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Engaging The Moral Imagination Through Metaphor:

Implications For Moral Education

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Abstract

The first contemporary approaches to moral education emphasize moral reasoning skills and value analysis. The possible role of imagination in moral understanding is, by and large, neglected. More recent approaches suggest engaging the imagination can benefit moral education. The concept of imagination, however, remains elusive. As the capacity to consider the possible beyond the actual, imagination is a valued educational tool. It is offered that morality and the opportunity for meaningful interpretation of human experience may best be conveyed in symbolic terms. Metaphor, once viewed as an ornamental product of language, has been rediscovered; claiming a position in our comprehension of human understanding. This thesis proposes that engaging the imagination through metaphor is critical for moral education on the basis that our moral understanding is fundamentally imaginative and metaphoric in nature.

Resumé

L'éducation morale contemporaine porte une attention particulière sur le raisonment formel. L'imagination est cependant, souvent négligée ou dépriciée. Il en est ainsi pour le langage symbolique et métaphorique. Cette thèse tente d'établir l'importance de l'imagination, tout particulièrement du role de la métaphore dans l'émergence de l'imagination morale. Notre compréhension morale est, à la base, imaginative et métaphorique.

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Introduction

And, as the imagination bodies forth

The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen

Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing

A local habitation and a name.

SHAKESPEARE, A Midsummer Nights Dream

(1595-6) Act 5, scene 1, 1.7

1. Background and Context

My interest in possible relationships between the imagination and narrative was initiated from my own educational experiences during childhood. Most clearly, I remember a young and energetic substitute geography teacher who had us create active volcanoes. He also asked us to write a short description on how we thought the volcano's eruption would effect the people of the village nearby. I recall imagining feelings of shock and worry the parents might feel having to flee their homes and run barefoot, for their lives. I also imagined mellifluous songs of joy sung by the children inspired by the idea that they would miss at least one day of

classes due to the volcanoes' eruption.

Recently the curious relationship between the imagination and narrative caught my attention more fully through my experiences as a social worker working with children and their families during the last eight year period. As a Youth Protection social worker and educator in residential treatment settings, I have been granted the opportunity to meet, observe and interact with many children and their families. My investigations and assessments of children at risk, individual counselling, and family work is most often with families in crisis and children exhibiting severely risky behaviours.

Increasingly often, I observe these children to be morally abandoned by their families and by the society which they inhabit. Many of the parents of these children speak of their unhappiness and frustration with their given situations. These parents voice their despair concerning their struggles with an abusive partner, relentless drug and alcohol addictions and diagnoses of chronic illnesses including cancer and A.I.D.S.. These are harsh realities for some families, and it seems that the feelings which can result from these circumstances are more difficult to deal with when family support is limited and meaningful social relationships are few.

I often see that a lingering sense of powerlessness articulated by some parents and witnessed through the actions (or lack thereof) by the children, has profound effects on the children. It seems to influence their conception of themselves, their families, their futures and their idea of how the world works. As primary role models, I consider the attitudes and perceptions of parents to be powerful forces contributing to their childrens' worldview. Feelings of frustration and doubt associated with the parents' perceived inability to alter their situation which affects them so negatively, genuinely affects the children. It is my experience that a ten year old remains highly dependant on his or her parents in ascribing meaning to their lives and to the world in which they live.

Treading in constant waves of discontentment within their family environment, children seem likely to learn that their glass is half empty rather than half full. Sometimes they learn that they have been handed the map to a future which is likely to unfold in a way similar to that of their parents. Children learn that their lives have limits articulated by despairing parents and that often, possible worlds of which they dream seem unlikely options for them to pursue with any seriousness. They learn that the world of human relationships and possibilities for being are defined by the world

experienced within their families. Frequently, I see that parents do not consider new possibilities, nor do they identify various options available to them. It is my experience that children of these families suffer from this significantly. I see children searching for a script different from the one authored by their parents. These children are resilient beings who, in some way or another, seek new possibilities.

I have found that this search for possibility is often met through behaviour considered risky and delinquent. It seems blatantly evident in adolescents as they seek values to identify with and define themselves against. Often their searches entail involvement with gangs and cults, drug use and abuse, prostitution, and flight from the family to other environments. In these situations children claim to feel a sense of belonging and a feeling of being understood by their peers, fellow gang members and pimps. It seems to me that frequently, they seek another identity; a role other than that ascribed by their position within their family and maintained by family relationships. I see an apparently inherent motivation in children to search for a context to their lives different from the one which is accessible to them through their families.

Through my work assessing risk, I am involved with families where children are truant from school. Each child has different reasons and individual agendas, the common thread of their collective stories are their apparent disinterest in school. Whatever the teachers' curriculum attempted to teach, somehow the benefits of education elude these students. On the other hand, I see these children captivated by various forms of narratives such as stories, music, music videos, movies, theatre and poetry. Some seem equally curious about stories told symbolically through paintings, drawings and sculpture.

While investigating serious school truancy issues in the case of Krista, Danny and David (pseudonyms), I was provided with accounts of the engaging power of narrative metaphor. These children, aged 14, 16, and 17 respectively, reported that they found school boring and had decided it was futile because they felt that they did not learn much. They reported feeling that their teachers were not interested in them or their learning process but that they seemed more interested in gaining a paycheque. Krista said that she skipped classes to write lines of poetry. Huddled between doors of the back entrance of the school, Krista would write haiku in her journal instead of attending classes. She preferred her shimmering lines of braided metaphor to the teachers' lessons on the history of Quebec. She said that writing poetry helped

her to get her feelings "outside of herself".

When Danny skipped his grade 10 classes he confessed to spending the day listening to music on his walkman in a park across from his school. He expressed his interest in his music and told me "I can really hold onto my music, it makes me feel alive." Danny did not find any classes to pique his interest. Nor could it offer him whatever it was that his music did. David spent days at a friends home watching movies and music videos instead of attending his grade 11 classes. When questioned, he said that he "saw more" in the movies than he did in class. He made a point of telling me that he never fell asleep watching a movie, whereas he had often fallen asleep in class.

I have come to identify these childrens' behaviours as their tailored searches for possible ways of being; as an exercise celebrating the freedom of the spirit in its fluid agility to consider inhabiting other possible worlds. I see them seeking new ways to creatively understand themselves through various metaphors. It is as if these new metaphors offer them access to new realities. Of course other issues are at hand such as peer pressure and culture, however, the strong motivation of these children seems guided by a curiosity in, and a necessity for, meaning; in a desire to consider the

possible beyond the actual. It seems that these young people are looking for a story by which to understand, guide and judge their own life stories. Their individually initiated quests for possibilities through metaphors seem to offer significant insight into their interest and motivation. These quests for alternative meanings and new understandings seem symptomatic of their desire to understand their own stories and feelings, and to help them to make sense of where they belong in the scheme of how the world works.

Prior to having read any literature on the topic, I have always sensed that the metaphors offered by various narratives, stories of adventure, magic, loss and despair frequently captivate children. These metaphors seem to offer them a way to make sense of their world and inspire a sense of hope, a sense of possibility. These mataphors that they seek seem to engage their imaginations and offer them a sense of the possible: possible conceptions of meanings and values, possible ways of relating to others and possible ways of being other than what they know.

I have also been increasingly fascinated by the way in which children express themselves through metaphors. I frequently observe children express themselves metaphorically with a natural agility. I met Jason for the first time at his

school. A shy and insightful child of nine years, Jason had recently been diagnosed with A.D.H.D. (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder) and was struggling both at home and at school. When I asked him to tell me about himself he sighed and asserted, "I'm no walk in the park." When prompted for more information, Jason proceeded to provide me with a descriptive account of his metaphor: "Well, you know that great feeling you get when you're walking in a park with the wind, the sun, and your friends in the fall time? Uhmmm, being with me is not like that at all... being with me is the very opposite of being there." What a powerful metaphor! In one sentence, one image, he communicated what I thought to be a precise account of what he wanted me to understand. He authored this narrative of his own inspiration, created and articulated this captivating image from his own meaning-making systems in a very imaginative way.

I also see children inclined to use metaphors when attempting to come to terms with tragic experiences. Amanda was five and had recently lost both her parents in a car accident; she was the only survivor and witnessed their immediate deaths. The foster mother expressed concern as Amanda did not seem to show any signs of sadness during the weeks following the event. Amanda refused to discuss the crash or her feelings around it with myself, or any other

adult. During our second meeting, Amanda began to create scenarios of tragedy using several toys including hand puppets. She relived the crash, and imaginatively constructed Lego buildings which she repeatedly destroyed. She created one scenario where Bonnet (the cat puppet) found Oscar (the dog puppet) alone and crying. Bonnet asked what Oscar had he lost that made him so sad, and Oscar replied that a strong wind found him and blew his strawberry ice cream cone into the sky. Both Bonnet and Oscar then fell lifeless to the ground and Amanda curled up on the floor and began to cry. Slowly, her anger, sadness and fear surfaced and became accessible through the metaphors she had created. It was through this metaphoric world that Amanda was able to come to terms with her parents' death and her new reality.

In my experiences to date, the most touching narrative metaphor was authored by a shy and withdrawn ten year old child who preferred not to engage in dialogue. John was living at home with his depressed mother and "absent" father. He was the youngest of two siblings and had a very distant relationship with his sister who was five years older than him and in the process of moving out of the province. John appeared very sad both at school and at home. One afternoon, he decided to write this narrative for himself. This story illustrates his agility in using metaphor to communicate his

conception of the world. This narrative in particular, among others, inspired my desire to pursue my thesis in this direction.

A Fish That Had Magic

A long time ago on the planet earth. In a stream, a fish just had eggs and one of those eggs had magic. In one week the eggs broke open one by one the fish came out of their eggs. When the last egg opened that was the fish that had the magic. He would not play with the other baby fish, he would stay near his mother because. His father died one hour ago. When they were swimming around the stream the mother saw something hanging in the water. She went to see it and she bit it. It was a fish hook so the small fish swim's where his mother was and he thought really hard, the hook came out of her mouth. She said come on lets swim away, all the fish followed her and swam to safety. They grew bigger and they had to leave and find their fortunes. The fish that had the magic was the last one to leave he was saying good-by to his mother. He told her that he had magic power she laughed then he lifted a rock with his thought, then he said now do you believe me? She said yes now I believe you she said again I love you, I love you too. He kissed his mother good-bye and swam slowly away sadly. Well on his trip to find his fortune he had trouble because he

went in the wrong holes (with predators) like sharks, squid, and hammerhead sharks he could not out swim them so he used his power. One day when he was eating the sea he saw a female but when he came near she swam away. He had trouble finding his fortune so he went to this place where all the woman stay so he can find his fortune there, no luck. There was no good ones there that he liked. So he went on looking for his fortune. He went all over the place to find his fortune.

At first I considered these examples with mere curiosity. But the more I witnessed this phenomenon, the more intrigued I became with the power of metaphor. The relationship between social work and moral education is not always a distant one. As a social worker, I am often in the position of counselling children and families. Counselling is understood as a process of assisting and guiding individuals to resolve personal or social difficulties. When issues raised for discussion and resolution are of a moral nature, I am confronted with the task of providing individuals with moral guidance. This guidance is moral education when I explore what individuals believe, what changes they would like to influence within themselves and their families, and what they wish to acheive. I have often found myself adressing the question of, "How do I want to live?" It is in this sense that I see social work as a form of moral education.

Robert Coles has come to similar conclusions from his extensive work as a child psychiatrist with children at risk. Coles talks about the truly moral nature of the issues which bring him into the lives of many children. In The Moral Intelligence of Children (1997), he offers narratives from his personal and professional experiences with children who abuse drugs, disrespect authority and are caught cheating at school. As a school consultant, Coles is the expert. As such, he is expected to provide various recommendations to professional teams regarding the child in question; the child who has gotten himself into trouble in one way or another. Coles is expected to make medical, psychiatric, psychological and cognitive judgements; he is in a position to suggest a course of action which will yeild the highest "return" for the child, family, school and community. Coles writes that these children (who are at risk) are at a point of crisis, "at a moral crossroad with respect to what confronted them, to where they stood in their lives" (p. 34). Reflecting on issues which he has helped children to confront, Coles reports that these issues "are very much moral ones: a child has gotten into trouble, all right - done something wrong, hurt someone, or violated a school regulation, a community's customs, or even laws" (1997, p. 33). Some children cheat at school, lie to their parents or steal from the drugstore. Sometimes these childrens' acts are symptoms of something greater; often that

"something greater" involves the family. For example, I can remember when Jane admitted to me that she cheated in high school because she did not want to disappoint her mother who was "already sad enough since the divorce". Daniel lied to his parents about his whereabouts one afternoon because he did not want them to know that he was out with his friends; at seventeen, his parents expected him to return directly home from school and forbid him develop any friendships. Josh told me that he stole the stuffed toy for his younger brother to help him fall asleep at night after his mother hit him. These are examples of how childrens' behaviour can be indicative of a larger family issue.

Coles says that we often turn to psychology, sociology, and their jargon, when making expert assessments. He urges us to heed Erik H. Erikson's comment, "These days, we sometimes spend a lot of time avoiding the obvious, and sometimes, psychology helps us do so!" (as cited in Coles, 1997, p. 33). Coles asks, "At what point do we face squarely that (moral) side of a child's life and conclude that a moral crisis is at hand, one requiring a candid assessment of character, an assessment of what a boy's or girl's moral assumptions, attitudes, an values have turned out to be, and with what likely outcome in terms of behaviour - law-abiding or antisocial?" (p. 34). By this I understand Coles to mean that

as professionals and experts we need to address the issues for "treatment" as the moral matters that they truly are.

On the meaning of education to which I am referring, it includes formal schooling and "informal education"; education provided by the family, the community and the interactions children have with their environment. Gabriel Moran (1997) addresses this broad concept of education in Showing How: The Act of Teaching (1997). Moran suggests that family, classroom, job and leisure activity are four major forms of education that are "lifelong and lifewide," and that education is best described as "the interaction of forms of life with end (meaning) and without end (termination)" (p. 156). In this sense, we are educated through our interactions with our environment; children hear their parents words and witness their actions. We learn from extended family members, babysitters and caretakers. We learn from teachers, peers, neighbours, schools and communities. Education as "interaction" suggests we learn moral lessons just as we learn the danger in playing with fire and how to behave with others.

Coming back to my fascination with the use of metaphor that I witness in children, I wonder if education recognizes this inclination and interest? Is this imaginative dimension of young peoples' lives addressed by the educational

curriculum? If students consider classes boring and yet spend hours engaging their imaginations through movies and writing poetry, how can this be applied to education in general and moral education in particular?

William Kilpatrick articulates my observations and concern accurately in the following passage:

> Traditional cultures made generous use of epics, stories, songs, painting, and sculpture in educating and socializing the young. In many ways it was a surprisingly up-to-date approach - what we would now call "teaching to the right brain." But much of this has been lost. In recent decades educators have turned a deaf ear and a blind eye to the crucial role of music, art, and story in moral formation. The result has been that these powerful influences have been left almost entirely in the hands of the entertainment industry, which has, in effect, become the real moral educator of the young (1993, p. 24).

My basic thesis proposes that imagination and metaphor play substantial roles in our moral understanding. I suggest that engaging the imagination through metaphor can contribute significantly to moral education. In chapter one I will

present an overview of contemporary approaches to moral education. I will focus on Kohlberg's Cognitive-Developmental theory of moral development and the Values Clarification approach to moral education. I will explore other approaches to moral education put forth by William Kilpatrick, Mark Tappan and Carol Witherell and present several ideas on moral development from child psychologists Robert Coles and Bruno Bettelheim. Chapter two will explore the possible roles of imagination and metaphor in learning. Finally, chapter three will examine the possible role of imagination and metaphor in shaping our moral understanding. I will then explore how the use of metaphor can contribute to moral education.

Chapter One: Approaches For Moral Education

I am looking for a philosophical framework that will do justice to my observations, one where metaphor and narrative are granted legitimacy for moral education. Conventional models for moral education are inadequate in this area. In the following section I intend to outline two approaches to moral education: Kohlberg's pervasive Cognitive-Developmental theory of moral development (1981) and Values Clarification (Raths, et al. [1966] and Simon, Howe and Kirshenbaum [1972]). These approaches are selected on the basis of their dominant influence in moral education. I will also include the "Philosophy for Children" approach put forth by Matthew Lipman (1977) because it seems to hold potential in acknowledging the power of narrative and imagination.

Part I: The First Contemporary Approaches

Lawrence Kohlberg began his studies on the moral thinking of children in the 1950's following the work of Piaget (1948), among others. His theory of cognitive moral development has been extremely influential in the domain of moral development. The interest and controversy provoked by his model illustrates the impact of his work during its evolution over the last

three decades (eg. Gilligan, 1977).

The Cognitive-Developmental model offered by Kohlberg (1981 & 1984) attempts to address the moral domain of human experiences. This model emphasizes moral reasoning and the just community approach. Through his work with boys ages 10 to 16, Kohlberg adopted the view that there exists a large rational component to moral behaviour. He also concluded that there was a natural developmental pattern to moral reasoning.

Kohlberg developed a six stage sequence model which presumes to capture the manner in which moral reasoning occurs. This model consists of three levels within which two stages are represented: the Preconventional level, the Conventional level and the Postconventional, Autonomous or Principled Level. The six stages represent a moral reasoning characterized by heteronomy to increasing autonomy. Kohlberg claims that children progressively move ahead through the proposed sequence. They may become fixated at various stages, however, they do not digress from these proposed sequences. He adds that children progress at varying speeds and may never attain what he identifies as the highest stage of moral development. Kohlberg makes the following claims: (1) All persons cross-culturally advance according to these stages; (2) no stage is skipped or missed; the development is

sequential; (3) once a higher stage is reached, there is no digression; (4) 50% of one's reasoning is at the stage one is claimed to be operating from; 25% remains in the previous stage, and 25% in the stage up ahead; (5) although reasoners can comprehend lower level stage responses below their own, any reasons given from stage orientations than one above their's will be distorted; (6) students will not advance up the "ladder" unless there is a need (disequilibrium) to answer moral questions; (7) few reasoners ever reach the principled level of moral reasoning; (8) "justice" is the zenith for moral growth; (9) "moral judgment, while only one factor in moral behaviours, is the single most important or influential factor yet discovered in moral behaviour" (cited in Freiberg, 1986; cf. Kohlberg, 1981 & 1984).

Kohlberg's aim is to encourage children to move to more sophisticated stages of moral reasoning. He proposes that this is facilitated through peer classroom discussions of moral dilemmas. He argues that the discussion of moral dilemmas in the classroom setting will represent students at various stages and that this exposure will facilitate the students' movement to higher stages. The primary assumption of this model suggests that an orientation of justice is the primary focus of all moral reasoning to all individuals at all times; that morality is equated to justice.

Kohlberg believed "each person, child or adult, is a moral philosopher" and that "as we grow up we reason in different ways, passing from one stage to the next since it gives us a more flexible way of handling moral issues" (Oliver, 1972, p. 2). Yet his theory of moral development does not address the cultivation of this "flexibility". Could it be that this "flexibility" required in handling moral issues is engaged through the activities of the imagination? Is it conceivable that in fact we have more flexible ways of handling moral issues as children and that this capacity deteriorates as we are educated into adulthood?

Values Clarification is another popular approach to moral education. During its' emergence in the seventies, it was applied throughout the curriculum in Canada (Cochrane, 1992) and the United States (Kirschenbaum, 1992). Values Clarification is primarily concerned with, as the title suggests, teaching children to explore and develop their own feelings and values, and learn the skills of value analysis. According to Raths, et al. (1966), this approach is based on two assumptions: (1) that it is wrong to impose values in a pluralistic society, and (2) that children will care more about values that they have thought through and determined on their own than values that are dictated by adults. The Value

Clarification approach stipulates that legitimate valuing involves seven criteria; values must be : (1) freely chosen (2) from alternatives (3) after consideration of the consequences. Also, an individual must (4) cherish, (5) publicly affirm, and (6) act on the determined value, (7) repeatedly (Raths, et al., 1966).

The primary goal for teachers of this model involves giving students the opportunity to identify their personal values by engaging in exercises which necessitates the analysis of values. Teachers are expected to ask probing questions and put aside their own values. For example, if a student identifies that they "value" violence, according to this approach, it is not appropriate for the teacher to suggest alternatives or pass judgment.

Critics questioned how this approach could promote moral behaviour if it was, as it claimed to be, value free. Former proponent of this approach, Kirschenbaum acknowledges that this is not a value free approach as it had "implicitly promoted freedom, justice, rationality, equality, and other democratic and civic values" (1992, p. 774). Other equally significant criticisms of this model are that Values Clarification does not make allowances for the possibility that children may make errors in matters of value, and that

its' premises are rooted in relativism (Halstead, 1996).
Kirschenbaum acknowledges some difficulties with this model.
In hindsight, he says that there is a "time to moralize to our
children and a time to listen to their wisdom... a time to
model and a time to clarify questions... a time to intervene
and a time to overlook... " (Kirshenbaum, p. 776). He asserts
that a more comprehensive model might include the best of both
moral guidance and values clarification and proposes a
progressive Comprehensive Values model to address this.

In relation the aforementioned approaches, Matthew
Lipman's (1977) "Philosophy for Children" is the most
chronologically recent. Consistent with the notion that
reasoning is the single most correlative aspect leading to
moral behaviour, this approach is concerned with patterns of
reasoning. Essentially, this approach acquaints children with
significant philosophical concerns so that they will be better
prepared to deal with these issues. His objective is to
cultivate the potential for philosophical thinking in
children.

In "Philosophy for Children," Lipman claims that by
introducing children to philosophical concerns, they will:
(1) have improved reasoning abilities, (2) develop creativity

(3) grow personally and interpersonally, and (4) develop ethical understanding. Lipman also makes the claim that there are philosophical goals which are to be achieved. These goals include the ability to discover and identify (1) alternatives, (2) impartiality (3) consistency (4) comprehensiveness (5) situation (6) part-whole relationships, and (7) the feasibility of offering reasons for beliefs.

Children become acquainted with ethical, logical, aesthetic, metaphysical and epistemological issues through a series of stories. These issues are addressed by the characters present in Lipman's philosophical novels. These novels include Harry Stottlemeir's Discovery, Suki and Lisa. These stories and their issues are intended to provide a starting point for philosophical discussions in the classroom. This approach relies heavily on the teacher to facilitate a fruitful discussion among students. Lipman asserts that "moral education cannot be divorced from philosophical education" and that "the development of imagination and logic, among other skills, will improve students' ability to make adequate moral judgments" (cited in Freiberg, 1986, p. 189).

Part II: Recent Developments

There is a growing body of literature suggesting that various forms of narrative have much to offer moral education. The rest of this chapter will present contributions offered by educationalists Johnson, Kilpatrick, Tappan and Witherell, and child psychologists Coles and Bettelheim.

Mark Johnson claims that moral storytelling is important for moral education because it gives one the opportunity to create, then narrate one's point of view. He argues that this enables one to gain self-knowledge concerning one's beliefs (1993, p. 154). He suggests that fictional and extended narratives are important for moral education because of the potential capacities of narrative to enrich our imaginations, our capacity for moral sensitivity, our ability to make subtle discriminations necessary in dealing with morally problematic situations, and in developing our empathy for others (1993, p. 197). I will return to Johnson in chapters two and three.

Robert Coles, Professor of Psychiatry and Medical Humanities at Harvard Medical School, has made significant contributions shining the light on the moral life of children. During the 1980's Coles published several books on the importance of narrative for moral education including The

Moral Life of Children (1986), The Spiritual Life of Children (1990) and The Call of Stories: Teaching and The Moral Imagination (1989).

In The Moral Intelligence of Children (1997), Coles concerns himself with the role of the moral imagination in shaping the moral intelligence of children. He suggests that children are witnesses to morality and consequently learn morality through what they observe. Coles defines moral intelligence as our "gradually developed capacity to reflect upon what is right and wrong with all the emotional and intellectual resources available to the human mind" (p. 3). Coles understands Moral Imagination as:

> ...that place in our heads, our thinking and daydreaming, our wandering and worrying lives, where we ponder the meaning of our lives and, too, the world's ethical challenges; and where we try to decide what we ought or ought not to do, and why, and how we ought to get on with people, and for what overall moral, religious, spiritual, practical reasons (p. 7).

Moral Imagination is the "place" where our moral deliberations occur, and our morality takes shape. It is the place in our minds where we call on our memories of experiences, lived or

shared, and envision possibilities for and consequences of, our lived morality.

Based on his experiences as a medical resident and his professional experiences as a child psychiatrist, Coles endorses the capacities of narrative for engaging the moral imagination for moral education. He writes: "Stories from real life as well as stories from the movies, from literature, can stir and provoke the moral imagination. Didactic or theoretical arguments don't work well; narratives, images, observed behaviour all do" (1997, p. 5). He asserts that children learn to grow morally as a consequence of learning how to be with others. This growth is prompted by "taking to heart what we have seen and heard" (p. 7). Coles affirms that narratives can contribute to our stock of experiences from which we draw in moral our deliberations.

Coles proposes that children are witnesses and learn morality from observing the words and actions of others. On children as witnesses, he writes:

> The child is a witness; the child is an ever-attentive witness of grown-up morality - or lack thereof; the child looks and looks for clues as to how one ought to behave, and finds them galore as we parents and teachers go about

our lives, making choices, addressing people, showing in action our rock-bottom assumptions, desires, and values, and thereby telling those young observers much more than we may realize (p. 5).

As witnesses to morality, children observe various attitudes and actions reflected in daily life by those around them and by those who are present in narratives to whom they are exposed. The idea of children as witnesses does not imply that children participate in the lives offered by narratives, but that by observing others, they have access to a vision of the particularities of, and possibilities for human moral life. It is by means of this observation, this vision, that children learn morality and the consequences of its character.

As in my experiences, Coles has observed children to be actively involved in seeking out possibilities for shaping their morality. He writes:

...children constantly ask their whys, seek moral reasons upon which to gird their present and future life - the heart of spirituality: to look inward in search of meaning and purpose; to seek an understanding of what truly matters and for which reasons, an activity that need not take place under formal religious or

institutional purposes and that can be encouraged by reading stories and poems... (1997, p. 178).

For Coles then, children are witnesses and learn morality by observing the actions and words of others, be it parents, teachers, neighbours or characters portrayed in stories, films and other narratives. The moral imagination plays an important role in shaping the moral intelligence of children. Moral imagination is more readily engaged by stories than by theoretical arguments. Narratives and the images they suggest can provoke, enrich, and stir the moral imagination. In this way, they have the capacity to sculpt the moral intelligence of children.

Although not a recent author, Bruno Bettelheim offers similar observations relevant to this inquiry. Educator and child psychologist, Bettelheim has worked extensively with severely disturbed children. One of his projects involved investigating the possible contributions of psychoanalysis towards the education of children. In this study he chose to explore why folk tales were considered valuable to children. In The Uses of Enchantment, Bettelheim (1976) details his conclusion that fairy tales are vital sources of psychological and moral strength for children. Concerning his investigation he writes:

I was confronted with the problem of deducing what experiences in a child's life are most suited to promote meaning in his life; to endow life in general with more meaning. Regarding this task, nothing is more important than the impact of parents and others who take care of the child; second in importance is our cultural heritage, when it is transmitted to the child in the right manner. When children are young, it is literature that carries such information the best (p. 4).

This offers support to my assessment on the central importance of parents in providing possibilities for meaning to their children. Bettelheim asserts that the most difficult and important parenting task is that of teaching the child to find meaning in his life (p. 3). It is interesting to consider that Bettelheim defines a psychologically mature individual as one who has attained a secure understanding of what the meaning of his or her life may or ought to be (p. 3). For him, meaning is of central importance to psychological maturity.

Bettelheim argues that narratives, specifically the fairy tale, offers much to children in helping them master the problems of growing up. These problems include gaining a feeling of self-hood, self-worth and a sense of moral obligation. Fairy tales initiate children into the idea that

they can make sense out of their feelings and provide them with ideas as to how they can create order in their "inner house" (p. 5). On mastering these tasks, Bettelheim proposes that fairy tales have unequalled value because:

> [T]hey offer new dimensions to the child's imagination which would be impossible for him to discover on his own. Even more important, the form and structure of fairy tales suggest images to the child by which he can structure his daydreams and with them give better direction to his life (p. 7).

Bettelheim says that fairy tales provide children with the message that human struggles are unavoidable in life and are, in fact, an intrinsic part of the human condition. More importantly, fairy tales suggest that it is possible for one to emerge victorious from these unexpected and unjust struggles when one confronts and meets their demands (p. 8). In the context of stories, morality is assurance that one can succeed (p. 10). This message is a momentous gift for children because it offers them a sense of possibility in addressing their own struggles. It is because the fairy tale address existential dilemmas and confronts the basic human condition in a level manner that they are Bettelheim's narrative of choice.

He argues that children identify with characters in fairy tales by their own accord and in this sense, fairy tales have the capacity to "imprint morality" on the child (p. 9).

For Bettelheim, the question for the child is not "Do I want to be good?" rather it is "Who do I want to be like?" (p. 10). He proposes that the fact that virtue wins out over evil in the end is not what promotes morality, but it is the identification the child makes with struggling hero that accomplishes this. He writes, "Because of this identification the child imagines that he suffers with the hero, his trials and tribulations, and triumphs with him as virtue is victorious" (p. 9).

Curiously, he suggests that morality may be addressed best in symbolic terms: "The child needs most particularly to be given suggestions in symbolic form about how he may deal with these issues [of growing-up] and grow safely into maturity" (p. 8). The metaphoric symbols offered by fairy tales can be powerful tools in the moral education of children. He states:

> He (child) needs... a moral education which subtly, and by implication only, conveys to him the advantages of moral behaviour, not through abstract ethical concepts but through that which seems tangibly right and therefore

meaningful to him. The child finds this kind of meaning through fairy tales (p. 5).

The imagination is active in enabling children to identify with heros and villains, and participate in a story intellectually and emotionally. Bettelheim suggests that the imagination is one of our inner resources that allows us access to deeper meaning and contributes to our morality as the capacity to know we can succeed. On this he writes:

> To find deeper meaning, one must become able to transcend the narrow confines of a self-centered existence and believe that one will make a significant contribution in life ... In order not to be at the mercy of the vagaries of life, one must develop one's inner resources, so that one's emotions, imagination and intellect mutually support and enrich one another. Our positive feelings give us the strength to develop our rationality; only hope for the future can sustain us in the adversities we unavoidably encounter (pp. 3-4).

Bettelheim suggests that the imagination must be engaged and developed in an effort to enrich the child's inner resources to ensure s/he is best equipped to confront and manage the problems of growing up. He claims that moral

education must convey both assurance that one can succeed and the benefits of virtue in symbolic form. Literature is what best accomplishes this task for young children, and because fairy tales confront the existential dilemma, it is Bettelheim's narrative of choice.

In <u>Why Johnny Can't Tell Right From Wrong</u>, Professor of Education at Boston College, William Kilpatrick (1992) speaks to the importance of engaging the moral imagination for moral education. Kilpatrick states that imagination plays a potent role in our moral life (p. 142). He suggests that good art, such as music, painting, sculpture, and literature shapes our imagination and consequently our morality. He also identifies a connection between vision and virtue.

Based on his own observations of "moral illiteracy" among his college students, Kilpatrick urges that moral education must be refreshed and renewed. He argues that schools must reestablish themselves as places of serious purpose and that in such places students would be introduced to the works of the moral imagination through the curriculum (p. 224). He refers to the moral imagination as a state of mind that is concerned with things as they ought to be; that works within the limits of reality and holds up an ideal that is attainable through dedication and hard work (p. 208). He suggests that

the imagination has the capacity to provide us with access to possibilities other than those which currently exist.

On the capacity of good art he writes, "art that is faithful to the human condition, and not escapist, illusionary or cynical - can put us in touch with what Ryn [Claes Ryn, Chairman of the National Humanities Institute] calls the ethical standard within experience" (p. 168). Good art, according to Ryn and Kilpatrick provides us with a vision of ethical reality. Good literature, then, can provide us with a view of the lived implications of distinct moral character.

On the role of stories and imagination, he observes that "different stories can inspire different kinds of imagination and the imagination, in turn, shapes our will and our character" (p. 207). For moral education, he specifically advocates for stories that teach by example (p. 131). He offers the dramas of Sophocles, Dante, Shakespeare, Tolstoy, Austen, Conrad and Elliot; along with narratives of history and biography to feed our moral imagination (p. 209). Kilpatrick suggests that narratives can instill virtue in readers. He says,

> Stories help us to make sense of our lives. they also
> create a desire to be good. Plato, who thought long and

hard about the subject of moral education, believed that children should be brought up in such a way that they would fall in live with virtue. And he thought that stories and histories were the key to sparking this desire. No amount of discussion or dialogue could compensate if that spark was missing (p. 27).

He argues that stories are more effective than peer group discussions when it comes to issues of moral import. He suggests that good literature introduces children to other children who are not like himself, but who are better than himself and represent a possibility of who he might become if he pursues and fufills his potential (p. 168). Like Bettelheim, Kilpatrick suggests that narratives can introduce children to various unavoidable struggles of life, to the possibility of emerging triumphant and to the value of virtue.

As presented above, novelist John Gardner concedes that fictions have the capacity to instill virtue in readers. He articulates his observation in this way, "When we read, we ingest metaphors of goodness, wordlessly learning to behave more like Levin than like Anna (in Anna Karenina), more like the transformed Emma (in Jane Austen's novel) than like the Emma we first meet in the book" (cited in Kilpatrick, 1992, p. 168). For Gardner, fictions nourish us with "metaphors of

goodness" which introduce and tempt us to script virtuous roles for our own life stories.

Kilpatrick offers the perspective that morality is inextricably bound up with vision and that with respect to morality, that we may need the "image" more than we think. For instance, he reminds us that we generally subscribe to moral principals on the basis that they are embedded within a vision or worldview that we hold to be true (p. 134). He has observed that moral transformation often occurs in conjunction with a transformation of vision, and that moral improvement is defined as the result of seeing things in a different light (p. 134). This notion has been addressed by therapists including White (1995), Epston & White (1992) and Roberts (1994). Kilpatrick writes:

> One way or another, art is intimately related to the way we live our lives. One way or another, some aesthetic vision of life governs our behaviour. A proper education nourishes the imagination with rich and powerful, yet realistic images. From that fund the child can build a deep and adequate vision of life. The alternative is not that the child will be left without images, symbols, and stories but that their perceptions of life will be colored almost totally by the commercialized dreams and

illusions that come out of Hollywood and Madison Avenue
(p. 169).

The chief reason stories are important for moral development
is because stories are one of the primary means by which
visions are communicated; and "a vision in turn, may be
defined as a story about the way things are or the way the
world works" (p. 135). Stories are essentially moving pictures
and where issues of moral import are concerned " ... it may be
that we do need the picture more than we think. The story
suits our nature because we think more readily in pictures
that in propositions" (p. 141). For example, an image provided
by a story character may "inhabit some corner of our
imagination" (p. 143); their names call up an image, and the
image will summon a story to the forefront of our minds. The
story that is now occupying our attention may,

> give us the power or resolve to struggle through a
>
> difficult situation or to overcome our own moral
>
> sluggishness. Or it may simply give us the power
>
> to see things clearly. Above all, the story allows
>
> us to make that human connection we are always in
>
> danger of forgetting (p. 143).

Kilpatrick proposes that the imagination plays a chief role in our moral life and that morality is inextricably tied up with vision. The images provoked and conveyed by good art feed the moral imagination. Good art that is faithful to the human condition engages the moral imagination and provides us with a vision of ethical reality. Narratives provide us with a means to make sense of our world and have the capacity to instill virtue. Stories that teach by example are especially important as they introduce children to others who represent the possibilities of who they might become.

Mark Tappan is associate professor and co-chair of the Education department at Colby College in Maine. His research interests include the moral development of adolescents and moral education. He proposes a narrative approach to moral education and argues that the attainment of moral authority is central to human moral development (1991, p. 6). Claiming moral authority for one's thoughts, feelings and actions is to clearly express and acknowledge one's own moral perspective (p. 7). It also entails assuming responsibility and accountability for one's moral perspective and for acting on behalf of that perspective. This is based on the idea that moral responsibility is directly tied to one's sense of moral identity. He suggests that claiming moral authority is important because "assuming responsibility for one's thoughts,

feelings and actions in the world enable one to to act in ways that are helpful, rather than harmful to others" (p. 7). Moral authority emerges from the process involved in narrating stories about one's lived moral experiences. Authoring one's story involves constructing a narrative which entails moralizing: "imbuing a story with moral value, thereby asserting or claiming authority on behalf of the author's moral perspective" (p. 8). For Tappan, moral authorship not only expresses itself through narrative, but also develops through narrative (p. 19). When individuals author the moral story that they tell, they claim authority and responsibility for that moral perspective (p. 9). This is relevant for moral education if we are interested in supporting students to develop, identify and respect their own moral voices, assume responsibility for themselves and act in ways that are helpful rather than harmful. If claiming moral authority is to be encouraged, he suggests teachers provide opportunities for students' to exercise their own moral voices and share their moral stories. Teachers must also be able to listen for different voices in students' narratives and help students to distinguish their voices from those of external authority. For Tappan the ability to make this distinction is the basis for teachers to support the gradual emergence of voice, self-authorization and responsibility that is central to moral development (p. 21).

Carol Witherell (1995) also writes on the importance of narrative for moral education. She says stories are tools of the moral imagination and proposes that narratives provide us with an opportunity to reflect on the particulars of moral life and imaginatively extend ourselves unto others. She asserts,

> Narrative can serve as an interpretive lens for reflecting the storied nature of human lives, for understanding the moral complexities of the human condition, and for enabling classrooms to expand their borders as interpretive communities. A good story engages and enlarges the moral imagination, illuminating possibilities for human thought, feeling, and action in ways that can bridge the gulf between different times, places, cultures and beliefs (pp.40-41).

Narratives have the capacity to put us in touch with possibilities for being and meaning as we imaginatively extend ourselves and accompany characters on their journey. Through this process we may emerge wiser, more receptive and more understanding (p. 41). Sharing stories can lead to an "extended intercultural understanding of the human condition, enhancing our sense of the fragility of human goodness and the

spaciousness of the moral imagination" (p. 48).

These more recent approaches seem to acknowledge some importance of imagination, but do not address what they mean by the term. Nor do these approaches look at the role of metaphor in any depth. They also fail to adequately represent the relationship imagination and metaphor and its role in moral education. Bettelheim does assert that morality may be best addressed in symbolic terms. Kilpatrick argues that we benefit from an image where issues of moral import are concerned. I surmise that metaphors have great capacity to give form to concepts of moral import and for this reason, can offer much to moral education.

Chapter Two: What Role Can Imagination and Metaphor Play

in Education?

Imagination is involved in important mental activities bearing significance to education and the process of learning. If we consider the writings of educational thinkers including Dewey (1859-1952), Plato (429-347 B.C) and Rousseau (1712-1778), we learn that their conception of education concerns itself with priorities other than the inculcation of values.   The accumulation of skills and knowledge concern them, but minimally. These educationalists identify the chief aim of education as enabling students to become autonomous thinkers who are able to identify conventional ideas as such. From this perspective, one who can be identified as educated is one who has a certain flexibility, richness and freedom of mental activity which enables the individual to exercise the capacity to consider things, be it conditions, limitations, expectations or possibilities other than as they are.

Egan cites Coleridge on imagination and autonomous thinking: "A well-developed imagination enables us to feel, in Coleridge's nice phrase, unsubdued by habit, unshackled by custom" (cited in Egan, 1992, p. 58). Egan (1992) asserts, "Education, to put it a bit tendentiously, is a process that awakens individuals to a kind of thought that enables them to

imagine conditions other than those that exist of that have existed" (p. 47). Given this interpretation, it can be suggested that the stimulation of the imagination parallels the chief aim of education as articulated by Dewey, Plato, Rousseau and Egan.

For these theorists "The failure of education... is evident not so much in ignorance as in imprisonment of the mind by conventional ideas" (Egan, 1992, p. 47). Egan asserts that "Imagination entails the ability to transcend the obstacles to thinking with which easy acceptance of conventional beliefs, ideas, interpretations, representations, and so on, confront us" (p. 47). It is because of these capacities of the imagination that it is necessary for education in general and moral education in particular.

2.1 A Historical Gleaning of Imagination

What follows is a brief inquiry into the history of the imagination leading to a functional definition articulated by Egan (1992). I offer this account in the hope to provide clarity in several areas. I attempt to provide a historical basis by which we can better understand 1) the origin and evolution of the conception of imagination, 2) how these conceptions influence Western educational schema and 3) the

neglected representation of imagination in contemporary education.

The ideas articulated by Plato concerning reason and imagination continue to influence Western thought and consequently, Western conceptions of education. Plato's ideas concerning human life emphasize the development of reason and offers little credibility to what is defined as imagination. Plato considered reason as the highest value because he believed it could lead one to sound knowledge about what was true about experience and the world. Plato asserted that the faculty of reason would provide access to truth while the faculty of the imagination would simply mimic the appearance of things (as cited in Egan, 1992, p. 14). This distinction between reason and imagination influences Western educational schemes significantly. Consequently, our educational curriculums aimed at the development of the imagination fall far behind its concern with the development of reason.

The activities of the imagination were defined as reproductive rather than productive. Plato offered Western culture the notion that all imaginative acts, including the making of images in the mind, simply replicate the creative acts of the gods. Plato defined these images as deceptive as they may "misrepresent the nature of the gods" (as cited in

Egan, 1992, p. 14). The imagination was not granted the capacity to create, only to repeat. As Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce eloquently states, "Ancient psychology knew fancy or imagination as a faculty midway between sense and intellect, but always as conservative and reproductive of sensuous impressions or conveying conceptions to the senses, never properly as a productive autonomous activity" (cited in Egan, 1972, p. 170).

Aristotle offered a different view from Plato. He argued that the imagination does not simply provide images which are copied from the objective world, but that the active imagination attempts to represent universal features of human experience. Aristotle viewed the mental images formed by the activity of the imagination as our means of connecting our sensations of experience with our faculty of reason: "Every time one thinks one must at the same time contemplate some image" (cited in Egan, 1992, p. 15). It follows that Aristotle believed the imagination to be actively involved in our intellectual activity (Egan, 1992, p. 15).

Aristotle's view implies an interactive relationship between imagination and reason. Defining the imagination as having a role in perception, it is granted the opportunity to contribute to rational thought. This is an important shift in

the perception of imagination and its relationship to the faculty of reason, relevant to the current inquiry. Previously considered a faculty designed to seduce the mind away from rationality, Aristotle offered imagination a place and function in a world which predominantly considered it "at best a somewhat distrusted servant of higher intellectual functions" (cited in Egan, 1992, p. 17). Until the eighteenth century the perception of the imagination as an intermediary between reason and sense perception prevailed.

It is the works by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) following those of David Hume (1711-1776) that established another conception of imagination granting it further legitimacy. Hume made a distinction between "impressions" being that which we are aware of in our perception and "ideas" being the images of these impressions we form in the mind. Hume questioned his assessment that our perception of the world is incomplete and fluctuating, however what is offered to the mind is a constant, stable and clear image. He wondered how a consistent image of the world could be harvested from constantly wavering perceptions. Hume decided that "this crucial role [of providing a constant and stable image to the mind] at the very foundation of our mind's functioning was performed by the imagination" (cited in Egan, 1992, p. 21).

Kant took Hume's conclusion a step further and argued that it is the role of the imagination to perform the task of providing the prior structuring of our perceptions. This notion entails that what we are able to perceive and what we can know is determined by our imagination. "What we experience is the world already structured by the imagination; ... at the most basic level of meaning-making, the imagination is active" (cited in Egan, 1992, p. 21). Both Hume and Kant identified characteristics of imagination which influence our modern conception of its relationship to reason. This is significant in establishing the imagination as influencing our perception and interpretation of the world.

It remains relevant that Aristotle's view of the mental images formed by the imagination create a connection between our sensations, our feelings and our reason. This notion remains consistent in the thoughts on imagination and is of particular relevance with respect to education. Kant determined that the imagination can, in our minds, generate ideas which cannot be expressed or represented in any other way. "A picture is worth a thousand words" comes to mind. "Ideas of infinite space, endless numbers, eternal duration can also fill us with complex emotions involving wonder and the sense of the sublime," (cited in Egan, 1992, p. 21).

Hume acknowledged a clear connection between our feelings and the imagination and wrote "Lively passions commonly attend a lively imagination," ([1739] 1888, p. 427). Furthermore, Hume determined the relationship between emotions and imagination to be reciprocally influential; "it is remarkable that the imagination and affections have a close union together, and that nothing which affects the former can be entirely indifferent to the latter" ([1739] 1888, p. 424).

Often it is our desires, fears and aspirations that push us to imagine possibilities and it is through our feelings that we access to our values. The interactive relationship between emotion and imagination is relevant for education considering Egan's assertion that "genuine education inescapably involves emotional engagement" (Egan, 1992, p. 52).

Given these explorations, a conception of imagination which simply copies the world outside of ourselves has disintegrated. What emerges identifies the creative and productive activity of the imagination as constantly engaged in constructing our perception of the world and calling on our emotions in forming this perception. Wordsworth writes on the crucial power of imagination;

Imagination... has no reference to images that are merely a faithful copy, existing in the mind, of absent external objects; but is a word of higher import, denoting operations of the mind upon these objects (as cited in Egan, 1992, p. 24).

Wordsworth also addresses the relationship between reason and imagination in his claims that they are neither mutually exclusive or incompatible in any way. He asserted that the imagination is "Reason in her most exalted mood" (as cited in Egan, 1992, p. 25). What exactly is this concept which we call imagination?

Egan offers an inclusive and functional definition:

... imagination is the capacity to think of things as possibly being so; it is an intentional act of mind; it is the source of invention, novelty, and generativity; it is not implicated in all perception and in the construction of all meaning; it is not distinct from rationality but is rather a capacity that greatly enriches rational thinking. The imaginative person has this capacity in a high degree. It may not be invariably true that imagination involves our image-forming capacity, but image-forming is certainly common in uses

of the imagination and may in subtle ways be inevitably involved in all forms of imagining; and image-forming commonly implicates emotions (1992, p. 43).

Imagination is the capacity to consider things as possibly being so. Once considered of a reproductive nature, conceptions evolved to recognize its constructive capacity in our interpretation of human experience. The imagination is a source of novelty, capable of originality, discovery and invention with some richness of detail. It is generative, flexible, and often engages our emotions. It is the activity of the imagination that allows us to consider possibilities beyond our present.

Kohlberg's Cognitive Developmental approach to moral development does not address the capacities of the imagination for moral education. Values Clarification similarly neglects the possible roles of imagination in our moral life and deliberations. Lipman's Philosophy for Children acknowledges that the development of the imagination will enhance students' abilities to make adequate moral judgements, however this approach does not fully explore or develop the concept of imagination. Nor does it address role of metaphor in moral education. Educationalists including Johnson, Kilpatrick, Tappan and Witherell concur on the importance of engaging the

imagination for moral education. Child psychologist Bettelheim says that morality may best be conveyed to children in symbolic terms, however he limits his argument to the analogies offered by the fairy tale. Coles suggests that engaging the moral imagination through the images offered by various narratives has much to offer moral development and education. Despite the emphasis on the importance of narratives for moral education, there is no mention on the role of metaphor in their approaches. It seems that engaging the imagination through metaphor can offer a gift of possibility for moral education that has not been fully explored by these approaches. In this chapter I look at imagination and metaphor in education. In chapter three I will explore the role of imagination and metaphor in moral education.

The importance of engaging the imagination in learning has been addressed by several contemporary writers.[1] I will address imaginative activity concerned with creativity, visualization, originality and enhanced memory. It is safe to say that these qualities are desirable and deemed valuable to education.

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[1] For further information on this topic refer to Torrance, 1969; Lipman, 1977; Kilpatrick, 1992; Coles, 1997; Johnson, 1993; Egan & Nadaner, eds., 1988; Mock, 1971; Warnock, 1976; Osborn, 1963 and Greene, 1995.

Creativity and originality are the kinds of imaginative activity which have been addressed and praised as valued capacities of the human being. To clarify what I mean by creativity, I will put forth the definition offered by Becker. He sees creativity as, "the healthy enjoyment of making something that is original" (1994, p. 170). This suggests that creativity is involved in the construction of something, be it perception or clay sculpture. Creativity and originality have also been acknowledged as important capacities contributing to the education and the self-development of persons.[2]

Dr. Edward de Bono, founder and director of the Cognitive Research Trust (1969) and the Centre for the Study of Thinking, has written extensively on the importance of creativity and originality in thinking. Credited with originating the term "lateral thinking," de Bono has been sought out by large American businesses such as I.B.M., Du Pont, Shell and Exxon to assist them in solving problems creatively. He has helped the Government of California with toxic waste problems. I interpret this as an indication that creativity plays a central role in interpreting problems and identifying possible solutions. Based on the demands made on de Bono, it appears that there exists a need to emphasize

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[2] For additional information on this topic see Rogers, 1961; Wadeson, 1980 and May, 1978.

creativity in education not only for enriched meaning in life, but also to assist us in our capacity to function and solve issues of significance that bear on all our lives.

The Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary defines lateral thinking as, "a method of solving problems indirectly or by apparently illogical methods" (1991, p. 810). This suggests that great value can be offered to creative solutions. With respect to education de Bono writes the following:

> The emphasis in education has always been on logical sequential thinking which is by tradition the only proper use of information. Creativity is vaguely encouraged as some mysterious talent. Lateral thinking is not a substitute for the traditional logical thinking but a necessary complement. Logical thinking is quite incomplete without lateral thinking (1970, p. 297).

De Bono states that lateral thinking is selective, provocative, deliberate, generative and manipulates information outside of reason. It is directly concerned with insight and creativity and is directed towards generating ideas through what he calls "insight restructuring," as the ability consider concepts which transcend convention (p. 299).

He says:

> Lateral thinking is used to restructure the perceptual
> pattern which is the way the situation is looked at.
> Without a method for changing concepts...one is liable to
> be trapped by concepts which are more harmful than
> useful. Moreover rigid concept patterns can actually
> create a great number of problems. Such problems are
> particularly fierce since they cannot be altered by
> available evidence but only by insight restructuring (p.
> 298).

The characteristics of what de Bono terms "lateral thinking"
as being selective, provocative, deliberate, generative and
using information beyond reason, lends itself to the
conception of imagination outlined here. Insight
restructuring seems to be captured by the phrase, "seeing
things in a new light". This is the work of the imagination.

The imagination is also active in the task of
visualization. Based on a limited conception of the
imagination as the capacity to create an image of something (a
glimmering sunset, a face we recall) in the mind and keep it
in "view" as we think about this something. Visualization is
an activity of the imagination already established as a valued

educational tool. Guided Imagery encourages students to exercise their imaginations in order to gain a better understanding of a specific body of knowledge. This technique entails that teachers provide students with rich verbalized descriptions making use of all the senses (sight, sound, touch, taste and smell). Students are asked to elaborate on the vivid images and to write and participate in a discussion about their images. Egan recognizes the effective use of visualization in the world of professional athletes where it is used to increase performance. Athletes are asked to visualize their performance while going through the physical motions of movement required by their sport. "The results in terms of improved performance have encouraged educationalists to import the technique into teacher pre-service and in-service programs" (1992, p. 62). An effective educational tool engaging the imagination, Guided Imagery addresses only one aspect of the imagination.

Imagination also plays a significant role in memory. Learning has often been considered synonymous with the retention of knowledge. The problem with the concept of memorization as learning is that it denies what is unique to human learning. Egan says that one justification for the stimulation of the imagination throughout the learning process is that the imagination is the faculty which can best preserve

human memory (1992, p. 25). He asserts that information presented in direct relation to human emotions is "not only more directly comprehensible but is also more engaging and meaningful" (1992, p. 86). Inert information and facts are what is contained in typical textbooks. These facts are held in "suspended animation in symbolic codes" and the educational task involves "the resuscitation of knowledge from its suspended animation" (p. 87). Knowledge only exists in the mind; and it is in the mind that meaning is derived from the connection to our feelings, intention, hopes, fears, and our imaginative lives (p. 86). How can inert knowledge be converted into meaningful knowledge in the minds'of students? "Education is also crucially about the meaning knowledge has for the individual, and that is where the imagination is vital" (Egan, 1992, p. 53). What tool can equip teachers to resuscitate inert information? It is the imagination. Egan writes:

> ... we see that a primary tool necessary for this transmutation from codes to living knowledge is the imagination - the students' capacity to think about the decoded content as part of some possible human world.
> ... knowledge embedded in the context of peoples' lives - those who invented or discovered the knowledge in the first place or those whose lives are affected by it in

the present - is most hospitable to students' imaginative meaning-making (1992, p. 87).

For example, when we learn a fact, such as the fact that snakes are scaly and not slimy reptiles, this fact combines with our constantly shifting emotions, intentions and memories that collectively constitute our mental lives. This new fact about snakes will connect to, and be affectively tainted by our feelings about reptiles in general and snakes in particular. The scaliness of snakes may trigger images from an Indiana Jones movie, a memory, a sense of fear or fascination. If and how we learn and remember information is directly affected by the way we structure meaning in our minds, which is similarly affected by our emotions, memories and intentions. Egan eloquently asserts,

> The human memory is not an orderly place with slots or shelves for each item to remain inertly until called for. It is more like a shifting turmoil stirred by those emotions and intentions that are a part of us. Virtually nothing emerges from the human memory in the same form it was initially learned. All kinds of associations curl around each new fact, there is endless blending and coalescing, and connections are made, broken, and remade. And no small part of this

activity involves the imagination. The more energetic and lively the imagination, the more are facts constantly finding themselves in new combinations and taking on new emotional colouring as we use them to think of possibilities, of possible worlds (1992, p. 50).

Prior to the invention of writing oral cultures required a tool by which to ensure their story, values and meanings would be maintained and remembered. Myth fulfilled this need. Nelson (1993) speaks to the narrative construction of memory and reports his findings as follows:

> ... adults who present the activity (to be recalled) in a narrative format, in contrast to a focus on identification and categorisation, appear to be more effective in establishing and eliciting memories with their young children (p. 370).

Jerome Bruner (1986) argues that cognition, affect and action cannot be separately easily and that by making a clear distinction between these "a real poverty is bred" (p. 69). He points out that one of the many functions of narrative is to hold these three dimensions together:

We can abstract each of these from the unified whole, but if we do so too rigidly we lose sight of the fact that it is one of the functions of a culture to keep them related and together in those images, stories and the like by which our experience is given cultural relevance (p. 69).

One example of narrative form which holds cognition, emotion and action together and offers meaning to human experience is myth. Myth being "an intricate set of interlocking stories, rituals, rites and customs that inform and give the pivotal sense of meaning and direction to a person, family, community or culture" (Keen, 1989, p.6). The power of such narratives lie in their ability to 1) provide lore coded within a narrative structure which is condusive to memorization and 2) orient listeners' emotions to their content (Egan, 1997, p. 62). Myth offers the transmission of meaning, of social norms, of ways to interpret social ties and outlines appropriate, expected behaviours and attitudes. These objectives are consistent with educational aims and, as such, are relevant to education.

Ernst Cassirer (1946) has argued, "no matter how widely the contents of myth and language may differ, yet the same form of mental conception is operative in both. It is the form which one may denote as metaphorical thinking" (p. 84).

I would like to address the necessity that children be exposed to much and diverse information which is necessary to nourish an enriched imagination. An enriched imaginative capacity is more generative and more flexible. This allows us to think of a greater range of things as possibly being so; our possibilities being more innovative, effective and rich. It is important to acknowledge that people can know only what they can remember: "The imagination is limited to working with what exists in memory... Ignorance, in short starves the imagination" (Egan, 1992, pp. 52-53). This means that only knowledge retained in our memory is accessible to the imagination. Consequently, the effectiveness, resourcefulness and richness of one's imagination is directly influenced by what is available to it through memory. Minds who have been exposed to much and diverse knowledge and who have retained that knowledge have more information accessible to their imagination with which they can construct meaning.

I think it is also necessary to mention one important consideration regarding imaginatively engaged learning: it is a pleasurable process. It has children interested and curious. Certainly we can recall an occasion where we have observed children, or we ourselves have participated in a learning process that engaged our imaginations. I suspect it is safe to say that those experiences can be identified as enjoyable.

Imaginative learning offers children an opportunity to take pleasure and interest in learning.

Imagination endows us with the capacity to transcend conventional ideas and perception, enabling us to consider the possible beyond the actual. Creativity and originality are capacities dependent on our ability to think of possibilities. In this sense they are extensions of the imagination and are relevant to education. We can see that imagination plays a crucial role in our capacity to visualize. Engaging the imagination influences our capacity to preserve memory. As one can only know what is in memory, exposure to much and varied information is necessary for enhancing the selection available to the imagination by which meanings are created and possibilities considered.

Dewey recognizes the importance of the imagination in human existence and education, "Imagination is as much a normal and integral part of human activity as is muscular movement" (cited in Egan, 1992, p. 65).

2.2   Imagination and Knowledge: Enabler of Objectivity and
      Our Sense of Freedom

As the ability to consider things as possibly being so,
the imagination plays a critical role in our pursuit of
objective knowledge and in establishing the "very conditions
of objectivity" (Egan, 1992, p. 59).   Johnson's view of
objectivity involves the capacities of the imagination to the
extent that "forms of imaginative rationality... make human
objectivity possible" (1993, p. 241).

It is the imagination's capacity to inhabit external
subjects (clay for the potter, stone for the sculptor,
formulas for the physicist, numbers for the mathematician)
which allows us to think about what it would be like to be
that external object (clay, stone, formula, number) and
consider what possibilities may arise from the manipulation of
these external subjects.   Ruth Mock (1970) remarks:

In the arts and sciences creative imagination demands
that an individual frees himself from his immediate
preoccupations and associates himself with the medium he
is using - the paint, wood, or stone for the painter or
sculptor, the words for the writer, the sounds for the
musician or the facts for the scientist - so that with it

he creates a new form which may to some extent be unexpected even to himself (as cited in Egan, 1992, p. 59).

The imaginative potter or scientist feels through their medium and becomes connected to the external subject at hand in such a way that the medium becomes an extension of the senses. In this capacity the medium can be integrated into the imagination as such (Egan, 1992, p. 60). It is the activity of the imagination that allows us to think in a particular way and consider the possibilities of a given medium. It is the imagination which enables us extend ourselves unto that medium and think in particular ways about what is or could be possibly true.

The creative potter can feel the clay embedded with all its potential. This artist will know how one brief uncontrolled movement of the thumb will inevitably lead to the opportunity to consider alternative plans for the clay than were originally intended. There is a reciprocal relationship between the external world around us insofar as we imaginatively extend ourselves onto it.

And it is not just that the stone, say, becomes an extension of ourselves, but that we become an extension

of the stone; our minds conform with the nature of the objects that they seek to incorporate, whether those objects are stone and paint, or mathematical symbols, or historical events, or astrophysical phenomena (Egan, 1992, p. 60).

Egan identifies the disciplines as "our tools for trying to grasp -truly- various aspects of reality" (p.60). Imagination can also assist us in understanding and grasping a reality that is not subject of our interest, intention or feeling. It is also imagination that facilitates our dealing with the ambivalences of our claims to knowledge (p. 60).

In The Educated Mind: How Cognitive Tools Shape Our Understanding, Egan (1997) presents a different conception of objectivity, yet he maintains the necessity of the imagination in its construction. Egan assesses that the Western conception of objectivity is essentially unattainable because we are not able to determine whether our experience and our versions of the world represent how things actually are (p. 153). Egan presents Richard Rorty's conclusion on objectivity: "We cannot get outside of our conceptual schemes, we cannot reach a position from which to judge how adequate our conceptual schemes represent reality" (1997, p. 153). However, the conception of objectivity as considered by Rorty

and fellow liberal ironists refers to "those things about which it is relatively easy to achieve the widest intersubjunctive agreement" (p. 153). Egan cites Rorty as valuing the imagination "more highly than intellectual skills" and maintains that liberal ironists "do not construct theories so much as tell stories" (p. 153). This conception of objectivity entails the notion that knowledge is constructed and not discovered. Although this second definition of objectivity articulated by Egan reveals a more limiting scope than the traditional Western view, the imagination continues to play a significant role in the construction of objectivity.

In Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics, Johnson (1993) offers a conception of objectivity called "transperspectivity". He asserts, "Human objectivity is what characterizes a reflective process by means of which we are able to take up multiple perspectives as a way both of criticizing and transforming our own views and those of others" (p. 241). Johnson presents Steven Winter's conception of transperspectivity as a realistic vision of human objectivity. Transperspectivity is "the ability of a physically, historically, socially, culturally situated self to reflect critically on its own construction of the world, and to imagine other possible worlds that might be constructed" (p. 241). In this sense, objectivity as

transperspectivity involves a "sense of freedom to imagine other values and points of view and to change one's world in light of possibilities revealed by those alternative viewpoints" (p. 241). Johnson claims that an enriched imagination plays a crucial role in our capacity for transperspectivity.

Our sense of freedom necessitates a capacity to consider possibilities outside of the actual which surrounds us. Egan identifies that this capacity for freedom is one whose "strength or weakness turns on the strength or weakness of our imagination" (1992, p. 58). As existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre declared,

> It is on the day that we can conceive of a different state of affairs that a new light falls on our troubles and our suffering and that we decide that these are unbearable (1956, p. 434-435).

That is, we can acknowledge the difficulties in our present only when we conceive of other, more liberating circumstances.

Freedom also suggests that we can make choices and changes in our lives designed to create an immediate world more consistent with our wishes and needs; one that is more consistent with our evolving identity - our authentic self. This sense of freedom, illusive or not, is central to our humanity. "Imagination as what empowers us to conceive of possibilities in or beyond the actualities in which we are immersed, and as such the key to our sense of freedom" (Egan, 1992, p.30).

Egan and Johnson acknowledge that we are constrained by many limitations including gender, culture, environment and genetics. However, we seem to acknowledge the existence of some part of us that can influence our behaviour and shape our lives in a way that offers us a feeling of some degree of freedom. For example, while I may not have a choice in my ascribed role of sister, I have a wide range of latitude in how I choose to live out that role. I can assume a variety of sibling roles such as dominating and parenting sibling, spiteful and jealous sibling, helpful and understanding sister, or independent and disinterested, and so forth. Johnson states that it is this kind of flexibility in the way that we may imaginatively and creatively author our lives that "is the basis for social change on a large scale" (1993, p. 151). As Le Guin asserts:

Only the imagination can get us out of the bind of
the eternal present, inventing or hypothesizing or
pretending or discovering a way that reason can
then follow into an infinity of options, a clue
through the labyrinth of choice, a golden string,
the story, leading us to the freedom that is
properly human, the freedom open to those whose
minds can accept unreality (1989, p. 45).

When we ask children what they want to be when they grow-up,
are we not asking them to access their sense of freedom and
draw from their imaginations in considering possibilities for
their futures consistent with their wishes?

It is offered that imagination plays a role in
establishing the conditions of objectivity and influences our
capacity for transperspectivity. It supports us in dealing
with ambivalences. It assists us in grasping the external
world and allows us to extend ourselves onto it. Imagination
is active in our interpretation of how we percieve and live
out our ascribed roles. Imagination is also key to our sense
of freedom as it allows us to consider possible conditions
other than those which exist.

2.3   Imagination's Role in Our Meaning-Making and

       Interpretation of Human Experience

In the following section, I intend to address the essential role of imagination in our meaning-making and interpretation of human experience. This is relevant because it offers insight into possibilities for a more comprehensive view of moral understanding and consequently possibilities for moral education.

Johnson proposes that human beings are imaginative synthesizing animals, constantly interpreting and weaving together threads of our experiences in order to have a sense of coherence in our lives (1993, p. 152). He reminds us that the acts we perform on a daily basis are most often situated within larger projects, and that these jointly constitute the direction and the pattern of our lives (1993, p. 164). He expresses:

We strive for unity in our lives by situating our present acts within our history and by projecting ourselves into a future that somehow partly blends together our multiple understandings, values, and purposes. We spend an enormous amount of time and energy trying to construct significant unities in our lives, thereby minimizing the

fragmentary, isolated, and insignificant episodes of our existence. It is through this evolving process that we both express ourselves as presently formed and also transform ourselves as we stretch out toward our future (p. 164).

Weaving a coherent unity of our experiences seems motivated by our ongoing search for a meaningful existence. Johnson argues that narrative structure provides and reveals the most comprehensive unity of meaning we can achieve and that "we strive for meaning, coherence, and narrative unity, even if it is never fully attainable" (p. 170). What seems to weave random and seemingly disconnected events into a coherent and meaningful understanding of the world? It is none other than the imagination. Johnson argues that it is the

> synthetic unity supplied by cognitive models, metaphors, frames and narratives -- the overarching ordering that transforms mere sequences of atomic events into significant human actions and projects that have meaning and moral import (1993, p. 165).

Congruent with the imagination as our capacity to think of possibilities, Egan acknowledges the critical role imagination plays in our creation of meaning. He writes, "It

is by means of imagination - to use the language of phenomenologists - that we make ourselves, seeing the directions in which we might move and the possible selves we might inhabit" (1992, p. 33). Bruner (1986) suggests that human learning critically involves constructing or composing (p. 51). The construction of meaning demands its reassessment to accommodate our existing meaning structures. Warnock says embuing experiences with meaning is one of the fundamental activities of the imagination (as cited in Egan, 1992, p. 51).

In order for us to make sense of things and unify our experiences into something coherent and meaningful, the synthesis of parts into a unified whole is required. Winter suggests that in order for an account of events to become a story it must evolve from a succession of events in serial order to become a "configuration" (as cited in Johnson, 1993, p. 166). It is offered that the structure by which we synthesize our experiences has a narrative character. Johnson asserts, "narrative characterizes the synthetic character of our very experience, and it is prefigured in our daily activities and projects" (p. 163). Here Johnson refers to narrative in a broad sense. Narratives are spoken or written texts that we tell ourselves about ourselves. Johnson uses the term in a metaphorically extended sense; in the sense that (pre)narratives are "broad (narrative) synthesizing structures

within our very experience itself" (p. 152). This human business of composing and constructing meaning and the ready form of narrative have been passionately addressed by educationalists and philosophers.[3] On the importance of human meaning and the form of narrative, educationalist Neil Postman writes:

> Human beings require stories to give meaning to the facts of their existence. I am not talking about here about those specialized stories that we call novels, plays, and epic poems. I am talking about the more profound stories that people, nations, religions, and disciplines unfold in order to make sense our of the world... If our stories are coherent and plausible and have continuity, they will help us to understand why we are here, and what we need to pay attention to and what we may ignore. A story provides a structure for our perceptions; only through stories do facts assume any meaning whatsoever (1989, p. 122).

This may help to explain why children frequently ask questions such as "Where did I come from?" "Why is this so?" "What will

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[3]. For detailed accounts of interpretation of meaning and the ready form of narrative see Postman, 1995; Keen, 1988; Keen & Valley-Fox, 1989; Lipman, 1992; Tappan & Brown, 1991; Kilpatrick, 1992; Greene, 1995; Egan, 1987, 1992, 1997; MacIntyre, 1981 and Holquist, 1986.

happen when I die?" These fertile minds, roaming and searching their landscape for evidence of significance, require a story to offer them meaning. If life is interpreted as ultimately void of meaning, then it is truly insignificant how one acts towards the self and others. If life seems incomprehensible and void of meaning, motives for behaviour, including virtuous behaviour, lose their momentum. To access meaning then, our personal narratives must be connected to some broader, overarching story or set of stories that offers us a sense of significance. It seems worthwhile to add here Barbara Hardy's observation: "We dream in narrative, daydream in narrative, remember, anticipate, hope, despair, believe, doubt, plan, revise, criticise, construct, gossip, learn, hate and love by narrative" (as cited in MacIntyre, 1981, p. 197).

Social psychologist Theodore Sarbin (1986) has made a case for the powerful relevance of narrative as a general metaphor for understanding human conduct. Sarbin proposes that a person's life can be interpreted as a story and that such a perspective enables social psychology to make contact with the historical context of an individual's life. He emphasizes narrative as an organizing principal for human action. Interestingly, Sarbin makes reference to the work of Heider and Simmel (1944) who created a motion picture film of varied geometric figures moving at various speeds in several

directions. Observers of the film reported the movement of the geometrical shapes as human action; that is to say that the geometrical figures in motion were interpreted as narrative figures. For Sarbin, this account reveals a strong tendency for humans to interpret even simple perceptual experience in terms of a narrative.

Jerome Bruner (1986) proposed that mental life is characterized by two qualitatively different modes of thought: propositional thinking and narrative thinking. Bruner made reference to the work of Michotte (1946/1963) who inspired the movie making of Heider and Simmel (1944). Michotte revealed through cinematic means, that when objects, such as geometric shapes, move within limited boundaries that the viewer has the perceptual experience of seeing causality, probably and intentionality. This suggested to Bruner that goal seeking and searching are "possibly innate attributes of human mental life - basic and powerful enough to be part of our fundamental primitive perceptual apparatus" (Vitz, 1990, p. 710). This offers further support to the claim that human beings are interpretive and actively seek meaning and coherence in human experience.

On the narrative landscape of human interpretation of experience philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre writes:

Human life has a determinate form, the form of a
certain kind of story. It is not just that poems
and sagas narrate what happens to men and women,
but that in their narrative form poems and sagas
capture a form that was already present in the
lives they relate (1981, p. 117).

As will be seen in the next chapter, Mark Tappan (1991)
addresses the narrative form of moral deliberation and the
interpretive nature of human moral understanding. He proposes
that narrative form "provide common discursive forestructures
that not only guide and direct how individuals interpret and
make sense of actions and experiences over time but also shape
and organize those actions in the first place" (p. 10) His
view points out the connection between human interpretation
of experience and narrative "discursive forestructures" which
enable our interpretation. Here again we are presented with
the idea that narrative describes the terrain of the landscape
by which we interpret human experience.

On the interpretive and imaginative nature of moral
understanding, Tappan writes "experiences (and action) must be
expressed and represented in signs, whether linguistic or
nonlinguistic, if it is to have any meaning of significance in

an individual's life" (1991, p. 10). Thus, human action has an inherently narrative character and structure "simply because cultural narratives and stories provide the symbolic means by which such actions must necessarily be engaged, expressed, and represented-and therefore experienced" (p. 10).

As imaginative meaning seeking and synthesizing beings, we are constantly going about the business of unifying our experiences into some coherent form in order to better make sense of the world. Johnson proposes that the imagination and its resources, such as conceptual metaphor, are actively involved in providing coherence and unity to our interpretation of experience. He acknowledges that not all we experience fits neatly into a narrative framework, however, he asserts "we must find a certain level of meaningful narrative order if we are to function physically, socially and culturally" (p. 179). In plotting the course of our lives, then, we need to create narrative unities that make it possible for us critique our present, explore possibilities to transform our futures for enhanced meaning and decisive action. The opportunities for such narrative order are primarily dependent on our "imaginative synthesizing devices [including metaphors and conceptual frames]" which are "encompassed within the narrative structures we inherit from our tradition" (Johnson, 1993, p. 179).

What does this mean for Danny or David who choose to participate in music and movie narratives instead of high school classes? Perhaps the metaphors (LIFE IS A DARK AND COLD BOTTOMLESS PIT or LIFE IS AN INSURMOUNTABLE MOUNTAIN) and conceptual frames (Things never change / history repeats itself) offered by their families painted a future of despair which they wished to escape. The narrative metaphors they chose to access were those offered by mass media and popular culture. The morals offered by these "traditions" are not always virtuous ones. If meaning is best conveyed symbolically, can metaphor meet this purpose? Can moral education benefit from making use of the metaphor as an imaginative and synthesizing device? How can moral education, concerned with the task of enhanced meaning for individuals, benefit from engaging the imagination through metaphor? In the next chapter I will address what roles imagination and metaphor can play in moral education.

Chapter Three : What Role Can Imagination and Metaphor Play
in **Moral** Education?

In the previous chapter I presented many possible roles
imagination can play in education. Several of these roles are
equally important to moral education. As the capacity to
consider the possible beyond the actual, the imagination is
active in human memory. If knowledge is to become meaningful
and alive, we must concern ourselves with the human importance
of the subject. Genuine learning is unavoidably influenced by
human emotions. For education concerned with the meaning
knowledge has for the individual, the imagination plays an
important role in the (re)construction and (re)assessment of
meaning. In chapter one, it was suggested that morality may
best be addressed in symbolic terms if is to have significance
for the individual. The imagination shapes our sense of
freedom. It influences our capacity to transcend conventional
ideas and perceptions which enable us to consider the possible
beyond the actual. Possibilities for meaning, valuing and
being are central to moral life as we address the question of
"How do I want to live?" Imagination is involved in
establishing the conditions of objectivity and influences our
capacity for transperspectivity. The capacity for objectivity
is imperative for moral education if we consider that our
ability to "put ourselves in the place of another" is central

to identifying, understanding and empathising with the "other". This is particularly relevant if we understand that our human connectedness is what defines us as ethical beings and that good ethical character grasps the fragility and necessity of these connections. Imagination is involved in our meaning making and interpretation of human experience. Human experience has a narrative character and narrative order is dependent on our imaginative devices. One such device is metaphor.

In Moral Imagination Mark Johnson (1993) makes the claim that moral understanding is fundamentally imaginative in nature. He writes,

> every aspect of morality is imaginative - our fundamental moral concepts, our understanding of situations, and our reasoning about those situations are all imaginatively structured and based on metaphor (p. 13).

Given this, Johnson suggests we need to consider a theory of morality as a theory of moral understanding (p. 188). Furthermore, Johnson addresses our (cultural) need to review the prevailing definition of morality. He proposes morality is an "ongoing imaginative exploration of possibilities for

dealing with our problems, enhancing the quality of our communal relations, and forming significant personal attachments that grow" (p. 209).

Johnson suggests that the findings of cognitive science are challenging us to reassess our conventional notion of morality. Chair of the Department of Philosophy at Southern University, his previous writings include Metaphors we Live By (1980) (co-authored by George Lakoff) and The Body in the Mind (1987). In these books the authors expand their innovative studies of human reason and provide tools for practical, constructive and realistic moral reflection.

Cognitive science refers to the combined study of several empirical disciplines which include cognitive and developmental psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, anthropology and computer science, among others, combined with philosophy. Johnson's theoretical orientation of cognitive science stresses the grounding of our conceptual systems in bodily experience and distinguishes the irreducibly imaginative character of human experience, including the central role of metaphor in much of our conceptualizations and reasoning (1993, p. 61). It is for these reasons that I chose his work to address the metaphoric nature of moral understanding and the importance of imagination for moral

education.

Johnson is clear about the limitations of his argument and acknowledges that not all concepts are based in metaphor and that not all thinking is metaphoric in nature (p. 61).[4] He provides evidence, however, which suggests much of our common moral understanding is structured by systems of metaphor. He proclaims "no account of morality can be adequate that fails to examine the extent to which our conceptualization, reasoning and language about morality involve metaphor (and other imaginative devices)" (p. 62). Johnson claims that the imagination is essential in our moral deliberations. He defines moral imagination in the following passage:

> Imagination is no longer banished to the realm of allegedly subjective aesthetic experiences. Instead, it is precisely that capacity which allows us both to experience present situations as significant and to transform them in light of our quest for well-being. Imagination is the means for going beyond our selves as presently formed, moving transformingly toward imagined

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[4] For absorbing reading on the operations of the mind as grounded in and growing out of narrative and metaphoric bases consult Langer, 1967, 1972 & 1982; Kolakowski, 1989 and Lakoff & Johnson, 1980.

ideals of what we might become, how we might relate to others, and how we might address problematic situations. Moral imagination is our capacity to see and to realize in some actual or contemplated experience possibilities for enhancing the quality of experience, both for ourselves and for the communities of which we are a part, both for the present and for future generations, both for existing practices and institutions as well as for those we can imagine as potentially realizable (p. 209).

In much of my family work I have called on this very capacity to help family members address problematic situations and encourage a more comprehensive understanding of others' points of view. For example, a single mother with two sons aged two and four, expressed great difficulties in managing their behaviours. Ms. Jones was quite frustrated by the time I first met her and told me that her children were "evil" and "out to torment" her. After several meetings with this family what became apparent to me was that her expectations of her boys far exceeded their capabilities by virtue of their ages. Based on limited life experiences, the two year old could not conceive of the dangers inherent in playing with matches or the gas stove. Little James thought nothing of running barefoot into the busy street in a game of hide and seek with

his imaginary buddies. In an attempt to address the frustration articulated by Ms. Jones, I hoped to assist her in conceiving of an alternative conception of the situation. I proposed that she deal with her toddlers as "guests or newcomers to this land". This metaphor entailed that toddlers require careful instruction, given that they do not speak the language well; need gentle and consistent reminders of what our customs entail; and need to be accepted despite breaches of customs with which they are not familiar. This "toddlers as newcomers" metaphor addressed her sons' enthusiastic curiosity about this world while denying any "evil" intentions on their part. In her attempt to reveal her understanding of my proposed metaphor, she said, "O.K., less Lord of the Flies and more Alice in Wonderland?" From this perspective, Ms. Jones understood that her children needed a competent and patient guide rather than constant discipline. This reframing seemed to diffuse much of Ms. Jones' frustration and enabled her to consider old issues in a new light.

Johnson claims that tasks for moral development involve "refining our perception of character and situations and of developing empathetic imagination to take up the part of others" (1993, p. 199). He proposes that the activities of the moral imagination are central to our interpretation of situations, our ability to discern possible ways of acting and

envisioning potential consequences which are likely to result from a given action. From this perspective, it is an enriched moral imagination which enables us to accomplish the tasks necessary for moral development. Johnson cites Martha Nussbaum in support of his claim. She writes:

> moral knowledge... is not simply intellectual grasp of propositions; it is not even simply intellectual grasp of certain facts; it is perception. It is seeing a complex, concrete reality in a highly lucid and richly responsive way; it is taking in what is there, with imagination and feeling (as cited in Johnson, p. 210).

Johnson suggests that the central task of morality concerns itself with the act of discerning what is going on in the morally problematic situations in which we find ourselves. This involves considering our own identities, desires, needs, biases, and those of others who are involved; it is considering our relationships to others who are affected; it is considering what possible actions we could pursue and the likely consequences of our imagined actions. In these deliberations, the activities of an enriched imagination are required for generating possible conceptions of a situation, possible solutions, and likely consequences.

Relevant to the goal of moral sensitivity, Johnson identifies the activities of the imagination as imperative in moral deliberations which involve extending ourselves imaginatively unto the experience of others. Concerning this imaginative empathic projection he writes:

> Unless we can put ourselves in the place of another, unless we can enlarge our own perspective through an imaginative encounter with the experience of others, unless we can let our own values and ideals be called into question from various points of view, we cannot be morally sensitive (p. 199).

Osborn acknowledges this capacity of the imagination [with sympathy as one its facets] and describes it as a "bridge by which we can put ourselves into another's place" (1963, p. 31). Johnson defines this "taking up the place of another" as one of the most important imaginative explorations we can perform given that it is insufficient to objectively reason about the situation of others. Johnson's view of objectivity as transperspectivity is relevant here because it suggests that the ability to imagine other values and points of view which may influence one's perspective in light of possibilities suggested by alternative viewpoints. He asserts that we need to imaginatively extend ourselves emotionally to

gain a better grasp of others' experience. He writes:
"We must... go out towards people to inhabit their worlds, not just by rational calculations, but also in imagination, feeling and expression" (p. 200). He understands that it is through this kind of imaginative experience that we can truly participate empathetically in the experience of one another. "Morally sensitive people are capable of living out, in and through such an experimental imagination, the reality of others with whom they are interacting, or whom their actions might affect" (p. 200).

Inherent in Johnson's argument is the role of the imagination in enlarging our capacities for tolerance. The idea that both open-mindedness and justice are educational values that are enhanced through imaginative capacities is addressed by other educationalists. Egan (1992) writes,

> Of course it would be too much to say that the evils of the world are due simply to a lack of imagination, but some of them seem to be so. The lack of that capacity of the imagination which enables us to understand that other people are unique, distinct, and autonomous - with lives, and hopes and fears as real and important as our own - is evident in much evil (p. 54).

Ruth Mock (1970) echoes a similar assertion on imagination and social virtues. She offers the following:

> To a great extent our lives are dominated by able and quick-witted individuals whose imagination... has been discouraged or suppressed and who in consequence, and in spite of their intellectualism as well as their declared intent, have little human sympathy or perceptive understanding. Such a... man can be... unintentionally cruel in his support of social or racial injustice when this works to his own interest and when he cannot recognise its true character because his imaginative limitations make him unable to comprehend emotions and conditions of life other than his own (p. 14).

Northrop Frye (1963) also endorses the capacity of the imagination for the promotion of tolerance:

> One of the most obvious uses [of imagination] is its encouragement of tolerance. In the imagination our own beliefs are also only possibilities, but we can also see the possibilities in the beliefs of others... what produces the tolerance is the power of detachment in the imagination, where things are removed just out of reach of belief and action (p. 32).

The imagination plays an active role in our moral deliberations and influences our perception of moral situations. It is by means of various imaginative acts which we are able to generate and envision different interpretations of a situation or circumstance. It is also by means of imaginative acts that we are able to take up the part of others in gaining a better understanding their experience, in considering how various possible actions may effect others and in exploring possible actions open to us. The imagination is also involved in the promotion of tolerance. It is because of the capacities of the imagination to engage us in these explorations that it is powerfully relevant to moral education.

3.1 Engaging The Imagination Through Metaphor

The central claim put forth by Johnson in <u>Moral Imagination</u> (1993) is that human moral understanding is fundamentally imaginative in nature. As one of the principal mechanisms of imaginative cognition, metaphor is indispensable to every part of our moral understanding. He writes,

I am going to argue that metaphor is pervasive in our moral deliberation, that it cannot reasonably be excluded

from our reasoning, and that it is, in fact, the chief means by which we are able to imagine possibilities for resolving moral conflicts, to criticize our values and institutions, and to transform ourselves and our situation. In short, metaphor lies at the heart of our imaginative moral rationality, without which we would be doomed to habitual acts (p. 33).

In the broadest of senses, metaphor involves talking about something in terms derived from something quite different. According to Paul Ricoeur (1991) metaphor is a "deviant naming" or "particular predication" (p. 8). Egan declares that the metaphor "establishes a new relationship between heterogeneous ideas in a way that adds something to, or throws new light on, the thing talked about" (1997, p. 55). On the method of metaphor, Max Black (1962) asserts that they are functional not because they address the similarities between things; instead, "it would be more illuminating... to say that metaphor creates the similarity than to say it formulates some similarity antecedently existing" (p. 83).

Johnson raises the objection against the relevance of metaphor for morality. He examines the assumption that metaphors are merely ornamental figures of speech which express attitudes or emotions. Considered as such, they are

defined as having no conceptual content or rational structure.
Johnson argues that "once we understand the nature of metaphor
as a process of cognition constrained by our biological,
social, linguistic, political, and economic interactions, the
spectre of an extreme relativism fades into the shadows" (p.
35).

The claim that metaphor is merely an ornamental product
of language is widely contested. Joan Cowan and Joyce Feucht-
Haviar (1979) say that metaphor

> permeates the entire range of linguistic activity
> and has a rich intellectual history; it has
> achieved unprecedented importance in modern
> thought, moving from a place on the ornamental
> fringes of discourse to a central position in the
> understanding of human understanding itself (see
> foreword, p. 1).

Nelson Goodman writes, "Far from being a mere matter of
ornament, [metaphor] participates fully in the progress of
knowledge: in replacing some stale "natural" kinds with novel
and illuminating categories, in contriving facts, in revising
theory, and in bringing us new worlds" (cited in Egan, 1997,
p. 55).

Educationalist Neil Postman (1995) writes on the importance of metaphor in language education. He concedes, "A metaphor is not an ornament. It is an organ of perception. Through metaphors, we see the world as one thing or another" (p. 174). He identifies one of the great failures of education as not giving "sufficient attention to the role of metaphor in giving form to a subject. In failing to do so, they deprive those studying the subject of the opportunity to confront its basic assumptions" (p. 174). Postman asserts that metaphors are one of the three "most potent elements with which human language constructs a worldview" (p. 175). He argues that language habits are at the core of how we imagine the world and that "metaphors express some of our most fundamental conceptions of the way things are" (p. 176). For example, Postman cites Rousseau's statement in <u>Emile</u>, "Plants are improved by cultivation", "and man by education" and points out that his entire philosophy rests on this resemblance between plants and children (p. 174). Postman also offers the example of the use of metaphor in the ancient Mishnah text where four kinds of students are described: the sponge that absorbs all; the funnel that receives all at one end and spills out at the other; the strainer that lets the input drain through and retains the sediment; and the sieve - which is the best kind of student because it retains the fine grounds and releases the dust (p. 175). The philosophies of

Rousseau and the compliers of the Mishnah are reflected by the difference between a plant and a sieve.[5]

Postman refers to the Samuel Butler's novel <u>Erewhon</u> to illustrate how metaphors control what we say, and to some extent what we say reveals ways we think about things. Butler depicts a society that lives according to metaphors very different from the ones of our culture. Illness is considered as something that one "does." This is seen in the statement "You've done a very nice case of arthritis." This kind of language implies that one has moral responsibility for the "doing". Criminality is considered to be something that one "has" revealed by "You have developed a bad case of criminality". This implies that criminality, as something one has thrust upon them, is beyond one's control (p. 176). These examples reveal different ways of conceiving of matters that are exposed by our language. This idea will be further explored in this chapter through the work of Mark Johnson. On morality and the influence of metaphor, Postman writes:

> Every legal system and every moral code is based on
> a set of assumptions about what people are, have,
> or do. And, I might add, any significant changes in

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[5] For a recent article on metaphors of education see Brunet, 1998.

law or morality are preceded by a reordering of how

such metaphors are employed (p. 176).

In giving form to a subject and leading us to new worlds,

the imagination is called forth. The possible roles of

metaphor articulated here seem to provide a means by which to

address Egan's previously stated need to "resuscitate" and

animate "suspended" knowledge. The metaphor, as a cognitive

tool of imagination, enables us to ascribe new meaning onto

existing concepts. In doing so, we can redefine previous

understandings. It was Aristotle who observed that "ordinary

words convey only what we know already; it is from metaphor

that we can best get a hold of something fresh" (as cited in

Egan, 1997, p. 55).

Studies on the growth and genesis of metaphoric

competence in children reveals the production of metaphors in

very young children. Discussing comparative tests of

recognizing appropriate metaphors, Gardner & Winner (1979)

assert:

The highest number of appropriate metaphors was

secured from the pre-school children, who even

exceeded college students; moreover, these three -

and four - year - olds fashioned significantly more

appropriate metaphors than did children aged seven
or eleven (p. 131).

Most intriguing in the study of metaphor in preschool children
was the discovery of,

> the capacity of at least some children to perform
> this game at an astonishingly high level. Not only
> do such youngsters frequently contrive clever names
> for the very objects which have stumped our adult
> pilot subjects; more dramatically, some of them can
> nearly effortlessly come up with a whole series of
> appropriate and appealing metaphoric meanings (pp.
> 132-133).

These findings suggests an agility in the use of metaphor in
young children. This has implications for education in
general and moral education in particular. Egan (1997)
acknowledges the generative power evident in metaphor and
suggests it can contribute significantly to education. He
says,

> The ready use of metaphor gives evidence of the
> human generativity that is central to learning;
> consequently, young children's fluency in and

recognition of metaphor is something educators should find centrally important (p. 55).

Egan continues, "Given the close connection between language development and metaphor, and the importance of fluent and flexible metaphoric control for nearly all forms of thinking, it would be prudent to emphasize support for metaphoric fluency early in education" (p. 57).

As a cognitive tool of the imagination, metaphor has the capacity to make significant contributions for enriched moral education. It is the generative quality of both the imagination and the metaphor which allows us to "extend ourselves" beyond the concrete present and learn from our past experiences and those of others. This generative quality of metaphor gives form to subjects and breathes new life into suspended knowledge, providing access to new concepts, new meaning and new perspectives. This generativity is essential in addressing morally saturated issues. Studies have revealed an agility in the use of metaphor in children, and my experiences have offered the same. To teach more effectively, we must recognize childrens' apparent interest and agility in using metaphor.

In <u>Metaphor and Memory</u> (1989) Cynthia Ozick writes on the relationship between inspiration and metaphor. She says "metaphor is one of the chief agents of our moral nature, and that the more serious we are in life, the less we can do without it" (1989, p. 270).

3.2   Johnson's Metaphorical Mappings

I will now address Johnson's claim and accompanying evidence which suggests that our moral understanding is metaphoric in nature. Johnson presents two kinds of evidence in support of this claim: metaphorical mappings and linguistic evidence. These metaphorical mappings are systematic metaphors that are representative of our metaphoric moral understanding. These include the LOCATION version of the EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor, the SOCIAL ACCOUNTING and the MORAL ACCOUNTING metaphors. Metaphoric mappings are intended to illustrate that the conceptual frames through which we understand concrete situations often involve systems of metaphor (1993, p. 61). He shows how various metaphors build upon each other in the construction of vast interconnected systems of metaphorically structured concepts that constitute the bulk of our moral understanding (p. 36). He also presents linguistic evidence concerning the way we ordinarily talk about morality in an attempt to reveal that our language of ethical discourse

is based on systems of metaphor that define our fundamental concepts of action, purpose, cause, rights, duties and laws (p. 61). In the pages that follow I will offer selections of his mappings and accompanying linguistic evidence.

Johnson identifies three "primary clusters" of metaphors that define our shared conception of morality as follows:

> (1) those that are concerned chiefly with the action performed and that involve metaphorical structuring of our notions of action, purpose, law, duties, rights, and so forth; (2) those by which we decide what we owe others and what others owe us as a result of our helping and harming each other; and (3) those by which we evaluate moral character (p. 36).

The EVENT STRUCTURE metaphorical system encompasses two different metaphorical mappings of our moral understanding of actions, duties, laws, causes and purposes. These two mappings are identified as the LOCATION version and the OBJECT version of the EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor. The LOCATION Version of the EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor is one by which we understand events metaphorically as motions along paths toward some destination (location). This version suggests that "we understand an event

as a motion along a path toward some destination"; and the "metaphoric system consists of an extensive mapping structure from the source domain (i.e., motion in space along a path) onto the target domain (i.e., events)" (p. 37). Excerpts of that mapping are as follows.

LOCATION Version of the EVENT STRUCTURE Metaphor

Spatial motion Domain		Event Domain
Self-propelled movements	>	Actions
Locations	>	States
Movements	>	Change in States
Destinations	>	Purposes
Paths to destinations	>	Means
Impediments to motion	>	Difficulties
Journeys	>	Long-Term purposeful activities

Johnson claims that the metaphor systems represented in the EVENT STRUCTURE mapping are fundamental to our conceptual systems of understanding. So much so that, "we are virtually never aware of the way it automatically structures our understanding of events of every kind" (p. 37).

In considering the metaphoric structure ACTIONS ARE MOTIONS ALONG PATHS from one location (= state) to another location-state it represents how we conceive of ourselves as directed towards defined goals or ends, and as motivated by varying purposes and interests. He declares that this "deep metaphorical concept underlies a massive system of linguistic expressions that we use to talk about events of various kinds" (p. 37). He offers linguistic examples of this which include, "Her surgery/recovery is going along quickly," "We are getting nowhere in solving this ...we are just plodding along," (p. 37). My own observations offer: "Her ship has finally come in," "He is really getting himself in gear for this interview," and "We'll have quicker success if we pursue it through this route."

STATES ARE LOCATIONS along metaphorical routes of action and are understood metaphorically as defined spaces. Johnson offers "He's in love" and "Stay out of trouble" (p. 37). CHANGES ARE MOVEMENTS from one location/state to another. Conversation frequently refers to being in or out of a state (of mind), of going into or out of it, of entering or leaving, and of getting to a state or emerging from it, (p. 37). This can be seen in expressions such as "I'm glad she got herself out of that depression," "He has pulled himself out of that rut," and "She has now moved on to obsess about something

else." PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS towards which we move. Johnson asserts that we understand purposes as metaphorical places we attempt to reach. His examples include, "They finally reached the end of their job search," "I started out to get a math degree, but I got sidetracked along the way" (p. 37).

DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION identifies the difficulties we may meet along the path of our purposeful actions are metaphorically understood as objects or things that impede our progress, divert us from or block our paths. He identifies predominant types of impediments to physical motion as (1) blockages, (2) features of terrain, (3) burdens, (4) counterforce and (5) lack of energy source. Here are several of expressions he says we use to talk about and refer to our difficulties (p. 37).

(1) Blockages: He never got over his divorce.

                  He's trying to get around the regulations.

(2) Features of the terrain:

                  It's been uphill all the way.

                  Don't get bogged down in the details.

(3) Burdens: Get off my back!

                  She's carrying too much of a load to ever finish.

(4) Counterforce: He's been holding her back.

                     Quit trying to push me around.

(5) Lack of energy source:

                     I'm out of gas.

                     We're running out of steam.

These are examples of the LOCATION version of EVENT STRUCTURE which Johnson asserts underlies our conception of events, means, purposes, actions and causes. This metaphor does not only refer to isolated actions and events, but also can be appropriated to a series of actions that make up part of the long-term purposeful activity we perform to achieve our larger life goals. "Many of our actions - both physical actions towards spatial locations, and mental actions directed toward abstract goals - are metaphorically construed as journeys towards destinations" writes Johnson (p. 39). According to his LOCATION metaphor," ...those component actions are each small motions along paths, and they can be chained together to form larger paths, which constitute our more comprehensive purposeful actions" (p. 37). This leads us to the LONG-TERM PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS along life paths metaphor. This metaphor suggests that we may understand ourselves as starting out towards a given objective, getting sidetracked, perhaps even being led astray or loosing our way on the road,

then hopefully gaining sight of where we were headed and finally arriving at our original objective. He offers A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor as a dominant metaphor by which we make sense of our experience and structures our language. He writes:

> In our culture, living a life is conceived of as a massive purposeful activity made up of a huge number of intermediate actions directed toward various purposes... Since life is a long-term purposeful activity, it, too, is a journey. It has goals (=destinations), actions (= self-propelled motions), a course (= a path made up of smaller actions-paths chained together), difficulties (= impediments), progress (= keeping on course towards your destination), and so forth (p. 39).

These excerpts of the LOCATION version of the EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor reveal that we understand events in our lives metaphorically as motions along paths towards locations.

He identifies a parallel mapping of the EVENT STRUCTURE Metaphor: OBJECT mapping version. The OBJECT mapping metaphor proposes that we understand events metaphorically as actions

that give us possession of some object and that achieving a purpose through one's actions is understood metaphorically as acquiring an object. According to this mapping, a state or property is understood metaphorically as a possession: "She has a pleasant disposition," "He lost his virginity." He proposes that the change from one state to another is understood as losing or gaining an object, as in "He acquired a bad habit," "The candidate lost his composure" (p. 40). I can add, "She gained her confidence," and "He lost his bearings". The OBJECT mapping identifies causation as control over the loss or acquisition of a possessable object, such as a property or state of being. This is expressed in "He gave me the jitters" (p. 40). Within this mapping, the achievement of a purpose is metaphorically understood as loosing an undesirable object ("He got rid of that flu virus") and acquiring the desired object ("He found joy," "He finally got some satisfaction").

Johnson presents the CAUSAL TRANSFER mapping as a transitive action from the source domain (transfer of objects) to target domain (causation). According to this mapping, a cause or agent gives an effect to the affected party. In conventional language this underlying metaphor is revealed by expressions which include, "That noise gave me a headache," "She gets her disposition and red hair from her father," "I

could not take her verbal abuse any longer!" (p. 41). Should the object received or given be understood as a commercial object, the CAUSATION IS A COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION metaphor is offered. This mapping consists of three metaphos and is considered of central importance to our moral understanding (p. 41). The CAUSATION IS A COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION mapping includes:

1. CASUAL TRANSFER (as aforementioned)

2. WELL-BEING IS WEALTH: Well-being is understood metaphorically as the possession of many valuable commodities. Money can represent a surrogate for such commodities as represented by the expressions, "Music has enriched my life," "Pessimists lead impoverished lives".

3. EXCHANGE FOR VALUE: An object, actual or metaphorical, is worth what someone is willing to give in exchange for it, either in terms of other commodities or money (p. 41).

This three pronged metaphor identified above "creates a realm of exchange, debt, credit and balance within our physical and social interactions" (p. 41). It puts forth the idea that any event/object which increases one's sense of wellness is understood metaphorically as an event/object that

gives one money. Linguistic evidence of such includes, "He profited from the experience," "She was enriched by the relationship," (p. 41). The loss of wellness and increased suffering is reciprocally understood as financial loss as seen in "He paid for his mistake tenfold" and "Her rudeness cost her job". Additionally, it is understood that causing detrimental effects is the taking of money: "The wind robbed him of that gold medal," "Reckless skiing cost her a leg". Causing beneficial effects is understood as the giving of money: "He bought her some time with his antics," and "They paid me with gratitude for my efforts." Johnson contends that the notion of causation based on monetary conceptualization leads to the commercial interpretation of our fundamental social and moral interactions. He declares "In our social and moral worlds people's actions affect the well-being of themselves and of others. These effects on a person's well-being are understood as increasing or decreasing their wealth" (p. 42). He argues that our fundamental concepts concerning action are metaphorically structured. The relevance of this to our conception of morality is such that "every moral concept that is in any way connected to action turns out to be metaphorical. This includes our conceptions of will, rights, duties, obligations, moral debt and moral credit" (p. 40).

What follows from this is his SOCIAL ACCOUNTING metaphor which suggests that actions create debts or earn credits towards others. This metaphoric mapping provides a framework within which we have rights and duties in terms of credit and debts owed. The mapping of the SOCIAL ACCOUNTING metaphor is as follows:

Financial Domain		Social Domain
Wealth	>	Well-Being
Getting money	>	Achieving a purpose
Earning money	>	Achieving a purpose by honest toil
Payment	>	Actions that increase well-being
Debts	>	Duties
Letters of credit	>	Rights
Debtor	>	Person with duty
Creditor	>	Person with I.O.U.
Inexhaustible credit	>	Inalienable rights
Contract	>	Exchange of rights

Johnson claims that rights and duties are metaphorically defined based on what is revealed in this mapping (p. 42). Let us return to the OBJECT version of the EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor which can also be appropriated to the notions of rights and duties as objects. If we consider rights and

duties as objects, then being in possession of a right is being in possession of a letter of credit (as an I.O.U.). This possession allows access to a desired object. This object can be a state (of being) or an action one can perform. It follows that when one has a right to a desired object, others have a duty not to block one's access to the possession of that object. He states, "They have a debt to you, which you have a right to collect on. They owe you whatever you have a right (i.e., a metaphorical I.O.U.) to" (p. 42).

Let us apply this idea of rights and duties as objects to the LOCATION metaphor. According to the LOCATION mapping metaphor, a purpose is destination and action is movement along a path. When considering rights and duties, this gives rise to the notion that rights are RIGHTS-OF-WAY. A RIGHT-OF-WAY suggests that there are (action) paths we are able to pursue without any interference in our movement towards our destination (= purpose). Metaphorically then, there are some paths we ought to be able to pursue without being blocked by others on the basis that their duty (what they owe us) is not to place barriers in our way on our specified (action) path.

Johnson suggests that there exists a parallel in both the LOCATION and OBJECT mappings where it is one's right which offers one access to the desired end and that there is

relative motion between the person and the specified end (p. 43). This is why we are considered to have a right to something. In the LOCATION mapping, a right as a RIGHT-OF-WAY allows the sojourner access to the destination (purpose). In the OBJECT mapping, one gains access to either money or a valuable commodity as a surrogate (purpose). In both these versions it is people who have rights and towards whom we have duties. However, Johnson contends that since our conception of personality is metaphorically defined and can be appropriated to other agents, we can understand ourselves as having duties and having debts towards anything to which we can attribute personality (p. 43). Johnson acknowledges that our Western tradition recognizes duties to particular persons, to society (SOCIETY IS A PERSON metaphor) and to God (as having personality).

He offers a version of the SOCIAL ACCOUNTING metaphor called the MORAL ACCOUNTING metaphor. The former defined what it is to have right and duties. The latter is intended to explain dimensions of moral experience. It is a framework which "defines procedures for determining what we "owe" others and what they "owe" us" (p. 44). The MORAL ACCOUNTING metaphor is as follows:

Commodity Transactions		Moral Interaction
Objects, Commodities	>	Deeds (actions), states
Utility or value of objects	>	Moral worth of actions
Wealth	>	Well-being
Accumulation of goods	>	Increase in well-being
Profitable = causing increase in wealth	>	Moral= causing increase in well-being
Unprofitable= causing decrease in wealth	>	Immoral = causing decrease in well-being
Money (surrogate for goods)	>	Well-being
Giving/taking money or commodities	>	Performing moral/immoral deeds
Account of transactions	>	Moral account
Balance of account	>	Moral balance of deeds
Debt	>	Moral debt = owing something good to another
Credit	>	Moral credit = others owe you something good
Fair exchange/payment	>	Justice

Johnson cites several conventional expressions revealing this metaphorical system as present in our conceptualizations (p. 46). Some of these expressions include:

1. Deeds/states are objects in transactions:

   In return for our kindness, she gave us nothing but trouble.

   Can somebody give me a hand?

2. Well-being is wealth:

   I have had a rich life.

   As a result of her illness, her life is impoverished.

3. Moral account is record of transactions:

   His despicable lying counts against him in my book.

   Don't judge him so harshly-take into account all of the good things he has done.

4. Moral balance is a balance of transactions:

   One good turn deserves another.

   His noble deeds outweigh his sins.

5. Doing moral deeds is accumulating credit:

   We all owe you so much for all you've done tonight.

   She certainly deserves credit for her exemplary behaviour.

6. Benefitting from moral deeds is accumulating debts:

   I owe you my life!

   He is indebted to her for her help.

   Much obliged.

7. Doing immoral deeds is accumulating debt:

   I owe you a great deal for the hurt I've cause you.

   He owes a debt to society for his crimes.

I will now address his metaphors for MORAL CHARACTER which he claims we use in our deliberations and judgements concerning moral character. Johnson cites three clusters by which we tend to articulate the tension in morality as the battle between good/evil; between the higher /lower parts of ourselves.

The first is Power/Control which is represented by the linguistic expressions: "The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak"; "Control your rage"; "She has strong moral character". The second is Uptightness which denotes the category encompassing the good "high" moral self, and the bad, immoral "low" self. This is evident in expressions such as : "That theft was a dirty, low-down act on your part"; "He fell into disgrace because of his actions"; "Paul is so high-minded". The third is Purity/Pollution which embodies the idea that the moral, rational self is "high" and must exercise control over the "lower" self as it is associated with passions, desires and the body. Conventional language revealing this cluster include: "Pornography pollutes the mind"; "Reading that filthy trash will ruin her good character"; "He claims those dirty acts are beyond his control"; and "She was washed clean from sin" (p. 50).

The linguistic evidence presented by Johnson seems to

reveal that conventional discourse we use to discuss ethical issues is one manifestation of the underlying metaphors by which we conceptualize moral issues.

3.3 Metaphors as Prescriptions for Our Thoughts and Actions

Johnson claims that metaphor is operative at another, more concrete level of our moral understanding. He suggests that the way in which we interpret or understand a particular situation will give rise to the conceivable options of actions available to us. He argues that our understanding typically involves several metaphorical concepts and expands on this through the work of Naomi Quinn (p. 53). Quinn (1987) concerns herself with the way in which individuals organize and understand their marriages, and how they act based on their understandings. Quinn discovered a number of systematic metaphorical mappings that underlie peoples' conception and experience of their marriage. Prominent metaphors for marriage noted by Quinn include MARRIAGE IS AN INVESTMENT, MARRIAGE IS AN ONGOING JOURNEY, MARRIAGE IS MANUFACTURED OBJECT (Johnson, 1993, p. 53).

For example, the MARRIAGE IS AN ONGOING JOURNEY metaphor, which Johnson cites as a specific case of the LONG TERM-PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS metaphor, is the conceptual

structure influencing conventional expressions, such as "We've just started out in our marriage," "They have come a long way in their sense of marital responsibilities," "They're just spinning their wheels and going nowhere fast," and "Their marriage is at dead end" (p. 53). He observes that the language we use seems conventionalized to the extent that it does not seem evidently metaphorical in nature. However, it would not be possible for us to understand the language without presupposing the metaphorical systems (i.e. MARRIAGE IS AN ONGOING JOURNEY) from which that language is generated. "Such systematic metaphors," writes Johnson, "reach deep down into our experience and understanding of marriage, and so they involve consequences for action in our daily lives" (p. 54). He offers these findings as evidence in support of his claim that our understanding of marriage (as a moral issue) is metaphorical and influences our actions.

Robert Sternberg, Professor of Education and Psychology at Yale University, offers additional evidence supporting the claim that our moral understanding is imaginative and metaphoric in nature. He speaks to our metaphoric moral understanding with respect to relationships. In Love is a Story (1998), Sternberg conceives of a "new theory of relationships" based on 26 types of stories (and consequently, the metaphors they entail) concerning our understanding of

love and relationships. These metaphors influence our expectations of a relationship and contribute to possible courses of action. He suggests that one way of understanding couples' behaviour is to consider what kind of story each partner has about love (p. 165). He writes, "The story gives the relationship meaning in the context of our lives. Sometimes each partner in the relationship sees different meaning in the same actions or events, because each interprets the actions or events in terms of a different story" (p. 7). Sternberg offers 26 narratives by which he suggests people conceptualize their idea of love and understand their relationships. These narratives include the cookbook story (suggesting that love is based on a recipe containing all necessary ingredients for a successful relationship) and the history story (where the present is defined in a large part by the past). He suggests that we are able to redefine our relationships by rewriting our stories; "That love is a story closes off no options to us; instead, it makes us aware of the infinite options we can create as we write the stories of our lives and loves" (p. 229). This is yet another example of how metaphor is operative at the level of our interpretation and conception of issues of moral import.

Metaphors can provide the means by which inferences are justified, actions are sanctioned and goals are outlined.

Metaphors entail a number of attitudes, beliefs, expectations, and behaviours that influence one' conception and actions in living the moral dimension of experience. Metaphor can function as a moral ideal and generate moral obligations influencing our behaviour. Metaphors are, in many ways, prescriptive of how a moral situation should proceed. For instance, embedded in the MARRIAGE IS AN ONGOING JOURNEY metaphor, consequences for action may include goals for the marriage, expectations concerning oneself and one's spouse, criteria for evaluating the marriage, and the range of (morally) acceptable activities and responses suggested or sanctioned by the underlying metaphorical system.

To illustrate how metaphors are prescriptions for thoughts and actions Johnson presents several metaphors which represented the basis for one man's understanding of his 13 year old marriage. Upon entry, Alex understood his marriage as MARRIAGE AS A RESOURCE/INVESTMENT metaphor. This entailed that he understood marriage as a means by which to address his needs and wants, and to ensure for the needs of his spouse. This obligation was understood as part of the commitment of marriage. Further along in the relationship, his understanding and ideas concerning his marriage shifted and a new metaphor revealed itself: MARRIAGE IS AN ORGANIC UNITY. Johnson elaborates that this metaphor suggests several entailments

such as (1) Spouses no longer exist as separate identities but are interdependent, (2) As interdependent, each spouse must accept certain constraints on his/her freedom (which did not exist prior to their fused identity) (3) Shared experience is required for the maintenance of the relationship, and (4) There exist justified expectations of mutual aid, support, consistency and comfort (p. 56). These new entailments come into play in our moral deliberations, consequently affecting our actions. The entailments of a specific metaphor for a specific person in a given circumstance are unique. The emergence of a new conception pushes the previous metaphor into the background of understanding, and redefines it within the context of the new metaphor.

Indeed one's conception of marriage would be quite different from Alex's should it be understood as MARRIAGE IS A PLAYGROUND (suggesting enhanced freedom and limited responsibility); MARRIAGE IS A WALK ON SLIPPERY ROCKS (suggesting a path of ongoing instability characterised by unexpected events); MARRIAGE IS A GARDEN (to be patiently tended to and nurtured), or MARRIAGE IS WAR (where battles are an expected and exciting part of the relationship). Changes in our conceptual systems do change what is real for us; it affects how we perceive the world and consequently how we act on those perceptions. It is in this sense that I understand

that "New metaphors have the power to create a new reality" (Johnson & Lakoff, 1980, p. 145).

In contrast, Camille Paglia uses metaphor when addressing the controversial date rape issue. She argues for women to accept full personal responsibility for their lives in general and the dating experience in particular. Her argument, as presented in Sex, Art, and American Culture (1992) rests on a series of analogies. Regardless of their appropriateness for the issue at hand, these metaphors play a valuable role in giving form to her position. For example, Paglia blames the feminist movement for portraying women in a certain way that is naive to reality. She says:

It is this whole stupid feminist thing about how we are basically nurturing, benevolent people, and sex is a wonderful thing between two equals. With that kind of attitude, then of course rape is going to be a total violation of your entire life, because you have a stupid, naive, Mary Poppins view of life to begin with. Sex is a turbulent power that we are not in control of; it's a dark force (p. 65).

She contends that feminists would say, "Sex is naturally good. It's nice and happy, Betty Crocker time" (p. 66). Betty

Crocker and Mary Poppins conjure up images of something
benevolent, wholesome, even freshly baked - which is assumed
to be sex in this case. "Rape", Paglia writes, "is one of the
risk factors in getting involved with men.   It is a risk
factor.   It's like driving a car.   My attitude is, it's like
gambling" (p. 63). "Every date is a gamble " (p. 74). Paglia
understands that rape is one of the possible outcomes of the
gambling/dating game; if you accept the chance to roll the
dice (or accept a date), then you must accept the consequences
of that throw, even if it forces you out of the game.

Paglia suggests that blaming the victim is appropriate
when the victim has behaved stupidly (p. 56).   She illustrates
this with an analogy she suggests parallels the issue:

We have the right to leave our purse on a park
bench in Central Park and go play twenty-five feet
away and hope the purse is going to be there when
we return, okay? Now, this is just simply stupid
behaviour... You may have the right to leave your
purse there, you may have the right to dress in
that way, but you are running a risk (pp. 72-73).

Paglia's position is that women must accept personal
responsibility for the dating experience and for the risks

inherent in that experience. He argument makes use of analogies which are designed to help illustrate her argument. While I am unsure if her choice of analogies successfully illustrates her point, it is clear that these analogies do illustrate her understanding of date rape. My point here is that her argument (regardless of her position) is fuelled by analogies. Despite the questionnable appropriateness of such analogies, Paglia gets her point across through the use of various metaphors which relay the way she thinks about the issue of date rape. In responding to her position, therefore, we must examine the metaphors more closely. In conceiving of alternative interpretations of date rape, we must consider alternative metaphors. This is the work of the moral imagination.

On the influence of metaphor in language education, Postman (1995) talks about an exercise he participated in assigned by I.A Richards during a seminar. Participants were divided into three groups, given an opening sentence and then asked to write a paragraph describing language. The sentences provided by Richards included: Language is like a river; Language is like a tree; Language is like a building. Notably, all the paragraphs were developed from different perspectives. One group concerned themselves with the rivers and floods of language, one with the roots and branches, and

one with the foundations and structure of language (pp. 185-186). The discussion following this exercise "centered on how metaphors control what we say, and to what extent what we say controls what we see" (p. 186). This kind of exercise can be applied to moral education with the aim of examining our underlying assumptions concerning issues of moral import.

Dr. Ronald Morris uses metaphors in teaching a course on Values and Human Sexuality at McGill University. In one exercise, he provides students with several metaphors and asks them to choose and create a metaphor which best describes their understanding of a good relationship. Metaphors offered by Morris include A GOOD RELATIONSHIP IS LIKE... A DANCE, A ROLLERCOASTER RIDE, AN OASIS and THE STEADY FLAME OF A FIREPLACE. The goal of this exercise is to help students' gain a degree of awareness concerning their understanding of a good relationship and to explore what assumptions their understanding entails. According to Morris, the multiple layers of interpretation and meaning expressed by metaphors can generate substantial discussion on the nature or qualities of a good relationship (personal conversation, May 13, 1998; cf. Morris, 1997).

Johnson's metaphorical mappings suggest our conception of rights, duties, actions, purposes and laws are metaphorically

defined by several systems of metaphor. It seems that our ideas concerning justice, as moral accounting, and our assessment of moral character are also metaphorically defined. The linguistic evidence reveals a metaphorical structure underlying our moral conceptions. Furthermore, metaphors operate at another level in our moral understanding. Metaphors prescribe our attitudes, beliefs, values, conceptions and expectations of moral situations. Metaphors also sanction possible ranges of actions and behaviours. Drawing from presented evidence, it seems possible and likely that our moral understanding is in fact, imaginative and metaphoric in nature. If this is conceivable, imagination and metaphor play a critical role in moral education.

> One of reasons metaphor is so basic for our moral understanding is that it combines these very dimensions of our embodied moral awareness - projection of possibilities, elation of feelings, imaginative reflection - that make it possible for us to have any degree of moral sensitivity in the first place (Johnson, 1993, p. 59).

Conclusion

This thesis has attempted to show that imagination is a
a valuable tool across the educational curriculum. As the
capacity to consider the possible beyond the actual,
imagination is active in our capacity for originality,
creativity and visualization. Imaginative learning is
engaging and pleasureable; it also effects enhanced memory.
Through imaginative activity inert facts can be transformed
into knowledge that is meaningful and alive. As interpretive
beings striving for (narrative) coherence in our experiences,
the richness of the imagination plays a crucial role in our
interpretation of human experience and our meaning-making
potential. Contemporary models for moral education notably
Kohlberg's Cognitive-Developmental model and Values
Clarification, emphasize moral reasoning skills and value
analysis respectively. These pervasive approaches neglect the
possible roles of imagination in our moral deliberations.

This thesis has attempted to show that imagination and
metaphor play significant roles in our moral deliberations.
Imagination actively influences our ability to perceive,
generate and envision different interpretations of a situation
with a richness of detail. Imagination also plays a large
part in our capacity for moral sensitivity. It is by means of

imaginative acts that we are able to take up the part of others for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of their experience, considering how various possible actions may effect ourselves and others and exploring possible courses of action open to us. These are important aspects of moral life. Imagination also enables us to extend ourselves imaginatively so we can learn from our past experiences and those of others. Imagination is involved in establishing the very conditions of objectivity and influences our capacity for transperspectivity. Imagination is key to our sense of freedom that is properly human and without which we would be doomed to habitual acts.

Moral education cannot be reduced to formal schooling. To suggest that educational institutions are the chief sites where moral education occurs is unrealistic. Rather, it would be prudent to adopt the "education as interaction" conceptualization proposed by Moran and explored in the introduction of this thesis. Moral education as interaction acknowledges that learning morality is what takes place during moments of observation and exchange between human beings and their environment. It is in these moments of interaction between children and peers, adults, communities, mass media, art and nature that experiences and relationships can serve as archs to build upon.

In chapter one Bettelheim offered that morality may best be conveyed in symbolic terms. Coles made the suggestion that images provided by narrative metaphors are more effective for moral education than theoretical arguments. Kilpatrick noted that stories communicate visions and where isues of moral import are concerned, the story suits our nature because we think more readily in pictures than in propositions. In chapter two Tappan offers that experience and action must be expressed and represented in signs if it is to have significant meaning for the individual. It seems that meaningful moral education can benefit from the use of symbolism, analogies and imagery. Metaphor, describing an object or action to which it is imaginatively but not literally applicable, can provide the opportunity for such symbolism. Metaphors can be both created and interpreted by students; new possibilities emerging from new metaphors.

Other disciplines employ metaphor as a means to access and convey understandings. Art therapists, for example, explore important issues at a conscious and unconscious level through the artwork of their clients. Children can reveal their perceptions (e.g. of family relationships) through various mediums including painting, drawing and sculpture. Therapists frequently use genograms as an objective family assessment device. A genogram is a structural diagram of a

multigenerational relationship system which symbolically maps out family history and kinship ties. From these symbolic mappings, family patterns and myths can become apparent. Perhaps it is because of the therapeutic value associated with these methods of employing metaphor that it is neglected by teacher "training" and consequently unfamiliar to teachers.

This thesis argues that metaphor has climbed from the ornamental fringes of discourse to a position contributing to the understanding of human understanding itself. This has implications relevant to both teachers and social workers. Consider that the oldest form of moral literature is the parable and the most common form of informal instruction is the anecdote; both are metaphors.

Linguistic evidence shows that the conventional language we use to talk about moral issues reveals underlying metaphorical systems that are indicative of ways in which we think about things. How we think about things, to some extent, controls what we can see. Metaphors also have the capacity to give form to arguments. Metaphors can provide the means by which inferences are justified, actions are sanctionned and goals are outlined. Through metaphor we can explore the underlying assumptions of our moral understanding. In this capacity metaphor is an invaluable device for

meaningful moral education.

Future teachers who are literate in metaphor gain additional tools to teach more effectively in a way that captures and runs with the interest and motivation of students. Future social workers and teachers could benefit from a reconceptualization of the potent roles of both imagination and metaphor in moral life. Social workers who are "metaphorically literate" can use their knowledge of this device for several purposes. Metaphor can be used to give form to social workers' positions in a way that may be understood by the child, meeting his imagination. Metaphors can also be used to reframe conceptualizations of situations (as illustrated in chapter three), opening possibilities for understandings that were previously inconceivable. Metaphorically literate social workers can gain insight into the moral lives of children as they interpret, and not dismiss, the metaphors children create and articulate. Social workers can also access underlying issues and understandings by listening for children's voices emerging through metaphor. Given these possibilities arising from engaging the imagination through metaphor, it seems wise to acknowledge the possible roles they play in moral life and moral education.

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