the image according to Deckard's verbal instructions, "pan left", "centre", etc. The machine itself does conduct scans on its own accord, as the audience hears the scanning continuing without Deckard's verbal instructions. This is the first indication that the technology, the computer scanning the image, is operating on its own accord, as a kind of artificial intelligence. As will be argued, this indicates that the technology Deckard is using is more sophisticated than a machine: it literally 'tells' Deckard who to kill-- Zhora.

The second and primary indicator that the technology Deckard is using to scan the photo from Leon's hotel room is actually directing Deckard's actions is the impossible capabilities of the Esper computer to create space and traverse the space with vision as if a person were present in the scene of the photo itself. Deckard uses the Esper computer to pan through the three dimensional space of the room where the photo was taken-- the ultimate technological collapse of time and space. The photo taken at a specific time and space is brought to life, because the computer actually scans through the space of the room-- everything is still in focus as the initial photograph is microscopically blown-up. This is an aesthetically beautiful and comprehensible scene-- the computer literally walks Deckard through the room in the photo, the room somehow inanimately (and paradoxically) comes alive.

²¹ The photographs might belong to Deckard, and if they do they make Deckard out to be much older than he looks. We presume that this is possible in the future, particularly if a superhuman organic/machinic, artificially intelligent body can be created. Likewise, there is a possibility that the photos are shared with Rachel. Deckard is separated from his off-world wife-- the possibility that Deckard's world is utterly contrived is also possible as a sub-plot of the film. The photos may also belong completely to Leon, which supports the idea that photography=memory, which is why Leon collects old photographs, regardless of initial emotional attachment.

Deckard scans the room to the degree that he enters the hypothetical space beyond the surface of a convex mirror placed on the opposite wall of an adjoining room. As for the convex mirror, I certainly could not make my claim that a certain kind of technological subjectivity is guiding Deckard without the impossibility created by the film whereby the mirror "sees" the woman in the room-- it is a computer that identifies Zhora. Technology give technology away, technology foils itself-- tells on itself. This may also be the only 'hope' left in the film for viewers. Technology doesn't work together and if it does it has a human death drive, a self loathing that does not resemble human, but is human. The convex mirror is symbolically Deckard's eye, but more importantly, it is the eye of technology, the inner eye of the Esper machine, appropriately convex, because as we learn, Deckard may well be a replicant himself, he's part of technology. The computer magnification/blow-up images take Deckard's sight through a doorway, into the next room, and significantly, through the 'looking-glass' mirror on the opposite wall of the room whose entrance threshold Deckard has just surpassed. In the convex mirror, we actually see in detail the contents of the room. Through the convex mirror, Deckard's vision is further ushered through the virtual space of another mirror, which is the facing of a vestiaire cabinet. Through the mirror of the cabinet we see Zhora, one of the outlaw replicants, lying on a bed or chaise-longue. Her face is turned slightly to her right, exposing the tattoo of a snake on the left of her neck. Zhora, as the viewer learns latter in the film when Deckard goes to investigate Zhora's existence at a burlesque strip club, indeed has a tattoo of a snake on the left-hand side of her neck. This tattoo is crucial to identifying Zhora. In the convex mirror, we see clearly Zhora's face, and the tattoo that rests on her neck-- she is turned towards the optical enhancement machine actually exposing her neck in such a way that the tattoo is distinctly visible. Deckard asks for a hard copy, but the image we witness on the screen is not the image that Deckard is given as a hard copy indicating that the optical enhancement machine, the Esper computer, is actually leading Deckard on, identifying Zhora for Deckard, leading Deckard to kill Zhora, rather than Deckard himself being able to determine who he should kill as part of his investigator/assassin job.

PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE MIND

Photographs are frozen possibilities; there is always the potential for animation. Ridley Scott articulates this well in his 1982 movie, **Blade Runner**. There is a particular scene where Deckard enters the "space" of the photograph using a computer. The computer magnifies and augments images in the photograph-- the viewer suspects with computer

enhancement even though no signs of computer enhancement are availed-- as if a viewer could walk into the perspective of the room which the photograph has captured.

Deckard spots a body (and later we learn that the 'body' is a replicant he is responsible for killing) in a convex mirror that reflects the otherwise closed or invisible contents of a full room. This is a fascinating game of the photograph whereby the photograph is more than simply the two-dimensional plan; what Hal Foster calls an informational mode. An informational mode however is still not exactly the obdurate matter it indexes, yet we have to question how the photograph can still yield as much information as to allow one to see through walls and around corners. Deckard makes a reproduction of the image he sees in the mirror. Deckard can now carry the image on his person, like a telepneumatic tube to the actual location of the replicant-- the site of the killing.

Photographs carry the information of objects-- they represent items at a specific range of movement in an always continual lineage of time; this in light of the notion that time can never be actually framed; its framing is always a surrogate, like the photograph. While it is assumed that no matter how influential the electronically suspended sphere of relations will become or how advanced its synthesis of the senses to the degree that it actually takes over the sense (the cyborg) will be. (. . . I hesitate to say, "how advanced electronic control will become") there is always an assumption that there will be a need to interpret-- to survey a photograph for information. Our society's eyes and individuals' eyes have been so well trained in the visual that to argue that all images need interpretation can forward strong opposition. In addition to the stance that all images need to be interpreted there is a politically active stance that another postmodern medium, television, is already at work ensuring that you see selectively, and that your sight becomes collapsed into a Gestalt of uncritical vision-- all television can be looked upon as animation: slice per slice. TV brings together fragmented realities into visual aggregate-- either to sustain the narrative function the Western world has been schooled in from the indistinct beginning of culture, or simply to capture the attention of a broad range of views to homogenize the audience, and reciprocally, portray one's subjectivity with greater success. In America, where the pyramid media system quickly becoming a pancake via the application of soft technologies and low-level hardware, coupled with the fact that America itself is a video playground: to compete for the audience with 499 other channels means you really have to toast your program well. Everyone in America is making a movie.

In the drive for the cyborg, it is assumed that the senses will no longer be required at all. This is not simply the dream of Hans Moravec, the surgery of television is successfully extracting any critical edge against what we see because of its continuous frame, which is moreover invisible and infinitely perpetual (television never really had a frame at all because, of course, electricity, like light, is both particle and wave). Technology is not simply ordering our sense, it is removing our senses. Baudrillard bridges this topic by saying the "ob-senity"-- the absorption of all forms of stage or performative edge-- is simply the saturated view. Because the spectacle is completely gone, all things, all objects become rhetorical, symbolic capital, and therefore, become capitalist.

Perhaps the taking over of the sense by technology will release us from desire-- however Avital Ronell says of drug addiction that there is a current "crisis of immanence:"

drugs, it turns out, are not so much about seeking an exterior, transcendental dimension-- a fourth of fifth dimension-- as they are about exploring fractal interiorities. This was already hinted at by Burroughs' "algebra of need."

We do not know how to renounce anything, Freud once observed. This type of relation to the object indicates an inability to mourn. The addict is a nonrenouncer par excellence, yet addiction does establish a partial separation from an invading presence. [Ronell, p. 62]

This statement indicates that there is a bodily issue to resolve, namely one of surfaces. Surfaces are about barriers to sight; what is barrier to sight is fire for the imagination. It can be deduced that surfaces are about seeing (perhaps the 4th or 5th dimension)-- like the Bauhaus innocent eye theory of Laszlo Moholy-Nagy and Josef Albers, and today, in the design work of Peter Eisenman. The kind of 3-D modeling that Eisenman once did with cardboard models and drawings is now enacted on the computer screen. This way of designing reduces architecture to a two-dimensional, atemporal surface and the agent to a subject flickering instantaneously on its surface; sometimes referred to as 'liquid architecture'. [Kazys Varnalis]

Trying to renounce technology is like trying to break addiction. It is not the object of addiction but the need to need (a sort of survival tactic), the craving to crave (to avoid boredom perhaps), the desire to have desire (which may be life itself), that is impenetrable. This relegates the object to a secondary item of our techné, and not an interactional consciousness.

Desire is beyond the object of desire; it is what Ronell calls the "hallucinated plenitude of pure communication, a kind of hinge on transcendental telepathy." [Ronell, p. 67] Like all media of science fiction, fascination with telepathy, fascination with being on drugs, is a necessity of desire. In discussing the nature of telepathy, one cannot but hark back to mysticism and the soul. Describing Flaubert's character of Emma Bovary at a point in her life when she discovers "God's insufficiency" [Ronell, p. 67], turning to drugs, Ronell says,

... the artisan of one's own body, fiddling around, experimenting, creating new parts or treating the psyche like an organ, a sick organ. One became a maniacal bricoleur of one's own body! It wasn't clear then whether the body was private property or not, whether the authorities could legislate zoning ordinances, or whether pleasure and liberty were values freely exercised upon a coded body. [Ronell, p. 67]

One scenario of the technologization of society is that once the soul has been subsumed by technology, it is easier to control: you are at the will of electricity and ordinances. The soul of silicon is the ultimate capitalization-- try and identify which Devil you are selling your soul too: Tyrell, IBM, Xerox, or Microsoft?

The link between the electronic and drug cultures is compelling in part because drugs constitute a place of non-knowledge that has attracted the crudest interventions, and also because there has never been a war on drugs that is not carried by another type of drug (religion, patriotism, oil, TV). Where one can study the question of technological addiction via the positive technologies, including media and the machine, it is perhaps timely now to raise questions about the structure of addiction as such. [Ronell, p. 61]

For Baudrillard cultural 'significance' is useful only for reproduction and self-reproduction: the ability to decipher difference is removed resulting in a totalizing construction of society which relies upon copies or rather, fakery. Baudrillard's target is the domination of subjectivity by the mediums of human interaction that technology has availed people in contemporary Western society (third order subjectivity). The same technological pattern that exists for telephones, TV, film, etc., is also at work in more tacit ways when applied to the consumption of drugs. The technological pattern of medium manipulation can be identified in medicines and drugs. The "pharmakon" is the conflation of meaning that occurs when drugs (poisons) are made to symbolize medicine. Gregory Ulmer discusses this intersection of drugs and medicine in this way:

... , the mushroom turns out to be the best emblem yet of what Derrida calls the "pharmakon," a potion or medicine which is at once elixir and poison (borrowed from Plato), modeling what Derrida calls (by analogy) "undecidables" (directed against all conceptual, classifying systems.) The undecidables are:

unities of simulacrum, "false" verbal properties (nominal or semantic) that can no longer be included within philosophical (binary) opposition, but which, however, inhabit philosophical opposition, resisting and disorganizing it, without ever constituting a third term, without ever leaving room for a solution in the form of speculative dialectics (the pharmakon is neither remedy nor poison, neither good nor evil, neither the inside nor the outside, neither speech nor writing (Positions, 43))

Ronell, using Heidegger as a theoretical guide, claims that *der Drang*, (hooked pulsion), dissolves responsibility for what is said in a communicational/informational system.

The structure of addiction, and even of drug addiction is particular, is anterior to any empirical availability of crack, ice, or street stuff. This structure and necessity are what Flaubert discovers and exposes. A quiver in the history of madness (to which no prescription of reason can be simply and rigorously opposed), the chemical prosthesis, the mushroom or plant, responds to a fundamental structure, and not the other way around. [Ronell, p. 69]

Ronell asks: "What do we hold against the drug addict?" [Ronell, p. 69]

Drug addiction-- addictions in general perhaps (relationships, coffee, cigarettes, chewing gum. But what if ritual and habit. Cannot brushing one's teeth become addiction, impulse, paranoia, pathology? And what of the addiction to family, to groups, to friends, to jobs, to routine itself.)-- achieves a self-reflexive stance with as noble an altruism that humanistic thought could have ever wished for. It's precisely about inner alterity, and the slave to addiction is a resistance to fourth order subjective imposition that rejects what is forced upon oneself by making oneself repulsive, uninhabitable, and easily camouflaged as a bricoleur allowed to engage in the rubble while holding fast to principles of a higher aesthetic.²²

²² The slave needs context because his/her actions are always reaction... there is no need to invent what needs to be structured or organized. The slave is the bricoleur because he/she deals with what is at hand, avoiding, or rejecting that which can be created-- such as crisis or threat. The bricoleur already senses threat, and deals with it in a formalist way. By contrast, the noble is the engineer-- creating crisis as to affirm self-importance, status.

Perhaps it was in irony that Nietzsche could so closely describe the priestly class as bricoleurs, adherers of rules of thumb that distinguish. What, in terms of Lévi-Strauss' 'engineer' armed the priestly class: the representation of purity and impurity was a plan or map of materials-- certain materials are out of the question, 'profane'.

...: all the concepts of ancient man were rather at first incredibly uncouth, coarse, external, narrow, straightforward, and altogether unsymbolical in meaning to a degree that we can scarcely conceive. The "pure one" is from the beginning merely a man who washes himself, who forbids himself certain foods that produce skin ailments, who does not sleep with a dirty woman of the lower strata, who has an aversion to blood-- no more, hardly more! [Nietzsche, GM, p. 468]

DRUGS AS IMAGINARY CAPITAL

This idea of suspension is like investment. The same kind of obdurate capital invested to convert obdurate capital to symbolic capital has pushed thinking itself into a range whereby the equation of this kind of modern investment no longer correlates. Avital Ronell has identified this by claiming that "Heidegger discovered that we latecomers" are addicted to addiction. [Ronell, p. 59] What has occurred then in an existence saturated by symbolic capital is a re-investment in imaginary capital. Imaginary capital, the willingness to become a fourth order subjectivity, is exemplified through the clearly dependent relationship of science fiction literature, art, film, and television to technology itself. Constance Penley's work on NASA and its use of the set and characters from Star Trek as a didactic and propaganda ploy for tourists (that is to say, the whole of the American population) clearly illustrates the ironic use of fiction to fuel reality-- a reality that carries a financial budget much larger than most non-Euro-American countries of the world. In short, we are addicted to our imagination, and hence addicted to our subjectivities.

Ronell links this dependence of the imaginary with the drive for human subjective expression via impersonal technology, the dividing line between second and third order subjectivities. This dispersion of the body and senses is a sensory overload equal in potency with the kind of drugs that really "fuck you up".

If the literature of electronic culture can be located in the works of Philip K. Dick or William Gibson, in the imaginings of a cyberpunk projection or a reserve of virtual reality, then it is probable that electronic culture shares a crucial project with drug culture. This project should be understood in Jean-Luc Nancy's and Blanchot's sense of *désœuvrement*-- a project without an end or program, an unworking that nonetheless occurs, and whose contours we can begin to read. [Ronell, p. 61]

What appears to be rules of thumb are disguised precepts for purity-- the domain of the engineers who cannot produce without producing first the composition of a product. In this way, humbleness is only the exterior, destruction of a desiring-machine kind camouflaged. Nietzsche continues:

When the noble mode of valuation blunders and sins against reality, it does so in respect to the sphere with which it is not sufficiently familiar, against a real knowledge of which it has indeed inflexibly guarded itself: in some circumstances it misunderstands the sphere it despises, that of the common man, of the lower orders;.... [Nietzsche, GM, p. 473]

The difference between the noble and the slave, the engineer and the bricoleur carries with it the commonly held perils of 'civilization'. The creation of morals is clearly the creation of organ-machines, desiring-machines; as Jeff Koons, the contemporary American artists insists, "abstraction and luxury are used as the guard-dog to the upper class." [Koons, 1991] The desiring-machine of the art gallery is the guard-dog of the bourgeois.

Ronell carries this claim through using one of Heidegger's guiding figures to the study of technology, Ernst Jünger, whose own book is about the "possible limits of dying and getting high". [Ronell, p. 61] Ronell establishes a link between the imaginary capital of contemporary Western Culture-- an imaginary that ranges from tech-topias to melding with the filth-- and drugs much the same way I would claim that there has been a transformation of intimacy due to the current dependency (addiction) on mediation between people through electronic control and speed; likewise, our stakes are placed (and thus suspended) in this mode under the assumption of perfection, exactness of execution, reduction of responsibility and expectation of marvel at what our inventions can do for us.

It is not simply the metaphor of electronic fragility and the anxiety that goes along with not having access to computers, technology, addictions to our CDs, radio, television (and on a more tribal level: gum, coffee, cigarettes, food, and sex; and on a more invisible level. "disposable" products, fashion, pollution, cleanliness, speed, and "bells and whistles"-- is there ever a complete list of addictions?).

The rhetoric of objective absorption by Baudrillard and others is a misreading of the drive to open a cybernetic space. Cyberspace is, in line with advertising and art, a "mode of production". The ease of manipulating image allows for an ease to govern human perception. In the mode of image manipulation, Amsterdam artist Inez van Lamsweerde stirs the bounds of body and image, representation and seduction. [See **Image Appendix, pp. 17-21**] As will be discussed later, in photographs where mutation constitutes uncanny artifice-- mannequin faces are assimilated with human bodies, bodies are re-articulated--, van Lamsweerde achieves the potential for "post-criticism" outlined by Gregory Ulmer.

As has been discussed, autopoiesis dictates that subjectivity is not controlled by the user, but lies in the user's choice of communication. Drugs and electronic media construct and totalize subjectivity outside of the user where notions of the sensorium are lost. Phenomenological considerations of experience or presence have limited influence over 'choice' when there is a sensorial vacuum. The objectivity of the experience relies on imagination. A human might as well be conscious in silicon as it is in a body; certainly for Marvin Minski, consciousness is as good as being a rock. Any somatic effect, is completely subjective. Even when the design of analysis is reversed upon the body in an environment of electronically suspended relations, the result is still one where the object

and objectivity do not have place, but exist as piths of manipulation, mutation, sense (as in understanding) and ideology (fourth order subjectivity).

Van Lamsweerde's works can be looked upon as a direct correlation to the nature of interaction in electronic suspension: bodies take different and surreal forms, faces can be replaced at will, codes and systems do not necessarily have to correlate, origin of production must be relinquished. Similarly, the works can characterize the seduction of the uncanny and ease at which the image alone determines the affective cravings of a Western philosophical tradition whose hegemony has, through absorptive technologies, usurped the senses in such a way as to divide sight from touch, sight from taste, need from value. production from labour, digestion from food, and fixates on coding the world so as to be philosophically impenetrable and hermetic.

Perhaps it is the predictability of images-- the notion that once rules are learned, there is comfort in that predictability-- and disruption of that predictability which makes van Lamsweerde's images seductive and repulsive, prognosticative and unfettered. Veiled communication-- the faceless, face-full body-- has opened a range of space in which anonymity is mandatory and the audience is wide. Photographs, example and result of technology, can be summed by the relationship between the camera and the object-- what lies in-between is what theory recovers to retain a flow of reality, a conviction, a continuum from and between nature and culture. From nature which has a subjectivism that is not directly communicative, to a culture whereby all things are subjective; the new nature-- electricity.

2001: A Space Odyssey (1968)

Stanley Kubrick's 1969 film is a chronology of the rise and future of humanity. In a kind of Foucaultian rupture, humanity is spontaneously evolved by a consistent and omnipotent gift from what one can only determine to be God, represented in both significant transition in the film by the presence and presentation of a large black monolith. The beginning of the film traces the discovery of a tool and weapon -- a bone-- in prehistoric man. From this prehistoric narrative the viewer is thrust into what, at the time represented the year 2001: space travel is as common as commercial flight, telecommunications are seamless, a polite peace pervades the earth and space, the moon is fully occupied and mined. Perhaps with a taint of irony, the pattern of society is high-modernism in the American tradition. The narrative develops around the discovery of a black monolith buried just under the moon's

surface, and an official of the United States Government is sent to investigate. Kubrick may yet be correct in this portrayal of this official or bureaucrat-- the government is corporate, and the discourse is likewise. The third sub narrative is introduced to the viewer as a parting gesture to an examination by officials of the black monolith: this is where the viewer is introduced to the HAL 9000 computer. HAL is the onboard computer of a space ship sent on a secret mission to Jupiter. Over the course of the voyage, two astronauts occupy the ship, three others wait in cryogenic stasis for their arrival on or around Jupiter. During the course of the voyage the HAL 9000 computer turns on its crew under the pretext that the mission itself is, "too important", and kills four of the five astronauts. The last living astronaut, Dr. Bowman, manages to elude HAL's control over the ship, and disables HAL. Once HAL has been shut-down, the viewer is plunged into a dream sequence where Dr. Bowman ages, dies and is reborn as a floating fetus in space: a kind of cyclical dawn-of-man epic.

There are a series of complex and important questions that arise from this film, the hypothetical presentation of artificial intelligence being only one theme. HAL is a watermark of human invention, and Kubrick's story, based on Arthur C. Clark's short story, The Sentinel, is the story of artificial intelligence gone mad-- fitting for a science fiction film aesthetically stylized more than any other science fiction film previous to it. The same problem that confronts an analysis of the body faces AI development: is it a body or a brain?

Stanley Kubrick has been planning the filming of **AI**, another science-fiction film with AI as its subject. This film will most certainly, if produced, be an analog to **2001**. Kubrick has always been interested in the possibilities of AI, and the ramifications are pragmatically important. "One of the fascinating questions that arises in envisioning computers more intelligent than men is at what point machine intelligence deserves the same consideration as biological intelligence," Kubrick mused in a 1971 interview for the book Stanley Kubrick Directs. Kubrick continues:

Once a computer learns by experience as well as by its original programming, and once it has access to much more information than any number of human geniuses might possess, the first thing that happens is that you don't know what it's doing or thinking about. You could be tempted to ask yourself in what way is machine intelligence any less sacrosanct than biological intelligence, and it might be difficult to arrive at an answer flattering to biological intelligence. [Kubrick in Parisi, p. 133]

Here Kubrick contemplates the possibilities of multiple subjectivities. One wonders how these multiple 'geniuses' might get along inside one being; if it does not already adequately describe the present state of any one human mind. If, for a moment, we indulge Kubrick in his flight of fancy, it is important to consider where in the hierarchy of superior/inferior does the human stand, and what, indeed, does a human become in opposition to an intelligent machine. Do humans retain superiority or establish an equality to a being of much superior intelligence? Again, one can't help but imagine that this being would be completely useless, deadlocked by its own contradictions. This result might make biological intelligence all that much more valuable. Simplicity is clearly bliss in certain cases when the thinking process verges on the only-Godlike-imaginable. However, postulated, allowing Kubrick this indulgence does raise specific questions about human slavery and submission. This complex, purely confident being would certainly be a handful for humans. Would it hold in its values things which are human? Would it be human? Would it also show such elements of human-ness that sometimes make humans unlikable, 'weak', deadly, unbearable? More importantly, would the human become slave to the 'machine' or would the machine remain loyal to the wishes of the human as has been discussed regarding desiring-machines? Where does this impressive 'brain' exist? Would the body be redefined according to the mechanical elements humans bring together to impress the creation of subjectivity or agency? Clearly, there are some who say that such an entity, a multiple-genius, would not be able to exist at all without a body. One is tempted to ask: if a multiple-genius so claimed by Kubrick develops out of human endeavor, what body would it, itself, chose to inhabit? Kubrick's body? A being so smart it can choose its own shell is currently science fiction, and perhaps horror. However, it is not so far fetched. Indeed plastic surgery is a small attempt at choosing one's own shell. Clearly there is a choice made when one undertakes plastic surgery, or surgery necessitated by medical standards.²³ One chooses to partake in what is offered as medical solutions for problems of pain or malfunction. Yet, humans are left to imagine and contemplate what body one would choose to inhabit for the sake of aesthetics or preservation. Certainly a multi-genius would not be so stupid as to choose a human body— volatile, vulnerable, constantly in flux, requiring diverse needs such as a variety of foods, love, affection, encouragement, advice, etc. The list is lengthy and not always continuous from moment to moment. An AI being would chose a vessel to reside which is eternal and without maintenance: electricity is too fragile a state to contemplate that anyone intelligent would chose to depend. Perhaps.

²³ See: BALSAMO, Anne. "On the Cutting Edge: Cosmetic Surgery and the Technological Production of the Gendered Body". *Camera Obscura: A Journal of Feminism and Film Theory*, 28. pp. 206-237.

ironically so, a black monolith stone representing artificial intelligence in **2001: A Space Odyssey** is a realistic option. Clearly there would also have to be possibilities to react, to move, to impress ideas upon the world in some way-- it would need a body technique to initially express its dormant, first order subjectivity. How would this be done necessarily? Electricity has finite limitation of imposition on the real world. Would this AI being create a completely artificial world? Besides, it might have all experience of this world wrapped up in a memory bank, and likely, if it too were anticipator of the needs that it found worthy, it could construct an economy of replication. It would only need to experience love once, hate once, sickness once, etc. This being would be smart enough to make certain that once one's needs are met, it should be easily replicatable, without having to seek any similarities in the world. I venture to guess that this being which Kubrick contemplates would be so cerebral that it would not need to communicate in any way whatsoever. Again, the black monolith is the satirical representation of intelligent life.

A more important question should be, if flesh and computers are synthesized, than what possibilities arise for the master/slave dialectic? Do humans conjoined with computers make that hybrid less or more human?

Desiring-machines are binary machines, obeying a binary law or set of rules governing associations: one machine is always coupled with another. The productive synthesis, the production of production, is inherently connective in nature:.... [D+G, AO, p. 5]

HAL not only has a twin, who confirms 'his' error-- rather giving a clue to the viewer that HAL may not be what he appears, and in this sense the twin computer indicates a flaw: anticipating HAL's plot to kill the ship's crew members-- but significantly, HAL and his twin are self-reproducing. They are responsible for spawning other HAL 9000 computers. Indeed HAL's desire is elsewhere, which is precisely why HAL's motives cannot be confirmed by his binary twin. Desiring-machines are organizing entities, they encompass a support network that presumes the existence of that which they desires. In Kubrick's **2001: A Space Odyssey**, the on-board computer system, HAL, is a desiring-machine whereas the foetus that ends the film is a body without organs. The obvious reason the foetus is a body without organs is its pure symbolic, narrative existence in the film: it floats in space and is a conceptual stance. While all things are possible in the imagination, even the least skeptical would not accept as believable the survival, let alone peculiarities of a floating foetus in space. As a symbolic gesture there is much at stake. The foetus is contained in the round womb, its round head likewise mirroring stars, moons, and planets

in space, those autonomous objects in space that seem to conform to design conceptions of all matter: spheres in space, which appear to have no connection to each other but indeed relate in ways not yet standardly conceived or believed.

Certainly the Lady of Thebes poses many barriers to penetration. Museum display has placed her in a glass womb of sorts. Of practical significance is the barrier that has been constructed around her which consists primarily of a curatorial staff, a natural history museum, and a glass presentation cabinet that limits access; an observer is only able to see her under weak lighting. Her preservational barriers intervene: she lies in a sarcophagus, is wrapped in the process of preservation by both cloth and pitch. A viewer of this spectacle does not have access to a genuine history, nor will-- the assumption however is always that there is some kind of genuine story. The second order subjectivities that preserve her existence either by design or by happenstance project an air of precise subjectivity: the spirit of the Lady of Thebes, the ghost of the Lady of Thebes, etc. Another significant barrier to penetration is our inability to name her, to clearly identify her living reality. Without recourse to the papyrus document-- the Egyptian Book of the Dead that rests between her bound legs-- we are helpless to identify her. She denies us the ability to name, unlike the curators who, by naming her the "Lady" of Thebes, have valorized her by enthusiastic association with nobility.

Her skin has been preserved-- her organs have literally been removed in this process-- preserved on their own in vessels inside the tomb. These organs accompany the body inside the tomb as "nonproductive stasis" [D+G, p. 9] , because they also accompany her to the Netherworld.²⁴ The body without organs does not have desires which assume to be met, and for this reason the body without organs has no consensus, no community of mutual agreement-- it is anti-cultural, antisocial. By contrast, the desiring machine is a machine because it is constructed to operate autonomously. This is clearly the flaw of artificial intelligence: perpetuity with impunity and reliability is not human. These are imbedded assumptions of such fictionalizations of artificial intelligence as Ridley Scott's **Blade Runner** and Stanley Kubrick's **2001: A Space Odyssey**. Kubrick recognizes that the foetus is a potent rationalization of Deleuze and Guattari's body without organs: symbolically scientific and organic at the same moment. A foetus that is contextualized by

²⁴ One might note that the concept of the body as temple is not particularly obscure. Mormonism has overt rules of bodily care in the name of the dwelling of God; predictably, this is primarily a privilege of the male body.

the incomprehensibility of space and its infinite expanse alludes to the reality that our consciousness exists in a paradox of embodiment and dislocation.

Desiring machines are to be set in motion with a confidence that they will perform or fulfill the desires of the perpetrators. They are not 'extensions of man' as Deleuze and Guattari state. [D+G, p. 9] Desiring machines are complete separations of the body. They are intended to operate with anonymity and autonomy; only responsive to human interjection. The body without organs exists as a resonate to the desiring machine-- a valueless entity that cannot be ignored yet demands no attention.

Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the desiring machine is a severed extension of the body [D+G, p. 10], and as such, it is anti-productive because it imposes a totalitarian social order that jeopardizes alternative political and psychic positions, reformulating possible alternatives by making alternative answers incomprehensible. The desiring machine is an ironic invention because it induces the accumulation of capital, while excluding a developmental rhetoric: a justification based purely on unquestionable need. That is why Deleuze and Guattari say of the desiring machine, "... it does not restrict itself merely to opposing productive forces in and of themselves. It falls back on (il se rabat sur) all production, constituting a surface over which the forces and agents of production are distributed, thereby appropriating for itself all surplus production and arrogating to itself both the whole and the parts of the process," [D+G, p. 10]

Solaris (1972)

Similar to **Blade Runner** and **2001**, the Russian science fiction adventure by Andrei Tarkovsky, **Solaris**, deals with a series of questions revolving around subjectivity, mind, memory, civilization, intelligence, etc. **Solaris** however has a more metaphysical feel. For example, the metaphysical nature of being is represented in the film by the difference between earth and space, artifice and natural beauty. One scene shows Kris, the main character, returning to a pristine earth from a space mission without realizing, as the viewer does, that the earth that he is experiencing is an illusion or deception.

Kris is a scientist chosen by the Russian space agency to travel to a science space station hovering over the planet Solaris. The Solaris space station has been cut off from communication with earth, and reports have surfaced that paranormal activities plague the scientific work of the small crew inhabiting the space station. Kris arrives to find his friend

Gibarian dead; the other crew members are fine, but the ship itself is disheveled and operations are clearly abnormal. Kris falls victim to the strange occurrences that have been blamed on the planet Solaris. In short, the space station Solaris is in a kind of time warp where humans, having a memory, materialize memory as if 'real'. Throughout the film it is the planet Solaris that is identified as the root of paranormal occurrences, such as strange apparitions that visit the space station from the memories of crew members-- these visitors are so real that they cannot possibly be manifestation of memory alone. Indeed, Kris, a psychologist, cannot help but be drawn into the psychological pain of his wife's suicide many years previous by her mysterious and living-flesh appearance on the space station. Hari, Kris' estranged wife, is both memory and reality.

It is the planet Solaris itself that is the primary victim of re-embodiment in the name of fourth order subjectivity. The planet has its own will, but is immune to and from influence. Even when the crew members of Solaris attempt to bombard the planet with an encephalogram from Kris' brain, the disturbances only seem to cease. The disturbances, hallucinations, time-shifts, unexplainable traumas that Kris and the crew experience emanate from the planet Solaris.

Upon exploration of the space station, Kris finds the body of Gibarian, a former working companion and friend. His body is frozen in a locker and a young woman walks in and out of the locker, supposedly accompanying the body.²⁵ Kris does not know if she is a ghost, an apparition or another crew member. Kris is only on the space station Solaris to observe, and therefore does nothing to correct the situation, even though he does not understand the existence of the woman who is associated with Gibarian's body. The viewer must deal with the ambiguity of subjective memory manifestation: since Gibarian is dead, the viewer assumes he cannot express his consciousness-- but does the young woman come from Kris' conscience or Gibarian's? Kris both accepts the death of his friend and the strange being that hovers over Gibarian's body. Gibarian is a kind of body without organs: frozen, dead, a result of the planet Solaris' psychic interference. But Gibarian does not die (suicide perhaps) without recording a message for Kris. Gibarian somehow knows that Kris will arrive after his death and leaves a video tape message for Kris to find in his ransacked quarters.

²⁵ Like the other examples presented (the Lady of Thebes, the frozen prehistoric man in **Horror Express**, Gibarian's frozen body places the flesh body in stasis, each representing third order/passive subjectivities.

Gibarian is re-presented as living by technology, he is 'resurrected' by technology. The technology in this case is so seamless that we assume Gibarian's spirit inhabits the computer that projects Gibarian's face and message. Admittedly, this challenges the hierarchy of subjectivity. Hari, likewise either returns, or comes back to life. She can never remain a corpse: she is doubtfully dead. It is more reasonable for Kris that Gibarian is dead because he is subjectively represented by technology; after all, Gibarian does not physically manifest, even though it is possible that Kris has memories of his friend, similar to those of his memories of Hari.

The ending of *Solaris*, where Kris returns to earth, to his father's home concurs with the thesis that culture (in this case science) is the sacred made worldly and earthly. According to Hyman, Tarkovsky may have used Stanislaus Lem's science fiction, but the intent was purely Tarkovskian "prophetic vision": "Crucial is the film's new ending with Kris's return and submission to his father." [Hyman, p. 54] If this is only seen as a metaphor for a simple vision of man being conquered by nature, Hyman resolves any uncertainty:

The space journey of Lem's novel is now enclosed, as a kind of dream core, within the sequences of earth; and the planet Solaris becomes...., essentially a metaphysical dimension, the location of an oceanic love. [Hyman, p. 54]

In this case, the oceanic love (BwO) is the return to the father: the condemnation of "this mechanical world of hardware and radiation." [Hyman, p. 55] One must remember however that Deleuze and Guattari have made clear demarcations regarding the Oedipus. As Kris' father states, 'earth has adapted itself to men like you but at a heavy price.' That price is selfhood-- Kris himself not only loses Hari, he also loses memory of her. His memories now include the Hari of Solaris. Kris' desires and sorrow for the death of Hari seem to be uncontrollable, a return to the father as fetish, as punishment for having been the cause of Hari's suicide. However, this is not quite the case, because what Kris returns to is the earth, the breath of nature, the BwO that is earth. He does not know it, but the viewer of the film is aware that Kris is still in a dream state-- being influenced by his desires, completely unaware of the manipulation that is taking place. The world mutates for him according to his desires-- he desires the chastisement that he receives from his father, to erase his oblivion about the death of Hari. Throughout the film we witness no significant emotions from Kris; he is the positivist in disguise.

The price paid to have the earth adapt to a man "like" Kris, is not simply an ecotopic/PC call for rules to the game, it is the sacrifice of human interaction-- a trade off of humanity

for heaps of scrap, for desiring-machines, for selection of varied material subjectivities. As Hyman discusses, several polarities evolve from the film: garden/city, organic/inorganic, humanistic/anti humanistic. [Hyman, p. 55] However, the fabricated resolution of the film whereby Kris returns to earth and to his father is a return to the mortality of earth where Kris can see as his father, "how we have aged". ²⁶

Kris's father inhabits an anachronistic world, of protest and nostalgia for the past (I dislike innovation) with a horse in the garage, the car beside it half-covered with hay, and a gas balloon moored to the roof. [Hyman, p. 55]

Hyman's knowledge of film method and filmic symbolism allow him to grant Tarkovsky the status of visionary: "in Tarkovsky . . . , there is a serious intent; the essence of this kind of film is that the spectator should be forced to undergo a confrontation with mystery, to acknowledge the uncharted." [Hyman, p. 54] Hyman takes this a step further by suggesting Kris' redemption, his return to earth, his escape from his consciousness. I read this as something akin to the experience of Kurtz in Joseph Conrad's **Heart of Darkness**, and F.F. Coppola's **Apocalypse Now** (1979) where the Kurtz of the novel finds the Kurtz of the film!-- he finds himself. Martin Sheen's heart attack on the set of **Apocalypse Now** in the Philippines, his act of rage against his own image in a mirror, and the emergence of his camouflage--made--up face reflecting against the mirror--still water of the river he has traveled to kill Kurtz are all clearly examples of self--meeting--self. In **Solaris**, Kris confronts his organic self only after he has brought his memory to both life and death.

. . . in the film's mysterious opening sequence, as Kris stares down at plants slowly waving underwater, is... a foretaste of that "contact with the ocean" by which Kris will be redeemed, and which will entail involvement with all that is most soft, fluid, and in a cultural sense, primitive. [Hyman, p. 55]

Without reinventing ourselves (the cyborg?) we (humans) are (perhaps falsely) connected to our genetic and primitive past. It is controversial to suggest the experience of a relationship between the metaphysical and the obdurate world is a return to the reaches of

²⁶ Kris' father greets Burton after a long period of time since Burton has been to the house (a replica of Kris' great-grandfather's house) with a greeting and the words, "you can see how we've aged". Clearly there is connection with his words here to both the metaphysical elements of being and death, and to the uncanny aging of Burton. As we learn later in the film, since Burton arrived back on earth from his shocking experience near the ocean on Solaris, he has gone bald and gray. This is the mirroring of the BwO (BwO=the Planet Solaris=Burton's bald head=my MRI=my head).

what has always been thought to be human nature-- a recess hardwired in the brain that links humans to ape and animal alike (becoming-animal).

Darko Suvin, to his merit, is futuristic in his analysis of Lem's novel, *Solaris*. Suvin writes about the metaphysical properties of the novel, and thus it is certain that Tarkovsky had a clear and guiding message to construct his particular vision of the film. Writing in an afterword carried in Lem's novel, Suvin writes:

Lem's novel *Solaris* has several levels. It is a puzzle, a parable about human relations and emotions, and a demonstration that anthropocentric criteria and "final solutions" of the religious kind are inapplicable to the modern world. [Suvin, p. 218]

In tandem with the novel, Tarkovsky catches the feeling of silences and pauses in life that mimic thought. When Suvin invokes the secularization of life as a means for the decentering of human arrogance wrapped in 'final solutions' and religious, perhaps pious, conduct as 'inapplicable in the modern world' we are presented with what constitutes the inaccessibility of truly reinscribing life (active subjectivity) onto a dead being, a past subjectivity. Realizing this, the trick of third order subjectivity becomes clear. *Solaris* is, but not completely, a complex demonstration of the absurdity of anthropocentrism and the rigidity of orthodox positions (whether that be religion, science, bureaucracy, or everyday life), but it is more successful in showing the complexities of memory. Memory and perception is enough to question control--mongering and inflexibility which, for example, modernism and television have installed on human consciousness.

Darko Suvin is aware of the changes technology and generalized communication have offered to post-modern society. Commenting on Lem's novel *Solaris* in 1970:

The novel's parable level implies that such resurrection and contact is a materialist rather than a spiritual mystery, a matter of history and earthly people rather than of abstraction and heavenly stars. It draws its potency from some of the deepest life-affirming heresies about human relations in European history, from the tradition flowing through Gnostics and Joachimites to the warm utopian socialism of Fourier and Marx.

Most noteworthy, perhaps, this is a parable without reference to any known system (for example, the Polish cultural environment, the Bible or the sacred books of Stalin). The truth it teaches through its fable is an open and dynamic truth. Lem's major novels have at their cognitive core the simple and difficult realization that no closed reference system, however alluring to the weary and poor in spirit, is viable in the age of relativity theory and post-cybernetic sciences. (Suvin, p. 220)

Tarkovsky's film is important in this attempt to understand that the body does not necessarily have to be the human body, it is a conjoined body, the body that places subjectivity in the third and fourth order, a planet is a BwO-- bodies are relational. Perhaps sentimentally, what the relation between desire and memory extends is a 'caring' of existence, one not necessarily resolved by the afterlife or penance; a return to the garden is much like the return to dust of Golem.

While the film is not precisely anti-Soviet (Tarkovsky gives some of the principle characters English names, and has Burton drive through Tokyo's freeways) yet it is clearly anti-materialistic. In Kris's return to his father's garden are implied many of the radical perspectives familiar to us in the west,... , set as they are here within a deeply felt metaphysical. What Tarkovsky is surely saying at the end of *Solaris*, is that love carries with it the imperative to change society, to build a very different society than our own. [Hyman, p. 55]

Not only does the "deeply felt metaphysical" permeate the sheer pace and contemplative resistance to action of the film, along with Kris's return to his father's garden, Hari's construction of her own history through Brueghel's painting "The Hunters in the Snow" is exemplary of Hyman's thesis that society is more than the formalities of material and logistical existence-- Hari experiments with becoming-human. To return once again to Guattari:

The paths/voices of power and knowledge are inscribed in external referential coordinates guaranteeing that they are used extensively and that their meaning is precisely circumscribed. [Guattari, 1992, p. 20]

Guattari splits the first two axioms against the last (subjects) by claiming that the combination of self-reference, power and knowledge "territorialized" power [Guattari, 1992, p. 20] but deterritorialized knowledge-- making both power and knowledge redundant or zero-sum-- and furthermore allowing self-reflexivity leverage to be creative, productive, constructive, and valuable.

What has led to this "speculative cartography" is what has led in a generalized way to literacy: the invention of written language, the print press, and the will of God-- i.e., the force of religion and emotionally capitalizing orders of control. (The Roman Catholic Church, the mullah, the Order of Monks, etc.):

It is safe to assume that their various consistencies are supported by collective systems for "memorizing" data and modes of knowledge, as well as by material apparatuses of a technical, scientific and aesthetic nature. We can then, attempt to date these fundamental subjective mutations in relation, on the one hand, to the

historical birth of large-scale religious and cultural collective arrangements, and on the other, to the invention of new materials and energies, new machines for crystallizing time and, finally, to new biological technologies. It is not a question of material infrastructures that directly condition collective subjectivity, but of components essential for a given setup to take consistency in space and time as a function of technical, scientific and artistic transformations. [Guattari, 1992, p. 21]

Memorization in Modernism is distinct from orality and memorization. Orality is embodied-- it depends upon the blood life of social networks-- ironically termed tribal or described as clannish. Alphonso Lingis observes of various cultures around the world that group initiations, group subjectivities, are codified by marking the body of the individual by initiation; it is a trauma significant enough to be an embodiment intrusion equal to entering the dormant subjectivity of an individual. "He will be tattooed, scarified, perforated, circumcised, subincised, clitoridecomized."

It is by attaching the impulsive organs of the bodies of the clan to the earth that the social body constitutes itself. Primitive societies are not constituted by a pact among its members, but by an attachment to the earth; the tribe is a group that inhabits, and that hunts and gathers together on, the productive surface of the earth that is not divided and parceled out among them. It is in being marked-- in being tattooed, scarified, circumcised, subincised-- that these men constitute a society, a social body of socius. [Lingis in Boundas, p. 292]

Such developments of religious and cultural collective arrangements clearly portray "universalities" that define modernism. Time is embodied, not lineage or patrimoine. Progeny is no longer necessary-- one good example of this is that we humans have sent into space a Voyager probe which carries "human intelligence" but carries no human. While I have invoked the rise of plastic "memory" through the means of printing press and religious order, Guattari extends this development. The body is organic memory. This is why third order subjectivity relies on re-embodiment. If a monarch's dead body could not be preserved, the carving of the life-size body into stone-- a sarcophagus for example, or on a tomb stone-- was enough to threaten the continued existence (and hence wrath) of the monarch.

Three "ages" or epochs reflect three different "components" of modernism:

1.) the age of European Christianity, 2.) the age of capitalist abstraction or deterritorialization of knowledge and technique, 3.) and lastly, most seductively: the age of planetary computerization. Guattari is confident that the cure to modernist "insanity" is

computer dependent.²⁷ This may be unfortunate and is contrary to the intent of Andrei Tarkovsky and his science fiction film **Solaris** whereby earthly re-emergence is salvation:

With respect to the last point (re: planetary computerization), one is forced to admit that there are very few objective indications of a shift away from oppressive mass-media modernity toward some kind of more liberating postmedia era in which subjective assemblages of self-reference might come into their own. Nevertheless, it is my guess that it is only through "remappings" of the production of computerized subjectivity that the path/voice of self-reference will be able to reach its full amplitude. [Guattari, 1992, p. 22]

The publishers of Guattari's text have included an image from Andrei Tarkovsky's film **Solaris**, even though Guattari never mentions Tarkovsky in his text. [See **Image Appendix, p. 9**] The image shows Kris (the central character) listening to the words of his friend Gibarian on a pre-recorded video/tele-monitor message. Not only has Gibarian anticipated his impending death (Timothy Hyman refers to the recording as the "Gabaryan we meet only after death, in the suicide cassette he records for Kris" [Hyman, 1976, p. 54]) when he makes the message, but he is also aware that his good friend Kris will receive, indeed 'needs' to receive the recorded message in the image. While Gibarian's death may have been easy for Kris to decipher, it was more a case of premonition. Gibarian knew that Kris was to arrive on the space station Solaris to investigate its strangeness. By leaving an absent note, Gibarian defies the logic of third order subjectivity by anticipating Kris' arrival on the space station Solaris. Tarkovsky's tactical method of defying the logic of subjective schemata creates the metaphysical 'feel' to the film.

Gibarian is a dematerialized deterritorialized body. In a freezer-room of the space station Solaris, Gibarian's body lies as a reference to the freezing of time that mummification, computerization and digitization strive for: ice, and the coldness of the heroine addict. This in stark contrast to the liquid surface of the planet below. The suggestion that there is some distress in Gibarian's psyche is reflected in Tarkovsky's divergence from Lem's novel. Gibarian's consciousness seems to manifest even in death. When Kris investigates the room in which Gibarian's body lies, he sees a young girl looming by the body.

²⁷ In the way the Donna Haraway likens the body to the 1969 hypothesis by James Lovelock that the planet is a living organism (Gaia), Guattari feels that cultures are integrated systems, more accurately. Guattari claims that social systems are machines. [Haraway, 1995, p. xii] Culture for Guattari is a network of "collective apparatuses [equipment] of subjectification." [Guattari, 1992, p. 18] Thus, Guattari feels that **Power** = force that divides people, **Knowledge** = powers that force people to act according to a logic, and **Self-reference** (or selfish thinking/reflection = power that sustains subjectivity/position.)

Gibarian's visitor is ... changed from the book-- from a gigantic black woman to a pubescent girl-- and the motives for his suicide are never given: Satorius attributes it to cowardice, and Kris first to "hopelessness" and then to "shame". [Johnson and Petrie, p. 106]

Kris' mention of 'shame' opens the viewing interpretation to ideas of paedophilia. Gibarian could not bare his own realization of right and wrong.

Gibarian's single orifice is the monitor playing his message to Kris. His dead body is the precondition for passive subjectivity, yet, the film does not suggest that the video Kris hears and sees is anything but the authentic voice of Gibarian. The strangeness of the planet and space station leave plenty of room to believe that Gibarian is only partially dead. The body without organs bypasses even the idea of breathe. Gibarian is a body without organs-- organs extended by his premonition of death, his post-human video message to Kris, in unison with the body without organs that is the planet Solaris.²⁸

As most social theorists strive for some dynamic resolution, so too does Guattari contradict himself on his free-form theory with the aim to claim "we" are on our own way out-- we are on a "path" of emancipation.

... individual and social practices for the self-valorization and self-organization of subjectivity are now within our reach and, perhaps for the first time in history, have the potential to lead to something more enduring than mad and ephemeral spontaneous outpourings-- in other words, to lead to a fundamental repositioning of human beings in relation to both their machinic and natural environments (which, at any rate, now tend to coincide). [Guattari, 1992, p. 22]

²⁸ While it may be that humanity is striving for eternal life, just as in Ridley Scott's **Blade Runner**, "skin jobs" seek eternal/"more" life (or the fountain of youth), technology does not preclude forced obsolescence. The same is true for Michael Anderson's **Logan's Run** and George Lucas' **THX 1138**. In **Logan's Run** and **THX 1138**, the main characters discover that life can be lived above ground, in the world. Life and culture do not necessarily have totalizing socio-structural limitations. In the (anti-)utopia of **THX 1138**, THX 1138 (the main character's name and identity) is the object of cruel experiment by 1138's "mate", the scientific "mass" society that he is a member of, and some omnipotent, omnipresent 'artificial intelligence' which is stylistically both human and machine. In this science fiction scenario, people are regulated with chemical and media-- including such devices as a 'mind block' where subjects' minds are controlled or frozen by the electronic network controlled by other humans for the purpose of monitoring human 'production'. Slightly barbaric-- everyone is connected to the invisible despots body by the organs of cameras-- , slightly realistic, the viewer is witness to a social horror where the panopticon operates efficiently and effectively. While the film incorporates communistic principles of vertically organized relationships, the object of the society is to "buy, buy more now". 1138 is an innocent victim, resembling Camus' character in The Stranger where utopia and distopia collide.

Recall that the Shroud of Turin is a freezing of time. Is this Christianity's attempt to re-appropriate history? The Shroud has been scientifically analyzed for its authenticity by carbon dating of the cloth itself and the pollen imbedded in the fibers. As is clear, the massive effort of Christianity to retain the 'pure' subjectivity of the once earthly, living Jesus Christ requires the re-embodiment of Christ. The Shroud is an odd example, but not unlike the re-embodiment of subjectivity that takes place during mass. The 'body of Christ' offered at mass is a docile re-embodiment of Christ and God. Furthermore, it is disputable whether God is an entity, leaving a great deal of interpretive space for active subjective investment. Aquino's projection of the Lady of Thebes implies a similar artifactual relevance. God and the Lady of Thebes image relate in that subjective re-embodiment implies a bringing-of-life to death.

Christianity's central figure of power did not assert a direct, totalitarian-totalizing hold over the base territories of society and of subjectivity. Long before Islam, Christianity had to renounce its desire to form an organic unity. However, far from weakening processes for the integration of subjectivity, the disappearance of a flesh-and-blood Caesar and the promotion of a deterritorialized Christ (who cannot be said to be a substitute for the former) only reinforced them. It seems to me that the conjunction between the partial autonomy of the political and economic spheres proper to feudal segmentarity and the hyperfusional character of Christian subjectivity (as seen in the Crusades and the adoption of aristocratic codes such as the Peace of God, as described by Georges Duby) has resulted in a kind of fault line, a metastable equilibrium favoring the proliferation of other equally partial processes of autonomy. [Guattari, 1992, pp. 22-23]

Christianity mastered the concept of "deterritorializing" Christ by making Christ not only passive and peaceful, exemplary of benevolence, but a duplicate entity that resides both in heaven and on earth (or at least, once resided on earth in a human body). Traces of bodily evidence pervade Christian mythology-- the existence of preserved blood and hair for example. Christianity was successful on a vast scale because the singularity of a "flesh-and-blood Caesar" allowed the technological Christ-- the virtual body-- to de-necessitate organic unity. The body of Christ in the form of a Host could be consumed by anyone as long as he or she recognized Christ as the savior of his or her soul. The Host is a technology, both a technique of the body because it is literally consumed, and a technology that formulates third and fourth order subjectivity; for Christianity, God is everywhere and in everything. The substitution of the body by technology is a kind of colonization of the body. In contemporary Western society, the discreet pharmaceutical pill doubles meaning, much like the host in Christianity. The logic being that if one accepts the precepts of chemical control of the body, one accepts the pharmaceutical rhetoric of health. Those who

do not accept the precepts of chemical health, such as homeopath and naturopaths, are heretics.

FANTASIES OF THE BWO: THE KINGDOM

Pharmaceuticals are just one example of the ironic adherence to the scientific order that the deterritorialization of meaning provokes. The same scientific order is what suspends the rhetoric and humour of the 1994 Danish television series, **The Kingdom**, by Lars von Trier, a six part television mini-series in the 'spirit' of David Lynch's **Twin Peaks**. The story is a complex matrix of characters and personalities in Denmark's largest hospital, the Kingdom (Riget), a massive modern hospital in the heart of Copenhagen whose corridors are haunted by spirits of past and present misdeeds. Built upon the malfasant infliction of harsh labour in bleaching ponds that existed previous to the construction of the first hospital some one-hundred years ago, the site is "cloaked in a permanent fog" as it was when it was a clothe bleaching pond. The tension of this film transpires as the hospital starts showing 'cracks' in its rock hard scientific foundation. Predictably, this 'quake' erupts from a uniquely Danish form of Occult Humanism. The good caring doctors, one docile (Moesgaard), one a cocaine/whisky/supplies dealer (Hook), one an infatuated practical joker (Mogge), a female doctor whose accelerated gestation culminates in the birth of evil and history (Judith); versus the bad doctors: one Swedish pseudo-science-fascist (Dr. Helmer), one doctor convinced that science must be given its specimen at all costs (Dr. Bondo), a league of Mason-like doctors who support each other as any tribal culture would, and a female doctor who is blindly in love with the despicable Dr. Helmer. Rigmor looses her identity to anger when Helmer, in ironic 'blackness', exchanges his admirer's place on a shared holiday airline ticket to Haiti for a Haitian rat-laboratory aide. Helmer's motive is pure satire, the Haitian lab worker is contracted as a scout to find voodoo practitioners in the hopes that Helmer can use voodoo's power to avenge his manic hatred for the kind-but-docile head doctor of the Kingdom.

In **The Kingdom**, it is by cult and ritual of primitive, perhaps Viking-like community that science's denial of superstition is humorously twisted. The hospital's male senior medical staff are members of a ritualistic Masonic 'brotherhood' that barter for the needs of its members, most importantly their scientific and professional needs—the members transplant a cancerous hematoma liver into Dr. Bondo to avoid the ethical consequences of extracting a liver from a patient with a family unwilling to consent to offering the body to

medical research. Likewise, the doctor members agree to aide fellow colleague, Dr. Helmer, who is under investigation for a more-than-legitimate malpractice suit.

Erasmus could not have been more applicable to the effort Lars von Trier has made in *The Kingdom* to discredit the hermetic stance of science and medicine when he said, "the more ignorant, reckless and thoughtless a doctor is, the higher his reputation soars even amongst powerful princes." [Erasmus, p. 114] Dr. Helmer, chief neurologist and legitimate target of a malpractice suit, carries fame across the board, from the kids who hang-out in the hospital parking lot, waiting to steal the hub-caps of his Volvo car, to the Danish Minister of Health; Helmer goes to Haiti to practice voodoo instead of conducting a tour of the neurological department. Dr. Helmer's reputation soars throughout the kingdom, demonstrating how little human society has changed since Erasmus' time. Likewise, no character in *The Kingdom* escapes ambiguity, least of all the mentally compromised dishwashers in the basement of the hospital who, throughout the series, periodically disclose the impending plot. The "fools" all-knowing commentary makes the kitchen washing room objective highground, dwelling places of the amused gods.

When the Kingdom starts showing signs of paranormal decay, it is Mrs. Drusse, a washed-up crackpot psychic who senses the evil that looms. Drusse, whose son is a hospital porter, feigns hypochondriac-neurological illness to gain entrance to the hospital. It is she who makes contact with the victim-ghost in need of assistance, Mary, the film's one-of-many body without organs. Mary is child-ghost who has haunted the Kingdom unnoticed for years: her whispers, whimpers, cries, sobs, and small neck bell her only outlet of emotional expression is unheeded by the hospital workers. We meet Mary for the first time in the elevator shaft-- proximal to the neuropsych ward-- the ward where Helmer has performed a botched operation on Mona. Mona, now mute, the second body without organs, is Mary's mirror of/in reality. Mona too is part of the growing number of signs that indicate the evil that is rising from the ancient bleaching ponds: Mona 'bleeds' her red art therapy paint all over her hospital room, expressing Mary's pain vicariously.

As the viewer learns later in the plot, Mary is a formaldehyde-pickled BwO-child whose preserved body is a remnant of the misdeed inflicted upon her many years ago. Killed with cyanide gas at the hands of her biological father (a doctor at the hospital when it was first constructed), Mary rests docile, encapsulated in a glass tube that still rests in Dr. Bondo's office. But she does speak, not from her mouth but through her spirit which roams the

elevator shafts and corridors of Het Rigt-- the Danish National Science research hospital, gleaming with pride and technology.

Merely so many nails piercing the flesh, so many forms of torture. In order to resist organ-machines, the body without organs presents its smooth, slippery, opaque, taut surface as a barrier. In order to resist linked, connected, and interrupted flows, it sets up a counterflow of amorphous, undifferentiated fluid. [D+G, 1983, p. 9]

The torture that Mary experienced at the hands of her father cannot represent an oedipal form of torture that is not simply physical: she was taken from her mother under false pretense-- the cure for her tuberculosis--, tortured and killed by her biological father, the same doctor who was to have cured her illness, and perished in the pain of a cyanide gas cloud; chased to her death. Mary is not only a ghost, she is a BwO that resists from her floatation tube, its 'smooth, slippery, opaque, taut surface' supporting her upright body in gruesome stasis. The formaldehyde, a synthetic liquid of science for organic preservation, her counterflow of amorphous, undifferentiated fluid-- not to mention the blood that perpetually drips from her nose as a result of cyanide poisoning and the blood red paint that Mary's doppelgänger, Mona, spreads undifferentiated across her body, clothes, hospital bed, hospital floor, and to the walls of her hospital room. An equally important resistance is the whispers and moans Mary emits from her state of in-betweeness:

In order to resist using words composed of articulated phonetic units, it utters only gasps and cries that are sheer unarticulated blocks of sound. [D+G, 1983, p. 9]

Mona, the victim of Dr. Helmer's uncompassionate incompetence cannot speak either. She too is a body without organs, or at the very least, a body without a brain. And so the symbolic organic disembodiment continues throughout the film whereby subjectivity is not specifically a resident of the body, but rather an energy form or spirit capable of avenging misdeeds carried-out by malevolent humans who are coupled with science and technology. There are a series of other BswOs that demonstrate both the need for re-embodiment pronounced in fourth order subjectivity as well as demonstrating the pure rhetorical power that suspicion has when fourth order subjectivity employs the doubt that the dead are alive. The body from which Bondo takes a completely functionless liver to implant into his own body for his research keeps the hematoma liver alive (destroying his own healthy liver in the process, which, like Mary's body, is preserved in formaldehyde by his colleagues), a voodoo doll that represents Moesgaard for the purpose of Helmer's revenge, and Mogge, Chief Physician Moesgaard's intern doctor/son has his body devoured in a dream by other circadian rhythm research volunteers while he is being monitored as a subject in the sleep research laboratory. The film shows on a series of levels how subjectivity is imposed and

redirected in an obvious, yet humouristic manner; and clearly, it is a incisive gesture that is required to observe the often malign and absurd exportation of subjectivity that defined objectivism and culture.

"Not over my living body": the artist works of Inez Van Lamsweerde and Aziz+Cucher as resistance to subjective imposition.

The schematized logic of subjectivity uncovers what might be called, postmodern strategies of subjectivity. Third order subjectivity is an obvious rhetorical device in any era, but in the postmodern period, the subjective logic of third and fourth order subjectivity (culture) is challenged, not by technology, but by the reformulation of the body that subjectivity is bound to inhabit. The artistic works of Dutch artist Inez van Lamsweerde and American art team Aziz+Cucher are examples of resistance to overarching cultural imposition by bodily reformation. Their photographic works paradoxically tease the objectification third order subjectivity can and does impose (thereby placing subjectivity open for outside reinterpretation as a fourth order subjectivity) on humans. In their photographs, what is referenced is not what is meant. They create impossible objects, in this case, impossible beings to underscore the irony of subjective re-investment that technology creates.

Contemporary art in recent decades has been one of the vivid examples of this postmodern re-definition of the body. That re-definition is intended to challenge the absurdity of imbedding subjectivity onto the vulnerability of fourth order subjectivity, both on an individual and social level. Working within the assumption of 'body image', Simon Taylor claims that contemporary art has used the fragmentation of the body as a political stance "against societal repression and its institutional architecture."

Scatological assemblages, bodily fragments, and base materials-- dirt, grunge, and the traces of sexual difference-- have defiled the white cube of the gallery space, calling into question its ideological "neutrality" as a site encoded with a rhetoric of contamination. This body of production often incorporates what Lacan terms "imagos of the fragmented body," which is to say, "images of castration, mutilation, dismemberment, dislocation, evisceration, devouring, bursting open of the body." [Taylor, 1993, p. 59]

Again, the body is broken down, parcelized; the body is resisted for the sake of resistance against the possibility of objectification by impersonal technologies and the subjective imposition that passive or fourth order subjectivity is vulnerable to. The need for body images relies upon disembodiment of both third and fourth orders. Mark Johnson attempts to answer why images of the body are necessary to understand subjectivity in his book,

The Body in the Mind. His conclusion is simple: the body has not been represented in knowledge because philosophy agreed that the body was separate from the mind and that the body threatened reason. Johnson claims that images of the body are necessary because images organize knowledge. According to Johnson, "an image schema is a recurring, dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that gives coherence and structure to our experience." [Johnson, p. xiv] Johnson's project is to legitimate bodily experience on behalf of, and in the eyes of philosophy. While this is a noble endeavor, it misses the point. The body in some cases may better be accepted as uncontrollable, and unreasonable. Death-- inevitable on a bodily level-- is and may be unreasonable. More importantly recognizing the body's contribution to knowledge also identifies the collusion the body has played in cultural discipline-- a discipline that have often been blamed on the Cartesian mind/body split.

Johnson makes an effort to reaffirm the bodily contribution to rationality. He does this by claiming that mythologies are essential elements of human sensation. Basing much of his work on phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty), Johnson cites categorization, framing of concepts, metaphor, polysemy, historical semantic change, non-Western conceptual systems, and the growth of knowledge as challenges to the Objectivist stance. Johnson explains that human organization and categorization are rooted in a bodily understanding of the world. Thus, the way ideas are assembled depend upon the body's relation to the assemblage ('up' is 'more', etc.)-- this supports Mauss' thesis that the body technique does much more for subjectivity than offering a habitus; it in fact is a reflection of knowledge, just as much as a signpost of distinctions. Classical philosophy purged the body from rationality because the body was too fluid to generalize about standards, constants, definitives, universals, etc., and passed instinct over to the gaugable world of technology; not surprising then that assumptions are readily made about the agency of technology. Marike Finlay-de Monchy calls this pan-discursivism. While commenting upon the influence of horror on talk and psychoanalysis, Finlay notes that the rejection by her colleagues to acknowledge the severity of horror in relation to self-understanding is a professional misconception. The ability of social theorists to pass judgments without self-contextualization is a trick of Classical thought. Objectivists can readily make universal claims, and at the same time pass-off exceptions to "a diversity of intensities of experience". Finlay then asks:

...is this an adequate ontology? A question that the post-moderns themselves gloss over a little too quickly by making "discourse" the subjective agency.

Moreover, this is a discourse that.

...abstracts from the body, from the flesh which is the immediate material of horror: the horror-effect is not pan-discursivist but profoundly anchored in the being of the body. It is a body to flesh de-ontologisation. [Finlay-de Monchy, pp. 3-4]

Finlay has uncovered both the misconception that horror is functionless to the degree that anyone who experiences horror is simply in the wrong place at the wrong time, and that the postmodern 'subject' (the subject of horror) processes life so as to de-ontologise the body so that the body might become part of the material one used in the bricolage of subjectivity: to accept the horror of the body.²⁹ While flesh-less agency is efficient to describe function-- applying autopoiesis to social systems for example-- it is not an excuse for bodily closure (after all, autopoiesis was originally a concept of the organic world). Alternatively, the relationship humans have with technology is mythological. Johnson's goal is to put the 'body back into the mind' by analyzing how humans 'know' or understand, and tracing the accumulation of knowledge to bodily formats, encouraging at least an acceptance that a body changes over time and according to specific patterns of experience.

²⁹ Jacques Derrida in "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" writes that structuralism is the doctrine of structure over function. Structure has a resonance; this resonance organizes, and thus limits what Derrida has called "play". Significantly, structure does act as a function: that is why Derrida uses the term, "structuring structure"; there are clear parallels here with Bourdieu's 'habitus' and Deleuze and Guattari's definition of desiring-machines. Once it is established that structuralism refers to a process, Derrida defines 'presence' as the notion of a central and indisputable meaning. Derrida likewise examines the duality of any single conclusion thereby delimiting the hegemonic tension of presence, rupturing discourse. For example, within ethnography, Derrida examines "the incest prohibition": challenging this notion by fusing the basis of a universal prohibition is the difference between nature and culture. Furthermore, Claude Lévi-Strauss' concept of bricoleur (the articulation of what is at hand to be used) is itself myth. According to Derrida, the claim goes further than deciphering grammar, but extends to the claim that the bricoleur is allowed any thought, high or low. And for this reason, the bricoleur is someone who derails, or upsets, predicted balance in contrast to the craftsman, whose work warrants credit and reverence. As Lévi-Strauss writes, "in our own time the 'bricoleur' is still someone who works with his hands and uses devious means compared to the craftsman". [L-S, p. 16-17] Lévi-Strauss used the concept of 'bricolage' to explain primitive myth. The bricoleur is eclectic, creating from what is readily at hand and available. The bricoleur does not strive for content, bypassing scrutiny. Lévi-Strauss clarifies this concept in this way:

The 'bricoleur' is adept at performing a large number of diverse tasks; but, unlike the engineer, he does not subordinate each of them to the availability of raw materials and tools conceived and procured for the purpose of the project. His universe of instruments is closed and the rules of his game are always to make do with 'whatever is at hand', that is to say with a set of tools and materials which is always finite and is also heterogeneous because what it contains bears no relation to the current project, or indeed to any particular project, but is the contingent result of all the occasions there have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it with the remains of previous constructions or destructions. The set of the 'bricoleur's' means cannot therefore be defined in terms of a project. [L-S, p. 17]

Leslie C. Jones in, "Transgressive Femininity: Art and Gender in the Sixties and Seventies", uncovers the forces behind a surge of feminist art.

The initial source for "the ideas of women have" were those practices that had made women different in the past, as well as what made them different physically-- their bodies. For this reason, many women artists chose to valorize previously marginalized female art practices such as weaving, quilting, embroidery, and ceramics, as well as daily female activities-- ironing, cooking, and cleaning. Many also adopted vaginal iconography as a means to uncover and celebrate the biological source of woman's difference. [Jones, p. 35]

Not only does the fabricated feminine body technique provide the basis to express a more wide ranging cultural expression (again, parody), it also exposes the basis of difference in a frank and obvious way. Forced to turn to the vagina-- a specific body element-- to express 'difference', a variety of women artists reconfirm the thesis that individual body parts conduct symbolic force. There is appropriate reason for this choice in the case of women artists because for certain feminists, the only way to redefine 'woman' was to deconstruct notions of the female body that traditionally repressed. However, to singularize the vagina is equally monolithic as the phallus. Regardless, it took the specificity of the vagina to express what had been known long ago, but could never be spoken or recognized if expressed in traditional forms established for the feminine voice-- if it existed at all. The specificity of body parts-- in this case-- shocks, and in the process, creates, diverts attention. While this is an effective means of representation, it sets precedence for the continued partitioning of the body as art form. There may be no need for a reciprocal reconstruction of the body as a unitary entity.

The partitioning is not judgementally negative; clearly in the case of women artists working in the 1970's, this was an affective art. Today however, the body in pieces is the dominant (bodily) art practice where the body is concerned; it may well reflect a certain generalized sophistication in bodily understanding. While many artists parcelize the body, Inez van Lamsweerde and Aziz+Cucher take a singular body organ, the skin, and stretch it out to envelope signs of other organs. In parcelizing the body, they mutate the body.

Inez van Lamsweerde has three significant series that represent bodies in mutation. The first, **Thank You Thighmaster**, is a series of female nudes (**Pam, Kim, Joan, and Britt**) in various uncharacteristic, object like poses whose faces have been replaced by those of a mannequin's, and whose presumed skin and surface markers of sexuality (hair, nipples, pubis, vagina) have been seamlessly removed by the computer while at the same

time augmenting other aspects of surface signification, i.e., the skin has been oiled to give it a highly reflective and artificial sheen, one model wears a blue, synthetic-looking, wig. The faces have the expression of vacuity expected by the inertia of a mannequin. The title itself is a satirical reference to an exercise machine, the Thighmaster, which is an almost ubiquitous exemplar of hard-body 'madness' and guerrilla advertising, particularly on late night American television. In **Final Fantasy**, van Lamsweerde has photographed female children (**Caroline**, **Wendy**, and **Ursula**) in somewhat objectified poses-- they are all close to the surface they are resting on which is characteristic of adult erotica), referencing the double taboo of child pornography; each wears a pink, silk body suit, again accumulating the sentiment of adult sensuality/sexuality to the point that **Wendy** has her shoulder strap hanging down from the shoulder in a classic sexual stance. Each child has an uncanny expression due to the electronic super-imposition of an adult male's smiling mouth to the face. Likewise, the figures have been photographed through glass thereby creating strange geometric patterns on the shape of the body. Lastly, in an untitled series, van Lamsweerde has taken exaggerated beauty-bodies (**Sasia** and **Rebecca**), placed them in satin bathing-suits or lingerie (and compromising poses), and reversed their heads one-hundred-and-eighty degrees, having the face face backwards. These photos too are riddled with overly synthetic lighting and skin tones, but the overall effect is the same: confusion, repulsion, intrigue, wonder, shock.

Faith, Honor and Beauty (1992) is a photographic series by San Francisco art team Aziz+Cucher.³⁰ In ektachrome images, they have electronically eradicated clear markers of sexuality (pubic hair, penis, vagina, nipples, belly button) on classically posed nude adults (and one child) in life size photos. The images have been reformed by technology to smooth the lines of sexuality. What results are, in the cases where masculinity is still obvious, organic Ken dolls, holding their various phallic substitutions: a baseball bat, a portable computer, a M-16 automatic rifle, a video camera. These photos, seamless and clear, demonstrate the power of computers to transform images, and demonstrate the current instability of the image, and, in this case, the instability of male identity. In the case where the defining shape of a female body is obvious, the substitutions are rounded, oval, and patterned on the curvature of the female body. These include the rounded shape of a

³⁰ I first saw the images of Aziz+Cucher in January and February of 1994 at Dazibao (centre de photographies actuelles) in an exhibition presented as, "Un homme et son image". This exhibition brought together three series of photographs by men. An untitled series by Australian Jeff Gibson; works from the **Faith, Honor and Beauty** (1992) series by San Francisco art team Aziz+Cucher; and three photographs by Montréal's Evergon. By and about men, the exhibition was a continuation of Dazibao's exhibition the previous winter about the female image and identity, "Pièces d'identité".

child, apples and bowl, helmet and curved bar-bell, and lastly, perhaps uncharacteristically rounded, but equally coded 'female', a looking-glass mirror, fur coat and stiletto heels. Likewise, in **After Eve** (1993) the images of a male and a female are electronically reformulated in the same way, conjoined in a sardonic reference the Judeo-Christian creation myth of Adam and Eve; the title derisively implying that Eve is responsible for the 'lack' that Adam and Eve both (dis-)bear.

Cyborg

Why the fragmentation of the body? What makes this fragmentation compelling? Is this fragmentation-- its prominence in the form of second and third order subjective categories and social theory alike-- a result of our times? Viewing a staple of horror films is all that is required to understand the emotional impact of the division and separation of the body; we are able to think and represent the body in pieces and it is thus not unusual that slasher films appeal because it the body in objectification is boundless. There is also a sense that a viewer says, "I don't want to go there, I don't want to be that". More importantly, why can the fragmentation be liberating-- not just accepted, but applauded and allowed to continue? Part of the reconstruction of the body is imbedded in the hope of the cyborg, the hope in being other. The cyborg stands in contrast to the predominantly medical viewpoint that the mastery of the human genome is enough to make organic cyborgs of humans-- where the present organic human life is tampered with to produce the desired result, versus the hybrid view whereby both organic manipulation and mechanical/digital enhancement will triumph as the new *Übermensch*. Perhaps the abject elements produced by artistic deconstruction of the body is a political stance meant to retain the inconsistency and repulsiveness of the body? Indeed the cyborg in all its perfection would be a continuation of bodily tidiness that was required and demanded in previous eras of body technique; the corset forced an erect posture, the high heel likewise.

The cyborg is a construction, composed of a series of elements, each having their own associations to social identity, which come together to form a symbolic whole. The cyborg exists as myth, influencing behavior and opinion as a recombinant being, a scarless Frankenstein. The pieces form a body, resemble the human body to such a degree that their organic form and functional fragility make them the perfect simulacra of human. The future body is somehow wrapped in this mythology. 'Cyborg' is a construct that intimates the possibilities of artificial intelligence and follows the criteria that a thinking entity requires a body. 'Artificial intelligence' is a term grounded in the potentials imbedded in the current

human form. The use of 'smart drugs' is a form of artificial intelligence, which recognizes untapped potentials of the organic brain, without necessarily denying the limits of the human/organic body.

Meaning accumulates around the body because the future body will be a technological body. The future body will be shaped by the imaginations of today, and thus it is important to examine what tendencies of 'belief' about the body and the future form that the body will take; this will become what is known, what is relevant because it is clear that the technology has profound influences not only on the individual body but the social body—one need only think of the profound changes to the individual and social body that a contemporary taken-for-granted technology plumbing has on urban hygiene. While traditionally, society has divided the mind from the body, contemporary society has divided the body into pieces, and reinscribed or reinvested meaning onto individual parts (third order subjectivity). This is the function of technology; it is a substitute for the body. Complete subjectivities can be inscribed upon single body parts; most notoriously, the penis, the vagina, the breast (as Aziz+Cucher have so adequately shown in their photographs), because these have base appeal. Ironically, the most useful contemporary tool for this parceling is technology. Why does the body accumulate these prosthesis? The subject has a new ambiguity: desiring existence and non-existence; making connections to extend an ontology, limited and dictated by technology. The idea of the subject needs once again to be re-articulated to understand the subject and its new ontology of technology, one might start by examining intimacy for example.

Technology divides the body, making it possible for packages of the body to exist external of each other. The body is not a whole because it has been broken into components to symbolically recombine according to wishes and desires, much the same way science reconfigures its object of study. The cyborg is for culture as the healthy newborn baby is to medicine.³¹ The cyborg is given birth outside the control of science, but the medical superstructure takes credit. The cultural world (artists, writers, creators) have used the possibility of the cyborg to advance their own goals and intentions based upon their pool of knowledge. The cyborg is not their creation but its life is.

³¹ One idealization of science is the achievement of the perfect newborn child, the perfect baby with no flaws except for those that science can control—much like androids in **Blade Runner** who are constructed with (seemingly irreversible) auto-destruct dates. Geneticists attempt to achieve the same result: eternal youth, or at least, control over the death date. [see PLATT, Charles. "Evolution Revolution". *Wired* 5.01. January 1997. Pp. 158-161/198-205.]

The contemporary fascination with the cyborg, or the artificially constructed human is derived specifically from the ease at which agency is "given-over" to objects and patterns. Fractal geometry images representing Mandelbrot Sets are good examples of autopoietic systems. In the case of postmodernism, the Net has agency (a kind of conscience because search engines define for the user what will be accumulated during a search). This too is mythology: that the body is a material which can be molded (science and aesthetics, as David Cronenberg has shown so vividly in many of his films) and that we can create humans like we create machines, using these creations as we already inhumanely treat machines (the Human Genome Project). Desire for the cyborg is not liberation, it is control and domination, as it is in **Blade Runner**. The post-modern turn has been demonstrated in two film sequels: **Alien 2** and **Terminator II: Judgment Day** (1991) by James Cameron. In both we see mythologies played-out whereby the original enemy or subject of horror reverses roles and becomes the hero-- in both cases, the subject in question is artificial or a 'synthetic person'. These androids rise to heroes and are valorized in their reversal from destruction. Likewise, the call to establish the Cyborg as a model of feminine liberation is also dazzled by the belief that as a cyborg, humans become more human. Haraway is not unaware of the fatality of envisioning an endorsement of the cyborg as a social plateau. Any analysis of the cyborg must acknowledge its ancestral physical manifestation, even if these first hybridizations of organic and machine assemblages were purely symbolic.

THE AESTHETICS OF RESISTANCE TO SUBJECTIVE IMPOSITION

I would say that *Anti-Oedipus* (may its authors forgive me) is a book of ethics, the first book of ethics to be written in France in quite a long time (perhaps that explains why its success was not limited to a particular "readership": being anti-oedipal has become a life style, a way of thinking and living). How does one keep from being fascist, even (especially) when one believes oneself to be a revolutionary militant? How do we rid our speech and our acts, our hearts and our pleasures, of fascism? How do we ferret out the fascism that is ingrained in our behavior? The Christian moralists sought out the traces of the flesh lodged deep within the soul. Deleuze and Guattari, for their part, pursue the slightest traces of fascism in the body. [Foucault, Preface to *AO*, p. xiii]

The idea that there are traces of fascism in the body is an interesting proposition because fascism conjures political rather than bodily analysis. The examples I have accumulated from high-end art have a similarity with the uncommon sexual practice of Rubberists, or latex fetishists. This is a complex example to compare, but one that underscores the postmodern trend of bodily manipulation in response to the overarching meta-narrative of

technological and social imposition that occurs in third and fourth order subjectivities. What both the art of van Lamsweerde/Aziz+Cucher and the Rubberist have in common is the symbolic resistance to subjective imposition availed as subjectivity leaves the body in the systematic division of the body from the body as a subject traverses the four orders of subjectivity to a final state of objectification. Both the academic message of the photographic arts of van Lamsweerde/Aziz+Cucher and the bodily practice of rubberists reverse the trend away from technological bodily fragmentation towards the unification of the body to the point of absurdity; in some case, this may include self-parody, and in others, it may include an aggressive stance. As will be discussed, the rubberist practice is both liberating for those who are freely allowed to engage in their sometimes unexplainable sexual practice, and repulsive in its aggressive iconographic state. Rubberists use fascist iconography both to make parody and to accumulate the psychic power that fascism was able to impose by terror. The result is a strange mix of accumulating larger state/society symbolism around the intimate, proximal body, as well as accumulating technological/scientific apparatus in the same space of the body. As will be explained, the fascist iconography is disturbing in the same way that Inez van Lamsweerde's photos place a viewer in an uncomfortable ambivalence. First, a small comparative lists allows some insight into the differences and similarities of the pictures of Inez van Lamsweerde/Aziz+Cucher and the rubberist activities as imaged in the Image Appendix. pp. 14-16.

Similarities	Differences	
BOTH:	Rubberist Images/Practice	van Lamsweerde / Aziz+Cucher photographs
require technology	practice	hypothesis
contain subjectivity	aggression	repulsion
objectify	fear	confusion
are technological	S+M	perversion
relate to anatomy	body armor	body sealant
are sexualized (sexuality)	State apparatus	popular culture/art
eliminate, yet augment sexual markers.	private expression	public expression: magazines, art galleries
are protective: one is body armor, the other is body impossibility	presence	absence

resist subjective imposition by making the body repulsive	addition to the body	subtraction from the body
use face masks	possible	partially impossible
are paradoxical: rubberists, while serious, do make fun of themselves	references the past	references the future
are a reformulation of traditional senses		

Fascism makes the aggressor machinic turning people into objects or material; the fascist makes oneself inhuman, machine-like, to spare oneself of one's own prerogative (or rather, wrath). This is done to shed 'bad' or wrong judgment: the machine does not make bad judgments (if it does make judgments at all), and in this 'spirit', fascism codes self-bodies machinic. Aside from being regimented in behavior, the historical fascist visual presentation is made inhuman: blacks, grays; leather; adornment with forceful symbols, medals. The swastika and the iron cross (with its exaggerated sharp corners) have a severity all their own, regardless of the associations society makes of them today or previous to its use by Nazis in Germany. While the fascists of the past objectified humans, postmodern-popular culture takes a similar turn: the body is 'meat', a resource as opposed to a pleasing and universal referent. Technology is a tool to construct subjectivity, to construct the possibilities of our own subjectivity as reflected off of the enveloped BwO, such as the Lady of Thebes. This is why fascists need first to fecalize humans (historically with specificity: homosexuals, the mentally compromised, Jewish and Gypsy humans, etc.), so as to impose the subjectivity of the fascist upon a human, and thus making a human, non-human (expendable detritus). This is the logic of fourth order subjectivity.

Resistance to fascist-like postmodern popular culture's delimitation of the body comes from making oneself a docile BwO-- just as the dead body posed the greatest problem to the fascists: the legacy of killing and the stigma which continues to interfere with the fascist intent speaks from dead BswO. The BwO-- bodies void of food in concentration camps-- is a fascist antithesis. The hermetically sealed body of Inez van Lamsweerde and Aziz+Cucher make for an anti-fascist statement; outside of postmodern popular culture because these images de-limit themselves from seduction-- they disturb and repulse, they

resist the imposition of other subjectivities; the logic being, "if subjectivity is going to be forced upon me by someone's technology, I want to make certain they will not want to force it onto/into my body".³²

The example of fascism and popular culture implies that aesthetic symbols have strength when they are present in many different forms. Likewise, aesthetic symbols seem to move from one structure for meaning to another structure of meaning: the appearance of a number of bar-code tattoos on people for example. The aesthetic of fascism is just one example of how strong aesthetic symbols have movement or general appeal over a broad range of forms, the body is a micro-attractor, absorbing larger symbolic codes into a proximal body technique. Even though there are many other ways to describe how symbols have currency over broad and sometimes contradictory structures, and while fascism comes in many forms, the fascism most common to contemporary Western society is that of early 20th century Nazism demonstrates best how aesthetic symbols move and manifest in other varied cultural forms-- the connections to this fascism are clearly demonstrated in contemporary culture. Fascism is a term associated with a political ideology-- accepted en masse in the early 20th Century. It was not only a property of national ideals, but was an expression of nationhood AND progress. Fascism was the new class system during the period of industrialization in the Western world. The extent of fascism's power on the Western mind is imbedded in an aesthetic that ranged from architecture to the body, and everything in between. Clothing has been one lasting example of fascism's will to power. As recently reported by Reuters in the Globe and Mail, "leading German (clothing) designer Hugo Boss tailored the uniforms of Hitler's Nazi elite during the Second World War,.... The (Austrian) current affairs magazine Profil says Boss, who died in 1948, manufactured uniforms for the SS (Black Shirts), SA (storm troopers or Brown Shirts), Hitler Youth and the Wehrmacht, and used French prisoners of war and Polish inmates from German death camps to make the clothes.... The company's success in outfitting Hitler's elite troops laid the foundation for the multimillion-dollar business that makes up today's fashion giant Hugo Boss." [Reuters, p. A9] The fascist iconographic spill-over into current cultural aesthetic is more tacit than was previously obvious in the sexualization of fascism. Another striking example of the fascist imaginary will to power is the use of

³² Christian DIOR (Paris) ads of a woman's profiled lower torso with a red or gold chiffon scarf draped across the hips appearing on various outdoor billboards in Montréal a short time ago might be said to accomplish the same reaction. However, unlike the image projections of van Lamsweerde and Aziz+Cucher, the Dior ads' popular appeal resides in their advertising brand-name, and thus appealing to the postmodern masses as commodity, purchase, and ownership. Moreover, the product being advertised, "Dior - Svelte", purports to eliminate cellulite, as well as being a body scent.

latex equipment to formulate sexuality in contemporary society. Indications of the construction of "power" are seen throughout images of latex and leather clad practitioners of rule based sexuality. Fetish rubberist activity is rule bound because they are under the confines of a moral stigma, as well as forming exclusionary protocols to avoid the problems of out-of-control voyeurism. [See **Image Appendix, p. 15: ad for Fetish Night**] The images are both State-ists, and reference industrial technology of various sorts such as animal-husbandry, the gear required for protection in the nuclear industry, and military/police biological and chemical warfare protection.

What I want to suggest is that rubberist iconography/imagology is central to the fascist project, i.e., adornment of the body to the degree that subjectivity is tightly defined (mimicking the bondage of rubberist pleasure). Similarly, but in contrast, van Lamsweerde's series, **Thank You Thighmaster**, is an inversion of fascist imagology. Her images achieve the same subjective resistance as rubberist practice/iconography attempts to do, but her images accomplish this without opting into the power matrix of fascist iconography. This would seem an odd claim, clearly because it is apparent that many images need not oppose or depart from fascist imagology/iconography. Van Lamsweerde's artistic endeavors oppose ideologically based visual constructions.

Body armor is often seen in film and television and is a dominant image in science fiction film. These images imply that the future will somehow bring dangers to the body. Everything from the body suits needed to live and work in some capacity in space to the subtle inclusion of people in the streets of **Blade Runner's** Los Angeles wearing filter masks. One might also mention that the future is not just about the harshness of space as the full body armor manifest in a character like Robocop demonstrates [**Robocop** (1987) by Paul Verhoeven]. Two forces seem to be at work, one is the acceptance of an overextended natural environment for the continuation of global society's macro death drive, and the second is one based less on the imaginary or passive state of human consciousness: the current state and history of imagology. While it seems to be the most simplistic of observations, the media has dissipated a great deal of images. The range of images we are able to consume with a relative ease has broadened the world. It has broadened the world in a very specific way until recent history. As Marshall McLuhan has identified, the television is a cold medium because there is a limited amount and sense of interaction. People do not sway world events through the television, they observe them through the television and only manipulate events in real-time to mark an effect that might

promulgate through the television. Television for this reason is only a certain medium in its consumptive form.

Van Lamsweerde's bodies are also uncanny manifestations of armor to threat: particularly the postmodern viral threat of AIDS/HIV. The desexed bodies, the body void of orifice closes the body to invisible penetration. Thus, in a disturbing way, the future is metaphorized in these bodies. Protection is not a technology such as a condom, but is a genetic manipulation. The armored body, the body of prosthetics is a reflection of human desire for the immalleable body. This desire stems perhaps from much more modest wantings than film and television: bodies age. Humans are confronted with aging in everyday life and a considerable amount of time is consumed by the maintenance of the body. If technology can eliminate the aging and maintenance of the body, relief to the taxing human is a fantasy that technology cannot do without. Regardless of how inconsistent the fantasy of technology is with reality, the construction of images that control the body do not cease.

The BwO sacrifices action. It is a body immune to damage, contentment implodes within its inanimacy. The images of van Lamsweerde and Aziz+Cucher are images without agency because they are singularly attached to the subjectivity of the artist (and certain artists choose, having the control to actually manipulate their bodies in the postmodern fashion, to commodify their bodies as art (Ste-Orlan), unlike the commodification of an ideal, accessible by proxy of possession)³³, and not to a product that is exchanged. The argument might be made that these images sell 'sex' (where sex is thought of as commodity, which is not the case with these images), but the images of van Lamsweerde and Aziz+Cucher do not rely upon consumer culture: what is there to exchange or purchase in these images?

The BwO reverts to an "anorganic plenum", a synthetic, mutually agreeing unity or wholeness. The BwO is "not the stillness of a mineral mass, which, producers of horror films have known." [Lingis, FB, 1994, p. 113] It is not a body as material equation: the BwO has a satisfaction that de-limits any violence or horror that can be rendered upon the body by the manipulation of obdurate matter. And, since the BwO only supports one

³³ In 1969 Rudolf Schwarzkogler castrated himself as performance art and died as a result. There seems to be no better and perhaps no less humourous definition of the BwO. See: Art and the Body: Schwarzkogler, Rudolf. Wenen 1941 - Wenen 1969. (catalogue, gallerie Krinzinger, Innsbruck 1976) - was in Europa 1987 Österreich.

orifice, it is not a communicative body. The BwO is a resisting gesture to the popular postmodern.³⁴

Fascist images have filtered into various cultural expressions, but it is not clear why fascist imagery has currency. Fascist imagery does not reflect the brutal acts and coercion that have taken place during the pseudo-legitimate rein of the National Socialist Party in Germany. One recent attempt to portray such acts is Steven Spielberg's film **Schindler's List** spawning controversy as to whether these images are necessary specifically because acts of brutality attributed to the Nazis are depicted. Certainly the story needs to be told.

Justin J. Lorentzen in his essay, "Reich Dreams: Ritual horror and armoured bodies", writes about the slipover of fascist imagology into popular culture and claims that the rise in the public culture sphere of identity politics and expanding forms of expression have been fodder for a series of diverse cultural affirmations. For example, Lorentzen discusses how images of rubberist practice harken fascist iconography, but admits that the prominence and freedom to engage in "rubberist" activity and the honesty with which it is presented is a positive psycho-social development. There is a whole range of representations of the rubberist tradition, some not necessarily prevalent in popular culture, but it is still conspicuously present: the black leather jacket is the most common and wide ranging rubberist simulation.

Lorentzen writes that Spielberg's film **Schindler's List** surfaces stories that carry deep emotions. These emotions conflate the acceptance of the story and dilute the "truth value" of which Western philosophy has been so preoccupied to determine. While it is not necessarily the ambiguity of narration that is important to this particular discussion, **Schindler's List** provides an example of how the naked body is both product of fascism and response.³⁵ The Nazis forced people to disrobe for inspection-- a seemingly un-sexual.

³⁴ Returning for a moment to Kubrick's **2001**. The final genesis of a fetus at the end of Stanley Kubrick's **2001: A Space Odyssey** is a BWO. Without mother, the fetus floats in space, oblivious to its impossibility. It is a body whose organs society has agreed upon as requiring capitalist attention, and not developed. Its surface is also white, translucent, "smooth, slippery, opaque, taut surface as barrier" [Deleuze and Guattari, p. 9], yet oblivious to its impossibility. The image itself is absurd: a fetus floats in space, somewhere between earth and Jupiter. It also represents, for Kubrick, a 'rupture' (Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge), whereby animals become humans, and humans become reborn. The body without organs is not a vulnerable body.

³⁵ The obsession of violence and sex as it is conflated by fascism is portrayed in the 1973 film by Cavani, **The Night Porter**. Max, a former SS officer who during the war posed as a doctor to legitimate carrying out his sexual fantasies, including making films, is confronted 12 years after the end of the war by a former prisoner who survives his brutality. As the story unfolds, we learn that Max is more or less in hiding from

un-erotic event (much like the medical norms of contemporary Western medical practice)—, yet, a viewer and greater audience of **Schindler's List** can eroticize the naked bodies depicted, in some cases as perverse pleasure, regardless of the narrative context— the viewer has a history between the past events and the re-creation/created event of Spielberg's story; the same is at work in Dürer's wood-cut print showing how the naked body is separated by technology (Alberti's linear grid) for the higher purpose of art alone. This 'history between' both divides the viewer from the events and exports emotions away from the context of the Holocaust. The Nazis humiliated people by disrobing them. While it may have been humiliating then, today, it is anti-fascist.³⁶ The Nazis invested much in bodily adornment— medals, symbols, and tense posture— they also formed differentiation by disrobing their victims in concentration camps. To do voluntarily what the Nazis did by force is to re-appropriate the power that was reneged by Nazi imposition. Fascism could not have been far reaching in German culture without the creation of a body technique, a body aesthetic.³⁷ As Lorentzen writes,

authorities and his past, but the witness who sees him cannot be forgotten, particularly because the witness/victim is both in love and a willing coadjutor of the brutality.

³⁶ It should be noted that Nazism was not adverse to the nude body, after all, Hitler himself had purchased several works of art from "Nazi" exhibitions that include depictions of nude bodies. Likewise, many exercises and formations of collective expression were produced by scantily clad Nazi soldiers. The postmodern eroticisation of the body I am referring to in the works of van Lamsweerde and Aziz+Cucher as an architecture of the body depends upon the boundaries between the nipple, for example, and the pubis being effaced [Bruno, 1993, p. 238]. Postmodernism would most certainly be considered an "enemy of the Reich". [see, *Architektur des Untergangs* [The Architecture of Doom] POJ Filmproduktion AB, Svenska Filminstitutet, Sveriges Television Kanal 1, Sandrew Film & Teater AB Zeigen; ein film von Peter Cohen. New York: First Run Icarus Films; Toronto: Libra Films (distributor), c1989. (119 min.): sd., b&w with col. sequences. Cinematographers: Mikael Cohen, Gerhard Fremm, Peter Ostlund; editor, Peter Cohen; narrator, Bruno Ganz. Summary: Looks at the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany from the perspective of Hitler's use of the arts in Nazi policy and propaganda. In German, with English subtitles.]

³⁷ The fascists of Germany were successful in that they inscribed fear upon the bodies of the Jewish race/nation— even today that embodiment or imprint (as one shockingly inscribed upon Nazi prisoners who managed to escape death, and who, without necessarily telling their story, could show their story inscribed as numbers on/in their flesh) is manifest in the sometimes paranoid fear that pervades impressions of 'other'.

The same fear that is inscribed upon the Jewish body, is similar to the fear upon the homosexual body.

The homosexual body is inscribed with fear of both social rejection, and the threat that sex, particularly homosexual sex, has imposed upon the sexually active within the last 10 or more years due to AIDS/HIV. This inscription, represented in a series of ways, is most often mistaken by the feminization of the male body. This general notion, that the homosexual body is somehow more feminine does not always apply; however, one might note that this feminization of the male body also invokes the already misconstrued impression of the female body— that of hysterics. The homosexual body, by way of association has been inscribed with hysterics— fear is equally a part of this inscription, one that hits closer to the strong social foundation of family whereby fear arises from rejection by people who at the very least supported one's existence, no matter how minimal that existence may or may not be.

...the determining and crucial focus for an explanation of the Holocaust....(must) recognise the role that the visual dimension of Nazi culture played in the movement's appeal to and mobilisation of the German people. The rituals, rallies and popular festivities of a culture dominated by the aestheticisation of everyday life, the Nazification of the public and private realms is, I would argue, not only a compelling feature of Nazi ideology, but also a powerful tool in... understanding the hold that Nazi imagery has over the popular imagination. [Lorentzen, pp. 162-163]

Inez van Lamsweerde's images and their desexualized subjects are confrontational because both body and human sexuality are disrobed/desexed, resulting in a dehumanization that Nazis practiced to absolve themselves of moral reproach, as can be seen in **Schindler's List**. Like clothing the naked body is, for the most part, gender specific. The Nazi self-imposed adornment of aggression/'efficiency' using gender inspecific uniforms were intended to achieved a formulation or code of 'machine'. As Susan Sontag notes, "SS uniforms were tight, heavy, stiff and included gloves to confine the hands and boots that made legs and feet feel heavy, encased, obliging their wearer to stand up straight." [Sontag, p. 99] Mechanic humans appear void, or rather beyond sexuality and gender specificity, but it did not work seamlessly. **Schindler's List** exemplifies the disrobing of concentration camp victims but likewise shows that the Nazis could not 'desex' the Jews, and by extension, nor can van Lamsweerde and Aziz+Cucher. Van Lamsweerde is aware of the sexuality and erotic qualities of her images as she states in my interview with her:

So... to me the idea of being able to recreate oneself is a very liberating one. There is this change we can make with our bodies, but, at the same time-- at the same sort of speed-- there is technology which enables us to move as little as possible. I mean, just a tiny computer and that's it; we communicate all over the world through the nets and so... physical contact is no longer necessary. I mean you don't have to know what somebody else looks like to talk personally, you are talking through PCs-- you're not really talking personally. That and things like phone-sex start this non-physical intimacy... so, I thought, "well, we can recreate ourselves and become the persons we want to be on the outside, but what happens then? We are there with our perfect bodies and we are behind the PC and there is no use any more for having this body because nobody will see it, nobody will feel it." Thus, in order to emphasize the non-physical contact, I took away sex to coordinate this genesis, I took away the nipples and genitalia to sort of emphasize this irony or idea of "being prefect without a reason": it's not necessary any more since there is no communication physically and visually. Visually, it's more a type-thing; it's not enticing.

For example, as a result of inscribing femininity on the Indian male's body, a humiliation at the hands of British colonialists, wide-spread revival of warrior rhetoric has shaped India's recent history in the Hindu attempt at the re-masculinization of the 'Indian' body which couples with ethnic violence. [See the documentary film: **Father, Son and Holy War** by Anand Patwardhan, India, 1994, colour, 16mm, 120 min.]

The **Thank You Thighmaster** series is distinctly innocuous: completely vacant faces don desexed bodies posed in anti-classic formations. Sarah, Sasia, etc. are inviting, perhaps brainless beings for our sexual entertainment, for onlookers. [See Image Appendix, pp. 20-21] The faces comfortably positioned to confront the sexual voyeur who imagines anal intercourse as if these bodies are available for such activities, as was Pris in **Blade Runner**; Bryant calls her, "your basic pleasure models... for off-world military officers".

These images, like the fascist images described in Lorentzen's analysis, have the dual response of attraction and repulsion. Lorentzen claims that this simultaneous 'paradox' of affinity and repulsion have inflicted writers and cultural commentators who have identified the insidious construction of fascist aggression in popular culture. "On the one hand there is an element of genuine concern on the part of those writers who detect the insidious presence of fascist imagery in contemporary culture; on the other hand, there is the simultaneous admission that this 'evil aesthetic' has a powerful attraction that appears to be beyond rational analysis." [Lorentzen, p. 162]

Changing the Pattern: Artist Photographic Reformulation of the Body as Subjective Resistance (Inez van Lamsweerde and Aziz+Cucher)

Katherine Hayles, in a lecture titled, "Are We 'Posthuman'? The Cyborg as Literary Metaphor and Social Actuality", argues that the distinction of presence and absence (of the phallus) as a psychoanalytic disciplinary fixation has been subsumed by the postmodern binaries of randomness versus pattern. This is not so clearly the case. Baudrillard sees this shift as a kind of 'mutation', not just in the sense that a discipline changes, but the function of the change is a direct result of certain 'mutations'. Baudrillard equates sexuality with images, and thus, for him, to change what we see is to change what can be seen. For Baudrillard, to go blind is desirable in the postmodern world, not simply because the couplings of image and sight, gaze and death, voyeurism and sex, and the truth of sight and recording are 'sins', but because the substitution of sight, the extraction of sight by technology (desiring-machines) changes what it is to be human. [Baudrillard, p. 52]; still a more complex association of presence and absence. This explains why photography of the human body attracts attention. However, Inez van Lamsweerde and Aziz+Cucher's photographs of the human body attract attention for the opposite reasons: what it is that makes humans not human; clearly the cyborg is a paradoxical and clearly inadequate vessel of human subjectivity.

This dialectic of randomness versus pattern is absorbed and reflected by the human subject through mutation, exemplified by Aziz+Cucher and van Lamsweerde's photographs of nudes who have been subject to electronic eradication of sexual body markers; this is not exactly lack: the masculinity and femininity of the bodies is still in-tact. There is a lack of bodily signs, but that does not limit the sexual nature of their expressions (the distant looking faces of Aziz+Cucher, the artificially inviting mannequin smile and relaxed stance of the models in van Lamsweerde's photos). These artists are dealing with mutation, and perhaps mutilation. By electronically eradicated clear markers of sexuality on nude females and males (the penis, nipples, pubic hair), the artists have created a sexuality that resides below the skin, or as a product of the skin alone. No detail of sexuality has been overlooked by Aziz+Cucher, including the erasure of the navel and the posing of subjects with their mouths closed—producing realistic images of the impossible or fantastic hermetic body. While van Lamsweerde concentrates on the female body, she goes one step further and places the actual face of a mannequin (a doll) upon the computer mutated human body.³⁸ For this reason, the photos of Inez van Lamsweerde are hermetically different: van Lamsweerde in the series **Thank You Thighmaster** has completely replaced the face, leaving no doubt that the white wall/black hole system is pure artifice. Conversely, on a pragmatic level, Aziz+Cucher's photographic representations are better sealed: their bodies have no navel and their mouths are closed. For Aziz+Cucher, it is still the body that is being manipulated, not the face. It is the body that is the sight of sexuality. It is however, the face that is the sight of subjectivity, as can be seen in a separate, but equally powerful series of photographs that Aziz+Cucher have embarked upon since the creation of **Faith, Honor and Beauty**. [See Image Appendix, p. 27, George]

The face is recognition and it is more meaningful to manipulate the face because faces are made for direct recognition, not mediated recognition—perhaps this is why van Lamsweerde has chosen to completely replace the face altogether. For example, clothing and technology (glasses, earring, nose rings, make-up) are each forms of mediation—the cellular telephone that dons the mobile body is a mediation of intimacy. It is a mediation of intimacy not simply because communication by way of mobility can occur anywhere, but because the code of a cellular phone also implies that personhood and subjectivity can be 'taken'-with at any time. Bodies, on the other hand, constitute a labyrinth of limitations:

³⁸ While certain limitations do not distract from the power of these images, both van Lamsweerde and Aziz+Cucher have overlooked skin colour as a manipulatable factor; nor have they gone beyond Western codes of dress and apparel.

both on an individual basis and in social norms. It is only through the body that a truly critical program can take place about what is hidden, out of sight, privileged-- that is also why any theoretical discussion of the body fails when individuality, self, personal intimacy, and personal experience are omitted. When making campaign posters, politicians reveal only their face, not their body. The face is what visually has been coded upon relations in the past, not the body.

"Strategy of absence, of evasion, of metamorphosis. An unlimited possibility of substitution, of concatenation without reference. To divert, to set up decoys, which disperse evidence, which disperse the order of things, . . . to slightly displace appearances in order to hit the empty and strategic heart of things. [Baudrillard. p. 68]

What is seen in van Lamsweerde and Aziz+Cucher's work is what Baudrillard describes as seduction.

Seduction is not desire. It is that which plays with desire, which scoffs at desire. It is that which eclipses desire, making it appear and disappear. It brings forth appearances before desire only to hurl it back into its very end. [Baudrillard, p. 67]

Nudity and spying is "that which plays with desire" in these photos. It is potent when we understand that technology defines the self in third orders subjectivity, and can easily eclipse the categorization of objectivity in fourth order subjectivity where the body and face become objects and therefore open to subjective imposition from outside subjectivities. As an object, the body is commodity, free and open to observe, to 'spy'-- voyeurism.

BW: So you are playing with the idea of commodity as well, walking the fine line (?) of commodity...

IvL: Yes, and that is exactly it. I feel I have to stay on that line. I wouldn't want to cross in either direction.

BW: So, did you have any reactions from people like, "they are very cheesy" . "they are not exactly interesting", "they are just forms"? Has it fallen over into that zone?

IvL: No, never, no. People in America and in New York when it was there didn't know how to deal with it or what to do with it because it's not 'PC'. I was there in February (1993) last year, a year ago the show opened, and that was what everybody was talking about "PC art", and I deliberately, . . . I cannot make PC art even. I was very sure that I didn't want to fall in that trap of labeling everything and so the fact that I was a woman but made images like this was totally incomprehensible. So you have people who are...

BW: Afraid?

IvL: People were afraid and shocked and I'm certain because it didn't fit into anything. And it's exactly what I wanted and also too, for me it's sort of a mirror of the American society or a small part of that. It shows something of their society. They are dealing with being preferred and sports and beauty and...

My inability to write about the photographs of Inez van Lamsweerde and Aziz+Cucher is similar to the uncategorized reaction people experienced at the first sight of van Lamsweerde's images in New York. These photos are alienating, there is nothing in the image that speaks of one's own body except for cursory shape. The reaction they received highlights the irony of bodily care versus bodily exposure. Van Lamsweerde's bodies are singularized by the elimination of gender signs; except for specific bodily shape-- shape too gives clues to and determines value. Van Lamsweerde has singularized the body, and divided it from its component parts-- leaving only one sign of gender-- shape. Even the skin is made distinct from a body with the technique of an artificial, high gloss finish. The photographs' real success however resides in their shock value. Their meaning, significance, importance, beauty, seduction is a distinction of the shock. Few people can actually place themselves in the photos, it is impossible to discuss these photos in a sympathetic position, because it is an intimate subjective product of the artist herself.³⁹

The way in which women deal with idealized images created by the media is a theme which is to be found everywhere in Van Lamsweerde's work.

"Also as a form of self-investigation," says the photographer. "Because after all it's about myself. My photographs are also an investigation of my ideas and fantasies of being-a-woman.... And at the same time, my photographs are of course a sort of projection of how I would like to be myself." [Savenije, 1996, p. 3]

What is lost in van Lamsweerde's statement is the process of becoming woman. She claims that being a woman is a stable marker, something universal is at work in being woman. However, in van Lamsweerde's work, there is also the issue of becoming-cyborg, becoming-sexual, becoming-neuter, becoming-child/adult. Van Lamsweerde creates the BwO, but does not acknowledge the difference between her BwO and her photography-- which in this case is her photography and the computer and equipment used to produce these photographs. She does acknowledge that these photographs are about her.

Fashion is slavish; trends follow one another super-fast. But that is exactly what makes it energetic and interesting to me. Many people think that this current glamour-trend could render my photographs harmless. The shock effect diminishes. But in fact I think that is good: there are more layers in my photographs than just the shocking one. I always think: show these pictures as much as possible, that way people will at least become more receptive and will see what it is

³⁹ While men and women exist without nipples and penis, it is not functional. Nor can a penis function in any way procreatively internal to the body. Is this significant? Perhaps it reaffirms, in a biological way, why Deleuze and Guattari place priority of becoming on becoming-woman.

really all about. That way they will see the underlying emotionalism: that we are living in a world where intimacy and real contact disappears more and more. A nearly autistic world. Non-communication. Maybe that is why my photographs are in fact always about seduction and desire. [Van Lamsweerde in Savenije, p. 8]

Her images are distinctly anti-fascist. This claim will do doubt issue a great deal of speculation on the part of readers as to what an 'anti-fascist' artistic production is. However, it would seem to me that the nude body is anti-fascist: open for inspection, vulnerable, unadorned, volatile. Fetish culture and the images I've used to highlight the similarities of "resistance" to fourth order subjective imposition mimics fascist iconography. Gas masks, bondage, black rubber and leather, rubber uniforms donned at times with medals and strapping make allusion to Nazi uniforms. [Lorentzen, pp. 166-7] It is the case that these adorned, armored bodies are sexualized as fetish, it is also then the case that the bodies constructed in **Thank You Thighmaster** are fetish objects. Van Lamsweerde has made the whole skin a fetish item. Bodies with only a shell of sexuality have the uncanny ability to re-motivate the imagination, perhaps deceive the mind to sexualize and in the case of the fetish, to objectify semblances of the human body. Indeed all of body adornment works to some degree in this way.

The bodies van Lamsweerde depicts are the future of bodies. They are constructed using optical technologies (camera and computer) which reference a history of body and image manipulation, but more so than the past, they represent the future, the future body. These bodies are grotesque and seductive, cold and emotionless but not visually fragmented or constructive impersonations; like watching a successful science fiction horror film. The future is sexless; van Lamsweerde overlooks the elimination of the navel-- the cursor to that apparently hostile entrance into the world of air and distance between flesh. In the laboratories of Inez van Lamsweerde, sealing of the navel, as in the photos of Aziz+Cucher, the bodily index to birth is erased, and the transfer from flesh to silicone is issue-less without birth! ⁴⁰ Clearly the photographs have guaranteed the cultural

⁴⁰ A significant curiosity is expressed in Kubrick's **2001**. Three references are made to date of birth: HAL expresses his own date of birth, "Good afternoon, gentlemen. I am a HAL 9000 computer, I become operational at the HAL plant in Urbana, Illinois, on the 12th of January, 1997. My instructor was Dr. Chandra, and he taught me to sing a song. If you'd like it hear it, I can sing it for you. It's call 'Daisy.' 'Daisy, Daisy, give me your answer do, I'm half crazy, all for the love of you....'" The child of Dr. Heywood Floyd, 'Squirt'-- played by Kubrick's daughter Vivian (and significantly, uncredited in the film credits), has a birthday while her father is in transit to the moon. Floyd calls her by television-phone, and has a short, 'cute' conversation with Squirt. Floyd has to apologies that he is missing her birthday. Finally, Dr. Frank Poole, one of the two ship crew-members not placed in incubation for the duration of the voyage to Jupiter also has a birthday during the filmic timeline. Dr. Poole also carries on a telepresence conversation with his parents on his birthday. Dr. Poole is HAL's first victim. All these birth references signify BswO: HAL, whose embodiment is the whole ship; Squirt, who is only seen on the film through a

imagination of others who see the paradox and irony of synthetic bodies. Léontine Coelewijn has been captured in these images to hypothesize about the existence of **Kim** [See **Image Appendix**, p. 17] as a living, animated body and subjectivity:

As a young girl, Kim grew up in a 'class 100' room-- an absolutely clean place in which airborne particles are never more than a cent per cubic foot of air. While mum and dad worked 90 hours a week in one of the high-tech firms in Silicon Valley, they began to work on herself. Having been born a tragic result of crazy bio-engineering experiment, her parents conducted some 15 years ago, Kim decided that it was time to perfect her sexless appearance. This didn't go unnoticed. Soon she was discovered by a fashion photographer who saw in her the new supermodel, the embodiment of all our hopes and fears in the age of biotechnology. Where Kate Moss was the pure innocent child woman of the early 90's, Kim was even younger and, as a result a purely artificial fabrication, ready to be launched as the cybernetic model of our times. In interviews she admitted the Cindy Crawford style workout was nothing for her. For months, her androgynous looks caused a great stir in London and New-York. Léontine Coelewijn, Documents, p. 10, no. 4, October 1993.

The effect achieved is brilliant because the manipulations are indeed slight and simulate a variety of possible responses. In the **Final Fantasy** series, the children are gendered by the addition of a male mouth to the poised child. While the child is gendered into an adult world of sexuality (which spurs me to see the creation of these images as a critique of the fashion world in general), the reverse is the case in the **Thank You Thighmaster** series. The **Thank You Thighmaster** photos create the fetish: The body, the whole body, one genitalia, one fetish item-- among none like itself, unlike specific fetish delineations: the breast, breasts, the penis, the scrotum, the buttocks, the single buttocks in profile, the vulva, feet, toes, hands, hair. Van Lamsweerde has created fetishism, perhaps because her background, the fashion industry, is a grand attempt and victory over desire by way of ephemeral fetish (clothing). Van Lamsweerde's fetish is not only a fetish because she has technologized an image of the body via computer manipulation (not unlike any sophisticated manipulation we can effect, and more because she does it with ease, with only powerful and astute observation and aesthetic contemplation)-- are layers of artificiality, but has made even more complex the definition of fetish by further incorporating a technology of camouflage, the mannequin-- within the finished image.⁺¹

television; and Dr. Poole, who is killed and launched into space in his moonwalk suit by HAL. Birth itself is a desiring-machine.

⁺¹ Deckard's first "termination" in **Blade Runner** is Zhora. He kills her while she is fleeing from Deckard's pistol aim, she plunges to her death through a series of store-front window display-cases set with clothed and unclothed mannequins. To make the scene even more artificial, the display cases shower Zhora with artificial snow; Deckard too traverses the snow to identify postmortem Zhora's snake tattoo on her neck... he still has doubts about her identity, even after assassinating her.

What is instrumental about the images van Lamsweerde has produced is that they validate a series of cultural expressions. For example, the popular discourse of the cyborg, futurism, and millennialism is clearly presented. The viewer can see that the images contain thin emotion, their bodies are clearly altered in a specific, patterned way— skin is smooth and taut, muscles defined, bodily hair removed, and the strong markers of sexuality removed. These bodily markers can be applied to any people at any given point in time, but extension of sophisticated technological images, such as these photographs, posit the moment beyond the present. The contemporary technological condition— posthuman, postmodernism, late-capitalism, late-modernism, etc.— informs the struggle to understand how human relations change. Van Lamsweerde's photographs speak to that change. Human relationships in whatever form opens subjectivity to inspection— a critique of capitalism is one way this has taken place—, and van Lamsweerde's images ask questions of the viewer regarding relations and subjectivity. Is it possible to be or become intimate with Kim, Britt, Sasia, etc.?

Van Lamsweerde works often in fashion photography, particularly with Vivienne Westwood, one of England's most recognized critical fashion designers.⁴² As Vivienne Westwood says, "Sex is the thing that bugs English people more than anything else, so that's where I attack..." [as quoted in Gamman and Makinen, p. i] Van Lamsweerde created the **Thank You Thighmaster** series in the United States, this work for her is a particular critique of American society.

BW: How did you come up with the ideas?

IvL: One thing was definitely being in America, where as I said, plastic surgery is such a status thing and this whole focus on fitness and more. I mean this in a good sense, I'm not trying to be moralistic about that . . . more in a way of a fascination. Fascination for the fact that we have the possibilities to recreate ourselves. Once we don't like certain things about ourselves we can go to the surgeon and change ourselves into another creation and that is for me the most fascinating thing about America. At the same time I (was) concerned with the emotional side of being able to recreate ourselves. My background is fashion. My mother is a fashion journalist and I have gone to the fashion academy before going to arts school. I work as well as a fashion photographer. So the whole idea of beauty and perfection and all that is, you know, . . . I have been brought up with that. This idea about "fashion" is something that's natural for me.

⁴² see: FLEURY, Sylvie. "Vivienne Westwood: The Most Beautiful Animals". FlashArt International XXVII (179). November-December, 1994, pp. 65-68, 110.

If England, according to Westwood, is fascinated with sex, North America is fascinated with the body. Perhaps it is more precise to say, rather, that North America is fascinated with the image a person projects; coupled with one's 'look', or good looks as prescribed by the beauty media, sexuality is defined. It is a social Darwinism based upon sexi-"ness". This sexiness is capital in North American society.

Imbedded in the definition of a subject is its capability to transform. Much has been made about the transformation of the subject as a result of the technical or mechanical world, the result being a kind of hyper-subjectivity, over exaggerated, over emphasized, hostile, and over active subjectivie imagination. This hyper-subjectivity has been examined by Jean Baudrillard in The Ecstasy of Communication. For Baudrillard, the human subject is as much a player in the contemporary technological drama as much as a passive observer. Relations determined by the desiring-machine/BwO dialectic are hyper-subjective because the subject must occupy two distinct identities simultaneously. Baudrillard's underlying claim is that this necessity is not possible without the current forms of technology that allow human subjectivity to reside in different times and places. Likewise, these split subjectivities can make expression repeatedly (as a simulation) and without adhering to traditional rules of time. Nor is subjectivity a matter of agency versus outside influence, or agency giving outside influence a resistance. Primary to Baudrillard's thesis is that simulation and its fluidity via new technologies of relations has brought relations closer to a purity of subjectivity alone-- unpredictable, multiple, chaotic, and most importantly, euphoric. Such a position also deregulates the need to vindicate one's subjectivity.

Photography

A discussion of Inez van Lamsweerde's photographic expression of the body would be incomplete without some comment on photography. Gregory Ulmer's thesis in "The Object of Post-Criticism", appearing in Hal Foster's, The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture, claims that photographic montage and collage identify a transition in philosophy and linguistics whereby "representation" is "without reference". [Ulmer, p. 92]

By using photography which has been manipulated to represent objects in mutation (bodies in mutation), different possibility arise for the extermination and creation of objects. The "death of the object" by the technology of photography is synchronic with Deleuze and Guattari's thesis on the in-existence of the body. Photography, documentation, advertising, projections, etc., where a majority of new manipulation/mutation occurs, are relational,

they attempt to communicate. An expression of the way the obdurate world should be is an often overlooked past-time. Photography is relational if only to the degree that such technologies presides over specific sense, and in the process perhaps, dulling others.

Ulmer embarks on an explanation of the transformation of representation away from any form of "realism" using examples from collage and montage. This transformation in representation began in the early part of this century when collage and montage offered indexes to the production contrived by "product": the simulacrum. Shifting from graphic forms to photography, Ulmer equates photography to a "model for the mode of representation . . . not as the culmination of linear perspective, but as a means of mechanical reproduction (as described by Walter Benjamin)." [Ulmer, p. 85] Ulmer's shift concludes that, "the principle of photographic representation in both its realist and semiotic versions . . . (are) a collage machine (perfected in television), producing simulacra of the life-world." Thus, for Ulmer, photography has two functions:

1) Photography selects and transfers a fragment of the visual continuum into a new frame . . . because mechanical reproduction, which forms the image of the world automatically without the intervention of human "creativity" (the reduction of this "creativity to the act of selection, as in the readymade), "the photographic image is a kind of decal or transfer . . . [it] is the object itself.

and,

2.) . . . the photographic images signifies itself and something else-- it becomes a signifier remotivated within the system of a new frame. [Ulmer, p. 85]

That new frame is the space where van Lamsweerde constructs her imagination. One of Ulmer's examples is photomontage where, "photographic images are themselves cut out and pasted into new, surprising, provoking juxtapositions, . . . " [Ulmer, p. 85] There is no doubt that van Lamsweerde's images are "surprising, provoking juxtapositions". Placing an adult male's smile on a child creates a provocative image. License to discuss the possibilities of the objects represented in van Lamsweerde's photographs is imbedded directly in the medium. The photos of van Lamsweerde demonstrate the perversity of subjective expression using electronic technology: the distance between object and touch is paramour to social control and thus only to be filled by theory itself, adding an extra element to the ontological complexities of submitting to technology for the purpose of communication.

Through a form of mimesis, van Lamsweerde has created what Derrida calls, logocentrism:

"Mimesis," which Derrida labels "mimetologism," refers to that capture (absorption in this text) of representation by the metaphysics of "logocentrism," the era extending from Plato to Freud (and beyond) in which . . . (all manner of inscription) is reduced to a secondary status as "vehicle," in which the signified or referent is always *prior* to the material sign, the purely intelligible prior to the merely sensible. [Ulmer, p. 87]

Not only is the object needed to think, and bolster the subject (the self)-- which is indeed what is at work in an illusory form in impersonal technological subjective couplings in the third and fourth order-- the object is needed for our ontology. Derrida's thesis here contradicts the propaganda of the scientific method since its first identification in Western thought (Greek mythology), but more importantly, Derrida critiques the thick propaganda of science by claiming that the "object" in the "object of study" was a secondary element... yet no thought can occur without it. Can we ask then: are the bodies constructed and depicted by Inez van Lamsweerde the future of our bodies? An equally important, but more broad question must be: does our total capacity to think, perceive, play, and put into action design (our bodies and our subjectivity) rely totally upon some mediation, now and forever more? Have we become cyborgs? As Elizabeth Grosz writes of the Deleuze and Guattari project:

Their notion of BwO is Deleuze and Guattari's attempt to denaturalize human bodies and place them in direct relations with the flows or particles of other bodies or things. [Grosz, 1994, p. 168]

Those other bodies and things imply denaturalized human bodies, cyborgs, comprising of technologies that perfect each feature of the body; but moreover, totalize the formation of a new body as the mode of communication.

Ulmer continues to justify this end: "Montage does not reproduce the real, but constructs an object (its lexical field includes the terms (quoting from the journal *Montage*) 'assemble, build, join, unite, add, combine, link, construct, organize'". [Ulmer, p. 86] All this, Ulmer says, "in order to intervene in the world, not to reflect but to change reality." [Ulmer, p. 86]

Van Lamsweerde's works demonstrate both the power of the image and the ease of manipulation-- as Grant Stone has suggested, van Lamsweerde has re-invented Barbie. Van Lamsweerde, in a way, if we accept Ulmer's claims via Benjamin, has not only re-

invented Barbie, but has invented the future, coupling the dread of the unknown in everyday life, and the dread of our imagination, while at the same moment conjuring both perverse alterity and beautiful seduction. They reveal the need for the post-modern self to manipulate the body/object in both slight and subtle ways, highlighting the depth of rhetoric that impersonal technological application of technology project and impose on the body as an object.

Technology as mediation is compelling because it is a magnification of subjectivity through the manipulation of the object/body, but at the object/body's expense. That magnification of subjectivity is through the medium: it is in the clean manipulation of images, and thus, impressions that make technological/desiring-machine mediation so "seductive"-- there is a clear economy of forcing external subjectivity upon the passive fourth order subjectivity of objectivified humans, or less overtly, people simply at a disadvantage to assert their own subjectivities in a significant way. The mode is made the subjectivism. It is not only a matter of manipulation of images and traces, but the manipulation and mutation of the self that van Lamsweerde has in mind as a resisting gesture to the potential that impersonal technological ease can assert over one's subjective stance. The distribution of self is vast and simultaneous: a place difficult to distinguish human limits. Like language, the self overflows: once a message is sent, it may not always be retrievable.

Kaja Silverman discussing Ferdinand de Saussure in her book, The Subject of Semiotics, claims that early-canon semiotic theory established language as logocentric whereby "language constitutes the signifying system par excellence, . . . it is only by means of linguistic signs that other signs become meaningful." [Silverman, p. 5] Thus, the visual sign, is only meaningful with a clear linguistic context. Silverman claims that Roland Barthes' photographic theory in Système de la mode exemplified the strength of such a logocentrism whereby Barthes assumes "photographic signs . . . depend upon the mediation of the linguistic 'copy' which surrounds them, and . . . (are) indecipherable or at least unreliable without it." [Silverman, p. 5] Van Lamsweerde's photographs rely upon the linguistic and semiotic assumptions of photography. We have a clear visual lexicon for photography. The occidental world invented modern photography, and has retained a consistent rhetoric about its reliability.

That reliability has extended from the frozen image to the moving image, and further penetrates technology so that video is also a code for reality.

Video suffers from a deeper problem (a deeper problem than text), one of ever diminishing reliability in the face of ever more capable morphing technologies. By decade's end, we will look back at 1992 and wonder how a video of police beating a citizen could move Los Angeles to Riot. [SAFFO, p. 48]

Van Lamsweerde has shifted only slightly the photographic image, and thus, initially, all the linguistic assumptions of a photograph-- especially a photograph of a naked woman-- are still in place at first glance. It is only by reading (and reading in the autopoietic sense), that a viewer registers the oddity of the images. Certainly, without the linguistic context of an explanation of photographic manipulation, one is comforted again by the notion that these photographs are "fiction." It is precisely by making only subtle changes to the images that van Lamsweerde capitalizes on the logocentric linguistic context of photography in general in the occidental world, and is able to startle a viewer. For example:

☐Date: Fri, 03 Jun 94 19:22:52 +0200
☐From: Brennan Murray Wauters <HAABL01@cc1.kuleuven.ac.be>
☐Subject: Re: Brennan Wauters : Lamsweerde
☐To: Grant Stone <stone@portia.murdoch.edu.au>
☐In-Reply-To: Your message of Mon, 16 May 94 11:15:18 WST
☐
☐Grant,
☐
☐You bring up a fascinating issue about the position of the arms.
☐
☐One of van Lamsweerde's images is a very passive looking "doll" figure--
☐doll because the hair is a blue wig (clearly artifice) and the
☐arms are lifeless, the legs and crouched so as to allow total but
☐passive invitation/invasion. Exactly like a blow-up dummy doll.

In "Rituals of Transparency", Baudrillard claims that the notion of, or dialectic of contemporaneity is determined specifically by the sexual play invoked by images. This suggests that van Lamsweerde's photos are more like chiaroscuro: the technology highlights the form of the body and furthermore highlights the absurdity of its representations.

The body is already there without even the faintest glimmer of a possible absence, in the state of radical disillusion; the state of pure presence. In an image certain parts are visible, while others are not; visible parts render the others invisible, and a rhythm of emergence and secrecy sets in, a kind of water mark of the imaginary. While here everything is of equal visibility, everything shares the same shallow space (Octavio Paz's aesthetic of disembodiment). [Baudrillard, pp. 32-3]

That is to say, the screen, or as Deleuze and Guattari claim, the white wall/black hole system: facialization. Technology itself is not important, but technology as a tool of

manipulation is important. It can strip away not just items of universal nature, subjectivity, but technology also strips the being of its own skin. Technology is an ideology. It is a sign in itself that indexes social fulfillment and the final satisfaction, order, control, and knowledge that impersonal desiring-machines determine.

Conclusion

According to Judith Butler, to theorize the body is to gain an expression of the body, to break the body into component parts, and focus on, for example, sex, or medical function, or vulnerability. However, Butler while not resisting the parcelization of the body, insists that the body must be theorized as something more than fluid-- without boundaries, whole mixtures of characteristics, etc. Deleuze and Guattari's explanation of the field of immanence and body without organs first appears to contradict Butler, in fact, it is clearly inline with the thesis that the body both divides, and elusively vibrates. Likewise, Merleau-Ponty was only able to justify reflexivity based upon the dissection of "embodiment" of parts of wholes:

I now refer to my body only as an idea, to the universe as idea, to the idea of space and the idea of time. Thus 'objective' thought (in Kierkegaard's sense) is formed-- being that of common sense and of science-- which finally causes us to lose contact with perceptual experience, of which it is nevertheless the outcome and the natural sequel. The whole life of consciousness is characterized by the tendency to posit objects, since it is consciousness, that is to say self-knowledge, only in so far as it takes hold of itself and draws itself together in an identifiable object. And yet the absolute positing of a single object is the death of consciousness, since it congeals the whole of existence, as a crystal placed in a solution suddenly crystallizes it. [Merleau-Ponty, p. 71]

Aware that "perspectivism" of the body is a result of 'self-knowledge' constructing itself-- building its unity as "an identifiable object" (this might be describable as the autopoietic function of selfhood or ego)-- Merleau-Ponty is convinced that the body is a single object in the continuum of worldly/universal objects, requiring an assemblage of body parts to objectify his own body. When Merleau-Ponty describes memory as referential, objects become memory. He recognizes that items cannot exist independent of context, as in an objective world where "gender" is static.

Taken in itself-- and as an object it demands to be taken thus-- the object has nothing cryptic about it; it is completely displayed and its parts co-exist while our gaze runs from one to another, its present does not cancel its past, nor will its future cancel its present. [Merleau-Ponty, p. 70]

Merleau-Ponty's position gives credence to the idea that images such as Inez van Lamsweerde and Aziz+Cucher's are valid commentary on the body in perception and mythologies. Subtraction from the whole (in this case subtraction of sexual markers such as penis, nipples, and hair) stresses preconceived notions-- that one is either man or woman and nothing in between--, and affects notions that singularly impart the body as "a

body": what shocks is not nudity or exposure, or in some cases vulnerability of the subject, but the subtraction of that which is stable, and 'apparently' consistent. The abjection of these bodies and images is consistent with the approach that bodies are whole and gender is invariable, un-malleable. To this degree, the images are potent because what is removed is what we can SEE. People are changed by pacemakers, and kidney failure, but these bodily extractions are less obvious and do not necessarily change how meaning and desire are derived (and if pacemakers do change meaning and desire, it is not manifest in the body; more likely being subtle or spiritual-- even then, J.G. Ballard's novel Crash, along with David Cronenberg's like-titled film adaptation, suggest that these subtle and spiritual changes are absurd.) Changes are necessitated by a series of over-arching mythologies about the struggle against nature and death, rather than the struggle to form sexuality and the crossing of boundaries (change). In **Crash**, the main character, James Ballard, lies in the airport hospital bed while his wife gives him a 'hand-job', there is no sexual intensity given over to the 'hand-job' because they carry a discussion in a normal tone about a subject other than sex. Society has come to a new 'term' through contemporary art and theory which has dislocated, deconstructed, and fragmented the body. The trend seems to be that our bodies hardly matter, as they hardly do in **Crash**. While James Ballard's relationship to his wife is distant, their comfort and knowledge of each other is desirable: they communicate as autonomous beings rather than beings struggling for autonomy. As Cronenberg says, these are relationships of the future. As has been discussed, vision is fabricated, much the same way the story was brought to the viewer of **Blade Runner**-- the viewer of the film watches genetically engineered eyes, and possibilities that the story-line offers to see the production of such eyes. Merleau-Ponty it seems, would have painted his own body-- scent included-- into his creation, unlike Alberti's apparatus for perspectivism.

It is curious that Merleau-Ponty also represents the body in pieces, in 'bits'. In light of Merleau-Ponty's explanation of the body, it is necessary to add that technology has recanned the means of interpretation: the gaze, time, space and language are subject to reconfiguration. Merleau-Ponty creates hierarchies of the eye, allotting vision as primary to all absorptive interpretations:

The object-horizon structure, or the perspective, is no obstacle to me when I want to see the object: for just as it is the means whereby objects are distinguished from each other, it is also the means whereby they are disclosed. To see is to enter a universe of beings which *display themselves*, and they would not do this if they could not be hidden behind each other or behind me. In other words: to look at an object is to inhabit it, and from this habitation to grasp all things in terms of the

aspect which they present to it. But in so far as I see those things too, they remain abodes open to my gaze, and, being potentially lodged in them, I already perceive from various angles the central object of my present vision. Thus every object is the mirror of all others. [Merleau-Ponty, p. 68]

Vision is modified by technology, and the ability to express imagination visually (as opposed to imaginatively) has been augmented to human advantage (exemplified in television, film, advertising, and now the internet). The images of Inez van Lamsweerde and Aziz+Cucher are good examples of imaginative intent.

As has been explained by Mark Poster in The Mode of Information, and Gianni Vattimo in The Transparent Society, language has changed according to the medium, suggesting that the phenomenology of perception might be revised according to sometimes slight and simple technological changes that reconfirm Merleau-Ponty's original thesis. The electronic medium has not only changed language, or rather "wrapped language", as it has compressed time-- leaving for example, the museum (the Nineteenth-Century museum model remaining largely uncontested, even beloved) as a reduction "to a database" [Bradley, p. 39]-- an idea of Friedrich Kittler. It is simply a matter of the possibilities of memory and connectiveness that allow Kittler to encourage the idea that the museum has met its match via the digitization of the object. Merleau-Ponty is concerned in the same way with not only objects with historical or time specificity, but with objects in general as they relate to the outside objective and visual agency of bodily experience.

....my human gaze never *posits* more than one facet of the object, even though by means of horizons it is directed towards all the others. It can never come up against previous appearances or those presented to other people otherwise than through the intermediary of time and language. [Merleau-Ponty, p. 69]

This offers insight as to why Judith Butler also demands that observance of the "constitutive" nature of the body is only possible for interpretation-- or rather, thinking in parts-- making clear why the art of Inez van Lamsweerde and Aziz+Cucher provoke strong emotional reactions:

Thinking the body as constructed demands a rethinking of the meaning of construction itself. And if certain constructions appear constitutive, that is, have this character of being that "without which" we could not think at all, we might suggest that bodies only appear, only endure, only live within the productive constraints of certain highly gendered regulatory schemas. [Butler, p. xi]

To disrupt the regulatory schemas is to infringe on previous articulations of the body, and I might add, in turn, previous articulations of desire and bodily emotion or expression (the animation of dormant subjectivity). These infringements might be thought of, however, as developmental, or revolutionary as it applies to the constraints of the contemporary Western body. Can one accept for example that AIDS can be cured? This is a stunning question for most, certainly for those who are directly affected, but it is an important question in terms of how the body has been previously interpreted. Can an afflicted body be thought of as recombinant? Can our general notions, or 'gendered regulatory schemas' instilled by an epoch of "disease" be recomposed again, particularly in a society that holds the body in contempt? These questions can only be answered if we once again, and continually disassociate the body.

The body without organs, an idea appropriated from Antonin Artaud's pain and incarceration, dematerializes the flesh-- a process contradictory to funerary practice of ancient Egypt. The flesh had to endure, and it was clearly intended to do so in peace and autonomy, with as much anonymity as the sand would conceal. Burial is a desiring-machine/technology of Ancient Egyptian culture; anomalous because it exposes the discreet relationship between fourth and first order subjectivity: she is embalmed by a cultural system, yet is buried with her personal accumulation of body technique accouterments, and portions of her own body. The burial of a mummy is a self-referencing system. Deleuze and Guattari call self-referencing subjects, "figureless and foundationless"; open to external subjective imposition. The mummy is powerless (she is a passive subjectivity) but symbolically powerful; it is docile, but a source of creativity. The Lady of Thebes is a fourth order subjectivity; as culture, vulnerable to subjective reformulation-- most famously in the case of Egyptian mummies by Hollywood. [See **Image Appendix, p. 4 and Filmography**] She recuperates human history, lost, complex civilization, one mired in mystery and wonder about the future, one unexplainable to the degree that, for some, aliens are responsible. It is the vulnerability of a fourth order subjectivity that intimates a BwO-- the fabricated impression that subjectivity requires re-embodiment. The BwO is clearly a rhetorical fabrication, but at a semantic level, the BwO is an easy target for the violation of active subjectivities that require an ideological couch.

The BwO, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is anorganic and synthetic, a completely cultural and social construction, even though it is manifest through an image of the organic body; the first order subject. Its sensation is its surface and the implications it has upon the viewer. Its power is not of its own, but of its power to symbolize for others. While the

Lady of Thebes may have been decapitated by the violence of Aquino's art, her face still belongs to her body, as Deleuze and Guattari would describe, a volume-cavity system, and her surface is still continuous with her shape as a human.

...: if the head and its elements are facialized, the entire body also can be facialized, comes to be facialized as part of an inevitable process. When the mouth and nose, but first the eyes, become a holey surface, all the other volumes and cavities of the body follow. [D+G, 1987, p. 170]

Not only does the body consist of a volume-cavity system, but the sarcophagus, glass casing, the "cabinet de curiosités", and the specificity of containment represented by a museum (by more particularly a natural history museum which stores things inside, encloses nature, codifies it, and de-naturalizes it just as the cavities of hundreds of stuffed animals, fur intact, come to represent cavities [cavities of occupation for other natures]) envelop referential meaning, like a transparent Russian doll-- the skin is invisible or transparent by the system of receding similarities available for interpretation. The puzzle spills its insides, traces of that existence projected outward by Aquino's repetitive, simulated montage-- and this similar to television where commercials are repeated again and again, sometimes back to back, sometimes overlapping.

Didier Anzieu, in The Skin Ego: A Psychoanalytic Approach to the Self, focuses on the skin as a primary site of experience of affect. Similarly, the eye is a significant bodily entrance/exit. Vision is a mediated sensory experience. No matter how slight the object or movement in the visual field, the body must respond to perceive (even with no overt bodily posture, vision is still possible). Furthermore, the brain substantiates perception in the form of recognition and fantasy-- the inner horizon of Gestalt psychology.

Visual technology has often been interpreted as an extension of the body, a prosthetic. Deleuze and Guattari, for example, call visual technology an 'organ', it is a product of impersonal technology (sensory parcelization) extracting and partitioning the body-- a partitioning but not a disassociation. For example, the material subjectivity that resides as a voice message on an electronic voice message system disembodies subjectivity, but only the voice, it does not disassociate.⁴³ Drugs act in a similar way. Extraction of sensations (by drugs, sensory stimuli, anorexia) isolates body parts, facializes them. Technology adds

⁴³ In David Lynch's latest film, *Lost Highway*, the main character is able to call his home and speak with a person that has just handed him a cellular telephone. By the end of the scene, the person on the phone is speaking what the character's expression is intimating.

contrast to a composed understanding and acceptance of the body— a unified body that Freud and psychoanalysis have striven to recover. At first glance it may appear that technology has done precisely what it was intended to do as a desiring-machine: extract and partition (thereby commodifying) the body as a causal, or developmental change according to historical/intellectual imperatives— it is intended to operate anonymously and autonomously.⁴⁴ But the voice and the body have not been cognitively disassociated— as it is in **2001: A Space Odyssey**.

Visual technology, like television and film, tells stories for us, relieving the ability or responsibility to act upon dreams, feelings and sense because visual technology is the simulacra that blinds or camouflages the senses. When human subjectivity is appropriated by technology in third and fourth order subjectivity, it delimits the current body techniques already at work in the human body sphere. Clearly, the body is the medium by which we sense, however, technology pacifies by substituting subjectivity. Hooykaas+Stansfield, and Aquino understand visual technology as a simulacra of the eye. Technology itself has no agency; it is efficient because it behaves in a pattern that resemble agency, when technology is a mode of subjectivity that restricts recourse to those who use and develop technology, those who impose the directives of specific subjectivity on the victims of technology. That is why third order subjectivity, particularly inscribed subjectivity, offers only partial recourse to the subjective expression. Likewise, for this reason, third order subjectivity can easily pass into fourth order subjectivity where larger questions of re-embodiment and culture have pan-discursive effects. If facialization is the white wall/black hole effect, television is the inverse. It creates white walls in an otherwise black hole. Electronic technology has become vision. It divides the senses from recognition of the facialization of the body.

⁴⁴ Social theory reacts and interacts with contemporary/parallel society, as is explained by the concept of the 'collective unconscious'. [For an in-depth analysis, see Pierre Bourdieu's work on 'taste' culture in: BOURDIEU, Pierre. (1984) Part I: *A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Richard NICE, trans. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP.] Technology is often used to couch the theoretical explanation of how structural/intellectual influences construct and deconstruct the body. The common conclusion being: A deconstruction of the body, without a reciprocal attempt (not necessarily an equal attempt) to theorize the body as a common entity of being human is culpable or co-responsible with the restrictions of the scientific method for creative and theoretical impasse. Theorists such as Freud begin with a partitioned/parcelized body, and reconstruct accordingly. However, in the oeuvre of Jean Baudrillard, unification is commodification, as is exemplified by the degrees to which a body without a penis emotionally reacts to 'lack'. Deleuze and Guattari contest, revise and resist the commodification of the body, blow the body apart, leaving debris as intensities of life; and not simply for the human.

Primary vision is organic and sensory. Secondary vision is interpretive, linked to the imagination; this vision is the vision of a prosthetic and is technological because it is constructed for, but outside, the body: an extension of the body that interpolates the organic body. Yet primary vision is dependent upon fabricated sight, and spontaneous image production has made that dependency seamless. Vision is not so simply divided: non-visual senses simulate the site of illusion, the screen, where one type of vision blends with the other. The distinction is the screen.

When Aquino makes a projection installation, his intent is to make visual technologies dominate the sensorium. The creating of an attraction or spectacle is enough to warrant the intent. The application of technology, as in the transfer from second to third (and then to fourth) order subjectivities, demands specific sensory perception and thus forces a conceptual division of the body onto/into the body. For example, visual technology not only divides the body from the mind, it further parcelizes an interpretation of the body, forcing a perception of the body as parts, as fragmentary. In this fragmentarity, the mind does not need a barrier to the body: the mind floats without a body or rather is utterly exposed-- the body is turned inside-out, and does not require a technique of the body.⁴⁵ The mind recedes deeper into the body so that the sockets of the eyes become screens to the world, severed sight sees the body from which it came. The fragmentary subject is the postmodern subject. Television, for example, extracts the senses from the body, unhinging the body from imagination and experience, achieving a compartmentalized sensorium whereby each sensation is dependent upon the specific material subjective technological apparatus from whence it came. This division of the senses parallels the postmodern inclination whereby the body is fodder, a potentially engineered material for the construction of a post-human subject and subjectivity. The mythical cyborg is a primary example. Technology divides the body, making discreet packages existing external to the whole or other parts, concise with and complementary to the project of the Enlightenment.

A confident, solid image of the body-- what it means, what it should be, what it lacks, what its potentials are-- overshadows the body's ability to interpret. This is why Western ideals of the body are more established by images of the body (fabrications versus

⁴⁵ Those who have been to a techno-rave will understand the idea that the skin is peeled away from the mind. The piercing music and equally intense light-shifts impact upon the ear and eye in a synchronized manner. The force of sensory stimulation is no barrier to the brain/mind itself. The ear and eye are completely bypassed. While the body is integral to the event, the music and spectacle ignore the body: heat, momentum, adornment stretch the physical limits of the body to the point where the mind becomes posited onto the screens of the aura and atmosphere-- upon the body itself-- leaving nothing to imagination.

attempting to deal with the body that is normally out of control and abject) than by the sensory and organizational abilities of the body. The body is able to interpret, and more importantly, able to be interpreted. Western construction of the body through the image is controversial because as a constructed image, an ideal is produced. An ideal that may not reflect the contemporary status of the body. The body is therefore less important as an interpreting, living, functioning unit.

All technologies to some extent cause the senses to divide; a bicycle for example redefines posture according to movement, and therefore one's sense of balance is linked to the bicycle just as much, or more so, as to the body. However, it is visual technology that demonstrates best the irony and discrepancy of how technology is able to categorize and divide human sensation. Visual technology appears simple because it is ubiquitous, yet its impact is important because it is not as obvious as its presentation. Television and film are part of knowledge. These technologies have an impact on the human body. It is not only the radiation that is given off from a television screen that affects our bodies. The economy of information, optimal according to the image, has made visual technology the means to extend broad ranging, even contradictory metanarratives. Before printed text there was the image-- sophisticated enough to define a visual language.⁴⁶ Visual technology, by creating vivid histories and stories for consumption, not only divides the mind from the body, but divides the body into parts; it separates the eye from the body.

The new media and technologies by which we amplify and extend ourselves constitute huge collective surgery carried out on the social body with complete disregard for antiseptics. - Marshall McLuhan, as quoted in Kroker.

Technologies, in particular visual technologies, divide and partition the senses, commodifying the senses for exchange, leaving the senses open to subjective imposition and substitution of meaning by proxy. This division of the senses is carried over to the physical body, portioning a hierarchy of value. For example, television and film are specific to vision and sound, but the perfection of the moving image does not require the other primary senses (taste, touch, smell). This does not, however, limit the impact of the moving image. By means of the visual, visceral memory can be recovered. Commercials on television for restaurants succeed to stimulate hunger because the sight of food stimulates a reaction, a Pavlovian memory of taste or smell, as does Alberti's linear grid system, stimulates hunger-- it is impossible to disassociate sexuality in the mind of either

⁴⁶ see: BAZIN, André. What is Cinema? Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. p. 16, 23-40.

model, artist or viewer [See Image Appendix, p. 11]. The artist depicted may be looking through a grid at the naked woman he is drawing, but that does not make his imagination immune, as David Howes has suggested. The reaction to a fabricated image does not require the original food item to be expressed; visual simulation is sufficient. Imagination works in this way yet the vision machine manages to co-opt imagination through the commodification of the visual: consumption requires the imagination to be controlled, that the body likewise be controlled. Howes' example of Alberti's linear perspective grid, used to make precision drawings, is interpreted by Howes in this way:

What I would like to underline,..., is the stultification of the non-visual senses which results from the interposition of the window between the artist and his model. In effect, Alberti's [linear perspective] grid screens out all the smells and sounds, tastes and textures, of the environment. It 'steps up' the natural power of the eye to survey things from afar, while at the same time de-emphasizing the other senses as ways of knowing and communicating. [Howes, VSE, p. 5]

Howes' claim is that the technology of a grid screen also screens out the implications of such a situation to other senses. Howes is correct to the degree that technology is the distillation of the body from pattern, a process that is not contrary to Deleuze and Guattari's project. As John Berger notes in, Ways of Seeing, Dürer, the artist depicting the use of Alberti's linear grid system, not only used the technology of a linear grid system, but understood what technology did even before it was used:

Dürer believed that the ideal nude ought to be constructed by taking the face of one body, the breasts of another, the legs of a third, the shoulders of a fourth, the hands of a fifth-- and so on. The result would glorify Man. But the exercise presumed a remarkable indifference to who any one person really was. [Berger, p. 62]

The window does structurally screen-out taste, etc., but the subjectivity of such an artist is not beyond effect/affect. Technology rather stultifies the expression of subjectivity, not the subjective position. While compartmentalization of sensation takes place in many ways, the technological media scape affecting visualization (reflections, refractions and mirrors; and by extension imaginations and dreams) feeds from the economy of the black wall/white hole system, the background variables in interpretation are erased, and the locus of information, the residuals of what once was the white wall/black hole system is inverted and absorbed, the white hole absorbs and concentrates the variables of an embodied knowledge or subjectivity. This might be termed the postmodern subjectivity. Body parts are fetishized making the fragmented body the aesthetic material for manipulation, economizing the overhaul of nature in the name of aesthetics: sight and mind are always

divided. Just as the screen divides the real from the fabricated, the screen divides the body from the sensation-- touch is severed. The image may provoke desire, but the vision machine image is always divided from touch. Desire is specifically prompted through this division; in this way, the compartmentalization of the body and senses commodify desire. Consumer culture, for example, is sexual in that it substitutes the imaginary with the real (or illusion of the real), and extends the division between imaginary and real-- metaphorically making the glass of the screen thicker, shinier, more luminescent and seamless. The further the frame blends with the background of the fabrication, the more real the image, the easier it is to stretch the commodification of desire. Sensation is not a visceral reaction to the simulating environment, it is provisional to the body. The body constructs itself (presentation) and its subjectivity (interiority) in response to the objective world (aesthetics). Sensations are about organization of understanding; an equally relevant desiring-machine to the organization of understanding both the body, one's body, and the external world, is the sensation-machine. Sensations have, therefore, a political and ethical implications because the organizational format of sensation determines how the body and psyche are re-invested. The logical extension of this thesis therefore is that the partitioning and commodification of sensation by technology establish patterns for expression. As Marshall McLuhan wrote, "faced with information overload, we have no alternative but pattern-recognition". While sensation is not necessarily overloaded, it is the patterns that technology establishes for the human body that limit (according to the input pattern) how humans socially and bodily behave (output).

In the decomposition of the real, subjectivity expands investment in the ideal, how complete the world could be, how perfect humans can/could be-- as Pierre Bourdieu discusses in **La Distinction**, there is a shift from economic capital to symbolic capital. Take any store catalogue and see how beautiful the models are, how well all the items of clothing fit, how clean the clothes are-- even in the most adverse environmental conditions: smiling faces, appetizing food, etc.

Sensation is not a singular element, it is a gestalt of human capacities to read information both external and internal to the body. Instinct is likewise an intrinsic part of human sensation.⁴⁷ The body, however, is partitioned by technology (which re-fabricates mythologies-- dreams and imaginations) and by the internal alienation of human

⁴⁷ For a unique interpretation of instinct according to Freud, see: LINGIS, Alphonso. (1994) Part 3: *The Libidinal Economy*, Chapter 7: *HardCurrency. Foreign Bodies*. New York: Routledge. pp. 107-164.

subjectivity which results from creating a habitus for the body external to the body.⁴⁸ This is process in technological interventions which bring subjectivity into the third and fourth order. The subject as an embodiment strives to divide one's own body, a process apart from the now common division of self from other. For example, tattooing is localized to the skin, and to spaces upon the body (and in some cases inside the body-- tattoos on the inside of lips and on the tongue) create a habitus for the symbolization represented by the tattoo. It is unavoidable that a tattoo upon the skin does not create its own frame; at the outside limit, the whole skin acts as the frame (or canvas) or boundary, coupled with the three-dimensional shape of the human body. The tattoo is a surface marker; the black hole/white wall system facializes the tattoo. The surface markers indicate internal affinities, syntax, semiotic thought-scapes. The tattoo is an opening for bodily flows, allowing dialogue to those privy to exposure; they are more than indexical signs because they are also performative, as in Thailand where specific tattoos are meditative conduits-- marking group inclusion as well as opening channels of concentration to the Monk/mentor of each wearer.

Compartmentalization of the body by oneself infers the compartmentalization that takes place when technology substitutes the body by proxy. For example, technologies of vision manufacture dreams and mythologies which fetishize the divided body, or parts of bodies

⁴⁸ Habitus is a structured, structuring disposition. Disposition can, to be simple, be sensed as desire. Any kind of attraction, interest, or inclination-towards, might constitute what Bourdieu calls disposition. Bourdieu claims dispositions are organized productions. The constructs to attain an end-product-- dispositions (and one might further say, opinion, justifications for action)-- is what Bourdieu calls: habitus.

Habitus is both self and society. Habitus can be identified in a way that a racial group can be identified: by prediction (Bourdieu, p. 59-60). Thus, Bourdieu claims that a member of a certain habitus can be generalized. The habitus is a program of preconditions. For example, one of the reasons there is such a broad and easily recognizable phenomenon of computer-phobia is because the computer itself operates as a habitus. There are sets of invisible (unchangeable) criteria and conditions which allow a user to interact . . . "but only to the degree that the computer only does what you tell it to do." A user does not have easy access to changing the criteria of interactions with a computer. The software that organizes all the information you wish to input and accumulate is not wholly changeable. One could imagine however, that individual access to the habitus of the computer would put many if not all computer programmers out of the skilled labour market.

Habitus is distinct because it cannot necessarily cope as a system when demands placed upon it are not epistemologically knowable. Without at least some form of experience reservoir (commonly known as memory-- but perhaps not applicable here as memory because the system of habitus does not operate on a simple origin of memory) a habitus is not 'at hand'. Thus, Bourdieu aligns the notion of habitus with the Marxist concept of "effective demand" . . . , a realistic relation to what is possible, founded on and therefore limited by power". [Marx, 1975 in Bourdieu, 1980: p. 65]

[BOURDIEU, Pierre. (1980/1990) Chapter 2: "The Imaginary Anthropology of Subjectivism"; Chapter 4: "Belief and the Body"; Chapter 5: "The Logic of Practice". The Logic of Practice. NICE, Richard, trans. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.]

(message=medium). The reason the media scape is successful is because vision allows the greatest economy of information; the greatest economy of information is imbedded in a black wall/white hole system-- information is precise. The patterns created by television are easily recognizable with practice, easily comprehensible by the psyche and this economy of image is the clearest mode of reaffirming dominant ideologies; it is a mode of power. While there is some truth to David Howes' observation that technological systems limit sensibilities, it does not, however, dispense with them.

Visual technology has superseded sensation, making the body obsolete in the contemporary world. By all forecasts, alienation from the body (which began with the Cartesian duality of mind and body) continues to register prominently in academic and generalized culture. Elizabeth Grosz in Volatile Bodies: Toward A Corporeal Feminism advocates a philosophical liberation politic through the female body. Volatile bodies are exclusions from philosophical prerogatives because they are uncontrollable and fluid, like gasoline. Bodies are dangerous not simply because they injure and can be injured, but because the recognition of the body highlights a general problem in knowledge and everyday life: women respond bodily to depictions of universal, humanist phallogocentric directives. Similarly, R.A. Stone understands that bodies justify suppression, specifically because the body of the woman is unpredictable and threatening.

Forgetting about the body is an old Cartesian trick, one that has unpleasant consequences for those bodies whose speech is silenced by the act of our forgetting: That is to say, those upon whose labor the act of forgetting the body is found---usually women and minorities. [Stone, 1991, p. 113]

What is unruly about the 'old Cartesian trick' is not that the bodies of women and minorities are forgotten-- on the contrary, these bodies are more thought of as bodies (objects) than subjectivities--, but that in general, any body displaced from its subjectivity is volatile, and most certainly, malleable. As was explained, there are postmodern practices which both externalize subjectivity and reserve the right to that subjectivity without losing recourse to what one's own body is used for. The division of the soul from the body is not necessarily far-fetched; it is not a particularly incomprehensible distinction. It is problematized rather by the impression that the soul is unitary, singular, and by extension, that the body is also singular, unitary. This creates two problems: 1.) the separation of subjectivity from soul in second and third order subjectivity leaves both body and subjectivity open for reinterpretation-- resulting in the imposition of subjectivity upon inanimate, fourth order subjectivity, and 2.) in relations to Cartesian dualism, perhaps it is

not so negative that technology leaves options open for subjective expression in a variety of forms making it is possible to partially or wholly satisfy some form of human need when a person who does not have functioning vocal cords has the opportunity to express through writing, an electronic vocal cord vibrator, or sign language.

Descartes established a polar model, whereby the body is as singular as the soul. This is not always practically applied: the body is often partitioned, divided, even in the simplest of technologies. Even with the technology of language, it is indeed difficult for a whole series of reasons to sufficiently express what one wishes to say, or what one believes, or what one is thinking. Technology, as we have seen, parcelizes the body, extracts parts, making sexuality, for example, as multiple as the desires that act upon the body. Music and its attraction combines with the ear, good food combines with the mouth and tongue, good sex couples with the skin. It is possible that Cartesian duality is victim of monotheism: one god, one soul. The body is not unitary-- and this is why there can be no hard and fast judgment made when animate subjectivities hinge expressive hopes on terminal subjectivities. If a person hangs a reproduction of a painting by, most commonly a well known artists on his or her wall, this is equally the appropriation of fourth order subjectivity as is placing one's own work of art on the wall-- one can reappropriate one's past for example. The reproduction itself is also an expression of the need to re-embodiment terminal subjectivities into animate illusion. The difficult question of how contemporary identity and subjectivity might be different in the post-modern era (and subsequently where that identity and subjectivity will formulate in the future) is tied directly to the contemporary need to re-invent oneself; easily accomplished as a product of fourth order subjective reinvestment. Certainly the technology for subjective re-investment is different than when technologies were alone, techniques of the body, and not mechanical substitutions of the body. As was explained with visual images from the lexicon of contemporary arts, conjectural photography creates the post-modern subject. Specifically, the post-modern subject resists the incurrence of animate subjectivities onto fourth order subjectivities⁴⁹ by making the body psychically uninhabitable. In this way, the post-modern tendency to reformulate, refabricate, destroy, augment, change, and reduce the body is a tactical stance to resist the objectification of the body. More importantly, to resist the penetration of outside animate subjectivities that force subjective re-embodiment according to their own needs and codes when a body is perceived to be in the fourth order.

⁴⁹ As one is an object, one becomes a fourth order subjectivity-- as an object one is not given recourse to human subjectivity, nor allowed to express individual subjectivity.

Cartesian dualism of mind and body is valid, but is a simplification, an inadequate generalization. The problem to me seems to be that since the soul is a unitary entity (the monotheism of a single God), the body by extension is also singular. Mind and body are quantifiably equal. The error in Cartesian thought is not, as most theorists willingly cite, that the body is divided from the soul, but that the body is singular, whole. This is the basis, too, of psychoanalysis whereby the singular, whole person must be reconstructed out of the rubble of trauma. Indeed the body in parts is the reality of desire. Fetishes make up desire in fragmented ways: the foot, the nose, the mouth, the tongue, the sex organs. And by metonymy, it goes beyond that as well: cars, drugs, latex, and as we shall see in the artistic work of Aziz+Cucher, baseball bats, guns, and computers. When the body is metaphorically ripped apart, it horrifies: the apparent singularity and wholeness of the body, as it must be in relation to a whole and singular soul, is an investment that Western culture and its Judeo-Christian antecedence impose. A body that is incomplete is horrifying. A fat body horrifies because what must conform to a shape does not conform: the same is true for a missing limb, a scarred body, a deformed bone structure. These horrify because these bodies are incomplete. Deleuze and Guattari test this tendency to singularity by advocating multiple possibilities (many souls, many bodies) as a product of becomings, as if the body did not exist or was entirely malleable. Second and third order subjectivities enable becomings, as do the possibilities to ride on fourth order subjectivities. A person's music collection, records, tapes, discs, the radio station listened to, are all potential becomings that express subjectivity. Furthermore, for Deleuze and Guattari, it is not only technology that enables a variety of becomings or body possibilities. The subjective system that Deleuze and Guattari have mapped in Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus is about the intimate decisions one makes about becoming something 'other'. For Deleuze and Guattari, a body is not at all necessary in this process, the flesh-body is secondary. If it is feasible that the body is a field of impasse, a zone for rhizomatic energies that have more importance than the body itself, then access to an ideal is crucial to subjectivity. As a process of becomings, the ideal fades away. The body is being substituted by technology, it is a kind of colonization of the body. For example, pharmaceuticals, particularly psychotropic drugs, impose a standardized level of happiness and depression.

Some contemporary theorists attempt to explain how visual technology has succeeded in appropriating the human ability to sense, not simply in the form of vision, but manifestly in desire and inquiry. Visual technology has taken over the human ability to sense by forming both perfect and competitive simulacra. Television and film, while often thought of as a

pulsating or strobe medium-- effecting motion-- challenges time. Visual technologies' challenge to time (and by extension, human existence) control both mythologies and perceptions (visual and phenomenological). Mythologies (fantasies, imaginings, thoughts, and ideas) and perception are essential elements of human sensation-- or more appropriately, what remains of sensation in contemporary culture whereby humans are subject to a proto-invisible and tacit form of artificial sensation. This synthetic sensation might be thought of as a prosthetic (O'Neill, 1985) replacing human sense of want and desire with that of frozen mythologies. For example, Lenin's body is embalmed, mummified in the Lenin Mausoleum in Moscow. It is only by the existence of the idea of flesh that the revolution survives.

Everything happens as if Mao and Franco had already died several times and had been replaced by his double. From a political point of view, that a head of state remains the same or is someone else doesn't strictly change anything, so long as they resemble each other. For a long time now a head of state-- no matter which one-- is nothing but the simulation of himself, and only that gives him the power and the quality to govern. No one would grant the least consent, the least devotion to a real person. [Baudrillard, *The Precession of Simulacra*, p. 25]

Preservation of the despot means preservation of the moment. Like the X-rays that are part of the museum's display and the art installation of Hooykaas+Stansfield/Aquino must inevitably utilize technology of illusion, illusion of existence. Aquino uses slides. One cannot help but think of the possibilities slides and photography offer to both public and private record, to memory; an important relationship that the mummy offers to us. The memory that is availed in the form of slides, a relatively recent technology in comparison to that of the mummy, is artificial, it is the re-invested subjectivity of the curatorial intent and Aquino realized the necessity of the illusion for art and rhetoric-- this artificiality is imperative to the development of 'artificial intelligence' is the same. The slides that Aquino uses are unique in that they are images of images. [**Image Appendix, p. 13**] The slides have been produced from a television screen, giving the final product a blurred effect; the image is less distinct, and more ambiguous, leaving the identification of the mummy completely imperceptible for anyone that did not know the context of the projection-- a project that seems somewhat self-indulgent, simply because the image is imperceptible-- like word games.

Each image that appears in the windows are slide-stills of a video projection (to a television screen) of the facial profile of the Lady of Thebes. [**Image Appendix, p. 13**] This is a double simulacra; meaning is created without any antecedent-- the complacency and

jouissance of spontaneous meaning recognition renders what is perceived as surface: the video absorbs an image at a specific and past time. The tape of that image is then played again at another time. Once again, the image is a competitive simulacra because it is not known how many times that particular video tape has played-- the assumption being that each time the tape is played, a different image, no matter how slight, appears (or disappears)--, and throughout, the video image is re-manipulated to change its colours and hues. From one slice of video image Aquino shot a slide image of the augmented video projection, ultimately producing the images that are back projected on the front windows of the Redpath Museum. What is also significant is that the Lady of Thebes lies dormant in a glass casing in the museum, with very low lighting to protect her. This gives the effect that one is in a mausoleum-- a skeptical homage to death.

The vision machine permits a recursive view, extending the Cartesian dualism of mind and body. The vision machine severs sight from the body, making it possible to view one's body outside of bodily situatedness. It is as if a person's head is severed, and is able to look back upon the body from which it came; a person requiring dialysis has a similar, less intense, less dream-like, view. While the dialysis machine is not specifically visual, a peculiar kind of self examination, extension of the body, notion of human fragility, is possible through technologies of vision. What is impossible as a living body is possible through technology. Indeed it is an objectivist position; as if the eye itself floats away from the body and can still 'view'/gaze.

Every "object" presupposes the continuity of a flow; every flow, the fragmentation of the object. Doubtless each organ-machine interprets the entire world from the perspective of its own flux, from the point of view of the energy that flows from it: the eye interprets everything-- speaking, understanding, shitting, fucking-- in terms of seeing. But a connection with another machine is always established, along a transverse path, so that one machine interrupts the current of the other or "sees" its own current interrupted. [D+G, AO, p. 6]

The objectivist view of the world is based upon subtraction and addition, division and multiplication. Everything is made up of discreet parts and implodes to smaller and smaller, or larger and larger extensions. Our bodies are constructed specifically by subtractions, and more importantly, according to the contemporary medium (gaze or rule/r) of the contemporary world, agency is given over to those body parts. The pieces of the body range from singular genes-- constructed on a grand scientific scale by the Human Genome Project whereby each individual gene has a complete and hermetic function in the organic creation of a body-- to more cosmic notions of, for example, bodily health. The Human

Genome Project makes its ultimate claim that the body is constructed by bits of information interacting to create an obdurate being. The political agenda of such research is less explicit: with the knowledge of what each bit of information represents and how it interacts, adjustments can be made to influence a bodily trait-- again, the focus is on individual body parts. As Judith Butler claims, bodies are not only performative but schematized. My argument stems from the direction of the schematization that is based, in part, on severing of the body. The gruesome term is deliberate-- I see the contemporary influence of technology as a parceling mechanism. Technology parcels the body senses-- just as Avital Ronell has explained in The Telephone Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, Electric Speech, the telephone separates the ear from the body.

Crucial to Ronell's analysis is technological language: language through the telephone is intrusive, within one's brain, personal, and at times non-interactive: particularly because the option is available for either party to hang-up. For Ronell, technology changes text; one must stand away from text and observe it, the text is an object rather than a standardized mode of communication. Language is not a standard in the context of telephone communication and by extension all forms of communication consolidated by and with technology deconstruct communion. For example, Ronell's observation that technology is not only a male invention, but one that is overtly influenced by the subjectivity, personal experiences and life-histories of the various people involved in the telephone's invention reciprocally subvert parallel inventions of communication that strike a deal of confusion into "the" telephone's invention.

Contemporary visual artists Inez van Lamsweerde and Aziz+Cucher divide the body to make exclamation. These divisions are absurd, to make nothing of the way the body is severed by society in which parts are commodified to express specific viewpoints about control. In particular, van Lamsweerde and Aziz+Cucher go beyond exclamation in that their images are created by the technology that parcels perception, making a double-entendre of technology and the body. Likewise, Rozanne Stone uses theory of technology and the physical transformation of her/his body to appropriate the powers of technology to form impressions and general objectivist philosophies. For R.A. Stone the extension/extermination of her own body by technology and the severing that results, is more extreme than art or images. In this same way, Orlan attempts to reconstruct her body by the use of addition and subtraction.

Ubiquitous visual machines extract and focus vision at the expense of other senses, at the expense of background information. This division of senses effects our conceptual understanding of the body-- how the human body is understood. The division has allowed for a severing of not simply mind and body but of the body itself-- making clear that the Cartesian project imbedded in science is extended to perfection through contemporary visual technologies. Contemporary representations of the body as fragmentary is a corollary of visual technologies' ability to extract vision at the expense of other senses, striking clear divisions and thereby encouraging productions and manifestations of 'body' and bodily existence as fragmentary to the degree that individual body parts are given decontextualized significance from a unitary body notion.

Sensation through the body conforms to technology. Visual technology acts, when it can, as a filter for other senses, particularly because the visual penetrates the imagination like no other sense-- due in part to the economy of information and the docile body which accepts what is perceived as something more than what is sensed. The body is subjectified by technology to control or specify impasse. As Hubert Dreyfus has explained, Husserl and Gestalt psychology characterize the docility of the body in sensation as the inner horizon. The inner horizon is that which is able to process information as taken-for granted imagination; recognition of the general patterns of human existence and the unconditional acceptance of those patterns. The classic example is that when one looks at a building, seeing its façade, it is taken for granted that it is still a building one is looking at, regardless of the fact that one cannot see the rooms, hallways, etc. The inner horizon is a necessary generalization of existence; we would not be able to function without an inner horizon. Dreyfus is aware of this, and comments on visual technology in this way:

... lack of horizons is the essential difference between an image in a movie or on a TV screen and the same scene as experienced by a human being. [Dreyfus, p. 241]

When watching television, the lack of an inner horizon requires very little instinctual processing. It should be mentioned that body techniques and technology placing subjectivity in the second, third and fourth orders simplifies the body according to partitions: the telephone voice message leaves only voice and television is two-dimensional. writing has semblances of the hand and touch [Greenaway, p. 74], etc. The body is independent of technology, but not the subjectivity that must express itself-- it is not independent of technology. This conclusion has fueled the excitement revolving around the cyborg in popular culture. For example, fashion designer, Lapidus, is designing 'technowear' suited to possibilities that one can receive a fax or download information to

the prosthetics one wears on their person, imbedded in clothing. Fashion is subjectivity to the degree that the fax machine expresses something about who we are. Likewise, in this regard, the location of the body dictates the necessity for contemporary technological. subjective expression and reciprocally dictates the body technique of the physical body. Technology emphasizes the division between sensation and emotion, (desire and touch for example), making it necessary to decide upon the body according to very personal and perhaps self-centered directives (autopoiesis). This may come in the form of body image, but it might also stem from a personal ethic that recognizes the instability of human experience and emotion that makes the body, as Elizabeth Grosz has determined, volatile. Does this mean that technology has agency? Do we give technology agency over our out-of-control bodies? As Finlay-de Monchy has explained, experience is not pan-discursive: technology is efficient at the impersonation of agency, but indeed it is more likely that the agents of technological innovation (again, animate subjectivities in the creation of desiring-machines) and the machine itself, are molar, indivisible. Technology, therefore, to some degree, determines human subjectivity as a product of human willingness to give agency over to technology (the desiring-machine) both in light of human shortcomings, and to provide for oneself without having to identify, justify or accept responsibility for one's desires.

With the recognition that there are strategies to negotiate a subjective self-positioning on the four orders of human subjectivity continuum, it is not unusual that larger meta-narratives of unidentifiable subjective constructions lend to a passive acceptance of what a human should be, particularly when one asks, as Deckard came to realize in his love for Rachel, what that humanity means to the self. As Marshall McLuhan sarcastically asks with regard to the greater subjective impositions and capacities enabled through technology, "in a world accustomed to the dominant imagery of mechanical production and consumption, what could be more natural than our coming to submit our bodies and fantasies to the same process?" [McLuhan, p. 62] As posthumans, it is ideally appropriate humans be, 'more human than human'.

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The Mummy (date)

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The Mummy's Curse (date)

Leslie GOODWINS, dir. w/ Lon Chaney

Horror Express (1972)

Eugenio MARTIN, dir. w/ Christopher Lee, Peter Cushing

Wild Palms (1992)

Oliver STONE

Solaris (1972)

Andrei TARKOVSKY

2001: A Space Odyssey (1968)

Stanley KUBRICK

Blade Runner

Ridley SCOTT

Dead Ringers

David CRONENBERG

Crash (1996)

David CRONENBERG

Logan's Run (1976)

Michael ANDERSON

Terminator, The (1984)

James CAMERON, with Arnold Schwarzenegger

Terminator 2: Judgment Day (1991)

James CAMERON

Robocop 2 (1990)

Irvin KERSHNER

Alien (1979)

Ridley SCOTT

Alien 3 (1992)

David FINCHER, with Sigourney Weaver

Robocop (1987)

Paul VERHOEVEN, with Peter Weller

The Night Porter (1973)

Liliana CAVANI, with Dirk Bogarde and Charlotte Rampling, witten by Liliana Cavani and Italo Moscati

Architektur des Untergangs [The Architecture of Doom] (1989)

Peter COHEN, ed; narrator, Bruno GANZ

Appendix 1: An interview with Inez van Lamsweerde

"if technology has power, that power is not its own", an interview with Inez van Lamsweerde in Amsterdam on February 18th, 1994, regarding two series of photographs: *Final Fantasy* (FF, 1993), and *Thank You Thighmaster* (TYT, 1993).

Final Fantasy is a series of child-models photographed in various performative positions, wearing silk lingerie. The backgrounds are white, and the bodies have been physically placed behind glass so as to give some parts of the body skin-to-glass distortion. The mouths of the child-models in **FF** have been re-imposed with an adult male mouth—the results are creepy. **Thank You Thighmaster** is a series of full-size portraits of adult women, nudes in various photographic poses. Their bodies have been oiled, resulting in an artificial, plastic-like skin texture. Each photo is titled with a popular female name to represent the individual in the photo. Both series have been manipulated by computer. In **TYT**, the nipples and traces of genitalia have been removed to appear as an organic smoothening of the body; likewise, the models faces have been substituted with faces of mannequins.

Issue that van Lamsweerde's work brings up: art, context of art, photography, electronic manipulation and its meaning, sexuality, the body as a sight of distortion, gendered places, spaces and body parts, artifice

Interview

BW: Do you think these photographs have a historical place? Could these have been made twenty years ago? Or, do you think that there is some kind of progression or contribution through your work with these images?

IvL: Well, in terms of the history of art, these are nudes. It's nudity. So it would fit into the whole sequence of female nudes in art. Yet different because technology has allowed the possibility for the photos to look real and not real at the same time. Because I am able to use the paintbox, I can make an image like one from the **Thank You Thighmaster** series, whereas before somebody could paint an image like these but it wouldn't be real. For me the importance is this variance: it's a photo and a viewer realizes that. At the same time you are looking at the size; a photo that is very big. In this way I tried to make people forget that it's a photograph while at the same time also emphasizing the form. That sort of two-way vein and for me a... in that sense, I mean, I think... and also with ... for me the thing about this was plastic surgery and the way that it has developed into a status symbol and ... in that respect I think it's very much a sign of the time.

BW: Were the models upset that they were reformulated in this way?

IvL: It's one girl. It's one and the same girl. She wasn't upset, not at all.

BW: Do you feel like you are creating objects as sculptural objects, or are you just creating a veneer-- something that is strikingly not real?

IvL: Oh, no. I preferred if you would look at it as if it is real.

BW: Is there a personal history for you in to coming to these issues?

IvL: For me, you mean?

BW: Ya. How did you come up with the ideas...

IvL: to make this?

BW: Ya.

IvL: One thing was definitely being in America, where as I said, plastic surgery is such a status thing and this whole focus on fitness and more. I mean this in a good sense. I'm not trying to be moralistic about that . . . more in a way of a fascination. Fascination for the fact that we have the possibilities to recreate ourselves. Once we don't like certain things about ourselves we can go to the surgeon and change ourselves into another creation and that is for me the most fascinating thing about America. At the same time I am concerned

with the emotional side of being able to recreate ourselves. My background is fashion. My mother is a fashion journalist and I have gone to the fashion academy before going to arts school. I work as well as a fashion photographer. So the whole idea of beauty and perfection and all that is, you know, . . . I have been brought up with that. This idea about "fashion" is something that's natural for me.

BW: Right...

IvL: So... to me the idea of being able to recreate oneself is a very liberating one. There is this change we can make with our bodies, but, at the same time-- at the same sort of speed-- there is technology which un-ables us to move as little as possible. I mean, just a tiny computer and that's it; we communicate all over the world through the nets and so... physical contact is no longer necessary. I mean you don't have to know what somebody else looks like to talk personally, you are talking through PCs-- you're not really talking personally. That and things like phone-sex start this non-physical intimacy... so, I thought, "well, we can recreate ourselves and become the persons we want to be on the outside, but what happens then? We are there with our perfect bodies and we are behind the PC and there is no use any more for having this body because nobody will see it, nobody will feel it. Thus, in order to emphasize the non-physical contact, I took away sex to coordinate this genesis, I took away the nipples and genitalia to sort of emphasize this irony or idea of "being perfect without a reason": it's not necessary any more since there is no communication physically and visually. Visually, it's more a type-thing; it's not enticing.

BW: Do you feel there is an erasure of emotion by erasing the body?

IvL: Yes, I think. For me it's very much that idea of emotions being locked up inside. By closing all the holes in the body I wanted to make a hermetic/closed body... showing emotions being in the body through simulating sweating and the working of that body. I mean a real body with wet hands and thick veins and hands that fix things. I used the mannequin faces for showing this emotional incompetence. It's clearly not a real face in terms of expression but still, they have expressions. Ironically, these are dolls; expressions of dolls. The intended idea for me was to have that locked-up emotional side shown in faces by using dolls' faces with strange expressions-- even for dolls! This is really weird to have the tongue exposed and all that.

BW : Right. But these could potentially be fetish objects as well?

IvL: What do you mean by fetish?

BW: Fetish, I mean people could look at these and become emotionally either aroused or repulsed. What have the responses been?

IvL: Repulsion . . . but fascination at the same time. Like, now they are in Paris at the Museum of Modern Art and I have watched people. They are all going "ah, naked women!" Finally, that turns into, "oh, my God, no." What I try is to make a desirable object also in how I package it. The photos are large, they are glossy, they are in between plexi glass so they are really shiny. I like to make it as smooth and glossy as can be. And I like to make it smooth and glossy as can be, like it's really thick and that the first thing that you say is "yes", that you say "oh , wow", you know, "a beautiful body or a naked body", and then the second impulse would be "no", something like "uff... this is not it, this is painful and awkward and disturbed."

BW : So you are playing with the idea of commodity as well, walking the fine line (?) of commodity...

: Yes, and that is exactly it. I feel I have to stay on that line. I wouldn't want to cross in either direction.

BW : So, did you have any reactions from people like, "they are very cheesy" , "they are not exactly interesting", "they are just forms"? Has it fallen over into that zone?

: No, never, no. People in America and in New York when it was there didn't know how to deal with it or what to do with it because it's not pc. I was there in February last year, a year ago the show opened, and that was what everybody was talking about "pc art", and I deliberately, . . . I cannot make pc art even. I was very sure that I didn't want to fall

in that trap of labeling everything and so the fact that I was a woman but made images like this was totally incomprehensible. So you have people who are...

BW : Afraid?

: People were afraid and shocked and I'm certain because it didn't fit into anything. And it's exactly what I wanted and also too, for me it's sort of a mirror of the American society or a small part of that. It shows something of their society. They are dealing with being preferred and sports and beauty and...

BW : Fascination?

: Ya.

BW : of that culture?

: and the status of surgery , I mean John Rivers.

BW : So do you see that surgery that goes on in America and the surgery that happens in these photographs as an addition to the body or a subtraction from the body?

: Well, I would like to see it as an addition. But at the same time there is Michael Jackson, for instance. That's gotten completely out of hand-- his surgery thing. And to me that is fascinating. It's not like you shouldn't get surgery, no, for me it's more outrageous, it's complete fascination and certainly an addition.

BW : So piercing-- the recent upsurge in piercing and tattooing-- is this an extension of that kind of culture?

: Not for me, no. No it's not. For me piercing comes close to showing how much you can take, showing how far you can go, whereas this is not the same thing. What goes on in these photographs is not like an initiation. I think piercing belongs essentially to this feeling of endurance, to go through a certain extent of pain and showing that I one is this far: I have a scare. Piercing to me is not that same idea as my work.

BW : But isn't beauty a kind of initiation?

IvL: Well, I don't think so.

BW : No?

IvL: To me it's not. No.

****break****

BW : Do you feel like the computer reigns over your work?

: No. I would not know.

BW : No?

: No.

BW : So, the computer isn't what has concerned you but the images that it produces or the images that you work with, what's more important for you? For example, could you do these photographs as they were without the oil on the body? Without the replacement of faces... with dolls faces?

IvL: To me, the computer is very essential in making my ideas come true. It's like lighting or, any other thing that is used for technique; a certain lens or as a kind of camera that you use to get a certain effect. For me the computer is exactly the extension of that. It's no more than that, it enables me to make whatever comes inside my head and then still the trap of that computer. I mean there are so many pitfalls, because everything is great on the screen. Every mask you put on there or every whatever, it's great.

BW: So it's always seductive?

IvL: Yes and it's always very much like strip, strip, strip until I come to the essence of the image or what I want to say. Because there are so many possibilities , and that's really the scary part. So you have to be really sure.

BW: You said that the most interesting things were slight manipulations, the ones that the people may not notice.

IvL: Ya. And that they are close to reality.

BW: So for you these images are a reality?

IvL: Ya...

BW: embodied in people like Michael Jackson?

IvL: And Madonna.

BW: And...

IvL: It's an enlargement, an extreme enlargement of these ideas. An enlargement this idea translates or turns it into this kind of image. It's not that I would really consider this an idea for, you know, me, surgery on my nipples, more of an extreme enlargement of, you know making these characters ...

BW: magnified?

IvL: Ya, making their idea magnified, that's it... in order to come across.

BW: The skin in these photos has been described as being stretched, right?

IvL: Ya.

BW: But of course the computer is not really stretching the skin, the skin is not being stretched, it's blended it. Right?

IvL: It's more pulling over I think.

BW: Pulling over?

IvL: For me it has very much the pulling of skin over ... ya... ???¹

BW: Right, so there's lot ??? Do you find these... these photos violent?

IvL: Yes, I do find them violent. But more in their bluntness than in because some people call it sexist.

BW: Right

IvL: I think it As if I would be violent to women.

BW: Right.

IvL: and to me it's more ??? I mean ??? know, so this is a... For me they are violent because they are so ... in your face.

BW: Two Canadians technology theorists, Arthur and Marilouise Kroger have called the last sex, "the third sex, neither male nor female, but a floating sex with all the signs of sex reversed in a game cold seduction." Are these photographs cold seduction?

IvL: They are. When people ask me to say something about my work in one sentence, I usually say: a cold blooded sensuality.

BW: What I find interesting is that these photos-- even though these are obvious feminine bodies in our culture--, because you have added the dolls' faces and these expressive body formations, they become quite sexless, like dolls.

: Ya.

BW: So would you say that sexuality is a process, that sexuality is a kind of emotion? I am curious what these pictures might imply about intimacy. You mentioned intimacy earlier.

IvL: Explain more.

BW: My own feelings about culture, and perhaps these photos represent that kind of culture, is that there is a vast transformation of intimacy within the last thirty years, forty years, may be, may be further back. I don't know the origin. But intimacy is distinct in contemporary society. What do you think is driving this change? If there is a transformation in intimacy, what do you think it is driving at? Is this the computer, is this the fact that people are communicating by technology whereby there is actually no touching or feeling of each other's bodies, or by clear or clearer language? Do you think language has become mixed up? Are there any implications of this sort through these photos?

IvL: I think there is a materialistic problem of how the world is going. The computer is sort of like. . .

BW: Is it harsh? The computer, is it a harsh environment to be in? Do you feel vulnerable?

: No, no. I mean, I do feel vulnerable but not because of the computer really. It's very complicated to say what it is that I feel changes our notions of intimacy or in the way we deal with that. I think the computer is one thing that changes the way we interact and for me that was the starting point for making this series. But, I think the way people are dealing with each other on almost every level is changing so much that it's kind of hard for me to

¹ Multiple question marks designate inaudible words during transcription.

describe or say what specific thing it is. I couldn't say that it was just intimacy. I don't know, because there are so many things and there is so much happening that makes us drift apart. There is definitely a lack of spirituality and too much materialism. It's very hard for me in English to describe this feeling of having no ground under your feet any more. That is mostly the feeling that's there for me. Yet, this disorientation is for me the underlying thing that is there in both series— more than the computer— even though these photos also deal with computer games and how that influences, but, basically there is something underneath that; you know there are all these layers. . .

Guest: For example, everyone is speaking about family values, but there are many people without a mother, without a family, without a father.

BW: I was leading you into talking about the photographs of children. In fact they are not children: the photos carry a male mouth, probably a male adult mouth. The pictures are developed out of proportion; almost frightened in a way.

IvL: Ya.

BW: ... the slight manipulation, the seductive apparel that the children are wearing. . .

IvL: . . . it's very beautiful, but extreme. I say they would be like the last children. All the beauty is extremism in hair colour, eye colours, I mean "types". So that they would like this whole Benetton idea and that they are in a completely different way.

BW: When I was thinking that there maybe a transformation of intimacy which is suggested in these photographs, it is in fact through the children and this idea of the way we treat children— like something different than this body or this conscious sort of entity and what that goes such a long time that it becomes a great divide in many ways between adults and children within families, yet we circulate this veneer of the stability and I was thinking that perhaps these photographs really did signify a transformation in intimacy not just about say, sexual partners or friends for example, as a sociologist, a British sociologist Anthony Giddens. He says that what has become odd about it is that sex that's more can be enjoyable, accidentally between friends than through stable relationships. And that's reflected very often in, say, cultural magazines of Montreal where it's quite trendy now-a-days to have a list of what's cool, what's not cool, what's interesting and what's not interesting and so you have this binary compositions like what's more interesting than sex with friends, what's out? sex with long-term partners ???, sex while you are doing... so . when I saw these photographs I was thinking here are some real indications of what those kinds of transformation of intimacy might imply. That's why I was leading you into this direction. So, again, my hypothesis is being subverted. So if you want to change the subject go ahead.

IvL: No. I wonder, I mean what is it exactly that you thought... you thought, tell me that because I am not sure I can follow you really. You are thinking that I was saying with these pictures that intimacy is completely over or do you mean exactly the opposite?

BW: I think may be both...

IvL: In English it's really hard for me... that's exactly what I was saying.

BW : I think it may be both. And that's why it's problematic. It's both a denial of intimacy yet in reaffirmation of intimacy. As you stated earlier, there may be this of lack of, what could be termed "spirituality". These photos are very cold and I wouldn't be surprised that a person would be shocked and stunned and repulsed by seeing them, and afraid and fearful to approach these as photographs, as abstractions, . . . as items that might be totally different story, I don't know, but I was hoping you could elaborate on that. This is my feelings, you don't have to accept at all.

: No, but it's interesting. For me it's more of a fascination... what kind of people are we creating and how are we dealing with the child? Michael Jackson is a source of inspiration with his whole child abuse case. This idea of children being innocent or a symbol for innocence, is, for me, something that's questionable. That was the first impulse for me to make this series; people... children kill, there was that two year old kid in England that was killed by two other kids. And in New York it's really very scary, I was afraid of twelve-year-old little guys walking down the streets with their guns. And then

again saying that a child has no sexuality and is born innocent. . . I was trying to question with these pictures whether you can still consider children innocent by simply making them very beautiful but it's also very violent and very sexual. At the same time the subject is photographed behind glass. There is this artificiality, like an incubator? Children are being kept alive artificially.

****break****

IvL: Nobody ever re-questions the absence of sexuality in children and indeed it is the idea of looking at children separately-- that also the reason why I could take a preference to look and work with children this time instead of women. In the ____ series, it's a clearly something about women. However, I prefer to speak or to say things which are deal with everybody instead of only women or only children. These girls allowed me to speak about much more than just a child or just a girl. Still, it's very hard because I know that the work is very cold and it makes you want to back off. a mixture of that quality and...

BW: Yet the detail makes you want to get very close.

IvL: Ya. And you have to get very close. That's what I saw in Paris. People go very close and then go back. They are trying to figure out what's happened and ... so that sort of makes me to go really close to that sort of ??? ...

BW: Especially to figure out that these are photographed behind glass (?). Because perhaps one would never understand that this was glass being pressed against the skin rather than a computer manipulation. So there is this game of deciphering the semiotics in the photographs which I find extremely thoughtful; they're playful with the audience and you can toy with these emotions.

Future Questions

Are these photos like clothing? What is beauty? Is it these photos? What criteria do you have for beauty?

Appendix 2: Snoecks 96

SEDUCTION AND DESIRE IN A NEARLY AUTISTIC WORLD - Inez van Lamsweerde

by : Hanneke Savenije

Translated by Gasparina de Laat

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Shocking, inciting, provocative, is what Inez van Lamsweerde's work is described as. Her imagery at the least causes a feeling of unease. In the mean time, the 31 year old Dutch photographer is making a dream career.

Active for five years only and her photographs appear in influential magazines such as The Face, Photo and Visionaire. International fashion glossies such as the American Vogue are lining up to give her assignments. Her work is exhibited from the Groninger Museum to the Venician Biennale. A city like Amsterdam is full of theatre billboards and ads created by her. On the manipulated and magnified reality of an obstinate talent.

Would it be a coincidence that the international break-through of photographer Inez van Lamsweerde coincides with a scornful critique of her work in the Dutch **HP/De Tijd**? Where we could read for years how her paintbox-manipulated photographs were praised to the skies, her last exhibition all of a sudden leads to talk of 'fashionable pictures' and the use of a 'nice commercial trick', which evokes mainly boredom to the critic. Inez van Lamsweerde, when confronted with the condescending judgement, shrugs her shoulders, gently smiling and hesitant to react. What is she supposed to say, anyway? She looks at her partner in work and in life, Vinoodh Matadin, and together they find in a resigned manner that this is apparently part of it, that success always has this other side. "It may have to do with **over-exposure**. On the occasion of the exhibition **Peiling 4** in the Groninger Museum, more of that kind of reviews were published. People suddenly call our work empty, they find we remove all meaning out of the image with the computer. Nobody has ever said anything like that abroad. People accept the photographs for the images themselves. After all, it is a very Dutch thing to say that something has to be 'real', that that alone is the truth. Holland has an enormous tradition of documentary photography. But our work is something very different, it is incomparable."

In any case, Inez van Lamsweerde's hyperrealistic images, created with the Quantel paintbox, often provoke intense reactions. And the photographer certainly does not try to avoid this. "After all," she claims, "my goal is to sort of raise people's consciousness in two ways. The past years, all publicity photographs you see are manipulated in one way or another. That is what is going on, that is what influences and leads us, and thus, that is apparently what we want to see. An ideal image, created by the computer is perceived as reality. I use this hyperreality to tell you with an exciting image what I think life is all about. I play with the given that people find that a photographer has to register reality. They look at my photographs assuming that they see reality. But that is not the case: my images are manipulated all over. And I hope to make people think in this way. I want to show that nowadays this artificiality is also a reality. That that is the truth just as much

now. Other than that, the idea is to put a particular image in the magazine-context; an image which brings to the eye the influence of the mass media, the role models and clichés which we are being dished up. By giving it just a slight twist, I try to make people conscious of the system.

A BLACK SUBSTRATUM

Her first love was not so much photography, but fashion. "I grew up with fashion. Already in 1950, my mother wrote for various magazines about fashion and illustrated her articles. From my earliest childhood on I was dragged along to fashion shows. Each season she went to Paris, and then she took a lot with her. I knew the fashion magazines, the French *Vogue* was always lying on the table, I saw the work of photographers such as Helmut Newton and Guy Bourdin, there was always talk of clothing and its importance. That is why I absolutely wanted to do something with fashion."

During two years, Van Lamsweerde took lessons at the fashion academy, but then she got the feeling that drawing or designing did not offer her sufficient possibilities to express what she had to say. "I find fashion one of the most direct reflections of life. It says everything about how people stand in life, about how society is put together, how people work. It has an enormous richness of images and symbols, and that has always intrigued me. There is so much connected to it, it is so telling. That is what I wanted to occupy myself with. And I noticed that photography was the most appropriate means to do that. So I enrolled myself in the Rietveld academy and switched to photography."

During the whole of her education, she took photographs for young Dutch designers, a period in which she soon developed her own style and vision. "Because of my background, the images and the language were very familiar to me." Her fashion photographs became less and less pictures of clothes, and more and more a comment on the fashion world. Where other photographers photographed clothing on beautiful models in ideal, luxurious situations, and thus created a perfect world, fashion for Van Lamsweerde seemed to be more a point of departure and a source of inspiration for obstinate images, in which perfection is disrupted just a bit.

The confusing field of tension between apparent perfection and the additions which disrupt the illusion has not left her work since. With the pinpoint-sharp techniques and cliché-like imagery of fashion- and advertisement photography, she creates a surrealistic universe, pleasing to the eye of the viewer. But through slight, subtle shiftings, the aesthetic caress suddenly changes into a confronting experience: through the cracks in the image a perturbing underlying reality becomes visible, a 'black substratum where secrets room.' A stunning woman in a haute couture-dress on her knees licking the floor. Two blond, glistening models on a terrace, whose radiant smile has stiffened into a grimace. A woman with a reddened face, sitting on a bed, turning a bourgeois hotel room into a claustrophobic meeting space. These are photographs that show a glimpse of what fashion photographers are usually so good at hiding: frustration, insecurity, violence, decay, the incapacity to have contact. "For me fashion is a language with which I can question a mentality, a portrait of the era, a point of departure for an image which consists of many layers."

THE POWER OF BEAUTY

Inez van Lamsweerde's photographs are mainly populated with women. The fact that women play the leading part is not so surprising, considering her fascination with manipulated reality: thanks to clothing, make-up and the advanced techniques of plastic surgery, women can thoroughly transform their appearances. The way in which women deal with idealized images created by the media is a theme which is to be found everywhere in van Lamsweerde's work.

"Also as a form of self-investigation," says the photographer. "Because after all it's about myself. My photographs are also an investigation of my ideas and fantasies of being-a-woman. I grew up with Charlie's Angels and The Avengers' Purdy: super strong women who have everything under control. That's whose example I followed as a child, those women who look fantastic but are in control of the situation in no time. That strength, mentally as well, can be found in my photographs. And at the same time, my photographs are of course a sort of projection of how I would like to be myself."

Helmut Newton's and Guy Bourdin's work has also strongly influenced her image of women. "They have contributed to a great extent to the formation of my ideas of fashion, photography, of what a woman should look like and be like, in photographs as well as in real life. Their women radiate that immense strength and independence, but also incredibly much humour, and enormous self-relativization. They show the power of beauty and how a woman can use that power in a certain way. In a positive way. It's about the fact that women can, as if it were, rise above their own situation and take the helm themselves. It is not so bad to be a sex object when you want it yourself and can enjoy that."

It is a message which is not always equally well understood.

Her persiflating photographs of cheeky women in pin-up-like poses were not understood as a comment on stereotypical pornographic erotics by hot-tempered feminists, but as pornography itself.

Two years ago, furious women blotted the several meters high, straddle-legged sitting ladies under the Hortus-bridge in Amsterdam, a work of art which used to stare at the waiting driver as the ships were given passage. "I still find it a terrible thing. A piece of art being destroyed because people call it pornography. While I wanted to show with that image that it is up to the woman to turn everything around and get in control of her case. Using all clichés of the advertising world, I intended to say that women shouldn't victimize themselves. All signals which the women in the photograph emit, indicate "Yes!", yet the look of the woman on the right hand side clearly screams "No!". Or, the way a journalist put it lately, "a look - if it could kill, the Muiderslot would immediately turn into a graveyard." This action group clearly did not want to see that. And I thought, and maybe it's naive of me, that women could see through that by now, that that had come to be okay. How can you label that as pornography? Who, in heaven's name, is being used? When you believe that nonsense, it must be in your own head. This kind of reactions give me the feeling that a lot of old stuff is being poured over me. Matters which have been fought out a long time ago. But maybe that is also a generation problem. To me, feminism and what it stands for is just normal, natural. More so because my mother, a true "Consciously Unwed Mother", has educated me all by herself. That makes you very independent. The battle of these women, that does not come into play for me anymore."

PAINFUL CHARACTERS

To her surprise, a similar game with erotic clichés was accepted in America, the place where **political correctness** was invented. For **Self Magazine**, a magazine with a circulation of 2.5 million copies, Van Lamsweerde lately photographed sneakers in a very explicit way: on endlessly long legs and with a smutty look under wafting up skirts, set in a wide canyons-landscape. "The ultimate cheerleader-fantasy, those buttocks, it's full of sexuality. And that in a magazine which is only about looks, beauty and self-fulfillment. It is great fun working in America, because the clichés are so clear there. This extreme enlargement of everything is very inspiring." The photographs for **Self Magazine** were not her first experience with America. In 1992, Inez van Lamsweerde was invited by the PSI Institute of Contemporary Art to spend a year in New York as **artist in residence**. "I had just won a Kodak Award with an assignment for the city of Groningen, a series of

pin-ups with the city as background, and for the first time it brought me a lot of publicity. Together with Vinoodh I was then all of a sudden totally isolated in a foreign city where no one knew us. That was not easy, we felt very lonely. But it turned out very well after all, because there was an exhibition connected to it, and because of that I made my first series of free work." With this series **Thank You Thighmaster**, a series of life-size portraits of four women, Inez van Lamsweerde once again managed to create a lot of confusion. While her former pin-ups turned out to have human traits underneath their perfect and unnaturally beautiful looks, Pam, Kim, Joan and Britt appeared to be real women who upon closer consideration had an unnatural expression and build. Influenced by the plastic character of American society, where plastic surgery is a perfectly accepted means to help a woman to the ideal body, and due to a fascination with the (im)possibilities of genetic manipulation, the photographer represented perfect but also painful characters. And with that she showed a completely different side of the beauty myth: "I wondered how you have to look at your body if it can be trained and altered. What happens to you when you let something like that happen to you? What are the choices based upon? Are body and mind separable?"

With the paintbox, photographs of a model and four mannequins were put together: the dummy's head on the real body, but over the head she put the skin of the model. All sexual characteristics were removed, so that bodies without openings came into being, confined in themselves. The life inside the bodies was accentuated by Van Lamsweerde by means of hands and feet gone red and swollen, shiny veins. "They do indeed have perfect, but useless bodies. They are not capable of sex, they are deprived of all intimacy. It is an extreme image of the future. In this time and age, the rapid development of technology causes us to have less and less bodily contact. Screens and modems replace intimacy. There you are then with your perfect body, you can't do anything with it, it is hermetically closed.

SUBDUED TENSION

"I don't call myself more of an artist than a fashion photographer. I like moving on the border line, using the elements of the one in the context of the other." That is also what interests her in working for magazines: the challenge of a clear context. "It is a kick to be in a magazine such as Self Magazine and to see how far you can go, how you can give your own twist to the reigning cliché-s in a magazine like that." Van Lamsweerde has worked regularly for Dutch magazines such as Avenue, Marie Claire and the cyberspace-magazine Blvd. But her march into the international magazine-world gained momentum at the beginning of 1994 with a fashion report for the English magazine The Face. The series "For Your Pleasure", with clothing of designer Véronique Leroy, came as a real bombshell. "All of a sudden, offers kept coming in; everybody we liked wanted to work with us. The American Vogue as well." Vogue's invitation to make a photoreport on fitness-equipment with supermodel Niki Taylor - whereby Van Lamsweerde was presented as a pioneer, because she as one of the first photographers made the paintbox into one of the essential components of her work - meant a definite recognition of her great talent. But it was also a first introduction to the limitations of commerce. "The American Vogue has an enormous circulation, and thus the contents have to address many different people. The stress in Vogue is therefore on beauty, positivism, and identification without much profundity. They did want to break new ground, do something different, and they went for my work because of the use of colour and the energy it has. But you can't go your own way unrestrictedly. A photographer like Newton can go very far, even though they get a lot of comments from the readers, but for us the matter is still a little different. It takes time to build up that trust. With the second assignment, a series of photographs on accessories, we got a lot more freedom, and they were very happy with it. It also has to do with our way of working: with other photographers the editors get to choose among several

pictures, but from us they get only one slide per outfit. Moreover, a very expensive one: computer-manipulation is expensive."

In the meantime, Van Lamsweerde has found another American counterpoint for Vogue's compulsory up and happy photography in her work for the collectors' magazine *Visionaire*. "That is a magazine with a very limited edition of 2,000, which is sort of a stage for all top-photographers and -illustrators. Just like with *Blvd* and *The Face* we have no restrictions. That is how we went for the most extreme items we could find in the collections of American designers, incredibly finicky, Burda-like clothing, made mainly out of synthetics. Those we combined with unreal interiors from a showroom, cliché-texts such as "an outfit with stunning simplicity, colourmatched as it comes" and decadent details such as patent leather gloves and a kneeling posture of the model. Which creates a subdued tension: the realism on the one hand and a black layer full of secrets on the other. They are harsh, revealing pictures. We thought those designers would not go for them, but to our surprise they all found them the most beautiful tearsheets they'd ever received. Whether the buyers get the irony as well - our comment on American culture - I don't know. It doesn't matter anyway, the photographs can be read in many layers."

PUZZLE PIECES

Inez Van Lamsweerde often talks about "us" and "we" in relationship to her work. "Because we do everything together," she explains. "Vinoodh and I have been working together for ten years already, and the last three years, since we started a relationship, very intensively even. At that time, Vinoodh stopped with his own brand of clothing *Lawina*, in order to occupy himself fully with the styling of the photographs. Currently we do nearly everything in fashion photography together. We invent the concept, usually also the styling, we do the computer work together, and then I am the one who finally pushes the button. Out of habit, my name has always been underneath it, but that will change now. Under our last production in *Vogue* it says "photography: Van Lamsweerde / Matadin." The free work is more mine, conceptually it is more mine, but the finishing touch with the paintbox is something we do together. At the paintbox the differences between us become most apparent: Vinoodh is someone with a great insight in composition and proportions. I watch the concept more. Our ideas are sometimes very far apart, but that is exactly what makes it interesting."

The nature of her work also forces Inez van Lamsweerde to collaboration. "If you work with the paintbox, you also need a computer operator. I have been doing this for years with Karin Spijker of the company I & I in Amsterdam; in the meantime we are on each other's wave length. Her contribution to the final result is very important. The operator's personal style is very important and inspiring. The possibilities are endless: we can touch something up to perfection, enlarge or reduce someone, place that someone in any possible location. For me that is the future of photography."

My photographs thus come about in a very different way from that of many other photographers. It is no spontaneous photography. It is an idea which you have already worked out completely before the actual printing. Almost like video-editing: you first shoot all different elements in order to combine them on the paintbox in the end. The creation of an image starts with for example the clothing: what does it evoke, what does it express, which women wear it? Inspired by that to make a particular image or a series, we choose the backgrounds, which we shoot ourselves or rent from a stock-library, which in turn calls for a specific pose and lighting of the model, and all of that finally becomes a photograph on the paintbox. Everything we do is a piece of the puzzle."

PORTRAITS

In a certain sense, the computer is an obstacle for making portraits. "I have not made many portraits. You can think of something from beforehand, but the portrayed person has to be willing to cooperate. And often we haven't even seen that person before. With a couturier like Vivienne Westwood it is simple. She is used to it all being about appearances, and her play with clothing is not much different from my play with images. We clicked immediately. But if somebody is not prepared to "surrender", it becomes very complicated. I don't just want to make a pretty picture. You have to give something a push after all, break through some preconceived ideas. For The Face we made a portrait of Brett Anderson, the singer of Suede, an androgynous man who provokes with bisexuality. We thought: let's go one little step further and make you as smooth and beautiful as a girl with make-up and the airbrush. But he himself had something completely different in mind, and preferred a true rock & roll image. That resulted in a very uncomfortable situation, which irritated Brett tremendously. Each time he removed the lipstick, yelled that he wasn't a model and that this would go too far. Somebody like that needs to have a lot of trust in you then, more so because with the computer you can bend things to your will again on the computer. The photograph is exactly the way I had it in mind, and I ended up getting an enthusiastic reaction from the singer."

Also with non-portraits the interaction between photographer and model plays an important role for Inez van Lamsweerde. "I am convinced that the model determines half of the picture. The trust you get from a model with each session is to me one of the most important experiences in this business. Something you have to handle with a lot of respect and care. I am fascinated by strong, sensual, intelligent women, and I cast my models according to these characteristics. A sense of humour is essential as well."

Photography is teamwork and I like that tremendously. The energy coming from hair and make-up artists, models, fashion editors, assistants, from everyone using his or her energy to create that one image, is very special and results in wonderful memories."

AN AUTISTIC WORLD

When Inez van Lamsweerde sent a portfolio to the German Vogue a year or two ago, there was no interest at all. Her work was found too harsh and too glossy. "Too retro and too old-fashioned. But a year later you saw the revival of the seventies and the glamour, and it turned (out) I had been making that which they wanted for years already. Then, all of a sudden in an article I was pitchforked into being "Artist of the Year 2000." Fashion is slavish; trends follow one another superfast. But that is exactly what makes it energetic and interesting to me. Many people think that this current glamourtrend could render my photographs harmless. The shock effect diminishes. But in fact I think that is good: there are more layers in my photographs than just the shocking one. I always think: show these pictures as much as possible, that way people will at least become more receptive and will see what it is really all about. That way they will see the underlying emotionalism: that we are living in a world where intimacy and real contact disappear more and more. A nearly autistic world. Non-communication. Maybe that is why my photographs are in fact always about seduction and desire.

Appendix 3: Weekend Knack

De POTTER, Peter. Inez van Lamsweerde: So Beautiful It Hurts. Weekend Knack, no. 9 (26 February - 4 March, 1997). Brussels. Pp. 157-166.

* Translated from original Dutch by Gasparina de LAAT.

Five years ago, she was shown the door in a friendly but firm manner everywhere, now important international fashion magazines ask her for her photographs. The manipulated images of the Dutch Inez van Lamsweerde do not leave anyone unmoved. A conversation about beauty, perfection and desire.

It seems so easy. When you watch a report on a fashion photographer on television you will see a mundane image-maker who is whizzing from one studio to another location, and catches the most perfect models in his lens. With winks he dictates the girl to sulk, then to smile, lets her turn, jump, dance. At the very moment the mannequin tilts her head backwards appears-- click-- the finished cover of a fashion magazine, this identical pose frozen between letters and headlines.

In reality, it does not happen that spontaneously and energetically. At photo-editorial offices of magazines and advertising agencies you will invariably find rows of computer screens on which dull hair is being made glossy, teeth being made white, and legs entirely smooth. before an image is sent into the world it has been electrically filed and erased. And technology's box of tricks is becoming ever more spectacular. At the time, designer Thierry Mugler went to Antarctica with a complete crew to make that one photograph of a model balancing on an ice flow. Now, you push some buttons and the Barbarellas triple jump over glowing planets and startled girls are being swallowed by liquid concrete.

Photographer Inez van Lamsweerde doesn't regard the paintbox-computer as a silent partner, but as a fully-fledged collaborator. She corrects and manipulates the bodies and faces of her models, changes the proportions and lets them flow together perfectly with separately photographed backgrounds. The results are very sharp hyperrealistic images with neatly lined compositions and bright illuminating colors. Her approach requires an almost mathematical preparation. A shot is minutely outlined beforehand: the pose and structure have to correspond entirely with the proportions and the incidence of light of the background which will be added.

"Photographing in itself is already a complicated technical process," she says, "once you have laid down the idea for an image you can't go back, you have to take everything into account, sometimes I would want to take a small camera and walk around the model, but that is simply not possible."

Fashion photography is the most ideal discipline. Before she bought her first camera she studied fashion in Amsterdam for two years, but very soon she saw more limitations than freedoms. "Making patterns and such was too prosaic for me. I wanted to express myself more directly and clearly. For me it was mainly about the people in the clothing or the atmosphere a particular piece of clothing could evoke. Even now it still happens often that the face or the aura of somebody inspire me for a greater image. So not just any model can do the job. Just being beautiful is not enough. I love faces with a certain tension in them, something hard and something soft, contrasts which I can extend into the clothing or the background."

The technique she uses could easily get bogged down in commercial rosy pictures or peculiar science fiction, but van Lamsweerde knows how to get around that in an intelligent way. At first sight her personage look like ethereal pin-ups, flawless, glossy and erotic. You expect somewhere at the bottom of the photograph the logo of a lipstick or a perfume.

But the sting is in the details: the heroic models have been placed in the most common place or day to day, middle class settings, in living rooms and offices, on the bus or in the car. Despite their breathtaking beauty they look bored, deserted or lonely. Their eyes roll away in a blind ecstasy or they look at you in a domineering, destructive way. They are larger than life, alarming in their perfection. They seem to be moving in a surrealistic twilight zone, almost a vacuum. they seduce, but raise questions. because not everything is as carefree as in the cliché pictures they personify.

In a picture of van Lamsweerde's you see a girl with glamorous makeup and lacquered gloves, her bright red mouth slightly open but out of one corner of her eye a tear is running down. In another image a woman in a fur coat sits straddle legged on a hotel bed, laughing confused, her face turned red or flushed. A blonde in a fishing net body recommends a bottle of vodka against an oil tanker which is stranded on the rocks. Below the glossy layer lie emotion and a deeply human reality. This images seem hard and cold, but in them slumber irony and humor.

"Eventually, I want to communicate with my work," she explains. "I will not directly take a militant point of view. Often, there are heavy contrasts in the photographs and this is how I want to show the two sides, introduce several layers. I realize it sounds a little vague, but what I strive for is some sort of an awareness raising for the viewer of what life is all about. Certain postures, pieces of clothing or interiors evoke the same stereotypical atmosphere for many people. Playing with these standard codes, you disturb that first impression and that makes the image more interesting. some sort of tension is created. Something which looks known and familiar to you, gets a double meaning. In this layeredness, as a viewer, can go as far as you please. It doesn't disturb me at all when somebody pays particular attention to a shoe or a hair-style in on of my coverage. that is the main goal of the magazines I work for and I think that is all right."

Van Lamsweerde was first published in her home county in magazines such as 'Avenue' and 'Blvd', but in the beginning of her career the foreign reaction was only half hearted or tepid. As laureate of a photography contest she was offered a year's stay as artist in residence in New York by the PSI institute of contemporary art in 1992. "I literally felt transplanted. There you are then. I got a house, a studio and money to live on, and the only requirement was a series of new work after finishing. Why exactly I was chosen is still unknown to me until today," she laughs. "In the mean time I ran from pillow to post with my portfolio, but that was a big disappointment. The American fashion world was at that time fascinated by grunge and everything had to be ordinary and shabby. My work was at the time already very glamorous and colorful and that seemed out of the question for them."

Long before the apprenticeship Inez had started working closely with Vinoodh Matadin who is now her partner. Until recently, he was mentioned as stylist of the productions. but that suggested a too strict division of tasks, so she says, and that is not the case. "In the end it is me who manipulates the camera, but for the rest we are a team with an equal contribution. We chose the clothing and the models together and we do the preparation as well as the finishing together. It just grew to be that way. And in order to make that completely clear, we have started signing the images a while ago with Lamsweerde/Matadin. No more confusion."

The duo's specific visual language attracts just as obstinate talents out of fashion circles. When van Lamsweerde went to borrow clothing for a photo session from Véronique Leroy, it clicked immediately between the two. "She made the outfits we were looking for, but could never find. And all of a sudden it was all there in racks! we were immediately on the same wavelength. In our work there is a certain nostalgia for the period in which we grew up. according to me, you're ideas about taste and style are shaped at a very early age and the things which you then saw and liked stay in your memory. Things which some label as kitsch are part of the collective memory of our generation. I will

readily admit that for example television is one of my greatest sources of inspiration, then and still now. You will see that with Véronique as well. For that matter, I think she is one of the most distinctive designers of the 90's."

Leroy returned the compliment and made Inez her steady photographer.

Using the gaudy fashion of Leroy, van Lamsweerde pulled out all the stops. The then infamous, now famous series 'for your pleasure' was a firework of conceited decors, pretentious women and flashy colours. They showed secretaries with Belinda cigarettes and girls with disco hairdos and hot-pants who feed one another erotic shaped ice-cream cones while behind them a real space shuttle is being launched into the air. The clothing, poses and make-up undeniably remind one of Charlie's Angels, playboy anno 1976, and airbrushed postcards. The English trendy magazine *The Face* reprinted the photographs in the beginning of 1994 and thus suddenly launch the international careers of Inez and themselves. The same press people who a couple of seasons before had pushed her work aside waved with contracts and the stream of offers hasn't stopped yet.

The Face has remained a faithful fan and the American *Vogue*, *Interview*, *Max* and the limited top magazine *Visionaire* also came knocking. Publicity campaigns for Patrick Cox and Vivienne Westwood have in the mean time become part of her list of achievements. Her work is shown at prestigious exhibitions ad biënnales. Doesn't it irritate her that her style which she sustained/maintained for so many years is now being appreciated? "Not really. That's the nature of the business after all. Fashion moves fast but always forward. It's a continuous interaction of designers, stylists and photographers. You are forced to renew yourself all the time and that can only be good for your personal development."

Recently, the trend-setting editor Scalo published a book "fashion photography in the 90's, an overview of the innovators in 'fashion' photography. The duo L/M was equally chosen, but their flawless, perfect portraits seem to be the odd one out between the casual, sleepy snap-shots of open "new realists" such as Wolfgang Tillmans and Corinne Day.

"Vinoodh and I also thought that our images clashed with the rest, but on the other hand it is pretty nice to be printed next to Cindy Sherman and Nick Knight. What most of those young Turks do, is not really my style. I think it is often too one sided. And everything but realistic. It is just as posed as the next thing. On top of that you feel that they try to glorify some sort of druggy life and I am utterly opposed to that."

Inez van Lamsweerde wants to show her characters from their best side, as beautiful and flawless as possible. When you ask her what the word 'beauty' means to her, she will not answer with terms such as "blue eyes" and "long legs". "Beauty is strength", she thinks, "and self knowledge, humour, perfection and imperfection at the same time. The women I photograph are fully aware of the way they look and their sexuality and they have everything under control. That aura is very important for me. I will never bring anything which is degrading to women or to the person who stands in front of my camera. The old discussion of how women have to submit themselves to codes designed by men is obsolete. For me that whole battle has been fought a long time ago. All in all the woman is still there."

A couple of months ago the Italian men's magazine *L'Uomo Vogue* asked Inez and Vinoodh what they understood by male beauty, style and luxury. They parried with an stunningly beautiful photograph of an aristocratic looking young man and a brief explanatory fax. They wrote that the requested characteristics for a man lie in his "natural glamour, a cool self-confidence and a destructive urge for desire". A modern Dorian Gray

in a turtle neck shirt. "That boy already had it in him", she explains. "With the paintbox we have tried to make him even more beautiful, so beautiful that it hurts. In the photograph he emanates a self assured glamour, but in the mean time there is a dark side lurking underneath it, something mysterious. That double sidedness is intriguing to me. Such a photograph is a certain idea about beauty and perfection which I then have someone else portray. It is an enlarged, extreme version of a fantasy. It is far beyond reality. Beyond an icon."


In her free work she even goes a little further. Even more than in her fashion photography she comments phenomena which she sees or feels around her. In America she made the series Thank You Thighmaster during the PSI apprenticeship year. Fascinated by the ease with which the average American woman lets herself be worked-on by the plastic surgeon, she invented the superlative of the beauty ideal. The result were four meter meters high images of mutated, naked women, with throbbing veins but without orifices. When you look at the works, you don't really feel disgust or incomprehension. Rather pity, because these creatures are forever deprived of human contact.

Last year she presented her sublime series of men's portraits Forest. A series of gentlemen in white shirts and t-shirts, looking like your average kind of guy but with slender woman's hands instead of broad men's fists. Their facial expression is a mixture between bliss and aggression.

"It struck me that so few men were being photographed and whenever it happens, it usually is the artist who photographs himself. I decided to tackle the theme after reading something about cross-dressers, men who dress in women's clothes. The men who got to speak in this book had nothing to do with campy transvestites. They did it solely for themselves, in a very personal way. I found that very moving. This dualism between the male and the female was what I wanted to assimilate or incorporate in my work. And in the meantime think more about the relationship between both sexes. In a relationship you have to be able to trust one another completely, to surrender to one another completely, over and over again. That is something very intimate; at that moment you make yourself extremely vulnerable. The men in the Forest series have something romantic and secure about them and at the same time they are repulsive and aggressive. Because on the other hand-- again that double sidedness-- it is usually men who rape and kill, who break the harmony."

In future she wants to make more photographs of men and in terms of equivalence of her strong independent women she then thinks of names such as Christopher Walken, David Bowie, or Iggy Pop. "Michael Jackson wouldn't be bad either", she smiles. "That way I can see from up close how he has paintboxed himself."

Thanks to the Torch Gallery, Amsterdam.



MUMMY

Egyptian mummy of an elderly woman from Thebes, who lived circa 1500 B.C.

IDENTIFICATION

- Mummy is wrapped in very fine linen.
- Head and feet have been unwrapped; their blackened appearance is probably due to the application of a dark resin used to adhere the linen strips to the body. A close examination of the head reveals short white hair and fragments of a copper mask remaining on the face. The feet are well-formed with toenails clearly visible.
- Coffin is made of wood covered with gesso and paint.
- Brought to Montreal from Egypt in 1859 by James Ferrier.

Museums try to establish the sex and period of a mummy before they can consider its age or the cause of death. Sex is determined by radiography and examining the shape of the pelvis. Observations regarding styles and techniques of embalming are important because there were many changes over the 3000 years that mummification was practised in ancient Egypt. Consideration of the smallest details, such as the type and weave of linen wrappings, the mode of preservation, the position of limbs within the bandaging, and written texts or inscriptions found within the wrapping can offer important clues to the identity of individual mummies.

With the exception of Cairo's royal mummies, museums rarely possess mummies with documented histories and fewer still are known by a specific name or have any recorded genealogy.



Mummification was done for religious reasons connected with the belief in an afterlife. By preserving a dead person's body in recognizable form, the ancient Egyptians hoped to prepare him or her for a future life. The idea of preserving human and animal dead was well-suited to the arid desert climate of Egypt, where bodies buried in the sand were often found to be naturally preserved with hair and skin intact.

Sandals, cosmetics, wigs, jewelry, tools, games, furniture, food, and other types of favoured objects were placed alongside the mummy in its tomb and were part of preparations for an enjoyable life in the next world. Most of the objects that have survived from ancient Egypt were found in tombs, where they had been buried with the dead.

The Theban mummy and anthropoid coffin on display were brought to Montreal from Egypt in 1859 by James Ferrier. During the nineteenth century, Victorian travellers with scientific interests had little sensitivity to issues regarding the purchase and display of mummies and the removal of cultural property from its culture of origin. Although scientific investigation and preservation of mummies by museums has contributed much to our understanding of life in ancient Egypt, and the public demand for mummy displays is great, the ethics of such collections and presentations is a subject of intense debate.



CANOPIC VESSELS were used to preserve the mummy's internal organs. The lids of the jars are carved to represent the four sons of Horus, each god being responsible for the preservation of a specific organ: •Duamutef, a jackal, guarded the stomach; •Qebehsenuef, a falcon, guarded the intestines; •the human-headed Imsety guarded the liver; and •Hapy, a baboon, preserved the lungs.



This panel from the chest covering of the Museum's Ptolemaic mummy depicts the jackal-headed Anubis, god of embalmers, preparing a mummy. The four objects below the table are canopic jars used to preserve the mummy's internal organs.

MYTH AND LEGEND



The mummy of Ramses III, who ruled 1184-1153 B.C., was used as the model for many modern horror films.


In 1922, Howard Carter found the resting place of the young king Tutankhamun, the only tomb of a New Kingdom pharaoh (the New Kingdom lasted 1552-1069 B.C.) to escape almost untouched by robbers.

Carter's first glimpse of the antechamber showing a variety of grave goods as they had been left several thousand years ago when the tomb was first sealed.

• **Curse of the Mummy.** In 1922, Howard Carter found the resting place of the young pharaoh Tutankhamun (who ruled 1347-1337 B.C.), during excavations subsidized by Lord Carnarvon with permission from the Egyptian Antiquities Service.


In the spring of 1923, newspapers around the world claimed that a dramatic inscription had been found proclaiming the death of anyone touching Tutankhamun's tomb. The excitement was caused by the sudden death of Lord Carnarvon, one of the first to enter the tomb. Many people claimed that the dead pharaoh was angry and had "cursed" all those who had disturbed his rest. The curse has since been blamed for the deaths of many people connected with the discovery.

Some now believe that the deaths may have been caused by bacteria or even atomic radiation sealed inside the tomb. But the deaths can all be rationally explained, and the famous inscription never existed.



DID YOU KNOW

- The word "mummy" comes from a Persian word meaning "pitch" or "asphalt". This resinous substance derived from petroleum, had been used in classical times in medical prescriptions, but medieval physicians introduced a refinement with preparations of pitch from Egyptian mummies.
- The Arabic "mummiya" was used to describe the bandaged resin-coated bodies of people or animals from ancient Egypt found by Arabs invading Egypt in the 7th century A.D.
- "Mummy" is now used to describe any dead body that is preserved with its skin intact. If people die or are buried in the right conditions, they may be mummified (preserved) by accident. This can happen in wet marshy places or in the freezing cold of mountains or the polar regions. But most often, people are preserved by being dried out.




ANIMAL MUMMIES The practice of mummification was also applied to animals, like the dog and snake pictured above. These were rarely pets, but animals with the attributes of gods. Animal worship was an ancient custom; different creatures became the totems or fetishes of individual localities.

HOW IT IS DONE

The preparation of a mummy was a painstaking process, carried out by specialists according to well-established rituals:

- A cut to the left side of the body with a flint knife, removing the liver and lungs. These were dried out and stored in special vessels called canopic jars;
- the brain was also removed, but the heart was left in the body;
- then the body was covered with crystals of a substance called natron, (a naturally occurring salt found in Egypt composed of sodium carbonate) which kept it from decaying, packed with linen, plant matter or sawdust, and wrapped in linen strips. Bandaging required yards of linen with each finger, toe, arm, and leg covered separately;
- the body was put into a coffin that varied with the status of the deceased. A wealthy person might be encased in an inner coffin, surrounded by several outer coffins.



HOW TO FIND

The aim of the Egyptian tomb was to provide a permanent house for the mummy. Unfortunately, greed and sheer curiosity over the centuries have reduced the hundreds of thousands of mummies to a small number of survivors.

Most museums with an Egyptology collection will have a mummy-related display. The largest Egyptology collection in Canada is at Toronto's Royal Ontario Museum. One can also see a mummy on display at the Musée du Séminaire de Québec.

HOW WE PRESENT IT

The Redpath Museum displays its Theban mummy with a composite x-ray taken at the Royal Victoria Hospital. Radiography is a method of investigation that does not involve destroying the coffin, mummy, or wrappings. Radiography can assist other analytical studies in understanding life and death in ancient Egypt.

The Museum protects its ancient guests from deterioration by keeping the display areas moisture-free with quantities of silica gel placed in close proximity to the mummy. Dessication or removal of water was the natural feature of the arid Egyptian climate that preserved bodies buried in the sand in ancient times and was also the basis for the process of mummification practised for over 3,000 years by Egyptians. The Redpath Museum is preserving its mummies by removing moisture from the mummy's environment, a preservation technique similar to that practised in ancient times.

MUSEUM LINKS

Anthropoid coffin; Canopic vessels; Ptolemaic mummy; Mummy mask; Mummy necklace; Palm leaf sandals; Mummified cat; Bowl of dried fruit from ancient Egypt.


CREDITS Egyptian Mummies. Shire Publications, Ltd., 1988; Mummies, Myth and Magic in Ancient Egypt. Thames and Hudson, 1989; Mummy. Stoddart Publishing Co. Ltd., 1993; Tutankhamun-The Last Journey. Quartet Books, Ltd., 1976




Redpath Museum/McGill University
859 Sherbrooke Street West
Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3A 2K6




The Lady of Thebes




Viewer for detail of X-ray, copper, plexiglass, glass, X-ray, LED screen and videotape. Time Machine (The Personal Observatory) by Madelon Hooykaas and Elsa Stansfield, 1996, 'in situ' installation.



Telescope, polished aluminum, led screen and videotape. Time Machine (The Personal Observatory) by Madelon Hooykaas and Elsa Stansfield, 1996, 'in situ' installation.



Radiography: composite pelvis x-ray of the **Lady of Thebes** taken at the Royal Victoria Hospital for the Redpath Museum.



Display cabinet for X-rays, copper, aluminum, plexiglass, X-rays and light. **Time Machine (The Personal Observatory)** by Madelon Hooykaas and Elsa Stansfield, 1996, 'in situ' installation.




Solaris (1972) , directed by Andrei Tarkovsky. Gibarian (Sos Sarkissian) disrupts the logic of fourth order subjectivity when 'he' (now dead) delivers a video message to Kris (Donatis Banionis) with the appearance of agency characteristic of second and third order, material subjectivity. The effectiveness of this scene is imbedded in the metaphysical possibility that the dead is living.



Man Drawing Reclining Woman, by Albrecht DÜRER (1471-1528) demonstrates linear perspective vision. The linear perspective grid was invented by the fifteenth-century Italian painter Alberti.

Touch, from the exhibition, *The Physical Self*, a selection by Peter Greenaway from the collection of the Boymans-van Beuningen Museum, Rotterdam, The Netherlands.

Clothing usually disintegrates before it can impressively bear the scars of use. Boymans-van Beuningen possess no metal armour. Glass breaks before it can bear a human mark, and most humble, domestic wooden articles were thrown into the fire after they had completed service. But the Boymans museum has a large collection of cutlery-- knives and spoons, and later forks, whose constant use, cutting and slicing, scooping and spooning, holding firmly in the hand and touching the lips and tongue, bring to mind the physical presence of thousands of unknown domestic users from the start of the 12th century until last year. Several hundreds of these have been laid out in uniform ranks, like a minimal exercise in variations on a historical standard, for close comparative inspection. [Greenaway, p. 75]





MONTREAL'S FETISH EMPORIUM

12 BOLERO
6842/46 ST-HUBERT
BETWEEN BELANGER AND ST-ZOTIQUE
METRO - BEAUBIEN

FOOT FETISH GEAR: CHAINS, CHASTITY DEVICES, COLLARS, DRESSES, HIGH HEELS, LATEX, P.C.V., T.V.s, DRAG, GAGS, LUBRICANTS, MASKS, PUMPS, RINGS, SADDLES, SHOCKS, STOCKINGS, WHIPS, AND MUCH MUCH MORE!

LEATHER PVC AND CUB WEAR CUSTOM MADE ON THE PREMISES


Fetish Night
MONTEAL MARKET DRESS-UP PARTY
382 MAJOR

STRICT DRESS CODE: LEATHER, PVC, T.V.s and DRAG
THURSDAY AUGUST 7th
INFO 270 6065
E-mail: info@fem.net

Newspaper ad for one of Montréal's many Fetish theme parties; note the disclaimer, "Strict Dress Code: Leather, Latex, P.C.V., T.V.s and Drag". At one time, the add also included the disclaimer, "Dress Code will be enforced"; that has since been eliminated from this regularly-run add. [Hour Magazine, vol. 5, no. 31. July 31 - August 6, 1997. p. 5.]


This image is an example of rubberist apparel and its close connection to sexual play. The subject rests on a bed with bound legs, her sexual markers exaggerated, just as the hose that extends from the gas mask references the limp penis (unlike the erect phallus). The rubberist not only references fascism, sexuality, bondage, death, and asphyxiation, but industrial culture such as is necessary for protection in laboratories and the practice of animal husbandry. This adds a twist to the possibility that rubberism is an over-exaggeration of protection necessary in the age of postmodern diseases (HIV).






Pam. Inez van LAMSWEERDE. Thank You Thighmaster (1993). Photo, 1m. x 1.5m. Quantel
"Paintbox" operator: Karin SPIJKER, I&I Amsterdam. Torch Gallery.

Kim. Inez van LAMSWEERDE. Thank You Thighmaster (1993). Photo, 1m. x 1.5m. Quantel
"Paintbox" operator: Karin SPIJKER, I&I Amsterdam. Torch Gallery.






Joan. Inez van LAMSWEERDE. Thank You Thighmaster (1993). Photo, 1m. x 1.5m. Quantel "Paintbox" operator: Karin SPIJKER, I&I Amsterdam. Torch Gallery.

Britt. Inez van LAMSWEERDE. Thank You Thighmaster (1993). Photo, 1m. x 1.5m. Quantel "Paintbox" operator: Karin SPIJKER, I&I Amsterdam. Torch Gallery.






Caroline. Inez van LAMSWEERDE. **Final Fantasy** (1994). Photo, 1m. x 1.5m. Quantel "Paintbox" operator: Karin SPIJKER, I&I Amsterdam. Torch Gallery.


Wendy. Inez van LAMSWEERDE. **Final Fantasy** (1994). Photo, 1m. x 1.5m. Quantel "Paintbox" operator: Karin SPIJKER, I&I Amsterdam. Torch Gallery.





Ursula. Inez van LAMSWEERDE. **Final Fantasy** (1994). Photo, 1m. x 1.5m. Quantel "Paintbox" operator: Karin SPIJKER, I&I Amsterdam. Torch Gallery.


Rebecca. Inez van LAMSWEERDE. **Untitled Series** (1995). Photo, 1m. x 1.5m. Quantel "Paintbox" operator: Karin SPIJKER, I&I Amsterdam. Torch Gallery.





in LAMSWEERDE. **Untitled Series** (1995). Photo, 1m. x 1.5m. Quantel "Paintbox"
1 SPIJKER, I&I Amsterdam. Torch Gallery.


ZIZ and Sammy CUCHER. **After Eden** (1992). Digitized Ektacolor C-print, 72" x 30".
allery, NY.





Man with Camcorder. Anthony AZIZ and Sammy CUCHER. **Faith, Honor and Beauty** (1992). Digitized Ektacolor C-print, 86" x 38". Jack Shainman Gallery, NY.

Man with Laptop. Anthony AZIZ and Sammy CUCHER. **Faith, Honor and Beauty** (1992). Digitized Ektacolor C-print, 86" x 38". Jack Shainman Gallery, NY.





Man with Baseball Bat. Anthony AZIZ and Sammy CUCHER. **Faith, Honor and Beauty** (1992). Digitized Ektacolor C-print, 86" x 38". Jack Shainman Gallery, NY.

Man with Gun. Anthony AZIZ and Sammy CUCHER. **Faith, Honor and Beauty** (1992). Digitized Ektacolor C-print, 86" x 38". Jack Shainman Gallery, NY.






Woman with Apples. Anthony AZIZ and Sammy CUCHER. **Faith, Honor and Beauty** (1992). Digitized Ektacolor C-print, 86" x 38". Jack Shainman Gallery, NY.

Mother and Child. Anthony AZIZ and Sammy CUCHER. **Faith, Honor and Beauty** (1992). Digitized Ektacolor C-print, 86" x 38". Jack Shainman Gallery, NY.





Woman with Mirror and Fur. Anthony AZIZ and Sammy CUCHER. **Faith, Honor and Beauty** (1992). Digitized Ektacolor C-print, 86" x 38". Jack Shainman Gallery, NY.

Woman with Helmet. Anthony AZIZ and Sammy CUCHER. **Faith, Honor and Beauty** (1992). Digitized Ektacolor C-print, 86" x 38". Jack Shainman Gallery, NY.

